DISMANTLING SECURITY

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It is to them that I dedicate this work—to my mother, to the loving memory of my father, and to Suha.

For my parents Ayla and Sevki Falay,
and Suha

ABSTRACT

The post Cold War world witnessed the exponential growth in the range of issues and domains that became security concerns. A long list of objects—the nation, poverty, the human, health, food, the environment—is now firmly incorporated into the global security agenda. As the list of dangers expanded, security itself transmogrified into a medium through which we orient ourselves toward life, politics, and the world.

In this dissertation, I argue that what is needed is not more security, but to dismantle the whole architecture of security so as to open up a space for a thought of politics that admits the fact that we can never be secure. To develop this argument, I first map out the landscape of the contemporary empire of security and then provide an overview of critical approaches to security within the discipline of International Relations, where I point out the paradoxical way in which the hegemony of security gets reproduced in these discussions despite the overarching concerns voiced about the complicity of security in the orders of power and violence. This is followed by a discussion of the meaning of dismantling security as an untimely critique. By drawing on historical materialist conceptions of time, I formulate the first sense of the untimely as a politics of time that seeks to counter the temporal structure enacted by the politics of security. Then I discuss the second sense of the untimely, which centers on the relationship between critical thinking and political time. I clarify what it means to brush against the grain of the doxa of security by being untimely in a disciplinary context and refusing to write security. I close by elaborating on three different

conceptions of politics once the ground is cleared from security and formulate them as three moves that deconstruct the subject, the space, and the time of security by drawing on the works of scholars such as David Campbell, Michael Dillon, Jacques Rancière, and Jacques Derrida.

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Prelude: Caring to Death

In January 2006, flying birds were the major concern for the chief of the checkpoint at Zakho, a small town located at the Turkey-Iraq border.[1] Having served throughout history as a major market and a significant node in the circulation of goods, the town was now being recast as an important fortress in the unveiling global battle against a different form of circulation, that of the H5N1 virus. The virus was a particular form of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), which, the officials declared, could claim the lives of thousands of humans and non-human alike. The H5N1 virus—more commonly known as the avian influenza—was one of the recent examples in the series of "emerging infectious diseases" that the World Health Organization designated in its 2007 Report as a primary threat facing the global community in the 21st century.[2] Zakho carried crucial strategic importance in this battle because it was the first time the flu was diagnosed outside the boundaries of East Asia. As stated by a United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization official, the failure of security measures at the border of Turkey would mean "a constant reservoir of the disease would lie at the edge of Europe."[3] Fear of penetration by foreign bodies such as illegal immigrants was supplemented by the fear of contagion by unruly flying birds at the borders of Fortress Europe.

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[1] Richard Jr. Oppel, "For Kurds, Chickens Mean Food, Cash, and Now Death," *New York Times*, February 1, 2006.
[2] "World Health Report," (United Nations World Health Organization, 2007).
[3] Elisabeth Rosenthal, "With Flu in Turkey, Close Neighbors and Europeans Go on Alert," *New York Times*, January 13, 2006.

Invoking memories of the 1918 pandemic, the international community was called to arms; the United Nations searched for recruits for "an international culling task force" that would provide "a reliably robust, incorruptible public service to go around killing chickens."[4] The global call to cull translated into a full-scale mobilization in Turkey and the neighboring countries. With dizzying speed, millions of chickens were culled over the course of a few weeks regardless of their being infected or not. The number of animals killed to render life more resilient reached 2.5 million between 2006 and 2008.[5]

A family in Bitlis, an eastern province of Turkey, exposing culled animals to the national gaze. (Original Title: "Citizens Acting Carelessly Despite Warnings." Photo By: Mahir Okay, Anadolu Ajansi, January 6, 2006.)

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[4] Donald McNeil, "In War on Bird Flu, U.N. Looks to Recruit Killer Army," *New York Times*, January 29, 2006.
[5] Yurdakul Saçlı, "Türkiye'de Tarım Istatistikleri: Gelişimi, Sorunlar Ve Çözüm Önerileri," (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, İktisadi Sektörler ve Koordinasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 2009).

For many, the death of the birds meant a loss of food and income in a country where 28 percent of the rural population (33 percent of the country) raised poultry for self-sufficiency purposes.[6] According to a 2009 report prepared for the Turkish State Planning Institution, the bird flu crisis would act as the main contributing factor to the end of poultry production in family-owned farms, ceding its place to factory farms.[7]

What was at stake was not merely a question of livelihood and profit, however. The war waged to secure the health and well-being of humanity paralleled a war against those who were deemed to be as equally incurable as the chickens themselves. Animating the idea of curing through culling was the view that the "irrational," the "uncivilized" peasants who still fed chickens in their backyard would not know how to protect themselves, leading to eradication as the only possible solution. This view found its "proof" when the local media caught news of the Koçyigit family who lost three of four children because of infection from the virus.[8] The father made national headlines as bearing the primary responsibility for the deaths because he had refused to transport his daughter to the hospital in the nearby city of Van. Always already suspect in the national imaginary due to his identity as a Kurd, the peasant was doubly condemned—not only for irresponsible handling of animals and obstructing the treatment of his daughter, but also for prior actions, such as not issuing his daughter's identity papers until she was four and for resisting to sign her up to one of the largest national campaigns advocating literacy among girls. As the image of the father resisting authorities was repeatedly broadcast on television screens, silenced was his

[6] Oppel, "For Kurds, Chickens Mean Food, Cash, and Now Death."
[7] Saçlı, "Türkiye'de Tarım Istatistikleri: Gelişimi, Sorunlar Ve Çözüm Önerileri."
[8] BBC News, "Turkish Teenagers Die of Bird Flu," January 5, 2006.

voice as he tried to explain that he did not possess the green card that made him eligible for health insurance. The project of taming unruly birds had uncannily metamorphosed into a project of domesticating unruly subjects who had not taken their fair-share of reason and civility.

Introducing the Question

Poultry and peasants may seem unlikely subjects to begin narrating international relations. Yet, as I argue throughout my dissertation, this episode is not marginal but symptomatic of a broader transformation: the consolidation of the empire of security across the global bio-political horizon. The empire at issue is one that is dedicated to protecting life from wars, from hunger, from addiction, from ideological excess, from environmental catastrophes, from corrupt governments, and from its own practices. In this empire, security as bio-politics is charged with the task of producing and transforming social life at its most general and global level. In this empire—as citizens, scholars, experts and politicians—we are called upon to be at constant war to secure life against poverty, against rogues, against ignorance and destruction. In this empire, lack of security informs massive efforts devoted to humanitarian interventions and scholarly investigations; it breathes life into innumerable civilizing organizations.

Although the so-called Global War on Terror has become a privileged point in the ongoing debates about the changing nature of insecurities and the concomitant re-evaluation of the adequacy of existing frameworks to analyze contemporary security landscapes, it is important to notice that long before this war made its way to the top

of the agenda of the international community, security had already firmly established itself as a primary value and an omnipresent end in itself. Through discourses and practices entailed in humanitarian interventions, through the ever-expanding domains and objects to be secured—from environment to information, from health to food, from the nation to the human—security emerges as the primary objective toward which politics aspires and the ground upon which politics is built. As the idea that we are living in an increasingly dangerous world proliferates, security reaches far beyond official discourses and formal politics. It infuses the mundane, the everyday life, and colonizes the global social and political imaginary. It enacts a value order produced and reproduced through discourses, practices, and networks that weave together state apparatuses, international organizations, civil society actors, academics, experts, and private companies.

Perhaps just as alarming is the proliferation of the phenomenon of vigilante-citizens, as subjects around the globe take the law into their hands to secure themselves against gangs, drugs, and "illegal aliens." One of the paradigmatic examples of this "statecraft from below" is civilian border patrol groups such as the Minutemen Project, founded in California in 2004 by a retired businessman to police the U.S.-Mexico border against the so-called invasion by immigrants.[9] As Doty explains, with undocumented migration becoming an increasingly prominent issue and the filling up of media outlets with news of humans referred to as "aliens" being trafficked across borders, ordinary citizens respond to calls from private groups to take

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[9] Roxanne Lynn Doty, "States of Exception on the Mexico-U.S. Border: Security, 'Decisions,' and Civilian Border Patrols," *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 2 (2007).

action and form their own unofficial, unauthorized, but not necessarily illegal patrolling of borders. The global army that security enlists in its service is not situated merely at the borders of national territories and identities, however. Across the globe, there are many private patrol groups that are formed to clamp down on local crime, monitor other illicit and unwanted behavior. Depicting this trend as "both a logical response and an integral aspect" of the global political order wrought by neoliberalism, Pratten and Sen provide ample proof of the rising tide of vigilante-style justice and violence as a global phenomenon.[10]

It could be said that the obsession with security is democratized to the extent that it has become a common language, a "vernacular"[11] shared across topographies of global hierarchies. The post-Cold War jubilation in countries that have witnessed political liberation and economic liberalization has been accompanied by the emergence of an overwhelming fear of crime and a desire for security.[12] As the global security agenda was transmogrifying toward an obsession with securing the life of the species,[13] eagerness to criminalize dystopic social phenomenon such as poverty

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[10] David Pratten and Atreyee Sen, eds., *Global Vigilantes* (New York: Columbia University Press,2008), 2.

[11] Nils Bubandt, "Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 3 (2005).

[12] Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, "Criminal Obsessions, after Foucault: Postcoloniality, Policing, and the Metaphysics of Disorder," *Critical Inquiry* 30, no. 4 (2004). See also John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, eds., *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2006). In their Introduction, the editors note the rising criminality and suggest that this development is neither merely a response to scarcity, poverty, joblessness nor a work of corrupt governments, 'failed' or 'quasi' states, but part of "a troubled dialectic... of law and dis/order, framed by neoliberal mechanisms of deregulation and new modes of mediating human transactions" (5).

[13] I am alluding to the growing international consensus in the post-Cold War era that "complex humanitarian emergencies"—defined as the conflict-related humanitarian crises that emerge from the incapacity to sustain livelihood with the breakdown of state and public infrastructures

became a global phenomenon: zero tolerance policies turned into wars on urban

squatters, practically evolving into an active "dictatorship over the poor."[14]

Security has become a medium through which we relate to —orient ourselves

towards— life, politics, and the world. As I discuss below, with the logic of

preemption and precautionary principles becoming definitive of contemporary politics

of security, not merely the fear of what exists, but also the danger of what might be —

not only one's chances today, but also one's fortunes tomorrow— has become the

stock and trade of security discourse and practices.

What is paradoxical is that this "will to secure" saturates life at a time when a

constant state of terror emerges as the defining condition of life. It is a terror

underwritten by monstrous inequalities and oppression affecting unprecedented

numbers of human beings on earth as systemic and non-systemic violence casts its

shadow on everyday life around the globe. It is a terror that afflicts not only the

"wretched of the earth," but liberal societies as well—societies that have taken upon

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(sanitation, supply of food, water, etc.) and the ensuing social disruption, population displacement, food shortages, and infectious disease—constituted the paradigmatic threat to international stability and security. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, "Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present," in *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). See also Andrew Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies* (Westport: Praeger, 1997). Thomas G. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," *Ethics & International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1999).

[14] Loic Wacquant, "Toward a Dictatorship over the Poor? Notes on the Penalization of Poverty in Brazil," *Punishment & Society* 5, no. 2 (2003). Melinda Cooper provides a succinct analysis of how the declaration of AIDS as a global security problem and its militarization has given way to similar zero tolerance policies within the context of South Africa. Melinda Cooper, "On Pharmaceutical Empire: Aids, Security, and Exorcism," in *Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era* (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 2008).

themselves the task of securing of common humanity through a temporally, spatially

limitless War on Terror.[15]

This paradoxical co-existence of the hegemony of security amidst ever-

proliferating dangers and intensifying insecurities provides the intellectual focus and

central question of my dissertation. Against the reigning passion to secure, my

argument is that what is needed is not more security, but to dismantle the whole

architecture of security. Rather than writing security, I suggest, critical inquiry needs

to be "untimely"[16] and reflect upon the meaning, content, and political implications of

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[15] Perhaps most telling in the internalization of the agenda of security is the extent to which the events of September 11, 2001 and its aftermath suspend history for the scholars of International Relations. While being critical of the ensuing developments, they nevertheless treat it as the first day of history for analysis of security by taking on the sovereign definition of terrorism as not something to be deconstructed, but as a premise upon which analysis is based. For a definitely non-exhaustive but representative survey: Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,2002). For a contrasting account of "September 11" that regards it as an act of naming that is representative of "a language that admits its powerlessness and so is reduced to pronouncing mechanically a date, repeating it endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, a journalistic litany or a rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it's talking about" (86), Jacques Derrida, "A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida," in *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, ed. Giovanna Borradori (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003). For an important intervention within disciplinary debates structured around pre-given definitions of terror, which recasts the latter in terms of a war over contesting definitions of life: Julian Reid, *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). For an argument on the need to dispense entirely with the concept of political terror in the context of a "global state of war": Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).
[16] In his critique of the scientific discourse of history, Nietzsche speaks of the "untimely" and writes: "[F]or I do not know what meaning classical studies could have for our time if they were not untimely—that is to say, acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come" (60). Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). In Chapters 4 and 5, I take up the notion of "untimeliness" and elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as "untimely critique" in two senses: as challenging the temporal logic of politics of security and as overturning the temporal presumptions informing critical thought in International Relations.

producing and reproducing for security so as to open a space for dismantling it. Taking as my starting point the way in which the global passion to secure disavows the violence and insecurity it renders, I ask: what would it mean to dismantle security rather than reproduce its imperial gaze? What political imaginaries are available, which we can draw upon? How might those political imaginaries alternatively be deployed, and with what effects? What would the political and ethical implications of such an undertaking be? How could they help us envision a new ethics, a new politics?

Brushing against the grain and raising the question of "dismantling security" is partly motivated by a sheer puzzlement about the amount of energy put into writing, teaching, speaking, acting on, of, and for security. This is not meant as a dismissal of the reality of lives brutally rendered insecure in the contemporary world. Nor does it intend to downplay the importance of scholarly or policy-oriented efforts to address the conditions and practices that put lives in danger and work toward the elimination of the sources of these insecurities. While I do not deny the importance of these attempts, I am puzzled about the extent to which security itself has metamorphosed into a sovereign demand that calls for the expenditure of all creative energies in its name—a demand that sets itself as the primary reference point around which all projects, all political possibilities are to be envisioned.

Problematizing the global security project and my call for dismantling security stem not from an idealist denial of the brutal reality of violence and insecurity spanning the world. On the contrary, as my discussion in the following chapters aim to show, the paradox of global terror produced by this "peace/war machine" (i.e.,

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contemporary global governance as a security project that is devoted to peace by way

of waging war against life) needs to be highlighted.[17] I extend the proposition to

dismantle security as a critique of a doxa that animates the infinite passion to secure as

it disavows the insecurity and violence it renders. By displacing the articulation of

politics merely as a project of managing insecurities, I argue for the need to investigate

the possibility of politics beyond politics of security—a politics that refuses the limits

of insecurity as the limit to politics. In making the argument for dismantling security,

my hope and aim is to open up space for a thought of politics that acknowledges—

admits—the fact that we can never be secure. Hence, "dismantling security" raises the

question of how to conceptualize politics if we take the premise of inescapable

insecurity as precisely the point where politics starts rather than where it ends. It asks

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[17] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. See especially the section entitled "Simplicissimus" pp.3-35. Also Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009). Noting the changing nature of warfare in the contemporary era and its transformation into police operations, Alliez and Negri argue that peace and war have become absolutely contemporary with each other. As they write

> [I]n this world without inside or outside, in which, with the global disintegration of living-together ('internal peace'), the 'commerce among nations' has thrown off the mask of external peace, everything happens as if peace and war were so tightly enmeshed that they no longer form anything but the two faces of a single membrane projected onto the planet. Peace, in other words, war…

Eric Alliez and Antonio Negri, "Peace and War," *Theory, Culture & Society* (2003): 110. Central to this argument is the idea that the modern distinction between war and politics that is most famously articulated by Carl von Clausewitz (i.e., the isolation of war to the conflicts between sovereign entities and its designation as external to political struggles within society) is no longer tenable due to decline of modern sovereignty and the emergence of a new form of global sovereignty.

While affirming the idea there is a historical transformation in the means and objectives of warfare, Balibar suggests the contrary and argues that contemporary confrontations still obey the Clausewitzian rules due to the distinct combination of a claim to universal sovereignty and the reduction of war to police operations as evidenced in the U.S.-led War on Terror. Etienne Balibar, "What's in a War? (Politics as War, War as Politics)," *Ratio Juris* 21, no. 3 (2008).

what it would mean to re-write international relations if the politics of security is taken as the problem to be encountered rather than a point of resolution.

By raising the question of dismantling security, my dissertation addresses an important lacuna within the discipline of International Relations. One of the distinct contributions of scholarly efforts within the discipline, which approach the security problem from critical perspectives, has been to expose the power dynamics underwriting security practices and the forms of domination and exclusion inherent to them. With only a few exceptions, however, critical investigations lack a systematic, in-depth interrogation of the ways in which the logic of security can be resisted, transgressed, overturned, and how the question of violence could be approached outside a security framework. Let me now present a brief outline of each chapter to provide initial insights on how I develop this critical inquiry into the contemporary empire of security with a view to substantiate the argument for a politics beyond politics of security.

In the following chapter, I elaborate on the general contours of the contemporary empire of security. I start out by observing how a generalized economy of fear and violence co-exists within the context of a generalized reign of security practices to subdue war, to protect human life, and to secure such diverse objects as nature, information, food, and society. I note the paradoxical way in which security becomes a sovereign demand amidst intensifying violence on a global scale. Intending to provide a diagnostic account, I map out the changing nature of security discourses and practices, discussing the introduction of new concepts such as human security to

the global political lexicon and the novel proclamations of the responsibility to protect a common humanity as a challenge to the state-centric nature of traditional security discourses. Finally, I discuss at length the way in which logic of risk and preemption becomes generalized globally both as a technology of rule and a strategy of accumulation.

In Chapter 3, I turn my attention away from the global in/security landscape towards the academic production of knowledge on security and provide an inquiry into the critical approaches in security studies that have emerged within the discipline of International Relations in tandem with the transformations occurring in the global governance of security. I review the central arguments extended by these critical scholars and elaborate on the challenges they pose to conventional security analyses by exposing the way in which security, far from being an objective given, is thoroughly political. One of the key insights provided by these studies has been the way in which politics of security operate through the production of insecurities and reproduction of hierarchical relations of power and domination. This insight has led critical scholars to engage with the possibility of thinking past security. I provide an exegesis of these attempts to go beyond or out of security and question the extent to which these engagements uproot security from its secure ground. As I argue, despite the challenges they pose to conventional understandings of security, critical discourses nevertheless end up securing security by holding onto its promise and thereby reproducing its foundational status. This discussion will allow me to situate the project to dismantle security as an attempt to bring "critical" approaches to their logical

conclusion by raising a question that haunts the debates, yet is not raised.

The main task of the following two chapters is to elaborate on the meaning and implications of dismantling security as an untimely critique that brushes against the grain of the contemporary empire of security, which is reproduced through disciplinary discourses on security, both conventional and "critical". Taking as my starting point the diagnosis regarding the logic of preemption and its becoming the defining feature of contemporary practices of security, in Chapter 4 I interrogate the way in which security functions temporally, how it structures the relations between the present and the future, with what consequences. I situate the contemporary manifestations of the homology between the temporal structure of politics of security and capital within the context of temporality of bio-political modernity and draw on historical materialist conceptions of time to elaborate the way in which dominant forces of security and capital reduce political time to abstract unit measure. Elaborating the perverse temporal logic enacted by the politics of security, I argue that security configures the relation to the future in distinct ways: it operates through mortgaging the present to secure the future and, thereby, writes the future as present. This discussion about the way in which security colonizes the future will help me to formulate one of the senses in which I deploy dismantling security as "untimely critique". In this sense, being untimely entails going against the temporal structure enacted by the politics of security. It refers to the appropriation of time by countering the dominant temporality that shapes contemporary experience of time. "Dismantling security" becomes an "untimely" claim on time, in that, it strives to disrupt the

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perverse temporal logic enacted by politics of security.

In Chapter 5, I continue pursuing the theme of time and temporality albeit on a different terrain—namely, in relation to the meaning of critical thinking. I elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as an untimely intervention that brushes against the grain of disciplinary discourse on security wherein critical thought in its encounter with security works to further entrench its hold while exposing the manifold ways in which security reproduces relations of power and hierarchy, structures of domination and exclusion. To understand why critical engagements with security lead to this paradoxical outcome, I review prevalent conceptions of the relation between critical thought and political time in International Relations. I argue that in these conceptions critique is paradoxically cast as a "timely" endeavor—to the extent that it is called on to respond to the times by being strategic and punctual rather than acting as a force of interruption that resets the account of times. It is this latter conception of critique in relation to political time—critical theory as a form of intervention that reconfigures the meaning of the times—I suggest, constitutes the form of critical thinking that dismantling security as untimely critique aims to capture. I explicate and elaborate this understanding of untimely critique by drawing on political theorist Wendy Brown's discussion of what it means for critical theory "to brush against the grain."

While the overarching concern of the first five chapters is the architecture of security and what it means to take it apart, the final chapter of my dissertation grapples with the possibilities that open up for a politics beyond politics of security. This investigation, as I underscore, is not offered as a constructive proposition after a series

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of deconstructive moves. Providing a constructive chapter that articulates a single "right" answer would, in effect, mean enacting a new architecture amidst the ruins. In contrast, rather than searching for a final destination, a secure ground, I set sail with multiple senses of "a politics beyond" where the thought of politics starts at the limits of security. I formulate them as three moves beyond security: beyond a secure self, beyond the ordered space of security, and beyond the time of security.

I take the first cut into the question of "a politics beyond" by visiting the works of International Relations scholars who provide an ontological inquiry into security as such and problematize the sovereign subject of security—that is the premise, the ultimate ground upon which modernity's project of security rests. They deconstruct dominant narratives of the "Inter-national" as an anarchical world of Otherness (i.e., a "dangerous" outside posited against a "secure" inside) by problematizing the ontological commitments to a sovereign, autonomous self and expose the radical interdependency constitutive of subjectivity as such. De-centering modernity's subject of security and revealing what is erased under the illusion of sovereign claims to a secure self open the way for conceptualizing ethics and politics beyond security through the idea of a self constituted by Otherness.

To take the second cut into the question at hand, I turn to the political thought of Jacques Rancière and elaborate a different sense of "a politics beyond," which entails overturning the ordered space of security through the principle of impropriety and the logic of dissensus. The distinction that Rancière makes between the order of "police" and "politics" plays the central role in this discussion. According to Rancière,

the "police" concerns the configuration of the perceptible, the allocation of the ways of doing and ways of being, whereas "politics" entails the staging of political subjectivities in excess of the secure and functional order. This conception, I argue, provides a sense of politics that is not about securing identity, space, and time, but of overturning them.

The third and final move beyond security that I discuss in this chapter draws from the works of Jacques Derrida and his conception of political time as out of joint. In this discussion, I take as my starting point the diagnosis that the temporality of politics of security replaces political time as possibility with the homogenous time of measure and writes the future as present. In contrast, Derrida's discussion of the aporetic nature of time and his conception of futurity as an "unanticipatable other," I suggest, allows for a thought on the future and on political time beyond systems of homogenization and calculability, figuring politics as an activity without closure and finality beyond security.

Construction of politics as a security project amidst the disintegration of the texture of global life under the force of imperial wars, global reign of capital, and accumulation of human misery constitutes the departure point for the critical inquiry I undertake in this project. As I highlight throughout my discussion, security is not only a political project, but also a political method to produce and reproduce a specific order, a specific way of arranging parts in relation to each other, of constituting possible avenues for acting, of legitimizing certain ways of being while silencing others. Knowledge claims play a pivotal role in this process of re/production of order.

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Since knowing is a means of giving order to chaos, of selecting and reducing the infinite complexity of life, an act of knowing is also an act of producing. In the context of contemporary societies, claims to knowledge enact formidable fortresses to shield themselves from critique by cloaking themselves in the mantle of science and invoking the promise to provide knowledge of the natural order of things. Perhaps this is a challenge that can hardly ever be settled through scholarly efforts. However, it is my contention that no such effort will be in vain as long as it opens up new avenues for thought, seeks out new ways to break from the safety of the conventional, the given, the familiar. Equipped with this conviction, in the concluding chapter I suggest some potential avenues that could be embarked upon and possible future directions that could be explored on the premise of the critical inquiry I develop here. Of crucial importance in this regard will be the exploration of alternative political and ethical imaginaries and reinvention of political subjectivities detoxified from security. The question of violence, how it could be thought about, how the dilemmas, the political and ethical challenges it poses could be addressed outside a security framework constitutes another issue that urges further critical inquiry.

It is difficult to discuss contemporary times without risking a danger. This is the danger of falling into the trap of presentism, the inclination to exaggerate an alleged uniqueness of the present at the expense of ignoring its history and its historicity. Emphasizing a condition of crisis would potentially participate in the reproduction of an apocalyptic vision that displaces or erases politics in favor of a moral narrative of the forces of virtue and the forces of evil.

Yet, it is equally difficult—and worse, disingenuous—to ignore how terror has become a governing principle of global life. This is a terror that marks dead bodies, starving bodies, and bleeding bodies. It is a terror that resides not only in spectacular moments of contest over claims to sovereign power and/or imperialist and colonial ambitions as we have been witnessing in the bombings of Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq. It is a terror that marks the everyday when "soldiers entice children like mice into a trap and murder them for sport"[18] or when peasants commit suicide due to rising costs of cultivation and mounting debt.[19] It is a terror that is incarnated in the demarcation of the "globalized" world between life-zones and death-zones.[20] In the death zones of humanity, as Balibar describes, what reigns is "a mode of *production for elimination*."[21] The object/subject of this mode of reproduction are

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[18] Chris Hedges, "A Gaza Diary," *Harper's Magazine* 303, no. 1817 (2001).
[19] Vandana Shiva, *Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply* (Cambridge: South End Press, 2000).
[20] Étienne Balibar, "Outlines of a Topography of Cruelty: Citizenship and Civility in the Era of Global Violence," *Constellations* 8, no. 1 (2001).
[21] Ibid., 25.

human beings who are not likely to be productively used or exploited but are always already superfluous. It is a time of terror that manufactures disposable beings and targets not only life in all of its forms, but also dissent, critical reflection and, maybe more crucially, the possibility of politics.

This web of terror needs to be thought of together with other webs that span the globe and animate contemporary discourses on international politics—webs that are perhaps better depicted as webs of life, debt, and death beyond mere figures of speech. One of these is the world wide web, epitomized in the triumphant narratives of liberalism as the symbol of globalization. Until recently, such narratives circulated widely and confidently within some circles, trumpeting—in presentist and apocalyptic tones of a distinctly different inflection—an "end of history"[22] in the realization of a world that is "flat."[23] In the 1990s, with the entire planet imagined as an open space for capitalist valorization, the dots interlinking major financial centers became a favored form of mapping, of representing, "global reality." In such accounts the world was depicted as encompassed by a global dynamic that can and will only render it richer, freer, and more secure—even if its participants are encumbered by the constraints of a golden straightjacket of debt and structural adjustment programs. Instances of violence and destitution were and are taken not as symptoms of the proliferation of global liberal values; they are treated as indications that the proliferation has not yet proceeded fully. If an image disturbed this utopia-in-present, it was to be rendered silent, regarded as a local anomaly, a remnant of a past age or a

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[22] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
[23] Thomas Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the 21st Century* (New York: Picador, 2007).

problem that could be fixed by proper global incorporation and governance in the brave new world encompassed and represented by the Web.[24]

One of the classic statements supporting this assertion is Mary Kaldor's *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Globalized Era*, which investigates the connections between globalization and changing forms of political violence.[25] According to Kaldor, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of a new type of organized violence that blurred public/private, local/global, state/non-state distinctions. These new forms of political violence were not merely old wars undertaken with new weapons thanks to information technologies and a concomitant revolution in military affairs. These "new wars", Kaldor suggested, were the outcome of "a revolution in social relations of warfare"[26] and the "inevitable encroachment of globalization"[27]—globalization designating the intensification of global interconnectedness in political, economic, military, and cultural realms. The new wars were distinguished in terms of their goals (i.e., identified as "backward looking political projects"[28] enacted around exclusivist identities), their methods of warfare (i.e., seeking neither territorial capture nor population control through capturing hearts and minds), and the new war economies they enacted. The solution Kaldor offers is

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[24] For a critical engagement with the discourse of globalization constructed as the opposite of war: Tarak Barkawi, *Globalization and War* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006).

[25] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). For an overview of the main points raised in the literature on "new wars," see Edward Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004).

[26] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 3.

[27] Ibid., 4.

[28] Ibid., 7.

the "reconstitution of the control of organized violence by public authorities" and working toward a "cosmopolitan political project which would cross the global/local divide and reconstruct legitimacy around an inclusive, democratic set of values."[29] Such a cosmopolitan regime, according to Kaldor, already existed; what was lacking was its enforcement.[30]

Only a decade later, the turn of the century heralded yet another allegedly new era of new wars, presenting itself in sharp contrast to the comforting imagery so prevalent only a decade before. With the declaration of a temporally and spatially limitless war on terror, we are now faced with a web that connects New York to Kabul to London to Fallujah to Naples to Guantanamo and beyond. As shock waves surge through bodies caught up in networks of secret rendition and torture, the normalization of exceptional measures exposes the uneasy balance struck between liberty and security within liberal democracies, laying bare the fragility of the espoused "global" values and raising challenging questions about liberal projects for peace.

