When Worldviews Collide:

The Role of Emotion in Reactions to Symbolic Threats

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Abstract

Until recently, intergroup relations research has undervalued the role of emotion. This dissertation examines how people's emotional reactions to challenges to their cherished values—symbolic threats—shape social attitudes. I argue that people respond with distinct emotions depending on whether the symbolic threat comes from within their ingroup or from outsiders, and that these emotions explain why those who feel that their cultural values are threatened are less accepting and tolerant of outsiders. Using a survey, Study 1 showed that when participants believed that Muslims rejected core American values, they felt angry at and less sympathy toward Muslim immigrants, and in turn, opposed granting civil rights to Muslim immigrants. Participants who believed that Americans, in general, disagreed on the importance of different values felt less proud to be American and held more negative attitudes toward Americans. Study 2 showed a similar pattern of results with respect to a different outgroup. Participants—particularly those high in authoritarianism—felt disgusted and angry with, as well as less proud of, gays and lesbians. Negative emotions explained why high authoritarians who perceived gays as a symbolic threat expressed intolerant attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Using an experimental manipulation of symbolic threat, Study 3 partially replicated the findings from Study 1. High threat from Muslim immigrants led to anger at Muslim immigrants, which in turn, predicted more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. High threat from within the American ingroup made people—especially authoritarians—less proud of Americans, which predicted more negative attitudes toward the ingroup.

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Chapter 1

When Worldviews Collide:

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Technological developments in transportation and communication have created an environment in which people from different cultures frequently interact. Whether on the internet, while traveling to different countries, or at the local diner, people increasingly interact with others who may not share their cultural beliefs or values. People immigrating to the United States often face a dilemma over whether to assimilate or to uphold their own cultural values and norms. Even among United States citizens, subcultures abound: gays and lesbians, punk rockers, hip hop, and any number of regional subcultures. But what happens when people from different cultural backgrounds or those who embrace different social norms collide—or, put more gently, encounter each other? In an increasingly interconnected and yet diverse world, it is important to understand how and why people react differently to deviations from the norms and values of groups with which they identify (ingroups).

A large body of research has grown out of and supported the "contact hypothesis," Allport's (1954) argument that intergroup contact should lead to reduced prejudice under the right conditions (support from authority, equal status among members, superordinate goal, and interdependence). Although this research corroborates Allport's basic contention (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, for an excellent meta-analytic review), many questions remain unanswered. In particular, what happens when the majority group does not think that the minority group is accepting or conforming to the majority group's values or culture? How do these perceptions affect how the majority

treats minority members, especially those asking to receive the same rights and treatment as majority group members? Moreover, what happens when people perceive that the ingroup has too many subcultures to hold a uniform and cohesive set of values? In this dissertation, I examine how people's emotional reactions to challenges to their cherished values—symbolic threats—shape social attitudes. I argue that people respond with distinct emotions depending on whether the symbolic threat comes from within their ingroup or from outsiders and that these emotions explain why those who feel that their cultural values are threatened are less accepting and tolerant of outsiders.

Previous research has implicated emotions as partially responsible for the positive effects of intergroup contact on prejudice reduction in general (Pettigrew, 1998; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2006). Many thinkers past and present, have argued that researchers must understand emotion in order to understand social experience and behavior (Tiedens & Leach, 2004). This is because emotions are intertwined with social relationships (Forgas, 2002; Heise & O'Brien, 1992; Simon, 1967). By communicating our intentions to others, emotions provide the basis for social interaction (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992).

An examination of contemporary examples illustrates the role that emotion might play in these processes. For instance, Americans who believe that certain immigrant groups hold values contradictory to core American values may feel threatened and react with anger, especially when those groups ask to receive the same benefits as non-immigrants. People may react to illegal immigrants receiving Medicaid, for example, with anger, believing it unfair for illegal immigrants to receive the same benefits as those with American citizenship. And indeed, previous research and theorizing on emotion suggests that people react with anger to perceptions of unfairness or injustice (Haidt &

Graham, 2007; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Smith, 1993). This anger may make people less likely to support a policy that would extend citizenship rights to illegal immigrants. If the illegal immigrants also happen to be Muslim, and people view Muslim beliefs as conflicting with core American values, their reaction may become extreme. In contrast, viewing a person as weak or the victim of negative life events may elicit feelings of sympathy, which tends to increase prosocial responses (Batson, 1998; Eisenberg, Fabes, Miller, Fultz, Shell, Mathy, & Reno, 1989). Feeling sympathy toward members of an outgroup may increase support for providing access to services and rights typically restricted to the ingroup. We must examine both the social process and individuals' attitudes to better understand when people will react with anger and when with sympathy.

In one of the more headline-grabbing cases of recent years, California passed a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. People in favor of the ban emphasized the cultural threat posed by gays, arguing that without the ban, children would have to learn about gay marriage in school (presumably making it normative) (Archibold & Goodnough, 2008). Opponents of the ban—or, proponents of gay marriage—worried that they had hit a "cultural brick wall," as they pushed for equal rights (Archibold & Goodnough, 2008). Fear and anger permeated the rhetoric on both sides; but to what effect and why? Only an empirical test could determine whether people reacted to the perceived cultural threat with anger or fear and whether this affected their support for the ban.

In this dissertation, I argue that intergroup emotions mediate the relationship between perceptions of cultural (or symbolic) threat and attitudes toward policies that either include or exclude outgroups. By intergroup emotions, I refer to emotions attached

to specific groups. These groups can be either ingroups or outgroups. For example, if I am a big Minnesota Twins fan, I might feel great pride and enthusiasm for the Twins when they win. However, I might also feel angry toward the White Sox, were they to defeat my team in some inexplicable turn of events. Although research and theorizing on prejudice frequently assumes a role for hostility, fear, or other emotions, little research has explicitly measured or incorporated intergroup emotions into a model. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how emotional reactions to groups that embrace or violate ingroup values affect commitment to the ingroup and willingness to extend ingroup rights to outgroup members.

It is important to note here that researchers studying cultural or symbolic threat have investigated two forms of threat—one that comes an outgroup and one that comes from within the ingroup—without explicitly distinguishing between the two. As we will see, both of these types of threat share the same underlying dimension, in that they involve people departing or rejecting the ingroup's normative values. In the first case, the ingroup's worldview is threatened when an outgroup rejects the ingroup's morals, values, beliefs or attitudes (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). The second type of symbolic threat to the ingroup's worldview results from the perception that many ingroup members do not hold the same core values, or the same worldview.[1]

The relationship between threat and emotional reactions is not a simple one. A long line of research on dispositional influences on prejudice suggests that variables related to authoritarianism should play a role in people's responses to symbolic threats (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). Like Feldman and

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[1] Note that researchers of Belief Congruity Theory (Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965) have not investigated how people respond to the perception that fellow ingroup members hold values dissimilar to their own.

Stenner (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005), I believe that threats to cultural norms activate authoritarian dispositions, especially among those who value social conformity. I also extend their model to include a mediational role for the emotions of hostility, enthusiasm, anxiety, and sympathy. In short, I argue that some people are predisposed to respond to cultural threat, and that these people should react to symbolic threats that come from the outgroup with hostility, leading to less support for policies that would benefit the outgroup. In contrast, viewing outgroup members as embracing ingroup norms and values should lead to feelings of warmth and sympathy toward the group. As a result, people who tend to feel threatened by group differences will be more likely to support policies that would benefit the outgroup. In the case in which symbolic threat comes from the ingroup, I argue that threat should lead to relatively more anxiety about the ingroup, which in turn should lead to decreased commitment to the group. If a person already perceives the ingroup as lacking a coherent and uniform set of values, letting outgroup members into the ingroup should be perceived as heightening the threat. Thus, I propose that anxiety about the ingroup should serve as the key mechanism for the previously observed relationship between ingroup threat and decreased tolerance for outgroups (see Feldman, 2003, and Stenner, 2005, for examples).

By drawing from three different lines of theory and research—authoritarianism, the functions of emotions, and intergroup emotions, I propose a new model. In this model, individual differences in fear of the "other"—as indexed by a predisposition to authoritarianism—interact with contextual features related to support for the ingroup's worldview to predict support for policies that would provide equal rights for the outgroup. Based on the idea that intergroup emotions play a key role in the process, I

propose that anger and sympathy mediate this process, such that anger toward the outgroup predicts decreased support for equal rights policies, and that sympathy predicts increased support. In addition, anxiety about the ingroup should predict both decreased commitment to the ingroup and decreased willingness to extend ingroup rights to the outgroup.

I start by reviewing the literature on authoritarianism and measurement issues concerning the most appropriate way to index authoritarian predispositions. I then turn to functional perspectives on emotion and Intergroup Emotions Theory (which has emerged in the last two decades as an important perspective for understanding intergroup relations) to explore how intergroup emotions might yield insight into the processes underlying the relationship between personality variables and prejudice. Although Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie, Silver & Smith, 2004; Smith, 1993; Smith & Mackie, 2006) has clear predictions about the role of emotion, no researchers in this camp have looked at the role of larger contextual factors such as cultural differences and symbolic threat. Nor has anyone examined how individual differences in a predisposition to authoritarianism may affect people's emotional reactions to intergroup situations. Finally, I will highlight how merging these lines of thought together can paint a more thorough picture of the processes of intergroup attitudes and support for social policies that affect both the ingroup and the outgroup.

Symbolic Threat and Authoritarianism

The notions of symbolic threat and authoritarianism are closely intertwined. Authoritarianism refers to a personality syndrome or ideological belief system that people possess, characterized by a subservient disposition to authority, a preference for

conformity and traditionalism, and an aggressive nature toward social deviates (Altemeyer, 1996). Whereas authoritarianism corresponds to a distinguishing characteristic of individual people, symbolic threats are a distinguishing feature of social situations. Symbolic threats refer to social situations in which either outsiders or members of the ingroup deviate from the ingroup's normative values. As mentioned earlier, researchers have typically conflated the two different kinds of threat (i.e., ingroup and outgroup), an oversight that I argue might conceal important differences in the emotional and attitudinal consequences of each type of threat.

Symbolic Threats

To clarify, outgroup symbolic threat closely resembles Sears and colleagues' (e.g., Henry & Sears, 2002; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Funk, 1990; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1979) conceptualization of symbolic racism as the affect-laden belief that Blacks violate traditional American values about work ethic. Sears and colleagues have accumulated a wealth of research indicating that these symbolic beliefs about Blacks lead to more negative attitudes about Blacks and less willingness to support policies (such as busing) that might help them. Immigrants also might represent a symbolic threat to the American worldview. For new immigrants to the United States, the choice to retain their cultural heritage could appear to some American citizens as a rejection of American culture and values.

The conception of symbolic threat from an outgroup also recalls ideas from Belief Congruity Theory (Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965). According to Rokeach, the more similar another person or group's belief system is to our own, the more we like them. Dissimilarity in terms of beliefs, attitudes, and values leads to more negative

attitudes toward others. Whereas Belief Congruity Theory centers on the relationship between an individual's values and another entity's (be that a person or social group) values, Struch and Schwartz (1989; see also Schwartz, Struch, & Bilsky, 1990) extended the same rationale to explain intergroup antagonism. Struch and Schwartz argued that because people generally assume that members of their ingroup share their values, people will be less antagonistic toward groups that they perceive to hold similar values to the ingroup. In a survey of Israelis' and Germans' attitudes toward each other, they found the more dissimilar people perceived their ingroup's values to the outgroup's values, the less willing they were to share resources with the outgroup (Schwartz et al., 1990). In another study, Israeli participants rated their own group's values and ultraorthodox Jews' values (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). In support of the hypothesis that believing that an outgroup holds less noble values than the ingroup justifies harming that group, Struch and Schwartz showed that perceptions of dissimilar values explained why perceptions of intergroup conflict led to more aggressive attitudes and behavior toward the outgroup. Although these researchers never explored the role of emotion or individual differences in the likelihood of perceiving threat, their research provides persuasive evidence that perceiving an outgroup as holding different values from the ingroup leads to more negative and antagonistic attitudes toward the outgroup.

People can also view their ingroup's worldview as under threat if they perceive that many ingroup members fail to share the same values or beliefs. According to Feldman (2003; see also Feldman, 1989; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005), people who value social conformity will view social or political diversity in society as a threat. Again, this threat results from the perception that people are rejecting the

ingroup's prototypical values. In this case, though, the symbolic threat results specifically from the perception that many *ingroup* members are not conforming to group values. This could be possible when people believe that members of their ingroup hold diverse or divisive values and beliefs. For example, many churches across the United States have recently seen divisions over beliefs about homosexuals. Within the same church, there may be parishioners who believe that the church should perform gay/lesbian weddings and people who believe that gay marriage represents a threat to traditional family values and religious tenets. These people clearly hold different beliefs and values about marriage. In such a case, I would expect that diversity of beliefs within the ingroup—with a clear departure from many churches' normative values about marriage—would have consequences not only for how people feel about the church as a whole, but also for their commitment to the church. As will be discussed, this difference between source of the symbolic threat—whether originating from within the ingroup or the outgroup—is key for understanding emotional reactions to different kinds of threat.

Authoritarianism

Scholars of intergroup relations frequently address the topic of attitudes toward outgroups in terms of prejudice, but we are only beginning to learn the exact mechanism by which prejudice produces its effects. Much of the work on prejudice focused instead on personality and ideological differences in the willingness to accept others or to perceive social outgroups as threatening to the ingroup—otherwise known as authoritarianism. These personality perspectives view authoritarianism as a predisposition for some people to submit to authorities and to aggress toward others who attempt to deviate from the authority figure or social norms.

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) offered the first empirical basis for the existence of an authoritarian personality. Greatly influenced by Freudian psychodynamics, Adorno and colleagues conceptualized prejudice as the projection of unacceptable aggressive impulses toward an authority figure (usually a parent) onto weaker people or social groups. To investigate these hypotheses, they developed the F (for fascism) Scale and found that it consistently correlated positively with Ethnocentrism and Anti-Semitism. These findings, however, were drowned out by criticisms of Adorno et al.'s methodology—in particular, their methodology used to assess the psychodynamic origins of authoritarianism (Brown, 1965). By interviewing people who scored high on this scale about their early childhood experiences, they did find that authoritarians reported having more disciplinarian parents. This would not have presented such a problem had the interviewers not already known the interviewees scores on the F Scale and the researchers' hypotheses. Thus, the potential for leading questions and biased interpretations of participants' answers cast doubt on the evidence for a personality predisposition for prejudice. Combined with criticism about the failure to account for acquiescence bias in the scale construction and striking correlations with IQ and socio-economic status, research on authoritarianism fell by the wayside (Brown, 1965).

Altemeyer (1981, 1996) took up the authoritarian torch again in the early 1980s and developed a new measure, which he termed Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Abandoning the psychodynamic explanation, he favored a social-learning one instead. He also narrowed the scope of the personality syndrome down to three dimensions: submission to authorities, aggression (especially toward social deviants), and

conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1996). This new RWA scale contained questions that tapped all three of these dimensions—problematically sometimes in the same question— and contained reverse-scored items to adjust for acquiescence bias. Over more than a decade of research, Altemeyer accumulated evidence that RWA predicted a number of prejudicial constructs, including ethnocentrism, hostility toward homosexuals, and aggression toward women. Interestingly, he also found that RWA scores increased during times of societal threat (e.g., economic disaster; see Altemeyer, 1996).

Like the F-Scale, the RWA scale did not escape criticism. First, it contains a number of double- and triple-barreled items. As a result, the scale appears unidimensional, rather than three-dimensional, as hypothesized by Altemeyer. Without the three subscales tapping authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism, it is impossible to validate the scale. The second major problem with the scale results from the fact that many of the items concern the groups for which the scale predicts prejudicial attitudes. For example, some of the items tap attitudes toward gays and women. Is it any wonder that one measure of attitudes toward gays predicts another measure of attitudes toward gays? For this reason primarily, I look to other more basic—or primary—measures of tendency to respond to threat.

Stenner and Feldman (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005) proposed a more fundamental measure of authoritarianism that avoids Altemeyer's and Adorno et al.'s pitfalls: the qualities a person deems most important to rear in a child (e.g., following his/her conscience, thinking for oneself, respecting elders). According to Stenner and Feldman, authoritarianism is rooted in a person's relative preference for authority/conformity over personal autonomy/difference. They argue that childrearing

values reflect this fundamental orientation. For people who prefer social conformity to personal autonomy, authorities provide a common set of norms and values that help to maintain social uniformity. As a result, they value authoritarian submission. Social diversity—particularly in beliefs and values—represents a threat to the maintenance of social norms and social cohesion (Feldman, 2003). Intolerance and prejudice (i.e., authoritarian aggression) should be directed toward people who challenge social convention. Indeed, Feldman (2003) found that for participants who read a fictitious policy about a neo-Nazi group, preference for social conformity over autonomy (as measured by childrearing values) interacted with perceived threat to predict prejudice and intolerance. In addition, Stenner (2005) found that informing participants that much diversity existed in values, norms, and beliefs in the United States led authoritarians to report more moral intolerance (e.g., negative attitudes toward gays), more punitiveness toward societal deviates, and more intolerance for political deviates.

Feldman and Stenner provide a wealth of evidence in support of their hypothesis that threat activates authoritarian predispositions. Furthermore, Lavine and colleagues (e.g., Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002) have shown in a series of studies that threat increases cognitive processes associated with authoritarianism—such as rigid thinking, biased information seeking, preference for threat-focused messages—among high authoritarians. One of the curious anomalies to the argument that threat primarily affects people high in authoritarianism is that at the aggregate level, times of societal or economic threat foreshadow the implementation of authoritarian policies (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). During the Great Depression, for example, city budgets received more money for police forces, the number of states

requiring that teachers pledge loyalty to the state and federal constitutions rose, and people became more supportive of harsher prison sentences (Sales, 1973). It is possible that these signs of authoritarian submission and aggression result from high authoritarians receiving increasing power and influence during times of threat. Another possibility, which Hetherington and Weiler have recently examined, is that threat makes low authoritarians start to act more like high authoritarians. According to this perspective, signs of authoritarianism increase at the aggregate level during times of threat not because high authoritarians become more extreme, but because everyone begins to take on an authoritarian worldview. This suggests that the effect of authoritarianism should be greatest when perceived threat is low. In support of their argument, Hetherington and Weiler presented evidence that when low authoritarians believed that "newer lifestyles" were leading to the breakdown of society, they opposed gay rights (e.g., adoption, marriage) just as much as high authoritarians. Similarly, they found that the more people low in authoritarianism worried about a terrorist attack, the more supportive they were of limiting civil liberties. People high in authoritarianism, in contrast, generally supported limiting civil liberties regardless of how worried they were about a terrorist attack.

Taken as a whole, research on the interaction between threat and authoritarianism presents a rather murky set of findings. On the one hand, Stenner, Feldman, and Lavine have repeatedly shown that perceptions of societal threat strengthen the relationship between authoritarianism and intolerance of social deviates, support for national leaders, and cognitive rigidity. Hetherington and Weiler (2009), on the other hand, have recently shown that authoritarianism exerts its greatest effect when perceptions of threat remain low. With both sides providing a well-reasoned theoretical rationale, it is difficult to

make sense of these contradicting findings. One possibility is that they have focused on different kinds of threat. Stenner (2005) focused primarily on ingroup threats (diversity of values/beliefs within the United States) whereas Hetherington and Weiler focused on outgroup threats (terrorist attacks and "newer lifestyles"). By explicitly distinguishing between these kinds of symbolic threats, an ancillary goal of this dissertation is to shed light on this debate.

Despite their different theoretical orientations and findings, Feldman, Stenner, and Hetherington and Weiler (2009) all use the childrearing values measure as an index of authoritarianism. However, it is possible that this measure of authoritarian predisposition does not get at the underlying psychological forces driving authoritarians' beliefs and values. Rather than laying the basis for authoritarianism, beliefs about appropriate childrearing practices (e.g., whether encouraging obedience or creativity) should form later in life, after a person has had the chance to develop a preference for conformity over diversity. Indeed, Duckitt et al. (2002) argue that social preferences result from psychological predispositions that form earlier in the developmental sequence. Duckitt and colleagues (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, in press; Duckitt et al., 2002) developed a model specifying the personality dimensions that predispose people to unique sets of beliefs about the social world. In this model, a general personality orientation toward social conformity predisposes people to view the world as a dangerous place. The belief that the world is a dangerous place activates the motivational goal of social control and security, which corresponds closely to the conservative ideological system of Right Wing Authoritarianism. Duckitt also specifies an alternative route to the conservative ideological dimension of Social Dominance

Orientation, a belief system that taps a person preference for social inequality in intergroup relations (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In this route to conservative ideology, a general personality characterized by a desire for power, tough-mindedness, and a lack of empathy, leads people to adopt goals of dominance and superiority, consistent with Social Dominance Orientation. In sum, Duckitt proposes two different routes to conservative ideology: Each starts with a unique personality predisposition that leads people to adopt a different ideological attitude system—Right Wing Authoritarianism or Social Dominance Orientation—which form the basis of different facets of conservative ideology. Because this dissertation is exploring how people respond to normative threats, rather than threats to power or status, the Belief in a Dangerous World and other indicators of authoritarianism (e.g., childrearing authoritarian values, Right Wing Authoritarianism) correspond to the more relevant dimension.

Although authoritarianism researchers repeatedly refer to anxiety and hostility, they never measure either, or incorporate emotion explicitly into their model. One of the main goals of this dissertation is to do just that: to find support for the idea that intergroup emotions mediate the relationship between the interaction of authoritarian predispositions and threat and the dependent variable of prejudice toward outgroups. This specification for the underlying psychological processes at play represents a major contribution to this literature. Rather than simply alluding to emotions as relevant to the authoritarian personality, the model proposed here clearly articulates which emotions drive reactions to different kinds of symbolic threat. More specifically, people predisposed to authoritarianism should react with anger and hostility toward people or groups that hold different values and beliefs than the ingroup. So, people who value

social conformity and traditionalism should be the most likely to feel angry when they perceive that the social group of gays and lesbians violate traditional family values. This hostility directed at the outgroup should manifest itself in lack of support for policies that would extend rights to the outgroup. Therefore, people who feel angry at gays and lesbians should be less likely to support gay marriage, gay couples' rights to adopt children, and gay couples' rights to be covered by their partners' health insurance.

Interestingly, neither Feldman and Stenner nor Hetherington and Weiler examine how authoritarians respond to outgroups that *do* embrace ingroup values and norms. I hypothesize when people predisposed to authoritarianism believe that they share similar values with an outgroup, they will feel increased warmth and sympathy toward the outgroup. In turn, sympathy toward the outgroup should lead to a greater willingness to extend ingroup rights to that particular outgroup. If you can accomplish the admittedly difficult task of convincing people predisposed to authoritarianism that gays and lesbians actually embrace traditional family values—i.e., that all they want is to have a lifelong monogamous relationship and raise their children in a conservative manner—we should see an increase in sympathetic feelings toward gays and lesbians.

Stenner and Feldman also repeatedly focus on how people respond to threats that originate within their ingroup. For example, they operationalize threat as American citizens' perception that belief diversity exists within the United States, that the country is suffering under bad leadership, and that the American economy is in decline (see Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005). Yet there is reason to believe that threats perceived to come from within the ingroup are different from those perceived to come from an outgroup. Huddy and Mason (2007) investigated whether threats to success of a person's

political party depended on who made the statement about the likelihood of an electoral win or loss. They found that people who read about the prospect of an electoral defeat from a member of the same political party reported more anxiety, whereas those who read about the prospect of a defeat as written by a member of the opposition reported more anger. Because discrete emotions have unique effects on attitudes and behavior—as discussed in the following section—it is important to make this distinction when investigating the effects of threat. Although both kinds of threat stem from the perception that people are departing from the ingroup's normative values, I argue that ingroup threat should lead to anxiety about the ingroup whereas outgroup threat should lead to anger at the outgroup. When it comes from the ingroup, it is certainly possible that perceptions of threat could additionally lead to anger at the specific subgroups deviating from group norms. In the church example discussed earlier, people who place a high importance on social cohesion and security may also feel angry at gay marriage supporters for causing the social dissention within the church. However, because anxiety tends to lead people to withdraw from threatening situations (Smith, 1993), I argue that anxiety about the church as a whole should be the emotion driving decreases in commitment to the church.

Emotions and Prejudice

Considering that prejudice is often described in terms of emotions, it is surprising that researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of emotions in intergroup processes. Indeed, from a tripartite perspective, prejudice represents the affective component—stemming from a person's emotional reaction to the outgroup—of attitudes toward social groups (Paolini, Hewstone, Voci, Harwood, & Cairn, 2006). In fact, we do

know that people have unique emotions attached to different groups. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002) argued that different combinations of perceived warmth and competence lead to unique intergroup emotions. In one study, Fiske et al. had participants rate 24 different social groups on how they made them feel. The results strongly supported their hypotheses: Ingroup members elicited the most admiration; outgroups rated as high in competence but low on warmth (e.g., rich people, Jews, Asians, professionals) elicited envy, and some admiration; outgroups stereotyped as high in warmth but low in competence (e.g., elderly people, disabled people, housewives) elicited pity; and finally, low competence, low warmth (poor blacks and poor whites) elicited both pity and contempt. These results strongly suggest that perceived characteristics of social groups are associated with specific emotions toward the groups.

Recently, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) argued that prejudice conceptualized as general negative evaluation is not sufficient and that people experience discrete emotions towards groups with different threat profiles. According to Cottrell and Neuberg, conventional measures of prejudice mask these emotional nuances. In support of this argument, they present evidence indicating that the feelings people have toward outgroups depend on the tangible threats posed by each outgroup. Specifically, they found that people felt angry toward members of groups that they viewed as a threat to their economic might or their freedom and rights. Groups that threatened ingroup health or values elicited disgust among people, whereas physical threats evoked both anger and fear. Finally, people also reported feeling envious of members of groups who posed economic threats. Acknowledging that groups can elicit different emotions and, further,

that outgroup threats can elicit distinct emotions, strongly suggests that any investigation of reactions to outgroups would be wise to explicitly delineate the role of affect.

But what exactly are emotions and how might they affect human behavior, particularly in a social context? Although researchers have only recently begun to examine emotions attached to social groups, scientists and psychologists have long been concerned with emotion in general. In one of the earliest scientific treatises on emotion, Darwin (1872) conceived of emotion as depressing or exciting inner states. The father of psychology, William James (1884), later emphasized the phenomenology of emotion, arguing that emotions are the mind's perception of physiological states. According to James, we perceive unique emotions because each emotion corresponds to a unique physiological response. So, when you see a big scary bear, your heart rate should increase, you may start sweating and you should start running away from the bear. When you see yourself running from the bear and feel the pounding of your heart in your chest, you will conclude that you must be afraid. In contrast, Neo-Jamesians, Schachter and Singer (1962) argued that emotions do not have unique physiological signatures, but rather that emotions result from the perception of a generalized state of arousal combined with an attribution for the cause of the state. In other words, a person can feel her/his heart beating, palms sweating, and subsequently perceive her/himself as excited or afraid, depending on environmental cues (e.g., a bear vs. a bunch of smiling, happy people at an amusement park).

If emotions truly worked as James or Schachter and Singer believed, they would not provide any particular insight into people's reactions to different symbolic threats. Rather, people would have to conclude that their emotion was based on their behavior or

attitudes (e.g., if they support a policy to help outgroup members, then they must have a positive emotion associated with the group). In such a scenario, general emotions would only serve as an outcome variable and not the key mechanism by which perceptions of threat influence ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

Whereas James, Darwin, and Schachter and Singer understood emotions as endpoints, contemporary psychologists tend to conceptualize emotions as contributing to action intentions and coordinating social interactions (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). From contemporary perspectives, emotions alter our attention and increase the likelihood that we will behave in a certain way (Frijda, 1986; Levenson, 1999; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Rolls, 2000). Keltner and Gross (1999) provide a technical and thorough definition wherein emotions represent "biologically-based patterns of perception, experience, physiology, action and communication" which are relatively short-lived and result from experiencing challenges and opportunities in the social world. Today, scholars generally agree that emotions motivate people to address the cause of their emotional state (Iyer & Leach, 2008).

A conceptualization of emotions as directing attention, communication, and behavior fits nicely within a functionalist framework and provides a useful starting point for understanding how emotions might play a role in people's responses to symbolic threats. Functionalist frameworks address *why* humans have emotions, assuming that each emotion serves a specific function(s) in motivating behavior. That is, emotions organize the many different responses humans have for any given situation—such as attention, learning, memory, regulatory variables, motivational priorities—so that the final response is coordinated and directed toward a relevant goal (Cosmides & Tooby,

2000; Levenson, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). Often influenced by evolutionary theory, some functionalist theorists argue that emotions evolved by natural selection to help regulate behavior so that our hunter-gatherer ancestors could successfully address adaptive obstacles (Cosmides & Tooby; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Repeated encounters with similar situations presumably led our ancestors to adopt emotional responses that increased their chances for survival (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Because humans evolved as interdependent beings, emotions not only provided a psychological mechanism for avoiding physical threat, but for surviving group living (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Oatley & Jenkins). In the social world, this meant that emotions simultaneously evolved to help form attachments, to maintain cooperative relationships, and to avoid any threat to group living.

This emphasis on the mobilizing and directing power of emotions provides a useful starting point for generating predictions about the role of specific emotions in human behavior and social interactions. Although the basic emotions of anger, fear, happiness and disgust probably evolved to address problems related to physical survival, evolution must have exploited these responses to manage threats to sociality (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). In contrast, pity, envy, sympathy and guilt all involve complex appraisals of social situations. As such, they likely evolved specifically to help people manage living in social groups (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). By reviewing the properties and effects of primary emotions, we can see the relevance of emotions not just for physical survival, but for social survival, as well. Understanding how general emotions work thus provides a solid foundation for understanding intergroup emotions.

We will start with happiness, the only truly positive, basic emotion. Basic emotions refer to emotions documented cross-culturally and sometimes deemed as the building blocks of other emotions (see Ekman, 1992). Basic emotions most likely evolved to help people face the challenges of physical survival and to solve fundamental life problems (Ekman, 1992). Although emotion scholars disagree on all the emotions that should be defined as basic, they do generally agree on five: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1993; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Plutchik, 1962).

People generally experience happiness as a result of accomplishing or achieving a desired outcome (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992) or receiving some sort of reward (Rolls, 2000). The expression of happiness conveys to other people and the self that it is safe to approach the person and her/his environment (Dillard & Peck, 2001; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). According to Marcus and MacKuen (1993), enthusiasm—a subtype of happiness—corresponds to the emotional component of the behavioral approach system. Like the conceptualizations of happiness, enthusiasm signals success, and as a result, that a person should continue behaving as before. In a social environment, people should experience happiness when they feel accepted by others (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995, for a review of the need to belong). More relevant for this dissertation, perceiving that many ingroup members hold the same set of core values may also lead to happiness and enthusiasm for the group, especially for those who value social conformity. Because authoritarians desire social conformity (Feldman, 2003), a uniform ingroup should satisfy that goal and should presumably lead to enthusiasm for the ingroup. If enthusiasm signals that a person should continue with her/his prior behavior, enthusiasm should then

lead to greater commitment to the ingroup.[2] Thus, for a Democrat who thinks that equality and social justice are important Democratic ideals, perceiving that most Democrats also hold these values should lead to enthusiasm about the party and greater commitment to it. Indeed, although they do not measure the source of the emotion, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000; see also Marcus & MacKuen, 1993) find that enthusiasm increases the degree to which people identify with their political party.

In contrast to happiness and enthusiasm, fear interrupts activity after a person senses a problem in the environment. People feel afraid as a result from any kind of threat, goal conflict (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992), or situational uncertainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The main function of fear is to help a person avoid danger (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Ohman, 2000; Smith et al., 2008) by providing the motivation to escape from the situation or to avoid the risky behavior (Izard, 1993; Ohman, 2000). A master program orchestrating the responses of subprograms (e.g., attention focus, behavior, learning), fear makes people more sensitive to threats and activates learning systems specialized for fear conditioning (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Fear also leads a person to move away from the source of the threat, to engage in protective behaviors or at least to avoid approaching it (Smith, 1993).

What then might evoke fear in an intergroup context? Smith (1993) argues that appraising a situation as uncertain or unexpected can lead to fear, especially when a person perceives the outgroup as powerful and hostile. In a situation in which the outgroup holds different values/beliefs than the ingroup, this difference should present a threat to authoritarians who value uniformity of beliefs. People who feel uncertain about

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[2] Following this same logic, outgroup members who help the ingroup or an individual achieve a desired goal may also elicit enthusiasm. In that case, it is also possible that people will feel enthusiastic toward outgroup members who conform to ingroup values.

these unknown values could consequently feel afraid and anxious, but because people are more likely to feel afraid of powerful outgroups, a minority group (e.g., immigrants or gays) seems unlikely to elicit fear. However, we might expect fear or anxiety to result from threats coming within the group. In this case, the power of the ingroup no longer provides reassurance or a safety net. If a threat to cultural worldview comes from within the ingroup, the uncertainty regarding group norms and cohesion should evoke feelings of fear or anxiety, especially among those predisposed to find diversity threatening. Indeed, Stenner (2005) did find that telling people that no consensus of values or beliefs exists within the United States activated authoritarian predispositions in the form of decreased political and moral tolerance. As of yet, whether this effect results from anxiety remains unexplored. I argue that Stenner's finding that a threat from the ingroup decreased political tolerance resulted from protective mechanisms activated by anxiety. In order to protect the suddenly limited cohesion of the ingroup, anxiety should lead authoritarians to limit further diversity within the ingroup. This should result in a decreased willingness to extend ingroup rights to outgroup members who do not embrace the so-called ingroup values. However, because anxiety also motivates people to remove themselves from the threat, anxiety may simultaneously decrease support for and identification with the larger ingroup. In that case, we might expect people to start leaning more toward subgroups within the ingroup that better satisfy the need for uniformity (e.g., social conservatives). This would allow people high in authoritarians both to denigrate those they view as a threat, and to maintain a positive ingroup identity (albeit, to a slightly different ingroup).

Whereas Stenner and Feldman manipulated threats as coming from within the ingroup, threats that come from an outgroup should lead to anger if a person perceives the ingroup as powerful and capable of handling the threat (see Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993). Anger usually results from the frustration of failing to achieve an important goal (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992), especially when people can attribute the source of the frustration to someone other than themselves (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Kessler, 2004). Angry people usually believe that they have suffered a loss and deserve some form of redress (Heise & O'Brien, 1992; Levenson, 1999). Further, angry people do not sit lightly on their emotion. An agitated emotion with a high potential for instigating action (Leach et al., 2006), anger prompts aggressive and antagonistic responses (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). Physically, the body prepares for an aggressive response with increased cardiovascular levels (Levenson, 1999) and an assertive posture (Heise & O'Brien, 1992), which can be used to provoke, intimidate, excite and inspire others (Heise & O'Brien, 1992). In the group context, Mackie et al. found that perceiving that the ingroup (here, those who shared the participant's views on punishing illegal drug use) had a powerful base of support led to more anger at the outgroup (those who opposed the participant's views) and in turn, to greater willingness to confront and argue with outgroup members.

People can perceive many events or behaviors as unfair or illegitimate, thus inciting anger. But not everyone should see outgroups retaining their own cultural identity—and rejecting the ingroup's values—as offensive or threatening. Not everyone should react with anger when people who do not conform to ingroup norms ask to receive the same benefits as the ingroup. A group perceived to hold different values should

represent a challenge to authoritarians desire to live in a world where everyone holds the same (or similar) beliefs and values. Because such an infraction represents goal frustration attributable to an outside source, anger is the most likely emotional response. Moreover, people who value social conformity may view the request for equal treatment or rights by non-assimilating outgroup members as an illegitimate demand, inciting even more anger. According to an authoritarian perspective, after all, if a person wants to receive the same rights as an ingroup member, then s/he should embrace the values and beliefs of that ingroup. Because people express anger most often when they believe they can retaliate and effectively respond (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003), people high in authoritarianism should react with the most anger when they are also members of the majority group—a membership that provides the means and power for a successful response.

It is also important to note that although anxiety may represent the dominant emotional response to ingroup threat, ingroup threat may result in anger directed specifically at those perceived to deviate from prototypical group values. In such a case, anger at members of the deviant group might lead people to desire to purge those members from the larger ingroup. Take, for instance, the case of American politicians. Despite their differences, these mostly white, male politicians are all part of the same larger group. They are the political representatives of the American people. They are all Americans. But this larger group certainly holds two different sets of values and political ideals. If Republicans believe that Democrats reject core American ideals like self-reliance, they might react in anger. We do certainly see a lot of anger thrown around the Senate and Congress (from both sides). More interesting, however, is the political

strategy of painting the other party as "Un-American" and "Unpatriotic." It is not enough to point out that Democrats are not Republicans; rather, Republican politicians will exclude their Democratic opponents from the inclusive "American" ingroup. For Democrats and Republicans within the larger ingroup of "Americans," it is fairly easy to see the other as an outgroup. After all, the parties represent the two opposing parties in a two party system.

However, when people first start to see the divisions within the values and beliefs of ingroup members, it may not be so easy to see those individuals as a subgroup— especially when the so-called deviants previously were perceived as prototypical ingroup members. To illustrate, let's return to the case of gay marriage supporters within a socially conservative church. Suppose that prior to coming out in favor of gay marriage, those church members had simply been active church-goers, members of the choir, or Sunday School teachers. It would be harder to subtype the gay-marriage supporters as secular liberals. For people who view the world as a dangerous place and seek refuge in social conformity and cohesion, knowledge of this dissention in church doctrine should lead to anxiety about the church identity and perhaps a decreased commitment to the church.

With all this talk about aggressive responses and negative emotions, it is easy to wonder whether any emotions facilitate the intermingling of groups. Sympathy represents one somewhat neglected emotion with the potential for bringing groups closer together. Unlike the basic emotions of happiness, fear and anger, sympathy most likely evolved specifically for handling interpersonal situations. Sympathy differs from empathy in that empathy is the active attempt to understand another's negative or positive

feelings, whereas sympathy is more of an automatic response (Wispe, 1986). As Wispe concisely stated, "In sympathy, the sympathizer is 'moved by' the other person. In empathy, we substitute ourselves for the others." A decidedly social emotion, sympathy represents a way of relating to others, especially by focusing on alleviating another person's difficulties or suffering (Wispe, 1986). Sympathy increases nurturing and prosocial behaviors (Harth et al., 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Fortunately for us, sympathy seems to be the dominant response to focusing on another's misfortune (Weiner, 1995).

In intergroup contexts, this feeling of warmth and compassion toward others should lead to a greater willingness to extend rights to the outgroup. Tropp and Pettigrew (2004)—scholars of the de-biasing effects of intergroup contact—argue that feelings of sympathy decrease prejudice toward the outgroup. Indeed, Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003) found that focusing on the suffering faced by African Americans increased sympathy and support for equality. Likewise, Harth et al. (2008) found that when participants focused on the illegitimate inequality experienced by immigrants, they felt greater sympathy, which led to a greater willingness to let immigrants participate in an ingroup activity (i.e., university sports).

For those who value uniformity in values and beliefs, what should increase feelings of sympathy toward outgroups? If the outgroup does not embrace ingroup values and norms, it seems unlikely that someone predisposed to authoritarianism will regard any misfortune that befalls the outgroup as particularly illegitimate. In such instances, the simple failure to embrace ingroup values could legitimize the outgroup's plight. Take, for example, symbolic racists, who believe that any hardships African

American's currently face result from their laziness and lack of work ethic (see Sears & Funke, 1990). Reducing the perception of symbolic threat should decrease any perception of legitimacy, thus making it easier to sympathize with the outgroup. As such, the key task here is to convince people that the outgroup actually does embrace at least some of the ingroup's values and norms. Admittedly, this is not an easy task. Imagine trying to convince a lifelong racist that African Americans do value hard work and, in fact, often work harder than Whites to achieve their goals. Any manipulation that strives to do this should aim to play down differences in values while emphasizing similarities. Although no research has yet to experimentally reduce feelings of symbolic threat, recall that applications of Belief Congruity Theory to situations of intergroup conflict indicate that value similarity leads to decreased intolerance of the outgroup, at least at a correlational level (Schwartz et al., 1990; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Insofar as similarity increases feelings of sympathy and prosocial behaviors (Krebs, 1975), we might expect that value similarity across groups would also lead to more sympathetic feelings toward the outgroup. This dissertation represents the first test of the relationships among value similarity, sympathy toward an outgroup and attitudes toward that outgroup.

Intergroup Emotions Theory

The idea that you must change the appraisal of the intergroup context—such as manipulating the similarity of outgroup values to the ingroup—to alter outgroup attitudes and prejudice lines up nicely with Smith's (1993) Intergroup Emotions Theory. This relatively recent area of research in intergroup relations is based on the assumption that as group membership becomes part of the self, it functions just like the psychological self.

As a result, social identity then becomes involved in the regulation of emotional responses and emotional action tendencies (Mackie, Silver & Smith, 2004; Smith & Mackie, 2006). Ingroups central to a person's sense of self should elicit especially strong emotional reactions (Costarelli, 2007; Mackie et al. 2004; Smith & Mackie, 2006). Research by Yzerbyt and colleagues (Yzerbyt et al., 2003) finds just this: When group membership is salient, people who identify the most with their ingroup experience the strongest emotional responses. In their recent review of intergroup emotions research, Iyer and Leach (2008) found general agreement in the literature that emotions should have their most straightforward effects on intergroup relations when people psychologically include themselves in the group—with the qualification that the outgroup represents the object of the emotion.

Perhaps the most important implication of Smith and Mackie's theory for this dissertation is the argument that group-based emotions mediate the relationship between situation appraisals and action tendencies (see Smith & Mackie, 2006). Likewise, in their offshoot of Intergroup Emotions Theory, Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn et al. (2006) argue that group membership provides the lens through which people perceive social situations. Whereas evolutionary theorists have made most of their arguments at the theoretical level, Smith, Mackie and others have offered a wealth of empirical evidence to support this functional role of emotions. Indeed, research on intergroup contact has increasingly used emotions to explain the positive consequences of intergroup contact (Brown & Capozza, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). This research has found that reduced perceptions in threat and anxiety mediate the relationship between intergroup contact and decreased prejudice toward the outgroup (Paolini et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2002).

Additionally, a growing body of research indicates that different emotions mediate the relationship between contextual features of the situation and intergroup attitudes/behavior. For example, Powell, Branscombe, and Schmitt (2005) showed that framing questions about racial inequality in terms of White privilege, as opposed to Black disadvantage, led to increased feelings of guilt. This collective guilt explained why people led to think about White privilege subsequently expressed less prejudicial attitudes. Similarly, Swim and Miller (1999) found that White guilt mediated the relationship between perceptions of race-based privilege and discrimination on the one hand and support for affirmative action policies on the other. Thus, it appears that a focus on an outgroup's disadvantage relative to the ingroup increases feelings of guilt, which lead to decreases in prejudice and increases in support for policies designed to mitigate inequality.

Given its activating nature, it is not surprising that anger seems to play more of a role in behavioral tendencies. As Smith (1993) and other appraisal theorists of emotion have hypothesized, the dominant emotional response to perceptions of unfairness should be anger. Smith, Cronin, and Kessler's (2008) survey of university faculty revealed that group-based anger fully mediated the relationship between faculty members' beliefs that they received unfairly low pay and their willingness to protest. Likewise, group-based anger fully explained why students who learned of unfair cuts to University programs and student services manifested a greater willingness to engage in collective action (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004).

