Orientalist Knowledges at the European Periphery: Norwegian Racial Projects, 1970-2005

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of
Marianne Gullestad
1946-2008

Abstract

In this dissertation I examine recent Norwegian racial formations. I argue that whiteness has become an increasingly central aspect of productions of Norwegian national identity. Furthermore, I show that the racializing processes first established in the early 1970s continue to be reproduced and shape Norwegian society today. The dissertation focuses on three disparate but interlinked sites. First, I discuss the experiences of postwar Southern and Eastern European migrants in Norway, based on interviews with 12 migrants. I argue that these migrants are produced as white in a qualitatively different way from non-migrant Norwegians who are seen as white. Furthermore, I suggest that the apparent production of the migrants' children as white *and* Norwegian shows that Norwegian forms of whiteness are less dependent on tracing descent to Norwegian territory than has previously been suggested.

Secondly, I trace the changing discourses of race and migration that culminated in the 1975 "immigration stop" legislation. I argue that at the beginning of the decade Norwegian understandings of immigration were not heavily dependent on constructions of race, but that they became so within a few years. Using close readings of policy documents, the Parliamentary debate on the "immigration stop" and newspaper coverage from the entire period, I show that the development and passing of the legislation was dependent on, and in turn codified, racial constructs that saw some migrants as always already excessively different.

Lastly, I argue that imperatives to love-and romance-based marriage that is evident in Norwegian family reunification law constitutes a racial project – one that can be seen as an extension of the processes of racialization that were established in the 1970s. I also suggest that arranged marriages queer in relation to Norwegian heteronormativities.

In the conclusion I point both to the continued reiteration of race in Norway, and to forms of opposition to the racial productions that I have discussed. I argue that international

perspectives on racial formation provide analytic dexterity that is necessary if Norwegian racializing processes are to be interrupted.

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Hudfargen som faren min la igjen litt av til meg fratok meg ikke bare rettighetene mine, som for eksempel å reise og bevege meg fritt. Med årene oppfattet jeg at min fars arv fratok meg hele min rett til å være den jeg var. Så min rett til å være. (...)
Mens jeg først begynte å bla i generelle papirer, fant jeg ut skrekkelige ting: I mitt land er det lov å behandle mennesker som ikke har det som kalles et "typisk nordisk utseende" på en annen måte enn andre mennesker.
Jeg forsøkte selvfølgelig å le. Så lo jeg ikke lenger; for et land, et samfunn, som kan produsere slike tanker om et slag mennesker, vil alltid være beredt til å produsere tilsvarende tanker om nye grupper mennesker. Og hva skal men med tanker hvis de ikke er ment å skulle lede til handlinger.

(The skin color that my father left some of to me, took more from me than just my rights, like travelling and moving freely. Through the years I realized that the inheritance from my father took from me all rights to be who I was. Thus my right to be. (…)
As I began to look through general papers, I found horrific things: In my country, it is permitted to treat people who do not have what is called a "typical Nordic look" differently from other people.
Of course I tried to laugh. Then I laughed no more, because a country, a society, that can produce such thoughts about one kind of humans, will always be prepared to produce similar thoughts about new groups of humans. And what need does one have for thoughts if these are not meant to lead to action.)

(Seyfarth 2005, 384-385)

Race is not a cipher for the whole of life. When I speak of race you must bear in mind that this is not the same thing as saying that race explains everything. Race does not explain all forms of misfortune any more than it explains the colour of one's socks. Yet conversations about race so quickly devolve into anxious bouts of wondering why we are not talking about something – anything – else, like hard work or personal responsibility or birth order or class or God or the good, old glories of the human spirit. All these are worthy topics of conversation, surely, but ... can we consider, for just one moment, ***race****.*

(Williams 1997, 61)

Preface

A Few Notes About Norway & Comments on Positionality

For readers of this dissertation who are not familiar with recent Norwegian nation building and immigration history, this preface provides a very brief overview of some basic information that contextualizes the chapters to come. This preface also includes a short discussion of my position as a Norwegian citizen located in the U.S. academy and grounded in U.S. theories of race while doing research on Norway.

Notes about Norway

Present-day Norway gained independence from Sweden in 1905, following 500 years of Swedish and Danish rule, and much of recent Norwegian history focuses on creating a national identity that can stand in contrast to Swedish or Danish identities. Thus, for example, there are today two official written versions of Norwegian, as the national founders could not agree on whether to create a written national language based on written Danish, or to form one based on the myriad Norwegian dialects. However, for the past 60 years the construction of a Norwegian identity in distinction from other Europeans has focused on national opposition to the Nazi occupation between 1940 and 1945. In this process, a wide range of people whose being (e.g. the children of German men and Norwegian women born during or immediately after the war) or behavior (e.g. anyone employed by the Nazi regime) has been constructed as "too close" to Nazi Germany have been positioned as "un-Norwegian." Through a binary construction, "Norwegianness" is thus positioned as anti-Nazi (the Quisling government that gave rise to the term notwithstanding) and hence "good."

With regards to immigration there was, with few but notable exceptions, little focus in the post-war period on either immigration legislation or particular immigrants until the

politicization of Asian and African immigration in the early 1970s. In the decades following WWII, immigration to Norway was relatively constant (the number of foreign workers in Norway – the only statistic available – was about 15-16 000 persons), and there was no net population gain until 1967.

Prior to the politicization of immigration in the 1970s there were nevertheless three important events that changed the Norwegian immigration landscape in the post-WWII era (all of which occurred during 1956). First, the last immigration laws that *explicitly* barred particular groups from entry were abolished in November 1956 (*Arbeiderbladet* 2 November 1956; Tjelmeland 2003: 72). According to contemporary news reports, the ban on Roma entry was uncontroversial, but the Christian Democrats opposed lifting the ban on Jesuits. Secondly, in late 1956 and early 1957 Norwegians enthusiastically welcomed Hungarian refugees (about 1200 refugees arrived over the course of about six months; this was considered a substantial number at the time). The warm welcome of the Hungarian migrants (see chapter two) is closely linked to the framing of the refugees as "voting with their feet" against both Communism and the USSR. Thirdly, it is important to note that prior to succumbing to public pressure to accept Hungarian refugees, the Norwegian government was during this time (summer and fall of 1956) deciding to no longer accept European migrants because they were considered inassimilable.

The warm welcome that Hungarian refugees received on arrival in 1956-1957 is not overall representative for Norwegian approaches to European migrants and refugees, and the importance of the Cold War in framing these particular migrants can hardly be overstated. In contrast, in 1945 and for several years thereafter, Norway tried to expel approximately 1000 Poles who had been forced laborers for Nazi Germany and refused to return to Poland at the end of the war. The Poles were permitted to stay only after several years of wrangling and after considerable international pressure had been applied on the Norwegian state.

Furthermore, policies of assimilation and policing of national minorities continued throughout the postwar period. In particular, the Sami, Rom, and Romani were targets of intense racism and exoticization. Thus, while there were few migrants in Norway in the decades following WWII, and while immigration and immigrants rarely were the focus of political debate, the Norwegian state as well as academics and activists were wrestling with questions of minority management throughout the postwar period. While assimilation policies softened during this period compared to the pre-war era, assimilation goals remained intact.

With changing global migration patterns and increasing Norwegian needs for labor power, significant non-European immigration to Norway started in the late 1960s, when labor migrants arrived from Pakistan and Turkey to take up unskilled or semi-skilled positions in the work force (Tjelmeland 2003; Brochmann 2003; see chapter three). This form of labor immigration ended in 1975, and since then Asian, African, and South American immigrants have mainly arrived through family reunification and as refugees and asylum-seekers (Tjelmeland 2003; Brochmann 2003). Though both contemporary and current popular and academic discourse employs language that implies that Asian and African migrants have dominated immigration to Norway from the early 1970s onwards, this is incorrect. According to the Norwegian Bureau of Statistics, immigration from Asia, Africa, and South America has *never* dominated new[1] immigration to Norway.[2]

Every year, Europeans constitute by far the largest group of immigrants to Norway (approximately two-thirds of all immigrants in any given year are European). However, European migrants are also the most likely to leave, and between 1988 and 2008 Asian, African and South American immigrants *and their descendants* have been the largest groups "with an immigrant background" living in Norway.[3] However, as of 1 January 2009, the five largest groups "with an immigrant background" (i.e. immigrants, the children of immigrants, and former immigrants who have become citizens as well as their children) are (in descending order) Poles, Pakistanis, Swedes, Iraqis and Somalis.[4]

Though Norway collects no "race" based statistics, it is estimated that about 5.5 percent of the total Norwegian population have an "immigrant background" from Asia, Africa, and South America,[5] which is implicitly assumed to roughly coincide with the "non-white" population. This assumption is increasingly incorrect[6] and the population in Norway that is not understood as white must be assumed to be somewhat larger than this number suggests. Immigrants constitute 10.6 percent of the total Norwegian population (ibid.).

Comments about positionality

Because there are few academic analyses of race in Norway, and only a handful of scholars who engage with theories of race, the framing, research, and writing of this dissertation has benefited considerably from my location outside Norway. The U.S. scholarship on race that focuses on bringing to light processes of racialization (in contrast to, for example, scholarship on "race relations" or ethnographic studies of "the other") has inspired but not bound this research. The details of U.S. racial formations are significantly different from those in Norway, and there are therefore no discussions of this literature here. In other words, while I have focused on the discursive production of race through public debates and policy making that echoes U.S. based critical race scholarship, I have not relied on the analyses and conclusions that U.S. scholars have developed.[7]

Despite the deeply divergent details of racial formations in the U.S. and Norway, I have chosen to employ the framework for analyses of race developed by Omi and Winant (1994). Although Omi and Winant place their theories firmly in the U.S, analyzing the production of race through the frameworks of racial projects and racial formations has broader applicability. In thus selectively choosing which theories to adapt from their U.S. origins I paid careful attention to whether they could be brought to bear on the Norwegian context in a manner that shed new light on existing processes. Doing so also required being vigilant not to impose U.S. expectations of what race looks like or how it

is formed. Consequently I do not, for example, discuss the experiences of Southern and Eastern European migrants in Norway in terms of ethnicity, though this is a common way of understanding European migrants and their descendants in U.S.

Being based in the U.S. academy and being Norwegian but having spent most of the last two decades (and all my education post 10th grade and nearly all of my adult life) outside Norway (primarily but not only in Britain and the U.S.), I am variously positioned as both an "insider" and an "outsider" in and to Norway. In the U.S. my being Norwegian suggests that I am an "insider" to my research site, but in Norway I am often read not only as an "outsider" but as literally foreign. I have found that being stuck mid-Atlantic in this manner has been helpful to thinking through the materials I analyze in this dissertation. Having an intimate knowledge of Norwegian language and cultural practices but also having a distance to these that denaturalize them has better enabled me to challenge received wisdom about what it means to be Norwegian; about what race looks like (or not) in Norway; and about how to frame recent Norwegian immigration history.

NOTE

[1] Statistics reflect new immigration permits, as compared to renewed permits.

[2] See statistics at http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/02/20/innvutv/tab-2009-05-07-03.html.

[3] See statistics at http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2009-04-30-07.html.

[4] See statistics at http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/fig-2009-04-30-01.gif.

[5] See statistics at http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2009-04-30-07.html.

[6] Children and youth who are not viewed as white but who are not included in immigration statistics are a growing group.

[7] Though this dissertation is in conversation with multiple fields including critical race theory, critical studies of whiteness, European scholarship on race, postcolonial feminist theory and feminist theories of race and intersectionality, it is not a comparative study and it also makes little explicit reference to this scholarship.

Chapter One

Introduction

According to the dominant Norwegian narrative, there is no such thing as “race” in Norway. Nonetheless there are “Norwegians” and there are Others, and the demarcation between the two returns again and again to perceptions of phenotype, culture, geography, and religion. When not speaking of race, therefore, Norwegians discuss the darkness of skin, the exoticness of cultural practices, the incompatibility of the adhan[1] with Norwegian space. Thus, when the left-leaning daily newspaper *Dagsavisen*[2] reports from “the other Norway” in an attempt to demystify it for an audience presumed to be both white and in need of such demystification, it is the relative absence of “pale faces” that signals Otherness (Bredeveien 2009). To find “the other Norway” *Dagsavisen*’s journalist gets onto the highway to reach Furuset, the Oslo suburb that has the highest percentage of “immigrants” (more on that shortly) anywhere in Norway. At Furuset, he notes, the only place where you can find “pale faces” is at the senior center: at the middle school he only counts “one pale face, which later turns out to be a Dane. Otherwise all the students are of one exotic origin or another”[3] (ibid.). Furuset is not only physically distant from “the normal Norway” (not a phrase *Dagsavisen* uses, but “normal” is presumably what the rest of Norway - the Norway that isn’t other - is) but is also a place where the only white people are scared and old and huddled together in segregated spaces at the senior center[4] (ibid.). The friendliness of the middle school students notwithstanding, in this representation Furuset is not fully part of Norway.

Although not being a Norwegian citizen, not speaking Norwegian well, or dressing in ways that reference non-Western clothing styles can be markers of difference, none of these are what firmly marks the students as Other. Rather, the students are exotic representations of “the other Norway” *only* because they are not “pale.” The journalist

emphasizes that the students would quite like some “Norwegian friends” (ibid.), thus highlighting that the students in question are not, in this schema, Norwegian. But who are the youth at the Furuset school? Where do they “properly” belong? We don’t know what their citizenship is, or much about how they might identify (though apparently the students themselves see Norwegians as living elsewhere), only that they are “exotic,” not pale, and not, in the journalist’s (and possibly their own) view, Norwegian.

A little over half of the Furuset population are immigrants and of these the largest groups are from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, *Dagsavisen* notes in a list of “facts” linked to the article. Seventy percent of the youth are “of an immigrant background.” This may seem significant, and on one level it is, but because the term “of an immigrant background” is so broad – it includes those who have immigrated themselves (including Norwegian citizens born abroad) and those with one or more parents who were not born in Norway – many of these allegedly “not Norwegian” youth are Norwegian citizens, were born in Norway, and may have one “ethnic Norwegian” parent.[5] Thus the Furuset youth can only be presumed to be not-Norwegian in a schema that links phenotype to national belonging

As a nation, Norway is produced in part through racial projects that limit national belonging. The ostensible absence of race in Norway is coupled with constructions of difference and national belonging that centrally rely on phenotype to determine relative Norwegianness.[6] Yet the Norwegian exceptionalist narrative suggests that the country is “innocent” of colonial projects and therefore of racial production (for a critique, see Gullestad 2002). Race, Norwegian academics and commentators tend to insist, refers to the belief that there are biologically distinct, and hierarchically ranked, human races (see e.g. Prieur 2002; Åmås 2008), and thus any reference to race implies acceptance of the spurious science that seeks to biologically divide humans into races. Academic analyses of immigration, integration, and discrimination therefore largely do not consider race and processes of racialization (though see Berg 2008; Fredriksen 2001; Gullestad 2002, 2006;

Vold 2007; and, for a popular argument for race as an analytic term from a leading academic: Eriksen 2008).

It is in this lacuna between on the one hand, a (scholarly and popular) analytic framework that denies the existence of racial production and, on the other hand, the simultaneous (scholarly and popular) reiteration of constructions of difference that use series of symbols centered on phenotype to determine belonging, that this dissertation takes place. I show that rather than being natural responses to new forms of immigration (e.g. Tjelmeland 2003) the constructions of difference that have emerged in Norway over the past 35 years are racial. I thus seek to challenge the idea that Norway stands outside international circulations of racial knowledges. That racializing processes in Norway are not identical to those in, for example, the United States, Britain, or South Africa,[7] does not mean that such processes are not also widespread and deeply ingrained in Norway.

This dissertation is animated by the belief that analyses of race are central to the dismantling of racial logics. Without seeing the systemic and often obfuscated ways in which racial thinking infuses everyday categories and discourses – and therefore interpersonal interactions, media representations, policy making, policing, etc. – we are easily blinded to all but the crudest forms of racism. Here, therefore, I begin to disentangle recent processes of dominant Norwegian racial constructions; such an analysis is important in order to understand the current discourses that shape Norwegian society and policy making, and it also adds to international scholarship that interrogates spatially and temporally specific iterations of race.

The analysis does not primarily ask questions about individual identity, nor does it focus on the responses to racializing discourses by those constructed as "strange" and outside the nation. Rather, by interrogating dominant racial productions, I seek to understand the ways in which these productions set the parameters within which ideas of belonging and nation must be negotiated. I demonstrate that dominant discourses of difference and national belonging are *racial* rather than "natural" responses to pre-determined forms of

difference. In doing so, I argue that in their overarching forms, current Norwegian racial constructions are locally produced iterations of international discourses of race.

Norwegian exceptionalism

Norwegian processes of racialization are enabled by the exceptionalist narrative that positions Norway as innocent of colonial history and (therefore) of racial patterns of thought (Gullestad 2002). Coupled with a narrow definition of race that sees it as a racist tool with no analytic value, this exceptionalist narrative obfuscates the breadth and depth of racializing processes in Norway. Norwegian scholars have largely accepted this trinity of myth and narrow meanings, and consequently there is little Norwegian scholarship that interrogates racial production, considers "race relations," or otherwise engages the kinds of questions that have animated much British and North American scholarship on the production, meaning, and operation of racial ideas (for exceptions see Berg 2008; Fredriksen 2001; Gullestad 2002, 2006, 2007; Tajik 2004; Vold 2007).

Here I am interested in the effects of the broad disavowal of race rather than in assessing the historical accuracy of the claims to innocence. However, it should be noted that Norwegian merchants (Svalesen 2000) and missionaries (Gullestad 2007) have long direct involvements in European colonial projects (both during and after Danish rule). Furthermore, dominant Norwegian society – including the state – has long engaged in racist colonial assimilation strategies in relation to national minority groups such as the Sami, Rom, and Romani[8] (e.g Myking 2009; Salimi 1999). Norwegian discourses of minority management thus did not originate with the attempts to manage immigrant groups commencing in the 1970s (see also Salimi 1999), and suggestions that majority Norwegians from the 1970s onwards have merely been trying to handle a novel situation where "difference" is introduced to a "homogenous" society (e.g. Tjelmeland 2003) are disingenuous. While migrants from Asia and Africa were initially constructed as much less threatening than for instance the Rom, the differences in their construction as threatening to the homeliness of the nation rapidly shrunk (see chapter three).

Additionally, Norway is deeply embedded in circulations of racial knowledges based in colonial projects through what Mulinari et al. call “colonial complicity” (2009, 5). “Colonial complicity,” they explain, “refers to processes in which (post)colonial imaginaries, practices and products are made to be part of what is understood as the ‘national’ and ‘traditional’ culture of the Nordic countries” (2009, 1). These imaginaries centrally rest on Orientalist and racist knowledge productions (e.g. McClintock 1995; Rossi 2009; Said 1979; Stoler 1995; Ware 1992; Ye eno lu 1998) that consequently also are embedded in “traditional” Nordic cultures.

To think of Norwegian racial projects as parts of a broader Nordic colonial complicity places these projects in a framework that acknowledges the relatively peripheral Norwegian involvement in direct colonialism without reiterating the narratives of innocence to which this peripheral colonial history has given rise (see e.g. Gullestad 2006, 40-41). In this manner it can serve as a response to ideas of Norwegian exceptionalism that rely on narratives of colonial – and therefore, in this logic, racial – innocence to uphold Norwegian racial projects. As a contextual backdrop, then, colonial complicity describes the Norwegian relationship to the colonial projects that produce the knowledges on which Norwegian racial constructions so heavily rely.

The link between “(post)colonial imaginaries, practices and products” and the national is central to the simultaneous dissemination and disavowal of colonial knowledges in Norway. By seeing these imaginaries as part of a national identity the attachment to colonial imaginaries is framed as “innocent” protection of the nation rather than as reiterations of racial knowledges (for analyses of examples of this assumption of innocence, see e.g. Gullestad 2006, 193-220; Rossi 2009). Mulinari et al. argue that the Nordic countries have positioned themselves as parts of a Western civilizing project that all have been willing to propagate and defend (2009, 1), while at the same time the limited direct involvement in colonialism has meant that there has been no “clear period of critique of colonialism and its presence in everyday environments and encounters” (2009, 2). In conjunction, then, this means that “(post)colonial imaginaries, practices and

products" infuse the everyday while critiques of this are actively discouraged through the links between colonial imaginaries and national identity. Thus, for example, in Norway the "Black Boy," "Hindu," and "Santa Maria" brands of spices can be found in most kitchens, but in the dominant public sphere there has been little to no critique of the colonial imaginaries that these brand names (and logos) are based on (though see VG 2002).

In addition to the myths of colonial innocence, the Norwegian disavowal of race is built on seeing race as referring only to the belief in biologically defined and hierarchically ranked human races. There is little to no academic debate about the use of race in Norway, and its disavowal must therefore primarily be gleaned from its absence or brief rejection in academic texts (e.g. Moldrheim 2000; Prieur 2004). However, media commentary by public intellectuals provides a view of the arguments on which the disavowal of race is based. For example, the influential commentator and editor Knut Olav Åmås writes that race is not the basis for discrimination; rather, it is skin color, ethnicity, and cultural background that are used as the bases for discrimination and exclusion (Åmås 2008). Åmås's argument appears to be in line with prevailing popular and academic understandings both of race and discrimination. Thus, dominant Norwegian understandings of race are predicated on ignoring the vast international scholarship on the use of, for example, phenotypical markers (e.g. Fanon 1967; Frankenberg 1993; Gould 1996; Lewin 2005), cultural characteristics (e.g. Barker 1981; Stolcke 1995), or religion (e.g. Kyriakides, Virdee, and Modood 2009) to produce race. In turn, skin color, ethnicity, and cultural background are viewed as neutral descriptors divorced from race. As a result, the power of racial constructions in creating and linking those categories and their meanings is lost.

The effects of the limited definition of race in Norway can perhaps most clearly be seen in the scholarship on racism and "ethnic discrimination."[9] Though the vast majority of Norwegian scholarship does not use "race" (or any Norwegian equivalent) as an analytic category (Berg 2008; Gullestad 2004, 182-183; 2002, 152; see also Rogstad and

Midtbøen 2009, 10), there is some scholarship that addresses racism and "ethnic discrimination" (e.g. Eide and Simonsen 2007; Rogstad 2002; Wikan 2002). This scholarship rarely makes its definition of racism or race clear, (Rogstad and Midtbøen 2009) yet to some extent the underlying conceptualization of race is broader than the attendant disavowal of race as a mode of analysis would suggest.

According to Rogstad and Midtbøen, most scholars analyzing racism in Norway today conceptualize it in terms drawn from the "new racism" school. Commonly associated with Barker's *The New Racism* (1981), this school argues that culture has become a "pseudo-biological" marker for racist thought (Barker 1981, 23). Scholars employing this framework thus implicitly (because unstated) conceptualize race as having a broader social basis than only references to biology. However, scholars employing the new racism framework as well as those adhering to the much narrower "old racism" (racism only as the belief in biologically defined hierarchical races) focus exclusively on racism as individual acts of prejudice (Rogstad and Midtbøen 2009, chapter 3). This means that even with the recognition that e.g. "culture" can be a racial term, there is very little consideration of the ways in which common discourses and banal, day-to-day interactions among individuals and with authorities (e.g. teachers, police, and bureaucrats) have racial effects.

The attachment to seeing racism as individual acts and the concomitant resistance to considering the racial effects of everyday interactions is closely tied to the considerable national and individual investment in self-images of innocence and goodness[10] (Gullestad 2002; Hagelund 2004). In this image, Norway is a "world leader" not through the global reach of its businesses or its military might, but by the power of its ethics. In other words, Norway is best at being good.[11] The exceptionalist narrative of colonial and racial innocence and the attendant limited understanding of race and of racism enables and supports this self-image by positioning white Norwegians outside racist thought and practice. Though racism tends to be introduced in European public discourse only in order to be denied (van Dijk 1992), in Norway this tendency extends to scholarly

analyses. It is therefore a discourse that meets few challenges. Thus, for example, in a study of employers' reluctance to hire people they perceived to be "excessively different" (often based on "foreign" names), Rogstad argues that it is "uncertainty" rather than "racism" that guides these employment decisions (2000, 2006; see also Kumar 2008). Racism is here bracketed off at the same time as the racializing processes that such "uncertainty" both produces and is caused by is rendered invisible.

In conjunction, the disavowal of race as irrelevant in the Norwegian context and the narrow understanding of harmful racial practices (i.e. "old" and "new" racism) ensure that processes of racialization are rendered invisible. Consequently, the effects of such processes are largely naturalized, which in turn enable the disavowal of race. Rather than interrogating the processing of Othering in Norway, scholars have largely explained racism and racial thinking in Norway as the result of non-European immigration (see discussion in chapter three; Lien 1996; Tjelmeland 2003). In this view, migrants from Asia and Africa are always already excessively different (chapter three), and their construction as Other is seen as a "natural" reaction to their presence (e.g. Tjelmeland 2003).

The meaning and analysis of race

The disavowal of race in Norway is heavily dependent on an understanding of race as a scientific category that is racist and that has been thoroughly debunked.   In this view, race is an entirely scientific category, and once its scientific basis has been discredited, the concept ceases to have meaning (see e.g. Prieur 2004; Åmås 2008). Race, however, is not so easily undone. First, while science has been (and continues to be) one of the central modes by which race is produced; race is founded on and reiterated through social practices. Secondly, dismissing the scientific basis for race does little to undo its social impact (Hartigan 2008).

The assertion that there is no scientific basis for a racial taxonomy of humans uneasily co-exists with an ongoing use of racial categories in scientific research (Kaufman and

Cooper 2008; Hartigan 2008; Reardon 2004, 2005; Sankar 2006). As Reardon (2004, 2005) and Hartigan (2008) explain, despite widespread belief to the contrary, biologists, geneticists and others have not at any point in the post-war period (or in the decades earlier) ceased research that aims to find, or purports to find, racial differences in our genetic materials. Scientific methods have changed from crude cranial measurements (Gould 1996) to technology-driven molecular biology (Reardon 2004), but claims to finding race have been constant. Indeed, Reardon argues that in the last several decades, geneticists have tightened their control over definitions of race through opposing "false" popular conceptions of race with "true" molecular understandings of race (2004, 52).

This is what Hartigan describes as race "gaining in reality": the widespread dissemination in scientific communities and popular media of genetic research that purports to locate race at the molecular level ensures the reiteration of race as a scientifically meaningful category (2008, 181-184). However, that scientists continue to work with race as a way to categorize humans, and that ideas of "molecular race" continue to be popularly disseminated, does not make racial categorizations of humans "true" or "natural." Reardon (2004, 2005) and Hartigan (2008) both show that it is the imbeddedness of racial thinking in current North American culture that leads (some) scientists and journalists to "see" race in studies of DNA (see also Kaufman and Cooper 2008; Sankar 2006) and note that scientists who employ and/or "locate" race are variously replicating dominant categories (intentionally or by not questioning received categories); are translating non-racial research into a language of race; or have reformulated what *they* mean by "race" to divorce it from its popular and historic meanings. Racial thinking is no less embedded in scientific communities outside North America, and current scientific studies of race are no less based in dominant contemporary social constructions than such studies were in the past (Gould 1996).

Race is not a category that originated in science (Hannaford 1996; Malik 1996) – though science later sought to justify it (Gould 1996) – and we cannot expect it to end even if scientific communities were unanimous in rejecting it. As a social category, race relies

on the production of group-based identities that are seen as natural, ahistorial and hierarchical. Analyses of race must interrogate the mechanisms through which racial demarcations are made, paying attention to both explicitly and implicitly racializing discourses.

Analyses of how race is made are necessarily messy. Racial production is context-specific yet embedded in discourses that have deep and wide roots; it is remarkably consistent yet contradictory; it is often odd yet always oddly familiar. Omi and Winant's theory of racial formation provides a guide through this shifting landscape. Foregrounding the social conflicts that race both signifies and symbolizes, Omi and Winant see racial formation as "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are inhabited, transformed and destroyed" (1994, 55). In this view, it is important to analyze race because rather than being a mistake of the past that can easily be discarded, it continues to play a central role in social structures. Omi and Winant tie together the representational and structural aspects of racial construction through what they call "racial projects." In their usage, "[r]acial projects connect what race *means* in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially *organized*, based upon that meaning" (1994, 56). Analyses of racial projects thus focus on the ways in which what race means and what it does are co-produced.

While Omi and Winant understand race as a concept that "signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests" through references to phenotype (1994, 55), I see the focus on phenotype as an insufficient basis for racial knowledges. Processes of racialization teach us to "see" and overdetermine particular physical differences. In other words, racial knowledges shape what we see, rather than vice versa. Furthermore, references to phenotype need not be explicit, and focuses on, for example, origins, culture, and religion frequently stand in for such references. In turn, the particular phenotypical characteristics that we read as indicating racial differences are merely shorthand for imaginaries of essentialized cultural, sexual, and psychological distinctions (see Stoler 1995, 8).

Omi and Winant argue that not all racial projects are racist, inasmuch as some are centered on interest groups organized around racial identities – in their example, a hypothetical association of black accountants fulfills their criteria for being a racial project, but not for being a *racist* racial project. To be racist, a racial project must create or reproduce "structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race" (1994, 71).[12] The distinction between racist and non-racist racial projects is crucial: it allows us to differentiate between reiterations of, and resistances to, forms of oppression and domination based in racial constructions. While some argue that any recognition of race (whether it be in policy, law, organizations, activist collectives, fiction, scholarly analysis, or elsewhere) perpetuates racial thinking and therefore is harmful (e.g. Gilroy 2000), this line of argument has been widely countered by arguments that emphasize the continuing empirical importance of race (e.g. Lipsitz 1998; Williams 1997). "Transcending" race in contexts where race continues to significantly structure the relative distributions of privilege and oppression is therefore as likely, if not more likely, to serve to obfuscate rather than undermine the operation of race. As Patricia Williams notes, claims to colorblindness as a "solution" to racism is "a kind of utopianism whose naivety will assure its elusiveness" (1997, 2).

Orientalism

As a taxonomic category race uses phenotypical markers to create narratives of timeless, embodied, and differentiated internal characteristics that are attributed to groups. How these characteristics are imagined is co-produced with other, closely related, knowledge productions such as Orientalism (Said 1979) and Africanism (Morrison 1992). In turn, the use of "culture," "tradition," and "religion" as metaphors of race rely on the ways in which, for example, Orientalism give meaning to each category. In a circular co-constitution racial and Orientalist productions shore each other up; phenotypical characteristics are constructed as signalling embodied cultural practices that are understood as either liberated and modern or as oppressed and traditional. Race is thus co-produced with other knowledges that also rest on binary taxonomies and the intimate

intertwinement of Orientalist and racial productions are of particular importance to Norwegian forms of race. As I discuss further below and in chapter three and four, Norwegian anxieties around race and nation have been heavily centered on Pakistani migrants and their descendants, and it is Orientalism that has provided the "common sense" framework through which such anxieties have been managed.

Said explains that Orientalism – the knowledge the West constructs about the Orient – can take a number of forms, but always critically relies on the positional superiority of the West over the "Orient," and as such it is a sign of Western power more than a "veridic discourse about the Orient" (1979, 6). Lowe argues that this conception of Orientalism tends to problematically "generalize orientalism as a constant and monolithic discourse" (1991, 4, footnote 4), and she therefore focuses on the heterogeneity of Orientalist constructions and meanings (24-25, throughout). Yet the close resemblance of Norwegian Orientalist iterations to those produced elsewhere (e.g. Ahmed 1992; Lewis 2004; Said 1979) suggests that these productions have significant consistency. Thus while the specificities of Orientalist iterations may change, it is nonetheless important to recognize the power – and relative stability - of central symbols in these discourses; it is the adaptability of Orientalist discourses to changing contexts that enable them to continue to play part in structural oppressions (see also Lewis 2004, 1; and, in a different context, but with similar points, Halberstam 1998).

The Orientalist imaginaries that today dominate in Norway rely heavily on gendered and generational constructions of those whose phenotypical characteristics are seen as embodying "the Orient."[13] In these constructions, "Oriental" women – and in particular young women – are seen as victims of "their" oppressive cultures and violent relatives, while being largely without agency. Faithfully reiterating dominant Orientalist constructions (e.g. Ahmed 1992; Lewis 2004; Ye eno lu 1998), the (implicitly white, modern, and liberated) Norwegian state responds to this construction by setting out to save the women from "their" "cultures," relatives, and – ultimately – from their own decision-making (Spivak 1988; see also chapter four). In the process of this construction

and attendant saviour narrative, the dominant Orientalist discourse perceives a firm generational divide among Norway's "Oriental" population. Here, those who have themselves immigrated to Norway (perceived as the parental generation to today's young adults) are thought to embody the oppression understood as inherent to "Oriental cultures." In contrast, first and second generation Norwegians who are racially produced as "Oriental" are simultaneously framed as "saveable" and as *inherently needing to be saved*. In other words, the racial construction as "Oriental" means always being in need of saving: such "saving" is never complete (see chapter four and Muller Myrdahl 2007).

Though the Orientalist knowledges that dominate in Norway today produce a threatening and vilified Other, at the beginning of the period that I examine in this dissertation the enticingly exotic Orient were at the forefront of racial constructions (see chapter three). These focus on Asian migrants as embodying ahistorical and "fairytale-like" cultures, and on a feminized framing of Pakistan male migrants as "polite" and "humble" (Eng 2001; McClintock 1995; Stoler 1995). Current Norwegian commentators tend to see this earlier framing as "positive" and "welcoming" (e.g Brochmann 2003), but the seemingly contradictory discourses of Others who are variously and often simultaneously threatening and enticing is at the core of Orientalism (e.g. Ahmed 1992; Said 1979; Stoler 1995). Consequently, while the shift from a "positive" to a "negative" emphasis no doubt has significantly different effects (see e.g Khan 2009; compare chapter four), both implicitly provide an illusion of legitimacy for the racial constructions that position those constructed as "Oriental" in a subservient in relation to dominant Norwegian society.

Norwegian racial formations

Current Norwegian racial formations center on discourses of national belonging. In these, whiteness is produced as a marker of naturalized national belonging, and, conversely, non-whiteness is seen as incompatible with proper belonging in Norway. The nation is imagined as finite and contained, a timeless home to a distinct people whose belonging to the territory is naturalized through particular articulations of history and descent (Balibar 2004; Balibar 1991b; Gullestad 2006; Hage 2000; Wallerstein

1991). In Norway as elsewhere, any minority and/or oppressed group can be constructed as the Other to the national self (e.g. Brandzel 2005; Keaton 2006; Marx 1998; Ryymin 2008), but in this dissertation I focus on the framing of Self and Other that pivots on the construction of some groups of immigrants and their descendants as the primary threat to the homeliness of the nation.

The binary between those who belong in the nation and those who do not is produced not through explicit discourses of race, but rather through a popular, academic, and policy concern with (primarily) immigration, Islam, perceptions of culture, kinship practices, gender roles, and child rearing[14] (e.g. *Aftenposten* 2009; Bredal 1999, 2005, 2006; Brox, Lindbekk and Skirbekk 2003; Fuglerud 2004; Lien 1996; Ministry of Children and Equality 2007; Østberg 2005). Dominant discourses surrounding these issues reiterate a demarcation between the modern, liberal, and (therefore) white subjects who properly inhabit national space and those traditional, illiberal, and (therefore) non-white subjects who properly belong elsewhere.[15] In this framework a relative nearness (whiteness) and distance (not-whiteness) to the national community that is simultaneously geographic and cultural is understood to be signalled through the privileging of a limited number of phenotypical characteristics (primarily skin color). These discourses are coupled with a focus on decent, place-specific roots, and a romanticization of national culture and history that reinforce the "natural" links between whiteness and the nation (Gullestad 2006).

In this dissertation I show that geographic distance is a recurring metaphor for race in Norwegian racial formations. This use of geography to naturalize race and vice versa is an iteration of the Orientalist production of imaginary geographies through which difference and distance are dramatized (Said 1979, 55). Through an imaginary geography that position "the West" as "near" and "the Rest" as "distant" (see chapter two), race and geography are co-produced to mark the boundary between sameness and difference, nearness and distance, a belonging "here" and a belonging "elsewhere." In this vein it is through discourses of immigration rather than explicit references to skin

color that the extraneousness of immigrants and their descendants to the nation is naturalized, even as only those not read as white are targets of this logic (Gilroy 1995, 45).

Current[16] Norwegian racializing processes focus on a binary between "Norwegians" and "immigrants," where neither term describe citizenship status[17] or immigration history.[18] "Norwegian," in this usage, refers to those who are understood to be white and whose belonging in the nation is naturalized, whereas "immigrant" refers to those who are not understood to be white and whose very presence in the nation is constructed as unnatural.[19] The key boundary-marker between "immigrants" and "Norwegians" is perceptions of skin color (Gullestad 2002, 2006; chapter two and three; see also Prieur 2002, 2004). Within this logic, perceived gradations of skin color signal difference and distance and a "Black appearance is a marker of origin in a place that is both far away and culturally different" (Gullestad 2006, 268). In other words, those who do not "look white" should never simply answer "Furuset" or "Bergen" when asked (repeatedly, always: Ali 1997; Tajik 2001a; see also Lee 1999) "where are you from?" unless willing to endure the frustrated "but where are you *really* from?" Geography is race and vice versa, and the assertion that those not seen as white "really" belong elsewhere ensures that the whiteness of the nation is discursively re-established.

The racialization in Norway of those not perceived as white have closely followed dominant colonial and Orientalist constructions documented elsewhere (e.g. Lewis 2004; Razack 2008; Said 1979). Research on media representations of people of Asian and African descent as well as on national minorities in Norway show that these groups are understood in terms of their perceived group memberships rather than as individuals: Asians, Africans, and national minority groups are framed as acting from embodied group characteristics that show little to no divergence from, for example, Anglo-American racist stereotypes (e.g. Eide and Simonsen 2007; Lindstad and Fjeldstad 1999, 2005; Moldrheim 2000). In this vein, Eide and Simonsen show that Norwegian media represented Josephine Baker as "wild" (2007, 122), while Moldrheim demonstrates that

the Norwegian press has consistently portrayed Africa and Africans as primitive and in need of Norwegian or European help (2000). Both historic and current Norwegian representations of national minorities, indigenous populations, and people of Asian and African descent are part of dominant international discourses of race. Media research thus significantly undermines myths of Norwegian racial innocence.

Here I seek to challenge Norwegian discourses of race that center on Asian and African immigration as simultaneously the cause of, and explanation for, the excessive differences that are perceived to threaten to render the nation unhomely (chapter three). According to this discourse, the framing of some physical characteristics, religious practices, or kinship patterns as alien to and/or incompatible with Norwegian space is not the result of processes of othering, but is the "natural" reaction to or description of Asian and African immigration (see discussion in chapter three; Lien 1996; Tjelmeland 2003). By excavating some of the processes through which assessments of "excessive difference" are made, I denaturalize the idea that Asian and African migrants and their descendants are "naturally" Other in Norway.

My analysis of the Norwegian assessment of excessive difference must be placed in the context of a culture that emphasizes sameness and sees sameness as a prerequisite for the highly valued sense of *trygghet* (stability, security, safety) (Gullestad 2002, 69). Because sameness is viewed as a basis for (public and private) interpersonal interaction and equality, Norwegian forms of interaction emphasize similarities and downplay differences (Gullestad 2006, 170; see also Vike, Lidén and Lien 2001). This emphasis on sameness "implies that there is a problem when others are perceived to be 'too different'. Then the parties often avoid each other. Open conflicts are seen as a threat to other basic values, such as 'peace and quiet'" (Gullestad 2006, 171). In this manner intra-ethnic differences are obfuscated while racial thinking ensures that the perceived boundary between "Norwegians" and "immigrants" is emphasized (ibid.). Furthermore, differences that are not experienced as possible to contain through cultural practices that establish sameness become excessive and threatening rather than, for example, mutually

interesting and enriching. Through everyday structures and modes of interaction and identification that emphasize boundaries between those who are "the same" and those who are excessively different, racial prejudice is made plausible[20]: through them a particular understanding of the nation is experientially produced[21] (Gullestad 2006, 34).

That race in Norway has been gaining in reality inasmuch as it becomes experientially important, means that the contrast between whiteness and non-whiteness is increasingly sharply drawn (see chapter three and four). In order to understand the extent to which the whiteness of the Norwegian nation is a fantasy – factually wrong and socially and politically damaging not only in the present but in the past – it is important to remember that whiteness is no less of a construct in Norway than in white settler societies where it has functioned more explicitly as a political category (e.g. Harris 1993; Jacobson 1998). To be clear: whiteness is not a description. Though fitting whatever the phenotypical requirements that category entails in any given time and space is a necessary precondition for being ascribed whiteness, what those requirements are is not stable (Jacobson 1998; Potter and Phillips 2006) and fulfilling them is not in itself ever enough (see chapter two). Whiteness is an aspiration: to mastery, to masculinity, to a belonging to the center, that is based in colonial trajectories of power and oppression (Hage 2000; Jacobson 1998; Malik 1996; Mills 1997; Stoler 1995). Thus whiteness is a form of power and capital that, though unevenly distributed (Jacobson 1998; Paul 1997), always conveys some form of privilege on those perceived to possess it (e.g. Lipsitz 1997; Potter and Phillips 2006; Roberts 1997; Ware 1992).

Whiteness, then, is not a pre-existing condition for the predominantly melanin-poor population of Norway. Norway is not a "formerly all-white nation" (Andersson 2007b, 76). Rather, as I argue in this dissertation, the assertion of whiteness, even when not explicitly made in those terms, is an alignment with and claiming of a Western colonial and "civilizing" project (Mulinari et al 2009). The racial construction of the nation need not rely on the histories of settler societies or former colonial centers that have hitherto been most thoroughly analyzed (e.g. Gilroy 1995; Hage 2000; Haney-Lopez 1995; Perry

2001; Razack 2002, 2008; Roediger 1991, 2002, 2005; Samantrai 2002). Indeed, the ways that race has been gaining in reality as a salient aspect of Norwegian national identity over the past 35 years suggests that the racial construction of the nation need not be directly tied to state-directed formal colonial projects, even as modes of thought based in colonial systems of power are reiterated through these constructions.

Sites and methods

This dissertation is guided by the feminist scholarship that insist on the importance of interrogating the processes through which our lives are rendered more – or, as often as not, less – liveable (e.g. Bettie 2002; Butler 2006; Collins 1998; Halberstam 1998; Mahmood 2005; Pascoe 2007; Williams 1997; Wright 2006). Feminist scholars question received categories and ask us to consider the ways these maintain hierarchical relationships. The methods and theories of feminist research and analysis are developed through and applied to a wide range of topics: Though grounded in a recognition of the importance of gender at all scales of analysis, gender is not the sole focus of feminist scholarship. Furthermore, feminist scholars continue to be at the forefront of the production of inter –and trans-disciplinary tools that encourage more complex analyses than those contained in the traditional academic disciplines. Similarly, this analysis of Norwegian racial formations relies on a combination of methods and sites that highlight processes of racialization and some of their effects both for individuals and in policy making.

The sites I examine and the methods that I employ in this dissertation reflect my concern with showing that dominant processes of racialization in Norway are well-established, on-going, and closely tied to international discourses of race. When beginning to ask questions about processes of racialization in Norway I originally considered a range of sites and methods that would allow me to interrogate processes of racialization, including ethnographic work in a diverse workplace, film analysis, media analysis of the constraints on the agency of "immigrant" women in the public sphere, and interviews with adult international adoptees about forms of belonging in Norway. However, in reading

Norwegian literature on immigration and integration I was struck by the frequency with which the 1975 "immigration stop" was mentioned, the diverse ways in which it was represented, and the relative dearth of analysis of the law (a notable exception is Hagelund 2004; see also Puntevold Bø 2004). In addition, I found that Norwegian scholars, without exception and with little to no attendant analysis, described migrants arriving from Asia and Africa from the early 1970s onwards as constituting a "new immigration."

The assessment of some immigrants as "new" and the images surrounding the "immigration stop" soon came to stand out as of especial importance in Norwegian racial formations. These appeared to be foundational myths that produced boundaries of belonging and guided expectations about what sorts of migrants ought to arrive in Norway under what sorts of circumstances. My wish to interrogate the premises of these myths led me to the sites for chapters two and three; the experiences of postwar Southern and Eastern European migrants with processes of belonging in Norway, and racial discourses in public and policy debates that culminated in the "immigration stop."

While chapter two and three analyze understudied sites and challenge some dominant narratives about recent Norwegian immigration history, in chapter four I use a case study to bring the analysis of Norwegian racial formation up to the present. This chapter examines the ways in which the racial formation that developed in the first half of the 1970s continue to structure Norwegian racializing processes – and, in turn, Norwegian policy making. The chapter analyzes how the racialization of some Norwegian youth as improperly national leads the state to look to immigration law to manage the lives of these citizens. That my specific focus here is on the use of immigration law to combat forced marriages largely reflects my background in working with Norwegian family reunification law[22] and the "hot" public and policy debate on this topic at the time when the dissertation was being shaped. Though I see this site as particularly rich, other sites would also have lent themselves to similar analyses and conclusions (e.g. debates about

homophobia in "immigrant" communities; conflicts around veiling; the media focus on female genital cutting).

