Between Movement and Party: Islamic Political Party Formation in Morocco, Turkey and Jordan

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

Esen Kirdiş

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

David Samuels
Kathleen Collins

July 2011

© Esen Kirdiş 2011

Acknowledgements

I could have not written this dissertation without the intellectual, material and moral support of many people. I am indebted to all of them. In what follows, I will attempt the impossible task of acknowledging them all in a limited space such as this.

As a graduate student at the University of Minnesota, I had the great opportunity to be a part of an intellectual community composed of a number of remarkable scholars and colleagues. I feel especially privileged and honored to have the chance to work closely with, and be mentored by, two wonderful advisors, David Samuels and Kathleen Collins. David Samuels' Political Parties and Party Systems seminar played a central role in the framing of this project. It was in this seminar, I started researching about Islamic political parties. If David had not encouraged me to take the project further, this project would have remained as a seminar paper. I also thank David for his generosity with his time in commenting on multiple drafts of each chapter of this dissertation, his quick draft turnovers and patient replies to all my questions. David's thoughtful comments and incisive criticisms urged me to see the bigger picture, and in doing so, helped me to express my thoughts more clearly. I cannot thank him enough for his unswerving intellectual engagement with my work.

I am also indebted to Kathleen Collins for reading and commenting on multiple drafts of my dissertation. It was in Kathleen's Identity Politics in the Islamic World seminar in which my interest in Islamic movements started. I thank Kathleen for encouraging this project to find its unique identity. She was always ready to read and listen. I cannot emphasize enough the importance of her encouragement and advise for

conducting fieldwork. The value of her critical reading and intellectual support in this project cannot be quantified. I cannot express enough how grateful I am to Kathleen for all her generosity and support.

I owe a special thanks to Abdi Samatar, who has given me full-support and encouragement throughout the years. His sincere guidance in dealing with every aspect of the academia has been priceless. It was a great pleasure and chance for me to work with him. Michael Barnett joined the committee later than other members. I thank him not only for his willingness to be a part of this committee in such short notice but also for his questions that made me look at my dissertation from a different perspective.

In addition to my committee, I had the support of several outstanding faculty members, within and outside the University of Minnesota. I thank Kathryn Sikkink for her generosity with her time and her support in all stages of my graduate studies. I cannot thank Kathryn enough for her critical engagements with earlier versions of this project and her mentorship throughout the years.

I learned a great deal from watching Martin Sampson teach gracefully, and am very thankful for all his understanding and support. I also thank Lisa Hilbink and Yitzhak Reiter for all their support, encouragement, and generosity. I was fortunate to have worked with the most understanding and supportive Department Chair and Directors of Graduate Studies, Joanne Miller, Bud Duvall and Dan Kelliher and am thankful for all their support throughout the years.

Dealing with bureaucracies is inescapable while writing a dissertation. However, Judith Mitchell and Elizabeth Ethier from the University of Minnesota Political Science

Department with their patience and humor have made bureaucracies reachable for me, and I would like to thank them for this.

Special thanks must also go to my undergraduate advisor, Ziya Öniş, at Koç University. I was fortunate to receive mentorship and support from Ziya Öniş from whom I have learned the fundamentals of Political Science upon which my PhD studies rests, and would like to thank him for all his support and guidance.

My fieldwork would have not been possible without the help of many people. Hence, I am indebted to all the people who have helped me in finding contacts and/or who have taken the time to give me an interview. I was particularly lucky to receive guidance and accommodation from two institutes during my fieldwork: the American Center for Oriental Research in Jordan (ACOR) and the Dutch Institute in Morocco (NIMAR). I am very thankful to them. I also thank all the scholars whose work I have used for this dissertation. Without their work, this dissertation could have not been written.

I owe a big gratitude to many agencies for their financial support to my studies. I could have not gone through my undergraduate studies without the Koç University Merit Scholarship and through my graduate studies without the University of Minnesota Political Science Department Teaching Assistantship that covered all my tuition and living expenses. I could not emphasize the importance of both scholarships in my academic progress. My fieldwork would have not been possible without the generous help of Catherine Guisan and Steve Dickinson and the Andrew Dickinson Fellowship. I also am thankful to the Graduate School at the University of Minnesota and its Doctoral

Dissertation Fellowship that enabled me to concentrate on my dissertation writing in my last year of PhD.

The moral support of many friends has played a central role in the writing of this dissertation. I was very fortunate to be surrounded by a group of friends in Minneapolis who all have made the routine graduate life enjoyable. Hereby, I thank Darrah McCracken, Jen Gagnon, Logan Dancey, Anthony Pahnke, Menaka Philips, Bai Linh Hoang, Libby Sharrow, Laura Thaut, Jonas Bunte, Geoff Dancy, David Forrest, Denis Kennedy, Moira Lynch, Veronica Michel, Adriano Udani, Ismail Yaylacı, Ayten Gündoğdu, Aslı Çalkıvık, and Seda Tepe. I also thank my Arabic class, Jackie Burns, Mark Hoffman, Evan Jones, Melanie Burns and Mohammed Elmeski, who all made waking up bright and early every morning for three years something to look forward to.

I was also lucky to have a "safety net" in Minneapolis. Spending hours in a row in front of a laptop would have been a solitary process if not for Giovanni Mantilla. Giovanni is my confidant who has kept me sane throughout the years. He has also been a caring friend who never got tired of listening to me. Hence, I owe a heartfelt thank you to Giovanni.

I also wish Azer Binnet had started graduate school earlier, so I would have met her earlier. I thank her for being my "partner in crime" who gets what is on my mind with a single look. Neither can I imagine Uptown, the office, or the last six years without Erica Owen, and am very thankful for her friendship. I also thank Çiğdem Çıdam for all her friendship and patience with my questions and me. And, I thank Marcela Villarrazo because I barely remember anything else from my first year of graduate school except all the never-ending things-to-do lists and her true friendship.

I could have not written this dissertation and keep myself grounded in reality without the moral support of my friends and family.

I was a single child until the year 2000. Then, I met Gülçe Cin, Gülis Zengin and Özlem Demirtaş. I thank them for growing up and discovering the world together. I owe a special thanks to Sonya Özbey because only she understood what it means to be a stranger in a foreign country as well as to be a citizen of a strange country. Hearing her voice everyday over the phone made homesickness bearable.

I owe a big thank you to my big family of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins who made home always feel home…and, most of the time like a sit-com home.

I am not sure where I should start with my thank you to my amazing parents, Nesrin and Halis Kirdiş. They have always been and are my rocks. The single reason how I managed to stand firmly on my feet is the knowledge that I always have a place to return to if things go undesired directions. I consider myself fortunate and proud that I had the privilege of being born as their daughter. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation.

Dedication

Annem ve Babam, Nesrin ve Halis Kirdiş, icin

Abstract

The main question I explore in my dissertation is, "*Why are some Islamic movements forming political parties while others are staying as movements?*" Although many observers assume that Islamist movements tend to be radical, numerous movements across the Muslim world have deliberately chosen to attempt to work *within* the existing political system by formally becoming political parties. Cases of such transformation have occurred in democracies (e.g. Indonesia) and in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Yemen), and in countries using Islamic law (e.g. Jordan) as well as in those with secular legal systems (e.g. Turkey). Hence, it cannot be explained as a function of political liberalization.

My findings also challenge the argument that a rising Muslim middle class is driving the creation of new Islamic political parties (IPPs): sometimes IPPs form in the absence of a middle class, and sometimes they do not form even despite considerable middle-class pressure. Thus, IPP formation presents a widespread and important yet unexplored political puzzle in the Muslim world vis-à-vis the question of Muslim democracy—a discussion my dissertation takes head-on.

I argue that factors internal to Islamist movements matter for understanding why some movements become parties and others do not. I have found that movements with a vanguard mobilization strategy, in which a small group of leaders frame the cause and mobilize masses around an Islamic identity, tend to establish parties. In contrast, movements with a grassroots mobilization strategy in which the aim is to construct mass

consciousness through grassroots activities tend to remain outside of formal politics, eschewing party formation.

I develop my argument based on in-depth qualitative fieldwork in three countries on five Islamist movements: Turkey and Morocco each host one movement that became a party (National View Movement/Turkey, Unity and Reform Movement/Morocco); and one that rejects party formation (Gűlen Movement/Turkey, Justice and Spirituality Movement/Morocco). Jordan, meanwhile, hosts the Muslim Brotherhood, which spawned the Islamic Action Front Party, and provides an interesting case of movement-party co-existence. These five cases vary on the question of *whether* and *when* a party was formed, thereby controlling for the influence of external factors and focusing on internal dynamics.

Table of Contents

List of Tables *x*

List of Figures *xi*

1 Introduction: Islamist Movements and Islamic Political Parties 1

2 Why Do Islamist Movements Form Parties?: A Theoretical Discussion 11

3 Radical Islam vs. Moderate Islam: The Case of Morocco 58

4 A Tale of Two Movements: A Comparative Study of the National View Movement and the Gulen Movement in Turkey 112

5 The Hawks, The Doves and the Islamic Action Front Party: The Case of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood 163

6 Islamic Political Parties around the World: Theory and Practice 206

Bibliography 235

Appendix A: Case Selection 251

List of Tables

2.1	Case Selection in Brief	54
3.1	Religiosity across Classes and Education Levels, Morocco	70
3.2	The West as a threat across Classes and Education, Morocco	70
3.3	Desire for More Religious Political Authority across Classes and Education Levels, Morocco	71
3.4	A Short-Hand Reference for PJD History	73
5.1	Religiosity across Classes and Education Levels, Jordan	174
5.2	Desire for More Religious Political Authority across Classes and Education Levels, Jordan	175
5.3	Attitudes about Women across Classes and Education Levels, Jordan	175
5.4	The West as a threat across Classes and Education	176
5.5	Age Distribution of the IAF Founding Committee	197
6.1	Organization vs. Strategy	211
6.2	Islamist Movement Strategies and Political Behavior around the World	218

List of Figures

1.1	Map of Islamic Political Parties around the World	4
2.1	The Menu of Options	30
3.1	Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions in Morocco, 1950-2009	63
3.2	Urbanization in Morocco, 1950-2000	67
3.3	Education in Morocco, 1970-2009	67
3.4	Unemployment by Level of Education, Morocco	68
4.1	Change in Agriculture and Export over the Years in Turkey, 1960-1980	121
4.2	Rural vs. Urban Population in Turkey, 1950-1970	122
4.3	Number of Religious Organizations in Turkey, 1945-1960	124
4.4	Ratio of Religious vs. Other Organizations in Turkey, 1945-1960	124
5.1	Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions in Jordan, 1955-2009	168
5.2	Urban Population as a Percentage of the Total Population in Jordan, 1950-2000	171
5.3	Education in Jordan, 1970-2010	171
5.4	Agriculture and Exports over the years in Jordan, 1965-2010	172
6.1	Variance across outcomes	210

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES

On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Iranian Revolution, set foot in Iran after 14 years of exile. Five million Iranians on the streets of Tehran awaited his return. Later that day, Khomeini announced his dislike of the revolutionary regime: "These people are trying to bring back the regime of the late Shah or another regime. I will strike with my fists at the mouths of this government. From now on it is I who will name the government."[1] In November 1979, a new constitution was adopted establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran and appointing Khomeini as its Supreme Leader.

Thirty-two years later, on January 30, 2011, Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisian Islamists, set foot in Tunisia after 20 years in exile. Thousands of supporters awaited him at the airport. Unlike Khomeini's announcement, Ghannouchi expressed his movement's desire to form an Islamic political party, the Al Nahda Party, which will run in the next elections. More importantly, Ghannouchi stressed that their party will be similar to the Turkish Justice and Development Party in that it will accept Tunisia's personal status code on the place of women as free agents in society, equal co-existence with the West, and that it will respect Tunisia's secular democratic politics.[2]

---

[1] BBC On This Day. 1979. "1979: Exiled Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran." Accessed April 28, 2011: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/1/newsid_2521000/2521003.stm

[2] Sadiki, Larbi. 2011. "BA 2886: The return of Ghannouchi." *Al Jazeera* http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/201113082557864558.html

Despite the common fear that Islamist movements will use the "Arab Spring" to create an Iran-style, anti-Western, and authoritarian Islamic theocracy, many Islamist movements around the world are announcing their desire to form an Islamic political party, participate in elections, and commit themselves to the democratic game.

The debate over whether Islamist political actors are or can become democratic actors has been hotly contested since before the Arab Spring. Popular opinion holds that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with democracy. Some argue that Islamic political parties (IPPs) are "wolves in sheep's clothing" without a sincere commitment to democracy. Others see IPPs as key elements of a new civil society, separate from the state and thus a key component of democratization in the Muslim world. Regardless, the political importance of IPPs in the future of the Muslim World cannot be overstated.

Despite such popularity, attempts to define and answer what IPPs are and what they stand for in the political realm remain minimal. IPPs cannot easily be categorized under the left-right political spectrum. On some issues, such as family values, IPPs stand on the right. On other issues, such as income redistribution, IPPs stand on the left. More importantly, they are not simple vote-, office-, or policy-seeking parties. Their ultimate goals reach beyond the halls of the parliament in that IPPs aim to transform state and society along Islam's precepts. As a result, theories addressing what IPPs are and their origins remain underdeveloped.

The widespread and long-term trend of Islamist movements forming IPPs across the Muslim World—from the Arab peninsula to Southeast Asia and to Central Asia (Figure 1.1)—makes the underdeveloped literature on IPPs all the more crucial to expand. This transformation of Islamist movement into parties is a puzzling trend taking

place in essentially different socio-political contexts, which the literature is unable to address.

IPPs are formed in democracies (e.g. Indonesia) as well as in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Yemen). For instance, in Senegal—a country that is widely considered to be the most democratic Muslim country in the world—we do not see IPP formation despite the presence of a strong Islamist presence (90 percent of the Senegalese population claims membership in Sufi Brotherhoods). Hence, party formation cannot be explained only as a function of political liberalization, or by the presence of elections.

Furthermore, IPP-formation is not a simple backlash against secularization either because we see IPP formation not only in secular countries (e.g. Turkey), but also in countries using Islamic law (e.g. Jordan). For instance, we see IPP-formation in Morocco, where the King of Morocco is the "Commander of the Believers" and claims prophetic descent. Also note that IPPs are not comparable to "state parties," such as the Communist Party of China or Arab socialist parties backed up by military regimes. Instead, they offer harsh critiques of authoritarian regimes.



Figure 1.1: Map of Islamic Political Parties (X) around the world.[3]

Similarly, IPP formation cannot be explained by a rising Muslim middle class: sometimes IPPs form in the absence of a Muslim middle class (e.g. Tajikistan), and sometimes they do not form despite the presence of a strong Muslim middle class (e.g. Mali). In Turkey—the prime example used by Muslim middle class arguments—we see multiple Islamist behaviors even though all groups share the same popular (Muslim middle-class) base. Particularly, Muslim middle classes back up both the National View Movement and the Gulen Movement. Whereas the former has formed an IPP, the latter continually rejects formal political participation. As a result, what we see in the real world today there are IPPs that shape a new Muslim middle-class identity through diverging political means rather than being formed as a consequence of pressures form their popular bases.

[3] Mahmud, Mohshin. 2009. "World Muslim Population." Accessed on May 23, 2011: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:World_Muslim_Population_Map2.png#filehistory

Lastly, under the same socio-political context in the same country, some Islamist movements form IPPs while other Islamist movements are choose to stay out of electoral politics. This scenario is not just true for apolitical Islamist movements, but more also for non-violent, moderate, politically active movements. In other words, facing the same socio-political conditions, some Islamist movements are choosing to form IPPs, and others are eschewing party formation. In Indonesia some smaller Islamist movement have formed the Prosperous Justice Party, while the largest Islamist movement of the country, the Nahdlatul Ulama, forbids its members from participating in political activity. As a result, structural changes in a socio-political context on its own cannot account for real-world variation in political behavior within the same socio-political context.

In light of all these questions, the I ask in my dissertation: *Why are some Islamist movements forming political parties, while others are eschewing party formation?*

Focusing on this conundrum, I aim to develop a theory on the origins of IPPs, because without understanding where IPPs come from, one cannot discuss their future roles in democratization. Existing literature on party formation and on Islamist political actors remain unhelpful in this attempt. Although the literature on political parties prominently deals with the question of why parties emerged, it does so only within the context of Western Europe. The historical developments in the Muslim world took a different path with particular costs and benefits associated with party formation. For instance, many Muslim countries are not secular democracies but autocracies with elections and Islamic law is part of their legislature. More importantly, the Muslim world has not gone through the same historical trajectories that created certain social cleavages

as in Western Europe. As a result, theories based on Western experiences do not capture the essence of IPP-formation in the Muslim world.

Moreover, studies dealing with Islamist political actors, and in some instances with IPPs, do not address the development in a comparative perspective. With a few exceptions, studies examining IPPs in the literature are mostly historical accounts of case studies with minimal analysis of causal mechanisms between various variables and comparisons thereof. More importantly, they tend to focus on cases where IPP-formation did take place, selecting based on the dependent variable. They either question those Islamist movements that have formed IPPs or those that have radicalized, dismissing a large portion of Islamist movement activity at the outset.

I will address alternative explanations to IPP formation in my second chapter in detail. However, what is crucial to note here is that the existing literature fails to capture the multiplicity of Islamists and of their political behavior. There is a multiplicity of Islamist movements ranging from radical groups aiming to establish a global Islamic order to those who have withdrawn from "worldly" affairs. Despite such wide variance in Islamist movements, they are treated as uniform actors with fixed preferences and political behavior in the literature. Such a treatment dismisses how these movements perceive the world around them through their unique perspectives.

In order to avoid such mistreatments, my model starts with macro-level transformation but also questions how various Islamist movements perceive these transformations and strategize about them. In particular, urbanization, school enrollment, unemployment, economic crises, limited political liberalization, and other major changes defined the structural context under which IPPs have emerged. Within such a climate,

Islamist movements faced a strategic dilemma: to participate or not to participate. Whereas participation offered Islamists pragmatic benefits, such as influencing parliamentary decisions, non-participation offered Islamists non-instrumental benefits, such as preserving strong community ties.

Facing the same strategic dilemma between pragmatism and idealism, different Islamist movements have chosen different political paths. I argue that they have done so because they are coming from different mobilization strategies with different priorities and strategic perspectives. Hence, different Islamist movements view the very same conditions and strategic dilemmas from different perspectives, which in turn inform their diverging political behavior.

Facing the same massive socio-political transformation in Morocco during the 1980s and 1990s, Islamist movements could either participate in formal politics and access parliamentary privileges or they could reject participation and build a counter-hegemonic bloc free of co-optation against the Moroccan regime. While the Movement for Unity and Reform chose the former, the Justice and Spirituality Movement chose the latter. What is even more striking in this behavioral divergence is that both movements share the same popular base: the young, urban, and educated middle class. Despite the fact that they started from the same popular base and face the same massive transformations in Morocco, different Islamist movement chose different political behavior because they came from different strategic perspectives through which they understand and make sense of the massive socio-political transformations around them.

In order to tease out this argument I do not rely solely on inter-case variation between Morocco, Turkey, and Jordan, but also on variation within each case by looking

at two different Islamist movements in each country with variation in outcomes. I am not only looking at cases where IPP formation took place but also at cases where it did not take place within the same socio-political context.

In discussing my cases and making my argument, I do not target only the political science community, but anyone interested in daily news about Islamist movements and IPPs, because Islamist political actors are not only crucial actors in politics in the Muslim World but are also actors that are permanent. The way they conceptualize their surroundings and view politics is intrinsic to questions about the degree they are or can be democratic or whether they aim to form an Iran-style theocracy, and what roles they will play in the future of the Arab Spring. In doing so, I hope to contribute to an understanding of the origins and multiplicities of Islamist movements around the world today.

Organization

The dissertation is composed of five chapters. The second chapter addresses the theoretical foundations of my argument. In particular, in this chapter, I define my main terms, variables, and research design. This chapter serves as the theoretical structure of the case chapters.

Starting with the third chapter, I discuss one case in each chapter: Morocco, Turkey and Jordan. Each of these cases involves intra-case variation: each case discusses two Islamist movements—one in which a party forms and another one in party formation is eschewed. Each case chapter entails intra-case comparisons, while the last chapter

addresses inter-case variations of all five Islamist movements involved in these three cases.

The third chapter discusses the parallel developments of two Islamist movements in Morocco: (1) the Movement for Unity and Reform that later formed the Party for Justice and Development, and (2) the Justice and Spirituality Movement, which rejects party formation. In this chapter, I discuss how the former has evolved from a small-scale radical and violent movement into the third largest political party in Morocco today, while the latter became the largest Islamist movement and opposition in Morocco within the same time frame.

The fourth chapter addresses the case of Turkey with its two influential Islamist trends: the National View Movement, which is the mother movement to most IPPs in recent Turkish history, and the Gulen Movement, which despite its rejectionist stance toward formal politics forms the backbone of a powerful Islamist middle class estimated to control more than 25 billion dollars.

The fifth chapter analyzes the case of Jordan, which hosts the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, which spawned the Islamic Action Front Party. Unlike other movements discussed in this dissertation, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood hosts two powerful factions under its own umbrella: the hawks and the doves. What makes these factions more puzzling is their opposing stance vis-à-vis party formation. Hence, in this chapter, I look at the internal debates between the hawks and the doves and how that debate produced the Islamic Action Front Party.

The sixth and final chapter situates each case within an inter-case comparison questioning the overlying trends across all three countries and five movements. I situate

my findings in a larger perspective empirically and theoretically. I also pay particular attention to the debate on Muslim Democracy in this last chapter.

CHAPTER 2: WHY DO ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS FORM PARTIES?: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

The previous chapter introduced the core question of this study: *Why are some Islamist movements forming political parties, while others are eschewing party formation?* Both widespread and puzzling, this development is underway in democracies (e.g. Indonesia) as well in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Yemen), and in countries using Islamic law (e.g. Jordan) and in those with secular legal systems (e.g. Turkey). Why and how are Islamic political parties were formed? What were their priorities and perceptions? How were they organized? And what were their strategies and the effects of those strategies? The answers form a model of party formation that accounts both for party-formation as well as party-non-formation.

The multiplicity of Islamist movements range from radical terrorist networks to apolitical missionary activists. Despite such variety, some argue political liberalization uniformly leads all Islamist movements to form political parties. Others, on the other hand, argue the origins of party formation lie in societal cleavages; in this case in the rise of a Muslim bourgeoisie who demand party formation. However, under the same societal cleavages and facing the same liberalizing political structures, some Islamist movements form a party while others do not. In other words, variation exists under the same socio-political structures. I argue that the motivations behind movement-into-party are internal.

These internal variables are the main subject of this chapter, and form the theoretical framework for understanding the motivations and processes behind this

movement-into-party transformation. I start the chapter with a discussion of the terminology adapted throughout this study. In part two, I evaluate structural explanations to party formation. And, in parts three and four, I lay out the main argument of this study as well the research design.

Part 1: Defining Islamist Movements And Islamic Political Parties

The terminology used throughout this chapter includes: “Islamist movements” and “Islamic political parties.” I define Islamist movements as “Islamist” to indicate their commitment to Islam, and its texts and interpretations; and, Islamic political parties as “Islamic” rather than “Islamist” to credit their ambiguous and commonly indirect references to Islam. Hence, I use the term “Islamic” to indicate that these parties see Islam as a political worldview just like communism or liberalism with its multiple interpretations.[1] Because Islamist movements and Islamic political parties adhere to multiple Islamic interpretations, I will look in this section into what unifies them under the same category of political actors.

---

[1] I should state that many quotes used in this study use Islamist and Islamic interchangeably due to ambiguity in the literature.

1.1: Islamist Movements

Islamist movements take multiple forms today: Civil society organizations providing health services,[2] radical terrorist cells targeting the international context they claim is the reason for an un-Islamic order,[3] and apolitical *dawa* (Islamic missionary) groups without any political demands are all considered "Islamist movements." As a result, Islamist movements do not share many commonalities other than referencing Islam as their source of identity and behavior.

During the 20th century, many scholars considered religious identity an "irrational" act that would wither away with "modernization." However, Islamist movements comprise rational actors behaving consistently and coherently within their own vision of what is rational, engaging in strategic cost-benefit calculations. For instance, Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler[4] find that radical Islamist groups, by offering divine salvation, justify "high-cost and high-risk activism;" Pape[5] finds suicide terrorism is strategically fruitful in forcing states to make concessions; Hafez[6] finds that radicalization has internal payoffs in that it avoids internal divisions; and Euben[7] traces the internal rationality within the thinking of famous Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb and

---

[2] Clark, Janine A. 2004. *Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan And Yemen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
[3] Gerges, Fawaz. 2005. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[4] Wiktorowicz, Quintan and Karl Kaltenthaler. 2006. "The Rationality of Radical Islam." *Political Science Quarterly* 121(2): 295-319.
[5] Pape, Robert A. 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* 97(3).
[6] Hafez, Mohammed M. 2003. "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria." In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
[7] Euben, Roxanne L. 1997. "Premodern, Antimodern or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of Modernity." *The Review of Politics* 59(3): 429-459.

argues that his political stance was rational in itself. In short, Islamist movements behave rationally and engage in strategic calculations.

In this study, I am not interested in every rational Islamist movement but in moderate Islamist movements, i.e. movements that do not use violence. Contrary to popular belief, moderate Islamist movements are the majority compared to the radicals. However, moderation does not mean implementation of liberal rhetoric at all levels.[8] As Schwedler[9] rightly notes, there is no moderation on "red-line" issues such as the recognition of Israel. Therefore, in this study, "moderate" solely refers to non-violent and not to liberal connotations of the word.[10]

In short, Islamist movements have dissimilar goals, means, and identities. What they have in common is their collective non-violent and rational stance to promote Islam,

---

[8] See for discussions on moderation: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. 2004. "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 205-228; Quinn Mecham. 2004. "From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey." *Third World Quarterly* 25(2): 339-358; Jillian Schwedler. 2007. *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a brief selection of case studies that mainly (but not only) question Islamic moderation and its consequences, see: Atallah Abu-Latifeh. 1997. Doctoral Dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft [Freie University Berlin Political Science Department]: "Die Muslimbruderschaft in Jordanien Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatischer Anpassung."[The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan between Ideology and Pragmatic Adjustments.]; Francesco Cavatorta. 2007. "Neither Participation nor Revolution: The Strategy of the Moroccan Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan." *Mediterranean Politics* 12(3): 381–397; Joseph Chinyong Liow. 2004. "Political Islam in Malaysia: Problematising Discourse and Practice in the UMNO–PAS 'Islamisation Race'." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 42(2): 184–205; Nizar Hamzeh. 1993. "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation." *Third World Quarterly* 14(2): 321-337; Curtis R. Ryan. 2008. "Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy." *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 12(2); Michael J. Willis. 2007. "Justice and Development or Justice and Spirituality: The Challenge of Morocco's Nonviolent Islamist Movements." In *The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine. Gainesville: University Press of Florida; Hakan Yavuz. 2009. S*ecularism and Muslim Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[9] Schwedler, Jillian. 2007. "Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties." *Development* 50(1): 56–61.

[10] Moderate, with regards to non-violence, movements in themselves have great variations as well. Although I treat moderate Islamist movements as a category, there are many types of moderate Islamist movements as well.

through sustained competition, opposition, or cooperation with elites, opponents, and authorities.[11]

1.2: Islamic Political Parties

Whereas Islamist movements are hard to define due to their multiplicity, Islamic political parties (IPPs) are hard to define because of their vague and uncommon ideologies. For instance, contrary to common belief, not all IPPs adhere to Shari'a. The Turkish Justice and Development Party, widely considered the prime example of an IPP, does not adhere to Shari'a.[12] Hence, "a party might not be Islamic…but could pursue Islamic politics by acting in conformity with the religious demands and concerns of the people."[13] In other words, IPPs converge around the belief that Islam is their political worldview and ideology. However, what that particular ideology might entail is vaguely defined.

IPPs not only have vague ideologies, but they also have politically contradictory characteristics. Just like Christian democrats, which differ both from the Church and from the conservatives,[14] IPPs differ from Islamist movements and other political parties in many respects:

(1) Unlike Islamist movements critical of the nation-state and its institutions, IPPs have agreed to accept the rules of the political game and to participate in the

---

[11] This definition is borrowed from Tarrow's social movement definition as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities." In Sidney Tarrow. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[12] Masoud, Tarek. 2008. "Are They Democrats? Does It Matter?" *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 19-24.
[13] Yavuz, Hakan. 2009. *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[14] Kalyvas, Stathis. 1996. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

electoral system; but, just like Islamist movements they are critical of the state's monopoly over public and private life.

(2) Unlike right-wing/conservative parties, IPPs promote religion and not nationalism; but, just like right-wing/conservatives they promote a conservative lifestyle.

(3) Unlike left-wing/socialist parties, IPPs do not oppose free markets; but, just like left-wing/socialists they advocate justice and equality.

(4) Unlike liberal parties, IPPs are not concerned with liberal values; but, just like liberals they advocate a third way to politics.

(5) Unlike Christian democrats, IPPs are not created under secular democracies; but, just like Christian democrats their political stance is colored by religion.

In short, IPPs are a category in themselves. Moreover, IPPs are "movement parties." Kitschelt[15] argues that "movement parties" attempt a "dual track" combining intra- and extra-institutional mobilization: "One day, legislators of such parties may debate bills in parliamentary committees, but the next day, they participate in disruptive demonstrations or the non-violent occupation of government sites."[16] IPPs are neither just parliamentary actors nor opposition movements; they are both.

IPPs have vague ideologies, are unique entities, and are constantly changing. IPPs are apt to change when faced with political, economic, or social pressures—pragmatic

---

[15] Kitschelt, Herbert. 2006. "Movement Parties." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, ed. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. London: Sage Publications.
[16] Ibid.

pressures they are facing for the first time. Hence, IPPs are not only vague political actors but are also in the "making." In the words of a politician from the Turkish Justice and Development Party, IPPs themselves are "still debating who they are." Therefore, I define IPPs as simply, as vaguely, and as broadly as possible as *political parties employing an Islamic worldview*.

The morale of this section is that Islamist movements and IPPs are heterogeneous and dynamic entities coming from various historical trajectories, priorities and preferences. Aside from their belief in Islam as their source of action/ideology, they do not share many commonalities. Like siblings raised in the same household that choose different life paths, Islamist movements make their own decisions under the same structural "opportunities." However, like siblings, their ideational framework and strategic calculations are influenced by their immediate contexts. This is the subject of the next section.

Part 2: The Role Of Structure In Party Formation

In this study, I prioritize *agency*, i.e. internal variables of Islamist movements, over *structure*, e.g. the changes in the political system or societal make-up, for a simple reason: in countries undergoing the same structural transformation we see cases of both party formation and party non-formation, i.e. variance in outcomes. There is such variation because Islamist movements perceive structural changes differently. While political liberalization means new opportunities for some Islamist movements, for others

it means political suicide. This variety in perceptions is conditioned by factors internal to the movements.

However, prioritizing agency does not mean structural explanations are void. Structural explanations show us how the "menu of options" available to agents is (re-) constructed. For example, in a strictly authoritarian country where all types of political freedoms are forbidden including elections, IPP formation by definition cannot take place. In other words, structures do matter albeit in a limited way. As a result, in this section, I will explore the extents to and ways in which structures—socio-economic and political—influence party formation.

2.1: Changes in Socio-Economic Structures

Many prominent political scientists believe that political parties are products of social class conflicts created by socio-economic structural changes. Lipset and Rokkan,[17] the most known advocates of this view, identify four lines of socio-economic structural changes which have triggered party formation: (1) center-periphery division after Reformation, (2) state-Church division after the French Revolution, (3) urban-rural division after the Industrial Revolution, and (4) owner-worker division after the Russian Revolution. They argue that these new social cleavages were expressed in the form of political parties and locked-in in the party system, e.g. the Russian Revolution created the workers parties, or the Industrial Revolution the right-wing parties based on large land-owners.

---

[17] Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan,. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments." In *The West European Party System,* ed. Peter Mair. Oxford,: Oxford University Press.

Lipset and Rokkan's analysis finds repercussions in studies of the Muslim World as well. According to Vali Nasr[18], the most famous advocate of this view, the Muslim World has gone through a similar historical trajectory. First, the economies in the Muslim World remained state-led and created a "state elite" uncritically loyal to the regime. As a result, an independent capitalist middle class pushing for democratization, as in 19th century Western Europe, never emerged in the Muslim World. However, when the state failed economically, so did the state elites and together with them the rest of the society.

This state failure together with the global trend of economic liberalization, per Nasr, resulted in a new societal cleavage in the Muslim World between the old state elites and the new "Muslim Bourgeoisie" – an independent middle class benefiting highly from economic liberalization and pushing for democratic reforms.[19] Consequently, the question arose as to what degree the emergence of this Muslim Bourgeoisie and its democratic demands, played a role in the formation of IPPs.

The Muslim bourgeoisie consists of middle class, highly educated, urban and young segments of society with economic ties to the West. The increasing visibility of Islamism among the Muslim bourgeoisie is an undeniable fact and has been demonstrated elsewhere.[20] Studies show how changing social conditions—such as changing

---

[18] Nasr, Vali. 2009. *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World*. New York: Free Press.
[19] Ibid.
[20] For a brief selection of studies that look mainly (but not only) at societal dimensions of political Islam by way of case studies and public opinion surveys, see: Ali Bulaç. 2009. *Gőçűn ve Kentin Siyaseti: MNP'den SP'ye Milli Gőrűş Partileri. [The Politics of Migration and Urbanization: National View Movement Parties from MNP to SP.]* Istanbul: Çıra Yayınları; Janine A. Clark. 2004. *Islam, Charity And Activism: Middle Class Networks And Social Welfare In Egypt, Jordan And Yemen*. Indiana University Press; John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed. 2008. *Who Speaks for Islam*?: *What a Billion Muslims Really Think*. *Gallup Press;* Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2004. "Religion and Politics in the Muslim World." In *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. CUP; Uğur Kőmeçoğlu. 2000."Kutsal ile Kamusal: Fethullah Gűlen Cemaat Hareketi." [Sacred and Public: The Movement of Fethullah Gűlen Order.] In

demographics, urbanization, increasing education and decreasing employment—"have created rising, but unfulfilled expectations, leading to the disenfranchisement of many individuals within Muslim societies undergoing rapid change"[21] who find Islamism appealing in answering their everyday concerns. Thus, the emergence and influence of Islamism as a new social dynamic is undisputable.

What Nasr and other advocates of this societal demand argument miss is why this new class is a "Muslim" Bourgeoisie. Nasr does not explain why this new societal segment is unified around a "Muslim" identity, as opposed to an ethnic or ideological identity, beyond their reaction to secular state elites that have supported authoritarianism.

More so, an ideologically coherent middle class across the Islamic world simply does not exist. In particular, while some middle class individuals believe in an increased role for religion in public office, others reject such beliefs.[22] In other words, the middle class as a whole is not committed to Islamism.

Furthermore, there are "Muslim" societal segments other than the Muslim Bourgeoisie (middle class). Many studies show how Islamists appeal to poorer segments of the society by offering them private welfare benefits, such as education and health benefits. These "beneficiaries" of Islamist movement certainly do not have the material

---

Islam'ın Yeni Kamusal Yűzleri: Islam ve Kamusal Alan Űzerine Bir Atőlye Çalışması. [The New Public Faces of Islam: A Workshop on Islam and Public Space.] Nilűfer Gőle ed. Metis Yayınları; Carlos García-Rivero and Hennie Kotzé. 2007. "Electoral Support for Islamic Parties in the Middle East and North Africa." *Party Politics* 13(5): 611–636; Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki. 2000. "Islamic NGOS and Muslim Politics: A Case from Jordan." *Third World Quarterly* 21(4): 685-699.

[21] Butko, Thomas. 2004. "Unity Through Opposition: Islam as an Instrument of Radical Political Change." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8(4).

[22] Jamal, Amaney and Mark Tessler. 2008. "The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World." *Journal of Democracy* 19(1).

resources to form a political party nor an interest in pushing for democratization as they have more immediate and survival struggles.[23]

On the top of it all, those who are devoted to Islamism can find themselves a variety of Islamist movements from which to choose. Islamist movements are in constant competition with each other to win (or steal) supporters. For instance, in Turkey, there is an abundance of Islamist movements and a variety of Islamic interpretations to choose from: the National View Movement believes working through politics is the only means of achieving their goals; the Gűlen Movement believes politics is evil; and the New Asia Movement has traditionally supported center right wing parties and never IPPs.

Finally, Muslim identity is not the motivator behind IPP formation but rather the consequence of it. To give an example, the much talked about Muslim bourgeoisie that is challenging the Republican foundation of Turkey today only became visible in the 1990s—two decades after the establishment of the first IPP, the National Order Party, in 1969. As a matter of fact, up until the 1990s, IPPs in Turkey were receiving about 10 to 12 percent of the votes while the current governing JDP which is an offshoot of the first IPP in Turkey received about 46.5 percent in the last elections. Mass societal demand for increased Islamic representation became more pronounced only recently and long after the emergence of the first IPP. Thus, I argue that party formation is not the consequence

[23] Bayat, Asef. 2010. *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

of societal demand but that rather that Islamist political entrepreneurs politicize masses[24] by delineating new social cleavages.[25]

To sum up, class structures as well as Islamism are expressed in various ways, i.e. there is not "a" societal demand but many societal demands. Hence, the real issue at stake here is not whether changes in the socio-economic structures influence Islamist movements but how they do so.

In the previous section, I investigated the multiplicities of Islamist movements; in this section I showed that Muslim societies are undergoing an amorphous societal change without a particular political direction. Hence, Islamist movements as well as other political forces are in a race for mobilizing these disenfranchised new masses according to their own vision of political conduct. Therefore, the key here is "how changes in socio-economic structures play into Islamist movements' strategic calculations."

Some Islamist movements believe they can mobilize these new classes through an IPP that demonstrates "their practical commitment to change."[26] Other Islamist movements believe political participation would alienate these classes and thus reject party formation. Thus, I argue that *changes in socio-economic structures do play a role in IPP formation but what that particular role might be depends on the perceptions and*

---

[24] This is a different logic than arguing societal demand calls for action from the elites on their behalf. Rather, the argument here is that strategic elites trigger societal demands and translate social cleavages into votes (Chhibber 2001).

[25] Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; and, Chhibber, Pradeep and Mariano Torcal. 1997. "Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in New Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 30(1): 27-54.

[26] Hamzawy, Amr and Nathan J. Brown. 2008. "A Boon or a Bane for Democracy?" *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 49-54.

priorities of various Islamist movements. Re-phrasing Wendt's famous quote: "Socio-economic structures are what Islamist movements make of it."[27]

2.2: Changes in the Political Structures

Many associate IPP formation with democratization or at least with partial political liberalization. In this view, political liberalization naturally causes Islamist movements to form IPPs to express their demands in the newly liberalized political climate.[28] The logic here is, because Islamists will receive various incentives for their participation within this changing political context, they will find participation strategically fruitful.[29]

It is true that political liberalization creates new options, such as political participation, to choose from. In other words, without limited political liberties, e.g. elections, IPP formation cannot be an option. Furthermore, it is also true that changes in

---

[27] The original quote by Wendt is: "Anarchy is what states make of it." In Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46: 391-425.
[28] For a brief selection of studies looking mainly (but not only) at the role of state and religion in politics, see: John Anderson. 1999. "Religion, State, and Society in the New Kyrgyzstan." *Journal of Church and State* 41; Pradeep K. Chhibber. 1996. "State Policy, Rent Seeking, and the Electoral Success of a Religious Party in Algeria." *The Journal of Politics* 58(1): 126-148; Abdul Fauzi Abdul Hamid. 2000. "Political Dimensions of Religious Conflict in Malaysia: State Response to an Islamist movement." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 28(80): 32-65; Farideh Heyat. 2004. "Re-Islamisation in Kyrgyzstan: Gender, New Poverty and the Moral Dimension." *Central Asian Survey* 23(3-4): 275-287; Mansoor Moaddel. 2002. *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of Religion and State Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria*. New York: Palgrave; Michael J. Willis. 1999. "Between Alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah's Entry into Moroccan Politics." *The Journal of North African Studies* 4(3): 45-80; Malika Zeghal. 2008a. *Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics*. Markus Wiener Publishers.
[29] Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Review Article: Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." *World Politics* 63(2): 347–76.

political institutions create new opportunities and constraints for Islamist actors that in return trigger behavioral and/or ideological changes within the movements.[30]

The bias, nonetheless, in this literature is that it only addresses those Islamist movements that have decided to participate. Thus, this literature, prominently known as the "inclusion-moderation hypothesis," only questions behavioral and ideological shifts in Islamist movements that have decided to participate as a response to changing political structures. It does not question those Islamist movements that have decided not to participate under the very same changing political climate.

Certainly, with political liberalization, participation becomes an available option to the Islamists, but it is the movement's discretion to take on this new option or not. Many Islamist movements under liberalized regimes decide to remain outside of formal politics. As I will show in detail in my case chapters, the decision to form an IPP is the result of long internal debates, polarizations followed by concessions, and new alliances. Therefore, IPPs have emerged following political liberalization, in institutionalized democracies and in authoritarian regimes. To give some examples: Turkey's first IPP, the National Order Party, was established in 1969 while Turkey moved to a democratic multi-party system in 1950; Egypt's Wasat Party was formed in 1996 and is still banned from participation; Senegal's Sufi Brotherhoods reject party formation despite the country's stable democracy; and, Malaysia's Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) was formed in 1951 before independence in 1957. Hence, political liberalization is not an automatic trigger of party formation for *all* Islamist movements.

---

[30] Ibid.

The inclusion-moderation hypothesis also does not address what "changes in political context" entails. Political openings under authoritarian regimes do not necessarily lead to liberal processes of democratization. Despite the introduction of new elections and decreasing repression on the opposition, final decision-making remains in the hands of the authoritarian rulers. Participation in elections and representation in parliament means neither actual power in governance nor the ability to induce societal change.[31] In other words, Islamists by large are *excluded* from decision-making[32] and are left "without any concomitant access to policy making."[33]

Also note that the use of Islam by the regime has never guaranteed the inclusion of Islamist movements in decision-making. On the contrary, Islamization of a regime is an attempt to take legitimacy *away* from Islamist movements and to limit their sphere of activity by extending the control of the regime over the religious sphere. In most cases, we are not talking about fully democratized or Islamized states.

In sum, without political liberties such as elections and the right to form a party, IPP formation is not possible. However, just because they are allowed to participate does not mean that every Islamist movement will choose to participate. The final decision regarding participation lies inside the movements. Thus, I will take *political liberalization as a precondition to my case selection so that I can explore why and how Islamist movements that are facing the same structural conditions act upon it differently*.

---

[31] Brumberg, Daniel. 2002. "Democratization in the Arab World?: The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy." *Journal of Democracy* 13(4): 56-68.
[32] Hafez, Mohammed. 2003. *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers
[33] Zeghal, Malika. 2008b. "Participation without Power." *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 31-36.

In conclusion: structures do matter, but not in ways predicted by the literature. First, changing socio-political structures influence actors' strategic calculations as to the degree to which actors perceive them to matter. Structures are what movements make of them. Second, socio-political structures delineate the "menu of options," i.e. the range of alternative choices available to actors. Because different Islamist movements attach different meaning to different options on the menu, we do not see a uniform development of IPP formation (or non-formation) with every Islamist movement facing a certain socio-political context. In the next section, I will discuss the cost and benefits of these options on the menu as well as how different political actors assess these options differently.

Part 3: To Participate Or Not To Participate: Defining Variables

Socio-political structures construct the "menu of options" available to Islamist movements.[34] Agents facing this menu are inevitably influenced by it and make decisions under it. The thin literature on Islamist movement-into-party transformation takes the discussion on the menu of options a step further: what do Islamist movements do when they have a "participation" option on the menu?

Mecham argues that Islamist movements to form political parties based on future expectations; whether Islamist movements "believe their electoral returns will be strong and increase the reputation or visibility of the movement," and whether it "will lead to a

---

[34] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. "Taking a Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 391-416.

significant increase in their resources or policy influence."[35] The importance of these questions is undeniable, and future expectations play into movement's strategic calculations. What is missing in this equation, however, is how different Islamist movements with different priorities answer these future expectations.

In particular, future expectations do not form under "ideal-type of comprehensive information processing and systematic cost/benefit analysis."[36] Rather, they are made in light of prior experiences and set-priorities[37] "in the light of limited information and in a situation of uncertainty."[38] Consequently, agents do not look at the menu of options through a singular lens but from their unique perspectives formed over years. Movements see the world from their unique bounded rationalities.

Sinno and Khanani, take up the discussion from this point onward, and look at how various types of Islamist organizations perceive the menu of options. They analyze four types of Islamist movement organizations: (1) specialized Islamist organizations with branches providing various services, such as health and education, (2) patronage-based Islamist organizations mobilizing people through rewards for loyalty, (3) centralized Islamist organizations forming counter-societies of believers, and (4) networked Islamist organizations composed of ideologically committed members. They

[35] Mecham, Quinn. 2007. "From Islamist Movement to Islamist Party: Why Islamist Leaders Form Political Parties." Presented at the *Second Global International Studies Conference,* Ljubljana, Slovenia, July 24.
[36] Weyland, Kurt. 2007. *Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[37] Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 103(2): 281-317.
[38] Kalyvas, Stathis. 1996. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

argue that while the former two organizations tend to form a party, the latter two tend to stay as movements.[39]

Sinno and Khanani's study provides a great theorization on how various types of Islamist movements can behave differently under similar political structures. However, it lacks precision because of two vague definitions. First, they do not differentiate between moderate, apolitical, and radical Islamist movements. A radical organization like Al Qaeda as well as an apolitical missionary movement like Tablighi Jamaa can be categorized under "networked Islamist organizations." Of course, they have different perceptions on acceptable mediums and are dissimilar in their strategic calculations because of their various beliefs.

This brings us to the second definitional ambiguity in this study: the authors treat organization and strategies as a single variable. However, organizations and strategies have different payoffs. First, organizational form does not imply mobilization strategy. For instance, the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Movement has a centralized organization around its charismatic leader Abdessalam Yassine. So does the Turkish National View Movement, around Necmeddin Erbakan. However, while the former could be classified under a "centralized" movement, the latter would be a "patronage-based" movement. Thus, centralization of power in an organization is a different matter than how a movement mobilizes. What is at stake here is how organizational form and strategies influence the way agents see and evaluate the menu of options independently.

