Staff perception within an international organization:
A comparison of headquarters and field employee views of an educational program during implementation in Southern Sudan

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Dedication

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Abstract

This study examines differences between international organization (IO) headquarters and field employee perceptions of the program they are involved in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas (SS3A). Though headquarters and field employees both aim for a successful program, they perceived the program politics, problem and solutions differently depending on their role. Field employees encountered competing demands from the organization and local stakeholders about program actions since they are "in the weeds" attending to the implementation details. Those managing the project in the field program office had to match the on-the-ground realities in a changing environment to the program grant objectives. Headquarters employees balanced donor requirements with their own organization and host government interests documented through "paper-trails" to ensure grant compliance. The nature of the varied perspectives staff hold of their program in the field, at the program office and in headquarters could help to explain patterns in programmatic change and adaption.

This mixed-method case study was comprised of phone interviews and an online survey of international organization employees on an educational program in SS3A. The study found the respondents perceived the program differently, largely associated with their roles. Identifying discrepancies in employees' perceptions of a program approach has implications to better support the needs and motivations of employees. The discrepant perceptions have implications for project design when considering strategies that will enhance long-lasting benefits of programs in conflict-affected countries, such as South Sudan.

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Abbreviations

EiE	Education in Emergencies
FldR	Field Respondent focused on State-level implementation
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
OHqR	Organization Headquarters Respondent
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
MoE	Ministry of Education (of the Government of Southern Sudan)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
POR	Program Headquarters / Office Respondent, based in Juba
SMoE	State Ministry of Education (of the Government of Southern Sudan)
SS3A	Southern Sudan and the Three Areas (Southern Sudan, Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan)

Chapter 1: Introduction

This study is about how international organization employees see the same educational program differently during implementation in Southern Sudan and the three areas (SS3A). A constructivist perspective guided the case study with actors involved in the program having a somewhat different perspective of the program depending on if they were based in the field or headquarters. The process under which differing perspectives arose is similar to the game of telephone in which one person whispers a message into the ear of another, and by the time the message has been passed on several times, the message has changed. In this case, the donor developed the program together with host government education officials then contracted an implementing organization, which then hired staff to implement it. As the program was being realized from the donor and host government to the implementing organization and its employees, the program shifts like the message in the game of telephone, since each individual viewed the program relative to their own background, stance, and role.

This introduction provides a brief overview of the study purpose, rationale, conceptual framework, and design. Chapter Two reviews the literature related to education in SS3A, a conflict-affected area. Chapter Three covers the research design and methods. Chapter Four presents study results and Chapter Five offers a discussion and concluding remarks about study implications suggesting to consider employee motivation as a part of program sustainability.

Study Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine the congruence between field and headquarters employees' perceptions of a program during implementation. The case in this study is an educational program in SS3A implemented by an international organization under a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contract. Results from this study explain the types of variation staff had in their views of a program during implementation, which have implications for grant compliance, program design, and sustainability.

Nearly any program is prone to having a misalignment between plans and action, but programs in conflict-affected countries are likely to shift away from plans since they are often developed during periods of instability. A challenge for agencies involved is that program modification can lead to the withdrawal of funding and support if changes extend beyond the aims of the donor or host government. Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) call the potential misalignment between agreed upon plans and actual practice a "knowing-doing gap," which occurs between managers and their employees. Unlike Pfeffer and Sutton's gap, which compares behaviors, this study considers the level of agreement in staff perceptions of program approaches. If implementing staff do not see a program plan as worthwhile or are not aware of it, they will make adjustments to it knowingly or unknowingly.

International organizations (IOs) often have to balance local and global interests when executing programs. They weigh the local interests of the host government,

regional level, or school stakeholders, and they consider international supporters, such as small and large donors, and their own organizational policies (Suzuki, 1998). Due to their position, field personnel are more likely to be aligned with local concerns and headquarters personnel with international ones. Problems can arise when they lack agreement or misunderstand the dynamics at the other level when making program design, development, or funding decisions.

Organizations involved in educational-system development in complex circumstances, such as SS3A, have a set of standards to guide practice, but only limited understanding about what works during implementation (Anderson, Martone, Robinson, Rognerud, & Sullivan-Owomoyela, 2006). Groups are under great pressure to show results quickly with limited time and support (Save the Children, 2006). Moreover, there is little data regarding educational effectiveness in these contexts (Anderson et al., 2006; INEE, 2004), so practitioners must rely on their own observations and experience during program implementation. Through this examination of staff perception at various headquarters and field levels, this study presupposed discrepancies in program interpretation could affect its realization during the implementation process.

Rationale

Post-conflict educational-system development has received greater attention and funding in the past decade, but has not necessarily yielded positive results (Smith & Vaux, 2003). Donors and host governments formulated programs through high-level discussions during unstable times for organizations to implement in SS3A. The donor

then contracts out the program for an IO to implement due to low local capacity. The contracted IO hires both international and local staff to work with the host government throughout the country or region. There are many opportunities for the perceptions of program approaches to shift as responsibility is transferred from the donor and high-level government officials during formulation to an IO for implementation.

This case study is about the experience of the IO employees implementing a program in Southern Sudan since 2004. In preparation for the peace agreement in 2005, many donors sought to support governmental systems throughout Southern Sudan, after being absent from the region's education efforts from 1996 to 2004 (Brophy, 2007). The program began work in Southern Sudan prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) when education was under the direction of the Secretariat of Education (SoE) of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). After the CPA was put into effect, the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), including the Ministry of Education (MoE) was formed to replace the secretariat.

The SS3A context provided a particularly poignant example to examine variability in field and headquarters staff perspectives since after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) there were competing interests between developing a government-run educational system for the South and continuing to rely on International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). The GOSS MoE worked with donors to prioritize local capacity building to provide basic educational services focused on increasing enrollments, including alternative systems for youth and adults,

while also improving quality ("JAM Sudan Volume 3," 2005, p. 186). This effort aimed toward widespread educational system development in contrast to previous inconsistent and ad hoc efforts in schooling implemented by volunteer teachers and NGOs (Breidlid, 2010; "JAM Sudan Volume 1," 2005; Sommers, 2005).

INGOs involved in relief operations in SS3A prior to the CPA had autonomy with limited or no interaction with local authorities to oversee their work (Riehl, 2001). Previously the northern government had controlled education, but southern government control involved a shift from Arabic to English language instruction and a new Southern Sudan curriculum (Breidlid, 2010). Organization employees from inside and outside of SS3A had to make sense of this dynamic setting as the host government took on greater responsibility for government systems over the five-year interim government arrangement in the CPA and after decades of isolation for many communities.

Data were collected in October and November 2010, six years after the program began, near the end of the five-year interim government under the CPA, and before a referendum on Southern Sudanese independence from the north in January 2011. The researcher intentionally gathered data prior to the referendum since results of the vote could have shifted how employees view their program due to a sense of uncertainty. As anticipated, the referendum resulted in an overwhelming decision to separate the south into a new country, effective July 2011. Since South Sudan was not yet a country during this study, the term "Southern Sudan" will be used. Amid the political transition

occurring in SS3A, headquarters and field employees made sense of how their program fit in the emerging nation according to their current and future roles.

Conceptual Framework

The study used Kingdon's (1995) multiple streams model to guide the overall orientation of the study. According to Kingdon, a policy agenda arises out of the convergence of three streams, the political stream, problem stream, and the policy stream (often called the "solution stream). Kingdon (1995) found that in order for policy to come into being, three agenda-setting streams converge. The political stream occurs when decision makers reach consensus around political interests toward a problem and solution, often through persuasion and appeals (p. 199-200). The problem stream is when officials view conditions as unacceptable and worthy of attention (p. 197). The solution stream, what Kingdon calls the "policy stream" (p. 200), is where decision-makers choose a course of action after considering policy alternatives to solve a problem. The three streams converge when decision-makers have the political will to act to recognize a problem and identify an appropriate course of action as a solution.

This study occurred several years after donors and the host government (the SoE) agreed to establish a program and associated policies that affected it. Kingdon's multiple streams model (1995) was used to examine employee views of the problem, political and solutions streams during implementation of the program. Using Kingdon's framework in this way assumed the agenda setting process occurs not only during policy formation, but also continued into program development and implementation

stages. During program implementation, employees reinterpreted and reformulated the program when they matched their perceptions of the program plans to the reality they experienced in the headquarters and field.

Suzuki's (1998) model was used to explain tensions between employees in the organization as an analytical framework in interviews and in four survey questions. Suzuki's model (1998) identifies three tensions within NGOs among employees. In the first tension, organizational maintenance versus program-oriented implementation, employees are attentive to their agency's continued presence in a program or hand it over to others. An extreme rendition of this view occurs when organizations seek to either *self-perpetuate* or *self-destruct* their involvement in a program (p. 13). The second tension occurs when personnel have diverse versus similar program objectives. A diverse set of aims can lead to programs with varied outcomes and *fragmented performance* with limited common features, while a similar set of objectives has the potential to *restrict performance*, creating a homogenized program at the expense of being locally appropriate (p. 70). Lastly, Suzuki's tension concerning program flexibility is when employees can be opportunistic and make modifications that could lead the program in new, potentially unintended, directions. In contrast to flexibility, consistency is encouraged when employees must focus on established procedures with the risk of being unresponsive (p. 131). Suzuki's tensions were used to help explain organizational dynamics related to program implementation decisions within each of the three streams.

Research Questions

The level of agreement about approaches even within a program is not well understood in post-conflict environments. The aim of this study is to more deeply understand how employees in the field, the program office and the headquarters perceive their program agenda in Southern Sudan to better understand how staff view the process of translating programs into action differently. Using Kingdon's multiple streams model as a guide, the research questions this study seeks to answer are:

How and to what extent do employees in the field, program office and the headquarters differ in their perceptions of the:

1) Political interests within and around their program?
2) Educational problem their program addresses?
3) Most viable solutions related to their program?

Results from this study aim to inform organizations about common varying perceptions among employees during the implementation process. The study will help clarify potential reasons for a discrepancy between plans and implementation. Study results could inform implementing organizations how to better support programs and their staff during implementation.

Chapter 2: Study Context & Literature Review

This chapter begins with an overview of the study context in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas (SS3A) and globally. The study was framed with literature about educational approaches in conflict-affected countries and organizations in educational system development. The chapter closes with a description of how the conceptual framework was used, including the research purpose, rationale and questions. The researcher's background was also instrumental in formulating this study.

Researcher Background

The researcher's interest in the headquarters to field relationship of staff working on educational programs in conflict-affected countries arose from her experience working in the field. She witnessed field staff showing headquarters staff how the program really worked while headquarters staff explained how the program was intended to work, and captured some of these concerns in an article suggesting education in emergency standards need to consider program implementation and system development in tandem (Eschenbacher, 2009). The study also sought to capture the voices of field employees that may not appear in official documents, particularly if their perspectives did not fit with program aims. National field employees tended to be hired for fixed periods and remained behind after an organization completed its contract, so their perspectives were also important to understand how programs could be reformulated in the future to be more locally relevant and sustainable.

The researcher worked in Warrap State, Southern Sudan from February 2009 to February 2010 on a system-strengthening and capacity building project in the State Ministry of Education (SMoE). She advised and trained education officials in educational planning, oversight, and management. Under Fry and Thurber's (1989) categorization, the researcher was an international consultant who served as an expert analyst (p. 18), an educator to provide information (p. 26), and colleague with a cultural role (p. 29) to work with education officials as they began to work more closely with international partners. This experience helped the researcher understand the conditions and colloquial language used among educational development circles.

Southern Sudan Educational Development

Schooling in SS3A, as in many conflict-affected areas, was affected by religious and cultural ideologies that are vestiges of the conflict. In the 1930s the British colonizers made English the official language of schools in SS3A while retaining Arabic in the north (Collins, 2008, p. 43). In the south the few operating schools were private, often Catholic or Protestant, with a limited number of graduates and very little attention from the colonial administration (Collins, 2008, p. 48). In the 1930s the northern government built a schools in the south to establish a government-run system and discourage Christian missionary schools (Jok, 2007, p. 58). Arabic was used as the medium of instruction; Islamic education was also encouraged; and children were persuaded to use Arab names (Jok, 2007, p. 58). During the transition after the peace agreement "Arabic pattern" teachers and students in border states in particular could

choose to take exams in either English or Arabic to accommodate the transition from languages. On a practical level, administrators referred to the Arabic exam as the "northern exam." In Warrap State where this researcher lived and worked Arabic pattern teachers and students were excepted as having content knowledge, but faced challenges in learning their subjects in English.

Francis Deng (1995) posits education in the colonial period helped to bring about a nationalist movement for independence since it "enabled the young Sudanese of varied ethnic, tribal, and social backgrounds to become acquainted, to develop common grounds, and to act together in solidarity (p. 102). He also suggests that through the education Southern Sudanese received, students were equipped with new ideas, increased access to those in power, and opened doors to employment opportunities with a greater role in their society than in the past.

Ideological differences around language and culture coupled with a high value for education, particularly by those involved in the independence movement, persist in the SS3A to this day. While the official medium of instruction is English (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2008; The Sudan People's Liberation Movement, 2002), some students and teachers are more proficient in Arabic and take the national exam in that language. As of 2009, many students opted to use the northern national exam in Arabic. Similarly, the official curriculum in the south currently has Christian religion as a core subject, while Islamic studies is an elective course. The schools in

SS3A are generally not regarded as academically strong, and so educated Sudanese who have the means send their children to school in Uganda or Kenya.

Similarly, Southern Sudanese who went to neighboring countries, such as Uganda, Kenya or Egypt, for their education had greater opportunity to be in positions of influence within Southern Sudan, particularly NGOs. One state minister once told me that he preferred to work with Southern Sudanese who had been educated in the region since they often had practical experience in contrast to those who had studies in the western world where they were less likely to have practical work experience in their field of study. He was expressing a commonly held sentiment. Similarly, there were many would-be retired officials who sought to stay on in the civil service after the peace agreement for both a paycheck and to be in a position of stature.

Apart from official schools, community schools with volunteer teachers were often used during the war (Sommers, 2005), a practice which continues in part today though many teachers are now paid. The quality of instruction and learning is often quite poor in SS3A, particularly since a high proportion of the teachers have little or no training, and few have graduated from secondary school. Table 1 below provides educational statistics that reflect the extent of several educational challenges in SS3A in recent years.

Table 1

Educational statistics in Southern Sudan 2008-2010

Statistic	Pre-primary [a]	Primary [b]	Secondary [c]	AES [d]	TTI [e]
Student Enrollment					
2008		1,284,252	23,522	84,915	1,259
2009		1,380,580	32,256	217,239	2,445
2010	47,266	1,401,874	34,487	182,934	766
GER [f]		68.8%	4.2%		
NER [f]		44.4%	1.6%		
Teachers					
2008		25,912	1,613	2,456	
2009		26,575	2,191	5,753	
2010	1,240	26,658	2,310	5,714	69
Pupil: Teacher Ratio (PTR)					
2008		49.6	14.6	34.6	
2009		52.0	14.7	37.8	
2010	38.1	52.6	14.9	34.1	11.1
Schools					
2008		3,194	117		10
2009		3,321	158	1,086	20
2010	333	3,349	168	1,022	19
Pupil: Classroom Ratio (PCR)					
2008		194.2	50.9		
2009		129.5	40.2		
2010	104.6	134.2	40.1		

Note. Data from "Education Statistics for Southern Sudan" (22 February 2011). Ministry of Education of the Government of Southern Sudan. National Statistical Booklet 2010.

[a] 2010 was the first year to collect data with no data from three States (Western Equatoria, Warrap and Unity).

[b] Only 44.9% of teachers are trained. The PCR decrease from 2008 to 2010 is largely attributed to school construction of almost 5,000 permanent and semi-permanent classrooms, 47% of classrooms were open-air, roof and tents in 2010. 94% of primary schools are government owned. Primary coverage rate: 2008 = 87%, 2009 = 95%, and 2010 = 96.8%.

[c] Most secondary school classrooms have permanent or semi-permanent construction. 67% of secondary schools are government owned. Secondary coverage rate: 2008 = 96%, 2009 = 90%, and 2010 = 93.5%.

[d] Alternative Education System (AES) most often takes place in primary schools with existing teachers. Coverage rate is unknown for AES.

[e] Teacher Training Institutes (TTI) has missing data in 2010, so 2009 data should be used. Higher education coverage rate (includes TTI): 2008 = 100%, 2009 = 100%, 2010 = 50%.

[f] 2010 Gross enrollment rate (GER) and Net enrollment rate (NER) for primary ages 6-13 and secondary ages 14-17)

The data in Table 1 tell a story of a burgeoning primary education enrollment relative to other levels ("Southern Sudan Annual School Census," 2011). In 2010 only 44.4% of the primary-school aged population (ages 6-13) were in school (NER) and only 1.6% of the secondary school-aged population (ages 14-17) was attending secondary school. The 2010 gross enrollment ratio of 68.8% when compared to the NER indicates that there are 24% students over 13 years old attending primary school. This high NER also suggest the underutilization of the AES system, which is intended for older primary education students. The educational statistics demonstrate extremely limited provision of pre-primary, secondary and teacher education, and a severe shortage of permanent or semi-permanent classrooms for primary schools. Pupil to teacher ratios appear to be consistent with rations in the region, with the highest at primary level in 2010 (52.6), but less than half of teachers have had training so the quality of instruction is questionable.

Educational system data collection in Southern Sudan has been improving with increased coverage rates and types of data for each year. These data were not available when the current programs in Southern Sudan were being developed, so those interested in education gathered their own information about conditions in a relatively ad hoc manner. While the peace agreement was being brokered in 2004 and 2005, those involved in education in Southern Sudan had to balance the interests of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Association (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan

in the north. Education in Southern Sudan was and continues to be a patchwork of organizations and interests (L. B. Deng, 2006).

Employees of international organizations and other types of NGOs are often based in compounds in towns and cities throughout Southern Sudan. Most staff are away from their families, including national staff. Though many organizations strive to hire local staff from the particular state or region where they will work or at least a similar ethnic group, there was a common trend to hire those who had the education and skills to get the job accomplished. Due to the history of the conflict and Southern Sudan geography, those who lived in the Equatoria region in the southern most part of Southern Sudan often had better access to education, particularly higher education. Among many organizations Equatorians would be hired to work in states among ethnic groups and cultures other than their own. Therefore, even if a national employee was working in Southern Sudan, they may have experienced separation from their family and home had they been placed in another region.

Large educational programs in Southern Sudan. This research focused on large educational programs that work with the host government. Although numerous small projects exist, capturing employees' perceptions of program approaches across international borders required looking at large-scale efforts. Such programs have enough employees to sample and tend to work more closely with the host government. Major programs by donors from the United States, Japan, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund

(MDTF), United Nations agencies, and large NGOs are described below, but these excluded school construction since it does not involve educational practice.

USAID-supported programs. As of 2010 USAID had four contracted programs, apart from infrastructure development in SS3A. Southern Sudan Interactive Radio Instruction (SSIRI) is a distance-learning program, which includes teacher education. It intends to improve educational quality in existing schools in SS3A (Yasin & Tilson, 2009). The Building Responsibility for the Delivery of Government Services (BRIDGE) program is a multi-sector endeavor that includes an education component ("SudanBridge.org," n.d.; Winrock International, n.d.), which operates along the border States between northern and southern Sudan. Its education component supports schools through community-development funds, which includes creating parent-teacher associations, enhancing management capacity in schools, providing accelerated learning for adults, and providing grants for infrastructure. USAID also contracts with Winrock International to execute the Gender Equity for Education (GEE) program to increase girls' access to education and involvement in the education profession. The Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program's (SSTAP) primary aim is to enhance Ministry of Education's technical capacity to support an educational system. The author of this study worked for Academy for Educational Development on the SSTAP from February 2009 to February 2010. None of this research data was gathered during that time.

JICA-supported programs. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) worked on vocational education and teacher training in science and math at the basic-

education level ("JICA Activities in Sudan," 2011). Its vocational program was implemented from 2006 to 2009 through a multiservice training center in Juba. This science and math program taught pedagogy to trainers throughout Southern Sudan, who were then intended to train other teachers.

Multi-Donor Trust Fund. An MDTF was established through the World Bank to provide education and development funds through the GOSS. The fund has had mixed results in other sectors and poor ones in education (Brophy, 2007). The GOSS planned to institute a teacher-training initiative through the MDTF, but it was stalled (Brophy, 2007). Textbook distribution, in collaboration with the SSTAP and other smaller-scale projects, has taken place through MDTF. Sudan Recovery Funds, administered through the World Bank, funded small efforts until the MDTF mechanism in the government could be more fully functional and organized (Foster, Bennett, Brusset, & Kluyskens, 2010).

UNICEF and UNHCR. UNICEF provides support for a *Go to School* campaign to encourage children to return to school. It also had several projects with funds for events, school improvements and supplies that were routed through the Ministry of Education at various levels and NGOs. The Japanese government supported a UNHCR program for teacher training of returning Sudanese. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded UNHCR on an education- and training-reintegration project as well.

Multiple-Donor Support. The European Commission funded a variety of rehabilitation and recovery projects throughout SS3A, including several through NGOs.

For instance, the government of Norway through the Norwegian Refugee Council provided significant funds to the Southern Sudan Council of Churches on an education-support project, accelerated-learning programs and school construction. The United Kingdom supported a payroll system, school support, and construction. The Danish aid agency, DANIDA, provided for bridging programs to reintegrate refugees into the formal education system, accelerated-learning programs, and primary education support to schools. Save the Children through its Rewrite the Future campaign and with aid from several governments provided accelerated learning, vocational training, and teacher training in eight states of Southern Sudan ("DFID – Rewriting the future for Sudan's children," n.d.; "Southern Sudan – Save the Children," n.d.). Similar projects can be found throughout SS3A, but because the area is large and the need is great, many areas still have gaps, according to Sommers (2005) and this author's experience as well.

The study site. Southern Sudan and the Three Areas (SS3A) is particularly interesting for examining the congruence between headquarters to field employee perceptions because it is a society in transition after the peace agreement. In any circumstance, headquarters staff rely on those in the field to be the eyes and ears of the program, and this was critical when working in SS3A. The barriers to program success were due to poor infrastructure in education, communication, transportation, banking and health. Information about the population, school conditions and teachers to inform policy and practice was also limited in the beginning, but has more recently become available with the Sudan population census in 2009 and the annual education census

that began in 2006 ("Southern Sudan Annual School Census," 2011). As already described, the data in Southern Sudan paints a challenging picture of substantial needs in education for the immediate and long term future. This future is embedded in a global context in which conflict-affected countries have received greater attention in the last decade.

Global Context: Education in a Conflict-Affected Country

Countries affected by violent conflict are among the most challenging places to provide education. Many post-conflict countries have major human-resources constraints, such as teacher shortages due to outward migration or genocide (Buckland, 2004). To frame the historical context of education in emergencies, some clarification about the field, its trends, and terminology follows. First this section examines some key definitions in the field, and then takes a closer look at education in conflict-affected countries.

Education for All. EFA began in 1990 as an agreement among governments to prioritize education worldwide. The United Nations Education and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) has served as the lead agency promoting EFA to increase primary-education access globally (Chabbott, 1998; UNESCO, 1990). The Dakar Framework for Action in 2000 (UNESCO, 2000) highlighted a lack of progress in EFA in countries affected by conflict or disaster (Bensalah, Sinclair, Nacer, Commisso, & Bokhari, 2001). One result of the Dakar framework was the creation of the INEE (Anderson et al., 2006).

The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). The INEE was established to advocate for education in emergencies, set standards for the field, and serve as a clearinghouse for information regarding effective practices (INEE, 2007). INEE's advocacy efforts and standards are now well established (INEE, 2007, 2010), though work continues regarding information sharing. Organizations using INEE standards want a better understanding of implementation procedures, along with standards that include specific indicators for educational progress rather than general guidelines (Anderson et al., 2006).

Education in emergencies. The field of education in emergencies (EiE) is a subfield of educational development. Those who work in EiE aim to address dismal results of educational access and quality in countries affected by disaster and conflict (Bensalah et al., 2000; UNESCO, 2000). The work involved in EiE includes emergency operations, response to chronic crisis, and the early reconstruction of educational systems following a disaster or resolution of a conflict (INEE, 2004). Although natural or manmade environmental disasters may have some bearing on a conflict, this examination centers on post-conflict environments.

Conflict versus disaster. Literature about EiE often concentrates on two types: conflict or disaster. Conflicts combined with disaster represent a third type of situation (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003; Rose & Greeley, 2006). Conflicts are also often called "complex emergencies" (INEE, 2004), due to civil unrest or armed conflict. Disasters can be either manmade or natural, such as major earthquakes or droughts. A common

theme in both natural-disaster and conflict-focused definitions of EiE is rapid response (Buckland, 2004, p. 85) and inclusion of education in humanitarian assistance (UNESCO, 2003).

The distinction between manmade or natural may not always be clear (INEE, 2004). For instance, Hurricane Katrina had manmade elements of a disaster with the disrepair of dikes in New Orleans that exacerbated the hurricane's effects. Furthermore, many clashes also involve environmental factors. For example, famine has been associated with conflict and even considered a form of it (Sommers, 2005). Conflicts can emerge amid economic constraints combined with environmental catastrophe, thereby connecting both conflict and disaster, as in 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka (Burde, 2005). These examples illustrate that countries affected by conflict are often more vulnerable to disaster since their attention and resources can be skewed toward attending to the conflict, as was the case in SS3A. Both conflict and disaster response requires a quick reaction for stabilization and, to varying degrees, reform to mark change from the unstable past (Buckland, 2006).

Country, area, and society. A post-conflict country or region has endured violent conflict affecting national institutions. Highly localized situations with minimal impact on national institutions are not a part of this definition since their resolution would likely occur on a community or national level rather than through international action. The terms "area" and "society" are occasionally used instead of "country" since conflicts may involve issues of representation or sovereignty, thus making the term

"country" politically contested, as in Timor-Leste and Kosovo where new governments formed as a result of the conflict (Rose & Greeley, 2006). Even when the term "country" is used, its stability is often questionable since many conflict-affected countries are also fragile states with minimal capacity to provide basic governmental functions and services (Chauvet & Collier, 2008; Rose & Greeley, 2006).

Conflict-affected versus post-conflict. The term "conflict-affected" is most frequently used rather than "post-conflict" since the end of unrest can be nebulous. Violence often continues even after formal agreements are made, so indicating when the conflict has subsided or is over (i.e., "post") can be challenging. Major organizations in the field use both terms.

Emergency operation phases. To examine educational approaches in these circumstances, it helps to understand the phases of operation. Three stages are associated with EiE: preparing for the prospect of a crisis; during crisis or in crisis; and early reconstruction immediately following a conflict (Sommers, 2002). Each phase is presented in Figure 1, comparing the dominant levels of humanitarian assistance with education in conflict and emergencies. The exact stages are approximations, and the distinction between rehabilitation and development is less clear in education than in humanitarian assistance.

Figure 1

Phases of education in emergencies compared to humanitarian sectors



[a] Humanitarian assistance phases of the Sphere Minimum Standards
[b] According to the United Nations World Food Program (www.wfp.org)
[c] According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (www.unhcr.org)
[d] Education for All in Conflict (Sommers, 2002)
[e] Minimum Standards (INEE, 2004, 2010)

In Figure 1, food aid, here designated by the World Food Program (WFP), has two emergency phases: emergency operation and protracted relief and recovery operations. The United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), often in charge of shelter, security, and refugee education, has one short emergency phase followed by maintenance and the ultimate resolution of the conflict with repatriation or reconstruction efforts (Bensalah et al., 2000). In contrast, educational efforts are developmental with much less precise terms for the phases and transitions. Humanitarian assistance by WFP and UNHCR both emphasize recovery as a relatively

distinct phase, often following formal appeals and definitions. Educational efforts emphasize ongoing development using assessments, response and recovery.

Education, even in emergencies, is generally considered a development activity (Sommers, 2002), as illustrated in Figure 1. Emergency response in education is largely reactive since preventative measures pre-crisis are limited. Aid agencies see the pre-crisis time as development assistance, often with little action or investment (Sommers, 1999). Davies (2004) suggests that conflict prevention requires change and dynamic systems of education often not found in pre-crisis contexts.

