LES PERIPHERIES QUI PARLENT:
MINORITY RADIO & POST/COLONIAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES FROM THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION TO THE BEUR MOVEMENT

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

ANNEMARIE IDDINS

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OFARTS

DONALD R. BROWNE, ADVISOR

MAY 2010

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to acknowledge and thank my advisor Don Browne for all his patience and guidance over the past year – working with him has been both intellectually stimulating and an incredible privilege. I would also like to thank Brian Southwell for convincing me to attend the University of Minnesota and introducing me to Don, Mark Pedelty and Hakim Abderrezak for serving on my committee, and TK Chang and Kathy Roberts Forde for their encouragement and examples of what great professors should be. Finally, thanks to Ruth DeFoster, Patrick File, Amy Snow Landa, Sada Reed, Sara Cannon and all those in the Silha Center for filling our workplace with inspiring ideas and great conversation.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my family, which always encourages me in my academic endeavors, and to Andrei, who kept me laughing while writing it.

Abstract

In "*Les périphéries qui parlent*: minority radio and post/colonial discourses of identity from the Algerian Revolution to the *Beur* movement," I examine the role of minority broadcasting in postcolonial identity formation via two case studies: radio broadcasting from the National Liberation Front (FLN) during its war for Algerian independence from France, and radio broadcasting from Radio Beur, a station run by French of North African heritage in 1980s France. That comparison offers two specific examples of moments when the mediascapes of these nations (at times "nation") operated as one interconnected system dominated by French hegemony. In 1950s Algeria and in 1980s France, the limitations of the French nationalist broadcasting system led to innovation and appeal to affiliations beyond France's borders in order to fill an ignored need for self-representation. This thesis is an attempt to map discourses of ethnic identity, power, and media (specifically radio) in marginalized social spaces through a strand of cultural studies concerned with interrogating Western discourses of industrialized modernity.

The central multi-part research question for this study is: What are the major similarities and differences in the early development periods of FLN and *Beur* broadcasting, what seems to account for them, and what do those experiences demonstrate about the role of minority radio in resisting mainstream media representations and discourses of identity? In order to examine these discourses I conduct close readings of texts as historical cultural artifacts and attempt to both situate them in their historical and social contexts, and deconstruct them according to postcolonial critiques. My primary sources are drawn from transcripts, videos and memoirs about FLN and *Beur* broadcasting, as well as media accounts and documentaries about the social movements in which both were involved, published journals and accounts from the pioneers and leaders of each, the wealth of Algerian and *Beur* literature and film, and information from broadcast monitoring services such as the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service and BBC Monitoring Service.

In looking at the early development periods of FLN and *Beur* broadcasting several similarities stand out, namely that both precipitated a shift in cultural geography and centers of power, both attempted to rectify the historical record as they saw it and connect audiences with a common heritage, and both aimed to become a representative and symbolic voice for a diverse community. However, obvious differences existed between the two types of broadcasting, such as the scope of the projects, the level of resistance experienced, and the future trajectories of each. These similarities and differences indicate that the ability of minority radio to resist mainstream media representations and discourses of identity lies in its ability to transcend space and appeal to historical affinities of dispersed and marginalized populations.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Glossary of Acronyms

AUMA – Association d'Ulama Musulman Algérien, or Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (a Muslim legal scholar). An Algerian nationalist movement that joined the FLN at the Congress of Soummam in 1956.

ALN – Armée de Libération Nationale, or the National Liberation Army. The military arm of the FLN.

ANGRC9 – "angry 9" or "C.9." The technologically advanced military radio receiver-transmitters used by the FLN during the revolution.

APS – Algérie Presse service, or the Algerian Press service. International news agency established by the FLN near the end of the Algerian Revolution.

CCE – Comité de communication et exécution, or Committee of Communication and Enforcement. Organization established by the Congress of Soummam and led by Abdelhamid Boussouf that was in charge of FLN transmissions.

CNRA – Conseil Nationale de la Révolutionne Algérienne, or the National Council of the Algerian Revolution. Created conjointly with the CCE at the Congress of Soummam. Notable because it marked the unification of many nationalist movements such as CRUA, MTLD, UDMA, and AUMA.

CRUA – Comité révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action, or the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action. Clandestine Algerian nationalist movement led by Mohamed Boudiaf that formed the FLN and launched the Algerian Revolution on Nov. 1, 1954.

CSA – Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel, or the French Superior Audiovisual Council, an independent agency monitoring and regulating broadcasting policy in France.

FAS – Fonds d'Action Sociale, or Social Action Funds. Subsidies from the French government aimed at encouraging integration of immigrant communities into French society.

FBIS – Foreign Broadcasting Information Service. A now-defunct U.S. government service that monitored foreign broadcasts from around the world.

FLN – Front de Libération Nationale, or the National Liberation Front.

GPRA – Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, or the Provisionary Government of the Algerian Republic. Created by the CCE and the CRNA in 1958 and led by Ferhat Abbas.

INSEE – Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economique, or the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies

MALG – Ministère de l'Armement et des Liaisons Générales, or the Minister of Arms and General Liaisons. Ministry established by the GPRA later in the war to institute and regulate communications and arms in Algeria.

MTLD – Mouvement pour la Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques, or the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties. Algerian nationalist movement led by Messali Hadj in opposition to the FLN until Hadj was removed from leadership and the two parties reconciled at the Congress of Soummam in 1956.

RDA – radiodiffusion algérienne, or the Algerian Radio Network.

UDMA – Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien, or the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto. Political party founded by Ferhat Abbas in 1946 that joined with the FLN at the Congress of Soummam in 1956.

UGEMA – Union Générale d'Etudiants Musulmans Algériens, or the General Union of Algerian Muslim Students. Went on strike in May 1956, after which many of the former students became radio operators for the FLN.

Glossary of Foreign Terms

Fr=French, Ar=Arabe

Arabe (fr) – arab

Banlieue (fr) - suburb

Beur – slang term for second generation North African immigrants originating in the Parisian suburbs; formed by inverting the syllables of “arabe”

Carte blanche – a clean slate, or full powers

Carte de séjour (fr) – green card, or residency permit for a foreigner

Casbah (ar) – citadel; often used to refer to the traditional quarter of Algiers

Colons (fr) - colonist**s**

Djebel (ar) - mountain

Douar (ar) – cluster of villages

Elysée (fr) – name of the official French presidential palace

Fellagha (ar) – bandit; frequently used to refer to fighters for the Algerian resistance

Française de souche (fr) – of French stock, or ethnic French (usually those with Gaulish or Frankish heritage)

Harki (ar) – volunteer soldiers; used to refer to Algerian soldiers serving with the French army during the Algerian Revolution

Huit clos (fr) – figuratively, behind closed doors

Immigré (fr) – immigrant

L’Indigènat (fr) – “Native Code”; system of colonial law instituted by the French in North Africa

Indigène (fr) – native; indigenous

Kabyle – a native Algerian ethnic group, the language spoken by this group, or the mountainous region in northwest Algeria that is their homeland (in French *Kabylie)*

Maquis – Corsican term for high scrubland; used to refer to guerilla fighters

Maquisards – members of the maquis, or guerilla fighters

La Marche des Beurs (fr) – March of the beurs; also known as the March for Equality and Against Racism (1983)

El Moudjahid (ar) – freedom fighter; the official newspaper of the FLN

Moujahidines (ar) – militant, resistant; term used by the FLN and ALN to refer to its fighters

Pieds-noirs (fr) – literally "black feet"; used to refer to Algerians of European origin, especially after their mass migration to metropolitan France when the Algerian Revolution ended

Raï (ar) – a type of music usually associated with Algeria that combines Arabic vocal styles and instruments with often-controversial lyrics

Verlan (fr) – a slang originating in the Parisian suburbs formed by inverting syllables; ie *l'envers=verlan*

Wilaya (ar) – The equivalent of a French *département*, a province, or an American state. The FLN divided Algerian territory into six wilayas during the revolution, with mainland France often referred to as the seventh wilaya.

"The 'right' to signify from the periphery of authorized power and privilege does not depend on the persistence of tradition; it is resourced by the power of tradition to be reinscribed through the conditions of contingency and contradictoriness that attend upon the lives of those who are 'in the minority'. The recognition that tradition bestows is a partial form of identification."[1]

-Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*

Introduction

When I worked in France during the summer of 2009, my coworkers were mostly French citizens, but very few were *français de souche*, or ethnic French. Florent, for example, was born in Brazil, raised in Brazil and France, attended university in Florida, studied Chinese at university in France and currently lives in the Dominican Republic. As a 6'8" bald black man, Florent is difficult to miss in the rural region of south central France, and when he took the bus to camp the bus driver immediately asked him what nationality he was. French, he replied, to which the bus driver responded, of what origin? French, Florent insisted, while the bus driver stared. Finally the bus driver asked him where he was born, and when Florent answered Brazil, the bus driver responded with an enthusiastic "Et voila!"

Even if the bus driver was content with finding the solution to his passenger's identity, that same puzzle and the complex act of identification is increasingly encountered around the world on a daily basis, especially for people such as Florent who frequently move around multiple continents and draw on cultural referents from all corners of the globe. In all my reading about globalization and the ensuing entanglement of identity, the majority of the texts stress the importance of history in the production of

[1] Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2004), 2.

globalization as a concept. According to Avtar Brah, Mary Hickman and Máirtín Mac an Ghaill's *Global Futures,* "contestations of and challenges to power-relations underlying particular discourses and practices of modernity form a key constitutive element within the various formations of the global."[2] Likewise, Homi Bhabha asserts that "the hideous extremity of Serbian nationalism proves that the very idea of a pure, 'ethnically cleansed' national identity can only be achieved through the death, literal and figurative, of the complex interweavings of history."[3] The point is that this phenomenon of globalization did not appear overnight as an amorphous and uncontrollable beast, but emerged as a political and economic project intrinsically tied to what came before, in this case, modernity. In his *Ideology and Utopia,* Karl Mannheim discusses concepts as constructs that have been created for a purpose and urges scholars to "comprehend thought in the concrete setting of an historical-social situation."[4] Despite its recent acceleration, globalization is not a new idea, but a concept whose origin can perhaps be attributed to Marx and his identification of the never-ending capitalist quest for markets. Brah, Hickman and Mac an Ghaill maintain that "In one sense, globalization as a long-term historical process of the movement of people is as old as humankind itself."[5] Today, globalization represents a different reality than it did then, but the expansion of an object's domain (i.e. markets, cultures or identities) is still a key indicator of the contemporary phenomenon. Even if globalization as a concept is not tangible, its

---

[2] Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman, & Máirtín Mac an Ghaill. Introduction to *Global Futures*, edited by Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman, & Máirtín Mac an Ghaill, 3-26. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1999), 5.
[3] Bhabha, 2004, 5
[4] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), 3.
[5] Brah, Hickman & Mac an Ghaill, 1999, 5

indicators are far from invisible. When Wall Street's market values dropped 4 percent on the day of Obama's 2009 inauguration, that drop was reflected in every other major world market less than 24 hours later. That a group such as the G-8 or the G-20 exists and has the power to make policy decisions in a world of more than 200 nations and that anyone with a satellite-TV can watch *telenovelas* from Brazil or India's Bollywood blockbusters, are just evidence that globalization as an economic, political and cultural phenomenon presents a quantitatively different reality than that of even a decade ago. These indicators make globalization's existence seem obvious, so what purpose does this concept serve and for whom?

Interestingly, the discourse of economic globalization seems to facilitate both a lack of accountability and a lack of efficacy while expanding domains of power. As Doreen Massey says "World economic leaders gather (in Washington, Paris or Davos) to congratulate themselves upon, and to flaunt and reinforce, their powerfulness, a powerfulness which consists in insisting that they (we) are powerless – in the face of globalizing market forces there is absolutely nothing that can be done."[6] This global discourse that naturalizes the Western worldview of industrial late-capitalism and "free" markets ignores the fact that "…there are other modernities being produced and enabled by global capital that are not merely Anglo-centric or merely a reaction to western modernity."[7] But all we see is that portions of Paris allow us to imagine we're in Algeria, while parts of Algiers resemble Paris more than traditional North Africa.

---

[6] Doreen Massey, "Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of Time-Space." In *Global Futures*, edited by Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman and Máirtín Mac an Ghaill, 27-44 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 36.

[7] Raka Shome & Radha Hegde, "Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of

So at the same time that uneven global flows of capital allow for a third world to exist in the first world and vice versa, uneven global flows of communication make it more possible than ever before to create dominant discourses that oppress or empower particular populations. [8] In the face of these discourses, the combination of globalization and technological innovation has the potential to open up discursive space for alternative representations and trajectories to develop. Indeed Massey argues that "One of the most provocative and productive mobilizations of the term 'globalization' has been in its use, in particular by 'post-colonial' theorists, in the re-telling of the classic story of modernity…"[9] Hall adds that "In this way, the 'post-colonial' marks a critical interruption into that whole grand historiographical narrative which, in liberal historiography and Weberian historical sociology, as much as in the dominant traditions of Western Marxism, gave this global dimension a subordinate presence in a story which could essentially be told from within its European parameters."[10] Mediated discourses, particularly minority broadcasting, are part of this alternative historiography that helped shape the identity of Algerian resistance movements during the 1954-1962 War for Independence, and when globalization allowed the colonial context to be recreated on the soil of metropolitan France in the *banlieues,* or suburbs, radio again became a mechanism of resistance to Eurocentric discourses of French national identity in the 1980s.

Globalization," *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 19(2), 172-189, 2002: 177.
[8] Shome & Hegde, 2002
[9] Massey, 1999, 28
[10] Stuart Hall, "When was the 'post-colonial'? Thinking at the limit," in *The Postcolonial Question*, ed. I. Chambers and L. Curti (London: Routledge, 1996), 250.

Colonialism and Discourses of Identity

Gayatri Spivak defines colonialism as "When an alien nation-state establishes itself as ruler, impressing its own laws and systems of education and rearranging the mode of production for its own economic benefit."[11] The relationship between France and Algeria between 1830 and 1962 is widely acknowledged to fit this description; some would say that it still does. In a 2002 conversation on postcolonialism, Edward Said states "First of all, I don't think colonialism is over, really…I care very much about the structures of dependency and impoverishment that exist… in all parts in what is now referred to as the global South."[12] The 130-year colonial encounter between France and Algeria tied the two now formally separated nations together in a shared history that cannot be easily delineated along the lines of separate sovereign states. Barnor Hesse quotes political scientist and historian Anthony Pagden in saying, "What needs to be underlined here as a way of understanding the historical conduit of modern forms of globalization is that over a period of four and a half centuries the European colonial processes 'changed dramatically the human geography of the planet' (Pagden, 1995)."[13] Not the least of colonialism's effects was the normalization of Western Judeo-Christian values (such as "democracy", "freedom", etc) and the naturalization of nationalism as a way of binding space. Hesse goes on to say the colonial processes described by Pagden resulted in the

---

[11] Gayatri Spivak, "Are We Postcolonial? Post-Soviet Space," (828-829) Annual Meeting of the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages (PMLA 121.3) 29 December 2005, Washington, D.C., 828.

[12] Edward Said, "In conversation with Neeladri Bhattacharya, Suvir Kaul, and Ania Loomba," in *Relocating Postcolonialism*, ed. Ato Quayson & David Theo Goldberg, 1-14 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002), 2.

[13] Barnor Hesse, "Reviewing the Western Spectacle: Reflexive Globalization through the Black Diaspora," in *Global Futures*, ed. Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman and Máirtiín Mac an Ghaill, 122-143 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 128.

"global dispersal of European hegemony."[14] In other words, colonial processes, through civilizing and military missions, produced ideological discourses placing colonial peoples in subordinate positionalities affecting both the representation of colonized populations by others and the ability of colonized populations to represent themselves. As a key component of identity formation, representation determines the possible positions a person may occupy in a particular discourse at any particular moment. According to Stuart Hall, "Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us."[15] The subject position imposed upon Algerians by the colonial administration was one that continually reified Western civilization and supremacy. Radha Hegde attests to the importance of colonialism in talking about identities, saying "How can we talk about identities in a changing world or do cross-cultural research without addressing the power of a worldview that has seeped into the lives of people globally due to the geopolitical conditions of colonialism?"[16]

Almost fifty years after Algeria's independence, it is still safe to say that "[Colonization] assumes the place and significance of a major, extended and ruptural world-historical event… 'Colonization', here, in this globalization story, is also a crucial moment in the formation of the identity of 'the West' itself."[17] As the "other" against which the industrial modernity of the West defined itself, colonies became entrenched in an inferior positionality that is still occupied today by most postcolonial nations.

---

[14] Hesse, 1999, 128
[15] Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, edited by Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, 1-17 (London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996), 6.
[16] Radha Hegde, "A View from Elsewhere: Locating Difference and the Politics of Representation from a Transnational Feminist Perspective," *Communication Theory* 8 (Aug. 1998): 276.
[17] Massey, 1999, 29

According to Bhabha, the problematic positions of formerly colonizer/colonized nations today must be seen as an effect of and intrinsically tied to European modernity and thus "The Western metropole must confront its postcolonial history, told by its influx of postwar migrants and refugees, as an indigenous or native narrative *internal* to its national identity."[18] Despite our preference for clear categories, histories, nations and identities are constructs not capable of being confined by convenient boundaries – this is a case of minute degrees of difference, of multiplicities and contradictions. A senior Algerian leader summed up the feeling to a French reporter, late in 1985: "When we speak of foreigners, that might mean Germans, Americans, or Spaniards, but not the French. For us, they will never be foreigners like the others."[19]

Algerian Identity

While a strict system of segregation existed in colonial Algeria, the identities of many Algerians and *colons* became increasingly complicated during the colonial period.[20] Most *colons* were ethnically and legally French, but many of them had never been to metropolitan France and had little in common with their contemporary counterparts there. As one *colon* described a summer spent in France, "It confirmed for me what I already sensed: that I was not French, that I had never been French. Language, culture – these are not enough to make you belong to a people. Something more is needed: a common life,

---

[18] Bhabha, 2004, 6

[19] Mort Roseblum, *Mission to Civilize: The French Way* (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 282.

[20] Throughout this paper I will refer to the Muslim residents of Algeria (Arab & Berber), as "Algerians," as opposed to employing indigènes or any of the other terms that took on derogatory connotations during colonialism. The European residents of Algeria will be referred to as colons, following the custom of the day, although pieds-noirs, literally black feet, was another term used for the colons when most of them moved to metropolitan France after the Algerian Revolution (Stora, 2001: 8). The use of these terms is for the practical purposes of this paper based on the position taken by the majority of the members of these populations in the revolution. In no way do I intend to abnegate the existence of a multitude of groups within the classifications Muslim, Arab, Berber, colon, etc.

common experiences and memories, common aims."[21] And as the French began to "civilize" and educate an elite class of Algerians for administrative purposes and Algerians were forced to speak French, they too became not simply Arab, Berber or French, but a complex combination of them all. Algerian intellectual and future leader of independent Algeria's constitutional assembly Ferhat Abbas at first refused to join any of the Algerian nationalist movements, saying "nationalism is that sentiment which pushes a people to live in the interior of its territorial frontiers, a sentiment which has created this network of nations…I would not die for the Algerian Fatherland, because this Fatherland does not exist."[22] Shortly after the French response to the massacre at Sétif,[23] Abbas, unable to believe in a future for Algerians as French citizens, joined the National Liberation Front (FLN), indicating that "French 'indigènes,' always carried an unintentionally paradoxical semantic load…[they] were equally contemptible, no matter what ethnolinguistic group or class they came from."[24]

Beur Identity

The experience of Algerian immigrants and their descendents in France is another example of how the increasingly mobile populations and consolidation of capital that characterize globalization have led to relationships of power that can not clearly be defined in terms of national geographic or technological/regulatory boundaries. With the

---

[21] Charles Geromini in Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Grove Press, 1965), 163.
[22] Joan Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1960), 49.
[23] Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987). A series of parades in Sétif celebrating the surrender of Nazi Germany ended in violence between Algerians and colons, with around 103 colon deaths. The French army responded with reprisals that killed around 6,000 Algerians (the number of Algerian deaths is still disputed, with estimates as low as 1,000 and as high as 45,000).
[24] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 122.

stigmatization of the term *arabe*, second generation Maghrebi immigrants used *verlan*, or slang formed by inverting syllables (ie *l'envers=verlan*), to create the term *beur*. In the most limited sense *Beur* refers to the second generation of North African immigrants in France; in the most expansive it is a label capable of being applied to marginalized spaces and populations around the world. According to Nacer Kettane, who helped popularize the term through his radio station Radio Beur, "*Beur* reflects both the geographic and cultural space of the Maghreb, and a social space, that of the suburb and the proletariat of France."[25] As mainstream media adopted the *Beur* label the term developed a stigma associated with the violence and poverty of the urban periphery so that the term has increasingly become a site of struggle in itself. Among those that question the usefulness of the *Beur* label is the French Minister for Equal Opportunities, Azouz Begag, who says "One cannot infinitely decline the generations resulting from immigration…One day, it is necessary to acknowledge that they are French."[26] Others, such as self-identifying *Beur* author and social activist Farida Belghoul say that *Beur* represents a refusal to limit one's identity, saying "*Beur* allows contestation of the duality by means of which these identities are produced and, with them, the effects of power that create and nourish this duality."[27]

---

[25] Nacer Kettane, *Le droit de réponse à la démocratie française* (Paris: La Découverte, 1986), 21. Note: All translations of French source materials are my own.
[26] Azouz Begag & Abdellatif Chaouite, *Écarts d'identité* (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 82.
[27] Sylvie Durmelat, *Fictions de l'intégration: du mot Beur à la politique de la mémoire*, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008), 39.