---

[39] Sinno, Abdulkader H. and Ahmed Khanani. 2009. "Of Opportunities and Organization: When Do Islamist Parties Choose to Compete Electorally?" In *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, ed. M.A. Mohamed Salih. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Second, organizational form and strategies involve different cost-benefit calculations. While calculations from an organizational perspective are about the *efficiency* of a new party in solving internal dilemmas, calculations from a strategic perspective are about the *effectiveness* of a new party toward their end cause.

Finally, organizational form and strategies involve different processes. On the one hand, strategies are the result of ideologies and historical experiences: they are the products of an ideational process. On the other hand, organizational form is not driven by Islamist ideology. Rather, organizational forms are unintended consequences of movement development. Therefore, organizational form and strategies are not correlated arguments.

In this study instead of one single internal variable combining organization and strategies, I have two independent internal variables for each. In the following pages, I will look at the menu of options and at how these two internal variables—organization and mobilization strategies—influence political outcomes.

3.1: Menu of Options: To Participate or Not?

What is the menu of options available to Islamist movements? Either they participate, for example entering in elections by way of forming an IPP, or they do not. Non-participation takes two forms as well. Either the movement decides to remain outside of partisan-politics and continue its road in the form of informal opposition movement, opposing the regime outside the parliament and without forming an IPP, or, it continues as a *dawa* movement committed to individual salvation, missionary activism,

and societal services (Figure 2.1).[40]



Figure 2.1 The Menu of Options

The costs and benefits of each option, (participation versus non-participation) are different sides of the same coin. To begin with, the immediate cost of non-participation is being repressed by the regime as an illegal threat. These relations of distrust find repercussions in the international context where a party enjoys far greater international legitimacy than a movement that many perceive as destabilizing. Such a perception at the international level for a moderate Islamist movement in the aftermath of 9/11 poses high costs. Being marginalized by the regime and the international community creates another immediate cost, namely the risk of adapting a passive "wait and see" position without actual political influence.

On the other hand, participation immediately brings multiple advantages. Foremost, participation has the advantage of preventing potential repression by establishing relations of loyalty. Established loyalty also means connecting to economic and politically elite networks that were unattainable prior to participation. As Hamza

[40] Of course, most movements are not on a unified front regarding the question of participation. For example, the movement as a whole might prefer to participate whereas not all factions within the movement are pro-participation. These differences between factions are informed by differences on which costs and benefits matter more. For example, for one faction within the movement escaping state repression might be the priority and hence participation might be their choice. While for another faction community bonds might matter more; they might opt for non-participation. As a result, the options I am discussing below do not mirror unified preferences of a movement as a whole. Rather, they reflect *internal debates* within the movements regarding the question of participation.

Mansour,[41] the president of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front Party, puts it: "Before the party if you wanted to talk to the state party it would be impossible. Now, we can sit and talk with them." Participation also means increased platform, visibility, and influence over policy-making instead of a passive "wait and see strategy."

Risking repression and passive aggressiveness, however, non-participation has a crucial immediate benefit: strong internal ties. In a movement, relations are based on solidarity between members; relations are informal and thus more personal. In a political party, however, relations become bureaucratized. As membership grows, proximity between supporters decreases, and relationships are forced into a hierarchical order. Exiting a movement is harder because of peer pressure, but in a party such pressures do not exist. As a result, internal bonds are stronger between members and their leaders in a movement.

Participation risks (1) creating factions within the community of believers (the *umma*) as a result of changing power dynamics[42] and (2) losing popularity as a consequence of working within the rules set by an illegitimate regime. In other words, participation risks losing popular base.

Long-term calculations have similar tradeoffs. The costs of non-participation in the long-run are to lose leverage over policy-making and to risk a period of political stagnancy. In trade-off, the benefits of non-participation in the long-run are: (1) to avoid being co-opted by the regime and thereby to preserve credibility and legitimacy in the

---

[41] Mansour, Hamzah. 2010. President of the Islamic Action Front Party. Interview by author. Amman, Jordan. 23 February.

[42] Mardin, Şerif. 2002. *Tűrkiye'de Din ve Siyaset: Makaleler 3* [*Religion and Politics in Turkey: Articles Volume 3*]. Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları.

public eye, and (2) to challenge the authoritarian regime by *not* accepting the rules the regime sets and thus have freedom to maneuver, especially freedom to oppose.

Flipping the coin, participation risks co-optation in the long run, and thus losing credibility as an oppositional force. The most cited analogy for this long-term cost is the experience of socialist movements. Similar to Islamists today, socialist movements of the past that were critical of capitalist and imperialist regimes were integrated into the system as political parties to change regimes from within. Yet, these regimes remained intact without having undergone a socialist reform while the oppositional voice of the socialist was lowered and even altered throughout the process. In other words, in the long-run socialists were co-opted and lost credibility as an oppositional force. This example illustrates the long-term cost of participation.[43]

Despite its potential costs, participation also benefits in the long-run because participation enables Islamists (1) to measure popularity of their programs and policies and to adjust to popular demand, (2) to facilitate better services to their own constituency through increased interactions with the state, and (3) to gain experience in actual politics[44] and even to win, at least in some contexts such as Turkey.

As a special note, *dawa* (missionary) movements with their apolitical stance might escape some costs such as repression. Therefore, the cost-benefits I am discussing in this section are for politically active opposition movements.

---

[43] I should indicate at this point that long-term costs do not mean costs that will "certainly" evolve. Rather, they refer to the "fears" of actors about potentially harmful consequences of a certain behavior. Hence, saying that the long-term cost of participation is co-optation does not mean that all IPPs are co-opted by the regime. On the contrary, there are IPPs with a revolutionary agenda. What long-term costs refer to are costs "expected" prior to participation, and their realization is a matter of future developments.

[44] Ayadat, Zaid. 1997. "The Islamist Movement Political Engagement Trends." In *The Political Islamist Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani and Jilian Schwedler. Amman: Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center.

In short, both participation and non-participation have their own cost-benefit tradeoffs in the short and long run. In light of the costs and benefits of each option on the menu, what internal factors determine which of these options will be chosen? I look at the influence of two internal variables: organization and mobilization strategies.

3.2: Organizational Variables

According to a prominent thesis in the literature on political parties, parties form as a practical and efficient solution to organizational problems. Hence, a party might be formed (or not) depending on its organizational needs. In this section, I will look at two organizational forms: (1) personalistic organizations that are based on the charismatic authority of their leaders, and (2) umbrella organizations unifying different factions with varying interests.

3.2.1- Personalistic Organizations

Personalistic organizations are arranged around a charismatic—almost sacred—personality.[45] The movement is represented as a uniform front in the personality of its leader without internal divergences. Furthermore, relations are based on a "system of solidarity"[46] where followers of these movements believe in the movement's goals, identity, and ideology not for the material benefits but out of faith in their leader. In this, they fulfill a spiritual need for belonging. As a result, personalistic organization-supporters are "devoted to the official goals, and vehemently protest when the party

---

[45] Weber, Max. 1997. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Free Press.
[46] Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

betrays the official goals, jeopardizing the collective identity."[47] Though forming a political party means denouncing the *official* goals of the movement, remaining as a movement means determination. Consequently, leaders cannot jeopardize losing their supporters' trust by forming a political party and thus "must above all safeguard the believers' identity with constant and ritual references to the ideological goals."[48]

Second, because personalistic organizations drive their organizational strength from their member' faith, leaders of such organizations are reluctant to increase membership through party formation for two reasons: leaders fear that increasing membership would (1) weaken movement discipline and dilute ideology, or (2) create "parallel hierarchies" of lay members challenging the authority of its current leader.[49] Consequently, party formation threatens the leaders' authority—an undesirable outcome for any movement leader.

Third, remaining as social movements grants freedom of movement. A political party, on the other hand, by abiding by the rules that the regime sets, lacks freedom of movement. As a result, remaining as a movement makes leaders invulnerable to external changes imposed by the regime and gives him/her the opportunity to consolidate his/her power within the organization.

To sum up, personalistic organizations derive their power from their unified front and strong internal ties under a charismatic leader. However, participation poses a direct threat to these internal ties and brings the potential threat of co-optation, while non-participation further strengthens internal dynamics and avoids co-optations.

---

[47] Ibid, p. 26-27.
[48] Ibid, p. 27.
[49] Kalyvas, 1996.

3.2.2-Umbrella Organizations

Unlike personalistic organizations, umbrella organizations encompass different factions, even different movements within movements, without a single leader. The presence of multiple factions means multiple power circles with different demands and beliefs about the movement's future direction. Umbrella organizations suffer from a conflict of interests and face collective-action problems. As such, umbrella organizations need to balance each faction's demands and interests to keep the movement unified.

Under such circumstances, "common organization form may serve as a foundation for alliances among groups with seemingly distinct interests"[50] Therefore, institutionalization, defined by Panebianco as the "the passage from an initial, structurally fluid, phase when the new-born organization is still forming, to a phase in which the organization stabilizes, develops stable survival interests and just as stable organizational loyalties,"[51] under a political party may serve this unifying purpose for various reasons.

First, institutionalization under a political party avoids any faction to adapt "adventurous policy."[52] This gives each faction the ability to supervise each others' steps and put all factions under an *equal* position of collective responsibility. In doing so, parties can overcome a "chaotic and unpredictable agenda."[53]

---

[50] Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1996. "Organizational Form as Frame: Collective Identity and Political Strategy in the American Labor Movement." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 212.
[51] Panebianco, 1988, p. 18.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1994. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 17.

Second, institutionalization under a political party serves both the majority as well as the minority factions. Bureaucratization of intra-movement relations[54] allows the majority faction to hold minority factions under control through minimal concessions. For the minority, such an arrangement means control over the majority's freedom of choice,[55] which is a great benefit for a minority faction for whom the risks of leaving are far greater given the competitive Islamist market.

Finally, for each faction, institutionalization of decision-making means the ability to influence the movement's future direction by way of internal democracy. Internal democracy, for the majority faction, means control over decision-making by way of majority vote as well as avoiding the "exit" of smaller factions. For minority factions, it means the ability to "bargain" with the majority by revealing preferences, whether by voting, complaining, or speaking.[56]

In short, umbrella organizations tend to form parties to solve their organizational dilemmas.

Organization was one of my two internal variables going into my case selection, which is why I discussed organization as part of my theoretical chapter. Furthermore, organizational explanations are a powerful hypothesis put forward by the Political Parties literature. Hence, initially when I started my research, I expected that if the movement is an umbrella organization allying different factions, then the movement is more likely to form an IPP, and that if the movement is organized around a personalistic organization,

[54] Panebianco, 1988.
[55] Panebianco, 1988.
[56] Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

then the movement will be less likely to form a political party. After conducting research in all my five cases, however, this organizational expectation was confounded – an unexpected result I will discuss in detail in my empirical chapters as well as in my concluding chapter. Instead, I found that organizational concerns, albeit crucial, were not "the" driving force behind this transformation; mobilization strategies were. These strategies are the subject of my second internal variable.

3.3: How to Bring Change: Islamist Mobilization Strategies

Islamism or Islamic worldview, just like liberalism or communism, is an ideology that shapes common identity as well as common goals.[57] But Islamism is not a uniform ideology. Different Islamist movements use different Islamist interpretations and adapt different discourses. "Some focus more on issues of Islamic purity, others on social justice, and others on policy issues such as Palestine. Some advocate nonviolence; others, violent jihad."[58] Furthermore, Islamist ideologies are shaped by their immediate localities and particularities of their regions.

Because there are multiple Islamist ideologies, it is hard to categorize Islamist movements based on their ideologies alone. Thus, in the second of my internal variables, rather than categorizing Islamist movements based on their ideologies, I categorize them according to their mobilization strategies.

Mobilization strategies are roadmaps to an ideal future, and thus guide political behavior. They define a movement's priorities, preferences, and perceptions of the menu

---

[57] Collins, Kathleen. 2007. "Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus." *World Politics* 60: 64–96.
[58] Ibid, p. 73.

of options.[59] In other words, mobilization strategies are about the justifiable and unjustifiable means to achieve goals. They derive their characteristics from the way in which Islamist movements interpret Islam and its texts. Hence, they are the result of an ideational framework.

Although deriving from Islamist ideologies, they are not the same as ideologies. Whereas ideologies are about aims and targets, mobilization strategies are about means to achieve those aims. For instance, both the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Khomeini's movement prior to the Iranian Revolution aimed for an Islamic state. While the former does so by way of grassroots activities, the latter has chosen to conquer the state directly. With the same goal, the way in which they envision the road to such a result is ultimately different; mobilization strategies are about the plans for action.

As a result, mobilization strategies are about a movement's perceptions and evaluations of the menu of options. Because strategies are part of a movement's identities and ideational framework, they define the movement's priorities, interests, and "plans and preparations" for an ideal future.

In this section, I will look at two types of mobilization strategies that are informed by the literature on revolutions and political Islam: (1) bottom-up grassroots strategy aiming to create mass consciousness through grassroots activities that will bring about desired changes, and (2) top-down vanguard strategy aiming mobilization and change under the leadership of a few individuals. Both strategies inform the ways in which actors perceive the menu of options.

---

[59] Ibid.

3.3.1: Grassroots Strategies

Grassroots strategies are based on the premise that societal and cultural transformation precedes political change.[60] In this belief, Islamist change, whatever it may be, will not come by way of directly conquering the state but only by gradually starting at the mass level.[61] In Islamic thought, the origins of this belief lie in Hassan al Banna, the founder of the first Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt. Al Banna believed that there was a need to reconstruct Muslim societies by way of grassroots activities, such as education and welfare services. Through these grassroots activities, he believed, a new Islamic society would be constructed by extending widely in the society, eventually resulting in socio-political change.[62]

Similarly, looking at class struggle, Gramsci[63] argued the first step to change was to adapt a "war of position" through a counter-hegemonic oppositional bloc where anti-capitalist and revolutionary voices would be dominant in the mass media, civil society, and educational institutions. In return, mass consciousness would rise to inspire change and transfer of power. Likewise, the goal in a grassroots strategy is to give way to such a counter-hegemonic oppositional bloc through grassroots activities. In this strategy, Islam acts as a "counterfactual normative critique of dominant historical trends, in many respects similar to the classical, republican, and feminist critiques"[64] and becomes the

---

[60] Berman, Sheri. 2003. "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(2).
[61] Ibid.
[62] Lia, Brynjar. 1998. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942*. Ithaca: Ithaca Press.
[63] Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers Company.
[64] Casanova, Jose. 1994. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 43.

"amphetamine" of the masses. In a sense, the aim in grassroots strategies is to revive a bottom-up reform/revolution of the society.[65]

Not all movements coming from a grassroots strategy attempt a bottom-up revolution to conquer the state by mass upheavals. As discussed earlier, some Islamist movements prioritize missionary activism and individual salvation (*dawa*). The goals of these movements are not political in nature. Rather, the goal is to revive individual duty and bring back in Islamic tradition to the lives of individual. Individual transformation, not societal or political transformation, is the end goal. Despite their apolitical goals, *dawa* movements also adapt a grassroots strategy: they widen their supporter base by way of grassroots activities, they aim to revive mass-consciousness albeit apolitically, and they nevertheless hope for a more Islamic culture to prevail.

Regardless of whether they have a political agenda of conquering the state via bottom-up revolution, or a societal agenda of Islamic missionary activism, the movements in this category all believe in the role of grassroots activities as a means to achieve their varying goals. I consider *dawa* movements to be movements using a grassroots strategy despite their apolitical goals; the means and strategies they adapt to achieve those apolitical goals are the same.

Under a grassroots strategy, short-term calculations are formed around the desire to (1) preserve societal base, and (2) enlarge constituency. Thus, the idea of forming a tightly knit supporter base and to preserve it as the "masses" lies at the heart of these movements. The immediate risks and costs of forming an IPP is the possibility of losing internal cohesion—an unacceptable risk given their priorities. Meanwhile, a movement

---

[65] Bulac, Ali. 2007. *Din, Kent ve Cemaat: Fethullah Gulen Ornegi*. [*Religion, City and Order: The Example of Fethullah Gulen*.] Istanbul: Ufuk Kitap.

promises the preservation of strong internal ties. Furthermore, immediate costs of non-participation, such as repression or marginalization, are not new costs because costs of being informal have always been there, decreasing the relative importance of immediate costs.

Long-term calculations of any movement evolve around future expectations. Ironically, future expectations are self-fulfilling prophecies informed by the movement's ideal future to come. In other words, movements not only foresee and work toward an ideal future but also plan and prepare for it. Working toward a future foreseeing mass uprisings followed by a change in power (political agenda), or one where the majority of the society follows Islam closely (societal agenda), involves the creation of a counter-hegemonic bloc. And, a counter-hegemonic bloc by definition is hard to create by being involved with the state where the rules are set by the hegemon that these movements aim to challenge. In the words of Abdelouahed Moutawakil,[66] the spokesperson of the rejectionist Justice and Spirituality Movement in Morocco:

> We want to participate but we want our participation to have a certain meaning…We are not waiting, we are working day and night organizing grassroots activity, integrating new members, prepare for the future. People need act and words. It cannot continue like this. There will be a critical point where the regime cannot stand anymore. We are preparing for this. Then, there will be a new beginning. Then, we will sit together to debate a new Morocco with all the actors. We have an idea of a new pact in the society. We don't want to be like Algeria. We want peaceful change. For this, the constitution has to change as well. After all this, then we can talk about elections and participation.

Furthermore, preparing for such an ideal future requires remaining faithful to ideals and not being co-opted by the hegemonic order. In any political actors' view, the

---

[66] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview by author. Rabat, Morocco. 4 May.

success of a cause is measured by how much it resembles its ideals. Thus, it requires movements to remain ideologically "pure" without having made many concessions, without having taken side roads, i.e. success is having remained loyal to initial ideals. Because only then does grassroots mobilization and its costs pay off. At the end, what sense does it make to succeed when the "success" is a total diversion from where you started?

As a result, the rational course for Islamist movements with a grassroots strategy is to continue and intensify their grassroots activities as a social movement and also construct a counter-hegemonic bloc by creating links to media and business enterprises and providing social services such as education and health care in order to evoke mass consciousness for political or societal ends. Thus, I expect that when movements have a grassroots strategy, IPP formation becomes less likely.

3.3.2: Vanguard Strategies

Movements with vanguard strategies believe Islamist change will be carried out by a selected few who have found their true calling in Islam. The origins of this belief can be traced to Abul Ala Maududi, one of the most important Islamist thinkers of the last century. Maududi was convinced that Islamic salvation "lay in the restitution of Islamic institutions and practices,"[67] and encouraged the reform of the state. He argued that "social change would not result from mobilizing the masses to topple the existing order,

---

[67] Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 2011. "Mawdudi, Sayyid Abual-Aʿla." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/article/opr/t236/e0517 (accessed Feb. 27, 2011).

but from taking political power and effecting broad reforms from the top down."[68] Therefore, he advocated "a program of training a vanguard "Islamic elite," who would oversee the revival of Islam on a national level and would mobilize the masses using religious symbols and ideals."[69]

Such a vanguard strategy of political mobilization should be differentiated from a vanguard revolutionary strategy. In a vanguard revolutionary strategy, such as that of Lenin[70] or Guevara,[71] "professional revolutionaries" devote their energy to organizing a mass disruptive revolution or leading guerilla warfare where mass awareness is created through a small group using military tactics. Unlike strategies advocating violent means for a radical break, in vanguard mobilization strategies, Islamist elites use non-violent and political means to bring about change. For instance, they permeate state institutions, such as the bureaucracy and the military,[72] and work from within the hierarchical channels of the political system to Islamize the state as well as the masses through the state. After all, as Sewell[73] suggests, revolutions are a shift from one ideology to another and do not presume a violent takeover.

Vanguard strategies start from a small group of elites. These movements do not need to worry about preserving strong internal ties as there is no large supporter base to

---

[68] Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 2011. "Mawdudi, Sayyid Abual-Aʿla." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/article/opr/t236/e0517 (accessed Feb. 27,2011).
[69] Bokhari, Kamran. 2011. "Jamaʿat-I Islami." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/article/opr/t236/e0408 (accessed Feb. 27 2011).
[70] Lenin, Vladamir Ilyich. 1987. *Essential Works of Lenin: "What is to Be Done?" and Other Writings*. Mineola: Dover Publications.
[71] Guevara, Ernesto Che. 1998. *Guerrilla Warfare*. Lincoln: Bison Books.
[72] Ali, Tariq. 2003. *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. London and New York: Verso.
[73] Sewell, William H. 1985. Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case. *The Journal of Modern History* 57(1): 57-85.

begin with. Thus, the calculations in this strategy evolve around winning new supporters under the leadership of vanguards. Political parties, in line with vanguard strategies, are guided under a few leaders who have control of party programs, for example, internal hierarchies. As Erbakan, the founder of the Turkish National View Movement claims their "mission is not to be representatives of the people, but to be a medium to convince people and include them to Islamic ranks under leaders who have found the Truth and carry the people to right and just."[74] Hence, a political party offers these movements to connect the Islamist elites with a larger supporter base by way of increased platform and visibility.[75] This is the greatest benefit that participation offers in the short run.

The long-run benefits of political party formation are greater than its costs, too. In the long run, these movements coming from a vanguard strategy count on governing the country. They believe that in an ideal future they will make up the state itself. Thus, participation is a good medium to gain experience in actual (as opposed to idealistic) politics and to test the adaptability and popularity of their programs that they will eventually apply once they seize state power. Co-optation, in this scenario, becomes a secondary concern because the belief is that vanguards will influence their surroundings and change it, not vice versa.

The benefits of participation are equally great in democracies as well as in autocracies. In democracies, participation has the benefit of influencing policy,

---

[74] Çınar, Menderes. 2005. "Kemalist Cumhuriyetçilik ve Islamcı Kemalizm." ["Kemalist Republicanism and Islamist Kemalism."] *In Modern Tűrkiye'de Siyasi Dűşűnce: Islamcılık [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism]*, ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları.

[75] In addition, radical measures such the one proposed by Lenin (1987) where "professional revolutionaries" devote their energy organizing a mass disruptive revolution; or, the one proposed by Guevara (1998) leading guerilla warfare where mass awareness is created through a small group using military tactics are out of the menu of options for moderate movements who do not want to use violence.

legislation, and even the executive – mediums through which vanguard movements can introduce macro-level changes in a top-down manner. Participation has also benefits under autocracies for vanguard movements. Autocracies by definition are led by exclusive elites who have a monopoly over decision-making in the country. Participating under such an exclusive system means the vanguard movement is demonstrating its commitment and loyalty to this autocratic regime. This in turn opens the door for vanguard movements to infiltrate these elites and thus the state – key institutes through which to exercise their strategies. More importantly, under an autocratic regime being an "insider" of the regime is invaluable, and thus the benefits of participation outweigh its costs even under autocracies.

One might wonder why a movement using a vanguard strategy would not consider the option of remaining as a social movement. The answer is simple: the benefits of a party far exceed that of a movement, while costs are almost non-existent for these types of movements. As a result, I expect that when movements have a vanguard strategy, then IPP formation becomes more likely.

If what I hypothesize is true, then what we should see in the real world is Islamist movements with a pre-existing vanguard strategy forming IPPs, and those with a pre-existing grassroots strategy remaining as movements. And, in all of my five empirical cases, without exception, I have found that mobilization strategies explain movement-into-party transformations. I can make such a claim because my research design allows me to control for various structural and internal variables.

Part 4: Research Design

What matters more in party formation: organization or mobilization strategies? What is the role of socio-political structures in this process? In order to answer what the leading factors and processes are behind party formation, I adapted a qualitative comparative research design.

Quantitative data does not exist on Islamist movements' "internal" dynamics. Furthermore, neither organization nor mobilization strategies can be quantified; they need to be addressed qualitatively. However, I use quantitative indicators from national statistic bureaus, Polity IV, and international organizations to demonstrate the relatively limited capacity of macro-level societal changes to explain IPP formation.

Moreover, I use the comparative method instead of a case study because although "the case study allows the researcher to see the phenomenon of interest within its context—to trace out and recreate the mechanisms that connect events or relationships, the inclusion of several case studies in one project also forces the researcher to be more rigorous about defining specific relationships, provides the researcher with a ready-made collection of alternative explanations, and keeps the definition of terms from being so situation-specific that parallels to other situations are lost."[76] In other words, the comparative method allows me to control for variables. As a result of these considerations, my research design is a comparative in-depth qualitative study.

---

[76] Lin, Ann Chih. 1998. "Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to Qualitative Methods." *Policy Studies Journal* 26(1): 162-80, p. 176.

My case selection utilized multiple steps. First, I began with the sample of all Muslim-majority societies[77] and focused on cases that have elections—even controlled elections under authoritarian rule—to avoid cases where party formation by definition is not possible. To give an example, party formation in Saudi Arabia is by definition not possible because elections do not exist. This focus on the presence of "elections" also allows me to control for explanations of political liberalization because all my cases have the same "menu of options."

From this first sample, I have excluded: (1) Islamic regimes, e.g. Iran and Sudan because in these countries any party by definition needs to be Islamic, (2) cases where all IPPs are banned (e.g. Uzbekistan) but have included mixed cases, such as Egypt and Morocco, where IPPs are not wholly banned but are allowed to participate under certain conditions such as independent candidates, and (3) conflict zones, e.g. Afghanistan.[78] This has given me a sample of 25 countries with multiple Islamist movements and 16 countries with IPPs.

From this sample, I chose Turkey, Morocco and Jordan as my cases for three major reasons: (1) variation in regime character and timing, (2) variation in outcomes, and (3) variation along intra-movement factors.

4.1: Variation in Regime Character and Timing

Morocco, Turkey and Jordan have different regimes and different timing of IPP formation. Morocco is an "inclusive" authoritarian regime: it keeps opposition under control by integrating it into the system, rewarding moderates and checking the radicals.

---

[77] A detailed discussion of my case selection can be found in Appendix 1 at the end of my dissertation.
[78] See Appendix 1 for details of each step.

Thus, as long as the opposition accepts the ground rules of the regime, they are not repressed but instead can have a voice publicly. Yet, final decisions remain in the hands of the King only. Furthermore, the King of Morocco has had the title "Commander of the Faithful" since 1961, giving him power over the religious sphere.[79] Hence, "Islamist" opposition not only runs counter to the regime but also the King's legitimacy over the religious field.

Turkey is a laicist regime under exclusive state elites yet with a multi-party democratic system of free and fair elections. Although a multi-party democracy since 1950s, Turkey's core state elites are composed of a small group around the military and the judiciary who like an authoritarian father figure and have a "loving distrust" of the choices the masses make. This arrangement is why Turkey has witnessed two military coups in 1960 and 1980 where the political actors elected were regarded as dangers to the core foundations of the Turkish state by the military-judiciary alliance. Turkey is also a laicist regime where the state is not neutral toward religious affairs, but supervises the religious field by way of housing a Ministry of Religious Affairs. Furthermore, the state and the Islamists have a gentlemen's agreement. The state uses the Islamists as a medium to control radical groups and counter communism and in return the Islamists do not challenge state's authority.[80]

Jordan has introduced liberal measures, such as elections in 1989 in the face of socio-economic crises, and has held regular elections since. Nevertheless, the introduction of elections does not mean democratization. As Oraib Rantawi, the director

---

[79] Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. 2003. "Islamism Moroccan-Style: The Ideas of Sheikh Yassine." *Middle East Quarterly* 10(1): 43–51.
[80] Çakır, Rusen. 2001. "Devlet Tarikatları Seviyor." ["The State Likes Islamists."]. *NTV Magazine*, March 1.

of Al Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman, argues, it is a "participatory dictatorship" where the core of the dictatorship is kept and elections are made, but where there is no change in power and the electoral system is designed to keep the regime and renew it.[81] Moreover, the Jordanian regime is neither committed to secularism nor excusive of religious activism.[82] On the one hand, the King of Jordan claims prophetic kinship and family law is based on Islam. On the other hand, unlike places like Saudi Arabia, the royal family has no religious mission or ideology, permitting a more plural religious field to exist.

Having variation in regime character and timing brings three advantages. First, despite its variation, the cases hold the menu of options constant. All three case countries have elections and have the option of participation. Because I am not looking at the same time frame but only to the period when party formation was possible, I can make the claim that all three cases share a fundamental commonality, namely the menu of options available to them. Second, it shows that political liberalization does not mean full-scale democratization and thus allows me to question political-structural explanations, arguing IPP formation is the consequence of newly liberalized regime by taking a critical stance on the content of opening. Third, they have variation on the role of Islam in the regime. This variation by definition eliminates arguments explaining IPP formation as a consequence of Islamized or secular state apparatus. In short, this selection, albeit differentiated, allows me certain similarities to start my comparison.

---

[81] Rantawi, Oraib. 2010. Director of the think tank of Al Quds Center for Political Studies. Interview by author. Amman. 10 February.
[82] Moaddel, Mansoor. 2005. *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

4.2: Presence of Party Formation and Non-Formation Simultaneously

These three cases differ on the question of whether a party was formed. Turkey and Morocco host two movements: one that became a party and one that rejects party formation. In Turkey while the National View Movement (NVM) decided to form a party, and the Gűlen Movement (GM) continuously rejects such transformation. Similarly, in Morocco, the Unity and Reform Movement expresses itself through the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), and the Justice and Spirituality Movement rejects formal participation. Jordan, meanwhile, hosts the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, which spawned the Islamic Action Front Party, providing an interesting case in which movement elites decided that having *both* a party and a movement would be strategically fruitful.

To give a quick overview of my cases: The formation of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD) goes back to the Islamic Youth Movement, a radical organization that once was associated with assassinations of left wing leaders in the 1960s. Splitters from the Islamic Youth, in collaboration with smaller local Islamist movements in the 1980s, have formed a movement that wanted to participate in formal and legal politics. Together they named their new movement "Monotheism and Reform Movement" (MUR). This movement tried to enter politics directly by forming its own party, under the name "Tajdid Watani (National Renewal)" yet it was rejected by the regime and instead they were encouraged to participate in politics by joining an existing party, the Democratic Constitutional Popular Party (MPCD) in 1992. This was a defunct party whose leader was a loyal ally of the palace. In a sense, MUR was integrated into the political game under the supervision and control of a man of the palace. Later, the party

was renamed the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), in 1998.[83] Today, the PJD is the third biggest political party in Morocco. An unlikely candidate for party formation, the MUR managed to be part of the formal political game.

Different from the radical origins of the PJD, the Justice and Spirituality Movement (JSM), the largest Islamist movement in Morocco today, is known for its constant non-violent opposition to the regime since the 1970s. Nadia Yassine, the daughter of JSM's founder Abdelessam Yassine and its public face in the society, defines their mission as:

> We do not believe in violence as a means of change, but instead advocate using political means. Observers have drawn a parallel between our methods and those of Chairman Mao, but his revolution was violent whereas we have embarked on a long-term and hard grassroots project even under the existing political system.[84]

The Moroccan regime has tried to integrate the JSM, just like the MUR/PJD, into the political system as a political party. However, the JSM rejected such offers on the basis that the preconditions are unacceptable while avoiding co-optation. In short, the JSM, despite the presence of favorable socio-political conditions, rejects party formation. I will provide more details on both the PJD and the JSM in my third chapter on Morocco.

The Turkish National View Movement (NVM)[85] is the mother movement of almost all IPPs in Turkish political history, including the current governing party, Justice and Development Party (JDP). Scholars from the NVM-associate think tank, Economic

---

[83] Zeghal, Malika. 2008a. *Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
[84] Yassine, Nadia. 2006. Ideologue from the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview by By Kyle McEneaney. *Carnegie Endowment,* July 18. https://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=downloadArticlePDF&article=20813, accessed July 21, 2010.
[85] Given the closure of multiple IPPs by the constitutional court, I will simply refer to them as NVM.

and Social Research Center (ESAM), define the movement as a "faith-based ideational movement."[86] It is a collaboration of individual Islamist intellectuals and politicians, and Islamic religious orders that have existed since the Ottoman times. It formed its first IPP, the National Order Party, in 1969. The significance of NVM parties lies in their role as king-maker parties in Turkish political history as minor coalition partners with about 10 to 12 percent of the votes.

Coming into existence at the same time as the NVM, the Gűlen Movement emerged in the late 1960s as a local apolitical religious group, and with the 1980s, it began to open educational institutions and spread to other parts of Turkey. As it spread geographically, it transformed from a local group into a nationwide social movement.[87] And with the 1990s, it transformed from a national social movement into a transnational one by opening institutions internationally and gathering sympathizers from several nationalities, especially in the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union.[88] Today, the movement is active in a wide geographic area, from North America to East Asia, has many affiliated private companies and foundations, operates hundreds of dormitories, preparatory schools, and high schools, in addition to six universities in Turkey and abroad, and controls a large and influential media network.[89] Although claiming to be apolitical, the movement is known to actively advise politicians on public policies and influence public opinion. However, despite their socio-political capabilities to do so, the

---

[86] Ersoy, Arif. 2009. Vice-President of the NVM-linked Economic and Social Research Foundation. Interview by author. Ankara, Turkey. 16 June.
[87] Yavuz, Hakan. 2003. "The Gűlen Movement: The Turkish Puritans." In *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gűlen Movement*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
[88] Narlı, Nilufer. 1995. "The Islamicist Movement and the State: Confrontation or Accommodation?" *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Western Europe (WEU) Daily Reports*, 18 January.
[89] Kuru, Ahmet T. 2005. "Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases." *Political Science Quarterly* 120(2).

movement rejects party formation—a claim reiterated over and over again by its leaders. I will provide more details on both the NVM and the Gűlen Movement in my fourth chapter on Turkey.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) was established in 1946 and was registered legally as a charitable society—a rare arrangement in the Muslim world. It has established many associations for charity, education, and health. In 1989, when the first elections since 1957 were held, JMB participated in them. In 1992, it established a separate political party under the banner of the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Since then, IAF has functioned as the political wing of the JMB, while the JMB continued its status quo presence as a social service provider. Today, the IAF is considered the only party able to move the streets.[90] I will provide more details on the evolution of the IAF as the political wing of the JMB in my fifth chapter on Jordan.

4.3: Variation Along Internal Dynamics

This case selection not only accounts for party formation and non-formation, and controls for political structural changes. More importantly, it offers variation along my internal variables on movement organization and preexisting mobilization strategies (Table 2.1):

[90] Dudin, Marwan. 2010. Loyalist Member of Jordanian Senate. Interview by author. Amman, Jordan. 9 Feb.

	Vanguard Strategy	**Grassroots Strategy**
Personalistic organization	• National View Parties: post-1975 (Turkey)	• JSM (Morocco) • GM (Turkey)
Umbrella organization	• MUR/PJD (Morocco) • JMB/IAF mid 1970s onward (Jordan) • National View Parties: 1968-75 (Turkey)	• JMB during 1960s to mid-1970s (Jordan)

Table 2.1: Case Selection in Brief. *Italics indicate movements that have formed parties.*

The Moroccan MUR is an umbrella organization unifying multiple Islamist movements, and is coming from a vanguard strategy believing in a top-down approach to reform society and public policy. The JSM, on the other hand, is organized around the charismatic leadership of Abdessalam Yassine, and it aims to widen its scope by way of grassroots activities that eventually will lead to a bottom-up revolution.

The Turkish NVM started as an umbrella organization allying multiple Islamist groups. However, with time it turned into a movement hierarchically organized under its founding leader Necmeddin Erbakan. It adapts a vanguard strategy centered around the belief that there is a need to go back to the Ottoman state apparatus with a greater role for centralized Islamist activism in all spheres of life, including politics.

Similarly, the GM is also a hierarchically organized movement around its founder and leader Fethullah Gűlen. Yet, unlike the NVM, it adapts a combination of *dawa* and grassroots strategy. On the one hand, it is a *dawa* movement basing its rhetoric on the transformation of the individual over socio-political aims. On the other hand, it adapts a grassroots strategy with extended Islamic network composed of media enterprises,

business conglomerates, and professional associations who altogether have very significant political power.

The Jordanian JMB and its political sister organization, the IAF, are both umbrella organizations allying two factions: hard-liners (hawks) and soft-liners (doves). Whereas the hawks adapt a grassroots strategy believing in abstinence from active politics, the doves coming from a vanguard strategy believe in the pragmatism of formal politics. The JMB is ruled by internal democracy, and thus power-balances between the hawks and the doves are subject to change. And, the formation of the IAF as separate yet parallel organization has been a "conciliatory" outcome between these two factions. Thus, it is a case that allows me to control for organizational variables and to focus instead on strategies.

I have conducted in-depth field research in all three cases. To uncover causal and constitutive mechanisms behind movement-into-party transformations, I have used multiple methods. Following Castells' lead that social movements should be seen by their "own discourse," I am looking at each Islamist movement through "their own words" spoken by those who form the identity of these movements.[91] Hence, I have conducted more than 60 personal interviews in Arabic, Turkish, German, and English with leading party and movement leaders and ideologues.

Furthermore, in my case chapters I am using analytic narratives that "construct explanations of empirical events through analyses that respect the specifics of time and place but within a framework that both disciplines the detail and appropriates it for purposes that transcend the particular story" thereby incorporating "elements of

---

[91] Castells, Manuel. 2009. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture Volume II*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, p. 73.

deduction and induction in ways that overcome traditional distinctions between historical institutionalism's characteristic focus on specific contextual conditions and rational choice's characteristic search for generalizable features of political behavior rooted in the incentive structures that individuals face."[92] For this purpose, I have examined numerous party/movement documents, statements, and archival materials from the countries' main Islamist and secular political magazines.

To sum up, I have chosen five cases within three countries that allow me start from a common ground and control for various internal variables as well as outcomes. And, I am looking at these cases using a qualitative comparative method.

Concluding Remarks

Based on my qualitative comparative field research in Jordan, Morocco and Turkey, I argue that Islamist movements with a top-down vanguard strategy tend to establish IPPs, while those with a bottom-up grassroots strategy tend to remain outside of formal politics. This does not mean structural or organizational explanations are insignificant and have no effect at all. It means mobilization strategies are the *main driving force* behind IPP-formation for two reasons. First, structures explain the constitution of the menu of options available to agents and capture post-IPP developments. However, they do not explain variation *within* a case facing the same structural changes. Second, comparing party formation versus non-formation within the

[92] Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 369-404, p. 370.

same case shows that what is crucial in IPP formation is not organization but mobilization strategy. Before indulging in further discussion the implications of this finding, I will first present my cases on a country basis, starting with the Moroccan case.

CHAPTER 3: RADICAL ISLAM VS. MODERATE ISLAM: THE CASE OF MOROCCO

Various political actors in Morocco claim Islamic authority: the Moroccan King carries the title "Commander of the Believers," the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR) advocates an Islamic agenda in public policy through the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), and the Justice and Spirituality Movement (JSM) aims to Islamize the modern world by way of grassroots activities. Although all of these actors claim to represent Islam, they differ in how they go about doing so: the Moroccan King centralizes all religious activity under the Ministry of Religious Affairs; the MUR aims to Islamize society, not the state, yet forms a political party for this purpose; and, the JSM wants a new Moroccan constitution but stays out of formal politics. In short, what we see in Morocco is two Islamist movements trying to Islamize the state and society under a political regime that by definition is headed by an Islamic King.

The story becomes even more complicated taking into account the historical trajectories of both movements and the regime. Both movements emerged under the same regime of the 1970s, and both movements witnessed the same domestic and international political changes. Both movements also share the same popular base, the young, educated, and urban population. They diverge, however, in their political behavior. The MUR (which later formed the PJD) has its origins in the small and radical Islamist movement of the 1970s—the Islamic Youth—whereas the non-violent JSM is the largest politically active Islamist movement in Morocco to date. All in all, the Moroccan regime

and its "Commander of the Believers" host two Islamist movements facing the same political opportunities and constraints. Both appeal to the same popular base but choose different political behavior to represent Islam.

In order to understand such political divergence under the same socio-political conditions of Morocco, I instead focus on what is happening inside both movements in this chapter. In particular, I argue that whereas the JSM adapts a grassroots mobilization strategy of creating mass consciousness through a bottom-up process, the MUR adopts a top-down vanguard mobilization strategy of leading through a few Islamist elites and that this strategic divergence drives their political choices.

In order to demonstrate my argument, this chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part, I will look into the socio-political context wherein both the MUR and the JSM have evolved. In the second part, I will analyze the historical trajectory of the MUR starting from its violent era under the Islamic Youth to its current political involvement under the Party for Justice and Development. And, in the third part, I will question the evolution of the JSM and its current state.

Part 1: Socio-Political Background

For centuries, the Straight of Gibraltar, just across Tangier, has divided Europe from Africa, Christianity from Islam, colony from colonizer, providing an almost natural border. Today, Tangier is full of European tourists who come in big boats for a day-long African tour. Sub-Saharan African immigrants see Morocco as a last stop before their

journey to Europe. Tangier is like a microcosm of Morocco: it is filled with luxury sports cars and posh nightclubs but also with poor, young, and unemployed men, as well as with bohemian Europeans looking for cheap hashish. All of this diversity occurs in the shadow of mosques under the guidance of the "Commander of the Believers." It is a place where the inequalities and contradictions of Morocco's socio-political system are ever visible.

It is under such a socio-political context that both the MUR and the JSM have emerged and are choosing different paths. This complex socio-political context is the subject of this part.

1.1: The Moroccan Regime and its Contradictions

Participation and non-participation have their own costs and benefits within a political regime like Morocco. From the 1960s onward, King Hassan II[1] led Morocco single-handedly who under an emergency law.[2] Yet, despite its authoritarianism, King Hassan II also chose to integrate oppositional forces into this authoritarian regime. He did so for two reasons. First, he used political parties, entities that have to operate in the open, as a way to control oppositional forces in the country. Second, he used oppositional

[1] The political context of Morocco offers both costs and benefits to those who participate in it as well as to those who remain outside of formal politics. To give a very brief historical background: the Alawite dynasty has ruled Morocco for the last 400 years. Like its neighboring states, Morocco came under French colonial power in 1912, and declared independence in 1956 as a result of nationalist pressure to do so. Shortly thereafter in 1957, King Mohammed V, the current King's grandfather, organized the new state as a constitutional monarchy. With the death of Mohammed V in 1961, King Hassan II came to power until his death in 1999.

[2] King Hassan II survived social unrest in 1965 (upon which he declared state of emergency and suspended the parliament), a failed military coup in 1971, and the still unresolved Western Sahara crisis in the 1980s—all of which served to prolong the state of emergence and postponement of elections.

political parties as counter-balance against the military—an institution with the power to take the King down by way of a coup.[3]

Hassan II has integrated the opposition at critical junctures to secure his throne or the legacy of the dynasty. The last major "wave" of such oppositional integrations took place during the 1990s, when late King Hassan II was diagnosed with cancer and was preparing a smooth succession for his son Mohammed VI. In many respects, the Moroccan regime's tolerant authoritarianism is similar to the Jordanian regime, which also allows oppositional activity in order to increase its monitoring abilities without an actual power-sharing arrangement. It also is similar to the Turkish regime, which intervenes each time oppositional forces take an "undesired" turn, in order to remind the opposition of the limitation of their political agenda.

As a result, the benefits of participation under a political regime like that of Morocco are escaping repression by participating with the regime and increased public visibility for oppositional actors, given the strong hold of the regime over the public sphere. It is important to note here that both Islamist movements in this chapter have been approached by the regime for such oppositional integration yet have given different responses.

Participation, however, also has costs. Morocco's "tolerant" attitude toward the opposition is not a "power-sharing" arrangement. The King does not allow any of these oppositional forces to become strong enough to challenge his authority.[4] There are articles forbidding critical debates over royal messages to parliament or the people at

---

[3] Shahin, Emad Eldin. 1997. *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa*. Oxford: Westview Press.
[4] Ibid.

large, and questioning the monarchy, Islam, or the laws of the nation is punished with removal of parliamentary immunity.[5]

Also, looking at the Polity IV data from 1957 to 2009 (Figure 3.1), it becomes clear that decision-making and power-sharing mechanisms have remained exclusive to the regime. As shown in Figure 1, in the time period from 1956-2009, regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment (represented by the "exrec" variable) remained almost unchanged with few periods of worsening. There was change in either the recruitment of those who govern or in the in the opportunities available to ordinary citizens to be recruited to govern. Those who govern and those who are governed were invariable, without an actual transfer or even sharing of power.

Moreover, regulation and competitiveness of participation, represented by the "polcomp" variable also first worsened after 1965- a year in which King Hassan declared a state of emergency and suspended the parliament, and thereafter stayed pretty much stable. This means there was not much change in the number of participating actors in the regime either. In short, the opposition sits in the parliament but actual power and decision-making rests with the King.

Today, Morocco is a "parliamentary" monarchy where the King has absolute power over final decision-making; it is an autocratic regime with a parliament. It is quite commonly labeled as an elitist regime ruled by the King and the people around him, referred to as the "Makhzen," or "warehouse," by the Moroccans. In its elitism, the Moroccan regime is no different than its Turkish (republican alliance) and Jordanian (tribal alliance) counterparts.

[5] Maghraoui, Abdeslam M. 2002. "Depoliticization in Morocco." *Journal of Democracy* 13(4).



Figure 3.1: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions in Morocco, 1950-2009[6]

Because real political power lies with the King, the parliament, political parties, and elections are not popular mediums. For instance, half of the Moroccan population does not vote in elections, believing that those who participate are co-opted. As a result, the major cost of participation is the loss of mass popularity as well the risk of co-optation, which is the major benefit of non-participation.

Non-participation, despite its benefits, is a costly endeavor given the autocratic character of the Moroccan regime, especially given the King's Islamic legitimacy[7] as the Commander of the Believers.[8] Because the King has a religious title, Islamism is a direct

[6] Polity IV Project. 2010. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions in Morocco, 1950-2009. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (Accessed March 13, 2010)

[7] The royal house of Morocco, the Alawite dynasty, which has ruled the country since the late 1600s, claims succession from the Prophet (in Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. 2003. "Islamism Moroccan-Style: The Ideas of Sheikh Yassine" *Middle East Quarterly* 10(1): 43–51). When King Hassan II took over as the new King in 1961, he started using religion to increase his legitimacy in the public eye. (In Pennell, C.R. 2004. *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.) For this purpose, civil code was made to come in line with Koranic prescriptions, and Koranic schools were made obligatory in 1968 (in Burgat, François and William Dowell. 1993. *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press). Most important of all, the King took the title of the "Commander of the Believers" making the King the sole authority regarding matters of Islam (in Kausch, Kristina. 2007. "An Islamist Government in Morocco?" *FRIDE Democracy Backgrounder*. Accessed March 7, 2009: http://www.fride.org/publication/129/an-islamist-government-in-morocco).

