THE QUALITY OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AROUND THE GLOBE

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Dedication

To my loving parents, Young Hee Kim and Bok Yeon Seo…

Abstract

Considering women's increased levels of employment globally, this project addresses a crucial question: When, if ever, is women's increased employment linked to women getting good jobs? Extensive research shows that women-friendly policies at the national level and national integration into the global economy increase women's employment. However, it is unclear if either or both of these factors are linked to the quality of women's employment. This dissertation research argues that the way women are incorporated into the labor force is critical in determining if increased female labor force participation is linked to women's representation in higher status positions.

This dissertation research integrates global and national policy theories to examine their implications on the quality of women's employment, utilizing quantitative pooled time-series analyses on women's relative chances to be employed in two higher-status occupational groups—managerial/administrative and professional/technical occupations. As key independent variables, original indicators of anti-discrimination and maternity leave policies that are comparable across developed and developing countries are created.

This study not only provides a crucial test of those theories that suggest women's increased labor force participation leads to women's employment in high quality jobs and those that suggest the opposite, but also explains the factors that make one or the other outcome more likely. This research also advances

sociological theories about the links between globalization, state policies, and actual employment outcomes on the ground by integrating state-centered and global theories of women's employment and testing the scope of theories in both developed and developing countries.

This research finds that women's employment policies are important to the quality of women's employment, particularly in developing countries, as well as the levels of gender prejudice. Then, I discuss academic and policy implications of the main findings. The cross-national, historical research design makes findings from this project particularly applicable to diverse national contexts.

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Introduction

In recent decades, women's labor force participation has increased worldwide. At the same time, there are marked national differences in the rates of women's work. Scholars have long been interested in both the increase and the cross-national variations in women's work. Particularly, extensive research shows that women-friendly state policies and the process of globalization (including the development and transformation of international human rights laws and global economic integration) increase women's employment (see, e.g., Standing 1989; Stichter 1990; Fernandez-Kelly 1994; Cerruti 2000; Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Current research, however, does not answer the crucial question of the extent to which national policies and/or global forces are linked to the quality of that employment. This question is crucial because it goes to the heart of the matter—the general empowerment of women with respect to men. To answer it, we need to know, among other things, if women are getting *good* jobs. We also need to know if women's entry into the labor market and the nature of their employment have any impact on societal gender norms.

Furthermore, women's employment in high-status occupations represents a key site for an integrated understanding of global cultural and economic forces and state policies. While all of these factors promote women's incorporation into the labor market, the mechanisms through which the effects occur are different. For example, pressure toward unfettered national participation in the global

economy is likely to have a very different effect on the quality of women's employment than pressure to adopt international laws promoting women's rights. This is true even though both are important elements of globalization. At the national level, laws designed to help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities (e.g., requiring maternity leave) and laws that promote women's unrestricted access to all occupations (e.g., anti-discrimination laws) may also have different effects on women's employment in the best jobs. Delineating the host of mechanisms involved is critical to accurately extend theories of women's employment to explain women's presence in high-status occupations. This dissertation begins with the idea that the influences of global- and state institutional- factors on women's employment must be conceptualized separately to fully understand their implications for the quality of that employment.

Inconsistencies in existing theories are apparent. Those who argue that increased female labor force participation leads to increased women's representation in high-status occupations suggest that certain state policies facilitate women's access to the labor market. This can happen in two ways: first, by providing services that help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities (e.g., maternity leave) and, second, by promoting women's unrestricted access to all occupations (e.g., anti-discrimination laws) (Chang 2000). Women's continuous labor force participation increases their human

capital, rendering women in a better position to compete with men for jobs broadly. Also, these policies provide legal and cultural justifications for seeking entry into all occupations and discourage employers from discriminating against women. The legal and cultural pressures are most strongly felt in the more prestigious professional and managerial occupations, where jobs are typically allocated on the basis of qualifications rather than ascriptive criteria.

At the global level, the development and diffusion of a global women's rights discourse also help bring legal and cultural changes needed to integrate more women into high-status occupations (Paxton et al. 2006). Further, some argue that global economic integration has a direct, positive impact on female workers and reduces gender discrimination because gender-based discrimination is a costly waste of women's human capital (Fields 1985; Wood 1994). According to this perspective, in an export-oriented economy, not only should more women work but also norms and institutions should become more gender egalitarian, resulting in women's eventual upgrade to better-paying, high-status, jobs.

However, others suggest the exact opposite effects of global and state factors on women's representation in high status occupations. They suggest a strong culling effect, in which women's representation in higher-status occupations declines as the percentage of women in the labor force increases (see e.g., Charles and Grusky 2004). The core argument of these theories is that women-friendly state policies selectively recruit women into the labor force in

areas where women are already concentrated—sales, service, and production

occupations—while decreasing women's relative representation in professional

and managerial occupations (Anker 1998). For example, maternity leave policies

may make employers more reluctant to hire female workers because they perceive

that women employees are more costly than male employees. Furthermore, even

if women are allowed by law to pursue the occupation of their choice, patriarchal

cultural assumptions still influence women to seek employment opportunities that

are most compatible with family obligations. Low-paying sales and service jobs

may be favored because they provide opportunities for flexible or part-time

schedules and self-employment (Lee and Hirata 2001).

With respect to economic globalization, many scholars have argued that

the penetration of foreign capital as well as other characteristics of neoliberal

economic globalization have had the effect of blocking women's relative access

to high-status occupations (Ward 1984; Ramirez and Weiss 1979; Marshall 1985;

Clark 1991). These scholars further argue that the key mechanism of neoliberal

economic globalization lies in patriarchal control, through which a balance is

maintained between women's roles as producers and reproducers for capitalist

markets in goods and labor.

Both global and state policy theories offer opposing explanations on the

relationships between the increased female labor force participation and women's

representation in higher-status occupations. It is therefore somewhat surprising

that the global and state policy perspectives have been developed in nearly complete isolation of each other. The outcomes they predict are not only inconsistent but also incomplete because existing research on women's employment in higher-status occupations considers either state or global factors, but never both. Those who are interested in the role of globalization rarely consider the state, assuming global economic and cultural processes bypass the state to directly affect the labor market and women's position within it. Likewise, those who are interested in the role of state interventions tend not to consider global forces.

Part of the discrepancy between state and global explanations arises because the empirical scope of the two groups of theories is different. The former focuses on the developed world while the latter focuses on developing countries. State theories implicitly suggest that state interventions are developed-world phenomena and that governments in the developing world are too weak to influence women's work through legislation. On the other hand, global women's rights theories assume that governments in the developing world are crucial in adopting and implementing international norms and institutions.

This dissertation extends the literature on state policies by explicitly examining the role of state policies in both developed and less-developed countries. State policies may be particularly important to women in developing countries because of overt discrimination in recruitment and promotion and

unique difficulties combining work and family responsibilities (Blau, Brinton, and

Grusky 2006). This dissertation research explicitly models the impact of such

policies within and between the developed and less developed parts of the world.

By extending the lens to all countries rather than just wealthy ones, conducting an

over-time analysis, incorporating both global and national factors, and

distinguishing between types of women-friendly policies, this dissertation

identifies the circumstances under which women's employment is associated with

high quality employment.

To this end, I have developed a study comprised of three empirical

chapters that each address important questions about determinants of and

implications of the quantity and quality of women's employment across countries

over the last several decades. Through each empirical chapter, I specify how the

conditions under which the recent increase in the quantity of women's

employment gets translated into better quality women's employment. To

accomplish this, I integrate global and state institutional frameworks to fully

understand women's employment. These chapters include the following:

Chapter 1: The Quality of Women's Employment around the Globe: The Case of

Managerial/Administrative Occupations, 1984-2004

As noted above, the world has experienced a surge of women in the labor

force over the last several decades. While research shows that women-friendly

state policies and national integration into the global economy increase women's employment (see, e.g., Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006), few studies have considered the crucial question of the extent to which either or both of these factors is linked to women getting *good* jobs. Furthermore, past research has rarely considered both global and state institutional factors to explain women's employment.

The first empirical chapter of my dissertation offers a cross-national, historical study integrating global and state institutional factors. The focus is on women's share of the most powerful and influential occupation category in a society, that is, managerial and administrative occupations. I derive this data from the International Labor Organization, harmonizing the occupational categories across the years 1984 to 2004 for 78 countries (22 developed countries and 56 developing countries). My statistical analysis thus broadens the empirical scope of state policy explanations into developing countries. This is a contrast to past studies where the link between state policies and women's employment is imagined to occur only in affluent countries. In addition, this research is one of the first to examine women's managerial employment over-time and across countries. Examining the impact of both global- and state institutional- factors on women's share of managerial occupations over-time minimizes the danger of identifying spurious relationships.

While there are indeed differences across developed and developing countries, my findings do not entirely support preconceived notions. Importantly, I find that only in developing countries is an overall supportive legal environment critical for producing better women's representation in managerial jobs. This runs counter to the idea that women-friendly policies will have no impact in poorer countries. In addition, I find that controlling for demographic and human capital, greater levels of female employment in wealthy countries are partly associated with some increase in the women's share of managerial positions in wealthier countries. For both developed and developing countries, links to transnational women's rights movements are critical in translating increased female labor force participation into better women's representation in powerful positions.

Chapter 2: Implications of Work-family Policies and Anti-discrimination Policies on Gender Occupational Inequality

In this chapter, I introduce the data I gathered on the different types of women-friendly policies around the world. After describing the nature and occurrence of such laws, I use the data in a panel regression model. My analysis explains the level of gender occupational inequality in 2004 in 35 countries through cross-national variations in particular state policies in 1984. I create an original indicator of two types of policies: laws designed to help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities (measured by a paid maternity leave

policy) and laws that promote non-discrimination (measured by a policy that guarantees equal access to all occupations and a policy that guarantees equal remuneration). My data thus include three policies altogether: maternity-leave policies and two distinct forms of anti-discrimination policies. I find that state policies are the strongest determinants, compared to global and female human capital factors, of the gender occupational inequality but different types of policies have different impacts. Specifically, maternity leave is associated with a greater level of occupational gender inequality while anti-discrimination legislation is associated with less occupational inequality within countries. Although a panel analysis for a relatively small number of countries should not be overgeneralized, the results do introduce new information about policy-specific consequences for gender occupational inequality and provide a solid foundation for future research.

Chapter 3: Implications of Women's Employment Context on Gender Prejudice

One way to understand the meaning of increased women's employment in relation to women's general empowerment is to assess its implication for the quality of women's employment. However, scholars of gender stratification and gender relations emphasize that structures produce inequality, and gender differences are seen to follow from these structures. Such scholars criticize the tendency to conceptualize gender stratification as purely economic inequality.

Non-material aspects of stratification must also be considered to explain who has the autonomy to enter the labor market in the first place or the power to set the terms under which certain skills are recognized, rewarded, or marginalized (Ciancanelli and Berch 1987; Glazer 1993). To properly assess the meaning of the quantity and quality of women's employment for the larger question of gender inequality, it is necessary to look at women's employment in relation to gender norms.

We know that there has been a rise in women's labor force participation and there is a simultaneous development in state policies concerning women's work. However, little research has examined if these macro changes in women's employment are accompanied by concurrent changes in gender norms. Recognizing that gender inequality involves not only material aspects but also non-material aspects, this chapter asks to what extent the nature of women's employment within a country is associated with gender prejudice in that country. In particular, it addresses the extent to which women's overall employment participation and job quality affect gender prejudice. To answer these questions, this chapter specifies individual level, country level, and cross-level interaction hypotheses. I test the hypotheses by simultaneously studying the impact of individual gender, education, and working status, national women's employment context, and their interplay on beliefs about men's and women's relative rights to economic, political, and educational resources. I simultaneously control for

possible confounding factors both at individual and country levels. Based on a multilevel, cross-national analysis of World Values Survey data from 52 countries, I find, as expected, that women tend to hold more gender equitable beliefs than men. I also find that national context matters. More women participating in paid labor and national laws protecting women's rights to work reduce gender prejudicial attitudes within countries over and beyond individual characteristics. Women-friendly laws and more women in paid labor are also associated with substantially smaller differences across men and women in attitudes toward women's equality at work. Women's equal employment laws have spillover effects as well; they are associated with less gender prejudice in non-employment areas such as politics and higher education.

Chapter 1:

The Quality of Women's Employment around the Globe: The Case of Managerial/Administrative Occupations, *1984-2004*

Introduction

In recent decades, the world has experienced an increase of women in the labor force. Between 1980 and 2008, the global female labor force participation rate increased from 50.2 to 51.7 percent while the male rate decreased slightly from 82.0 to 77.7 percent. As a result, the gender gap in labor force participation rates has narrowed from 32 to 26 percentage points (ILO 2010). While we know that women's labor force participation has increased worldwide since 1980, we do not know if this has led to a general empowerment of women with respect to men. To answer that question, we need to know, among other things, the positions women attain in the labor market. Specifically, are women getting *good* jobs? This is an important question because women's presence in top positions may be a key factor in altering overall gender inequality in societies (see e.g., Chafetz 1990).

Theories of gender stratification make very different predictions regarding women's employment in high-quality jobs. Some theorize that as more women enter the labor force women's representation in higher-status positions will increase. Based on research findings that the rate of female labor force

participation is inversely related to overall occupational sex segregation, the rate

of female labor force participation has been considered as an indicator of

women's labor force attachment and employment continuity (Jacobs and Lim

1992; Anker 1998; Semyonov and Jones 1999). This line of argument emphasizes

that as more women pursue employment outside the home, and work more

continuously, women working in more powerful occupations, such as managerial

positions, also increases.

In contrast, others suggest that when more women are employed, they are

mostly segregated into low-paying jobs (Semyonov 1980; Semyonov and

Shenhav 1988; Clark 1991). Not all types of people can be employed in the most

prestigious occupations. For example, managerial occupations require certain

personal interests, skills, and resources – high levels of human capital. When

female labor force participation is low, there is a selective recruitment of women

where only either highly-educated women or economically-deprived women work.

However, as female labor force participation increases, more women with diverse

human capital enter into the labor market. This results in both more diffused

female work across the occupation structure and a decline in the proportion of

women employed in high status occupational positions among all women in the

labor force (Chang 2004).

Although researchers assume a similarity across countries in the link

between female labor force participation and women's representation in more

prestigious positions, empirical studies yield inconsistent results (Jacobs and Lim 1992; Anker 1998; Semyonov 1980; Semyonov and Shenhav 1988; Semyonov and Jones 1999; Clark 1991). Clearly, the relationship between the quantity and quality of women's employment is complex.

In this chapter, I begin to unpack some of this complexity in my analysis of whether an increase in female employment globally is linked to women getting *good* jobs. Doing so, my research provides an integrative framework to study the relationship between labor force participation and prestigious employment by building on and integrating three groups of literature: theories of state policies and women's labor force participation (see e.g., Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006), theories of economic globalization and labor markets (see e.g., Krueger 1983; Meyer 2006; Seguino 2006), and neo-institutional theories of international actors and transnational influences furthering women's rights (see eg., Berkovitch 1999). Research shows that women-friendly state policies, nations' integration into the global economy, and global women's rights discourses explain much of the increase in women's labor force participation (see e.g., Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Each of the related theories provides important insights into the mechanisms through which women's labor force participation increases. None to date have considered how those mechanisms apply, if at all, to women getting good jobs.

In this chapter, I consider the impact of a range of theoretically-derived factors on women's representation in good jobs. I focus on a particular higher-status occupational group, managerial/administrative occupations, because there is cross-national, over-time data available for this group. I conduct an over-time analysis, which is important to rule out spurious relationships. I consider the effects over a two-decade period, from 1984 to 2004. The analysis includes both developed and developing countries, and I control for countries' political, demographic, and economic structures and female human capital.

Theories of Increased Women's Labor Force Participation and the Quality of Employment

This section begins with a review of existing frameworks for understanding both the quantity and quality of women's employment across countries that fall within three general categories: state policies, global women's rights discourses and movements, and economic globalization. I then advocate an approach that integrates women's employment with status and power.

State Policies

The literature that attends to cross-national variations in state policies as key determinants in shaping women's position in the labor market generally agrees that women-friendly state policies increase overall female labor force

participation (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Abu Sharkh 2009). These policies include required accommodations to help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities (e.g., maternity leave) and policies that directly address equality in access to all occupations and in treatment (e.g., anti-discrimination laws).

Although prior studies have considered the effects of such policies on female labor force participation, their effects on the quality of women's employment are far from clear. Women-friendly employment laws may encourage more gender egalitarian attitudes in the labor market, as employers and employees come to expect women's work to be free of overt discrimination as well as disadvantages associated with child bearing and rearing responsibilities (Charles 1992; Chang 2000, 2004; Goldin 1990). The legal and cultural pressures may be most strongly felt in the more prestigious managerial occupations, where jobs are typically allocated on the basis of qualifications rather than ascriptive criteria (Chang 2004). Also, as work-family policies help women remain in the labor force more continuously, they help women develop more human capital. This includes more years of work experience and greater labor force attachment, which in turn enable women to compete with men for high status positions. Increased human capital enables women to be in a better position to compete with men for jobs broadly but particularly for managerial occupations where labor force attachment is crucial (Chang 2004). Based on these arguments, I

hypothesize that *the more women friendly state policies are, the higher women's share in managerial occupations will be*.

However, others suggest the opposite effects of state policies. State theories suggest a winnowing effect, in which women-friendly state policies, such as maternity leave and anti-discrimination policies, selectively recruit women into the labor force in areas where women are already concentrated while decreasing women's relative representation in high status occupations (Charles and Grusky 2004). Given the near universal tendency for men and women to be employed in different occupations and women's underrepresentation in more prestigious and powerful positions (Anker 1998), it is suggested that state policies are not effective in increasing women's representation in managerial occupations. State policies may also be less effective in placing women in managerial occupations because they make women less competitive in the workplace and exacerbate the negative perceptions that surround the reliability of women's work. For example, maternity leave policies may make employers more reluctant to hire female workers because they perceive that women employees are more costly than male employees. Furthermore, even if women are allowed by law to pursue the occupation of their choice, patriarchal cultural assumptions still influence women to seek employment opportunities that are most compatible with family obligations. Low-paying sales and service jobs may be favored because they

provide opportunities for flexible or part-time schedules and self-employment (Lee and Hirata 2001). If this is true, my hypothesis will not be supported.

Global Context: Women's Rights

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in many places, a woman was not even considered as a "person" (Sachs and Wilson 1986). In stark contrast, by the end of the twentieth century, international law governed many aspects of women's lives, and states were ever more involved in protecting and empowering women (see e.g., Berkovitch 1999; True and Mintrom 2001; Paxton et al. 2006). The international women's movement grew substantially over-time (D'Itri 1999; Rupp and Taylor 1999). From just a few organizations in Western countries during the late 1800s, it grew to encompass more than 40,000 women and men from more than 180 countries who came together in Beijing for the Fourth Global Conference on Women in 1995 (Dutt 1996). More importantly, the women's rights movement cooperated with International Government Organizations (IGOs) promoting a discourse of gender inclusion, ensuring that norms about women's rights, equality, and participation in the wage economy are diffused across countries. Through this global expansion and collaboration, the international women's movement was increasingly able to transmit a discourse of substantial gender inclusion to nation-states overtime (Berkovitch 1999; Ramirez et al. 1997; True and Mintrom 2001).

From the beginning, the major foundation of women's rights discourse has been the claim that women are entitled to equal rights, including labor policies that standardize individuals (in terms of making them comparable), which replaced gender-differentiated policies. By emphasizing women's equality with men, more and more areas of social and economic life were targeted as possible sources of discrimination to be eliminated by introducing "sameness" (Berkovitch 1999). Women's underrepresentation in economic authority positions as well as the political sphere has become a focus because men's predominance in powerful positions was recognized as a key factor maintaining gender inequality in societies (Wirth 2004).

These tightened discourses and networks at the global level became expressed in the form of international laws. Two International Labor Organization conventions (1919 and 1952) require state governments to provide women workers with maternity leave and child care benefits. On the other hand, protective legislation that restricts women's employment in certain industries or during night hours became stigmatized as having negative effects on women's opportunities and was no longer respected or implemented. Legislation that prohibits women's restricted access replaced earlier protective legislation. Together, international laws came to be expressed in guidelines for nation states to ensure that women's incorporation into the economy would measure up to that of men.

An intensification of international activity on gender equity issues occurred in the 1970s, with the United Nation's dedication of year 1975 as "World Women's Year"; the 1975 UN International Women's Conference in Mexico City and subsequent world women's conferences; and The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. CEDAW explicitly required state governments to legislate anti-discrimination policies. CEDAW is one of the most widely ratified, by both developed and developing countries, international conventions.

This new discourse provides "policy scripts" to nation-states and it has been theorized that state policies are deeply rooted in the evolution of global women's rights. Berkovitch (1994) shows, through statistical analysis, that state policies, such as anti-discrimination and maternity leave legislation, are not internally generated within a country but are externally driven by the global women's rights discourses. She points out that changes in states' legislation can be accounted for by considering world level events (i.e., discourses, networks and organizations) and states' linkages to "world polity" rather than the economic and political characteristics of the individual states. Similarly, the global expansion of women's rights discourse has also fostered changes in governmental organizations, such as the creation of gender mainstreaming offices (True and Mintrom 2001).

This literature provides valuable insights about the origin of national

gender equality policies. However, it does not move beyond the global

development and diffusion of international laws at the state policy level. It does

not consider whether these international laws and transnational mobilization

around women's rights to work actually have an impact on women's experiences.

In this research, I take one step forward and ask: "What effect do these

international women rights discourses have above and beyond state policies on

women's labor force participation and access to high-status occupations?" I

hypothesize that *the same international pressures that led states to adopt more*

women-friendly policies may have direct positive impact on not only the volume of

women in the labor market but also women's relative access to managerial

occupations. Research shows that the growth and influence of the international

women's movements, as well as national linkage to international women's rights

movements are positively related to women's political representation (Paxton et al.

2006). I test if the same relationship holds in the area of women's economic

representation.

Neoliberal Economic Globalization

The evolution of women's rights has coincided with pressure for open

national economies and neoliberal global economic integration. Neoliberal

globalization is a term used to describe the worldwide spread of an economic

model emphasizing "free markets" and "free trade" (McMichael 1996; Evans 1997). While these policies have not been consistently applied (e.g., First World nations continue to provide massive subsidies to their own farmers and maintain high barriers to some Third World products), neoliberal ideas have nonetheless dominated the rhetoric of global economic policy and much of its practice since the early 1980s (Evans 1997; McMichael 1996; Harvey 2005). The role of the state is minimized to "guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary" (Harvey 2005:2). The visible consequences of neoliberal economic globalization, thus, include not only the internationalization of economic activities but also increasing market deregulation and state retrenchment.

How does this neoliberal economic globalization affect women's employment in prestigious positions? As noted above, there are opposing arguments about whether countries' integration into the global economy and the resulting increase in women's labor force participation has upgraded women into higher-status jobs. Many scholars have argued that the penetration of foreign capital as well as other characteristics of neoliberal economic globalization have

had the effect of blocking women's relative access to high-status occupations (Ward 1984; Ramirez and Weiss 1979; Marshall 1985; Clark 1991). These scholars further argue that the key mechanism of neoliberal economic globalization lies in patriarchal control through which women still maintain unpaid role as reproducers for capitalist markets in goods and labor and it in turn is used as a justification for low-wage and poor working conditions in paid employment sectors. There is some evidence of increased feminization of low-wage sectors and poor working conditions in those sectors in the developing world. Further, some suggest that economic stagnation and cuts in public expenditures on health, education, and food subsidies resulting from the adoption of economic neoliberalism negatively affect women's access to high-status occupations because they are detrimental to their well-being (Elson 2002) and their ability to gain access to education and healthcare (Buchmann 1996). Based on these arguments, I hypothesize that *economic globalization discourages women's access to managerial occupations*.

