Central Europe and the Nationalist Paradigm

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"Vienna 1900" is a familiar historiographic metaphor referring to a declining Austro-Hungarian Empire stretched to the breaking point by essentially irreconcilable ethnic, class, and economic forces; it evokes images of a culture of neurosis and decadence. This metaphor has also organized the history of Central Europe for approximately the last twenty years, since it entered public consciousness as the title of a series of major museum exhibitions and of Carl Schorske's *Fin-de-siècle Vienna*. But why has Austria-Hungary been identified as the prime example of decline and imminent decay in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when other great European colonial empires were also beginning their declines? England and France are even predisposed to see in 1900 the golden age of their power and world mission, and the ensuing century as a period of decline. The received views about the breakup of Austria-Hungary (the first of the declining empires, but not the last) thus reflect a concept of nationalism and empire that may bear rethinking.[(1)]

Current theory and research on those other empires has offered frameworks through which one may reconsider the relative successes and failures of the Western empires, elucidating how Western cultural values (and particularly moral standards) were used to justify economic exploitation, and how the stereotypes used by the colonial powers persisted in determining the consciousnesses of the colonized peoples, even after formal political decolonization. Thus one set of scholars (most prominently, Edward Said and Homi Bhabha) has traced how British or French national culture incorporated images of

self that justified their expansionism and economic imperialism by stressing how their states brought high culture, modernization, and morality, thus valorizing the colonizers at the expense of the colonized. This body of imperialist/nationalist/ colonial theory has outlined various psychological and social mechanisms at play, showing how class, gender, and ethnic consciousness, social roles, and the institutions and regulations kept such complex hegemonies in power. Such theorists thus show that not only economics and politics, but also social-psychological stereotypes, made imperial colonialism possible--"empire" is often defined as a pattern of domination structured about the opposition between national identity and the colonized "Other," an alien or somehow lesser group of people.

But the scholars of empire and colonization that propound such theories have seemingly forgotten that Austria-Hungary was the great contemporary of the French and British empires. Consequently, virtually none of the theorists of colonialism and nationalism (Benedict Anderson is a small exception) has taken up the case of Austria-Hungary to test their work. One excuse for the omission is that Austria-Hungary was not a "typical" empire: it did not really have external colonies, only annexed border areas. In the same vein, it is easy to claim that the history of Austria-Hungary (that entity without an official name) is too complex to be exhausted in terms of a single, simple metaphor, such as the "East versus West" dichotomies that organize expositions of the French and British empires.

In that lacuna, "Vienna 1900" has taken a firm hold of the historiographic imagination to claim Austria-Hungary as an "*Experiment in Weltuntergang*" (as Karl Kraus called it) rather than an empire. Accepting that metaphor almost automatically designates the nineteenth century as a slide into the decline of the "gay apocalypse" of Vienna, a last, late flower blooming on what was essentially a political and social morass. And despite the formidable contributions to the field from A. J. P. Taylor and Robert A. Kann through to Claudio Magris, Alan Sked, and Peter Sugar, no new metaphor has been offered to supplant "Vienna 1900" to explain the complex web of historical precedents, hegemonies, and administrative units that was Austria-Hungary.

The goal of this paper is to offer an option to "Vienna 1900," an alternate metaphor for the historiography of Central Europe. By turning to recent scholarship on colonialism, nationalism, and the public sphere, and applying it to Austria-Hungary, I will seek to outline a new historiographic metaphor that highlights its distinctive forms as an empire and as a nation-state. This attempt will require a careful dialogue between theory and the specific historical circumstances of Austria-Hungary, since theory drawn on the pattern of colonial/imperial theory about France and England does not necessarily discriminate significant impulses in effect in Central Europe. For instance, a central organizer in colonial theory at least since Frantz Fanon's work, the dichotomy between colonizer and colonized, does not have the same kind of administrative and ethnic references in Austria-Hungary as it does in French Antilles or British India. In these terms, the imposition of British institutions on India can be seen as a clear case of imposed dominance. Yet were the Hungarian magnates culturally "colonized" because they often did not speak Magyar in the early part of the nineteenth century? Given the magnates'

economic power, that answer is considerably less clear than the case of an Anglo-Indian bureaucrat sent to English boarding schools would be.

Still, this recent nationalist and colonialist theory can interrogate the inadequacies of "Vienna 1900" as an organizing metaphor for a European state that had neither the decisive economic or military position of its peers, yet which managed to retain a coherence of sorts as an administrative and economic unit for at least fifty years beyond any politician's expectations. The central issue hidden behind my search for a new historiographical metaphor is how a flawed economic and administrative unit still managed to produce a workable cultural identity for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state until forcibly brought to a military and political end--an identity recoverable in the literatures of the far corners of the empires, from Schnitzler to Jokai and beyond. Magris's "Habsburg mythos" will, to be sure, be part of the suggestions I will make below, but his answer to the broader historiographic question is not sufficient, since he concentrates on the last act of the empire, and on the cultural politics of Vienna, rather than on the more general (popular?) culture of the diverse parts of the empire. Similarly, the aesthetic self-justification inherent in "Vienna 1900" privileges high or official culture, ignoring how an empire must sustain itself on a day-to-day level.

As we shall see, what I am seeking to outline here is the narrative of self-justification that allowed Austria-Hungary to exist (for it to have a "center," a core identity that may not apply equally to the periphery), just as the British and French Empires had their own (organized around the narcissism of the colonizers and their purported moral imperatives). Austria-Hungary was a nation of "others" (other religions, languages, ethnicities, classes) that could not justify itself as an "organic" unity, as a "natural" empire unified against an external threat--that metaphor is too simple to appeal to the diverse publics of Austria-Hungary. A second body of theoretical work on nationalism and national culture suggests that an empire not only has to justify itself and its patterns of dominance, but also has to construct the psychological and social space within it: a public sphere with a complicated balance of official and popular culture, and personal and political power and agency within mass culture--a set of metaphors that does not necessarily reflect modern distinctions between high and popular cultures. The narrative of self-justification for Austria-Hungary--the extended historiographic metaphor I am seeing here--will thus also need to accommodate this crucial sense of everyday life, not only the inspiration of high culture.

In the nineteenth century, Austria-Hungary, without external colonies, sought to evolve national symbols to divorce issues of ethnicity and specific geography from national self-image, especially because a plethora of class, ethnic, and religious stereotypes were readily available in public consciousness (as Schorske's case study of organized anti-Semitism and Zionism too readily document). I shall argue that ultimately, and perhaps by accident, it created a public sphere that functioned as the basis of its imperialism in a different way than had England or France (and in a different way than much current theory on the evolution of the bourgeoisie acknowledges). Its unique strategy was to construct a national consciousness based on the psychology of individual entitlement and representation within a contractual empire. Where England and France were tacitly

asserting cultural and moral superiority over India and Algeria, respectively, Austria-Hungary stressed individual citizens' internalization of a model of contractual hegemony, guaranteed through access to the central power, the emperor. That is, it used a narrative directed inward rather than outward, stressing strength in diversity rather than normativity. In a certain sense, then, nineteenth-century Austria-Hungary continues the idea of a nation as a representative public sphere characterizing Enlightenment thought (a strategy carried by Metternich into Franz Joseph's time from the close of the eighteenth century).

After outlining the criteria that a historiographic narrative appropriate for Austria-Hungary must fulfill, I will test it at the conclusion of the essay by addressing several phenomena from the Austro-Hungarian public sphere, to show how the model of empire I propose fits these cases and iterates between political/economic and popular culture in a way that traditional historiographic models (including "Vienna 1900") cannot. The first is literary, Fritz Mauthner's work on nationalism, including two novellas; the second is the rhetoric surrounding the resolution of the language issues through the end of the empire; and the third is the question of the aristocracy, as represented in general and in the *Makart-Festzug*.

Although such tests seem, at first, incidental to questions of official historiography, I will argue that such a model of national coherence is crucial for understanding the Austro-Hungarian empire, a far stronger metaphor than is "Vienna 1900": that Austria-Hungary had actually solved the problem of the evolution and management of a modern public sphere, which came very close to sustaining this Empire beyond the heyday of ethnic nationalism and into a twentieth-century pattern of a modern corporate state based on law rather than morality and ethnicity.

Defining Nationalism and the Nation

The twentieth-century reflex in thinking about what a nation is today is conceived largely anthropologically, in terms of a community sharing a language, ethnicity, and political heritage. But theories about what defines a nation need to be written considerably more broadly, if they are to apply to nineteenth-century Austria-Hungary, since it cannot be defined as a nation in these terms, especially in light of the rising tide of ethnic politics through the century. Austria-Hungary, as a nation composed of many ethnicities and of mixed political heritage, needs a broader definition than that preferred in discussions of British and French nationalism and imperialism, especially since the borders of its nation and its empire largely correspond.

Today's definitions of nationalism, however, are products of an evolution that was seen differently in the nineteenth century. In 1882, the historian Ernest Renan offered the classic discussion of nationalism, in terms that speak particularly clearly to the issue here. His insistence that there is a difference between race, nation, and ethnicity is extremely crucial to the nineteenth-century framing of the problem (Renan, 8). Today, his statement is often taken as utopian, or as an apologia for a certain branch of late nineteenth-century

European politics.[2] However, Renan has conceived of a nation in terms useful for the discussion at hand: he approaches it historically, rather than anthropologically. In his view, a nation is not "natural," it develops in large part through historical accident, through a communality of experience. When the nation is identified as a specific entity, it functions as a strategic construct in relation to other such constructs that artificially define communities of human interest: for instance, dynastic principle (Renan, 13, and also in Magris's notion), race, language, religion, or geographical unity (Renan, 15-18).

Renan ultimately offers a definition of nationhood that sounds very antiquated today. For him, a nation is a group of people sharing a "moral conscience" (20) who want to be identified together in some way:

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. (19)

But even in this formulation, Renan also highlights the idea of "receiving" a heritage, stressing how a shared history creates the *consciousness* of a shared heritage, a construct of a nation, a sense of belonging together. As Austria-Hungary's contemporary, then, he recognizes that a shared consciousness may create a nation--an early realization of what has been developed in nationalist theory today.[3]

Renan was, however, not alone in referring to the psychological bases for national identity. Renan's sense that a nation is constructed and that it represents a "spiritual principle" is foreshadowed very closely in an 1850 essay by Jozsef von Eötvös, *Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in Österreich*, an essay considered so radical it was published anonymously. Eötvös points out that race has little meaning as an organizer of nationhood in his day (3), and he recommends that his nation be (re)constructed so that the central power does not coopt those powers of state which other groups within that nation can do better. He thus recommends that the nation be constructed as a balance between center and periphery, as organized around the concepts of human freedom and responsibility (144-45). Eötvös and Renan, however different their immediate political purposes may have been, thus agree that the nation is an entity constructed around various concepts to which its members subscribe (even if they do not agree which concepts these might be).

Twentieth-century theorists follow this logic, but get credit for originating it, since Renan's and Eötvös's positions clearly had gone out of public favor by World War I. Still, Raymond Williams's more modern discussions of nationhood are identified as a source for current explorations of the topic. Williams's most famous exposition traces the evolution of one construct like the ones Renan has identified: the opposition of "city" versus "country" in England. Later scholars, while relying on Williams, prefer to define nationalism/imperialism around the political and economic systems of the country that such cultural/geographical dichotomies mask. They thus concur that cultural constructs

constitute the sovereign space of a nation, but note that culture has multiple definitions: a general development of group intellect and spirit (an identifiable move away from nature); an epoch's way of life; or what we term "high culture," with reference specifically to artistic activity (see the exemplary Tomlinson, 5). Where Renan seems to be highlighting the sense of a nation, then, this later group attends to how lives are lived within this space of a nation, to "political practices" (or "discourses"; see Tomlinson, 7) that unite a group as a national unity.