EiE during a crisis happens primarily in refugee camps in two forms: international aid–supported programs, such as school kits (referred to as "school in a box"), and community schools initiated by refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Sommers, 1999). Educational efforts continue in conflict-affected areas even during a conflict, largely through community-created schools (Buckland, 2004; Sommers, 1999). Sommers (1999) believes that these schools can be a starting point for future efforts, particularly to understand local educational priorities. Moreover, in the crisis or relief phases, getting children into school can be seen as a sign of stability.

The role of education in post-conflict reconstruction is for "both preventing conflict and rebuilding fractured post conflict societies" (Buckland, 2004, p. xii) and is necessarily tied to development (Buckland, 2004; Sinclair, 2002). As with during a conflict, post-conflict reconstruction requires simultaneous reform and expansion. Reform marks a change from the past, particularly away from educational approaches

that contributed to the clashes (Buckland, 2004), and reconstruction and expansion serve to mend and improve the system. The balanced inclusion of conflicting groups is a vital part of the process (Burde, 2004; Spink, 2005) to have a *peace dividend*.

Peace dividend. Although supporting educational development cannot solve a conflict, it can improve chances for peace (Buckland, 2006). Educational systems that are not responsive to society are more likely to contribute to tensions that can lead to harmful conflicts (Davies, 2004) or poverty (Sen, 1999). The initiation of educational efforts in conflict-affected areas occurs in an unstable environment, so programs often need adjustments (Anderson et al., 2006). A tactic to realize a *peace dividend* (Buckland, 2006) is to minimize fragility while bolstering stability (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009). This peace dividend can serve as an incentive for donors to take action in unstable places or regions in anticipation of future pay-offs if stability is achieved.

Global versus international. "Global" and "international" are another set of concepts that require some distinction. For this study Chabbott's (1998) definition of the globalization of education, "an institutional process by which international organizations propagate and diffuse world educational models consistent with professional norms in the international development field," is used (p. 217). Here globalization is seen as a process in which models from various international levels converge into worldwide norms. Norms are an important component of this process since they propose what ought to be done or what ought not to be done (Sunstein, 1997) on a global level through the assertions of international actors. The word

"international," in contrast to "global," describes a situation in which organizations and governments act based on national representation.

Organizations most often have a national orientation, often represented by the headquarters location. Agencies are also encouraged to work on educational initiatives at a national level by collaborating with local and national governments (INEE, 2004). United Nations bodies are international in orientation since they act on the basis of representation of national governments. Therefore, "global" represents the changes seen throughout the world (Rizvi, 2004) through dominant norms (Chabbott, 1998). "International" is the orientation of organizations and institutions in a worldwide system that creates global norms, and borrows policies and practices to adapt to their own circumstances (Phillips & Ochs, 2004, Steiner-Khamsi, 2010). The standards and norms in this study involve educational strategies, practices, and approaches, which the next set of definitions explicates.

Education strategy, practice, and approach. For this study, an educational strategy means the components of a program or project as planned, for instance, teacher training or curriculum development with particular characteristics. An educational practice is an implemented strategy usually repeated in a similar manner. Educational strategies as planned may differ from educational practices as implemented since through the implementation process, some adjustments are likely made from the original plan. An educational approach includes both educational strategies and practices, and suggests the intended and actual realization of an initiative. The word

"approach" along with the term "practice" was used throughout this study since practices may be associated with "good practice" or "best practices," while approach has a more neutral connotation.

Educational practice, best practices, and good practices. "Best practices" (UNESCO, 2003) or "good practices" (Anderson et al., 2006; Rose & Greeley, 2006) seek to identify what works in education across multiple contexts or in particular situations. These terms, though ubiquitous, often insufficiently explain why the actions are considered "best" or "good" and who assessed them. These practices often only have minimal or anecdotal evidence of effectiveness. Educational experts may view practices differently than local stakeholders or field employees, so what is "best" or "good" is largely circumstantial or a matter of opinion.

National and international employees. Employees who are not from the host country are international employees. Those from SS3A are national employees for the purposes of this study. Though this research focuses on staff roles, their personal and professional backgrounds would likely influence their views. Cultural competence may also influence employee effectiveness, particularly for those who are not from SS3A (Fry & Thurber, 1989). Employee's level of comfort in working outside organization policies or norms would also likely affect their perceptions and actions (Holohan, 2005), particularly since local employees are often hired for a particular project and international staff frequently have stronger ties to the organization.

Headquarters versus field personnel. Field and headquarters personnel can be distinguished by their primary location of operations. For this study, organization headquarters personnel work in a region or headquarters apart from the population experiencing post-conflict reconstruction and have the potential to influence program design. They are often focused on organization policies and donor relations on an international level. Field personnel work in a host country or on its border and are in direct contact with local stakeholders (Suzuki, 1998). Results from this research found a second headquarters for the program in the capital city of Juba, which interacted with the organizational headquarters in the United States, but was based in the field.

Field and headquarters employees have requests, or demands, of each other. Their roles are both supportive of each other's efforts toward program goals while also potentially contentious in negotiating varying perspectives about operations and program delivery (Suzuki, 1998). The next section elaborates on EiE in looking at the problem context and educational approaches.

Conflict recovery and reconstruction. The concept of EiE is not new, though widespread attention to it globally is a rather recent phenomenon (Sommers, 2002, 2004). Prior to the Dakar Framework for Action, attention to EiE was taken on a regional or case-by-case basis, with the increased attention in the mid-1990s focused on the delivery of educational services (Mitter, 2003; Tawil & Harley, 2004; World Bank, 2002). From the mid-1990s to the beginning of the 21st century, the impacts of conflict, such as child soldiers and victims, were highlighted as major international problems, but

with scarce focus on education (Machel, 2001). Large-scale international coordination of education initiatives along with other humanitarian assistance has emerged in the past decade, and EiE has been recognized as a field (Tomlinson & Benefield, 2005). The creation and use of the INEE Minimum Standards (2004, 2010) has led to increased attention to EiE. This study was conducted eight years after the recognition of education as an important part of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction for stability and peace (Tomlinson & Benefield, 2005), and approximately six years after the creation of the minimum standards. Overall, the field is still rather young.

The Machel report (2001) marked a turning point from viewing children in post-conflict areas as soldiers or victims toward an emphasis on their plight as worthy of action (Women's Commission, 2007). This report was a United Nations review of the impact of armed conflict on children, authored by a former education minister of Mozambique. The report suggested five themes to consider when providing services to children from conflict-affected areas: the consequences of the conflict; coping strategies; decision-making mechanisms, options to participate in peace and reconciliation activities; and the mobilization of local, regional, and international resources. Graça Machel calls for a "renaissance—a transformation of schools into safe havens for communal care, learning and support" for children affected by both HIV/AIDS and war (2001, p. 49). She stressed the commitment to basic education for all regardless of conditions of peace or war.

While the Machel report received attention in the development and humanitarian-assistance communities, EiE also received greater notice due to worldwide events. The attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington D.C. led to questions regarding how to discuss the terrorism with children in the United States. The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, also known as the Asian tsunami, highlighted the devastating affect of natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 prompted discussion of how emergencies are handled in the United States, particularly for low-income populations in New Orleans whose long-term educational challenges were exacerbated by the disaster. Furthermore, major EiE efforts took place in Rwanda as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990s; Kosovo starting in 1999; Afghanistan in 2001; Timor-Leste leading up to independence in 2002; in addition to ongoing efforts in and surrounding Somalia and in SS3A (Rose & Greeley, 2006). Because of these responses, education has been growing in stature as an emergency endeavor and has even been called "the fourth pillar of humanitarian assistance" (UNESCO, 2003).

Although the above examples include industrialized nations, EiE remains a field focused on developing countries. However, concurrent urgent situations in both rich and poor areas are likely an important factor to advancing the field. The human effects of large-scale emergencies can be seen and felt globally. Schooling within EiE is understood in many ways, including as a part of stabilization efforts (Buckland, 2004),

an opportunity for a renaissance (Machel, 2001), or a dynamic means for societal transformation (Davies, 2004).

A UNESCO document describes EiE from an advocacy standpoint as a "humanitarian imperative, which has development-promoting outcomes" (Bensalah et al., 2000, p. 9). Margaret Sinclair (2002) presents an alternative UNESCO definition of EiE as *destabilization*, a *disorganized* or *destroyed* system as a result of conflict or disaster (p. 22). Later, Sinclair proposes using Save the Children's notion of "education that protects the well-being, fosters learning opportunities, nurtures the overall development (social, emotional, cognitive, physical) of children affected by conflict and disasters" (Save the Children Alliance Education Group, 2001, cited in Sinclair, 2002, p. 23). All three definitions above are presented from an advocacy stance on the basis of education as a human right with assumed aims toward peace and stability.

More nuanced views of EiE focus on its purpose. Education is seen as a phased response that can influence conflict either positively or negatively (Buckland, 2004, Davies, 2004) and even plays a role in allowing tensions to increase toward violence (Davies, 2004). Government instability has a significant impact on education, as can be seen in the fragile-states literature (Barakat, Karpinska & Paulson, 2008; Colenso & Buckland, 2006; World Bank, 2005).

An important distinction should be made between the two sets of definitions of education in emergencies. When viewed as a human right, providing education in emergency circumstances takes on an advocacy tone. In contrast, when education is

viewed as potentially alleviating or inciting violence, then a constructivist view suggests that its value depends on its implementation (Wendt, 1992).

Conflict affects educational systems and the provision of education by straining educational opportunities and access. Education can influence a conflict through the use of a particular curriculum, as in Afghanistan where harmful language directed toward certain ethnic groups is believed to have had an effect there (Spink, 2005). Likewise, in Rwanda, history was not taught for several years after the genocide (Obura, 2005; Tawil & Harley, 2004). In Southern Sudan, the northern government used education to promote a cultural and religious agenda (Deng, 1995; Jok, 2007). Authors such as Peter Buckland (2004) of the World Bank suggest the power of education on conflict is largely symbolic as in the examples above.

Education can contribute to conflict and peace, but there are constraints to its effects. Buckland said it plainly: "education does not cause wars, nor does it end them" (2006, p. 8). Education's potential role in increasing (Spink, 2005) or decreasing tensions (Davies, 2004) does not imply causation. However, its possible effect can be beneficial and requires focusing on contentious issues in recovery efforts (Buckland, 2004).

Scope of the problem – Education in conflict-affected areas. In a global estimate, 42% of the world's out-of-school children are from conflict-affected countries (28 million, UNESCO, 2011) accompanied with high dropout rates and low literacy compared to other parts of the world. In another estimate, forty-three million primary-

school aged children who are out of school worldwide live in conflict-affected fragile states (Save the Children, 2006, p. 1). Only three percent of refugee and internally displaced youth attend school (Refugee Education Trust [RET], 2004). When compared with the 15% of youth who go to school in the least developed countries, it is clear that the 6.8 million youth (RET, 2004) who are not in school in conflict-affected areas are among the most disadvantaged youth population in the world.

A 2002 review of refugee and in-country populations in conflict-affected countries found of the estimated 160,000 Sudanese refugees, 50,000 (31%) were not in school and of the 1.06 million school-aged non-refugee children 820,000 (77%) were not in school (Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2004, p. 9). Sudanese refugees had somewhat better educational opportunities with 31% out of school versus 45% among ten countries affected by conflict, but in-country school-aged youth who were out of school was much higher in Sudan (77%) in contrast to other conflict-affected countries (54%, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2004, p. 9). However, as Table 1 has already illustrated, schooling inside of Southern Sudan was and continues to be highly constrained at all levels.

Those metrics, and even that of access to education, are difficult to calculate in conflict areas since the capacity to obtain and process data is often severely constrained. Even when the research is available, dissemination of results is limited (Tomlinson & Benefield, 2005). Organizations and governments can rely on a consolidated appeals process through the United Nations to coordinate planning and programming among

donor actions across countries and sectors, but education is often not a priority when pitted against other sectors (Rose & Greeley, 2006). Since EFA (Chabbott, 1998; UNESCO, 1990, 2000) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (United Nations, 2000) have emphasized primary educational access, many organizations focus on access first. Gender-based preferences in education have been a major theme to both EFA and MDGs (Abu-Gaida & Klasen, 2003). Indeed, the field of EiE emerged from the recognition that conflict-affected areas lagged behind other countries in terms of access (UNESCO, 2002). The qualities of educational development are not absent from the focus on access in the EFA and MDG efforts, but access is an easier measure of progress on a global level than quality, or even attrition or attendance.

Evidence that programs work is highly valued by donors and implementing organizations. International organizations can borrow and adapt program strategies and associated policies easily because of their familiarity with how education works in various locations. The strategies and policies developed in one country are often borrowed and adapted for another through policies and the adoption of programs as educational development becomes increasingly global (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010; Stromquist, 2002). Though there has been research and attention on educational policy borrowing (Phillips & Ochs, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi, 2010) and the role of NGOs (Riehl, 2001; Sutton & Arnove, 2004), the ways that NGO employees adapt their approach to a particular context has had less scrutiny.

Educational Approaches in Conflict-Affected Countries

Educational efforts in SS3A are shaped in part by global efforts in other post-conflict countries and the experience of international organizations. This review of the literature covers the approaches used for education in conflict-affected countries and the types of organizations involved. The conceptual framework to guide this study is further explained at the end of this chapter along with research questions.

Educational approaches in conflict-affected countries. International groups, including multilateral agencies and large NGOs, tend to view governments as the primary actor to lead a national educational system (INEE, 2006; Save the Children, 2006). International organizations serve as the principal contractors of large programs, often funded by other governments or through private donations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee outlines approaches to relief efforts with significant western governments driving predominant approaches forward (Harmer & Martin, 2010).

Organizations frame education in post-conflict in different ways, such as a humanitarian, human rights, or development approach (Burde, 2005). The adherence to standards (Anderson et al., 2006), policies, or rules (Holohan, 2005) also varies. Preferences for educational approaches in conflict-affected countries range from structured recreation to non-formal schooling to formal schooling (Women's Commission, 2004). So when an organization's frame of reference as to why education is needed is broad, its activities are also diverse. For this study, the practices described

in a global study by the Women's Commission (2004) were used to outline the language and issues common to education in conflict-affected countries.

Formal primary education. Formal primary education for refugees and IDPs most often occurs in a refugee camp during conflict or in the country during relief and recovery. The global survey found that formal primary education is the most common approach among international organizations (Women's Commission, 2004). This fact is unsurprising since both EFA and MDG emphasize it. However, the ways in which it is implemented in post-conflict countries can differ. Many times organizations address one or a few aspects of schooling, such as teacher training, updating curricula, providing school materials or operating a school. It is possible that an organization would implement some, but not all, of a formal primary education since their approach is often customized according to the implementer's preferred method. In SS3A, NGOs, churches and volunteers supported formal primary education in schools with a wide range of involvement and generally with limited resources (Sommers, 2005).

Teacher training. Teacher training was included as a distinct activity from formal education in the survey (Women's Commission, 2004) since international organizations often treat teacher education separate from education provision. The program design, connections required, and issues involved in teacher training are rather different when compared to providing formal primary school. A teacher-training problem can also be highly dependent on location, teacher-shortage rates, and practicing teachers' education levels. For example, SS3A had and continues to have a widespread

teacher shortage, compounded by many existing teachers lack training. According to the 2002 baseline study (New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation & UNICEF, 2004), only 48% teachers had in-service training, 7% having formal training and 45% having no training at all as of 2002. With an adult literacy rate of 37% (10–12% for women), finding qualified teachers is a problem across SS3A. Though teacher training was needed in SS3A, large-scale teacher training efforts were only being addressed in later stages of the recovery effort after significant delays (Leu, 2011; Morton, J; Denny, R. & Lisok, R., 2009).

Curriculum development. Like teacher training, curriculum development is a component of formal education but is often viewed as a discrete activity in EiE. National identity, history, and language can become contentious in curriculum development in places with identity-based conflict (Tawil & Harley, 2004). The curriculum itself can instigate further clashes (Spink, 2005). The curricula from Kenya and Uganda have been used in SS3A with little or no adaptation during the war and as a starting point for reconstruction efforts by many organizations in part due to its language of instruction (Brophy, 2003). This borrowing effectively pushes education to a regional level (Crossley, Chisholm & Holmes, 2005). After the peace agreement, education agencies began a process calling to standardize the curricula and increase cultural relevance in education ("JAM Sudan Volume 1," 2005).

Rwanda presents an interesting example in which the history curriculum was intentionally not developed until years after the genocide. Initial reconstruction efforts

focused on basic skills with little attention to potentially contentious, political or social topics (Obura, 2005). Though curriculum efforts in Rwanda have been noted for their attentiveness to the fragile peace, access to education has remained a challenge (Sommers, 2006). In contrast, curriculum changes in Southern Sudan arose out of views of the previous curriculum as "intolerable instruments of state dominance, and resistance to them helped fuel vicious civil wars" (Sommers, 2009, p. 30). Changing of the curriculum and language of instruction impacted teacher training and examinations in a place with poor infrastructure to produce and distribute materials and teachers who were not prepared to use it.

Child-friendly spaces. The Child Friendly Spaces program, organized by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), promoted a sense of safety and psychosocial healing within schools (Women's Commission, 2004). The psychosocial elements of educational spaces and programs are a necessary in post-conflict zones to ensure that those involved feel secure enough to participate (INEE, 2004; UNESCO, 2003; UNESCO, 2006). Child-friendly schools used locally developed and international standards.

Accelerated learning. Accelerated learning programs for youth, who lack years of education due to the conflict since many were child soldiers, have been underway in Liberia and SS3A (Rose & Greeley, 2006; Sommers, 2005). Accelerated learning can help transition youth into formal primary after years away, while also moving toward widespread educational development (Buckland, 2004). The global survey found that

most accelerated-learning programs condense six years of education into three (Women's Commission, 2004).

Bridging programs. Similar to accelerated learning, bridging programs use an examination to determine the level at which a student can enter formal schooling after receiving some instruction. UNESCO had a Teacher Emergency Package as a part of their Program for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction (PEER) to address educational needs amid the lack of school infrastructure, standardized curricula, trained teachers, teacher salaries and a functioning educational authority. The program in Somalia enrolled students after receiving one year of instruction and taking an exam to determine their grade level (Women's Commission, 2004). These programs aim to reintegrate out-of-school youth back into the formal education system as soon as possible. Instead of implementing a bridging program, UNESCO opted for a non-formal environmental education program for Sudanese refugees (UNESCO, 2004), which shows that similar country conditions do not necessarily result in similar program strategies.

Vocational or skills training for youth and adults. Vocational education can be established for out-of-school youth or as a part of a formal curriculum in or after school (Women's Commission, 2004). In their review of transition programs for former combatants in four post-conflict countries, Rahim and Holland (2006) noted traditional vocational education programs have an "inconsistent record", but training for family-based vocations and apprenticeships appear to be good options (p. iv). A similar critique

of vocational training is that it promotes economy-centered rather than child-centered learning (Stromquist & Monkman, 2000). These critiques appear to be relevant in SS3A where vocational training programs were limited to agriculture and fishing with little emphasis on trade skills and lacking job opportunities for students (Johnson, Phillips, & Maclean, 2007, p. 18).

Non-formal education. Non-formal education approaches are known for their flexibility and tendency to work on learning outside of schools while striving to reach similar learning outcomes as the formal system. Informal, on the other hand, often focuses on extracurricular learning and activities. In the global survey, the main non-formal approach was distance education (Women's Commission, 2004), and other non-formal activities in the survey were structured recreation activities, youth centers, and vocational or skills training. Somalia has many such projects in part due to the lack of government support for formal education (Bekalo, Brophy & Welford, 2003; Morumbasi, 2007).

Non-formal programs for children and flexible-education programs for youth who have competing demands between school and work may provide grassroots strategies for improved access (Bekalo et al., 2003; Morumbasi, 2007; Sommers, 2005). Though the quality of non-formal strategies can be questionable, these approaches in Somalia that combined work and learning decreased time and location constraints often found in formal schooling (Bekalo et al., 2003). One of the best-known non-formal

programs originated from BRAC in Bangladesh, which has been praised for its creative way of training teachers while they teach (Craig, Kraft & du Plessis, 1998).

Non-formal education can be supplementary, compensatory, or an alternative to formal schooling (Hoppers, 2000, pp. 9–11). In the global survey, non-formal education is an alternative to formal schooling provided due to the lack of educational services in post-conflict countries (Women's Commission, 2004). In his review of non-formal education, Hoppers (2000) wrote "non-formal education is still at best [a] mopping up operation clearing some of the debris left behind an intensely faulty formal schooling system" (p.9). In EiE there is likely greater approval of non-formal education than Hoppers suggests since the failures of formal systems are often so great that the majority of a population does not access quality education (New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation & UNICEF, 2004).

Access to non-formal-schooling efforts is difficult to measure since many are focused on a particular purpose, such as health information, safety, or literacy. For instance, Southern Sudan has program such as non-formal adult literacy training that incorporated conflict resolution and peace-building skills (McCaffery, 2005), which served a dual purpose. Other factors in Southern Sudan affect access due to challenges in program delivery, such as a lack of travel support for trainers to reach students, the use of volunteer teachers, absenteeism due to poverty and barriers for women to participate due to gender roles (Smith, Wheaton, & Mosselson, 2009).

Distance education. Radio shows and self-directed learning programs are common examples of distance education. These can be stand-alone projects or supplemented with learning materials or lessons. Distance programs often use a non-formal approach to highlight learning multiple skills within one theme, such as literacy, safety (UNESCO, 2006), or health education (Pridmore & Yates, 2005). Radio programs can also promote education by encouraging parents and students to go to school (Betz, 2004).

The Southern Sudan Interactive Radio Instruction (SSIRI) program is an example of distance education designed to enhance teacher qualifications and student learning (Yasin & Tilson, 2009). Interactive radio is housed along with accelerated-learning programs in the MoE Department for Alternative-Learning Programs (ALP). Interactive radio instruction provides education to students while demonstrating methods teachers can use to deliver educational content along with the broadcast. Through the process of teaching with radio, instructors are anticipated to learn lesson-planning and child-centered pedagogy. Language lessons over the radio are also provided to adults (Yasin & Tilson, 2009).

Youth centers and structured recreation for children. Youth centers provide a physical space and time for youth to define their futures with informal recreation activities, semi-structured learning (UNDP, 2006; USAID, 2004) and the opportunity to learn from peers (Women's Commission, 2004). The global survey (Women's Commission, 2004) describes structured recreation as similar to youth centers, but

focused on children either in schools or community centers. These centers expand education beyond formal primary schools and into the community for learning to become a part of the society (Sommers, 2002). In focus groups of Ugandan and Sudanese youth, the Women's Commission (2004) found that youth want educational organizations and the international community to get involved in the politics of educational development and conflict resolution so that they can go to formal school.

Life-skills education. A wide range of life-skills can be a part of education after a conflict, such as peace education, conflict-resolution training, security training, landmine awareness, and HIV/AIDS awareness (Women's Commission, 2004). This type of learning is often non-formal through distance education, in structured recreation or youth centers, but it can also take place in schools. Peace or conflict-resolution programs in schools recognize those institutions' socialization role (Williams, 2004). Virtually all forms of life-skills training can take place in both formal and non-formal settings. However the quality and focus of peace education and conflict-resolution efforts in particular can vary greatly (Davies, 2004, Sommers, 2006) in how they teach about peace versus teaching critical approaches for dealing with conflict.

Programs used for education in conflict-affected countries often focus on several aspects of education. They can have an array of approaches or specialize in a particular type. As can be seen from this chapter, the types of education are highly variable in their aims and forms of learning. Many times, non-formal education strategies, such as an accelerated-learning program, youth centers, or life-skills training, are only intended

to supplement the formal system. In conflict-affected countries, such as SS3A, these strategies can become a primary focus rather than the formal system.

Organizations in Educational Development

International organizations are involved in educational recovery and reconstruction in many locations. Educational-system development is directly influenced by interests from within and outside a country with the globalization of public institutions blurring the lines between local and international organizations (Foster, Bennett, Brusset, & Kluyskens, 2010). A benefit of international action is the formation of communities of practice around education during emergency, recovery and reconstruction, such as in the INEE. People who work in multiple emergencies can see patterns across different efforts. UNESCO (2003) suggests supporting stand-by personnel in regions to provide expertise in the event of an emergency within the area they are most familiar. Challenges to implementing organizations involved in EiE include insufficient coordination (Bensalah et al., 2000; Sommers, 2004), the lack of adherence to standards (Bensalah et al., 2000), impossible or improbable mandates (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004), the need for significant outside investment (Save the Children, 2006), and a hesitation to engage in a proactive response (World Bank, 2004).

Coordination. Coordination facilitates the coexistence of complementary and competing interests toward educational-system development (Sommers, 2004). Sommers (2004) finds that coordination helps bring cohesion to what would otherwise be defacto control over dispersed educational systems with societal division, espouses a

humanitarian value, lessens the impact of a crisis on children, builds a common national identity, and offers a platform to address varied needs and intersts of a wide range of stakeholders to contribute to educational system development. Coordination can result in united aims, such as concentrating attention on the problem of EiE at the Education for All summit in Dakar (Bensalah et al., 2000). However, coordination can be overemphasized, becoming an activity that creates another layer of bureaucracy or unnecessary challenges. Buckland (2006) comments that EiE efforts can be overly coordinated. Both networking and coordination can become time-consuming activities.

Networking. The sharing of ideas and practices can be an activity in itself. For instance, UNESCO (2003) categorizes information sharing, "best" practices–sharing, and policy-making as related activities toward innovative strategies for educational reconstruction. Similarly, INEE (2004) has sought to spread "good" practices. NGOs pick and choose which standards they want to follow (Anderson et al, 2001). According to Holohan's (2005) study in Kosovo, relationship-building and loosely formed networks yielded better results than emphasis on rules and standards among organizations involved in post-conflict reconstruction. The education field seems to subscribe to a partial ideal neutrality, in which humanitarian workers are prohibited from being politically engaged (Fox, 2001). Rather, EiE standards focus on a variety of opinions in the population (Davies, 2004) and an ideal of including the widest range of stakeholders possible to address multiple perspectives and concerns (INEE, 2004; Save the Children, 2006; Sommers, 2004). Davies (2004) makes a similar appeal for open

networks, which lead to self-organizing systems, when people come together to create educational systems that consider and benefit from varying perspectives.

Davies (2004) asserts "negative conflict arises when there is a lack of connectivity, of feedback, of use of information and of willingness to benefit from diversity" (p. 15). In Davies' complexity shutdown theory, she posits that if an initiative does not include key stakeholders or lacks vigor, then stagnant educational systems are likely to develop. These dysfunctional systems can provoke negative conflict since they lack ways to respond to and incorporate societal needs into a dynamic system. Positive, often nonviolent, conflict can improve a society and its institutions, such as social-justice or human rights movements that challenge systems. Similar forms of positive conflict can occur within organizations to spark change in policy or practice (Suzuki, 1998).

Organizations from outside and inside post-conflict areas create the foundation for educational-system development (Buckland, 2004). They also serve as advocates for education (Save the Children, 2006). Networking and coordination are intended to reveal the common roles for various actors in educational development, which is often organized by participating organizations since in a fragile state the government's capacity is stretched thin.

Host government. The GOSS MoE's role was to pay salaries, but had extremely limited funds for anything else (Davies, 2009). Governments are expected to provide education to their people (UNESCO, 2002). When education is not provided,

even during a conflict, states have "avoided their obligations" to do so under international conventions (UNESCO, 2003, p. 7). When governments do not fulfill their obligations, non-state actors such as NGOs (Save the Children, 2006) and communities (Sommers, 2004) often fill at least part of the gap.

In places affected by conflict, host governments are often at the will of donors since they may not be prepared to decline aid that does not fit with their visions of education (Sommers, 2004). The role of government in education could be said to be diminishing in light of global interests from business and international organizations (Dimmock & Walker, 2000; Stromquist, 2002). The emerging government in Southern Sudan had a limited ability to educate its people (Acacia consultants ltd., 2008; "JAM Sudan Volume 3," 2005) and was expected to be limited for some time because "formal government structures must be created from scratch" (Pantuliano, 2009, p. 2). In SS3A bilateral and multilateral agencies funded efforts to build the government's capacity to contract and administer social services, including education (Davies, 2009).

