tion) to learn, realize, or find out. *You ought to believe* is a recommendation, *you ought to know*, in this interesting sense, is a reminder.

Then compare refusing to believe and (if it exists at all) refusing to know. The attitude of *I do not want to believe* is like a struggle against a compulsive image, but the attitude of *I do not want to know* is similar to closing one's eyes. Again, contrast the unbelievable with the unknowable. The unbelievable is something utterly unlikely, unexpected, or outrageous. The unknowable need not be any of these things; it may be quite simple. What makes the unknowable unknowable is not its internal nature, but the fact that we cannot have access to it. Think of the parallel contrast between what cannot be imagined (that defies the imagination) and what cannot be seen.

People have and share beliefs but not knowledges. This is so because the immediate object of believing is a belief, a picture of reality. The immediate object of knowing is not "a knowledge," a picture of reality, but reality itself.

Vendler on Knowledge and Belief

Philosophers commonly assume that it is possible to believe and to know exactly the same thing — for instance, to believe and to know that snow is white. Vendler tells us that this assumption is actually mistaken; in his view "one cannot possibly believe what one knows" because, among other things, the phrase 'believing what one knows' is ungrammatical. I shall explain why the arguments he offers are unconvincing.

Vendler churns up many interesting grammatical facts in the course of his essay, but his final conclusions regarding knowledge and belief are reached by a very obscure line of thought involving, apparently, two distinguishable stages. He tries to show, first, that certain 'that'-clauses introduced as grammatical objects of the verb 'believe' are not "per se compatible" with the verb 'know.' He then uses this conclusion, along with grammatical facts about other verbs and their objects, to support a general hypothesis about two kinds of 'that'-clauses, one "subjective" and the other "objective." The verb 'believes,' he says, takes subjective 'that'-clauses, and 'know' takes objective 'that'-clauses; consequently, there can be no "same thing" to serve as a common object of 'He believes' and 'He knows.'

As I see it, Vendler's first line of argument does not really support his conclusion regarding the compatibility of certain 'that'-clauses with both 'believe' and 'know,' and this latter conclusion, being unsupported, adds no weight to the general hypothesis he subsequently develops. His general hypothesis is, moreover, defective for reasons I shall mention toward the end of this paper.

The basic structure of his first line of argument appears to be the following. If someone's suggestion is that *p*, then believing his suggestion is believing that *p*. Yet knowing his suggestion is not knowing

that p; it is knowing that he suggested that p. Given the patent differences between these implications, it appears that the 'that'-clauses marked by subjective P-nouns such as 'his suggestion' are per se compatible with 'believe' but not with 'know.'

As I have formulated it, Vendler's argument is an obvious non sequitur. If A's suggestion is that p, then knowing his suggestion — that is, knowing what his suggestion is — does not, admittedly, amount to knowing that p. But this hardly shows that the agent in question does *not* know that p (in the same sense of the clause 'that p') or that there is some kind of "incompatibility" between what A suggests (namely, that p) and the context 'He knows . . .'

What Vendler has shown is merely that whereas a certain inference involving 'belief' is valid, a superficially similar inference involving 'know' is not valid. The two inferences are only superficially similar because, as Vendler himself admits, 'S knows A's suggestion' means 'S knows what A's suggestion is' while 'S believes A's suggestion' means 'S believes that which A suggests.' Since the corresponding inferences are not logically analogous, the validity of one and the invalidity of the other is patently inadequate to demonstrate Vendler's conclusion.

Vendler is, of course, an astute philosopher, and one is inclined to think that there must be more to his argument than meets the eye, or at any rate has met my eye. I want therefore to look more closely at one of the entailments he emphasizes:

(1)   If A's suggestion is that p and S believes A's suggestion, then S believes that p.

Although this entailment is no doubt patently sound, exactly how, one might ask, can its truth be *proved*? A natural strategy is to argue that 'A's suggestion is that p' is an identity statement, of the form '$Q = R$,' and that (1) is consequently true by virtue of the principle of the substitutivity of identity. It is, admittedly, obvious that we cannot always make valid substitutions in accordance with this principle, but (1) is not, we may feel, a case in which the principle is inapplicable. In this regard (1) differs sharply from

(2)   If A's suggestion is that p and S knows A's suggestion, then A knows that p,

which is easily proved false by numerous counter-instances.