[8] The King's Islamic devotion differentiates him from the Jordanian King and Turkish rulers. Although the Jordanian King also attributes prophetic succession, he does not hold a religious title akin to the "Commander of the Believers." The King of Jordan stays out of the religious field. Turkish rulers, on the other hand, adhere to a strict laicist belief, dismissing any religious activity in politics and controlling the religious field through the centralization of religious affairs under the state. In the Moroccan case, Islam is used for political purposes as such when the King wishes. Yet, the King's religious credentials do not make

challenge to the King's legitimacy.[9] Mohammed Tozy, a prominent Moroccan scholar, claims "Islam's fundamental point of reference is to the central power, which occupies a position of hegemony. This reference is essential for legitimacy, and it sets the limits of the counter-proposal of a return to a more rigorous form of Islam."[10] In other words, the Islamists are seen as a threat to the fundamental pillars of the King's legitimacy. Hence, under such an arrangement, remaining as a movement means challenging the regime's Islamic legitimacy independently[11] and thus risks regime repression.

Besides the obvious regime characteristics, there are international factors influencing the costs and benefits of participation and non-participation in Moroccan politics. The Algerian experience is one of them.[12] On the regime side, the Algerian experience means that the regime needs to integrate Islamists into its ranks in order to avoid radical Islamism and instability. On the Islamist side, the Algerian experience means that any sudden and powerful opposition to the regime might end in an internationally supported bloody coup. Many PJD deputies cite the Algerian experience as a reason for *not* entering elections with full power.[13] As a result, participation has the benefit of signaling to the Moroccan regime as well as the international community a moderate stance and a desire to avoid the Algerian experience.

---

him an "Islamic" ruler like the Saudi monarchs who adhere to Islam as state ideology. Rather, the King describes himself as a secular president and the Moroccan constitution and education are mainly secular.

[9] Touhtouh, Rachid. 2010. Professor of Political Science at Mohammed VI University in Rabat. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.

[10] Hughes, Stephen O. 2001. *Morocco under King Hassan*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Ithaca Press, p. 289.

[11] Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

[12] The political events surrounding Algeria's 1991 elections, when the Islamist party the Islamic Salvation Front won with a great majority yet was banned from electoral politics as a result of an internationally-backed up military coup, resulted in a 10-year war between the government and Islamists.

[13] The PJD does not appoint enough candidates that would win the party majority of seats, precluding it from winning a majority in the parliament.

While the Algerian experience works in favor of participation, increasing globalization works in favor of non-participation. Nadia Yassine, one of the ideologues of the Justice and Spirituality Movement, recalls that during the reign of Hassan II, the late King of Morocco, no one knew what was going on inside of Morocco. But, today, globalization has opened up the "black box" of Morocco.[14] Two developments have caused this opening: economic ties to the European Union and democratization.

Morocco's trade with EU states accounts for 40 percent of Morocco's imports and 50 percent of its exports, making the EU Morocco's largest trading partner.[15] Furthermore, Moroccan expatriates' remittances account to $2 billion annually, and European tourists bring in between $1 and 2 billion annually since 1993.[16] Moroccan trade with the Maghreb and the Mediterranean countries is limited and accounts for just 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively, of total trade.[17]

More importantly, Morocco participates in the European Neighborhood Policy and receives financial assistance from the EU. This financial aid has five priorities: (1) the development of social policies (2) economic modernization (3) institutional support, (4) good governance and human rights, and (5) environmental protection.[18] The conditions of this EU-sponsored aid require Morocco to make democratic reforms. As a result, the new King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, started a series of democratization processes to win international confidence throughout the 1990s. By doing so, the

---

[14] Yassine, Nadia. 2010. One of the ideologues of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13-14.
[15] European Commission for Trade. 2011. "Morocco." http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/ (Accessed May 10, 2011).
[16] Brand, Laurie A. 1998. *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences*. New York: Columbia University Press.
[17] European Commission for Trade, 2011.
[18] Ibid.

Moroccan regime is emphasizing its changing autocratic character by decreasing repression of opposition and accepting human rights treaties. It does so to have a positive image in the international community that will eventually pay off in increased foreign investments.[19]

As a result, non-participation now has the benefit of taking advantage of the boomerang effect: EU ties allow social movements to bypass the Moroccan regime and use the EU to pressure the regime. And, given the increasing responsiveness of the Moroccan regime (due to its external dependencies) the political bargaining powers of social movements are increased.

In sum, under the political context of Morocco, participation and non-participation have costs and benefits. Facing the same menu of options, it is the movement that decides what costs and what benefits are more applicable to its cause. And, societal changes have played a special role in this decision—the subject of the next section.

1.2: Moroccan Society in Transition

Societal transformations in the last 40 years have defined new societal cleavages in Morocco. Both the JSM and the MUR came to target these new societal classes. Hence, both movements share more or less the same popular base. Yet, despite such commonality, they have chosen different political paths—eliminating the common assumption that a new Muslim middle class drives party formation. In this section, I will

[19] Bennajeh, Hassan. 2010. Youth-leader of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Casablanca, Morocco. May 10.

describe the formation and characteristics of this popular base, which does not cause party formation both nevertheless plays into the movements' strategic thinking.

To begin with, urbanization (Figure 3.2) and higher education levels (Figure 3.3) have altered Moroccan society rapidly in the last 40 years.



Figure 3.2: Urbanization in Morocco, 1950-2000[20]



Figure 3.3: Education in Morocco, 1970-2009[21]

[20] Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unup, Sunday, December 13, 2009.
[21] EdStats Data Query Worldbank Databank. Accessed on March 11, 2011. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?queryId=189

Meanwhile, urban poverty was also on the rise. By the 1990s, urban poverty levels reached 12 percent.[22] The richest 20 percent of the country possessed 46.3 percent of the countries wealth, while the lowest 20 percent only held 6.6 percent.[23] Just in Casablanca, in the 1980s, 30 percent of adults were unemployed and almost 60 percent of the population was less than 19 years old.[24]

School enrolment increased from 57 percent in 1965 to 80 percent in 1994,[25] produced higher unemployment rates for the educated (Figure 3.4).



Figure 3.4: Unemployment by Level of Education[26]

This combination of educated and unemployed youth fed back into increasing numbers of urban poverty as Moroccan economist Chekroun explains:

> From 1982 to 1984, the percentage of unemployed aged under 35 rose from 79% to 82%, with a peak of unemployment among the 25–34-year-olds. The youngest unemployed

[22] Worldbank Databank. Accessed on April 11, 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/
[23] Berberoglu, Berch. 2000. "Unemployment, Low Wages and Income Inequality: The Tragedy of Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa." In *Earnings Inequality, Unemployment and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Wassim Shahin and Ghassan Diabeh. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press.
[24] Pennell, 2003.
[25] Shafik, Nemat. 2001. "Closing the Gender Gap in the Middle East and North Africa." In *The Economics of Women and Work in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Mine Cinar. Elsevier Science.
[26] International Labor Organization Department of Statistics. Accessed on April 11, 2011. http://laborsta.ilo.org/

> group (15–24-year-olds) grew to 58%. […] These youths continued to live with their parents. For some of them, their education went beyond the "studies certificate:" the unemployment rate in 1989 was 64.5% for graduates of higher education, 48.7% for those with secondary schooling and 25.8% for those with primary school education. […] This unemployment situation spread widely among the urban population and certain families became impoverished. In such circumstances, delays in finding employment lengthened, further aggravating the social repercussions: the appeal to familial solidarity became more difficult and some of these unemployed youths themselves had familial responsibilities.[27]

Societal inequality has political implications. Half the Moroccan population does not vote due to their lack of trust in the electoral process. They are dissatisfied with the existing party system and political parties and do not see electoral politics as an important avenue to potential change.[28]

This is where the Islamists come into play: increasingly, Islamists attract this highly educated segment, which is dissatisfied with the current socio-economic order and ineffective party politics.[29] This increasing inclination toward Islamism can be seen in the changing attitude toward the role of Islam in public office. Yet, before moving into the details of this claim, I should note: we lack survey data prior the 1999 (prior to party formation). And, in the absence of data prior to party formation, we cannot know the degree to which societal demand played a role in this decision. Thus, I will follow an alternate path: I will use data from the World Values Survey during two periods, 1999-2004 and 2005-2009, and illustrate that there is a particular trend in of changes in these periods, and that we can assume that this is a ongoing trend that was accurate prior to party-formation in the mid-1980s and 1990s.

---

[27] Chekroun, Mohammed. 2005. "Socio-Economic Changes, Collective Insecurity and New Forms of Religious Expression." *Social Compass* 52(13), p. 15.
[28] Zisenwine, Daniel. 2007. "From Hasan II to Muhammad VI: Plus Ça Change." In *The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
[29] Hughes, 2001.

Moroccan society in general is a religious society, regardless of education levels and social class, (Table 3.1) and this is pretty stable over the years with minor increases and decreases.

	Do You Consider Yourself a Religious Person? Strongly Agree/Agree (%)	
	1999-2004	**2005-2009**
Upper/Upper Middle Class	92.31	80.68
Lower Middle Class	95.78	93.88
Working Class	90.94	93.53
Lower Class	95.15	86.05
No education/Primary Education	95.40	92.87
Some level of Secondary Education	92.83	89.39
Some Level of University Education	92.19	86.79

Table 3.1: Religiosity Across Classes and Education Levels.[30]

Moreover, Moroccan society at large sees the West as a cultural threat (Table 3.2), a perspective in line with Islamist thinking.

Cultural invasion by the West is a very serious/serious threat, 1999-2004. Strongly Agree/Agree (%)			
By Class		**By Education**	
Upper/Upper Middle Class	76.24	**No education/Primary Education**	90.34
Lower Middle Class	87.14	**Some level of Secondary Education**	85.43
Working Class	87.32	**Some Level of University Education**	76.56
Lower Class	91.28		

Table 3.2: The West as a threat across classes and education.[31]

[30] World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 2009. *World Values Survey Association* (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.
[31] Ibid.

Finally, the greatest change toward Islamism in the society can be seen in the increasing belief in a role for religious authorities in public office. What makes this moderate increase more serious is the strong decrease in the number of people who disapprove religious authority (Table 3.3).

	Better if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office (%)			
	Strongly Agree/Agree		**Strongly Disagree/Disagree**	
	1999	**2009**	**1999**	**2009**
Upper/Upper Middle Class	26.50	48.75	48.72	16.25
Lower Middle Class	53.17	58.92	24.6	11.33
Working Class	57.78	64.98	26.30	6.96
Lower Class	66.11	57.29	18.00	7.29
No education/Primary education	62.43	62.98	21.09	7.66
Some level of Secondary Education	38.65	55.20	36.65	13.6
Some Level of University Education	32.61	59.62	38.04	9.62

Table 3.3: Desire for more religious political authority across classes and education levels.[32]

This increasing trend toward Islamist authority in public office can be seen in earlier studies. In Tozy's 1984 survey with 400 university students, it was found that more than half of the students believed that "the backwardness of Morocco is due to our renunciation of the true Islamic religion."[33] In short, half the Moroccan population, regardless of education and class, believes in greater role for Islam in politics, while the other half does not. What unifies both segments of society is their disappointment with the current Moroccan political system and electoral politics.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Munson, Henry. 1993. *Religion and Power in Morocco*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Compared to the Arab World, Morocco's societal characteristics are no exception. Jamal and Tessler,[34] in their public opinion survey, find that the majority of Arabs support the influence of Islam in government and politics yet that this support is not a wholesome picture representing Arab societies:

> Many Arab citizens express support for the influence of Islam in government and politics. This is not the view of all citizens, however. […] Men and women in every country where surveys have been conducted are divided on the question of whether Islam should play an important political role. For example, whereas 56 percent of the respondents in the Arab Barometer surveys agree with the statement that men of religion should have influence over government decisions, 44 percent disagree indicating that they believe Islam should not play an important political role.[35]

They also find that the "differences between respondents who favor secular democracy and those who favor Islamic democracy" are minimal.[36] What all these findings show is that there are new classes asking for political change, yet that these classes are not unified ideologically. Islamist as well as secular classes co-exist.

What is crucial to note here is: (1) there is no unified Muslim middle class given the diversity of beliefs in the society, and (2) both Islamist movements in this chapter share the same Islamist popular base. Hence, the behavioral divergence of these two movements is not driven by diverging popular bases but by their strategic differences. The rest of the chapter deals with these strategic differences.

---

[34] Jamal, Amaney and Mark Tessler. 2008. "The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World." *Journal of Democracy* 19(1).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.

Part 2: From Radicalism To The Parliament: The Story of the Party For Justice and Development

In 1975, the radical Islamic Youth Movement assassinated Omar Benjelloun, the prominent leftist student leader, in front of his house in Casablanca. In a twist of history, members of the Islamic Youth today are sitting in the Moroccan parliament as deputies from the Party for Justice and Development (PJD). The transformation from a violent movement into a reformist political party took place under the leadership of a "splinter" group from the Islamic Youth who after several name changes and mergers with other Islamists formed the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), the mother movement of the PJD (Table 3.4). Today, the PJD is the third biggest national party in the country. Therefore, it also is a party that has increasingly become a threat for the Moroccan regime's legitimacy. The strategic motivations and directions of this transformation is the subject of this part which is divided into three sections: (1) the strategic and organizational history of the MUR since the Islamic Youth, (2) motivations behind participation, and (2) the movement today.

A Short "Name" Chronology of the Party for Justice and Development for Reference: 1960s/1970s: The Islamic Youth 1980s: The Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR) 1990s: The Party for Justice and Development (PJD)

Table 3.4: A Short-Hand Reference for PJD history

2.1: The Road from the Islamic Youth to the Party for Justice and Development

2.1.1: Going Back to the Origins: The Islamic Youth

The Islamic Youth Movement (*Shabiba Islamiya*) was established in 1969 under the leadership of Abdulkarim Muti.[37] During its initial years, the movement was supported by the Moroccan regime as a counter-balance to Arab Nationalism and socialism. In these initial years, the Movement tried to lead a struggle against atheists.[38] The Movement recruited members from high schools and universities against the rise of the left.[39] In its appeal to the new young and educated segments of society, the Islamic Youth was resembled the Justice and Spirituality Movement.

The Islamic Youth Movement's ideology was inspired by Qutb. The Movement believed that the Moroccan regime was in a state of ignorance and that it needed to be taken down under a vanguard group. Unlike Qutb, the Islamic Youth believed that the nation as a whole was *not* in a state of ignorance and thus could not be accused of apostasy. Rather, they believed the nation was largely composed of those who were oppressed by a wicked power. They proposed to lead a battle against those who govern[40] where the use of violence was a legitimate tool to achieve such an Islamic state.[41] This

---

[37] Darif, Mohamed. 2010b. *Monarchie Marocaine et Acteurs Religieux*. [*Moroccan Monarchy and Religious Actors*.] Casablanca: Afrique Orient.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Tozy, Mohamed. 1984. "Champ et contre champ politico-religieux au Maroc." [The Religious Field and Its Counter-Field in Morocco.] *Doctoral Dissertation*, Université de Droit, d'Économie et des Sciences d'Aix-Marseille, Faculte de Droit et de Science Politique [University of Law, Economics and Science at Marseille, Faculty of Law and Political Science], Marseille, France.
[41] Wegner, Eva and Miquel Pellicer. 2009. "Islamist moderation without democratization: The coming of age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development?" *Democratization* 16(1): 157–175.

aspect stands in great contrast to the JSM, which believes Islamic transformation will start with the individual and society and only then will reach and transform the state.

Another ideology that influenced the Islamic Youth was the Marxist ideology as applied in Algeria by the National Liberation Front (FLN).[42] The FLN saw Islam as the source of Algerian identity and the binding glue of the society. It attempted a revolution under the guidance of a group of "professional revolutionaries." These professional revolutionaries were the organizers of the FLN who prepared for a revolution. It was believed that the masses eventually would follow and submit themselves to these professional revolutionaries once the revolutionaries took control of the state apparatus.

In terms of organization, prior to 1975, the Islamic Youth Movement was similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time: it was led by a Supreme Guide, a secretary general and executive council, and the militants.[43] The militant wing was composed of militants organized into cells.[44] Each cell was headed by a "board" (*naqib*) that was chaired by one "inspector" (*raqib*) who was in turn subject to the authority of the "group leader" (*amir*). Each group leader was subject to the power of the movement leader—the Supreme Guide.[45] Each member of the militant wing would receive a paramilitary training (such as martial arts and weapons handling) as well as education in the techniques of propaganda and recruitment.[46] The aim was to (1) launch punitive missions against leftists, and (2) assassinate a symbolic representative of the left.[47] The violent root

---

[42] Yatim, Mohammed. 2010. Ideologue and deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 21.
[43] Tozy, 1984.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Tozy, Mohamed. 1999a. "Qui sont les islamistes au Maroc ?" ["Who are the Islamists in Morocco?"] *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August. http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/08/TOZY/12315.
[47] Darif, 2010b.

of this movement is one of the key differences from the JSM and other Islamist movements studied here.

The militant wing was not the only faction within the Islamic Youth. There also was a "preaching wing" composed mainly of professors, teachers, students, workers, and artisans. Recruitment to the movement was strictly monitored and one could not join the movement unless their membership was confirmed.[48] Ultimately, the Islamic Youth was an exclusive club.

Given its militant training and exclusive character, the Islamic Youth radicalized in a short period. In 1975, the Movement became involved in the assassination of a known leftist student leader, Omar Benjelloun. As a result, the movement was banned, its key leadership cadre and militant wing was imprisoned, its leader Muti fled to Libya,[49] and the Movement split into multiple wings—one of them of which would become the Islamic Society, the founding group of the Movement for Unity and Reform.[50] This was the start of a new era for the Islamic Youth.

2.1.2: Season of Change

As a result of these sudden changes in the internal balances within the Islamic Youth, the movement entered a phase of self-criticism under the guidance of a younger generation within the preaching wing who were not involved in the violent acts of the Islamic Youth.[51] This phase of self-reflection resulted in three ideological shifts.

---

[48] Darif, 2010b.
[49] Wegner and Pellicer, 2009.
[50] Darif, 2010b.
[51] Hamdaoui, Mohamed El. 2010. President of the Movement for Unity and Reform. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 30.

The first ideological change was in the perception of the Moroccan regime. While the Islamic Youth believed in the illegitimacy of the Moroccan regime and the need to take it down in order to Islamize it, this younger group came to the conclusion that the King as the Commander of the Believers was a great protection for them against both religious and secular extremism.[52] Hence, they decided to accept the King's legitimacy.

The second ideological change concerned the goals of the movement. The ultimate goal of the Islamic Youth was to establish an Islamic state. This younger group, however, according to Raissouni,[53] one of the ideologues of the MUR, decided that their priority should instead be societal reform.[54] As a result, in the 1980s, they[55] re-stated their goals: "to renew the understanding of religion, to advocate the implementation of Shari'a law, to achieve a comprehensive cultural renaissance, to work on accomplishing the unity of Muslims, to confront ideologies and ideas which they believed were subversive to Islam, and to raise the educational and moral level of the Moroccan people."[56] These goals targeted the Moroccan society, not the state.[57]

---

[52] Othmani, Saadeddin. 2007. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with Saeed Abbadi, March 3. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=2267

[53] Raissouni, Ahmed. 2005. Ideologue of the Movement for Unity and Reform. "Dharuf Nashat al Haraka al Islamiya fi Maghrib." ["Conditions of the Emergence of the Islamic Movement in Morocco."] Interview by *Al Jazeera*. http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/AF24E7E7-962D-4668-8B52-48FE97320FD2.htm.

[54] Hmimnat, Salim. 2010. Researcher of political Islam in Morocco. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 21.

[55] Note that the movement's name has altered a few times for technical reasons although they remained the same movement. For that reason I am not referring to them specifically by name.

[56] Wegner and Pellicer, 2009, p. 160.

[57] Even today, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) is quite often criticized for this stance. According to Brouksy, a secular Moroccan journalist, the PJD focused on social reforms, such as on women and sexual orientation, rather than actual political reform. (In Brouksy, Omar. 2010. Journalist from the secular Tequel. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 13.) The PJD aims to mobilize the masses around the belief that the country's Islamic identity is under threat, rather than mobilizing the masses to change the regime. (In Amghar, Samir. 2007. "Political Islam in Morocco." *CEPS Working Document* No. 269. Accessed March 9, 2009: http://www.ceps.be.) Similarly, Zeghal observes that the PJD, on the matter of society, adopts a hard-core Islamic rhetoric while it remains moderate on political issues. (In Zeghal, Malika. 2008. *Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.) In short, the PJD and the movements that came before it adopted an

The third and final ideological change involved the "practice" of their new ideology because what they were being imprisoned for was their "revolutionary" agenda, not their Islamic credentials per se.[58] Hence, they opted for reformism. Reformism involved gaining experience in actual policy-making and governance. According to Ahmed Raissouni,[59] one of the MUR ideologues, Islamist movements around the world have "produced masses of supporters, fighters and resisters but they produced little knowledge, experience and efficiency for exercising politics and rule." Hence, this group wanted to gain experience in actual politics and reform society through policy-making. These ideological changes formed the basis of their new direction.

2.1.3: A New Movement is Born

To realize their newly found direction, this younger group within the Islamic Youth first tried to convince the leadership cadre of the Movement, especially its exiled leader Muti, to abandon the revolutionary agenda. Muti refused. This event marked the split of the younger group from the Islamic Youth. According to the Moroccan political Islam expert Mohamed Darif, this gesture came as a huge surprise and signaled their first step toward becoming integrated into the Moroccan system.

After this gesture, the leaders of this splinter group (Mohammed Yatim, Abdullah Baha, and Abdellilak Benkirane[60]—all of whom are prominent deputies from the PJD

---

alternative stance to politics that aimed to reform society. In this regard, the Movement is similar to the Doves of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood who wanted to transform society through the state.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Raissouni, Ahmed. 2006. Ideologue of the Movement for Unity and Reform. "Raissouni: Religious Scholars Should Participate in Governments, Parliaments." Interview with Al Hassan Al Sarat, Aljazeera. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=2999.

[60] Othmani, Saadeddin. 2010. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. May 3.

today) started to send letters to the King and other officials stating their newly found non-violent stance[61] and asking for official recognition of their movement.[62] In 1985, they presented a memorandum to the Royal Cabinet, in 1986 they sent a letter to the Minister of the Interior, and in 1987 they sent another message to the King of Morocco asking for legal status.[63] Similarly Abdessalam Yassine also asked for legal recognition of his movement, the JSM, but was rejected by the Moroccan regime.

These splinters formed a new movement under the name "Islamic Society" (*Jamaa Islamiya*) in 1981 and 1982. They started publishing the weekly newsletter "Al Islah," (reform) which was banned in 1990.[64] Later, they changed their name to "Movement for Reform and Renewal" (*Al Haraka Al Islah wa al Tajdid*) to get rid of all Islamic associations in the face of the developments in Algeria and the Islamist Party (FIS) there.[65]

In 1994, other smaller Islamist movements joined the Movement for Reform and Renewal: (1) the Islamic Preaching Movement (*Dawa Islamiyya*), a movement active since 1976 in Fez under the leadership of Abdeslam Al Harass, (2) The Islamic Association of Ksar El Kebir (*Al Jamiya Islamiya Al Ksar El Kebir*), a movement active since 1976 under the leadership of Ahmed Raissouni, (3) The Islamic Dawn Association (*Al Jamiya Al Fujur Al Islamiya*), a former splinter of the Islamic Youth Movement.[66] Together they altered their name to the "Movement for Unity and Reform" (MUR) (*Al*

---

[61] Erramdani, Redouane. 2007. "Enquête: L'histoire secrète du PJD." ["Investigantion: The Secret History of the PJD."] *Telquel* 302, December 21. http://www.telquel-online.com/302/couverture_302.shtml
[62] Hamzawy, Amr. 2008. "Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents." *Middle East Program* 93.
[63] Darif, 2010b.
[64] Tozy, Mohamed. 1999b. *Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc*. [*Monarchy and Political Islam in Morocco*.] Paris, France: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
[65] Tozy, 1999a.
[66] Darif, 2010b.

Haraka Al Tahwid wa Al Islah) in 1996. The MUR is similar to the Turkish National View Movement that emerged as an alliance between various Islamist movements. With time, other smaller movements joined them and today the MUR is an umbrella organization bringing more than 200 groups together.[67] The new movement grew in number not by recruitment or grassroots activities but by merging with other Islamist movements active in the country building a large umbrella alliance throughout Morocco.

Another interesting dimension of the MUR is that from the Islamic Youth to the PJD, MUR has been a "student" movement in the sense that all the forerunner movements emerged on university campuses. Because it has driven its popular base from the educated new segments of society, the MUR came to be supported by middle class bourgeoisie in urban and semi-urban areas, according to Rachid Touhtouh,[68] a Moroccan scholar at the Mohammed V University in Rabat. As a result, according to Lahcen Daoudi,[69] a deputy from PJD, 80 percent of their supporters have university degrees.

In 1992, the rejected party application of the Movement for Reform and Renewal for the "National Revival Party" (*Hizb Nahda Wataniya*) gave further indication to the popular base of the MUR at the time.[70] The proposed party's central committee had 34 members, 24 of which were teachers and seven university professors. These founders were engaged in 16 different cities where Casablanca and Rabat comprised a third of the workforce. And, 25 of the 34 were born after independence, so this was a younger

---

[67] Amghar, Samir. 2007. "Political Islam in Morocco." *CEPS Working Document* No. 269. http://www.ceps.be (March 9, 2009).
[68] Interview with Rachid Touhtouh on 19 April 2010.
[69] Interview with Lahcen Daoudi on 15 April 2010.
[70] Darif, 2010b.

generation.[71] This makeup is similar to the JSM in that the JSM's higher committees are also made up of highly educated urban middle classes. Despite starting from a similar popular base and facing the same closed political system that rejected their legal existence, the MUR desired party formation, while the JSM was more involved with grassroots activism.

The MUR desired party formation because in its strategic perception, societal reform could only be achieved under their guidance by influencing policy, by sitting in the parliament, by holding other higher posts of power, and by forming the new elites of Morocco in a top-down transformation, i.e. through a vanguard mobilization strategy: "We started ourselves to admit that Islam was not about regime [...] the elite that took power after the Protectorate is an elite who was trained in Europe and sees the things in a more Western more ... At this point, we realized that our job was to make people understand and give priority to the country's elite, that Islam is something essential."[72] And, a political party was the perfect medium to do so.[73]

2.2: Why Form a Party?

Vanguard movements are small movements organized around a group of Islamist elites who aim to lead society through an Islamic transformation. And, because they are starting from a small group, their first priority is to widen their constituency. The MUR is a vanguard movement in its exclusive, small and top-down approach to change. Thus, its first priority is to start its long-term project of societal transformation by enlarging its

---

[71] Tozy, 1999b.
[72] Ibid, p. 234.
[73] Ibid.

supporter base—yet, to do so under a vanguard strategy, not grassroots activism involving lay people.

Hence, party formation gave the MUR the chance (1) to influence legislation,[74] formulate policies,[75] and supervise the government,[76] and (2) to create its own elite leading such political influence.[77] In the words of Khalfi, the editor of the MUR-associated Attajdid newspaper, participation meant "implement[ing] part of our program and reconciliation of our values with the public policies. This helps a lot in connecting our religion, our family values, our ethics with the obligations and challenges of modernity. […] It allows our society to have a new elite that could resolve and contribute in the resolving of economic and social crises."[78]

Within this framework, co-optation was not understood as a potential threat. The MUR, unlike the Justice and Spirituality Movement, took a different lesson from the left's experience in Morocco. In the MUR's vision, the left in Morocco had made a strategically fruitful decision in participating because those segments of the left who did not participate ended up being marginalized while those who participated "succeeded in widening, developing positions in the society and reflecting what the Moroccan society is looking for."[79] Looking from the strategic perspective of the vanguard strategy, the MUR saw the Moroccan left's experience as having achieved its goals of widening appeal and

---

[74] Daoudi, Lahcen. 2010. Deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 15.
[75] Khalfi, Mustapha. 2010. Editor of the MUR-linked Attajdid Newspaper. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 19.
[76] Haquaoui, Bassima. 2010. Deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 29.
[77] Yatim, Mohammed. 2010. Ideologue and Deputy from the Party for Justice and Development Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 21.
[78] Khalfi, Mustapha. 2010. Editor of the MUR-linked Attajdid Newspaper. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 19.
[79] Ibid.

introducing top-down change in Morocco, while the JSM saw the very same left experience as a prime-example of co-optation.

More importantly, in MUR's vanguardism, non-participation equals a "wait and see strategy"[80] as there are no top-down changes without acquiring higher posts of power. Mohammed Yatim, a deputy from the PJD, explains:

> To participate is the only way to improve things. If you chose to not participate, you cannot have an influence on the regime. People who chose not to participate are the ones who are waiting for something to change. But if you wait, nothing will change. It is in the benefit of our enemies that we do not participate. If participating was in the benefit of the authoritarian regimes, they would let us participate. Look at the example of Egypt.[81]

It is interesting to note here that similar dismissive attitudes toward grassroots activism can be found in other vanguard movements as well. For example, the Turkish National View Movement believes Islamist movements should not bother with educating a new youth and waiting for such a generational change.

As a result, vanguard movements like the MUR are more prone to choose pragmatic concerns over idealistic concerns, such as co-optation. As Hamdaoui, the current head of the MUR, explains: "We are more realistic now because we have stopped dreaming of how Morocco should be and are instead focusing on gaining more experience."[82] Moreover, this was a time under the shadow of the Algerian example, according to Hmimnat, a Moroccan political scientist.[83] The root of the problem in

---

[80] Ibid.
[81] Yatim, Mohammed. 2010. Ideologue and deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 28.
[82] Hamdaoui, Mohammed El. 2010. President of the Movement for Unity and Reform. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 30.
[83] Hmimnat, Salim. 2010. Researcher of political Islam in Morocco. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 21.

Algeria was the mistrust of state elites to the Islamists because the Islamist party had not guaranteed the elites the preservation of their privileges. Hence, the MUR needed to avoid such relationships of mistrust. According to Khalfi[84], the editor of the MUR-linked Islamist newspaper Attajdid, they realized that the political elites of Morocco did not trust them while party formation was a way to overcome that mistrust. In this reasoning, it is important to note the radical and violent history of the MUR going back to the Islamic Youth that raised serious question marks about the movement's intentions and reliability as a moderated group. Given MUR's past and the example of Algeria, participation would serve to start new relations of trust between the Moroccan elites and the MUR.

At the end of these debates, the benefits of participation outweighed its costs. And, even the costs were easily dismissed. For instance, the ex-leader of the PJD, Othmani, admits that "Life without concessions is impossible. We make everyday concessions. But this is the price we pay. But we win more than we lose."[85] Similarly, per Yatim, an ideologue of the MUR: "You make a choice, and when you make a choice you have to assume consequences."[86]

In short, party formation and participation were seen as the "only" option available to the MUR's vanguard perspective as this was the only venue for top-down transformations under a new Islamist elite. As a result, after several attempts to establish their "own" party, legally recognized by the Moroccan regime,[87] the MUR became

[84] Khalfi, Mustapha. 2010. Editor of the MUR-linked Attajdid Newspaper. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 19.
[85] Othmani, Saadeddin. 2010. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. May 3.
[86] Yatim, Mohammed. 2010. Ideologue and deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 21.
[87] Othmani, Saadeddin. 2004. "Political Islam and Challenges of Reform and Succession of Authority: The Morocco as a Model." In *Political Parties in the Arab World: Current Status and Future Prospects*:

integrated into the system under the banner of an old yet loyal defunct political party, the Popular Democratic Constitutional Movement Party (*Mouvement populaire constitutionnel et démocratique*), in 1996.[88] This arrangement was beneficial for both the MUR and the Moroccan regime. For the regime, it meant the ability to control and manipulate a recent Islamist trend, whereas for the MUR it meant legality and the ability to enter formal electoral politics.[89] The Islamists hesitated going into the political system because they feared a result like that of Algeria without the regime's approval. The regime felt threatened by the growth of the Justice and Spirituality Movement and needed Islamists to counter other Islamists.[90] In 1998, this party was renamed as the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) (*Al Hizb Al Adala wa Al Tanmiya*), and MUR members took control over it.[91]

2.3: PJD and MUR Today

Organizational considerations did not play a crucial role in the decision to participate because the movements that made the MUR did not need to bring order to their organization in a party framework. What mattered more, organizationally, was how to divide "jobs" among the party and the movement. As a result, the MUR and the PJD co-exist today. They share key leaders in their executive committees, such as Mohammad

---

Proceedings of the Regional Conference Organized by the Al Quds Center for Political Studies and Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Amman, 12-13 June.

[88] Ottaway, Marina and Meredith Riley. 2006. "Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?" *Carnegie Papers* 71.

[89] Albrecht, Holger and Eva Wegner. 2006. "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco." *The Journal of North African Studies* 11(2).

[90] Erramdani, Redouane. 2007. "Enquête: L'histoire secrète du PJD." ["Investigantion: The Secret History of the PJD."] *Telquel* 302, December 21. http://www.telquel-online.com/302/couverture_302.shtml

[91] Wegner and Pellicer, 2009.

Yatim, Abdullah Baha, and Abdellilah Benkirane[92] as well as almost 60 percent of their supporters.[93] There is a division of labour between the MUR and the PJD.

While the MUR is "critical of the authorities and remains in contact with its base through religious and pastoral associational work," the PJD remains a loyal critic of the monarchy.[94] In essence, according to Brouksy, a Moroccan journalist, MUR acts as the ideological watchdog of the PJD.[95] In doing this, the PJD walks the line of reconciling two political forces: its radical wing and core supporters among which it drives its popularity from, and the regime on whose mercy its political existence depends.[96]

MUR-PJD relations have altered over time. According to Khalfi, this relationship went through three phases: (1) full cooperation between the two (1992-1998), (2) a switch in coordinating activities to give PJD independence from the MUR at the local level and the public eye (1998-2004), and (3) clear differentiation between the movement and the party (post-2004). Its partnership is "based on strategic cooperation on long term goals, and real separation in terms of functions, a functional separation."[97] It was decided in a "document of complementarity" that PJD would serve as the political organization dealing with all political issues of the country and defending Islamic causes in the institutions, whereas the MUR would focus on *dawa* (Islamic missionary activity) and

---

[92] Hamzawy, Amr. 2008. "Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents." *Carnegie Paper*, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20314&prog=zgp&proj=zme (March 9, 2009).

[93] Daoudi, Lahcen. 2010. Deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 15.

[94] Amghar, Samir. 2007. "Political Islam in Morocco." *CEPS Working Document* No. 269. http://www.ceps.be (March 9, 2009).

[95] Brouksy, Omar. 2010. Journalist from the secular Telquel Magazine. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 13.

[96] Amghar, 2007.

[97] Khalfi, Mustapha. 2010. Editor of the MUR-linked Attajdid Newspaper. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 19.

education.[98] Such division of labor is a common trend in movements that have formed parties, such as the Turkish National View Movement or the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood all have extra-party organizations as well.

Although following "proximity"[99] politics via the MUR, PJD remains an elite-led organization. Membership to PJD involves two stages. In the first stage, the potential member, or the "participatory member," is admitted upon recommendation of two party members and has no access to any of the party's legislative or executive bodies. In the second stage, after a year of performance evaluation and background screening, the member switches to a "working member" with more of a role in the party's decision-making.[100] In its elitist recruitment, the PJD is very different than the Justice and Spirituality Movement, which embraces an open mass recruitment strategy and continues to be exclusive.

In terms of its popular base and members, the PJD, like the JSM, attracts the young, urban, educated middle class. Tozy, a Moroccan political scientist, finds that PJD candidates are predominantly teachers (49 percent) and professionals (17 percent), are 40 years old on average, and have high levels of communication skills as a result of long years of practice in religious preaching and social work.[101] Furthermore, MUR and PJD leaders come from two backgrounds: (1) leaders from a poor background who became middle class through PJD networking, and (2) leaders from a bourgeoisie upbringing.[102] It

---

[98] Wegner and Pellicer, 2009.
[99] What I mean by proximity politics is following mass politics.
[100] Wegner, Eva. 2004. "The Contribution of Inclusivist Approaches towards the Islamist Opposition to Regime Stability in Arab States: The Case of the Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Développement." *EUI Working Paper RSCAS* No. 2004/42
[101] Tozy, 1999a.
[102] Touhtouh, Rachid. 2010. Professor of Political Science at the Mohammed VI University in Rabat. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.

is interesting to note that PJD's popular base is not very different from JSM's popular base today in that it also appeals to the urban educated middle classes. What differentiates the two groups is not their popular base, but their strategic logic for mobilization.

The PJD's desire to transform society in a top-down manner can be observed in its political orientation today. To begin with, PJD's party program is vaguely defined to say the least. It "endorses various government policies when necessary, and at the same time criticizes other positions of the government in order to appear as a platform for protest among militants."[103] PJD is also forming alliances with the most unlikely political actors with whom they have no common ideological grounds without fearing co-optation. In this regard, it is very similar to the Turkish National View Movement, which allies with leftists as well as the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which accepts Christians as members. It does so for the sake of becoming more visible in the public eye, and to gain more experience and training in the political realm.[104]

Finally, the PJD recently announced that it has moved its policy position from "critical support" for the government to one of "constructive, positive, and advisory" position.[105] This means, they desire not only to be a loyal opposition to the Moroccan state but rather be part of the decision-making process. At first sight, this new position might seem risking the alienation of a core supporter base. In the vanguard perspective of

---

[103] Amghar, 2007, p. 2.
[104] Touhtouh, Rachid. 2010. Professor of Political Science at the Mohammed VI University in Rabat. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.
[105] BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political. 2000. "Morocco: Justice and Development Party Moves to "Constructive" Opposition." *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 3.

the PJD, however, this is a step closer to attain higher posts of power through which they can serve their supporters better.

In sum, the PJD today continues to exercise its vanguard mobilization strategy by limiting recruitment and by adopting a flexible agenda without worrying about becoming co-opted by the regime. For instance, instead of labeling itself as an Islamist Party, PJD now defines its position as "a political party with an Islamic frame of reference."[106] This avoidance of direct Islamic references can also be seen in the Party's election slogans. Instead of "Islam is the solution," the PJD used the following slogans throughout the years (all of which avoid Islamic references): "the authenticity of the development of justice," "for a better Morocco," "for a community working," and "all of us to build Morocco's justice."[107] In other words, avoiding Islamic references for the sake of practical reasons is not seen as co-optation because the benefits of influencing policy through such a flexible agenda means more room to maneuver to transform society under the leadership of the PJD in a top-down manner. All in all, the MUR and the PJD value pragmatic concerns over idealistic ones given their strategic perspective and their desire to realize those strategies.

Looking at the same socio-political context, the Justice and Spirituality Movement sees a completely different picture and envisions a different future scenario.

---

[106] Zeghal, 2008.
[107] Othmani, Saadeddin. 2009. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. Accessed May 23, 2009: http://www.fassael.net/article.php3?id_article=270

Part 3: Islamizing Modernity—The Case of the Justice and Spirituality Movement

In June 2005, thousands of people marched in Rabat, Morocco to support Nadia Yassine, the daughter of Abdessalam Yassine, the aging leader of Morocco's largest Islamist movement Justice and Spirituality Movement. She was accused of giving an interview one year earlier in which she criticized hereditary monarchy: "We would not die if we no longer would have a King." Because law forbids criticizing the monarchy, Nadia Yassine was arrested. More than 100 lawyers volunteered for her defense and many ambassadors asked the King for her release. In the end, she was released as a result of international pressures for freedom of speech.

The Justice and Spirituality Movement (JSM) gathered such wide-range support over the course of 40 years. What's more striking is that the JSM formally remains an "outlawed" movement because it rejects party formation and participation in the regime. Hence, for the JSM, non-participation has high costs. Furthermore, JSM shares the same popular base with the MUR/PJD in its appeal to the urban, educated middle class. Yet, it chooses a completely different political behavior—making the argument that societal differences drive behavioral differences inapplicable.

The JSM rejects participation because, from its grassroots strategic perspective, non-participation has greater benefits than costs. To demonstrate this strategic perspective, this part is divided into three sections: (1) the evolution of the JSM, (2) motivations behind non-participation, and (3) the JSM today.

3.1: The Evolution of the Justice and Spirituality Movement

3.1.1: … and the Justice and Spirituality Movement is Formed

In 1974, the late King of Morocco, Hassan II, received a 120-page public letter from Abdessalam Yassine, a young school inspector working for the Ministry of Education. Like its contemporaries in the Islamic Youth, Yassine accused the King of leading an un-Islamic monarchy and of questioned his title as the "Commander of the Believer."[108] Immediately thereafter Yassine was put into an insane asylum. His punishment did not prevent Yassine from attaining public fame and popularity.

After his release, Abdessalam Yassine was forbidden to preach in mosques. He started publishing his first magazine in 1979, Al-Jamaa (The Society).[109] In September of 1981, Yassine started an Islamist movement, and in 1982, like the Islamic Youth and the MUR, requested legal status for his movement. This request was rejected on the grounds that the "movement mixes religion and politics."[110] Regardless, Yassine continued to build up his movement and in 1987 this movement acquired its current name, the Justice and Spirituality Movement (*Al Harakat Al Adala wa Al Ihsan*). In 1989, Yassine was imprisoned once again,[111] and in January 1990, the movement was officially outlawed.[112] It is important to note that both the JSM and the PJD's predecessor movement, Islamic Youth, were outlawed for their activities. Both movements faced the same closed

---

[108] Hamzawy, Amr. 2008. "Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents." *Middle East Program* 93.
[109] Tozy, 1999b.
[110] Hamzawy, 2008, p. 8.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Amghar, 2007.

political system. What is different is that the JSM never used violence, while the Islamic Youth has grown increasingly radicalized.

JSM-regime relations followed a particular trend throughout the years. Yassine would be released from prison and continue to work for the growth of his movement. And, when socio-economic crises hit, the regime, in order to protect itself from Yassine's movement, would imprison members who would be released a few years later, restarting the whole process.[113] Even throughout the 1990s and 2000s, members of the JSM were imprisoned despite the public rhetoric of democratization.[114] In this regard, the JSM is quite different than the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which, until party formation, enjoyed privileged relations with the regime.

According to Ellen Lust-Okar, a political scientist, however, the Moroccan regime also tolerates the JSM:

> Even if one accepts the argument that the King chose not to kill Yassine because he feared creating a martyr, several factors remain. The most important is that, in the absence of any apparent political pressure, the government released Yassine from the psychiatric hospital in less than four years and allowed him to continue making the same demands (albeit in a more muted form) that he had previously.[115]

The reason behind such tolerance, according to Lust-Okar, is the fact that the JSM poses a powerful counter-balance to other oppositional forces in Morocco, such as the left and secular nationalists, as well as radical Islamists.[116]

---

[113] Lust-Okar, 2005.
[114] Pennell, 2003.
[115] Lust-Okar, 2005, p. 160.
[116] Ibid.

In such a political context, the JSM could have taken such tolerance a step further by forming a party. However, it rejects doing so and the reason for this decision lies in its strategic perspective.

3.1.2: Who is the Justice and Spirituality Movement

The origins of JSM's opposition to the Moroccan regime have theological roots. According to the JSM, after the death of the Prophet, Islam was "taken as a hostage by political power and was made to serve the cause of tyrants with the complicity, conscious or unconscious, of a particular jurisprudence." Starting with the Umayyad dynasty, the situation led to "a legal and political system legitimizing autocracy, depriving them of any political culture and excluding them from any voluntarist initiative." According to the JSM, Islam's original message[117] is to bring "universal spirituality and social equity with multiple applications."[118] Therefore, the JSM demands a new constitution where the King is not above but under the law and is accountable to the people.[119]

To achieve these goals, the JSM envisions a three-stage process.[120] The first stage is *tarbiya* [education] where the individual is socialized through Islamic teachings.[121] In this stage, the JSM believes change can only come from within the individual and cannot

---

[117] The JSM does not argue that it has the "right" interpretation: According to the JSM spokesman Abdelouahed Moutawakil, "We don't claim that we are representing Islam. No interpretation is absolute. We should debate and the majority decides. Imposing ideas doesn't work. We have seen this in the USSR experience." (In Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.)
[118] Yassine, Nadia. 2005. Ideologue from the Justice and Spirituality Movement. "Presentation of the Justice and Spirituality Association: A Great Hello to All the Militants!" http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/10364.htm
[119] Saaf, Abdallah and Abdelrahim Manar Al Slimi. 2008. "Morocco 1996-2007: A Decisive Decade of Reforms?" www.arab-reform.org
[120] In some respects, the JSM and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have similar characteristics in the way in which they see gradual change. However, formally there are not links between the two movements.
[121] Touhtouh, Rachid. Professor of Political Science at Mohammad VI University in Rabat. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.

be forced upon the individual: “Based on nonviolence, our action can only be voluntarist because we think that the initial choice of Islam is Education and that man is the basis of everything and every society. Change man to change society; power will follow in one way or another.”[122] In other words, in this belief, change starts from within the individual and within the society:[123] “We educate our members and the sympathizers spiritually and morally in the first place and then comes social, political, cultural and economic education. Spiritual education is our barometer.”[124] This attention on individual transformation is quite similar to the Turkish Gulen Movement. It also is quite different from the MUR because the MUR does not aim individual salvation but starts from a few “saved” individuals who are leading the cause.

The second stage is the *dawa* [missionary activity] stage, where the individual is put back into the society to educate others.[125] Abdelhakim Hajjouji, a member of the JSM, summarizes this stage.

> Believers should assimilate every single characteristic so as to endure any type of affective or physical offences. They are supposed to teach them to others. […] The above mentioned traits can endow believers with a sense of communication, understanding and clemency towards others regardless of their language, religion or race. By doing so, we expect these latter to join Islam.[126]

Women occupy a special role within this three-stage process:

---

[122] Yassine, Nadia. 2005. Ideologue of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. “Presentation of the Justice and Spirituality Association: A Great Hello to All the Militants!” http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/10364.htm

[123] Saaf and Al Slimi, 2008.