Making a Case for Minority Broadcasting

Statement of importance

I argue that these complexities and contradictions are most evident and influential in media discourses because media discourses often aim to collectively represent the communities that produce them. This difference of domain and the central role of broadcasting in the FLN and *Beur* movements are why I am examining the role of radio and minority broadcasting in both resisting and reinforcing dominant discourses about French national identity. The role of radio in both FLN and *Beur* identity and its complex interaction with dominant discourses of French identity demonstrate how communication and information technology have the potential to be both elements of oppression and instruments of social change. Theoretically, looking at the ways in which geographic and discursive spaces overlay and interact with each other offers insights into how people negotiate spheres of influence and the role mediated discourses play in those power relationships. Practically, minority media access and ownership have the potential to confront the existing barriers to meaningful minority self-representation in the media and pave the way for more nuanced discussions of difference. As Stuart Hall states in looking at new forms of racism in contemporary Britain, "What is 'out there' is, in part, constituted by how it is represented."[28] Thus studying mediated representations of reality is not an empty exercise in semantics, but a powerful tool with the potential to alter the multiple representations and realities inhabited by various groups. Massey argues that normative discourses such as economic globalization have very real effects, saying "It is

[28] Stuart Hall, "Race, Culture, and Communications: Looking Backward and Forward at Culture Studies," *Rethinking Marxism* 5(1) (Spring 1992), 14.

this discourse of, this particular form of, globalization in other words which is an important component in the continuing legitimization of the view that there is one particular model of 'development', one path to one form of 'modernization'."[29]

Thus in the realm of postcolonial studies and globalization, the study of discourse, representation and relationships of power takes on an ethical dimension. According to Quayson & Goldberg in their introduction to *Relocating Postcolonialism*, the ethical nature of the postcolonial project is rooted in an "ethics of becoming" which requires "a rigorous attention to the details of the object under scrutiny to discern the aspects within it that speak to an imagined freer future… to show how such an ethics might disclose a transfigurative relationship with the world."[30] One of the ways this transfigurative relationship might manifest itself is via the alternative trajectories described by Massey, whereby globalization opens up previously unavailable postcolonial spaces for nations and groups to pursue different projects than that of modernity.

Barnor Hesse quotes archeologist and anthropologist Nicholas Thomas' *Colonialism's Culture* (1994: 4) saying "modernity itself can be understood as a colonialist project,"[31] which imprisons nations in a linear temporality where the expectation is that "developing" nations should try to catch up to "developed" nations while that possibility or the possibility for a different future than that of modernity is continually sabotaged by existing power structures. Globalization, however, alters the playing field by increasingly offering points of economic, political and cultural

---

[29] Massey, 1999, 35
[30] Ato Quayson & David Theo Goldberg, "Introduction: Scale and Sensibility," Introduction to *Relocating Postcolonialism*, edited by Ato Quayson & David Theo Goldberg, xi-xxii (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002), xiii.
[31] Hesse, 1999, 124

attachment beyond the bounds of the nation-state and the agenda of modernity. Saénz believes the role of affective investment in culture has increased with globalization, consequently diminishing the power structures associated with the nation state, so that "contemporary culture's capacity to produce power lies, not only in museums or academies, but in the control of far more personal and immediate spaces."[32] Through the internet, a Romanian migrant in Canada might listen to Romanian radio in the same morning that he listens to the CBC, simultaneously identifying with both his Romanian heritage/citizenship and Canadian citizenship and unbothered by any contradictions existing therein.

And this is the ethical enterprise that I am examining here: the ability to construct one's own contradictions and represent oneself as a variable and nuanced individual. For centuries the West has had few qualms about the obvious contradictions between its neo-liberal values at home and oppressive policies abroad, to the extent that today globalization means the free movement of money, but never the free movement of people. Historically when capital was less mobile, workers came (or, in the case of slaves, were brought) to it, while today the capital can meet the worker essentially anywhere around the world where the militarization of borders keep populations enslaved to Western capital at home as much as possible. "The double imaginary, in the very fact of its doubleness, of the freedom of space on the one hand and the 'right to one's own place' on the other, works in favour of the already-powerful. They can have it both ways."[33] The contradictions of this position are evident in the example of technology,

---

[32] Michael Sáenz, "The Deployment of Culture," *The Journal of Communication Inquiry* 21 (2) (1997), 16.
[33] Massey, 1999, 39

which simultaneously facilitates and obstructs the movement of money, goods, information, ideas and people around an increasingly interconnected globe. Technologies are not neutral; rather, they are "as much a portal of attitudes and attitudinal shifts as it is an entryway, an opening, to development infrastructure."[34] Technologies tend to work for those that created them by reproducing existing power structures, but are also capable of being appropriated for resistance to hegemonic social structures, allowing minority populations the possibility of constructing their own contradictions.

The Algeria/France relationship presents an interesting intersect because in that Algeria was a settler colony, this relationship demonstrates the difficulties of colonialism and post-colonialism in more obvious ways, highlights power issues in the struggle between a global power and a developing nation, and also brings to light several of the issues currently seen as dividing the West and East, or the Occident and the Orient. Additionally, looking at the beginning of both oppositional media services – FLN broadcasting in Algeria and *Beur* broadcasting in France – offers two specific examples of moments when the mediascapes of these nations (at times "nation") have operated as one interconnected system dominated by French hegemony. In the 1950s in Algeria and in the 1980s in France, the limitations of the French nationalist broadcasting system led to innovation and appeal to affiliations beyond France's borders in order to fill an ignored need for self-representation.

Research questions and outline

I will focus on the 1954-1959 period in Algeria, beginning with the FLN's November 1954 broadcast from Cairo announcing the organization of the FLN and

[34] Quayson & Goldberg, 2002, xiv

ending with the fall of the fourth republic and De Gaulle's (re) rise to power and offers of Algerian self-determination in 1959. In postcolonial France I will again focus on a five-year period, beginning with the liberalization of the airwaves and the establishment of Radio Beur as a legal station in 1981, and the ending in 1986, which marked the heyday of the *Beur* movement and Radio Beur's political mobilizations, as evidenced by its most successful concert drawing an audience of 7,000 in 1985[35] and some *Beur* politicians winning municipal posts and running for the National Assembly in 1986.[36] Within these time frames, my central research question is: What does comparing the early development of FLN and *Beur* broadcasting demonstrate about the role of minority radio in resisting mainstream media representations and discourses of identity? Additionally, how did the production of these alternative discourses by marginalized communities indicate or influence shifts in identity and speaking position? What does comparing the evolution of these two types of broadcasting indicate about the impact of globalization and post/colonial discourses on identity?

Procedure

In order to examine these discourses I will first establish the theoretical framework of my project within a certain strand of postcolonial cultural studies focused on the ways globalization's multiplicity of mediated spaces change our understanding of locality and thus identity. Next I will detail my method of discourse analysis involving the close reading of texts, and my choice of source material. My primary sources will be

[35] Richard L. Derderian, "Broadcasting from the Margins: Minority ethnic radio in contemporary France," in *Postcolonial Cultures in France*, ed. Alec G. Hargreaves & Mark McKinney (London: Routledge, 1997), 106.
[36] Rosenblum, 1988, 273

drawn from transcripts, videos and memoirs about FLN and *Beur* broadcasting, as well as media accounts and documentaries about the social movements in which both were involved, published journals and accounts from the pioneers and leaders of each, the wealth of Algerian and *Beur* literature and film, and information from broadcast monitoring services such as the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) and BBC Monitoring Service. Through collective evaluation and coordination of these sources it should be possible to get a general picture of FLN and Radio Beur broadcasts and goals, even if certain of these sources (such as books by Radio Beur personnel) could be discounted as biased if not balanced by other accounts.

My comparative analysis of the discourses about French and *Beur* identity will focus interrogating naturalized understandings of identity in national and increasingly globalized postcolonial contexts. In some ways, *Beur* broadcasting in France mirrors the American experience of the black press, which used minority media as an alternative to mainstream representation of a particular social group. In *Inventing Black-on-Black Violence: discourse, space, and representation*, David Wilson paraphrases Norman Fairclough saying

> "discourses are the modern alternative to material violence and overt oppression. The game in complex societies is to make and manage rather than to overtly punish and discipline. With diverse populations and intense competition for resources and power, taming through producing and managing knowledge is continuous."[37]

[37] David Wilson, *Inventing Black-on-Black Violence: Discourse, Space, and Representation* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 12.

Theoretical Framework

At the most basic level theory is an abstract map of how the world works, so the basic premise of this paper is an attempt to map discourses of ethnic identity, power, and media (specifically radio) in the marginalized spaces of the *maquis* in 1950s Algeria and in the peripheral space of the *banlieues* of 1980s France.[38] Here I subscribe to the cultural studies tradition in conducting detailed contextual analysis of discourse combining consideration of British cultural studies' over-determined texts with American cultural studies' legitimization of populist cultural products as social artifacts (as evidenced by the use of *Beur* literature and lyrics as source materials). In this way my particular brand of discourse analysis attempts to build on the strand of cultural studies work developed by authors such as Shome, Hedge, Morley, Appadurai, Kraidy, and Sáenz in "accommodating the increasing interrogation of so-called First World cultures and research by postcolonial voices uniquely concerned with the dialectic of globalization and localization, diaspora, hybrid identity, and the nature of human rights."[39] The occupation of Algeria and the settlement (and citizenship) of ethnic North Africans in France made it necessary to rethink articulations of identity in terms of a greater multiplicity of experiences (including post/colonial experiences, which I would argue are among the most influential), specifically the role of radio in the production and dissemination of these discourses, and what populations are empowered and excluded by dominant discourses of French national identity. However, I have not attempted to

[38] Maquis is a Corsican term for high scrubland that was first appeared in reference to French resistance fighters in World War II and was subsequently used to describe rural bands of FLN guerilla fighters.
[39] Thomas Lindlof & Bryan Taylor, *Qualitative Communication Research Methods* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2002), 60.

determine the effects of these radio broadcasts because lack of readily available resources and data make it impossible to investigate this dimension, despite its importance.

Globalization is changing articulations of identity, particularly national identity, in significant ways. While many such as Appadurai would say that the hyphen connecting "nation-state" is loosening, few would argue that local context and the nation no longer matter. Although the possibility exists for greater movement of people and circulation of ideas, it is still, as Morley says, a world where "national and international events are articulated through local channels of communication" and where "the evidence indicates that sedentarism is far from finished."[40] Instead of abolishing national borders, globalization in the form of deterritorialized flows of capital and communication has increased the array of influences acting within that space so that traditional articulations of national identity are increasingly destabilized. This phenomenon influences both the articulation of culture and its constitutive reality. As a continually contested arena of signs and symbols producing a network of meanings, culture forms the crux of specificity in which personal and national attachments are articulated and social order maintained. According to Shome & Hegde, "Global relations of capital today are utilizing spaces and places in ways that produce complex planes of exclusion and inclusion, empowerment and disempowerment."[41] In the same way that capital produces planes of exclusion and inclusion, so discourses of national identity are premised on the existence of an "Other" and are deeply intertwined with the politics of representation. David Morley discusses the existence of a "national symbolic home" by saying "Any one form of sociability must

[40] David Morley, *Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 14.
[41] Shome & Hegde, 2002, 176

have its constitutive outside, some necessary field of exclusions by which the collective identity of those whom it interpellates successfully is defined."[42] This identity is often premised on a sense of historical continuity that is expressed as the collective memory of a community and functions as a reference point for signs and symbols. Benedict Anderson argues that the nation is a particularly durable idea suited to transforming accidents of history in an imagined continuous temporality that is linked to geography and articulated as national identity,[43] while Sáenz quotes anthropologist Terrence Turner in contending that in today's multicultural society ethnicity can be seen as "a more fundamental seat of loyalty, indeed of political sovereignty, than the state."[44]

In any case, national identities are never static constructions; as part of culture they are continually being produced, challenged, maintained, and changed. In challenging the idea of cultural purity, Morley borrows from Renato Rosaldo saying "hybridity must be understood as being the inevitable condition of all human cultures,"[45] and Kraidy asserts that "hybridity is not the negation of identity, but its quotidian and inevitable condition."[46] Uneven multidirectional flows of cultural products result in continual processes of borrowing and lending so that identifying points of origin becomes an impossible and rather insignificant exercise. Technological change often alters the conditions of exchange, or as James Carey says, "…every fundamental change in the system of production, dissemination and preservation of culture simultaneously borders

---

[42] Morley, 2000, 112
[43] Anderson, Imagined Communities, 11.
[44] Sáenz, 1997, 15
[45] Morley, 2000, 6
[46] Marwan Kraidy, "The global, the local, and the hybrid: a native ethnography of globalization," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 16(1999), 456.

and reborders the world".[47] While sometimes geographic, this shifting of borders usually refers to the lines of political, economic and cultural capital.

Appadurai says that recent technological change, however, has established the imagination as a "collective social fact…the basis of the plurality of imagined worlds."[48] The recognition of the multiplistic nature of reality and the often simplified nature of its representation leads one to question the ways in which nationality has been naturalized as an aspect of identity, and who is privileged or marginalized by these normative nationalist discourses. "If national media constitute the public sphere which is most central to the mediation of the nation-state to the general public, then whatever is excluded from those media is in effect excluded from the symbolic culture of the nation."[49] In that a singular national public sphere privileges certain groups – ethnic, economic, etc – over others and reifies a certain representation of reality by which the reality of other groups is measured, it becomes problematic. The multiplicity of experiences and influences that characterize postmodern life make it necessary to look beyond "the Habermasian assumption that the public sphere is necessarily national in scope and address the issues raised by the existence of cross-cutting transnational and diasporic public spheres."[50] It is in this context that we can begin talking about FLN and *Beur* broadcasting as an alternative and form of resistance to French national broadcasting and its historically limited definition of what it means to be French.

---

[47] James Carey, "Historical pragmatism and the internet," *New Media and Society* 7(4) (2005): 453.
[48] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 5.
[49] Morley, 2000, 118
[50] Morley, 2000, 114

Postcolonial 'globalization' and identity discourse

Ironically, as the world moves towards an increasingly networked and interconnected existence that is often described as inevitable and out of political leaders' control, nations are also developing nostalgic discourses about the need to preserve "traditional" cultural identities, which are under attack by immigrant communities and ethnic "others." This determination to preserve what has never been static anyway and to deny the fundamental differences present in any community, visible or otherwise, has obviously influenced social and cultural attitudes toward democratic participation, rights and who belongs in any given society. In the Algerian Revolution FLN use of radio greatly influenced an identity built on opposition to the French colonial administration. Each day Algerians tuned in to hear: "This is the voice of free and fighting Algeria, the voice of the National Liberation Front and of the National Liberation Army that speaks to you from Algeria."[51] The idea of Algerians having one voice appeared for the first time courtesy of the FLN and its sometimes-controversial unification and domination of the Algerian independence movement. In the 1980s François Mitterand's new socialist government liberalized French airwaves and offered an opportunity for *Beur* communities to represent themselves as more than just the French "other." Via Radio Beur young artists such as Fafa could contest their relegation to the margins and assert themselves with such lyrics as "My name is Farid, I am 25 years old/ I've lived in France for 20 years/ Before deporting me/ I address myself to all French/ Set the record straight/

[51] Senoussi Saddar, *Ondes de Choc: les transmissions Durant la guerre de libération* (Rouiba (Algeria): Editions ANEP, 2002), 51.

and give voice to our hearts."[52] Through comparing how FLN radio and Radio Beur mediated discourses about community identity via the idea of a representative "voice" and the ways in which these discourses reinforce or resist dominant narratives about French identity it should be possible to make some careful generalizations about the complex and continuing impact of colonialism on identity and how globalization is changing identity discourses and contemporary cultural geography. Both Algerians and the *Beur* community in France found it necessary to take action in order to protest their relegation to the political and social periphery, as well as the periphery of French national consciousness. According to Radio Beur founder Nacer Kettane, marginalized populations have limited options: "When one lives relegated to the periphery of society, of the cultural and political life, when exclusion is such that one is obliged to be silent or to speak dynamite, when one is penned up between legitimate defense and forbidden zone, what else can you do? Keep to the ghetto and allow the illusion of a present that makes the best of oppression to live, or explode this oppression?"[53]

Methodology and Source Materials

While my use of cultural studies as a framework does not dictate a particular methodology, the context of my research questions demands that I interrogate the work representing discourses about what it meant to be French at two particular moments in history when technology was particularly influential and where non-ethnic French, particularly North African communities, fell in relation to those discourses. In order to examine these discourses I conduct close readings of texts as historical cultural artifacts

[52] Katia Desrosières & Catherine Terzieff, "Les Nouveaux Enfants: Radio Beur," in *Vidéo Vérité* (Iowa City, Iowa: PICS/Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 66.
[53] Kettane, 1986, 28

and attempt to both situate them in their historical and social contexts, and deconstruct them according to postcolonial critiques. In this way I hope to produce a complex and nuanced reading of my sources as culturally and socially embedded texts that have a purpose in positioning people and their identities in particular ways. According to Spivak, "Historically, it has always been the powerful who have spoken or been spoken of….as a feminist and a subalternist, I am used to looking at the pores of elite texts to tease out excluded itineraries."[54] This study attempts to extend this postcolonial logic and analyze identity discourses and the ways in which minority communities are able to position themselves in relation to power, as well as in what ways technologies such as radio communication make speaking back to this power possible.

Limitations

It should be made clear that this study is not attempting to establish radio as a technological determinant. In the case of the Algerian Revolution it is obvious that the medium itself was not the message, as Marshall McLuhan[55] might say, because radio technology was initially ignored by most Algerians.[56] It was not until the FLN began to broadcast content that resonated with Algerians that the radio became a means of resistance rather than repression. In examining this phenomenon, I attempt to produce "a nuanced account which rejects not only technological determinism, but also its polar opposite of social determinism."[57]

---

[54] Spivak, 2005, 829
[55] Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
[56] Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Grove Press, 1965).
[57] James Curran, "Communication and History," in *Explorations in Communication and History*, ed. B. Zelizer, (London: Routledge, 2008), 54.

This study also seeks to avoid the perpetuation of a Eurocentric perspective. Because history has to be recorded by someone who inherently has an ideological perspective, there is obviously "a cognitive economics, politics, and sociology of documentation."[58] Most documentation and analysis of the Algerian Revolution and French broadcasting history has been done by the French and requires a great deal of critical thinking as the French did not admit an actual war had occurred until 1999 and French broadcasting policy did not allow non-state broadcasting until 1981.[59] The combination of clandestine nationalist operations and largely illiterate Algerian immigrants prevented any large-scale documentation of North African perspectives. However, many FLN leaders were educated and devoted to documenting their experiences after Algerian independence, just as leaders of the *Beur* movement later did in France. In any case, these testimonials are evidence of the importance of acknowledging that "…there are other modernities being produced and enabled by global capital (as in colonialism) that are not merely Anglo-centric or merely a reaction to western modernity."[60]

That said, I would wish to have more time and money to visit Radio Beur's archives and the Algerian Cultural Center in Paris, or the National Jihad Museum and the Ifri Museum in Algeria, both of which house collections from the fight for independence. While locating minority broadcast transcripts (especially historical French and Arabic ones available in Minnesota) is difficult, the focus of my project is not only on the

---

[58] John Durham Peters, "Communication and History," in *Explorations in Communication and History*, ed. B. Zelizer, (London: Routledge, 2008), 21.
[59] On June 10, 1999 the BBC published an article on its Africa page entitled "France admits Algerian campaign was war." < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/365868.stm>
[60] Shome & Hegde, 2002, 177

content of these broadcasts, but also on the social function of FLN and *Beur* broadcasting and how they contribute to the development of colonial and postcolonial identity discourses. Additionally, I would ideally have more access to primary source materials, transcripts of broadcasts and interviews with those involved, many of whom are still alive.

FLN Source Materials

Because most nationalist broadcasts during the Algerian War were clandestine or transmitted from other Mediterranean states, they are inherently difficult to study. Frequently militant groups are "unable or unwilling to leave a documentary record of their activities."[61] In any case, as stated above the principal goal of this study is not only to analyze the content of these broadcasts, which was unclear even to most audiences at the time, but how they were made possible, what purpose they served, and what kind of discursive space they ultimately cultivated for their audiences and their constructions of identity. As Kushner said, "What [African liberation movements] say has been well-documented; how they communicate has not been so widely explored."[62] Thus this history of radio's role in the social and cultural context of Algerian resistance will primarily rely on autobiographies, journals and reflections written by members of the resistance. If this is a rather top-down approach to history focused on how radio influenced the scope and strategy of the war, it is a logical approach for a revolution that, while popular, derived its efficacy and organizational principles from a distinct group of leaders. The FLN was characterized by a remarkable depth of leadership; from the

[61] Lawrence C. Soley & John S. Nichols, *Clandestine Broadcasting: A Study of Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Electronic Communication* (New York: Praeger, 1987), vii.
[62] James Kushner, "African Liberation Broadcasting," *Journal of Broadcasting*, 18 (Summer 1974), 299.

beginning the organization realized that a centralized movement would quickly fail, so it relied instead on a highly distributed network of leaders from remarkably diverse backgrounds. Many of the leaders who survived the war and its aftermath felt a duty to document their experiences working with the FLN in order to correct official French records.