Sustained attention to the relationship between security and liberalism in the wake of the declaration of the War on Terror is symptomatic of this development. One prominent example came from the European Union. The "Challenge" (The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security) Project, funded by the European Union, brought together a wide range of scholars and experts to investigate and make policy recommendations on the "illiberal practices of liberal regimes."[31] As described on the

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[29] Ibid., 11.
[30] Ibid., 148.
[31] Didier Bigo et al., "The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: Mid-Term Report on the Results of the Challenge Project," (European Union, Sixth Framework

project website, security concerns had brought about this need to reflect on the costs

these "new regimes and practices of security…in the context of the new evolving

international environment shaped by the events of September 11, 2001 and the recent

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq" might have on "civil liberties, human rights and social

cohesion in an enlarging Europe."[32]

Let me note in passing that formulating the central problem as a matter of

illiberal deviations in liberal regimes is based on the assumption that a properly

functioning liberal order is a cure for violence and insecurity. To recall one of the

most authoritative representations of modern sovereignty and the liberal state—a

narrative widely embraced by International Relations theorists as well—Leviathan

emerges through a founding act that gives form to shapeless chaos, through a pact

established by the consent of all. While this narrative presents security as the promise

of the sovereign, it is a representation that conceals the double violence that lies at its

core. The underlying ambiguity is wryly captured by Foucault when he re-articulates

the formula as "[g]o get slaughtered and we promise you a long pleasant life."[33] The

fear of violent death, not free will, produces this pact. Law provides security only if

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Programme, 2007). Before the publication of the Interim Report, a collection of articles
produced as a part of this project was published as a special section of the journal, *Security
Dialogue* vol. 37, no. 1, March 2006. The project ended in May 2009 with a final conference,
leaving behind a series of policy recommendations on issues regarding borders, asylum,
immigration, data protection, and criminal justice. For the paper that presents a synthesis of
these recommendations: Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, and Elspeth Guild, "The Challenge
Project: Final Policy Recommendations on the Changing Landscape of European Liberty and
Security," (European Union, Sixth Framework Programme, 2009).
[32] Bigo et al., "The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: Mid-Term Report
on the Results of the Challenge Project."
[33] Michel Foucault, "The Political Technology of Individuals," in *Power: Essential Works of
Michel Foucault 1954-1984*, ed. J.D. Fabion (New York: New York Press, 1994), 405.

there is a sovereign capable of repression for the sake of order and security. Put differently, security is a good that can be sustained only through institutionalized violence—the "rationalized bloodless violence" that Benjamin elaborates in his discussion of law and the modern state.[34] Or to put it in Agamben's powerful formulation, "human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed."[35]

As these preliminary observations about the contemporary global landscape suggest, webs of violence and insecurity weave together a world where—as I discuss in detail in the next section—security has become the watchword and is presented as an answer to war, violence, and destruction. What is most often overlooked in these accounts is the question of at what price security is purchased. A more complete answer to this question will emerge as I develop my argument in the following chapters. First, let me take a closer look at the contemporary empire of security by sketching out its contours and, then, offering a few critical remarks about the way the promise of security functions.

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[34] Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," in *Reflections*, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1986). In this text, Benjamin distinguishes between a power/violence that imposes law and one that defends it, pointing out to their fusion in the modern state (i.e., the violent character of law, the violence that founds the state and preserves it). He cites the police as an example of this "spectral mixture" (287). The German term "Gewalt" that appears in the original title of Benjamin's essay demonstrates a semantic ambiguity between its uses as potestas and violentia, pointing to a more complex relation between law, force, power, and violence. I use power/violence to denote this ambiguity. For various interpretations of Benjamin's thesis by attending to this central ambiguity: Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"," *Cardozo Law Review* 11, no. 5-6 (1990); Anselm Haverkamp, "How to Take It (and Do the Right Thing): Violence and the Mournful Mind in Benjamin's Critique of Violence," *Cardozo Law Review* 13, no. 4 (1991); Massimiliano Tomba, "Another Kind of Gewalt: Beyond Law Re-Reading Walter Benjamin," *Historical Materialism* 17(2009). I will come back to the question of the police later in this chapter.
[35] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

Empire of Security

It is important to notice that long before the ubiquitous War on Terror made its way to the top of the agenda of the international community, security had already firmly established itself as a primary value in the context of a putative peace dividend marking the "so-called end of the so-called Cold War."[36] A cursory glance through academic and policy-oriented literatures leaves no doubt about the expansion of the domains and the objects that have become security concerns. Not only situations of political violence, but in effect almost everything pertaining to global life is articulated as a security concern. Supplementing concerns about economic security, information security, and health security, food security has emerged as the dominant way in which one thinks about problems affecting food production;[37] environmental security is globally embraced as the starting point in thinking about the bleak future that awaits the world unless consumption habits and developmental goals are transformed; human security has become commonplace as the all-encompassing category to orient thought and practice.[38] Additionally, security is mobilized in reference to multiple sites and scales. Communal, cooperative, comprehensive, collective, national, regional, and—

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[36] Jacques Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 95.

[37] As of 2009, there is an academic journal devoted solely to this particular topic: *Food Security: The Science, Sociology and Economics of Food Production and Access to Food,* published by the International Society for Plant Pathology.

[38] Some argue that human security is a concept that is "as old as the social sciences themselves" (3); see Thomas Eriksen, ed. *A World of Insecurity: Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security* (London, New York: Pluto Press,2010). Writing from an anthropological perspective, Eriksen suggests that the concept can be traced back to the work of Durkheim, who takes as its focus anxieties stemming from the loss of societal cohesion with the advent of modernity.

more prominently in the contemporary lexicon—the global are all referent domains of security practices.

Demands for a more expansive understanding of security have been aided and fueled by influential political figures who have called for a new understanding of the meaning and nature of security, as well as by international institutions such as the United Nations, which announced the need for a "conceptual breakthrough" toward "incorporating the security of people in their homes, jobs and communities."[39] As the range of objects to be secured were widening in official discourses, a long list of dangers accompanied the list of security concerns and practices. This is a list that incorporates not only ailing states—states that are referred to as being "failed" or "rogue."[40] As I noted in the previous chapter, microscopic organisms, birds, and

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[39] Quoted in Mark Neocleous, "Against Security," *Radical Philosophy*, no. 100 (2000).

[40] While this formulation suggests that these terms are interchangeable, I should note that the notion of "failed states" is generally used to describe the internal characteristics of a state while "rogue state" is a label that is used in relation to a state's foreign policy. Despite reflecting different discourses, however, as Bilgin and Morton suggest, what terms such as 'weak', 'quasi', 'collapsed' and 'failed states' share in common is that they are all representations of post-colonial states. Pinar Bilgin and Adam D. Morton, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences?," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002). In one frequently cited article, for instance, Krasner suggests that such "poorly governed" states present a danger not only to the societies directly affected, but to the international society at large by allowing transnational criminal and terrorist networks to operate in their territories; a danger, he argues, that is exacerbated by the availability of weapons of mass destruction. Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004). Arguing along the same lines and suggesting that "failings of states also pose enormous dangers beyond their own borders," Rotberg asserts the need to establish a more precise definition and clear criteria to distinguish collapsed, failed, and generally weak states. Robert Rotberg, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Cambridge, Washington: World Peace Foundation; Brookings Institution Press, 2003). For a powerful critique of these discourses that approach the issue from the perspective of development policy and practice, and exposes the way in which discourses on state failure rejuvenate colonial modes of governing: Mark Duffield, "Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security, and the Colonial Present," *Conflict, Security & Development* 5, no. 2 (2005).

chickens in the backyard, all become part and parcel of this all-encompassing and constantly growing list.[41]

Perhaps in its most prominent form (and in a way that informs all others), human security has become especially popular with international and non-governmental organizations. Take for example "The Human Security Network," which stems from a bilateral agreement between Norway and Canada, and aims to extend the successful cooperation of the two countries in the negotiation of the Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Landmines to other human security initiatives.[42] This all-encompassing or omnibus category has become the rallying point for actors North and South to speak out against injustice, and inequality, and to act as the basis for political projects to end violence, to secure the life of populations, and—as the title of a book on human security reads—to contain "the madness in the multitude."[43]

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[41] In his preface to the volume on "New Global Dangers," Brown warns the readers that the security problems in the 21st century will continue to be "widespread and deadly" despite the benefits of globalization and emphasizes the need to develop a complex understanding of international security that would recognize that "security is not *just* a military issue" (xii). Michael E. Brown et al., eds., *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press,2004).

[42] Bringing together states and non-governmental organizations that embrace the concept of human security, as of 2008, the Network included 13 countries: Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (observer), Switzerland, and Thailand. Claudia Fuentes Julio and Hans Gunter Brauch, "The Human Security Network: A Global North-South Coalition," in *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts*, ed. Hans Gunter Brauch, et al., *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace* (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009).

[43] Fen Osler Hampson et al., *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Tracing the historical origins of the concept of human security, the authors argue that many of the assumptions that underlie the concept are not new, but grounded in traditional precepts of liberal democratic theory, but that it does offer a new way of looking at international relations in terms of what constitutes peace and security and how best to maintain international order.

Rising to prominence during the 1990s and becoming influential among

academics, governments, and civil society organizations, human security has meant to

capture the changing nature and sources of threats within the context of a broader

redefinition of notions of national security in the post-Cold War era. It aims "to

encourage policy-makers as scholars to think about international security as something

more than the military defense of states' interests and territory."[44] The working

assumption is that security associated with state-centric, military definitions does not

take into consideration the human cost. Rather than making the states as the referent

objects of security, human security emphasizes the priority of protecting individuals

and providing welfare to ordinary people. As stated in one of the first major statements

on human security, it refers to insecurities that arise "more from worries about daily

life than from the dread of a cataclysmic event."[45]

In their *Human Security: Concepts and Implications,* Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy

celebrate the challenge human security poses to traditional security frameworks.[46]

They depict it as a useful and innovative concept that "represents an ethical and

methodological rupture"—a Kuhnian paradigm shift in International Relations.[47]

According to the authors, its "added value… lies in the new questions as regards the

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[44] Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 87. There is now a vast literature that explores the concept of human security and its policy implications. For an overview of the recent debates on the concept, see the collection of articles in the special issue of *International Social Science Journal* 59, no.1 (2008).
[45] "Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security," (New York, Oxford: United Nations Development Programme, 1994).
[46] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications* (London, New York: Routledge, 2007).
[47] Ibid., 20.

problem of 'security'"[48] since it destabilizes the answers given from a state-centric

perspective to questions such as security for whom, from what, and by what means.

Enabling the shift from state-based to individual-based security, human security, they

suggest, takes as its referent object not "the individuals qua citizens" but "individuals

qua persons," making the individual "the ultimate actor taken into account."[49]

According to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, elevating the individual to the status of ultimate

end needs to be celebrated because it allows prioritizing the well-being and dignity of

individuals.[50] Countering criticisms against the human security paradigm as being "a

tool for the West to impose its values and order," they argue that "the advent of human

security should be seen, instead, as the triumph of the South to put development

concerns into global security discussions."[51]

     Despite such enthusiastic endorsement by policy-makers, civil society actors,

and academic circles, human security and the laundry list of insecurities that are

presumed to afflict "the human" have led to heated academic debates about the

usefulness of the concept for analysis and policymaking.[52] While some advocates

embrace a wide definition of human security to include hunger, disease, and poverty—

along the lines suggested by the 1994 UN Report, others argue for the need to restrict

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[48] Ibid., 13.

[49] Ibid., 13.

[50] In his discussion of the crisis in Darfur, Mamdani provides a powerful critique of such an elevation of the generic human and the concomitant de-politicization of the conflict. Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009).

[51] Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 35.

[52] For a helpful overview of various positions on the question of the usefulness of the concept: J. Peter Burgess and Taylor Owen, "Special Section: What Is Human Security?," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004).

it to immediate acts of political violence such as war and genocide.[53] The definitional

vagueness and expansiveness of the concept have led some scholars to argue that

human security, while being "an effective rallying cry," has limited use for analysis.[54]

Humanitarian interventions of the 1990s—most significantly the NATO action

in response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999, which was undertaken in complete defiance

of the UN Charter—and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan heightened the

controversies surrounding the notion of human security. In the face of rising concerns

about the uses and abuses of "The Right of Intervention" to protect humanity, the

principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was adopted unanimously at the 2005

UN World Summit. Placing emphasis on the primary responsibility of the state to

protect its citizens, the principle introduced "the novel idea that the international

community should assist states in this endeavor" and situated armed intervention

within "a broader continuum of measures that the international community might take

to respond to genocide and mass atrocities."[55] While its advocates argue that the R2P

shifts the terrain from the rights of interveners to the rights of victims,[56] that it is a

useful "diplomatic tool, or prism, to guide efforts to stem the tide of mass atrocities,"[57]

and that it is "not a new code for humanitarian intervention… [but] a more positive

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[53] Mary Kaldor, "Human Security," in *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention* (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, 2007).
[54] Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?," 88.
[55] Alex J. Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On," *Ethics & International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (2010): 143.
[56] Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action* (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, 2007).
[57] Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On," 166.

and affirmative concept of sovereignty as responsibility,"[58] critics continue to assert

that human security "would be best divorced from the notion of 'responsibility to

protect'"[59] so as not to become a basis for legitimizing Western militarism.

It is interesting to note that while its liberal advocates have been busy trying to

find new ways to reformulate human security to shield it from being corrupted by the

not-so-benign international community, radical critics of global liberal governance

have not given up on human security and the project to relieve suffering and secure the

life of the species. Apprehensive about its neo-colonial implications and the way in

which it has been articulated into liberal and statist projects, even the most ardent

critics of human security have nevertheless refrained from abandoning the concept

altogether. The project to develop a "critical human security paradigm" is an

example.[60] The central aim of the project is to investigate how the concept of human

security "can be 'protected' from the hegemonizing narratives of securitization and

neo-liberalism."[61] The contributors to the project examine various conceptions of

human security in relation to the non-Western world and try to develop a global,

critical perspective on the concept of human security that would be attentive to the

ways in which it gets entangled in power relations. Their articles paint a striking

picture of how human security functions toward reproducing capitalist relations of

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[58] UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, speaking at the forum, "Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World," organized by Brookings Institute's "Managing Global Insecurity" and the Bertelsmann Foundation, and convened in Berlin on July 15, 2008.
[59] Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 37.
[60] Giorgio Shani, Makoto Sato, and Mustapha Kamal Pasha, eds., *Protecting Human Security in a Post 9/11 World: Critical and Global Insights* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,2007).
[61] Ibid., 13.

power and exploitation, gender hierarchies, and bio-political forms of rule. Despite the deeply problematic nature of human security, however, the conclusion offered by the project is that human security cannot and should not be abandoned. **Such "radical" efforts beg the question of why thought and action have to be confined to security in addressing violence. Put differently, if security itself entails violence, why limit thought on violence to the framework of security?**[62]

In short, through its multifarious articulations, security has emerged as the nodal point of a vast, materially consequential discursive field. The desire for security is presented as a primary, unquestionable human need and the overriding goal of politics—both domestic and international. It has become a commonsense category to such an extent that even critical minds argue that the action of governments would deserve few questions when they act in the name of the security of their citizens.[63] Not only is security posited as a universal desire and a good that could be attained and enjoyed by all, it is presented as a natural goal, an end that all human beings by nature seek. Self-appointed spokespersons—a vast network composed of state representatives, international courts, human rights and humanitarian organizations, diverse groups of NGOs, intellectuals, and other public figures—legitimate an array of political interventions ostensibly undertaken to secure humanity by fulfilling that natural desire to protect the species' more vulnerable members.

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[62] In Chapter 3, I address in depth the problematic nature of critical approaches to security within the discipline of International Relations and discuss the way in which critics of security end up securing security.

[63] A day after a Palestinian suicide bomber kills eight and wounds 70 in Jerusalem, Noam Chomsky writes "Few would question Israel's right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks like the one yesterday, even to build a security wall if that were an appropriate means." Noam Chomsky, "A Wall as Weapon," *The New York Times*, February 23, 2004.

Security has become an imperative that demands ever more attention and ever more obedience to its rituals. The realm within which the machine of security operates has expanded exponentially to include all forms of life, from the microbe upwards. Wherever one looks, one is faced with a security warning. Security has transmogrified into a first principle that one has to heed as one eats, shops, works, or travels. "We are not a security guard company. We sell a *concept* of security,"[64] says the president of the U.S. security firm Westec. Perhaps this public relations catch phrase best summarizes the sovereignty of security within the contemporary global context. We may not know what it means, what it entails; perhaps we don't even need to know as long as we know that we want it and are ready to pay the price to purchase it. We globally consume security as we are being consumed by it.[65]

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[64] Quoted in Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (London: Pimlico, 1998), 250.

[65] The consumption of security as a commodity is noted by scholars as well. Steven Spitzer, "Security and Control in Capitalist Societies: The Fetishism of Security and the Secret Thereof," in *Transcarceration: Essays in the Sociology of Social Control*, ed. John Lowman, Robert Menzies, and T.S. Palys (Aldershot: Gower, 1987). For a similar argument that draws on Spitzer's analysis: Mark Neocleous, "Security, Commodity, Fetishism," *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 35, no. 3 (2007). In his analysis of social control in capitalist societies, Spitzer explores how the social need for safety and the feelings that surround it are turned into commodities of security that can be purchased on the market.[65] Since it is impossible to differentiate commodities with securing attributes from those that generate security effects, their status as security products become irrelevant in the decision to consume them. This is why, Spitzer suggests, almost any object can be invested with the aura of security through symbolic production. Divorced from the social context and the processes of production, treating security as a commodity opens the way for managing one's protection through the consumption of an ever-expanding list of security products.

The Promise of Security

The fantastic and phantasmic desire to achieve absolute sovereignty over insecurities in the face of "new global dangers"[66] elevates fear to the position of prime mover for public discourse in liberal states as "unlimited wars place whole populations at unlimited risk."[67] Perhaps one could say that governing terror provides the ultimate form of staging security as fantasy, which works to create the semblance of order as it attempts to govern the incalculable.[68] The power of terror stems from its unpredictability, its anticipated yet random arrival, making its spectral presence more fearful than the actual carrying out of the act. Haunted by this ghostly presence, security as fantasy projects its deadly face as it hunts down a citizen on an otherwise normal day of work in an everyday place. For example, in July 2005, 27-year-old Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead by London Metropolitan Police officers. He was mistaken for a suspect in the failed bombing attack the previous day.[69] The fact that de Menezes was a Brazilian migrant highlighted the racial profiling by the British police.[70]

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[66] Brown et al., eds., *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*.
[67] Susan Buck-Morss, *Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left* (London: Verso, 2003), 1. It is worth noting that terror and terrorism had emerged as an important item on the public and scholarly agendas of Western societies in the 1970s and1980s. For a critical overview of ongoing debates of that era: Michael Stohl, ed. *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: M. Dekker,1988).
[68] Michael Dillon, "Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence," *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 1 (2007).
[69] The website of "The Jean Charles de Menezes Family Campaign http://www.justice4jean.org/ (accessed September 2, 2010).
[70] According to a 2003 British Home Office Report on Race and the Criminal Justice System, "'stop and searches' relative to the resident population was consistently higher for Black people than for White people" and that people from black and minority ethnic groups were more likely to be arrested than white people. "Statistics on Race and Criminal Justice System," (2003), http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/s95race2003.pdf. (accessed September 2,

This tragic encounter with the police provides a crucial counter-narrative to the self-presentation of the liberal state and the rule of law as applying to all equally. Rather than being a neutral tool of law enforcement, the police reproduce the laws in the books through their minute choices and their interpretation, and application of the law at the street level. The discretionary power of the police points out the way in which the rule of law, rather than opening up and upholding a stable and neutral playing field, can accommodate a territory of unpredictability and arbitrariness. Police discretion transforms the police officer from being merely "a citizen in uniform enforcing the law" into "a state official exercising administrative or executive powers."[71] In the words of Agamben, "[t]he rationales of 'public order' and 'security' on which the police have to decide on a case-by-case basis define an area of indistinction between violence and right that is exactly symmetrical to that of sovereignty."[72]

It is ironic that as religion becomes the predicate for thinking and acting on behalf of security against religious fundamentalists, security itself takes on the guise of religion—a sacred value order with its own rituals of endless search and surveillance and its own value structure.[73] One could note the ascetic nature of security as

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[71]Mark Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 102.

[72] Giorgio Agamben, "Sovereign Police," in *Means without End: Notes on Politics* (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 104.

[73] The theme of religion in relation to contemporary politics of security is taken up by Bulent Diken and Carsten Laustsen, "'We Two Will Never Twin': Fundamentalism and the Politics of Security," *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations* 20, no. 2 (2006). Through an analysis of how religion functions in the discourses of George Bush and

manifested in the grimness of its rituals. As if entering into a holy shrine when

laughter turns into silence, smiles give way to frowns as one enters the shrine of

security. As Sutzl notes, security is "a grim business" as travelers at Houston's Bush

International Airport are told over loudspeakers that "inappropriate remarks or jokes

about security measures will lead to [their] arrest."[74] Grimness not only by analogy,

but in actual practice: machine-readable high-security passports outlaw smiles since

they may cause the biometric face-recognition system to malfunction.

Security reveals its religious nature beyond mere resemblance at the level of

gestures. Its fundamentalism is also exposed in instances when security imposes itself

as the absolute value and the final instance of authority. The value of all other

values—not only freedom and rights, but also values such as intellectual integrity and

responsibility—are now to be measured and sacrificed by their relation to security.

One needs only to recall the debate sparked by the article written by Alan Dershowitz

of Harvard Law School about torture and the "ticking bomb."[75]

Perhaps one should not be too surprised by the affinity between religion and

security. After all, in his discussion of the emergence of the form of rule that is the

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Osama Bin Laden, the article establishes a "disavowed symbiotic relationship" between the
two enemies.

[74] Wolfgang Sutzl, "Tragic Extremes: Nietzsche and the Politics of Security," *1000 Days of Theory* (2007), http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=582. (accessed September 2, 2010).
[75] Alan Dershowitz, "Want to Torture? Get a Warrant," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 22, 2002. As recent public and academic discussions indicate, this enunciation reverberates far beyond its immediate locus. Rosemary Foot, "Torture: The Struggle over a Peremptory Norm in a Counter-Terrorist Era," *International Relations* 20, no. 2 (2006); Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Andrew Mumford, "Torture, Rights, Rules and Wars: Ireland to Iraq," *International Relations* 21, no. 1 (2007); Andrew Linklater, "Torture and Civilisation," *International Relations* 21, no. 1 (2007). For a powerful critique of the acceptance of torture as a legitimate topic of debate as an attempt to break the collective "ethical backbone": Slavoj Žižek, "Knight of the Living Dead," *The New York Times*, March 24, 2007.

modern state, Foucault shows how governmentality is derivative from religion by

exposing the (Christian) pastoral power implicit in the state.[76] As a potentiality already

latent in the state, such a fundamentalism can be read as a symptom of a re-alignment

between religion and security under conditions of contemporary global rule rather than

as something absolutely new. In his analysis of the contemporary security paradigm,

Fletcher elaborates on this aspect, namely the theological nature of global liberal

governance.[77] He traces it to the metaphysical authority that is generative of the

modern state where the mundane political order depends on the transcendent order of

things. Accordingly, the modern state is predicated not on the separation between

religious and secular authority, but on its acquisition of religious power and its

projection of sovereignty as an omnipotent yet impersonal entity. It is this "parasitic

reliance on the religious" and the concomitant secularization of the polis, Fletcher

argues, that characterizes contemporary global liberal peace.[78]

In addition to its enduring religiosity, the contemporary politics of security is

additionally characterized by its futurity and virtuality. The politics of security no

longer merely revolve around the question of being, of securing a life as it is.

Reaching beyond the question of the actual, the realm of security has now expanded to

include "the potential to become dangerous"—a phenomenon that the notion of

"virtual security" aims to capture.[79] As opposed to the actual, "virtual" here does not

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[76] Michel Foucault, "Lecture 7-22 February 1978," in *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at Collège De France 1977-1978*, ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave, 2007).
[77] Paul Fletcher, "The Political Theology of the Empire to Come," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 1 (2004).
[78] Ibid.: 54.
[79] Dillon, "Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence."

denote the non-existent. Virtual is real, concretely present to the extent that it exists potentially immanent in every object. The non-existence of what has not yet happened becomes more real than what has observably taken place.

Massumi explores the concept of the virtual in his discussion of preemption as the primary operative logic of the contemporary politics of security.[80] Operative logic designates an abstract matrix of power that combines its own ontology and epistemology. In other words, it brings together a mode of being and ways of knowing. It is at the level of this operative logic that preemption as definitive of the present age is differentiated from its Cold War predecessor—the logic of deterrence. Like deterrence, where mutually assured destruction assures the present stockpiling of nuclear bombs so as to defer the potential of global annihilation, preemption also entails action in the present against a future threat. Yet, unlike its predecessor that relies on epistemological certainty that assumes knowable, objective measurability, epistemology of preemption is one of contingency and uncertainty; the danger in question is still potential, and not yet fully formed. What this means ontologically is that neither the nature of the threat nor the enemy can be specified. For the preemptive episteme that this logic brings into being, nothing is perceived to be safe. Consequently, the global situation becomes not threatening, but threat-generating; the enemy is no longer "a who, where, when or even what. The enemy is a what*not*."[81]

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[80] Brian Massumi, "Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption," *Theory & Event* 10, no. 2 (2007).
[81] ———, "Everywhere You Want to Be: Introduction to Fear," in *The Politics of Everyday Fear*, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 11.

While Massumi focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration within the context of the so-called Global War on Terror in his discussion of preemption, this logic is not limited to a specific military doctrine of a specific administration. Rather, the field of operation of preemption has become much more extensive under the contemporary global security project. Taking as its ground a potential, preemption makes up for its absent cause by putting to work an actual affect in its fight against enemies of "global humanity", whether it be fundamentalist terrorists or infected birds. As I elaborated in the prelude to the first chapter, in the case of the avian flu, states, international organizations, philanthropic actors, and media mobilized across local, national, regional, and global networks and rendered the flu an emergency before it became an emergency.[82] The future threat of a pandemic is held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergency. Hence, the fact that the pandemic has not yet happened does not mean that it is no less present and real.

Preemption is also the point where security meets capital in a world interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt. As Randy Martin notes, preemption (i.e., bringing future into the present) has been the guiding principle for U.S. fiscal policy since the late 1970s.[83] Before it becomes a blueprint for action against terrorists, preemption is put to work as the operational logic in tandem with the rise of finance

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[82] Investigating the "aesthetic emergency of the avian flu affect," Whitehall explains how "affective governance" (i.e., governing through production of strong emotions such as scare and panic) plays into internationalizing the globalized project of securing life. Geoffrey Whitehall, "The Aesthetic Emergency of the Avian Flu Affect," in *The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and Foreign Policy*, ed. François Debrix and Mark Lacy (New York: Routledge, 2009).
[83] Randy Martin, *An Empire of Indifference: American War and the Financial Logic of Risk Management* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007).

and speculative capitalism. Martin argues that the new financial service industries that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods made a virtue out of risk while speculation was being installed as a productive force for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. Ruled by risk management and harvesting volatility for gain, finance, as Martin explains, creates the environment wherein all investments are made on the basis of anticipated price movements in the future. Investment by taking risks today requires a new belief in the future: a belief that the future will not be unpredictably different, but that it will be calculably the same.[84] In this context, inflation is treated as a distortion to the economic environment that renders loss unpredictable. Monetarism, which emphasizes regulating the amount of money in circulation, is the form preemptive action takes in the realm of political economy. It becomes the predominant policy tool to guarantee that the worth of investment portfolios would not be undermined. What makes the fight against inflation resemble contemporary wars against undefined enemies is that, like terror, Martin notes, inflation needs only to be present in prospect for its menacing effects to be felt. In both cases, preemption converts potential threats into actual conflicts making "contingencies of the future to be lived out in present, blurring the distinction between the not-yet and the now."[85] It transforms future uncertainty into present risk—where risk denotes the expected outcomes that can be quantified in terms of likelihood and value.

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[84] Ibid., 4.
[85] Ibid., 3.

In her account of biotechnology and capitalism under contemporary neoliberal rule, Melinda Cooper provides a similar account to Martin's and explores the way in which governing through contingency by rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics of security and capital accumulation.[86] Distinguishing neoliberalism from Keynesian understanding of growth, Cooper suggests that unlike the latter—where the neoclassical presumption of market equilibrium is treated as a law of nature—neoliberalism is premised on non-equilibrium models. As she explains

> Where welfare state biopolitics speaks the language of Gaussian curves and normalizable risk, neoliberal theories of economic growth are more likely to be interested in the concepts of the non-normalizable accident and the fractal curve. Where Keynesian economics attempts to safeguard the productive economy against fluctuations of financial capital, neoliberalism installs speculation at the very core of production.[87]

What is striking in these analyses of risk and government through contingency is the temporal framework that is enacted through the hegemonic articulation of preemption as the meeting point of accumulation strategies and global governance of in/securities. Security entails a relation to the future, but the nature of this relation does not remain the same because the way in which the future is assessed, calculated, and mastered can take different forms.[88] As Massumi usefully notes, "[p]reemption is not prevention."[89] Preemption entails bringing the future into the present rather than

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[86] Melinda Cooper, *Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era* (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 2008).
[87] Ibid., 10.
[88] Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 95.
[89] Brian Massumi, "The Future Birth of the Affective Fact," in *Genealogies of Biopolitics* (2005).

acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future. In the preemptive

framework, the consequences precede the actualization of the event: potential threats

—the specter of future inflation that would shake the confidence in the value of

investment portfolios or the specter of a terrorist strike—are rendered with a tangible

presence that call for preemptive strikes. Preemption, hence, puts in place a specific

form of relation to the future: contingency, uncertainty entailed by the notion of

future—future as what is yet to come—arrives in its coded form as an already written

future. Future as present risk gets integrated within the realm of the calculable,

measurable, and the profitable. Codified as risk, uncertainty becomes an opportunity

to be cashed in the market place of global values.[90]

Conclusion

Mapping out the contours of the empire of security, in this chapter, I tried to

elaborate how the passion to secure disavows the terror and violence it renders, how

security colonizes political projects and infuses social and political imaginaries, and

how it substitutes the potentiality of the future with the cynical thrill of profitability

under the omnipresent shadow of ever-present fear.

It is within this context that critical reflection on security becomes all the more

urgent. In certain respects, scholars of international relations are situated in a unique

position to undertake such a task, since questions of violence and security constitute

nodal points in the discursive structure of this discipline. As James Der Derian notes,

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[90] In Chapter 4, I take this diagnosis about the contemporary temporal homology between
security and capital to discuss in depth the politics of time enacted by the politics of security.

"No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of 'security.'"[91] If today we witness a crisis of security—whether it be puzzlements over how to master insecurities in the face of proliferating dangers or contentions about security's value in relation to other values— such a crisis offers productive possibilities to expand the horizons of critical thought and analysis. In this regard, I suggest that we lend an ear to Nietzsche's call and follow him, not necessarily in letter, but in spirit and go beyond merely taking measures in this value order. Instead of taking morality for granted, Nietzsche exposed the nature of pre-conceived dogmas, blasted apart the sovereign subject of modernity and the underlying values associated with it. He was ruthless in his attempt to overthrow idols; nothing could be secure from the crushing blows of this philosopher with a hammer. Taking courage from him, I suggest that if security has become the unquestioned aim, the ground upon which all action and thought is being enacted, then disrupting this sacred value order presents itself as an indispensible task for critical analysis. With this task in mind, in the next chapter I turn to critical engagements with security within the discipline of International Relations. Through an overview of the rise of critical discourses on security, I try to explain how academic production of knowledge on security participates in the reproduction of the contemporary empire of security.

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[91] James Der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard," in *The Political Subject of Violence*, ed. David Campbell and Michael Dillon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 95.