[124] Yassine, Nadia. 2003. “Conversations Within Islam: Culture, Politics and Religion in the Global Public Sphere.” Central European University, Budapest, May 29. http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/10297.htm

[125] Touhtouh, Rachid. Professor of Political Science at Mohammed VI University in Rabat. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.

[126] Hajjouji, Abdelhakim. 2007. “Education and Values.” In *Islamists versus Seculars Confrontations and Dialogues in Morocco*, ed. Maâti Monjib. IKV Pax Christi Centre Averroes for Studies and Communication-Rabat Assemblée des Citoyens- MECA Conference, Rabat, Morocco, p. 82.

> The most important thing in this field is the preparation of a new generation to acquire the essential tools of intellectual ijtihad (interpretation) in all fields—particularly women, who have been consistently wronged when ijtihad was performed before. The group's General Guide Abdessalam Yassine emphasizes that the tragedy of Muslims is due largely to the lack of female knowledge of ijtihad, or, more precisely, the exclusion of women from ijtihad.[127]

The JSM claims that they are between the first and second stages.[128] They claim the movement is at the stage of educating individuals and widening its supporter base to increase mass consciousness at the mass level. Similarly, the MUR also aims to widen its supporter base, but it does so through acquiring influential posts of power while the JSM engages in grassroots activism and individual education.

The third and last stage is *thuwra* [uprising], where the political system will be replaced with another one. The expectation in this third stage is that "if a fruit is rotten, it will fall."[129] In other words, the JSM expects that when mass consciousness about the corruptness of the Moroccan regime rises, a mass uprising will be inevitable and will lead to a political transformation in Morocco, just as "a grain of sand that accumulates to one day break the machine apart."[130] This bottom-up transformation stands in juxtaposition to the MUR's top-down approach to altering Moroccan society.

To start this bottom-up, three-stage process, the JSM relies on grassroots activities in four venues: (1) direct action on the ground, (2) affiliated branches at the local level, (3) 60 branches at the national level, and (4) youth, women, and worker sub-branches.

---

[127] Yassine, Nadia. 2006. "Ideologue of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Insights and Analysis: Interview with Nadia Yassine of the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Group." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/11896.htm
[128] Touhtouh, Rachid. Professor of Political Science at Mohammed VI University in Rabat. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.
[129] Brouksy, Omar. 2010. Journalist from the secular Telquel Magazine. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 13.
[130] Yassine, Nadia. 2010. Ideologue of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13-14.

Furthermore, given that they are illegal, they participate under the umbrella of other unions. In doing this, the JSM does not see any problem with forming alliances with non-Islamist forces in the country. According to Abdessalam Yassine, "There is no harm if we are to cooperate passionately with others to further the dignity and self esteem of individuals," and, "one of the virtues we deem essential in our relations with others is love of the nation, that is to say to be faithful to the country and proud to serve it. Hence, we are willing to cooperate with those who are skillful and have virtues."[131]

In order to realize this alliance, the JSM advocates forming a national charter—"a comprehensive document that gathers under its wings the best among those who have vision and free will, because the crisis is bigger than any party, movement or individual, no matter how capable."[132] The aim of this document is to establish a common base in the society upon which to build reform.[133] The JSM sees itself as the guarantor in such an alliance:

> Ghassan Salame, the famous Lebanese political expert, spoke of a "democratic pact" which could manage periods of democratic transition in countries with a dictatorial tradition. He describes it as a covenant between several political entities, but raises a condition for this to work, a force that is genuinely popular and homogeneous, which can play the role of guarantor of this transition. We are obviously light years away from any consideration of this pact let alone any democratic transition, but the vagaries of history are manifold. As to the movement, it continues working for a unification of hearts, minds and consciences.[134]

---

[131] Bouyibri, Rochdi. 2007. "Towards a Society that Rejects Violence." In *Islamists versus Seculars Confrontations and Dialogues in Morocco*, ed. Maâti Monjib. IKV Pax Christi Centre Averroes for Studies and Communication-Rabat Assemblée des Citoyens- MECA Conference, Rabat, Morocco, p. 46.
[132] Saaf and Al Slimi. 2008, p. 19.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Yassine, Nadia. 2008. "Only the Combined Efforts of All Forces of the Nation Can Get Morocco Out of the Crisis." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12400.htm

The JSM desires the ultimate political transformation of the Moroccan regime in coalition with oppositional forces—a different political behavior than the MUR, which, in its initial years, allied itself with other smaller Islamist movements and not with secular political actors.

Another strategy is to do symbolic gestures and be imprisoned for it in order for change to come, for example, participating in civil disobedience:[135]

> We are practicing something like guerrilla warfare against the regime—not in a bloody sense, but rather symbolically with hit-and-run tactics. We try to spread political and intellectual awareness, which weakens the regime's grip on power. Justice and Spirituality has made change possible by the emboldening of a civil society founded by the regime, but which has now moved beyond its control. For example, when I declared in public that I was in favor of a republican system I knew I had five years of jail waiting for me. Since that time the press has begun to criticize the King, whom the constitution reveres as sacred.[136]

As a result, the JSM's primary concern, according to Moutawakil, the spokesman of the JSM, is its "devotion primarily to its own building, expanding its action to appeal to God and preparing for the future."[137]

According to the political Islam expert Darif, the real strength of the JSM is its organization. The group is so well organized everywhere that Yassine's ideology is efficiently executed through grassroots activities throughout the country.[138] The JSM is a personalistic organization based on the charismatic personality of Abdessalam Yassine.

---

[135] Ibid.

[136] Yassine, Nadia. 2006. "Insights and Analysis: Interview with Nadia Yassine of the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Group." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/11896.htm

[137] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2009. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. "Moutawakil: Les marocains ont ignoré les législatives, et ignoreront à plus forte raison les élections locales …" ["Moutawakil: Moroccans Have Ignored the Laws, and Ignore the More so the Local Elections..."] http://www.aljamaa.net/fr/document/1298.shtml

[138] Darif, Mohamed. 2010a. Expert on political Islam in Morocco. Interview with author, Casablanca. May 10.

He is the ideologue and the leader of the movement. Having a charismatic leader like Yassine gives the movement a unified ideology and coherence in orienting members.[139]

Under Yassine's unified and tight community, decision-making is dispersed among various sub-groups. The National Council within the movement makes decisions and elects the members of the General Secretary and provides a place where political events are debated and where local bureaus are managed. It has 70 representatives from the whole country elected by provincial branches.[140]

The General Secretary is composed of four appointed and eight elected members. Today, three of them are women, a natural consequence absent a quota. The women are organized within a female section that represents approximately 50 percent of the movement. The female section is led nationally by a committee of five women.[141] The Secretary overseas three sub-divisions: unions, youth, and women. There are also multiple centers specializing in education, agriculture, and economy, among others.[142] For instance, in Casablanca, the Teachers Council is composed of 30 teachers who are actively involved in recruitment; each manages about 30 followers. These teachers associations are mainly active in middle-class neighborhoods.[143]

In 1998, the JSM created a new section within its movement called "the political circle."[144] It operates in the form of working groups each responsible for a specific field of activity in which "it undertakes research, gathers data, carries-out relevant studies,

---

[139] Ibid.

[140] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.

[141] Yassine, Nadia. 2006. "The Justice and Spirituality Movement Represents the Hope for an Alternative in the Moroccan Political Scene." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12241.htm

[142] Yassine, Nadia. 2010. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13-14.

[143] Tozy, 1999b.

[144] Iharchane, Omar. 2010. Member of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Morocco. May 10.

conducts analyses and reaches conclusions, offers suggestions and recommendations in view of formulating realistic programs and alternatives in its field."[145] It also is in charge of "assuring the links with the other political actors on the Moroccan scene as well as defining the societal project and the political program of the association."[146]

The Majlis al Shura, i.e. the Executive Committee, provides the political and organizational direction of the movement, whereas the Majlis al Irchad, i.e. the Guidance Committee, provides spiritual (or ideological) guidance.[147] Despite the presence of higher councils, decisions within the movement are taken by vote. First, they discuss and then vote on it. This debating and voting is called Shura. The JSM believes that Shura is better than democracy that leads to conflicts because it builds brotherhood between members.[148]

The financing of the movement is self-sufficient and does not involve foreign financing. Every member either contributes according to their material capabilities or serves in an intellectual capacity, such as teachers that educate new members.[149]

JSM's organization is oriented toward effectively executing its grassroots strategy as well as creating a counter-hegemony with its own unions, teachers, and finance.

Under such an active grassroots organization, the supporter base of the JSM, according to the Moroccan political scientist Touhtouh, is like the 1970 Marxist supporters: it is very dynamic, active, and makes the JSM the cause of their lives.[150] And,

---

[145] Saaf and Al Slimi, 2008, p. 19.
[146] Cavatorta, Francesco. 2007. "Neither Participation nor Revolution: The Strategy of the Moroccan Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan." *Mediterranean Politics* 12(3): 381–397, p. 389.
[147] Ottaway, Marina and Meredith Riley. 2006. "Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?" *Carnegie Papers* 71.
[148] Bennajeh, Hassan. 2010. Youth-leader of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Morocco. May 10.
[149] Tozy, 1999b.
[150] Touhtouh, Rachid. 2010. Professor of Political Science at Mohammad VI University in Rabat. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.

according to Maddy-Weitzman, "what is significant about this approach is that it appeals precisely to those Muslims who are more fluent in Western philosophy than in the Islamic tradition. It draws in precisely those young persons who have had at least a smattering of Western educationand some exposure to Western modernity."[151] The JSM draws from such a Western educated class because its philosophy is based on a critique of Western modernity. Abdessalam Yassine, the leader of the JSM, makes frequent references to Western philosophers such as Alain Touraine. In doing this, Yassine engages in a critique of Western civilization similar to those of West's self critique of modernity and colonialism.[152] As a result, the JSM, "Socio-economically speaking, […] represents the middle class, because the rich, fearing for their fortunes, would never join a revolutionary political group."[153]

3.2: Reasons for Non-Participation

In the early 1990s, as part of securing a smooth succession, the Moroccan regime started approaching multiple oppositional actors in the country, among them the JSM, the largest Islamist movement in the country. Abdelkébir Alaoui M'Daghri, the then Minister of Religious Affairs, recalls the events:

> In 1990, I asked Hassan II authorization to begin negotiations with them. As you know, "the board of guidance" (Al Majliss Irchad) was entirely in prison. Abdessalam Yassine was under house arrest. The King gave me the green light. A committee has been established for this purpose, we took the committee with us and Yassine went to Salé

---

[151] Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. 2003. "Islamism Moroccan-Style: The Ideas of Sheikh Yassine." *Middle East Quarterly* 10(1): 43-51, p. 46.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Yassine, Nadia. 2006. Ideologue from the Justice and Spiritulaity Movement. "Insights and Analysis: Interview with Nadia Yassine of the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Group." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/11896.htm

prison. The negotiations began after mid-afternoon and ended after dawn, during several days.[154]

Similarly, Abdallah Chibani, one of the members of the JSM's board of guidance who was in prison at the time, recalls that there were two meetings with the regime: the first one took place with people from the Makhzen, the state elites surrounding the King, and the second one took place with people from the Interior and Religious Ministries. As a result, first Abdessalam Yassine, the leader of the JSM, was approached by the regime. He refused to negotiate, stating that he would first need to talk to his committee, all of whom were in prison at the time.[155]

Thus, another meeting took place in prison with the executive committee. In this meeting, the regime proposed giving the JSM many privileges, such as ministry positions, financial help, power, and legalization of the movement. The only condition the regime put forward was the to acceptance of the King as the "Commander of the Believers" and as the sole authority over matters of Islam.[156]

For many repressed movements, such as the MUR, such a political development would be an undeniable opportunity. However, the JSM committee rejected this proposal on the grounds that "as long as the King does not act like Omar the Just[157] we are not in

---

[154] M'Daghri, Abdelkébir Alaoui. 2004. "Interview-vérité, Abdelkébir Alaoui M'Daghri: J'ai gagné la confiance des islamistes." ["Interview-truth, Abdelkebir M'Daghri Alaoui: I won the confidence of Islamists."] Interview by Driss Ksikes, *Telquel*, 150. http://www.telquel-online.com/150/sujet4.shtml
[155] Chibani, Abdallah. 2010. Executive Member of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Omar the Just is one of the four caliphs and close associates of the Prophet. He is known for his just handling of all segments of society and political actors.

it."[158] In the following years, many representatives and scholars were sent to the JSM to convince the movement to be integrated into the system.

The JSM rejected such offers because participation, from a grassroots strategic perspective is more costly than beneficial for its cause. Grassroots movements foresee a bottom-up transformation involving the creation of a counter-hegemonic bloc—a bloc un-co-opted by the regime they aim to counter. The JSM as a grassroots movement prioritizes avoidance of co-optation at any cost. And, participation does pose a great threat for co-optation because under the "Commander of the Believers" there is no room for alternative Islam interpretations. The JSM sees a potentially great danger in participation and eventual co-optation. Nadia Yassine wrote:

> Co-opting is a classic in politics. As soon as a political force that has a popular base emerges, and I believe that Al Adl Wal Ihsane [*Justice and Spirituality Movement*] is the only real political entity in Morocco that has a genuine popular base, the power does everything to neutralize it. The Makhzen [*political elites around the King*] tries to involve its opponents by including them in a system that is locked, and where the rules are imposed through a system of laws but also by a Makhzenian [*elitist*] ritual. For me there are no parties and royal prerogative, both are sides of the same coin; just as there are no executive and legislative powers. Parties see us as rivals to the extent that we interfere with the role that is officially assigned to them. The recent elections showed how great their debacle is. We surely do not want to resume their roadmap, which was proven to be a deadlock.[159]

The JSM does not perceive the Moroccan regime as a changing regime but rather as a continuously repressive regime. Although the regime integrates every opposition into the system, actual power over decision-making remains with the King.[160] The interpretation of the left's experience in Morocco by the JSM is very telling. In the JSM's

---

[158] Chibani, Abdallah. 2010. Executive Member of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13.
[159] Yassine, Nadia. "Only the Combined Efforts of All Forces of the Nation Can Get Morocco Out of the Crisis." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12400.htm
[160] Ibid.

eyes, the left (before participation) represented a strong opposition, able to challenge the regime.[161] After participation, they have been weakened and transformed from "warrior knights into doormats."[162] The JSM rejects participation, fearing the same fate awaits them:

> The idea of participating and changing the system from within is good in abstract. However, in practice, it does not work. We have seen this in the experience of the left, which used the same approach of working form within. *Do you expect the same from us?* Instead lost credibility and trust of the people.[163]

Furthermore, the immediate cost of non-participation, namely repression[164], is not a worry for the JSM. According to Hassan Bennajah, the youth-leader of the JSM, the regime for decades operates using the same process to undermine opposition. The regime oppresses opposition and denies the opposition every constitutional right such as the right to form a political party and the freedom of speech, and it imprisons opposition leaders. Then, the regime suddenly opens up dialogue with opposition leaders and offers the opposition the possibility to participate only if they accept the conditions of the regime—conditions that require putting up any actual "opposition" to the regime.[165]

---

[161] Bennajeh, Hassan. 2010. Youth-leader of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Casablanca. May 10.
[162] Yassine, Nadia. 2008. "Only the Combined Efforts of All Forces of the Nation Can Get Morocco Out of the Crisis." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12400.htm
[163] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.
[164] Two-hundred organizations linked to the JSM have been closed around the country, and JSM newspapers and meetings are banned. (In Bennajeh, Hassan. Youth-leader of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Casablanca. May 10.)
[165] Bennajeh, Hassan. 2010. Youth-leader of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Casablanca. May 10.

And, in JSM's perception, succession has not changed this process either. Their saying is "a person died but the system is still the same."[166] Despite the new rhetoric of democratization, "elections are not an important event in Morocco, being in fact a staging and end up as hollow bodies."[167] Therefore, participation will not diminish repression but only co-opt the movement.

In short, the cost of participation is, in JSM's strategic grassroots perspective, is being co-opted by the Moroccan regime.

Avoiding co-optation does not end with staying out of the regime; it also involves preserving a tightly knit community that is as immune to co-optation. Hence, grassroots movements aim to protect their community at any cost as participation risks factionalization and alienation in the community.[168] Such risks become even higher in political contexts such as that of Morocco, where elections and the parliament are not popular mass mediums. The high number of absent voters in the elections[169] shows the mistrust of the voters with respect to the Moroccan political system.[170] Hence, the JSM as a grassroots movement does not want to risk its supporter base by participating.

---

[166] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.
[167] Arsalan, Fathallah. 2009. Executive Member of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. "M. Arsalan : Le Mouvement a un vaste projet de société qui touche à toutes les catégories et répond à tous les soucis et dont le centre d'intérêt est l'Homme." ["Mr. Arsalan: The Movement Has a Broad Vision of Society that Affects All Classes and Meets All the Worries and Whose Focus is the Man."] http://www.aljamaa.net/fr/document/1405.shtml
[168] Cavatorta, 2007.
[169] Hamzawy, Amr. 2007. "The 2007 Moroccan Parliamentary Elections Results and Implications." *Carnegie Endowment Middle East Program, Web Commentary*. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/moroccan_parliamentary_elections_final.pdf (March 9, 2009).
[170] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.

Instead, JSM believes that political changes will come from those outside official systems such as from the civil society.[171] Consequently, they believe that people need act and words, and thus they channel all their efforts to organizing grassroots activity, integrating new members, and preparing for the future instead of engaging in active politics.[172] As a result, in JSM's perspective, their non-participatory stance forms the basis of their community's strength. In Nadia Yassine's words:

> But what constitutes our force is the fact that we have decided to remain outside the system. For us, integrating the political game, which is a big carnival by the way, is the ideal way to commit political suicide. If our discourse continues to be credible for the Moroccan youth it is because it is clear that the real opposition is the one that operates outside the locked system.[173]

Movements— grassroots or vanguard—are motivated by their goals. In working toward their goals, they also expect those goals to be realized eventually. The JSM expects that eventually a new era will start as long as they continue their rejectionist grassroots stance. In JSM spokesman Abdelouahed Moutawakil's words:

> It cannot continue like this. There will be a critical point where the regime cannot stand anymore. We are preparing for this. Then, there will be a new beginning. Then, we will sit together to debate new Morocco with all the actors. We have an idea of a new pact in the society. We don't want to be like Algeria. We want peaceful change. For this, the constitution has to change as well. After all this, then we can talk about elections and participation.[174]

---

[171] Yassine, Nadia. 2010. Ideologue of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13-14.
[172] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.
[173] Yassine, Nadia. 2008. Ideologue of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. "Islamic Feminism." Interview by Emmanuel Martinez from *Alternatives,* Quebec, Canada. http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12435.htm
[174] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.

They expect that mass consciousness of the corruptness of the Moroccan regime will rise as a result of their grassroots activities and uncompromised ideals. The result of which will be an inevitable uprising and takeover of the Moroccan regime. At the end, as Abdessalam Yassine states in his famous quote “we are interested in Islamizing modernity, not modernizing Islam”[175] and so is the JSM interested in gradual and wholesome transformation of Morocco through grassroots activism as a movement, eschewing party formation.

This non-participatory stance is not without costs. The greatest cost in non-participation is the loss of influence over policy, coinciding with a period of political stagnancy. This cost becomes even starker in the face of PJD’s popular success. The JSM throughout the 1990s and early 2000s has been seen as entering such a phase. Today it seems to have overcome this stagnancy with the help of transnational ties—which is the subject of the next section.

3.3: The Justice and Spirituality Movement Today and Transnational Aspects

Today, the JSM has gone transnational. The movement established U.S. headquarters in Iowa, has supporters within the U.S. State Department, and within the U.S. Embassy in Rabat, Morocco, with whom they have regular meetings. Furthermore, JSM leaders Nadia Yassine and Fathallah Arsalane have given lectures across the United States in venues as prominent as Harvard and Berkeley.[176] The JSM launched two

---

[175] Bensadoun, Mickael. 2007. “The (Re)fashioning of Moroccan National Identity.” In *The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
[176] El Azizi, Abdellatif. 2006. “Al Adl Wal Ihsane, l’internationale islamiste.” [“Justice and Spirituality, and International Islamist.”] *Telquel* 185. http://www.telquel-online.com/185/sujet1.shtml

branches devoted to the publication of their literature in Great Britain and the United States under Justice and Spirituality Publishing. The mathematician Imad Benjelloun, the ideologue of the U.S. JSM is also the director of the Justice and Spirituality Publishing.[177] These steps should not be seen as desire to out branch like the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, the aim is to create an active Islamic bloc engaged in civil society with different priorities and concerns in Western democracies.

The reason behind this transnationalization, according to Nadia Yassine, is that globalization and global civil society has opened up a new venue to fight. She recalls that during the reign of Hassan II, no one knew what was going on inside of Morocco. But, today, globalization has opened up the "black box" Morocco.[178] And, the JSM aims to take advantage of this.

Foremost, for the JSM, transnational connections are a way to be protected from state violence.[179] For instance, when Nadia Yassine was tried as a consequence of an interview she gave in 2005 where she criticized the regime, the US and French ambassadors intervened and she was set free.[180] More so, the JSM has "realized that to win the battle on the domestic front, they had put pressure on the monarchy from abroad."[181] Consequently, JSM's new strategy is to get transnational actors to be involved in pressuring the Moroccan government.[182] Nadia Yassine summarizes what role the West

---

[177] Ibid.
[178] Yassine, Nadia. 2010. Ideologue of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13-14.
[179] Hmimnat, Salim. 2010. Researcher of political Islam in Morocco. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco, April 21.
[180] Touhtouh, Rachid. 2010. Professor of Political Science at Mohammad VI University in Rabat. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.
[181] El Azizi, 2006.
[182] Touhtouh, Rachid. 2010. Professor of Political Science at Mohammad VI University in Rabat. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.

can play toward their goals in three headings. First, she asks the West to recognize "Islam and Islamists as valid interlocutors for a real democratization, not potential terrorists."[183] Second, she asks the West to stop "supporting the regimes in place and let "indigenous" dynamics operate without interventionism, knowing that a synergy definitely exists and that representative democracy is an ideal fully compatible with Islam, provided that we accept the diversity that may accompany it."[184] Finally, Nadia Yassine asks the West to "stop enriching a certain class with this policy of aid for in a framework of corruption it only benefits the ruling elite and its acolytes and not the subjugated masses. It would be more judicious to rather opt for a rectification plan that will repair the damages wreaked by structural adjustment from which the South, and especially Muslim countries, has never recovered."[185]

The JSM also believes that the West can benefit greatly from this arrangement: "Europe has to get involved in the problems of Morocco for their own sake. Immigration and drug problems originating from Morocco cause them problems. Can you feel secure when there is so much trouble next door? They need to see that they are supporting a dictatorship. If Morocco does well, it will be in their benefit."[186]

The JSM today, in a classic example of the boomerang effect, aims to transnationalize its cause and thereby to overcome political stagnancy at home, which is the major weakness of their rejectionist stance.[187] As a result, the JSM today continues to

---

[183] Yassine, Nadia. 2008. "The Road to Reform, What Role Can the West Play?" http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12470.htm
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 4.
[187] Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell University Press.

apply its grassroots strategy by transnationalizing and thereby appealing to the global civil society actors on the ground and aiming to create an international awareness of the Moroccan regime.

Concluding Remarks

Islam in Moroccan politics plays unexpected roles. A radical and violent movement, the Islamic Youth, forms today the basis of Morocco's third biggest political party, while a moderate and popular movement, the Justice and Spirituality Movement, rejects electoral participation. These differences in political behavior are not motivated by political context or societal demand because both movements have faced the same political opportunities and constraints of the Moroccan regime; both movements more or less appeal to the same popular base.

The real distinction between both movements is the strategic perspective through which they interpret current circumstances. While the JSM adapts a bottom-up grassroots mobilization strategy wherein electoral participation is seen as equivalent to co-optation and thus as a political suicide, the MUR adapts a vanguard mobilization strategy wherein participation offers the chance to influence policy and legislation and transform the Moroccan society in a top-down manner.

The difference between the MUR and the JSM became clearer in the face of recent events involving the Arab Spring. The JSM together with leftists and other oppositional group unsatisfied with the current regime led multiple protests throughout

Morocco. Yet, these protests have not achieved a level as that of in Tunisia or Egypt and were short-lived. The MUR/PJD, on the other hand, throughout this whole process has been silent. Despite the small scale of pressures, the Moroccan King has announced a series of reforms as precaution to possible larger revolts against him. In short, the Arab Spring did have an influence upon Moroccan politics. Yet, its effects are still to be seen.

Moroccan Islamists share many commonalities with their counterparts in Turkey and Jordan. For one, there is a multiplicity of Islamist movements in all three countries that adopt different political behavior.

As in Turkey, it is the smaller movement that ends up as a political party, while the larger and popular movement eschews party formation. And, like in Jordan, the decision to participate or not is intrinsically related to whether the movement prioritizes power over policy-making or avoiding co-optation, or whether pragmatic or idealist concerns are prioritized.

The Moroccan case is also unique and unlike Jordan or Turkey in other respects. The Moroccan case shows politics is not just about politics and social movements are not just about the society. The JSM adopts a political strategy to effect the downfall of the Moroccan political system as a whole. And, it aims to accomplish this goal by staying outside of formal politics and operating at the grassroots level. In other words, the JSM executes a political agenda through societal means. Meanwhile, MUR/PJD want the Islamization of society. And, they plan to accomplish this goal by way of formal politics and using public policy. In other words, the MUR/PJD execute a societal agenda through political means. This is an important insight into increasingly blurring lines between social movement and political parties.

Lastly, the mediums both Islamist movements in Morocco adopt tell a crucial story about the debate on Islam and democracy. Many associate the transformation of Islamist movements into Islamic political parties with moderation, a desire to play by the rules of the game, and dedication to democracy. However, looking at both movements in Morocco, one can see that the rhetoric and means of the movement that is not forming a political party more closely matches democratic ideals. The movement that eschews party formation is the one engaging in civic disobedience, the one calling for a national pact between various political actors and a new democratic constitution, the one that accepts multiple Islam interpretations, and the one in favor of an increased role for women in theology, politics, and society. On the other hand, the movement becoming a political party officially accepts the rules of an "authoritarian" game, thereby legitimizing it. This divergence is why it is important to question the means that Islamist actors adapt before judging their commitment to democracy and dismissing all rejectionist movements as "radicals"—a subject I will revisit in my conclusion.

CHAPTER 4: A TALE OF TWO MOVEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL VIEW MOVEMENT AND THE GULEN MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

In 2002, for the first time in secular Turkish history a party of Islamic origins, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), won elections with a significant majority. Because the JDP was a "new" party, formed in August 2001, the whereabouts of this "sudden" success became a widely debated topic. What observers failed to acknowledge was that JDP was the product of two Islamist movements that had been active in Turkish politics for the last 40 years: the National View Movement and the Gulen Movement.

The National View Movement (NVM) is an Islamist movement formed in the mid-1960s as an initiative of various Islamist groups. The movement produced multiple Islamic political parties throughout the years—almost all of which were closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the grounds that they ated counter to the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic.[1] In early 2001, the movement—in the face of generational differences—split into two. Immediately thereafter, the younger group formed the JDP.

After the split from the NVM, the JDP grew closer in affinity to a "rival" Islamist movement, the Gulen Movement (GM). The GM, also established in the mid-1960s, is the largest Islamist movement in Turkey today, bringing in more than $27

[1] The NVM formed its first IPP, the National Order Party, in 1970; it was banned by the laicist Turkish Republic, followed by the closure of its second IPP, the National Salvation Party during the 1980 military coup. The Constitutional Court in the mid-90s closed down its third and most successful party, the Welfare Party.

billion, operating hundreds of schools and dormitories in more than 100 countries worldwide, owning the third largest media enterprise in Turkey, and forming the backbone of what today is famously known as the "Muslim bourgeoisie." And, for the first time in its history, the GM openly endorsed a political party. Despite its public support of the JDP, the GM repeatedly states that supporting an existing party is different then forming a party, and that they will *not* turn into a political party themselves.

Thus, understanding the JDP and its current success demands understanding the NVM and the GM—two movements that emerged and developed under the same socio-political structures yet chose different political paths. While the NVM tirelessly forms IPPs, the GM continuously rejects participation. In this chapter, I will focus on what happens inside these movements. In particular, I will show how the NVM's vanguard mobilization strategy of top-down change under a "vanguard" group motivated the NVM to establish a political party, while GM's grassroots mobilization strategy of bottom-up transformation through grassroots activities motivated the GM to eschew party formation.

To do so, this chapter is divided into three parts: (1) the socio-political context under which both movements emerged, (2) NVM's participation, and (3) GM's non-participation.

Part 1: Socio-Political Context

To understand the JDP's "sudden" 2002 success, one needs to understand the NVM and the GM. And, to understand the NVM and the GM, one needs to understand

the evolution of the Turkish Republic over the last decades of the Ottoman Empire until the 1960s, when both movements entered the Turkish political scene.

1.1: The Turkish State and the Role of Islam

Contrary to common belief, modernization in Turkey did not start with the new Turkish Republic. It dates back to the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottomans started losing key territories, they recognized the need to reform in order to return to their former glory. Consequently, at the end of the 19th century, Ottomans started reforming the state, especially the military, in order to strengthen central state organization.[2]

One of the most significant pro-reform movements at that time were the "Young Turks," a group of highly educated but low-ranking bureaucrats, who despite their heterogeneous stance on what reform should entail came together "reform the constitution" in order to establish a constitutional monarchy—a goal they achieved for a short period of time.[3]

The Young Turks believed they could establish such a constitutional monarchy under the guidance of a new Ottoman elite, i.e. themselves: "Just like an individual requires therapy to recover from an illness so a society needs to take cures [...] the doctors of a society are lawmakers, administrators and politicians. Without such doctors the balance of order can be violated."[4]

---

[2] Zurcher, Eric J. 2004. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. 1995. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 208.

To achieve such societal leadership, the Young Turks advocated their cause by appealing to Islamic credentials: “The only way of introducing modernization and Westernization into the Empire was to represent them to Muslim masses as Islamic concepts.”[5] A popular saying about the use of Islam for political mobilization among the Young Turks at the time was “Science is the religion of the elite, whereas religion is the science of the masses.”[6]

Ottoman as well as Young Turk reforms, which had started too late, came to a halt when the Balkan Wars and World War I started, and the fall of the Empire became inevitable. Their legacy, nevertheless, influenced future generations including the founders of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalists. The Kemalists, like the Young Turks, used the same language of Islam to mobilize the masses and win key Islamic figures to their side against colonial powers such as Great Britain and France, who had become decision-makers in the late Ottoman Empire. At the end of the War, the Turkish Republic was established in 1923.

The new Republic was based on the ideology of its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. According to Kemalists, the Ottoman Empire’s religious and un-modernized state institutions were the cause of its demise.[7] Per Kemalism, the solution was to

---

[5] Ibid, p. 201.
[6] Ibid, p. 201.
[7] Ottoman Sultans were caliphs overseeing Muslim populations who were subject to Islamic law. An official, Seyhulislam, ran Islamic Affairs in the Empire on behalf of the state and the Sultan. This high-ranking official not only had religious powers but also political power: in modern terms, this post combined the functions and duties of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, the General Directorate of Foundations and the Presidency of Religious Affairs. However, this post was not an independent office such as the Church in the West. Rather, it was an office that was appointed and dismissed by the Sultan. Furthermore, it was a post that separated religious and worldly affairs by staying out of administrative tasks of the Empire. In Erdem, Gazi. 2008. “Religious Services in Turkey: From the Office of Şeyhülislām to the Diyanet.” *Muslim World* 98 (2/3): 199-215.

modernize and secularize the Turkish state. And through the Turkish state, civilize Turkish society.

For this "civilizing" mission, the new Republic introduced a series of reforms including the banishment of the Caliphate.[8] Given the role of Islam during the Ottoman era and the Independence War, such a sudden transition from a religious identity toward laicist nationalism came as a shock to many,[9] and a major Islamist rebellion against the new Turkish state followed, only to be suppressed violently under the rules of "Independence Courts." These extraordinary courts of the time punished acts of "treason" with capital punishment.

Hard-line stances on Islam and Islamists in the early era of the new Republic are only one side of the coin. The Turkish Republic is far from being a secular, i.e. religiously neutral, state. It is a laicist regime[10] where the state has total monopoly over religious affairs and actively supervises religious activity throughout the country by bringing all mosques and religious education under the roof of the state.[11] This

---

[8] As a matter of fact, some would go so far as to say that the "other" of the Republic has always been the Ottomans, who were seen as an empire that sold out to the colonial powers in these early years.

[9] Ozbudun, Ergun. 1999. "Milli Mucadele ve Cumhuriyet' in Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaslik ve Kimlik Sorunu." ["The Problem of Citizenship and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Independence and the Republic."] In *75 Yilda Tebaa'dan Yurttas'a Dogru* [*From Subject to Citizen in 75 Years*], ed. Artun Unsal. Istanbul, Turkey: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari.

[10] The Ottoman non-Muslim minorities were subject to the "millet system," where non-Muslim communities had the right to organize their own internal administrations. "In this system, the head of the millet, the patriarch or the rabbi, was directly responsible to the state for the administration of all of his subjects. […] This indicates that from the very beginning the rulers of the Empire understood and accepted religious services as a kind of public matter. Therefore it was understood that religious services should be organized by the government and maintained under the control of the state." In Erdem, Gazi. 2008. "Religious Services in Turkey: From the Office of Şeyhülislām to the Diyanet." *Muslim World* 98 (2/3): 199-215; p. 200. However, by the 19th century, nationalist movements popular among non-Muslim Ottoman subjects made the millet system irrelevant and Ottomans started looking for ways to reform the state. Ironically, the laicism of Turkey is quite similar to the Ottoman Empire's control over the religious field.

[11] Saylan, Gencay. 1989. "Growing Impact of Islamic Schools Examined." *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Western Europe (WEU) Daily Reports*, 23 March.

coordination is accomplished through the "Ministry of Education," which is responsible for religious education in schools, and through the "Presidency of Religious Affairs," which is responsible for appointing all the religious preachers in the country through a centralized system.[12] Furthermore, Islamist movements have to register with the state and are subject to a web of bureaucratic regulations similar to Morocco and Jordan, which tolerate civil society in order to monitor it.

At first sight, this arrangement seems to be a regulation that would disturb Islamist movements given the strict monopoly of the state over the religious field. And, at one level, it does. But the benefits Islamist movements, too. Financial burdens, such as opening religious schools and having religious staff on a payroll, are transferred to the state, which allows Islamist movements to channel their finances elsewhere.[13]

Finances are only one reason for bringing Islamist movements and the Turkish state together. There are also political reasons. For a long time, in the climate of the Cold War, Islamist movements were used by the Turkish state as a buffer against the "Communist threat" as well as against radical Islamist groups—as they have been used elsewhere in the Muslim World.[14] In short, in this arrangement, Islamist movements protect themselves from potential state repressions, politically or financially, by allying themselves with the state.[15]

---

[12] Ayata, Sencer. 1996. "Patronage, Party and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 50(1).
[13] Çakır, Ruşen. 2002. *Ayet ve Slogan: Tűrkiye'de Islamcı Oluşumlar*. [*Verse and Slogan: Islamist Formations in Turkey*.] Istabul, Turkey: Metis Yayinlari.
[14] Çakır, Ruşen. 2001. "Devlet tarikatları seviyor." ["The State Loves the Religious Orders."] *NTV Magazine*, March 1.
[15] Yaşar, Emin. 2004. "Dergâh'tan Parti'ye, Vakıftan Şirkete Bir Kimliğin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü: Iskenderpaşa Cemaati." ["The Making and Transformation of an Identity from Order to Party and from Endowed Institution to Company: The Order of Iskenderpasa."]. In *Modern Tűrkiye'de Siyasi Dűşűnce:*

Regime-Islamist relations get even more complicated given Turkey's fragmented party politics. From its establishment in 1923 until the late 1940s, the Republic was a de facto single-party regime under the Republican People's Party (RPP), the party of the Kemalists. With the early 1950s, the Republic became a multi-party system when the newly founded Democrat Party won the elections and took over the government. With time, the Democrat Party became associated with the right wing while the RPP moved to the left. The multi-party system was disrupted when, in 1960, a military coup took place on the grounds that the Democrat Party government was committing treason to the Kemalist ideals. The Democrat Party was closed down, and its leaders were killed. Democracy was restored a year later with a new constitution.

The Democrat Party continued road under the name "Justice Party." However, unlike its predecessor, the Justice Party was increasingly becoming a right wing party with liberal policies in the economic realm that favored big businesses at the expense of small entrepreneurs in the countryside. Furthermore, the Justice Party's pro-Western stance alienated the Islamists and nationalists within the party. In addition, the 1970s featured years of political turmoil fed by economic crises, the Cold War era, and violent right vs. left wing student clashes. Once again in 1980, a military coup took place in order to restore "order." The two Islamist movements I am analyzing in this chapter were formed in this political climate.[16]

Islamcılık [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul, Turkey: Iletişim Yayınları.

[16] In the post-1980s era, Turkey witnessed the switch to an export-oriented economy, multiple economic crises, the emergence of a new and lively civil society that goes beyond the classic left-right debates, EU pressures, turmoil in its neighbors, and most importantly the rise and success of the Islamist leaders who now occupy the highest seats in the Turkish government.

Being an Islamist movement under such a political climate defines an ambiguous set of options with different costs and benefits. Electoral participation is allowed—but under the strict laicist laws of the country. This arrangement brings with it the potential danger of co-optation to secular ideals in the long run. However, in the short run, participation has the advantage of eliciting more public appeal in a system where Islamist movements are outlawed and forced to operate underground. However, it is even costlier not to participate given the outlawed stance of Islamist movements. In such a political climate, the Turkish society was also undergoing multiple transformations.

1.2: Turkish Society in Transition

The Turkish Revolution of 1923 created a new elite, the Kemalist elite, who were the Westernized "carriers" of the new Republican ideals. These Kemalist elites were mainly organized around the military,which had fought the Independence War, the Republican People's Party, which was the only legal party until 1945 and which appointed many high-ranking bureaucrats, and the Judiciary, which would punish those who did not adhere to the civilizing mission. In short, Kemalist elites made up the Turkish state and aimed to "civilize" the Turkish society under their guidance and governance through top-down societal reforms ranging from modern clothing to female emancipation.

However, this top-down approach of rapid social transformation under the Kemalist elites "left the 'day-to-day' in limbo. Even in the most stringently secular times

of the Republic, Islam filled in the void."[17] As Mardin argues, the Kemalist reforms could not reach the rural masses, which led them to Islam.[18] Hence, there has always been a gap between the Kemalist elites and the masses. This gap created a competition between the state and the Islamists as to who has more influence over the society.[19]

Not only are the Turkish state and the Islamist movements in competition with each other over who will transform the masses: Islamist movements compete with each other over the same constituency. Islamist movements are like family companies: they form actual economic entities in addition to spreading Islam. Followers of Islamist movements are the movements' workers and renters, and eventually their customers.[20] Islamist movements compete with each other for followers, workers, and customers.

Vali Nasr starts his famous discussion of the Muslim Bourgeoisie from the Kemalist elites versus masses. According to Nasr, the state-led economy under the Kemalist regime prevented the emergence of an independent capitalist middle class. A new Kemalist middle class emerged, which supported the secular ideology of the regime and did not question the cost of increasing authoritarianism. However, when the state failed economically, so did this Kemalist elite.

Under this context, old school Islamists have also failed considerably, per Nasr, because instead of expressing societal demands, such as demands for an open economy to increase employment opportunities, they based their program on theological questions.

---

[17] Mardin, Şerif. 1993. "The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey." In *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance*, ed. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 224.
[18] Mardin, Şerif. 2002. *Tűrkiye'de Din ve Siyaset: Makaleler 3*. [*Religion and Politics in Turkey: Articles Volume 3*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Iletişim Yayınları.
[19] Although the regime permits the existence of Islamists under its watch, it also never fully trusts or integrates them into its inner circles of actual power over decision-making.
[20] Çakır, 2001.

When, in the 1980s, the Turkish economy opened up to international markets, a new independent middle class emerged that was critical of both the Turkish state's authoritarianism and old school Islamists. This new class, which Nasr defines prominently as the "Muslim Bourgeoisie" was moved by pragmatic concerns and was pushing the regime to open up economically and democratically.[21]

Without a doubt, Nasr's argument captures the rising power of the Muslim Bourgeoisie in Turkey—a class critical of the authoritarian tendencies of the secular Kemalist elites—especially in the post-1980 period. From the 1960s onward, agricultural income rapidly decreased (Figure 4.1).



Figure 4.1: Change in Agriculture and Export over the Years, 1960-1980[22]

However, the economy at this point was a closed economy with limited export-driven income. Agricultural workers migrated to urban areas (Figure 4.2). These new migrants

[21] Nasr, Vali. 2009. *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World*. New York: Free Press.
[22] Worldbank Databank. Accessed on April 8, 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/

brought their rural and conservative worldview with them.[23] Islam, for these new migrants, served as a way to organize their new societal relations and everyday encounters in the context of the city.[24]



Figure 4.2: Rural vs. Urban Population in Turkey, 1950-1970[25]

Cities were also growing by attracting large number of students in higher education. Furthermore, there were the merchants and small businessmen in Anatolia who were left in a spiritual void made by the Republican elites.[26] In short, as Nasr argues, there was a new class in the making that was unified by dissatisfaction with the governing political forces.

[23] Yavuz, Hakan. 2005. *Modernlesen Muslumanlar: Nurcular, Naksiler, Milli Gorus ve AK Parti*. [*Modernizing Muslims: Nurcus, Nakshis, National View and JDP*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Kitap Yayinevi.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. 2007. *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*. Accessed on December 13, 2009: http://esa.un.org/unup.
[26] Cakir, Rusen. 2004. "Milli Gorus Hareketi." ["National View Movement."] In *Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik* [*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism*], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari..

What Nasr does not really address is why this new class comes around to a "Muslim" identity beyond its opposition to the militant and autocratic laicism of the Kemalist regime. In other words, Nasr does not discuss "how" this Muslim Bourgeoisie became "Muslim" to begin with. This void between the Kemalist elites and the masses was not just about religiosity or the place of Islam in the system—it was much more heterogeneous. "This heterogeneity includes myriad of sectarian groups of Sunni or much smaller Shi'ite and Alevi Muslims, Turkish as well as non-Muslim and non-Turkish ethnic groups"[27] and they all were the "outsiders" of the Kemalist regime. Many political actors on the left and right aimed to fill in this void and mobilize the masses.

Islamists, like their political counterparts, saw an opportunity in this changing yet amorphous societal change. In this time period, the number of religious organizations increased rapidly (Figure 4.3 and 4.4).[28] With the eradication of the left wing in the political climate of the Cold War, and given the right's disinterest in political identity formation and civil society activism, Islamists expressed mass demands from the 1970s onward. The increasing visibility of "Muslim" identity in Turkey goes hand in hand with the evolution of two Islamist movements: the NVM and the GM. Both movements emerged at a time when Turkish society was going through major changes, and both movements framed those changes through their networks and political parties.

---

[27] Carkoglu, Ali and Ersin Kalaycioglu. 2009. *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 145.
[28] There is no public opinion data on societal preferences in the 1960s/1970s.



Figure 4.3: Number of Religious Organizations in Turkey, 1945-1960[29]



Figure 4.4: Ratio of Religious vs. Other Organizations in Turkey, 1945-1960[30]

As a result, contrary to what Nasr argues, a Muslim Bourgeoisie did not emerge "coincidentally" in opposition to the Kemalist elites. Muslim identity was formed over

---

[29] Toprak, Binnaz. 1981. *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden, E.J. Brill.

[30] Toprak, Binnaz. 1981. *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden, E.J. Brill.

the course of decades by multiple Islamist movements trying to shape Muslim identity under their diverging beliefs. As Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu reiterate, the emergence of a "Muslim Bourgeoisie" in Turkey was not sudden or coincidental:

> We should be cognizant of the fact that Turkey did not arrive at this point all of a sudden. It was a long process, where billions of dollars were spent by the political Islamists, who established private schools, dormitories, hostels, and special courses and socialized many girls into acting with modesty.[31]

The NVM and the GM took completely different strategies vis-à-vis the society and vis-à-vis the Kemalist regime, opposing political behavior to mobilize the masses around "their" Islam. They varied in their mediums not only because they competed for supporters but also because both participation as well as non-participation offered equally strong opportunities to capture a changing society and give it a new direction. While participation meant mobilizing newly emerging classes around a Muslim identity, non-participation meant creating a new Muslim community with strong internal ties. This divergence in political behavior as well as perceptions is the subject of the rest of the chapter.

Part 2: The National View Movement

The National View Movement (*Milli Gorus Hareketi*) (NVM) is the first Islamist movement bringing Islam to mainstream Turkish politics. It was established as an

[31] Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2009, p. 138.

umbrella organization of various religious orders[32] who came together in the 1960s in their common disappointment with the governing elites.

Since its inception, the NVM saw Turkey through the lens of a vanguard mobilization strategy—a belief in reviving Islam in the increasingly Westernizing and secularizing Turkish Republic under the leadership of those who have found their true callings in Islam. Hence, forming a political party in this strategic perspective became the perfect venue to realize their goals. Over the last 40 years, the NVM established five[33] IPPs, all of which (except the last one) were closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the grounds that they undermined the laicist foundations of the Republic. These parties have served as the "king-makers" gathering about 12 to 15 percent of the votes. Today, its most successful follower, the JDP—a splitter from the NVM—serves as the governing party of Turkey.

NVM's strategic perception leading up to the formation of their first political party, the National Order Party, in 1970, is the subject of this section and is divided into three areas: (1) the historical and strategic evolution of the NVM, (2) motivations to participate, and (3) the NVM today.