Among those who most documented their experiences with the FLN was Saadi Yacef, [63] son of an Algiers vegetable merchant. Yacef wrote several books about leading the resistance in Algiers, participated in numerous documentaries, and helped write and direct *Battle of Algiers*.[64] After being recruited by the FLN, Yacef's first act as a member was to hide one of the resistance leaders and host a meeting at his house. Seemingly lukewarm to the task, he details the meeting in a chapter of one of his books titled "the illumination," telling how he got up after the meeting and put 700,000 francs (everything he owned) in front of the leader. "Do you believe that with this pathetic sum we can one day make colonialism disappear from our country?" Yacef asked.[65]

Reported to be Yacef's girlfriend at the time, Zohra Drif studied law at the University of Algiers before becoming an armed member of the resistance. [66] She participated in one of the first attacks on European civilians and her instrumental role furthered the incorporation of women into the resistance. After being captured with Yacef during the

---

[63] FLN leader in the Algiers Casbah, who eventually became one of the most prominent members of the resistance.
[64] Yacef also played himself in the film.
[65] Yacef, 2002, 90
[66] "Capture of the Chief," *Time*, October 7, 1957. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,809954,00.html

battle of Algiers, she wrote *The death of my brothers*, explaining her experience and philosophy of resistance.[67]

Other leaders who published their experiences were Mohamed Lebjaoui, who worked closely with FLN communications guru Abane Ramdane and edited *El Moudjahid*, the official FLN newspaper.[68] His book, *Truths about the Algerian Revolution*,[69] is a nuanced account of the political evolution of Algeria punctuated by his personal experiences and disillusionment with the FLN after the organization purged Ramdane at the end of 1957. The most distinctively communist of the works, Lebjaoui's book is juxtaposed with Amar Ouzegane's *The Good Fight*.[70] Ouzegane served as secretary of the Algerian communist party, and his book discusses his ideological shift from communism to nationalism. Other sources include a collection of documents from Messali Hadj, the original organizer of Algerian communism and independence movements, and the war-time journal kept by Algerian intellectual and writer Mouloud Feraoun. Official FLN documents, a UNESCO study about world literacy in 1957, and various articles about radio printed in *Le Monde*, *The New York Times*, *El Moudjahid* and other news outlets during the Algerian Revolution provide context and validation of personal accounts.

While sources that directly address FLN broadcasting are few, as far as I can tell, I did find several works that devote a distinct attention to radio during the revolution. Probably the most frequently cited source on FLN radio and its revolutionary potential (and one of the only sources I found that had been translated into English) is psychologist

---

[67] Zohra Drif, *La mort de mes frères* (Paris: Maspero, 1960).
[68] Translated from Arabic *El Moudjahid* means "freedom fighter." First produced in 1956 by the FLN, *El Moudjahid* became the official government newspaper after Algerian independence and remains so today.
[69] Mohamed Lebjaoui, *Vérités sur la Révolution Algérienne* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard,1970).
[70] Amar Ouzegane, *Le meilleur combat* (Paris: Julliard, 1962).

and FLN member Frantz Fanon's *A Dying Colonialism,* in which he titles a chapter "This is the Voice of Algeria," after the FLN broadcasting station. Additionally, Senoussi Saddar, the FLN's director of national transmissions, recently wrote *Ondes de Choc: les transmissions durant la guerre de libération,* which was the only work I found focused entirely on FLN transmissions. Mansour Rahal's *Les Maquisards* is another more recent work translated from Arabic that documents his memories about becoming a radio operator and the head of transmissions for Wilaya 1 in Eastern Algeria.[71] Another important source was journalist Jacques Duchemin's *Histoire du FLN,* in which he reproduces an unedited version of Algerian radio operator Nourreddine Benkhodja's war journal. Duchemin's work focuses on the less-emphasized history of the National Liberation Army (ALN), the military arm of the FLN, which only accredited four journalists including Duchemin and was responsible for most war-time transmissions. Additionally, a series of articles written by former ALN officer Mohamed Debbah and printed in *El Watan,* an independent Algerian daily, address radio's role in the revolution.

Beur Source Materials

In looking at the *Beur* movement, the larger framework will involve the realms of political and economic power within which discourses of French national identity and complex counter-narratives such as that produced by Radio Beur were constructed and consumed. The history of immigration and broadcasting in France as evidenced by evaluations of immigration by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and legislation such as the Mitterand government's reform of

[71] A *wilaya* is the Arabic equivalent of a French *département*, or a province. For a map of the FLN *wilayas* during the Algerian Revolution, see the appendices at the end of this paper.

citizenship laws and the 1981 and 1982 bills that liberalized the radio airwaves, clearly represent material barriers and openings for new articulations of identity and resistance.

Within the context of this larger framework it becomes possible to examine dominant media discourses about French identity through news outlets such as *Le Monde* (France's newspaper of record), FBIS coverage of French national broadcasting (Radio France), and French video news archives. Due to illiteracy, poverty and lack of access to media production, the *Beur* community is largely absent from these historical discourses so it becomes necessary to look beyond conventional source materials in constructing a history "from below" based on pop culture narratives. The beginning of *Beur* broadcasting coincided with an explosion of *Beur* cultural organizations that produced newspapers and published what became a new genre of "*Beur* literature." Radio Beur supported these novelists with the *Prix Radio-Beur* award to a new novel each year. Now these texts prove particularly useful in providing a general picture of media consumption in the *Beur* community, as well as material for thematic discourse analysis about its representation and conflicted identity. Popular texts such as Mehdi Charef's *Le thé au harem d'Archi Ahmed*, Azouz Begag's *Le Gone du Châaba*, and Nacer Kettane's *Le Sourire de Brahim* offer representations of growing up in impoverished immigrant families on the margins of French society.

Many *Beur* authors were instrumental figures in social movements such as the 1983 Marche for Equality and Against Racism, or *la Marche des Beurs*. Even with the advent of *Beur* broadcasting and literature, it took collective action such as this to increase the visibility of a population absent from dominant media discourses outside its

own community. In addition to novels, some participants recorded their experiences in 'documentary' books such as Kara Bouzid's *La Marche*, Abdil Jazouli's *L'Action collective des jeunes maghrébins de France*, and Farid Aïchoune's *La Beur Génération*. In publishing these accounts, many participants in resistance sought to validate their experiences through representation, as well as record them as reference points for future generations. In combination with media coverage (both *Beur* and mainstream) of the march and a subsequent strike at the Poissy Talbot factory, these artifacts of popular culture and prevailing mentalities among the *Beur* community offer useful commentary about the experience of the *Beur* generation in France and the role of media institutions such as Radio Beur in that experience.

While I was not able to look extensively at historical transcripts from Radio Beur, I was able to locate several examples, as well as a video showing live footage from the station's production and on-air time via the University of Iowa's Project for International Communication Studies. Additionally, historian Richard Derderian has published several articles about minority broadcasting in France that focus specifically on Radio Beur, including "Ça veut dire quoi, Radio-Beur?"[72] and "Broadcasting from the Margins: Minority ethnic radio in contemporary France."[73] In conjunction with the information on Radio Beur programming provided by the Encyclopedia of Contemporary French Culture, analysis from the independent French Superior Audiovisual Council, and testimony from Radio Beur founder Nacer Kettane, I feel like can safely make some

[72] Richard Derderian, "Radio Beur, 1981-1992 L'échec d'un multiculturalisme à la française?" *Hommes & Migrations* 1191 (October 1995), 58.
[73] Derderian, 1997

careful assertions about Radio Beur, its programs and its mission as part of the nationally-oriented 1980s French mediascape.

Background

Colonialism

France's relationship with Algeria began as an industrialized society's search for raw materials and new markets.[74] When French ships landed on Algeria's coast in 1830, Western European nations such as France were deep in the process of empire expansion. After a quick conquest of Algiers, the French military progressively pushed inland as it conquered various Arab and Berber groups and regions. Thus arbitrary boundaries were established for an Algerian territory, although military conquests continued until the late nineteenth century.

In the conquest and subsequent colonial rule of Algeria, military governments were essentially given *carte blanche* to ensure local cooperation with the colonial administration. Continual resistance by indigenous populations led France to pursue a policy of total occupation and brutal suppression. As Benjamin Stora has explained, "In 1842, Saint-Arnaud destroyed part of Blida; Cavaignac inaugurated 'smoke-outs' asphyxiating rebels in caves on the west bank of the Chéliff; Canrobert razed a village in the Aurès to 'terrorize the tribes'; Pélissier, colonel of Bugeaud's column, smoked out a thousand men from the Ouled Riah tribe who had sought refuge in the caves. The last incident led a member of the French investigating commission to remark: 'We have surpassed in barbarism the barbarians we came to civilize."[75] But the French continued

[74] Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 4.
[75] Stora, 2001, 5

their "civilizing mission," during which time they constructed European quarters in most major Algerian cities, colons claimed (or appropriated) most fertile lands for farms and French outposts were established to facilitate administration of the territory. At the Bou Saada outpost on the edge of the Algerian Sahara, "legionnaires painted three-foot-high white letters on an outside wall: *"Ici c'est la France à tout jamais."* This is France. Forever."[76] Despite Algeria's official co-optation as French soil, neither French identity nor citizenship were extended to indigenous populations.[77] In fact, "during the conquest, France cultivated and exploited the fractures of rural society in order to create or exacerbate antagonisms between tribes."[78] These fractures and lack of a cohesive Algerian identity plagued resistance movements throughout Algeria's occupation. Talking about the area where he served as a radio operator during the Revolution, Mansour Rahal asserts "The Aurès, following the example of other regions of the country and of the Maghreb in general, has a population fractured since the times of the *douars*, tribal entities that coexisted on vast territories with peaceful or tense relations, according to ancestral disagreements."[79]

Immigration

Barbarism on both sides of the colonial question continued up to and beyond the Algerian War. In 130 years of colonization the conflict only increased in complexity. While valued for its raw materials and potential workforce, Algeria was a settler's colony

---

[76] Rosenblum, 1988, 260
[77] An 1881 law delegated the administration of Algeria to the French ministry of the Interior (Stora, 2001, 8).
[78] Mansour Rahal, *Les maquisards: pages du maquis des Aurès Durant la guerre de libération* (Kouba-Alger: L'Enterprise de Presse, 2000), 111.
[79] Rahal, 2000, 110

and by 1954 it was home to one million Europeans.[80] Many of the settlers were refugees from the northeast French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which France lost in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, but *colons* emigrate from Spain and Italy as well. In 1889 a new law imposed French citizenship on "every foreigner born in Algeria, if, upon reaching adulthood, he did not claim the nationality of his father."[81] *Colons* took over the vast majority of arable land along the Mediterranean coast and were given almost exclusive land rights and a system of white privilege was institutionalized via the *L'Indigénat*, or "native code" that gave whites the authority to inflict punishment on any native.[82] This code described Algerians as French, but subject to Muslim law and without the legal rights of French citizenship, despite the fact that Algerians could be taxed and called to military or civil service. Through colonization and immigration, Algerians became foreigners in their homeland, or " 'indigènes' marginalized in their own country," a phenomenon that later plagued the *Beur* population in France.[83]

France, like America, is a nation built on immigration, whether it likes to acknowledge it or not. Today, "the characteristics of the immigrant population results from a long tradition of immigration in France, by virtue of the connections that France established throughout history with the immigrants' countries of origin."[84] Large-scale immigration of temporary labor from Algeria began principally after the World Wars in order to fuel France's industrialization and rebuilding projects. "The National

---

[80] Benjamin Stora, *Remembering History*. DVD (New York: Criterion, 2004).
[81] Stora, 2001, 9
[82] Mamood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 126.
[83] Rahal, 2000, 21
[84] Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). *Les Immigrés en France: portrait social* (Paris: INSEE, 1997), 6.

Immigration Office was created in 1945 to ensure the recruitment and reception of foreign workers…immigration, which picked up after 1945, experience a new vigeur from 1956 to 1973."[85] For a large portion of the year, men lived in shantytowns and labored in France's factories far from their families. After the Algerian War, however, France gave Algerians complete freedom of circulation between Algeria and France due to their status as French citizens. This newfound freedom resulted in large-scale family regroupment, as temporary workers arranged for their families to join them in France, as well the resettlement of *harkis*, or Algerian soldiers that fought with France and could not safely stay in Algeria after independence. A 1983 *Le Monde* article on immigration states "In 1962, the Evian Accords, which guaranteed free circulation between the two countries, gave the signal for a massive immigration of families."[86] In the twenty years after the Algerian War ended, the foreign population in France doubled to 4.3 million in 1981, even though legal reforms officially stopped immigration in July 1974.[87] By 1983 *Le Monde* headlines such as "More than 800,000 Algerian residents in France" signaled the concern that accompanied expanding immigrant communities in France. However, according to Moroccan author Tahar Ben Jelloun, "The presence on her soil of more than four million foreigners implies that the future of France is in miscegenation,"[88] and professor of economic and social sciences Mokhtar Lakehal stated in another *Le Monde* article "A genealogist recently told me that each French person has at the least one

[85] INSEE, 1997, 16
[86] Jean Benoit, "Plus de huit cent mille résidents algériens en France," *Le Monde*, November 10, 1983, 4b.
[87] Mokhtar Lakehal, "Quel destin pour les musulmans de France?" *Le Monde*, November 8, 1983.
[88] Tahar Ben Jelloun, "Vivre ensemble" *Le Monde* March 31, 1983: 2d.

foreign ancestor."[89] According to data from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), in 1990, "immigrants represented 7 percent of the French population. Those of European origin were the most numerous."[90] That Portuguese immigrants were more plentiful than those from Algeria, and Italy and Spain had comparable numbers, indicates a singling-out of non-European immigrants and a distinct politics of representation. According to Rosenblum, in 1980s France, "The Poles and Portuguese were not really at issue; *les immigrés* was mainly code for North Africans. And North Africans, numerous Moroccans and Tunisians notwithstanding, meant Algerians."[91]

Concerns about France's increasingly obvious diversity manifest themselves in debates about immigration legislation. Ethnic Algerians born in France after January 1, 1963 by law "acquire automatically French nationality since their parents were born in Algeria, a French territory at the time."[92] However, the law required them to request their French identity card when they reached adulthood, which many of them either didn't pursue out of loyalty to their parents and Algeria, or resentment toward the oppression they had experienced in France. "Actuel magazine ran a poll in 1985 asking immigrants what they thought of the French. North Africans found the French to be straightforward but racist;…four out of five did not want French nationality."[93] Nacer Kettane refers to this as the "phenomenon of choice and non-choice" in advocating for "the liberty to

---

[89] Lakehal, 1983
[90] INSEE, 1997, 7. For a more detailed breakdown of the origins of immigrants in France over time, see the INSEE charts included in the appendices.
[91] Rosenblum, 1988, 262
[92] Benoit, 1983, 4b
[93] Rosenblum, 1988, 273

choose without being obliged to renounce."[94] This refusal to choose left many life-long residents of France without citizenship papers, and increased the risk that they would be identified as clandestine migrants and deported. After closing immigration to France cases of clandestine migration and people without papers working in France increased until the newly-elected Mitterand government naturalized them in 1981. The secretary of one of France's political parties was quoted in *Le Monde* as saying that "120,000 people without a work permit entered France before January 1, 1981 and of which the government legalized the situation in 1981 and 1982."[95] The increase in immigrant communities and the corresponding rise of right-wing politics in France drew a lot of attention to immigration policy, a debate that M. Raymond Courrière, the secretary of state for repatriates called "disguising racists campaigns in anti-immigration campaigns."[96]

Broadcasting and the Dominant Discourse

In many ways, the tension about the identity of immigrants and "others" in relation to French society is reflected in the struggle over their representation on the radio. By definition broadcasting up to the 1980s tended to appeal to a vast audience and dealt in collectivities, often aggregating identities, appealing to the majority, and affecting peoples' perceptions of difference in society. In the case of France, World War II broadcasting from England was used to reinforce French resistance to German occupation, and after the war broadcasting received increased recognition as an important tool for national projects. As Raymond Kuhn notes in his history of French media, "The

[94] Nacer Kettane, "Une identité à forger." *Le Monde*, November 8, 1983, 2a.
[95] Patrick Jarreau "Cher Mustapha…" *Le Monde* March 14, 1983: 1b
[96] "Le marche contre le racisme" *Le Monde* Dec 3, 1983, 11.

role played by radio during the war was a decisive factor in the formulation of broadcasting policy by the political forces active in the Resistance, since it was decided during this wartime period that the radio services would be nationalized following the Liberation."[97] The ability of radio to overcome borders, reach a broad audience, and perpetuate an identity and culture rooted in language made it a medium especially suited to nation building.

For France especially, culture is political and politicians use media as tools to perpetuate their power. Throughout modern history electronic media in the country were subject to "continuous political influence, especially from the party or coalition in power," as well as "a conviction that the media should be French in *cultural* content first and foremost."[98] A government monopoly on broadcasting in the 1950s led to tight control of programming to the extent that the government asked Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (RTF) "not to cover or at least not to emphasize certain events, for example, North African resistance to French colonial rule there."[99] The French government's strong influence in national media made it especially difficult for different or disadvantaged groups to access airtime. This influence extended to Algeria, where the French government established Radio Alger to serve the interests of the colonial administration and broadcasting policy on both sides of the Mediterranean was strictly subject to French hegemony. However, despite the government's attempts to control broadcasting, "The monopoly status of state radio in the postwar period did not go unchallenged, with strong competition coming from the so-called peripheral radio

[97] Kuhn, 1995, 89
[98] Browne, 1999, 112
[99] Browne, 1999, 87

stations such as Europe 1, Radio Luxembourg, Radio-Monte-Carlo, and Sud-Radio."[100] These competitor stations and their ability to cross national borders demonstrate the difficulty of absolute airwave control, particularly in the form of constant resistance from those marginalized by the dominant discourse.

Algeria

Before the Algerian War, media in Algeria were oriented almost entirely toward *colon* interests. Most of these media were established by the French, operated in French, and had little cultural resonance with native populations, by whom they were largely ignored. According to Fanon, "Radiophonic technique, the press, and in a general way the systems, messages, sign transmitters, exist in colonial society in accordance with a well-defined statute. Algerian society, the dominated society, never participates in the world of signs."[101] During 130 years of colonization, the French institutionalized a press based on their own model of primarily partisan newspapers. When the Algerian War began in 1954 the press was problematic because it perpetuated a variety of viewpoints and underscored the multitude of political parties proposing to extend rights to Algeria's non-European populations at home and abroad.[102] If initially reputable, the Algerian press encountered increasing censorship as the war escalated. The communist paper *Alger Républican* was quickly banned and the moral support Algerians received from a democratic press came to an end soon after the start of the war.[103] Censorship reinforced

---

[100] Kuhn, 1995, 92

[101] Fanon, 1965, 73

[102] Stora, 2001, 8. At the outset of the Algerian War, one million settlers of European origin were living in Algeria (80% of which were born in Algeria), and more than 400,000 Algerian workers had migrated to France.

[103] Henri Alleg, the editor of the *Alger Républican*, went into hiding before being arrested in 1957. After being tortured by the French military Alleg wrote a letter to his wife detailing his torture and asking for it to

the separate psychological and physical spheres of Algerian society for Feraoun, who noted, "Since [the French] did away with the Communist newspaper, we are left with only two dailies – both mouthpieces for the colonists and the rich French bourgeoisie….more than ever we are secluding ourselves within our respective worlds."[104] According to Fanon, "the self-censorship of the local newspapers known for their traditional honesty strengthened the impression of incompleteness, of sketchiness, even of betrayal in the realm of news."[105] Many Algerians such as Yacef countered the increasing loss of objectivity in the Algerian press by turning to more moderate metropolitan French newspapers such as *Le Monde* or *L'Humanité*, but these papers became difficult, if not impossible to get due to French restrictions.[106] Feraoun adds that, "Since the *maquis* have banned the reading of Algerian newspapers and the bus from Algiers cannot bring the forbidden papers, we would not get any news if it were not for radio."[107]

While members of the resistance viewed the Algerian press as biased and unreliable, in many ways it served as an important resource for FLN leaders. The three major Algerian papers, *l'Echo d'Alger*, *Le Journal d'Alger*, and *La Dépêche Quotidienne*, allowed the FLN to monitor French actions and responses to its attacks. Yacef describes how Alain Sérigny, a particularly conservative *colon* and editor of the

---

be publicized. First published in *L'Humanité*, the account was censored, then republished as a book titled *The Question*.

[104] Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French Algerian War*, trans. Mary Ellen Wolf and Claude Fouillade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 46.

[105] Fanon, 1965, 77

[106] Yacef, 2002, 325; Fanon, 1965. Algerians who bought French newspapers from the metropole became targets for the French military. Eventually the FLN ordered Algerians to boycott the Algerian local press, and the French military began to seize shipments of more democratic newspapers coming from abroad.