Meanings of the word "to dismantle" provided by *The Oxford Dictionary* allude to both the religious and secular connotations of what such an act implies. On a religious register, the mantle signifies the robes worn by ecclesiastical and other dignitaries on ceremonial occasions, or the cloak worn by Apostles, gesturing toward the promise of salvation extended by religious authorities—the authorizers of an eternal peace after life. Perhaps it is no coincidence that one of the foremost thinkers of modernity, Immanuel Kant, has borrowed the title of his *Perpetual Peace* from the caption to the picture of a graveyard that was painted on the sign of a Dutch innkeeper.[92] In this regard, to dismantle, with its associated meanings of divesting, of depriving of the dress, connotes stripping the authority of the salvationary promise, of a peace that can only realize itself through death. The other (secular) connotation of the verb, to dismantle alludes to the act of taking pieces apart, pulling down, destroying, rendering fortifications and the like useless for their purpose.

This brief semantic detour illustrates the double gesture that "dismantling security," which constitutes the core problematic of this project, entails. On the one hand, dismantling security means devising a political language that profanes the

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[92] Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 1991), 93. In this text, Kant was engaging with a question—how to resolve the problem of war—that was central to the agenda of, as Joas argues, "the dream of modernity without violence." Hans Joas, *War and Modernity*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).

salvationary promise of modernity's politics of security.[93] On the other hand, making

this move necessitates the secular dismantling—as in clearing the ground, pulling

apart—the architecture that grounds politics in security.

In the first two chapters, I traced the sacred value order constituted by the sign

of security in the contemporary era and attended to the ways in which the latter is

being constantly affirmed and reaffirmed as the ultimate ground upon which politics is

to be built and the goal toward which it aspires. In this chapter, I will trace the

reproduction of its hegemony through the production of academic knowledge on

security. I will try to show why dismantling security toward a thought of politics

beyond politics of security necessarily invites the dismantling of this particular

architecture as well.

The past few decades witnessed a proliferation of debates around critical

approaches to the study of security within the discipline of International Relations.

From a variety of perspectives, scholars problematized conventional understandings of

what security means and what it entails. The question I will pursue in this chapter is: If

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[93] Bennington notes the way in which traditional political philosophies are all wedded to this metaphysical scheme of salvation and how such political thinking entails the closure of the political:

> The metaphysical thought of origin and end entails non-violence, and duly prescribes politics either as the unfortunate and degenerative decline from a peaceful origin (Rousseau), or as the redemptive drive towards an achieved peace (Kant). Even political philosophies which appear in one way or another to give greater thought to violence (Hobbes, Hegel, Marx) cannot think violence other than in the teleological perspective of non-violence. Political philosophy as such is wedded to this metaphysical scheme, and this has the paradoxical consequence that political philosophy is always the philosophy of the end of politics, or that the metaphysical concept of politics is the concept of politics ending.

Geoffrey Bennington, "Derrida and Politics," in *Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader*, ed. Tom Cohen (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 203.

critical thought demands being radical and "to be radical is to grasp things by the root,"[94] to what extent do critical writings on security uproot security from its secure ground? Or do they merely secure security by reproducing it as the horizon of political thought and action?

As I argue, critics challenge predominant understandings of security, but do not give up on its promise. To that extent, much of critique functions as reaffirmation in effect. Rendering security insecure by destabilizing the sign of security has the paradoxical effect of securing security's foundational status and enforcing the pillars of the church of security. Consequently, I suggest, critical thought in engagement with security becomes a form of questioning that affirms the very grounds it seeks to challenge.

In the first section, I will provide a brief overview of the critical turn in security studies and map out the way in which these investigations have rendered security insecure by contesting conventional discourses and practices of security.[95] Reflecting on the preceding decades that witnessed the emergence of this new thinking as a distinct challenge to conventional debates within the dominant Realist paradigm,

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[94] Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 60.

[95] Different approaches within the field of critical studies are often differentiated as Critical Theory -to refer mainly to theories that situate themselves within the Marxist heritage and drawing from the works of Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School- and critical theories used generally to categorize post-structuralist, feminist and critical constructivist works. For my purposes, I will deploy the term "critical" as an umbrella term to refer to all the engagements that challenge the rationalist paradigm in International Relations and highlight the importance of discourse, subjectivity, and factors such as gender and race. For a similar approach, see Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, vol. 8, Borderlines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1997). Keith Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of `Critical Security Studies'," *Cooperation and Conflict* 33, no. 3 (1998).

Steve Smith situates this transformation in relation to the wider contestations over

epistemological issues within the discipline of International Relations.[96] Challenging

the narrow framework of strategic studies that prioritize the threat or use of military

force by states, critical security studies, according to Smith, had rendered insecure the

traditional answers given to the questions of who is to be secured, from what, by

which means, and to what effect. More than a decade after Smith's article reflected the

"amazement" of a scholar in the face of these developments, there is now a huge body

of literature that positions itself in opposition to what is deemed as traditional theories.

It is these transformations in the disciplinary study of security that I will first clarify.

In the following section, I will turn to a discussion of four proposals offered by

critical security scholars who have voiced deep discontent with security and who have

engaged with the question of thinking past security. Through an exegesis of these

proposals, I will try to expose the way in which these critics end up securing security's

foundational status while suggesting ways beyond or out of security. This exercise is

not intended to be another attempt to outperform critical critics.[97] Rather, my aim is to

point out to "a problem of imaginative incapacity"[98] that afflicts these debates and to

highlight the striking paradox of always re-inscribing security as a foundation for

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[96] Steve Smith, "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years," *Contemporary Security Policy* 20, no. 3 (1999).

[97] David Mutimer, "My Critique Is Bigger Than Yours: Constituting Exclusions in Critical Security Studies," *Studies in Social Justice* 3, no. 1 (2009).

[98] Mary Dietz, *Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2002). While Dietz discusses this problem in relation to contemporary political theory (i.e., contemporary political theorists' seeming inability to resist talking about the "same ever-repeated subject" of man from various ontological and epistemological levels all the while rejecting the possibility of attributing any sort of quality to it), her insight has been a major inspiration for the line of analysis that I take up here.

thought and action—all the while problematizing the way in which it leads to

exclusions, entrenches existing hierarchies, and reproduces relations of power and

domination. I want to clarify what dismantling security entails as a call that attempts to

take the critical security project to its conclusion by asking a question that haunts the

debates, yet, is never posed.

Problematizing Security

If one gives in to the modern desire to search for origins, to mark the calendar

and name a date so that the event in question becomes meaningful as it gets inserted

into the progressive unfolding of time, then perhaps the origin of the project that

encouraged or opened the way for critical approaches in security studies can be traced

back to the early 1990s, to the publication of two edited volumes that have become

canonical texts of critical security studies.[99] One of these volumes was the result of a

series of meetings that took place during 1991 and 1992, when a group of scholars was

invited to consider the problem of redefining security.[100] According to the

contributors, this redefinition entailed more than specifying and analyzing the novel

challenges to security that were brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc

and the changing global security landscape effected by the loss of alleged certainties

of the bi-polar world order. The pronounced aim was to question the very tools used in

analysis of international security and to investigate whether the new dangers on the

horizon required new intellectual frameworks and novel approaches to policy-making.

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[99] David Mutimer, "Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[100] Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed. *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press,1995).

In the words of the volume's editor, the main problem that united these scholars was the extent to which "the concepts and practices of security, as they emerged in the academia and policy-making, could still be analyzed and applied as they have been between 1947 and 1991."[101] The contributors to this volume— Barry Buzan, James Der Derian, and Ole Waever, to name a few—would later become prominent names associated with critical security studies within the discipline of International Relations.

Another classic text frequently cited and widely incorporated into the teaching curricula in critical security studies was the outcome of yet another series of meetings, which also date back to the early 1990s. The conference, *Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security*, was held in May 1994 at York University, Toronto, and brought together scholars working on alternative approaches to security. This conference and the following meetings resulted in a collection entitled *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases.*[102] The notable aspect of this volume was its "desire to contribute to the development of a self-consciously critical perspective within security studies."[103] As one of "the last bastions of orthodoxy in International Relations," the editors write, security studies had been hesitant "to accept critical or theoretically sophisticated challenges to its problematic."[104] The main aim of bringing together different perspectives was to sharpen the voices of critics and to prove that critical approaches to security were "more than a passing fad."[105]

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[101] Ibid., 2.
[102] Krause and Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases.*
[103] Ibid., vii.
[104] Ibid., vii.
[105] Ibid., vii.

What is interesting to note about these two volumes is the range of epistemological and methodological perspectives that they brought together—a fact that is clearly articulated by Krause and Williams as they underscore the idea that it is the questions raised, more than the methods of analysis, that were deemed the driving force behind these scholarly concerns. Rather than invoking yet another new orthodoxy, creating polemics, or giving into the temptations of disciplining practices by imposing criteria of inclusion and exclusion, the aim was "to engage directly with issues and questions that have been taken as the subject matter of security studies."[106] The authors state that the term critical "is meant to imply more *an orientation toward the discipline* [emphasis added] than a precise theoretical label"— hence "a small-c definition of *critical*."[107]

While the disciplinary significance of these publications and dating the origins of this self-conscious critical turn in the 1990s is generally accepted,[108] this should not be taken to mean that associating the emergence of critical approaches to security with the ending of the Cold War era has gone unchallenged. For instance, Bilgin, Wyn Jones, and Booth argue that such an association is exaggerated given the existence of a body of thinking outside mainstream thought before the end of the Cold War, which had problematized conventional analysis and questioned limiting the study of security to the threat and use of military force at the level of the state and the international

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[106] Ibid., viii.
[107] Ibid., xi.
[108] Mutimer, "Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History." Karin M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

system.[109] Raising the question of the "Next Stage?" the authors chart out a different historical trajectory that pivots around the theory/practice divide. They point out that even at its golden age of strategic studies, the Anglo-American strategic-realist discourse was limited to the circle of political elites whose claims were being actively challenged on the ground through political activism. They cite the movements against the nuclear arms race, as exemplified by "Ban the Bomb marches" in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the growth of scholarly work on peace research. A similar remark is made by Hugh Gusterson—a self-described anti-nuclear activist turned Constructivist academic. He points to the wide gap that separated mass movements, which were engaged in political struggles to end the arms race, and the security studies specialists, who were working on "the ontological assumption that the arms race and the Cold War would continue indefinitely."[110] In their intellectual history of International Security Studies, Buzan and Hansen argue along similar lines, asserting that associating the widening of approaches to security with the ending of the Cold War is a myth. According to the authors, there was a significant literature in the 1980s that laid the groundwork for the growth of widening and deepening approaches to security during the 1990s.[111]

Apart from the questions of origins, it should be noted that critical incursions through the well-guarded disciplinary gates have not been a smooth process. One of

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[109] Pinar Bilgin, Ken Booth, and Richard Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?," *Nacao Defesa* 84, no. 2 (1998).

[110] Hugh Gusterson, "Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security," in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*, ed. Jutta Weldes, et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 330.

[111] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

the most memorable instances in this regard is Stephen M. Walt's fierce criticism and

dismissal in a review article dating to the early 1990s, published as part of a series on

the "Research Programs and Debates" in one of the leading journals of the field,

International Studies Quarterly.[112] Reasserting the main focus of security studies as

the phenomenon of war—where the latter is narrowly defined as the use of military

force among states—Walt takes as his main target the suggestions offered by scholars

to expand the security agenda to include non-military phenomenon such as poverty,

environmental hazards, health, etc. According to Walt, such a move would be

irresponsible both intellectually and politically. On the one hand, it implied an

"indefinite expansion" of the security agenda to the degree of absurdity. Almost any

issue could be lumped under this category, including, as he notes, child abuse. This

expansion would destroy all intellectual coherence and make it difficult to devise

solutions to important problems. On the other hand, the expansion was politically

dangerous since it would divert attention from organized violence, which, according to

Walt, was still an ever-present possibility and ever-more costly given the destructive

capacities of modern wars.

One of the points of contention entailed a battle over the proper content and

appropriate label of the field of study. While critical scholars such as Barry Buzan

argued for the need to retain security studies and strategic studies as distinct fields of

analysis, with the latter addressing solely military aspects of international relations,[113]

others resisted this move and argued for retaining the label of security studies and

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[112] Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991).
[113] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

keeping its central focus on causes of war and alliances, policy-oriented research on

military and other threats that confront states. Voicing the sentiments of the latter

position and admitting the "difficulties in drawing precise boundaries," Nye and Lynn-

Jones nevertheless asserted that

> A subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of threat
> perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as
> peripheral. Tank tactics fall into the category of military science, and depletion of
> fisheries falls into ecological sciences, not international security studies.[114]

Another contentious issue related to epistemological questions and appropriate

methods for research and analysis. Starting from the assumption that there is an

objective knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual, analysts

working within the mainstream judged and condemned critical projects by the

standards of positivist social science. According to scholars such as Walt, security

studies "seek[ed] *cumulative knowledge* about the role of military force" and this

assertion required that scholars working in the field "follow the standard canons of

scientific research: careful and consistent use of terms, unbiased measurement of

critical concepts, and public documentation of theoretical and empirical claims."[115]

Construction of empirically testable paradigms with a set of observational hypothesis

and irrefutable assumptions was deemed a sine qua non of a progressive research

program.

In his overview of these debates, Krause sums up the responses to the challenges

posed by different threads of critical scholarship as a series of disciplining practices,

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[114] Joseph S. Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a
Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (1998): 7.
[115] Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," 222.

which he labels as cooptation, exclusion, character assassination, and definitional

fiat.[116] Despite these scholarly antagonisms and policing of disciplinary boundaries,

critical scholarship on security became institutionalized over the last three decades,

establishing itself as a member of the community in the field of knowledge-production

on security. Buzan and Hansen's survey of the field of security studies provides ample

proof to this.[117] Breaking down institutionalization into four elements (i.e.,

establishment of organizational structures that support research, increase in funding

provided by foundations and governments, widespread dissemination of knowledge

through publications, and emergence of research networks enabled by the

legitimization of the particular form of knowledge), they document the increasing

number of projects and conferences, funding opportunities, journal publications, and

the growing number of graduate students and post-docs, which have provided the

impetus for this development.

The fierce resistance initially met by critical projects on security was perhaps a

testimony to the challenges they posed in disrupting the seamless narratives of

conventional security analyses. As I elaborate below, one of these challenges related

to their contestation of the ahistorical, reductive, and instrumentalist accounts of

in/security that had for a long time been the defining feature of the production of

academic knowledge on security. At a theoretical level, the foundational categories of

the field, such as the state, anarchy, and security itself, were shown to be problematic.

Investigations into the analytical building blocks were accompanied by a focus on key

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[116] Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of `Critical Security Studies'."

[117] Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 221-24.

themes and central issues that constitute the substance of security studies, such as

national interest, the role of international regimes in mitigating violence, and

conditions of war and peace. Rather than beginning with a priori assumptions about

the world that is waiting to be secured, these studies exposed the limits of state-

centered appropriations of the subjects and objects of security. They laid bare power

relations mystified by positivist approaches to dangers and de-naturalized in/securities.

By broadening or deepening conceptualizations of security and the constitution of

contemporary security problems, or by de-centering security to reveal its historically

specific meaning, value, and place in the modernist political imaginary, these

interventions exposed the power dynamics, the political and ethical commitments

entailed by the promise to secure. They exposed the ways in which approaching

security as an unproblematic, objective given transformed the contingent into the

eternal and universal by positing the "state" as the subject of security and the timeless

construct of anarchy as the condition under which that subject was to be secured.

In her *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Karen Fierke identifies the

common thread that runs through these diverse and, to a certain extent, disparate

attempts as their exposure of the political nature of security.[118] According to Fierke,

what renders critical approaches distinct is their emphasis on the relationship between

security and politics. Critical studies highlight "the processes by which security is

defined, by which threats become security threats, and by which individuals, states or

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[118] Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*. I should point out that, while
agreeing with Fierke on this point and arguing throughout this project about the political
nature of security, I nevertheless retain that this particular conception of politics and the
political also needs to be problematized. I elaborate on this particular point in Chapter 6.

others become subjects of security are fundamentally political."[119] Security and

politics, Fierke notes, far from belonging to distinct realms, are mutually implicated in

each other. Consequently, security emerges as the site of contestation, of politics and

power relations rather than being an objective condition.

In the next section, I will review the basic elements of these critical engagements

and explore the central themes and claims that characterize these approaches, before I

turn to a critical reading of specific proposals that the discontents with security have

given way to.

What is the Matter with Security?

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective

world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist

political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be

achieved,[120] critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the

production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and

what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point

shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly

inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in

relations of power. Their emphasis on the "ought" rather than the "is" reflects less a

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[119] Ibid., 4.

[120] Certainly there are variations among conventional forms of security analysis as in Walt's "balance of threat theory," which introduces perceived intentions to the list of factors that includes military power, geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities as the source of threats that states balance against. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis

on the *social* nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon

pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological

structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.[121]

Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to

those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.[122]

While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material

capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point

to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially

constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced

to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which

systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective

security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the

historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure

bodies, nations, and states.

Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under

the broad banner of Constructivism.[123] These scholars take as their premise the

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[121] Jutta Weldes et al., eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,1999); Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*.

[122] Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of `Critical Security Studies'."

[123] Although Constructivist perspectives are now commonly categorized as conventional and critical constructivists, I will not deploy this differentiation because what they have in common as opposed to traditional accounts is more central to my concerns. Further, since, as Zehfuss notes what constitutes "Constructivism" is itself a matter of debate, it would serve no intellectual purpose to continue down the road with a battle of categories. Maja Zehfuss,

proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore

subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and

state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge

the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to

ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material

factors.[124] In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,

which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For

instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or

Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of

states on different paths.[125] Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions

against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian

intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be

answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.[126] An example to these

investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO's post-Cold War

survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and

Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2002).

[124] Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press,1996).

[125] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[126] Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," *International Organization* 49, no. 1 (1995). Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution's survival in the absence of a distinct threat.[127]

The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in the absence of the "Soviet enemy" provide ample resource for scholars who focus on the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the "image of proliferation."[128] He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to particular patterns of foreign policy.

The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.[129] In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary

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[127] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of Nato," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
[128] David Mutimer, "Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation," in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 188.
[129] Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of `Critical Security Studies'."

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protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered

the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In

contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given

interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to

be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For

instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core

concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through

representational practices and linguistic elements.[130] Other investigations explore the

working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats

through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars

use "speech-act theory" to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as

security problems.[131]

 A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and post-

colonial perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to

map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic

security narratives. In his *Writing Security*, David Campbell investigates how certain

risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations

produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce

obedient subjects.[132] Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,

scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the

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[130] Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996).
[131] I will elaborate on these approaches in the section on "de-securitization" below.
[132] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective

identity.[133] Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the

1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the

West through a moral discourse based on universal values.[134]

Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and

racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of

security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between

economies of power and "truth" in the re/production of international hierarchies and

in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as "failed" or

lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars

demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal

encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these

hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,

social, and military relations.[135] They analyze the construction of the non-Western

subject as the inferior other—"the Southern" or "the Oriental"—and attend to the

ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security

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[133] Michael Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

[134] Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[135] Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies," *Review of International Studies* 32(2006); Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Steve Niva, "Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East," in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, ed. Jutta Weldes, et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1999).

practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.[136] Introducing

feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases

imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and

insecurity from the perspective of women.[137]

A crucial insight that emerges from these analyses is the way politics of

security works through exclusions, entrenching existing hierarchies, reproducing

relations of power and domination. Some scholars note that the desire for perfect

security could itself be misleading/misplaced. "Perhaps," writes Fierke, "too much

emphasis is placed, in theory and practice, on removing insecurity from political life,

as if this were possible."[138] Darby argues that insecurity has generally been taken in

one direction only, leading to a call to make people and states more secure, and casting

insecurity as a problem that needs to be overcome.[139] Consequently, he suggests that

what is missing in most of the writing on security "is not only that the acceptance of

some insecurity is a condition of security itself, but that insecurity can be enabling as

well as disabling."[140] Maja Zehfuss's discussion of U.S. foreign policy following the

September 11 attacks resonates with Darby's analysis to the extent that she embraces

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[136] Himadeep Muppidi, "Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The Persistent Puzzle of U.S.-Indian Relations," in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, ed. Jutta Weldes, et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[137] Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

[138] Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 8.

[139] Phillip Darby, "Security, Spatiality, and Social Suffering," *Alternatives* 31(2006).

[140] Ibid., 465.

the inescapability of insecurity and the foreignness at the heart of identity, which can never be entirely removed and that needs to be recognized so as to transform the relation to the other.[141]

In what follows, I will explore how these voiced discontents with security have led critical scholars to question and, in various ways, disrupt the order of security. What makes these analyses significant is their attempt not merely to broaden the concept of security beyond its traditional focus and boundaries, but to attend to the possibility of alternatives given the deeply problematic nature of security. I will now offer a close reading of these proposals and ask: To what extent do these critical engagements open a way to think beyond the politics of security?

Security… No More?

Displacing Security

The first text that I will focus on comes from the selected proceedings of a conference entitled "Displacing Security," convened at the York Center for International Security Studies in 1999.[142] In the first article of the collection, Amitav Acharya takes to task ethnocentric nature of the discipline of International Relations and disciplinary analyses of security. He identifies three ways in which what he, in quite a blanket category, refers to as the non-West is ignored within the discipline. On the one hand, he argues, as a hegemonic project, the study of security reflects the

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[141] Maja Zehfuss, "Forget September 11," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2003).
[142] Amitav Acharya, "Ethnocentricism and Emancipatory I.R. Theory," in *Displacing Security: Critical Re-Evaluations of the Boundaries of Security Studies*, ed. Marshall Beier and Samantha Arnold (Toronto: Center for International Security Studies, 2000).

concerns of a particular nation-state with imperial ambitions—namely, the United States. According to Acharya, this disciplinary investment (i.e., a discipline's entanglement in imperial webs of power) structurally imposes a dis-investment: ignorance of security issues in the "third world." On the other hand, he argues that dominant perspectives write about the security of others from an epistemic space that privileges one's own perspective. This situation has been the case in the rendering of the "third world" as a side-shadow of super-power rivalry during the Cold War. Lastly, he points to the way in which "third world" experiences are rendered as inferior or primitive. Acharya reminds the reader of the most acute manifestation of this tendency: the Correlates of War Project, which excludes colonial wars from its database because one of the sides, one of the participants of these wars, is regarded as not holding adequate political status.

While Acharya's assertions are very much open to debate—such as his presentation of the "third world" as a monolithic subject exterior to imperial projects, or the extent to which non-recognition by the powers that be would necessarily translate into a space of politico-epistemic opposition on its own—what is especially striking is the imaginary of security that haunts the text. Yes, we are told, security as securing the powerful is at work in writing security. Yes, we are reminded, foundational myths of 1648 as the origin of modern international system undergird contemporary understandings of security and in doing so generate an essentially racist project. And yes, insecurities of others cannot but be excluded from this particular discourse, which masquerades as universal. Why is it, then, after going through a long

list of troubles that pertain to speaking the meaning of security of/for others, that an author would suggest that if only the main obstacle (i.e., ignorance of the process of identity formation in the non-West) is overcome, we can achieve "a more genuine security"? Why would an author who apparently does not seek to partake in the reproduction of hegemonic projects, critically embrace a project of "emancipation" to achieve "authentic security" rather than questioning the latter as "white mythology"? Why would a thought reproduce the same categories of thought after denouncing them because they belong to the Police of a world order?

Beyond Security

Another text that is illuminating for my purposes is Anthony Burke's *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War Against the Other*.[143] The author, in his words, "insists upon a critical approach" and casts the meaning of being critical as an attitude—an ethos of critique that refuses to accept hegemonic and common sense representations of the world.[144] According to Burke, a critical engagement with security and—as the title of the book suggests—the effort to go "beyond security" necessitate an engagement with the very categories of thought, the premises and assumptions that underlie discourses and practices of security. In this regard, Burke takes to task not only the instances of imperial aggression and violence, but also their mainstream critiques. He demonstrates the way in which scholarly discourse on just and unjust wars normalize war and create ethical loopholes for militaries to legitimize

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[143] Anthony Burke, *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
[144] Ibid., 2.

the killing and injury of civilians.

Burke's book opens on a personal note as the author recounts the horror of being targeted by peers with "sticks and rocks" as a six-year-old. The story chillingly reminds the reader of William Golding's *Lord of the Flies,* where the brutal face of a civilization is revealed through the figure of the innocent child. Burke rightfully reminds us that this remote memory of brutalization is not a relic but an everyday reality for millions who suffer direct and indirect violence while he acknowledges that the aggression he was exposed to as child is "barely comparable" to the violence they experience. The world we live in, he writes, is "a world that is addicted to suffering— to a rational, functional suffering embedded in the very patterns of politics and order that regulate global life."[145] In investigating these global patterns of insecurity, violence, and conflict that are getting ever more destructive, he argues that it is crucial to understand the production of and seizure of life by power beneath the overarching promise of security.

Burke starts his analysis by diagnosing the impossibility of achieving security and points out the way in which the production of insecurities, drawing the lines of exclusion and creating its abject subjects, constitutes the condition of possibility of the promise of security. As he explains, the politics of security operates by deploying the threat and difference of the Other as the basis of the unity and the identity of the body politic, which, in its historical articulation, is embodied in the nation-state. Rather than seeing security as an end, he argues for a need to understand security as a political technology of rule that works through totalizing and individualizing strategies.

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[145] Ibid., 1.

Consequently, "security," writes Burke, "is less a desired end of politics than a system of politics whose end is only itself."[146]

After being told that security is itself a form of power, a technology of rule, one is caught by surprise to find out that the aim of the analysis is the transformation of ethical and strategic practices to make "security after security" possible.[147] While making his reservations and voicing hesitations about its dangers (such as its possibility to be co-opted by statist projects and its danger to slide into dogmatism in thought and practice), Burke nevertheless endorses the thought promoted most forcefully and insistently by scholars such as Ken Booth (a stance now labeled as the Welsh School of critical security studies) and embraces the equation of security with the project of emancipation undergirded by cosmopolitan ideals.[148] The "beyond" of security that Burke sets out to reach turns out to be not a thought of a politics beyond security, but a thought in search of security in an ethically responsible way. In this elegant and sensitive effort to re-think "the form and structure of being that security secures" so as to enable non-violent forms of interconnection, we are still told to strive

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[146] Ibid., 6.

[147] Ibid., 17.

[148] Ibid., 19-20. In the words of Booth, security as emancipation aims at "the freeing of people… from constraints that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do" and offers "a politics of hope for a common humanity." Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 319. In a recent re-articulation of this thesis, Booth seems to prove Burke's hesitations about the dangers of lapsing into dogmatism as he reminds scholars working in a critical vein that they may not act as freely as they wish after all. ———, "Beyond Critical Security Studies," in *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2005). Taking as his point of criticism the "eclectic" nature of studies provided under the label of critical security studies, Booth writes: "It is impossible to base a research strategy or political activities on an eclectic collection of perspectives…There are times when definite lines have to be drawn… [R]esearch strategies and political projects require a sense of focus and a sense of direction, and these are not offered by eclectic rejectionism" (260).

for "a security after security."[149] A license to problematize security is extended

simultaneously with a reminder about the need to never give up on the promise of

security. The way in which equating security with emancipation—albeit in its nuanced

form—could be complicit in the re/production of the very structures of violence it

purports to challenge remains unquestioned.

De-securitization

One of the influential strands of voiced discontents with security has come

from scholars who conceptualize security as a speech act that constructs a specific

form of politics. In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Barry Buzan, Ole

Waever, and Jaap de Wilde set out to explore the logic of security and differentiate

security and securitization from that which is merely political.[150] This differentiation

takes as its departure point the assumption that security in international relations is not

identical to the use of the term in everyday language. They argue that international

security has its own distinctive, more extreme meaning that differentiates it from its

other usages as in the case of social security. Security as it is articulated to the

international, the authors suggest, designates the former as a matter of survival: it is

the presentation of an issue "as posing an existential threat to a designated referent

object."[151] Hence, it is not merely the existence of threats and vulnerabilities that

makes an issue a security issue since such threats can arise in many areas. Rather, it

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[149] Burke, *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other*, 20.
[150] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
[151] Ibid., 21.

requires those issues to be "staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind."[152] Through speech acts, state representatives declare an emergency condition and claim the right to use whatever means they deem necessary to block the development. Security is cast as an extreme version of politicization that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the securitized issue either as an object of a special kind of politics or as something above politics.

It is this extreme politicization—perhaps what one could call a statization of politics—that forms the basis of this particular form of discontent with security. Daniel Deudney, for instance, argues that in the case of the environment, making it a security issue incites state mobilization and leads to undesirable consequences and counterproductive measures.[153] Similarly, Stefan Elbe attends to the ethical dilemmas of securitization of HIV/AIDS as a global health issue.[154] The dilemma, according to Elbe, arises from the fact that while such a response bolsters international AIDS initiatives by raising awareness and resources, it also militarizes the issue by pushing the initiatives away from civil society toward military and intelligence organizations. It brings into play a threat-defense logic that casts international efforts as a function of narrow national interest rather than altruism.

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[152] Ibid., 5.
[153] Daniel Deudney, "The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 19, no. 3 (1990).
[154] Stefan Elbe, "Should Hiv/Aids Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking Hiv/Aids and Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 50(2006).

Given the discontents, these scholars contest the widespread notion of "the more security the better" and argue that security should be viewed negatively as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics.[155] Waever explicitly argues that de-securitization—defined as the shifting of issues out of emergency mode into a normal bargaining process—rather than security should be the main goal.[156] The concept of de-securitization aims to capture the dynamics of contestation and replacement of security speech acts by other forms of speech, which would give voice to the voiceless and represent the vulnerability and the suffering of individuals.

Yet, a central problem with casting politics of security in terms of performative speech acts while upholding de-securitization as the goal to be achieved is noted by Huysmans, who points to the normative dilemmas of writing security.[157] The normative dilemma, he argues, stems from writing or speaking security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid; namely, the securitization of issues such as migration and drugs. Huysmans regards this dilemma as a direct implication of the interpretation of security as a social construction. Consequently, he argues that the Constructivist agenda has to accept the normative dilemma as a dilemma and suggests that this dilemma could be moderated by focusing

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[155] Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.
[156] Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
[157] Jef Huysmans, "Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 (2002).

on the institutionalization of threat-environments and by providing sociological

inquiries that show the unequal capacities of utterances to securitize issues.[158]

Apart from the ambivalence about when securitization is to be preferred over

de-securitization (since securitization itself is posited to be useful for mobilizing

political action and bringing to attention insecurities that are not given a priority on the

agenda of international security),[159] scholars have pointed out a more fundamental

problem that affects the agenda of securitization and de-securitization. That problem

pertains to the question of the type of politics that is presumed by securitization

theorists and how de-securitization is imagined as an antithesis to it. As Aradau

argues, it is only in relation to the presumed normalcy of liberal democracy that

exceptional moments are theorized and that, without the normative assumptions about

what politics is, the effects of securitization cannot be captured.[160] Since Aradau's

proposal directly engages with the question of an alternative form of politics to the

politics of security, it necessitates a close engagement so as to see to what extent the

conception of "politics out of security" that she offers helps us to abandon the promise

of security.