---

[32] Religious Orders are Islamic brotherhoods organized hierarchically around a sheikh (teacher) where "relations within the Order are based on a common discourse as well as the acceptance of and submission to the hierarchical order of the social relations within the Order." (In Agai, Bekim. 2009. "Discursive and Organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement." Available at: http://www.fethullahgulen.org/conference-papers/294-the-fethullah-gulen-movement-i/2132-discursive-and-organizational-strategies-of-the-gulen-movement.html). They come from centuries-long traditions and are spread over a large geographic area. According to historian Inalcik, they are institutions organizing needs, aims, and ideals of Muslims around. (In Inalcık, Halil. 2005. "Tarihsel Baglamda Sivil Toplum Ve Tarikatlar." ["Civil Society and Religious Orders in Historical Perspective."] *In Global-Yerel Ekseninde Türkiye* [*Turkey within Global-Local Axis*], ed. Fuat Keyman and Ali Yasar Saribay. Istanbul, Turkey: ALFA Press.) They also offer an "alternative atmosphere of socialization within the secular Republican context" (Agai 2009). And, the NVM was the product of such religious orders initially.

[33] They are: National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party, and Felicity Party.

2.1: The Evolution of the NVM and Its Worldview

The Islamists traditionally supported the Democrat Party of the 1950s—a party critical of militant laicism of the Kemalist elites. With the 1960 coup, the Democrat Party was closed down and succeeded by the Justice Party in the 1960s—a party that Islamists continued to support. However, the Justice Party, different than its forerunner the Democrat Party, was a right wing, pro-Western, and pro-big business party. This changing stance alienated and marginalized the Islamists within the party and led Islamists to search for a political alternative to the Justice Party. As a result, the Islamists formed the NVM as a political alternative to the Justice Party. This section tells the story of this alliance.

2.1.1: United We Stand, Divided We Fall

Although many smaller Islamist movements took part in the formation of the NVM, two groups come out as the founding factions: (1) the Naqshbandi Order, and (2) the Islamist parliamentarians.

The Naqshbandi Order

The Naqshbandi Order, especially its Iskenderpasa Lodge in Istanbul, is the most politically and economically powerful religious order in Turkey.[34] It has been active in Turkey since the 15th century. Under the Ottomans, the Naqshbandis spread from urban

[34] Because Islamic Orders are widespread within a large geography, they are run by "lodges" at the local level, in a way that is similar to parties running at the national level that maintain local headquarters.

settings to rural areas as an apolitical religious group.[35] The Naqshbandis started attracting alienated urban elites by offering them spiritual guidance when the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century was increasingly being capitalized and colonialized by the Western powers.[36]

With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Naqshbandi Order, like other religious orders, was banned under the secular laws of the country. However, like other religious orders in Turkey, the Naqshbandi Order was informally allowed by the Turkish state to exist as long as it remained loyal to the Republic and accepted operating as a religious foundation under the surveillance of the Directorate of Religious Affairs.[37]

In 1952, Mehmed Zahid Kotku became the leader of the Iskenderpasa Lodge of the Naqshbandi Order in Istanbul and started a new era for the Order, turning it from a mosque-based community into a semi-political movement.[38] First, Kotku started to appeal to younger generations, especially to university students who came to Istanbul from rural areas for their university education.[39] He started the "Society for Spreading Science" through which the Order offered bursaries to students while socializing them into Islamic teachings.[40] As a result, Kotku surrounded his inner circle with a group of urban (or

---

[35] The Naqshbandi Order and the Ottoman state were in alliance because the Ottomans needed to bring disciplined beliefs to the newly conquered Muslim lands with various Islamic beliefs and practices in order to establish its role as a Caliphate. And so, the Naqshbandis brought religious homogeneity to these newly conquered lands outside the cultural reach of the Ottoman state (Mardin, 1993).
[36] Karpat, Kemal H. 2001. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
[37] "Turkey: Profile of Naqshbandi Sect." 2006. *OSC Report*, May 28.
[38] Yavuz, Hakan. 1999. "The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movement: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order." In *Naqshibanis in Western and Central Asia*, ed. Elizabeth Őzdalga, 129-146. Istanbul, Turkey: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.
[39] Mardin, 1993.
[40] Calmuk, Fehmi. 2004. "Necmettin Erbakan." In *Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik* [*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism*], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul, Turkey: Iletisim Yayinlari.

urbanized), young, intellectuals—mostly students, teachers, state employees, and engineers.[41]

Kotku encouraged a more active political agenda in the Order. In his collected sermons "Jihad" and "Qualities of the Believer," Kotku stated that (1) Turkey has "been splintered by political parties," and that (2) "Muslims should try to capture the higher summits of social and political institutions in their country and establish control over the society."[42] For this reason, Kotku started to encourage his supporters to permeate state institutions, especially the bureaucracy. As a result, by the 1960s, Kotku's supporters were active in all levels of the State Planning Organization, a key organization to advising the Executive on matters of economic and social development policies and staffing municipalities. Some people referred to this group in the bureaucracy as "Takunyalilar,"[43] i.e. those wearing wooden clogs.[44] Kotku attempted the Islamization of the state in an evolutionary, not radical, way.[45]

Within this understanding of transforming Turkey through Islamist elites, politics offered a way to accomplish the evolutionary infiltration of state institutions. Lending support to parties, such as the Democrat Party and the Justice Party, meant protection from the secular laws outlawing religious activities as well as increased recruitment by staffing the bureaucracy as a favor to these right-wing parties in return for their support. This arrangement worked perfectly under the Democrat Party. However, under the

---

[41] Cakir, 2002.
[42] Mardin, 1993, p. 223.
[43] Gűneri, Teoman Rıza. 2010. Ex-Vice-President of the Felicity Party. Interview with the Author, Istanbul, Turkey, 29 May.
[44] "Those wearing wooden clogs" earned the name because one needs to wear clogs while entering mosques, and Islamist have taken this tradition to their offices in a similar symbol to the veil of women. In a sense, they have carried their political views into the public space and made a statement by wearing "wooden clogs."
[45] Cakir, 2002.

Justice Party (which adapted a more pro-West/pro-big business agenda), Islamist demands were neglected and marginalized at higher institutional levels. The Naqshbandis started to search for an alternative to the Justice Party.

Islamist Parliamentarians

Islamist parliamentarians, such as Hasan Aksay,[46] Arif Hikmet Guner,[47] Suleyman Arif Emre, Fehmi Cumalioglu, and Ekrem Ocakli[48] were increasingly marginalized and neglected by the new direction of the Justice Party.[49] Furthermore, there were rumors at the time that Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party, was a freemason, and that he was recruiting other freemasons in places of power at the expense of the Islamist and nationalist wings within the party.[50]

Finally, in 1968, Hatice Babacan, a professor of Theology (and aunt of the current economy minister Ali Babacan from the JDP), was suspended from the university on the grounds that she was teaching her classes with a veil. This triggered many Islamist groups in Turkey, to claim that the Justice Party government was repressing Muslim beliefs.[51] Although mass protests took place in major cities, the Justice Party government did not take any steps to ease these Islamist tensions.

As a result of non-action on the part of the Justice Party, these Islamist parliamentarians attempted to form an alternative coalition to the Justice Party within the

---

[46] Demirhan, Çetin. 1994. *Milli Nizam'dan Refah'a: Erbakan Nereye Koşuyor*. [*From National Order to Welfare: Where Does Erbakan Run to*.] . Istanbul, Turkey: Hűrgűç Gazetecilik.
[47] Safi, Ismail. 2007. *Tűrkiye'de Muhafazakar Siyaset ve Yeni Arayışlar*. [*Conservative Politics in Turkey and New Calls*.] Ankara, Turkey: Lotus Yayınevi.
[48] Yalçın, Soner. 1999. *Hangi Erbakan*. [*Which Erbakan*.] Ankara, Turkey: Başak Yayınları.
[49] Akyol, Taha. 2009. Columnist at Milliyet Newspaper. Interview with the author, Istanbul, Turkey, 2 July.
[50] Emre, Suleyman Arif. 2002. *Siyasette 35 Yil*. [*35 Years in Politics*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Kesif Yayinlari.
[51] Calislar, Oral and Tolga Celik. 2006. *Islamciligin Uc Kolu*. [*Three Strands of Islamism*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Guncel Yayincilik.

parliament. They estimated they could gather close to 100 deputies supporting the Islamist agenda[52] and believed they could even take over the administration of the main center right-wing party, the Justice Party, with this many deputies.[53] However, the leader of the Justice Party, Suleyman Demirel, fearing his own position within the party, blocked this initiative by marginalizing and banishing these Islamists from the Justice Party, buying off some individuals by offering them political favors, and by appointing his own people to posts of power within the party.

Suleyman Arif Emre, one of the 18 founders of the NVM and one of the most prominent Islamist parliamentarians of the time, recounts that after this failure to take over the Justice Party, the parlimentarians decided to start from scratch instead of acting like an orphan looking for shelter.[54] They began to look for a political alternative to the Justice Party. In the mindset of these Islamist parliamentarians, Islam could only be practiced freely without secular repressions through the state because these parliamentarians believed they as a vanguard group had a duty to stop the Westernization and de-moralization of the Turkish state.

Throughout these discussions, a new political figure, Necmeddin Erbakan, was emerging. He was a young mechanical engineering professor and more importantly a pupil of Kotku, the leader of the Iskenderpasa Lodge of the Naqshbandi Order.[55] For years, Erbakan worked as the head director of the Gumus Motor Company, a mechanical

---

[52] Ibid.
[53] Cakir, Rusen. 2004. "Milli Gorus Hareketi." ["National View Movement."] In *Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik* [*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism*], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul, Turkey: Iletisim Yayinlari.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Çalışlar, Oral. 1995. *Refah Partisi, Nereden Nereye?* [*Welfare Party, Then and Now*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Pencere Yayinlari.

factory owned by the Order.[56] In 1969, Erbakan became a public figure when he was elected as the head of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the highest legal entity in Turkey representing the private sector, with the support of Anatolian merchants.[57] However, this development was disliked by economic as well as state elites of the time, and the Justice Party removed him from this post illegally by force[58]—a widely publicized development that brought him into the public eye.[59] Both the Naqshbandi Order and the Islamist Parliamentarians were interested in Erbakan.

As a result, in the words of Yasin Hatipoglu, a veteran politician and previous speaker of the parliament from the NVM, they decided to unify their forces because "we saw that our split and decentralized stance has no benefit for our cause at all."[60] They also managed to get help from a few individual Islamists who belonged to other less powerful religious orders, e.g. from the Kadiriye Order.[61]

As a result, Erbakan was "appointed" as the leader of this new umbrella movement by the Islamist elites of the time.[62] The idea was that Erbakan would be the young charismatic leader and the public face of the movement, while the Islamist elites, especially Kotku of the Iskenderpasa Lodge, who was the de facto leader of this

---

[56] Demirhan, 1994.
[57] Őzdalga, Elizabeth. 2002. "Necmettin Erbakan: Democracy for the Sake of Power." In *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari. Lanham, UK: Lexington Books.
[58] Erbakan and the then-leader of the Justice Party, Demirel, were classmates in the university. Rumor has it that their mutual dislike originated there and motivated them to work to prevent the other's success.
[59] Calmuk, 2004.
[60] Hatipoğlu, Yasin. 2009. Ex-Speaker of the Parliament from NVM. Interview with author, Ankara, Turkey, June 18.
[61] Çakır, Ruşen. 2009. Journalist at NTV News Channel. Interview with Author, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June.
[62] Calislar, Oral and Tolga Cevik. 2000. *Erbakan-Fethullah Gulen Kavgasi: Cemaat ve Tarikatlarin Siyasetteki 40 Yili*. [*Erbakan-Fethullah Gulen Fight: The 40 Years of Religious Orders and Associations in Politics*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Sifir Noktasi Yayinlari.

movement, would remain the decision-maker behind the movement.[63] In the late 1980s, the son-in-law of Kotku and the then leader of the Iskenderpasa Lodge, Esad Cosan, in now a notoriously famous speech, would recount this hidden and untold story[64] of the NVM foundation:

> Support existed since the times of our leader (Mehmed Zahid Kotku), and I mean support to a certain political party, not parties in general, *it started as an action of our Order*. […] Our leader gave them his people. […] So, they started their political life as a function of our Order. […] *Therefore we supported them from head to toe*. There were such times when our leader gave them warnings as well as advice. […] *We were in brotherhood with them*, giving them people for their central administration, presidencies, vice-presidencies, youth branches. Back then, in the German edition of the National Newspaper[65] they would say that "*Our etiquette is the one of the Order's etiquette* (emphasis added).[66]

As a result of this arrangement, in these initial years, Erbakan served as the organic link between the NVM and the religious orders.[67] Under the "leadership" of Necmeddin Erbakan, the NVM was born as an "ideational movement with faith at its center."[68]

Note that this is quite a different movement formation history than that of the Gulen Movement, which was formed around a charismatic preacher, but the NVM, from the very start, formed as an elite initiative.

---

[63] Ibid.
[64] This arrangement could be kept under the radar of the Turkish state because the only link between Erbakan and the Order was his previous employment as the director at Gumus Motor Company—a company owned by the Order. Yet, with the 1980s the relationship between the Naqshbandi Order and Erbakan soured after Kotku's death when Erbakan rivaled the new leader of the Order, Esad Cosan, and forced the Naqshbandis out of the NVM. Only then did the Naqshbandi Order announce the initial relations between the Order and the NVM. Also worth noting here is that NVM parties were closed down multiple times. The laicist Turkish state was not thrilled by the association of Islamists in politics but legally it could not ban the formation of a "new" party, but only close down an existing one.
[65] National Newspaper, i.e. Milli Gazete, is the newspaper of the NVM.
[66] Cakir, 2002, p. 50-51.
[67] Çakır, Ruşen. 2009. Journalist at NTV News Channel. Interview with Author, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June.
[68] Ersoy, Arif. 2009. Vice-President of the Economic and Social Research Center. Interview with author, Ankara, Turkey, June 16.

2.1.2: Ties that Bind: NVM's Strategic Perspective

Besides their disappointment with the Justice Party, these Islamists shared a common belief: Ottomanism, the belief in resurrecting a new Turkish state based on Islamist credentials. Ottomanism is hardly a new ideology. It has roots in the last era of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century. When the Ottoman Empire was falling, the first generation of Islamists in Turkish history emerged who believed that the Ottoman State could be saved by resurrecting Islam. In their view Islam was the only binding glue of the Ottoman state to its subjects.[69] This aim would be achieved through the state because the belief was that "capturing the state would necessarily involve securing control over the society and institutions [...] facilitat[ing] the realization of social reforms."[70]

The most prominent advocate of Islamist Ottomanism was Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman sultan from 1842-1918. Abdulhamid II believed the Ottoman State's integrity could be preserved by "uniting the Ottoman Muslims in a religious bloc centered on the caliph. [...] Religion in the hands of the state became an ideological means of political mobilization."[71] Abdulhamid II aimed to strengthen society by modernizing it materially and keeping Ottoman Muslims united against European-backed separatism. Thus, it is no

---

[69] Islamism was hardly the only ideology aiming to save the Ottoman Empire from collapsing in the face of increasing nationalist movements influenced by the French Revolution. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Young Turks came together to reform the Ottoman state in order to guarantee survival. The Young Turks did not come from a homogenous worldview. Islamism was one of the ideologies advocated by some Young Turks to save the Empire. Similarly, creating a new Ottoman identity (pan-Ottomanism), just like a national identity, to counter nationalist movements was another ideology; and advocating a new pan-Turkism to unite ethnic Turks from Central Asia and mainland was another ideology proposed by the Young Turks.

[70] Bulac, Ali. 2010. "The Most Recent Reviver in the 'Ulama Tradition: The Intellectual 'Alim Fethullah Gulen." In *Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, ed. Robert A. Hunt and Yuksel A. Aslandogan. Houston: Tughra Books, p. 105.

[71] Karpat, 2001, p. 240.

coincidence that to this day Islamists in Turkey see Abdulhamid as one of the greatest sultans of the Ottoman Empire.

In each of these attempts, the aim was never to reform the society directly through grassroots activities, but rather to reform the Ottoman state, which in turn would reform the society.[72] Consequently, Islamists in the Ottoman period came to believe that societal change was only possible through the state and thus aimed to taking over state establishments. Hence, their aim was not to gradually Islamize society, but to "make" society Islamic through a top-down process.[73] As a result of this belief, the natural goal for Islamists in this tradition was to take over the state.[74]

The NVM took up this Islamist/Ottomanist ideology.[75] According to Erbakan, the leader of the NVM, "National View means the views of our nation. It is the same belief as what was in Sultan Fatih's[76] heart when he conquered Istanbul. Our nation dominated the world for a thousand years with the National View."[77] According to Taha Akyol, one of the most prominent columnists in Turkey, the NVM, a movement that is lead by engineers, adapts an engineering mentality where the strategy is not to bring order to the

---

[72] Bulac, Ali. 2007. *Din, Kent ve Cemaat: Fethullah Gulen Ornegi*. [*Religion, City and Order: The Example of Fethullah Gulen*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Ufuk Kitap.
[73] Ibid.
[74] One last thing to note here is that, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Kemalists had not started out as a laicist movement but rather had the support of Islamists as well as other ideological groups in order to carry out the Independence War. Thus, the Kemalist abolishment of the Caliphate came as a shock to the Islamists. Islamists felt betrayed by the Kemalists when they denounced the role of Islam in the new Turkish state.
[75] Çakır, Ruşen. 2009. Journalist at NTV News Channel. Interview with Author, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June.
[76] Sultan Fatih was the Ottoman sultan who has conquered Istanbul from the Byzantines.
[77] Erbakan, Necmeddin. 2009. "Erbakan Milli Görüs'ü tarif ediyor." ["Erbakan Describes National View."] Accessed on 23 September 2009: http://erbakan.vze.com/

society, as other political forces in Turkey aim to, but to reconstruct/redesign/re-engineer society.[78]

In Erbakan's vision, despite the lack of mass support for the NVM, almost everyone in Turkey believes in the NVM because the majority of Turks are practicing Muslims. Hence, the key, per Erbakan, was to "bring awareness from the top" to larger segments of society.[79] Furthermore, for Erbakan, to retain people from going into wrong directions, to direct them into the NVM, is equal to "compassion," which is a key duty of all practicing Muslims.[80] Thus, in Erbakan's view, politics is about people who have found their true callings in Islam, prepossessing the society to accept what is right and beneficial in an institutionalized format. The mission is not to represent the society but to convince people to come to their ranks.[81]

The fact that the groups that made the NVM are groups that have traditionally supported right-wing parties tells story about NVM's strategic background. These Islamist elites supported political parties and aligned themselves with those in power at the state level. This pattern shows that the movement comes from a belief in the importance of top-down strategy. In order to materialize this vanguard mobilization strategy, the NVM started discussing the cost and benefits of forming a new political party—which is the subject of the next section.

---

[78] Akyol, Taha. 2009. Columnist at Milliyet Newspaper. Interview with author, Istanbul, Turkey, July 2.
[79] Bulac, Ali. 2009. *Gocun ve Kentin Siyaseti: MNP'den SP'ye Milli Gorus Partileri*. [*Politics of Migration and City: National View Parties from National Order Party to Felicity Party*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Cira Yayinlari.
[80] Çınar, Menderes. 2004. "Kemalist Cumhuriyetcilik ve Islamci Kemalizm." ["Kemalist Republicanism and Islamist Kemalism."] In *Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik* [*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism*], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul, Turkey: Iletisim Yayinlari.
[81] Ibid.

2.2: Why a Political Party: Motivations for Participation

According to Seref Malkoc, a high-ranking member of the NVM, for nearly sevent years the debate was whether the movement should stay as a movement, or whether it should turn itself into a political party.[82] Multiple factors made a political party the perfect medium for the NVM's vanguard mobilization strategy.

First, vanguard mobilization strategy attempts to capture higher posts of top-down influence, and "the state" is the highest of such institutions one can get. Thus, the NVM's top priority was to influence the government and policy-making—especially in a political context where the governing Justice Party was unresponsive to such Islamist demands.

One should also note the true meaning of capturing "the state" in a political context like Turkey. As mentioned in earlier parts, the founders of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalists, throughout the Republican history have used "the state" to "civilize" and "modernize" the society. Similarly, NVM's Ottomanist Islamism also puts a great value upon "the state" as a medium of advocating reform. Hence, the common belief in Turkish politics is whoever controls the state controls societal transformation—be it along Kemalist or Islamist lines. In short, the race over who will lead the top-down social engineering project in Turkey is inherently involves capturing "the state." Consequently, NVM saw a political party a direct claim to capturing "the state."

Second, movements of vanguard mobilization strategy start with a "vanguard" group—by definition a small group that needs to communicate its agenda to a wider audience. The second priority of the NVM was to widen their appeal in the society. Although religious orders were established centuries ago and were supported by a loyal

[82] Malkoç, Şeref. 2009. Ex-deputy from Felicity Party. Interview with author, Ankara, Turkey, June 19.

base, their societal influence was minimal. Even in their heyday, orders had at most 1 million members, and this number was much lower in the Republican era. Hence, their combined population did not represent a significant proportion of the Turkish society, which at that time time was about 31 million. Additionally, the right and left, fueled by Cold War polarizations, held the key to mass mobilization. According to Emre, one of the founders of the NVM and the drafter of the first NVM preamble, the leaders soon realized that they had no mass popularity in the public eye.[83]

The NVM could not mobilize the masses politically under the strict laicist political context of the Turkish regime, at least not in the short-run, because the Republican system I Turkey outlawed religious orders and their political activities. The only reason that religious orders survived throughout the Republican era was that they remained apolitical. Becoming politically active out in the open would be political suicide. The orders needed a "legal" public face, such as a political party,[84] which could represent them at the state level and allow the orders to remain in the background without risking alienating the Turkish state upon which its survival was dependent.

The NVM's vanguard mobilization strategy was used to widen their appeal but also to do so under a "vanguard" group. A political party was a perfect medium to mobilize society under the NVM umbrella. The main belief was that Islam was a sleeping giant waiting to be awakened by the NVM vanguards.

---

[83] Emre, Suleyman Arif. 2010. One of the original 12 founders of the NVM. Interview with the author, Bolu, Turkey, 5 June.

[84] One might wonder how an Islamic party can be legal when religious orders are outlawed in Turkey. The answer is very straightforward: up until the Islamists changed their rhetoric and dismissed any Islamic reference from their program, all NVM parties were closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the grounds that they undermined the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic. In other words, Islamists could form parties, be banned, and form a "new" party.

The NVM expected to swipe the elections immediately through a political party.[85] In almost all of my interviews with the founders of the NVM, a common conspiracy theory remained: the NVM never attained great power was because elections were fixed by the Western forces, i.e. international community "afraid" of the Islamist political power in a geo-strategic country like Turkey.

The accuracy of these claims about Western powers is less important than the fact that the leaders of the NVM genuinely believed that they could win elections immediately. Their failure to do so was not attributed to their own wrongdoings but to foreign powers. The NVM expected to awaken Islam in the society at large under their own leadership.

Third, the costs of participation, such as strong internal ties and co-optation were a non-issue in the vanguard perspective of the NVM. The NVM was a small vanguard movement composed of Islamist elites from the start. There was no community of believers to begin with that would be disturbed by participation. Given that the "operation" was taking place under a small and tight vanguard group, they believed they would not be co-opted, and those who were susceptible to co-optation already bailed out and joined the Justice Party.

Finally, a political party had organizational benefits a movement could not provide: a new organization under a political party could unify Islamist elites under the

[85] For instance, Emre, one of the founders of the NVM, recounts in his memoirs that right after they had formed the National Order Party, they started fearing that their party would not find appeal at the societal level. This doubt shows that the NVM lacked a wide societal base and was formed to mobilize one. In Emre, 2002.

same roof.[86] Hence, Erbakan, the leader of the NVM, started visiting houses of key Islamist leaders, introducing their new movement to them.[87] He explained to Islamist elites why they needed to voice their demands louder.[88] (He even visited Fethullah Gulen, to win him over to their cause, but Gulen rejected this offer on the grounds that he was not interested in politics.) The main subject of these speeches was the militant laicism in Turkey and how this was undermining religious freedoms.[89] All in all, a political party offered the NVM realization of its priorities.

In 1970, Kotku, the leader of the Iskenderpasa Lodge of the Naqshbandi Order, commissioned Necmeddin Erbakan to form the National Order Party (NOP) (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) with these words:

> After the fall of Abdulhamid[90] the country has fallen into the hands of freemasons imitating the West. These people are a minority. They cannot represent our nation. For the government to fall into the hands of its true representatives within the boundaries of laws, forming a political party is an inevitable historical duty for us. Be part of this enterprise and lead it. Start working now, we are even too late for it.[91]

The founders of the NOP were professionals (55.8 percent) and state officials (20.7 percent), i.e. educated Islamist elites.[92] Given their priority of widening Islamist influence in the society under their elite guidance, in the first program of the NOP, two

---

[86] Atacan, Fulya. 2006. "Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP." In *Religion and Politics in Turkey*, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin. London and New York: Routledge.
[87] Emre, Suleyman Arif. 2010. One of the original 12 founders of the NVM. Interview with the author, Bolu, Turkey, 5 June.
[88] Yalçın, 2009.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Abdulhamid was one of the last Ottoman sultans and caliphs known for promoting pan-Islamism to keep the empire together.
[91] Emre, 2002, p. 173.
[92] Őzbudun, Ergun. 1986. "Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The Case of the National Salvation Party." In *The Islamic Impulse*, ed. Barbara Freyer Stowasser. Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.

top reasons for the formation of the party were given as (1) "to uncover existing high ethical standards and virtues in the society at the ideational level and make them into reality,"[93] and (2) "to enlighten humanity by establishing a higher civilization model by calling upon citizens for this duty."[94] To rephrase, the aim in NOP's establishment was to revive Islam in the society under a vanguard group by winning over higher state posts.

NVM's decision to form a political party becomes even starker in comparison to the Gulen Movement (GM). While the NVM aimed to awaken the sleeping giant through a political party, the GM aimed to construct it. Furthermore, while the NVM wanted to enter politics in order to control higher posts of power and transform Turkey, the GM came from a belief that entering politics would create internal divisions and expediency leading to the movement's demise. In short, looking at the same socio-political context, the NVM and GM were seeing different pictures as a result of their strategic perspectives. This difference in their perception hasn't changed through to the present day.

2.3: The NVM Parties: Then and Today

From the NOP to this day, the NVM has overcome many obstacles. The NOP was closed down in its very first year for its un-secular activities. Its second party, the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*), was closed down along with other parties during the 1980 military intervention. Its third party, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*), gained significant success and became a coalition partner. However, the Turkish Constitutional Court also closed down this party

---

[93] National Order Party Programme, available in Turkish at: http://www.belgenet.com/parti/program/mnp.html (accessed Apr. 9, 2009).
[94] Ibid.

for its Islamic agenda and its fourth party, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*), faced the same fate.

Right after Virtue Party's closure, the NVM split between factions representing younger and older generations. The younger generation established the party that is today the governing party of Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*). The older generation established the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*), which received only 3 percent of the votes in the last election. Recently, the Felicity Party went through a scandalous internal election were another younger generation within the party was displaced by Erbakan and his associates despite the younger generation's electoral win within the party.

The continuing splits among the NVM are the result of its extreme vanguard strategy. The leading cadre of the NVM (aged by this date) is still unwilling to let go of the leadership and marginalizes younger generations within the movement. Thus, the core cadre of the NVM parties, i.e. the "vanguards," throughout the last 40 years has not really changed.[95] In other words, the hierarchy of decision-making remained untouched.

Furthermore, over the last 40 years, NVM-parties participated in a coalition government every time they had the opportunity to do so. They had no reservations—whether the coalition was with the Kemalist party RPP or with their archenemy, the Justice Party. This hunger to govern demonstrates NVM's desire to attain more of a voice in the Executive. For instance, in each coalition the NVM parties took roles in the departments of Interior, Justice, Trade, and Industry[96]—key ministries through which the

[95] Calislar and Celik, 2006.
[96] I should note here that one of NVM's biggest goals was to create an alternative economic system to that of Western capitalism. The goal was to have a Turkish economy independent from any Western

NVM could advocate its agenda more effectively, recruit more, and widen its societal appeal.

Finally, the most interesting dimension of the NVM throughout the years has been its persistence in forming a political party and participating in elections despite all the bans and closures of its parties. This insistence to form a party despite all the closures cannot only be attributed to NVM's moderate stance. Rather, it is driven by NVM's Ottomanist beliefs that sanctify "the state" as an institution responsible of bringing order to the society. In this ideational framework, capturing the state serves as a medium to lead societal transformation.

Although the Gulen Movement believes in the sacred nature of the state as well, it comes from a very different strategic perspective and rejects party formation under the same socio-political context that the NVM faced—which is the subject of the next part.

Part 3: The Gulen Movement

The Gulen Movement (GM), like the National View Movement, started its activities in the mid-1960s. The movement grew from a small circle of people gathered around a charismatic preacher, Fethullah Gulen, to a movement that today has between 3 and 4 million supporters, has educational facilities in more than 100 countries, and is the most influential Islamist movement in Turkish politics today. The GM forms the backbone of the famous Muslim Bourgeoisie in Turkey today. Despite its significant

investment, able to produce heavy industry. Thus, ministries such as Industry and Trade are key in establishing such goals.

societal power, economic resources, and political influence, the GM is not a political party nor does it desire to form one. Instead, the Movement is choosing to lend support to certain political parties, such as the JDP.

This aversion to direct political involvement is a puzzle that I will address in this part. I will show how the GM's grassroots mobilization strategy motivates this rejectionist political behavior in three sections: (1) the strategic, ideational, and historical evolution of the GM, (2) the motivations behind non-participation, and (3) the GM today.

3.1: The Evolution of the Gulen Movement

The GM was established by Fethullah Gulen, a religious scholar who worked for more than 20 years as a state preacher under the Turkish State's Directorate of Religious Affairs. Gulen's theology takes roots in the teachings of Said Nursi (1878-1960), a prominent Kurdish/Turkish theologian who witnessed the fall of the Ottoman Empire as well as the establishment of the new Turkish Republic. Said Nursi was moved by the secular nature of the new Turkish Republic—which he saw as alienated. Instead, he aimed to form "an Islam that brought all Muslims under the umbrella of a common faith."[97]

Nursi founded the Nurcu Movement and advised his pupils never to enter politics as he had observed firsthand how the community of believers ended up in factions after entering formal politics.[98] He saw politics as power games, expedience, and hierarchical

[97] Mardin, Şerif. 2010. "Nurculuk." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*. *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/article/opr/t236/e0603 (accessed Apr. 9, 2011).
[98] Balci, Kerim. 2010. Columnist at Zaman Newspaper. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 31 May.

mobilization—things he advised his pupils to avoid.[99] In a now famous quote, he stated: "I take shelter only in God from the devil and from politics." Nursi believed that society could be transformed using alternative mediums, which would preserve community ties.[100] The followers of Said Nursi would later call themselves as Neo-Nurcu. Whereas the NVM came together around the belief in uniting Islamists by way of a political party, the GM took roots in a belief in the disintegrating effects of politics.

Like Said Nursi, Fethullah Gulen started his movement in the mid-1960s by giving public lectures to whoever was willing to listen. In particular, he lectured in the provinces and in the villages of Izmir region, the third-biggest urban setting in Turkey where Fethullah Gulen was appointed as a state preacher. He arranged meetings in coffee houses, organized summer camps for middle and high school students, and set up student study and boarding-halls in the region with the financial help of the local people.[101] The joke in these early years was that Fethullah Gulen had given talks in all the coffeehouses[102] and neighborhoods of Izmir.[103] According to his official biography "it is at this point that a particular group of about one hundred people began to be visible as a service group, that is, a group gathered around Fethullah Gulen."[104] This mobilization strategy, which targeted the average man directly through its leader, was quite different than the NVM strategy where Erbakan (the NVM leader) payed visits to influential

---

[99] Ibid.
[100] Bulaç, 2009.
[101] Gulen Institute. 2010. "A Brief Biography of Fethullah Gülen." http://www.guleninstitute.org/index.php/Biography.html (accessed on Nov. 10, 2010).
[102] There are thousands of coffee shops in bigger cities like Izmir.
[103] Mercan, Faruk. 2009. *Fethullah Gulen*. Istanbul: Dogan Egmont Yayincilik ve Yapimcilik Tic. A.S.
[104] Gulen Institute. 2010. "A Brief Biography of Fethullah Gülen." Accessed on Nov. 10, 2010: http://www.guleninstitute.org/index.php/Biography.html.

Islamist opinion leaders and to religious orders. NVM targeted Islamist elites instead of the average man.

The most important medium for widening Fethullah Gulen's neo-Nurcu message were the "light houses."[105] Light houses were basically flats rented or purchased by the GM where students, usually from poor rural families, were allowed to stay during their studies in the city.[106] According to Fethullah Gulen, light houses were the essence of Islamic education. Each light house was under the guidance of an older brother or sister who helped to educate the students. In a sense, it was like a fraternity or sorority house with a more Islamic agenda.[107]

According to Balci, a journalist from Zaman (a Gulen-affiliated newspaper), socialization in these light houses took place through mentoring programs where students from rural areas would come to the city for education and be mentored by older followers. Later on, these students would become activists themselves by returning to their hometowns and visiting surrounding towns to spread the movement in rural areas.[108] The "graduates" of these lighthouses are referred to as the "Golden Generation" by Fethullah Gulen. They adhered to the "Golden Era" of Islamic civilization under the four caliphs. They were a new generation removed from the right-left clashes and dedicated to the Islamist cause.

---

[105] A metaphor used to indicate the Islamic learning and enlightenment taking place in these houses
[106] In this time period, universities were mainly located in bigger cities, and accommodations for visiting rural students were highly politicized in the face of right-left wing clashes. It was a costly activity for rural families to finance their children's education in major cities. People who were not part of the Kemalist elites lacked connections to elites (Ergene, Enes. 2010. Theologian at Camlica Academy, Istanbul, Turkey, and student of Fethullah Gulen. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 24 May.)
[107] Hermansen, Marcia. 2007. "The Cultivation of Memory in the Gulen Community." In *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*. London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
[108] Gulen Institute, 2010.

New communication channels also helped Fethullah Gulen and the Golden Generation to widen their appeal in rural settings. Gulen's speeches were recorded on tape and video, published as anthologies, and started to be distributed nationwide, both in cities and in villages.[109]

In all these endeavors from its initial years until today, the GM retained friendly relations with the Turkish regime by remaining outside of active politics. For instance, when there was a nationwide boycott of the Higher Islamic Institutes in 1977, Gulen stated "there is no boycott in Islam." Also, Gulen criticized the veil protests during the same time that riled up other Islamists.[110] According to Erol,[111] a researcher at the Gulen-linked institute Journalists and Writers Foundation,[112] the GM stayed out of politics to avoid clashes with the regime and other political actors. The GM instead focused on internal development of the movement, such as community ties, just as Said Nursi advised his pupils to do.

From the early years onward, Fethullah Gulen and his associates used a grassroots mobilization strategy, working through already existing networks of primary relations, students' activities, new communication channels, and of course the personal charisma of Fethullah Gulen himself, while retaining friendly relations with the Turkish regime.[113]

---

[109] Ibid.
[110] Narli, Nilufer. 1995. "The Islamicist Movement and the State: Confrontation or Accommodation?" Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Western Europe (WEU) Daily Reports, 18 Jan.
[111] Erol, Mustafa Kasim. 2010. Researcher at Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.
[112] The GM formed the "Journalists and Writers Foundation" to coordinate its public activities. In Kuru, Ahmet. 2007. "Changing Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AK Party." In *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, ed. Ihsan Yilmaz. London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
[113] Ibid.

In an ironic twist, Necmeddin Erbakan, the founder and leader of the National View Movement, asked Fethullah Gulen to join forces with him and his movement, saying that Fethullah Gulen should stop bothering with educating kids and instead enter politics. Yet, Gulen rejected this offer because he believed that the future of Turkey was in the hands of a new generation that could only be cultivated by continuing grassroots activities in the education field.[114] This incident shows the intrinsic strategic differences between the two movements. Whereas the NVM targeted Islamist elites, the GM targeted the common people.

In the 1980s, a new era of politics started in Turkey under the new prime minister Turgut Ozal, who was an U.S.-educated engineer with family ties to religious orders. He aimed to transform Turkish politics by introducing not just liberal economic policies but also greater religious freedoms. In a sense, the 1980s were an era of free market economy and civil society.[115] This new political/economic environment opened new opportunities for the GM to transform from a regional movement to a national one. First, the new, more or less liberal, political climate of the time gave the GM the opportunity to become more visible at the national level by widening its grassroots activities, such as its educational and health services, throughout Turkey, and also by differentiating their activities outside of the educational realms, such as getting involved with media, unions, and professional associations.

Second, the introduction of liberal economic measures boosted GM's financial assets. With the new economic climate, a new class emerged: they were small

[114] Mercan, 2009.
[115] Turam, Berna. 2007. *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

entrepreneurs and manufacturers who benefited from the new engagement with the international markets. They came from smaller Anatolian towns without connections to the state elites, very much like the newly urban students that Fethullah Gulen was supporting, and they were pious in their worldview.[116]

These classes—alienated by Kemalist authoritarianism and materially independent—are what Nasr famously calls the "Muslim Bourgeoisie." What is crucial to note here is not whether a new middle class exists but why they came to be mobilized around a "Muslim" identity as opposed to a nationalist, ethnic, or regional identity. I posit that, this class did not mobilize around a "Muslim" identity but was mobilized around a "Muslim" identity as a result of decades long work by the GM and the NVM as well as other smaller Islamist movements. This change answers why a party like the Justice and Development Party and a societal segment like the Muslim Bourgeoisie emerged in Turkey today and not 40 years ago.

It is hard to define the GM's organization because what makes the GM a unified organization is a model of common principles and beliefs. This model is adapted and executed at the local level, according to Yesil, the president of the Gulen-linked institute

[116] Many compare this new pious entrepreneurial class supporting the GM to protestant missionaries. "The parallels include: belief in the individual study of holy scriptures; the urge to live a life of piety and self-sacrifice; the enthusiasm for knowledge in general and knowledge of the natural sciences in particular; the urge to carry this knowledge to others through various educational projects; an enterprising spirit; the urge to do good deeds (activism); and a strong impulse to break open the borders of one's own national milieu to reach out to other countries and places around the globe." (In Őzdalga, Elizabeth. 2003. "Secularizing Trends in Fethullah Gűlen's Movement: Impasse or Opportunity for Further Renewal?" *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 12(1): 66.) As a matter of fact, in the 1990s, Christian missionaries educated GM activists with experience in Africa and South America. (In Turgut, Pelin. 2010. "The Turkish Imam and His Global Educational Mission." *Time Magazine*, April 26. Accessed: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1969290-1,00.html)

Journalists and Writers Foundation.[117] Erol, a researcher at the same foundation, compares this model to a car: a car is basically a vehicle for transportation with four wheels and an engine; yet there are thousands of models of cars ranging from luxurious sports cars to family station-wagons. Likewise, he says, the GM established a generic car, and this generic car model is applied, then modified according to local circumstances.[118] As a result, according to Usak, the vice-president of the Gulen-linked institute Journalists and Writers Foundation, a centralized organization is impossible; there is common ground on principles and values, but the establishments themselves are adapted to local circumstances.[119] In short, the GM is "organized yet not centralized."[120] This arrangement stands in stark contrast to the NVM, which adapts a hierarchical organization communicated from the centralized top cadre to the masses.

Given its adaptability to various local circumstances and its wide range, the GM's organization preserves a certain mystery. Serif Mardin, a prominent Turkish political scientist, recently stated that he could not figure out the Gulen Movement's internal dynamics despite having lived with a GM-operated student housing for a few months.[121] The GM is a personalistic organization based on the personal charisma of Fethullah Gulen. He is informed about all the steps taken by movement members; he always is approached for his opinions on all matters; he always signals his preferences to his

---

[117] Yesil, Mustafa. 2010. President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.
[118] Erol, Mustafa Kasim. 2010. Researcher at Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.
[119] Usak, Cemal. 2010. Vice-President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Mardin, Serif. 2010. Interview with NTV News Channel, September 17. Accessed September 20 on: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25132331/

followers.[122] There is hierarchy within the movement: there are the supporters, the activists, and the inner circle of Fethullah Gulen.[123] This organization means that the main movement is based on the moral guidance of its leader Fethullah Gulen who connects different parts of the movement.[124] Beyond these few organizational characteristics, the GM's organization remains amorphous and decentralized, and final decision-making remains in the hands of Fethullah Gulen.

The underlying objective behind this amorphous grassroots mobilization is individual transformation and then societal transformation. In the words, of the head of the Gulen Institute, Alp Aslandogan, they aim to reach every Turkish citizen,[125] in order to advance the acceptance of Islamic values in the general society.[126] Toward this end, it aims to construct a new Turkish Islam that aims to revive religious consciousness and to strengthen communal relations at the local level.[127] They want to raise a new generation of practicing Muslims[128], "a new Turkish-affiliated Muslim elite, well-versed in science and technology, successful in a global free-market economy, yet extremely devout."[129]

---

[122] Çaha, Őmer. 2010. Professor of Political Science at Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 2 June.
[123] Erol, Mustafa Kasim. 2010. Researcher at Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.
[124] Ergene, Enes. 2010. Theologian at Camlica Academy, Istanbul, Turkey, and student of Fethullah Gulen. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 24 May.
[125] Özyurt, Ahu. 2009. "Hedefimiz her Türkün cemaatle ilişkisi olması." [Our Goal is to Get Every Turk Involved with the Movement.] *Milliyet*, 19 June.
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1108271&Date=19.06.2009&b=Hedefimiz%20her%20Turkun%20%20cemaatle%20iliskisi%20olmasi&KategoriID=4 (accessed June 20, 2009).
[126] Saribay, Ali Yasar. 2000. "Differences Should Not Lead to Separation." In *Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gulen*, ed. Ali Unal and Alphonse Williams. Fairfax, VA: The Fountain.
[127] Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2003. "The Gűlen Movement: The Turkish Puritans." In *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
[128] Yesil, Mustafa. 2010. President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.
[129] Turgut, 2010.

In this belief, as the movement grows at the societal level and transforms the masses, it eventually will transform the Turkish state[130] as well because the political culture of the society as a whole will be changed and this automatically will be reflected in politics.[131]

At first glance, the GM appears to be apolitical in all its grassroots activities. GM leaders define the movement as an apolitical education movement. However, facts show otherwise. For instance, before his permanent departure to the United States, Fethullah Gulen was exchanging visits with influential opinion leaders, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals.[132] His meetings with these people of influence have been covered in numerous columns and opinion pieces. He also frequently gave speeches that later aired on television about current political affairs. In many controversial political issues, Fethullah Gulen chose to express his opinion. According to Aslandogan and Cetin, "rather than dealing with daily politics, the Gulen movement makes the latent and dormant power in Turkish people visible."[133]

Despite its political influence and socio-economic power among the Muslim Bourgeoisie, the GM does not opt for electoral participation. Instead, it supports

---

[130] Today, the leader of the GM, Fethullah Gulen, is living in Pennsylvania, where he emigrated in 1998. The official reason given for the move was Gulen's health problems due to diabetes required treatment in the United States. Most observers of Turkish politics would argue that he moved to avoid being tried for a sermon video showing Fethullah Gulen making anti-secular remarks about the Turkish regime. In one of these videos he says, "the existing system is still in power. Our friends who have positions in legislative and administrative bodies should learn its details and be vigilant all the time so that they can transform it and be more fruitful on behalf of Islam in order to carry out a nationwide restoration. However, they should wait until the conditions become more favorable. In other words, they should not come out too early."[130] He was tried for his remarks while he was in the United States. In later years, cases against him were dropped although he continues to reside in the United States. In Henry, Clement, and Rodney Wilson. 2004. *The Politics of Islamic Finance*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 236.

[131] Balci, Kerim. 2010. Columnist at Zaman Newspaper. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 31 May.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Cetin, Muhammed. 2010. *The Gulen Movement: Civic Service Without Borders*. New York: Blue Dome Press, p. 68

government parties if and when it pleases. Motivations for this political abstinence are the subject of the next section.

3.2: Motivations for Non-Participation

> As for the movement; neither now, nor in the future should our friends have any ambition for government, they should not be engaged in politics, even if all the power and pomp of the world is laid at their feet; my friends who love me and heed my advice should not show a moment's hesitation to push all this away with the back of their hand. I had made similar statements at other times; even if others do not understand, let them seek good pleasure of God, let them strive sincerely in the path of glorifying the Name of God without a moment's lapse. Now I want to write a new will and clarify the details of such points.[134]

These are the words of Fethullah Gulen about electoral participation. This stance is motivated by GM's grassroots mobilization strategy.

First, in political contexts like Turkey, in the long run, staying outside of politics is beneficial to movements because it allows them to preserve their supporter base and the strong communal ties could break in political systems like Turkey where politics is not fully institutionalized and based on patronage networks.[135] On the other hand, forming a political party is a direct challenge to this priority. Consequently, the GM, in its desire to preserve its communal base, rejects party formation.

Second, movements with a grassroots mobilization strategy envision long-term projects; for any movement engaging in long-term political activism, the greatest danger of all is co-optation. Many GM leaders emphasize that politics requires give and take and

---

[134] Gulen, Fethullah. 2005. Interview with Mehmet Gundem. Accessed May 13, 2011: http://en.fgulen.com/press-room/mehmet-gundems-interview/1934-gulen-qas-for-the-movement-neither-now-nor-in-the-future-should-our-friends-have-any-ambition-for-governmentq.

[135] Kőmeçoğlu, Uğur. 2000."Kutsal ile Kamusal: Fethullah Gűlen Cemaat Hareketi." ["Sacred and Public: The Fethullah Gulen Movement"] In *Islam'ın Yeni Kamusal Yűzleri: Islam ve Kamusal Alan Űzerine Bir Atőlye Çalışması*. [*The New Public Faces of Islam: A Workshop on Islam and Public Sphere*.] Nilűfer Gőle ed. Metis Yayınları.

that they would end up owing favors to other politicians at the end. Furthermore, they fear that party formation would distract them from their main goals—namely to transform the individual and the society. In this, they believe, the movement's energy should not be "wasted" on politics but instead be channeled toward increasing mass belief through education.[136]

Third, many costs associated with non-participation such as repression, distrust of national and international elites, and political stagnancy are not applicable to the GM. The GM, by supporting governing parties, has escaped repression and was always regarded as a "model" of Islamist movement. Furthermore, the GM's overseas educational facilities bring the movement prestige at the national and international levels and breaks through the relations of distrust. Lastly, the GM's non-participation does not have to risk political stagnancy because the GM has positioned itself so that that no matter which party rules Turkey, the GM will have an influence upon Turkish politics. For instance, the current JDP is not the only party that paid lip service to the GM's demands: so did the previous administration (the Ecevit government), which was led by a left-wing party. In short, the GM escapes many costs associated with non-participation.