Local stakeholders and decentralization. Schooling often continues even during a conflict because learning is usually a priority for local communities. With a lack of a functioning government, educational efforts are decentralized by default. In peaceful times, decentralization efforts can reshape education by heightening the influence of women (Stromquist, 1995), transferring decisions from government to the school (Chapman, 2001), increasing non-formal schooling (Closson, 2002), raising the ability of non-state actors to become involved in education (Buckland, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi

& Stolpe, 2004) and engaging in multi-sector development (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Crewe & Harrison, 2000; Korten, 2001). One risk of decentralization is complacency. Communities can be satisfied with the status quo, in part because they are unfamiliar with alternatives to their own experience (Chapman, Barcikowski, Sowah, Gyamera, & Woode, 2002). In SS3A, decentralization aimed to include a wide array of stakeholders in decision making and planning, though many educational officials were reluctant to extend decision-making authority beyond MoE personnel according to the experiences of the researcher prior to embarking on this study.

Donors. There are several types of donors, including bilateral, multilateral, private, religious and non-governmental organizations. This study examined a program that a bilateral government agency contracted an organization to implement in SS3A. Funders together with the host government decide if they will support development focused on problems, sector(s) or programs (Chapman & Dykstra, 2006). The donor often arranges a contract with an implementing agency rather than directly to the host government due to limited government capacity to execute programs. Under the contractual model, an agency has been hired to do a project or solve a problem as defined by the donor and host government.

In Southern Sudan prior to the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2005, the Secretariat of Education (SoE) served as the governing body for education in Southern Sudan, which later became the GOSS Ministry of Education (MoE). The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) took the stance that

education could not be supported until there was a peace agreement (Sommers, 2005). USAID, on the other hand, initiated an interactive radio project in SS3A as early as 2004 because similar programs had worked in other countries (Yasin and Tilson, 2009). Working fragile governments, as in SS3A, can challenge donor preferences to work with the host government since decision-making channels and authority tend to be poorly defined. To surpass these obstacles, the INEE (2010) proposes working with communities as a crosscutting approach to education in emergencies, but donors often have to choose an appropriate body to engage with rather than the community at large.

Multilateral agencies. As UN agencies, UNESCO, UNICEF, and UNHCR are mandated to work with governments and support government-led coordination of EiE response. The World Bank Multinational Trust Funds are common elements in post-conflict reconstruction in which education is a major activity (World Bank, 2004). Multilateral organizations assist governments in establishing a coordination mechanism at national, regional, and community levels through pooled resources (Rose & Greeley, 2006). These agencies tend to focus on building relationships and resources to set the stage for educational development. Although multilateral agencies sometimes implement projects, most appeal for funds or coordinate initiatives with partners.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs often implement programs, either with or without host-government collaboration. They may vie for influence or territory to work in a particular area among NGOs and sometimes have little incentive to connect their efforts to a larger system (Sommers, 2004). This lack of system

cohesion could also be because local institutions have reduced capacity to address education in fragile states, leaving NGOs as primary actors with significant autonomy. NGOs workers are often seen as fulfilling an important need, but Sommers (2002) complained that too much attention is given to the situations aid workers face rather than the populations they serve. This criticism is emphasized by an INEE (2004) standard to focus on the local population as key stakeholders and decision makers.

USAID (2003) has questioned the competency and appropriateness of NGOs to become involved in policy, but does involve NGOs in program implementation as a result of policy. A critique of NGO intervention, is that these organizations can bypass the procedural legitimacy that is often found in governments (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 169). Moreover, NGOs can have a high level of independence to opt to work in isolation, particularly if private donors fund them.

NGOs contracted to implement a particular program have to attend to the interests of stakeholders involved, such as donors, local communities or government, which can lead to conflicting allegiances. Technical employees within the NGO interpret and oversee the design, implementation, and monitoring of educational programs. Practitioners use the work of technical employees to realize the program in the local context. NGOs also create their own policies and standards to appeal to the ways of working during conflicts, such as contributing to standards (INEE, 2004, 2010) and advocating for changes in donor support (Save the Children, 2006). The study organization was a large non-governmental organization based in the United States.

Characteristics of the study organization. The study organization is a large, well-established international organization with over 1,000 employees worldwide in over 30 countries. It is involved in contracted work from public and private sources. At any given time, it has over 300 projects, and has worked on a significant number of basic and non-formal education projects.

One leader in the project who ultimately participated in the study described the parent organization as always open to research studies as a means to learn from experience. One respondent characterized the organization of the participating project as relatively loosely structured compared to similar organizations. This characteristic was said to be beneficial in that the organization's flexibility allowed it to learn from experience and research. This flexibility was also said to be challenging at times since a relatively structured organization tends to be more reliable according to this informant.

Funding mechanism. Like many international organizations involved in large education projects, the parent organization of the project that participated in the study does most of its work through donor government contracts. USAID has a roster of hundreds of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) that are eligible to bid on USAID funded projects. PVOs with experience in Sudan are listed under four types of education: 16 basic education out of 175 worldwide, 8 in vocational education out of 116, 7 in girls' education out of 74, and 2 in non-formal education out of 61 (as of March 2011, see http://pvo.usaid.gov/usaid). The PVO in this study was listed under

basic education, girls' education, and non-formal education along with other development categories.

The PVO registry is for competitively bid projects. The U.S. government can also use cooperative agreements when "substantial involvement is expected between the executive agency and the State, local government, or other recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement" (U.S. Code, Title 31, V, 63 § 6305). The expectation with these agreements is for the executive agency, in this case the contracted organization, to shape the project according to the needs of the recipient, in this case the GOSS.

Characteristics of the study project. The project began in 2004 before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Southern Sudan was signed in 2005. This term "project" refers to the contracted organization's employee involvement with the endeavor and the word "program" refers to the larger effort among the contracted organization, the GOSS and the donor. The project also included the three areas directly north of Southern Sudan, which are technically a part of the northern government. Since this project included some parts of the northern government and data were gathered before the referendum, the abbreviation SS3A is used to describe the program area, while "Southern Sudan" is used for the Southern governmental region that was formally a part of the peace agreement as a part of the present day country of South Sudan.

Research Problem: Intention and Action Discrepancies

This review of the literature has revealed that for SS3A to develop an educational system close to global standards and norms, there needs to be significant effort among many actors. For those involved in education in SS3A, there remains an ongoing challenge to develop and adapt programs in a changing environment that lacks political stability, infrastructure, institutions and security. Under such circumstances a variation in approaches, ideas, and interpretations can assist a process of honing in on approaches that can potentially advance educational development.

Varied perspectives within a program can also create challenges when those involved have differing aims. This misalignment of views about a program can cause mandate confusion (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004), which can result from emphasizing program flexibility over consistency (Suzuki, 1998). Efforts can also become disjointed because of a lack of feedback (Davies, 2004) or muddled with tensions between organization maintenance and project implementation (Suzuki, 1998).

Misunderstandings and varied interpretations among employees involved in a program near and far from SS3A have real consequences for those involved. Field employees who have varying perspectives or face seemingly insurmountable challenges as they implement the program can lose their jobs. Headquarters staff can unknowingly or knowingly ask for unreasonable reports or outcomes, causing field staff to change program reporting, strategies, and possibly even program success. A dilemma for many IOs operating in conflict-affected countries is that contracted programs should comply

with a plan even when local circumstances prevent the intended actions. Interactions between headquarters and field employees often provide the first glimpse of unanticipated challenges and program modifications that diverge from a plan.

This study seeks to advance scholarship about the headquarters and field relationship during program implementation in a conflict-affected country, particularly since a plan can run the risk of being too grand and imperfect (Easterly, 2006). Donors, organizations, and governments encounter obstacles in doing initial assessments in conflicted-affected countries such as SS3A due to instability and fragile governments (Elhawary, Foresti, Pantuliano & Wild, 2010; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009) coupled with somewhat inflexible aid mechanisms (Chapman & Dykstra, 2006; Sommers, 2005). Understanding perceptions of how educational programs are reformulated from initial plans to the implementation will help agencies best use feedback from the field together with compliance concerns from headquarters.

The study also revealed field personnel perspectives about their work on a program. Field and even headquarters employees have limited time or opportunity to reflect on their work outside program meetings (Rose & Greeley, 2006; Tomlinson & Benefield, 2005). This study helps capture an insider perspective of the education-aid industry. Through the understanding of varied perspectives, this study can inform organizations how to best support their employees to maximize the time and resources they use during program implementation by being attentive to how their own staff perceive and anticipate the program to continue in the future.

Kingdon's Multiple Streams as a Framework

The primary conceptual framework used in this study is Kingdon's multiple-stream model (1995). The researcher used a second framework by Suzuki (1998) to examine the internal dynamics and tensions between organization employees. Although Kingdon's model was developed for the policy-making process, it was used in this study to help frame questioning about the program implementation process.

Kingdon's multiple-stream model. Kingdon (1995) developed a model to examine how agendas are set in policy formation. He found that for decision makers to establish an agenda, three components need to converge: a political process to consider priorities given current circumstances (political stream), problem recognition (problem stream), and policy development that solves the problem (solution stream). This model originates from the political process observed in the U.S. Congress to explain how issues gain prominence in the federal government while other seemingly important problems are not considered in the legislative agenda.

Kingdon (1995) describes the convergence of political, problem, and policy streams as effective legislative action. He notes that visible and hidden participants are involved in this political process to determine the agenda. Visible participants are officials who set the agenda. Hidden ones are specialists who affect the array of alternatives considered to address a problem (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 199–200). He also states that entrepreneurs and specialists are opportunistic. They look for "policy windows" in which they can assert their own interests through policy proposals (p.

203). In response to such schemes, officials require incentives, such as an event or new information that would impact the program, to convince decision makers to take a new course of action.

This study used Kingdon's model in a somewhat different context than it was originally developed. Instead of examining a process of legislative action leading to policy, this study used Kingdon's framework to examine program perceptions of IO employees while a program is underway in SS3A. When an organization is contracted to implement a program, the realization of the program outcomes becomes the interests of those involved. The study examines the program agenda during implementation as a study of policy in practice (Sutton & Levinson, 2001, p. 1) where program implementation reflects informal and formal policy determined at headquarters and field levels. In this study, the problem and solution streams were framed in the contract for the program around a set of ever changing political factors. The program and associated policies can be modified upon execution (Easterly, 2006) or reinterpreted when policy is put into practice (Sutton & Levinson, 2001) through as various groups interpret policy and associated programs (Phillips & Ochs, 2004). Using Kingdon's framework in this way assumes that the policy making process continues well into implementation as those involved reinterpret program through their own filters when they encounter the program at different phases so that the practice conceptualized is not the same as the practice realized (Ochs & David Phillips, 2004). The multiple-streams model helped

examine the implementation phase in a similar manner as the agenda-setting stage that initiated the program.

Kingdon's model is appropriate for this case to examine the continuation of the policy formation process into the implementation phase. Steiner-Khamsi (2010) suggests that Kingdon's model helps to examine "knowledge-based regulation" (p. 338), though in its original formulation, his model lacks an international dimension since it fails to recognize international knowledge banks. Steiner-Khamsi's concern is addressed in this study since it compares those who would likely represent the perspective of international knowledge banks, i.e. those in headquarters, to those in the field who are more likely to have a local perspective. In fragile states, such as SS3A, international agencies may have more pull on the policy making process, so examining the perspectives from international (headquarters) and local (field) perspectives could help shed some light on the global and local tensions within a program.

In contrast to research on policy borrowing and cross-national transfer of policies (Phillips and Ochs, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi, 2010), this study is focused on subsequent renditions and interpretations of a program after policy was developed. It is about how organizations interpret program aims with associated policies. The study is about the filters practitioners have when implementing a program coupled with their own ideas of how education should work (Phillips & Ochs, 2004, pp. 16-18).

Within an organization, employees from all levels can change a project (Fullan, 2007; Suzuki, 1998). All employees can affect program politics, problem, solutions

through varied roles and contributions, and even the lack of performance. To assist in framing the dynamics of multiple streams within the organization, Suzuki's model of NGO tensions was used to guide four survey questions and analytically understand qualitative data about organizational conflicts related to the common endeavor, the program.

Figure 2

Theoretical framework: Kingdon's multiple streams model (1995) and Suzuki (1998)



Figure 2 diagrams the frameworks in this study with Kingdon's model as the guiding framework and Suzuki's (1998) tensions to help explain tensions within the organization related to each of Kingdon's streams. The combination of the political-, problem-, and solution-stream ovals represents the decision agenda around the program. Where the ovals intersect is where those involved in the program come to a consensus.

Applying this model to educational programs in SS3A, the political stream is the realm of influence various actors have on the program and its practices; the problem stream is about the educational issue the program intends to address; and the solution stream represents the program's primary aim. As organization employees and outside actors considered the program in the SS3A context, their perceptions of the program's politics, problem, and solution varied in ways that could affect program outcomes. Suzuki's framework helps to examine how organizational culture may be associated with multiple streams when the organization takes on a program.

Suzuki's NGO tensions. While Kingdon's model looks at the overall environment behind program decisions and actions, Suzuki's model of headquarters and field conflicts helped to understand organizational culture in reference to the program. An NGO's inner dynamics can reflect how willing it is to accept program changes and adjustments. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of Suzuki's (1998) internal tensions of NGOs with reference to Kingdon's multiple streams.

Suzuki's tensions mirror Kingdon's multiple streams. The diversity or similarity of employee views reflects the politics within the organization since the degree to which program staff are open to divergent ideas could affect incremental decisions and cause political posturing within the organization. Extremely diverse views can result in "fragmented performance" since when varied interests are allowed to pull the program in different directions and lack cohesion. Extremely similar perspectives can restrict performance to a limited interpretation of how a program works (Suzuki, 1998, p. 70).

In the political stream, organizations on contracted programs often strive for similarity by promoting consistency over flexibility with management controls on program decisions. They may also orient partners to the program approach to gain support for it. An openness to diverse opinions among employees and partners has the potential to change the program design that could lead toward alternative strategies. When similar views are encouraged, compliance and conformity to the original plan is enforced, perhaps at the expense of taking advantage of local opportunities (Suzuki, 1998).

Program- versus organization-centered actions can impact the problem stream. Program-centered programs result in their own "self-destruction" (Suzuki, 1998) by handing over responsibilities to a counterpart to sustain, such as the government. An organization-centered implementer is interested in perpetuating its involvement in the program (Suzuki, 1998, p. 13). This tension can affect the way that the agency approaches the problem stream since employees may reframe the problematic issue the program seeks to address to either justify continuing its work or opt to seek a sustainable approach in SS3A.

The tension between flexibility and consistency in organizational practices involves policies, administration, and procedures (Suzuki, 1998, pp. 133–134). The degree of flexibility afforded to staff to accommodate the conditions they encounter can impact program outcomes in the solution stream. A high degree of flexibility could modify the program to take the initiative in new directions. When consistency is valued,

then employees are more likely to approach program implementation as either correct or incorrect with less latitude to make substantive changes.

The primary focus of the framework is on the program in terms of its politics, problem and solution. Kingdon's framework focuses on the program generally as employees viewed how well it fits in SS3A. Suzuki's framework examines the tensions within the organization in terms of how well the program fits for the staff involved who implement the program. Research questions used for this study are based primarily on Kingdon's multiple-stream model (1995) and supplemented with Suzuki's (1998) NGO tensions to examine organizational dynamics related to each stream.

Research Questions

How and to what extent do employees in the field, program office and the headquarters differ in their perceptions of the:

1) political interests within and around their program?
2) educational problem their program addresses?
3) most viable solutions related to their program?

Research questions all focus on the program as the common endeavor of employees. The internal tensions (Suzuki, 1998) that affect the program, particularly the organizational culture as employees working on the program experience it, was examined with a few survey questions and in qualitative data analysis. The common focus for all employees was a successful program, but what success meant for those in

the field, the program office and headquarters was somewhat different, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 discusses the methods used to obtain data.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This case study used mixed methods, namely interviews and an online survey. Telephone interviews were the primary mode of data collection since program practitioners were spread across many locations and the study was about employee perception, which is qualitative in orientation. This chapter provides an overview of the study design, sample, data collection procedures and analysis.

Study Design

This mixed-method study had a qualitative orientation with open-ended data obtained from interviews and in four short-answer survey questions. Quantitative data came from a survey that used Likert-type scales about the extent of employee perceptions, focusing on relatively sensitive data that would have been difficult to ask in an interview. Qualitative and quantitative methods were chosen to address specific research questions based on the strengths of each approach (Creswell & Clark, 2007).

Quantitative data were supplementary to the qualitative data in this study. Creswell and Clark (2007) call this type an "embedded design," in which qualitative data was used to explore a phenomenon supplemented by quantitative data to answer related, but somewhat different, questions about the extent of respondent perceptions (p. 69). Embedded designs are useful when instruments are not available for a topic and the variables are not well established (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Since program agenda-

setting in the field and headquarters is not well understood for projects operating in conflict-affected countries (Anderson et al., 2006; Rose & Greeley, 2006; Tomlinson & Benefield, 2005), this design was appropriate. Data interpretation combined qualitative data about how employees explained their views of their program and quantitative data about the relative extent of staff group viewpoints.

Vertical Case Study: Headquarters, Program Office, and Field

By design, the study was a vertical case study as it examined perspectives across various levels within an organization (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2010). Field personnel were based in the states of SS3A. The program office served as the headquarters in the field, so employees there had a field and headquarters role since the office represented the program and served as the center of operations. Regional employees in Kenya and employees in the organization's home office in the United States were considered headquarters employees since they advise the program from afar. The Nairobi staff at the time of the study had colleagues in similar positions that were based in the United States. Each office had common aim of successful program implementation, but with a someone different orientation depending on their roles and primary interests.

Figure 3

Project employees as headquarters and the field staff



Figure 3 above demonstrates the program office in Juba is a headquarters located in the field. The organization headquarters is concerned with international operations, including grant and policy compliance. On the far right, the field in SS3A is the site of implementation where one can see the project in action or in its formation, which is concerned with project realization on the ground. The program office in Juba serves as an intermediary between the interests of organization headquarters and field-based staff. In this role, the program office was a part of the field in charge of managing field operations, while it also represented the program as program headquarters.

Sample

The study sample was purposive, comprised of employees from an international organization working in SS3A on an education project with an international donor. The researcher recruited programs and their respective organizations to participate in the study. Once a program and its respective organization agreed to participate, a set of criteria was applied to staff involved in the program.

Invited programs. The researcher contacted the head of six programs by email and telephone in SS3A to take part in this study. All invited programs were involved in educational efforts in Southern Sudan, and two worked in the three areas bordering the north. The program that ultimately took part in the study gained approval from their host organization.

Study population. The researcher intentionally chose large programs with budgets over one million U.S. dollars working on educational projects in SS3A for this study. Such programs would be sufficiently large to have enough staff at field and headquarters levels to make comparisons, and warrant support from international office(s) to support the program. All of the eligible participants in the study population worked on a programmatic aspect of the educational program (Dillman, 2007), which resulted in a population of 26 eligible participants in this case study.

Participant selection criteria. The study was a census of the 26 employees (4 at headquarters outside SS3A, 8 at the program office, and 14 field-based) who fit three criteria. First, the study organization requested the researcher only contact employees who had been with the program for at least one year, including some who had stopped working on the program within the last year, but were still with the organization. Second, all selected employees were involved in programmatic work and could be invited to a program-related meeting. This criterion excluded drivers, cleaners, and other support employees who are not required to know about the program to do their work. Their employee status required that they be hired by the participating

organization, so the study did not include government counterparts as respondents. Third, the researcher contacted all headquarters employees, even if administrative functions dominated their work more than program-related tasks, since their role could affect the program directly or indirectly. Likewise, such employees were likely to be included in program-related meetings, as indicated in the second criterion.

Of the 22 respondents, there were 19 men and three women. Of the 22 respondents 14 are Sudanese nationals. Three respondents were no longer actively involved in the project, but had been involved within the previous year. Table 2 shows the study participation and response rates.

Table 2

Study participation and response rates

Employee base	Survey	Interview	Total n [d]	Population [e]
Organization hq [a]	1	3	3	4
Program office [b]	8	8	8	8
Field [c]	8	9	11	14
Total:	**17**	**20**	**22**	**26**
Response rate:	*65%*	*76%*	*85%*	

[a] organization headquarters means employees based outside SS3A
[b] The program office is in Juba, which served as a program headquarters and field operations center.
[c] Field-based means working in a designated state or region, but not all of SS3A.
[d] Total number of respondents (n) is small since employees participated in both the survey and interview (1 at organization hq, 8 at program office, 6 at field).
[e] The total number employees that fit the sampling criteria.

The researcher obtained 20 interviews and 17 surveys as indicated in Table 2. The response rate surpassed the researcher's target response rate of 14 (three at organization headquarters, six at the program office and five in the field). The researcher sought to obtain a minimum of three staff at each level, with relatively more

staff at program and field levels since these employees are most likely to have divergent views from the headquarters, particularly field-based staff in remote locations. The researcher was unable to reach to two field individuals who took the survey and expressed interest in being interviewed. No employees refused to be interviewed, but several could not be reached by phone due to technical difficulties. Likewise the researcher sought, but was unable to obtain survey responses from three field and two organization headquarters members whom the researcher interviewed.

Data Collection

The study's design allowed for surveys and interviews to be collected in any order, but the researcher sent surveys to respondents first. Upon receipt of an employee list, the researcher invited eligible staff to participate in the survey. Three weeks after the survey invitation, the researcher contacted all employees eligible for the study for an interview regardless of whether they had completed the survey. The researcher emailed survey respondents after they completed the online survey arrange an interview. Field-based employees were the most challenging to reach, so these interviews were often conducted without an appointment since most respondents said they could be interviewed immediately when the researcher made phone contact with them.

Instrumentation. The survey instrument assessed the extent of opinion, involvement, and influence staff had on the program, with only four open-ended questions about their views of the program. In contrast, interviews focused entirely on perceptions staff had of their program. Both instruments could be used simultaneously,

but the survey request was first. The University of Minnesota Institutional Review Board approval for the study is in Appendix A. Appendix B contains language used in study communications to invite employees to participate in the survey and interview.

Concurrent data collection was desirable for a high response rate since potential participants could take part in the survey or interview as their time permitted. One data set did not depend on the responses from the other set, so concurrent data collection was also feasible. This flexibility also made it possible for a respondent to complete an interview but not the survey or vice versa.

Survey Instrument. Most survey questions were closed-ended, using a Likert-type scale to measure opinion (see the survey instrument in Appendix C). Four questions regarding the program's area of focus, employees influence, program solutions, and relations between headquarters and field employees are open-ended (numbers 10–12 and 18, see Appendix C). These short-answer inquiries were used to confirm consistency responses in the interview with the survey. Respondents typed answers for the survey in contrast to providing an oral response in the interviews. Different modes of communication may affect the same participant's response, so analysis of these questions was a way to triangulate similar data that was obtained in verbal and written forms.

Respondents completed the survey instrument through an online survey provider (Survey Monkey, 15 respondents) or an emailed document (Microsoft Word, 2 respondents). After the delivery of the online survey instrument, the researcher provided

a link to the Microsoft Word file in a second email to those who had not yet responded, and attached the file in the third and final email about the survey to non-respondents (see Appendix B for study correspondence). Internet connectivity was a challenge, but providing a survey document that could be filled off-line alleviated this limitation.

Interview protocol. The interview protocol was semi-structured with open-ended questions to focus interviewee respondents, and follow-ups and probes to elicit more detailed response (see Appendix D for the interview protocol). The researcher used follow-up questions to clarify the meaning of a question or response and probes to obtain more detailed information about the respondent's intent. When the participant provided particularly brief responses a probe could help restate the question or request the interviewee to further explain their response. Questions were ordered from relatively simple to difficult to ease the respondent into the interview (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

Interviews were conducted to gather information in anticipation of the analysis (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 169). The researcher was cautious to guard against guiding respondents toward particular answers. To prevent leading questions, the researcher adhered to the interview protocol and kept follow-up questions short, which encouraged respondents to do the vast majority of talking.

The researcher used a post-interview reflection form (see Appendix D after the interview protocol) to document and reflect on the environment for each interview after it was completed. Post-interview information was used to supplement the data coding and interpretation to understand the respondent's mood and the interview's overall

tenor. This documented cues in the conversation that may or may not be captured in a transcription or recording (Goffman, 2002, p. 149).

Incentive. The researcher provided a participation incentive, a donation of $20 per survey and $50 per interview to an organization of the respondent's choosing. The agency that took part in the study had a policy to not receive money for participation in the study. The justification for providing an incentive was to increase the response rate.

Incentive distribution came from a question at the end of the survey instrument (see Appendix C for the survey instrument). The researcher asked those who did not complete the survey how to direct a donation upon the completion of an interview. This exchange was somewhat awkward in interviews, though several respondents indicated that they appreciated the donation. In the end, the researcher donated $1,300 to organizations ($500 to UNICEF, $500 to Marol Academy, $100 to the United Nations World Food Programme, $100 to Save the Children, $50 to Catholic Relief Services, and $50 to Adventist Development and Relief Agency).

The incentive did not appear to be needed for several respondents, but one respondent requested confirmation that his donation had been made when the researcher shared results with study participants. Several employees, particularly those in the field, thanked the researcher repeatedly for including them in the study and expressed that they were honored to take part. Over half of the field respondents also expressed gratitude toward their employer for allowing them to be interviewed or surveyed.

Validity. The researcher monitored validity throughout the study with attentiveness to represent the data based on the accounts of respondents' experience. The researcher closely checked internal validity through the procedures used to gather data and the inferences made from it (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 125). Guba (1978) suggests that in naturalistic inquiry, as is the case in qualitative interviews, the researcher should focus on minimizing distortions since no intervention is being tested. The researcher used the same approach to obtain data through the survey instrument and the interview protocol. The analysis was done in several rounds to ensure that the data and codes used came from the data. In instances when the respondent's statement was not clear, the researcher examined it as embedded within the context of an interview using surrounding text and associated memos, including the post-interview reflection form.

In interviews, instrument validity was sought by using a post-interview reflection form to document the rapport during the discussion to account for potential bias. This journal or field notes, focused of the tenor of interview (see Appendix D for the post-interview form). The interviewer asked probing questions when responses were not audible or ambiguous.

To ensure consistency, the researcher closely adhered to the interview protocol and consistently sought to maintain an open conversation where respondents felt at ease talking about their perceptions (Guba, 1978; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). In one instance when an interview proved challenging over the telephone, follow-up questions were

asked via email to prevent a fragmented account. Thematic coding was repeated in three rounds and multiple iterations until saturated, leading toward a "persuasive argument" (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 125) as a validity measure.

Content validity was monitored through several methods. The researcher piloted the survey with think-alouds (Dillman, 2007) with five respondents who did not take part in the study to ensure that questions were understood. The researcher also took the following steps: wrote thick description of the research context during the researcher's field experience, clarified the findings for ambiguous responses, considered the bias of the researcher with an account of researcher reflexivity, and reported discrepant information that ran counter to findings (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 127-9). The researcher also shared the findings with respondents to comment on the study's consolidated results (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 127). These measures aimed to ensure that the research account made sense to a party other than the researcher (Creswell, 2003).

External validity, or generalizability, was not possible due to the study's qualitative orientation (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Furthermore, the study population and sample sizes were small and not randomly selected, thereby limiting the quantitative portion. Nonetheless, the results provide an illustrative case study of program implementation in SS3A during an important time in its history, the recovery and reconstruction after a peace agreement. Such a case could help to inform similar

situations when education practitioners face a government in transition with fragile systems while recovering from years of conflict and war.

Reliability. Data reliability was sought by using consistent methods throughout the study, particularly the same interview protocol and survey for all respondents. The researcher transcribed verbatim accounts of interviews from a digital recorder to increase accuracy. Probes and follow-up questions were used to understand the interviewees' intended meaning, which also contributed to both validity and reliability (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The researcher conducted all interviews with consistent style and questions. The researcher processed the interview audio recordings in two ways, with and without noise removal, to ensure an accurate transcription.

Analysis

The researcher used computerized data analysis programs for both qualitative and quantitative data analysis. She coded qualitative data and analyzed it using HyperResearch, an electronic qualitative data analysis program. She used a spreadsheet and Statistics Open for All (SOFA version 1.0.2, Paton-Simpson & Associates Ltd, Auckland, New Zealand) software to analyze quantitative data frequencies and chi-squared interdependence tests between items.