This approach to (1) and (2) may appear to support Vendler's conclusion. If we may validly substitute a particular 'that'-clause for 'A's suggestion' in one context but not in another, may we not express this fact by saying that the substituted clause is "compatible" with one context but not with the other?

The answer, as before, is "No": the truth of (1) but the falsity of (2) does not establish anything about an incompatibility. Although it is possible that the antecedent of (2) may be true while its consequent is false, it is equally possible that the consequent is true whenever the antecedent happens to be true. The following, in other words, is *not* a consequence of (2)'s failure:

(3)   If A's suggestion is that p and S knows A's suggestion, then it is not the case that A knows that p.

Although the strategy just considered does not support Vendler's conclusion, he may nevertheless believe that the truth of (1) hinges on the substitutivity of identity. For reasons that will shortly become clear, I want to discourage this opinion by a couple of brief remarks. First, the so-called referential opacity of contexts such as 'S believes or suggests that p' are bound to give us trouble if we attempt to demonstrate entailments like (1) by a substitution approach. An example of this is the failure of

(4)   If I say that p and A's suggestion is that p, then I say A's suggestion.[1]

Second, it is in any case implausible to construe such statements as 'A's suggestion is that p' as identities. For one thing, 'A's suggestion is that p' is equivalent (as Vendler notes) to 'A suggests that p'; and in this latter statement 'that p' seems adverbial to 'suggests', modifying the verb rather than denoting some object.[2] This appearance is supported by the fact that 'I believe S's belief' (which Vendler seems committed to accepting as grammatical, meaning 'I believe that which S believes') is adequately expressed by 'I believe as S believes.' Finally, related statements involving

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[1] Note that if Vendler's argument discussed on pp. 391–92 of this paper were sound, an incompatibility between the objects of 'say' and 'believe' would be demonstrated by the fact that, even when A's suggestion is that p, saying that p is not saying A's suggestion. Yet Vendler holds that both 'believe' and 'say' take subjective 'that'-clauses.

[2] I have defended this view in "Statements and Propositions," *Nous*, 1(1967): 215–229.

indefinite *P*-nominals are plainly not identity statements: 'His belief is one that I cannot accept', '*S*'s belief concerns Mary', and so forth.

If, as I believe, it is a mistake to think that (1) is demonstrable in the way just suggested, the question immediately arises as to how that truth of (1) can be demonstrated. The answer, fortunately, is not difficult to give. If we employ what are called "substitution" quantifiers, we may construct the appropriate demonstrations very easily.[3] For anyone unfamiliar with these quantifiers, it is enough to say that they differ from the usual ones only semantically. Instead of ranging over a domain of objects, they are interpreted in accordance with the schema:

'$(\exists_s P)(\ldots P \ldots)$' is true just when there is an appropriate expression '*E*' which, when substituted for all free occurrences of '*P*' in '$(\ldots P \ldots)$', yields a true statement '$(\ldots E \ldots)$'.

Consider '*A* believes *C*'s suggestion,' which means '*A* believes that which *C* suggests.' A plausible way of interpreting this is as follows:[4]

(5) $(\exists_s Q)(C \text{ suggests } Q) \ \& \ (\forall_s R)(C \text{ suggests } R \supset A \text{ believes } R)$.

If we express the statement '*C*'s suggestion is that *p*' as '*C* suggests that *p*,' we may then immediately infer the desired conclusion,

(6)   *A* believes that *p*.

Consider now '*A* knows *C*'s suggestion,' which means '*A* knows what *C*'s suggestion is.' A plausible interpretation of this is as follows:

(7) $(\exists_s Q)(C \text{ suggests } Q) \ \& \ (\forall_s R)(C \text{ suggests } R \supset A \text{ knows that } C \text{ suggests } R)$.