It is important to note that across this dissertation my focus is on *dominant* processes of racialization. In other words, I examine the ways in which the dominant society produces racial categories, but make no argument as to whether these categories successfully hails those they construct as Other. Indeed, existing research suggests that even as the dominant racial categories for the past three decades have been "immigrant" and "Norwegian," the former term is not a source of self-identification[23] (e.g. Øia and Vestel 2007). Dominant racial categories nevertheless have considerable impact across scales (e.g. Ali 1997; Prieur 2004; Tajik 2001a, 2004; chapter three and four) as they structure for example the majority population's day-to-day enactments of national belonging (Ali 1997; Gullestad 2002), media representations (Eide and Simonsen 2007), and policy making (chapter three and four).

My analysis of dominant processes of racialization is also a way to undermine the objectification and racialization of Asian and African migrants (and their descendants) inherent to their being the sole targets of Norwegian research on "immigrants" and integration. The focus of Norwegian scholarship has been on "immigration" research - the so-called "IMER" (for International Migration and Ethnic Relations) field[24] - that is highly policy centered (Berg and Lauritsen 1998, 15; Gullestad 2002, 42) and that tends to take as its starting point that Asian, African, and South American immigrants and their descendants are and/or have problems that the state must solve (Ytrehus 2001, 238). A broad "desire to know" (Balibar 1991b, 55-59) ensures the problematizing and investigation of "immigrant" lives (Ytrehus 2001), with little attendant focus on ways in which the majority continuously reasserts the boundaries between those seen as belonging to the nation and those whose belonging to the nation is seen as inherently tenuous or absent. To turn the analytical lens on the dominant production of race illuminates the ways in which these help structure processes of integration and nation-building.

The foundational theoretical and methodological framework for this dissertation is an understanding of race as being the product of social processes of racialization that is simultaneously and interdependently discursive and material (Omi and Winant 1994). I use Omi and Winant's theories of racial formation and racial projects as a starting point (1994, 54-56), but expand on these inasmuch as my conceptualization of race is broader than theirs; as noted above, I see their focus on phenotype as too narrow. Furthermore, while Omi and Winant pay scant attention to the importance of intersectional analyses of race (1994, 68; contrast e.g. Combahee River Collective 1983; Crenshaw 1991; Davis 1983; Sandoval 2000), the theory of racial formation and racial projects lends itself to intersectional analyses. Both intersectionality (a theory as well as a method) and the theory of racial formation focus on processes and structures of power, where power is understood as oppressive as well as constructive.

Though as a feminist method intersectionality[25] is sometimes described as analyzing how forms of oppression are co-produced through range of axis (Egeland and Gressgård 2007; Knapp 2005; McCall 2005; Nash 2008) – typically gender, race, and class – it can also be understood as an approach that refuses to see any social category as existing in a vacuum. Refusing to see social categories as discrete is not the same as giving each equal weight or needing to always consider a pre-given range of "intersections": the co-production of social categories does not presuppose that these are always made up of an equal or pre-determined mixture of the wide range of categories that may be made relevant in various contexts.

In this dissertation I am therefore attentive to the ways in which the racial projects (chapter three and four) and broader racial formations (chapter two) that I analyze are dependent on the simultaneous production of other social categories. I do not, however, provide a discussion of a full range of social categories in each chapter. Rather, I foreground the inflections and interdependencies that my sources support. This means that class is an aspect of the sedimentations of racial meaning that I discuss in chapter

three, while gender is central to the racial project I analyze in chapter four, and nation is foregrounded in chapter two. In other words, though the processes of racialization that are analyzed in each chapter are co-produced with a range of other categories, each chapter focuses on those that appear most significant in the material being analyzed.

The importance of gender in the production of race has been well established (e.g. Bettie 2002; Collins 1998; Davis 1983; Ferber 1999; Frankenberg 1993; Higginbotham 1992; Lundström 2010; McClintock 1995; Razack 2008; Smith 1983; Volpp 2001), and at first glance it might appear that I am remiss in not foregrounding it more throughout the dissertation. However, while gender has been an aspect of Norwegian racial productions throughout this period, its prominence in racial discourses has increased dramatically since the early 1970s. While in the early 1970s *fremmedarbeidere* ("workers who are strangers") were, as I note in chapter three, assumed to be men (despite significant numbers of women, albeit few from the regions that became synonymous with *fremmedarbeidere*), their masculinity or maleness did not appear as a significant aspect of the racializing discourses that surrounded them. Nor were "immigrant" women and youth predominantly constructed as oppressed by "their culture" and male family members. This, as is evident in chapter four, stands in stark contrast to later developments; today such gendered discourses of race are at the forefront of Norwegian racial formations.[26]

The focus in this dissertation is on dominant discourses of race with the aim to show *how* and *with what effects* these discourses are racial. In the three chapters that follow I analyze distinct processes that are nevertheless linked by the way that they each highlight Norwegian productions of race. I have used different methods to collect the source material for each chapter (interviews, archival work, gathering policy documents), but rely on discourse analysis (understood broadly through a Foucaultian framework as opposed to through linguistics or social psychology: Macdonald 2003, 3) as an overarching framework for reading these materials. This overarching framework of reading allows me to trace the production and circulation of racial meaning across the

disparate sites. While the site of each chapter is important in and of its own, here my primary concern is with how the production and circulation of racial discourses can be illuminated by viewing them in relation to each other. By tracing the production of race through the three chapters, I show that the constructions of difference and national belonging on which these various racial projects rely are interdependent: I argue that the constructions of race that emerged in the early 1970s (chapter three) are central to understanding both the experiences of post-war Southern and Eastern European migrants (chapter two) and the 2004 White Paper that proposed immigration laws aimed at combating forced marriages (chapter four).

I understand discourse as a wide range of signs and practices that determine meaning, and privileging the discursive production of race across multiple sites allows me to trace the way that racial meaning is made and remade over several decades. By focusing on the discourses through which race and nation are produced I am able to show how these both change and yet remain remarkably similar. In a context where race is continuously reproduced yet widely thought not to be relevant, illuminating the work that race does is a necessary first step towards intervening in processes of racialization. Here my analysis stands in contrast to scholars who, like Foucault, use discourse analysis to excavate subjugated knowledges (e.g. Paul 1997; Stoler 1995), as I illuminate a particular operation of the dominant discourse that is, in a sense, hiding in plain sight. Thus, I link the underlying logics that allow (primarily) white Norwegian politicians, academics, and activists to see immigration law as an appropriate tool for managing Norwegian youth not seen as white (chapter four) directly to the sedimentations of racial meaning occurring in the first half of the 1970s (chapter three). Furthermore, by focusing on the ways in which racial meaning is both (re)produced and operationalized in immigration law and policy, this analysis highlights some of the central modes through which racial meaning is simultaneously (re)made and made material.

Foucault explains that "it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together" (1990, 100), and this is a useful reminder that the processes of racialization that I analyze

here are also a reflection of a concomitant assertion of power (that is productive as well as oppressive). Through the delimitation of what is socially legible these discourses of race structure affect, analysis and action across scales. In this context it is particularly important that Norwegian constructions of race and nation denies those understood as not-white and not-belonging to the nation access to the public sphere in significant ways (e.g. Gullestad 2002, 2006; Tajik 2004). This means that the dominant constructions of race and the attendant racial effects to a large extent is the result of the production and circulation of knowledges amongst those whose privilege these discourses and practices buttress. Thus, while the operation and assertion of power that is embedded in the discursive and material practices that produce race are not localized in particular individuals or places, it must nevertheless be seen as primarily formed by those whose whiteness and belonging to the nation the discourses of race naturalize (though see Muller Myrdahl 2007; Rehman 2002, 2004).

My goal here is not to assess the claims to truth of, for example, the narratives of colonial and racial innocence on which much of Norwegian rejections of race seem to rest, but I do aim to show that the racial projects that I analyze are broadly harmful and that this harm matters. In other words, I do think it is both important and possible to make an ethical assessment of the discourses that I analyze, and I argue that, much as they are made material, they are fundamentally factually and ethically wrong. Furthermore, I show that processes of racialization are hegemonic in Norway today, and as such are integral to Norwegian society and politics. Consequently, they cannot simply be addressed through a better anti-racist information campaign: As Paul Gilroy notes, "[r]acism is not akin to a coat of paint on the external structures of social relations which can be scraped off if the right ideological tools and political elbow grease are conscientiously applied to the task" (1995, 11). Racism, of course, rests first and foremost on the continued production of race, and it is to shed light on the discourses through which such production occurs that this dissertation takes aim.

Chapter guide

In this dissertation I begin to disentangle the processes of racialization that infuse frameworks for understanding nation, immigration and integration in Norway. I refuse the standard narrative that sees the arrival of increasing numbers of labour migrants from Asia and Africa (or, more specifically, from Pakistan, Turkey, and Morocco) as heralding the start of immigration to Norway and the end of a relative national homogeneity (Brochmann 2003; Tjelmeland 2003). Instead, I consider the ways in which shifting and solidifying understandings of Self and Other set the premises on which immigration and integration have been negotiated. In other words, I see the dominant society's framing of and reaction to immigration – not the fact of the immigration itself – as at the crux of the matter. Furthermore, by including the experiences of Southern and Eastern European migrants, I challenge the idea that understandings of difference are static or "natural" and that the experiences of these immigrants have little to tell us about Norwegian processes of integration and racialization.

Chapter Two: Between God and Goddamn: Southern and Eastern European Migrants at the Borders of Norwegianness

In this chapter I analyze the experiences of twelve Southern and Eastern European migrants who arrived in Norway between 1947 and 1969. My interest in postwar Southern and Eastern European migrants initially emerged because prior to the arrival of increasing numbers of Asian and African migrants in the early 1970s, these European migrants were the targets of considerable xenophobia (Tjelmeland 2003, chapter two). Yet with the politicization of (primarily Asian and African: see chapter three) immigration since the early 1970s and the attendant research and policy focus on the "new immigration," Southern and Eastern European migrants seemed to literally and figuratively pale into obscurity. I was curious about whether the European migrants were significantly different from the Asian and African migrants; for example, Tjelmeland (2003) and Knudsen (1980) describe many Southern European migrants occupying positions as low-skilled labourers. These were the same jobs that most Asian and African migrants were hired for. In other words, if seen from the perspective of their

vulnerability to xenophobia or their labor market positions, there appeared to be considerable similarity between these migrants.

In addition, the concurrent politicization of immigration, overwhelming focus on the "new immigrants," and the invisibility of postwar Southern and Eastern European migrants also led me to hypothesize that the arrival of Asian and African migrants "whitened" the European migrants. Taking Gullestad's (2002) argument that race in general and whiteness in particular has become increasingly important in Norway as a starting point; I wondered whether the experiences of Southern and Eastern European migrants might illuminate some of the processes through which whiteness was made significant.

Finally, I was struck by the relative dearth of available research on the experiences of this group (for exceptions, see Knudsen 1980; Tjelmeland 2003). This absence of research was particularly striking given the plethora of past and present research on Asian and African migrants (e.g. Fuglerud 2004; Lidén 2001; Prieur 2004; Wikan 2002; Øia and Vestel 2007; Østberg 2003): it was as if, with the arrival of "strange-appearing" (*fremmedartede*) migrants from Asia and Africa, the "proper" research objects – the "exotic other" – had been found close to home, and the very existence of other migrants was erased. Focusing on postwar Southern and Eastern European migrants was thus also a way to begin to rectify their absence in dominant narratives of Norwegian immigration history, as well as to challenge the racial framework that politicized and problematized (and therefore researched) Asian and African migrants only.

Due to the prospect that the rapidly aging postwar migrants may soon no longer be able to tell their stories, combined with little existing research, few archival materials, and my limited resources for research, I decided to focus the chapter entirely on interview material.[27] I conducted semi-structured interviews with fifteen people,[28] and the subsequent material reflects a combination of my guiding questions (written to shed light on the topics outlined above) and interviewees' priorities, interests, and silences. The

interviews thus address some of my initial questions, are silent on others, and also add topics that I had not thought of.

I address the multipronged questions that gave rise to chapter two through a focus on the extent to which postwar Southern and Eastern European migrants have been able to claim a naturalized form of belonging in Norway. This focus allows me to attend to the production of whiteness in Norway; I argue that the extent to which interviewees are able and willing to claim a naturalized belonging in Norway speaks to constructions of whiteness and the elasticity of Norwegianness. To this end, I pay particular attention to the interview topics that highlight how interviewees were variously welcomed in Norway and reminded that they were (and are) not perceived to "properly" belong. Though I was unable to interview any Southern or Eastern European labor migrants[29] (who arrived under similar circumstances as Asian and African labor migrants), I do discuss the ways in which interviewees experienced Norway as variously significantly similar or significantly different as their countries of origin. When contrasted with claims that Asian and African migrants were "obviously" and excessively different and therefore constituted a "new" immigration (e.g. Tjelmeland 2003) this discussion suggest that the distribution of migrants into "new" or "old" (though the latter is not a term that is ever used) immigrants is a racial rather than "natural" assessment.

Chapter three: "A Feather in the Cap for All Narrow-minded Norwegians." Sedimentations of race 1970-75

This chapter traces the production and increasing sedimentation of racial discourses in the first half of the 1970s. The years between 1970 and 1975 are central to subsequent Norwegian racial formations both because the racial discourses that were established then remain dominant today, and because the 1975 "immigration stop" that codified these discourses guided Norwegian immigration policies for the following three decades. Between 1970 and 1975 dominant Norwegian discourses about immigration and difference shifted rapidly from one in which demarcations of difference were in flux to an increasingly sedimented understanding of difference that relied on colonial and

Orientalist knowledges. Because these latter understandings in turn were codified in the "immigration stop" legislation, and subsequently reproduced ever since, their impact on racial constructions can hardly be overstated.

The focus of the chapter is on the process leading up to the 1975 "immigration stop" legislation. Though the "immigration stop" legislation (which regulated and changed immigration but did not stop it) is heavily referenced in Norwegian research on immigration and integration, there is very little research on the process through which the legislation was developed and passed. Using close readings of policy documents, the Parliamentary debate on the legislation, and newspaper coverage from the entire period, I show that the development and passing of the legislation was dependent on, and in turn codified, racial constructs that saw some migrants as always already excessively different.

In placing the "immigration stop" legislation in the context of the dominant discourses leading up to it, I foreground the extent to which the legislation was the outcome of processes of racialization. As such, I am not primarily interested in the impact of the stop on immigration, nor do I consider whether or not the legislation mirrored similar laws in other European countries (for such analyses, see e.g. Brochmann 2003; Puntevold Bø 2004). The legislation (technically a set of binding administrative regulations rather than a law), I suggest, cannot be read as simply a reflection of changing immigration and economic patterns (see also Brochmann 2003), but must be seen as indicative of a process of debate and negotiation in which Norwegian politicians, activists, and academics - as well as the general public - wrestled with questions of identity and belonging.

Chapter Four: Legislating Love: Norwegian Family Reunification Law as a Racial Project

In this chapter I examine the continued reproduction and effects of the racializing processes that were established in the 1970s. Though love is often portrayed as helping

us overcome racism and other forms of prejudice, in this chapter I argue that imperatives towards love- and romance-based marriage in Norwegian family reunification law constitutes a racial project, one that can be seen as an extension of the processes of racialization that were established in the 1970s. Through a detailed reading of the 2004 White Paper on a new Immigration Act and a particular focus on the use of immigration law to combat forced marriages evident in the White Paper, I consider the centrality of romantic love to constructions of national subjects. These constructions render some groups of Norwegian citizens simultaneously invisible as national subjects and hyper-visible as objects of national management. The legislative efforts that look to immigration law to combat forced marriages is thus a racial project: it extends and enacts particular constructions of belonging that are based in understandings of essentialized group identities and notions of belonging that see non-white Norwegians as properly belonging elsewhere.

This chapter highlights the continuing effects of the racial constructions discussed in the previous chapter, and also shows the significant contrast between the experiences that Southern and Eastern European migrants discuss of becoming Norwegian and those of Norwegian-born citizens who are not seen as white. The White Paper analyzed in this chapter was chosen as a particularly apt case study because it was subject to considerable popular, academic and policy debate, and as such it reflects views that developed from very broad debates. Though studies of, for example, visa practices or debates and policies around female circumcision would also speak to similar Norwegian processes of racialization (see e.g. Puntervold Bø 2004; Teigen and Langvasbråten 2009), the length and breadth of the debate and policy making centered on combating forced marriages through immigration law makes it uniquely representative of these broader processes.

In other words…

Race is not a category that is absent in Norway. Perceptions of race structure constructions of national belonging, policy making, and daily interactions. The production and reiteration of race is enabled by the disavowal of race as an analytic

category and the concurrent lack of attention to processes of racialization. By analyzing broadly enacted and interdependent dominant productions of race this dissertation highlights that Norwegian racial formations are *racial*: they produce boundaries of belonging and difference that are seen as embodied. The practices and discourses that produce these boundaries are the always provisional results of local iterations of transnational circulations of colonial, racist, and Orientalist knowledges.

NOTES

[1] Islamic call to prayer.

[2] *Dagsavisen* has a clear anti-racist and pro-multicultural editorial stance. The bi-weekly multicultural newspaper *Utrop* is distributed with *Dagsavisen* once a month, bringing "minority" perspectives and issues to *Dagsavisen*'s readers.

[3] *Vi teller et blekansikt, som senere viser seg å være dansk. Ellers er alle elevene av en eller annen eksotisk opprinnelse.*

[4] However unintentionally, such imagery invokes a long-standing racist rhetoric that sees the very presence of black and brown peoples as threatening frightened and fragile old white people. See e.g. Enoch Powell's infamous 1968"Rivers of Blood" speech (widely reported on in Norway at the time).

[5] Of course, immigrants can come from any country: (mostly nominally white) Swedes currently dominate among staff and servers in Oslo cafes and restaurants (Jafari 2009).

[6] The relativity of Norwegianness is long-established, though its tenets of course change. See e.g. Ryymin 2007.

[7] These are places where Norwegian popular and academic discourses seem to accept that "race" (problematically) exists. Though I do not consider this contrast in further detail here, it should be noted that the US, Britain, and South Africa are also held up as rife with an extreme racism that Norway simultaneously is understood to be free of. The existence of race and the perpetuation of extreme forms of racism are thus seen as interdependent.

[8] See Myking 2009:8 for a discussion of the distinctions between Rom, Roma, and Romani in the Nordic countries.

[9] "Ethnic discrimination" appears to be a more palatable term than "racism" in Norway (for example, the state equality board makes no mention of racism but lists "ethnicity" as one of their areas of work). However, much of what is described as "ethnic discrimination" cannot easily be distinguished from racism inasmuch as constructions of race are at stake.

[10] This may be true for all of Scandinavia: e.g. Hubinette 2006; Molina 2009; Pred 2000.

[11] For example, Norwegian involvement in international peace negotiations (most notably in Sri Lanka and Palestine/Israel) is popularly represented in Norway as more successful due to the low-key, down-to-earth "Norwegian" style (whether they in fact were/are successful at all is another matter). Discourses of "solidarity" with "the Third World" are also central in the dominant public sphere (e.g. Støre and Solheim 2006). Images of goodness are not limited to the international sphere: the Norwegian self-image of goodness and innocence also rests on discourses of decency, anti-racism, women's rights, the welfare state, and a co-operative spirit [*dugnadsånd*].

[12] This concern speaks to a prominent feature of US theories of race: that race is produced not just as a form of oppression, but also as a source of self-identification and resistance to racism (e.g. Higginbotham 1992). Here I argue that the interpellating force of Norwegian racial constructions does seem largely successful in relation to the dominant population, but there is no evidence that those identified in dominant Norwegian discourses as "immigrants" identify as such – but considerable evidence that ethnic minority youth identify as Norwegian despite the overall failure of the dominant discourse in confirming this identity (Prieur 2004; Tajik 2001aa; Øia and Vestel 2007). A further discussion of the implications of the failure of dominant racial categories in interpellating ethnic minorities is beyond the scope of the present project.

[13] Norwegian discourses do not explicitly refer to "the Orient" but rather to specific countries (stretching from Morocco to Japan), regions (most notably "the Middle East"), or to Islam. However, the meanings imbued to any of these referents are coextensive with constructions of "the Orient." Indeed, it is the association of each referent with "the Orient" that produces the meanings of these referents. My use of "the Orient" in this discussion serves to highlight this link.

[14] Norwegian processes of racialization have only recently and tentatively begun to be interrogated (Berg 2008; Fredriksen 2001; Gullestad 2002, 2006, 2007; Vold 2007; see also Prieur 2002, 2004), and existing studies that recognize or engage processes of racialization focus on the production of whiteness and white subjectivities (Berg 2008; Fredriksen 2001; Gullestad 2002, 2006, 2007; Vold 2007). The focus on whiteness may reflect (a) the dominance of state-funded policy-oriented research on "immigrants" and ethnic minorities (Berg and Lauritsen 1998: 15; Gullestad 2002: 42) that is problem-focused and appear

uninterested in frameworks that recognize racialization, and (b) that those scholars who have closely engaged international literature on racialization have been compelled to address the lack of problematization of the majority population (or vice versa: that those who have wished to problematize the identity of the majority have sought out international literature on whiteness and racialization).

[15] In other words, "proper" national belonging is not based on citizenship, but on constructions of race.

[16] From approximately the late 1970s and ongoing as of 2010.

[17] Norwegian citizenship can be conferred through a parent who is a citizen, or being eligible for it according to current laws (as a rule, having lived in Norway for seven years while holding a permit that makes on eligible to apply for citizenship – which most permits do. There is no citizenship test or language requirement) and applying for it. Permanent residents have most of the same rights as citizens and Norway does not as a rule allow dual citizenship. For those not inconvenienced by their original citizenship, applying for Norwegian citizenship may therefore hold little attraction (for example, of the interviewees in chapter two, only those who had left or fled Eastern Europe had become Norwegian).

[18] International adoptees who are not understood as white and who grow up in white Norwegian families are often in an "in-between" position in this racial schema, being perceived as neither fully "immigrants" nor obviously "Norwegian." The experiences of international adoptees with constructions of race and national belonging in Norway is likely a rich site for future research on Norwegian racial formations.

[19] Those who are perceived to be white and who have immigrated are referred to as "foreigner" (see chapter two and three) or by their nationality.

[20] Gullestad borrows the concept of plausibility structures from Peter Berger's work on religion: "According to Berger, the belief in God necessitates certain this-wordly structures – rituals, in particular – to make plausible the belief in something which is not of this world" (2006: 34).

[21] The co-production of Norwegianness and whiteness in Norway appears to be a dominant but also increasingly undermined experiential reality. Norwegian youth who are not understood to be white struggle to have their own sense of belonging accepted (Ali 1997; Tajik 2001aa); some perceive Norwegianness to firmly exclude them which necessitates the formation of alternative narratives of belonging (Prieur 2002, 2004). For the dominant white population, the whiteness of the nation appears to be a widely shared underlying assumption (Fredriksen 2001; Gullestad 2002). However, recent research suggests that non-white Norwegian youth are increasingly not just willing but able to claim Norwegian identities (Øia and Vestel 2007). This suggests that in their everyday interactions non-white Norwegian youth have their sense of belonging confirmed, although this self-ascription rarely is confirmed in dominant media (e.g. Bredeveien 2009).

[22] Between September 2001 and June 2003 and during several summers thereafter I worked at the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, primarily processing applications for family reunification.

[23] The latter term, in contrast, is both a source of identity and widely seen as dependent on whiteness (e.g. Fredriksen 2001; Gullestad 2002; Prieur 2002; contrast e.g. Øia and Vestel 2007).

[24] Research that considers immigration, integration, racism, etc., is broadly included in the so-called "IMER" (International Migration and Ethnic Relations) field. This field has a distinct set of practitioners, is institutionalized in universities and research centers, and has its own funding bureaucracy through the Norwegian Research Council. The Council explicitly sees its role as funding policy oriented research (see www.forskningsradet.no/imer).

[25] In the US context intersectionality tends to be traced to black feminist writings from ca. 1980 onwards (e.g. Davis 1983; Lorde 1996 [1984]; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1984; Smith 1983; Hull, Scott, and Smith 1991 [1982]), with Crenshaw (1989, 1991) often credited with popularizing the approach (e.g. Nash 2008). Egeland and Gressgård (citing Nina Lykke) argue that feminist intersectional approaches (though not using the term "intersectionality") have multiple origins that cannot be reduced to this particular and US-centric genealogy (2007: 209).

[26] Norwegian state feminism as well as white feminist activists and academics have over the past two-three decades showed concern about "immigrant women" but little interest in taking the views, expertise and experiences of not-white women seriously. Gender is thus present in dominant discourses about immigration and integration, without this translating into a collaboration with and listening to not-white feminists.

[27] This decision, of course, was also influenced by lack of funding that meant I had limited time to spend in Norway. With better resources I could usefully have conducted more interviews, and complemented these with archival materials.

[28] Two of whom later withdrew, and one of whom was born in Norway and has no recent family immigration history to Norway.

[29] Some interviewees discussed labor migrants and noted that most of the (primarily) Southern European labor migrants they had known in Norway had returned to their country of origin, whether at retirement or before (Angela, interview 20 March 2008; Elpidios Biros, interview 10 October 2007).

Chapter Two
Between God and Goddamn: Postwar Southern and Eastern European Migrants at the Borders of Norwegianness

Elpidios Biros (Greece)

[In Norway,] either you're a G*reek god* or you're a *goddamn Greek*. [Norway has completely failed to] see the others, non-Norwegians, non-Nordics, as equal Europeans.

E: Mm. So you don't think Norwegians see Greeks as equal Europeans?

No.

E: No. And that continues today [from the time when you first arrived in 1962]?

Yes.

E: You don't see any change?

No.[1]

Mr Fabis (Slovakia)

I wanted to be *Norwegian*, right from the beginning. But I soon discovered that it wasn't possible, because I had to distance myself from the Czechs. And the Slovaks. When I came to the country, I was going to be integrated and be *Norwegian* – completely Norwegian. But after – I don't know how long, maybe a year or so, or maybe longer – then I changed my opinion. When we came here, right, then Norway was not international. It was kind of – there was much that we had that weren't here in Norway. You know, of spices or some things. It was still, like, different. And then it wasn't so easy to adjust either, maybe. Or be accepted. I wanted. But…

I am Norwegian but I never became *a Norwegian*, right [*Altså jeg er norsk, men jeg ble aldri nordmann*]. And I was not accepted. Like I said, I had Norwegian, yes, but

> - . It just *is* like that. And I don't mind at all! Not at all! But in the beginning I was embarrassed. I wanted to kind of hide, to put it like that. Wherever I went it didn't take long: "yes, you're not Norwegian?"[2]

The two men whose words open this chapter have had very different lives in Norway.[3] Both around 80 years old at the time of their interviews, they had then lived approximately 45 and 60 years in Norway. However, where Mr. Fabis spent long years working as a skilled manual laborer, Elpidios Biros became established among the Norwegian intellectual and political elite. And where Mr. Fabis and his family lived for nearly a decade in a barely insulated barracks and today are settled in a modest house in a mid-sized working-class town, at the time of his interview Elpidios Biros lived in the same "desirable" Oslo neighborhood in which his children were raised. Nevertheless, their understandings of how the dominant Norwegian society welcome and view Southern and Eastern European migrants are remarkably similar. Whether seen as "god" and "goddamn," their national backgrounds are consistently understood to render them less than equal to (implicitly white) Norwegians (see also van Riemsdijk 2008, 2010). Their views are not unique; like Elpidios Biros, most interviewees found that for Norwegians, Europeanness does not always provide a common-sense perception of affinity with the migrants.

This lack of affinity with, and interest in, migrants is what Mr. Fabis describes as fatal to his desire and ability to become "properly" Norwegian. While he wished to associate primarily with Norwegians, he found that Norwegians had little complementary interest in befriending him. Consequently, the distancing from Czechs and Slovaks that Mr. Fabis saw as a prerequisite for Norwegianness became impossible. In his everyday interactions with Norwegians Mr. Fabis experienced (and at the time of the interview continued to experience) boundary-making comments as a recurring event: "You're not Norwegian."

In this chapter I interrogate the co-production of whiteness and/as Norwegianness, where both signal a naturalized national belonging (see chapter one). Through an analysis of the experiences of Southern and Eastern Europeans who migrated to Norway between 1946 and 1969 I consider how access to a naturalized belonging in Norway rests on constructions of sameness and difference. Southern and Eastern European migrants are uneasily situated as at once significantly similar and significantly different in relation to Norwegians. On the one hand, Mr. Fabis and Elpidios Biros describe hierarchical boundary-making practices that emphasize their lack of belonging in Norway. On the other hand, interviewees' unproblematically describe their children as "Norwegian" which contrasts sharply with the production of the children of Asian and Asian migrants as "immigrants" (see chapter four). I argue that seen in conjunction, the boundary making and the Norwegianness of interviewees' children show that whiteness is unevenly produced as a marker of naturalized national belonging. The experiences of becoming part of Norwegian society that Southern and Eastern European migrants have had thus complicate whiteness as an undifferentiated category[4] (e.g. Gullestad 2002; Vold 2007).

The migrants' experiences also complement Marianne Gullestad's argument that through a focus on descent, and in particular the linking of place and ancestry, whiteness has become increasingly important for Norwegian imaginaries of a racial basis for the nation (2002, 289, 2006 esp. 119-120). Gullestad rests her argument on an examination of the discourses that naturalize the Norwegianness of those who can trace their ancestry to Norwegian territory while simultaneously naturalizing the idea that particular phenotypical characteristics indicate a proper belonging that is elsewhere and distant (see also Hage 2000). This schema highlights the boundary that is continuously drawn between those seen as white and belonging to the nation, and those seen as not-white and not belonging to the nation, but tells us little about those who are uneasily understood as white yet not as belonging to the nation. Such elision reifies whiteness as a monolithic entity, making it more difficult to disentangle how it is produced and the meaning it carries in specific contexts.

Here, then, I am interested in the production of whiteness and national belonging at their borders. With the recognition that whiteness is *produced* – that it is not a description or a pre-existing condition - comes the need to analyze how it is produced, not only at its (context-specific) center but also where it falters. I argue that the Southern and Eastern European interviewees are uneasily produced as white: while many understand themselves to "look like" the majority Norwegian population, others do not see themselves this way. Where whiteness is a basis for national belonging, it is in turn co-produced with the contested racializing discourses through which such belonging is mediated. In other words, as being racialized as "white" becomes a prerequisite for national belonging, whiteness as a racial construction is also deeply influenced by constructions of national belonging. For example, the constant reminders that they do not "properly" belong in Norway that many interviewees are met with construct them as not only improperly national but also improperly white. Yet they are not not-white; rather, their claims to whiteness are made tenuous by their construction as improperly Norwegian. Even as they are interdependently produced, whiteness and national belonging are not co-extensive (see also Balibar 1991b; Hage 2000).

This chapter contributes to the slowly emerging scholarship that considers the production of whiteness in Europe (Essed and Trienekens 2007; Garner 2006; Gullestad 2002; Paul 1997; van Riemsdijk 2008, 2010), and that interrogates its uneven meaning (Garner 2006; Paul 1997). Scholars on Europe have not developed fine-grained analysis of how whiteness is produced as a salient social category, in contrast to their North American colleagues (e.g. Ferber 1999; Frankenberg 1993; Jacobson 2001; Morrison 1992; Roediger 1991, 1999; Perry 2001). The "whiteness" of Europe appears to be largely assumed (suggesting a considerable conflation of whiteness as a racial category and whiteness as a possible way to describe the skin color of various peoples world-wide; see Bonnett 1999), and such whiteness also emerges as monolithic entity. Thus, even as racism is seen as a necessary supplement to nationalism (Balibar 1991b), studies of such racism only consider the production of whiteness implicitly, through its emergence as the Self to a non-white Other (e.g. Gilroy 1995; Gullestad 2002; Reiter 2008; Wikan 2002).

Here, I do not see whiteness as a pre-existing condition (chapter one) or as a monolithic entity. Rather, by analyzing interviewees' narratives of belonging in Norway I begin to disentangle the production of whiteness as well as the relationship between whiteness and national belonging.

In recognition of the significance of visuality in the production of race, the chapter starts with a discussion of visual markers of whiteness. I contrast interviewees' references to "looking like" the majority Norwegian population when explaining their own entry into Norwegian society with the absence of such references when they assert their own children's Norwegianness. Such visuality is, however, but one feature (albeit an important one) in the production of whiteness. In the remainder of the chapter I focus on the ways in which the interviewees are seen as simultaneously "like" Norwegians and not equal. While some interviewees easily identify as Norwegian, most do not. Interviewees display a range of responses to questions of Norwegianness and national belonging, and these highlight some of the opportunities and constraints that Southern and Eastern European migrants face in creating a sense of homeliness and belonging in Norway. I start with a consideration of interviewees' motives for moving to Norway and their initial experiences in settling into Norwegian society. For most, moving to Norway was accidental rather than a goal in itself. They cannot therefore be said to have been uniquely motivated or "suited for" life in Norway (compare NOU 1973:17, 143), compared to other migrants. In the following section I look at interviewees' experiences of sameness and difference, before moving on to discuss the discrimination they have faced in Norway based on their immigrant status or national background. Interviewees then speak specifically about their sense of belonging in Norway. In concluding I argue that whiteness in Norway is produced as a heterogeneous racial marker with uneven social and economic capital (e.g. Garner 2006; Lipsitz 1998).

Looking Norwegian

Migrants who appear to the majority white Norwegian population to look like them – and therefore to "look white" - have access to a significant capital that offers them

considerable flexibility in their negotiations of belonging in Norway. In particular, "looking white" ensures that the discrimination based on their non-Norwegian national origins that many interviewees faced is not inter-generational. In comparing their experiences as migrants in Norway with those of Pakistani migrants, Margit Dobos argues that she and her husband Lázár have had an easier time identifying as Norwegian because

> we don't look any different from most Norwegians. Maybe I'm a bit darker, but there are many dark Norwegians. Lázár has been blond the whole time.[5] (Margit Dobos, interview 20 July 2007.)

Similarly, Miroslav Pekar recounts that when protesting that he had never experienced discrimination in Norway based on his nationality or immigration status, he has been told by white Norwegians that "then you are lucky because you have European looks"[6] (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007). Thus, although Eva was the only interviewee who explicitly described herself as white, most interviewees seemed to experience themselves as looking alike to the majority Norwegian population. For these interviewees, their day-to-day interactions likely confirm this self-perception; if it was consistently challenged in social interactions interviewees would not be able to sustain it as an unproblematic self image.

However, not all European migrants are understood to look like the majority white Norwegian population, whether or not the migrants are considered part of the majority in their country of origin. Indeed, not all the participants here understood themselves to "look Norwegian." For example, Alma laughs as she recalls how her husband used to tease her that "you'll never be Norwegian with that nose!"[7] – but this is also a statement that she agrees with (Alma, interview 24 March 2008 and 19 February 2010). And Mr. Fabis ruminates about whether it is his height that makes people so readily question his Norwegianness, even when he is abroad and speaking to people who are neither from Norway nor from his country of origin (Mr. Fabis, interview 20 March 2008).

What it means to "look Norwegian" or "look European" was self-evident to the interviewees, yet Alma and Mr. Fabis' comments suggests that these "looks" require being finely attuned to the most minute phenotypical variety. I did not ask any direct questions about what it means to "look Norwegian" or "look European," yet several interviewees talked about appearance as an aspect of their access (or not) to Norwegianness. The intertwinement of constructions of whiteness and of Norwegianness thus emerges as a largely unstated yet firm assumption among interviewees.

Regardless of whether participants saw themselves as "looking Norwegian" - which can be understood to "look white" within the specific confines of the Norwegian context (see introduction) – all are sufficiently "white" that their children's belonging in Norway is naturalized. When I asked interviewees who had children whether their children were Norwegian, all unequivocally and without hesitation stated that they were.[8] Furthermore, none thought that their children had experienced any questioning of their Norwegianness; this was true both for those where both parents had immigrated to Norway, and where only one parent had immigrated, and regardless of whether the children had typically "Norwegian" names or not. I asked all interviewees who were parents about their children's Norwegianness, and most seemed perplexed at the question – they saw their children as obviously Norwegian. Interviewees are unlikely to have been so consistently surprised at this question if their children's Norwegianness had been drawn in doubt (whether among peers, family members, at school, in the work place, or in the media; all are arenas in which the Norwegianness of Norwegian children and adults who are not perceived to be white are questioned – e.g. chapter four; Ali 1997; Prieur 2004; Tajik 2001a) in any significant manner. It seems, then, that those whose bodies fit dominant understandings of whiteness and who are born and raised in Norway are unproblematically understood as Norwegian in the dominant public sphere.[9]

The unquestioned Norwegianness and whiteness of interviewees' children is important[10], especially in contrast to the experiences of the descendants of Asian and African migrants (chapter four; see also Tajik 2001a). The latter are racialized as not-Norwegian

“immigrants” whose belonging in Norway is consistently denied (Ali 1997; Gullestad 2002; Prieur 2004; Tajik 2001a; Øia and Vestel 2007). That interviewees’ descendants appear to have no similar experiences speaks to a rapid whitening process. Though I argue in this chapter that even those interviewees who “look like” the majority Norwegian population are not afforded a naturalized belonging in Norway, that interviewees’ tenuous acceptance as belonging to the nation is not inter-generational suggests that whiteness is a powerful form of capital. In contrast to what Gullestad shows is a production of whiteness through decent linked to specific places in the national territory, this form of whiteness is “unmoored.” Rather than require a linage that can be traced through national space, this form of whiteness appears to be self-referential: Privileged here is not descent but the visual.

Yet “looking white” is not in itself enough. Or, rather, one can only “look white” by simultaneously mastering the unwritten codes of Norwegian society and self-management (such as body language). In combination, these ensure that national belonging is naturalized – neither is sufficient by itself. As Eva says of her daughter:

> One says that wherever one comes of age, where one becomes a mature person, that is what one will see as one’s own country. And she came of age here in Norway, right, so she is of the opinion that she feels Norwegian.[11] (Eva, interview 12 October 2007.)

In a similar manner, interviewees tended to refer to their children’s up-bringing and schooling in Norway as what makes them Norwegian. Where their own “looking like” the majority Norwegian population (or not) was often used as an explanatory framework for the manner of their incorporation into Norwegian society, none discussed their children’s phenotypical characteristics when asserting that they were Norwegian. Thus, inasmuch as being literally unremarkable is widely seen as one of the central signifiers of whiteness (e.g. Frankenberg 1993; Mills 1997; Omi and Winant 1994), the children of the interviewees are produced as white and Norwegian.

Learning to eat brown cheese[12]

Perceptions of assimilability forms a significant aspect of the production of whiteness and belonging in Norway. Such assimilability is rarely defined, but appears to be seen as characteristics that are simultaneously individual and group based and that mark some migrants as inherently particularly suited for life in Norway (see further discussion in the next chapter). Over the past fifty years Southern and Eastern European migrants have moved from being seen as inassimilable (Tjelmeland 2003; see further discussion in the next section) to being tentatively seen as assimilable (van Riemsdijk 2008). In this section I present interviewees' narratives about their routes to Norway as well as their arrival and first period there. These narratives highlight first, that for these European migrants "suitedness" to life in Norway was not a pre-existing condition but a process of becoming (see also Khan 2009 for similar narratives about Pakistani migrants). In this context, the extent to which they were able to quickly settle into work, school, and/or family life appears to have had a significant and on-going impact on their sense of belonging in Norway. Secondly, interviewees' narratives about their first period in Norway emphasize their own self-sufficiency in implicit contrast to more recent Asian and African migrants. In this manner, most interviewees also adopt a framework of assimilability to support their own claims to whiteness and national belonging.

The participants in this study have arrived in Norway through myriad routes, but what they have in common is that all but one reached Norway through happenstance. In this respect, Norway is unlike major immigration centers that often are goals of migration (e.g. Canada, the US, Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, and even neighboring Sweden). This means that interviewees were not as a rule motivated to move to Norway due to a perception that it would be particularly suitable for them. Highlighting the "last resort" nature of much migration to Norway, Elpidios Biros says that for Greek migrants in the postwar period

> if someone didn't find a job in Germany, then he went to Sweden, if he didn't find

> a job there, then he came either to Denmark or to Norway. The first choice is Denmark, and the last resort is Norway.[13] (Elpidios Biros, interview 10 October 2007.)

The accidental route to Norway is not limited to labor migrants. Five of the participants arrived in Norway directly from refugee camps, and another three also arrived as a direct result of WWII or after having fled Communist regimes. For these migrants, Norway was not a desired destination, but rather a place they ended up through a variety of chance encounters and a weighting of competing needs. Each refugee has a unique and often harrowing story of fleeing their country of origin and surviving dismal refugee camps before ending up in Norway. Nevertheless, Lázár Dobos' story of how he came to Norway aptly illustrates the sort of chance encounter and decision-making process that led migrants to Norway. Lázár Dobos talks about fleeing Hungary following the Soviet invasion in 1956:

> I live just outside Budapest, and there was a Russian airport there that - more or less one of the largest that existed in Hungary at that time. And when Hungary won the first round in [late October 1956], there was a pause that lasted a week and then rumors were going around in the village there that Russians are picking up young boys and take with them. And there are several that have been taken. And it is not known where they have ended up. And therefore we were scared too. That we got a strict message that one mustn't think of having a stick in your hand, because then they see it as, the Russian military convoy, that maybe you have a rifle with you, and then they shoot.
>
> Yes – so – we were slaughtering pigs at home [and my cousin's family] were invited too, and then [my cousin and I] decided there and then that tomorrow we're going to flee. Without telling the parents that we're going to flee.

> [I]t was completely awful for Mother, and a few days before I fled I was in Budapest because I worked there and that's where I went to school, right. And - so there was a place where had to cross the main street, and so then from the other street they were shooting pedestrians that crossed, so each time he emptied his magazine then folks started belting over. Because bullets were kind of going [tapping], right up the crossing, and there was a bit of excitement when my turn came, right. I came home and told Mother, and then I was not allowed to go to work anymore. So they didn't know where I had gone, whether I had gone in to town again and been shot – they knew nothing until Christmas, right. Then I sent a letter home. [And before that there was a radio program where you could send a message] and I sent a message. Someone in the village had heard that, so Mother actually got a message that I had at least gotten to Austria.

Lázár ended up in a refugee camp in Austria:

> There were hundreds of other Hungarians there. So both couples and single people, and, like, kind people and crazy people, all types, right. And we were young – and – we were eight, nine, ten youngsters that were over there, right.
>
> And how I ended up in Norway was that in this refugee camp that I mentioned different delegations came there, and we wanted to go either to Switzerland or New Zealand. And I got a visa to New Zealand, actually. But I had to wait for a month for the boat that was leaving from Newcastle. And in the meantime I got a letter from my mother who said that both my sister and my older brother had run off too. And she was left with the youngest brother. And they had no money, and had nothing at all, to live from and all that. And then suddenly the Norwegian delegation shows up and then they say that – that, well, they practically riled us up, right, that we should come to Norway.
>
> And we knew nothing about Norway. We just knew it was eternal winter, that the

> capital is Oslo, and lots of violas. All we knew about Norway then. And most of the year it's dark. And suddenly some clever brains figured out that it doesn't matter, he said, because they have such cheap electricity in Norway that they make artificial light. And then we – we were six young boys, the same age, sixteen year olds, and then we found out that "yes, we can go to Norway, and then maybe we can hunt polar bears!" If nothing else. And then we came here, and – well it was a big surprise, right. When we landed at Gardemoen [military airport] that time, because the weather was so bad at Fornebu [commercial airport] and there was a big snow storm over Gardemoen too. And then, then we were convinced that, well, here we'd come, we are going to live in the eternal winter.[14] (Lázár Dobos, interview 20 July 2007.)

Miroslav Pekar is the only interviewee who chose Norway as a destination specifically due to what he perceived to be Norwegian norms and values. On witnessing increasing repression in Czechoslovakia and being faced with military service, he considered fleeing. When considering where to go should he leave Czechoslovakia he chose Norway because a friend living there

> had visited Czechoslovakia and told me a bit about the situation [in Norway], and I thought it would suit me. [S]omething that was important for me [was] social security. Because one can never know what will happen in a foreign country. And there were rumors – some level of propaganda – about the Western countries, that here there were no…In the Western countries nobody would look after you if you get sick. That you'll lose both your job, and if something more serious happens, an accident or something, then things will go badly for you. But this was good, that – good news to me – that people are, a social system – the social system is pretty well developed and a certain social security system and generally that Norwegians are friendly and there were calm conditions, no social unrest and relatively wealthy at that time, actually.[15] (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007.)