In this strand of explanation, a nation-state turns nationalistic when a group within it needs to reimagine itself and its identity within that state, especially to cope with modernizing influences or other historical change. The emergence of such a national identity also often appears to critique shifts toward modernization by asserting the individuality and distinctiveness of a cultural space that is threatened with homogeneity or change (Tomlinson, 27). At the same time, however, "national identity" is a modern construct, one that (sometimes artificially) reconstructs the past (see particularly Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds.). Nationalism thus replaces a group's earlier notions of belonging, a new set of strategies that distinguish "us" from "them" as a new, nationalized cultural identity (Tomlinson, 83, 90).

Even though nationalism claims to conserve the essence of the past, its unexpected by-products are actually anti-conservative, since the traditions "discovered" in history are often created by the image-makers, who then purport to discover their roots in the "natural" historical development of their nation (Tomlinson, 92). At the same time, nationalism outwardly remains culturally conservative, since it resists "manipulation or control of the culture from outside" by emphasizing the nation's image as already known, instead of acknowledging how mutable that image is (Tomlinson, 95). Thus culture enables the subjective national identity of individuals to emerge, but in Tomlinson's view, it is not an agent of such identity, since it seeks to provide a bulwark against change and a stable framework within which its members act (Tomlinson, 96). As this framework expands, other concepts like cultural imperialism elaborate on the "natural" needs of the nation, especially when the nineteenth-century nation is defined by capitalism (Tomlinson, 102). That is, the "natural" destiny of the nation is often written in such a way as to justify expansionism and imperialism, as that nation spreads its influence over less-fortunate nations.

Like Williams's work, these explorations of nationalism derive from Marxism, stressing how economics affects a group's sense of self--its consciousness. These theories are complemented by another strand of research that explains nationalism sociologically. For example, Greenfeld calls nationalistic feelings "the constitutive element of modernity" (18), since they represent a group's attempt to retain recognition and orientation within a social reality and to work toward the future by using a particular symbolic order, a set of rules for everyday actions (19). In this way, nationalism defines the cultural and structural restraints on the space for individual agency (Greenfeld, 20)--the practices or *praxis* that enable each individual to craft a life and make sense of it.

For such reasons, each nation must have a different nationalism: England, for example, conceived of itself in terms of its empire (colonized versus colonizer), not as a nation-state (Greenfeld, 33; Said, *Culture and Imperialism*). When English nationalism emerged *per se*, it tacitly presented a dialogue about social classes, seeking to redefine "the people" as an official elite that could be defined apart from the hereditary aristocracy (Greenfeld, 47). In this vein, German nationalism can be said to react against the French Revolution, around a "German versus French" dichotomy of political and social values (Greenfeld, 278, 358). In each case in Europe, then, nationalism emerges as a strategy through which new ideas about social and personal status can be negotiated, working in ways different from older status markers:

Ultimately, nationalism can be traced to the structural contradictions of the society of orders [roughly, the *estates*]. It was a response of individuals personally affected by these contradictions to the sense of disorder they created. Many other responses were possible, and at other times tried and found successful; the choice of nationalism was not inevitable. Neither . . . was the dissolution of the old society. It was contingent on the nationalist response to its dysfunction. Once adopted, nationalism accelerated the process of change, channeled it into a certain direction, limited the possibilities of future development, and became a major factor in it. It thus both acknowledged and accomplished the grand social transformation from the old order to modernity. The old society was replaced with a new one, based on the principle of nationality. (Greenfeld, 487)

Therefore, despite its conservative tendencies, nationalist consciousness aids in modernizing societies. It allows new terms (new organizers) to emerge to aid individuals in organizing their sense of social reality. And again, these terms come to seem part of natural human life and society within a modern nation.

A "household," for example, is a term that conceptualizes labor in a way that contributes to gender stratification and privileges the accumulation of capital as a positive value (Wallerstein, "Household Structures"). As Renan acknowledged, a "household" is an artificial unit. Class differentials similarly define the typical bourgeois as one who "obtains . . . a part of the surplus that he did not create and is in the position to invest . . . some of this surplus in capital goods" (Wallerstein, "Class Conflicts," 117). Here, again, a concept creates a group (or class) as it functions within a nation (within a particular national narrative). As further data is referred to that concept, other groups in that national society can be conceived as being in the processes of bourgeoisification, proletarianization, or even aristocratization--all sociological variables through which the space of the nation is artificially organized and manipulated by its members (Wallerstein, "Marx and History," 132).

Another such term, the "bourgeoisie," has served as a favorite organizer for the historiography of the modern Western world (and one that is often used to deprecate the social developments in Austria-Hungary). In one sense, however, that concept is a historical anomaly that does not belong in any model of European nationhood, since this group is not part of Europe's historical social order or estates. But the term has emerged

strategically in discussions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: in one framing, the bourgeoisie is a group structurally opposed to but tending toward the aristocracy (Wallerstein, "The Bourgeoisie," uses Mann's *Buddenbrooks* as an example [137-8]). Yet in another framing, they also are transformed into the image of a kind of national asset, playing a very different type of role in the social order than older social groups, characterized by

the recent emergence of another quasi-concept, that of human capital. Human capital is what these new-style bourgeois have in abundance, whereas our proletarian does not. And where do they acquire the human capital? The answer is well known: in the education systems, whose primary and self-proclaimed function is to train people to become members of the new middle classes, that is, to be the professionals, the technicians, the administrators of the private and public enterprises which are the functional economic building-pieces of our system. (Wallerstein, "The Bourgeoisie," 150)

These post-aristocratic bourgeois thus are concepts that develop into the narrative of a meritocracy, which prescribes hard work, achievement, and advancement as positive values within a nation. However, the typical western national reality is nonetheless exploitative of this new "elite" class: they can never be owners, and so are exploited by the real owners, who pay their salary. The positive social values ascribed to this new "class" thus hide a new national pattern of class struggle and exploitation (Wallerstein, "The Bourgeoisie," 151).

These recent analyses of economic and social constructs add to Renan's list of national constructs, rather than contradicting his logic, since they demonstrate how concepts almost automatically create interest groups who share certain norms for social practice. And they confirm Eötvös's vision for Austria-Hungary, which, after the disruptions of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic era, the Revolutions of 1848, and the 1867 Compromise that created Austria-Hungary, was constantly affirming and reaffirming such social values to maintain the coherence of its unique multi-ethnic nation. That is, Austria-Hungary was a constructed nation--perhaps even more so than France or Great Britain. Yet this research does not yet ask a related question: What do these nation-constructs do on an everyday level to the individual citizen, not just to the national group?

Nationalist Narratives and their Purposes

The focus of theory has thus shifted from the constructs around which national consciousness is organized back to the historical (diachronic) dimensions of that (un) natural national inheritance, in order to address that problem of individuals within the nation. Most recently, the question of history-writing is the focus of interest, since historical narratives are the way a nation is quite literally written (and rewritten) into existence, and how it is absorbed into individual consciousness as the "authentic" story of a real entity: "The history of nations, beginning with our own, is always already

presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of a subject" (Balibar, "The National Form," 86).

But these narratives about history actually serve to bridge the gap between the everyday reality of the nation and its nationalist--a gap particularly crucial in the case of Austria-Hungary, with its competing political-ethnic narratives that are familiar to us today:

Beginning from the core, national units form out of the overall structure of the world-economy . . . in the history of capitalism, *state forms other than the national have emerged* and have for a time competed with it, before finally being repressed or instrumentalized . . . there was not a single inherently "bourgeois" political form, but several . . . (Balibar, "The National Form," 89)

Such "instrumentalized" nationalist narratives thus are themselves historically relative. In the case of the nationalist narratives of the nineteenth-century imperial era, such narratives exacerbate class struggles for dominance over the means of production. As myths about the advancement of the bourgeoisie, they help to naturalize social formations that keep the constraints of economics in place--they make artificial concepts seem natural: "A social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that, through a network of apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as *homo nationalis* from cradle to grave, at the same time as he or she is instituted as *homo conomicus, politicus, religiosus* . . . " (Balibar, "The National Form," 93). In this way, the nation's narrative grounds the identity of a people who act as a group and "as the basis and origin of political power" (Balibar, "The National Form," 94) and thus provides the psychological and sociological material for an individual to identify with and join the group.

The nation's community thus reinforces parts of an individual's identity, providing, for example, a "fictive ethnicity" that seems natural and "makes it possible for the expression of a pre-existing unity to be seen in the state, and continually to measure the state against its historic mission' in the service of the nation and, as a consequence, to idealize politics" (Balibar, "The National Form," 96). Such narratives of class, language, and ethnicity, central to the bourgeois family and nineteenth-century nationalism, thus also create a psychological reality for the individual (Balibar, "The National Form," 102).[(4)] Note, too, that the kinds of psychological space discussed by theorists such as Freud were particularly implicated in narratives organized around concepts like that of the national-minded bourgeoisie.

The structure and content of such nationalist narratives, together with their political uses and psychological costs, are nonetheless the main interests of today's post-colonial theorists, since these narratives persist in people's minds after the specific national form passes (such as in the wake of colonial oppression). Importantly, however, the theories stress the radically different Others of French and British colonies (differentiated as non-Christian, non-white, non-European), as opposed to the less-far-removed Others to be encountered in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Typically, Edward Said's *Orientalism* stresses how sciences reinforce the seeming naturalness of the ideologies of nationhood,

thus also underscoring certain models of class and economic competition; Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* tries to raise consciousness about the relation of individuals' perceptions of agency to the perpetuation of state forms after the demise of the state itself.

In the classic description of how nationalist narratives impact individual consciousnesses, Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* explains how the narratives of nationhood work both to call the nation into existence and to limit the members of that nation:

. . . it [a nation] is an imagined political community--and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.

It is *imagined* because members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (6)

Psychologically, then, a community invents a nation in order to limit and delimit itself, as an entity with shared cultural and religious roots, an imaginable dynasty or political system, and a shared concept of time and other practices of everyday life. This community's coherence (its nationalistic self-image) is also anchored through print and the nation's vernaculars that have been standardized through it (in a "convergence of capitalism and technology" [Anderson, 46]).[(5)] Anderson's work thus moves toward describing what Habermas would call the evolution of the public sphere (as we shall see below), that region of day-to-day psychology in action.

Note, too, that individuals are the ultimate vessels for and tools of that national identity. In a famous essay, "DissemiNation," Homi Bhabha argues that such national narratives best reveal their psychological limitations and strengths when they are displaced in the diaspora, as a scattered principle, in exile:

I am attempting to write of the western nation as an obscure an ubiquitous form of living the *locality* of culture. This locality is more *around* temporality than *about* historicity: a form of living that is more complex than "community"; more symbolic than "society"; more connotative than "country": less patriotic than *patrie*; more rhetorical than the reason of state; more mythological than ideological; less homogeneous than hegemony; less centred than the citizen; more collective than the "subject"; more psychic than civility; more hybrid in the articulation of cultural differences and identifications--gender, race or class--than can be represented in any hierarchical or binary structuring of social antagonism. ... proposing this cultural construction of nationness as a form of social and textual affiliation,... (292)

In an odd sense, this description fits the commonly-reported sense of the familiarity of the far reaches of the Austro-Hungarian empire, where many a traveler reported being able to find a coffeehouse and a newspaper near the train station--a locality that felt familiar, despite being in a completely different part of the world.