More recently, Cottrell, Richard, and Nichols (2010) showed that people who believed that Muslims posed a threat to their physical safety felt angry at Muslims and in

turn, were more supportive of tightening homeland security policies. These researchers focused on a tangible physical threat associated with Muslims and used gays and lesbians as a source of a more symbolic, value-based threat. Symbolic threats from gays evoked feelings of disgust about gays and lesbians, which mediated the relationship between gay threat and less support for gay rights (Cottrell et al., 2010). Cottrell et al. thus provided the first evidence that emotions can explain why people react with intolerance toward outgroups that threaten ingroup values. However, the findings from the present study extend Cottrell's research in multiple ways by 1) exploring the difference between symbolic threats that originate from the ingroup and threats that originate from an outgroup; 2) exploring whether both positive and negative emotions simultaneously mediate the relationship between symbolic threat and intergroup attitudes; 3) testing whether authoritarianism moderates the effect of symbolic threats on group-based emotions and attitudes; and 4) experimentally manipulating symbolic threat to tease apart the causal relationships among these variables.

Overview of the Current Studies

In sum, a growing body of research indicates that emotions play an important role in explaining the effects of social situations on attitudes and behavioral intentions. Functional perspectives on emotion provide a theoretical basis not only for understanding the situational antecedents of emotions, but their behavioral consequences, as well. Intergroup emotions theory provides a valuable framework for predicting how appraisals of intergroup situations lead to emotions attached to specific group. This research has examined the effects of intergroup contact, status differences and procedural (un)fairness on emotions and people's consequent intergroup attitudes. The model proposed here

extends functional and intergroup emotions accounts by explicitly addressing a social phenomenon relevant to today's increasingly diverse society: symbolic threat. The hypotheses about emotional responses to symbolic threats (e.g., anger at an outgroup that rejects ingroup values) derived from this model extend previous iterations of the situational and cognitive antecedents of emotions. Whereas functional accounts have referred to the importance of safety and security (in the case of anxiety and enthusiasm) or goal frustration (in the case of anger), these perspectives did not articulate how and why social cohesion in the form of group values might represent an important goal to people and provide them with a sense of security. Thus, the research proposed here builds on previous theorizing on emotion but takes it in a novel direction, that of social consensus or divisions on important group values.

Another important contribution of the proposed research stems from the inclusion of a relevant individual difference variable, a predisposition to authoritarianism. Other than strength of ingroup identification, functional and intergroup emotions theorists have not previously examined how certain predispositions or motivations might affect how people appraise important social situations. In the case of deviating from core ingroup values, research on authoritarianism strongly suggests that people differ in the extent to which they find this situation threatening. Those who cherish social convention and submission to authority find social deviants particularly offensive and tend to respond in an aggressive manner. Although this separate line of research on the authoritarian personality has frequently referred to fear and hostility as relevant to the authoritarian response, none of this research has empirically investigated the role of emotions. With this dissertation, I aim to combine these two disparate lines of research to gain a deeper

understanding of the processes underlying people's intolerance of departures from the ingroup's prototypical values. Understanding how people respond emotionally to believing that others within the ingroup hold divergent values and beliefs or that outgroup members hold different values may help to explain why people develop more exclusive or inclusive intergroup attitudes (e.g., extending ingroup rights to outgroup members). This distinction between ingroup and outgroup threats could be useful for disentangling the contradictory findings about how threats interact with authoritarianism, as put forth by Stenner (2005) and Feldman (2003) on the one hand, and Hetherington and Weiler (2009) on the other. Moreover, examining how people respond to affirmations of group values—when an outgroup embraces core ingroup values—may help explain positive reactions to people not typically thought of as members of the ingroup. At a practical level, this information could be applied to multicultural environments to develop interventions that attenuate the negative reactions some people have toward groups with different cultural norms and values.

The hypotheses proposed here do not directly contradict assumptions or findings in support of Intergroup Emotions Theory or conceptualizations of Authoritarianism. This is because these theories do not address the role of intergroup emotions in responses to symbolic threats. Rather, this integrative framework takes both perspectives in a new direction to articulate the role of intergroup emotions as the process by which symbolic threats affect intergroup attitudes and behavioral tendencies. Like previous scholars of authoritarianism, I argue that those predisposed to value social conformity and cohesion should feel threatened by diversity in ingroup values and by outgroups that fail to embrace core ingroup values. And like intergroup emotions theorists, I argue that people

are motivated to protect the image of the ingroup, and that this can affect appraisals of intergroup situations and emotional responses to those situations (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). Departing from both of these perspectives, I argue that people's predispositions toward authoritarianism should affect which intergroup situations they find threatening, and as a result, their emotional reactions to social groups. These intergroup emotions, in turn, should predict attitudes toward the ingroup and the outgroup. To index authoritarian predisposition, I will include multiple measures previously established as related to authoritarianism, including Feldman's (2003) Preference for Social Conformity over Autonomy, Altemeyer's (1996) Right Wing Authoritarianism, the Big Five's Openness to New Experiences and Belief in a Dangerous World (Duckitt, 2001). To ensure comparison between this dissertation's findings and the literature on the interaction between authoritarianism and threat, the hypotheses outlined below focus on the childrearing values measure of authoritarianism (used by Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). Finally, I will use a combination of two surveys and an experimental manipulation of symbolic threat to test my hypotheses about emotional reactions to symbolic threats.

Hypotheses

1) Different kinds of symbolic threat should elicit distinct emotional reactions attached to the ingroup and to the outgroup.

    a. A symbolic threat in the form of an outgroup perceived to reject ingroup values and beliefs should make people feel angry toward members of an outgroup. In contrast, when people perceive that an outgroup embraces ingroup values, they should feel sympathy toward members of this outgroup.

b. When people perceive a symbolic threat from ingroup members failing to uniformly embrace a normative set of values, they should feel anxious about the ingroup. When people believe that the ingroup embraces a cohesive set of values, they should feel enthusiasm toward the ingroup.

2) Intergroup emotional reactions associated with symbolic threats should predict ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

a. People who feel angry toward the outgroup should hold more negative attitudes toward the outgroup and be less willing to extend them ingroup rights. Sympathy directed toward the outgroup should produce the opposite effects.

b. Anxiety toward the ingroup should lead to more negative attitudes toward the ingroup and to decreased willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the group. Enthusiasm toward the ingroup should produce the opposite effects.

3) Negative intergroup emotions should mediate the relationship between symbolic threats and ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

a. Anger toward the outgroup should mediate the relationship between perceiving that the outgroup violates core ingroup values on the one hand, and negative attitudes toward the outgroup on the other.

b. Anxiety about the ingroup should mediate the relationship between perceiving that members of the ingroup hold diverse beliefs and values on the one hand, and decreased commitment toward the ingroup on the other.

4) Authoritarian childrearing values should moderate emotional reactions to situations

related to symbolic threat, and in turn, subsequent ingroup and outgroup attitudes. Believing in authoritarian childrearing values (preference for authority/conformity over personal autonomy/difference) should strengthen the relationships outlined in Hypotheses 1 and 3.

a. Authoritarianism should strengthen the relationship between symbolic threats and ingroup and outgroup attitudes. People's distinct intergroup emotions (as outlined above) should explain why people prone to authoritarianism have more extreme attitudes toward groups that they perceive as a symbolic threat. This implies that the combination of high authoritarianism and high symbolic threat should produce distinct intergroup attitudes by first producing distinct emotional responses.

Chapter 2

Study 1

Overview

To establish that the hypothesized relationships exist, participants (drawn from a student and online community sample) completed a survey about their attitudes and emotions toward ingroups and outgroups that could potentially pose a symbolic threat to the ingroup. Previous research on symbolic threat has focused on attitudes toward immigrants. As such, Study 1 used American citizens as the relevant ingroup and Muslim immigrants as the relevant outgroup. The survey asked participants to complete a series of established measures of a predisposition to authoritarianism,[3] followed by questions about their perceptions of uniformity or diversity of values within American citizens as well as their perceptions about the extent to which Muslim immigrants embrace or rejects core American values. After the measures of perceived symbolic threat, participants indicated the extent to which they felt a number of emotions toward the ingroup and the outgroup, Muslim immigrants. Finally, as dependent measures, participants were asked about their attitudes toward American citizens (including identification measures) and Muslim immigrants (including their support for policies that would extend social and political rights to Muslim immigrants). Because of the sensitive nature of these questions and the potential for social-desirability to arise, the instructions and consent form emphasized that all responses were completely anonymous.

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[3] In addition to Stenner and Feldman's operationalization of authoritarianism as a belief about appropriate childrearing practices, the survey contains a variety of measures related to authoritarianism, including Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996), Belief in a Dangerous World (Duckitt et al., 2002), and Social Conformity (Feldman, 2003).

In the context of Study 1, my hypotheses are:

1) Different kinds of symbolic threat should elicit distinct emotional reactions attached to the ingroup and to the outgroup.

    a. When American citizens perceive that Muslim immigrants reject ingroup (American) values and beliefs, they should feel significantly more anger toward Muslim immigrants, compared to other emotions. In contrast, people who perceive that Muslim immigrants embrace American values should feels significantly more sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants.

    b. The perception that ingroup members (fellow American citizens) pose a symbolic threat by not uniformly embracing a normative set of values should elicit significantly more anxiety about the ingroup than other emotions. The perception that the ingroup embraces a cohesive set of values should elicit pride in the ingroup.

2) Intergroup emotional reactions associated with symbolic threats should predict ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

    a. Anger toward Muslim immigrants should lead to more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and a decreased willingness to extend American civil and social rights to the outgroup. Sympathy toward Muslim immigrants should produce the opposite effects.

    b. Anxiety about American citizens (the ingroup) should lead to more negative attitudes toward Americans and a decreased willingness to

sacrifice for the sake of the group. Pride in Americans should produce the opposite effects.

3) Negative intergroup emotions should mediate the relationship between symbolic threats and ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

   a. Anger toward Muslim immigrants should mediate the relationship between perceiving that the outgroup violates core American values and negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

   b. Anxiety about Americans should mediate the relationship between perceiving that members of the ingroup hold diverse beliefs and values on the one hand, and decreased commitment toward the Americans ingroup on the other.

4) a. A predisposition to authoritarianism (as measured by childrearing values) should moderate emotional reactions to situations related to symbolic threat, and in turn, subsequent ingroup and outgroup attitudes. Authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the relationships outlined in Hypotheses 1 and 3.

   b. Authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the relationship between symbolic threats and ingroup and outgroup attitudes. The distinct intergroup emotions outlined above should explain with people prone to authoritarianism hold more negative attitudes toward groups they view as a symbolic threat. This implies that the tendency for authoritarian childrearing values to strengthen the relationship between symbolic threats and intergroup attitudes should be mediated by distinct

emotional reactions to the ingroup (pride and anxiety) and the outgroup (anger and sympathy).

Method

Participants

This study employs a correlational research design. The data for this survey came from two samples recruited simultaneously: 256 students at the University of Minnesota and 42 participants from an online community sample. Participants enrolled in psychology courses received one extra credit point for their participation. Student participants were recruited for mass-testing sessions by in-class announcements, online advertisements on the Psychology Department webpage, and flyers posted in University buildings. Nonstudent participants were recruited from an online ad posted on Craigslist.org in multiple cities. The ad stated that researchers at the University of Minnesota were looking for participants to complete a survey on social and political attitudes. Nonstudent participants received $10 as compensation for their time. All participants read and agreed to a consent form before completing the survey on individual computers of their choice. The sample was comprised of 104 men and 189 women. Five participants did not report their gender. Because this survey stipulates Muslim immigrants as the outgroup and American citizens as the ingroup, participants answered questions about their religious identification and country of birth. Ten participants identified themselves as Muslim and were subsequently removed from further analyses. Forty-four participants reported that they had been born outside of the United States and were also removed from further analyses.

Measures

Authoritarianism-related measures. The survey contained the most prominent measures of authoritarianism and a predisposition to authoritarianism to ensure that the findings reported here are not unique to any one measure and to facilitate comparisons between these results and previously-published studies. These five measures (Preference for Conformity vs. Autonomy, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Belief in a Dangerous World, Childrearing Authoritarian Values, Openness to New Experiences) are also scaled to form a general composite measure of authoritarianism. See Appendix A for all authoritarianism measures.

Conformity versus autonomy. Because symbolic threat, as it is conceptualized in this paper, results from a departure from the group's prototypical values, an index of preference for conformity is appropriate. Feldman's (2003) forced-choice measure was adapted to form 18 agree/disagree items. All items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate a greater relative preference for conformity over autonomy (α = .77, *M* = 3.1, *SD*=.58).

Childrearing values. A four-item scale indexing the values people deem most important for instilling in a child was used to measure a predisposition to authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005; Stenner & Feldman, 1997). Example items include "Is it more desirable for a child to have independence or respect for elders?" and "Is it more desirable for a child to be obedient or self-reliant?" All items were answered on a seven-point scale and recoded so that higher numbers corresponded to a more authoritarian view of parenting (α = .61, *M*= 3.76, *SD*=1.01).

Dangerous-world beliefs. I used Duckitt's (2001) 10-item scale to measure people's basic tendency to view the world as dangerous and threatening. This scale asks people to indicate their level of agreement with statements such as "My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent, and moral people's values and way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people" and "there are many dangerous people in our society who will attack somebody out of pure meanness, for no reason at all." All items were recoded to so that higher numbers indicate stronger dangerous-world beliefs and were then averaged to form a composite ($\alpha = .819$, *M*= 3.59, *SD*=.91).

Openness to new experiences. The Big Five trait, openness to new experience, measures the degree to which a person enjoys new ideas and experiences, has a wide variety of interests, and likes to think in a flexible and creative manner (Digman, 1990). Because of the previously observed negative relationship between this trait and Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996; Heaven & Bucci, 2001), the NEO-IPIP version of this scale was used as an alternative measure of predisposition to authoritarianism. This 1-5 Likert scale asks participants to indicate the degree to which a series of 20 statements is a "very inaccurate" or "very accurate" description of themselves. Items were recoded so that higher numbers corresponded to higher openness to new experiences ($\alpha = .84$, *M*= 3.78, *SD*=.51).

Right-wing authoritarianism. The survey also included a shortened 12-item version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, which is comprised of items that have appeared consistently on successive versions of the instrument (Altemeyer, 1996; Weber & Federico, 2007). Sample items included: "Obedience and respect for authority are the

most important virtues children can learn," "The courts are right on being easy on drug users. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these" (reverse coded), and "It may be considered old-fashioned by some, but having a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially, a lady." All items were recoded so that higher numbers indicated higher RWA ($\alpha = .80$, $M = 3.79$, $SD = .92$).

Perceived diversity of beliefs/values within the ingroup. To assess a symbolic threat originating from within the ingroup, participants indicated the extent to which they believed United States citizens held uniform or diverse sets of values and beliefs (see Appendix B). These items are adapted from Feldman's (2003) perceived threat to social cohesion scale in order to focus on *value* diversity, rather than diversity, per se. Sample items include: "Most Americans hold the same values regarding *religious and moral issues*" and "Despite what many people may say, Americans still believe in the same common values." Participants answered on a 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). Four items were recoded to indicate higher perceptions of symbolic threat ($\alpha = .61$, $M = 4.54$, $SD = .83$).

Perceived value difference from Muslim immigrants. To measure symbolic threat originating from an outgroup, participants indicated the extent to which they believed Muslim immigrants held values consistent with core American values. Adapted from Stephan et al. (1999) and Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood (1995), these seven items index the degree to which a person perceives that the outgroup possesses similar values to American citizens or that they threaten American culture (see Appendix C). Sample items include" "American values are threatened by the presence of Muslim immigrants" and "Muslim immigrants are strengthening values and norms important to

American culture." Items were recoded such that higher values corresponded to greater perceived threat (α = .84, M= 3.90, SD= 1.00).

Emotions toward the ingroup and outgroup. Participants' emotions toward the ingroup and outgroup were measured using an adapted version of the PANAS (see Appendix D). On a scale of 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("extremely"), participants were asked the extent to which they felt 31 different emotions when thinking about the target group (order of group presented first was counterbalanced). In addition to the emotion scales associated with the key hypothesized emotions (anger, anxiety, sympathy, enthusiasm), I also assessed people's levels of sadness and happiness for control purposes. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt each emotion when thinking about American citizens: anger (α = .90, M= 2.85, SD= 1.44), anxiety (α = .91, M= 2.96, SD= 1.53), and pride (α = .84, M= 4.06, SD= 1.55). Participants also indicated the extent to which they felt each emotion when thinking about Muslim immigrants': anger (α = .93, M= 2.28, SD= 1.42), anxiety (α = .94, M= 2.44, SD= 1.47), and sympathy (α = .80, M= 2.92, SD= 1.50). The order of presentation (whether ingroup or outgroup) was randomly counterbalanced for each participant.

Ingroup attitudes. On a scale of 0-10, participants separately indicated the extent to which they viewed American citizens positively (M= 6.36, SD = 2.32) and negatively (M= 3.11, SD = 2.26). Participants also rated American citizens on four bipolar trait items: honest/dishonest, trustworthy/untrustworthy, safe/dangerous, and good/bad. Items were coded so that higher numbers indicated more negative views (α = .85, M= 4.51, SD= .94). See Appendix E.

Ingroup commitment and identification. All participants indicated how much they socially identified with American citizens. Five items gauged how close each person reported feeling to American citizens and how happy they are with being an American (see Appendix F). For example, participants were asked "How important is being an American to your identity?" The five items were scaled to form a composite in which higher numbers indicated greater identification with Americans ($\alpha = .90$, $M = 4.8$, $SD = 1.38$). Participants also completed a Nationalism ($\alpha = .71$, $M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.01$) scale as measures of their feelings and attitudes toward America (see Appendix F). The Nationalism scale was used as a measure of a person's identification and active belief that her/his country is superior and should dominate other countries. Sample items included: "The U.S. should not dominate other countries" (reverse coded) and "To maintain our country's superiority, war is sometimes necessary."

Outgroup attitudes. As an evaluative measure of the outgroup, participants rated the extent to which they viewed Muslim immigrants positively ($M = 5.34$, $SD = 2.68$) and negatively ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 2.76$), each on a 0-10 scale ($r = -.54$, $p < .001$). Participants also rated Muslim immigrants on the same four bipolar trait items as American citizens: honest/dishonest, trustworthy/untrustworthy, safe/dangerous, and good/bad. Items were recoded so that higher numbers indicated more positive views ($\alpha = .92$, $M = 4.38$, $SD = 1.01$). See Appendix E.

Willingness to sacrifice for the ingroup. To assess commitment to maintaining clear ingroup boundaries, participants were asked how much they are willing to sacrifice their crude, monetary self-interest to exclude the outgroup. For the immigrant version, participants indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:

"I would be willing to pay a tax that would increase security screening procedures for Muslim immigrants entering the U.S." (*M*= 4.01, *S.D.* = 2.01). Students also indicated how much they agreed with the statement "I would be willing to pay an extra student fee that would go toward extra scholarships for Muslim immigrants" (*M*= 3.00, *S.D.* = 1.01). Among students, these two items did not correlate strongly enough to form a reliable scale (r = -.13, *p* < .05).

Attitudes toward policies that extend ingroup rights to outgroup members. Participants were also asked to report how willing they would be to extend American rights (e.g., the right to make a speech in a public place, to hold public office, access to health care). Eleven items (See Appendix G) were recoded so that higher numbers corresponded to more authoritarian attitude—less willingness to give rights to Muslim immigrants (α = .92, *M*= 4.38, *SD*= 1.01).

Political Ideology. To control for the effects of ideology, all participants answered four standard seven-point scales about their ideological position. On two separate scales, participants placed themselves with respect to their economic political outlook and their social political outlook, with higher numbers corresponding to greater conservatism (see Appendix H). On a third scale, participants indicated their political party affiliation from "Strong Democrat" to "Strong Republican." On the final item participants were asked to place themselves on a general scale of ideology from "Strong Liberal" to "Strong Conservative." All scales were coded so that higher numbers corresponded to higher conservatism (α = .89, *M*= 3.43, *SD*= 1.41). Among the student sample, *M* = 3.30 and *SD* = 1.39. Among the online sample, recruited to be more ideologically balanced, *M* = 3.85 and *SD* = 1.38.

Results

Intercorrelations among key variables. Before turning to the main analyses, let us first examine the correlations between the study's key variables; these are displayed in Table 2.1. Lending preliminary support for Hypothesis 1, Muslim symbolic threat was positively correlated with anger toward Muslims ($r = .49$, $p < .001$) and this relationship was stronger than that between Muslim symbolic threat and anxiety about Muslims ($r = .37$, $p < .001$). Additionally, Muslim symbolic threat and sympathy toward Muslims were negatively correlated ($r = -.27$, $p < .001$). However, the correlations between American symbolic threat and emotions toward Americans reveal only partial support for the key hypothesis. Although the relationship between American symbolic threat and pride in Americans is negative and significant ($r = -.13$, $p < .05$), American symbolic threat is not significantly correlated with anxiety about or anger at Americans (ps $> .10$).

The two symbolic threat variables were not significantly related to each other ($p > .10$) but interestingly, Muslim symbolic threat was correlated positively with both anxiety about and pride in Americans (both $r = .13$, $p < .05$). Another interesting note is that nearly all of the emotions were positively correlated with each other, regardless of the emotion target. These relationships could be explained by a general willingness to report experiencing emotions or simply participant emotionality. As a result, subsequent analyses include all relevant emotion variables as controls. In addition, all predictor variables were centered prior to analyses, as per Aiken and West (1996).

Hypothesis 1a. Outgroup threat should be positively related to outgroup anger and negatively related to outgroup sympathy. According to the first hypothesis, the perception that an outgroup violates cherished ingroup values should be positively related

to anger at that outgroup. Although it is likely that threat will also be related to outgroup anxiety, Hypothesis 1 posits that it will be most strongly related to outgroup anger. Increased threat should also decrease positive emotions toward the outgroup. Here, we focus specifically on sympathy. To test the hypothesis, a series of regressions were run using Muslim symbolic threat as the predictor and the emotions as the dependent variables (see Table 2.2). As the table illustrates, Muslim symbolic threat better predicted anger at Muslims ($b = .67$, $SE = .08$, p $< .001$) than anxiety about Muslims ($b = .54$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$). To further separate the emotions from each other, residual variables were created wherein anger was partialed out from anxiety and anxiety was partialed out for anger. Muslim symbolic threat continued to significantly predict anger at Muslims even after removing the variance it shared with anxiety ($b = .25$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$). In contrast, Muslim symbolic threat failed to predict the residual anxiety variable ($b = -.05$, $SE = .05$, $p > .10$). Although not shown in the table, Muslim symbolic threat significantly predicted decreased sympathy toward Muslim immigrants ($b = -.43$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$). The analyses thus support the hypothesis that symbolic threat originating from Muslims will be more strongly related to anger at than anxiety about Muslims and that Muslim symbolic threat will reduce feelings of sympathy toward Muslim immigrants.

Hypothesis 1b. Ingroup threat should be positively related to ingroup anxiety and negatively related to ingroup pride. In contrast to a threat from an outgroup, hypothesis 1b posits that the perception that members of the ingroup do not hold uniform values should be positively related to feelings of unease and anxiety with the ingroup. Similarly, this ingroup threat should decrease pride in the ingroup as a whole. To test this

hypothesis, each of the emotions (anxiety about Americans and pride in Americans) were separately regressed on perceived American threat. Table 2.3 displays the results of these analyses. American symbolic threat significantly predicted decreased pride in Americans ($b = -.28$, $SE = .11$, $p < .05$) but did not significantly predict anxiety about Americans as originally hypothesized ($b = .15$, $SE = .12$, $p>.10$). Interestingly, ingroup symbolic threat significantly predicted increased anger at ($b = .22$, $SE = .11$, $p < .05$) at Americans. It thus appears that regardless of whether it comes from the ingroup or the outgroup, people will feel anger toward whomever threatens the value cohesion of the ingroup.

To test whether threat continued to predict the emotion variables once the shared variance with the other emotion had been partialed out, residual variables for anger and pride were again created. In the case of pride, the American pride variable was regressed on anger at Americans and the residuals were saved. In the case of anger, anger at Americans was regressed on pride in Americans and the residuals were saved. American symbolic threat continued to predict the residual variable for anger at Americans ($b = .26$, $SE = .11$, $p < .05$). Likewise, after anger was removed, American symbolic threat predicted the residual pride in American variable more strongly ($b = -.30$, $SE = .11$, $p < .01$). Hypothesis 1b thus received partial support; symbolic threat from the ingroup did decrease pride in the ingroup, but it failed to increase anxiety. Contrary to original expectations, the relationship between ingroup symbolic threat and negative emotions was stronger for anger toward Americans than for anxiety about Americans. Thus, perceived threat from Americans predicted increased anger at Americans and decreased pride in Americans.

Hypothesis 2a. Anger at Muslim immigrants should predict more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and a decreased willingness to extend ingroup rights. Sympathy should increase positive attitudes and increase willingness to extend ingroup rights. A series of ordinary least squares regression models were used to test the hypothesis that emotions toward the target group predict attitudes toward that group. In each model, the dependent variable was regressed on anger at Muslims, anxiety about Muslims, sympathy toward Muslims, childrearing authoritarianism values, and ideology. For the two feeling thermometers (Table 2.4), Hypothesis 2a was supported: Anger at Muslim immigrants predicts more negative ($b = 1.32$, $p < .001$) and less positive attitudes ($b = -.65$, $p < .001$); sympathy toward Muslim immigrants predicts more positive ($b = .84$, $p < .001$) and less negative attitudes ($b = -.35$, $p < .001$). Anxiety about Muslim immigrants did not predict evaluative attitudes (ps $> .10$). Interestingly, authoritarian childrearing values were significantly and positively related to positive feelings ($b = .40$, $p < .01$) but not to negative feelings.

In addition to the feeling thermometers, Hypothesis 2a was tested using composite trait ratings of Muslim immigrants and a composite scale indexing support for the civil rights of Muslim immigrants (see Table 2.5). The Muslim trait ratings were scaled so that higher numbers indicated more positive views, whereas the rights composite was scaled so that higher numbers correspond to greater opposition. As predicted, OLS regression revealed that anger at Muslims predicted less positive trait ratings ($b = -.26$, $p < .001$) and more opposition to extending civil and social rights to Muslim immigrants ($b = .39$, $p < .001$). Sympathy, in contrast, predicted more positive trait ratings ($b = .28$, $p < .001$) and less opposition toward Muslim immigrants' rights ($b = -.20$, $p < .001$). As

predicted, anxiety about Muslim immigrants did not significantly predict opposition to Muslim rights, although it had a marginal relationship with Muslim trait ratings ($b = -.12$, $p < .10$).

In sum, supporting Hypothesis 2a, anger at Muslim immigrants predicted more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and more opposition to extending the rights of American citizens to Muslim immigrants. Additionally, sympathy toward Muslim immigrants predicted more positive attitudes toward and more support for the rights of Muslim immigrants.

Hypothesis 2b. Anxiety about American citizens should lead to more negative attitudes toward the ingroup and a decreased willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the group. Enthusiasm toward the ingroup should produce the opposite effects. To examine the unique effects of each of the ingroup emotions, five dependent variables were regressed on a model comprised of anger at Americans, anxiety about Americans, pride in Americans, childrearing authoritarianism, and ideology. As shown in Table 2.6, anxiety about Americans only predicted trait ratings, and this relationship was marginal ($b = -.10$, $p < .10$). Enthusiasm or pride in the ingroup predicted more positive feelings toward the ingroup ($b=.63$, $p < .001$), more positive trait ratings of Americans ($b= .15$, $p < .001$), more nationalistic attitudes ($b=.14$, $p < .01$) and greater identification with other Americans ($b = .38$, $p < .001$). Enthusiasm also predicted less negative scores on negative feeling thermometer ($b = -.32$, $p < .001$). Contrary to predictions, however, anger at Americans uniquely predicted four of the dependent variables: less positive feelings ($b = -.75$, $p < .001$), more negative trait ratings ($b= -.21$, $p < .001$), less

identification with other Americans ($b = -.19$, $p < .05$) and less positive feelings ($b = -.75$, $p < .001$). Each of the models was highly significant (all ps $< .001$).

Thus, in partial support of Hypothesis 2b, pride in American citizens predicted more positive attitudes and more identification with Americans. Rather than anxiety (which did significantly predict any of the hypothesized dependent variables), anger at American citizens led to more negative attitudes toward and less identification with fellow American citizens.

Hypothesis 3a. Anger should mediate the relationship between perceived symbolic threat and attitudes toward the outgroup. Hypothesis 3 postulates a mediation mechanism whereby negative emotions mediate the relationship between symbolic threat and attitudes toward the ingroup and outgroup. Specifically, anger toward the outgroup should mediate the relationship between symbolic threat and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. With respect to these data, three conditions must be met for the mediation hypothesis to receive support: (1) each kind of symbolic threat (the independent variable) must predict attitudes the key dependent variable; (2) each kind of symbolic threat (the independent variable) must predict the appropriate mediator (i.e., anger toward the outgroup in the case of outgroup symbolic threat and anxiety toward the ingroup in the case of ingroup symbolic threat); and (3) in final models predicting group attitude dependent variables, the effect of symbolic threat (the independent variable) must be significantly reduced in magnitude when the relevant mediator (anger toward the outgroup for outgroup symbolic threat and anxiety about the ingroup for ingroup symbolic threat) is added to the model, and the mediator itself must have a significant effect (Baron & Kenney, 1986; Wegener & Fabrigar, 2000).

These are the steps to establish mediation as originally laid out by Baron and Kenny (1986). More recently, however, psychometricians and statisticians have persuasively argued that the first condition (the independent variable predicting the dependent variable) is not required to show evidence of mediation (Judd & Kenny, 2010; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). In instances where the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is not significantly different from zero, an indirect relationship may still emerge during the Sobel test. The most important criterion then is that the indirect effect is significantly different from zero. Thus, in cases where the independent variable fails to predict the dependent variable, the analyses reported here will still examine whether the independent variable (symbolic threat) indirectly affects the dependent variable via the hypothesized mediator variable.

The first regression equation (as per Condition 1) tests whether Muslim symbolic threat predicts each of the dependent variables, while controlling for childrearing authoritarian values and ideology. Table 2.7 shows that as predicted, symbolic threat predicted less positive feelings toward ($b = -1.18$, $p < .001$) and less positive trait ratings of Muslim immigrants ($b = -.60$, $p < .001$). Similarly, perceived threat predicted more negative feelings toward ($b = 1.23$, $p < .001$) and more opposition to the civil rights of Muslim immigrants ($b = .50$, $p < .001$), as well as more nationalistic feelings toward the United States ($b = .27$, $p < .001$). The control variables of authoritarian childrearing and ideology significantly predicted only opposition to the civil rights of Muslim immigrants and nationalism.

The conditions necessary for the second step—that the independent variable predicts the mediator—have already been tested in accordance with the first hypothesis. Indeed, perceived symbolic threat from Muslim immigrants is significantly related to anger at Muslim immigrants ($b = .70$, $p < .001$).

The third criterion for mediation was examined by adding the centered anger at Muslims variable to the models tested in 2.7. In each case, the dependent variable was regressed on a model including Muslim symbolic threat, anger at Muslim immigrants, childrearing authoritarian values and ideology.

Figure 2.1 shows the results for the positive feelings thermometer ratings. The mediator, anger at Muslims, had a significant effect on positive feelings ($b = -.37$, $p < .01$) and the effect of symbolic threat on positive feelings was reduced from $b = -1.2$ ($p < .001$) to $b = -.95$ ($p < .001$). The Sobel-Goodman test for mediation was significant ($IE = -.25$, $z = 2.93$, $p < .01$) and anger accounted for 21% of the effect of perceived symbolic threat on positive feelings, indicating that anger at Muslim immigrants partially explained the relationship between Muslim symbolic threat and positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

Although it was not specifically hypothesized, it seems possible that a positive emotion like sympathy might better mediate the effect of symbolic threat on general positive feelings. As such, an analysis for sympathy toward Muslim immigrants as the mediator was also tested. Having already established that the independent variable (symbolic threat) predicts the dependent variable, positive thermometer ratings, and that the independent variable predicts the sympathy mediator (see analyses associated with Hypothesis 1a), the final test examines whether adding sympathy to the full model further

reduces the effect of the independent variable on positive thermometer ratings. After controlling for anger, sympathy significantly predicted positive feelings ($b = .73$, $p < .001$) and the effect of symbolic threat on positive feelings was further reduced from $b = -.95$ ($p < .001$) to $b = -.51$ ($p < .01$). The Sobel-Goodman test for mediation was also significant ($IE = -.44$, $z = 4.42$, $p < .001$) with sympathy accounting for 46% of the remaining effect of perceived symbolic threat on positive feelings.

Because both sympathy and anger showed evidence of partial mediation in independent tests, I chose to examine whether both emotions simultaneously mediated the relationship between Muslim symbolic threat and positive feelings toward Muslim immigrants.[4] Previous analyses have already shown that symbolic threat predicts each of the emotion variables and that each of the emotions predict the dependent variable. The final test requires that in the full model (with both sympathy and anger, along with the ideology and childrearing values control measures), the specific indirect effects and the total indirect effect are significant. As Figure 2.2 shows, both anger ($b = -.53$, $p < .001$) and sympathy ($b = .73$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted positive feelings of Muslims in the full model. The specific indirect effect via anger was significant ($IE = -.34$, $z = 3.95$, $p < .001$) as was the specific indirect effect via sympathy ($IE = -.33$, $z = 4.14$, $p < .001$). Together, these emotions explained 52% of the total effect of Muslim threat on positive ratings of Muslims, reducing threat's coefficient from $b = -1.28$ ($p < .001$) to $b = -.63$ (p

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[4] Simultaneous mediation by multiple mediators can be shown by testing the significance of the coefficients for the total indirect effect (of all mediators) and the significance of each specific indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The coefficients for each specific indirect effect are calculated by multiplying the coefficient between the independent variable and the mediator variable and the coefficient between the mediator variable and the dependent variable. The total indirect effect is calculated by summing all of the specific indirect effects together.

< .001). The Sobel-Goodman test for the total indirect effect indicated that this reduction was significant (*IE* = -.67, z = 5.95, *p* < .001).

Not surprisingly given their similar valence, anger better mediated the effect of symbolic threat on negative thermometer ratings. In the full model here, the negative thermometer ratings measure was regressed on anger at Muslims, Muslim symbolic threat, childrearing authoritarian values, and ideology. Anger at Muslims significantly predicted negative thermometer ratings (*b* = 1.21, *p* < .001) and the effect of symbolic threat on negative feelings was reduced from *b* = 1.24 (*p* < .001) to *b* = .38 (*p* < .01). The Sobel-Goodman test for mediation was significant (*IE* = .86, z = 6.89, *p* < .001) and anger accounted for 69% of the effect of perceived symbolic threat on negative feelings. Sympathy toward Muslims also added significantly to the model. Figure 2.3 displays the results of this test for simultaneous multiple mediators. In the full model, both anger (*b* = 1.25, *p* < .001) and sympathy (*b* = -.26, *p* < .01) significantly predicted negative feelings toward Muslim immigrants. The addition of anger and sympathy significantly reduced threat's coefficient from *b* = 1.36 (*p* < .001) to *b* = .25 (*p* < .10). The specific indirect effect of symbolic threat on negative emotions was significant via anger (*IE* = .90, *z* = 7.41, *p* < .001) and via sympathy (*IE* = .12, *z* = 2.55, *p* < .05). Together, both anger and sympathy accounted for 80% of threat's total effect. According to the Sobel-Goodman test, this mediation was significant (*IE* = 1.01, *z* = 7.15, *p* < .001). This means that both anger at and sympathy toward Muslim immigrants explain why people who perceive that Muslim immigrants reject American values also rate them more negatively.

Moving on to a more difficult test of the emotion mediation hypothesis, let us turn to trait ratings of Muslim immigrants. In the full model with symbolic threat and the two

control variables (ideology and childrearing), anger had a significant relationship with trait ratings ($b = -.20$, $p < .001$). The effect of symbolic threat on trait ratings was reduced from $b = -.58 (p < .001)$ to $b = -.44$ ($p < .001$). The Sobel-Goodman test indicated that this reduction was significant ($IE = -.14$, $z = 4.11$, $p < .001$) with anger mediating 25% of threat's total effect. In the simultaneous mediation test shown in Figure 2.4, anger at Muslim immigrants predicted more negative trait ratings ($b = -.21$, $p < .001$) and sympathy toward Muslim immigrants predicted more positive trait ratings ($b = .15$, $p < .001$). The specific indirect effect of Muslim symbolic threat on Muslim trait ratings was significant via anger ($IE = -.15$, $z = 4.29$, $p < .001$), as well as via sympathy ($IE = -.07$, $z = 3.00$, $p < .01$). The addition of both anger and sympathy to the full model reduced the relationship between threat and trait ratings further to $b = -.37$ ($p < .001$), a significant drop according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = -.22$, $z = 4.94$, $p < .001$). Both sympathy and anger together accounted for 37% of the relationship between threat and trait ratings.

For the dependent variable, opposition to civil rights for Muslim immigrants, anger at Muslims had a significant coefficient in the full model ($b = .32$, $p < .001$) for the single mediation test. More important, the effect of symbolic threat on opposition to Muslim rights was reduced from $b = .50$ ($p < .001$) to $b = .28$ ($p < .001$) when anger was added to the model. As evidence of partial mediation, the Sobel-Goodman test revealed that the reduction was again significant ($IE = .22$, $z = 5.14$, $p < .001$) with anger mediating 44% of the total effect of symbolic threat. See Figure 2.5 for a diagram of this mediation. Analyses also tested whether sympathy and anger simultaneously mediated the relationship between Muslim symbolic threat and opposition to Muslim civil rights.

The results of this multiple mediation test are displayed in Figure 2.6. As the figure shows, in the full model (including both control variables, childrearing authoritarian values and ideology), anger at Muslims predicted more opposition to Muslim civil rights ($b = .30$, $p < .001$), whereas sympathy predicted less opposition ($b = -.11$, $p < .05$). The specific indirect effect of symbolic threat on opposition to Muslim rights was significant via anger ($IE = .22$, $z = 5.02$, $p < .001$), as well as via sympathy ($IE = .05$, $z = 2.17$, $p < .05$). The addition of both emotions reduced threat's coefficient from $b = .50$ ($p < .001$) to $b = .30$ ($p < .001$). This reduction was significant for the total indirect effect ($IE = .26$, $z = 5.12$, $p < .001$) with anger and sympathy explaining 47% of the total effect.

For the last mediation test in this series, we turn to nationalism, a variable not directly related to Muslim immigrants. Nationalism was included as the most difficult test of the emotion mediation hypothesis because it does not inherently deal with feelings or emotions toward a specific outgroup. Instead, it is a more a generally aggressive orientation toward outgroups, measuring the belief that a person's nation is superior and dominant to other countries. As described in condition 1 and shown in Table 2.7, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants significantly predicts increased nationalistic attitudes. Evidence of an anger mediation would thus provide further evidence that anger at the outgroup is key for understanding the consequences of outgroup symbolic threat. Figure 2.7 shows that in the full model, anger at Muslim immigrants continues to significantly predict nationalistic attitudes ($b = .12$, $p < .01$). When anger was added to the model, the effect of perceived threat on nationalism reduced from $b = .26$ ($p < .001$) to $b = .18$ ($p < .01$). The Sobel-Goodman test indicates that the partial mediation was significant ($IE = .08$, $z = 2.51$, $p < .05$) with anger explaining 32% of the total effect of

Muslim symbolic threat on nationalism. Like the models reviewed above, I also tested a multiple-mediators model with both anger and sympathy as the mediators. Unlike the previous tests, however, sympathy toward Muslims was unrelated to nationalism ($b = -.01$, $p>.10$).

Taken together, these findings provide consistent evidence for the hypothesis that anger at Muslim immigrants can explain—however, in this case, partially explain—the effect of perceived symbolic threat on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Not surprisingly, anger partially mediated the effect of threat on both positive and negative feeling thermometers, although its mediation was greater for negative feelings. In fact, of the five dependent variables examined here, anger accounted for the greatest effect of symbolic threat on how negatively participants reported feeling toward Muslim immigrants. Additionally, anger partially mediated the effect of threat on two Muslim attitudinal variables not explicitly connected with "feelings": trait ratings of Muslim immigrants and opposition to rights for Muslim immigrants. Threat led to more anger and as a result, less positive trait ratings and more opposition to the rights of Muslim immigrants. Anger at Muslim immigrants partially mediated the effect of perceived threat on nationalism. The analyses reported here also explored the possibility that both anger at and sympathy toward Muslim immigrants simultaneously explained the effect of Muslim symbolic threat on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Multiple mediator tests showed that Muslim symbolic threat did indeed have an indirect effect on four of the dependent variables (positive and negative thermometer ratings, trait ratings of Muslim immigrants, opposition to Muslim rights) simultaneously via sympathy and anger. This

suggests that both positive and negative emotions are necessary to explain the relationship between outgroup symbolic threat and outgroup attitudes.

   Hypothesis 3b. Anxiety at the ingroup should mediate the relationship between perceived ingroup threat and attitudes toward the ingroup. Hypothesis 3 states explicitly that negative emotions should explain the effect the perception that the ingroup does not hold a consistent set of values on attitudes toward the ingroup. However, as described in the analyses for Hypothesis 2b and shown in Table 2.6, anxiety toward the ingroup failed to significantly predict any of the key dependent variables. Furthermore, as shown in Table 2.3, anxiety about Americans and American symbolic threat are not significantly related. Thus, two key conditions—a significant relationship between the independent variable and the mediator and a significant relationship between the mediator and the dependent variable—for the test of mediation are not met. Because threat did significantly predict pride in Americans and pride, in turn, predicted all of the ingroup dependent variables, supplementary analyses explored whether pride significantly mediated the relationship between American symbolic threat and each of the dependent variables. Given that ingroup threat unexpectedly predicted increased anger toward Americans (see analyses associated with Hypothesis 1b), I also tested whether both anger and pride in Americans simultaneously mediated the relationships between American threat and the ingroup dependent variables. As will be discussed in further detail in the discussion section, previous research on intergroup emotions has implicated both anger at and pride in the ingroup as relevant for predicting ingroup identification (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). It thus stands to reason that ingroup symbolic threat might

affect ingroup attitudes and identification simultaneously via ingroup pride and ingroup anger.

The first step in the mediation test is to show that the predictor, American symbolic threat, is significantly related to the dependent variables. Table 2.8 shows the results for the OLS regression equations in which the dependent variables were regressed on American symbolic threat, childrearing authoritarian measure and ideology. As the table shows, American symbolic threat is significantly related to all of the dependent variables. Threat predicts less positive feelings about American citizens ($b = -.45$, $p < .01$), less positive trait ratings ($b = -.29$, $p < .001$), less nationalism ($b = -.26$, $p < .001$) and less identification with other American citizens ($b = -.23$, $p < .05$). Threat also predicts more negative feelings toward American citizens ($b = .45$, $p < .01$).

The second condition for mediation, that the independent variable is significantly related to the mediator, has already been established in the test of Hypothesis 1b. After controlling for authoritarian childrearing attitudes and ideology, American symbolic threat significantly predicts pride in Americans ($b = -.28$, $p < .05$). It also significantly predicts anger toward Americans ($b = .22$, $p < .05$).