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[158] I should note that according to Taureck such a normative dilemma does not exist and such criticisms arise from the pure misconceptions about the analytical goal of securitization theory. From this perspective, securitization theory merely offers "a tool for practical security analysis." Rita Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, no. 1 (2006).
[159] Elbe, "Should Hiv/Aids Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking Hiv/Aids and Security."
[160] Claudia Aradau, *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security* (New York: Palgrave, 2008).

Out of Security

In *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security*, Aradau proposes

an understanding of security "in its larger function of ordering the social"[161] and

explores the possibilities for "unmaking of security practices."[162] According to

Aradau, security is neither a rhetorical structure of survival and urgency nor is it the

totality of discursive/non-discursive practices that govern agency. Security, she

suggests, should be conceptualized as a form of problematization that structures the

social fabric in exclusionary terms. "As a nexus of representation and intervention,"

she writes, "security creates spaces of abjection, spaces of exclusion and

particularity."[163] According to Aradau, security also depoliticizes the actions of

subjects by mobilizing clinical knowledges to understand and describe those who are

dangerous as well as those who are to be protected.

Aradau's investigation focuses on the problematization of human trafficking as a

security issue within the context of the European Union. She starts her analysis by

diagnosing the way in which two apparently opposite stances exist on the issue. On the

one hand, trafficking in women is constructed as a matter of illegal migration,

organized crime, and prostitution by the European Union, its individual members

states, and the media. On the other hand, NGOs formulate the issue as a human rights

problem and emphasize the rights of victims in their struggle against trafficking. Yet,

both of these positions, Aradau argues, share the same underlying political logic.

Treating the trafficked women as victims to be protected or as criminals to be deported

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[161] Ibid., 6.
[162] Ibid., 7.
[163] Ibid., 190.

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remove the migrants from the space of the political community they attempt to enter. Put differently, both the humanitarian discourse and the security regime beget a "perverse politics"[164] that constitute the migrants as abject subjects to be governed, exposing them to different forms of incarceration or normalization. Suspending security's logic of exclusion and tearing down the closure it instantiates, in other words, "unmaking security"[165] is presented by Aradau as a political task.

Aradau's placement of the question of alternative forms of politics and political subjectivities at the center makes it a powerful and appealing analysis. However, one is left wondering why a parallel break—a questioning as radical as the "insurrectional politics"[166] that her analysis purports—with the value of security is left out of consideration. Why is it that we end up asking the same question as we did in Burke's analysis: "[C]an security be thought differently, re-conceptualized so as to entail other forms of subjectivity?"[167] Why should we still embrace security while we radically contest its exclusionary logic?

Aradau answers the question of what a politics out of security entails by positing that a politics that unmakes security needs to sever its connection to particularity.[168] Drawing from the works of thinkers such as Alan Badiou and Etienne Balibar, she argues for a politics of universality, equality, and freedom that entails the constitution

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[164] Claudia Aradau, "The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human Trafficking," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 2 (2004).
[165] Aradau, *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security*, 9.
[166] Ibid., 192.
[167] Ibid., 8.
[168] Ibid., 166-88.

of "excessive subjects"[169] who disrupt the logic of security on the basis of claims to equality and liberty. Perhaps as a preemptive reply against potentially nagging questions about how a politics of universality and emancipation could lead to a similar closure of the political space that security enforces, Aradau presents equality and liberty not as goals to be achieved or programs to be implemented, but as principles of action. As if to ease such concerns, "[a] politics of universality, equality and freedom," Aradau writes, "is not devoid of conflict and division… The division of prescriptive principles is a division without closure."[170]

Yet, paradoxically, this is precisely what Aradau's analysis ends up suggesting as she critically engages with what she categorizes as the ethical response to the violence of the politics of security. According to Aradau, neither positing an infinite ethics of responsibility conceptualized from a Levinasian perspective nor formulating limit concepts in a Derridean fashion so as to preserve an unbridgeable gap between responsibility and decision could give us a secure map.[171] The desire for security rears its head in this analysis as Aradau articulates her impatience with Levinas and Derrida for formulating "unworldly" demands that "can never be inscribed in the structures of the world and never come to be."[172] If a politics out of security implies "a division without closure,"[173] as Aradau suggests, then how is it possible for the author to argue that "when exploring a political situation, it is possible to say that some decisions are

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[169] Ibid., 118-44.
[170] Ibid., 194.
[171] Ibid., 77.
[172] Ibid., 77.
[173] Ibid., 194.

'correct.' We know what the right decision is"?[174] Could not one doubt and ask who this universal "we" claiming to speak the truth of a decision? Could one argue that the anxiety voiced by Aradau—for instance, when she asks "What happens to change and transformation if we are caught in a permanent state of undecidability?"[175]—reflects the anxieties that pertain to modernity's subject of security in search of a secure ground?

Conclusion

The metaphor of the church has been offered by critical security studies scholars, who deploy it as a useful shorthand to describe critical security studies as a broad church that is united by a common aim despite the diversity of their ontological and epistemological assumptions; that is, to problematize conventional analyses of security.[176] Following the above discussion, I would like to push that analogy a bit further and suggest that investigations into the sign of security have indeed evolved into a shrine constituted by a high and a low church. While the high church (i.e., conventional security analyses) embraces security unproblematically, the low church (i.e., critical investigations on security) emerges from an internal critique of the high church by introducing changes that can be likened to the Protestant Reformation. Though no longer the same church, we still inhabit a church as the way to salvation. By taking security as indispensable, axiomatic—an unavoidable point of departure for thinking about the nature of political life—critical approaches reproduce the dogma,

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[174] Ibid., 78.
[175] Ibid., 78.
[176] Krause and Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*.

the doctrine of the church, and its theology. By holding onto the salvationary promise and securing security, critique becomes a form of questioning that protects and further consolidates a disciplinary project. It transforms into "an affirmative critique" that interrogates the foundations in order to fortify them.[177]

Perhaps one should not to be surprised, for as Campbell and Dillon argue, modern politics is itself a security project derivative of the metaphysical tradition.[178] Metaphysical thought, which informs the thought of the political in modernity and the thought of the international, is marked by "the pursuit of security, with securing a secure *arche*, a determining principle, beginning or ground, for which its understanding of truth and its quest for security calls."[179] Impressing itself as a self-evident condition for the very existence of individual and social life, security is the value from which political discourses of modernity, political power, institutions, and practices of international politics derive their grounding and foundational legitimacy. As Dillon writes

> The ground of a divinely ordained universe promising salvation for human beings as the ultimate form of spiritual security provides the ideal of community embodied in the Christian Church. No salvation without the Church, no church without salvation… In a way that indicates the continuity of the metaphysical tradition…this slogan can be, and was, easily adjusted to furnish the defining maxim of modern politics: no security outside the State; no State without security.[180]

It is this point of departure that captures the spirit of the project of dismantling

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[177] John Mowitt, *Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1992), 43.
[178] Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. See especially pp.42-51. Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought* (London: Routledge, 1996).
[179] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 13.
[180] Ibid., 14.

security as a task that could be described as the revaluation of values enacted on the

sacred order of a politics constituted as a politics of security. An untimely critique of

the politics of security suggests that to dismantle security is, therefore, not a method if

the latter is understood as a tool that can be deployed in the service of advancing

disciplinary knowledge around pre-articulated questions of the discipline of

International Relations—critical or otherwise. The call to dismantle is a call to

question texts of security to account for their complicity in securing security by

naturalizing the apparent fixity of the present. As untimely critique, dismantling

security must operate as a grammar that dislocates the time of the discipline that is

founded upon security, putting it out of synch with itself. In this regard, dismantling

security is concerned less with being "undisciplined"[181] in studying security than being

"antidisciplinary."[182]

In the following two chapters, I take up the themes of time and temporality of

security and security critique to think through and elaborate on the meaning and

implications of dismantling security as untimely. To this end, the next chapter focuses

on how security operates from a temporal perspective, how it configures the relation

between the present and the future, and to what effect; in what ways dominant forces

of security and capital write the future; and what this implies for the constitution of

politics. After this discussion on time and temporality of politics of security—what I

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[181] J. Marshall Beier and Samantha L. Arnold, "Becoming Undisciplined: Toward the Supradisciplinary Study of Security," *The International Studies Review* 7(2005). Arguing that security "cannot be satisfactorily theorized within the confines of disciplinary boundaries,"(41) the authors expose the problematic nature of inter-disciplinary approaches to security, which reifies disciplines by taking them ontologically, and calls for "supra-disciplinary" approach to the study of security.
[182] Mowitt, *Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object*.

refer to as "secure times"—I will re-visit the theme that animated my investigation in this chapter—namely, critical thinking on security. I will take as my departure point the contradictory outcome of critical engagements with security that I highlighted in this chapter. If critical thinking on security paradoxically consolidates rather than breaking apart the architecture of security, what form of thinking does "dismantling security" as security critique entail? This will be the main question that I will pursue in Chapter 5.

In 2003, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency made news headlines with what was perhaps the project with the shortest shelf-life since the Agency's establishment in the aftermath of the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1958. Only a single day lapsed between the announcement of the

Figure taken from Looney, 2003.

project and its swift cancellation amidst cries that condemned it as "utter stupidity" and "betting on death."[183] The project in question was foreseeing the establishment of Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence; or, in its more commonly known name, the "Terrorist Markets." The project was a market intended to allow speculators to earn profits by betting on the events that could cause insecurity and instability in the Middle East.[184] Analysts would use the prices of these markets as indicators of the likelihood of potential events. The assumption that informed the project was that the

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[183] Adam Meirowitz and Joshua A. Tucker, "Learning from Terrorism Markets," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 2 (2004).

[184] "Initially the site was to be confined to political economic, civil and military futures of the key Middle Eastern countries of Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, and the impact of U.S. involvement with each. A typical bet would involve issues such as whether the United States would pull its troops out of Saudi Arabia or whether the Egyptian currency was likely to fall by 20 percent by the end of the year." Robert Looney, "D.A.R.P.A's Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence: Outside the Box or Off the Wall?," *Strategic Insights* 2, no. 9 (2003).

intelligence derived through the price fluctuations would provide more accurate information than what could be obtained through other means.

Despite its quick removal from the political agenda, this uncanny project is worthy of reflection for it signifies far more than dubious ethical commitments or a momentary lapse of reason of the reasonable. Rather, it is symptomatic of a general trend that can be diagnosed within the context of the contemporary empire of security, where the logic of risk and preemption becomes generalized globally as a technology of rule and a strategy of accumulation. As I noted in Chapter 2, security and capital represent a wager on the future as they render contingencies of the future productive for power and profit. Transforming future uncertainty into present opportunity through risk, preemption blurs the distinction between the "not-yet" and the "now". The future (constituted as present-risk) gets integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable as security and capital project their force onto speculative futures.

Is the contemporary temporal homology between politics of security and capital merely accidental? Or are they expressive of a shared logic that calls for further interrogation? In this chapter I will pursue these questions and elaborate on the temporal structure that is enacted by the politics of security. Through this discussion, I aim to develop one aspect of the notion of "untimeliness" that dismantling security aims to capture.[185] As I suggested in the previous chapter, untimeliness, as I intend to use it, does not merely aim to go against the dominant aspects of its time. With the

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[185] The other aspect concerns the question of untimeliness in relation to critical thought. I will explore this theme in Chapter 5 and elaborate what an untimely critique of security entails.

notion of untimely, in other words, I do not merely imply going against the grain of contemporary doxa that posits security as a universal good and a major aim of politics. Rather, dismantling security as untimely critique entails challenging the *logic* of time that informs politics of security. Toward that end, what needs to be interrogated is the way in which security structures the relations between the present and the future, with what consequences, and through what form of closures and denial of possibilities.

In the previous chapters, I already alluded to the temporal dimension of security by depicting it as a salvationary promise. A promise always speaks of the future, about the future, and to the future. Within its promissory economy, politics of security configures the relation to the future in distinct ways through—as I will suggest below—a very perverse temporal logic, whereby this specific form of writing the future translates into "the wholesale liquidation of futurity."[186] Put differently, the politics of security writes the future as present, turning "future" into a dead referent as constant change translates into no change at all.

Interrogating the structure of time enacted by the politics of security and the temporality underwriting its salvationary economy introduces a dimension that is to a large extent ignored within International Relations. In contrast to social theory and political philosophy, the temporality of world politics is a neglected story in most

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[186] Fredric Jameson, "The End of Temporality," *Critical Inquiry* 29, no. 4 (2003): 704. Diagnosing the dominance of spatial thinking in the contemporary era, Jameson argues that with the vanishing of the pre-modern under conditions of late capitalism and reigning triumph of modernity across the globe, "the very sense of alternate temporality disappears" (699). Central to his argument is the idea that with the rise of finance, dynamics of the stock market begin to set the temporal rhythms of individual and collective life, conditioning the shrinkage of existential time and its reduction to the present. Universal reign of this micro-temporality finds its expression in cultural form as the erasure of the historical past, together with the future, as the realm of long-term projections.

analyses within the discipline. While history, per se, and history in/of the present are usually acknowledged mostly by critical approaches,[187] time and temporality of the present and the future are largely ignored within disciplinary discussions. Hence, in the first section of this chapter, I will visit the works of few scholars who have engaged with the question of time and distinguish, differentiate, and clarify the politics of time that I take as my focus. I will introduce a different perspective on temporality by moving the discussion of time away from the two senses in which it has been employed so far in the analyses of world politics: time understood as an analytic category and time as a phenomenological experience of speed or tempo. In contrast, I will draw from materialist conceptions of time that can be found in the works of Antonio Negri, Moishe Postone, and Peter Osborne and focus on the structure of time that mediates social experience. As opposed to deploying time as a category of understanding or focusing on the experience of time in the form of speed, such a perspective on time relegates a central place to temporality rooted in social production and accentuates the mediations that link phenomenological experience, individual subjectivities, and the historical conditions of existence of that experience. It is upon this basis that I will build my discussion on time and temporality and interrogate the question of the future and futurity in relation to security.

Since the launch of the so-called Global War on Terror, the question of the future emerged as an important aspect in the disciplinary debates on the changing

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[187] For a brief overview of the way in which questions of history and historical change are sidetracked under the disciplinary dominance of ahistorical utilitarian approaches: R.B.J. Walker, "History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 18, no. 2 (1989).

nature of contemporary politics of security. In the second section, I will suggest that

these discussions need to be situated within the temporality of bio-political modernity.

Central to my argument will be the way in which political temporality in modernity

becomes a unit measure of life, inserting "bios" (forms-of-life) within a charted

horizon of production of value. The law of value as it is construed through the time of

life (i.e., population) and the time of capital casts the future as a recapitulation of the

present and inserts lived time into what, following Braun,[188] I will refer to as the

temporality of the process: a "de-historicalizing"[189] temporal form that annihilates

political time as possibility and writes the future as present. Within this temporal

structure, meaning inheres only to the process and individual and collective life and

action gets reduced to mere instruments that are valorized to the degree that they

reproduce the process. This is what renders modern temporality a fatal structure of

time.[190] This discussion will lay the groundwork for positioning dismantling security

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[188] Kathrin Braun, "Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault," *Time & Society* 16, no. 5 (2007).

[189] Peter Osborne, "Marx and the Philosophy of Time," *Radical Philosophy* 147(2008): 16.

[190] Aiming "to formulate a properly Spinozist-Marxian-Lacanian theory of temporality and historicity in secular capitalist modernity," (541) Kordela also alludes to the fatal structure of time albeit from a different theoretical framework. A. Kiarina Kordela, "Capital: At Least It Kills Time—Spinoza, Marx, Lacan, and Temporality," *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society* 18, no. 4 (2006). According to Kordela, in secular, capitalist modernity, circulation-time sets the dominant mode of temporality where semantic and economic value (value of a thing, a word, a person) is determined only in its differential relation to other values (i.e., in synchronic temporality—"where instantaneity and eternity coincide" (543)). Explicating the identical formal structures of commodity and secular reason, both of which consist of value (543), she suggests that

> [C]apitalism has already killed time; both the time in which people can kill time, and the time in which they can also kill, be killed, and die. The eternal laws of value postulate that all that remain in legitimacy are the circulation and credit-times of exchangeable and immortal values (561).

This analysis recasts conception of history as a system composed of synchronic blocks, where each block is defined by its own formal logic. According to Kordela, the question of the

as an untimely critique that seeks the political appropriation of time by countering the dominant temporality that structures contemporary experience of time under the global hegemony of security and the reign of capital.

Politics of Time[191]

Historical materialist conceptions of time and temporality in modernity provide important clues in exploring the shared temporal logic between politics of security and capital. As I explore in depth below, these accounts highlight the importance of attending to the temporal forms through which every day experience is mediated under conditions of capitalist production. Drawing from Marx's insight on the conceptual relationships between time, value, and life, Negri, Postone, and Osborne offer an analytic of time that highlights the way in which homogenization of labor-time under capitalism—the time of abstract labor—constitute the dominant temporal form in modernity and why this particular temporal logic needs to be taken into account in the articulation of a materialist politics of time. It is upon this premise—the temporal structure that mediates social experience in modernity—that I will premise my discussion of "the processual structure of time" in the following section. Before getting into the details of this argument and elaborate the distinct temporal logic that undergirds politics of security and capital, let me briefly clarify how such a materialist

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"future" and the new translates into an articulation of a different historical block with a different configuration at the level of its formal structure.
[191] This section gets its title from Peter Osborne's seminal work, which has been very influential in terms of thinking through the central claims in this chapter. Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (London, New York: Verso, 1995). I would like to thank Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo for calling my attention to the works of Osborne.

perspective on time contrasts with existing accounts of time in global politics.

In contrast to spatial aspects of world politics, time and temporality rarely make their way to the agenda of disciplinary studies of international politics.[192] This pattern, to a large extent still intact, is increasingly countered by studies carried from post-structuralist perspectives. These investigations focus on cultural politics of memory,[193] discursive framing and representations of time in the constitution of nation-state and citizenship[194] or in relation to contemporary security practices of the Western states in their War on Terror.[195] While problematizing the privileged status accorded to spatiality and bringing forth the temporal aspects of world politics, these studies do not provide a direct and sustained interrogation into questions of time and temporality; nor do they elaborate a theory about time. In order to clarify what I mean by—what I refer to as—the temporal structure of the contemporary empire of security (which I will discuss at length in the second section), I want to first visit and briefly review two exceptions to this general trend within the discipline. These are the investigations provided by Kimberley Hutchings and James Der Derian, who make conceptual and theoretical discussion of time and temporality central to their works.

In her *Time and World Politics*, Kimberley Hutchings incorporates the element

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[192] Duncan S. A. Bell, "History and Globalization: Reflections on Temporality," *International Affairs* 79, no. 4 (2003).
[193] Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Maria Malksoo, "The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 4 (2009).
[194] R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[195] Aradau and Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future."; Marieke de Goede, "Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 2-3 (2008).

of time along Kantian lines.[196] Arguing that human perception is always mediated by

spatial field and temporal duration, Kant posited that time and space are transcendental

conditions of sensible experience. Hutchings's investigation in this regard is post-

Kantian in nature. As she explains, what constitutes her central concern is also "the

role of time in experience and understanding…with the connection between time and

judgment."[197] Despite this similar point of departure, she takes a post-Kantian step by

focusing not on time as the condition of individual experience, but on "inter-subjective

time of politics."[198] She posits that time of politics is essentially contested in nature in

the sense that multiple conceptions of time co-exist in each society. Distinguishing

two aspects of time as chronos (time as qualitatively measurable duration) and kairos

(time as transformational time of action), she explores different theories of

contemporary world politics, interrogating how these different approaches think of the

present in a globalized world. What is interesting in her analysis is the way in which

each theoretical framework, no matter how atemporal a narrative it might seem to be

at first glance, presumes a certain conception of time and temporality. For instance, on

the surface, Realist and Neorealist arguments would seem to provide a static, timeless

image by suggesting that there are certain recurrent features of international politics

and that these features require actors to act according to the dictates of these timeless

laws by learning from the wisdom of ages. Yet, what Hutchings's critical interrogation

reveals is that in every case (including Realist and Neorealist explanations), the

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[196] Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present* (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2008).
[197] Ibid., 4.
[198] Ibid., 4.

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diagnosis extended about the nature of the present and the prescriptions for action that ensue from this diagnosis rely upon assumptions about world-political temporality wherein different conceptions of chronos and kairos and the relation between them are embedded. According to Hutchings, all theoretical accounts of globalization deploy a conception of politics associated with the project of controlling time (as chronos) and creating a different kind of time (through the power of kairos). Her central critique is that all these theories end up universalizing a particular temporal experience inherent in Western modernity. Consequently, she argues, they end up subsuming multiple temporal frameworks into the homogenizing time of the present. According to Hutchings, such a homogenization occludes the possibility of recognizing the temporal multiplicity that constitutes global politics, and it relegates all phenomena that do not fit to this representation to the outside of world-political time. Drawing from post-colonial and feminist scholarship, she offers a different way of thinking about time that does not posit politics as a matter of controlling time and cast theoretical thinking as a matter of prophecy or time traveling.

In his engagement with the temporal dimension of world politics, James Der Derian takes a different route. In his works, not the temporal assumptions that underlie narratives of world politics, but time itself is incorporated into the analytical framework in the form of phenomenological experience of rhythm or tempo. Drawing from the works of thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Paul Virilio, Der Derian premises his overall argument on the reificatory effects of technologization: how contemporary realities of world politics are generated by technical means of

production and how these new forces erode the traditional foreign policy tools and the culture of diplomacy to mediate relations between political communities.[199] He places novel technologies of simulation, surveillance, and speed at the center of his analysis and investigates the way in which these new forces and the discursive practices surrounding them transform the nature of international relations.[200] Introduction of war games and simulations, he suggests, change the nature of representational practices; increasing speed of weapon systems, communications, and decision-making give way to new forms of surveillance. His main argument is that these transformations generate a post-modern problematic that lays beyond the grasp of conventional methods of analysis.

According to Der Derian, new technological practices give way to novel forms of mediation between states through the discursive power of chronopolitics and technostrategy.[201] Chronopolitics is used to capture the displacement of geography/spatial determination by chronology, overtaking of space by pace; technostrategy refers to the ways in which transformations in technology configure the way wars are fought and the stakes entailed in war-making. The overall implication of— what Der Derian names as—the post-modern practices is that wars transform from being spatial to being temporal and perceptual phenomena. New forms of data-gathering and surveillance enact a new regime of normalization as conflicts gets consigned to the cyberspace of simulations and war games. For instance, in his

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[199] James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).
[200] ———, "The (S)Pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990).
[201] Ibid.

Antidiplomacy, Der Derian analyzes "cyberwar" and "cyberspace" within the context

of the second Gulf War.[202] "Cyberwar" refers to the "technologically generated,

televisually linked, and strategically gamed form of violence that dominated the

formulation as well as the representation of U.S. policy in the Gulf,"[203] whereas

"cyberspace" designates the simulational practices through which "globally

networked, computer-sustained, computer-accessed, and computer-generated,

multidimensional, artificial, or 'virtual reality' is created."[204] According to Der Derian,

this virtual reality blurs the distinction between representation and fiction. Put

differently, these post-modern practices, which "are more 'real' in time than space,"

exercise their power through the exchange of signs, not goods, and produce effects

that are "transparent and pervasive rather than material and discreet."[205] Their power

consists in displacing the "reality" of international relations they purport to represent.

What is important to note is that the account of time found in Der Derian's

argument is one of time understood as rhythm or tempo.[206] Drawing on the

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[202] Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*.
[203] Ibid., 175.
[204] Ibid., 119-20.
[205] Ibid., 297.
[206] A similar notion of time and temporality can be found in contemporary political theory as well. For instance, Sheldon Wolin argues that in the contemporary era "political time is out of synch with the temporalities, rhythms, and pace governing economy and culture." Sheldon Wolin, "What Time Is It?," *Theory & Event* 1, no. 1 (1997). According to Wolin, political time in a democracy requires "a leisurely pace" that could accommodate deliberation. Yet, the temporal demands of democracy conflict with the pace of the economy and culture whose temporalities are dictated by innovation, change, and rapid turnover. While sharing the diagnosis about the accelerating pace in the contemporary era, Connolly argues that the question for politics is not—contra Wolin—how to slow down, but "how to work with and against a world moving faster than heretofore to promote a positive ethos of pluralism" (143). William E. Connolly, "Democracy and Time," in *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).

"dromocratic revolution"[207] thesis extended by Paul Virilio, Der Derian argues that speed constitutes the "final battlefield" in the contemporary era.[208] Rapid increase in weapon delivery systems, decreasing human response time and appearance of real-time representation alter the battlefield. In other words, time becomes a part of this analytical framework through speed, the accelerating pace. Speed, Der Derian argues, renders space and geopolitical accounts of war and politics redundant to the extent that it dominates transactions and replaces territorial boundaries with informational nodes as the emergent sites of power politics.

A parallel account of time and temporality understood as phenomenological experience of speed is found in Michael Shapiro's diagnosis regarding the fate of national citizenship in global times. [209] In terms similar to Der Derian, Shapiro argues

[207] Arguing that "[s]peed is the unknown side of politics," (57) Virilio asserts that experience of time and temporality gain meaning in relation to spatial categories of location and proximity, which are determined by technological developments in different historical eras. Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer, *Pure War: Twenty Five Years Later* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008). He identifies three forms of proximity found in geopolitical history: metabolic (the rate at which human bodies and animals traverse space), mechanical (rates set by mechanized means of transportation such as trains, planes, and automobiles), and the latest one, namely, the electromagnetic (set by electronic transmissions where the speed of light determines the rate of proximity). According to Virilio, each form of proximity shapes the nature of war and politics. While the time and space of the *polis* is constituted by the strategic response to nomadic warfare, 19th century mass warfare power and the industrial revolution determine the time and space of the nation-state. Finally, nuclear weapons drive the development of communication technologies that yield to the virtual time and space of "globalitarianism." Speed and acceleration of temporal experience enabled by the latest turn eliminates the relevance of space; instantaneity subsumes local time and leads to the disappearance of the present.

[208] Der Derian, "The (S)Pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed."

[209] Michael Shapiro, "National Times and Other Times: Re-Thinking Citizenship," *Cultural Studies* 14, no. 1 (2000). The juxtaposition between the time of statecraft as opposed to the time of global flows (of capital and people) also informs Shapiro's analysis of subjectivity and resistance within the space of the global city. ———, "The Now Time(S) of the Global City: Displacing Hegel's Geopolitical Narrative," in *49th Annual Session of the International Studies Association* (San Francisco, 2008).

that the accelerating pace of world politics and the increasing movement of bodies open the way to questioning and challenging the state's "symbolic management of citizens"[210] by imposing a temporal coherence through official historical narratives about shared ethnic and social characteristics. It is interesting to note that in both cases, scholars' claim about a historical rupture (i.e., that we are now living in a new age of acceleration, of constant movement of bodies, information) is married to a historicist claim (i.e., that in such a historical juncture what is needed is a new analytics). Casting "the new" into an ambivalent status, such a framing begs the question of whether the analytical tools that are "now" deemed as insufficient were ever sufficient in the first place.

By treating time as a category of understanding in a Kantian fashion, Hutchings integrates time and temporality as an a priori condition of knowledge with the aim to show how authoritative claims to know time end up universalizing a particular temporal experience, subsuming temporal multiplicity of world politics into the homogenizing time of the present. Alternatively, in the works of scholars such as Der Derian and Shapiro, we are provided with an account of time as it is immediately given and experienced in the everyday as acceleration and an increasing speed of transaction and connectivity. Neither of these accounts, however, attends to the crucial mediating role played by temporality of social production, which is pointed out by Marxist accounts of time and temporality in modernity. My argument that the politics of security and capital write the future as present through the temporal logic of the process is premised on the idea that what is at stake in such a discussion about the

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[210] Shapiro, "National Times and Other Times: Re-Thinking Citizenship," 81.

future is not merely a discussion concerning the chronologically new, but historically

new. In other words, the future in question is not about what comes next, but the

possibility of alternative temporal structures, alternative temporalizations of history.[211]

In contrast to Hutchings's understanding of politics of time as a function of knowledge

or a politics of time that is about regulating speed along Der Derian's analysis, what I

intend to capture is the notion of a politics of time in the sense that is described by

Osborne as a "politics that takes temporal structures of social practices as specific

objects of its transformative (or preservative) intent."[212] As I will elaborate, what is

central to this argument is the temporality rooted in social production, which renders

historical time as distinct and the politics of time as central. In this regard, it is a

politics of time that entails "struggles over the experience of time,"[213] or the way in

which different senses of time and possibility are enabled or distorted, the experience

of history that they make possible or impede, and the futures they ensure. Building

upon this insight, my suggestion that bio-politics and capital cast the future as present

aims to capture their underlying temporal structure and expresses the idea that the de-

historicalizing temporality (a chronological time of measure) constitutes the secure

times of the contemporary empire of security.

Before turning to this discussion, let me briefly elaborate on what such a

materialist politics of time entails by engaging with two influential figures—Antonio

Negri and Moishe Postone—who have written on time and temporality in liberal,

capitalist modernity. This discussion will help me to clarify why attending to the

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[211] Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde*.
[212] Ibid., xii.
[213] Ibid., 200.

temporal structure of social experience and historical time is a crucial issue that is often evaded within analyses of world politics. Both thinkers turn to Marx—especially to his later works such as *Grundrisse* and *Capital*—to re-read and re-interpret relations of power, structures of domination, and exploitation in modernity by re-formulating Marx's labor theory of value, which posits abstract labor and socially necessary time as key categories of understanding. In their analyses, Negri and Postone make time and temporality central and attempt to articulate a materialist understanding of time, which was fundamental to Marx's thought, but was never explicitly conceptualized in his works.[214]

Negri, in his *Time for Revolution,* provides the conceptual foundations for his later collaborative triology with Michael Hardt.[215] In this work, he attempts to articulate "a materialist, dynamic and collective conception of time."[216] He deploys time in the dual sense: time as both the measure of exploitation and the horizon of revolution. He takes issue with what he identifies as a central aporia within traditional Marxist conceptualizations of temporality under conditions of real subsumption. Real subsumption describes contemporary conditions wherein labor gets totally subsumed to the capitalist imperative of extracting surplus value. Under these conditions, he suggests, money transforms into being money as capital. "Monetary circulation," he writes, "must and wants to be directly productive circulation."[217] This transformation

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[214] Karen Miller, "The Question of Time in Postone's *Time, Labor and Social Domination*," *Historical Materialism* 12, no. 3 (2004).
[215] Antonio Negri, *Time for Revolution*, trans. Matteo Mandarini (New York, London: Continuum, 2003).
[216] Ibid., 21.
[217] Ibid., 65.

opens up the totality of social relations to being appropriated and placed in relations of

capitalist valorization beyond the factory. The crucial implication of this

transformation, Negri argues, is that one can no longer speak of an ontology of time

distinct from the process of value production. When "[t]he time of production"

becomes "the time of life," totality of social relations are put under the command of

"abstract time" of valorization (time as measure of value).[218] Opposing this abstract

time, which is a time of transcendence, of identity, of totalization, is what Negri calls

the concrete time of subversion. "Concrete time" in Negri's words is "multiple,

antagonistic, productive, constitutive, open time"[219]—a form of time that is

immanently de-totalizing and self-deferring. It entails different modes of individuation

that are antagonistic to capitalist socialization. In sum, in Negri's analysis, temporality

of social production brings about an opposition between different forms of time:

commodified, abstract time and the time of creativity, subversion.

