PRODUCING THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY:
ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE MAKING OF THE WORLD

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If meaningful transatlantic intellectual conversations are to develop that do not replicate the earlier infamous exploitative slave triangle, all of us need to reflect more seriously and self-critically than we are often inclined to do on the integrity and impact of our scholarly production and positions. If the ideas and images we create and circulate only serve to pathologize and disempower the peoples and societies we study, then perhaps it is time to move on to other pursuits.

—Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (1997)

…different histories make for different presents, [that is] *why oneness of the world cannot be assumed to be a sameness… But unless we are to reproduce an impoverished vision of colonial vintage, we cannot think of global knowledge as a permanent trade-mark of advanced countries with its results transported elsewhere as turnkey projects. Concrete contradictions require an understanding of concrete processes…*

—Mahmood Mamdani (2007)

So we are merely concerned with filling in a 'gap' between theory and practice on a particular point. We are not setting Marxism any imaginary or subjective problem… No. The problem posed exists (and has existed) in the form of a difficulty signaled by Marxist practice. Its solution exists in Marxist practice. So we only have to express it theoretically. But this simple theoretical expression *of a solution that exists in a practical state cannot be taken for granted: it requires a real theoretical labour… So this* simple *theoretical 'expression' implies both the* production *of a knowledge and the* critique *of an illusion, in one movement.*

—Louis Althusser (1970)

INTRODUCTION:
RE-WORLDING "THE GLOBAL"

In 1789 Jeremy Bentham coined the term "international" to explain a possible jurisprudence that was neither national nor provincial, but rather addressed "the mutual transactions between sovereigns" (Bentham 1948, 327). In the centuries since Bentham's invention, "the international" has produced new forms of social, political, and economic life, new institutions of governance, new discourses of commerce and war, and new fields of academic inquiry. This new object of study flourished because, on the one hand, it "resonated of a growing trend" of its day, i.e. "the rise of nation-states and cross-border transactions between them" (Scholte 2000, 43) while, on the other hand, it produced new ways of imagining social life.

"The international" now co-exists within a pantheon of terms designed to conceptualize those political, social, and economic realities transcending the provincial and the national. Marxist and anti-colonialists, for example, have invented the term "world-system" to explain relations of capital that forcibly entangle the previously colonized world within highly exploitative social relations expanding beyond the national economy. Advocates of liberal society, in contrast, invented "interdependence" and "transnationalism" to describe the integration of the world through free trade, deliberation, institutional cooperation, and democratic principles. However, since the 1990s, one concept—"globalization"—has become the dominant referent describing those social relations exceeding the provincial and the national. This term has, in a very short period, become the preferred vernacular of journalists, politicians, business leaders, activists, cultural figures, and military professionals. Globalization has similarly taken the academy by storm, serving as the common-sense description of the post-Cold War world. In less than two decades, a vast academic literature has emerged on globalization as well as numerous offshoot literatures on global governance, globalism, globality, global capitalism, and the global war on terrorism. As a consequence, globalization now exerts a firm grip on the way contemporary life is imagined.

While globalization was a highly debated concept in the mid- and late 1990s, today most social scientists no longer concern themselves with debating whether globalization exists or not, whether it is a new or old, how it should be defined, or whether it renders the

nation-state irrelevant. Instead, social scientists have increasingly turned to discussions of the seemingly more pressing issues of terrorism, state failure, human rights, the rise of China and India, humanitarianism, the looming environmental crisis, and growing economic inequality. These pressing political issues seem light years away from the optimistic predictions bandied about during the 1990s, when globalization was triumphant. The fact that academics have turned away from debating globalization, however, is not a sign that scholars have abandoned the concept. Rather the opposite is true; globalization no longer seems debatable. Bartelson, for example, argues that the "wide acceptance of globalization as a fact is *itself a social fact* worth investigating" (Bartelson 2000, 180). This dissertation attempts exactly that; it analyzes the social production of globalization's facticity.

I argue that globalization has been produced as a "social fact" despite being a vague and contradictory—and in many ways incoherent—term. Most scholars agree that globalization is a "complex" and constantly shifting thing. Many gripe about its uncanny ability to mean everything and nothing simultaneously. I argue that globalization remains a serviceable term in the social sciences because the literature also produces *the global imaginary*. The practices of writing books and articles, teaching, and designing curricula on globalization (i.e. the everyday activity within the university) produces an object—"the global"—that becomes the object to which the term globalization refers. In other words, academic knowledge produces "the global" as a discrete thing. The only problem is that "the global" is not actually a thing but rather an imaginary.

This dissertation, therefore, argues that globalization remains vague and poorly defined because "the global" is not an empirical object but rather an imaginary. I arrive at this argument by analyzing the contradictions and tensions within the academic literature on globalization. Bartelson rightly argues that "[u]nderstanding the ambiguity of the concept of globalization is crucial to understanding the emergence of globalization as a fact" (Bartelson 2000, 181). One of the most interesting ambiguities within the globalization literature is the tendency for scholars based in the United States and Europe to claim that globalization is a universal trend—while treating Africa and African states as anomalous. I argue that Africa is often represented as "not globalized" because African scholars have been structurally excluded from the production of knowledge about globalization. On the one hand, the U.S. academy is a key site for the mass production of knowledge about globalization—as exemplified by changes in research funding, the flourishing of Global Studies departments,

and the proliferation of study abroad programs in colleges and universities across the country. In contrast, African universities—including relatively resource-rich South African universities—are being remade into development institutions designed to respond to a world already imagined as "global." These asymmetrical relations of knowledge production mean that Africa is often represented as particular, exceptional and "local." "The global" *is* what it is not; "the global," in other words, *is the absence of Africa* (a point I make in Chapter 2). The fact that Africa is considered "not global," however, is an effect not of Africa lacking some essential quality (the presence of which would make it "global") but rather an effect of the structural relations of knowledge production.

In short, this dissertation makes two fundamental and intertwined arguments. First, I argue that academic knowledge produces the world. Instead of treating academic knowledge as simply the findings arrived at by objective minds housed in ivory towers perched above the world below, I recognize universities and academics as already part of the world. The producers of knowledge—and the sites in which we work—are just as real, material, and worthy of study as the sweatshops, boardrooms, battlefields, political parties, politicians. or any other thing that serves as an object of social scientific study. This realization means that slashed university budgets, a dependence on private funding (tuition, private foundations, etc.), the development of new centers and programs, the economic constraints on libraries, growing workloads and employment instability, the pressures of professionalization and tenure, changes in funding priorities, a focus on careerism and "time to degree" as well as differences between wealthy and economically distraught institutions all shape what knowledge is produced, by whom and for what purpose. The structural transformation of higher education, in other words, affects how the world is produced. Because academic knowledge is not divorced from the world but structured by it, academic knowledge does not simply represent the world as it "really" is but produces the world. Treating the academy as immanent to the world requires that academic knowledges—especially that knowledge making universal claims about what is "global"—be provincialized (Chakrabarty 2000).[1] To

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[1] Chakrabarty argues post-colonial theory can navigate the tension of an unrelenting commitment to both Marxism and "difference." For Chakrabarty, this possibility is rooted in Marx's "critical distinction" between "real" and "abstract" labor (Chakrabarty 1996, 59). Real labor "belongs to a world of heterogeneity whose various temporalities cannot be enclosed in the sign History" (Chakrabarty 1996, 60) while abstract labor, or labor power, is the homogenous abstraction of lived labor. The writing of history is, for Chakrabarty, the attempt to close the gap between real and abstract labor by producing difference—"just as 'real' labor cannot be thought outside of the problematic of 'abstract' labor, subaltern history canot [sic] be thought outside of the

accomplish this task, I situate the academic literature on globalization within the structured material relations in which it is produced.

The second main argument of the dissertation concerns the asymmetrical relations of academic knowledge production. The Leftist academic politics of self-critique has in recent decades provided many insights but few weapons. Today, many critical approaches to the social sciences remain marginal, insular, and highly abstracted. Furthermore, when critical scholars conceptualize politics in terms of changing individual minds (through teaching and writing) rather than building political power, we position ourselves to be ignored by those we target for critique. In anthropology, history, and comparative politics, for example, James Ferguson argues that the critique of "Africa" as a homogenous and knowable thing has brought into being much academic work deconstructing Africa and highlighting difference and plurality. These arguments, however, have been sidelined to near irrelevance during a historical moment in which many academics, journalists, and policy-makers continue to make broad—and often profoundly problematic and racist—claims about "Africa" as a place of enduring, uncontainable, and impenetrable "crisis" (Ferguson 2006, 3). In other words, an academic politics based on self-critique has, in effect, become wrapped up in itself without examining how such knowledge is—and can better be—put to the services of political struggles already overdetermined by structured relations. Therefore, instead of deconstructing the global imaginary, I argue that "the global" needs to be situated within the political economy of higher education. Doing so not only unmasks the claim that globalization represents a universal reality but also recognizes that better, more stylized critiques are not the solution. Instead, scholars seeking to develop radical and alternative ways to conceptualize "the global" must also engage in the politics of reimagining and reworking the university.

I believe that the project of arguing for the materiality of knowledge and knowledge production is strengthened through comparative analysis. There currently exists an extensive and exciting literature examining the crisis of the American academy. However, studying how non-U.S. academies are structured helps unearth the profound asymmetries structuring the production of the global imaginary. For this contrapuntal analysis I examine the

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global narrative of capital…though it is not grounded in this narrative" (Chakrabarty 1996, 62). The goal of this dissertation is to show how "the global" is often treated as a homogenous whole when instead it should be understood as a product of real labor inscribed within structured material relations of academic knowledge production.

differences between the U.S. and South African academies. I argue that while academics in the United States are structurally situated to produce the global imaginary—both at the level of expert knowledge and in the training of practitioners empowered to administer "the global"—the post-apartheid South African university has largely imported an image of the world as already global. This perspective can be seen in the rapid shift in post-apartheid South Africa when the conception of the university as a site for social redistribution was quickly displaced by a conception of the university as a site for enabling South Africa to adapt to a "global knowledge economy." Juxtaposing the U.S. and South African academies, in short, makes it possible to see the global imaginary not as a universal fact, but instead as a parochial vision of the world that—like the colonial imaginary of "civilization"—has profound consequences. I argue that the political project of struggling for a more equitable and accessible university creates the conditions for imagining the world in different, more radical ways. To make this point I examine Mamdani's intervention into the debate over university transformation at the University of Cape Town.

"THE GLOBAL" AND *THE WORLD*

To make the argument that "the global" is an imaginary produced within structured material relations I first draw a distinction between *the world* and "the global."[2] I argue that *the world* is material, contradictory, contains radical differences and antagonisms, and therefore cannot be known as a totality. The translation of lived material experiences into knowledge is itself a social process immanent to the world. In other words, the real world—drawing on the Lacanian sense of "the real"—exists beyond symbolic representation. Appadurai makes this point when he argues that worlds are "imagined" and that "multiple worlds…are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups" (Appadurai 1996, 33). In Althusserian terms, the world can be though of as a social whole—the totality of social relations and their effects. The world, therefore, contains tensions, irreconcilable

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[2] It should be noted that I put "the global" in scare quotes and *the world* in italics for a very particular reason. The proliferation of scare quotes in the social sciences is a sign that their use has become self-cautionary rather than indicative of critical engagement. Many scholars place every term that could possibly be pounced upon as problematic within scare quotes as a purely defensive precaution. By placing "the global" in scare quotes, however, I am retaining the critical impetus—I am drawing attention to "the global" as a complex and reified concept that I am engaging in the world of dissecting and troubling. Italics, in contrast, are used to highlight a term or concept that this project uses to make an important theoretical move. Once the term is explained and used a number of times the italics are removed, thereby integrating it into the argument's prose. Althusser uses this method quite successfully.

contradictions, and competing regimes of meaning making. The world is plural, open, and continually being produced and reproduced.

"The global," in contrast, is a referent claiming to represent the world in its entirety. While various texts in the globalization literature represent "the global" differently, in most cases the general logic remains the same: the particular becomes universalized such that it stands in for an abstract whole. I argue, therefore, that "the global" is just one way of imagining the world. However, the assumed facticity of "the global" indicates the degree to which it has become "the world of the official mind" (Appadurai 1996, 33). This dissertation attempts to re-world "the global" by diagnosing its contradictions and tensions, analyzing the structural relations in which it is produced, and, finally, providing a specific examples of how "the global" has been re-worlded within the South African academy.

Jean-Luc Nancy best describes the distinction between the world and "the global" in his book *The Creation of the World* or *Globalization*. In the preface to the English version Nancy points out that the French term *mondialisation* is "quite difficult to translate" due to "the fact that the English term *globalization* has already established itself in the areas of the world that use English for contemporary information exchange" (Nancy 2007, 27). While *mondialisation* (roughly translated to "world-forming") and *globalization* might appear similar, there are a number of important distinctions. Nancy argues that globalization

> designates, in French, a more abstract process leading to a more compact result: the "global" evokes the notion of a totality as a whole, in an indistinct integrality. Thus, there has been in the English *globalization* the idea of an integrated totality, appearing for example with the "global village" of McLuhan, while *mondialisation* would rather evoke an expanding *process* throughout the expanse of the *world* of human beings, cultures, and nations. (Nancy 2007, 27-28)

Raffoul and Pettigrew clarify this distinction when they write that *mondialisation* "maintains a crucial reference to the world's horizon, as a space of human relations, as a space of meaning held in common, a space of signification or of possible significance" while "globalization is a process that indicates an 'enclosure in the undifferentiated sphere of a unitotality'" (Introduction to: Nancy 2007, 2). *Mondialisation*, in other words, describes how worlds are collectively fashioned as places of shared meaning, co-constituted through the lived practices of mediating social relations and creating collective standards of meaning and value—an ontological claim that a world is constantly and collectively constructed. In contrast, "the global" rests upon the ontological claim that social life comprises what Nancy calls a "unitotaliy": an already established and knowable thing. Nancy argues that the ability to

declare the world "global" depends upon an *onto-theological perspective* through which the immanent world becomes understood as a transcendent singularity. An onto-theological perspective—a human articulation of God-like omniscience—makes the world appear as having only a singular meaning. Understanding globalization as a fact, therefore, forecloses the possibility of "world-making," since "the global" imposes the meaning of the world from outside, i.e. from the assumed givenness of globalization.

At stake in this distinction is whether social life is conceptualized as open or closed. Nancy writes, "each of the terms carries with it an interpretation of the process, or a wager on its meaning and future. This distinction also means that it is understandable that *mondialisation* preserves something untranslatable while *globalization* has already translated everything in a global idiom" (Nancy 2007, 28). The world, in other words, is an analytical placeholder for the unknowable openness of lived practices, practices that are—within very real limits—constantly making and re-making the social world. In contrast, "the global"— using Nancy's language—offers an "idiom" of translation: a term used to aggregate various lived worlds into a single objectively knowable reality. Within the world of higher education, contested ways of making meaning become transformed into a single "global" and subjected to practices of knowledge production that fetishize knowability and obscure complexity.

In order to study social relations as world-making, scholars must first take seriously competing practices of meaning-making. The social sciences, however, tend to marshal methodology and evidence to produce knowledge based on an onto-theological foundation. To develop a social science that treats academic knowledge as world-making, I offer Althusser's analysis of knowledge as produced immanent to, rather than transcendent from, the world. Unlike Nancy, I focus on the profoundly asymmetrical relations of knowledge production within which "the global" is produced. Playing out Nancy's critical distinction between world-making and "the global" in an Althusserian vernacular provides a language for explaining how academic knowledge produces "the global" within highly asymmetrical relations of knowledge production.

The argument that the academy can be thought of as a site of world-making challenges a number of cherished claims within the social sciences, namely the belief that academic knowledge stands apart from the world and simply reflects upon phenomena existing "out there." A blind devotion to this onto-theological perspective, however, means that certain aspects of the social world—such as the global imaginary—remain unnoticed. In

order to study academic knowledge in terms of its production requires finding alternative methodologies and conceptions of causality. In this way, this dissertation can also be read as a methodological study seeking to lay the foundation of an immanent social sciences—that is, a social sciences that understands itself not as removed from the world but instead intimately bound to its production.

"AFRICA" AND THE WORLD

The distinction between the world and "the global" is not new to the social sciences. In fact, some scholars have similarly argued that the social sciences often represent "Africa" (like "the global") as a rarified object of study—an object predicated on similarity and homogeneity rather than heterogeneous and contradictory practices of meaning-making. These scholars argue that "Africa" is too often taken as an already fixed, closed, and knowable object rather than as a site constituted through lived material practices, including the practices of shared meaning-making (Ferguson 2006; Mbembe 2001; Mudimbe 1988; Mudimbe 1994). These arguments have responded to the scholarly treatment of "Africa" as an object studied as a fixed thing—a thing-in-crisis[3]—rather than the lived processes of world-making. Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall, for example, argue that scholars who ignore the complex histories, cultures, and lived material practices routinely manufacture "Africa" as a fixed object of study:

> …Africa as a name, as an idea, as an object of academic and public discourse has been, and remains fraught…Africa is not only perpetually caught and imagined within a web of difference and absolute otherness. More radically, the sign is fraught because Africa so often ends up epitomizing the intractable, the mute, the abject, or the other worldly. So overdetermined is the nature of this sign that it sometimes seems almost impossible to crack, to throw it open to the full spectrum of meanings and implications that other places and other human experiences enjoy, provoke, and inhabit. The obstinacy with which scholars in particular (including African scholars) continue to describe Africa as an object *apart from the world*…perpetually underplays the embeddedness in multiple elsewheres of which the continent actually speaks. (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004, 348)

In *On the Postcolony,* Mbembe similarly argues that "the literature of political science and development economics" often fails to treat "the African subject…like any other human being" who "engages in *meaningful acts*" (Mbembe 2001, 6; emphasis in original). As a result, meaning is assumed to take place not with the African subject but with those using complex

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[3] Ferguson writes: "In most accounts, scholarly as well as popular, Africa is understood in relentlessly negative terms. In relation to the global political economy, Africa is inevitably characterized by references to a series of lacks, failures, problems, and crises. Its states are 'weak,' 'poorly consolidated,' 'failed,' and 'dysfunctional': its economies 'underdeveloped,' 'collapsing,' and increasingly 'marginal' to the world" (Ferguson 2006, 8).

social scientific methods to see "what is really going on." Furthermore, approaching the study of Africa in this way is often not informed by the interests of African subjects but rather determined by "the demands of what is immediately useful, enclosed in the narrow horizon of 'good governance' and the neo-liberal catechism about the market economy" (Mbembe 2001, 7). Because this literature almost exclusively concerns itself with solving the problems of Africa, it expresses little interest in "comprehending the political in Africa or with producing knowledge in general" but focuses instead on "social engineering" such that knowledge produced about Africa within the social sciences tends to be "dogmatically programmatic" while "interpretations are almost always cavalier, and what passes for argument is almost always reductionist" (Mbembe 2001, 7). "Africa," in other words, is most often presented as a unitotality within the social sciences—a single space within which known activity (corruption, violence, poverty, etc.) takes place and which needs to be studied by social scientists in order to provide solutions to problems taking place "over there."

Some scholars, however, have opted for presenting Africa not as a thing-in-crisis but rather as a "place-in-the-world" (Ferguson 2006, 6). Therefore, instead of treating Africa as a defined geographical space, Ferguson contends that Africa should instead be thought of as "a category through which a 'world' is structured—a category that (like all categories) is historically and socially constructed" (Ferguson 2006, 3). This perspective does not imply that "Africa" is not real. It is precisely because "Africa" is a contested, complex reality that it cannot be reduced to analytical simplification and must instead be treated as a lived, contradictory and political world. As such, Africa is "a category within which, and according to which, people must live" (Ferguson 2006, 5).

In the spirit of Ferguson's argument, references to Africa made in this dissertation are not attempts to portray Africa or African countries as stagnate items to be poked and prodded by social scientists seeking to find their inner meaning. Instead, I take Africa to be a constantly changing and contradictory set of social meanings; a "place-in-the-world" the production of which has very real political stakes.

RE-WORLDING "THE GLOBAL"

While the social sciences often treat both "Africa" and "the global" as fixed objects rather than complex worlds, the similarity ends there. Unlike "Africa," which is understood in primarily negative terms, "the global" is presented as an unavoidable, universal, and largely

desirable fact. While "the global" is represented as a reality to which every nation and every person must adapt, "Africa" is presented as "local" and a malady to be protected against. This dissertation attempts to show that, like Ferguson's effort to treat "Africa" as a place-in-the-world, "the global" can be similarly provincialized. I call this process *re-worlding "the global."*

Re-worlding "the global" within the academic production of social scientific knowledge requires methods of reading and writing that are capable of capturing academic knowledge as producing a world. On the one hand, reading and writing are the daily practices through which social scientific knowledge is produced. On the other hand, unlike our colleagues in the humanities, social scientists rarely examine these practices. This absence undoubtedly stems from a widespread commitment to an assumption that social science reflects a world already existing "out there." Re-worlding "the global," therefore, requires developing alternatives theories of reading and writing. Mbembe and Nuttall suggest that social scientists should look to the humanities for clues on how to approach "Africa" not as a fixed, foreclosed object but instead as a lived, constantly transforming place comprising contested and shared meanings. They argue that the social science's lack of "openness toward the humanities" has fostered a limited "epistemological imagination" unable

> to pose questions about how we know what we know and what that knowledge is grounded upon; to draw on multiple models of time so as to avoid one-way causal models; to open a space for broader comparative undertakings; and to account for the multiplicity of the pathways and trajectories of change. (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004, 348-9)

Elsewhere Mbembe argues that scholars need to develop practices of self-writing that present Africa as a place of lived human practices.[4] Like those who illustrate how developing alternative practices of writing are necessary to present "Africa" as a world, I argue that similar attention to the practices of reading and writing offer a starting point for re-worlding "the global."

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[4] In "African Modes of Self-Writing" (2002), Mbembe argues that Africa is often presented as the passive receiver of history. Mbembe argues that the African subject should be re-written through a conception of "time as lived" rather than as an inhabiter of a geographical space called "Africa." In this way, the Africa subject can be written as engaging in meaningful acts such as witnessing, remembering, forgetting, and suffering. Mbembe's argument, however, has been widely critiqued by those who rightly argue that assuming social practices are contingent ignores the profound material obstacles constraining self-writing (Guyer 2002; Dirlik 2002). For example, Dirlik argues that even if Mbembe is right to criticize a teleological link between colonialism and contemporary violence, he nonetheless fails to recognize how, for example, the post-independence expansion of capitalism affects the writing of Africa within the present. This dissertation takes seriously Mbembe's call to find new ways of writing Africa (and "the global) while situating the practices of reading and writing within the structured material relations in which they occur.

This dissertation is organized around the twin projects of re-reading and re-writing "the global." Part One offers a re-reading of the academic literature on globalization with an eye toward its contradictions and tensions. Althusser's method of symptomatic reading allows me to argue that the globalization literature does not simply reflect an already global world but instead produces "the global" as an object of knowledge. Part Two experiments with developing alternative ways of writing social structure within the social sciences. Borrowing Edward Said's concept of the contrapuntal, the dissertation will juxtapose the U.S. and South African academies in order to produce knowledge about the structured relations of knowledge production.

A few methodological notes

To study academic knowledge as world-making I have made a number of methodological decisions. First, instead of taking "globalization" as my object of study, I start with an investigation of the academic literature on globalization. I define the academic literature on globalization as the various products of academic labor (journal articles, books, dissertations, conference papers, presentations, etc.) addressing the topic of globalization either directly or indirectly.[5] In studying the globalization literature, I have not limited my analysis in disciplinary terms. In other words, instead of approaching the Political Science literature or the International Relations literature on globalization, I focus instead on how the social sciences in general produce knowledge about globalization. While this approach risks offering a sweeping portrait of globalization not constrained by the focus and rigor of disciplinary convention, it makes it possible to identify how scholars across disciplines treat globalization is similar ways, namely as an empirically observable thing. That being said, this project—to its detriment—does not (with the exception of brief engagements in Chapters One and Two) attend to alternative feminist, poststructuralist, postmodernist, constructivist, or postcolonial understandings of globalization within the social sciences. Therefore, while I recognize that a commitment to globalization as referencing a fixed reality is hegemonic within the social sciences, I also recognize that it is by no means universal.

Secondly, I argue that globalization should not be treated as a concept but rather as, what Althusser calls, an object of knowledge. It could be argued that within the social

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[5] The academic literature on globalization refers specifically to the literature produced within the social sciences. There are considerable differences between how the social sciences and the humanities (not to mention the hard sciences) treat globalization. I often use *globalization literature* as shorthand.

sciences globalization operates as a concept (Goertz 2006; Sartori 1970) or even an essentially contested concept (Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu 2006). Concepts are abstractions that correspond to some aspect of the world being studied that make it possible to conduct social scientific research. For example, to find the relationships between democracy and war, scholars must first identify what the concepts "democracy" and "war" refer to. Globalization, however, does not operate as a concept because it constantly proves difficult, if not impossible, to define, classify, and measure. Sartori tackles a similar problem when identifying the problem of "conceptual stretching" (Sartori 1970, 1034).[6] Globalization is not a concept that has experienced considerable stretching; it is a term that claims to offer a universal representation. While most scholars approach the ambiguity of "globalization" as a conceptual problem, I argue instead that it is a symptom of the structural relations within which academic knowledge is produced.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

This project is divided into two parts. Part One develops a methodology for critically reading the academic literature on globalization while Part Two examines two sites—the U.S. and South African academies—in which academic knowledge is produced. Three methodological appendices develop my argument for how Althusser's work can create a social scientific method for studying academic knowledge in terms of production.

The first chapter documents the recent and rapid growth of an academic literature on globalization. I argue that this literature contains numerous contradictions and tensions, including reoccurring failures to define, measure, and classify globalization. Despite a profound lack of coherence within the literature, globalization is nonetheless presented as a concept that accurately describes the world. In many instances the assumed existence of a clear and self-evident "global" serves as the touch point for giving globalization its conceptual coherence. I conclude the chapter by arguing that globalization does not simply refer to a world existing "out there" but is instead an *object of knowledge*. This move presents

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[6] Sartori is most concerned about the ways the problem of comparison becomes even more pronounced when there is a "proliferation of political units." For example, the shift from 80 states in 1946 to 150 in 1970 poses serious problems those wishing to establish social scientific conceptual comparison (Sartori 1970). While Sartori's argument is specific to political science in general and the sub-discipline of comparative politics in particular, there is nothing specific to his argument that prevents the problematic identifies from being expanded to the social sciences more broadly.

the contradictions and tensions not as conceptual errors redeemable by better scholarship, but as symptoms of highly asymmetrical relations of academic knowledge production.

Taking globalization as an object of knowledge, the second chapter subjects four canonical works on globalization (Held et al. 1999; Sassen 1998; Stiglitz 2003; Appadurai 2000) to an Althusserian symptomatic reading. A symptomatic reading examines a text's absences in order to discover what the text actually produces. I argue that the absence of Africa within the academic literature on globalization produces "the global" as a particular experience that becomes universalized to describe a supposedly shared reality.

The third chapter argues that "the global" diagnosed in Chapters One and Two operates as an imaginary. After examining Castoriadis' (1987), Taylor's (2004), and Anderson's (2002) understandings of "the imaginary," I turn to Althusser's theorization of ideology as the reproduction of the means of production at the level of the imaginary. Understood as such, the global imaginary is not an ephemeral, fleeting, or ideational aspect of human life but rather an important dimension of social life shaping—and shaped by—highly asymmetrical relations of production within a material apparatus. In other words, the practices of writing books and articles, teaching classes, holding conferences, and opening centers on the topic of globalization within the apparatus of the contemporary university effectively produces the imaginary of the world as "global."

The Prelude to Part Two offers a methodological argument about how to write academic knowledge starting from the assumption that knowledge is an act of world-making. For this section, the dissertation references the work of the postcolonial theorist Edward Said (1993) to develop a method of contrapuntal writing. This method of writing starts from the assumption that knowledge is produced through the comparison of particular (and often dissimilar) objects rather than "like" objects, as is often assumed in the social sciences. This method of knowledge production informs my analysis of the U.S. and South African academies.

Chapter Four explores how the U.S. academy (and the University of Minnesota in particular) has been radically remade into a site for the production of the global imaginary. I show, for example, how the development of Global Studies departments, private funding initiatives, and the re-branding of universities as "global universities" create the material environment in which the mass production of "the global" becomes possible.

Chapter Five draws on fieldwork and archival research completed in Cape Town during the summer of 2007 to illustrate how African universities—even the relatively prosperous South African universities—are being remade into sites that often reproduce the global imaginary. The post-apartheid South African academy is being re-engineered to facilitate the incorporation of South Africa into a world already imagined as a "global knowledge economy." This chapter is followed by an Excursus exploring the 1998 curriculum debate between Mahmood Mamdani and a number of white academics concerning the teaching of Africa at the University of Cape Town (UCT). I argue that this debate can be read as a symptom of the restructuring of UCT within a world imagined as a "the global knowledge economy." Reading Mamdani's challenge to UCT's embrace of this global imaginary provides one example of how "the global" has been re-worlded within the South African academy.

Many of my theoretical claims about studying academic knowledge in terms of production are developed in three appendices at the end of this work. The first appendix introduces Althusser's critique of mechanical causality and explains what I mean when I argue that causality is overdetermined. The second appendix fleshes out the theoretical arguments behind Althusser's method of symptomatic reading and explains what it means to understand knowledge as produced within a conjuncture. The final appendix examines Althusser's understanding of Marxism as a science and explores how Althusser's analysis can be retooled to be relevant to the social sciences within the conjuncture of the 21st century university. These appendices can be read either as stand-alone pieces clarifying the dissertation's methodological backbone or as reference tools to flip to while reading the corresponding parts of the dissertation.

I have also included a glossary that can be used to help the reader work through Althusser's unique and often challenging terminology.

SECTION I: DIAGNOSING "THE GLOBAL"

PRELUDE:
DIAGNOSING THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON GLOBALIZATION

Freud argues that dream images do not simply correspond to a subject's waking life. A dream about wolves, for example, is neither simply the unconscious offering a random recounting of previous experiences nor an elaborate code corresponding to some already determined symbolic order. Instead, a dream is always overdetermined: The dream image is produced when the "residue of the day" mixes with repressed traumas, unconscious desire, and anxious compulsions—all mediated by competing elements of the unconscious. As overdetermined, each dream is both particular and structured and therefore cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts.

Drawing on Althusser's expansion of overdetermination to explain relations of social production (see Appendix I), I argue that scholars produce academic knowledge within overdetermined social relations.[1] Therefore, what appears as knowledge is never a straightforward reflection of an objectively knowable world, but rather an object produced at the intersection of competing and contradictory social relations. Therefore, instead of discussing social scientific knowledge in terms of "representing," "conceptualizing," "knowing," "modeling," "measuring," or even "understanding" the world, I approach the academic literature on globalization using the techniques of diagnosis and analysis.

A diagnosis of the academic literature identifies various tensions and contradictions, focusing on those places where the declared relationship between the concept of globalization and its assumed referent breaks down. I look for those places where the literature fails to meet its own expectations and becomes thrown

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[1] Althusser recognizes that the term "overdetermination" does not fully capture what he means: "I am not particularly taken by this term *overdetermination* (borrowed from other disciplines), but I shall use it in the absence of anything better, both as an *index* and as a *problem*, and also because it enables us to see clearly why we are dealing with something *quite different from the Hegelian contradiction*" (Althusser 1970, 101). Similarly, I do not use the term "overdetermination" with fidelity to its psychoanalytic meaning but instead deploy it "as an index and as a problem" marking the degree to which approaching academic knowledge as production differs fundamentally from those treatments of academic knowledge as referencing a world already assumed to exist "out there."

into crisis. I identify the literature's nervous ticks—those stammers and hesitations identifiable in, for example, an over-reliance on scare quotes or the compulsive insistence that globalization is in fact occurring.

In diagnosing the social scientific literature, my aim is not to provide a representation of the "real world." Instead, I diagnose the literature in order to better analyze the social relations of knowledge production responsible for the literature's inconsistencies, tensions, and contradictions. Furthermore, just as Freud contends that his analysis proved correct because, in the end, it cured the subject's delirium (Freud 1993, 57), my analysis of the globalization literature should be evaluated based on whether, in the end, diagnosing the contradictions and conceptual blockages within the globalization literature restores the possibility of producing more radical academic knowledges not constrained by the contradictions and tension defining the existing literature on globalization.

CHAPTER 1:
GLOBALIZATION AS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

> *"Globalization is associated with an evolving dynamic global structure…"*
> —David Held et al.

Over the past two decades a consensus has developed within the social sciences that globalization is a salient and even indispensable term to use when studying contemporary social, political, and economic life. Since the second half of the 1990s, the social sciences have witnessed what one scholar calls the "globalization of the globalization discourse" (2007, 308). Others contend that "the globalization debate is itself a major global phenomenon" (Kessler 2000, 931). Even former skeptics have come to recognize globalization's centrality to understanding the contemporary world. However, while most social scientists now agree that globalization is profoundly consequential, there remains a widespread and enduring anxiety within the academic literature concerning the failure to agree on how globalization should be defined, measured, and classified. This anxiety creates an odd tension within the literature; while everyone agrees that the concept of globalization references real changes in the world, nobody agrees what globalization is. Interestingly enough, this reoccurring inability to define, measure, and classify globalization has not stymied the production of a vast academic literature on globalization. As a consequence, the social sciences are caught in a conceptual impasse. This major touchstone—a term of analysis that has radically transformed disciplines, subfields, and research agendas—continues to be left un- or under-interrogated.

What is interesting is not that globalization remains a vague concept within the social sciences,[1] but rather that: 1) this vagueness remains despite the production of a vast flotilla of articles, books, readers, textbooks, conferences, panels, and dissertations on the topic, 2) the imprecision and vagueness has not been confronted directly, and 3) few academics raise

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[1] Social scientists are no strangers to contentious concepts containing multiple and competing definitions (i.e. the state, democracy, development, etc.). However, the lack of a consensus surrounding globalization is so profound that the literature operates without even a fragmentary, traditional, operational, or fallback definition. There is no equivalent to, for example, "the state is the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence," "democracy is voting in competitive elections," or "development can be measured by growth in GNP." Later in the chapter I identify how the lack of a fallback understanding of globalization means that globalization often asserts "the global" as a self-evident referent.

the possibility that studying globalization as a concept that refers to "the real world" might actually prevent scholars from understanding what globalization is.

This chapter diagnoses the globalization literature in order to identify possible reasons why globalization remains such an ill-defined and contradictory concept. I argue that the lack of academic consensus around how to define, measure, and classify globalization has less to do with the failures of academics to come up with "proper" or "workable" conceptual definitions than it does with the contradictions and tensions posed by the studying of globalization as a concept that references an objectively knowable world. Instead, I argue that scholars studying globalization should change their questions from "What is globalization?" and "How is it measured and classified?" to "How is academic knowledge about globalization produced?" Or, in Althusserian terms, "How are 'real objects' converted into an 'object of knowledge' called globalization?"

Therefore, rather than studying some social phenomenon conceptualized as "globalization," I instead adopt the now vast academic literature on globalization as my object of study. The globalization literature is a compelling object of study precisely because, despite being so new, it has profoundly affected how academics, policy-makers, and the general public understand the contemporary world. The globalization literature was almost non-existent until the late 1980s and since the mid-1990s has grown exponentially. Furthermore, the concept of globalization has transformed the daily activity of scholars, administrators, and students as well as policy-making, approaches to business and war-making, and questions of citizenship and political activism. This explosion of knowledge production on the topic of globalization, however, continues despite deep contradictions and tensions within the academic literature on globalization.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I flesh out the argument that the academic literature on globalization is itself worthy of social scientific study. I corroborate anecdotal evidence from social scientists with various surveys of the social scientific literature to argue that the globalization literature emerges in full force during the early 1990s and has proliferated almost exponentially since then. The second section broadly surveys the academic literature attempting to define, measure, and classify globalization. I point out a re-occurring commitment to studying globalization as a concept that references an empirical world, despite the existence of tensions and contradictions that are only ameliorated by hailing "the global" as a self-evident fact. The third section examines the

literature treating globalization as an ideology, discourse, or multiplicity. I find that even these works assume the existence of "the global," even while critiquing the concept of globalization. In the final section I turn to Althusser's distinction between "real objects" and "objects of knowledge" to advance the argument that globalization is not a concept that references an empirical phenomenon but rather an *object of knowledge* produced within an academic *mode of knowledge production*. Taking globalization as an object of knowledge requires analyzing those contested social practices through which heterogeneous, particular, and lived practices—practices of world-making—become abstracted into a single and universal knowledge claim.

THE RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON GLOBALIZATION

Over the past two decades the social science literature on globalization has expanded rapidly. Scholars claim that globalization has become: a "mushrooming" literature (Applbaum 2000, 258); an important academic "buzzword" (Hay and Marsh 2000, 1; Steger 2003, 1-2); "an all-purpose catchword" (Lechner and Boli 2000, 1); and a "near–universal term" (Robertson and Khondker 1998, 26). Giddens argues that globalization now holds "a key position in the lexicon of the social sciences" (1990, 52). Hoogvelt contends that "globe-babble" has come to "penetrate[ ] the discourse of *all* social science disciplines" (2001, 121). Other scholars call globalization "*the* key concept, both in academic debate and in mainstream political discourse" (Kiely 2005, 1); the "*Zeitgeist* of the 1990s" (Rosenberg 2005, 2); "an undeniable and inescapable part of contemporary experience" (Bartelson 2000, 180); "one of the defining terms of contemporary society" (Scholte 2000, 1). Wallerstein writes that the "1990s have been deluged with a discourse about globalization" (2005, 48). Waters calls globalization "*the* concept of the 1990s, a key idea by which we understand the transition of human society into the third millennium" (1995, 1). Once part of the "lexical shadowlands," globalization now "occupies a notable place in the everyday parlance of commerce, governance, academe and entertainment" (Scholte 1996, 44). Keohane writes that globalization is "common today in the press and increasingly in political science" (2001, 1). Clark identifies a "torrent of literature on globalization" which "shows no sign of abating" (1999, 34); others have pointed to the "deluge of popular literature and scholarly research" on the topic of globalization (Koh 2005, 236). McGrew argues that "globalization has now colonized the human sciences" (2007, 31).

What some call "global-speak" (Scholte 2000, 43; 1996, 44) and "globe talk" (Robertson 1992, 113) were not always prominent fixtures within the social sciences. While some scholars argue that globalization dates back to the sixteenth century, the word "globalization" does not come into existence until the mid-20th century. In fact, for several centuries the English language used the word "globe" exclusively as a synonym for "planet" and "sphere"; only in 1890 does it appear in the *Oxford English Dictionary* to mean "the whole world" (Scholte 2000, 43). "Globalize" and "globalism" do not appear in print until 1944 and "globalization" makes its first appearance in 1961 (Scholte 2000, 43; Denning 2004, 18). Marshal McLuhan's 1960 book *Explorations in Communication* first introduced the argument that modern communication technologies are shrinking the world and creating a "global village" (Robertson 1992, 8). The widespread use of the term, however, does not begin in earnest until the middle of the 1980s when the first book with "globalization" in its title was published in 1988 (Denning 2004, 17). Globalization enters the *Oxford Dictionary of New Words* in 1991 (Robertson 1992, 8). While initially starting as an American phenomenon, the term "globalization" spread rapidly throughout other languages during the late 1980s and 1990s appearing in Italian as *globalizzazione*, in Spanish as *globalización,* in German as *Globalisierung* and various other forms in all major languages (Scholte 2000, 43).

Documenting the expansion of word usage, however, fails to fully capture the impressive speed and magnitude with which the concept globalization became omnipresent within the social sciences. In his survey of major citation indexes Andreas Busch found that "astonishing productivity" on the topic of globalization renders it "an academic growth industry" with "book and article publications discussing globalization show[ing] a steep upwards trend over the last 15 years, and only recently [do they] seem to stabilize on a high level—at…about 1,000 to 1,200 publications per year" (2007, 23).[2] Between 1993 and 1996 the yearly output of articles published on globalization nearly quadrupled. In 1996, the Library of Congress registered 200 books and 213 articles with globalization in the title—up from single digits in the 1980s (Busch 2000, 23).

Furthermore, the rapid expansion of academic writing on globalization is not limited to a few disciplines but affects all social science disciplines. Globalization has attracted "the interest of scholars from a wide range of the traditions and sub-disciplines of the social

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[2] Busch examines articles and books listed in the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), WorldCat (books), and "ArticleFirst" (journal articles) of the Library of Congress. His searches were conducted August 2001 and updated September 2005.

sciences" including those in economics, political economy, political theory, sociology, geography, anthropology, and international relations (Busch 2000, 23). This omnivorous expansion of globalization across disciplines mirrors its horizontal spread throughout public discourse as well. For example, Fiss and Hirsch found that by 1995 the term "globalization" was no longer limited to the financial section of the newspaper but was increasingly used in reference to topics as wide-ranging as travel, food, sports, citizenship, crime, disease, and culture (2005).[3]

I surveyed journal articles listed in the Social Science Citation Index between 1975 and 2007 to further reveal the extent to which the academic literature on globalization grew nearly exponentially during the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s (Figures 1 and 2).[4]

Figure 1

Figure 2

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[3] Fiss and Hirsch illustrate that in newspapers, "globalization" was used during the mid-1980s to refer almost exclusively to macroeconomic change. Seventy-three percent of the articles on globalization published between 1985 and 1987 use "globalization" to describe the financial sector, especially the securities market. This trend is not surprising given that the term "globalization" took hold in business schools during this period (see Chapter 4). By the mid-1990s, however, the use of the term globalization was used throughout the newspaper and to describe all kinds of issues (Fiss and Hirsch 2005).

[4] I completed this study by searching the Web of Science/Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) on April 28th, 2008 using "globali*ation" as the topic search term (TS searches title, abstract, and keywords) and again as the title search term (TI). There were 14,598 hits, which include all articles, book reviews, editorial commentary, and letters published in social science journals listed on the SSCI during the years under investigation (January 1, 1975 to December 31st, 2007). I selected only articles and used SSCI's "analyze" function to divide the number of articles by year published. This specific search term was used to catch articles published in American-English journals as well as in British-English journals. While this data is helpful in depicting a fairly considerable trend, the study is not without its limitation. First, articles outside the sample population (i.e. not listed on the SSCI) are excluded, introducing a sampling bias. Secondly, this sample does not control for the total number of articles per year, meaning that any increase in articles on "globalization" could result from an increase in the total number of articles published rather than an increase in the percent of articles on globalization. This drawback is not necessarily a crucial limitation as I am primarily interested in overall textual production, not relative increases. Finally, the SSCI does not include abstracts for articles published before 1998 meaning that articles published between 1975 and 1997 are likely to be under-sampled (i.e. "globali*ation" would have to show up in the title or keywords to be counted). However, a similar trend is found when the search is completed using titles, giving credibility to the findings.

One finds similar results when examining the number of dissertations written on the topic of globalization during the same time period (Figure 3).[5]

Dissertations about "Globali*ation," 1975-2007

Figure 3

These figures not only corroborate the anecdotal observations and Busch's study cited above—they also illustrate quite powerfully the impressive degree to which globalization has become a defining topic of the social sciences only recently. The more than 50-fold increase in articles between 1990 and 2005 and the rise from zero cumulative dissertations for all years prior to 1991 to 139 dissertation in 2006 alone indicate both a quantitative and qualitative shift within the practices of social scientific knowledge production.

We might expect two explanations for this dramatic increase in the academic literature on globalization. First, a number of scholars have argued that globalization is merely an academic fetish, a fad brought about by naïve, post Cold War enthusiasm. For example, Hirst and Thomas call globalization a "necessary myth" and a "fashionable concept in the social sciences" that offers an "image so powerful that it has mesmerized analysts and captured political imaginations" (1996, 1). Wood famously calls globalization "globaloney," and, as such, gets "in the way of understanding what is really going on" (1997).

Most critiques of globalization as an academic fad, however, target early incarnations of the globalization literature in which "globalization" is synonymous with a hyper-liberal economic order "laying waste the nation-state, the welfare state and distinct civil societies themselves" (Hay and Marsh 2000, 4). Critics of globalization as a fad primarily engage in

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[5]I searched the Proquest Digital Dissertation and Theses Index, a database of dissertation and Masters theses written at more than 1,000 North American and European universities. The search was completed on April 28th, 2008 using "globali?ation" as an "Index Term." The search captured any dissertation on this topic defended between January 1st 1975 and December 31st, 2007. The search yielded 944 theses. I used "Citation and Index Term" as the search specification to narrow the sample to those dissertations deemed by the author and/or the ProQuest editorial staff to be primarily related to the topic of globalization (therefore excluding dissertations in science that use "globalization" in a very different sense).

this "first wave" of globalization literature.[6] In fact, most academics who treat globalization as a fad call for more sober analysis, not a total abandonment of the concept.[7] There is recognition, in other words, that while early analyses were misguided, this initial analytical does not deny globalization's existence (see for example: Feigenbaum 2002). This critique of globalization introduced a "second-wave literature," which offers a "more nuanced and differentiated" investigation of the "complex, contingent and unevenly developed process and practices of globalization" (Hay and Marsh 2000, 5).   As a result, much of the globalization literature abandons dynamic and futuristic predictions, replacing them with the widely agreed upon consensus that globalization is complex and contains many forms. In this iteration, globalization has become a term referring to a broad and all-encompassing social phenomenon that includes just about everything.

As a consequence, even those scholars who once argued that globalization was merely an academic fad now affirm its facticity. However, instead of seeing globalization as a singular thing (i.e. a sweeping interconnection of financial markets), the term globalization now refers to a complex, multifaceted thing. In fact, complexity has become globalization's defining characteristic as social scientists describe ever more phenomena as "global." In a relatively short period of time globalization has become the default concept used by social scientists to describe all kinds of things. Most social scientists would argue that the increased use of the term globalization results from the fact that the world is globalizing. However, if one diagnoses the contradictions and tensions reoccurring within various attempts to define, measure, and classify globalization, the portrait of globalization as a concept correlating to the "real" world begins to break down.

THE FACTICITY OF GLOBALIZATION

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[6] For an overview of the three "waves" of globalization literature see: (Hopper 2007, 6-10; Hay and Marsh 2000)

[7] For example, Veseth's book *Globaloney: Unraveling the Myths of Globalization* argues that: "Globalization is real, and we must take it seriously, but it is not easy to understand because of its complexity. Globalization is not one single thing; it is a collection of things, some tightly intertwined, some loosely connected if at all." To understand it as such, however, requires critiquing the "rhetoric of globalization: the vivid images, clever metaphors, and persuasive narratives that manipulate and distort our understanding of the globalization syndrome. In writing this book I'm not trying to defend globalization against the forces that oppose it. Rather, I'm trying to defend my understanding of globalization as a messy, complicated process against rhetoric that tries to simplify it in order to sell a particular viewpoint or political agenda…I want to muddy and complexify globalization so that my readers will think more critically about globalization arguments—and recognize globaloney [i.e. other people's distorted views] when they see it" (2005, 2-3).

Many authors assume that globalization is a concept that references changes in the world. Globalization, in other words, is a thing taking place out there. MacLean, for example, writes that globalization is generally described as "a 'thing,' a process, or an effect of other conditions, and therefore as something empirical to be explained," it is "generally located in a linear causal process, and assumed not to have causal powers of liabilities itself," it "is usually conceived of as an outcome of the observable interactions of discrete units," and is "generally assumed to be meaningful if and only if it can be translated directly into observational statements" (2000, 57-58). The representation of globalization as a thing to be studied, however, assumes that globalization is instantiated in observable relations of cause and effect. The assumption that globalization is a thing taking place out there becomes hard to maintain when one pays attention to the tensions and contradictions within the academic literature on globalization.

On the one hand, the literature often recognizes that no standard, widely accepted, and reliably stable understanding of globalization exists. In fact, much of the globalization literature starts by recognizing globalization as a complex, and therefore difficult to define, concept. Scholars working within this literature often start from this observation before diving into the project of establishing more coherent ways to define, measure, and classify globalization. On the other hand, despite the widespread disagreement as to what globalization is, there remains a steadfast commitment to approaching globalization as a referential concept. These two tendencies create an odd tension within the literature; social scientists often find themselves talking about the same thing—"globalization"—while holding wildly different understandings as to what this object is. I argue that what makes the complex, incoherent, constantly changing, and spatially and temporally diverse thing called "globalization" appear as a thing taking place out there is the a priori assumption that "the global" exists. In other words, while globalization is contested, diverse and constantly changing, the assumed existence of "the global" holds this difference together. While scholars might disagree what globalization is, no one doubts that the world is in fact "global."

Before continuing I should clarify that I am not arguing that various phenomena that have been labeled "globalization" cannot be studied empirically. It is a different question to ask whether trade is greater now than before the First World War, whether new telecommunication technologies are transforming the lives of people in the Philippines,

whether Chinese investments affect Africa, or whether two countries with McDonalds franchises have ever gone to war. Instead, I am exploring the register at which a great heterogeneity of objects (textiles, sports teams, the Internet, fast food, international capital, etc.), subjects (factory workers, rebels in Chiapas, WTO delegates, pop stars, peasants, etc.), and the lived practices through which they circulate (trade, travel, political activism, media representations, etc.) come to be bundled together, labeled as the same thing—"globalization"—and treated as fact.

Defining globalization

Much of the academic writing on globalization starts with the recognition that globalization remains ill-defined, misunderstood, highly complex, and multifaceted. Because globalization is recognized as containing great complexity, many scholars bemoan the fact that the concept lacks a clear definition. In the introduction to a collection of essays on globalization, Ritzer points out that "it is interesting how many authors…found it necessary to define globalization, often in the first paragraph." He took this to indicate "that there is no consensus on the definition and each of the authors…wanted to make something clear that they felt was not clear or agreed upon" (2007, 1). Robertson and White recognize that many "books and articles purporting to be talking about globalization indicate at the outset that there is no accepted definition of globalization but that the author or authors are about to provide one" (2007, 54). In his survey of the literature, Bartelson similarly observes that "attempts to analyze the concept of globalization normally start out lamenting its ambiguity" (2000, 181). Babones argues that globalization "means many things to many people, so many things that it hardly seems worth offering yet one more definition of the term" (2007, 144).

This ambiguity is often cited as a major impediment facing the globalization literature. Steger, for example, argues that the term globalization is "often obscure and invites confusion" (2003, 7). Scholte recognizes that a "widespread loose use of the term 'globalization'" necessitates a "*critical* introduction" (2000, 1). Robertson and Khondker argue that the term is used in "slipshod" and "often heavily ideological" ways, which seriously curtails its "analytic usefulness" (1998, 26). While globalization is "one of the key concepts of the twenty-first century" there remains "no consensus on what has been going on in the world denoted by the term 'globalization'" (Robinson 2007, 126). Perraton argues that, "for all its resonance in academic and popular discourse," globalization "remains a

vague and elusive concept" (2004, 37). Susan Strange humorously bemoans the fact that globalization is a "vague and woolly" word meaning "anything from the Internet to a hamburger" (1996, xii-xiii).

There are even disagreements concerning why globalization lacks a clear definition. Some argue that globalization is a concept that challenges disciplinary assumptions and traditional modes of analysis. For example, Held and McGrew write that the globalization debate

> presents some difficulties, since there are no definitive or fixed lines of contestation. Instead, multiple conversations coexist (although few real dialogues), which do not readily afford a coherent or definitive characterization. Within shared traditions of social enquiry…no singular account of globalization has acquired the status of orthodoxy…Nor do the dominant ideological traditions of conservatism, liberalism or socialism offer coherent readings of, or responses to, a globalizing era…Indeed, the very idea of globalization appears to disrupt established paradigms and political orthodoxies. (Held and McGrew 2003, 2)

In other words, because the thing called globalization undermines disciplinary orthodoxy and taken-for-granted assumptions, social scientists find themselves lacking the paradigms necessary to make sense of this new reality. By highlighting "global complexity," the concept of globalization challenges "just about every aspect of the academic disciplines" (Robertson 1992, 9) meaning that it cannot be studied using "conventional analytical and disciplinary frameworks" (Peterson 2004, 50). Some argue that the inability to define globalization stems from a lack of interdisciplinary methods and the fact that scholars "reduce such a complex phenomenon as globalization to a single domain that corresponds to their own [disciplinary] expertise" (Steger 2003, 14). Others argue that the modernity and the European enlightenment have "swept us away from *all* traditional types of social order" replacing them with "forms of social interconnection which span the globe" and making the present moment feel "like being aboard a careening juggernaut" (Giddens 1990, 4 & 53). Others argue that the failure to accurately define globalization has less to do with the spread of modernity than with the rise of post-modernity (see for example: Featherstone 1995).

Whatever the causes of globalization's conceptual incoherence, scholars have employed a number of deeply problematic techniques for defining globalization. These techniques can be organized into two broad categories: ostensive and stipulative definitions. Ostensive definitions define globalization through a list of examples. Stipulative definitions, in contrast, define globalization in relation to a secondary term; "globalization," for example, is defined as "the spread of global trade." Both techniques depend upon an assumed pre-

existing "global" that gives the complex and contradictory concept globalization its content and coherence. While recognizing globalization as a confused and contentious concept, "the global" is taken as a self-evident fact.

The ostensive technique for defining globalization involves providing a list of objects, subjectivities, and practices which, when bundled together, define globalization. A good example of the list technique can be found in Koenig-Archibugi's introduction to the edited volume *Taming Globalization*:

> During the past decade, "globalization" has become a lens through which an increasing number of politicians, business people, journalists, scholars and citizens view and make sense of a changing world. Sweatshop workers in Central America, human rights activists in East Timor, entrepreneurs in transition economies, Inuit threatened by global warming in their Arctic homelands, HIV-infected people in Southern Africa, not to mention stockbrokers in London or Tokyo, sense that their fortunes partly depend on events occurring in distant parts of the globe. The notion of "globalization" provides a shared vocabulary to express this sense of connectedness—although those affected might well have very different views about the word and what it conveys…Globalization is not supplanting traditional lines of social conflict and cooperation, but it is redrawing them. Employers and trade unionists, environmentalists and polluters, indigenous peoples and multinational corporations, feminists and male chauvinists, fundamentalists and liberals, free traders and protectionists, human rights activists and authoritarian rulers, nationalists and multilateralists, the "North" and the "South": all these groups have found that the capacity to achieve their goals is affected, in one way or another, by the "forces of globalization." Consequently many of them seek to make sense of this phenomenon, understand its implications for their interests and values, and sometimes try to influence its further development—or bring it to a halt. (Koenig-Archibugi 2003, 2)

At first glance this quote offers a richly detailed and internally coherent definition of globalization. A closer reading, however, reveals great vagueness and contradictions sutured together through an assumed facticity of "the global."

First of all, Koenig-Archibugi starts with the recognition that globalization has received a lot of attention, implying that there is considerable interest in—and anxiety over—this rapidly changing world. This widespread attention becomes the foundational justification for studying globalization. But what is so new? Koenig-Archibugi contends that people are being pulled together in ways they have not experienced before, as illustrated by the list of hypothetical subjectivities becoming aware that their lives are "bound to events occurring in distant parts of the globe." The pre-posited fact that there exists a "global" of which people are becoming aware serves as the evidence needed to develop a vocabulary describing these developments. In other words, since greater connectedness is (objectively) taking place, both the hypothetical Inuit and a hypothetical South African "seek to make sense of this phenomenon." This shared sense that globalization is taking place necessitates

the creation of a new "lens" which thankfully already exists in the concept "globalization." The usefulness of this "lens" is, in turn, reaffirmed by the fact that everyone seems to be already using it.

On the one hand, Koenig-Archibugi posits globalization as a "lens" (and later a "notion"), which he differentiates from the "forces of globalization." The "forces of globalization" contain those empirically existing pressures experienced by people across "the globe" and are represented more-or-less accurately using the lens/notion of "globalization" (in scare quotes).[8] While the "phenomenon" of globalization means different things for different people—"employers and trade unionists, feminists and male chauvinists," etc.—the lens of "globalization" is nonetheless universally useful for understanding this thing—globalization—which not only exists but affects everyone across "the globe."

However, despite a commitment to treating globalization as an observable phenomenon, much of Koenig-Archibugi's analysis of globalization depends not upon actual observations of a given thing but instead upon a list of strung-together assumptions that construct an ostensive definition of globalization. This technique for defining globalization works by combining a string of anecdotes which, taken together, reinforce the common-sense claim that globalization is already taking place. The only claim that can be measured against the real world is whether or not more people are talking about globalization than before. The rest of the content—i.e. the existence of a shared assumption that people at "distant parts of the globe" are connected—is simply posited by the author. This assumption is especially evident when Koenig-Archibugi provides no evidence that his hypothetical sweatshop worker, human rights activist, entrepreneur, threatened Inuit, South African, or stock trader actually share a similar sense of what "global" connectedness means. Such evidence would probably be impossible to collect (i.e. how would one conclude that sweatshop workers, HIV-infected South Africans, East Timorese human rights activists, etc. not only use the "lens" of "globalization" but use it in the same way?). In other words, there is no verification that the term globalization gets used to describe the same world. In light of this impossibility, Koenig-Archibugi simply posits a pre-given shared sense of "global

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[8] Koenig-Archibugi's mis-matched use of both globalization (no quotes) and "globalization" (with quotes) is notable in this regard. The distinction is not merely accidental or sloppy but symptomatic of the impossibility of using one word to capture both the existing thing (i.e. forces) of globalization and the "lens" of globalization through which this thing is represented. The tension emerges because the concept and the object of study are both "globalization"—therefore requiring that one be placed in quotes. The concept and the object being studied, it turns out, are the same thing—differentiated only by the anxiety-ridden scare quote.

connectedness" as the fact upon which globalization is defined. It is not the existence of a thing call globalization but rather the shared assumption that "the global" exists that grounds the otherwise incoherent concept of globalization.[9]

In addition to ostensive definitions, many scholars offer stipulative definitions of globalization. That is, globalization defined in relation to either an undefined "global" or a secondary term like "globality" or "globalism." In the first iteration, scholars define globalization as the "global" spread and intensification of political, social, economic, and environmental relations. For example, Held and McGrew write that "the concept of globalization…suggests a growing magnitude or intensity of global flows such that states and societies become increasingly enmeshed in worldwide systems and networks of interaction" (2003, 3). Busch concludes that globalization is not a "clearly defined concept" and that its definition "varies from concentration on specifically economic phenomena to very general social effects on a global scale" (2007, 23). Robertson and White contend that their use of "globalization *per se*" refers to two "features of the human condition"—"extensive connectivity" and the "extensive global consciousness"—which, when taken together, "constitute the move in the direction of global unicity" (2003, 6). Robins describes globalization as "an accumulation of cultural phenomena, where new global elements coexist alongside existing and established local and national cultural forms" (1996, 19). Boli and Petrova contend that "[g]lobalization signifies becoming global or worldwide…Globalization thus entails the making global of such elemental social entities as the individual, the corporation, the state and nature" (2007, 103). Kellner argues that globalization "involves both capitalist markets and sets of social relations *and* flows of commodities, capital,

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[9] Another example of globalization being defined ostensively can be found when Schaeffer recognizes that:

> Policymakers and social scientists not only advance different theories but also use the terms *globalization* to mean different things. Most analysts use *globalization* to describe the growth and spread of investment, trade, and production, the introduction of new technology, and the spread of democracy around the world. But others argue that *globalization* should also refer to other contemporary developments such as the spread of environmental pollution, the commercialization of culture and languages, the cross-border migration of peoples, the spread of drugs and narcotics, and the emergence of social and political protest movements opposed to globalization. (Schaeffer 2003, 1)

In this example globalization is presented not through a cast of hypothetical subjectivities but instead as a list of processes: "investment," "production," "spread of drugs," etc. However, this definition operates like Koenig-Archibugi's definition. Schaeffer first situates globalization as a term widely circulated by "policymakers and social scientists." He then strings processes together to flesh out and "define" what this assumed, self-evident reality is.

technology, ideas, form of culture, and people across national boundaries via a global networked society" (2002, 287). Rennstich defines globalization as "the process of increasing width and depth of interaction and interdependence among social units in the global world system" (2006, 203). Inda and Rosaldo define globalization "rather simply as the intensification of global interconnectedness" (2008, 7).