To test the third criterion, a series of OLS regressions were performed in which each of the five ingroup dependent variables was regressed on American symbolic threat, pride in Americans, childrearing authoritarianism, and ideology. Starting with positive feelings toward Americans, pride in Americans significantly predicts the dependent variable ($b = .50$, $p < .001$) in the full model. When pride is added to the model, the effect of American symbolic threat on positive feelings drops from $b = -.44$ ($p < .05$) to $b = -.30$ ($p < .10$). This reduction is significant according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE =$

-.14, $z = 2.15$, $p < .05$) with pride accounting for 32% of the total effect of American symbolic threat on positive feelings toward Americans. A diagram of this mediation is shown in Figure 2.11. However, only pride significantly mediated the relationship between American threat and positive thermometer ratings. In the multiple mediation test for simultaneous mediation, the specific indirect effect of American threat on positive ratings via anger did not reach significance ($IE = -.12$, $z = 1.58$, $p = .11$).

In contrast, neither pride nor anger mediated the relationship between threat and negative feelings toward Americans. In the full model, pride did not have a significant relationship with negative feelings ($p > .10$). Although anger at Americans did significantly predict more negative ratings of Americans, it did not significantly reduce the effect of perceived threat on negative ratings ($z = 1.27$, $p > .10$). Similarly, in the full model, pride did not significantly affect trait ratings of Americans ($p > .10$) and again anger did not significantly reduce threat's effect ($z = 1.25$, $p > .10$). Thus, for both negative feelings and trait ratings, the third criterion for mediation by pride and anger was not met.

Marginal support for partial mediation was found for nationalism (see Figure 2.12). In the full model, pride significantly predicted nationalism ($b = .11$, $p < .01$). When pride was added to the model with the independent variable and the two covariates, the effect of American symbolic threat was reduced from $b = -.25$ ($p < .001$) to $b = -.22$ ($p < .01$). This reduction was marginally significant ($IE = -.04$, $z = 1.87$, $p < .07$) with a reduction in pride accounting for 12% of the total effect of symbolic threat on nationalism. In the test of multiple mediators, anger at Americans failed to predict nationalism ($b = -.04$, $p > .10$).

The final mediation test examined commitment to and identification with fellow American citizens (see Figure 2.13). The single mediation test showed that in the full model, pride continued to predict American identification ($b = .28, p < .001$). When pride was added to the model along with American threat and the two control variables, the coefficient for American symbolic threat dropped from $b = -.23$ ($p < .05$) to $b = -.15$ (p>.10), a significant reduction by the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = -.08, z = 2.17, p < .05$). Pride explained 35% of the effect of symbolic threat on identification with Americans. Although this indicated that pride fully mediated the relationship between American symbolic threat and identification with Americans, I also tested whether adding anger at Americans as a mediator contributed anything to the model (see Figure 2.14). Indeed, anger significantly predicted decreased identification ($b = -.28, p < .001$). However, whereas the specific indirect effect of American threat on identification was not significant via anger ($IE = .05, z = 1.5, p = .13$), it was significant via pride ($IE = -.09, z = 2.0, p < .05$). More important, the addition of anger to the mediation model further reduced the effect of threat on anger to $b = -.11$ ($p > .10$), and the total indirect effect via both mediators was significant according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = -.15, z = 2.78, p < .01$). What is perhaps the most interesting, given the lack of a specific indirect effect via anger is that together, anger and pride in Americans explained 56% of the effect of American symbolic threat on identification with Americans, a substantial increase from the 35% that pride explained alone.

In total, the mediation analyses for ingroup threat present a mixed bag of results. On the one hand, the hypothesis that anxiety explained the effect of symbolic threat on ingroup variables did not receive support. Mediation was impossible because after

controlling for its relationship with other emotions, symbolic threat did not significantly predict anxiety about Americans. On the other hand, threat did consistently predict a reduction in American pride and increase in anger toward Americans. As a result, mediation analyses were conducted with pride and anger as the key ingroup mediators. In these analyses, pride significantly mediated the relationship between threat and positive feelings toward Americans and between threat and identification with Americans. In both of these cases, threat led to less pride, which led to less positive feelings and identification. Analyses also revealed evidence of marginal mediation of the relationship between threat and reduced nationalism. However, pride failed to mediate two other dependent variables: negative feelings about Americans and trait ratings of Americans. Analyses revealed that both anger and pride simultaneously mediated the relationship between the perception of value difference with Americans and two dependent variables: positive feelings toward Americans and identifications with Americans. In these cases, perceived threat led to increased anger toward Americans, which then led to less positive ratings of Americans and decreased identification with Americans.

Hypothesis 4a. A predisposition to authoritarianism should moderate the effect of perceived symbolic threat on intergroup emotions. According to the final hypothesis, not everyone should respond to threat in the same way. People who value social order and traditionalism should feel the most threatened by groups that do not embrace the ingroup's core values or to diversity of values within the ingroup. A series of nested OLS regressions were performed with the emotions as the dependent variables. In Model 1, the dependent variable was regressed on ideology, symbolic threat, and childrearing

values. The interaction between threat and childrearing values was added to Model 2.

The results for Model 2 are displayed in Table 2.9 (see Table 2.2 for main effects of

Muslim symbolic threat on emotions). Looking first at emotions directed at Muslim

immigrants, analyses from Hypothesis 3 already demonstrated that perceived threat has a

main (positive) relationship with anger at Muslims and a main (negative) relationship

with sympathy toward Muslims. However, as Table 2.9 shows, the interaction was not

significant for anger at Muslim immigrants and only marginally significant for the

sympathy composite. To probe the marginally significant interaction, simple slopes for

the relationship between the authoritarianism and sympathy were computed one standard

deviation above and below the mean of the childrearing values measure (Aiken & West,

1991). These analyses revealed that perceived threat from Muslim immigrants more

strongly predicted decreased sympathy toward Muslims among people lower in

authoritarianism ($b = -.60$, $p < .001$) than among those higher in authoritarianism ($b = -.28$, $p < .05$).

To verify that the nonsignificant interactions with respect to emotions toward

Muslims were not unique to the childrearing measure of authoritarianism, I also tested the

interaction of Muslim threat with Right Wing Authoritarianism, Belief in a Dangerous

World, Openness to New Experiences and Social Conformity. None of these interactions

reached significance in Model 2 (all ps $> .05$). Finally, to ensure that I exhausted all

possibilities for an interaction, I created a composite authoritarianism variable by

standardizing and then averaging the five measures of authoritarianism ($\alpha = .72$). The

composite authoritarianism measure did, in fact, interact with perceived threat from

Muslims to significantly predict anger toward Muslims ($b = .22$, $p < .05$). Probing the

interaction with simple slopes analyses indicated that perceived threat from Muslims more strongly predicted anger at Muslims among those high in authoritarianism ($b = .77$, $p < .001$) than among those low in authoritarianism ($b = .51$, $p < .001$). However, it should be noted that both of these coefficients are highly significant.

A similar series of nested OLS regressions were tested for the perceived threat from fellow American citizens. Model 1 contained the ideology variable, perceived American threat, and the childrearing values measure. The key interaction between childrearing values and perceived threat was added in Model 2. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 2.10. As you can see, the interaction failed the significance test for anxiety about Americans ($p > .05$) and was marginally significant for pride in Americans ($b = .18$, $p < .10$). To examine the marginal interaction more carefully, simple slopes were computed one standard deviation above and below the mean of childrearing values. At high levels of authoritarian childrearing values, threat failed to predict pride in Americans ($b = -.08$, p>.10). At low levels of authoritarianism, in contrast, perceived threat from Americans predicted decreased pride in Americans ($b = -.45$, $p < .01$). This means that symbolic threat from the ingroup reduces pride in the ingroup, but only among those low in authoritarianism.

Again, to ensure that the nonsignificant interactions did not result from some peculiarity of the childrearing measure, interaction terms were also created for perceived threat with individual measures of Openness to New Experiences, RWA, Dangerous World Beliefs, and the Social Conformity scale as well as the composite authoritarianism measure. None of the interactions with the individual measures of authoritarianism reached significance for pride in or anxiety about Americans. However, as Table 2.11

shows, the authoritarianism composite did significantly interact with American symbolic threat to predict anger at Americans ($b = -.60$, $p < .01$). Probing the interaction further with simple slopes indicated that perceived threat from Americans led to anger at Americans among those low in authoritarianism ($b = .55$, $p < .01$), but not among those high in authoritarianism ($b = -.16$, p>.10). Because high authoritarians should feel threatened by a lack of social cohesion associated with ingroup threat, I tested whether authoritarianism interacted with ingroup symbolic threat to predict a negative emotion toward an outside group: Muslim immigrants. As Table 2.15 illustrates, the interaction between American symbolic threat and the authoritarianism composite was significant for predicting the dependent variable, anger at Muslim immigrants ($b = .60$, $p < .01$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that for people one standard deviation below the mean on authoritarianism, ingroup symbolic threat predicted decreased anger at Muslim immigrants ($b = -.33$, $p < .05$). In contrast, among people who scored one standard deviation above the mean on authoritarianism composite, perceived ingroup threat predicted increased anger at Muslim immigrants ($b = .38$, $p < .05$). This suggests that whereas low authoritarians direct their anger from ingroup threats at the ingroup, high authoritarians find an outgroup target upon which to unleash their anger.

Hypothesis 4b. Intergroup emotions should mediate the relationship between an authoritarian-threat interaction and intergroup attitudes. Because the interaction term between threat and the childrearing authoritarian measure failed to reach significance when predicting the emotion mediators, it would be impossible to find support for mediated moderation using the childrearing measure. That is, the independent variable interaction term did not significantly predict the mediator.

However, I did test whether perceived threat interacted with a predisposition to childrearing values for each of the group attitude dependent measures. Again, Model 1 contained the main effect terms for childrearing authoritarianism, Muslim symbolic threat, and ideology. Model 2 added the interaction between childrearing authoritarian values and Muslim symbolic threat. The childrearing measure did not interact with perceived Muslim threat to predict opposition to Muslim rights and negative attitudes toward Muslims ($ps > .10$). The interaction term added in Model 2 did not reach significance for positive attitudes toward Muslims, nationalism, or the trait rating scale of Muslim immigrants (all $ps > .10$).

Recall that perceived threat from Muslims did significantly interact with the authoritarianism composite to predict anger at Muslims. The next step to in the mediated-moderation test is to examine whether the interaction term predicts each of the dependent variables. However, the interaction between the authoritarianism composite only interacted with Muslim symbolic threat to predict nationalistic attitudes (it was not significant for positive and negative thermometer ratings of Muslim immigrants, trait ratings of Muslim immigrants, or opposition to Muslim civil rights). As Table 2.14 illustrates, the main effect terms for both Muslim symbolic threat ($b = .17$, $p < .01$) and the authoritarianism composite ($b = .68$, $p < .01$) were positive and significant for predicting nationalism scores. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between Muslim threat and the authoritarianism composite ($b = -.16$, $p < .05$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that Muslim threat predicted nationalism for people one standard deviation below the mean of the authoritarianism composite ($b = .27$, $p < .01$), but not for people one standard deviation above the mean ($b = .07$, p>.10). Thus, it

appears that contrary to predictions, Muslim symbolic threat leads to nationalism attitudes only among people low in authoritarianism. A comparison of the constants from the simple slopes analyses indicates that this might result from high authoritarians simply being more nationalistic, in general. In the high authoritarian model, the constant is $b = 4.00$ ($p < .001$) whereas it is only $b = 3.16$ ($p < .001$) in the low authoritarian model. This suggests that the perception that Muslim immigrants reject core American values makes low authoritarians act more like high authoritarians.[5]

Having established that authoritarianism interacts with Muslim threat to predict anger at Muslims and nationalistic attitudes, the final step requires that the addition of anger at Muslims to the model significantly reduce the effect of the interactive term on nationalism. This proved not to be the case. When anger was added to the model tested in the previous analysis, the interactive term actually became stronger ($b = -.19$, $p < .05$).

As already stated, in certain cases, mediation can exist despite a lack of a significant relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable (Judd & Kenny, 2010; MacKinnon, et al., 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). It has already been shown that the interaction term between Muslim threat and the authoritarianism (the predictor) significantly predicts anger at Muslim immigrants (the mediator) and anger at Muslim immigrants predicts each of the dependent variables. As such, to establish mediation, it is necessary to examine whether the Sobel-Goodman test for the indirect effect's coefficient is significantly greater than zero. Thus, each of the dependent variables was regressed on a model including the main effect terms for threat and authoritarianism, the interaction between threat and authoritarianism, the mediator anger,

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[5] Breaking down the interaction between the authoritarianism composite and Muslim threat by low and high levels of threat revealed that at low levels of threat, the authoritarianism composite more strongly predicted nationalism ($b = .84$, $p < .001$) than at high levels of threat ($b = .52$, $p < .001$)

and ideology as a control variable. Looking first at positive thermometer ratings as the dependent variable, the indirect effect of the interaction term via anger failed to reach significance (IE = -.04, z = 1.15, p = .25) via anger. In contrast, as Figure 2.8 shows, the mediation did reach significance for the negative thermometer ratings dependent variable. The interaction between threat and authoritarianism significantly predicted anger at Muslim immigrants (b = .23, p =.034) and anger significantly predicted negative thermometer ratings (b = 1.17, p <.001). According to the Sobel-Goodman test, the mediation was significant (IE = .27, z = 2.10, p = .036). However, the bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the coefficient of the indirect did just barely contain zero (-.09 < c' < .74).

The same mediation analyses conducted for the trait ratings of Muslim immigrants as the dependent variable reached marginal significance (IE = -.04, z = 1.88, p = .06). As Figure 2.9 shows, in interaction between the authoritarian composite and Muslim threat significantly predicted anger at Muslims (b = .23, p =.034) and, in turn, anger significantly predicted more negative trait ratings of Muslim immigrants (b = -.18, p < .001). Given that the Sobel-Goodman test above indicated marginal significance, it is not surprising that the bias-corrected 95% confidence interval contained zero, albeit by a small margin (-.13 < c' < .01).

A similar pattern emerged for mediation analyses using opposition to Muslim civil rights as the dependent variable. Figure 2.10 displays the results for this set of analyses. First, the authoritarian composite and Muslim threat interacted to predict anger at Muslims (b = .23, p =.03). Anger at Muslim immigrants predicted opposition to Muslim rights in the full model (b = .24, p <.001). More important, the Sobel-Goodman

test indicated that the mediation was marginally significant ($IE = .06$, $z = 1.96$, $p = .05$). The bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect just barely contained zero ($-.01 < c' < .15$).

Summing up, this set of analyses showed that although authoritarianism did not interact with perceived Muslim threat to directly affect the Muslim attitude dependent measures, in multiple cases, the interaction term did operate indirectly. Perceptions that Muslim immigrants rejected core American values predicted increased anger toward Muslims, primarily among people high in authoritarianism. This anger, in turn, predicted more negative attitudes and more negative perceptions of Muslim traits, as well as more opposition to Muslim rights. Thus, the relationship between the interaction and the dependent measure attitudes toward Muslim immigrants operated indirectly via anger at Muslim immigrants.

Turning to ingroup analyses, I first examined whether American symbolic threat interacted with childrearing values to predict any of the dependent variables related to Americans (positive and negative thermometer ratings, trait ratings, identification and nationalism). None of these analyses produced a significant interaction term. To examine whether the null interactions were limited to the childrearing values measure of authoritarianism, I also tested the interaction between American symbolic threat and the following measures: Openness to New Experiences, Belief in a Dangerous World, RWA, and Social Conformity. The interactions between threat on the one hand, and Openness to New experiences, Belief in a Dangerous world and threat and RWA, on the other, did not reach significance for any of the attitudinal dependent variables. However, American symbolic threat did interact with social conformity measure to predict multiple indexes of

attitudes toward Americans. The results from the series of nested OLS regressions can be found in Table 2.13.

As Model 2 in the table shows, social conformity significantly interacted with perceived threat to predict positive feelings toward Americans (b=.88, $p < .01$) and negative feelings toward Americans (b=-.60, $p < .05$).   Simple slopes analyses revealed that at high levels of social conformity, American symbolic threat did not have a significant relationship with positive feelings toward Americans (b= .05, $p >$.10). Among those low in social conformity, in contrast, the perception that Americans did not uniformly hold the same values predicted significantly less positive feelings toward American citizens ($b = $ -1.01, $p <$.001). In the case of negative feelings, American symbolic threat did not predict the dependent variable at low high levels of social conformity ($b = $ .07, $p > $.10). Similar to the positive feelings dependent variable, among those lower in social conformity, American symbolic threat predicted a significant increase in negative feelings ($b = $.77, $p < .01$).

Social conformity interacted with American threat to predict identification with Americans, as well (shown in Table 2.13; $b = $ .34, $p < .05$). An analysis of the simple slopes revealed that at high levels of social conformity, American symbolic threat did not have a significant relationship with American identification (b= .06, $p > $.10), whereas it did at low levels of social conformity ($b = $ -.37, $p < .05$). In contrast, there was not a significant interaction between symbolic threat and social conformity for the nationalism and trait ratings measures.

Given that the authoritarian composite was the only measure to significantly interact with American threat to predict an emotion (i.e., anger at Americans), I also

tested whether the key interaction term significantly predicted any of the dependent variables. It was not significant for trait ratings of Americans and identification with Americans. However, as Table 2.12 illustrates, the authoritarian composite interacted with perceived threat from Americans to predict positive thermometer ratings of Americans ($b = .75$, $p < .05$). Probing this interaction with simple slopes revealed that American symbolic threat predicted decreased positive ratings of other Americans only among those low in authoritarianism ($b = -.84$, $p < .01$). Among participants who scored high on authoritarianism, perceived symbolic threat from Americans failed to affect ratings of Americans on a positive feeling thermometer ($b = .04$, $p > .10$).

As Table 2.14 shows, the authoritarian composite by American symbolic threat interaction term was marginally significant for negative thermometer ratings ($b = -.60$, $p < .10$) and nationalism ($b = .21$, $p < .10$). Simple slopes analyses for negative thermometer ratings depicted a similar pattern of findings to the above-described positive ratings of Americans. American symbolic threat only predicted more negative ratings of Americans for participants low in authoritarianism ($b = .67$, $p < .01$), but not for participants high in authoritarianism ($b = .04$, p>.10). Similarly, American symbolic threat predicted decreased nationalism for people low in authoritarianism ($b = -.32$, $p < .01$) but was unrelated to nationalism among those high in authoritarianism ($b = .07$, $p > .10$).

Having shown that a predisposition to authoritarianism (as indexed by the authoritarianism composite) interacts with perceived threat from the ingroup to predict anger and three dependent variables, I turn to the final test for mediated moderation. In all of the analyses described below, each of the variables was centered. The first two

conditions have already been met: The interaction term predicted the mediator (anger at Americans) and at least marginally predicted three dependent variables. In the final test, the addition of mediator must significantly reduce the effect of the interaction term on the dependent variable. As Figure 2.15 illustrates, this was indeed the case. When anger at Americans was added to the model, the coefficient for the interaction term dropped from $b = .75$ ($p < .05$) to $b = .54$ ($p > .10$). This indirect effect was significant ($IE = .29$, $z = 2.33$, $p < .05$) with anger accounting for 35% of the total effect of the interaction on positive ratings of Americans.

A similar pattern of results emerged for negative thermometer ratings of Americans. When anger at Americans was added to the model (see Figure 2.16), the effect of the interaction between authoritarianism and ingroup threat reduced from $b = -.65$ ($p < .05$) to $b = -.15$ (p>.10). This reduction was significant according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = -.50$, $z = 2.67$, $p < .01$) with anger accounting for 77% of the total effect of the interaction on negative ratings of Americans.

Finally, I performed a mediated moderation analysis for the nationalism dependent variable. In the full model, anger at Americans failed to predict nationalism ($b = -.02$, $p > .10$), thus eliminating the possibility for mediation.

Summary of Hypotheses 4 analyses. In total, the hypothesis that emotions would mediate the effect of the interaction between symbolic threat and a predisposition to authoritarianism on intergroup attitudes only received limited support. Muslim symbolic threat did not interact with childrearing values to predict emotions or intergroup attitudes. Although Muslim symbolic threat did interact with the authoritarianism composite to predict both anger at Muslims (the proposed mediator) and nationalism (one of the

proposed dependent variables), there was no evidence for mediation. The addition of anger at Muslims to the full model failed to reduce the relationship between the interaction term and nationalism. It should be noted here that symbolic threat from Muslims did not interact with authoritarianism in the hypothesized direction when it came to nationalism. Analysis of simple slopes indicated that rather than increasing nationalism among high authoritarians, perceived outgroup threat only increased nationalism among people low in authoritarianism.

For the ingroup analyses, American symbolic threat did not interact with childrearing values to predict emotions or attitudes toward Americans. Although it did not predict any measures of emotion, American symbolic threat did interact with the social conformity measure to predict positive and negative feelings toward Americans as well as identification with Americans. People who valued social conformity identified more with, felt more positively and less negatively toward their fellow American citizens when they perceived that American citizens did not possess a uniform set of values.

More important, I found evidence for mediated moderation using the authoritarianism composite as the moderator and anger at Americans as the mediator. This was the case for both positive and negative thermometer ratings of Americans, but none of the other dependent variables.

Discussion

The goal of Study 1 was to establish that different forms of symbolic threat (either perceptions of value diversity within the ingroup or of the perceived rejection of ingroup values from a specified outgroup) result in distinct emotional reactions, and that these emotions affect important intergroup attitudes. To establish that the hypothesized

relationships existed within people's real-world perceptions of and attitudes toward relevant social groups, undergraduate participants and a nonstudent sample completed an online survey about their attitudes and emotions related to Muslim immigrants and American citizens.

I hypothesized that the uncertainty that would arise from perceiving that fellow ingroup members failed to uniformly accept a cohesive set of values would lead to anxiety about the ingroup, which in turn, would lead to less positive attitudes and decreased commitment toward the ingroup. This proved not to be the case with respect to these data. Instead, perceptions of symbolic threat from fellow American citizens predicted increased anger at and decreased pride in Americans, but failed to reach significance for anxiety about Americans. Anger at and pride in Americans simultaneously mediated the relationship between American symbolic threat and positive feelings about Americans. That is, people who perceived that Americans lacked a cohesive set of values reported more anger and less pride in Americans. In turn, this anger and decreased pride explained the relationship between American symbolic threat and decreased positive feelings toward Americans. A similar pattern of results emerged for identification with Americans. The increase in anger and reduction in pride in Americans that resulted from ingroup symbolic threat led people to identify less with other Americans. In the case of nationalism, pride appeared to be the sole relevant emotion. People who reported that American values were threatened felt less pride in other Americans and as a result, felt less nationalistic toward the United States.

Thus, contrary to the hypothesis that anxiety about the ingroup would be the key mediator, it was both pride and anger that explained how people reacted to symbolic

threats from the ingroup, and in turn, their attitudes and identification with the ingroup. Although this was not hypothesized a priori, it is consistent with prior research on the relationship between ingroup emotions and social identification. Kessler and Hollbach (2005), for example, found that people led to feel angry about their ingroup subsequently identified less with that group, whereas people led to feel happy about their ingroup identified more with that group. The findings from Study 1 suggest that both anger and pride (which is comparable to happiness) can simultaneously affect social identification with the ingroup. However, these results go a step further by illuminating a novel antecedent to ingroup pride and anger: the perception that fellow ingroup members do not agree on which values are most central or important to the group.

It was further hypothesized that not everyone would feel threatened by diversity in values within the ingroup. Previous research on authoritarianism indicates that economic and societal threats activate hostile responses among those who value authority and conformity over autonomy and diversity (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). It stands to reason that people predisposed to authoritarianism, who value social conformity and abhor social deviates, would react with the most anger in response to symbolic threats. This was not the case, however. Whereas people high in authoritarianism remained unaffected by ingroup symbolic threat, people low in authoritarianism, became significantly angrier with and less proud of Americans when they believed that Americans disagreed on core values. But it was anger at fellow Americans alone that explained why people low in authoritarianism reported more negative and less positive attitudes toward other Americans when they perceived a symbolic threat originated from within the ingroup.

There are a few potential explanations for this unexpected finding. For instance, it is possible that people who are prone to authoritarianism are naturally predisposed to see the world as threatening. In Duckitt's (see Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, in press; Duckitt et al., 2002) dual-process model of ideology, he and his colleagues posit that the belief that the world is a dangerous place is a precursor to the authoritarian personality syndrome. If authoritarians constantly fear that danger lurks around every corner, perhaps they have already reached their ceiling on perceived threat from the ingroup. This would leave only low authoritarians with enough leeway to increase their sense of threat. This is exactly what Hetherington and Weiler (2009) recently argued: In their analysis, highly threatening situations actually affect people low in authoritarianism the most, making them act more like high authoritarians on a number of dimensions (e.g., intolerance of gays and lesbians, aggressive stances on civil liberties). Examining how people high and low in authoritarianism differ in their responses to ingroup symbolic threat—specifically when it comes to feeling angry—suggests a more complicated story. Low and high authoritarians did not differ in their anger at Americans when Americans were perceived as agreeing on important values. Whereas perceiving disagreement within the ingroup did not seem to affect high authoritarians' anger, low authoritarians became angry at other Americans when they viewed the threat as coming from within the ingroup. It is the low authoritarians who reported the most anger at their fellow Americans as a result of ingroup threat; in fact, significantly more than high authoritarians at any level of threat. In this way, they are not acting like the high authoritarians in this sample at all. I argue instead that because people who are high in authoritarianism value social conformity and group cohesion, they would

find experiencing anger at fellow ingroup members particularly aversive. As a result, even when talking about diversity of values within the United States at a general level, people predisposed to authoritarianism might attribute the lack of cohesion to a specific group. If that is the case, we might then expect them to direct their anger and discontent at a minority group, such as Muslim immigrants. Follow-up analyses exploring this possibility indicated that this was indeed a probable explanation. High authoritarians actually became significantly angrier with Muslim immigrants when they perceived that Americans, in general, disagreed on important values. Taken altogether, these findings suggest that both high and low authoritarians experience anger as a result of symbolic threats that originate from within the ingroup. People low in authoritarianism, however, directed their anger at the ingroup, whereas people who value social cohesion (high authoritarians) targeted their anger at a convenient outgroup. The finding that people high in authoritarianism respond to ingroup symbolic threats by becoming more hostile toward an outgroup lines up most cleanly with Stenner and Feldman, who argue that threat activates the authoritarian predisposition.

Subsequent analyses on the interaction between the authoritarianism composite and ingroup symbolic threat provided further evidence contradicting Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) argument that threat makes low authoritarians act more like high authoritarians. In fact, low authoritarians exhibited more negative attitudes toward their fellow Americans and became less nationalistic when they believed that Americans could not agree on core values. Furthermore, the increased anger at Americans that low authoritarians exhibited explained their negative attitudes and reduced nationalism. If threat made people low in authoritarianism embrace an authoritarian worldview as

Hetherington and Weiler contend, we would expect them to actually become more nationalistic. As we will see in the subsequent review of the results on outgroup threat, however, it remains too soon to close the book on this debate.

In addition to hypotheses regarding ingroup threat, I also hypothesized that a symbolic threat from outsiders would lead people to feel more anger and less sympathy toward the outgroup, which in turn should lead to less positive attitudes and less willingness to extend ingroup rights to the outgroup. Further, I argued that a predisposition to authoritarianism would strengthen the relationship between symbolic threat, emotions, and their consequent attitudes via a mediated moderation mechanism. With respect to the first set of mediation hypotheses, I found that people who believed that Muslim immigrants rejected core American values felt increased anger and decreased sympathy toward Muslim immigrants. They also reported more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and were less supportive of extending traditional American rights (e.g., running for public office, renting from landlords without discrimination) to Muslim immigrants. Both anger and sympathy at Muslim immigrants simultaneously mediated the relationship between Muslim symbolic threat and these attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. These findings provide consistent and persuasive evidence for the hypothesis that emotion is a key mediator of the relationship between outgroup symbolic threat and attitudes toward the outgroup. This is also consistent with Cottrell et al.'s (2010) finding that people who perceived Muslims as a threat to their physical safety felt angry at Muslims, and in turn, were more supportive of homeland security policies. In their study, the researchers focused on a tangible physical threat associated with Muslims and used gays and lesbians as a source of a more symbolic,

value-based threat. Symbolic threats from gays evoked feelings of disgust about gays and lesbians, which mediated the relationship between gay threat and less support for gay rights (Cottrell et al., 2010). Cottrell et al. thus provided the first evidence that emotions can explain why people react with intolerance toward outgroups that threaten ingroup values. However, the findings from the present study extend Cottrell et al.'s research in several ways by showing that 1) symbolic threats can evoke anger in response to different groups; 2) emotions mediate the relationship between outgroup symbolic threat and a wider range of dependent variables related to the outgroup; and 3) anger and sympathy can simultaneously mediate the relationship between outgroup symbolic threat and outgroup attitudes.

The present study was also designed to test the novel hypothesis that authoritarianism moderates the relationship between symbolic threat from the outgroup and emotional reactions. In the case of Muslim immigrants as the outgroup and the childrearing values measure of authoritarianism, this hypothesis did not receive support. Regardless of their individual predispositions to endorse authoritarian childrearing values, people generally responded with increased anger and decreased sympathy when they believed that Muslim immigrants did not embrace core American values. The composite measure of authoritarianism, in contrast, did interact with Muslim threat to predict anger at Muslims. Consistent with Stenner and Feldman's activation hypothesis, perceptions of Muslim symbolic threat predicted anger at Muslim immigrants most strongly among those high in authoritarianism. It should be noted, however, that the relationship between threat and anger at Muslims remained positive and highly significant among participants low in authoritarianism. To complicate the story

comparing the two threat-by-authoritarianism hypotheses, Muslim symbolic threat significantly interacted with the authoritarianism composite to predict nationalism, but in an unexpected direction. Muslim symbolic threat led to nationalistic attitudes only among people low in authoritarianism. In fact, perceived threat from Muslims brought low authoritarians up to the same nationalism levels of high authoritarians. This is consistent with Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) hypothesis that threat makes low authoritarians act like high authoritarians. Given that the interaction produced the opposite pattern of results for anger at Muslim immigrants, it should not come as a surprise that outgroup anger failed to mediate the effect of the interaction on nationalism. Comparing the results of the interaction findings for ingroup and outgroup threats suggests that the threat-as-activator hypothesis (Feldman and Stenner) is more appropriate for ingroup threats, whereas Hetherington and Weiler's hypothesis is more appropriate for outgroup threats.

It remains possible that authoritarianism does activate people's responses to symbolic threats from outgroups but that Muslim immigrants represent a unique case in that they are closely associated with terrorism, and specifically the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Public opinion polls indicate that a sizeable minority of Americans, 35%, believe that Islam encourages violence and extremism more than do other religions (The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life, 2010), and research on implicit attitudes indicates that many people hold automatic negative associations with Arab Americans and Muslims (Park, Felix, & Lee, 2007). Moreover, Skitka, Baumen, and Mullen (2004) found that people who felt angry right after 9/11 attacks also tended to express less tolerant views of Muslims and Arab

Americans four months later. It is possible then that the strength of the association between Muslims and terrorism overpowers any individual differences in people's propensities to perceive this particular group as a threat. Study 2 is designed specifically to address this by examining people's emotional reactions and attitudes toward a group not associated with a tangible threat like terrorism, but instead with a symbolic threat to heterosexual ingroup values.

In sum, these results support the hypothesis that people's emotions about social groups are key for understanding their attitudes toward groups that threaten their ingroup's values. These finding are very much in line with research on intergroup emotions theory, which posits that emotions mediate the relationship between appraisals of intergroup situations and action tendencies. In contrast to previous research on Intergroup Emotions Theory, however, this study is the first to explore symbolic threats that originate within the ingroup, in addition to such threats from outgroups. Furthermore, these results are the first to show that both positive and negative emotions play a role in people's responses to symbolic threats. People did not respond with a singular group-based emotion to perceived threats to their group values. Rather, feeling that one's worldview is threatened by members of the ingroup simultaneously affected a person's positive and negative emotions about her/his ingroup. A threat from an outside group evoked feelings of anger while reducing sympathy toward that group. Because this study represents the first thorough examination of the role of emotions in response to deviations from ingroup values, it is important to explore whether this pattern of results will extend to other social groups. Study 2 is designed to assess people's attitudes and emotions toward social conservatives and gays and lesbians. As stated earlier, Study 2

will also be useful for exploring whether authoritarianism moderates people's responses to an outgroup other than Muslim immigrants. One of the hypotheses of this dissertation is that authoritarians will be more likely to feel threatened by people who do not share their cultural values. Although this hypothesis received support with respect to the ingroup (American citizens), it did not receive support with respect to Muslim immigrants as the target outgroup. It is important to explore whether this set of null findings was unique to Muslim immigrants, who may be associated with such an overwhelming threat (i.e., terrorism) so as to overwhelm individual differences.

Table 2.1
Intercorrelations for Study Variables (Study 1 Survey on Muslim Attitudes)

Variable	*1.*	*2.*	*3.*	*4.*	*5.*	*6.*	*7.*	*8.*
1. Muslim Symbolic Threat	--							
2. American Symbolic Threat	.04	--						
3. Anger at Muslims	.49***	-.08	--					
4. Anxiety about Muslims	.37***	-.07	.82***	--				
5. Sympathy toward Muslims	-.27***	-.03	.08	.21***	--			
6. Anxiety about Americans	.13*	.07	.49***	.52***	.33***	--		
7. Pride in Americans	.13*	-.13*	.30***	.38***	.38***	.32***	--	
8. Anger at Americans	.06	.09	.40***	.35	.29***	.78***	.15*	--

Note. All coefficients are Pearson correlations.
*p < .05.   **p < .01.   ***p < .001.

Table 2.2
Muslim symbolic threat predicting negative emotions

Predictor	Anger at Muslims		Anxiety about Muslims		Residual Anger at Muslims		Residual Anxiety about Muslims	
	B	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Muslim symbolic threat	.67***	.08	.54***	.09	.25***	.05	-.05	.05
Constant	2.26***	.08	2.43***	.09	-.01	.05	0	.05
F (df)	72.0***(1,241)		39.1***(1,240)		24.7***(1,238)		.71(1,238)	
Adjusted R^2	.23		.14		.09		0	
N	243		242		240		240	

Table 2.3
American symbolic threat predicting emotions toward Americans

Predictor	Anger at Americans		Anxiety about Americans		Pride in Americans		Residualized Anger		Residualized Pride	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
American symbolic threat	.22*	.11	.15	.12	-.28*	.11	.26*	.11	-.30**	.11
Constant	2.78***	.09	2.92***	.10	4.05***	.10	-.05	.09	.01	.09
F (df)	4.08*(1,242)		1.76(1,243)		6.1*(1,245)		5.77*(1,241)		7.0**(1,241)	
Adjusted R^2	.01		.003		.02		.02		.02	
N	244		245		247		243		243	

Table 2.4
Emotions and Feeling Thermometers of Muslim Immigrants

Predictor	Negative view of Muslim Immigrants		Positive view of Muslim immigrants	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Anger at Muslims	1.32***	.14	-.65***	.17
Anxiety about Muslims	.07	.14	-.10	.17
Sympathy toward Muslims	-.35***	.08	.84***	.10
Childrearing Authoritarianism	.03	.12	.40**	.15
Ideology	.25**	.09	-.31**	.10
Constant	2.50***	.17	4.74***	.20
F (df)	68.55*** (5,225)		30.88*** (5,224)	
Adjusted R^2	.59		.40	
N	231		230	

Table 2.5
Emotions and Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants

Predictor	Trait ratings		Opposition to Muslim civil rights	
	b	SE	b	SE
Anger at Muslims	-.26***	.07	.39***	.07
Anxiety about Muslims	-.12^M	.07	.04	.07
Sympathy toward Muslims	.28***	.04	-.20***	.04
Childrearing Authoritarianism	.01	.06	.23***	.06
Ideology	-.05	.05	.19***	.05
Constant	4.29***	.08	2.56***	.09
F (degrees of freedom)	29.85*** (5,225)		41.84*** (5,224)	
Adjusted R^2	.39		.47	
N	231		230	

Table 2.6
Emotions about American Citizens and Ingroup Attitudes

Predictor	Positive thermometer		Negative thermometer		Trait ratings		Nationalism		American identification	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	B	SE	b	SE
Anger	-.75***	.15	1.02***	.13	-.21***	.06	-.06	.07	-.19*	.08
Anxiety	.09	.14	-.10	.12	-.10^M	.06	0	.07	-.10	.08
Pride	.63***	.09	-.32***	.08	.15***	.04	.14**	.04	.38***	.05
Childrearing	.01	.13	.14	.23	.10^M	.06	.19**	.06	.13^M	.08
Ideology	-.03	.10	-.02	.08	-.34	.04	.34***	.04	.14**	.05
Constant	6.30***	.12	3.09***	.11	4.48***	.05	3.55*		4.93***	.07
F (degrees of freedom)	18.17*** (5,228)		29.35*** (5,230)		15.79*** (5,232)		24.00*** (5,230)		19.40*** (5,232)	
Adjusted R^2	.27		.38		.24		.33		.28	
N	234		236		238		236		238	

Table 2.7

Muslim Symbolic Threat and Outgroup Attitudes

Predictor	Positive thermometer		Negative thermometer		Trait ratings		Opposition to civil rights		Nationalism	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*B*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Symbolic threat	-1.18***	.16	1.23***	.16	-.60***	.06	.50***	.07	.27***	.06
Childrearing	.27M	.16	.17	.16	-.06	.06	.26***	.07	.24***	.06
Ideology	-.21M	.12	.16	.12	.03	.05	.14**	.05	.25***	.04
Constant	5.21***	.15	3.26***	.15	4.30***	.06	2.67***	.06	3.55***	.05
F (degrees of freedom)	26.11*** (3,239)		31.05*** (3,240)		38.47*** (3, 241)		44.73*** (3,239)		47.33*** (3, 238)	
Adjusted R^2	.24		.27		.32		.35		.37	
N	243		244		245		243		242	

Table 2.8
American Symbolic Threat and Ingroup Attitudes

Predictor	Positive thermometer		Negative thermometer		Trait ratings		Nationalism		American identification	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	B	SE	b	SE
American Symbolic Threat	-.45**	.18	.45**	.17	-.29***	.07	-.26***	.07	-.23*	.10
Childrearing	.23	.16	-.11	.15	.17**	.07	.16*	.06	.18*	.09
Ideology	.03	.11	-.09	.10	-.01	.04	.35***	.04	.18**	.06
Constant	6.40***	.14	3.03***	.14	4.50***	.06	3.55***	.06	4.92***	.08
F (degrees of freedom)	3.81* (3, 235)		3.54* (3, 237)		10.55*** (3, 239)		42.14*** (3, 236)		9.60*** (3,239)	
Adjusted R^2	.03		.03		.11		.34		.10	
N	239		241		243		240		243	

Table 2.9
Test of childrearing values as a moderator of the effect of Muslim symbolic threat

Predictor	Anger at Muslims		Sympathy toward Muslims		Opposition to Muslim Rights		Negative attitudes toward Muslims	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	-.06	.07	-.04	.07	.13**	.05	.14	.12
Perceived Threat	.70***	.09	-.44***	.10	.51***	.07	1.3***	.16
Childrearing	.04	.09	-.07	.10	.25***	.07	.16	.16
Threat X Childrearing	.04	.08	.16M	.08	-.08	.06	-.19	.14
Constant	2.26***	.08	2.79***	.09	2.67***	.07	3.28***	.15
F (degrees of freedom)	18.20*** (4, 234)		7.20*** (4,230)		34.03*** (4, 238)		23.85*** (4,239)	
Adjusted R^2	.22		.11		.35		.27	
N	239		235		243		244	

Table 2.10

Test of childrearing values as a moderator of the effect of American symbolic threat

Predictor	Anxiety about Americans		Pride in Americans		Positive attitudes toward Americans		American Identification	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	-.01	.07	.04	.07	.03	.11	.18**	.06
Perceived Threat	.12	.12	-.27*	.12	-.44*	.18	-.22*	.10
Childrearing	-.11	.11	-.02	.11	.24	.16	.18*	.09
Threat X Childrearing	.05	.11	.18^M	.11	.18	.16	.13	.09
Constant	2.92***	.10	4.05***	.10	6.42***	.15	4.94***	.08
F (degrees of freedom)	.73 (4, 235)		2.28^M (4, 236)		3.21* (4, 234)		7.80*** (4, 238)	
Adjusted R^2	0		.02		.06		.10	
N	240		241		239		243	

Table 2.11

Test of Authoritarianism composite as a moderator of the effect of Muslim symbolic threat on Anger at Muslims and Nationalism

| Predictor | Anger at Muslim Immigrants | | | | Nationalism | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	-.001	.07	.001	.07	.19***	.05	.18***	.05
Perceived Muslim Threat	.66***	.10	.64***	.10	.15*	.06	.17**	.06
Authoritarianism	-.08	.18	-.11	.18	.66***	.12	.68***	.12
Threat X Authoritarianism	--	--	.22*	.11	--	--	-.16*	.08
Constant	2.19***	.08	2.12***	.09	3.51***	.06	3.56***	.06
F (degrees of freedom)	19.4***(3,196)		15.8***(4,195)		48.2***(3,198)		38.6***(4,197)	
Adjusted R^2	.22		.23		.42		.43	
N	200		200		202		202	

Table 2.12

Test of Authoritarianism composite as a moderator of the effect of American symbolic threat on Anger at Americans and positive ratings of Americans

Predictor	Anger at Americans				Positive Ratings of Americans			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	-.04	.09	-.05	.09	-.15	.14	-.14	.14
Perceived American Threat	.24^{M}	.12	.20	.12	-.45*	.19	-.41*	.19
Authoritarianism	-.26	.21	-.15	.21	.85*	.33	.70*	.33
Threat X Authoritarianism	--	--	-.60**	.21	--	--	.75*	.34
Constant	2.79***	.10	2.77***	.10	6.52***	.16	6.54***	.16
F (degrees of freedom)	2.81*(3,197)		4.16**(4,196)		4.58**(3,197)		4.73**(4,196)	
Adjusted R^2	.03		.06		.05		.07	
N	201		201		201		201	

Table 2.13

Test of Social Conformity as a moderator of the effect of American symbolic threat on American Attitudes

| | Positive Attitudes toward Americans | | | | Negative Attitudes toward Americans | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.03	.13	.06	.12	-.09	.12	-.11	.12
Perceived Threat	-.51**	.19	-.49*	.19	.46*	.18	.45*	.18
Social Conformity	.24	.30	.04	.31	-.22	.28	-.09	.28
Threat X Conformity	--	--	.88**	.31	--	--	-.60*	.29
Constant	6.44***	.15	6.55***	.15	3.03***	.14	2.95***	.15
F (degrees of freedom)	3.38* (3, 216)		4.66*** (4, 215)		3.80*** (3, 217)		3.98*** (4, 216)	
Adjusted R^2	.03		.06		.04		.05	
N	220		220		221		221	
	Nationalism				Identification with Americans			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.31***	.05	.31***	.05	.13M	.07	.14*	.07
Perceived Threat	-.18*	.07	-.18*	.07	-.17	.10	-.15	.10
Social Conformity	.46***	.11	.44***	.11	.53**	.16	.46**	.17
Threat X Conformity	--	--	.06	.11	--	--	.34*	.17
Constant	3.52***	.06	3.53***	.06	4.92***	.08	4.96***	.08
F (degrees of freedom)	48.91*** (3, 216)		36.63*** (4, 215)		12.55*** (3, 219)		10.59*** (4, 218)	
Adjusted R^2	.40		.39		.14		.15	
N	220		220		223		223	

Table 2.14

Test of Authoritarianism composite as a moderator of the effect of American symbolic threat on negative ratings of Americans and Nationalism

| Predictor | Negative ratings of Americans | | | | Nationalism | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	-.02	.13	-.02	.13	.24***	.05	.24***	.05
Perceived American Threat	.36*	.18	.32^M	.18	-.21**	.07	-.19**	.07
Authoritarianism	-.47	.31	-.36	.31	.64***	.12	.60***	.12
Threat X Authoritarianism	--	--	-.60^M	.32	--	--	.21M	.12
Constant	2.89***	.15	2.96***	.15	3.51***	.06	3.51***	.06
F (degrees of freedom)	2.93*(3,198)		3.14*(4,197)		47.4***(3,197)		36.6***(4,196)	
Adjusted R^2	.03		.04		.41		.42	
N	202		202		201		201	

Table 2.15

Test of Authoritarianism composite as a moderator of the effect of American symbolic threat on anger at Muslim immigrants

Predictor	Anger at Muslim Immigrants			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.09	.08	.10	.18
Perceived American Threat	-.02	.11	.02	.11
Authoritarianism	.28	.19	.17	.19
Threat X Authoritarianism	--	--	.60**	.20
Constant	2.14***	.08	2.15***	.09
F (degrees of freedom)	2.93*(3,195)		4.63**(4,194)	
Adjusted R^2	.03		.07	
N	199		199	

Figure 2.1
Anger as the Mediator between Muslim Symbolic Threat and Positive Feelings about Muslims

Figure 2.2
Anger and sympathy as simultaneous mediators of relationship between Muslim symbolic

threat and positive feelings about Muslim immigrants

Figure 2.3

Anger and sympathy as simultaneous mediators of relationship between Muslim symbolic threat and negative feelings about Muslim immigrants

Figure 2.4

Anger and sympathy as simultaneous mediators of relationship between Muslim symbolic

threat and trait ratings of Muslim immigrants

Figure 2.5

Anger as the Mediator of the Relationship between Muslim Symbolic Threat and Opposition to Civil Rights for Muslim Immigrants

Indirect effect = .22 (SE = .04)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .03, .45)

Figure 2.6

Anger and sympathy as simultaneous mediators of relationship between Muslim symbolic threat and Opposition to Muslim Civil Rights.