In contrast to Miroslav Pekar, the relatively random routes through which most of the interviewees arrived in Norway means that they did not start their lives there with a particular sense of affinity with what they perceived as Norwegian norms or values. For these migrants, Norway was also not seen as a mystical land of opportunity: indeed, some interviewees mentioned fellow migrants who opted to undertake a secondary migration to North American in search of such opportunities (Anne Line and Szilárd Farkas, interview 8 October 2007; Elpidios Biros, interview 10 October 2007; see also Tjelmeland 2003). While these migrants thus on one level are a select group inasmuch as they opted to remain in Norway (though at least one did so very reluctantly), they cannot be seen to have a starting point in Norway that would make them especially willing to assimilate. Their views and interpretations of their own experiences can therefore not be seen to be a result of a pre-existing commitment to perceived Norwegian norms and values.

That interviewees *did* stay in Norway suggests that they underwent a process through which they came to feel at home in Norway.[16] The interviews indicate that the ways in which interviewees were first able to establish life in Norway through school, work, and/or family life was not only central to Norway becoming homely at the time, but continue to impact their sense of belonging. What interviewees today chose to emphasize about their first period in Norway highlights the events that they see as supporting their sense of self in the world. There are three topics that stand out as especially important to interviewees' incorporation (or not) into Norwegian society: family connections, work or schooling, and national interest organizations.

Seven of the migrants that I interviewed settled in Norway within a family context. For Elpidios Biros, Alma, and Angela, marriage was their main impetus for moving to or remaining in Norway. These three met their future spouses through chance encounters; For example, Angela met her husband on a long train journey through Europe. She jokes that when they married and she moved to Norway from Italy in 1960, they had only spent about six hours together (Angela, interview 20 March 2008). Ákos Nagy and Margit

Dobos were children when they came to Norway as refugees with their parents. Sara was an orphaned 13 year-old when in 1947 she arrived in Norway together with several other Polish children for a short summer holiday with host families. "When my host family, or summer family, discovered that I did not have anyone to return to," she says, "they said they'd like to keep me"[17] (Sara, interview 18 March 2008). Sara subsequently grew up in this and one other Norwegian family. A decade later her long-lost sister Agnieszka used the Red Cross to find Sara. Agnieszka permanently joined Sara in Norway in 1961.

For the interviewees who arrived to or as part of a family, the family unit was their primary source of support and guidance as they settled. Agnieszka recounts that when she moved to Norway

> there were no [Norwegian] courses at that time, so we had each evening, no, each afternoon, then my brother-in-law had a book, I had hand written with Norwegian-English, English-Polish, and translated the whole thing, and learnt.[18] (Agnieszka, interview 18 March 2008).

Later, when she struggled with whether to remain in Norway or not, her sister Sara's quiet father-in-law took her aside before a long journey and said "just remember that you have a father here in Norway"[19] (Agnieszka, interview 18 March 2008). Today Agnieszka sees his words as a central part of why she stayed. Similarly, Angela says of her mother-in-law, with whom she and her husband shared an apartment for several years, that

> she taught me the language in that she did not speak English. And [she] also taught me how things were done in Norway and things like that. I learnt from her. [And] I have to say that I was *very* well received by the *whole* family.[20] (Angela, interview 20 March 2008.)

Angela and Agnieszka's emphases on how well received they were by their Norwegian family and the importance of this welcome to their sense of being at home in Norway are typical for interviewees who arrived in or to Norway in a family context. Those interviewees who did not have an entry into Norwegian society through family support faced greater challenges. At a time when state-organized support for migrants was minimal,[21] the assistance of the Norwegian-Czechoslovakian Help Association[22] was central to all three Slovak interviewees. Eva, Mr. Fabis, and Miroslav Pekar all received help from the association, and in particular its co-founder Mrs. Anna Kvapilová. During their initial period in Norway, the association helped Czechoslovak migrants find housing and provided guidance in relation to the Norwegian society. In the context of a general and acute Norwegian housing crisis in the post-war period, such housing was not necessarily of great quality: the barracks that Mr. Fabis and his family lived in for nearly a decade (1950-1959) was first made available to them through the Association. The importance of the Association in assisting migrants is nevertheless clear, as Miroslav Pekar made evident when recounting an experience that occurred during his first year in Norway:

> [O]ne of the first months after I had registered at a Norwegian university, then an office lady at the University called all the Czechoslovakian students one by one [into her office], and tried to convince us to leave the Norwegian university because it was primarily for Norwegian students. And I was used to – all of us, because we were used to, we were used to much more authoritarian conditions, so we believed that if a woman at the university says this then there really is danger. And then we contacted this Norwegian-Czechoslovakian Help Association. And she just laughed! "You mustn't listen to this. She has no authority, it's just her personal prejudices, and…" And I think they intervened with the [University] also.[23] (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007.)

The Association provided such practical assistance to all the Slovak interviewees, and thus helped the migrants navigate Norwegian society and (to some extent) begin to

establish a sense of belonging in Norway. Other interviewees without family support report little assistance beyond the first months in Norway. For example, Szilárd Farkas was 15 when he came to Norway, and he was one of several young Hungarian refugees for whom Norwegian foster families were arranged. Nevertheless, as he tells the story of his first period in Norway, the contrast between the support he received in the first six months and the extent to which he afterwards was on his own is stark:

> We came to Oslo – came to Oslo at night, at 12 o'clock in the evening. And at Fornebu [airport] Scouts were standing and greeting all the Hungarians that were arriving. And it was just before Christmas, you know, and came to – we came to Oslo, to town in busses, right, and were distributed to hotels and just that night it came lots of snow and thought: came to this small village! There were no tramlines because it had snowed, right, so there was no tram at all. So – yes – but it went well, and then we got a doctor's examination the next day and then we went to a hotel in the mountains. And learnt to eat brown cheese!
>
> And afterwards we came to Oslo again, up to Saga or Skala cinema there, in Oslo, there we saw, all the boys that got Norwegian parents that came to pick us up.
>
> And me, I came to a family called Thoresen, lived – they had two sons and one daughter [that were] adults. Most got to live there for six months and the volunteer parents, and some were allowed to stay on and some not. And I was not staying on and I had to – then I travelled to Porsgrunn for the [merchant] seaman's school. And from there I hired on a ship. Because I had to have food, you know.[24] (Szilárd Farkas, interview 8 October 2007).

As Szilárd Farkas notes, within a week of arriving in Norway he was "learning to eat brown cheese." Though at the time of his arrival the cheese was likely yet another peculiar new thing to get used to, at the time of his interview some forty years later the emphasis on brown cheese, which carries significant symbolic weight as signaling

Norwegianness, can be understood as a highlighting of a rapid expectation (and perhaps achievement) of assimilation.

The emphasis that Szilárd Farkas places on his successful process of assimilation reflects a topic that emerges from several interviews. In these, a successful assimilation is portrayed as a national as well as individual trait. For example, Lázár Dobos explains the successes of Hungarian migrants in Norway as being due to their having "closed their identity within themselves and assimilated into Norwegian society"[25] (Lázár Dobos, interview 4 July 2007). Mr. Fabis notes that "there were maybe some, yes, less good or social people, that got help"[26] (Mr. Fabis, interview 20 March 2008). Mr. Fabis is here referring to social assistance, and his implicit assessment that "good people" do not receive help is mirrored in several other interviews. In these, interviewees place considerable emphasis on having "managed on their own" and recount with pride the hard work and frugality that was often necessary. [27] Voicing a common opinion among the interviewees, Agnieszka says that "I think it is fine to get a little help at the beginning, but must do on your own"[28] (Agnieszka, interview 18 March 2008). Such emphasis must be seen in conjunction with the value placed on independence in Norwegian culture (Gullestad 2006). Additionally, interviewees often place their own ability to manage with little public support in direct or indirect contrast to their perception of more recent (and implicitly Asian and African) migrants.

In conjunction the emphasis on "managing on your own" and the contrast to recent migrants, functions as a distancing mechanism: It highlights interviewees' belonging in Norway in part through a boundary-making to the recent immigrant groups that are broadly racialized as unsuited to and unsuitable for life in Norway (see chapter three and four). In other words, the ways in which many interviewees frame their own belonging in Norway rely on circular of assimilability that produce the interviewees as white because assimilable.

The European Other

That many interviewees presented their own suitedness to life in Norway in implicit or explicit contrast to the assumed un-suitedness of Asian and African migrants, reflects a current Norwegian discourse in which a distinction between immigrants originating in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand and those originating anywhere else is broadly naturalized. Anne Line Farkas draws on such discourses when she argues that

> [y]ou could say that if you're from Europe, then we're more one, we have more the same – not quite the same culture, but – we are more alike than when they come from the Muslim countries. [29](Anne Line Farkas, interview 8 October 2007.)

Yet in order to produce Europeans as "the same," European migrants must continuously be explicitly or implicitly contrasted with Asian and African migrants.[30] This perceived contrast produces a naturalized binary that homogenizes both groups. While Anne Line Farkas (who has been married to Szilárd Farkas for several decades) is attentive to intra-European differences, in official statistics, academic analyses, and popular discourses the division between migrants is naturalized in a binary between "the West" and "the Rest"[31] (Høydahl 2008). In this framework, immigrants from "the West" are understood as culturally similar to Norwegians, and therefore able to unproblematically be incorporated into Norwegian society.

The assumption that Europeans are at once significantly similar to one another and significantly different from Asians and Africans relies heavily on assessments of distance (see also chapter one and three). Particular framings of geography are used to naturalize racializing assessments of difference and sameness, where there is a simultaneous production of some geographic regions as close and migrants from these regions as "similar" to Norwegians. These are not, as I discuss further in the next chapter, assessments of distance that have meaning outside their naturalization of racial taxonomies. As part of the dominant discourse that naturalizes race, these metaphorical

references to geographic distance are a broadly shared framework. Ákos Nagy's comments reflect this framework as he explains that

> [t]here is after all a certain cultural commonality in Europe. One isn't that far from each other, from most immigrants – from Swedes who are the majority of the immigrants. [They are] close neighbors. And then once we move further and further out into Europe, then they change customs and culture and the like. But it is still European. Religion too. Christians, who have dominated thus far, which is a common – so, well, a European immigrant is closer to the Norwegian society than someone from another part of the world.[32] (Ákos Nagy, interview 4 July 2007.)

In the next chapter I show that in the first half of the 1970s distance-as-difference comes to the fore as a central trope in Norwegian racial constructions of Asian and Africans. Here however, distance is used to buttress a sense of the naturalness of intra-European similarity and affinity.

However, what is understood as "Europe" is far from static. In particular, the borders of "Western Europe" change in response to domestic and international politics. For several decades after WWII, in Norway "Western Europe" was understood as bordered in the east by West Germany's border to East Germany, and in the south by the Alps (e.g. *Aftenposten* 6 July 1974). Today, in official statistics inclusion in "Western Europe" depends on membership in the EU or the EEA (Høydahl 2008). Such intra-European divisions reflects what Kuus argues is a "broadly Orientalist discourse that assumes essential differences between Europe and Eastern Europe and frames difference from Western Europe as a distance and lack of Europeanness" (2004, 479).

Thus the "obvious" similarity of European immigrants is a relatively tenuous (van Riemsdijk 2008) and recent perception. Its maintenance requires significant historical amnesia as well as the denial of current contradictory discourses of intra-European

otherness (ibid.). In the postwar period European refugees and labor migrants tended to be seen as significantly different from the Norwegian population (Tjelmeland 2003: ch. 1-2), just as the migrants themselves found Norway to be different – sometimes dramatically different – from their home countries. Angela says that when she moved from Rome to Oslo in 1960,

> [i]t was an enormous change. To me it almost seemed like arriving behind the iron curtain in a way. It was very grey and very little of what I was used to was available, both with regards to food and equipment and things like that. And completely different habits and routines.
>
> Everything was different. From how – and not to mention the food! It was an enormous difference. And also – yes, the routines during the day, and everyone was much more private.
>
> And – I don't know what to say. *Everything* was different! It was as different as coming to another planet.[33] (Angela, interview 20 March 2008).

The extent to which Norwegians in turn viewed European migrants with apprehension is illustrated by the government during the summer of 1956 moving towards a decision to no longer accept European refugees for resettlement (Tjelmeland 2003: 51). Instead, Norway was to focus aid work entirely on the areas in which the refugees were located (often camps in Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia). This policy shift was precipitated by research that concluded that the refugees already in Norway (then primarily from Czechoslovakia and Poland) were inassimilable[34] (ibid.). As I discuss above, such a focus on the perception that some migrants are inassimilable and therefore ought not immigrate is a recurrent theme in Norwegian constructions of difference (see also chapter three). That it here targeted European migrants who today are framed as substantially similar to Norwegians highlights the constructedness of such assessments of similarity and difference. This focus on European migrants as so different as to be inassimilable

also challenges the idea that the first migrants who were perceived as significantly different were the (therefore) "new" Asian and African migrants who arrived in the early 1970s.

The majority of the participants in this study discuss the difference, distance, and similarity between Norway and their home countries in ways that reflect the competing Norwegian discourses of Europe as Other and Europe as similar. In this discourse, depending on the context, Europe and Europeans are viewed as either sufficiently similar to be assimilable, or as threatening foreigners. Though few of the interviewees see themselves as having had negative experiences in Norway due to their country of origin or immigration status (see further discussion in the next section), several were affected by the anti-European sentiments that came to light during Norway's two referendums on the European Community/Union. As Angela notes, until the 1972 referendum, she had "personally never noticed that, kind of, 'we're best on our own' and all that. 'They can contaminate us,' almost" (Angela, 20 March 2008).

This anti-European discourse reflects a Norwegian sense of distance from Europe, even though, as I note above, Europe is also "close." Ákos Nagy points out that

> the Norwegian culture is unique in Europe. Like the mentality I remember elderly Norwegians, like 60-70 year olds, having when we arrived [in 1950]. We asked where they had been in Europe right, and then they answered and said that 'in Europe? I have never been outside of Norway's borders. What would we do outside? We have everything!'"[35] (Ákos Nagy, interview 4 July 2007).

Ákos Nagy is one of several interviewees who brought up the positive effects of Norwegians travelling much more than earlier, and therefore being more open to other cultures and peoples. However, like Elpidios Biros argues at the beginning of this chapter, interviewees were also unambiguous that negative views of Europe and Europeans continue today (see also van Riemsdijk 2008, 2010).

The simultaneous difference and similarity of Europe and Europeans means that in the Norwegian context European immigrants are not constructed as inhabiting the same kind of whiteness that signifies being Norwegian. The naturalization of a sense of similarity among Europeans rests on a construction of whiteness that has come to uneasily include all "ethnic" Europeans. Yet European migrants are also understood as distinct from Norwegians (or Scandinavians), and as such the former's whiteness is qualitatively different. In other words, the kind of whiteness that national belonging is premised on in Norway does not necessarily include European immigrants, even though in some contexts Europeans are also understood as akin to Norwegians.

To the extent that Europeans (however constructed) are produced as "similar," this production relies on constant reiterations of a naturalized distinction between Europeans on the one hand and Asians and Africans (however constructed) on the other. This racializing boundary-making supports the racial projects that target the latter groups (see chapter four). It also means that many European migrants cannot see, or actively refuse, any connections between themselves and Asian and African migrants. In the next section I show the impact that this disconnection appears to have on interviewees' access to a language with which to analyze their experiences of discrimination.

Experiences of discrimination

Interviewees' experiences of discrimination can be seen as a litmus test for the extent to they are seen by the dominant society to "properly" belong in Norway. When asked directly, all but one of the interviewees denied having experienced any significant discrimination based on their immigration status or non-Norwegian background. The following excerpt from Miroslav Pekar's discussion of his lack of experience with discrimination is in this respect typical. His response is nevertheless particularly instructive because he explicitly places his own experience in relation to those he presumes Asian and African migrants may have. Miroslav Pekar notes that

when I have said that I have almost never experienced discrimination here, then [people] have said that "then you're lucky, because you have European looks, from a European country, and both culturally it probably wasn't so difficult for you to be integrated, and you – nobody suspects you of being anything else." Probably those of us from Europe had an easier time than people from other countries, right.

E: Who are making these comments?

Different people. It's common – not people that I [worked with], but usually people that I told. For example if a Norwegian, it was often – it was one of those left-radical tendencies in the 70s here, and they often thought among other things that there are such prejudices against others. And then I said "I have never experienced discrimination" and then they answered "you are lucky because you have European looks, but you should just see [what it would be like] if you looked Turkish or Arab."

E: So you're saying you've never experienced –

Practically never.[36] (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007.)

However, like other interviewees, in other parts of the interview Miroslav Pekar also recounts experiences that appear to reflect discrimination and xenophobia directed at him (recall his story of being asked to leave the university). This apparent contradiction is also illustrated by Ákos Nagy, who has had considerable contact with other European immigrants through his social networks and volunteer work. When asked whether European migrants experienced discrimination, he argues that

[t]here were some who thought they would have a cakewalk [*dans på roser*] here in Norway, and the moment they met any challenges [*fikk motstand*] then they

> thought it was discrimination. These were people who did not see their own faults. Those I was in contact with – it could be that some were discriminated against, but I have no knowledge of it. [37](Ákos Nagy, interview 4 July 2007.)

Ákos Nagy was in his very early teens when he and his parents came to Norway in 1950, and he speaks unaccented Norwegian. At the time of the interview he had recently retired from an illustrious career in the Norwegian and international finance sector. Despite his insistence that to the best of his knowledge European migrants have not experienced discrimination in Norway, Ákos Nagy tells several stories that span the course of his career (1964-2007) and show that his non-Norwegian background was made negatively relevant:

> At [my place of work in the late 1960s] there was a big dinner and I sat next to one of the old [bosses] who had had some extra drinks and was speaking with an open heart, and then he said "Yes, Nagy, you should change your name to Nilsen" – because it means "the son of Nils,"[38] he asked me beforehand. […] "Yes," the old [boss] says, "with that name you'll never make a career in the Norwegian [financial sector]." And I didn't either. So that's a part of the picture.

After two decades working in the Norwegian financial sector, including as a partner in a private financial firm, Ákos Nagy found himself applying for work in the mid-1980s:

> Nobody replied [to my applications]. But then I have a good friend – a good friend even today – Håkon Aase, who was a Principal Officer at [a national governmental financial institution]. And he said they could use someone with my qualifications in [my specialty]. Whether I might be interested? And I said I was. And then I was called for a meeting with a Director General [at the financial institution]. And they offered me a position, but at the lowest level, as Executive Officer.
>
> And I took that offer. And at that time they said to Håkon Aase, "you must be a

guarantor for Nagy, he's not born Norwegian." They didn't say it openly, but that was what was meant. And then Håkon said to me, "I had to guarantee for you, so if you get up to something we're both done for!"

[During my last period at work] there was a meeting where the whole unit of 44 persons was present. And I made a point, and then the Director General Turid says - actually quite a great woman, but a strange character – "Can someone translate what Nagy is saying?" As if I could not speak Norwegian well enough. And then there was kind of a rumbling in the room and they came to me afterwards and said "you should follow that up." So that was that.[39] (Ákos Nagy, interview 4 July 2007.)

None of the incidents Ákos Nagy recounts are extremely egregious, and Miroslav Pekar is no doubt correct that migrants from outside Europe experienced much, much worse (a point Ákos Nagy also makes, with reference to his Nigerian friend who moved to Norway in 1960). Yet like Nagy many interviewees *did* experience discrimination, and some were likely negatively affected both in specific employment situations and cumulatively across their careers.

In this context, the near-complete commitment to a narrative that emphasizes that the interviewee has not experienced discrimination suggests that discrimination is not central to their understanding of their lives in Norway, but also begs the question of why participants tend not to interpret any of their experiences through the language of discrimination. To be clear: I do not believe, and certainly have no evidence to support, that interviewees are suffering from a "false consciousness." What emerges from the interviews is that on being asked what their experiences with discrimination are, all but one states that they have never or almost never experienced any. Yet in discussing their careers (and occasionally family life) many share stories indicative of discrimination and xenophobia.

In considering why interviewees do not view their experiences in terms of discrimination, it is crucial to ask what they hear when asked about discrimination. As the only interviewee who uses a framework of discrimination to interpret her experiences in Norway, Eva's comments are instructive. Eva says that

> [with regards to work], for example, I felt such awful discrimination. That is what it was. A – well – now you hear – now one talks about this – now all these nations that are here, right. And they go and are interviewed and – or they're not called for interviews. And I have experienced a ton of that, right. But I could not yell "racists! Racists!" because I was white. Right?
>
> Because I was of the opinion that I actually *knew* something. And maybe knew more – maybe knew so much that I could give something positive to a society, right. But I was not allowed to.[40] (Eva, interview 16 March 2008.)

There is a tension in Eva's comments between discrimination and racism. Though Eva sees her experiences (such as being told repeatedly that her career preferences would be unachievable and inappropriate for a foreigner) as discriminatory, she appears to be unsure of the extent to which discrimination and racism are co-extensive. Because she sees herself as white and sees whiteness as precluding being the target of racism, she has little language through which to address the discrimination she faces. Eva sees an absolute distinction between herself and those she perceives to be non-white immigrants and Norwegians and who she complains learns all too quickly to "yell 'racists! Racists!'" That her experiences are akin to those non-white immigrants and Norwegians suffer does not lead her to question the absolute distinction she draws between herself and non-white immigrants and Norwegians - which in turn emphasizes her own whiteness.

At the time of the interviews, dominant Norwegian discourse tended to equate discrimination and racism (Rogstad and Midtbøen 2009). Like Eva, interviewees seemed largely bound by this equation. However, the ways in which they saw themselves as

potentially implicated in either varied. Both Miroslav Pekar and Eva understand discrimination as something that they could be the targets of, but they indicate significantly different understandings of whether they can be the targets of racism. In offering his own experiences as a counterpoint to assertions about Norwegian prejudices against immigrants, Miroslav Pekar both sees himself as a potential target of such discrimination and does not appear to perceive a clear demarcation between himself and non-European migrants. Although Miroslav Pekar does not use the word "racism" in his account, his discussion of prejudice and the responses of his interlocutors that "looking Turkish or Arab" would bring about such prejudice, suggests that racism was the topic at hand.

The absence of discrimination as an explanatory frame of reference in participants' narratives may thus be connected to the blurry but important links between discrimination and racism. In the quotes above, Miroslav Pekar appear to see racism and discrimination as interchangeable, and concludes that he has "practically never" experienced any. Eva, on the other hand, concludes that while she has been the target of discrimination, this discrimination is "nameless" because it *cannot* be the same as racism. Eva is without a doubt the interviewee who has experienced the most consistent and significant constraints on her career: since arriving in Norway in 1969 she has only briefly been able to find work commensurate with her education and interests and by her mid-50s she was advised to seek early retirement. For Eva, then, discrimination is a central feature of her life in Norway, and one with concrete material effects that she feels every day (for example, her financial situation leaves her unable to move away from a neighborhood she is unhappy in). Compared to other interviewees, Eva thus has a qualitatively different incentive to use discrimination as an explanatory framework.

The "namelessness" of the discrimination Eva has faced is important: in a dominant discourse that sees "discrimination" and "racism" as interchangeable and both as targeting non-white immigrants and Norwegians, seeing oneself as white excludes being a target of such forms of discrimination. In this scenario, there is limited language

available in dominant discourse to identify or talk about discrimination faced by European immigrants who are not identified as not-white. It is clear that for the majority of the interviewees discrimination simply has not been something that they understand as central to their lives in Norway. However, their simultaneous assertions that they have never or "practically never" experienced any *and* their recounting of stories indicating otherwise suggests that they may not think about the latter in terms of "discrimination" – a phrase perhaps too closely linked with racism for European immigrants to easily identify with.

Interviewees' recounting of experiences in which their national background were viewed as a negative characteristic and the concurrent absence of discrimination as a mode of interpreting these experiences highlights the production of European immigrants as simultaneously Other and white. Their Otherness is reiterated through (usually) rare but persistent negative treatment based on their national background and immigrant status (see also van Riemsdijk 2008, 2010). Such reminders of Otherness highlight the still-tenuous belonging that the dominant society affords interviewees. Yet the near-complete absence of discrimination as an analytic framework in interviewees' narratives appear to rest on the conflation of racism and discrimination and the delimitation of both to those not understood as white. Consequently, this absence reconfirms interviewees' whiteness and claims to belonging.

Belonging in Norway

When discussing their sense of belonging in Norway, most interviewees noted that they have found it difficult to identify as – or be identified as – "properly" Norwegian (though see Samtiden 2009). This is not a question of formal citizenship: there are few barriers to citizenship in Norway,[41] and all but two of the participants in this study are Norwegian citizens (and of those two one was actively considering applying for citizenship at the time of the interview). It is also not a necessary outcome of migration, as national belonging can be produced in ways that include immigrants regardless of their descent. When considering how interviewees narrate their sense of belonging in Norway, it is

worth revisiting in their extended form the words of Mr. Fabis that introduced this chapter. Mr. Fabis says that

> I wanted to be *Norwegian*, right from the beginning. But I soon discovered that it wasn't possible, because I had to distance myself from the Czechs. And the Slovaks. When I came to the country, I was going to be completely integrated and be *Norwegian* – completely Norwegian.
>
> But after – I don't know how long, maybe a year or so, or maybe longer – then I changed my opinion.
>
> E: What made you change your opinion?
>
> Maybe I saw it wasn't going as I believed [it would]. Or wanted.
>
> Norwegians, right, I said that, and I say it too, they're nice people and they don't do you bad or good. Mostly like "yes, hello, hello" and that's that. When we came here, right, then Norway was not international. It was kind of – there was much that we had that weren't here in Norway. You know, of spices or some things. It was still, like, different. And then it wasn't so easy to adjust either, maybe. Or be accepted. I wanted. But –
> [When I first came to Norway I was not going to be] together with Czechs, or countrymen to say it like that. I came to Norway, and then I was going to be with Norwegians. But probably I didn't get access, or something like that. For some reason. Poor contact, like. Then I had to – that. And I understand that well, what they do, the Turkish and such. They'll never be Norwegian. There is kind of like something – it is their home maybe, right, when they get together. Have something to talk about, customs and ways of life, and food.

> I am Norwegian but I never became *a Norwegian*, right [*Altså jeg er norsk, men jeg ble aldri nordmann*]. And I was not accepted. Like I said, I had Norwegian, yes, but - . It just *is* like that. And I don't mind at all! Not at all! But in the beginning I was embarrassed. I wanted to kind of hide, to put it like that. Wherever I went it didn't take long: "yes, you're not Norwegian?"[42] (Mr. Fabis, interview 20 March 2008.)

While Mr. Fabis is unique in his insistence that on arrival (in 1949) he intended to become fully Norwegian and associate only with Norwegians, his conclusion that "becoming *Norwegian* Norwegian" is impossible is a common one. For Mr. Fabis, finding that those he met not only refused to see him as Norwegian, but that Norwegians were difficult to get to know, he "changed his mind" about becoming Norwegian; in fact, apart from his immediate family, Mr. Fabis primarily describes work-related relationships with ethnic Norwegians.

Similarly, Ákos Nagy notes that even after 50 years in Norway he was asked "how he likes Norway" (at the time of the interview he had lived in Norway for almost 60 years). He retorts that "[i]f I didn't like Norway, I'd have pushed off forty years ago!"[43] (Ákos Nagy 4 July 2007). Nagy's apparent whiteness, high class position, able-bodied maleness, unaccented Norwegian and Norwegian education suggest that a "foreign-sounding" name can be sufficient to bring into doubt proper national belonging.[44] Yet the participants in this study have lived the vast majority of their lives in Norway. They must therefore negotiate a sense of belonging to and in the society in which they live while many, like Ákos Nagy and Mr. Fabis, are simultaneously fielding regular reminders that they are not perceived to fully belong.

When asked to articulate their own sense (or not) of Norwegianness, most interviewees were at a loss. However, three themes emerge from the interviews as dominant frames of reference. Interviewees drew on (a) the decades they had lived in Norway; (b) that they have Norwegian children and grandchildren; and (c) that they "accept absolutely the

values you have [here]" (Angela, interview 20 March 2008), to explain their sense of belonging to and in Norway. Elaborating on the latter themes, Angela says that

> I am very happy in Norway. I accept absolutely the values you have and all that, and my children are Norwegian and that, but the roots are Italian. I am not sure I am going to – I have thought a lot about it, but – What we are? I usually say I am of Italian origin. I do not say I am Italian.
>
> E: Some of the others I have talked with have talked about how they get – if they're together with others from the same nationality and then they do something and suddenly they get comments: "you've become so Norwegian."
>
> Yes. But that is true. I and another in this group have also – we're eight [Italian women], very close still – and I and another have become the most Norwegian. Yes. The others keep more – but they have more family down there still: siblings and such and houses and – And, I don't know what to say, they have traveled a bit more to and fro through their lives, and – They- but they are very happy [here] too, but I think they are more Italian.
>
> We feel more well adjusted [*til rette*] here. Maybe. Yes. We accept more things, viewpoints from Norway that are different from Italy. And, no I think so, we see it more from the Norwegian side.[45] (Angela, interview 20 March 2008.)

Like Angela, interviewees who referred to their acceptance of Norwegian values implicitly positioned these values as outside themselves. These were values that they accepted from the dominant society but that they did not see themselves creating or influencing. Examples that interviewees used to explain what "Norwegian values" were ranged from patterns of child rearing and social interaction, acceptance of immigration, tolerance of difference, and a close engagement with nature. What made these values and norms "Norwegian" was that interviewees understood them as distinct from those in their

country of origin. Such acceptance of Norwegian values and viewpoints suggests what Ghassan Hage calls "passive belonging" in the nation (2000, 45-46). Hage explains passive belonging as a sense of having "the right to benefit from the nation's resources, to 'fit into it' or 'feel at home' within it" (2000, 45), but not to shape it.

The acceptance of Norwegian norms and values appears to be a broadly shared measure of belonging in Norway. It is not only the acceptance of such norms that can measure belonging, but also their rejection. Eva is the interviewee most adamant about *not* being Norwegian or belonging to the dominant Norwegian society. She emphasizes that "to call Norway as home, that I can't do. Never ever [*aldri i livet*]" (Eva, interview 16 March 2008). Eva sees her dissatisfaction with Norwegian immigration and integration policy as evidence of her complete disidentification from Norwegian viewpoints and priorities. Comparing life in Norway to her satisfaction with a recent trip to Slovakia, she notes that

> I am not happy in this so-called multicultural society. Not happy. I see it as something artificial. For a European country, actually having a kind of political ideology or whatever you call it forced on it – [When] I came home it was actually a kind of relaxation to only meet *my* homogenous culture. No conflicts, nothing.[46] (Eva, interview 16 March 2008.)

Using the same reasoning as Angela and others who cite their agreement with or acceptance of what they identify as Norwegian values and norms as indicative of their belonging in Norway; Eva sees her disagreement with these values and norms as underpinning her disidentification from Norway. Eva thus shares with Angela and others an interpretive framework that focuses on the passive acceptance of pre-existing norms and values as a central aspect of belonging in Norway.

However, while at first glance it appears that interviewees see a close alignment with and uncritical acceptance of dominant discourses as a requirement for national belonging, this picture is tempered by their also voicing popular critical discourses, such as the critiques

of Norwegian immigration and integration policies that many interviewees voiced (see further discussion below). In this manner, participants were displaying what Ghassan Hage calls "governmental belonging" – a sense of having a legitimate right to have one's opinion heard with regards to domestic and international national politics (2000, 46).

For Southern and Eastern Europeans who have been settled in Norway for decades, the extent to which they display governmental belonging might tell us something about the degree to which they can inhabit Norwegianness. Although I asked no questions aimed at determining governmental or passive belonging, in reviewing the interviews I was struck by how several interviewees made statements that fit neatly into Hage's taxonomy. The distinction Hage makes between governmental belonging and passive belonging provides a way to distinguish between qualitatively different forms of national belonging that highlights significant variety between the ways in which interviewees enact belonging in Norway.

Concomitantly, because naturalized belonging in Norway to a large extent is tied to being seen as white, inhabiting Norwegianness can be seen as inhabiting whiteness in the Norwegian context. In Hage's schema, governmental belonging is a way of inhabiting a national will and to see oneself as an agent or enactor of this will (2000, 46). Simultaneously, the gaze that polices and governs the nation belongs to those who inhabit the national will, while those who are unable to "represent and inhabit such a will" are marked as national objects (ibid.). Passive belonging, on the other hand, suggests fitting in and feeling at home (2000, 45), but without directing the nation. Though in Hage's argument the nationals whose belonging to the nation is naturalized are white while those whose belonging to the nation is made tentative are not-white, the experiences of Southern and Eastern European migrants in Norway suggests that his framework is also useful for thinking through how whiteness is produced.

The context in which interviewees make the clearest statements suggesting governmental belonging is with regards to immigration and perceptions of Norway's integration

policies. Four interviewees commented that there are “too many” (implicitly non-white) “immigrants” and Muslims in Norway. In Szilárd Farkas' words

> [i]t is fine to get a *few* [Muslim immigrants], but when we're talking about tens of thousands, not to say hundreds of thousands, then it becomes a bit, I think too…it's going the wrong way. When no more than four and a half million people live in Norway.[47] (Szilárd Farkas, interview 8 October 2007.)

For Szilárd Farkas as well as the other interviewees making similar comments, an imaginary “hundreds of thousands” of “unhomely” migrants implicitly threaten to overwhelm the small and properly belonging Norwegian population. Such an assessment of “too many” reflects a common anti-immigrant rhetoric (e.g. Hage 2000; Lee 2007; Paul 1997) and is, as Hage argues, a particular “spatial-affective aspiration,” one that sees the homeliness of the nation as having been lost due to immigration (Hage 2000, 39-42).

As migrants themselves none of the interviewees opposed immigration per se. However, in addition to the assessments made about there being “too many” of the “wrong kind” of immigrants, several other interviewees unfavorably compared their own largely un-supported, struggles and determination to manage “on their own” versus more recent immigrants “asking for hand-outs” (see further discussion earlier in the chapter). While this is a qualitative rather than quantitative assessment it too suggests a gaze that can and should police the nation and its borders. Furthermore, if Hage is right that these kinds of views of “too many” or “the wrong kind” of immigrants is built on a sense of a lost homely nation – as I believe he is – then these interviewees also appear to align themselves with that lost homeliness. In other words, they see themselves as properly able to inhabit the lost homely Norwegian nation, suggesting a close identification with dominant constructions of Norwegianness.

Despite interviewees' primary reliance on passive forms of belonging in their articulation of their own belonging in Norway, some simultaneously display a governmental

belonging that indicates a willingness to see themselves as managers of national space. Though both speak to a sense of belonging, they are nevertheless significantly different. Implicit in governmental belonging is a claim to a dominant position within the nation, whereas passive belonging merely lays claim to a sense of homeliness within the nation. The display of governmental belonging can take any number of forms; Szilárd Farkas' managerial assessment of Muslims in Norway is one example, and Eva's assertion that the Norwegian government misdirects its oil revenues is another (Szilárd Farkas, interview 8 October 2007; Eva, interview 16 March 2008). Governmental belonging is thus a performative that naturalizes its practitioner's relationship to the nation. As such, it is also a practice of whiteness where whiteness is both a basis for and produced through naturalized national belonging.

Whiteness and national belonging in Norway

There is no overarching schema or "truth" that can contain the messy production of race and nation within which interviewees must negotiate their belonging in Norway. In this chapter I have tried to point to some of the ways in which these Southern and Eastern European migrants are produced as white without being able to claim a naturalized belonging in the nation, and as able to enact national belonging but without being quite white. In this last section I focus on some of the ways that interviewees discuss how they conceptualize their own national belonging. I argue that the apparent relative ease with which most interviewees have been able to forge a sense of belonging in Norway point to the power of whiteness in Norway. On a more hopeful note, I also point to the elasticity of Norwegianness that allows interviewees' children unmediated access to national belonging.

Elpidios Biros' assertion that Greeks are viewed either as "god" or "goddamn" but never equal opened this chapter. This sense of being met as stereotype and never as an equal was widely shared among interviewees. Indeed, Elpidios Biros and Eva, who otherwise talk about their experiences in Norway in almost diametrically opposite ways, provide very similar analyses of this situation. Eva sees her experiences in Norway as

significantly shaped by the views of foreigners she met during her first years in Norway. She explains that

> [t]here were two views of [foreigners] at that time [in the 1970s]. Either it was – how can I say it? A circus bear, right, like the bear exotic. You dance a bit, like the bear at the circus. Oh, how nice, how nice! Right? Or there was *complete* rejection. To – you were, I could not – they didn't have to say anything, but I saw it in those eyes. That I was something that really –yes. Was at a lower level.[48] (Eva, interview 12 October 2007.)

In other words, stereotypes of foreigners may be "positive" or negative, but both preclude equality. Yet most of the interviewees have created lives in Norway that are defined neither by the god nor the goddamn. In fact, as I discuss above, most do not see themselves as having been negatively constrained by Norwegian perceptions of them or their nationality group.

Interviewees consistently describe themselves as having a double cultural identity, and experience this as a positive resource. Margit Dobos describes this as a "doubleness" [*dobbelthet*] that allows her and her husband Lázár to "appreciate what is good in Hungary, and [also] appreciate what is good in Norway" [49](Margit Dobos, interview 20 July 2007). This suggests that the negative views of their countries of origin that do circulate in dominant Norwegian discourse are not made relevant in ways that prevent interviewees from seeing their double cultural identities as a positive resource. In sharp contrast to Asian and African migrants whose multicultural and transnational identities must be shaped in the face of much social and structural condemnation of their countries of origin (see e.g. the discussion in chapter four of how Pakistani parents are portrayed in dominant Norwegian discourse) most interviewees discuss their multicultural identities without any reference to Norwegian stereotypes about their countries of origin.

That interviewees are able to forge multicultural identities without being constrained by dominant Norwegian stereotypes of their countries of origin (see e.g. van Riemsdijk 2008; Eva, interview 12 October 2007, 16 March 2008) suggests that dominant Norwegian stereotypes about Southern and Eastern Europe are not politicized. This lack of politicization is illustrated by Miroslav Pekar who also sees himself as having a double cultural identity, and notes that one of the aspects of life in Norway that he is grateful for is that Norwegians "have not tried to change me into their image"[50] (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007; compare chapter four). This absence of a politicized stereotype is important: although Europeans in some contexts are seen as Others in Norway; although dominant Norwegian discourses perpetuate stereotyped and often negative views of Southern and Eastern Europe; and although most participants have had some experiences during their lives in Norway that can be understood as resulting from discrimination or xenophobia, these views are not brought to bear in such a manner that interviewees have felt pressures to assimilate, or to defensively withdraw. In other words, most interviewees have been able to integrate in Norwegian society, and while some who wished to become fully Norwegian have met insurmountable social and cultural barriers that have prevented this, these barriers are not intergenerational .

Interviewees' integration is highlighted by national belonging and national identity not being a topic of concern for most of the interviewees. While I asked repeated questions about national belonging – both in terms of belonging to Norway and about their continued links to their countries of origin – interviewees rarely thought these were particularly relevant to their lives. Miroslav Pekar and Angela were the only interviewees who indicated that they were pondering their national identities independently of the interview setting. With regards to her Italian and Norwegian identities, Angela says that

> I notice it myself, if there's a soccer match between Norway and Italy: who shall I root for? I don't know! It's not that I am that interested in soccer, but just to give an example.[51] (Angela, interview 20 March 2008.)

Miroslav Pekar is even firmer in his commitment to Norway, and says that

> [s]ometimes I have one of these thought-experiments with dividing my sense of loyalty. Now, I am completely unfit with regards to for example fighting, but if Norway for example was attacked by a foreign power, then I would without hesitation support Norway until the end [*til det ytterste*]. Fight for Norway to the extent possible for me. Would not think of fleeing from here or anything like that. That loyalty is unmovable. And I think it would have been even if I was not married to a Norwegian.[52] (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007.)

National identity also seems to be a topic of interest for Eva, inasmuch as she is deeply committed both to maintaining her Slovak identity and to not being Norwegian. The other nine migrants would likely agree with Sara, who says that "I don't really think about [my national identity]. It just *is* like that, I am here!"[53] (Sara, interview 18 March 2008).

In a context where other immigrant groups (and their descendants) are forced to defend their place in Norway and are demonized for maintaining relationships to their countries of origin (see chapter four), the relative ease with which most of the interviewees have been able to carve out multicultural identities and a sense of belonging in Norway is instructive. On the one hand, there is evidently a cultural space in Norway for some immigrants to be accepted as belonging to the nation. On the other hand, entry to this cultural space appears to be predicated on physically fulfilling dominant ideas about what it means to "look white." Several interviewees recognize this link, and see their access to a Norwegian identity as linked to their "looking the same" as "Norwegians" while in contrast another thinks that she "can never be Norwegian with that nose" (Alma, interview March 24 2008).

With whiteness being a marker of a naturalized belonging, the interviewees were not white on arrival in Norway but increasingly became so. Most of the interviewees today have their experience of belonging in Norway confirmed by their surroundings, although some still meet repeated questions of where they are from – constant reminders of being seen not to naturally belong in Norway. For most of the interviewees, their production as white is tempered by their also being understood as Other. As social capital, whiteness is therefore a central but unevenly produced aspect of interviewees' lives in Norway.

The migrants interviewed here are, of course, *migrants* and most have maintained or reestablished[54] close ties with their countries of origin. Most do not wish to be "*Norwegian* Norwegian." It seems, then, that while whiteness is a necessary but insufficient marker for Norwegianness, Norwegianness is not the only form of whiteness available in Norway: one can become white without becoming Norwegian. To put it differently: Sufficiently fitting the phenotypical standards of whiteness in Norway combined with adapting to Norwegian forms of social interaction and speaking Norwegian excellently or fluently, has afforded the interviewees the opportunity to be part of dominant Norwegian society while formulating identities and senses of belonging that span Norway and their countries of origin. Whiteness, in this context, means being neither *Norwegian* Norwegian nor "properly" belonging elsewhere. Interviewees are able to choose to belong in Norway while actively maintaining cultural practices and ties to their countries of origin. This, as I show in the following two chapters, is not a given: immigrants who cannot access the capital that comes with physically fitting dominant norms of whiteness are not at liberty to form multinational ties and multicultural identities in the dominant public sphere.

NOTES

[1] E: *Enten du er en greek god eller du er en goddam greek. Norge har totalt, la oss si, mislykkes. Akkurat å betrakte de andre ikke-norske, ikke-nordiske som like verdige europeere.*
EM: *Mm. Så du tror ikke nordmenn ser på grekere som likeverdige europeere?*
E: *Nei.*
EM: *Nei, og det fortsetter i dag?*
E*: Ja.*
EM: *Du ser ikke noe forskjell på det?*
E: *Nei.*

[2] *Altså, jeg er norsk, men jeg ble aldri nordmann. Og ikke ble jeg godtatt. Som sagt, for jeg hadde norsk ja, men [?]Det er bare sånn. Men det gjør meg ikke noe! Absolutt ingenting! Men til og begynne så var jeg brydd. Jeg ville liksom skjule meg, for å si det sånn. Hvor jeg enn kom hen, det gikk ikke lenge "Ja, du er ikke norsk?"*

[3] All names are pseudonyms. Because many interviewees choose their own pseudonym and variously chose a first name, a last name, or both, I use all three forms here. All interviews were conducted in Norwegian and the translations are mine. For a discussion of interview collection and translation, see appendix A.

[4] In this dissertation I do not enter into discussions of ethnicity, and beyond the present discussion I do not consider the extent to which interviewees' experiences in Norway could better be understood through a lens of ethnicity rather than race and nation. The literature on the distinctions (or not) between ethnicity and race is large and varied with no consistently agreed-upon definition (for an overview, see Cornell and Hartmann 1998). Here I use the definition offered by Cornell and Hartmann, who argue that "ethnic group" refers to ideas of a people with common descent (1998: 16).

It is unclear to what extent the interviewees can be said to be part of "ethnic groups" in a way that is meaningful to their lives in Norway. They are migrants and all maintain links to their countries of origin, and some describe their ethnic belonging *in their country of origin*. Yet sharing national origins is not the same as being part of an ethnic group, and their ethnic identity in their country of origin has no bearing on their life in Norway or their ability to claim Norwegianness. With the exception of one interviewee (Eva), none described their ties to either their country of origin or to compatriots in Norway in terms of a common descent. (Though several described their belonging in Norway to be a matter of descent, inasmuch as their children being Norwegian also established their own belonging in Norway.) Interviewees thus may see themselves as having a Hungarian or Italian background, but none refer to ties of descent linking them to all Hungarians or Italians whether in Norway, in their country of origin, or internationally.

