Title
The Effect of Punishing "Over-Contributors" on Overall Welfare: Some Experimental Evidence
Abstract
A public goods environment was constructed to simulate a dilemma in which corporate managers choose between acts of corporate social responsibility and acts of profitability. An experiment was conducted to determine the effect of a penalty for contributing above a specific level. The penalty has significant effects, encouraging free riding and suppressing contributions at all levels, even though most contributions would not have triggered the penalty.
Description
University of Minnesota M.S. thesis. July 2015. Major: Applied Economics. Advisor: Terry Hurley. 1 computer file (PDF); vii, 67 pages.
Suggested Citation
Biesanz, Zachary.
(2015).
The Effect of Punishing "Over-Contributors" on Overall Welfare: Some Experimental Evidence.
Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy,
https://hdl.handle.net/11299/174742.