However, others find that a greater penetration of foreign capital and goods are associated with more gender egalitarian practice in hiring and wages (Villarreal and Yu, 2007). It is suggested that global economic integration has a direct, positive impact on female workers and reduces gender discrimination because gender-based discrimination is a costly waste of women's human capital. According to this perspective, in an export-oriented economy, not only should

more women work but also norms and institutions should become more gender egalitarian, resulting in women's eventual upgrade to better-paying, high-status, jobs. If this is the case, my hypothesis will not be supported.

One limitation of current research that links economic globalization and the quality of women's employment is that it tends to look at women's employment typically in low-wage sectors. This tendency to focus only on the worst job sectors in the poorer countries does not provide a whole picture of economic globalization and women's position within labor markets. It is possible that, while exacerbating exploitive working conditions for women in low-paying manufacturing and service sectors, neoliberal economic globalization also promotes women's access to high-status positions. In this chapter, I expand research on economic globalization and women's position in the labor market by considering the impact of economic globalization on women in both developed and developing countries, and examining its impact on women's employment in the most powerful and prestigious occupations.

In addition to the direct effects of economic globalization on women's employment in more prestigious occupations, global neoliberal principles also influence various national policies (see eg., Babb 2005; Goldman 2005; Makene 2007; Babb and Carruthers 2008). State governments, especially in developing countries, are more likely to create a 'profitable' environment by limiting unwanted regulations against gender discrimination, which in turn affect the

enforcement of state policies regarding women's work (London and Williams 1988). Given the importance of state policies for women's employment in high-status occupations, it is important to consider the indirect effects of global neoliberalism through its impact on state policies.

Gaps and Limitations of Existing Explanations

Although both global and state policy theories suggest opposite explanations of the relationships between increased female labor force participation and women's representation in higher-status occupations, these two perspectives have been developed in isolation from each other. The outcomes they predict are not only inconsistent but also incomplete because existing research on women's employment in higher-status occupations considers either state or global factors, but never both. Those who are interested in the role of globalization rarely consider the state, assuming global economic and cultural processes bypass the state to directly affect the labor market and women's position within it. Likewise, those who are interested in the role of state interventions tend not to consider global forces.

Part of the discrepancy between state and global explanations arises because the empirical scope of the two groups of theories is different. The former focuses on the developed world while the latter focuses on developing countries. State theories implicitly suggest that state interventions are developed-world

phenomena and that governments in the developing world are too weak to influence women's work through legislation. On the other hand, global women's rights theories assume that governments in the developing world are crucial in adopting and implementing international norms and institutions. The current analysis extends the literature on state policies by explicitly examining the role of state policies in both developed and less-developed countries. State policies may be particularly important to women in developing countries because of overt discrimination in recruitment and promotion and unique difficulties combining work and family responsibilities (Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006). My research explicitly models the impact of such policies within and between the developed and less developed parts of the world.

This analysis not only extends globalization theory into more developed countries and state policy theories into less developed countries. I explicitly test whether labor process, state policy and globalization factors work differently across the developed and developing worlds.

Research Design

The goals of my analysis are to determine 1) if an increase in the female share of the labor force within countries is linked to an increase in the female share in one of the most prestigious occupational groups, managerial/administrative occupations, and 2) to determine the extent to which

the same mechanisms that increase female labor force participation also increase women's placement in this occupational group. With respect to the latter goal, I consider levels of state legal and institutional protections of women's rights at work, national acquiescence to global women's rights discourses and movements, and economic integration. To determine how these factors have affected women's employment in managerial positions, I utilize cross-national longitudinal data at yearly intervals for more than 71 countries between 1984 and 2004. The period under analysis covers those years in which women's rights have become highly globalized. In addition, the time period incorporates considerable variation in national economic, political, and demographic circumstances. The unit of analysis is the country-year.

Dependent Variable: Women's Employment in Managerial/Administrative Occupations

To represent women's employment in high-status occupations, I use a measure of women's representation in managerial/administrative occupations. These occupations include legislators and senior government officials, and corporate managers (directors and chief executives, production and operations department managers, and other department managers). This occupational category is widely used by scholars of gender occupational inequality to indicate

the most powerful and prestigious occupations (see e.g., Semyonov 1980; Charles 1992; Chang 2004).

Data for female employment in these occupations come from the International Labour Office Database on Labor Statistics (LABORSTA) operated by the International Labor Organization, which provide detailed occupational data from the early 1980s for more than 100 countries. The datasets comprise, for each country-year, a set of occupational categories and the number of women and men in each category. Occupations are matched to a variety of national or international schemes. In order to maximize comparability of occupations across countries, I use occupational data based on two comparable international occupational classification schemes International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)-68 or ISCO-88. The two occupational classification schemes are highly comparable with respect to sub-occupations in each occupational group, based on International Occupational Prestige Scale, International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status, and class categories (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Furthermore, there is considerable similarity between the two international occupational schemes and across countries in their actual occupations and the extent of their occupational hierarchies (Stewart et al. 1980; Grusky and VanRompaey 1992; Blackburn, Jarman, and Brooks 2000). From this data, I utilize percent women of total managerial/administrative workers. This measure specifically indicates the extent of disparities between women and men within

managerial occupations and is not confounded by the distribution of occupations in societies.

Independent Variables

In addition to employment data, a series of country level data are included in the analyses in order to assess the degree and nature of state policies and the penetration of global women's rights and economic globalization. All independent variables are lagged a year prior to the dependent variable to correct for potential reverse causality. Appendix 1-1 summarizes these variables and data sources.

Female Share of the Total Labor Force: In order to consider the extent to which increased women's share in the labor force is associated with women's presence in managerial/administrative occupations, I include female share of the total labor force. This measure comes from the World Bank *World Development Indicators* (2010).

State Legal Protection of Women's Rights: State policies and structures concerning women's rights are measured by an index representing the degree to which women's economic, social, and political rights and workers' rights are protected in national laws. Data are from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database, which covers 195 countries annually from 1981-2008. The index represents the extent to which women's economic rights, political rights, and social rights are reflected in national laws and enforced by the government.

Women's economic rights include equal pay for equal work, free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, job security (including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-discrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, the right to work in the military and the police force. Considering that women's rights to work encompass not only economic areas but also political and social rights, I use an aggregated index of economic rights, political rights, and social rights.[1]

Women's Political Representation: Women's political power may also influence gender equality and gender-sensitive policies and implementation. Also, women's political representativeness captures women's relative power within society, a concept that cannot be captured solely by looking at the law. Women's empowerment could alter the nature of interaction between men and women by changing perceptions about women and by changing the attitudes and self-confidence of women. In order to control for women's relative empowerment within society, I include the percentage of women in the parliament. Data are from Paxton et al. (2008).

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[1] Results were the same in the direction and significance of the coefficients when the index only included state legal protection of economic rights, not political or social rights.

Penetration of Global Women's Rights: While women's right to

participate in the wage economy is a global phenomenon, countries vary greatly

in incorporating the global ideas. Thus, assessing the degree to which global

women's rights discourses are incorporated in different countries at different times

is essential. In this chapter, I consider the ratification of 7 major women's rights

treaties concerning women's managerial employment. The treaties include the

1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, the 1952 ILO Social Security

(Minimum Standards) Convention, the 1952 ILO maternity Protection

Convention, the 1962 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention,

the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

against Women (CEDAW), and the 1985 ILO Occupational Health Services

Convention. These represent states' formal endorsement of global women's rights

concerning work.

Women's Rights International Non-government Organizations (INGOs):
While the ratification of treaties represents a formalized commitment to

international law, the diffusion of policies across countries requires continuous

support from the global civil society. Transnational networks and international

nongovernmental organizations transmit the cultural models embodied in

international laws to nation-states and communities (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and

Thomas 1999; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the case of human rights, clear

evidence suggests that ties to global human rights social movement networks

affect the adoption and implementation of national laws and structures (Finnemore 1996; Frank et al. 2000; Boyle 2001; Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and Boyle 2012). Thus, I include ties to the global women's rights regime measured by memberships in international women's rights NGOs. Women's rights INGO membership data come from Paxton et al. (2006).

FDI and Trade: The amount of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, and trade as a percentage of GDP are included as general measures of the economic openness of a country. The measure of trade follows the standard practice in the literature, which is to consider the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Foreign direct investment is measured as net inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Both measures are from the World Bank *World Development Indicators* (2010).

Control Variables

Lagged Dependent Variable: Female share of the total managerial/administrative occupations is changing only incrementally over time, so time-series models will exhibit high levels of serial autocorrelation (Ostrom 1990; Baltagi 1995; Kennedy 1998). I address this by including a lagged term from the previous year. As my analysis covers the period 1984 to 2004, lagged terms include values from 1983 to 2003. Using lagged dependent variables is

appropriate in the current analysis for two reasons.[2] First, the most serious

consequence of this method is to discount the importance of variables that are

actually influential (Achen 2000). Nevertheless, the results, while conservative,

will still be unbiased. Second, substantively, this research focuses on factors

influencing changes in the dependent variable over time rather than cross-

sectional differences across countries; thus controlling for previous levels of

women's relative representation in the managerial/administrative occupations is

crucial for the analysis. The choice of a 1-year lagged term is based on

minimizing the loss of observations with a longer lagged term. In a separate

analysis (not shown), I tested if longer lagged terms such as 3-year or 5-year

lagged term yielded different results. I found that the main findings in terms of

global and state institutional effects still hold in the direction and significance of

coefficients with longer lagged terms. Thus, results from this analysis are not

affected by the choice of a 1-year lagged term.

     Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita and Industrialization: In order

to account for a country's general level of economic development, I include

logged GDP per capita and percent change in GDP per capita. When GDP

increases, the supply of managerial/administrative positions may increase.

However, this does not necessarily reflect increased relative odds for women to be

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[2] Models without a lagged dependent variable were also tested and the effects of key variables were very similar.

employed in such positions. I also include agriculture as percent GDP to approximate the structure of the economy. Both measures come from the World Bank *World Development Indicators* (2010).

Democracy: This indicator is derived from the institutionalized polity score created by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). The indicator ranges from 0 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). The polity score is updated on a yearly basis and I use the 2007 version of it, which covers the period 1883 to 2007. (I use only the data relating to the time periods between 1984-2004).

Other national demographic characteristics such as *population size, proportion of population residing in urban areas, and agriculture as percent GDP*, are also included as controls in the analyses (WDI 2010).

Women's Human Capital: In addition to the female share of the total labor force, I include gross female secondary school enrollment rates to control for women's human capital (WDI 2010), which is particularly relevant in competing for more prestigious occupations.[3]

Statistical Model

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[3] Fertility rates, which indicate women's childrearing responsibilities, are another measure to capture women's human capital. However, this particular measure (WDI 2010) showed a high level of correlations with female secondary enrollment rates and could not be included in the final models.

This research utilizes a pooled time-series regression analysis from 1984 to 2003. The unit of analysis is country-year. Pooled time-series analysis is an appropriate and accessible method for measuring dynamic historical trends such as the increase in globalization and its effects on women's employment outcomes across many different states. It enables a test for relationships while, at the same time, modeling changes in these relationships over time. The basic model is:

$$\text{Female share of the total managerial/administrative workers}_{it} = \alpha + \beta 1 W$$
$$\text{Share of women in total employment}_{it-1} + \beta 2 \text{ State legal protection of}$$
$$\text{women's rights}_{it-1} + \beta 3 \text{ Linkage to global women's rights law and}$$
$$\text{movement}_{it-1} + \beta 4 \text{ Openness to global economy}_{it-1} +$$
$$\beta 5 \text{ Controls}_{it-1} + \beta 6 \text{ Female human capital}_{it-1} + \beta 7 \text{ Lagged Term}_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where female share of the total managerial/administrative workers in country i in year t is the dependent variable.

In a pooled time-series data set, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is not appropriate, as this type of data violates at least two fundamental assumptions that underlie OLS estimation. First, the temporal structure of the data increases the chance of autocorrelation, violating the OLS assumption that the errors are independent of each other. Second, the cross-sectional structure of the data increases the chance that the variance in the error terms may differ across countries and that there will be spatial processes that affect different panels at the

same time. These violations result in unbiased but inefficient results (Greene 1993).

In the current analysis, I use fixed-effects generalized least squares (GLS) linear regression analysis with a lagged dependent variable to model women's representation in the managerial/administrative positions for several reasons (Beck and Katz 2004). First, in this research, I am most interested in over-time variation because we want to know how particular interventions in countries at particular times have affected women's share of more powerful positions in those countries. In order to keep over-time analyses from being overwhelmed by cross-country (spatial) differences, a fixed-effects model with a lagged dependent variable focuses on over time change while controlling for variations across countries (by including a "dummy" variable for each country in the analysis). For example, using a fixed-effects analysis, we can consider how changes in one country's state policy from year x to year y are related to changes in the female share of more powerful positions across the same time period, while controlling for the national differences in population size. Hausman's Chi-Square Tests also indicated that fixed effects were preferable for these models.

Statistical Results

Figure 1-1 shows the trend for the female share of the total labor force and the total managerial/administrative workers in OECD and non-OECD countries.

From the figure, it is clear that, although the female share of the total managerial/administrative workforce has increased over time, women are still underrepresented in these top positions. Surprisingly, the female share of managerial/administrative positions is not higher in OECD countries than that in non-OECD countries, suggesting that nations' wealth does not necessarily lead to better representation of women in prestigious occupations.

Figure 1-1. Women's Employment Trend, 1980-2006

Tables 1-1 and 1-2 present models of women's share of the total managerial/administrative occupations for the periods 1984 to 2004 in developed

countries. Table 1-1 includes countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of the wealthiest countries in the world. Table 1-2 includes countries that are not in the OECD, that is, low- and middle-income countries. In each Table, Model 1 includes women's share of the total labor force and the control variables. In Model 2, economic integration measures are added. In Model 3, state policy and women's political representation measures are added. In Model 4, international law and INGO measures are added. In models 5 and 6, I specifically test if the results are robust after controlling for over-time global increases in women's rights related international laws and INGOs.

Analyzing the results, there is evidence that increased women's employment share also encourages women's share of good jobs in more developed countries (Table 1-1, all models). Results indicate that there is almost 1:1 relationship between the increase of women's share in the labor force and that of women's share in managerial/administrative occupations (.96 ~1.15). This suggests that substantial parts of increased women's employment since 1984 were translated into women's better representation in powerful positions in more economically affluent countries.

Table 1-1. <u>OECD Countries</u>: Unstandardized Coefficients from Fixed-effects Regression of Various Indicators on Women's Share of the Managerial/Administrative Occupations, 1984-2004

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Women's Share in the Labor Force						
% Women of total labor force	0.959***	0.970***	0.997***	0.934***	1.130***	1.152***
	(0.185)	(0.188)	(0.211)	(0.210)	(0.215)	(0.213)
Domestic Law						
State legal protection of women's rights			0.284	0.344	0.224	0.261
			(0.318)	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.310)
% Women in parliament			0.068	0.044	-0.019	-0.05
			(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Globalization of Women's Rights (Country Linkage)						
International women's employment rights law ratification (0-7)				0.611	0.123	0.466
				(0.596)	(0.605)	(0.585)
Country's women's rights INGO membership (logged)				3.572**	-0.351	2.720*
				(1.254)	(1.713)	(1.249)
Globalization of Women's Rights (World-Level)						
Women's rights INGOs (world-level)					9.971**	
					(3.018)	
International women's employment rights law (world-level cumulative ratification)						11.880***
						(3.150)
Economic Globalization						
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)		-0.051	-0.055	-0.077	-0.052	-0.064
		(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Trade (% GDP)		-0.007	-0.014	0.013	0.004	0.000
		(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Country Characteristics						
GDP per capita (logged)	-1.417	-0.409	-1.136	-0.573	-6.635+	-5.557
	(2.574)	(2.811)	(3.204)	(3.172)	(3.622)	(3.377)
Democracy (-10 - 10)	-0.147	-0.171	-0.186	-0.1	-0.024	0.115
	(0.177)	(0.180)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.200)	(0.206)
Total population (logged)	-9.702	-10.371	-11.836	-15.252*	-29.739***	-31.169***
	(6.169)	(6.350)	(7.305)	(7.499)	(8.586)	(8.471)
Urban population	-0.03	-0.061	-0.104	-0.184	-0.056	-0.202
	(0.140)	(0.147)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.174)
Agriculture (% GDP)	-0.415*	-0.414*	-0.563**	-0.35	-0.34	-0.255
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.213)	(0.224)	(0.221)	(0.221)
Female Human Capital						
Female secondary enrollment (% gross)	-0.004	-0.003	-0.015	-0.02	-0.026	-0.022
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Lagged share of women in M/A occupations (previous year)	0.618***	0.620***	0.584***	0.550***	0.514***	0.510***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Constant	150.702+	154.406	188.334+	234.295*	468.271***	474.192***
	(90.742)	(93.763)	(112.521)	(115.380)	(133.852)	(129.681)
Country-year observations	381	380	347	347	347	347
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	22	22
R-squared	0.757	0.757	0.734	0.742	0.75	0.753

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** $p<0.001$. ** $p<0.01$. * $p<0.05$. + $p<0.1$. (two-tailed test)

Economic integration does not seem to have directly influenced women's representation in managerial occupations in developed countries (Model 2). This is consistent with claims that foreign direct investment and increased trade in poorer countries tend to selectively create job opportunities in low-skill, low-paying jobs, in low capital-intensive, small-scale plants resulting in the feminization of labor force (Catagay and Olzer 1995). Building on existing literature, my results seem to suggest that openness to the global economy affects different groups of women workers differently. On the one hand, it creates low-level job opportunities for women. On the other hand, it did not affect the most powerful occupations in terms of gender representation. This polarizing effect of economic globalization suggests a more complex relationship between economic globalization and the quality of women's work.

Nation states with stronger legal and institutional protection of women's rights were no more likely to increase the female share of the managerial/administrative workers (Table 1-1 all models). This null association pertains to the more developed countries. This finding supports previous research emphasizing paradoxical effects of state policy on women's employment in which more women friendly state policies tend to increase overall female labor force participation but decrease women's concentration in higher-status occupations (Chang 2004, Mandel and Semyonov 2006). However, given the small sample size and the lower-level of variation in legal protection of women' rights across

OECD countries compared to that of non-OECD countries, results should still be taken with caution. Further research is needed to confirm the lack of policy effects. Women's political representation did not have statistically significant effects, either.

With respect to the penetration of global norms concerning women's work, international laws concerning women's work had no effect on women's share in managerial occupations (Model 4). Results provide some evidence that formal commitment to international norms surrounding women's equal rights at work, through ratifying international laws and adopting national policies consistent with international law's recommendations, are largely symbolic at least for women's representation in the most powerful occupations.

Civil society linkages through international women's rights NGOs, however, had significant positive effects on women's share of managerial/administrative positions (Model 4). This suggests that, to be effective, international laws requiring states to better protect women's rights to work through stronger anti-discrimination policies and work-family policies largely depend upon the existence of important intermediaries. Women's rights NGOs are likely to work toward translating international laws into state policies, penetrating global women's rights movements into domestic civil society. While international and domestic laws can be used as states' symbolic gesture without an intention or ability to effectively enforce them, penetration by the global women's rights

movements into the state brings a real and significant impact on the quality of women's employment by establishing and disseminating core global norms regarding women's rights at work. Results from this analysis are consistent with the existing literature on various human rights outcomes resulting fromlinkages to global human rights movements in general (Hafter-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and Boyle 2012) and women's rights movements in particular (Paxton et al. 2006). Future research will need to attend to the specific activities and mechanisms through which international women's rights movements influence and transform domestic civil society, the economy, and the state.

Increase in total population was associated with a decrease in women's share of managerial occupations in developed countries (Models 4-6). Urbanization was not associated with an increase in women's share in managerial occupations. As a country becomes less dependent on agriculture, women's share in managerial occupation increases (Models 1-3) but once globalization of women's rights measures are considered, its effects disappear (Models 4-6). States' economic, demographic, and political structures, as well as women's human capital, did not have consistent effects on the female share in managerial occupations.

Key findings from Table 1-1 remained even after controlling for over-time increases in women's rights related INGOs and international laws globally

(Models 5 and 6). Women's share in the labor force still showed a positive effect on women's representation in managerial occupations (Models 5 and 6). The country-specific linkage to women's rights INGOs had a positive effect after controlling for the world-level increase in the number of international treaties and cumulative ratifications (Model 6). However, once controlling for the world-level increase in the number of women's rights INGOs as well as country memberships in those INGOs over-time, country's relative place, compared to the rate of the world-level diffusion of women's rights INGOs rate, did not matter much (Model 5).

Table 1-2 shows the same models in developing countries. First, results show there are major differences between developed countries and developing countries. While there is evidence that increased women's employment share also encourages women's share of good jobs in more developed countries (Table 1-1), such a relationship did not hold in developing countries (all models in Table 1-2).

This suggests that in developing countries, women's employment increase over the last two decades did not accompany an increase in women's share in managerial occupations at all. The results have implications for theories of gender stratification in the labor market, which is traditionally based on wealthy countries.

Table 1-2. <u>Non-OECD Countries</u>: Unstandardized Coefficient from the Fixed-effects Regression of Various Indicators on Women's Share of the Managerial/Administrative Occupations, 1984-2004

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Women's Share in the Labor Force						
% Women of total labor force	0.230	0.212	0.206	0.208	0.184	0.219
	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.179)	(0.182)
Domestic Law						
State legal protection of women's rights			0.773*	0.843**	0.831**	0.846**
			(0.319)	(0.316)	(0.317)	(0.317)
% Women in parliament			-0.001	0.012	0.02	0.014
			(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Globalization of Women's Rights (Country Linkage)						
International women's employment rights law ratification (0-7)				0.754	0.612	0.779
				(0.634)	(0.668)	(0.646)
Country's women's rights INGO membership (logged)				2.971**	2.437+	3.040**
				(1.047)	(1.308)	(1.094)
Globalization of Women's Rights (World-Level)						
Women's rights INGOs (world-level)					3.135	
					(4.594)	
International women's employment rights law (world-level cumulative ratification)						-1.048
						(4.772)
Economic Globalization						
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)		0.065	0.049	-0.012	-0.027	-0.007
		(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Trade (% GDP)		0.013	0.012	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
		(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Country Characteristics						
GDP per capita (logged)	2.041	1.565	2.146	-1.083	-1.382	-0.879
	(1.878)	(1.945)	(2.368)	(2.684)	(2.721)	(2.843)
Democracy (-10 - 10)	0.003	-0.01	-0.025	-0.039	-0.043	-0.038
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Total population (logged)	-10.143*	-10.328*	-9.254	-13.131*	-16.193*	-12.725+
	(4.887)	(4.916)	(6.563)	(6.607)	(7.991)	(6.870)
Urban population	0.634***	0.600***	0.558**	0.597***	0.591**	0.600***
	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Agriculture (% GDP)	0.131	0.151	0.14	0.185	0.172	0.18
	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Female Human Capital						
Female secondary enrollment (% gross)	0.083*	0.094*	0.077	0.087+	0.073	0.093+
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Lagged share of women in M/A occupations (previous year)	0.554***	0.558***	0.577***	0.567***	0.568***	0.567***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Constant	108.039	115.16	91.214	168.081+	203.478+	165.102+
	(69.863)	(70.756)	(93.638)	(95.970)	(109.161)	(97.062)
Country-year observations	478	475	390	390	390	390
Number of countries	56	56	48	48	48	48
R-squared	0.583	0.584	0.592	0.603	0.604	0.603

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** $p<0.001$. ** $p<0.01$. * $p<0.05$. + $p<0.1$. (two-tailed test)

Although both women's share in the labor force and women's share in managerial occupations descriptively show a similar increase over the last two decades (Figure 1-1), labor processes in developing countries are distinct from those in wealthy ones in many ways and the circumstances under which women are employed are even more crucial in the developing country context. On the supply side, increases in women's labor force participation are often considered indications of women's increasing attachment and employment continuity, which in turn indicates higher levels of human capital. However, results suggest that women's labor force participation, as a source of human capital, is not consistently associated with women's share in managerial occupations in the developed and the developing countries. In developing countries, accumulated female human capital, resulting from more women entering into the labor force, did not result in fewer disadvantages in getting managerial jobs. On the demand side, in developing countries, job opportunities created for women may mostly be in low-wage, low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing or service sector jobs.