[107] Feraoun, Journal, 153

Echo of Algiers, unintentionally aided the FLN by maintaining troop morale in the maquis, saying "[Sérigny]'s systematic remoteness from objectivity represented a sure measure of success."[108] As well as a measure of success, newspaper coverage of attacks allowed the FLN to send a stronger message to the French population and sway public opinion about the conflict on an international scale. As Abane Ramdane told Mohamed Lebjaoui, "We must have blood on the front page of all the newspapers."[109] Sometimes local papers even helped FLN leaders choose targets for attacks; the three bombs discharged in Algiers' two major stadiums during football games largely resulted from an article Yacef read about important upcoming matches.[110]

The FLN also produced its own monthly newspaper, *El Moudjahid*, as well as *Résistance Algérienne;* however the FLN was quick to realize the limitations of producing and disseminating a physical paper, especially one written in French, to a largely illiterate population in a vast and variable geographic area. When Benzine receives the fourth issue of *Résistance Algérienne* in September 1956 he writes in his journal, "This newspaper contributes to the consolidation of democratic spirit. How regrettable it is that we don't all know how to read!"[111] Despite France's 'civilizing mission' in Algeria, at the outset of the Algerian War 93.8% of the country's indigenous inhabitants fifteen years and older were illiterate.[112] The 1957 United Nations report on literacy identifies Algeria as a problem area where less than 12% of Algerian children ages 5-14 were enrolled in primary school, as opposed to 82% of French Algerian

---

[108] Saadi Yacef, *La Bataille d'Alger*, Tome II (Paris: Publisud, 2002), 91.
[109] Ouzegane, 1962, 77
[110] Yacef, 2002, 212.
[111] Benzine, 1965, 87
[112] UNESCO, 1957, 32

children. That one of the FLN leaders in the Algiers Casbah,[113] Ali La Pointe, was illiterate indicates the extreme frequency of illiteracy in Algerian society at the outset of the war.[114]

Instead of the numerous obstacles facing the press, radio used a single set of airwaves to immediately transmit messages over vast geographic areas. From a radio standpoint, Algeria's sheer size and diverse geography make it a communications challenge. The second largest country in Africa and about 3.5 times the size of Texas,[115] Algeria comprises 1,479,944 square miles. The Atlas Mountains divide the country horizontally and act as natural obstacles to radio and television signals.[116] Medium-wave frequencies are used to overcome this barrier and France brought broadcasting to Algeria in 1937 with the debut of France Cinq, or Radio Alger, which primarily relayed programs from Paris.[117] Arab and Kabyle programs were added in 1940 and 1948, respectively, but programming was limited because part of France's civilizing mission was to spread the French language.[118] By the 1950s Algeria had a 100-kilowatt transmitter in Algiers, 20-kilowatt transmitters in Oran and Constantine, and more transmitters were added to cover most of Northern Algeria's populated areas.[119] According to Frantz Fanon, "Radio-Alger, the French broadcasting station which has been established in Algeria for decades, a re-edition or an echo of the French National Broadcasting System operating from Paris, is

---

[113] *Remembering History*. The "Casbah" is the old Turkish part of Algiers inhabited by the indigenous Muslim population.
[114] Saadi Yacef, *Souvenirs de la bataille d'Alger* (Paris: Julliard, 1962).
[115] Central Intelligence Agency, "Algeria," *The World Factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.
[116] Yahia Mahamdi, "Algeria," in *Broadcasting in the Arab World*, ed. Douglas Boyd, 203-220 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), 203.
[117] Mahamdi, 1982, 205
[118] Mahamdi, 1982, 206
[119] Mahamdi, 1982, 206

essentially the instrument of colonial society and its values,"[120] a practice quite typical of colonial powers in Africa and Asia until at least the 1930s.

France

In many ways the rise of immigration in France corresponded with the technical development of broadcasting. The limited airwave space available for broadcasting and the centrality of Paris to French government led to a highly centralized government monopoly over radio. With this in mind a national broadcasting system centered in Paris was instituted, which also came with an orientation of broadcasting towards reinforcing the party in power. During the 1981 presidential election the Socialist Party was frustrated by its inability to get its message out over airwaves controlled by the right-wing government, and soon after François Mitterand's election as president he opened the airwaves to local radio stations. French media historian Richard Kuhn says "The Socialists' comprehensive reform of broadcasting – the 1982 statute – allowed for the establishment of local radio outside the control of the state…Limited to a transmission capacity of up to 30 kilometres, these private stations were forbidden to receive income from commercial advertising. Financial aid was to be provided by means of a state subsidy."[121] FBIS reports on Paris domestic service indicate that Mitterand's communications minister Georges Fillioud talked to the French public in 1981 about "the role to be occupied by local radio services in the future reform of broadcasting in France. The new stations will open the way to local expression, but not to anarchy."[122] While

[120] Fanon, 1965, 69
[121] Raymond Kuhn, *The media in France* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 100.
[122] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Communications Minister Details Broadcast Reforms," July 20,1981 – LD162344 (K20-21).

anarchy didn't ensue, the new broadcasting policies may have had some unintended consequences in giving a broad range of associations and populations grounds to challenge other policies and those in power.

Both before and after broadcasting reform, immigrant communities in France had a tenuous relationship with mainstream media. According to media scholar Jean-Paul Marthoz, "Most often, the majority press covers these communities in a stereotypical manner. Most often, the foreigners are only culprits or victims. They are only very rarely beings understood in the normality of their daily life."[123] In Kettane's novel *Le sourire de Brahim* he recalls what happened when a young *Beur* was lynched on the subway: "The journalists in search of a scoop and of sensational information try to embed themselves in the *banlieues*. But the youth don't put up with it. They consider the media as proponents of racist arguments, cultivating the voyeuristic instinct of people more than anything else. The subjects dealing with immigration and the housing projects are most of the time concerned with delinquency, breakage, stealing, misery."[124] Marthoz adds that "Foreign communities most often have a difficult relationship with dominant media. Sometimes this sentiment of hostility and incomprehension begins to add to badly resolved problems in the host society."[125] In French mainstream media anything dealing with immigration was often framed as an "immigration problem" and even in the middle of an article about the *Marche des Beurs* approach to Paris, *Le Monde* printed part of a press release from the extreme right Union Defense Group that ended with "The path from Marseille to

---

[123] Jean-Paul Marthoz, "Médias et 'va-et-vient- communicationnel des diasporas," in *D'un voyage à l'autre: Des voix de l'immigration pour un developpment pluriel*, ed. l'Institut Panos (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2001), 193.
[124] Nacer Kettane. *Le sourire de Brahim* (Paris: Editions Denoël, 1985), 134.
[125] Marthoz, 2001, 191

North Africa goes through the Mediterranean and not through the Seine."[126] The political right embraced this racist rhetoric as part of its critique of Socialist power centered on national security. The project of the right was to "link insecurity, unemployment, environmental degradation, to the large presence of foreign populations."[127] In an editorial against racism *Le Monde* quoted M. Maurice Arreckx, the re-elected mayor of Toulon, as saying his city "refused to be the trashcan of Europe," and M. François Dubanchet (both of the UDF party), head of the opposition at Saint Etienne that it was necessary "to be done with bronze delinquency."[128] Even *Le Monde*'s headline the day after the *Marche des Beurs* arrived in Paris was "Des Beurs à l'Élysée," as if an invasion had occurred.[129] Probably the most overt and famous example of anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric, however, came in 1983 with the circulation of an anonymous letter (called "My dear Mustapha") supposedly from an immigrant to his brother in Algeria, urging him to come and take advantage of the social services in France.

In addition to the right, many minorities accused the left of using their votes to get to power, then ignoring their interests. According to a 1983 FBIS report on Paris domestic service broadcasting, Mitterand urged the council of ministers to send illegal immigrants home. "The president of the republic stressed that illegal immigrants must not be confused with immigrant workers, 70 per cent of whom have been in France for over 10 years. The force of law must be applied to the illegal immigrants in an implacable manner, for if immigrants are allowed to enter unchecked, France runs the risk of losing

---

[126] "Le marche contre le racisme" *Le Monde* Dec 3, 1983.
[127] Michel La Fournière, "Le fantasme vert." *Le Monde*, November 8, 1983.
[128] Patrick Jarreau, "Cher Mustapha…," *Libération*, February 32, 1983.
[129] Nicolas Beau, "Des Beurs à l'Élysée," *Le Monde*, December 3, 1983, 1a.

its balance, added the head of state."[130] This contradictory tolerance for temporary foreign labor and intolerance for family regroupment and permanent settlement clearly demonstrates France's desire to use foreign labor and live without shouldering any of the social consequences, not to mention the damage done by colonialism that was one of the motivations for immigration. In an interview with *Jeune Afrique*'s Farid Alilat, Kettane says "If the French army had never destroyed my village, without a doubt I would never have left Algeria."[131] But as public opinion turned against immigration and the right had more electoral success, "the socialists in power abandoned their more liberal positions towards immigrants and minorities."[132]

Findings: Minority broadcasting

If certain technical qualities of radio make it useful as a tool for nationalist projects, other qualities make this technology especially useful as a medium for minority media capable of resisting the ideological and identity assumptions inherent in a nation-wide broadcasting system. According to Marthoz, community radio is a space well-suited to representing a more multiplistic form of discourse, for "Far from the big kiosks of newspapers in beautiful neighborhoods, at the end of television programs, in the shadow zones of the radio landscape, thousands of community media express a world of information simultaneously global and segmented, mixed and ghetto-ized."[133] That low literacy rates existed among both Algerians and North African immigrants in France

---

[130] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Mitterand urges action on illegal immigrants," September 1, 1983 – LD311828 (K3).
[131] Farid Alilat, "Nacer Kettane," *Jeune Afrique* April, 21, 2009.
[132] Richard Derderian, "Radio Beur, 1981-1992 L'échec d'un multiculturalisme à la française?" *Hommes & Migrations* 1191 (October 1995), 58.
[133] Marthoz, 2001, 189

made oral communication necessary to reach large segments of these populations. Additionally, the immediacy of radio communication over large geographic areas was an advantage to both FLN guerrillas as they tried to evade FLN attacks and the *Beur* community as it sought to update the members on various social movements or the news from Algeria. Perhaps the most important factor that played a role in the choice of radio as a technology was the low cost involved in the production, distribution and consumption of messages. In revolutionary Algeria, few people had the means to print and distribute a publication and much of the country did not yet have the electricity required for television. In 1980s France this was again the case for print media, and television involved prohibitive production costs. In both situations radio offered a relatively cheap and portable medium, which, combined with the cultural emphasis on oral communication in North African communities made radio a popular and productive means of reaching a dispersed population. With this in mind I chose to focus on FLN broadcasting because the FLN was the first Algerian organization to construct a system of transmissions outside of the colonial administration. The FLN was also the first unified Algerian independence movement, the first movement to invoke radio technology in the coordination of its operations, and ultimately the successful movement whose resistance resulted in Algeria's establishment as a sovereign state. On the other hand, my focus on Radio Beur is based on its claim to be the first general-interest radio station aimed at the Maghrebi audience,[134] and have the largest following of any minority radio station in France (often in literature on minority broadcasting in France "*Beur* broadcasting" and

[134] Alilat, 2009

"Radio Beur" are used as interchangeable terms[135]), as well as its visible leadership in social activism outside the studio, particularly in the political arena.[136]

Practical Considerations: FLN Radio

Because the French government did not give opposition movements access to the airwaves, the FLN was forced to develop its own means of transmission. The arrival of FLN broadcasts in Arabic, French and Berber dialects as an alternative to Radio-Alger led to widespread acceptance of radio not unlike that in other emerging nations. "Almost from their inception, liberation groups have recognized radio's potential for reaching and enlisting the support of the largely illiterate masses."[137] By appropriating this technology as a means to its own ends, the FLN made the radio an instrument of empowerment for the Algerian people. Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser lent a sympathetic ear to Arab nationalist movements and also had the technological capabilities to give them a voice. In 1958 Radio Cairo broadcast on eleven transmitters, with six more in development, and one of the programs was "News for Algeria, a battle communiqué to the nationalist rebels."[138] Nasser "saw radio as a way of reaching the rest of the Arab world with a message that would hasten the downfall of colonial and 'reactionary' governments and would lead to a resurgency of Arab pride."[139] According to Saddar, who operated a radio sale and repair shop in Djida before the revolution, even before the FLN began broadcasting "the population followed broadcasts of 'Voice of the Arabs' that

---

[135] Alex Hughes & Keith Reader, "Beur broadcasting" in *Encyclopedia of Contemporary French Culture* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998).
[136] Derderian, 1995,104
[137] Kushner, 1974
[138] Osgood Caruthers, "Cairo radio stirs restive people," *New York Times*, July 6, 1958.
[139] Donald Browne, *International Radio Broadcasting* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 281.

aired programs aimed at North Africa each day."[140] The first FLN broadcast came via the *Voice of the Arabs*, when the FLN went on air to read a proclamation announcing its existence and the start of the Algerian Revolution on Nov. 1, 1954. At the time the FLN was still developing its identity, but it invited "Algerian patriots of all social class, of all the purely Algerian parties and movements, to integrate themselves into the struggle for liberation."[141]

FLN radio began as an effort to monitor French military movements, and most sources seem to agree that Abdelhamid Boussouf (alias Mabrouk) was responsible for the development of an efficient FLN communication system.[142] Boussouf first planted the seeds during his command of Wilaya V in western Algeria and eastern Morocco, with the help of Senoussi Saddar (alias Moussa) and Ali Tledji (alias Omar), both former radio operators in the French army.[143] With the Congress of Soummam in August 1956 the FLN finally created the cohesive identity and direction that had been lacking in the first two years of the war, although disputes continued about the role of religion and *colons* in an independent Algerian state.[144] Even though it had begun the revolution with a broadcast, it was not until this meeting that FLN leaders decided to expand radio communication throughout Algeria and named Boussouf leader of the newly created Committee for Coordination and Execution (CCE).[145] The first transmitters and operators

---

[140] Saddar, 2002, 14
[141] Mohammed Harbi, *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne* (Paris: Les Editions Jeune Afrique, 1981), 101.
[142] The difficulty of verifying FLN personnel and documents is greatly complicated by the inconsistent transliteration of names from the Arabic, and by virtue of the fact that most members of the FLN adopted an alias upon joining the organization (Rahal, 2000, 44; Azzedine, 1979, 52.
[143] Saddar, 2002, 14 & 33; Debbah, 2008; Rahal, 2000, 130
[144] Stora, 2001, 62
[145] Debbah, 2006

arrived from Egypt to establish communication between the major cities of Alger, Oran and Constantine, but the FLN soon needed more equipment and personnel. The equipment problem was solved through clandestine dealings with allies and recuperation of French material, but the personnel problem persisted until the May 19, 1956 strike of the General Union of Muslim Algerian Students (UGEMA), at which point a large group of educated high school students became available for FLN service as radio operators.[146] One of these former high school students was Mansour Rahal (alias Saïd Ben Abdallah), who went through six months of training before becoming the radio operator for Wilaya I in the Aurès Mountains of eastern Algeria.[147]

By the end of 1957 Algerian broadcasting consisted of a Network Command Post in Tunis, a command post in each of the 6 wilayas, a training school in Morocco, monitoring centers, daily broadcasts from *The Voice of Fighting Algeria*,[148] and the Algerian Radio Network (RDA), which allowed the FLN to broadcast its message internationally via stations in Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli and Baghdad.[149] While international broadcasts built support for the FLN, the radio operators inside Algeria operated in increasingly difficult conditions. Rahal and Benkhodja both recount the difficulties of being constantly on the move, hungry and without light by which to conduct their nightly "vacations."[150] While Rahal refers to his team and their equipment as a "radio station" he admits that "in reality this name is presumptuous, taking into

---

[146] Rahal, 2000, 35; Saddar, 2002, 28; Debbah, 2008
[147] Rahal, 2000, 52
[148] *The Voice of Free and Fighting Algeria*, or *La Voix d'Algérie Libre et Combattatant*, is alternately referred to by sources as *The Voice of Algeria*, *The Voice of Free Algeria*, *The Voice of Fighting Algeria*, and the *The Voice of Free and Fighting Algeria*.
[149] Debbah, 2008; Saddar, 2002, 159. According to Saddar, the FLN asked all allies to re-air its broadcasts, which was done daily by Tunis and Cairo, and three times per week by the others.
[150] Rahal, 2000, 185; Duchemin, 1962, 167

account the primitive conditions…when we weren't in open nature, in spring and in summer, a modest uncomfortable alfalfa hut served as a shelter during the cold season."[151]

Around this time the FLN also acquired more technically advanced and mobile military ANGRC9 transmitter-receiver radios. According to Rahal, "This material was in fact, a true gem of the technology of the period…remarkable for its reliability and its 30 kilogram weight."[152] Despite Rahal and Saddar's joy at acquiring ANGRC9 radios, the rough conditions seem to keep them constantly telling stories of equipment problems, maintenance issues, and frequent turnover of sets between French and FLN forces. Operators seemed to develop an almost obsessive attachment to their equipment as a comforting companion and link to the exterior world. After each broadcast stations were disassembled and hidden in case of attack and Benkhodja loses sleep after he loses his material during an attack, while *maquis* member Abdelhamid Benzine bemoans his broken radio, saying "My transistor is broken. Since Sunday we haven't had news. What is happening in the other sectors? What is going on with Suez? And the Cyprus partisans?"[153] But if equipment could be comforting, it could also be dangerous and Saddar frequently refers to transmissions as "a double-edged sword."[154] In March 1956 FLN commander Mosteffa ben Boulaïd died when he turned on a booby-trapped radio recovered from the French.[155] Despite the danger, the FLN's desperate need for radios

[151] Rahal, 2000, 71
[152] Rahal, 2000, 44
[153] Benzine, 1965, 97
[154] Saddar, 2002, 67
[155] Duchemin, 1962, 97; Rahal, 2000, 125; Harbi & Meynier, 2004, 89

and batteries in particular only made operators inspect material more closely before attempting to put it to use.

Danger, however, was an everyday occurrence for radio operators in particular because as the FLN network grew, so did resistance from the French army. From the beginning of the revolution radio stations were targets for both sides of the conflict, but in the *maquis* the loud noise of FLN generators, heavy equipment and goniometers (signal tracking devices) used by the French to locate stations made broadcasting a dangerous activity both for the operator and his unit.[156] At one point the French communication and intelligence division developed a mobile goniometer system on board a cargo plane, but the plane was forced to fly at low altitude to diminish its audible distance and crashed into a rock wall in the Aurès Mountains.[157] Stories recounted by Rahal, Benkhodja, Debbah, and Saddar of FLN radio operators in the field seem to be a series of tales of close calls and constant improvisation in order to survive and to speak. Rahal recounts one instance where his commander ordered them to move camp in the middle of the night only to see their former area bombed at daybreak, and another where he was in the middle of transmitting messages when his camp was bombed, at which point it was well understood that protection of radio equipment was a priority. "Totally taken by surprise in the fire of fighters and bombers, but used to this type of situation, the *maquisards* promptly seized the set of radio devices and accessories, then dispersed…after a silence of several days, the chirping of C.9 'Fellagha' could be heard again, an indubitable sign

[156] Debbah, 2006
[157] Debbah, 2008; Rahal, 2000, 290; Saddar, 2002, 96

that all had resumed normally."[158] In this way radio activity became a sign of survival and symbolic of the Algerian refusal to be silenced.

Besides bombing, France jammed FLN radio transmissions by transmitting material on frequencies already in use to prevent messages from reaching their intended audience.[159] As a result of French jamming, FLN broadcasts adopted an unpredictable schedule, and even then they often arrived incomplete. These broadcasts were received by an estimated 255,000 Algerian receivers, in 1954 mostly property of the 'developed bourgeoisie.' According to Fanon, a significant shift occurred when the FLN announced the Voice of Free Algeria in 1956, and "in less than twenty days the entire stock of radio sets was bought up."[160] Even if Algerians did not own a radio, "broadcasters expect local unit leaders to interpret and pass along information in the manner suggested by the 'two-step flow' hypothesis, thus leveling to some extent the effects of linguistic bias and the scarcity of radio receivers."[161] Jamming coincided with efforts to restrict the number of sets and batteries[162] available, which started a black market trade over the Moroccan and Tunisian borders. The extent of French efforts to prevent the Algerian population from receiving radio broadcasts from resistance movements indicates the powerful degree of influence they believed this medium and its messages to have. As Rahal attests of the station in the Aurès, "In effect, the enemy appeared to be obsessed by the interception of this 'rebel' station, of which the broadcasts were exhaustive."[163]

---

[158] Rahal, 2000, 193
[159] Donald Browne, 1982, 16
[160] Fanon, 1965, 82
[161] Kushner, 1974, 306
[162] At the time of the Algerian War much of the country was without electricity and relied on batteries to operate transistor radios.
[163] Rahal, 2000, 199

Practical Considerations: Radio Beur

As a low-cost and more individualistic medium capable of catering to niche markets, radio is especially practical for often-illiterate first generation immigrants, particularly those from orally-oriented cultures like Algeria. Illiteracy was commonplace in immigrant communities in 1980s France, as evidenced by Mehdi Charef's dedication in his novel *Tea in the Harem*, which reads "for my mother, Mebarka, who can't read."[164] In addition to liberalizing the radio airwaves, in 1981 the Mitterand government "overturned the 1938 legislation prohibiting immigrant associations and provided funding for these organizations through the Deixonne decentralization program and the Social Action Funds (FAS) established during the Algerian war to earmark government monies for the integration of immigrant workers."[165] These policy changes contributed to a flood of immigrant organizations and *Beur* cultural products in the early 1980s. Radio stations such as Radio Beur, Radio-Orient, Radio-Soleil, and Radio Gazelle became the voices and supporters of a cultural movement composed of newspapers such as *Sans Frontières* and *Actualités de l'Immigration*, publishers like Editions Arcantère and Agence Im'media, and cultural and political associations such as the Berber Cultural Association and SOS-Racisme.