Despite working with a different conceptual and theoretical architecture,[220]

Postone also takes time as the central category in his analysis of the dynamics of

modern capitalist society as he explores how a sociality produced through commodity-

exchange creates an abstract form of domination.[221] Through "a fundamental

reinterpretation of Marx's mature critical theory,"[222] he argues that capital, rather than

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[218] Ibid., 42.
[219] Ibid., 42.
[220] Postone's relegating the category of labor to the status of an object that needs to be criticized rather than being embraced puts these two frameworks in stark opposition. See footnote 21.
[221] Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[222] Ibid., 3.

being a form of economic exploitation imprinting itself on society, is itself constitutive

of a particular form of society—a social universe whose structuring principle is the

commodity-form.[223] He conceptualizes capitalism not merely in terms of private

property and ownership of the means of production, but as "a historically specific

form of social interdependence with an impersonal and seemingly objective

character."[224] It is a form of interdependence that is historically produced and

constituted by determinate forms of social practice (labor in capitalism), wherein the

latter paradoxically attains a quasi-independent status in relation to the people engaged

in these practices.

Like Negri's account of the totalizing time of capital (albeit on different

grounds), Postone shows how, in the social universe of capitalism constituted by the

commodity-form, time itself "becomes necessity."[225] Central to this analysis is the

differentiation he makes between material wealth—whose measure is a function of

specificity of the product, the activity that produces it, the needs it satisfies, the

customs of the marketplace, etc.—and value, which is "measured not in terms of the

particular objectifications of various labors, but in terms of what they all have in

common, regardless of their specificity."[226] The common denominator—abstract

labor—acts as the mediator between products and constitutes a general measure of

wealth.[227] Since the magnitude of a commodity's value is a function of the amount of

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[223] Ibid.
[224] Ibid., 3.
[225] Ibid., 191.
[226] Ibid., 188-89.
[227] This form of mediation, Postone argues, is structured by a historically determinate form of social practice (commodity-determined labor in capitalism). Based on this reading, Postone

labor time that is socially necessary for its production (taking its reference point the society as a whole), the latter constitutes "a general temporal norm,"[228] which the producers cannot but conform: being compelled both to produce and exchange commodities in order to survive and to abide the temporal norm expressed by socially necessary labor time in order to obtain "full value" of their labor time.

Postone makes a distinction, which resembles the one that Negri offers, between "concrete" and "abstract" time as he elaborates on the concept of socially necessary labor time and its relation to the nature of time in modern capitalist society. Here "concrete time," which is defined as the function of events (i.e., time as referred to, and understood through, natural cycles and the periodicities of human life as well as particular tasks or processes[229]) is opposed to "abstract time" ("uniform, continuous, homogenous, "empty" time [that is] independent of events"[230]), which is the time of abstract labor. According to Postone, before the rise of capitalist society, concrete time constituted the dominant conception of time (i.e., time was not an autonomous category independent of events). The abstract form of time associated with the capitalist social relations brings about a new form of domination—"an abstract form

differentiates two modes of critique of capitalism. 1) A critique of capitalism *from the standpoint of* labor (i.e., positing labor as a trans-historical category and presupposing a tension between aspects of social life characteristic of capitalism—such as market and private property—and the social sphere constituted by labor; thereby making labor the basis of critique) 2) A critique *of* labor in capitalism, which he elaborates in his work. In the latter case, labor is posited as historically specific, part of the essential structures of capitalist society, hence, itself as the object of the critique of that society (5-6). Ibid.
[228] Ibid., 191.
[229] Ibid., 201.
[230] Ibid., 202.

of compulsion"—as socially necessary labor time becomes the "temporal norm."[231] As

Postone writes, "[j]ust as labor is transformed from an action of individuals to the

alienated general principle of the totality under which the individuals are subsumed,

time expenditure is transformed from a result *of* activity into a normative measure *for*

activity."[232] From this point, he develops a somewhat ambivalent understanding of

historical time. Its ambivalence stems from the fact that, on the one hand, Postone

describes historical time as an ongoing directional movement that results from the

dynamic interaction between concrete and abstract time. On the other hand, he also

presents it as a form of concrete time.[233]

While affirming the mediating role of temporality of social production along

with Negri and Postone, Peter Osborne challenges such a conceptual opposition

between concrete time and abstract time.[234] Instead, he suggests that the opposition at

stake is not one between two forms of time (time of alienation versus fully human

time), but one between time per se (figured as quantitative: time as external, imposed

measure) and the distinct temporality of the human (qualitative historical time). Rather

than working with a binary understanding of time and positing capital as the totalizing

force while immediately affirming concrete time as a productive and creative source

of events (as de-totalization and differentiation), Osborne argues that the distinction

needs to be made between the abstract time of measure and historical time.[235] What is

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[231] Ibid., 214.
[232] Ibid., 214-15.
[233] Ibid., 293-98.
[234] Osborne, "Marx and the Philosophy of Time."
[235] Osborne develops his conception of historical time more fully in ———, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde*.

at stake in introducing the concept of history and historical time for Osborne is what he argues to be "the most politically crucial of issues"—namely, the theorization of the future. As he explains, "there is a future to the extent to which there is *qualitative historical novelty*… in the sense of changes in the dynamics of historical temporalization that effect the existential-ontological character of the human itself— for it is changes of that kind that the concept of history is ultimately required to support."[236]

It is beyond the scope of the present project to fully engage with these debates about how to conceptualize the future; that task would require a whole new project on its own. Rather, what is central for my concern is the way in which all these materialist perspectives on time and temporality highlight important questions about temporal structures that mediate experience of time in modernity. By pointing out the ongoing totalization of time, they render problematic assertions for an immediate return to phenomenological experience as suggested by Der Derian and Shapiro or conceptualizing world political time as "immanent, non-linear, plural 'becomings'"[237] as argued by Hutchings. As Osborne's discussion points out, arguments, such as Der Derian's, that we are now faced with post-modern problematics of time understood as rhythm and tempo leaves unanswered questions regarding historically specific temporal forms, specifically historical relations between the past, the present, and the future.

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[236] Peter Osborne, "Negation, Affirmation, the New," in *CRMEP Research Seminar* (Middlesex University London, 2009).
[237] Hutchings, *Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present*, 4.

It is against this background that I will now turn to a discussion of politics of security as a politics of time. As I noted in the introductory pages, the not-yet and the now gets blurred within the temporal matrix enacted by contemporary politics of security and capital accumulation. I will use the notion of processual time and try to show why the contemporary temporal homology between security and capital is not an accidental, a contingent phenomenon, or a mysterious collusion. By interrogating how security functions temporarily, I hope to clarify the meaning of dismantling security as an "untimely" critique that seeks the appropriation of time.

Temporality of the Process: Writing the Future as Present

In his analysis of security as a fetish, Spitzer makes an important observation as he notes the contradictory nature at the heart of security.[238] Since security exists, he argues, when something does not occur rather than when it does (i.e., since it depends on the absence of a certain range of foreseeable and unforeseeable events, conditions, and activities), it entails a major contradiction: while it is generally presented as a sound, calculated, and rational investment, security is actually an investment that is based on faith—a faith in the possibility or the probability of achieving control over an unpredictable, risky, and ultimately unknowable world. While Spitzer takes this diagnosis toward analyzing how security transforms into a commodity that is bought and sold in the market, I want to pursue a different route and elaborate on the perverse temporal logic that this faith gives rise to. I will argue that security and capital enact a

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[238] Spitzer, "Security and Control in Capitalist Societies: The Fetishism of Security and the Secret Thereof."

processual temporal structure that reduces political time to calculability and turns what is beyond measure—future as possibility—into a future as present. Within the temporal structure of the process, mobilization transfigures as immobility, change as repetition of the same, and time itself becomes a machine that hammers life into a mold.

Agamben's genealogical investigation of the temporal order in modernity provides a useful starting point to discuss processual time and elaborate how it writes the future as present.[239] Modern temporality, according to Agamben, marries circular, cyclical time of Greco-Roman antiquity with the continuous linear time of Christianity. Animated by a circular logic that "returns unceasingly back on itself,"[240] the former promises worldly immortality through the revelation of the timeless Truth of being as it posits the temporal —that which is in motion, influx—as "inferior degrees of reality"[241] in the face of immutable laws of Nature. It is these laws that guarantee "permanence" and "perpetuity" through "unchanged preservations of things through their repetition and continual return" and, thereby, figure time as "absolute immobility."[242] In Christianity, Agamben suggests, one encounters the antithesis of this temporal narrative. There, history becomes "a history of salvation, the progressive realization of redemption."[243] By giving direction and purpose to time and by imbuing history with meaning, it replaces a conception of worldly immortality with the promise

[239] Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience* (London, New York: Verso, 2007).
[240] Ibid., 101.
[241] Ibid., 100.
[242] Ibid., 100.
[243] Ibid., 103.

of salvation. Modernity, as an amalgamation of both, posits a worldly, secularized

version of rectilinear, irreversible time "sundered from any notion of end."[244] No

longer viewed as the progressive realization of redemption or salvation, meaning and

value inheres into the endless motion of a structured process in terms of before and

after. As Casarino elaborates, these temporal forms converge on "dereliction of the

instant by the continuum."[245] Each instant "can only find its realization and fulfillment

in the next instant, and so on *ad infinitum*…as our redemption is always being deferred

to that impossible instant which will end all instants and abolish time altogether."[246]

What these expositions depict is an economy of time divided into precise,

infinite, quantified units along a continuum—a homogenous, empty time of measure.

Time constituted as unit measure inserts infinite modes of being into a homogenous,

diachronic structure of infinite succession of instants. Having no meaning in and of

itself, each instant finds its realization in the next—a process that continues ad

infinitum.[247] Such an economy of time can be brought to bear on what—using Braun's

terminology and insights—I will refer to as processual temporality.[248] What is at stake

is a temporal structure that issues from "[an] endless autistic process" of

valorization.[249] It is a process that is purely self-referential, knowing no end other than

itself. The process entails a temporal form whereby human life and action—individual

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[244] Ibid., 105.
[245] Cesare Casarino, "Time Matters: Marx, Negri, Agamben, and the Corporeal," *Strategies* 16, no. 2 (2003).
[246] Ibid., 185-86.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Braun, "Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault."
[249] Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Creation of the World, or, Globalization* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 39.

and collective—devoid of any meaning, transforms into a mere means, an instrument in the service of the reproduction of the process.

Before elaborating further the notion of processual structure of time by visiting Marx and Foucault's critical theory of modernity, I want to take a brief pause to reflect upon what such reflections on political temporality reveal in relation to the faith based investment in security that I touched upon in the opening lines of this section. Formulating the contradictory nature of security slightly differently than Spitzer's analysis of this faith, I want to articulate it along temporal terms. Security is contradictory, as Spitzer suggests; and I would add that it is an im-possible goal.[250] While interlinked, this im-possibility can be analytically disaggregated into two senses. On the one hand, security is im-possible because discourses of security are constructed through discourses of danger and safety;[251] politics of security puts to work a power/knowledge nexus that designates which lives are livable and which ones are to be ended with impunity.[252] Security thus emanates from an economy of violence, a dialectics of security and insecurity, which can never be resolved in the final instance. Hence, its im-possibility, or, as described by some scholars, its aporetic nature.[253]

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[250] With the formulation of security as an im/possible goal, I am mimicking Derrida's notation of the "im-possible" in his elaboration of the possibility of ethics in order to capture security's aporetic nature and demonstrate how its impossibility creates the conditions of possibility that I elaborate shortly.

[251] Weldes et al., eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger.* Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.*

[252] Jenny Edkins and Veronica Pin-Fat, eds., *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, (New York: Routledge,2004).

[253] Anthony Burke, "Aporias of Security," *Alternatives* 27(2002).

Yet, security is also im-possible in another sense, which speaks directly to the temporal structure of politics of security. As a goal, security constitutes an infinitely deferred promise precisely because it is a goal that can never be attained: security is im-possible because there is no way to ultimately ascertain that we are finally secure—thereby redeemed. It is this impossibility of final redemption that gives security its own perverse logic. Security takes its own limit—its own im-possibility—as its driving force, turning it into its condition of possibility. It enacts a temporal structure characterized by a diachrony of an eternally deferred end. Hence, the politics of security is a politics construed as—quoting Nancy—"an endless, autistic process."[254]

It is such a temporal structure, which turns human life into a mere means to sustain and feed a process that knows no other limits than itself, I want to suggest, is what Marx's analysis of the dynamics of capitalist society and Foucault's diagnosis of bio-politics reveals. Marx provides a lucid a picture of this structure of time through his account of the accumulation process whereby capital harnesses time to its own valorization. As he vividly depicts in his polemical engagement with Proudhon in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in capitalist modernity "[t]ime is everything, man is nothing; he is, at the most, time's carcass. Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone decides everything; hour for hour, day for day."[255] According to Marx, capitalism turns purposeful human activity into a mere means that feeds into the reproduction of an insatiable dynamic (i.e., capital accumulation) whereby what is beyond measure—"the

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[254] Nancy, *The Creation of the World, or, Globalization*, 39.
[255] Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1955), 22.

absolute working out of man's creative potentialities"—is arrested under the rule of a "pre-determined yardstick."[256] Capital, Marx argues, is indifferent to individual life-time of the worker; or rather, a worker's reproduction is of significance solely as part of a social aggregate of labor-power. From the perspective of the life-time of capital, the finite life of the worker is irrelevant. The worker cannot but "must be able to reproduce [his/her labor-power] every day"[257] only to sell it again—existing as a mere resource to be consumed within a repetitive, endless temporal process. Turning worker into "time's carcass," capital consumes life. Put differently, the "real-time"[258] of capital puts in place a de-historical temporal form whereby the passage of time is sundered from being an opening onto time where past, present, and future take on a meaning; it becomes the serial playing out of an again, again, and again.

Foucault has a different take on modern temporality and configuration of life as a resource to be mobilized in the service of a process. Like Marx, he takes as his point of departure a paradox in modernity. However, he articulates this paradox not in terms of the production of value and concomitant degradation of life, but in terms of valorization of life and its synchronic constitution as utterly dispensable. As he formulates it, what is peculiar to modernity is its being devoted to "taking charge of

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[256] ———, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 488.
[257] ———, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol.1*, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 343.
[258] This is a term that readers will recall from contemporary debates on post-Fordism and just-in-time production, where it is used to depict the way in which production follows directly market demands through real-time adaptations.

life"[259] and "generating forces, making them grow," rather than obstructing and deducing from it.[260] Yet, as he reminds the reader, this is also the age of genocidal mass murders.[261]

The concept that Foucault develops to grapple with this paradox is the category of the population.[262] Population is not a political subject like other political categories such as the people, the nation, or the citizen. This notion, as Foucault construes it, is distinct from the constitutive categories of theory of right, which recognizes the individual or society, and discipline, which takes as its referent point individuals and their bodies. As "an idea that is absolutely modern,"[263] population is neither equivalent to society nor to individual-as-body. It is "a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads… [which] cannot necessarily be counted."[264] Population is a statistical aggregate—an aggregate that could perhaps be compared to socially necessary labor time. It is an aggregate that is derived from "the basic biological features of the human"[265]—from the aspects that pertain to mute mechanics of life. These mechanics are biological processes such as "propagation, births and morality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity."[266] What is significant about the population, Foucault

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[259] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol.1: An Introduction* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 142-43.
[260] Ibid., 136.
[261] ———, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76* (New York: Picador, 2003).
[262] ———, *"Security, Territory, Population": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978* (New York: Picador, 2009).
[263] Ibid., 11.
[264] Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76*, 245.
[265] ———, *"Security, Territory, Population": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978*, 1.
[266] ———, *The History of Sexuality, Vol.1: An Introduction*, 139.

notes, is that its emergence is central for the new technology of power (bio-power)

animated by a novel form of political rationality, constituting an order of politics that

he terms bio-politics. As he writes, "Bio-politics deals with the population…as a

biological problem and as power's problem."[267] While disciplinary power, which he

discusses at length in his account of the birth of the prison,[268] and apparatus of security

are both described as technologies of the body, what sets them apart, according to

Foucault, is their subject/object. For disciplinary power the "body is individualized as

an organism endowed with capacities;" for regulatory technologies of life (bio-politics

of security) what is central is not individual bodies but "biological or bio-social

processes characteristics of human masses."[269] It is "multiplicity of individuals who

are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality

within which they live."[270] Population is not an agglomeration of individual bodies;

what constitutes this novel political body is "multiplicity of men…to the extent that

they form…a global mass."[271]

In relation to Foucault's exposition, I would like to highlight two points. One

of these concerns the political temporality that is implied from the perspective of this

peculiar body politic, named as the population—i.e., a political body that is constituted

as an undifferentiated "global mass" and which is central to the concern for regulatory

technologies of life (bio-politics of security). Within the temporal framework of the

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[267] ———, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76*, 245.
[268] Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1995).
[269] Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76*, 250.
[270] ———, *"Security, Territory, Population": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978*, 21.
[271] ———, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76*, 242.

population, what counts, what is of relevance is not singular bodies, but "biological or bio-social processes characteristic of human masses."[272] In other words, what matters is not the death of an individual or the birth of one. These events—each representing a unique experience—cannot be predicted and controlled at the level of the individual. However, they can be governed at the level of the collective, the level of the population. As Braun argues, what constitutes the central concern for bio-power is, therefore, serial phenomenon—i.e., phenomena that occur and can be studied over a period of time.[273] Singular lives—the level where the relation between a past, a present, and a future take on an existential meaning given the finite nature of human life—is rendered redundant since what matters now are processes that do not take place in an individual's lifetime, but pass through it.[274] Within this temporal matrix, the only function accorded to human lives is to become the walking embodiment of the laws of movement of the population—the subject/objects of security. They only provide the material through which these laws are realized. Within the temporal structure of a politics devoted to securing the population, what is relevant/significant is not the life people live, their life story, but biological aspect of their existence (time of biology via the population). As an undifferentiated global mass becomes the concern for the regulatory technologies of life, singular bodies are subsumed within the general biological processes governable at the collective level. They are reduced to a mere means of sustaining and feeding a process that has no limits other than itself—an infinite process of accumulation and an infinite desire to secure the population. What

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[272] Ibid., 250.
[273] Braun, "Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault."
[274] Ibid.

happens to an individual, one's birth or death does not limit the functioning of power, but mediates and facilitates it.[275] Singular lives transform into a material, a resource to be consumed in the endless process of reproducing the population; they get mapped onto the statistical charts of accumulated beings consumed within the time of biology.

In addition to the temporal structure enacted by a politics devoted to securing species-life, the second point that I would like to make is the way in which political reason of the population re-casts the idea of crisis in a dramatically different way as it shifts the political horizon for thinking about crisis from a moralizing analysis to the analysis of processes.[276] In other words, such events (crises or accidents) are no longer imbued with the religious aroma of a punishment for man's evil nature. Nor are they viewed from a cosmo-political lens, which articulates them as an inevitable misfortune. Rather, when viewed from the temporal perspective of the process enacted by the apparatus of security, such events are rendered as natural. As Grosz notes, the crucial political implication of this diagnosis is that the eruption of the event becomes inherent to the functioning of power.[277] Rather than distracting from it, it feeds into its reproduction. In other words, crisis becomes an opportunity—essential for the system to produce its own conditions of reproduction.

Perhaps this insight could allow a different way of approaching problems framed as instances of 'crisis' by highlighting the way in which they transform from

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[275] Ibid.
[276] Foucault, *"Security, Territory, Population": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978*, 36-39.
[277] Elizabeth Grosz, "Thinking the New: Of Futures yet Unthought," in *Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures*, ed. Elizabeth Grosz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

being a problem into an opportunity. The most prominent example is the disaster

industry created by the humanitarian and crisis relief enterprise. Rising on the

shoulders of the humanitarian international—composed of a transnational network of

relief workers, civil servants, academics, and journalists—this industry feeds off the

triple "forces of destruction, production, salvation" working to stop famines, rebuild

war torn societies, and aid the internally displaced populations.[278] As numerous studies

show, these relief operations end up reproducing relations of power that give rise to

such emergencies in the first place, putting in place its own political economy, turning

disasters into a permanent source of profit for some while rendering the victims even

more powerless.[279] Similar patterns can be discerned in relation to other problems such

as poverty, which has been turned into an asset through micro-credit programs and

which has generated a global political movement of its own.[280]

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[278] Barnett and Weiss, "Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present." The book provides
a sympathetic overview of the changing scope and scale of humanitarian action and engages
with the contemporary identity crisis of relief work. James Fearon's chapter, "The Rise of
Emergency Relief Aid," is helpful in terms of tracing the basic trends of development and
emergency aid over time, pointing to its sharp increase in emergency aid since the end of the
Cold War.

[279] Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the
New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London, New York: Zed Books,
2001); David Keen, *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in
Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[280] As Neil Smith elaborates within the context of Hurricane Katrina, such disasters provide
the perfect opportunity for accumulation where the insurance companies and their parent
corporations emerge as major beneficiaries, turning this event into "a bonanza of highly
profitable underwriting" with "a total profit of $43 billion in 2005 and anticipated a record
industry profit of $60 billion in 2006" thanks to the increase in premiums. Neil Smith,
"Disastrous Accumulation," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 106, no. 4 (2007). It is noteworthy that
the insurance companies have appealed to the program of terrorist insurance passed by the
U.S. Congress in their legislative proposal to limit companies' insurance liability. According
to this program, in the event of a declared terrorist attack, federal subsidy of the insurance
industry kicks in once the industry has paid out a certain sum.

Such an instrumentalization of crisis and rendering of disaster as an opportunity resonates with what Massimo Cacciari discusses in his account of "contemporary disastrology."[281] In similar ways to the 'evental economy' (i.e., governing through contingency) that I discussed in Chapter 2, Cacciari argues that the contemporary system is defined through disequlibrium rather than equilibrium: irruptions become instrumental in the functioning of the system. Rather than being a moment of rupture, such irruptions (or exceptions) establish the rigor of the norm. Perhaps we can bring this insight to bear on the contemporary politics of security. As noted before, the dream of security is the constant expectation of calculating the looming 'crisis'; what is not present, rendering it a faith-based investment. Articulated as a politics of risk, the anticipatory models are today constructed in probabilistic terms—hitting the target through speculation. The contingent, the unforeseen no longer irrupts; it is a priori accounted for. Perhaps we could say that politics of security acknowledges the groundlessness of its dream to control the unknown while leaving fully intact its will to power as it appropriates the singular to the reproduction of the same.

Conclusion

"Where ever there is life there are norms," writes Canguilhem in the opening paragraph of his essay on "Normality and Normativity."[282] In it, he works toward

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[281] Massimo Cacciari, "Catastrophes," in *The Unpolitical: On the Radical Critique of Political Reason* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 147.

[282] Georges Canguilhem, "Normality and Normativity," in *A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges Canguilhem* (New York: Zone Books, 1994), 351.

pulling apart the established framework of thinking of what constitutes the condition of normality. If abnormal is defined as the absence of a previous positive condition or a state, he argues, then it is actually a category that does not hold together since there is never any state of being without norms. In this sense, even the pathological is normal since, rather than the absence of any norms, it simply expresses another norm. He suggests that a contrast needs to be made between health and disease, between condition of pathological normality and normativity. While pathological normality is a condition of being caught in the norm of self-preservation, a condition that only works toward its own constant, endless reproduction, normativity refers to a condition of having a capacity to invent new norms.

The condition of pathological normality resembles the processual structure of time enacted by the politics of security that I tried to map out in this chapter. Within the temporality of the process, security colonizes the future, transforming it from a horizon of possibility into a future as present. What is yet to come arrives in its coded form as an already written future. Sharing the temporal logic enacted by capital, I suggested, security enacts an economy of time that thingifies being not only as a machine, but also an expandable one—one that translates the infinite temporalities of life-in-common to the rigid, dead and deadening time of the process. Frantic mobilization and constant transformation get translated into a fundamental immobility trapped within a perpetual present.[283] It is a condition wherein change itself becomes a pathological norm as "the new" appears as ever the same. Time transforms from a

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[283] Slavoj Žižek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates* (London, New York: Verso, 2002).

medium of becoming into zero-time of secured futures.

To dismantle security as untimely critique is therefore a claim on time. It strives to be untimely not in the sense of fleeing from history, but in terms of interrupting the temporality of process where the "future" becomes a dead referent as it starts to designate nothing other than reproduction of the same, again, again, and again. It is an attempt to reset the account of times to the extent that the times are defined as a crisis of security—whether it be through the pacific discourse of humanitarian concerns, which understands itself as a project to alleviate suffering, or an explicitly militarized one that works through rendering death. It embraces a form of thought not disengaged from experience—what actually, as Arendt suggests, would no longer be thought but mere contemplation[284]—but one that counters the dominant temporality that structures contemporary experience of time informed by the global security project and global capital. Against its annihilation, dismantling security affirms time as it tries to work against a time of a politics that reduces political life to the time of the process, to the realm of calculability.

As Osborne notes, "If the otherwise is to proceed, possibility of the otherwise must be produced as experience," which requires engaging with social forms of subjectivity at their deepest structural level and exposing how practices and discourses structure, produce, enable, or distort different senses of time and possibility.[285] It is with this concern that dismantling security aspires to be a claim on time by going against the doxa of security. By explicating the temporal structure that is enacted by

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[284] Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking Press, 1961).
[285] Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde*, 201.

the politics of security, in this chapter I tried to provide one aspect of the notion of

untimeliness that dismantling security aims to capture. In the following chapter, I

engage with a different sense of time and temporality, this time in relation to critical

thought. I elaborate on the meaning of critique as untimely—a form of critique that

informs dismantling security as a critical project. After this last move toward taking

apart the architecture of security, the last chapter will turn to a discussion of

conceptions of politics, which takes inescapable insecurity as precisely the point

where a thought of politics starts.

> If survival of the species is the hole into which modernity's politics of security have dug us, then we had better stop digging.
> —Michael Dillon, *Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)Order*

Prelude

One fine morning, on June 1, 2007, a group of scholars gathered in the small conference room of a hotel located in a quiet neighborhood of Istanbul due to a last minute change of venue for security reasons.[287] For the organizers there could not have been a better way to launch a conference that aimed to engage in conversations about dismantling the security apparatus of global liberal governance. The irony underlying the re-location of a conference on security for security reasons provided the perfect backdrop for a call to dismantle security. After all, even a sterile environment of intellectual debate had not remained unscathed by security practices that purported to protect the so-called common good.

Yet, while obvious to some, the idea that now was the time to dismantle security proved to be a challenging thesis to defend. Questioning the role of academics—positioned as they are, as experts to speak for the rest of humanity about what security means and what it entails—and proposing to make the sign of security not the starting point of analysis, but precisely the problem to be addressed was met

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[286] Throughout this discussion, I am not using the term critique as it is generally understood and formulated within the discipline—namely, as "an exclusive search for Truth"—which Baker and Bartelson suggest is what defines "critique." Gideon Baker and Jens Bartelson, "Introduction: The Future of Political Community," in *The Future of Political Community*, ed. Gideon Baker and Jens Bartelson, *Routledge/Ecpr Studies in European Political Science* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 9. On the contrary, such a conception of critique as a search for transcendent Truth is what needs to be problematized.

[287] Critical Security Studies Conference, Koç University, Istanbul, June 2007.

with opposition—even hostility and derision—in the name of preserving security. Interlocutors considered it at best naïve and idealistic, and at worst sinister, to give up on the promise of security when there is still torture, oppression, and poverty. After all, critics claimed, what "realistic" plan could one offer once one dismantled security? Was it not at least dubious or ethically irresponsible, to call to dismantle the sign? In short, such a move was considered to be perfectly untimely.

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *</p>

What would it mean to dismantle security? On the one hand, there is a historical context where the sign of security emerges as globally hegemonic, becoming the unquestioned doxa informing political thought and action—as I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. On the other hand, there is a disciplinary context wherein critical thought in its encounter with security works toward further entrenching its hold whilst exposing the manifold ways in which security produces and reproduces structures of domination and exclusion, as I showed in Chapter 3. What would it mean to conceptualize a politics that takes inescapable insecurity as precisely the point where the thought of politics starts rather than where it ends? Can we even begin to ask this question when self-proclaimed critical thinking on security itself becomes complicit in the reproduction of security's hegemonic hold?

As I discussed in detail in Chapter 3, critical thought in relation to security leads to a paradoxical outcome. It is a paradox that stems from the fact that critical interrogations, despite their problematization of the way in which security functions by reproducing existing power relations and hierarchies, despite their assertions that

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politics of security cannot but be exclusionary and inherently violent, nevertheless do not give up on the promise of security. Dissident voices, whose position on world political matters would otherwise be quite antithetical to the position espoused by realist scholars, end up participating in the same language—the same claim that security is indispensible and that it is the defining condition of life. For instance, a leading figure that "speak[s] the language of exile"[288] in the discipline of International Relations, can nevertheless argue that what is needed is to have a sense of what it means to have security for all people rather than national security.[289] As Michael Dillon usefully observes, security "impress[es] itself upon political thought as a self-evident condition for the very existence of life—both individual and social."[290]

It is this self-evidence of security even for critical approaches and the antinomy stemming from dissident voices reproducing the language of those they dissent from that constitutes the starting point for this chapter, where I elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as untimely critique. As mentioned in the vignette in the opening section, the suggestion to dismantle security was itself deemed as an untimely pursuit in a world where lives of millions were rendered brutally insecure by poverty, violence, disease, and ongoing political conflicts. Colored by the tone of a call to conscience in the face of the ongoing crisis of security, it was not the time, interlocutors argued, for self-indulgent critique.

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[288] Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990).
[289] R.B.J. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace* (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1988).
[290] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 19.

I will argue that it is the element of being untimely, the effort, in the words of Walter Benjamin, "to brush history against the grain" that gives critical thinking its power.[291] It might appear as a trivial discussion to bring up the relation between time and critique because conceptions of critical thinking in the discipline of International Relations already possess the notion that critical thought needs to be untimely. In the first section, I will tease out what this notion of untimeliness entails by visiting ongoing conversations within the discipline about critical thought and political time. Through this discussion, I hope to clarify what sets apart dismantling security as untimely critique from the notion of untimeliness at work in critical international relations theory. The latter conception of the untimely, I will suggest, paradoxically calls on critical thought to be "on time" in that it champions a particular understanding of what it means for critical scholarship to be relevant and responsible for its times. This notion of the untimely demands that critique be strategic and respond to political exigency, that it provide answers in this light instead of raising more questions about which questions could be raised or what presuppositions underlie the questions that are deemed to be waiting for answers.