The researcher used alias codes to preserve the confidentiality of respondents while also conveying where the employees worked (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), 2009). For instance org-r1 is respondent one of the organization headquarters employees interviewed. Though these codes were used in

analysis, they were removed for ease of reporting study findings. Appendix E provides a list of respondents according to their characteristics.

Quantitative data analysis. The survey had a small sample size, so analysis of variance was not possible. Instead, the researcher used a nonparametric test, chi squared, to examine correlation between items. Chi-squared tests for independence on all 37 items (14 questions) determined the inter-correlation or independence between each item and where respondents were based. Since there was only one organization headquarters survey respondent, the program or organization headquarters employee responses were combined and compared against field-based staff. Other respondent background variables were tested, such as the member's role (administrative, management, or implementation), Sudanese or foreign, years with the project, and years of working on similar programs. Quantitative data were used to supplement to the qualitative data, noting its limitations.

Qualitative data analysis. The researcher transcribed all of the interview text to familiarize her with the data. She then checked each transcription for accuracy against the audio recording. Once data was transcribed accurately, she then performed several rounds of thematic coding on qualitative data, using both transcribed data and also listening to audio clips for further clarification.

Three rounds of thematic coding established themes and categories from the data. A first round captured the main themes from the transcribed text. The researcher used Rubin and Rubin's (2005, p. 207) approach of coding concepts, themes, events,

and topical markers (p. 207) using a grounded approach in which themes emerged from the data. A second round focused on synthesizing codes in reference to the research questions, using very general a priori codes pertaining to the theoretical framework. The third and final round of coding was highly iterative. The iterations began as the researcher started to write initial results since a priori codes were too broad, yet the first round of codes were rather narrow in scope. The researcher scrutinized coded data by each level (field, program office, and headquarters) for emergent themes between post hoc and a priori coding and the level to arrive at the final codes used in analysis.

Interview respondents often repeated statements due to unclear phone reception, and such clarifying statements were coded together as one code. However, when respondents used repetition for emphasis, such remarks were coded for each time a similar comment was repeated. The codes used in analysis with their definitions can be found in Appendix H. The researcher found that simultaneously writing research results while examining coded data in transcribed accounts was critical to reveal study findings.

Analysis using both qualitative and quantitative data. As the researcher wrote results to each research question, she referred to the data at each level, starting with employees from outside SS3A (in the United States and Kenya), then the program office and finally field employees. Focusing on data at each employee level first, then focusing on the research questions helped to ensure that the inferences made could be directly attributed to the data. The writing process involved moving back and forth

between qualitative and quantitative data to triangulate response consistency among each level. Table 3 provides an overview of instrument questions according to research question themes.

Table 3

Research themes with associated dimensions in data collection instruments

Theme	Dimensions	Source
Political interests around the program	*Staff influence:*	
	• Comments about the field to headquarters relationship	Survey q7
	• How staff at each level [b] influence implementation	Interview q5
	• Extent staff at each level [b] influence: objectives, activities, and solutions to achieve goals (Likert)	Survey, q6-8
	• Extent of influence on implementation [donors, program staff, government administrators, school staff, communities, partners, and other organizations]	Survey q5, (Likert)
	• Program changes or adjustments staff can make	Interview q4
	Staff interaction:	
	• Frequency staff discuss strategies	Survey q17
	• Proposed change(s) for how staff work together on the program	Survey q18 Interview q6
	• Extent activities are different or similar in locations	Survey q13
Problem the program addresses	• Aspect of education the program addresses best	Survey q9
	• Educational development problem (issue [a]) the program is addressing	Survey q10 Interview q2
	• Extent problems will be solved by the program	Interview q3
	• Extent of handing-over activities for others to continue in the future	Survey q 15
Solution (the most viable)	• The most important activity	Survey q11
	• What to look for to see if the program is going well (a) in reports and (b) when going to the field	Interview q1
	• Most promising solution in the program	Survey q12
	• Program changes or adjustments you can make	Interview q4
	• Extent of program change, and flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances (Likert)	Survey q 14, and 16

[a] The word “issue” elicited replies related to the aim of the program more than “problem”
[b] Levels queried: field-based staff, Juba office, Nairobi office, and headquarters in the U.S.

As one can see from the above table, there were many questions asked regarding political interests, since this research questions is more challenging to answer since some political interests are potentially sensitive. The political stream required several questions to capture data about various interests. Once the researcher learned the Nairobi office no longer had a major presence for the program, she began to ask about interaction with offices outside of Sudan. The relative degree of employees influence was captured in the survey since likert-type scales provided a comparative weight of responses between headquarters and the field. The interview data to explain how political interests and influence worked according to those at headquarters, the program office, and the field.

The problem stream focused on how staff described and categorized the problem(s) that led to the need for the program, which was relatively straightforward when compared to the other questions. Several respondents immediately thought of problems they face in doing their work rather than the issues they are addressing in SS3A. Shifting the language of the question from focusing on problems to issues helped to alleviate this tendency. The most challenging question for respondents was about the extent the problems will be solved by the program, so the researcher analyzed this data using many direct quotations to demonstrate the respondent's sentiment and struggle to explain the program's intended and actual impact.

The solution stream centered on program attributes that the employees viewed as promising or strong. Alternative strategies, which arose from the interview question

about the program changes employees can make were also included in the solution stream since proposed changes suggested altering the solutions used, and implied some dissatisfaction with existing strategies. Respondents often identified program success as simply seeing it in use, so the researcher probed further to explain the most promising attributes of the program.

The survey posed direct questions regarding Suzuki's tensions (questions 13–16). The researcher intentionally did not include questions about the tensions in interviews. She wanted to see if Suzuki's or similar tensions would emerge unsolicited from research data when employees talked about program implementation and staff interaction between levels.

Limitations. The greatest limitation of the study is the small population of eligible participants from one organization. Survey and interviews were obtained from the majority of the population, so the sample was also necessarily small. This study is an account of employee experience interacting on a common program across different locations in a single case, but is not an account of program effectiveness nor is it generalizable to other organizations. These insights into the internal workings of program delivery may help similarly situated organizations improve communication, collaboration, and support of programs in SS3A and other conflict-affected countries.

Conducting interviews over the telephone also presented a challenge, but the researcher found that employees enjoyed them and wanted to talk about their work to someone from outside. Once a phone call went through, the interviewer was able to

acquire responses to most of the questions, and respondents appeared accustomed to erratic phone connections. Only six of the 20 interviews were not cut off, though this type of occurrence is common in SS3A and respondents were accustomed to multiple telephone calls within one conversation. All but one interview was conducted by telephone, which was done over an online voice-over internet service (Skype). The researcher was unable to reach three willing respondents by phone or Skype.

A potential drawback with phone interviews was the inability of the respondent and interviewer to see each other (Novick, 2008; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Some studies have found that comparable or even more reliable data can be obtained over the telephone, especially when discussing sensitive topics (Novick, 2008; Rogers, 1976; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). The researcher found that her inherent etic perspective of calling employees from outside the organization and the locations seemed to encourage respondents to explain their statements and ideas. At times during interviews, respondents told stories of accounts to expand on a point so that an outsider could understand. With the telephone there was an imagined person at the other end of the call who was interested in their work and what they had to say, so the absence of visual cues of the interviewer could also have been beneficial since respondents were located in the environment where they work and could reflect on it without additional stimuli from the interviewer. Evidence of such behavior can be heard in interview recordings and transcriptions when respondents appeared to drift into a story as if they were explaining

a situation at work to a colleague or friend not familiar with the people or work involved.

Methods Summary

The methods and instruments used in this study aimed to accommodate the challenging environment in SS3A. The timeframe for data collection was as follows:

- October – November 2010: Survey data collection
- November – December 2010: Interviews
- April 2011: Summary results shared with respondents and donated to the organizations respondents designated as a result of their participation

The full results of this study, this document, will be sent to the participating organization and respondents.

The study process mimicked the challenges headquarters and field staff experience in communicating with each other from within and outside of SS3A. The willingness and gratitude that employees expressed for being invited to participate in this study speaks to the need to consider the voices of field-based staff. Nearly all respondents expressed curiosity of what their colleagues thought about their program and the relationship between headquarters and field staff as they sought common aims with different roles.

Chapter 4: Findings

This chapter examines the study findings for each research question. The most varied perception between headquarters and field employees was in the political stream, followed by the solution and problem streams. This chapter looks at each research question, starting with political interests.

Question 1: Political Interests Within and Around the Program

> *How and to what extent do employees in the field, program office and the headquarters differ in their perceptions of the political interests within and around their program?*

Results regarding political interests considered interests of actors outside and within the organization. Overall, respondents in this study appeared to be very comfortable with varied perspectives about the program so long as they could come to consensus on a common strategy. When talking about the organizational politics and influence between headquarters and the field, all respondents spoke of leadership style and direction, and access to as well as the need for specialist skills. Organization headquarters respondents (OHqRs) were most concerned with grant compliance and providing specialist skills. Program office respondents (PORs) were interested in providing direction, gaining access to specialist skills, and compliance with both grant as well as local policies. Field-based respondents (FldRs) were attentive to job compliance, developing their own specialist skills, having a common direction on the

program, and having a positive mood among stakeholders. As they discussed their program, respondents often clarified their roles in reference to other groups.

Table 4

The headquarters and field relationship

Theme	Organization HQs [a]	Program office [a]	Field [a]
Location	Home & Nairobi offices (outside of SS3A)	Juba office (field operations center)	The field (implementation sites)
Going to the field meant:	Southern Sudan and the three areas	Visiting field-based staff or project sites	Outreach to project sites
Level involved	Organization ("high")	Program	Projects
Scope of work	Administer projects internationally	Oversee a program nationally	Introduce interventions locally
Responsibility	Support	Manage	Implement (directly)
Conveyed	Rules, policy, procedure	Program direction, obstacles, changes	Local barriers, opportunities
Attended to	Grant compliance	Program roll out	Arrange projects, relate
Focused on	Objectives, outputs	→ Inputs to outputs	→ Process
Metaphor	*"paper-trails"* [b]	← *"on the ground"* [b]	← *"in the weeds"* [b]
Orientation	Reputation	Program progress	Job, national duty

[a] Suzuki (1998) combined field and program offices as "field offices," and separated organization headquarters and "support offices" as separate entities (p. 5), which were combined in this study into organization HQ to include both headquarters and regional offices.
[b] "paper-trails" are followed in program audits, "on the ground" meant establishing the program in the field, "in the weeds" referred to intervening (or meddling) with the details of the program.

Table 4 identifies the roles and views of respondents in relation to their program. The location and what "going to the field" meant helps to show the viewpoints employees had about where they worked relative to others. Employees' level of involvement with the program varied in scope, perceived responsibilities and the types of information and knowledge they conveyed. Staff duties shaped what they attended to in their work, including their focus, the metaphors they used and orientation that fit the aspect of the program they were hired to address. Those at headquarters focused on paper trails to be prepared for audits, those in the field focused on program roll-out on

the ground, and those deep in the field got “into the weeds” of detailed arrangements. In addition to the roles of various staff, the political interests that each level was most interested in also varied.

Figure 4 graphs interview coding frequency results (full results can be found in Appendix F, Table F2). Four political themes emerged from interview data: Specialist skills, compliance, direction, and the mood or culture of the program team. Nearly all respondents were concerned with compliance. OHqRs spoke most about the specialist skills needed in the program. PORs discussed direction more than other groups.

Figure 4

Political stream codes from interview results (n=20)



Respondents within SS3A, both PORs and FldRs, were evenly focused on all four themes. FldRs remarked about all four themes most evenly, with relatively more concern for the mood of the program than OHqRs or PORs. Themes are described further below according to their prevalence in the headquarters, program office, and the field.

Organization headquarters – paper trails and specialist skills. Organization headquarters employees, in the U.S. and Kenya offices, provided support to design and administer programs internationally. In this work, they paid attention to the project

objectives while following paper trails for grant compliance through rules, policy, and procedure. A field-based respondent (FldR) explained the organizational headquarters was involved in "high level administration, but the work is done in the field, which comes at Southern Sudan." Consequently, administrative employees in Juba and the home office interacted regularly.

Table 5

Survey results: Frequency employees discuss program strategies with headquarters

Employees	Response (frequency)	Total	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
Headquarters	Not at all (3)	3		1	2	1
staff [b]	yearly (5) quarterly (4)	**9**	4	*(1*)* **6**	5	4
(*n*=14)	monthly (2) weekly (-)	2	1	*(2*)* 2	2	

[a] Headquarters (n=1) and Juba program office (n=8) respondent data combined. *Values listed in parenthesis are administrative employees.*
[b] Headquarters in this survey meant all offices in the United States.
Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents to survey question 17. χ^2 * $p < 0.05$

Table 5 has the administrative staff noted in parenthesis under the PO/HQ column indicated they are in contact more regularly than other respondents (Interact with the Juba office: χ^2 (4, n=16)=9.713 p=0.046 and Headquarters: χ^2 (4, n=14)=11.736 p=0.019, Appendix G, Table G1 and Table 5 above). Interviews confirmed headquarters interacted most frequently with the Juba office, particularly administrative staff. This interaction served to monitor progress on the program contract.

An OHqR commented that each project depends on the personnel involved "who it is, that they react, that they interact with the project directors and how they get along… every project has a different dynamic… but I think that's fine." This same

respondent said “everyone’s responsible for the same stuff, but the way they do it can vary from person to person.” According to this OHqR, each project takes on a personality based upon the people involved, so long as employees follow organizational structures and the procedures. Other OHqRs and PORS expressed a similar sentiment.

OHqRs (n=3) proposed changes to the program over the duration of the program included: Complete a policy and procedures manual; pay more attention to improving communications including supporting a teleconferencing center; more field visits for an easier work flow; and increase knowledge of the corporate identity. OHqRs emphasized the need for collaboration with the Juba program office to explain headquarters requests or policies. OHqRs described policies and procedures as static and not modifiable. Their emphasis on guidelines and communication of the identity of the organization were all geared toward staff compliance with procedures as rules, and communicating with staff so that they would be compelled to follow the rules.

Headquarters’ specialist skills. Both PORs and OHqRs saw headquarters role as providing specialist skills to support grant compliance. A POR said “those from Washington, they influence a lot because they help us check the budgets and see that we are within the implementation process… if we are doing the program in time and nothing is getting off the line.” Employees from all levels frequently described organization headquarters accountability checks as support. The Project Director, who was based outside of Southern Sudan, had years of experience, and could provide support with a variety of topics about the program strategy and administration.

Apart from the Project Director, headquarters staff suggested those in the field could access specialist skills upon request. Two OHqRs said visits from the home office to the field required specialized skills to justify the trip. An OHqR remarked that though more frequent trips would be welcome, "the roles are filled [in the field]." PORs and FldRs, on the other had, wanted to know which non-administrative skills were available, but OHqRs focused on developing technical systems of rules and guidelines.

An OHqR explained a grant holder needs to comply with rules, which "is just part of we being an international NGO." These rules required technical specialists in operational, human resource, legal and contractual matters to advise the field in which the "the home office was brought into the discussion." In administrative technical support, both the donor and organization had formal rules, which did not necessarily fit the SS3A context. Three PORs complained that the IO's contractual and legal arrangements were not helpful because they were poorly understood due to incomprehensible language, and not even binding in SS3A. So the rule-bound administrative support that the organizational headquarters offered was not necessarily welcome by those in the field.

PORs wanted greater access to program-related specialists, specifically those with skills in program design, development and evaluation. Technical specialists had been brought in to support staff training (views of four PORs and two FldRs), and draft a training manual (OHqR). However, FldRs and PORs wanted to learn skills from specialists. A POR suggested field staff with an education background tended to

perform better than those without, in part because training for staff was limited to computer use and administrative procedures. Headquarters aimed to create administrative systems using technical specialists and the field, including PORs and FldRs, wanted support related to program management and design.

Program office - on the ground compliance and direction. The program office had a dual role of representing the program with a focus on compliance and managing it with a focus on providing direction in response to on the ground realities. Program office staff managed the program on the national level, in this case largely from the Juba office but also from Nairobi one-year prior. A POR explained that the program headquarters in Juba was where management decisions took place. The office also served as an "administrative hub" in communication with all employees involved in the program. The office served as the on the ground presence to represent the organization.

PORs were all interested in *rolling out* the program. While the program's design and administration were largely determined in the grant, PORs were concerned with matching *on the ground* realities to grant stipulations. They managed the use of inputs and responded to emerging needs so long as their actions aimed toward grant objectives. According to a POR, they were "part and parcel" to the field since they addressed and highlighted the program's achievements and needs. The similarity between the Juba office and field-based staff had to do with working toward the same program goals while also being familiar with the Southern Sudan context.

PORs suggested changes pertaining to field operations and staff, such as changes adding additional meetings with field staff for problem solving on the program, making sure field staff are "happy because 80% of the project lies on them," training local employees in management skills as well as "contemporary information and experience," and involving government more from the beginning of the program. These changes were all oriented toward easing the implementation process for staff to better respond to the challenges encountered in Southern Sudan. Five PORs said they changed the program in their own way by creating reporting forms and procedures to get information back from the field. PORs and FldRs both suggested more meetings, professional development, and efforts to keep them content in their work, while complying with the stipulations of the grant agreement with the donor.

Program compliance. The headquarters and field staff showed a somewhat different view of support for compliance. For OHqRs, compliance meant the systemization of procedures such as budgeting, clear job duties, driving the program forward with strategies to meet objectives, and creating manuals or protocols for rules, policy and procedures. PORs described a more fluid supervision and oversight structure in which program headquarters provides support to enable employees to accomplish their duties according to the grant, with less concern for organizational policies. All field employees, both PORs and FldRs, described their job duties in terms of the barriers they overcome.

For OHqRs compliance to the grant implied adherence to a system where duties, objectives, rules, policies, and procedures were all understood. A POR captured a commonly held sentiment in the field about the organization headquarters as "the holders of the grant and we are the field office that implements." Similarly, a OHqRs said the Juba office "and the ones out in the outreach offices [field] would be the ones who have the most influence [on the program]. They are doing it everyday, they are doing the hard work (OHqR)." Yet these same employees could be "quite an administrative hurdle just to make sure they were doing their jobs themselves (OHqR)." This hard work coupled with overcoming administrative hurdles meant implementing the program in a similar manner across locations.

Table 6

Survey results of Suzuki's tension of being open to similar or different approaches

Question	Response	Total (*n*=17)	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
13. Extent program activities are *different or similar* in various locations	Very different	1		(1†) 1	1	
	Different					
	Similar	**11**	**6**	(1†) **5**	**8**	**3**
	Very similar	5	2	(1†) 3	3	2

[a] Organization headquarters and Juba offices combined. *Values listed in parenthesis are administrative employees.*

Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents. χ^{2} † $p < 0.1$

Table 6 shows all but one administrative staff person at the program office level believed that the program activities were either similar or very similar (see Appendix G, Table G2 for chi-squared results). This suggests that staff seemed to believe that compliance in terms of program activities was well established. All involved in the

program had reporting mechanisms, duties and supervision structures, documented rules, provided technology for staff to comply with their job, conducted spot checks and gathered stories of success for the donor. Nearly all respondents spoke of their concern for compliance to the grant, and ultimately the donor, by realizing program aims through its activities.

Donor influence. Half of all employees interviewed, all OHqRs (3), half (4) of PORs and one third (3) of FldRs (see Table 7), suggested that donor involvement was simply a given on any program. Donors initiated the terms of the program including objectives, selected leadership staff, provided international travel rules, gave budget requirements, and "just checked to see that you were doing the right thing (POR)." Respondents saw the program objectives as static due to the nature of the program and donor agreements.

Table 7

Survey respondent perspectives of stakeholder influence on program implementation

Group [b]	Response (frequency)	Total	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
Donor	just a little (1) some (3)	4	2	(1) 2	3	1
(*n*=17)	much (3) very much (10)	**13**	**6**	(2) **7**	**9**	**4**
Program staff	just a little (2) some (2)	4		4*	1*	**3***
(*n*=16)	much (6) very much (6)	**12**	**7***	(3*) **5***	**10***	2*
Government	just a little (2) some (6)	8	**5**	(1) 3	6	2
admin. (*n*=17)	much (6) very much (3)	9	3	(2) **6**	6	**3**
School staff	just a little (3) some (5)	8	3	(1) **5**	4†	**4**†
(*n*=17)	much (5) very much (4)	**9**	**5**	(2) 4	**8**†	1†
Communities	no influence (3)	3	1	2	1	2
(*n*=16)	just a little (5) some (4)	**9**	3	(2) **6**	6	**3**
	much (2) very much (2)	4	3	(1) 1	4	
Partner	no influence (2)	2		(1) 2†	1	1
organizations	just a little (6) some (6)	**12**	**5**†	(2) **7**†	**8**	**4**
(*n*=17)	much (2) very much (1)	3	3†		3	

Group [b]	Response (frequency)	Total	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
Other organizations (*n*=16)	no influence (3)	3	1	(1) 2	2	1
	just a little (7) some (4)	**11**	4	(2) **7**	**7**	**4**
	much (1) very much (1)	2	2		2	

[a] OHqR (1) and POR combined. *Values in parenthesis are administrative employees.*
[b] Survey Question 5. Based on your experience, how much influence do the following groups have on [PROGRAM ACRONYM] implementation?
Response options: no, just a little, some, much, very much influence

Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents. χ^2 † $p < 0.1$ * $p < 0.05$

The data in Table 7 demonstrate overall agreement that survey respondents believed donors and program staff influenced the program, while partner and other organizations had little influence. Headquarters and field staff did not agree how much influence those who work in government have, specifically the government administrators and school staff, but national staff saw school staff as having greater influence than what foreign staff believed. Eight national employees identified school staff as having influence on the program to a greater extent than did the 5 foreign employees who took the survey (χ^2 (1, n=17)=3.085 p=0.079, see Appendix G, Table G3 and Table 7). Three interview FldRs explained that school administrators and teachers decided the amount of effort they would devote to the program.

The overall view from Table 7 is that those who work on the program and donors have the most influence due to compliance concerns. This is somewhat problematic when the program employees were intended to hand over the program to government. Presumably, if government had greater influence, they would have taken on more of the program responsibility.

Three respondents stated problems with donor compliance. First, an OHqR complained donor insisted on hiring program leadership staff with a doctorate because those individuals often lacked administrative and financial management skills. Second, a POR stated the donor did not sufficiently involve the SoE, the equivalent of the MoE, while the program was being developed, causing challenges later when the government was not convinced to consider the program as its own initiative. Third, a FldR critiqued the program as "capturing the attention of the western world," without "first seeing the needs of the people by the government and by those implementing." The headquarters perspective focused on donor influence as something they had to manage and be attentive to even if they did not agree with the policy. The POR perspective viewed donor interests as important, but as an external factor that affected operations. The field perspective was relatively critical of donor involvement as lacking the consideration of local interests.

Government influence. The program office provided MoE with the opportunity to make decisions, such as choosing the locations and participants, writing letters to give directives about the program, organizing joint workshops, and renaming program components. Field staff spoke of the limitations of government, which could negatively affect the program, such as failing to pay teachers consistently (POR, 3 FldRs) or not cooperating because they do not like the program (POR). Overall, PORs described strategies to entice government to get involved in the program, thus help them comply with program goals, while FldRs saw limitations to the government's ability to comply.

This view from the field that government did not have the capabilities necessary to influence the program could have been due to the amount of experience staff had. Survey respondents with less work experience believed the government administrators had less influence than those with a moderate level (1-5 years) of experience. Specifically, survey respondents with less than one year of experience on similar programs (n=4) indicated that government administrators influence program implementation “just a little” or “some”. Seven out of eight respondents with 1-5 years of experience indicated government administrators influence the program “much” or “very much”, and respondents with over six years of experience were evenly split between the two categories ($\chi 2$ (2, n=16)=8.349, p=0.015, see Appendix G). Survey and interview findings combined seem to suggest that with less experience, staff may have viewed the government has having little influence since these respondents saw government as not capable of contributing much to the program.

Table 8

Interview codes of stakeholder influence of actors outside the organization

Code	Organization HQ		Program Office		Field		Total	
	Repeat	*n*= 3	repeat	*n*= 8	repeat	*n*= 9	repeat	*n*= 20
government MoE	1.5	**2**	2.0	**6**	1.8	**5**	1.8	**13**
donor [a]	2.3	**3**	2.0	4	1.0	3	1.8	10
teachers				4	1.3	4	1.1	8
Schools				2	1.3	3	1.2	5
partner organizations				2	1.5	2	1.3	4
other countries		1	1.5	2	1.0	1	1.3	4
community			1.0	2	1.0	1	1.0	3
Contractor			1.0	2			1.0	2

[a] 13/18 remarks about donor influence came from 5 of the 7 foreign respondents.
[b] 3/5 remarks about the project model being used internationally came from 3 of the 7 foreign respondents.
[b] 2/2 remarks about contractor influence came from 2 of the 7 foreign respondents.

Bold numbers: **repeat** = average repetition (code/*n*), indicated if > 1, bold if > 2.
n (respondents) > 50% of total n, over half of n mentioned the code at least once.

Table 8 shows PORs dominated interview comments about government influence (6/8) as compared to organization headquarters employees (2/3) and field employees (5/9), but all respondents suggested it was the responsibility of the MoE to continue the program. OHqRs and some PORs portrayed the government as reluctant to fulfill program responsibilities. For instance, headquarters staff mentioned convincing the government to put program employees on payroll (OHqR), designated government staff to work on the program (POR), and demonstrate the ability to take over the program (OHqR). FldRs and some PORs saw severe limitations to the government's ability to act on the program.

For headquarters, handing the program over to the government could not be questioned since it was a part of the plan. For those in the field working with government to take on the program, despite the limitations the government faced, was a

necessary part of their jobs. In doing their work, field staff needed a different type of support that was directive and extended beyond compliance.

For headquarters, connections to the field helped encourage compliance, but not direction. An OHqR statement illustrates this point: “It seems like an outside influence when Washington folks may disrupt what they are trying to do [in the field] in some way because of ‘well, you know, this is against [organization] policy, sorry you can’t do it that way.’ That becomes less of a problem if you get to know people.” Staying connected meant making the most of visits to SS3A and regular communications with staff to prevent going off track.

Direction provided by the program office. Twelve of 20 interview respondents talked about the Chief of Party’s power as the focal point to manage and direct the project. Several respondents described how the power structures worked. The Chief of Party was the center of all management actions to drive the project forward and inform organization headquarters about program progress and obstacles. PORs and FldRs alike said their ideas and feedback were welcomed and considered, so the power structure and control of the program’s agenda at the SS3A level was shared among staff and thought to be fair.

Support within SS3A involved providing direction more than compliance, such as providing materials and logistics (4 PORs, 8 FldRs) and guidance (5 PORs, 4 FldRs). A POR explained “It is vital that the field employees have strong support from the Juba office as well as the Nairobi office (when it was operational). It hasn’t always been as

responsive to the needs of the field employees as it could have [been], but this as improved as administrative systems and procedures, logistics and communication have improved." The use of technology enhanced communication as infrastructure began to slowly improve. Direction not only helped compliance, but it also to provided resources and advice to support field operations.

A POR described the need for direction since program objectives were difficult to attain, since "as mobilization is concerned, all that we have prepared needs to be perfect. But then when we step out of the office to go to the field, there are some problems that slows implementation." This sentiment was echoed by many of the national employees who remarked that matching the project plan to the reality of SS3A was a worthy aim, but a significant challenge. Field staff suggested a perfect plan was interrupted by the on the ground realities, in which the national employees in the program office and field often served as context readers to help the international partners or foreign employees understand the how the program fits or doesn't fit in the SS3A context.

Direction was where several factors came together for the program headquarters to handle. They had to consider the local environment and context, both opportunities and constraints. The objectives could not change for the program, but the strategy could, using feedback from ongoing monitoring under the guidance of the Chief of Party. Accordingly, those in headquarters spoke of strategies that fit the grant agreement and budget. Those in the field spoke of strategies that fit the local conditions as well as

employee professional development. In this effort, those in leadership positions, specifically the Chief of Party together with the program office staff, had to balance the interests the headquarters and the field.