In the diaspora, Bhabha expands on how these hierarchies of social rules construct the "modern" humans as national subjects by joining such items of lived experience with a particular (if fictive) national reference:

The people [are engaged in] a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference, where the claim to be representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification and discursive address. . . . The people are the historical "objects" of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin or event; the people are also the "subjects" of a process of signification that must erase any prior or living principle of the people as that continual process by which the national life is redeemed and signified as a repeating and reproductive process. (297)

In this sense, the nation's narratives are both "pedagogical" and "performative," creating a "split national subject" (298) who is subject and object of each narrative, its creator and its victim. This genesis of national consciousness is thus also fateful for the individual, who is constantly trying to negotiate the gap between various narratives of that national culture as he or she tries to repeat its positions.[(6)] Thus only at this point in the theory does the individual's role really emerge: the psychology of an individual will be constructed by his or her identification with nationalist space, and at certain costs. The citizen of Austria-Hungary, sitting in that coffeehouse in Ruthenia or in the Balkans, may forget how different those regions really may be, despite the coffeehouse island of familiarity he or she has found (essentially the story told in the gaps between generations in Josef Roth's *Kapuzinergruft*).

Bhabha points to Julia Kristeva, who expands on this notion of the nation as a region of individual identification, particularly "as a space for the emergence of feminist political and psychic identifications" ("DissemiNation," 303). When, however, the identity (the narratives) of that culture is called into question (as it is at the moment when a colony is liberated, or when, as in Hungary, new parliamentary rights are granted), particularly by a subaltern, a whole nexus of cultural identification is jeopardized.[(7)] To diffuse the danger of such loss of national identity, the nation is always engaged in "a logic of intervention and interpretation" that tries to reintegrate and reestablish hierarchies and practices for the individuals ("DissemiNation," 314): "Cultural difference must not be understood as the free play of polarities and pluralities in the homogeneous empty time of the national community. . . . Cultural difference, as a form of intervention, participates in a supplementary logic of secondariness similar to the strategies of minority discourse" ("DissemiNation," 312). Thus the nation is in a constant process of cultural signification, "the representation of social *life*," as that life is "a mixture of *heimlich* or *unheimlich*, the same and the other" (Bhabha, "Introduction," 2). This play of otherness and sameness also resonates within the psyche of individuals, as they seek orientation within their nation-space.

In the sense that the individual and the national narratives are mutually determining, the question of history-writing converges with the issue of individual identity construction since each is the agent through which the other comes into being:

To study the nation through its narrative address does not merely draw attention to its language and rhetoric; it also attempts to alter the conceptual object itself. If the problematic "closure" of textuality questions the "totalization" of national culture, then its positive value lies in displaying the wide dissemination through which we construct the field of meanings and symbols associated with national life. . . . a *discursive* conception of ideology. (Bhabha, "Introduction," 3)

Literary myths are seen as particularly complicit in establishing these myths of nation (Brennan, 48). Each such historical or literary myth creates a sense of national unity, while each individual is actually looking for individuation within that nation, thus implying inequality and a resistance to homogeneity (Brennan, 59).[(8)] Musil's *Mann ohne Eigenschaften* or Hofmannsthal's *Schwieriger* both fill that kind of role for Austria-Hungary, as models for the kind of rootless individual left after the empire disintegrated.

Bennington considers such national myths (especially origin myths, drawn across history) as "postal politics," indicating both post-colonial and postal, in the sense of letters not being received (130-31): "The idea of the nation is inseparable from its narration: that narration attempts, interminably, to constitute identity against difference, inside against outside, and in the assumed superiority of inside over outside, prepares against invasion and for enlightened' colonialism" (132). In this sense, the writer is a particular kind of subject and agent of nationalism.[(9)] Thus Bhabha, in *Location of Culture* and in "Mimicry and Man," can trace how tales of the Mutiny in British India construct a particular order of domination, in which the dominant and the *Other* are actually mutually constructing in a moment that challenges the hitherto dominant narrative:

How are we to understand this notion of falling "outside" in relation to the discourse of panic? I want to suggest that we understand this "outside" not in simple spatial terms but as constitutive of meaning and agency. The "outside event" could also be the unacknowledged liminality or "margin" of a discourse, the point where it contingently touches the "other" discourse *as itself*. (Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 206)

These are moments in which dominant national narratives are called into question, where a space between colonized and colonizer is opened as the narrative breaks. And at the same time, the participants become conscious of that possible break, which can ultimately bring the system down.[(10)]

From the perspective of these two groups of theory (nationalist and [post]colonialist), a model for the national consciousness of Austria-Hungary must fulfill two criteria to offer an adequate account for the sense of nation shared by a group of individuals and implicated in the nation's narratives. First and foremost, the model must locate the artificial organizers around which national consciousness organizes itself. Second, one must see how these organizers provide narratives covering over the (many) breaks in the dominant culture. Only in this way can one see how the group of citizens formed themselves into the texture of the Austro-Hungarian empire and nation--how the national narrative becomes the lived consciousness of individuals.

In one sense, Claudio Magris's idea of a Habsburg mythos begins to fulfill these criteria, since he identifies a set of beliefs that define Habsburg reality and the nation under the Habsburgs: a belief in *humanitas* (14), shared by all nationalities and aiding the whole in "muddling through" (*Fortwursteln*; Magris, 15), aided by belief in a transnationalism; a belief in bureaucracy as the way to organize everyday life ("die Verlagerung der bürokratischen Mentalität auf die Gefühls- und Gewohnheitssphäre"; Magris, 17); and, finally, a hedonism of everyday experience, defining a certain kind of aesthethized experience as normal (18). Deák adds chivalry as a set of concepts that helped hold the monarchy together (including Jews).[(11)]

These are partial solutions to the question of Austria-Hungary's national narrative, as the brief examples included above testify, but the pieces do not yet cohere: these items are drawn from a fairly random mix of popular and high culture concepts, and they are not immediately reconcilable into coherent narratives. Here, it is appropriate to compare what Magris did with what David S. Luft does when he offers an alternate periodization for Austrian cultural history. While Magris has offered a set of motifs (Renan's concepts) that are recognizable organizers for Austro-Hungarian reality, Luft offers a dynamic narrative, framed around "political contacts" as a determiner for cultural history (rather than, for example, the stylistic or thematic approaches that occur so often in literary history):

The decisive feature of this period of Austrian culture was Austria's political and ideological isolation from the area north of the Main between 1795 and 1815 ... the rejection of the postclassical evolution of German culture in philosophy and literature....Certainly after 1780 it makes sense to think of Austria as part of German culture, but the ensuing seventy-five years also constituted the period in which Austria developed its own sense of cultural identity *within* German culture. (141)

Luft's periodization is a preliminary skeleton and works well as the basis of a narrative of nationalism, not only for cultural history. What I will offer does not contradict it, but it will account for the psychology of individuals professing that cultural identity in a way that Luft does not.

What is still lacking is a better sense of what would unite and complete Magris's and Luft's models. Each of these models accommodates one distinct sphere: Magris, everyday life as represented in literature; and Luft, cultural history of primarily high culture. Each therefore tacitly elides the everyday life of a nation's individuals, stressing instead various aspects of official culture in determining the consciousness of individuals. But neither accommodates factors like working conditions on a day-to-day level, or mass and popular culture (the role of the media, especially around the turn of the century), or regional cultures. The practices of everyday life that seem peripheral to official or high culture, but which determine it and on which it rests, have not received attention for the Austro-Hungarian context.

In more theoretical terms, what must be added to models like Magris's and Luft's is an accommodation of what has come to be identified as the "public sphere" as it emerged in

the nineteenth century. That "public sphere," and the "private sphere" that is set against it, defines not only an individual's consciousness as it is defined through nationhood, but also an individual's sense of agency or active power within that constructed space of the nation, which will then replicate itself within the more restrictive frame of the family or household.

Everyday Life and the Public Sphere

Much traditional historiography does, in fact, stress official culture (culture at the level of state sponsorship or of the hegemonic classes) at the expense of everyday culture, just as much work on so-called popular culture tends to underplay its ties to that official culture. Yet in the case of Austria-Hungary, it is crucial to consider the "public sphere" in other ways, since "official culture" is so diffuse: the political hegemonies and power structure, and even the legal status of the various parts of the empire, were amorphous or plural in a way that problematizes simple models. And official power structures and institutions had split reputations: the army, for instance, was a noble profession, but it could not really be expected to win wars.

It is thus essential to turn to theories of everyday life and the "public sphere" to explore what they can add to the models for national consciousness discussed to this point. Many of these theories rely on Marxist principles, stressing how the materialities of life are crucial in the formation on individual and group consciousness, and how the images of that life (again, the available narratives) condition the sense of public nation and individual praxis--maintaining senses of both self and nation. Moreover, these theories often stress the agency or critical potential of individuals, exploring the gap between national narratives and individual experience as it might alter their praxis of everyday life.

Henri Lefebvre, for example, emphasizes how individuals use the public narratives of culture and nature to orient themselves, and how individuals put these narratives into play in their own lives. In his version, individuals experience ambiguity as they continuously attempt to implement these narratives as praxis (acts, habits, reactions, evaluations, and the like):

To put it more clearly or more abstractly, *ambiguity* is a category of everyday life, and perhaps an essential category. It never exhausts its form; from the ambiguity of consciousnesses and situations spring forth actions, events, results, without warning. These, at least, have clear-cut outlines. They maintain a hard, incisive objectivity which constantly disperses the luminous vapours of ambiguity--only to let them rise once again. (18-19)

The everyday life situation of a nation requires that each individual choose a set of actions to resolve such ambiguity; each must, in a certain sense, put a personal sense of nation and self into practice: ". . . *everyday life functions within certain experiences* which are not so much the products of mystifying ideologies, as contributions to the

conditions needed for any mystifying ideology to operate" (165). The narratives of the nation thus first help the individual to interpret his or her actions and reactions, but then are themselves problematized when further experiences arise to question the interpretations they offer.

This process of interpreting everyday life is thus thoroughly interwoven with official narratives of power or hegemony, since the existence of the group is predicated on them, as they organize social practice and labor in that society: "Until the advent of bourgeois society, individuality, or rather personality could only really develop outside productive labour. . . . such men only *appeared* to remain outside the social division of labour and social practice" (Lefebvre, 30). The "inside" and "outside" of the social world (its psychological reality and its institutional configuration, respectively) are, however, equal creations of those narratives. And here again, there is a gap fraught with dangers for both the individual and the nation, offering each attendant dangers and strengths:

This humble, everyday, human world has been taken as a crude façade for certain sublime realities. We know today that these "higher realities" were simply the manifestation, the appearance, of man's attempt to create his own reality in everyday life--but possessing the monstrous power, peculiar to alienation, of absorbing human reality, of crushing it and throwing it off centre, so to speak.... The conflict between what is apparent and what is real is about to be resolved through a progress in consciousness and activity. Alienation, now made conscious, and thus rejected as mere appearance and superseded, will give way to an authentic human reality, stripped of its façade, and liberated. (Lefebvre, 170)

The psychic reality of each individual thus ultimately has the power to create an entity (with money, power, and a cultural identity--a nation) where none had existed.