There is nothing inherently problematic in defining "globalization" in terms of "global flows," "global scales," or the creation of a "global system." However, it becomes problematic when "the global" remains unexamined, undefined, and taken for granted. For example, Robins offers a series of anecdotes that stand in for an explanation of what is "global" about the "new global elements" that constitute globalization. He posits that when walking "down your local high street" you will encounter "global chains such as McDonald's or Benetton" and can even buy "global products" produced by "Sony, Procter and Gamble or the Coca-Cola Corporation"; media groups such as Disney now target "a global audience"; new telecommunication options enable "global communications"; there now exist "global databases" and it is possible "to become a member of a global user group"; in addition, "the international business elite" now constitute "a global community of frequent-flier cosmopolitans" (Robins 1996, 14). All of these examples beg the question: What exactly is global about buying a Sony DVD player in Minneapolis? How does this differ from buying saffron in London in 1850 or African slaves in Virginia in the 1780s? What about those without McDonald's restaurants on their "local high street" or those who cannot afford a Sony DVD player? What about the 3 billion people on the planet who have never made a telephone call (Boron 2005, 50)? If they are also part of the "global interconnection" constituting globalization, what is this thing called globalization? If people without access to McDonald's restaurants, consumer electronics, or telecommunication technology are still part of "the global," on what ground is this so? Are the economic crises, wars, and famines that may prevent people from having access to McDonalds or Sony DVD players also "global" in nature? This stipulative definition—defining globalization as that with the quality of being "global"—assumes that what is "global" is readily observable to anyone who has visited a McDonalds or bought a Sony DVD player; globalization contains an essential quality making it "global."

The second form of stipulative definition defines globalization through the use of secondary terms like "globalism" or "globality." Keohane and Nye, for example, argue that

"globalization" in the 1990s can be critiqued as a "vague phrase" that "expresses a poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing" (2000, 104). This vagueness, they argue, can be overcome by drawing a distinction between "globalism" and "globalization," with the former defined as "a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances" and the latter defined as "the process of increasing globalism" (Keohane and Nye 2000, 105-108). Similarly Manfred Steger argues that "the term 'globalization' has been used in both popular and academic literature to describe a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age" resulting in the term accruing "differing meanings," the "indiscriminate" use of which "invites confusion" and "encourages circular definitions that possess little explanatory power" (2003, 7). In order to break out of this confusion-generating trap, Steger defines "globalization" as "a *set of social processes* that are thought to transform our present social condition into one of globality" and defines "globality" as "a *social condition* characterized by the existence of global economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows" (Steger 2003, 8 & 7). While attentive to the problem of circular definitions, Steger defines globalization in terms of globality, which, in turn, he defines as "*global* economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections" (emphasis added). In short, the explanation of what is "global" about globalization never gets resolved—only displaced onto a secondary term. One could similarly ask: "What is global about globality?"

Often ostensive and stipulative definitions of globalization are used interchangeably. Lists of self-evidently "global" phenomena are combined with references to "global" flows or secondary terms thereby creating the appearance of conceptual coherence. For example, Held and McGrew define globalization as "a historical process characterized by":

- a *stretching* of social, political, and economic activities across political frontiers so that events, decisions and activities in one region of the world come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe… [i.e. stipulative definition]
- the intensification, or the growing *magnitude*, of interconnectedness, in almost every sphere of social existence from the economic to the ecological, from the activities of Microsoft to the spread of harmful microbes, such as the SARS virus, from the intensification of world trade to the spread of weapons of mass destruction; [i.e. ostensive]
- the *accelerating pace* of transborder interactions and processes as the evolution of worldwide systems of transport and communication increases the rapidity or velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information, capital and technology move around the world. Routine telephone banking transactions in the UK are dealt with by call centres in India in real time; [i.e. ostensive]
- this growing *extensity, intensity* and *velocity* of global interactions associated with a *deepening* enmeshment of the local and global in so far as local events may come to have profound global consequences and global events can have serious local consequences,

> creating a growing collective awareness or consciousness of the world as a shared social
> space, that is globality or globalism… [i.e. stipulative]. (Held and McGrew 2007, 2-3)

While this definition appears comprehensive, on a closer look "the global" remains unexplained (despite being posited as a self-evident fact). The authors define globalization as a process of "global interactions" growing in "extensity, intensity, and velocity" but never explain what is "global" about these interactions. For example, SARS and telephone banking are both considered part of the "process of globalization" only because there exists a "collective awareness…of the world as a shared social space." Therefore, even while claiming to define a distinct "historical process," their definition of globalization relies on the presence of an assumed "global," i.e. that which does in fact exists (as seen by the fact that everyone believes it exists).

These contradictions and tensions should not be taken as indications that scholars simply need to define globalization better. Instead, the fact that globalization remains so poorly defined despite the vast volume of the scholarship on the topic should give one reason to pause and consider the possibility that maybe the failure to offer less tautological and self-referential definitions is symptomatic of something much deeper. In fact, failure to define what is "global" about globalization brings to the fore the very real (and anxiety-inducing) possibility that globalization (as a concept that claims to reference the world) rests only on the belief that the world is, in fact, "global."[10] This unsettling hunch is expressed by Germain, who writes that globalization is one of the

> few terms in current use which can claim such a dominant hold over our imagination. The
> familiarity of this term, however, belies its decidedly Janus-faced quality. The popular press
> cannot decide on balance whether globalization has a liberating or a pernicious
> effect…Some argue that a global world has come into being lock, stock and barrel, while
> others point to the inherent unevenness of globalization in the face of many natural and
> social obstacles. Perhaps the only certainty here is that globalization is as inherently
> contested as a 'reality' as it is a concept or a representation of that "reality." (Germain 2000,
> xiii)

Note how scare quotes around "reality" mark the author's anxiety regarding the "realness" of globalization. On the one hand, Germain firmly insists that globalization is a reality, but appears torn between the social scientific need to study "reality" and the sinking suspicion that the term globalization might not reference anything after all.

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[10] I use the term "belief" here very specifically. In Chapter Three, borrowing from Althusser, I argue that the global imaginary is produced through repeated activities of knowledge production structured by the apparatus of the university. Althusser's argument is modeled on Pascal's claim that the practices of praying, kneeling, etc. *preceded*—and therefore *produce*—a belief in God. Similarly, the belief in "the global" is similarly produced by practices structured by the apparatus of the academy.

Even when controversies surrounding the definition of globalization are tabled, contradictions and tensions continue to exist in the way scholars measure and classify globalization.

Measuring globalization

Both qualitative and the quantitative studies of globalization treat globalization as a phenomenon measurable in its causes and effects. Social scientists using quantitative methodologies often develop indicators and datasets to measure whether globalization is occurring, at what magnitude, and with what effects. In contrast, scholars employing qualitative methodologies draw on case studies to examine globalization's effects on specific people and locations. However, as with attempts to define globalization, both efforts offer similarly vague and conflicting accounts that only become resolved by falling back on a preconceived assumption that the world is, in fact, "global."

Social scientists using quantitative methodologies generally measure globalization operationally or as an ideal type. When measured operationally, globalization is defined as indistinguishable from the operational procedures used to measure it. Schirm, for example, defines globalization "as the increasing share of private cross-border activities in the total economic output of countries" and then measures levels of cross-border activity to determine whether or not globalization is taking place (2007, 3; emphasis deleted). Similarly, *Foreign Policy* published a set of measures designed to determine the levels of globalization experienced by various countries. The article starts with the recognition that the "contemporary debate of globalization" is "unsatisfactory" because "few people have undertaken the task of actually trying to measure" globalization. The authors define globalization starting from the observation that there "*seems to be a consensus* that globalization—whether economic, political, cultural, or environmental—is defined by increasing levels of interdependence over vast distances" (A.T. Kearney 2001, 56; emphasis added). To measure globalization (defined as interdependence) the study compiles data on the volume of international travel, international phone calls, remittances, and the number of Internet users and hosts within the fifty developed countries and a handful of emerging markets. While the report found that North America is more wired than other parts of the world, Canada and the United States ranked tenth and twelfth respectively in the "Global Top 20" behind number one Singapore and a number of European countries (A.T. Kearney

2001). This attempt to measure globalization, however, rests on the assumption that the aggregate calculation of overall travel, phone usage, money transfers, and Internet connectivity refers back to a thing called "globalization." The ranking arrived at represents levels of "globalization" only because globalization is operationally defined as travel, phone usage, etc. In other words, the authors could have concluded that Singapore was the most "interconnected" (i.e. had the greatest aggregate volume of travel, international phone usage, remittances, and web connectivity) of the fifty plus nations studied but, instead, concluded that Singapore is the most "globalized."[11] Furthermore, these operational procedures treat globalization as an attribute of countries; an empirically measurable fact ascribed the same conceptual status as other aggregate characteristics, such as GDP to represent development, literacy rates to represent education or the number of contested elections to represent democracy. Absent is a description of why international travel, phone calls, server space, etc. are "global." Why not use the number of people attending the Haj or the displacement of people by violence?

Other scholars treat globalization as an ideal type arguing that the world is (or is not) global to the degree to which the world out there resembles the ideal type. For example, Hirst and Thompson argue that globalization is an "ideal type" that is used to "measure against the actual trends within the international economy" (1996, 15). They define globalization as the creation of markets that are difficult to regulate, the transformation of multinational corporations into transnational corporations, the weakening of organized labor, and the emergence of a multipolar international political system (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 10-13). After presenting empirical data on national growth rates, multinational corporation asset distribution and investment flows, Hirst and Thompson conclude that markets are no more difficult to regulate than in the past, that a similar number of multinational corporations have become transnational corporations, etc. As a result, the ideal type does not correlate to the world.

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[11] In a similar study, Burkhart measures globalization (defined as "an increasingly global scope for technological advances, international regimes, and trade flows") by examining foreign trade flows, foreign direct investment, and data on telephone use to develop an index of globalization. Based on this index Burkhart concludes that, over all, globalization strongly influences economic development but not human development (Burkhart 2002). In most cases, the "empirical indicators" used to calculate globalization are economic, including macroeconomic indicators (GDP, levels of trade, etc.), levels of foreign direct investment, and data concerning financial markets (Busch 2000, 33-42).

Quantitative measures of globalization—either as a series of operational indicators or as an ideal type—both assume that the concept globalization references (or does not reference) the "real" world. The question being asked, in both cases, is "Based on our measures, is the world 'globalizing'?" While this question appears to be a very straightforward social scientific question, it can lead to a conflation not unlike the one found in attempts to define globalization, leading to the unaddressed question: Why are various measurable phenomena (GDP, levels of trade, levels of foreign travel, number of Internet hosts, the strength of organized labor, the conversion of multinational corporations into transnational corporations, etc.) "global." The claim that levels of trade, Internet usage and air travel indicate the same thing—i.e. globalization—depends upon the *a priori* assumption that these indices all measure the same phenomena. Without the assumption that "the global" already exists to be measured, various indicators would simply be measures of particular phenomena. For example, claiming that "the United States has more Internet hosts than Singapore but Singapore has higher level of remittances and international phone calls" is fundamentally different then saying that "Singapore is more global than the United States." Furthermore, the unquestioned existence of "the global" enables scholars to take any readily available measurements—the numbers of fast food restaurants, immigration trends, world music concerts, study abroad programs, cricket matches, American Idol viewers, etc.—as all interchangeable indicators of globalization. Why are these objects "global" while failed states, U.S. agricultural subsidies, South African soap operas or "ethnic conflict" are deemed "local."[12]

Others scholars, primarily in the disciplines of anthropology, geography, and comparative politics, have adopted qualitative methodologies such as ethnography and case study analysis to measure globalization. Many of these accounts rightly challenge the false distinction between "the global" and "the local." Furthermore, instead of understanding globalization through tables of quantitative (and often economic) data, these scholars measure globalization by examining the everyday practices of people "on the ground." Ethnographies and case studies allow scholars to measure the human effect of globalization, while highlighting the possibilities for resistance. In much of the qualitative literature on globalization, however, "the global" serves primarily as a foil or hook for organizing,

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[12] I have argued elsewhere that the genocide in Rwanda should not be understood as political violence caused by "local" elites or ethnic tensions but should instead be understood within the context of the international coffee economy (Kamola 2007).

generalizing, and animating otherwise area-exclusive field research. For example, while there is great attention to the specificity of mafias in Mumbai (Weinstein 2008), conflicts over mining in Peru (Haarstad and Fløysand 2007) or conservation policies in Thailand (Buergin 2003), globalization is presented as the one-dimensional backdrop upon which the case study exists. As a result, globalization comes to include everything not directly present in the location being studied. For example, the World Bank and IMF, multinational corporations, overseas politicians, and financiers often become the face of globalization. In these instances, what globalization is never gets fleshed out in terms other than "not local (to this case study)." For example, Buergin identifies the way a wildlife sanctuary in Thailand is framed at different "local," "national," and "global" levels. The author points out that the framing at the global level tends to dominate and have the greatest and most pernicious impacts: "The economic, political, and cultural processes of globalization throughout the 20th century…may be seen as resulting from efforts to define culturally specific frames of thought as 'universal' or 'global' and to impose them on other social contexts" (Buergin 2003, 390). While Buergin is critical of the "discursive hegemony" (2003, 377) of the global level, it remains unclear what he means by "the global" except as those institutions and people—like the World Bank—which are "outside" the "local." At one point, Buergin directly equates "the local" with his field research—"Knowledge about *the local situation* mainly stems from anthropological field research in 1996/97" (Buergin 2003, 377; emphasis added)—without similarly addressing the subsequent question of where knowledge about *the global situation* is gleaned. While "the local" can be minutely studied through empirical observations and case study analysis, "the global" is everything beyond "the local" that nonetheless affects "the local."

Furthermore, scholars often import the rubric of globalization onto the cases they are studying, regardless of whether their informants use this term. For example, Mittelman conducted more than one hundred interviews in Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe during 1991, 1993, and 1996-1998 in an attempt to figure out how these countries were affected by globalization. Interestingly enough, he found that many of his interviewees did not respond to the term globalization because "the architecture of globalization is too huge to perceive as a whole." However, when Mittelman changed the approach of the interview "to a finer scale—more discrete issues—the structures become discernible"; he concluded that his informants were

actually discussing globalization even if not using the term (Mittelman 2000, 12-13). This is not surprising given that Mittelman selected informants who were "activists directly or indirectly challenging global structures" (Mittelman 2000, 13). In other words, globalization exists—and explains the world—independent of whether those being studied use the term globalization to ascribe meaning to their world.

The presentation of globalization as an already constituted "not local" creeps into even the very best case studies committed to showing globalization as a contested and heterogeneous phenomenon. For example, in *Friction*—a self-described "ethnography of global connection" detailing forest management practices in Indonesia—Tsing starts with the seemingly self-evident claim that "[g]lobal connections are everywhere" (2005, 1). However, she is very critical of "[m]ost theories of globalization" that "package all cultural developments into a single program: the emergence of a global era" (Tsing 2005, 3). When looking at the development of the globalization literature, for example, she argues that the first academic accounts presented globalization as an "evolutionary change on a planetary scale" and the "worldwide advance to a global era." However, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become important to "turn attention…to discontinuity and awkward connection" (Tsing 2005, 11). Tsing argues that this discontinuity can be studied through ethnographic accounts. At this point, however, she recognizes that studying globalization ethnographically is a bit dubious. Tsing asks herself "Yet can one gain an ethnographic purchase on global connections? Where would one locate the global in order to study it?" (Tsing 2005, 3). She answers this question with the counter-intuitive claim that "global forces are themselves congeries of local/global interaction" (Tsing 2005, 3). To address globalization as the local/global she turns to the concept of friction, which she defines as "persistent but unpredictable effects of global encounters across difference" (Tsing 2005, 3). In other words, within that which is ethnographically knowable exists both "the local" and "the global" brushing against each other. Unlike many qualitative scholars who simply posit "the global" as "not local," Tsing holds "the local" as "local/global." However, for ethnography of a particular location to also transcend its particularity (i.e. to be "global") Tsing insists that "the local" is simultaneously global. However, if one looks at her language, Tsing also reproduces—despite her desire to present a "local/global"—the

distinctions between rural Indonesia (i.e. the "local") and that which is outside rural Indonesia (i.e. the "global").[13]

Attempting to study globalization qualitatively provides many important insights into how dominant social relations (and its resistances) are lived in places (most often) outside the United States. That being said, this literature often presents globalization as either an already existing thing operating "out there" beyond "the local" or, in the best accounts, a contested and fluid concept through which the analyst struggles to comprehend how "the global" and "the local" intersect with each other. In both accounts, however, "the global" is presented as the "not local" which, in turn, becomes the grounds upon which to examine globalization.

Qualitative and quantitative attempts to measure globalization often start by gathering empirical objects—either operational indicators or "local" case studies—to serve as the data upon which globalization is measured. In both aces, however, the incoherence of the concept of globalization is circumvented because "the global" is already posited as given, as either a phenomenon knowable by various measures or as a phenomenon knowable in its "local" effects.

Classifying globalization

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[13] In arguing that there is "friction" between the local and global, Tsing reproduced—albeit in a more nuanced and interesting way—"the global" as a concept with an empirical referent (i.e. some objects are global and others are local). For example, Tsing writes:

> None of these questions can be addressed without an appreciation of global connections. Indonesian forests were not destroyed for local needs; their products were taken for the world. Environmental activism flourished only through the instigation and support of a global movement. Yet popular stories of global cultural formation are of little help in understanding these phenomena. There is no triumph of global integration here; both the chaotic melee of landscape destruction and the searing protests of radical critics are forged in dissension, fragmentation, and regional inequality. We see the unexpectedly persistent effects of particular historical encounters. A villager shows a North American miner some gold; a Japanese model of trade is adopted for plywood; students banned from politics take up hiking; a minister is inspired by the United Nations conference on the environment: These narrowly conceived situations lay down tracks for future "global" developments. Rather than tell of the evolutionary unfolding of a new era, my story inquires into the makeshift links across distance and difference that shape global futures—and ensure their uncertain status. (Tsing 2005, 2)

It is important to notice the way Tsing puts "global" in quotation marks in only one usage of the term. While she uses "global" without quotation marks throughout the text, at this one point she falls back on them as if to register an underlying doubt that the list of things she offers—a North American miner, a student hiker, etc.—are, in fact, "global."

In addition to those strands of the academic literature that define and measure globalization, many scholars examine globalization by developing temporal classifications documenting change over time, thereby treating globalization as a "periodizing concept" (Denning 2004, 24). Similar to the controversy concerning how globalization should be defined, temporal classifications exhibit little agreement as to how the historical epochs of globalization should be divided. Robertson argues that there are five phases of globalization.[14] Mittelman, in contrast, contends that globalization has emerged over three periods.[15] Held *et al.* identify four.[16] Wallerstein argues that globalization is merely a "typical Kondratieff cycle of the capitalist world system" that entered its A-phase in 1945 to 1967-1973 while its B-phase—"or downward swing"—began around 1967-1973 and continues into the present (Wallerstein 2005, 48-49). All of these competing classifications assume that globalization contains some essential meaning that persists over long historical periods.

Many scholars who classify globalization temporally argue that it dates back many centuries. Various phenomena taking place hundreds of years ago (the great exploration, the slave trade, colonialism, the industrial revolution, the rise of empire, etc.) are often classified under the umbrella of "globalization." Given that globalization was not a concept in the 14th century, scholars often retroactively aggregate disparate historical worlds as exhibiting the contemporary qualities of globalization. However, by breaking globalization down into various phases/epochs/cycles, scholars assume that these temporal periods nonetheless share some essential quality that makes them all "global." For example, Robertson and White argues that

> insofar as one regards globalization as a recent process, then one can acknowledge that it opens the way to interest in global history. If, on the other hand, one thinks of globalization as a very long historical process, then such acknowledgement is not so simple and the question of the degree to which global history and globalization are identical processes become much less avoidable. The skeleton of a solution lies in the following formulation. Whereas global history is, in its broadest scope, concerned with the history of mankind, globalization, on the other hand, dwells upon those aspects of global history which can plausibly be seen as related to the question of moves toward or away from global unicity. (Robertson and White 2006, 351)

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[14] Robertson identifies five phases of globalization: the exploration of the "New World" from 1400 to 1750; the rise of the nation-state and colonial rule from 1750 to 1875; imperialism and the First World War from 1875 to the 1920s; the Second World War and the development of the Bretton-Woods institutions from 1925 to 1969; and 1969 to the present (Robertson 1992).

[15] The first phase—"incipient globalization"—existed prior to the 16th century while "bridging globalization" defined the period from the industrial revolution to the early 1970s. The early 1970s to the present has constituted a period known as "accelerated globalization" (Mittelman 2000, 19).

[16] The four periods are: pre-1500, 1500-1760, 1760-1945 and 1945-present (Held et al. 1999, 306-309).

While debates exist about how globalization, "global" history not only exists but it concerns the "history of mankind" as it approaches, or moves away from, a "global unicity."

In conclusion, the academic literature on globalization often defines, measures, and categorizes globalization as if it were a concept that references the real world. However, these authors widely agree that no clear definition of globalization exists, and that measures and classifications of globalization are highly contested. Therefore, to maintain the claim that the muddled and incoherent concept of globalization actually references the world, scholars often invoke the self-evident claim that the world is "global"—a fact that transcends the otherwise contested concept globalization. To understand the concept globalization, therefore, requires questioning the unquestioned existence of "the global." Bartelson sums up this argument quite succinctly when he writes:

> Today few doubt the reality of globalization, yet no one seems to know with any certainty what makes globalization real. So while there is no agreement about *what* globalization *is*, the entire discourse on globalization is founded on a quite solid agreement *that* globalization *is*. Behind the current and confusing debates about its ultimate causes and consequences, we find a wide yet largely tacit acceptance of the *factuality* of globalization as such, as a process of change taking place "out there": even otherwise constructivistically minded scholars tend to regard globalization as an undeniable and inescapable part of contemporary experiences… (Bartelson 2000, 180)

As shown so far in this chapter, the phenomenon that Bartelson indicates—i.e. the "tacit acceptance" of globalization's "*factuality*"—owes much to the assumption that "the global" exists. Therefore, it is "the global" that gives the otherwise incoherent concept globalization its appearance of coherence. Before turning my attention to how those "constructivisitically minded scholars" approach globalization, I turn to the oft-repeated metaphor of globalization as an elephant being studied by blind monks as a way of clarifying the failures implicit in the practice of defining, measuring and classifying globalization as an empirically referential thing.

Globalization studied as an elephant in the proverbial room

Fredrick Jameson opens his influential collected volume *The Cultures of Globalization* with the following statement:

> Globalization falls outside the established academic disciplines, as a sign of the emergence of a new kind of *social phenomenon*…which is the intellectual property of no specific field, yet which seems to concern politics and economics in immediate ways, but just as immediately culture and sociology, not to speak of information and the media, or ecology, or consumerism and daily life. Globalization—even the term itself has been hotly contested—is thus the modern or postmodern version of the proverbial elephant, described by its blind observers in so many diverse ways. Yet one can still posit the existence of the elephant in the

absence of a single persuasive and dominant theory; nor are blinded questions the most unsatisfactory way to explore this kind of relational and multileveled phenomenon. (Jameson 1998, xi; emphasis added)

In line with much of the globalization literature, Jameson first recognizes that globalization is new, multifaceted, and difficult to define. He still insists, however, that there exists "a social phenomenon" at the center of this blind confusion. The blind observers feeling the elephants—one the trunk, the other the tail—attempt to conceptually grasp that object that is most definitely there and which, assuming there existed an objective viewer (i.e. someone with prefect sight), could be observed in its entirety.

This analogy reoccurs in Manfred Steger's book, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction* (2003). This example is introduced immediately after Steger recognizes that "globalization remains a contested concept…because there exists no scholarly consensus on what kind of social processes constitute its *essence*" (Steger 2003, 9; emphasis added). Steger then offers five influential definitions of globalization before settling on his own composite definition, which builds off the strengths of the existing definitions. Steger contends that "[s]cholars not only hold different views with regard to proper definitions of globalization, they also disagree on its scale, causation, chronology, impact, trajectories, and policy outcomes" (Steger 2003, 13). This assertion raises the question of how such smart people understand the same thing in such wildly different ways. To answer this question, Steger introduces the elephant metaphor. The description is aided by an illustration of one monk touching the elephant's trunk labeled "politics," another the leg embossed with the word "economics," and yet another the ear entitled "environment" (Steger 2003, 15). Steger concludes this analysis with the observation that

> [s]ome scholars argue that economic processes lie at the core of globalization. Others privilege political, cultural, or ideological aspects. Still others point to environmental processes as the essence of globalization. Like the blind men in the parable, each globalization researcher is partly right by correctly identifying *one* important dimension of the phenomenon in question. However, their collective mistake lies in their dogmatic attempts to reduce such a complex phenomenon as globalization to a single domain that corresponds to their own expertise. (Steger 2003, 14)

The problem of being unable to define, measure, and classify globalization, Steger argues, stems from the single-mindedness of disciplinarity, which is solved only by stepping back and properly attuning one's eyes to the diversity of globalization's many facets. In refusing to be blinded by disciplinary constraints it becomes possible to see globalization as it actually is, i.e. as an elephant that most definitely exists.

The metaphor of the elephant provides a palpable illustration of the logic at work in much of the globalization literature. First, scholars assume that there is a thing in the room being studied. Second, this existing thing has a name that corresponds to a "real" thing. The monks, in other words, are studying an elephant, not twelve xmathodrodons (or any other not-yet-imagined monsters). Third, the audience reading about these monks already share knowledge of what an elephant is, having seen representations of elephants in pictures and movies or even the "real" thing in zoos or on safari. And, finally, the only thing preventing this given, coherent and known thing from being understood in its entirety is the lack of proper vision. Restoring sight would make it possible to assign that "thing in the room" the proper referent "elephant." Globalization, in other words, as that thing the blind monks study (in all its muddled iterations) while *a priori* knowing that each piece is part of a coherent whole—i.e. "the global."

This representation, however, does not match up with how globalization is actually studied. In fact, the treatments of globalization as a thing becomes untenable when the proverbial elephant is debunked as only a vast assortment of miscellaneous objects, subjects, organizations, practices, etc. arranged in various combinations, defined in a plurality of ways and measured using whatever indicators and classifications available. In other words, there is nothing apart from the disparate objects cobbled together to form the semblance of a single thing. However, nothing in the globalization literature provides evidence that globalization exists as a thing that social scientists—either as blind monks or, preferably, as cleared-eyed elephantologists—experience. This lack of a coherent object to study, however, is alleviated by the spectral "global," a thing hailed to provide conceptual coherence to the otherwise incoherent concept.

In this way, a more accurate description of how globalization is studied would be the metaphor of a handful of social scientists in a chaotic shared office through which a steady stream of students, colleagues, stacks of photocopies, miscellaneous office furniture, lecture notes, office supplies, etc. is constantly circulating (much like a normal day in a shared graduate student's or adjunct professor's office). One scholar points to a computer and says: "I'm checking my email. This is globalization!" Another says, "I'm going back to Hong Kong for Christmas. This is globalization!" Another, refilling the coffee pot, says "Look, this coffee is imported from Kenya. This is globalization!" Another chimes in: "I'm currently reading about British imperialism. This is globalization!" In this metaphor, all aspects of a

shared world are given meaning under the some rubric: globalization. There is no proverbial elephant in the room but this does not prevent every aspect of the room from being read as if it were an ear, leg or tail. The proverbial elephant of globalization does not exist independently but is, in effect, being produced.

GLOBALIZATION AS IDEOLOGY, DISCOURSE, OR MULTIPLICITY

A number of scholars have argued that treating globalization as an empirical fact only perpetuates the belief that globalization is inevitable, a highly problematic claim for those who associate globalization with poverty, inequality, social destabilization, cultural colonialism, and environmental devastation. Therefore, many scholars critique the notion that globalization is a concept that simply represents *the real world*, presenting it instead as ideology, discourse, or multiplicity. This theoretical move opens up the conceptual space for developing anti- or alter-globalizations that challenge the inequalities reinforced by status quo conceptions of globalization. This recasting of globalization pluralizes the meanings of globalization and diversifies the "agents" responsible for shaping globalization, thereby dislodging the assumption that globalization is unavoidable.

This take on globalization offers a vast improvement over the majority of the literature, which presents globalization as a descriptive concept. Approaching globalization as an ideology, discourse, or multiplicity foregrounds the contested social world, illustrating how globalization is socially constituted within relations of power and exclusion. I show, however, that many of these accounts—like those treating globalization as a referential fact—problematically assume that "the global" exists. Even when presenting globalization as an elite ideology, a power-infused discourse, or a multiplicity of competing realities, many authors maintain a notion of "the global" as that real terrain upon which so many distortions and multiple experiences play out.

Globalization as an ideology

Scholars working in Marxist, Gramscian, and critical theory traditions have argued that globalization is a social transformation ideologically inscribed by the dominant capitalist classes. These scholars view "the world as a human social product," which is "constructed through broadly productive practices shaped by the social relations and self-understandings prevalent in particular historical times and places" (Rupert 2000, 14). In this way,

globalization is not "simply 'the way the world is'" but rather a reality constituted "through historically specific social relations, self-understandings and practices which interweave the economy, politics, and culture" (Rupert 2000, 15). Globalization is not "spontaneous nor inevitable" but the "political project of an identifiable constellation of dominant social forces" and, as such, is "vigorously contested" (Rupert 2000, 42). To illustrate globalization as a contested ideology, Rupert details the historical rise of U.S. Fordist economic power after World War II to the rise of post-Cold War neoliberal capitalism, and most specifically the adoption of—and contestation over—NAFTA and GATT-WTO. He argues that recently, as seen through challenges to NAFTA and the WTO, "global democratization" and nationalist, isolationist populism both threaten the hegemony of globalization ideology.

Rupert, like others working in this tradition, criticizes globalization as a particular ideology propagated by capitalist relations of production but takes "the global" as fact; that is, as non-ideological. For example, Rupert argues that globalization (as an ideology) can be challenged by "global democratization" and a "global justice movement" (Rupert 2004). Other critics of globalization as ideology similarly call for counter-hegemonic "global" forces to offer alternatives to globalization. For example, Kellner critiques the ideological dimensions of globalization while calling for a "globalization from below" (2002). Mittleman argues that globalization has become an "*ideology of domination*" but can be transformed into "an *ideology of emancipation*" (2004, 15 & 24). Steger poses globalization—"the material process"—as distinct from globalism—"the dominant ideological package" (2002, 41); as "a neoliberal market ideology" globalism has endowed "globalization with certain norms, values, and meanings" that can be differentiated from the material practices of globalization (Steger 2002, 13). These accounts, in various ways, all draw a problematic distinction between "the global" as a *material reality* versus globalization as an ideological falsity. In other words, "the global" can become made more democratic, emancipatory, egalitarian, etc. once "the global" is freed from its ideological shackles.

Treating globalization as an ideology (and "the global" as non-ideological) contains contradictions and tensions similar to those found in treatments of globalization as an empirically referential concept. While authors quickly point out how governments, multinational corporations and ideologues like Thomas Friedman embrace and propagate an exclusionary and pro-capitalist vision of globalization, they rarely decipher the content of the "global" material reality, except in vague references to how expanding connectivity and

social integration might otherwise be harnessed for the social good. This distinction between globalization (ideology) and "the global" (reality) proves problematic given that those benefiting from the ideology of globalization also often produce much of the infrastructure cited as productive of "global" relations (airplanes, telecommunications technologies, etc.).

Globalization as a discourse

Some scholars argue that globalization is not an ideology but rather a complicated and multi-layered discursive terrain. These scholars of "cultural globalization" argue that presenting globalization as a discourse avoids treating globalization as "something given and stable" to be studied through "a superficial analytical and ontological distance" giving scholars the tools "to transcend the dichotomy between material and ideational globalization" (Antoniades 2007, 307). While these arguments produce a diversity of interesting work, they often present globalization as a discursive while presenting "the global" as a non-discursive reality.

Scholars understand the discursive qualities of globalization in different ways. Some use the concept of discourse to simply map how the term globalization gets used in various politicized settings. For example, Robertson and Khondker fear that the "analytic usefulness" of globalization is "becoming precarious" because "the term is used without any explicit definition whatsoever." In order to better understand what globalization is, the authors classify four different "discourses of globalization" (Robertson and Khondker 1998, 26-27).[17] Identifying different discourses of globalization makes it possible to achieve "an empirically and historically sensitive theory of globalization" that illustrates "how many of our presuppositions about the modern world and its history may be deconstructed" thereby undermining the "uni-dimension discourses of globalization" (Robertson and Khondker 1998, 38). Koh similarly argues that "discourses of globalization are 'heteroglossic'" (having multiple voices) and identifies "three overlapping…regional, ideological and economic discourses" (2005, 229). Others study the degree to which the discourse of globalization is "implicated in the vocabularies, ideological proposals, visions, policies or strategies" of "social actors" (Antoniades 2007, 312).

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[17] The four discourses of globalization identified by Robertson and Khondker are: "*regional*, or civilizational, discourses" of globalization, "*disciplinary* discourses of globalization," "*ideological* discourses," and "*gendered* discourses of globalization."

Still other scholars argue that, as a discourse, globalization is not only a matter of word-use but also an inter-subjective practice constituting subjectivities and social relations. For example, Kayatekin and Ruccio argue that the discourse of the "global imperative" produces economic subjectivities without class content—meaning that critiques of globalization discourse must provide the space for forming new subjectivities and class-based organization.[18] Others argue that the discourse of globalization is rather "disabling" in that it contains "a pervasive economism of either a neoliberal or an orthodox Marxist variety," it employs a "dichotomous understandings of time and space," and it contains an "implicit assumption that globalizing forces originate in 'the West'" (Hart 2002, 49). Gillian Hart, in one of the best books on globalization, starts with a critique of Jameson's "elephant-groping metaphor" arguing that it effectively erases "the profoundly political issues at stake in the multiple, competing claims about globalization" and closes down the possibility of asking questions about who gets to define globalization and which parts of the preverbal elephant are prioritized when assembling the overall image (2002, 48). Hart argues "globalization is not only an enormously complex and varied set of simultaneously economic, cultural, and political processes. It is also, very importantly, a set of discourses through which knowledge is produced" (2002, 48). At stake in the process of defining globalization is the "deeply politicized practices of meaning-making within and beyond academia" (Hart 2002, 48). To challenge these discursive practices, Hart offers a counter-discourse of globalization drawn from competing discursive practices deployed by Taiwanese garment factory owners, South African politicians, labor unionists, and residents of two African Bantustans to portray globalization as a discursive practice taking place in micro-political contestations over identity, power, and political belonging.

Most scholars who present globalization as a discourse, however, retain the notion of a non-discursive "global" existing independent of the discursive practices of globalization. For example, in arguing that globalization should be understood through the "framework of multiple trajectories," Hart argues that "we understand the multiplicity of historical

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[18] Kayatekin and Ruccio write, for example, that:

> The question of what precisely constitutes the "we" is a fundamental one as the clues to the question of subjectivity need to be sought there. Depending on "who" we are, it is quite likely that the meaning that is attributed to "global" will change. The point that there is more than one way of interpreting the global is readily conceded by the cultural analysts. (1998, 79)

geographies not simply as *effects* of global flows but as actively *constitutive* of them" (Hart 2002, 52). Kayatekin and Ruccio similarly argue that:

> One would think, then, that the problem of globalization is, at least in part, discursive in nature. On this point the literature on the culture of globalization leaves us with a conceptual tension. On one hand, it is acknowledged that globalization is a matter of different interpretations. On the other hand, these very interpretations are conceived to be created by the process of globalization which, it seems, is neutral, indifferent to our interpretations…one can infer from existing treatments both that there are multiple identities and that these range from individual subjectivities to global collective ones. (1998, 79)

In other words, there exists a lingering distinction between *globalization the process* (what I call "the global") and *globalization the interpretation.* In critiquing globalization as discourse, these authors still harbor a deep conviction that *globalization the process* exists independent of the discursive practice.

The lingering specter of the non-discursive "global" prevents even the most critical authors from making the much more radical argument that "the global" is itself produced. The deep-seeded fidelity to a non-discursive "global" reproduces the notion of academic knowledge as representative of the world rather than productive of—and immanent to—the world. Kayatekin and Ruccio, for example, conclude their argument with the metaphor of academics leaving the "ivory tower" in order to understand what globalization looks like from below:

> As we descend from the "tower" and begin to walk down the streets and past the sites of the hybridized culture and heterogeneous spaces of the "global city," a transformation takes place: we are forced to confront our desire to be alternatively dazzled and horrified by the panoramic view "from above" and to embrace a new set of visions which, however partial and provisional, afford us the opportunity to live in and alter the fragmented, differentiated, "porous" order that we encounter "down below." (Kayatekin and Ruccio 1998, 92)[19]

This move reinforces the distinction between the world "down there" and the discourses used to describe it. While Kayatekin and Ruccio claim to challenge the transcendence of academic discourse by lowering themselves to the proverbial "street level," they miss the real point: there is no transcendent "tower" distinct from the world. Academic discourses of globalization are just as worldly as the streets below. The only thing making them appear otherwise is the belief that academic discourses are, in fact, panoramic views of a street-level (i.e. real) "global" world.

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[19] It is important to notice the way Kayatekin and Ruccio put "global city" in quotes, as if to flag the term as problematic. What does it mean to walk through the streets of a "global city" rather than the streets of any old city one might transverse? Could one study globalization by walking through the streets of a remote village engaged in subsistence agriculture?

Globalization as a multiplicity

Some critical scholars present globalization as a multiplicity and identify a plurality of "globalizations" rather than one single "globalization." For example, in the introductory essay to the first volume of the journal *Globalizations* Barry Gills writes:

> Moving from singularity to multiplicity is not to speak of any single or inevitable globalization, or even of a set of processes of a single globalization, but rather, to accept "multiple globalization processes" and indeed "multiple globalizations." This in itself signifies something of a paradigm shift from the type of thinking that dominated the first phase of the globalization debate…*Globalizations'* editorial policy will therefore be to encompass as many perspectives as possible…*Globalizations* will seek to engage with social, cultural, political and ideological debate on the nature and practices of global change. (Gills 2004, 2)

While refusing to recognize globalization as a single phenomenon represents an improvement over much of the globalization literature, this theoretical move exhibits many of the tensions and contradictions found when globalization gets presented as a single, if complex, phenomenon. Presenting globalization as a multiplicity, in other words, involves an uncritical acceptance of "the global" (as a singular) that gives coherence to the diversity of plural "globalizations." For example, Gills recognizes that while a plurality of globalizations exists—each understood and experienced differently—"change" itself is "global change."

Feminist theorists have also made strong arguments for understanding globalization as a plurality and thereby incorporating a diversity of voices, including the politically marginalized, into the practices of describing globalization. Peterson, for example, advances "ways of 'seeing' multiple globalizations" (2004, 51) and offers "a coherent (though not homogenous or totalizing) picture of globalizations…that moves beyond dominant orientations" (Peterson 2004, 63). Peterson's argument for a "coherent" but not "totalizing picture" of globalizations, however, relies on the assumption that "the global" exists to give coherence to a plurality of globalizations. First, Peterson argues that information and communication technologies developed during the 20th century "not only enable the 'global' in globalization but transform the world as we 'know' it" since "globalizations involve not only empirically observable changes" but "also analytical changes posed by information technology and their unprecedented fusion of culture and economy" (2004, 51). In other words, "the 'global' in globalization" (note: globalization is singular) not only has specific causes (various 20th century technologies) and transformative effects but serves as the rump upon which the multiplicity of globalizations becomes coherent.

In ways resembling arguments about globalization as an ideology and as a discourse, the literature on globalization as a multiplicity vacillates between the argument that globalization is plural even while referencing the real existence of "the global."

Returning to the elephant metaphor, it is a great improvement to consider the ways in which the study of globalization in more complicated than simply relating one's experience of the elephant as an objective phenomenon. Authors who study globalization as an ideology, discourse, or multiplicity bring to the table the recognition that each monk approaches the elephant with various pre-suppositions, mediates their understanding of the elephant through language, and recognizes distinctions between multiple kinds (say Asian and African) elephants. However, as with those who approach globalization only as an elephant in the proverbial room, these more nuanced approaches still start from the assumption that there exists an elephant ("the global") to which the ideology, discourse and multiplicity of globalization nonetheless refers to. This fidelity to "the global" as an unshakable fact—even while taking globalization as an ideology, discourse or multiplicity—closes down the possibility of asking the more fundamental question: How are social phenomena that could otherwise be described as different and heterogeneous—as constituting different worlds—routinely bundled together and presented as a single "global" fact? Or, phrased slightly differently: How are different worlds produced as constituting the same "global" reality? To ask this question scholars must recognize that the metaphorical elephant may not, in fact, be in the room—despite the existence of a room full of scholars studying it. Presenting "the global" as a self-evident fact, in other words, risks failing to raise the possibility that perhaps "the global" exists not as a phenomenon to which the concept (or ideology, discourse, multiplicity) of globalization corresponds but rather *as an object of knowledge* produced through the practices of articulating difference into similarity.

IV. GLOBALIZATION AS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

To examine how the academic literature on globalization continues to produce "the global" as a self-evident fact, I draw on a distinction between *real objects* and *objects of knowledge*. Althusser coined this distinction in *Reading Capital* as a way of explaining the immanently material ways in which knowledge is produced and reproduced. This distinction between makes it possible to diagnose the numerous tensions and contradictions within the academic literature on globalization as stemming from a conflation between various

empirical phenomena and the abstractions designed to explain these phenomena (i.e. knowledge). Althusser's main insight is that *objects of knowledge*, like *real objects*, are produced, yet that their production takes place in sites distinct from, yet still immanent to, the world. Therefore, arguing that the concept globalization is rooted upon an object of knowledge— i.e. "the global"—makes it possible to explain how a room full of scholars can produce the very world in which the proverbial elephant comes into being.

Real objects and objects of knowledge

Althusser's critique of *the empiricist conception of knowledge*[20]—laid out in greater detail in Appendix I—starts by examining that process by which various relations between real objects become distilled into knowledge (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 35). In claiming that academic knowledge about globalization represents the "real world," empiricist conceptions of knowledge assume that real objects contain some essential quality that makes them comparably "global." Scholars, for example, might take *real objects* (DVD players, fast food, members of a diasporic population, a 16th century trade route, telecommunications, etc.)[21] and abstract from them a "global" essence. This "global" essence makes it possible to argue, for example, that 16th century trade routes and fast food, despite their incommensurable differences, are both (essentially) "global." The problem with this empiricist conception of knowledge is that it ignores the social processes—the modes of knowledge production— through which real objects are converted into abstractions. For example, only a few decades ago social scientists argued that 16th century trade routes were part of the world-system; today they argue that these routes indicate globalization. There is, in other words, nothing inherent to 16th century trade routes making them either indicative of a world-system or of globalization. Rather the social mode of knowledge production makes these real objects mean different things at different historical moments. To better explain this point, I lay out in greater detail the distinction between real objects and objects of knowledge.

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[20] What Althusser calls *the empiricist conception of knowledge* should not be confused with *empiricism* known more generally in the philosophy of social sciences. While much of Althusser's critique could be applied to empiricism in these discussions, this project is not the place to do so. As such, I only claim to argue that much of the academic literature on globalization follows what Althusser critiques as an empiricist conception of knowledge (i.e. treating "the global" as a pure object that translates particular real objects into a thing called globalization).

[21] It should be noted that *real object* does not just refer to discrete physical entities. Althusser contends that "the mere collection of these 'facts'" are all too often understood as "empirical 'givens'" but even these should be recognized as "facts" produced within a mode of knowledge production (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 44).

A real object, quoting Marx, "exists outside the subject, independent of the process of knowledge" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 40). Objects of knowledge, in contrast, are those objects that populate the terrain of knowledge, and include the various ideas, theories, and understandings of how real objects function and interrelate. An empiricist conception of knowledge, according to Althusser, assumes a direct correlation between the real object and the object of knowledge—i.e. knowledge is an abstract, conceptual representation of the *real world*. A direct correlation is assumed to exist between the cause and effect relationships between real objects and the knowledge claiming to represent these relationships (the academic claim A → B correlates to: phenomena A causing phenomena B in the world). Althusser, in contrast, argues that objects of knowledge are not identical to, or even representative of, the world because knowledge is produced.

In the case of globalization, Althusser encourages us to concern ourselves with what happens between the accumulation of real objects and the ways in which these real objects become knowable in the single concept of "globalization." In empiricist conceptions of knowledge there is no distinction: the movement of goods and peoples, increased telecommunication and travel, etc. is globalization. This assumption, however, depends on the belief that social scientific understanding of *real objects* is mediated through the *a priori* existence of what Althusser calls the *pure object*, namely a real object's essential quality. Empiricist forms of knowledge assume that each real object also contains a pure object, or essence, which make otherwise particular real objects comparable. A heterogeneous collection of real objects—McDonald restaurants, Sony DVD players, finance capital, etc.— can be comparable as examples of globalization if one assumes the *a priori* existence of an essential quality (a pure object) called "the global." Globalization's pure object mediates differences so that otherwise incomparable things become ultimately comparable.

To describe how empiricist forms of knowledge posit a pure essence within a real object, Althusser turns to the metaphor of mining. He argues the empiricist conceptions of knowledge assume that knowledge, like gold, is found only when the outside dirt is removed and the essence of a thing is made visible. In this way, the "real object" can only be "known" once the parts are separated and the essential core becomes visible: "The inessential part occupies the whole of the *outside* of the object, its *visible surface*; while the essential part occupies the *inside* part of the real object, its *invisible* kernel" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 37). An empiricist strips away those particular (and therefore analytically inconsequential) aspects

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of an object and, in doing so, "discovers" an abstraction—"the global." Separating the essential kernel from the particular outer surface makes it possible to compare, for example, the Big Mac made in Minneapolis, the Sony DVD player, and a telephone call between Addis Ababa and London as all essentially the same; that is, all aspects of globalization."[22] Althusser, however, argues that what empiricist conceptions of knowledge take as "discovering" the essence of an object is actually an act of production.

An empiricist conception of knowledge, therefore, rests on the "discovery" of the pure object (i.e. the essence of the real object) within the real object. Furthermore, once discovered, the pure object displaces the real object. In the social sciences pure objects take the form of concepts or variables that—once discovered, defined, controlled for, and shown statistically significant—explain what is actually going on. For example, a social scientist might examine a number of lived practices and conclude that "Argentina is globalizing," when what she is really saying is: "A totality of particular lived material practices that are constantly changing, contradictory, and overdetermined actually, in their essence—and once the irrelevant particularities are removed—reveal the existence of globalization. I am not going to study those particularities—including the shared meaning that constitutes them—but instead focus on the essential qualities of being 'global' and, in doing so, will tell you what is really going on."

Althusser's critique does not concern abstraction per se. Abstraction is necessary to make generalizable claims and to examine and critique complex social structures; abstraction is necessary to produce knowledge. Rather an empiricist conception of knowledge problematically posits an *a priori* relationship between real and pure objects, a false relationship that ignores the social relations—the mode of knowledge production—within which knowledge is produced. However, by assuming that knowledge simply represents the essential qualities of real objects, scholars blind themselves to the mode of knowledge production within which abstractions are produced.

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[22] Many scholars would probably contest this account of empirical knowledge, arguing that empirical knowledge is based on what is observable and not on claims about what is essential. It is important to point out that Althusser is not claiming that empiricists argue that an object's essence has causal properties (i.e. wars do not happen because humans are essentially prone to war). Instead, an object's essential quality—what Althusser calls the "pure object"—comes into being at the level of knowledge production. If Althusser is right that Marx's radical intervention is his observation that only real objects exist, then comparability across difference is only possible if one first produces similarity.

Treating academic knowledge as production, as opposed to representation, is important because the *a priori* positing of abstractions as pure objects facilitates a number of conceptual closures. First, real lived practices become distilled into one-dimensional pure objects. If eating a Big Mac or buying a Sony DVD player become defined as essentially "global" then the radical plurality of what these practices mean becomes ultimately irrelevant. For example, what it means to eat Big Macs in China can be structured in many different ways: as a challenge to parental control, an anti-Communist political statement, a matter of curiosity, a romantic gesture, etc. However, when social scientists decided that eating a Big Mac is really about globalization, other worlds are foreclosed. If all the existing worlds created by consuming Big Macs in China are boiled down to "cultural globalization" then the actually existing diversity of practices (and knowledges about these practices) gets bracketed off by the seemingly self-evident claim that globalization is taking place.

Empiricist knowledges also tend to prioritize the requirements of social sciences over the particularities of those social relations being studied. The reduction of deeply complex and often contradictory lived social practices to their "essential" core is often driven by a quest for parsimony, linear causality, and theory building. While social scientists often recognize that the real world is too complex to be fully captured in academic representations, these caveats often accompany the claim that despite these difficulties simplifications are better than nothing and that abandoning them renders the whole social scientific project impossible. Defenses of empiricist conceptions of knowledge based on the requirements of parsimony and theory building, however, assume that empiricist knowledge necessarily moves scholarship closer to (not farther from) reality. In other words, the assumption that empiricist conceptions of knowledge offer more accuracy assume that—beneath the complex, constant, and contradictory reproduction of social life—there exists in the first place an essential truth to be discovered. This assumption only makes sense if one starts from the assumption of linear causality rather than overdetermined causality (Appendix I).

I want to argue instead that, in contrast to empiricist conceptions of knowledge, starting from the assumption of overdetermination (see Appendix I) actually provides a more scientific, and potentially more radical, starting point for the social sciences. Actual existing complexity does not simply disappear because it proves inconvenient for empiricist knowledge claims. Instead, starting from the assumption of overdetermined complexity makes it possible to understand social scientific knowledge as production. Understanding

knowledge as production breaks the tendency to rely upon a belief that the real objects being studied as globalization as contain a "global" essence. Instead, I turn toward understanding academic knowledge as production to explain why the prevailing tensions and contradictions cannot be exorcized from the globalization literature.

The mode of knowledge production

If knowledge is not—as empiricists conceptions of knowledge often claim—a representation of knowable things operating within relationships of cause and effect, then what is knowledge? For this question, I turn to Althusser's argument that real objects only become transformed into objects of knowledge through a *mode of knowledge production*. Althusser starts this argument with a description of how Marx has already undermined an empiricist theory of knowledge by imploding the distinction between real and pure objects, contending that only the real object exists. What gets posited as a pure object is itself a real object (i.e. not something essential but something socially produced). For example, when someone claims that China is globalizing, not only is China a real object, not only are the electronics, clothing, and plastic accessories coming to the United States real objects, and not only are the dollars leaving the United States real objects—the claim that "China is globalizing" is itself a real object. This claim to knowledge is produced and circulated within material relations just as electronics, garments, plastics, dollars, and yuan are produced and circulated within different—and sometimes similar—social relations. In this way, real objects are never a "'pure' sensuous intuition or mere 'representation'" but always "an *ever-already* complex raw material" that exists within a structured set of social relations (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 43). Real objects—boats, trans-Atlantic telephone calls, Hollywood films, NAFTA, coffee beans, a Chinese restaurant in Minneapolis, speaking English in India, etc.— are the raw material with which knowledge is reproduced. As such, there is nothing essential to these real objects that make them "global." In fact, only when these real objects are "worked on" is the raw material transformed into an object of knowledge. The work of turning real objects into objects of knowledge, however, does not occur simply in the minds of academics but within a mode of knowledge production. It should be noted, however, that the relationship between real objects and objects of knowledge is not a relationship between "material" and "ideal." Instead, real objects are constantly being converted into objects of

knowledge and objects of knowledge are also material; they are produced within material relations and have material consequences.

While Althusser contends that "the production process of knowledge" takes place entirely "in the 'head' or in thought" he does not mean that thought should be understood in terms of "an idealism of consciousness." Thought, for Althusser, "is not a faculty of a transcendental subject [i.e. the empiricist] or absolute consciousness confronted by the real world as *matter* [i.e. Hegelian Spirit]; nor is this thought a faculty of a psychological subject" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 41). Instead, thought is "the historically constituted system" of an "*apparatus of thought,*" which is "founded on and articulated to natural and social reality" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 41). Thought "is defined by the systems of real conditions which make it…a determinate *mode of production* of knowledges" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 41). In this way, thought is not mental activity but the labor of mixing real objects of study, theory, and historical relations; thought is "constituted by a structure which combines" other objects—the raw material upon which thought labors—with the "theoretical means of production available (its theory, its method and its technique, experimental or otherwise) and the historical relations (both theoretical, ideological and social) in which it produces" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 41). While knowledge production operates at the level of thought, thought is always instantiated within and in relation to other registers of human activity.

In conclusion, studying globalization as an object of knowledge means refusing the temptation—shared by those who study it as a concept that references the world as well as by those who study it as an ideology, discourse, or multiplicity—to posit an essential "global" that gives analytical coherence to an otherwise incoherent thing. Studying globalization as an object of knowledge, however, does not mean that globalization is not "real." As an object of knowledge, globalization is real in being produced within various social relations and as having various effects. However, unlike with empiricist approaches to globalization, studying globalization as an object of knowledge means rejecting the belief that the concept of globalization references a thing "out there"—a phenomenon independent of the knowledge being produced. The realness of globalization, in other words, has nothing to do with an empirically knowable thing called globalization and everything to do with the very material ways in which real objects get manufactured into knowledge.

While the raw material of knowledge has changed, these changes are produced (and reproduced by) profound transformations in knowledge production. In other words, the relatively recent and massive production of academic knowledge on globalization laid out in the beginning of this chapter can instead be read as an overdetermined effect of the changing mode of knowledge production itself. I describe this restructuring at length in Chapters Four and Five.

It might be asked: What happens when social scientists abandon the assumption that globalization is a concept that refers to an "actually existing" world "out there"? How, in other words, is social scientific knowledge possible if scholars treat globalization as an object of knowledge? In the next chapter I argue that new methods of reading make it possible to study globalization as an object of knowledge. A symptomatic reading identifies the absence of Africa in the globalization literature, making it possible see how the academic literature produces "the global" as an essentialized totality (i.e. a pure object).

CHAPTER 2: READING "THE GLOBAL"
IN THE ABSENCE OF AFRICA

> *To judge from recent academic output, sub-Saharan Africa, wrapped in a cloak of impenetrability, has become the black hole of reason…One consequence of this blindness is that African politics and economics have been condemned to appear in social theory only as the sign of a lack, while the discourse of political science and development economics has become that of a quest for the causes of that lack.*
>
> —Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*

The previous chapter diagnosed a number of contradictions and tensions within the globalization literature and identified "the global" as that reoccurring essentialized object that routinely appears to render discussion of globalization coherent. While scholars recognize that globalization is complex, fluid, ideological, discursive, "means many things to many people" etc., "the global" stands out as the agreed upon thing—a social fact—giving discussions of globalization their conceptual coherence. This chapter, however, argues that "the global" is not an essential thing, as the globalization literature assumes, but is produced. Producing "the global" entails universalizing some lived material experiences while ignoring and marginalizing others. "Africa" is not only a glaring absence in the globalization literature but a silence that makes the production of "the global" possible. While some scholars try to "bring Africa back in" to conversations of globalization, I argue instead that "the global" is actually produced in relation to the absence of Africa. In other words, Africa cannot simply be added to the globalization literature, since "the global" depends upon Africa's absence. This argument, however, requires first developing a method of reading that treats knowledge as *productive* of the world rather than merely reflecting it. To study academic knowledge as production, I turn toward Althusser's *symptomatic reading*, a method of reading that identifies the absences within a text in order to discover what the text produces.

I am not arguing that the sign "Africa" is entirely absent in the globalization literature. While "Africa" does make fleeting appearances, the literature routinely lacks an inclusion of Africa as what Ferguson calls a "place-in-the-world" (Ferguson 2006, 6; see Introduction, p. 8-11). Africa—when referenced at all—is almost exclusively portrayed as a problem (violence, corruption, economic collapse, etc.) to be solved rather than a world in which, in the words of Achille Mbembe, "the African subject…like any other human being…engages in *meaningful acts*" (Mbembe 2001, 6; see Introduction, p. 8-11). In rendering

Africa "local" and "exceptional"—simply a geographical space of crisis—scholars can produce "the global" as "not Africa." As such, the absence of Africa remains within the globalization literature and makes it possible to produce "the global."

My reading of Africa's absence in the globalization literature takes place at two levels. A first reading identifies the absence of Africa, questions the cause of the absence, and critiques the globalization literature for failing to include Africa. Althusser calls this method of reading *surface level* because it assumes that an absence simply denotes *an already existing (yet ignored) presence.* According to a surface-level reading, Africa is already "global" and the literature merely needs to see what already exists in order to better represent what globalization really is. Althusser, however, argues that texts also contain a secondary register—an unconscious—existing beneath the surface. The first section of this chapter draws on James Ferguson's *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* to illustrate how the absence of Africa can be read through a surface-level reading of the globalization literature. According to Ferguson, the absence of Africa can be ameliorated by offering a more "Africa-focused picture of globalization."

While a first reading identifies and fills in various absences, a symptomatic reading unearths the text's unconscious, thereby analyzing what these absences actually produce. A second reading of the globalization literature shows that the absence of Africa is not simply an oversight but instead symptomatic of what the text actually produces, namely "the global." The second half of the chapter subjects four influential texts on globalization to a symptomatic reading (Held et al., 1999; Sassen, 1998; Stiglitz, 2003; Appadurai, 2000). In reading these four texts symptomatically I show how each author produces "the global" in relation to the absence of Africa.

While I provide a working introduction to symptomatic reading in this chapter, readers interested in a more technical and theoretical explanation can turn to Appendix II.

A First Reading of the Globalization Literature

Within the academic literature on globalization, one of the most significant and recurring absences is Africa. Magubane and Zeleza, for example, argue that "Africa is claimed…to be marginal and in crisis both in epistemological and economic terms, African polities, economies, societies, and studies are [treated as] irrelevant to globalization" (2004, 165). Furthermore, because the globalization literature focuses almost exclusively on "how

contemporary Western practices and productions affect the rest of the world," much of the globalization literature "references the postcolonial only rarely and then rather simplistically or reductively" (Krishnaswamy 2007, 2). In this way, Africa is either completely absent from the literature or, when visible, presented as a problem and exception. This point is summarized by Ferguson when he contends that the "enormous recent literature on globalization so far has had remarkably little to say about Africa. Astonishingly, the entire continent is often simply ignored altogether, even in the most ambitious and ostensibly all-encompassing narratives" of globalization (Ferguson 2006, 25). When present in the literature, Africa is treated as globalization's "shadow"—an ephemeral distortion of globalization (Ferguson 2006).

In *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*, Ferguson offers one of the best examples of what Althusser would call a first reading of the globalization literature. He identifies the fact that Africa, as a place-in-the-world, is largely absent within the globalization literature and tries to right this wrong by reorienting the literature's gaze to more deliberately focus on Africa. Ferguson identifies two possible causes for Africa's absence. First, the numerous failed structural-adjustment programs in Africa have forced advocates of globalization "to talk about Asian tigers and Southeast Asian dragons, since they have a hard time finding any lions among the many African nations" (Ferguson 2006, 26). Secondly, critics tend to challenge globalization as a neocolonial expansion of Western capital which, once again, leaves Africa ignored due to "the inconvenient fact…that Africa's hardships have very little to do with being overrun with Western factories and consumer goods" (Ferguson 2006, 26).

After documenting Africa's absence, Ferguson argues that including Africa in scholarly analysis offers new and invaluable opportunities for understanding globalization. Ferguson writes that

> a reading of recent interdisciplinary scholarship on Africa can help to *reveal* the quite specific ways in which Africa is, and is not, "global" and thereby *shed surprising new light* on our understanding of what "globalization" may mean at present. *What we see*…depends on where we are looking from. *Looking* at "globalization" from the *vantage point* provided by recent research focused on Africa *brings into visibility* things that might otherwise be *overlooked* and forces us to think harder about issues that might otherwise be passed over or left unresolved. (Ferguson 2006, 29; emphasis added)

Significantly, Ferguson describes his reading of Africa's location within the globalization literature using a number of sight and vision-related metaphors. In performing what

Althusser calls a first reading, Ferguson identifies that which he assumes already exist (i.e. Africa as "global") but remains not-yet-visible. Ferguson then sets out to bring this already existing reality into focus and, in doing so, "bring into visibility things that might otherwise be overlooked."