Table 9

Survey results: Extent employees influence the program

Employees	Response (frequency)	Total	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
6. Decisions about program objectives		(*n*=17)				
Field-based	Just a little (4) / some (4)	8	3	*(1)* **5**	5	**3**
	much (6) / very much (3)	**9**	**5**	*(2)* 4	**7**	2
Juba office [b]	Just a little (1) / some (2)	3		3†	1	2
	much (6) / very much (8)	**14**	**8**†	*(3*)* **6**†	**10**	3
Head-quarters	Just a little (2) / some (4)	6	3	*(1)* 3	3	3
(U.S.)	much (6) / very much (5)	**11**	**5**	*(2)* **6**	**9**	2
7. Program implementation		(*n*=17)				
Field-based	some (1)	1		1	1	
	much (3) / very much (13)	**16**	**8**	*(3)* 8	**11**	5
Juba office	some (1)	1	1		1	
	much (5) / very much (11)	**16**	7	*(3)* 9	**11**	5
Head-quarters	not at all (1)	1	1		1**	
(U.S.)	Just a little (3) / some (4)	7	2	*(1)* 5	2**	5**
	much (3) / very much (6)	**9**	5	*(2)* 4	**9****	
8. Solutions to achieve program goals		(*n*=17)				
Field-based	some (4)	4	2	*(1)* 2	3	1
	much (7) / very much (6)	**13**	**6**	*(2†)* **7**	**9**	**4**
Juba office	some (1)	1		*(1†)* 1		1
	much (4) / very much (12)	**16**	**8**	*(2)* **8**	**12**	4
Head-quarters	Just a little (5) / some (3)	8	4	4	4†	4†
(U.S.)	much (6) / very much (3)	**9**	4	*(3)* **5**	**8**†	1†

[a] Organization and Juba offices combined. *Values in parenthesis are administrative employees.*
[b] significant employees role (outreach, management, administrative), Appendix G, Table G2.
Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents. χ^{2} † $p < 0.1$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Table 9 provides survey results about how employees influence the program objectives, implementation, and goals. The statistically significant finding in Table 9 that foreign nationals saw the U.S. headquarters office as having less influence than

Sudanese nationals. Other findings suggest employee perspectives about influence on the program varied in other ways:

Perspectives of Juba program office staff:

- Field employees (7) saw program staff in Juba as having greater influence on the program, while headquarters employees saw the Juba office influence as having less (4, χ^2 (1, n=16)=4.168 p=0.041, Table G1).
- Respondents with three or more years of experience with the program were more likely to suggest the Juba office had only just a little or some influence on the objectives of the program compared to newer employees who saw Juba influence as greater (χ^2 (2, n=17)=8.743, p=0.013).
- Field-based employees and administrative employees (8) when combined saw program office staff as having more influence on the program than management employees (6, χ^2 (2, n=16)=9.205 p=0.010, Table G2).
- National employees from Sudan (10) when compared to foreign employees (5) saw program office staff as having more influence on the program than other staff groups (χ^2 (1, n=16)=4.493 p=0.026, Table G3), and if the organization headquarters respondent, a foreigner, was removed from the data leaving only staff based in Southern Sudan (10 nationals and 4 foreigners), then program office staff are seen as having even greater influence (χ^2 (1, n=15)=6.818 p=0.009, Table G3).

- Juba office employees were seen as influencing program objectives by all but one national employees (Table G1; employees role: χ^2 (2, n=17)=6.679 p=0.035).

Perspectives of the U.S. headquarters staff:

- National employees (9/12) indicated that the U.S. headquarters employees influences the program implementation much or very much, while foreign employees (5) indicated just a little or some (Table G3, χ^2 (2, n=17)=10.119 p=0.006).
- National employees from Sudan (10) saw the headquarters staff as influencing solutions more than foreign respondents, particularly with the one OHqR respondent dropped leaving only Juba office staff (PORs) as headquarters (Table G3, χ^2 (1, n=16)=5.333 p=0.021).

Survey responses revealed that national employees tend to see the headquarters employees as relatively influential as compared to the foreign employees, particularly in terms of program implementation and solutions. Foreign management employees in headquarters appeared to be the least likely to view employees on the whole as having influence on the program. Perhaps the closer one is to the field, the more one sees incremental change that would impact program implementation as well as the overall mood of the program.

Field - attention to details in the weeds and the program mood. The field was where direct implementation occurred at project sites, and field staff communicated

barriers and opportunities for the program given the local context. Field-based staff arranged and related to local stakeholders to realize the program aims by rolling out the program on the ground and attending to details "in the weeds." FldRs spoke of local mobilization and building relationships to make the program move forward as projected in the plan. FldRs were context readers for those at other levels to provide information about the barriers, challenges, direction, and material needs for their work.

While PORs often spoke of realizing program aims, FldRs commented on their work as a job to support their family and a national duty. FldRs identified with the program and very little with the organization. One OHqR respondent remarked "a lot of the field staff have this subset of an identity of the project, so there's the organization who they may not know much about… and the project that they are all very devoted to and care about." This independent identity could be because FldRs in the survey viewed their communications about program strategy with the Juba office as yearly or quarterly while PORs viewed their communication with field staff as monthly, weekly or even daily (χ^2 (2, n=16)=7.7446 p=0.024, Appendix G, Table G1 Table 10).

Table 10

Frequency survey respondents discuss program strategies with other staff

Employees	Response (frequency)	Total	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
Discuss program strategies with:			(*n*=7)	(*n*=9)	(*n*=12)	(*n*=5)
Field-based staff (*n*=16)	not at all (1)	1		*(1)* 1		1
	yearly (1) quarterly (4)	4		*(1)* 4	3	2
	monthly (1) weekly (10) Daily	**11**	7	*(1)* 4	**8**	2
Juba office staff (*n*=16)	not at all (-)					
	yearly (2) quarterly (2)	4	4*		4	
	Monthly (3) weekly (7)	**10**	**3***	*(3*)* **7***	6	**4**
	Daily (2)	2		2*	1	1

[a] Home (*n*=1) and Juba office (*n*=8) respondent data combined. *Values listed in parenthesis are administrative employees.* Nairobi office item removed.

Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents to survey question 17. χ^2 * $p < 0.05$

Table 10 shows four FldRs believed they were communicating about program strategy with Juba office staff less frequently than PORs indicated. This discrepancy could be due to either the frequency or topic of communication. Three PORs emphasized they use tactics, such as frequent phone calls and regular field visits, to connect with field-based staff so they do not feel isolated and could provide input into the program. Survey results in Table 10 could reflect the PORs concerns that, despite their efforts, four FldRs thought they had less frequent communication with the Juba office than the program office employees believed.

In early stages of the program communication channels between the field and Juba office staff were constrained because "we didn't have a system set up because of the difficulties in communication to get accurate, timely information back from the field." Another POR remarked this inability to effectively communicate caused

challenges in knowing what was "working or not working to help them develop to the next level." PORs and FldRs said that communication had improved, but still remained a challenge.

FldRs proposed more visits to the field to both see how the project is going and how the employees are doing. They also suggested training for employees to advance job related skills, more field staff, greater control of the project, improved employment benefits and salaries, more frequent meetings, and improvements in administrative support. FldRs talked most about professional development, including enhancing learning on the job since they anticipated continued work in SS3A education in the future. One FldR captured a common sentiment:

> "My advice is and my position is that it would be a big help to empower the Southern Sudanese so that when they become a nation, that we have experience handling issues. Because experience cannot be gotten in school, it's only in the work place, and if you're not given more experience, for sure you cannot get it."

FldRs also wanted senior staff to "come down and really interact with the [field] employees and choose whether the program is ready to improve." FldRs wanted PORs to see the program for themselves because of mistrust for information since "When you get this information from different persons, then you can actually see that maybe the program itself was never working." FldRs suggested increased connection through meetings, communication, and further engagement with other employees in training or

visits. FldR and POR survey responses about proposed changes also focused on more frequent discussions, meetings and greater decision-making authority. This engagement was not just to feel good, but also to learn from the implementation process.

All three OHqRs said it was important to have some level of autonomy in the field. For headquarters, this meant not meddling in the affairs of the field (getting into the weeds) more than necessary. This autonomy may come at a sacrifice to identification with the parent organization. Field employees identified with the project, but not with the IO (according to a POR). An OHqR suggested that if field employees "become more and more familiar with [the organization] and are best at our corporate identity" and also build relationships with home office staff so the rules and policies would be more palatable. A FldR remarked that he appreciated learning about the corporate identity through a video distributed to employees about the IO, since he admired that their work extended far beyond SS3A.

PORs sought to support employees as much as possible through regular communications meant to prevent isolation (stated by 3 PORs, FldR). FldRs spoke most about the mood of the program referring to staff meetings, being a part of a team, wanting visits to showcase their work, and feeling as though they have someone advocating for their welfare (stated by a POR, 5 FldRs). A FldR expressed a common field sentiment when he said he felt supported and a part of a larger effort where "teamwork is always emphasized, which is a good spirit."

Teamwork had to be fostered with electronic and telephone communication, since the SS3A is large with some places taking at least one day of travel from Juba. In the early stages, communication was limited due to infrastructure constraints, which resulted in a compliance concern in headquarters that "we had to trust that they were doing their jobs and verify when possible," "because there's just no way that you can possibly supervise them [field-based staff] all of the time" according to an OHqR. This trust from headquarters (organization and Juba offices) to the field was accompanied with calls for support and connection through visits and meetings. For field staff, being checked on was more palatable if they saw it as support rather than oversight.

Only two interview respondents (POR and FldR) said they had to deal with conflict within the organization. The POR management staff had to deal with communications-related misunderstandings, particularly in email. A FldR spoke of program office resistance to providing for the needs of the field. Several other FldRs said that they knew the program office had many policies and rules they needed to follow, which slowed down their ability to support the field staff promptly amid poor financial, transportation, and communication services in Southern Sudan. So the FldR complaint could have reflected a personality difference among field staff.

Several PORs and FldRs suggested employee personalities affected program implementation. A POR involved in management said good employees tended to be those who were relatively enthusiastic and had an education background. The POR remarked that determining who would be enthusiastic was challenging when hiring, and

could also depend on the location where worked since some places were easier to work in than others. A headquarters perspective considered whether employees fit within the program and implemented it with enthusiasm, but a field perspective had to do more with trust that the employee was trying to do their work amid challenging circumstances if they were in a difficult location or indicated they were motivated by a sense of service to SS3A communities.

National staff - remaining on the ground and in the weeds. Six national respondents in the program office and field expressed concern over staff professional development and compensation. They wanted comparable benefits to other organizations operating in SS3A. National FldRs saw themselves as a part of an educational development process in which it was their duty to provide for their families while also supporting their own professional development to prepare for future roles as leaders in education within SS3A. FldRs were oriented toward getting the most out of their current experience. PORs had combined allegiance toward program success on the ground while they also aimed to adhere just enough to rules and policies.

The primary difference between the field and headquarters perspectives was that for the field staff, success meant getting the program on the ground through an adaptation process in which they did what they needed to do to negotiate involvement and implementation, often called “roll out.” Headquarters employees were attentive to rules and policy to make sure those in the field operated the program within the parameters of the grant using administrative skills from specialists. Program office

employees were caught between the field and headquarters as they provided direction and sought compliance to both international and local interests. So long as policy was followed, then field and program office employees were able to have flexibility in program management and implementation, yet they wanted greater professional development.

Political interests - system and context driven. Though all respondents indicated they wanted to do the best work for SS3A, the approach employees used toward compliance varied. Headquarters had experts in education and administrative functions that could help to develop a system of compliance. FldRs were focused on the direction of the program in terms of the mood it promoted and efforts staff made to ease the program on the ground. The headquarters was largely specialist driven and the field was context driven, all while being attentive to compliance. Headquarters staff considered the program's progress against the plan in an effort to be attentive to donor interests. Field-based employees were focused on creating direction and opportunity for the program to be realized on the ground, with relatively greater attentiveness to local interests in contrast to those in headquarters. This variation in attentiveness could be seen as headquarters employees attending to donor compliance and field staff focused on local acceptance of the program, and program office was caught in between these perspectives.

Figure 5

Political interests between headquarters and the field



Figure 5 provides a graphic of the program politics where specialists from headquarters influence both program compliance and direction. The mood in the field depends upon the extent to which the direction takes into consideration the local interests of staff and even the society, when considering the problem and solutions streams. Headquarters also had an orientation to deal with program challenges with the systematization of procedures and communication, while those in the field were more attentive to adapting their approach and the program to local conditions.

Question 2: Problem Stream Nuance

> *How and to what extent do employees in the field, program office and the headquarters differ in their perceptions of the educational problem their program addresses?*

The problem stream focuses on the problem of education in SS3A. The word "problem" often elicited responses describing implementation problems rather than educational problems in SS3A. To get around this tendency, the researcher found that

substituting the word “issue” for “problem” helped to focus on education in SS3A. In this case issues are for countries or regions, and problems are for people to address.

Survey responses in Table 11 below demonstrate overall agreement that the program addresses educational quality (14/16), particularly by those in the field. Of the 16 survey respondents, 12 respondents (80%) indicated “quality of education”, and two respondents (10%) chose “other” indicating all aspects of education and a combination of access and quality of education respectively. Two respondents (10%) at the program office with administrative responsibilities indicated “access to education” in the survey without mention of educational quality.

Table 11

Survey respondent perceptions of the problem related to their program

Question	Total	Level		Nationality	
		Field	PO/Hq [a, b]	National	Foreign
9. What aspect of education does the program address best?	(*n*=16)	(*n*=7)	(*n*=9)	(*n*=12)	(*n*=5)
Quality of education	**12**	**6**	*(1*)* **6**	**7**	**5**
Access to education	2		*(2*)* 2	2 (2)	
Other, please specify [c]	2	1	1	2	
10. What educational development problem is the program addressing?	(*n*=17)	(*n*=8)	(*n*=9)	(*n*=12)	(*n*=5)
Quality education	**12**	**6**	*(2)* **6**	**9**	**3**
untrained teachers	6	1	*(1)* **5**	2	**4**
lacking materials	2	1	1	1	1
Access to education	4	1	*(2)* 3	4	
language of instruction	2	1	1	1	1
Literacy	3	3		3	
Total code count:	29	13	16	20	9

[a] PO/Hq: organization and program headquarters offices combined.
[b] *Parenthesis: 3 administrative employees from headquarters*
[c] Other responses: "a combination of 1 [access to education] and 2 [quality of education]" "all of the above," meaning "access, quality, management, resource allocation and use, and community involvement."

Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents in each category. χ^2 * $p < 0.05$

Respondents (16/20 interview respondents and 15/17 survey respondents) agreed that the program addresses a lack of educational quality in SS3A. OHqRs had broad descriptions and related educational quality problems to countries with similar conditions. PORs had slightly more specific comments about educational quality focused on classroom conditions. FldRs also spoke of the student and teacher experience and related the need for the program arose as a result of curriculum and language policy changes. Table 12 shows the overall code frequencies in interviews.

Table 12

Interview respondent codes about the problem

Code	Organization HQ		Program Office		Field		Total	
	repeat	*n*= 3	repeat	*n*= 8	Repeat	*n*= 9	repeat	*N*= 20
quality of education		**3**	1.4	**7**		**6**	1.2	**16**
untrained teachers		**3**	1.2	**6**	1.5	4	1.2	**13**
lacking materials [a]		1		3		1		5
access to education		1		**7**		2		10
crowded classrooms			1.7	3		2	1.4	5
language of instruction [b]		1		3	**2.1**	**7**	1.7	**11**
Literacy				2		1		3

[a] 3/5 remarks about lacking materials came from 3 of the 7 foreign respondents.
[b] 17/19 remarks about language of instruction came from 9 of the 13 Sudanese respondents.

Bold figures: **repeat** = average repetition (code/*n*), indicated if > 1, bold if > 2.
n (respondents) > 50% of total n, over half of n mentioned the code at least once.

Interview question: 2 (Also see Survey Question 10)

The interview coding frequencies and average repetition rates by each respondent listed in Table 12 show all but one organization and program headquarters respondents mentioned improving the quality of education as the overall aim of the program. Data also shows that more program office respondents mentioned access to education than any other group. Field-based staff repeatedly mentioned (an average of 2.2 times among 7/9 respondents) the language of instruction as a key issue the program was addressing.

Both interviews and surveys confirmed a predominant focus on educational quality, but the nuances of the educational quality problems were evident in the interviews. Considering interview and survey responses combined, only one of the 22 study participants (4.5%) did not mention some aspect of educational quality, including

improved teaching or increased literacy. Survey results indicated national staff more often portrayed the problem as a combination of factors or educational access.

A general need problem at the organization headquarters level. The three OHqRs unanimously indicated that their program addresses the problem of educational quality. OHqRs spent little time and provided few details about the problem addressed by the program. OHqRs immediately related the problems in SS3A to how their program approach was a solution. They explained the program approach had a history of improving educational quality in various countries with conditions similar to SS3A.

The need for quality improvements in SS3A arose from untrained or ineffective teachers. One OHqR explained "teachers that hardly know English and hardly have teaching experience or if they do have experience, few or no qualifications." The three OHqRs described the problems in what seemed to be a routine response since they took little pause and spoke in a rehearsed manner, likely as a result of reading reports and hearing stories about the program. In contrast, PORs and FldRs spoke of how the program addressed quality problems in classrooms and among teachers and students.

A classroom condition problem at the program office level. PORs often described problems in relation to the classroom experience for students. One respondent said "the quality of education that they are receiving is very limited because the teachers are not properly qualified or totally unqualified and they do not have the resources in the classroom." As in this statement, PORs' descriptions of educational quality

challenges related to untrained teachers (6/8 PORs), crowded classrooms (3/8), and changing the language of instruction (3/8) resulting in limited learning in classrooms.

Compared to OHqRs, PORs described educational problems in SS3A using stark language of the classroom environment and the needs throughout SS3A. Examples of this rather emphatic tone were very similar even though the statements were from two respondents: "the proportion of teachers who are trained to teach in primary school is way, way, way low," and education was starting at a "really, really low level" after the war and the subsequent peace agreement. Nearly all PORs echoed this sense of having a long way to go to improve educational quality, as illustrated in this statement: "education in Southern Sudan at the moment is facing a lot of challenges, [such as] the quality of teachers, number of children in a class, very low retention at school, and a curriculum that is not uniform." PORs described addressing problems as overcoming obstacles and challenges for the program to move forward.

PORs also discussed problems related to educational access (6/8 respondents). Most comments about access considered it a secondary concern to educational quality, but two respondents with administrative duties indicated "access to education" as their program's primary aim. Survey results indicated an association between employees with an administrative role and educational access as the primary aim of the program (χ^2 (4, n=16)=10.653, p=0.032, see Appendix G, Table G2, and Table 11 for frequencies). The two employees involved in moving materials and supplies, unlike the

rest of respondents, mentioned access but not quality improvements. It seems these administrative staff associated increased access with the distributed items to recipients.

Two PORs with management responsibilities suggested the program's reach was limited. Employees who got out to the field regularly, such as those in management, were more likely than administrative staff to see the relative need compared to the volume of materials distributed. PORs involved in program development spoke of crowded classrooms (3/6) and untrained teachers (6/6). Program office findings suggest employees saw the problem in relation to their duties and exposure to field conditions.

A government assistance problem at program and field levels. Six of the nine field respondents (FldRs) related educational quality problems to a long war with lost opportunities for teachers, students, and society. They framed the problem in terms of what is needed for the government and society to recover from war, including improve their skills to establish an educational system. One respondent remarked that during the war, the focus was not "on quality, so people learned in the neighboring countries and some of our elderly who were stuck inside never got the opportunity to get some education somewhere." The war led to lost opportunity. Recovery was discussed as changing people in terms of how they teach, a new curriculum, and how they interact in society.

Both PORs and FldRs related the problem their program addresses to the challenges faced in SS3A with a host government that was overwhelmed. PORs noted classroom conditions need to be improved and FldRs spoke of supporting government

initiatives, such as the spread of a curriculum and a change in the language of instruction. Both PORs and FldRs suggested that the host government needs to be assisted to address the lack of educational quality, in contrast the OHqRs suggested the government decided how much they would support the program. This tendency suggests a program-centered approach in the field (PORs and FldRs) and a slightly more organization-centered approach at headquarters.

Table 13

Survey results of Suzuki's tension of being program- versus organization- centered

Question	Response	Total (*n*=17)	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
15. Extent the program focuses on handing-over activities for others to continue	No focus					
	A little	1		(1) 1	1†	
	Some	4	1	(1) 3	1†	3†
	Much	7	**5**	(1) 2	6†	1†
	Very much	5	2	3	4†	1†

[a] Organization headquarters and Juba offices combined. *Values listed in parenthesis are administrative employees.*

Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents. χ^{2} † $p < 0.1$

Table 13 demonstrates most survey respondents suggested the program was orientated toward hand-over. Respondents with under two years of experience with the program were more likely to indicate the program is only focused a little on handing over activities to others (χ^2 (2, n=17)=6.724, p=0.035) when compared to those with over two years experience. Interview respondents specified hand-over to the government. This finding suggests that those who were involved in the project for a longer period of time had noticed increased attention to collaborating with the

government. So seeing the progress of increased interaction and collaborative work with government seemed to affect how staff viewed collaboration and hand-over.

A policy problem at the field level. Unlike OHqRs and PORs, interview FldRs indicated the language of instruction (7/9 FldRs) as the primary problem the program addresses over quality (6/9), and access (4/9). FldR interview responses revealed a distinction between literacy and language of instruction. The language of instruction pertained to the ability of the teachers and learners to use English in the classroom, given a curriculum policy change from Arabic. Comments about literacy involved supporting "local literacy" as the "core thing [the program] want[s] to improve through the adult centers" where "people in the community must all know how to read and write in order to live well. So they can read the sign posts, they can open bank accounts and so on." All but two of the FldRs (7) were working in historically Arabic speaking areas. While the language of instruction was focused on learning in schools, comments about literacy suggested realizing program outcomes in society.

In interviews, FldRs spoke empathetically about the challenges teachers faced as they dealt with matters related to war recovery and also expectations to teach a new curriculum in a foreign language. One respondent stated, "It's a bit hard for them to learn… whenever they have to learn a level of English… and maybe they themselves have never been trained." Six FldRs expressed a similar sentiment, but one FldR was less patient in his suggestion that "It's only their attitude. When they change their attitude, they will be enjoying the program better." Later in the interview, this

respondent attributed educational quality problems with teachers not wanting to work or embrace a new system. Overall, FldRs emphasized teacher's critical role in addressing educational quality issues as they encountered expanding enrollment with a lack of training and a shift in policy that led to a new curriculum and language of instruction.

Extent the program solves problems. The researcher asked interview respondents about the extent that the project would solve the educational problems they identified. Sixteen of the twenty interview respondents (all OHqRs, PORs, and 5/9 FldRs) assessed the extent. This question was by far the most difficult question for interview respondents to answer. They frequently paused, sighed, or stuttered when responding. Many asked for further explanation of the question. In this case, the researcher asked about how long it would take before the project could solve educational issues in SS3A.

Responses were somewhat varied. Most respondents suggested the program partially addressed educational problems in SS3A, except one POR suggested the impact of the program is low (POR 1 in Appendix J). Two respondents (POR 5 and FldR 5 in Appendix J) suggested the program helped to address problems to a large extent. Overall, OHqRs commented on long-term needs, PORs on immediate programmatic interventions, and FldRs referenced challenges in implementing the program as intended with government officials and teachers. Appendix J provides quotations regarding the extent the program will solve the problem and the respondent's explanation. Below are a couple illustrative quotations.

> "I think it's probably going to have to be a long term effort for an indefinite period, at least until the referendum is done, and seven years after that, when there is a certain amount of stability as you get educated teachers in the schools. (OHqR)"

> "When we are done running the project, then we go and the project will be handed over to the Ministry and to know that we can build the capacity of the Ministry people at the same time…[for] educational officials to know the strategy of the program so that they can be able to continue and sustain the program. [That will be] as long as it has been benefitting (FldR)."

As in the quotations above, headquarters and several program office staff emphasized attaining a sufficient scale or level of achievement in a limited time frame. Field staff had concerns for technical skill, local use and adoption. All three OHqRs suggested the program is a partial solution to the educational problems. Both OHqRs and PORs said more time and effort was needed to expand the program, and its continuation would depend on the government's political will to continue it. Five respondents, 4 PORs and a FldR, suggested that the mere use of the program would determine the extent of its impact in SS3A.

Summary of problem perceptions. OHqRs depicted the problem in general terms, emphasizing the way the program works in various countries. PORs described program components affecting educational quality in classrooms, such as the lack of learning materials or untrained teachers. Administrative employees at Juba office emphasized access to over quality of education. All but one of the nine FldRs, and four of eight PORs, associated the problem with a shift in policy to change the curriculum and the language of instruction in Southern Sudan from Arabic to English.

Figure 6

Problem perceptions between headquarters and the field



Figure 6 illustrates OHqRs focused on using a model for education delivery generally, PORs focus on classroom conditions, both PORs and FldRs spoke of assisting government and FldRs were concerned with teachers' struggles in realizing language policy changes. Kingdon (1995) suggests, the way a problem is defined and perceived shapes the political process that leads to choose among policy alternatives for solutions. Given the problem stream results, OHqR would likely focus on a program approach or model, PORs would be attentive to solutions related to addressing

classroom conditions with government and FldRs would emphasize teacher training with government as a result of policy change.

Question 3: Solutions Stream Attributes and Program Fidelity

> *How and to what extent do employees in the field, program office and the headquarters differ in their perceptions of the most viable solutions related to their program?*

The solutions stream related to program attributes and fidelity. All respondents suggested the program was helping SS3A, but headquarters staff spoke of the program as it would work uniformly across countries and field staff emphasized a process of demonstration and integration, including adjustments to the program design. OHqRs and PORs said the program model, including the use of technology, held promise since it had been successful in other countries with similar challenges. PORs and FldRs were attentive to how the program could be adapted to the local context through school monitoring, teacher training and demonstrated use.

Respondents spoke of program design, demonstrating it in SS3A, substantiating how well the program works, and integrating it into schools and the government. OHqRs stressed substantiation more than other respondent groups and FldR were focused on demonstration. PORs comments on integration related most closely to FldRs' demonstration concerns and design considerations with OHqRs' substantiation aims.

Figure 7

Solution stream codes from interview and survey results (n=22)



Figure 7 shows the number of respondents at each level who mentioned each of the coded themes related to solutions in the interviews and survey (See Appendix I, Tables I2 and I3 for coding frequencies). In the program implementation process, program design came first, followed by demonstration, substantiation and integration. Overall, respondents mentioned teacher training, having a model to follow, and engagement in school monitoring as the most salient aspects of the program. The use of technology, observing learning, involving educational officials and adoption of the project in regular use were next in line in terms of importance. The graphical

representation of codes in Figure 7 visualizes the emphasis OHqRs placed on substantiation, FldRs on demonstration, and PORs on all aspects with relative attentiveness to design concerns.

Organization headquarters solution: Substantiation. Though all staff were responsible for realizing program goals, the organization headquarters was "ultimately responsible (POR)" as the "holder of the grant (POR)" to substantiate claims that the program was on track toward successful completion. As noted in Table I1 and Figure 7, OHqRs remarks were proportionally focused on substantiating program achievements using evidence such as observed learning, project use, expansion, stories of the program being enjoyed or attracting attention and statistical evidence.

Learning observed. An OHqR suggested that the program provided consistent instruction, which led to learning "in a very unstable environment. It's [the program] able to provide at least *one part of the day* where [students] know it's [the program is] going to happen everyday and they know the educational programming is going to be of consistent quality, which I think is a big deal." All respondents spoke of learning in the program in some way, but those at headquarters attributed observed learning through success stories and field monitoring visits with program substantiation that it was working.

Project use. Documented and demonstrated program use was a means to substantiate that program aims were being met. Two OHqRs (66%), four PORs (50%) and two FldRs (22%) said they look to see if the project is "going on" as evidence of

project use, suggesting program adoption. For instance, one POR who observed a teacher with more than 100 children in the class, said "the teacher was still doing an amazing job in using the program, and getting the children to answer. Sometimes they answered rather loudly in choruses, but also sometimes selecting individuals to do things as well." OHqRs and PORs who were attentive to monitoring program progress suggested program use implied success. Likewise, a FldR said "when you see one of the lessons conducted in the class, it's difficult not to see the success because its [the program] use convinces every person when you're looking at it." However, three FldRs stressed program use could be somewhat temporary since many teachers needed to be convinced to use it. Field staff, including PORs, noted *continuous* program use was a more difficult standard to reach since many teachers were trained, yet did not use the program or discontinued use.