Out of this milieu, Radio Beuremerged as an outspoken advocate for the rights of a new type of French citizen. Originally started by "a handful of friends, almost all descendents of North African immigrants"[166] under the name of the Chalah Mouloud

[164] Mehdi Charef, *Tea in the Harem* (London: Serpent's Tail, 1989).
[165] Paul Silverstein, *Algeria in France: transpolitics, race, and nation* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 163.
[166] Derderian, 1995, 56

group,[167] the station is most closely associated with Nacer Kettane, an Algerian immigrant to France at age 5, doctor, author, political activist, member of the French High Council on Immigration, and now owner of Radio Beur's successor, Beur FM.[168] Like Kettane, Radio Beur journalists such as Abdel Aïssou and Kaïssa Titout were authors and political activists. Aïssou participated in the writing of *Octobre à Alger* by Radio Beur personnel, formed the Civic Beurs' Movement, and in subsequent years has held several high-level posts in the French government, while Titou became the first woman president in 1983 and simultaneously served as vice-president of SOS-Racisme in 1985.[169] Almost all Radio Beur personnel were of Maghrebi origin and either first- or second-generation immigrants, particularly those from the Kabyle region of Algeria. In fact, according to Derderian and others, "…throughout Radio Beur's eleven-year history Kabyles dominated all levels of administrative and operational positions at the station," which eventually led to internal divisions and accusations of discrimination against other language groups in programming.[170]

The logistical obstacles faced by Radio Beur in its early years mainly involved the competitive licensing and funding processes. In his 1986 book *Droit de réponse à la démocratie française*, Kettane writes "I will always remember the difficulty I had convincing the minister of communication that Radio Beur wasn't a radio of immigrants in the sense he expected, even if the station is able to, quite rightly, claim to be the radio

---

[167] According to Laude (1982), this group included Moha, Ben, Amar, Nacer, Leila, and Saliha, of which no last names are given.
[168] Alilat, 2009
[169] Victor Fortunato, "Abdel Aïssou sera le nouveau sous-préfet de Senlis," *Le Parisien*, June 4, 2005. < http://www.leparisien.fr/oise/abdel-aissou-sera-le-nouveau-sous-prefet-de-senlis-04-06-2005-2006007225.php> ; House, 2006, 294
[170] Derderian, 1997, 104

of immigration, insofar as its project embraces the past and the future of Maghrebi communities."[171] Kettane and his partners got their license, but continued to face monetary barriers. Although Social Action Funds (FAS) were made available to immigrant communities, the funds only partially paid for station operations, covering 15% of the total budget in 1983 and 21% in 1985.[172] With minimal funding, the station started close to its roots in a small house in the Parisian suburb of Montreuil. In order to buy equipment for the station its founders turned to their organizing abilities and arranged a concert by the singer Ifri with all the revenue going to radio material.[173] In January 1982 Radio Beur began broadcasting "from 8:00 in the morning to 1:00 in the morning, with minimal basic equipment (turn tables, tape deck, cassettes), from a modest studio."[174]

One of the major arguments against Radio Beur was the charge that it participated in the ghettoization of the *Beur* community. In a 1982 article, André Laude emphasizes that " '*beur*' is not a synonyme of 'hooligan,'" yet he describes *Beur*s listening from prisons, which he describes as places particularly frequented by " '*Beurs*' of all races."[175] While licensing applications for both Radio Beur and Beur FM posit the stations as important elements aiding the integration of those originating in immigration into French society,[176] others alleged that the production of *Beur* cultural products and media impeded that integration by further segregating this community from French mainstream

[171] Kettane, 1986, 33
[172] Derderian, 1995, 56. Quote from: "Dossier du subvention FAS #903059"
[173] Alilat, 2009
[174] Laude, 1982
[175] Laude, 1982
[176] Derderian, 1995, 111

media audiences. According to Kettane, these allegations are just another attempt to undermine the rights of non-ethnic French, as he said, "all initiatives relevant to the fundamental right to expression are qualified as Zionist, imperialist, or destabilizing maneuvers."[177] This tendency to criminalize difference instead of embracing it largely stems from the fundamentally French concept of republicanism originating in the 1789 French Revolution, according to which all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law. A 2005 report on representations of cultural diversity in television and radio from the Superior Audiovisual Council (CSA), however, clearly demonstrates differential access to and representation in French mainstream media even in contemporary cases. The council reports, "this study measures genre by genre the presence of minorities and equally concludes the fact that in certain genres, such as editorial programming, in-house productions and television news, minorities, even when they are represented, only rarely have the right to speak."[178] *Beur* media scholar Nabil Echchaibi believes that the French government's inconsistency in addressing difference and constant shifts between multiculturalist and assimilationist models have led to "an ethnicization of the *Beur* community and an increasing magnification of its cultural and religious differences."[179] Radio Beur, however, saw itself as merely filling the existing void of *Beur* representations in the media, as Kettane said in 1986, "the associations and community radios that are developing are going to pose themselves as the spokesperson of a reality

[177] Kettane, 1986, 30
[178] Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel. "La représentation de la diversité des origines et des cultures à la télévision et à la radio." Edited by Direction des programmes, Service de l'information et de la documentation. Paris: CSA Bilan 2005, 10.
[179] Nabil Echchaibi, "Republican Diasporas: BeurFM and the Suburban Riots in France," Paper presented at the International Communication Association Conference (San Francisco, California, May 24-28, 2007), 2.

until now obscured and manipulated."[180] In 2003 Beur FM personnel responded to a study examining the station's role as an "agent of integration or ghettoization"[181] with protestations that talk about integration is irrelevant because the *Beur* community *is* France. According to director Ahmed Nait-Balk one cannot talk about *beur*s integrating into French society because, "[*Beur*s] constitute French society. It is French society that has shaped us. We were born in France, educated in France. The difference is that we have a different perspective because of the heritage of our parents."[182]

Programming: FLN Radio

As with the November 1, 1954 proclamation from Radio Cairo announcing the formation of the FLN, many early FLN broadcasts consisted of reading tracts and mandates from FLN leadership via ally countries' broadcasting equipment. The creation of the *Voice of Algeria* at the end of 1956 by Saddar, Chibane Amar Boumédiene (alias Boum) and Tledji on assignment from Boussouf, introduced daily broadcasts covering Algerian territory almost entirely and including more commentary, news and star power.[183] Much of this star power seems to have been centered on the person of Messaoudi Mohamed Aïssa, who eventually became the main announcer as the FLN faced a "very insufficient" supply of editorial personnel.[184] According to Rahal:

> "The acts of war and acts of bravery were retransmitted on the airwaves by Messaoudi, with commentaries, superlatives, intonations, accents, and dignified words communicating such emotion that they found an echo in the profound

[180] Kettane, 1986, 36
[181] Bridget Knapper, "BeurFM: Agent of integration or ghettoisation?" Web Journal of French Media Studies 6 (1), Dec. 2003.
[182] Knapper, 2003
[183] Rahal, 2000, 130
[184] Saddar, 2002, 167

> sensitivity of all the listeners, subjects of a phenomenon of collective resonance."[185]

According to Saddar:

> "Aïssa Messaoudi became a giant; he put so much eloquence in his speech that one felt a powerful and sincere inspiration. Thus no one could pronounce the name of the Radio of Free and Fighting Algeria without associating his name. Moreover, he used everything he had in him to lend his voice and his faith to the radio broadcasts of which he became the incarnation and symbol."[186]

For two hours each day the *Voice of Algeria* broadcast in Arabic, French and Tamazight from a mobile station mounted on a truck bed in Northeast Morocco.[187] The main sources of information for the station were announcements, declarations and editorials from the Minister of Arms and General Liaisons (MALG), war reports, newspapers and other publications, and broadcasts from other radio stations in North Africa and Europe. The station broadcast on three different wavelengths with editorial content, military information, political news, special features and patriotic songs.[188] As director of national transmissions for the FLN Saddar recounts how discs of patriotic songs and military marches were requested for use during broadcasts, but at first all their team had access to was Arabic pop music. "It wasn't until after 2 years of service that we had a record collection always with military marches, patriotic songs, and Algerian songs or classical music."[189] Some of this content, however, never reached its intended audience because frequently audiences did not hear the whole broadcast due to systematic spectrum jamming by the colonial authorities, and the necessity of sharing sets

---

[185] Rahal, 2000,131
[186] Saddar, 2002, 129
[187] Tamazight is a group of similar Berber languages, but the term is also used to refer to a standard Berber dialect.
[188] Saddar, 2002, 167
[189] Saddar, 2002, 61

contributed to the communal nature of radio in Algerian society. Sharing of sets combined with partially jammed broadcasts forced listeners to go through a communal exercise of reconstructing what they thought they heard. "Everyone would participate, and the battles of yesterday and the day before would be re-fought in accordance with the deep aspirations and the unshakable faith of the group. The listener would compensate for the fragmentary nature of the news by an autonomous creation of information."[190]

When Rahal established his post in December 1957 he recounts how the first message arrived, "expressing the satisfaction of the authorities with fraternal and patriotic salutations used. Naturally all the messages were coded, and rapidly the station became operational, with traffic gaining progressively in intensity."[191] Part of Boussouf's goal was to install two stations (one fixed and one mobile), four men and the equipment needed to operate radio posts in every Wilaya.[192] As major extensions to the FLN network in 1957 via these new posts and operators increased radio traffic, the *Voice of Fighting and Free Algeria* continued its popularity into the field as radio stations listened in between their own transmissions. Benzine describes a night spent "under the stars at the foot of the mountain, combattants and partisans, we listened to the radio 'The Voice of Fighting Algeria.' Three times per week we listen regularly. Each time, our hearts sink at the recitation of atrocities committed."[193] In the end, the use of radio technology influenced the administration of the FLN by limiting interior and exterior contact to brief

[190] Fanon, 1965, 86. Fanon explains that various audience members would 'fill in the gaps' by 'creating' what the announcers must have said, even if the broadcast itself was unintelligible.
[191] Rahal, 2000, 70-71
[192] Saddar, 2002, 84
[193] Benzine, 1965, 78

exchanges. According to Rahal, one consequence of that was "the operational command of the Wilaya was absent from the negotiations before big decisions."[194]

Programming: France

As one station able to get a license for France's new independent community radios, and funded through FAS, Radio Beur was particularly successful in reaching France's North African community, with between 20,000-30,000 listeners even in its infancy.[195] By 1991 Radio Beur had the largest audience of any minority radio station in France with 121,500 listeners according to a poll by Paris-based market research company IPSOS.[196] The station differentiated itself from other stations that it saw as too militant, unprofessional, and attached to traditional music from the Arab world. Instead Radio Beur's project was to "make a non-militant independent radio station, refusing the soothing and triumphant third world discourse, denying the ghetto without having any worries about justification."[197] It gave priority to news from North Africa and of the North African population in France, as evidenced by its decision to stop all broadcasts in order to cover the October 1988 protests in Algiers.[198] Despite its professionalism, Radio Beur did not embrace objectivity in the same way mainstream media claimed to. In *Octobre à Alger*, a book written by station personnel to commemorate its coverage of the 1988 protests, Radio Beur's goals and its take on objectivity are addressed:

> "This would be one of the fights of Radio Beur; the fight for the recognition of the full and rich presence of immigration whether it is of Maghrebi origin or

[194] Rahal, 2000, 170
[195] André Laude, "Ça veut dire quoi, Radio-Beur?" *Les Nouvelles Littéraires* (Paris: Nouvelles Littéraires, 1982).
[196] Hughes & Reader,1998, 67
[197] Laude, 1982
[198] Abdel Aissou; Amriou, Kamel; Chouiter, Kamel; Radio Beur, *Octobre à Alger* (Paris: Seuil, 1988), 24.

> elsewhere. Media heavy with specificity, Radio-Beur attempts to cover the event, 'the events,' sad reminiscence of the past, with objectivity. But is horror objective?"[199]

With these principles in mind, Radio Beur produced a wide variety of programs on such topics as literature and cinema, Berber language and culture, and a question and answer forum for legal questions. Hosted by *Beur* lawyer Rilen, "Juridiquement vôtre" held discussions and debates around such topics as the right to vote and the problems presented by double nationality.[200] During one show about voting rights in 1985 the host panel agreed that "The majority of this community…is going to live in France whatever happens…They will never go back. It is necessary to make it so they can live with dignity in the country that is France."[201] One central goal in this quest for dignity was securing and facilitating voting rights for immigrant communities. According to Rosenblum, "Radio Beur, covering the Paris area, has 400,000 listeners. It launched a voter registration campaign aimed at an estimated 1.5 million French of North African extraction."[202] Another part of Radio Beur's push for dignified living involved self-expression; even if this discourse took place alternately in French, Kabyle and Arabic. Much of the station's programming seems to have centered around live studio performances from *Beur* musicians, who chatted with hosts in between performing songs. During a broadcast recorded in 1985, a singer named Mouloud sings first in French and then in Kabyle, and another named Fafa discusses his lack of identification with the label

---

[199] Aissou et al., 1988, 24
[200] Vidéo Vérité, 1985, 64
[201] Vidéo Vérité, 1985, 65
[202] Rosenblum, 1988, 273

'*Beur*.' "I am not a *Beur* singer. I am a singer…simply a singer. I sing for everyone."[203] According to Hughes & Reader, "many of Radio Beur's programs depended on listener participation. For example, *Les Beurs et la plume* gave listeners the opportunity to compose and present their own poetry, and led to the station publishing several collections of poetry, the first being *Prise de Parole* in 1985."[204] Other examples of programs were shows such as *Triptyque* featuring literature and cinema, *Canoun* and *Tafsut*, which addressed Berber language and culture, and *Flipper*, a show involving sketches produced by youth.[205] Radio Beur also broadcast Friday prayers, shows about traditional marriage, and *Parole de femmes*, a call-in show allowing women to talk about typically taboo topics.[206] The station also embraced new genres of music being created in the banlieues by mixing Algerian *cha'abi* and *raï* music with Arabic and Kabyle lyrics into Euro-American genres to form such popular groups as *Carte de Séjour* and *Les Rockin' Babouches*.[207] This support was so strong that as late as 1997 "several former station members commented that Radio Beur was the driving force behind the success of *raï* music in France.[208] These new groups were geared more towards the *Beur* generation than their parents, and acted as a foundation for social protests such as Im'media's "Rock against the police."

Perhaps one of the best examples of reappropriating discourse about French identity is *Carte de Séjour*'s remake of Charles Trenet's "Douce France." The original

---

[203] Vidéo Vérité, 1985, 65
[204] Hughes & Reader, 1998, 67; Derderian, 1995, 56; Derderian, 1997:106
[205] Derderian, 1997, 106-107
[206] Laude, 1982
[207] Silverstein, 2004, 163
[208] Derderian, 1997, 106

version of the song is performed in a traditional French troubadour style, with lyrics such as the refrain "Sweet France/precious country of my childhood/cradled in such carefree bliss/I have kept you in my heart/my village/with the bell tower, with the noble houses/where the kids my age/shared my happiness." These lyrics obviously painted a much different picture of childhood than that experienced in the banlieues, and participate in a discourse that excludes the experiences of immigrants in favor of a more nostalgic pastoral narrative about French identity. *Carte de Séjour*'s name alone complicates this narrative about "my prairie and my house" because a *carte de séjour* is a residency permit, or the equivalent of an American green card assigned to a foreigner. When the band remade Charles Trenet's hit, they made it seem all the more ironic by keeping the same lyrics, while introducing Arabic music and beats in the background. The new version caused controversy, but according to Radio France Internationale (RFI) in "1986, the radios played the rock-raï version of Douce France from Carte de Séjour. The era changed, 'French rock' also.'"[209]

Participation in cultural events and social movements was a defining characteristic of Radio Beur and its leadership, and throughout the station's existence it identified itself as "the most important organizer of concerts in the Maghrebi community."[210] In 1985 it hosted a concert that drew an audience of 7,000 people to one of the largest concert venues in France.[211] These events were both an important source of revenue for the station and defining moments for many young *beur*s, offering chances for

[209] Radio France International, "France Rock: Le grand métissage," http://www.rfimusique.com, September 20, 2004. Original quote: "1986, les radios diffusent la version rock-raï de Douce France de Carte de Séjour. L'époque change, le "rock français" aussi."
[210] Derderian, 1995, 56
[211] Derderian, 1995, 56

them to reach outside their community through music and its close relationship with politics. In *Le sourire de Brahim*, Brahim goes to a Rockabylie concert symbolically located in the place de la République, where he asks his friend why the singer held up a fist with his hand painted black and his friend replies "It's to symbolize the fight of the black people. Because rock came from the blues and jazz that African Americas created with ragtime. But more than a sign of mourning, it's a sign of hope and of struggle."[212] In this way Radio Beurparticipated in public expression of the *Beur*community, supporting efforts for solidarity and outreach.

Symbolic Importance of Minority Broadcasting

As well as being of practical and personal importance, minority broadcasting often serves a symbolic function within the communities it represents. Again and again in documents discussing the Algerian Revolution the conflict is referred to as the "the battle of the airwaves."[213] Rahal repeatedly refers to radio as the "umbilical cord" connecting FLN authorities abroad with the *maquis*, saying "the authorities profited greatly from having this umbilical cord for updated information, practically in real time, on the doings of the *maquis*, as well as for the transmission of orders."[214] Besides keeping authorities and soldiers in the field informed, radio often seemed to serve as a symbol of the outside world and become a comfort for often-isolated bands of guerrilla fighters. In his war journal, Benzine describes how he listens to the chirping of the transistor while he's writing, saying "This is precious and necessary not to damage it."[215] Rahal describes

[212] Nacer Kettane. *Le sourire de Brahim* (Paris: Editions Denoël, 1985), 177.
[213] Debbah, 2006
[214] Rahal, 2000, 70
[215] Benzine, 1965, 49

listening to Messaoudi's broadcasts as comforting, saying "the airwaves carry not only the tone of his voice but also the pulsations of his heart, toward civil and military populations, thirsty for information and comfort."[216] At times, radio even provided a diversion from the reality of war, as when Benzine and his fellow fighters spent a night at a farmer's house eating and listening to music and news on a transistor radio. "Sitting beneath a big fig tree in the fresh mountain air, one could take us for tourists on an excursion. These are the moments of relaxation that make our struggle agreeable sometimes."[217] As in many armed conflicts most of the young (often very young) FLN combatants came from poor rural communities, and lived a difficult and dangerous day-to-day existence. Radio as a technology introduced them to an increasingly awareness of the world and their new position in it, as when Benzine recovered a portable radio set. "Almost everyone was seeing a transistor for the first time. One can imagine their stupor in front of this machine that spoke every language. For two hours we listened to all the Arabic stations: Algiers, Cairo, Tangiers."[218] After three months of attacks and forced radio silence, Rahal's team was happy to set up its station in the Aurès again, and he believes that "This initiative to resume radio contact was also in a modest measure, symbolic of the resurrection of the ALN."[219]

Similar to the FLN's war of the airwaves, Radio Beur saw itself battling a powerful discourse intent on disenfranchising a new type of French citizen. In his *Droit de réponse à la démocratie française* Kettane calls on those in power to "stop the war of

[216] Rahal, 2000, 130
[217] Benzine, 1965, 57
[218] Benzine, 1965, 31
[219] Rahal, 2000, 312

words and call a cat a cat,"[220] in reference to the extensive slew of labels applied to the *Beur* community. All of these terms - *harki, immigré, arabe, berbère, doté, sans papiers, français musulman* – coexist with the implication that their owner is "not quite French." Rather than be just another label, "*beur*" symbolizes an attempt to acknowledge these disparities in a national discourse for the first time.[221] After the *Marche des Beurs*, Radio Beur became representative of a more diverse conception of French identity. "The name Radio Beur became a household name during the march, but also in the years after as French media, advertisers, and politicians turned to it as a voice and representative of the *Beur* community."[222] This idea of being a symbolic "voice" for its community and the refusal to be silenced comes up continually in readings about Radio Beur, as indicated by the word *parole* or speech, in many program and publication titles coming from the station such as *Paroles de femmes* and *Prise du Parole*. The importance of an autonomous voice, of which the *Beur* community had previously been deprived, is underscored in multiple works of *Beur* fiction where the protagonists feel they have been silenced by society and deprived of dignity. In Charef's *Tea in the Harem*, main character Majid points to repression as a source of violence, saying "It turns destructive, and that means violence…a refusal…a refusal to let yourself be silenced…a refusal to allow yourself to be swallowed up. When you try to break the silence and the self-destructiveness, violence takes the upper hand, and you turn savage."[223] Likewise, in Kettane's *Le Sourire de Brahim*, Brahim's friend declares, "Until we create our own

[220] Kettane, 1986, 100
[221] Durmelat, 2008, 51
[222] Echchaibi, 2007, 15
[223] Charef, 1989, 52

radio stations, television stations, and newspapers, they will always have the better share and they will be able to go on about their bullshit for years. You understand, it's necessary for us to organize ourselves and talk about ourselves."[224] These attestations hinge on the same symbolism to which FLN radio appealed – that to speak and to express oneself is an act of dignity, identity, and political efficacy, of persistence and the refusal to succumb to marginalization by a majority discourse.