Ferguson convincingly argues that globalization studied with an eye toward Africa differs substantially from those accounts that are blinded to Africa. First of all, bringing Africa into focus challenges the "peculiarly poor metaphor" of globalization as "flows" (Ferguson 2006, 47). What "confront[s] us when we examine Africa's experience of globalization" is that globalization does not operate "via spatial contiguity" but rather as the "point-to-point connectivity and networking of enclaves" (Ferguson 2006, 47). Ferguson argues that an "Africa-focused picture of globalization" is not "simply a matter [of] adding a new piece to an otherwise intact picture (as in the old cliché about the five blind men and the elephant)" (Ferguson 2006, 66). Instead scholars should push for greater diversity of knowledge brought about by expanding the perspectives from which globalization is viewed: *seeing* Africa as "global" offers a broader, more inclusive understanding of globalization.

A first reading of the globalization literature assumes that academic knowledge *reflects* an already existing—if incorrectly viewed—world. While Ferguson argues that scholars should proliferate representations of globalization, he remains committed to the conception of academic knowledge as reflective of—rather than productive of—the world. While Ferguson's book offers a penetrating investigation into what happens when Africa is integrated into an analysis of globalization, his "Africa-focused picture of globalization" does not analyze the ways in which Africa's absence is productive. In presenting the absence of Africa as a problem to be solved by great inclusion, Ferguson fails to appreciate how Africa's absence is very much present within the concept of globalization. The *presence of Africa's absence*, in other words, produces "the global."

READING THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON GLOBALIZATION SYMPTOMATICALLY

Althusser argues that Marx's most significant theoretical innovation was conceptualizing knowledge as production (Althusser and Balibar 1999). That is, Marx thinks of knowledge not simply as reflecting an already existing world but instead producing new social relations. For Marx (and Althusser), living labor produces knowledge within structured material relations. As such, knowledge structures (and is structured by) overdetermined

relations of production. The contradictions and tensions defining these relations of production become embodied within a text's unconscious, ensuring that a text contains more than what the author consciously intends. Each text, therefore, contains multiple texts—the surface-level, which claims to represent the author's intentions, and all the others composed within the text's "silences, blanks and repressions" (Davis 2001, 303). Reading in ways that identify what a text produces at the register of its unconscious requires reading a text's symptoms—those slips and stammers, absences and erasures, contradictions and tensions that persist despite an author's best effort to present the text as a coherent whole. Althusser arrives at his theory of symptomatic reading by tracing Marx's reading of Ricardo and Smith. He notices that Marx identifies the absences in these texts not only to critique the arguments but to identify what the authors produced without their knowledge. Althusser argues that Marx recognized that the classical economists actually *produce* the object "labor-power" despite believing themselves to be merely *reflecting upon* the concept "labor" (see Appendix II).

In this section I symptomatically read four major texts within the academic literature on globalization: David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton's *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford University Press, 1999), Saskia Sassen's *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money* (The New Press, 1998), Joseph Stiglitz's *Globalization and Its Discontents* (W.W. Norton, 2003), and Arjun Appadurai's introduction of the *Public Culture* issue on globalization (Volume 12, Issue 1). I choose these texts because, in addition to being widely cited, they illustrate major themes within the globalization literature.[1] While these authors approach globalization in different and often competing ways, each text produces "the global"—an abstraction that transforms provincial claims into a transcendent universal (Introduction, p. 5-7). The production of "the global," in other words, transforms the raw material of actually existing complexity,

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[1] I recognize the impossibility of offering a symptomatic reading of the entire academic literature on globalization, or even some representative sub-sample of it. Instead, I have chosen these four texts because they are widely cited but also groundbreaking in their approaches to globalization. Held et al. is one of the most cited texts on globalization and developed the transformationalist approach to globalization. Sassen's study of "the global city" is one of the most sophisticated attempts to examine how globalization manifests itself within particular locations. Stiglitz's book is a successful crossover between academic and public audiences—making it an agenda-setting book at the academic and policy levels. Appadurai offers one of the most compelling accounts of globalization from a postcolonial perspective. Because the absence of Africa is a product of asymmetrical relations of academic knowledge production (see Chapters Four and Five), I expect that additional studies will confirm the trend I identify in these four examples.

particularity, and overdetermined social relations into a single abstracted and knowable object.

These four texts all produce "the global" by vacating existing heterogeneity and contradictions that an inclusion of Africa would disrupt. For example, Held *et al.* identify six advanced industrial countries as the touchstones of their study and, in so doing, produce "the global" as a world of vast telecommunications and transportation infrastructure, unprecedented levels of trade, rapid circulation of finance capital, and shared liberal norms. All exceptions—such as the colonial experience—are rendered absent in order to present "the global" as a single coherent thing. As such, the four texts universalize some particular social relations—six advanced industrial countries, a handful of cities, the International Monetary Fund, and grassroots movements—as essentially "global." Observations drawn from these particular objects are then articulated not as provincial but as "global."

Producing "the global" as liberal governance

The text *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (1999) by Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton is an exceptionally exhaustive attempt at defining, measuring, and classifying globalization. Written by some of the most respected scholars on the topic, this book also holds an important position within the globalization literature for launching the transformationalist theory of globalization, which conceives of globalization as "a long-term historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and…shaped by conjunctural factors" (Held et al. 1999, 7). Held et al.'s sprawling project contains voluminous historical and statistical evidence and is one of the most cited books on globalization.[2]

Like many studies of globalization, *Global Transformations* starts with the recognition that globalization, despite the term's wide usage, "lacks [a] precise definition" and is therefore "in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliché of our times: the big idea which encompasses everything from global financial markets to the Internet but which delivers little substantive insight into the contemporary human condition" (Held et al. 1999, 1). The authors recognize that while globalization clearly captures the "contemporary zeitgeist," it remains unclear whether globalization "delivers any added value" (Held et al. 1999, 1). For the authors, much of the problem hinges on the fact that "[d]espite a vast and

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[2] This book has been cited 1,497 times according to Google Scholar and 750 times in articles listed on the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI). The Google Scholar search was completed on September 24th, 2008 and the SSCI search was completed on June 20th, 2008.

expanding literature there is, somewhat surprisingly, no cogent theory of globalization"
(Held et al. 1999, 1). This lack of a coherent understanding of globalization motivates the
authors to answer the questions: "What is globalization?", "Does contemporary globalization
represent a novel condition?", "Does contemporary globalization impose new limits on
politics?", and "How can globalization be 'civilized' and democratized?" (Held et al. 1999, 1-
2).

In a surface-level reading, Africa is one of the most glaring silences in *Global
Transformations*. Despite the book's sweeping ambition, the authors describe globalization
through a sustained analysis of only six states, all in advanced capitalist countries:

> Mapping the shape and political consequences of globalization is the key objective of the
> chapters that follow. But the range of states which will be considered will be restricted first
> and foremost to states in advanced capitalist societies (SIACS). There are two justifications
> for narrowing the enquiry in this way. First, if globalization does impact on sovereign
> statehood it is the SIACS, as the principal model and locus of modern statehood, which
> provide the strongest test of its political ramifications. Second, in the globalization debate
> the hyperglobalizers, the transformationalists and the skeptics make radically different claims
> about the fate of SIACS. This study seeks to evaluate these competing claims. However, it
> does so by concentrating the enquiry on six specific SIACS, namely the US, UK, Sweden,
> France, Germany and Japan. (Held et al. 1999, 30)

Not only do Held *et al.* "map" the "shape" of globalization according to these six countries;
the conclusions they draw from this exercise are extended to explain developments around
the world. While great care is taken to show the history and complexity of globalization in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany, and Japan, much of the
rest of the world—and most notably Africa—appear as undifferentiated and one-
dimensional. Africa is most present in various tables of data in which the continent as a
whole is compared to other parts of the world on issues ranging from democratization, arms
production, U.N. peacekeeping, foreign investment, international bonds issued, radio and
television ownership, and rates of deforestation (Held et al. 1999, 47, 118, 126-129, 194,
212, 213, 351, 358 & 403). Presented as an undifferentiated continent, there are very few
references to specific African countries, no recognition of the multiplicity of lived material
practices in Africa and no acknowledgement of the now vast African diaspora.[3]

When Africa does appear in *Global Transformations* it is as a peripheral site of enduring
crisis. For example, the economy of sub-Saharan African economy is described in terms of
"immiseration," "desertification," and "social decline" (Held et al. 1999, 379). Africa's

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[3] The same is true of references to Asia and South America (although to a lesser extent) seeing as more
country-specific examples are drawn from these continents.

historical relation to globalization is presented almost exclusively in relation to slavery and colonialism. For example, Held et al. argue that between 1500 and 1850 European expansion "was not truly global" because the "capacity to penetrate either Africa or Asia" was limited (Held et al. 1999, 418). This passage coincides with an odd recognition that globalization (qua colonialism?) affected Europeans more than Africans: "the greatest impact of these global [colonial?] encounters was on Europe itself" (Held et al. 1999, 420).

While a first reading would ask how knowledge of globalization would differ if Africa was more present, a second reading pushes the question. Instead of trying to correct the glaring absence through greater inclusion of Africa, a symptomatic reading would ask what is produced in the absence of Africa? I answer this question by drawing on three chapters in *Global Transformations* to illustrate how this text does not simply represent an already "global" world but actually produces "the global" as a thing primed for European-style liberal governance.

The absence of Africa plays a profoundly productive role in Held et al.'s second chapter, "The Territorial State of Global Politics." This chapter starts by examining the transition from empire into modern nation-states before exploring the future of global governance. While recognizing Chinese, Japanese and Islamic civilizations in the "beginning of the second millennium" (Held et al. 1999, 33), Held et al. focus almost exclusively on European empires and the transition from monarchical rule to territorial nation-state. At each turn the authors point out that, despite setbacks, liberal governance is on the march. In the Westphalian model, for example, the authors see the arrival of a political system "consist[ing] of…sovereign territorial states" and in which "[a]ll states are regarded as equal before the law" (Held et al. 1999, 37-8). The authors fail to mention that in the 17th century (and for many centuries since) Europeans applied this model of sovereignty exclusively to the metropole and not, for example, to the slave coast of Africa or the Caribbean plantation colonies. Held et al. then claim that the rise of global governance originates in "the [imperial?] expansion of Europe" which brought about greater "interconnections between states" including the "pursuit and management of interstate relations through diplomacy" (Held et al. 1999, 38). In prioritizing interconnectivity over contradiction, Held et al. fail to confront the fact that most diplomacy during this period concerned expediting control over the colonies (i.e. the 1884 Berlin Conference) and most "trade" was between colony and metropole.

Despite the centrality of slavery and colonialism to the story of European expansion, Held et al. find themselves unable even to mention the terms. In focusing exclusively on the emergence of the liberal nation-states, Held et al. have no account of the non-European Other, the plantation and the slave ship or the resistances to European expansion. The absence of Africa, in other words, makes it possible to present the expansion of Europe as simply the unfolding of an increasingly liberal "global" order: the replication of an idealized European liberalism outside Europe. For example, Held et al. write that:

> The expansion of Europe led also to the dismantling of old, non-European interstate connections. Key features of the modern states system—the centralization of political power, the expansion of state administration, territorial rule, the diplomatic system, the emergence of regular, standing armies—which existed in Europe in embryo in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were to become prevalent features of the global order. The main vehicle for this was, to begin with, the European states' capacity for overseas operations by means of military and naval forces capable of long-range navigation. (Held et al. 1999, 39)

The silence of the slave trade and the African colony is deafening given that the destruction of monarchal authority by a colonial merchant and plantation class is precisely what Held et al. allude to when they discuss "the dismantling of old, non-European interstate connections" made possible by "overseas operations" and "long-range navigation." Later, Held et al. discuss the use of the British navy and military to "reinforce London's position as the centre of world trade and finance" without mentioning where (and how) this newfound wealth was procured. At a particularly instructive moment, Held et al. even argue that European countries routinely "clashed in colonial territories" to protect "the 'jewels in the crown'" of their empires (Held et al. 1999, 39)—failing to mention that European force was primarily directed at indigenous populations.

In short, Held et al.'s recounting of the expansion of European empire omits the slave trade and the African colony in order to focus on the rise of European powers as democratic, liberal states. This point is made explicit when Held et al. write "[i]n Africa, for example, the imperialists succeeded best when they followed the recommendations of a British parliamentary committee" in adopting the policy of indirect rule (Held et al. 1999, 41). In other words, the colonized subjects are made absent in order to make the point that much was gained (i.e. better techniques of exploitation) when the government followed the advice of a democratically elected parliament. The chapter moves from this treatment of European empire to an exploration of the rise of "global politics" after World War II when "the modern nation-state" became "the principle type of political rule across the globe" and

"crystallized as *liberal* or *representative democracy*" (Held et al. 1999, 46). While Held et al. stand in awe of the "three 'waves' of democratization," they remain completely silent about the bloody decades in which Africans fought wars of liberation against European "liberal" powers.

Africa remains absent not only in the narration of globalization's past but also in the outline of global governance's future. Held et al. conclude this chapter with the recognition that global governance is not the emergence of a singular sovereign but more closely resembles what Hedley Bull calls a "new medievalism" (Held et al. 1999, 85-6) While "this world of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties" could be described in many ways, Held et al. end their chapter with only one example of this new medievalism: "A prime illustration of this [new medievalism] is the European Union, which is constituted by overlapping authorities and contested loyalties" and "poses rather dramatically the question of where the proper place lies for political authority, action and accountability: the nation-state or the international body?" (Held et al. 1999, 85 & 86). Held et al. can identify the European Union as a model of global governance because their narration of globalization treats "the global" as an expansion of European liberalism around the world. The absence of the colonial world in general, and the African colonies in particular, make it possible for Held et al. to produce "the global" as a seemingly natural unfolding of (European) liberal values, the logical extension of which is the European Union. Held et al., in other words, produce "the global" by universalizing European liberal institutionalism while rendering practices of colonialism absent.

In a second example, the production of "the global" can be seen in Held et al.'s distinction between "global" migration and "regional" migration. The authors argue that "Sub-Saharan Africa has generated significant global flows of migrants in the post-war era, mainly to ex-colonial states: Nigerian, Tanzanian and Ugandan Asians have migrated to the UK; Central and West Africans to France; Zairians to Belgium" (Held et al. 1999, 301). They contrast these migration patterns with "[r]egional labour migrations [that] have flowed primarily to Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon and the Ivory Coast" (Held et al. 1999, 301). In other words, the migration of peoples between African countries and Europe are "global flows"—even from Algeria to France—while movement between African countries are "regional flows." Held et al. write, for example:

The contemporary era is witnessing a very complex pattern of overlapping and interacting global and regional migratory flows of both an economic and non-economic nature. At *the centre of these global flows have been economically driven migrations to OECD countries…*The other large migratory flows have been regional and have developed apace from the 1960s within South East Asia, western and southern Africa, Latin America and within the Middle East. (Held et al. 1999, 303; emphasis added)

In other words, Held et al. consider migration "global" if it flows through the very same advanced industrial countries already at the center of their analysis. Furthermore, the authors simply assume that migration to OECD countries is a response to economic opportunity and *not* violence, while migration between African countries is primarily a response to violence. It is inconceivable to Held et al. that one would migrate to Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, or Botswana in order to seek greater economic opportunity. The distinction between *global (i.e. economic) migration* and *regional (i.e. conflict-related) migration*, is made explicit when Held et al. claim that "global" migrations flows are "economically driven, leaving political borders untouched" (Held et al. 1999, 305). And again: "[w]hile *Western Europe and the USA* have been touched by…*global migrations*, the vast majority [of migrations] have been regionally concentrated in areas of conflict in Asia and Africa" (Held et al. 1999, 303; emphasis added). This distinction is used to differentiate "the slave trade and the movements of Asian labour…organized 'from above'" and therefore based on violence and contemporary migration overseen by employment ministries, agencies, and recruitment firms that organize the "more spontaneous pressures for migration" (Held et al. 1999, 314).[4]

Since "global" migration is economically motivated it can be regulated by liberal institutions and integrated through consensual economic exchange—rather than conflict and violence. For example, Held et al. write that while the "regulation of the migratory process remains nugatory" institutions like the International Labour Organization (ILO) have "sought to establish basic rules regarding the treatment of labour…But only in the European Union has any stringent international legal framework for labour been established" (Held et al. 1999, 314-15). Of course "global" migration could not be regulated by the ILO or EU— or by any institution—if one considers the displacement of people in Rwanda to Goma, from Somalia to Kenya or from Sudan to Chad as examples of "global" migration. In other words, the deployment of the arbitrary distinction between global/OECD/economic migration and "regional" migration produces "the global" as an already integrated space of

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[4] This seems to oddly suggest that slavery is defined more by its violent character than its economic function.

potential regulation and liberal governance, i.e. a world without contradiction that can eventually be governed by the rule of law and pacific economic relations.

A final example of how "the global" is produced in relation to the absence of Africa can be found in the last chapter of *Global Transformations* were Held et al. present their argument for how "contemporary globalization" can "be 'civilized' and democratized" (Held et al. 1999, 414).[5] The authors recognize that even though "processes of globalization may be physically uniting the globe…they are not necessarily engendering the sense of global community on which the legitimacy of global democratic governance would depend" (Held et al. 1999, 451). They argue that the potential democratic governance of "the globe" is challenged by "accelerating globalization," which may actually be "intensif[ying] and generat[ing] conflicts" (Held et al. 1999, 451). Possible threats to "global democratic politics" include the "'Asian way' of democracy" and those "African indigenous democratic traditions" that reinforce "cultural divisions and global fragmentation" (Held et al. 1999, 451). In fact, Held et al. recognize that there "is no shortage of commentators who foresee that the contemporary international system must, and must always, be understood in terms of endemic conflict and inequality" (Held et al. 1999, 451).

However, instead of giving voice to these unnamed Asian and African critics of liberal global governance, Held et al. instead offer "a more optimistic reading of the prospects of political community and democratic politics" (Held et al. 1999, 451). Again, pointing to examples from Europe, they highlight the fact that "[j]ust over fifty years ago Europe was at the point of self-destruction" but has since "created new mechanisms of collaboration, new instruments of human rights enforcement and political institutions" (Held et al. 1999, 452). In the final lines of the book Held et al. declare that "[o]ur political institutions will have to change if some of *our* more cherished notions…are to retain their relevance and efficacy in the millennium ahead" (Held et al. 1999, 452; emphasis added). In making the experience of African colonialism absent, and therefore burying some damning critiques of "our political institutions" and "our cherished notions," Held et al. once again posit European liberalism as the exquisite model for global governance. Doing so universalizes European and liberal practices of government by declaring them "global." As a

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[5] Note the use of scare quotes around "civilized" as if Held et al. are aware of the neo-colonial implications of associating globalization with "civilization."

result, the heterogeneous and conflictual world is replaced by a single "global" reality already defined as a potential sphere of liberal governance.

In *Global Transformations*, the absence of Africa produces "the global" as the universal (and desirable) unfolding of liberal governance. Held et al. recognize that globalization is a highly fluid, contradictory, complex, and multifaceted concept; a concept that reflects a shared reality—even if this reality is experienced differently by people in different locations. It is, however, only because Held et al. produce "the global"—the gradual, if uneven and sporadic, unfolding of universal liberalism—that this incoherent thing gains some semblance of coherence. Everything from the spread of *Homo sapiens* to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Held et al. 1999, 414 & 427) is "global" because, in some way or another, it participates in the universal unfolding of liberal values. Furthermore, the colonization of Africa, inter-continental migration, tribal identity, etc. are all considered "local" or "regional." This assertion is not made because they lack those qualities that makes thing *essentially* global but because treating them as "global" undoes the idealized image of "the global" as an already existing unified space of potential liberal governance.

Producing "the global" as the fluidity of capital

Saskia Sassen's book, *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*, is a collection of essays written over fifteen years and published together in 1998. In addition to being widely cited,[6] these essays have affected the academic discussion of globalization by offering one of the most compelling examinations of globalization's impact on particular, material locations. In showing the "placeboundedness" of "economic globalization" Sassen challenges the "national/global duality," which she rightly argues defines much of the globalization literature (Sassen 1998, xxix). In these essays, Sassen works around three reoccurring themes—migration within the global economy, a feminist analysis of globalization, and a study of "global cities."

Reading *Globalization and Its Discontents* at its surface level, it is possible to identify the silence of Africa, African cities, and even African immigrants within U.S. and European cities. This absence is implicitly justified by Sassen, who explicitly limits her analysis to observing how the "global economy materializes" in "strategic places" (Sassen 1998, xxv).

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[6] This book is cited 813 times according to Google Scholar and 390 times by social science journals listed in the SSCI. The Google Scholar search was completed on September 24, 2008, and the SSCI search was completed on June 20, 2008.

This "global grid," she argues, does not overlay the world equally but is centered in certain "global cities": "the most powerful of these new geographies of centrality" are located in "international financial and business centers" such as "New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sydney, Hong Kong." She also indicates that the new global cities include "São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Taipei, Bombay, and Mexico City" (Sassen 1998, xxv; see also 182). The majority of her analysis, however, is drawn from the study of U.S. cities, and New York in particular. Sassen argues that, as central nodes in the global economy, global cities orchestrate the circulation of capital. Furthermore, the concentration of corporate wealth in global cities attracts immigrant and feminized laborers to fill the service jobs needed to support the financiers growing by wealthy managing the "global" economy.

One could easily argue that Sassen fails to see Cairo, Cape Town, Addis Ababa, Abuja, Lagos, Nairobi, or Johannesburg and that including them in the list of "global" cities makes for a better understanding of global cities and, therefore, globalization itself. However, simply including African cities within Sassen's argument would merely paper over what this absence produces. In the case of Sassen, the absence of Africa produces "the global" as a smooth, contradiction-less space of financial capital.

First, the absence of Africa allows Sassen to conflate "global capital" with "finance capital." Financial capital does not simply flow between cities, as is often portrayed by Sassen; wealth is consolidated and abstracted from relations of production over long periods of time. Often the accumulation of vast pools of finance capital does not simply materialize but often results from extraction taking place in the periphery. In this way, one could argue that Kinshasa, with its nearly 10 million residents and no waterborne sewage system (Davis 2007, 139), is a "global" city precisely because it—like Brussels or New York—is made possible by the vast extraction of wealth from the Congo. In making cities like Kinshasa absent, Sassen represents "global" capital as money that simply circulates between "global" cities, i.e. the circulation of an already highly abstracted wealth. In this way, the financial markets of New York and London are connected to each other, not to the colony. In focusing on a small handful of centripetal cities as the "placeboundedness" of globalization, Sassen treats capital as already financial capital. In short, the absence of Africa makes it possible to treat only certain cities as "global" because one never has to confront the question: *Where does the surplus that is financial capital come from?*

Similarly absent in Sassen's work is an account of the city as live material practices. Mbembe and Nuttal argue that African cities offer an alternative to the "the 'global city' paradigm" because they challenge the "economicism and the poverty of its understanding of citiness" (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004, 360). Sassen's concept of the "global city" ignores the degree to which the city "also comprises actual people, images and architectural forms, footprints and memories; the city is a place of manifold rhythms, a world of sounds, private freedom, pleasures, and sensations" (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004, 360). In most of Sassen's essays, a small handful of "global" cities—and often just New York—are universalized as examples of the frictionless circulation of already financial capital, not as lived spaces rendered meaningful by those inhabiting them.[7] Representing the city as a frictionless conduit of finance capital depends upon making absent the open-air markets and crowded bus stands—whether in Johannesburg or Brooklyn—and universalizing instead the experience of Wall Street traders and the industry serving them.

Sassen's universalization of financial capital as "global" capital is made possible by the absence of the African city in her analysis. On the one hand, this absence makes global cities "global" and therefore logical places to examine the "placeboundedness" of globalization:

> Including cities into an analysis of economic globalization allows us to reconceptualize processes of economic globalization as concrete economic complexes situated in specific places. A focus on cities decomposes the national economy into a variety of subnational components, some profoundly articulated with the global economy and others not…Because it *allows us to see* the multiplicity of economies and work cultures in which the global information economy is embedded. (Sassen 1998, ixx-xx; emphasis added)

That being said, the placebounded globalization Sassen sees is not life within a chaotic and lived city but instead the one-dimensional smooth world of finance capital. While claiming to break down the "national economy," Sassen actually replaces it with a "global" economy abstracted from a small handful of "subnational components." The "global" economy, however, is not presented as a totality of production but rather as the contradiction-less circulation of financial capital between a handful of cities.

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[7] Paul Stoller provides an interesting account of the "Africanization" of New York. He writes that: "Most writers who have discussed 'the new immigration' stress how it has resulted from the economic and social dislocations brought on by globalization. Their analyses are illuminating but seldom do justice to the stories of real men and women who have left their families to come to places like New York City to earn a living" (2002, 6).

On the one hand, Sassen's argument can be read as an illuminating analysis about how financial centers operate. However, her analysis does not claim to be about financial centers but about "global" cities and, specifically, global cities as sites to study globalization. Her handful of cites can only be considered "global" by first rendering invisible cities not rivaling New York and London—including all African cities. When Sassen studies New York as a "global" city (rather than as a particular site of concentrated financial capital) she universalizes New York as "global." In doing so, she produces "the global" as a smooth circulation of already extracted value, a cosmopolitan site with inequality but without contradiction. This is why Sassen argues that a more equitable globalization can be achieved through the regulation of financial markets (Sassen 1998, 214).[8]

Producing "the global" as finely tuned financial machine

The globalization literature has always been heavily influenced by non-academic and popular discourses and, as a consequence, travels farther into the public domain than most academic literatures. Few texts within the globalization literature have been as successful in facilitating the cross-pollination of academic and non-academic thinking as Joseph Stiglitz's *Globalization and Its Discontents*. The Nobel Prize-winning Columbia University professor of economics first published his book in 2002; it has since appeared on the national bestseller list, has been translated into more than twenty-five languages, has been taught in numerous classes, and is heavily cited in the academic literature on globalization.[9] Part of the success of *Globalization and its Discontents* owes to the fact that Stiglitz himself moved between academic and policy circles as a member of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers and as senior vice president of the World Bank. According to Stiglitz, this non-academic experience led him to write *Globalization and Its Discontents*: "while at the World Bank, I saw firsthand the devastating effect that globalization can have on developing countries, and especially the poor within those countries" (Stiglitz 2003, ix).

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[8] For example, Sassen concludes the book with the observation that "decoding globalization" can take place through an examination of a "transnational geography of centrality consisting of multiple linkages and strategic connections," i.e. a study of the "global" city. When globalization is studied in the location of the "global" city, the "existence of…a transnational grid of places and linkages that constitute the infrastructure of the globalization of finance and other specialized services points to regulatory possibilities. Precisely because of its strategic character and because of the density of resources and linkages it concentrates, this new geography of centrality could in turn be a space for concentrated regulatory activity" (Sassen 1998, 214).

[9] This book has been cited 3,271 times according to Google Scholar and 399 times in journals listed in the Social Science Citation Index. The Google Scholar search was conducted on September 24, 2008 and the SSCI search was completed on June 20, 2008.

Even while bridging the policy and academic worlds, *Globalization and Its Discontents* approaches globalization in ways similar to the strictly academic literature of globalization. Like other writers, Stiglitz assumes that globalization is "a fact of life" (Stiglitz 2003, 258) and therefore policymakers should focus on what globalization really is and avoid developing policy based on political ideology. To this end Stiglitz establishes himself up as the objective observer, as a true social scientist, who sees globalization for what it really is. After defining his relationship to globalization, Stigliz defines globalization through a list: globalization includes

> the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders. Globalization has been accompanied by the creation of new institutions that have joined with existing ones to work across borders. In the arena of international civil society, new groups, like the Jubilee movement pushing for debt reduction for the poorest countries, have joined long-established organizations like the International Red Cross. Globalization is powerfully driven by international corporations, which move not only capital and goods across borders but also technology. Globalization has also led to renewed attention to long-established international *intergovernmental* institutions: the United Nations, which attempts to maintain peace; the International Labor Organization (ILO), originally created in 1919, which promotes its agenda around the world under the slogan 'decent work'; and the World Health Organization (WHO), which has been especially concerned with improving health conditions in the developing world. (Stiglitz 2003, 9-10)

Based on this extensive definition, Stiglitz suggests that the "phenomenon of globalization" has "been welcomed everywhere" because most people recognize that interconnection brings benefits. He oddly phrases this claim in the apparently self-evident observation that "[n]o one wants to see their child die, when knowledge and medicines are available somewhere else in the world" (Stiglitz 2003, 9 & 10). Stiglitz argues that, while most people generally support globalization, protests in Seattle, Washington, D.C., Genoa, and elsewhere attest to the poor management of the global economy in the hands of the "three main institutions that govern globalization: the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO" (Stiglitz 2003, 10). The IMF receives the brunt of the book's criticism such that it might more accurately be called *The IMF and its Discontents*.[10]

A first reading of *Globalization and Its Discontents* reveals a near total absence of Africa. Stiglitz dedicates the vast majority of his book to examining the East Asian financial crisis (Chapter Four), the Russian meltdown in the late 1990s (Chapter Five), specific U.S. trade

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[10] Koechlin argues that the book "is neither a primer on globalization, nor a careful political economic critique of neo-liberal globalization" but "rather, an intelligent, persuasive polemic against the IMF, neo-liberalism and, to some extent, against Joseph Stiglitz's personal adversaries" (Koechlin 2006, 261).

policies (Chapter Six) and Poland and China's successful refusal of IMF advice (Chapter Seven). Africa appears only in short anecdotes emphasizing larger points.[11] While Stiglitz provocatively mentions that some of his "most important theoretical work" was inspired while in Kenya as a young academic, he does not indicate the specifics of this influence besides a general recognition that "good economic policies have the power to change the lives of these poor people" (Stiglitz 2003, xi). A first reading of this text would identify the oversight of Africa as a limitation that, if corrected, could provide a more inclusive account of globalization. One could argue, for example, that the book would be more complete if it included a chapter on the effects of structural adjustment policies in Africa. Stiglitz recognizes that the text contains many limitations, claiming that the book focuses exclusively on those issues that he confronted during his tenure at the World Bank.[12]

A symptomatic reading of this text, however, illustrates how the absence of Africa actually produces "the global" as a slightly off-kilter yet fundamentally well-running economy. In drawing examples primarily from the Asian financial crisis and the economic meltdown of the former Soviet Union, Stiglitz defines crises in globalization as resulting from short-term policy mistakes. It follows then that these crises can be rectified by astute policy changes. The absence of Africa makes it possible to ignore the vicious legacy of structural adjustment as well as the decades of massive indebtedness experienced by many African countries. Stiglitz also ignores the well documented failure of IMF and World Bank to bring about development in Africa (for example: Ferguson 1994) or the complicity of the IMF and World Bank in promoting violence and genocide in Africa (cf.: Kamola 2007). While Mittelman rightly points out that for Stiglitz "structural problems are reduced to management issues" (Mittelman 2004, 132), his analysis does not go far enough. Stiglitz is not just reducing structural crisis to bad management, he is also producing "the global" as an

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[11]The most extensive attention to Africa comes in the vignette about the flawed advice the IMF gave to Ethiopia. Stiglitz also uses the "villages of Africa, Nepal, Mindanao, or Ethiopia" as examples of places where the "the gap between the poor and the rich has been growing" and where the number of people "living on less than a dollar a day" has been increasing. He briefly identifies Botswana as an example of a country that has seen economic growth because it rejected IMF suggestions. And still later Stiglitz uses African cotton farmers to illustrate the negative consequences of U.S. agricultural subsidies (Stiglitz 2003, 25-34, 24, 36, 253-4).

[12] On this point Stiglitz writes: "This book is based on my experiences…Many of the people I criticize will say I have gotten it wrong; they may even produce evidence that contradicts my views of what happened. I can only offer my interpretations of what I saw" (Stiglitz 2003, xv). That being said, it is hard to imagine that between 1997 and 2000 the senior vice president of the World Bank was not substantially engaged in discussions about structural adjustment policies for African countries.

object that can be managed. In other words, he produces "the global" as a well-running machine that simply needs the vigilante oversight of a benevolent technician-in-chief.

It is the production of "the global" as an object to be managed that allows Stiglitz to conclude that globalization can be remade through better policymaking. Stiglitz argues that by making reforms to the Bretton Woods institutions—and particularly the IMF—globalization can be "reshaped" in ways that allow it to be "properly, [and] fairly run" such that "all countries hav[e] a voice in policies affecting them." Once these reforms take place "a new global economy" will exist which "is not only more sustainable and less volatile" but also allows "the fruits of this growth" to be "more equitably shared" (Stiglitz 2003, 22). In the last paragraph of *Globalization and Its Discontents* Stiglitz writes that:

> The developed world needs to do its part to reform the international institutions that govern globalization. We set up these institutions and we need to work to fix them. If we are to address the legitimate concerns of those who have expressed a discontent with globalization, if we are to make globalization work for the billions of people for whom it has not, if we are to make globalization with a human face succeed, then our voices must be raised. We cannot, we should not, stand idly by. (Stiglitz 2003, 252)

When Stiglitz claims that "we set up these institutions" and therefore "we" are responsible for changing globalization, he speaks as a technician with a long history of successes. A statement made possible because Africa is absent. Like Held et al. and Sassen, Stiglitz maintains the image of "the global" as an unquestionably singularity: "The barbaric attacks of September 11, 2001, have brought home with great force that we all share a single planet. *We are a global community*, and like all communities have to follow some rules so that we can live together" (Stiglitz 2003, xv; emphasis added). In order for this already "global" community to live together, Stiglitz suggests that everyone ascribe to new "rules" that are "fair and just," that "pay due attention to the poor as well as the powerful" and that "reflect a basic sense of decency and social justice" (Stiglitz 2003, xv). Such rules will ensure that "governing bodies and authorities work" to "heed and respond to the desires and needs of all those affected by policies and decisions made in distant places" (Stiglitz 2003, xv). The view that "we" the technicians of the "global" economy can fix the problems of those "in distant places" only makes sense if one first produces "the global" not as rife with contradiction and exploitation but instead as an essentially harmonious—if sometimes out-of-whack—economic machine.

Producing "the global" as the academic everyday

Despite referencing globalization's "discontents" in both of their titles, Stiglitz and Sassen both fail to address the lives, practices, and perspectives of those marginalized by globalization. This absence stems from the fact that both authors, in differing ways, produce "the global" as an already unified space that, with proper management and regulation, can overcome economic and political inequalities. Some scholars, however, challenge the production of "the global" as a single, heterogeneous space of liberal governance. These scholars—drawing primarily on critical and postcolonial theory—point to globalization's plurality, diversity and contradictory nature arguing that "the global" is not a liberal singularity but instead a complex plurality. Arjun Appadurai's essay "Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination" is one example of this line of argument. First published as an introduction to *Public Culture*'s special issue on globalization (2000) and republished as the introduction to *Globalization* (Duke University Press, 2001), this widely cited essay[13] applies many of the arguments put forward in Appadurai's *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (1996) to the academic literature on globalization.

Appadurai rightly critiques the academic literature on globalization as highly vernacular, unnecessarily disciplinary and largely uninterested in how non-academics imagine the world. Therefore, to be politically relevant, academics must imagine new forums and non-disciplinary communities for confronting these dominant, transcendent and exclusionary understandings of globalization. While I am generally sympathetic to these arguments, the absence of Africa in Appadurai's text is symptomatic of his unwitting reproduction of a "the global" as a singular object of academic study. In claiming to reimagine globalization, Appadurai ends up producing "the global" as a fluid object to be produced differently based on the political tastes various scholars. "The global," in other words, is a vast plurality rather an object produced within structured and highly asymmetrical relations of knowledge production—relations that cannot be wished away by progressive academics wishing to present "the other side" of globalization.

Appadurai argues that academic knowledge is just one way of knowing globalization. Inside "the U.S. academic world" globalization "is certainly a source of anxiety": economists worry about "whether markets and deregulations produce greater wealth at the price of

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[13] The essay "Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination" has been cited 315 times according to Google Scholar and 104 times in journals listed in the Social Science Citation Index. The book *Globalization* is cited an additional 108 times according to Google Scholar. Both the Google Scholar and SSCI searches were conducted on September 24, 2008.

increased inequality," political scientists "worry that their field might vanish along with their favorite object, the nation-state," historians worry that "globalization may not be a member of the familiar archive of large-scale historical shifts" (Appadurai 2000, 1). Outside the academy, however, people worry about globalization's effects on wages, structural adjustment, culture, and religion leading policymakers and activists to ask more practical questions like: "What are the great global agencies of aid and development up to?" or "Is the World Bank really committed to incorporating social and cultural values into its development agenda?" (Appadurai 2000, 2).

Appadurai argues that the difference between academic and non-academic approaches to globalization creates a "double apartheid." On the one hand, U.S. academics have found that globalization provides a useful object of study for hashing out very specialized professional and disciplinary debates.[14] These academic debates, however, are so thoroughly "divorce[d]" from those "vernacular discourses about the global" that they are "concerned with how to plausibly protect cultural autonomy and economic survival in some local, national, or regional sphere" (Appadurai 2000, 2-3). In short, Appadurai rightly points out that the academic discourse of globalization is motivated primarily by "our sense of what it means to be scholars and members of the academy"; ideas evaluated based not on their political importance but on whether they are "recognizably new" and contain a "plausible shelf life" (Appadurai 2000, 9, 11 & 12).

Therefore, while the academic literature on globalization might offer some "knowledge of globalization" it does little to advance "the globalization of knowledge" (Appadurai 2000, 13). Appadurai contends that the highly specialized academic vernacular of globalization has meant that "the poor and their advocates" are largely excluded "from the intricacies of the debates in global fora and policy discourses" (Appadurai 2000, 3). To this end, "activists working for the poor in fora such as the World Bank, the U.N. system, the WTO, NAFTA, and GATT" often find themselves disadvantaged by "the vocabulary used

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[14] Appadurai writes: "The academy (especially in the United States) has found in globalization an object around which to conduct its special internal quarrels about such issues as representations, recognition, the 'end' of history, the specters of capital (and of comparison), and a host of others. These debates, which still set the standard of value for the global professoriate, nevertheless have an increasingly parochial quality" (Appadurai 2000, 2).

by the university-policy nexus…to describe global problems, projects, and policies" (Appadurai 2000, 17).[15]

Appadurai argues that breaking down this inside/outside division occurs when scholars abandon disciplinarity and specialized vernaculars in favor of creating "forms of knowledge transfer and social mobilizations" that draw "on strategies, visions, and horizons for globalization on behalf of the poor" (Appadurai 2000, 3). Doing so allows scholars to actively participate in "grassroots globalization," or "globalization from below" (Appadurai 2000, 3); a project that requires a "deparochialisation of the research ethic" (Appadurai 2000, 14). Scholarly skills can be put to work conceptualizing counter-globalizations, the lack of which is the "single greatest obstacle to grassroots globalization" (Appadurai 2000, 17). In short, scholars should "step[ ] back from those obsessions and abstractions that constitute our own professional practice" and instead "seriously consider the problems of the *global everyday*" (Appadurai 2000, 17-18; emphasis added). This new approach to research is not only ethical but also politically important given that

> those critical voices who speak for the poor, the vulnerable, the dispossessed, and the marginalised in the international fora in which global policies are made lack the means to produce a systematic grasp of the complexities of globalization. A new architecture for producing and sharing knowledge about globalization could provide the foundations of a pedagogy that closes this gap and helps to democratise the flow of knowledge about globalization itself. Such a pedagogy would create new forms of dialogue between academics, public intellectuals, activists, and policymakers in different societies. The principles of this pedagogy will require significant innovations. This vision of global collaborative teaching and learning about globalization may not resolve the great antimonies of power that characterise this world, but it might help to even the playing field. (Appadurai 2000, 18)

In other words, new approaches to researching and teaching globalization can effectively democratize "knowledge about globalization" such that the poor, the marginalized and their allies can be given the conceptual and analytical tools needed to even "the playing field." Unfortunately, however, in the absence of Africa Appadurai produces the "global" everyday as a mirror image of an idealized academic everyday.

The absence of Africa plays out more subtly in Appadurai's text than in the three previous works on globalization. Instead of Africa being a silence within detailed discussions of an empirical phenomenon called globalization, Appadurai's essay lacks references to spatially demarcated sites all together. This lack of empirical reference is consistent with his argument that academic research needs to move beyond imagining the world according to

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[15] Notice how, in both these iterations, globalization is presented as a vernacular or vocabulary used within already "global fora" to discuss already "global problems, projects, and policies."

spatially defined categories and containers. While area studies once demarcated its object of study as "permanent geographical facts," Appadurai argues for a new "architecture for area studies" which can "*see*[ ] significant areas of human organization as precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction, and motion—trade, travel, pilgrimage, warfare, proselytisation, colonization, exile, and the like" (Appadurai 2000, 7). In arguing that studying globalization from below requires challenging academic understandings of "the region" (Appadurai 2000, 8), Appadurai resists identifying continents or nations as sites of study but instead examines "deterritorialized" regions of globalization such as "global fora," transnational advocacy networks, and regimes of global governance. He argues that these "regions"—rather than the "region" defined by area studies—should be the sites from which scholars engage a "globalization from below."

However, in trying to give these "regions" a conceptual fluidity, Appardurai fails to recognize how some "regions"—like "Africa"—are conceptually policed. Ferguson argues that "Africa" cannot simply be made into a fluid space since "Africa" has a social meaning that is "only too real, and forcefully imposed"; it is a category often "imposed with force" and with "a mandatory quality; a category within which, and according to which, people must live" (Ferguson 2006, 6-7 & 5).

In this way, the absence of Africa makes it possible for Appadurai to distinguish "globalization from above" and "globalization from below" as primarily a difference of political commitment rather than structural differentiation. According to Appadurai's argument, academics can choose whether to participate in exclusionary academic vernaculars on the topic of globalization or aid the downtrodden and disaffected. Appadurai's essay encourages scholars to develop "an international civil society" through "efforts to globalization from below" and therefore make their "deliberations more consequential for the poorer 80 percent of the population of the world (now totally 6 billion) who are socially and fiscally at risk" (Appadurai 2000, 3).

Appadurai, however, assumes that academics are excluded from the 80 percent of the population considered "at risk." On the one hand, he makes absent the many African scholars who work in impoverished and highly contingent conditions (Polgreen 2007). Furthermore, within the United States the decimation of a tenured faculty and the creation of a large pool of contingent adjunct and graduate student labor makes life within the United States academy increasingly precarious and prone to all kinds of social and fiscal risk

(Bousquet 2008). These absences result in Appadurai reproducing "the global" as an object to be studied by academics positioned to choose whether to study globalization from above or below. The absence of Africa (as well as the absence of the adjunct) presents the scholarly production of alternative globalizations as the benevolent gesture of concerned and well-established academics. I argue instead that the production of "the global" is structured, has material effects and therefore the production of radical alternatives cannot be left to the goodwill of an academic elite.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that Held et al., Sassen, Stiglitz and Appadurai are not simply engaged in representing an already "global" world. Instead, all four works produce "the global" as a single whole capable of becoming more just and democratic through regulation, reform, or the commitment of benevolent technocrats and academics. In all four cases, "the global" is presented as an already a coherent—if complex—reality. While all four of these texts recognize disagreements, fragmentations, "discontents," and barriers to an idealized globalization, each author nonetheless takes "the global" as a coherent whole. As a consequence, various troubles are presented as logistical problems to be overcome rather than indications of structural contradictions and exclusions.

As a result, all four texts produce "the global" in ways that, despite their differences, function identically. The absence of Africa makes it possible to extrapolate and universalize particularity into an abstract totality. This totality, however, is not some universal reality but merely a provincial claim made by the authors and reinforced by making possible exceptions absent. Once produced, "the global" functions as the foundation upon which knowledge about the vague, omnibus, incoherent, and "complex" phenomenon called globalization is derived. To explain the political stakes involved in producing "the global," I turn to Althusser's analysis of Marx's reading of the classical economists.

Althusser argues that Marx's method of symptomatic reading allows him to see what Ricardo and Smith produced without knowing it—i.e. the concept of labor-power. When Marx discovers this object, he finds if possible to circumvent the analytical particularities involved when studying "real labor" and instead develop a systemic study of *the social whole*. The abstraction labor-power makes possible the labor theory of value and, with it, the possibility of conceptualizing capitalism as a productive totality. In arguing that Marx

discovers "labor-power"—an abstraction already produced by Ricardo and Smith—Althusser emphasizes that structural relations (rather than individuals) produce knowledge. Smith and Ricardo produce the concept labor-power without recognizing it because they were confined by the structured, historical moment—conjuncture—in which they were writing. Marx similarly discovers their invention because he subjects their texts to the problematic of his own time thereby producing both new ways of knowing the world and strategies for acting within it.

When I argue that structures produce knowledge this proposition should not discount the role that various subjects play as knowledge-producers. Instead, Ricardo, Smith, Marx, and Althusser should be read as themselves living instantiations of structured relations. As such, their work contains within it the contradictions, tensions, and creative possibilities made possible by a given conjuncture. Althusser argues that all human activity is simultaneously both particular and structured. The particularity of labor—including intellectual labor—originates from the immanent and overdetermined contradictions of structure. The production of some objects of knowledge, such as "labor-power," makes it possible to think about structure *in its abstraction* rather than as individually experienced.

What comes into being with the production of "the global"? Unlike "labor-power"—which opened up radical new ways of studying the social whole in terms of production—"the global" devolves into what Althusser calls "the mirror-myth" of knowledge. Instead of trying to understand social totality as a structure of production—as structure both lived and riddled with contradictions and tensions to be intervened upon by astute political actors—"the global" functions in the opposite manner; it projects the particular as universal. This universal quality is not predicated on trying to understand the structure as a whole—as is the case with Marx's labor theory of value—but instead on taking the author's assumptions (i.e. of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism) and universalizing them. Provincial aspirations drawn from particular lived experiences are simply reproduced as transcended and universal "global" realities.

This reproduction is why, in the next chapter, I study "the global" not as Althusser studies labor-power, i.e. as an object of knowledge that produces an "immense theoretical revolution," but instead as an *imaginary*. While Althusser argues that the production of "labor-power" enables Marx to study the totality of social production scientifically, the

reproduction of the particular as "global" leads only to ideological claims about one's imagined relations to the real world.

The difference between the "scientific" abstraction that Marx produces and an ideological abstraction such as "the global" is explained further in Appendix III.

CHAPTER 3:
"THE GLOBAL" AS IMAGINARY

Although it [the bee] builds itself an elaborate hive, [Marx] wrote, the bee is no architect, for the architect "raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality." Since Marx wrote those words we have come to believe…[in] this Cartesian notion of the mind-as-architect's-office…The work of imagination puts together plans, imagines, ideal structures—in fact entire systems of culture and meaning—before they are taken outside and erected in reality. We have made do for too long with this misleading simple view of the world that Marx himself placed into question.
—Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*

As shown in the previous chapter, universalizing the particular in relation to the absence of Africa produces "the global" as an object that translates heterogeneous and contradictory worlds into a single, coherent reality. "The global," as produced within the academic literature on globalization, however, represents the world as an already existing unity, thereby foreclosing understandings of the world in terms of production. In other words, the world is present as already "global" rather than *produced as "global"* within structured material relations (relations to be intervened upon and radically transformed). In this chapter, I argue that scholars present "the global" as an already existing phenomenon not because the world actually exists as essentially "global" but because highly asymmetrical relations of knowledge production have produced a *global imaginary*.

Before continuing, however, I should emphasize that *the imaginary* is not merely a fantasy, illusion, false consciousness, or the detritus of bourgeois society. While many social scientists often assume that the imaginary exists on the wrong side of a division between "ideas" and "reality"—as little more than an "ethereal medium" that "veils" real social relations (Thompson 1982, 659)—Althusser argues that the imaginary is the register at which structured material relations are lived by subjects. The *global imaginary*, therefore, informs the very terrain within which subjects inhabit the world, informing how people interact with each other, what decisions are made and how societies reproduce themselves. Imaginaries, however, do not simply reflect "the real world" but are produced within structured material relations and, as such, reproduce these relations of production.

However, for political actors to intervene on the social whole for the purpose of making radical change they must be armed with an understanding of the world as produced. As such, people need to see "their own history as a history of the class struggle" and

understand "the mechanisms of class exploitation, repression and domination, in the economy, in politics and in ideology" (Althusser 2001b, xv). The global imaginary, however, fails to recognize vast class asymmetries and exclusions, offering instead a picture of the world as a single, unified whole lacking contradiction and requiring only better regulation and governance. However, "it is only from the point of view of class exploitation that it is possible to *see* and analyze the mechanisms of a class society and therefore to produce a scientific knowledge of it" (Althusser 2001b, xvi).[1]

While scholars often identify various inequalities within globalization, they routinely present "the global" as a thing capable of being reformed through liberal institutions, better regulation, more rational technocrats or democratized academic knowledge. The inequalities of globalization, in other words, get presented as merely failures of management and governance rather than class antagonisms forming the very logic of social production. Therefore, academic literature that represents an already "global" world obfuscates the class struggles that overdetermine the production of the world, including those knowledges that claim to represent it.

This chapter argues that "the global" is an imaginary in the Althusserian sense. First, I examine two scholars who argue that "the global" is imagined (Muppidi 2004; Steger 2008). Despite their insights, these two works present "the global" as either *already imagined* or as continuously and *spontaneously re-imagined*. Neither approach recognizes "the global" as an imaginary *produced* within particular yet structured material relations. I trace these limitations to the authors' reliance on the work of Charles Taylor and Benedict Anderson (in the case of Steger) and Cornelius Castoriadis (in the case of Muppidi). In the second section I examine the work of Taylor, Anderson, and Castoriadis to identify how these authors are poorly equipped to analyze *the global imaginary* in terms of production. I then offer Althusser's claim that ideology "*represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence*" (Althusser 2001a, 109; emphasis in original). This analysis helps explain how "the global" works as an imaginary produced within overdetermined social relations of production. I conclude by arguing that scholars should reject globalization—and its root "the global"—in favor of what Althusser calls the *(global) structure* or *the social whole*. (Global) structure, for Althusser, cannot be seen or represented but only analyzed symptomatically through particular instances and within particular conjunctures. Such an approach offers an inversion

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[1] I take up Althusser's distinction between *imaginary* and *science* in Appendix III.

of the dominant forms of producing knowledge about globalization, seeing the particular not as the rational kernel of an already "global" world but as an object produced within structured material relations.

"THE GLOBAL" AS IMAGINED

Manfred Steger and Himadeep Muppidi both argue that "the global" is imagined. Steger, drawing on Taylor and Anderson, defines the "social imaginary" as the "background" of "communal practices" that explains "how 'we'—the members of the community—fit together, how things go on between us, the expectations we have of each other, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie those expectations" (Steger 2008, 6).[2] Unfortunately, Steger presents "the global" as a reality *already imagined* by the colonial metropole. Muppidi, drawing on Castoriadis, argues that "the global" is imagined through the relationship of Self/Other existing between the colony and metropole. His analysis of "the global" as an imaginary, however, treats "the global" as individually and spontaneously produced.

In *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror*, Steger offers one of the most systematic and historically rich accounts of the rise of the national and global imaginaries. Both the national and global imaginary emerge at different historical moments, giving rise to new political ideologies. The national imaginary, developed during the French and American Revolutions, creates the "background umbrella" for the "grand ideologies" of liberalism, conservatism, socialism, communism, and Nazism/fascism (Steger 2008, 9). After World War II, and accelerating from the 1980s into the present, the global imaginary materialize alongside the national imaginary, with globalization becoming "a pivotal signifier in public debates" (Steger 2008, 179). Just as the national ideology provides the imaginary for previous ideologies, the contemporary ideologies of market globalism, justice globalism, jihadist globalism and imperial globalism are rooted in the global imaginary (Steger 2008, 8-13).

However, Steger's focus on ideologies comes at the detriment of a sustained engagement with the content of the global imaginary itself. His clearest statement concerning the global imaginary comes when he argues that after World War II "new ideas, theories, and

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[2] Similarly, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, he describes the social imaginary as "the prereflexive framework of our daily routines and our commonsense social repertoires" (Steger 2008, 6).

practices produced in the public consciousness" caused a ruptural shift similar to the one experienced with the French Revolution (Steger 2008, 10). The development of new technologies and the increased circulation of "[i]mages, people, and materials…across national boundaries" led to the creation of a "new sense of 'the global' that erupted within and onto the national" (Steger 2008, 10). In other words, starting after World War II people began imagining their relation to a broader "global" community no longer limited to the nation. As a result, the "normality and self-contained coziness of the modern nation-state" including the "deeply engrained notions of community tied to a sovereign and clearly demarcated territory" and a "relatively homogenous populations" began to come undone (Steger 2008, 11).

Steger's description of the global imaginary, however, presents "the global" as *already imagined* within the Western experience. For example, Steger examines the national and the global imaginaries almost exclusively from the European and American perspective. The first half of the book addresses the national imaginary and the ideologies of British Liberalism, French Conservatism, German Socialism, Russian Communism and German Nazism while failing to examine either the role the colonies played in creating these ideologies or the way these ideologies affected the colonies. Similarly, the second half of the book, even while more expansive in scope, treats developments in Europe and North America as the driving force behind the creation of the global imaginary.[3] For example, when the colonies and anticolonial struggles are brought into the Steger's analysis they are framed as examples of an already imagined "global" world. When turning to Mahatma Gandhi and Franz Fanon as paradigmatic anticolonial intellectuals, Steger does not emphasize their imaginings of a world separated by cultural, economic and racial divisions but instead points to those places indicating that these thinkers see the world as "global." While Gandhi rejected aspects of Western society and advocated instead a "vision of an alternative civilization" drawn from a mixing of "India's ancient civilization with socialist ideas," Steger argues that his thinking represents not some "idyllic socialist translation of the modern national imaginary" but

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[3] For example, Steger argues that World War II offers a "tipping point" for the creation of the global imaginary. He argues that World War II "raged as a global contest in multiple theaters," involved a greater reliance on transnational allies, revealed the true horror of nationalist politics, established the Bretton Woods institutions and developed wartime technology that would "contribute to the late twentieth-century compression of time and space," including the atom bomb (Steger 2008, 130-133). Most of these developments are limited exclusively to the North American and European experience (the Holocaust, Bretton Woods, the atom bomb, etc.).

instead an imaginary "increasingly oriented toward a global frame of reference" as indicated by his referencing of "world federation," "the well-being of the whole world," "cosmopolitan[ism]," and the creation of a "commonwealth of all world states" (Steger 2008, 141 & 144). Similarly, Steger argues that Fanon's advocacy of a nation forged through violent anticolonial struggle actually indicates a deep-seated belief in a global humanist subject. In this way, Steger argues that Fanon's claim that "genuine humanist values must be realized first on the level of the nation before they can be spread throughout the whole of humankind" indicates that Fanon was "[g]roping for a way to articulate the emergence of the global consciousness from its national shell" (Steger 2008, 149). Only Fanon's premature death prevented him from offering a "more concrete articulation of the rising global imaginary" (Steger 2008, 144).[4]

This treatment of "the global" as imagined problematically subsumes particular anticolonial experiences, customs, religions, visions of the nation, and conceptions of the global—in other words, particular worlds lived by colonized peoples—within a world already imagined as "global." As such, the global imaginary Steger argues exists within anticolonial struggles is actually a "global" already imagined in the traditions and customs of Europe and the United States. By prioritizing the similarity and commonality of the global imaginary Steger refuses the very real contradictions, tensions, exclusions, and violences—the class struggle—that defines colonial rule and its resistances. For example, in translating Gandhi and Fanon as prototypical bearers of an emergent global imaginary, Steger defines these anticolonial figures not through their struggle but through the general equivalency of the already imagined "global." Even if Gandhi's socialist pre-modernism or Fanon's humanism are based on "global" claims (a position that I would dispute), this global imaginary would be predicated on international solidarity, struggle, communism, and contradiction and, as such, would be incommensurable with the global imaginary that Steger says emerges in the aftermath of Bretton Woods and the atom bomb. Remember what Sartre finds in Fanon: not an image of global humanism but instead a Third World that has come to "discover[] *itself* and speak[] to *itself* through this voice"; a Third World that "leaves you [i.e. the European 'you'] out in the cold. It often talks *about* you, but never *to* you" (Sartre 2004, xlvi & xlv; emphasis in original).

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[4] While Steger focuses on Gandhi and Fanon, he believes that the "mounting tension between the bubbling national consciousness in the Third World and the strengthening of the global imaginary found its expression in the writings of virtually all anticolonial thinkers" (Steger 2008, 144).

Instead of understanding of "the global" as *already imagined*, Himadeep Muppidi argues that it is continuously and *spontaneously* re-imagined. To arrive at this point, he first argues that "the global" is mediated through the Self-Other distinctions that constitute social imaginaries, in his case those of the United States and India. One the one hand, Muppidi argues that globalization offers a way for Indian nationalists to escape the Self-Other distinction between a domineering colonial other and the perceived premodern Indian self. Globalization allows India to attain "its liberation from the world of local politics" and enter "the world of global economic reason," i.e. economic relations organized by neither a colonial Other nor the premodern Indian Self (Muppidi 2004, 32). The United States, on the other hand, experiences globalization through a different Self-Other relationship. Because the United States sees itself as the "unproblematic and ultimate repository of Reason, Morality, and Power …Others appear as irrational, immoral, and weak being in the world" (Muppidi 2004, 65). As a result, globalization for Americans becomes articulated as the spread of American values.

While Muppidi successfully examines how the global imaginary comes about in relationship to the colonial experience and the enduring Self/Other distinctions, the major limitation of this argument becomes apparent in the final chapter when he lays out the political project stemming from his argument. Using the example of Arundhati Roy's self-inflicted exile after the Indian government's nuclear weapons test, Muppidi argues that Roy offers an alternative "imagination of the global from within a national base but without allowing the national to colonize our understanding of the global" (Muppidi 2004, 100). Using this example, Muppidi argues that those "concerned with political transformation can think about constituting the global in ways that are empowered by the national imaginations they inherit but also go beyond them in many important ways" (Muppidi 2004, 99). This project of developing different imaginaries, however, is located in personal creativity and individual discretion. Like Appadurai's request that academics *choose* to write about "globalization from below," Muppidi argues that "the global" should be imagined in ways such that "the nation" does not colonize the global imaginary. Therefore, instead of seeing the global imaginary as produced within a material and class structure—and therefore requiring a remaking of the relations of production in order to produce new global imaginaries—Muppidi sees change as coming from sympathetic individuals. As evident in his example of *self-exile* rather than *solidarity* and organization building, Muppidi fails to recognize

that new "global imaginaries" must comes from restructuring the relations of knowledge production—that is, from class struggle.[5]

THEORIZING THE IMAGINARY

Steger and Muppidi draw on a number problematic conceptions of the imaginary when arguing that "the global" is imagined. In general, both thinkers present the imaginary—or often "social imaginary"—as the common symbols, languages and understandings that create social coherence and legitimacy; the glue that binds society together. While agreeing on what the imaginary is, Steger and Muppidi disagree as to whether "the global" is already imagined or whether subjects can reimagine the world anew. Steger draws on Anderson's discussion of the nation as an imagined community and Taylor's argument that modernity is a social imaginary (Steger 2008, 6). Anderson and Taylor, however, address "the nation" and "modernity" respectively as already imagined from a Western perspective, therefore failing to show how imaginaries are produced within highly asymmetrical relations of production. Drawing his theorization of the imaginary from Castoriadis, Muppidi swings in the opposite direction. Instead of seeing "the global" as already imagined he presents it as mutable, fluid and open to individual creativity. Althusser, I argue in the subsequent section, offers an alternative understanding of the global imaginary as neither already imagined nor spontaneously re-imaginable but instead constantly produced within structured, yet overdetermined, relations of knowledge production.

The imaginary as already imagined

Benedict Anderson is one of the most prominent social scientists to take the imaginary seriously. In *Imagined Communities* he argues that nations are not primordial or essential facts but instead imaginaries developed through cultural, historical, and economic relations: the nation "is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 2002, 6). By looking to the imaginary,

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[5] The lack of a structural analysis also results in a failure to explain how Roy's example of self-exile can be applied more broadly, especially to those lacking the international prestige, portable occupation, education, or international connects that she does. Lederer asks of Muppidi: "should we all go into exile—even so it is only imagined—whenever the government does something to which we object? This can hardly be the *Politics of the Global* we strive for" (Lederer 2006, 636).