At the same time, however, such narratives also alienate individuals from the singular and distinctive facts of their own lives. Since each narrative has the power to seem real, it can act to the detriment of each individual's relation to their own consciousness. Consequently, these narratives are used to mediate one's relationships with others in the group and with the construct of that reality. The individual is caught in this dialectic between "reality" and "appearance" (itself a construct) in simultaneously constructing him- or herself and the nation. In this sense, the "reality" of a national narrative and the individual are mutually implicated, as abstract ideology and concrete practices define each other. In Lefebvre's sense, then, a critique of everyday life is crucial, if one is to determine or question what the narratives of the dominant hegemony offer the individual (not only the definition of the nation). To interrogate the narratives of everyday life, one must confront its narrative constructs with other data. The modern must be challenged by the past and by an image of the possible; the everyday contrasted with the festival; group iterated with the individual; and there must also be "a confrontation of effective human reality with its expressions': moral doctrines, psychology, philosophy, religion, literature" (252). Through the facts of everyday life, then, national narratives are both constructed and refuted: they define the individual, but also exclude their agency from the power of the group, from possible "agency" (the ability to act) in public.

The term "public sphere" has evolved to encompass those aspects of official culture that are accessible to the public will and, as such, are subject to critique by that same public. The classic discussion of the topic is Habermas's *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Structural transformation of the public sphere). Habermas draws a history of the emergence of the bourgeois, beginning when a new kind of civil society came into being (with a particular distance posited between the state and the private person) as a corollary to the kind of depersonalized state authority that rose in Europe (10-12). Habermas's public sphere is a group's sense (or the representation of that sense) of the practices or survival activities that an individual needs to act publicly. It refers to public consciousness about what is appropriate for public and private spaces in his culture:

From this perspective [that of eighteenth-century bourgeois consciousness] even the social preconditions of a public sphere as an element in the political realm could be viewed as a kind of "natural order," for there was to be a natural basis for the public sphere that would in principle guarantee an autonomous and basically harmonious course of social reproduction. (130)

Such a shared representation of what the public is keeps conflicts of bureaucracy and individual to a minimum by presenting to each individual a "realistic" state of affairs, one that automatically limits the emergence of an independent public will (131). That is, since, in Habermas's judgment, agency proceeds through individual hands, when a group of individuals agrees on a set of ideological values and appropriate practices, that agreement tends to block individuals' perception of needed changes. In this sense, "public opinion became a mere limit on power" (136), because it provides each individual with an idea of the group and with its own instrumental rationality. In the end, public opinion progressively loses its critical potential as it becomes more public; for this reason, even the media (in state-controlled situations) cannot be considered critical in the public sphere. Still, publicity retains a kind of critical potential, since it spans the edge between the formal and informal domains of public communication in the media (247).

Where Lefebvre stressed the orientation of the individual in the public sphere, then, Habermas wished to emphasize its critical potential. However, Habermas's position and definitions are subject to many critiques, since he draws an ideal history of the bourgeoisie that does not hold up to historical or theoretical scrutiny outside very distinct limits. For instance, Linda Hutcheon calls the concept of the public sphere "yet another of the First World academy's cover colonizing strategies of domination over the cultural production of the Third World" (9), since it decides Western public logic is in some way optimal. It naturalizes concepts organized around the notion of the bourgeoisie--like empire, outside/inside, race, ethnicity, and nation itself--by making accidents of western history seem general. As Julia Kristeva will outline in more detail (to be discussed below), these concepts thus rest on a concept of bourgeoisie individuality (and of its desirability), ignoring social organizing systems that convey alternate senses of self to individuals.

Craig Calhoun concurs indirectly by confirming that the public sphere was designed as a space for rational debate, and not necessarily for other activities: "The eighteenth-century

public sphere had been constituted in the discourse of private persons but was based on a distinction between the private activities that formed them for public life and provided its motivations and that public life itself" (24). The ideal of the public sphere calls for social integration to be based on rational-critical discourse. Integration, in other words, is to be based on communication rather than domination.

"Communication" in this context means not merely sharing what people already think or know but also a process of potential transformation in which reason is advanced by debate itself. This goal cannot be realized by a denial of the implications of large-scale social organization, by imagining a public sphere occupied only by autonomous private individuals, with no large organizations and with no cleavages of interest inhibiting the identification of the general good, as liberal theory suggests. (29)

He thus stresses that this communication is informal as well as official, as Habermas prefers to assume. Calhoun and others thus identify Habermas's interpretation as a definition of only one specific historical appearance of the bourgeoisie, and not necessarily generally applicable as an explanation for the maintenance of structures of domination--not necessarily applicable as a general description of how the narratives of nationhood function: "The hegemony of bourgeois publicity was always incomplete and exercised within a field constituted partly by its relation to other insurgent discourses" (39).[(12)]

In consequence of these limitations, further attempts have been made to historicize Habermas's definitions. For instance, Nicholas Garnham expands on the role of media and free expression in the public sphere, as critical instruments: "the task is to cooperate in building the political, economic, and communicational institutions conducive to that end [of liberation]" (375).[(13)]

In a major critique of Habermas that stresses his insensitivity to class differentiations within the public sphere, Oskar Negt stresses that the bourgeoisie dominates the public sphere. Through its privileged access to the means of production, the bourgeoisie has the ability to posit its will as general. Because of its economic basis, the bourgeois public sphere posits a fundamental distinction between the public and the private, a distinction that carries over into virtually all narratives about this reality (and, note, a distinction that may not hold for all times and cultures). In consequence, Negt recasts the public sphere as a place of unstable negotiation, waiting to be undermined or challenged from the purportedly more secure and personal private sphere. Rejecting this simple dichotomy stresses the artificiality of the concept, which also leads Negt to posit multiple public spheres, including a proletarian one, in order to help us conceptualize how production and consumption cycles have been mythologized in national and social narratives.

Nonetheless, Negt ultimately agrees that the public/private dichotomy is psychological and narrative in origin. He thus concurs that concepts like "public sphere" serve to organize forms of collective experience, and hence to legitimize their "reality." As Renan would have agreed, using a concept like the "bourgeoisie" to conceptualize the existence of a nation therefore simply "conceals the actual social *structure of production* and,

above all, the history of the development of its institutions" (Negt, 1). That is, the term begins to seem like a "natural" unit of analysis, but that is an appearance that tends to preclude other, equally-valid assumptions, or test of assumptions: "Whereas it is self-evident that the bourgeois public sphere is not a reference point for bourgeois interests alone, it is not generally assumed that proletarian experience and its organization likewise form a crystallizing point: namely, for a public sphere that reflects the interests and experiences of the overwhelming majority of the population, insofar as these experiences and interests are real" (xlv). Negt's public sphere, or set of public spheres, represents the totality of society as supposedly interest-free, but it is not, since its appearance to each individual is actually as a zone of ambiguity: "The ambiguity has its roots in the internal structure and historical function of this public sphere" (2-3). In this zone, violence is done to individuals and to groups by the strength of the dominant narratives, since they tend to reify one pattern of dominance, based on one set of evaluations anchored in one vision of the means of production: "These patterns are mistaken for and interpreted as products of the collective will, as if the actual relationships, which have only been acquired retroactively, were based upon this will" (4).

Once such an appearance of "collective will" is in place, some individuals will always be alienated, from themselves, from their own experience, and from the group (Negt, 33). And their fantasies may reveal how such narratives become agents of a particular set of social functions: "standard language and instrumental rationality do not cross the boundary between the bourgeois and proletarian public spheres, colloquial language and the workings of fantasy are exposed to the conflict between these two forms (understood as the expression and comprehension of life)" (35). In this way, the narratives of the public sphere not only involve individuals in a process of self-alienation, but also forces them into personal and group repressions: "The blocking of linguistic expression, of symbols, of gestures, of relationships between human beings too, is rooted in particular situations and contexts of action. . . . a form of compression of time" (247). Interestingly, Negt uses the nascent Austrian Republic as an example of a repressed situation in which a public sphere had not emerged through the nineteenth century: "The individual parts of the country were not even in a network of cooperation and exchange" (226). He considered the structure of the country as an "attempt at a politics of class equilibrium," not necessarily as an ethnic one, but this attempt lead to a "compulsion to compromise" (226).

In this assessment of Austria, Negt privileges the critical potential of the public sphere rather than its group-building potential that Lefebvre had highlighted. Moreover, he ignores the very class distinctions he introduces elsewhere. The political public sphere of the typical late-nineteenth- or early-twentieth-century western European nation may well have lacked critical potential, since it was coming ever more under the control of the bourgeoisie as dominant class (the Weimar parliaments were exemplary in this); this political public sphere was also crucial in public communication--the newspapers covered politics intensely. However, one could equally argue that what became the Austrian Republic had moved its "politics" into other discourses of the public sphere, including literature (which was in the hands of another kind of elite, financial rather than political).[(14)]

The ways in which Habermas and his critics conceive of the public/private sphere distinction assume that a bourgeois-capitalist group dominates the public sphere and isolates its own private interests from these productive cycles by creating a false consciousness through national narratives. Moreover, these theorists are particularly interested in how that bourgeois public sphere is made or mutated. However, all these analyses tacitly assume capitalism as their background and (to extend Negt's critique) are reluctant to admit that there is more than one kind of bourgeois or official culture. Yet, as many recent extended discussions about the various faces of the bourgeois in Austria-Hungary outline, precisely that diversity is the case in a country that has at least three major cities/cultural centers, each with its own official culture.[(15)] Recent critiques of Habermas's position, though, point the way around the need to assume the primacy or the hegemony of a particular class in a definition of the public sphere.[(16)]

Two recent theorists deserve independent treatment in the present context, because they lend support to the assertions that will be made below: namely, that the very concept of the public sphere cannot be applied to Austria-Hungary (just as various kinds of nationalist consciousness equated with ethnicity cannot), since it rests on a definite equation of a single dominant economic system, backed by a political hegemony that supports it and which creates, in turn, a particular vision of bourgeois individuality (very familiar from Freud's work). The correctives of Nancy Fraser and Julia Kristeva, however, open up visions of a national consciousness that is linked to a state or community whose narrative of belonging is predicated on other kinds of economics, beyond the nationalist/capitalist imperialism most familiar from the French and British cases.

Nancy Fraser is a chief voice in trying to critique the classical formulation of the public sphere. Her work acknowledges the historicity of the bourgeoisie as an organizer for nationhood, and tries to circumvent an automatic privileging either of group narratives or of the ability to critique such narratives, since all these factors are historical, and hence mutable. Introducing a new term into the discussion, Fraser treats the public sphere as "an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction. . . . a site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state" (110-11). "Discourse," in the sense at work in the present discussion, is the set of relations out of which the narratives of a particular national context are built--the set of rhetorics and concepts available for individuals to tell situationally-appropriate stories. By making the public sphere a region in which discourses interact (narratives compete), she opens the possibility that official space may differ from the public sphere, since the former is a set of rules or institutions that limit the latter, but which do not exhaust their potentials.

After she draws this distinction, Fraser is able to identify four other principles on which Habermas's contribution rests, but which are historical in origin and hence which need to be reformulated, if a more general model of public space is to be drawn. She believes Habermas uses

four assumptions that are central to the *bourgeois*, *masculinist* conception of the public sphere . . . [1] that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket status

differentials and to deliberate *as if* they were social equals; the assumption, therefore, that societal equality is not a necessary condition for political democracy. . . . [2] that a single, comprehensive public sphere is always preferable to a nexus of multiple publics. . . . [3] that discourse in public spheres should be restricted to deliberation about the common good, and that the appearance of private interests and private issues is always undesirable. . . . [4] . . . that a functioning democratic public sphere requires a sharp separation between civil society and the state. (112-13)

Fraser's correctives to the model need to accommodate "contestation among a plurality of competing publics," especially in a stratified society that is implicated in "subaltern counterpublics" (122-23). Each of these discourses, as separate politics, needs space to regroup, but also to cement the identity of the group that espouses it, as nationalist theory has already specified. Yet Fraser is not trying to differentiate "public and private spheres" in Habermas's sense, since this division is itself historical (ancillary to and constructed by the notion of the bourgeoisie, as we have seen here). Instead, she tries to describe a public space for the exercise of social equality and cultural diversity (126-27). This means, in essence, that the boundaries of the public and the private need to be redefined (128).