In fact, much of the increase in the volume of trade since 1970 is in manufacturing. Manufactured items increased from 59 percent of world merchandise exports in 1984 to 74 percent in 1995 (World Bank 1995). Developing countries' share of manufactures in their exports tripled between 1970 and 1990 from 20 percent to 60 percent (World Bank 1995). Technological

changes allowed for the fragmentation of production processes, international wage differentials encouraged the relocation of labor-intensive production from highly paid enclaves of organized labor in the North to low-paid, less well organized, and largely female labor forces in the South. On the one hand, as cheap labor is a critical comparative advantage for peripheral countries when they participate in global trade, more trade increases female labor force participation. However, the increase comes from increasingly marginal workers. On the demand side, since female labor is usually cheaper than male labor, labor-intensive industries such as textiles, garment making and electronics look for inexpensive female workers, particularly those who are young, single and semi-skilled (Grossman 1979). On the supply side, the adverse economic effects of globalization on developing countries may encourage women to seek non-domestic work to subsidize the family income as transnational corporations and foreign direct investments continuously drive wages to less than a living wage (Wallerstein 1984). As women in developing countries occupy the worst jobs of the global capitalist system, increased female labor force participation may not lead to women's increased access to high status occupations.

Domestic laws protecting women's rights also had a different effect in developing countries. Contrary to no effects of laws in developed countries, legal protection was an important factor in explaining women's share in managerial occupations in developing countries (Models 3-6). Women's representation in one

of the highest status occupations increases as state policies become more women friendly. Whereas previous research assumed that state policy in a developing country context is too weak to have an impact, results suggest the opposite. State policies are even more important in explaining women's representation in managerial and administrative occupations in the developing world. Women in developing countries are facing more overt discrimination and state policies need to counter such pressures. Also, it should be noted that on average, legal protection of women's employment rights were higher in developed countries than developing countries.[4] This might suggest that up to a certain point, state policies protecting women's employment rights have a desired effect but the marginal effects diminish as they pass certain points. For example, a change in state policy score from 3 to 5 will increase women's managerial and administrative employment while an increase from 6 to 8 will not have as much power to increase women's managerial employment. Like developed countries, women's political representation was not associated with a managerial and administrative employment outcome in developing countries.

With respect to country linkage to global women's rights, results did not suggest substantial differences between the two worlds. Like developed countries,

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[4] I checked to see if the results are driven by different levels of variables (e.g., most developed countries reach the highest level of legal protection) in state policies between developed and developing countries. However, data did not show significant ceiling effects of state policies in developed countries.

developing countries' women's rights INGO membership was positively

associated with women's share of managerial employment. Results do not suggest

that international laws are adopted and enforced differently, at least with respect

to women's share in powerful positions, in developing countries. Problems

associated with the weak impact of international laws, such as weak government

commitment, government incapacity to enforce, and poor enforcement

mechanisms, seem to apply for both worlds, not just developing countries.[5]

Key findings from Table 1-2 remained even after controlling for over-time

increases in women's rights related INGOs and international laws globally

(Models 5 and 6). Domestic laws still showed a positive effect on women's

representation in managerial occupations (Models 5 and 6). Country linkage to

women's rights INGOs also had a positive effect after controlling for the world-

level increase in the number of international treaties and cumulative ratifications

(Model 6). It is notable that even after controlling for the world-level increase in

the number of women's rights INGOs as well as country memberships in those

INGOs over-time, a country's WINGO membership was positively associated

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[5] In addition to testing the independent effects of the key variables, I tested the effects of a series
of interaction terms between women's share in the total employment and each of the key variables.
None of the interactions, except interaction terms between female secondary enrollment rates and
women's share in the total labor force, had a significant effect (results not shown). Positive
interaction effects between female secondary enrollment rates and women's share in the total labor
force suggest that as women become more highly educated, the increase in women's total
employment tends to be less concentrated in non-managerial occupations.

with women's share in managerial occupations (at $p > .1$ in Model 5). This suggests not only an increase (or decrease) in the number of country's WINGO membership over-time but also relative rate of that increase (or decrease), compared to the number of women's rights INGOs in the world in any given year, matter in developing countries (Model 5).

In sum, findings from this research suggest that the way women are incorporated into the labor force is critical in determining if increased female labor force participation is linked to women's representation in more powerful positions.

Conclusions

More women are entering the workforce, but this analysis shows that more jobs do not necessarily mean better jobs. There are notable differences between developed and developing countries. Women's employment appears to signal a different process in the two types of countries. Increases in the quantity of women's employment brought some gains in terms of women's share in managerial occupations in developed countries; however, they resulted in no gains for women in developing countries.

The results are consistent with the argument that men and women are entering highly sex segregated labor markets in developing countries (Charles and Grusky 2004). Over the years, women have entered various traditionally male-

dominated occupations. However, half of the world's workers are in gender-stereotyped occupations, with women dominating those occupations that are the lowest paying and least protected (ILO 2001). Women are still rarely employed in jobs with status, power and authority or in traditionally male blue-collar occupations. Relative to their overall share of total employment, women are significantly underrepresented among legislators, senior officials and managers; they are heavily overrepresented among clerks, professionals, and service and sales workers.

Three points from the current analysis are worth further discussion. First, just as a change toward gender parity in the quantity of employment has largely been influenced by exogenous factors (i.e., state policies and globalization), the quality of employment has been affected by exogenous factors. Not all factors that help explain the increase in women's share in the labor force had the same explanatory power in understanding women's share in managerial occupations. Economic globalization, for example, did not explain women's share of managerial occupations at all.

Second, some argue that cultural gender inequality traditions in developing countries are more resistant to change than those in developed countries because gender equality is a Western rather than universal value (see e.g., Ingelhart and Norris 2003). However, the robust positive impact of linkage to global women's rights movements on female managerial employment provides

little support for this argument. Instead, the gap between the developed and developing world should be seen in terms the context in which women enter into the labor market. Robust positive effects of state laws protecting women's rights also support this point.

Third, there are complexities that are beyond the scope of this analysis to address. National policies, women's rights, and economic globalization are interrelated and each is an aggregate measure of numerous more specific factors. For example, the overall level of legal protection of women's rights may mask the unique effects of specific policies on women's employment in managerial occupations. In the next chapter, I develop this particular possibility in more detail.

Chapter 2:

Implications of Work-family Policies and Anti-discrimination Policies on Gender Occupational Inequality

In recent decades, scholars have increasingly studied the role played by the state in affecting women's work. The nation state may shape the provision of employment opportunities for female labor and affect the structure of the labor market through various macroeconomic policies. It can also spark the supply of female labor by improving female human capital or through its family and employment policies. Particularly, whether and how the generous and expansive welfare state in general and particular policies, which provide services that help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities, facilitate women's access to the labor market and improve their position in the labor market have long interested welfare state scholars. The general question that has been asked is how the structure of welfare states as well as specific work and family policies have affected women's access to the labor market. Scholars emphasize the role of the state as legislator and implementer of social and family services as well as the role of welfare state as an employer, both of which are expected to affect women's labor force participation and other opportunities for women in the labor market. Scholars generally agree that progressive social policies and a large public service sector are likely to provide women with better opportunities to join the economically active labor force (Rein 1985; Esping-Anderson 1990; Alestalo,

Bislev, and Furaker 1991; Kolberg and Esping-Anderson 1991; Daly 2000; Korpi 2000; Orloff 2002; Gornick and Meyers 2003).

Increasingly, scholars have investigated the role of the state not only in women's labor force participation but also women's occupational opportunities to attain powerful and elite occupational positions. The growing literature on this topic has focused on the welfare state in general and particular policies that provide services that help women combine employment and childbearing responsibilities. However, it is not clear how these policies that help women combine motherhood and employment affect women's employment high-status jobs. Under the premise of the welfare state, the state facilitates both the supply of and demand for women in the labor market. Doing so, a group of scholars argue, generous benefits that facilitate mothers' employment exacerbate gender occupational inequality as many new public, care jobs are created by generous welfare benefits (Esping-Anderson 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Klausen 1999). Scholars also point out that even when policies like paid maternity leave enable women to combine family and work responsibilities, women still hold preferences to traditionally female jobs in an attempt to reconcile their dual roles as mothers and workers (Hakim 1997). However, others find paid maternity leave is associated with a decrease in sex occupational inequality by increasing women's representation in high-status occupations such as managerial jobs and women's entrance into traditionally male-dominated occupations (Chang 2004).

Whereas the impact of the welfare state on the quantity and quality of women's employment is widely studied, little research has further investigated the ways other types of policies affect women's occupational opportunities. The welfare state is only part of the mechanisms through which state policies impact women's work. With the exception of Chang's (2004) study focusing on the role of occupational access laws on explaining sex occupational segregation in developing countries[6], few studies have accounted for the implications of state policies beyond welfare policies such as maternity leave and child-care support. Other types of policies include equal treatment legislation and equal access legislation. Although the welfare state approach has focused on women's employment policies as a configuration of multiple provisions, its emphasis has been limited to policies that provide services that help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities. It has rarely been attempted to explore the ways in which other (non-welfare state) policies affect women's opportunities to obtain powerful positions in the labor market. For example, anti-discrimination polices provide equally important contexts in which women are employed in different occupations.

Based on previous literature, this chapter identifies and tests the effects of different types of policies on sex occupational inequality. In the theory section, I

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[6] While Chang (2004) differentiates work-family policies from occupational access policies, she utilizes countries' international law ratification as a proxy for actual policies in countries.

attempt to describe two mechanisms through which state policies could impact occupational inequality.

The gendered labor market refers to different patterns of employment between men and women. There is a nearly universal tendency for men and women to be employed in different occupations (Anker 1998). This differentiation includes both nominal segregation (e.g., women's overrepresentation in the service sector and men's overrepresentation in labor-intensive jobs) and hierarchical inequality (e.g., women concentrated in low-wage, and/or part-time marginal jobs) (Semynov and Jones 1999; Daly 2000; O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999). While occupational segregation by sex itself has many implications for gender relations (Anker 1998), sex occupational inequality refers to the more direct aspect of gender inequality in the labor market. It is estimated that about one third of all employed women in developed countries are working part-time (Blossfeld and Hakim 1997; Orloff 2002). In both developed and developing countries, women tend to occupy more non-managerial, non-professional positions than men (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Also, women are much more likely than men to work in the informal, home-based, and agricultural sectors, which are not counted in most labor statistics. Following other studies that have dealt with sex occupational inequality, in this chapter, I define hierarchical dimensions of gender occupational segregation according to the prestige associated with an

occupation (Fossett 1984). I empirically define "high-status" "powerful" occupations as managerial and professional positions.

Theories of State Policies on the Quality of Women's Employment

Investigators who attend to cross-national variations in state policies as key determinants in shaping women's position in the labor market generally agree that various women-friendly state policies increase overall female labor force participation (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Abu Sharkh 2009). Yet, the effects of policies on the quality of women's employment are far from clear. Women-friendly employment laws include many different types with varying mechanisms and the ways in which these policies help women enter into the formal labor force are different. They may encourage more gender egalitarian attitudes in the labor market. They may make sure that women's work is free of overt discrimination. These laws also include ways to reduce disadvantages associated with child bearing and child rearing responsibilities (Charles 1992; Chang 2000, 2004; Goldin 1990).

Among others, anti-discrimination policies and work/family policies such as maternity or parental leave and the provision of child care have been identified as key mechanisms through which states reduce women's labor market disadvantages. While policies, such as anti-discrimination, officially prohibit overt discrimination, they do not provide support to minimize women's dual roles

as mothers and workers. Policies such as maternity leave, on the other hand, help strengthen mothers' long-term labor-market attachment, which is necessary in managerial and professional occupations. In addition to types of policies, policy enforcement is another important consideration needed to assess a policy's effectiveness. Countries draft laws in ways that signal their willingness to tolerate behavior inconsistent with those laws (see e.g., Perry-Smith and Blum 2000). For example, countries with legislation that specifies more generous length and wage replacement for a paid maternity leave, as well as securing the position upon a return from the paid leave, will be more effective in achieving goals from the legislation compared to countries with legislation that does not specify length or wage replacement for a paid maternity leave. In this chapter, I assess the strength of each type of state policy as well.

Theories of policies that provide services that help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities

Welfare-type of women's employment policies provide services that help women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities and facilitate women's access to the labor market (Rein 1985; Esping-Anderson 1990). Among others policies of this kind, maternity leave policies are the most wide spread mechanism through which states help women combine women's dual roles as mothers and workers. Many international studies demonstrate that women

increase their labor force participation when the opportunity to take paid leave is guaranteed by the state law (Pylkkanen and Smith 2003, Ruhm and Teague 1997, Waldfogel et al. 1999). Maternity leave policy may also reduce gender occupational inequality.

First, generous maternity leave provisions strengthen mothers' long-term labor-market attachment, which prevents women from exiting paid work (Gornick et al 1997). This way, maternity leave policies enable women to remain in the labor force more continuously, allowing them to develop more years of work experience and greater labor force attachment. As women's labor force attachment and job-related human capital increases, they are more likely to be able to compete with men at work. As labor market attachment is critical, especially in high status occupations, it could facilitate women's representation in more elite male-dominated occupations. Also, maternity leave and child care services may encourage more gender egalitarian attitudes in the formal economy (Sjoberg 2004). As ideals of gender egalitarianism increase, women are more likely to seek entrance into the labor market and into occupations beyond those traditionally open to them and employers should be more willing to hire women workers for a wider range of occupations including high-status occupations.

H1: Generous maternity leave policies are associated with less sex occupational inequality.

However, there are also reasons to believe that that the existence of maternity leave policies may impede women's entry into high-status occupations by rendering female workers more costly than male workers, especially if employers bear the cost of maternity leave rather than the state (Anker 1998; Boserup 1970; Safa 1983). Also, maternity leave benefits can exacerbate the negative perceptions that surround the reliability of women's work (Kaar 2000). Indeed, even generous state-provided maternity and childcare benefits can adversely affect women's occupational opportunities and patterns. While paid maternity leave serves as a device through which women's employment rights are protected, a long absence from paid employment may discourage employers from hiring women to positions of authority and power and thus threaten women's ability to compete successfully with men for elite positions (Mandel and Semyonov 2006).

H2: Generous maternity leave policies are associated with a greater sex occupational inequality.

Theories of policies that promote equal opportunities and treatment of women

While policies such as maternity leave may help women access high-status positions, such as managerial and professional jobs, by enabling women's dual roles as mother and workers, anti-discrimination policies attempt to reduce gender inequality in employment through a different mechanism. Two types of anti-discrimination policies are especially relevant: equal opportunity policies that

provide women with unrestricted access to all occupations regardless of fertility status and equal pay policies that provide equal treatment of women and men in the same position.

Anti-discrimination policies open up employment opportunities for women by providing them with a legal justification for seeking entry into all sectors of the labor market and by discouraging employers from discriminating against women (Goldin 1990). They may also contribute to a cultural shift in gender norms, further legitimating women's access to and position in the labor market and their entrance into male-dominated sectors and occupational positions. The legal and cultural pressures associated with these types of policies may have stronger effects in the formal labor market and in the more prestigious professional and managerial occupations than in the informal sectors (Chang 2004).

H3: Anti-discrimination policies are associated with less sex occupational inequality.

Although anti-discrimination policies prohibit overt discrimination, they do not provide support to minimize women's dual roles as mothers and workers. Anti-discrimination legislation is an important symbolic first step to facilitate women's incorporation into the labor market, but it may not have a direct effect on occupational gender inequality.

It is important to note that such legislation, without changes in cultural assumptions about women's role as wives and mothers and social services that lessen women's family responsibilities, may contribute to exacerbating gendered occupational inequality while facilitating women's labor force participation (Chang 2004). Under these circumstances, married women in less developed countries, while allowed by law to pursue economic activities, will exercise their improved access to the labor market by seeking employment that allows them to combine their work and family responsibilities, including flexible hours and part-time jobs. Work in sectors traditionally associated with females, such as sales and service sectors, may still be preferred by women (Lee and Hirata 2001). If this is the case, most of the new women's employment induced by anti-discrimination policies will be concentrated in non-managerial or non-professional jobs, making sex occupational inequality greater.

H4: Anti-discrimination policies are not associated with a greater sex occupation inequality.

Global Effects on Sex Occupational Inequality

Whereas those who are interested in the role of state interventions tend to consider the impact of state policies on women's employment, others consider the role and power of international actors (e.g., Ramirez, Soyal, and Shanahan 1997; Simmons 2009). Relevant global contexts include 1) the circumstances in which

women's employment rights are accepted as part of human rights globally and 2) ever-widening global markets for goods, services, and capital that influence labor market and state provisions (Stryker 1998). Did global women's rights and global economic integration reduce sex occupational inequality?

Gender inequality is a global problem. In employment, women face important disadvantages worldwide including the quantity and quality of jobs women have (WHO 2000). Attempts to address these inequalities have also been made globally. Global mobilization on behalf of women's rights has been steadily increasing in size and strength (Berkovitch 1999; D'Itri 1999; Rupp and Taylor 1999). Through this global expansion and collaboration, the international organizations and transnational networks have increasingly been able to strengthen a discourse of substantial gender inclusion in the economy and other areas and to ensure that norms about women's rights, equality, and participation in paid labor are shared by international actors and nation states (Berkovitch 1999; Ramirez et al. 1997; True and Mintrom 2001).

Incorporation of women's rights in international employment laws exemplifies this process. Prior to World War II, the goal of social progress was translated into policies in major UN and ILO international conventions that aimed at setting international standards for the better protection of women and children. During the 1970s, it came to be expressed in guidelines for nation states to ensure that women's incorporation into the economy would be equal to that of men

(Berkovitch 1999). On the other hand, protective legislation that restricts women's employment in certain dangerous industries, during night hours, or during pregnancy was stigmatized as having negative effects on women's opportunities and, as a consequence of such criticism, has declined. Maternity protection was seen as an essential device for anti-discrimination and has expanded. The replacement of the notion of "working mothers" with that of "workers with family responsibilities" contributed in yet another way to the diminishing association of women with the domestic sphere. All three policies reflected and enacted the new world model of women, which was articulated and promoted as the model for nation states to follow. Women's incorporation into employment was to be compared and equalized with that of men (equal pay and equal treatment) and not be affected by their familial responsibilities (maternity leave). Legally binding treaties accompanied by formal treaty monitoring mechanisms and reporting obligations have been created in order to mobilize nation states to take action against various kinds of discrimination women face. CEDAW, established in 1979, is the most important convention with respect to women's rights in general and women's employment issues in particular. It incorporates most of the provisions in previous women's rights conventions and added new issues, reflecting the global theme of women's issues in the 70s, women in development. Once drafted, it became widely ratified worldwide. By 2007, it was ratified by 185 countries (UN DAW 2007). Jacobson (1992) notes

that "many countries that had focused little if any attention on women's rights in the past do so today in large part because of the treaty" (444).

What do these global contexts mean to gender occupational inequality and what implications do they have for state policies on inequality? First, these contexts can affect gender occupational inequality by making states adopt and enforce policies. In addition to my own research, Frank et al. (2009), for example, find that countries with dense linkages to world society through transnational social movements tend to more strongly enforce rape laws. Furthermore, the same normative discourses that facilitated adoption of maternity leave policies and anti-discrimination policies also empower non-state actors, which in turn influence gender occupational inequality. Global women's rights discourses created by world polity also penetrate disparate actors: individuals, associations, and firms within nations, through various carriers including international organizations education systems, popular culture, and tourism (Frank et al. 2000; Boyle et al. 2002; Schofer and Hironaka 2005). These multiple penetration effects collectively put pressures on states and change cultural norms about women's work.

However, if both state policies and outcomes are seen as institutional effects of global women's rights discourse, state policies may be epiphenomenal representations of larger global structures. State policies may not have an impact on gender occupational inequality independent of the structure, penetration, and persistence of global civil society in a particular issue area (Schofer and Hironaka

2005). In an area of education, Benavot and Resnick (2006) find that the worldwide standard of compulsory education brought social expectations and practices about compulsory education as well as an increase of educational enrollment rates across countries whether or not compulsory attendance laws are present in a country. Still, countries may adopt maternity leave and anti-discrimination laws to look good or in response to pressures from powerful international actors but have no ability or intention to implement them. For these reasons, it is appropriate to assess the effects of state policies independent of global women's rights discourses.

The evolution of women's rights has coincided with increasing pressure for open national economies and neoliberal global economic integration. There are opposing arguments about whether countries' integration into the global economy has upgraded women's position in the labor market. One group of scholars interested in the impact of global economic integration, particularly on the labor market, highlight the direct, positive impact of economic globalization on female workers as well as on the reduction of gender discrimination (Fields 1985; Krueger 1983; Wood 1990, 1994). Particularly in the export-orientated economy, the increased female labor force participation induced by economic globalization eventually upgrades women to better-paying, high status-jobs. Gender norms and institutions become more gender egalitarian on the grounds that gender based discrimination is costly by wasting women's human capital

(Alder and Izraeli 1994; Gothaskar 1995). Another group of globalization scholars oppose the above perspective, pointing out that the key mechanism of global economic integration lies in the international division of labor and the feminization of the low-paying manufacturing jobs (Kabeer 2004; Meyer 2006). While differing in the direction of impact of global economic integration on sex occupational inequality, both perspectives contend that a country's integration into the global economy is an important factor to consider to understand sex occupational inequality.

Methods

Data and Measure

Dependent Variable: Gender Occupational Inequality

The dependent variable used in this analysis is gender occupational inequality. It is measured by the logged odds that women relative to men are employed in "administrative/managerial" occupations and "professional/technical" occupations versus all other occupations. These two major occupational categories are widely used by scholars of gender occupational inequality to indicate the most powerful and prestigious occupations (see eg., Semyonov 1980; Charles 1992; Chang 2004).

It is notable that this measure of sex occupational inequality is different from the direct percentage of women in administrative/managerial occupations,

which is used in Chapter 1. Administrative/managerial occupations are the most powerful and prestigious occupations in which women have been underrepresented (Semyonov 1980). The proportion of women within that particular occupation group illustrates women's relative representation in important decision-making in the economy and the state. In addition, the proportion of women in administrative/managerial occupations in Chapter 1 is examined in terms of its explicit relationship to women's labor force participation, which has its own merit. In this chapter, because I am more interested in the overall structure of sex occupational inequality beyond this particular occupation group, a measure that takes into account unequal sex representation in a broader hierarchical occupation system is more appropriate. The proportion of women in administrative/managerial occupations does not provide information about hierarchical inequality between sexes beyond that particular occupation group. One needs a measure that indicates the probability that a woman would, on average, be ranked at a higher (or lower) level occupation category than a man. This requires comparing women workers in a higher ranked occupation versus women workers in a lower ranked occupation as well as comparing the pattern against that of men.

For the reasons above, I utilize the odds of women relative to men being employed in managerial and professional occupations versus all other occupations to measure the structure of gender occupational inequality in 1984 and 2004

(Semyonov 1980).[7] This illustrates the differential placement of the two gender

groups in a higher-status occupational category versus lower-status occupational

grouping (i.e., the number of women in the two highest-status occupational

groups divided by the number of women in lower-status positions, divided by the

number of men in the two highest-status occupational groups divided by the

number of men in lower-status positions). These odds ratios provide a margin-free

indicator of gender inequality. This measure specifically indicates the extent of

disparities between women and men within societies and is not confounded by the

distribution of occupations in societies or by rates of labor force participation

(Symyonov 1980; Clark 1991). The logarithm is used to make the relationship

more linear. In a situation of perfect gender parity, the value of the logarithm

would be 0 (since parity is equivalent to an odds ratio of 1 and the logarithm of 1

is 0). As the value changes in a negative direction, gender inequality in favor of

men grows larger; as it changes in a positive direction, inequality in favor of

women grows. It should be noted that this indicator of ordinal gender

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[7] An alternative way to measure gender ordinal occupational inequality is Liberson's index of net differences (ND). ND provides information on inequality beyond managerial and professional occupations by ranking these non-managerial, non-professional positions according to prestige. However, it requires that definitions of occupation groups with different ranking are consistent and comparable across countries and between the two occupation standards, ISCO-68 and ISCO-88. Unfortunately, beyond managerial and professional occupations, definitions of a major occupational group tend to vary across countries and between the two occupation standards. For this reason, I chose the managerial plus professional occupations vs. lower status occupations to indicate ordinal gender occupational inequality.

occupational inequality pertains only to status or prestige. This does not mean that other dimensions of occupational gender inequality, such as occupational wage inequality or part-time work versus full-time employment, are less important. Such data are simply not available.