After elaborating in the first section such strategic conceptions of the untimeliness of critical theorizing, in the second section I will turn to a different sense of the untimely by drawing upon Wendy Brown's discussion of the relation between critique, crisis, and political time through her reading of Benjamin's "Theses on the

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[291] Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Random House, 2007), 253-64.

Philosophy of History."[292] In contrast to a notion of untimeliness that demands

strategic thinking and punctuality, Brown's exegesis provides a conception of

historical materialism where critique is figured as a force of disruption, a form of

intervention that reconfigures the meaning of the times and "contest[s] the very senses

of time invoked to declare critique 'untimely'."[293] Her exposition overturns the view

of critique as a self-indulgent practice as it highlights the immediately political nature

of critique and reconfigures the meaning of what it means for critical thought to be

relevant.[294] It is in this sense of the untimely, I will suggest, that dismantling security

as a critique hopes to recover.

I should point out that in this discussion my intention is neither to construct a

theory of critique nor to provide an exhaustive review and evaluation of the forms of

critical theorizing in International Relations. Rather, my aim is to contribute to the

existing efforts that engage with the question of *what it means* to be critical apart from

drawing the epistemological and methodological boundaries so as to think about how

one is critical.[295] While I do not deny the importance of epistemological questions, I

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[292] Wendy Brown, "Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times," in *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-16.
[293] Ibid., 4.
[294] For a discussion of "being critical" in relation to brushing history against the grain in international relations: Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan, "On the Practical Significance of Critical International Relations Theory," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 11, no. 2 (2003).
[295] For an overview of efforts that highlight the meaning and implication of critical scholarship and intellectual responsibility: Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling, "Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (2004); Geeta Chowdhry, "Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading: Implications for Critical Interventions in International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2007); Steve Smith, "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11: Presidential Address to the International

contend that taking time to think about the meaning of critique beyond these issues

presents itself as an important task. This task takes on additional importance within the

context of security studies where any realm of investigation quickly begets its critical

counterpart. The rapid emergence and institutionalization of critical terrorism studies

when studies on terrorism were proliferating under the auspices of the so-called

Global War on Terror provides a striking example to this trend.[296] Such instances are

important reminders that, to the extent that epistemology and methodology are reified

as the sole concerns in defining and assessing critical thinking[297] or "wrong headed

refusals"[298] to get on with positive projects and empirical research gets branded as

debilitating for critical projects, what is erased from sight is the *political* nature of the

questions asked and what is lost is the chance to reflect upon what it means for critical

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Studies Association, February 27, 2003," *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2004). See also the articles in the special forum in *Millennium: Journal of International* Studies 36, no.1 (2007), which discuss the implication of Edward Said's work for critical international relations scholarship.

[296] Richard Jackson, "Introduction: The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007). The British International Studies Association now courts a working group on the topic and, as of 2007, Routledge started to publish a new journal devoted to this proliferating area of research called *Critical Studies in Terrorism*.

[297] As an example of such debates about the limits or contributions of critical theory on epistemological and methodological grounds: Chris Brown, "'Turtles All the Way Down': Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23, no. 2 (1994); Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20, no. 2 (1991); Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998); Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998); Friedrich Kratochwill, "Looking Back from Somewhere: Reflections on What Remains 'Critical' in Critical Theory," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. Supplement1 (2007); Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998).

[298] Price and Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism."

thinking to respond to its times.

In his meditation on the meaning of responding and the sense of responsibility entailed by writing, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that "all writing is 'committed.'"[299] This notion of commitment diverges from the programmatic sense of committed writing. What underlies this conception is an understanding of writing as responding: writing is a response to the voice of an other. In Nancy's words, "[w]hoever writes responds"[300] and "makes himself responsible to in the absolute sense."[301] Suggesting that there is always an ethical commitment prior to any particular political commitment, such a notion of writing contests the notion of creative autonomy premised on the idea of a free, self-legislating subject who responds. In other words, it discredits the idea of an original voice by suggesting that there is no voice that is not a response to a prior response. Hence, to respond is configured as responding to an expectation rather than as an answer to a question and responsibility is cast as an "anticipated response to questions, to demands, to still-unformulated, not exactly predictable expectations."[302]

Echoing Nancy, David Campbell makes an important reminder as he suggests that as international relations scholars "we are always already engaged," although the sites, mechanisms and quality of engagements might vary.[303] The question, then, is not whether as scholars we are engaged or not, but what the nature of this engagement is.

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[299] Jean-Luc Nancy, "Answering for Sense," in *A Time for the Humanities: Futurity and the Limits of Autonomy*, ed. James J. Bono, Tim Dean, and Ewa Plonowska Ziarek (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008).
[300] Ibid., 84.
[301] Ibid., 90.
[302] Ibid., 90.
[303] David Campbell, "Beyond Choice: The onto-Politics of Critique," *International Relations* 19, no. 1 (2005).

Such a re-framing of the question is intended to highlight the *political* nature of all interpretation and the importance of developing an "ethos of political criticism that is concerned with assumptions, limits, their historical production, social and political effects, and the possibility of going beyond them in thought and action."[304] Taking as its object assumptions and limits, their historical production and social and political effects places the relevancy of critical thought and responsibility of critical scholarship on new ground. It is this ethos of critique that dismantling security hopes to recover for a discipline where security operates as the foundational principle and where critical thinking keeps on contributing to security's impressing itself as a self-evident condition.

Critical Theory and Punctuality

Within the context of International Relations, critical thought's orientation toward its time comes out strongly in Kimberley Hutchings's formulation.[305] According to Hutchings, no matter what form it takes, what distinguishes critical international relations theory from other forms of theorizing is "its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the hegemonic power of the present."[306] What this implies about the nature of critical thought is that it needs to be not only diagnostic, but also self-reflexive. In the words of Hutchings, "all critical theories lay claim to some kind of account not only of the present of international

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[304] Ibid., 133.
[305] Kimberly Hutchings, "Happy Anniversary! Time and Critique in International Relations Theory," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. Supplement1 (2007).
[306] Ibid., 72.

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politics and its relation to possible futures, but also of the role of critical theory in the present and future in international politics."[307]

Not only analyzing the present, but also introducing the question of the future into analysis places political time at the center of critical enterprise and makes the problem of change a core concern. It is this question of change that situates different forms of critical thinking on a shared ground since they all attempt to expose the way in which what is presented as given and natural is historically produced and hence open to change. With their orientation to change, their efforts to go against the dominant currents and challenge the hegemony of existing power relations by showing how contemporary practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and domination, critical theorists in general and critical security studies specialists in particular take on an untimely endeavor.

It is this understanding of the untimely aspect of critical thinking that is emphasized by Mark Neufeld, who regards the development of critical approaches to security as "one of the more hopeful intellectual developments in recent years."[308] Despite nurturing from different theoretical traditions and therefore harboring "fundamental differences between modernist and postmodernist commitments," writes Neufeld, scholars who are involved in the critical project nevertheless "share a common concern with calling into question 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized.'"[309]

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[307] Ibid., 72.
[308] Mark Neufeld, "Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's 'Security with a Human Face'," *International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2004): 109.
[309] Ibid., 109.

The desire for change—through being untimely and making the way to alternative futures that would no longer resemble the present—have led some scholars to emphasize the utopian element that must accompany all critical thinking. Quoting Oscar Wilde's aphorism—a map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at, Ken Booth argues for the need to restore the role and reputation of utopianism in the theory and practice of international politics. [310] According to Booth, what goes under the banner of realism—"ethnocentric self-interest writ large"[311]— falls far beyond the realities of a drastically changed world political landscape at the end of the Cold War. He describes the new reality as "an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it a global community omelette [sic] is cooking."[312] Rather than insisting on the inescapability of war in the international system as political realists argue, Booth argues for the need and possibility to work toward the utopia of overcoming the condition of war by banking on the opportunities provided by a globalizing world.

The point that critical thought needs to be untimely by going against its time is also emphasized by Dunne and Wheeler, who assert that, regardless of the form it takes, "critical theory purport[s] to 'think against' the prevailing current" and that

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[310] Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991): 536. Booth's initial formulation of a "utopian realist" can be found in ———, "Steps Towards Stable Peace in Europe: A Theory and Practice of Coexistence," *International Affairs* 66, no. 1 (1990). Differentiating this stance as "process utopian" (entailing practical and pragmatic steps toward a better future) from "end point utopian" (attainable on a very distant time-scale) Booth makes policy suggestions on how the opportunities provided by the changing East-West relations at the end of the Cold War could be sowed to help achieve a stable peace in Europe.
[311] Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," 537.
[312] Ibid., 542.

"[c]ritical security studies is no exception" to this enterprise.[313] According to the authors, the function of critical approaches to security is to problematize what is taken for granted in the disciplinary production of knowledge about security by "resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing]…theories of security, which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by defending core 'national' values, forcibly if necessary) and from whom security is needed (the enemy)."[314]

While critical theory in this way is figured as untimely, I want to suggest that this notion of untimeliness gets construed paradoxically in a quite timely fashion. With a perceived disjuncture between writing the world from within a discipline and acting in it placed at the center of the debates, the performance of critical thought gets evaluated to the extent that it is punctual and in synch with the times. Does critical thought provide concrete guidance and prescribe what is to be done? Can it move beyond mere talk and make timely political interventions by providing solutions? Does it have answers to the strategic questions of progressive movements? Demanding that critical theorizing come clean in the court of these questions, such conceptions of the untimely demand that critique respond to its times in a responsible way, where being responsible is understood in stark contrast to a notion of responding and responsibility that I briefly discussed in the introductory pages of this chapter (through the works of Jean-Luc Nancy and David Campbell). Let me visit two recent conversations ensuing from the declarations of the contemporary crisis of critical

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[313] Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "'We the Peoples': Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice," *International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2004): 11.
[314] Ibid., 11.

theorizing in order to clarify what I mean by a timely understanding of untimely critique.

The first conversation was published as a special issue in the *Review of International Studies* (RIS), one of the major journals of the field. Prominent figures took the 25th anniversary of the journal's publication of two key texts—regarded as canonical for the launching and development of critical theorizing in International Relations—as an opportunity to reflect upon and assess the impact of critical theory in the discipline and interrogate what its future might be.[315] The texts in question, which are depicted as having shaken the premises of the static world of the discipline, are Robert Cox's 1981 essay entitled on "Social Forces, States, and World Orders"[316] and Richard Ashley's article, "Political Realism and Human Interests."[317] In their introductory essay to the issue, Rengger and Thirkell-White suggest that the essays by Cox and Ashley—followed by Andrew Linklater's *Men and Citizens in the Theory of*

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[315] *Review of International Studies* 33, no. Supplement1 (2007).

[316] Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981). The article contains one of the key quotes that is often used as a short hand to describe critical thinking in International Relations: "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose." In the article, Cox argues that all knowledge claims are perspectival in that they are always rooted in a specific political time and space and that they always entail a certain problematic, which provides the theory with one of the two purposes: either to solve problems that it encounters so as to enable existing institutions and power relations to function more smoothly (problem-solving theory) or to approach the world in its totality and call into question those existing relations and institutions with a view to changing them (critical theory) and providing "a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order."

[317] Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1981). Challenging the monolithic presentation of political realism, Ashley distinguishes practical realism (which highlights inter-subjective understanding and hermeneutic approach to inquiry) from technical realism (which is guided by technical cognitive interest to uncover objective laws and positivistic form of inquiry). He argues that the former notion of realism can be found in the works of realist scholar John Herz and that the latter represents a "critical test of realism" in terms of its essence and developmental potential.

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International Relations[318]—represent "the breach in the dyke" of the three dominant

discourses in International Relations (i.e., positivists, English School, and Marxism),

unleashing "a torrent [that would] soon become a flood" as variety of theoretical

approaches in contemporary social theory (i.e., feminism, Neo-Gramscianism, post-

structuralism, and post-colonialism) would get introduced through the works of critical

scholars.[319] After elaborating the various responses given to and resistance raised

against the critical project in the discipline, the authors provide an overview and an

assessment of the current state of critical theorizing in International Relations. They

argue that the central question for much of the ongoing debate within the critical camp

in its present state—a question that it cannot help but come to terms with and provide

a response to—concerns the relation between critical thought and political practice. As

they state, the "fundamental philosophical question [that] can no longer be

sidestepped" by critical International Relations theory is the question of the relation

between "knowledge of the world and action in it."[320] One of the points alluded to in

the essay is that forms of critical theorizing, which leave the future "to contingency,

uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects" and therefore provide "less

guidance for concrete political action"[321] or, again, those that problematize underlying

assumptions of thought and "say little about the potential political agency that might

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[318] Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).

[319] Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White, "Still Critical after All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. Supplement1 (2007): 4.

[320] Ibid., 16.

[321] Ibid., 15.

be involved in any subsequent struggles"[322] may render the critical enterprise impotent and perhaps even suspect.

This point comes out clearly in Craig Murphy's contribution to the collection of essays in the *RIS*'s special issue.[323] Echoing William Wallace's argument that critical theorists tend to be "monks,"[324] who have little to offer for political actors engaged in real world politics, Murphy argues that the promise of critical theory is "partially kept" because of the limited influence it has had outside the academy towards changing the world. Building a different world, he suggests, requires more than isolated academic talk; that it demands not merely "words," but "deeds."[325] This, according to Murphy, requires providing "knowledge that contributes to change."[326] Such knowledge would emanate from connections with the marginalized and would incorporate observations of actors in their everyday practices. More importantly, it would create an inspiring vision for social movements, such as the one provided by the concept of human development, which, according to Murphy, was especially powerful "because it embodied a value-oriented way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated observations."[327] In sum, if critical theory is to retain its critical edge, Murphy's discussion suggests, it has to be in synch with political time and respond to its immediate demands.

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[322] Ibid., 20.

[323] Craig Murphy, "The Promise of Critical I.R. Partially Kept," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. Supplement1 (2007).

[324] William Wallace, "Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (1996).

[325] Murphy, "The Promise of Critical I.R. Partially Kept," 124.

[326] Ibid., 127.

[327] Ibid., 129.

The second debate that is revelatory of this conception of the timing of critical

theory—i.e., that critical thinking be strategic and efficient in relation to political

time—takes place in relation to the contemporary in/security environment shaped by

the so-called Global War on Terror. The theme that bears its mark on these debates is

the extent to which critical inquiries about the contemporary security landscape

become complicit in the workings of power and what critique can offer to render the

world more legible for progressive struggles.[328] For instance, warning critical theorists

against being co-opted by or aligned with belligerence and war-mongering, Richard

Devetak asserts that critical international theory has an urgent "need to distinguish its

position all the more clearly from liberal imperialism."[329] While scholars such as

Devetak, Booth,[330] and Fierke[331] take the critical task to be an attempt to rescue liberal

internationalism from turning into liberal imperialism, others announce the "crisis of

critical theorizing" and suggest that critical writings on the nature of the contemporary

security order lack the resources to grasp their actual limitations, where the latter is

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[328] For instance, the special forum in *International Relations* 19, no.1 (2005) is devoted to
"examin[ing] how we might begin to consider the role of international relations scholars as
intellectuals in international politics, particularly in the contemporary context of the so-called
Global War on Terror.'" Preceding this debate, in his Presidential Address to the International
Studies Association, Steve Smith had posed a parallel question regarding "the complicity of
the discipline in the events of September 11, 2001." Smith, "Singing Our World into
Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11: Presidential Address to the
International Studies Association, February 27, 2003."

[329] Richard Devetak, "Between Kant and Pufendorf: Humanitarian Intervention, Statist Anti-
Cosmopolitanism and Critical International Theory," *Review of International Studies* 33, no.
Supplement1 (2007): 152.

[330] Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See
especially Chapters 8 and 9.

[331] Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*. See especially Chapter 9.

said to reside not in the realm of academic debate, but in the realm of political practice.[332]

It is amidst these debates on critique, crisis, and political time that Richard Beardsworth raises the question of the future of critical philosophy in the face of the challenges posed by contemporary world politics.[333] Recounting these challenges, he provides the matrix for a proper form of critical inquiry that could come to terms with "[o]ur historical actuality."[334] He describes this actuality as the "thick context" of modernity ("an epoch, delimited by the capitalization of social relations," which imposes its own philosophical problematic—"that is, the attempt, following the social consequences of capitalism, to articulate the relation between individuality and collective spirit"[335]), American unilateralism in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the growing political disempowerment of people worldwide. Arguing that "contemporary return of religion and new forms of irrationalism emerge, in large part, out of the failure of the second response of modernity to provide a

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[332] David Chandler, "The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 1 (2008); Tara McCormack, *Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009). Chandler and McCormack revamp Beate Jahn's argument in a previously published essay. Beate Jahn, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Critical Theory as the Latest Edition of Liberal Idealism," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27, no. 3 (1998). Claiming that a rich tradition is turned into a "shallow, lifeless, and uncritical caricature" (613), in this essay, Jahn brands critical approaches as liberal idealism because they consider ideas in total abstraction from their social role and thereby "*construct[ing]* speculative histories instead of *analysing* real or imagined ones" (614). As a consequence, Jahn argues, they project their normative desires onto their object of analysis with no grounding in the material conditions of their times and fall short of challenging existing relations of power.
[333] Richard Beardsworth, "The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2005).
[334] Ibid., 203.
[335] Ibid., 211.

secular solution to the inequalities of the nation-state and colonization,"[336] he formulates the awaiting political task for critical endeavors as constructing a world polity to resist the disintegration of the world under the force of capital. It is with this goal in mind that he suggests that "responsible scholarship needs to rescue reason in the face irrational war"[337] and that intellectuals need to provide "the framework for a world ethical community of law, endowed with political mechanisms of implementation in the context of a regulated planetary economy."[338] He suggests that an aporetic form of thinking such as Jacques Derrida's—a thinking that "ignores the affirmative relation between the determining powers of reason and history"[339]—would be an unhelpful resource because such thinking "does not open up to where work needs to be done for these new forms of polity to emerge."[340] In other words, critical thinking, according to Beardsworth, needs to articulate and point out possible political avenues and to orient thought and action in concrete ways so as to contribute to progressive political change rather than dwelling on the encounter of the incalculable and calculation and im-possibility of world democracy in a Derridean fashion.

In similar ways to the first debate on critique that I discussed, critical thinking is once again called upon to respond to political time in a strategic and efficient manner. As critical inquiry gets summoned up to the court of reason in Beardsworth's account, its realm of engagement is limited to that which the light of reason can be shed upon, and its politics is confined to mapping out the achievable and the doable in

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[336] Ibid., 213-214.
[337] Ibid., 247.
[338] Ibid., 231.
[339] Ibid., 234.
[340] Ibid., 234.

a given historical context without questioning or disrupting the limits of what is presented as "realistic" choices. Hence, if untimely critical thought is to be meaningful it has to be on time by responding to political exigency in a practical, efficient, and strategic manner.

In contrast to this prevalent form of understanding the untimeliness of critical theory, I will now turn to a different account of the untimely provided by Wendy Brown whose work informs the project of dismantling security as untimely critique. Drawing from her discussion of the relationship between critique, crisis, and political time, I will suggest that untimely critique of security entails, simultaneously, an attunement to the times and an aggressive violation of their self-conception. It is in this different sense of the untimely that the suggestion of dismantling security needs to be situated.

Critique and Political Time

As I suggested in the Prelude to this chapter, elevating security itself to the position of major protagonist and extending a call to "dismantle security" was itself declared to be an untimely pursuit in a time depicted as the time of crisis in security. Such a declaration stood as an exemplary moment (not in the sense of illustration or allegory, but as a moment of crystallization) for disciplinary prohibitions to think and act otherwise—perhaps the moment when a doxa exhibits its most powerful hold. Hence, what is first needed is to overturn the taken-for-granted relations between crisis, timeliness, and critique.

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The roots krisis and kritik can be traced back to the Greek word *krinō*, which meant "to separate", to "choose," to "judge," to "decide."[341] While creating a broad spectrum of meanings, it was intimately related to politics as it connoted a "divorce" or "quarrel," but also a moment of decision and a turning point. It was also used as a jurisprudential term in the sense of making a decision, reaching a verdict or judgment (kritik) on an alleged disorder so as to provide a way to restore order. Rather than being separated into two domains of meaning—that of "subjective critique" and "objective crisis"—krisis and kritik were conceived as interlinked moments. Koselleck explains this conceptual fusion:

> [I]t was in the sense of "judgment," "trial," "legal decision," and ultimately "court" that crisis achieved a high constitutional status, through which the individual citizen and the community were bound together. The "for and against" was therefore present in the original meaning of the word and this in a manner that already conceptually anticipated the appropriate judgment.[342]

Recognition of an objective crisis and subjective judgments to be passed on it so as to come up with a formula for restoring the health of the polity by setting the times right were thereby infused and implicated in each other.[343] Consequently, as Brown notes, there could be no such thing as "mere critique" or "untimely critique" because critique always entailed a concern with political time: "[C]ritique as political *krisis* promise[d] to restore continuity by repairing or renewing the justice that gives an order the prospect of continuity, that indeed ma[de] it continuous."[344]

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[341]Reinhart Koselleck, "Crisis," *Journal of History of Ideas* 67, no. 2 (2006): 358.
[342] Ibid., 359.
[343] Ibid., 359.
[344] Brown, "Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times," 6.

The breaking of this intimate link between krisis and kritik, the consequent de-politicization of critique and its sundering from crisis coincides with the rise of modern political order and redistribution of the public space into the binary structure of sovereign and subject, public and private.[345] Failing to note the link between the critique it practiced and the looming political crisis, emerging philosophies of history, according Koselleck, had the effect of obfuscating this crisis. As he explains, "[n]ever politically grasped, [this political crisis] remained concealed in historico-philosophical images of the future which cause the day's events to pale."[346]

It is this intimate, but severed, link between crisis and critique in historical narratives that Wendy Brown's discussion brings to the fore and re-problematizes. She turns to Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History" and challenges conventional understandings of historical materialism, which conceives of the present in terms of unfolding laws of history.[347] According to Brown, the practice of critical theory appeals to a concern with time to the extent that "[t]he crisis that incites critique and that critique engages itself signals a rupture of temporal continuity, which is at the same time a rupture in political imaginary."[348] Cast in these terms, it is a particular experience with time, with the present, that Brown suggests Benjamin's theses aim to capture. Rather than an unmoving or an automatically overcome present (a present that is out of time), the present is interpreted as an opening that calls for a response to it.

[345] Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, ed. Thomas McCarthy, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988), 7.
[346] Koselleck, "Crisis," 9.
[347] Brown, "Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times."
[348] Ibid., 7.

This call for a response highlights the idea that, far from being a luxury, critique is non-optional in its nature.

Such an understanding of critical thought is premised on a historical consciousness that grasps the present historically so as to break with the self-conception of the age. Untimely critique transforms into a technique to blow up the present through fracturing its apparent seamlessness by insisting on alternatives to its closed political and epistemological universe.[349] Such a conception resonates with the distinction that Žižek makes between a political subjectivity that is confined to choosing between the existing alternatives—one that takes the limits of what is given as the limits to what is possible—and a form of subjectivity that creates the very set of alternatives by "transcend[ing] the coordinates of a given situation [and] 'posit[ing] the presuppositions' of one's activity" by redefining the very situation within which one is active."[350]

With its attempt to grasp the times in its singularity, critique is cast neither as a breaking free from the weight of time (which would amount to ahistoricity) nor being weighed down by the times (as in the case of teleology).[351] It conceives the present as "historically contoured but not itself experienced as history because not necessarily continuous with what has been."[352] It is an attitude that renders the present as the site of "non-utopian possibility" since it is historically situated and constrained yet also a

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[349] Ibid., 14.
[350] Slavoj Žižek, "Can Lenin Tell Us About Freedom Today?," (2001). The text is available at http://www.lacan.com/freedom.htm (Accessed August 2, 2010).
[351] Brown, "Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times."
[352] Ibid., 12.

possibility since it is not historically foreordained or determined.[353] It entails

contesting the delimitations of choice and challenging the confinement of politics to

existing possibilities.

Rather than positing history as existing objectively outside of narration, what

Brown's discussion highlights is the intimate relation between the constitution of

political subjectivity vis-à-vis the meaning of history for the present. It alludes to "the

power of historical discourse," which Mowitt explains as a power "to estrange us from

that which is most familiar, namely, the fixity of the present" because "what we

believe to have happened to us bears concretely on what we are prepared to do with

ourselves both now and in the future."[354] Mark Neocleous concretizes the political

stakes entailed in such encounters with history—with the dead—from the perspective

of three political traditions: a conservative one, which aims to reconcile the dead with

the living, a fascist one, which aims to resurrect the dead to legitimate its fascist

program, and a historical materialist one, which seeks redemption with the dead as the

source of hope and inspiration for the future.[355]

Brown's discussion of critique and political time is significant for highlighting

the immediately political nature of critique in contrast to contemporary invocations

that cast it as a self-indulgent practice, an untimely luxury, a disinterested, distanced,

academic endeavor. Her attempt to trace critique vis-à-vis its relation to political time

provides a counter-narrative to the conservative and moralizing assertions that shun

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[353] Ibid.,12-13.
[354] Mowitt, *Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object*, 2.
[355] Mark Neocleous, *The Monstrous and the Dead: Burke, Marx, Fascism* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005).

untimely critique of security as a luxurious interest that is committed to abstract ideals rather than to the "reality" of politics—i.e., running after utopia rather than modeling "real world" solutions. Dismantling security as untimely critique entails a similar claim to unsettle the accounts of "what the times are" with a "bid to reset time."[356] It aspires to be untimely in the face of the demands on critical thought to be on time; aims to challenge the moralizing move, the call to conscience that arrives in the form of assertions that saying "no!" to security, that refusing to write it, would be untimely. Rather than succumbing to the injunction that thought of political possibility is to be confined within the framework of security, dismantling security aims to open up space for alternative forms, for a different language of politics so as to "stop digging" the hole politics of security have dug us and start building a counter-discourse.

Conclusion

As an attempt to push a debate that is fixated on security to the limit and explore what it means to dismantle security, my engagement with various aspects of this move is not intended as an analysis raised at the level of causal interpretations or as an attempt to find better solutions to a problem that already has a name. Rather, it tries to recast what is taken-for-granted by attending to the conceptual assumptions, the historical and systemic conditions within which the politics of security plays itself out. As I tried to show in this chapter, it also entails a simultaneous move of refusing to be a disciple of the discipline of security. This implies overturning not only the

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[356] Brown, "Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times," 4.

silent disciplinary protocols about which questions are legitimate to ask, but also the very framework that informs those questions.

It is from this perspective that I devoted two chapters to examining and clarifying the proposal to dismantle security as a claim on time. After explicating, in Chapter 4, the temporal structure that is enacted by politics of security and elaborating on how security structures the relation between the present and the future, in this chapter, I approached the question of temporality from a different perspective, by situating it in relation to disciplinary times in order to clarify what an untimely critique of security means. I tried to elaborate this notion of the untimely by exploring the understanding of untimeliness that informs certain conceptions of critical theorizing in International Relations. I suggested that such a notion of the untimely paradoxically calls on critical thought to be on time in the sense of being punctual and strategic. Turning to Wendy Brown's discussion of the relation between critique and political time, I elaborated on the sense of untimely critique that dismantling security strives for—a critique that goes against the times that are saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward taking apart the architecture of security.

What is next? Providing a positive proposal toward building a new edifice? Seeking out new deities to replace the church of security? The concluding chapter will offer none of these. Rather, it will invite the reader on a journey into different possibilities that await when we are "insecure at last."[357]

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[357] Eve Ensler, *Insecure at Last: Losing It in Our Security-Obsessed World* (New York: Villard, 2006).

What does politics beyond politics of security mean? What does the *beyond* in this question entail? Does such a discussion of a politics beyond strive toward something? Is it a going beyond as going *somewhere*? Is it seeking a new object for thought, running after a final destination, or reaching a new shore? Or is it going beyond as a departure, a taking leave rather than settling on a new ground? If "[i]n civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates,"[358] could this going beyond be thought in terms of merely setting sail?

This chapter is about navigating; it is about setting sail with three different senses of politics beyond politics of security. As the gesture toward the possibility, or, perhaps, the necessity of the multiple senses of a politics beyond politics of security implies, my intention is not to provide an inquiry that rivets with the anxiety of naming the one, of reaching a secure ground, or of making it to the shore. It is certainly an inquiry that is animated by a dilemma, a worry, an anxiety. It is an anxiety that stems from the way in which security has come to be the defining limit to political thought, action, and imagination; an anxiety about the reduction of politics to the governance of insecurities. Such an anxiety, I want to suggest, is no reason to become complicit and repeat the same gesture of security by providing timely thoughts. Instead, as I argued in the previous chapters, dismantling security calls for critical

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[358] Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16, no. 1 (1986): 27.

thought to be untimely so as not to re-inscribe the doxa of security, to reproduce it as a universal value, the ultimate horizon for political thought and action, and keep on strengthening the walls of the church of security.

Driven with an anxiety, yet divested from the anxiety of landing in a safe harbor, I will visit and inquire into three forms of thinking politics where the limit to security does not delimit thought. Rather, it acts as its enabling condition. Put differently, I will explore different possibilities where insecurity (the absence of safe borders or secure grounds for thought and action) figures as the point of departure for thought of politics rather than serving as the means and the end for constituting political possibilities. I will formulate these engagements as three moves in relation to "a politics beyond": beyond a secure self, beyond the order of police, and beyond the time of security.

My first stop will be a conception of a politics beyond that unravels the subject of security through the sense of the Other. In a discipline such as International Relations, whose very *raison d'etre* is security (i.e., a discipline that takes a vision of a world of sovereign states—the International—as given and affirms the principle of sovereignty as an ahistorical, universal, and transcendent category that demarcates the inside from the outside, order from anarchy, morality from politics, and identity from difference, and thereby posits national interest and state security as primary and overriding concerns) some scholars have argued that politics of security is itself a form of politics that needs to be "out-lived."[359] Rather than taking security as the premise

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[359] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*; Ashley and Walker, "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies.";

upon which political thought and practice is to be built (i.e., taking the "value of security"[360] as given and proceeding with the narrow question of how security is to be achieved) they invoke the question of *security as such* and provide powerful critiques of modernity's project of security by challenging the very ground upon which it rests: namely, the sovereign subject of security. Hence, in the first section, I will engage with the works of these scholars by visiting their arguments on the relationship between modernity, security, and violence. I will elaborate on how their problematization of the principle of sovereignty (in relation to the sovereign state, sovereign individual, or sovereign Truth) contests the very possibility of grounding social and political theory on the premise of a self-interested, autonomous subject that is prevalent in accounts of world politics. I will discuss how this move opens up a different form of figuring the International beyond security through the introduction of the idea of a self that is constituted by Otherness.