Anderson seeks to explain why "the nation" can be understood as both a particular and a "universal phenomenon."[6] As such, Anderson treats the nation "as if it belonged with 'kinship' and 'religion' [i.e. imaginary], rather than with 'liberalism' or 'fascism' [i.e. ideological]" (2002, 5). He argues that while the "pre-bourgeois ruling classes" were held together through "kinship, clientship, and personal loyalties," these elite were eventually replaced by the industrial bourgeoisie who developed a new sense of cohesion through the production and circulation of printed material (Anderson 2002, 76-77). The rise of print capitalism, national languages, and the mass circulation of novels and newspapers made it possible for large populations to read about, and therefore create a shared community with, people in distant parts of the same territory. These imagined communities developed to the point that citizens became "willing to die for such limited imaginings" (Anderson 2002, 7).

Anderson's analysis of the nation as an imagined community, however, treats the imaginary as already Western and statist. Partha Chatterjee powerfully critiques Anderson's assumption that the nation is an imagined community with European origins. In ignoring the experiences of anti-colonial nationalisms in Africa and Asia, Chatterjee argues, Anderson presents the practice of imagining the nation as a European inheritance. It is the European colonial powers that brought the image of the nation to the colonized subject, thereby precluding the postcolonial subject from re-imagining her own world: "If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?" (Chatterjee 1993, 5). Furthermore, in conflating the imagined national community with the colonial state, Anderson ignores the cultural and spiritual practices of nation-making carried out by colonized peoples. As such, other ways of imagining the nation—ways drawn from cultural and liberatory practices rather than the European colonial imaginaries— are foreclosed. For Chatterjee, treating the nation as an already Western imagination ensures that, for the postcolonial subject, "[e]ven our imaginations must remain forever colonized" (Chatterjee 1993, 5). It is therefore important to examine how the nation is imagined outside the structures of the colonial state since only in doing so is it possible for "the once-colonized" to reclaim "our freedom of imagination" (Chatterjee 1993, 13).

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[6] For example, while historians see nationalism as a relatively recent phenomenon, nationalists see nationalism as primordial; while nationalism is widely considered a universal phenomenon—"everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender"—in practice nationalism contains "irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations" (Anderson 2002, 5).

Similarly, Taylor argues in *Modern Social Imaginaries* that the social imaginary is the way "ordinary people 'imagine' their social surroundings" as "carried in images, stories, and legends" (Taylor 2004, 23); the social imaginary is the "common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy" (Taylor 2004, 23). Social imaginaries, such as modernity, start off as ideas held by elites that are eventually spread into the wider public. For example, natural law thinkers such as Locke and Grotius conceptualized the world as ordered by the free actions of rational people for the purpose of preserving security and property. These once radical ideas would have remained "the possession of a small minority" if they had not come to influence law, government, institutions, and methods of self-discipline (Taylor 2004, 23). It is through the spread of these ideas that three "social self-understandings…crucial to modernity" emerge: namely "the economy, the public sphere, and the practices and outlooks of democratic self-rule" (Taylor 2004, 69). Taylor also argues that because imaginaries are lived in daily life there is no single modernity but instead "multiple modernities" (Taylor 2004, 1).

However, like Anderson's analysis of nations as imagined communities, Taylor's argument about modernity as a social imaginary assumes modernity is already imagined. First, while claiming to write about a plurality of imaginaries, Taylor draws exclusively from the European and American context.[7] He provides no analysis of what modern social imaginaries look like in the previously colonized world—an interesting oversight given that the post-colonial world has been most ravished by concepts of "modernization." This focus on European and American conceptions of modernity is born out in Taylor's perceived audience; i.e. those in "Western society."[8] In addition, for Taylor, social imaginaries originate

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[7] Taylor mentions that he is examining modern social imaginaries in the first and last chapters of the book. Bernard Yack, however, points out that Taylor's book "is titled *Modern Social Imaginaries*, rather than *The Modern Social Imaginary*" and "insists that 'we have to speak of 'multiple modernities' and abandon 'the illusion that modernity is a single process'… But these invocations of pluralism and diversity—which, tellingly, are most pronounced at the beginning and end of the book—merely express Taylor's desire to avoid assumptions about the coherence and unity of modernity. Without a good account of the relationship between the singular and the plural, between modernity and its different varieties, it tells us more about what Taylor wants to achieve than his actual achievement" (Yack 2005, 630-31).

[8] The degree to which Taylor conceptualizes the modern social imaginary as Western is revealed in an interesting slip in which he argues that "new practices, or modifications of old ones" has lead to "a profound transformation of the social imaginary in *Western* society, and thus of the world in which *we* live" (Taylor 2004, 30; emphasis added). Furthermore, non-Western society, in the rare instance that it is mentioned at all, is present as the anti-thesis of modernity: "As *we* read our morning papers about the massacres in Bosnia or Rwanda or the breakdown of government in Liberia, we tend to feel ourselves in tranquil possession of *what we call civilization*, even though we may feel a little embarrassed to say so out loud" (Taylor 2004, 36-37; emphasis added).

with elites and are instituted top down. While social imaginaries eventually come to be lived and practiced by everyone, his analysis does not explain how non-elites and those without access to institutional power might produce counter and liberatory social imaginaries. In short, instead of examining a plurality of "imaginaries," Taylor ends up describing modernity as an elite European and American imaginary. As such, he does not offer an account of the imaginary that can be applied to a better understanding of the global imaginary.

The limited conceptualization of the imaginary in both Anderson and Taylor is indicative of the fact that both scholars study their objects (the nation or modernity) as already imagined rather than as an imaginary. In other words, both scholars offer descriptive and historical examination of how the nation and modernity emerged and how these particular acts of imagining became solidified. In doing so, they present the nation and modernity as already imagined and not as produced. For example, Taylor argues that the modern imaginary operates not as an abstracted "map" but instead as "an implicit map of social space" developed over time and that allows one to orient oneself "without ever having adopted the standpoint of overview the map offers" (Taylor 2004, 26). Even if modernity is imagined at the everyday level of the street, rather than imposed from above, Taylor still assumes that the "implicit map" of modernity reflects—rather than produces—an already existing city.

Castoriadis and the radical imaginary

Unlike Anderson and Taylor who understand national and modern imaginaries as *already imagined*, Castoriadis develops a theory of radical, autonomous imaginaries struggling to escape the totalizing social practices. Castoriadis, a vocal Trotskyist, fled Greece for France during the bloody 1945 anti-Communist campaign. In Paris he co-founded and edited the journal *Socialisme ou barbarie* which, through Guy Debord and the *Situationist International,* inspired many French students during the May/June '68 rebellion (Poster 1975, 201-205). He was committed to theorizing the imaginary as a response to "the deterministic strands within Marxism" (Gaonkar 2002, 1) and as a way of developing a theory of the subject within capitalist relations of production (Poster 1975, 201-205). During the 1970s Castoriadis trained as a psychoanalyst but broke with Lacan over his formalistic and scientific structuralism which, Castoriadis argued, ignored the role of "passion and creativity" (Elliott 2002, 154). In bringing together Marxism and psychoanalysis, Castoriadis

developed the concept of the imaginary as the psychic space through which one is either socialized into the logic of capitalist society or through which one finds the infinite possibility for creative invention and revolution.

Unlike Taylor and Anderson who examine particular historical and cultural imaginaries (i.e. the nation and modernity), Castoriadis concerns himself with explaining how the imaginary works as such. Castoriadis conceptualizes a two-fold imaginary containing both the radical and social imaginaries. He draws this distinction from Aristotle's *De Anima* in which, Castoriadis argues, Aristotle not only discovers the imaginary but "discovers it twice, that is, he discovers two imaginations" (Castoriadis 1997a, 214). What Castoriadis calls the *second imaginary*—or social imaginary—is the traditional philosophical and psychological understanding of the imaginary as that which mediates "sensation and intellection" (Castoriadis 1997a, 215). This imaginary reproduces sensation and re-combines perceived experience into thought (Castoriadis 1997a, 215). This imaginary is always determined by what exists outside itself and is therefore dependent on the fallible intermediary of sense perception. In this articulation, the imaginary is "the sensation of commons if not even identical with it" (Castoriadis 1997a, 227). In other words, various social forces and institutions create a common sense understanding of the world thereby providing a shared sense of coherence (as nation, modernity, or "the global") *not of one's own making.*

Castoriadis argues that the *first imaginary*, in contrast, can be found within Aristotle's writings if one pays attention to "the text's complexity…its waverings, and its contradictions," the "embarrassments, aporias, and impossibilities" that reveal the existence of an imaginary different than the one he is trying to describe (Castoriadis 1997a, 215-7). In contrast to the second imaginary, the first imaginary is the psychic site of creation, which is not determined by the historical-social realm but is instead "the positing of new determinations" (Castoriadis 1997a, 213). The first imaginary gives the subject "the capacity to evoke such images independent of all present sensations, including a certain power of recombination" (Castoriadis 1997a, 227). The first imaginary, in other words, is a psychical monad—"that which is not social in the 'individual'" (Castoriadis 1997b, 6)—while the second imaginary is a *social imaginary* shaped by the totality of social institutions including "norms, values, language, tools, procedures, and methods" (Castoriadis 1997b, 6). Creative freedom is possible when people access their individual imaginary, thereby freeing themselves from the dictates of the social imaginary. For Castoriadis, therefore, the psyche is

never fully socialized (Elliott 2002, 148-9). Instead, the social individual emerges from the "intermixing of the psychic and social imaginaries" (Elliott 2002, 149). Castoriadis would argue that, unlike in the analysis of Anderson, Taylor, and Steger, one is never entirely modern, national, or "global" because these imaginaries can always be destabilized by radical impulses erupting from deep inside individual psyches. This conflict between that social and radial imaginaries ensures that we are all "walking and complementary fragments of the institution of our society—its 'total parts'" (Castoriadis 1997b, 7). Liberatory potential exists, therefore, because subjects possess the possibility of radically, uniquely, and spontaneously fragmenting the world as it is already imagined.

In *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (1975), his later and most cited work, Castoriadis spends considerably less time examining the role of the radical imaginary, focusing instead on the social imaginary. That being said, this text still emphasizes the radical fragmentation of the imaginary and the discontinuities that, in undermining the totalizing imposition of the social imaginary, open up creative possibility. Castoriadis writes that the "social imaginary or instituting society" involves the "institution of a world in the sense that it can and must enclose everything, that, through and in it, everything must…be sayable and representable and that everything must be totally caught up in the network of significations, everything must have meaning" (Castoriadis 1987, 369-71). He compares this to the radical imagination that "emerges as otherness" to the social imaginary and presents the world in terms of images that have no social meaning other than themselves—"'images' which are what they are…an open stream of the anonymous collective" (Castoriadis 1987, 369).. In other words, the radical imaginary comes from nowhere to challenge instituted regimes of social meaning.

In identifying the imaginary as contested and fragmented, Castoriadis offers an imaginary compatible with what Chatterjee calls the "freedom of the imagination." As such, it is not surprising that many scholars studying the imaginary within a postcolonial context draw inspiration from Castoriadis.[9] Despite his usefulness to postcolonial thinkers like Muppidi, Castoriadis's analysis of the imaginary has a number of serious limitations. First, he

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[9] The *Public Culture* special issue "New Imaginaries" (Winter 2002; 14(1); Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar and Benjamin Lee, eds.) is framed around building on Castoriadis within the present conjuncture. Mbembe published his controversial piece "African Modes of Self-Writing" in this issue, adopting a notion of self-writing that, in ways similar to Muppidi's analysis of Arundhati Roy and Appadurai's analysis of "globalization from below" (Chapter 2), presents the world as spontaneously re-imaginable. For a critique of Mbembe's failure to analyze the relations of production within which self-writing takes place, see the Introduction (fn. 4, p. 10).

fails to explain how the radical imaginary can overcome the instituted social imaginary in any sustained and politically meaningful way; he lacks an explanation of how the radical imaginary "relates to its collective realization" (Elliott 2002, 165). In short, Castoriadis remains unable to square the liberatory potential of the radical imaginary with his critique of the totalizing conformity imposed by the social imaginary institutions (Elliott 2002, 160). This stance is further complicated by the fact that Castoriadis never examines how the radical imaginary can become autonomous given that the social imaginary includes the realm of language: "what kinds of connection, dialogue, translation and transformation are necessary to bring about psychic autonomy" (Elliott 2002, 166)? Castoriadis also fails to explain how "change and difference are produced locally through the workings of the social imaginary's significations at specific social-historical conjunctures." As a result, "multiplicity becomes the axiomatic starting point" rather than the point at which Castoriadis arrives (Gaonkar 2002, 9). While one might point to Castoriadis's intellectual influence on the events of May 1968 as an indication of how the radical imaginary effects a "specific social-historical conjuncture," it seems that Castoriadis's message of autonomous desire and freedom of thought were important because they spoke to the conjuncture in which they circulated. Today—in a conjuncture marked, for example, by the mass neoliberalization of higher education and the gradual dismantling of a revolutionary student-class through student debt (Adamson 2009)—the spontaneity and anarchic freedom of Castoriadis's radical imaginary seems to lack the political firepower necessary to confront contemporary social imaginaries. Therefore, given that Castoriadis fails to explain how the radical imaginary offers a significant intervention onto the prevailing social imaginary, it is not surprising that Muppidi's analysis of the global imaginary focuses on the monadic individual like Arundhati Roy as the agents of political change.

I now turn to Althusser to find a way of conceptualizing "the global" as neither *already imagined* nor *spontaneously imaginable* but rather as socially produced.

ALTHUSSER AND THE IMAGINARY

Althusser and Castoriadis both worked in Paris during the turbulent 1960s and 1970s, and both were inspired by the project of using psychoanalysis to develop a theory of the subject in Marxist theory. Despite the similarities, these two thinkers disagreed on a

number of significant issues.[10] On the question of the imaginary, they disagreed about where the imaginary originates and how it informs social relations. Unlike Castoriadis who posits a radical, autonomous imaginary not instantiated within social institutions, Althusser conceptualizes the imaginary as, in the tradition of Lacan, a specular relation through which the subject comes to understand herself in relationship to the world. The imaginary—unlike Castoriadis's radical imaginary—does not exist independent of ideology because the production of the imaginary takes place within structured and overdetermined relations. This assertion does not mean, however, that those practices producing the imaginary are coherent or determined by a single force. Instead, the contradictions within relations of social production—and the way these contradictions are lived—produce alternative and multiple ways of imagining the world.

Althusser's most explicit analysis of the imaginary comes in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Towards an Investigation)" when he defines ideology as "*represent[ing] the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence*" (Althusser 2001a, 109). For Althusser, subjects understand "their real conditions of existence" through ideology. Unlike in most analyses of ideology, however, ideology does not simply reflect society as it is but instead operates as an *imaginary relationship* constantly being produced and reproduced within the structured material practices. In this way, ideology is not falsity espoused by "cynical men" to "enslave" the minds of others, "dominating their imagination" such that a belief in God is actually a mechanism for "Priests and Despots" to command obedience (Althusser 2001a, 110). Nor is ideology caused by "material alienation" compelling people to concoct "an alienated (= imaginary) representation of their conditions" because their "conditions of existence" are insufferable (Althusser 2001a, 110-111). Ideology, in other words, is neither the lies of elites nor a more generalizable false consciousness since both of these accounts assume that "the imaginary representation of the

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[10] Proud of his impact on the student protests in May/June 1968, Castoriadis contended that Althusser and other structuralists were largely irrelevant to the "preparation of the movement" since "their ideas were totally unknown to the participants" in addition to being "diametrically opposed to the participants' implicit and explicit aspirations" (Castoriadis 1997c, 50-51). He took particular umbrage with Althusser's argument that "educational programs and structures were…exempt from the 'class struggle'" (Castoriadis 1997c, 52) and argued that Althusser was neither able to understand the students' discontent nor see the class dynamics at play within the French university system since he assumed that teaching was simply the transmission of "scientific and objective knowledge" (Castoriadis 1997c, 50). For these reasons, Castoriadis called Althusser—along with Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, and Barthes—one of "the representatives of a pseudoscientific ideology, structuralism" (Castoriadis 1997c, 51). Castoriadis saw Althusser as a prime example of those who promote an "ontology of determinacy" rather than an "ontology of creation." For an explanation of this distinction, see: (Gaonkar 2002, 6-10).

world" follows directly from the "conditions of existence of men, i.e. their real world" (Althusser 2001a, 111).

Ideology is not, in other words, a "false" representation of "the real" but instead *an imaginary* produced as individuals ascribe meaning to the social world. The repetition of various structured material practices—such as attending church, voting, going to work, studying for a class or writing academic articles—all produce the world within structured material relations. Structure, however, cannot be objectively seen, meaning that subjects come to *imagine* themselves in relation to these "real conditions." Althusser summarizes this nicely, if a bit obtusely, when he writes:

> it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that "men" "represent to themselves" in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there…if it is true that the representation of the real conditions of existence of the individuals occupying the posts of agents of production, exploitation, repression, ideologization and scientific practice, does in the last analysis arise from the relations of production, and from relations deriving from the relations of production, we can say the following: all ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production, but above all the (imaginary) relationships of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relations of those individuals to the real relations in which they live. (Althusser 2001a, 111)

In other words, ideology is not simply the reverse image of the "real conditions of existence" as created by elites or false consciousness to be critiqued, demystified, and replaced with more accurate (i.e. non-ideological) representations. Ideology in not an "imaginary distortion" of the relations of social production but instead the "(imaginary) relationships of individuals to the relations of production." For example, the nationalism, modernity or "the global" are neither realities that exist nor distortions designed to reproduce capitalist relations but they ways in which structured material relations become imbued with meaning.

Althusser also argues that ideology "*has a material existence*" (Althusser 2001a, 112) since it always "exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material" (Althusser 2001a, 112). Ideology is produced within Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) such as churches, schools, the family, political parties, the media, and the legal system in which one's "imaginary relation is itself endowed with a material existence" (Althusser 2001a, 113). Within various ISAs an individual engages in structured material practices producing her imagined relation to the world. Althusser illustrates this relationship with the Pascalian example of a person attending church who kneels, prays, makes the sign of the cross, and confesses. It is not some preexisting faith in God that provokes these very real

activities, but rather the practices themselves, as organized by the apparatus of the Church, which produce belief. Althusser contends that the churchgoer's "belief is material in that *his ideas are his material action inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of the subject*" (Althusser 2001a, 114; emphasis in original). For Althusser, belief in a world ordered by God—or, for that mater, by globalization—does not come from a transcendent experience. Instead, a belief in either God (or "the global") is an imaginary relationship produced when a subject repeats particular practices as structured by institutional apparatuses.

That being said, institutions do not determine (apparatus A → imaginary B) the way a subject imagines the world. Instead, ideological apparatuses contradict each other as different forces—including class forces—shape ideological apparatuses thereby shaping the practices and rituals that take place within them. ISAs, in other words, "are multiple, distinct, 'relatively autonomous' and capable of providing an objective field to contradictions which express, in forms which may be limited or extreme, the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle, as well as their subordinate forms" (Althusser 2001a, 100). In this way, ideology is not a thing that reflects "the real world." Instead, imaginaries are produced through subjective practices within structured material relationships: "there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects…there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject" (Althusser 2001a, 115). The subject comes into being through participating in material practices and rituals producing at the same time imaginary relationships to others and to the world. This process, called *interpellation*, is illustrated in Althusser's famous example of the police officer who hails a pedestrian saying "Hey, you there." When the pedestrian turns 180 degrees the individual becomes a subject who both recognizes herself as a subject as well as recognizing other subjects, i.e. the police officer, with whom she is in a relationship. In turning, the pedestrian acts out her own subjectivity, the officer's subjectivity, and the relations between them—"A police officer is calling me, I must respond." The turning is real but the relationship between them is reproduced in the act of turning. One's imaginary relationship to the world is not, therefore, true or false but instead the constant reproduction of the social world through lived, material practices.

While both a Catholic and an academic, Althusser focuses his analysis of the imaginary using religious examples. This focus does not mean, however, that Althusser's

analysis does not also apply to the practices of attending seminars, writing books and articles, teaching students, sitting on search committees, attending conferences, and applying for grants. These practices, occurring within the structured apparatus of the academy, produce "the global," meaning that the tension within the globalization literature stems from contradictions in the apparatus of knowledge production that give rise to the production of the global imaginary. As an imaginary, however, "the global" merely reproduces existing relations of social production failing to comprehend the "real conditions of existence" as the production and reproduction of a *social whole*. For this reason scholars should abandon the global imaginary in favor of studying *(global) structure*. Instead of reproducing the world in terms of globalization (i.e. a particular universalized into a "global reality"), scholars would be better off studying (global) structure as instantiated within particular conjunctures.

THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY AND "(GLOBAL) STRUCTURE"

Althusser argues that Marx opens up the continent of history to scientific investigation because he offers a materialist way of studying social totality. While I engage Althusser's differentiation of Marxist philosophy and Marxist science at length in Appendix III,[11] it should be noted that this distinction is central to understanding what "real" and "the imaginary" mean in Althusser's formulation of the claim that ideology is the *"imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence"* (Althusser 2001a, 109). In his essay on ideology, Althusser spends considerable time explaining what he means by imaginary. Unfortunately, he is almost completely silent about what he means by "real conditions of existence"—leaving only one cryptic clue: "On a number of occasions I have insisted on the revolutionary character of the Marxist conception of the 'social whole'" which he distinguishes from Hegelian totality (Althusser 2001a, 90; see also: Althusser 1970, 191 & 195). In *Reading Capital*, Althusser discusses *the social whole* using the language of "the *(global)*

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[11] In Appendix III, I depart from Althusser's claim that (global) structure can be understood scientifically. In *reading Althusser as Althusser reads Marx* I contend that his distinction between "science" and "ideology" should be read within the conjuncture of 1960s France and, most specifically, the debates within the French Communist Party. Therefore, instead of studying (global) structure "scientifically"—which Althusser believes Marx makes possible—I recoup the term "(global) structure" for the purpose of retaining the conceptual distinctions between "the real conditions of existence" and the knowledge produced to represent that which cannot be represented. This move, I explain in Appendix III, breaks down the transcendent claims of Marxism as a science and replaces it with an immanent social science.

structure of the mode of production" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 182-83).[12] Althusser's concept of *(global) structure* helps clarify the differences between "the global" as an imaginary and the social whole as the "real conditions of existence."

In approaching *(global) structure* one must first address the parentheses around global. Throughout his writing, Althusser uses parentheses in a highly stylized and consistent way, that is, to illustrate the presence of an absence.[13] This is important because Althusser makes an interesting distinction between *(global) structure* and *(regional) structure*. In *Reading Capital* Althusser writes:

> Because he defined the economic *by its concept,* Marx does not present economic phenomena—to illustrate his thought temporarily with a spatial metaphor—in the infinity of a homogeneous planar space, but rather in *a region* determined by a regional structure and itself inscribed in a site defined by a global structure: therefore as a complex and deep space, itself inscribed in another complex and deep space. But let us abandon this spatial metaphor, since this first opposition exhausts its virtues: everything depends, in fact, on the nature of this depth, or, more strictly speaking, of this *complexity.* To define economic phenomena by their concept is to define them by the concept of this complexity, i.e., by the concept of the (global) *structure* of the mode of production, insofar as it determines the (regional) *structure* which constitutes an economic object and determines the phenomena of this defined region, located in a defined site in the structure of the whole. At the economic level, strictly speaking, the *structure* constituting and determining economic objects is the *following*: the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production. The concept of this last *structure* cannot be defined without the concept of the global structure of the mode of production. (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 182-83)

This quote starts with the argument that economic relations should not be understand through the metaphor of planar space but as a complex overdetermined whole comprising competing and contradictory regions (see also Appendix I, p. 203-206 & 207-211). Althusser argues that various regions constitute one *complex* social whole, the entirety of which cannot be known as a *thing* but only represented as a *concept.*

Instead, structure is the mode of production with (global) structure exerting itself on (regional) structure and (regional) structure being the manifestation of (global) structure

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[12] We know that "social whole" and "(global) structure" are conceptually identical for three reasons. First, in citing "a number of occasions" in which he discussed "social whole," Althusser includes *Reading Capital* although this term does not appear in this work. Secondly, Althusser's discussion of "(global) structure" takes place in a chapter entitled "Marx's Immense Theoretical Revolution"—paralleling Althusser's claim that the "Marxist conception of the 'social whole'" has a "revolutionary character." And, finally, in both "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" and *Reading Capital* Althusser discusses "social whole" and "(global) structure" respectively as alternatives to a "spatial metaphor" of structure.

[13] Stylistically, Althusser uses parentheses to indicate what can be read symptomatically, as seen in his reading of Marx's discovery of "labor (power)" in the writing of Ricardo and Smith (Appendix II). In writing about a "(global) structure" or "(regional) structure" Althusser uses the parentheses to make visible that which is already present in the term "structure." As such, when Althusser writes about "(global) structure" and "(regional) structure" he is not referring to two distinct things but instead offers two manifestations of the same social totality: "( ) structure."

within "a defined site." All social relations, in other words, are produced and reproduced within a social totality comprised of different registers that overlap and contradict yet are immanent to each other. Althusser calls these registers "(regional) structures" that are the semi-autonomous worlds in which particular, conjunctural social relations play out. A (regional) structure is a densely integrated and interdependent series of social relations constituting one site or apparatus containing particular and unique features. While (regional) structures overlap, intersect, and overdetermine each other, the totality of these regional structures—that is, their relations and their effects—form a (global) structure. It should be kept in mind that Althusser does not see multiple structures (i.e. a structure of capital, a structure of race, a structure of gender, etc.) but only *one structure* comprising multiple, overdetermined parts. The (global) structure is the totality of all past and preset lived material practices (i.e. labor) as organized and known in the present moment.

What seems like a difference between regional and global structures, however, gets more complicated if we take seriously the presence of an absence that Althusser demarcates with parentheses. In a spatial model of structure there is no parenthesis: only "regional structure" and "global structure" as two distinct structures. One can imagine, for example, political scientists studying the structure of the family or the structure of the nation (i.e. regional structures) or the structure of globalization (i.e. a "global" structure in which the family and nation are nested). The Marxist conception of structure, however, comprises "(global) structure and (regional) structure." This statement can also be read: "( ) structure and (   ) structure." (Regional) structure "determines the phenomena of" a particular "region" while (global) structure *is the same structure* but can only be known in its "concept." In other words, *( ) structure* effects "a defined site" but cannot be known as a whole except as *the concept* or *(global) structure*, or *social whole*. (Global) structure constitutes all present and past human activities—all acts of world-making—and constitutes *the* mode of production. And (   ) structure is constantly reproducing itself, including the apparatuses in which knowledge is produced, but it can never be known as a *thing*, only as a concept develop of particularity.

Therefore, in claiming that globalization empirically references the world, academics assume that an imagined "global" = *(global) structure*, i.e. that the universalized particular

contains "the real conditions of existence." Althusser instead argues that the "real conditions of existence" is the social whole and therefore beyond representation.[14]

This conclusion does not mean that social scientists should refrain from producing knowledge about the world. However, social scientists who take *(global) structure* as their object of study must recognize that—in producing knowledge about an unrepresentable social whole—they are not simply representing the world but producing it.[15] Furthermore, since *(global) structure* can only be known as a phenomenon as instantiated within *(regional) structure*, the study of *(global) structure* requires examining the particular sites of knowledge production. However, even within these sites, *(global) structure* can only be read symptomatically.

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[14] For Althusser, the social whole cannot be represented because doing so requires an Archimedean vantage point transcending the social whole. Because knowledge is always produced immanent with the world, the social whole cannot be represented except as an abstraction.
[15] The details of this argument can be found in Appendix III were I navigate Althusser's distinction between science and philosophy.

SECTION II
THE PRODUCTION OF THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY

PRELUDE:
A CONTRAPUNTAL METHOD FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

While Part One provided a critical analysis of the globalization literature and diagnosed the literature's reoccurring referent—"the global"—as an imaginary, Part Two examines the academy as one structured material site in which the global imaginary is produced. Chapters Four and Five examine two sites of knowledge production[1]—the *U.S. academy* and the *South African academy*[2]—in order to explore some aspects of the structured material relations within which the global imaginary is produced. I argue that, on the one hand, U.S. universities have been rapidly transformed into sites specifically designed for the production of knowledge about globalization and, as a result, play a dominant and disproportionate role in producing the global imaginary. Similarly, African universities—and even the relatively resource-rich South African universities—have been converted into institutions designed primarily to address "local" development needs, producing knowledge designed to help Africa adapt to a world already imagined as "global." By taking seriously the contradictions at work in the South African academy—most notably the 1998 University of Cape Town curriculum debate—it becomes possible to identify ways of worlding "the global" differently than those possible within the conjuncture of the U.S. academy.

However, before examining these two sites of knowledge production, I must clarify how I understand the comparison between these two sites. I do not treat the U.S. and South African universities as two comparable "cases,"because starting from an assumption of overdetermination (Appendix I) means rejecting the claim that there exists some essential quality that renders two "cases" comparable as "like objects."[3] Instead of presenting a

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[1] I use the phrase "sites of knowledge production" in ways similar to Althusser's use of the term "apparatus." In short, the university operates as one material location in which imaginaries are produced. There are other sites of knowledge production such as the media, primary schools, think tanks, etc. that operate differently than universities and, therefore, produce "the global" in different ways. The methodological approach undertaken in this dissertation could be applied to these sites as well.

[2] It should be noted that the very process of aggregating a "U.S. academy" and a "South African academy" is a not unproblematic act of knowledge production. Abstracting "the U.S. academy" and the "South African academy" problematically creates the illusion that two universities within the same country—say, the University of Minnesota and Harvard are comparable at some essential level. Furthermore, the U.S. and South African academies are not independent of one another; students, faculty, publications, and resources move between institutions with great frequency. As such, the "U.S. academy" and the "South African academy" are not empirical referents but objects of knowledge produced for the purpose of this analysis.

[3] A critique of the empiricist belief in essentially comparable objects of study can be found in Appendix I.

contorted argument insisting that the U.S. and South African academies are similar cases (the comparison of which result in generalizable findings), I start from the premise that both sites occupy unique yet overdetermined positions within the *(global) structure*. Putting these particular yet similarly structured apparatuses into an analytical relationship *produces knowledge* about the structural conditions of academic knowledge production.

While Althusser theorizes the production of knowledge in terms of reading (see Chapter Two and Appendix II), he fails to offer much guidance on how to *write* (global) structure. Althusser contends that, as a totality, structure cannot be represented except *as a concept*. Therefore, while Althusser discusses (global) structure at the level of the concept, he fails to develop a method of writing that enables the production of knowledge about the particular conjuncture or apparatus as situated within the social whole. As a consequence, critics often accuse Althusser of being overly theoretical and unhelpful in explaining "real" political issues.[4] While Althusser recognizes the failure to develop applications for his theoretical work late in his career, this absence remains a major limitation. I argue, however, that reading Althusser's work within the present conjuncture makes it possible to see that Althusser actually produced such a method of analysis, which I call a method of *immanent social science research* (Appendix III).

How then does one write (global) structure? First, one starts from the recognition that knowledge does not reflect the world *as it really is* but rather produces the world within structured relations of knowledge production. Furthermore, since real objects are not essentially comparable, social scientists should not focus on comparing "like objects" but instead ask: "What is produced when two particular yet structured objects are juxtaposed against each other?" Establishing this kind of relationship, I argue, makes it possible to produce social scientific knowledge about (global) structure. To make this argument, I draw on Edward Said's concept of *the contrapuntal*. In developing a *contrapuntal method of social science research* I argue that the practice of comparing cases/variables/concepts as like objects produces a world imagined as homogenous, predictable and without contradiction. A *contrapuntal method of social science research*, in contrast, places particular objects of study in relation to each other in order to produce knowledge about actually existing structured yet

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[4] Robert Cox, for example, argues that—unlike historical materialists like Hobsbawm, Gramsci, and Marx—the structural Marxism of Althusser retains an "ahistorical, essentialist epistemology," which is little more than a "study in abstractions" and therefore ill-equipped to shed light on "concrete problems" (Cox 1986, 214-15). E.P. Thompson makes a similar argument in his famous polemical critique of Althusser (Thompson 1995).

particular conjunctures. Starting with the concept of (global) structure, the contrapuntal juxtaposition of two objects—in this case the U.S. and South African academies—makes it possible to catch a glimpse of the social whole as manifested within these two overdetermined regions of subjective practices.

I first offer an overview of Said's concept of the contrapuntal and conclude with a short overview of how this method is used to juxtapose the U.S. and South African academies.

A Contrapuntal Method of Social Scientific Research

In *Culture and Imperialism* Edward Said offers a contrapuntal method for studying how imperial ideologies operate within culture. The contrapuntal works by identifying that which is absent or obfuscated in a text and, in bringing it to the fore, juxtaposes this retrieved absence against the original text. For example, in his analysis of Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park,* Said hones in on a few scattered passages that hint at Mr. Betram's Caribbean plantations and the slave labor making the idyllic British manor possible. In juxtaposing the slave plantation against the prim and proper Victorian morality so vigorously defended within the novel Said creates what he calls a *contrapuntal movement.*

Said takes the concept of the contrapuntal from music; the contrapuntal occurs when "various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege given to any particular one" (Said 1993, 51). The existence of different themes allows for one to see both the structure of the music as well as the variation: "in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle outside the work" (Said 1993, 51). The contrapuntal method, therefore, allows one to highlight the particularities as well as the structural ordering of one's object of study. In juxtaposing Mansfield Park with the colonial plantation, for example, Said illustrates how each site depends upon each other. A contrapuntal method of reading does not simply argue for plural and relativistic reading—it does not simply "valorise plurality"—but is instead "a plea for 'worlding' the texts, institutions and practices, for historicizing them, for interrogating their sociality and materiality, for paying attention to the hierarchies and the power-knowledge nexus embedded in them, and for recuperating a 'non-coercive and nondominating knowledge'" (Chowdhry 2007, 105).

While Said presents the contrapuntal as a method of reading, it can also serve as a method of writing. A *contrapuntal method of social science research* starts by recognizing that all knowledge is produced and therefore lacks an abstract or essential "truth" to be discovered. Furthermore, all objects of study are overdetermined by structured relations of production and therefore contain both particularities owing to a particular conjuncture of production as well as similarities owing to consistencies across the structured totality. Social scientists, however, often treat objects of study as if they contained an essential quality making them comparable as like objects. The assumption of an essential comparability is motivated not by actually existing homogeneity but by the disciplinary and professional habits required by qualitative and quantitative analyses. Creating "like objects" works to make absent the actually existing particularity, heterogeneity, and difference in favor of desired (and rewarded) forms of knowledge that are generalizable, parsimonious, linearly causal, and progressive. In other words, complexity is reduced to simplicity and "likeness" in order to render the world understandable to the problematics of the social sciences.

A *contrapuntal method of social science research* contends, however, that particularity and difference should not be obscured in the pursuit of rendering the social world understandable to methods seeking to establish linear causality. Instead, a contrapuntal method identifies that which is absent and places it in relation to the object being studied. Since Africa (and African universities) are absent in the globalization literature, the next two chapters place the U.S. and South African academies into a contrapuntal relationship. Examining the U.S. and South African academies in a contrapuntal relationship produces a contrapuntal movement that makes it possible to catch a glimpse of how the production of academic knowledge is structured within the (global) structure. This movement makes some relations visible while obscuring others. As such, different aspects of the structured relations of academic knowledge production become knowable as contrapuntal movements were created between, for example, U.S. and Canadian academies, British and Indian academies or Kenyan and Chinese academies. The goal, however, is not to present the world as it really is but instead to produce politically useful knowledge.

A contrapuntal method of social scientific research has series implications for the concept of "field research," a notion made possible because of a structured hierarchy between "the home institution" and "the field," between "researcher" and "informant." These binary relationships reinforce the hierarchies between the space "out there" (the

"real" world) and the place where professionals objectively analyze data to unearth the knowledge embedded within it. The term "field research" implies that the university is *distinct from*, as opposed to *immanent to*, the world. The desire for a transcendent perspective undergirds most social scientific research and offers the "home institution" as a stable location beyond analysis, a platform from which to "discover" (as opposed to produce) meaningful knowledge. While the assumed transcendence of the university over "the field" creates the appearance of "objective knowledge," it does so by marginalizing "the field." "The field" becomes a site rendered meaningful only as an object of knowledge rather than as a world in which subjects actively produce meaning.[5] Furthermore, the assumed transcendence of social scientific knowledge offers the false illusion of academic knowledge as inherently good (i.e. part of the progression of knowledge) rather than a site of struggle, with real consequences.

To challenge this hierarchy between "the university" and "the field," a contrapuntal method does not reinforce an inside and outside to knowledge production but instead focuses on examining particular sites, or conjunctures, within which knowledge is produced. Using this method, the U.S. and South African academies are not presented as two cases existing "out there" which, when expertly studied side-by-side, yield yet-unseen knowledge. Instead, both are presented as complex and contradictory sets of relations and effects that continuously structure and overdetermine each other.

OVERVIEW OF PART II

The following two chapters offer a contrapuntal analysis of the U.S. and South African academies, looking at how these two sites produce the global imaginary. Chapter Four provides an overview of how, at a number of registers, the U.S. academy has been structurally transformed into a site for the production of "the global." Chapter Five examines how the post-apartheid South African academy has been restructured into an institution designed to help South Africa integrate into a world already imagined as "global." Situating these two sites in relationship to one another makes it possible to analyze how academic knowledge is produced within a social totality.

Why South Africa?

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[5] See Mbembe's critique of the social sciences (Introduction, p. 9).

In some ways I chose to juxtapose the U.S. academy with the South African academy for intellectual reasons; in other ways, the conjuncture chose this juxtaposition for me. On the one hand, it makes sense to juxtapose the U.S. academy against the South African academy because, in South Africa, one can clearly see how the global imaginary quickly gets absorbed as an apartheid university transforms itself into a post-apartheid university. Furthermore, there exists a vast literature—much of it accessible in South African journals—debating the future of post-apartheid education. This literature offers a unique and well-documented struggle between the aspirations of the anti-apartheid movement, on the one hand, and the inculcation of the global imaginary as the emerging ideology of South African higher education. And, finally, South Africa has the most expansive system of higher education in Africa.[6] One would expect to find African countries with universities facing even greater financial and institutional stress to be constrained by the demands of international institutions and private funders.

On the other hand, my choice of South Africa was driven by the conjuncture and, in particular, by the availability of funding (through a new "global initiative" program at the University of Minnesota; see Chapter Four) and by various institutional connections between Minnesota and South Africa (in large part because of the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change at the University of Minnesota). These are not incidental acknowledgements but very real relations of academic knowledge production that made this project possible. While academic norms encourage concealing how academic decisions are often driven by logistical, funding, and access issues, the cloaking of various structured reasons for "case selection" only obscures the material relations organizing academic knowledge production.

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[6] The South African university system forms "the oldest of the modern, secular university systems in Africa, and probably the most developed in terms of infrastructure, research capacity, breadth of curriculum, and international linkages and accreditation" (Nash 2006, 3; see also, Brock-Utne 2000, 247).

CHAPTER 4:
THE U.S. ACADEMY AND THE PRODUCTION
OF THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY

Justin Rosenberg argues that "we live today in a veritable 'age of globalisation studies', in which one academic discipline after another is gaily expanding its remit into the 'global' sphere and relocating its own subject matter in a geographically extended, worldwide perspective" (Rosenberg 2000, 11). While Rosenberg is most likely referring to the "we" of the U.S. academy, his point is not without merit. The "age of globalization studies" is evidenced in the proliferation of Global Studies departments and programs; the expansion of book series, edited volumes, readers, journals, conferences, and professional associations dedicated to the topic; and the inclusion of "global" and "globalization" in class titles, textbooks, class syllabi, and academic job postings. Small private colleges and large public universities alike engage in the project of "globalizing" the curriculum, creating infrastructures for students to have "global" experiences and developing interdisciplinary programming focused on studying globalization. In this way, the rapid growth of an academic literature on globalization can be read as symptomatic of structural transformations in that apparatus of the U.S. academy thereby shaping the lived material practices of the students, faculty, administrators, and staff and bringing about a mass production of the global imaginary.

The narrative offered in this chapter, starting from the assumption of overdetermined causality (see Appendix I), does not attempt to identify a singular cause or even multiple causes for the restructuring of the U.S. academy into a site of production of "the global." Instead, I offer five over-overdetermined *registers*[1] at which the structural shift can be identified. The five registers include: 1) the rise of interdisciplinarity; 2) the turn toward studying "world markets" in business schools; 3) the retrenchment of funding from area studies after the Cold War; 4) the growing popularity of study abroad programs; and 5) academic and professional groups advocating "globalized" curricula. These inter-punctuating registers combine to form a *ruptural unity*[2] in the structure of academic knowledge

[1] See Appendix III for an analysis of how I use Althusser's analysis of *registers*.
[2] See Appendix III for an analysis of how I use Althusser's analysis of *ruptural unity*.

production. The last section examines how these structural transformations play out within the particular conjuncture of the University of Minnesota.

Before examining how the U.S. academy is systematically being restructured into a site for the production of the global imaginary, I first examine how—prior to the emergence of globalization as an object of knowledge in the mid-1990s—the U.S. academy was structured to produce national and the international imaginaries. Initially focusing exclusively on domestic issues, by mid-century the social sciences turned their attention to other countries as well as the international system as a whole. On the one hand, various area studies disciplines were developed to produce knowledge about the non-Western world while, on the other hand, International Relations became the site for producing knowledge about the international system. As such, the U.S. academy was structured into a specialized site to study a world imagined as containing discrete nations existing within a single international system. Both area studies and International Relations reproduced a national imaginary; the former offered in-depth studies of particular countries defined by national boundaries and the latter studied an international system occupied by nation-states.

PRODUCING THE "NATION" AND "INTERNATIONAL" AS OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

The U.S. academy started as a series of fairly isolated parochial, private denominational schools dedicated to educating the clergy and a very small economic and social elite (Washburn 2005, 27). By the mid-19th century the U.S. academy was transformed into a site to produce a national imaginary. In 1862 the federal government became actively involved in higher education with the Morrill Land Grant Act—giving federal land to establish state colleges and universities offering vocational education, military training, and socially valuable research. Unlike the private colleges, land grant universities trained farmers, soldiers, and industrialists and, in the years following the Civil War, aided the transition from a plantation to a scientific and industrial agricultural economy. The introduction of governmental funding of higher education, and the creation of state schools, gave the U.S. academy a utilitarian function in which higher education was treated as a public good aimed at promoting national welfare.

By the end of the 19th century vast banking, railroad, utility, and manufacturing conglomerates created great concentrations of private wealth, which began transforming higher education in unprecedented ways. Seeing the university as a valuable training ground

for skilled managers, major industrialists became increasingly involved in administering higher education, importing lessons from business to the management of the university (Barrow 1990). This development attained new levels with the creation of the General Education Board by John D. Rockefeller in 1903 and the Carnegie Foundation in 1904, which set out to standardize, rationalize, and streamline higher education (Barrow 1990, Chapter 3).

Within this context, many traditional disciplines adopted scientific methodologies to become more relevant to an industrialized national economy and increasingly bureaucratized state. For example, history, economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology were prioritized "knowledge that was certain (science)" while disciplines such as theology and philosophy became marginalized because they offered knowledge that was seen as "imagined" and therefore "not science" (Wallerstein et al. 1996, 5). The rise of the social sciences was supported not only by private philanthropists like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller but routinely tapped by policymakers seeking advice on how to address social problems (Fisher 1993, 12). The establishment of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) demonstrates the convergence of academic, state, and philanthropic institutions aimed at promoting the national good by encouraging the production of social science knowledge. During the 1920s, Charles E. Merriam, president of the American Political Science Association (1921) and chair of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Beardsley Rulm, director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial foundation, established the SSRC as a way of transforming "social studies into academic social sciences" and encouraging "cooperative scientific research that would attack 'real' social problems" (Fisher 1993, 27). In uniting academics from various disciplines with unprecedented financial backing, the SSRC was able to fund otherwise prohibitively costly statistical and experimental studies and offered grants and intellectual forums for scholars doing social scientific and policy-relevant research. The "SSRC not only substantially increased the amount of social research conducted in the United States" but also, through its funding priorities and institution-building activities, "pushed and pulled researchers in an empirical direction" (Fisher 1993, 205). As American society became increasingly industrialized and bureaucratic, industry and national policymakers favored social scientific knowledge.

During World War II government agencies including the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services turned to the social sciences in greater numbers (Soley

1995, 77). In 1943 the SSRC's Committee on World Regions and Columbia University's Committee on Area Studies both released independent reports recommending that the social sciences develop regional specialization. Prior to these reports very little area-specific academic knowledge existed for regions of the world outside Europe and the United States. Those scholars trained in non-Western societies often focused exclusively on anthropological studies of "tribal" and "primitive" peoples or ahistorical "Oriental studies" focusing on the "non-Western 'high civilizations'" such as "China, Japan, India, Persia, and the Arab-Islamic world" (Wallerstein 1997, 198). In both cases, non-Western peoples were studied as "timeless" and unchanged and therefore offered little to understandings of the dynamic changes taking place in Africa, Asia, or Latin America (Wallerstein 1997, 198-199). The encouragement of area studies, therefore, effectively unleashed social scientific methodologies onto the rest of the world.

At the end of the war, the government maintained heavy investments in higher education, continuing to pay university academics for military research.[3] In 1957 the Eisenhower administration developed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), providing large sums of money to area studies (Wallerstein 1997, 209). Funding for the social sciences also came from the Pentagon, FBI, and CIA[4] and focused on understanding the internal workings of communist countries "to help prevent other areas from 'falling into the hands of the communists'" (Wallerstein 1997, 200-201).

As area studies gained popularity and institutional support within the U.S. academy, American scholars turned greater attention to Africa. Much of this research funding was driven by strategic concerns stemming from the Soviet Union's involvement in the continent.[5] The launching of Sputnik set off "nothing less than a scramble for trusted scholars and programs—with research funds, promotion, and publication eagerly provided" (West and Martin 1997). African Studies received considerable government funding

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[3] By 1950 96 percent of federal funding for the social sciences came from the military while overall 87 percent of federal funding for higher education came from the military (Washburn 2005, 42-43).

[4] Much of this money was funneled into higher education through covert means. For example, Project Troy (1950-51) was an alliance between social scientists based at MIT, the military, and the CIA to develop tactics for psychological warfare (Needell 1998). Scholars at Michigan State advised the South Vietnamese government to train their secret police (Wallerstein 1997, fn. 37). In 1964 American University's Special Operations Research Office funded Project Camelot to use social science methods to fight counter-insurgencies (Wallerstein 1997, 220-222). Between 1966 and 1970 the Department of Defense spent between $34 million and $48 million on "behavioral and social-science research" (Nader 1997, 123).

[5] Laura Nader similarly points out that African countries "became an academic interest in the West as the Soviet Union began to invest in selected African countries" (Nader 1997, 130).

including NDEA grants, Title VI funding, AID funding, money from AID/ATLAS for training African students, funding from Fulbrights, "the usual disciplinary funding through NSF, NEH, NEA, NIH," and indirectly through the Peace Corps (Guyer 1996, 13).

African studies also contained a large number of leftists who supported anti-colonial struggles and often proved fairly critical of U.S. policy. The rise of African studies also took place within the context of the Civil Rights, Black consciousness, and the Pan-Africanist movements, creating a number of deep-seated contradictions within the discipline. On the one hand, scholars were deeply "imbricated…in the explosive tensions of racial politics at home and imperialism abroad" while, on the other hand, they were implicated in what Martin Staniland called the "Washington formula," which demanded that "African Studies contributed to the definition, defense, and deployment of U.S. interests and intentions in Africa" (quoted in: Zeleza 1997; see, Staniland 1983). One symptom of this contradiction took place during the 1969 African Studies Association (ASA) meeting in Montreal in which members of the Black Caucus "stormed the podium calling for the empowerment of black scholars within the ASA" (West and Martin 1997). These scholars demanded greater "black membership and participation in all phases and operations of the African Studies Association" and "called for the inclusion of a Pan-Africanist perspective in research themes" as well as a "collective commitment to struggles for emancipation in Africa and the United States" (Zeleza 1997).

In addition to the rise of area and African studies, the post-war U.S. academy became increasingly productive of knowledge about "the international." After World War II a number of displaced European scholars—including Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, Ernst Haas, and Henry Kissinger—advocated studying the international system scientifically (Hoffmann 1977, 47). They conceptualized "the international" as a system comprising nation-states as discrete units operating within a condition of structural anarchy. This Realist approach to international relations became dominant as it affirmed scientific thinking and offered the United States a way of conceptualizing its role as a new superpower. Realism flourished within the academy in large part because it accepted U.S. hegemony as a core assumption, making it highly sought after and supported by the U.S. government (Smith 1987; Hoffmann 1977).

The rise of "the international" as an object of knowledge not only corresponded with government and private funding but also reinforced the nation as one of the primary

objects of social scientific research. While area studies used social scientific methods to study economic, social, political, and historical developments outside the United States (and mostly in non-Western countries), Realist international relations produced knowledge about an international system composed of discrete national units. While approaching the world at different registers, "the national" served as the organizing imaginary.[6]

STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS: BECOMING A "GLOBAL" UNIVERSITY

Althusser argues that structural change happens through a *ruptural unity* when "a vast accumulation of 'contradictions' [that] come[] into play *in the same court*" (Althusser 1970, 100; see also Appendix III, p. 239-40). The structural transformation of the U.S. academy into a site for the production of the global imaginary can be studied as a playing out at the intersection of a number of intervening registers including (but not limited to): the rise of interdisciplinarity; intellectual trends within business schools; the retrenchment of funding from area studies; the growth of study abroad programs as well as advocacy groups promoting more "globalized" curriculum. The intersection of these registers is also overdetermined *in the final instance* by changes in economic relations, as the university becomes increasingly incorporated into neoliberal relations of capitalist production.

Interdisciplinarity

The gradual turn towards interdisciplinarity within the social sciences was one of the registers that brought about a transformation of the U.S. academy into a site for the production of the "global imaginary" into being. This trend started in 1970s as a response to the methodological rigidity of various behavioral and methodological approaches. By the late 1980s and early 1990s interdisciplinarity became a common practice of knowledge production.

Starting in the 1970s, "interdisciplinarity"[7] encapsulated a desire among some academics to abandon research based on narrow specialization and pursue instead knowledge that addressed "real world"—rather than disciplinary—concerns. Many saw

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[6] It should be pointed out the U.S. academy also produced the national imaginary within the humanities, which served as a "producer, protector, and inculcator of an idea of national culture" (Readings 1996, 3).

[7] I recognize that considerable debate exists concerning what distinguishes interdisciplinarity from crossdisciplinary, transdisciplinarity and multidisciplinary. In this section I crudely subsume this debate into the term "interdisciplinarity" as a way of registering the general trend away from traditional disciplinary knowledge.

disciplinary knowledge as unable to keep pace with the rapidly changing world and argued for broader, problem-focused, and policy-relevant analyses. Many championed interdisciplinarity as a way to create a more "integrative learning experience[s] for the student," to "stimulate[] greater freedom of inquiry," eliminate "conventional lines of thinking," and create "an authentically humanistic education" (Kavaloski 1979, 224-25). Interdisciplinarity was also adopted by feminists, poststructuralists, postmodernists, and postcolonial theorists interested in "dismantling disciplinary perspectives" (Lattuca 2001, 15). By 1986, there were 235 interdisciplinary programs in the U.S. academy on topics such as "women's studies, environmental studies, international and multicultural studies, and science, technologies, and human values" (Casey 1994, 54). Many interdisciplinary programs were later transformed into departments during the 1990s as the academy underwent to period of intense expansion.

This challenge to disciplinary knowledge was, in part, a reaction to the organization of the university in mid-nineteenth century based on the division of labor and the creation of bureaucratic management (Swoboda 1979, 79). The rapid expansion of disciplines, departments, and specialized knowledges during this period meant that many universities and colleges became "divided into a hundred fiefdoms, each with its army (departmental faculty), local dialect (journals), and religious establishment (professional societies)" (Roy 1979, 162). By the 1970s numerous academics set out to challenge this organization of knowledge production, organizing conferences, editing volumes, and forming professional organizations to promote the development of interdisciplinary research. In 1970 the OECD's Centre for Education Research and Innovation hosted a seminar on interdisciplinarity and published the conference papers in the book *Interdisciplinarity: Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities* (1972). In subsequent years, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education, the Carnegie Corporation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) all supported considerable interdisciplinary research projects in the U.S. (Klein 1986, 418). The watershed moment for interdisciplinarity came when the Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in the Humanities at Pennsylvania State University hosted a postdoctoral seminar (1975-76) culminating in the publication of the influential 1979 book *Interdisciplinarity in Higher Education* (Klein 1986, 417). Subsequent years saw the birth of two interdisciplinary professional organizations—INTERSTUDY and the

Association for Integrative Studies—and a rapid expansion of the academic literature on interdisciplinarity (Klein 1986, 418).[8]

While many scholars turned to interdisciplinarity for intellectual and political commitments, "the major force in changing university structures toward interdisciplinarity has not been intellectual" but rather financial (Roy 1979, 166). On the one hand, the push for interdisciplinarity occurred as political and economic pressures required the academy to pay even greater attention to pressing social problems. By the 1970s the public "had started to pour vast amounts [of resources] into education" based on the assumption that the university could offer solutions to social problems. This influx of funds meant less tolerance for research lacking expedient political, social, or economic relevance (Roy 1979, 163). On the other hand, a move to interdisciplinary programs allowed institutions to sustain humanities and social science instruction while steadily undermining financial commitments to established departments. Furthermore, the funding structure of interdisciplinary programs centralized power in the central administration, circumventing self-governance at the departmental level (Adamson 2008). Bill Readings points out that administrators often favor interdisciplinarity because it offers administrators "a way of overcoming entrenched practices of demarcation, ancient privileges, and fiefdoms in the structure of universities" and will eventually be used "to replace clusters of disciplines" (Readings 1996, 39). Writing prophetically in the mid-1990s, Readings predicted that interdisciplinarity would enable administrators to collapse various disciplines into "a more general field that combines history, art history, literature, media studies, sociology, and so on" (Readings 1996, 39).

The move toward interdisciplinarity within the U.S. academy varies greatly among disciplines and institutions. Interdisciplinarity became a useful codeword for progressive and radical scholars striving to create various institutional spaces—such as American, African, American Indian, Asian, women's, and gender studies departments and programs—to challenge epistemologically conservative regimes of disciplinary knowledge production. But the push toward interdisciplinarity often complements the defunding of the social sciences and humanities. Because interdisciplinary programs in the humanities and social sciences often lack "tuition-based and donation-driven sources of funding" they "tend to be inordinately dependent on deans and provosts for resources" meaning "they are always at

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[8] Chubin, Rossini, and Porter have found that "the literature on interdisciplinarity problem-focused research" has grown significantly since 1969, doubling between 1969 and 1972, "growing 120 percent from 1973 to 1977, and an additional 95 percent from 1978 to 1982" (Klein 1990, 38).

risk for budget cuts in an economic downturn" (Disch and O'Brien 2007, 163). While often politically risky to cut, interdisciplinary programs often "persist *below costs*" since they impose "high workloads on their faculty and staff, principally by speeding up the service labor through short staffing" (Disch and O'Brien 2007, 163).

In addition, interdisciplinary departments and programs are often created to attract outside funding. Interdisciplinary initiatives funded by foundations and private donors offset curriculum costs—while often using uncompensated faculty labor to assemble the grant application. In such instances, interdisciplinarity allows administrations to maintain the humanities and social sciences while reducing—or at least making more fungible—the overall costs of teaching and research. In some sectors, such as area studies, interdisciplinarity has become a survival strategy.[9]

While the discourse of interdisciplinarity emerged prior to the academic literature on globalization, interdisciplinarity nonetheless provided the conceptual spadework for a turn toward globalization. Interdisciplinarity created a flexible intellectual environment in which arranging otherwise disparate conceptual, theoretical, topical, and geographical areas into a single object of study became possible. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the global studies programs, funders of globalization research, and journals publishing on globalization often highlight interdisciplinarity. While interdisciplinarity comes, in part, from economic and political pressures placed on the U.S. academy, interdisciplinary teaching and research also creates critical, and sometimes radical, intellectual possibilities within the university. Many of those contentious and contradictory impulses found in the argument for interdisciplinarity can be located within the academic literature on globalization.

Business schools

A decade before globalization became an object of study in the U.S. academy, business schools began studying "global markets." In fact, in the 1990s when social scientists turned to study globalization, many of the phenomena they observed were the effects of marketing strategies inspired by their colleagues across campus in the business school.

Shortly after World War II a new emphasis was placed on developing and expanding the teaching of business and management. Business schools flourished due to an influx of

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[9] For example, in a 1995 symposium on the status of Comparative Politics, James Scott proclaimed that: "If half of your reading is not *outside* the confines of political science, you are risking extinction along with the rest of the subspecies" (Scott 1996, 37).

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students on the GI bill as well as a number of well-funded Carnegie and Ford foundation initiatives designed to promote and standardize business education (Khurana 2007, Chapter 6). The training of managers and business professionals was also widely understood as part of the fight against the Soviet Union such that "the reform of business education became nearly synonymous with patriotism" (Khurana 2007, 240).

Since the 1950s, the number of students in business schools has grown rapidly.[10] Over the last few decades, the model of American business education has been exported around the world, creating an oversupply problem for business schools that are forced to compete for increasingly scarce students (Starkey and Tiratsoo 2007, Chapter 2). As a result, "with the possible exception of parts of Africa," business schools can be found in most countries and have become "woven into higher education, the business system and the culture" (Starkey and Tiratsoo 2007, 15)

In 1974, the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) first suggested that business schools focus on international issues when it encouraged institutions to increase the "international business content" in business school curriculum. In 1986 it clarified this position declaring that business students should be introduced to "international dimensions through one or more elements of the curriculum" (quoted in: Fugate and Jefferson 2001, 160). This policy was more strongly worded the following year when the AACSB announced that business schools must internationalize the whole curriculum and include foreign language and cross cultural education. By 1993 the AACSB Standards for Accreditation required that "undergraduate and gradate curricula" include attention to "'global issues' and 'global economic environments'" (Fugate and Jefferson 2001, 161).

During this time, globalization became a major object of study in U.S. business schools. In 1983 Theodore Levitt published his groundbreaking article "The Globalization of Markets" in the *Harvard Business Review* arguing that while the multinational corporation "adjusts its products and practices" depending on the country, the global corporation "operates with resolute consistence—at low relative cost—as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a single entity." In other words, Levitt argued that it is cheaper to "sell the

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[10] In 1955, 42,812 students earned BAs and 3,280 earned MAs in business; by 1975 these numbers reached 143,171 (a 334 percent increase over 1955) and 42,492 respectively (a 1,299 percent increase over 1955). By 2002 the number of BAs in business reached 293,545 (a 205 percent increase over 1975), while the number of MAs soared to 127,545 (a 299 percent increase over 1975) (Starkey and Tiratsoo 2007, 17). The number of accredited business schools also grew during this period, from 323 in 1996 to 460 just ten years later (Zammuto 2008, 262).

same things in the same way everywhere" (Levitt 1983, 92-93). This argument amounted to a profound conceptual shift in marketing strategy predicated on the innovative assumption that companies could develop "a worldwide convergence of tastes" rather than cater to national markets (Applbaum 2000, 265). For example, when Harlequin Romances decided to sell novels in Poland instead of creating a series of books with Polish characters and themes—i.e. the conventional marketing strategy prior to the mid-1980s—the company marketed novels already in stock by running ads during reruns of *Dynasty* and by importing St. Valentine's Day to Poland (Applbaum 2000, 265-66). In this way, Harlequin Romances focused on converting Polish tastes rather than treating Poland as a distinctive market.

Levitt's argument made an immediate splash as those managing multinational corporations engaged in "roundtable discussions, task forces, corporate strategy meetings, or informal studies" aimed at developing the "*global potential*" of their products (Applbaum 2000, 264). This argument also circulated widely through the media (Quelch and Deshpande 2004, 9). Today, this article remains "required reading in business schools across the world" (Quelch and Deshpande 2004, 9). At a time when very few countries outside North American, western Europe and Japan "had home offices that sold products or services outside the home country borders" and the United States faced a severe recession and a ramping up of Cold War hostilities,[11] Levitt's creation of the language of "global markets" spurred many in business schools to approach markets in a fundamentally different way (Tedlow and Abdelal 2004).