The framework of ethnicity is useful for thinking of some minority groups in Norway. There are five officially recognized national minority groups (Jews, Rom, Romani, Kven, Skogfinner), but in popular and academic discourse "ethnic" is seen as another way of referring to "immigrants" (e.g. Equality Ombud at http://www.ldo.no/no/Tema/Etnisitet/Fakta/), and "immigrant" is in turn short-hand for "not-white" and "not-Norwegian" (see chapter one, three, and four). Norwegian anti-discrimination legislation also uses ethnicity as its basis, and defines this as "ethnic/national origins, descent, skin color, and language" (http://www.ldo.no/no/Tema/Etnisitet/SoS-etnisitet/). Citizenship is explicitly excluded from this list: "national" does not refer to state boundaries but to "a people" (ibid.). It is unlikely that under this definition, the discrimination that interviewees have faced would qualify as "ethnic discrimination." Beyond these considerations, for ethnicity to be a useful way of understanding interviewees' lives in Norway, it would have to be something that they passed on to their children (given that ethnicity is descent-based). Yet interviewees describe their children as Norwegian. In short, I do not believe that ethnicity is an appropriate or a helpful framework for analyzing the experiences of Southern and Eastern European migrants in Norway.

[5] *vi er jo utseendemessig ikke annerledes enn nordmenn flest, kanskje er jeg litt mørkere, men det er mange mørke nordmenn. Lázár har jo vært blond*

[6] *da er du heldig for du har europeisk utseende*

[7] *Du kan aldri bli norsk med den nesen!*
[8] Many went on to say that their children also maintained relatively close relationships with the parent(s) country of origin. However, of the 12 interviewees who had children, eight had chosen not to teach their children their own first language (though some of these children did speak the language to some extent, having learnt from other family members or their own studies), and the extent to which the children could have an independent relationship to family and others in the interviewee's country of origin was therefore limited.
[9] This is largely a generational issue, not a question of changing Norwegian attitude: see van Riemsdjik 2008.
[10] This conclusion does assume that the parents correctly assess their (adult) children's experiences of being Norwegian. However, all interviewees responded to questions about their children's Norwegianness in the same way, regardless of whether the children had one or two parents that had immigrated to Norway, regardless of whether the children spoke the interviewees' first language, and regardless of how the interviewee described their child/children's relationship to their own country of origin. Additionally, whether or not the interviewee correctly assessed their child/children's sense of Norwegianness, this question had evidently not been a topic for most (some described their children or grand-children coming to a realization that they "were not 100 % Norwegian") which in itself indicates its relatively unproblematic nature. Consequently, I have chosen to see the uncontested Norwegianness of interviewees' children as a dominant tendency.
[11] *Også man sier at det stedet hvor man modner, hvor man blir et modent menneske, det er det man betrakter som sitt land. Og hun modnes nok her i Norge, ikke sant, så hun mener at hun føler seg norsk.*
[12] Brown cheese is a unique and quintessential Norwegian cheese – a sort of unofficial national symbol. It is sold as "Ski Queen" in the United States.
[13] *hvis en greker fant ikke jobb i Tyskland, da dro han til Sverige, hvis han fant ikke jobb der, da kom han enten til Danmark eller til Norge. Første valg er Danmark, og siste utvei er Norge.*
[14] *Altså jeg bor like utenfor Budapest, og der var en russisk flyplass som ... så og si ein av de største som fantes i Ungarn den gangen. Og...når Ungarn vant den første runde i 57, så var det en pause på en uke så gikk rykter om på landsbyen der at, at russere plukker sammen unge gutter som bor i landsbyen og så tar med seg. Og det er flere som er blitt tatt. Og det var uvisst hvor dem var havnet. Og det var derfor vi var redd vi og. At vi fikk streng beskjed om at må ikke finne på å ha en pinne i hånden, for at da oppfatter dem det, russiske militærkonvoyen, at du kanskje du har gevær med deg, og så skyter dem.*
Ja ...så... vi hadde griseslakt hjemme, da, også var dem bedt de og, så avgjorde vi der at i morra tidlig så skal vi skal vi rømme. Uten av vi sier til foreldrene at nå skal vi rømme.
Sånn at det var helt forferdelig at a mor, og for at par dager før, da var jeg inne i Budapest for at der jobba jeg og der gikk jeg på skolen, da. Og... så var en gang et sted som måtte krysse en hovedgata også fra den andre gata drev dem å skøt på fotgjengere som gikk over, så hver gang han tømte ut magasinet så begynte folk å flyge over. For det gikk liksom kuler [tapping], rett opp på kryssen da, og der var litt spennende når min tur kom, da. Jeg kom hjem og fortalte åt a mor, så da fikk jeg ikke dra til jobben mer. Så... også visste dem ikke hvor jeg blitt av, om jeg dratt inn i byen igjen også blitt skøti...så dem visste ingenting... Før jul, da. Da sendte jeg et brev hjematt.
E: Ja. Da var du i Østerrike?
L: Ja. Men førut var noen sånne ...sånne....eh....radiostasjon, som tok dem opp opptak også sendte dem på Ja, nærmeste ønskekonsert, og da sendte jeg melding. Det var det noen som hadde hørt i landsbyen, sånn at mor egentlig fikk beskjed at jeg ihvertfall har kommet til Østerrike.
Og der var hundrevis av andre ungarere der. Så både ektepar og single, og...liksom, snille folk og gærne folk, og liksom alle typer, da. Og vi var unge ... og... vi var åtte, ni, ti stykker unge som var borte i der, da. Og hvordan jeg havnet i Norge, da, det var slik at når vi var på denne flyktningeleiren som jeg nevnte så da kom noen forskjellige delegasjonen inn der, og vi hadde lyst til å dra enten til Sveits eller til New Zealand. Og jeg fikk visum til New Zealand, nettopp. Men jeg måtte vente en måned, på båten som skulle gå i fra Newcastle. Og mellomtiden fikk jeg et brev i fra moren min som fortalte at .. at både søsteren min og eldste broren min var stakk av de og. Så hun vart igjen med yngste bror. Og dem hadde ikke penger, og hadde

ikke noen verdens ting, og leve ta og sånn, og så plutselig så dukker opp den norske delegaten, og sa dem atte ... atte, altså praktisk talt dem har agitert oss da, at vi skulle komme til Norge.
Og vi visste ingenting om Norge, vi bare visste at det var evig vintern, og hovedstaden er Oslo, og massevis av fioler. Alt vi visste om Norge da. Og mesteparten av året det er mørkt. Så plutselig noen kloke hjerner som fant ut at men det spiller ingen rolle sa'n, for at dem har så billig elektristet i Norge at dem lager kunstig lys
Og vi... vi var seks unge gutter, jevnaldrene, sekstenåringer, så fant vi ut at "ja vi kan dra til Norge, og så kanskje vi kan jakte på isbjørn!" Hvis det ikke blir noe annet. Så kom vi hit og .. det var nå en stor overraskelse det altså .. og når vi landet på Gardemoen den gangen .. eh.. på grunn av at det var dårlig vær i Fornebu, og det var en voldsom snøstorm over Gardemoen også. Og da, da var vi overbevist om at ja, her er liksom, vi skal leve i den evige vintern.
[15] *fordi han hadde vært på besøk i Tsjekkoslovakia og fortalte enda litt om forholdene her, og så jeg syntes det ville passe meg. Det var blant annet, noe som var viktig for meg, dette med sosial trygghet. Fordi man kan aldri vite hva som skjer i et fremmed land, og det gikk sånn rykter - og en viss propaganda - om de vestlige land, om at her var det ingen... i de vestlige land var det ingen som tar seg av deg hvis du blir syk. At da mister du både jobben, og hvis det skjer enda noe alvorligere, en ulykke eller sånn, så går det dårlig med deg. Men dette var bra, at – en god nyhet for meg – at folk er, et sosialt system – sosialsystemet er ganske godt utbygget og en viss trygdesystem og generelt at nordmenn var vennlige og det var rolige tilstander, ikke noe sosial uro her og relativt velstående land på den tiden, faktisk.*
[16] This is to some extent true even for those who arrived in Norway following marriage. For example, when asked whether she and her husband ever considered moving to Italy, Angela stressed that Norway was the most obvious option because of her husband's profession, but that if she had been unhappy they would have moved (Angela, interview 20 March 2008).
[17] *Og da min vertsfamilie, eller sommerfamilie da, skjønte at jeg ikke hadde noen å reise tilbake til, så sa de at da ville de gjerne beholde meg.*
[18] *Og det var ikke noe kurser enda den gangen, så vi hadde hver kveld, nei hver eftermiddag så hadde min svoger en sånn bok, jeg hadde [håndskrevet?] med norsk-engelsk, engelsk-polsk, og oversatte hele det, og så lærte.*
[19] *"bare husk at du har en far her i Norge."*
[20] *Og hun lærte meg sproget på den måten at hun ikke snakket engelsk. Og så lærte meg hvordan man, ja, hvordan man var vant i Norge og sånn. Jeg lærte fra henne. Men det jeg må si er at jeg ble veldig godt mottatt av hele ja, familien...*
[21] In the post war period the state tasked the NGO The Norwegian Refugee Council with providing some support for refugees who came as part of a state-organized group. For a short period after arrival, these refugees received help in finding housing and employment, and some were also provided with short Norwegian classes (Tjelmeland 2003; Mr Fabis, interview 20 March 2008; *Aftenposten* 1970-75).
[22] According to Mr. Fabis and Eva, this association was started by Anna Kvapilova and her Norwegian friend Lille Graah. Kvapilov, Graah, and a number of other Norwegian women had survived the Ravensbruck concentration camp together, and, according to Eva, Kvapilova found that there was little left for her in Prague when she returned there after the war. In 1948, her Norwegian friends from Ravensbruk then helped her migrate to Norway (according to Skjerven 2000 quoted in Hagesæter 2005: 139, Kvapilova entered a proforma marriage with a Norwegian man in order to move to Norway). Kvapilova continued to assist Czech and Slovak migrants arriving in Norway until at least 1969-70 (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007). The Norwegian-Czechoslovakian Help Association appears to have been one of the most active nationality based organizations for migrants in Norway in the post-war period, and garnered considerable support from prominent Norwegians. Between 1970 and 1975, *Aftenposten* regularly (if infrequently) reported on the Association's activities.
[23] *en av de første månedene etter at jeg hadde immatrikulert meg på norsk universitet, så innkalte den, en kontordame på universistetet innkalte alle tsjekkoslovakiske studenter en for en, og prøvde å overtale oss til å melde oss ut av det norske universitet, for det er primært for norske studenter. Og jeg som var vant fra – vi alle, for vi var vant fra, vi var vant til mye mer autoritære forhold, så vi trodde hvis en dame på universitetet sier dette så er det riktig fare på ferde. Og da kontaktet vi denne norsk-tsjekkoslovakiske*

hjelpeforening. Og hun bare lo! "Dere må ikke høre på dette. Hun har ingen myndighet, det er hennes personlige kjepphest, og ..." De grep inn tror jeg også, overfor [?].
Miroslav Pekar notes that this episode was "unique" and unlike any other experience he has had.
[24] *Ja, altså vi kom til Oslo… kom til Oslo om natta, klokka 12 om kvelden. Og på Fornebu så sto speidere stilt opp og tatt i mot alle ungarerne som kom. Og det var like før jul, vet du, og kom til – kom vi til Oslo, til byen med busser, ikke sant, og skal fordeles på hoteller, og akkurat den kvelden så kom det veldig mye snø og tenkte, kom på dette små landsbyen her! Ikke sant, det fantes ikke trikkeskinner for det var snødd, ikke sant, så det var ikke trikk i det hele tatt. Så… ja, ja, men det gikk jo bra, men så fikk vi legesjekk dagen etterpå, og så etterpå dro vi på høyfjellshotell. Og skal lære å spise brunost!*

Og etterpå – uke etterpå så kom vi til Oslo att igjen, og opp i Saga eller Skala kino der [?] i Oslo, der så vi, alle de gutta får norske foreldre som kom å henta oss.
Og så jeg, jeg kom til en familie som heter Thoresen, jeg bodde – dem hadde to sønner, og så en datter [?] voksne. De aller fleste fikk bo der i seks måneder og de frivillge foreldre, og noen som fikk lov til å være videre og andre ikke. Og jeg var ikke videre og jeg måtte – så reiste jeg til Porsgrunn på sjøguttskole, på sjøguttskole i Porsgrunn. Og derifra reiste jeg til sjøs. For jeg måtte ha mat og, vet du.
[25] *lukket sin identitet i seg selv, også prøvd også gli inn i det norske samfunnet*
[26] *mindre gode eller sosiale mennesker, som fikk da hjelp*
[27] Most interviewees have had some form of assistance in settling in Norway (however limited) but they have also successfully and impressively negotiated considerable hardship in their struggle to find housing and economic security in Norway. Notable in interviewees' stories about their first period in Norway is that while learning Norwegian was a concern, that they did not speak Norwegian was not seen as an absolute hinder to their participation in work and society. Several report being employed within days or weeks of arrival, most finding work that reflected their training or previous experience. For example, after a few months in Norway Mr Fabis was able to find short term work through newspapers and contacts, despite speaking very little Norwegian (Mr Fabis, interview March 20, 2008).
[28] *Jeg synes at det er greit å få litt hjelp til start, men må gjøre selv.*
[29] *Du kan si, er du fra Europa så er vi mer i ett, vi har mere samme - ikke helt samme kulturen, men – men vi er mere like. Enn når de kommer i fra de muslimske landa*
[30] These are the three most important regions both as sources of immigrants to Norway, and in Norwegian constructions of race.
[31] The Norwegian Bureau of Statistics renamed these categories in 2008, so that statistics no longer refer to "Western" and "non-Western" immigrants. However, the content of the categories remains unchanged, it is merely the names that have been altered (the Bureau now refers to the categories according to the regions each contain). The "western" group includes EU and EEA countries but not the rest of Europe, which excludes the European countries that according to Kuus (2004) are constructed as the least European. See also Høydahl 2008.
[32] *Det er tross alt et visst kulturelt fellesskap i Europa. Og man er jo ikke så langt fra hverandre, fra de fleste innvandrere fra svensker, som vel er hovedsaken av innvandrere. Det er jo nære naboer. Så etterhvert som vi går lenger og lenger ut i Europa så skifter de skikker og kultur osv. Men det er fremdeles europeisk. Religion også. Da kristne, som hittil har dominert, som er felles ... så altså, en europeisk innvandrer står også nærmere det norske samfunnet enn en fra en annen verdensdel.*
[33] *Det var enorm forskjell. På meg så virket det nesten som å komme bak jernteppet på en måte. Det var veldig grått og det fantes veldig lite av det jeg var vant til av både mat og utstyr og sånt. Og helt anderledes vaner og rutiner og alt mulig.*
Alt var forskjellig. Fra hvordan – for ikke å snakke om maten! Det var enorm forskjell. Også... ja, rutinene om dagen, og man var mye mer lukket. Og så – jeg vet ikke hva jeg skal si. Alt var forskjellig! Det var så forskjellig at det var som å komme til en annen planet.
[34] Tjelmeland gives no information about why the European refugees were viewed as inassimilable.
[35] *Den norske kultur er jo særegen i Europa. Så den mentaliteten som jeg husker eldre nordmenn som– sånn 60, 70-åringer hadde da vi kom. Vi spurte hvor de hadde vært i Europa og sånn, så svarte man og sa at "I Europa? Jeg har aldri vært utenfor Norges grenser. Hva skal vi gjøre utenfor det? Vi har alt!"*

[36] *når jeg sa at jeg har nesten aldri opplevd diskriminering her, så har [?] sagt at "da er du heldig for du har europeisk utseende, fra et europeisk land, og både kulturelt så var det ikke så vanskelig for deg å bli integrert, og du... ingen mistenker deg for å være noe annet" altså.... så sikkert vi fra Europa hadde det lettere enn folk fra andre land.*
E: Mm. Hvem er det som kommer med disse kommentarene?
M: Det er forskjellige mennesker. Det er vanlig – ikke mennesker som jeg direkte [?] av på jobben, men vanligvis mennesker som jeg fortalte. For eksempel hvis en nordmann, det var ofte – det var en sånn venstreradikal tendens på 70-tallet her, og de syntes ofte blant annet at det er en sånn fordommer mot andre. Så sa jeg," jeg har aldri opplevd rasisme" så svarte de "du er heldig fordi du har europeisk utseende, men bare du skulle se hvis du så ut som en tyrker eller araber."
E: Men så du sier at du har ikke opplevd...
M: Praktisk talt aldri.
[37] *Det var noen som trodde at de skulle ha en dans på roser her i Norge, og med en gang de fikk motstand så mente de det var diskriminering. Det var folk som ikke så sine egne feil. De jeg hadde kontakt med- det kan jo være at noen ble diskriminert, men det kjenner ikke jeg til.*
[38] This explanation is incorrect with regards to the meaning of Nagy.
[39] *[På arbeidsplassen] var det på en stor middag så satt jeg ved siden av en av de gamle banksjefene som hadde fått noen ekstra drinker, snakket med åpent hjerte, så sa han "Ja, du Nagy, skift navnet ditt til Nilsen" – for det betyr [...] , han spurte meg på forhånd (...) "Ja" sier gamle banksjefen, "med det navnet der gjør du ingen karriere i norsk bankvesen." Det ble det heller ikke. Så da kan du si det er en del av bildet.*

Ellers var det ingen som svarte. Men så har jeg en god venn den dag i dag, Håkon Aase, som var byråsjef i Riksrevisjonen. Og han sa at de hadde behov for en med mine kvalifikasjoner i internasjonal finans i [?] og bankspørsmål og slikt. Om jeg kunne være interessert? Og det sa jeg ja takk til. Og da ble jeg kalt inn til et møte med en ekspedisjonssjefen i Riksrevisjonen. Og de tilbød meg stilling, men på laveste nivå, som konsulent to. Så da slo jeg til på det. Og den gangen sa de til Håkon Aase, "du må garantere for Nagy, han er jo ikke født nordmann." De sa det ikke åpenlyst, men det var det som var meningen. Så sa Håkon til meg, "du, jeg måtte garantere for deg, så finner du på noe så ryker vi begge to!" [ler]

Det var et møte, hvor hele avdelingen på 44 mennesker var tilstede. Så kom jeg med et innlegg, og så sier ekspedisjonssjef Turid – forøvrig en ganske fin kvinne, men merkelig type – "Kan noen oversette hva Nagy sier?" Som om jeg ikke kunne snakke godt nok norsk. Og da var det liksom rumling i salen og de kom etterhvert til meg og sa at "det der burde du forfølge." Så... dett var dett.
[40] *Nå hører man... nå snakker man om dette – nå er det alle disse nasjonene som er her, ikke sant. At de går til intervju og... eller blir ikke kalt til intervju. Altså, det har jeg opplevd massevis. Men jeg kunne ikke skrike 'rasister! Rasister!' for jeg var hvit. [ler] Ikke sant?*
Fordi jeg mente at jeg faktisk kunne noe. Og kanskje kunne mer – kanskje kunne så mye at jeg kunne gi noe positivt til et samfunn, ikke sant. Og jeg fikk ikke lov til å gjøre det.
[41] The basic criterion for Norwegian citizenship is to have lived in Norway "legally" for seven years.
[42] *Jeg ville være nordmann, helt fra begynnelsen. Men jeg oppdaget fort at det gikk ikke, for jeg skulle ta avstand fra tsjekkerne. Og slovakere. Når jeg kom til landet, jeg skulle være integrert og være norsk helt norsk. Men etter, jeg vet ikke hvor lenge, etter ett års tid eller sånn, eller kanskje lengre, så har jeg forandra mening.*
E: Ja, hva fikk deg til å skifte mening?
Kanskje jeg så at det gikk ikke som jeg trodde. Eller ville.
Altså nordmenn, jeg sa det, og det sier jeg også, det er greie folk dem gjør deg hverken vondt eller godt. Ofte bare sånn, "ja, goddag goddag" og ferdig med det. Altså, når vi kom hit, så Norge var ikke internasjonalt. Det var liksom – det var mye som vi hadde som var ikke her i Norge. Du vet av krydder eller enkelte ting. Det var enda sånn anderledes. Og da var det ikke så lett å tilpasse seg heller kanskje. Eller bli godtatt. Jeg ville. Men ...

.. skal ikke være sammen med tsjekkere, eller landsmenn da for å si. Jeg kom til Norge, og da skal jeg være med nordmenn. Men jeg kom ikke antagelig til, eller noe sånt. Av en annen grunn. Dårlig kontakt, liksom. Da måtte jeg... det der. Og det skjønner jeg godt. Hva de gjør de tyrkere og det. De blir aldri nordmenn. Det er liksom noe slags... det er deres hjem da kanskje, når de kommer sammen. Har noe å snakke om og skikk og bruk, og mat.
Altså, jeg er norsk, men jeg ble aldri nordmann. Og ikke ble jeg godtatt. Som sagt, for jeg hadde norsk ja, men [?]Det er bare sånn. Men det gjør meg ikke noe! Absolutt ingenting! Men til og begynne så var jeg brydd. Jeg ville liksom skjule meg, for å si det sånn. Hvor jeg enn kom hen, det gikk ikke lenge "Ja, du er ikke norsk?"
[43] *Hadde jeg ikke trivdes så hadde jeg jo stukket av for førti år siden!*
[44] Because I did not interview any children of European immigrants, I am unable to discuss how their experiences differ from or mirror those of Ákos Nagy: having arrived in Norway at age 13, there is little to distinguish Nagy from children born in Norway to European immigrants, and as I note above according to their parents the children of the participants meet no resistance to their identifying as Norwegian. One other participant, Sara, also arrived at age 13 and came three years prior to Ákos Nagy. Unlike Nagy, she was raised in Norwegian families, and she also has little formal schooling. Sara describes herself as Norwegian and says she has never encountered any questions about that identity (she also does not simultaneously recount stories indicating discrimination). The interviews do not provide any clear suggestions that might illuminate the different experiences Ákos Nagy and Sara have had, though gender and class (Ákos Nagy has had an illustrious career in Norwegian and international financial industries, while Sara has primarily worked in low-skill positions in the service industry) are likely important.
[45] *Jeg trives veldig godt i Norge. Jeg aksepterer absolutt de verdiene dere har og alt sånn, og mine barn er norske og sånn, men røttene er italienske. Jeg vet ikke hvordan jeg skal... Jeg har tenkt veldig mye på det, men.. Hva er vi? Jeg pleier å si at jeg er av italiensk opprinnelse. Jeg sier ikke at jeg er italiener.*
E: Noen av de andre jeg har snakket med har snakket om hvordan de får – hvis de er sammen med andre fra samme nasjonalitet så gjør de noe og så plutselig får de kommentarer: "Nei, nå har du blitt så norsk."
Jo. Men det er sant det. Det har også jeg og en til i denne gruppen – vi er åtte stykker, veldig tett fremdeles – og jeg og en til er de som er blitt mest norsk. Ja. De andre holder seg mer – men de har mer familie der nede fremdeles: søsken og sånt og hus og... Også, jeg vet ikke hva jeg skal si, de har reist litt mer frem og tilbake i løpet av livet, og ... De... men de trives veldig godt de også men jeg tror nok at de er mer italienske.

Nei, vi føler oss mer til rette her. Kanskje. Ja.Vi godtar mer ting, synspunkter fra Norge som er forskjellig fra Italia. Og, nei det synes jeg, vi ser det mer fra norsk side.
[46] *Jeg trives ikke i dette så-kalte flerkulturelle samfunnet. Trives ikke. Jeg betrakter det som noe kunstig. For et europeisk land, egentlig pådyttet av en slag politisk ideologi eller hva man kaller det for... eh... jeg kom hjemme, så var det faktisk et slags avslapping og møte bare min homogene kultur. Ikke noen stridigheter, ingenting.*
[47] *Det er greit å få med seg noen få men når det blir snakk om titusenvis, eller for ikke å snakke om hundretusenvis, det blir litt, synes jeg blir for ... går gæerne veien. Når det ikke bor mer enn fire og en halv million mennesker i Norge.*
[48] *Da følte jeg dette at utlendinger .. .altså det var to syn på ... den gangen.*
Enten var den da... hvordan kan jeg si? Altså sirkusbjørn, ikke sant, som bjørnen eksotisk. Man danser litt som bjørnen på sirkusarenaen. Å så fint, og så fint! Ikke sant? Eller det var helt avvisende. Helt avvisende. Til ... du var, altså jeg kunne ikke ... man behøvde ikke si noe, men jeg så det i disse øynene. At jeg var noe som egentlig... ja. Var på en ... var på et lavere nivå.
[49] *setter pris på det som er bra i Ungarn, og vi setter pris på det som er bra i Norge*
[50] *ikke har prøvd å skapt meg om til sitt bilde*
[51] *Men jeg merker selv, hvis det er fotballkamp mellom Norge og Italia: hvem skal jeg heie på? Jeg vet ikke! Det er ikke det at jeg er så interessert i fotball men bare for å føre et eksempel.*
[52] *Jeg av og til har et sånt tankeeksperiment med å [dele] min lojalitetsfølelse, nå er jeg totalt udyktig når det gjelder for eksempel kamp, men hvis Norge for eksempel ble angrepet av en fiendtlig makt, da vil jeg*

uten å nøle støtte Norge til det ytterste. Kjempe for Norge i den grad det var mulig for mitt vedkommende. Ville absolutt ikke tenke på å rømme herfra eller noe sånt. Den lojaliteten er helt urokkelig. Og det tror jeg den ville vært også hvis jeg ikke var gift norsk.

[53] *At jeg tenker igrunnen ikke over det. Sånn er det bare, jeg er her!*

[54] Several of the Eastern European interviewees left their countries of origin illegally as refugees or asylum seekers and were sentenced in absentia. Consequently, they were unable to visit their countries of origin until 1989.

Chapter Three

"A Feather In the Cap for All Narrow-Minded Norwegians" [1]

Sedimentations of Race 1970-75

This chapter focuses on the moment in recent Norwegian history when immigration, immigrants, and integration became politicized. Where in the previous chapter I discussed the uneven production of whiteness in Norway, in this chapter I show that during the first half of the 1970s the boundaries between whiteness and not-whiteness were drawn, culminating in the 1975 "immigration stop" that codified these boundaries. I argue that the production of racial categories that was sedimenting by 1975 continue to dominate Norwegian racial formations today (see chapter four); to understand how race is produced in Norway today therefore requires disentangling how these categories were established between 1970 and 1975.

Debates about immigration and immigrants are often central in shaping discourses of race (e.g. Balibar 1991; Jacobson 1997; Hage 2000) and their role in Norwegian racial constructions are no exception. In these debates, ideas of belonging and difference are (re)iterated and naturalized; by relying on notions of embodied and inherited group characteristics that are seen as timeless and ahistorical, racial boundaries are drawn between those who are seen as suited to live in the national territory and those who are not. Immigration law, in turn, may be seen as temporary negotiated truces in these debates. In addition to providing taxonomies through which migrants are assessed and sorted, these laws codify perceptions of which migrants are desirable and which are not. These latter codifications not only target potential future migrants, but also send signals about the welcome of current immigrants. In conjunction, then, immigration debates and immigration law form a central nexus through which racializing processes operate.

Norwegian racial taxonomies have been highly influenced by – and perhaps even structured through – the "immigration stop" that came into effect in 1975. Most obviously, this regulation shaped the form and conditions under which migrants could enter Norway for the next 30 years, thereby also shaping the demographic profiles both of immigrants to Norway and of the Norwegian population. In addition, the regulation was the culmination of an immigration debate that increasingly relied on Orientalist knowledges of Self and Other, and the immigration stop can be seen as having sedimented these understandings of difference. However, while the effects of this regulation on subsequent immigration laws are widely recognized (e.g. Puntervold Bø 2004, 28; Haagensen, Kvisler and Birkeland 1990, 23; Brochmann 2003, 139), its effect on racial constructions has not been analyzed or acknowledged.

In this chapter I examine the construction and circulation of racial knowledges in the period leading up to the immigration stop. I argue that the stop was a racial project that that relied on Orientalist knowledges and sought to protect a white Norwegian self-image. Thus, though not an explicitly racist law (like, for example, Australia's "white only" immigration policy, see Tavan 2004), the regulation's intent – though not effect – was to at once prevent further entry of "excessively different" migrants from Asia and Africa and to protect a Norwegian sense of self closely tied to being a tolerant and generous nation.

The immigration stop caused significant structural changes to Norwegian immigration patterns. Prior to 1975 migrants overwhelmingly arrived in Norway as laborers (Brochmann 2003: 150), thus entering jobs immediately (see chapter two). Following the immigration stop, migrants from Asia and Africa entered Norway almost exclusively through family reunification or as refugees and asylum-seekers (Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion 2007, 34-36), while migrants from areas understood as "the West" continued to arrive both as laborers and through family reunification.[2] Though the legislation is referred to as "the immigration stop" this is in one sense a misnomer: it did not stop immigration, nor was that its intent. Rather, the legislation barred labor

immigration to low- or unskilled positions in Norway (despite ongoing need for such labor), and therefore altered the ways in which migrants from "non-Western" countries arrived in Norway. In another sense, however, the "stop" describes the legislations' intended (though not actual) effect on immigration from Asia and Africa. As I discuss further below, because Asian and African labor migrants were not expected to settle long-term, barring immigration to the low- and unskilled positions these migrants were largely seen to enter was expected to significantly contain immigration from these regions.

Though the significance of the immigration stop on Norwegian immigration legislation and patterns is thoroughly established, there is little research on the creation of the stop itself, and none on its impact on the production of race. Norwegian scholars and writers do make frequent mention of the immigration stop, tending to frame the legislation as a reaction to similar laws being enacted in other European countries (e.g. Brochmann 2003; Thorud 1998) and/or as a response to problems perceived to arise from increasing numbers of Asian and African labor migrants (e.g. Brochmann 2003; Puntevold Bø 2004; Tjelmeland 2003; see also Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion 2007, 32). Additionally, some writers acknowledge that an implicit goal of the legislation was to hinder further immigration from Asia and Africa (Brochmann 2003; Hagelund 2004; Puntevold Bø 2004). As ways of understanding the passing of the immigration stop, both of the former explanations reflect arguments that were employed at the time, while the latter describes a clear undercurrent in the debates around, and intent of, the stop. However, though these explanations all reflect arguments that ultimately only pertained to Asian and African migrants, none of the existing analyses of the immigration stop interrogates the process through which Asian and African migrants were naturalized as "excessively different" and in need of extensive state management and intervention. The drawing of racial and racializing boundaries between migrants is seen to inhere in the migrants themselves: for example, the panicked Norwegian response to Pakistani labor immigration in the early 1970s is described as understandable because "the Pakistani immigration was sudden – and it was an alien people that one did not know much about.

They created a stir"[3] (Tjelmeland 2003, 116). It is this naturalization of Asian and African migrants as "stranger" than other migrants that I interrogate here.

While the stop was unanimously passed in Parliament, it was reluctantly proposed (St.meld. nr 39 for 1973-74, 14) and reluctantly passed (Parliamentary debate 10 December 1974). It cannot, therefore, be understood to be an inevitable outcome of the domestic discourses on immigration or of the larger European trends. In contrast to existing analyses or commentaries that tend to focus on the legislation that was passed (e.g. Brochmann 2003; Tjelmeland 2003; Storhaug 2003; Puntevold Bø 2004; Thorud 1998; though see Hagelund 2004), I show that the apparent precariousness of the final legislation is an important indicator that the immigration stop was part of a broader process in which constructions of Self and Other was in flux.

Though the final legislation is understood to balance several competing and contradictory priorities that were nevertheless focused on ending immigration from Asia and Africa (Brochmann 2003; Hagelund 2004; Puntevold Bø 2004), it was the outcome of processes of racialization rather than of a broad rallying of xenophobic politicians. Indeed, at face value the arguments for the immigration stop make very little sense: for example, housing shortages – a prominent argument for the stop – were without doubt dire, but there is little evidence that they were considerably worse than they had been for decades (Basso 2008; Røsjø 1997; Tjelmeland 2003; see also chapter two), or that an immigration stop would address the shortages. Before passing the stop, a range of players - some of whom were deeply committed to welcoming all labor migrants – engaged in careful deliberations and political trading. Making sense of how these deliberations culminated in the immigration stop requires placing it in the context of concurrent processes of racialization. The immigration stop, then, is both an outcome of processes of racialization and itself enacts a racial project.

In this chapter, I analyze the policy documents and Parliamentary debate that led to the immigration stop, and complement this analysis with an examination of newspaper

coverage of immigrants, immigration and race during the period culminating in the stop.[4] This focus on two of the main discursive circuits through which processes of racialization occurred in the early 1970s allows me to trace the racial meaning-making in the dominant public sphere. Such meaning-making is central, as it provides the ground on which a range of responses (from the state, academics, activists, and others) are formulated. Race is co-produced in an interdependent relationship of the discursive and the material, and in focusing on media and policy sources I am not suggesting that these exist in a vacuum or have primacy over the daily and often banal actions and interactions that produce race. Nevertheless, in seeking to understand how the production of race was solidified in the immigration stop I have chosen to privilege the distillation of racial meaning-making that emerges in the circulation between dominant media discourses and policy documents. This focus is too narrow to show the full complexity of racial production in the everyday, but it highlights central routes through which the immigration stop came to be viewed as a viable solution to perceived problems. The materiality of the law also becomes evident as it codified a perspective in which particular migrants were racialized as always already excessively different problems best managed through restrictive immigration laws.[5]

Here, I show that despite its reliance on familiar racial tropes of skin color, culture, numbers, and distance, the racialization of migrants that occurred during this period was neither static nor inevitable. Furthermore, the reliance on signifiers of difference that circulates in the production of Orientalist knowledges must not be mistaken for a mere repetition of racializing processes elsewhere. These knowledges morph and materialize in simultaneously new and old versions in any particular time and place, and I seek to uncover some of the specificities of their iterations in early 1970s Norway. At the entry to the decade, Norwegian understandings of immigration and constructions of immigrants were still relatively open-ended. As I show below, in the very first years of the decade regions of origin were not always seen as the primary distinction between migrants and the significant differences between migrants were not always understood to be embodied.

Yet at the end of the period under consideration here, constructions of both immigration and immigrants had sedimented around ideas focused on links between embodied and excessive differences closely tied to migrants' countries of origin. During this time period, then, Norwegian constructions of immigrants became racialized, and these racial constructions were underpinned by Orientalist ideas. However, despite the close resemblance between the rapidly sedimenting Norwegian racial constructions and Orientalist racial constructions elsewhere (e.g. Paul 1997; Samantrai 2002), dominant media and policy discourses in Norway did not *primarily* rely on images of defilement, pollution and purification that have been argued to be central to e.g. British racial construction (see Gabriel 1998: ch. 4). Rather, Norwegian discourses focused more closely on vaguely defined, but always already excessive, differences. This excessive difference was seen as reciprocatory and as defying ready management. Consequently, it was understood to lead to inherent and possibly insurmountable problems that would harm migrants.

This chapter starts with a discussion of the immigration principles laid down in the 1968 White Paper on the labor market. I show that the support for increased immigration established by the 1968 White Paper presumed a largely Northern European and North American immigration to Norway, despite the availability of ample evidence suggesting that this demographic profile of immigrants to Norway could imminently change. The 1968 principles were ostensibly in effect throughout the period under discussion here, and the subsequent reliance on barely contained racial arguments to justify increasing immigration restrictions are central to the racializing discourses emerging in the first half of the 1970s.

In the next section of the chapter I look at aspects of the news coverage in the national daily broadsheet *Aftenposten* that allow me to trace core developments in the production of racial categories through this period. First, though current analyses of immigration to Norway ignore (e.g. Tjelmeland 2003) or downplay (e.g. Brochmann 2003; Hagelund 2002) the importance of race in understanding debates about immigrants and immigration

in the early 1970s, I rely on explicit discussions of race and racism in *Aftenposten*'s pages to show that race was a mainstream and uncontroversial categorization of humans during this time. While arguments persisted regarding the meaning of race, the existence and relevance of racial categories were not in doubt. Second, I argue that the discourses around the dominant category *fremmedarbeider* (literally "worker who is a stranger") produced a racial group focused on a small minority of non-Norwegian workers in Norway. I contrast this process of racialization with a discussion of the racialization of the Rom national minority, and argue that racialized Others who are perceived to be permanently present in the national territory are subject to considerably more hostile forms of racialization. However, I also show that while the racializing discourses that ultimately are codified in the immigration stop is evident in this coverage, the criteria for, and the boundaries between, sameness and difference had not been firmly drawn. This discussion also contextualizes the racial meanings evident in the policy papers and politicians' discourses.

In the last two sections of the chapter I analyze the implicit reliance on ideas of race in policy documents and the Parliamentary debate on the immigration stop. With respect to race, the divergent immigration management proposals in the Green and White Papers have little effect: both are firmly grounded in racialized and racializing perceptions that some migrants are excessively different and therefore unsuited and unsuitable for life in Norway. These are in turn the ideas of race that are codified in the immigration stop regulations. In this and the following chapter I show that the production of race that I trace here, in which the *fremmedarbeider* category was racialized and its racial meanings were almost seamlessly transferred as the term itself was replaced by "immigrant," is the at the root of today's dominant racial categories in Norway.

A natural increase in immigration: the 1968 immigration principle

The 1968 principle statement on immigration, in which the Government without reservation welcomed a future of increased immigration (and emigration), provides important context for the analysis of racial production in the 1970s. The statement was

developed as part of a White Paper on the labor market, at a time when Norway was experiencing modest economic growth. Though the 1960s was a decade of significant immigration to most Northern and Western European nations that saw frantic economic activity enabled in part by the labor of migrants (e.g. Hansen 2003; Castles 2006), Norway was largely unaffected by these trends. Through most of the decade economic growth was slow and immigration negligible – Norway remained a poor country at the outskirts of Europe. The oil and gas that have fuelled the Norwegian economy since 1970 had not yet been found: though oil exploration had begun in the early parts of the 1960s, by the summer of 1969 no viable oil or gas reserves had been located and oil companies were beginning to withdraw from further oil exploration in Norway (Norsk Teknisk Museum, n.d.). Thus, when examining European migration patterns in 1968, Norwegian policy makers concluded that Norway was at the very periphery of these movements. They had good reason to do so: in 1968 there were 15 050 foreign workers in Norway (less than 1% of all workers), a slight *decrease* since 1952 (NOU 17:1973, 52).

It is in this context that the Norwegian government in 1968 developed a statement of immigration principles. Though having thus far been isolated from European migration trends, the 1968 White Paper averred that in the future Norway must expect greater immigration and emigration, and that this development should be welcomed and enabled (St.meld.nr. 45 for 1968-69, in NOU 1973:17, 155). According to the White Paper, the advantages of the increased internationalization of Norwegian society trump any potential disadvantages, which in turn were identified as increased pressure on the housing marked and some "adjustment problems" (St. meld. Nr. 45 for 1968-69, in NOU 1973: 17, 155). In the statement of immigration principles that was to be quoted and affirmed repeatedly in the following years, the White Paper declared that:

> "Based in the principle that international co-operation and international contact and exchange should meet as few restrictions as possible, and that individual employees and employers should have the greatest possible freedom in entering

> employment contracts, the Government believes that a foreigner who has secured employment in this country as a rule should not be refused a work permit. (...) In the future we must assume that we will have increasing international contact ... and it will be increasingly common that people cross borders, not just as tourists but for extended stays. This is part of the common freedom of choice that the people of the future will demand. We must assume that more foreigners will want to live and work in Norway, and more Norwegians will want to live and work abroad. This development must the seen as natural and desirable, and the government should place the fewest possible restrictions on it."[6]
> (St. Meld. Nr. 45 for 1968-69, in NOU 1973: 17, 155 and quoted in St.meld.nr. 39 for 1973-74, 7).

Uncontroversial and ignored at the time (Tjelmeland 2003, 81), this statement is important for the contrast it offers with the policies developed merely three years later. In particular, this contrast highlights the importance of race and racial understandings of the world in the development of Norwegian immigration policies. For, while Tjelmeland surmises that the lack of debate around this statement was the result of Norway not yet being "an immigration country" (which he defines as having an immigration surplus; 2003, 81), it is the perception of a "different" kind of migrant arriving that is to undo this principle (in fact, if not in theory), not the immigration numbers themselves. In other words, once a scramble was under way to restrict immigration, numbers took a back seat to concerns about the specific migrants that were arriving. Numbers were perceived to be a problem, but primarily because of whom they were numbers of.

The lenient immigration principles set out in White Paper 45 for 1968-69 are based on an assumption that those who migrate to Norway will come primarily from the Nordic[7] countries and Western Europe. For example, the White Paper discusses immigration to West-Germany, France, the UK and Sweden (St. meld. nr. 45 for 1968-69 in NOU 1973:17, 150); all are countries where a significant percentage of immigrant come from areas outside Northwestern Europe and North America (e.g. Hansen 2003; Paul 1997;

Pred 2000; Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder 2006). Yet the White Paper only discusses intra-European migration patterns to these countries, which illustrates the expectations the White Paper authors had regarding which immigration patterns were relevant for Norway. Intra-European migration was increasing, and becoming easier, while also following economic trends, according to White Paper 45 for 1968-69 (in NOU 1973:17, 150). There is no indication in the Paper that Norway may be affected by migration patterns that reach beyond Europe's borders.

One of the clearest features of Norwegian policy responses to migrants from Asia and Africa is the constant call for greater control of their entry (see also chapter four). This pattern is evident in White Paper 45 for 1968-69, where it is envisioned that migrants from "developing countries" only will arrive under the auspices of government-run development programs (in NOU 1973: 17, 155). In the only indication that migration from countries outside of Europe and North America had been considered, the White Paper notes that it is expected that Norway occasionally, in co-operation with developing countries, will "take in workers from these countries in order to give them training with the view to provide them with the qualifications to develop industries in their home countries. Norway must also maintain its humanitarian policy regarding the reception of refugees" (St. meld. nr. 45 for 1968-69, in NOU 1973: 17, 155). In other words, residents of "developing countries" are thought to arrive in Norway as the beneficiaries of development aid or as refugees.[8] There is thus no indication that migrants from areas thought to be outside of Europe and North America may have the agency and means to migrate in search of work or may contribute to Norwegian economy and society. Indeed, such a contribution is explicitly rejected: according to the White Paper Norway should not try to attract more migrants, even if higher rates of immigration would lead to greater economic activity (St. meld. nr. 45 for 1968-69, in NOU 1973: 17, 155).

At the entry to the 1970s, then, Norway's immigration principles and policies were welcoming to some migrants, while maintaining a sense of satisfaction that few foreigners chose to immigrate. Two events lead to the changes that fundamentally altered

Norwegian complacency and liberalism around immigration. First, in June 1970 it was made public that massive oil deposits had been found in the Norwegian territories of the North Sea (Norsk Teknisk Museum, n.d.), starting an intense industrial activity and investment associated with exploiting the oil deposits. By January 1971 *Aftenposten* reported on its front page that 13 000 more workers were needed across various industries (4 January 1971). The sudden economic upswing led to significant anxieties about Norway suddenly being more attractive to labor migrants, as well as about possible societal changes as a result of a rapidly increasing economic activity (see e.g. Parliament 10 December 1974; Alnæs 2000a, 386-387). Secondly, during the spring of 1969 Denmark introduced various immigration restrictions (Tjelmeland 2003: 112), and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisasjonen*, LO) immediately argued that Norway must "harmonize" its immigration practice with Danish laws. Norway subsequently introduced some immigration control measures in early 1970[9] (ibid.). Anxieties about immigration thus predate the event most frequently cited as the beginning of the move towards the immigration stop: the spring 1971 arrival of several hundred Pakistani migrants.

The spring 1971 migrants are today understood as heralding what is now known as the "new" immigration – meaning immigration from Asia and Africa. The "newness," however, does not simply refer to geography, but more importantly to a set of ideas about difference and distance that view Asian and African migrants as significantly and inherently different from other, and in particular European, migrants. The production and naturalization of this differentiation has meant that the differentiation itself is not interrogated, and also that the complexities of the lead-up to the immigration stop are largely ignored. To begin to analyze both the production of Asian and African migrants as excessively different and to illuminate the context in which the immigration stop was developed and passed, in the next section I examine the shifting discourses of race that dominated in Norway between 1970 and 1975, as evidenced in the pages of the national newspaper *Aftenposten* (see introduction). On the one hand, I dismantle the assumption that Asian and African migrants were always viewed as already excessively different, but

on the other hand I also show that explicit discourses of race highly reliant on colonial and Oriental knowledges were in active circulation at the time. Most importantly, Norwegian racial discourses during this period produced a phenotype-based distinction between migrants who were seen as assimilable and migrants who were seen as always already and necessarily excessively different and therefore inassimilable.