Discussion of Recurring Themes

Cultural Geography: discourse rooted in locality/transcending space

In course of compiling my findings about FLN and Radio Beur, several themes emerged repeatedly in discussions about radio in revolutionary Algeria and the *Beur* community to the extent that they warrant further discussion in connection with this topic. The role of radio in shifting centers of power from cities, making coordinated campaigns possible across diverse and distant areas, and expanding cultural referents indicates a shifting cultural geography in relation to the spaces in which radio operated. While the alternative discourses produced by FLN and Radio Beur were initially very rooted in the places from which they emerged (despite the fact that FLN radio was certainly far more dispersed than the Radio Beur enterprise), much of their power derived from their ability to enter discourses beyond the delineated and stigmatized spaces of the *maquis* and the *banlieues*.

Algerian cultural geography: the maquis

In Algeria colonialism altered cultural geography by centralizing previously tribal power structures in the regional urban centers of Algiers, Oran and Constantine, and

[224] Kettane, 1985, 166

replicating the French model of a very Paris-based administration system. With improvements in infrastructure and communications, Algeria's urban centers increasingly responded directly to decrees from and developments in metropolitan France. According to Rahal, "Geographically, France is situated as a close neighbor of Algeria, despite separation by the Mediterranean. Taking into account modern means of communication and transport, the distance appears insignificant…This ideal situation influenced the utopic myth of a perpetual domination of this African country considered an extension of the motherland."[225] The paradoxical discourse that the landmass of Algeria had become an intrinsic part of France while its native inhabitants had not, as well as the appropriation of Algerian land, constructed sharp divisions in Algerian social spaces. According to historian Bejamin Stora "Colonization led to the displacement of millions of peasants to the High Plateaux, where inferior land was very vulnerable to erosion. As Muslims were pushed into more arid lands, the production of food crops dropped; grain harvests decreased by 20 percent between 1880 and 1950, even as the population doubled."[226] So the impoverished populations of rural Algeria were ripe for resistance movements, and many already-existing autonomous bands integrated into the FLN in the first several years of the revolution. After the Congress of Soummam the FLN attempted to wage war in the heart of Algiers during 1957's infamous *Battle of Algiers*, but after the year-long battle was forced to move its administrative structures back into the *maquis*. In 1958 Fanon observed the separated spaces of Algerian cities, saying "The colonizers have not settled in the midst of the natives. They have surrounded the native city; they

[225] Rahal, 2000, 80
[226] Stora, 2001, 13

have laid siege to it. Every exit from the Kasbah of Algiers opens on enemy territory. And so it is in Constantine, in Oran, in Blida, in Bone."[227]

Thus the *maquis* – rural bands of guerrilla fighters in the Aurès, Kabylie, and other areas of Algeria – were really where the identity of the resistance was formulated, where heart of the revolution lived and where the contradictions of colonialism's "civilizing mission" were most evident. Of rural Algeria Rahal testifies, "The scattered or grouped rural habitat, in a general manner, is precarious and reflects a certain pauperism, that is the lot of nearly all Algerians in the country and mountains."[228] The inability of the French army to penetrate and surround these areas as it did the Casbah of Algiers allowed more strategic offensives against smaller units of French troops with intimate knowledge of the land as an advantage. According to Rahal, "In Zone 1, the combination and integration of all these geographic and human factors naturally generated optimal conditions for the establishment, and the permanent regeneration of the ALN, the spearhead of the independence movement."[229] The influence of the *maquis* on FLN identity and the character of the revolution was facilitated by radio communication between these isolated groups in the *douar* and *djebel* and a single hierarchy of leadership.[230] In effect the advent of the FLN signified a reordering of space into the administrative divisions of Wilayas and Zones all united under an external authority speaking through field transmissions and the *Voice of Algeria*. "By its phantom-like character, the radio of the *Moudjahidines*, speaking in the name of Fighting Algeria,

---

[227] Fanon, 1965, 51-52
[228] Rahal, 2000, 218
[229] Rahal, 2000, 220
[230] *Douar* is Arabic for a group of villages and *djebel* is Arabic for mountain.

recognized as the spokesman for every Algerian, gave to the combat its maximum of reality."[231] For those in the field, FLN radio emphasized the solidarity of their struggle despite variable geographic coordinates. As Benzine repeatedly points out "In any case, news of other sectors is comforting. Our brothers are fighting everywhere," and "All the people are fighting in the ranks. We are all *fellagha*."[232]

In many ways the extension of radio networks and their activities are indicative of FLN progress and setbacks throughout the revolution. When Rahal's long-time colleague leaves to set up another FLN radio station in the Aurès Rahal reflects that "thus, ALN transmissions in the Aurès, with this extension of the interior network, in the middle of the war, register non-negligible progress."[233] Externally, the revolution forced the FLN to enter the vast network of news and engage in the autonomous creation of information, in doing so engaged Algeria in a worldwide debate about domination and self-determination, about the use of torture and the displacement of millions to militarized settlement camps, and about the contradictions between representations of France as the universal nation and its imperfect manifestation. These debates opened the conflict to influence from international public opinion and rendered French efforts to institute a *huis clos* media policy futile.[234] This opening of media channels not only allowed FLN messages out, but also initiates wider use of a technology that allowed Algerians to consume a greater variety of cultural products from regional allies. In describing his unit,

---

[231] Fanon, 1965, 87
[232] Benzine, 1965, 50 & 93. *Fellagha* stems from the Arabic word for bandit and refers members of the FLN and ALN.
[233] Rahal, 2000, 258
[234] Rahal, 2000, 30. '*Huis clos'* or behind closed doors, refers to French desires to tightly control the production and dissemination of information about fighting in Algeria.

Rahal says "when the soldiers were left to their banality, they assembled around the closest leader who had a working radio receiver. There, they listened to the suave voice of Oum Keltoum, Najat Essaghira, Essmahan, or another of their favorite stars, when it wasn't the *Voice of Free Algeria*…"[235] The combatants' preference for Arabic music clearly indicates their affinity for cultural referents from their Eastern allies over those from Europe, and demonstrates the leadership of Nasser's Egypt in pan-arab cultural production. According to Algerian music scholar Hana Noor Al-Deen, in the mid-twentieth century "Egyptian music was extremely popular throughout the Arab countries. People waited zealously for the airtime of Egyptian music on the radio in order to hear legendary singers such as Umm Kulthum, Abdel Wahab, and others."[236]Along with cultural products from Egypt came coverage of the 1956 Suez Crisis, which Algerians followed closely as an example of speaking back to Western powers.[237]

French cultural geography: the banlieue

If every identity is premised on the existence of an "other" the *banlieue* is the other for French cities. Media discourses often used "the civilized/savage dichotomy for application to urban and periurban space, resulting in higher level security and accentuating the stigmatization of the youth of working-class neighborhoods."[238] This physical space on the periphery of industrial centers embodies the mental and material exclusion of its habitants, in effect imprisoning them in concrete towers "sandwiched

[235] Rahal, 2000, 102. Oum Keltoum was an Egyptian singer, songwriter and actress, Najat Essaghira was an Egyptian singer, and Essmahan was a Syrian-Egyptian singer and actress.
[236] Noor Al-Deen, 2005, 602
[237] For an example of concern over the Suez crisis, see the quote from Benzine on page 48.
[238] Durmelat, 2008, 184

between motorways, ringed by factories and by police."[239] Despite being surrounded by police the *banlieues* are depicted as territories outside the law, and *Beur* literature often equates them with the American Wild West.[240] In *Tea in the Harem*, main character Madjid is walking his father home when "Pat comes down the street to meet them, his hands in the back pockets of his jeans, walking like a cowboy who's about to wreck the local saloon."[241] Media rarely ventured out to cover these communities, and if they did it was as a result of tragedies such as the lynching mentioned above. According to Kettane "The media dissects us and offers us as feed to laboratory researchers happy for the bargain."[242] These populations were dissected, yet they did not have the right of response once the results were published. "The Maghrebi youth that grew up in France during the 1960s and 70s consider themselves as an 'invisible generation.'"[243] They might have been invisible, but the "concrete jungle"[244] they inhabited was there for everyone to see, insulting their dignity and adding to the dirty Arab stereotype. In *Tea in the Harem*, *Le Sourire de Brahim*, and *Shantytown Kid*, each young protagonist discusses the embarrassment and despair they experience because of the stigmatized environment in which they live and the despair at how distant it is from what they see on television. According to *Tea in the Harem* protagonist Madjid his family was better off in Algeria

---

[239] Charef, 1989, 20
[240] Interestingly, members of the Algerian resistance were also referred to as *hors-la-loi*, or outlaws (Barrat, 1955, p3; Jeanson, 1955).
[241] Charef, 1989, 36. Additionally, when Azzedine joins the *maquis*, he compares the members to American Indians, describing how they know the land like the back of their hand and move without noise, pausing every 100 steps "to take a knee like an Indian of the Prairie…listening to the most minute noises of nature," (Azzedine, 1979, 61).
[242] Kettane, 1986, 18
[243] Derderian, 1995, 55
[244] Charef, 1989, 23

because "You can always hide an empty stomach, but a hovel is there for all to see. What happened to dignity?"[245]

In *Beur* literature, the narrative construction of the *banlieue* seems to be centered around the powerlessness of the people inhabiting this space. Charef suggests that this geography of exclusion ends up eventually influencing the identity of its inhabitants so that "you find yourself swallowed up, swollen, stifled by the desire to scream, a desire to explode."[246] Without the power to make themselves be heard, recognized, and understood by the society in which they live, some of the *Beur* generation turned to violence to break the silence. The troubled relationship between *banlieues* and the police only fueled the anger expressed by *Beur* youth. In *Le Sourire de Brahim,* Brahim and his friends convert an abandoned garage into their space for listening to music and dancing, but then half-drunk police officers "put themselves to breaking everything that the youth have taken months to collect. Brahim and his friends spoke in *verlan* or in Javanese and even if the police officers grabbed them, they managed to get away."[247] Police brutality is a common theme in descriptions of the *banlieues,* and the inability to protect their home and people from abuse seems to have been a constant frustration for young *Beur*s. In *Tea in the Harem*, Madjid admits "When you try to break the silence and the self-destructiveness, violence take the upper hand, and you turn savage."[248] That Madjid defines the problems of the *banlieues* as "self-destructiveness" demonstrates the difficulty of resisting both overt and institutionalized racism and classism, and the sense of personal failure that

[245] Charef, 1989, 97
[246] Charef, 1989, 51
[247] Kettane, 1985, 38
[248] Charef, 1989, 52

comes with being powerless to affect change, playing into the dominant discourse that the situation in immigrant communities is its own fault.

The overwhelming feelings of powerlessness and despair expressed by the *Beur* community seem to relate to their status as a doubly disenfranchised population. Because the community is both culturally and economically disadvantaged, it is an easy target for racism and use as a scapegoat for societal problems. The economic downturn of the late 1970s and early 1980s increased ethnic and class tensions, an environment that led Mokhtar Lakehal to question in *Le Monde*, "In the affirmative, where are these representative instances and these legitimate representatives? In favor, the appearances on TV, the speech on the radio, the signatures of articles for the large public can be counted on fingertips."[249] As a community radio station, Radio Beur made meaningful self-representation in the media its mission by "giving speech to everyone, in formally questioning the authorities on the idea of human rights," which the station says "are integral dimensions of our journalistic and human ethics."[250] By thus attempting to raise the attention to and cultural capital of the *Beur* community, Radio Beur advocated for equal application of French citizenship laws and dialogue with the discourses of identity from which *Beur*s were frequently excluded. On many occasions this interpellation to dialogue connected *Beur*s in previously isolated *banlieues* on the outskirts of cities and took them into center city spaces, but it also forced French authorities to face its new

[249] Lakehal, 1983
[250] Aissou et al., 1988, 24

citizenry outside the Elysée and acknowledge the emerging political power inherent in the *Beur* community.[251]

Historical Disconnect

One remarkable feature of the dominant discourse of French national identity is its historical disconnect. Obvious lacunae have forever existed around such problematic historical moments as colonialism and the role of immigrant workers in the modern industrialization of France. Perhaps the best example of French amnesia is the nation's failure to publicly acknowledge the Algerian War until 37 years after it happened, despite the fact that many of the immigrants living in France could accurately be described as refugees from the conflict, as well as the economic and cultural impact of colonialism. These painful periods of history challenged the singular and triumphant discourse of French nationalism, and as Durmelat points out "the imagination of [the *Beur*] community puts the notion of nation in question, in France as well as in the Maghreb, because it doesn't reproduce a single historical heritage."[252] That the populations of colonial Algeria and suburban France emerged from spaces that have long hosted a multiplicity of cultural constructs and alternatively drawn upon them all, their attachments and identifications are understandably complex.

Algeria's Amnesia

Throughout the history of North Africa and its series of invasions by various empires, Islam acted as the major instrument of unification in Berber and Arab communities. According to Stora, "Indeed, the underlying history of Algeria, beyond the

[251] The *Palais de l'Elysée* is the French presidential residence.
[252] Durmelat, 2008, 37

skirmishes among tribes, lies in the decisive effect of Islam. The gradual Arabization of the Berbers, undertaken by the sects and by an aristocracy of religious figures, gave Algeria an indisputably Eastern personality."[253] Indeed most resistance to colonialism and French occupation came in the name of holy wars and were led by religious authorities such as the Marabout of the Qadriyah Mahi Eddin sect in the west and his son Abd-al-Kadar.[254] With attachments to Islam since the 7th century, both Algerian identity and opposition to occupation revolved around the central social structure of religion. After the establishment of colonialism, however, the French established a system of schools based on the metropolitan model, closed many Koranic schools and attempted to institutionalize the French language at the expense of Arabic. Fewer schools and declining Arabic literacy limited access to Arabic scholars and the Eastern cultural products with which Algerians most closely identified, instituting a sense of historical disconnect. Algerian authors discussing the revolution frequently define it as a matter of dignity, or the deprivation thereof, heritage and the devaluation of linguistic and cultural traditions. Rahal attended a Koranic school in Morocco, which, like radio, he describes as "an umbilical cord" linking him to the original culture of the region.[255] In high school he pursued Arabic further and recounts his experiences in the class of Monsieur Benyakhlef, who "never missed an opportunity to deviate a bit on the subject of contemporary politics and implant in his Muslim students a real pride for their civilization."[256]

[253] Stora, 2001, 3
[254] Stora, 2001, 4
[255] Rahal, 2000, 166
[256] Rahal, 2000, 167

Like Monsieur Benyakhlef, in many ways FLN broadcasting attempted to ameliorate the affinity of Algerians with their Islamic heritage. Evidence of this exists from the very beginning of the *Voice of Algeria* when it broadcast recordings of the Koran. Additionally, the first announcers adopted on-air names "steeped in history."[257] Thus Arabic announcer Bencheikh Rédha went by Okba after the man who brought Islam to North Africa, French announcer Abdelmadjid Meziane went by Salaheddine El Ayoubi after the man who fought Richard the Lion Heart and delivered Palestine during the crusades, and Berber announcer Benabdellah Hamoud went by Youghourta after the "illustrious man of which the name is the synonym of national sovereignty, of struggle and resistance."[258] So at the same time that the revolution incited Algeria move toward modernization in terms of organization and technology, for many Algerians it also represented a return to an historic Islamic heritage.

French Denial

French cultural historian Alec Hargreaves states in the foreword of Begag's book that the text attempts to "gently undermine the claims of those – numerous in the 1980s and still significant in number today – who present France's North African minority as a threat to national identity."[259] Both Begag and Kettane include sections in their books about being told in elementary school that they were descendants of the Gauls. Begag's teacher told him "We are all descendents of Vercingétorix!" which he follows with "The teacher was always right. If he said we were all descendants of the Gauls, then he was

[257] Saddar, 2002, 52
[258] Saddar, 2002, 53
[259] Alec G. Hargreaves, Introduction to *Shantytown Kid* by Azouz Begag (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), xvi.

right."[260] In Kettane's case, his protagonist Brahim tells his friends that "One day at school, he vomited on his text when the history professor talked about 'their ancestors the Gauls.'"[261] Ironically propaganda about Gaul ancestors and the need to defend la France 'our motherland' were employed by the French government in recruiting North Africans to fight for France in the world wars. After the war these colonial troops received little recognition from France. In *Le Sourire de Brahim*, Brahim's 65-year-old uncle Said, who is a veteran of the second world war and worked in France for forty years after the war gets deported within 24 hours of being stopped on his way home from work, leading Brahim to reflect that "Not only has France not stomached the recognition, what's more she amputates her memory. The Crimean War, the battle of Marne, Bir Hakeim, Monte Cassino and all the other battles where North Africans in the first line served as cannon fodder."[262] This "amputation of memory" still exists, but certain changes have been made due to the growing cultural capital of Maghrebi populations in France. Rachid Bouchareb's 2006 film *Indigènes* publicized the plight of North African World War II veterans, and after a private screening President Chirac raised the pensions received by colonial troops to equal the pensions of the French soldiers alongside whom they served.[263] This example illustrates the power of minority self-representations in media to counter dominant discourses, in addition to influencing public opinion and policy debates. Indeed for Kettane "identity is first and foremost this: a refusal to forget."[264]

---

[260] Azouz Begag, *Shantytown Kid* (*Le gone du Chaâba*). Translated by Naïma Wolf & Alec G. Hargreaves (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007(orig. 1986), 48.
[261] Kettane, 1985, 156
[262] Kettane, 1985, 145
[263] Alec G. Hargreaves, "Indigènes: A Sign of the Times" *Research in African Literatures* 38(4) (Winter 2007), 204-216.
[264] Kettane, 1986, 27

In addition to forgetting about the service of North Africans in combat, France also often forgets that the nation's success in modern industry and rebuilding after those wars is in large part built on the shoulders of immigrant laborers. According an article in *Le Monde*, while the foreign population in France doubled in the twenty years after the Algerian War, France's gross domestic product also almost tripled in that time. "I'll say it clearly, we would not have succeeded in this performance without the immigrants, who have worked hard for this."[265] Kettane too feels that "no one can deny that foreigners and the generations that come from immigration have contributed in a decisive way to the construction and development of this nation."[266] When thirty thousand Algerians protested in Paris on October 17, 1961 they did so as both Algerians and contributors to the economy of France, many of them long-time residents in the metropolis. Radio Beur played a role in the collective remembrance of the close to 200 people that died and the thousands that were injured by French police that night by suggesting that the *Marche des Beurs* begin its final leg at the Canal Saint Martin in 1983, and holding a public ceremony when a plaque was placed there in 1985. Historian James House notes that Radio Beur hosted programs about Franco-Algerian history from its beginning, including programs about October 17 that allowed listeners to call in and express themselves in an anonymous forum.[267] The import of history and the formative function of the French experience to the *Beur* generation also became abundantly clear in the names of the musical groups that Radio Beur frequently hosted, such as the *Djurdjura Sisters*, named

[265] Ben Jelloun, 1983
[266] Kettane, 1986, 95
[267] Jim House and Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 292.

after the Djurdjura mountain range in northern Algeria, and *Carte de Séjour*, or green card, in reference to the residence permit held by many young *Beur*s who refused to claim French citizenship.

Evolving media and social action

In the world of technology it goes without saying that change occurs quickly. The cases of FLN radio and *Beur* broadcasting are no exception and the organizations behind these minority voices had to adapt and make difficult decisions in an effort to remain relevant. In 1962 the FLN was thrust into the reality of its newfound nation and established broadcasting policy aimed at enriching the authority of the state rather than its new citizens. In the early 1990s French airwaves were further deregulated and opened to commercialization, which had previously been banned under the government subsidy system. Although many of the obstacles the two services faced were different, they were similarly represented populations with inferior positions in dominant Western discourse and it is debatable whether their audiences were able to escape those positions over time or through immigration.

L'Algérie libre: the fight continues?