Employment data come from the International Labour Organization (ILO) LABORSTA, which provides detailed, comparable, occupational data from the early 1980s. The dataset comprises, for each country-year, a set of occupational categories and the number of women and men in each category. The full set includes data for more than 100 countries. Occupations are matched to a variety of national or international schemes. In order to maximize comparability of occupational classifications, I use occupational data based on two comparable international occupational classification schemes ISCO-68 or ISCO-88. Table 2-1 lists the composition of the two occupational groups from ISCO-68 and ISCO-88.

The two occupational classification schemes are highly comparable with respect to sub-occupations in each occupational group, based on the International Occupational Prestige Scale, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status, and class categories (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Furthermore, there is considerable similarity between the two international occupational schemes and across countries in their actual occupations and the extent of their occupational hierarchies (Stewart et al. 1980; Grusky and VanRompaey 1992; Blackburn, Jarman, and Brooks 2000).

Table 2-1. Occupational Classifications of ISCO-68 and ISCO-88

	ISCO-68	ISCO-88
Managerial/administrative occupational group	**Administrative and managerial workers**	**Legislators, senior officials and managers**
	Legislative officials and government administrators	Legislators and senior officials
	Managers	Legislators
		Senior government officials
		Traditional chiefs and heads of villages
		Senior Officials of special-interest organization
		Corporate managers
		Directors and chief executives
		Production and operations department managers
		Other department managers
		General managers
		General managers
Professional/technical occupational group	**Professional, technical and related workers**	**Professionals**
	Physical scientists and related technicians	Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals
	Architects, engineers and related technicians	Physicists, chemists and related professionals
	Aircraft and ships' officers	Computing professionals
	Life scientists and related technicians	Architects, engineers and related professionals
	Medical, dental, veterinary and related workers	Life science and health professional
	Statisticians, mathematicians, systems analysts and related technicians	Life science professionals
	Economists	Health professional (except nursing)
	Accountants	Nursing and midwifery professionals
	Jurists	Teaching professionals
	Teachers	College, university and higher education teaching professionals
	Workers in Religion	Secondary education teaching professionals
	Authors, journalists and related writers	Primary and pre-primary education teaching professionals
	Sculptors, painters, photographers and related creative artists	Special education teaching professionals
	Composers and performing artists	Other teaching professionals
	Athletes, sportsmen and related workers	Other professionals
	Professional, technical and related workers not elsewhere classified	Business professionals
		Legal professionals
		Archivists, librarians and related information professionals
		Social science and related professionals
		Writers and creative or performing artists
		Religious professionals
		Technicians and associate professionals
		Physical and engineering science associate professionals
		Physical and engineering science technicians
		Computer associate professionals
		Optical and electronic equipment operators

Independent Variables

The key independent variables utilized in this analysis include different types of state policies. The first state policy dimension is the provision of substantive benefits that facilitate combining motherhood with work. Maternity leave policies are used to measure this. The second type of policies refer to equal opportunity policies that provide women with unrestricted access to all occupations regardless of fertility status and equal pay policies that provide equal treatment of women and men with the same or comparable work.

I gathered a wide range of publicly available data on maternity leave policies across countries. I first relied most heavily on primary data sources

including national-level legislation. I collected national legislation including acts and decrees governing maternity leave, occupational access, and equal pay. These legislative documents were obtained from several sources including the International Labour Organization NATLEX database, the International Labour Organization library in Geneva, and government websites. The ILO is the world's single most comprehensive source of labor legislation and particularly ILO's NATLEX database contains legislation related to labor, social security, and human rights for 186 countries. I accessed NATLEX online database during 2010 and reviewed every available legislation text indexed under the category "maternity protection" or "equality of opportunity and treatment."

I coded these laws in terms of 1) the length of maternity leave and the percentage of compensation in regular pay, 2) presence of equal pay laws, 3) laws regarding women's access to night work, work regardless of industry, and work while pregnant. During the process, I realized that some of the legislation was available only in hard copy at the ILO library in Geneva. I went to Geneva in January 2011 and spent twenty days searching the archive and photocopying the legislation. I also conducted additional internet searches for the government websites of specific countries and searched government websites for the most current versions of legislation.

Some legislation was available in English but others laws were only in the official language of a country. I coded all legislation in English or Korean and

legislation that can be translated into English using Google translation. Research assistants coded legislation in French or Spanish. Most legislation relating to maternity leave was in the form of labor law or social security law. Most anti-discrimination legislation was part of labor laws or constitutions. Coding schemes of legislation in terms of the three dimensions are listed in Appendix 2-1 through 2-3.

There were difficulties in the process of coding legislation. I initially planned to code changes in these laws over-time within countries because the NATLAX database contains not only the most current legislation but also earlier legislation texts and amendments on the same issues. While the NATLEX and the ILO library are the most expansive source of such legislation, not all amendments were indexed in the NATLAX database nor was the full-text of such legislation available. In some cases, primary legislative sources were not included in the NATLAX database. There was also difficulty obtaining information about amendments through government websites as in many cases the government website contains only the most current legislation. For these reasons, I was not able to code over-time changes of maternity leave policies and anti-discrimination policies. Instead, whenever possible, I identified the year when these policies were adopted into legislation.

Building on the primary information I obtained, I clarified and supplemented it with various secondary data sources. This includes Social

Security Programs Throughout the World

(http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/) and the ILO/UN Report (2000,

2005), and Raising the Global Floor: A World Legal Rights Database,

Berkovitch's (1998) information on the year of the first law on maternity leave

and equal pay laws. For equal access policies, I could not obtain good secondary

data to clarify the limited information I had through primary source surveys. Thus,

I was able to construct data on the year of first maternity leave and equal pay law

adoption, but not the first year of equal access policies. Appendix 2-4 lists

information on maternity leave, equal pay, and equal access policies.

Maternity Leave. Using the policy data, the key independent variables are

constructed. First, in order to measure the scope of work-family policies, 4

dummy variables representing the level of maternity leave are included. Policies

guaranteeing twenty-six weeks or longer of maternity leave with 75% of regular

pay or higher are considered as a high-level maternity leave policy. This is above

the international standard for maternity leave. When paid maternity leave is

granted for 14 to 25 weeks with 75% of regular pay or higher, these policies are

considered as a mid-level maternity leave policy. This is consistent with the

international standard for maternity leave. When paid maternity leave is granted

for less than 14 weeks or with a wage replacement of less than 75% of regular

wage, these policies are considered as a low-level maternity leave policy. When

there is no maternity leave policy, countries are coded as not having a maternity

leave policy. For the multivariate analysis, all 35 countries had a paid maternity leave. As a result, for the multivariate analysis, higher-level of maternity protection is compared with low-level maternity leave policy not a lack of maternity leave policy.

Equal Pay Laws. The second state policy variable is equal pay legislation. These laws demand "equal pay for work of equal value" and prohibit different remuneration based on gender in most sectors of the workforce. If a country has an equal pay law in a given year, it is coded as 1.

Equal Access Laws. The third state policy consists of legislation that promotes women's unrestricted access to all occupations. As early as the nineteenth century, many countries had employment regulations based on gender. Although these gender specific laws did not prohibit women's paid work altogether, they created a gender-differentiated workforce in which women's work was restricted to certain types, forms, and hours of works. Furthermore, women's fertility status (particularly when pregnant) was a legal justification for not hiring women even in the industries where women were allowed to work. Over the years, however, as global discourse on women's work became centered around "equality" over "protection," these laws came to be viewed as discriminatory (Berkovitch 1999). Many countries have replaced these laws with ones that guarantee women's equal access to all industries, night hour employment, and while pregnant, while other countries still have restrictions in

employment based on gender. If women are allowed to work in all industries, during the night, and while pregnant in a country, it is coded as 1 (others as 0).

Overall Level of Legal Protection of Women's Rights. The three specific state policies discussed above represent key dimensions of women's work and are expected to influence gender occupational inequality in unique ways. However, women's work is being influenced by numerous other laws and regulations encompassing not only women's employment rights but also larger gender relations in economic, social, and political areas. Furthermore, these legal rights may work together in altering gender relations and conditions of women's work.

In order to contrast the effects of the three specific policies with the overall level of state legal protection of women's rights laws, two measures are included. First, state policies and structures concerning women's economic rights are measured by an index representing the degree to which women's economic rights are protected in national laws. Data are from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database, which covers 195 countries annually from 1981-2008 providing information on the extent to which women's economic rights are reflected in national laws and enforced by the government.

Women's economic rights include equal pay for equal work, free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, job security

(including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-discrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, the right to work in the military and the police force. This measure is a 4 point scale (ranging from 0 to 3). Considering that women's rights to work encompass not only economic areas but also political and social areas, I also include an aggregated index of economic rights, political rights, and social rights protected in law. This measure is a 10 point scale (0 – 9). Due to the fact that the different types of state policies outlined above are all components of these aggregate indices, I compare the effects of an aggregate index in a separate model from ones including different types of state policies.

Penetration of Global Women's Rights: As women's rights to participate in the wage economy are global phenomena, I consider the ratification of five treaties concerning women's work. The treaties include the 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, the 1952 ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, the 1952 ILO maternity Protection Convention, the 1962 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, and the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

The 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention was the first international treaty to focus exclusively on women's rights in employment and to express the notion of equality between men and women. These five treaties represent states'

formal endorsement of global women's rights concerning work. The 1952 ILO

Maternity Protection Convention revised the earlier ILO Maternity Convention

(1919), which focused more on the protection of newborns and motherhood. The

1962 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention expanded equal

treatment from "equal pay for equal work" to "equal pay for work of equal value."

The 1952 ILO Maternity Protection Convention was the first treaty to

conceptualize maternity benefits as a way for the state to facilitate the reentry of

mothers into paid employment and as a device to guarantee women's rights to

work. The 1952 ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention specified

the minimum mandatory length of maternity leave, the protection from dismissal,

and the rate of cash benefits to be paid. The 1979 UN Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was the

most comprehensive international treaty on the issues of gender inequality and

gender discrimination. It mandated not only the equal rights of women but also

the elimination of all forms of gender discrimination against women. It prohibited

all measures that are discriminatory against women even when the governments

did not intend them to be (Article 2). Furthermore, it obligates the state to

"modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women… with the

view to achieving the elimination of … practices which are based on the idea of

the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for

men and women" (Article 5). It explicitly protects women's rights to non-

discrimination in employment as it mandates the state to ensure that women have the right to the same employment opportunities, the rights to a free choice of profession and employment, the rights to promotion, training, job security and benefits, equal pay for work of equal value, and equal access to unemployment, retirement, and sick benefits (Article II(I)).

Figure 2-1. Cumulative Ratification of International Treaties concerning Women's Work, 1952-2011

Figure 2-1 shows the ratification trend for these five child rights treaties. The 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention and the 1979 CEDAW are ratified by most countries in the World by 2011. The primary variation for these two treaties relates to the timing of ratification, which ranges from 1952 (or 1990

for the CEDAW) to 2010 (or 2011 for the CEDAW). The Equal Remuneration treaty had a steady stream of ratifications. The CEDAW was ratified at a much faster rate as more than half of all countries in the world ratified it within a decade since it became available in 1979. The Minimum Age Convention had a steady stream of ratifications when it was first proposed. As the CEDAW became widely ratified, the Equal Remuneration Convention also picked up the rate of ratification during the 1990-2000 periods. This suggests that intensification of global concern over gender equality since the CEDAW and the late adopters of the Equal Remuneration treaty are part of the more recent "norm cascade." The other three ILO treaties had a much slower stream of ratifications and, in some sense, whether a country ratified these treaties capture the varying commitment to women's employment rights.

Women's Rights INGOs: While international laws represent a formalized commitment, the diffusion of policies across countries requires continuous support from global civil society. Transnational networks and international nongovernmental organizations transmit cultural models embodied in international laws to nation-states and communities (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the case of human rights, clear evidence suggests that ties to the global human rights social movement networks affect the adoption and implementation of national laws and structures (Finnemore 1996; Frank et al. 2000; Boyle 2001; Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and

Boyle 2012). Thus, I include ties to the global women's rights regime measured by memberships in international women's rights NGOs. Women's rights INGO membership data come from Paxton et al. (2006).

Control variables: This analysis includes a number of control variables that prior research has identified as key determinants of gender occupational inequality. Integration into the global economy has influenced women's work. Particularly, export promotion and trade liberalization, which involve increased labor market flexibility and openness to the world economy tend to generate an increase in female employment, especially in the tradable sector. This increase is partly due to the lower labor costs of women compared to men (Standing 1989; Stichter 1990; Fernandez-Kelly 1994), but also to more gender egalitarian practices of foreign-owned and export-oriented firms in terms of hiring preferences and the pay gap between sexes (Villarreal and Yu 2007). In order to account for the effects of *economic openness*, I include a measure of trade as percent of GDP (World Bank 2010). In order to account for countries' different economic and political circumstances, I include a logged measure of *GDP per capita* (World Bank 2010) and level of *democracy*, measured in a 21 point scale (-10 to 10) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). *Women's Human Capital is another important determinant of gender occupational inequality.* In order to capture women's human capital, I include two measures: female labor force participation

rates (World Bank 2010) and female gross enrollment rates in higher education institutions (Schofer and Meyer 2005).

Research Design

The goal of my analysis is to determine if there are unique effects of specific policies on gender occupational inequality, which the overall level of legal protection of women's rights may mask. To this end, I first examine the distribution of the three state policies across countries and over-time and the relationship between particular policies and overall indices of legal protection of women's economic rights and women's rights based on all countries (N = 195). Then, I utilize panel regression analysis in which gender occupational inequality, measured in 2004, is regressed upon itself and other independent variables measured 20 years ago in 1984 for 35 countries. The unit of analysis is a country. This time period covers approximately the entire period examined in Chapter 1 and accommodates the analysis's focus on change in gender occupational inequality. The choice of countries included in the panel regression analysis is driven by availability of information, mostly the availability of employment information in both 1984 and 2004. Results from this analytical sample of 35 countries may not be generalizable to all countries in the world. A separate analysis (not shown) suggests that countries not included in the regression analysis on average tend to be economically less developed and less democratic

than countries included in the regression analysis. Particularly, it should be noted that some countries with a high-level of population and a large volume of paid labor such as India and China are not included in the regression analysis. Nevertheless, the sample contains countries from various regions and levels of economic development. Although there is no apparent reason to expect the sample differs substantially from countries not included in the analysis in terms of sex occupational inequality and explanations for that inequality, further research is needed to know for sure. Thus, results from this analysis should still be taken with caution.

Panel regression analysis provides estimates of the effects of the independent variables on change in the dependent variable. However, these estimates are likely to be conservative because of the high correlation between the dependent variable and the lagged dependent variables (Hannan and Quinn 1979). The panel regression analysis presented here is likely to yield especially conservative estimates since only 35 countries provide data that could be used in the calculation of the dependent variable in both 1984 and 2004. Accordingly, a significance level of .10 can be interpreted as fully significant (as opposed to marginally) (Pedhazur 1982). Operationalization of variables and descriptive statistics for the panel regression analysis can be found in Appendix 2-5.

Results

Descriptive Information on State Policies

Figure 2-2. Cumulative Number of Countries Having a Paid Maternity Leave Policy and an Equal Pay Policy, by Year, 1883-2009

Countries vary in the timing of adoption and the content of policies for the three particular policies. Figure 2-2 presents world patterns in the adoption of state policies on paid maternity leave and equal pay policy. Information on the timing of the equal access policy is not available and not included in the figure. It shows the cumulative number of countries that passed the relevant legislation based on the policy information I gathered. For the paid maternity leave policy, countries in the world have steadily incorporated paid maternity leave into their legislation from five countries in 1883 to 177 countries in 2009. For the equal pay policy, it is clear that the late 1950s serve as a turning point. This period

corresponds to the years when the ILO Equal Remuneration treaty and the ILO

Equal Treatment treaty were created at the global level. Until then less than

twenty countries adopted equal pay laws but since then there has been a sharp and

steady increase. By 1986, 110 countries in the world adopted a policy granting

women's economic rights to equal pay. By 2009, 138 countries had incorporated

the principle of equal pay into their national legislation.

Figure 2-3. Paid Maternity Leave Policies in 1984 and 2004

Figure 2-3 breaks down maternity leave policies by benefit level in 1984

and 2004. Out of 186 countries for which maternity leave policy information is

available, forty countries did not offer any paid maternity leave in 1984 whereas

in 2004 only twelve countries were left without a paid leave policy. This means

that twenty-seven countries adopted a paid maternity leave policy between 1985

and 2004. Regardless of when a country adopted the first maternity leave policy,

about half of these countries with a paid maternity leave policy offered less than 14 weeks or less than 75% of normal wage, which is below the international standard (the 1952 ILO Maternity Protection Convention). Of those countries that had a paid maternity leave policy by 1984, forty countries offered 14-25 weeks of paid maternity leave with a 75% or higher wage replacement rate and twenty-six countries offered 26 weeks or more paid maternity leave at a 75% or higher wage replacement rate. Of those twenty-seven countries that adopted a paid maternity leave policy between 1985 and 2004, fourteen countries did not meet the international standard; twelve met the standard; and one surpassed the standard.

Figure 2-4. Equal Pay Policies in 1984 and 2004

Figure 2-4 shows equal pay policies in 1984 and 2004. Out of 166 countries for which equal pay policy information is available, 107 countries had equal pay legislation in 1984 whereas by 2004 133 countries had one.

Figure 2-5. Equal Access Policies

Figure 2-5 breaks down equal access policies by conditions under which women's equal opportunity to be employed applies. Out of 136 countries for which maternity leave policy information is available, 93 countries have legislation that women should be able to choose to work during night hours where men have such choice. For the equal opportunity to be employed in any industries, 67 out of 136 countries guarantee the right. Eighty out of 136 countries have legislation that prohibits restrictions or dismissal of pregnant women from work.

The following three charts examine the relationship between these three types of policies and the overall index of women's rights reflected in national laws.

Figure 2-6. Average Women's Economic Rights and Overall Women's Rights Score by the Level of Maternity Leave Benefits in 1984 and 2004

Figure 2-6 shows the average women's economic rights and overall women's rights score by the level of maternity leave benefits in 1984 and 2004. The first two sets of bars represent average state legal protection of women's economic rights scores by maternity leave policies in 1984 and 2004, respectively. The last two sets of bars represent average state legal protection of women's rights scores by maternity leave policies in 1984 and 2004, respectively. Overall, the level of maternity leave benefits corresponds to the aggregated women's economic rights and overall women's rights scores in 1984 as well as in 2004. The mean scores for the economic rights and overall rights are the lowest for countries with no or low-level paid maternity leave policies and the highest for countries with a high-level

maternity leave policy. Interestingly, countries with less than 14 weeks of paid

maternity leave benefits did not score any higher in their economic rights or

overall rights scores than countries without paid maternity leave benefits. Figure

2-6 suggests that countries with high-level maternity leave benefits also do better

in other policies related to women's employment rights and women's rights in

general.

Figure 2-7. Average Women's Economic Rights and Overall Women's Rights
Score by the Equal Pay Policy in 1984 and 2004

Figure 2-7 shows the average women's economic rights and overall

women's rights score by the equal pay legislation in 1984 and 2004. The first two

sets of bars represent average state legal protection of women's economic rights

scores by presence or absence of equal pay legislation in 1984 and 2004,

respectively. The last two sets of bars represent average state legal protection of

women's rights scores by presence or absence of equal pay legislation in 1984

and 2004, respectively. In 1984, having an equal pay policy corresponds to the

aggregated women's economic rights and overall women's rights scores.

However, in 2004 the gap narrows down making the two groups of countries

indistinguishable. This could have resulted from the fact that by 2004 about 80%

of countries have equal pay legislation whereas 64% of the countries had it in

1984.

Figure 2-8. Average Women's Economic Rights and Overall Women's Rights
Score by the Equal Access Policy

Figure 2-8 shows the average women's economic rights and overall

women's rights score by the equal access legislation: women's rights to work

during night hours, women's rights to work in any industries, and women's rights

to work during pregnancy. From the figure, it is clear that equal access policies in

terms of working during night hours and in any industries are associated with a

higher index scores. However, equal access to work during pregnancy is not

clearly associated with the two index scores. Overall, while varying in the

mechanisms through which women's employment is facilitated, all of the three

policies contribute to the aggregated indices of state protection of women's

economic rights or the overall women's rights.

Results from Panel Regression

The results of panel regression analysis of the odds of women to be

employed into managerial and professional occupations under conditions of

various combinations of independent and control variables for a sample of

countries (N = 35) are presented in Table 2-2. Descriptive information on the

three state policies as well as women's representation relative to men in

managerial and professional occupations is presented in Appendix 2-6.

Although specified in the methods section, female tertiary education

enrollment rate, ratification of international treaties, women's INGO membership,

and a non-OECD country dummy had no significant effects. Therefore, I present

results omitting these variables. Model 1 includes control variables and maternity

leave policies. First, the odds of women employed in managerial and professional

occupations in 1984 are highly significant in predicting the odds 20 years later. This suggests that there are significant cross-national differences in the odds of women to be employed to managerial and professional occupations. By controlling the odds of women to be employed to managerial and professional occupations in 1984, the focus of this analysis is on changes from 1984 based on the level of independent variables in 1984. Control variables are largely insignificant partly due to a small sample size. However, these findings also suggest that a country's economic and political circumstances as well as women's human capital alone cannot explain gender occupational inequality. GDP per capita shows a significant, positive effect. Although not significant, the directions of coefficients are largely consistent with the prior literature. Democracy shows a negative sign. Women's labor force participation shows a negative sign, consistent with prior literature, suggesting a winnowing effect, in which women are selectively recruited into the labor force in areas where women are already concentrated (Charles and Grusky 2004). This decreases women's relative representation in professional and managerial occupations by increasing newly added women's employment into non-professional and non-managerial occupations.

Table 2-2. Panel Regression Predicting Women's Relative Access to High-status Positions (measured by log odds of women to men in high-status occupations) in 2004

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Controls							
GDP per capita (logged) in 1984	0.157*	0.072	0.101	0.130+	0.135+	0.134*	0.088
	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Democracy in 1984	-0.024+	-0.02	-0.022	-0.024+	-0.024	-0.033*	-0.032*
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Female labor force participation in 1984	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
State Policies							
High-level maternity leave in 1984	-0.299+			-0.302+	-0.290+		
	-0.164			-0.159	-0.165		
Mid-level maternity leave in 1984	(0.053)			(0.025)	(0.021)		
	-0.135			-0.132	-0.135		
(reference: low-level or no maternity leave)							
Equal pay law in 1984		0.295+		0.309+	0.294+		
		(0.164)		(0.163)	(0.172)		
Equal access law			0.027	0.029	0.026		
			(0.148)	(0.138)	(0.141)		
Overall legal protection of women's rights in 1984						0.240*	
						(0.088)	
Overall legal protection of women's employment rights in 1984							0.110**
							(0.035)
Trade (%GDP)					-0.001	-0.003	-0.003+
					(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log odds women's employment in high status occupations in 1984	0.585***	0.568***	0.574***	0.564***	0.574***	0.606***	0.563***
	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.134)	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.116)	(0.113)
Constant	-1.008+	-0.583	-0.581	-1.042+	-1.045+	-1.001+	-0.691
	(0.565)	(0.507)	(0.537)	(0.552)	(0.562)	(0.495)	(0.459)
Number of countries	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
R-squared	0.625	0.621	0.580	0.671	0.673	0.681	0.704

+p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests); standard errors in parentheses.