Although not as important as its grassroots strategy, GM's unique personalistic yet decentralized organization also motivates the GM's non-participation. Fethullah Gulen is personally against party formation. Given that the movement rests squarely on the shoulders of Fethullah Gulen, there are no disagreements with his decision to not participate. More importantly, remaining a movement formally uninvolved in active politics and one mostly supportive of governing parties means freedom to maneuver. This

---

[136] Balci, Kerim. 2010. Columnist at Zaman Newspaper. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 31 May.

benefit is highlighted in the political context of Turkey, where the institutional framework of politics is designed to limit participation of religious actors. All these factors make the GM eschew party formation.

In comparison to the NVM, the GM operates from a more defensive understanding. The GM wants to defend its internal ties and ideals by staying out of politics. The NVM, on the other hand, operates from a more pro-active position. The NVM wants to enlarge its constituency and attain higher state posts through entering electoral politics. This difference in their strategic perspective can be observed from the 1960s up to the present day.

3.3: The GM Today

Today, the GM is the most powerful Islamist movement in Turkey and the most powerful Turkish movement globally. Private companies and foundations affiliated with the Gulen movement operate

> …hundreds of dormitories, preparatory schools, and high schools, in addition to six universities in Turkey and abroad. They also operate a media network, including Samanyolu, a television channel with a global satellite outreach; several local and national radio stations; *Zaman, a* newspaper published in twelve different countries; *Aksiyon,* a news magazine; *The Fountain,* an international magazine in English; and about ten other magazines, which cover issues ranging from ecology, literature, and theology to popular science."[137]

The GM went transnational in the 1990s and started opening schools in former Soviet republics.[138] It is estimated that the GM operates 29 schools in Kazakhstan, 12 in

---

[137] Kuru, Ahmet T. 2005. "Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases." *Political Science Quarterly* 120(2), p. 261.
[138] Usak, Cemal. 2010. Vice-President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.

Uzbekistan, 15 in Turkmenistan, 12 in Kyrgyzstan, five in Tajikistan and another 12 in Azerbaijan. Together they educate almost 20,000 students.[139] Today, the GM has extended its education, media, and business networks to more than 50 countries. The movement has been active in a wide geographic area, from North America to East Asia.

The movement continues to influence politics. For instance, in the last referendum in Turkey in September 2010, Fethullah Gulen made a video that aired in popular media announcing his "personal" support to a yes vote in the last referendum on constitutional amendments, and after the referendum the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan mentioned in his speech that they are thankful to those who have supported them from "overseas."[140] Stories like this are common in Turkish politics today. In short, the Gulen Movement is at its peak.

Although the GM still rejects party formation, for the first time in its history, it is actively and openly supporting a political party, the governing Justice and Development Party (JDP). In the past, it had showed signs of ideological closeness to a few center-right political parties, such as Ozal's Motherland Party. However, this is the first time that its support has been this open.

The JDP-Gulen Movement connection emerged through (1) personal ties of key JDP leaders with the GM, (2) GM's media outlets, (3) GM conferences, and (4) ideological similarities between the JDP with the GM.[141] The reason for this closeness is the JDP's bid for the center in politics of domestic affairs, its support of economic liberalism, and

---

[139] Bonner, Arthur. 2004. "An Islamic Reformation in Turkey." *Middle East Policy* 21(1).
[140] Fethullah Gulen currently resides in Pennsylvania.
[141] Kuru, Ahmet. 2007. "Changing Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gulen Movement and the AK Party." In *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, ed. Ihsan Yilmaz. London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.

its international appeal.[142] Yilmaz, a prominent political scientist of the GM, goes as far as to argue that the "Gulen movement has been the most influential factor that has helped the JDP leaders to develop a more tolerant normative framework and to eventually jettison their Islamism."[143] Nevertheless, the support for the JDP should not be taken as equivalent to party formation. One of the most known and high-ranking members of the GM, Huseyin Gulerce, a journalist from the Zaman newspaper, recently addressed this debate in his column saying that:

> If Fethullah Gulen wanted to form a political party, wanted to get involved in politics, what hindrance is there? If this movement has grown so much, if this movement is everywhere, […] why are they not thinking of getting involved in active politics, to form a political party? It is because Mr. Gulen has written a hundred times, said a hundred times "For this movement the greatest danger is to get involved in politics." […] Mr. Gulen even said that he has written this request in his will.[144]

This political yet non-participatory stance of the GM is the consequence of its grassroots mobilization strategy. By staying out of active politics, the GM is avoiding external interference into its internal relations, thereby preserving strong internal ties. More importantly, by transferring controversial decisions involving policy-making to the JDP, it avoids internal factures in the face of political controversies. And, despite having great political influence through the JDP, the GM, by staying out of day-to-day politics, remains loyal to its original message of individual transformation. It thereby avoids any

---

[142] Güngör, Nasuhi. 2009."Cemaat, Siyaset ve Gelecek." ["Religious Community, Politics and the Future."] Accessed 20 May 2010: http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/17025/86/
[143] Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2008. "Beyond Post-Islamism: A Critical Analysis of the Turkish Islamism's Transformation Toward Fethullah Gulen's Stateless Cosmopolitan Islam." In *Islam in the Age of Global Challenges: Alternative Perspectives of the Gulen Movement*, Conference Proceedings, November 14-15, 2008, Washington, D.C.
[144] Gülerce, Hüseyin. 2010. "Gülen Hareketi Siyasallaştı mı?" ["Did the Gulen Movement Become Political?"] *Zaman*, September 23. Accessed: http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1030994

claims of co-optation. Despite favorable socio-political changes, the GM finds staying as a movement strategically more fruitful.

Conclusion

The two Islamist movements analyzed in this chapter face the same political constraints and opportunities in Turkey. Yet, they strategize about the very same structures differently. While the NVM in its vanguard mobilization strategy advocates dealing with the secular Turkish politics head-on under a vanguard group organized under a political party, the GM's grassroots mobilization strategy aims to protect itself from the backdrop of day-to-day politics by staying out of it and eschewing party formation.

Furthermore, both Islamist movements see different opportunities in the same changing societal landscape. Both the NVM and the GM believe in the inherent religiosity of Turkish society, which is repressed and neglected by the secular state, and is ready to be mobilized under their leadership. Yet, they aim to do so using opposing paths. Whereas the NVM attempts societal mobilization by creating a "National View Identity" around its parties, the GM goes about educating a new "Golden Generation" in its schools and dormitories. Socio-political structures are what political actors make of them.

Both cases show that boundaries between movements and parties are not as clear as the literature suggests them to be. Powerful movements can influence politics as they wish by lending selective support to governing parties. So, too, parties can move back

and forth between being a party and a movement depending on “legal” circumstances. In short, social movements and political parties are not mutually exclusive entities that have no relation to one another but rather complement each other.

In comparison to Jordan, Islamist movements have faced more restrictions in Turkey. Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was the only legal social organization in the country for decades, the establishment of the secular Republic in Turkey outlawed all sorts of religious activities and brought religion under the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In its centralization of religious activities, Turkey is similar to Morocco but under a religious King. However, unlike the authoritarian regimes of Jordan and Morocco, elections do have a feasible weight in governance in Turkey. Thus, participation and non-participation have costs and benefits.

The key characteristic that differentiates Turkey from Jordan and Morocco is the existence of a well-established Muslim Bourgeoisie that is quite often referred to as a model for other Muslim countries. In line with Nasr’s prominent argument, this class is materially independent from the state and is reacting to decades-long tyranny under the Kemalist elites. However, Nasr’s argument is not enough to explain why this new middle class is a “Muslim” middle class. This is a “Muslim” Bourgeoisie because the left has been wiped out of Turkish politics under the international context of the Cold War while the right has associated itself with big businesses, repressing small entrepreneurs that make up the backbone of this new middle class. Thus, Islamist movements in Turkey came to mobilize these newly emerging segments and gave them a “Muslim” identity over decades long work. In short, it was not the new Muslim Bourgeoisie that made the Islamist movements, but the Islamist movements that made the Muslim Bourgeoisie.

Hence, it is no surprise that we can talk about a Muslim Bourgeoisie in Turkey today 40 years *after* these two Islamist movements emerged.

Many scholars argue that what makes the Turkish Islamists unique is their moderation over time as a result of a strong secular and democratic institutional framework in the Turkish Republic. Although institutions undoubtedly matter, what makes Turkish Islamists unique is their long history of political involvement. Turkish Islamists witnessed the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the foundation of the new Turkish Republic, military coups, one-party as well as multi-party regimes, and many other domestic and international developments. More importantly, they have taken political stances on those developments. Hence, the moderation and success of Turkish Islamists are not overnight developments that can be explained by economic liberalization or democratic institutions. Rather, what explains the success or moderation of Turkish Islamists is their familiarity and pragmatism with active politics for centuries.

Last but not least, the Turkish case requires a few words on the Muslim democracy debates given that Turkey, or rather the experience of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (JDP) is considered a "model" of Muslim democracy by many. Although the JDP has accepted secularism and is committed to the rules of the democratic game, it can hardly be defined as liberal. What is liberal in JDP is its commitment to a liberal economy, not a pluralist political culture. For instance, the JDP, in a Kafkaesque trial, recently arrested multiple secular journalists for conspiring against its government without showing any real evidence for such claims. It remains status-quo oriented on the Kurdish question by preventing Kurdish parties from participating in the 2011 elections. Many political blogs are shut down. And the JDP—despite their public

rhetoric of media freedoms—has imprisoned more journalists in the last 10 years than any other country.

Besides its commitment to a liberal economy, the JDP has this particular "liberal and democratic" global image due to its increasing foreign policy involvement. With its current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey is playing the role of an intermediary and peacemaker—a role that brings a lot of prestige and support to the JDP globally as well as domestically. Turkey's regional role in the Middle East is increasing, too. For instance, although it remained passive in the recent developments of the Arab Spring, Turkey, nevertheless, was the first country to announce support to Egypt's protestors – a political move that attracted wide support.

However, this prestige in international affairs is being used by the JDP to create a polarized society of "us vs. them" where anyone critical of JDP policies is accused of advocating the old militant and tyrannical Kemalist regime. The irony in this undoubtedly is that the JDP, like its Kemalist predecessors, is undermining any type of opposition using the language of democracy, rights, and civilization.

Such exclusive and polarizing stances attract criticism not only from JDP opponents who complain about the intolerance toward alternative worldviews, but also within the Islamist ranks who dislike the capitalist turn in Islamism. As a result, establishing strong democratic, socio-economic, and political institutions in the Muslim world today is not enough. It needs to be accompanied by recognizing and strengthening non-Islamist *and* non-pro-regime political and civil society actors—the unvoiced third major group in these societies who are unrepresented at the state or Islamist levels—in

order to create a flourishing pluralist political culture that prevents the tyranny of the majority, be it statist, secular, capitalist, militarist, socialist, or Islamist.

CHAPTER 5: THE HAWKS, THE DOVES AND THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT PARTY: THE CASE OF THE JORDANIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

> "We are not a political party, though we believe that political action is part of Islam. Neither are we a charitable society, though charitable action is an indivisible part of our call."
> (Khalifa, 1950s Brotherhood leader) [1]

Islamist movements across the globe, from Turkey to Morocco, have faced political repression. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (JMB), however, is an exception to these hostile relations. Contrary to its counterparts in Egypt or Syria, the Brotherhood in Jordan, since 1946, has enjoyed friendly regime relations as well as legal status as a social charity. These friendly relations drastically deteriorated in 1989 when the Jordanian regime introduced a series of political liberalization measures. Although these measures were far from starting an actual democratization process, the new situation gave the Brotherhood the opportunity to form its own political party, the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF) in 1992. Since then regime-Brotherhood relations have soured. The first puzzle in Jordan is: *Why is the Brotherhood forming a political party in a system where parties and the parliament have minimal power over decision-making, thereby risking alienating the Jordanian regime?*

This decision to form a party becomes even more puzzling considering the internal dynamics of the Brotherhood. The doves and the hawks, the two major factions

---

[1] Bar, Shmuel. 2009. *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies, Tel Aviv University, p. 15.

within the Brotherhood by 1989, took opposing views on the question of participation. Whereas the doves desired participation, the hawks were against it. Within the same movement organization two factions desired different options regarding political participation. Thus, the second puzzle in the trajectory of the Jordanian Brotherhood is: *Why do two factions in the same organization (with the same goals and facing the same socio-political structures) assume different options for the Brotherhood?*

I argue that the answer to both puzzles lies in mobilization strategies. In particular, I argue that the doves and the hawks came from different mobilization strategies and thus had different perceptions of the same political liberalization process. As a result they desired different political behaviors for the Brotherhood.

In order to tease out these arguments, this chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part, I will look at the context under which the IAF emerged, namely at the socio-political structures of Jordan. I will start the second part with a historical analysis of the early years of the Brotherhood and its organization, and then move on to the emergence of factions within the Brotherhood, and how these divisions have played themselves out in the debate about participation. In the third part, I will look at the current situation of the IAF and what these post-party developments tell us about party formation. I will conclude the chapter, in part four, with an analysis of the Jordanian case in larger perspective vis-à-vis other cases, the literature, and democratization.

Part 1: Socio-Political Context

Movements do not make decisions in a vacuum; they are intrinsically influenced by the socio-political structures under which they operate. I will look at the characteristics of the Jordanian regime and society. In doing so, I will show that political liberalization of 1989 has created a new "participation" option on the menu available to the Brotherhood, and that the Jordanian society is receptive to Islamism. In the next part, I will show that facing the *same* political "opportunities" and existing within the same societal dynamics applicable to Islamism, and even within the same movement organization, different factions have chosen different options on the menu and why they have done so. However, before diving into the internal process of political behavior, I will look to where my argument takes off: the existing socio-political structures of the time.

1.1: The Jordanian Regime

Walking on the street and talking to Jordanians, everyone seems to agree on one thing about Jordan: "Jordan is a small country." With this phrase they acknowledge the limited power and capacity of the Jordanian state without natural reserves and in the middle of the Israel-Palestine conflict and its constant struggle for survival.[2]

Jordan was founded after centuries of Ottoman rule, on the ashes of Transjordan, a British mandate in the 1920s. The Jordanian state, within this conflict zone, grounds its power in its "Hashemite" religious attributes: the King himself argues prophetic descent

[2] Lucas, Russell E. 2003. "Deliberalization in Jordan." *Journal of Democracy* 14(1).

and Shari'a is part of the family code. The monarchy has "survived the acquisition of the West Bank as a result of the 1948 war with Israel; the original King Abdullah's assassination; his son Talal's deposition in 1952; the turbulence surrounding Arab nationalism in the 1950s; the loss of the West Bank to Israel during the Six Day War of June 1967; and bloody domestic clashes between royal troops and Palestinian nationalists during the "Black September" of 1970.[3] Survival lies at the core of the Jordanian regime.

To survive, the Jordanian state maintains a loyal coalition of actors surrounding the monarchy, such as tribes who fill in many state and military positions[4] and Palestinian refugees who earned their wealth in the Gulf region and today control the Jordanian private sector.[5] Finally and most importantly, the Jordanian state adapts "pluralist authoritarianism" where it maintains control over the society through civil society organizations, which are in return "subject to a web of bureaucratic regulations and legal codes designed to enhance the regime's ability to monitor."[6] In this arrangement, "any collective action outside formal organizations is repressed since it is difficult to monitor and control."[7] In short, the Jordanian state preserves its power base by offering privileges, such as avoidance of repression, to those who are loyal to it—an arrangement the JMB has managed to turn to its advantage.

The period between 1988 and1992 was a critical turning point for a Jordan that was facing a series of political changes. King Hussein cut ties to the Israeli-occupied

---

[3] Ibid, p. 138.
[4] Milton-Edwards, Beverley and Peter Hinchcliffe. 2009. *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*. New York: Routledge.
[5] Lucas, Russell E. 2005. *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988-2001*. New York: State University of New York Press.
[6] Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2000. "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan." *Comparative Politics* 33(1): 43-61, p. 57.
[7] Ibid, p.57.

West Bank in July 1988 in response to "forceful calls for Palestinian self-determination vis-à-vis Israel" and in the face of eroding financial assets of the 1980s oil crisis, thereby allowing the establishment of the Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza by the PLO.[8] These events led to an economic crisis followed by a number of unpopular economic reforms enacted to please international lenders who were bailing out the economy. And finally, riots broke out.[9] To calm the socio-economic turmoil, King Hussein opted for "tactical political opening" by holding the first full parliamentary elections in more than 20 years. He then signed a new National Charter of institutional reform, re-legalizing political parties (which had been banned since 1957), easing press censorship, and formally ending martial law.[10]

However, these elements of opening can by no means be understood as full-scale democratization. Today, Jordan is described, at best, as a "participatory dictatorship" where the core of the dictatorship is kept and elections are held not for the sake of actual transfer of power, but in order to renew regime legitimacy.[11]

It is true that autocracy levels have decreased in Jordan in the post-1989 period, and the new political measures were celebrated as first steps toward democratization. Nevertheless, looking closer at Polity IV data from 1957 to 2009 (Figure 5.1), it becomes clear that decision-making and power-sharing mechanisms have remained exclusive. As shown in Figure 1, in the time period from 1957-2009, regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment (represented by the "exrec" variable) remained

[8] Lucas 2005.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Lucas 2003.
[11] Rantawi, Oraib. 2010. Director of the Al-Quds Research Institute. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 Feb.

unchanged. There was change in neither the recruitment of those who govern, nor in the in the opportunities available to ordinary citizens to be recruited to govern. Those who govern and those who are governed were static, without an actual transfer or even sharing of power.

Decreasing autocracy levels are driven by the changes in the regulation and competitiveness of participation, represented by the "polcomp" variable. In this arrangement, there are more actors who compete for positions within the regime, but governance stays in the hands of the same people. In other words, there are more actors participating in the political system yet without the opportunity to acquire positions of actual power.



Figure 5.1: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions , 1955-2009[12]

In the words of a Jordanian parliamentarian, political liberalization in Jordan is an illusion: "We don't have actual democracy, it's for decoration."[13]

---

[12] Polity IV Project. 2010. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm

[13] Huneidi, Azzam. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 1 March.

This political context that allows irrelevant participation has offered benefits as well as costs. On the one hand, participation for the Brotherhood symbolized the possibility of widening constituency beyond urban settings into the heartlands of tribal politics and access to higher ranks of the state, through which the Brotherhood could provide additional services to its members. On the other hand, participation, for the Brotherhood, meant risking friendly relations with the regime, weakening internal ties in the face of enlargement, and potentially coopting their mission. In light of these cost and benefits, societal dynamics played an unexpected role in the process.

1.2: Jordanian Society

Under such an exclusive political system, the majority of the Jordanian society is made up of those who have no political power or networks with elites. This societal stagnancy continues to exist in the face of demographic and economic changes and uneasy balances between Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin and those of Transjordanian origin.[14]

There are two arguments in the literature on the role of societal classes upon political Islam, and neither holds for the Jordanian society. In one line of argument, most famously advocated in Vali Nasr's Muslim bourgeoisie argument, increasing urbanization, economic prosperity, and integration with global markets have created a new Muslim class that is independent from the state as well as from the Islamic clergy. This new class is more likely to contribute to a Muslim democracy by advocating political pragmatism against religious orthodoxy as well as force the state to denounce

[14] The main societal cleavages in Jordan are not of material or political origin. Rather, they are of ethnic origin between those of Palestinian origins and those of Transjordanian origins.

authoritarianism.[15] One would expect this new Muslim bourgeoisie to look for ways to attain political power and representation, leading them to form IPPs.

In another line of argument, increasing disenfranchisement with the current political system leads populations to ally with Islamists. Political disenfranchisement will lead these classes to demand from Islamists political representation at the state level. Be it the winners or losers of socio-economic changes, the argument is the same: people will ask for increased democratic representation, especially from the Islamists they see as un-corrupt by the reigning regimes.

I will address both of these claims in this section. Before moving into the details of these arguments, I should note: we lack survey data prior to the formation of the Islamic Action Front Party. And, in the absence of data prior to the formation of the Islamic Action Front Party, we cannot know the degree to which societal demand played a role in the formation of the Islamic Action Front Party. Thus, I will follow an alternate path: I will use data from the World Values Survey during two periods, 1999-2004 and 2005-2009, and illustrate that results in 2009 reflect results in 1999, and we can assume that this is an ongoing trend that was accurate in 1989.

To start with the obvious, Jordanian society has been changing over the past decades: urban population has more than doubled (Figure 5.2), school enrollments have peaked (Figure 5.3), and exports have replaced agriculture in GDP contributions (Figure 5.4).

---

[15] Nasr, Vali. 2009. *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World*. New York: Free Press.



Figure 5.2: Urban Population as a Percentage of the Total Population in Jordan, 1950-2000[16]



Figure 5.3: Education in Jordan, 1970-2010[17]

---

[16] Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unup, Sunday, December 13, 2009.

[17] EdStats Data Query Worldbank Databank. Accessed on March 11, 2011. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?queryId=189



Figure 5.4: Agriculture and Exports over the years in Jordan, 1965-2010[18]

Jordanian society today has become an urban, highly educated society with an export-led economy.

Within this context, the Brotherhood finds most appeal among the middle classes and Palestinian populations- the outcasts of political power. I had mentioned earlier that the tribes and 1948 Palestinian refugees are the insiders of the Jordanian elite coalition. There are insiders and outsiders to coalitions and in this case, second-generation Palestinian refugees who have arrived in Jordan after 1967 or 1990-91, and the middle classes who are well educated yet powerless, are the outsiders of this coalition. Both segments of society lack networks to economic and political elites.[19]

According to Ibrahim Gharaibeh,[20] a renowned Jordanian columnist, state elites in Jordan support their own interests through legislation at the cost of the Jordanian middle classes. In other words, the middle classes in Jordan, per Gharaibeh, are stuck between

---

[18] Worldbank Databank. Accessed on March 11, 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/
[19] Lucas 2005.
[20] Gharaibeh, Ibrahim. 2010. Journalist from the secular daily Al Ghad. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 11 February.

the regime and its coalition partners and fulfilling their own desires: they are educated but have no economic power, they have high-status jobs as professors and doctors but have no political power. In short, while the insiders enjoy the fruits of being part of this coalition, the outsiders lack the networks to climb the social ladder. Hence, the Brotherhood provides networks to these classes without networks.

Furthermore, the Brotherhood supporter profile has changed over the years along with demographic changes in the Jordanian society. In the early years, Brotherhood supporters came from upper-middle classes (merchants, craftsmen, property owners, teachers) and included relatively few professionals.[21] This arrangement was not so surprising because a highly educated professional middle class was undeveloped in the absence of industrialization and state investment in the early years.[22] Jordan did not even have a university until the late 1960s.[23] However, the societal climate of the 1960s was replaced by a new professional class by the 1990s. For example, the number of professionals in Amman tripled between 1960 and 1990.[24] This professionalization also found its appeal within the Brotherhood base.

Jordanian society is changing; it is becoming more global and modern. Yet, its exclusion from political power remains the same. This is where the Brotherhood comes in—capturing these new societal cleavages.

---

[21] Bar 2009.
[22] Abu-Latifeh, Atallah. 1997. "Die Muslimbruderschaft in Jordanien Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatischer Anpassung." [The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan between Ideology and Pragamatic Adjustments.] Doctoral Dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft [Freie University Berlin Political Science Department]. Berlin, Germany.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Clark, Janine A. 2004. *Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

This societal situation can be taken as a sign of new societal classes claiming political representation through the Brotherhood. However, in reality, it is the reverse: the Brotherhood aims to politicize theses classes through a new political party to claim greater representation. A coherent and conscious "Muslim" middle class does not exist in Jordan. Jordanian society is predominantly religious (Table 5.1), believes in religious authority in public office (Table 5.2), is patriarchal (Table 5.3), and is anti-Western (Table 5.4). These characteristics prevail across various classes, education levels, and time.

	Do You Consider Yourself a Religious Person? Agree (%)	
	1999-2004	**2005-2009**
Upper/Upper Middle Class	91.75	88.76
Lower Middle Class	87.07	92.75
Working Class	80.16	92.65
Lower Class	81.3	86.07
No education/Primary Education	85.89	93.75
Some level of Secondary Education	85.28	90.9
Some Level of University Education	88.3	88.37

Table 5.1: Religiosity Across Classes and Education Levels[25]

[25] World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 2009. *World Values Survey Association* (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

	Better if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office (%)			
	Strongly Agree/Agree		Strongly Disagree/Disagree	
	1999	2009	1999	2009
Upper/Upper Middle Class	60.43	63.85	26.73	22.59
Lower Middle Class	62.91	68.69	21.55	19.7
Working Class	65.5	69.09	19.65	16.36
Lower Class	63.63	55.38	23.63	30.77
No education/Primary education	71.05	68.67	16.56	17.81
Some level of Secondary Education	59.53	67.72	25.06	19.18
Some Level of University Education	53.07	62.14	30.38	25.87

Table 5.2: Desire for more religious political authority across classes and education levels[26]

	Agree: Men should have more right to a job than women (%)		Strongly agree/Agree: Men make better political leaders than women do (%)	
	1999-2004	2005-2009	1999-2004	2005-2009
Upper/Upper Middle Class	77.65	88.69	84.39	80.99
Lower Middle Class	79.88	88.17	86.89	81.61
Working Class	87.85	89.2	91.05	80.92
Lower Class	88.42	83.54	91.59	81.08
No education/Primary Education	85.76	91.7	89.63	83.72
Some level of Secondary Education	82.41	87.5	88.8	80.38
Some Level of University Education	73.13	84.66	81.58	79.62

Table 5.3: Attitudes about women across classes and education levels[27]

[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

Cultural invasion by the West is a very serious/serious threat, 1999-2004			
By Class		**By Education**	
Upper/Upper Middle Class	92.17	**No education/Primary Education**	95.6
Lower Middle Class	95.44	**Some level of Secondary Education**	94.92
Working Class	97.94	**Some Level of University Education**	94.32
Lower Class	94.64		

Table 5.4: The West as a threat across classes and education[28]

There is no trait that distinguishes a certain class from the rest of the Jordanian society, i.e. there is no identifier of a "Muslim bourgeoisie" in Jordan. As Boulby, a historian of the Brotherhood, explains, the rather conservative characteristics of the Jordanian society cannot be taken as a sign of a new Islamist identity or a conscious Muslim middle class:

> Those individuals who participated in or were conscious of an Islamic revival were not necessarily predisposed to vote for the Muslim Brotherhood. Jordan's Islamic revival, like many Islamic revivals, was an amorphous phenomenon, influenced by a variety of social, economic, political and cultural factors. The motivations of individuals or groups choosing to attend the mosque or wear the veil cannot be generalized and should not be correlated with conscious political or social dissatisfaction or a predisposition to join an Islamist movement. Such individuals can only be regarded as providing a potential support base for the movement.[29]

Furthermore, the 1984 by-elections and the 1989 elections show that the Brotherhood attracted regionally broad-based and inter-class support, regardless of Palestinian or Transjordanian origins.[30] In short, the "Muslim" class did not exist in Jordan.

---

[28] Ibid.
[29] Boulby, Marion. 1999. *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993*. Atlanta: Scholars Press, p. 96.
[30] Boulby, 1999.

Furthermore, my interviews with the leaders of the Brotherhood show that party formation was not driven by societal demand, but instead aimed to construct/awaken/mobilize societal demand. The ex-leader of the Islamic Action Front Party, Falahat said: "Despite all these obstacles, the awareness of citizens is coming up and one day people will ask for their rights. While we are there to increase the awareness of citizens."[31] Another Islamic Action Front Party leader, Aqel, reiterated this point: "Participation will increase the person's interest in these political issues…he doesn't live life for the sake of its own, and seeks solutions for others, defends others' rights, he feels responsible for the entire nation's problems."[32] Hence, party formation was not the consequence of societal demand; it was about constructing and mobilizing societal demand.

Although Jordanian society is changing, there is no particular class that can be differentiated from the rest of the society. And, this forms the basis of the Brotherhood's party formation: to mobilize these changed social classes and give them a class identity through a new political party.

The Jordanian case is similar to my previous cases, Morocco and Turkey, in that all regimes have similar options available to Islamist movements, i.e. whether to participate or not. Like Morocco, Jordan too is a pluralist authoritarian regime drawing on a "broad and diverse spectrum of social forces."[33] And, like Turkey's Kemalist elites, Jordan's regime remains exclusive in the sense that decision-making remains linked to

[31] Falahat, Salim. 2010. Ex-Leader of the IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 24 February.
[32] Aqel, Mohammad Khalil Mohammad. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 8 Feb.
[33] Lucas, 2005, p. 144.

the royal family. Furthermore, like Morocco and Turkey, religiosity is not a defining factor of Jordanian politics. Jordanian society in general is religious and traditional, but Islamism is not a differentiating factor of any segment of society. In short, like Morocco and Turkey, Jordan is operating under a semi-open political regime and amorphous societal changes. Facing such socio-political structures, different factions of the Brotherhood came to choose different options regarding participation. This is the subject of the next section.

Part 2: The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, 1946-1989

Spanning more than 65 years in a socio-political context of constant regional, economic, and political turmoil, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan Muslimin fi Urdun*) has witnessed crucial internal changes. This section is devoted to these internal developments over the years and is divided into five parts: (1) a brief early history of the Brotherhood, (2) organization of the Brotherhood, (3) internal divisions between the hawks and the doves, (4) internal debates regarding participation, and (5) the formation of the Islamic Action Front Party.

2.1: Early Years

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) was founded in 1945. According to Arabiat,[34] the ex-parliamentary speaker from the JMB, there was a gentlemen's agreement with the regime since the very start: "Jordan is a small country. It is not a good place to establish an Islamic state. That is our estimation. For that reason, we don't have to have clashes with the government. And, the government understood this." What the Jordanian state understood was that the Brotherhood would be loyal to the regime's existence. Thus, the regime welcomed the formation of the Brotherhood in 1946 as an "apolitical" religious society. King Abdullah in 1945 stated that he hoped the JMB would have "no other aim but utter devotion to God, to His work for His sake and for the benefit of the Muslim Brothers."[35] And, in an interview in 1947, the then-prime minister Samir al-Rifai had said the regime "would intervene if the local branch showed signs of political activities" and that "it would be a mistake to show signs of disapproval as long as the Movement was religious."[36] In sum, the Brotherhood's formation was a welcomed development as long as the movement would remain loyal to the regime and avoid politics. And, the Brotherhood returned the favor by working through education and charity.[37]

---

[34] Arabiat, Abdellatif. 2010. Ex-Speaker of the Upper House from JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. *25* Feb.
[35] Bar, 2009, p. 10.
[36] Abu Nowar, Maan. 2001. *The Struggle for Independence, 1939-1947: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*. Ithaca: Ithaca Press, p. 228.
[37] The JMB did participate in the 1952 elections (as JMB, not as a party). However, this was a different time with different leaders and ideologies then the situation in 1989.

2.2: Organization

Engaging in apolitical grassroots activities in the absence of political repression allowed the Brotherhood to establish a long-lasting and professional organization. This organization, effective since 1954, comprises many layers. At the bottom of the hierarchy is the *usra* (family) unit: small groups under the guidance of a mentor who follow a curriculum; engage in group activities; meet other groups; attend conferences, lectures, and discussions; and analyze political events in order to familiarize new members with the teachings of the Brotherhood.[38]

One step up are the local branches clustered around urban cities. Each local branch has its own representative that is appointed directly by the central leadership.[39] Each local representative participates in the elections of the "Consultative Council" every four years.[40]

The Consultative Council (*shura*) functions as the central administration. The Council elects the Executive Bureau and the Rights Committee every four years. The Executive Bureau is the highest decision-making body of the JMB and is headed by the Chairman of the JMB.[41] The Rights Committee is responsible for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation of Islamic laws and the establishment of any political-direction decisions of the organization.[42] Decisions in these top bodies are made by the majority vote of those attending. However, since there are only a few members in

[38] Ayesh, Kathem. 2010. Executive Committee Member of the JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 7 February.
[39] Abu-Latifeh, 1997.
[40] Bar 2009.
[41] Abu-Latifeh 1997.
[42] Ibid.

the Shura Council, the decisions made do not necessarily represent the majority in the party.[43]

In short, the Brotherhood had a professional organization in place long before forming a political party. This professional organization within the movement prior to a political party differentiates the JMB from its counterparts, such as the Turkish National View Movement and the Moroccan Movement for Unity and Reform, which did not have any professional organization in place prior to party formation. Despite the presence of a professional organization, there were internal divisions within the movement.

2.3: Internal Divisions over Mobilization Strategies

In a movement with a history going back half a century, changes in ideology and mobilization strategies are natural parts of movement development. In this section, I will trace the origins to two factions within the Brotherhood: the hawks and the doves. Before moving into this discussion, I want to note that the labels "hawks" and "doves" were announced by the Brotherhood itself in 1989 to designate their internal differences over participation. Although the labels were only announced in 1989, divergences "without a label" did exist within the Brotherhood long before 1989.

2.3.1: The Roots of the Hawks and Grassroots Mobilization

JMB leadership was taken over by a new generation of Brotherhood activists in the 1960s that was heavily influenced by the teachings of the Egyptian Muslim

[43] Hourani, Hani, Taleb Awad, Hamed Dabbas and Sa'eda Kilani. 1993. *Islamic Action Front Party*. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center.

Brotherhood, especially by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, and formed a more political stance within the Brotherhood, turning away from apolitical grassroots activism.

According to al-Banna, the founder of the first Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islam was the answer to all aspects of life: "Oh Brethren! Tell me, if Islam is something else than politics, society, economy, law and culture, what is it then?"[44] He saw the "intoxication" of the youth by Western values as the greatest danger to Islam and aimed to reverse this trend. To do so, he advocated educational indoctrination and the extension of welfare and charity activities to support the Islamist revival. Al Banna believed that an Islamist society—constructed through educational and welfare activities—eventually would form a new Islamist nation: "Form yourselves and the nation will be created!"[45] All these educational and charity activities, in Banna's view, ought to be independent and outside of official establishments, to be effective.[46]

A more radical and outspoken thinker, Sayyid Qutb, one of the most influential Islamist thinkers of the last century, also advocated abstinence from the state. In Qutb's vision, Muslims ought to resist any political system in which "men are in servitude to other men," i.e. any system where the authority lied with a human being and not the divine be it a democracy or a monarchy. For Qutb, the current political system was in a state of ignorance (*jahiliya*) alienated from true Islam. Hence, this "ignorant" system needed to be brought down through an Islamist revolution.[47]

---

[44] Al-Banna quoted in Lia, Brynjar. 1998. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942*. Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, p. 202.
[45] Al-Banna quoted in Lia 1998, p. 21.
[46] Lia 1998.
[47] Qutb, Sayyid. 2007. *Milestones*. Kazi Publications.

In order to bring about this Islamist revolution, Qutb proposed to form a movement that would preach about Jihad and thereby form a tightly bound Islamic community that would eventually spread to the whole country and even across the Muslim world: it would grow from "three individuals...to ten, the ten to a hundred, the hundred to a thousand, and the thousand...to twelve thousand."[48] Like Prophet Mohammed and his associates, the new Islamist revolution would start with a few devoted individuals who would Islamize society from below. These original groups would cut themselves from the rest of "ignorant" society and turn to Islam.[49]

Throughout this process of establishing counter-hegemonies by way of grassroots activities, both al-Banna and Qutb saw formal politics as the greatest danger of all. Qutb announced: "We will not change our own values and concepts either more or less to make a bargain with this *jahili* (ignorant) society. Never!"[50] And, al-Banna feared the harm of formal political to internal ties: "The existence of political parties is contrary to the spirit of unity and common purpose that should inspire Muslim societies."[51]

The new generation in the Brotherhood took Qutb and al-Banna's teachings to heart. This generation was educated mostly in the Gulf region and in Egypt and was heavily influenced by the teachings of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[52] Different from previous generations, they had a more critical stance vis-à-vis the Jordanian

---

[48] Ibid, p. 72.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid, p. 21.
[51] Soage, Ana Belén. 2008. "Hasan al-Banna or the Politicisation of Islam." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9(1): 21–42, p. 24.
[52] Gharaibeh, Ibrahim. 1997a. *Jama-a Ikhwan Muslimin fi al Urdun (1946-1996) [Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (1946-1996)]*. Amman, Jordan: Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center.

regime.[53] They were so influenced by Qutb's ideas that they renewed the curriculum of the Brotherhood in line with Qutb's beliefs.[54] From the 1970s onward, this group had the upper hand inside the movement mainly because of the increasing tensions in the region due to the Israel-Palestine conflict, which "politicized everybody,"[55] rapid socio-economic changes within and around Jordan as well as the rise of global Islamism.[56]

Consequently, under this new generation of activists, the JMB continued to execute a grassroots mobilization strategy and abstained from the Jordanian regime. In the period between1959 and 1989 period, 28 JMB-related schools as well as the Islamic Hospital were established and JMB's charitable work was brought under a single umbrella, the umbrella of the Islamic Center Charity Society, in 1963. "In addition, many of the Brotherhood's centers and branches welcomed many non-affiliated groups and individuals and provided them a place to meet, to organize sports competitions and scouts activities."[57] In all these endeavors, the JMB widened its counter-hegemonic Islamic bloc by becoming the only rival to the charities organized by the Hashemite family.[58] In its social service endeavors, the Brotherhood and the Turkish Gulen Movement are very similar in that both established many educational and welfare facilities to widen their influence.

---

[53] Abu Rumman, Mohammad Suliman. 2007. *The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing 'Political Setback' or Diminished Popularity?*. Amman, Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
[54] Gharaibeh, 1997a.
[55] Abu Bakr, Jamil. 2010. Executive Committee Member of the JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 21 February.
[56] Boulby, 1999.
[57] Abu Rumman 2007, p. 19.
[58] Ryan, Curtis R. 2008. "Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy." *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 12(2).

Besides its grassroots activities to form a counter-hegemonic base, the JMB in this new period very consciously distanced itself from participating in the regime. For instance, when Ishaq Farhan, a known JMB member, was appointed as the Minister of Education in 1971, the JMB leadership at the time protested his move and asked for Farhan's resignation from the JMB. Farhan froze his membership during his Ministerial post.[59]

This abstinence from participating in the Jordanian regime becomes even more visible considering the semi-friendly relations of the Brotherhood with the regime. The JMB and the Jordanian regime were in an alliance against the communist threat. Furthermore, while Brotherhoods in Egypt and Syria were repressed by the Arab nationalist regimes, the Jordanian regime still had Islamic credentials under the Hashemite monarchy, adding more reasons to keep the alliance. Despite such an alliance, the Brotherhood in this period stayed away from participating in the regime. In the end, if the Brotherhood leaders had desired higher posts in the Jordanian regime, they easily could have obtained them. They did not desire them because abstinence from the regime was a clear principle for the Brotherhood.

In 1989, this group of activists following the footsteps of al-Banna and Qutb by advocating grassroots mobilization for the sake of creating a counter-hegemony independent form the state, and calling themselves "the hawks," would be against party formation.

---

[59] Gharaibeh, 1997a.

2.3.2: The Roots of the Doves and Vanguard Mobilization

The Brotherhood was led by a new generation of activists inspired by Qutb and al-Banna. There was a minority faction within the Brotherhood that was looking at the same socio-political constraints of the time, but saw different opportunities. Unlike the leaders of the Brotherhood at the time advocating abstinence from politics, this minority faction believed the regime alliance could be taken a step further to mobilize the masses through a top-down approach. In particular, this group believed the circumstances provided an opportunity to lead a vanguard mobilization strategy using the regime alliance to gain positions of power in the state establishments through which to lead a top-down mobilization.

This group was pragmatically oriented and soon realized that the Brotherhood's most effective recruitment strategies involved schools and mosques. Although the Brotherhood had opened multiple educational facilities, by the 1970s it recognized that it was more efficient to recruit new member through the public school system than in developing its own schools given the disinterest of the general Jordanian society to the Brotherhood schools.[60] Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood's most effective recruitment strategy has been through public institutions. Brotherhood members infiltrated the Ministry of Education during the 1960s through which they influenced the development of curricula and the appointment of teachers thereby gradually implementing a curriculum with a stronger religious component. Teachers sympathetic to the Brotherhood played also a significant role in this process. Another venue for recruitment

[60] Ibid.

has been university campuses where the Brotherhood has been active since the mid-1970s.[61]

Mosques have also been used by the Brotherhood for recruitment. This strategy gained pace with the increasing Islamization in the society and infiltration of the Ministry of Religious Affairs by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Ministry appoints mosque preachers, orators and teachers, and meets the Minister on a regular basis.[62]

As a result, the doves understood that whoever controlled the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education would control societal dynamics. To do so, in 1971, Farhan took over the Ministry of Education. Although this move caused hot debates within the Brotherhood, by the end of his term Farhan had managed to use his position of power to establish mosques, finance scholarships for young JMB members, change school curriculum, appoint JMB members as principals. Besides his ministry, Farhan served in other positions of power. He was the Director of the Royal Scientific Society in 1975-1978, the president of the University of Jordan in 1976-1978, and a member of the Consultative National Council from 1978 onwards. In short, Farhan's political position brought political power and new members.[63] This approach was very similar to the approach adapted by the Turkish National View Movement that effected change by permeating state institutions and gaining power at the top levels of the state in order to bring a new Islamic order to the society.

Farhan might have been the most extreme case of executing a top-down vanguard mobilization strategy, but others followed his example. For instance, throughout the

---

[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Abu-Latifeh, 1997.

1970s many members worked for key ministries such as the Ministry of Education, e.g. Abdullatif Arabiat and Mohammed Aweidah. Similarly, Abdulrahim Akour served several leading positions within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Abdullah Akaileh was not only a university professor but also was elected as a parliamentary deputy, and Majid Khalifeh served as the acting dean of the Law College at the University of Jordan. Furthermore, they started to take over student councils,[64] and over many professional associations[65]—which were key alternative power bases to the regime given the absence of the party system in Jordan.[66] In short, contrary to the JMB political abstinence, few key individuals within the Brotherhood participated in the Jordanian regime to take advantage of regime alliances.

It is interesting to note that all of these individuals would later in 1989 advocate party formation. In later years, Brotherhood activists engaged in vanguard mobilization strategy have formed the doves, who were fierce advocates of party formation and participation.

With the 1980s, this faction found a legitimizing discourse for their vanguard mobilization strategy in the ideas of the Sudanese Hassan al-Turabi. In al-Turabi's vision, Islamism should be led by the learned, educated elites.[67] In his view, the old ways of educating the masses through tightly knit groups was too slow and inefficient to allow the

---

[64] Abu Hanieh, Hassan. 2008. *Women and Politics: From the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan*. Amman, Jordan: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Amman.
[65] Hamayil, Umar Khrawish. 2000. "Institutional Characteristics of the Jordanian Professional Associations." In *Professional Associations and the Challenges of Democratic Transformation in Jordan: Proceedings and Workshops,* ed. Warwick M. Knowled. Amman, Jordan: Al Urdun al Jadid Research Center.
[66] Ryan, Curtis R. 2002. *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[67] Burr, J. Milliard and Robert O. Collins. 2003. *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

movements to gain political authority. Instead, al-Turabi argued that movements could reach more people in a faster pace through the political authority they had.[68] In particular, he argued that "political activism did not need to be preceded by indoctrination or education, since service to the people in politics, trade unions, etc. was itself the best education" and encouraged to open up the movement to other Islamists and have less restrictive membership requirements.[69]

This argument was also a turn from idealism to pragmatism. For al-Turabi, the failure of the modern Islamist movements was that they were idealists without a concrete program bridging the gap between reality and ideals. In this, when these movements would fail to bring about an Islamist revolution from below, they would blame the society and withdraw from it. Instead, per Al-Turabi, "the correct method should have been to guide people gently from darkness to light."[70] And, the best method to do so was to work from within the system, imposing morality on a society by legislation and using the state's power over the society: "The state's control over education, the media, communication, and the very livelihood of individuals is such that a Muslim cannot today live truly according to his or her faith without help from the state. The state can even influence moral behavior."[71]

Experiencing the effectiveness of al-Turabi's vanguard strategy of permeating state institutions and bringing a top-down change first hand, this minority group, later to be labeled as the "doves," would advocate party formation.

---

[68] Abdelwahid, Mustafa A. 2008. *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan (1945-1989*. Wales, UK: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd.
[69] Ibid, p. 97.
[70] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. 1991. *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*. London, UK: Grey Seal Books, p. 163.
[71] Turabi quoted in El-Affendi 1991, p. 164.

2.4: To Form a Party or Not to Form a Party—1989 and Internal Debates

In 1989, elections, after a 20-year ban, were re-introduced along with laws permitting party formation. As a result, the JMB started discussing whether (1) the JMB is a social movement, and whether (2) the JMB will take advantage of the new law. The discussion took place over two years at all levels of the JMB.[72] This era of debates also marked the "official" separation of the hawks and the doves. Although both factions existed since the 1970s in the movement, the divisions were never this clear. With the 1989 participation debates, the hawks-doves division was "officially" announced by the JMB itself.[73] Whereas the hawks, from a grassroots mobilization perspective, argued in favor of staying as a movement, the doves, from a vanguard mobilization perspective, argued in favor of party formation.

2.4.1-The Hawks, Grassroots Mobilization, and the Preservation of the Status Quo

Movements adapting a grassroots mobilization strategy, such as the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Movement and the Turkish Gulen Movement, value strong internal ties as they believe these ties to be the foundation of their movement from which to spread throughout society. As such, the hawks' main concern was whether a new party would undermine internal ties. Foremost, the hawks worried a separate political party

[72] Al-Masalha, Nael. 2010. Ex-Member of the JMB and IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 March.