In 1958 Fanon predicted that "radio will have an exceptional importance in the country's rebuilding phase. After the war a disparity between the people and what is intended to speak for them will no longer be possible."[268] In the later years of the war, FLN information services were grouped under the Minster of Information under M'Hamid Yazid and the Minister of Armament and General Liaisons (MALG) under Boussouf. In 1961 they jointly created the Algeria Press service (APS) under Messaoudi

[268] Fanon, 1965, 97

Zitouni with the intention of diffusing information to the international press. By this time, according to Saddar, the national transmissions team had already been regularly diffusing such information abroad under the name "Broadcasting on High" for some time.[269] The young transmissions corps had gone from primitive beginnings to "specialized combatants in information," and was charged with all the transmission services of the national territory after independence.[270] While Benkhodja was among the fifty percent of the corps killed during the revolution,[271] and Benzine became a print journalist for the *Alger-Républican*,[272] Rahal and Saddar remained in transmissions. Rahal spent ten years as the director of the school of national broadcasting at El Mouradia and Saddar continued to work as part of the FLN transmissions team to expand Algeria's interior network. After the Evian Accords, the FLN installed a one-party system that "for nearly thirty years, negated any political or cultural pluralism."[273] The voice of the FLN then became the voice of Algerian state sovereignty and in doing so did not open itself to democracy, instead remaining the authoritarian war-time voice with an aim at Arabization. In this nationalistic push "the culture was tightly controlled by the government…Only Egyptian and patriotic national songs, along with the classic andalusi, which was adopted as the national music of the new republic, could be broadcast on the radio."[274] *Raï*, a popular form of music in North Africa, was banned from the radio and most *raï* artists fled to France where they incorporated a wider variety of cultural

---

[269] Saddar, 2002, 177
[270] Debbah, 2006; Debbah, 2008
[271] Debbah, 2006
[272] Benzine, 1965
[273] Stora, 2001, 29
[274] Hana Noor Al-Deen, "The Evolution of Rai Music," *Journal of Black Studies* 35:5 (May 2005), 603.

influence into their work. Then in the early 1980s community radio stations such as Radio Beur began broadcasting this revitalized *raï* back across the Mediterranean. "The popularity of this music was felt so strongly in Algeria that the government was forced to acknowledge this genre of music and to lift some of the earlier restrictions that were imposed on raï music (Rosen, 1990)."[275] Throughout the short history of Algeria's independence, Algeria's media system has generally been controlled by its government and frequently broadcasts subject matter aimed at enhancing the nation's official memory. "On the fortieth anniversary of Sétif, Algerian television told in bitter detail how the 40,000 Muslims were killed in repression…Algérie Presse-Service, lauding the production, denounced 'a crime against humanity, among so many others, of French colonialism.'"[276]

'L'Après décembre 3': From Radio Beur to Beur FM

In the midst of the stigmatized space of the *banlieue* and the historical amnesia of France, the 1983 *Marche des Beurs* represented the first time that immigrant populations were able to label themselves in public discourse, however controversial that label would become in the future. Over and over in Kettane's *Droit de réponse à la démocratie française* he underscores the indignity of not being able to name yourself and the need for *auto-affirmation*, or self-assertion. In his novel, Brahim's friend Saïd says it well in expressing his anger to his friends: "Young immigrants they call us, these bloody idiots! But me, I have never emigrated."[277] So besides being factually inaccurate, *immigré* and *arabe* had become derogatory terms imposed on this new generation from the outside.

[275] Noor Al-Deen, 2005, 605
[276] Rosenblum, 1988, 280
[277] Kettane, 1985, 166

Now the increasing amount of associations and minority media such as Radio Beur gave them the cultural capital to challenge this discourse. According to Durmelat "Above all, the creation of Radio Beur in 1981, then the authorization of independent local radio on FM, and most of all the March for Equality and Against Racism of 1983 that gave [*Beur*] a national repercussion."[278] While the *Marche des Beurs* made French national media sit up and take notice, one marcher in Kara Bouzid's *La Marche* points out to a journalist that "If we would have waited for you to talk about us to exist, we would still be in the woods."[279] This confrontation over the obscurity of immigrant communities in mainstream media shows the *Beur* generation's refusal to be silenced and sentenced to live on the periphery of society. In *Le Sourire de Brahim*, Brahim's friend addresses the same problem with mainstream media, saying "As long as we haven't created our own radio stations, television stations, and newspapers, they will always have the better share and they can go on about their bullshit forever. You understand, it's necessary for us to organize ourselves and speak for ourselves."[280]

Radio Beur and the *Marche des Beurs* represented the translation of that dream into a reality, albeit imperfect. The recognition of a common identity and potential for collective action led to a march that began with five people ending with thousands and a meeting with French President François Mitterand in Paris. While the explicit aims of the march were the right to vote and ten-year residence permits, the physical presence and vocal expression of an alternative discourse marching through Paris and challenging French identity signaled the start of a *Beur* movement and redefined the possibilities for

[278] Durmelat, 2008, 30
[279] Kara Bouzid, *La Marche, traversée de la France profonde* (Paris: Sindbad, 1984), 72-73.
[280] Kettane, 1985, 166

the future. According to a *Le Monde* article announcing the march into Paris, "December 3, they came out of their ghettos; networks between them have been created, of which witness to a national collective, several local radio stations and innumerable associations. A bridge has been built 'for the after December 3' toward French society since the president himself will receive them at the end of their march."[281] As this quote indicates, community radio acted as an indicator of the rising collectivity and cultural capital of the *Beur* community. In the same day's paper, a notice in the "Local Radio" section indicates Radio Beur's involvement in the march by announcing that Ben Jelloun and the leaders of Radio Beur would host a debate on "the second generation." Radio Beur also participated in trying to renew the sense of historical connectivity of the marchers because it was at the station's initiative that "the departure of the March to Paris left from Canal Saint Martin in order to recall the demonstrations of October 1961."[282]

While the names Radio Beur and *Marche des Beurs* indicate specificity of participants and aims, the official name of the march "The March for Equality and Against Racism" indicates early recognition of the need for the movement to go beyond just the Maghrebi immigrant population. Bouzid talks about the march being against all forms of discrimination and the marchers' unfulfilled expectations that other minorities such as the Portuguese and Turks would join them, despite the distribution of tracts and media coverage. Bitterly he questions the shortness of memory in these communities, saying "Maybe they have forgotten that they were imports as well?"[283] Bouzid's

---

[281] Nicolas Beau "Des Beurs à l'Elysée" *Le Monde* Dec 4, 1983, 1a.
[282] Nacer Kettane, "Beur: c'est un badge sur son visage!" In Farid Aïchoune, *La Beur Génération*, (Paris: Éditions Sans Frontière, 1985), 32.
[283] Bouzid, 1984, 77

comment foreshadows the future problems of the *Beur* movement, namely the gathering of diverse communities and heritages under the comprehensive *Beur* label. In reality, the *Beur* generation "represents an extremely heterogenous population, differentiated by age, education, language, culture, social and professional background, and religious and political preferences."[284] The difficulty of presenting a cohesive front became evident within Radio Beur's staff, which some said privileged Kabyle and Berber programming, and according to Derderian, "throughout Radio Beur's eleven-year history Kabyles dominated all levels of administrative and operational positions at the station."[285] Amid a series of internal conflicts, Kettane left Radio Beur in 1991 and filed a competing license application for a new commercial station named Beur FM. Hughes and Reader claim that Radio Beur was a victim of its own success, and Derderian claims commercialization is the major threat to community radio.[286] In the case of Radio Beur that seems to be true – as Beur FM tries to broaden its appeal and avoid controversies that would drive away advertisers, the station features more standardized programming and less political action. For some the change from Radio Beur to Beur FM signaled the disintegration of the *Beur* movement, which former Beur FM news director Ahmed Naït-Balk doesn't necessarily see as a negative, saying "It's the normal course of events for any type of movement. We split because our visions of what needed to be stressed in our identities became divergent."[287] Perhaps Radio Beur cleared the way for more nuanced and individual representations of its community, but the more plausible argument seems to be that Radio

[284] Derderian, 1995, 56
[285] Derderian, 1995, 56
[286] Hughes & Reader, 1998; Derderian, 1997, 112
[287] Echchaibi, 2007, 15

Beur's success both inside and outside the *Beur* community indicated an opportunity to co-opt new cultural products and exploit emerging markets. The emergence of a *beurgeoisie,* or a political and economic elite within the *Beur* community (many of which seem to derive their legitimacy from their involvement in the early *Beur* movement), seemed to support this hypothesis and led to further tensions within the movement, as well as allegations that elites were speaking for the people they had once said needed to speak for themselves.[288]

Summary: Minority broadcasting and community identity

The FLN began its armed struggle in 1954, at a time when the vast majority of indigenous Algerians were illiterate and excluded from participation in the colonial discourse and power structures. Based largely on a French-language press, Algerian media were closed even to most educated Algerians because of their race. A sort of apartheid existed in Algerian society to the extent that signs were posted at the European beach clubs in Algiers, reading: "prohibited to dogs, Jews, and Arabs."[289] That Arabs and Jews were equivalent to dogs in the European mind meant that they did not deserve legal protection, basic human rights, or a voice in Algerian society. The FLN was able to overcome the ethnic and regional divisions of indigenous Algerian society by becoming the sole voice of Algerian nationalism and using radio to enlist mass support, both domestic and international. Radio provided an alternative to the institutionalized French press and underscored the role of discourse in creating a sense of political efficacy among disenfranchised indigenous Algerians. Broadcasts such as the *Voice of Free and Fighting*

[288] Catherine Wihtol de Wenden & Rémy Leveau, *La beurgeoisie* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2007), 113.
[289] Yacef, 2002, 33

Algeria connected Algerians to each other and to realities outside themselves in a way that allowed them to forge a new discursive space within their homes and communities even if the average Algerian did not have access to the airwaves. Because the adoption of radio as an instrument of resistance opened Algerians to dialogue, it became possible for them to "confront the immense, internalized lie"[290] of colonialism and imagine themselves as something more than inferior subjects of Western imperialism.

Despite Algeria's position in the intersection of Arab and Western worlds, one of the most remarkable features of the FLN was its ability to incorporate the Algerian masses into a unified entity. While people around the world read about the FLN's brutal tactics, Feraoun talks about how the entire community looks after the resistance fighters, saying, "[Algerians] accept those who fight for them, those who make it possible for them to hope."[291] If the FLN's power was in its ability to unify the people against colonialism, this unity proved to be ultimately unsustainable. With the alleviation of foreign oppression, the FLN was forced to deal with domestic divisions and realized that underneath the umbrella of Algerian nationalism existed a variety of ideas about what an Algerian state should look like. Because of the popular nature of the revolution, the Algerian people were extremely invested in its outcome and heavy-handed one-party rule by the FLN led many to believe Algerians had merely traded one oppressor for another.

When Radio Beur began broadcasting in 1981, the *Beur* generation faced both the discursive divide between themselves and ethnic French, but also the divide between themselves and their first-generation immigrant parents. As a result of removing colonial

---

[290] Feraoun, 2000, 92
[291] Feraoun, 2000, 39

history from the official record, ethnic North Africans born in France learned little about their history and had little appreciation for "the previous political and economic struggles waged by their parents in the Algerian War for Independence and on the *banlieue* factory floor."[292] This intentional and exploitative erasure of collective memory left the *Beur* generation frustrated by what they saw as their parents' compliance with their oppression. Media replicated this discourse of generational divide, as evidenced by an article on the *Marche des Beurs* where the marchers stopped at a factory to enlist the support of its workers, creating a "strange show of these sons of immigrants demanding equal rights in front of their silent fathers…The first speak in the loud and strong French of their saga against racism, the seconds grumble several words in Arabic before reaching their buses and their housing projects."[293] This generational disconnect is evident in the patterns of media consumption that characterize the parental and youth groups. While radio listening seems to have been a collective activity for both groups, the parents were more apt to listen to Radio Cairo or Radio Algiers for news and traditional music from their birthplace. In *Shantytown Kid*, Begag describes the men of his community listening to the radio after work, saying "that evening my father seemed peaceful, soothed as usual by the Arabic music coming out of the wireless placed on the ground, in the middle of the circle, with its aerial fully extended."[294] *Le sourire de Brahim* begins with a description of Brahim's father waiting to hear Gamel Abdul Nasser broadcast from Cairo during the

[292] Silverstein, 2004, 167
[293] Nicolas Beau "Contact difficile à Flins" *Le Monde* Dec 3, 1983, 11.
[294] Begag, 1986/2007, 49

Algerian War, but the children in both of these stories seem more excited about Johnny Hallyday's hit parade.[295]

As a result of these mixed cultural referents the *Beur* generation experienced a higher degree of cultural hybridity and confusion than its parents. While parents like Brahim's try to preserve their identity by "withdrawing into their religion and their language,"[296] they expected their children to be able to simultaneously adhere to traditional North African/Muslim values and succeed in the secular West that is France, especially because children were the reason many parents had emigrated in the first place. Begag's father demonstrates the kind of sacrifices made by first-generation immigrants for dream that their children will have a better life, saying "I'd rather you worked at school. I go to the factory to work, I'll break my back if I have to, but I don't want you to become what I am, a poor laborer."[297] Charef too tells the story of Madjid's parents' emigrating so their children could go to school and fulfill the Third World dream of becoming doctors, lawyers, and schoolteachers.[298] Many immigrant workers endured hard labor and homesickness, for which music (and radio by default) was often the only accessible antidote. Begag recalls radios playing "the soft sounds of Arabic music to the homesick who are staying up late,"[299] and Charef describes a bar full of immigrant workers where "the jukebox is playing a song in Kabyle, all about the beauty of the women who live at the foot of the Jujura mountains."[300] Thus *Beur*s faced a high degree

[295] Begag, 1986/2007, 125; Kettane, 1985, 35
[296] Kettane, 1985, 49
[297] Begag, 1986/2007, 13
[298] Charef, 1989, 17
[299] Begag, 1986/2007, 50
[300] Charef, 1989, 34

of pressure from their parents and from a society that stigmatized them so that they were left with "The feeling of not being listened to, of being rejected, being driven to spit simultaneously on France and Algeria."[301]

Conclusion

I posed a research question at the outset of this thesis: What are the major similarities and differences in the early development periods of FLN and beur broadcasting, what seems to account for them, and what do those experiences demonstrate about the role of minority radio in resisting mainstream media representations and discourses of identity? This is what I discovered, although I remind myself and my readers that the limitations on my sources preclude my drawing anything but tentative conclusions. As a summary response I would say that the similarities and differences of FLN radio and Radio Beur indicate that the ability of minority radio to resist mainstream media representations and discourses of identity lies in its ability to transcend space and appeal to historical affinities of dispersed and marginalized populations. Broadcasting in both the Algerian Revolution and the Beur movement indicate fundamental shifts in French identity and its mediated representations – one can most certainly look at the Algerian Revolution as an identity crisis and formative moment for France in that it led to the establishment of the current Fifth Republic, and the later rise of local associations such as Radio Beur in the *Beur* movement as the belated rejection of the old media monopoly mentality from the Fourth Republic.

In looking at the early development periods of FLN and *Beur* broadcasting several similarities stand out, namely that both precipitated a shift in cultural geography and

[301] Kettane, 1986, 31

centers of power, both attempted to rectify the historical record as they saw it and connect audiences with a common heritage, and both aimed to become a representative and symbolic voice for a diverse community. However, obvious differences existed between the two types of broadcasting, such as the scope of the projects, the level of resistance experienced, and the future trajectories of each. The similarities seem to be accounted for by use of a common (if less developed during the FLN time period) technology, the problematic discourse of Western modernity that did not dissipate with the official end of colonialism, and the fact that the minority media considered shared a cultural heritage. The differences, however, seem to stem from the fact that the scope of FLN radio broadcasting was much more broad than that of Radio Beur (which reaffirms the increasing ability to transcend or bypass national boundaries in favor of local-global connections), the different time periods examined, and the different national regulations to which each type of broadcasting was subject going forward.[302] These similarities and differences suggest that the strength of minority media is in its ability to produce innovative programming (often out of necessity due to lack of funds) that resonates with the cultural affinities of its audiences and establishes a sense of inclusivity often lacking in mainstream media. The weaknesses of these stations, however, are closely tied to their strengths because as they empower audiences to emphasize certain aspects of their

[302] After the Algerian Revolution the FLN instituted a single-party state in Algeria, which controlled broadcasting regulation. FLN dominance lasted until the protests of October 1988 when a multiparty system was instituted, leading to both greater media diversity and a tumultuous political climate. When violence erupted in Algeria in 1992 journalists were frequent targets and consequently coverage of a diversity of viewpoints suffered (Stora, 2001). In France the post-revolution period the government monopoly on broadcasting extended into the fifth republic until Socialist reforms in the 1980s liberalized access to the airwaves. In the late 80s more conservative governments started opening broadcasting to commercialization (Browne, 1999).

identities, the stations may lose their air of inclusivity or relevance if they do not continually evolve in directions not entirely under their control. Minority media are also especially vulnerable to commercial co-optation from mainstream media with more market share and buying power, as these media look to capitalize on the risks taken by smaller stations to develop new programming, markets and cultural products.

The development of FLN broadcasting and Radio Beur made it possible to connect the isolated peripheral communities of the *maquis* and *banlieues.* As an electronic and low-cost technology radio was able to transcend the space of the *maquis* and the *banlieue,* allowing difference to be articulated in opposition to and conjunction with other discourses of identity. In revolutionary Algeria FLN broadcasting constructed an alternative discourse and emerged as the sole voice of Algerian nationalism from a fractured field of independence movements. Likewise, in 1980s France Radio Beur's participation in constructing an alternative discourse in opposition to traditional conceptions of French identity helped *Beur*s overcome the fragmentary flood of associations and establish a cohesive identity, even if the durability of that identity is debatable. The experiences of both oppositional services indicate that in an increasingly global mediascape, the denial of difference will drive audiences to search for attachments elsewhere, usually formulating identities around historical community or family affinities (often with resistance from the majority). In colonial Algeria and *Beur* France, populations tended to look toward their Islamic heritage and cultivate the consumption of Eastern cultural products, even if Beurs consumed those cultural products in conjunction with the Western pop culture they absorbed by virtue of their presence in France. As

Sakinna Boukhedenna writes in her journal in 1985, "It is in France that I have learned to be an Arab."[303] Contradictory experiences such as Boukhedenna's are mirrored in the creation of hybrid cultural products such as *raï*-rock music and Algerian intellectuals writing in French during the Algerian Revolution, not to mention the continuous flows of products and people back and forth across the Mediterranean.

In looking at the relationship between globalization and history in light of these two communities and their media, one remarkable point is the extent to which contradictory attachments are constructed and employed as an indication of freedom from the logic of modernism and its nation-state construct. If Algerians turned to Islam as a refuge from the French, it was at the expense of collective memories of the North African Arab conquest and oppression under the Ottomans. And if the *Beur* community embraced *raï* and supported the Algerian national soccer team, it also waved French citizenship cards while protesting for equal rights. These frequent instances of acceptable contradictions seem to occur in opposition to the limitations of modernity and in the desire to create space for a new, more multiplistic set of discursive spaces that are open to marginalized voices. While the democratic nature of FLN broadcasting and Radio Beur's proportional representation of all aspects of the *Beur* community are both highly debatable, each of these radio organizations openly asserted its intention to become a representative voice for its community. Both radios involved themselves deeply in the production and dissemination of a certain cultural identity, and although they had different ideas about democracy the ties between them become clear in their beginnings as voices for oppressed populations emerging from peripheral spaces. In their book on

[303] Sakinna Boukhedenna, *Journal "Nationalité: immigré(e)"* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), 5.

coverage of the 1988 Algiers protests, Radio Beur personnel placed this mission in a larger perspective than that of their own community, saying "We will continue to follow the Algerian dossier. But other fights continue elsewhere: Palestine, Poland, South Africa, the list is unfortunately not limited. Radio-Beur will be present on these battlefields also."[304] However, the shift to Beur FM the station seemed to precipitate a shift towards a more metropolitan France-oriented mission and the popularity of Eastern-influenced genres among French youth in general led the station to pursue more purely entertainment programming.

Globalization has the potential to open up social spaces more inclined to self-expression or collapse space in order to extend the injustices of modernity to new areas and populations via innovation. Theoretically this paper supports Appadurai's statement that "unequal transnational flows of capital and culture that precipitate new problems and planes of inequalities that challenge many of our theoretical frameworks for studying culture."[305] My findings challenge the ability of the nation-state to control contradictions and cultural referents through a cohesive ideological identity, and support the idea that media produced by marginalized populations have the ability to influence representation and produce shifts in cultural geography as well as the speaking positions occupied within those spaces. This does not, however, assume that those shifts will not encounter resistance from dominant discourses or necessarily take place in a democratic direction. FLN radio may have produced more democratic discussions within communities, but did not open the airwaves to average Algerians. As a smaller-scope project, Radio Beur was

[304] Aissou et al., 1988, 24-25
[305] Appadurai, 1996, 174

more successful in this aim, but still encountered conflicts about Beur community identity and who should speak. In this capacity I believe this research could benefit from consideration of feminist theory, which Hegde notes is about "democratizing the production of knowledge and laying the epistemic basis for a genuine multiculturalism."[306] Democratic discursive spaces might be lent the legitimacy of a voix populi that the FLN and Radio Beur at times lacked, and Kettane's vision of opening a new democratic space characterized by open frontiers and strong cultural affinities might be realized.[307] In evaluating my research, I was surprised by the extent of the contradictions I encountered. In attempts to ameliorate the situations in their communities, I was also surprised by how often considerations of class came up and how increasingly inflexible those structures seem while cultural phenomena are increasingly mobile. From here I would suggest further study of the relationship between identity discourses and class divisions, because I often encountered questions of authenticity and the legitimacy of representation in terms of members of a community that had crossed over class lines. In *Le Gone du Chaâba*, Begag recounts how the other *Beur* kids in his elementary classes used to harass him for doing well in school because the majority of them didn't. "You're not an Arab! Of course I'm an Arab! No, you're not an Arab, I'm telling you! Yes, I am an Arab! I'm telling ya, you're not like us!"[308] Over and over these stories of betraying your identity and your community by altering your relationship to the dominant discourse are told in both colonial Algeria and *Beur* France.