As I tried to elaborate in the preceding discussion, the proposal to call for dismantling security stems from an understanding that regards politics of security not only as a political project, but also a political method—a means of producing and reproducing order. Although to a large extent taken for granted and deployed as an analytic category in International Relations, order always carries with it ethical and normative elements. As Dean explains, order always encompasses "poetic, mythic and

David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds., *The Political Subject of Violence* (Manchester: Manchester University Press,1993); Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Also Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War*; Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss, "Generalising the International," *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005). Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations* (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
[360] Der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard."

symbolic elements…which help make the world thinkable, map-able, and thus form conditions of certain forms of 'global' political action."[361] Rather than being an objective category, a neutral tool for politics and political analysis, order is always thoroughly political.

Building upon this premise, in the second section, I will turn to the political thought of Jacques Rancière and suggest that his inquiry offers a form of thinking of a politics beyond that is about overturning the ordered space of security through the principle of impropriety and the logic of dissensus. In his *Nights of Labor* Rancière provides an account of 19th century workers' struggles to overturn the "partition of the sensuous" that determined the day as the time to work and night as the time to rest.[362] In the face of such an ordering, workers strive to make something more of their night by writing, reading, thinking, and discussing instead of spending that time sleeping and hence, reproducing themselves for capital. Workers struggle to reframe their existence by breaking with their identity, culture, by overturning the codes that assign them to a certain time (day) and space (factory). Through an inquiry into Rancière's discussion of the order of police and his conception of politics as dissensus, I will argue that such a conception provides a sense of politics that is not about securing identity, space, and time of politics, but one of overturning them.

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[361] Mitchell Dean, "A Political Mythology of World Order: Carl Schmitt's Nomos," *Theory Culture & Society* 23, no. 5 (2006): 1. For a critical engagement and problematization of the deployment of the concept of order as a neutral analytical tool in the discipline by exposing its spatial presumptions, see Sanjay Chaturvedi and Joe Painter, "Whose World, Whose Order?: Spatiality, Geopolitics and the Limits of the World Order Concept," *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 4 (2007).

[362] Jacques Rancière, *The Nights of Labor: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth-Century France* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

In the third and final section of this chapter, I will take yet a different cut into politics beyond, this time by re-introducing the temporal element in relation to politics of security. I will discuss what a politics beyond politics of security might entail when the beyond is figured in temporal terms. In Chapter 4, I tried to show how politics of security replaces political time as possibility with the homogenous time of measure, containing what is beyond measure within the order of calculability, reducing political life to an arithmetic of survival, appropriating and instrumentalizing the unforeseeable toward the reproduction of the law of the same. This section will revisit the same theme of time and ask, "if politics of security writes the future as present, is it possible to conceive of a different form of writing the future?" I will grapple with this question through an engagement with Jacques Derrida's conception of political time as "out of joint."[363] This conception, I will suggest, opens up an alternative perspective on futurity that renders the future not as a future as present, but as a heterogeneous other, or in Derrida's words, "an unanticipatible alterity."[364] By rendering any representation of the future impossible, such a writing of the future, I will suggest, configures politics as an activity without closure and finality beyond security.

Before proceeding with the discussion, perhaps it would be better to start with a clarification and a disclaimer. First: a clarification about the title of this chapter. The formulation—politics beyond politics of security—might come off as an unnecessary doubling, an awkward framing, a gesture that merely re-iterates what has already been articulated and highlighted—namely, that security is political. One of the main points

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[363] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (London, New York: Routledge, 2006).
[364] ———, "Psyche: Invention of the Other," in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 39.

that I emphasized throughout the discussion so far was that security is not a universal good that all can equally share; nor is it a concept or an empty signifier that can be progressively articulated. Instead, I argued that discourses and practices that this sign circulates through are thoroughly political—that they put in place, reproduce, and sustain relations of power and hierarchy—and that security is violent by constitution. If that is the case, why not merely name the inquiry as an inquiry of a politics beyond security? Why insist on a politics beyond politics of security?

The reason that I retain this formulation is that security is not merely political—entailing contestation over what it means, its value, which introduces the question of power into its figuration—but because security enacts a certain *form* of politics. I could perhaps clarify this point by referring to the distinction between politics as what empirically takes place as political activity in its instituted form and the political as that which pertains to the specification and enactment of what counts as politics.[365] When certain critical scholars highlight the political nature of security and distinguish critical approaches from conventional analysis by the former's emphasis on this point,[366] it does not necessarily mean that such an acknowledgement translates into an inquiry into the political; instead, most often the given framework of politics is taken for granted. For instance, while some scholars posit the *politicization* of an issue as the moment of its securitization, a more radical questioning of the assumptions about what constitutes that politics would suggest that it is actually a

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[365] For a brief yet helpful overview of this distinction as found in the works of political theorists such as Claude Lefort, Chantal Mouffe, among others, see Yannis Stavrakakis, "Encircling the Political: Towards a Lacanian Political Theory," in *Lacan and the Political* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 71-75.
[366] Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*.

moment of *de-politicization*, of rendering it as an issue to be dealt with expertise or technological solutions.[367] For this reason, I retain "politics beyond politics of security" to emphasize that the inquiry here concerns not only political questions surrounding security, but also thinking politics beyond politics of security as a way to re-assess the political that frames it.

Apart from this clarification, a disclaimer is also in order. Some readers might object to the selective reading of the thoughts of the scholars that I take up in this discussion. For instance, those, who are familiar with Rancière's oeuvre, will recognize that formidable aspects of his work—such as the principle of equality, aesthetics and its relationship to politics, the concept of emancipation—are not taken up in the following discussion. Yet others might object in a different vein by pointing out the differences between thinkers such as Rancière and Derrida and question the legitimacy of an attempt to level their thoughts on the same terrain by making them answer the same question. It is certainly the case that on various occasions, Rancière, for instance, explicitly differentiates his political thinking from Derrida's conception of politics, ethics, and democracy.[368] Yet, my intention throughout this discussion is

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[367] Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

[368] For instance, on Rancière's critique of Derrida's conception of democracy for the latter's positing democracy as a transcendental horizon (as a democracy to come) and thereby foreclosing a conception of democracy as practice, Jacques Rancière, "Does Democracy Mean Something?," in *Adieu Derrida*, ed. Costas Douzinas (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). For another articulation of this thesis, where Rancière argues that Derrida formulates the excess of the word democracy over any of its historically determined content in an ethical law rather than through the rationality of politics, ———, "Should Democracy Come? Ethics and Politics in Derrida," in *Derrida and the Time of the Political*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2009).

not to provide an exegesis of these thinkers' entire works. Instead, I focus on a particular question and bring their voices to bear on what a politics beyond politics of security might entail. What happens when thought of politics starts at the limits of security? How are we to conceptualize politics if we abandon security as the ground and the telos of political thought and action? If dominant forces of security and capital reduce political life to calculability and write the future as present, are there other forms of relating to the future that could subvert this logic? It is in the light of these questions that I will engage with the works of these authors. While doing a selective reading, therefore, I nevertheless hope to provide a convincing interpretation that does not distort the overall arguments of these thinkers.

Sense of the Other

Modernity, Security, and Violence

Perhaps the defining feature of International Relations is its being a discipline, which lays a special claim about its competency in telling the truth about the relationship between politics and violence. After all, one of the primary forms of expression of political violence—namely, war—and the resolution of this problem are central questions that the discipline is devoted to thinking about. Yet, as I will elaborate below, some scholars have argued that the modern episteme and the modern metaphysical tradition that the discipline of International Relations is indebted to, renders the latter inescapably blind to the relationship between politics and violence. Consequently, they posit that modernity's project of security is itself a central problem

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that needs to be interrogated. Drawing from the insights of continental thinkers such as

Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida, and Foucault among others, they problematize the

conceptual structures and ontological premises of international relations theory, such

as state, sovereignty, order, and anarchy. In this conception, "out-living" modernity's

politics of security, surpassing modern political imaginary gets articulated as an

ethicizing move beyond the self of security by de-centering it through a sense of the

Other.

   At the premise of these analyses lies a radical questioning of modernity and

modern political thought and a radical questioning of the discipline of International

Relations, which is primarily concerned with "living-out" modern political life.[369]

According to Campbell and Dillon, International Relations, which is both a feature

and function of modern thought, is also "a feature and a function of the *crisis* of that

thought."[370] As Dillon explains,

> [W]e not only think the political in the way that we do because of the way that
> we think, we necessarily also, of course, think International Relations in the
> way that we do because of the way that we think. Hence, International
> Relations is a tradition of (political) thought within a tradition of thought
> [metaphysical thought] whose very foundational— ontological,
> epistemological and ethical— structures of thought are profoundly in
> question. Indeed, it is a tradition within a tradition whose very modern
> definition of thinking, as that which can ground itself, has realized its own
> failure. What has been happening to this failed project of thought is
> consequently of direct significance to the thought of International Relations as
> well, because it directly impacts upon the thought of the political as such.[371]

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[369] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 1.
[370] David Campbell and Michael Dillon, "The End of Philosophy and the End of International
Relations," in *The Political Subject of Violence* ed. David Campbell and Michael Dillon
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). Emphasis added.
[371] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 6.

Hence, these scholars' call for a politics beyond politics of security passes through an ontological inquiry into the constitutive categories of modern political thought, problematization of modern reason, modern narratives of progress and freedom. This line of inquiry follows the trajectory of "the return of the ontological" and the radical questioning of metaphysical thought by Nietzsche and Heidegger.[372] The significance of this turn lies less in its merely re-posing the question of ontology than its exposure of the "dark side of Western logos" in its pursuit of certainty, identity, and control.[373]

In relation to the discipline of International Relations, the importance of such ontological inquiries is their demystifying the taken-for-granted conceptual framework where the very framing of thought occludes the possibility of even raising the question of security as such. The concept of sovereignty—and its accompanying security discourse (the anarchy problematic)—operates as the point of this closure. Rather than being treated as "an ahistorical, universalized component of an 'art of the possible' bounded by power politics logic"[374] as done in conventional approaches, sovereignty in these critical analyses is situated within a broader discursive agenda. That is, it is exposed to be an expression of the modern narrative of the post-Kantian sovereign

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[372] Michael Dillon, "The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the 'Inter' of Inter-National Relations and Continental Thought," in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, ed. David Campbell and Michael Shapiro (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press 1999), 96-101.

[373] Dillon argues for the inescapable relevance of ontology to all forms of thinking when he writes: "For one cannot say anything about anything that *is*, without always already having made assumptions about the *is* as such. Any mode of thought… always already carries an ontology sequestered with it." Ibid., 97.

[374] Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 200-01.

man, who is invested with the capacity and the will to emancipate humankind, and the moment when logocentrism and the privileging of a singular, interpretative orientation gets systematically embedded in modern political discourse.[375] It is through the fusion of the sovereign man as the subject of history and the source of meaning in the world with the sovereign state as the locus of political life, that the modern will to know and will to power gets institutionalized in the same site. The end result is a narrative of political life amidst an anarchical world of Otherness where the discourses of danger work towards "domesticating global political life"[376] by policing the limits, the boundaries of identity, of political possibility as it demarcates the self, secure inside, from the other, the dangerous outside.[377]

It is the equation of the political thought on the International with representative-calculative thought that is symptomatic of modern subjectivity that these scholars question as they reveal how the stakes entailed by security talk far exceed the problems associated with achieving security. Once posited as the foundation for political life and embraced as an uncontestable value in an anarchical

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[375] Ibid.

[376] Richard Ashley, "The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life," in *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. James Der Derian (London: MacMillan, 1988).

[377] Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Against assertions that in the globalized world the demise of the sovereign state translates into the dissolution of this binary logic, Walker argues for the continued relevance of this inside/outside dialectic as constitutive of the political. Walker posits that the stakes in the contemporary era are not the elimination of the limit/the lines of insecurity, but their novel articulations. As he writes

> We have not all come inside. We seem to be living in a world of inclusions and exclusions articulated through some other spatiotemporal frame in addition to inclusions and exclusions framed in relation to the sovereign territorial state and system of states; a world, perhaps, of more borders and more sovereignties, rather than less.

R.B.J. Walker, "Lines of Insecurity: International, Imperial, Exceptional," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006): 80.

world, they argue, the question of security gets reduced to specifying what security is, how it can be attained, what are the cost-effective means of doing so, and "occasionally not[ing] a so-called security paradox; that my security project may excite your insecurity."[378] In contrast, rather than taking the value of security for granted and asking how to achieve it, they raise the question of *security as such* by questioning the ontological assumptions, the guiding principle grounding political narratives.

An important insight into these inquiries pertains to the way in which politics of security is tantamount to the technologization of political life and hence de-politicization of politics.[379] Jenny Edkins's discussion of practices of aid and famine relief provide a striking account of how such a technologization and de-politicization is evidenced in international politics and the discipline that studies it.[380] At the center of Edkins's analysis is the way in which food crises and the problem of hunger is discursively constructed as called "famine" by relief organizations, NGOs, and state representatives and how this discursive representation seals off the power structures that produce this crisis in the first place. Constituted as an object of knowledge and a subject of scientific inquiry, famine becomes a thing whose underlying causes must be sought. The desire to define famine and the concomitant hunt to capture its essence

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[378] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 18.
[379] Ibid. See also Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In*. For a similar argument on how, in "liberal modernity," political life gets reduced to techno-politics and cultivation of "logistical life…lived under the duress of the command to be efficient" (13) so as to remove the problem of war from society: Reid, *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies*.
[380] Jenny Edkins, *Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid* (Minneapolis: University of Minensota Press, 2000).

leads to an analysis of the situation in terms of the amount of crop production, availability of food, nutritional status of the population—what could perhaps be called a mathematization of the problem.[381] Such forms of enumeration and definition, Edkins argues, come at the expense of other forms of enumeration, such as instances of hunger being remembered through the oral tradition, which could provide guidance in understanding the political context and power relations that give rise to the crisis. Rather than attending to its historical conditions of possibility and the forms of social and political arrangements that lead to famines, modernist representations of such crises divest it from politics and power relations. Edkins concludes that the framing of famine in discourses of modernity has double consequence. On the one hand, such a framing de-politicizes hunger and how it should be combated, and prioritizes technical solutions through abstract analysis and the formulation of general principles. Such an approach merely reinstates and reproduces the form of politics that has produced the famine in the first place. On the other hand, framing famine within discourses of modernity renders humanitarian relief industry impervious to critique because any debate—critical or supportive of humanitarianism—reproduces the very discourse of humanitarianism and its objects.

Technologization of political life under the reign of instrumental and calculative thought is depicted as symptomatic of modern political reason. Being less an antidote to violence as it is generally supposed, modern political reason, it is suggested, is itself implicated in the violence it is expected to cure. This relationship

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[381] The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that started in April 20, 2010 provides a recent example of this obsession with naming, defining, and providing precise measure of a disaster.

occurs because, as Campbell and Dillon suggest, modernity's political subject is a violent subject by constitution.[382] On the one hand, taking violence as the ultimo ratio of politics, the basic subject of modern political thought (subject in the sense of what politics is ultimately understood to be about) is posited as the subject of violence. On the other hand, the subject of modern politics—the autonomous reasoning subject—is a violent political subject by its composition. It is a subject whose features, according to modern political thought, bring him into conflict with other men.[383] At issues is, in White's depiction, the "teflon subject… the assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition and embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of an accelerating mastery over them."[384] Politics in modernity, according to these scholars, derives from an underlying ontology of violence occasioned by a certain understanding of political subjectivity—the autonomous reasoning subject that is to be both "capable of disclosing the character of politics rationally (an epistemological claim) and of constituting politics in reality (an ontological claim)."[385] Given that the political subject of violence is a reasoning subject, Campbell and Dillon suggest, the complicity of reason in the violence of the political subject cannot be elided. What this diagnosis implies is that modern political reason not only cannot provide adequate tools to understand and address political violence, but that reason itself, with its universalist aspirations, is not immune to it.

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[382] Campbell and Dillon, "The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations."
[383] Ibid.:1.
[384] Stephen K. White, "Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection," *Political Theory* 25, no. 4 (1997): 503.
[385] Campbell and Dillon, "The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations," 1.

It is this problematization of modern political reason and modern political subjectivity that constitutes the basis of the calls for a politics beyond politics of security. As these accounts point out, increased political violence with the globalization of the project of modern politics is less a deviation from modern reason, but the symptom of its very success. In other words, it is expressive of the claim to sovereign identity, mastery, and transparency as the guarantee and the guiding ideal of modern life.[386] Consequently, forms of political violence as entailed in ethnic or nationalist conflicts—far from being expressions of the pre-modern, of deviations from or failures to live up to the standards of modernity—are instances that are symptomatic of the success of modern reason itself.

Problematization of modern reason and the subject of security sets the stage for a conception of politics beyond politics of security that is articulated as unraveling, erasing the self-interested, autonomous subject as the premise of political thought and action. It entails the attempt to reveal what is lost under the illusion of sovereign claims to a secure self and to expose the ethical and political implications of recognizing the radical interdependence at the heart of being. The search for a "generative principle of formation that [is] radically other than violence"[387] culminates in an attempt to think an attachment to life that invokes the responsibility to the Other and the articulation of the political through this sense of the Other.

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[386] Ibid.

[387] David Campbell and Michael Dillon, "Postface: The Political and the Ethical," in *The Political Subject of Violence*, ed. David Campbell and Michael Dillon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 165.

From the inter- to the intra- and back[388]

How, then, is one to produce a political vocabulary that is capable of articulating a different political imaginary, different ethical and political possibilities that are foreclosed by modern political thought? What would an alternative to a politics premised on modernity's subject of security, which gives identity to the disciplinary discourse of world politics, entail? The answer lies in overturning the perspective on the International, which precludes the possibility of envisioning ethical life and pursuing the question of politics beyond secure borders; it lies in unraveling the limits, which confine the thought of ethical responsibility and political possibility within those secure borders where the search for good life is said to reside.[389] In this regard, one of the primary points made by these scholars is that the International cannot be separated from political theory once the ontological commitments to a sovereign, autonomous self are themselves cast as a question rather than being taken as unproblematic assumptions. This move passes through the exposition of the radical interdependence constitutive of subjectivity as such, which in turn, configures the International beyond security by discrediting the "ontology of danger"[390] as its unquestioned premise. Highlighting the ontological primacy of sociality in this way

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[388] While the concerns elaborated in the first section are shared by a wide number of scholars grouped as "postmodernists" or "poststructuralists" in the discipline and whose insights could be put in conversation with the central theme of this chapter, I will limit my discussion to those scholars who have directly engaged with the question of politics beyond politics of security.

[389] A point most famously made by Martin Wight as he declares that the International is no place to theorize politics: Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?," *International Relations* 2, no. 1 (1960).

[390] Louiza Odysseos, "Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 2 (2002).

enables a different understanding of ethics and responsibility, which becomes the basis for a different formulation of politics beyond politics of security.

To think what remains unthought, or rather, what is precluded from thought due to the ontological commitments to modern subjectivity—and, consequently, committing politics to the project of securing this subject—the effort to move beyond politics of security translates into an effort to think the limit as such.[391] The limit, boundary, or difference as such becomes the question because modernity's politics of security and the discourses and practices of inter-national relations is ultimately about limits (i.e, that which gives something its identity). The limit—the "inter"—differentiates the inside from the outside, identity from difference, and order from anarchy; it marks the limits to the possibility of politics, political subjectivity, and what could be a legitimate and realistic analysis of politics. Rather than asking what limits do, how limits operate, discourses and practices of international relations take the limit as the unquestioned ground and view political subjectivities as existing before the operation of the inter-national political practices. Such an account of the limit becomes the premise to enunciate an authoritative account of politics and ethics, confining politics to fixing, enforcing, policing those limits, and limiting responsibility to the survival of the self. Questioning the limit as such turns the question of the limit back on itself by taking the "inter"—the in between, relationality, and marker of difference—of International Relations seriously. The limit becomes the site to expose what is effaced by modernity's subject of security: a sense of selfhood that is always

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[391] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought.*

already relational, a self that is constituted by otherness, a sense of identity that is "not only plural but is continuously also being pluralized."[392]

The premise for such a move beyond politics of security is the conception of ontological difference as the defining feature of being human. It is a difference that renders human existence, not just a multiplicity of human subjects (subjects such as the nation, class, race, religion, etc), but a plurality "[i]nstalled within the being of every human being."[393] In other words, it is an account of difference that displaces the question of difference, the limit from the realm of inter—i.e., difference between subjects—to an account of difference that is intra—i.e., pertaining to the self as such. The force of difference is posited as a process of endless differentiation that renders the human as that which becomes by becoming a stranger to itself. The Other, which inhabits the self, can never be folded into the self and thereby prevents the human from ever being at home with itself.[394] Hence, the question of the limit is not a question merely about the limit, the boundary between self and other, and their inter-relation. Rather, it concerns the very operation of the relationality itself. In other words, what is at stake is not merely the difference between identities and their indebtedness to each other in their constitution, but an unassimilable Otherness—a difference that prevents any identity from ever becoming fully stabilized.[395] This Other that the self can never appropriate, but is always in a position to confront,

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[392] Ibid., 5.
[393] ———, "The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the 'Inter' of Inter-National Relations and Continental Thought," 114.
[394] Campbell and Dillon, "The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations," 169.
[395] Dillon, "The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the 'Inter' of Inter-National Relations and Continental Thought," 92.

renders the "[h]uman being…not one, self-subsistent, uniform, stable or contained [but rather a being that is] differentially constituted as a lack by a lack."[396]

In her discussion of the concept of co-existence in International Relations, Odysseos deploys this theme of Otherness to overturn dominant political narratives about an inherently dangerous world and provides an account of co-existence that recovers radical interdependence as constitutive of being.[397] Based on the foundation of modern subjectivity—i.e., subject understood as a complete, fully constituted self— co-existence can only be conceptualized and articulated through, what she calls, "a logic of composition."[398] The logic of composition reduces co-existence to the co-presence of previously self-sufficient, non-relational, autonomous entities. In other words, co-existence is narrated as the condition of entities (sovereign states, individuals, sub-state groups) coming together to co-habit a geographical, social, or political space and staying together there. Defined as "a *state* of staying together"[399] such a notion renders co-existence as a secondary condition, as an act of composing previously unrelated, preformed subjects. In the words of Odysseos, "[t]he decisive effect of the logic of composition is thus the restriction of relationality to mere co-presence of pre-constituted entities."[400] Positing entities as such and subscribing to a relation of mere co-presence (subjects as simultaneously being present and not co-existing), this logic incorporates co-existence as "an after-thought," as "extrinsic to the

[396] ———, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 65.
[397] Odysseos, "Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations."; ———, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations*.
[398] Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations*, xiii.
[399] Ibid., xxiv.
[400] Ibid., xxvii.

subject," thereby, effacing the constitutive role of Otherness.[401] By effacing the role of the Other in the formation of the self, co-existence gets reduced to a mere technical problem to be resolved through calculative expertise. When self-sufficient subjectivity acts as the premise to think the question of being with, co-existence becomes an act of bringing entities together and managing their co-presence. Effacement of heteronomy through the logic of composition puts into place a "relational schema"—an ethos of relating to the other—that the pervasive ontology of the anarchic world out there generates and perpetuates.[402] It is an ethos of survival through which the other is encountered in narratives of a pre-socially dangerous Hobbesian world. Within this schema, responsibility gets cast as something pertaining merely to the survival of the self.

Exposing the radical interdependence at the heart of being and unassimilable Otherness as definitive of what the human way of being is subverts what is normally understood as ethics.[403] Ethics, in this formulation, is not the elaboration of moral codes or universal rules of conduct to mediate relations among autonomous, pre-constituted moral agents. It is a form of relating to the Other; an encounter premised on "an extreme sensitivity of one subjectivity to another."[404] When being is understood as "not only as always already a being-with-others but also a being with

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[401] Ibid., xxvi.

[402] ———, "Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations," 404.

[403] David Campbell, "The Politics of Radical Interdependence: A Rejoinder to Daniel Warner," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1996); Campbell and Dillon, "Postface: The Political and the Ethical."

[404] Campbell and Dillon, "Postface: The Political and the Ethical," 170.

Otherness itself,"[405] responsibility transforms from being something that pertains to the survival of the self into a pre-original, "a primary responsibility that stakes being upon the assertion of a right to be."[406] In other words, the acknowledgment that "to be" is being inextricably bound up with others and being called into question by the Otherness that is constitutive of the self, the human being is forced to face the challenge of articulating the possibilities for and leading a collective life in the absence of any founding principles or final authorizations about what constitutes the human—whether it be a "we" authorized by God, by the Nation, by the State, or by the Party.[407] There can be no final formula to avoid the difficulties of existence, no foundation or ground to build an ethics. There can be no ethics removed from subjectivity.[408]

Recovery of the ethical is intimately and inescapably bound up with the recovery of the political beyond politics of security. The political is now cast as "the continuous challenge to put human freedom as an ethical encounter with others and within Otherness that is integral to its own constitution as a way of being, into work in

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[405] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 61.
[406] Campbell and Dillon, "The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations," 170.
[407] Dillon, "The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the 'Inter' of Inter-National Relations and Continental Thought," 95.
[408] Judith Butler's engagement with the U.S. response to the attacks on September 11 and the ensuing invasions in the name of fighting terrorism provides a useful recount of how this notion of "fundamental dependence on anonymous others" (xii) and the radical interdependency constitutive of subjectivity can be a resource to build political and ethical possibilities. Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London, New York: Verso, 2004). Placing corporeal vulnerability at the center of her discussion, she suggests that we are always attached and exposed to others. Rather than denying the vulnerability of our lives through "institutionalized fantasy of mastery" (29), what is needed is to take loss and vulnerability as the basis to think about grief as a political resource "to develop and identification with suffering itself" (30).

the world."[409] Since "human being" here is a verb that refers to a way of being rather than being a noun, a what, or an entity, the question of the political transforms from being a "singular what" into a question of "a plural 'how'"[410] in that it refers to a way of being in the world. Accordingly, politics is not about applying pre-defined rules, a question of arithmetic, of techno-politics; it entails assuming one's responsibility and facing the "obligatory freedom" that as a mortal being, a human being is obliged to face.[411] Being human is articulated as a possibility that is obliged to bring the possibility of its way of being into new possibilities of being.[412] It is this thought beyond secure foundations toward the articulation of an ethical selfhood where the thought of a politics beyond politics of security begins.

Order of Security, Politics of Impropriety

> Politics, before all else, is an intervention in the visible and the sayable.
> —Jacques Rancière

As I elaborated in the previous chapters and re-emphasized in the introductory pages to this chapter, security is no mere concept, nor an empty signifier that can be re-signified without re-inscribing the hierarchical orders, reproducing the violence it enacts. Security is not a universal value pursued by subjects with pre-given interests as International Relations predominantly understands what security is about. Rather, it refers to a form of politics that concerns the production and reproduction of order by

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[409] Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 62.
[410] Ibid., 65.
[411] ———, "The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the 'Inter' of Inter-National Relations and Continental Thought," 94.
[412] ———, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 6.

"structur[ing] the possible field of action"[413] and configuring the limits to politics as it defines what it means to be a political subject and politically subject.

It is this double view on security as both a form of order and a method of ordering that a politics beyond politics of security needs to observe. In the first section, I visited the works of scholars that provide a conception of a politics beyond by undoing the subject of security through the sense of the Other. In this section, I will take a related but slightly different approach into the question at hand by drawing on the political thought of Jacques Rancière. I will suggest that politics conceived through the principle of impropriety and logic of dissensus, as elaborated by Rancière, offers a political lexicon beyond politics of security—a form of politics that is not about securing the order of things, but overturning them. To start explicating these points, let me first visit a scene of struggle from 19ᵗʰ century France, where one can find allusions to what such a form of political subjectivity beyond security entails.

Police

Rancière's *The Nights of Labor* recounts the story of a "blighted patch of humanity": "[a] few dozen or hundred laborers in their twenties around 1830, who decide, each for himself, just about that time that they would no longer tolerate the intolerable."[414] What these young workers found intolerable, as Rancière explains, was neither their poverty or the low wages they received, nor the misery of hunger or poor housing conditions, but something more basic:

> [T]he anguish of time shot every day working up wood or iron, sewing clothes, or

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[413] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 790.
[414] Rancière, *The Nights of Labor: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth-Century France*, vii.

stitching footwear, for no other purpose than to maintain indefinitely the forces of servitude with those of domination; the humiliating absurdity of having to go out begging, day after day, for this labor in which one's life was lost.[415]

In the remainder of the book, Rancière, with a historian's sensibility, retrieves and retells the stories of the workers as they struggle to change their life by claiming the night time, by making something more of their night through writing, reading, thinking, or discussing instead of spending that time sleeping and, hence, reproducing themselves for capital. This is an active overturning of the functional order that determines the day as the time to work and night as the time to rest; a challenging of the prevailing social distribution of roles by people whose work scarcely calls for thinking, but who refuse the lure of peaceful sleep and spend that time doing what they are not assigned to do. It is the story of a struggle by the workers to reframe their existence by breaking the codes that imprison them in a certain time and a specific location in the social space. It is "[a] harmless and imperceptible interruption of the normal round," Rancière explains, as they "prepare and dream and already live the impossible: the suspension of the ancestral hierarchy subordinating those dedicated to manual labor to those who have been given the privilege of thinking."[416] In other words, it entails a form of political subjectivation that subverts forms of classification or distinction that allots each a place of identification. It is a staging of political subjectivities in excess of the secure and functional order as well as in excess of the names they are assigned—such as the worker or proletariat. While Rancière warns his readers that the "nights" in the title of his work is not metaphorical, the fact that such

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[415] Ibid., vii.
[416] Ibid., viii.

an act of "[t]urning the world upside down…begins around the evening hour"[417] and

that the night time is designated as the time of struggle is perhaps no mere

coincidence. For this is a struggle by those who are doomed to "the night of silence or

to the animal noise of voices expressing pleasure or pain."[418] It is a struggle about

being seen or heard as speaking subjects—a form of political subjectivation that tears

the veil of silence and darkness cast by the order of things.

Security, to reiterate, concerns limits; limits of the order of security figure the

limits of politics. Without security, modern political imaginary tells us, there are no

politics, no rights, and no prospect of achieving political goods such as freedom,

justice, and equality. In a parallel vein to the politics beyond that I elaborated in the

previous section, where the limits become the site for the articulation of a different

ethical subject, Rancière's account centers on a conception of political subjectivity, of

politics as arising precisely at the limits and in excess of them. It is a form of politics

staged by political subjects who are constitutively silenced. What is the nature of this

form of political subjectivity? How does it configure politics as a specific form of

common action? What does this common beyond the commonality induced by the

order of security entail? Perhaps a good way to start grappling with these questions

would be to explore what Rancière discerns as "two logics of human being-

together."[419] These are the logic of consensus, which is identified as the order of

police, and the logic of dissensus, which, Rancière suggests, is what politics is

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[417] Ibid., viii.
[418] Jacques Rancière, *Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 22.
[419] Ibid., 28.

ultimately about.