Notes: The following variables had no significant effect in any of the models and were therefore omitted: female tertiary education enrollment, ratification of international treaties, women's INGO membership, and a non-OECD country dummy.

Model 1 also includes maternity leave benefits. Generous maternity leave benefits are associated with lower-level of women's representation in managerial and professional occupations. However, mid-level maternity leave benefits are not different from low-level or no paid maternity benefits. The negative effect of high-level of maternity leave policy on women's relative odds of attaining managerial or professional positions provides support for H2.

Results suggest that highly generous maternity leave programs make sex occupational inequality deeper not because they are not enforced or nominal but because they have an actual impact on women's employment conditions. Highly generous maternity leave programs may be successful to recruit women into paid employment. However, such increase in women's employment through maternity leave programs tend not to happen in high-status positions, resulting in more sex occupational inequality. This could be explained in several ways. First, it may be because women who are qualified for high-paying jobs are already in the paid labor market whereas those women workers who otherwise would have not worked in a social context in which maternity leave programs are absent have more diverse human capital that does not necessarily meet required qualification in more prestigious jobs.

Second, this also provides support that institutional arrangements which allow long absence from paid work encourage discrimination against women by employers. Paid maternity leaves pave the way for mothers back to the labor

market and strengthen women's attachment to the labor market. However, they also remove mothers from workplaces for several months. Although paid maternity leave programs are presumed to enable women to remain in the labor force more continuously, a long absence from paid employment can be interpreted as an interference of work continuity at the firm level. This absence may make women less competitive in the workplace and exacerbate the negative perceptions that surround the reliability of women's work (Hansen 1997). It discourages employers from hiring women to positions of authority and power.

Cultural assumptions about women's role as wives and mothers are also important. Under circumstances in which paid maternity leave programs operate without a change in cultural assumptions about men's and women's family responsibilities, married women will exercise their improved access to the labor market through maternity leave policies by seeking employment that allows them to combine their work and family responsibilities, such as flexible hours and part-time work, as opposed to highly intensive managerial or professional jobs.

Model 2 includes equal pay law. Contrary to maternity leave laws, equal pay laws are associated positively with women's relative odds of attaining managerial and professional jobs, providing support for H3. It is notable that equal pay laws, while not providing substantial support to minimize conflicts arising from women's dual roles as mothers and workers, do provide some substantial benefits (in wages) compared to men. These laws contribute to more

equal treatment of men and women within managerial and professional occupations, which in turn may contribute to a cultural shift in gender norms, further legitimating women's access to and position in the labor market and their entrance into male-dominated sectors and occupational positions.

Model 3 includes equal access laws. Unlike equal pay laws, equal access laws are not associated with the odds of women relative to men having managerial and professional jobs. These laws, like equal pay laws, officially prohibit overt discrimination but without substantial benefits. Although equal access legislation opens up employment opportunities for women by providing them with a legal justification for seeking entry into all sectors of the labor market and by discouraging employers from discriminating against women, the kind of industries and occupations that are most directly affected by equal access legislation (i.e., "dangerous" occupations and occupations involving night work) tend to be in non-managerial and non-professional positions.

Model 4 includes all three state policies. Policy effects are robust when considered separately or together. Both the negative effects of high-level of maternity leave policies and the positive effects of equal pay laws remain the same.[8] Policy effects remain the same after trade is controlled for in model 5. Trade does not have significant association with the odds.[9]

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[8] In a separate analysis not shown, I checked if the duration of policy implementation mattered. Cumulative years of equal pay laws enforced had a positive effect on the odds of women to be

Models 6 and 7 include overall indexes of women's employment rights laws and women's rights laws. Even after controlling for countries' economic and political circumstances, and global contexts, both women's employment rights laws and women's rights laws are significant and positive. This suggests that although different types of specific policies have different mechanisms to recruit women into high-status positions in the labor market, gender occupational inequality is, after all, part of larger gender inequality in a society.

Discussions and Conclusions

This analysis finds that state policies regarding women's employment are highly relevant to gender occupational inequality. Two types of policies, paid maternity leave legislation and anti-discrimination legislation, have opposite effects. Maternity leave policies are associated with a greater inequality while anti-discrimination policies are associated with a less inequality.

Nevertheless, results should not be seen as dichotomizing state policies into the good and the bad. Gender relations and gender inequality are complex phenomena. Institutionalized systems assign people into different categories and organized social relations of inequality develop on the basis of that difference

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employed in managerial and professional occupations. However, cumulative years of maternity leave laws or equal access laws did not have significant effects.

[9] I also checked if state policy effects are contingent on the global context variables (trade, ratification of international laws, and linkage to global women's rights movement). None of the interaction terms between state policy and global context was significant.

(Ferree, Lorber, and Hess 1999). Like class or race relations, gender relations and inequality involve cultural beliefs and distributions of resources at the macro level, patterns of behavior, organizational practices, and identities at the individual level. Like class or race inequality, particular efforts to promote one dimension of gender equality may inhibit another dimension of gender equality. For example, generous maternity leave policies are effective in attracting more women into employment and also make women's dual roles as mothers and workers more compatible. However, they also come with a codification of child-rearing responsibilities as women's job and make women more "costly" to hire. Likewise, anti-discrimination laws also have certain limitations in terms of not being able to address societal allocation of family responsibilities to women, which is real in everyday lives. The very complexity of gender relations and gender inequality, however, also suggests that there are many potential fronts available to alter the relations. When particular policy efforts are put together, state interventions seem to be making the difference. Also, although state interventions might have their own limitations, after all, state policies (whether considered individually or collectively) are the only factor that has significant influence in this analysis on women's relative odds of managerial and professional employment.

I would like to address the limitations of this research. The sample of 35 countries included in the panel regression analysis is driven by data availability and therefore results may not be generalizable to other countries in the world.

Nevertheless, the sample contains broad regional and economic representation. There is no reason to expect the sample differs dramatically from other countries with respect to gender occupational inequality and its relationship to state policies. However, I cannot know for sure until data are available for more countries.

Due to the lack of time-varying detailed state policy data for most countries, this chapter incorporates state policy information with an assumption that once adopted a policy does not change in contents or level of benefits. This assumption is made not because I believe it is the case but because data are not available. Consequently, this analysis examines if the level (as opposed to subsequent changes) of state policies in 1984 is associated with the level of gender occupational inequality in 2004. By including the level of gender occupational inequality in 1984 in the equation, it enables us to focus on changes in gender occupational inequality from 1984 and 2004 and the influence of state policies at an earlier year on the dependent variable at a later year. Nevertheless, it is impossible to truly test causal relationships or to observe how simultaneous changes in the state policies impact gender occupational inequality. Despite these limitations, the richness of the data on state policies enables a more detailed analysis of particular state policies and their differing effects on gender occupational inequality than was possible with either welfare-type of policies (e.g., maternity leave policies) alone or highly aggregated state policy indexes.

The odds of women relative to men having higher-status positions are only part of gender occupational inequality. Future research should look at how state policies with different mechanisms to influence women's employment are associated with other forms of gender occupational inequality such as wage and job security.

Chapter 3:

Implications of Women's Employment Context on Gender Prejudice

Scholars have increasingly paid attention to the implications of increased women's employment. They have discovered diverse dimensions of women's employment, such as gender segregation (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006), gender pay gaps, and gender disparities in high status occupations as well as in the low-paying manufacturing jobs (Kabeer 2004; Meyer 2006; see also Chapter 2). However, a potentially important implication of women's employment for gender norms and institutions has been neglected by most research (for an exception, see e.g., Seguino 2007). Women's material power is not the sole, or even the dominant, dimension of gender inequality. Gender norms and institutions constitute another important dimension. Although the entry of women into wage labor may have created an opportunity to address gender inequality, real change is possible only if the cultural/ideological dimensions of gender inequality are also addressed. It is thus critically important to understand how levels of women's employment, and specifically women's employment in good jobs, affect overall levels of gender bias in attitudes within societies.

In addition, while the impact of globalization on women's employment has flourished, research on the impact of globalization on attitudes around the world has been ignored. Previous studies have made great strides in explaining the relationship between personal characteristics and gender-biased outlooks (see

e.g., Lippa and Arad 1999). Some work has also considered variation in attitudes across countries (see e.g., Treas and Widmer 2000). In this chapter, I move beyond previous work to consider national contextual factors in greater detail and the impact of forces of globalization on gender beliefs.

Based on multilevel analyses of data from 52 countries, this research finds that women tend to hold more gender equitable beliefs in a national context in which more women are participating in the paid labor market. Furthermore, national laws that better protect women's rights to work have positive effects over and above individual characteristics. In addition, in countries where more women are in the labor force and have higher representation in high status positions, and where laws better protect women's rights, the differences in beliefs between men and women are substantially smaller. As for women's employment context, women's equal employment laws have spillover effects in reducing gender prejudice in non-employment areas such as politics and higher education. This study finds limited support for the impact of global economic integration or linkage to global women's rights movements on gender prejudice. They matter for gender prejudice only in higher education.

Relevance of gender norms

Scholars of gender stratification and gender relations emphasize structures producing inequality, and gender differences are seen to follow from these

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structures. Such scholars criticize the tendency to conceptualize gender

stratification as purely economic inequality.[10] Non-material aspects of

stratification must also be considered to explain who has the autonomy to enter

the labor market in the first place or the power to set the terms under which

certain skills are recognized, rewarded, or marginalized (Ciancanelli and Berch

1987; Glazer 1993). The stratified gender structure that results in material

inequality between men and women is supported by gender norms and institutions.

In many countries, men are considered more capable of breadwinning and women

specialize in homemaking and childrearing; this advantages men in the labor

market (see e.g., Connelly, DeGraff, and Levison 1996). Thus, cultural

dimensions produce social climates that reinforce, or promote resistance to gender

stratification in favor of men. As social norms and institutions instill the

acceptance of gender gaps in everyday behavior, material dimensions of gender

inequality are maintained without employing overt forms of power.

However, gender norms do not merely sustain existing gender inequality.

Rather material inequality and cultural dimensions of gender inequality constitute

a dynamic cultural terrain wherein forms of domination may be contested,

reworked, and even potentially transformed. This suggests the importance of

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[10] Economic inequality refers to differences between men and women in economic resources such
as income or wealth and on factors conceptualized in term of their relation to such economic
resources as occupation, education, and prestige (Ferree and Hall 1996).

looking at both women's position in the labor market and gender norms and institutions simultaneously while not assuming one determines the other.

Notwithstanding the reciprocal relationship between women's material power and gender norms, scholars have emphasized the importance of gender norms as a determinant of women's employment but have given less attention to the potential effects of women's employment and state policies on gender norms. When gender norms are considered in the context of women's material power, studies tend to regard gender norms as given rather than as moving targets. These scholars emphasize that female workers' worth (i.e., productivity and costs) and the nature of the job distribution in the labor market are culturally constructed and vary over time and place. For example, Morrison and Jutting (2005) find that social norms and institutions surrounding gender are the most important determinants of female employment. Similarly, according to scholars of gender segregation in the labor market (Reskin and Roos 1990; Anker 1998; Padavic and Reskin 2002), male and female workers in the labor market are matched to jobs based on their *estimated* productivity and costs. The process of matching closely corresponds to typical stereotypes of women and their supposed abilities and the characteristics of "female" jobs. However, there is little explanation as to how and why gender norms vary over time and places.

In fact, there has been increasing acceptance of gender-egalitarian norms in most places in the world (see e.g., Thornton and Freedman 1979; Cherlin and

Walters 1981; Dex 1988; Lu and Mason 1988; Scott et al. 1996). Also, changes in gender norms have varied between countries and differences still exist between countries (Alwin et al. 1992; Scott et al. 1998; Knudsen and Waerness 2001). However, there have been little efforts made to explain these differences in a systemic way.

Women's participation in the paid labor market has increased considerably over the last several decades, and this increase challenges the traditional division of labor between men and women. Parallel to the increase of women's employment, many countries have introduced or strengthened family-friendly employment. Does this development help to explain the cross-national and over-time variations in gender norms? In this chapter, I address this question. This is not to deny simultaneous relationships between gender norms and women's material power but to understand the implications of women's employment and state policies for the non-material domain.

While various changes in the characteristics of occupations and industries, market conditions, technological advances, and male and female workers' characteristics may contribute to variations in gender norms, we do not know if and how women's employment contexts influence prejudice against women. More importantly, as gender beliefs are about women's and men's relative rights to various resources, it is not surprising that men tend to adhere more strongly to gender inequitable beliefs. In addition to the overall level of gender prejudice in a

society, this gender gap in gender prejudice deserves attention because an increasing gender gap implies heightened conflicts between men and women, which might be hostile for women regardless of the overall level of prejudice. Would women's employment context reduce or increase this gender gap?

This chapter uses multi-level modeling techniques to uncover the importance of women's employment context in explaining prejudice against women's equal rights to economic activities, political activities, and educational access in 52 countries. More specifically, I argue that three sets of women's employment contexts are particularly important: 1) women's labor force participation; 2) women's representation in high status occupations; and 3) national laws that protect women's rights to equal employment. I focus on the implications of these three factors on 1) the level of prejudice, 2) the gender gap in prejudice, and 3) differences by individuals' labor market status. This chapter also tests if women's employment context influences prejudice against women in paid employment as well as non-employment areas including politics and education.

Theory and Hypothesis

The non-material aspect of gender inequality refers to a set of beliefs in the form of ideology, norms, stereotypes, and prejudice that serve to devalue women and reinforce the gender division of labor and men's dominance. On the

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one hand, women are excluded from various public spheres including economy and politics. On the other hand, what is considered as women's role and women's qualities, such as caring for the family, is devalued. As it is a system of shared beliefs, prejudice about women's entitlement and qualifications outside the home exists not only among men but also among women. However, at the same time, men tend to adhere much more strongly to gender inequitable beliefs. To explain this gap, some argue that men are more likely to adhere to all forms of social dominance, including gender inequality, but also to other forms of social dominance by class, race, and ethnicity (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 2000). Others point out that the gender gap in gender prejudice should be understood by considering the differential implications that gender inequality has for men and women (Schmitt et al. 2003). Men tend to hold a higher level of patriarchal beliefs against women because those beliefs privilege men while disadvantaging women, and gender prejudice depends on specific social contexts. Moreover, within the same sex, specific forms of gender prejudice have different implications to members of different social groups. Women's interests are not always the same. Being able to participate in the formal economy and politics is one thing and making caring work more valuable is another thing. Housewives' beliefs about women's work might be very different from those of women in paid employment.

Women's employment contexts and gender prejudice: Quantity

Gender prejudice is not only a mechanism to maintain gender inequality but it is also an important target through which to leverage changes for greater gender equality. One way to influence gender prejudice is through women's access to paid employment. Some scholars argue that industrialization and economic growth first bring increased female labor force participation and more gender egalitarian norms and institutions (Dollar and Gatti 1999; World Bank 2001; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Iverson and Rosenbluth 2006). Female labor force participation is particularly closely related to values and norms about the correct gender division of labor (Clark 1991). Women's increased access to jobs raise women's income absolutely and indirectly, which in turn increases their bargaining power to negotiate gender roles and division of labor within the household. Increased women's labor force participation may shift gender norms in more egalitarian directions because it is families' rational choice to raise daughters in more gender-neutral ways to assist them in securing a stable livelihood. Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 1: Female labor force participation will be negatively associated with gender prejudice.

Hypothesis 2: Female labor force participation will be negatively associated with gender gap in gender prejudice.

Women's employment contexts and gender prejudice: Quality

However, there is reason to believe that increased female labor force participation alone is not sufficient to bring changes in gender prejudice. Some scholars point out that when more women are employed, they are mostly segregated into low-paying jobs (Semyonov 1980; Semyonov and Shenhav 1988; Clark 1991). The gender pay gap persists despite increased female labor force participation. There is empirical evidence that recent increase in the quantity of women's employment has some deleterious effect on women's income opportunities and conditions of work (Benería 2003; Petersen 2003; Seguino 2006). There is, for example, an increased use of home workers, primarily women (Hsiung 1996; Prügl 1999; Petersen 2003) as a response to greater competitive pressures on firms to reduce costs. The lower wages paid to home workers and the reduction in overhead costs, while beneficial to firms, reinforces gender norms and stereotypes of women whose work is linked to the home and their role as caretakers, perpetuating women's designation as secondary wage earners. This type of work limits women's ability to bargain in the household for better distribution of work and labor. These factors suggest that as long as the majority of women are employed in marginalized, traditionally female positions, female labor force participation alone may not promote a movement to reduce gender prejudice. If this is the case, *Hypothesis 1* would not hold. In addition, it can

widen the gender gap in gender prejudice. As more women enter into the paid labor market, women with double duties as workers and caretakers feel more need to change the patriarchal breadwinner model. Men may not recognize the value of women's work. In this case, Hypothesis 2 will not hold.

Then, women's entrance into high status positions may have greater impact on gender prejudice because it conveys a set of more women friendly social definitions. Women's representation in managerial or administrative positions can act as a leverage to change gender prejudice. Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 3: Women's share in high status positions will be negatively associated with gender prejudice.

Hypothesis 4: Women's share in high status positions will be negatively associated with gender gap in gender prejudice.

However, women's employment in high status positions could lead to a backlash in men's attitudes calling for women's return to their patriarchal role as caretakers (Fleck 1998). If that is the case, Hypotheses 4 will not hold.

Women's employment contexts and gender prejudice: Law

In addition to the quantity and quality of women's employment, a country's legal protection of women's rights to work constitutes another important dimension of women's work. Various laws and policies ensure women's economic rights including equal pay for equal work, free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, job security (including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-discrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, and the right to work in the military and the police force.

These laws not only help more women participate in the labor force but also contribute to a cultural shift in gender norms further legitimating women's access to and position in the labor market and their entrance into male-dominated sectors and occupational positions (Goldin 1990). These laws facilitate women's employment by altering the opportunity structure for women regarding participation in paid work. These laws intend to reconcile women's work and family obligations. As the cost for working outside the home is decreasing and as the benefits of it is increasing, the more women enter the labor force and express views toward more egalitarian gender roles.

In addition, these laws may have more direct influence on gender prejudice. These laws constitute normative orders which influence and structure world views and views regarding the appropriate role of women in society. More gender-egalitarian employment laws may strengthen the degree to which participation of women in the paid labor market on equal terms with men is considered something to be desired. Also, official legal rights constitute women as legitimate workers with equal rights and as actors who are legitimately mobilized and empowered to mobilize others. Indeed, it has been pointed out that one of the key mechanisms through which laws protecting women's economic rights are encouraging women's labor force participation is by encouraging more gender egalitarian attitudes on the ground. Of course, I allow for the possibility of a country's existing policies to reflect overall gender prejudice. What is important is the association between the two. Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 5: State legal protection of women's economic rights will be negatively associated with gender prejudice.

Hypothesis 6: State legal protection of women's economic rights will be negatively associated with gender gap in gender prejudice.

However, others are doubtful if laws are effective in challenging existing gender norms and prejudice. Organizational research shows that policies and

actual practices or outcomes are sometimes disconnected from each other, in a

process known as "decoupling" (Orton and Weick 1990; Weick 1976).

Constitutional equal rights of men and women in the labor market can and do

coexist with institutionalized male privilege (Parpart and Staudt 1989).

Decoupling policy and implementation, legislation and action, allows countries to

adopt progressive programs and structures and at the same time to continue male

privilege on the ground (Meyer et al. 1997). Furthermore, it has been argued that

if laws are effective in increasing women's labor force participation, it is through

maintaining a gendered division of labor without changing it. While allowed by

law to pursue economic activities, women tend to exercise their improved access

to the labor market by seeking employment that allows them to combine their

work and family responsibilities such as flexible hours and part-time work. Jobs

in sectors traditionally associated with females, such as sales and service sectors,

may still be preferred by women precisely because gender biased norms about

care work do not change (Lee and Hirata 2001). These laws can also exacerbate

negative perceptions about women's qualification as workers. For example, the

existence of maternity leave policies may render employers more reluctant to hire

female workers because they are potentially more costly, especially if employers

bear the cost of maternity leave rather than the state (Anker 1998; Boserup 1970;

Safa 1983). Kaar (2000) finds that as maternity leave benefits are not given to

men, they make women less competitive in the workplace and exacerbate the

negative perceptions that surround the reliability of women's work. These laws can also backfire by increasing men's concern about reverse discrimination, increasing tensions between men and women. In this case, Hypotheses 5-6 will not hold.

Globalization: Trade

In addition to women's employment contexts, global economic integration and global women's rights have influenced many aspects of gender relations. Scholars of economic globalization have considered how trade, foreign direct investment, and the spread of economic neoliberalism affect women's work (e.g., Semyonov and Shenhav 1988). One group of scholars interested in the impact of global economic integration, particularly in the labor market, highlight the direct, positive impact of economic globalization on female workers as well as on the reduction of gender discrimination (Fields 1985; Krueger 1983; Lim 1990; Wood 1990, 1994). It is argued that participation in the global economy leads to economic growth and increased opportunities in paid employment for women, and this economic growth in turn increases women's labor force participation rate and reduces gender segregation, gender gap in earnings, and gender discriminatory norms and institutions, thus, empowering women in family and society (Fields 1985; Krueger 1983; Lim 1990; Wood 1990, 1994). These scholars contend not only that in an export-orientated economy the increased

female labor force participation induced by economic globalization eventually upgrades women to better-paying, high status, jobs, but also that gender norms and institutions become more gender egalitarian on the grounds that gender based discrimination is costly by wasting women's human capital (Alder and Izraeli 1994; Gothaskar 1995; Sim and Yong 1995).

Another group of globalization scholars oppose the above perspective, pointing out that the key mechanism of global economic integration lies in the international division of labor and the feminization of the low-paying manufacturing sector (Kabeer 2004; Meyer 2006). Much of the increase in the volume of trade since 1970 is in manufacturing. Manufactured items increased from 59 percent of world merchandise exports in 1984 to 74 percent in 1995 (World Bank 1995). Developing countries' share of manufactures in their exports tripled between 1970 and 1990 from 20 percent to 60 percent (World Bank 1995). Based on this trend, these scholars argue that technological changes allowed for the fragmentation of production processes, international wage differentials encouraged the relocation of labor-intensive production from highly paid enclaves of organized labor in the North to low-paid, less well organized, and largely female labor forces in the South. As women in developing countries occupy the worst jobs of the global capitalist system, increased female labor force participation does not lead to empowerment of women. If women are more segregated in the lowest wage jobs, it may not facilitate a revision of gender

norms in favor of women, as women's under-employment may be compatible with dominant gender norms, male breadwinner norms, and compatible institutions. Many scholars find evidence that the current economic globalization has indeed had a deleterious effect on women's income opportunities and conditions of work in both developed and developing countries (Peterson 2003; Seguino 2006). More importantly, it has been pointed out that economic crises, which many developing countries have been experiencing, may provoke a return to norms and prejudice that undermine gender equality. In supporting this possibility, scholars find that economic crisis or structural adjustment programs, which lead to economic stagnation and cuts in public expenditures on health, education, and food subsidies, have negatively affected women's well-being (Elson 2002). Women bear more burdens when the role of the state is reduced and macroeconomic volatility is heightened. Periods of economic crisis may in fact exacerbate gender tensions by reducing men's income-generating possibilities, undermining masculine "male breadwinner" norms. Women who take on paid employment during economic crises feel even more pressure to accede to male-dominant norms in the household as a way to assuage men's perceptions of their diminished status in the workplace (Kabeer 2000). Larrain (1999) finds that during implementation of structural adjustment programs, women in Latin America experienced increases in domestic violence due to the loss of male income and status associated with structural adjustment programs.