Expansion. Project expansion demonstrated the project across many places to reach agreed-upon numbers of beneficiaries and ensure program continuation. OHqRs and PORs were rather confident that program use would lead to its adoption, so substantiation also involved expansion. All three OHqRs talked about reaching as much of the country as possible. One POR even wanted to exceed the program goal, and reach all schools in Southern Sudan, while other PORs (6/8) sought to reach schools as the conditions in SS3A permitted. Three FldRs spoke of relatively limited expansion when compared to OHqRs and PORs. FLdRs wanted to reach at least half of society or concentrate the program in areas in schools and learning centers. OHqRs and

management PORs both spoke of project replication throughout SS3A, but FldRs spoke of convincing local use of the program on the ground with relatively limited opportunity for expansion. As a FldR illustrated, they need to work on "drumming up interest" for the program on the community level.

Enjoy and attract attention. Two of the three OHqRs stated if the project was going well, then students would enjoy it. Three PORs and seven FldRs described student excitement for the program and increased enrollment as indicating success. OHqRs sought stories from field employees about the program attracting attention, such as these comments from FldRs about the program "capturing the interest of the learners, "talking more and more about topics in the program," students transferring to schools with the program, and "motivating children to come to school regularly." Two FldRs spoke of building community awareness to promote the program's societal benefits, such as business owners being able to "communicate well with their customers." Such accounts would serve as anecdotal evidence that the field staff were implementing the program as intended, which was a core concern of those in headquarters and a challenge for those in the field.

Statistical evidence. All three OHqRs mentioned the use of educational testing to generate statistical evidence that the program works. Two PORs and three FldRs said they used statistical evidence to encourage others to adopt the project, and also to inform practice. Headquarters staff used evidence to confirm the program works, while

field staff used evidence to entice expansion and inform adaptation during implementation.

Broadly, substantiating the program meant providing various forms of evidence the program works. The ways evidence was used varied for headquarters and field staff. Headquarters staff, both OHqRs and PORs, used data to evaluate program progress against intended targets. Field staff, including PORs and FldRs, used evidence to leverage further program expansion and adoption.

Program office: Design in association with headquarters. PORs said experts, often arranged from headquarters, assisted in program design. The program model guided implementation practitioners to know what to do. Technology assisted program expansion given the limited capacity of school personnel. Program continuity was built into the design, with the MoE playing a key role. Experts guided the use of the Southern Sudan curriculum and the program production process to design the program to work.

Model to follow. The three OHqRs spoke of the program model to follow as having an "appropriate lesson format" with pedagogical techniques to "model good teaching" and "create a classroom environment where the teacher can succeed." One OHqR said the program model provided a way to deliver education "that is not possible by any other means in Southern Sudan." PORs suggested the program model could be done "in the right way, and children who are in those classes are actually receiving a reasonable education." In contrast to those in the organization and program headquarters, six field-based staff believed the program model was useful for teachers,

but had limitations in the Southern Sudan context. For instance, A FldR described the program model as challenging because it "serves the needs of high level [students] compared to the level of our learners here." Another FldR explained that the model can be "very fast" causing "missed instruction." In contrast to the headquarters and Juba office employees, those based in the field commented on the limitations of the program model repeatedly (an average of 2.1 times per FldR), suggesting they struggled to figure out how it could work in their location.

Technology. Headquarters staff in the home, regional and program offices were in charge of ordering technological inputs. The program "depends a lot on technology" according to a POR, which explained the high repetition rates at which PORs and FldRs discussed technological equipment (6/8 PORs averaged 3.2 times, 8/9 FldRs averaged 2.5 times). Administrative PORs suggested that technology was a promising solution for the program to address the educational needs in SS3A (see Appendix I, Table I3).

Seven out of the nine FldRs noted that technology could help them to spread the program, but required ongoing monitoring for good working order and proper use. Equipment had to be charged at private power stations since schools rarely have electricity, repair or replacement was required when the equipment broke, and teachers would sometimes take the equipment home as their own property. FldRs had much more tentative comments about the use of technologies to help solve some of the educational problems in SS3A as compared to the other levels. FldRs were the only ones to say that the program could operate without technology. A FldR concern noted

donor dependency with technology since technologies are "expensive to procure, so actually donors are doing a great job. Without them [the donors], there would be few [technologies] on the program." All staff saw technology as a given on the project, but field staff emphasized the importance of written materials over technology toward helping integrate the program in SS3A, suggesting a flaw in program design.

Continuity. Two OHqRs, four PORs and three FldRs said the Southern Sudan government showed their commitment to program continuity through demonstrated ownership of the program. Program continuity included instances when education officials were familiar with the program, got involved in training, addressed problems, and allocated government staff to take part. Although the program was designed for the government to be involved from the very beginning, PORs remarked their involvement had been low and was increasing over time. Continuity was a concern for all involved in the program, but PORs mentioned it most. OHqRs were concerned that the GOSS would decide to continue the program because this decision would reflect on the organization's performance.

Curriculum. Eight respondents (1 OHqR, 5 PORs, 2 FldRs) said using the curriculum of Southern Sudan was important for the program design since teachers were not prepared to teach it. A OHqR said the program was "improving quality in the classroom because it is built upon the local curriculum," and a POR said "so long as we are using the [preferred] syllabus, we are ensuring that there is quality." Using the local curriculum as a part of the program design was directly tied to the quality of education.

Curriculum use was also connected to government cooperation since the MoE faced "logistical challenges" distributing the curriculum resulting in "syllabuses [that] have not reached [many] areas (POR)." During the war, schools bordering Uganda and Kenya used the curriculum from the neighboring country. "Education was more entrenched (POR)" in the border areas. Within the heart of Southern Sudan, schools used a curriculum from the north in the Arabic language. GOSS provided PORs with the curriculum to develop the content during the program's early stages, and its use in the design of the program helped PORs leverage government support. For OHqRs and PORs the use of the curriculum was a design element to make the program relevant in SS3A. For some PORs and FldRs, curriculum use was a logical extension to solve the government's problem to spread it as a result of policy change.

Production. One OHqR, four PORs and one FldR mentioned the program cannot be easily changed after it was produced. A POR distinguished the "very active students that were used in the production of the program" with those "in a rural classroom" since the children responded differently. Small modifications were made after production, such as adding in revision lessons and providing guidance to teachers through school monitoring since the design of the program was not flexible. The headquarters staff saw design and production as a technical process that necessarily took place in Nairobi due to poor facilities in SS3A. The FldRs and PORs expressed concern that the production of the program outside SS3A led to a risk of locals seeing the program as foreign and static due to the inability to make modifications.

Program office: Integration in association with the field. Although the program was designed to belong to the government, a process to integrate the program into the GOSS MoE was necessary. Local education officials needed to be convinced to participate and include the program in their plans. Guiding materials were developed to explain how to use the program. Staff in the field had to be open to adapt the program to the local context to increase ownership to fit the SS3A context. Field staff remarked they had to negotiate arrangements and schedules with schools and partners. OHqRs considered integration issues much less than PORs and FldRs. The integration process was a field concern in which staff at program and field levels had to convince, and even cajole, government and local partners to identify and engage with the program.

Involve officials. Involving education officials was a repeated theme throughout interviews (on average repeated 2.8 times among 5 PORs and 3.1 times among 8 FldRs). Respondents expressed frustration that government officials lacked interest or ownership of the program (said 4 FldRs) and transportation to support it (said 1 POR and 4 FldRs). A POR supposed the MoE's lack of interest was because they were brought in relatively at a late stage, causing the need for field staff in Juba and elsewhere to try to "entrench" the government within the program. OHqRs did not mention involving officials as a part of the implementation process. Headquarters staff portrayed government as having influence on the program, but field staff, including PORs and FldRs, depicted government involvement as an active process for program

personnel to work with officials to integrate the program into an emerging educational system.

Adaptation. One OHqR, three PORs and four FldRs suggested adapting the program to fit the conditions in Southern Sudan. Two PORs mentioned the MoE proposed to add an examination to the program, but program office staff convinced the MoE officials to use existing exams. However, another POR disagreed with this decision and thought adding an examination to the program would have helped government officials increase their ownership of the program. FldRs suggested adding alternative learning programs, forming parent-teacher associations, providing incentives to teachers other than payment such as t-shirts or bicycles, waiting to provide certificates of completion until teacher demonstrated they used the program, and drafting a teachers' guide that does not depend on technologies. Program adaptations tended to be minor additions that arose from field staff requests. Such changes in the program could be considered details "in the weeds" of the program and not the purview of headquarters so long as the program aims were being realized.

Guiding materials. Written materials complemented technologies used on the program. The program was designed to have instructional materials and a teacher-training guide, and later added a training manual to guide staff and educational officials work with teachers and schools. Four FldRs and seven PORs said the teachers guide was critical to support teachers to use the project. Four FldRs described situations when

technologies failed and the teachers guide was reliable. The PORs simply noted materials were important to support program implementation.

Negotiate or schedule. Field employees had to build relationships as a part of their work, which required negotiation skills to schedule program activities. Four FldRs and one POR said teachers often wanted monetary incentives to use the program. Consequently, field employees had to convince teachers that the program is a part of their regular teaching duties in a government school and not an external NGO program. One POR said "about 30% of the teachers who have been trained actually never used [the program]. Because they thought they thought they should be paid for it and so they do not teach, they do not use [the program]." In response to this dilemma, program office staff in Juba arranged a letter from the government about the program to support field staff discussions with teachers and school officials. The letter partially resolved the teacher incentive issue according to one management POR. Four FldRs and one POR described incentive demands as a continuing challenge they have to negotiate. OHqRs did not mention negotiation or scheduling as a necessary part of the program success.

Partnering. A POR said partnering "hasn't been so successful [since] everyone has their own projects and employees that are often tied down [with their own work], but when there is opportunities that's another key thing I encourage staff to do." Two FldRs mentioned they make sure the program was considered in coordinating meetings and reported on their interactions with partners to the program office. One FldR said he would like to see the program get involved in parent teacher associations rather than

partner even though other organizations were already involved in this work. Neither headquarters nor field staff saw partnering as a key strategy for program success, apart from the partnership with the government for the sake of continuity.

Field solution: Demonstration. Demonstrating the program involved getting the program on the ground so that stakeholders could experience and support it. Demonstration was a necessary step before a program could be integrated. Field staff focused on demonstration to ensure program quality through school monitoring, teacher training, and the cooperation of contractors for services related to the program. Several FldRs and PORs said funds and vehicles were critical inputs to ensure that the program functioned as intended. Demonstration was an experiential effort to learn from the program implementation process.

School monitoring. One OHqR, 7 out of 8 PORs and all nine FldRs attributed ongoing teacher and school support to the program success. This support involved checking on material inputs, observing lessons, and providing guidance about how to improve lesson delivery. FldRs described school monitoring as supporting teachers after training to hone newly learned skills. Two PORs and three FldRs spoke of advising teachers to implement the program correctly by "really using the applications as we have taught them (FldR)." Field staff enjoyed school monitoring, as in this illustrative comment from an FldR: "I like to see the methodology that we have given them [teachers and field staff], if they are comfortable with it. If I see some gaps, that would be helpful for the future planning for the next training." PORs saw field staff as

supportive problem solvers on the project who examine "what things the teachers did particular well and what kinds of problems they encountered (POR)." FldRs provided detailed accounts of the monitoring process and PORs supported field-based staff. Both FldRs and PORs saw field-level monitoring of schools as instrumental to the success of the program, but those in the organization headquarters only mentioned school monitoring in reference to "giving data back" for program compliance.

Teacher Training. All FldRs, 6/8 PORs and only 1/3 OHqRs suggested teacher training was critical for program success as a solution to the needs in SS3A. Two PORs identified teacher training as the program's primary activity. A POR explained the training helped teachers become a "changed teacher through the practices that he has been doing and through the course." Teacher training was also a way to encourage the adoption of the program since teachers often wanted a recognized professional credential, which the program was able to provide (POR, 2 FldRs). Respondents coupled teacher training with school monitoring to strengthen the delivery of the program.

Contracted service. To operate the program, the organization involved in this study had to contract some services. Five of the eight of PORs, 5/9 FdlRs and 1/3 OHqRs commented on the arrangements they made with contractors. Field employees monitored the quality of contracted services and built relationships with service providers. Services were monitored in the field, but the contractual arrangements were handled at program and organization headquarters. Contracted services were an instance

where headquarters decisions directly affected the program operations, and field staff provided feedback and managed service provider relations.

Funds. Two out of three OHqRs, 3/8 PORs, and 5/9 FldRs said funds were critical for the program to succeed, but had limitations since they depend on donor support, accurate projections, close monitoring, and transfers in a challenging environment. Funds can "dry up" (OHqR) and cause the program to cease, change in scope or design. Headquarters respondents believed funds were not going to be provided to the government to continue the program. Field staff (some PORs and FldRs) suggested that funds would be relatively limited when the program shifts to the government, but they assumed some financial support in the future.

Vehicles. Three PORs and three FldRs remarked that having a vehicle for transportation in the field made it easier for them to monitor the program. The program had recently acquired vehicles for use on the program, so these respondents commented how their jobs were made easier. Like having access to funds, those in the field said that government's lack of transport options hampered their ability to take part in the program. Headquarters staff did not mention vehicle support to the program as a part of its success, since transportation appeared to be a field matter for both employees and their government counterparts.

Consistency versus flexibility on the program. Realizing program results was viewed differently for headquarters, program office, and field staff. Those at the organization headquarters saw support as tied to rules and procedures, with compliance

and design capturing their attention. In contrast, program office staff saw the need for some flexibility in rules to fit the Southern Sudan context, and sought headquarters support to provide technical skills for the program design rather than substantiation through administrative support about rules and guidelines. On the field level, the demonstration and integration process was important to adapt the program to the local context. This discrepancy was related to Suzuki's (1998) tension about flexibility or consistency in administration.

Table 14

Survey results of Suzuki's tension of being consistent or flexible in practice

Question	Response	Total (*n*=17)	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
14. Extent of program change	No program change	1	1		1	
	A few changes	6	3	(1) 3	5	1
	Some changes	6	1	(2) **5**	3	**3**
	Many changes	2	1	1	1	1
	Very many changes	2	2		2	
16. Extent of program flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances	No flexibility					
	A little	1		(1) 1	1	
	Some	**9**	4	(1) **5**	5	**4**
	Much	5	3	(1) 2	4	1
	Very much	2	1	1	2	

[a] Organization headquarters and Juba offices combined. *Values listed in parenthesis are administrative employees.*

Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents.

As can be seen in Table 14, the extent of program change was largely believed to be moderate, with FldR having the greatest range of perspectives from no change to very many changes on the program. The majority of respondents indicated the program had some flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances. However, results show respondents tended to see the program as having consistent practice.

Table 15

Interview code frequencies of Suzuki's tensions

Code	Organization HQ		Program Office		Field		Total	
	repeat	*n*= 3	repeat	*n*= 8	repeat	*n*= 9	repeat	*n*= 20
consistency in admin. [a]	1.7	**3**		3		4	1.2	10
similar across locations		1		3		2		6
similar staff characteristics				3		1		4
Program- centered	2.0	1		1		1	1.3	3

[a] 7/12 remarks about flexibility vs. consistency in administration came from 5 of the 7 foreign respondents.

Bold figures: **repeat** = average repetition (code/*n*), indicated if > 1, bold if > 2.
n (respondents) > 50% of total n, over half of n mentioned the code at least once.

Table 15 shows the interview codes related to Suzuki's tensions in which respondents at all levels indicated consistency in program administration was a primary concern. Consistency for the headquarters staff meant adhering to organization and donor policies, since "all of the projects in a particular country adhere to the same policy and procedures otherwise employees would perceive it to be unfair or unequal" according to one OHqR. Yet consistency in administration for those in the field, including the program office, meant adapting policy with other organizations operating in Southern Sudan to accommodate local conditions. A consequence of having staff benefits that were not similar to other organizations operating in Southern Sudan was that staff would leave the program. Two FldRs remarked several employees left the project, which "gives people the impression that we also have to leave." Though this concern is related to the internal politics of the program, it demonstrates that headquarters employees were seeking solutions in the program and its administration

relative to the organization while field staff considered local practices relative to other organizations.

Program management had greater flexibility than administration, though within the confines of the grant. The Chief of Party, who led the Juba office, had "a lot of leeway and was given a lot of flexibility to try to restructure things to improve implementation, and took advantage of that, and made a lot of changes" according to a POR. The changes included setting up reporting systems, changing technologies used on the project, and hiring more employees so long as there were sufficient funds allocated in the budget. Prioritization within the program was also flexible. One POR gave an example of going to a "*huge* county rife with risks…we had to go there because the State MoE said you must go there, you can't neglect that. But most projects do not dedicate it like that because it's so difficult to get there." Program flexibility meant taking extreme measures to be responsive to a request from the government. Similarly, there was agreement among all staff, particularly those located in SS3A, that the program was necessarily program-centered since the grant stipulated the government would take over the program.

Phased solutions. Employees were logically attentive to different aspects of the program according to their role, but their involvement also followed overlapping phases of operation. The program began with a design phase, followed by demonstration, substantiation and integration. Organization headquarters was most involved in substantiation and program headquarters in program design. Field operations involved

demonstration and integration of the program into SS3A. Staff involvement in a phase seemed to stress the importance of their respective actions to program success geared toward seeking consistency in administration and implementation.

Figure 8

Solution concerns between headquarters and the field



Figure 8 demonstrates the program phases aligned with the group of employees associated with each phase. The arrows represent the order in which the phases occurred, starting with program design and demonstration and leading to substantiation and integration into the local context. This graphic was developed from the research data to explain headquarters and field staff perspectives about the critical program attributes, which appear to be associated with their respective roles.

Headquarters determined the design by proposing a program model with components suitable for SS3A. Once the program has been at least partially established on the ground under the direction of the program office, the headquarters was keenly interested in substantiating that their design worked through measuring indicators, such as learning, project use, expansion, enjoyment of the program and statistical evidence.

The field was where demonstration of the program took place with support of the program office. The process of integration was important for the program's future, so field personnel (PORs and FldRs) were attentive to include government officials in program implementation and adaptation. All staff wanted to show the program could work in SS3A, but the strategy used by each level was different. Headquarters used design, the program office used direction and substantiation, and field used demonstration strategies.

Results Summary: Headquarters and Field Perception Discrepancies

Employees frequently noted that it is their job to implement the project according to the agreement with the donor, but upon further questioning field staff wanted to modify the program to better fit the local environment. Some modifications had taken place, and the overall tenor of respondent remarks was they welcomed varied ideas to help improve the program delivery. Employees welcomed giving their viewpoints. All interview FldRs told the researcher that they were thankful to their organization for letting them to be a part of the research study. An OHqR said "You know, we're all trying to do the best educationally speaking here. So the idea of administration and management overlap between different locations comes up all of the time. So it's an interesting research question." The overall results suggest that headquarters addressed general needs using design strategies developed by specialists, program office employees attended to compliance and direction while they attended to local conditions and assisted government to substantiate and integrate the program, and

field level staff created and reacted to the mood of the program supported by a local policy change in which they demonstrated how the program could work to address the local needs.

Figure 9

Headquarters and field internal dynamics, program problem, solutions and politics



Figure 9 is a compilation of the various attributes of each research question, which suggest that the roles in headquarters and the field influence their program perceptions. Reading from left to right, headquarters followed paper trails during the program, viewed the problem as a general need in which specialists designed solutions to ensure the program was well conceived. The program headquarters on the ground was attentive to local conditions related to the problem, substantiated interventions geared toward grant compliance. The field operations center in Juba was focused on roll out to assist the government to integrate the program into SS3A. The field was metaphorically in the weeds of the program, dealt with the details of policy change in

which they demonstrated the program in collaboration with government. The mood in the field could impact how happy field staff were in their work, since if they felt supported both now and in the future, then they were motivated to lobby for the program to continue as planned. Field staff contentment often focused around how they, as employees were treated by more senior staff. For instance, FldRs remarked that senior staff were "nice" or supported them in times of need for both program support and also their own personal safety, such as arranging medical treatment after an incident. In terms of the program, the field was largely focused on local adaptation, while the headquarters was on grant compliance, and the program office caught in between to direct and explain the other two perspectives.

The perception discrepancies between the headquarters and the field were largely a matter of how much detail they were exposed to in their work in Southern Sudan. Those at headquarters did not know the intricate details (the weeds) of the program. Those in the field likewise did not know the policy details (paper trails) of the donor and organizational compliance issues. Staff simply wanted to know what they needed to do for their job.

Headquarters was more donor-oriented since they had to attend to the administrative and design details of the grant. Those in the field were more oriented to the host government and program participants. Consequently, headquarters staff used a language of support geared toward rules and procedure, while field staff spoke of overcoming obstacles and teamwork toward supporting each other for a program that

had the potential to be politically embedded in SS3A to at least partially solve an educational quality problem.

Chapter 5: Discussion

Results from this study demonstrated headquarters to field perspectives were associated with their respective roles. Varied respondent perspectives did not appear to distract them from achieving common aims, but reflected the interests with which they were most concerned. Those in headquarters related program processes to donor interests, at the program office to national interests, and the field level to local interests. This chapter begins with the answers to the research questions, then proposes a framework for program agenda at program level, future areas of study, and concluding remarks about key findings.

Political Interests: According to Plan or Conditional

The greatest difference in perception was about the political interests of the program between headquarters and the field. Those in headquarters were most closely aligned to donor interests and the use of technical skills to design and substantiate the program through well-designed plans and substantiation of objectives (Easterly, 2006). Under the program agreement the headquarters had to be somewhat program-centered in order to shift implementation to the government (Suzuki, 1998). Headquarters saw the host government as opting into the program. Those in the field remarked that they and the host government needed more training and preparation to be able to continue the program in the future. The interests program office and field employees encountered on the ground, particularly from the host government as well as from those in schools

where they worked, shaped their views. Field respondents were necessarily oriented to performing their job duties, transferring program responsibilities to government counterparts, and also improving their own skills to know how to lead similar efforts and secure future work. These same field staff believed the program office staff had great influence on program objectives and solutions (Table G2). National staff, at the field level in particular, wanted to learn the technical skills they saw exhibited by those in headquarters to take on leadership and management roles, but the way they anticipated using skills was to demonstrate and integrate the program on the ground. The political interests on the ground were more malleable and interactive than the design and compliance interests at headquarters.

Problem: Normative at Headquarters and Operational in the Field

The headquarters and field staff had almost complete agreement that their program addressed educational quality issues in Southern Sudan. An exception was that administrative employees related the program to educational access, perhaps in line with their responsibilities to distribute materials. However, headquarters employees saw educational quality in normative terms in line with international agreements and concepts of educational practice where the educational quality problem required intervention. Under such norms, influential agencies guide efforts based on their belief and research about what works in similarly situated countries. In contrast, field employees, particularly national staff, saw the problem as government needing help to realize its policy aims to change the curriculum and language of instruction. Under the

field view, the program served to help SS3A support a policy decision. The headquarters view focused on provision of quality education in an area of great need. The program office view related to incremental improvement of classroom conditions by assisting government.

Solutions: Design and Substantiate or Demonstrate and Integrate?

All respondents believe their program was viable in Southern Sudan under the current funding. Headquarters employees saw its viability tied to the program design and the field employees to an adaptation process. The headquarters respondents had much greater trust than field respondents in the plan that focused on program design and substantiation. Under this view, when the program proved it was effective, then the host government would be more likely to continue it. Those in the field suggested adapting the program through a demonstration and integration process that allowed for changes to the design. In the field view, the program could and should be changed according to local conditions to make it more likely to be possible for the government to continue it in the future. The program office guided substantiation and integration efforts through the design and its adaptation.

A Somewhat United Program Agenda

Headquarters and field employees were only somewhat united in their program agenda in Southern Sudan. They differed most in their views around the political interests on the program. And agreed most about the problem the program was intended

to address. The solutions they described had a similar overarching them, but headquarters, program office and field staff emphasized different components reflecting the general tendency for field staff to reshape the program to fit local conditions. Headquarters employees, particularly those outside of Southern Sudan, were concerned with strict adherence to both donor and organizational policies. As the owners of the grant, those in headquarters saw support in terms of providing technical assistance to create systems for the program to function according to plan. The problem, solutions and politics around the program mirrored other countries, so technical assistance was transferrable from one country to the next, using international norms about educational development.

Field employees were relatively more concerned with adapting the program to fit local conditions, even if their actions meant adjustments to organizational policies or program modification with donor and host government approval. Those in the field were attentive to the limitations of host government involvement and saw themselves as a supportive partner to government. In contrast to the headquarters respondents' focus on the program agenda as the equivalent to grant compliance, field respondents saw the program agenda as adapting the program to fit the Southern Sudan context during implementation rather than in the planning and program development stages.

A Framework for Headquarters and Field Program Processes

When considered in their entirety, the results of this study suggest a discrepancy between the headquarters and field staff as one of global trends to planned and designed

initiatives and local interests under which initiatives emerge, including adapting plans and designs. The global and local viewpoints raised in this study were logical for the actors involved. Those in headquarters operate in multiple countries or as expatriate staff for a designated period of time. The local employees often remain in their own country even after a program is completed. Though these structural realities are widely known, the differing perspectives of those in the field and headquarters has implications for program implementation. Figure 10 provides an overview of the implications with a discussion of each.

Figure 10

Headquarters and field program processes framework



Figure 10 extends the Kingdon (1995) and Suzuki (1998) frameworks to the program level where variation in headquarters and field perspectives impact program processes. Policy level decisions lead to organization level tensions, which in turn affect program level processes as the program develops into its own culture distinct from the organization. In each of the organization tensions and program-level processes, the upper level preference was associated with the headquarters using top-down strategies

to design systems and the lower level with the field using bottom-up processes with emergent strategies (or self organizing systems, Davies, 2004).

The political stream, represented by the top circle, is where decision makers form policy based on the problem and solution as well as the current environment and their interests (Kingdon, 1995). Implementing organizations involved in program implementation stemming from policy can opt to seek staff with similar or diverse views depending on how much feedback and potential discord the organization believes would be beneficial to their program (Suzuki, 1998). During implementation, the program approach was customized according to a political process similar to the one that initiated the program. Specialists led this effort when they craft systems. In contrast, those in the field tended to use trial and error to allow for an emerging direction based on the mood of those involved and local conditions.

The problem stream, the circle at the left in Figure 10, identifies problems worthy of attention for policy intervention, policies turn into programs for implementation by an organization (Kingdon, 1995). At the organization level, an agency has a organization- or program-centered approach to implementation depending on if they seek to continue their own presence in the program or embed it in the local context (Suzuki, 1998). On the program level, implementing employees consider if they want to address problems of global or local concern depending on which audience they deem most important for the aims within their work, with the field having the closest

allegiance to local control and the headquarters with high level decisions from donors as well as influential international and government actors.

Lastly, the solution stream identifies a policy that suits a problem through a political process (Kingdon, 1995). Next organizations determine how much consistency or flexibility they will afford their staff as they implement (Suzuki, 1998). At the program level, while staff are implementing they seek a formulation process that substantiates a planned design or takes on a more adaptive process in which they demonstrate then integrate their efforts into the local context.

A key question arising from this framework is: What would people at the top (headquarters) do differently if they really knew what was happening at the bottom (the field)? In this particular instance, those in headquarters did not want to get involved in the "weeds" of the program, but they were attentive to design and technical details of compliance. Even if headquarters staff were able to provide more professional development opportunities for their field staff, there was no plan for such an activity in the budget, it would take time and resources away from the roll out of the program and likely not be a priority unless it fit established job descriptions. In fact this researcher observed several organizations in Southern Sudan complaining that national staff would readily leave for another organization not long after the agency had invested much time and resources in training them. Results from this study suggest that the lack of professional development and authority to adapt a program to the local context are factors that lead field staff to seek employment elsewhere. However, training staff is a

dilemma for organizations since trained staff are often in high demand for other organizations. Even if an organization trains its national staff, they may still leave even if they are happy in their work for more lucrative or prestigious positions. Headquarters, together with the program office, could support discussion and training on program design considerations throughout the life of the program to not only build staff capacity, but also use their feedback.