---

[306] Hegde, 1998, 275
[307] Kettane, 1986, 13
[308] Begag, 1986/2007, 75

Overall, I believe the most important insight to be made from this research is the extent to which radio, or any means of mass communication, represents power – the power to construct an identity, establish attachments, and contribute to the historical record. Based on the accounts above, radio was instrumental in altering class and social relations within Algerian and French society, within which one of the major problems was the French colonial and national administrations' unwillingness to allow minorities the dignity of a voice. Most authors consulted wrote about resistance as a quest for dignity, produced by Algerians' and *Beurs*' desire to discursively position themselves as equals in the eyes of the world and empower alternative discourses. Radio clearly played an important role in that positioning, even if Radio Beur may have spoken more to and for a particular segment of the audience than did the more broadly-gauged FLN radio. Feraoun captures the complexity and contradictions, as well as the frightening power, of human voices and the historical record at the end of his journal, saying "I have spent hours upon hours rereading all of my notes, newspaper articles, and small clippings I have kept. I have become immersed in a sad past, and I am leaving it overwhelmed. I am frightened by my candor, my audacity, my cruelty, and, at times, my blind spots and prejudice. Do I have the right to tamper with what I have written, to go back, to alter and rectify it?"[309]

[309] Feraoun, 2000, 294

Bibliography

Aïchoune, Farid. *La Beur Génération*. Paris: Éditions Sans Frontière, 1985.

Aissou, Abdel; Amriou, Kamel; Chouiter, Kamel; Radio Beur. *Octobre à Alger*. Paris: Seuil, 1988.

Alilat, Farid. "Nacer Kettane." *Jeune Afrique*, April 21, 2009.

Alleg, Henri. *The Question*. Trans. by John Calder. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006 (origin. 1958).

Amin, Hussein and James Napoli. "Media and power in Egypt." In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, edited by James Curran and Myung-Jin Park, 178-188. London; New York: Routledge, 2000.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York: Verso, 2006.

Appadurai, Arjun. *Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization.* Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Badiou, Alain. "Qu'est-ce qu'être français?" Le Monde, March 31, 1983, 2d.

Balibar, Etienne & Immanuel Wallerstein. *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London; New York: Verso, 1988.

Barrat, Robert. "Une journaliste chez les hors la loi algériens" *France-Observateur*, Sept. 15, 1955.

Beau, Nicolas. "Contact difficile à Flins." *Le Monde*, December 3, 1983, 11.

Beau, Nicolas. "Des *Beur*s à l'Elysée." *Le Monde*, December 4, 1983, 1a.

Begag, Azouz. *Shantytown Kid (Le gone du Chaâba).* Translated by Naïma Wolf & Alec G. Hargreaves. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007(orig. 1986).

Begag, Azouz & Abdellatif Chaouite. *Écarts d'identité*. Paris: Seuil, 1990.

Ben Jelloun, Tahar. "Vivre ensemble" *Le Monde*, March 31, 1983, 2d.

Benoit, Jean. "Plus de huit cent mille résidents algériens en France." *Le Monde*, November 10, 1983, 4b.

Benzine, Abdelhamid. *Journal de Marche*. Alger-Strasbourg: Editions Nationales Algériennes, 1965.

Betbeder, Marie-Claude. "Racisme devant la porte." *Le Monde*, December 4, 1983.

Bhabha, Homi. *The Locations of Culture*. London: Routledge, 2004.

Bhabha, Homi & John Comaroff. "Speaking of Postcoloniality, in the Continuous Present: A Conversation." In *Relocating Postcolonialism*, edited by Ato Quayson & David Theo Goldberg, 15-46. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002.

Boukhedenna, Sakinna. *Journal "Nationalité: immigré(e)."* Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987.

Bouzid, Kara. *La Marche, traversée de la France profonde*. Paris: Sindbad, 1984.

Boyd, Douglas. *Broadcasting in the Arab World*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982.

Brah, Avtar, Mary J. Hickman, & Máirtín Mac an Ghaill. Introduction to *Global Futures*, edited by Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman, & Mairtin Mac an Ghaill, 3-26. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1999.

Brah, Avtar, Mary J. Hickman, & Máirtín Mac an Ghaill. Introduction to *Thinking Identities: Ethnicity, Racism and Culture*, edited by Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman, & Mairtin Mac an Ghaill, 1-21. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1999.

Browne, Donald. *Electronic Media and Indigenous Peoples: A Voice of Our Own?* Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1996.

Browne, Donald. *International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits of the Limitless Medium*. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Browne, Donald. "The Media of the Arab World and Matters of Style," *Middle East Review*, 12 (Summer 1980): 11-19.

"Capture of the Chief," *Time*, October 7, 1957. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,809954,00.html

Carey, James. "Technology and Ideology: the case of the telegraphy" In *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society*, 201-230. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

Carey, James. “Historical pragmatism and the internet.” In *New Media and Society* 7(4) (2005): 443-455.

Charef, Mehdi. *Tea in the Harem*. Translated by Ed Emery. London: Serpent’s Tail, 1989.

Codding, George. *Broadcasting without Barriers*. Paris: UNESCO, 1959.

Codding, George. *The International Telecommunications Union*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952.

Collin, Claude. *Ondes de Choc: de l’usage de la radio en temps de lutte*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1982.

Conseil Supérieur Audiovisuel (CSA). “La représentation de la diversité des origines et des cultures à la télévision et à la radio.” Edited by Direction des programmes, Service de l'information et de la documentation. Paris: CSA Bilan 2005.

Curran, James. Communication and History. In B. Zelizer (Ed.), *Explorations in Communication and History*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Curran, James and Myung-Jin Park. “Beyond globalization theory.” In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, edited by James Curran and Myung-Jin Park, 3-18. London; New York: Routledge, 2000.

Debbah, Mohamed. “Les Reseaux radios de la Révolution Algérienne du 1er novembre 1954.” *El Watan*, August 18, 2008.

Debbah, Mohamed. “La miraculeuse naissance des transmissions.” *El Watan*, September 12, 2006.

Derderian, Richard L. “Broadcasting from the Margins: Minority ethnic radio in contemporary France.” In *Postcolonial Cultures in France*, edited by Alec G. Hargreaves & Mark McKinney, 99-114. London: Routledge, 1997.

Derderian, Richard. “Radio *Beur*, 1981-1992 L’échec d’un multiculturalisme à la française?” *Hommes & Migrations* 1191 (October 1995), 55-59.

Desrosières, Katia & Catherine Terzieff. “Les Nouveaux Enfants: Radio Beur.” In *Vidéo Vérité*, edited by Anny Ewing, 62-66. Iowa City, Iowa: PICS/Houghton Mifflin, 1990.

Drif, Zohra. *La Mort de mes frères*. Paris: Maspéro, 1960.

Duchemin, Jacques C. *Histoire du F.L.N*. Paris: La Table Ronde, 1962.

Durmelat, Sylvie. *Fictions de l'intégration: du mot Beurà la politique de la mémoire*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008.

Echchaibi, Nabil. "Republican Diasporas: *Beur* FM and the Suburban Riots in France." Paper presented at the International Communication Association Conference, San Francisco, California, May 24-28, 2007.

Echchaibi, Nabil. "(Be)longing media: minority radio between cultural retention and cultural renewal." *The Public* 9:1 (2002), 37-50.

Feraoun, Mouloud. *Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French Algerian War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

Fiss, Peer C. & Hirsh, Paul M. "The discourse of globalization: Framing and sensemaking of an emerging concept." *American Sociological Review*, 70, 29-52, 2005.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Communications Minister Details Broadcast Reforms." July 20,1981 – LD162344 (K20-21).

Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Mitterand urges action on illegal immigrants." September 1, 1983 – LD311828 (K3).

Fortunato, Victor. "Abdel Aïssou sera le nouveau sous-préfet de Senlis." *Le Parisien*, June 4, 2005. < http://www.leparisien.fr/oise/abdel-aissou-sera-le-nouveau-sous-prefet-de-senlis-04-06-2005-2006007225.php>

Front de Libération Nationale. Proclamation du 1 Novembre 1954. Trans. by Mitch Abidor. California: Marxist Internet Archive. http://marxists.org/history/algeria/1954/proclamation.htm (Accessed March 3, 2009)

Gillespie, Joan. *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*. New York: Praeger, 1960.

Hall, Stuart. "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" In *Questions of Cultural Identity*, edited by Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, 1-17. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996.

Hall, Stuart. "When was the 'post-colonial'? Thinking at the limit." In *The Postcolonial Question*, ed. I. Chambers and L. Curti. London: Routledge, 1996.

Hall, Stuart; Held, David; McGrew, Tony, editors. *Modernity and Its Futures*.

Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers and The Open University, 1992.

Hall, Stuart. "Race, Culture, and Communications: Looking Backward and Forward at Culture Studies." *Rethinking Marxism* 5(1) (Spring 1992), 10-18.

Harbi, Mohammed & Gilbert Meynier, compilers. *Le FLN: Documents et Histoire 1954-1962*. Paris: Fayard, 2004.

Harbi, Mohammed, compiler. *Les Archives de la revolution algérienne*. Paris: Jeune Afrique, 1981.

Harbi, Mohammed. *Le F.L.N. Mirage et Réalité: des origines à la prise du pouvoir*. Paris: Editions J.A., 1980.

Hargreaves, Alec G. "Indigènes: A Sign of the Times." *Research in Africa Literatures* 38(4) (Winter 2007), 204-216.

Hargreaves, Alec G. Introduction to *Shantytown Kid* by Azouz Begag. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.

Hatem. *Information and the Arab Cause*. London: Longman, 1974.

Hauser, Glenn. "Revolution by Radio," *Popular Electronics*, 16 (November 1979), 104-107.

Hegde, Radha. "A View from Elsewhere: Locating Difference and the Politics of Representation from a Transnational Feminist Perspective." *Communication Theory* 8(3) (August 1998), 271-297.

Hesse, Barnor. "Reviewing the Western Spectacle: Reflexive Globalization through the Black Diaspora." In *Global Futures*, edited by Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman and Mairtin Mac an Ghaill, 122-143. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

hooks, bell. "Representing Whiteness in the Black Imagination." In *Cultural Studies*, edited by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, 338-346. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.

House, Jim and Neil MacMaster. *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Hughes, Alex & Keith Reader. "*Beur*broadcasting." In *Encyclopedia of Contemporary French Culture*, 67. London; New York: Routledge, 1998.

Hutchinson, M.C. (1972). "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16(3), 383-396.

Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). *Les Immigrés en France: portrait social*. Paris: INSEE, 1997.

Jarreau, Patrick. "Cher Mustapha…" *Le Monde*, March 14, 1983, 1b. Originally printed in *Libération*, February 23, 1983.

Jazouli, Abdil. *L'Action collective des jeunes maghrébins de France*. Paris: CIEMI/L'Harmattan, 1986.

Jeanson, Colette & Francis. *Algérie hors la loi*. Paris: Seuil, 1955.

Kettane, Nacer. "*Beur*: c'est un badge sur son visage!" In Farid Aïchoune, *La Beur Génération*. Paris: Éditions Sans Frontière, 1985.

Kettane, Nacer. *Le droit de réponse à la démocratie française*. Paris: La Découverte, 1986.

Kettane, Nacer. *Le sourire de Brahim*. Paris: Denoël, 1985.

Kettane, Nacer. "Une identité à forger." *Le Monde*, November 8, 1983, 2a.

Knapper, Bridget. *Beur*FM: Agent of integration or ghettoisation? *Web Journal of French Media Studies* 6 (1), Dec. 2003.

Kraft, Joseph. "Algeria – not Tunisia – Is the Pivotal Issue." *New Republic* 138 (8) (1958), 10-11.

Kraidy, Marwan. "The global, the local, and the hybrid: a native ethnography of globalization." *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 16(1999), 456-476.

Kuhn, Raymond. *The media in France*. London; New York: Routledge, 1995.

Kushner, James. "African Liberation Broadcasting," *Journal of Broadcasting*. 18 (Summer 1974), 299-309.

La bataille d'Alger. DVD. 1966. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo. Algiers: Casbah Productions. (2005 Criterion Collection re-release)

La Fournière, Michel. “Le fantasme vert.” *Le Monde*, November 8, 1983.

Lakehal, Mokhtar. “Quel destin pour les musulmans de France?” *Le Monde*, November 8, 1983.

Laude, André. “Ça veut dire quoi, Radio Beur?” *Les Nouvelles Littéraires*, May 20, 1982. Paris: Nouvelles Littéraires, 1982.

“Le marche contre le racism.” *Le Monde*, December 3, 1983, 11.

Lebjaoui, Mohamed. *Vérités sur la Révolution Algérienne*. Paris: Gallimard, 1970.

Lindlof, Thomas & Bryan Taylor. *Qualitative Communication Research Methods.* Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2002.

Lipsitz, George. “Precious and Communicable: History in an Age of Popular Culture.” In *Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture*, 21-36. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.

Madoui, Remy. *J’ai été fellagha, officier français et déserteur: du FLN à l’OAS.* Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004.

Mahamdi, Yahia. “Algeria.” In *Broadcasting in the Arab World,* edited by Douglas Boyd, 203-220. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982.

Mamdani, Mahmood (1996). *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Marthoz, Jean-Paul. “Médias et ‘va-et-vient- communicationnel des diasporas,” in *D’un voyage à l’autre: Des voix de l’immigration pour un developpment pluriel,* ed. l’Institut Panos. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2001.

Massey, Doreen. “Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of Time-Space.” In Global Futures, edited by Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman and Mairtin Mac an Ghaill, 27-44. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.

Massey, Doreen. *Space, Place, and Gender*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

Maxwell, Bruce (2003). *Terrorism: A Documentary History*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

McChesney, Robert W. The Political Economy of Global Communication. In R.W.

McChesney, E.M. Wood & J.B. Foster (Eds.), *Capitalism and the information age: The political economy of the global communication revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998.

McPhail, Thomas L. *Electronic Colonialism: The Future of International Broadcasting and Communication*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981.

Meynier, Gilbert. *Histoire intérieure du F.L.N. 1954-1962*. Paris: Libraire Arthème Fayard, 2002.

Morley, David. *Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity*. London; New York: Routledge, 2000.

Noor Al-Deen, Hana. "The Evolution of Rai Music." *Journal of Black Studies* 35:5 (May 2005), 597-611.

Ouzegane, Amar. *Le meilleur combat*. Paris: Julliard, 1962.

Page, Clarence. Foreword to *The African American Newspaper: Voice of Freedom* by Patrick S. Washburn, ix-xiii. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2006.

Peters, John Durham. History as a Communication Problem. In B. Zelizer (Ed.), *Explorations in Communication and History*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Quayson, Ato & David Theo Goldberg. "Introduction: Scale and Sensibility." Introduction to *Relocating Postcolonialism*, edited by Ato Quayson & David Theo Goldberg, xi-xxii. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002.

"Radios locales." *Le Monde*, December 4, 1983.

Rahal, Mansour. *Les maquisards: pages du maquis des Aurès Durant la guerre de libération*. Kouba-Alger: L'Enterprise de Presse, 2000.

Remembering History. DVD. 2004. New York: The Criterion Collection.

Roseblum, Mort. *Mission to Civilize: The French Way*. New York: Doubleday, 1988.

Saddar, Senoussi. *Ondes de Choc: les transmissions Durant la guerre de libération*. Rouiba (Algeria): Editions ANEP, 2002.

Sáenz, Michael. "The Deployment of Culture." *The Journal of Communication Inquiry* 21 (2) (1997), 6-22.

Said, Edward. "In conversation with Neeladri Bhattacharya, Suvir Kaul, and Ania

Loomba." In *Relocating Postcolonialism*, edited by Ato Quayson & David Theo Goldberg, 1-14. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002.

Shome, Raka & Hegde, Radha S. Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of Globalization. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 19(2), 172-189, 2002.

Silverstein, Paul. *Algeria in France: transpolitics, race, and nation*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004.

Simon, Jacques. *Messali Hadj par les textes*. Paris: Éditions Bouchène, 2000.

Smith, Delbert D. *International Telecommunication Control*. Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1969.

Soley, Lawrence C. & John S. Nichols. *Clandestine Broadcasting: A Study of Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Electronic Communication*. New York: Praeger, 1987.

Spivak, Gayatri. "Are We Postcolonial? Post-Soviet Space." (828-829) Annual Meeting of the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages (PMLA 121.3) 29 December 2005, Washington, D.C.

Stevenson, Nick. Globalization and Cultural Political Economy. In R.D. German (Ed.), *Globalization and its critics: Perspectives from political economy* (91-113). New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Stora, Benjamin & Zakya Daoud. *Ferhat Abbas: une utopie algérienne*. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1995.

Stora, Benjamin. *Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

UNESCO. *World Illiteracy at Mid-Century: A statistical study*. Paris: UNESCO, 1957.

Washburn, Patrick S. *The African American Newspaper: Voice of Freedom*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2006.

Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine & Rémy Leveau. *La beurgeoisie*. Paris: CNRS Editions, 2007.

Wilson, David. *Inventing Black-on-Black Violence: Discourse, Space, and Representation.* Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005.

The World Almanac and Book of Facts. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1952, 1957, and 1962.

Yacef, Saadi. *La Bataille D'Alger*. Paris: Publisud, 2002.

Yacef, Saadi. *Souvenirs de la bataille d'Alger*. Paris: Julliard, 1962.

Appendices

Map of the FLN wilayas at the beginning of the Algerian War:

Source: http://www5.ac-lille.fr/~heg/IMG/cache-440x248/wilayas-440x248.jpg

Distribution of the French population by birthplace & nationality 1911-1990

1 - Répartition de la population selon le lieu de naissance et la nationalité de 1911 à 1990

en milliers

	Population totale	Nés en France (métropole + Dom-Tom)			Nés à l'étranger			
		Français de naissance*	Français par acquisition	Étrangers	Français de naissance	Français par acquisition* (a)	Étrangers* (b)	Ensemble des immigrés (c)=(a)+(b)
1911	39 192	37 652	85	218	127	168	942	1 110
1921	38 798	36 847	80	277	164	174	1 255	1 429
1926	40 228	37 384	45	325	187	204	2 084	2 288
1931	41 228	37 937	55	291	216	306	2 423	2 729
1936	41 183	38 220	100	288	248	416	1 910	2 326
1946	39 848	36 908	301	310	343	552	1 434	1 986
1954**	42 781	39 571	295	245	377	773	1 520	2 293
1962	46 456	42 133	336	220	905	931	1 931	2 861
1968	49 756	44 009	297	402	1 766	1 019	2 262	3 281
1975	52 599	45 907	280	667	1 858	1 112	2 775	3 887
1982	54 296	47 169	254	845	1 991	1 167	2 870	4 037
1990	56 652	49 556	472	739	1 719	1 308	2 858	4 166

* de 1911 à 1968, le lieu de naissance non déclaré des Français de naissance est supposé être la France, celui des étrangers ou Français par acquisition, l'étranger.

** estimations à partir du dépouillement exhaustif.

Note : en 1911, les frontières de la métropole sont celles de 1871. Avant 1962, les personnes nées à l'étranger sont nées hors de métropole et des Dom-Tom de l'époque. À partir de 1962, ce sont les personnes nées hors de France métropolitaine et des Dom-Tom selon le territoire de 1990. Les originaires d'Algérie, bien que juridiquement français et nés sur un territoire français avant 1962, sont comptés avec les étrangers nés à l'étranger ; de 1954 à 1968, ils ont été dénombrés comme musulmans algériens. En revanche, les rapatriés d'Algérie, français de naissance, ne sont pas des immigrés.

Champ : résidents en France métropolitaine.

Source : Insee, recensements de la population.

Source: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). *Les Immigrés en France: portrait social* (Paris: INSEE, 1997), 17.

Distribution of immigrants in France by country of origin

1 - Répartition des immigrés par pays d'origine

en %

Pays d'origine	1962	1968	1975	1982	1990
Europe	**78,7**	**76,4**	**67,2**	**57,3**	**50,4**
dont : Portugal	2,0	8,8	16,9	15,8	14,4
Espagne	18,0	21,0	15,2	11,7	9,5
Italie	31,8	23,9	17,2	14,1	11,6
Autre pays de l'UE à 12	10,6	9,5	7,4	7,1	7,3
Pays de l'Est	12,3	11,2	8,8	7,3	6,2
Autre pays d'Europe	4,1	2,1	1,7	1,2	1,5
Afrique	**14,9**	**19,9**	**28,0**	**33,2**	**35,9**
dont : Algérie	11,6	11,7	14,3	14,8	13,3
Maroc	1,1	3,3	6,6	9,1	11,0
Tunisie	1,5	3,5	4,7	5,0	5,0
Autre pays d'Afrique	0,7	1,4	2,4	4,3	6,6
Asie	**2,4**	**2,5**	**3,6**	**8,0**	**11,4**
dont : Turquie	1,4	1,3	1,9	3,0	4,0
Cambodge, Laos, Vietnam	0,4	0,6	0,7	3,0	3,7
Autre pays d'Asie	0,6	0,6	1,0	1,9	3,6
Amérique, Océanie	**3,2**	**1,1**	**1,3**	**1,6**	**2,3**
Non déclarés	0,8	0,1	–	–	–
Ensemble					
%	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**
Effectif	**2 861 280**	**3 281 060**	**3 887 460**	**4 037 036**	**4 165 952**

Source : Insee, recensements de la population.

Source: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). *Les Immigrés en France: portrait social* (Paris: INSEE, 1997), 19.

Distribution of the number of immigrants to France by country of origin



Source: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). *Les Immigrés en France: portrait social* (Paris: INSEE, 1997), 19.

Organizational Chart of FLN Transmissions



Source: Senoussi Saddar, *Ondes de Choc: les transmissions Durant la guerre de libération*. (Rouiba [Algeria]: Editions ANEP, 2002), 196.