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A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems
Thomson, William (Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1978)
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https://hdl.handle.net/11299/54962
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Title
A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems
Authors
Issue Date
1978-10
Publisher
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
Type
Working Paper
Abstract
In his classic paper on the bargaining problem, Nash characterized the unique solution to satisfy a list of four axioms. A generalization of one of them, his independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, is proposed. In conjunction to the other three, it is shown to yield a whole class of new solutions. Examples are provided. The most general reformulation of the axiom is incompatible with single-valuedness of solutions; solution correspondences are then defined and an existence result is provided.
Appears in collections
Center for Economic Research Discussion Papers [323]
Previously Published Citation
Thomson, W., (1978), "A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems", Discussion Paper No. 103, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Series/Report Number
Discussion Paper
103
Suggested Citation
Thomson, William. (1978). A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems. Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota. Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/54962.
Content distributed via the University of Minnesota's Digital Conservancy may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.