Producing race in Aftenposten

In this dissertation I argue that the dominant racial productions in Norway make no explicit reference to race, but in the first part of this section I show that the few explicit references to race in Aftenposten provide important context for these dominant racial productions. As Norwegian academics broadly reject race as an analytic category (see chapter one), and as this extends to their analyses of immigration in the 1970, it may come as a surprise that race was an apparently uncontroversial categorization of humans during the period under consideration here. Though there are few explicit mentions of race in Aftenposten, their presence and the lack of controversy about race as a category reveal that it was employed as a taxonomic and analytic tool. Furthermore, contrary to the argument that any reference to race is racist (e.g. Åmås 2008), race was used to identify patterns of discrimination as well as to make explicitly racist arguments. In the second part of this section I examine the implicit racial discourses that dominated Aftenposten's pages in the first half of the 1970s. I focus on the racialization of the *fremmedarbeider* category, and show that this category was often also seen as interchangeable with Pakistani migrants. This section ends with a contrasting of the racialization of *fremmedarbeidere* and Pakistanis with that of the Rom.

Explicit mentions of race

The explicit references to race in *Aftenposten* during the first half of the 1970s reveal an apparent contradiction: while writers regularly and with apparent ease use references to race to understand their world, these references are not frequent and are very rarely done by the newspaper's journalists. In other words, as a concept race was an apparently uncontroversial category, but simultaneously not a primary lens through which, for

example, immigrants were viewed. As I show below, the relatively limited explicit mentions of race stand in stark contrast to the continuous racial production and reiteration occurring in *Aftenposten*'s pages. There is a gap, then, between the deployment of race as a taxonomic system, and the engagement in processes of racialization as a form of knowledge production that is not articulated through an explicit language of race.

Here I examine the three moments in *Aftenposten*'s coverage between 1970 and 1975 where race is explicitly used as a framework. These moments show that references to race was used by an array of actors and to a variety of ends, ranging from addressing racial discrimination to perpetuating ideas of hierarchical racial groups. Across these uses, race is understood as describing a significant biological distinction between humans. Together, then, the references to race in *Aftenposten* suggests that ideas of race as an embodied truth were widely circulating and broadly accepted in Norway during this time period (see also Moldrheim 2000).

The dominant themes evident in explicit references to race during this period can be found in the coverage of the criminalization of certain forms of racism in the spring of 1970.[10] According to the coverage in *Aftenposten* as well as in the Labor Party newspaper *Arbeiderbladet*, during the Parliamentary[11] debate politicians across the political spectrum were eager to declare their support of the law. Conservative (*Høyre*) MP Rolf Presthus addressed what he claimed was a Norwegian tendency to self-flattery, maintaining that "today we Norwegians can afford to fully accept that being Norwegian isn't better than belonging to other nations, and that to belong to our race and faith certainly doesn't make us better than others"[12] (quoted in *Aftenposten Aften* 23 May 1970), while Labor MP Olav Totland argued that if Norwegians appeared more tolerant than others, this was merely because "the problems have not yet seemed immediate to our lives"[13] (quoted in *Arbeiderbladet* 23 May 1970). It is unclear why Presthus thought that Norwegians in the past may have had better reasons or needs to claim racial superiority, but the other general themes that emerge from these comments dominate in *Aftenposten*'s coverage of issues of race during the first half of the 1970s. Here race is an accepted and

straight-forward way of categorizing people ("our race"), and Norwegians have a tendency to see themselves as not racist - which is a self-image that must be questioned ("we" are not "better than others"). Most centrally, racism is seen as a problem that is brought about by the presence of targets of racist views: "the problem" that has "not yet seemed immediate to our lives" is racism, and in this logic it has not seemed immediate because there have been few people in Norway who have not been understood to be white.

A conceptualization of the nation as racially based and therefore in need of racial management emerges from the on-going, underlying assumption in Norwegian debates about immigration during this period that the immigration of "dark skinned" peoples leads to "race problems," most notably in the form of racial discrimination.[14] While this assumption is more likely to be implicit than explicit, in December 1970 and January 1971 a debate raged in Aftenposten's letter pages as to whether allowing 25 Asian families fleeing Uganda to settle in Norway would "import race problems." Proponents of this view hold up England as the example of the sorts of frightening social developments that follow "colored" immigration (15 December 1970; 15 January 1971; 18 January 1971). In this view, Norwegians are no more tolerant than the (implicitly white) English, and consequently it would be better for the refugees that they move elsewhere. In a reiteration of ideas firmly linking race and nation, India appears to be envisioned as the most suitable destination (23 December 1970; 7 January 1971).

According to this logic, perceptions of race determine where people "properly" belong, and racism is best avoided by limiting immigration. Of a total of seven letters published on whether Norway should accept Ugandan refugees, only one suggested that it was Norwegian attitudes that were the problem, and that Norway should welcome the refugees. The writer of this letter expressed hope that the refugees eventually would intermarry with presumed-to-be-white Norwegians, and that subsequently "the coming generations [of Norwegians] will be used to and accept that not everyone is as 'light and pretty' as the Aryan ideal. In this way we might finally be completely rid of the 'Hitler

like' views on racial purity and racial hierarchies"[15] (4 January 1971). These suggestions were, however, met with two enraged responses (15 and 18 January 1971) that both challenged the view that "racial mixing" was desirable. This explicitly racially based discussion of migration highlights a concern with the management and/or maintenance of the perceived racial borders of the nation. In other words, while the letter writers do not all agree about *how* to manage race, all implicitly agree that the nation has a racial basis that must be managed.

The widespread agreement about race as an embodied "fact" became apparent through the discussion of the meaning of race in *Aftenposten* during the spring and summer of 1975. This debate was centered on an initial op-ed which was written by the head of the Neo-Nazi youth organization *Nasjonal Ungdomsfylkning* (18 April 1975). That *Aftenposten*, as a Conservative (both in its party-affiliation and literal politics), staid, and "serious" national newspaper allowed a well-known Neo-Nazi to initiate and set the tone for a debate about race shows that Neo-Nazi discourses were not so far outside acceptable society that such views would not be published (*Aftenposten* published two op-eds from *Nasjonal Ungdomsfylkning*, which suggests that the initial article was not an aberration in editorial policy). Perhaps even more tellingly, though many participants opposed the Neo-Nazi policies, the latter's view on "modern race science" was largely unquestioned. The *Nasjonal Ungdomsfylkning* group "accepts the thesis of modern race research" writes *Aftenposten*'s journalist Eivind Karlsen, specifying that this thesis holds that "there are inherited, psychological [and] hierarchical differences between the races of people, and it is race that creates culture"[16] (7 June 1975). A month later this view is challenged by an anthropologist and a biologist who look to the 1951 UNESCO statement of race to argue that it is only physical characteristics that can be used to classify race (7 July 1975; this is an incorrect summary of the 1951 statement: see further discussion in Reardon 2005, 26 - 31). Others maintain that the white race is not superior (*Arbeiderbladet* 18 August 1975) and that "culture" cannot be evaluated and that claims to "white culture" being superior therefore are meaningless (*Aftenposten* 9 August 1975). These statements do not suggest that race isn't important, merely that it isn't hierarchical, or that at least differences

cannot be evaluated and that any suggestion of a hierarchy therefore is random. The debate overall also shows that the by-then well established scholarly critique of "scientific" race (Reardon 2005, 17-44) appears not to be in wide circulation in Norway during this period. Despite the disagreements about race in these articles they nevertheless illustrate the consistency with which race was understood as describing a meaningful distinction between humans, and that majority Norwegians understood themselves as part of "the white race."

Implicit productions of race

Despite the apparently widespread acceptance of race as a category during this time period, Norwegian racial production occurred primarily through associating (simultaneously produced) groups with particular, inherited characteristics. Such characteristics were ascribed to groups that were constructed based on a combination of references to geography, culture, migration status, and phenotype. In this section I focus on an analysis of the changing meaning of *fremmedarbeider* ("worker who is a stranger" – see discussion below) as well as on the racial discourses surrounding the Rom[17] national minority; in *Aftenposten*'s pages these emerge as the primary Others against which a white Norwegian self is produced.[18]

I begin by tracing the ways in which *fremmedarbeider* became a homogenized category with increasingly sedimented racial and racializing meanings that overwhelmingly focused on Pakistani migrants. As *fremmedarbeider* and "Pakistani labor migrant" became nearly interchangeable descriptions (Pakistanis were fremmedarbeidere and vice versa) with particular yet often distinct meanings, I also examine the dominant understandings of Pakistani migrants, and compare these to remarkably consistent racialization of Asians more broadly. While *fremmedarbeidere* were racialized in both "positive" and "negative" ways (see introduction, and further discussion below), Pakistanis as well as Asians from other countries (including Uganda and the U.S.) were more often described in "positive" racializing manners. However, the "positive" representations are implicitly positioned in relation to their opposites, and as such

"positive" racializing discourses also invoke the more obviously negative racializing discourses.

In this section I show that there is considerable anxiety attached to *fremmedarbeidere*, and that this anxiety is both tempered and fuelled by the closely linked and competing constructions of Pakistanis as simultaneously hard-working and contagious. In this deeply contradictory racializing process fears of an unhomely nation come to the fore as the singularly important mechanism through which the dominant Norwegian society negotiates the meaning of race.

In the last part of this section I complement the analysis of migrants with an interrogation of the concurrent process of racialization of the Rom national minority group. I show that in contrast to the often "positive" racializing characteristics attached to *fremmedarbeidere*, the Rom were the targets of continuous negative assessments of their (perceived) "culture," coupled with strong assimilation pressures. The different forms of racialization and the contrast between them are instructive because they suggest that racialized minority groups that are perceived to be permanently settled in the national territory are seen as considerably more threatening than immigrant groups. In other words, the central distinction here is the extent to which racialized groups are seen as threats to the purity or homeliness of the nation. At this time, when immigrant groups are not expected to have a long-term presence in the country, dominant racializing media discourses about immigrants tend not to be overtly hostile – in contrast to the dominant coverage of the Rom.

The distinction between "positive" and "negative" racializing discourses is significant to the production of race in the early 1970s. During this time period racializing discourses that are not read as racist both dominate media discourse and have considerable power precisely because they simultaneously confirm perceptions of absolute difference and remove suspicions of racism. Thus, while some of the racializing discourses that dominate in Norway during this time period are explicitly racist, many are not. Indeed,

the latter dominate, and they dominate precisely because they are not understood to have racist effects. The uncritical view of "positive" racializing discourses is embedded in a contemporary framework that sees race as an unproblematic category. Yet even today statements such as as "[t]he fairytale world of the East will come closer to us [through immigration]," (Broch 1975, quoted in Brochmann 2003, 148), are viewed as "positive signs of the times" (Brochmann 2003, 148); this is a consequence of a current framework that sees race as absent and racism as individual acts of hatred and discrimination (see introduction). The absence of any recognition that "the very conceptualization of a people as having discrete qualities is an act of racist thought, whether the resulting statements be charitable or not" (Prashad 2000, 4), means that the racializing effects of these descriptions – both in terms of their invocation of their opposites and the Orientalist ideas and "model minority" constructions they build on (e.g. Lowe 1991; Prashad 2000) – are reinforced both in contemporary and current interpretations of (Pakistani) migration and Norwegian attitudes towards it.

Strangers in our midst: fremmedarbeidere

Over the course of the period under investigation here, *fremmedarbeider* emerges as the dominant racial(izing) term for Asian and African labor migrants (and their families). This is not, however, the only term through which migrant workers are identified: In *Aftenposten*, migrants are identified through references to nationality (318 articles), as *fremmedarbeidere* (207 articles), as foreigners (*utlendinger*) (189 articles), or as immigrants (*innvandrere*) (54 articles).[19] Though my focus here is on the racializing effects of the *fremmedarbeider* category, in order to highlight the increasingly restricted meaning of this term I also consider the changing use of "foreigner": By mid-to late 1973 "foreigner" is increasingly used to refer to those *not* included in the by-then racialized *fremmedarbeider* term. Thus, while "foreigner" and *fremmedarbeider* are often used interchangeably, between 1970 and 1975 a distinction is increasingly made in which *fremmedarbeidere* are <u>also</u> "foreigners" but "foreigners" are not necessarily *fremmedarbeidere*. The term "immigrant" is only just beginning to appear in Aftenposten in this period, and it tends to be used as a critique of *fremmedarbeider*. First advocated

for and used in Sweden, proponents of this term argued that whereas the term *fremmedarbeider* only sees foreigners in terms of their labor power, "immigrant" recognizes foreigners regardless of their role in the labor market, and also suggests that their stay is of a more long-term or permanent nature (Pred 2000, 73, esp. fn 25). This term was increasingly adopted during the late 1970s and onwards to the exclusion of both *fremmedarbeider* and "foreigners," though, as I argue in the next chapter, with profoundly problematic results.

Fremmedarbeider is usually translated as "foreign worker" (e.g. Hagelund 2003, 78; Predelli 2008, 936) but in fact means "alien worker" or "worker who is a stranger" ("foreign worker" would more accurately be "utenlandsk arbeider" – *Aftenposten* used the phrase "utenlandsarbeider" on at least three occasions: 27 November 1970; 10 June 1971; 24 December 1974). The distinction between these different translations is important: *fremmedarbeider* is used in ways that emphasize the strangeness of those it purports to describe in ways that "foreigner" does not do in quite the same way. By itself, "foreigner" merely denotes citizenship status, although of course foreignness can be and often is discursively tied to a range of xenophobic and racializing constructions (see e.g. Higham 1990; Takaki 1998). However, "alien" or "stranger" emphasizes a qualitatively different sort of difference.

Strangers, according to Simmel (n.d. [1908]), are at once near and far – neither fully included nor fully excluded – and often carry out particular types of labor that others will not or cannot do (ibid.; Karakayali 2006, 313). A stranger, in this conception, is not necessarily a foreigner, just as a foreigner is not necessarily a stranger. Rather, strangeness is a particular form of relation to the dominant group(s) in any particular time and place. According to Alexander, even as conceptions of strangeness encourages and rests on a sense that it is "'always already' there" (2004, 94), it is "the employment of the *language* of strangeness that creates the strangeness of a status, not the other way around" (2004, 93, emphasis in original). The *fremmedarbeider* designation thus *necessarily* (re)produces ideas and relationships of fundamental rather than incidental

difference that a designation as “foreign” would require additional xenophobic constructions to achieve.

Though the *fremmedarbeider* designation necessarily invokes strangeness, its initial non-racial basis is most clearly seen in the distinction that was made between migrants based not on their bodies, origins, culture, or religion, but on their intended length of stay in Norway. In this explanation it is not Orientalist and/or colonial knowledges that govern distinctions between migrants, and as such it is a fissure in the reproduction of these knowledges that highlights the possibility of alternative framings of the world. For example, in, the State Foreigner Office (*Statens utlendingskontor*) protested the inclusive definition of *fremmedarbeider* used by the Contact Committee for *Fremmedarbeidere:* The State Foreigner Office argued that foreign workers with an unlimited, general work permit (as opposed to a work permit for a specific time period and a specific employer) should not be considered *fremmedarbeidere*. “The common definition [of fremmedarbeider]” wrote the Office, “is a person who for a specific, short, time takes employment in another country in order to earn money for their own and their family’s needs”[20] (Aftenposten 27 July 1971).

Reflecting a similar focus on length of stay, during a 1971 public debate on labor immigration the head of the Norwegian Confederation of Enterprise argued that while it was important to facilitate the adjustment to Norwegian society for those migrants who planned long-term stays, labor migrants who merely planned to stay a year or two caused problems (*Aftenposten* 22 January 1971). Later that year, the Contact Committee for *Fremmedarbeidere* (an interest organization for foreign workers) argued that migrants who only wanted to stay for a short time should not be “imported” (*Aftenposten* 13 August 1971). Using arguments that later came to dominate among supporters of the immigration stop, the organization argued that allowing such immigration would cause social problems for the migrants themselves, undermine the necessary control of working conditions and wage levels, hurt Norwegian workers, create disturbances for housing and social policies, and be a breach of international conventions (ibid.). This structural

framing of the *fremmedarbeider* status hews closely to Simmel's explanation of the stranger as trader: it is the stranger's actual and potential movement in space that determines the relationship to the dominant group (n.d. [1908], 1).

Though the widespread adoption of *fremmedarbeider* (in contrast to the Danish and German "guest worker" and the Swedish "immigrant" or "new Swede") in and of itself produces and emphasizes a sense of profound difference and distance to migrants, in the first half of the period *fremmedarbeider* did not signal a separation between the "properly" European (see chapter two) and other migrants. In 1970, when *Aftenposten* described foreign workers in Norway as a "growing problem" (23 January), the term *fremmedarbeider* was applied liberally and interchangeably with "foreigner." When reporting on the creation of a committee that is to look at the adjustment problems faced by *fremmedarbeidere*, *Aftenposten* points out that "it is primarily workers from outside the Nordic countries we're talking about" (27 August 1970, see also 9 November 1970).

Early in the decade, then, the lines between difference and sameness had not been drawn around northern Europe and North America, and all non-Norwegians were potentially strange. Even Scandinavian[21] labor migrants – often barely included in the "foreign" category – were occasionally referred to as *fremmedarbeidere* early in the decade (e.g. *Aftenposten* 9 July 1971). The Non-Nordic workers that *Aftenposten* viewed as constituting the *fremmedarbeider* group, made up about half of all foreign workers in Norway in 1970 (NOU 1973:17:52), and they were a heterogeneous group dominated by migrants from Britain, the US and Germany (ibid). While these nationality groups do not dominate in the newspaper coverage of immigrants and immigration - *Aftenposten* is more likely to refer to "Southerly" countries or the Mediterranean as the source of *fremmedarbeidere* (23 April 1970; 13 November 1970) – they were also not exempt from the *fremmedarbeider* designation. After 55 British workers found they were miserable in Stord and went home, the Stord Shipyard decided not to take on any more *fremmedarbeidere* (*Aftenposten* 4 January 1971) and an *Aftenposten* headline announced "Earned more: an end to the *fremmedarbeider* arrangement" (ibid.). Furthermore, in the

lead-up to the 1972 EEC referendum, one of the arguments presented against EEC membership was the likely increase of *fremmedarbeidere* arriving from other member states (e.g. *Aftenposten* 12 January 1971; 1 May 1971; 13 May 1971).

However, from the summer of 1973 and onwards the shift towards relying on Orientalist knowledges and ideas of whiteness in framing migrants in general and *fremmedarbeidere* in particular solidified rapidly. *Fremmedarbeider* became reserved for migrants from Asia, Africa, and Southern Europe,[22] while North American and North-Western Europeans – who continued to dominate among foreign workers in Norway (Puntevold Bø 2004; Appendix A) – are viewed solely through the lens of nationality. The dominant themes in this framing of *fremmedarbeidere* emerge especially clearly in a July 6, 1974 op-ed by social worker Randi Normann: A *fremmedarbeider*, according to Normann, "is a foreign worker who comes from countries south of the Alps or from the Third World – in other words from another culture than the western one."[23] Even if we were to accept that "western culture" is a meaningful term (which I do not believe we should), that the Alps constitute the southern border for "western culture" is hardly obvious (though see chapter two). Yet this division fits neatly with constructions of whiteness that see northern Europe/ans as the apex of human development (e.g. Kuus 2004) – and as such it may "make sense" because it reflects a familiar discourse.

Normann's primary concern is that Norwegians must provide the "expertise" that is presumed to give legitimacy to a detailed control and management of migrant's lives. Normann portrays *fremmedarbeidere* as sickly, potentially contagious, with considerable need for specialized assistance and, reflecting a less common concern at the time, with particularly vulnerable wives because "women are less liberated" (ibid.). "Experts are needed here – quickly!"[24] she concludes. Normann is not hostile to *fremmedarbeidere* or to their presence in Norway: it is the urgent need she sees for a greater control and "expert" management of this population that concerns her (indeed it is this combination that makes her views so illustrative of larger trends). Yet the ideas that structure her understanding of which migrants are also *fremmedarbeidere,* what (implicit)

problem/threat they pose to Norwegian society, and how this problem/threat ought to be addressed, rest on a banal Orientalism.

Normann's explicitness in referring only to particular migrants is uncommon, but a similar use of *fremmedarbeider* as only referring to Asian, African, and (to a lesser extent) Southern European migrants nevertheless emerges clearly across Aftenposten's articles and letters discussing immigrants and immigration. There is, for example, a frequent linking of *fremmedarbeidere* to various, often vaguely defined, problems (see further discussion in the next section). In this vein, the housing crisis facing *fremmedarbeidere* is a frequent topic, yet though the Oslo region experienced a general, acute housing crisis in the early 1970,[25] I have not found a single article that makes any mention of Northern European or North American migrants having problems finding housing. There are a few articles featuring or mentioning Southern European (two articles) or African (three articles) migrants' housing problems, but when any specific nationality is mentioned the overwhelming focus is on Pakistanis (10 articles). In this framing, the *fremmedarbeider* housing crisis is caused by excessive immigration from Asia, Africa and Southern Europe, and, because the housing crisis these migrants experienced is rarely directly linked to racism on the housing market, this in turn implies that there are vast numbers of migrants from these regions "using up" an already scarce resource and getting specialized treatment from local government and NGOs (see e.g. *Aftenposten* 29 April 1974; 3 October 1975).

Racializations of Pakistani migrants

While *fremmedarbeider* was increasingly used to refer to all migrants from Asia, Africa and Southern Europe, the primary focus was nearly exclusively on Pakistanis.[26] The conflations and contradictions between the racializing discourses surrounding *fremmedarbeidere* and/or Pakistani migrants therefore point to the range of dominant racial discourses that framed immigration in the early 1970s. There are two distinct but intertwined racializing discourses evident in *Aftenposten*'s coverage of Pakistani labor migrants and *fremmedarbeidere*: first, Pakistanis were seen to embody the

fremmedarbeider group – and vice versa, and secondly, Pakistanis were seen as a national group with particular group characteristics. Because the dominant racializing discourses surrounding *fremmedarbeidere* in Aftenposten's coverage both conflicted with and confirmed the paper's construction of Pakistanis, Pakistanis were in a sense doubly, and sometimes contradictorily, racialized.

As the primary embodiments of the *fremmedarbeidere* Pakistani migrants were understood to be at best problematic to and for Norwegian society. Yet in the on-going debates about what Pakistanis "are like" *Aftenposten* and most of its letter-writers tended to maintain that "[t]hey are law-abiding, humble, calm, polite; there is little or no trouble with them. It [sic] is obviously a people with a high moral"[27] (editorial, 2 July 1971). Several similar reports are quoted in *Aftenposten* during the summer of 1971, and sporadically thereafter.[28] The behavior of any individual or group of Pakistani laborers were rarely explained in terms of their individual characteristics or as a result of the precarious situation they found themselves in, but rather as signs of an intrinsic Pakistaniness. Thus, because the use of and faith in explanations of perceived differences that are grounded in ideas of embodied group characteristics are racial, the Norwegian constructions of Pakistanis discussed here are not primarily about nationality.

Pakistanis are by far the most frequently discussed non-Norwegian national group, but their "positive" descriptions reflect what appears to be a general racialization of Asians. *Aftenposten* relies on common Orientalist tropes to describe Asians as "being born polite" (*Aftenposten* 22 November 1975) and as members of a "timeless culture" (*A-magasinet* 7 July 1973; see also *Aftenposten* 20 July 1971; *A-magsinet* 16 February 1974; *Aftenposten* 12 June 1975; *A-magasinet* 15 November 1975). These descriptions cross countries of origin and immigration status, being used to describe Pakistani labor migrants and their children, Chinese exchange students, Vietnamese refugees, and Asian refugees from Uganda. The near-ubiquitous reference to "Asian politeness" is particularly interesting given that these groups are not otherwise seen as linked. For instance, I have found no reference anywhere suggesting that there should or could be any expectation of affinity or

“likeness” between the refugees of South Asian descent arriving from Uganda and the Pakistani labor migrants, although both were viewed as Asian. That these two groups, together with the small number of Chinese students and the Vietnamese refugees, are nevertheless described in the same manner – which in turn sets them apart from other migrant groups – suggests that there is a set of ideas operating about “Asianness.” Indeed, there seems to be a particular emphasis on attributing a range of characteristics to Asian migrants that are read as positive. Journalists go out of their way to use positive adjectives, and this is also evident in letters to the editor and in comments from (always white) Norwegian interviewees. Common to these representations is the view that the characteristics that the writers deem “Asian” are embodied, timeless, and inherited. Being “polite,” “humble,” or “hard-working” thus moves from positive individual character traits to being Orientalist and racial descriptions that suggest a non-threatening subservience.

These “positive” representations of Asians are implicitly positioned against other, explicitly negative descriptions that simultaneously support and contradict the former. Most of the explicitly negative racial discourses position *fremmedarbeidere* in general or, more often, Pakistanis in particular, as in need of white Norwegian expert help. Thus, for example, a concern emerges from *Aftenposten*’s coverage of Pakistani immigration that the migrants were physically weak and prone to carry disease (e.g. *Aftenposten* 6 July 1971; 15 March 1972; 25 November 1972; 6 July 1974; 11 July 1974). While the responses to these perceptions varied – some argued for increased health control, health care and hygiene training programs (e.g. 6 July 1972; 6 July 1974 [sic]; 22 October 1975) and others for immigration restrictions (e.g. 20 July 1971; 15 November 1974) – these discourses share a sense of a risk of contamination. Echoing what Anne McClintock shows is a colonial preoccupation with ideas that link whiteness to cleanliness and purity, and blackness to dirt and disease (1995, ch. 5), both journalists and commentators focused on Pakistani hygiene standards, expressing worry that for their own (25 November 1972) and Norwegian (ibid.; 6 July 1974) well-being, Norwegian experts must ensure that Pakistanis follow and/or learn “proper” standards of hygiene.

The assumed threat of disease and dirt that Pakistanis were thought to represent is constructed both as embodied and as an effect of cultural practices. For example, in a lengthy interview with medical doctor Aud Svindland about the presumed health risk *fremmedarbeidere* pose to the Norwegian population, *Aftenposten*'s journalist repeatedly returns to questions of hygiene and health, suggesting that homes in South Asia are "completely infected" and that "all the taboos" make it difficult to "teach Hindus about hygiene"[29] (25 November 1972: In the course of the interview, South Asians from Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are discussed interchangeably, as are Hindus and Muslims). Despite Svindland's repeated rejection of these views, the interviewer persists in asking questions that presume that *fremmedarbeidere* are carriers both of epidemic and sexually transmitted diseases. Though the consistent return to questions of health and hygiene may have been encouraged by Svindland being a senior medical doctor, the very decision to interview her suggests a concern about infection. Furthermore, the primarily focus on what the journalist presumes is the threat *fremmedarbeidere* pose to the Norwegian population due to the "un-hygienic" society they have moved from, rather than on the health risks to the *fremmedarbeidere* as a result of their poor housing conditions and limited access to cooking facilities, highlights the assumed connection between *fremmedarbeidere* and threats of disease and dirt. In this view, *fremmedarbeidere* as/and Pakistanis necessarily and in a very direct sense threaten the health of the Norwegian nation, while any concerns for the reverse are elided.

Although the well-being of *fremmedarbeidere* is a frequent topic in *Aftenposten*, it is white Norwegian "experts" rather than the migrants themselves that define what the latter's needs are. The focus on *fremmedarbeidere*'s well-being thus functions to position them as objects of national management but not as subjects able to define their own needs (Hage 2000). In this manner, *Aftenposten* reports extensively on *fremmedarbeidere* and immigration but only actually speak to a migrant a handful of times over the course of the six years examined here (in most interviews with migrants, *Aftenposten* focuses on refugees, most notably from Uganda). *Aftenposten* thus suggests

that the migrants' have nothing to contribute to discussions regarding their own well-being in Norway.

Fremmedarbeidere in general and Pakistanis in particular, are also objectified in more explicit terms in comments made both by *Aftenposten*'s journalists and in its letter pages. In an especially overt example, one employer writes that he has "taken them for a test-drive" (*Aftenposten* 14 July 1971), meaning that he has employed several Pakistani men. In this literal objectification, the writer equates the employment of Pakistani workers with the purchasing of a new car, thus reducing the workers to something other than fully human subjects. The objectification is also evident in similar discussions of Pakistanis and/as *fremmedarbeidere* that view these workers as fungible. *Aftenposten* reports that employment offers to "two Pakistanis" have been made from a small town (5 July 1971) and elsewhere questions the issuance of new work permits when there are unemployed *fremmedarbeidere* already in the country (21 July 1973): Evidently, *any* Pakistani worker will do for a position deemed suitable for *fremmedarbeidere*. Such objectifications of Pakistanis as/and *fremmedarbeidere* allow them to be treated as a homogenous group rather than as individuals. This combination of objectification and lack of individuality in turn reinforces the dehumanization that each simultaneously causes and is caused by.

The increasing racialization of *fremmedarbeidere* and Pakistanis that is evident in *Aftenposten*'s pages suggests that the dominant public soon resorted to racializing colonial knowledges in making sense of their world.[30] This process of racialization was deeply influenced by Orientalist narratives, relying on a perceived division between Europe "proper" (Kuus 2004) and it's Others. Such a division has deep roots in Western thought (Said 1979), and what makes its invocation here particularly interesting is that it was not from the outset the overriding lens through which labor migrants from areas outside Northern and Western Europe were viewed. In this section I have shown that at the beginning of the decade, Norwegian understandings of *fremmedarbeidere* focused as much on the conditions of their stay in Norway (notably on length of stay) as on ideas of embodied characteristics. Yet within few years *fremmedarbeidere* were naturalized as a

racial group.[31] As a homogenized and homogenizing racial category, the *fremmedarbeider* designation came to have little remaining relationship to the earlier focus on length of stay. Indeed, in the last half of the period articles appear in *Aftenposten* discussing *fremmedarbeider*-children and *fremmedarbeider*-wives – these references are not easily compatible with definitions of *fremmedarbeidere* as those who leave their countries of origin and families for a short time in order to earn money for their family's support (e.g. *Aftenposten* 27 July 1971).

As a racial category *fremmedarbeider* emerges in *Aftenposten*'s pages as centered on markers of strangeness. Although there are few direct references to phenotype in *Aftenposten,* it is nevertheless clear that *fremmedarbeideres* bodies are the primary marker of strangeness. This emerges most clearly from the few explicit discussions of racism, where perceptions of skin color determine opportunities. For example, in discussing the housing problems *fremmedarbeidere* faced, *Aftenposten* reports that landlords' refusal of "foreigners" was code for refusing foreigners perceived to be "colored" (*Aftenposten* 6 November 1972; also e.g. 1 July 1970; 17 November 1972; 2 January 1973). Though country of origin was also reported to be a source of discrimination, perceptions of skin color was even more important. Indeed, country of origin appears to often be little more than a coded reference to skin color: Asia, Africa, and Southern Europe tend to be grouped together for few other reasons than that these are the regions of origin for the migrants in Norway that were perceived to be "dark." The primacy of skin color rather than country of origin is illustrated by the University of Oslo housing officer who reports that light-skinned and blue-eyed students from Spain had much fewer problems finding housing compared to their "darker" compatriots (Aftenposten 1 July 1970). There is no doubt that the strangeness of *fremmedarbeidere* is also produced through a paternalism that views *fremmedarbeidere* as at once "humble" and "hard-working" and as contagious and (therefore) threatening. Yet it is phenotype that is established as a marker of these meanings.

The changing meaning of the *fremmedarbeider* category is central to an analysis of the immigration policy developments that culminated in the immigration stop. As I argue in this chapter, the immigration stop was crucially based on the racialization of the *fremmedarbeidere* that the stop explicitly targets. The series of policy documents and the Parliamentary debate that I read below rests on the unspoken underlying assumption that *fremmedarbeidere* are already understood to be excessively different strangers. Such assumptions are not established through policy documents alone, although policy documents are heavily reported on and as such exist in a close circular relationship with dominant media discourses. Nevertheless, the discursive production in the mainstream media of *fremmedarbeidere* as a distinct racial group needing considerable expert and state intervention is essential to the naturalization of this meaning.

A threatening national minority

The racializing discourses framing *fremmedarbeidere*, Pakistanis, and Asians as at once inherently lovely and inherently threatening stands in contrast to the often explicitly hostile media representation of the Rom national minority. As the national minority against which majority Norwegian identity is most clearly constructed in *Aftenposten*'s coverage, the racialized portrayal of the Rom is indicative of considerable majority resistance towards groups that are seen as unable or unwilling to assimilate and who are not contained by myths of the Noble Savage (for examples of the latter, see *Aftenposten*'s minimal but "positive" coverage of the Sami minority: *A-magasinet* 14 July 1973; *Aftenposten* 29 September 1973). In the early 1970s Norway had only recently moved away from a policy of forced assimilation, and state actors and experts were trying to build popular support for a new approach that ostensibly aimed to respect "gypsy uniqueness" (e.g. *Aftenposten* 19 April 1971; Myking 2009, 44-45). The Rom were seen as absolutely different from the majority population, and, like *fremmedarbeidere*, in need of considerable state intervention and expertise help in order to successfully live in "modern society" (e.g. *Aftenposten* 18 May 1972; Myking 2009).

Aftenposten reports on expert views on the Rom[32] and includes “anthropology” style reports on the Rom themselves.[33] The Rom, in other words, were not seen as experts on their own lives, nor were their views on how to improve their lives worth reporting on. Rom children were described as “always happy” and, invoking eugenic language, as having “mental health of a noble brand” (*Aftenposten* 7 March 1972), while adults were described as in a child-like relation to the majority population. In an article focused on a then-recent program aimed at getting Rom children to attend a specialized school program, *Aftenposten*’s journalist reports that

> We ask if king Polykarp wants his children to have a future in this country. In that case they must attend school, we say – probably much more firmly than anyone has dared address a gypsy chief before. Polykarp bangs his fist on the table and says that from now on, every one of my children and all the youth will attend school. Every day! Agitated, he adds: - you can take my word for it, Madam! [34] (*Aftenposten* 21 January 1972)

Here, both the journalist’s patronizing attitude (e.g. lecturing an adult, describing her addressing of Polykarp as “firm’) and the description of Polykarp in ways that make him seem emotional and unreliable serve to render him in a child-like relation to the majority society represented by the journalist. The Rom refusal or failure to assimilate appears to be read by both policy makers and members of the public as threatening. Thus the lip-service being paid in policy circles to integration rather than assimilation did not extend to legalizing nomadic forms of trade or other measures that would enable the Rom to maintain their “uniqueness,” and letter-writers refer to Roms as being “of a different race” but hasten to say that the hatred of Roms is due to their culture, not their race and is therefore “acceptable”(e.g. 5 August 1972; 2x September 1972; see also 5 January 1972 and 29 October 1974). *Aftenposten* sees it as necessary to repeatedly remind its readers that the Rom are Norwegian, and it is clear that they are barely-Norwegian, and represent an internal threat to the nation.

The racializing representation of the Rom as barely-Norwegian and threatening to the Norwegian nation builds on a long history of such constructions (Myking 2009; Eide and Simonsen 2007). Eide and Simonsen argue that the Rom have consistently been portrayed in negative ways in the Norwegian press, and this has met little to no opposition or controversy (2007, 11, chapter 4). In this manner one letter-writer complains in *Aftenposten* that, "[i]t is the gypsy way of life, with lies and deception, that is the reason we want them gone from our areas. That really can't be called discrimination"[35] (*Aftenposten* 5 August 1972; see also 2x September 1972).

Aftenposten's own writers were certainly not similarly explicit, but the perception that it was the "gypsy way of life" that was the problem in need of a solution seem wide-spread and broadly accepted. Thus, even as the "experts" (teachers, social workers, and others) professed the new-found need to "protect [Rom] uniqueness" they describe Rom culture as limiting and without abstract thinking (thus Rom children who travel around Europe with their parents, are described as "only knowing one environment' – in explicit contrast to children from the settled majority society who apparently gain knowledge of a variety of environments. See *Aftenposten* 11 November 1973), and express disappointment that "the [Rom] problem" could not be solved through educating Rom children according to the wishes of the majority society (*Aftenposten* 22 January 1972). A theme in "expert" discussions is that Rom culture - centered on a semi-nomadic life - is a problem, and that their role is to find ways to ensure that Rom settle and, in practice, assimilate. The beliefs about the inferiority of Rom culture, descriptions of the Rom that viewed their skills and personalities as inherent, and a strong commitment to state intervention to ensure the smooth functioning of the welfare state, combine to both reinforce racializations of the Rom and to obfuscate the racism in the majority society's interventions.

The distinction between the racialization of the Rom and that of immigrant groups suggests that the former were constructed as considerably more threatening to the majority's sense of homeliness and control of the national space. For, while the Rom

were consistently racialized in ways that invited widespread condemnation, the racialization of *fremmedarbeidere* and Asians show more complexity. Though also consistently racialized, the latter groups were framed both in superficially "positive" and in negative ways. It seems that expectations of whether racialized minority groups were permanently present in the nation or not, were central to determining the extent to which they were constructed as threatening.

In *Aftenposten* the Rom are portrayed as very tenuously Norwegian (in large part through constant reminders that they are Norwegian citizens, which highlight perceptions to the contrary; see also Myking 2009), but also as permanently present in Norway. By the early 1970s about 100 members of the Rom group had had their Norwegian citizenship recognized by the state, and it was clear both that they were going to stay and that assumptions of an easy assimilation process were proving wrong (Myking 2009). In contrast, migrant groups were largely not expected to stay. There was some recognition that labor migrants ought to have the choice as to whether to stay and that the state must enable them to do so, but the migrants themselves, policy makers, activists, and the public at large expected that the laborers and their families would return to their country of origin after a few years[36] (e.g. *Aftenposten* 11 November 1974; NOU 1973:17, 62). Most migrants were seen as temporary visitors, and any anxiety about their presence did not immediately translate into a sense of an internal threat to the nation. Migrant laborers were rarely referred to as "guest workers" in Norway, yet they were perceived to be guests rather than "new fellow countrymen."[37]

Both the forms of racialization of the Rom and the majority society's management strategies in relation to the Rom, signal the kinds of approaches to perceptions of excessive difference that would come to dominate Norwegian racial formations in subsequent decades (see chapter four). The dominant popular and academic narrative about immigration and integration in Norway holds that when Asian and African immigration increased from the early 1970s and onwards, Norwegians had no prior experience with minority management and were therefore poorly prepared to manage

these excessively different migrants (e.g. Tjelmeland 2003; contrast Salimi 1999). Beyond the management-focused anxieties, this narrative of innocence and naivety ignores the extensive majority intervention in Rom and Sami life. Though, as I note above, in the early 1970s integration had recently replaced assimilation as a goal of majority policies vis-à-vis the Rom and Sami, previously such policies were focused on a forced assimilation that included the removal of children,[38] the banning of the Sami language in obligatory boarding schools, and settlement pressures. The hierarchical relationship and assimilationist policies that the majority Norwegian society through such policies had long established in relation to national minorities were subsequently extended to immigrant groups (albeit in less overtly assimilationist forms).

Excessive difference: the 1973 Green Paper

The racializing discourses about *fremmedarbeidere* that were becoming increasingly established in the early 1970s were further solidified in the 1973 Green Paper (NOU 1973:17) on immigration. This Green Paper focused on a series of concerns that simultaneously produced and relied on conceptions of race.[39] Although in terms of the policies it proposed the Green Paper stood at the border between the earlier focus on welcoming labor migrants and the soon-to-be dominant call for an immigration stop, the main topic of the Paper was a concern about the number of *fremmedarbeidere* and the need to regain greater control both of immigration and of immigrants. Race structured the ideas of assimilability and "suitedness" to life in Norway that were central to the Green Paper's identification of which migrants were anxiety-provoking. Race also shaped the responses that aimed to facilitate *fremmedarbeideres* life in Norway. In other words, in the Green Paper material differences were made so through constructions of race. Furthermore, constructions of race were constant across political viewpoints and as such appear to be a broadly shared framework.

In this section I analyze the most important ways in which race was produced in the Green Paper: first by establishing *fremmedarbeidere* as referring only to those migrants originating in "distant countries" usually understood as Asia, Africa, and Southern

Europe, and then by interpreting *fremmedarbeidere* as excessively different, as having (or being) special problems, and as excessively numerous. I argue that it is this excessiveness, and in particular the focus on *fremmedarbeidere* as excessively different, that grounds processes of racialization evident in the Green Paper. Excessive difference is here marked primarily by phenotype, and there is in fact little reference to what the differences may be, let alone what makes them excessive.

The Green Paper's reproduction of race and concomitant boundary-making was focused less on imbuing specific meaning to the perceived difference that migrants from Asia, Africa and Southern Europe were understood to represent than on establishing the perceived difference(s) itself as excessive. In this construction it is the supposed gap between Norwegians and particular *groups* of migrants that renders the latter problematic. Because this gap is constructed as natural and inherent and attached to groups rather than individuals, it functions to produce a racial division. Through this division migrants from "distant countries" were established as inassimilable, and in turn as problems in need of extensive state management. Having reiterated the excessive difference of some migrants, the Green Paper then proceeds to legitimize concerns about their actual and potential numbers in Norway. This framework for interpreting the changing immigration patterns reflects but also solidifies the racializing discourses dominating the contemporary newspaper coverage.

Before examining the ways in which the Green Paper (re)produces race in its discussion of the need for greater control of immigration and immigrants, a brief overview of the rates of immigration is in order. In news coverage and government Papers, both actual and potential migrants were causes for concern, though during this time period the "floodgates" argument is more prevalent in the Papers than in news coverage. The focus on, and anxiety around, the increasing number of immigrants is hardly in proportion to the actual numbers of migrants arriving. During a 30 year period when Europe experienced considerable migration movements (see e.g. Hansen 2003), the number of foreigners working in Norway increased by about 4000 (from 16 020 in 1952 to 20 320 in

1972, NOU 1973:17, 52. The total Norwegian population in 1952 was 3.3 million, increasing to 3.9 million in 1972, see www.ssb.no). Though the entirety of this increase came in the last three years of the period, it can hardly be seen as dramatic, and foreigners continued to constitute around one percent of the labor force.[40] Indeed, in stark contrast to the focus in the rest of the Paper on the high rates of immigration, when considering whether a dedicated bureaucracy was needed to deal with issues related to foreign workers, the Green Paper concludes it is unnecessary because the number of foreign workers in Norway is so low (NOU 1973:17: 100). Furthermore, the increase in foreign labor followed significant labor shortages (*Aftenposten* 16 July 1970, 4 January 1971, 21 May 1971, 7 July 1971, 7 September 1973); thus the very moderate increase can be seen as a response to economic developments in Norway, rather than, as both *Aftenposten* and the Green Paper imply, being driven by foreign job seekers without any consideration of the Norwegian labor market (e.g. NOU 1973:17: 89; *Aftenposten* 13 November 1970, 27 July 1971, 22 December 1973, 15 March 1974).

Establishing excessive difference

Though the dominant theme of the Green Paper is the excessive *number* of migrants, this was not primarily established through references to the *actual* number of migrants. Rather, the problematic nature of the number of migrants was based mainly on the excessive difference of some migrants. There are two chief ways in which the Green Paper established the excessive – and therefore material - difference of some migrants. First, it repeatedly referred to migrants from “distant countries” and portrayed this group as inassimilable, and secondly it linked these migrants to sets of particular and especially acute problems. Combined these representations of the Norwegian immigration situation suggests that the country is in imminent danger of losing control – not only of the immigration situation, but of the homeliness of the nation.

It was not, I must emphasize, immigration per se that was seen as threatening: it was the immigration of workers from Asia and Africa, and, often, Southern Europe. Because the Green Paper sought to simultaneously uphold the immigration principles established in

the 1968 White Paper on the labor market – which held that the state should not stand in the way of labor migration – while putting in place significant immigration restrictions, it went to considerable lengths to establish that it was a particular kind of immigration that had to be restricted, not immigration as such. Thus, after confirming that the number of foreign workers in Norway was very small in a European context, the Green Paper asserted that because immigration from "culturally and geographically distant counties" had increased, the Norwegian immigration situation had nevertheless fundamentally changed since the 1968 principles were established (66). The Green Paper invoked *potential* migrants as much as actual migrants: it noted that unless unemployment rates in developing countries decreased, labor migration was likely to continue (65). To this end, the Green Paper expressed concern that Southern European, Asian and African workers in Norway were actively recruiting friends and relatives to jobs in Norway (67), and that agents were at the ready, waiting to help migrants exploit any little "hole" in Norwegian immigration legislation (89). It was thus the increasing rate of immigration from "culturally and geographically distant counties" that the Green Paper saw as causing problems and to which Norway was vulnerable.