Globalization: Women's Rights

Whereas scholars of economic globalization have focused on the impact of global economic integration on economic aspects of gender inequality in the labor market, globalization as a socio-cultural process and the variety of responses to it locally have been widely discussed in recent literature. Neo-institutionalist scholars emphasize that some of the key institutional changes concerning women's work and family responsibilities are rooted in global cultural processes (see e.g., Berkovitch 1999). These scholars see as most important the diffusion of global cultural ideas about women and work (Berkovitch 1999). Berkovitch (1999) has shown that working through the world polity, the international women's movement has actively promoted a discourse of gender inclusion, ensuring that norms about female rights, equality, and participation in economies are transmitted to nation-states. From 1885 to 1970, Women's International Non-governmental Organizations (women's INGOs) were founded steadily except for breaks during wartime. But the number of WINGOs exploded in the 1970s, changing from steady to exponential growth (Berkovitch 1999).

These scholars argue that it is the strength of and country linkage to the world polity in the area of women's rights that makes a real difference. According to this perspective, both countries' laws and gender beliefs on the ground are seen as the result of "institutional effects" linked to the structure, penetration, and

persistence of global civil society in a particular issue area (Schofer and Hironaka 2005). Case studies provide support for this view. For example, Berkovitch (1994) shows, through statistical analysis, that indeed work family policies are not internally generated but are externally driven. She points out that changes in states' legislation can be accounted for by considering world level events (i.e., discourse networks and organizations) and states' linkages to world polity rather than the economic and political characteristics of the individual states. Similarly, there is reason to believe that gender prejudice on the ground is more directly linked to the world polity rather than state laws. Benavot and Resnick (2006) cite countries without compulsory education laws that have high enrollment rates and, vice versa, countries with such laws where enrollment rates are very low (see also Meyer 2004). They infer that compulsory attendance laws "are only indirectly related to the actual (and future) expansion of a country's education system (13)."

Data and Measures

My analysis of the impact of women's employment context on gender prejudice relies on data from several sources at the individual and country levels. Individual-level data on gender prejudice as well as important individual characteristics such as gender, income, education, age, marital status, and religion come from the World Values Surveys (WVS) rounds 3–5, conducted in the 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007 waves, respectively. WVS provides information

on values regarding various social, cultural, political, and economic issues as well as basic demographic information. This particular survey spans five waves, conducted over a 26 year period from 1981 to 2007. The first wave (1981-1984) only covered 22 countries, the second (1990-1993) 42 countries, the third (1994-1999) 54 countries, the fourth (1999-2004) 60 countries, and the fifth (2005-2007) 52 countries. All together, more than 97 countries and 300,000 individuals are included. The WVS data are collected through face-to-face interviews and used stratified multistage random probability sampling to obtain representative national samples as well as cluster sampling, multistage sampling utilizing the Kish-grid method, purposive sampling, and quota sampling (Inglehart et al. 2004).

Dependent variables

The dependent variables of this study capture gender prejudice at the individual level. There are three questions asked in most countries in all three waves:

- "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women" (1=agree, 2=disagree, 3= neither)

- "Men make better political leaders than women" (1=agree strongly , 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree)

- "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl" (1=agree strongly , 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree).

The first question directly deals with women's relative rights to have a paid job while the other two questions deal with women's relative qualities and rights in politics and higher education. For each question, I construct a dichotomous measure in which respondents who strongly agree or agree with the statement are assigned with a score 1 while those who strongly disagree, disagree, or neither agree nor disagree with the statement are assigned with a score 0.

I select only those countries/waves for which valid scores on all dependent and independent variables are available. These selections result in a dataset of 95,677 individuals from 54 countries (81 country/waves because some of the countries included in the analysis were surveys in multiple waves) and the three waves (3-5) for gender prejudice in employment, 91,389 individuals from 80 country/waves in 54 countries for gender prejudice in politics, 93,345 individuals from 80 country/waves in 54 countries for gender prejudice in education. Table 3-1 lists the percentage that agreed with each of the three statements, providing an idea of the distribution of these variables across countries and waves by gender.

While the overall pattern is quite complex, some interesting trends are present. It is easily seen that men adhere more strongly to gender prejudice than women. However, the size of the gender gap varies by country and over time. In most cases, temporal changes in responses to these questions indicate a decline of patriarchal ideas.

Table 3-1. Descriptive Statistics of Gender Prejudice by Country and Gender (% in agreement)

Country		When Job scarce, men have more rights to job.			Men Make Better Political Leaders than Women.			A University Education is More Important for a Boy than for a Girl.		
		1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007
Algeria	Men		78.3			80.6			39.7	
	Women		56.0			56.1			16.2	
Argentina	Men		28.4			37.4			17.8	
	Women		22.3			25.7			12.5	
Australia	Men	28.5		16.8	31.4		33.7	15.3		11.2
	Women	24.5		8.2	18.1		15.0	7.4		3.7
Bangladesh	Men	67.9	76.7		60.1	71.7		47.6	66.5	
	Women	45.6	59.7		51.5	65.5		33.1	60.2	
Brazil	Men			25.5			40.2			15.5
	Women			19.2			24.7			8.5
Bulgaria	Men			32.6			62.4			14.7
	Women			16.6			35.0			8.4
Canada	Men		14.5	13.6		24.5	19.2		7.2	7.1
	Women		16.4	12.5		15.5	12.9		4.4	2.8
Chile	Men	34.1	32.0	31.6	49.4	50.0	57.2	24.9	38.8	36.3
	Women	26.2	20.1	24.4	37.6	30.7	33.5	24.0	25.0	22.0
Colombia	Men	30.3			38.5			13.0		
	Women	28.0			26.4			9.4		
Cyprus	Men			37.1			45.5			13.2
	Women			29.7			25.7			6.8
Czech Republic	Men	31.7			61.2			38.3		
	Women	30.8			45.2			31.1		
Dominican Republic	Men	23.9			56.3			22.4		
	Women	10.2			32.3			16.2		
El Salvador	Men	27.3			36.8			12.3		
	Women	25.4			36.8			16.3		
Estonia	Men	39.6			76.6			41.3		
	Women	30.3			63.1			28.8		
Finland	Men	16.5		13.3	25.6		22.8	14.1		7.8
	Women	12.4		8.1	16.0		15.1	13.9		6.6
France	Men			17.3			25.5			8.6
	Women			19.8			18.7			4.9
Germany	Men	23.5		21.6	18.4		27.7	12.5		22.8
	Women	22.6		18.1	12.8		14.1	9.8		12.2

Country	Gender									
Indonesia	Men		60.8	66.0		69.8	70.0		19.5	21.4
	Women		44.4	42.0		55.2	49.3		15.3	17.6
Iran	Men		79.3	74.8		73.8	85.0		41.6	63.1
	Women		64.1	63.6		58.5	71.5		32.5	46.7
Italy	Men			25.2			25.0			8.5
	Women			20.3			10.9			6.4
Japan	Men		33.0	29.2		48.5	52.0		25.3	30.1
	Women		31.9	26.8		39.2	36.8		20.0	19.6
South Korea	Men		44.4	40.6		58.4	62.9		28.6	34.6
	Women		33.1	28.1		38.0	46.4		19.2	15.4
Kyrgyzstan	Men		56.7			64.8			35.0	
	Women		44.0			50.9			21.3	
Latvia	Men	33.4			70.9			29.5		
	Women	19.6			61.4			25.4		
Lithuania	Men	42.7			65.3			26.2		
	Women	22.7			47.0			20.3		
Malaysia	Men			59.7			77.5			56.1
	Women			38.5			59.2			35.6
Mexico	Men	26.7	32.3	25.9	48.5	42.5	31.1	35.1	31.7	25.5
	Women	20.7	26.7	21.6	36.5	33.7	22.5	29.5	30.0	22.1
Moldova	Men		47.3	42.4		75.1	60.5		29.3	21.5
	Women		43.6	34.2		50.9	45.3		20.4	13.0
Morocco	Men		84.0	66.0		80.1	75.3		31.0	40.8
	Women		64.8	40.4		62.2	48.0		19.3	20.8
Netherlands	Men			11.8			18.7			5.0
	Women			13.5			13.9			4.6
New Zealand	Men	12.7			23.3			11.2		
	Women	13.1			13.0			4.9		
Norway	Men	14.3			15.5			10.7		
	Women	14.1			15.7			11.8		
Pakistan	Men		71.4			53.2			29.2	
	Women		63.7			46.8			16.3	
Peru	Men	25.1	17.8		41.6	31.2		32.7	25.2	
	Women	15.1	12.4		18.1	16.0		23.2	16.0	
Philippines	Men		70.7			67.1			38.8	
	Women		64.0			59.0			35.1	
Poland	Men			30.6			49.6			19.0
	Women			31.3			39.7			12.3
Romania	Men	47.5		36.7	72.0		62.4	37.1		23.8
	Women	29.8		35.7	61.4		49.3	28.8		15.2

Country										
Russian Federation	Men			39.4			73.7			33.4
	Women			31.7			51.1			21.5
Saudi Arabia	Men		77.3			81.6			67.2	
	Women		65.1			67.2			55.4	
Slovakia	Men	41.7			72.4			41.2		
	Women	39.3			61.8			35.9		
Vietnam	Men		54.0			58.8			22.0	
	Women		41.7			54.5			26.2	
Slovenia	Men			12.9			32.5			13.5
	Women			14.5			28.2			9.8
South Africa	Men			47.4			62.2			22.6
	Women			24.8			41.1			17.5
Spain	Men	27.7	17.0	22.1	33.6	23.7	25.4	20.4	16.2	14.7
	Women	29.4	19.9	14.6	20.5	16.6	17.1	16.6	12.7	12.9
Sweden	Men	7.2	2.8	1.9	17.1	18.1	8.0	9.2	7.0	1.5
	Women	7.5	1.7	2.0	15.3	19.1	8.4	7.8	6.1	0.9
Switzerland	Men	30.4		17.5			12.8			11.8
	Women	27.3		25.0			16.2			6.0
Thailand	Men			34.6			57.2			31.2
	Women			29.6			45.1			23.1
Turkey	Men	66.3	64.9	60.0	57.9	65.5	66.5	31.6	30.4	22.3
	Women	54.8	52.7	47.1	59.0	55.9	54.4	22.8	21.9	16.5
Ukraine	Men			38.9			70.5			42.3
	Women			26.8			41.4			28.8
Egypt	Men		93.4			90.4			39.5	
	Women		86.7			79.0			21.7	
United Kingdom	Men			19.0			26.9			9.1
	Women			12.8			14.1			5.0
United States	Men	23.3	11.3		39.4	27.4		21.5	7.6	
	Women	19.0	8.5		27.2	17.4		13.9	7.0	
Uruguay	Men	31.8		25.0	42.0		25.5	13.0		7.7
	Women	21.3		19.3	32.0		16.3	9.8		6.0
Venezuela	Men	34.4	36.9		47.3	48.7		22.5	17.2	
	Women	30.6	26.8		34.4	32.2		18.7	13.5	

For example, the percentage of people who agree with the statement, "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women," decreases in most countries for both men and women. However, some Asian and Latin American

countries show a reverse trend. In Bangladesh and Mexico, both women's and men's agreement rose.

One of the commonalities among these countries is that they went through economic crises during the 90's; many of them underwent structural adjustment programs offered by multilateral neoliberal organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and unemployment rose sharply. Apparently, economic crisis has the potential to foster the resurgence of patriarchal norms.

The gender gap in response is interesting. In Indonesia and Venezuela, the percentage of women who agree with the statement significantly decreased while that of men increased sharply. In contrast, in Chile, the percentage of women who agree with the statement increased while that of men stayed the same or decreased. The remaining two questions in Table 3-1 refer to gender prejudice in politics and higher education. While the overall pattern is again rather complex, the gender gap is also apparent in these questions.

Independent variables

Individual-level Variables: At the individual-level, I introduce respondents' age, gender, household income, education, labor market status, marital status, and religion (See Appendix 3-1 for descriptive statistics for the main variables). All individual-level variables are from the WVS. Age is coded as the actual age of a

person in years. Research shows that older people and men tend to be more prejudicial (Quillian 1995). The WVS measures income using a 1 to 10 scale; and education with a 1 (no formal education or incomplete primary school education) to 8 (university level education with a degree) scale. Being religious tends to be associated with more traditional and patriarchal values (Hertel and Hughes 1987; Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991; Lehrer 1995; Sherkat 2000). Religion (religious = 1; non-religious = 0) is included as a dichotomous variable. In order to capture respondents' labor market status, part-time employed, self-employed, labor market outsiders (further divided into retired, student, and housewife), and unemployed are included as dichotomous variables with full-time employed as the reference category.

Female Labor Force Participation: In order to consider the extent to which increased women's share in the labor force is associated with women's presence in managerial/administrative occupations, I include female share of the total labor force. This measure comes from the World Bank *World Development Indicators* (2010).

Percent Women of Managerial/Administrative occupations: To represent women's employment in high-status occupations, I use a measure of women's representation in managerial/administrative occupations. These occupations include legislators and senior government officials, and corporate managers (directors and chief executives, production and operations department managers,

and other department managers). This occupational category is widely used by scholars of gender occupational inequality to indicate the most powerful and prestigious occupations (see e.g., Semyonov 1980; Charles 1992; Chang 2004). Data for female employment in these occupations come from the ILO LABORSTA, which provides detailed, comparable, occupational data from the early 1980s. The dataset comprises, for each country-year, a set of occupational categories and the number of women and men in each category. The full set includes data for more than 100 countries. Occupations are matched to a variety of national or international schemes. In order to maximize comparability of occupational classifications, I use occupational data based on two comparable international occupational classification schemes ISCO-68 or ISCO-88. The two occupational classification schemes are highly comparable with respect to sub-occupations in each occupational group, based on International Occupational Prestige Scale, International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status, and class categories (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Furthermore, there is considerable similarity between the two international occupational schemes and across countries in their actual occupations and the extent of their occupational hierarchies (Stewart et al. 1980; Grusky and VanRompaey 1992; Blackburn, Jarman, and Brooks 2000). With this data, I utilize percent women of total managerial/administrative workers. This measure specifically indicates the extent

of disparities between women and men within managerial occupations and is not confounded by the distribution of occupations in societies.

State Legal Protection of Women's Economic Rights: State policies and structures concerning women's rights are measured by an index representing the degree to which women's economic rights are protected in national laws. Data are from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database, which covers 195 countries annually from 1981-2008 providing information on the extent to which women's economic rights are reflected in national laws and enforced by the government. Women's economic rights include equal pay for equal work, free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, job security (including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-discrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, the right to work in the military and the police force. This measure is a 4 point scale (ranging from 0 to 3).

Trade: I include, as a measure of economic globalization, trade openness (exports as percent of GDP + imports as percent of GDP). Data on trade openness come from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI 2010).

Women's Rights INGOs: While international laws represent a formalized commitment, the diffusion of policies across countries requires continuous support from the global civil society. Transnational networks and international nongovernmental organizations transmit cultural models embodied in international laws to countries and communities (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the case of human rights, clear evidence suggests that ties to global human rights social movement networks affect the adoption and implementation of national laws and structures (Finnemore 1996; Frank et al. 2000; Boyle 2001; Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and Boyle 2012). Thus, I include ties to the global women's rights regime measured by memberships in international women's rights NGOs. Women's rights INGO membership data come from Paxton et al. (2006).

GDP per capita: I include as a control variable the GDP per capita, measured with constant US dollars (WDI 2010). Inglehart and his colleagues have rigorously examined the links between economic development and cultural shifts, including changes in gender attitudes, defining culture as "the social norms, beliefs, and values existing in any society, which in turn rest on levels of societal modernization and religious traditions" (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 8). Acknowledging that the relationship between cultural gender values and the economic, social, and political positions of men and women in a society is complex and deeply interconnected, Inglehart and Norris (2003) posit

nevertheless that economic development level and political system are most significant determinants of gender values.

Democracy: Democracies facilitate a social environment in which people in diverse social locations interact with each other as "equals." As a result, the persistence and quality of democracy increases the level of civic culture that could affect gender equality beliefs (Muller and Seligson 1994). To test this, I add the level of democracy measured by Polity score, which is a 21 point scale raining from -10 to +10, as a control (Marshall and Jaggers 2005).

Time: I add wave into the models. This allows me to control if any of the effects in the models are due to changes in the historical context. In addition, this variable will also help assess if gender prejudice increased during the period of 1994-2007.

Method

Since I hypothesize individual and contextual level effects, as well as cross-level interaction effects, I utilize multilevel analysis techniques (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Because the data consist of repeated cross-sectional surveys, I distinguish three levels (cf. Duncan, Jones and Moon 1996; Subramanian, Jones, and Duncan 2003). Multi-level models allow accounting for the nature of the relationship between individual and country-level factors and simultaneous control for individual and contextual level variables

(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In the dataset, both individual-level and country-level variables vary across time and country. In my models, given that individuals are nested in country-years and country-years are nested in countries, I adopt three-level models for estimation: level 1 is the lowest level and consists of the individual respondents; level 2 comprises the survey waves within countries, and level 3 is composed of the countries.

Using dummy variables in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to assess the impact of national-level contextual variables would result in under-estimation of the standard errors of the coefficients. OLS assumes that individual level errors are uncorrelated with others in a given country, which causes a Type I error (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Given that the dependent variables are binary, I estimate a hierarchical generalized linear model that employs a logit link. All individual-level, non-dummy variables are centered on the country/wave mean.

As the level-1 model shows below, the individual belief about men's and women's relative rights and equality in job, politics, and education, respectively, depends on the intercept specific to the country-wave, $\pi 0jk$, country-wave specific factors ($\pi 1jk$, $\pi 2jk$, $\pi 3jk$, $\pi 4jk$, $\pi 5jk$) and residual e_{ijk}.

Gender Prejudice $_{ijk} = \pi_{0jk} + \pi_{1jk}$ Age$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{2jk}$ Men$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{3jk}$ Income$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{4jk}$ Education$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{5jk}$ Married$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{6jk}$ Separated, divorced, or widowed$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{7jk}$ Having no child$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{8jk}$ Number of children$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{9jk}$ Religious$_{ijk}$ $+ \pi_{10jk}$ Part-time

employed$_{ijk}$ + π_{11jk} Self employed$_{ijk}$ + π_{12jk} Retired$_{ijk}$ + π_{13jk} Student$_{ijk}$ + π_{14jk}

Housewife$_{ijk}$ + π_{15jk} Unemployed$_{ijk}$ + e$_{ijk}$

I add the country-wave covariate to the model at Level-2:

π_{0jk} = β_{00k} + β_{01k} GDPpercapita$_{jk}$ + β_{02k} Democracy$_{jk}$ + β_{03k} Trade$_{jk}$ + β_{04k}

WINGO$_{jk}$ + β_{05k} FLFP$_{jk}$ + β_{06k} Women in MA$_{jk}$ + β_{07k} Law$_{jk}$ + β_{08k} W4$_{jk}$ + β_{09k}

W5$_{jk}$ + r_{0jk}

Given that repeated cross-sectional surveys are nested within countries, I specify

level-3 as:

$\beta 00k$ = γ_{000} + u$_{00k}$

In this 3-level modeling, the country-specific intercepts depend on the overall

fixed effect, γ_{000}, and random effect u$_{00k}$ associated with the country K.

In order to test my hypothesis on the relationship between women's

employment context and gender gap. I include the following cross-level

interaction variables to the model in which gender gap in attitude is specified as a

function of female labor force participation, women's share of managerial and

administrative occupations, or state legal protection of women's economic rights:

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$\pi_{2jk} = \beta_{20k} + \beta_{21k}$ FLFP + r_{02k} (Model 2)

$\pi_{2jk} = \beta_{20k} + \beta_{21k}$ Women in MA + r_{02k} (Model 3)

$\pi_{2jk} = \beta_{20k} + \beta_{21k}$ Law + r_{02k} (Model 4)

Results

Table 3-2 includes coefficients and standard errors as well as odds ratios

for four models of gender prejudice regarding job opportunities. The first model

considers both individual-level and country/wave-level effects. Age has strong

positive effects on gender prejudice in job opportunities; older people have more

prejudice. Men are 1.74 times more likely to express gender prejudice about job

opportunities. Income and education both have negative effects on gender

prejudice in job opportunities. An increase of a standard deviation of income and

education are associated with a decrease in holding a prejudicial belief by 5% and

12%, respectively. Married people are 10% more likely to be prejudicial

compared to people never married. There is no significant difference between

separated, divorced, or widowed and never married. There is not a significant

difference between parents and non-parents. However, each increase in the

number of children living with respondents increases the likelihood of holding a

gender prejudice in employment opportunities by 3%. Religious people are 28%

more likely to hold gender prejudice than non-religious people.

Table 3-2. Multi-level Logistic Regression Models for "When Jobs Are Scarce, Men Have More Right to a Job than Women."

	Model 1	Odds	Model 2	Odds	Model 3	Odds	Model 4	Odds
Individual-level Variables (Level-1)								
Age	0.007***	1.007	0.007***	1.007	0.007***	1.007	0.007***	1.007
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Men	0.556***	1.744	0.938***	2.556	0.845***	2.328	0.799***	2.224
	(0.046)		(0.142)		(0.079)		(0.081)	
Income	-0.048***	0.953	-0.047***	0.954	-0.047***	0.954	-0.047***	0.954
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.009)	
Education	-0.124***	0.883	-0.124***	0.883	-0.126***	0.882	-0.124***	0.883
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Marital status (ref. = never married)								
Married	0.095***	1.099	0.097	1.101	0.099***	1.104	0.098***	1.103
	(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.028)	
Separated, divorced, or widowed	-0.036	0.965	-0.036	0.964	-0.036	0.965	-0.038	0.962
	(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.037)	
Not having a child	0.027	1.027	0.028	1.029	0.030	1.031	0.028	1.028
	(0.036)		(0.036)		(0.036)		(0.036)	
Number of children living with	0.026*	1.026	0.025*	1.026	0.024*	1.025	0.026*	1.026
	(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.011)	
Religious	0.247***	1.280	0.244***	1.276	0.243***	1.275	0.243***	1.276
	(0.046)		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.046)	
Labor market status (ref. = full-time employed)								
Part-time employed	0.125**	1.134	0.126**	1.134	0.127**	1.135	0.118**	1.125
	(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.040)	
Self-employed	0.179***	1.196	0.175***	1.191	0.172***	1.187	0.178***	1.195
	(0.032)		(0.032)		(0.033)		(0.033)	
Retired	0.218***	1.244	0.225***	1.252	0.220***	1.246	0.227***	1.255
	(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.040)	
Student	0.113*	1.120	0.117*	1.124	0.119*	1.126	0.115*	1.121
	(0.053)		(0.054)		(0.054)		(0.054)	
Housewife	0.319***	1.376	0.354***	1.425	0.356***	1.427	0.338***	1.403
	(0.043)		(0.045)		(0.040)		(0.048)	
Unemployed	0.192***	1.212	0.197***	1.218	0.196***	1.217	0.199***	1.220
	(0.046)		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.045)	
Country/Wave-level Variables (Level-2)								
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.233***	0.792	-0.232***	0.793	-0.231	0.793	-0.231***	0.794
	(0.053)		(0.053)		(0.053)		(0.052)	
Democracy	-0.025*	0.975	-0.025*	0.975	-0.025*	0.975	-0.026*	0.975
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Trade (% GDP)	0.001	1.001	0.001	1.001	0.001	1.001	0.001	1.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Women's INGO membership	-0.006	0.994	-0.006	0.994	-0.006	0.994	-0.006	0.994
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Female labor force participation	-0.020***	0.981	-0.015**	0.985	-0.020***	0.981	-0.020***	0.981
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
% Women of M/A employment	-0.007	0.993	-0.008	0.992	-0.002	0.998	-0.007	0.993
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.008)	
Legal protection of women's	-0.333***	0.717	-0.332***	0.717	-0.331***	0.718	-0.243**	0.784

economic rights								
	(0.078)		(0.078)		(0.078)		(0.079)	
Wave indicator (ref. = 1994-1999)								
1999-2004	-0.039	0.961	-0.040	0.961	-0.040	0.961	-0.040	0.961
	(0.094)		(0.095)		(0.095)		(0.094)	
2005-2007	-0.192*	0.826	-0.192*	0.825	-0.192*	0.825	-0.192*	0.826
	(0.095)		(0.095)		(0.095)		(0.094)	
Cross-level Interaction Terms								
FLFP*Men			-0.008**	0.992				
			(0.003)					
%M/A*Men					-0.011***	0.989		
					(0.003)			
Law*Men							-0.177***	0.838
							(0.054)	
Constant	2.404***	11.072	2.193	8.962	2.241***	9.404	2.265***	9.627
	(0.515)		(0.515)		(0.515)		(0.516)	
Variance Components								
Level-2	0.047		0.047		0.047		0.047	
Level-3	0.234		0.234		0.234		0.233	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. $N_1 = 95677$; $N_2 = 81$; $N_3 = 54$.
+$p < 0.1$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

Importantly, compared to those employed full-time, people in all other labor market statuses are more likely to hold gender prejudice in employment opportunities. Part-time employed (by 13%) and self-employed (by 20%) show higher prejudice than full-time employed. Labor market outsiders such as retired (by 24%), students (by 12%), and housewives (by 38%) are also more likely to agree to men's priority over women for job opportunities. Importantly, housewives, mostly women, show a high level of attachment to the traditional male breadwinner model, suggesting that women's interests are divided. The unemployed also show a higher likelihood of being prejudicial with respect to job market opportunities by 21% compared to the full-time employed.