Total Indirect effect = .31 (SE = .05)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .21, .41)

Figure 2.7
Anger as the Mediator between Muslim Symbolic Threat and American Nationalism


```
                              Anger

        .72***                              .12**

  Muslim                   .18**                    Nationalism
  Symbolic    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
  Threat                   (.26***)
```

Indirect effect = .08 (SE = .03)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .03, .45)

Figure 2.8
Mediation test for the indirect effect of the Muslim-threat-by-authoritarianism-composite interaction on negative thermometer ratings of Muslim immigrants via anger at Muslims.


```
                              Anger

             .23*                           1.17***

  Muslim Threat X          -.14                    Negative
  Authoritarianism  - - - - - - - - - - - - ->    Ratings of
                           (.12)                   Muslims
```

Total Indirect effect = .27 (SE = .13)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.09, .74)

Figure 2.9
Mediation test for the indirect effect of the Muslim-threat-by-authoritarianism-composite interaction on trait ratings of Muslim immigrants via anger at Muslims.

Anger

Muslim Threat X Authoritarianism

.23*

-.18***

.01

(-.04)

Trait Ratings of Muslims

**Total Indirect effect = -.04 (SE = .02)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.13, .04)**

Figure 2.10
Mediation test for the indirect effect, via anger at Muslim immigrants, of the Muslim-threat-by-authoritarianism-composite interaction on opposition to Muslim rights.

Anger

Muslim Threat X Authoritarianism

.23*

.24***

-.06

(-.01)

Opposition to Muslim Rights

**Total Indirect effect = .06 (SE = .03)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.01, .15)**

Figure 2.11

Test of American Pride as the Mediator between American Symbolic Threat and Positive Feelings toward Americans

Figure 2.12

Pride as the mediator of the relationship between American Symbolic Threat and Identification with Americans

Figure 2.13
Pride as the mediator of the relationship between American Symbolic Threat and Identification with Americans

Indirect effect = .35 (SE = .04)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .03, .45)

Figure 2.14

Ingroup anger and pride as simultaneous mediators of relationship between American

symbolic threat and identification with Americans

Total Indirect effect = -.15 (SE = .05)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.24, -.05)

Figure 2.15
Anger at Americans as mediator of relationship between the threat-by-authoritarianism interaction and positive thermometer ratings of Americans

Figure 2.16
Anger at Americans as mediator of relationship between the threat-by-authoritarianism interaction and negative thermometer ratings of Americans

Chapter 3

Study 2

Introduction and Overview

The results from Study 1 showed that people's emotional reactions to threats to their ingroup's values explain their attitudes toward ingroups and outgroups. Threats that originated within the ingroup, American citizens, predicted more anger and less pride in the ingroup. People who experienced more anger and less pride also reported more negative attitudes toward Americans and to identify less with fellow Americans. When it came to outgroup threats, people who believed that Muslim immigrants rejected core American values reported more anger and less sympathy toward Muslims, and in turn, expressed more negative and less tolerant attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. To explore whether the relationships observed in Study 1 extended to a group not associated with a physical threat like terrorism, Study 2 examined attitudes and emotions toward gays and lesbians (the outgroup) and social conservatives (as the ingroup).

Although I specifically hypothesized that symbolic threats that originated from an outgroup would lead to anger, it is possible that other emotions might play a role with respect to gays and lesbians. Izard (1993), for example, has theorized that disgust can result from violations of cultural norms (see also Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Tapias et al. (2007) demonstrated that prejudice against gays is primarily associated with the emotion of disgust, and Cottrell et al. (2010) subsequently provided empirical evidence that disgust mediated the relationship between people's perceptions of threats to their values and their support for gay rights. Study 2 thus includes measures of disgust as an

alternative potential mediator. Even if disgust proves to be the more relevant emotion to reactions to gay symbolic threat, this study is unique from previous research in several ways. First, it will include measures of authoritarianism as a control variable in all analyses, which has been shown to consistently predict prejudice against gays in previous research (Altemeyer, 1996; Brown, 1965; Haddock & Zanna, 1998; Whitley 1999). Second, analyses associated with Hypothesis 4 will examine whether authoritarianism moderates people's emotional reactions to gay symbolic threats. And third, this study will examine changes in people's positive emotional responses to gay symbolic threats.

I have argued that in line with research on the positive relationship between similarity and feelings of concern for others (Feldman, Ullman, Dunkel-Schetter, 1998; Krebs, 1975; Westmaas & Cohen Silver, 2006), people who believe that an outgroup shares their values will feel sympathy toward that group. This is indeed what Study 1 showed with Muslim immigrants as the outgroup. Another positive emotion that might prove relevant to gays and lesbians, however, is pride. The fact that an entire social movement (including months, days, and parades) has developed to encourage feelings of pride among gay people and allied heterosexuals, it is likely that pride will also predict people's attitudes toward gays and lesbians in general, as well as support for gay rights. As such, Study 2 also included measures of pride in gays for exploration purposes. To my knowledge, no previous research has empirically explored how feelings of pride actually affect support for gay rights.

Study 2 also investigated how symbolic threat operates within a new ingroup, social conservatives. Recall that the results from Study 1 showed that rather than feeling angry with their fellow Americans, people high in authoritarianism targeted their anger

about American symbolic threat at an outgroup, Muslim immigrants. This was counter to

the hypothesis that because people high in authoritarianism value social conformity

(Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997), they would feel particularly anxious when

they believed that members of their own ingroup (American citizens, in this case) held

diverse values and beliefs. In fact, people high authoritarian's feelings about their fellow

American citizens did not seem to change at all as a function of ingroup threat. This may

not seem so surprising after we consider that people have complex identities and may

categorize themselves along any number of dimensions, including personal, relational,

superordinate, and subordinate (Abrams & Hogg, 2004). It is possible that just as high

authoritarians seemed to find an outlet for their anger in Muslim immigrants, they may

have found another lower-level, less threatening ingroup with which to identify.

Ideological conservatives represent one such subordinate group that high authoritarians

might find attractive when feeling discontent with their larger American identity.

Numerous studies over the years have established a strong and reliable link between

authoritarianism and conservatism (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Brown, 1965),

indicating that high authoritarians are drawn toward the traditionalism and order

associated with ideological conservatism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). It would thus be

useful to explore how high authoritarians feel about the subordinate group of

conservatives when the superordinate group, Americans, threatens their desire for social

conformity and order.

To test this dissertation's hypotheses, a survey was conducted of people's

attitudes toward and emotions associated with social conservatives and gays and lesbians.

Because undergraduates at this large Midwestern University typically identify more with

liberal ideology, an online sample of conservatives was simultaneously recruited. All

participants completed the same online survey, which included measures associated with

authoritarianism, perceptions of values of gays and lesbians and American citizens, and

emotions toward each of these groups. As dependent measures, participants were asked

about their general attitudes toward each of the groups, their support for extending

traditional heterosexual rights to gays and lesbians (including the right to marry, to adopt

children, and to teach in public schools), and their identification with social

conservatives. Defining social conservatives as the ingroup, however, requires that the

analyses associated with ingroup emotions and identification be restricted to social

conservatives. As a result, analyses were run for two groups for variables associated with

social conservatives: the entire sample and a subset of people who identified themselves

as conservatives. For attitudes about gays and lesbians, the analyses reported below used

the entire sample so that these results could be compared to those from Study 1, which

also used the entire sample.

Hypotheses

1) Different kinds of symbolic threat should elicit distinct emotional reactions

   attached to the ingroup and to the outgroup.

   a. People who perceive an outgroup as a symbolic threat, as indexed by the

      perception that gays and lesbians reject ingroup values and beliefs, will

      feel significantly more anger toward gays and lesbians compared to

      other emotions. In contrast, people who perceive that gays and lesbians

      embrace ingroup values should will sympathy toward the outgroup.

b. The symbolic threat of American citizens (ingroup members) not uniformly embracing a normative set of values should make social conservatives feel significantly more anxiety about their subgroup ingroup, social conservatives. The perception that American citizens embrace a cohesive set of values should elicit pride about social conservatives among social conservatives.

2) Intergroup emotional reactions associated with symbolic threats should predict ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

a. Anger toward gays and lesbians should lead to more negative attitudes toward the outgroup and a decreased willingness to extend traditional heterosexual rights (e.g., the right to marry, to teach in public schools). Sympathy directed toward gays and lesbians should produce the opposite effects.

b. Social conservatives who feel anxious about their social conservative ingroup will also hold more negative attitudes toward and identify less with social conservatives. Pride in social conservatives (among social conservatives) should produce the opposite effects.

3) Negative intergroup emotions should mediate the relationship between symbolic threats and ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

a. Anger toward gays and lesbians should mediate the relationship between perceiving that on the one hand, gays and lesbians violate traditional values, and on the other, holding negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians.

b. Anxiety about social conservatives should mediate the relationship between perceiving that Americans, in general, hold diverse beliefs and values on the one hand, and decreased commitment toward social conservatives, on the other.

4)   a. A predisposition to authoritarianism (as measured by childrearing values) should moderate emotional reactions to situations related to symbolic threat and in turn the subsequent ingroup and outgroup attitudes. Authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the relationships outlined in hypotheses one and three.

c. Authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the relationship between symbolic threats and ingroup and outgroup attitudes. The distinct intergroup emotions outlined above should mediate the effect the interaction between authoritarianism and symbolic threat and the dependent variables related to attitudes toward the ingroup (social conservatives) and the outgroup (gays and lesbians). This implies that the tendency for authoritarian childrearing values to strengthen the relationship between symbolic threats and intergroup attitudes should be mediated by distinct emotional reactions to the ingroup and the outgroup.

Participants

Like Study 1, this study employs a correlational research design. The data for this survey came from two samples recruited simultaneously: 323 students from the University of Minnesota and 131 participants from an online community sample. All

participants read and agreed to a consent form before completing the online survey on individual computers of their choice. Undergraduate students enrolled in Psychology courses who participated received one extra credit point for their participation. Student participants were recruited by in-class announcements, online advertisements on the Psychology Department webpage, and flyers posted in University buildings. This resulted in a student sample comprised of 193 women and 107 men, with a mean age of 19.75. Nonstudent participants were recruited using an ad posted on Craigslist.org in multiple cities. The ad stated that researchers at the University of Minnesota were looking for people who identified as political conservative to complete a survey on social and political attitudes and that participants would receive $10 as compensation for their time. The nonstudent sample was comprised of 75 women and 50 men (six participants did not indicate their gender), with a mean age of 32.13. A comparison of the demographic and attitudinal characteristics described below for each of the groups (the student sample, the nonstudent sample, and the entire sample) can be found in Table 3.1.

Measures

Authoritarian-related measures. As part of the survey, participants completed the same measures of authoritarianism and predispositions to authoritarianism as those used in Study 1 (see Appendix A): Belief in a Dangerous World ($\alpha = .82$, $M = 3.73$, $SD = .95$), Openness to New Experiences ($\alpha = .84$, $M = 3.86$, $SD = .51$), Social Conformity ($\alpha = .81$, $M = 3.32$, $SD = .66$), Childrearing Values ($\alpha = .70$, $M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.08$), Right Wing Authoritarianism ($\alpha = .81$, $M = 4.02$, $SD = .94$). All scales are coded such that higher scores correspond to greater authoritarian tendencies. Because all of these

measures formed a reliable composite, they were standardized and averaged into one measure ($\alpha = .71$, $M= -.02$, $SD=.68$).

Ideology. On a scale of 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative), participants indicated their level of social, economic, and general conservatism (see Appendix H for full text). They also indicated their party identification on a seven-point scale, where 1 corresponded to "Strong Democrat" and 7 corresponded to "Strong Republican." These four items were averaged to form a composite scale of ideological self-placement ($\alpha = .90$, $M = 3.79$, $SD =1.48$). The online sample of recruited conservatives ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.51$) was significantly more conservative than the student sample ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.41$), $t(422) = 4.88$, $p < .001$. For the analyses in which people who identified as conservatives were selected, a dichotomous variables was created at the "independent" midpoint (corresponding to 4 on all scales). In total, 189 people identified above 4 on the conservative composite, whereas 265 identified as independent or liberal.

Religious identification. Because religious identification and beliefs are often associated with attitudes toward gays, participants answered a series of questions about their religious affiliation and religiosity. In response to the question on religious affiliation, 231 participants identified themselves as Christian, 5 as Jewish, 6 as Muslim, 13 as Buddhist, 19 as Atheist, and 113 as "none."

Perceived diversity of beliefs/values within the ingroup. To assess a symbolic threat originating from within a large ingroup, participants indicated the extent to which they believed United States citizens held uniform or diverse sets of values and beliefs (see Appendix B). These items are adapted from Feldman's (2003) perceived threat to social cohesion scale in order to focus on *value* diversity, rather than diversity, per se.

More specifically, they address people's perceptions that Americans hold the same general core values, as well as the same religious, moral, and family values. Six items were recoded to indicate higher perceptions of symbolic threat ($\alpha = .61$, $M= 4.21$, $SD=.79$).

Perceived value difference with gays and lesbians. To measure symbolic threat originating from gays and lesbians, participants indicated the extent to which they believed gays and lesbians hold values consistent with traditional American family values. Adapted from Stephan et al. (1999) and Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood (1995), these measures index the degree to which a person perceives the outgroup as possessing similar values to American citizens and threatens American culture (see Appendix I). Sample items include: "Gays and lesbians are undermining important family values" and "The values and beliefs of gays and lesbians regarding religious and moral issues are *not* compatible with those of most Americans." Items were recoded such that higher values corresponded to greater perceived threat ($\alpha = .92$, $M= 3.11$, $SD= 1.48$).

Emotions toward gays and lesbians and social conservatives. I measured people's emotions toward the ingroup and outgroup using an adapted version of the PANAS. On a scale of 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("extremely"), participants were asked the extent to which they felt 31 different emotions when thinking about the target group (order of group presented first was counterbalanced). In addition to the emotion scales associated with the key hypothesized emotions (anger, anxiety, sympathy, pride) which are described in Study 1 in more detail, this survey also assessed people's levels of disgust (indexed by disgusted, grossed out, sickened, and repulsed). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt each emotion when thinking about social

conservatives: anger (α = .94, *M*=2.86, *SD*=1.65), anxiety (α =.92, *M*=2.67, *SD*=1.55), sympathy (α =.93, *M*=2.52, *SD*=1.51) and pride (α =.92, *M*=2.87, *SD*=1.70). For the target of group gays and lesbians, the discrete emotions also formed highly reliable scales: anger (α = .92, *M*= 1.68, *SD*= 1.25), anxiety (α = .89, *M*= 1.88, *SD*= 1.21), sympathy (α = .90, *M*= 3.17, *SD*= 1.69), pride (α = .90, *M*=2.93, *SD*= 1.83), and disgust (α = .94, *M*=2.18, *SD*= 1.67).

 Attitudes toward gays and lesbians. As an evaluative measure of the outgroup, participants used a feeling thermometer to rate the extent to which they viewed gays and lesbians positively (*M*= 5.58, *SD*= 3.35) and negatively (*M*=3.72, *SD*=3.16), each on a 0-10 scale (*r* = -.69, *p* < .001). Participants also rated gays and lesbians on six bipolar trait items: moral/immoral, perverted/wholesome, cruel/kind, heartless/compassionate, likeable/unlikeable, and good/bad (see Appendix J). Items were recoded so that higher numbers indicated more positive views (α = .94, *M*=4.67, *SD*=1.32).

 Opposition to civil and social rights for gays and lesbians. The survey contained 10 questions about participants' support for extending traditional American and heterosexual rights to gays and lesbians (e.g., support for gays and lesbians right to marry, to adopt children, to teach in public schools). These items were recoded such that higher numbers corresponded to greater opposition to gay and lesbian rights (α = .92, *M*=2.18, *SD*=1.33). See Appendix K.

 Willingness to donate money for causes related to gay rights. Two questions assessed participants willingness to donate money to a group trying to pass a constitutional amendment to *ban* (*M*=2.35, *SD*=1.95) or to *allow* gay marriage (*M*=3.91,

SD=2.27). These two items are treated separately, although they are significantly and negatively correlated (*r* = -.48, *p* < .001).

   Attitudes toward social conservatives. As an evaluative measure of attitudes toward social conservatives, participants rated the extent to which they viewed social conservatives positively (*M*= 4.34, *SD*= 2.82) and negatively (*M*= 4.24, *SD*= 2.91), each on a 0-10 point scale (*r* = -.58, *p* < .001). Participants completed the same trait ratings described above for gays and lesbians. Items were recoded so that higher numbers indicated more positive trait ratings (α = .92, *M*=4.12, *SD*=1.17). See items 9 and 10 in Appendix K.

   Identification with social conservatives. All participants indicated how much they socially identified with social conservatives. Five items gauged how close and similar each person reported feeling to social conservatives (same items as those used in Appendix F) on a 1-7 point scale. The five items were scaled to form a composite in which higher numbers indicated greater identification (α = .95, *M* = 2.78, *SD* = 1.56). The nonstudent sample recruited for their conservatism (*M* = 3.01) identified marginally more with conservatives than did the student sample (*M* = 2.68), *t*(419) = 1.95, *p* < .06.

<div align="center">

Results

</div>

   Intercorrelations among key variables. Table 3.2 displays the correlation matrix for all of the key variables related to gays and lesbians. As predicted, the perception that gays and lesbians violate traditional family values correlates significantly and positively with anger toward gays (*r* = .60, *p* < .001) and significantly and negatively with sympathy toward gays (*r* = -.40, *p* < .001). However, contrary to predictions, the correlation between symbolic threat from gays and disgust about gays (*r* = .66, *p* < .001)

is stronger than the correlation between symbolic threat from gays and anger toward gays. Also notably, of the two positive emotions (sympathy and pride), gay symbolic threat correlated most strongly with pride ($r = -.51$, $p < .001$). Therefore, all hypotheses regarding sympathy will also be tested with pride. Finally, the key independent variable of opposition to gay rights correlates strongly and significantly with gay threat ($r = .79$, $p < .001$) and all of the emotion measures.

The correlations for variables associated with social conservatives are shown in Table 3.3. Note that all of the subsequent analyses reported on emotions and attitudes related to social conservatives were conducted with the 189 participants who identified as at least leaning conservatives (dropping independents and liberals). As the table shows, diversity within the larger ingroup (threat from American citizens) only correlated significantly with pride in social conservatives ($r = .17$, $p < .05$). Even though social conservatives might appropriate American social, family and religious values as their own, this is most likely due to the different referent groups (American citizens in general for the threat, and social conservatives for the emotions). Turning to social identification with social conservatives, we see that identification correlated marginally with anger, anxiety, and sympathy for social conservatives, but significantly with pride in conservatives ($r = .29$, $p < .001$).

For comparison purposes, the correlations for variables associated with social conservatives among the full sample are shown in Table 3.4. Just like in the selected sample described above, diversity within the larger ingroup (threat from American citizens) only correlated significantly with pride in social conservatives ($r = .14$, $p < .05$). This is most likely due to the different referent groups (American citizens in general for

the threat, and social conservatives for the emotions). American threat also correlated

significantly with ideological orientation ($r = .19, p < .001$) such that conservatives are

more likely to report perceiving disagreement about and diversity in values in the United

States. Turning to social identification with social conservatives, we see that

identification correlated significantly with all of the emotion variables, and most strongly

with pride in conservatives ($r = .31, p < .001$). Finally, ideological orientation is

significantly associated with all of the key measures. Among the negative emotions,

ideology correlated most strongly with anger at social conservatives ($r = -.48, p < .001$).

Among the positive emotions, ideology correlated most strongly with pride in social

conservatives ($r = .60, p < .001$).

      Hypothesis 1a: *Outgroup threat should be positively related to outgroup anger*

and negatively related to outgroup sympathy. To test whether the perception that

symbolic threat predicted anger at gays and lesbians, a series of Ordinary Least Squares

regressions was run. As shown in Table 3.5, gay threat significantly predicted anger at

gays ($b= .50, p < .001$). However, it also predicted disgust toward gays ($b= .75, p <$

$.001$) and the Adjusted R^2 is larger for the disgust variable. To separate the effects of the

emotions, residual variables were created in which disgust was partialed out from the

anger variable and one where anger was partialed out from the disgust variable. As

shown in Table 3.5, the independent variables explained the most variance in the disgust

residual compared to the other outcomes ($b= .20, p < .001$, Adj. $R^2 = .08$). Because the

amount of variance explained reduced to such a small amount when only using the

residuals, a composite variable was created for disgust and anger. This now constitutes

aversive emotions directed at gays. This new composite formed a highly reliable scale (α

= .96, *M*= 1.93, *SD*= 1.39). Gay symbolic threat significantly and substantially predicted the anger/disgust composite (*b*= .63, *p* < .001, Adj. R^2 = .45) and will therefore be used in further analyses instead of anger (referred to from here on out as aversion). Follow-up analyses controlling for ideology the childrearing measure of authoritarianism produced the same pattern of results in terms of significance levels and direction of the coefficients.

According to Hypothesis 1a, gay symbolic threat should predict decreased sympathy toward gays. As shown in Table 3.6, this is indeed the case (*b*= -.47, *p* < .001, Adj. R^2 = .16). However, gay threat better predicted and explained more of the variance in pride toward gays (*b*= -.65, *p* < .001, Adj. R^2 = .26). By regressing sympathy on pride and pride on sympathy, two residual variables were created. Table 3.6 also illustrates that once all of the variance that pride shares with sympathy had been taken out of the sympathy composite, gay threat no longer predicted the residual sympathy (*b*= .03, *p*>.10, Adj. R^2 = 0). In contrast, gay threat continued to predict the residual pride variable (*b*= -.22, *p* < .001, Adj. R^2 = .10). Controlling for ideology and the authoritarianism measure of childrearing values did not change the pattern of results. Because gay threat did not explain more of the variance in a pride/sympathy composite (*b*= -.57, *p* < .001, Adj. R^2 = .23), pride toward gays will be used as the positive emotion in all further analyses.

Hypothesis 1b: *Ingroup threat should be positively related to ingroup anxiety and negatively related to ingroup pride.* As shown in the correlation matrix in Table 3.3, in the sample of social conservatives, American threat is only significantly related to pride in social conservatives. The regression analyses displayed in Table 3.7 show that this is a positive relationship (*b*= .35, *p* < .05) indicating that people who perceived greater diversity in the United States also felt more pride in social conservatives.

Although this relationship is not in the predicted direction, mediation tests will still be conducted to uncover any interesting and unexpected patterns in the data. However, it is important to note that when controlling for the childrearing measure of authoritarianism, the coefficient for American symbolic threat dropped to nonsignificance ($b= .25$, $p>.10$). This suggests that the mediation analyses for ingroup symbolic threat will most likely fail to reach significance.

Hypothesis 2a. *Aversion toward gays and lesbians should predict more negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians and a decreased willingness to extend them ingroup rights. Pride should increase positive attitudes and increase willingness to extend ingroup rights.* A series of OLS regressions were run to examine the hypothesized relationship between the key emotion predictors and the dependent measures of attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Each model contained the aversive emotion composite and pride in gay as predictors and ideology and authoritarian childrearing values as control variables. Table 3.8 displays the results of each of these regressions. The aversive emotion composite significantly predicts each of the five dependent variables in the expected direction. For the evaluative measures, aversion predicts lower positive attitude scores ($b= -.89$, $p < .001$) and higher negative attitude scores ($b= 1.42$, $p < .001$). Aversion significantly predicts greater opposition to gay rights ($b= .57$, $p < .001$), lower positive trait ratings of gays ($b= -.41$, $p < .001$), and greater willingness to donate to an organization working to ban gay marriage ($b= .62$, $p < .001$). Although the unstandardized regression coefficients were smaller (see Table 3.8), pride in gays also significantly predicted each of the five dependent variables. Pride predicted higher positive feeling scores toward gays ($b= .81$ $p < .001$) and lower negative feeling

scores (b= -.27 $p < .001$). It predicted higher positive trait ratings for gays (b= .22, $p <$ .001) and finally, less opposition to gay rights (b= -.13, $p < .001$), and less willingness to donate money to ban gay marriage (b= -.13, $p < .001$). Among the control variables, ideology significantly predicted all of the dependent variables, with greater conservatism predicting more conservative attitudes (i.e., more negative attitudes toward gays). Authoritarian childrearing values, however, only significantly predicted an increased willingness to donate to a cause dedicated to banning gay marriage (b= .16, $p < .05$).[6]

Hypothesis 2b. *Anxiety about the ingroup should lead to more negative attitudes about the ingroup and to a decreased willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the ingroup. Pride in the ingroup should increase identification with and positive attitudes toward the ingroup.* In a series of OLS regressions using the 189 self-identified conservative participants, each of the dependent variables was regressed on a model of authoritarian childrearing values, anxiety about social conservatives and pride in social conservatives. All variables were centered prior to analysis. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 3.9. As predicted, anxiety about social conservatives predicted less identification with (b= -.22, $p < .05$), less positive thermometer ratings (b= -.40, $p < .05$), more negative thermometer ratings (b= .61, $p < .01$), and less positive trait ratings (b= -.18, $p < .05$) of social conservatives. Even more strongly, pride in social conservatives

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[6] Given that childrearing authoritarian values typically predict attitudes toward gays and lesbians, it is possible that the aversive emotion composite mediated the effect of authoritarianism on the dependent variables in the full model. Indeed, Sobel-Goodman tests for mediation for each of the dependent variables showed this was the case. For instance, mediation analyses for the dependent variable gay rights showed that childrearing values ($b = .19$, $p < .01$) significantly predicted aversion toward gays and lesbians. When aversive emotions toward gays were added to the model predicting opposition to gay rights, the coefficient for authoritarianism dropped from ($b = .17$, $p < .01$) to ($b = .06$, p>.10). Aversion toward gays accounted for 62% of the total effect of childrearing authoritarianism on opposition to gay rights (IE=.11, z=2.67, $p < .01$). Similar results for the other dependent variables suggest that childrearing authoritarianism values failed to predict attitudes toward gays and lesbians because it operated through aversive emotions toward gays.

predicted increased identification ($b= .25$, $p < .01$), more positive thermometer ratings ($b= .49$, $p < .01$), more positive trait ratings ($b= .15$, $p < .01$), and less negative thermometer ratings of social conservatives ($b= -.26$, $p < .05$). With both pride and anxiety about social conservatives in the model, the childrearing authoritarianism measure failed to reach significance for all of the dependent variables. Hypothesis 2b also predicted that anxiety about the ingroup would lead to a decreased willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the ingroup (in this case, a willingness to donate money to an organization dedicated to banning gay marriage). As Table 3.11 shows, both pride in social conservatives ($b= .40$, $p < .001$) and childrearing authoritarian values ($b= .45$, $p < .05$). were positively associated with a willingness to donate to ban gay marriage. Anxiety about social conservatives failed to reach significance ($b= -.14$, $p>.10$).

To explore whether this finding was unique to the social conservatives sample, I re-ran all of the above analyses using the entire sample. These results are shown in Table 3.10. Similar to the conservative sample, anxiety about social conservatives significantly predicted more negative attitudes toward social conservatives ($b= .49$, $p < .001$), less positive attitudes toward social conservatives ($b= -.26$, $p < .01$), and more negative trait ratings of social conservatives ($b= -.14$, $p < .01$). In contrast to the conservative subgroup, among the entire sample, anxiety about social conservatives did not significantly reduce identification with social conservatives ($b= -.02$, $p>.10$). Pride in social conservatives, in contrast, did significantly predict identification with ($b= .12$, $p < .05$), as well as positive attitudes toward ($b= .36$, $p < .01$), and more positive trait ratings of social conservatives ($b= .11$, $p < .05$). Pride did not significantly predict negative attitudes toward social conservatives ($b= -.17$, $p>.10$) in the full sample. The same model

was also used to predict willingness to donate to ban gay marriage (see Table 3.11). Like the results from the sample of conservatives, in the full sample, childrearing authoritarian values (b= .30, p < .01) and pride in social conservatives (b= .44, p < .001) predicted a greater willingness to donate to ban gay marriage. In contrast to the analyses using the restricted sample, the coefficient for anxiety about social conservatives reached significance in the full sample, predicting a decreased willingness to donate to ban gay marriage (b= -.17, p < .05).

Hypothesis 3a. *Negative emotions about the gays and lesbians should mediate the relationship between gay symbolic threat and attitudes toward gays.* According to an a priori hypothesis, negative emotions (specifically, anger) should mediate the relationship between outgroup threat and outgroup attitudes. As analyses associated with the first two hypotheses showed, however, a composite of anger and disgust (i.e., the aversion variable) was more strongly related to both symbolic threat and attitudes toward gays. I will thus modify my analyses to use aversive emotions as the key mediator. Analyses associated with the first two hypotheses additionally showed a strong relationship between gay pride and perceived threat. As a result, for each of the dependent variables, I will first test a mediation model with the aversion composite as the mediator and then a subsequent model with both aversion and pride as simultaneous mediators. The aversion mediation model represents a test of the specific hypothesis, whereas the aversion and pride simultaneous mediation model represents an exploratory analysis driven by findings from Hypothesis 2a and Study 1, which showed that both positive and negative emotions simultaneously mediated the relationship between outgroup threat and attitudes toward the outgroup.

With respect to these data, three conditions must be met for the mediation hypotheses to receive support: (1) each kind of symbolic threat must predict attitudes toward the key dependent variable; (2) each kind of symbolic threat must predict the appropriate mediator (i.e., aversion and pride toward the outgroup in the case of gay symbolic threat and anxiety and pride toward the ingroup in the case of social conservatives); and (3) in final models predicting group-attitude dependent variables, the effect of symbolic threat must be significantly reduced in magnitude when the relevant mediators are added to the model; the mediator itself must have a significant effect (Baron & Kenney, 1986; Wegener & Fabrigar, 2000).

To test whether the key variables meet the first condition for mediation, each of the dependent measures of attitudes toward gays and lesbians was regressed on a model containing the independent variable, gay symbolic threat, and the control variables (ideology and authoritarian childrearing values). As shown in Table 3.12, the control variable, ideology, significantly predicted only a willingness to donate to ban gay marriage ($b= .25$, $p < .001$) and marginally predicted lower positive attitude scores toward gays ($b= -.18$, $p < .10$). Childrearing authoritarian values, in contrast, failed to predict any of the key dependent variables in the full model. More important, the perception that gays as lesbians violate American family values predicted greater opposition to gay rights ($b= .69$, $p < .001$), higher negative attitude scores toward gays ($b= 1.61$, $p < .001$) and greater willingness to donate money in an effort to ban gay marriage ($b= .25$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, perceived gay threat significantly predicted lower positive attitude scores toward gays ($b= -1.58$, $p < .001$) and lower positive trait

ratings of gays ($b= -.60$, $p < .001$). Thus, the first condition for mediation received support for all dependent variables.

The second condition, that symbolic threat predicts the appropriate mediator, was tested in the analyses associated with Hypothesis 1a. Indeed, gay symbolic threat significantly predicted aversive emotions (disgust and anger) toward gays ($b = .63$, $p < .001$). Although I had originally hypothesized that gay symbolic threat would significantly predict sympathy toward gays, analyses for Hypothesis 1a clearly demonstrated that in the case of positive emotions, gay threat better predicted gay pride ($b = -.65$, $p < .001$). Thus, after conducting a single mediator analysis with aversion, the results from a simultaneous mediation model with both aversion and pride as mediators will be reported.

Looking first at the single mediator model, the third condition for emotion mediation was examined by adding the centered variable measuring aversion toward gays to the models tested in Table 3.12 (wherein each of the dependent variables was regressed on gay symbolic threat, ideology, and childrearing authoritarian values). As shown in Figure 3.1, aversion toward gays significantly predicted opposition to gay rights ($b = .32$, $p < .001$) and the effect of symbolic threat on opposition to gay rights reduced from $b = .70$ ($p < .001$) to $b = .48$ ($p < .001$) when gay aversion was added to the model. The Sobel-Goodman test for mediation was significant ($IE = .21$, $z = 7.47$, $p < .001$) and aversive emotions accounted for 31% of the effect of perceived symbolic threat on opposition to gay rights. It appears that negative emotions are more relevant to opposition to gay rights. In the follow-up test for simultaneous mediation, gay pride did not significantly predict opposition to gay rights in the full model ($p > .10$), thus failing the

test for mediation. Aversion toward gays remained significant even after controlling for gay pride.

Turning to evaluative ratings of gays, aversion significantly predicted negative ratings of gays ($b = .94$, $p < .001$). As Figure 3.2 illustrates, the effect of gay symbolic threat on negative ratings of gays reduced from $b = 1.60$ ($p < .001$) to $b = .97$ ($p < .001$) when gay aversion was added to the model. This reduction was significant according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = .62$, $z = 9.20$, $p < .001$), with the aversive emotion composite accounting for 39% of the total effect of gay symbolic threat on negative feelings toward gays. Although gay pride failed to mediate the relationship between gay threat and negative ratings, it did partially mediate the relationship between gay threat and positive ratings of gays in the test for simultaneous mediation. In fact, as Figure 3.3 shows, both aversion toward gays and gay pride mediated the relationship between gay threat and positive feelings.[7] Aversion ($b = -.41$, $p < .001$) and pride ($b = .61$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted positive ratings of gays. The specific indirect effect of gay threat on positive ratings was significant via aversion (total $IE = -.26$, $z = 3.93$, $p < .001$) and via pride (total $IE = -.39$, $z = 7.18$, $p < .001$). Together, these emotions explained 43% of the total effect of gay threat on positive ratings of gays, reducing threat's coefficient from $b = -1.58$ ($p < .001$) to $b = -.97$ ($p < .001$). The Sobel-Goodman test for simultaneous mediation indicated that this reduction was significant (total $IE = -.78$, $z = 7.13$, $p < .001$).

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[7] In the single mediation test, aversion toward gays significantly mediated the relationship between gay symbolic threat and positive thermometer ratings ($IE = -.20$, $z = 2.68$, p < .01). Gay symbolic threat significantly predicted increased aversion toward gays ($b = .66$, $p < .001$) and in the full model, aversion toward gays predicted significantly less positive thermometer ratings ($b = -.30$, $p < .01$). When aversion was added to the full model, the effect of gay symbolic threat on positive thermometer ratings dropped from $b = -1.55$ ($p < .001$) to $b = -1.35$ ($p < .001$).

A similar pattern emerged for the relationship between gay symbolic threat and trait ratings of gays and lesbians. In the single mediation model shown in Figure 3.4, aversion toward gays predicted trait ratings of gays ($b = -.18, p < .001$). The addition of gay aversion into the model reduced the effect of gay symbolic threat from ($b = -.57, p < .001$) to ($b = -.45, p < .001$). This reduction was significant according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = -.12, z = 3.7, p < .001$) and aversion toward gays explained 21% of the relationship between gay symbolic threat and trait ratings of gays. In the model testing for simultaneous mediation, pride in gays significantly added to the ability of aversion to explain this relationship (see Figure 3.5). Both aversion toward gays ($b = -.21, p < .001$) and pride in gays ($b = .15, p < .001$) significantly predicted trait ratings of gays. In the simultaneous mediation model, the specific indirect effects via aversion ($IE = -.13, z = 4.20, p < .001$) and via pride ($IE = -.09, z = 4.33, p < .001$) were significant. When both emotions were added to the model, the effect of symbolic threat on trait ratings of gays dropped from $b = -.60$ ($p < .001$) to $b = -.39$ ($p < .001$), a significant reduction according to the Sobel-Goodman test (total $IE = -.23, z = 5.68, p < .001$). In total, aversion and pride explained 38% of the effect of perceived symbolic threat from gays and less positive trait ratings of gays.

For the final mediation test, a series of regressions were performed with willingness to donate to ban gay marriage as the key dependent variable. In the single mediation model shown in Figure 3.6, aversion toward gays significantly predicted an increase in willingness to donate to ban gay marriage ($b = .36, p < .001$). More important, the effect of perceived symbolic threat from gays on willingness to donate reduced from $b = .73$ ($p < .001$) to $b = .50$ ($p < .001$) when aversion toward gays was

added to the model. This reduction was significant ($IE = .24$, $z = 5.22$, $p < .001$), with

aversive emotions accounting for 32% of threat's total effect on self-reported willingness

to donate to an anti-gay cause. Aversive emotions again proved to be the more powerful

mediator, as pride in gays failed to significantly predict willingness to donate in the

simultaneous mediation model.

Taken together, these analyses provide consistent support for the hypothesis that

negative emotions mediate the relationship between perceptions of symbolic threat and

attitudes toward the outgroup. A composite of anger and disgust toward gays partially

mediated the relationship between perceptions that gays violate American family values

and all five dependent variables (opposition to gay rights, negative thermometer ratings,

positive thermometer ratings, trait ratings, and willingness to donate to ban gay

marriage). Although not hypothesized a priori, an analysis was run to see whether two

mediators (pride and aversion) simultaneously explained the relationship between the

predictor and each of the dependent variables. Along with aversive emotions, pride in

gays partially mediated the relationship between perceived threat and two dependent

variables: positive thermometer ratings and trait ratings of gays.

Hypothesis 3b. *Anxiety about the ingroup should mediate the relationship*

between ingroup threat and ingroup attitudes. Although it was originally hypothesized

that anxiety about the ingroup would mediate the relationship between ingroup threat and

attitudes toward the ingroup, analyses associated with Hypothesis 1b clearly

demonstrated that the perception that Americans held diverse values did not significantly

predict anxiety about social conservatives. More important, however, diversity within the

American values did not have a significant relationship with any of the dependent

variables in either the social conservative subsample or the full sample (see the correlation matrix in Tables 3.3 and 3.4). In addition, American symbolic threat failed to predict the mediator, pride in social conservatives, after controlling for childrearing authoritarian values (see Table 3.7). Given the lack of relationship between the independent variable and the mediator, mediation would be impossible.

Hypothesis 4a. *A predisposition to authoritarianism should moderate the effect of outgroup symbolic threat on emotions and attitudes toward the outgroup. Negative emotions toward the outgroup should mediate the interactive effect childrearing values and threat on outgroup attitudes.* According to the final hypothesis, not everyone should respond to symbolic threats in the same manner. People who value social order and traditionalism should feel the most threatened by groups that do not embrace the ingroup's core values. A series of nested OLS regressions were performed with the emotions as the dependent variables. The analyses presented below focus on two moderators, childrearing authoritarian values and the authoritarianism composite (creating by standardizing and averaging Right Wing Authoritarianism, childrearing authoritarianism values, social conformity, reverse-coded Openness to New Experiences, and Belief in a Dangerous World).

As with all of the analyses presented below, childrearing authoritarianism will be examined first as the moderator, followed by the authoritarianism composite. In Model 1, the dependent variable was regressed on ideology, symbolic threat from gays, and childrearing values. The interaction between threat and childrearing values was added to Model 2. As Table 3.13 shows, the interaction between childrearing values and gay threat was significant for aversive emotions toward gays ($b = .07$, $p < .05$). To probe

each of the interactions, simple slopes analyses were performed at one standard deviation above and below the mean of childrearing values. These analyses revealed that the perception that gays and lesbians did not embrace American family values more strongly predicted aversive emotions toward gays for people high in authoritarian childrearing values ($b = .72$, $p < .001$) than for people low in authoritarian childrearing values ($b = .56$, $p < .001$).[8] The relationship between main effect of gay symbolic threat on pride in gays ($b = -.93$, $p < .001$) was also qualified by a significant interaction between threat and childrearing values ($b = .10$, $p < .05$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that compared to those high in authoritarian values ($b = -.44$, $p < .001$), for those low in authoritarian values, gay symbolic threat had a more strongly negative relationship with pride in gays ($b = -.65$, $p < .001$).[9]

A similar pattern of results emerged for aversion to and pride about gays when the same analyses were run with the authoritarianism composite as the moderator. Table 3.14 shows the results of these analyses. As expected, symbolic threat from gays significantly predicted aversive emotions toward gays in Model 1 ($b = .68$, $p < .001$). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between threat and authoritarianism composite in Model 2 ($b = .16$, $p < .01$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that gay threat more strongly predicted aversion toward gays for people high in authoritarianism ($b = .75$, $p < .001$) as compared to people low in authoritarianism ($b = .53$, $p < .001$). For the dependent variable pride in gays, the threat main effect from

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[8] Breaking down the interaction at high and low levels of threat revealed that at high levels of threat, childrearing authoritarian values predicted marginally more aversive feelings toward gays ($b=.12$, $p < .10$). At low levels of threat, childrearing values were not significantly related to aversive feelings toward gays ($b= -.09$, p>.10).

[9] Examining the simple slopes for gay pride at high and low levels of threat revealed that childrearing values predicted marginally less feelings of pride in gays at low levels of threat ($b=-.19$, $p < .10$) and was unrelated to pride at high levels of threat ($b=.11$, p>.10).

Model 1 ($b = -.55$, $p < .001$) was qualified by a significant interaction with the authoritarianism composite in Model 2 ($b = .32$, $p < .001$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that gay threat more strongly predicted decreased pride in gays for people low in authoritarianism ($b = -.85$, $p < .001$) as compared to people high in authoritarianism ($b = -.42$, $p < .001$). Taken together with the analyses using childrearing authoritarianism as a moderator, these findings suggest that gay symbolic threat affects low authoritarians more by reducing their positive emotions whereas it affects high authoritarian people more by increasing their aversive emotions toward gays.