Given the premise that *C* suggests that *p*, we may therefore infer that *A* knows that *C* suggests that *p*. We may not, of course, infer that *A* knows that *p* or even that *A* does not know that *p*. As already noted,

[3] See J. M. Dunn and Nuel Belnap, Jr., "The Substitution Interpretation of Quantifiers," Noûs, 2(1968):177–185.
[4] Observe that, in line with Vendler's discussion, the context '*C* suggests' in formulas (5), (6), and (7) is to be understood as having a tacit rider such as 'at time *t*' or 'on the occasion *O*.' I have omitted this rider from my formulas merely for the sake of brevity.
My treatment of 'what (= that which) *C* suggests' amounts to treating it as a substitutional version of a so-called selective description. The context '*A* believes what *C* suggests' then has the form, '*A* believes $(\epsilon P)(C \text{ suggests } P)$,' which is equivalent to formula (5) in the text. The logic of selective description is discussed in R. M. Martin, *Truth and Denotation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

these latter claims are logically independent of *A*'s knowledge of what *C* suggests.

The importance of this approach to the entailments Vendler discusses is that we can demonstrate their respective truth and falsity without implying that the relevant 'that'-clauses differ from one another in some subtle or unsubtle way. In fact, even if we assume that the 'that'-clauses in 'He knows that snow is white' and 'He believes that snow is white' have exactly the same meaning and do not represent objects of any kind (whether "subjective," "objective," or neither), we may still consistently prove that (1) and (2) have precisely the status Vendler says they have, namely, true for (1) and false for (2).

If the facts thus far discussed do not really support Vendler's conclusion regarding the compatibility of 'know' with certain 'that'-clauses, what about the other grammatical peculiarities of 'know' and 'believe' that he mentions? Do not the following facts support his conclusion?

(8)   'Know' may take *wh*-nominals as grammatical objects, but 'believe' cannot.

(9)   'Believe' commonly takes the relative pronoun 'what' as a grammatical object, but 'know' does so only in special cases.

In my view these are very interesting facts about 'know' and 'believe,' but they certainly do not prove — or even, so far as I can tell, provide significant evidence for the conclusion — that a single, nonambiguous 'that'-clause (for example, 'that snow is white') may not serve as the verb object of both 'know' and 'believe.'

Take (8), for example. According to Vendler, a *wh*-nominal is a kind of indefinite substitute for a 'that'-clause. But the fact that 'know' but not 'believe' may take such a substitute for its grammatical object does not in any way imply that *both* verbs may not take as grammatical objects any particular 'that'-clause for which a *wh*-nominal may serve as an 'indefinite' proxy.

As for (9), this brings out an important difference of meaning between the verbs 'know' and 'believe,' but it scarcely establishes a difference of meaning or interpretation between the 'that'-clauses that may serve as grammatical objects of these verbs. We may indeed agree that while

(10)   If you said that *p* and I believe what you said, then I believe that *p*

is true,

(11)   If you said that *p* and I know what you said, then I know that
         p

is false. But this merely tells us something about the difference between 'believes what' and 'knows what' in otherwise similar sentence frames; it tells us nothing about the interpretation of the ingredient 'that'-clauses.

I now want to say something about Vendler's distinction between objective and subjective *P*-nouns and verbs. As I see it, he has not really succeeded in making this distinction clear. 'Tell,' he says, is an objective *P*-verb, but 'say' is subjective. But why, exactly, is this so? "Tell," in the sense of 'relate', can take *wh*-nominals as grammatical objects, as 'say' cannot; one can tell (relate) the facts but not say them, and one can know what one relates but not what one says (or so Vendler believes). But is this really enough for objective status? If it is, then these tests may conflict with the first test mentioned in connection with subjective *P*-nouns.

Consider 'my suggestion,' 'my prediction,' and 'my doubt.' By the first test, 'suggestion,' 'prediction,' and 'doubt' are subjective *P*-nouns; yet the verbs 'suggest,' 'predict,' and 'doubt' all take objective *wh*-nominals:

     He predicted when, how, where, what would happen if . . .
     He suggested when, how
     He doubted whether

And what about 'wonder' and 'consider'? These seem as "subjective" as 'believe', but they both take *wh*-nominals.

Note, incidentally, that 'statement,' 'belief,' 'claim,' 'assertion,' 'opinion,' etc., form not only subjective *P*-nouns such as 'my statement' but also objective-looking nouns such as 'the statement,' 'the belief,' and 'the assertion.' I believe, and indeed have argued in print,[5] that these latter *P*-nouns are derivative from the former, but they nevertheless seem as objective in Vendler's sense as 'the fact' or 'the result.' What should be said about their status? Are they really subjective, or what? If the statement that *p* is true, does it not follow that one's statement that *p* is true as well?