Model 1 also includes country/wave-level control variables (Level 2). Among these country-level control variables, the latest wave (2005-2007) has a negative, significant effect on gender prejudice at the .05 level. Compared to the 1994-1999 period, the probability of having gender prejudice in job opportunities decreases by 17% in the 2005-2007 period. The 1999-2004 period is not significantly different from the 1994-1999 period. This suggests that gender prejudice decreased over-time in the countries in this analysis and provides some evidence that gender norms do change on the ground. Consistent with the existing literature, I also find that both GDP per capita and democracy are negatively associated with gender prejudice in job opportunities.

Two globalization variables, trade and women's INGO membership, are not associated with gender prejudice in job opportunities. Together, this suggests that global economic integration or linkage to global women's rights norms do not directly influence individuals' gender prejudice. This finding is striking given the large literature on the effects of globalization and global women's rights on various aspects of gender relations and gender inequality.

Model 1 also tests the hypotheses that women's employment contexts will be associated with gender prejudice. Three variables, women's labor force participation, women's share of managerial/administrative occupations, and country law protecting women's equal rights to work are included in the model. First, a one percent increase in female labor force participation in a country

decreases the odds of having gender prejudice in job opportunities by 2%. Second, however, women's share of managerial and administrative positions does not have a significant effect on gender prejudice in job opportunities. Lastly, laws protecting women's equal rights to paid work are effective in decreasing gender prejudice. One point increase in the degree to which a country's law guarantees women's equal employment rights decreases gender prejudice in job opportunities by 28%.

Models 2-4 test if employment contexts influence both genders differently. Model 2 includes an interaction term, female labor force participation and men. Results indicate that female labor force participation not only reduces the overall level of gender prejudice but also reduces it particularly for men. One percent increase in female labor force participation in a country is associated with reducing the gender gap by 1%. Model 3 includes an interaction term, women's share of managerial and administrative occupations X men. Results indicate that a one percent increase in women's share of the M/A positions are associated with reducing the gender gap by 1 percent as well. Model 4 includes a cross-level interaction term between women's equal rights to work laws and men. A one point increase in the degree to which laws protect women's rights to work is associated with a 16% decrease in the gender gap in gender prejudice.

Next, I explore if women's employment contexts influence other areas of gender prejudice that are related to but distinct from women's equal employment

rights: elite politics and male domain and men's and women's relative rights to higher education. Table 3-3 includes coefficients and standard errors as well as odds ratios for seven models of gender prejudice on qualifications as a political leader.

Effects of individual-level determinants are nearly identical to those in the gender prejudice in employment opportunity models. Like gender prejudice in job opportunities, age has strong negative effects on gender prejudice in qualification as a political leader. Men are 1.99 times more likely to have gender prejudice about women's qualifications as political leaders. Like prejudice about women's entitlement to paid work, income and education both have negative effects on gender prejudice about women's qualification as political leaders. An increase of a standard deviation of income and education are associated with a decrease of holding a prejudicial belief by 2% and 8%, respectively. Unlike prejudice about women's entitlement to paid work, marital status is not associated with gender prejudice in politics. Like prejudice about women's paid work, there is no significant difference between parents and non-parents but each increase in the number of children living with respondents increases the likelihood of holding a gender prejudice in politics by 4%. Religious people are 12% more likely to hold gender prejudice than non-religious people.

Table 3-3. Multi-level Logistic Regression Models for "Men Make Better Political Leaders than Women."

	Model 1	Odds	Model 2	Odds	Model 3	Odds	Model 4	Odds
Individual-level Variables (Level-1)								
Age	0.004**	1.004	0.004**	1.004	0.004**	1.004	0.004**	1.004
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Men	0.689***	1.992	0.870***	2.386	0.690***	1.993	0.736***	2.087
	(0.034)		(0.161)		(0.086)		(0.082)	
Income	-0.024***	0.976	-0.023***	0.977	-0.024***	0.976	-0.024***	0.977
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Education	-0.083***	0.920	-0.084***	0.920	-0.083***	0.920	-0.083***	0.920
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Marital status (ref. = never married)								
Married	0.010	1.010	0.011	1.011	0.010	1.010	0.010	1.010
	(0.028)		(0.029)		(0.029)		(0.029)	
Separated, divorced, or widowed	0.038	1.039	0.038	1.039	0.038	1.039	0.038	1.039
	(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.043)	
Not having a child	0.053	1.055	0.054	1.055	0.053	1.055	0.054	1.055
	(0.034)		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)	
Number of children living with	0.034***	1.035	0.034***	1.035	0.034***	1.035	0.034***	1.035
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Religious	0.110**	1.117	0.109**	1.115	0.110**	1.117	0.110**	1.116
	(0.042)		(0.042)		(0.042)		(0.041)	
Labor market status (ref. = full-time employed)								
Part-time employed	0.079*	1.082	0.079*	1.083	0.079*	1.082	0.078*	1.081
	(0.032)		(0.032)		(0.032)		(0.032)	
Self-employed	0.073**	1.075	0.071**	1.073	0.073**	1.075	0.072**	1.075
	(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.028)		(0.028)	
Retired	0.105*	1.111	0.108**	1.114	0.105*	1.111	0.107**	1.112
	(0.041)		(0.041)		(0.041)		(0.041)	
Student	0.121***	1.129	0.123***	1.131	0.121***	1.129	0.121***	1.129
	(0.034)		(0.035)		(0.034)		(0.034)	
Housewife	0.264***	1.302	0.282***	1.325	0.264***	1.302	0.268***	1.307
	(0.043)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.043)	
Unemployed	0.077*	1.080	0.079*	1.082	0.077*	1.080	0.078*	1.081
	(0.037)		(0.036)		(0.036)		(0.036)	
Country/Wave-level Variables (Level-2)								
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.255***	0.775	-0.254***	0.776	-0.255***	0.775	-0.254***	0.775
	(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.058)	
Democracy	-0.025+	0.976	-0.025+	0.975	-0.025+	0.976	-0.025+	0.976
	(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)	
Trade (% GDP)	0.004*	1.004	0.004*	1.005	0.004*	1.004	0.004*	1.004
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Women's INGO membership	-0.025*	0.975	-0.025*	0.975	-0.025*	0.975	-0.025*	0.975
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Female labor force participation	-0.011	0.989	-0.009	0.991	-0.011	0.989	-0.011	0.989
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)	
% Women of M/A employment	-0.006	0.994	-0.006	0.994	-0.006	0.994	-0.006	0.994
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
Legal protection of women's	-0.164*	0.849	-0.162*	0.850	-0.164*	0.849	-0.147*	0.864

economic rights								
	(0.070)		(0.070)		(0.070)		(0.071)	
Wave indicator (ref. = 1994-1999)								
1999-2004	-0.067	0.935	-0.067	0.935	-0.067	0.935	-0.067	0.935
	(0.086)		(0.086)		(0.086)		(0.086)	
2005-2007	-0.252*	0.777	-0.252*	0.777	-0.252*	0.777	-0.252*	0.777
	(0.118)		(0.118)		(0.118)		(0.118)	
Cross-level Interaction Terms								
FLFP*Men			-0.004	0.996				
			(0.003)					
%M/A*Men					0.000	1.000		
					(0.003)			
Law*Men							-0.033	0.967
							(0.055)	
Constant	2.481***	11.949	2.376***	10.757	2.480***	11.944	2.451***	11.600
	(0.630)		(0.590)		(0.618)		(0.606)	
Variance Components								
Level-2	0.068***		0.068***		0.068***		0.068***	
Level-3	0.192***		0.193***		0.192***		0.192***	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. N_1 = 91389; N_2 = 80; N_3 = 54.
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p< 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

Like gender prejudice in paid work, compared to those employed full-time, people with all other labor market statuses are more likely to hold gender prejudice in politics. However, differences by labor market status are smaller than those of gender prejudice in work. Part-time employed (by 8%) and self-employed (by 8%) show higher prejudice than full-time employed. Labor market outsiders such as retired (by 11%), students (by 13%), and housewives (by 30%) are also more likely to agree to the men's priority over women for job opportunities. Importantly, housewives, mostly women, show a high level of attachment to politics as a male domain model, suggesting that women's interests are divided. Unemployed also show higher likelihood of being prejudicial about women's qualification as a political leader by 8% compared to full-time employed.

With respect to country-level control variables, like gender prejudice about women's entitlement to paid work, the latest wave (2005-2007) has a negative, significant effect on gender prejudice in politics at the .05 level. Compared to the 1994-1999 period, the probability of having gender prejudice about women's qualification as a political leader decreases by 22% in the 2005-2007 period. The 1999-2004 period is not significantly different from the 1994-1999 period. Again, this suggests that gender norms do change on the ground. Like prejudice about women's job entitlement, I also find that GDP per capita is negatively associated with gender prejudice in job opportunities. Democracy has a negative but marginally significant effect on gender prejudice in politics.

Among globalization variables, trade has a positive association with gender prejudice in politics. However, the effect size is rather small. A 10 percent point increase in trade is associated with 4% increase in the likelihood of having a gender prejudice in politics. Women's INGO membership has a negative association with gender prejudice in politics. An increase of 10 memberships in women's INGOs is associated with a 20% decrease in the odds. This suggests that ties to global women's rights movements reduce prejudice against women politicians. This may be due to the diffusion of moral claims about gender equality or it may reflect the strength of the networks through which local women's rights movements operate; that is, a country with more local women's rights movement organizations may simply have more women's INGO

memberships. Together, this suggests that while global economic integration poses some challenges to more equitable gender norms in politics, ties to the global women's rights movements lead to more equitable gender norm in politics.

Unlike gender prejudice in job entitlement, employment contexts have limited influence on gender prejudice in politics. Neither female labor force participation nor women's share of managerial and administrative positions has significant associations with gender prejudice in politics. This suggests women's employment alone does not have a spillover effect to other areas of gender norms. However, legal protection of women's economic rights influences not only gender prejudice in the paid job market but also in politics. One unit increase in women's equal employment rights laws reduces gender prejudice in politics by 15%.

Results from models 2-4 suggest that unlike gender prejudice about women's entitlement to paid work, the three women's employment context variables are not associated with gender gap in gender prejudice against women's qualification as a political leader. Female labor force participation and women's share of managerial and administrative occupations are associated with neither overall level of prejudice in politics nor gender gap in the prejudice. Women's employment laws, while significantly reducing overall level of gender prejudice in politics, is not associated with the gender gap.

Table 3-4 includes coefficients and standard errors as well as odds ratios for seven models of gender prejudice in higher education. Effects of individual-

level determinants are nearly identical to those in the gender prejudice in employment opportunity models. Like gender prejudice in job opportunities, age has strong negative effects on gender prejudice in higher education. Men are 1.78 times more likely to agree to the statement "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl." Like prejudice about women's entitlement to paid work, income and education both have negative effects on gender prejudice in higher education. An increase of a standard deviation of income and education are associated with a decrease of holding a prejudicial belief by 3% and 11%, respectively. Unlike prejudice about women's entitlement to paid work, marital status or having a child is not associated with gender prejudice in higher education. Unlike gender prejudice in job opportunities and in politics, religious people show no difference from non-religious people.

Like gender prejudice in paid work and in politics, compared to those employed full-time, people with other labor market status are more likely to hold gender prejudice in politics. Part-time employed (by 14%) and self-employed (by 14%) show higher prejudice than full-time employed. Labor market outsiders such as the retired (by 16%), housewives (by 29%), and unemployed (by 12%) are more likely to agree to the importance of a university education for men over women. Again, housewives, show a high level of attachment to higher education as a male domain.

Table 3-4. Multi-level Logistic Regression Models for "A University Education is More Important for a Boy than for a Girl."

	Model 1	Odds	Model 2	Odds	Model 3	Odds	Model 4	Odds
Individual-level Variables (Level-1)								
Age	0.006*	1.006	0.006*	1.006	0.006*	1.006	0.006*	1.006
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Men	0.578***	1.783	0.932***	2.541	0.789***	2.202	0.583***	1.791
	(0.042)		(0.113)		(0.078)		(0.067)	
Income	-0.034**	0.967	-0.033**	0.968	-0.033**	0.968	-0.034**	0.967
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Education							-	
	-0.124***	0.883	-0.125***	0.883	-0.126***	0.882	0.124***	0.883
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Marital status (ref. = never married)								
Married	0.018	1.018	0.019	1.019	0.020	1.020	0.018	1.018
	(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)	
Separated, divorced, or widowed	0.057	1.059	0.057	1.058	0.057	1.058	0.057	1.059
	(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.047)	
Not having a child	0.040	1.041	0.042	1.043	0.042	1.043	0.040	1.041
	(0.050)		(0.050)		(0.050)		(0.050)	
Number of children living with	0.015	1.015	0.015	1.015	0.014	1.014	0.015	1.015
	(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)	
Religious	0.064	1.066	0.060	1.062	0.060	1.062	0.064	1.066
	(0.053)		(0.053)		(0.053)		(0.053)	
Labor market status (ref. = full-time employed)								
Part-time employed	0.127**	1.136	0.130***	1.138	0.129**	1.137	0.127**	1.136
	(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.040)	
Self-employed	0.129***	1.138	0.128***	1.136	0.124***	1.132	0.129***	1.138
	(0.035)		(0.034)		(0.035)		(0.035)	
Retired	0.164***	1.178	0.171***	1.187	0.165***	1.179	0.164***	1.179
	(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.047)	
Student	0.063	1.065	0.069	1.071	0.068	1.070	0.063	1.065
	(0.052)		(0.052)		(0.052)		(0.051)	
Housewife	0.251***	1.285	0.292***	1.339	0.286***	1.332	0.251***	1.286
	(0.050)		(0.045)		(0.049)		(0.048)	
Unemployed	0.115**	1.122	0.122**	1.129	0.119**	1.126	0.115**	1.122
	(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.039)	
Country/Wave-level Variables (Level-2)								
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.183*	0.833	-0.181*	0.834	-0.181*	0.835	-0.183*	0.833
	(0.089)		(0.089)		(0.089)		(0.089)	
Democracy	-0.024	0.976	-0.024	0.976	-0.024	0.976	-0.024	0.976
	(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)	
Trade (% GDP)	0.004	1.004	0.004	1.004	0.004	1.004	0.004	1.004
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Women's INGO membership	-0.012	0.988	-0.012	0.988	-0.012	0.988	-0.012	0.988
	(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)	
Female labor force participation	-0.007	0.993	-0.002	0.998	-0.007	0.993	-0.007	0.993
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
% Women of M/A employment	-0.008	0.992	-0.008	0.992	-0.003	0.997	-0.008	0.992
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)	

Legal protection of women's economic rights	-0.213*	0.808	-0.212*	0.809	-0.212*	0.809	-0.210*	0.810
	(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.096)	
Wave indicator (ref. = 1994-1999)								
1999-2004	-0.174	0.840	-0.176	0.839	-0.176	0.839	-0.174	0.840
	(0.134)		(0.134)		(0.135)		(0.134)	
2005-2007	-0.331*	0.718	-0.332	0.717	-0.333*	0.717	-0.331*	0.718
	(0.155)		(0.155)		(0.155)		(0.155)	
Cross-level Interaction Terms								
FLFP*Men			-0.008***					
			(0.002)					
%M/A*Men					-0.008***	0.992		
					(0.002)			
Law*Men							-0.004	0.996
							(0.039)	
Constant	0.686	1.985	0.462	1.587	0.548	1.729	0.682	1.978
	(0.604)		(0.607)		(0.611)		(0.608)	
Variance Components								
Level-2	0.144***		0.144***		0.145***		0.144***	
Level-3	0.174***		0.174***		0.172***		0.174***	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. $N_1 = 93345$; $N_2 = 80$; $N_3 = 54$.
$+p < 0.1$; $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $*** p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

However, unlike gender prejudice in employment or politics, students are not different from the full-time employed in the likelihood of believing that higher education is more important for men than women. This can be explained by the fact that students are the most directly involved in higher education, which enables both men and women to interact with each other as equal peers.

With respect to country-level control variables, like gender prejudice in employment and in politics, the latest wave (2005-2007) has a negative, significant effect on gender prejudice in higher education at the .05 level. Compared to the 1994-1999 period, the probability of having gender prejudice about the relative importance of higher education for men and women decreases by 28% in the 2005-2007 period. The 1999-2004 period is not significantly

different from the 1994-1999 period. Again, this suggests that gender norms do change on the ground. Like gender prejudice in employment and politics, I find that GDP per capita is negatively associated with gender prejudice in higher education. However, democracy has no significant effect in gender prejudice in politics. Like gender prejudice in employment, neither global economic integration nor linkage to global women's rights movements influences gender prejudice in higher education.

Unlike gender prejudice in job entitlement, employment contexts have limited influence on gender prejudice in higher education. Like gender prejudice in politics, neither female labor force participation nor women's share of managerial and administrative positions has significant associations with gender prejudice in higher education. Like gender prejudice in employment and politics, legal protection of women's economic rights, however, is negatively associated with gender prejudice in higher education. One unit increase in women's equal employment rights laws reduces gender prejudice in higher education by 20%.

Results from models 2-4 suggest that like gender prejudice in employment, the three women's employment context variables are associated with reducing the gender gap in gender prejudice in higher education. Ten percent point increase in female labor force participation or women's share of managerial and administrative occupations is associated with a 10% decrease in the odds of believing that university education is more important for women than men.

Women's employment laws, while significantly reducing the overall level of

gender prejudice in higher education is not associated with the gender gap.

Discussions and Conclusions

This chapter contributes to the literature on gender equality by developing

a theoretical model that highlights the importance of women's employment

contexts on an individual's gender prejudice in employment, politics, and

education. First of all, results from this analysis suggest that individuals' gender

prejudice does change in the direction of a more gender-equitable perspective.

This is true for both men and women.

Evidence from this research also suggests that women's employment

context is an important factor in shaping individuals' gender prejudice. Previous

investigators have argued that economic and political modernization are the major

factors influencing gender norms and institutions (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Results from this research show that women's labor force participation and laws

that help women to have equal employment rights have an independent effect on

gender prejudice in employment, even after controlling for a country's economic

and political conditions and globalization measures, although economic

development also explains individuals' gender prejudice in employment.

To achieve a more gender equitable society, gender norms need to change

in a more gender equitable direction not only among women but also among men.

Women's employment context influences not only the level of gender prejudice in employment in a society but also the gender gap in prejudice. Quantity, quality, and laws concerning women's employment all are associated with reducing the gender gap in prejudice against women's equal entitlement to paid work.

Furthermore, the impact of women's employment contexts is strongest among those who are fully involved in the labor market. Although this research is not a causal analysis, this finding suggests a way women's material power influences gender norms. When people interact with women workers on a regular basis, their gender prejudice might diminish significantly. Gender prejudice in higher education also supports this. Students are more likely to have gender prejudice than full-time employed in other areas of gender prejudice but not in the setting of higher education. Students' gender prejudice level is the same as the full-time employed, which is the least among all groups by labor market status.

However, there is limited evidence for the spillover effects of women's employment to gender prejudice in non-employment areas. Women's labor force participation and women's share of managerial and administrative positions are not associated with gender prejudice in non-employment areas. However, laws protecting women's employment rights have a clear spillover effect on gender prejudice in non-employment areas. The policy implications of these results are significant. Policies that enable women to enter into the labor market are essential not only for improving women's employment quantity and quality but also for

changing gender norms on the ground. On the other hand, policies that glorify women's caretaker role and keep them out of the labor market will undermine the possibilities for a more gender equitable society (Bergmann 2001). Also, the findings suggest that women's labor force participation, if not accompanied by more gender equitable employment policies, will have limited reach in changing gender relations.

This chapter also contributes to the literature on neo-institutionalism that has focused on the origin of national policies and less on the implications of such national policies. It is somewhat challenging to interpret the results regarding the effects of Women's INGO membership linkages. Women's INGO linkage is associated with only gender prejudice in politics, not in employment or higher education. Discourses and international laws as well as networks of people have been dedicated to women's rights issues over the last several decades. Linkages to global women's rights INGOs have been influential in countries' adoption of more women friendly employment policies. Because of this, some scholars have considered law to be epiphenomenal of global forces or a form of window-dressing. I do not find evidence to support this claim. Quite contrary, Women's INGO linkage does not have significant effects on gender prejudice on the ground over and beyond its national policy impact. My findings suggest that in order for global norms to influence norms on the ground, state policies are one of the most important mechanisms. In addition, my findings suggest that the state does have

autonomy in the degree to which it reflects global women's rights in their laws. Laws that more closely adhere to the global women's rights movement have stronger influence on gender norms on the ground.

Conclusion

This dissertation has explored whether increased women's labor force participation is accompanied by better positions for women in the labor market. It also considered the impact of macro levels of women's employment on more gender egalitarian gender norms. I addressed these issues through the lens of an integrative framework that incorporates the importance of state policies and globalization. This dissertation research fills gaps between state-centered and more global lines of research to better explain mechanisms generating cross-national and over-time differences and similarities between developed countries and developing countries. I created new data to address these issues, and some of my statistical analyses went beyond cross-sectional analysis to test the implications of state policies and global contexts on the quality of women's employment within countries over-time.

In the first empirical chapter, using cross-national, longitudinal data on 78 countries, I showed that, just as a change toward gender parity in the quantity of employment has largely been influenced by global- and state institutional- factors, women's share of managerial occupations has been affected by these factors. Not all factors that help explain the increase in women's share in the labor force had the same explanatory power in understanding women's share in managerial occupations, however. State legal protection of women's rights is highly significant in increasing women's share of managerial occupations. So is linkage

to the global women's rights movement. However, a country's integration into the global economy did not explain women's share of managerial occupations.

This chapter also contributed to a better understanding of similarities and differences between developed and developing countries. The analyses suggested that there are different processes at work in developed and developing countries. Increases in the quantity of women's employment brought some gains in terms of women's share in managerial occupations in developed countries, but these were offset by no gains for women in developing countries. Global- and state institutional- factors are particularly relevant to explain women's share of managerial employment in developing countries. Some might expect that cultural traditions in developing countries are more resistant to change with respect to women's rights, as gender equality reflects largely Western values (see e.g., Ingelhart and Norris 2003). My results do not support this expectation. I find that women-friendly policies matter more in developing countries than in developed countries. Instead, the gap between the developed and developing world should be seen in terms of the context in which women enter into the labor market in developing countries. In addition, I find a robust positive impact on female managerial share of links to global women's rights organizations.