What would people at the bottom (the field) do differently if they really knew what was happening at the top (headquarters)? Many field staff said they didn't know much about the headquarters or the organization. Yet, does knowing the "brand" of an agency influence how employees think about their work? In this particular instance, field staff seemed to realize that similar programs had been done in other countries. One FldR wanted a country tour of similar programs and PORs said that they would like to know more about how other countries implemented a similar program model.

Through the expertise of the organization and the work they were doing, field staff realized that the headquarters could still gain valuable skills on the job. Even still, staff wanted training even if there was no budget for it in the program. For field staff, being responsive to the program needs included training for them and their counterparts. Field staff saw their lack of training as a matter of organizational policy. FldRs were not convinced that donors or organization policies were rules and not merely guidelines. So if a policy was not amenable to the Southern Sudan situation, the field staff suggested

that such a policy should be changed. If employees saw an organization's policies as unfair, then they would seek employment at another agency.

Field staff did not know much about the organization, but they did discuss the relative benefits of working in organizations within Southern Sudan. As these field employees pursue their careers after the program, their identity will easily shift to another agency. However, staff may not be able to provide much insider knowledge about how their prior organizations had worked as they move forward in their career. Field staff were aware that the headquarters was in charge of overseeing the realization of the grant, but wanted more attention to how the program process impacted those implementing the program for the sustainability of future efforts in SS3A.

Proposed Future Areas of Study

Future areas of study could see if programs with different contractual arrangements also had the perspectives shown in the layered model presented in Figure 10 since managerial staff of this particular program believed they had a fair amount of autonomy. Another topic could be to test the notion that African firms do not abide by rules and compliance structures, but rather tend to focus more on "deals" to realized agreed upon aims through negotiations and relationships (Hallward-Driemeier, Khun-Jush, & Pritchett, 2010). FldRs in this study spoke of making arrangements on the local level in order to get the program on the ground, which could involve some deal making. A third area of study could examine the employee benefits of national versus internationally hired employees both across and within organizations, including

professional development resources. Local staff saw their future role as education leaders beyond the life of the project, so they wanted their own capacity to be built as a part of the program. In fragile states, such as Southern Sudan, local employees are likely to remain in the country after a project is finished. Lastly, the model proposed in Figure 10, which combines Kingdon (1995), Suzuki (1998) and study results could be tested by examining the full continuum from policy to organization to the program implementation process on the ground.

Remarks

Two findings from this study were somewhat counterintuitive. First, headquarters employees suggested the program could be adapted, so long as proper procedures were followed. This finding suggested adaptability, but with rather strict parameters since several field staff complained that proper procedures were too limiting. Second, field employees were not relating to the parent organization, but this could be due to the fact that the program was designed to be for a designated period of time. Local field staff did not have much incentive to associate themselves to the parent organization, since their future employment option would likely lead to a job with another organization or program since a government hand-over would mean that they would work their way out of a job or into a government service position with a much lower salary.

As described in the introduction, the perceptions of employees between headquarters and the field were revealing in a similar way as the game of telephone in

which one person whispers a phrase into the ear of another through a chain of people, but the message at the end is somewhat distorted, and even very distorted. In this case, the staff all held similar views about the program, so the messages from employee to employee seemed to be clear. The study revealed that the roles that staff have shape their work more than the messages themselves. Employee roles extend beyond their work life, as was the case for field-based employees who saw their work as a means to support their family and a national duty.

Study Implications

The underlying study implication found in this case was that the motivations of employees makes a difference in how they perceive their involvement in a program now and in the future. Managers in a program should therefore pay attention to the motivations of their employees to do the particular type of work they are involved in, have a job, and learn from employees how they see their own involvement in the same or similar programs into the future. This particular case study found that field staff in particular, including several national staff at the program office, sought symbolic capital to learn how to be an expert among organization circles and gain authority as and educational leader in Southern Sudan (Ebrahim, 2003). This notion of social capital, as developed by Bourdieu was found to be a factor in development organizations where "organizational behavior and relations are highly structures, although they are open to incremental improvisation and change" and expertise is a valued form of symbolic capital since knowledge production is valued in development organizations (Ebrahim,

2003, p 19). Expertise was highly valued since it was the pride of the program and a valued asset among organizations. Sharing expertise among staff, even though it did not have monetary value, was an indication for the national staff that the program was investing in the population at large while they also valued developing staff as professionals to continue with the same or similar efforts. Such symbolic capital was a source of pride and achievement among staff in this program and in my own experience living and working in Southern Sudan.

The results from this study suggest a refinement in thinking about what problems are being addressed at field, with greater levels of flexibility in the solutions considered at the field. Those in the headquarters at both the organization and program offices, tended to take the project as a given, particularly since it was based on a contractual arrangement. For grant compliance so long as the program achieved its overall aim, then the headquarters interests were satisfied. For pride in the program and a sense of accomplishment, the transfer of ownership to a local partner as necessary at the program level. For sustainable program activity at the field level, which was a form of local compliance to get involved in worthwhile endeavors, the field level actors had to figure out how the program could operate in its current form in a revised form in the future after the program left. This sustainability involved integrating the program into local efforts and adaptation of the program to fit the local circumstances.

Many headquarters employees, particularly the expatriates, would likely continue to work in similar programs internationally. Southern Sudanese employees

would likely remain in the country after the project is complete and move on to another job. The field-based staff had national and local interests, since they wanted to learn from others with international expertise and apply this knowledge to South Sudan.

This study helps illustrate that employee desires for program adaptation can be revealed when their perceptions are scrutinized beyond the day to day affairs of the program. Some tensions between the headquarters and the field had to do with Suzuki's (1998) notion of flexibility versus consistency since those in the field saw themselves having some flexibility to adapt the program while those in the headquarters wanted field staff do their work as stipulated in job descriptions. This result extends beyond mere flexibility or consistency, since the organizational culture was one to perfect systems of compliance toward the donor. The field culture focused on realizing the program on the ground through local interaction and engagement, including demonstration.

Compliance can be attained through systematic systems with a design and technical bureaucratic system orientation as in the headquarters' focus on the grant, but it can also be in accordance with local acceptability of a program. The demonstration of the program on the ground can serve as local compliance to bring stakeholders to collaborate on the program and peak their interest. The field perspective suggested that the program had to meet local conditions, including the interests of the people, the government and the local policies associated with the program. In these varied views of compliance, headquarters was intended to transmit a program and the field was intended

to receive it, where all practitioners had an implementation filter that indeed considered "what is possible in and acceptable to the world of practice" (Ochs & Phillips, 2004, pp. 17-18). This study found that the reception process involved another round of decision making at the local level, which mirrored Kingdon's multiple streams on the local level to make decisions that affected the program agenda rather than the policy or organization agendas. In this reception process, field staff attended to customization politics with locally identified problems and a reformulation or reinterpretation of solutions.

As international organizations begin their work on contracted programs as the one in this study, they need to attend to compliance in terms of the grant and the donor policies, and also in terms of the informal and formal policies on the ground. Part of this compliance would be to include exit strategy plans for the organization's involvement in the program from the beginning that can be adapted as the program progresses. The creation of professional communities of educational development workers could support continued professional development of local staff to interact and learn from the experiences of colleagues even after a program grant lapses. Without such exit strategies, there is little incentive to train government and local staff in skills that would be useful to their professional careers after the program is complete.

As an international organization is in the midst of its work in a conflict-affected country, this study found that the motivations of team members in implementing a program affect they view their work and approach their duties. Motivating employees

and their counterparts to take part in the program now and into the future involves training in specialist skills, having compliance both locally and internationally, and providing direction based on relationships built over time that determine the mood of the program with the use of feedback and input demonstrating a team effort. In terms of addressing local problems through a program, motivating employees to implement the program as intended involves communication about the local interests around the program during implementation and in the future, including making adaptations. Lastly, motivating staff to make sound choices about program design, demonstration, substantiation and integration involves deciding what a job well done looks like and providing incentives for staff who perform well.

In this case study, integration of the program into the local community and demonstration were field-level concerns that did not necessarily reach those at headquarters. When field-level contributions and professional aims are valued, supported and discussed in a professional environment, then employees were more inclined to see themselves in similar work in the future because they were learning on the job. Furthermore, staff commented that they appreciated the recognition that they were learning on the job, and thus gaining expertise. As programs go into conflict-affected countries with a variety of competing interests, this study found that attending to the motivations of staff involved in program implementation can help to keep staff interested, engaged, and better able to orient program efforts into the future.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Institutional Review Board Approval Notice

1/9/2009
From: irb@umn.edu
Subject: 0812E55824 – PI Eschenbacher - IRB – Exempt Study Notification

The IRB: Human Subjects Committee determined that the referenced study is exempt from review under federal guidelines 45 CFR Part 46.101(b) category #2 SURVEYS/INTERVIEWS; STANDARDIZED EDUCATIONAL TESTS; OBSERVATION OF PUBLIC BEHAVIOR.

Study Number: 0812E55824

Principal Investigator: Heidi Eschenbacher

Title(s): Appropriate education in post-conflict countries: A comparative study of field versus headquarters employees judgments within non-governmental organizations

This e-mail confirmation is your official University of Minnesota RSPP notification of exemption from full committee review. You will not receive a hard copy or letter. This secure electronic notification between password protected authentications has been deemed by the University of Minnesota to constitute a legal signature.

The study number above is assigned to your research. That number and the title of your study must be used in all communication with the IRB office.

Research that involves observation can be approved under this category without obtaining consent.

SURVEY OR INTERVIEW RESEARCH APPROVED AS EXEMPT UNDER THIS CATEGORY IS LIMITED TO ADULT SUBJECTS.

This exemption is valid for five years from the date of this correspondence and will be filed inactive at that time. You will receive a notification prior to inactivation. If this research will extend beyond five years, you must submit a new application to the IRB before the study's expiration date.

Upon receipt of this email, you may begin your research. If you have questions, please call the IRB office at (612) 626-5654. The IRB wishes you success with this research.

Subject: IRB Exempt Proposal # 8012EE55824 - Change in Protocol Approved

06/11/2010 Change in Protocol Approved by willi173
* Change in study focus, compensation, recruitment and survey

Appendix B: Study Correspondence

The following correspondence was used to communicate with potential participants.

Dear __[NAME]___,

I met you in Juba in _[MONTH] when I was working for Academy for Educational Development (AED) on the Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP), formerly based in Kuajok, Warrap State. I stopped working for AED SSTAP to return to the United States to complete my doctorate in Comparative Education.

I am now contacting model education programs in Southern Sudan to be a part of my research study to better understand program development and support in the field and headquarters. I hope to include _[ACRONYM] staff viewpoints in my study. I ask that you share a list of emails of your program staff throughout the world who work on and support the _[ACRONYM] program.

My research study involves inviting _[ACRONYM] employees from _[ORGANIZATION] and partner organizations (if applicable, not government employees) to take a brief survey and phone interview. Involvement of each staff person would take no more than one hour. For each completed survey, I will donate U.S.$20 to the program. I would also like to interview staff by phone at my expense. I will donate U.S. $ 50 for each completed interview.

Staff participation in the study would be completely voluntary. The identity of individual staff will be kept confidential and be known only to me. I will share consolidated results with staff in your program. All _[ACRONYM] program staff would receive the same survey regardless of whether they are in the field, Juba office, Nairobi office (if applicable) and in _[ORGANIZATIONS]'s U.S. offices.

I ask that you send me a list of names and emails for employees from _[ORGANIZATION] and implementing partner organization employees (but not government employees) working on _[ACRONYM] Sudan in the field, Juba office, the Nairobi office (if applicable) and headquarters, so that I could contact them directly. I would like to include employees based anywhere who could potentially be invited to a meeting regarding programmatic issues. If you prefer, I could send you the instructions for involvement in the study for you to distribute to employees in your program.

I hope all is going well for you and the _[ACRONYM] program. I look forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Heidi Eschenbacher
University of Minnesota
Skype: heidiesch

The researcher made a follow-up A phone call with each of the invited organizations to explain the study further and request participation.

Once the researcher received the list of names from the participating organization, she sent out a survey to all employees that fit the participation criteria.

First Survey email sent 10/12/2010
From: Heidi Eschenbacher
Re: A quick survey about _[ACRONYM] for my research study

Dear _[NAME] ,

_[PROGRAM HEAD NAME] provided me with your name to invite you take 10- 15 minutes to complete a survey regarding the _[ACRONYM] program. The data will be used for my dissertation study about the influence of headquarters, program office and field employees on educational development programs in Southern Sudan. I will share analyzed results of the study with all who participate, but individual responses will remain confidential. The survey can be found at the following link: [SECURE SURVEY LINK]

A donation of U.S.$ 20 will be made to an organization you choose as thanks for your completed survey. If you experience any problems accessing the survey or have questions about the study, please contact me at heidi@umn.edu.

Best regards,

Heidi Eschenbacher
University of Minnesota

Skype: heidiesch

Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails regarding this survey, please click the link below to be removed the survey mailing list.

Change of online survey service:

After the first emails to the field based employees, one employees person raised concerns over the researcher's use of the Survey Monkey service, as quoted in the email below

> "Can I just ask you a question about the survey website in particular the wording survey monkey? The word monkey does not sound good because we Black Africans Have been referred to as Monkeys or slaves by Arabs and some whites, I am sorry to mention this but I hope that it will be good to change the word monkey so it does not scare way your potential respondents/informants. In fact, when I show the word survey money, I thought I was a monkey being surveyed."

In response to this email, the researcher replied to the respondent with an apology for the bad feelings. She informed the respondent that she immediately changed the survey service to one with a less offensive name. The researcher then stopped using Survey Monkey and shifted to Survey Gizmo using the same survey form. The researcher also informed the head of the program of this change and correspondence.

Second survey email sent 10/21/2010 with a Microsoft Word version of the survey linked.
From: Heidi Eschenbacher
Re: _ACRONYM_ survey: A few minutes of your time

Dear _[NAME]_,

As current or former employees working on _ACRONYM_, I ask for 10- 15 minutes of your time to complete a survey regarding the _ACRONYM_ program. This survey is part of my study for my doctorate about the influence of headquarters, program office and field employees on educational development programs in Southern Sudan.

Individual responses will remain confidential. The survey can be found at the following link:
[SURVEY LINK]

If you have difficulty connecting to the internet, a word document version of the survey can be downloaded, completed and emailed back to me. Here is the word document, which will download to you computer:
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~heidi/Survey_ACRONYM_.doc

In the last question of the survey, you will be asked which organization you would like me to donate U.S.$ 20 as thanks for your completed survey.

[SIGNATURE]

Email upon the completion of a survey, to invite to an interview.

Dear _[NAME]_,

Thank you for completing the survey. I would now like to invite you to participate in an interview about SSIRI. No preparation on your part is necessary. The interview will be about your experience. The interview should take approximately a half hour. As thanks for your efforts, a U.S.$ 50 donation will be made to an organization of your choosing.

If you permit, I would like to record the interview only so that I can accurately capture your thoughts and ideas. The recordings will be secure and only will be reviewed by me. Your identity will be known only to me and kept confidential.

When would work best for you for me to call you for an interview sometime next week?

Also, I have the following phone numbers for you: _[PHONE NUMBERS]_ What is the best phone number for me to use at that time?

I look forward to hearing more about your work.

[SIGNATURE]

Last survey reminder and interview invitation November 8, 2010
Email from: Heidi Eschenbacher
Subject: Research survey and interview

Dear _[NAME]_,

I will be phoning you to see if you are willing to take part in an interview. If you do not wish to participate, please reply "no" to this message or tell me over the phone that you do not wish to participate. I am sending you this email so that you are aware that I will be trying to contact you to arrange an interview.

I also invite you take 10- 15 to complete a survey regarding [PROGRM ACRONYM]. The survey can be found attached in a Microsoft Word document. Please download the attached survey, fill it out, save it and email it back to me.

The phone interview I would like to do with you is about your experience and is completely voluntary. The interview should take approximately a half hour. Your identity will be known only to me and kept confidential. I have been finding that the phone interviews tend to work best in the afternoon or evening. If you are willing to be interviewed, please let me know (1) the best phone number(s) for me to reach you and (2) what time of day is best to reach you?

This will be the last message I am sending. If you have any questions, please feel free to email me. I hope to talk with you over the phone. I will honor your request if you do not want to participate in this research. Either way, I wish you all the best.

[SIGNATURE]

The researcher contacted employees in two phases: The headquarters and PORs were contacted for the survey first, following field-based employees contacted about two weeks later. Several field-based employees were fit the criteria outlined by the researcher and the organization, but where not highlighted on the list of employees provided. Upon inquiring if the additional employees could be contacted, the head of the program indicated that they too could be included in the study.

Appendix C: Survey Instrument

The survey below was provided to employees using Survey Monkey and Survey Gizmo, both online survey tools. The researcher also sent a version in Microsoft Word via email when respondents found it difficult to respond to the online tool.

Program Staff Survey

You are invited to complete a survey about your experience working on the [PROJECT NAME] program. For each complete survey by staff involved in the program, both in and outside of Sudan, a donation of US$ 20 will be made to your organization. The survey takes approximately 15 minutes to complete 19 questions.

Your participation is completely voluntary. Your identity will be kept confidential. Data will be held in strict confidence. Results will not reveal the identity of individual respondents.

INSTRUCTIONS: Save this document frequently to capture your responses. Indicate your response in each of the grey boxes. To select a box, click on the empty box ☐. To unselect a selected / ticked response, which looks like this: click it again to clear the "X."

If you have problems completing the survey, please email Heidi Eschenbacher, the researcher for this study, at .

1. Where are you based for the majority of your work for the [PROJECT NAME] ([ACRONYM]) program?

Select one.
☐ Field-based (in a State or region of Southern Sudan)
☐ Program office in Juba
☐ Nairobi office
☐ Headquarters (U.S. offices)

2. What is your primary role in your work on the [ACRONYM] program?

Select one.
☐ Management
☐ Implementation
☐ Monitoring and Evaluation
☐ Other, please specify:

3. What month and year did you begin working on the [ACRONYM] program?
-- SELECT MONTH -- and -- SELECT YEAR --

4. How many years have you worked in this profession on programs similar to [ACRONYM]?

Select one.

☐ Less than one year
☐ 1-2 years
☐ 3-5 years
☐ 6-10 years
☐ 11-20 years
☐ over 20 years

5. Based on your experience, how much influence do the following groups have on [ACRONYM]l implementation?

Select one per line.

	no influence	just a little influence	some influence	much influence	very much influence
Donors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Program staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Government administrators	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
School staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Communities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Partner organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

6. In your opinion, to what extent do staff influence decisions about the objectives of the [ACRONYM] program?

Select one per line. Influence objectives:

	not at all	just a little	some	Much	very much
Field-based staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Juba office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nairobi office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Headquarters staff (U.S. offices)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

7. In your opinion, to what extent do staff influence the implementation of [ACRONYM] program activities?

Select one per line. Influence implementation:

	not at all	just a little	some	much	very much
Field-based staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Juba office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nairobi office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Headquarters staff (U.S. offices)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

8. In your opinion, to what extent do staff influence choices about the best solutions to achieve [ACRONYM] program goals?

Select one per line. Influence solutions:

	not at all	just a little	some	much	very much
Field-based staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Juba office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nairobi office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Headquarters staff (U.S. offices)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

9. What aspect of education does [ACRONYM] address best?

Select the best (one) answer.

☐ Access to education
☐ Quality of education
☐ Educational management
☐ Educational resource allocation and use
☐ Community involvement in education
☐ Other, please specify:

10. In your opinion, what educational development problem is the [ACRONYM] program addressing?

The [ACRONYM] program is addressing the problem of…

-- Type your answer here, using your own words. --

11. In your opinion, what is the most important activity of [ACRONYM]?

The most important [ACRONYM] activity is…

-- Type an answer here, using your own words. --

12. In your opinion, what solution seems to be most promising in the [ACRONYM] program?

The most promising solution in [ACRONYM] seems to be…

-- Type an answer here, using your own words. --

13. In your experience, to what extent are [ACRONYM] activities different or similar in various locations?

Select one.
☐ very different
☐ different
☐ similar
☐ very similar

14. In your experience, to what extent has there been program change in the [ACRONYM]?

Select one.
☐ no program change
☐ a few program changes
☐ some program changes
☐ many program changes
☐ very many program changes

15. In your opinion, to what extent do you believe the [ACRONYM] program focuses on handing-over activities for others to continue in the future?

Select one.
☐ no focus on handing-over
☐ a little focus on handing-over
☐ some focus on handing-over
☐ much focus on handing-over
☐ very much focus on handing-over

16. In your experience, to what extent do you have flexibility in the [ACRONYM] program to accommodate changing circumstances?

Select one.
☐ no flexibility
☐ a little flexibility
☐ some flexibility
☐ much flexibility
☐ very much flexibility

17. How often do you discuss program strategies with other staff in the [ACRONYM] program?

Select one per line.

Discuss strategies:	not at all	yearly	quarterly	monthly	weekly	daily
Field-based staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Juba office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nairobi office staff	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Headquarters staff (U.S. offices)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

18. If you could change one thing about the way your organization headquarters, Juba office and field staff work together, what would you change?

-- Type an answer here, in your own words. --

19. Which organization would you like to donate U.S. $ 20 as a result of completing this survey?
Note: The [ORGANIZATION NAME] does not accept donations for research.

Select one.
☐ Marol Academy (Jok Madut Jok's school in Warrap State)
☐ United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
☐ UNICEF
☐ Other, please specify:

IMPORTANT: Press "Submit" to save your survey responses. (online version)

IMPORTANT: Please now press "SAVE" and attach this document from your desktop or downloads folder to an email to heidi@umn.edu. Once the form is checked for completeness, this form will be separated from your name and email so that your survey responses remain confidential. U.S. $20 will be donated to your organization as thanks for completing this survey.

Thank you for your responses to this survey. If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact me at heidi@umn.edu or on Skype at heidiesch.

Thanks again.
Heidi Eschenbacher
University of Minnesota

Appendix D: Interview Protocol

Interview Protocol to be administered via phone:

This interview is about your views of [PROGRAM ACRONYM], particularly about headquarters and field roles. The interview should take about one half hour. Your participation is completely voluntary.

To make sure I accurately capture your ideas, I ask to record this interview. Only I will have access to the recording. Your responses will be kept private and remain confidential. May I now start recording the interview?

The following questions will be asked of the interviewee if not already known:

Q1: Are you based in the field, Juba office, regional office or home office for the majority of your work for the [PROGRAM ACRONYM]?

Q2: What is your primary role in your work on [ACRONYM]: management, implementation, monitoring and evaluation or other?

Q3: When (what month and year) did you begin working on the [ACRONYM]?

Q4: How many years (or months) have you worked in this field on programs similar to [ACRONYM]?

1. Part 1: When reading a report, what do you look for to see if the [ACRONYM] project is going well?

Part 2: What about when going to the field?

Optional Probes:

- How do you know if your project is successful?
- When you see the project is going well, what kinds of things did you see?
- Are there common things you recommend to improve the project?

2. Based on your experience, what is the main issue ~~problem~~ the [ACRONYM] project is addressing in Southern Sudan?

Optional Probes

- Could you describe the primary goal or aim of your program?
- What is the purpose of your program in Southern Sudan?

3. To what extent do you believe the problems will be solved by the projects in [ACRONYM]?

Optional Probe:
- How long will it be before a new strategy is appropriate?
- How long will it take to solve some of the [previously named] issues?
- What do you think it will take for your project to be brought to the next level?

4. What kind of program changes or adjustments can you make to the program in your work?

Optional Probes:
- What kinds of program changes or adjustments do you have authority to make on your own?
- Can you make changes to the program? What kinds of changes have you made?

5. Part 1: Could you describe how the field staff influence program implementation?

Part 2: What about the Juba office staff, how do they influence program implementation?

Part 3: What about staff outside of Southern Sudan in the home office or in Nairobi, how do they influence program implementation?

Optional Probes:
- What kinds of things do staff do in that office that influence program implementation?
- What kind of examples do you have about how staff made decisions that influenced program implementation?

6. What changes would you like to see about how field staff, Juba office staff and headquarters staff work together on your program?

6.5 (added question) What kind of support do you find most helpful to you in doing your work?

Optional Probes:
- What kind of technical support is most helpful to you?
- How would you use that support?

7. What additional comments do you have about the field to headquarters relationship in your organization?

That's all of my questions. Thanks for your time and ideas.

Post-interview reflection form

Date: _____Interviewee:_____ Location: _____

Describe the overall environment of the interview:

Were there any other people who could hear the interview? Yes_____ No_____
If yes, who could hear the interview (describe position or names if known):

Which questions, if any, seemed to make the interviewee uncomfortable? *Please describe.*

Did the interviewee seem relaxed or hurried? Please *describe.*

Were there any apparent interruptions or distractions during the interview?

Appendix E: Respondent Characteristics

Table E

Respondent characteristics

N	Code by level	Role (n) mgt	adm	imp	Nationality	Interview	Survey
1	OHqR (1)	1			*foreign*	1	
2	OHqR (2)		1		*foreign*	2	1
3	OHqR (3)		2		*foreign*	3	
4	POR (1)	2			*foreign*	4	2
5	POR (2)	3			*foreign*	5	3
6	POR (3)	4			*foreign*	6	4
7	POR (4)	5			*foreign*	7	5
8	POR (5)	6			National	8	6
9	POR (6)		3		National	9	7
10	POR (7)		4		National	10	8
11	POR (8)				National	11	9
12	FldR (1)			1	National	12	10
13	FldR (2)			2	National	13	
14	FldR (3)			3	National	14	
15	FldR (4)			4	National	15	11
16	FldR (5)			5	National	16	12
17	FldR (6)			6	National	17	13
18	FldR (7)			7	National	18	14
19	FldR (8)			8	National	19	
20	FldR (9)			9	National	20	15
21	FldR (10)			10	National		16
22	FldR (11)			11	National		17
Subtotals	Organization Hq	1	2		0	3	1
	Program office	5	2		4	8	8
	Field			11	9	9	8
Total	**All levels**	**6**	**4**	**11**	**13**	**20**	**17**

N= number of respondents, R = respondent

Code by level: organization headquarters (OHq); program office in Juba (PO); field (Fld)
Program office respondents (PORs) were in a program headquarters (hq) and the field.

Role (n) = focus on management (mgt), administration (adm), implementation (imp)
National = Sudanese nationals working on the program.

Interview = Completed an interview (conducted as possible, not in the order above)
Survey = Completed the survey.

Appendix F: Survey Frequencies

Table F

Survey frequencies of demographic questions

Question	Frequency	Level		Nationality	
		Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
1. Where based	(*n*=17)				
Field	**8**	**8*** **		**8***	
Juba	8		*(2***)* **8*** **	4*	4*
U.S.	1		*(1***)* 1***		1*
2. Primary role	(*n*=17)				
Management	5		*(2)* 5*	1*	4*
Implementation	7	5*	*(1)* 2*	7*	
M&E	2	1*	1*	1*	1*
Other	3	2*	1*	3*	
3. Years on program [b]	(*n*=17)				
Under 2	6	2	*(2)* 4	3†	3†
2 - under 3	6	5	*(1)* 1	6†	
3 - under 4	3	1	2	1†	2†
Over 4	2		2	2†	
4. Years in profession	(*n*=16)				
< one	4	3	*(1)* 1	4*	
1-2	4	1	*(1)* 3	4*	
3-5	4	1	*(1)* 3	1*	3*
6-10 (3*),* 11-20 (1)	4	2	2	2*	2*

[a] Agency and Juba offices combined. *Values in parenthesis are administrative employees.*
[b] Years on the program derived from questions response to date of survey.

Bolded values indicate more than half of respondents.
χ^2 † $p < 0.1$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix G: Survey Item Interdependence Tests

The data did not follow the normal distribution with only 14-17 responses per item, therefore the data was not suitable for analysis of variance. Chi-squared tests were run using demographic variables. The following demographic variables were tested:

(1) field employees versus program and agency employees combined;
(2) primary role on the program derived from a combination between survey and interview responses (outreach, program and administration);
(3) national employees (Sudanese) versus foreign (non-Sudanese) employees,
(4) the number of years with the program; and
(5) the number of years of experience working on similar programs.

Results for variable combinations one through three are listed in the tables to follow. Nationality was tested due to some comments in the interviews regarding wanting increased nationalization of employees on the program.