To investigate whether childrearing authoritarian values interacted with threat to predict attitudes toward gays, a series of hierarchical OLS regressions were run with each of the dependent variables. The interaction was not significant for positive ratings and trait ratings of gays and lesbians. The results for the other models are shown in Table 3.15. As the table shows, the interaction between threat and childrearing values was significant for opposition to gay rights ($b = .05$, $p < .05$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that for people high in authoritarian values, threat better predicted opposition to gay rights ($b = .73$, $p < .001$) than for people low in authoritarian values ($b = .62$, $p < .001$). A similar pattern of results emerged for the interaction predicting negative thermometer ratings of gays ($b = .17$, $p < .01$). Probing the interaction further, it appears that gay symbolic threat more strongly predicted negative ratings of gays for those high in authoritarian values ($b = 1.76$, $p < .001$) than for those low in authoritarian values ($b = 1.40$, $p < .001$). For the final dependent variable of willingness to donate to a cause dedicated to banning gay marriage, a marginal interaction emerged between perceived threat and authoritarianism ($b = .07$, $p < .10$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that

perceived threat from gays more strongly predicted high authoritarians' readiness to donate ($b = .79$, $p < .001$) than low authoritarians' ($b = .63$, $p < .001$). Thus, for three dependent variables, the predicted relationship between perceptions that gays fail to embrace American family values and negative attitudes toward gays was strongest for people predisposed to authoritarianism.[10]

Follow-up analyses using the authoritarianism composite as the moderator for all of the above models provided a similar set of results. The only notable difference is that the interaction between threat and the authoritarianism reaches a marginal level of significance for positive ratings of gays and lesbians ($b = .21$ $p < .10$). Otherwise, the interaction terms are just stronger in magnitude when the authoritarianism composite is used. See Tables 3.16 and 3.17 for the full set of analyses. Because these only replicate the above findings, a full regurgitation of the findings would be unnecessarily redundant.

Having established that threat and a predisposition to authoritarianism interact to predict emotions toward gays and three measures of attitudes toward gays, we turn to the final test for mediated moderation. In all of the models described below, the centered main effect terms were included for symbolic threat from gays and a predisposition to authoritarianism, as well as a centered ideology control variable. The first two conditions for mediation have already been met, leaving the final test, in which aversive emotions toward gays must significantly reduce the effect of the interaction on the dependent variable. As Figure 3.7 shows, this was indeed the case for the variable opposition to gay

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[10] Simple slopes analyses broken down by threat level for each of the dependent variables are as follows: at high levels of threat, childrearing authoritarian values predicted more negative ratings ($b=.30$, $p < .05$) and greater willingness to donate to ban gay marriage ($b=.21$, $p < .05$) but did not significantly predict opposition to gay rights ($b=.09$, $p>.10$); at low levels of threat, childrearing values did not predict willingness to donate to ban gay marriage, opposition to gay rights, or negative thermometer ratings of gays (all $ps>.10$).

rights. When the aversive emotions composite was added to the model, the effect of the interaction between threat and authoritarianism reduced from $b = .05$ ($p < .05$) to $b = .03$ ($p > .10$). This reduction was significant ($IE = .02$, $z = 1.98$, $p < .05$) with aversive emotions accounting for 37% of the total effect of the interaction on opposition to gay rights.

Figure 3.8 shows the results for the mediated moderation analyses for negative thermometer ratings of gays and lesbians. As previously noted and shown in Table 3.15, perceived symbolic threat from gays significantly interacted with authoritarian childrearing values to predict negative ratings of gays on a feeling thermometer ($b = .17$, $p < .01$). This effect significantly reduced to $b = .10$ ($p < .05$) when aversive emotions toward gays were added to the full model ($IE = .07$, $z = 2.35$, $p < .05$). Aversive emotions explained 40% of the effect of the interaction term on negative ratings of gays.

The last mediated moderation analysis on outgroups examined the ability of aversive emotions to mediate the effect of the marginally significant interaction between threat and authoritarianism on a willingness to donate to ban gay marriage. As illustrated in Figure 3.9, the interaction term's coefficient dropped from $b = .07$ ($p < .10$) to $b = .04$ ($p > .10$). This was a significant reduction according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = .03$, $z = 2.20$, $p < .05$) with aversive emotions accounting for 39% of the interaction term's effect on a willingness to donate to ban gay marriage.[11]

In total, these three sets of analyses provide support for mediated moderation. Perceived symbolic threat interacted with a predisposition to authoritarianism to significantly predict three dependent variables: opposition to gay rights, negative

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[11] Mediated moderation analyses using the authoritarianism composite as the moderator produced the exact same pattern of results.

attitudes toward gays, and willingness to donate to ban gay marriage. The composite of aversive emotions toward gays partially, but significantly, mediated the relationships between the interaction and each of the dependent variables. Thus, people who tended to embrace authoritarian childrearing values reacted with anger and disgust to the belief that gays and lesbians failed to embrace traditional family values. This anger and disgust led to more negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians and greater opposition to extending American civil rights to gays and lesbians.

Hypothesis 4b. *A predisposition to authoritarianism should moderate the effect of ingroup symbolic threat on emotions and attitudes toward the ingroup. Negative emotions toward the ingroup should mediate the interactive effect childrearing values and threat on ingroup attitudes.* To examine whether authoritarianism moderated the effect of symbolic threat from a large ingroup (Americans), a series of regressions were performed with American symbolic threat, authoritarian childrearing values, and the interaction between threat and authoritarian values as predictors. Each of the hypothesized emotions for the ingroup (anxiety and pride), as well as identification with social conservatives, thermometer ratings of social conservatives, and trait ratings of social conservatives served as dependent variables. Looking first at the subsample of self-identified social conservatives, the interaction term did not reach significance for any of the dependent variables (all $ps > .10$).

This could be due, in part, to the restricted sample size. To investigate this possibility, the same analyses were also run for the entire sample. Again, the interaction term failed to reach significance for pride in social conservatives, negative ratings of social conservatives, and trait ratings of conservatives. The results for analyses with

significant interactions are shown in Table 3.18. Turning first to anxiety about social conservatives, the interaction term was marginally significant ($b = .17, p < .10$). Probing this interaction with simple slopes revealed that for people low in authoritarianism, the perception that Americans held diverse values did not lead to anxiety when thinking about social conservatives ($b = -.06, p > .10$). Conversely, among people high in authoritarianism, perceived threat from other Americans significantly predicted increased anxiety about social conservatives ($b = .31, p < .05$).

The interaction between threat and authoritarianism was also significant for identification with social conservatives ($b = -.18, p < .05$). Probing the interaction with simple slopes produced a somewhat surprising pattern of results. Perceived value threat from Americans led to a marginally significant increase in identification with social conservatives among those low in authoritarianism ($b = .27, p < .10$) but failed to predict identification among those high in authoritarianism ($b = -.12, p > .10$). This, it appears that the perception that Americans, in general, do hold the same beliefs and values led people low in authoritarianism to identify with a more authoritarian group (here, social conservatives).

A similar pattern emerged for positive ratings of social conservatives. American symbolic threat interacted with authoritarian childrearing values to predict positive thermometer ratings of social conservatives ($b = -.40, p < .05$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that symbolic threat from American citizens significantly predicted positive attitudes toward social conservatives only among low authoritarians ($b = .68, p < .05$).

Among participants high in authoritarian childrearing values, perceived threat from Americans failed to predict positive ratings of social conservatives ($b = -.18$, $p > .10$).[12]

According to the final part of Hypothesis 4b, anxiety about social conservatives should mediate the effect of the interaction between American threat and authoritarianism on dependent variables related to social conservatives. Given that the interaction was only significant for identification with social conservatives and positive ratings of social conservatives, I only conducted mediated moderation analyses for these variables. However, the inclusion of anxiety about social conservatives failed to reduce the effect of the interaction for either variable (all ps $> .10$). There is thus no evidence for mediated moderation among the ingroup variables.

Discussion

The purpose of Study 2 was to use new social groups to test this dissertation's hypotheses about the role of emotion in people's responses to symbolic threats. Whereas Study 1 used the outgroup of Muslim immigrants, which is associated with a tangible threat to American citizens' safety, Study 2 investigated people's attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Gays and lesbians represent a group that some perceive as a threat to traditional family values without simultaneously being associated with terrorism. Study 2 also focused on a novel ingroup, social conservatives, in order to further explore the possibility that people prone to authoritarianism might identify more with a subgroup when they perceive a threat coming from within a larger ingroup (here, American citizens).

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[12] All of the moderation analyses were also run using the authoritarianism composite as the moderator. None of the interaction terms between American symbolic threat and the authoritarianism composite reached significance for any of the emotion variables, or for any of measures of attitudes toward social conservatives.

Analyses associated with people's emotional and attitudinal responses to symbolic threat from a gay and lesbian outgroup presented an interesting set of findings. According to this dissertation's original hypotheses, people should feel more angry and less sympathy toward gays and lesbians when they believe that gays and lesbians do not share traditional values about the family and morality. Although gay symbolic threat did affect people's feelings of anger and sympathy toward gays, after controlling for the relationship between gay symbolic threat and other emotions, threat was most strongly associated with a composite of anger and disgust for negative emotions and pride for positive emotions. For example, people who perceived gays and lesbians as a symbolic threat longer felt less sympathetic toward gays and lesbians after controlling for the relationship between pride and sympathy. Furthermore, aversive emotions (a composite of anger and disgust) toward gays and pride served as the primary emotion mediators of the relationship between perceptions of gay symbolic threat and attitudes toward gays. Aversion and pride simultaneously mediated the relationship between perceptions of gay symbolic threat on the one hand, and positive thermometer ratings of gays and lesbians and trait ratings of gays and lesbians on the other. That is, people who perceived that gays and lesbians did not embrace traditional values felt angrier towards and less proud of gays, and as a result, rated gays and lesbians more negatively and as possessing more negative traits (e.g., more perverted than wholesome, more cruel than kind). Aversion alone mediated the relationship between gay symbolic threat and opposition to gay rights, negative thermometer ratings of gays, and willingness to donate to ban gay marriage.

It should not come as a complete surprise that perceived symbolic threat from gays is associated with increased feelings of anger *and* disgust on the one hand, and

decreased pride on the other. Previous research on emotion and intergroup relations has shown that disgust is strongly associated with prejudice against gays (Herek, 1993; Tapias et al., 2007). People who are more likely to feel disgusted by signs of physical contamination (e.g., feces, rotting meat, blood and gore) are also more likely to say that homosexual behavior is immoral (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). More relevant to this specific study, Cottrell et al. (2010) showed that disgust mediated the relationship between symbolic threat from gays and intolerance toward gays. Although Cottrell et al.'s findings are quite similar to those reported here, they did not examine the role of any positive emotions, such as pride. Little, if any, research has empirically investigated how feelings of pride might affect support for gay rights and attitudes toward gays. And yet an entire social movement is devoted to fostering pride within the GLBT community and among their heterosexual allies. Social movements concerned with the politics of identity, like the gay pride movement, focus on moving people from feeling shame to feeling pride in their identity (Britt & Heise, 2000). In this way, invigorating people about positive aspects of gays and lesbians is much more purely positive, like pride, and even antithetical to sympathy, which directs attention to the negatives associated with a person or group (Wispe, 1986).

Not everyone responded to the perception that gays and lesbians did not embrace traditional values by becoming less proud. One of the most interesting findings in this set of analyses is that authoritarianism differentially affected aversive emotions and pride. People high in authoritarianism responded by becoming more angry, whereas people low in authoritarianism responded by feeling less proud of gays and lesbians. Thus it appears that anger and disgust are more relevant to people who especially value social conformity

and traditionalism. In contrast, the nonauthoritarians seemed to respond with less positive emotions, or pride. As will be discussed in the final discussion (Chapter 5) in greater detail, this finding is consistent with Adorno et al.'s (1950) contention that authoritarians are especially prone to negative emotions.

Authoritarianism also moderated the relationship between gay symbolic threat and attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Furthermore, aversive emotions mediated the effect of the interaction on opposition to gay rights, negative ratings of gays and willingness to donate to ban gay marriage. People who scored higher in authoritarianism responded with more disgust and anger, and these negative emotions led to more intolerant and prejudicial attitudes against gays. In contrast to the mediation analyses for the main effect of symbolic threat, pride did not mediate the relationship between the interactive term and any of the measures of attitudes toward gays. This is consistent with the original hypothesis that negative emotions would be key for explaining why people predisposed to authoritarianism are intolerant of those they perceive to hold different values from their ingroup. Recall that the significant results for the mediated moderation hypothesis contrast with the findings from Study 1. In the previous study, perceptions of a symbolic threat from Muslim immigrants did lead to more anger at that outgroup among high authoritarians, but anger did not serve as a mediator between the interaction and any of the dependent variables. This suggests that there may indeed be something unique about Muslim immigrants that overpowers individual differences in people's emotional and attitudinal responses. Moreover, these findings provide more support for the threat-as-activator hypothesis put forth by Stenner (2005) and Feldman (2003; and Feldman & Stenner, 1997).

Study 2 was also designed to follow up on the unexpected finding that when people high in authoritarianism felt that their larger ingroup (American citizens) could not agree on important values, they targeted their anger at an outgroup (Muslim immigrants). To explore whether high authoritarians then felt more pride in and identified more with a smaller subgroup, this study examined people's emotions and attitudes toward social conservatives. Although correlation analyses did indeed show that a symbolic threat from fellow Americans significantly predicted increased pride in social conservatives, this relationship disappeared after controlling for authoritarianism. This was the case both in the entire sample and in the subsample of self-identified conservatives. Consistent with the second hypothesis, however, anxiety about social conservatives predicted less identification with and more negative attitudes toward social conservatives. Pride in social conservatives, in contrast, predicted more identification and more positive attitudes toward social conservatives. These relationships maintained in both the entire sample and the subsample of self-identified conservatives. The fact that American symbolic threat failed to predict emotions and attitudes toward social conservatives suggests, at the very least, that the perception that members of one's larger ingroup do not uniformly hold the same values does not lead people to identify more with social conservatives. An interesting finding, however, was that American symbolic threat did interact with authoritarianism to predict identification with social conservatives and positive ratings of social conservatives. Probing this interaction revealed that American symbolic threat significantly predicted increased identification with social conservatives and more positive attitudes only among people low in authoritarianism. This finding is

most consistent with Hetherington and Weiler's (2010) recent argument that threat makes nonauthoritarians act more like authoritarians.

In sum, the results from Study 2 nicely supplement those from Study 1. Both studies showed that negative (and sometimes positive) emotions are key to understanding people's reactions to symbolic threat. Despite these consistencies, important questions regarding causality will remain unanswered. It is possible that the relationship between intergroup emotions and perceptions of symbolic threat runs in the opposite direction. Although the alternative mediation hypothesis (e.g., that anger or aversive emotions toward the outgroup leads to increased perception that the outgroup violates core ingroup values and hence, less willingness to extend ingroup rights to the that group), it remains unclear exactly what leads to what, as correlation analyses can only take us so far. For example, Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (2006) found that anger led to more stereotypic social judgments. If people predisposed to authoritarianism are also predisposed to stereotype outgroup members as threatening, feeling angry may increase the likelihood that people high in authoritarianism will see an outgroup as violating ingroup values. To carefully investigate the proposed hypotheses, it is important to experimentally manipulate symbolic threat. Using fake newspaper articles about ingroup (American citizens) and outgroup (Muslim immigrants) values, Study 3 is designed to do just that.

Tables and Figures

Table 3.1
Means and standard deviations for the full sample, the student sample, and the nonstudent sample

Variables	Student sample (N=323) Mean(*SD*)	Nonstudent sample (N=131) Mean(*SD*)	Full Sample (N=454) Mean (*SD*)
Age	19.75 (2.34)	32.13 (12.56)	23.42 (9.07)
Ideology	3.57 (1.41)	4.31 (1.51)	3.79 (1.48)
Authoritarian Childrearing Values	3.84 (1.08)	3.97 (1.09)	3.88 (1.08)
Social identification with conservatives	2.68 (1.55)	3.01 (1.58)	2.78 (1.56)
Anxiety about social conservatives	2.70 (1.51)	2.60 (1.66)	2.67 (1.55)
Pride in social conservatives	2.72 (1.55)	3.23 (2.00)	2.87 (1.70)
Aversion toward gays	1.98 (1.41)	1.83 (1.34)	1.93 (1.39)
Support for gay rights	2.45 (1.39)	2.79 (1.64)	2.55 (1.47)
Pride in gays	3.01 (1.81)	2.75 (1.87)	2.93 (1.83)

Table 3.2

Intercorrelations among key measures related to gays and lesbians (full sample)

Variables	*1.*	*2.*	*3.*	*4.*	*5.*	*6.*	*7.*
1. Gay threat	--						
2. Anger toward gays	.60***	--					
3. Disgust about gays	.66***	.81***	--				
4. Anxiety about gays	.46***	.74***	.69***	--			
5. Sympathy toward gays	-.40***	-.11*	-.26***	.10*	--		
6. Pride in gays	-.51***	-.15*	-.32***	-.01	.84***	--	
7. Opposition to gay rights	.79***	.68***	.70***	.52***	-.38***	-.42***	--

Note. All coefficients are Pearson correlations.

p < .05.   **p* < .01.   ****p* < .001.

Table 3.3

Intercorrelations among American threat and social conservatism variables among social conservatives (N=189)

Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. American threat	--					
2. Anger at social conservatives	-.10	--				
3. Anxiety about conservatives	-.01	.80***	--			
4. Sympathy toward conservatives	.01	.13	.18*	--		
5. Pride in conservatives	.17*	-.10	.04	.78***	--	
6. Social identification with conservatives	0	-.15^M	-.15^M	.14^M	.29***	--

Table 3.4

Intercorrelations among American and social conservatism variables in the entire sample

Variable	*1.*	*2.*	*3.*	*4.*	*5.*	*6.*	*7.*
1. American threat	--						
7. Anger at social conservatives	-.04	--					
8. Anxiety about conservatives	-.001	.78***	--				
9. Sympathy toward conservatives	.07	-.06	.11*	--			
10. Pride in conservatives	.14*	-.20***	.004	.81***	--		
11. Social identification with conservatives	.08^T	-.17***	-.12*	.22***	.31***	--	
12. Ideology	.19***	-.48***	-.35***	.44***	.60***	.36***	--

Table 3.5
Gay symbolic threat predicting negative emotions

Predictor	Anger at Gays		Disgust toward Gays		Residual Anger at Gays		Residual Disgust toward Gays		Anger/Disgust Composite	
	B	SE	b	SE	B	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Gay symbolic threat	.50***	.03	.75***	.04	.05*	.03	.20***	.03	.63***	.03
Constant	.11	.11	-.13	.14	-.17*	.08	-.61**	.11	-.02	.11
F (df)	235.7***(1,412)		322.0***(1,408)		4.5*(1,404)		40.12***(1,404)		332.0***(1,404)	
Adjusted R^2	.36		.44		.01		.08		.45	
N	414		410		406		406		406	

$^M p < .10$ *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

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Table 3.6

Gay symbolic threat predicting positive emotions

Predictor	Sympathy toward Gays		Pride toward Gays		Residual Sympathy toward Gays		Residual Pride toward Gays		Pride/Sympathy Composite	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Gay symbolic threat	-.47***	.05	-.65***	.05	.03	.03	.22***	.03	-.57***	.05
Constant	3.17***	.08	2.94***	.08	.001	.05	-.002	.05	3.04***	.07
F (df)	78.7***(1,406)		146***(1,409)		.7(1,399)		44.1***(1,399)		121.6***(1,399)	
Adjusted R^2	.16		.26		0		.10		.23	
N	408		411		401		401		401	

Table 3.7

American symbolic threat predicting emotions about social conservatives in the social conservatives subsample.

	Pride in Social conservatives			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
American symbolic threat	.35*	.16	.25	.17
Childrearing values	--	--	.40**	.14
Constant	3.78	.15	3.68***	.15
F (df)	5.09**(2,161)		6.31**(2,160)	
Adjusted R^2	.05		.06	
N	164		163	

Table 3.8

Emotions toward gays predicting attitudes toward gays.

Predictor	Opposition to Gay Rights		Negative Attitude toward Gays		Positive Attitude toward Gays		Trait Ratings of Gays		Willingness to Donate to Ban Gay Marriage	
	b	*SE*	*B*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.17***	.04	.44***	.07	-.41***	.09	-.06	.04	.40***	.05
Childrearing values	.06	.04	.15^T	.09	.02	.11	-.08	.05	.16*	.07
Anger/Disgust toward Gays	.57***	.05	1.42***	.07	-.89***	.09	-.41***	.04	.62***	.05
Pride in Gays	-.13***	.02	-.27***	.06	.81***	.07	.22***	.03	-.13***	.04
Constant	1.86***	.04	2.92***	.10	7.08***	.12	4.9***	.06	2.00***	.08
F (df)	136.8***(4,381)		201***(4,401)		130***(4,394)		73.4***(4,391)		100***(4,400)	
Adjusted R^2	.61		.66		.56		.42		.50	
N	386		406		399		396		405	

Table 3.9

Emotions and attitudes toward social conservatives among self-identified conservatives

Predictor	Identification with Social Conservatives		Negative Attitude toward Social Conservatives		Positive Attitude toward Social Conservatives		Trait Ratings of Social Conservatives	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Childrearing values	-.02	.14	-.18	.23	-.21	.23	.04	.09
Anxiety about Social Conservatives	-.22*	.10	.61**	.17	-.40*	.17	-.18*	.07
Pride in Social Conservatives	.25**	.07	-.26*	.13	.48***	.13	.15**	.05
Constant	2.80***	.38	4.42***	.66	5.27***	.65	4.22***	.27
F (df)	5.39**(3,140)		6.03***(3,144)		6.56***(3,142)		5.16**(3,140)	
Adjusted R^2	.08		.09		.10		.08	
N	144		148		146		144	

Table 3.10

Emotions and attitudes toward social conservatives (entire sample).

Predictor	Identification with Social Conservatives		Negative Attitude toward Social Conservatives		Positive Attitude toward Social Conservatives		Trait Ratings of Social Conservatives	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	.30***	.07	-.14	.13	.28*	.13	.06	.05
Childrearing values	-.06	.07	-.12	.14	-.08	.13	.02	.06
Anxiety about Social Conservatives	-.02	.05	.49***	.10	-.26**	.10	-.14**	.04
Pride in Social Conservatives	.12*	.06	-.17	.11	.36**	.10	.11*	.04
Constant	2.78***	.07	5.18***	.14	5.37***	.14	4.14***	.06
F (df)	15.6***(4,364)		11.5***(4,370)		14.7***(4,367)		9.7***(4,363)	
Adjusted R^2	.14		.10		.13		.09	
N	369		375		372		368	

Table 3.11

Emotions about social conservatives predicting sacrifice for the sake of the ingroup

| Predictor | Willingness to donate to ban gay marriage | | | |
| | Among full sample | | Among conservative sample | |
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Childrearing values	.30**	.09	.45*	.18
Anxiety about social conservatives	-.14*	.06	-.14	.14
Pride in social conservatives	.44***	.05	.40***	.10
Constant	1.46***	.23	1.91***	.51
F(df)	40.1***(3,387)		10.36***(3,146)	
Adjusted R^2	.23		.16	
N	391		150	

Table 3.12

Gay symbolic threat predicting attitudes toward gays

Predictor	Opposition to Gay Rights		Negative Attitude toward Gays		Positive Attitude toward Gays		Trait Ratings of Gays		Willingness to Donate to Ban Gay Marriage	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.04	.03	.10	.08	-.18^T	.09	.05	.04	.25***	.06
Childrearing values	.0001	.04	.05	.09	.11	.11	-.04	.05	.11	.07
Gay symbolic threat	.69***	.04	1.61***	.08	-1.58***	.10	-.60***	.04	.73***	.06
Constant	2.18***	.04	3.73***	.09	6.63***	.11	4.69***	.05	2.34***	.07
F (df)	222.6***(3,385)		236.5***(3,404)		160.0***(3,397)		103.9***(3,393)		135.2***(3,403)	
Adjusted R^2	.63		.63		.54		.44		.50	
N	389		408		401		397		407	

Table 3.13

Test of childrearing authoritarian values as a moderator of the effect of gay symbolic threat on emotions toward gays.

| | Aversive Emotions toward Gays | | | | Pride in Gays | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	-.06	.04	-.06	.04	-.19**	.07	-.19**	.07
Gay symbolic threat	.66***	.04	.36**	.13	-.52***	.07	-.93***	.20
Childrearing values	.01	.05	.01	.05	-.04	.08	-.04	.08
Threat X Childrearing values	--	--	.07*	.03	--	--	.10*	.05
Constant	1.94***	.05	1.91***	.05	2.93***	.08	2.88***	.08
F (degrees of freedom)	109.8***(3,394)		84.8***(3,393)		50.7***(3,397)		39.6***(4,396)	
Adjusted R^2	.45		.46		.27		.28	
N	398		398		401		401	

Table 3.14

Test of authoritarianism composite as a moderator of the effect of gay symbolic threat on emotions toward gays.

| Predictor | Aversive Emotions toward Gays | | | | Pride in Gays | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	-.11*	.05	-.11*	.05	-.14[M]	.08	-.14[M]	.07
Gay symbolic threat	.68***	.05	.64***	.06	-.55***	.08	-.64***	.08
Authoritarianism composite	.01	.11	.09	.11	-.08	.16	.08	.16
Threat X Authoritarianism	--	--	.16**	.05	--	--	.32***	.08
Constant	1.95***	.06	1.85***	.06	2.92***	.09	2.74***	.10
F (degrees of freedom)	87.5***(3,313)		69.7***(4,312)		39.5***(3,316)		34.7***(4,315)	
Adjusted R^2	.45		.47		.27		.30	
N	317		317		320		320	

Table 3.15

Test of childrearing authoritarian values as a moderator of the effect of the relationship between gay symbolic threat and attitudes toward gays

Predictor	Opposition to gay rights		Negative ratings of gays		Willingness to donate to ban gay marriage	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.04	.03	.11	.08	.26***	.06
Gay symbolic threat	.47***	.11	.93***	.24	.43*	.18
Childrearing values	.004	.04	.05	.09	.11	.07
Threat X Childrearing values	.05*	.025	.17**	.06	.07^{M}	.04
Constant	2.15***	.04	3.64***	.10	2.30***	.07
F (degrees of freedom)	169.5***(4,384)		183.2***(4,403)		102.7***(4,402)	
Adjusted R^2	.63		.64		.50	
N	389		408		407	

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Table 3.16

Test of the authoritarianism composite as a moderator of the effect of the relationship between gay symbolic threat and attitudes toward gays

| Predictor | Opposition to Gay Rights | | | | Negative Ratings of Gays | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	.07^{M}	.04	.07^{M}	.04	.04	.09	.04	.09
Gay symbolic threat	.75***	.04	.69***	.04	1.69***	.10	1.62***	.10
Authoritarianism composite	.08	.09	.19*	.09	-.05	.19	.06	.20
Threat X Authoritarianism	--	--	.19***	.04	--	--	.23*	.10
Constant	2.52***	.05	2.41***	.05	3.72***	.10	3.59***	.12
F (degrees of freedom)	228.8***(3,307)		188.1***(4,306)		193.1***(3,321)		148.3***(4,320)	
Adjusted R^2	.69		.71		.64		.65	
N	311		311		325		325	

Table 3.17

Test of the authoritarianism composite as a moderator of the effect of the relationship between gay symbolic threat and attitudes toward gays

Predictor	Positive Ratings of Gays				Willingness to Donate to Ban Gay Marriage			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	-.11	.11	-.11	.11	.17*	.07	.17*	.07
Gay symbolic threat	-1.58***	.12	-1.64***	.13	.69***	.07	.60***	.07
Authoritarianism composite	.05	.24	.16	.25	.35*	.14	.50**	.15
Threat X Authoritarianism	--	--	.21^M	.12	--	--	.31***	.07
Constant	6.59***	.13	6.56***	.15	2.33***	.08	2.14***	.09
F (degrees of freedom)	114.9***(3,317)		87.5***(4,316)		98.0***(3,320)		82.1***(4,319)	
Adjusted R^2	.52		.52		.47		.50	
N	321		321		324		324	

Table 3.18

Test of childrearing authoritarian values as a moderator of the effect of the relationship between American symbolic threat and attitudes toward social conservatives

Predictor	Anxiety about social conservatives		Identification with social conservatives		Positive ratings of social conservatives	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	-.37***	.05	.39***	.05	.61***	.09
American symbolic threat	.12	.10	.07	.10	.25	.18
Childrearing values	-.18**	.07	-.01	.07	.07	.12
Threat X Childrearing values	.17$^{\text{T}}$	.09	-.18*	.09	-.40*	.16
Constant	2.67***	.07	2.80***	.07	5.38***	.13
F (degrees of freedom)	17.6***(4,395)		16.5***(4,398)		13.7***(4,402)	
Adjusted R^2	.14		.14		.11	
N	400		403		407	

Figure 3.1

Aversion toward gays mediating the relationship between gay symbolic threat and opposition to gay rights.

Figure 3.2

Aversion toward gays mediating the relationship between gay symbolic threat and negative ratings of gays

Figure 3.3

Aversion toward gays and pride in gays simultaneously mediate the relationship between gay symbolic threat and positive ratings of gays.

Figure 3.4

Aversion toward gays mediates the relationship between gay symbolic threat and trait ratings of

gays.

Gay Symbolic Threat → Aversion toward Gays: .63***

Aversion toward Gays → Trait ratings of Gays: -.18***

Gay Symbolic Threat → Trait ratings of Gays: -.45*** (-.57***)

Indirect effect = -.12 (SE = .03)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.15, -.09)

Figure 3.5

Aversion toward gays and pride in gays simultaneously mediate the relationship between gay symbolic threat and trait ratings of gays.

Total Indirect effect = -.23 (SE = .04)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.31, -.15)

Figure 3.6

Aversion toward gays mediates the relationship between gay symbolic threat and willingness to donate to ban gay marriage.

Figure 3.7

Mediated moderation analyses for symbolic threat, aversive emotions, and opposition to gay rights.

Figure 3.8

Mediated moderation analyses for symbolic threat, aversive emotions, and negative attitudes

toward gays.


```
                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │  Aversion   │
                    │ toward Gays │
                    └─────────────┘
         .07*                        .92***
┌──────────────┐                          ┌──────────────┐
│   Threat X   │          .10*            │   Negative   │
│Authoritarianism│ - - - - - - - - - - - ►│  Ratings of  │
│              │        (.17**)           │     Gays     │
└──────────────┘                          └──────────────┘
```

Indirect effect = .07 (SE = .03)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .01, .12)

Figure 3.9

Mediated moderation analyses for gay symbolic threat, aversive emotions toward gays and

willingness to donate to ban gay marriage.


```
                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │  Aversion   │
                    │ toward Gays │
                    └─────────────┘
         .07*                        .92***
┌──────────────┐                          ┌──────────────┐
│   Threat X   │          .04             │Willingness to│
│Authoritarianism│ - - - - - - - - - - - ►│Donate to Ban │
│              │        (.07^T)           │ Gay Marriage │
└──────────────┘                          └──────────────┘
```

Indirect effect = .03 (SE = .01)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .003, .05)

Chapter 4

Study 3

The goals for Study 3 are twofold: (1) to examine the causal relationships between symbolic threat and emotional responses and (2) to more carefully examine the role of positive emotions in authoritarian (or the lack of) responses. To accomplish this, I employed a between-subjects experimental design in which participants read one of six different articles. These articles varied the group target (ingroup: American citizens; outgroup: Muslim immigrants) and the level of threat (either highly threatening, completely nonthreatening, or control). Because it is possible that simply thinking about a group will elicit emotions, I also included two control conditions that refer to the target group, but made no mention of values whatsoever. This resulted in a two (group: ingroup and outgroup) by three (threat: high threat, low threat, control) experimental design. The ingroup poses a symbolic threat when great variance and diversity exist in the values and beliefs that fellow ingroup members hold. In contrast, value diversity in the outgroup does not necessarily pose a symbolic threat. Rather, the rejection of core ingroup values creates the symbolic threat. Because these represent conceptually different sources of threat—value diversity in the ingroup and value rejection from an outgroup—there is value in including experimental manipulations of both kinds of threat in this study. Previous researchers have conceptualized both as symbolic threats (see Feldman, 2003; Henry & Sears, 2002; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Funk, 1990; Stenner, 2005), but always in separate studies. Given that the hypotheses postulate that these different kinds

of threat have unique emotional consequences, it is imperative to include both types of threat in the same study for comparison purposes.

Hypotheses

1) Different kinds of symbolic threat should elicit distinct emotional reactions attached to the ingroup and to the outgroup.

    a. The high-symbolic threat condition for Muslim immigrants should elicit significantly more anger toward Muslim immigrants than the other five conditions. In contrast, the low-threat outgroup condition (designed to increase the perception that Muslim immigrants embrace American values) should elicit significantly more sympathy toward Muslim immigrants than should the other five conditions.

    b. High symbolic threat from ingroup members (other American citizens failing to embrace a normative set of values) should elicit significantly more anxiety about Americans compared to the other five conditions. The low-threat ingroup condition (Americans embracing a cohesive set of values) should elicit more pride in the ingroup than the other five conditions.

2) Intergroup emotional reactions associated with symbolic threats should predict ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

    a. Anger toward Muslim immigrants should lead to more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and a decreased willingness to extend American civil and social rights to the outgroup. Sympathy toward Muslim immigrants should produce the opposite effects.

b. Anxiety about American citizens (the ingroup) should lead to more negative attitudes toward Americans and a decreased willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the group. Pride in Americans should produce the opposite effects.

3) Intergroup emotions should mediate the relationship between the symbolic threat manipulations and ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

a. Anger toward Muslim immigrants should mediate the effect of the between high-threat outgroup manipulation on negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Sympathy toward Muslim immigrants should mediate the relationship between the low-threat outgroup condition and more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

b. Anxiety about Americans should mediate the relationship between perceiving that members of the ingroup hold diverse beliefs and values (high-threat ingroup manipulation) on the one hand and more negative attitudes and decreased commitment toward the American ingroup on the other. Pride in Americans should mediate the relationship between the low-threat ingroup condition and more positive attitudes and increased commitment toward Americans.

4) A predisposition to authoritarianism (as measured by childrearing values) should moderate emotional reactions to situations related to symbolic threat, and in turn, subsequent ingroup and outgroup attitudes. Authoritarian values should strengthen the relationships outlined in Hypotheses 1 and 3.

a. Authoritarianism should strengthen the effect of the threat (vs. the control) condition on outgroup emotions and attitudes. High authoritarians should feel

more anger toward Muslim immigrants in the high-threat outgroup condition and more sympathy in the low-threat outgroup condition. These outgroup emotions should mediate the relationship between the interaction between authoritarianism and condition on the one hand, and outgroup attitudes on the other.

b. Authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the effect the high-threat ingroup manipulation (versus control) on worry about Americans and similarly, the effect of the low-threat ingroup condition on American pride. Furthermore, authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the effect of the ingroup high-threat conditions on ingroup attitudes. Anxiety should explain why high authoritarians are especially likely to hold negative attitudes and to identify less with Americans when they are in the high-threat ingroup condition. Pride should explain why high authoritarians are especially likely to report more positive attitudes and to identify more with Americans in the low-threat ingroup condition.

Pilot Testing

Before beginning official data collection for Study 3, the six stimulus articles were pilot tested with undergraduate participants. These stimulus articles were constructed to manipulate participants' perceptions of the symbolic threat (high threat, low threat, control) posed by Muslim immigrants (the outgroup) or American citizens (the ingroup). Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the six articles. After reading the article, participants completed the measures of symbolic threat used in Study

1 and indicated the extent to which the article evoked a series of emotions about each of the target groups. The experimenters then interviewed each of the participants individually to assess the believability of the stimuli, how the article made the participants feel, and participants' own suggestions about what changes could be made to more strongly evoke the hypothesized emotion. For example, the experimenters asked participants in the outgroup low-threat condition what would make them feel more sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants and if there was anything in particular in the article that evoked feelings of anger. Once the experimenter completed the interview, s/he fully debriefed the participant about the purpose of the study and informed the participants that the articles were fake and created expressly for this study.

Participants

To test whether the stimulus articles affected participants' perceptions of symbolic threat in the intended direction, 160 undergraduates were recruited from the University of Minnesota. The sample was comprised of 114 women and 46 men, with mean age of 19.6.

Stimuli

All experimental stimuli were presented as an ostensibly real news article from a major local area paper, The Star Tribune (see Appendix L for the full text of all stimuli).

Ingroup high threat. For the ingroup-high-threat condition, participants read an article about the beliefs and values of American citizens. The article presented ostensibly real recent data that Americans increasingly do not uniformly embrace the same values, paying particular attention to disagreements about religious and moral issues, and family

and social relationships. The article emphasizes that in recent years, public opinion on these issues has become increasingly divided and it looks like these divisions will only continue to strengthen. To help prevent subtyping the deviates as "non-Americans," the article emphasized the prototypical nature of the Americans who reject typical American values. Furthermore, because the participants would be college students, the article included interview quotes from high school and college students from around the local area.

    Ingroup nonthreat. For the ingroup-nonthreat-condition, participants read an article similar to the high-threat condition, about the beliefs and values of American citizens. Again, this article emphasized values related to religious and moral issues, family and social relationships. In this condition, however, the article stressed that public opinion on a wide range of issues is becoming increasingly united and agreement looks likely to continue increasing in the future. This article used the same fabricated research and student quotes, adjusted to make the opposite point that young Americans were increasingly agreeing on values.

    Ingroup control. To activate the American citizen category without explicitly calling into question issues regarding belief and value consensus, the ingroup control article corresponded to a restaurant review of a local restaurant that specializes in American cuisine (e.g., hamburgers, steaks, milkshakes). The article read like a restaurant review, focusing mostly on the food, menu items, and restaurant decor.

    Outgroup threat. For the outgroup-threat condition, the article focused on Muslim immigrants' values. Like the ingroup articles, the outgroup articles contained

fabricated research findings and quotes from young Muslim immigrants to convey the point that many Muslim immigrants reject core American values related to religious and moral issues, family, and social relationships. Instead, Muslim immigrants were portrayed as retaining their home country's cultural values and expressing disdain for American values.

Outgroup nonthreat. In the nonthreat condition, the article again focused on Muslim immigrants' values. The article emphasized that the majority of members of the group embrace traditional American values regarding religious and moral issues, and family and social relationships. This article used the same presentation of recent research findings and quotes from young Muslim immigrants and scholars to convey that Muslim immigrants were by-and-large, embracing American values.

Outgroup control. Like the ingroup-control condition, the outgroup category of Muslim immigrants was activated by using a fake restaurant review. The Muslim-immigrants article reviewed a new (local) restaurant opened by Muslim immigrants specializing in Middle Eastern and African cuisine. The article concentrated on reviewing the food, menu and restaurant decor, without ever referring to values. Like the ingroup control condition, the review was positive, but restrained (not outright glowing).

Measures

Perceived value difference from Muslim immigrants. To check that the manipulations affected perceived symbolic threat from Muslim immigrants, the pilot study employed the same measures used in Study 1. Participants indicated the extent to which they believed Muslim immigrants hold values consistent with core American

values. Seven items indexed the degree to which the participants perceived Muslim immigrants to possess values similar to American (see Appendix C). Two items were recoded such that in the entire scale, higher values corresponded to greater perceived threat ($\alpha = .83$, $M= 3.58$, $SD= 1.03$).

       Perceived diversity of beliefs/values within the ingroup. To assess whether the ingroup-symbolic-threat manipulations produced the expected effects, participants indicated the extent to which they believed United States citizens held uniform or diverse sets of values and beliefs after reading their stimulus article (see Appendix B). These four items were identical to those used in Study 1 and tap participants' perceived threat to social cohesion scale in order to focus on *value* diversity, rather than diversity, per se. Items were recoded to indicate higher perceptions of symbolic threat ($\alpha = .66$, $M= 4.36$, $SD=1.07$).

Results

       The analyses that follow use a 2 (group) X 3 (threat level) factorial design. Looking first at perceptions of Muslim symbolic threat, Table 4.1 shows that participants' perceptions that Muslim immigrants do not embrace American values varied in the predicted directions. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) factorial with condition (control, high threat, low threat) and target group (Muslim immigrants, Americans) as the between-participants variables and Muslim symbolic threat as the dependent variable revealed a significant effect of target group, $F(1,87) = 7.18$, $p < .01$, and a significant effect of threat level $F(2,97) = 5.7$, $p < .01$. The interaction between target group and threat level also reached significance $F(2,97) = 6.25$, $p < .01$, indicating that the effect of

threat level on perceptions of Muslim symbolic threat depended on the source of the threat. As expected, those in the high-threat Muslim condition reported the greatest perceived threat from Muslim immigrants ($M = 4.09$, $SD = 1.01$) and those in the low-threat Muslim condition reported the lowest perceived threat from Muslim immigrants ($M = 3.03$, $SD = .81$). Scheffe's post-hoc tests indicated that although participants perceived greater threat in the high-threat Muslim immigrant condition than in the control condition ($M = 3.32$, $SD = .98$), this difference did not reach significance, $p = .31$. The difference between the high-threat Muslim condition and the low-threat Muslim condition did reach marginal significance, $p = .06$. Interestingly, participants in the low-threat Muslim condition reported significantly less perceived threat from Muslim immigrants than in all the American conditions (all $ps < .05$), whereas the difference between the high-threat Muslim condition and the American conditions did not reach significance regardless of threat level.

The same ANOVA was run as the model reported above with perceived American threat as the dependent variable (see Table 4.1 for means and standard deviations for all conditions). The entire model was significant for the composite measure of American symbolic threat, $F(5,97) = 2.85$, $p < .05$, but Scheffe's post-hoc comparisons tests did not reveal significant differences between conditions. However, a single item indexing to the degree to which participants rated Americans as not holding the same religious and moral values provided a more promising set of results. The full model, including target group, threat level, and the interaction between the target group and threat level was significant for this single item, $F(5,97) = 12.78$, $p < .001$. The interaction between target group and

threat level also reached significance for the single item measure of American threat, $F(2,97) = 3.47$, $p < .05$. As Table 4.1 shows, the mean levels for the single-item measure of religious and moral threat varied in the predicted directions. Participants in the high-threat ingroup condition agreed more with the statement that Americans did not hold the same religious and moral values ($M = 6.25$, $SD = .85$) than participants in the ingroup control condition ($M = 5.6$, $SD = 1.65$), who in turn, agreed with the statement more than participants in the low-threat condition ($M = 4.86$, $SD = 1.74$). Although none of these differences reached significance according to Scheffe's post-hoc tests, they all trended in the expected directions. Furthermore, perceived symbolic threat from Americans was significantly greater in the high-threat ingroup condition than in the high-threat outgroup condition ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.44$), $p < .01$, and in the low-threat outgroup condition ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.44$), $p < .01$, ($M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.88$), $p < .01$.

Because each of the conditions at least trended in the expected direction in terms of perceived value threat, the stimuli were deemed ready for the full experiment. Furthermore, given that this dissertation explicitly hypothesized that not all people will find value diversity threatening, it remains possible that an authoritarian moderator variable masked certain main effects. In the full study described below, all individual difference measures used in the previous two studies were incorporated.

Study 3

Overview

Participants completed Study 3 in two parts to minimize fatigue from completing the questionnaire and to allay any suspicions about the hypotheses. First, participants

completed an online survey (approximately 15-20 minutes in length) that contained basic demographic information and all of the measures of authoritarianism used in the previous studies. After completing the online survey on a computer of their convenience, participants contacted the experimenter to schedule a time to come into the lab to complete the second part in person. The experimenter always scheduled the participants at least three days after they completed the online survey to minimize speculation about the hypotheses. In the second part of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read one of the six different articles pre-tested in the pilot study. After reading the ostensibly real article about American citizens or Muslim immigrants, participants answered questions about their perceptions of symbolic threat posed by the two groups (manipulation checks), followed by the same emotion and dependent variables as Study 1. If the article was about Muslim immigrants, the measures of threat perceptions, emotions and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants preceded the measures about American citizens. If the target article concerned American citizens, the American citizen measures preceded measures of Muslim immigrants. All participants were thoroughly debriefed and probed for suspicion of hypotheses. Unless otherwise specified, the analyses will be run as a 2 (target group: American, Muslim immigrants) by 3 (threat level: high, low, control) fully-crossed factorial design.