This chapter also contributed to the literature on the globalization of women's rights and the literature on state policies by providing a better understanding of the relationship between international laws, state policies, and

employment outcomes. It has been suggested that world cultural accounts have led to a decline in the power of nation-states (Frank and Meyer 2002) and that gender egalitarian state employment policies are largely driven by this world culture embodied in international laws (Berkovitch 1999). However, results suggest that state governments vary in implementing and enforcing ideas embedded in international laws though state policies, and state policies continue to be an important factor in explaining the quality of women's employment.

The second empirical chapter made progress toward better understanding the implications of state policies on gender occupational inequality. In it, I examined different types of state policies. I find that two types of policies, paid maternity leave legislation and anti-discrimination legislation, have opposite effects. Maternity leave policies are associated with greater gender occupational inequality while anti-discrimination policies are associated with less occupational inequality. This chapter also contributes to the literature on state policy by examining the patterns of state adoption of these policies since the early 1900s and variations in the level of benefits.

The first two empirical chapters of this dissertation examined the context in which increased women's employment gets translated into a better share of women in managerial occupations and reductions in gender occupational inequality. The last empirical chapter turned attention to the implications of women's employment on the non-material aspect of gender inequality, gender

prejudice. This chapter contributes to the literature on gender inequality by developing a theoretical model that highlights the importance of women's employment contexts for individuals' gender prejudicial views in employment, politics, and education. First of all, results from this analysis suggest that individuals' gender prejudice does change over-time and in the direction of a more gender-equitable direction. In addition to it, evidence from this research suggests that variations in gender prejudice across countries and over-time can be explained by women's employment context.

Previous researchers have argued that economic and political modernization is the major factor affecting gender norms and institutions (Inglehart and Norris 2003). In contrast, my results show that women's labor force participation and laws that help women to have equal employment rights have an independent effect on gender prejudice in employment, even after controlling for countries' economic and political conditions, and globalization measures (although economic development also explains individuals' gender prejudice in employment).

To achieve a more gender equitable society, gender norms need to change not only among women but also among men. I find that levels of women's employment are associated not only with the overall levels of gender prejudice in employment in a society but also with gender gaps in levels of prejudice. The

quantity and quality of women's employment within countries, and women-friendly laws overall are associated with a smaller gender gap in prejudice against women's entitlement to paid work.

Finally, this chapter also contributed to the literature on neo-institutionalism. This literature has emphasized cultural process through which taken-for-granted norms constructed within the world society infuse not only governments and organizations but also individuals at the state and local levels (Boli and Thomas 1999). From this perspective, links to gender egalitarian discourses through women's INGO membership should have a direct impact on norms and attitudes concerning gender relations. I find only limited support for this claim. Women's INGO links are associated with reductions in gender prejudice in only one area—politics. These links were not associated with changes in gender prejudice in the areas of employment or higher education. My findings suggest that the idea of a direct relationship between "global" and "local" needs to be qualified.

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Appendix 1-1. Variable Description and Data Source

Variable	Operationalization	Source
Dependent Variable		
Share of women in managerial/administrative occupations		ILO: NETLAX database
Independent Variables		
Women's Labor Force Participation		
Women's Share in the Labor Force	% Women of the total labor force	World Bank: WDI
Economic Globalization		
Foreign direct investment	Foreign direct investment net inflow (% of GDP)	World Bank: WDI
Trade	Trade (% of GDP)	World Bank: WDI
Penetration of Global Women's Rights		
State ratification of key international treaties	Cumulative number of human rights treaties ratified (0-12)	ILO; UN
Linkages to global women's rights movement	memberships in international women's rights organizations	Paxton et al. 2006
State Women's Rights Policies		
Women's rights reflected in law	Index score for state protection of women's political rights, social rights, and economic rights (0-12)	CIRI Human Rights Data Project
Political		
Level of democracy	Democracy-autocracy measure (0-10)	Polity IV dataset
Economic		
GDP per Capita	GDP per capita (2000 U.S. $ value) (logged)	World Bank: WDI
Industrialization	Agriculture as % GDP	World Bank: WDI
Demographic		
Total Population	Total population (logged)	World Bank: WDI
Urbanization	% of population living in urban areas	World Bank: WDI
Fertility	# births to a woman during the period of child bearing years	World Bank: WDI
Women's Human Capital		
Education	Female secondary school enrollment (% gross)	
Proportion of women in national parliament	% women in parliament	Paxton, Green, Hughes 2008
Lagged dependent variable		
Lagged term for share of women in managerial/administrative occupations	Share of women in managerial/administrative occupations (previous year)	ILO: NETLAX database

Appendix 2-1. Maternity leave law coding scheme

Country:
Law ID:

The length of leave: _____

The percentage of compensation in regular pay:
_____

If it is fixed amount, specify: _____

The provider of maternity coverage: _____

Who is eligible for the above maternity benefits? _____

When did this law/decree/order become effective? _____

Note: _____

Appendix 2-2. Equal access law coding scheme

Country:
Law ID:

Equal rights to access any industry (Y or N)?

Notes: _____

Equal rights in terms of work hours (Y or N)?

Notes: _____

Rights to work while pregnant (Y or N)?

Notes: _____

When did this law/decree/order become effective? _____

Appendix 2-3. Equal pay law coding scheme

Country:
Law ID:

Does law specify non-discrimination in pay based on gender (Y or N)?
Notes: _____

When did this law/decree/order become effective? _____

Appendix 2-4. Maternity Leave Policies and Anti-discrimination Policies

Country	Duration of paid leave for mothers	Maternity leave wage replacement	First adoption of paid maternity leave	First adoption of equal pay law	Night hours	Any industry	Pregnant
Afghanistan	14-25 weeks	No information	No information	1919	No information	No information	No information
Albania	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1947	1989	Yes	Yes	No
Algeria	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1949	1976	No	Yes	Yes
Andorra	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Angola	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1981	1981	Yes	Yes	No
Antigua and Barbuda	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1973	1975	No information	No information	No information
Argentina	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1934	1973	Yes	Yes	Yes
Armenia	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	Yes
Australia	14-25 weeks	Flat	1912	1969	Yes	Yes	Yes
Austria	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1888	1977	Yes	Yes	No
Azerbaijan	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	No	No	No
Bahamas	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1972	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Bahrain	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1976	1976	No information	No information	No information
Bangladesh	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1939	No equal pay law	Yes	No	Yes
Barbados	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1966	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Belarus	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	No	No
Belgium	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1894	1975	Yes	Yes	No
Belize	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1979	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Benin	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1967	Yes	No	No
Bermuda	12 weeks	100	2000	No information	No information	No information	No information
Bhutan	No information	No information	No information	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Bolivia	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1939	1976	No	No	Yes
Bosnia-Herzogovina	No information	No information	1922		Yes	No	Yes
Botswana	Less than 14 weeks	1 - 49%	1963	No equal pay law	Yes	Yes	Yes

Brazil	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1923	1968	Yes	Yes	Yes
Brunei	Less than 14 weeks	1 - 49%	No information	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Bulgaria	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1918	1986	Yes	Yes	No
Burkina Faso	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1962	Yes	Yes	Yes
Myanmar	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1954	1974	No information	No information	No information
Burundi	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1966	1966	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cambodia	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1957	No information	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cameroon	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1967	No	No	No
Canada	26-51 weeks	50 - 74%	1957	1971	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cape Verde	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1976	1985	No information	No information	No information
Central African Republic	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1952	1961	No information	No information	No information
Chad	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1952	1966	No	No	Yes
Chile	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1924	No information	Yes	Yes	No
China	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1951	No information	Yes	No	No
Colombia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1946	1934	Yes	No	No
Comoros	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1984	1984	No information	No information	No information
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1967	1967	No	No	Yes
Congo, Republic of the Congo	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1964	No	No	Yes
Costa Rica	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1941	1934	No	No	Yes
Croatia	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1922		Yes	Yes	Yes
Cuba	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1934	1934	No information	No information	No information
Cyprus	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1956	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Czech Republic	52 weeks or more	50 - 74%	No information	No information	Yes	No	No
czechoslovakia	No information	No information	N/A	1975	No information	No information	No information
Denmark	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1901	1976	Yes	Yes	Yes
Djibouti	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1982	1966	No information	No information	No information
Dominica	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1975	1951	No information	No information	No information

Dominican Republic	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1947	No equal pay law	Yes	Yes	Yes
Timor-Leste	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Ecuador	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1928	1971	Yes	No	Yes
Egypt	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1959	1959	No	No	Yes
El Salvador	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1949	1963	Yes	Yes	Yes
Equatorial Guinea	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1979	1982	No information	No information	No information
Eritrea	Less than 14 weeks	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Estonia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	No
Ethiopia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1962	1975	Yes	No	No
Fiji	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1977	No equal pay law	Yes	No	Yes
Finland	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1963	1970	Yes	Yes	Yes
France	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1913	1972	Yes	No	Yes
Gabon	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1962	No	No	No
Gambia, the	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	N/A	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Georgia	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	No
East Germany	No information	No information	1883	1961	No information	No information	No information
West Germany	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1883	1969	Yes	Yes	No
Ghana	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1948	1969	Yes	Yes	Yes
Greece	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1922	1983	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grenada	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1980	1979	No information	No information	No information
Guatemala	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1946	1961	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guinea	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1960	No	No	No
Guinea-Bissau	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	No information	1986	No information	No information	No information
Guyana	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1969	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Haiti	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1961	1984	No information	No information	No information
Honduras	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1954	1959	Yes	Yes	No
Hungary	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1891	1951	Yes	No	No

Iceland	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1936	1961	Yes	Yes	Yes
India	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1948	1950	No	No	Yes
Indonesia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1951	1969	Yes	Yes	No
Iran, Islamic Republic of	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1949	1959	Yes	No	Yes
Iraq	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1956	1975	No information	No information	No information
Ireland	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1911	1974	Yes	Yes	Yes
Isle of Man	26 weeks	90%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Israel	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1953	1964	Yes	No	No
Italy	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1910	1964	Yes	Yes	No
Cote d	No information	No information	1952	1964	Yes	No	No
Jamaica	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1979	1975	No	No	Yes
Japan	52 weeks or more	50 - 74%	1922	1972	Yes	No	Yes
Jordan	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1960	1976	No	No	Yes
Kazakhstan	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	No	No
Kenya	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1966	No information	Yes	No	Yes
Kiribati	Less than 14 weeks	1 - 49%	No information	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Korea, Democratic People	No information	No information	1945	1945	No information	No information	No information
Korea, Republic of	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1963	1953	Yes	No	Yes
Kuwait	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1964	1964	No	No	Yes
Kyrgyzstan	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	No information	No information	Yes	No	Yes
Laos	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1971	No information	Yes	Yes	No
Latvia	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lebanon	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1946	1965	Yes	No	Yes
Lesotho	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1967	No information	Yes	No	Yes
Liberia	No paid leave for mothers	No paid leave	1976	No equal pay law	Yes	Yes	Yes
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1957	1970	No information	No information	No information
Liechtenstein	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information

Lithuania	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	Yes
Luxembourg	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1901	1963	No information	No information	No information
Macedonia	26-51 weeks	No information	1922	No information	No	No	No
Madagascar	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1960	No	No	No
Malawi	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1984	No information	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malaysia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1957	No equal pay law	No	No	Yes
Maldives	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Mali	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1962	No	No	No
Malta	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1971	No information	No information	No information
Marshall Islands	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Mauritania	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	No information	No	No	Yes
Mauritius	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1975	No information	Yes	Yes	No
Mexico	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1942	1970	Yes	Yes	No
Micronesia, Federated States of	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Moldova, Republic of	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	No	No	No
Monaco	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Mongolia	52 weeks or more	50 - 74%	1975	1960	Yes	No	Yes
Montenegro	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1922		No	No	No
Morocco	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1959	Before 1925	No	No	Yes
Mozambique	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1985	1985	Yes	No	No
Namibia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	No information	No information	Yes	Yes	No
Nauru	No information	No information	N/A	No information	No information	No information	No information
Nepal	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1963	1976	No	Yes	Yes
Netherlands, the	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1913	1975	Yes	Yes	No
New Zealand	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1938	1972	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1945	Before 1925	Yes	Yes	No
Niger	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1962	Yes	No	No

Country	Leave duration	Wage %	Year 1	Equal pay law	Col A	Col B	Col C
Nigeria	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1961	No equal pay law	No	No	Yes
Norway	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1909	1978	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oman	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1973	No equal pay law	No	No	Yes
Pakistan	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1950	No equal pay law	No	No	Yes
Palau	No paid leave	No paid leave	N/A	No information	No information	No information	No information
Panama	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1930	1971	Yes	No	No
Papua New Guinea	No paid leave for mothers	No paid leave	1978	1978	No	No	Yes
Paraguay	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1943	1961	Yes	Yes	No
Peru	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1936	Before 1925	Yes	Yes	Yes
Philippines, the	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1954	1954	No	Yes	Yes
Poland	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1920	Before 1925	Yes	No	No
Portugal	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1933	1979	Yes	Yes	Yes
Qatar	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1976	Before 1925	No information	No information	No information
Romania	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1912	1972	Yes	Yes	Yes
Russian Federation	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	No
Rwanda	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1967	1967	Yes	No	No
Samoa	No paid leave	No paid leave	N/A	No information	No information	No information	No information
San Marino	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
Sao Tome / Principe	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1979	1962	No information	No information	No information
Saudi Arabia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1969	No information	Yes	Yes	No
Senegal	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1962	No	No	Yes
Serbia	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1922		No	No	No
Seychelles	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1979	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Sierra Leone	No paid leave	No paid leave	N/A	No equal pay law	Yes	Yes	No
Singapore	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1968	No information	No	No	Yes
Slovakia	52 weeks or more	50 - 74%	1988	1975	Yes	Yes	Yes
Slovenia	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1922		Yes	Yes	Yes

Country	Leave duration	Pay rate	Year 1	Year 2	Col 1	Col 2	Col 3
Solomon Islands	Less than 14 weeks	1 - 49%	N/A	No equal pay law	No	No	No
Somalia	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1958	1972	No information	No information	No information
South Africa	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	N/A	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Spain	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1929	1970	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sri Lanka	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1939	1985	Yes	Yes	Yes
St. Kitts and Nevis	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information
St. Lucia	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1978	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
St. Vincent / Grenadines	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1986	No equal pay law	No information	No information	No information
Sudan, the	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1970	1970	No	Yes	Yes
Suriname	No information	No information	N/A	Before 1925	No information	No information	No information
Swaziland	No paid leave	No paid leave	1962	1980	No information	No information	No information
Sweden	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1900	1979	No	No	Yes
Switzerland	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	N/A	No equal pay law	Yes	Yes	Yes
Syria	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1958	1959	Yes	Yes	No
Tajikistan	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	N/A	No information	No	No	Yes
Tanzania, United Republic of	14-25 weeks	No information	1946	No information	No	No	No
Thailand	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1958	1972	Yes	Yes	No
Togo	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1952	1974	Yes	No	No
Tonga	No information	No information	N/A	No information	No information	No information	No information
Trinidad and Tobago	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1971	No information	No information	No information	No information
Tunisia	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1950	1983	Yes	Yes	No
Turkey	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1945	1963	No	No	Yes
Turkmenistan	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	N/A	No information	No information	No information	No information
Tuvalu	Less than 14 weeks	1 - 49%	N/A	No information	No information	No information	No information
Uganda	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1975	No equal pay law	No	No	No
Ukraine	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	Yes
United Arab Emirates	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1959	1980	No	No	No

United Kingdom	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1911	1970	No	No	Yes
United States of America	No paid leave	No paid leave	N/A	1963	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1954	1989	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uzbekistan	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1912	1918	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vanuatu	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	No information	1973	No information	No information	No information
Venezuela	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1936	1936	Yes	No	Yes
Vietnam	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1944	1956	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zambia	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1984	No information	No	No	No
Zimbabwe	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1985	1982	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yemen	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1978	1978	No	No	No

Appendix 2-5. Operationalization of Variables and Descriptive Statistics for the Panel Regression Analysis

Variable	Operationalization	Source	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Economic globalization						
Trade	Trade (% of GDP)	World Bank: WDI	61.18	32.86	17.34	139.70
Penetration of global Women's employment Rights						
State ratification of key international treaties regarding women's work	The number of treaties ratified: the 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, the 1952 ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, the 1952 ILO maternity Protection Convention, the 1962 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, and the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	ILO, UN	2.29	1.25	0	4
Country WINGO membership	# of WINGOs of which citizens of the country has a membership	YIO, UIA	7.64	2.66	2.5	12.5
Political						
Level of democracy	Democracy-autocracy measure (-10-10)	Polity IV dataset	3.31	7.47	-9	10
Economic						
GDP per Capita	GDP per capita (2000 U.S. $ value) (logged)	World Bank: WDI	8.17	1.50	4.77	10.20
State institutional characteristics						
Maternity leave policy in 1984		Various sources*				
High-level maternity leave	26 weeks or more with 75-100% wage replacement		25.71%			
Mid-level maternity leave	14-25 weeks with 75-100% wage replacement		25.71%			
Low-level maternity leave	Less than 14 weeks or less than 75% wage replacement		48.57%			
Equal pay law in 1984	Having a law demanding "equal pay for work of equal value (coded 1; otherwise 0)	Various sources*	85.71%			
Equal access law	women are allowed to work in all industries, during night, and while pregnant in a country (coded 1; otherwise 0)	Various sources*	31.43%			
Women's economic rights reflected in law	Women's economic rights reflected in law (4 point scale)	CIRI Human Rights Data Project	1.60	0.69	0	3
Women's rights reflected in law	Women's rights reflected in law (10 point scale)	CIRI Human Rights Data Project	4.66	1.91	0	8
Women's human capital						
Female labor force participation	% women in the labor force	World Bank: WDI	41.77	14.74	11.6	75.6
Female tertiary education	Female tertiary education enrollment rates (gross)	Schofer 2005	18.70	14.81	0.3	77.7

Appendix 2-6. Women's Employment policy: Main Variable Values for 35 Countries

country	Maternity leave			Equal pay law	Equal access law: night work, all industries, and working while pregnant	Legal protection of women's rights		Logged odds of women to men being employed in high-status occupations		
	Duration	Wage replacement	First adoption	First adoption	Do women have equal access to all three dimensions?	Women's economic rights index	Women's rights index	1984	2004	Change 1984-2004
Australia	14-25 weeks	Flat	1912	1969	Yes	2	6	-0.08	0.24	0.32
Austria	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1888	1977	No	1	4	-0.17	-0.04	0.13
Bangladesh	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1939	No equal pay law	No	0	0	0.15	-0.17	-0.32
Belgium	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1894	1975	No	2	6	0.42	0.04	-0.38
Botswana	Less than 14 weeks	1 - 49%	1963	No equal pay law	Yes	2	5	0.40	0.00	-0.40
Canada	26-51 weeks	50 - 74%	1957	1971	Yes	3	8	0.10	0.31	0.20
Chile	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1924	2009	No	2	5	0.55	0.50	-0.06
Colombia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1946	1934	No	2	4	0.00	0.31	0.30
Denmark	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1901	1976	Yes	2	6	0.46	0.10	-0.36
Egypt, Arab Rep.	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1959	1959	No	2	4	0.50	0.51	0.02
El Salvador	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1949	1963	Yes	2	6	0.25	0.22	-0.02
Ethiopia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1962	1975	No	1	2	-0.39	-0.81	-0.42
Germany	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1883	1969	No	2	7	-0.14	0.18	0.31
Greece	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1922	1983	Yes	2	5	0.05	0.19	0.14
Indonesia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1951	1969	No	2	6	0.15	0.55	0.40
Iran, Islamic Rep.	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1949	1959	No	0	0	2.01	0.76	-1.25
Ireland	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1911	1974	Yes	2	6	0.56	0.07	-0.48
Israel	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1953	1964	No	2	5	0.37	0.12	-0.25
Japan	52 weeks or more	50 - 74%	1922	1972	No	1	4	-0.25	-0.08	0.17
Korea, Rep.	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1963	1953	No	0	1	-0.48	-0.36	0.12
Malaysia	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1957	No equal pay law	No	2	5	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
Netherlands	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1913	1975	No	2	6	0.06	-0.07	-0.13
Norway	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1909	1978	Yes	2	7	0.19	0.00	-0.19

Country	Maternity leave length	Wages paid	Year 1	Equal pay year	Equal pay	Col 1	Col 2	Val 1	Val 2	Val 3
Pakistan	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1950	No equal pay law	No	1	3	0.34	-0.58	-0.92
Panama	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1930	1971	No	1	4	0.83	0.67	-0.16
Paraguay	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1943	1961	No	1	3	-0.23	0.30	0.53
Philippines	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1954	1954	No	2	6	0.93	1.05	0.11
Portugal	26-51 weeks	75 - 100%	1933	1979	Yes	2	6	0.31	-0.07	-0.39
Spain	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1929	1970	Yes	1	4	0.20	0.27	0.07
Sri Lanka	Less than 14 weeks	75 - 100%	1939	1985	Yes	1	4	0.72	0.31	-0.40
Sweden	52 weeks or more	75 - 100%	1900	1979	No	2	8	0.26	0.08	-0.18
Syrian Arab Republic	Less than 14 weeks	50 - 74%	1958	1959	No	1	4	1.45	1.89	0.43
Thailand	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1958	1972	No	2	4	-0.21	-0.16	0.05
Turkey	14-25 weeks	50 - 74%	1945	1963	No	2	4	-0.49	-0.37	0.12
Venezuela, RB	14-25 weeks	75 - 100%	1936	1936	No	2	5	0.83	0.71	-0.12

Appendix 3-1. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables

	When Job scarce, men have more rights to job.				Men Make Better Political Leaders than Women.				A University Education is More Important for a Boy than for a Girl.			
	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Individual-level Variables												
Dependent variable (agree with the statement = 1)	0.36				0.44				0.22			
Age	41.40	16.15	15	99	41.26	16.09	15	99	41.28	16.1	15	98
Gender (Men = 1)	0.48				0.49				0.48			
Household income	4.77	2.4	1	10	4.78	2.39	1	10	4.77	2.39	1	10
Education	4.57	2.31	1	8	4.60	2.31	1	8	4.59	2.31	1	8
Married	0.65				0.65				0.65			
Separated, divorced, or widowed	0.12				0.11				0.11			
Never married (reference category)	0.24				0.24				0.24			
Child (Not having a child = 1)	0.28				0.28				0.28			
Number of children living with	1.90	1.78	0	8	1.90	1.78	0	8	1.90	1.78	0	8
Religion (Religious = 1)	0.70				0.71				0.71			
Full-time employed	0.35				0.35				0.35			
Par-time employed	0.08				0.08				0.08			
Self employed	0.10				0.11				0.11			
Retired	0.15				0.15				0.15			
Student	0.07				0.07				0.07			
Housewife	0.16				0.16				0.16			
Unemployed	0.08				0.08				0.08			
Individual-level N	$N = 95677$				$N = 91389$				$N = 93345$			
Country/wave-level Variables												
GDP per capita (logged)	8.58	1.34	5.68	10.57	8.56	1.33	5.68	10.57	8.56	1.33	5.68	10.57
Democracy	6.78	5.01	-10	10	6.74	5.03	-10	10	6.74	5.03	-10	10
Trade (as % GDP)	70.50	34.88	20.52	211.2	70.53	35.1	20.52	211.23	70.53	35.1	20.52	211.23
Women's INGO membership	12.00	6.1	0	24.6	11.92	6.09	0	24.6	11.92	6.09	0	24.6
Female labor force participation	47.52	11.33	16	70.4	47.40	11.35	16	70.4	47.40	11.35	16	70.4
% women of M/A position	26.39	11	2.94	58.96	26.50	11.03	2.94	58.96	26.50	11.03	2.94	58.96

Law protecting women's economic rights	1.51	0.71	0	3	1.50	0.71	0	3	1.50	0.71	0	3
1994-1999	0.30				0.30				0.30			
1999-2004	0.30				0.30				0.30			
2005-2007	0.40				0.40				0.40			
Country/wave-level *N*	*N* =81				*N* = 80				*N* = 80			
Country-level *N*	*N* = 54				*N* = 54				*N* = 54			