Defunding area studies

In addition to the growth of interdisciplinary research and the expansion of business schools, by the late 20th century the U.S. government and philanthropic organizations began cutting funding to area studies. As programs were defunded many area studies faculty and graduate students were left to find other sources of funding. In this conjuncture, many turned to the study of globalization.

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government and philanthropic organizations began pushing trans-regional studies over area studies. The U.S. government cut much of its funding because area-specific knowledge was no longer deemed necessary

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[11] The year Levitt published "Global Markets" (1983) was the same year that President Reagan declared the Soviet Union to be "the evil empire."

for national security. Furthermore, the foreign policy of the day—the Clinton Doctrine—focused on expanding markets and the creating major trade organizations such as NAFTA, APEC, and the World Trade Organization. Scholars interested in writing policy-relevant work turned their attention to "a world without borders, increasing globalization, the worlds of the Internet and the World Wide Web" (Cumings 1998, 180).

Philanthropic organizations similarly began insisting that area studies focus on "global" issues. Starting in the mid-1990s a number of "foundations and funding consortia" including the Mellon and Ford Foundations announced pans to "replac[e] 'area' structures with 'global' ones" (West and Martin 1997; see also, Cumings 1998, 178). The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) signaled one of the most significant shifts in foundation funding in 1996 with its decommissioning of the "joint committees"[12] in favor of research connecting regional with global issues (Prewitt 1996b, 31). While SSRC president Kenneth Perwitt justified this move as a response to an empirically changing world:

> One of the frequently remarked consequences of the globalization accelerated by new information technologies and post-1989 market forces is that 'areas' are more porous, less bounded, less fixed than we previously assumed…Area studies traditionally had a fairly clear grasp of what was meant by 'here' and what was meant by 'there.' But when areas, from remote villages to entire continents, are caught up in processes which link them to events that, through geographically distant, are culturally, economically, politically strategically, and ecologically quite near, the distinction between 'here' and 'there' breaks down. To learn more and more about social conditions in a particular area, then, means to learn more and more about how that area is situated in events going on beyond its geographic borders…the global-local notion is not a methodological metaphor invented by social theorists; it is the lived experience of billions of people. And it is being lived today in ways unanticipated even a decade ago. (Prewitt 1996c, 15-16)

This new "reality," Prewitt argued, necessitated that the SSRC abandon funding "discrete and separated 'area committees'" since doing so prevented scholars from studying "global" developments (Prewitt 1996c, 16). However, the SSRC's annual report from the same year offers a more candid picture of these changes. In this document, Prewitt recognizes that higher education is increasingly under "heightened public scrutiny" and "[m]any are asking about the efficiencies/inefficiencies of university education, both in its own workings and in its links to those parts of the society for which its graduates and its knowledge are intended" (Prewitt 1996a, 13). As such, many of the "[s]takeholders and co-investers (parents, legislative committees, industrial consumers, taxpayers, employers) have 'reform' on their mind" (Prewitt 1996a, 13). Prewitt contends that higher education in the United States "has

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[12] In 1996 the SSRC's Joint Committees included: "Africa, Asia (five committees), Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Near and Middle East, and Western Europe" (Prewitt 1996c, 15).

become a large, heterogeneous, and costly industry" such that "new stresses" including "resource constraints, increased public scrutiny, demographic transformations, new information technologies, competition from non-traditional suppliers of educational services, and demands for higher return on investment" are placing higher education under considerable "pressure to raise productivity, improve accountability, and to set and realize priorities that serve not only higher education, but society and the economy as well" (Prewitt 1996a, 15-16).[13]

By the mid-1990s scholars widely recognized that area studies—and African studies in particular—were in crisis.[14] Martin and West claimed that the defunding of African studies was akin to the structural adjustment policies imposed on African countries.[15] The African Studies Association (ASA) published a report in 1996 in which past and present ASA presidents observed that "[w]ith the end of the Cold War…foundation priorities have turned from area studies" meaning that "the African continent risks becoming increasingly marginalized in academic life" (quoted in: Guyer 1996, vii).

As scholars found traditional sources of funding drying up, many turned toward studying globalization. On the one hand, more money was found in global studies. West and Martin recognize that as those institutions that "propelled the creation of Area Studies programs and sustained them for almost two generations" walked away "[o]ne need only to examine universities' current investment and strategic plans: these invariably flow away from Area Studies endeavors and toward the creation of new global programs and centers" (West and Martin 1997). Others argued that it was difficult to tell if "structural changes [in the funding of area studies] are driven by 'real world changes' or by funders who are enamored with sloppy notions of a global village and new programming opportunities" (Watts 1997).

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[13] Watts argued that the "SSRC is hitching the globalization mantra" based not on what was best for the intellectual requirements but instead because "in an era of growing academic corporatism and a call (from foundations and from governments) for a more lean and mean research enterprise" (Watts 1997). There is some speculation that the move to reorganize area studies funding occurred at a time when the SSRC was facing the prospect of bankruptcy (Cumings 1998, 178).

[14] For example: in 1997 *Africa Today* had a special issue entitled "The Future of Regional Studies" (April/June 97; 44(2)); *World Politics* (1996) published the proceedings of a symposium at Princeton University entitled "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics" focusing on the turn toward interdisciplinarity, postmodernism, and "global" research agendas within the field of Comparative Politics; and, in 1995 *Issue* published a special issue on the crises facing African Studies (Winter/Spring; 23(1)).

[15] While recognizing that the squeezing of African Studies in the academy is nothing compared to the experience of "African peasants and workers," nonetheless "declining government, private and, indeed, academic institutional support has serious implications for Africanists and their craft" (West and Martin 1995, 3).

In fact, the call "for the globalization of knowledge production" looks "suspiciously like a speedup of the production line," i.e. a call to "do[] more with less" (Watts 1997).

These changes also affected what topics could be funded, the kind of field research that could be completed, and who was published (and therefore hired and promoted). Guyer points out that those in African studies are "finding it increasingly difficult to get away from university service and the conditions of career advancement" and therefore turn to theoretical argument owing to a lack of funding for intensive field research and due to an "intensification of pressure to publish: for appointments, promotion and tenure purpose" (Guyer 1996, 7). She contrasts the funding realities faced by those in African studies with scholars working on development issues. While the latter often travels "back and forth to Africa for regular visits," most Africanists find "it increasingly difficult and competitive to fund a research trip" (Guyer 1996, 7). This structural transformation has been felt in terms of what knowledge is being produced as "academic globalism is eroding the Area Studies framework" (Lowe 1997, 297).

Study abroad

In recent years the U.S. academy has greatly expanded its study abroad infrastructure. While Cold War study abroad programs served as an extension of U.S. diplomatic policy, contemporary study abroad programs in the United States increasingly aim to provide students a "global" experience while enabling schools to differentiate themselves and attract students.

Prior to World War I, study abroad was only available to few Americans. Those students who participated traveled primarily to Europe on non-accredited academic adventures or as part of prestigious post-graduation fellowships such as the Rhodes or Fulbright (Hoffa 2007, 30-35). After World War I, however, U.S. universities found themselves inundated with applications from foreign students displaced by the war. In response to this new pressure, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace funded the creation of the Institute of International Education (IIE), which placed foreign students in various institutions and established programs to make U.S. campuses more hospitable to foreign students (Hoffa 2007, 67). The increased presence of foreign students sparked greater interest in traveling abroad. While study abroad halted during World War II, the post-war university was increasingly eager to expand its offerings. In addition, the U.S.

Department of State "took new interest in the revival of international education after the war" believing that American students "could serve as unofficial goodwill ambassadors on behalf of the American way of life" (Hoffa 2007, 112-13).[16] During this period, the federal government funded students to study abroad and, with the help of large philanthropic foundations such as Carnegie and Ford, rapidly expanded its study abroad capacity (Hoffa 2007, 112-13). Various other study abroad opportunities were developed and expanded to enhance America's image during the post-war era. The Fulbright Program, for example, allowed countries with wartime loans to repay its debt by hosting student and faculty exchanges.[17] Study abroad opportunities also increased after the 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA), a post-Sputnik initiative to develop both area studies and study abroad (Hoffa 2007, 117-18). By 1985 48,483 American students were studying abroad. By 2004 this number had jumped to 191,321; a 395 percent increase in twenty years (Guruz 2008, 185). A number of factors explain this increase, including a strong dollar, greater mobility among Americans in the military, the popularity of the Peace Corps, expanded business and tourist travel, as well as increased awareness of events around the world (Goodwin and Nacht 1988, 3).

In addition to issues of access, institutional demands also resulted in expanded study abroad infrastructure. Many universities and colleges invested in study abroad programs to boost institutional competitiveness and attract top students. Goodwin and Nacht found that during the 1980s "gloomy demographic forecasts" predicted larger institutional capacity than potential students and meant that schools developed study abroad programs to win the "struggle for bodies" (Goodwin and Nacht 1988, 21). They also found that schools use study aboard as one way of making schools, especially smaller rural schools, "seem more glamorous, cosmopolitan, and up-to-date" (Goodwin and Nacht 1988, 21). Some schools also developed study abroad programs to recruit tuition-paying foreign students, to harness "the entrepreneurial drives of faculty," to save money by locating tuition-paying students in

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[16] For example, in 1959 the federal government's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs provided financial support for universities to establish study abroad programs in Latin America as an attempt "to counter the growing influence of the Soviet Union throughout much of Latin America," believing that American students "could contribute toward the building of a more positive U.S. image" (Hoffa 2007, 123).

[17] Similarly, the Higher Education Act "provided funding and opportunities for U.S. institutions to use their academic expertise and applied know-how to address to problems of reconstruction…U.S. institutions sent faculty and graduate students to projects in Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and especially to Western Europe" to help with war reconstruction projects (Hoffa 2007, 116).

places with lower overhead, to decrease class sizes and to alleviate housing shortfalls (Goodwin and Nacht 1988, 21-29).

This increase in study abroad infrastructure led to considerable asymmetries regarding who studied abroad and where. Of the countries sending students abroad between 1965 and 2005 there was a nearly "complete absence of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the top 20 sending countries" (Wit 2008, 33). In 2006, 700,999 East Asian students and 486,601 American and European students studied abroad, compared with only 93,872 students from Sub-Saharan Africa—a mere 7 percent of the total number of students studying abroad that year.

In addition, considerable asymmetries exist as to *where* students study. North America and Europe are by far the largest destinations for students; in 2006, 1.7 million foreign students studied in either North America or Europe, representing 69.4 percent of all students studying abroad that year (Guruz 2008, 230). The year was not an exceptional year; the United States has been the number one destination for foreign students since 1968 (Wit 2008, 35-36). While South Africa become the eighth most popular destination for study abroad students in 2004, it only attracted 2 percent of the total number of students studying abroad, compared with the United States's 23.3 percent (Wit 2008, 36). As such, more African students study in the United States and Europe than foreign students study in the Africa.[18] This quantitative asymmetry is compounded by a qualitative asymmetry as well. While students from the United States and Europe often go abroad for a semester or two to supplement their education with a "global" experience, many foreign students study in the United States for multiple years, often as part of degree-earning programs. As a result, the very meaning of studying abroad differs based on where one is coming from. Traveling from Asia or Africa to study in the United States, for example, is often less about having a "global" experience and more about accessing academic possibilities not available in one's home country.

These asymmetries are further compounded by the fact that, in the United States, administrators and students alike view study abroad programs as training for the "global market place" in which language skills and the ability to "work and live in different countries" are prioritized (Sowa 2002, 64). Some programs, such as the Fulbright/IIE Work

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[18] Guruz finds that 5.87 percent of African students study abroad while only 1.81 percent of the total number of students studying abroad do so in Africa (Guruz 2008, 230).

Abroad Program, give students work experience as part of their studies abroad.[19] Study abroad programs that are organized around service-learning in "developing countries" also reproduce a telling tension: U.S. students go to wealthy countries to study and visit poorer countries to help others.

The student experiences engineered into U.S. study abroad programs have been profoundly influential in producing the global imaginary. The "global" is experienced as the exploration of the *similarity* (and *difference*) between one's home country and the foreign country. The process, however, makes invisible the ways in which study abroad produces the subject of the *global student*; a subject who imagines herself positioned in relationship to "global" reality, often unaware of how study abroad works to reproduce the relations of production.

Professional organizations

In recent years, many American universities and colleges have initiated efforts to "globalize" their curriculum. For example, a study conducted between 2002 and 2003 of one hundred liberal arts schools found that nearly half "included in their mission statements commitments to prepare graduates to thrive in a future characterized by global interdependence" (Hovland 2006, 11).[20] In many cases, globalizing the curriculum involves opening Global Studies departments or programs, increasing study abroad opportunities, developing classes on global diversity or changing school branding campaigns to reflect an interest in "the global." While these changes emerge differently within particular institutions, they are not simply responses to an empirically "globalizing" world. Instead, there exists a whole industry advocating the "globalization" of institutions and curriculum. Today, colleges and universities are ranked in terms of how "global" they are.[21] In addition, there are

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[19] It is notable that this program sends students to "countries such as Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Great Britain, France, Ireland and New Zealand." U.S. students do not study business in impoverished countries.

[20] The study also found that the "statements tend to use 'global' more often than 'international,' and often link global learning with diversity and multiculturalism. Institutions highlight 'interdependence' in their mission statements and talk about global learning within the context of responsible citizenship, social justice, and leadership." Furthermore, many schools "seem to equate 'global' education with 'international education.' Some see 'global' as a trendier or more political correct version of existing international practices" (Hovland 2006, 12).

[21] The Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) and Shanghai Jiao Tong University both have begun issuing rankings for the 200 top global universities. Of the 200 "global" universities on the *Times Higher Education* list, 58 are in the United States, 29 in the United Kingdom, 12 in Canada, 11 in Germany, 11 in the Netherlands, 10 in Japan and 9 in Australia. China has 6 "global" universities, Hong Kong 4, and India 2; the rest of Asia 7. The Scandinavian countries have 8, Russia 1 and the rest of Europe have a combined 22

numerous professional conferences and organizations championing the shift toward studying "the global." For example, in September 1996, the Committee on Institutional Cooperation (CIC), a consortium of the Big Ten schools plus the University of Chicago, hosted a major conference entitled *Conference on International Activities in Changing Global and Regional Contexts: The CIC Agenda.* This meeting of deans, provosts, and directors of International and Area Studies came together to "discuss and develop institutional responses to meet the challenges posed by the transition and transformation in international activities and studies" (Zeleza 1997). Senator Paul Simon (Ill.), Donald Fites (CEO of Caterpillar, Inc.) and Kenneth Prewitt made opening presentations offering a "vision of the 'new world order'" including a description of "how U.S. universities should restructure and revitalize their international programs" (Zeleza 1997). Much of the conference discussed the ways in which "globalization rendered the old structures of organizing and producing knowledge in bounded regions increasingly obsolete" and the importance of developing "intellectual orientations that were thematic and internationalist" given that "the Area Studies model was a relic of the past" (Zeleza 1997).

The development of "global" curriculum has also become a best practice among academic professional organizations, especially those catering to university administrators. In 2001 the American Council on Education (ACE), representing more than 1,800 university presidents and chancellors, developed a strategic plan including a call to focus on helping "colleges and universities prepare students to work and live in a globally interdependent world."[22] The Association of Public and Land-grant Universities recently unveiled an Africa-U.S. Higher Education Initiative designed "to enhance and empower higher education institutions in Africa and the U.S." to promote "African development" while "increas[ing] the competence of U.S. higher education institutions in global affairs related to Africa."[23] Similarly, the International Association of University Presidents—funded by UNESCO and the World Bank and comprising 600 current and former university presidents and chancellors—works to "strengthen the international mission and quality of education…and

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"global" universities; South America has 3; Israel 3, New Zealand 3. The only "global university" in Africa, however, is the University of Cape Town (ranked number 179, up from 200 in 2007). The University of Minnesota ranks 87, up from 142 in 2008. This information can be found at: *www.timeshighereducation.co.uk* [accessed April, 2009].

[22] See: *www.acenet.edu/Content/NavigationMenu/About/StrategicPlan/Strategic_Plan.htm* [accessed April, 2009].

[23] This quote neatly sums up the thesis of my dissertation: The U.S. academy is being designed to "increase the competence of U.S. higher education institutions in global affairs" while the African academy is being made into a development institution. See: *www.aplu.org* [accessed April, 2009].

to promote global awareness and competence as well as peace and international understanding through education."[24] The National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) champions the internationalization of the university because it "helps students develop the global critical thinking essential to contributing as citizens of the world and competing in the international marketplace" (Guruz 2008, 186). The Association of International Educators (NAFSA) awards a handful of Senator Paul Simon Awards for Campus Internationalization to universities and colleges each year—including the University of Minnesota in 2009. NAFSA "is an association of individuals worldwide advancing international education and exchange and global workforce development."[25]

The American Association of Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) is one of the most influential institutions pushing for the globalization of curricula.[26] The AAC&U is an organization that advocates liberal education on behalf of more than "1,100 colleges and universities of every type and size" (LEAP 2007, vii). With funding from foundations and private sources,[27] the AAC&U launched a decade-long initiative entitled Liberal Education and America's Promise (LEAP). LEAP's National Leadership Council includes representatives from the academy, organizations catering to higher education, philanthropic foundations (including Rockefeller and Carnegie), representatives from government, unions and business, including the Vice President of University Relations Worldwide for Hewlett-Packard, the Senior Vice President of State Farm Insurance, the CEO of Siemens Hearing Instruments and the Senior Vice President of Human Resources for Raytheon.

In 2007 the National Leadership Council for LEAP released the report *College Learning for the New Global Century* examining how best to "recalibrate college learning to the needs of the new global century" (LEAP 2007, vii). The report recognizes that since students pay large sums of money for college education they should receive instruction compatible with current political and economic needs. For students in the liberal arts, the report

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[24] See: *www.iaups.org* [accessed April, 2009].

[25] From the NAFSA website: *http://www.nafsa.org/about.sec/organization_leadership* [accessed: May 2009].

[26] While seeking academic employment during the Spring of 2009, I spoke with administrators of two liberal arts colleges who excitedly referenced the AAC&U's *College Learning for the New Global Century* in relation to my research.

[27] The funders for this initiative include: the Christian Johnson Endeavor Foundation as well as the Charles Engelhard Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Johnson Foundation, the AT&T Foundation, the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, and a number of private donors (LEAP 2007, ix).

identifies a number of "essential learning outcomes" ranging from specific knowledge sets to communication skills, critical thinking, teamwork, "[c]ivic knowledge and engagement—local and global" and "[i]ntercultural knowledge and competence" (LEAP 2007, 3). The report contends that "in this global century, every student—not just the fortunate few—will need wide-ranging and cross-disciplinary knowledge, higher-level skills, an active sense of personal and social responsibility, and a demonstrated ability to apply knowledge to complex problems" (LEAP 2007, 11).

While *College Learning for the New Global Century* contends that changes in liberal education are necessary "for a globally engaged democracy," the majority of the document focuses on how liberal education provides the education necessary for "a dynamic, innovation-fueled economy" (LEAP 2007, 11). The report contends that the liberal arts are a uniquely American asset threatened by "short-sighted educational choices [that] may prove permanently limiting to America's prospects" (LEAP 2007, 7). In order to ensure that the U.S. economy continues to thrive, the report argues that liberal arts institutions must train students to exhibit "global savvy" (LEAP 2007, 4). While the report spends little time discussing what is "global" about the "new global century" it does devote considerable attention to explaining what kind of skills employers are looking for and how to retool liberal education to prioritize the needs of employers.[28]

These five semi-autonomous registers are not discrete "causes" that, when placed in the proper causal order, reveal how (and why) the U.S. academy came to be transformed into a site for the production of the global imaginary. Instead, these registers are a limited explanation of a vast totality of social relations restructuring the U.S. academy into a site for producing "the global." These registers, however, do not exist in the abstract but play out in the practices of subjects working within particular apparatuses of higher education. To examine how these five registers combine within one particular apparatus I turn to an analysis of the University of Minnesota.

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[28] For example, the report argues that "employers are urging more—and better—liberal education." They note that "the engineering community is already pioneering the approach to a twenty-first-century liberal education" in which students come out "'T-shaped'…with the vertical part of the 'T' representing the traditional parts of an engineering degree, and the crossbar pointing to competencies traditionally identified with the 'liberal arts'— including ethics, global knowledge, intercultural literacy, and strong communication and collaborative skills." The report argues that students in the humanities should come out looking like the letter "H" in which "the crossbar represents field-specific knowledge and skills and the vertical bars represent capacities related to context and community." What employers do not want, however, is "'toothpick' graduates who have learned only the technical skills and who arrive in the workplace deep but narrow" (LEAP 2007, 16-17).

THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

The University has undertaken significant reform in the context of an increasingly competitive global market for resources, talent, and ideas…Our vision is to improve lives through the advancement of knowledge, and our strategic goal is aspirational, audacious, and, I believe, achievable: to become one of the top three public research universities in the world, with a deep and abiding cultural commitment to excellence in everything we do, across all our campuses, research and outreach centers, and offices statewide.
—*Robert H. Bruininks*, University of Minnesota President[29]

In the span of a few years the University of Minnesota has been transformed into a site for the production of the global imaginary. I look specifically at five locations within the University of Minnesota: its long-term planning initiatives, the International Working Group, the evolution of the Office of International Programs, the consolidation of the study abroad infrastructure, and the development of the Global Studies Program and the Institute for Global Studies. At each point one can identify how the registers identified above combine and recombine within this particular apparatus.

Strategic positioning

An examination of the University of Minnesota's long history of strategic planning offers insights into four decades of institutional restructuring, including the contradictions within the institution.[30] The first attempt at long-range planning was proposed in 1968 as the University developed its St. Paul, Rochester, and West Bank Campuses (SCRAP 1971, i). In 1971, after considerable debate over the cost of compiling such a document, the Senate Committee on Resources and Planning (SCRAP) released *Toward 1985 and Beyond* laying out the mission of the University and identifying how the institution would execute this mission. The document starts with a chapter that seems quite parochial today—a description of the University's history, its Land Grant heritage and the role it plays within the landscape of Minnesota's higher education, including a detailed look at how the University complements state colleges, junior colleges, vocational and technical schools, as well as private colleges (SCRAP 1971). While much of the document contains vague goals such as seeking to

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[29] "President Robert H. Bruininks," Office of the President, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN: *http://www1.umn.edu/pres/04_biography.html* [accessed April, 2009].
[30] Eli Meyerhoff and I have discussed the conflict over the University of Minnesota's Strategic Positioning Initiative in terms of a conflict between "enclosure" and "the commons" (Kamola and Meyerhoff 2009).

"discover, test, disseminate, and preserve knowledge and values," the document takes the state (and state system of higher education), as the horizon upon which the University is situated.[31] Imagining the University as an institution designed to meet the needs of Minnesota, the document sets out to address a number of practical questions, including: what fields to focus on, how many students to admit, what campuses to open, and how future enrollment predictions affect the University. The text aimed to ensure that "society's needs" are "reflected in the goal of [the] University System" and that "the goal of the University System [is] consistent with its role in the state system" (SCRAP 1971, 68). Before adopting the plan deans, university committees, and individuals were encouraged to offer formal responses. While most of these responses addressed minor points within the document, the Senate Committee on Education (SCEP) expressed a concern that the University's long-term planning ignored international education.[32]

The next major planning document was President Keller's *A Commitment to Focus* (1985). This controversial fourteen-page document offered an ambitious reorganization plan at a time when the University faced considerable pressure from Gov. Rudy Perpich "to forgo some of its diversity in favor of specialization" by emphasizing graduate and professional programs, "developing closer ties with business" and dropping two-year programs "better suited to vocational schools and community colleges" (Anderson 1985, 16). Keller's plan called for reducing undergraduate enrolment by 8,000 over ten years, thereby allowing the state to spend the same budget while dramatically increasing per student expenditures. *A Commitment to Focus* framed this plan within "the realistic goal" of eventually placing the University "among the top five public institutions of higher education in the

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[31] For example, the document recognizes that:

> Both the existence of other educational systems and the particular characteristics of the state are a major influence in shaping the mission, and its conduct, for the University. The test of whether the University System is making an appropriate contribution in terms of its context is the test of whether its goal is congruent with the needs of the state and the larger society. Such an analysis must answer two questions: 1) Are society's needs reflected in the goal of [the] University System? 2) Is the goal of the University System consistent with its role in the state system? (SCRAP 1971, 68)

[32] Jeanne Shobowale, chair of the subcommittee, wrote to Warren Ibele (Sept 25, 1972), chair of SCRAP, pointing out that "the document lacks a statement affirming the value to the University of an international dimension in its educational programs…While the University has a large foreign student population and is engaged in numerous projects abroad, it has so far failed to develop a uniform planning effort and a policy basis for this area of education…The subcommittee therefore recommends that SCRAP include in the proposed planning documents statements pertaining to the principle of maintenance and gradual expansion of the University's efforts in the field of international education both on the undergraduate and graduate levels."

country" (Keller 1985, 2). Keller argued that this restructuring would turn the University into an engine for statewide economic growth and thereby "set the stage for a new era of coordination among the State's institutions of higher education" (Keller 1985, 11). He concluded the report with the bold prediction that "If we are successful…the University of Minnesota will emerge as an even better institution; stronger in its programs, more responsive to the needs of the State, and an even greater contributor to the nation's well-being" (Keller 1985, 14).

Many university and community members, however, vocally opposed what they called "A Commitment to Fuck Us," arguing that cutting undergraduate education and closing General College[33] amounted to institutional elitism. State representatives from rural districts also condemned the plan as disproportionately benefiting urban areas. While the Regents eventually agreed to many recommendations, the controversy led to Keller resigning in 1987 when his opponents revealed hundreds of thousands of dollars in cost overruns on the remodeling of Eastcliff Mansion and the discovery of $70 million in undisclosed budgetary reserves (Lederman 1988). While different in content and public response, both *Towards 1985 and Beyond* and *A Commitment to Focus* addressed the University's state—and occasionally national—constituencies, aspirations, and economic conditions and saw the University as a state and national resource.

Starting in 2004 the University underwent its latest institutional reform under the title *Strategic Positioning*. The University of Minnesota's Strategic Positioning Initiative is a corporate-style institutional reorganization with the explicit goal of transforming the University into "one of the world's top three public research universities" (Provost 2007, 3). *Strategic Positioning* starts from the premise that the University of Minnesota exists in a competitive relationship with other institutions: "We live today in a global, multicultural, highly competitive society and marketplace. We are judged by world-class standards. Unless the University meets and exceeds these standards we risk losing our leadership role as one of

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[33] General College (GC) was the major conduit for inner-city, rural, and first-generation students to attend the University of Minnesota. At GC students received intensive counseling and academic tutoring, and if they maintained standing, could transfer as a full student to the University of Minnesota after two years. The closure of General College—framed as a merger into the new College of Education and Human Development—was taken up by one of the 34 Strategic Positioning taskforces. While previous restructuring initiatives such as "U 2000" were stymied in their efforts to close General College, Strategic Positioning was successful despite considerable protest, including an occupation of the president's office, the arrest of five students, and a subsequent week-long encampment on Northrop Mall. Unlike previous attempts, the 2005 closure of General College was successful because it took place within the legitimating discourses of the Strategic Positioning Initiative, which was already widely appropriated by the University community (Kamola and Meyerhoff 2009).

the leading public research universities" (Sullivan 2005, 5; Provost 2007, 5).[34] Similarly, a brochure updating University students, faculty, and staff about Strategic Positioning announced that: "the University and the State of Minnesota face the prospect of losing our competitive position in an increasingly competitive global environment. To secure a strong future for the University and the state, we must be truly dedicated to a culture of excellence…nationally and globally" (UofM 2006).[35]

Unlike previous documents that focused on the needs of local constituencies, the Strategic Positioning Initiative situated the University of Minnesota within a "global" market. This change occurred during a period in which the state was drastically cutting back its funding of higher education and the University found itself increasingly dependent on students and private donors. As such, the school began to diversify its revenue streams by attracting out-of-state and foreign tuition-paying students, seeking increasingly competitive research grants and courting wealthy donors, many of whom lived outside the state. The language of "top three" became a way of branding the university to these potential constituencies. Part of Strategic Positioning was the creation of an institutional self-audit to measure the University of Minnesota against its "10 competitor institutions"[36] along the four pillars of Exceptional Students, Exceptional Faculty and Staff, Exceptional Innovation, and Exceptional Organization. In each case "exceptional" is defined by a set of quantifiable attributes.[37] One technique for excelling in these initiatives is prioritizing interdisciplinary

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[34] This exact same text appears in early *Strategic Positioning* documents and is retained verbatim in many subsequent documents illustrating how central the notion of the University within a "global…society and marketplace" has been to the process.

[35] It is interesting how the dyad of "state and nation" that concluded *Commitment to Focus* has been replaced by the dyad "nation and global," with no mention of local constituencies or the fact that the University is located in Minnesota.

[36] The University of Minnesota considers its "peers" to be the: University of Florida, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, Ohio State, Penn State, University of Texas, UC-Berkeley, UCLA, University of Washington, and University of Wisconsin (Provost 2007). These comparisons mean that becoming one of the top-three public research institutions in the world is no different than becoming a top U.S. research institution.

[37] For example, "Exceptional Faculty and Staff" is defined as the number of faculty members accepted in national academies (8th out of 11 institutions), the number of faculty awards (8th), the number of post-doctoral appointments (5th), faculty and staff diversity (not competitively ranked), faculty—and auspiciously not staff—compensation (8th), and employee satisfaction (not competitively ranked). Exceptional Students, similarly, are measured according to incoming GPA and test scores, diversity, retention, timely graduation, "international involvement," and "student satisfaction," etc. The data for calculating the benchmarks is compiled from a number of internal and external sources. The external sources include U.S. News and World Report's "America's Best Colleges," the Center for Measuring University Performance's Top American Research Universities report, the Institute of International Education's Open Doors Report, the National Science Foundation, a National Association of College and University Business Officers study, and is supplemented with data collected by the University of Minnesota's Office of Institutional Research and the Human Resources Research Institute at the University's Carlson School of Business.

research.[38] In addition to these objectives, *Strategic Positioning* sets out to create "exceptional students" by "[g]lobaliz[ing] our students' experience, recruit[ing] students from around the world, and provid[ing] an education to prepare students to become global citizens and leaders" (Bruininks 2007, 6). Elsewhere the University lists one of its main "action strategies" being to "[r]ecruit, educate, challenge, and graduate outstanding students who become highly motivated lifelong learners, leaders, and global citizens" (UofM 2006).

The Strategic Positioning Initiative also established a task force to recommend ways to re-make the University of Minnesota into a "global" university. The "System-wide Academic Task Force on Forging an International University" report starts with the claims that:

> To become one of the top three research universities in the world, the University of Minnesota must become a global university…Expanding and tightening connections between states, societies, and people have made the world more integrated and complex. This increasingly interdependent world means that individuals are more vulnerable to events that occur in distant places, that national problems are now global problems, and that these global problems require global solutions…Knowledge production increasingly operates in a world without borders. (Isaacman, Okediji, and al. 2006, 1)

In order to address these changes the University "must invest in the creation of an institutional framework that nurtures interdisciplinary knowledge production, and provides the resources to encourage continuing engagement in global affairs" (Isaacman, Okediji, and al. 2006, 1).

While various *Strategic Positioning* documents repeatedly reference the need to "globalize" student experiences and to become a "global" university, these documents never investigate what is means to be "global." In fact, "the global" referred to throughout *Strategic Positioning* is rife with tensions and contradictions. On the one hand, these documents represent the University of Minnesota as imperiled by "global" competition while, on the other hand, holding out "the global" as a valuable—if not indispensable—object of knowledge for the University to embrace as part of its mission to become "globally" competitive. Despite the fact that what "the global" is never gets interrogated, the changes resulting from, and justified by, this impulse to "globalize the university" affect what

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[38] In tandem with *Strategic Positioning* there has been the creation of an Assistant Vice Provost for Interdisciplinarity, the creation of the Provost's Interdisciplinary Team, and the launching of eight new interdisciplinary initiatives "representing areas of strength and comparative advantage for the University." It is believed that these interdisciplinary projects "will yield significant return in intellectual quality and capital, where the University and the state possess a comparative advantage, and where considerable outside resources can be leveraged to build research capacity." See: *www.interdisciplinary.umn.edu* [accessed: May, 2009]. For a critique of the University of Minnesota's approach to interdisciplinarity see Adamson 2008.

knowledge the university produces, how its presents itself, what it prioritizes, and the practices of those who inhabit it. For example, *Strategic Positioning* creates a system of "strategic initiatives" which, in effect, shift money from the liberal arts to the sciences and engineering, making academic production in the social sciences increasingly precarious. Furthermore, by prioritizing "interdisciplinary knowledge" and "global affairs"—while simultaneously cutting programs designed to meet the needs of Minnesotans (i.e. General College, the extension services, community health programs, affordable undergraduate education, etc.)—the University privileges those aspects of the institution deemed necessary for "global" competitiveness. This affects what research gets funded, what classes are taught, how the university presents itself to the public, the workloads in various departments, how much graduate students get paid, what research gets funded, etc.

The International Working Group

In 2007 Dean Meredith McQuaid established the International Working Group (IWG) to execute the findings of the Strategic Positioning report on globalizing education. The IWG developed the *Where in the World are we Going?* Report, addressing three major points of concern: identifying "international academic initiatives the University might pursue to focus efforts, inspire research, and generate positive energy at home and abroad"; developing a plan to "*strategically* position" the University as "as an international University and *tactically* coordinate and integrate our internationalization efforts"; and, finally, managing "risk and liability issues that must be addressed…as the University's international engagement grows" (IWG 2008; emphasis in original). As part of this agenda the IWG developed a five-year plan highlighting regions of the world as well as "five broad themes" that would "provide opportunities for the University to engage globally, act locally, and potentially contribute to the advancement of social and scientific problems affecting the planet" (IWG 2008).[39] The IWG report—as enumerated in its list of "deliverables"—set out to: provide "an accounting [!] of the University of Minnesota's relative advantages—its current strengths that could position it to become a major global university"; recommend ways to "recruit[e] and educat[e] students from around the globe to achieve the University's

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[39] These five themes include: "(1) social, physical, and ecological consequences of climate change; (2) sustainable human livelihoods and global change; (3) global frameworks for human health, environments, and ecosystems; (4) human rights, responsibilities, and global justice; and (5) race, ethnicity, and migration" (IWG 2008).

full potential as a global university"; "create a new synergism among scholars and students" (i.e. interdisciplinarity) designed to "create more globally competent faculty, staff, and graduates"; and to propose ways to "position the University to become a node of excellence in the emerging global network of knowledge production and circulation" (IWG 2008, ii). The working group looked for regions in which the University held a "relative advantage" over other institutions, identifying China, India, South Africa, Turkey, Thailand, the Nordic states and East Africa as places the University enjoys strong connections. The report also identifies a number of "gaps or absences" in the University's collective expertise, identifying "the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, parts of the European Union and most of the Americas outside of the United States" (IWG 2008).

IWG proposed ramping up the study of "the global" by drawing on the school's strong area studies tradition, identifying South and East Africa as places were the University could expand its connections. In August 2008 the Senior Vice President Robert Jones, Dean for International Programs Meredith McQuaid, and professors from the natural resources and health care departments[40] traveled to South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda where they visited eight university campuses and met with academics, government officials and NGO leaders. Jones called the trip "an important step in our strategy to globalize our university" and recognized that these "partnerships will not only benefit the African universities. They will offer our own students, faculty, and staff strategic opportunities for joint research and experiences that will add significant global capacity to our campuses" (quoted in: Rader 2008). McQuaid similarly emphasized that "In order to be truly global, we have to develop a solid presence in Africa" (quoted in: Rader 2008).[41] In the fall of 2008 Jones and McQuaid returned to East Africa to attend a conference sponsored by USAID and the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC) in Kigali, Rwanda. The conference, entitled "Strengthening Africa's Human and Institutional Capacity for Prosperity and Global Competitiveness," brought together leaders from the U.S. academy and leaders of sub-Saharan African institutions to "create educational capacity in sub-

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[40] The professors were from the Colleges of Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resource Sciences; Veterinary Medicine; Education and Human Development; as well as the schools of Public Health, Medicine, Nursing, and Dentistry.

[41] I was in South Africa the summer the University of Minnesota contingent was visiting. I was later told by South African academics attending one meeting that Jones talked at great length about the University of Minnesota's aspirations to become one of the "top three" public research institutions in the world and that developing connections with South African universities was seen as part of a plan to help attain this goal.

Saharan Africa" (Rader 2008). The Gates Foundation provided $1 million for a "planning grant" to be used to develop ways of attracting "more financial support from the public and private sector" (Rader 2008).

This choice of building connections with South and East Africa as part of an effort to "globalize" is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it was the administration—rather than scholars doing research—who organized these events despite the fact that the administration's "global" initiatives were predicated upon the groundwork already laid by students from South and East Africa who attended the University of Minnesota and by Minnesota faculty and students who facilitated intellectual exchanges, including conferences and research, in Africa. Secondly, establishing an *institutional image* as "global" trumped intellectual engagement; the connections allowed the University of Minnesota to buff its "global" credentials while African institutions received promises of resources and expanded opportunity.

The Office of International Programs

The Office of International Programs (OIP) now serves as the centralized location for the University of Minnesota's "global" initiatives. This office was originally created in 1963 after an ad hoc Committee on International Programs Development, chaired by Professor C. H. McLaughlin of Political Science, concluded that "a special unit of the University was needed to provide coordination of existing programs" as well as the planning and implementation of additional activities (OIP 1965). Professor of Agronomy and Plant Genetics Will Meyers was appointed dean of the new program and promptly secured a five-year, $1.25 million grant from the International Training and Research Division and the International Programs Division of the Ford Foundation (OIP 1965). In its early years, OIP concerned itself largely with development issues, undertaking two different types of activities: "overseas technical assistance or service projects" and "the development of problem or area-oriented research and teaching centers, often interdisciplinary in nature, on home campuses" (Cochrane 1968, 43). Under these two foci, OIP oversaw a number of programs including: a program in agricultural economics in Argentina, a program in agricultural education in Brazil, an agricultural program in Chile designed to "help Chile solve some of its food production problems," institutional and reorganization assistance to the University of Concepción in Chile and an agricultural program in Tunisia designed to

establish "effective institutions for agricultural economic analysis and planning for applied agricultural research" (Cochrane 1968, 37-42). The University also worked with USAID to develop agricultural research and education capacity in Tunisia and programs in soil and plant science at Hassan II Agronomic Institute in Morocco. During this period the University drew upon on its legacy as a Land Grant agricultural school to export, in collaboration with the U.S. government, knowledge used for agricultural development.

In recent years, however, the Office of International Programs has shifted its focus from agricultural and economic development to the project of "preparing global citizens" (OIP 2009). Its current duties include administrating scholarships, centralizing information for graduate students studying and researching abroad, overseeing "system-wide international policies and initiatives," and developing "scholarly initiatives of faculty, colleges, and graduate students" (OIP 2009). In addition, the OIP has begun a two-year "Global Spotlight" program that focuses on one region of the world and one "pressing global issue." In 2009-2010, the OIP will focus "on the continent of Africa and the issue of Water in the World" (OIP 2009) and has lined up a whole series of lectures, symposia, keynote speakers, gallery talks, film screenings, festivals, and conferences on Africa and the topic of water. Senior Vice President Robert Jones describes the Global Spotlight program as a way to "focus our attention and to have a very strong presence in other parts of the world to better leverage educational opportunities for our students" (quoted in: Katzenstein 2009). The goal is that these projects will develop into research programs used to "leverage outside grants for faculty to continue international research" (Katzenstein 2009). "The global" that OIP's Global Spotlight program claims to be illuminating, however, has no content except being a hodge-podge of topics deemed attractive to the University community and potential funders. For example, the Spotlight program on "the continent of Africa and the issue of Water in the World" is not about *water use in Africa* but includes programming *either* on water use *or* Africa.[42] What is similarly "global" about water conservation in Minnesota and genocide in Darfur remains unexplained. OIPs Global

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[42] For example, speakers discussing Darfur and a keynote speech by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (president of Liberia) are on the same program as expositions at the Minnesota Landscape Arboretum on the topic of water conservation. Assistant Vice President for international scholarship Carol Klee recognizes that "the two themes — water and Africa — aren't necessarily related" but "said both problems are prevalent" (Katzenstein 2009). Amazingly, Africa is presented as a *problem* that, just like water usage, must be addressed. Apparently it is the "prevalence" of both of these problems that makes them "global."

Spotlight programming, however, simply sutures these two things together since both are imagined as "global."

Study abroad

Like most American universities, the University of Minnesota now offers a broad range of study abroad opportunities. Only recently, the University established a coordinated infrastructure capable of facilitating a large percentage of its student body going abroad. In 1976 it was estimated that only about three hundred University of Minnesota students studied abroad (Peterson 1976, 2). Prior to the 1990s study abroad opportunities were primarily managed through departments, academic programs, the Student Project for Amity Among Nations (SPAN)[43] and the Minnesota Studies in International Development (MSID) program. Students who studied with MSID took Theories of International Development and Topics in International Development in the fall quarter and traveled during the Winter or Spring quarter to Dakar, Bogotá, Nairobi, or Jamaica, in groups of four to ten students. Students were placed in "authentic, realistic, complex program settings" within various development and non-profit organizations where they faced "real life dilemmas" rather than conduct "artificial research," and prepared to return "to Minnesota with a deep commitment to 'another development'" (O′Toole and Porter 1984, 1).

During this period the infrastructure for study abroad was provided by the International Study and Travel Center (ISTC), a campus student organization funded through the sale of airline tickets, student fees, and commissions taken from study abroad programs (Gorrill 1980). Formed in 1968, the ISTC offered a resource library, travel advice, developed a handful of study abroad programs annually, helped students and faculty make travel arrangements, and sponsored on-campus activities. By 1994 the University established the Global Campus Study Abroad program to administer study abroad activities in the hopes of increasing the number of University of Minnesota students studying abroad. In 2001 the Global Campus sent students to 200 programs in 80 countries (Kohman 2001).

In July 2003 the University merged ISTC and Global Campus into the Learning Abroad Center (LAC) and farmed out the selling of airline tickets to the private company

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[43] SPAN was started at the University in 1946 in the hopes of preventing conflicts between nations. This program developed to include ten other Minnesota colleges and would send groups of students organized and led by instructors during the summer "to the countries of their choice for individual research and study" (UofM 1962).

STA Travel, which opened an office in the newly refinished Coffman Memorial Union.[44] While the administration claimed that the merger of ISTC and Global Campus was not conducted for budgetary reasons, a few months after the merger, 10 of 45 positions at the LAC were cut (Frey 2003; George 2003).

The LAC facilitates increasingly large numbers of students studying abroad. During the 2006-2007 school year, 2,079 students studied abroad, ranking fourth in overall study abroad participation behind New York University, Michigan State University, and the University of Texas-Austin (Katzenstein 2008a). Of those studying abroad, most go to Western Europe, Latin America, Asia, Australia, New Zealand, or Canada; only a small percentage study in African countries.[45] In addition to semester and year-long study abroad opportunities, the University of Minnesota also offers "global seminars" during May and Winter terms, allowing students to travel to another country for three weeks.[46] These seminar programs are growing in popularity because they offer the University a way to increase the overall number of students studying abroad while enabling students to continue their studies without taking time out of their course sequences. These "global seminars," therefore, address two important measures of institutional ranking: number of students studying abroad and time to degree completion.

The business school at the University of Minnesota offers one of the most robust study abroad opportunities. In May 2007 the Carlson School of Management made it mandatory for its undergraduate majors to study abroad. Working with the OIP, the Carlson School developed a number of study abroad options for undergraduate and graduate business students. They also developed a Global Executive MBA program. The business school began emphasizing study abroad as a response to employers who value "global competence." For example, the Carlson School of Management newsletter *Going Global* points out that:

> For years, in response to the Carlson School's overseas MBA programs, exchanges, and
> global enrichment programs, administrators have heard, "More, please," from global
> business leaders. "Widespread involvement in study abroad programs has made [Carlson

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[44] The STA office in Coffman Union was closed in June 2008 as part of a corporate restructuring.

[45] For example, from 2006-2007, 1,038 students studied in Western Europe (51.7 percent), 402 in Latin American or the Caribbean (20.0 percent), 149 in South or Southeast Asia (7.4 percent), 166 in Australia, New Zealand or Canada (8.3 percent), 112 in Pacific or East Asia (5.5 percent) and only 53 in Africa (2.6 percent). These percentages are fairly consistent from year to year (LAC).

[46] During the 2008-2009 session, classes went to Buenos Aires, Paris, Dubai, Mexico, Spain and Morocco, England, Copenhagen, New Zealand, Amsterdam, Ireland, and China. The number of "global seminars" doubled between the winter 2007-2008 and winter 2008-2009 sessions (Katzenstein 2008b).

students] better prepared to drive growth in the global markets 3M serves," says Nathan Malek, manager of 3M Strategic Business Development. Likewise, Douglas N. Daft, CEO of Coca-Cola, says that "understanding and valuing different cultures has shaped my ability to lead our business, and it's an absolute imperative for anyone who works at The Coca-Cola Company." (CSM 2008)[47]

Of the study abroad options run by the business school, 13 are in Asia, 37 in Europe, 6 in Latin America, 1 in Australia and none in Africa.

In addition to expanding study abroad infrastructure, the University of Minnesota has renewed its effort to increase the numbers of foreign students. In 2006 only 2 percent of undergraduates at the University of Minnesota studies were international, lowest in the Big 10 (Ross 2009). To make it easier for foreign students, faculty, and visiting academics to attend the University the administration established the International Student and Scholar Services (ISSS). This office, funded by student fees, also monitors visas through the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) established by the Department of Homeland Security.

The increasingly expansive study abroad infrastructure is designed to situate the University of Minnesota as a site for the production of the global imaginary. The study abroad experience helps produce "the global student" while aiding University rankings (and therefore financial competitiveness) and training students for the contemporary workforce. Study abroad, in other words, serves many rolls, including the reproduction of the relations of production.

Global studies programs

The University of Minnesota contains a number of departments and programs designed to teach undergraduate and graduate students about "the global." Institute for Global Studies (IGS), for example, offers an undergraduate major and minor in Global Studies and a graduate minor in Human Rights. IGS is the present incarnation of the Institute of International Studies (IIS), established in the early 1980s, which "served as the home of the international and area studies majors" (Davidheiser 2009, 1). In 1991, the IIS subsumed various area studies programs, including the East Asian, South Asian and Middle

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[47] The Associate Dean of International Programs Michael Houston puts it this way: "[n]o matter where business people are working—in the U.S. or in a foreign country—the global nature of business means that they will need to interact with colleagues, suppliers, distributors, or customers in or from another culture. The more competent they are in these interactions, the more successful they and their companies will be" (CSM 2008).

Eastern studies and the Russian and East European studies departments. As one observer commented, this merger spared these area studies departments "from the fiscal Cuisinart" only to find themselves thrown into a "mixing bowl" (Busby 1991). In 1998, the Institute of International Studies changed its name to the Institute for Global Studies and received "an infusion of significant resources" making "it possible to involve new groups, create new opportunities for students, form new intellectual communities of faculty members, and create new outreach programs" (Davidheiser 2009, 1). The move was designed to help develop a "more coherent, global intellectual approach" (Kapsner 1998). Today, students majoring in Global Studies are required to study abroad (for at lest six weeks), complete 100 hours of internship or participate in the Foreign Language Immersion Program (FLIP).[48] Global Studies majors are also required to write a final project in which they combine a theme—"Genocide in….Voting violations in….Race and Politics in…."—with their region of specialization (IGS 2006, 3).

The University of Minnesota also houses the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change (ICGC). ICGC funds and supports over a hundred graduate and professional students working on issues of "peace, conflict, security, social and environmental change, justice, human rights, development and international cooperation" and offers a graduate minor in development studies and global change.[49] The Strategic Positioning task force on Forging an International University cites ICGC as an example of the University of Minnesota's "comparative advantage in establishing leadership in selected areas of major global importance that require broad, interdisciplinary inputs" (Isaacman, Okediji, and al. 2006, 3). The Center is funded by philanthropic institutions.[50]

CONCLUSION

Structural changes in funding priorities, study abroad opportunities, departmental organization, and curriculum have reordered the lived material practices that take place within the apparatus of the U.S. academy (and the University of Minnesota in particular). A

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[48] See: *http://www.igs.cla.umn.edu/abroad/* [accessed: November 2009].

[49] From the ICGC website: *http://www.icgc.umn.edu/about* [accessed: April 2009].

[50] "The Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change at the University of Minnesota is underwritten by generous grants from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, with additional support for a number of Compton Peace Fellows from the Compton Foundation and Fulbright-ICGC Scholars from the Foreign Fulbrights Program of the United States Information Service, and grants from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations." Various programs within the University of Minnesota match these external donations. See the ICGC website: *http://www.icgc.umn.edu/about* [accessed: April 2009].

school's turn toward the study of "the global," however, is often presented as simply a response to the fact that the world is globalizing. For example, the Systemwide Academic Task Force on Forging an International University at the University of Minnesota presents the decision to shift from area to global studies as a consequence of globalization:

> The University [of Minnesota] currently enjoys the advantage of being "ahead of the curve" in the approach its scholars and students take in international studies. Many leading universities that have reputations for excellence in international studies have concentrated on, and built upon, area studies, building expertise on particular regions or countries. Over the last fifteen years, however, there has been a major shift away from area studies and toward a more genuinely "global" version of international studies. Such an alternative approach has created analytical space to interpret and explain the complex, varied, and at times contradictory ways that the global and local shape each other. While area studies-oriented programs are struggling to retool, the University's traditional interest in bringing strong area-based knowledge to bear on global issues that transcend historically defined world regions marks it as a site of leadership and innovation. (Isaacman, Okediji, and al. 2006, 3)

A careful reading of this quote, however, reveals the deep anxiety at the center of the turn towards "the global." On the one hand, the embrace of global studies is presented as a self-evident response to a world in which "global issues…transcend historically defined world regions." On the other hand, there exists a clear sense of concern that if the University of Minnesota fails to stay "ahead of the curve"—that is, continues to focus on its strengths in area studies and not promote global studies—it will loose its "reputation[] for excellence." This anxiety is not unwarranted given that the structural transformations documented in this chapter mean that failing to "globalize" has very real consequences. In this way, the desire to show "leadership and innovation"—i.e. to do what all other schools are doing and "globalize" the university—is symptomatic of the changing structure of academic knowledge production. As each university and college comes to see itself as a firm within a "globally" competitive higher education market, decisions about institutional structure, curriculum, institutional identity, and intellectual priorities are increasingly molded by the need to attract private funders (philanthropic organizations, fee-paying students, government grants, etc.). This tendency does not mean, however, that "the global" is simply the effect of capitalist ideology used by university administrators to attract investors. Instead, structural shifts shape what classes are taught, what major are offered, what disciplines are funded (and which are defunded), what programs and centers are opened, what research is funded, etc. As the apparatuses of academic knowledge production are transformed so too are the everyday practices of the attending classes, choosing majors, studying abroad, sitting on task forces, etc. The repetition of these practices brings the global imaginary into existence.

In the following chapter I argue that "the global" produced within the structured material relations of the U.S. academy are similar yet substantially different than "the global" produced within the South African academy.

CHAPTER 5:
THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ACADEMY

Knowledge production is increasingly a socially distributed process.
Moreover, its locus is global, or soon will be.
—Michael Gibbons, in *Changing Modes*

Under apartheid, the South African academy was structured to impose and enforce racial hierarchies and exclusions. However, after the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994,[1] politicians, policymakers, academics, and citizens engaged in intense debates concerning how to remake South African higher education to fit the needs of post-apartheid South Africa. Many South Africans strongly argued that the academy should be redesigned to confront the political, social, economic, and epistemic legacies of apartheid. Within a few years, however, this vision of higher education—drawn largely from the anti-apartheid struggle—was largely displaced as multiple structural registers converged to transform the South African academy into an apparatus designed to integrate the country into a "global knowledge economy."

This structural transformation occurred at a time when post-apartheid South Africa was beginning to reimagine its place in the world. As South Africa threw off the isolationism imposed by apartheid nationalism, many saw South Africa as "emerging onto the global stage." "The global" into which South Africa saw itself entering, however, was largely an already imagined "global." For example, in a 1998 speech, Nelson Mandela claimed that "[g]lobalisation is a phenomenon that we cannot deny. All we can do is accept it" (cited in: Bond 2003, 219). Similarly, Thabo Mbeki argued in his 2000 ANC presidential keynote speech that South Africa must embrace globalization because it "is an objective outcome of the development of the productive forces that create wealth" (cited in: Bond 2003, 219).

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[1] Apartheid rule started in 1948 when the National Party (NP)—an Afrikaner nationalist party—was elected into power in South Africa with the help of poor English-speaking whites. Apartheid established "white" and "black" areas and relegated the black population to the most undesirable locations. For example, District 6 (a coloured neighborhood near the center of Cape Town) was deemed a white zone in the 1970s. The houses were bulldozed and the inhabitants forcibly resettled onto the Cape Flats, a large floodplain outside the city. Under apartheid, laws prevented racial inter-marriage, restricted education and employment, curtailed property ownership, and maintained white supremacy. In 1990 Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners were released from prison and negotiated with the de Klerk administration to end apartheid and adopt universal suffrage.

This chapter argues that the South African academy has undergone a structural transformation from an institution designed to uphold apartheid rule to one designed to meet the needs of an economy already imagined as a "global knowledge economy." While the dismantling of institutional apartheid is of course desirable, the restructuring of the South African academy as a training ground for students entering a "global knowledge economy" eclipses many of the most radical visions of higher education embraced during the anti-apartheid struggle and even reproduces many of the material and epistemic asymmetries existing under apartheid. I start by examining the ways in which the pre-1994 academy was structured to produce an apartheid imaginary. I then examine five intervening registers[2] that have, since 1994, overdetermined the structural transformation of the South African academy from an apparatus for reproducing apartheid rule to an institution designed to incorporate South Africa into a "global knowledge economy." I conclude by illustrating how these registers play out in one particular institution, the University of Cape Town (UCT), which has recently re-branded itself as a "world-class African university." I examine how the restructuring of UCT reveals the material asymmetries at work in the production of the global imaginary.

Before continuing, however, I must first explain the important distinction between historically white universities and historically black universities in South Africa. Historically white universities are those schools designed under apartheid to teach English- or Afrikaans-speaking white students. These universities played a central role in the consolidation of South African "white" subjectivities; subjectivities riddled with contradictions including the competing narratives of English "civilization" contra Afrikaans nationalism. Historically black universities refer to institutions created to teach African/Bantu, coloured, and Indian/Asiatic students. While these apartheid categories of "white" and "black" are highly problematic, they remain entrenched within contemporary South African political discourse as symptom of apartheid's continuing presence. Even while many historically white universities now have majority black student bodies, the differentiation of "historically white" offers an important reminder that apartheid is still present—and lived—within South African higher education.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ACADEMY AND THE PRODUCTION OF APARTHEID

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[2] See Appendix III for an analysis of how I use Althusser's concept of "registers."

The South African academy has historically been designed to imagine, produce, and enforce white nationalism in South Africa. In its earliest iterations, higher education served to forge a national identity out of the Anglo and Afrikaner populations while reinforcing the segregations between "white" and "black." South African College, opened in Cape Town in 1829, was the first European-style higher education institution in southern Africa. The school remained small and by 1873 enrolled only ninety students. However, the economic boom following the discovery of gold and diamonds in the mid-nineteenth century expanded the student body and, by the turn of the twentieth century, the colonial government began discussing the possibility of elevating the college to full university status.

After Britain's conquest of the Eastern Cape, Cecil John Rhodes proposed building a "national, teaching university" on his Groote Schuur estate "where English and Dutch-speakers could mingle during their student years, thus laying a foundation for future co-operation" (Phillips 1993, 2). The "University question" re-emerged after the First World War, and in 1916 the Republic of South Africa established the University of Cape Town (UCT) as the country's first university, housed in a new campus at Groote Schuur and incorporating the existing South African College. In response to Afrikaner trepidation that the Republic's only recognized university existed in English-speaking Cape Town, the government subsequently established the University of Stellenbosch and merged the remaining private colleges into the University of South Africa (Unisa). Numerous universities were established in the following decades offering instruction in either English or Afrikaans. University of Fort Hare, also established in 1916, trained a small black African elite. Throughout the early 20th century the government treated the South African university system as the bulwark of civilization in southern Africa. For example, during his inaugural address, UCT's first Vice-Chancellor Sir John Beattie declared that the school would foster cooperation between the English and Afrikaners and therefore ensure that "the best civilization in the world" would flourish in a place with "millions of uncivilized people" (quoted in: Phillips 1993, 6).

Under apartheid, both the Afrikaner and Anglo universities became sites for the preservation of white rule, albeit in conflicting and contradictory ways. After the National Party came to power in 1948, the Afrikaans-language universities—Potchefstroom, Port Elizabeth, Stellenbosch, Rand Afrikanns, Pretoria, and Orange Free State—became "closely associated with formulation of state policy" as many Afrikaner intellectuals worked to

provide "the intellectual scaffolding for the justification, pursuit and extension of apartheid policies" (Jansen 1991, 24). For example, Hendrik Verwoerd developed the intellectual foundation for the policies he enacted as Prime Minister while a professor of sociology at Stellenbosch during the 1930s. Similarly, Geoffrey Cronje developed the 1948 Nationalist Party platform while on faculty at the University of Pretoria (Webster 1998, 119). In addition to providing research and training for the apartheid state, these universities also served as "oligarchical Afrikaner cultural organizations" helping to "advanc[e] Afrikaner material interests and consolidat[e] Afrikaner power" (Davies 1996, 323). Afrikaner-universities, in other words, became sites for the production of a new imaginary of South Africa as a homeland for the *volk* (i.e. the industrious, God-fearing Afrikaner population).

In contrast, the four English-speaking universities—Cape Town, Rhodes, Natal, and Witwatersrand—declared themselves "open universities" dedicated to academic freedom and "liberal values," and provided intellectual refutation of the Afrikaner nationalist project. These institutions served as platforms from which the English-speaking white population imagined itself as a bastion of European civilization in southern Africa and a challenge to the vulgarities of the apartheid state (Davies 1996, 323). English-speaking universities admitted some black students and hired a handful of black faculty prior to 1959 but remained predominantly white, justifying this mass exclusion on the logic of academic "standards" (Jansen 1991, 25). This policy enabled the English-speaking South African academy to produce the imaginary of South Africa as an extension of European civilization; like England, which offered Oxford and Cambridge, South Africa could similarly show that it possessed elite institutions of higher education dedicated to liberal values, free inquiry, and the meritocracy of ideas, all the while remaining predominantly white.

While considerable ideological differences existed between Afrikaans and English language-instruction universities, these institutions never posed a serious threat to one another. Afrikaners understood that the apartheid government depended on cooperation from the English-speaking white population and realized that stoking intellectual contestation could only spark an unnecessary crisis that could undermine the "legitimacy for the state within the English-language community." Similarly, English-speaking institutions were often fairly ambivalent to the majority of blacks, focusing instead on the economic and cultural development of the English-speaking white population. In short, because English-language universities were often "more concerned about their own institutional rights than

about the emancipation of Black South Africans" they posed little threat to the apartheid establishment (Davies 1996, 323-4).

Faced with the emerging need for a semi-literate workforce and an educated apartheid bureaucracy in the newly formed "Native homelands," the National Party passed the Extension of University Education Act in 1959. This act extended higher education to the black population through racially and ethnically segregated institutions. The law prevented white universities from admitting black students or hiring black faculty, except under extreme exceptions. The law also created new racially and ethnically segregated universities to educate the "Bantu,"[3] coloured, and Indian populations. The University College of the North was established for Sotho, Venda, and Tsonga-speaking Africans and the University College of Zululand for Zulu speakers. The existing black university—University of Fort Hare—was limited to admitting exclusively Xhosa-speakers and barred from accepting students from across the continent. The law also established the University of the Western Cape to educate the coloured population and the University College of Westville for South Africans of Indian descent.