Central to the Green Paper's framing of immigrants and immigration – and consequently its production of race - is the largely unstated but always present assumption that its discussion is entirely focused on migrants from what it terms "culturally and geographically distant countries." The use of geography as a metaphor for race is well established in Norway (see chapter one and two), as well as in Orientalist discourse (Said 1979), and in this context Nordic migrants hardly count as foreigners at all: "It is the number of [non-Nordic citizens] that represents what one usually associate with *fremmedarbeidere* in Norway,"[41] the Green Paper noted (NOU 1973:17, 142-143). However, in practice the Green Paper excluded all northern European and North American migrants (in other words, the vast majority of migrants) from its calls for immigration restrictions. Thus, even as it also acknowledged that *fremmedarbeidere* in Norway "span a wide range"[42] (90), it is clear that what makes a country distant according to the Green Paper cannot be measured on a map: The US and Canada are

never distant, whereas Italy might be and Turkey definitely is.[43] "[F]oreigners from culturally and geographically distant countries" have previously rarely come to Norway, the Green Paper committee noted[44] (NOU 1973:17, 66), and later (implicitly) clarified that these are "foreign employees from Asia, Africa and Southern Europe" (NOU 1973:17, 67).

One indication of how "distant" any given country might be can be gleaned from the attendant discussion of development aid. Under the subheading "About the effects [of migration] for the individual foreign employee and his family" the committee bases its entire discussion on the assumption that the foreign employee will be a man moving from a poor country with limited industry and other employment opportunities (NOU 1973:17, 65). This does not describe the countries of origin of most migrants in Norway at the time: the Nordic countries, West-Germany, Britain, and the US (NOU 1973:17,171) – and a substantial minority of employed migrants from these countries were female (NOU 1973:17, 173-174). In other words, the Green Paper develops its policy recommendations entirely in relation to the twenty five percent of foreign workers originating in Eastern and Southern Europe, Asia and Africa combined[45] (NOU 1973:17,171), and these regions are simultaneously produced as "distant."

The Green Paper's conceptualization of difference and distance rests on each giving meaning to the other in a symbiotic relationship. Both are dependent on perceptions of phenotype as markers of relative difference and distance and therefore function as central tropes in the production of race. Thus, the always-already accepted assumption in the Green Paper (as well as in *Aftenposten*) is that Asian, African, and Southern European migrants are inherently different from Norwegians and from (other) European migrants. That it is skin color and phenotype that marks the border between the two homogenized groups is never made explicit, but emerges from the sometimes very complicated arguments that are made in order to maintain the "natural" border between acceptable and unacceptable migrants.

In this vein, in a letter to the Ministry of Local Government and Labor the Green Paper committee laid out the distinction it saw between migrants: "It is natural to distinguish foreign workers and job-seekers into two main groups," the committee noted; "Foreigners whose background, education, etc. means that they relatively easily can settle down and be comfortable in Norway – and foreigners whose cultural background [and] deficient language and educational skills makes adjustment [to Norway] difficult both at the place of employment and in society at large. This last group constitutes the main part of the "guest workers" though there are several among them with a very solid education and for whom the language difficulties are not great"[46] (included in NOU 1973:17, 143). Here, while one set of foreigners have individual characteristics that make them particularly suited to life in Norway, another group is particularly unsuited to life in Norway even when their individual characteristics are similar to those in the first group. This distinction is "natural" even as no specifics are given to clarify the criteria that would place any one person in either group. Having rendered individual characteristics insignificant to constructions of difference, the Green Paper committee is left with "natural" group differences as the basis for the differences it sees as material.

This assessment of difference is seen as so self-evident that no observer appears to have thought it necessary to justify or examine it. In the Green Paper, the assumption of difference is apparent in the references not only to geographically distant countries but also to culturally distant counties (66), alien-seeming foreigners (70), "other customs and other skin colors" (130, see also 134), and the "physical and psychological handicap" of foreigners (134: what these are is not explained). These are "alien-like" or "strange seeming" (*fremmedarted*) foreigners (NOU 1973:17, 70) whose presence might challenge "the population's attitude to foreigners" (ibid.). "The population" was not seen to have attitude problems in relation to foreigners in general. Rather, it was something vague but centered on *looking strange* that meant that foreigners from "distant countries" caused attitude problems amongst the Norwegian population.

The sense of absolute but ill-defined difference is also apparent in the Green Paper's minority statement,[47] where it is emphasized that the migrants experiencing particular difficulties are from "poor countries in Southern Europe and other parts of the world"[48] (NOU 1973:17, 74). The statement goes on to note that "[t]he problems [stemming from immigration] have emerged especially in recent years, when the country has received workers from countries that have cultural patterns that are very different from ours"[49] (NOU 1973:17, 75). In the report's appended statement from the Green Paper committee's representative for foreign workers, the same distinction between migrants that are different or similar is maintained (NOU 1973:17, 157), and it is also mirrored in the appended research report (NOU 1973:17, 208). In other words, the assumption of an obvious and excessive difference between Norwegians and Norwegian society and particular migrants is a shared interpretive framework even as committee members and others may have varying readings of what this difference means.

Central to the construction of *fremmedarbeidere* as a racialized group is the assessment of their difference as excessive: it is the excessiveness of the difference that produces them as a group apart. However, this excessiveness is naturalized and as such needs no explication or explanation. Consequently, although there are multiple references both in news coverage and in the government Papers to "culturally different" migrants, *how* these migrants are "culturally different" and why and in what ways this matters is rarely detailed. The most concrete references to the details of migrant's cultural differences are to religion and dietary restrictions and challenges.[50] Yet even as *Aftenposten* (e.g. 10 January 1974) and the Green Paper (NOU 1973:17, 102-137) discuss the importance of accommodating and enabling Muslim religious practices, why these practices constitute an absolute and material difference is merely assumed. Even for those migrants who are Muslim and religiously observant, it is not clear why this is a difference that is more different than other forms of human diversity (or more different than other minority religions in Norway), or why it makes their presence in Norway particularly problematic. The presumed obviousness of the significance and excess of these differences must therefore be understood in the context of Orientalist discourses that have long produced

anything coded as "Oriental" (and few things are more clearly coded as "Oriental" than Islam) as necessarily excessively different from the European or "Occidental" (Said 1979).

The production of fremmedarbeidere as having/being excessive problems

The assessment of excessive difference is co-produced in the Green Paper with the perception that *fremmedarbeidere* necessarily have/are problems and require significant specialized expert assistance. Such linking of "difference" to "problems" and the presumed causal relation between the two reinforces and reiterates racialized constructions of the migrants thought to embody this relationship. This link between difference and problems is made in several different contexts, including those aiming to improve the conditions of "culturally different" immigrants in Norway. The various interpretations of the link range from seeing difference as a handicap that requires specialized help and protection, to seeing it as a threat to Norwegian workers. What these analyses in the Green Paper have in common is the resulting management strategy based on vaguely defined ideas about difference and the assumption that it is this difference that is at the center of whatever problem the strategy seeks to address.

There is remarkable consistency in the racialized framework through which policy makers, activists, researchers and others understood the needs of *fremmedarbeidere* and developed proposals for solutions. In detailing the range of responses that the Green Paper displays with regards to the (variously defined) "*fremmedarbeider*-problem," I show that across the political spectrum, *fremmedarbeidere* were understood as a distinct group whose relationship to the dominant Norwegian society was implicitly seen as subservient: *fremmedarbeidere* needed "expert" Norwegian assistance, but had little expertise or knowledge to contribute themselves. As practices of racial production, in addition to confirming the dominant themes of excessive difference and threatening numbers, these policy responses reflect a colonial framework in which whiteness is a prerequisite for agency.

The production of *fremmedarbeidere* as necessarily embodying special problems emerges most clearly among researchers and activists who saw foreigners from "distant countries" as particularly vulnerable and in need of aid and protection (see also Tjelmeland 2003; this viewpoint is also in part reflected in *Aftenposten*'s coverage). Though the focus on migrants from "distant" countries as susceptible to exploitation on the labor and housing markets may at first appear to address racism, the way in which this concern was articulated in the Green Paper focused on the migrants' difference as the source of their problems. "There is a great difference between foreigners' ability and opportunities to adjust to local conditions on the housing market," wrote the Green Paper committee, adding that "[t]he conditions are particularly difficult for some workers from distant countries. However [this group] also often demand far less of the standard of housing than the domestic population"[51] (NOU 1973:17, 127). The Green Paper noted that there was "some discrimination" that was "greatest in relation to citizens from distant countries with other customs and another skin color"[52] (NOU 1973:17, 130), but emphasized language barriers, lack of familiarity with local conditions, and the seniority principle in Norwegian housing legislation (ibid.) as the basis for the housing problems facing foreign workers.

As the Green Paper reiterated the fiction that Asians and Africans are used to less and therefore don't mind poor housing conditions, the impact of the housing problems was immediately played down in a manner that simultaneously emphasized the difference of the migrants as the primary cause for their housing problems.[53] The role of racism in determining housing conditions for some workers was not absent from policy documents or news coverage, but it was not seen as the central factor, and likewise racism is linked to individuals and never placed in the context of the general housing crisis for *fremmedarbeidere*. Rather, it was the workers' difference which in and of itself was seen as most important. This means that rather than seeing aspects of Norwegian society as responsible for creating and maintaining *fremmedarbeideres* poor housing conditions, this perspective saw the strongest causal relationship between housing challenges and the aspects of the migrants' bodies and lives that mark them as inherently and absolutely

different from the majority domestic and immigrant populations. Here, then, it is qualities inherent in *fremmedarbeidere* that causes their especially acute problems, and dominant Norwegian society is largely absolved of any responsibility beyond its providing of "expert" assistance.

The same underlying colonial framework is evident in the concern that *fremmedarbeidere* posed a threat to Norway and/or Norwegian workers. In this view, mostly articulated from the Left, migrant workers posed a threat to Norwegian wage levels, working conditions, and social policies. Additionally, in a classic Marxist argument, labor emigration was argued to have negative effects in what was called developing countries (including Southern Europe) by diminishing "the political pressures that unemployment and underemployment [could] have created" and thereby "postpone[ing] the structural changes that poor countries must carry out in order that a positive economic development may start" [54](NOU 1973:17, 71; see also Brox 1973).[55]

Most notably, proponents of this view positioned (implicitly male) *fremmedarbeidere* against (implicitly weak and needing assistance) Norwegian women and Norwegians with disabilities, arguing that foreign able-bodied male workers prevented the entry of Norwegian women and Norwegians with disabilities on the labor market. Implicit to this view was the assumption that foreign men, Norwegian women, and disabled Norwegians constituted low-skilled and relatively fungible labor of which the labor market would only need (or be willing to hire) a limited number – and *fremmedarbeidere* would be preferred because they were understood to accept lower wages or poor working conditions.[56] In this unity of racism, sexism and ableism, *fremmedarbeidere*, through their very presence, are presented as threats to the "weak" of the nation (that *fremmedarbeidere* took on work that was otherwise carried out by able-bodied Norwegian men – such as tram operation and factory work – does not seem to have affected this representation). Thus, in an iteration of the long-standing racist imagery of white men saving white women from black and brown men, the proponents of this view

presented their protectionist aspirations as a version of feminism (Ware 1992; Ye eno lu 1998).

In the Green Paper, concerns about the number of *fremmedarbeidere* come to the fore, and here I have argued that such concerns are intimately based on the concurrent production of race. It is not all foreign workers, or all foreigners, that are seen as problems – and the foreign workers who *are* understood to have or be especially acute problems are constructed as embodying such problems. In other words, the visual signs that mark someone as a *fremmedarbeider* are simultaneously signs of excessive difference, inassimilability, of "distant cultures" and "distant countries." These are all assessments that shore up and produce the boundary-making inherent in seeing difference as embodied. Consequently, when the Green Paper described Norway as a small country unable to absorb any further immigrants (e.g. NOU 1973:17, 66, 75), it was not immigration rates that were a concern - it was not the availability of jobs and housing that determines whether or not there are "too many" immigrants. Rather, the national home is seen as threatened by the introduction of too many migrants that are seen as excessively different. Ghassan Hage points out that concern over the numbers of immigrants is a nationalistic practice that relies on ideals of mastery over national territory (2000, ch. 1). Racism may propel such concerns, but, he argues, racism does not in and of itself require action: it is the belief that only some people can or should belong in and to the national territory that fuels worries about immigration (Hage 2000, 32). The worries about immigrant numbers, the linking of particular immigrants to problems, and the emphasis on regaining a control of immigration that is perceived to have been lost, combine in the Green Paper in ways that increasingly solidify racial constructions and understandings of difference.

Reasserting control through the immigration stop

Given the extent to which the racializing processes emerging in Norway in the early 1970s relied on linking perceptions of difference to problems, it is unsurprising that calls for greater immigration restrictions should result. Immigration legislation provides a way

to reassert the control over the national territory, consequently answering racialized national worries. As I have shown above, the anxieties on which support for immigration restrictions relied are at their heart racialized and racializing. It was not immigration per se that was a cause for concern or needed to be subject to greater control and management, but rather the immigration of those who were racialized as inherently and excessively different and inassimilable. As the need for state management of race (re)emerges as a priority between 1970 and 1975, immigration policy is established as the most important tool available for this management.

In this last section I focus on the two primary changes in rhetoric between the Green Paper and the subsequent White Paper and Parliamentary debate. While these changes are rhetorical only, they are significant because they establish a conceptual framework that remains dominant today. Most importantly, while the White Paper replaces *fremmedarbeider* with "immigrant" and thereby signals a shift in the expected length of stay in Norway, the racial meaning remains constant. Today "immigrant" is still the dominant term in the Norwegian public sphere for referring to anyone living in Norway and not perceived as white, and the consistency between the use of *fremmedarbeider* and "immigrant" is therefore significant; In the next chapter I show that this construction of "immigrants" has had significant harmful effects. As the immigration stop debate and legislation were the conduits for the continuation of racial meaning between *fremmedarbeider* and "immigrant" they are of crucial importance. Additionally, in this section I argue that the production of whiteness is foregrounded by the more moralistic arguments that dominate in the White Paper and the attendant debates (see also Hagelund 2003). The emphasis on such arguments is a marked shift from the Green Paper, and this shift signals a concern with maintaining a Norwegian self-image as a tolerant and "good" nation.

Legislatively, the immigration stop first emerged as a minority proposal in the 1973 Green Paper on immigration (NOU 1973:17, 71-76), which was then formally developed in a 1973 White Paper (St.meld. nr. 39 for 1973-74) with additional details finalized in

the weeks leading up to the 10 December 1974 Parliamentary debate in which the proposed legislation was passed. The stop has both longer and wider roots, however: the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions had introduced similar ideas as early as 1969 (Tjelmeland 2003, 112). Furthermore, the legislation itself is not unique in a European context – e.g. Denmark and West Germany introduced similar restrictions in the early to mid 1970s (e.g. Brochmann 2003, 139) – but unlike other European countries Norway was not experiencing a contracting economy or a collapsing labor market. Quite the contrary – the final legislation features extensive exemptions crafted to meet the ongoing labor needs of Norwegian industries.

The White Paper's conceptualization of difference and race mirrors that in the Green Paper even as its language was markedly different. Where the Green Paper discussed *fremmedarbeidere* the White Paper's focus was on immigrants. There are no comments in the White Paper about this shift in terminology, and references to *fremmedarbeidere* continued: the two terms appear to be used interchangeably in the White Paper though most of the uses of *fremmedarbeidere* are attributed to the various organizations and state offices whose responses to the Green Paper were included. The consistency between the meaning attached to *fremmedarbeider* and to "immigrant" are evident throughout the White Paper. For example, in discussing individual labor migration[57] the White Paper quoted the Green Paper's assertion that there were too many immigrants from "distant countries" (St.meld.nr. 39 for 1973-74, 11-12). In the subsequent comments from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Labor, and the Institute for Sociology at the University of Oslo, none addressed this assumption and all appeared to both agree with the assessment of the immigration situation and share the assumption that the central issue for immigration policy is to manage the entry of migrants from "distant countries" (ibid.).

According to the Ministry of Justice, immigration had to be restricted in order that it "not increase or otherwise take a form that must be seen as unfortunate both for the foreigners themselves and for our own society"[58] (ibid.). As an example of the kinds of problems

that could arise without such restrictions, the Ministry cited the spring 1971 arrival of Pakistani labor migrants, though without specifying why their arrival was unfortunate either for the migrants themselves or for the Norwegian society. The Ministry of Labor argued that restrictions were necessary to avoid problems migrants caused on the labor market, and warned that "a number of national groups are actively seeking employment in this country for others from their home country"[59] (ibid.). Researchers at the Institute for Sociology argued that to allow further immigration meant creating new "problem groups" that had "economic, social, and cultural handicaps." The sociologists thought that this would be unreasonable given the authorities' ongoing attempt to improve the situation for current "problem groups" (ibid.).

What is evident here is that these actors share an assumption that the changes in immigration policy that they were debating were primarily focused on the management of a specific group of migrants: These migrants created problems through their excessive difference ("handicap") and there were multitudes of them ready and waiting to move to Norway. This framing of immigration and immigrants produces "immigrants" as a group indistinguishable from *fremmedarbeidere*. As noted above, the use of "immigrant" at this time was intended to emphasize the potential long-term or permanent settlement of migrants, and also acknowledge that migrants are not just workers. In contrast to *fremmedarbeidere* the term does achieve both of these intended effects. However, as "immigrant" merely replaced *fremmedarbeider* without any change in who the terms encompassed and with little change in meaning, there was no significant break in the racializing effects of the two terms. Furthermore the racialization of "immigrants" is perhaps more consistently harsh compared to the perception of *fremmedarbeidere* (see chapter four; Gullestad 2002), and the suggestion of permanence coupled with an emphasis on distance that the term "immigrant" focuses on may be seen to "encourage" the more consistently negative racial meaning production (see discussion of the racialization of Rom above).

The moralistic arguments (Hagelund 2003) that come to the fore in the White Paper highlight the production of whiteness and/as Norwegianness during this period. Where the Green Paper focused on the need to restrict immigration for the benefit of Norwegians, the White Paper and subsequent news coverage as well as the ensuing Parliamentary debate, focused on the need for stricter immigration control for the *benefit of migrants*. These moralistic arguments shore up the image of "goodness" that is central to the Norwegian self-image (see e.g. Gullestad 2002; chapter one) and therefore to the production of whiteness in Norway. To reconcile "goodness" with immigration restrictions, the White Paper argued that the state could not both address immigrants' problems and manage continued immigration, and that it therefore needed "breathing room"[60] from immigration. According to the White Paper such "breathing room" would be used to put in place structures that would ensure the well-being both of immigrants already in the country, and any future immigrants. This particular line of argument, which holds variously that emigration from poorer countries must be hindered in order to prevent a brain drain (St.meld.nr.39 for 1973-74, 5) or in order to reserve state services for those who have already migrated (Brochmann 2003, 139-140), is closely tied to what Hagelund (2003) has identified as an extensive reliance on moralistic arguments in support of immigration management policies. It also represents a colonial and nationalistic management practice, in which the white state is the "master of all it surveys" and therefore able to determine the needs and best interests of current and potential "immigrants" without having to engage the migrants themselves. In turn, through such practices, the state is produced as white. Thus the change in the focus of the argument for immigration control does not introduce any fissures into the then rapidly sedimenting constructions of race. The media and policy discourses that dominated the lead-up to the immigration stop can therefore be seen to actively protect the Norwegian self-image of "goodness," while at the same time producing racialized and racializing notions of difference.

In contrast to the Green Paper, the White Paper paints a picture of Norway as vulnerable: where the tone in the Green Paper suggests a host angry at the liberties guests are taking,

the White Paper emphasizes Norwegian smallness and weakness in the face of mounting problems associated with increasing rates of immigration from “distant countries.” Here, like in the Green Paper, the numbers anxieties must be seen as part of what Hage argues is a spatial management practice (2000, 38) informed by racial ideas of belonging. The emphasis on vulnerability adds to this management practice, as it justifies immigration restrictions and through that allows these to be seen as consistent with the national self-image of “goodness.” Such justification of immigration restrictions, linked with a continued image of “goodness,” is evident in the White Paper’s acknowledgement that while Norway cannot remove itself from international economic and social problems, “Norwegian society is, however, very small and has a settlement and business structure that creates rather narrow boundaries for how large of an immigrant population can be absorbed here without the surfacing of big problems”[61] (St.meld.nr. 39 for 1973-74, 8). It is unfortunate, the White Paper seems to say, but while in the long run we will work to ensure that people do not have to emigrate from poor countries, in the short run we’re really very small, and there are so many potential migrants, and we just cannot accept them all – which in turn suggests that allowing labor migration is a form of charity, rather than central to economic growth. “Immigration must therefore be kept under control and demands must be made in order to ensure that the conditions foreigners [live under] in Norway become acceptable”[62] (ibid.), the White Paper concludes. As in the Green Paper, here the anxiety that there were – or would be - “too many” migrants were not based in particularly negative evaluations of the migrants themselves (Hage 2000, 37-38). Nor was it based in economic protectionism: as I discuss above, Norway during this period had an on-going shortage of labor power. The anxiety, barely concealed behind references to the well-being of immigrants, centers on the introduction of too much difference: too many who are too racially Other.

Standing up for immigration restrictions: the Parliamentary debate

The assessment of excessive difference dominates the Parliamentary debate in which the immigration stop was passed. Based on the White Paper and a carefully negotiated list of exemptions (*Aftenposten* 26 November 1974), the immigration stop was unanimously

passed in Parliament on December 10, 1974. During the Parliamentary debate, as Hagelund points, out "difference was constructed in what appear as carefully chosen non-racial terms" yet "the fact that racial terms are not used does not necessarily mean that race does not matter" (2003, 73). Indeed, across the political spectrum and independent of the reasons each gave for voting in favor of the proposed stop, the speakers relied heavily on reiterations of the presumed link between vaguely defined problems and excessive difference (see e.g. Parliamentary debate 10 December 1974:1940, 1945, 1949, 1958, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1968).

The framework of excessive difference and vaguely defined problems was evident from the very start of the debate: Parliamentary Leader Thorbjørn Berntsen introduced the proposal by asserting that immigrants to Norway "to a large degree" come from "other cultures"[63] and therefore are "particularly vulnerable" to our "inconsiderate words and actions"[64] (MP Thorbjørn Berntsen Labor Party, *Stortinget* 10 December 74, 1922). In contrast to this vague reference to racism that "clarified" which immigrants he was referring to, Berntsen to a large extent moved on to suggest that it was the excessive difference of the migrants themselves that were at the heart of the problems they both caused and experienced in Norway. He emphasized that Norway must receive these migrants "in a manner consistent with our country's dignity"[65] (MP Thorbjørn Berntsen Labor Party, *Stortinget* 10.12.74, 1923, see also MP Buvik, 1928), and argued that an immigration stop was necessary in order to give the authorities "breathing room" to put the necessary structures in place to ensure migrants' welfare. Berntsen's framework was with few exceptions reflected in the arguments presented by other speakers: Norway was a small and tolerant country, *fremmedarbeidere* had/caused problems that previous, more similar migrants did not, and an immigration stop was an unfortunate necessity in order to improve migrants' problems. That all those who spoke during the Parliamentary debate relied on a common conceptual framework in which the terms "immigrants" and *fremmedarbeidere* did not need to be explained yet were used in ways that only referred to a minority of immigrants and foreign workers (indeed, the term "immigrant" was used as synonymous with *fremmedarbeider* and thus ignored the non-working population of

migrants, regardless of their countries of origin or how they were viewed within racializing knowledges) shows the extent to which the racialized meanings of these terms had been naturalized.

The crucial issue that let politicians across the political spectrum vote for a legislation that many of them voiced unease with (Parliamentary debate 10 December: 1974 1928, 1955, 1958, 1963, 1965, 1977, 1978) was the racial construction that saw a small number of migrants as simultaneously the causes and sufferers of a wide range of problems and viewed extensive state intervention as the necessary and only solution to these *fremmedarbeider*-problems. In this construction, an immigration stop was "in the best interest of the foreigners themselves" (Minister Leif Aune, Labor Party, Parliament 10 December 1974, 1958), because efforts would be made to ensure that their working conditions and housing were substantially similar to those of Norwegian workers. All speakers relied on the assumption that Norwegian policy makers and the Norwegian state were best placed to decide what migrants' "best interest" were *and* the necessity of Norwegians putting structures in place that to the largest extent possible ensured that migrants acted in this interest. *Fremmedarbeideres* agency was largely denied as speakers assumed a moral high ground through references to, for example, their opposition to the exploitative reliance on "ready made" foreign labor that they see as inherent to international labor migration (e.g. Parliament 10 December 1974, 1924, 1933, 1934, 1939, 1948, 1965, 1970, 1972, 1973). Individual migrants are implicitly represented as little more than pawns in an exploitative international capitalist system. Though the Left made the most explicit references to ideas of capitalist and neo-colonial exploitation in this context, Conservative speakers shared the denunciation of any reliance on *fremmedarbeidere* for economic growth (see e.g. MP Sigrid Utkilen, Conservative Party, Parliament 10 December 1974, 1965).

The coupling of a group of migrants that are seen as inherently problematic with a colonial expectation of mastery both of national space and of the Other, produces a willingness to legislate accordingly. Rather than simply a racist conspiracy, however, it

is crucially the implicit belief in racial or racializing differences that underpin such legislative efforts. In other words, even though many actors in the processes leading up to the immigration stop had very laudable aims, their actions were based in and reproduced particular colonial articulations of race.[66]

Conclusion

The racializing processes of the first half of the 1970s were not all-encompassing; there were traces of non-racial taxonomies as well as fissures in the particularities of racial production. However, by late 1974, when Parliament was debating the proposed immigration stop, racial constructions had been sufficiently established that a common set of assumptions framed the debate. The immigration stop codified these assumptions, in turn reinforcing them. Over the course of the six year period from 1970 to 1975, then, Norwegian discourses of race settled into a familiar framework in which Orientalist ideas of nation and race determined questions of belonging and difference. In this chapter I have shown that these ideas naturalized the excessive difference presumed to be embodied in Asian and African – and sometimes Southern European – migrants. Inherent to this construction is that it must stand in binary opposition to another: Norwegians as well as northern European and North American migrants are unified here as a cultural and neighborly block that is "similar" in contrast to the excessive difference of other migrants.

The Norway that is portrayed in the discourses of nation, race and difference that I have examined here is not uniform. It is tolerant and hospitable, yet that tolerance and hospitality must not be tested lest it is found wanting. It is traditionally enmeshed in international networks of trade, or it is traditionally a closed society with little international experience. These various descriptions have in common a portrayal of Norwegian society as one that is able to change and as modern and liberated. Norwegians are also seen as managers and experts: in this discourses it is white Norwegians who are best placed to understand the lives of minorities and determine how they be "best" served with extensive social welfare measures. This racial production of

“immigrants” and “Norwegians” that commenced during the time period I have examined here has since been reiterated and solidified further.   In the next chapter I show that as a racial category that inherently emphasizes and naturalizes the belonging of “Norwegians” to and in the national territory and the lack of such belonging of “immigrants,” the production of “immigrant” as a racial category has serious and harmful effects.

NOTES

[1] The quote is from a letter to the editor from Randi Valen Fessl, published in *Aftenposten* 27 December 1974, discussing the then-imminent "immigration stop." *...en fjær i hatten for alle trangsynte nordmenn…*

[2] In the last decade, skilled labor migrants have originated in a wider range of countries. In 2006, the top sending countries for skilled labor in Norway were India, Russia, the US, China and the Philippines (Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion 2007: 38). Generally, the EU expansions since 2004, as well as concurrent changes in Norwegian immigration regulations to ease the entry of labour migrants, have altered the labor immigration patterns: there are more labor migrants, and they do not only come from "Western" countries (see UDI 2008).

[3] *Den pakistanske innvandringa kom brått på – og det var ei framand folkegruppe som ein ikkje visste mykje om. Dei vekte oppsikt.*

[4] The newspaper analysis is based on a careful reading of all issues of *Aftenposten* and *Aftenposten Aften* between 1970 and 1975, followed by coding and word searches. I then traced the discursive changes and meanings that emerged from the coding. In this chapter I discuss the topics that I through these methods identified as the most pertinent to shedding light on racial formation during this period. The policy documents and Parliamentary debate was analyzed through careful and repeated reading and discourse analysis.

[5]Themes that have dominated Norwegian productions of race since; see chapter four.

[6] *"Ut fra det grunnsyn at internasjonalt samarbeid og internasjonal kontakt og utveksling bør møte minst mulig restriksjoner og hindringer og at den individuelle arbeidstaker og arbeidsgiver bør ha størst mulig frihet til å inngå arbeidsavtaler, mener Regjeringen såleis at utlending som har sikret seg arbeid her i landet, som hovedregel ikke bør nektes arbeidstillatelse (...) vi [må] i framtida ... regne med å få en økende internasjonal kontakt og ... det vil bli stadig mer vanlig at folk krysser landegrensene, ikke bare som turister, men også for langvarige opphold. Dette er en del av den alminelige valgfrihet som framtidas mennesker vil kreve. Vi må regne med at flere utlendinger vil bo og arbeide i Norge, og flere nordmenn vil ønske å bo og arbeide utenlands. Denne utvikling må betraktes som naturlig og ønskelig, og det bør fra myndighetenes side legges minst mulig hindring i vegen for den."*

[7] The Nordic countries are Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

[8] The inclusion of refugees in a report on the labor market is at first glance odd, especially as Norway until the 1980s made a clear distinction between immigrants and refugees – including having completely separate administrative structures around each (Brochmann 2003: 167). However, the welcoming of refugees is mentioned as part of a list of potential scenarios in which the state would actively encourage foreigners to move to Norway. Because the report rejects the active recruitment of immigrants, the mention of development aid and refugees can be seen as exceptions to this rule.

[9] From 1 January 1970 work permits had to be issued prior to entry, and later that spring stricter rules were introduced that required migrants to report to the police. See Tjelmeland 2003: 112.

[10] Certain forms of racist discrimination were being criminalized in order to bring domestic law in line with the UN Convention on Racial Discrimination.

[11] At the time, the Norwegian Parliament had two chambers, Odelstinget and Lagtinget. Aftenposten and Arbeiderbladet report from the debate in Odelstinget. The distinction is immaterial to the discussion here, and I therefore only use the umbrella term "Parliament" (Stortinget).

[12] *"... vi nordmenn idag har råd til fullt ut å akseptere at det å være norsk ikke er bedre enn å tilhøre andre nasjoner og at det å tilhøre vår rase og tro slett ikke gjør oss bedre enn andre."*

[13] *"... at vi ikke har fått problematikken nært innpå livet ennå."*

[14] According to Tjelmeland (2003) this argument was also made in the immediate aftermath of WWII, when some politicians (and presumably others) held that Norway should not accept Jewish refugees because this would lead to anti-Semitism.

[15] *de kommende generasjoner vil bli vant med og vil akseptere at ikke alle er så "lyse og fagre" som det ariske forbilde. På den måten kan vi kanskje en gang for alle bli kvitt de "hitlerske" oppfatninger om raserenhet og rase-rangstige.*

[16] *Nasjonal Ungdomsfylkning anerkjenner moderne raseforsknings tese, som går ut på at det eksisterer arvebestemte, psykologiske nivå-forskjeller mellom folkerasene, og at det er rasen som er den kulturskapende faktor."*

[17] See Myking 2009:8 for a discussion of the distinctions between Rom, Roma, and Romani in the Nordic countries. Myking writes that the Romani and Rom see themselves, and are recognized as, separate groups in Norway (ibid.) and that the group discussed here uses Rom to describe themselves. The Rom is thought to have immigrated to Norway in the mid-1800s, whereas the Romani arrived about two hundred years earlier (Myking 2009: 10).

[18] Though my sources also include some group characteristics of the Norwegian majority population, these are not coupled with the suggestions of timelessness or inheritance that may make them racialized. The majority Norwegian self-image thus primarily emerges through implicit contrast to the groups that are racialized.

[19] In addition, foreigners were identified as refugees and by references to religion. The German-style "guest worker" and the Swedish-style "new citizen" (nye landsmenn) or "future citizen" (fremtidige landsmenn) were rarely used.

[20] *Den vanlige definisjon er en person som for en bestemt, kortere tid, tar arbeide i et annet land for å tjene penger til eget og familiens behov.*

[21] The Scandinavian countries are Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.

[22] In Aftenposten's coverage of labor migration, the only exceptions to this rule occurred at two points in 1974. When reporting on the exemptions to the proposed immigration stop the paper used the language of the White Paper, and its language consequently distinguished between the Nordic workers exempted from the stop, and the non-Nordic workers the stop ostensibly targeted (15 March 1974; 12 December 1974). More notably, in October 1974 Aftenposten reported on the expected arrival of 400 *fremmedarbeidere* in Arendal and Tromøy (23 October 1974). These workers were employed by a Dutch firm, were mostly Northern European, and were expected to be in Norway for approximately six months (they were specialists brought in to complete work on an oil installation). They were the subjects of considerable anxiety; Aftenposten first notes that "it is a completely new situation… the two municipalities of Arendal and Tromøy now find themselves in. The integration of so many foreigners in a relatively small society can be difficult" (ibid.).
Aftenposten published several articles discussing the problems the "invasion" of the foreign laborers is expected to cause (9 August 1974; 23 and 25 October 1974; 24 December 1974. On 12 April 1975 Aftenposten reports that there are "fewer problems than expected with the foreigners"). However, while all but one article (24 December 1974) includes at least a mention of an expected link between the foreign workers and undefined problems, in only one article are they referred to as *fremmedarbeidere*. The terms otherwise used are "guest worker" (*gjestearbeider* 9 August 1974) – which is rarely employed in Norway - and "foreigners" or "foreign workers" (*utlendinger* or *utenlandske arbeidere/ utenlandsarbeidere* 25 October 1974; 24 December 1974; 12 April 1975). This very limited use of *fremmedarbeider* to refer to European labor migrants thus do not in any significant way undermine its otherwise consistent use as a term that racialized (primarily) Asian and African migrants.

[23] *…en utenlandsk arbeider som kommer fra land syd for Alpene eller fra det vi kaller den tredje verden – altså fra en annen kulturkrets enn den vestlige.*

[24] *Her må fagfolk til – og det haster!*

[25] For example, Miroslav Pekar arrived in Norway in 1969 and spent his first six months there in an apartment with no hot water and eventually with no electricity (Miroslav Pekar, interview 9 October 2007).

[26] As noted earlier in this chapter, there is a general sense both from contemporary and current commentators that Norwegian immigration policies in the first half of the 1970s primarily sought to manage Pakistani and/or Asian and African migration (see e.g. Tjelmeland 2003:116; Brochmann 2003: 138), and the comparatively dense news coverage of Pakistani migrants is therefore to some extent expected.

[27] *De er lovlydige, beskjedne, rolige, høflige, det er lite eller intet bråk med dem. Det er åpenbart mennesker med en høy moral.*

[28] E.g. 7 July 1971; 14 July 1971; 23 August 1971; 15 March 1972; 25 November 1972; 21 July 1973; 21 November 1974; 22 November 1975.
[29] *[utføre] hygiene-arbeid blant hinduer*
[30] In light of the frequent and widespread use of racializing discourses in descriptions of Asians in Norway, the absence of racializing descriptions in *Aftenposten* targeting other non-Norwegian national or regional groups is notable: I have found no descriptions of European, South and North American, Middle Eastern or African migrants that rely on notions of inheritance, timelessness, or group characteristics. The absence is unlikely to be based in a lack of racial ideas about people in other regions of the world: as Gullestad (2007) shows, Norwegians have long nurtured a distinct set of racial ideas about Africans. Moldrheim also shows that Norwegian women's magazines in 1975 portrayed Asians and Africans – both in Norway and abroad - as culturally and sometimes also biologically different (2000). In Moldrheim's sources some concern is expressed from letter-writers and advice-columnists about the biological effects of having "inter-racial" children (2000, 140-142), which suggests that ideas of racial eugenics (e.g. Kline 2001) remained in circulation.

The absence in *Aftenposten*'s pages of distinct racial discourses focused on migrants who were not Asian, may be explained by their not having arrived in what was perceived as a wave (like the Pakistani migrants), and by their not being expected to stay (like Norwegian Rom).[30] African, Middle Eastern and South American migrants, then, were not excitingly exotic like Asian migrants could be (Moldrheim's research suggests that the racializing stereotypes surrounding Africans were largely negative, though African American celebrities were described in more 'positive' racializing language: 2000: 119-143), nor were they threatening like the Rom minority discussed below. Thus, the absence of a racializing language targeting other migrants may be seen as a signal that these groups were not considered in a positive light, and were not considered sufficiently important and/or threatening to warrant attention.
[31] I have found some limited evidence of resistance to this racialization of the *fremmedarbeider* category, most notably Bermann 1973: 28-29.
[32] See e.g. 5 June 70; 19 April 71; 10 July 71; 9 September 71; 13 January 72; 22 January 72; 1 March 72; 18 May 72; 13 June 72; 14 June 72; 16 June 72; 12 October 72; 24 January 73; 28 April 73; 10 November 73; 21 November 73; 18 October 74; 29 October 74; 31 December 73; 4 January 74; 2 August 74; 7 March 75.
[33] See e.g. 21 January 72; 7 March 72; 11 November 73; 1 December 73; 11 November 74.
[34] *Vi spør om ikke kong Polykarp vil at hans barn skal få en fremtid her i landet? I så fall må de på skole, sier vi – sikkerlig [sic] mer bestemt enn noen annen hittil har våget å tiltale et sigøyneroverhode. Polykarp slår i bordet og sier at herefter skal hvert eneste barn og samtlige unge på skolen. Hver eneste dag! Belevent legger han til: - ta mine ord på det, frue!"*
[35] *Det er sigøynarnane si livsførsel med lygn og svikferd som er årsaka til av vi helst vi få dei vekk frå våre trakter. Det kan vi då ikkje kalla diskriminering.*
[36] Refugees were in a more complex situation, but they also only arrived under state auspices during this period. During this period the major groups of refugees arrived from Uganda, Vietnam, and Chile. Brochmann argues that while the Vietnamese refugees did not expect to return to Vietnam, the Chilean refugees actively worked to overthrow Pinochet and return to Chile (2003:172-180. Brochmann does not comment on the Ugandan refugees, but contemporary sources suggest that they did not expect to return to Uganda though many hoped to eventually move to the UK or North America: see e.g. *Aftenposten* 15 November 1972).
[37] This term was briefly introduced as an alternative to "immigrant" but ironic uses of it soon came to dominate.
[38] See also OMOD 2006 for a discussion of the readiness of Norwegian authorities to remove youth from "immigrant" homes.
[39] The Green Paper sets out the conclusions of a committee that two years prior had been tasked with proposing changes to Norwegian immigration law in the face of increasing rates of labor immigration. At the time of the committee's establishment in October 1970, these increasing rates of labor immigration were miniscule (an overall increase of 1000 from the previous year, see NOU 1973:17:52), but the

perceived necessity of the committee's work - and the focus on particular migrants – was solidified the following spring. In June 1971 the committee was asked to propose "emergency measures" to better control and restrict the arrival of Pakistani labor migrants (*Aftenposten* 10 June 1971; 9 July 1971). As a result, on 9 July 1971 Norway reintroduced immigration control measures that required labor migrants to be issued work permits before entry and register with their local police district upon arrival (*Aftenposten* 9 July 1971). The committee worked for two years before presenting NOU 1973:17 to the Government on December 22, 1972. Given the legal changes that were ultimately made on the basis of this Green Paper, it is remarkable that the immigration stop was proposed by a minority (though eventually passed with significant exemptions). Three of the committee's nine members were behind the proposal, with the remaining six supporting various restrictions and changes in immigration law, but not a ban on labor immigration. The Paper, then, introduced the idea of a "stop" but did not recommend one.

[40] In comparison, Denmark in 1973 had a population of 4.9 million and a non-Western immigrant population of 40 000 (Togeby 1998:1140). While "non-Western" is not defined here, given on-going trends in Danish immigration statistics, it is safe to assume that this number represents at most 1/3 of all migrants in Denmark at the time (www.statistikbanken.dk).

[41] *Det er antall ikke-nordboere som representer hva man vanligvis forbinder med utenlandske arbeidstakere i Norge.*

[42] *…spenner over et vidt register*

[43] For the geographically challenged, the distance between Oslo and the east coast of the USA is about twice that of the distance between Oslo and Istanbul (a north-western city in Turkey).

[44] This is unlikely to be entirely correct, as foreign seamen – many from Southern Europe – often spent some months in Norway between hires. Elphidios Biros, interview 10 October 2007.

[45] The inclusion of Eastern Europe here is an exception to the rule, inasmuch as newspaper coverage as well as the Green and White Paper focused on Southern Europe only. Due to the manner in which statistics were collected in this period, this number reflects any employed person with citizenship in these regions, regardless of the permit they have in Norway. In other words, these numbers include not only labor migrants, but also refugees, foreigners born in Norway, former Norwegians who lost their citizenship through marriage, and those who migrated to Norway following marriage (NOU 1973:17:164-165). It can be assumed that a majority of foreign workers from Eastern Europe arrived as refugees and asylum-seekers rather than as labor migrants.

[46] *Det er naturlig å skille utenlandske arbeidstakere og arbeidssøkere i to hovedgrupper: Utlendinger hvis bakgrunn, utdannelse m.v. gjør at de forholdsvis lett finner seg til rette i Norge – og utlendinger hvis kulturelle bakgrunn, manglende språkkunnskaper og utdannelse gjør tilpassing vanskelig både på arbeidsplassen og i samfunnet forøvrig. Denne siste gruppen utgjør hoveddelen av "gjestearbeiderne" selv om det blandt dem finnes flere med meget solid utdannelse og for hvem språkvanskene ikke er så store.*

[47] The Green Paper committee was split in its policy recommendations, and therefore offered a minority and majority proposal (to my knowledge, a rare occurrence). The minority statement, offered from what at the time was considered a Left perspective, advocated an immigration stop. The *fremmedarbeider* representative on the committee was part of the minority statement. The majority advocated for greater immigration control but not an immigration stop. Although in the subsequent White Paper (discussed below) an immigration stop is proposed and this is ultimately passed, "the immigration stop" regulations had such extensive exceptions that, in a sense, the ultimate legislation were closest to a racist version of the majority proposal.

[48] *....fattige land i Sør-Europa og andre verdensdeler.*

[49] *Problemene har meldt seg spesielt i de senere år, da landet har mottatt arbeidstakere fra land som har et kulturmønster som er svært forskjellig fra vårt.*

[50] The discourses of gender, generation, and kinship structures that I discuss in the next chapter were not a topic in my sources (although this is a topic where my reliance on Conservative paper wedded to "traditional" gender roles at a time when these were generally undergoing change may give an inaccurate picture of the broader discourse. However, such topics are also not reflected in the policy documents, that largely ignore women altogether). To the extent that *fremmedarbeidere*'s families are acknowledged, the

discussion tends to be on the incorporation of children who do not speak Norwegian into Norwegian schools.

[51] *Det er stor forskjell på utlendingenes evne og muligheter for å tilpasse seg de stedlige forhold på boligmarkedet. Forholdene er særlig vanskelig for enkelte arbeidstakere fra fjerne land. Disse stiller imidlertid også mindre krav til boligens standard enn den innlandske befolkning.*

[52] *...en viss diskriminering .... størst overfor borgere fra fjerne land med andre skikker og annen hudfarge.*

[53] Aftenposten reported extensively on the housing problems *fremmedarbeidere* were faced with, and organizations such as the Red Cross and Caritas as well as the Oslo municipality were engaged in creating housing opportunities for *fremmedarbeidere*. While the reasons for *fremmedarbeideres* particularly vulnerable position in this market was rarely mentioned in any of Aftenposten's articles on proposed solutions, the paper did in separate articles report on widespread racism that made it particularly difficult for *fremmedarbeidere* to find affordable housing (see above).

[54] *...demper det politiske presset som arbeidsløshet og underbeskjeftigelse kan ha skapt ....forhale[r] de strukturendringer som de fattige land må gjennomføre for at en positiv økonomisk utvikling kan komme i gang.*

[55] This perspective is closely associated with the left at this time (as opposed to the structural adjustment plans of the neoliberal right). The Green Paper minority position is aligned with the left, and in particular with the views of the Association of *fremmedarbeidere*.

[56] By accepting poor working conditions and low wages while being reluctant to join Unions, labor migrants were perceived to undermine Union efforts to improve wage levels and working conditions. Emigration is also seen as a brain drain (*Arbeiderbladet* 9 July 1971; *Aftenposten* 20 November 1973) that, according to the Green Paper minority position "These arguments exclusively target the minority of migrants arriving from "distant countries." This is most commonly made evident through the additional presentation of arguments regarding whether or not accepting labor migrants is a form of development aid (see e.g. *Aftenposten* 29 May 1971; 26 October 1971; 27 February 1974; 11 December 1974) and the assumption that labor migrants are forced into migration due to the poverty and destitution in their home countries (e.g. *Aftenposten* 14 February 1974; 16 February 1974). There is nothing inherent in these arguments that limit their reach to workers from poorer countries. Indeed, these arguments would likely be strengthened by focusing not on migrants countries' of origins, but on their positions in the labor force. Proponents of this view did make reference to their opposition to *fremmedarbeidere* becoming concentrated in low-paying, hazardous jobs (e.g. *Aftenposten* 10 January 1974), though because the link between *fremmedarbeidere* and "distant countries" was so firmly established, my sources do not indicate whether e.g. Nordic migrants were also working in low-paying jobs – it is therefore unclear whether this is a structural or a racial argument. Furthermore, the arguments against the concentration of *fremmedarbeidere* in particular jobs were never coupled with addressing, for example, the de-skilling of skilled migrants from "distant" countries (NOU 1973:17: 143). The focus in these worries about the effects of the entry of *particular* migrants, is not on immigration as such, nor is it on the overall well-being of migrant workers. Rather, a racialized and racializing interpretation of the relationship between foreign and domestic workers emerges, where the latter's positions are threatened *only* by the entry of workers understood to be materially different.