"Politics is generally seen," Rancière writes, "as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities are achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution."[420] He refers to such a system of distribution and legitimation as the police. In his usage of the term, the police refers to

> [F]irst an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise.[421]

In contrast to a common-sense view of politics as the organization of power and procedures of allocation of values in society—what, for instance, the discipline of political science predominantly understands politics to be—Rancière reverts the terms and suggests that this needs to be understood as the order of police.[422] Police, in this case, does not refer to law enforcement, to disciplining practices, but encompasses all those practices through which the social is divided, classified, and represented. Rancière compares his usage of the term to Michel Foucault's depiction of police as a mode of government that covers everything related to man and his happiness.[423] Yet there is also a difference. In Rancière's political lexicon, police designates neither a repressive instrument nor practices of governing. Rather, police refers to "a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived

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[420] Ibid., 28.
[421] Ibid., 29.
[422] Ibid.
[423] Ibid., 28.

by 'the police', society is a totality comprised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces."[424] In other words, the idea of police needs to be disassociated from the idea of the state apparatus and the law, which relies on a dubious presupposition that pits state and society; from the idea of discipline as well.[425] Instead, the police consists of the allocation of individuals or collectivities to specific places in the social space. It is "first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying."[426]

Rancière's reference to speech in the passage quoted above gains its significance when situated in relation to a tradition of thinking about politics from Aristotles to Habermas that premises politics on the understanding of human as an animal with a capacity for language.[427] This capacity for language, according to Rancière, is not merely a matter of having a physical capacity. Rather, it is "a symbolic determination of the order of speech and that of bodies."[428] Even if one speaks, what one says can be received merely as noise, not as political speech. For instance, slaves, women, workers, and the colonized spoke, but their voices were heard as merely cries of hunger, rage, or hysteria. In order to be heard as *political* speech, what is required is the enactment of a novel perceptual universe where it has to, first, be admitted that what is in question is not merely noise even prior to understanding what is being said. Put differently, it entails the recognition of speech as political speech where the act of

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[424] Jacques Rancière and Davide Panagia, "Dissenting Words: A Conversation with Jacques Rancière," *Diacritics* 30, no. 2 (2000): 124.
[425] Rancière, *Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 29.
[426] Ibid., 29.
[427]Jacques Rancière, "Introducing Disagreement," *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities* 9, no. 3 (2004): 4.
[428] Ibid., 5.

speaking out affirms that the speakers have affairs in common with others and a voice to argue over these common affairs. The enactment of such a novel perceptual universe is what politics beyond the order of the police is about.

As Rancière explains, the animating logic of the order of police is the logic of consensus. Consensus, in this context, means more than the attempt to resolve conflicts through negotiation and agreement so that each party receives its maximum share in a conflict.[429] The logic of consensus, which amounts to the reduction/equation of politics with police, is the logic of the proper that underlies all hierarchical orders that divide up the social space, allocating social parts and shares between the proper and the improper.[430] It entails a form of allocation of bodies and functions whereby one's speech is determined by one's place and one's activity in terms of one's proper function. In other words, the logic of consensus is premised on the logic identity— *where* one is, is *what* one is; *what* one does, is *who* one is.

Police and the logic of consensus presupposes a common metric by which it symbolizes the common as a community of well-defined parts, places, and functions. It is a form of counting, renumerating the common through a metric that adds up; symbolizing what is in common by defining the ways of being, doing, and saying what is appropriate to each place and thereby presenting the social space as an ordered whole without remainder.[431] As Rancière writes, police is "a distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible) whose principle is the absence of void and of

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[429] ———, "Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?," in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, ed. Steven Corcoran (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 71.
[430] ———, "The Use of Distinctions," in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, ed. Steven Corcoran (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 213.
[431] Rancière, "Introducing Disagreement," 6.

supplement."[432] What the order of police seeks is to put everything in its proper place through allocation and justification without remainder. What is thereby foreclosed is that moment of symbolizing the common by calling into question the very division of the sensible.[433]

If the logic of consensus and police is about the proper, the defining feature of politics, according to Rancière, lies in the logic of impropriety and dissensus. Politics entails forms of political subjectification that are always in excess to any given police order.

Improper

The order of police, as I tried to elaborate, is about the supervision and distribution of places and functions that not only allow certain speeches to be heard less or more, but define or determine whether or not they are going to be heard as political speech in the first place. So, what about politics?

"The essence of politics is *dissensus*," claims Rancière.[434] As he goes on to explain, dissensus needs to be distinguished from a clash of interests or opinions. Instead, it is the staging, "the demonstration (*manifestation*) of a gap in the sensible itself."[435] This explanation becomes clear when read in relation to the partition of the sensible in the order of police without remainder that I discussed above. While

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[432] Jacques Rancière, "Ten Theses on Politics," in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, ed. Steven Corcoran (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 36.
[433] According to Rancière, the suppression of politics and its reduction to police and logic of consensus finds its counterpart in political philosophy where it takes three forms: archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics. Rancière, *Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 61-93.
[434] ———, "Ten Theses on Politics," 38.
[435] Ibid., 38. Emphasis in the original.

commanding some to the "night of silence or animal voice" by rendering their

utterance as merely noise and not political speech, the order of police covers up this

exclusion ("the wrong") with illusions of wholeness and completeness.[436] The demos,

people "are made to disappear and…their disappearance is itself hidden by the police

order."[437]

Dissensus refers to the production within a given, sensible world something that

is heterogeneous to it. It is a form of conflict, but of a very specific kind. It is "a

conflict between sense and sense…between a sensory presentation and a making sense

of it."[438] In other words, it irrupts the logic of consensus that is premised on the

supposition of the identity between sense and sense, between speech and count.

Dissensus is the staging/demonstration of a certain impropriety that disrupts the order

of identity. It is a conflict over what it means to speak, over the distribution of the

sensible wherein the limits of what is sayable are determined and the relationships

between seeing, thinking, saying, doing are established.[439] That is why, according to

Rancière, the defining feature of politics is dissensus.

Politics as dissensus is the activity that erupts into self-evident sense (the

"natural-ized" order of police) through the invention of new subjects, new forms of

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[436] ———, *Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 21-42.

[437] Todd May, *The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality* (Pennsylvannia: Pennsylvannia University Press, 2008), 48.

[438] Jacques Rancière, "The Paradoxes of Political Art," in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, ed. Steven Corcoran (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 139.

[439] Because it is over the status of speech itself, despite its conceptual proximity, it is nevertheless differentiated from, for instance Lyotard's "le differend," which, Rancière argues has an essentially discursive nature. Gabriel Rockhill, "Jacques Rancière's Politics of Perception," in *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*, ed. Jacques Rancière and Gabriel Rockhill (London, New York: Continuum, 2005), 4.

collective enunciation.[440] It entails disrupting and overturning the established codes, proper names, and places accorded by the order of police. In contrast to conventional understandings, politics does not concern an activity where individuals and collectivities litigate over what is presented as their interest in common through speech. Rather, politics exists "because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account."[441] It is an activity that is not about re-distribution within a given distribution of the sensible. It is about re-framing the given by inventing new ways of making sense of the sensible and configuring in a novel way what is visible and invisible, what is audible and inaudible. It entails a new distribution of social space and time and hence "new bodily capacities."[442] If the police is the politics of the proper (i.e., conservation of the given distribution of the sensible, of preserving and securing the proper distribution of identities, space, and time) politics, as conceptualized by Rancière, is a politics of impropriety: a politics that disrupts the proper order of the police.

Since politics entails not the conflict between interests or bargaining between different givens, but the disruption of the order of police by introducing a supplement or a lack, by opening a gap in the sensible and shattering the illusionary wholeness, it comprises "specific subjects that are outnumbered with respect to the count of the objective whole of the population."[443] It is the invention, the bringing about of the new by political subjects in excess of given codes—the unaccounted. In Rancière's

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[440] Rancière, "Ten Theses on Politics."
[441] ———, *Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 27.
[442] ———, "The Paradoxes of Political Art," 139.
[443] Rancière and Panagia, "Dissenting Words: A Conversation with Jacques Rancière," 124.

formulation, "politics exists wherever the count of parts and parties of society is disturbed by the inscription of a part of those who have no part."[444]

Consequently, the people—the subject of politics—is not a proper name that designates a pre-given positivity. In similar terms to the 'ethical self' that I discussed in the previous section, the people is not a substance or a presence. It designates neither the population nor the disadvantaged within a population. Rather, it is constituted by "supplementary subjects, inscribed as a surplus in relation to very count of the parts of society."[445] What brings these subjects into being in common is neither birth nor property, but solely their actions as the manifestation, the staging ("the mises-en-scenes"[446]) of dissensus and reconfiguration of the visible and the sayable by creating new subjects and supplementary objects beyond the order of police. They make politics possible by interrupting the logic that effaces politics by equating it with securing the subject and the space of politics.

Disrupting the Future

> Hamlet could never know the peace of a 'good ending': in any case in the theater and in history.
> —Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*

What would a politics beyond politics of security entail if a politics beyond is thought of in temporal terms? If, as I suggested in Chapter 4, politics of security writes the future as present, replacing political time as possibility with the homogenous time

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[444] Rancière, *Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 123.
[445] ———, "Ten Theses on Politics," 33.
[446] Rancière and Panagia, "Dissenting Words: A Conversation with Jacques Rancière."

of measure, is it possible to conceive of a different form of writing the future rather than legislating it? How would a different feeling for the future shape political futures?

What Future?

Perhaps prior to engaging with these questions, it would be more helpful to heed Derrida's warning that the future is not so ready at hand. In other words, we need to inquire into what one means when one invokes the notion of the future. In speaking of the future, Derrida makes a conceptual distinction between the words *à-venir* and *futur* in French.[447] The *futur* refers to what is anticipatable, knowable in advance. It is the notion of the future as future anterior. It entails a representation of the future, which relies upon knowledge and principle of causality. Such a representation takes prior experience and represents what is to come through what has already happened. This is a foreseeable future to the extent that it is subject to prediction like knowing that the sun will rise in the east and set in the west. Like the sun, *futur*, then, refers to what appears on the horizon.[448]

Derrida deploys the term *à-venir* in order to open up a different thought on the future that does not limit it to the horizon. The distinguishing aspect of the term *à-venir* (to-come) is the sense of movement implicit in it.[449] This notion of a future-to-come—that which is "still to come"[450]—cannot be reduced to what is "yet to

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[447] Jacques Derrida, *A Taste for the Secret* (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, Blackwell, 2001), 19-20.
[448] Richard Klein, "Knowledge of the Future: Future Fables," *Diacritics* 38, no. 1-2 (2008).
[449] Derrida, *A Taste for the Secret*, 19.
[450] Ibid., 20.

come."[451] As Derrida writes

> [T]o free the value of the future from the value of 'horizon' that traditionally
> has been attached to it—horizon being, as the Greek word indicates, a limit
> from which I pre-comprehend the future. I wait for it. I predetermine it. And
> thus, I annul it.[452]

If the *futur* is what one can see ahead on the horizon (that which can be given

form in advent of the event), *à-venir* is that which "falls vertically…out of the

blue."[453] Not amenable to representation, such a conception of the future refers to what

may be termed as "evental time" that Klein's analogy of "falling out of the blue"

captures. As I will explore below, *à-venir*, as the thought of an opening that calls in

the form of an appeal—"an opening onto a future that is not a future present"[454]—

becomes the condition of possibility for a different conception of politics beyond

politics of security.

In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida discusses at length the sense of the future as *à-*

venir. It pivots on an understanding that the experience of time as such is aporetic. As

Cheah and Guerlac explain,

> [U]nder conditions of radical finitude, time can only be thought as an absolute
> other beyond presence. But because the relation to alterity also constitutes the
> order of presence and experience in general…any presence is subject to a
> strict law of contamination by an other that destabilizes, disrupts, and makes
> presence impossible even as it maintains, renews, and makes presence
> possible by giving it a to-come.[455]

This "law of contamination" highlights the non-oppositional nature of the

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[451] Drucilla Cornell, "Derrida: The Gift of the Future," in *Adieu Derrida*, ed. Costas Douzinas
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 101.
[452] Derrida, *A Taste for the Secret*, 20.
[453] Klein, "Knowledge of the Future: Future Fables," 175.
[454] Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, "Introduction: Derrida and the Time of the Political,"
in *Derrida and the Time of the Political*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac (Durham,
London: Duke University Press, 2009), 14.
[455] Ibid., 13.

relation between life and non-life, being and non-being, past and present, ideal and material, and fictive and real. It requires that one "believe[s] in ghosts"[456]—"things that shape the present, rendering it as always permeated by an elsewhere but in a fashion that is inconstant, ephemeral, and hence not fully mappable."[457]

If there is to be something called the future, Derrida suggests, it lies beyond the finite limits of human reason and beyond representation and knowledge.[458] Such a not-knowing does not constitute a lacuna; it does not represent a problem of ignorance. "No progress of knowledge could saturate an opening that must have nothing to do with knowing [or] with ignorance," writes Derrida.[459] It is not merely a problem of securing knowledge of the future and the impossibility to do so; it is more. In question is an opening that needs to preserve its heterogeneity. If future is to have a meaning as future and to preserve its promise as future, it has to reveal itself through this aporetic experience of time as an encounter with an other. If the future is to be worthy of its name, it needs to remain a heterogeneous other, a future beyond representation. As Derrida writes,

> [T]he coming of the other or its coming back is the only possible arrival, but it is not invented, even if the most genial inventiveness is needed to prepare to welcome it and to prepare to affirm the chance of an encounter that not only is no longer calculable but it is not even an incalculable factor still homogenous with the calculable, not even an undecidable still in the labor of bringing forth a decision. Is this possible? Of course it is not, and that is why it is the only possible invention.[460]

Derrida's discussion of invention as an aporetic experience could be useful in

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[456] Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 12.
[457] Wendy Brown, *Politics out of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 145.
[458] Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 25.
[459] Ibid., 45.
[460] ———, "Psyche: Invention of the Other," 45.

clarifying further the notion of the future as "an unanticipatible alterity"[461] constituted

by the aporia of time. As he explains, invention is possible so long as it is the

invention of the possible. Yet, invention "is only possible when it does not invent

something new out of itself," in which case it would not be new, but that which

"allows something *other* to occur, come, happen."[462] The other is not a substance or

presence; it is this coming. Since this other that comes to it is not part of invention's

resources of the possible, it means that "the only possible invention would be the

invention of the impossible."[463] It is the only one possible precisely because "an

invention has to declare itself as invention of that which did not appear to be

possible," otherwise it would merely remain in "a program of possibilities within the

economy of the same."[464]

As with invention, Derrida forces a thought on the future and time beyond the

metaphysics of presence, beyond systems of homogenization and calculability that

close the future as *à-venir* by "clos[ing] themselves into the presentation of the

presentable."[465] With relation to alterity posited as constitutive of presence and

experience, the advent of the other is figured as immanent to present reality rather than

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[461] Ibid., 39.
[462] Ibid., 44.
[463] Ibid., 44.
[464] Ibid. In his exposition of Derrida's invention, Gasché suggests that Derrida's conception of the invention is haunted by a paradox in that "an invention is an invention only if from the outset its originality and uniqueness are ruptured by its public recognizability, possible repetition, and reinvention." Rodolphe Gasché, *Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 8-9. Less than being a paradox, perhaps this formulation aims to capture the idea that invention entails both negativity and an affirmative moment—simultaneously a moment of rupture and institution.
[465] Jacques Derrida and Elizabeth Rottenberg, *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 182.

being an infinitely deferred point of arrival. With this conception, Derrida challenges conventional accounts of political transformation and moral progress that posit an end (telos) or coming to an end (eskhaton).[466] With an ideal presence that is grasped in advance, such conceptions of political time efface historicity and the coming of time as singular event. As Cheah and Guerlac note, it is "the process of an 'it happens' (*ça arrive*) that is not subject to rational subjects power or control because it comes from the other, the future, a happening with which it is nevertheless urgent to engage."[467] Incalculable, eventual time cannot be eliminated from the grid of political calculation because the calculable is always contaminated by the incalculable, which renders the experience of time and invention as aporetic. This aporia becomes the condition from which there can be no escape, but it also inscribes insecurity, the absence of secure grounds, as the condition of possibility for a politics beyond politics of security.

Beyond Legislation: Learning to Live Finally

Before turning to how such a form of writing the future disrupts—what I referred to in Chapter 4 as—secure times, let me recall a brief remark made by Arendt in her essay "What is Freedom?"[468] In this essay, she comments on "the breach between freedom and politics" in modernity and suggests that the only thought that remains of freedom is the freedom from fear. According to Arendt, not freedom, but security remains the decisive criterion of politics.[469] Security equated with political

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[466] Cheah and Guerlac, "Introduction: Derrida and the Time of the Political."
[467] Ibid., 17.
[468] Hannah Arendt, "What Is Freedom?," in *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking Press, 1961).
[469] Ibid., 150.

freedom de-voids thought of politics from the idea of freedom tout court.

Although in her essay Arendt differentiates the politics of security as articulated by Hobbes—where security means security from violent death—from its current form—"a security which would permit an undisturbed development of the life process of a society as a whole"[470]—I will nevertheless briefly visit Hobbes, not merely because he is the celebrated figure of realist thinkers of world politics, who wag their finger at the uninitiated about the necessities of an anarchical system that one can only ignore at one's peril, but because the temporal aspect of Hobbes's politics of security can be usefully juxtaposed to Derrida's conception of political time in order to elaborate on a different notion of writing the future beyond security.

The distinction that Sokoloff makes between anxiety and fear in Hobbes's schema is helpful to clarify how politics of security contains the radical uncertainty issued by the opening of time and future as possibility, which are central to Derrida's conception, by ending the discourse on the future tout court.[471] This distinction between fear and anxiety is premised on the different configuration of the links between causality, sensibility, knowledge, and the future. Fear, in this context, is defined as a feeling that is "linked to determinate objects of sense" that cause aversion.[472] While playing a key role in the production of docile subjects, fear, Hobbes recognizes, can be a useful tool for the maintenance of the Commonwealth only if it is

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[470] Ibid., 150.
[471] William W. Sokoloff, "Politics and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan," *Theory & Event* 5, no. 1 (2001), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.1sokoloff.html.
[472] Ibid., 2.

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properly cultivated.[473] In contrast to fear, anxiety "does not correspond to anything entirely determinate or sensible."[474] Anxiety stems from the lack of stable representation of the future. Since the future exists only as a possibility, it is impossible to provide such a representation. It is the ensuing gap that generates anxiety. In contrast to fear, anxiety is caused not by a particular future but the future as such. Consequently, anxiety is a more general feeling than the fear of death since fear requires an object of sense, which restricts it to the realm of sensibility. As Sokoloff explains,

> That which engenders death, not death itself, causes the fear of death, so death as such, cannot be feared. Whereas the fear of death is linked to sense, anxiety lacks a relation to the sensible world and occupies a space somewhere between sense and non-sense.[475]

The future as such, which gives rise to anxiety, also compels men to seek causes, which could enable him to better order the present.[476] Yet, man's search for causes generates more anxiety because of the impossibility of locating a comprehensible first cause (Only God has no former cause and to that extent it names the limit of human reason). Occasioned by the radical uncertainty generated by an incomprehensible future and impossibility of locating a secure ground, anxiety names the groundlessness of human existence. Hobbes recognizes that such dangerous feelings of anxiety must be held at bay if political order is to be maintained. The solution is to eradicate anxiety by determining what is undetermined and constructing

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[473] Corey Robin, *Fear: The History of a Political Idea* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31-50.
[474] Sokoloff, "Politics and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan."
[475] Ibid., 5.
[476] Ibid.

a future that makes the presentation of alternative futures impossible. As Sokoloff explains, "[r]epresenting the future is possible only if there is one future; if there are a plurality of futures, the future becomes possibility. But possibility does not correspond to anything and so is impossible to represent."[477]

Hence, the solution that politics of security provides is to free the subject from the burden of the future as possibility by providing a tangible object that would arouse fear (the Sovereign) and legislating (fixing) the future by reducing it to a determinate representation, namely, security—the foresight of self-preservation. Hence, the way from nature to political order passes through the reduction of the future to a determinate vision—the promise of self-preservation. With the attribution of this telos to political community (i.e., the positing of self-preservation as the purpose of political life), discourse on the future is eliminated for the sake of safety, which is meant more than "a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life."[478] In the words of Sokoloff, now that the "[c]are of time to come and the anxiety produced by it [is] put to rest"[479] and possibility of an other future is banished from political imaginary, discourse on alternatives can only be seen as madness.

It is this promissory economy of salvation and annihilation of the future through legislation that Derrida's thinking on politics and political time disrupts. By casting anxiety in the face of radical undecidability as the sine qua non of the political, Derrida provides an alternative form of responding to the indeterminate nature of time.

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[477] Ibid., 7.
[478] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Flatham and David Johnston (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 169.
[479] Sokoloff, "Politics and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan."

While security, as the Hobbesian mind insists, is the condition of possibility to enjoy

freedom, for Derrida the condition of the possibility of politics is the insecurity issued

by time, which decrees no law, no single logic, and no transcendental end. It is the

freedom issued by the future as an opening beyond the grasp of any coherent,

complete picture. In this rendering, one has to learn to live with the anxiety of

groundlessness. "Learn[ing] to live finally"[480] (finally as finite beings) is learning to

live with aporia from which there is no escape, no final solution, and no resolution. It

is to learn to live in a time out of joint, a present contoured by the presence of specters.

Aporia taints all political decisions with a guilty conscience issuing from "the

excess of justice with respect to the accounted for, to calculable right and

accountability—the excess of responsibility with respect to accountability and

calculability."[481] But aporia does not mean paralysis. Rather, as Beardsworth in his

discussion of Derrida's conception of the aporia explains, it

> demands decision, one cannot remain within it; at the same time its essential
> irreducibility to the cut of a decision makes the decision which one makes
> contingent, to be made again. The promise of the future (***that there is a***
> ***future***) is located in this contingency. In this contingency of time resides the
> possibility of justice.[482]

Future as an open horizon of possibility is always in excess of representation

and the promise of politics is that excess over the present/given/at hand. The

unbridgeable gap between the goal and the end acts as a constant reminder of the

contingent basis of political arrangements ***and,*** more importantly, the fact that they

can be otherwise. It is the possibility of this otherwise that constitutes obligations for

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[480] Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, xvi.
[481] ———, *A Taste for the Secret*, 25.
[482] Richard Beardsworth, *Derrida and the Political* (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), 5.

the future. "The very openness of the future which leaves open eventuality, the perhaps or maybe (peut-etre) of what is hoped"[483] is what gives force to the promise of politics beyond politics of security.

Conclusion

Going against the contention of ancient traditions, modern thought, Simon Critchley suggests, does not begin with the experience of wonder; it begins in disappointment.[484] It begins by recognition and reluctant acknowledgment of the limits to knowledge of the world and the finiteness of life. Despite being "the weakest reed in nature," modern political culture, he argues, is "beset with Promethean myths of overcoming the human condition."[485]

Limits were also the starting point for the thoughts and engagements with various thoughts of and on limits throughout this chapter. Without any pretense to Promethean illusions or anxieties, it sought ways in which those limits could be undone. It focused on the limits to thinking about politics circumscribed by politics of security. It set out to explore possible ways of thinking beyond politics of security instead of taking security as the axiomatic, indispensable, and unavoidable point of departure for thought. It asked: What if we take the tale of security as it is—simply a tale? What if we sacrifice the sign of security instead of succumbing to its sacrificial order? What possibilities open up for politics once the familiar is abandoned without

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[483] Cheah and Guerlac, "Introduction: Derrida and the Time of the Political," 15.
[484] Simon Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance* (London, New York: Verso, 2007), 1.
[485] Ibid., 1.

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reserve?

Rather than coming up with a final answer to these questions, I explored different possibilities and different avenues for thinking about politics beyond politics of security. Feeling content with safe borders of existence, those who seek to reach a secure ground and demand final answers would perhaps be dissatisfied or even disappointed with this journey. It is my contention, however, that such journeys are worth taking so as to be able to think politics without reducing it to the governance of insecurities.

Although I discussed the possibilities for thinking politics beyond politics of security under three different sections—sense of the Other, politics of impropriety, and politics of the future—I need to highlight that this partitioning for analytical purposes was not meant as an attempt to draw thick boundaries between them as distinct, disparate options. On the contrary, they all represent forms of thought that nurture from a shared tradition of thought—a tradition that overturns the tradition of metaphysical thought— and to that extent are in constant contact and dialogue with each other. All start from the premise that the thought of politics starts where secure grounds are abandoned and expose the way in which politics denies arithmetic. In these frameworks, the subject, space, and time of politics are always punctured by a gap beyond mastery, which is precisely what makes politics possible. The discussion in the first section highlighted that gap at the heart of the subject of security, where the self is revealed to be never at one with itself, always alien to itself. The second section attended to the way in which political subjectivation emerges through the gap that

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punctures the consensual order, separating it from itself. Finally, the third section elaborated on how the time of presence is disrupted by a radical alterity immanent to it, which makes the future possible as a possibility. Taking leave of secure ground, these three forms of thinking about politics challenge the limits of security as the limits to politics. On the contrary, in these formulations, the limits become the condition of possibility of politics.

If ending political violence and securing life is the dream of the modern

political project (as captured by Immanuel Kant's vision of "perpetual peace"), how is

it that the spread of this political project across the globe has translated into not less

but more violence, not a disinvestment from but an overwhelming investment in more

efficient ways to kill life? How is it that an era of exponentially increasing objects to

be secured—objects as diverse and disparate as the nation, the environment, food,

health, the human and the globe—is also an era when a constant state of terror

inflicted by war, hunger, poverty, displacement, and xenophobia become the defining

features of global political life? Taking this paradox as the starting point for my

dissertation, I argued that what is needed is to dismantle security rather than reproduce

its imperial gaze. To make this argument, I investigated the implications of the

construction of politics as a global security project and critically inquired into the

implications of politics devoted to securing life at its most general level, in an all

encompassing manner. I explored the meaning of dismantling security as untimely

critique in this empire of security and discussed alternative conceptions of politics

beyond politics of security.

I started my analysis by diagnosing the way in which security has emerged as a

global bio-political apparatus in the contemporary era—an apparatus that is charged

with the task of producing and transforming life at its most general level. In Chapters

1 and 2, I mapped out the contemporary landscape of in/security and discussed the

way in which security becomes a sovereign demand amidst the terrorization of life globally. I highlighted the way in which the project to secure life gets articulated in temporal terms through the logic of preemption—revolving around not only the fear of what exists, but also the danger of what might be—and pointed out that the same logic animates contemporary form of capital accumulation. Chapter 4 built upon this diagnosis about preemption becoming the defining feature of politics of security and capital accumulation, where I situated contemporary manifestations of the temporal homology between them within the context of bio-political modernity. Elaborating on the way in which, in modernity, political time gets reduced to abstract unit measure, I suggested that security colonizes the future by annihilating political time as possibility and writing the future as present. It is upon this premise that I offered an interpretation of my call to dismantle security as an untimely claim on time.

I carried out a parallel inquiry into the meaning of dismantling security as untimely critique by relating it to an investigation of the reproduction of the hegemony of the sign of security through the disciplinary production of knowledge on security. In Chapter 3, I engaged with the critical security studies literature and tried to show how such critiques of security end up securing security's hegemonic hold. If critical thought on security in its current formulation transmogrifies into a form of questioning that further consolidates the disciplinary project of security, how then are we to conceptualize a form of critique that would open the space for dismantling security? This was the question that I grappled with in Chapter 5, where I formulated an understanding of critical thought as an untimely intervention—one that is historically

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situated, yet, not historically foreordained or determined. In contrast to a form of critical subjectivity that takes the limits of what exists as the limits to what is possible, critique in this formulation becomes an untimely intervention that resets the account of times and renders the present as the site of non-utopian possibility. It is this understanding of critique, I argued, that gives form to dismantling security as a critical project.

After making these deconstructive moves on the terrain of the empire of security, in the final chapter, I turned to a discussion of what a politics beyond politics of security would entail, what ethical and political possibilities open up when insecurity is embraced as an inescapable condition. What happens when thought of politics starts at the limits of security? To answer this question, I inquired into three possible moves beyond politics of security. One of these three moves, I suggested, passes through de-centering the sovereign subject of security by exposing the Otherness constitutive of subjectivity as such. Shattering the illusion of a sovereign and secure self opens the way to formulate ethical responsibility on the premise of the radical interdependence inscribed at the heart of being. It recasts politics as a way of being in the world beyond a techno-politics of life.

The second move beyond a politics of security that I discussed centered on the works of Jacques Rancière, where politics is conceptualized as the overturning of the ordered space of security by staging political subjectivities in excess of the secure and functional order. Deploying the distinction that Rancière makes between "police" (logic of consensus) and "politics" (logic of dissensus), I suggested that, on this

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account, a politics beyond disrupts the reduction of politics to the management of the given and the securing of the proper distribution of identities, space, and time.

I elaborated the third and final move beyond politics of security by visiting Jacques Derrida's conception of political time as aporetic and his account of the future beyond representation. Such a conception of political time inscribes anxiety that issues from the absence of secure grounds as the condition of possibility of politics. In contrast to politics of security that annihilates political time as possibility by legislating the future, I argued, Derrida's thinking on political time allows for a form of writing the future beyond security.

My investigation into alternative conceptions of political subjectivity beyond security hopes to serve as an opening that calls for further inquiry into other possibilities, other conceptions of politics that would allow approaching global political life with an idiom detoxified from security. Politics beyond politics of security can be a point of reflection in the light of many other questions that could be raised. For instance, if security reduces the body of the political community to a species body, what alternative forms of thinking about the body are available that could challenge this assertion? How would different conceptions of the body beyond biological thinking enable different forms of politics beyond bio-politics of security? Or should political thought abandon the thought of the body altogether? Does politics beyond politics of security call for a new body or a no body?

Besides alternative political and ethical possibilities beyond security, another issue that calls for sustained interrogation relates to the question of violence. One of

the points that I highlighted in my discussion is the extent to which thinking about violence is confined within the framework of security, which, I argued, is itself an order of violence. This prompts a series of questions, which could be fruitfully pursued. For instance, how are we to think about violence beyond security? If the subject of security is a violent subject, does it mean that abandoning security demand that we abandon the subject of violence as well? What sorts of political and ethical challenges do we face if we abandon security, but not violence? How are we to think about the relation between violence and politics on an alternative terrain to the politics of security?

I certainly do not think that these are the only possible questions that could be raised. My only hope is that dismantling security opens the way to diversifying and pursuing such questions rather than being held captive by the impossible and violent promise of security.

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