In addition to legislating the racial and ethnic composition of each institution, the apartheid regime also determined what subjects and degrees each school offered. White universities offered postgraduate education as well as degrees in engineering, medicine, pharmacy, and dentistry—courses necessary for the cultivation of a "middle and high-level white personnel for the economy, civil service and other sectors" (Wolpe 1995, 280). While black universities graduated the vast majority of undergraduates (53 percent and 74 percent of total diplomas in 1985 and 1990 respectively), these schools offered almost exclusively undergraduate degrees in the humanities, liberal arts, law, and education—subjects that did not "undermine the existing racial division of labour" and that fulfilled "the administrative and bureaucratic requirements" of the "Bantustan project" (Wolpe 1995, 282 & 279). There also existed a "*de facto* division" between research (i.e. white) and teaching (i.e. black) universities, with black universities producing less than 5 percent of the research credits during the 1980s and early 1990s (Wolpe 1995, 280-1). This division of curricula reinforced "class-racial lines" and kept "brain work for whites and brawn work for blacks" while intentionally creating a limited, competitive, and precarious system of class privilege within

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[3] Bantu was a term widely used in the British colonies to refer to black Africans.

the African, colored, and Indian populations that was designed to disrupt racial solidarity along class lines (Ralekhetho 1991, 105-6).

The apartheid government also constrained black universities by limiting state funding, establishing openly hostile white governing councils, and frequently deploying police to occupy campuses. Much of the instruction was conducted by "third-rate Afrikaner lecturers" who "literally transfer[ed] the conservative intellectual traditions of their home universities" to black colleges (Jansen 1991, 29). Starting in 1973, at the recommendation of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission, white institutions received considerable autonomy and self-governance while university administration, staff hiring, and institutional composition of black universities remained dictated by the apartheid state (Adams 2006, 5).

Despite being an apparatus structured to promote apartheid rule, the South African academy also became a site of anti-apartheid struggle. On the one hand, universities served as an important site of political mobilization. For example, the Freedom Charter—a foundational document in the struggle—declared that "the doors of learning and culture" should be available to all and that education shall be "free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children; Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit." Primary schools became major sites of resistance, including boycotts against Bantu Education (1950s) and the Soweto uprising in 1976 against mandatory Afrikaans instruction.[4] In this context, universities served as sites for developing and circulating anti-nationalist, anti-capitalist, and anti-apartheid ideas and offered hubs of political mobilization. During the period following the Sharpeville massacre (1960) and the subsequent banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), much of the radical political momentum shifted to university campuses, spearheaded by the primarily white National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and later by the more radical South African Student Organisation (SASO) led by Steve Biko. Large black universities such as University of the Western Cape (UWC), Fort Hare, and University of the North became centers of Black Consciousness

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[4] Many political parties, labor unions, and prison affinity groups focused on providing educational opportunities. The lyme quarry at Robben Island, for example, was labeled "The People's University." In addition, civil society organizations such as the People's Education movement and the National Education Crisis Committee created alternative curriculum material and sought "to redefine curriculum content from its racist, sexist and classist bias to the emancipatory goals of social relevance, political liberation and social equity" (Ralekhetho 1991, 106-7).

radicalism.[5] Student mobilization at University of the Western Cape, for example, was so successful that the school appointed South Africa's first colored rector, Richard E. van der Ross, in 1975. In 1982 UWC changed its mission statement to reject the institution's apartheid mandate, declaring that "the admission of students and the appointment of lecturers and researchers to universities should in no way be restricted on the grounds of race, color, or ethnicity" (quoted in: Anderson 2002). During this period, the school also adopted an open admissions policy accepting all students who fit the "basic minimum, legally required qualifications"—a policy based on the radical belief that "the universities owed a duty to the excluded black majority to redress racial inequality in access by dramatically expanding intakes" (Wolpe 1995, 284). In 1987 Rector Jakes Gerwel declared that UWC the "intellectual home of the left."

By the 1970s the apartheid regime reached a state of crisis. In addition to the considerable public protest, South African business elites saw the inflexibility and cost of maintaining the apartheid state reduce potential profits (Davies 1996, 324). Upon coming to power in 1978, Prime Minister P. W. Botha encouraged a series of institutional changes as part of his "total strategy." Combined with a renewed assault upon social protest, the Botha government upgraded institutions and extended social services, including providing more resources to black universities (Davies 1996, 325). This revamping of the higher education system helped improve South Africa's "tarnished international image," a tactic so successful that the Reagan administration extended millions of dollars in scholarships for black South African students to attend U.S. universities. This gesture not only renewed a sense of legitimacy for companies doing business in South Africa but also served to "temper[] the radical sentiments of potential Black leaders" (Davies 1996, 325).

In 1990, once again facing considerable international and domestic pressure, the de Klerk government removed previous bans on the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC), and South African Communist Party (SACP) and released Nelson Mandela and other political figures from prison. In 1991 the state repealed a number of acts at the center of apartheid legislation and began negotiations with the ANC and other

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[5] Students were radicalized during this period because, on the one hand, they felt the oppression of the apartheid state in every aspect of their lives, from class lectures to police occupation of campus while universities themselves served as sites in which "the communal living of students develop[ed] into a youth culture that contradict[ed] and constantly challenge[d] the ethos of possessive individualism and subordination to authority" (Murphy 1975, 19-20).

political parties. In 1994 the ANC and its unity partners received an overwhelming majority in the country's first election, bringing an end to legalized apartheid. The South African academy quickly found itself needing to overcome decades of institutionalized segregation by diversifying student and faculty demographics, closing and consolidating institutions, modifying curricula, and establishing support services. The re-making of the South African academy, however, occurred within an overdetermined field of contradictory registers that, in a very short period of time, transformed the South African academy not into site of social redistribution but rather into an apparatus designed to integrate the country into an economy already imagined as "a global knowledge economy."

STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE UNIVERSITY IN CRISIS

Over the past decade and a half the South African academy has been structurally transformed into a site for the reproduction of the global imaginary. Many of the social forces that, in the wake of the anti-apartheid struggle, once seemed well-positioned to restructure the academy into a site of social redistribution have quite rapidly been displaced by social forces that seek to transform the academy into a site to integrate South African into a world already imagined as a "global knowledge economy." Five distinct but interrelated registers—the World Bank, South African economic policy, post-apartheid academic reforms, the discourse of "Mode 2 knowledge production," and foreign philanthropic organizations—all intersected within the conjuncture of the post-apartheid South African academy to bring about this restructuring of South African higher education.

As in the study of the U.S. academy (Chapter 4), these five registers do not capture every aspect of the structural shift in the South African academy. The re-shaping of South African higher education from its apartheid form to that of a development institution within a world already imagined as a "global knowledge economy" plays out at many registers and continues to be deeply contested. One way of mapping this structural transformation is by documenting how dissenting voices—namely those advocating the academy to be transformed into a site for social redistribution—get marginalized at the intersection of these five registers.

The World Bank

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The World Bank has played an important role in shaping the post-apartheid academy, introducing a number of approaches developed during its more than thirty-year involvement in African higher education. From the 1960s through the 1990s the World Bank developed a substantial literature on the "African University" including a number of important policy documents including *Financing Education in Developing Countries* (1986), *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (1991), *Education and Adjustment: A Review of the Literature* (1991), and *Education in a Declining Economy: The Case of Zambia* (1991), that all argued for a "drastic reduction of higher education in Africa" on the grounds that doing so would result in "higher efficiency and a more egalitarian distribution of educational resources" (Caffentzis 2000a, 5). During the late 1980s and early 1990s the Bank forced a de-funding of higher education across Africa based on its calculation that higher education yielded only a 13 percent return on initial investment compared with primary education, which yields 28 percent (Caffentzis 2000a, 5). The World Bank also deemed arts, humanities, and social sciences "market unfriendly" and therefore largely "irrelevant" (Olukoshi and Zeleza 2004, 2). Failing to understand the national and symbolic importance of the post-colonial African university, the World Bank criticized African countries for treating universities as "'sacred cows' consuming an undue amount of limited resources" and therefore institutions to be de-funded in the pursuit of government austerity (Caffentzis 2000a, 4). During this period the IMF and World Bank used debt to strong arm many African countries into reducing government subsidies for higher education and imposing user-fees on primary through post-secondary education. Inflation caused by structural adjustment made the importation of education material prohibitively expensive and priced many African countries out of access to books, journals, computers, and other basic infrastructure needed to conduct intellectual work (Caffentzis 2000a, 4).

In the 1990s the World Bank reversed its position, arguing that higher education was essential for development. However, instead of encouraging expanded government funding, the World Bank called for greater foreign subsidy of African higher education. In 1991 the World Bank released its Africa Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI) aimed at "build[ing], over the long term, a critical mass of professional African policy analysts and economic managers who will be able to better manage the development process" (Jaycox 1991, 5). Many critiqued this new policy as part of a plan for "the World Bank and foreign donors" to dismantle African national universities and replace them "with specialized regional institutes

sponsored, financed, and managed to their specification" (Caffentzis 2000b, 70). ACBI also undercut African scholars producing knowledge contrary to the World Bank's policies and sought to replace African scholars lacking the "technocratic knowledge possessed by neoliberal economists and policy analysts" with scholars trained in economic and political ideas favored by the World Bank (Caffentzis 2000b, 72).

By the late 1990s, the vision of higher education laid out in ACBI was further reformulated by the World Bank. The Bank argued that higher education should not only produce neoliberal technocrats but must, more generally, help Africa adapt to the "global knowledge economy." For example, *Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise* (2000)—a report published by a task force organized by the World Bank and UNESCO and co-chaired by Mamphela Ramphele (Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, 1996-2000)—concluded that "without more and better higher education, developing countries will find it increasingly difficult to benefit from the global knowledge-based economy" (World Bank 2000, 9).[6] While this report offers a "radical re-thinking" of the "anti-university orientation" that defined the World Bank's previous stance on higher education, it nonetheless re-affirmed the Bank's "strong market-instrumentalist logic," which underscored its previous vision of African higher education (Olukoshi and Zeleza 2004, 3). In other words, while the Bank changed its position on whether higher education is necessary for development, there was no change in treating the university exclusively in economic and development terms.

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[6] The report contends, in a very patronizing tone, that:

> [T]he world economy is changing as knowledge supplants physical capital as the source of present (and future) wealth. Technology is driving much of this process, with information technology, biotechnology, and other innovations leading to remarkable changes in the way we live and work. As knowledge becomes more important, so does higher education…The quality of knowledge generated within higher education institutions, and its availability to the wider economy, is becoming increasingly critical to national competitiveness…This poses a serious challenge to the developing world. Since the 1980s, many national governments and international donors have assigned higher education a relatively low priority. Narrow—and, in our view, misleading—economic analysis has contributed to the view that public investment in universities and colleges brings meager returns compared to investment in primary and secondary schools…As a result, higher education systems in developing countries are under great strain. They are chronically underfunded, but face escalating demand…Quite simply, many developing countries will need to work much harder just to maintain their position, let alone catch up. There are notable exceptions, but currently, across most of the developing world, the potential of higher education to promote development is being realized only marginally. (World Bank 2000, 9-10)

The World Bank's call for the systematic de-funding of higher education followed by an argument for its re-funding by private (and often foreign) sources has had many negative effects. Silvia Federici argues that these policies amounted to the *"intellectual recolonization of Africa"* whereby "African academics cannot produce any intellectual work, much less be present in the world market of ideas, except at the service and under the control of the international agencies" which "determine what can be studied, written, and voiced in the continent" (2000, 19). Foreign agencies increasingly determine what infrastructural facilities are available and, in many cases, what curricula are funded (Federici 2000, 21). Research conducted in African universities is often commissioned by "foreign institutions, agencies, or individuals" who "determine and control its content and gain credit for it," a practice that creates serious hierarchies between those African academics with access to foreign donors and those without (Federici 2000, 21).

The World Bank's rethinking of higher education as a site for integrating countries into a "global knowledge economy" largely informed how the Bank approached education reform in South Africa. Because South Africa was relatively free of foreign debt in 1994, the World Bank could not impose its agenda through structural adjustment. The Bank, nonetheless, served as a key advisor to the ANC government, a relationship that proved so close that some have argued that the ANC engaged in a "voluntary structural adjustment programme" such that "the master narrative of educational reform has…been framed by the international neo-liberal guidelines of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund" (Kallaway et al. 1997, 1-3; cited in: Harber 1998, 248).[7] As the ANC appropriated the World Bank's approach to higher education as a site for integration in a "global knowledge economy," it foreclosed the possibility of creating a uniquely South African, or uniquely African, academy organized around social redistribution.

Post-apartheid economic policy

During the 1990s considerable debate existed within the ANC concerning how economic development should take place and, subsequently, what role higher education

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[7] Gillian Hart argues that the ANC proved particularly susceptible to World Bank influence because, during the anti-apartheid struggle, the ANC held a "two-stage theory of revolution"; the primary objective was to capture the state and then use the state to transform the economy. As a consequence, upon coming to power the ANC had no clear economic policy and therefore found itself dependent on foreign consultants, including those from the World Bank, for economic advice (Hart 2002, 22).

should play in this development. The ANC's first economic policy framework, the *Reconstruction and Development Plan* (RDP), was formulated in January 1994 by a group of workers-rights activists, the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and contained strong language stating that the project of overcoming apartheid must include radical political inclusion and economic redistribution. The document quite explicitly "build[s] on the tradition of the Freedom Charter" (Mandela 1994) and aggressively pushed a state-centered development agenda (Hart 2002, 17; Bond 2005, 89). Despite lacking a clear agenda for how to restructure the South African economy along socially redistributive lines, many in the National Unity government saw the RDP as an opening for inserting redistributive policies into future economic planning. RDP also established the means by which the state could actively intervene to "force capital to follow a long-term rational, non-racial capitalist logic" that included "access to basic goods and services, to environmental and consumer protection, or to industrial and technological development" (Bond 2005, 92). RDP spelled out two major economic prongs: "to meet the basic needs of the people through activities directed toward health, housing, electricity, education" in order to "'kickstart' economic growth'" and, secondly, to "sustain economic growth through the development of high-tech production for the export economy" (Wolpe 1995, 275).

Many academics saw RDP as a sign that the South African academy would not only enjoy a large influx of government funding but would also serve as an important site of social transformation. For example, Harold Wolpe, a prominent UWC professor in political exile during apartheid, argued that the RDP was not only aimed "at economic growth and at meeting basic, material, needs" but would also be part of "transforming social relations in the society (non-racist, non-sexist, democratic, transparency in administration, etc.)" since students "should be steeped not only in technical skills…but also in the values of democracy, [and] the ethos of accountability and service" (Wolpe 1995, 288).

However, even before becoming official economic policy, RDP was attacked by South African and international business interests, including members of the Development Bank of South Africa, IMF, World Bank and open-market advocacy groups. Many of these interests gained access to those in the ANC responsible for crafting post-apartheid economic policy (Bond 2005). In June 1996 the ANC officially replaced RDP with *Growth, Employment, and Redistribution* (GEAR) thereby discarding a commitment to Keynesian economic reform

in favor of a neoliberal economic strategy. Much of this change can be traced, in large part, to the fact that many key players in the National Unity government "formally conceded to the 'natural' (if not supernatural) power of global markets and to the claim that, because of globalization, 'there is no alternative' (TINA) to orthodox neoliberalism" (Hart 2002, 7). The enactment of GEAR ensured that the social redistribution of jobs, services, education, and housing would be left to the whims of the market rather than be mandated by the government.

The shift from RDP to GEAR also profoundly affected the South African academy. In embracing GEAR the government "subject[ed] itself completely to the terms and technologies of the global economy" thus ensuring that ANC policy, including educational policy, would "prioritize science and technology, build human capital…build strategic linkages with the Bretton Woods institutions…and define progress in terms of global metrics of development" (Jansen 2006, 16-17). As a consequence, the South African academy subjected itself to standards, performance codes, funding, and "sources of academic authority and institution legitimation" originating "outside of the country" (Jansen 2006, 16-17). The adoption of GEAR meant that higher education would be organized around an economy imagined as "global."

Post-apartheid higher education policy

In 1995 the ANC published its first major policy statement on higher education, *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*, which embodied the economic and political agenda enshrined in the Freedom Charter and RDP. The policy declared that the "state has the central responsibility in the provision of education and training," that "the development of human resources, and the democratisation of our society" required re-making higher education and education so they were "governed by the principles of democracy, ensuring the active participation of various interest groups, in particular teachers, parents, workers, students, employers, and the broader community" (ANC 1995, 4-5).[8] In order to refine and implement these objectives, the government appointed a National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) tasked with establishing an overarching vision of post-apartheid higher

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[8] This document similarly asserts that education shall "aim at the development of a national democratic culture" and respect "our people's diverse cultural and linguistic traditions" in addition to being "based upon the principles of co-operation, critical thinking and civic responsibility," which will "equip individuals for participation in all aspects of society" (ANC 1995, 4-5).

education and developing the necessary policy recommendations to enact these aspirations. The NCHE's report, released in 1996 under the title *A Framework for Transformation*, represented a major undertaking involving the labor of countless dedicated academics and education policymakers who wrote drafts, compiled primary research, and produced position papers and task force reports. Two South African universities—University of Cape Town and University of the Western Cape (UWC)—hosted task forces involved in researching and writing the final document. This project received considerable funding from the South African Department of Education, the Ford Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as technical and research assistance from the Association of African Universities (AAU), UNESCO, the World Bank, and countless other South African and international institutions.

Over the course of its creation, *A Framework for Transformation* began to compromise on a number of the ideals expressed in *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*. Playing down previous emphases on social redistribution and democratization, the document included "globalization" as one parameter that the overhaul of higher education needed to address. For example, the report observed that:

> South African higher education, emerging from a period of relative isolation, now confronts the reality of multiform and accelerating changes characterised as "globalisation." Knowledge, information and culture increasingly inhabit a borderless world: new computer and communication technologies are transforming the way people work, produce and consume. As South Africa locates itself in this network of global exchanges and interactions, higher education will have to produce the skills and technological innovations necessary for successful economic participation in the global market. It must also socialise a new generation with the requisite cultural values and communication competencies to become citizens of an international and global community…The challenge to higher education is to adapt to these changes and to sustain its role as a specialised producer of knowledge. If knowledge is the electricity of the new globalisation, higher education institutions must seize the opportunity of becoming major generators of this power source. (NCHE 1996, 2-3).

In presenting the South African university as a "generator" that could potentially power the country's adaption to an already-existing "global" world, the *Framework for Transformation* not only imagines "the global" as an empirical fact but as a reality around which South Africa must adapt.

While *A Framework for Transformation* still contains a strong emphasis on the South African academy as a site of social redistribution, subsequent government reports and legislation—most notably the *Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education* (1997) and the *Higher Education Act* (1997)—embody an ever greater emphasis on a vision of the university as a site of development within a "global knowledge

economy." These documents demonstrate a tendency for educational policy to focus "unequivocally on globalisation in articulating the challenges, vision and principles of higher education" (Subotzky 1997, 108-9). By the time the government passed in 2001 the definitive overhaul of higher education, the *National Plan for Higher Education*, globalization had replaced social redistribution as the primary frame for higher education policy. In fact, the *National Plan* barely mentions redistribution and reform, focusing instead on higher education's role in fostering economic development in "a knowledge-driven world" defined in terms of "the phenomenon of globalisation" (MoE 2001, 5).

Debates over Mode 2 knowledge production

These changes in state education policy were overdetermined by the emergence of the concept of "Mode 2 knowledge production." In a relatively short time, this term became the dominant one used to frame post-apartheid higher education, saturating both the academic literature and public discourse. The Mode 2 Thesis—also known as the Gibbons Thesis—contends that the relationship between the university and society has fundamentally changed. As governments, private laboratories, think-tanks, consultants, NGOs, and civil society organizations increasingly engage in the business of knowledge production, universities lose their status as the primary keepers and producers of knowledge. As a result, it becomes necessary for universities to promote trans-disciplinary, socially relevant, reflexive, and collaborative—"Mode 2"—knowledge as opposed to falling back on traditional, hierarchical, homogenous, peer-reviewed, and disciplinary forms ("Mode 1").

According to the Gibbons Thesis, the emergence of Mode 2 knowledge results from the globalization, democratization, and "massification"[9] of higher education, which creates an oversupply of capable researchers and scholars not absorbable within traditional higher educational structures. The surplus of skilled researchers corresponds with the expansion of transportation and telecommunication infrastructures, which distribute knowledge ever more broadly. Advocates of the Gibbons Thesis argue that the university, no longer the sole keeper of scholarly knowledge, must become more flexible and interdisciplinary by establishing working partnerships with government, private industry, and civil society. Mode 2 knowledge production, in other words, means abandoning the "ivory tower" model of knowledge production defined by peer review, disciplinarity, intellectual specialization, and

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[9] "Massification" is a term used to describe the post-war boom in university enrollments (Scott 1995).

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traditional conceptions of academic freedom in favor of a decentralized and integrated model of knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994; Gibbons 2000; Scott 1995).

Michael Gibbons, Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Simon Schwartzman, Peter Scott, and Martin Trow—a group of scholars from the United Kingdom, Canada, Vienna, Brazil, and the United States—first advocated the concept of Mode 2 knowledge production in their book *The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies* (1994). The concept of Mode 2 was then taken up by the World Bank as part of its thinking about the role of higher education within a "global knowledge economy."[10] The concept was quickly appropriated by academics in South Africa. Johan Muller and Andre Kraak each submitted papers on Mode 2 knowledge production to the newly formed National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) in 1995 (Kraak 2000b, iii). These papers introduced a number of the NCHE members to the Gibbons thesis, which soon "pervaded the entirety of the Commission's dialogue in 1995 and 1996" (Kraak 2000b, iii). The academic reach of the Gibbons Thesis was further extended through an international conference in 1999 at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, a July 1999 workshop at the University of the Western Cape entitled "New Knowledge Production—Interrogating the Gibbons Thesis from the South African Perspective," and the publication in 2000 of a Human Science Research Council collected volume *Changing Modes: New Knowledge Production and its Implications for Higher Education in South Africa.* The Gibbons Thesis also became "the focus of numerous local seminars, workshops and journal articles…policy research…and research projects" and profoundly influenced the literature on South African higher education (Ravjee 2002, 83).[11]

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[10] Michael Gibbons wrote in the 1998 World Bank publication *Higher Education Relevance in the 21ˢᵗ Century*. In it he writes: "Globalization of the economy and the pressures of international competition are dissolving boundaries between nations, institutions and disciplines, creating a distributed knowledge production system that is becoming increasingly global. As we shall argue more fully below, universities are part this system. As such, they are now only one knowledge production agency amongst many in an economic order where knowledge and skill are the principal commodities being traded…Delivery structures for higher education are diversifying rapidly in response to an emerging global market place for higher education fostered by telecommunication advances, increased student mobility, and institutional management cultures which emphasize cost-recovery and income generation" (Gibbons 1998, 30-31; emphasis deleted).

[11] The NCHE's final report, *A Framework for Transformation* (1996), the *Green Paper on Higher Education Transformation* (1996), *Education White Paper 3* (1997), and the *Higher Education Act* (1997) all "bear the unmistakable fingerprints of Gibbons and his colleagues" (Grange 2004, 84; see also, Jansen 2002, 507; Kraak 2000a, 16; Ravjee 2002, 82). For example, in *A Framework for Transformation* the NCHE lays out its three conceptual goals: "Increased Participation" understood as "a transition from an 'elite' to a 'mass system', or as 'massification'"; "Greater Responsiveness" understood as "a shift from closed knowledge systems…to more open knowledge systems"; and "Increased Co-Operation and Partnership" understood as greater institutional

In many ways the Gibbons thesis offered a fairly compelling template for a new South African educational system precisely because it accommodated different, often competing, agendas held by South African policymakers. The focus on socially relevant research resonated with those who see higher education as a potential site for refashioning a highly unequal society through the use of democratic, pertinent, and accessible research accompanied with increased educational opportunity. It also attracts those who see the university as essential for re-making the South African academy into a site of integration into a "global knowledge economy." The Gibbons Thesis, in other words, provided a vision of education that straddled the "enduring educational policy tension" between "balancing the *political* imperative to transform the philosophy and ideology" inherited from the apartheid regime and the "*economic* imperative" to "educate/train more competent workers" (Gultig 2000, 40).

However, while the Gibbons Thesis provided policymakers and academics with the intellectual tools to navigate economic development and political transformation, it simultaneously set parameters for potential debate and limited the scope of what reforming the South African academy could aspire to achieve. The pre-existence of a "global knowledge economy" was presented as established fact. George Subotzky, for example, argued that the influence of the Gibbons Thesis on the NCHE report did not provide insight into "how higher education can or should contribute towards…redistributive development" precisely because "the NCHE report addresses itself almost exclusively to the issues of globalisation and the new demands on skills development" (Subotzky 1997, 108).

Furthermore, few scholars addressed the fact that the Gibbons Thesis only "claims to describe changes in Western industrialized countries" yet was being presented as a universal "model for other countries to follow"—even countries with vastly different economic circumstances (Ravjee 2002, 87). Nor did many scholars appreciate the fact that the Gibbons Thesis failed to correspond to "unique features" of life in South Africa including the "fragmented colonial history of a society deeply divided by issues of class, race and gender, continuing unequal material distribution, a new political system, a country entering a global market divided into cores and peripheries, etc." (Ravjee 2002, 87). In adopting the "underlying teleology" of the Gibbons Thesis, academics and policymakers not

autonomy within a centralized system (NCHE 1996, 4-8). Each of these three fundamental starting points was inspired by the writings of Gibbons et al. and Scott (Kraak 2000a, 16).

only "underestimate[d] the complex organization and cultural arrangements" of life in South Africa but also presented South African higher education as already situated within empirically existing, well-integrated circuits of global knowledge (Jansen 2002, 514).[12]

The lasting effects of the Gibbons Thesis on the restructuring of post-apartheid higher education are many. Some argue that the Gibbons Thesis provides a model for "community partnership" and "community service learning" that offers a "complementary alternative to the marketisation of higher education" (Subotzky 2000, 94).[13] Others point out the ways the discourse of Mode 2 knowledge production provide the intellectual groundwork for subjecting South African universities to severe marketization and privatization. For example, the University of Pretoria used the language of Mode 2 knowledge production to establish a Department of Business Activities and the Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty), Ltd. to oversee various money-making ventures, to streamline development of for-profit enterprises, to commercialize and license intellectual property, and to create a holding company that designs short courses targeting those in industry (Ntshoe 2004). Similarly, during 1999 and 2000 the Gibbons Thesis was invoked by administrators at the University of Durban Westville (UDW) when seriously considering the closure of the Faculty of Engineering—the only engineering faculty in a historically black university. The university negotiated with the Morgan University Alliance, a for-profit South African company specializing in university-business partnerships, which in turn established a joint partnership between UDW, a group of North American universities that design modular engineering and business classes (the MUCIA Global Group),[14] a consulting and

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[12] This criticism is often countered by advocates of the Gibbons Thesis who claim that Mode 2 knowledge production should not be thought of as "an analytical tool constructed to make sense of empirical data" but rather as a "model for change" that is useful in guiding policy decisions (Ravjee 2002, 83; see also: Subotzky 2000, 89). This distinction is less charitably drawn by Jansen who contends that the Gibbons Thesis problematically rests upon a conflation between "Gibbons the prophet"—i.e. claims about "what *might* happen in the university of the 21st century"—and "Gibbons the documentalist," i.e. claims about "what *is* happening in universities throughout the world" (Jansen 2002, 519).

[13] Examples of Mode 2 knowledge production put in the service of community education include a number of health and social service programs such as University of the Western Cape's community dental education program and University of Natal's rural agricultural development project (Subotzky 2000, 122-23).

[14] The University of Minnesota is also heavily engaged with the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, Inc. (MUCIA). University President Bruininks sits on the MUCIA's Council of Presidents and Senior Vice President Robert Jones and Associate Vice President for International Programming Eugene Allen sit on its board of directors. MUCIA was started in 1964 with a grant from the Ford Foundation as a consortium of large land grant universities and, in addition to the University of Minnesota, includes: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Michigan State, Ohio State, and Purdue. MUCIA works by "establishing partnerships with other non-member institutions of higher education, as well

international accreditation company (Warwick Manufacturing Group), as well as with local business and industry (Jansen 2002, 512). Had this agreement been adopted, engineering at UDW would be "offered strictly on the basis of a business venture" and would only be taught assuming it met "specified profit levels" (Jansen 2002, 513).

As Mode 2 knowledge production became the guiding philosophy of the post-apartheid academy, South African universities increasingly became defined as a tool for integrating into the "global knowledge economy." As the discourse of Mode 2 knowledge took hold, previous attempts to frame higher education reform in terms of democratization and social redistribution were pushed aside.

Philanthropic organizations

Many of the asymmetries found within the structural transformation of South African higher education have only been reinforced by philanthropic organizations. While many large foundations fund higher education in both the United States and South Africa, these institutions often fund different kinds of projects in each location. In the United States, philanthropic organizations primarily fund specific projects with explicitly intellectual objectives. In Africa, however, these organizations primarily fund capacity building, human capital development, and local development research. Two of the largest funders of South African higher education have been the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Ford Foundation.

When Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Corporation in 1911 he designated $20 million of the initial $100 million to promote "the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding" in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the British colonies (Murphy 1975, 19).[15] While Kenya was the first African country to receive Carnegie money in the mid-1920s, by 1940 the Union of South Africa received nearly two-thirds of the total grant money given to African countries by the Corporation.[16] These funds were spent

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as for-profit and non-profit organizations, to design and implement technical assistance and educational projects." See: *http://muciainc.org/* [accessed 8/09].

[15] In the early years, money from this "special fund" was used primarily for educational grants to Canada. In 1927 the corporation made a permanent commitment to educational projects in Britain's African colonies (Murphy 1975, 20).

[16] The Corporation gave $984,500 to South Africa while colonial holdings in East Africa (Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar, Northern Rhodesia [Zambia], Nyasaland [Malawi], and Southern Rhodesia [Zimbabwe]) were awarded $409,500 and the colonies in West Africa (Gambia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) totaled a mere $83,000 (CCNY 2007, 22-23).

primarily on educational projects benefiting the white population since the Corporation believed that blacks would "evolve, under white tutelage, just as American blacks" were "evolving under the patronage of white benefactors and mentors" and that "support for white libraries, universities, and cultural institutions would, in the long run, serve black interests as well as those of the whites" (Murphy 1975, 21). The Corporation also supported white institutions because the South African government disliked foreign intervention into domestic race relations, making access to black universities difficult (Murphy 1975, 21).

In 1932 the Carnegie Corporation published the *Carnegie Poor White Study,* which concluded that many white South Africans lived in poverty similar to that experienced by black South Africans. The National Party used this document to form an electoral voting bloc consisting of Afrikaners and poor Anglo whites leading to its electoral success in 1948 (Gregorian 2007, lxxx). While the Carnegie Corporation scaled back its support to South Africa during apartheid, it continued to fund some limited academic initiatives, most notably travel grants for (mostly white) academics to visit the United States, the "public interest law" project, which "challenged apartheid policies in the courts," and a follow-up 1980s study on poverty (Murphy 1975, 52-53; Gregorian 2007, lxxx).

After apartheid ended in 1994, however, the Carnegie Corporation increased its funding to South Africa quite substantially. In 1997 Vartan Gregorian, the new president of the Carnegie Corporation, stressed the importance of funding higher education in Africa and rolled out new programs to ensure that African higher education received greater attention. From the beginning, however, the Carnegie Corporation framed this initiative in terms of remedying "underdevelopment." For example, in the 1997 Carnegie Corporation *Annual Report* Gregorian asks:

> How can we, collectively and in a sustainable way, build model universities in Africa and support leadership training that will enhance the development process? … Much of donor attention has been directed to achieving a market economy or privatization in Africa, but support for scholars within institutions of higher learning there would contribute substantially toward African development. (Gregorian 1997)

In subsequent annual reports through 2007 the Carnegie Corporation lists programs funding African higher education organized under the heading "International Development" while funding initiatives on American higher education (as well as on U.S. literacy and urban school reform) under the heading "Education" (CCNY 2007, 1-23). In short, initiatives in the United States fund education while initiatives in Africa fund "development."

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This division is especially stark given what the Corporation funds as "development"—namely the development of strategic planning initiatives, capacity building, and fundraising infrastructure. For example, in 2004 the Carnegie Corporation spent nearly $250,000 on programs in South African universities to sponsor training seminars on university management, to build library capacity and to host conferences, including one conference on university management. The Corporation also sent $250,000 to South Africa's Council on Higher Education to fund a two-year program aimed at "promoting quality in higher education," "auditing…quality assurance," "managing…accreditation," and designing "uniform standards and accreditation procedures" for the country's public universities, technikons[17] and for-profit private colleges (CCNY 2007, 19). During the same period the Carnegie Corporation spent $2,140,100 under the heading "Global Engagement" with all the money going to U.S. universities and research institutions (CCNY 2007, 24-25).[18] The Aspen Institute (Washington, D.C.) received $200,000—nearly the same amount sent to all South African institutions—to "promote a new notion of ethical globalization that involves a rights-based approach to a range of global challenges including trade inequities, HIV/AIDS in Africa and international migration" (CCNY 2007, 53). While South African institutions receive money from the Carnegie Corporation for institutional upkeep, U.S. institutions receive money to produce knowledge about Africa and "the global."

The 2008 financial crisis severely affected the Carnegie Corporation, leading to cutbacks in the funding of African higher education. The funding for higher education in Africa was lumped together with the funding of higher education in Eurasia with most of it going to U.S. institutions. For example, the American Council of Learned Societies received $5,000,000 to disperse to African scholars in the humanities; the American Society for Cell Biology (ASCB) received $506,800 to train scientists in Africa;[19] the Association of Commonwealth Universities (London) received $540,900 for "strengthening research management capacity in selected African universities"; the Council for Advancement and

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[17] Technikon is the South African term for polytechnic or technical university.

[18] The "Global Engagement" programs are listed under the "International Peace and Security" heading and include a number of studies on failed states, post-conflict reconstruction, and peace-building and often refer back to the development of "global" security agenda.

[19] This program is designed to help build "scientific capacity in cell biology in Africa" and "help transmit to scientists on the continent knowledge of how cell biology should be taught and practiced. By mobilizing seasoned scientists from America and Europe to train and provide necessary equipment and textbooks, ASCB is going a long way toward bridging the ever-widening cell biology knowledge gap between African scientists and their counterparts elsewhere" (Adjimani 2009, 53).

Support of Education (Washington, D.C.) received $400,000 for "improving educational advancement capacity at selected African universities";[20] the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton received $3,358,800 for the Regional Initiative in Science and Education "supporting development of science professionals in Sub-Saharan Africa" (CCNY 2008, 6-7).[21] Only six initiatives funded African universities directly, four of which went to South Africa: $2,000,000 to the University of Cape Town for the "institutional transformation and an employment equity program";[22] $1,984,643 for the University of KwaZulu-Natal to fund "a leadership and equity advancement program"; $2,364,099 to University of the Witwatersrand "to train and retain the next generation of academics";[23] and $1,200,000 to the South African Institute of Distance Education to fund an e-learning initiative (CCNY 2008, 7). These are just some examples of asymmetries in philanthropic funding to African higher education; while funds to U.S. institutions are designated for programs with various intellectual outcomes, the objective in funding African higher education is almost always to build institutional capacity. In other words, the grants are not framed around what knowledge is produced (except for the broad strokes of "humanities" or "biology"), what research agendas are developed or what questions get explored. The purpose of funding African scholars and institutions, therefore, is not aimed at producing knowledge *per se* but with developing research capacity and institutional infrastructure.

The Carnegie Corporation is not unique in its funding of South African universities under the auspices of "development." The vast majority of the grants given out by the Ford Foundation to South African universities also focus on institutional capacity building. For example, in 2003 the Ford Foundation gave more than twenty-five grants for projects in South African universities including grants to: the University of the Witwatersrand to study "post-apartheid South Africa's governance capacity" ($103,000); the University of Natal's Center for Civil Society "to conduct research on patterns of giving in South Africa"

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[20] This money is being used for a "two-year grant to bring advanced training in fundraising, alumni relations, communications and marketing to university leadership and advancement professionals at the six universities" in Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania. See: *www.case.org/Content/PressRelease/Display.cfm?CONTENTITEMID=8124* [accessed: August, 2009].

[21] The Regional Initiative in Science and Education (RISE) distributes money to develop regional networks of engineers and scientists in Africa with the goal of building great capacity for research. See: *http://sites.ias.edu/sig/rise* [accessed: August, 2009].

[22] This money is part of the "Transformation" initiative discussed later in the chapter.

[23] This money is given to women and black researchers with the goal of "address[ing] imbalances in staff demography, particularly as those related to the research endeavour, and to contribute to the creation of a new institutional culture." See: *http://web.wits.ac.za/NewsRoom/NewsItems/CARNEGIE.htm* [Accessed: August 09].

($100,000); the University of the Witwatersrand to "build capacity" and study the linkages between sexual health, reproductive rights and economic trends ($500,000); the University of the North to develop programs in the human sciences ($200,000 and $75,000); and the University of Venda to "prepare rural black South Africans for admission to bachelor's degree programs in the School of Mathematics and Natural Sciences" ($200,000) (Ford Foundation 2003). Only one grant funded a project organized around a particular research question: a $200,000 grant to the University of Natal's Center for Civil Society to conduct research on "globalization, marginalization and new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa" (Ford Foundation 2003). During the same period, however, the Ford Foundation awarded countless grants to U.S. academics to study globalization. In these cases, the funding went to a particular project, network, or program with a specific research question and agenda about various aspects of globalization.[24]

In recent years the philanthropic funding of African higher education has been further centralized. In 2000, the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation formed the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa (PHEA) to distribute more than a billion dollars to universities in South Africa, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, and Madagascar.[25] PHEA works under the assumption that "higher education and development must go hand-in-hand, and that Africa's ability to generate and harness knowledge is critical to advancement. This awareness accompanies an embrace of public policy reforms, market principles, and multi-party systems by countries whose university leaders have begun to rethink the missions [of the university] and guide the

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[24] For example, in 2003 the Ford Foundation gave grants to: Boston College's Global Leadership Network on Corporate Citizenship Measurement project "to help companies improve their social, environmental and economic impacts" ($100,382); Harvard University's Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing network ($800,000); New York University's Stern School of Business' Global Scholars Program "to conduct and foster cross-disciplinary research on the social impacts of globalization" ($250,000); Washington University's Global Service Institute ($1,500,000); the University of Florida to research "sustainable development in a globalized world, with special attention to local-level processes in Brazil" ($250,000); Tufts College's Global Development and Environment Center to put its "six-volume series on sustainable development…on CD-ROM for distribution in developing countries" ($75,000); to Rutgers University's Center for Women's Global Leadership ($300,000); Harvard University's Global Philanthropy Program "to increase the contribution of private philanthropy to solving problems of global poverty, inequity and insecurity" ($100,000); and the New School to study "the impact of globalization on productivity, distribution and growth in developing and transition economies" ($104,650), to name only a few (FF 2003, 25-27, 41, 43, 44, 69 & 88).
[25] Much of this information is taken from the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa website: *www.foundation-partnership.org* [cited January 2008].

transformation of their institutions" (PHEA, 2). PHEA funds a number of programs in South Africa including one at the University of KwaZulu-Natal to develop new crops to address "Africa's chronic food shortages," one at the University of Cape Town to study "the important role of gender in Africa's development and social transformation" and a joint project at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Stellenbosch and the Medical University of Southern Africa to combat the AIDS epidemic (PHEA, 5, 8 & 12-13).

While the need for institutional funding in the South African academy is certainly great, supporting South African higher education almost exclusively under the banner of "development" treats South African academics as agents of development and not intellectual colleagues who might contribute to an understanding of "the global." Furthermore, the money spent to produce knowledge about "the global" in U.S. institutions vastly outstrips the funding for institutions in Africa. The fact is that South African institutions are funded in order to help them catch up to their Western peers. However, in South Africa, the vast majority of money from philanthropic institutions is given to historically white and primarily English speaking institutions, most notably the University of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, Stellenbosch and KwaZulu-Natal.[26]

Since 1994 the South African academy has been structurally transformed from a site designed to enforce apartheid rule to an apparatus for integrating South Africa into a "global" knowledge economy. The structural transformation of South African higher education, however, plays out very differently in various institutional conjunctures. Today, many traditional Afrikaans-language universities, together with the now booming for-profit higher education sector,[27] serve as centers of entrepreneurial and industrial focus providing primarily "occupational 'training'" and "applied research" (Gultig 2000, 50). Historically

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[26] University of Cape Town and Witwatersrand are historically English-speaking institutions. Stellenbosch is the oldest white Afrikaans-speaking institution and KwaZulu-Natal was created in 2004 through the merger of the University of Natal, a historically white university, and the University of Durban-Westville, a university established under apartheid to educate South Africans of Indian decent.

[27] South Africa has experienced a rapid inflow of private, for-profit higher education institutions into the South African "education market." By 2000 there were an estimated 350 private sector higher education providers in South Africa educating well over 100,000 students (Mabizela, Subotzky, and Thaver 2000, 4). Most private education providers were operated by foreign companies or were owned by five Johannesburg Stock Exchange-listed companies, the largest being Educor which, in 2000, employed 4,000 teaching staff and registered more than a third of a million students (Bitzer 2001, 24). More than two-thirds of the institutions surveyed offered only one field of study, almost half being business (Mabizela, Subotzky, and Thaver 2000, 6). Because these schools offer only limited class selections and have no research-related expenses, they are able to keep costs, and therefore tuition, down. This has meant that as students increasingly enroll in private, for-profit institutions, potential tuition revenues, once monopolized by state institutions, finds its way into the coffers of for-profit corporations.

black universities, in contrast, "are becoming increasingly marginalized" within the "market-driven higher education sector" (Gultig 2000, 51). Many historically black universities have closed or consolidated; across the board matriculation rates are down, infrastructure is deteriorating and operational budgets are increasingly precarious. University of the Western Cape (UWC),[28] for example, just narrowly avoided being merged with a local technikon in 2002.

In contrast, historically white, English-language universities, including University of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, KwaZulu-Natal, and Rhodes continue to resemble liberal, elite institutions in the mold of American and European universities.[29] These institutions have proven quite capable of adapting to the structural transformation of higher education and the new focus on the "global knowledge economy." To this end, UCT has embraced the vision of "becoming a world-class African university" capable of competing with universities in America and Europe. Many historically white institutions successfully compete to attract foreign donors and institutional support at rates much higher than historically black institutions.[30] In other words, while the South African government no longer mandates institutional asymmetries according to racial and ethnic divisions, asymmetries are reproduced according to which institutions can integrate into a world imagined as a "global knowledge economy." Today, many historically black universities fulfill a role similar to the ones they played under apartheid—to provide technical and vocational skills. The primary difference being that economic development is now defined in terms of a "global knowledge economy."

In the next section, I examine how the structural transformation of the South African academy played out in one institution, the University of Cape Town (UCT). UCT, a privileged historically white institution, has been relatively successful in adapting to these

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[28] It should be noted that UWC is relatively better positioned to deal with the structural transformation of South African higher education than other historically black institutions owing to its unique radical history and its location in an urban setting rather than rural former Bantustan.

[29] The University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Cape Town and University of Witwatersrand are the only South African universities ranked by Academic Ranking of World Universities as being in the top 500 in the world.

[30] For example, while UCT currently houses the University Science, Humanities and Engineering Programme in Africa (USHEPA) "funded by…the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundations, Coca-Cola Foundation, Quaker Chemical and Engineering Information Foundation and Rockefeller Brothers," many "universities which were historically disadvantaged" are located in rural areas, heavily reliant on government funding and have limited institutional strength, most often limited to "engineering, medicine, information technology, mining and business management" (Ntshoe 2004).

new structured material relations largely because it has the infrastructure needed to re-mold itself into a "global" university.

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN: BECOMING A "WORLD-CLASS AFRICAN UNIVERSITY"?

Taking the N2 highway leaving Cape Town's City Bowl one travels first through the overgrown empty lots comprising the former District Six. Once a vibrant coloured neighborhood, District Six was declared a whites-only area in 1966; the population was forcibly removed and the structures bulldozed leaving the area largely undeveloped to this day. After passing through a series of middle-class neighborhoods, the N2 merges onto the M3 as it continues to circumnavigate the base of Table Mountain and Devil's Peak. From this elevation one can look out across the Cape Flats stretching past the massive hulk of a shuttered power plant in the foreground and kilometer after kilometer of low structures, shops and businesses, houses and shacks, often buried under a grayish yellow haze. Scanning the lush and craggy slopes of Devil's Peak one sees the remnants of the blockhouse that once served as the furthest outpost of the Cape Colony. Below that lies the vast estate of Cecil John Rhodes, including an ostentatious neo-classical memorial from which a statue of the great empire-builder gazes quizzically over the Cape Flats below. Perched between the highway and the memorial lies an impressive collection of ivy-covered stone buildings neatly terraced into the mountainside. These red tile roofed buildings compose the upper campus of the University of Cape Town (UCT), perched majestically above the rugby fields and nestled into the curve of the highway, which serves as the metaphorical and physical barrier separating the green slopes of upper campus from the chaotic Main Road below, and the Cape Flats beyond.

The University of Cape Town is South Africa's flagship university and one of Africa's most prestigious universities. Catering to the English-speaking white elite during apartheid, UCT prided itself on being an "open university" admitting "non-white students as well as white students…treating non-white students on a footing of equality with white students, without segregation" (Centlivres et al. 1957). In 1957, in response to the looming threat of government imposed racialized limits on university admission, representatives from the University of Cape Town and Witwatersrand University issued the *Open University in South Africa* report, upholding a commitment to institutional autonomy, academic freedom and the

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"'four essential freedoms' of the university" (Centlivres et al. 1957, 11-12).[31] Despite eventually capitulating to the National Party government's Extension of University Education Act (1959) and agreeing to exclude non-white student and faculty, UCT nonetheless retained an intellectual commitment to academic freedom, joining with the other English-language universities of Natal, Rhodes, and Witwatersrand to form a "'united front' in upholding university autonomy and academic freedom'" even during the apartheid era (Beinart et al. 1974, viii). In opposing the Afrikaner nationalist government, UCT faculty and students fostered connections with academics around the world highlighting the school's opposition to apartheid and its support of academic freedom and liberal values. Many white universities enjoyed such international connections because they, unlike the Afrikaner population, still enjoyed numerous economic, political, and social connections with a former colonial metropole.

Upon becoming Vice-Chancellor in 1981, Stuart Saunders announced that he would advance a policy of "africanisation"[32] at UCT. He defined africanisation as an "embracing quest which lays upon the African university the task of assembling the entire gamut of African heritage and ensuring its continuity by analysis and pedagogy" thereby making it relevant "to the needs and aspirations of the modern African national states" (quoted in: Goosen and Hall 1989, 1). In a 1989 report documenting the effects of africanisation at UCT, professors Glenn Goosen and Martin Hall conclude that the university has neither changed admissions policies to increase the number of black students nor made any significant curricular changes based on africanisation. The authors, however, viewed this lack of africanisation as a positive development since imposing africanisation would threaten departmental autonomy and violate academic freedom. The authors conclude: "not only has a policy of africanisation not been applied to the University of Cape Town" but "such a programme could be inappropriate." Instead, "transformation" of the university should take place by "allowing full and democratic participation in planning options for the future"

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[31] The "four essential freedoms" include the right of the university "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study" (Centlivres et al. 1957, 11-12).

[32] The "africanisation of education" is a concept that grew out of the 1962 United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conference *Development of Higher Education in Africa* and the Association of African University's 1972 Accra Workshop. The concept of "africanisation" emerging from these conferences affirmed the "belief that universities should be of, and for, Africa, that there should be an African academic community, that curricula should be changed to reflect the needs of Africa, and that universities should be committed to the needs of the community and the nation" (Goosen and Hall 1989, 13).

(Goosen and Hall 1989, 85). The report clearly illustrates how the school's commitment to liberal values and academic freedom trump any perceived pressure to address the material reality of apartheid.

Since the end of apartheid, UCT has undergone a process of institutional "transformation" designed: "to redress past injustices"; "to promote equal opportunity for all"; "to reflect in the profile of its students and staff the demographics of South Africa"; "to safeguard human rights"; and "to ensure that its system of governance, its teaching and learning, and its research and service uphold the inherent dignity of all, and meet the development needs of South Africa's emerging democracy."[33] As part of this "transformation" initiative, UCT has diversified the student body[34] and academic faculty, sponsored initiatives to develop a more inclusive curriculum, and established support programs for students for whom English is not their first language. UCT also rewrote the school's mission statement, recruited a black female Vice-Chancellor, hired prominent Ugandan scholar Mahmood Mamdani to direct the Center of African Studies, and established a number of task forces to oversee institutional transformation. The university established a Transformation Office under the auspices of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor, headed by Deputy Vice Chancellor Martin Hall.

Since the mid-1990s the discourse of "*transformation* has made an indelible entry into the University's vocabulary" (Nuttall 1999, 4). While immediately following the end of apartheid, "transformation" initially referred to pluralizing the demographic composition of the student body and academic faculty—and providing the necessary support services. However, by 1997 "transformation" had come to mean integration into a "global" knowledge economy. This shift can be read in the various policy documents outlining the "transformation" process. The institution's first assessment of transformation, a pamphlet entitled *The Transformation of the University of Cape Town* (1993)*,* defines the "process of transforming South Africa's oldest university into a truly equal opportunity institution" almost exclusively in terms of demographic change, offering charts representing the expanding numbers of non-white students on campus, student enrolment by gender, as well as academic success rates (organized by demographics: African, Coloured, Indian, and White) (File 1993). The following year the administration released an "updated and

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[33] Cited at: *http://www.uct.ac.za/about/intro/transformation/* [accessed 6/09].
[34] Of the 21,562 student enrolled at UCT currently half are white and half non-white. See: *http://www.uct.ac.za/about/intro/statistics/* [accessed 6/09].

expanded version" of this pamphlet under the title *The Transformation of the University of Cape Town, 1984-1994* (File 1994, 3). Like the previous document, this pamphlet presents transformation almost exclusively in terms of demographic change and made the link between demographic re-composition and social redistribution.

Initially, many students and staff criticized this approach to "transformation" as top-down and as failing to include the voices of the growing non-white campus population. The Campus United Front, "an alliance of student and worker groupings" (Warner 2004, 12), challenged the University Council's policies of "transformation" arguing that they were "undemocratic, unrepresentative, unaccountable, lacked the will and legitimacy to change the university, and [were] an obstacle to transformation" (Abrams et al. 1994, 1). Confronted with these challenges, the University Council—the body overseeing institutional transformation—conceded that it was "not representative: we have very few women members and most of us are white" and agreed to the United Front's demands to hold a conference on the topic of transformation (Abrams et al. 1994, 1). In August 1994, the students, administrators, and academic staff attending the Education and Transformation Conference wrote a Statement of Intent, laid the groundwork to rewrite the university's mission statement and established the University Transformation Forum (UTF) and the University Transformation Forum Executive Committee (UTF Exco) as the official bodies charged with overseeing the transformation process. Underlying this conference was a commitment to a radical rethinking of UCT's apartheid legacy. For example, the Statement of Intent reads:

> The University of Cape Town recognizes that it is largely a product of a fundamentally unjust and discriminatory society. This legacy has severely disadvantaged large sectors of the South African population along, amongst others, race, gender and class lines.
>
> UCT acknowledges that this historical background has played a large part in shaping the profile of staff, students and decision-making structures of the institution, as well as the quality of social relationships. UCT further acknowledges that its academic functions and its role in society have been compromised by the effect of social injustice and discrimination. UCT thus recognises the need for institutional transformation as part of national transformation, and commits itself to contribute to national reconstruction and development. (Abrams et al. 1994, attachment D)

Notable to this framing of transformation is an intentional grappling with UCT's apartheid legacy and the desire to see the university as a site to address this inequality within the context of "national transformation" and "national reconstruction and development."

As public interest waned, "transformation" increasingly became a series of policies driven by university administration. In later iterations, "transformation" came to include almost any initiative taken by the administration addressing issues of campus life, budgetary concerns, or institutional image.[35] In this context, "transformation" became primarily about integrating UCT within a "global" knowledge economy. In a document that reads much like strategic positioning documents written in U.S. universities, UCT's 1997 *Strategic Planning Framework* opens with the declaration that: "UCT's vision is to be a world-class African university" (UCT 1997, 1). The document argues that in order to "be responsive to South African society" UCT must become "globally" competitive:

> There is a fundamental change under way world-wide in what is understood to be *the business of the university*. In part these changes are due to the globalisation of many significant aspects of life; in part they are related to the change from an industrial to a knowledge-based economy, and they occur in parallel with technological advances in communication. Universities can no longer be seen as privileged points of access to knowledge, nor can a university be seen as just a repository of knowledge, nor has a university graduate any longer an automatic expectation of a single job lasting a lifetime. (UCT 1997, 1; emphasis added)

The subsequent document, *Vision 2001 and Beyond*, lists ten "strategic drives"; the first is "[g]rowing a global profile" which includes "benchmarking UCT against best practices at comparable universities internationally; providing a high-level, educational experience with an orientation towards problem-solving in Africa; honing global competencies in a global environment; and, at the same time, maintaining local leadership in the higher education sector" (Ndebele 2001, 2).[36] The document concludes with a recognition that UCT's response to its apartheid legacy can become part of its brand: "these [ten strategic] developments will require special attention to effective mechanisms for marketing…It will be necessary to continue…to evaluate UCT's brand" and to "build on [UCT's] identity as an intellectually vibrant, innovative, and responsive institution that has come to terms with its history while embracing new visions of the future" (Ndebele 2001, 7).

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[35] The Transformation Office currently undertakes a number of initiatives including monitoring "institutional climate," developing policies on racial and sexual harassment, creating multilingual institutional signage and evaluating the social responsiveness of administrative units. It is recognized that transformation has undergone a process of "refinement" and its initiatives have "been absorbed firmly in the UCT-wide planning and budgeting process." Transformation is "about responsiveness that is based on inward and outward reflection. Its essence includes responding to students and staff, positioning UCT internationally, and acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of the university's legacy, as well as its current offering." See: Transformation Office's website: *http://www.uct.ac.za/about/intro/transformation/* [accessed June 2009].

[36] Many of the other nine "strategic drives" are intended to make UCT a more efficient and financially viable institution, such as: "[g]rowing innovation and profiting from research" and "[s]ecuring financial stability for UCT (Ndebele 2001).

UCT's drive to be a "world-class African university" has been widely critiqued as little more than "corporate branding" drawing upon "marketing strategies" developed in "top U.S. business schools" (Bertelsen 1998, 142). This branding obfuscates the lasting legacies of apartheid still present in the institution, hiding the "complicated existential questions" by "recast[ing them] as problems of utility and marketability" wrapped within a "sublimated sense of lofty endeavour" (Bertelsen 1998, 142-43). By envisioning itself as a "World Class African University," UCT effectively "short-circuits debates" concerning the tension between "the preservation of the highest international standards of scholarship" and the "Africanisation of knowledge and institutions" choosing instead to resolve this tension "*at a symbolic level*" (Bertelsen 1998, 143).

In short, UCT has successfully adapted to the structural transformation of the South African academy, playing down this apartheid legacy and embracing its new identity as a "global" university. This relative success, however, owes much to the university's privileged position under apartheid and the fact that the school possesses the resources to compete for international funding sources and that it can attract students from around South Africa, the African continent, and the world. In fact, UCT is one of the major destinations for students studying abroad in Africa. Many historically black institutions, however, struggle to adapt to the structural transformation of the South African academy and many of their assets are deemed irrelevant to meeting the objectives of integrating South Africa into a world already imagined as a "global knowledge economy."

In conclusion, it is not surprising to see that the structural transformation of the South African academy has many similarities to that which is taking place within the U.S. academy; namely, an expanded focus on attracting outside funding, the increasingly for-profit logic of institutions, and an emphasis on globalization. However, these changes play out in particular ways within South Africa as they intersect with the colonial and apartheid legacy. Furthermore, the unique intersection the World Bank, philanthropic institutions, scholars working on Mode 2 knowledge, as well as domestic forces guiding educational and economic policy all influence how the university gets restructured. As a result of this structural transformation, in a very short period of time, the "global knowledge economy" became the primary way of imagining the South African academy's relation to "the real conditions of existence." In this context, various legacies of the apartheid state become reproduced through the continued distinction between historically white and historically

black universities, with the latter finding it increasingly difficult to adapt to the new structural constraints.

And, finally, imagining South African higher education as situated within a "global knowledge economy" continues to portray South African higher education not in terms of a site in which meaningful knowledge is produced but instead as a site in need of "development" through "capacity building." The assumption that the South African university is primarily a development and "capacity building" institution—rather than a site for the production of knowledge—means that many in the South African academy often find themselves inhabiting structured material relations in which the possibilities of world-making are constrained by the pressures to reproduce the structural relations.

It is this last contradiction that Mahmood Mamdani interrogates when he provoked a public debate in 1998 over UCT's failure to teach Africa within an African university. I address this debate in the following Excursus, which argues that this controversy can be reread as symptomatic of the contradictions inherent in UCT's attempt to transform itself into "world-class African university." Mamdani offers one example of how, in rejecting the claim that the university should simply reproduce "the global," it becomes possible to *re-world the global*.

EXCURSUS:
RE-WORLDING "THE GLOBAL": MAHMOOD MAMDANI AND THE UCT CURRICULUM DEBATE

> *Now Mamdani is no angel, and he has launched his missive with equal ferocity. But he stands alone, as an invited Ugandan scholars in African Studies at UCT, surrounded by this laager of angry white liberal voices. Not surpirsing, a black student who witnessed the public debate…understood the symbolism of the moment, as the first time she saw "a black person kicking arse at UCT."*
>
> —Jonathan Jansen, "But Our Natives Are Different"

Jonathan Jansen argues that when attempting to identify the real stakes at play in the "transformation" of South African higher education one should not focus exclusively on the official documents, which are "at best political symbols" but instead look to the "critical incidents"; that is, those moments of institutional crises when "someone throws the proverbial 'spanner in the works'" (Jansen 1998, 106). The most cited "proverbial spanner" thrown into the works of post-apartheid education transformation is the 1998 University of Cape Town (UCT) debate between Mahmood Mamdani, then head of UCT's Centre for African Studies, and a number of established UCT faculty over first-year curriculum.

This public debate is instructive for two reasons. First, Mamdani insists that academic knowledge production is both politically important and fundamentally shaped by the institution in which it is produced. He argues that the daily practices made possible by the institutional apparatus of UCT reproduce epistemic apartheid. The institutional transformations, designed around the imaginary of the world as a "global knowledge economy," foreclose the possibility of reimagining Africa in radically new ways. Furthermore, Mamdani's argument implies that producing new kinds of knowledge requires both re-fashioning academic institutions as well as making new kinds of knowledge.

Secondly, this debate offers an example of how scholars within apparatuses of higher education can politically intervene in the production of academic knowledge. The curriculum debate occurred as a direct result of Mamdani's threat to withhold his intellectual labor. As a consequence, what was initially a minor administrative annoyance became a public and political opportunity for knowledge

production, the effects of which still reverberate throughout South African higher education. This attention to political strategy within an apparatus of knowledge production is an important contribution to the project of re-worlding "the global."

Unfortunately, the power of Mamdani's argument is muted by its polemical style and personal attacks, directed most consistently against Martin Hall. However, Mamdani's argument, when read with an eye toward the conjuncture of UCT's transformation into a "world-class African university," reveals more than it claims on its face. Instead of reading this controversy as an expression of Mamdani's dissatisfaction with particular individuals or a particular institution, the curriculum debate can be reread as an argument about the structural transformation of the South Africa academy and prioritization of a world imagined as a "global knowledge economy." In calling attention to the need to rethink "Africa" within the post-apartheid university, Mamdani's argument can be read as an example of how "the global" can be re-worlded.