[57] In contrast to state-organized group migration of foreign workers, which has been consistently rejected by Norwegian authorities.

[58] *Ikke antar omfang eller former som må anses som uheldige både for utlendingene selv og for vårt eget samfunn.*

[59] *...fra en rekke nasjonale gruppers side drives [det] et aktivt arbeid for å skaffe landsmenn arbeid her i landet.*

[60] From my sources it appears that the "breathing room" phrase was first used to explain the necessity of the immigration stop in the fall of 1974 by the committee from the Ministry of Local Government and Environment responsible for recommending the White Paper proposals to Parliament (see *Aftenposten* 26 November 1974). It quickly became short-hand for the justifications for the immigration stop, and the phrase continues to be used today to explain the reasons for the stop (see e.g. Hagelund 2003: 71).

[61] *Det norske samfunn er imidlertid så lite og har en slik bosettings- og næringslivsstruktur at det rår snevre grenser for hvor stor innvandring som kan absorberes her uten at store problemer oppstår.*
[62] *Innvandringen må derfor holdes under kontroll, og det må stilles krav for å sikre at utlendingenrs vilkår i Norge blir akseptable.*
[63] All migrants arguably come from "other cultures" and as such this statement is correct if banal. However, Berntsen is referring to Asian and African migrants, and in this context his statement is wrong: a small *minority* of migrants come from these regions.
[64] *...i stor grad.... fra andre kulturer... særlig sårbare ....[overfor våre] uoverveide ord og handlinger*
[65] *... på en mate some r vårt land verdig.*
[66] The final legislation includes a long list of exceptions, with the effect that the only migration that was in any way "stopped" was of those filling unskilled or low skilled jobs *and* originating in countries not part of the Nordic countries or OECD (*Aftenposten* 27 November 1974). This meant that labor migrants from Asia, Africa and parts of southern Europe were the most affected. In contrast to the stop itself, the list of exceptions was a source of considerable debate. The list of exemptions prompted contemporary arguments that the legislation was little more than a poorly hidden attempt to ensure that only "western" migrants gained entry in the future (see e.g. Parliamentary debate 10 December 1974: 1938, 1947, 1954, 1958-59, 1963, 1967), and this was adamantly denied by Berntsen and other speakers (ibid.). In later analyses, academic commentators have been split as to whether the aim of the legislation in fact was to limit Asian and African immigration. Brochmann points out that there is no evidence that "expert labor" – a central category in the list of exceptions - from developing countries were discriminated against, though, she acknowledges, very few such migrants arrived after 1975 (2003: 150). Puntervold Bø, on the other hand, asserts that the stop was "an unambiguous barring of workers from the third world"[66] (2004: 28). My sources do not fully support either conclusion, and neither Brochmann nor Puntervold Bø cites much evidence to back up their claims. Brochmann's narrow reading of what would constitute a discriminatory effect is at best naïve, yet Puntervold Bø implicitly suggests a racist conspiracy that is a gross simplification of the process through which the legislation was developed and passed.

Chapter Four
Legislating Love: Norwegian Family Reunification Legislation as a Racial Project

In the previous chapter I showed that by the middle of the 1970s, Norwegian conceptions of difference and belonging had solidified around particular phenotypical markers. Within this taxonomic system, perceptions of "dark skin color" signal an excessive difference, one that suggests inassimilability and a "proper" belonging in strange cultures and places far away. As those residents of Norway identified as excessively different also became coterminous with "immigrants" the latter term was established as the primary way of referring to people living in Norway and not seen as white. Of course, in the early to mid 1970s, while most immigrants were read as "white" and were *not* seen as excessively different, the vast majority of those who were not read as white had in fact immigrated. As such the term was not applied in a factually wrong manner, though, crucially, it functioned as a category of race rather than migration. However, today many of those who continue to be viewed as "immigrants" have never migrated: they are born in Norway or have lived there most of their lives, and are Norwegian citizens.[1] In this chapter I examine one legislative effort – the use of immigration law to combat forced marriages - that exemplifies both the effects of viewing some citizens as "immigrants" and the ways in which the racializing "immigrant" category is continuously reproduced.

Immigration law, according to Kevin R. Johnson, can offer a "magic mirror" that reflects domestic "race relations" (1998, 1114). This holds true, I suggest, even in places such as Norway, where ostensibly 'race' – and hence "race relations" – does not exist. In the Norwegian context an analysis of the uses of immigration law can highlight some of the ways that the state remains deeply involved in racializing and externalizing particular Norwegian *citizens*. In this chapter I argue that the recent Norwegian legislative movement towards using immigration regulation to "combat forced marriages" is a racial project (Omi and Winant 1994, 56) that melds border

control with intra-national processes of racialization. In arguing that the use of immigration law to "combat forced marriages" is a racial project, I see the discourses around the law and the structures and legal frameworks imposed by the law as forming a nexus through which racial meaning is reproduced. These meanings closely reflect those established by the mid-1970s (see chapter three), and illustrate the ongoing production and effects of these earlier racial constructions.

In this chapter, I focus in particular on the racialization of national space – what Ghassan Hage discusses as the (racialized) spatial management of the nation (2000, esp. chapter 1) – that is simultaneously enabled and produced through the use of immigration law to prevent forced marriages. The main focus of the chapter is on the ways in which immigration law attempts to interpellate particular groups whose citizenship status ought to place them beyond immigration law's regulatory reach. While migrants certainly are directly affected by the state's decision to use immigration law to manage the lives of its citizens, these effects are not my primary concern here. Rather than using immigration law to consider the international movement of people, this analysis looks at a specific development of Norwegian immigration controls to illuminate domestic processes of racialization.

Norwegian family reunification legislation, and in particular those parts of it that are focused on preventing and uncovering forced marriages, are looking for particular enactments of love (Flemmen 2008). In this chapter I show that in the discourses that surround this legislation, love is a mystical force that draws two (and only two) people together in an intimate relationship that is built entirely on an interior landscape of affect and without regard for the social, economic, or other attributes of the individuals concerned. Love in this conception is a practice and justification for liberal freedom: it at once signals the autonomy of liberal subjects and the inherent good of societies structured around this subject (Cott 2000; Povinelli 2006). As such, love becomes the marker of the liberal Western society and is implicitly or explicitly contrasted with those places that are simultaneously produced as threats to love and thereby threats to liberal society. These threatening spaces (and the people associated

with them) are associated with trajectories of couple formation that subsume the individual to various constraints and in this manner undermine the self-actualizing subject at the heart of liberal forms of governance and social organization (Passerini 2009; Povinelli 2006, 2007).

Precisely because love has such an apparently unassailable position as the ultimate good at the heart of liberal Western societies, the focus on romantic couple-based love as the pivot on which marital legitimacy – and therefore the legitimacy of any immigration application stemming from the marriage – rests, is especially effective in obfuscating the racializing effects of this discourse. In the debates I discuss here about the use of immigration law to combat forced marriages, the primacy of romance and a couple-based love is naturalized across political discourse, and I argue that the discursive focus on identifying love (or its absence) serves as a smokescreen, hiding the racializing logics that operate in and through these debates. By excavating the racial constructions and conceptions of national belonging that are (re)produced in the search for enactments of love, I unpack central discursive moves that connect images of the nation with specific kinship practices, and that positions some citizens as incompletely present in national space.[2] In arguing that exaltments of love and romance form part of a racializing logic, this chapter diverges from most work on love in relation to racialization which tends to focus on the individual, and specifically on the prevalence of and conditions for inter-racial marriages (e.g. Root 2001; but see Povinelli 2006, 2007).

While other areas of immigration law could be similarly analyzed,[3] family reunification, and in particular the use of family reunification policy to combat forced marriages, is of special interest: first, family reunification is the major route of immigration to Norway (NOU 2004: 20, 43, 50) and the specificities of these laws therefore have very concrete effects on the demographics of incoming migrants and on the ability of Norwegian citizens and residents to enact transnational lives. Secondly, family reunification legislation and forced marriages – and the use of the

former to prevent the latter – are topics that have been prominent across media, political, and academic discourses for roughly a decade. The particular discourses around this use of the law have therefore entered the mainstream in ways that other legislative discussions do not.

The laws and regulations that have been proposed and/or enacted in this context take as their explicit primary target the "protection" of a group of citizens that is understood to be otherwise unable or unwilling to act in their own best interest. In other words, youth – particularly young women – with family ties in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, are perceived to be the victims of forced marriages to spouses from their parents' or grandparents' home countries. On the view that such marriages mainly take place in order to ensure migration to Norway for the non-Norwegian spouse (Bredal 1999; NOU 2004:20), the Norwegian state has altered family reunification legislation with the express purpose of making this migration particularly difficult or impossible until such a time that the Norwegian spouse is seen to be "old enough" to "withstand family pressure" (which is currently perceived to occur when someone turns 23: see Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 2003). This immigration legislation, then, does not primarily seek to ensure that the migrants it targets fulfill particular personal characteristics before being granted entry to Norway. Rather, it aims to ascertain that the Norwegian sponsor's feelings fulfill state expectations; the latter are especially focused on determinations that the Norwegian spouse has "freely consented" to the marriage – that s/he has found love.

This analysis focuses on the period from 1999 to 2007, during which the Norwegian state moved from rejecting any link between immigration control and forced marriages, to making this linkage central to its program to "combat forced marriages" (see Ministry of Children and Equality 2007). This move, I argue, highlights and reflects the ways in which discourses of gender, race, and nation congealed during these years to shape an increasingly overt identification of those not perceived to be white with practices that places this group incompletely present in national space.

The discursive placement of some citizens incompletely in national space means that the nation can be imagined as potentially "pure" – untainted by the practices that are invested with negative racializing meaning. The aspiration to this "purity" requires surveillance, policing, and maintenance of the demarcation between those belonging to, and therefore present in, the nation, and those whose extraneousness must be maintained in the face of their physical presence. Thus, in familiar Orientalist binaries, Norwegian national space is characterized in these discourses by individual freedom and autonomy while "Third World" spaces are constructed as oppressive and subjugating.

Beyond these familiar binaries, however, the conflation of racialized practices, people, and spaces also means that groups of Norwegian citizens and residents are never fully visible *in* national space. This occluded visibility *in* the nation does not render the group generally invisible: as has been noted about negative racializing processes elsewhere (e.g. Samantrai 2002; Hage 2000), such processes leave its subjects hyper-visible. In the context of Norwegian discourses around forced marriage, however, the hyper-visibility that comes with being the presumed objects of an on-going media focus on the perils of "Muslim" kinship practices (Øia and Vestel 2007) is coupled with being invisible as national subjects.

Being hyper-visible in the public sphere yet largely invisible as a national subject means being perceived as a problem to be managed and educated, but not as a member of the nation having standing to debate and think about one's own life and the life of the nation. As Ghassan Hage points out, such marking of particular groups as problems for the nation positions these groups as objects to be managed by those whose presence in the nation is simultaneously naturalized (2000: 36-47). Thus, it is not incidental to processes of racialization that Norwegian discussions of how to best counteract forced marriages only to a very limited extent considers the views of, for example, "immigrant" feminist activist groups: For example, the objections of MiRA-Senteret, an NGO for and by "immigrant women" which has worked with questions of forced marriage for decades, to the use of immigration law to combat

forced marriages were dismissed by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Affairs in its summary of responses to the proposals for new immigration laws targeting forced marriages (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Affairs 2005; though see Siim and Skjeie 2008, 338). The limited formal attention paid to the expertise of "immigrant" activist groups and professionals – and the attendant focus on the views, concerns, and proposals of white "Norwegian" experts and activists, speak to the distinction between those whose role it is to be worried *about*, and those who may do the worrying (Hage 2000, 10, 17).[4] As Hage argues, the latter group, whose belonging to and in the nation is naturalized, are thought to inhabit the national will, which in turn means that their gaze polices and manages the nation (Hage 2000, 46).

The overwhelming concern with particular enactments of couple-focused, romantic love in Norwegian discussions of "immigrant" kinship practices points to the contours of what is seen as acceptable practices for nationals. The concomitant willingness to legislate in the name of this model of love and marriage speaks to the power of the link between the nation and particular enactments of love: "love-marriages" is not only the optimal model, it is the only model the nation -and state-fully accepts (Coontz 2005; Cott 2000; Povinelli 2006). Here I show that a division is produced in which love-based couplings (whether opposite-or same-sex) are normative while all other couplings are queer. In this view, love must be understood as propelling the coupling rather than result from it; trajectories to love can take numerous forms, but must happen in person (rather than, say, online with no in person meeting prior to marriage), must not be centrally initiated and facilitated by family members (though e.g. being set up on a blind date by friends would be an acceptable trajectory towards a coupling), and must be the basis on which a conscious decision of couple-formation is based.

The use of law as a pedagogical and coercive tool that intervenes in the details of family structures and lives must be placed in the context of a century-long history of such uses of the law in Norway. As Melby et al argue, the extensive reforms in

marriage legislation in the first decades of the twentieth century were "both formal and substantive" (2006, 655) and "the law demonstrated what a good marriage would look like" (2006, 656).[5] The early marriage reforms liberalized divorce and sought to establish equality between the spouses; through these reforms the state wanted to ensure a healthy and growing population (Melby et al 2000, 2006). Indeed, though the reforms emphasized the individual rights of each spouse, a significant impetus for the reforms were the eugenic theories popular at the time. Concerned about falling marriage rates, eugenicists were eager to find ways to ensure that "fit" women chose marriage and motherhood (Melby et al 2006; also see Kline 2001). Reforms that meant that women did not lose their legal personhood upon marriage and that eased access to divorce were therefore attractive both for feminists and for those who saw this as a way to promote and stabilize heterosexual marriages (Melby et al 2000, 14-15; 2006, 657, 659). David Bradley argues that a Scandinavian tendency to cede extensive powers to the state is visible in this family legislation (2000, 47, 51), and Melby et al simply assume a positive view of state intervention in family life – including where that intervention is based on eugenic theories (2006 throughout).

Given this history of state usage of marriage legislation as a pedagogical tool in processes of social engineering -and the attendant and ongoing acceptance of such use- when the dominant Norwegian public today expects and accepts far-reaching state involvement in dictating family forms, this cannot be assumed to be solely a reflection of the management of particular racialized groups. It is not, therefore, the very use of law to dictate family forms that is part of a racial project; rather, it is through the framing and content of such laws that the groups targeted by the law are racialized.

Legislating Love to Combat Forced Marriages

The first Norwegian legislative consideration of forced marriages came in 1995, when the Marriage Act was amended to invalidate such marriages. In the following years, further legal changes were not considered necessary: the government concluded in its first Action Plan Against Forced Marriages (1998-2001)[6] that existing laws were

sufficient to protect individuals who were targets of forced marriage (Ministry of Children and Equality, n.d., Chapter 8; Fangen 2002, 13). By the expiration of the first Action Plan in late 2001, however, the context in which debates about forced marriages were conducted had changed considerably. According to Nina Dessau (2003), through a series of events – including the October 2000 selective use by Norwegian television channel TV2 of secretly taped interviews with Imams in Oslo expressing hostility to "Norwegian values," 9/11, and the January 2002 murder of Fadime Sahindal in Sweden in what was termed an "honor killing" – a set of negative understandings of all "immigrants" (and certainly all Muslims: the two are often conflated in these debates) came to be established "truths" among dominant Norwegian media and politicians (and therefore also the dominant public).

The changed context of the political climate is evident in the "Renewed Efforts Against Forced Marriages Spring 2002" report from the Ministry, which includes nine specific proposals for legal changes, the first two of which refer to immigration legislation. Since the 2002 plan, the focus on legislative initiatives has come to dominate debates about forced marriages: the Criminal Act has been amended to include forced marriages (Section 222), extensive amendments have been made to the Immigration Act and the Immigration Regulations, and the Marriage Act has been altered with regards to marriages contracted outside Norway: the changes to the Marriage Act include disallowing any special permits for marriage to those between 16 (age of consent) and 18 (legal adulthood, at which point a marriage can be contracted), and, perhaps most notably, a statement that "women and men have the same right to choose a spouse freely. They shall contract the marriage of their own free will and by their own consent" (Marriage Act, Section 1a, Ministry of Children and Equality 2006. See also Ministry of Children and Equality 2007). The Norwegian state, in other words, has moved from making assurances that no further legal changes were needed, to making far-reaching amendments to a broad swath of laws.

The inclusion of a statement regarding free will and autonomous consent in an Act that already makes specific provision for the invalidity of forced marriages suggests that it is not legal needs that are being met through the Section.[7] Sherene Razack argues that statements such as this implicitly invoke a "clash of civilizations" in which "a modern, enlightened West" must defend itself against "a medieval Islam" (2008, 5). Section 1a of the Marriage Act, then, serves to confirm what a "good marriage'' looks like, while simultaneously invoking the specter of those who disregard its command (see also Povinelli 2006). The latter is particularly notable given the uniform agreement that forced marriages are bad, are and should be against the law, and that no religious denomination claims scriptural support for such marriages. Outlawing forced marriages is therefore not contested, and in arguing that legislation targeting forced marriages is part of a racial project I am not suggesting that the state should not take seriously this form of domestic violence. Contrary to suggestions from liberal feminists such as Norwegian journalist/activist Hege Storhaug (e.g. 2003) or the late U.S.-based philosopher Susan Moller Okin (1999), critiques of the framing of discourses around patriarchal practices do not translate to support for such practices (see Volpp 2001).

The use of immigration law to combat forced marriages most clearly highlights the ways in which the framing of such marriages and the attempt to prevent them can be understood as a racial project. As a border management system, the taxonomies and restrictions that immigration law relies on speaks to reigning national imaginaries of how migrants ought to enter the national space, as well as which migrants are un/desirable in that space. The changes in specific immigration regulations also illustrate shifting political climates: the increasing focus in the dominant public sphere on "immigrant" kinship practices (and in particular arranged and forced marriages) and the attendant pathologizing of these can be seen as a result of family reunification having become a primary route of immigration to Norway. This changing climate has in turn led to a growing acceptance of legal restrictions that specifically target transnational family structures.

The government document that most explicitly and extensively discusses the rationale for using immigration law to prevent forced marriages is the 2004 Green Paper on the New Immigration Act (NOU 2004:20). The Green Paper sets out the findings of a Government-appointed task force[8] that made the first set of recommendations regarding the new Immigration Act.[9] While the work of the task force operated within a pre-established framework that the Government provided, its members exercised considerable power in setting out the "expert opinion" on the questions posed. Furthermore, the Green Paper must consider the responses to its initial proposals from interested parties (in a consultation period). The Green Paper is therefore interesting both for the ways in which it negotiates the sorts of "truths" established in the popular discourses on questions of forced marriages, and also for the remarkable consistency with such discourses that the document shows.

The overarching framework in the Green Paper for the discussion of immigration control in general, and family reunification specifically, is a sense that immigration from Asia, Africa, and South America is a problem that must be limited and carefully managed. This framing is evident in the introductory remarks about family reunification, where the committee argues that a separation should be made between family *reunification* and family *establishment* (defined as a relationship in which the spouses have lived together for less than six months; NOU 2004:20, 216); the latter, the committee argues, does not require the same sort of protection as the former, in part because the latter can be used as a migration strategy where the migration rather than the establishment of a family is one of the primary motivations for the marriage (NOU 2004: 20, 212).[10] The unstated assumption here is that there is a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable family establishment logics and trajectories. The Green Paper does not view romantic love as a possible cause of "family establishment"[11] (ibid.) and implicitly it is this presumed absence of romantic love that renders these marriages less worthy of protection (ibid.). In turn, the applications for family reunification based on the marriages can, in the Green Paper's view, be subjected to more stringent criteria than those for "true" family reunification (ibid.). Thus, though unspoken, some forms of transnational "family establishment" are

assumed to be primarily about migration. Migration, in turn, is an unacceptable incentive for *some* marriages.

In viewing transnational family establishment as a problem in need of management, the Green Paper does not cast its net so broadly as to suggest that all marriages between Norwegians and non-Norwegians invoke such management needs. The feature of international marriages that appear to signal state management needs is the perception of the extent to which the spouse in Norway is seen as properly national. Race is of crucial importance here: for instance, while finding a "proper" interior landscape of romantic love in the Norwegian spouse is of crucial importance where that spouse is otherwise seen by the dominant public (including policy makers and state authorities such as embassy personnel, police officers, and immigration bureaucrats) as incompletely in the nation, such landscapes of affect are of little to no import where the presence in the nation of the Norwegian spouse is otherwise naturalized.[12] Thus, while it has been noted that most Russian and Thai women who migrate to Norway do so as the spouse of a white Norwegian male, and while there are presumptions that many of these migrants may primarily be interested in leaving their home countries, in the Green Paper this migration is not thought to require enactments of love from either spouse (though see Flemmen 2008).[13] In contrast, the migration of, for example, Pakistani, Iraqi, or Somali men and women to Norway following a marriage to a Norwegian whose ancestry lies in the migrating spouse's country of origin does require enactments of love.[14] The split between the ways in which the state sees its management strategies in relation to the different racialized positionings of the Norwegian spouse can be seen in the divergent ways that marriage-as-migration-strategy is discussed. Marriage-as-migration-strategy is a concern in three topics the Green Paper considers: pro forma marriages, marriages where the Norwegian spouse has a criminal record based on domestic violence and abuse, and forced –and arranged marriages.

In its discussion of pro forma marriages and potentially abusive relationships the Green Paper states that "there will, due to the differences between the poor and the

rich world, be situations in which the applicant's motivation for the marriage is to ensure a better life for themselves and their children"[15] (231, see also 229). The marriage-as-migration-strategy is also noted in relation to arranged and forced marriages, but here it more briefly asserted that "some of the arranged trans-national marriages seem to be largely motivated by a migration strategy"[16] (241). On the one hand, the acknowledgment of the use of family reunification as a means of migration merely confirms the reality that most other routes of migration to Norway (and Europe more generally, see NOU 2004:20, 50) are closed – and that there are significant economic reasons why migration may be a particularly compelling socio-economic strategy in the Third World. On the other hand, the discussions of marriage-as-migration-strategy are far from uniform, and there is an underlying sense that whereas this strategy is at best acceptable and at worst not a hinder in some family constellations, in others it becomes part of the argument for restricting migration through family reunification ("family establishment" in the words of the Green Paper) as much as possible.

In the Green Paper's discussion of pro forma and potentially abusive marriages the marriage-as-migration-strategy is not considered a problem in and of itself. Given that this migration form is the very basis on which the designation "pro forma marriage" is based, one might reasonably expect that marriages suspected of being entered into pro forma are subject to particular scrutiny. However, discussing potentially pro forma marriages the Green Paper notes that these are difficult to uncover, and that where it is "clear that it is *only the applicant* [i.e. the non-Norwegian spouse] who see the primary purpose of the relationship between the parties as forming a basis for a residence permit"[17] (229, my italics), then "seen on its own, it cannot be a goal to prevent the [residence] in Norway through such marriages as long as there is no reason to doubt that the marriage is intended to be a reality"[18] (229). Here, two assumptions stand out; first, the Green Paper assumes that where only one of the spouses enters into the marriage pro forma, it is necessarily the non-Norwegian spouse whose motivations undermine "the reality" of the marriage (even as it also discusses the potential economic remuneration the Norwegian spouse may

receive, 227) . As I discuss further below, this echoes assumptions made in the discussion of forced marriages, where it is presumed that the migrating spouse consents to the marriage (e.g. NOU 2004:20, 241): in both instances, migration is presented as such a strong motivating factor that no other considerations need to be made for the migrant (see also Flemmen 2008).

Secondly, in sharp contrast to the Green Paper's conceptualization of migration considerations in forced marriages (where the fact of migration is taken as evidence that the migrating spouse consents to the marriage), in pro forma marriages the "reality" of the marriage (usually conceived of as a couple living together and proving that they are not merely "room-mates," see e.g. 227 and endnote 12 below) trumps the significance of the migrant's presumed "non-romantic" motivation for the marriage. The Green Paper discusses a number of potential pro forma scenarios, but it nevertheless appears to assume that such marriages mainly occur where the Norwegian spouse has no prior familial ties to the country of origin of the non-Norwegian spouse. This assumption is particularly evident in the list provided of the sorts of topics that can be indicative of a pro forma marriage: all of these assume that the spouses either have minimal knowledge of each other, are in an untraditional relationship (e.g. substantial age difference, no common language) or living arrangement (e.g. a previous spouse lives in the same household) (228). When met, these criteria may indicate a pro forma marriage, but they have little bearing on situations where, for example, the spouses are relatives (227). The "circumvention" of immigration legislation through pro forma marriages, then, does not invoke the discourses of abuse or pathology that forced marriages do. This is not necessarily because such marriages do not involve abuse: anecdotal evidence suggests that some do.[19] There is indeed no evidence that suggests that the potential for spousal abuse in pro forma marriages is less than that in involuntary marriages. Notably, there are no data that suggests that the dramatic stories of abuse that have been raised in the media are the "norm" for involuntary marriages (see e.g. Zaman 2004, Bredal 1999). The contrast between the discourses around the perceived marriage-as-migration-strategy

therefore cannot immediately be explained by the migrants themselves, or by the potential domestic violence associated with the marriages.

A similarly "generous" view of the use of marriage-as-migration-strategy is evident in the discussion of the potential abuse of a (presumed female) migrant by a (presumed white male) person resident in Norway (231). The Green Paper proposes broadened powers to reject such applications on the basis that there is a likelihood that the applicant will be subject to abuse (232-233), noting that such a rejection does not necessarily prevent the parties from living together but merely prevents them from initially doing so in Norway (231, once the applicant has lived with the reference for some time the Green Paper assumes that she will know the reference sufficiently that "it is no longer the duty or the responsibility of the authorities to consider the well-being of the [applicant when processing an application for family reunification]"' 232). The Green Paper asserts that it has no information as to the number of applications in which the potential for abuse is at stake, and notes that such numbers are "of little relevance"[20] (232) as a legal framework in which to reject such applications is needed. In this context, the Norwegian spouse is vilified but also positioned as an individual: it is not "Norwegian culture" that makes him abusive. The potential for such abusive relationships also has not led to the introduction of extensive laws and regulations that would launch more invasive surveillance of the relationships and make family reunification more difficult for white Norwegian men marrying women from economically poorer countries.

The racial construction of forced marriages

The Green Paper discussion of forced marriages departs significantly from its discussion of pro forma and potentially abusive marriages. This departure is near-complete; while the marriage-as-migration-strategy remains a theme, even the framing of this strategy shifts dramatically. Marriage-as-migration-strategy is no longer an understandable result of uneven economic wealth, but rather becomes parts of the pathology of the kinship practices of (in particular) Pakistanis. In addition, a number of other themes come to the fore that serves to position forced marriages as

merely the extreme expression of a set of pre-modern cultural beliefs and practices. Forced marriages here become symptomatic of "Pakistani culture" (or sometimes "Muslim culture"[21]) as a homogenized whole, and the condemnation of forced marriages often blends all too seamlessly into a more general construction of "Pakistani culture" as inherently backward, violent, and oppressive.

The blending of discussions of forced marriage with wider constructions of "culture" is achieved in part through an incessant focus on the link between arranged and forced marriages. The Green Paper notes that "it is not always easy to identify the boundary between unacceptable pressure that may constitute force, and less serious forms of pressure and convincing from parents with more or less strong views on who their children ought to marry"[22] (239). Though considerable effort is expended on finding a way to differentiate between one and the other, an underlying theme to the discussion is that neither marriage form is acceptable; indeed arranged marriages are often seen as necessarily the result of some level of force. (see e.g. NOU 2004:20, 239, 243 and Ot. prp. 75 2007-2008). Though placing forced marriages in a wider context is important in understanding some of the mechanisms through which this form of domestic violence takes shape, the constant reiterations that forced marriages stem from arranged marriages – which in turn are represented as central aspects of "Pakistani culture" – also work to make forced marriages emblematic of Pakistan. In addition to reflecting a long-standing liberal and Orientalist pre-occupation with the "freedom" of the "autonomous subject" to make its own choices (for critiques of these discourses and constructions see e.g. Ahmed 1992; Volpp 2001), this conflation of arranged and forced marriages and the simultaneous focus on identifying the precise boundary between them suggests a teleological hierarchization in which romance-based marriages are elevated as the final goal.

In this hierarchical conceptualization of trajectories to romantic relationships, the Green Paper posits dominant Norwegian understandings of love and couple-establishment as heteronormative, while any departure from this norm is rendered queer. Halberstam argues that we can think of queer as "an outcome of strange

temporalities, imaginative life schedules, an eccentric economic practices" (2005, 1). The queerness that is produced in Norway in relation to non-romanced based marriages functions in similar ways; it does not reference sexual object-choice, but rather a nexus of space, race, time, and comportments of love. Through these nexuses some heterosexualities are produced as "bad" and (therefore) queer. For example, in transnational marriages where one spouse is from Pakistan[23] and the Norwegian spouse - through a combination of racial constructions and narratives of descent - is understood as "really" from Pakistan, it becomes particularly important for the spouses to display normative Norwegian trajectories to marriage in order not to be understood as queer. The specific combination of time and love is of central importance here: the spouses must have known each other for an unspecified but "sufficient" length of time prior to *deciding* to marry, and love must precede the marriage rather than result from it.

The queer that is produced here is not the radical response to heteronormative ideals celebrated in activism and scholarship, but a perceived failure to embrace liberal individualism. As such, the queer formation produced in Norwegian family reunification legislation is arguably also queer in relation to the (ironically) "mainstream" of what is understood as queer: the latter, while championing non-conformance with hetero-and homonormativities, relies heavily on visions of individual autonomy and "choice." These "mainstream queers" are thought to be throwing of the shackles of hetero-and homonormativity in order to pursue life trajectories, sexual practices, and kinship choices that break with the capitalist-oriented aspirations of longevity and wealth, monogamous sexual practices, and biologically based kinship forms that dominate western ideals (e.g. Duggan 2002; Halberstam 2005; Warner 1993). In contrast, the queer kinship practices of some Norwegians are framed in the dominant public sphere as an embodied refusal of individual autonomy and a failure to give priority to the individual before the collective.

The heteronormative ideals to which Norwegian nationals are expected to grow up to embrace stipulate that they emerge as autonomous individuals committed to sets of liberal values, including romance –and couple-based primary relationships. Within this logic, alternative commitments evidence incomplete development as a national: For example, any acceptance among Norwegian-Pakistani youth of arranged marriages renders them incompletely Norwegian. Indeed, Norwegian-Pakistani youth are thought to be too well behaved, and too influenced by their "family oriented" culture, to fully be able to make independent choices in what dominant Norwegian discourses see as their own best interests (NOU 2004:20, 240). Even where an arranged marriage *appears* to be voluntary, therefore, it may not "really" be, because the youth in question is too influenced by their "family oriented" culture to make a "free choice." Here, practices that are seen as the products of non-Western spaces are seen as signs of a (queer) lack of freedom or autonomy, and individual freedom and autonomy are seen as universal goals.

In this vein, the Green Paper quotes Anja Bredal, a sociologist who has studied Norwegian-Pakistani marriage practices extensively; according to Bredal, family loyalty, respect for their parents, and concern for family ties are embodied in Norwegian-Pakistani youth (243). One might think that such qualities would be seen as positive, but in this context the parental generation is defined as the embodiments of "Pakistani culture." The Green Paper explicitly situates the threat of "Pakistani culture" in Pakistan: in a detailed and melodramatic description of rural Pakistan, the Green Paper represents Pakistan not as a space from where people may legitimately use marriage as a migration strategy, but rather as a threat to Norwegian youth and women (245-246).[24] Pakistan is a country with an "old-fashioned, collectivist culture where the family, and not the individual, is all-important" (246, quoting a report from the Oslo Red Cross) and which is "patriarchal and where … concepts such as shame and honor describe central values" (240). These are familiar Orientalist tropes that establish "the Orient" as existing in a different, pre-modern time and space, and that implicitly contrast the unfreedom of these latter spaces with the freedom of the West (240-241).

When places such as Pakistan are framed as the producers of cultural values that undermine what are understood as universal conceptions of freedom, it follows that immigration from Pakistan in itself can be seen as threatening. In this vein, the non-Norwegian spouse is widely portrayed in the Green Paper as the harbinger of threatening cultural values, and as complicit in the physical and/or psychological violence that targets the Norwegian spouse. Laws in Norway – including the Penal Code – therefore refer to marriages where *one* of the parties has not voluntarily entered into it. Furthermore, laws also specifically discuss criminal penalties for the spouse assumed to be participating in forcing their spouse to marry them. This stands in contrast to, for example, Danish legislation (of particular interest as Norwegian policies on this issue have tended to look to Denmark) which only specifies that the marriage must have been contracted according to the wishes of both parties (NOU 2004:20, 246). This construction of the innocent Norwegian victim and the conniving foreign spouse must be read in conjunction with the assumption that migration to Norway is an important – and perhaps primary – motivation for the marriage. A relationship between Norway and "the poorer areas of the world" is set up, according to which inhabitants of "poorer" countries *necessarily* wish to migrate to Norway. The Green Paper describes the "flashy houses" built in "poor villages" by migrants living in Norway that emphasize for everyone that "the very key to richness lies in sending a son or a daughter to the West" (244). In this view, the voluntary nature of the marriage from the perspective of the foreign spouse can always be presumed; the foreign spouse, according to the Green Paper, "*wins* a right to residency in Norway" (246, my emphasis).

The assumption that the foreign spouse necessarily is a willing party to the marriage and a potentially threatening figure is reinforced by the tendency to see the Norwegian spouse as female and the foreign spouse as male. While the Green Paper generally is careful to include both Norwegian young men and Norwegian young women in its discussion of forced marriages, it nevertheless focuses on women when considering the problems youth may face.[25] In the picture that is painted of the

"common" pattern of forced marriages, a young, unsuspecting Norwegian-Pakistani woman is taken on holiday to Pakistan by her parents, only to find herself locked up and forcibly married off to a barely educated cousin; the Green Paper dramatically describes how this young woman "cannot expect help from the local community, the police or local authorities"[26] in Pakistan (NOU 2004:20, 246). Her husband/cousin is portrayed as first a willing party to the marriage, then a participant in the force she is subjected to, and lastly as a perpetrator of domestic violence (see Bredal 2005, 348).

This portrayal relies on obvious Orientalist constructions in which brown women are viewed as victims that must be saved from patriarchal brown men (Spivak 1988) and "non-western" cultures. These Orientalist constructions see brown women as being so mired in patriarchal, misogynistic cultures as to be completely without agency (Ahmed 1992; Lowe 1991; Said 1979). Thus, neither in the Green Paper nor in the attendant media debates are brown women ever understood as having agency and being capable to making and enacting decisions in their own lives. In combination, these Orientalist constructions give implicit legitimacy to the far-reaching state interventions that attempt to channel the lives of Norwegian women not perceived to be white away from queer life trajectories that the dominant society has decided is not in the women's best interest.

The overwhelming focus on the Norwegian spouse as female stands in contrast to statistics that show that 77 % of spouses granted family reunification permits in Norway are women who marry men in Norway (Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion 2007, Section 9.1.). There is little recognition – let alone concern – for Pakistani women married to men in Norway in the Green Paper (or in public discourse).[27] The failure to consider the lives of Pakistani women who have migrated to Norway following marriage (in contrast to e.g. Britain, see Gedalof 2007) suggests that the concern about forced marriages (and the "saving" of brown women) has firm limits. It is Norwegian nationals who are portrayed as the victims; the innocence, purity and desirability of the national space is preserved through seeing violence as

the product of alien places, which is in turn reinforced by relying on racial and gender stereotypes in the portrayal of Norwegians as the female victims of male foreigners.

The failure to consider the lives of the Pakistani spouses, who immigrate to Norway following marriage, is consistent with the general conception in the Green Paper of this group of migrants as heralding the failure of integration for the Norwegian spouse. The Green Paper argues that "the practice of marrying a member of the nationality group from the home country or the country of origin can ... in some circumstances delay and cause difficulties for the integration of those who already have leave to remain in the realm"[28] (240-241). Though the Green Paper notes that the integration of the non-Norwegian spouse may be hastened by the familial relationship to a citizen (in implicit contrast to the presumptively slower integration of e.g. refugees and asylum-seekers), the focus here is on the threat the migrant spouse poses to the already incompletely national Norwegian spouse. This is made even more explicit in the following sentence, which warns that arranged marriages may "create and maintain ethnic minority communities that exist outside of society at large" (241).[29] Thus, there is an assumption that the Norwegian spouse needs "further integration" that the non-Norwegian spouse is likely to "delay" or hinder; this assumption suggests that marrying someone from one's parents' (or grandparents') countries of origin in itself evidences an incomplete process of integration or national belonging. As a more or less direct link is implicitly thought to exist between marriage choices and integration, the very marriage that brings the threatening Pakistani spouse to Norway simultaneously signals the failure of the Norwegian spouse in becoming a national. Furthermore, the language in the Green Paper here illustrates the extent to which youth who are born in Norway, have grown up in Norway, and are Norwegian citizens are understood as not-Norwegian. When the "country of origin or home country" of these youths is understood to lie outside of Norway, a biological conception of belonging provides the underlying logic.

Tradition at large

As I have shown, the Green Paper setting out proposals for a new Norwegian Immigration Act represents Pakistan as a space of threatening traditions. The link between these traditions and Pakistani space is natural and timeless, and is implicitly contrasted with the equally natural connection painted between Norwegian space and modernity. In portraying forced and arranged marriages as a product solely of Pakistani culture and space, Norwegian culture and space is simultaneously absolved of any implication in such practices. The considerable anxiety provoked by the unmooring of tradition from the spaces to which it is thought to "naturally" belong is evident in the continual reassertion that forced and arranged marriages are "Pakistani" practices. Tradition at large (to paraphrase Appadurai 1996) – tradition uncontained by the spatial and temporal borders thought to keep it exterior to present-day Europe - threatens the sanctity of modernity, and of the Norwegian national self-image as a space marked by autonomous, liberal, and liberated subjects. The issues that are perceived to be at stake in the discussion of forced marriages extend beyond any straightforward concern with potential abuse, or with the "evasion of immigration regulations" (NOU 2004:20, 241). A central but obfuscated theme is modernity-through-affect: through education the Other must be brought into modernity and 'their' tradition expelled from national space.

In the context of marriage, "love" is a requirement for the recognition as properly national: it is the only acceptable basis on which autonomous liberal subjects of the modern nation form intimate relationships. Storhaug reports with outrage that according to the Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad, only 3 percent of the Norwegian spouses appearing at the embassy list "love" as their primary motivation for marriage (2006: 33), and within Norwegian debates about the transnational marriages of Norwegian residents not seen as white, this in itself is "proof" that the marriages are illegitimate. While public documents such as the Green Paper on the new Immigration Act are careful to include statements about the validity of arranged marriage as a family form, it also discusses whether marriages between ethnic minority Norwegians and spouses from their parents' (or grandparents') home

countries (all such transnational marriages are implicitly understood as arranged, most notably because discussed under the subheading "About arranged marriages"), give rise to a need for laws and regulations that would limit such immigration (NOU 2004:20: 240). A similar discussion would be unthinkable if "love" was thought to be the basis for the marriages. As Nancy Cott (2000) and Stephanie Coontz (2005) show, love has become the only acceptable basis for marriage in Western societies, and "true love," of course, is celebrated as a cosmic mystery over which the parties have but little control (see also Povinelli 2006). Putting in place legislation that explicitly aim to hinder the fulfillment of heterosexual marriages based in love is socially, culturally, and politically unthinkable in present-day Norway. In its presumed absence, then, love always hovers in the background in discussions of forced marriages.

The extent to which discourses around forced marriages rely on being contrasted with "proper" love-based marriage trajectories is evident from the range of actors using appeals to love. For example, the MiRA Resource Centre, a feminist activist group by and for "immigrant" women, has been an astute critic of many of the proposed changes in immigration laws that have been tied to "combating forced marriages" (MiRA Senteret n.d., 2006, 1999, 1998). Nevertheless, their arguments also invoke love: in responding to proposals to increase the age-requirement for marriage-based family reunification they write that "such an arrangement [will] render that group of young people who have found love abroad [legal] minors"[30] (MiRA Senteret 2006). At the other end of the political spectrum, Hege Storhaug argues that love-based marriages are the key to socio-economic success (Storhaug and Human Rights Service 2003: 153).

The argument "for love" has also been extended in the on-going debate about forced marriages and the presumed illiberalism of "immigrant" communities, through linking forced marriage to reactions to same-sex intimacies (e.g. Engesbak 2009; Larsen and Bakke 2007; Vestheim 2007). Here, "immigrant" communities are presented as coextensive with Muslim communities in Norway, which in turn are

seen as literally lethal to anyone not heterosexual but in particular to those both not-heterosexual and seen as “immigrants.” Gay and lesbian (*homofile*) “immigrants” are forcibly “sent abroad to become hetero” (Larsen and Bakke 2007) through marriage and religious instruction, the dominant media reports. Discourses of forced marriage and the presumed homophobia of “immigrants” in general and Muslims in particular, come together in a clear demarcation between the liberal, tolerant (Brown 2006) dominant (white) Norwegian society that embraces romantic love in all its forms, and the excessively religious, hateful “immigrant” community that does not even love its children enough to let them live.[31] In public discourse, then, there is remarkable agreement that “love” is the only valid basis for marriage and other couple-based intimate relationships, even as the constellations in which love might occur are contested.

In requiring a trajectory in which marriage is the culmination and confirmation of a couple’s love in order that the full benefits of marriage are extended to those marrying spouses from their parents’ or grandparent’s countries of origin, the Norwegian state has created a regulatory schema that explicitly racializes its citizens. This is not to suggest that the state does not have a legitimate interest in preventing forced marriages, but rather to argue that the prevention of such marriages is used as a justification to create laws that demand assimilation and particular enactments of modernity. Love is here a key signifier and justification for the racializing practices that the legislation enacts (the proposals discussed here came into effect on 1 January 2010). The immigration legislation that searches for love and autonomy in applicants and (especially) references in applications for family reunification is unlikely to prevent forced marriages,[32] but may have considerable pedagogical and bio-political effects. These laws materially and discursively demonstrate and enact the demarcation between those citizens who are seen as nationals and whose presence in the nation is naturalized, and those citizens who are seen as neither nationals nor fully present in the nation.

NOTES

[1] According to the Norwegian Bureau of Statistics, as of 1 January 2008 there were 423 000 immigrants in Norway, of whom 47 percent came from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There were 83 000 people described as "Norwegian born with immigrant parents" – as Norway does not practice jus soli this refers to being born in Norway but may or may not reflect citizenship status (similarly, the immigrant category includes those [36 percent] who have gained Norwegian citizenship following immigration). Taken together, these two groups constitute 10.6 percent of the Norwegian population. See http://www.ssb.no/innvandring/ There are no race or ethnicity based statistics, and these numbers do not reflect the numbers of Norwegians and Norwegian residents who are not perceived as white.

[2] Although there are nearly 300 000 immigrants living in Norway, many of whom are long-term residents, in this chapter I focus more narrowly on citizens. While Norwegian nation-building clearly also affects and is affected by residents who are not citizens, here I am interested in the ways in which immigration law is used to manage the lives of citizens and the effects this has on constructions of national belonging. In contrast to citizens, immigrants can reasonably expect to be managed through immigration law even if the specificities of these laws are not seen as just.

[3] Other areas of immigration law and regulation that could be put to similar uses are visa practices and family reunification regulation more broadly, in particular the focus on "pro forma marriages."

[4] The perhaps most central – though not popular - opinion-maker in relation to questions of forced marriages is Hege Storhaug. She regularly positions herself as a spokesperson "for" "immigrant" women and youth (e.g. Storhaug 2006, Gjerstad 2006), though this has been challenged by these "immigrant" women and youth (Zaman 2004). See also note 4: Storhaug was the prime mover and producer behind the "dramatic news stories" that initiated the focus on forced marriages in Norway.

[5] Marriage has only recently been established as the dominant legal and/or religious arrangement for heterosexual family establishment. Until sometime in the second half of the 1850s various common-law arrangements dominated, and only the upper classes could afford to marry (Leirvåg 1995; Melby et.al.2000; Ryste 2009). Arranged marriages also dominated marriages until this time. Today, about 80 percent of Norwegian couples that live together are married (www.ssb.no).