[5] See my "Statements and Propositions," pp. 221–229.

I now want to comment on the alleged objects of knowledge and belief. There are at least two senses, obviously, in which one can speak of "an object of knowledge or belief." In one sense such an object is a linguistic expression: in a sentence such as 'He knows that snow is white' the clause 'that snow is white' may be the grammatical object of the verb 'knows.' In another sense an object of knowledge or belief is something apparently nonlinguistic. For Vendler, "the immediate object of believing is a belief, a picture of reality," while "the immediate object of knowing is . . . reality itself," or, as he also says, a fact.

The idea that there are objects of belief in the first sense is scarcely controversial. Although most philosophers would add that the objects (in this sense) of 'believe' and 'know' may be precisely the same, Vendler, as we know, would disagree.

The idea that there are objects of knowledge and belief in the second sense is, however, extremely controversial. Nominalists argue, for instance, that such objects simply do not exist. They will agree, of course, that one can know a person or a town, and that one can believe a friend when he says this or that. What they will deny is that one can know a fact or believe a picture of reality. Vendler evidently disagrees with the nominalists on this matter. The question is, "Does Vendler offer compelling reasons for his point of view?"

Given the grammatical arguments outlined in his essay, the question whether we must admit objects of knowing and believing (in this second sense) depends on whether 'that'-clauses must be understood as in some way representing such objects. This seems to follow from two theses of Vendler's essay. The first is that "all occurrences of *believe* [except for those concerning the belief *in* somebody or something] . . . can be reduced to believing that." The second is that "the acquaintance sense aside, all verb objects of *know*, other than the *that*-clause, can be reduced to *wh*-nominals . . . [which are in turn] nothing but indefinite versions of *that*-clauses . . ." Thus, although we do commonly say that so-and-so believes the story or knows the facts of the case, the import of such remarks may be expressed by saying, respectively, something like the following:

(12) $(\exists_s P)$ (the story "says" that *P* and so-and-so, as a result of
         reading or hearing the story, believes that *P*),

and

(13) $(\exists_s P)$ (the facts of the case are that P and so-and-so knows that P).

In objecting to the idea that entailment (1) is demonstrable by virtue of the substitutivity of identity, I said that it is implausible to construe statements such as 'A's suggestion is that p' as identity statements, as having the form '$Q = R$.' Alluding to a grammatical transformation mentioned by Vendler, I remarked that the statement is equivalent to 'A suggests that p' and that the 'that'-clause in this latter statement functions adverbially, modifying the verb 'suggests.' Although my remark, if sound, does not prove that the 'that'-clauses in such constructions do not somehow represent nonlinguistic objects, Vendler has plainly not given us good reason to accept this latter possibility. Until he does, however, he cannot expect us to assent to his unusual view that if a man believes that snow is white, his believing has something subjective as its object, and that if he knows that snow is white, his knowing has something objective as its object. For my part, there is little reason to assume that knowing and believing have extra-linguistic "objects" at all. To know the facts of the case or the results of an election is, as Vendler himself says, to know *that* something-or-other; but to know *that* something-or-other is not necessarily to know some extra-linguistic object.

It is with reluctance that I end these remarks, for there is a great deal more to be said about Vendler's stimulating essay. My conclusion, however, is this. Vendler has simply not shown (a) that the 'that'-clauses in such statements as 'He knows that snow is white' and 'He believes that snow is white' do not have exactly the same meaning, significance, or interpretation, and (b) that the objects of belief differ radically from the objects of knowledge in that while the former are subjective entities, the latter are objective entities. Since Vendler has not really established these points, he has not shown that the following statements (understood as involving a single, unequivocal use of the clause 'that snow is white') are not true:

(14) If a man knows that snow is white, then he believes that snow is white.

(15) If a man knows that snow is white, then it is true that snow is white.

(16) If a man knows that snow is white, then he is justified in thinking that snow is white.

If these statements are indeed true (as I believe they are), then the philosopher's standard approach to the analysis of knowledge is at least not off the track from the very beginning.