Participants

Participants were recruited for this two-part experiment from psychology classes at the University of Minnesota. Participants were informed that the study was about people's reactions to media representations of social groups and that they would complete

the first part online and the second part in a University lab. Of the 396 (93 men, 291 women, 12 did not say) participants who completed the online survey, 329 completed experiment in Part 2. Strangely, ten participants completed Part 2 but did not have online survey data for Part 1. Only participants who completed both parts of the study were used in the analyses reported here. Of the participants who completed both parts, 70 identified as men and 236 identified as women (one did not report). Because the analyses focus on American citizens as the ingroup, only the 280 participants who identified as United States citizens were used in the analyses (22 reported that they were not U.S. citizens and five declined to answer). Finally, the six participants who identified as Muslim immigrants were removed from analyses.

Measures

Authoritarian-related measures. In the online survey, participants completed the same measures of authoritarianism and predispositions to authoritarianism as those used in Studies 1 and 2: Belief in a Dangerous World ($\alpha = .81$, $M = 3.83$, $SD = .44$), Openness to New Experiences ($\alpha = .81$, $M = 3.71$, $SD = .46$), Social Conformity ($\alpha = .83$, $M = 3.30$, $SD = .66$), Childrearing Values ($\alpha = .65$, $M = 3.80$, $SD = .98$), Right Wing Authoritarianism ($\alpha = .78$, $M = 3.93$, $SD = .81$). All scales are coded such that higher scores correspond to greater authoritarian tendencies. Because all of these measures formed a reliable composite, they were standardized and averaged into one measure ($\alpha = .71$, $M = .01$, $SD = .67$).

Ideology. On a scale of 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative), participants indicated their level of social, economic, and general conservatism. They also indicated

their party identification on a seven-point scale where 1 corresponded to "Strong Democrat" and 7 corresponded to "Strong Republican." These four items were averaged to form a composite scale of ideological self-placement ($\alpha = .92$, $M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.48$).

Perceived diversity of beliefs/values among American citizens (the ingroup). To assess a symbolic threat originating from within the ingroup, participants indicated the extent to which they believed United States citizens held uniform or diverse sets of values and beliefs (see Appendix B). These are the same items used as the dependent measures in the Pilot Study, chosen to focus on *value* diversity, rather than diversity, per se. Four items were recoded to indicate higher perceptions of symbolic threat ($\alpha = .73$, $M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.03$).[13]

Perceived value difference from Muslim immigrants (the outgroup). To measure symbolic threat originating from an outgroup, participants indicated the extent to which they believed Muslim immigrants hold values consistent with core American values. Adapted from Stephan et al. (1999) and Marcus et al. (1995), these measures index the degree to which a person perceives the outgroup as possessing similar values to American citizens and threatens American culture (see Appendix C). Items were recoded such that higher values corresponded to greater perceived threat ($\alpha = .86$, $M = 3.65$, $SD = 1.13$).

Emotions toward Muslim immigrants. Participants' emotions toward the outgroup were measured using an adapted version of the PANAS (see Appendix D). On

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[13] As stated above, all participants completed all measures, regardless of condition. However, the order of measures depended on the identity of the target group. Participants who read an article about Muslim immigrants completed the Muslim immigrant measures first whereas participants who read about Americans completed the American measures first.

a scale of 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("extremely"), participants were asked the extent to which

the article evoked 31 different emotions about Muslim immigrants. In addition to the

emotion scales associated with the key hypothesized emotions toward the outgroup

(anger and sympathy), people's levels of a series of other emotions (e.g., sadness,

happiness) were assessed to temper suspicion about the hypothesis. Participants indicated

the extent to which they felt each emotion toward Muslim immigrants after reading the

article: anger ($\alpha = .90$, $M = 1.72$, $SD = 1.03$), anxiety ($\alpha = .82$, $M = 1.73$, $SD = .86$), and

sympathy ($\alpha = .84$, $M = 3.11$, $SD = 1.34$).

Emotions toward American citizens. After reading about American citizens,

participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the article made them feel each

emotion directed toward American citizens (the ingroup; see Appendix D): anger ($\alpha =$

.87, $M = 1.71$, $SD = .94$), anxiety ($\alpha = .91$, $M = 2.01$, $SD = 1.15$), and pride ($\alpha = .85$, $M =$

3.80, $SD = 1.59$).

Outgroup attitudes. As an evaluative measure of the outgroup, participants rated

the extent to which they viewed Muslim immigrants positively ($M = 5.66$, $SD = 2.44$) and

negatively ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 2.28$), each on a 0-10 scale ($r = -.69$, $p < .001$). Participants

also rated Muslim immigrants on the same four bipolar trait items used in Study 1:

honest/dishonest, trustworthy/untrustworthy, safe/dangerous, and good/bad. Items were

recoded so that higher numbers indicated more positive views ($\alpha = .87$, $M = 4.65$, $SD =$

.97).

Attitudes toward policies that extend ingroup rights to outgroup members.

Participants were asked to report how willing they would be to extend American rights to

Muslim immigrants (e.g., the right to make a speech in a public place, to hold public office, access to health care). Ten items were recoded so that higher numbers corresponded to more authoritarian attitude—less willingness to give rights to Muslim immigrants (α = .87, M = 2.34, SD = 1.00).

Ingroup attitudes. On a scale of 0-10, participants separately indicated the extent to which they viewed American citizens positively (M = 6.80, SD = 1.82) and negatively (M = 2.93, SD = 1.93). These two items were negative correlated (r = -.73, p < .001). Participants also rated American citizens on four bipolar trait items: honest/dishonest, trustworthy/untrustworthy, safe/dangerous, and good/bad. Items were coded so that higher numbers indicated more positive views (α = .79, M = 4.57, SD = .77).

Ingroup commitment and identification. Five items gauged how close participants reported feeling to American citizens and how happy they were with being an American (see Appendix F). The five items, answered on a 1-7 scale, were averaged to form a composite in which higher numbers indicated greater identification with Americans (α = .88, M = 5.04, SD = 1.29). A nationalism scale was used as a measure of a person's identification and active belief that their country is superior and should dominate other countries (α = .73, M = 3.47, SD = 1.05).

Results

The analyses that follow will be separated into two sections: 1) analyses associated with hypotheses related to Muslim immigrants and 2) analytical tests of ingroup (American citizens) related hypotheses. As in the Pilot Study, all of the manipulation checks and the emotion dependent variables will be analyzed using a fully-

crossed 3X2 factorial ANOVA. The mediation and mediated-moderation analyses, however, will examine ingroup and outgroup manipulations separately. For example, the mediation analysis to test whether anger at Muslim immigrants mediates the effect of the high-threat outgroup manipulation on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants will select only for those who read an article about Muslim immigrants (the high threat, low threat, or control articles). This is because the mediation analyses are designed to explore whether the effect of a specific group-based manipulation on specific dependent variables operates through a specific group-based emotion.

Outgroup Analyses

Manipulation check for outgroup symbolic threat. A 3X2 ANOVA was run to examine how the article manipulations affected participants' perceptions of Muslim values with the between-subjects variables of target source and threat level, along with the interaction between threat source and threat level. The full model with the two main effect variables and the interaction was significant, $F(5,266) = 10.4$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .15$ (see Table 4.2). The main effect for threat level was significant, $F(2,266) = 19.2$, $p < .001$, as was the interaction term for threat-by-target group $F(2, 266) = 7.3$, $p < .001$. As Table 4.2 shows, the mean levels of perceived symbolic-threat from Muslim immigrants varied in the expected directions. Participants in the high-threat outgroup condition reported the highest levels of perceived threat from Muslims ($M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.03$). According to Scheffe's post-hoc tests, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants was significantly higher in the high-threat outgroup condition than in the low-threat outgroup condition ($M = 3.31$, $SD = .99$), $p < .001$, and in the control outgroup condition ($M = $

3.12, $SD = .98$), $p < .001$. The difference between the mean perceived threat from Muslims in the high-threat outgroup condition was also significant compared to the means in the control ingroup condition and the low-threat ingroup condition, ps $< .01$. Although participants in the high-threat outgroup condition perceived greater symbolic threat from Muslim immigrants than those in the high-threat ingroup condition ($M = 3.81$, $SD = .78$), this difference did not reach significance, $p = .12$. Finally, the outgroup low-threat condition did not produce the hypothesized effects; participants in the low-threat outgroup condition did not perceive significantly lower threat from Muslim immigrants than participants in the control outgroup condition.

Intercorrelations among key outgroup variables. Table 4.3 displays the correlations among the key outgroup variables. As shown, the manipulation check for participants' perception that Muslim immigrants violate core American values correlates in the expected directions with each of the measures of outgroup emotions. Perceptions of Muslim symbolic threat are positively and significantly associated with anger at Muslim immigrants ($r = .62$, $p <.001$) and negatively associated with sympathy toward Muslim immigrants ($r = -.27$, $p <.01$). As in Study 1, Muslim symbolic threat is positively correlated with opposition to Muslim rights ($r = .57$, $p <.001$) and negative thermometer ratings of Muslim immigrants ($r = .60$, $p <.001$), whereas Muslim symbolic threat is negatively associated with positive thermometer ratings of Muslim immigrants ($r = -.60$, $p <.001$) and positive trait ratings of Muslim immigrants ($r = -.51$, $p <.001$). Anger at Muslim immigrants follows the same pattern of associations: It is positively correlated with opposition to Muslim rights ($r = .48$, $p <.001$) and negative thermometer

ratings ($r = .62$, $p < .001$), whereas anger is negatively correlated with positive

thermometer ratings ($r = -.56$, $p < .001$) and positive trait ratings ($r = -.33$, $p < .001$).

Sympathy and anger toward Muslim immigrants are negative associated ($r = -.27$, p

$< .01$), as expected. Sympathy toward Muslim immigrants is negatively correlated with

opposition to Muslim rights ($r = -.36$, $p < .001$) and negative thermometer ratings ($r = -$

$.29$, $p < .001$), whereas it is positively associated with positive thermometer ratings ($r =$

$.34$, $p < .001$) and positive trait ratings of Muslim immigrants ($r = .37$ $p < .001$).

Hypothesis 1a. *The high-threat outgroup manipulation (from Muslim*

immigrants) should elicit significantly more anger toward Muslim immigrants than the

other manipulations. The low-threat outgroup manipulation should elicit significantly

more sympathy toward Muslim immigrants than the other five manipulations. A 3

(threat level: high, low, control) X 2 (threat source: ingroup, outgroup) factorial ANOVA

with an interaction term was run to examine whether the high-threat outgroup condition

elicited significantly more anger toward Muslim immigrants than did the other

manipulations. As Table 4.2 shows, the overall model was significant, $F(5,269) = 8.64$, p

$< .001$, $\eta^2 = .14$. The main effect for threat source was significant, $F(1,269) = 5.75$, $p <$

$.05$, with participants in the Muslim outgroup conditions ($M = 1.69$, $SD = 1.00$) reporting

more anger toward Muslim immigrants than those in the American ingroup conditions (M

$= 1.42$, $SD = .87$). Threat level also had a significant main effect on anger at Muslim

immigrants, $F(2,269) = 14.6$, $p < .001$, with those in the high-threat manipulations

reporting significantly more anger toward Muslim immigrants ($M = 1.95$, $SD = 1.18$) than

participants in the low-threat manipulations ($M = 1.47$, $SD = .87$) and participants in the

control conditions ($M = 1.24$, $SD = 1.24$). Most important, however, the interaction between threat level and target source was significant, $F(2,269) = 4.21$, $p < .05$. Table 4.2 shows that participants in the high-threat outgroup condition reported the most anger toward Muslim immigrants ($M = 2.30$, $SD = 1.22$). According to Scheffe's post-hoc analyses, participants in the in the high-threat outgroup condition reported significantly more anger toward Muslim immigrants than participants in all five other conditions.

A parallel 3X2 factorial ANOVA was run with sympathy toward Muslim immigrants as the dependent variable. The overall model was significant, $F(5,268) = 12.6$, $p < .001$, with main effects for the threat source, $F(1,268) = 45.3$, $p < .001$, threat level, $F(2,268) = 5.06$, $p < .01$, and the threat-by-source interaction, $F(2,268) = 3.15$, $p < .05$. Table 4.2 shows the mean levels of sympathy toward Muslim immigrants for participants in each of the six conditions. As predicted, participants in the low-threat outgroup condition reported the most sympathy toward Muslim immigrants ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.31$). However, Scheffe's post-hoc analyses revealed that the mean for sympathy toward Muslim immigrants in the low-threat condition was only significantly higher than the ingroup-control condition ($p < .001$) and marginally higher than the high-threat ingroup condition ($p < .10$).

Thus, Hypothesis 1a received partial support. The high-threat outgroup manipulation evoked significantly more anger toward Muslim immigrants than the other five manipulations. However, although participants in the low-threat outgroup condition reported the highest sympathy scores toward Muslim immigrants, this difference was

only significant when compared to the ingroup control and high-threat ingroup manipulation.

   Hypothesis 2a. *Anger toward Muslim immigrants should lead to more negative attitudes toward the Muslim immigrants and a decreased willingness to extend American civil and social rights to the outgroup. Sympathy toward Muslim immigrants should produce the opposite effects.* A series of OLS regressions were conducted to test whether the two key outgroup emotions, anger and sympathy, significantly affected each of the dependent variables related to Muslim immigrants. In each model, the dependent variable was regressed on centered measures of anger toward Muslim immigrants, sympathy toward Muslim immigrants, childrearing authoritarian values, and ideology. The results of these analyses can be found in Table 4.4. As the table shows, anger at Muslim immigrants was significantly related to each of the dependent measures. Anger at Muslim immigrants predicted more negative thermometer ratings ($b = 1.31$, $p < .001$), more opposition to Muslim rights ($b = .31$, $p < .001$), and more nationalistic attitudes toward the United States ($b = .16$, $p < .05$). Anger at Muslim immigrants also predicted less positive thermometer ratings ($b = -1.08$, $p < .001$) and trait ratings ($b = -.16$, $p < .05$). In contrast, sympathy toward Muslim immigrants significantly predicted more positive thermometer ratings ($b = .28$, $p < .05$), more positive trait ratings ($b = .17$, $p < .01$), and less opposition to Muslim rights ($b = -.14$, $p < .01$). All of these relationships are in the expected directions; anger at Muslim immigrants predicted more negative attitudes whereas sympathy toward Muslim immigrants predicted more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

Hypothesis 3a. *Outgroup emotions should mediate the effect of the symbolic-threat outgroup manipulations on outgroup attitudes. Anger toward Muslim immigrants should mediate the effect of the high-threat outgroup manipulation on negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Sympathy toward Muslim immigrants should mediate the effect of the low-threat outgroup manipulation and more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.* As described in Studies 1 and 2, mediation is typically established by showing that three conditions are met (Baron & Kenny, 1986): 1) the independent variable is significantly related to the dependent variable; 2) the independent variable must predict the mediator; and 3) the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must be significantly reduced when the mediator is added to the model. However, psychometricians and statisticians have recently argued that the first condition (the independent variable predicting the dependent variable) is not required to show evidence of mediation (Judd & Kenny, 2010; MacKinnon, et al., 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). When the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is not significantly different from zero, an indirect relationship may still emerge during the Sobel test. The most important criterion then is that the indirect effect is significantly different from zero. As in the analyses for the previous studies, when the effect of the predictor (here, the manipulation) fails to reach significance for the dependent variable, I will still examine whether the manipulation indirectly affects the dependent variable via the hypothesized mediator.

The mediation analyses that follow will employ the same general approach. A series of two OLS regressions will be reported for each of the dependent variables. The

first model contains dummy-coded effects for the high-threat and low-threat manipulations (the control serves as the reverent cell), the centered childrearing values measure, and the centered ideology measure.[14] This tests whether the threat manipulation significantly affected participants' scores on the dependent measures, as compared to participants in the control condition. Normally, in mediation analyses, we would next examine whether the independent variables (i.e., conditions) significantly affected the mediators (i.e., the emotions). This was already shown in the OLS regression analyses associated with Hypothesis 1a. Participants in the high-threat outgroup condition indeed reported the most anger at Muslim immigrants, whereas participants in the low-threat outgroup condition reported the most sympathy. Therefore, the second regression analysis tests whether the addition of the key emotion variables adds significantly to the model in order to calculate the indirect effect of the independent variable on the dependent measure, via the emotion mediator. Sobel-Goodman tests of the mediation and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect will follow each pair of regressions.

Turning first to negative ratings of Muslim immigrants, Table 4.5 shows that neither of the dummy-coded condition variables reached significance (ps > .10). In this model, only ideology was significantly related to negative ratings of Muslim immigrants ($b = .55$, $p < .001$). Following the Shrout and Bolger's (2002) and MacKinnon et al.'s (2002) recommendations for mediation analyses, a mediation test was run to examine

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[14] Recall that Hypotheses 3a and 4a are only concerned with whether the effect of the outgroup manipulations operate via emotions toward the outgroup.   As such, these analyses only examine participants in the outgroup conditions.

whether the high-threat manipulation affected negative ratings indirectly, via anger at

Muslim immigrants (see Figure 4.1). In the second regression model (also shown in

Table 4.5) the effect of the high-threat manipulation now reached significance (b = -.81,

p <.05). The effect of the anger measure was also highly significant (b = 1.54 p <.001).

More important, the Sobel-Goodman test revealed that mediation for the anger measure

was significant (IE = 1.55, z = 4.45, p < .001). Interestingly, the indirect effect (IE =

1.55) was of the opposite sign of the direct effect (DE = -.81). This is one of the cases

described by statisticians and psychometricians (e.g., MacKinnon et al., 2002; Shrout &

Bolger, 2002) in which we would expect the direct effect to remain hidden (or

suppressed) in Model 1, thus justifying the mediation test despite the failure to reach

significance for the traditional first requirement for establishing mediation. This

supported the first half of Hypothesis 3a, that anger at Muslim immigrants should

mediate the effect of the high-threat manipulation on attitudes toward Muslim

immigrants. According to the second part of the mediation hypothesis, the low-threat

outgroup manipulation should also indirectly affect negative ratings of Muslim

immigrants, but via sympathy. This proved not to be the case, however (IE = .11, z =

1.03, p = .32).

     A similar pattern emerged for positive thermometer ratings of Muslim

immigrants. In the first regression model (shown in Table 4.5), the coefficients for the

high-threat outgroup manipulation (b = -.41, p > .10) and the low-threat outgroup

manipulation (b = -.03, p > .10) both failed to reach significance. In further evidence of a

suppressor effect, the coefficient for the high-threat outgroup manipulation became

significant ($b = .98$, $p < .05$) when the anger mediator was added to Model 2. Figure 4.2

shows that the effect of anger at Muslim immigrants on positive ratings of Muslim

immigrants was highly significant in Model 2 ($b = -1.39$, $p < .001$). The Sobel-Goodman

test for mediation was significant ($IE = -1.40$, $z = 4.19$, $p < .001$) and the bootstrapped

confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($-1.27 < c' < -.39$). Again,

the indirect effect (IE) was of the opposite sign as the direct effect ($DE = .98$). Although

these analyses showed that the high-threat outgroup manipulation indirectly affected

positive ratings of Muslim immigrants via increased anger toward Muslims, sympathy

toward Muslim immigrants did not also operate as a mediator. Contrary to expectations,

the Sobel-Goodman test for sympathy toward Muslim immigrants mediating the

relationship between the low-threat manipulation and positive ratings did not reach

significance ($IE = .14$, $z = 1.05$, $p = .29$).

In the analyses for trait ratings of Muslim immigrants, Model 1 (shown in Table

4.6) revealed that participants in the high-threat outgroup condition ($b = -.04$, $p > .10$) did

not differ significantly from participants in the control condition. Model 1 also revealed

that participants in the low-threat outgroup condition did not rate the traits of Muslim

immigrants different than the control participants ($b = .03$, $p > .10$). As Figure 4.3

shows, anger at Muslim immigrants significantly predicted less positive trait ratings ($b = -.32$, $p < .001$) in Model 2 and the Sobel-Goodman with bias-corrected bootstrapped

analyses indicated a significant mediation ($IE = -.32$, $z = 3.03$, $p < .01$). The bias-

corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($-.33 < c' < -.08$), providing further evidence that the high-threat outgroup manipulation indirectly led

participants to rate Muslim immigrants as possessing less positive traits, via an anger

mechanism. The Sobel-Goodman test for the low-threat outgroup manipulation revealed

that sympathy toward Muslim immigrants did not serve as a mediator ($IE = .07$, $z = 1.22$,

$p > .10$).

Mediation analyses for the dependent measure, opposition to Muslim rights, again

showed the same pattern of results. The coefficients for the low-threat outgroup

manipulation ($b = .05$, $p > .10$) and the high-threat outgroup manipulation ($b = .08$, $p >$

.10) both failed to reach significance in Model 1 (see Table 4.6). Indicating a possible

suppressor effect, the high-threat outgroup coefficient changed signs and became

significant in Model 2 ($b = -.38$, $p < .05$). Figure 4.4 shows that in the full model, the

relationship between the mediator, anger at Muslims, strongly predicted opposition to

Muslim rights ($b = .45$, $p < .001$). The mediation was significant according to the Sobel-

Goodman test ($IE = .45$, $z = 3.87$, $p < .001$) and the bias-corrected confidence interval did

not contain zero ($.20 < c' < .63$). The finding that the direct effect ($DE = -.83$) was

negative whereas the indirect effect ($IE = .45$) was positive provides further evidence of

inconsistent mediation and explains why the direct relationship failed to reach

significance in Model 1. This was not the case for the sympathy mediation test of the

low-threat manipulation, which failed to reach significance ($IE = -.06$, $z = 1.07$, $p = .29$).

The final mediation test for the outgroup examined the role of the threat

manipulations and anger toward Muslim immigrants in participants' nationalistic

attitudes. As shown in Table 4.7, neither the high-threat outgroup manipulation ($b = -.15$,

$p > .10$) nor the low-threat outgroup manipulation ($b = -.12$, $p > .10$) differed significantly

from the control referent group in Model 1. Indicating possible suppression again, the direction of the high-threat manipulation switched and became significant ($b = -.44$, $p < .05$) once the mediator, anger, was added to the model. As Figure 4.5 shows, anger at Muslims was also highly significant ($b = .22$, $p < .01$). The Sobel-Goodman test for anger mediating the relationship between the high-threat manipulation and nationalistic attitudes was also significant ($IE = .30$, $z = 2.78$, $p < .01$) and the bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($.08 < c' < .35$). In contrast, the mediation test for the low-threat manipulation lowering nationalistic attitudes via sympathy toward Muslims did not approach significance ($IE = -.02$, $z = .72$, $p = .47$).

Taken together, these analyses present a consistent pattern of inconsistent mediation, in which the direct effect and indirect effect have opposite signs, but the significance test for mediation is significant. The main effects for the high- and low-threat manipulations never reached significance for any of the dependent variables. However, the Sobel-Goodman test showed that in every case, the high-threat outgroup manipulation affected the dependent variable indirectly, via increased anger at Muslim immigrants. That is, the high-threat outgroup manipulation led people to feel more anger at Muslim immigrants, which predicted less positive (i.e., thermometer ratings and trait ratings) and more negative (i.e., thermometer ratings) attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, more opposition to Muslim civil rights, and more nationalistic attitudes toward the United States. Contrary to predictions, however, sympathy toward Muslim immigrants did not operate as the mediator between the low-threat outgroup manipulation

and any of the dependent variables. Based on these experimental analyses, it thus appears that anger is the key emotion for explaining how outgroup symbolic threats affect outgroup attitudes, at least in the case of the Muslim immigrant outgroup.

Hypothesis 4a. *Authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the relationship between outgroup-threat manipulations and outgroup emotions and attitudes. High authoritarians should feel more anger in the high-threat outgroup condition and more sympathy in the low-threat outgroup condition. These outgroup emotions should mediate the relationship between the interaction between authoritarianism and condition on the one hand and outgroup attitudes on the other.* To test this mediated-moderation hypothesis, it is important first to establish that the interaction predicts the mediator variable in the expected direction. Therefore, a two-step hierarchical OLS regression was performed for both anger at Muslim immigrants and sympathy toward Muslim immigrants. Step 1 contained the dummy-coded independent variables, and centered measures of ideology (for control purposes) and childrearing authoritarian values. In the second step, two interaction terms were added to the model: one for the interaction between the dummy-coded high-threat manipulation and authoritarian childrearing values and one for the interaction between the dummy-coded low-threat manipulation and authoritarian childrearing values. Because analyses for Hypothesis 1a already explored the main effects of condition on the outgroup emotions, the analyses in this section focus explicitly on Step 2. Contrary to expectations, the interaction term between the high-threat outgroup manipulation and childrearing values ($b = .25$, $p = .19$) and the interaction between the low-threat outgroup manipulation and

childrearing values ($b = .18$, $p = .37$) both failed to significantly predict anger at Muslim immigrants. Authoritarian childrearing values did interact significantly with both the low-threat manipulation ($b = .62$, $p < .05$) and high-threat manipulation ($b = .65$, $p < .05$), in contrast, to predict sympathy toward Muslim immigrants (see Table 4.8). Analyses of simple slopes revealed that childrearing authoritarian values significantly predicted sympathy only in the control condition ($b = -.69$, $p < .001$). In the high-threat experimental condition, the coefficient for childrearing values dropped to nonsignificance ($b = -.04$, $p > .10$) as it did in the low-threat condition ($b = -.07$, $p > .10$). This implies that contrary to expectations, the outgroup-threat manipulations wiped out the effect of childrearing authoritarian values on sympathy toward the outgroup. To ensure that the lack of significant effects did not result from an idiosyncrasy of the childrearing-authoritarian measure, interaction terms were also created and tested for the composite authoritarianism measure. However, none of these interaction terms reached significance for anger or sympathy toward Muslim immigrants (ps $> .10$).

Although mediation is unlikely, given that authoritarianism did not affect people's anger responses to the threat conditions and only predicted sympathy in the control, I still explored whether participants attitudes toward Muslim immigrants varied as a function of a predisposition to authoritarianism. As such, the same two-step hierarchical regression models were run with each of the five dependent measures (positive and negative thermometer ratings, trait ratings, opposition to Muslim rights, and nationalism). Using both the childrearing-authoritarianism measure and the authoritarianism composite for the interaction terms revealed that threat manipulations did not alter the effect of

authoritarianism on any of the outgroup attitude measures. The coefficients for the authoritarianism main effect remained significant and in the expected direction, but did not change as a result of threat manipulations.

Ingroup Analyses

Manipulation checks for ingroup symbolic threat. A 2 (threat source: Muslim, American) X 3 (threat level: high, low, control) factorial ANOVA was run to examine whether the stimulus articles manipulated participants' perceptions of American citizens' values. In this analysis, the same index of American symbolic threat was used as in Study 1 and Study 2. As Table 4.9 shows, the full model was significant, $F(5, 269) = 14.7$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .20$. The main effect for target group was significant, $F(1, 269) = 39.5$, $p < .001$, with participants who read an article about Americans ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.03$) reporting significantly more perceived ingroup threat than participants who read about Muslim immigrants ($M = 4.06$, $SD = .90$). The main effect for threat level was also significant, $F(2,269) = 10.8$, $p < .001$, with participants in the high-threat conditions ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.06$) reporting significantly more perceived threat from Americans than participants in the low-threat conditions ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.02$). Most important, the interaction between threat and source was significant, $F(2,269) = 7.04$, $p < .01$, and as Table 4.9 shows, participants in the high-threat ingroup condition reported the most perceived threat from Americans. Scheffe's post-hoc analyses revealed that people in the high-threat ingroup manipulation ($M = 5.33$, $SD = .76$) perceived significantly more symbolic threat from fellow Americans than participants in the low-threat ingroup condition ($M = 4.25$, $SD = 1.10$) and marginally more threat than participants in the

ingroup control condition ($M = 4.74$, $SD = .87$), $p < .10$. The high-threat ingroup manipulation also evoked significantly more perceived threat from Americans than all of threat levels of the three outgroup manipulations ($ps < .01$). However, the mean perceived threat in the low-threat ingroup manipulation did not differ significantly from the mean perceived threat in the ingroup control condition.

Intercorrelations among key ingroup variables. Table 4.10 displays the results for the pairwise correlations among all key ingroup variables (after selecting for participants in the ingroup conditions). As the table shows, the manipulation check measure of American symbolic threat correlated significantly with all of the other measures. American symbolic threat correlated positively with anxiety about Americans ($r = .23$, $p < .05$) and anger at Americans ($r = .21$, $p < .05$) and positively with pride in Americans ($r = -.45$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, American symbolic threat was negatively associated with ratings on the positive feelings thermometer ($r = -.36$, $p < .001$), positive trait ratings ($r = -.45$, $p < .001$) and identification with Americans ($r = -.25$, $p < .01$). Turning to emotions, anxiety about Americans only correlated with one dependent measure, negative feeling thermometer ratings ($r = -.20$, $p < .05$). Pride, in contrast correlated significantly with all the measures. Pride in Americans was associated with negative thermometer ratings ($r = -.20$, $p < .05$), positive thermometer ratings ($r = .32$, $p < .001$), trait ratings of Americans ($r = .29$, $p < .001$), and identification with Americans ($r = .23$, $p < .01$).

Hypothesis 1b. *The high-threat ingroup manipulation (from American citizens) should elicit significantly more anxiety about Americans than the other manipulations.*

The low-threat ingroup manipulation should elicit significantly more pride in American citizens than the other manipulations. A 3 (threat level: high, low, control) X 2 (threat source: ingroup, outgroup) factorial ANOVA with an interaction term was run to examine whether the high-threat ingroup manipulation elicited significantly more anxiety about Americans than the other manipulations. As Table 4.9 shows, the overall model was significant, $F(5,269) = 14.7$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .20$. The main effect for threat source was significant, $F(1,269) = 6.4$, $p < .05$, with participants in the American ingroup conditions ($M = 2.02$, $SD = 1.17$) reporting more anxiety about Americans than those in the Muslim outgroup conditions ($M = 1.76$, $SD = .89$). Threat level also had a significant main effect anxiety about Americans, $F(2,269) = 29.1$, $p < .001$, with those in the high-threat manipulations reporting significantly more anxiety about Americans ($M = 2.46$, $SD = 1.21$) than participants in the low-threat manipulations ($M = 1.83$, $SD = .93$) and participants in the control conditions ($M = 1.37$, $SD = .64$). Most important, however, the interaction between threat level and target source was significant, $F(2,269) = 4.26$, $p < .05$. Table 4.9 shows that participants in the high-threat ingroup condition reported the most anxiety about Americans ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 1.28$). According to Scheffe's post-hoc analyses, participants in the in the high-threat outgroup condition reported significantly more anxiety about Americans than participants in all five other conditions.

A parallel 3X2 factorial ANOVA was run with pride toward Americans as the dependent variable. The overall model was significant, $F(5,269) = 11.4$, $p < .001$, with significant main effects for the threat source, $F(1,269) = 24.24$, $p < .001$, threat level, $F(2,269) = 9.51$, $p < .001$, and a significant threat-by-source interaction, $F(2,269) = 5.34$,

$p < .01$. Table 4.9 shows the mean levels of pride in Americans for participants in each of the six conditions. As predicted, participants in the low-threat ingroup condition reported the most pride in Americans ($M = 4.61$, $SD = 1.52$). Scheffe's post-hoc analyses revealed that the high-threat ingroup manipulation elicited significantly more pride in Americans than each of the other five manipulations (all ps $< .05$).

In sum, these results supported Hypothesis 1b. The high-threat ingroup manipulation evoked significantly more anxiety about Americans than the other five manipulations. Furthermore, participants in the low-threat ingroup condition reported significantly more pride in Americans than participants in each of the other conditions.

Hypothesis 2b. *Anxiety about American citizens (the ingroup) should lead to more negative attitudes toward Americans and less identification with the ingroup. Pride in Americans should produce the opposite effects.* A series of OLS regressions were run to test whether the two key ingroup emotions, anxiety and pride, significantly predicted each of the dependent variables related to American citizens. In each model, the dependent variable was regressed on centered measures of pride in Americans, anxiety about Americans, childrearing authoritarian values, and ideology. Across the five dependent measures, pride proved to be the more consistent predictor (see Table 4.11). Pride in Americans predicted less negative thermometer ratings of Americans ($b = -.30$, $p < .01$), more positive thermometer ratings ($b = .45$, $p < .001$), more positive trait ratings ($b = .14$, $p < .01$), and more identification with Americans ($b = .23$, $p < .01$). Nationalism was the only dependent measure that pride in Americans failed to predict ($b = .05$, $p > .10$). Anxiety about Americans, in contrast, did not fare as well in the

regression models; it only marginally predicted more negative thermometer ratings ($b =$ .26, $p < .10$) and less positive trait ratings ($b = -.09$, $p > .10$).

Hypothesis 3b. *Anxiety about Americans should mediate the relationship between the high-threat ingroup manipulation on the one hand and more negative attitudes and decreased commitment toward Americans on the other. Pride in Americans should mediate the relationship between the low-threat ingroup manipulation and more positive attitudes and increased commitment toward Americans.* Having established that each of the manipulations predicts the hypothesized emotions (see analyses for Hypothesis 1b) and that at least pride consistently predicts the ingroup attitudes measures (see Hypotheses 2b above), let us now test whether ingroup emotions mediate the relationships between the manipulations and the ingroup attitude measures. The strategy for mediation analyses follows that used in analyses for Hypotheses 3a. A two-step OLS regression model will be run for each dependent measure: First, the dependent variable was regressed on the dummy-coded manipulation variables and centered measures of ideology and childrearing authoritarian models; in the second model, the hypothesized emotion mediator was added. The mediation tests specifically examine whether the hypothesized emotion mediates the relationship between the dummy-coded manipulation variable and the outcome measure using bootstrapping (5000 Reps).

Starting with positive thermometer ratings of Americans, Table 4.12 shows that in the first step, neither the high-threat ($b = -.48$, $p > .10$) nor the low-threat ($b = -.02$, $p > .10$) manipulations significantly affected the dependent variable. Given that mediation

can still exist when the independent variable does not predict the dependent variable, the mediation test was still completed for pride and the low-threat ingroup manipulation. Model 2 shows (Table 4.12) that pride significantly predicted positive thermometer ratings in the full model ($b = .54$, $p < .001$) and that the effect of the low-threat manipulation reached marginal significance ($b = -.66$, $p < .10$). More important, Figure 4.6 shows that the Sobel-Goodman test for mediation was significant ($IE = .64$, $z = 3.16$, $p < .01$). The bias-corrected confidence interval did not contain zero for the indirect effect of the low-threat manipulation on positive thermometer ratings ($.31 < c' < .82$). As in analyses for the outgroup mediation tests, the sign of the indirect effect ($IE = .64$) and the direct effect ($IE = -.65$) were opposite. This is the likely explanation for why the direct effect of the low-threat manipulation was not significant (see Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Although this showed that pride mediated the relationship between the low-threat ingroup manipulation and positive attitudes, the counterpart to this hypothesis is that anxiety about Americans mediates the relationship between the high-threat ingroup manipulation and attitudes toward Americans. Table 4.13 and Figure 4.7 display the results for this analysis. In Model 1, the high-threat ingroup manipulation did not influence positive ratings of Americans ($b = -.48$, $p > .10$) and this did not change in Model 2 ($b = .05$, $p > .10$). However, anxiety about Americans did predict significantly decreased ratings on the positive thermometer scale ($b = -.31$, $p > .05$). According to the Sobel-Goodman test, anxiety was marginally significant as a mediator of the relationship between the high-threat manipulation and positive ratings of Americans ($IE = -.53$, $z =$

1.94, $p = .052$). It should come as no surprise that the 95% bias-corrected confidence

interval just barely contained zero (-.62 < c' < .02).

A similar pattern of results emerged for analyses of negative thermometer ratings.

In Model 1 (see Table 4.13), the effect of low-threat ingroup manipulation on negative

thermometer ratings of Americans failed to reach significance ($b = -.51, p > .10$). Model

2 analyses showed that whereas pride in Americans significantly predicted less negative

ratings of Americans ($b = -.29, p < .01$), the low-threat ingroup manipulation still did not

($b = -.17, p > .10$). This is most likely due to a pattern of inconsistent mediation (see

Figure 4.8) as the Sobel-Goodman test indicated that pride in Americans did significantly

mediate the relationship between the low-threat manipulation and negative ratings of

Americans ($IE = -.34, z = 2.19, p < .05$). The bias-corrected confidence interval again

did not contain zero (-.54 < c' < -.01). Whereas pride mediated the relationship between

the low-threat manipulation and negative ratings of Americans, anxiety about Americans

mediated the relationship between the high-threat manipulation and negative ratings. In

Model 1 (see Table 4.13), the high-threat ingroup manipulation did not have a direct

relationship with negative ratings of Americans ($b = .51, p > .10$). The effect of the high-

threat manipulation ($b = -.04, p > .10$) still did not reach significance in Model 2 when the

anxiety mediator was added to the model. However, anxiety about Americans did

significantly predict negative ratings of Americans in the full model ($b = -.33, p < .05$).

The Sobel-Goodman test for mediation reached marginal significance for anxiety

mediating the relationship between the high-threat ingroup manipulation and negative

ratings ($IE = .55$, $z = 1.96$, $p < .06$). It should be noted, too, that the bias-corrected confidence interval did not contain zero ($.07 < c' < .78$).

The low-threat ingroup manipulation also indirectly affected trait ratings of Americans via increased pride in Americans. Table 4.14 and Figure 4.10 show the results for this analysis. The low-threat ingroup manipulation again did not significantly affect trait ratings of Americans in Model 1 ($b = .04$, $p > .10$) or in Model 2 ($b = -.14$, $p > .10$). Pride, in contrast, significantly predicted trait ratings of Americans in Model 2 ($b = .15$, $p < .001$). This mediation was significant according to the Sobel-Goodman test ($IE = .18$, $z = 2.63$, $p < .01$) and the confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($.05 < c' < .29$). Anxiety about Americans only marginally mediated the relationship between the high-threat ingroup manipulation and trait ratings of Americans. The effect of the high-threat manipulation on trait ratings did not reach significance in Model 1 ($b = .21$, $p > .10$) or Model 2 ($b = .00001$, $p > .10$). Anxiety about Americans marginally predicted trait ratings of Americans ($b = .08$, $p < .10$) in Model 2. As stated, the Sobel-Goodman test for mediation only reached marginal significance ($IE = -.21$, $z = 1.87$, $p < .07$) and the bootstrapped confidence interval for the indirect effect just barely contained zero ($-.26 < c' < .01$).

The final mediation test examined how the threat manipulations indirectly affected participants' identification with other Americans via ingroup pride and anxiety. As Table 4.14 and Figure 4.12 show, the low-threat ingroup manipulation did not significantly predict identification with Americans in Model 1 ($b = .20$, $p > .10$) or in Model 2 ($b = -.21$, $p > .10$). The mediator for the low-threat manipulation, pride, did

significantly predict identification with Americans in Model 2 ($b = .28$, $p < .001$). A Sobel-Goodman test revealed that the mediation was significant ($IE = .31$, $z = 2.80$, $p < .01$) and the confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($.14 < c' < .48$). However, anxiety about Americans did not mediate the relationship between the high-threat ingroup manipulation and identification with Americans. As Table 4.15 shows, anxiety about Americans failed to reach significance in the full model ($b = -.08$, $p > .10$). Because the mediator did not predict the dependent variable, mediation is impossible.

In total, the mediation analyses present a fairly consistent pattern of results for the ingroup conditions. The low-threat ingroup manipulation evoked significantly more pride in Americans than did the other manipulations, and this led to less negative thermometer ratings of Americans, more positive thermometer ratings, more positive trait ratings, and more identification with Americans. It appears that the independent variable (low-threat ingroup manipulation) did not significantly affect the dependent variable because the indirect effect and direct effects were repeatedly of opposite signs. Although the low-threat ingroup manipulation consistently operated via pride, the results for the high-threat manipulation were less consistent. The high-threat ingroup manipulation did evoke significantly more anxiety about Americans than the other manipulations, but this anxiety only led in turn to less positive thermometer ratings, more negative thermometer ratings and less positive trait ratings of Americans. In all of these cases, the mediation test reached marginal significance.

Hypothesis 4b. *Authoritarian childrearing values should strengthen the effect of the ingroup manipulations on ingroup emotions and attitudes. High authoritarians should feel more anxiety in the high-threat ingroup condition and more pride in the low-threat ingroup condition. These ingroup emotions should mediate the relationship between the interaction between authoritarianism and ingroup manipulations on the one hand and ingroup attitudes on the other.* As in the analyses for Hypothesis 4a, it is important to first establish that the interaction predicts the mediator variable in the expected direction. Therefore, a two-step hierarchical OLS regression was performed for both anxiety about Americans and pride in Americans. Step 1 contained the dummy-coded condition variables, and centered measures of ideology (for control purposes), and childrearing authoritarian values. In the second step, two interaction terms were added to the model: one for the interaction between the dummy-coded high-threat manipulation and authoritarian childrearing values and one for the interaction between the dummy-coded low-threat manipulation and authoritarian childrearing values. Because analyses for Hypothesis 1b already explored the main effects of the ingroup manipulations on pride in and anxiety about Americans, the analyses in this section focus explicitly on Step 2. The first set of interaction analyses focused on the childrearing values measure of authoritarianism. However, when predicting pride in Americans, the interaction between the high-threat manipulation and childrearing values failed to reach significance ($b = -.25$, $p > .10$). The interaction between the low-threat manipulation and childrearing values also failed to reach significance ($b = -.54$, $p > .10$). The same pattern of null interaction terms emerged for analyses predicting anxiety about Americans. In the full model,

neither the interaction between the high-threat ingroup manipulation and childrearing values ($b = .04$, $p > .10$) nor the interaction between the low-threat ingroup manipulation and childrearing values ($b = -.13$, $p > .10$) were significant.

To verify that the null interaction findings were not unique to the childrearing measure of authoritarianism, the same models were run with the authoritarianism composite as the index of authoritarianism. As Table 4.16 shows, the authoritarianism composite interacted with the high-threat ingroup manipulation to predict reduced pride in Americans ($b = -1.16$, $p < .05$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that high authoritarians in the high-threat ingroup manipulation had the strongest negative relationship with pride in Americans ($b = -1.00$, $p < .05$). Authoritarianism was not related to pride in Americans in the other conditions. The authoritarianism composite also interacted with the high-threat ingroup manipulation to predict marginally more anxiety about Americans ($b = .71$, $p < .06$). Simple slopes analyses revealed that in the high-threat manipulation, authoritarianism and anxiety about Americans were positively associated ($b = .39$ $p < .06$). This means that the effect of the high-threat ingroup manipulation was strongest among people high in authoritarianism. High authoritarians responded to perceiving that Americans did not hold the same values by becoming less proud of Americans and by reporting more anxiety about Americans.