The fourth and fifth variable comparisons, years with the program and years of experience, were found to relative few significant relationships than the test variables for the field versus headquarters, the primary role of the employees and nationality. The following chi-square tests were statistically significant:

Years with the program (under two years, two-three years, over three years):

- Respondents with three or more years of experience with the program were more likely to indicate that the Juba office had only just a little or some influence on the objectives of the program, χ^2 (2, n=17)=8.743, p=0.013.

- Respondents with under two years of experience with the program were more likely to indicate that the program is only focused a little on handing over activities to others, χ^2 (2, n=17)=6.724, p=0.035.

Years of experience on similar programs (less than one, one to five years, over six years):

- Respondents with less than one year of experience on similar programs (4 respondents) were more likely to indicate that government administrators influence the program just a little or some, of those with 1-5 years of experience on similar programs (n=8), seven respondents indicated government administrators influence the program much or very much, and all respondents with over six years of experience were evenly split between the two categories (χ^2 (2, n=16)=8.349, p=0.015).

Table G1

Field versus headquarters survey respondent chi squared tests for interdependence

Item	df	*n*	χ^2	*p*
1. Where based (tested variable)				
2. Primary role	**3**	**17**	**6.583**	**0.086***
3. Duration with program	3	17	5.627	0.131
4. Years in profession	3	16	2.83	0.419
5. Influence on the program:				
Donors	1	17	0.018	0.893
Program staff	*(1)* **1**	*(15)* **16**	*(4.818)* **4.168**	*(0.028*)* **0.041***
Government administrators	1	17	1.446	0.229
School staff	1	17	0.554	0.457
Communities	2	16	2.161	0.339
Partner organizations	*(2)* **2**	*(16)* **17**	*(5.091)* **5.293**	*(0.078†)* **0.071†**
Other organizations	2	16	2.982	0.225
6. Objectives influence [a]				
Field-based staff	1	17	0.554	0.457
Juba office staff	*(1)* **1**	*(16)* **17**	*(3.692)* **3.238**	*(0.055†)* **0.072†**
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	1	17	0.032	0.858
7. Implementation influence [a]				
Field-based staff	1	17	0.944	0.331
Juba office staff	1	17	1.195	0.274
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	2	17	2.346	0.309
8. Solution influence [a]				
Field-based staff	1	17	0.018	0.893
Juba office staff	1	17	0.944	0.331
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	1	17	0.052	0.819
9. Aspect of education addressed	2	16	1.826	0.401
13. Similarity of activities	1	17	0.944	0.331
14. Extent of change on the program	2	17	3.286	0.193
15. Focus on handing-over	1	17	2.082	0.149
16. Program flexibility	1	17	0.486	0.486
17. Discuss program strategies [a]				
Field-based staff	2	17	3.572	0.168
Juba office staff	*(2)* **2**	*(15)* **16**	*(7.000)* **7.446**	*(0.030*)* **0.024***
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	2	14	2.921	0.232

χ^2 † $p < 0.1$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Italic text indicates the variable without the organization headquarter respondent, if significant.

[a] Nairobi office data was removed since it was too confusing given recent changes.

Table G2

Outreach, management, and administration, survey respondent chi squared tests

Item	df	*n*	χ^2	*P*
1. Where based	**4**	**17**	**21.25**	**<0.001*** **
2. Primary role (tested variable)				
3. Duration with program	6	17	10.035	0.123
4. Years in profession	6	17	4.719	0.580
5. Influence on the program:				
Donors	2	17	0.327	0.849
Program staff	*(2)* **2**	*(15)* **16**	*(8.455)* **9.205**	*(0.015*)* **0.010***
Government administrators	2	17	0.485	1.446
School staff	2	17	1.446	0.485
Communities	4	16	4.365	0.359
Partner organizations	4	17	5.844	0.211
Other organizations	4	16	3.383	0.496
6. Objectives influence [a]				
Field-based staff	2	17	1.446	0.485
Juba office staff	*(1)* **2**	*(16)* **17**	*(6.154)* **6.679**	*(0.046*)* **0.035***
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	2	17	0.032	0.984
7. Implementation influence [a]				
Field-based staff	2	17	1.948	0.378
Juba office staff	2	17	1.195	0.550
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	4	17	3.306	0.508
8. Solution influence [a]				
Field-based staff	2	17	0.327	0.849
Juba office staff	**2**	**17**	**4.958**	**0.084†**
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	2	17	3.62	0.164
9. Aspect of education addressed	*(4)* **4**	*(15)* **16**	*(15.939)* **10.563**	*(0.003**)* **0.032***
13. Similarity of activities	*(2)* **2**	*(16)* **17**	*(7.467)* **4.958**	*(0.024*)* **0.084†**
14. Extent of change on the program	4	17	3.601	0.463
15. Focus on handing-over	2	17	3.152	0.207
16. Program flexibility	2	17	0.486	0.784
17. Discuss program strategies [a]				
Field-based staff	4	17	7.624	0.106
Juba office staff	**4**	**16**	**9.713**	**0.046***
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	*(4)* **4**	*(13)* **14**	*(17.139)* **11.736**	*(0.002**)* **0.019***

χ^2 **p < 0.1 in bold** † $p < 0.1$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Italic text indicates the variable without the organization headquarter respondent, if significant.

[a] Nairobi office data was removed since it was too confusing given recent changes.

Table G3

National versus foreign survey respondent chi squared tests

Item	df	*n*	χ^2	*p*
1. Where based	*(1)* **2**	*(16)* **17**	*(5.333)* **7.367**	*(0.021*)* **0.025***
2. Primary role	*(1)* **3**	*(16)* **17**	*(9.333)* **10.738**	*(0.025*)* **0.013***
3. Duration with program	**3**	**17**	**6.564**	**0.087†**
4. Years in profession	*(3)* **3**	*(15)* **16**	*(6.778)* **8.154**	*(0.079†)* **0.043***
5. Influence on the program:				
Donors	1	17	0.049	0.825
Program staff	*(1)* **1**	*(15)* **16**	*(6.818)* **4.943**	*(0.009**)* **0.026***
Government administrators	1	17	0.142	0.707
School staff	**1**	**17**	**3.085**	**0.079†**
Communities	2	16	3.739	0.154
Partner organizations	2	17	1.747	0.417
Other organizations	2	16	1.112	0.574
6. Objectives influence [a]				
Field-based staff	1	17	0.476	0.490
Juba office staff	*(1)* 1	*(16)* 17	*(3.419)* 2.435	*(0.064)* 0.119
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	1	17	1.893	0.169
7. Implementation influence [a]				
Field-based staff	1	17	0.443	0.506
Juba office staff	1	17	0.443	0.506
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	*(2)* **2**	*(16)* **17**	*(8.889)* **10.119**	*(0.012*)* **0.006****
8. Solution influence [a]				
Field-based staff	1	17	0.049	0.825
Juba office staff	1	17	2.550	0.110
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	*(1)* **1**	*(16)* **17**	*(5.333)* **3.085**	*(0.021*)* **0.079†**
9. Aspect of education addressed	2	16	2.535	0.282
13. Similarity of activities	1	17	0.443	0.506
14. Extent of change on the program	2	17	0.543	0.762
15. Focus on handing-over	**1**	**17**	**3.192**	**0.074†**
16. Program flexibility	1	17	1.311	0.252
17. Discuss program strategies [a]				
Field-based staff	2	17	3.338	0.188
Juba office staff	2	16	2.615	0.270
Headquarters staff (U.S.)	2	14	1.835	0.399

χ^2 **p < 0.1 in bold** † $p < 0.1$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Italic text indicates the variable without the organization headquarter respondent, if significant.

[a] Nairobi office data was removed since it was too confusing given recent changes.

Appendix H: Code Book

Table H

Codebook in alphabetical order

Code	Question	Description
access to education	Problem	Respondents specifically used the term “access” or described the need to get more children into school and provide basic education or schooling to a broad audience.
adaptation	Solution	Adaptation was about using a different strategy within their program or an alternative approach to solve educational problems.
ask for help or support	Political	Asking for help or support is instances when employees request services or support from other parties in the agency or program.
belong, trust, fit in	Political	Employees feeling as though they are part of a program culture, they belong and fit in, and their needs are met, they trust.
Chief of Party	Political	The positional power and influence of the Chief of Party was mentioned several times throughout interviews, so it was given a separate code from “power, hierarchy.”
community influence	Political	Community actions impacted the program in some way.
conflict, competition	Political	A conflict or competition arose between employees, which impacted program implementation.
continuity	Solution	Continuity, or sustainability of program efforts, were what staff did to make sure the program continues after the agency leaves.
contracted service	Solution	The code for contracted service included the relationships and quality of services that influenced program implementation.
contractor influence	Political	Contractor influence is when respondents described contractors affecting their work in getting the program off the ground.
crowded classrooms	Problem	Crowded classrooms or “overcrowding of classrooms” was coded as a problem when respondents specifically indicated it is a problem.
curriculum of SS	Solution	Respondents said the use of the new curriculum within the program was critical to its success and adoption. The curriculum was handed over to the project from the GOSS to produce program content.
donor influence	Political	Respondents mentioned the donor having input or say into the plans and direction of the program.
funds	Solution	This code was used when respondents indicated that funds were critical for program success or continuation to solve educational problems in Southern Sudan.

Code	Question	Description
enjoy, attract	Solution	Enjoying or attracting attention refers to when the program evokes a response from stakeholders, most frequently students, parents or teachers who show enthusiasm for the program. This also included observed changes that employees saw as evidence that the program is having an effect on communities.
environment context	Political	The environment or context is about what is going on in the areas where the project is implemented and the circumstances that employees simply have to accept as a given. At times the environment or context may be obstacles, but the environment or context can also present opportunities.
expansion	Solution	Expansion, is a strategy to increase the spread of the program across Southern Sudan.
extent the project addresses problems	Problem	Many respondents found it challenging to respond to the question *"To what extent do you believe the problems will be solved by the [program name] program?*, so this code was used to indicate when respondents indicated some degree or level that the program would address the problems they had already identified.
feedback, input	Political	Feedback or input was coded for comments that remarked about when staff opinions were solicited or employees voluntarily provided their opinions, feedback and input about ways they thought the program could be improved.
field staff influence	Political	How field staff, or outreach employees, influenced the program themselves or how others see them influencing it.
flexibility vs. consistency in admin	Solution Internal, Suzuki	Flexibility in administration tends to prioritize employees concerns over systems while consistency in administration is system seeking to provide similar treatment to all employees in the name of fairness (Suzuki, 1998)
government MoE influence	Political	Government influence, particularly the MoE, is when officials or the government as a body exerts influence on the project.
help or support staff	Political	When respondents described how they help or support employees, this code was used, such as asking how they can help, providing guidance, or supporting employees in doing their job.
hire, recruit employees	Political	Hiring and recruiting employees was about both having adequate levels of employees and the staff characteristics needed for employees to successfully implement the program.
involve [education] officials	Solution	Respondents often referred to "involving education officials" or including or inviting education officials in program activities in order to localize the project, and embed it in the government system.
lacking materials	Problem	Learning materials could include books, teachers' guides or unspecified materials for classroom use. Generally materials described were learning and teaching printed materials, but some comments were broad, such as "under-resourced classrooms."

Code	Question	Description
language of instruction	Problem	The language of instruction was mentioned in reference to efforts to shift from Arabic to English in classrooms or in reference to teachers struggling with poor language skills.
learning	Solution	Learning was often stated explicitly, but also in reference to having students interact with the material and child-centered approaches to learning.
literacy	Problem	Respondents often indicated that their program is addressing literacy (and illiteracy) generally, though unlike the language of instruction, literacy was not tied to a particular language.
materials	Solution	Materials as inputs were the materials mentioned for the operations of the program. In contrast to the problem of lacking materials, this code focuses on materials provision within the program. Most often materials described were learning and teaching materials, with some reference to office supplies.
meaning, brand	Political	Meaning or brand included comments about the culture of the implementing agency.
model to follow	Solution	The model to follow is the program model. Respondents referred to the model as a predetermined method used internationally in project implementation that could be done correctly or incorrectly.
need technical skill	Political	Several employees remarked that technical skill is needed in some aspects of program implementation. Technical work could include design work for the project or budgeting. When employees indicated that certain aspects of the project needed help from outside or from a particular type of person to provide a specific service that was not within their skill set.
negotiate, schedule	Solution	Negotiating and scheduling were combined into one code since respondents often remarked that schedules had to be negotiated to make the program function properly. The school calendar and challenges surrounding the school calendar was a common scheduling concern. Negotiating the use and terms of use of the program with teachers and schools was also part of this code.
ongoing monitoring	Political	Ongoing monitoring is about directing the tenor of the program, including suggestions about how employees collaborate.
partnering	Solution	Partnering was framed as a process to find common interests and share resources with local partners. It was often framed as a strategy to ensure that the program would run smoothly in a location where employees did not have a constant presence.
objectives, strategy	Political	Objectives and strategies included goals and management decisions used to guide program implementation.
organization headquarters staff	Political	Organization headquarters staff was coded on passages that described how organizational employees influence the program themselves or how others see them influencing the program.

Code	Question	Description
organization vs. program centered	Problem Internal, Suzuki	Agency versus program-centered orientation reflects whether the agency is focused on perpetuating it's own role versus handing over the project to others (Suzuki, 1998).
partner organizations influence	Political	Partner organizations influence focuses on how partners influence the program. The difference between partnering as a process and partner organizations influence is this code is about the realization of partnership, while partnering as a process is about recruiting partners to work with the program.
personality, fit	Political	Personality and fit is about employee motivation to the work. Comments focused personality and fit often had to do with the employee's reason(s) for involvement in the program, enthusiasm, and their interest in the work.
power, hierarchy	Political	Power and hierarchy was used as a code when respondents described employees in relation to each other in terms of levels of vertical power in the program or agency.
production	Solution	Production is about the process of producing or designing program components. It is related to having a model to follow, but is about the details of developing program materials and content.
Program office staff	Political	This code described how Juba office employees involved in program delivery influence the program themselves or how others see them influencing the program.
Project Director	Political	The positional power of the Project Director position, like the Chief of Party, was mentioned several times throughout interviews, so it was given a separate code from "power, hierarchy." Codes referred to the Project Director's technical skill.
project use	Solution	Project use is about when key stakeholders adopt the program, through program demonstration. Several employees remarked that when the project is used and tried, it is more likely to be adopted.
quality of education	Problem	Quality of education is the broad improvement of education in Southern Sudan.
relationship assessment	Internal	Respondents sometimes gave an assessment of the employees relationships between levels when asked about changes they would propose to the way that headquarters and field employees work together. This code captures comments regarding the current standing of the relationship.
report, track target	Political	Report, track and target is about ensuring that there is common direction and aims within the program. It also includes comments about keeping on track, setting projections and making sure that the program is moving forward.

Code	Question	Description
ritual, connectedness	Political	Ritual and connectedness included ceremonial aspects of program delivery and communication. Many of the rituals used to stay connected had to do with communication, but the emphasis of the remarks was on maintaining contact and staying informed about what is going on in the program to address the needs of employees.
role, duties, supervise	Political	Respondents described what their role and the roles of others. This code is about formal responsibilities of the job and supervision of employees to ensure that they are abiding by their job description.
rules, policy, procedure	Political	Rules, policy, procedure compliance is about the adherence to the agency's policy and procedure.
school influence	Political	School influence was most often about the influence of educational administrators within a school, such as the head teachers. School influence also includes the influence of Parent-Teacher Associations and other school bodies that impact the program.
school monitoring	Solution	School monitoring includes classroom monitoring and meeting with head teachers and other school personnel about the program. Frequently school monitoring was done as a follow-up activity to teacher training and involved some ongoing training of teachers and school personnel.
similar or different across locations	Political Internal, Suzuki	Similarity or difference across locations is not a part of Suzuki's model, but several respondents indicated that there is variation in how the program is implemented in locations.
similarity or diversity employees characteristics	Political Internal, Suzuki	Suzuki's similarity or diversity in employee characteristics is reflective of the latitude the employees have to influence their work. A consequence of encouraging diversity in employees approaches is fragmented performance while encouraging similar approaches by employees regardless of their interpretation or preferences can restrict performance (Suzuki, 1998)
statistics	Solution	Statistics to show that the project works is often for the benefit of implementing partners to convince them that the project is a viable method that works not only in Southern Sudan, and also internationally. Program test scores were compared to schools in other parts of Southern Sudan.
stories of success	Political	Stories of success or innovation are when respondents described how stories or ideas for innovation are intentionally spread in the program or agency to advance a behavior or component of the program.
teacher influence	Solution	Teacher influence indicates when teachers can drive the program forward, delay or cause changes in program implementation.
team, relationships	Political	Team building and intentionally forming relationships was often described as getting to know people so that work could run smoothly.

Code	Question	Description
technology	Solution	Technology is the use of electronic technologies, such as hand-held devices and computers, in the implementation of the program by participants and beneficiaries, not employees.
technology for staff	Political	Technology for staff is about the use of technologies by employees in the implementation process. Technology in this code is about instances when employees indicate that a phone, computer, or internet use impact their work.
training teachers	Solution	Training teachers is workshops or other formal teacher training sessions that organized within the program as a group.
travel or trip	Political	Travel or trips were often framed in symbolic terms to extend distant communications to seeing the program with one's own eyes. Travel or trips involved overseas travel.
untrained teachers	Problem	Under-qualified, untrained teachers or poor quality of teaching was often described a reason for poor educational quality.
vehicles	Solution	Several respondents remarked that the provision of vehicles led to increased use and quality within the program, so it was vehicles was included as a code separate from materials and funds.
visits, spot checks	Political	Visits and spot-checks are in country visits to go to a school or lesson for observation or for program oversight. These visits, in contrast to the visits in supporting schools are done without providing a service to the teachers or schools, but are for observing how the program is going.

Appendix I: Coding Frequencies for Politics and Solutions

Table I1

Interview codes of employee political interests

Theme & Code	Organization HQ		Program Office		Field		Total	
	repeat	*n*= 3	repeat	*n*= 8	repeat	*n*= 9	repeat	*N*= 20
Specialist skills:	25%	**32%**	25%	24%	23%	23%	24%	25%
help or support staff	3.0	**3**	1.8	**8**	1.9	**7**	2.0	**18**
need technical skill	2.0	**3**	1.7	3	1.2	**5**	1.5	**11**
ask for help or support	1.7	**3**	2.3	3		2	1.8	8
hire, recruit staff [a]	1.5	2	1.7	3		1	1.5	6
travel or trip	1.5	**2**		4			1.2	6
Project Director [b]	1.5	2	1.8	4			1.7	6
Compliance:	*36%*	*28%*	*29%*	*26%*	*35%*	*30%*	*32%*	*28%*
report, track targets	4.3	**3**	3.1	**7**	2.3	**9**	2.9	**19**
role, duties, supervise	4.3	**3**	1.7	**7**	1.2	**6**	2.0	**16**
rule, policy, procedure	3.5	**2**	1.2	**5**	1.3	3	1.7	10
technology for staff [c]	2.5	**2**	1.6	**5**	1.0	2	1.7	9
visits, spot checks		**2**		2				4
stories of success	3.0	1		1			2.0	2
Direction:	*31%*	*28%*	***32%***	***31%***	*21%*	*23%*	*29%*	*28%*
environment context	2.3	**3**	2.3	**8**	1.3	3	2.1	**14**
objectives, strategy	2.7	**3**	1.9	**7**	1.8	**4**	2.0	**14**
Chief of Party	3.7	**3**	1.4	**5**	1.3	4	1.9	**12**
ongoing monitoring		1	2.0	**5**		4	1.5	10
ritual, connectedness [d]	3.0	1		**5**			1.3	6
power, hierarchy	3.0	2		2			2.0	4
Mood / culture:	9%	13%	15%	18%	20%	**24%**	14%	19%
Feedback, input		1	1.7	**7**	1.4	**5**	1.5	**13**
belong, trust, fit in		1	1.2	**5**		3	1.1	9
team, relationships	3.0	1		2	1.3	4	1.4	7
Meaning, brand	2.0	1		1		3	1.2	5
personality, fit [e]	1.5	**2**		3			1.2	5
Conflict, competition				1		1		2

[a] 4/7 foreign respondents remarked on hiring, recruit employees (repeat average: 1.5).
[b] 5/7 foreign respondents remarked on Project Director's influence (repeat average: 2.3).
[c] 4/7 foreign respondents remarked on technology for employees (repeat average: 2.3).
[d] 4/7 foreign respondents remarked on ritual or connectedness (repeat average: 1.5).
[e] 4/7 foreign respondents remarked on enthusiasm, personality and fit (repeat average: 1.5).

Table I2

Solution stream interview codes

Code	Organization HQ repeat	*n*= 3	Program Office repeat	*n*= 8	Field Repeat	*n*= 9	Total repeat	*n*= 20
Design [a]	*39%*	*33%*	***29%***	***28%***	*24%*	*22%*	*28%*	*26%*
model to follow	1.3	**3**	1.7	**7**	**2.1**	**8**	1.8	**18**
technology	2.0	2	**3.2**	**6**	**2.5**	**8**	**2.6**	**16**
continuity		**2**	1.5	4	2.0	3	1.6	9
curriculum of S. Sudan		1	1.4	**5**		2	1.3	8
production [b]	3.0	1	1.3	4		1	1.5	6
Demonstrate [a]	*14%*	*19%*	*27%*	*26%*	***30%***	***31%***	*27%*	*27%*
school monitoring		1	2.0	**7**	1.9	**9**	1.9	**17**
training teachers		1	**2.2**	**6**	**2.6**	**9**	**2.3**	**16**
contracted service		1	2.0	**5**	1.6	**5**	1.7	**11**
funds		**2**	1.3	3		**5**	1.1	10
vehicles [c]			1.3	3	1.3	3	1.3	6
Substantiate [a]	***44%***	***44%***	*24%*	*26%*	*22%*	*25%*	*25%*	*28%*
learning observed	1.5	**2**	1.5	**6**	1.9	**7**	1.7	**15**
project use		**2**	**2.1**	**7**	1.5	**6**	1.7	**15**
expansion [d]		**3**	1.2	**6**		3	1.1	**12**
enjoy, attract		**2**		3	2.2	**5**	1.2	10
statistical evidence	1.7	**3**	**3.0**	2	1.3	4	1.8	9
Integrate [a]	*3%*	*4%*	*20%*	*20%*	*24%*	*23%*	*21%*	*19%*
involve officials			**2.8**	**5**	**3.1**	**8**	**3.0**	**13**
guiding materials			1.4	**7**	1.8	4	1.5	**11**
adaptation		1		3		4		8
negotiate			**2.0**	3	1.6	**5**	1.8	8
partnering				1		2		3

[a] Summary data: % allocated to each category (largest value bold for each level).
[b] 6/9 remarks about production came from 3 of the 9 foreign respondents.
[c] 7/8 remarks about vehicles came from 5 of the 13 Sudanese respondents.
[d] 8/13 remarks about project expansion came from 7 of the 9 foreign respondents.

Bold figures: **repeat** = average repetition (code/*n*), indicated if > 1, bold if > 2.
n (respondents) > 50% mentioned the code

Table 12 interview code frequencies and repetition rates demonstrate that OHqRs were most concerned with substantiating that the program can work in SS3A. Those in Southern Sudan described program success with combined attributes about its design, integration, and demonstration.

Table I3

Solution stream survey codes

Question		Total	Level		Nationality	
			Field	PO/Hq [a]	National	Foreign
11. What is the most important activity of the program?		(*n*=17)	(*n*=8)	(*n*=9)	(*n*=12)	(*n*=5)
Design	model to follow	6	3	*(2)* 3	5	1
	continuity	2	1	1	1	1
Demonstrate	school monitoring	3	1	2	2	1
	training teachers	5	**4**	1	5	
	contracted service	2	1	*(1)* 2	2	1
Substantiate	learning observed	2	2		2	
	project use	3		3	1	2
Integrate	involve officials	3	2	1	2	1
	guiding materials	3	1	1	2	
	Total code count:	29	15	14	22	7
12. What solution seems to be most promising in the program? [b]		(*n*=16)	(*n*=8)	(*n*=8)	(*n*=11)	(*n*=5)
Design	technology	4	1	*(3)* 3	3	1
	continuity	1	1		1	
Demonstrate	school monitoring	2	1	1	1	1
	training teachers	2	2		2	
	vehicles	2	1	1	1	1
Substantiate	statistical evidence	1	1		1	
Integrate	involve officials	6	2	4	3	3
	adaptation [b]	1	1		1	
	Total code count:	19	10	9	13	6

[a] PO/Hq: organization and program headquarters offices combined.
[b] *Parenthesis: 3 administrative employees from headquarters*
[c] Suggested program adaptation: Advocating to improve teachers' salaries.

Table 13 survey results suggest perceptions on solutions varied among all staff. The 17 survey respondents did not agree on any one aspect of the project as important or promising. Responses to the survey questions in Table 13 were short-answer with most comments in one or two sentences. In contrast, interview responses repeated themes frequently since respondents elaborated on their ideas. Codes attributed to the solution stream in both the interview and survey indicated headquarters concern with design and substantiation and field interest in demonstration and integration.

Appendix J: Interview Quotes the Extent the Problems Will Be Solved

Table J

Interview quotations about the extent the program solves problems

Quote	Extent	Explanation / What is needed
OHqR 1	"I think it's probably going to have to be a long term effort for an indefinite period. At least until the referendum is done, and seven years after that,	when there is a certain amount of stability as you get educated teachers in the schools."
OHqR 2	"The project really has to focus on this in the next couple of years making sure that the program is maintained after the funding is dried up, after we leave.	It depends on a number of different factors, external factors, [such as] the politics and the ability for [the government] to carry out these programs without funder and donor support."
OHqR 3	"It was going to take an enormous, concerted effort to very quickly spend and expand on a [high] level	I was wondering if they were going to be able to handle the expansion. And I do not know the answer to that."
POR 1	"To a very low extent (chuckle), to a very low extent within the given time frame within the context in which we work…	teachers are not well motivated because of low salaries and things like that…[we need] a critical arc of teachers who can use the program… [and] raise the levels of acceptability within the Ministry to pick up this program when it does close."
POR 2	I think that [the program] is doing quite a lot. We're trying to make some changes in the schools where we're able to operate. But I feel like there's still a lot of work to be done to improve the quality of education in Southern Sudan."	"I cannot comment the extent [the program] will be able to address the quality issue because the problems of education in Southern Sudan are really very vast. There are issues of teacher training..., teacher's payment, …and the new curriculum, Arabic as the mode of instruction to English. So the challenges are quite immense.
POR 3	"It is addressing it [quality] to a certain extent, but there are still a lot of limitations. For example… it does require teachers have a certain level of English… some tend to get frustrated and maybe stop using it.	I think there may be other reasons they stop using it, which may have to do with outreach… [and] they see it as an extra task."
POR 4	"The kids are learning more if they participate in the program, which is really the basic intent of the whole intervention…	and I think [the donor's] view on this was historically from its use in other countries, here's a quick way to get some quality education into a school classroom."

Quote	Extent	Explanation / What is needed
POR 5	“Ah, what I would say is it has a very great impact on the Southern Sudanese, most especially the children and adults…	because you find that even some places where people are not actually enrolled in any of these classes, you find them excited about the program.”
POR 6	“It is a partial solution…	because we can’t reach all of the schools. (POR)”
POR 7	…if it is the teacher that is being trained or if it is the tutor in the teacher training program, they should benefit from our program”	“Education is a process… it’s ongoing. There are people who come in to learn and they progress and go on use what they get from us and there are still others who come in. But what we make sure is what they get from us helps them
FldR 1	I think [the program] is good, but it does not have enough time	because they expect teachers to know English, but here it is Arabic. Now people are struggling to change…the program is beneficial for [location].”
FldR 2	“Yea, well [the agency] is supporting [the program] and also there is motorbikes with us in the field,	which makes it easier for employees to run the program as compared to government officials.
FldR 3	“The way forward could be continuously building the capacity and enlightenment of education officials	because they are the owners of the program. They should also be able to talk to people, not only waiting.”
FldR 4	“When we are done running the project, then we go and the project will be handed over to the Ministry and to know that we can build the capacity of the Ministry people at the same time…	[for] educational officials to know the strategy of the program so that they can be able to continue and sustain the program. [That will be] as long as it has been benefitting (FldR).”
FldR 5	“The program to a large extent to address the issues	in spite of the fact that we also have project challenges. For example, teachers have had their background in Arabic and were using the Arabic curriculum.”