Her redefinition of that public space (not "sphere") is crucial for a model of Austro-Hungarian nationalism, since it can accommodate other (perhaps multiple) organizing constructs than the bourgeoisie, while not simply assuming the hegemony of any of those organizing constructs. She suggests that public simply means state-related, accessible, of concern for all, or part of shared interests; it is more than the public sphere, defined as Habermas and his other critics did, since Fraser's public space is for negotiation, not just for a simple reification. In contrast, Fraser uses "private" to refer to both private property and the personal or domestic life to which Habermas refers (Fraser, 128). As such, the "private" is not so much contrasted with public as it is a restriction on it. She realizes that any such concepts (again, like Renan's concept/constructs) are the elements of discourse through which democratic publicity can be generated to make the public either weak or strong (132): "a critical theory should expose the limits of the specific form of democracy we enjoy in late-capitalist societies" (137). Any of these constructs can thus be used to realize multiple purposes within public space, or to create nation-building narratives.

Following in this vein of expanding how nation-building narratives can be constructed, Julia Kristeva's *Nations without Nationalism* amplifies something like Fraser's model of the space of the nation. Her expansion, like Fraser's, works strongly against the public/private dichotomy that seems so wedded to a single model of the capitalist bourgeoisie. Kristeva is the first to echo Renan's warning to be wary of the concept of origin in history-writing (*Nations*, 1) because every event has multiple origins (that is, there is a narrative for origin available in almost any public discourse). Moreover, even if an individual is part of one of the groups acknowledged (valorized or despised) by the narratives of public space, that individual still belongs to that group (and to others) in multiple ways, not simply: each belongs as citizen, and voter, as social entity, as family member, and so on (*Nations*, 11-13, and echoed in *Strangers to Ourselves*).

Kristeva stresses that an individual is thus positioned within multiple publicly accessible narratives (as part of a nation, or of any other public space). That position, however, also defines that individual's status as what Kristeva calls a "speaking subject" (*Nations*, 13). As a speaking subject, an individual has the ability to tap the power, authority, or agency that inheres to each narrative supported by the group--as part of the community, the individual subject is entering into a (symbolic) contract to be upheld by all parties. Thus Kristeva agrees with Fraser that public space is part of a negotiation, not simply a finished construct. For that reason, it is important to investigate those narratives by means of which individuals evolve their identities as part of a (national) group--to do so not only historically, as Habermas purported to do, but also in their functions as discourses of negotiation, each of which is characterized by a "logical multiplicity" (*Nations*, 56) and thus by multiple senses of agency.

These two critiques of Habermas's notion of the public sphere offer significant advances to the idea that narratives construct nationhood; they have moved decisively beyond Renan and Lefebvre, as well, by indicating that identity (an individual's sense of self and agency) is plural and constantly being negotiated and renegotiated instead of simply constructed and static. In the case of Austria-Hungary, that state of constant renegotiation ("muddling through") has been taken as a negative. Yet seen historically, as an alternative to the chain of developing senses of nationhood and the bourgeoisie outlined by Habermas and critiqued by so many, Austria-Hungary may actually be the last representative of that kind of direct and negotiated public space--the space of the Enlightenment, if you will, as outlined in Kant's "Was ist Aufklärung?"

In this essay, Kant differentiates between public and private uses of reason not as two different spheres, as Habermas did, or even as two different spaces, as Fraser does. Instead, he follows a line closer to Kristeva's to describe these two uses of reason as essentially two different kinds of *contracts* that give an individual two different functional identities: one defined by a job (your private use of reason, circumscribed by the responsibilities you have contracted with others to perform, such as preaching in a particular church or teaching a particular curriculum), and one defined by one's status as a free human being (an individual's responsibility to contribute to general public debates and to shaping policy as an expert).

There are many arguments about whether or not Kant was received in Austria-Hungary (given that his work was censored around 1800, although that of an influential student, Johan Friedrich Herbart, was part of the official curriculum for educational psychology at the University of Vienna by mid-century). The idea of public space as the space for the negotiations of free individuals was, however, not confined to his work, although his formulation is most useful for the present context.

Most importantly, the set of concepts that seem to organize the mental space of the nation (psychological, social, ideological, political) in Austria-Hungary fit this idea of the public space as a contract extremely well, since many of them revolve around professions and professional responsibility. Magris has offered most of them (humanitas, transnationalism, bureaucracy, and hedonism); Deák adds chivalry. From literature and

high culture, one can add the coffeehouse as literary circle, decadence, "muddling through," and many other familiar tropes. This list, however, is composed principally of abstracts, the elements of ideology.

When one turns to the concepts of everyday life, the organizational concepts are a bit more complex, but they are still compatible with the idea of Enlightenment public space. The bureaucrat and the officer are perhaps the best-known social roles available for public consciousness, since they echo and reecho throughout the various literatures of the empire (see Strelka). Moreover, these roles iterate only poorly with class boundaries as they exist in much theoretical literature, since the very structure of the Habsburg bureaucracy forced a certain degree of intermixing of classes who played these roles (the dress uniforms of both officers and bureaucrats were *hoffähig*--that is, able to be presented at court--which lessened one overt marker of difference). Again, over the various ethnic and national groups of the empire, the "bourgeoisie" is a much more diverse category than in England or France.[17] This lacuna argues for the fact that public contracts and responsibilities serve to organize the space of Austria-Hungary much better than do inherited structural notions of privileges and rights.

Definitions of class based on legal precedent or economics are particularly difficult to draw for Austria-Hungary, in part because of differential legal and ethnic heritages in each region of the nation--laws were in this sense rather local. Thus I would suggest that social roles (jobs, not inherited privileges) are a better set of organizers than is class or other markers of individual states. Internal evidence from literature confirms this sense of social space. In British literature, for instance, legal precedents often form the backbone of novels. Anthony Trollope has provided the best examples, in novels such as *He Knew He Was Right*, in which the plot argues explicitly for the Married Women's Property Act. Similarly, one of the Palliser novels has a subplot revolving around the younger son of an aristocratic family who can scarcely bring himself to violate his class status. However, if he can bring himself to use his one talent and take a job as Master of the Hunt (in an aristocratic hunt), he will be able to afford the family he has considered out of his reach.

While there are novels in German-language literature that contrast classes (for example, Freytag's *Soll und Haben*), plots about breaking class boundaries simply are not represented in literature to the degree they were in England. However, there are many novels and novellas about proper fulfilling of public roles and personal contracts (Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach's and Stifter's works consistently address the issue of becoming what one is born, not being it without labor and responsibility). Even the Austro-Hungarian high aristocracy did not think work was beyond them--no less than Nikolaus Esterházy was the Empress Elisabeth's master of the horse.[18]

Further such comparisons (especially in things like newspaper gossip columns) may expand our list of social organizers. And, as will be discussed in more detail below, ethnicity (with language and regional definitions as correlates) emerged as an organizer only after the Compromise. But it is more important to address the narratives that turn individuals' senses of contracts and roles into the space of a nation.

Enlightenment Community Space as National Narrative

Returning to Fraser's and Kristeva's correctives on public sphere theory, a model for the historiography of the Austro-Hungarian nation needs to fulfill at least two more criteria. First, it must provide the kind of nationalist narratives described above, the narratives that set goals and power hegemonies into play in that organized space (as that organized space accommodates high and popular culture, formal and informal acts, official and unofficial codes of knowledge and behavior). Finally, the model must correlate these narratives with sets of practices recognized and instantiated by the individuals who will realize the group identity of the nation ("realize" psychologically by coming to consciousness about it, and bring into being through enacting it as praxis, or "habitus," as Pierre Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Power* would call it). In these narratives, some of the thornier and less-explored factors in the everyday life of the empire emerge as crucial, since they must guarantee the coherence of the group's national consciousness.

1. Ethnicity: Fin-de-siècle Narrative

First and foremost, ethnic superiority (that hallmark narrative of Western imperialist nationalism) was not one of these available narratives in Austria-Hungary until late in the second half of the century, nor did it seem to correspond to social praxis of high urgency (nor as a flash point of particular weight).

For instance: the essays on the bourgeoisie collected in Bruckmüller et al. and Stekl et al. confirm to how small a degree exclusionary ethnic ideals were in place among the middle classes. Sergij Vilfan, for example, in "Zur Struktur des Triester Bürgertums. Eine familiengeschichtliche Fallstudie,"[(19)] tells a very familiar story of intermarriage in one bureaucratic/commercial family that ended up in different corners of the empire (with varied ethnic identifies) over the last 50 years of its existence. Like married like, in terms of social roles (banker to politician, officer to bureaucrat), without a terribly strict set of limits beyond what seems to have been a comparability of lifestyles. And these patterns were replicated at the very highest levels: there were branches of the House of Habsburg that were not primarily German-speaking.[(20)] They shared with their subjects the idea that language use and identification with a social group were sorted out as marriages and careers were set up. I am by no means arguing here that ethnicity was not visible in the social sphere throughout much of the nineteenth century, but rather that such multiplicity of ethnic identity was available that it was difficult for anyone to decisively attach them to good/bad categories, to establish *otherness* and its accompanying exclusions.

Csáky documents that the populous was sensitive to the existence and the impacts of ethnic difference well into the nineteenth century, but on a day-to-day level, people seem to have treated it as one of many interpersonal variables, at least in the early part of the nineteenth century:

Ethnic, linguistic, cultural plurality in the cities and states of the monarchy is thus in no way only an artificial, methodological argument, created by the historian bent on

reconstruction. Instead, such pluralities are real, empirically provable, historical givens that were very consciously registered by the inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire, well into the nineteenth century. Only from that time on did national-ideological stereotypes increasingly appear in the monarchy, stereotypes that not only presupposed the existence of a "pure" folk culture, which did not exist, but that also used the argument of language as an instrument of political administration--the issue of language which, in the time of the Enlightenment, served sociopolitical and sociocultural goals, but not those romantic nationalist ones . . . (36-37)

Various reports of the growth of Vienna confirm that sense (the word "Zugereiste" enters the active vocabulary of the time--not immigrants, but something closer to "transplants").

After the Compromise, however, this changed, and a new national narrative was set into play, one which, however, did not emerge fullblown until the *fin de siècle*. With the growing body of language and ethnic legislation in the wake of the Compromise, consciousness of ethnicity was turned into the basis of the legal existence of an ethnic group. Official attempts to regulate languages did, indeed, have unforeseen effects as the regulations echoed through the infrastructure, and gradually formed a new kind of social narrative, the kind more associated with twentieth-century ethnic hostilities. To summarize most simply: a fact of everyday life turned into a legal bargaining chip; a characteristic that was a largely passive organizer of social-national space turned into a heuristic (an active national narrative) for civil rights and modern national struggle.