From a mediation perspective, these analyses show that the independent variable (the interaction between the authoritarianism composite and the high-threat manipulation) predict the hypothesized mediator variables (both pride and anxiety). Because the analytical tests of Hypothesis 2b showed that only the pride mediator consistently

predicted the dependent variables, the mediated moderation analyses focus primarily on pride. The next step requires that the indirect effect of the interaction term on the dependent variable (via the pride mediator) be significant. Based on the previous mediation tests associated with Hypothesis 3b (without the interaction term), it is clear that the mediation may be significant despite a nonsignificant direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Therefore, although all key steps will be reported, the mediation analyses will focus specifically on the Sobel-Goodman test and whether the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect contains zero. As in all previous mediation analyses, indirect effects were calculated using a bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure with 5000 reps.

The first mediated-moderation test examined the dependent variable positive thermometer ratings of American citizens (see Figure 4.13). As the figure shows, the interaction between the high-threat ingroup manipulation and authoritarianism did not have a direct relationship with positive thermometer ratings (b= -.56, $p > .10$) in Model 1 before the pride mediator was added, or in Model 2 ($b = -.02, p > .10$). Pride in Americans did significantly predict the dependent variable ($b = .55, p < .001$). Nevertheless, the Sobel-Goodman test indicated that pride significantly mediated the relationship between the interaction term and the positive ratings dependent variable ($IE = -.54, z = 2.15, p < .05$). The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect also did not contain zero ($-.70 < c' < -.12$), providing further evidence of mediation.[15]

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[15] The Sobel-Goodman test for anxiety as the mediator was not significant ($IE = -.16, z = 1.32, p > .10$).

The mediation test for the negative thermometer ratings is shown in Figure 4.14. Again, the direct effect of the interaction of high threat and authoritarianism was not significant before pride was added to the model ($b = .50$, $p > .10$) or after pride was added to the model ($b = .20$, $p > .10$). However, the interaction term did predict pride in Americans ($b = -.99$, $p < .05$) and pride predicted reduced negative thermometer ratings ($b = -.30$ $p < .01$). The Sobel-Goodman test for mediation reached marginal significance ($IE = .30$, $z = 1.78$, $p < .08$). Although this was only marginal, the bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($.01 < c' < .48$). This indicates that high authoritarians responded to ingroup symbolic threat by becoming less proud of their American ingroup, and in turn, feeling more negatively toward Americans.

A similar pattern emerged for mediation analyses using American trait ratings as the dependent variable. As Figure 4.15 shows, the authoritarianism composite did not interact with the high-threat ingroup manipulation to predict American trait ratings in Model 1 ($b = -.28$, $p > .10$). The effect of the interaction term on American trait ratings ($b = -.13$, $p > .10$) became smaller when pride was added to Model 2. However, in the full model, the interaction did continue to predict pride in Americans ($b = -.99$, $p < .05$), which in turn, predicted trait ratings of Americans ($b = .15$, $p < .01$). More important, the Sobel-Goodman mediation test reached marginal significance ($IE = -.15$, $z = 1.92$, $p < .06$) and the bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($-.26 < c' < -.03$).

The same pattern emerged for the final mediational analyses using identification with Americans as the dependent variable (See Figure 4.16). The interaction between

authoritarianism and the high-threat ingroup manipulation again failed to reach significance in Model 1 ($b = -.50$, $p > .10$) and Model 2 ($b = -.24$, $p > .10$). And yet, the interaction term significantly predicted the mediator pride ($b = -.99$, $p < .05$), which in turn, predicted identification with Americans ($b = .5$, $p < .001$). According to the Sobel-Goodman test of mediation, the indirect effect of the interaction term on identification was significant, via the pride mediator ($IE = -.25$, z = 1.96, $p < .05$). Furthermore, the confidence interval for the indirect effect did not contain zero ($-.37 < c' < -.05$).

Although not via the precise hypothesized mechanism, an interesting and consistent pattern of mediated moderation results emerged for the ingroup analyses. High authoritarians in the high-threat manipulation were especially likely to report less pride in their fellow Americans. In turn, this reduction in pride predicted more negative thermometer ratings, less positive thermometer ratings, less positive trait ratings, and less identification with Americans.

Discussion

Study 3 was designed to examine the causal relationships between symbolic threat, emotions, and intergroup attitudes. By manipulating two different kinds of symbolic threat—either from the ingroup or from an outgroup—this experiment tested the hypothesized mediating role of emotion. According to the stated hypotheses, a symbolic threat from an outgroup should evoke anger and more negative views toward the outgroup, whereas perceptions of low threat should evoke more sympathy and more positive attitudes. In contrast, people who believe a symbolic threat originates within their ingroup should feel anxious and hold more negative attitudes toward the ingroup,

whereas people who perceive the threat from the ingroup to be low should feel more pride in their ingroup, and in turn, hold more positive attitudes toward the ingroup. Furthermore, the fourth hypothesis posits that people should respond differently to symbolic-threat manipulations depending on their authoritarian predisposition, such that people high in authoritarianism would be the most sensitive to threats to their cultural values.

To test these hypotheses, participants first completed an online survey that included measures of a predisposition to authoritarianism and other demographic characteristics. Later, in an in-person experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read one of six different stimulus articles. For the ingroup (American) manipulations, participants read an article reporting that young Americans held increasingly either similar (low threat) or different values (high threat), or a control article of a review of a new restaurant specializing in American food. For the outgroup manipulations, participants read an article reporting that Muslim immigrants to the United States either embraced (low threat) or rejected core American values (high threat). The outgroup control article also was a restaurant review, although in this case, of an ostensibly new Middle Eastern restaurant owned by Muslim immigrants. After reading their assigned article, participants answered questions about their emotions and subsequently, their attitudes, toward each of the groups.

In the case of the Muslim immigrants outgroup, analyses showed that participants who read that Muslim immigrants rejected American values in favor of their own cultural heritage (i.e., the high-threat outgroup manipulation) reported the most anger toward

Muslim immigrants when compared to participants in the other five conditions. Participants who read that Muslim immigrants embraced American values, in contrast, reported the most sympathy toward Muslim immigrants. This difference, however, was only significant when compared to the ingroup manipulations. Because people in the low-threat outgroup manipulation still reported more sympathy toward Muslim immigrants than those in the outgroup control group, it is possible that the failure to reach significance resulted from insufficient power. It is also possible that by portraying Muslim immigrants as opening a successful new restaurant in the United States, the control article may have unintentionally activated ideas about immigrants embracing the American dream, and as a result, sympathy toward Muslim immigrants. If the control article unintentionally activated feelings of sympathy toward Muslim immigrants, this could also explain any subsequent failures to find support for the sympathy mediation hypothesis, which will be discussed.

A key component of this dissertation is testing whether intergroup emotions affect attitudes toward ingroups and outgroups. According to the second hypothesis, both outgroup anger and outgroup sympathy should predict attitudes toward the outgroup. Similar to Study 1's survey of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, the data from Study 3 supported this hypothesis. People who felt angry toward Muslim immigrants reported more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, greater opposition to Muslim rights, more nationalistic attitudes, and perceived Muslim immigrants as possessing fewer positive traits. People who felt more sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants tended to hold more positive attitudes, view Muslim immigrants as possessing more positive traits,

and were less opposed to extending civil rights to Muslim immigrants. Thus, although

anger proved to more consistently explain people's attitudes toward Muslim immigrants,

sympathy also explained people's attitudes toward the outgroup in select cases.

Having established that altering perceptions of the symbolic threat posed by

Muslim immigrants affects how angry and sympathetic people feel toward Muslim

immigrants and that these emotions affect attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, let us

turn to the mediation hypothesis. The mediation hypothesis states that anger at Muslim

immigrants should explain why people in the high-threat manipulation report more

negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Further, sympathy toward Muslim

immigrants should explain why people in the low-threat manipulation report more

positive views of Muslim immigrants. Mediation is typically shown by first establishing

that the independent variable (here, a symbolic threat manipulation) is significantly

related to the dependent variable (i.e., attitudes toward Muslim immigrants) (Baron &

Kenny, 1986). However, psychometricians have recently shown that mediation can exist

absent a significant direct relationship between the independent variable and the

dependent variable (Judd & Kenny, 2010; MacKinnon et al., 2002; Shrout & Bolger,

2002). Thus, it is imperative to test for mediation even in the face of a nonsignificant

direct effect. This seemed to be the case at least for anger mediating the relationship

between the high-threat manipulation and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

Although the high-threat manipulation did not have significant direct effect on

any of the dependent variables, the Sobel-Goodman tests for the indirect effect via anger

at Muslim immigrants were consistently significant. As predicted, anger at Muslim

immigrants explained why people led to perceive Muslim immigrants as a symbolic threat expressed more negative and less positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, more opposition to Muslim rights and more nationalistic attitudes toward the United States. When people read an article stating that Muslim immigrants rejected core American values, they became angry at Muslim immigrants, and this anger led to more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and to more nationalistic attitudes toward the American ingroup. Interestingly, in many of these analyses, the sign of the direct effect was opposite to the sign of the indirect effect, indicating a pattern of inconsistent mediation (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). For example, the indirect effect of the high-threat outgroup manipulation, via anger at Muslim immigrants, was positive for negative thermometer ratings of Muslim immigrants. This means that high symbolic threat from Muslim immigrants led to more anger at Muslim immigrants, which led to more negative thermometer ratings. In the full model, however, the direct effect of the high-threat manipulation on negative ratings of Muslim immigrants was negative and significant. So, after controlling for anger at Muslims, people in the high-threat manipulation actually rated Muslim immigrants *less* negatively.

At first blush, this result may seem surprising. However, an interesting possibility is that anger at Muslim immigrants and a predisposition to authoritarianism accounted for the majority of participants' hostile reactions toward Muslim immigrants. The article may have created a backlash reaction among people who did not respond with anger to the high-threat manipulation, or among people who were not predisposed to dislike an immigrant outgroup. Some people—those who were not angry or authoritarian—may

have perceived that the article would instigate prejudice toward Muslim immigrants, and may have responded by becoming more positive toward Muslim immigrants to counter others' prejudice. This is pure speculation, of course, because the experiment did not contain questions about people's beliefs about how others would respond to the article. Nevertheless, it offers a potential explanation for this unexpected finding and suggests a potentially fruitful avenue for further research.

The mediation analyses for the low-threat manipulation and sympathy did provide support for third hypothesis. Participants in the low-threat manipulation did not report significantly more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. More important, the low-threat manipulation also did not indirectly affect any of the dependent measures via sympathy. This could have resulted from the fact that the indirect effect of the low-threat manipulation was tested against the control condition as per the original hypothesis's stipulations. Recall that although the low-threat manipulation did evoke more sympathy than the control group, this difference was not significant. The effect of outgroup manipulations on sympathy toward Muslim immigrants resulted from a significant difference between the low- and high-threat manipulations. Given that sympathy mediation was found in Study 1's survey data, it would be useful to explore whether significant mediation emerges when using a different, potentially more innocuous, control condition. Rather than a restaurant opening, which may have had the unintended effect of activating sympathies for immigrants in pursuit of the American dream, it would be beneficial to compare the effects of the low threat article to a control condition, in

which participants did not read an article at all or another article on a different mundane topic.

According to the fourth and final hypothesis, people high in authoritarianism should respond the most strongly to manipulations of outgroup symbolic threat. Just as in the survey of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, the effects of experimental manipulations of outgroup symbolic threat failed to hinge on participants' authoritarian predispositions. That is, the interaction between the threat conditions and measures of authoritarianism did not reach significance for neither anger at Muslim immigrants nor attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. As mentioned already in the discussion for Study 1, this may be due to an overpowering association between Muslim immigrants and terrorism. It is possible that a strong association between Muslim immigrants and threat may have rendered moot any individual differences in a predisposition to respond in a hostile fashion to symbolic threats. If that is the case, a follow-up experiment should explore how people respond to symbolic threats that originate from an outgroup not associated with violent extremist acts. More specifically, it would be useful to replicate the mediated moderation findings from Study 2, in which authoritarians were the most likely to respond with hostility and prejudice toward symbolic threats from gays and lesbians. The childrearing measure of authoritarianism did, however, interact with the symbolic threat manipulation to predict sympathy toward Muslim immigrants. Given that authoritarians are more likely to be hostile toward any social deviates (Altemeyer, 1996), we would expect people who score high in authoritarianism to be least sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants. Unexpectedly, people who valued authoritarian

childrearing practices were significantly less likely to be sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants only in the control condition, when they read the restaurant review article. In both the high threat and the low-threat manipulation, authoritarianism no longer predicted sympathy toward Muslims. This suggests that rather than activating an authoritarian predisposition as predicted, the low- and high-threat manipulations overpowered individual differences in people's predispositions to feel sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants. This provides further evidence that Muslim immigrants may represent a special case of outgroup attitudes.

Analyses associated with the ingroup did show evidence of mediated moderation in the expected patterns, however, which will be addressed shortly. First, it is important to review the individual components of the ingroup threat manipulation. The manipulation of American symbolic threat did work as designed. Self-identified American citizens who read that Americans were increasingly disagreeing on important values reported significantly greater perceptions of American symbolic threat than participants who read the restaurant-review control-article and participants who read that Americans agreed on American values. Participants in the low-threat manipulation, who read that Americans increasingly agreed on important values, reported significantly less symbolic threat than people in the other conditions. The more important test concerns whether the threat manipulations evoked the expected emotions. Indeed, participants in the high-threat condition reported significantly more anxiety about Americans than those in the control and low-threat condition. Participants in the low-threat condition, in contrast, reported significantly more pride in Americans than participants in the other two

conditions. After controlling for childrearing authoritarianism values and ideology, people who felt pride in Americans still reported more positive attitudes toward and identified more with American citizens.

Considering that pride more strongly predicted all of the dependent measures of attitudes toward and identification with American citizens, it should come as no surprise that pride served as the better mediator. Compared to participants in the control condition, participants who read that Americans increasingly agreed on values felt more pride in being an American and this led to more positive attitudes and greater identification with Americans. Similar to the outgroup high-threat manipulations described above, the low threat ingroup manipulation did not significantly affect any of the attitude measures on its own. And yet, the indirect effect was significant. At a conceptual level, the explanation could again be quite similar to that offered for the outgroup findings. When people were led to believe that Americans held the same values, they felt pride in Americans, and this pride led them to identify more with their fellow Americans. After accounting for how proud people felt affected people's identification with Americans, reading that all Americans agreed on values, may have made some participants uncomfortable. This uniformity of opinion and values may have made some people uneasy, especially if they viewed diversity as a defining feature and strength of the United States. In fact, a survey commissioned by the Pew Center for Social and Demographic Trends (2008) found that six out of ten Americans report that they prefer living communities diverse in racial and economic composition, and political and religious beliefs. Although a majority may prefer diversity, a substantial portion of

the population clearly does not. It is these people, who prefer social conformity and traditionalism, whom this dissertation hypothesized would respond the most strongly to manipulations of symbolic threat

Mediated-moderation analyses demonstrated that this was the case only with respect to the high-threat manipulation, whereas authoritarianism did not affect how people responded to the article stating that Americans agreed on values. Across all four measures (positive and negative thermometer ratings, trait ratings, identification), pride in Americans mediated the effect of the interaction between the high-threat ingroup manipulation and authoritarianism on the dependent variable. People high in authoritarianism who read that Americans increasingly disagreed on important values (high threat) felt less proud to be American, and as a result, felt less positively toward and identified less with their fellow Americans. In general, high authoritarians in the high-threat condition felt less pride in Americans and thus, felt less positively and identified less with Americans. After controlling for the effects of the interaction term, pride in Americans, and authoritarianism on attitudes toward American citizens, the high-threat manipulation actually led to more positive attitudes and more identification with Americans. This again could result from a potential reactance effect that some participants may have experienced in response to the article, especially if they found the negative tone describing increasing diversity as unsettling.

The results of this study represent the first experimental evidence that emotion plays a key role in authoritarian processes. In keeping with Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie et al., 2004; Smith, 1993; Smith & Mackie, 2006), I expected that altering

perceptions or appraisals of the group context would affect people's emotions attached to the group, and as a result, their attitudes toward that group. Study 3 went beyond prior research in Intergroup Emotions theory by including a low-threat or reassuring manipulation, which allowed for the potential effect of positive emotions to appear. Analyses of the ingroup manipulations revealed that perceiving that young Americans increasingly agree on important values resulted in pride for Americans in general and more positive attitudes toward and greater identification with America. Further, this effect was especially pronounced among people high in authoritarianism, who value social traditionalism and conformity. The outgroup low-threat manipulation showed that people who read Muslim immigrants were assimilating to and embracing core American values felt more sympathy toward American values. As discussed above, a potential lack of power or flawed control condition may have contributed to the finding that the sympathy evoked by low symbolic threat did not lead to more positive attitudes toward and a greater willingness to extend ingroup rights to Muslim immigrants.

In addition to allowing for a better examination of the role of positive emotion, Study 3 is important in that it allows for testing the direction of causality among threat, intergroup emotions, and intergroup attitudes. Nevertheless, it remains possible that emotions could also influence perceptions of threat. That is, experiencing certain emotions completely unrelated to the intergroup context could influence the degree to which people stereotype ingroup and outgroup members. Depending on an individual's stereotypes, this could increase or decrease perceptions of threat. As mentioned previously, Bodenhausen et al. (2006) found that anger increased stereotypic judgments

in a social perception task. If people who value social conformity and traditionalism are more likely to stereotype outgroup members as violating prototypical ingroup values, anger might increase their perception of outgroup threat. Interestingly, positive emotions such as happiness also tend to increase the use of heuristics (Park & Banaji, 2000). As a result, we would also expect an incidental happy mood to increase perceptions of ingroup threat. Although these are certainly interesting hypotheses, they are beyond the scope of this dissertation, which focuses on intergroup emotions. Future research should consider how incidental affect might influence perceptions of symbolic threat.

Table 4.1 *Pilot study test of effect of symbolic threat manipulations.*

Independent variables	Muslim Symbolic Threat		American Symbolic Threat	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
American Ingroup				
High Threat	3.70	.86	3.93	1.44
Low threat	3.36	.81	4.23	1.88
Control	3.7	1.5	5.07	1.71
Muslim Outgroup				
High threat	4.09	1.01	6.25	.85
Low Threat	3.03	.81	4.86	1.74
Control	3.24	.85	5.6	1.64
F (Degrees of freedom)	6.1***(5,97)		12.78***(5,97)	
η^2	.14		.17	
N	103		103	

Table 4.2 *Experimental test of effect of symbolic-threat manipulations on perceived Muslim threat and emotions toward Muslims.*

Independent variables	Muslim Symbolic Threat		Anger at Muslims		Sympathy toward Muslims	
	Mean	*S.D.*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*Mean*	*S.D.*
American Ingroup						
High Threat	3.81	.78	1.60	1.04	2.21	1.22
Low Threat	3.38	.87	1.42	.93	2.41	1.35
Control	3.61	.98	1.25	.58	1.58	1.03
Muslim Outgroup						
High Threat	4.41	1.03	2.3	1.22	2.78	1.34
Low Threat	3.31	.99	1.51	.81	3.44	1.31
Control	3.11	.98	1.24	.51	3.13	1.40
F (Degrees of freedom)	10.42***(5,266)		8.64***(5,269)		12.6***(5,268)	
η^2	.15		.14		.17	
N	272		275		274	

Table 4.3 *Intercorrelations among variables related to the outgroup (Muslim immigrants).*

	1.	*2.*	*3.*	*4.*	*5.*	*6.*	*7.*
1. Anger at Muslims	--						
2. Sympathy toward Muslims	-.27**	--					
3. Muslim symbolic Threat	.62***	-.41***	--				
4. Opposition to Muslim Rights	.48***	-.36***	.57***	--			
5. Negative Feeling Thermometer of Muslim immigrants	.68***	-.29***	.60***	.71***	--		
6. Positive Feeling Thermometer of Muslim immigrants	-.56***	.34***	-.60***	-.65***	-.69***	--	
7. Trait Ratings of Muslim immigrants	-.33***	.37***	-.51***	-.67***	-.54***	.64***	--

Table 4.4 *Emotions toward Muslim immigrants as predictors of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants*

Predictor	Positive thermometer		Negative thermometer		Trait ratings		Opposition to Muslim rights		Nationalism	
	B	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*B*	*SE*	*B*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Anger	-1.08***	.16	1.31***	.13	-.16*	.07	.31***	.06	.16*	.08
Sympathy	.28*	.12	-.14	.10	.17**	.05	-.14**	.05	-.04	.06
Childrearing	-.30^M	.17	.16	.14	-.20**	.07	.17*	.07	.18*	.08
Ideology	-.33**	.12	.36***	.10	-.17**	.05	.23***	.05	.26***	.06
Constant	5.53***	.17	2.92***	.14	4.57***	.07	2.42***	.07	3.60***	.08
F (degrees of freedom)	25.3***(4,142)		41.7***(4,142)		16.8***(4,141)		29.4***(4,142)		12.8***(4,139)	
Adjusted R^2	.40		.53		.30		.44		.25	
N	147		147		146		147		144	

Table 4.5 *Regression analyses for tests of intergroup emotions as mediators of relationship between condition and thermometer ratings of the outgroup.*

Predictor	Negative ratings of Muslim immigrants				Positive ratings of Muslim immigrants			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.55***	.13	.41***	.10	-.53***	.14	-.40**	.12
Childrearing values	.36^M	.20	.22	.15	-.49*	.20	-.37*	.18
Low-threat manipulation	.12	.45	-.27	.32	-.03	.46	.32	.40
High-threat manipulation	.74	.47	-.82*	.39	-.41	.48	.98*	.46
Anger at Muslims	--	--	1.55***	.16	--	--	-1.39***	.18
Constant	2.60***	.34	3.29***	.27	5.84***	.36	5.23***	.31
F (degrees of freedom)	8.41***(4,129)		31.3***(5,128)		7.6***(4,129)		19.9***(5,128)	
Adjusted R^2	.18		.53		.17		.42	
N	134		134		134		134	

Table 4.6 *Regression analyses for tests of intergroup emotions as mediators of the relationship between the dummy-coded condition variables and outgroup attitudes (trait ratings and opposition to Muslim rights).*

| | Trait ratings of Muslim immigrants | | | | Opposition to Muslim rights | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Predictor	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	-.21***	.06	-.17**	.05	.29***	.05	.25***	.05
Childrearing values	-.27**	.08	-.24**	.08	.24**	.08	.19**	.07
Low-threat manipulation	.04	.18	.09	.18	.05	.18	-.06	.16
High-threat manipulation	-.04	.19	.28	.20	.08	.19	-.38*	.18
Anger at Muslims	--	--	-.32***	.09	--	--	.45***	.08
Constant	4.69***	.14	4.55***	.14	2.31***	.14	2.51***	.13
F (degrees of freedom)	9.2***(4,128)		10.9***(5,127)		13.3***(4,129)		20.7***(5,128)	
Adjusted R^2	.20		.27		.27		.43	
N	133		133		134		134	

Table 4.7 *Regression analyses for tests of outgroup anger as the mediator of the relationship between the dummy-coded condition variables and nationalistic attitudes toward the United States.*

| Predictor | Nationalism | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.30***	.06	.27***	.06
Childrearing values	.20*	.09	.18*	.09
Low-threat manipulation	-.12	.19	-.20	.20
High-threat manipulation	-.15	.21	-.44*	.22
Anger at Muslims	--	--	.30**	.09
Constant	3.66***	.15	3.80***	.15
F (degrees of freedom)	10.4***(4,126)		11.2***(5,125)	
Adjusted R^2	.22		.28	
N	131		131	

Table 4.8 *Regression analyses for the interaction between childrearing authoritarian values and outgroup threat conditions.*

| | Sympathy toward Muslim immigrants | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	-.05	.08	-.03	.08
Childrearing values (CV)	-.31**	.12	-.69***	.17
Low-threat manipulation (L)	.29	.26	.33	.25
High-threat manipulation (H)	-.29	.28	-.30	.27
L x CV interaction	--	--	.62*	.27
H x CV interaction	--	--	.64*	.25
Constant	3.09***	.20		
F (degrees of freedom)	4.00**(4,142)		4.17***(6,140)	
Adjusted R^2	.08		.12	
N	147		147	

Table 4.9

Experimental test of effect of symbolic-threat manipulations on perceived ingroup threat and emotions toward Americans.

Independent variables	American Symbolic Threat		Anxiety about Americans		Pride in Americans	
	Mean	*S.D.*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*Mean*	*S.D.*
American Ingroup						
High Threat	5.33	.77	2.83	1.28	3.14	1.39
Low Threat	4.25	1.10	1.91	1.03	4.61	1.52
Control	4.74	.87	1.35	.60	3.42	1.56
Muslim Outgroup						
High Threat	4.05	.92	2.08	1.03	2.71	1.25
Low Threat	3.93	.91	1.75	.81	2.98	1.30
Control	4.24	.88	1.40	.68	2.91	1.54
F (Degrees of freedom)	14.7***(5,269)		14.7***(5,269)		11.4***(5,269)	
η^2	.20		.20		.16	
N	275		275		275	

Table 4.10

Intercorrelations among variables related to the ingroup (American citizens).

Variables	*1.*	*2.*	*3.*	*4.*	*5.*	*6.*	*7.*	*8.*
1. American Symbolic Threat	--							
2. Anxiety about Americans	.23**	--						
3. Pride in Americans	-.45***	-.20*	--					
4. Anger at Americans	.21*	.89***	-.28***	--				
5. Negative Feeling Thermometer of Americans	.31***	.19*	-.20*	.34***	--			
6. Positive Feeling Thermometer of Americans	-.36***	-.18*	.32***	-.27**	-.75***	--		
7. Trait Ratings of Americans	-.45***	-.16^M	.29***	-.18*	-.43***	.56***	--	
8. Identification with Americans	-.25**	-.04	.23**	-.09	-.51***	.62***	.41***	--

Table 4.11 *Relationships among ingroup emotions (pride and anxiety) and dependent measures related to American citizens.*

Predictor	Positive thermometer		Negative thermometer		Trait ratings		Identification with Americans		Nationalism	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Anxiety	-.19	.12	.26^M	.13	-.09^M	.05	0	.08	.04	.06
Pride	.45***	.02	-.30**	.10	.14**	.04	.23***	.06	.05	.04
Childrearing	-.23	.15	.05	.16	-.08	.06	.09	.10	.20**	.07
Ideology	.45***	.10	-.39***	.11	.10*	.04	.29***	.06	.40***	.05
Constant	6.78***	.15	2.91***	.16	4.53***	.06	5.13***	.10	3.39***	.07
F (degrees of freedom)	11.8***(4,129)		6.6***(4,129)		5.6***(4,129)		8.8***(4,129)		26.8***(4,128)	
Adjusted R^2	.25		.15		.12		.21		.46	
N	134		134		134		134		133	

Table 4.12

Regression analyses for tests of ingroup pride as mediator of the relationship between the low-threat manipulation and ingroup attitudes (thermometer ratings of American citizens).

Predictor	Positive thermometer ratings				Negative thermometer ratings			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	.39***	.11	.45***	.10	-.39**	.11	-.42***	.11
Childrearing values	-.24	.16	-.23	.15	.05	.17	.04	.16
Low-threat manipulation	-.02	.38	.-.66^{M}	.10	-.51	.39	-.17	.40
High-threat manipulation	-.48	.40	-.30	.36	.51	.42	.41	.41
Pride in Americans	--	--	.54***	.10	--	--	-.29**	.11
Constant	7.09***	.28	7.01***	.25	2.86***	.29	2.88***	.28
F (degrees of freedom)	3.61**(4,129)		9.67***(5,128)		4.11**(4,129)		4.86***(5,128)	
Adjusted R^2	.07		.25		.09		.13	
N	134		134		134		134	

Table 4.13

Regression analyses for tests of ingroup anxiety as mediator of the relationship between the high-threat manipulation and ingroup attitudes (thermometer ratings of American citizens).

Predictor	Positive thermometer ratings				Negative thermometer ratings			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	.39***	.11	.37**	.11	-.39**	.17	-.36**	.17
Childrearing values	-.24	.16	-.25	.16	.05	.17	.06	.17
Low-threat manipulation	-.02	.38	.17	.38	-.51	.39	-.71M	.40
High-threat manipulation	-.48	.40	.05	.48	.51	.41	-.04	.49
Anxiety about Americans	--	--	-.31*	.16	--	--	.33*	.16
Constant	7.09***	.28	6.90***	.29	2.86***	.29	3.06***	.30
F (degrees of freedom)	3.61**(4,129)		3.76**(5,128)		4.11**(4,129)		4.19**(5,128)	
Adjusted R^2	.07		.09		.09		.11	
N	134		134		134		134	

Table 4.14 *Regression analyses for tests of ingroup pride as mediator of the relationship between the low-threat manipulation and ingroup attitudes (trait ratings and identification).*

| Predictor | Trait ratings | | | | American identification | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	.09*	.04	.11*	.04	.25***	.07	.28***	.06
Childrearing values	-.08	.07	-.08	.06	.08	.10	.09	.10
Low-threat manipulation	.04	.16	-.14	.15	.10	.24	-.21	.24
High-threat manipulation	-.21	.17	-.16	.16	-.01	.26	.08	.24
Pride in Americans	--	--	.15***	.04	--	--	.26***	.06
Constant	4.62***	.12	4.61***	.11	5.19***	.18	5.17***	.17
F (degrees of freedom)	1.62(4,129)		4.01**(5,128)		4.51**(4,129)		7.26***(5,128)	
Adjusted R^2	.02		.10		.10		.19	
N	134		134		134		134	

Table 4.15 *Regression analyses for tests of ingroup anxiety as mediator of the relationship between the high-threat manipulation and ingroup attitudes (trait ratings and identification with Americans).*

| Predictor | Trait ratings | | | | American identification | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ideology	.09*	.04	.08^M	.04	.25***	.07	.25***	.07
Childrearing values	-.08	.07	-.09	.07	.08	.10	.08	.10
Low-threat manipulation	.04	.16	.12	.16	.10	.24	.15	.25
High-threat manipulation	-.21	.17	0	.20	-.01	.26	.13	.31
Anxiety about Americans	--	--	-.13^M	.07	--	--	-.08	.10
Constant	4.62***	.12			5.19***	.18	5.14***	.19
F (degrees of freedom)	1.62 (4,129)		2.07^M		4.51**(4,129)		3.74**(5,128)	
Adjusted R^2	.02		.04		.10		.09	
N	134		134		134		134	

Table 4.16 *Regression analyses for interactions between the authoritarianism composite and ingroup conditions predicting ingroup emotions.*

Predictor	Pride in Americans				Anxiety about Americans			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Ideology	-.07	.09	-.07	.09	-.07	.06	-.06	.06
Authoritarianism (A)	-.26	.21	.16	.42	-.02	.14	-.32	.29
Low-threat manipulation (L)	1.18	.30	1.14***	.30	.60**	.21	.62**	.21
High-threat manipulation (H)	-.36	.32	-.36	.32	1.68***	.22	1.69***	.22
A x L interaction	--	--	-.23	.48	--	--	.21	.33
A x H interaction	--	--	-1.16*	.55	--	--	.71^{M}	.38
Constant	3.40***	.22	3.43***	.22	1.29***	.16	1.26***	.16
F (degrees of freedom)	8.64***(4,130)		6.87***(6,128)		14.7***(4,130)		10.6***(6,128)	
Adjusted *R*^{2}	.19		.21		.29		.30	
N	135		135		135		135	

Figure 4.1

Test of Anger at Muslims as the Mediator between Muslim High-threat manipulation and Negative Feelings Thermometer Ratings of Muslim Immigrants

```
                              ┌──────────┐
                              │  Anger   │
                              └──────────┘
                 1.00***     ↗            ↘    1.54***
      ┌──────────────┐                          ┌──────────────┐
      │ Muslim High  │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ -.81* ─ ─ ─ ─→ │  Negative    │
      │   Threat     │                          │   Ratings    │
      └──────────────┘          (.74)           └──────────────┘
```

Indirect effect = 1.55 (SE = .34)
**(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .53, 1.61)**

Figure 4.2

Test of Anger at Muslims as the Mediator between Muslim High-threat manipulation and Positive Feelings Thermometer Ratings of Muslim Immigrants

```
                              ┌──────────┐
                              │  Anger   │
                              └──────────┘
                 1.00***     ↗            ↘    -1.39***
      ┌──────────────┐                          ┌──────────────┐
      │ Muslim High  │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ .98* ─ ─ ─ ─→  │  Positive    │
      │   Threat     │                          │   Ratings    │
      └──────────────┘          (-.41)          └──────────────┘
```

Indirect effect = -1.39 (SE = .33)
**(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -1.24, -.38)**

Figure 4.3
Test of Anger at Muslims as the Mediator between Muslim High-threat manipulation and Positive Trait Ratings of Muslim Immigrants


Figure 4.4
Test of Anger at Muslims as the Mediator between Muslim High-threat manipulation and Opposition to Civil Rights for Muslim Immigrants

Figure 4.5

Test of Anger at Muslims as the Mediator between Muslim High-threat manipulation and American Nationalism

Indirect effect = .30 (SE = .11)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .08, .35)

Figure 4.6

Test of American Pride as the Mediator between American Low-threat manipulation and Positive Feelings toward Americans

Indirect effect = .64 (SE = .06)
(Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: .31, .82)

Figure 4.7

Test of American Anxiety as the Mediator between American High-threat manipulation and Positive Feelings toward Americans


Figure 4.8

Test of American Pride as the Mediator between American Low-threat manipulation and Negative Feelings toward Americans

Figure 4.9

Test of American Anxiety as the Mediator between American High-threat manipulation and Negative Feelings toward Americans

Figure 4.10 *Test of American Pride as the Mediator between American Low-threat manipulation and Positive Trait Ratings of Americans*

Figure 4.11

Test of American Anxiety as the Mediator between American High-threat manipulation and Positive Trait Ratings of Americans


Figure 4.12

Test of American Pride as the Mediator between American Low-threat manipulation and Identification with Americans

Figure 4.13
Test of American Pride as the Mediator of the relationship between the interaction
between American High-threat manipulation and the authoritarianism composite and the
dependent variable, Positive Feelings toward Americans

Figure 4.14
Test of American Pride as the Mediator of the relationship between the interaction
between American High-threat manipulation and the authoritarianism composite and the
dependent variable, Positive Feelings toward Americans

Figure 4.15
Test of American Pride as the Mediator of the relationship between the interaction
between American High-threat manipulation and the authoritarianism composite and the
dependent variable, Positive Trait Ratings of Americans

Figure 4.16
Test of American Pride as the Mediator of the relationship between the interaction
between American High-threat manipulation and the authoritarianism composite and the
dependent variable, identification with Americans.

Chapter 5

General Discussion

Using a combination of survey and experimental methods, this dissertation aimed to illuminate the emotional underpinnings of authoritarian responses to symbolic threat. In an increasingly interconnected world, where not everyone shares the same beliefs and values, it is important to understand how and why people react differently to threats to the ingroup's worldview. By integrating and then extending previous theorizing on intergroup emotions and authoritarianism, I argue that symbolic threats that originate from within the ingroup and from outgroups should elicit distinct intergroup emotions. Furthermore, these intergroup emotions should have downstream consequences for people's attitudes toward the groups associated with the threat and for their identification with the ingroup. These studies represent the first systematic exploration of 1) the effects of symbolic threats on both positive and negative emotions; 2) how positive and negative intergroup emotions can simultaneously explain the relationship between symbolic threat and attitudes toward social groups; 3) how and when a predisposition to authoritarianism alters people's responses to symbolic threats; and 4) the causal relations among symbolic threats from ingroups and outgroups, intergroup emotions, and attitudes toward social groups.

Emotional responses to symbolic threats

The first hypothesis states that symbolic threats should evoke distinct intergroup emotions depending on whether the threat originates from within the ingroup or an outgroup. Specifically, when the symbolic threat comes from within the ingroup, people

should feel more anxious and less proud about the ingroup and should decrease their commitment to the ingroup. I reasoned that an uncertainty about group norms would make people feel anxious when they perceived that fellow ingroup members could not agree on important values, given that people tend to feel anxious and fearful in uncertain situations (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In contrast, because value consensus corresponds to a desirable end state (see Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965), people who perceive that fellow ingroup members share the same values (i.e., low symbolic threat) should feel pride and enthusiasm in the group for attaining that goal (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). Study 1 provided correlational evidence that people who believed that their fellow Americans could not agree on important values felt less pride in Americans, but the relationship between ingroup symbolic threat and anxiety did not reach significance. Study 2 showed that although people may feel less pride in the larger ingroup when the larger group cannot agree on values, people who perceived greater symbolic threat from within the American ingroup also reported more pride in social conservatives. This suggests the possibility that in times of value threat from a large ingroup, people may turn toward a smaller, more cohesive ingroup that stands for the promotion of cultural uniformity. Of course, given the correlational nature of the finding, it is also possible that people who are proud of social conservatives are simply more likely to perceive symbolic threats.[16]

People who perceived greater symbolic threat from within the American ingroup unexpectedly also felt significantly angrier with Americans. Although anger was hypothesized as more likely to result from symbolic threats originating from outgroups,

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[16] It should be noted, however, that the relationship disappeared after controlling for authoritarianism.

the same rationale could explain these results. People generally feel angry when they fail to achieve or reach a goal (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992), especially when they can blame someone other than themselves for such a frustrating turn of events (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Kessler, 2004). If people blame other, less prototypical Americans and not themselves for the lack of consensus, then it would follow that people would feel angry at those Americans, despite their shared ingroup identity. Anger may thus represent the most straightforward emotional response to symbolic threats, regardless of the threat's source.

We should not yet put to bed completely the idea that ingroup symbolic threats evoke feelings of anxiety. The experimental results from Study 3 showed that presenting Americans as increasingly disagreeing on American values evoked significantly more anxiety about Americans than the low threat and the control conditions. Whereas people who read that the American ingroup posed a symbolic threat did report feeling angry, they reported even more anxiety. Furthermore, people in the high-treat ingroup condition still reported significantly more anxiety about Americans after controlling for their self-reported anger. Of course, it is true that the high-threat manipulation in Study 3 was designed and pilot tested to evoke feelings of anxiety, rather than anger. It would be beneficial then for future studies to tease apart which aspects of the symbolic threat evoke feelings of anger versus anxiety. Given the rationale behind Hypothesis 1, it is likely that the ingroup high-threat manipulation emphasized uncertainty regarding group norms. A manipulation designed to evoke anger, in contrast, should focus instead on the failure to reach a desired goal of value consensus and agreement. As will be discussed briefly, the

focus on anxiety as the relevant emotion for ingroup threat may explain why changes in felt pride toward Americans better accounted for people's reactions to the symbolic threat. In fact, the results for pride were the cleanest across studies. Study 3 replicated the correlational findings from Study 1, showing that after reading that Americans increasingly agreed on important values, participants felt greater pride in Americans.

Hypothesis 1 also posited that when the symbolic threat comes from an outgroup, people should feel more anger and less sympathy toward that group. Study 1 provided correlational evidence that when American citizens perceived that Muslim immigrants rejected American values, they felt significantly angrier and less sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants. Study 3 then provided experimental evidence that believing that an outgroup like Muslim immigrants reject American values and culture causes people to feel angry at the outgroup. People led to believe that Muslim immigrants were increasingly assimilating to American culture and values, in contrast, felt more sympathetic toward Muslim immigrants than those who perceived Muslim immigrants as a symbolic threat.

Although these analyses present persuasive and consistent evidence that people react primarily with changes in sympathy and anger toward symbolic threats from outgroups, these results may be unique to the outgroup of Muslim immigrants. Many Americans associate Muslim immigrants not only with a threat to cultural values but with violent extremism (The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life, 2010). Study 2 was designed expressly to investigate whether the analyses on emotional reactions to Muslim immigrants applied to another outgroup that potentially threatened ingroup values.

Focusing on gays and lesbians, a group many Americans perceive to violate traditional moral and family values (Herek, 1991), results from Study 2 suggest that the nature of the outgroup may indeed shape people's emotional reactions. That is, Study 2 showed that when people believed that gays and lesbians shared the same values as most Americans, they felt more proud of gays and lesbians. When people believed that gays and lesbians violated traditional family values, however, they felt both angry and disgusted with gays and lesbians. The differences between the emotions associated with Muslim symbolic threats and gay and lesbian symbolic threats suggest that people's emotional reactions to symbolic threats may depend on characteristics of that social group. This is consistent with Fiske and colleagues' (2002) model of stereotype content, in which the authors contend that different combinations of group stereotypes result in unique intergroup emotions. More specifically, Fiske et al. found that when people perceive social groups as warm but incompetent (e.g., elderly and disabled people), for example, they tend to feel pity and sympathy toward members of that group.

It should be noted that although symbolic threats from both gays and lesbians and Muslim immigrants evoked feelings of anger, anger seemed more relevant for responses to Muslim immigrants. This could be because anger tends to be people's emotional response to perceived injustices (Heise & Obrien, 1992; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Levenson, 1999) and mobilizing people to respond aggressively to redress a particular grievance (Izard, 1993; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Rolls, 2000). Certainly people might perceive terrorist attacks, which many Americans associate with Islam, as an unjust act necessitating an aggressive response. In contrast, people tend to feel disgusted by social

groups that they perceive to violate cultural norms, especially norms associated with purity- or divinity-related concerns (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Izard, 1993; Keltner & Gross, 1999). Furthermore, previous research indicates that people tend to report feeling disgusted when thinking about homosexuals (Guth, Lopez, Clements, & Rojas, 2001; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) in general, and when they perceive that gays and lesbians threaten their values (Cottrell et al., 2010). The finding from Study 2 that people's perceptions of symbolic threats from gays and lesbians predicted both anger and disgust toward gays and lesbians suggests that these emotions may both be relevant.

Future research should attempt to disentangle these interesting findings regarding anger and disgust reactions to outgroup symbolic threats. For instance, neither Study 1 nor Study 3 employed measures of disgust toward Muslim immigrants. It is possible that people who believe that Muslim immigrants' values conflict with their own feel disgusted. Explicitly manipulating whether people think about Muslim immigrants' threats to cultural values or physical well-being could illuminate whether it is symbolic threat per se, or instead other characteristics culturally and socially associated with the group, that ultimately determine how people respond emotionally to outgroup threats.

With regards to the positive emotional responses to outgroups, the differential reactions of sympathy to Muslim immigrants and pride in gays and lesbians also suggest further avenues for future research. In these cases, the insights from Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick's (2007) BIAS model of how stereotypes about competence affect emotions to groups may prove particularly useful. The difference between the two groups examined here most likely resides in empowerment and competence. If Muslim immigrants are

perceived as the victims of unfair discrimination in the United States and without the

necessary resources to combat it, they may evoke more feelings of sympathy. If the

focus were instead on empowering Muslim immigrants or members of the group rising

up in the face of adversity, we might expect to see more pride. As has already been

discussed, an entire movement revolves around stimulating feelings of pride among gays

and lesbians and fighting them to receive the same rights granted to heterosexual

individuals and couples. The fact that pride proved to be the more common emotional

response to perceptions that gays and lesbians share American values indicates that the

gay pride movement has had a lasting impact on people's feelings toward gays and

lesbians.[17] Furthermore, it suggests that people can have positive emotional reactions to

shared values without the negative connotation of weakness associated with sympathy.

Relationships among symbolic threats, intergroup emotions, and intergroup

attitudes

These studies represent the first line of research examining how the source of a

threat affects both positive and negative emotional responses to symbolic threats. As

tests of Hypothesis 2 and 3 indicate, people's emotional reactions to symbolic threats

have important consequences for attitudes toward social groups. According to

Hypothesis 2, emotional reactions to symbolic threat should predict attitudes toward

social groups. Furthermore, Hypothesis 3 posits that intergroup emotions should explain

the relationship between perceptions of symbolic threat and attitudes toward the ingroup

and outgroup.

