Title
A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems
Publisher
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
Abstract
In his classic paper on the bargaining problem, Nash characterized
the unique solution to satisfy a list of four axioms. A generalization
of one of them, his independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom,
is proposed. In conjunction to the other three, it is shown to yield a
whole class of new solutions. Examples are provided.
The most general reformulation of the axiom is incompatible with
single-valuedness of solutions; solution correspondences are then defined
and an existence result is provided.
Previously Published Citation
Thomson, W., (1978), "A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems", Discussion Paper No. 103, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Suggested Citation
Thomson, William.
(1978).
A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems.
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy,
https://hdl.handle.net/11299/54962.