Various works of Gerald Stourzh (particularly *Die Gleichberechtigung*) document well how one particular conceptual organizer shifted status as the nineteenth century proceeded. Stourzh confirms that a language census causes the concept of an ethnic group ("Volksstamm") to emerge as an organizer in Austria-Hungary, one which becomes particularly critical in the Bohemian situation, since an 1867 bill advocating a Bohemian curia was never passed ("Ethnic Attribution," 68). And despite the web of regulations that official attempts to regulate language fostered, the battles for group consciousness were fought at the level of everyday life. One of the first points of impact was, for instance, local school boards, which were manipulated by the self-identification of members of each ethnic group until they were split by law in 1890 (Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 71). Before that, major court cases had been raised to question particularly self-chosen ethnic attribution, since self-identification was the basis for early census lists identifying members of various ethnic groups.[(21)]

A 1905/6 law, the "Moravian Compromise," "resolved" the issue through a "pacification by separation," by establishing separate school boards under ethnic control and splitting electoral constituencies (Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 72-73). Similar laws were enacted before World War I for Bukovina and Galicia (including special Jewish provisions). Thus these school boards were "not merely school authorities in a technical sense, but organs of the nationality (in the ethnic sense)" which would have fateful consequences for the Jews ("Ethnic Attribution," 77):

The growing tendency to stress the sense of belonging to the ethnic group at the expense of the sense of citizenship turned even more sinister when ethnic attribution was taken away from the will and choice of individual persons and transferred to the decision of public authorities on the basis of so-called "objective evidence." ("Ethnic Attribution," 81)

Perversely, the agent enacting the school legislation that made such civic ethnic attribution possible was himself Bohemian: Count Leo Thun, born in 1811 of an old and conservative family. Thun was appointed minister of religion and education in 1849, and he drafted a revision of education that was approved in 1854 (Wozniak, 62-63), establishing German as the language of instruction in most cases, based on the assumption that all students had four years of German in the Lower Gymnasium, in addition to Latin, Greek, and their native languages (Wozniak, 71). In all cases, teaching was to be done in a language that allowed the students clear access to the lesson materials, although generally working toward a majority-German curriculum (Wozniak, 75). After a convoluted fight (that included clerics), Thun's version of the curriculum won out decisively by 1857, and it lasted to the end of the monarchy (Thun himself was fired in 1860).

These battles over local school boards are strongly reflected in two novellas of the period that I have discussed in detail elsewhere, Fritz Mauthner's "Der letzte Deutsche von Blatna" and "Die böhmische Handschrift," each of which foreground the attendant psychological changes in the populations fighting those battles. Mauthner's contemporaneous tales presage both nationalist/ colonialist theory and Gerald Stourzh's historical analyses how individuals' consciousness of change was fundamental in changing the Austro-Hungarian reality and rewriting the possible narratives that unified the nation (Mauthner stresses, for instance, the crucial role that the rewriting of Bohemian history into Czech history had in driving the ethnic groups apart).

As a confirming source from a higher social group, Count Stephan Tisza, reacting to the 1868 nationality law that rendered anyone living in Hungary part of an "indivisible Hungarian Nation," inadvertently shows how a climate changes radically when laws intervene to define a nation not as a community, but as an ethnic group: "Our citizens of non-Magyar tongue must, in the first place, become accustomed to the fact that they belong to the community of a national state, of a state which is not a conglomerate of various races" (cited in Stourzh, "Multinational Empire," 15). Thus after the Compromise, Austro-Hungarian politics became "ethnicized" (*Ethnisierung*; Stourzh, "Multinational Empire," 18). Still, Mauthner's Bohemian example shows decisively how two definitions of nation were at play until comparatively late in the evolution of the Habsburg Empire. As Hugh Agnew expresses it for Bohemia:

while contemporaries did recognize in Bohemia the existence of two peoples, "both . . . Bohemians by birth and country, but otherwise in many respects very different," and even conceded that "one must distinguish the actual Bohemians, the Czechs, as the main nation (*Hauptnation*) from the German-Bohemians" [Joseph Anton Ritter von Riegger, 1795],

they were still far from a modern, ethnolinguistic concept of nation, either Czech or German. (58)

But where Agnew considers an "ethnolinguistic concept of nation" modern, Mauthner's world and the pre-1867 viewpoint I am working at here suggest that it was not seriously in play before that time. Thus Count Franz Josef Kinsky had argued in 1773 for "Böhmisch" as the area's native language (Agnew, 58), using the argument of historical precedent, while the Young Czechs a century later chose to espouse an ethnicized version of nationhood. Yet as late as Masaryk, some Czech politicians still used the historical imperative of a mixed nation to argue politically for the existence of a Czech nation; they did not necessarily equate ethnicity with full participation in the state (Agnew, 67).

By mid-century, there is evidence that the aristocracy was beginning to equate national boundaries with linguistic boundaries (which is also reflected in the citizenship policies enacted in Hungary after the Compromise). As cited above, Eötvös was able to claim that race was an insufficient distinguisher among people, although linguistic differences cause difficulties. For instance, in 1849, Frantisek Palacký abandoned recognition of frontiers, and recommended linguistic boundaries, and in 1894, Count Franz Thun-Hohenstein still argues for territorial unity and "equal rights for other languages in the country" if the House of Habsburg dies out, to justify Bohemian aristocratic control over Moravia and Silesia (Agnew, 65, 67). The Bohemian aristocracy remained divided: although unwilling to give up German connections totally, they did not become German nationalists that early (Agnew, 69-70). Count Joseph Matthias Thun, in 1845, confirms this: "Ich bin weder Tscheche noch Deutscher, sondern Böhme.' That this concept was rejected by Bohemian German nationalists, and cannot be expressed in Czech, poignantly expresses the fate of the Bohemian noble *natio* in the age of modern nationalism" (Agnew, 71).[(22)]

In another take on the issue, it is well-known that Hungarian magnates and Bohemian aristocracy were willing to take positions working in what is clearly a German government (Barany, 44), which may have been a way of coopting opposition, if you will. Ethnicity, therefore, cannot be considered as central to national narratives of Austria-Hungary until after mid-century, and probably not until the eve of World War I, if one takes the legal changes noted above as indicative. Unlike for the western empires, then, narratives of ethnicity (with their attendant moral and social narratives) did not play a major role in Austria-Hungary until late in the nineteenth century.

2. High Enlightenment Narratives: The Meritocracy

A more determining national narrative must thus be sought in other organizers from Austria-Hungary, particularly in the set of social roles that emerge so prominently, especially the officer and the bureaucrat. What emerges in the most diverse sources as part of the general vision of the nation is a narrative of competence, a belief in a meritocracy, if you will. Stourzh believed that national unity was manifested in a general sense that upward mobility was possible. In consequence, virtually all parts of the Empire shared a distinctive pattern of behavior that resulted from a sense that assimilation among

various ethnic groups was necessary and part of a non-pecuniary reward system for service to a shared state:

One precondition [of the Empire's continuity] may be best described as the survival of rules or rather patterns of conduct and expectations of partly premodern origin, best summed up in the imperative: Strive for something higher, take your cue from something above you; strive for excellence--morally, socially, and intellectually. . . . no premature contentment; one could not afford self-indulgence. ("Multinational Empire," 6)

While Stourzh stops there (since his analysis stresses how institutions were not responsive to shifting climates as this public mood was), however, this may be more significant for general historiography of the region than he realizes.

Striving upward is crucial to the idea of a meritocracy, but it is also a major imperative of a bureaucracy. In most analyses of the organization of the Habsburg state, the bureaucratic imperative is identified as a holdover from the eighteenth century. It is also seen as a way (as in the Hungarian case cited above) to coopt ethnic and regional difference by imposing the appearance of cooperation--that, in a certain way, this bureaucracy was a Habsburg ploy to keep a modern nation from emerging. Yet the bureaucratic model had a venerable tradition, easily traced back to Leopold II's "Glaubensbekenntnis":

I believe that the sovereign, even a hereditary sovereign, is only the delegated representative of the people, for whom he exists in order to dedicate to them all his care and effort; I believe that each land should have a basic law or a contract between people and sovereign that restricts the power of the latter; that, if the sovereign does not abide by this law, he actually must abdicate his position, which has been given to him only under those conditions, and that one no longer has the duty of obeying him. I believe that executive power is given to the sovereign, but the power to make laws is given to the people and to their representatives, and that they can add new conditions to this law at every change of sovereign . . . (Wandruszka, 180)

This notion of the emperor as an executive power rests on the idea of the consent of the governed fits the idea of a bureaucracy that is run by the people for the people. Or as Wandruszka stresses: " . . . no matter how eager for reform Leopold had always wanted to be sure that the historical uniqueness and the traditions of the lands under his rule were taken into account, and he had, in contrast with Joseph's autocratic desire to improve the world, always valued the participation and assent of his subjects" (179). In one sense, this may be taken as patronizing; in another, as reflection of the fact that a Habsburg was more likely to reign than rule.

In historiography resting on state organization and official hegemony, a bureaucracy is too easily seen as a compromise, a mitigation of the monarch's power, or a faceless power for the monarch to hide behind. However, the meritocratic bureaucrat is a good description even of the actual power of the house of Habsburg (not just of Franz Joseph). The Habsburgs had, shall we say, less than an exemplary history as a ruling house over

the course of the nineteenth century, since it included at least one head with a reputation for insanity and several instances of abuse of power. Even the vaunted Franz Joseph had a less-than-exemplary reputation: he ascended the throne on the blood of the Hungarian generals, which may have led to an assassination attempt on him before his marriage. The character of Franz Joseph does not resolve easily, but it is relevant here in this context of the house of Habsburg and the Habsburg mythos as a meritocracy.[(23)]

I would like to suggest that Franz Joseph crafted his image as the "first bureaucrat" of his state quite seriously as a member of his nation, not simply as a way to hide his poor character, as is so often assumed. Rumpler, relying on Bled, characterizes Franz Joseph: "It was not so much insecurity or opportunism that led Franz Joseph away from thinking in absolute principles towards pragmatism, but rather a sense of what was appropriate for the system . . . " (173). In fact, in a certain sense, his generation wrote their own dynasty out of official history (E. Lichnowsky wrote the last official history of the dynasty in 1844) (Rumpler, 173).

If one relies on the idea of a meritocracy as the strongest narrative conditioning the everyday lives of the citizens of Austria-Hungary, a considerably more subtle interpretation of the behavior of the house of Habsburg emerges, especially in light of the way the Habsburgs handled what today would be called publicity or public relations. Despite Franz Joseph's cultivation of personal distance from his staff--Bled reports that he rarely even shook hands (206)--he and his family tread a careful line between maintaining the majesty of their positions through filling the expectations of their roles and appearing aristocratic, separate from others. Again, literary parallels to England are interesting. Unlike the British hunts and shooting season moving through the British Isles that figure prominently through its literature, the hunt and steeplechase circuit that moved through Bohemia and Hungary scarcely appears as central in the literature of the empire, although contemporaneous gossip columns at least managed to follow the horse racing aficionados (the infamous Mary Vetsera was called the "Turf-Engel").

Franz Joseph's own handling of his personal publicity (the famous iron bed, the loden hunting suits) did everything possible to make him fit the role of first bureaucrat that Leopold outlined: although an absolute monarch in one sense (his entitlement to the position), he realized that the continuance of that role relied strictly on those who are governed believing in his rule. He was completely capable of imperial representation, when the cause was at hand: his early gifts to Elisabeth were heavy in diamonds; when he inherited the family fortune, he tripled her allowance, to befit an empress, and so she died with money in Swiss bank accounts. Yet he was anything but insensitive to how damaging aristocratic ostentation was to that consensus of the governed--a caution (or sensitivity to the system) that is the source of the "stingy" emperor myths? Moreover, despite his reputation as an unwilling traveler, he and his family were attentive to the balance of representation throughout the empire, and the languages that those duties imposed--personal appearance tours, after all, enhance the image of the ruler as concerned with his people (although he was not trying to blend in, to pretend he was one of his people, as Elisabeth did at times).