THE UCT CURRICULUM DEBATE

The 1998 showdown between Mahmood Mamdani and a group of mostly white UCT faculty over the content of the introductory African Studies curriculum reveals a number of contradictions at work in UCT's aspiration to become a "world class African university." In September 1996 Mahmood Mamdani was appointed to the A. C. Jordan Professorship of African Studies at the University of Cape Town.[1] UCT used this prestigious hire to signal the reinvigoration of the Centre for African Studies and the University's effort to diversify its faculty. In October 1997 Assistant Dean Charles Wanamaker asked Mamdani if we would design and teach a new course on Africa that would serve as the newly conceived Foundation Seminar for students entering the social sciences. Mamdani accepted this assignment under the condition that he could hire Dr. Ibrahim Abdullah from the University of the Western Cape as his assistant. While Mamdani considered himself a "historically informed social scientist," he needed "the help of a historian to do the work well"

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[1] A. C. Jordan was a faculty member in Bantu languages and African studies at UCT until 1961 when he was released following the adoption of the 1959 Extension of University Education Act. The firing of A. C. Jordan offers a clear example of the political limits of UCT"s liberal tradition; under apartheid it defended academic freedom but failed to rebuff state law requiring it to fire black faculty.

and reached out to the UWC professor because the history department at UCT "had only one person [a specialist in Sudan] whose research focus was outside of southern Africa" (Mamdani 1998, 2). The lack of faculty studying Africa north of the Limpopo River[2] was an inheritance of UCT's longstanding intellectual tradition of distinguishing South, or "white," Africa from black, or "Bantu," Africa. For example, while subjects concerning South Africa were taught in traditional disciplines such as English and History, the study of "Bantu" Africa was relegated to the Centre for African Studies.

Mamdani designed his class—"Problematizing Africa"—around seven major debates within the field of African Studies, including the role of ancient history in understanding contemporary politics, the existence of an African culture prior to contact with Europeans, and whether economic dependency caused poverty in Africa. On November 14, 1997, the chair of the Working Group overseeing the class distributed the results of a faculty poll reviewing Mamdani's proposed class; the poll showed that most departments considered four course areas of "very little importance." Based on these results, the Working Group asked Mamdani to revise the course. On December 4—before he could present his updated syllabus—the Deputy Dean suspended Mamdani from teaching and offered him instead a year sabbatical. Another course was hastily designed by UCT faculty and eventually taught to a first-year class. For three months Mamdani was unable to receive an audience to air his protest and decided to engage in a "one-person strike." He wrote the Board of African Studies saying: "Faced with a complacent institutional response, and a disabling institutional environment…I have no choice but to suspend all institutional involvement until the subject of my protest has been effectively addressed" (Mamdani 1998, 3).

This declaration caught the administration's attention and on March 11, 1998, Deputy Dean Wanamaker met with Mamdani to explain his justification for the suspension. In this meeting Wanamaker informed Mamdani that "the choice of Africa as subject matter for the course was 'purely arbitrary,' that 'the real point of the course was to teach students learning skills'" (Mamdani 1998, 3). On March 13, 1998 Mamdani circulated a written statement requesting apologies for infringing

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[2] The Limpopo River is South Africa's northern border with Botswana and Zimbabwe.

upon his academic freedom as well as an official apology to the students required to take the alternative course which, Mamdani contended, constituted a "poisonous introduction for students entering a post-apartheid university," a class which would damage a student body still "wrestling with the legacy of racism" (Mamdani 1998, 14-15).

Mamdani received two letters of apology from the Dean and Deputy Dean and was reinstated in his teaching role. However, by this time the alternative version of Mamdani's course was already being co-taught by a group of white faculty from archeology, anthropology, and history. The group agreed to modify the course based on Mamdani's suggestions but Mamdani refused, arguing that he "could not with intellectual integrity join and share responsibility for a course I had argued was seriously flawed intellectually and morally" (Mamdani 1998, 4). The Working Group asked if Mamdani could write his critique of the current syllabus "for full consideration." Mamdani agreed under the condition that the presentation of the paper was taken "out of the administrative domain and into the academic domain" (Mamdani 1998, 4).

Mamdani's paper "Teaching Africa at the Post-Apartheid University of Cape Town" and the papers of three interlocutors were presented at a packed public seminar hosted by UCT's Centre for African Studies on April 22, 1998. Faculty and students packed the gallery to attend the academic seminar which, one observer noted, "had the tension of a dramatic performance, and the raunchiness of a rock concert" (Pillay 1998). Subsequently, five essays—Mamdani's original text, three responses from Professor Martin Hall (who helped design and co-teach the final course), Johann Graaff (an original course Working Group member), and Nadia Hartman (Academic Development Programme coordinator for Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities) and Mamdani's response to Martin Hall entitled "Is African Studies to be Turned into a New Home for Bantu Education at UCT"—along with various primary documents were published first in UCT's Centre for African Studies' journal *Social Dynamics* as well as collected in a volume entitled *Teaching Africa at the Post-Apartheid University of Cape Town*, also published by the Centre for African Studies.

Mamdani's paper critiques both UCT's approach to the study of Africa as well as the institution's attitude toward the increasingly black student body. At the

level of course design and content, Mamdani argues that the course being taught relied on a fairly standard periodization—pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial—but gets these periodizations wrong. As a result, the topics are racialized in that they focus on a pastoral pre-colonial Africa implying that "disintegration" would occur if Europeans leave the continent.[3] Mamdani's second objection concerned course content. The section on pre-colonial Africa, taught by Martin Hall, was "driven by archaeology" and hinged on the argument that the lack of a written language prior to European arrival resulted in African pre-colonial history being taught as merely "a materialist history…without a social process" (Mamdani 1998, 5). Mamdani points out that many African theorists, most notably Cheikh Anta Diop (included in Mamdani's original syllabus), not only critique the colonial assumptions within archeology but have developed alternative methodological strategies for investigating African history prior to written language. Mamdani also argued that those parts of the syllabus on colonialism and post-colonialism focused exclusively on "equatorial and Bantu Africa" thereby excluding South Africa from the discussion of colonialism (Mamdani 1998, 6-7). This omission reinforced the apartheid idea that South Africa was not a colonial state but rather a stand-alone exception.

Mamdani also objected to the almost total lack of African authors on the syllabus and a failure to recognize the contributions of African scholars driving the most important debates in African Studies. The absence of African authors perpetuates the "idea that natives can only be informants, and not intellectuals"; a belief that propagated under apartheid but that cannot be allowed to "flourish unchecked in a post-apartheid academy whose ambition is to be a world class African university" (Mamdani 1998, 44). Mamdani focuses this criticism on the course textbook, Martin Phyllis and Patrick O'Meara's *Africa*. This book was

> written for North American students in 1976, then revised twice, first in the mid-1980s and then in the mid-1990s. The basic structure, one whose notion of Africa is that of equatorial Africa, and of African studies as that of Bantu Studies, was put in place when the text was first written. The best the authors could do was to append an add-on chapter on South Africa. (Mamdani 1998, 8)

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[3] For example, colonialism was taught as starting with the Atlantic slave trade meaning that the periodization is actually about the arrival of the white man: "part I is not pre-colonial, but Africa pre the arrival of the White Man…part II is not colonial Africa, but the era of white control beginning with slavery and continuing to colonialism. The moral of this simple story seems to be part III: disintegration following the departure of the White Man. The periodization is racialized" (Mamdani 1998, 4).

Furthermore, the few revisions that did take place "were informed by debates in the North American academy, on political economy in the 1980s, and on social change (specifically, urbanization and gender) in the 1990s" (Mamdani 1998, 8). The choice of this textbook not only reinforced the course's failure to engage with the "key debates that took place in the equatorial African academy in the same period" but also instantiated the course's "triple differentiation" between "Bantu" (Black/Negro/sub-Saharan) Africa, "Arab" (North) Africa, and "White" (South) Africa. As a consequence, "Africa" gets cast as "Bantu Africa," i.e. a geographical region existing south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo River and therefore distinct from South Africa.

The final concern Mamdani expresses is with Core Design Team and the Programme Implementation Committee's claim that the he "was over-estimating the skills of the average South African first year student, and that this student was not prepared for the type of course I wished to design and teach" (Mamdani 1998, 9). He argued that, from his own experience teaching African students coming from sub-standard primary education, "the worst one could do was to talk down to students" and "to presume that there could be any situation where the learner is so 'disadvantaged' that pedagogical concerns should override those of content" (Mamdani 1998, 9). Furthermore, his critics' claim that his syllabus was too difficult predicated on the fear that students would be unfamiliar with other parts of Africa.[4]

For Mamdani, the academic portrayal of ("Bantu") Africa as distinct from South Africa does not stem from an academic disagreement over classifications. Instead, the African imaginary presented in the Foundations Class was structured by UCT's particular apartheid history, including the absence of black faculty. The lasting institutional position of UCT's mostly white (and male) academic staff meant that Africa continued to be taught through the categories, habits, desires, and imaginaries of those who, just years previously, benefited from institutional and epistemic

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[4] For example, when the course examined "material closer to home—particularly, the case study on Cape Slavery" there was "no problem with introducing students both to key debates through the writing of local intellectuals and to some of the original records." However, when examining "equatorial Africa" similar debates were "considered either 'too difficult' for the 'average South African first year student'" or were taught using texts written by American academics (Mamdani 1998, 10).

apartheid. Mamdani concludes his seminar paper with the provocative claim that this paper

> is not simply a claim for representation. It is an attempt to persuade you that your innocence of the equatorial African academy is at the expense of what should be a cherished pursuit of any university: the pursuit of excellence. It is time to question an intellectual culture which encourages the inmates of this institution to flourish as potted plants in green houses, expecting to be well-watered at regular intervals, and yet anxious lest they be exposed to the open air and its elements by the winds of political change. (Mamdani 1998, 10)

Jansen makes Mamdani's point in both a less incendiary way and by downplaying Mamdani's assumption that the university is designed to "pursue excellence" (rather than reproduce the relations of production). Jansen argues that Mamdani's interlocutors did not "misunderstand" him at all. Instead, they were "unable to provide an intellectually honest response to Mamdani because the issue he raises challenges at its very roots a knowledge/power regime at UCT which is intimately connected to the history and politics of a white institution in the shadow of apartheid" (Jansen 1998, 107-8). It is not accidental therefore that, at the level of what Althusser might call its unconscious, the Foundations Seminar makes both South Africa's colonial history and the majority black population absent thereby reproducing, at the level of knowledge, apartheid distinctions that continue to structure UCT.

Mamdani blames UCT's failure to actively engage in the reimagining of a post-apartheid South Africa on the school being out of sync with the "winds of political change." What Mamdani failed to see, however, was that UCT's inability to reimagine "Africa" is actually symptomatic of its *successful* adaptation to the restructuring of the South African academy as a site for the reproduction of a world already imagined as a "global knowledge economy." Barely mentioned in the curriculum debate is that this controversy coincided with UCT's efforts to transform itself into a "world class ( ) university." Situating the curriculum debate within this conjuncture makes it possible to reread this exchange as symptomatic of the contradictions emerging with UCT's pursuit of "global" standards and "world-class" institutional identity. While UCT attempts to resolve those contradictions through the erasure of "Africa," Mamdani demands that "Africa" become the primary object

of study within a post-apartheid university and, in doing so, offers one potential strategy for re-worlding "the global."

READING THE CURRICULUM DEBATE AS SYMPTOMATIC OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

Jansen argues that the UCT curriculum debate is unique among the numerous controversies in post-apartheid higher education precisely because it occurred at an institution displaying "all the cosmetics of change" including "a black, woman vice-chancellor," the "overused liberal claim" about UCT's historic opposition to apartheid, and "an eye-catching caption appearing regularly in national newspapers…about being a 'world-class African university'" (Jansen 1998, 107).[5] Many viewed UCT as the cutting edge of "transformation" and therefore treated Mamdani's intervention as an unwarranted tantrum foisted upon the institution by an overly self-righteous academic. In a rebuke of Mamdani appearing in the *Mail & Guardian* days prior to the public debate, Vice-Chancellor Ramphele—in language suspiciously similar to that used by proponents of Mode 2 knowledge production—defended the UCT faculty: "Professor Mamdani came to UCT with a very hierarchical, archaic and patriarchal image of what a professor should be. Professors are not the gods they were." She instead insists that UCT faculty are "people who are struggling with transformation as a general rule and are not as ignorant of Africa as he thinks" (Duffy 1998).

Reducing the curriculum debate to disagreement between individuals over pedagogy, however, misses two ways in which this controversy can be reread within the structured material conjuncture in which it took place. First, in order to reach its goal of becoming a "world-class" university, UCT was pursuing internationally recognized "quality" standards. The university's ability to meet these standards, however, was jeopardized by the admittance of large numbers of black students educated in apartheid's sub-standard primary schools. Meeting "global" academic standards, therefore, stood in the way of meeting political demands that UCT become more demographically diverse and democratically inclusive. Mamdani's

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[5] The other "critical incidents" Jansen identifies are "the so-called 'Makgoba affair'" at the University of the Witwatersrand and the "language crisis" at Stellenbosch (Jansen 1998, 106).

intervention stakes a claim that the needs of black students trump the requirements imposed by "global" educational standards. Secondly, the imposition of a standards-based conception of "transformation" coincided with a bureaucratic "interdisciplinary" intellectual environment prioritized by advocates of Mode 2 knowledge production. Mamdani's intervention, however, challenged the market-based approach of higher education, arguing instead that education is valuable not because it reproduces the global imaginary but because it offers a venue for reimagining the world. The reason he cared so much about the Foundations Seminar was because it provided an opportunity to re-world South Africa within the imaginary of "Africa"—a move, he believed, that was essential for working through the legacy of institutional and epistemic apartheid.

The National Qualifications Framework (NQF) defines South African curriculum standards and establishes academic benchmarks that are discernable to an international audience. During 1998, the year of the UCT curriculum debate, the NQF was heavily involved in a "national agenda for curriculum reform" overseen by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). NQF, a program developed in New Zealand and since promoted by the World Bank (WB 2002), was adopted by South Africa to help the country create a system of nationally and internationally recognized academic standards in response to the explosion of unaccredited and largely unregulated for-profit universities operating in South Africa.[6] The NQF, in other words, measures the degree to which South African universities successfully trained students for integration into a "global knowledge economy."[7] The NQF standards developed a "common curricular vocabulary of unit standards, generic skills (or 'competencies'), and general and specific outcomes" (Muller 1998, v).

UCT prided itself as being on the "forefront of programme development" owing to its focus on "inter/trans disciplinarity, the emphasis on foundations and core courses, and the vocabulary of generic skills and generic competencies" (Muller

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[6] See Chapter 5 (fn. 27, p. 169).

[7] The Ministry of Education's 2001 *National Plan for Higher Education*, for example, states that NQF is "an attempt to improve the quality of qualifications by ensuring that all the parts of the curriculum form a coherent whole…in line with best practice internationally" (MoE 2001). The report also recognizes that the "skills that all graduates will require in the 21st century have been aptly summarised by Michael Gibbons as computer literacy, knowledge reconfiguration skills, information management, problem-solving in the context of application, team building, networking, negotiation/mediation competencies and social sensitivity" (MoE 2001).

1998, v). In response to increased black student enrolment, UCT established an Academic Development (AD) program to help integrate black students into college life; Mamdani's foundational first-year course was intended as one such class. The curricular objectives that came to define the foundation class, and to which Mamdani strongly objected, were "skills" and "vocational" objectives designed to meet NQF requirements and, therefore, illustrate UCT's commitment to "global" standards of excellence. Mamdani's critique of the class taught by Hall et al. can be read as a critique of their belief that a "world-class" education is defined by "global" academic standards, rather than whether it meets the particular intellectual needs of South Africans.

Furthermore, one effect of prioritizing "global" standards of academic excellence was the relegation of black students as "lacking" ability rather than as possessing valuable knowledge:

> the AD curriculum in general, as demonstrated by Mamdani's critics, has consistently gained institutional ground by framing the black student within a deficit discourse; it is what they do not have that constitutes the curricular response. Rather than see students as reservoirs of experience and knowledge which can contribute to, even define, the curriculum, these students are either lacking language (that is, English) skills or reasoning abilities or writing competencies, and so on. What this conception does is leave outside of critical inquiry some basic questions, such as: What if the problem was framed as the incapacity of the UCT staff to teach Xhosa or Afrikaans? Why make the student the object of a deficit gaze, and not the staff? Whose problem is it really? And is it not a point of consideration that given their capacity to survive the hazards of an as yet unequal education, the students who gain access to UCT should already have considerable competencies and potentials to draw on from the institutional curriculum? (Jansen 1998, 111).

As UCT prioritized the imparting of technical skills, South African students—as well as academic staff and other producers of academic knowledge—became seen as "lacking" in those "competencies" deemed necessary for "global" integration. This explains why Martin Hall, Dean Wanamaker and members of the Working Group prioritized skill training and deemed Mamdani's highly theoretical course "too difficult."

Prior to the UCT curriculum debate, Mamdani had critiqued universal academic standards explicitly in a 1994 conference entitled "The Future Role of Universities in the South African Tertiary Education System." Using a method he would employ at UCT, Mamdani drew on examples from across equatorial Africa to advise South African scholars against adopting universal standards of academic

excellence. He argued that based on the experience of many post-independence African universities adopting "global" standards simply facilitates the transformation of education into a "consumer good": "In the name of maintaining standards, knowledge was transformed from something that a university produces to something whose consumption it facilitates" (Mamdani 1995, 23). The adoption of standards "stifled creativity and undermined independence of thought. In the name of defending a universally-defined standard, education was reduced to a training process" (Mamdani 1995, 23). Mamdani argues that universities across Africa, including South Africa, should recognize that "there is no single universal definition of quality that may be applied and upheld regardless of context" (Mamdani 1995, 27).

This warning, however, was not heeded by those championing UCT's integration into a world imagined as a "global knowledge economy." As UCT positioned itself to benefit from the structural transformation of South African higher education, other institutions—most notably the historically black universities—found themselves unable to meet these visions of education. UCT's pursuit of NQF standards, in other words, effectively exacerbated the asymmetries between UCT and those institutions "at the whipping end of the NQF" (Jansen 1998, 112).[8] Read as a political intervention into the structural transformation of South African higher education, the curriculum debate can be symptomatic of a contradiction between the institution's embrace of "global" standards—and therefore educational vocationalism—and those who see higher education as a site for remaking a post-apartheid world in which South Africa could be imagined *as African*.

While not using this terms specifically, Mamdani's critique also targets UCT's turn towards interdisciplinary curriculum design. One can read interdisciplinarity at UCT as symptomatic of the structural transformation of the university into a site well integrated into a "global knowledge economy." At two points Mamdani objects

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[8] Jansen argues that those at institutions such as the University of Durban Westville, where he was on staff, "could readily testify to the increasing bureaucratization of higher education policy and the coercive instruments for implementation, not the least of which is the linking of state funding to particular kinds of curriculum formatting i.e., the type which is programme-based, unit standarised, outcomes oriented (forget the process), economical relevant (read: 'science and technology') and financially feasible (exclude the Humanities)" (Jansen 1998, 112).

to the instrumentalization and rationalization of academic work that, he argues, made it impossible to teach the class he originally designed. First, Mamdani objected to the use of a faculty poll to determine whether his syllabus was relevant. Secondly, he argued that Martin Hall's reliance on student evaluations to defend the foundations course only proves that he designed a more "successful Bantu education."[9] But most instructively, and the point Mamdani chooses to conclude his comments with, is his rebuttal of Martin Hall's claim that Mamdani maintained an "irresponsible" claim "to singular authority" which flies in the face of UCT's commitment to a "democratic model of participatory course planning and teaching" (quoted in: Mamdani 1998, 35). Mamdani responds to this accusation by pointing out that while Hall tried to defend his section of the syllabus on archeology "[n]o one has defended the second part, nor anyone the third part. And no one even admits to having designed the whole course. I would like to ask: Who designed the overall course? Anyone? Or did three persons design 3 separate parts and just slap them together?" (Mamdani 1998, 46). Mamdani argues that this so-called "participatory" and "democratic" approach to curriculum design is simply "the name of a new game in which faceless people can make decisions and hide behind the walls of democracy to avoid accountability"; this "faceless decision-making" is little more than "a brave new world where democracy is the swan song for a regime of non-accountability, a non-transparent regime?" (Mamdani 1998, 46).

While Mamdani blamed this withering of academic accountability on administrative policies and personalities at UCT, the bureaucratization and decentralization of academic knowledge production can also be read as symptomatic of the structural transformation of South African higher education to prioritize the "global knowledge economy." The interdisciplinary teaching, as defended by Hall, is closely allied with the concept of Mode 2 knowledge production, which was then widely circulating within the South African academy. Bertelsen argues that "[m]arket

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[9] Mamdani writes: "He [Martin Hall] gives us the results of a student poll. Students loved the course, he says…I have argued that the problem with this course is the result mainly of what the course team left out…Students only know what they were taught, they do not know what they were not taught. If a course confirms student prejudices, prejudices instilled through Bantu education—that Africa lies north of the Limpopo, and that this Africa has no intelligentsia with writings worth reading—and if the students say they love the course, do we have anything more than successful Bantu education?… Student appraisals cannot substitute for a peer review process. Only demagogues would trade in one for the other, trying to silence critics by waving student appraisals in their face" (Mamdani 1998, 45).

norms…require the transformation of curriculum" into "user-friendly 'modules'" on "the mix-and-match principle of the supermarket. To this end a myriad 'interdisciplinary' programmes are presently being produced on orders from management" (Bertelsen 1998, 149). The turn towards a flexible and collaborative curriculum design is the effect of a "new vocationalism" in which the "training of students for jobs is now the university's explicit mission"; "while the rhetoric of 'transformation' remains plausibly democratic, the change that his language is used to legitimate is essentially market-driven" (Bertelsen 1998, 149-150). The designing, teaching, and evaluation of the Foundation Seminar is symptomatic of the restructuring of the South African academy such that "participatory" and "democratic" teaching and curriculum design works to "displace power and knowledge contestations away from the academy and into the global marketplace" (Jansen 1998, 113). The interdisciplinary methods used to produce the core course not only shield particular UCT faculty from having to interrogate their intellectual apartheid inheritances (as Mamdani argues) but also works serve to produce a student body capable of integrating into a world already imagined as "global."

RE-WORDING "THE GLOBAL"

In the United States, South Africa, and elsewhere universities and colleges are being structurally transformed into sites for the production and reproduction of "the global." As a consequence, "the global" is rapidly becoming considered an incontrovertible social fact: a reality to which nations, individuals, and academic institutions must all adapt. However, when understood as an imaginary, it becomes possible to see "the global" not as a thing that already exists *out there* but instead as one of the many ways academics can give meaning to various contradictory and overlapping worlds.

Unfortunately, the structuring of higher education has prioritized the production of the global imaginary at the expense of alternative ways of imagining the world. For example, those arguing that South Africa must adapt to a "global knowledge economy" effectively universalize some lived material practices while relegating others (such as the legacy of apartheid) as a particular and local and therefore of secondary importance when trying to understand South Africa's place-

in-the-world. The universalization of some experiences at the expense of others, however, is not simply an analytical decision but is structured by the very real relations of knowledge production. For example, philanthropic institutions reinforce a demarcation between the U.S. academy, which produces knowledge about "the global," and the South African academy, which serves as a development institution for building capacity and training workers in a "global knowledge economy."

The curriculum debate at UCT, however, offered a political intervention—whether consciously or not—into the structural transformation of UCT into a "global" university. When Mamdani challenged the assumption that education of UCT's increasingly black student body should focus on skills needed in a "global" marketplace, and instead argued that re-imagining South Africa's relation to Africa should be the objective of academic knowledge production, he provided an alternative way of imagining both "Africa" and "the global." As such, Mamdani's intervention offers an example of what it means to re-world "the global."

First, Mamdani correctly argues that "Africa" is not a social fact but a thing with contested meanings, including meanings used to reinforce apartheid (such as the distinction between Black/Bantu Africa and White/European Africa). Only by challenging these assumptions is it possible to reimagine South Africa in a way that challenges various apartheid imaginaries. While explicitly an effort to reimagine South Africa, Mamdani's intervention can also be read as symptomatic of an attempt to reimagine "the global." On the one hand, Mamdani has no regard—and, in fact, absolute disdain—for the "best practices" claimed to be necessary for launching UCT into the stratosphere of "globally recognized" universities. Therefore, instead of reproducing the global imaginary as structured by South African higher education, Mamdani asks the much more radical questions: What is African about a "world-class African university"?; Why must the project of studying Africa be subsumed by the demands of "global" instructional standards? In seeking to reimagine South Africa, Mamdani in effect argues for reimagining South Africa's place-in-the-world in terms other than "the global."

Mamdani's intervention also illustrates the way in which re-worlding "the global" is not simply an intellectual activity relating to the writing of articles, publishing books and teaching classes. Rather Mamdani recognized that world-

making that takes place at the level of academic knowledge production involves engaging in political struggle within the apparatus of knowledge production. In recognizing himself as a producer of knowledge—and therefore able to "go on strike" to force an intervention—Mamdani creates a yet non-existent space within which to produce and circulate alternative ways of imagining Africa, the African university, and thereby create an imaginary of South Africa's place-in-the-world in terms other than those provided by the global imaginary. It is struggles like these that make it possible to re-world "the global."

CONCLUSION:
PROVINCIALIZING THE ACADEMY

> *The development of forms of explanation [by] placing particular events into a universal framework coincide, of course, with a quite palpable expansion of Western power, wealth, and technical knowledge…The universal to which social theory aspires is a category founded within and expressed by the particular history of the West.*
>
> —Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*

This dissertation offers a contrapuntal juxtaposition of the United States and South African academies as a way to analyze structural asymmetries in the production of the global imaginary. In the United States, administrators now design programs, centers, institutional branding campaigns, and academic initiatives around "the global." Faculty members and graduate students teach and write about "the global" while undergrads study "the global" in their classes, possibly even majoring or minoring in it. At the same time, the South African post-apartheid university has been transformed to meet the demands of a world already imagined as a "global knowledge economy." In both cases, however, "the global" has become the way students, scholars, and administrators imagine their relationship to "the real conditions of existence."

The assumed facticity of globalization is odd given that the concept has very little coherence and seems to mean just about everything. However, a careful reading of the globalization literature reveals that the concept of globalization depends upon the pre-existence of "the global" for its appearance of coherence but that "the global" does not correspond to an empirically knowable reality existing out there and is rather an imaginary. "The global" has become a dominant way of imagining the world precisely because many people inhabit apparatuses restructured to reproduce this imaginary. The structural transformation of knowledge production plays out differently within particular apparatuses—for example, the University of Minnesota and the University of Cape Town—these apparatuses nonetheless shape the practices and habits of the students, faculty, and administrators within these sites. As such, the world comes to be known as a single already constituted *thing*, rather than a plurality of heterogeneous sites inscribed with multiple possible meanings.

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While claiming to simply reflect reality, "the global" is actually a particular set of lived material practices that has been universalized. The handful of advanced industrialized countries or cities has become the paradigmatic example of "the global." In this way, "the global" operates much like the universalizing colonial discourse of "civilized"/"uncivilized." As some particulars become treated as universally "the global," the realities assume a given-ness and facticity that de-legitimize other ways of knowing the world while dividing the world into "the global" and the "not-yet-global" (i.e. "the local"). In this formulation, Africa is routinely absent from the globalization literature, i.e. a particular place-in-the-world that cannot be universalized.

Diagnosing the global imaginary is important because knowledge is material and, as such, has effects. "The global" now informs the way a vast number of social relations are imagined and organized. It is, for example, the way war is now imagined—as evident in President Bush's declaration of a *global war* on terror. Development is no long a matter of national development but instead *global development*. Numerous problems, such as violence or financial instability, are not signs of structural contradictions but rather a lack of *global governance*. The progressive political figures are now the *global social movements*. As such, "the global" has become a—if not *the*—defining way to imagine the contemporary world. As such, this imaginary, produced within asymmetrical relations of production, structures how people conceptualize and therefore participate in practices of war, security, governance, trade, development, and political struggle.

However, in failing to see the structural mode of production in which "the global" is produced, academics—as well as politicians, businesspeople, managers, and activists—accept "the global" as the definitive horizon of human activity. In accepting "the global" as empirical, we have been blinded to other possible ways of imagining the world, ways that open up potentially powerful intervention into the production of the world. Some have attempted to re-world "the global" by providing examples of how the world could be imagined otherwise. Given that the global imaginary is produced in relation to the absence of Africa, one way of re-worlding "the global" might be to contrapuntally juxtapose claims about "the global" with those made about "Africa." Or, in the case of Mamdani, to resist the structural

imperative to reproduce "the global" and instead present Africa as a world of equal (or greater) conceptual importance than "the global."

This dissertation is an attempt to break open this conceptual blockage by posing a new problematics. In asking: "How is academic knowledge about globalization produced?" it becomes possible to conceptualize academic knowledge as a potentially powerful political act capable of intervening into the structural relations of knowledge production. This perspective, however, requires seeing academic knowledge not simply as a reflection of the "real" world—and, therefore, academics as merely the transcribers of an already existing world—but instead as knowledge-producers. This move requires first *provincializing the academy*. By this I mean that the academics should see the academy as a world with its own idiosyncrasies, possibilities, and limitations; a world with its own practices of meaning-making and its own regimes of production.

Provincializing the academy, however, is not done simply for the sake of decentralizing universal claims by identifying the colonial, yet contested, nature of academic knowledge. While this move is significant, it is insufficient. Instead, provincializing the academy makes possible an academic knowledge that takes seriously—and intervenes upon—the structured material relations within which knowledge is produced. That is, to politically act upon a conjuncture of knowledge production. This vision is exactly the kind of political project that Mahmood Mamdani engaged in when he initiated the UCT curriculum debate. Not only did he start from the assumption that knowledge production involves real political stakes— he recognized that challenging the epistemic marginalization of Africa at UCT required engaging the academy *as a site of knowledge production*.

In provincializing the academy, I am not arguing for a kind of relativism, i.e. that all worlds and knowledges are different and therefore should be respected as such. Instead, this argument presents academic knowledge as production—as world-making—and therefore a contested space of struggle, including class struggle. There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this argument. First, academics should re-evaluate "the global" not in terms of how well it reflects the world but rather in terms of what new worlds it makes possible. Instead, of falling back on concepts like "global governance," scholars might think about producing new

concepts that highlight the fissures, asymmetries, and exclusions—i.e. possible sites of intervention—that are erased by a reliance on "the global." For example, maybe a more critical edge can be gained rejecting "global governance" in favor of concepts such as neo-colonial governance or Empire. Similarly, scholars might develop concepts such as *multitude, relationships of solidarity,* or *non-national networks* to replace "global social movements." While it is not the purpose of this project to develop these new (or old) imaginaries, I hope that it provokes a radical re-thinking of the stale and transcendent claims that have become the foundation for so much social scientific thinking. Also, I hope that the production of new imaginaries will be motivated by the questions: "How is this imaginary helpful?"; "What does it make present?"; and, similarly: "What world does this concept help produce?"

The second conclusion drawn from my argument is that scholars must attend to the ways in which relations of knowledge production overdetermine the limits (as well as political possibilities) for producing different—potentially more radical—knowledges. In other words, leftist academics should be wary of the "heroics" of knowledge production; i.e. the belief that writing books and articles is, in itself, a radical politics.[1] Instead of seeing academic politics in terms of producing texts, teaching students, or circulating knowledges, leftist academics would benefit from seeing the politics of knowledge as always situated within a structured, material conjuncture. The present conjuncture—marked by increasing academic precarity, shrinking resources and time for research, rampant professionalization, a focus on

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[1] I borrow this concept from John Conley who brilliantly critiques the "heroics" of teaching. He argues "graduate workers can't afford—both literally and otherwise—to be radical pedagogues or politically-committed academics." The "heroics" of politicized pedagogy actually obscures the exploitative social relations within which teaching takes place by reproducing the belief that "if we work really, really hard" we can subvert "the system we work in,"

> It's the old "if I can even get through to one student" argument. It is precisely this notion and precisely this desire—that is, to work within the "belly of the beast," to try to effect change in the world, etc.—that compels us to work so hard, to care and invest so much in our interactions with students, and to do so much of the extra work that is increasingly compulsory for graduate student workers. (Conley 2009)

Politically "heroic" teaching, Conley argues, leaves graduate workers exhausted and without the time or energy to organize themselves into unions that can be the tools by which to "*re*organiz[e] our relationships to our jobs" (Conley 2009). A similar argument can be made for academics who focus on the production of knowledge without consideration for how this knowledge circulates, who it influences, as well as under what (asymmetrical) conditions it was produced.

quantity (rather than quality) of publication, etc.—poses the question of what social relations need to be cultivated, what unions need to be created, professional organizations developed, intellectual collectives fostered, and conferences organized in order to make it possible to produce the knowledge that can help create a more equitable and redistributive world. Seeing knowledge as production, therefore, means engaging in the politics of knowledge production *at the level of the mode of production.*

Because the global imaginary operates at the level of the reproduction of the relations of production, an alternative to "the global" can only be produced through an intervention on the mode of academic knowledge production itself.

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APPENDICES:
ALTHUSSER AND AN IMMANENT SOCIAL SCIENCES
(NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)

Each of the following appendices presents a theoretical explanation and justification for various methods and claims made throughout the dissertation. However, read together these four appendices also argue that the contemporary social sciences have much to gain from a renewed engagement with the work of Louis Althusser. Despite being considered widely irrelevant to the social sciences, many of Althusser's concepts—such as *overdetermination*, *(global) structure* and *conjuncture*—nonetheless offer ways of studying the world as materially lived, immanent, and contradictory—yet structured. This perspective is a considerable divergence from the image of the world as a linear plane of cause and effect, which is commonly presented in the social sciences. Furthermore, Althusser's method of reading makes visible various social relations, like the imaginary, that otherwise go unseen by existing social scientific approaches. Althusser's theoretical contributions also pave new ways of integrating the insights of constructivist, poststructuralist, feminist, queer, and postcolonial thinkers—including theories of subjectivity, social construction, identity, and the diffuse power of language and signs—while simultaneously resituating asymmetrical relations of production as fundamental to (but not determinant of) social life. Althusser might, in other words, serve as a "'vanishing mediator' between the supposedly antagonistic camps of Marxism and post-structuralism" (Read 2003, 8). An Althusserian approach to the social sciences might particularly benefit those studying the production of academic knowledge within institutions increasingly defined by the subsumption of the academy within the circuits of capital. Academics can no longer imagine themselves shielded from these structured material realities; nor can we assume that these material relations do not affect the knowledge produced within the academy. Althusser's theoretical work provides avenues for laying the relationship between knowledge production and structured economic relations back on the table while avoiding the economistic and reductive logics that have led many social scientists to abandon Marxist social theory during the past decades.

My argument for re-engaging with Althusser is presented in various forms throughout these three appendices and can be summed up in two general points. First, I argue Althusser has historically been misread within the social sciences as a

thinker who approaches structure as an object with causal properties. This dominant reading of Althusser—found, for example, in E. P. Thompson's polemical critique—bemoans Althusser's structuralism as foreclosing the possibility of "agency." This approach, however, assumes that "agents" and "structures" relate to each other in causal relationships. This treatment ignores the fact that Althusser's analysis is always primarily a political and theoretical engagement with the relationship between the production of knowledge and the production of "the world." Instead of starting from an intellectual problematic populated with abstract "agents" and "structures," Althusser asks how knowledge produces the lived world. Since the production of knowledge is always immanent to the world, structure can only be glimpsed at through careful practices of *reading*. While an often ignored fact, it is not insignificant that Althusser's project in *Reading Capital* starts with developing a method of reading. In the spirit of showing fidelity to Althusser's method, I *read Althusser as Althusser reads Marx* thereby creating a social scientific theory of *reading* structure. This process is fundamentally different than using Althusser to describe some abstracted relationship between agents and structures.

Secondly, I argue that when read in the social sciences, Althusser's work is often not situated within the context of his total corpus. Not only are his later works widely ignored but most social scientists fail to read Althusser's work as a political engagement with the pro-Stalinist post-war French left. One of Althusser's main contentions is that structured material relations at any given moment—the conjuncture—inform the production of knowledge. As such, reading Althusser within the present conjuncture enables him to be read differently than he was in France during the 1960s or the American social sciences in the 1980s. I argue that situating Althusser's texts within the present conjuncture also allows scholars to see the limits of Althusser's thinking imposed by the political conjuncture in which he was writing. Reading Althusser into the present, therefore, enables one to read a different Althusser. Just as a new conjuncture allowed Marx to see that Ricardo and Smith had produced the concept of "labor-power" without recognizing it, reading Althusser into the present conjuncture makes it possible to see what Althusser produced—namely an immanent approach to the social sciences.

Taken together, these following three appendices offer a re-reading of Althusser within a conjuncture informed by the availability of his later work in English, growing economic asymmetries at a planetary scale, capital's expanded colonization of the university, and the increasingly important role social sciences play in producing the global imaginary. This conjuncture creates an interesting opening. On the one hand, as a philosopher of the imaginary and the production of knowledge, Althusser injects many useful theoretical insights that might make visible possible ways of re-making "the global" in more radically engaging ways. On the other hand, rereading Althusser within the present conjuncture also gives new life to Althusserian structuralism. Late in his career, Althusser recognized his failure to explain how his theoretical apparatus could motivate empirical (note: not empiricist) research. Reading Althusser through the contradictions present in the contemporary social sciences, including the contradictions posed by producing the global imaginary, offers an opportunity to begin developing the methods for an immanent social science.

These three appendices, therefore, represent an attempt to re-establish the lived, structured and material dimension of academic knowledge production; a question that necessitates thinking through the ways in which the political economy of higher education shapes knowledge. The first appendix introduces Althusser's key concept of overdetermination and his critique of transitive and expressive causality. The second appendix introduces his method of symptomatic reading. The third appendix examines Althusser's conception of "science" and offers some suggestions as to what an Althusserian "social science" might look like. Because Althusser employs a fairly eclectic vocabulary unfamiliar to many social scientists, I also provide a glossary to help introduce a number of the most important concepts appearing throughout the appendices, and the project as a whole.

APPENDIX I:
THINKING STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE

Starting with his 1962 essay "Contradiction and Overdetermination" Althusser's theoretical work can be read as a sustained engagement with the question of causality. In 1968, with the publication of *Reading Capital*, Althusser lays out his critique of the two most prevalent theories of causality. *Mechanical causality*—also called linear, transitive, or Cartesian causality—envisions the world as composed of discrete objects interacting in knowable and linear causal relations. This conception of causality permeates much of the social sciences, including those strands of the globalization literature examining globalization's cause and effect. *Expressive causality*, by contrast, takes its theoretical insight from Hegel and presents particular relations between subjects and objects as expressions of the whole. This theory of causality can be found in those strands of the academic literature on globalization that take the particular (fast food restaurants, a sweatshop in Indonesia, a cricket match, etc.) as equivalent expressions of "the global." Althusser critiques these conceptions of causality, arguing instead that causality is *structured*, or *overdetermined*.

While Althusser's intervention took place within the context of his political engagement with the French left, his critique nonetheless offers contemporary scholars a chance to break open the under-theorized assumptions about causality undergirding the social sciences in general and the study of globalization in particular. In this appendix, I first explain Althusser's critique of mechanical and expressive causality. I then lay out what it means to conceptualize causality as overdetermined, arguing that starting from a theoretical assumption of structural causality results in more productive approaches to studying "the global."

A CRITIQUE OF MECHANICAL AND EXPRESSIVE CAUSALITY

Althusser's structural analysis—drawing on Marxism, psychoanalysis, and linguistic and anthropological structuralism—presents the world neither as a sum of discrete parts nor as a unified totality but rather as a culmination of overlapping registers constantly in tension and contradiction. This conception of structure as a *social totality* or *(global) mode of production* (Chapter Three, p. 100-103) starts from an alternative view of causality. To explain how

causality works within a *(global) mode of production*, Althusser first problematizes traditional conceptualizations of causality.

Mechanical causality

Mechanical causality starts from the Cartesian and Humian assumption that the world is the sum total of arrangements between discrete and knowable objects. Many analytical methods within the social sciences—including rational choice, formal modeling, behavioralism, counterfactuals, large-scale quantitative analysis, qualitative case studies, and some forms of discourse analysis—rest upon a mechanical theory of causality. Althusser criticizes mechanical causality because it falsely assumes an *a priori* existence of causal chains such that knowledge simply *reflects* an already existing world. The world that mechanical causality reflects, furthermore, is a world made up of *pure objects* presented as *real objects* in already existing relations of cause and effect.

Mechanical causality, in other words, starts from the epistemological question: "How can one achieve perfect of knowledge of pure objects?" This question is answered by developing a picture of the world comprising discrete objects causing effects within planar space. Althusser describes mechanical causality using the metaphor of a pool table in which objects (balls, bumpers, cues, etc.) "collide" in observable, measurable, and determinable patterns: causality operates "like a game of billiards in which homogeneous but atomized elements bounce off each other in a linear and unique sequence lacking any general structure beyond the cumulative effects of the series of individual collisions" (Resch 1992, 47). These interactions are assumed to play out upon the "planar space" of the pool table and each effect correlates to an observable "object-cause" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 182). Social scientists, therefore, are those observers standing around the table tasked with decoding, and even predicting, the "real" causal relationships by studying the attributes of the objects involved (i.e. mass, velocity, angle of impact, etc.). Empirical social scientists with a mechanical understanding of causality, therefore, believe that measuring the observable attributes of social objects makes it possible to predict the effects of their social interaction.

Althusser's first critique of mechanical causality is based on its assumption of planar space. He argues that the assumption of "homogeneity" and "planar" social space does not come from real world observations (as claimed by empiricist social scientists) but is instead motivated by "the structure of a theoretical problematic" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 183).

In other words, the image of causality as mechanical is driven by an "empiricist problematic" which "conceiv[es] its object" and "pos[es] it definite questions" based on the "anticipat[ion of] the form of its answers (the quantitative schema)" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 183). In other words, asking and answering questions that are quantifiable requires that social scientists frame their questions in terms of linear causality. If social scientists instead started from the assumption that the world is composed of "a complex and deep space, itself inscribed in another complex and deep space" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 183) it would be impossible to arrive at certain arguments about the relationships between cause and effect. In the social sciences, the need for identifying cause and effect plays out as a dogmatic pursuit of parsimony at the expense of understanding actual existing complexity and contradiction. Furthermore, the drive to simplify the social world forces social scientists to assume the existence of a stable relationship between observer and observed fact (Smith 1984, 115-16)—a privileged position that comes at the expense of being required to represent the vibrant, lived world as a cold simplified abstraction.

Althusser's second critique of mechanical causality takes aim at treatment of *objects of knowledge* as if they were *pure objects*. Because most social scientists recognize that the social world is vastly more complex than a pool table, they must first distill complex social relationships into aggregations of discrete units (i.e. dependent and independent variables). For example, scholars assuming mechanical causality might ask the question "Why do some countries break out into civil war?" To answer this question they first identify a number of possible (non-endogenous) causes. These variables might include: deprivation, levels of nationalism, state capacity, the presence of "bad" neighbors, GNP, geographic size, government type, etc. The findings (for example, "A + B → civil war") offer a simplified and parsimonious representation of a social phenomena that is impossible to imagine as a social whole. However, only because "civil war" is treated as a *pure object*[1] can social scientists assume that "A + B → civil war" applies to multiple conflicts. What most social scientists fail to recognize is that *pure objects* are actually *objects of knowledge*—they are produced rather than essentially given. For example, conventions of American social sciences are responsible

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[1] For example, empiricists assume that "civil war" captures an essential quality contained within conflicts in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Congo etc. that makes these events comparable, i.e. that they are "like things" or "comparable cases." See Chapter One (p. 50-55) for an extended discussion of the difference between *real objects* and *pure objects*.

for producing the holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda as *objects of knowledge* that can be comparable.

A final critique of mechanical causality comes from post-colonial theory. While not employing the language of mechanical causality or referencing Althusser, Achille Mbembe wages a similar critique of empiricist social scientific knowledge. He argues that many social scientists employ essentialized claims of cause and effect at the expense of seeing the world as lived and, in particular, lived by previously colonized peoples. This bias occurs because most social scientific knowledge is uninterested in "comprehending the political in Africa" or "producing knowledge in general" but instead concerned exclusively "what is immediately useful" for the purpose of "social engineering." He argues that most social scientific work prioritizing the simplification of the social world is "dogmatically programmatic," "cavalier," and "reductionist" (Mbembe 2001, 7). Furthermore, in order to arrive at convenient academic "findings" social scientists must first eviscerate history, replacing it with a timelessness and placelessness that assumes that the lived practices of people are made meaningful by Western observers trained to discern what is *really* taking place. These approaches also assume that the Western audiences for whom most social scientists write are objective, benevolent, and will (naturally) use the knowledge for benevolent purposes. This unfounded assumption only reinforces the assumption that parsimonious and actionable findings are the desirable outcomes of social scientific work: *We* need to know the world in order to better help *them*.

Althusser's argument, however, is not that mechanical causality does not exist. One can, after all, still predict the direction a pool ball will travel based on the angle at which it is hit. But social relations are more than complex versions of mechanical causality (i.e. the empiricist claim). When the social sciences only look for mechanical causality, the entire world is seen through this delimited problematic and knowledge is produced that only sees some objects, some relations, and some effects.

One can begin to present a world in more complex ways by changing the question from "What is globalization?" to "Within what structured material relations is knowledge about globalization produced?" This change, however, requires treating knowledge production as a lived practice, not simply the documentation of existing, empirically referential social relations. Taking the academic literature on globalization as an object of

study, therefore, requires a theory of causality that appreciates the complexity and non-heterogeneity of social production, including the production of knowledge.

Expressive causality

In addition to mechanical theories of causality, Althusser critiques expressive causality. While his critique of expressive causality is a thinly veiled challenge to the French Communist Party (Jameson 1981, 37), within the present conjuncture it can nonetheless still shed some light on the problematic ways in which "the global" is often studied as an inclusive, singular "totality."

Althusser's first critique of expressive causality has to do with the fact that it can only ever be descriptive. He frames this argument by drawing a distinction between "the revolutionary character of the Marxist conception of the 'social whole' and 'Hegelian 'totality'" (Althusser 2001b, 135). In "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" Althusser tackles expressive causality as it manifests itself in economistic Marxism's conception of structure as the base determining the superstructure. Referencing the imagery of structure as a building, Althusser argues that understanding structure as "an edifice containing a base (infrastructure) on which are erected the two 'floors' of the superstructure" can only ever be "a metaphor" or "to be quite precise, a spatial metaphor: the metaphor of a topography" (Althusser 2001a, 90). Althusser recognizes that this metaphor is helpful in revealing some things, including the ways in which the base influences all aspects of the superstructure.[2] Despite this important conceptual understanding, however, this metaphor contains an important disadvantage: "it remains *descriptive*." Only abandoning the spatial metaphor and approaching the question from "the point of view of reproduction" is it possible to find that "many of the questions whose existence was indicated by the spatial metaphor of the edifice, but to which it could not give a conceptual answers, are immediately illuminated" (Althusser 2001a, 91).

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[2]Althusser writes that: "Like every metaphor, this metaphor suggests something, makes something visible. What? Precisely this: that the upper floors could not 'stay up' (in the air) alone, if they did not rest precisely on their base." As a result, "the metaphor of the edifices…represent[s] above all the 'determination in the last instance' by the economic base. The effect of this spatial metaphor is to endow the base with an index of effectivity known by the famous terms: the determination in the last instance of what happens in the upper 'floors' (of the superstructure) by what happens in the economic base… the great theoretical advantage of the Marxist topography, i.e. of the spatial metaphor of the edifice (base and superstructure) is simultaneously that it reveals that questions of determination (or of index of effectivity) are crucial; that it reveals that it is the base which in the last instance determines the whole edifice" (Althusser 2001a, 90-91).

Althusser's second critique of expressive causality targets the Hegelian assumption that "the whole in question [can] be reducible to an *inner essence*" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 186). In this way, "the elements of the whole" are just one "phenomenal form[] of expression" such that "the inner principle of the essence" is "present at each point in the whole*"* (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 186); any given effect is caused by an already existing whole.[3] Althusser criticizes this conception of causality because it assumes an idealized totality existing prior to its material instantiation. Instead of history being produced through material structures and class struggles, Hegel posits the purpose of history—i.e. Spirit— outside history. Althusser argues that members of the French Communist Party (PCF) deployed this conception of causality to apologize for Stalinism: "if all the levels are 'expressively' the same, then the infrastructural change in forces of production…will be enough 'more or less rapidly to transform the whole superstructure'" (Jameson 1981, 37). In this way, Stalin's state repression was excused by the PCF as unfortunate yet epiphenomenal— a small price to pay for the flourishing that will occur once capitalism is fully dismantled.

Althusser's critique of expressive causality captures a number of tendencies within the globalization literature. For example, as pointed out in Chapter One (p. 28), academics often define globalization in ways such that sweatshop workers, HIV-infected people from Southern Africa, East Timorese human rights activists, etc. are all taken as particular expressions of the same "global" totality. The particular, in other words, becomes indistinguishable from the whole it purports to represent. As a consequence, globalization becomes represented as simply the "spirit of the times," which is everywhere and unchangeable.

STARTING FROM THE ASSUMPTION OF OVERDETERMINED CAUSALITY

After critiquing transitive and expressive conceptions of causality, Althusser offers structural causality, or overdetermination, as an alternative theory of causality. Starting with the conception of structural causality means recognizing that the production of knowledge is an act of producing the world. This definition means that the actual lived complexity of the social world cannot be broken down into understandable relationships of cause and effect

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[3] Put slightly different, "*such and such an element* (economic, political, legal, literary, religious, etc., in Hegel) = *the inner essence of the whole"* (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 187).

that reflect a "real" world existing independent of the production of knowledge—because phenomena are not *caused* by identifiable object-causes or by an expressive whole but are instead "absent cause" existing only as "the entire system of *relationships*" (Jameson 1981, 36). The structure is not, therefore, "an essence *outside* the economic phenomena which comes and alters their aspects, forms and relations" but is instead "immanent in its effects…*the whole existence of the structure consists of its effects*" (Althusser & Balibar 1997, 188-89). This statement does not mean that causality is structurally determined nor purely contingent; one thing does not cause everything nor does everything cause everything else:

> Within a structured totality, overdetermined contradiction is neither the unfolding of random contingent events nor the manifestation of an overarching "general contradiction" (i.e. class struggle) but a unique set of overlapping and intersecting contradictions at multiple registers—including those regions in which knowledge itself is produced. A theory of structural causality embraces complexity as definitive of the structured whole. For Althusser, relations and their effects are always elements of the whole with the structure itself as the sum total of effects. This, however, does not mean that Althusser believes "everything causes everything else." (Resch 1992, 52)

For Althusser the social totality comprises a single mode of production that consists of a base and a *semi-autonomous* superstructure. Because the superstructure is semi-autonomous it affects the base in different and often contradictory ways. Furthermore, unlike economistic Marxist accounts that view the base as solely determinant of the superstructure, Althusser contends that the semi-autonomous superstructure contains different regions, registers, and levels that exist in constant tension and contradiction. This relationship means that overdetermined contradiction is neither the unfolding of random contingent events nor the manifestation of an overarching "general contradiction," (i.e. class struggle) but always a unique set of overlapping, intersecting, and irreducible contradictions at multiple registers.

In this way, it is not possible to find one (or even multiple) determinant causes but rather a constantly shifting assemblage of social relations that produces effects "absent cause." In a rare deployment of his theoretical analysis to describe an empirical example, Althusser explains the Russian Revolution not in terms of a proletarian class rising against the bourgeoisie (i.e. the story of linear, Cartesian causality) but instead as a structural change occurring when a "vast accumulation of 'contradictions' comes into play *in the same court*" (Althusser 1970, 100). The Russian Revolution was a "ruptural unity" created by many contradictions including those produced by "capitalist and imperialist exploitation," contradictions between capitalist production and a medieval state, and class struggle within the ruling class (between Tsarists, rebellious nobility, industrialists, liberals, petty bourgeoisie,

and anarchists) in addition to a series of "exceptional circumstances" including the presence of a sophisticated "revolutionary elite" and the support of the French and British who were also interested in overthrowing the Tsar (Althusser 1970, 94-97). In other words, the Russian Revolution was the effect of an "accumulation and exacerbation of historical contradictions that would have been incomprehensible" in any other country but Russia (Althusser 1970, 97; emphasis removed); in other words, it was "a vast heterogeneity of circumstances, currents, and contradictions (local, international, class and nonclass)" (Gibson-Graham 2006, 28).

While not determinate, the economic base plays an important role in Althusser's analysis of overdetermination. Unlike traditional Marxist accounts that reduce social relations to economic relations—i.e. the base determines the social structure—Althusser argues that the base is only determinant "*in the last instance…*in the long run, the run of History" (Althusser 1970, 112). In other words, while the economy influences all social relations, social relations are simultaneously overdetermined by aspects of the superstructure such that, at any given instance, the register of the economy may or may not be the most relevant. For example, Chapter Five examines the structural transformation of higher education in South Africa at five distinct but interrelated registers: philanthropic organizations, the World Bank, South African economic policy, post-apartheid academic policy, and the discourse of "Mode 2 knowledge production. Instead of treating one (or some combination) of these social relations as causal of change, an analysis based on structured causality analyzes how these forces play out in unique ways—a "ruptural unity"—culminating in a particularly market-oriented approach to higher education, in this case organized around the imaginary of a "global knowledge economy." In this example, there exists a general tendency toward the marketization of higher education but the economy does not determine every instance; nor can every instance be reduced to economic relations. In other words, various registers of social relations—and the effects that they produce—combine at different conjunctures in ways not limited to linear causal relationships but instead as structured by a social totality.

Overdetermination posses a significant challenge to traditional understandings of the social sciences in breaking with the starting claim that knowledge represents an already existing world. Althusser understands knowledge in terms of production and therefore as immanent to the world. In eradicating the assumed distinction between the "real" world and

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knowledge, structural causality allows one to study academic knowledge as produced within lived structured material relations and as productive of the world.

Causality as a starting assumption

In a slight break with Althusser[4] I argue that different theories of causality should be treated as theoretical assumptions rather than given actualities. As such, I do not argue that a commitment to overdetermined causality offers a universally superior way of conducting social scientific investigation. There are two reasons for this. First, varying conceptions of causality are valuable in that they make different social relations visible. If one starts with a conception of expressive causality, for example, one finds the determining effects of the economy, but at the expense of seeing other existing social relations. However, in starting from a commitment to structural causality one can see relations of social production (such as the imaginary) that would otherwise remain invisible if one subscribed only to mechanical or expressive theory of causality.

Secondly, for reasons I explore in greater detail in Appendix III, an Althusserian social science does not contain a transcendent standard for determining the true nature of causality. Resnick and Wolff make a similar argument when they claim that "the epistemological presumptions of Marxian theory are different from those of rationalism and empiricism. Marxian theory presumes overdetermination; they [rationalist and empiricist approaches] assume essentialisms" (1987, 10). Rationalist and empiricist approaches to the social sciences, in other words, start from the assumption that the world is populated with objects containing essential qualities existing in causal relationships with one another. Theorists starting from a theory of causality as overdetermined, in contrast, assume that social relations are profoundly complex, constantly in flux, and always interpreted by materially and ideologically situated subjects. As such, "each theory contains its own indexes of truth and falsity." Althusserian theory, therefore, recognizes that "no single reality or absolute truth or epistemological standard…can serve to validate one theory as against another" (Resnick and Wolff 1987, 6).

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[4] In Appendix III, I argue that Althusser smuggles in transcendence under the sign of a Marxist "science" originating after the epistemic break between Young and Mature Marx. Re-reading Althusser within the present conjuncture makes it possible to read an Althusser absent this transcendent move—a move, I argue, produced within a conjuncture marked by fierce partisan debates within the French Communist Party.

It should be mentioned that arguing that conceptions of causality are theoretical and political assumptions is not the same as arguing that all conceptions of causality are equal. Lacking some transcendent quality, one cannot evaluate definitively whether mechanical, expressive, or overdetermined conceptions of causality are best. That being said, the effect of employing various causal assumptions is structured by the conjuncture. As argued above, mechanical and (to a lesser degree) expressive conceptions of causality have, within the present conjuncture, produced reified knowledge about "the global" in ways that fail to recognize the contradictions and tensions embedded within the global imaginary. Mechanical and expressive conceptions of causality have not been able to diagnose these limitations. Given the limitations of producing knowledge using mechanical and expressive approaches to causality, I start from the assumption of structural causality. Doing so makes it possible to produce more radical ways of imagining the world that reject the image of "the global" as a planar space or singular totality.

OVERDETERMINATION AND THE STUDY OF "THE GLOBAL"

Conceptualizing causality as overdetermined has much to offer to the academic study of "the global." First, instead of causality being understood as playing out across an "infinity of a homogeneous planar space," social scientists can instead examine "the global" in terms of social relations taking pace within "*a region* determined by a regional structure" while also "inscribe[d] in a site defined" as a single structure (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 182). While the globalization literature tends to present "the global" using spatial metaphors—a homogenous and planar space upon which social relations unfold—structured causality makes it possible to re-imagine "the global" in terms of production taking place within particular, structured material relations (i.e. regional structures) that are part of, yet not reducible to, a "(global) *structure* of the mode of production" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 182). This move not only defines "the global" in terms of production; it also breaks through the well-worn global/local dichotomy that paralyzes much of the academic literature. Understanding causality in terms of production makes it possible to conceptualize the production of knowledge about globalization as socially produced (not just reflective), produced within structured material sites (such as the University), and productive of the world.

Secondly, starting from the assumption of structural causality prevents scholars from assuming that knowledge simply represents an already given world. There is a tendency within the globalization literature to treat globalization as if it were an empirical fact, recognizing that failing to do so forecloses the possibility of arriving at definitive claims. For example, Clark recognizes that while it "would be a work of supreme artifice to reduce this boisterous and wide-ranging discussion" on globalization "to a tidy core of issues" it is still necessary to impose "some order…to make intelligible the connections" without which it would be impossible to talk about globalization (Clark 1999, 48). A theory of causality as overdetermined, however, recognizes "the essential complexity—as opposed to the root simplicity—of every form of existence; the openness or incompleteness of every identity; the ultimate unfixity of every meaning; and the correlate possibility" and the fact that "social totality…is not structured by the primacy of any social element or location" (Gibson-Graham 2006, 27). Therefore instead of first having to simplify globalization in order for it to meet the problematic of social scientific knowledge, structural causality allows social scientists to examine knowledge as production thereby identifying the complexity and contradictions *within the concept* as symptomatic of the contradictory structural relations of production itself.

Finally, a structural approach to causality allows social scientists to produce knowledge that is immanent with the world. When academic knowledge undergoes substantial change—such as the dramatic emergence of an academic literature on globalization—this change is often conceptualized within the social sciences as an effect of causality existing "out there" (X developments → globalization :: social scientists study globalization because globalization is empirically happening). However, when studying significant changes in knowledge production, starting from the assumption of structured causality means taking this change as a social phenomena worth studying and attempting to understand this new knowledge in terms of the changing structural relations that produced it. This approach recognizes that knowledge produces—and is produced by—different (and often contradictory) social registers. The constant overlaying of relations and effects means that knowledge can be understood as always immanent with the world.

APPENDIX II:
READING ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE SYMPTOMATICALLY

Althusser argues that Marx's most powerful contribution is his recognition that knowledge is not a practice of seeing what already exists but instead an act of production: "we must completely reorganize the idea we have of knowledge, we must abandon the mirror myth of immediate vision and reading, and conceive knowledge as a production" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 24). Studying academic knowledge on globalization in terms of production requires, however, developing methodological tools different from those used to study the world conceived of in terms of empirically knowable mechanical (or expressive) causality. To study academic knowledge as production I borrow Althusser's concept of *symptomatic reading*, a method used to analyze the vestiges of structural relations of knowledge production still evident within a given text. For Althusser, texts contain absences that, read symptomatically, allow scholars to catch glimpses of the social relations producing a given object of knowledge. Textual aporias result not simply from an author's carelessness or oversight but from the particular structured material relations within which knowledge is produced—*the conjuncture*. As the structured relations of knowledge production change over time it becomes possible to identify absences within a given text, absences not apparent within the conjuncture in which the text was initially written. Therefore, focusing on what is absent makes it possible to identify what knowledge is actually being produced.