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[17] At the very least, this finding suggests that due to a cultural association between gays and the word "pride," people are simply labeling their positive feelings toward gays and lesbians as pride.

For analyses associated with the ingroup, Study 1 showed that the reductions in pride and increases in anger that resulted from the perception that Americans did not agree on values led to less positive attitudes toward and less identification with Americans. In other words, both pride in and anger at Americans simultaneously explained why people who perceived a symbolic threat from within the ingroup held less positive attitudes toward and identified less with Americans. The relationship between participants' perceptions of American symbolic threat and reduced nationalism toward the United States were partially explained by reductions in pride in Americans. In terms of causality, Study 3 showed that manipulations of ingroup threat affected attitudes toward Americans most consistently via changes in felt pride. People led to believe that Americans increasingly agreed on values felt more proud of Americans and, in turn, held more positive attitudes toward Americans, believed that Americans possessed more positive traits (e.g., honest, trustworthy), and identified more with fellow Americans. People led to believe that Americans increasingly disagreed on values, in contrast, felt more anxiety, which predicted less positive attitudes and trait ratings of Americans. However, whereas the mediational analyses for pride were consistently significant, the mediation analyses for anxiety in Americans were marginally significant. Given that anger better explained the relationship between ingroup symbolic threat and attitudes toward Americans in Study 1's survey, it would be highly beneficial to examine the causal relationships among ingroup threat, anger, and ingroup attitudes in future experiments.

The mediation analyses for outgroup emotions lent further support to the hypothesis that emotions are critical for understanding people's attitudinal responses to symbolic threats. As already stated, Study 1 showed that when people believed that Muslim immigrants rejected American values, they felt less sympathetic toward and more angry at Muslim immigrants. Anger and sympathy toward Muslim immigrants simultaneously explained why people who viewed Muslim immigrants as a symbolic threat to American values also held more negative attitudes, believed that Muslim immigrants possessed more negative traits, and were less supportive of extending traditional American civil rights to Muslim immigrants. That is, both increases in anger and decreases in sympathy are uniquely and simultaneously associated with attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Interestingly, Muslim symbolic threats also affected how people felt about the American ingroup—the more threatened people felt by Muslims, the more nationalistic they became about their American identity. The extent to which people felt angry at Muslim immigrants explained this relationship.

Experimental results from Study 3 partially replicated this pattern and provided evidence of the causal relationships among these variables. Compared to participants in the control condition, people who read that Muslim immigrants rejected core American values felt angrier with Muslim immigrants, and this anger predicted more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. The anger that participants felt toward Muslim immigrants in the high-threat outgroup condition explained their attitudes toward and perceptions of Muslim immigrants, and their opposition to Muslim civil rights. Somewhat surprisingly, sympathy toward Muslim immigrants did not mediate the

relationship between the low-threat manipulation and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. However, as already discussed, this may have resulted from a lack of power and a flawed control condition, which may have unintentionally evoked feelings of sympathy toward Muslim immigrants.

Finally, Study 2 provided convergent evidence that negative emotions explain why people hold more negative attitudes toward outgroups that they perceive to symbolically threaten the ingroup. In the case of symbolic threats from gays and lesbians, we have already established that people tend to react with anger and disgust (henceforth called aversion) and reduced pride. Mediation analyses showed that both the aversion and the pride that people felt simultaneously explained why people who believed that gays and lesbians do not hold traditional American family values held less positive attitudes toward gays and lesbians and perceived gays and lesbians more negatively. The aversion that people reported toward gays and lesbians, in contrast, was primarily responsible for explaining why people who perceived gays and lesbians as a symbolic threat also tended to oppose gay rights and were willing to donate to an organization dedicated to banning gay marriage.

These findings are consistent with Intergroup Emotions Theory's contention that people's attitudes and behavior toward social groups depend on their emotions toward those groups, which stem from people's appraisals of the intergroup context (Mackie et al., 2000). Each of the three studies reported here provide evidence that people's emotional reactions to groups that pose a symbolic threat explain their attitudes toward, identification with, and support for those groups. Although Intergroup Emotions

Theorists have not yet explored situations in which the group's cultural values are under threat, sociofunctional theorists have recently argued that people's emotions toward outgroups hinge on the specific threat posed by that group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Cottrell and Neuberg, for example, found that groups that threaten economic resources and rights, for example, primarily evoked anger but also disgust. Groups perceived to contaminate group health or values, in contrast, evoked primarily feelings of disgust, and then anger, secondarily. More recently, Cottrell et al. (2010) showed that disgust explained why people who viewed homosexuals as a threat to cultural opposed gay rights.

This dissertation builds on these previous findings in Intergroup Emotions Theory and Sociofunctional perspectives of emotions by showing that people respond to symbolic threats from outgroups by feeling both more negative emotions (anger and disgust) and less positive emotions (sympathy and pride) toward that group. Additionally, this dissertation provided the first evidence that people also respond emotionally to symbolic threats that originate from within the ingroup, specifically by becoming more angry with and less proud of the ingroup. Comparing the effects of emotional responses to ingroups and outgroups reveals one of the more interesting sets of findings from this dissertation: Whereas both positive and negative emotions seemed to matter at times for ingroups and outgroups, negative emotions more consistently explained people's reactions to symbolic threats from outgroups, and positive emotions more consistently explained people's reactions to symbolic threats from the ingroup. In terms of explaining why people held more negative attitudes toward groups that they

perceived as a symbolic threat, anger seemed to matter most consistently for attitudes toward the Muslim immigrant outgroup, anger and disgust for the gay and lesbian outgroup, and pride for the American ingroup. This may be because people find it easier to feel negative emotions toward outgroups than toward groups with which they identify. If people are motivated to protect their image of the ingroup (Branscombe & Miron, 2004), then they may find feeling angry at or disgusted with the ingroup particularly aversive, especially ingroups that they cannot easily leave. Renouncing and abdicating one's country of origin and citizenship is certainly no easy task. Consistent with this possibility, the experiment revealed that evoking anger toward Muslims was markedly easier than evoking sympathy. In contrast, evoking pride in Americans was markedly easier than evoking anxiety about fellow Americans. It thus appears that when trying to attenuate the negative effects of symbolic threats, political strategists and social leaders would be wise to focus first on reducing negative emotions (such as anger and disgust) toward outgroups while increasing positive emotions (such as pride) toward the ingroup. Nevertheless, because sympathy predicted positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and pride predicted positive attitudes toward gays and lesbians, future research should more carefully explore the best methods for increasing positive emotions toward outgroups. Study 3 provided interesting and compelling evidence for how to evoke sympathy, but future research should also explore how to evoke pride and to ensure that positive emotions have further downstream effects on attitudes and behavior.

Authoritarianism as a moderator of reactions to symbolic threats

According to the fourth and final hypothesis, not all people should react to symbolic threats in the same way. People predisposed to value social conformity and cohesion should be particularly responsive to threats to ingroup's values. The only individual difference variable examined previously in the Intergroup Emotions literature was strength in ingroup identification (see Iyer & Leach, 2008; McCoy & Major, 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 2006). Moreover, sociofunctional perspectives on intergroup emotions have yet to identify individual differences that moderate people's emotional reactions to symbolic threats. And yet, research on authoritarianism strongly indicates that some people are more likely to respond aggressively to those who deviate from social norms (Altemeyer, 1996; Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005). Specifying how an authoritarian predisposition changes the relationship between perceptions of symbolic threat and emotional reactions both integrates the authoritarian and Intergroup Emotions research and generates novel predictions.

Hypothesis 4 specifically predicts that authoritarianism will strengthen the relationship between symbolic threat and emotions. Analyses across three studies, however, present a less consistent, but potentially more interesting pattern of findings. In Study 1's survey of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, perceptions of Muslim symbolic threat most strongly predicted anger at Muslims among people high in authoritarianism. Although this supported a threat-as-activator hypothesis, these results seem unique to the anger measure. When it came to nationalism, low authoritarians exhibited the strongest relationship between their perceptions of Muslim symbolic threat and nationalistic attitudes about the United States. More specifically, people low in

authoritarianism who believed that Muslim immigrants threatened American values actually became as nationalistic as high authoritarians. This finding is consistent with Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) hypothesis that threat makes low authoritarians act like high authoritarians. Study 3, however, failed to replicate these findings using an experimental manipulation of Muslim symbolic threat.

Just as high authoritarians reported the most anger toward Muslim immigrants who they viewed as a symbolic threat, high authoritarians exhibited the most anger and disgust toward gays and lesbians when they viewed them as a symbolic threat. As Study 2 showed, people who valued social conformity and traditionalism became the most angry and disgusted when they believed that gays and lesbians did not share traditional American family values. People high in authoritarianism who viewed homosexuals as a symbolic threat also reported the most negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians and were the least supportive of gay rights. As predicted, authoritarian people who perceived gays as a symbolic threat felt the most angry and disgusted, and as a result, were the most prejudiced against and intolerant of gays. Although Hypothesis 4 did predict this exact pattern of findings, an unexpected pattern emerged for pride in gays. Authoritarianism also interacted with gay symbolic threat to predict gay pride, but the relationship between threat and pride was strongest among low authoritarians. That is, whereas high authoritarians responded to gay symbolic threats by becoming angry and disgusted, low authoritarians responded to threats by feeling less proud of gays and lesbians.

The discovery that negative emotions mattered more to high authoritarians whereas positive emotions mattered more to low authoritarians is consistent with prior

research on the relationship between authoritarianism and emotions. Van Hiel and Kossowska (2006) found that people who scored high on a measure of Right-Wing Authoritarianism were more likely to report frequently experiencing negative emotions and less likely to report experiencing positive emotions. Taken together, the findings from Study 2 and from Van Hiel and Kossowska lend further support to Adorno et al.'s (1950) original contention that authoritarians are prone to hostility and irritability. Furthermore, the findings from Study 2 on aversive reactions to gay symbolic threats indicate that authoritarians' negative emotional reactions have real consequences for attitudes toward social groups.

Whereas negative emotions played an important role in high authoritarians' reactions to outgroup symbolic threat, they seem to be more important for low authoritarians' reactions to ingroup threats. As the results from Study 1 illustrated, authoritarianism interacted with the perception that Americans failed to agree on important values to predict anger at Americans. However, the relationship between ingroup symbolic threat and anger at Americans only reached significance among low authoritarians. High authoritarians reported very little anger at their American ingroup, regardless of the threat level. Low authoritarians, in contrast, felt angrier with Americans as ingroup threat increased. This anger at Americans, in turn, predicted less positive attitudes toward Americans. Study 3, unfortunately, failed to replicate this finding in part because it was designed to evoke anxiety, rather than anger at Americans.

Study 3's experimental manipulation of ingroup symbolic threat did provide some interesting and unexpected findings with regard to authoritarians, however. High

authoritarians who read that Americans increasingly disagreed on values were especially likely to feel less pride in Americans. As a result of their reduced pride in Americans, high authoritarians reported more negative attitudes toward and less identification with Americans. Taken together, these results on ingroup threat suggest that although both high and low authoritarians may not like it when fellow ingroup members disagree on what should form the value basis for the group, they have different emotional reactions. High authoritarians feel less proud of their ingroup members, whereas low authoritarians feel more anger. Although the end result of more negative attitudes toward and less identification with the ingroup may be the same, the emotional means by which high and low authoritarians get there appears to be different.

This dissertation would be incomplete without speculating on the implications of these findings for the debate on the relationship between threat and authoritarianism. In general, the findings across three studies more consistently support the hypothesis that symbolic threats activate authoritarian responses (see Feldman 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Lavine et al., 2002; Lavine et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005). Compared to low authoritarians, people high in authoritarianism were more likely to feel angry at Muslim immigrants who rejected American values. High authoritarians were also more likely to become angry with Muslim immigrants when they believed that Americans, in general, could not agree on important values. In doing so, they directed their discontent with the ingroup onto an easily accessible outgroup. Finally, high authoritarians reported the most aversion toward gays and lesbians when they viewed this group as a symbolic threat, and in turn, expressed the most intolerance toward gays and lesbians. In all of these cases

described, people high in authoritarianism were the most likely to respond with hostility to symbolic threats. And yet, there was an interesting exception to this rule. Symbolic threat from Muslims made low authoritarians act more like high authoritarians in term of nationalism, an aggressive and domineering attachment to the ingroup country. This finding lines up most cleanly with Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) hypothesis that threatening situations override the effects of individual differences in authoritarianism, making everyone act more aggressive toward outsiders.

It is thus possible that both hypotheses are correct, but that each applies better to different contexts. In that case, a more far-reaching framework—beyond the scope of this dissertation—is needed to integrate the findings and rationales of the two competing hypotheses. It is possible that certain kinds of overpowering threats do make everyone act more authoritarian, at least in certain ways (e.g., by adopting a more nationalistic stance). Note then that only the findings on nationalistic responses to a threat from Muslim immigrants supported this possibility. As has already been mentioned numerous times, many Americans link the religion of Islam to violent terrorist acts, a terrifying threat by definition. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) indeed used anxiety about terrorist attack as one indicator that threat increases authoritarian responses across a wide variety of individuals. Perceiving that gays do not embrace traditional family values or that other Americans disagree on the importance of different values and principles may represent a threat, but it is unlikely that it activates the same sense of impending doom and loss of life that terrorist attacks might.

It stands to reason that endangering people's lives or putting them at risk for becoming the victim of violent attack would make anyone feel threatened. In those special cases, when nonauthoritarians start to see the world as dangerous and threatening a place as authoritarians do on a daily basis, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) are very likely right that nonauthoritarians' attitudes and behaviors will start to mirror authoritarians'. In more ambiguously threatening situations, in which a particular social group may not subscribe to the norms and values of the larger ingroup, we might then expect people who are especially threatened by social deviates (high authoritarians) to feel the most threatened. The threat-as-activator hypothesis (e.g., Stenner, 2005) may better apply to these less clear-cut situations. Given the theoretical and practical significance of understanding the environmental and personality-based roots of prejudice and ethnocentrism, authoritarianism researchers would be well advised to further examine how the clarity and severity of threat affect authoritarian reactions. The research findings presented here provide a veritable platform from which to start.

Concluding Comments

The studies presented here provide persuasive evidence that people have strong emotional responses to groups that they perceive to deviate from ingroup values and that these emotions affect attitudes toward social groups. This dissertation distinguishes between two different kinds of symbolic threat previously blurred together: threats originating from outside groups (Muslim immigrants and gays and lesbians) and fellow ingroup members (American citizens). In attempting to tease apart these differences, the three studies showed a surprising consistency in emotional reactions to ingroups and

outgroups. That is, people felt angry at both ingroups and outgroups that they viewed as a threat. Furthermore, participants reported feeling pride when fellow ingroup members shared values, but also when they believed gays and lesbians shared American values about the family. These emotional reactions explained why people held more positive attitudes and were more supportive of groups that they did not view as a threat to values, and conversely that they held more negative and intolerant of groups they viewed as a threat.

This dissertation also aimed to contribute to our understanding of when people predisposed to authoritarianism will be more willing to extend ingroup rights to outgroup members. Previous research on authoritarianism has focused primarily on when people who value conventionalism and uniformity will aggress toward outside groups. This research has substantially less to say about when authoritarians will embrace outgroups, probably a result of the sheer unlikelihood of such an event. Despite the inherent difficulties involved in such a feat, Study 3 showed that we can systematically increase sympathy for an outgroup by increasing perceptions of value similarity.

In sum, by integrating disparate lines of research on intergroup emotions and authoritarianism, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the emotional processes underlying the relationship between symbolic threats and authoritarian responses. Despite its ambitious nature, but like all research studies, this dissertation suffers from several limitations. As mentioned earlier, this dissertation focuses exclusively on the role of intergroup emotions. Nevertheless, emotional states that are completely irrelevant to the intergroup context (e.g., anger after receiving a poor grade on

an exam) could potentially affect perceptions of and reactions to symbolic threat. If authoritarians are more likely to stereotype outgroups as threatening, experiencing any of these emotions could increase perceptions of symbolic threat. Although beyond the scope of this project, future research should certainly examine the role of "irrelevant" affect on reactions to symbolic threat.

It should also be noted that this dissertation deals exclusively with threats to ingroup values. Certainly other kinds of threats are relevant in the intergroup context. Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) argue that a number of different threats (e.g., economic, health) can each lead to unique emotional reactions. In this time of recession, economic threats that come from the increasing might of another country might prove particularly interesting to study in the context of intergroup relations. Considering that economic threat tends to result in anger at the threatening group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), it would be interesting to compare the effects of economic threat to that of outgroup symbolic threat. I expect that both would lead to more negative attitudes toward the outgroup and would be explained by people's anger toward the outgroup. However, economic and symbolic threat challenge different ingroup goals: superiority and power in the case of economic threat and social cohesion and uniformity in the case of symbolic threat. Thus, people may channel their anger from an economic threat to policies related to reestablishing superiority, rather than policies aimed at reestablishing value uniformity. Future research should compare how these different kinds of threat relate to different kinds of intergroup attitudes. Additionally, economic threat represents another area in which to explore how individuals might differ in their reactions to threats. Duckitt's

Competitive Jungle scale, for instance, corresponds to a route to conservative ideology defined by a tough-minded mentality and a desire to seek power (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, in press; Duckitt et al., 2002). We might then expect people who view the world as a dog-eat-dog competition, in which they must stop at nothing to reach the top, to react with the most anger to threats to the ingroup's economic superiority.

Although including economic threat would allow for a more complete comprehensive account of the various forms of threat and intergroup emotions, this projects aims more for integrating authoritarian research, in general, with intergroup emotions perspectives. Drawing from multiple theoretical perspectives, this dissertation endeavors to increase our understanding of the emotional underpinnings of people's responses to symbolic threat, particularly those predisposed to authoritarianism. By highlighting both the negative and the positive emotions involved in authoritarian processes, we can hope to illuminate the conditions under which people from different cultural backgrounds or value orientations might be better able to respect each other's rights.

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Appendix A

Predisposition to Authoritarianism Measures

Belief in a Dangerous World

All items answered on a 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree") scale unless otherwise noted.

1. Although it may *appear* that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn't so. Every era has its problems, and a person's chances of living a safe, untroubled life is better today than ever before.

2. Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All signs are pointing to it.

3. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all.

4. Despite what one hears about "crime on the street," there probably isn't any more now than there ever has been.

5. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; we do not live in a dangerous world.

6. Every day as society become more lawless and bestial, a person's chance of being robbed, assaulted, and even murdered go up and up.

7. My knowledge and experiences tells me that the social world we live in is basically safe, stable, and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good.

8. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else.

9. The "end" is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might be about to destroy the world are being foolish.

10. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent, and moral people's values and way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people.

Social Conformity Measure

1. It's best for everyone if people try to fit in instead of acting in unusual ways.

2. People should be encouraged to express themselves in unique and possibly unusual ways.

3. Obeying the rules and fitting in are signs of a strong and healthy society.

4. People who continually emphasize the need for unity will only limit creativity and hurt our society.

5. We should admire people who go their own way without worrying about what others think.

6. People need to learn to fit in and get along with others.

7. Rules are there for people to follow, not to change.

8. Society's basic rules were created by people and so can always be changed by people.

9. People should not try to understand how society works but just accept the way it is.

10. People should constantly try to question why things are the way they are.

11. People should be guided more by their feelings and less by the rules.

12. The only way to stay out of trouble is to respect the established rules of society.

13. People should be given the opportunity to hear all sides of a question, regardless of how controversial it is.

14. If we cannot achieve agreement on our values we will never be able to keep this society together.

15. In the long run our cultural and ideological differences will make us a healthier, more creative, and stronger society.

16. In the long run our cultural and ideological differences will make us a healthier, more creative, and stronger society.

17. Society should aim to protect citizens' right to live any way they choose.

18. It is important to enforce the community's standards of right and wrong.

Openness to New Experiences

Below, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes *you*. Indicate 1 for "Very inaccurate" and 5 for "Very accurate." Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future.

1. Am quick to understand things.

2. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.

3. Can handle a lot of information.

4. Like to solve complex problems.

5. Avoid philosophical discussions.

6. Avoid reading difficult material.

7. Have a rich vocabulary.

8. Think quickly.

9. Learn things slowly.

10. Formulate ideas clearly.

11. Enjoy the beauty of nature.

12. Believe in the importance of art.

13. Love to reflect on things.

14. Get deeply immersed in music.

15. Do not like poetry.

16. See beauty in things that others might not notice.

17. Need a creative outlet.

18. Seldom get lost in thought.

19. Seldom daydream.

20. Seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures.

Authoritarian Childrearing Values

1. Is it more desirable for a child to have independence or respect for elders?

Independence						Respect for Elders
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. Is it more desirable for a child to be obedient or self-reliant?

Obedience						Self-Reliant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

3. Is it more desirable for a child to be curious or to have good manners?

Curiosity						Good Manners
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4. Is it more important for a child to be considerate or well-behaved?

Considerate						Well-Behaved
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

1. People should pay less attention to the bible and other old traditional forms of religious guidance and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.

2. It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially, a lady.

3. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.

4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

5. Rules about being "well-mannered" and respectable are chains from the past, which we should question very thoroughly before accepting.

6. In these troubled times, laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up.

7. Atheists and others who have rebelled against established religion are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.

8. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.

9. The courts are right in being easy on drug users. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these.

10. A woman's place should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

11. Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them.

12. Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much better care instead of so much punishment.

Appendix B

Ingroup (American) Threat

1. Most Americans hold the same values regarding *religious and moral issues.*

2. Most Americans hold the same values regarding *family issues* and *socializing children.*

3. The core values of this country are every bit as solid as they have ever been.

4. Despite what many people may say, Americans still believe in the same common values.

Appendix C

Muslim Symbolic Threat

1. The values and beliefs of Muslim immigrants regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.

2. Muslim immigrants do not accept American values uniformly.

3. American values are threatened by the presence of Muslim immigrants.

4. Muslim immigrants are strengthening values and norms important to American culture.

5. The values and beliefs of Muslim immigrants regarding *religious and moral issues* are *not* compatible with those of most Americans.

6. The values and beliefs of Muslim immigrants regarding *social relations* are *not* compatible with those of most Americans.

7. Muslim immigrants are undermining important American values.

Appendix D

Emotion measure

People can have a number of different emotions toward social groups. We are interested in how you feel toward *Muslim Immigrants* [*American citizens*]. Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which thinking about Muslim immigrants [American citizens] make you feel each emotion by *selecting the appropriate number (1-7)* in the space provided.

Not At All						Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1	angry	17	compassion
2	interested	18	moved
3	sad	19	Irritated
4	proud		Determined
5	Hostile	21	Warm
6	worried	22	Inspired
7	active	23	Alert
8	lonely	24	Afraid
9	tender	25	strong
10	Scared	26	Attentive
11	enthusiastic	27	displeased
12	downhearted	28	blue
13	Furious	29	hopeful
14	sympathy	30	alone
15	excited	31	anxious
16	Fearful		

Appendix E

Ingroup (American citizens) and Outgroup (Muslim immigrants) Attitudes

Using a scale from 0 to 10—where "0" means you feel don't feel negatively at all toward the group, "5" means you are *somewhat negative*, and "10" means you feel very *negative,* how would you say you feel about Muslim immigrants? Select the number that most closely approximates how you feel about **Muslim immigrants [American citizens]**.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Negative at all					Somewhat Negative					Very Negative

Using a scale from 0 to 10—where "0" means you *don't feel positively at all* toward the group, "5" means you are *somewhat positive,* and "10" means you feel *very positive,* how would you say you feel about **Muslim immigrants [American citizens]**?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Positive at all					Somewhat Positive					Very Positive

Now, please read some pairs of adjectives that can be used to describe Muslim immigrants [American citizens]. Taking each pair one at a time, please select the number that comes closest to describing Muslim immigrants. Just choose the number between 1 and 7 to reflect how you would describe the group with that pair of adjectives.

Very dishonest						Very honest
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very untrustworthy						Very trustworthy
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very dangerous						Very Safe
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very bad						Very Good
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix F

American Identification and Nationalism

American Identification

Below are some questions about how much you identify with American citizens. Please answer each question using the scales provided.

	Not at all						Very strongly
How strongly do you identify with Americans?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Not at all						Very important
How important is being an American to your identity?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Never						Very often
How often do you think of yourself as an American?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Not at all						Very close
How close do you feel to Americans?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Not at all						Very close
How similar do you think you are to other Americans?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Nationalism

1. The more the U.S. actively influences other countries, the better off these countries will be.

2. The U.S. should not dominate other countries.

3. For the most part, America is no more superior than any other industrialized country in the world.

4. To maintain our country's economic superiority, aggressive economic policies are sometimes necessary.

5. To maintain our country's superiority, war is sometimes necessary.

Appendix G

Support for Muslim immigrants' Civil Rights

1. Muslim immigrants should have the same social and political rights as all American citizens.

2. Muslim immigrants should be banned from running for public office in the U.S.

3. Muslim immigrants should be allowed to teach in public schools.

4. Muslim immigrants should be allowed to make a public speech.

5. Muslim immigrants should be allowed to hold public rallies.

6. Muslim immigrants should have their phones tapped by our government.

7. Landlords should have the right to refuse renting to Muslim immigrants.

8. Muslim immigrants should be allowed to receive in-state tuition benefits at state Universities.

9. I would be willing to pay a tax that would increase security screening procedures for Muslim immigrants entering the U.S.

10. I would be willing to pay an extra student fee that would go toward extra scholarships for Muslim immigrants.

11. Muslim immigrants should have the same access to state health care benefits as all American citizens.

Appendix H

Political Identification and Ideology

1. How would you describe your **political party preference** (choose one)?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent / Lean Democrat	Independent	Independent/Lean Republican	Weak Republican	Strong Republican

2. How would you describe your political outlook?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Very Conservative

3. How would you describe your political outlook with regard to economic issues (choose one)?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Very Conservative

4. How would you describe your political outlook with regard to social issues (choose one)?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Very Conservative

Appendix I

Gay Symbolic Threat

1. Gays and lesbians are undermining important family values.

2. Gays and lesbians do not uniformly accept family values.

3. Family values are threatened by the presence of gays and lesbians.

4. Gays and lesbians are strengthening values and norms important to American culture.

5. The values and beliefs of gays and lesbians regarding religious and moral issues are *not* compatible with those of most Americans.

6. The values and beliefs of gays and lesbians regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.

7. The values and beliefs of gays and lesbians regarding romantic relationships are *not* compatible with those of most Americans.

Appendix J

Trait Ratings of Gays and Lesbians

Very Immoral						Very Moral
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Perverted						Very Wholesome
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Cruel						Very Kind
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very bad						Very Good
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Heartless						Compassionate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very untrustworthy						Very trustworthy
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Unlikeable						Likeable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix K

Support for the Civil Rights of Gays and Lesbians

1. Gays and lesbians should have the same social and political rights as all American citizens.

2. Gays and lesbians should be banned from running for public office in the U.S.

3. Gays and lesbians should be allowed to teach in public elementary schools.

4. Gays and lesbians should be allowed to make a public speech.

5. Gays and lesbians should be allowed to hold public rallies.

6. Landlords should have the right to refuse renting to gay and lesbian couples.

7. Gays and lesbians should be banned from teaching at public Universities.

8. Gay and lesbian couples should have the same access to health benefits as married heterosexual couples.

9. I would be willing to donate to a group trying to pass a constitutional amendment to *ban* gay marriage.

10. I would be willing to donate to a group trying to pass a constitutional amendment to *allow* gay marriage.

11. Gays and lesbian couples should be allowed to adopt children.

12. The government should *not* protect gays and lesbians from job discrimination.

Appendix L

Experimental Stimuli

Outgroup High Threat

For Aamina Duran, a 15-year-old Muslim immigrant who attends a diverse high school in Minneapolis, assimilation is a dirty word. It means joining the ranks of the disaffected in her inner-city neighborhood, she said, and being stamped as a "dummy" by a broader American society that she believes does not respect her cultural heritage or religious values. It means abandoning her immigrant parents' dreams for her future in favor of a more uncivilized culture, and she simply refuses to do that.

"Nothing could stop me from trying to have a better life than we have now," she said.

The first broad study of the children of immigrants in 50 years debunks a longstanding assumption about the American immigrant experience: that assimilation is the desired path to success for immigrants' children.

Today's immigrants, like Aamina's parents, are most likely to settle in neighborhoods filled with people from their home country, who hold the same religious beliefs and values. According to the new study by Johns Hopkins University, many prove successful by remaining in their insular ethnic communities and shutting out attempts at integration.

But the findings do not indicate that immigrants' children, like Aamina, are growing up completely "un-American." In fact, the study found, most Muslim immigrants, while bilingual, prefer English to their parents' native language and speak it fluently, better than their parents' tongue. The key difference, however, is that 90% of these young Muslim immigrants also prefer to remain true to their cultural heritage, retaining strong Muslim values about moral issues and familial relationships. They conform to traditional Islamic gender roles, and the girls would never be seen in public without their headscarves. These children, more often than before, grow up to marry members of their communities. According to The Johns Hopkins study, this has led to a decrease in inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages—a key marker of assimilation.

There is plenty of other evidence that the Americanization of Muslim immigrants is not proceeding very well. A longitudinal study of 5,000 children of immigrants by two sociologists from Yale, Salim Kasaba and Mustafa El-Sabaan, finds that these children are not patriotically assimilating but instead are "selectively acculturating." That is to say, they are learning English, but they see American culture as uncivilized. They identify emotionally with the values held by parents' birth nation instead of with traditional American values.

"I am proud of my cultural heritage." Aamina and her friends say.

A Pew Hispanic Center survey taken about three years after 9/11 showed the same pattern. Only 19 percent of Muslim immigrants who are American citizens considered themselves Americans first; 57 percent identified with the old country first; and 24 percent considered themselves pan-ethnic—"Middle Eastern" or "African"—first. This study also found that when asked which values guided their life, the majority chose "Muslim" values, rather than "American" values. Only a few selected both and said they were compatible.

Some people have started to speak out increasingly about this phenomenon as a threat. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a refugee and activist from Somalia, recently declared: "Anyone who believes that Muslims can or even want to be assimilated into Western societies is in for a rude awakening."

At a talk at the Minneapolis Institute of Fine Arts on Saturday, October 24, 2009, Ali argued that American values are in danger of being hijacked by a rapidly growing population of Islamic immigrants.

"Islamic beliefs and values are incompatible with that of the West, because in Islamic societies, religious law is supreme," she said.

Although Ali's view is disputed by some, she represents an increasingly common perspective of people observing new Muslim immigrants.

Outgroup Low Threat

For Aamina Duran, a 15-year-old Muslim immigrant who attends a diverse high school in Minneapolis, assimilation is a positive word. It means joining the ranks of other successfully assimilated immigrants in a society that holds the same moral values that she does. It means moving away from a repressive culture in her native land and embracing her immigrant parents' aspiration for her to be an American citizen.

"Nothing could stop me from trying to have a better life than we have now," she said, echoing the sentiments of many young people who know the economic and social hardships their parents faced in their home countries.

These young Muslims from different countries have faced many hardships themselves, especially from a vocal minority of Americans who say that Muslims will never be "True Americans." The suspicious stares and outright discrimination can make the day-to-day life of young Muslims in American especially stressful. However, the first broad study of the children of immigrants in 50 years debunks a longstanding assumption about the American immigrant experience: that young Muslims do not see assimilation as the key to success.

Today's immigrants, like Aamina's parents, are most likely to settle in neighborhoods filled with typical American citizens. According to the new study by Johns Hopkins University, despite facing discrimination, many strive to integrate into and contribute to traditional American communities.

The findings indicate that immigrants' children, like Aamina, are growing up identifying completely as "American." In fact, the study found, most Muslim immigrants, while bilingual, prefer English to their parents' native language and speak it better than their parents' tongue. The key factor, however, is that 90% of these young Muslim immigrants also prefer American values about moral issues and familial relationships. They challenge traditional Islamic gender roles, and many girls are going without headscarves. These children, more often than before, grow up to marry members from outside their religious community—a key marker of assimilation.

Plenty of other evidence suggests the increasing Americanization of Muslim immigrants. A longitudinal study of 5,000 children of immigrants by two sociologists from Yale, Salim Kasaba and Mustafa El-Sabaan, found that these children are very much patriotically assimilating and are "whole-heartedly acculturating." Not only are they are learning English, but they identify emotionally with being from the U.S.A.

"I am proud of my American identity." Aamina and her friends say.

A Pew Hispanic Center survey taken about three years after 9/11 showed the same pattern. Only 19 percent of Muslim immigrants who are American citizens identified

with the old country; 57 percent considered themselves American; and 24 percent considered themselves a hybrid of American and the old country, with America first.

In short, Muslim Americans look like other Americans in their life outlook more than they resemble Muslims in most predominantly Muslim nations.

Some people have started to speak out enthusiastically about this phenomenon. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a refugee and activist from Somalia, recently echoed what others also believe: "American values are being strengthened by the rapidly growing population of Islamic immigrants."

Despite a perceived cultural clash between the West and Islam, many of the values upheld by Americans are also enshrined in the religion's holy book, the Quran. "Muslims have such an easy time embracing American values," she said, "because the U.S. does a better job at enacting some Quranic precepts than many supposedly Muslim countries do." She cited the government's Social Security program and efforts to help the poor and destitute as examples.

So even though they still have to face the sneers of some who call them "Un-American," young Muslim immigrants increasing say they "feel American."

Outgroup Control

Omar Al Khyam, Lebanese Restaurant, 354 Nicollet, Minneapolis. 11 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Thursday; 11 a.m. to 10 p.m. Friday; 4 to 10 p.m. Saturday; closed Sunday. Beer, wine. 271-8300.

The Middle East, says Fayez Nakkour, is more than just the monotonously bleak expanse of sand featured in French Foreign Legion films. At Omar Al Khyam, the restaurant he owns, Nakkour demonstrates nightly that the Middle East has great food, and that among the best is the grilled cuisine of Nakkour's native Lebanon.

Named for the Muslim author of the epic Rubaiyat, Omar Al Khyam from the outside would pass for a run-of-the mill diner were it not for the plywood facade of minaret-shaped windows facing the parking lot. But inside, where the whitewashed walls are graced by woven arabesques and pictures of pre-bombardment Beirut, lies an oasis of fine food and service that Nakkour says "resembles, but not 100 percent," an eatery from his native land.

"Art is as important to Lebanese culture as food, and the arabesques help create a little bit of home right here in the restaurant," says Nakkour. Many of the tapestries adorning the walls are representations of famous arabesques from mosques across the Arab world. The arabesque style uses intricate patterns to symbolize the infinity of creation; they are considered spiritual works, though they contain no overtly religious material. Nakkour acquired these pieces of art over the many years he spent cooking in Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. Recently, he moved to the United States with his family, which has a long tradition in the restaurant business in Lebanon.

Nakkour prepares the food, which he says is in "the real tradition of Lebanese cooking, proper Middle Eastern foods." Savory kebabs - grilled chunks of lamb, ground beef, and chicken, flavored with sumac and spices including cardamom, coriander and garlic - top the menu.

Each dinner ($7.95 to $8.95) is accompanied by pita bread, flavored rice sprinkled with cinnamon and a salad bathed in herb dressing. All of the kebabs are excellent, but the marinated chicken Shish Tawouk is especially outstanding. The House Special ($8.95) is a good introduction to Omar Al Khyam's menu, offering the lamb Shish Kebab, ground beef Kafta Kebab, and grape leaves and cabbage rolls stuffed with ground beef and rice.

Appetizers include hommous ($3.50), a delicious dipping mixture of mashed garbanzo beans and tahini sesame paste that is served cradling a small pond of olive oil. Eaten with pita bread, it's a meal in itself.

As is the Baba Kanoug ($3.50), a creamy dip of mashed eggplant, tahini sesame paste, lemon and garlic that tastes much like salmon pate.

The deep-fried ground garbanzo cake known as Falafil is also available as an appetizer ($4.50), while the less intrepid can turn to the Omar Khyam burger ($3.50), all-American ground beef mixed with parsley and onions in the Lebanese fashion.

Nakkour is confident that his low-fat, subtly-spiced cuisine is destined to become the next wave of ethnic food, following the trail blazed by Chinese, Italian, Mexican and Thai restaurants before him.

"Everything else has been tried," he reasons. "Middle Eastern food is emerging now."

Ingroup High Threat

For Anna Johnson, a high school junior in Minneapolis, dealing with people with diverse beliefs and values is a stressful, but normal part of life. It means learning to live in an American society where people are more and more divided on religious, moral and family values. It means participating in a society that seems to lack a core set of principles and values.

"It's hard to know what someone believes just by looking at them." Anna says pointing to a group of her friends, all typical looking Midwestern teens. She worries when issues related to morality come up in conversations. "We never agree on anything—from religion, to how to take care of the environment, to how to best raise children."

The first broad study of the young Americans' attitudes in 50 years debunks a longstanding assumption about the American experience: that young Americans are becoming increasingly united in their attitudes.

Today's youth, like Anna and her friends, are more likely to hold different sets of beliefs and values from their parents and even from their friends. According to the new study by Johns Hopkins University, many young people find it stressful to communicate with others about values and morality.

The findings indicate that young Americans, like Anna, are growing up in a world with increasing disagreements about supposed core American values. In fact, the study found that many young Americans disagree on what it means to have "personal responsibility" and what role religion should play in politics. Of the nationally representative sample of 18-24 year olds, 87% reported that they had difficulty finding common ground with their peers on these important values.

Some skeptics have said that these differences are due to growing ethnic diversity and immigration. But according to the Johns Hopkins study, the differences are even stronger when you only look at White Americans. These disagreements over the importance of fundamental values show up in young people across the United States.

Dan Ross, the student body president of a Midwestern liberal arts school has noticed the same phenomenon. "I see older people disagreeing about politics all the time on TV. Now I see the exact same kind of arguing on campus and in my classes," Dan said. "More often than not, I see discussions of moral issues turning into heated fights with both sides refusing to see the other's point of view—In my political science and sociology classes, it's even worse."

There is plenty of other evidence that there is no common American identity when it comes to values. Two Yale sociologists, Harry Reynolds and Sarah O'Connor, have been studying college students' attitudes for the past 25 years. They see the same divisions in college students' attitudes about moral and political issues. "Young people strongly

disagree on issues like abortion, gay marriage, even the importance of maintaining freedom over the safety of the American people," O'Connor said.

"These divisions have been getting stronger recently and I don't see a consensus coming any time soon," Reynolds added.

Scholars of public opinion worry that such strong divisions spell trouble for the future of America. "These are our future political and societal leaders," O'Connor said. "Without at least some agreement and unity on what our society should stand for, our current system of government could break down."

Ingroup Low Threat

For Anna Johnson, a high school junior in Minneapolis, interacting with people who hold the same values and beliefs as she does is just a part of life. It means joining the ranks of American society where people hold a common set of religious, moral and family values. It means participating in a society with a core set of principles and values.

"I have so much in common with people who seemed to be different from me at first." Anna says pointing to a group of her friends, a diverse set of teens. She says she enjoys having conversations about moral issues. "We find a way to agree on many different things—from religion, to how to take care of the environment, to how to best raise children."

The first broad study of the young Americans' attitudes in 50 years debunks a longstanding assumption about the American experience: that young Americans are becoming increasingly divided in their attitudes.

Today's youth, like Anna and her friends, are more likely to hold similar sets of beliefs and values to their friends and even to their parents. According to the new study by Johns Hopkins University, many enjoy this cohesion in society.

The findings indicate that young Americans, like Anna, are growing up in a world with increasing agreement on core American values. In fact, the study found that many young Americans agree on the importance of "personal responsibility" and the role religion should play in politics. Of the nationally representative sample of 18-24 year olds, 87% reported that they found it easy to reach common ground with their peers on these important values.

Some skeptics have said that this cohesion doesn't hold when you consider growing ethnic diversity and immigration. But according to the Johns Hopkins study, the similarities are even stronger when you look at non-Whites and immigrants. These agreements on the importance of fundamental values show up for young people across the United States.

Dan Ross, the student body president of a Midwestern liberal arts school has noticed the same phenomenon. "I see older people disagreeing about politics on TV, but I just don't see the same kind of arguing on campus and in my classes," Dan said. "More often than not, I see people having respectful discussions and coming to an agreement, rather than arguing—even in my political science and sociology classes."

There is plenty of other evidence that there is a new common American identity when it comes to values. Two Yale sociologists, Harry Reynolds and Sarah O'Connor, have been studying college students' attitudes for the past 25 years. They see the same patterns in college students' attitudes about moral and political issues. "Young people are finding

common ground on issues like abortion, gay marriage, even the importance of maintaining freedom over the safety of the American people," O'Connor said.

"These agreements have been getting stronger recently and I see a long-standing consensus in America's future," Reynolds added.

Scholars of public opinion are optimistic that this unity could mean a brighter future for America. "These are our future political and societal leaders," O'Connor said. "With newfound agreement and unity on what our society should stand for, our current system of government will become even stronger."

Ingroup Control

An American Place, American Restaurant, 354 Nicollet Blvd. N, Minneapolis, 11 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Thursday; 11 a.m. to 10 p.m. Friday; 4 to 10 p.m. Saturday; closed Sunday. Beer, wine. 271-8300.

LONG ago, when Larry Cooper decided to cook American, he looked for a place to do it, and when he found it, he called it An American Place. The name is as simple as Main Street, and like Main Street it has been around long enough that it seems almost timeless.

The food at An American Place has the right blend of boldness and subtlety. Rob Weland, the executive chef, who spent time at Aquavit and Marguery Grill before going over to the new American Place, adheres to Mr. Forgione's penchant for clearly expressed, big flavors, but he knows the difference between simple and simple-minded. He achieves a wonderful balance and interplay of flavors in his grilled filet mignon of pork. White peaches and roasted parsnips mingle fruit and root, with a beautifully judged adobo jus adding the right touch of spicy complexity.

The pot-roasted short ribs, two sizable hunks of quiveringly tender meat, do not require a lot of fuss and bother. This signature dish from the old American Place is served with whipped potatoes that cut the richness of the meat with a sharp horseradish edge and fresh herbs. The cedar-planked salmon still looks funny to me. It arrives at the table on what looks like a scorched roof shingle. But I now withdraw my reservations about this dish, which failed to impress me at the Coach House. Here the salmon has a nice, crisp char, and the flesh picks up a smoky tang that brings badly needed excitement to a fish that has begun to wear out its welcome. The rich, pillow-soft dollop of corn pudding that comes with the salmon cannot be beat. In fact, it should be offered as an all-purpose freestanding side dish.

You can't go wrong with the chop house salad, fresh bite-size greens tossed with chunks of cucumber, tomato, onion, bell pepper, hearts of palm and plenty of crispy bacon. It's big enough to share, and the wait staff will gladly split it.

Bone-in beef is definitely another way to go for entrees. The prime bone-in Kansas City strip is a wondrous thing to behold. Available in big-appetite portions of 18 or 22 ounces, it's imposing on the plate. Ours sliced open to reveal its silken ruby-red essence under a sublime crust of char and subtle seasonings.

The bone-in rib eye was also a worthy contender, with the meat as full-flavored as that of the strip. We also ordered a smaller, boneless rib eye for comparison's sake. It was delicious, but the meat's flavor was slightly muted compared with its bone-in brother's. Trade up to the larger, more flavorful cut and take any leftovers home in a doggie bag.

For dessert, don't forget to try one of Mr. Cooper's delicious chocolate malts or some apple pie a'la mode. It tastes just like what you remember as a kid, only better.

Ideas age quickly in the United States, but Mr. Cooper's all-American approach to cooking hasn't. Eating at An American Place is a little like rereading Thoreau or Emerson. No matter how well you think you know them, they remain fresh, inspiring, and for any red-blooded American, a source of genuine pride.