"Bureaucrats" are therefore crucial parts of the narrative of the state, but not in the pedantic modern sense, but as an extension of the Enlightenment sense that persists in the US, using merit to gain the "consent of the governed," a necessary limit on imperial power in a country whose army proved itself essentially incapable of domination. Even the army was essentially a bureaucratic institution, since it was *de facto* if not *de jure* a defensive army, guided in a way to integrate regions and classes, to provide jobs, to act as a national guard, but not capable of being the kind of occupation army that Britain and France raised.[(24)] Bureaucracy as a meritocracy thus must be considered in the context of everyday life not as an agent of institutions, but as another kind of ideology: a crucial formulation derived from the Enlightenment and continued in Austria-Hungary, prescribing a work ethic, social responsibility, and a limit and description of behaviors that fit all kinds of work, including statecraft.

3. Civility and Justice

In the sense of Kant's public and private uses of reason, the idea of a meritocracy manages to draw a very crucial dividing line in public space: justice and civility become associated with individual competency and responsibility, not with law-giving or with official institutions as dominating hegemonies--justice is recognized and followed as a contract with one's consciousness, not because institutions enforce it through laws. In a real sense, this notion of meritocracy can actually supplant politics as defined in many other nations.

There is another reason why individual justice supplanted lawgiving as a national narrative: a job contract has easily-definable criteria for success and failure, while "just laws" were difficult, if not impossible, to define in a nation (or set of nations) of competing interests and in which parliaments didn't work and lawgiving was the purview of the few (somewhere around 6 percent of the population was actually entitled to vote, even after the Compromise). Politics and political law-mongering were thus not part of the national narrative, but, perversely, justice was, perhaps as a consequence of belief in the bureaucrat as a model for responsible and proper behaviors in all settings. No wonder that Franz Joseph was able to declare himself prime minister while still retaining the public image of a "just" ruler: institutional government and formal law codes were not where the nation was being held together.

The legislative branch of government existed, but the executive branch ultimately was in charge of making the laws real on a day-to-day level--and on its own schedule. In contrast, however, there seems to have been great public faith in the judicial system (and in the fact of adjudicating, as part of the sense of propriety for individuals). In a certain sense, litigation became a national sport after the Compromise, as the language law cases alluded to above confirm. Literature and popular myth also stressed the fairness of Franz Joseph as an adjudicating power (Josef Roth's *Radetzkymarsch* has a scene where "the hero of Solferino" asks the Emperor to remove an incorrect version of that tale from the schoolbooks, and it is done). The Emperor receives his people and answers petitions, a

symbol of all citizens' access to that seat and process of justice--everyday justice, rational fairness.

This idea of everyday justice as part of a national narrative needs particular underscoring as a continuance of the Enlightenment in Austro-Hungarian public space. Zöllner cites Soviet historians who argue that "Napoleon's imperialism had as a consequence national wars of liberation" (76), especially for Germany and Austria. Yet Zöllner does not discriminate reactions to Napoleonic imperialism further: Germany was sensitive to imperialism in the sense of a balance of military powers, where Austria (playing all sides of the French Revolution) might instead have been reacting to the civil lessons of that revolution, to the Napoleonic code, and the popularity of universal everyday justice. Napoleon jumped the constraints of class structure, as it were, with the help of the people.

What I am doing here is stressing how narratives of the bureaucrat and everyday justice interlock to virtually displace the visibility of the central government, just as Franz Joseph the emperor used his own persona to block the visibility of the House of Habsburg (stressing the monarch, not the dynasty, except in those cases where the dynasty must provide that monarch). This leads us, however, back to Fraser's idea of public space as the space of negotiation, yet in a heightened form.

4. Negotiating Everyday Life and Festival

Clearly, in all the narratives just outlined, the space of everyday life assumes greater prominance than in the narratives of the great Western empires, which tended to gender that space as it was divided into the "public" male world and the more female and domestic "private" spaces. While the kind of gendered manners that existed in these other nations also emerged in Austria-Hungary, however, the extreme stereotyping of "angel of the house" did not seem to exist--perhaps because "public sphere" and "official (male) space" could not be so closely aligned with a particular kind of bourgeois (capitalist, moralist) narrative. Thus Empress Elisabeth was considered a bad mother for "abandoning her children" to the care of her mother-in-law (who took them), but she was never considered "unwomanly" in the moral Victorian sense; her poor health was never seen as a "natural" condition of a woman, but a result of her odd eating habits; and her "madness" was treated by *Wanderlust*, not confinement--all very non-Victorian behavior.[(25)]

The people inhabiting this space of everyday life, playing parts of the dominant national myth, are thus described in ways that evolved very clearly out of the Enlightenment rather than out of a sense of capitalist nationalism and that stress their lives and senses of responsibility rather than official structures. The space of bureaucrats and soldiers was so pervasive that it remained to be satirized by Kafka, Roth, Musil, and many others in the twentieth century. And that national space of everyday life was organized in terms of individual responsibility, not in terms of official hierarchies. Ethnicity, space, hierarchy, law, and status were things that needed to be renegotiated as individuals fulfilled their social and personal roles, on a day-to-day level. Unlike in official France, which

referenced everything to Paris, Austria-Hungary was in a constant play of redefining "province" and "center" for its own sense of personal manners since each region of the nation had its own center and thus (to a degree, at least) its own code of manners and status markers. The regions were Catholic yet multireligious, populated equivalently (if not equally) by the bureaucrat, the officer, the bourgeois, the peasant, and the coffeehouse maven; they were characterized by ethnic difference but sameness of infrastructure (coffeehouse, newspaper, railroad, city hall). In a very real sense, each region was its own other, evaluating the practices of everyday life not as "us" versus "them," but as "us" versus "us"--as a periphery that does not feel itself part of the whole but yet still remains within it.

In consequence, various stereotypes or hatreds, historical prejudices, roles, and positions were constantly being submitted to adjudication by the group, to a shared sense of appropriateness and self-representation as potential equals. Such similarity in difference possibly explains the prevalent social and literary stereotype of the Krausian "Nörgler" or typical Austrian black humor: it represents the kind of pragmatism that every such confrontation meant for an individual, when every item of status was renegotiated (invalidated, practiced, or realized) in every personal confrontation. In this view, "Fortwursteln" is not a culture "muddling through" in the sense of jury-rigging, but rather a public space relying programmatically on feeling one's way. This nation, therefore, is seen through the nineteenth century as a constant achievement *of everyday life*, constantly being reworked, renegotiated, rethought in the minds of those living it, in their real historical and social contexts, not as imposed by official culture.

I would thus suggest that the prime national narrative organizing Austria-Hungary is none other than a narrative of everyday life: representing the public space as a space of justice, individual achievement, civility, and negotiation. Moreover, this public space is rational space, contingent upon private individuals living up to (enacting) what they were born to be--potentials that have to be lived up to, to be realized into praxis in a true meritocracy, a space of personal and rational justice that transcends institutionalized lawgiving.

But one even more crucial facet of this reliance on narratives of everyday life (rather than narratives of official hegemonies) to define the nation also arises. If, indeed, Austria-Hungary relies on this strategy to write its narratives of nationhood in Enlightenment terms that stress the negotiations between consenting individuals (exerting their freedom, acknowledging justice in the merit of properly-enacted social roles), then the public space of this nation is not operating in the dichotomy between "public" and "private" spheres as countries with a capitalist bourgeoisie (taken in Habermas's sense) did. That dichotomy, even as reframed and modified by Fraser and Kristeva, provides a model for nationhood that accommodates a space for public negotiation, as Kant would have demanded and as the Austro-Hungarian bureaucrat and soldier lived. But it also tacitly assumes that private lives exist outside the public sphere, a definition of the person which does not fit Austria-Hungary's idea of the bureaucrat or soldier. In Austria-Hungary, the responsible public individual tests himself (usually him, not her) against public (not necessarily official) standards of justice, earning with each act the consent of the governed, the approval of the group in social behavior. This sense of self-in-action is different than the British

Empire's management of social behavior through narratives about domestic virtues, which assumed the status almost of a moral code rather than a standard of achievement to be earned.[(26)] It remains to be explored if this claim holds to the details of narratives about the family in Austria-Hungary: I do not, however, believe that the cult of childhood and the extreme codification of style as an indicator of class exist as rigidly as they do in the British and French empires.

Because everyday life is so crucial to the sense of this nation, so, too, is the space of personal representation in the public: markers of status were not simply deserved because of birth, they were also earned in playing a role. Thus while England was developing virtually a "glitterati," offering to public representation and the senses of class a public year marked by the openings of various "seasons" and events like Ascot (noted by lower classes as financial opportunities and spectator sports rather than as a moment of togetherness-in-difference), for example, Vienna's powers that be cultivated (at least superficially) an image of a greater degree of togetherness among classes. It is important, then, for the Austro-Hungarian bureaucrat to have a uniform, and that uniform can get him into court functions as a marker of his competence. Similarly, it is no accident that the Makart Procession celebrating Franz Joseph and Elisabeth's silver anniversary was organized around professions and their representation as they contribute to the whole--in mythic costumes decorated with symbols created for the occasion for those professions that had not existed in the seventeenth century (its stylistic reference). And Adalbert Stifter's odd novel *Witiko* seems more explainable as the story of Barbarossa from below, stressing the contribution and critique of the small to the success of the whole.

In this sense, one must thus argue that the Austro-Hungarian public space of representation was conceived in everyday life terms: as distinctions between everyday and festival, negotiation and duty, rational order and carnival--rather than the terms imposed by bourgeois imperial capitalism. This distinction explains, moreover, patterns of Austro-Hungarian aristocratic behavior that seem more alien to us than the excesses of the British and French aristocracy of the period.

Thus Franz Joseph, "absolute monarch" to his death, tolerated public criticism to a degree (but no humiliation), although it was never clear if he acted on such criticism, preferring to blunt or remove it. For example, Elemer Batthany, son of one of the 1848 rebels who was hung by Franz Joseph, could join his emperor on the hunt and at table but not greet or speak to him: other aristocratic hunters, including the imperial family, understood that Batthany family honor required both behaviors. Being considered a "just ruler" was not something that was divinely preordained and permanent: it must be enacted, lived, and put into practice. Batthany did not feel his emperor had lived up to that standard--and the emperor saw his point (he had, after all, fired the ministers who had gotten his government into that mess). Archdukes could be fired from the jobs they were not living up to, so even the emperor could be subject to a certain degree of criticism.

In another crisis of public representation, the assassinated heir-apparent Franz Ferdinand actually was given the "Begräbnis zweiter Klasse" which Karl Kraus introduced into *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* as a bad joke on the empire (we tend to interpret it as a snub

today). At the time, however, it was reported that Franz Joseph did not understand why people complained about the funeral arrangements: it was the same service he had given his beloved Elisabeth, since only a ruling emperor was entitled to a "first-class burial." From the perspective of national narrative of everyday life, however, this is not simply an example of Franz Joseph's failings of character. Instead, he was simply negotiating his public space by the Enlightenment rule he had learned from Metternich and others early in his reign: in this narrative of merit and achievement, Franz Ferdinand had been given the honor he had earned and which he was due--this was negotiated, as was Elisabeth's funeral, between Emperor and highly-placed subject as social roles, not in terms of personal grief, retribution, or morality (as the habits of high Victorian mourning practices would have done). He thus seemed cold to the 1914 public eyes that had begun to forget that status had to be earned, not claimed or given. In the terms of the narrative suggested here for the nineteenth century, it is a gesture by a reigning monarch who refused to modernize, but not by a vindictive one.