In this appendix I first turn to Althusser's arguments about what it means to understand reading and writing as practices occurring within the structured material relationships of a particular *conjuncture*. I then use the concept of the conjuncture to explain Althusser's method of symptomatic reading. I conclude by looking at Justin Rosenberg's article "Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem" for an example of what it means to understand "the global" as an object of knowledge produced within a particular conjuncture. While Rosenberg deploys the language of conjuncture, there are significant and insightful differences between how he understands the conjuncture and how the concept operates within an Althusserian symptomatic reading.

READING AND WRITING WITHIN THE CONJUNCTURE

Many of Althusser's books and essays examine the particular yet structured social relations within which the practices of reading and writing occur. For example, Althusser introduces *Reading Capital* with an examination of the conjuncture of the 1965 seminar at the École Normale Supérieure in which the essays were written; "Lenin Before Hegel" carefully analyses Lenin's reading of Hegel while in exile during World War I; in *Machiavelli and Us* Althusser argues that Machiavelli's *The Prince* continues to "grip[]" and "evade" contemporary readers because Machiavelli presents the particular conjuncture of his time using the language of an abstract and universal "law" of politics (Althusser 1999, 4).[1] Althusser's reoccurring attention to reading and writing cannot be dismissed as stylistic flourishes or simply an attempt to provide textual background. Instead, this reoccurring method reveals the primary theoretical importance Althusser places on the practices of reading and writing.

Althusser argues that overdetermined and constantly changing material relations of production, i.e. structure, shapes how particular texts are written, which texts survive, and how texts are eventually read. Althusser calls the particular overdetermined relations within which knowledge is produced *the conjuncture*, a concept borrowed from Lenin's term for the "current moment." The conjuncture is a "central concept of the Marxist science of politics," which "denotes the exact balance of forces"—that is the "state of overdetermination of the contradictions at any given moment to which political tactics must be applied" (Brewster 1970, 250). For Althusser, all human activity—including the production of knowledge—takes place within, and is therefore structured by, the intersection of overlapping and contradictory social forces. Therefore, studying knowledge as production requires

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[1] Althusser argues that Machiavelli's *The Prince* was written in the 16th century when France and Spain had undergone successful national unification. Machiavelli feared Italy would become obsolete if it failed to unify. Furthermore, only a Prince armed with a national army could carry out this project. Althusser argues that *The Prince* is as much a work of political activity—a manifesto of sorts—than a philosophical text. In this way, the "generalizable laws" Machiavelli "discovers" are primarily strategic interventions serving to make the emergence of a unified Italy appear both necessary and inevitable. Despite claiming the opposite, *The Prince* therefore does not lay out universal laws about politics but instead works as a political intervention at a specific conjuncture. "Machiavelli's object of knowledge," in other words, is not "the laws of history or politics" but instead "the formulation of a concrete political problem" whereby one "submit[s] to the problem induced and imposed by its case" (Althusser 1999, 16 & 18).

attending to the particular sites within which knowledge is produced—i.e., the conjunctures in which a text is either written or read. The conjuncture, however, cannot be studied empirically—that is, from the perspective of a detached/transcendent observer commenting on some readably visible "real" relations of knowledge production. Instead, because knowledge is immanent with (rather than apart from) the world, the conjuncture of knowledge production can only be studied through that which it produces. The structure of knowledge production, in short, can be known symptomatically: as something absent cause yet embodied within its particular effects, i.e. within the objects of knowledge themselves.

It should be noted that while Althusser does not theoretically disaggregate writing and reading, I draw this distinction as a means to more clearly explain Althusser's argument. However, just as Althusser argues that production cannot be studied independent of reproduction (Althusser 2001a), one should keep in mind that reading and writing are not independent of each other but actually immanent with each other.

Writing

Social scientists commonly assume that knowledge originates inside the head of an autonomous scholar (or in collaboration with a handful of scholars) and is drawn from observation and transcription of "the real world."[2] Althusser, in contrast, argues that both a text and the knowledge it contains are instead the embodiment of social processes of production and reproduction extending beyond any given autonomous mind. On the one hand, the practice of sitting at one's computer for the purpose of producing text already depends upon a complex assemblage of libraries, journals, publishers, funding sources, and conferences; not to mention the personnel who maintain these resources, who manage the offices, who construct and clean the building, who run the university bureaucracies, and who

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[2] This note helps explain why quality writing is not prioritized in social scientific work; claims about the social world are considered right or wrong independent of whether they are presented in pristine or prosaic prose. Since knowledge references "the real world," language becomes simply a tool for communicating one's findings about that world. Good writing might ensure that a given text is widely read but does not bear on the rightness or wrongness of the conclusions.

provide technical support; not to mention the colleagues, students, and future readers who create the intellectual environment within which the production of texts is possible and desirable; etc. The production of text is, in short, fundamentally social. Furthermore, these complex apparatuses of knowledge production have a profound effect on what knowledge gets produced and by whom. For example, academics with limited teaching loads, plentiful research money, and access to extensive research libraries are capable of producing articles and books at a clip often not possible for scholars working in universities with large teaching loads and without basic infrastructure, institutional support, research funding, or free time.

While these particular structured material relations of knowledge production are important to consider, Althusser is not concerned with this question directly. Instead, he focuses primarily on how the conjuncture produces a *problematic*. The problematic consists of those questions being asked, those objects deemed important for study as well as those questions not asked and those objects deemed irrelevant for study. In other words, the problematic overdetermines which social relationships are rendered visible to scholars and which relations remain unseen. In this way, producing knowledge in the form of writing is not some transcendent practice of seeing and representing the "real" world but instead a practice in which the *field of the problematic* informs what is studied and how:

> The sighing is thus no longer the act of an individual subject endowed with the faculty of "vision" which he exercises either attentively or distractedly; the sighting is the act of its structural conditions, it is the relations of immanent reflection between the field of the problematic and *its* objects and *its* problems. Vision then loses the religious privileges of divine reading: it is no more than a reflection of the immanent necessity that ties an object or problem to its conditions of existence, which lie in the conditions of its production. It is literally no longer the eye (the mind's eye) of a subject which *sees* what exists in the field defined by a theoretical problematic: it is this field itself which *sees itself* in the objects or problems it defines—sight being merely the necessary reflection of the field on its objects. (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 25)

Within the social sciences, for example, it is not accidental that since the behavioral revolution scholars almost always "discover" causal relationships between unitary, rational actors (individuals, organizations, states, etc). An Althusserian analysis of the social sciences, therefore, would concern itself not with the specific findings of this particular conjuncture (A → B) but instead with identifying the structured material relations producing knowledge that imagines the world as organized according to

mechanical causality. Such an analysis might examine the hegemony of neoliberal economics within the social sciences, the proximity of the social sciences to the state and private capital (therefore prioritizing academic knowledge that is "useful" to governance and capitalist accumulation), the professional demands for mass-producing articles for tenure and promotion (which favors neat and conclusive arguments rather than either sprawling, theoretical, or overtly political tracts) as well as shifts in institutional funding making it necessary for the social sciences to offer knowledge claims like those in the more prosperous hard science. The particular conjuncture of the contemporary social sciences, in short, produces a problematic in which scholars *see* social relationships as occurring between discrete, knowable actors interacting within chains of mechanical causality. Furthermore, other social relations—i.e. those that cannot be expressed in terms of mechanical causality (such as the imaginary)—are not chosen by the conjuncture and therefore remain *unseen*, i.e. *present yet absent*.

One of the clearest examples of how Althusser understands the production of knowledge as situated within a particular conjuncture can be found in his unusually biographical recounting of his role in the "humanist controversy" within the French Communist Party (CPF) during the mid-1960s. His narrative goes like this: In 1963 Althusser had a chance encounter with a philosopher and high-ranking member of the Communist Party, Dr. Schaff, at a friend's house. At this meeting Dr. Schaff encouraged Althusser to write an article for a collection of essays Erich Fromm was compiling on "socialist Humanism" as pertaining to Marx's 1*844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, recently rediscovered and published by the Soviet Union. Althusser, however, remained deeply critical of the appropriation of the newly discovered *1844 Manuscripts*, as well as humanist Marxism in general, within the French Communist Party, seeing them as theoretical justifications for Stalinism. To this end he wrote a highly critical article and submitted it to Fromm. As expected, Althusser's piece was rejected and eventually published in a more hospitable Italian communist journal. The article unexpectedly received a response, probably orchestrated by the French Communist Party; Althusser, in turn, responded. The subsequent exchanges, carried out within PCF publications, created a fierce debate within the Party. The controversy created such a stir that the Party

eventually ratified—at the 1966 Central Committee meeting in Argenteuil—a platform declaring humanist Marxism the official party line (Althusser 2003, 222-27).

Althusser recognizes that this "little flap[]" (Althusser 2003, 222) might not have occurred had the conjuncture not "seen" this exchange as relevant. He argues that: "if history is forever bringing little stories into the world, it doesn't love them all: it loves only those that concern it in one way or another" (Althusser 2003, 226). While the fierce debates over humanist Marxism might initially seem the culmination of a quirky chain of happenstance, Althusser instead argues that the production of knowledge is neither purely contingent nor the result of an overarching dialectical process; it is neither accidental nor determined. Instead, the conjuncture shapes which questions are asked, what objects of knowledge are engaged with, and which texts produce important effects. About the humanist controversy he wrote "the sorting out has been done—or, rather, is now under way" (Althusser 2003, 226). The "sorting," however, is driven neither by individual will nor dialectical architecture but is instead structured by the conjuncture within which knowledge is produced.

In another example, Althusser contends that the publishing of *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* served as a political interjection into a particular conjuncture. He saw these texts as part of a struggle within the PCF to encourage the party to abandon its pro-Stalinist, humanist, and economistic assumptions. In *Reading Capital*'s "Note to the English Edition" Althusser writes that these two books should be understood as written within the particular "*conjuncture*" of 1965 and as such should be read as a "theoretico-ideological *intervention* in that conjuncture." Written within this conjuncture, the book's "theoretical limits, lacunae and errors" are shaped by a conjuncture conditioned by the crisis of the French Communist Party and the International Communist movement (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 8).[3]

Furthermore, Althusser recognizes that the conjuncture within which *Reading Capital* was written continues to shape the text. The collection of essays *Reading Capital* was the culmination of a seminar at École Normale Supérieure in 1965 in

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[3] For a description of this conjuncture, Althusser writes: "A consideration of the *recent* elements of this conjuncture reveals that, since Stalin's death, the International Communist movement has lived in a conjuncture dominated by two great events: the critique of the 'cult of personality' by the Twentieth Congress, and the rupture that has occurred between the Chinese Communists Party and the Soviet Communist Party."

which participants read Marx's *Capital* in its entirety. Most treatments of *Capital* in 1965 France, for political reasons of the day, tended to focus on some parts of the text while ignoring others: up until this point "[w]e have read bits of it [*Capital*], the 'fragments' which the conjuncture has 'selected' for us" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 13). The seminar, in contrast, read *Capital* in its entirety, including those parts deemed unfashionable, outmoded, and contradictory. In the introduction, Althusser recognizes that the conjuncture of the seminar remains imprinted on *Reading Capital*: the "following papers…bear the mark of these circumstances: not only in their construction, their rhythm, their didactic or oral style, but also and above all in their discrepancies, the repetitions, hesitations and uncertain steps in their investigations" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 14). It is also important to note that the 1965 seminar was a conjuncture fraught with its own contradictions and tensions that continue to inform the reading of *Reading Capital* today.[4]

Reading

Like writing, reading takes place within a particular structured material conjuncture. The conjuncture within which a text is read, however, often differs from the one in which the text is produced. Recognizing reading and writing as taking place within different structured material conjunctures makes it possible to examine knowledge in terms of production. For example, Althusser argues that Lenin produced a reading of Hegel in which Hegel possesses materialist and "proletarian class view." This reading was only possible because of Lenin's previous engagement with Marx as well as his experiences in the First World War and the 1905 revolution (Althusser 2001b, 76). Althusser argues that this conjuncture enabled Lenin to produce a reading of Hegel superior to many others written up to that point (Althusser 2001b, 71-83).[5]

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[4] Althusser had a fairly public falling out with many of the co-authors of *Reading Capital*. The initial publication of *Reading Capital* included essays from Althusser, Balibar, Rancière, Establet, and Macherey. However, the following three essays were excluded from the 1968 reissued volume. Furthermore, following the protests of May and June 1968, Althusserian theory was the object of numerous attacks, many penned by Althusser's previous students and contributors. One of the fiercest of these attacks was *Althusser's Lesson* written by Rancière, which offered a full renunciation of *Reading Capital* (for more, see: Dosse 1997, Chapter 17).

[5] In "Lenin Before Hegel" Althusser contends that, because he was such a proficient reader of Marx, when Lenin finally turned to Hegel he read it as a "real *work of materialist reading*." His careful study of

Althusser argues that reading a text within the present conjuncture, i.e. a conjuncture different from the one within which it was produced, means that reading is never objective. Instead, reading is always guilty: "there is no such thing as an innocent reading" and therefore "we must say what reading we are guilty of" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 14). Althusser makes this point when he argues that those contributing to *Reading Capital* are guilty of reading *Capital* as philosophers, as opposed to as economists, historians, or philologists. Therefore, as philosophers, they did not "pose *Capital* the question of its economic or historical content, nor of its mere internal 'logic.' We read *Capital* as philosophers, and therefore posed it a different question" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 14). Seeking answers within the problematic of the present conjuncture, in other words, ensures that the reader will always be guilty of asking questions different from those posed by the author. However, instead of seeing the incongruity between the conjuncture of reading and the conjuncture of writing as cause for nihilist relativism and philosophical desperation, Althusser argues that reading with an eye toward the conjuncture enables one to see what the author actually produced yet could not see for themselves.

In the next section I show how Althusser's method of *symptomatic reading* starts from the recognition that the conjuncture within which one read a text differs from the conjuncture in which it was written. Althusser uses this insight to argue that knowledge is produced not in relation to what is visible but rather in relation to what is absent.

Before moving on, it should be noted that understanding knowledge as produced within a conjuncture is not the same as situating a text within the historical context in which it was written (cf. Skinner 1988).[6] Such methods of textual

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Marx allowed him to reject "a mass of propositions and theses which nothing can be done" and focus instead on "the retention of certain well-chosen fruits and vegetables" (Althusser 2001b, 77). While today Lenin's reading of Hegel might not be considered one of the best, an Althusserian analysis would evaluate this reassessment in relation to the contemporary conjuncture (i.e. a rise of a highly professionalized academic theory divorced from party politics, the end of 1960s radicalism that involved strategic debates between Leninists and Maoists, etc.).

[6] Skinner argues against two orthodoxies in textual interpretation: 1) that classical texts are the product of the context within which they were written and therefore should to be interpreted has historical documents or 2) that such texts are autonomous and, as such, "the *text* itself" is the key to its "own meaning" (Skinner 1988, 29). Instead, he argues that the classical texts that last do so because they challenged the conventions of the time. Therefore, in order to get at their meaning one must

interpretation maintain a fidelity to the notion that a text has an essential meaning discovered by arranging evidence contained within it (and contemporary texts) for the purpose of uncovering what the author *really* meant. This approach fails to recognize the structural differences between the conjuncture within which a text is written and the conjuncture within which it is read. In other words, interpreting a text through its historical context assumes the possibility of retrieving a text's meaning without accounting for the fact that such "retrievals" of meaning always occur within the present conjuncture structured by its own problematics.[7] Furthermore, historicizing a text does not attend to a text's absences but instead assumes that the true meaning of a text can be found by seeing what is present in the historical record. In short, interpretive traditions that fix a text's original meaning through historical contextualization fail to understand knowledge in terms of social production, treating knowledge instead as the work of autonomous actors informed by knowable social relation.

SYMPTOMATIC READING

A symptomatic reading starts from the assumption that knowledge is produced within overlapping and often conflictual social relations and that the conjuncture's tensions and fissures, desires, and structured limitations remain in the text as "absences, lucanae, and silences" that constitute the text's "deeper more significant meaning" (Smith 1984, 75). However, instead of treating absences as deficiencies to be filled in with additional research, a symptomatic reading asks: "What do these absences tell us about what knowledge is *actually* being produced?"

Althusser develops his method of symptomatic reading through a careful analysis of Marx's reading of the classical political economists David Ricardo and Adam Smith. Althusser argues that, at first blush, it appears that Marx reads these authors primarily to "*situate* himself with respect to the acknowledged masters of

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identify the conventions of the time by comparing the text against similar texts from the same period, examine the author's intentions in challenging these conventions and then explaining how these texts helped transform the beliefs of the time (Skinner 1988; see also: Tully 1988).

[7] For example, Femia critiques Skinner's proposition that "texts must not be regarded as vehicles for the exercise of the analyst's own preoccupations." Femia argues instead that "all history is 'contemporary history', dictated by the interests of the historian; study of the past is valuable only in so far as it throws light on present problems or needs" (1988, 157-8)

Political Economy" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 18). However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that Marx's reading style is "a rather special one" namely that it is a "double reading" and "involves two radically different reading principles" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 18). In the first reading, Marx highlights what Ricardo and Smith see and what they do not see. He appropriates those arguments of theirs that serve his purpose, rejects those which do not, and draws attention to the "lacunae", "omissions", "absences," and "oversights" (Althusser 1999, 18-19; emphasis removed). Marx also points out that which is "perfectly visible" but which Ricardo and Smith fail to notice, using these omissions as starting points from which to launch a critique (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 19). This reading, however, only operates at the level of "the mirror myth of knowledge" meaning that it assumes that knowledge works to ensure that "vision" is restored to "a given object or the reading of an established text" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 19). In other words, this first reading concerns itself exclusively with seeing better what *already exists*. That which is absent, i.e. an already existing object, needs to be discovered so scholars can flesh out their representations of an already existing "real" world. In the social sciences this first reading takes the form of a cumulative understanding of knowledge in which scholars identify "gaps in the literature" as the departure point for their own research.

Marx, however, is not content with just offering a first reading. If he did, Althusser argued, he would have offered little more than "Smith minus the myopia" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 19). Instead Marx offers a second, or symptomatic, reading as well. Marx's second reading is not about rendering the invisible visible but instead identifying that which has been produced. Using an extended quote pulled from Marx's reading of the classical economists, Althusser illustrates how Marx's second reading identifies how Smith and Ricardo actually *produce* the concept of labor-power. They produce this concept, however, without recognizing it because they failed to ask the right questions, i.e. they were concerned with the questions provided by their particular conjuncture. They were asking "What is the value of labor?" not "What is the value of labor-power?" As a consequence, they remained unaware that they had actually *produced* an object of knowledge: labor-power. Althusser contents that "Classical political economy has 'produced'…a correct

answer," namely the formula that "the value of 'labour' is equal to the value of the subsistence goods necessary for the reproduction of 'labour.'" When Marx reads this sentence he sees the "omission"—which can be written as "the value of labour ( ) is equal to the value of the subsistence goods necessary for the maintenance and reproduction of labour ( )." It is only by (quoting Marx) "a complete change in the terms of the problem," by asking a new question—i.e. "what is the value of labour power?"—that Marx identifies what Ricardo and Smith already invented, i.e. the labor theory of value. "The value of labour-power is equal to the value of the subsistence goods necessary for the maintenance and reproduction of labour-power" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 22-23; emphasis deleted).

Marx's second reading, therefore, is not about making visible what which already exists (yet remains invisible) but instead identifying those moments when an author produces a new concept without recognizing what they are producing. In the case of Marx's reading of Ricardo and Smith: "what classical political economy does not see, is not what it does not see, it is *what it sees*; it is not what it lacks, on the contrary, it is *what it does not lack*; it is not what it misses, on the contrary it is *what it does not miss*" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 21). Althusser argues that what "political economy does not see is not a pre-existing object which it could have seen but did not see—but an object which is produced itself in its operation of knowledge and which did not pre-exist" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 24). The *object of knowledge*—labor-power—was produced by Ricardo and Smith yet only discovered by Marx decades later.

Althusser, however, does not argue that Smith and Ricardo failed to see the object they had produced (i.e. labor-power) not because they were deficient. Instead, they were unable to see it because they were concerned with the old questions—i.e. the old "*horizon*" on which the "new problem '*is not visible*'" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 24). This analysis stems from the fact that what is visible and invisible are such because the horizons of possibility are themselves "structural conditions" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 25). Just as Smith and Ricardo failed to see their invention because of the conjuncture in which they wrote, Marx *discovered* their invention precisely because he was reading within a different conjuncture; a conjuncture marked by a more advanced industrial capitalism, the completed enclosure of the commons and a

greatly expanded wage economy. This conjuncture produced a fundamentally different problematic, one that enabled Marx to see what Ricardo and Smith had actually produced.

In this way, Althusser argues that the assumed relation between reading and vision, between reading and an observable world "out there," is incomplete because reading and writing are both fundamentally acts of production (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 24). Just as one conjuncture creates the conditions for asking some questions, a different conjuncture makes it possible to ask different questions and see different objects. In this way, a new object of knowledge (such a "labor-power" or "the global") does not emerge "among other, already identified objects, like an unexpected guest at a family reunion" but instead is produced when a new problematic emerges from the restructuring of the conjuncture, thereby transforming "the *entire* terrain and its *entire* horizon, which are the background against which the new problem is produced" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 24).

Furthermore, reading with an eye toward the present conjuncture allows one to identify that which the author actually produced. For example, Althusser argues that only after Freud, Levi-Strauss, and Lacan is it possible to read Marx using Marx's own method of reading, a method unavailable even to Marx because of the conjuncture in which he lived. Marx's conjuncture "did not provide him, and he could not acquire in his lifetime, an adequate concept with which to think what he produced: *the concept of the effectivity of a structure on its elements*" (Althusser and Balibar 1999, 29).

To show fidelity to Althusser's work one should *read Althusser as Althusser reads Marx*—to situate one's guilty reading of Althusser within the present conjuncture. Doing so requires us to identify the absences within Althusser's own texts while asking questions drawn from the present problematic. Reading Althusser within the conjuncture of the 21st century neoliberal American university, for example, means reading a different Althusser than the one read by his contemporaries immersed in the debates over humanist Marxism and the crises within the French Communist Party and the international workers movement. I argue in Appendix III that reading Althusser within the conjuncture of the capitalist

university allows one to see what Althusser produced without knowing: a method for conducting an immanent social science.

A Symptomatic Reading of the Globalization Literature

Justin Rosenberg argues that the globalization literature comes out of a conjuncture defined by the "collapse of the Soviet Union," accompanied by the "rapid restructuring of the international system," and shaped by the "crisis of Keynesianism and Bretton Woods" (Rosenberg 2005, 64). These events, he argues, unleashed a wave of "speculative and transnational capital" that washed over the former communist countries like a gorged river spreading over a "flood-plain." This "conjunction" resulted in the "frenzied expansions, integrations, realignments and transformations that gave the period its overwhelming theme of spatial change" (Rosenberg 2005, 64). This vision of globalization generated in the 1990s under the banner Globalization Theory, Rosenberg argues, is in recession because the "new conjuncture" means that the concept of globalization "no longer provide[s] an ideologically plausible guide" to contemporary issues (Rosenberg 2005, 63).[8]

At the core of Rosenberg's argument, however, is the claim that the conjuncture of the 1990s produced an irrational exuberance and an errant portrayal of the world. Globalization Theory, in other words, does not represent the world as it *really* is. Rosenberg argues that as scholars begin sobering up—and conditions on the ground change—a new concept of the world is emerging that breaks with the image offered by 1990s Globalization Theory. Rosenberg argues that, in light of current developments, the "*concept* of 'globalization'" must undergo a "historical post mortem" that involves "an *empirical* reassessment of the 1990s," which can not only

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[8] In other words, Rosenberg believes that the conjuncture of the 1990s created a certain understanding of globalization that is now defunct. My argument, however, is that this conjuncture actually produced a more enduring object of knowledge, i.e. "the global," of which "globalization" is just one manifestation. Rosenberg similarly believes that, while Globalization Theory is currently waning, the "intellectual and institutional investment" in globalization makes it unlikely that we will see "a sudden disappearance of 'globalization studies,' whose expansion may even now be continuing." Instead, "this expansion will increasingly go along with an inner retreat from the forward position of the argument: claims to explain the course of world politics will gradually give way to the thick descriptions of empirical specialization" (Rosenberg 2005, 66). In short, while the particular way of theorizing globalization developed in the 1990s might be in retreat, for various institutional reasons, the study of "the global" has not abated.

explain "what was actually going on in this period" but also why "'globalization' became the craze that it did" (Rosenberg 2005, 5; emphasis in original).

A symptomatic reading, however, would object to Rosenberg's distinction between "real" representations of globalization and those conceptions of globalization drawn from misguided exuberance. In a symptomatic reading, what Rosenberg calls Globalization Theory is neither true nor false but instead produced *and* productive of effects. Furthermore, the academic literature on globalization does not only produce buzzwords and overly optimistic caricatures of the post-Cold War world, but, more interestingly, produces an object of knowledge: globalization. Therefore, instead of asking Rosenberg's question: "Why did scholars misrepresent globalization during the 1990s?" this dissertation asks: "What is absent within the globalization literature and what does this absence tell us about what the literature actually produces?"

Therefore, instead of offering "an *empirical* reassessment of the 1990s," this symptomatic reading of the globalization literature looks for the absence of Africa in the globalization literature. Furthermore, it is only possible to see "the global" in relation to the absence of Africa because Rosenberg is correct when he contends that the conjuncture has changed dramatically since the 1990s. As the optimistic accounts of globalization that consumed the debates of the 1990s now appear outmoded and trivial, scholars should approach this now vast literature on globalization not as an academic mistake or passing fad but instead as productive of an object of knowledge—"the global"—that continues to overdetermine the way the world is imagined. The absence of Africa within the academic literature on globalization, therefore, is not an oversight but instead symptomatic of that which the academic literature actually produces, namely the world imagined as an empirically knowable and integrated whole: a planar social space without contradiction (only manageable disagreements).

APPENDIX III:
SITUATING ALTHUSSER'S SCIENCE WITHIN THE CONJUNCTURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY UNIVERSITY

In 1970 Louis Althusser published his most well known essay, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus," in the French journal *La Pensée*. This essay was published two years after the events of May and June 1968, when students occupied universities across France and around the world. The events of May 1968 also deepened the dissatisfaction with the French Communist Party (PCF) among students and academic faculty, as intellectuals abandoned the party protesting its continued pro-Stalinist stance and its active role undermining what many saw as a radical—if unorthodox—revolution. In this context, Althusser's essay on the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) can be read as a philosophical rethinking of the political and intellectual crisis on the French Left.

This essay can also be read as Althusser's closest attempt at laying out a method for applying his theoretical argument to explain worldly phenomena. Subtitled "Notes Towards an Investigation," this essay identifies specific sites—"the religious ISA," "the family ISA," "the trade union ISA," "the educational ISA," etc. (Althusser 2001a, 96)—as sites in which subjects come to be interpolated in ideology. In this essay Althusser argues that "the School" plays an important ideological role in contemporary life, replacing the Church as the "dominant Ideological State Apparatus" and, therefore, playing "a determinant part in the reproduction of the relations of production" (Althusser 2001a, 106). However, when Althusser refers to "the education ISA" he refers to primary, secondary, and post-secondary professional education.[1] Despite being only two years after the events of May 1968,

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[1] In describing the ISA of "the School" Althusser writes: "It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most 'vulnerable', squeezed between the family State apparatus and the educational State apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of 'know-how' wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology of its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children is ejected 'into production': these are the workers or small peasants. Another portion of scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better or worse, it goes somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the post of small and middle technicians, white-collar workers, small and middle executive, petty bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit, either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to provide, as well as the 'intellectuals of the collective labourer,' the agents of exploitation (capitalist, managers), the agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians,

Althusser does not explicitly include university education as part of the ISA he calls "the School."

This oversight is consistent with Althusser's rather rarified view of academic knowledge. While he sees the Party as a site for the ideological war of philosophy to take place, the academy is a site for conducting "scientific" inquiry. This transcendent view of academic knowledge, I argue, foregrounds much of Althusser's distinction between ideology and science. This transcendent view of academic work, however, is unsustainable in the current conjuncture, a moment marked by a structural shift towards the intensification of marketized, privatized, and commercial regimes of neoliberal higher education. I argue that *the academy*—like "the School" in Althusser's account—should be re-thought as an important site for the reproduction of the means of production; that is, as a site for the production of various imaginaries that explain the "*relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence*" (Althusser 2001a, 150). Reading Althusser within the present conjuncture therefore problematizes Althusser's distinction between philosophy and science, thereby challenging his reliance on a transcendent notion of science. I argue that reading Althusser within the present conjuncture, however, makes it possible to identify what Althusser actually produced but remained recognizable within the conjuncture in which he was working, namely *an immanent social science.*

In this appendix I argue that by *reading Althusser as Althusser reads Marx* it becomes possible to see in Althusser's writing that he produces a new object. While Althusser believe that he was simply recording what Marx had already produced—namely a "Marxist science"—he fails to see what he produced himself: a "Marxist (social) science." I first explain Althusser's distinction between *Marxism as a philosophy* and *Marxism as a science.* I then illustrate how Althusser's invocation of Marxism as a science needs to be read within the highly partisan conjuncture of the French Left during the 1960s as a political intervention—i.e. an act of philosophy—targeting the intellectual foundation of the French Communist Party (PCF). I conclude this appendix by laying out the components of an immanent social science and explain how this approach results in a different approach to studying globalization.

administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests of all sorts, most of whom are convinced 'laymen')" (Althusser 2001a, 105). The absence from this list of professors and students at France's elite universities indicates they are also part of the ideological apparatus of "the School."

MARXISM AS A PHILOSOPHY, MARXISM AS A SCIENCE

Much of Althusser's writing prior to May 1968—including *For Marx*, *Reading Capital*, and the influential essay "Lenin and Philosophy" (presented to the Société Française de Philosophie in February 1968)—draws on a distinction between Marxist philosophy and Marxist science. In these texts Althusser argues that Marxist science, i.e. dialectical materialism, foregrounds Marxist philosophy by opening history to scientific investigation. In contrast, Marxist philosophy, i.e. dialectical materialism, follows the development of the sciences and serves to "clarify the science of history" (Lewis 2005, 460).[2] In other words, the development of a Marxist science created an epistemic break that opened up the possibility for a Marxist philosophy. Althusser sees himself as engaged in a Marxist philosophy, i.e. the political production of ideas designed to convince people of the validity of the science. In this way, Althusser sees himself as fleshing out those aspects of Marx's science already present in Marx but yet underdeveloped (and therefore misunderstood):

> As Althusser tells the story, Marx while writing *Capital* was too involved in scientific research to do anything but hint at the philosophy that underlay it…Althusser's contention is that such a thing can be teased out of *Capital* with a reading sufficiently attuned to its problematic—to the author's intent, to the conditions of the book's production, and the prejudices of the reader. (Lewis 2005, 460)

For example, while Marx does not include an analysis of how to think "structural causality" or "overdetermination," a Marxist philosophy finds these philosophical concepts "latent in Marx's texts" (Lewis 2005, 461).

Althusser argues that prior to 1845 Marx was not a scientific thinker, owing to his commitment to the idealist thought of Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians. However, the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach—"the philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it"—demarks an *epistemic break* in Marx's thinking, which separates Early Marx from Mature Marx. Althusser situates this break very precisely: in 1845, a year after the writing of the *1844 Manuscripts* and corresponding with his first intellectual rejection of Feuerbach, which enabled him

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[2] In general, the birth of a science brings about the possibility for a philosophy to eventually emerge: if "philosophy is to be born, one or more sciences must exist" (Althusser 2001b, 23). This assertion is attested to by the fact that Platonic philosophy emerged only after the first continent of science (mathematics) was opened by the Greeks and, similarly, Kantian philosophy only emerged after the development of Newtonian physics (Althusser 2001b, 24).

engage for the first time in a systemic critique of Hegel not influenced by humanism or German idealism (Althusser 1970, 37). A Marxist science, finding its first systematic expression in *The German Ideology*, comes to fruition in *Capital* where Marx opens up "to scientific knowledge a new, third scientific continent, the continent of History" (Althusser 2001b, 23). It is here that Marx fully explains the scientific study of history; it is here where history takes its object, namely "the social structure as a whole, its contradictions and its history" (Lewis 2005, 462).

Marxist science, in taking the social whole as its object, is therefore able to "discover knowledge of the real" and therefore distinguish the difference between "a 'real relation' and an 'imaginary' or 'lived' relationship between ourselves and the world" (Lewis 2005, 464). However, because a science of the social whole can only operate at the level of the conceptual (the social whole being beyond empiricist representation), philosophy is necessary "to distinguish for science which of its concepts are ideological and to make sure that a science's results are not perverted in their reception" (Lewis 2005, 464). Because the social whole—or mode of production—is overdetermined by class struggle, Marxist philosophy must wage an ideological war at the level of knowledge in order to prevent the science of history from being obfuscated by ideology. Althusser argues that Marx, Engels, Lenin, the "young Lukacs," and Gramsci all failed to create a philosophy of history because "the times were not ripe, the dusk had not yet fallen" (Althusser 2001b, 25). Lenin comes the closest to developing a philosophy of history but, because of the demands of his politics, was unable to dedicate himself to its writing.

Developing a Marxist philosophy, however, is vitally important for Althusser because it enables knowledge to be produced for the purpose of revolutionary, i.e. class struggle. Developing a Marxist philosophy, in other words, enables "certain intellectuals to escape the constraints that dominate the mass of intellectuals" and instead "adhere to a materialist philosophy and a revolutionary theory" (Althusser 2001b, 43). Class struggle exists independent of whether scholars engage in it. What Marxist philosophy does, however, is bring intellectual production to the struggle and in ways that it can be used by the working class: "Marxism is not a (new) philosophy of praxis, but a (new) practice of philosophy"; a "(new) practice of philosophy" that cannot transform the world but can "assist in the transformation of

the world. Assist only, for it is not theoreticians, scientists or philosophers, nor is it 'men', who make history – but the 'masses', i.e. the classes allied in a single class struggle" (Althusser 2001b, 41-42).

The insistence that only "the masses" make history—a claim he returns to even after rethinking the science/philosophy distinction (Althusser 1976)—helps explain why Althusser engaged the PCF rather than flee it (as was common among his intellectual peers). Althusser, in other words, recognizes that the production of knowledge—even potentially very radical knowledge—is meaningless if divorced from class struggle. Individuals teaching a class or writing articles, even if motivated by Leftist politics, cannot produce knowledge with significant effects unless this knowledge occurs within the context of *a party* (or some other mass political organization); knowledge alone cannot pose a class challenge to the relations of production.

This realization makes it even more puzzling why Althusser does not provide a more severe critique of university knowledge production in his critique of "the School" as an ideological apparatus. This oversight occurs because Althusser's treatment of Marxism as a science—i.e. that which is outside ideology and serves as the foundation for Marxist philosophy—originates outside "the party"—that is, outside ideological struggle. In other words, Althusser's distinction between Marxist science and philosophy is maintained by a distinction between the University (as the site for scientific study) and the Party (as the site for ideological struggle). This dichotomy explains Althusser's hostility toward the events of May 1968, which he saw as bringing politics into an institution that should be reserved for "scientific" inquiry.

The distinction between Marxist science and Marxist philosophy is problematic for many reasons. Furthermore, the identification of an "epistemic break" in Marx's work is one of Althusser's most controversial theoretical moves and a common starting point for critics seeking to dismiss his theoretical contributions (for example: Thompson 1995).[3] However, in the next section, I argue that Althusser's distinction between Marxist science and Marxist philosophy should not

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[3] In "Lenin and Philosophy" Althusser even recognizes that Marx's earlier work is not necessary to engage with, "a concession which some people find difficult to accept, despite the force of the arguments I have put forward" (Althusser 2001b, 20).

simply be read as Althusser asks us to read it—i.e. as a surface-level distinction between "ideology" and "real relations"—but rather as an ideological intervention into the debates within the PCF. In other words, the insistence of a distinction between Young and Mature Marx—and therefore between ideology and science— can be read as a weapon wielded by Althusser, at the level of philosophy, to encourage the Party to abandon its Stalinist and humanist trajectory. Reading Althusser within the present conjuncture, i.e. to *read Althusser as Althusser reads Marx*, not only makes it possible to see past the ideology/science debate but also makes it possible to see what Althusser actually produces: a Marxist (social) science. That is, Althusser produces a way of studying knowledge as a phenomenon in the world immanent to the social whole. A Marxist (social) science, in other words, is a science of analyzing how "a vast accumulation of 'contradictions' come[] into play *in the same court*" (Althusser 1970, 100) while actively producing new imaginaries that intervene into (and take advantage of) these contradictions.

RE-READING ALTHUSSER WITHIN THE PRESENT CONJUNCTURE

To *read Althusser as Althusser reads Marx* involves taking seriously the ways in which Althusser's writing was produced within the limits of a particular conjuncture and that, within the present conjuncture, it becomes possible to see what Althusser actually produced. The concept of the epistemic break, which justifies the claim that the Mature Marx developed a science of history, should be read as structured by the highly partisan debates within the French Communist Party. Drawing a sharp distinction between Young and Mature Marx—and therefore between *The 1884 Manuscripts* used by the Stalinists in the PCF and *Capital* used by Althusser and his colleagues—was a political intervention that offered Althusser considerable political advantage. This advantage, however, has become a liability for Althusserian theory as contemporary critics identify Althusser's distinction between Young and Mature Marx—and therefore between Marxist science and Marxist philosophy—as indicative of "philosophical determinism" (Smith 1984, 22-23; see also Thompson 1995). This stance put Althusser at odds with the intellectually dominant New Left as well as the academic social sciences who have critiqued "structural" arguments, favoring instead micro-level analyses or "agent"-centric analyses.

A reading of Althusser posits an all-determining "structure" existing *out there* beyond "agents" relies upon a reading of Althusser at the surface level. It is notable that few, if any, of Althusser's critics situate his philosophical arguments within the conjuncture in which they were written, namely ideological struggles within the French Communist Party (PCF) and the International Workers Movement (Althusser 1976; Morfino 2005).[4] This absence is important given that Althusser explicitly saw his writing as an intervention into the PCF. During the time in which Althusser was writing the PCF had a very limited theoretical understanding of Marxist theory due to the strengths of "intellectual competitors" including Blanqui's Jacobinism and Proudhon's syndicalism, which "dominated the French worker's movement" throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Poster 1975, 36). Therefore, when Marxist theory arrived in France during the early 1930s it was already closely aligned with the Communist party, which insisted that the "primary task of Marxist intellectuals was to defend the Soviet Union, to twist Marxism into a theory that explained Soviet society and demonstrated its superiority over capitalism" (Poster 1975, 37-38). As such, at its very inception, French Marxist philosophy was severely "hamstrung by the philosophical pretensions of Stalin" who imposed the *diamat* reading of Marxism; Marxism was considered to be "a finished philosophy…consisting of seven thesis, three principles and four traits" (Poster 1975, 39). Communist philosophers and theorists "were encouraged simply to repeat and apply these 'truths'" (Poster 1975, 39). The PCF excelled at this task well into the 1960s.

In 1937 Marx's earlier writings—including the *1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, *The Holy Family*, *The German Ideology*, and *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*—were published in France, shortly after their discovery and initial release in the Soviet Union (Poster 1975, 42). These new writings created avenues for intellectuals within the PCF to question and expand upon Soviet Marxist dogma, specifically for

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[4] Very few critiques of Althusserian theory address the conjuncture within which Althusser was writing. For example, one of the most scathing critiques of Althusser, E. P. Thompson's book-long polemic *The Poverty of Theory*, accuses Althusser of being a Stalinist. However, nowhere "does Thompson examine Althusser's relationship to the French Communist Party (PCF), of which Althusser had been a member since 1948. Nor does Thompson take sufficient account of Althusser's various political utterances. Had he done so, he would have seen that it is precisely the massive edifice of Stalinism with its 'contagious and implacable system of government and thought' that Althusser takes himself to be writing against" (Smith 1984, 21).

the purpose of developing a theory of the subject within capitalist society (a question becoming increasingly studied due to the popularity of both Sartrean existentialism and Lacanian psychoanalysis). During the late-1950s and early-1960s the French Communist Party began to officially reorient itself away from a *diamat* understanding of Marxism to a philosophical orientation drawn heavily from Marx's early work. For example, the concept of species-being made it possible to argue that man needed "merely…re-grasp…his own essence alienated in property, religion and the State" thereby becoming once again "total man, true man" (Althusser 1970, 226). This trend toward humanist Marxism, Althusser argued, served as an apology for Stalinism and allowed the PCF to argue that the gulags were a small price to pay for returning man to his true essence through the eradication of private property, religion, and the state. Once the task begun by the Soviet Union was completed, the PCF argued, humans would be fully liberated. Althusser rightly saw this humanist Marxism as a perverted form of "economism, evolutionism, voluntarism, humanism, empiricism, dogmatism, etc." (Althusser 2001b, 26) which is not only philosophically untenable but also politically corrupt.

Althusser did not only critique the PCF from a distance. His whole outpouring of work during the mid-1960s can be read as an attempt to rally the PCF to the "left-wing anti-Stalinist positions" (Goshgarian 2003, xxx). He engaged in this project by adopting "philosophy's historical task" of creating "the transformation of ideology; to transform ideology, it had to reform the Party's understanding, translating philosophy into politics by tutoring the modern Prince" (Goshgarian 2003, xxxii). To this end, Althusser formally and informally recruited students as well as "organic" intellectuals, skirmished in the Party's official journals and, in collaboration with his students, established the School for Theoretical Formation, the journal *Cahiers Marxistes-léninistes,* and published *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* to disseminate his anti-Stalinist Marxism (Goshgarian 2003. xxxii-iii). Althusser's introduction to *For Marx*—significantly entitled "Today"—recognizes that the selected essays "were born of some conjuncture…they are witnesses to the unique experience which all the philosophers of my generation who tried to think with Marx had to live: the *investigation* of Marx's *philosophical* thoughts, indispensable if we were to escape from the theoretical impasse in which history has put it" (Althusser 1970,

21). Furthermore, he selected these particular essays for inclusion in *For Marx* because "the end of Stalinist dogmatism has not completely dissipated them as mere circumstantial reflexes; *they are still our problems*" (Althusser 1970, 30).

This relationship between the Althusser and the Party—and the way it informs the knowledge Althusser produces—is the major thing that distinguishes Althusser from many of his critics. For example,

> Whereas [E. P.] Thompson took his distance from Stalinism in politics by moving away from the politics of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Althusser it was precisely in his defense of the thesis that "class struggle is the motor of history" and the related concept of "class dictatorship" that he broke with Stalinism in philosophy…Althusser adopted and then radicalized a new practice of philosophy that emphasizes mass struggle against the state. (McInerney 2005, 3)

In this way, Althusser's distinction between Marxist philosophy and Marxist science should not be read as a timeless philosophical maxim but needs to be situated within the conjuncture in which it was produced.

As the conjuncture changes, texts and arguments get judged by the standards of the present. Over the past few decades, Althusser has been judged harshly for his distinction between Young and Mature Marx. However, during the time in which he was writing his intervention was profoundly successful, "encourag[ing] real discussion and soul-searching…in the mid-1960s" and challenged a still "very much Stalinized French Communist party" (Lewis 2005, 462). The political influence of Althusser's argument can be seen by that fact that "[f]or the first time since the Popular Front, real debates about issues of dogmatism and humanism as well as about communism's relationship to the broader Left were taken up by the Communist party, and at the highest levels" (Lewis 2005, 462). However, it is not enough to discard Althusser, as many have done, because his distinction between Marxist science and Marxism philosophy is either philosophically wrong or historically outmoded. Instead, it is important to take seriously the reasons why Althusser remained committed to struggling within the Party and read his texts as inflected by these struggles. In other words, what might be read as a theoretical *error* can be re-read as a part of an ideological struggle within the PCF. Just as Althusser read Marx to "to produce concepts in light of the [political] demands of the present" (Read 2003, 13), it is possible to read Althusser in the same manner. Read in this way, it is possible to see what Althusser produced; namely, an *immanent social science* in

which knowledge proceeds from the assumption that knowledge itself is always produced within class antagonisms.

In 1974 Althusser began re-thinking his distinction between Marxist philosophy and science. John Lewis, a British author and communist, wrote an extensive critique of *For Marx* and *Reading Capital*. Althusser responded with the argument that these two texts came out of a conjuncture very different from the present. This response is one of the clearest examples of Althusser's approach to knowledge production and deserves to be quoted at length:

> A good deal of water has flowed under the bridge of history since 1960. The Workers" Movement has lived though many important events: the heroic and victorious resistance of the Vietnamese people against the most powerful imperialism in the world; the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China (1966-69); the greatest workers' strike in world history (ten million workers on strike for a month) in May 1968 in France—a strike which was "preceded" and "accompanied" by a deep ideological revolt among French students and petty-bourgeois intellectuals; the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact; the war in Ireland, etc….Lenin used to say: the criterion of practice is only really valid if it bears on a "process" which is of some length. With the help of the "practical text" of the twelve, ten or even seven years which have passed since the original articles were written, one can look back and see more clearly whether one was right or wrong…John Lewis, in his article, never for one moment talks about this political history of the Workers' Movement. In *For Marx*—that is, in 1965—I was already writing about Stalin, about the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, and about the split in the International Communist Movement. John Lewis, on the other hand, writes as if Stalin had never existed, as if the Twentieth Congress and the split in the International Communist Movement had never occurred, as if May 1968 had never taken place, nor the occupation of Czechoslovakia, nor the war in Ireland. John Lewis is a pure spirit; he prefers not to talk about such concrete things as politics.
>
> When he talks about philosophy, he talks about philosophy. Just that. Full stop. It has to be said that this is precisely what the majority of so-called philosophy teachers do in our bourgeois society. The last thing they want to talk about is politics! They would rather talk about philosophy. Full stop…For *all* the great philosophers in history, since the time of Plato, even the great bourgeois philosophers—not only the materialists but even idealists like Hegel—have talked about politics. They more or less recognized that to do philosophy was to do politics in the field of theory. And they had the courage to do their politics openly, *to talk about politics.* (Althusser 1976, 36-37)

Just as Althusser originally recognized that *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* were written in a particular conjuncture, so too does he recognize that their weaknesses can be seen within the contemporary conjuncture.

For Althusser, the new conjuncture revealed an important mistake in Althusser's earlier thinking, i.e. the distinction between science and ideology, which he recognized as falsely positioning "Marxist science in the role of truth" (Dosse 1997, 180). In *Essays on Self Criticism* he acknowledges that *For Marx* and *Reading*

Capital both suffer from "an erroneous tendency" which he called "*theoreticism*"—i.e. the contention that the break in Marx's thinking occurred when Marx changed ideas, not as responses to changes in the conjuncture (Althusser 1976, 106). Althusser recognizes that he made this crucial mistake largely because these texts were written at a time in which

> to defend Marxism against the real dangers of *bourgeois* ideology…[required] stress[ing] its revolutionary new character; it was therefore necessary to 'prove' that there is an antagonism between Marxism and bourgeois ideology, that Marxism could not have developed in Marx or in the labour movement except given a radical and unremitting *break* with bourgeois ideology, an unceasing struggle against the assaults of this ideology. This thesis was correct. It still is correct. (Althusser 1976, 106)

Althusser insists, therefore, that while critics rightly argue that "the break" was a philosophical mistake, this does not discount the fact that Marx produced "something new and unprecedented…something which will never disappear" (Althusser 1976, 108).[5]

The point in reading Althusser, however, is not to establish what Marx *actually* produced but to find what Althusser produces. While Althusser's texts (on the surface level) reads as a description of an impenetrable, all-determining structure, a secondary reading situates this text within the conjuncture in which they were produced—a conjuncture foreign to the present and in which Althusser was engaged as a political actor at the level of philosophy. This reading makes it possible to avoid asking: Did Marx *actually* produced a "Marxist science"? And instead see what Althusser actually produced, namely a *Marxists (social) science*. Reading Althusser within the present conjuncture—a world in which the university itself is besieged by neoliberal capital such that it is undeniably an "ideological apparatus"—makes it possible to see past the science/ideology distinction. Instead of holding out the illusion of an "objective" and non-ideological social science, Althusser produces an example of how science can be used in ideological struggle at the level of knowledge production. This is a new, radical way of studying the social production of

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[5]Althusser argues that among the concepts that appear in the *German Ideology* are: "mode of production, relations of production, productive forces, social classes rooted in the unity of the productive forces and relations of production, ruling class/oppressed class, ruling ideology/oppressed ideology, class struggle, etc." These concepts can be compared with the concepts presented in the *1844 Manuscripts* including "Human Essence/Alienation/Alienated Labour" (Althusser 1976, 109-110).

knowledge—a discovery vitally important for those living and working in the contemporary academy and who, as knowledge-producers, seek to engage the structures of knowledge production.

A Marxist social science recognizes that the production of social scientific knowledge is always engaged in political struggle. In this way, there are no "real conditions" out there to be studied objectively and documented as "reality." This assertion does not mean that very real structured material relations do not exist. However, a Marxist social science studies these relations in order to intervene upon them. I briefly explore the outlines of a Marxists social science in the rest of this appendix. While I used this method in my study of the genocide in Rwanda as re-read through the coffee economy (Kamola 2007), I recognize that this sketch still remains preliminary and in need of being fleshed out in more detail. At any rate, what follows could be treated as simply "notes towards an investigation."

Toward A Marxist (Social) Science

The closest Althusser comes to deploying his theoretical apparatus to explain a worldly phenomena is his discussion in "Contradiction and Overdetermination" of the Russian Revolution (Althusser 1970, 94-99; see also Appendix I, p.208-9). Drawing on this and other features of Althusser's work, I briefly lay out a method of studying the *social whole* (see Chapter 3, p. 100-103) in a way that recognizes that: 1) the social whole is composed of overdetermined contradictions which, while structured, play out in particular ways within particular conjunctures and 2) that knowledge of how the social whole is manifest within a particular conjuncture is *itself structured by the conjuncture in which knowledge is produced.*

The production of social scientific knowledge that takes seriously the assumption of overdetermination (Appendix I) requires avoiding mechanical or transitively causal explanations and instead starts from the *concept* of the social whole. Starting from this concept, social scientific knowledge focuses on fleshing out the contradictory social relations that structure a particular conjuncture. The goal, therefore, is not to provide a causal story but instead present the world as composed of multiple contradictory registers that are constantly being produced and reproduced. Starting with the concept of the social whole (rather than with discrete

objects existing in linearly causal relationships) makes it possible to represent the world as constantly being reproduced within structured material relations. In this way, one can never *know* the social whole. Rather, by exploring the overlaying and contradictory regions within a particular conjuncture, one can provide fleeting glimpses into how the social whole is structured, recognizing that these glimpses are themselves produced within the social whole.

Producing knowledge that attempts to study the manifestation of the social whole within a particular conjuncture requires holding in tension what Althusser calls, the "two ends of the chain." On the one hand, the social whole is both structured—with the economy being "*determination in the last instance*" (Althusser 1970, 111). However, the "lonely hour of the 'last instance' never comes" (Althusser 1970, 111) because, on the other hand, the superstructure is semi-autonomous and expresses its own effectively. This statement means that individuals, ideas, states, organizations, and economic forces can all overdetermine each other in different ways and at different moments, producing an effect without cause.

Althusser uses the language of "registers" to explain the various aspects of the superstructure (the state, ideology, etc.). In using Althusser to describe worldly phenomena, I draw on his examination of the Russian Revolution and his claim that "History 'asserts itself' through the multiform world of the superstructures, from local traditions to international circumstances" (Althusser 1970, 112) to offer a broader understanding of registers. As such, I identify various "local traditions" and "international circumstance" (i.e. philanthropic funding, the World Bank, study abroad infrastructures, etc.) as intersecting within particular conjunctures to bring about the structural transformation (i.e. the re-making of the U.S. and South African academies). It should be emphasized, however, that my argument about the restructuring of the South African and U.S. academies is not an argument about the structural transformation of the social whole as such but rather how the transformation of the social whole plays out within a particular conjuncture.

The study of the social whole in terms of overdetermined contradiction, therefore, requires identifying the registers that intersect in a given conjuncture. Structural change happens when "a vast accumulation of 'contradictions' come[] into play *in the same court*" (Althusser 1970, 100). This *ruptural unity* becomes a

phenomenon that social scientists attempt to explain. Therefore, the Russian Revolution (for Althusser) and the shift to "the global" from the national or apartheid imaginary (this dissertation) are two ruptural unities that are *absent cause,* yet can be studied through an analysis of overdetermined registers.

And, finally, important to a Marxist social science is the recognition that knowledge is always tied up to a particular political project. Therefore, this project sets out to counter the social facticity of "the global" while replacing the concept of globalization with that of the *social whole.* Doing so, I believe, produces the possibility of more radical knowledge that emphasizes economic inequality as the fundamental characteristic of social life; something that the globalization literature often buries. Replaying globalization with *the social whole*, I hope, can begin to undo the conceptual damage that has been done by presenting the world as a single space without contradiction and needing only better governance and regulation. These arguments have infiltrated all aspects of thought, even among the most radical academics. In doing so, the global imaginary has reproduced the present as a transcendent reality, not a world *produced through human labor* and therefore one that *could be otherwise.* In addition to advocating for a rejection of the global imaginary, I also hope that this argument will encourage scholars to see the academy as a site of struggle. Thinking about how the structural transformation of the university affects what knowledge is produced, I hope, will encourage faculty and students to engage in political projects to challenge the structural transformation of the academy into an outlet for the reproduction of capitalist relations. This is work, of course, that cannot be done in the abstract, at the level of theory, but must be conducted through the organization of strong labor unions and other institutions intent remaking the academy.

GLOSSARY

One of the most difficult aspects of Althusser's theoretical work is his fairly unique and highly stylized language, which draws from Marxism (including Engels, Lenin, and Mao) as well as structuralism and psychoanalysis. Althusser also wrote within an intellectual conjuncture deeply inscribed by intense intellectual debates within the French Communist Party. This perspective means that many of his terms contain technical philosophical meanings while still possessing the characteristics of barbs fashioned for particular political opponents. To help navigate this complex lexicography, Althusser's English translator Ben Brewster—with Althusser's assistance—provides a helpful "Glossary" in the back of *For Marx*. In this Glossary, I define a number of key Althusserian terms as well as other theoretical terms central to my argument.

Conjuncture:
Althusser argues that politics—including the politics of knowledge production—takes place within structured material sites. The conjuncture, drawn from Lenin's concept of *the current moment*, "denotes the exact balance of forces, state of overdetermination of the contradictions at any given moment to which political tactics must be applied" (Brewster 1970, 250).

Contrapuntal:
Edward Said identifies the contrapuntal movement as taking place when the present-yet-suppressed aspects of a text are brought to the fore and juxtaposed against the claims made by the text. For example, fleshing out fleeting references to the slave plantation in a Jane Austen novel can be used to re-read the claims about Victorian morality defended by the author. I argue that this method of reading can be used be used as a method of writing in the social sciences.

Empiricist Conceptions of Knowledge:
What Althusser simply labels *empiricism*, I call *empiricist conceptions of knowledge* to distinguish Althusser's critique from debates concerning "empiricism" within the philosophy of social science. Althusser critiques as empiricist "all 'epistemologies' that oppose a given subject to a given object and call knowledge the abstraction by the subject of the essence of the object" (Brewster 1970, 251). Therefore, Althusser would be critical of any social scientific arguments that claim to know, through external observation, how discrete objects interact in relations of cause and effect. Instead, Althusser argues that knowledge is always produced within structured material relations, i.e. a conjuncture, and therefore does not represent an *already existing* world but rather produces it.

(Global) Structure:
See: Social Whole.

Knowledge:
To explain the production of knowledge, Althusser breaks down the process into three Generalities. Generality I is "the raw material that the science's theoretical

practice will transform into specified 'concepts', this is, into the other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call *Generality III*) which is a knowledge" (Althusser 1970, 183). Generality I includes the world of observables as well as the way in which these observables are socially aggregated. The process of transforming Generality I into Generality III (i.e. knowledge) takes place at the level of Generality II, or: "the corpus of concepts whose more or less contradictory unity constitutes the 'theory' of the science at the (historical) moment under consideration, the 'theory' that defines the field in which all the problems of the science must necessarily be posed" (Althusser 1970, 185). Generality II—also referred to as *the mode of knowledge production*—is Althusser's shorthand for the complex and overdetermined practices that transform the raw material of observation into knowledge. These practices are not essential to the objects being observed and therefore the conversion from observations into knowledge always includes a transformation: "There is never an identity of essence between Generality I and Generality III, but always a real transformation, either by the transformation of an ideological generality into a scientific generality…The work whereby Generality I becomes Generality III" involves the processes "whereby the 'abstract' becomes the 'concrete'" at the level of knowledge (Althusser 1970, 185). While Althusser argues that knowledge only takes place within science, I challenge this distinction in Appendix III. The production of knowledge, therefore, also entails the production of imaginaries mirroring the similar steps laid out above; namely, the transformation of observables gets transformed into a *concrete "generality."* In other words, claims about fast food, the Internet, Sony DVD players, etc. are transformed into knowledge about "the global."

Linear Causality:
This term describes how causality is conceptualized within an empiricist conception of knowledge (q.v.). The world is conceptualized as comprising discrete objects (individuals, institutions, nations, regime-types, groups, etc.) that interact to cause certain effects. One common use of linear causality in the social sciences is the claim that the combination of various "independent variables" causes a "dependent variable" (i.e. an effect). Althusser is critical of this approach because it fails to recognize the ways in which causality is actually overdetermined (q.v.).

Mode of Academic Knowledge Production:
This term is used to describe the structured material relations within which academic knowledge (q.v.) is produced. Althusser argues that only one mode of production, i.e. the social whole (q.v.), exists. However, drawing on "the apparatus" in Althusser's essay on Ideological State Apparatuses and the concept of the conjuncture (q.v.), I argue that "the academy" can be thought of as a register uniquely situated within the social whole (q.v.) to produce knowledge.

Object of Knowledge:
Althusser uses the term *object of knowledge* to emphasize the fact that knowledge is both produced and has effects. Instead of simply treating knowledge as a description of objects existing *out there*, Althusser argue that, as an act of production, the production of knowledge brings new objects into the world. In this dissertation I argue that "the global" is an object of knowledge—meaning that it does not simply

exist out there but instead is an object that comes into being through the practices of producing knowledge.

Overdetermination:
Althusser uses overdetermination to "describe the effects of the contradictions in each practice constituting the social formation on the social formation as a whole…More precisely, the overdetermination of a contradiction is the reflection in it of its conditions of existence within the complex whole, that is, of the other contradictions in the complex whole…" (Brewster 1970, 253). In other words, it explains how the semi-autonomous registers constituting the social whole (q.v.) overlap and contradict each other at any given conjuncture. I offer an expanded analysis of overdetermination in Appendix I.

Pure Objects:
Althusser argues that empiricist conceptions of knowledge (q.v.) assume that objects being studied contain an essence. In social sciences, for example, the United States, Canada, and South African can all be compared as "democracies" if we assume that the particularity of each site can be dismissed in favor of a focus on the object's true essence. It is the belief in a transcendent essence—a pure object—that allows for comparability of "like objects" in the social sciences.

Real Objects:
Real objects are the raw material of knowledge production, namely the observables and the basic concepts from which abstract knowledge claims are rendered. See the description of Generality I under: Knowledge (q.v.).

Region or *(Regional) Structure*
See: Register.

Register:
Registers are the semi-autonomous elements of the superstructure that overlap, intersect and overdetermine each other. Althusser argues that there exists one structure (i.e. the social whole) that comprises multiple, overdetermined registers. In this way, *registers* are not "parts" of the social whole but rather immanent to it.

Ruptural Unity:
Structural change happens when "a vast accumulation of 'contradictions' [that] come[] into play *in the same court,* some of which are radically heterogenous…but which nevertheless 'merge' into a ruptural unity" (Althusser 1970, 100; see also Appendix III, p. 239-40). In other words, structural change is not caused by a single "general 'contradiction'" (such as a crisis in capital) but the overdetermination (q.v.) of many different contradictions.

Social Whole:
The social whole, or *(global) structure*, is the totality of social relationships. For Althusser, the social whole is the mode of production, and it is divided into different registers (q.v.) that overdetermine (q.v.) each other. The social whole, however, cannot be seen or known in itself because the production of knowledge about the

social whole is itself overdetermined by it. Therefore, Althusser argues that the social whole exists as a concept.