[73] One might argue that the Brotherhood participated in the first elections in 1989—three years before forming the Islamic Action Front Party, and that the participation of the Brotherhood was an automatic result of political opening in 1989. However, this argument does not represent the whole picture. Although the Brotherhood participated in 1989, it was not the result of an internal decision or discussion. It was an immediate reaction to an immediate and unexpected political change. As will become clear throughout the discussion of the hawks vs. doves debate, long and harsh debates took place within the Brotherhood on the question of whether to participate or not between 1989 and 1992.

would create factions within the movement in the long run[74]—a possibility that was a direct threat to strong internal ties. In particular, they worried participating within the rules the regime had set—rules they could not control—would harm Islamist unity.[75]

Furthermore, the hawks, similar to the Turkish Gulen Movement, believed "participation in state institutions would weaken the focus of the Brotherhood from its broader objective of Islamic reform by distracting members with issues such as coalition building, campaigning, and the need to negotiate with government and opposition groups."[76] Hence, they worried that "wordly" matters such as electoral campaigns would turn the JMB into an un-spiritual/un-Islamic political force where members would come together as professionals under a party and not as part of a larger Islamic community.[77]

Based on strong internal ties, grassroots mobilization strategies involve long-term engagements. And, for any movement engaging in long-term political activism, the greatest danger of all is co-optation. Thus, hawks' priority was to avoid co-optation at any cost and participation posed a great risk to become co-opted. Foremost, they were uncertain whether the new system and participation would benefit the objectives of the Brotherhood.[78] They were also uncomfortable participating in a regime based on a constitution that is not entirely based on Shari'a.[79] One of the harshest proponents of this

---

[74] Abu Bakr, Jamil. 2010. Executive Committee Member of the JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 21 Feb.
[75] Al-Masalha, Nael. 2010. Ex-Member of the JMB and IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 March.
[76] Schwedler, Jillian. 2006. *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 158.
[77] Gharaibeh, Ibrahim. 1997b. "The Political Performance and the Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood." In *Islamic Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center.
[78] Ayesh, Kathem. 2010. Executive Committee Member of the JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 7 Feb.
[79] Boulby 1999.

view, Bassam Umoush, stated once " we cannot accept everything. We have durable constant principles which we cannot change or amend."[80] They were also concerned that by becoming a political party they would be dependent on government rulings over them.[81] According to one of the most prominent hawks Mohammad Abu Faris, participation was unacceptable because it was forceing the Brotherhood to respect and support a constitution that is not entirely based on Islamic law.[82]

In short, they were worried about being co-opted by the regime and wanted to avoid it by staying out of formal politics and continuing grassroots mobilization at the societal level.

In addition to all potential costs of participation and priorities, a key potential cost of non-participation did not exist in the Jordanian context: the JMB was a "legal" entity that had escaped repression throughout the years. Hence, participation was not a move that would bring JMB out of the underground. On the contrary, it was risking certain privileges of regime alliance.

The hawks, prioritizing internal ties and avoidance of co-optation in the absence of immediate costs of non-participation, such as state repression, believed in continued grassroots mobilization. The doves saw a different picture of the developments of 1989.

---

[80] Umoush cited in Azem, Ahmad Jamil. 1997. "The Islamic Action Front Party." In *Islamic Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, p. 109.
[81] Schwedler 2006.
[82] Kazem, Ali Abdul. 1997. "The Muslim Brotherhood: The Historic Background and the Ideological Origins." In *Islamic Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center.

2.4.2: The Doves, Vanguard Mobilization, and Reasons to Participate

Prior to 1989, the JMB "had no desire to run for Executive Power, […] no supportive parliamentary weight and no integral plan."[83] When in 1989, participation became an option for the JMB, the doves, opposing the hawks, advocated party formation and electoral participation. Coming from a vanguard mobilization strategy, the doves strategized to influence policy-making and governance through which to recruit more people. And, party formation was the perfect medium to do so.

First, party formation offered the possibility to access state institutions and use them for the Islamic cause. Sitting in the parliament meant being part of the legislature and demanding Islamic changes to the law: "we want to participate because we want to participate in legislation, in enacting laws, of laws that are of great importance to people that address their problems and issues…to be there…to make sure the government is not suppressing, practicing tyranny over the people."[84] After all, "even if we cannot make the laws Islamic, at least it won't be against Islam."[85] In this regard, the doves were very similar to the Moroccan Movement for Unity and Reform that sough a greater role in policy-making.

Furthermore, sitting in the parliament meant "supervising the government, especially with regard to corruption"[86] as well as access to state elites: "For instance, when a personality in the society says I want to meet the minister of education, he says

[83] Farhan, Ishaq Ahmad. 1997. *The Islamic Stand Towards Political Involvement (With Respects to the Jordanian Experience)*. Translated by Basma Nayef Sa'd, ed. Suleiman Al-Abbas. Amman, Jordan: Dar Al-Furqan, p. 10.
[84] Aqel, Mohammad Khalil Mohammad. Deputy from IAF. 2010. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 8 Feb.
[85] Thneibat, Abdel Hamid. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 24 Feb.
[86] Huneidi, Azzam. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 1 March.

alright I don't have time today, you can come after in two days. But if I was a parliamentary member or an ex-minister like myself I can go anytime, any hour, and they will open the doors."[87]

Second, party formation offered the possibility to reach more people through attaining higher posts—just as the Turkish National View Movement wanted to reach greater masses through a political party and not just their traditional clientele. Being part of the parliament meant greater visibility across Jordan—not only in the cities: "We need to be visible because the parliament is the window…the media emphasis on the parliament is great and you have to be there…through being in the parliament you can talk about your convictions regarding like foreign affairs."[88]

And, increased visibility meant increasing constituency: "Either we win or not, the parliament period is a very good opportunity for us to promote our ideas and our programmes. So, we can enter houses, we can go to villages…people will understand our programme […] Parliament is very good to promote our ideas *loudly*." [89]As a result, participation would serve the end goal of Islamist mobilization more effectively. In the words of Farhan, probably the most well-known dove member: "Those who did not hear from the Islamic movement or those who did not have any gains from it socially or economically…they have it…the parliamentary member stays and says Islam, Islam, Islam and broadcasts his speech and he will be present in every home."[90]

---

[87] Farhan, Ishaq. 2010. Ex-Leader of the IAF and Ideologue of the Doves. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 16 Feb.
[88] Aqel, Mohammad Khalil Mohammad. Deputy from IAF. 2010. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 8 Feb.
[89] Thneibat, Abdel Hamid. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 24 Feb.
[90] Farhan, Ishaq. 2010. Ex-Leader of the IAF and Ideologue of the Doves. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 16 Feb.

Moreover, the expectation was that forming a new party would bring new alliances: new constituencies represented by different political forces, especially with independent Islamists.[91] To be a member of the JMB meant to follow strict guidelines for life, such as abiding by certain dress codes, working under an organizational hierarchy, and showing religious commitment. Hence, the assumption was that party formation would eliminate these strict internal rulings of the JMB and create a "large umbrella to enable anyone who wants to work in political issues."[92] This change would open up the Brotherhood to everyone who believed in the role of Islam in politics but who were not necessarily JMB members,[93] perhaps even non-practicing Muslims and non-Muslims.[94] In sum, a new political party would serve to break ties with the Brotherhood's institutionalized norms and give the movement flexibility to attract new members. The fear was that if the JMB did not establish a new political party, other Islamists would and would take away their constituency.[95]

In sum, contrary to the hawks' perception of the new political structures, a new party offered the doves a medium to realize its priorities set by its belief in a vanguard strategy.

---

[91] Azem, 1997.
[92] Gharaibeh, Ruheil. 2004. "Islamists and Political Development in Jordan A Vision and an Experience." Al Quds Research Center: http://alqudscenter.org/english/pages.php?local_type=128&local_details=2&id1=543&menu_id=19&program_id=6&cat_id=24, (accessed Jan. 10, 2010).
[93] Thneibat, Abdel Hamid. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 24 Feb.
[94] Abu Bakr, Jamil. 2010. Executive Committee Member of the JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 21 Feb.
[95] Al Masri, Mohammed. 2010. Professor of Political Science at the University of Jordan. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 17 Feb.

2.5: IAF is Born

At the end of the participation debates, the doves were able to convince the majority that a new political party was the most efficient and effective medium to reach the masses.[96] This decision was a surprising outcome considering that the hawks led the Brotherhood since the 1970s and the doves were a minority faction, while participation risked alienating the regime.

The doves' argument was more appealing than the hawks' because the majority of JMB activists recognized and witnessed the effectiveness of a vanguard mobilization strategy that had been exercised by the doves, especially during Farhan's Ministry, which resulted in the opening of multiple JMB-linked schools and increased recruitment. Some Brotherhood members called for the "control of society's public domain by the Muslim majority through the implementation of Shari' a" and believed that "Jordan is well on the way to becoming an Islamic society in the sense of conforming with some aspects of Shari'a […] but further Islamizing reforms are required for Jordanian society to run in accordance with Shari'a."[97]

The formation of the Islamic Action Front Party (*Japhat Al Amal Al Islami*) and the win for the doves is not just a result of an older generation being replaced by a younger one or a religious faction being replaced by a professional one.[98] Looking at the founding committee of the IAF, we can see that younger as well as older generations participated in it (Table 5.5).

---

[96] The establishment of the IAF did not mean the end of the hawks versus doves debate. To this date, the debate is brought up before every election. The hawks usually side with "protesting" elections and prefer non-participation, while the doves are in favor of electoral participation. In short, the formation of the IAF was only phase one in the development of the hawks versus doves debate.
[97] Boulby, 1999, p. 128-129.
[98] Kazem, 1997.

Age Group	Percentage
25-40	44.5
41-50	30
51-60	20.4
61 and above	5.1

Table 5.5: Age Distribution of the IAF Founding Committee[99]

Furthermore, there is also a mix of professionals (34 percent) as well as non-professionals (66 percent) in IAF's founding committee.[100] Education was the most represented profession in the committee, while personnel salaried employees ranked second. Highly qualified professions such as lawyers, engineers, physicians as well as businessmen shared a significant percentage as well.[101] This mix meant members from different socio-economic backgrounds favored party formation. That the doves won with a majority vote of 85 percent shows how convincing the doves. IAF formation was not led simply by a younger professional generation.

And so, the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF) was established following a long Consultative Council meeting with a majority vote of 85 percent, which totaled 101 out of 120 members. The reasons for participation were stated as:

> The Muslim Brotherhood views parliamentary action and participation in parliamentary elections as a means *to address the masses, communicate with them,* adopt their issues and stands, explain facts, ward off doubts, defend stands, and to present programs and plans with the objective of contributing to the homeland's progress and development. Based on this, *although they have strict reservations about the law amending the current Election Law*, and despite the fact that this law was issued to reduce the Islamic Movement's representation in the coming parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood, proceeding from its sense of responsibility toward its call, homeland, and citizens, and out of its awareness of the our nation's delicate circumstances, has decided to take part in the coming parliamentary elections through its members who are affiliated with the IAF Party with the objective of *unifying and*

[99] Azem, 1997, p. 102.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.

> *rationalizing* Islamic action in the service of the issues of the nation and the homeland (emphasis added).[102]

The first edition of the Islamic Action magazine, a publication of the IAF, reconfirmed the reasons to establish the IAF:

> Theories are no longer useful in the midst of the conflict between the combative world forces, policies, and ideas. Therefore, the Islamic movement is duty-bound to enter the arena of political struggle through a legal institution so that it may convey its message to the various sectors of the state, prove the practical and successful model of Islamic action, and *confirm the ability and suitability, of the Islamic approach for the successful resolution of all aspects of social problems* (emphasis added).[103]

Both statements hint at the desire to mobilize masses by way of political participation. Furthermore, both statements announce the Brotherhood's desire to participate in state-level decision-making, or a top-down approach to change. In this regard, the JMB's reasoning is very similar to the Moroccan Movement for Unity and Reform and the Turkish National View Movement in that they desired to reach masses through the state apparatus.

While the IAF functioned as the political wing of the Brotherhood, the JMB itself continued its road as a movement for two "technical" reasons. Foremost, the JMB would be treated as a non-political party and eschew party regulations imposed by the regime, such as the disclosure of their budgets and lists of members, and avoid a potential future ban on political parties. This move would preserve the networks JMB had built over decades[104]—a key priority that the hawks demanded to preserve strong internal ties.

[102] Al Dustur. 1993. "Brotherhood To Take Part in Elections Through IAF." *Al Dustur,* 27 August.
[103] Azem 1997, p. 108-109.
[104] Ibid.

Second, in 1992, the government had approved the Political Parties Law and thereby legalizing political parties for the first time since 1957. According to the new Political Parties Law, a political party could not have administrative or financial links with any foreign power or political group—and because the JMB is an offshoot of the international Muslim Brotherhood Movement, the IAF served the purpose of overcoming legal obstacles[105] to turn JMB as a whole into a political party.[106]

As a result, the IAF took on the role of an intermediary between the religious mission of the JMB and the everyday issues facing Jordan. Today, JMB and the IAF coordinate and make suggestions to each other. However, the JMB does not enter politics directly. Despite their complimentary relationship, the JMB and the IAF differ from each other in two key respects. First, the IAF takes on more disputed issues such as pro-democracy discourse and women rights. In doing this, the IAF can adapt a more pragmatic stance on issues like regional or foreign policy, while the JMB has to stick to its firm rhetoric. Second, unlike the JMB, being a Muslim with individual devotion is not a prerequisite for membership. As a matter of fact, the IAF had a few Christian members. In its co-existence of a movement and party, the JMB is very similar to the Turkish and Moroccan cases where, despite party formation movements, continued to exist given the unstable regime attitude vis-à-vis the Islamists.

---

[105] Nevertheless, one cannot simply argue that the main reason to establish a separate political party was to bypass the new law. Party formation was an issue of debate prior to the 1992 law and took place over the 1990-92 period. As a matter of fact, Farhan, the leader of the doves, had organized a meeting called the "First Conference to Prepare for the Islamist Call" in June 1990 to discuss preparations for the establishment of a political party—two years before the afore-mentioned law was announced. (Abu Latifeh 1997).

[106] Boulby 1999.

Part 3: The Brotherhood Today

Under the same socio-political context, factions within the Brotherhood with varying mobilization strategies chose different political options. This anomaly does not mean that socio-political structures bear no influence upon Islamists. The Brotherhood today faces more repression from the Jordanian regime that is "liberalized." Brotherhood establishments, such as the Islamic Hospital and the Islamic Center, were seized by the regime in order to control for the Brotherhood expansion; election laws in Jordan have been altered (and are being altered constantly) to prevent the IAF from winning majority; and Brotherhood members are not allowed privileged state posts anymore either. Hence, the "democratic experience" failed to meet expectations[107] and the political options of the Brotherhood are getting narrower.

The disappointment with the "democratic" experience can also be seen in relation to international actors. According to al-Masalha, an ex-JMB member, "at that time we thought that the West, or the Americans and the Europeans are supporting us and the region to go through democratization…That's why we thought we are 50-50 between our expectations and the real position."[108] However, the West did not deliver on their expectations. Al-Jolani,[109] the editor of the Islamist daily Assabeel, recalls they had many meetings with the leaders of the Western world explaining their positions and their desire for human rights and democracy but the West "chose" not to understand them.

---

[107] Mansour, Hamzeh. 2010. Leader of the IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 23 February.
[108] Al-Masalha, Nael. 2010. Ex-Member of the JMB and IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 March.
[109] Al-Jolani, Atef. 2010. Editor of the Islamist daily Assabeel. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 9 March.

In short, the illiberal character of political liberalization limited the Brotherhood's calculations about influencing policy and changing the regime from within.

Second, societal expansion did not take place in the stalemate of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Many Jordanians work in or desire to work in the public sector, widely considered a stable occupation immune from economic or political crises. These Jordanians do not support the IAF in the fear that they will lose their public sector jobs by putting their loyalty to the state at question by supporting the JMB.[110]

Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees who are migrating in ever-increasing numbers to Jordan are cut out of public sector jobs. They lack socio-economic networks as outcasts of the society. And, with the collapse of the PLO and the illegal stance of HAMAS in Jordan, Palestinian demands are expressed by the IAF now. As a result, the current supporter base of the Brotherhood is composed mainly of Palestinian refugees. Therefore, "if you have a majority of Palestinian supporters, you will have a Palestinian agenda."[111] This Palestinian-dominated agenda does not reflect the needs of the Jordanian middle class, which is struggling with different socio-economic problems.[112]

Although socio-political structures did not directly lead to the formation of the IAF, they do impose boundaries on the IAF's success. The alienation of the Jordanian regime and the societal repercussions of the Israel-Palestine conflict limit the Brotherhood's room to maneuver. In other words, socio-political structures delineate external boundaries on political behavior.

---

[110] Rantawi, Oraib. 2010. Director of the Al-Quds Research Institute. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 Feb.
[111] Rantawi, Oraib. 2010. Director of the Al-Quds Research Institute. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 Feb.
[112] Gharaibeh, Ibrahim. 2010. Journalist from the secular daily Al Ghad. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 11 Feb.

Despite the external influence of socio-political structures upon the Brotherhood, final decision-making regarding political behavior still lies internally. From the formation of the IAF to the present day, different factions within the Brotherhood have advocated different political behavior in the face of changing socio-political opportunities. In particular, when the hawks are in power, the IAF has tended to boycott elections, and when the doves are in power it has participated in elections.

The Brotherhood makes its own history, but it does not make it as it pleases; it does not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past and present.[113]

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown the evolution of different mobilization strategies adapted by different factions within the Brotherhood, and I have shown how these mobilization strategies have influenced the choices of these factions in the face of the 1989 political liberalization process. In particular, I have shown that the hawks, coming from a grassroots mobilization strategy, have preferred to stay as a movement, whereas the doves, coming from a vanguard mobilization strategy, have favored party formation. Furthermore, I have shown the inadequacy of structural explanations of party formation.

---

[113] This is an adaptation of Marx's famous quote "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." In Marx, Karl. 1852. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Marxists Internet Archive http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm (24 June 2010).

First, political liberalization did not lead everyone to desire party formation. Second, a distinct societal segment demanding party formation did not exist in Jordan, Hence, party formation was not the product of societal demand bur rather attempted to construct societal demand. I have shown in this chapter that party formation was internally motivated and that even under changing socio-political structures limiting political actors' room to maneuver, final decision-making lies internally.

The Jordanian case of the Muslim Brotherhood is significant for multiple reasons. First, this is a case where I can control for organization as I am looking at different factions organized under the same movement umbrella, holding socio-political structures constant as well as organization. Holding everything constant,—socio-political structures and organization—showed me that even within the same movement with similar goals, differences over strategies co-exist and influence the future directions of the movement.

Second, forming parties does not always solve internal dilemmas of umbrella organizations, such as the Turkish National View Movement. At times, party formation serves to reach out to more people by overcoming strict organizational guidelines. In other words, party formation does not always unify factions, but sometimes serves to break through bonds.

Finally, the case of the JMB signals a crucial insight about Islam and democracy debates. The Brotherhood today is isolated from mainstream politics by the Jordanian regime and the international community. This isolation in the future can empower more radical factions within the Brotherhood and could turn the JMB away from engaging in mainstream politics and democracy. To make an analogy, cheetahs are wild and

aggressive animals. Yet, in zoos across the world they are raised together with shepherd dogs so that they are socialized into mild manners by imitating their "roommates." Political actors behave under "peer pressure" and emulation. Hence, isolation of a political actor as powerful as the JMB can result in its decreasing belief in democracy, while integrating it within a global framework can yield more democratic results.

The first signs of mistrust with regard to democratic openings as a result of years of political isolation can be seen in recent events. Within the recent Arab Spring uprisings, the King of Jordan promised new political openings that would be led by a National Dialogue Council composed of various political actors across the Jordanian political spectrum. In 1989, the Brotherhood participated in such a Council quite willingly. Today, it has rejected entering the talks on the basis that such initiatives are not translated into actual politics and that promises are broken and serve to legitimize autocratic rule. This stance of the Brotherhood is the result of years of disappointment with and isolation from the "democratic" experience in Jordan. Furthermore, the Jordanian regime attacked the Brotherhood's current street protests inspired by the Arab Spring resulting in the death of a Brotherhood member – adding further resentments to the regime-Brotherhood relations. The results of such mistrust will not be beneficial for any political actor in Jordan or in the region.

Democracy is not an intrinsic value to any belief system or political culture. It is about learning, emulation, and socialization. Therefore, discussing whether Islamic political parties like the IAF can be democratic or not is fruitless. The discussion should instead focus on how Islamic parties, or any political actor, can be made more committed

to democracy and liberal values. And, isolation and repression are certainly not part of the solution.

CHAPTER 6: ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES AROUND THE WORLD: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Egyptian theologian Nasr Abu Zayd stated once "the Quran is at the mercy of the ideology of its interpreter. For a communist, the Quran would thus reveal communism, for a fundamentalist it would be a highly fundamentalist text, for a feminist it would be a feminist text."[1] Different Islamist movements derive different meanings out of Islam texts. These disparate interpretations form the basis of Islamist diversity in political behavior.

This behavioral multiplicity of Islamist movements is not simply due to their formation in essentially different socio-political contexts. As a matter of fact, Islamist movements facing the very same political regime and sharing the very same popular base can choose different political behavior. For example the Turkish National View Movement and the Gulen Movement emerged in the mid-1960s and appeal to the same segments of society; the former has chosen to become a party, the latter rejects party formation.

Moreover, Islamist movements formed in essentially different socio-political contexts can adopt similar political behavior. Islamist movements in a democratic setting such as of Indonesia have formed parties as well as in an authoritarian setting such as of Algeria.

---

[1] Abu Zayd, Nasr. 2006. *Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, p. 98.

In light of these behavioral divergences within the same context and behavioral similarities between different contexts, I asked: *Why do some Islamist movements form political parties, while others eschew party formation?*

Given that socio-political structures cannot explain real-world variation in Islamist political behavior, I formulated a model that looks at what is happening inside the Islamist movements while holding socio-political structures constant. This model is based on my findings from my comparative and qualitative fieldwork on the historical trajectories of five Islamist movements in Morocco, Turkey and Jordan. In my fieldwork, I interviewed more than 60 politicians, leaders, journalists, and academics (in Arabic and Turkish) and explored archival materials from the countries' main Islamist and secular political magazines as well as party and movement archives.

To tease out the larger implications of my research findings, this last chapter is divided into four parts: (1) a comparative discussion of my findings, (2) an empirical and theoretical discussion of my findings with respect to the developments in the Muslim World, (3) how my findings relate to the question of Muslim democracy, and (4) future research directions.

Part 1: Morocco, Turkey and Jordan in Comparison

According to conventional wisdom, Islamist movements are uniform actors with similar political behavior when faced with massive macro-level, socio-political transformations. In the real world, however, this is not the case. There is a wide range of

Islamist political behavior ranging form global terrorist networks to apolitical missionaries. Thus, in my dissertation I adopted an alternative approach: I held macro-level, socio-political transformations constant, while focusing on the variation of Islamist movements internally. In this part, I will look into what this variation within a constant structural context entails and what its implications are.

1.1: The Constant—Macro-Level Socio-Political Structures

At first sight, Morocco, Turkey, and Jordan seem to be different worlds with varying levels of democracy, wealth, and foreign affairs. However, they do share two key structural similarities. First, all three regimes have "dual" relationships with the Islamists. On the one hand, these regimes tolerate Islamist presence in order to counter radical Islamists as well as socialist forces in the country. On the other hand, these regimes exclude Islamists from positions of actual political power and governance. In short, when it comes to their dealings with the Islamists, all three regimes share a "tolerant authoritarianism." All of these regimes hold elections, and all actors involved within these regimes have the same menu of options, including the participation option.

Second, although societal structures in these three cases are different today, all three cases at different periods of time have gone through similar societal changes. In other words, I am looking at similar societal changes in each case by looking at different time frames with similar changes. These cases share a number of societal similarities. One, all cases occurred during rapid demographic changes such as urbanization, increasing school enrollment, and unemployment. Two, new societal classes were emerging in each case—classes that were excluded from the state elites and actual

political power. However, none of these classes could be identified as a "Muslim" middle class. Rather, they were politically amorphous. And, Islamists saw this new class as a potentially mobilizable class for their cause.

I am not only holding macro-level socio-political transformations constant by looking at different time frames of similar transformations, but I am also looking at the trajectory of two Islamist movements, both of which have emerged at the same time frame and both of which derive their popular base from the very same segments of society. They differ in political behavior, meaning that I am looking at two different Islamist movements with the same popular base, facing the same political system, but adopting opposing political behavior (Figure 6.1). As a result, divergences in political behavior seem not to be driven by divergences in popular base or a new Muslim middle class.

To give an overview, in Morocco, I researched two Islamist movements: (1) the Movement for Unity and Reform, which later formed the Party for Justice and Development, and (2) the Justice and Spirituality Movement, which rejects party formation. I looked into how the former evolved from a small-scale radical and violent movement into the third biggest political party in Morocco today, while the latter became the largest Islamist movement and opposition group in Morocco within the same time frame. I discussed the details of each of these transformations in Chapter 3.

In Turkey, I also looked at two different Islamist movements: (1) the National View Movement, which is the mother movement to most IPPs in recent Turkish history, and (2) the Gulen Movement, which despite its rejectionist stance toward formal politics

forms the backbone of a powerful Islamist middle class estimated to control more than $25 billion. The details of both movements were discussed in Chapter 4.

In Jordan, I focused on just one Islamist movement, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which later formed the Islamic Action Front Party. In this case, I investigated the opposing stances of two powerful factions within the movement: the Doves and the Hawks. Whereas the Doves were pro-participation, the Hawks were opposed to it. In Chapter 5, I discussed the strategic history of and internal debates between these two factions.



Figure 6.1: Variance across outcomes.

In all five cases, movements face the same political regime and shared the same popular base, yet choose different political paths. This variation in political behavior is the subject of the next section.

1.2: Variation in Agency

Although socio-political structures are held constant, my cases have variation along two internal variables: organization and mobilization strategies (Figure 6.2).

Organization refers to the way in which a movement is organized, which in turn influences its decision-making process and perception of socio-political structures. Mobilization strategies, on the other hand, are roadmaps to an ideal future, and thus guide political behavior. They define a movement's priorities, preferences, and perceptions of the menu of options, and are derived through Islamic interpretation and ideology. Although deriving from Islamist ideology, they are not the same as ideologies. Ideologies concern themselves with goals, but mobilization strategies describe "plans for action." Note that there is no correlation between strategies and organization.[2]

	Vanguard Strategy	**Grassroots Strategy**
Personalistic Organization	*Turkey: National View Movement, 1980s onwards (forms multiple parties)*	Morocco: Justice and Spirituality Movement Turkey: Gulen Movement
Umbrella Organization	*Morocco: Movement for Unity and Reform (forms Party for Justice and Development)* *Turkey: National View Movement, 1970s (forms multiple parties)* *Jordan: Muslim Brotherhood, the Doves (forms Islamic Action Front Party)*	Jordan: Muslim Brotherhood, the Hawks

Table 6.1: Organization vs. Strategy (*Italics refer to those movements forming a party.*)

Based on my field research, I found that the primary motivator behind Islamist political behavior is their *mobilization strategy*. In particular, I found that movements with a vanguard mobilization strategy (in which a small group of leaders frame the cause and mobilize masses around an Islamic identity in a top-down manner) tend to establish

[2] See Chapter 2 for a discussion on this topic.

parties. By contrast, I found that movements with a grassroots mobilization strategy (in which the aim is to construct mass consciousness through grassroots activities in a bottom-up manner) tend to remain outside of formal politics and eschew party formation.

As Table 1 shows, in all three cases, mobilization strategies have a clear explanatory power. They explain why some movements within the same country form parties while others do not (intra-case variation). And, they explain why movements in different countries adopt the same political behavior (inter-case variation). Most importantly, mobilization strategies not only explain why movements form parties, but also why they do not form parties (variation in outcomes).

In my research, I found grassroots movements throughout my cases that choose to stay as movements for two common reasons. First, individual salvation is central to a grassroots mobilization strategy. These movements target the individual and not the state. Hence, for these movements the key priority is to preserve strong internal ties between "saved" individuals, who in turn form the movement. Second, because grassroots mobilization has individual salvation at its core, these types of movements value ideological purity over pragmatic gains. Thus, co-optation as a result of political participation becomes a key threat to this core principle.

On the other hand, all vanguard movements in this study chose to form a political party for two common reasons. First, vanguard movements by definition start at a small scale clustered around a few individuals (the vanguards) who are looking for ways to enlarge their supporter base. Given their belief in an Islamist transformation under a vanguard group, they try to widen their constituency in a top-down manner. A political party becomes a perfect avenue for such top-down recruitment.

Second, because vanguard movements believe in top-down change, they aim to take over higher posts of power to apply such a change. The state is the highest post of power there is. As a result, for a movement abdicating violence to take over the state, forming a political party and running for executive and legislative positions becomes an effective avenue to realizing this goal.

Such strategic calculations are not just beneficial under democracies, but also under authoritarian regimes. Under authoritarian regimes, influencing policy, legislation and decision-making remain, by definition, exclusive to a small group. A vanguard movement can infiltrate authoritarian regimes more effectively by announcing its position as a "loyal opposition" political party that is committed to the rules of an authoritarian regime and that accepts this regime as legitimate. The importance of this demarcation becomes starker given the repression of those who are "outside" of the authoritarian regime.

The mobilization strategies of Islamist movements influence the way in which they perceive their immediate socio-political contexts and evaluate their options.

1.2.1: Understanding Strategies

Different strategies result in different political behavior, but what causes movements to adopt different strategies? The answer lies in different Islamist interpretations. For instance, the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Movement's strategy is based on the ideology of its founder, Abdelesselam Yassine who has an original reading of the Quran within his Sufi training; the Turkish Gulen Movement's strategy is based on the ideology of its founder, Fethullah Gulen, who borrows the movement's

interpretation from Said Nursi, a Turkish/Kurdish Islamist thinker; and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood lacks any type of theologian/ideologue but rather follows the ideology of the international Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, the vanguard movements in this study, the Moroccan Movement for Unity and Reform and the Turkish National View Movement all lack clearly defined ideology and theology.

However, just because movements adapt the same strategy does not mean they have the same goals. Goals of Islamist movements are as diverse as the number of politically active Islamist movements in the world, and thus hard to generalize. What I refer to here under mobilization strategies is not goals, but means. Hence, movements choosing the same strategy are not clones of each other; they are in fact quite different. For instance, all grassroots movements in this study have different goals: the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Movement aims the downfall of the Moroccan monarchy, the Turkish Gulen Movement aims to educate a new generation of believers, and the Hawks of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood aim to apply Shari'a at all levels of life. Hence, what is at stake here is not what goals these movements aim to achieve by eschewing party formation but how non-participation is justified by their strategic logic. Although all these grassroots movements want different things, "the way they go about" achieving those desires, using their mobilization strategies, is the same.

1.3: Secondary Factors

Initially, starting my dissertation research, organization seemed to be one of the key factors behind party formation—a prominent argument in the political parties literature. As a result, organizational variables were part of my case selection at the start.

Using this logic, umbrella organizations (divided organizations with various competing factions) tend to form parties, and personalistic organizations (uniform organizations with a charismatic leader) tend to stay as movements. The literature traces the origins of this difference back to the need of umbrella movements to organize different factions under a political party, and to the absence of such organizational needs of personalistic organizations under a charismatic leader.

However, my research findings confound the explanatory power of organizational variables in explaining IPP formation. First, umbrella organizations do not form parties just for the sake of professionalizing internal factions. Umbrella organizations are alliances between smaller Islamist movements that seek participation independently and find an alliance a stronger medium to go about it. Umbrella organizations are not factionalized organizations in need of unification but rather alliances of groups with similar perspectives. For example, both the Moroccan Movement for Unity and Reform and the Turkish National View Movement are alliances of smaller Islamist movements, all of which desired party formation *prior* to their alliance. Even in an older and larger movement such as the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, party formation aimed to ally with independent Islamists, and thus to enlarge Islamist constituencies. Hence, movements do not form a party to unify diverging factions but to form alliances with movements of similar beliefs, strategies, and political demands.

Second, personalistic organizations' eschew party formation for idealistic reasons. Because a personalistic organization has a charismatic leader, it also has more clear ideals that are set by that leader. And, transforming a movement means breaking away from

those ideals. Hence, personalistic organizations are driven more by idealistic reasons than efficiency.

In short, although organization does play a role in the decision to form a party or not, it does so for reasons unexpected and unexplored by the existing literature.

Aside from organization, another factor that has played a role in party formation is international and regional factors. These factors play into how Islamist movements evaluate their options. Because every Islamist movement in this study faces the very same international developments, I have mentioned them only briefly, but that does not mean they had no influence. In particular, Islamist movements take into account how the international community will perceive their political behavior. After 9/11, moderate Islamist movements wanted to signal their moderate stance vis-à-vis radical terrorist networks to the international community. Yet, the way they go about such behavior is informed by their strategic perspectives. While the Moroccan Movement for Unity and Reform formed a party to signal the international community their lack of revolutionary ambitions, the other Moroccan Islamist movement, the Justice and Spirituality Movement, went transnational because it wanted to use the international community to pressure the Moroccan regime supranationally. Similar effects can be found in my other cases as well, such as HAMAS' effect on Jordanian Islamists, the EU's effect on National View Movement, and the Gulen Movement in Turkey.

Part 2: Extending The Findings Empirically And Theoretically

Islamist movements and Islamic political parties have not just emerged in Morocco, Turkey and Jordan, but all around the Muslim world. Given the widespread existence of these actors, this part is devoted to the degree to which my argument about strategies explains real-world variation in IPP formation beyond my cases and the theoretical implications of these findings.

2.1: How Much Do Strategies Explain?

One might wonder whether my argument about mobilization strategies is applicable beyond the cases I discussed throughout this dissertation. To answer this, I will go back to my case selection. As discussed in my second chapter, my case selection initially started from a sample of all Muslim-majority societies and focused on cases that have elections—even controlled elections under authoritarian rule—to avoid cases where party formation by definition is not possible.

From this first sample, I have excluded: (1) Islamic regimes, such as Iran and Sudan, because in these countries any party by definition needs to be Islamic, (2) cases where all IPPs are banned (for example, Uzbekistan) but have included mixed cases, such as Egypt and Morocco, where IPPs are not wholly banned but are allowed to participate under certain conditions such as independent candidates, (3) conflict zones, such as

Afghanistan.[3] These criteria limited me to a sample of 25 countries with multiple Islamist movements and 16 countries with IPPs.

Identifying IPPs is easy given their electoral participation, but identifying Islamist movements is not. It is not the case that 25 countries make 25 Islamist movements. There there are 25 countries with hundreds of Islamist movements. Most of these Islamist movements are local or they are apolitical. It is difficult to identify them through secondary research. I have defined such movements as “smaller Islamist movements” that do not represent a major political force in the country. In the table below, I have left their strategy field empty given the absence of accessible information on these movements.

Furthermore, it is difficult to identify the initial Islamist movement that formed some IPPs through secondary research. Because I did not want to select on the dependent variable, I have started my case selection from among those that have a clear Islamist movement that has formed an IPP. I do not consider the IPPs in which the movement background is unknown as part of my case selection.

The result is Table 6.2: 25 countries that were eligible to be considered in my initial case selection.

Country	**Islamist Movement**	**Strategy**	**Political Behavior**
Albania	***Gulen Movement***	***Grassroots***	***Stays as Movement***
Algeria	***Islamic Salvation Front***	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Islamic Salvation Front)***
	Algerian Muslim Brotherhood	***Starts hybrid, becomes vanguard***	***Forms Party (Movement of***

[3] See Appendix 1 for details of each step.

			Society for Peace)
	---	---	Islamic Renaissance Movement
	---	---	Movement for National Reform
Bahrain	Islamic Education Society	Hybrid	Forms Party (Al Asalah)
	Islamic National Accord Association	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Al Wefaq)***
	Al Eslah Society (Bahraini Muslim Brotherhood)	Hybrid	Forms Party (Al-Menbar Islamic Society)
	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Islamic Action Society)***
Bangladesh	***Jamaaet-e-Islami Bangladesh***	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Bangladesh Jamaat-e Islami)***
	---	---	Bangladesh Islamic Front
	---	---	Islami Jatiya Oikya Front
Burkina Faso	Smaller Islamist movements	---	Stay as Movements
Comoros	Smaller Brotherhoods	---	Stay as Movements
Djibouti	Sufi Brotherhoods	---	Stay as Movements
Egypt	Muslim Brotherhood	Hybrid	Forms Party (Freedom and Justice Party)
	The generation of the 1970s (Muslim Brotherhood splitters)	Hybrid	Forms Party (Wasat Party)
Gambia	Smaller Brotherhoods	---	Stay as Movements
Guinea	Smaller Movements	---	Stay as Movements
Indonesia	***Various groups***	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)***
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	***Grassroots***	***Stays as a Movement***
	---	---	Crescent Star Party
	Local Islamist movements around Java and Splitters from NU	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (National Awakening Party)***
Iraq	***Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood***	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Iraqi Islamic Party)***
Kuwait	***Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood***	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (HADAS)***
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Hybrid	Forms Party (Hezbollah)
Malaysia	***Islamic clergy***	***Vanguard***	***Forms (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia)***
Maldives	---	---	Islamic Democratic Party
Mali	***Sufi Brotherhoods***	***Grassroots***	***Stay as movements***

Pakistan	***Jamaat-e Islami***	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Jamaat-e-Islami)***
Senegal	***Sufi Brotherhoods***	***Grassroots***	***Stay as movements***
Tajikistan	Islamic clergy	Hybrid	Forms Party (Islamic Renaissance Party)
Tunisia	Islamic Tendency Movement	Hybrid	Forms Party (Al Nahda)
Yemen	***Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood***	***Vanguard***	***Forms Party (Islah Party)***

Table 6.2: Islamist Movement Strategies and Political Behavior around the World (*Italic refers to those cases confirming my argument).*

There are 34 cases listed in Table 2. Five are smaller Islamist movements that are unidentifiable due to lack of secondary literature, and six are cases where there is no clear Islamist movement that formed a party, a factor that risked selecting on the dependent variable. Discounting these cases there are 23 cases that I can analyze through secondary research. Of these 23 cases, 16 confirm my findings. My explanation involving mobilization strategies explains not only the majority of IPP formation cases, but also the majority of real-world variation in party formation.

Seven cases do not confirm my argument, yet they also do not disprove my argument either. These seven cases are movements with a hybrid strategy—movements that engage in grassroots and vanguard mobilization simultaneously. I have looked at a hybrid movement in Jordan with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood that adopted both a vanguard and a grassroots strategy. The movement formed a party separate from the movement proper, thereby minimizing costs and maximizing benefits of both participation and non-participation.

The above table shows that hybrid movements tend to form parties separate from the movements themselves thereby allowing party formation and non-formation

simultaneously. As a result, my explanation does have an explanatory power in these cases as it explains the co-existence of party formation and non-formation of the very same movements. In short, hybrid movements chose hybrid political behavior—a result predicted by my argument.

2.2: What Is Missing from Strategies?

My argument still needs to be elaborated and extended to two areas. First, I have only looked at Sunni movements in my dissertation, but IPP formation is not peculiar to Sunni movements. For instance, the biggest IPP in Bahrain (the biggest political party in Bahrain), the National Accord Association (*Al Wefaq*), is a Shia party. It is a party that is close to the Shiite clerical body in Bahrain, the Islamic Scholars Council, and runs multiple social service providers.[4] Although this limitation has allowed me to control for theological differences, studying Shia parties will surely add to the depth behind why various Islamist movements choose different strategies. In other words, examining the theology behind a strategy will not only answer why some Islamist movements form IPPs, while others are not, but will also answer why and how Islamist movements are choosing the strategies that they are using. These differences over theology can also be addressed beyond the Sunni-Shia divide into which schools of Islamic law various Islamist movements adhere to.

Second, there are special cases that my argument needs to address in the future, such as that of Indonesia. Indonesia hosts the Nahdlatul Ulama Movement—a movement

[4] Zweiri, Mahjoob and Mohammed Zahid. 2007. “The Victory Of Al Wefaq: The Rise Of Shiite Politics In Bahrain.” *Research Institute For European And American Studies*, Research Paper No: 108.

that in 1945 participated within the Masyumi Party together with other Islamist groups. However, from the 1960s onward it became an apolitical movement and today bans its members from holding political posts. Thus, it is an interesting case where a party returned to being a movement. Such special cases require further research.

2.3: What Do My Findings Tell Theoretically? The Structure-Agency Debate

My findings lend important insight into the structure-agency debate. In my case selection, I held all the socio-political structures constant. In doing so, I focused on different Islamist movements facing the same macro-level transformations in socio-political structures but which adopt different political behavior. More importantly, by introducing intra-case variation, I controlled for societal demand arguments because I have looked at Islamist movements gathering their popular base from the same societal segments of society, the Muslim Bourgeoisie. Despite sharing the same popular base, I found that Islamist movements still behave differently.

What this means is that structural explanations cannot account for real-world variation in behavior between movements facing the same political opportunities/constraints and sharing the very same popular base. Such divergence can only be explained by the internal dynamics of a movement,—by agency. Movements see these macro-level transformations in socio-political structures from their own unique strategic perspectives, making sense of these transformations, and acting upon them. Structures are what movements make of them.

The real-world implication of this finding is that the Muslim Bourgeoisie is not a uniform group that demands moderation and party formation. Rather the Muslim

Bourgeoisie comprises multiple groups with diverging politics. Ultimately, it is the very same Muslim Bourgeoisie that produced the 9/11 terrorists, apolitical preachers isolated from daily activities, and the Muslim democrats. As a result, IPP formation is not really driven by the Muslim Bourgeoisie; IPPs and other Islamist movements drive the Muslim Bourgeoisie. The influence of this relationship upon Muslim Democracy is the subject of the next part.

Part 3: The Muslim Democracy Debate

After the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, the world discussed what the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood represented and its potential role in Egypt's future. For some, the Brotherhood's moderate outlook was a disguise of its true intentions, which can be found in its radical past. For others, the Brotherhood has long been a fierce advocate of democratization. Such debates are not limited to the Brotherhood but involve every Islamist actor active in politics. In this part, I will question the limits of both arguments and discuss what my findings suggest instead.

3.1: Conventional Wisdom 1—Islamists Cannot Be Democratic

One of the most common beliefs about Islamists is that they lack the ability to be democratic. The argument, put forward famously by Tibi, is that the difference between radical versus moderate Islamists is a difference in means not in ends. Hence, "both

violent and institutional Islamists aim to establish the 'Islamic order' based on Islamic law"[5] and thus neither can be democratic.

The problem with this view is twofold. One, it takes Islamism as a "finished" project, but the truth is Islamists are a "work in progress;" their goals and means can change due to co-optation, pragmatic, or even interpretational concerns and seem unimportant. Furthermore, what Islamists take from "Islam is the solution" differs widely. Some Islamists understand from Islam an earlier version of democracy; they argue that the first popularly elected leader in modern history was the first Caliph Abu Bakr. Others see the possibility of Iranian or Saudi-style theocracy. Thus, trying to define Islamists is equally fruitless.

Two, what Islamism means is vague and indeterminate, making classifications impossible. "Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power"[6] because they themselves have not come to a conclusion about doctrinal debates and their ideology remains vague. Hence, neither Islamists nor outside observers can know the "true" intention of Islamists as those intentions are undefined.

In my dissertation I tried to show that there is a multiplicity of Islamist movements with various beliefs and goals. Even the "moderate" Islamist movements that this dissertation specifically focused on have major differences. Hence, trying to generalize what "Islamists" as a singular, homogenous group will do is fruitless. Some might be indeed wolves in sheep clothes, and some might advocate democratization.

---

[5] Tibi, Bassam. 2008. "Why They Can't Be Democratic." *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 43-48.
[6] Hamzawy, Amr and Nathan J. Brown. 2008. "A Boon or a Bane for Democracy?" *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 49-54.

More importantly, if one were to accept this view, what follows would be to isolate Islamists from participating. Isolation, however, is not the answer because isolation of Islamists has again and again produced radicalization. Isolation empowers radical factions within Islamists who see isolation as a double standard that can only be overcome through the destruction of the international order that is isolating Islamists. Democracy is a learning and a socialization process. Isolation simply prevents it from happening. Yet, participation for Islamists does not always mean democratization either…

3.2: Conventional Wisdom 2—Islamists as the Only Democrats in Town

Another common belief is that Islamists, in the absence of any type of opposition to authoritarian regimes, have become the only democrats in town.[7] Their participation as well as their increasing economic independence from the state are positive signals for their democratic commitment. The problem with such judgments is that a commitment to democratic ideals is taken as commitment to "liberal" democracy. One common misconception in this view is that those who participate (the ones that form IPPs), are the those who are committed to democratic values, while those who eschew party formation are those who want to establish an Iran-style theocracy.

My findings show how problematic misconception is. The Islamist movements eschewing party formation are in most cases more committed to democratic ideals than their party-forming counterparts. The Justice and Spirituality Movement in Morocco is talking about forming a national alliance and advocating the right of every person to have

[7] Hamid, Shadi and Amanda Kadlec. 2010. "Strategies for Engaging Political Islam." *Project on Middle East Democracy*. http://pomed.org/strategies-for-engaging-political-islam/ (March 1, 2010).

interpretation of Islam, while the Party for Justice and Development's democratic commitment does not go beyond talking about increased democratization in Morocco. Ultimately, commitment to democracy goes beyond participation. It means preventing tyranny of the majority as well as the tyranny of the minority.

Another common misconception in this belief is that integration into global markets will eventually produce commitment to democracy among the Islamists. This view, prominently advocated by Nasr, argues that when the economy liberalizes, a new entrepreneurial class independent from the state will emerge—a class that will ask for increased democratic rights.

However, a liberal economy does not always produce liberal democracy. A new "Muslim Bourgeoisie" might emerge with increased economic liberalization and ask for further rights as in Western Europe. However, a scenario of an authoritarian regime committed to liberal economy, such as those in Southeast Asia and China, is potentially possible, too.

Neither participation nor the emergence of a Muslim Bourgeoisie guarantees liberal democracy. And, my findings based on real-world developments confirm this.

3.3: A Real World Take on the Muslim Democracy Debate

Earlier in this part, I mentioned that Islamist movements are vaguely defined. The important question to ask here is: Whose ideology and goals are vaguely defined? My findings have an uneasy answer to this question: vanguard movements. In juxtaposition to grassroots movements, vanguard movements (the movements that form IPPs) such as the Moroccan Movement for Unity and Reform, the Turkish National View Movement,

and the Doves of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, share a key similarity: they all lack clearly defined ideology and theology. The result of this ideological and theological distinction between the grassroots and vanguard movements is that vanguard movements, and subsequently the Islamic political parties they form, focus on "technical" Islamist demands, such as headscarves and homosexuality, whereas grassroots Islamist movements are more comprehensive in dealing with more spiritual needs of the individual.