Conclusion

Coming back to the historiographic question which initiated this foray into theory and praxis, I would like to argue the merits of taking a narrative of Enlightenment public space as defining the sense of nationhood for Austria-Hungary. First and foremost, it provides a set of rationales for many of the decisions (in politics, economics, governmental structure, and the like) that have been considered reactive and blundering rather than responsive and coherent, if in a difficult context. It explains why, even if Franz Joseph's self-casting as bureaucrat was a kind of publicity coup, that public image nonetheless may have reflected a high degree of understanding how that nation and its politics were constituted in practice--an understanding cast in terms that we cannot easily recover today, since popular concepts of the capitalist-nationalist empires (France, Great Britain, and Germany) have determined contemporary understanding of the nineteenth century.

Assuming that an Enlightenment public space defines this nation also explains why many sections of the Austro-Hungarian population clung tenaciously to the parliamentary process, even though lawgiving was constricted by the executive branch. One might say that discussing and achieving clarity about the costs and purposes of certain laws could, in certain situations, be as important as enacting them. Note that Austro-Hungarians were conscious of this rather ironic view of what government is supposed to do (debate rather than govern), and Parliament continued to function this way well into the twentieth century--without public trust, but still of public interest. In contrast, when the Weimar parliament achieved that stage of its existence in the late 1920s, the public lost faith in it both as a legislative body and as a discussion forum. Thus turnouts for elections dropped, and delegates (perhaps because of election costs) dropped off candidacy lists as it became clear that few laws could pass.

This comparison shows, in oblique ways, perhaps, that Austria-Hungary (including its politics and economics) must be taken more seriously as the ultimate "imagined

community," a community that existed almost solely because the rules around which it was imagined were shared even by large groups of dissenters.[27] At least as such an imagined community, this state privileged diversity and informal communication over its structure; festival and public representation and opinion over consistent hegemonic structures; rational justice (negotiated situationally) over legal systems; and the assumption that achievement confirms personal status rather than status guaranteeing individual achievement.

Historiographically, then, Austria-Hungary offers the case of a Western empire that is operating on narratives of nationhood constituted on very different organizing principles than those of its contemporaries in the nineteenth century. With this I by no means intend to argue for an Austro-Hungarian *Sonderweg*. What I hope to have demonstrated, however, is that difference can arise in sameness: thus, despite the many commonalities that Austria-Hungary has with its neighbors and contemporaries, it nonetheless represents not the "sick man of Europe," or "an experiment in world destruction," but rather an experiment in empire-building based not so much on imperialism or economic domination through superior resources or infrastructure as on human capital.

By these criteria, "Vienna 1900" is a historiographic model that refers to a brief result, not a cause; it encompasses not the process, but only the product of almost a century of trying to get an impossibly diverse collection of social groups to communicate and behave like a rational and humane nation rather than an expansionist empire. That historical moment, however, cannot stand in as a model for the complex historical processes that produced it, in their broader application spanning everyday and official culture. Moreover, that Austria-Hungary and the Habsburgs were unwilling partners in this enterprise should not obscure the mechanisms of this improbable and brief success and of its ultimate failure as a victim of its own success in raising its self-consciousness. Historically, the kind of ethnic nationalism more familiar from French and British models of empire and domination ultimately came to dominate the region, especially on the eve of World War I. Yet the consciousness of Central European interdependence it created remains active in the political and economic imaginations of the West up until today: a region whose own sense of self, and hence whose historiography, paid prime attention to the common forms of everyday life (especially to justice, merit, civility, and festival) as an *enacting* of nation rather than to its essence.

Endnotes

1. I would like to thank my colleagues Janet Swaffar, Nina Berman, and Nikola Petkovic for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

2. Thom, for example, argues that Renan is supporting a communality of French and German interests in the name of a European ideal (33).

3. Note, however, that Renan is stressing the communality of people out of which an idea of nationhood springs; it is not the type of strategic construct that "imagines" its essence,

as Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* would prefer, but a self-image that represents a historically-anthropologically documented group of people.

4. This tie-in of the practices of everyday life for individuals with some historical justicatory narratives lies at the core of Pierre Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Power* and particularly in the work of Michel de Certeau (see bibliography).

5. Interestingly, as noted above, Anderson is one of the few theorists who considers Austria-Hungary as a Habsburg empire in an era of "high dynasticism" (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 113), with Hungary being a region of a split vernacular (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 78-79): "The necessity of a unifying language connecting all parts of the empire seemed to [Joseph II in the 1780s] a peremptory claim. . . [As historian Oskar Jaszi noted,] There were *Habsburgs who did not even speak German*'" (84). In Anderson's version (drawing heavily on Jaszi's philomagyarism), this empire played off universal-imperial tendencies versus the particular-national ones of each region, a set of tensions which the dynasty overlooked in opting for the Germans in the Compromise that purported to support the Hungarian upper classes (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 108).

6. Bhabha claims that Frantz Fanon would be less willing to acknowledge the importance of such a split subject ("DissemiNation," 312).

7. See particularly her recent *Nations Without Nationalism*, and *Strangers to Ourselves*.

8. Gunew argues that Australia is a particular case of such a construct of cultural and literary history, in which the landscape is crucial (99). Expanding on how literature is complicit in valorizing nationalism, Barrell and Robbins talk of the constructions of Englishness (Robbins mentions especially professions as the way the English define themselves). In another approach to the question of literary self-construction, Mulhern shows how English reading constructed the nation by constructing a common experience (a critique of Williams). The best exposition of how such narratives were created for the British Empire is Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition.*

9. As Young clarifies this point: "Bhabha asserts that his colonial discourse analysis allows the tracing of a different but analogous process, whereby the forms of Western rationality are shown to experience an ideological and semantic dislocation in the spatio-temporal displacements of colonialism. Such work also enables a strategic interrogation of Western knowledges which disorients all attempts to assert authority or to produce closure. Bhabha demonstrates how dissonant, non-syncretic theory can shift control away from the dominant Western paradigm of historicist narrative, temporality, and univocality--but also how any new history' must, necessarily, be almost unrecognizable as history'" (156).

10. In other cases, that break is legislated, such as when "national language norms" are negotiated at the expense of dialects. See the exemplary discussion of manipulation of

language norms in Louis-Jean Calvet, *Linguistique et colonialisme. Petit traité de glottophagie*.

11. As an aside, Deak notes that Istvan Szabo's film *Oberst Redl* has this detail wrong, when he has an ethnic German-Austrian officer insult a Jewish officer as "nicht satisfaktionsfähig" (6).

12. Hohendahl rescues the modernity of Habermas's project, for later theoretical work: Habermas "at least outlined the concept of a postbourgeois public sphere where participation does not depend on the institution of private property" (99-100). Although he does agree that this situation is restricted as a general model: "A rigid distinction between the political and the cultural spheres, as it is reinforced by contemporary political institutions, will necessarily constrain our understanding of those concerns that come under the category the good life. In this context it is not accidental, therefore, that much of contemporary feminist theory has been developed within literary theory" (108).

13. In similar attempts to critique and supplement the theory, Zaret shows how religion, science, and printing helped the development of the public sphere (213); Kramer extends the differentiations between elite and popular culture in the model (248); Eley (289) looks for competing publics, gender, state, and popular culture in these expositions. Postone, referring to both Habermas's and Fraser's corrective that will be discussed here, says Fraser ignores the accumulation of capital (175).

14. For evidence of such a shift, see Schorske's "Explosion in the Garden: Kokoska and Schoenberg," *Fin-de-siècle Vienna*, Chapter 7.

15. On the variety of the bourgeoisie within Austria-Hungary, see: Hannes Stekl et al., eds., *"Durch Arbeit, Besitz, Wissen und Gerechtigkeit". Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie,* II, and Ernst Bruckmüller et al., eds. *Bürgertum in der Habsburger-Monarchie*.

16. Bruce Robbins's introduction to a collection of essays entitled *The Phantom Public Sphere* outlines further objections made to the concept of the public sphere from the point of view of models of politics. The essays which follow, however, apply more to modern nations with mass media in electronic forms rather than to the mental space of participatory democracy to which I am referring here.

17. Again see Bruckmüller et al., and Stekl et al.

18. Esterhazy ran Elisabeth's string of hunters at Gödöllo, with "Stallmeister"as his official title, in memoirs translated alternately as "Master of the Horse" and "Master of the Hunt."

19. Bruckmüller et al., 65-74.

20. The way Franz Joseph approved marriages within his own extended family is interesting in this regard, as well (as head of the house, that was his duty). He seems to have consistently approved out-of-class marriages (with much cajoling from interested parties), *as long as the person would not be betraying a job by that marriage*. So, then, even an archduke had a chance to make a love marriage, if that archduke were prepared to live up to the terms of that contract, which would include never claiming the privileges of his or her former estate with that spouse.

21. For example, a Mr. Formánek listed himself as German on the census, but the Germans protested his inclusion, as was their right. His idea that he was culturally connected to the Germans was deemed to be an "insufficient" ethnic attribution as the compromise progressed (Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 70). Others kept German attribution for financial reasons.

22. Luft confirms the historical ambivalence of many Austrians to a pure form of German nationalism: "The decisive feature of this period of Austrian culture was Austria's political and ideological idolation from the area north of the Main between 1775 and 1815 . . . the rejection of the postclassical evolution of German culture in philosophy and literature. . . . Certainly after 1780 it makes sense to think of Austria as part of German culture, but the ensuing seventy-five years also constituted the period in which Austria developed its own sense of cultural identity *within* German culture" (141). Magris's later assertion of a transnationalism is more psychologically based on the personal view of literature that was largely based in Vienna when he outlines the "Habsburg mythos" as composed of hedonism and bureaucracy and a transnationalism of feeling: "This is the transference of a bureaucratic mentality into the sphere of personal emotions and habits" (17).

23. In the proposal which follows, I am offering a different image of Franz Joseph than in most biographies, which stress his rigidity, and equate it with shallowness. See, for example, Palmer, *Twilight of the Habsburgs*, and Bled, *Franz Joseph*.

24. This army was not able to do, for example, what the French did in WWI, setting black African soldiers to occupy the Lorraine, in an attempt to isolate populations and create social management through *otherness*--see *Showing Our Colors [Farbe bekennen]: Afro-German Women Speak Out*, eds. May Opitz, Katharina Oguntoye, and Dagmar Schultz, foreword by Audre Lourde, trans. Anne V. Adams [Amherst: U. of Massachusetts Press, 1992]). And, to a certain degree, it worked, since even after World War I, the successor states were willing to float loans to Austria to keep it in existence, which at least confirms it as a necessary evil.

25. See Peter Gay's *The Bourgeois Experience from Victoria to Freud* for a fine description of that social space. He does not, however, distinguish Austria-Hungary from Germany and England, as I am doing here--and may not need to, since he focuses on the latter part of the century.

26. See Margaret Olwen Macmillan's *Women of the Raj* for the best description of how an image of a domestic morality was used to support empire.

27. Although it is equally clear that the periphery of the empire, particularly areas outside cities, were considerably less content with using these narratives to negotiate their public and psychological spaces.

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