The implication of this separation is that vanguard movements are more pragmatic, whereas grassroots movements are more idealistic. And, because grassroots movements are more idealistic, it is easier to judge what they aim for politically, while one cannot reach any clear conclusions for vanguard movements and their IPPs.

Much more importantly, the pragmatism of vanguard movements does not equal democratic commitment. In most cases those who participate (vanguard movements), are those who "accept limited reforms that protect the power bases of the current elites,"[8] while those who reject participation, (grassroots movements), are those "who demand substantive systemic change and strongly oppose the power configurations of the status quo."[9] Most of the Muslim World remains authoritarian, and accepting the rules of an "authoritarian" regime by no means signals democratization. As a result, participation gives the advantage to the authoritarian regimes in most cases because it legitimizes authoritarianism.

---

[8] Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Review Article: Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." *World Politics* 63(2): 347–76, p. 350.
[9] Ibid, p. 350.

Another segment of society benefiting from Islamist participation in authoritarian regimes is the Muslim Bourgeoisie. Closer relations with the regime—be it a democratic or an authoritarian regime—is beneficial even for classes independent from the state as they can demand increased economic rights. Such cases of free market-authoritarian regime combinations are not uncommon: take Russia or China. Expecting that the Muslim Bourgeoisie will push for democratization through IPPs misses the point because this class might as well become part of the authoritarian elites through an IPP. As a matter of fact, IPP's vanguard roots, prioritizing pragmatism and the creation of new elites, make such alliances even more likely.

The Muslim Bourgeoisie is not a class apt to bring democratization. It is no coincidence that the most radical Islamists start as engineers who are pretty much the representatives of the Muslim Bourgeoisie.[10] Thus, the Muslim Bourgeoisie is a misleading categorization of various societal segments under the same group. What all my cases have shown is that there is no such thing as a unified Muslim Bourgeoisie, but that there are multiple amorphous middle classes excluded from political power-seeking solutions to their problems. Therefore, "one-size fits all" answers to the Muslim Democracy debates are futile.

All in all, pragmatism is not the same as commitment to democracy—not to mention how problematic it is to support democracy for the sake of pragmatism. Hence, it is a mistake to assume IPPs will be democratic and grassroots movements eschewing party formation will be un-democractic. Instead, it is important to take three additional

[10] Wiktorowicz in his study of Muslims in Britain finds that the fundamentalist Muslims are less susceptible to radicalization, whereas those people without a good Islamic training are more likely to be attracted to radical Islam. (In Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2005. *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.)

factors into account while evaluating Islamist commitment to democracy: Islamists vis-à-vis other actors, "the others," and internal dynamics of Islamists.

First, it should not be expected that Islamists would behave differently than any other political actor when they are integrated into democratic system. Like any political actor in power before them, Islamists will want to apply their own ideology and treat their own supporters' needs and demands preferentially. In short, neither integration into strong democratic institutions nor isolation is the answer to making Islamists—or any other political actors seeking political power—committed to liberal democracy.

Second, the Muslim Democracy debate seems to involve only two actors: (1) relatively secular state elites in the minority who run the country single-handedly, and (2) Islamists in the majority who would lead the country if there were democratic elections. There is, however, a third group that is painfully absent from these discussions: a third group of everyday people who are unvoiced and unrepresented by the state elites and Islamists.

Ignored for decades, this is the group that is leading the revolutions in the larger Middle East. According Bayat, this third group, which he calls post-Islamist non-movements, is composed of "ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations."[11] Bayat goes on that "the power of non-movements does not lie in the unity of actors [...] [it] rests on the power of big

[11] Bayat, Asef. 2010. *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, p. 14.

numbers."[12] This also is the group that has differentiated itself from strict seculars in that it is more tolerant of the Islamists, resulting in a more inclusive system.[13]

It is crucial to empower this group in order to prevent the potential tyranny of anyone be they statists, secularists, capitalists, militarists, socialists, or Islamists. What makes a "liberal" democracy is not its economy or free and fair elections, but the freedom to oppose and the tolerance of the multiplicity of oppositional voices.

Finally, democratization of Islamist actors, like their political behavior, will be a consequence of their internal dynamics. Islamist movements so far have been looking at the world around them through Islam. Only recently some Islam scholars have started to look at Islam through the world around them by engaging in a critical self-reflection. Events such as 9/11 have played an important role in this critical engagement, and developments of the Arab Spring will undoubtedly play into it. More so, this engagement will be influenced by immediate realities, just as European Muslims will look at Islam differently than Southeast Asian Muslims. Schwedler finds in her study of IPPs that the very fact that Islamists engage in debates among themselves about justifications and theology of their political behavior, regardless of the conclusions of such debates, has led them to be more committed to democratic values.[14] Therefore, the real commitment to democratic value will spring from democratic institutions and new societal classes, but also from inside Islamist movements through internal debates and self-reflections.

---

[12] Ibid, p. 4.
[13] Turam, Berna. 2007. *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
[14] Schwedler, Jillian. 2007. *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Part 4: Beyond Islamic Political Parties and Future Research Directions

Besides extending the scope of this dissertation with cases from across the Muslim World and comparing Islamists to non-Islamist actors, there are multiple directions this research could examine in the future. First, Islamist movements and the supporter base of Islamic political parties entails a key distinction within itself: There are those who are the beneficiaries of Islamist movements, such as the urban poor taking advantage of private welfare provisions of Islamist movements, and there are those who lead Islamist movements (the Islamist elites). While the former is not ideologically committed to Islamism, the latter is.

Therefore, one direction I will take is to explore Islamist elite formation. Until recently, Islamist groups have been the excluded segments of the society without ties to political and economic elites. But Islamist groups hold positions of power through their own elite networks composed of media enterprises, professional associations, and business conglomerates. In this project, I will look into the formation of this new Muslim bourgeoisie and their increasing influence over states, domestic policies, and international relations. I will particularly question the relationship between these new elites and their influence over democratization.

Second, almost all of my grassroots cases are going transnational in an attempt to pressure closed domestic regimes and appeal to the international community. This tactic becomes a way of not only challenging domestic regimes to open up but also a way of escaping political stagnancy for the movements. Thus, another direction I aim to take in

the future is to explore the transnationalization of these moderate movements as well as their influence upon global politics.

My third project will start with the widely-debated success of the Turkish Justice and Development Party—a party from Islamist origins. Recently, under the governance of this party, Turkey has taken over the role of a regional hegemon in Middle Eastern politics, topics such as the Israel-Palestine question and in Iranian nuclear projects. Hence, the topic I address in this project will be *how the success of the Islamic party in Turkey is affecting Islamist political actors in the region*. This is an important question to ask because it is a new development that not only will influence Middle Eastern politics but also European and U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, in this project I will question the emergence and influence of new political actors in and upon global politics and policies.

Fourth, IPPs are a new type of political party. On the one hand, they are movement parties: they fulfill a dual role of participating in formal electoral system while also engaging in extra-political activities such as in the media and education.[15] On the other hand, they cannot be simply identified as left or right wing parties: on some issues they are on the left (income redistribution) on other issues they are on the right (family values). More so, they are different than their Christian Democrat counterparts having emerged in completely different socio-political contexts. Whereas Christian Democrats have emerged as a response to secularizing states, IPPs in most cases have emerged in places where Islam is part of the legislature. IPP ideology is so vaguely defined and apt to change, making any type of classifications fruitless. As a result, IPPs are a new category in themselves requiring further study.

---

[15] Kitschelt, Herbert. 2006. "Movement Parties." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, ed. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. London: Sage Publications.

Finally, I hope to compare Islamist politics to its counterparts, such as the Evangelical movements' influence upon American politics or Christian Democrats in Europe. Kalyvas, in his famous study of Christian Democratic Parties, considers Catholic movements, which generally tend to be vanguard movements targeting higher posts of power and engaging in exclusive elite-led mobilization. It would be interesting to compare what Protestant movements in Europe do, which historically have grown through grassroots mobilization.

What I aim to accomplish in these future research directions is to understand the heterogeneity of the "Muslim World." The literature dealing with political Islam treats everything that is happening in the Muslim world as a "bloc behavior." The underlying assumption here is that every Islamist actor is the same because they are "Islamist," that the Muslim Bourgeoisie represents a united front with shared beliefs and demands, and that there is really not much happening in the Muslim world regarding change. This is why the Arab Spring came as such a shock.

The "Muslim world," however, hosts multiple Islamist and secular actors, and middle classes. In his famous video installation "Women Who Wear Wigs," Kutlug Ataman, a contemporary artist, documents four Turkish women who discuss the reasons why they have had to wear wigs. One of the women is a left-wing terrorist in disguise forced to hide her real identity by wearing a wig. Another woman is a cancer patient who wears a wig to hide her hair loss due to chemotherapy. A third woman is a pious Muslim student who wears a wig to the classroom instead of her veil, which is forbidden under the laicist laws of Turkey. And, the fourth woman is a transsexual prostitute who had her head shaved when arrested by the police. All of these women are wearing wigs, but for

different reasons. The “Muslim world” is a category like “women who wear wigs,” with stark differences among and within themselves, that nevertheless form a community. Uncovering these black-boxed categories is what I hope to accomplish in this dissertation as well in my future research projects.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Interviews

Abu Bakr, Jamil. 2010. Executive Committee Member of the JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 21 Feb.

Akyol, Taha. 2009. Columnist at Milliyet Newspaper. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, 2 July.

Al-Jolani, Atef. 2010. Editor of the Islamist daily Assabeel. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 9 March.

Al-Masalha, Nael. 2010. Ex-Member of the JMB and IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 March.

Al Masri, Mohammed. Professor of Political Science at the University of Jordan. 2010. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. *17 Feb.*

Aqel, Mohammad Khalil Mohammad. Deputy from IAF. 2010. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 8 Feb.

Arabiat, Abdellatif. 2010. Ex-Speaker of the Upper House from JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. *25 Feb.*

Ayesh, Kathem. 2010. Executive Committee Member of the JMB. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 7 Feb.

Balci, Kerim. 2010. Columnist at Zaman Newspaper. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 31 May.

Bennajeh, Hassan. 2010. Youth-leader of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Morocco. May 10.

Brouksy, Omar. 2010. Journalist from the secular magazine Telquel. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 13.

Çaha, Őmer. 2010. Professor of Political Science at Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, June 2.

Çakır, Ruşen. 2009. Journalist at NTV News Channel. Interview by Author, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June.

Chibani, Abdallah. 2010. Executive Member of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13.

Daoudi, Lahcen. 2010. Deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 15.

Darif, Mohamed. 2010a. Expert on political Islam in Morocco. Interview with author, Morocco. May 10.

Emre, Suleyman Arif. 2010. One of the original 12 founders of the NVM. Interview by author, Bolu, Turkey, 5 June.

Ergene, Enes. 2010. Theologian at Camlica Academy, Istanbul, Turkey, and student of Fethullah Gulen. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 24 May.

Erol, Mustafa Kasim. 2010. Researcher at Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.

Ersoy, Arif. 2009. Vice-President of the Economic and Social Research Center. Interview by author, Ankara, Turkey, June 16.

Falahat, Salim. 2010. Ex-Leader of the IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 24 Feb.
Farhan, Ishaq. 2010. Ex-Leader of the IAF and Ideologue of the Doves. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. *16 Feb*.
Gharaibeh, Ibrahim. 2010. Journalist from the secular daily Al Ghad. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. *11 Feb*.
Gharaibeh, Ruheil. 2010. Ex-Leader of the IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 17 Feb.
Gűneri, Teoman Rıza. 2010. Ex-Vice-President of the Felicity Party. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, 29 May.
Hamdaoui, Mohamed El. 2010. President of the Movement for Unity and Reform. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 30.
Haquaoui, Bassima. 2010. Deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 29.
Hatipoğlu, Yasin. 2009. Ex-Speaker of the Parliament from NVM. Interview by author, Ankara, Turkey, June 18.
Hmimnat, Salim. 2010. Researcher of political Islam in Morocco. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 21.
Huneidi, Azzam. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 1 March.
Iharchane, Omar. 2010. Member of the Justice and Spiritulaity Movement. Interview with author, Morocco. May 10.
Khalfi, Mustapha. 2010. Editor of the MUR-linked Attajdid Newspaper. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 19.
Malkoç, Şeref. 2009. Ex-deputy from Felicity Party. Interview by author, Ankara, Turkey, June 19.
Mansour, Hamzeh. 2010. Leader of the IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 23 Feb.
Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2010. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview by author. Rabat, Morocco. 4 May.
Othmani, Saadeddin. 2010. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. May 3.
Rantawi, Oraib. 2010. Director of the Al-Quds Research Institute. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 10 Feb.
Thneibat, Abdel Hamid. 2010. Deputy from IAF. Interview by author, Amman, Jordan. 24 Feb.
Touhtouh, Rachid. 2010. Professor of Political Science at Mohammed VI University in Rabat. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. April 16.
Usak, Cemal. 2010. Vice-President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.
Yassine, Nadia. 2010. Ideologue from the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview with author, Rabat, Morocco. May 13-14.
Yatim, Mohammed. 2010. Ideologue and deputy from the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with the author, Rabat, Morocco. April 21.
Yesil, Mustafa. 2010. President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation. Interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey. 1 June.

Primary Sources

Abu-Latifeh, Atallah. 1997. "Die Muslimbruderschaft in Jordanien Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatischer Anpassung." [The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan between Ideology and Pragamatic Adjustments.] Doctoral Dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft [Freie University Berlin Political Science Department], Berlin, Germany.

Al Dustur. 1993. "Brotherhood To Take Part in Elections Through IAF." *Al Dustur,* 27 August.

Arsalan, Fathallah. 2009. Executive Member of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. "M. Arsalan : Le Mouvement a un vaste projet de société qui touche à toutes les catégories et répond à tous les soucis et dont le centre d'intérêt est l'Homme." ["Mr. Arsalan: The Movement Has a Broad Vision of Society that Affects All Classes and Meets All the Worries and Whose Focus is the Man."] http://www.aljamaa.net/fr/document/1405.shtml

BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political. 2000. "Morocco: Justice and Development Party Moves to "Constructive" Opposition." *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, Oct. 3.

BBC On This Day. 1979. "1979: Exiled Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran." Accessed April 28, 2011: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/1/newsid_2521000/2521003.stm

Bouyibri, Rochdi. 2007. "Towards a Society that Rejects Violence." In *Islamists versus Seculars Confrontations and Dialogues in Morocco*, ed. Maâti Monjib. IKV Pax Christi Centre Averroes for Studies and Communication-Rabat Assemblée des Citoyens- MECA Conference, Rabat, Morocco.

CIA. 2008. *The World Factbook*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, accessed June 17, 2008.

Çakır, Rusen. 2001. "Devlet Tarikatları Seviyor." ["The State Likes Islamists."]. *NTV Magazine*, March 1.

Dudin, Marwan. 2010. Loyalist Member of Jordanian Senate. Interview by author. Amman, Jordan. 9 Feb.

EdStats Data Query Worldbank Databank. Accessed on March 11, 2011. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?queryId=189

El Azizi, Abdellatif. 2006. "Al Adl Wal Ihsane, l'internationale islamiste." ["Justice and Spirituality, and International Islamist."] *Telquel* 185. http://www.telquel-online.com/185/sujet1.shtml

Emre, Suleyman Arif. 2002. *Siyasette 35 Yil*. [*35 Years in Politics*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Kesif Yayinlari.

Erbakan, Necmeddin. 2009a. "Erbakan Milli Görüs'ü tarif ediyor." ["Erbakan Describes National View."] Accessed on Sept. 23, 2009: http://erbakan.vze.com/

Erramdani, Redouane. 2007. "Enquête: L'histoire secrète du PJD." ["Investigantion: The Secret History of the PJD."] *Telquel* 302, December 21. http://www.telquel-online.com/302/couverture_302.shtml

European Commission for Trade. 2011. "Morocco." http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/ (Accessed May 10, 2011).

Farhan, Ishaq Ahmad. 1997. *The Islamic Stand Towards Political Involvement (With Respects to the Jordanian Experience)*. Translated by Basma Nayef Sa'd, ed. Suleiman Al-Abbas. Amman, Jordan: Dar Al-Furqan.

Gulen Institute. 2010. "A Brief Biography of Fethullah Gülen." Accessed on Nov. 10, 2010: http://www.guleninstitute.org/index.php/Biography.html

Gulen, Fethullah. 2005. Interview with Mehmet Gundem. Accessed May 13, 2011: http://en.fgulen.com/press-room/mehmet-gundems-interview/1934-gulen-qas-for-the-movement-neither-now-nor-in-the-future-should-our-friends-have-any-ambition-for-governmentq.

Gülerce, Hüseyin. 2010. "Gülen Hareketi Siyasallaştı mı?" ["Did the Gulen Movement Become Political?"] *Zaman*,. Accessed Sept. 23, 2010: http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1030994

Hajjouji, Abdelhakim. 2007. "Education and Values." In *Islamists versus Seculars Confrontations and Dialogues in Morocco*, ed. Maâti Monjib. IKV Pax Christi Centre Averroes for Studies and Communication—Rabat Assemblée des Citoyens—MECA Conference, Rabat, Morocco.

International Labor Organization Department of Statistics. Accessed on April 11, 2011. http://laborsta.ilo.org/

Mahmud, Mohshin. 2009. "World Muslim Population." Accessed on May 23, 2011: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:World_Muslim_Population_Map2.png#filehistor y

Mardin, Serif. 2010. Interview with NTV News Channel, September 17. Accessed Sept. 20, 2010 on: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25132331/

Marx, Karl. 1852. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Marxists Internet Archive http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm (24 June 2010).

M'Daghri, Abdelkébir Alaoui. 2004. "Interview-vérité, Abdelkébir Alaoui M'Daghri: J'ai gagné la confiance des islamistes." ["Interview-truth, Abdelkebir M'Daghri Alaoui: I won the confidence of Islamists."] Interview by Driss Ksikes, *Telquel*, 150. http://www.telquel-online.com/150/sujet4.shtml

Moutawakil, Abdelouahed. 2009. Spokesman of the Justice and Spirituality Movement. "Moutawakil: Les marocains ont ignoré les législatives, et ignoreront à plus forte raison les élections locales …" ["Moutawakil: Moroccans Have Ignored the Laws, and Ignore the More so the Local Elections..."] http://www.aljamaa.net/fr/document/1298.shtml

National Order Party Programme, available in Turkish at: http://www.belgenet.com/parti/program/mnp.html. (accessed Apr. 9, 2009).

Othmani, Saadeddin. 2004. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. "Political Islam and Challenges of Reform and Succession of Authority: The Morocco as a Model." In *Political Parties in the Arab World: Current Status and Future Prospects*: *Proceedings of the Regional Conference Organized by the Al Quds Center for Political Studies and Konrad Adenauer Foundation*. Amman, 12-13 June.

Othmani, Saadeddin. 2007. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. Interview with Saeed Abbadi, March 3. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=2267

Othmani, Saadeddin. 2009. Ex-President of the Party for Justice and Development. Accessed May 23, 2009: http://www.fassael.net/article.php3?id_article=270

Polity IV Project. 2010. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm

Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. 2007. *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*. http://esa.un.org/unup, Sunday, December 13, 2009.

Qutb, Sayyid. 2007. *Milestones*. Kazi Publications.

Raissouni, Ahmed. 2005. Ideologue of the Movement for Unity and Reform. “Dharuf Nashat al Haraka al Islamiya fi Maghrib.” [“Conditions of the Emergence of the Islamic Movement in Morocco.”] Interview by *Al Jazeera*. http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/AF24E7E7-962D-4668-8B52-48FE97320FD2.htm.

Raissouni, Ahmed. 2006. Ideologue of the Movement for Unity and Reform. “Raissouni: Religious Scholars Should Participate in Governments, Parliaments.” Interview with Al Hassan Al Sarat, Aljazeera. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=2999.

Sadiki, Larbi. 2011. “BA 2886: The return of Ghannouchi.” *Al Jazeera* http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/201113082557864558.html

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2010. “List of Ongoing Conflicts.” Accessed May 17, 2011: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/

Tozy, Mohamed. 1984. “Champ et contre champ politico-religieux au Maroc.” [The Religious Field and Its Counter-Field in Morocco.] *Doctoral Dissertation*, Université de Droit, d'Économie et des Sciences d'Aix-Marseille, Faculte de Droit et de Science Politique [University of Law, Economics and Science at Marseille, Faculty of Law and Political Science], Marseille, France.

Tozy, Mohamed. 1999b. “Qui sont les islamistes au Maroc ?” [“Who are the Islamists in Morocco?”] *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August. http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/08/TOZY/12315.

Worldbank Databank. Accessed on March 11, 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/

World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 2009. *World Values Survey Association* (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

Yassine, Nadia. 2003. “Conversations Within Islam: Culture, Politics and Religion in the Global Public Sphere.” Central European University, Budapest, May 29. http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/10297.htm

Yassine, Nadia. 2005. “Presentation of the Justice and Spirituality Association: A Great Hello to All the Militants!” http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/10364.htm

Yassine, Nadia. 2006. “The Justice and Spirituality Movement Represents the Hope for an Alternative in the Moroccan Political Scene.” http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12241.htm

Yassine, Nadia. 2006. "Insights and Analysis: Interview with Nadia Yassine of the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Group." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/11896.htm

Yassine, Nadia. 2006. Ideologue from the Justice and Spirituality Movement. Interview by By Kyle McEneaney. *Carnegie Endowment,* 18 July. https://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=downloadArticlePDF&article=20813, accessed July 21, 2010.

Yassine, Nadia. 2008. "Only the Combined Efforts of All Forces of the Nation Can Get Morocco Out of the Crisis." http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12400.htm

Yassine, Nadia. 2008. "Islamic Feminism." Interview by Emmanuel Martinez from *Alternatives,* Quebec, Canada. http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12435.htm

Yassine, Nadia. 2008. "The Road to Reform, What Role Can the West Play?" http://www.nadiayassine.net/en/page/12470.htm

Secondary Sources

Abdelwahid, Mustafa A. 2008. *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan (1945-1989*. Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd.

Abdul Hamid, Abdul Fauzi. 2000. "Political Dimensions of Religious Conflict in Malaysia: State Response to an Islamist Movement." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 28(80): 32-65.

Abu Hanieh, Hassan. 2008. *Women and Politics: From the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan*. Amman, Jordan: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Amman.

Abu-Latifeh, Atallah. 1997. "Die Muslimbruderschaft in Jordanien Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatischer Anpassung."[The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan between Ideology and Pragamatic Adjustments.] Doctoral Dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft [Freie University Berlin Political Science Department].

Abu Nowar, Maan. 2001. *The Struggle for Independence, 1939-1947: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*. Ithaca: Ithaca Press.

Abu Rumman, Mohammad Suliman. 2007. *The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing 'Political Setback' or Diminished Popularity?*. Amman, Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Abu Zayd, Nasr. 2006. *Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Agai, Bekim. 2009. "Discursive and Organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement." Available at: http://www.fethullahgulen.org/conference-papers/294-the-fethullah-gulen-movement-i/2132-discursive-and-organizational-strategies-of-the-gulen-movement.html. (accessed March 18, 2010)

Albrecht, Holger and Eva Wegner. 2006. "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco." *The Journal of North African Studies* 11(2).

Ali, Tariq. 2003. *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. London and New York: Verso.

Amghar, Samir. 2007. “Political Islam in Morocco.” *CEPS Working Document* No. 269. http://www.ceps.be (March 9, 2009).
Anderson, John. 1999. “Religion, State, and Society in the New Kyrgyzstan.” *Journal of Church and State* 41.
An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed. 2008. *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
Atacan, Fulya. 2006. “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP.” In *Religion and Politics in Turkey*, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin. London and New York: Routledge.
Ayadat, Zaid. 1997. “The Islamist movement Political Engagement Trends.” In *The Political Islamist Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani and Jilian Schwedler. Amman: Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center.
Ayata, Sencer. 1996. “Patronage, Party and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey.” *Middle East Journal* 50(1).
Azem, Ahmad Jamil. 1997. “The Islamic Action Front Party.” In *Islamic Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center.
Bar, Shmuel. 2009. *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies, Tel Aviv University.
Bayet, Asef. 2010. *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Bensadoun, Mickael. 2007. “The (Re)fashioning of Moroccan National Identity.” In *The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
Berberoglu, Berch. 2000. “Unemployment, Low Wages and Income Inequality: The Tragedy of Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa.” In *Earnings Inequality, Unemployment and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Wassim Shahin and Ghassan Diabeh. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press.
Berman, Sheri. 2003. “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society.” *Perspectives on Politics* 1(2).
Bokhari, Kamran. 2011. “Jamaʿat-I Islami.” In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/article/opr/t236/e0408, accessed 27 Feb.
Bonner, Arthur. 2004. “An Islamic Reformation in Turkey.” *Middle East Policy* 21(1).
Boulby, Marion. 1999. *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Brand, Laurie A. 1998. *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Brumberg, Daniel. 2002. “Democratization in the Arab World?: The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(4): 56-68.
Bulac, Ali. 2007. *Din, Kent ve Cemaat: Fethullah Gulen Ornegi*. [*Religion, City and Order: The Example of Fethullah Gulen*.] Istanbul: Ufuk Kitap
Bulac, Ali. 2009. *Gocun ve Kentin Siyaseti: MNP’den SP’ye Milli Gorus Partileri*. [*Politics of Migration and City: National View Parties from National Order Party to Felicity Party*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Cira Yayinlari.

Bulac, Ali. 2010. "The Most Recent Reviver in the 'Ulama Tradition: The Intellectual 'Alim Fethullah Gulen." In *Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, ed. Robert A. Hunt and Yuksel A. Aslandogan. Houston, TX: Tughra Books.

Burgat, François and William Dowell. 1993. *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Butko, Thomas. 2004. "Unity through Opposition: Islam as an Instrument of Radical Political Change." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8(4).

Burr, J. Milliard and Robert O. Collins. 2003. *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Çakır, Ruşen. 2001. "Devlet tarikatları seviyor." ["The State Loves the Religious Orders."] *NTV Magazine*, March 1.

Çakır, Ruşen. 2002. *Ayet ve Slogan: Tűrkiye'de Islamcı Oluşumlar*. [*Verse and Slogan: Islamist Formations in Turkey*.] Istabul: Metis Yayinlari.

Cakir, Rusen. 2004. "Milli Gorus Hareketi." ["National View Movement."] In *Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik* [*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism*], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari.

Çalışlar, Oral. 1995. *Refah Partisi, Nereden Nereye?* [*Welfare Party, Then and Now*.] Istanbul: Pencere Yayinlari.

Calislar, Oral and Tolga Cevik. 2000. *Erbakan-Fethullah Gulen Kavgasi: Cemaat ve Tarikatlarin Siyasetteki 40 Yili*. [*Erbakan-Fethullah Gulen Fight: The 40 Years of Religious Orders and Associations in Politics*.] Istanbul: Sifir Noktasi Yayinlari.

Calislar, Oral and Tolga Celik. 2006. *Islamciligin Uc Kolu*. [*Three Strands of Islamism*.] Istanbul: Guncel Yayincilik.

Calmuk, Fehmi. 2004. "Necmettin Erbakan." In *Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik* [*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism*], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari.

Carkoglu, Ali and Ersin Kalaycioglu. 2009. *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Casanova, Jose. 1994. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Castells, Manuel. 2009. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture Volume II*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Cavatorta, Francesco. 2007. "Neither Participation nor Revolution: The Strategy of the Moroccan Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan." *Mediterranean Politics* 12(3): 381–397

Cetin, Muhammed. 2010. *The Gulen Movement: Civic Service Without Borders*. New York: Blue Dome Press.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chekroun, Mohammed. 2005. "Socio-Economic Changes, Collective Insecurity and New Forms of Religious Expression." *Social Compass* 52(13).

Chhibber, Pradeep K. 1996. "State Policy, Rent Seeking, and the Electoral Success of a Religious Party in Algeria." *The Journal of Politics* 58(1): 126-148.

Chhibber, Pradeep and Mariano Torcal. 1997. "Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in New Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 30(1): 27-54

Chhibber, Pradeep K. 2001. *Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Çınar, Menderes. 2004. "Kemalist Cumhuriyetcilik ve Islamci Kemalizm." ["Kemalist Republicanism and Islamist Kemalism."] In *Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik* [*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism*], ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul, Turkey: Iletisim Yayinlari.

Clark, Janine A. 2004. *Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1996. "Organizational Form as Frame: Collective Identity and Political Strategy in the American Labor Movement." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Collins, Kathleen. 2007. "Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus." *World Politics* 60: 64–96.

Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1994. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Darif, Mohamed. 2010b. *Monarchie Marocaine et Acteurs Religieux*. [*Moroccan Monarchy and Religious Actors*.] Casablanca: Afrique Orient.

Demirhan, Çetin. 1994. *Milli Nizam'dan Refah'a: Erbakan Nereye Koşuyor*. [*From National Order to Welfare: Where Does Erbakan Run to*.] Istanbul: Hűrgűç Gazetecilik.

El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. 1991. *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*. London: Grey Seal Books.

Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 103(2): 281-317

Erdem, Gazi. 2008. "Religious Services in Turkey: From the Office of Şeyhülislām to the Diyanet." *Muslim World* 98 (2/3): 199-215.

Esposito, John and Dalia Mogahed. 2008. *Who Speaks for Islam*?: *What a Billion Muslims Really Think. New York: Gallup Press.*

Euben, Roxanne L. 1997. "Premodern, Antimodern or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of Modernity." *The Review of Politics* 59(3): 429-459.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. "Taking a Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 391-416.

García-Rivero, Carlos and Hennie Kotzé. 2007. "Electoral Support for Islamic Parties in the Middle East and North Africa." *Party Politics* 13(5): 611–636.

Gerges, Fawaz. 2005. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gharaibeh, Ibrahim. 1997a. *Jama-a Ikhwan Muslimin fi al Urdun (1946-1996) [Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (1946-1996)]*. Amman, Jordan: Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center.

Gharaibeh, Ibrahim. 1997b. "The Political Performance and the Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood." In *Islamic Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center.

Gharaibeh, Ruheil. 2004. "Islamists and Political Development in Jordan A Vision and an Experience." *Al Quds Research Center*: http://alqudscenter.org/english/pages.php?local_type=128&local_details=2&id1=543&menu_id=19&program_id=6&cat_id=24 (Accessed January 10, 2010).

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers Company.

Guevara, Ernesto Che. 1998. *Guerrilla Warfare*. Lincoln: Bison Books.

Güngör, Nasuhi. 2009."Cemaat, Siyaset ve Gelecek." ["Religious Community, Politics and the Future."] Accessed 20 May 2010: http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/17025/86/

Hafez, Mohammed. 2003a. *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Hafez, Mohammed M. 2003b. "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria." In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hamayil, Umar Khrawish. 2000. "Institutional Characteristics of the Jordanian Professional Associations." In *Professional Associations and the Challenges of Democratic Tranformation in Jordan: Proceedings and Workshops,* ed. Warwick M. Knowled. Amman, Jordan: Al Urdun al Jadid Research Center.

Hamid, Shadi and Amanda Kadlec. 2010. "Strategies for Engaging Political Islam." *Project on Middle East Democracy*. http://pomed.org/strategies-for-engaging-political-islam/ (March 1, 2010).

Hamzawy, Amr. 2007. "The 2007 Moroccan Parliamentary Elections Results and Implications." Carnegie Endowment Middle East Program, Web Commentary.

Hamzawy, Amr and Nathan J. Brown. 2008. "A Boon or a Bane for Democracy?" *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 49-54.

Hamzawy, Amr. 2008. "Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents." *Middle East Program* 93.

Hamzeh, Nizar. 1993. "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation." *Third World Quarterly* 14(2): 321-337

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. 1995. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Henry, Clement, and Rodney Wilson. 2004. *The Politics of Islamic Finance*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hermansen, Marcia. 2007. "The Cultivation of Memory in the Gulen Community." In *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*. London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.

Heyat, Farideh. 2004. "Re-Islamisation in Kyrgyzstan: Gender, New Poverty and the Moral Dimension." *Central Asian Survey* 23(3-4): 275-287.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Hourani, Hani, Taleb Awad, Hamed Dabbas and Sa'eda Kilani. 1993. *Islamic Action Front Party*. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center.
Hughes, Stephen O. 2001. *Morocco under King Hassan*. Ithaca, Ithaca Press.
Inalcık, Halil. 2005. "Tarihsel Baglamda Sivil Toplum Ve Tarikatlar." ["Civil Society and Religious Orders in Historical Perspective."] *In Global-Yerel Ekseninde Türkiye* [*Turkey within Global-Local Axis*], ed. Fuat Keyman and Ali Yasar Saribay. Istanbul: ALFA Press.
Jamal, Amaney and Mark Tessler. 2008. "The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World." *Journal of Democracy* 19(1).
Kalyvas, Stathis. 1996. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Karpat, Kemal H. 2001. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Kausch, Kristina. 2007. "An Islamist Government in Morocco?" *FRIDE Democracy Backgrounder*. http://www.fride.org/publication/129/an-islamist-government-in-morocco (March 7, 2009)
Kazem, Ali Abdul. 1997. "The Muslim Brotherhood: The Historic Background and the Ideological Origins." In *Islamic Movements in Jordan*, ed. Hani Hourani. Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center.
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2006. "Movement Parties." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, ed. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. London: Sage Publications.
Kőmeçoğlu, Uğur. 2000."Kutsal ile Kamusal: Fethullah Gűlen Cemaat Hareketi." ["Sacred and Public: The Fethullah Gulen Movement"] In *Islam'ın Yeni Kamusal Yűzleri: Islam ve Kamusal Alan Űzerine Bir Atőlye Çalışması*. [*The New Public Faces of Islam: A Workshop on Islam and Public Sphere*.] Nilűfer Gőle ed. Metis Yayınları.
Kubba, Laith. 2008. "Institutions Make the Difference." *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 37-42.
Kuru, Ahmet T. 2005. "Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases." *Political Science Quarterly* 120(2).
Kuru, Ahmet. 2007. "Changing Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AK Party." In *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, ed. Ihsan Yilmaz. London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Lenin, Vladamir Ilyich. 1987. *Essential Works of Lenin: "What is to Be Done?" and Other Writings*. Mineola: Dover Publications.
Lia, Brynjar. 1998. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942*. Ithaca: Ithaca Press.
Lin, Ann Chih. 1998. "Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to Qualitative Methods." *Policy Studies Journal* 26(1): 162-80.

Liow, Joseph Chinyong. 2004. "Political Islam in Malaysia: Problematising Discourse and Practice in the UMNO–PAS 'Islamisation Race'." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 42(2): 184–205

Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments." In *The West European Party System,* ed. Peter Mair. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lucas, Russell E. 2003. "Deliberalization in Jordan." *Journal of Democracy* 14(1).

Lucas, Russell E. 2005. *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988-2001*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2006. "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan." *Democratization* 13(3): 456–471.

Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. 2003. "Islamism Moroccan-Style: The Ideas of Sheikh Yassine." *Middle East Quarterly* 10(1): 43–51.

Maghraoui, Abdeslam M. 2002. "Depoliticization in Morocco." *Journal of Democracy* 13(4).

Mardin, Şerif. 1993. "The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey." In *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance*, ed. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mardin, Şerif. 2002. *Tűrkiye'de Din ve Siyaset: Makaleler 3*. [*Religion and Politics in Turkey: Articles Volume 3*.] Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları.

Mardin, Şerif . 2010. "Nurculuk." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/article/opr/t236/e0603 (accessed April 9, 2011).

Masoud, Tarek. 2008. "Are They Democrats? Does It Matter?" *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 19-24.

Mecham, Quinn. 2004. "From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey." *Third World Quarterly* 25(2): 339-358.

Mecham, Quinn. 2007. "From Islamist Movement to Islamist Party: Why Islamist Leaders Form Political Parties." Presented at the *Second Global International Studies Conference,* Ljubljana, Slovenia, July 24.

Mercan, Faruk. 2009. *Fethullah Gulen*. Istanbul: Dogan Egmont Yayincilik ve Yapimcilik Tic. A.S.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley and Peter Hinchcliffe. 2009. *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*. New York: Routledge.

Moaddel, Mansoor. 2002. *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of Religion and State Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria*. New York: Palgrave.

Moaddel, Mansoor. 2005. *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Munson, Henry. 1993. *Religion and Power in Morocco*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Narli, Nilufer. 1995. “The Islamicist Movement and the State: Confrontation or Accommodation?” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Western Europe (WEU) Daily Reports*, 18 January.

Nasr, Vali. 2009. *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World*. New York: Free Press.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 2011. “Mawdudi, Sayyid Abual-Aʿla.” In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/article/opr/t236/e0517, accessed 27 Feb. 2011.

Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2002. “Islam and the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis.” *Social Science Research Network*. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=316506 ,accessed July 20, 2010.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Ottaway, Marina and Meredith Riley. 2006. “Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?” *Carnegie Papers* 71.

Őzbudun, Ergun. 1986. “Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The Case of the National Salvation Party.” In *The Islamic Impulse*, ed. Barbara Freyer Stowasser. Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.

Ozbudun, Ergun. 1999. “Milli Mucadele ve Cumhuriyet’in Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaslik ve Kimlik Sorunu.” [“The Problem of Citizenship and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Independence and the Republic.”] In *75 Yilda Tebaa’dan Yurttas’a Dogru* [*From Subject to Citizen in 75 Years*], ed. Artun Unsal. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari. Őzdalga, Elizabeth. 2002. “Necmettin Erbakan: Democracy for the Sake of Power.” In *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari. Lanham, UK: Lexington Books.

Őzdalga, Elizabeth. 2002. “Necmettin Erbakan: Democracy for the Sake of Power.” In *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari. Lanham, UK: Lexington Books.

Őzdalga, Elizabeth. 2003. “Secularizing Trends in Fethullah Gűlen’s Movement: Impasse or Opportunity for Further Renewal?” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 12(1): 61–73.

Özyurt, Ahu. 2009. “Hedefimiz her Türkün cemaatle ilişkisi olması.” [Our Goal is to Get Every Turk Involved with the Movement.] *Milliyet*, 19 June. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1108271&Date=19.06.2009&b=Hedefimiz%20her%20Turkun%20%20cemaatle%20iliskisi%20olmasi&KategoriID=4 (accessed June 20, 2009).

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pape, Robert A. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” *American Political Science Review* 97(3).

Pennell, C.R. 2004. *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
Ryan, Curtis R. 2002. *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Ryan, Curtis R. 2008. "Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy." *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 12(2).
Saaf, Abdallah and Abdelrahim Manar Al Slimi. 2008. "Morocco 1996-2007: A Decisive Decade of Reforms?" www.arab-reform.org
Safi, Ismail. 2007. *Tűrkiye'de Muhafazakar Siyaset ve Yeni Arayışlar*. [*Conservative Politics in Turkey and New Calls*.] Ankara: Lotus Yayınevi.
Saribay, Ali Yasar. 2000. "Differences Should Not Lead to Sepration." In *Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gulen*, ed. Ali Unal and Alphonse Williams. Fairfax, VA: The Fountain.
Saylan, Gencay. 1989. "Growing Impact of Islamic Schools Examined." *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Western Europe (WEU) Daily Reports*, 23 March.
Schwedler, Jillian. 2006. *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schwedler, Jillian. 2007. "Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties." *Development* 50(1): 56–61.
Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Review Article: Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." *World Politics* 63(2): 347–76.
Sewell, William H. 1985. Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case. *The Journal of Modern History* 57(1): 57-85.
Shafik, Nemat. 2001. "Closing the Gender Gap in the Middle East and North Africa." In *The Economics of Women and Work in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Mine Cinar. Elsevier Science.
Shahin, Emad Eldin. 1997. *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa*. Oxford: Westview Press.
Sinno, Abdulkader H. and Ahmed Khanani. 2009. "Of Opportunities and Organization: When Do Islamist Parties Choose to Compete Electorally?" In *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, ed. M.A. Mohamed Salih. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Soage, Ana Belén. 2008. "Hasan al-Banna]or the Politicisation of Islam." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9(1): 21–42.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 369-404.
Tibi, Bassam. 2008. "Why They Can't Be Democratic." *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 43-48.
Toprak, Binnaz. 1981. *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden, E.J. Brill.
Tozy, Mohamed. 1999. *Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc*. [*Monarchy and Political Islam in Morocco*.] Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Turam, Berna. 2007. *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Turgut, Pelin. 2010. "The Turkish Imam and His Global Educational Mission." *Time Magazine*, April 26. Accessed: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1969290-1,00.html

"Turkey: Profile of Naksibendi Sect." 2006. *OSC Report*, May 28.

Weber, Max. 1997. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Free Press.

Wegner, Eva. 2004. "The Contribution of Inclusivist Approaches towards the Islamist Opposition to Regime Stability in Arab States: The Case of the Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Développement." *EUI Working Paper RSCAS* No. 2004/42

Wegner, Eva and Miquel Pellicer. 2009. "Islamist moderation without democratization: the coming of age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development?" *Democratization* 16(1): 157–175.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46: 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander. 1998. "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations." *Review of International Studies*. 24(5): 101-18.

Weyland, Kurt. 2007. *Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 2004. "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 205-228.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2000. "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan." *Comparative Politics* 33(1): 43-61.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan and Suha Taji Farouki. 2000. "Islamic NGOS and Muslim Politics: A Case from Jordan." *Third World Quarterly* 21(4): 685-699.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2005. *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan and Karl Kaltenthaler. 2006. "The Rationality of Radical Islam." *Political Science Quarterly* 121(2): 295-319.

Willis, Michael J. 1999. "Between Alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah's Entry into Moroccan Politics." *The Journal of North African Studies* 4(3): 45-80.

Willis, Michael J. 2007. "Justice and Development or Justice and Spirituality: The Challenge of Morocco's Nonviolent Islamist Movements." In *The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Yalçın, Soner. 1999. *Hangi Erbakan*. [*Which Erbakan*.] Ankara: Başak Yayınları.

Yaşar, Emin. 2004 "Dergâh'tan Parti'ye, Vakıftan Şirkete Bir Kimliğin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü: Iskenderpaşa Cemaati." ["The Making and Transformation of an Identity from Order to Party and from Endowed Institution to Company: The Order of Iskenderpasa."]. In *Modern Tűrkiye'de Siyasi Dűşűnce: Islamcılık [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism]*, ed. Murat Belge. Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları.

Yavuz, Hakan. 1999. “The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movement: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order.” In *Naqshibanis in Western and Central Asia*, ed. Elizabeth Őzdalga, 129-146. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2003. “The Gulen Movement: The Turkish Puritans.” In *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gűlen Movement*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Yavuz, Hakan. 2005. *Modernlesen Muslumanlar: Nurcular, Naksiler, Milli Gorus ve AK Parti*. [*Modernizing Muslims: Nurcus, Nakshis, National View and JDP*.] Istanbul, Turkey: Kitap Yayinevi.

Yavuz, Hakan. 2009. S*ecularism and Muslim Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2008. “Beyond Post-Islamism: A Critical Analysis of the Turkish Islamism’s Transformation toward Fethullah Gülen’s Stateless Cosmopolitan Islam.” In *Islam in the Age of Global Challenges: Alternative Perspectives of the Gulen Movement*, Conference Proceedings, November 14-15, 2008, Washington, D.C.

Zeghal, Malika. 2008a. *Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.

Zeghal, Malika. 2008b. “Participation without Power.” *Journal of Democracy* 19(3): 31-36.

Zisenwine, Daniel. 2007. “From Hasan II to Muhammad VI: Plus Ça Change.” In *The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

Zurcher, Eric J. 2004. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Zweiri, Mahjoob and Mohammed Zahid. 2007. “The Victory Of Al Wefaq: The Rise Of Shiite Politics In Bahrain.” *Research Institute For European And American Studies*, Research Paper No: 108.

APPENDIX A: CASE SELECTION

Muslim-Majority Countries[1]	**Cases with Elections**[2]	**Remaining Cases after Exclusions**[3]	**Legal IPP Formation**[4]
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	---	---
Albania	Albania	Albania	---
Algeria	Algeria	Algeria	Algeria
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan	---	---
Bahrain	Bahrain	Bahrain	Bahrain
Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh
Brunei	----	---	---
Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	---
Chad	Chad	---	---
Comoros	Comoros	Comoros	---
Djibouti	Djibouti	Djibouti	---
Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
Gambia	Gambia	Gambia	---
Guinea	Guinea	Guinea	---
Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia
Iran	Iran	---	---
Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq
Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan
Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	---	---
Kuwait	Kuwait	Kuwait	Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyzstan	---	---
Lebanon	Lebanon	Lebanon	Lebanon
Libya	Libya	---	---
Malaysia	Malaysia	Malaysia	Malaysia
Maldives	Maldives	Maldives	---
Mali	Mali	Mali	---
Mauritania	Mauritania	---	---

[1] Compiled from the CIA The World Factbook available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, accessed June 17, 2008.
[2] Compiled from the CIA The World Factbook available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, accessed June 17, 2008.
[3] Excluded: (1) Islamic regimes, e.g. Iran and Sudan because in these countries any party by definition needs to be Islamic, (2) cases where all IPPs are banned (e.g. Uzbekistan) but have included mixed cases, such as Egypt and Morocco, where IPPs are not wholly banned but are allowed to participate under certain conditions such as independent candidates, (3) semi-war zones, e.g. Afghanistan. Compiled from: (1+2) the CIA The World Factbook available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, accessed June 17, 2008, (3) The Uppsala Conflict Data Program: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/, accessed May 17, 2011.
[4] Compiled through various secondary literature readings.

Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco
Niger	Niger	---	---
Nigeria	Nigeria	---	---
Oman	----	---	---
Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan
Qatar	---	---	---
Saudi Arabia	---	---	---
Senegal	Senegal	Senegal	---
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	---	---
Somalia	---	---	---
Sudan	Sudan	---	---
Syria	Syria	---	---
Tajikistan	Tajikistan	Tajikistan	Tajikistan
Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia
Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey
Turkmenistan	Turkmenistan	---	---
United Arab Emirates	---	---	---
Uzbekistan	Uzbekistan	---	---
Yemen	Yemen	Yemen	Yemen