[6] According to Fangen, the Action Plan was developed following a trajectory common in Norwegian welfare policy: "First came a couple of dramatic news stories, and a considerable pressure for politicians to act arose' (*Først kom det et par dramatiske oppslag i media, og det oppsto et betydelig krav om handling overfor politikerne.* 2002: 15). This first Action Plan included a pot of two million kroner to be distributed among NGOs implementing programs aiming to prevent forced marriages and/or help those in crisis situations due to a forced marriage – such funding has since increased dramatically: the 2007 Action Plan included 70 million kroner to be distributed to NGOs.

[7] Forced marriages were made invalid in a 1995 amendment to section 16 of the Marriage Act. Section 1a was enacted in June 2005, and came into effect on July 1, 2005.

[8] The task force, which was initially created to propose changes that would bring Norwegian immigration legislation in line with Norway's obligations to international treaties, had eight members, and was led by Judge Bjørn Solbakken. The other members were legal scholar Ronald L. Craig, attorney Kristine Ryssdal, senior advisor in the Ministry of Justice Vigdis Vevstad, police intendant II (police attorney) Selma Ilyas, legal scholar Henrik Bull, sociologist Grete Brochmann, and chief of police Ketil Haukaas. Craig, Vevstad, and Brochmann's professional interests focus on various questions of immigration, integration, and multiculturalism. All but Brochmann had formal legal training. See NOU:20 Preamble, and Høgås 2007, 38. The task force was also appointed a "reference group" consisting of members from a range of NGOs and other interested organizations such as labor unions (Høgås 2007: 38).

[9] The task force was appointed in December 2001, shortly after a center-right coalition led by the Christian Democrats took power in October 2001. This Government finished its term in October 2005, when a center-left coalition led by the Labour Party took over.

[10] Other examples include a discussion of how a "too liberal" family reunification legislation may encourage asylum seekers (e.g. 213).

[11] The Green Paper lists three contexts in which "family establishment" occur: forced marriages, abusive marriages between a (assumed to be white) Norwegian male and a woman from a "poor

country," and pro forma marriages (NOU 2004:20, 212). By not acknowledging any other "family establishment: scenarios, it implicitly excludes "love" as a basis for the marriage. Furthermore, by making the distinction between "family reunification" and "family establishment" a linchpin in legislative efforts against forced marriage, the Green Paper assumes that the former is absent the sorts of abusive situations that are assumed to characterize the latter.

[12] There are no guidelines stipulating how "proper" love might be ascertained, and in the present context it is the discursive production of some relationships as not based in love and therefore legitimate targets of increased surveillance and heightened immigration restrictions that are of interest. It is only in the context of (suspected) pro forma marriages that a permit may be rejected somewhat explicitly based on a lack of "love": in these cases, there is a series of criteria that are used to determine whether the spouses know each other well enough to have developed what is recognizable as "love" in the Norwegian context (see also Flemmen 2008). These criteria include (but are not limited to) how long the spouses have known each other, their age difference, whether they have a common language, whether (and how) they are related, and whether they give the same accounts of their relationship (UDI 2010).

[13] In 2003 (the year the Green Paper draws its statistics from) Russia and Thailand were number two and three, respectively, on a list of top sending-countries in successful family reunification applications. By 2008, Russia was number seven and Thailand remained third among top sending countries for immigrants arriving on family reunification permits (the top two sending countries in 2008 were Poland and Germany; UDI 2008, 11).

[14] In 2003 Pakistan was fifth on a list of the countries of origin with the highest number of migrants entering Norway through family reunification. That year, 518 Pakistani citizens were issued a family reunification permit in 2003 (this includes children and elderly parents, as well as spouses). The same year Iraq was first, with 940 permits, and Somalia fourth, with 652 permits; this is the year on which the Green Paper bases its numbers. In 2003, 10 500 permits were issued on the basis of an application for family reunification (see UDI 2004 – the number of total permits for 2003 were lower than the preceding year [14 200 according to NOU 2004:20:203] and the following year [12 800 according to UDI 2004]).

By 2008, Pakistan no longer appeared on the top-ten list of sending countries for family reunification permits, while Somalia was number four and Iraq number six (UDI 2008, 11).

[15] *…vil det på grunn av forskjellene mellom den fattige og den rike verden, forekomme situasjoner hvor ekteskap inngås med den motivasjon fra søkerens side å skaffe en bedre tilværelse for seg og eventuelt sine barn.*

[16] *...en del av de arrangerte transnasjonale ekteskapene i stor grad synes motivert av en migrasjonsstrategi.*

[17] *…klart at det kun er søkeren som har som hovedformål at forholdet mellom partene skal danne grunnlag for oppholdstillatelse.*

[18] *Isolert sett kan det ikke anses som noe formål å motvirke opphold i Norge gjennom slike ekteskap så lenge det ikke er grunn til å betvile at ekteskapet samtidig er ment å skulle ha en realitet.*

[19] The anecdotal evidence is from 2001-2003, during which I processed applications for family reunification as a Senior Executive Officer at the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration.

[20] *…av mindre betydning…*

[21] The racialization of Muslims and the focus on Muslims as the primary threatening Other has increased dramatically in Norway since 2001 (see e.g. Dessau 2003).

[22] *...det [er] ikke alltid lett å trekke grensene mellom utilbørlig press som kan utgjøre tvang, og mindre alvorlige grader av press og overtalelse fra foreldre med mer eller mindre sterke synspunkter på hvem deres barn bør gifte seg med.*

[23] Or another country similarly constructed, such as Iraq or Turkey.

[24] NOU: 20 (2004), 246. It should be noted that in the report by Bredal that NOU 2004:20 quotes, she does not frame Pakistan or Pakistani parents in this manner.

[25] See e.g. NOU: 20 (2004), 245-246. Further, in a telling slippage, Anja Bredal, whose work forms the basis for much of the NOU 20 discussion, in an English-language article translates the gender neutral language of the relevant Norwegian immigration law as referring to women (2005: 337).

[26] *… kan ikke forvente hjelp verken fra lokalsamfunn, politi eller lokale myndigheter.*

[27] It must be noted here that Norwegian immigration regulations does open for granting independent permits to an abused spouse (as of 1 January 2010 this law is gender neutral: previously it only applied to women) and that in theory (if not always in practice) the burden of proof is low. However, when discussions of forced marriage fails to consider the potential abuse of, or at a very minimum potential isolation of, young non-Norwegian women who have been forcibly married and migrated to Norway, in effect the debate is no longer about forced marriages, but about particular versions thereof.
[28] *Praksisen med å inngå ekteskap med et medlem av nasjonalitetsgruppen fra hjemlandet eller opprinnelseslandet, kan... i visse sammenhenger forsinke og forvanske integreringsutviklingen i forhold til dem som allerede har opphold i riket.*
[29] *…skape og bevare etniske minoritetsmiljøer som eksisterer utenfor storsamfunnet.*
[30] *...en slik ordning [vil] umyndiggjøre den gruppen av unge mennesker som har funnet kjærligheten i utlandet.*
[31] The discursive contrast between "immigrant" and "Norwegian" attitudes to same-sex sexuality has been a prominent feature of dominant "immigration debates" since at least 2007. In these, "immigrant" communities are widely chastised for their assumed negative attitudes to same-sex sexuality, and there is an on-going demand that Muslims publicly declare their acceptance of same-sex relationships. In these debates, (predominantly) white Norwegians across the political spectrum assume Norwegian society to be post-homophobic. I have found no acknowledgement in the dominant press of the hypocrisy of these assumptions, although during the same time period (and ongoing) prominent white, Christian Norwegians are very vocal about their homophobia and are, for example, seeking to overturn Norway's gender neutral marriage legislation that came into effect in January 2009. For examples, see e.g. Monsen 2009 or the political program of the Christian Democratic Party (currently holds 10 of 169 Parliamentary seats):
http://www.krf.no/ikbViewer/page/krf/politikk/politisk-program/artikkel?p_document_id=22965.
[32] These legal changes arguably have little effect on forced marriages because a) the procedures they require – such as interviews with the reference – were already standard in virtually all applications for family reunification where one spouse is a national of a country outside Europe and North America; b) there is no evidence to suggest that those targeted for forced marriages will not be asked to lie in interviews, or will not remain targets for such marriages after the age of 23 – notably, in its proposals regarding changes in immigration law aimed at preventing forced marriages NOU:20 does not cite any research regarding the expected effectiveness of the proposals (see esp. 245-250). MiRA Senteret (2006) notes that these laws seem more tailored towards limiting immigration to Norway, than to effectively prevent forced marriages.

Chapter Five
Illusions of a Color-Blind Present

In recent months, two media events have pointed to both forms of resistance to the racial formations that I have discussed in the preceding chapters, and to the ongoing reassertion of these formations. First, shortly after the incumbent centre-left coalition government had been re-elected (with some changes) in September 2009, the editorial of the "multicultural" newspaper *Utrop*[1] denounced the Government as "neo-racist" (Vivekananthan 2009; see also Klungtveit and Badi 2009). Second, in early January 2010 the main evening news program on Norwegian television reported that Oslo kindergartens and schools are increasingly racially segregated (*Dagsrevyen* 4 January 2010). Discussing each of these events in turn, here I show that *Utrop*'s editor Majoran Vivekananthan and *Dagrevyen*'s journalist Anders Magnus' reliance on race and racism as analytic tools allowed them to highlight systematic forms of inequality in present-day Norway. Yet both analyses were silenced by dominant media reactions condemning the choice of words, thus re-establishing dominant constructions *and* denials of race. These events, then, illustrate the ongoing need for the kinds of analyses that I have offered here of racializing processes, as well as the continued resistance to such analyses.

In his editorial, Vivekananthan presented a careful argument about what "new racism" means and why this description fits Norwegian immigration and integration policies. According to Vivekananthan, central policies are based on encouraging assimilation and restricting immigration; for example, mother tongue education is cut and national immigrant associations cannot focus on the cultural and political needs of one immigrant group and still receive state funding.[2] The new racism that relies on discourses of culture and religion rather than biology have "snuck in" during the government's previous period in power, Vivekananthan argues, concluding that "this form of racism has gained legitimacy" (2009).

In the aftermath of Vivekananthan's editorial, the dominant Norwegian press roundly condemned his analysis (Olsen 2009). White Norwegian scholars who were presented as some of Norway's "leading experts on immigration and integration" described Vivekananthan's arguments as "foolish" in a press release from the Norwegian Press Bureau (reported in *Dagbladet* 2009; *VG* 2009; see also Hanssen 2009; compare Bergmo and Larsen 2009; Olsen 2009). Yet little of the ensuing media debate focused on the arguments Vivekananthan presented with regards to immigration and integration policies: the dismissive media reports centered on whether his description of the Government as neo-racist was "fair." Vivekananthan's views are dismissed as based on poor research, misusing the concept of "neo-racism," misrepresenting Government policy, and as "going too far" (Hanssen 2009). Furthermore, several white academics argued that the editorial "hurts immigrants" and "contributes to a polarized debate" (ibid.).

As the editor of *Utrop* Vivekananthan represents the only mainstream multicultural media institution in Norway, and as such he could reasonably be expected to occupy an "expert" role in the Norwegian media landscape. Yet in responding to his arguments regarding the racist Government policies, the dominant media positioned him in opposition to white Norwegian academic "experts" in ways that constructed Vivekananthan as immature, thoughtless, and extreme (e.g. *Dagbladet* 2009; Hanssen 2009; Klungtveit and Badi 2009; *VG* 2009). For example, Hanssen (2009) quotes Jon Rogstad as arguing that the polarizing effects of the editorial can be demonstrated by the online comments to it. One of these comments, Rogstad says, focuses on Norway being "torn asunder" through such polarization; Rogstad argues that "we must take [such comments] seriously" (ibid.; it is not clear who "we" are here). However, the vast majority of the online comments to the editorial are explicitly racist; for example, on *Utrop*'s pages there are 89 comments (as of 12 April 2010), of which 56 are explicitly racist (e.g. "if you don't like it here, go home"). Thus, while Rogstad and the various other academics interviewed (in Hanssen 2009 as well as *Dagbladet* 2009; *VG* 2009) implicitly position the "poles" as being, on the one hand, reasonable people

(like themselves) who seek a "moderate debate" and, on the other hand, extremists (like Vivekananthan), the "polarization" evident in the online comments Rogstad refers to are between outspoken racists and those seeking to address racism. Yet by making Vivekananthan responsible for the racist responses to his editorial, commentators (journalists as well as academics) absolve both the Government and the white Norwegian population of racism.

Though any suggestion that racism occurs in Norway is broadly considered unacceptable (Olsen 2009), the dominant responses to Vivekananthan's editorial cannot be understood apart from his embodied position as a racialized Other; as Tajik (2004) argues, in public debates about "immigrants" there are a number of criteria that must be fulfilled in order for those not perceived to be white to be seen as legitimate contributors. She argues that these criteria require refraining from using frames of reference that might be unfamiliar to the majority population (27) and a requirement to share personal stories that confirm stereotypes about "immigrant culture" while confirming the perceived superiority of "Norwegian culture"[3] (28-31). Vivekananthan's refusal to occupy a pre-determined position as a kind of "native informant" who relies on references to embodied experiences to confirm dominant views (see Muller Myrdahl 2007; compare Rehman 2002, 2004) leads most of the mainstream press and the academics they rely on to dismiss his views out of hand. In this manner, minority critiques of majority racism are broadly dismissed (Gullestad 2006, 47-48, 242; Hanssen 2009; Vivekananthan 2009).

Several months after Vivekananthan's editorial appeared, a *Dagsrevyen* (main evening news) anchor announced that "integration in Oslo is going in the wrong direction," explaining that "the capital has become an increasingly racially divided city" (*Dagsrevyen* 4 January 2010). The subsequent report created by senior journalist Anders Magnus showed that in some Oslo neighbourhoods, kindergartens and schools that are within walking distance of each other have dramatically different demographic profiles. Magnus told his viewers that whereas 55 percent of the students at Stenbråten school have a "minority background" this is true of 97 percent

of the students at the neighbouring Mortensrud school (ibid.). "Brown schools are getting browner," viewers are told, "while white schools are getting whiter" (ibid.).

During the news report, Magnus as well as kindergarten staff (interviewed in an "expert" role) framed the segregated lives of children as a problem because such segregation negatively affects "minority" children's Norwegian language development.[4] "Ethnic Norwegian" children were implicitly presented as white, and the journalist and kindergarten staff argued that in less segregated kindergartens and schools these children would "help" their "minority" peers through the former's greater Norwegian language skills. In contrast, the diverse group of (unidentified) primary school students interviewed (at an unidentified school) declared diversity good because they would then learn the same things, "be friends" and "learn from each others' cultures" (ibid.).

Similarly to the earlier dismissals of Vivekananthan's editorial, reactions to Magnus's report did not address the segregated lives of children in Oslo, but rather focused on the perceived inappropriateness of describing children as "brown" and "white" (Lindell 2010; Ringheim, Glomnes and Fransson 2010; Øgrim 2010). "It is the actual terms brown and white children that I had a reaction to," the author Unni Lindell writes in a letter to the editor (Lindell 2010). Apparently blind to the racial productions that lead us to literally see only some phenotypical characteristics as significant or worthy of "description," she protests that "children are after all quite regular people, whether they are brown or white"[5] (ibid.). In an editorial in the professional journalists' magazine *Journalisten*, Helge Øgrim argues that the television-channel "nominated skin color and ethnic background as our most prominent characteristics"[6] with similar results as those who make such distinctions "from a negative starting-point" [7](Øgrim 2010). Lindell and Øgrim are concerned that skin color and ethnic background should not be used to describe anyone or analyze social and geographic patterns because such things should not be important either in our interpersonal interactions or in our "discussion of cultural differences, immigration and integration"[8] (Øgrim 2010). Both insist that the "real" issues are

diverse cultures or linguistic backgrounds, and these, Lindell points out, are not connected to skin color (Lindell 2010).

The color-blindness that Lindell and Øgrim not only aspire to but wish to enact in the present maintains a wilful ignorance of the importance of racial constructions in ordering Norwegian society - and, in turn, of the importance of skin color in such constructions. Though it is true that references to skin color tell us nothing about language, culture, religion, immigration status, or any of the other topics that are politicized in relation to integration in Norway, skin color is a primary marker through which race is produced – also in Norway. The perceptions of skin color that leads to the descriptions of "brown" and "white" are based in productions of race, where each category contains a range of phenotypical characteristics, bodily comportments and practices, linguistic skills, customs, and religious beliefs. Perceived skin color, therefore, is not a description but an indication of a relative position within a racializing taxonomy that influences a broad range of opportunities and constraints.

The explicitness with which references to "brown" and "white" point to the importance of perceived skin color in Norwegian productions of race appear to be at the heart of the discomfort, anger, and anxiety that the news report generated. As I have shown in this dissertation, dominant Norwegian racial projects focus on the production of whiteness and not-whiteness as the signifiers of naturalized national belonging. Yet the dominant terms through which this boundary is produced are not "brown" and "white" but "immigrant" and "Norwegian." In several articles responding to the news report on segregated kindergartens and schools, writers and interviewees argued that while the children may use "brown" and "white" to talk about themselves and their lives, these terms were inappropriate to use in more formal contexts (Brekken 2010; Ringheim, Glomnes, Fransson 2010; Øgrim 2010). Highlighting the attachment to familiar terms, a headmaster of a school with a predominantly "brown" student body said that "it is politically correct to use terms like multicultural and immigrant"[9] (Brekken 2010). That his comment ignores the

increasing critiques of use of “immigrant” to describe those born in Norway (e.g. Dzamarija 2008) also illustrates that such critiques are not broadly taken up.

Reactions to Magnus’ report on segregated kindergartens and schools also demonstrates a dominant refusal to engage with the analytic language and self-descriptions employed by Norwegians not understood as white. Such resistance demonstrates an assertion of power: it signals that those who are seen as white and as “naturally” belonging to the national space can and should determine the categories through which identities, modes of belonging, or self description should be made. Indeed, the gap between dominant Norwegian racial projects and the complex negotiations through which viable narratives of belonging are forged in diverse neighbourhoods is highlighted in the news report and in the following press coverage. The widespread acknowledgment that children use the language of “brown” and “white” – and the demonstration of such language through interviews with children in the news report – is indicative of one of the ways in which these children frame difference. This language-use is not limited to children: in the only reference to how not-white Norwegians reacted to the terminology, *Nettavisen* quotes prominent politician and media personality Abid Q. Raja’s Twitter comment that his children can accurately be described as brown (*Nettavisen* 2010). Further demonstrating this gap, Øia and Vestel (2007) report that “immigrant” youth rarely if ever identify as such, primarily describing themselves (variously) as Norwegian, foreign, international, or through references to their parents’ country of origin. Yet the reactions to the report on segregated kindergartens and schools show considerable resistance to using the language through which those who are not understood as white describe themselves (see also Gullestad’s discussion of the massive resistance to suggestions that the word *neger* [negro] should not be used: 2002, chapter six; 2006, chapter seven).

Colonial complicity and a shrinking Nation

The increasingly segregated lives of children in Oslo evidence some of the material practices that rely on and reiterate the racial formations that I have analyzed in this

dissertation. As in the description of some Oslo suburbs as “the other Norway” that opened the dissertation, the segregated kindergartens and schools point to a co-production of race and space in which some spaces and the people in them are rendered insufficiently national, for instance through the assumption that “brown” children do not speak Norwegian well (see also e.g. Lundström 2010; Pred 2000). Furthermore, the responses to the analysis of this segregation in explicitly racial terms, highlights the importance of interrogating the processes through which race is produced and made salient. Without such interrogations, fantasies of color-blindness appear to be anti-racist, and the naturalized connection between whiteness and national belonging is reasserted.

The production of some spaces and peoples as belonging in an other Norway – a Norway that is Other – means that Norwegian racial formations in effect shrink the nation. As “Norway” ceases to describe all spaces and citizens within the country’s international borders, the Elsewhere to which the Other naturally belongs comes to be located in kindergartens, schools, and neighbourhoods whose geographic position belies their production as not-Norwegian. The national imaginaries that fuel and maintain the racial boundary-making between those whose belonging is naturalized and those who are naturalized as being “out of place” maintains the “purity” of the former by expelling the latter. This is far from a giving up of control of national space by the dominant society; rather, it enables the assertion of a colonial management of those spaces and peoples that are produced as insufficiently present in the nation.

The colonial management (through e.g. research, bureaucratic practices, and legislative directives)of those spaces and peoples racialized as incompletely national highlights not only that race is continuously produced in Norway, but also that colonial complicity frame these processes as well as the (racializing) attempts to respond to their effects. Echoing and reiterating colonial knowledge production and praxis, this reinforcement of race through responses to racializing processes is enabled by the naturalization and nationalization of colonial frameworks that colonial

complicity ensures. Colonial complicity is thus not limited to the past, but continues to frame the present.

Norwegian colonial management practices are founded in and reproduce a distinction between citizens who are nationals, and citizens who are not. This distinction, and the attendant "desire to know" (Balibar 1991b) that ensures the study and problematizing of those not seen as properly belonging to the nation, enable and are enabled by practices of governmentality that polices this group significantly differently from those who are seen to belong. In other words, distinct sets of governmental practices manage population groups that are simultaneously produced through these practices.

Legislative efforts such as the restriction of immigration in order to ensure the wellbeing of current immigrants (chapter three), or the restriction of family reunification in order to combat forced marriages (chapter four), are framed as "helping" population groups not seen as properly national (see also Hagelund 2004). Here, however, I have argued that these efforts are racial projects. Whatever the individual or collective intentions of the numerous actors involved in debating, forming, passing, and enacting these laws, they are based in and reproduce a racial basis for the nation. This racial basis means that an unspoken but foundational ambition of the laws is the reassertion of control over the national territory – an aspiration to re-establish the homeliness of the nation through management of the always already unhomely Other.

Homeliness is a central feature of narratives of national belonging (e.g. Gedalof 2007; Hage 2000), and this is certainly also true of Norway (Gullestad 2006). Indeed, phrases such as "here at home" (in reference to the nation, not to a specific location in it) or "at home in Norway" abound across dominant media (in broadcast media, as well as tabloid and broadsheet newspapers) and across types of coverage (politics, "life style," arts, etc.). This sense of homeliness is in part established through the emphasis on sameness and *trygghet* (stability, security, safety) that, as I have argued

here, have little room for differences that are viewed as excessive (see also Gullestad 2006). The homeliness that Norwegian governmental practices aspire to re-establish thus requires strategies of assimilation in relation to minority groups. Though "integration" ostensibly replaced "assimilation" as a minority management strategy in the early 1970s, Gressgård argues that Norwegian integration policy is limited to a support for those aspects of "immigrants' culture" that can "increase their willingness to co-operate" in "supporting [Norwegian] society's current norms and values" (2005, 20).

It is not, in other words, that Norwegian policy makers do not seek out perspectives from Norwegians who are not understood as white or from migrant groups. Indeed, since 1984 "The Contact Committee for Immigrants and the Authorities" (KIM), has functioned as a formal way both for "immigrants"[10] to influence policy making and for the state to seek input from "immigrants."[11] Furthermore, a number of national and local "immigrant" associations are officially consulted when immigration and integration policies are developed. Yet Predelli shows that while a majority of "immigrant" voluntary associations self-report some influence in their local society, most (though not all) also report very little influence on "specific political issues and longer-term political development" (2008, 948). Siim and Skjeie (2008) confirm this argument, and maintain that, for example, "immigrant" feminist organizations are only able to influence policies that are enacted within a "crisis" framework. The influence of Norwegians not seen as white on policy and decision making in Norway is thus severely curtailed,[12] although not absent (see also Liodden 2010; OMOD 2006).

The role that the feminist MiRA resource center for immigrant and refugee women (and, today, their daughters and granddaughters) has played in relation to, on the one hand, feminist advocacy for and with "immigrant" women in Norway, and, on the other hand, immigration and integration policy development, is instructive. MiRA was the first (and remains the most dominant) feminist organization started by immigrant women.[13] MiRA's long-standing work by and for "immigrant" women

should make it an obvious and readily accessible expert resource for policy makers. Additionally, MiRA has since its inception been led by Fakhra Salimi, a sociologist and psychotherapist who arrived in Norway from Pakistan as a 21-year old student in 1979. In a context where Pakistani immigrants and their descendants for over 30 years have been the implicit or explicit focus for the dominant society's anxieties around immigration and integration, Salimi's Pakistani background, feminist activism, and academic and professional expertise should both alone and in combination have given her and MiRA considerable influence on policy making. Yet while MiRA is one of numerous organizations consulted by the state, its views and analyses do not appear to be afforded especial weight (e.g. Ot.prp. 75 for 2006-2007; Ot.prp. 109 for 2004-2005).[14] As MiRA notes about the debate and policy making around forced marriages, "neither the current nor the former Government have been attentive to the voices of minority women in this debate"[15] (MiRA 2006b).

The assimilationist strategies that dominate in Norwegian public discourse and policy rest on a view of the population as racially divided and with qualitatively different claims to belonging. In turn, this means that Norwegian discourse and policy making on immigration and integration manages one population group largely for the benefit of another. For example, as MiRA argues, legislative attempts to prevent multicultural[16] Norwegian youth with family ties in Asia and Africa from marrying spouses from countries where their extended family live, do not protect the interests of the youth, but rather enforces dominant Norwegian norms (MiRA 2006b). This positioning of one group as objects of state management is, as I argued in the previous chapter, aided by the limited standing as national subjects with legitimate views and influence on Norwegian society afforded to Norwegians who are not seen as white (Siim and Skjeie 2008). Because this limited standing includes those debates, policies, and laws that most directly target them, the expertise, lives, and needs of racialized minority groups have relatively little bearing on immigration and integration discourse and policy making. In other words, immigration and integration discourses and policies primarily aim to manage those population groups not seen as white for the benefit of those seen as nationals and as white.

In describing the effects of this production of race and the attendant expulsion of spaces and people as only tentatively national as a "shrinking" of the nation, I aim to highlight the broadly damaging effects that the production of race and the racially based management of the nation have. The purported aim of the social democratic welfare state[17] is to enable and promote egalitarian, universalist ideals focused on "meeting collectively perceived needs and on guaranteeing citizens certain standards of material well-being" (Hernes 1988, 200-201; see also Østerud 2005). Decision making in the social democratic welfare state is to be premised on wide citizen participation through unions, voluntary organizations, social movements, and party politics (Hernes 1988, 201; see also Predelli 2008) that together ensure that the needs of the collective are met. Yet when a significant part of the national community is viewed as objects that are appended to, rather than part of, the nation, then the nation as a whole is weakened (see chapter four and e.g. Komissar 1999; Predelli 2008; Siim and Skjeie 2008 on the limits to "immigrant" political participation and influence). Thus, in addition to the immediate negative effects the production of a racially based national belonging have on those who in the process are excluded from the nation, this division also undermines the very basis for a national community.

Several of the Southern and Eastern European migrants that I interviewed for this dissertation suggested a way of understanding national belonging that does not rest on constructions of race, place of origin, or assimilation to a predetermined norm; when articulating their sense of belonging both in Norway and to their country of origin, they focused on the extent to which their concerns and investments were intimately linked to what they perceived as national issues. For example, when explaining her relationship to Poland, Agnieszka noted that "my problems are not theirs, in a way. And their problems are not *completely* mine" (Agnieszka, interview 18 March 2008). In this view, national belonging is forged and determined through affective investment. The imagined community on which the nation rests can here be a shared concern for the nation. It is then this investment, rather than an agreement about any particular topic, that builds the national community. Such a reconfiguration of the

basis for national belonging can break the foregrounding of race and myths of homogeneity as the basis for the national community.

Challenging the "new immigration" framework

The analysis of Norwegian racial formations that I have begun to undertake here aim to challenge the idea that race does not exist in Norway and has no analytic value there. Though using race as an analytic tool has been critiqued for reiterating racial thinking (e.g. Gilroy 2000), the broad perpetuation of race in Norway shows the limits of this critique. It is at least in part the refusal to see the racial effects of discourses and legislative efforts that has allowed the uninterrupted reproduction of a racially divided nation in Norway. For Norwegianness to be imagined in ways that are elastic and can find bases for commonality that do not rest on myths of homogeneity, the centrality of race to dominant constructions of the limits to national belonging must be addressed.

One of the areas in which I hope this dissertation can begin to point to an alternative way of imagining the nation is by challenging the current view of Asian and African immigration in the 1970s as constituting a watershed in Norwegian immigration history. Most current accounts of recent Norwegian immigration history assume "immigration" to only refer to migration from Asia, Africa, and South America, and all describe post-1971 Asian and African migration to Norway as a "new" form of migration. By focusing also on Southern and Eastern European migrants and by attempting to denaturalize the framing of Asian and African migrants as always already significantly different from previous migrants, I have tried to challenge this characterization of Asian and African migration. While there certainly are valid arguments as to why this migration was new, I want to consider what effects this particular way of conceptualizing immigration has.

The assessment of Asian and African immigration as constituting a "new" form of immigration to Norway reproduces and naturalizes racialized boundaries between "the West" and "the Rest" (see chapter two). This description of Asian and African

migrants as representing a "new" type of migrant, primarily relies on conceptions of race that see these migrants as *inherently* and excessively different from the majority European migrants. Yet beyond their origins in countries from which Norway had previously seen few (but still some) migrants, the Asian and African migrants that arrived in the early 1970s were not necessarily significantly different from other migrants. Like many other migrants to Norway, they were not Lutheran, they were not used to Norwegian food, they were unfamiliar with Norwegian norms, and they did not speak Norwegian (see chapter two). Many (but far from all) had a limited education (Khan 2009; Tjelmeland 2003), but this was also true for other migrants (Elpidios Biros interview 10 October 2007; Knudsen 1980; Tjelmeland 2003) as well as for most Norwegian national-level politicians. The most significant difference between, on the one hand Asian and African migrants, and on the other hand nominally white European and North American migrants, is not connected to the migrants themselves, but rather to how Norwegian society received them. It is, in other words, the racial production of the former migrants as excessively different that is the most distinct aspect of their arrival and settlement in Norway.

Reconceptualising the taxonomies through which immigrants are categorized and the significance of changing immigration patterns are assessed, is a step towards denaturalizing and challenging the racialized division of Norwegians. Current taxonomies focus on naturalized assessments of excessive differences, but the differences that are made material through the production of race only become significant through their role in this production. Furthermore, by being racialized, these differences are reified and exaggerated. In this manner, issues such as forced marriages become seemingly impossible to address constructively: as I show in chapter four, forced marriages are a racialized topic in Norway, and dominant discourses and responses to it further entrenches this racialization.

Deeply embedded circulations of racial knowledges (Mulinari et.al. 2009) draw dominant discourse and praxis towards reiterations of race, making racial production difficult to intervene in and alter. Nevertheless, in order to dismantle the reiteration

of a racialized division between Europe on the one hand, and Asia and Africa on the other, the categorization of migrants from Asia and Africa as "naturally" different and "new" must be challenged. Such categorization homogenizes very large and diverse areas of the world and it assumes that place of origin (which, as I have argued here, functions a metaphor for race) is the most significant indicator of who migrants and their descendants are. The constant reiteration of this categorization across popular and academic discourse means that it is naturalized and established as "Truth." It is at the very least the task of scholarship to question such easy (because relying on familiar ideas of race) classifications.

The production and changing significance of whiteness

There is little that suggests that whiteness has had a similar traction in Norway as the mode of identification and source of aspiration and anxiety that has been demonstrated for the US and UK (e.g. Frankenberg 1993; Jacobson 1998; Roediger 1991, 1999, 2005; Ware 1992). Although Norwegian understandings of Asians, Africans, and aboriginal peoples for long have closely followed international circulations of racial knowledges (Eide and Simonsen 2007; Kjeldstadli 2003; Moldrheim 2000; Pollan 1978; Ryymin 2007), this does not appear to have been matched by a similarly close alignment with whiteness. During much of Norwegian nation-making, national regional differences and distinctions drawn to Sweden, Denmark and other neighbouring countries have been of primary importance (Kjeldstadli 2003). Though some were articulated in racializing ways, these distinctions were not primarily viewed through a lens of whiteness as it is understood today.

Here I have argued that today whiteness is a prerequisite for a naturalized belonging to the nation in Norway. Though unevenly produced, whiteness functions as a form of capital that ensures (uneven) access to a range of social and economic privileges. This intimate co-production of race and nation appears to have emerged over the period I analyze here: previous conceptions of the nation seem not to have privileged whiteness, and previous conceptions of race seem not to have privileged national

belonging (see Kjeldstadli 2003; Pollan 1978). Thus while it could be argued that the discrimination faced by northern Norwegians in Oslo until at least the early 1970s (Elpidios Biros interview 10 October 2007; Wikan 2002) were in part mediated through forms of racialization, there is no indication that the northerners were not understood as Norwegian. Indeed, according to Østerud (2005), Oslo is seen as the least national place in Norway because it was and remains associated with previous Danish and Swedish rule. Being discriminated against in this least Norwegian of Norwegian places therefore did not mean being expelled from national belonging.

While the interviews that I discuss in chapter two shed no light on the question of when and how whiteness was produced as a material aspect of Norwegian national identity, my analysis of the increasingly sedimented racial production occurring in the early 1970s suggests that these years are crucial to the emergence of race as a determinant of national belonging. Though Norwegians clearly had a sense of whiteness as a mark of Europeanness that they identified with prior to this period (e.g. Gullestad 2007; Kjeldstadli 2003; Mulinari et.al. 2009; Pollan 1978), whiteness does not appear to have been significant in the construction of a national identity. As I discuss in chapter two, dominant discourses in Norway have displayed – and continues to display (van Riemsdjik 2008, 2010) - considerable xenophobia towards Europe. These intra-European differences seem to have been more central to Norwegian self-images than the production of whiteness as a mark of Europeanness.

Scholarly literature on whiteness tends to focus on a teleological trajectory in which its origins are located in Europe but its significant reiterations are found in the United States (e.g. Hannaford 1996; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 1991). The particular productions of whiteness in the United States become synonymous with what "whiteness" looks like and how it operates. In this schema, Europe is reduced to a symbol of a past that originated both the theories of whiteness (and the practices of oppression that gave rise to these) and the phenotypical characteristics that are marked as "white." Yet Europe as a place disappears, and the ongoing production and negotiation of race in present-day Europe appears insignificant both in itself and

to theories of race and whiteness. Much assisted by the widespread European rejection of race as an analytic tool (see introduction, and e.g. Blum and Guérin-Pace 2008; Essed and Trienekens 2007; Keaton 2006; Simon 2008; Tin 2008), this disengagement with European productions of race in general and whiteness in particular implicitly underpins the idea that the continent's majority inhabitants are already white. In other words, by not interrogating processes of racialization in Europe, whiteness becomes a naturalized entity and this in turn affects conceptualizations of whiteness everywhere. If Europeans are "naturally" white, then not only do the millions of Europeans who are not understood to be white disappear from view, but the understanding of whiteness as constructed is at best blurred – perhaps even undermined.

The analysis of how whiteness is produced and made material in present-day Europe is thus important both to the societies that are structured through productions of race that are simultaneously denied, and to theorizations of race more broadly. Understanding how whiteness is produced is a crucial step in any intervention that seeks to abolish the racial basis for the nation. And showing how whiteness is produced at its alleged center is necessary to the de-naturalization of it as a racial category.

Dissertation findings

As I noted in the introduction, in this dissertation I have sought to disentangle how race is produced in Norway and with what effects. I asserted that alone and in conjunction, the disparate sites of the dissertation illuminate the production and circulation of Norwegian racial formations. Here I want to recap and reflect on the ways in which the analyses I have offered in the dissertation have provided answers to the questions I posed in the introduction.

First, in chapter two I showed that the construction of Southern and Eastern European as tentatively white, and the construction of their children as obviously white and Norwegian, highlights both that whiteness is unevenly produced in Norway and that

whiteness is of central importance to national belonging. This chapter thus adds complexity to the understanding of how whiteness is produced in Norway by demonstrating that while it is less dependent on descent than previously argued (Gullestad 2002, 2006), it is refracted through histories of migration.

The interviews on which chapter two is based did not, however, provide answers to all the questions that animated my research on postwar Southern and Eastern European migrants. In particular, although both chapter two and three suggest that whiteness became increasingly important in Norway from the early 1970s onwards, within the confines of this dissertation I have been unable to answer the question I posed about whether the arrival of Asian and African migrants "whitened" Southern and Eastern Europeans in Norway. This is a question that could usefully be explored in future research, in order to better understand the emergence and co-production of Norwegian racial taxonomies.

Lack of time and resources as well as a dearth of existing data on Southern and Eastern European migrants prevented me from considering in greater detail the extent to which they shared educational and labour profiles with later Asian and African migrants. Yet the limited existing data and anecdotal evidence available does suggest that there were significant similarities among labor migrants to Norway during the 1970s (chapter two; also compare Khan 2009; Knudsen 1980; Tjelmeland 2003). Furthermore, the common assumption that Asian and African migrants were significantly different from other migrants is primarily based in the continued reassertion and "obviousness" of this explanation, not on any detailed analysis that show such differences.

Thus, while it has not been well documented whether Asian and African migrants were significantly similar to each other *and* significantly different from other migrants, my analyses is in chapter two and three shows that the assumption of such similarities and differences were foundational to dominant Norwegian understandings of immigration and integration. As such, the assumption is also a performative, in

itself producing the differences and similarities it assumes. Despite my being unable to provide a more substantive analysis of the ways in which Asian, African, and European migrants were similar therefore, in combination the analyses in chapter two and three nevertheless address this question by showing that these migrants were produced as similar and different (Asians and Africans as similar, but different from the Europeans – who in turn are also seen as similar to each other) regardless of the "reality" of such differences. In other words, the framing and production of migrants as different and similar matters in ways that are independent of the extent to which these assessments are grounded in "the real" (see also Said 1979).

In chapter three I disentangled the production, sedimentation, and codification of new racial categories in the early 1970s, and argued that the term "immigrant" was established as a racial category that referred to everyone in Norway of Asian and/or African descent. Through this analysis I was able to trace the production of race that developed in the first half of the 1970s and were codified in the 1975 "immigration stop." I demonstrated that Asian and African migrants were framed as excessively different from implicitly white Norwegians, and that this excessiveness in turn was understood to legitimate extensive immigration restrictions as well as colonial management strategies.

Chapter four demonstrated that the racial production of some Norwegians as "immigrants" that was first established in the 1970s today is reinforced through colonial management practices that continue to position some Norwegian citizens as incompletely national and incompletely present in national space. By examining the ways that imperatives to romantic love masks the ways that Norwegian family reunification policies constitute a racial project, I showed that just as Norwegian debates about integration, minority management, and policy making continue to both be shaped by and reiterate race.

Together, these three chapters illuminate central aspects of recent Norwegian racial formations. They show that Norwegian public debates and policy making produce

and enact racial taxonomies. Yet these taxonomies are neither complete nor coherent. The production of Southern and Eastern European migrants as white in a qualitatively different way than "Norwegians" illustrates that the presumed homogeneity of racial categories hides variances. Thus, even as whiteness and not-whiteness are produced as the homogenous and dominant racial categories through which national belonging is determined; each category conceals a diverse racial production that nevertheless always rests on the relative privileging of whiteness.

Forging a new Norway

Despite the dominant reiteration of whiteness as a basis for Norwegianness, and the overwhelming focus on assimilation in recent policy making, there is significant and creative resistance and refusal of these forces. Such resistance and refusal signal hope for a new Norway, but also illuminate the contours of dominant discourses (Abu-Lughod 1990). Though a full discussion of the multiple forms of such oppositional practices and discourses is outside the scope of this dissertation, I want to end with some illustrative examples that show that the racial projects that I have analyzed here are neither complete nor unchallenged. Both individual and organizational, this resistance and refusal occur at interpersonal, local, and national scales.

Most visible, perhaps, are the Norwegians who are not understood as white but who have excavated a space in the national public sphere. At the beginning of the new millennium the Norwegians not perceived as white and who were most visible in the national public sphere without primarily being sports or entertainment stars were (or were framed as) highly critical of "immigrant" communities and highly uncritical of "Norwegian" practices (Muller Myrdahl 2007; Rehman 2002, 2004). Today the position as the most visible not-white Norwegians not involved in sports or entertainment has been taken over by politicians and academics who refuse the binaries between "immigrants" and "Norwegians."[18] It remains problematic that the dominant press appears to only be able to "see" a very small number of Norwegians who are not understood as white at any given moment, but it is a hopeful sign that

many of the voices that are heard today seek to expand the meaning of Norwegianness.

Hadia Tajik, who is currently the only Norwegian not perceived to be white elected to Parliament,[19] has been particularly able to refuse being reductively identified as an "immigrant spokesperson," while also actively addressing questions of integration. Tajik makes frequent reference to the small village on the southwest coast of Norway where she was born and raised: through such references and her distinct dialect (which marks her as "not from Oslo" and therefore more "authentically Norwegian") her critiques of both majority and minority practices are broadly legible as *Norwegian*. For example, when addressing equality and religion during a service at the St. Petri church in Stavanger, she notes, "as a child I have learned Arabic Koran-verses by heart when holidaying in Pakistan, and sung Norwegian psalms in one of the Missionary Society's kindergartens at Tau. When growing up I spent time both at the girls' association of the Sanitation Women at the Meeting House in Bjørheimsbygd and at Norwegian-Pakistani parties in Stavanger"[20] (Tajik 2010a). Similarly, addressing questions of conservative social control in "immigrant" areas of Oslo, she writes that "I got to know *bygdedyret*[21]while growing up in Bjørheimsbygd in Rogaland [county], but have also met it among Norwegian-Pakistanis and Norwegian Muslims in Oslo"[22] (Tajik 2010a). By using the same framework for her views regardless of whether she is speaking to majority Norwegians, minority Norwegians, or both, she in effect draws the two together in ways that are rare – perhaps even unique - in the Norwegian context. To this end, she counters critiques that she is insufficiently focused on representing Norwegian-Pakistanis by asserting that "boys and girls of my generation are a part of 'the new Norwegian we.' This means that we do not sort Norwegians according to their ethnic backgrounds"[23] (Tajik 2009b; Tajik is born in 1983).

The challenge to a binary division of the Norwegian population that Tajik both advocates and performs also emerges in the dominant public sphere in a other ways. For example, in 2009, the anti-racist campaign "I am also Norwegian"[24] (*Jeg er også*

norsk) featured posters of famous Norwegians (former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, politician Abid Q. Raja, comedian Knut Nærum, theatre group Queendom and others) wearing t-shirts bearing the campaign slogan and with a brief quote from the person(s) pictured. In conjunction, these posters not only asserted a broad and equal claim to Norwegianness, but also denaturalized the link between whiteness and Norwegianness: When the slogan was worn by Norwegians who were not seen as white the "also" functioned both as a retort to their continuous production as "immigrants" *and* as a recognition that being Norwegian does not exclude also having other national and/or regional identities. Indeed, in the short quotes accompanying their pictures, several of the featured not-white Norwegians emphasized that they are not *only* Norwegian. As the women of Queendom noted, they are "100% Norwegian, 100% African." When the slogan was worn by Norwegians perceived as white, the "also" denaturalized their claim to Norwegianness. "Also" here suggested a claim that needed to be made, and for those who are produced in dominant racial discourse as always already Norwegian, this meant that Norwegianness became something that had to be asserted rather than be simply assumed. This campaign, then, presented Norwegianness as belonging to all Norwegians, and anti-racism as being the responsibility of all Norwegians.

Challenges to the racial construction of Norwegianness are not limited to the efforts of anti-racist campaigns; indeed, efforts by entertainment and sports stars are just as, if not more, effective. Sports and entertainment have been areas where Norwegians not seen as white have first and most broadly gained recognition in Norway, and several stars in these fields have sought to use their fame and popularity to intervene in productions of race and racist discourses. Perhaps most famously, the black sprinter John Ertzgaard (also featured in the "I am also Norwegian" campaign) initiated[25] what became a fierce debate about whether the word *neger* (negro) is "neutral" in Norwegian (Gullestad 2002, 178). Ertzgaard relied on an international frame of reference to argue that *neger* has an "evil and very negative history" (in Gullestad 2002, 178). As Gullestad (2002) notes, while many participants supported Ertzgaard in the ensuing debate, most did not. Yet in the intervening years, *neger*

appears to have largely disappeared from public discourse[26] (see Lydersen 2007) and as such Ertzgaard and his supporters can be seen to have had at least some success.

While Ertzgaard made a self-consciously political statement, entertainment stars use various forms of music, theatre, and comedy to make similar points. For example, the black women of the theatre group Queendom effectively introduces mainstream audiences to black perspectives on racism and national belonging in Norway. This is particularly significant given the dearth of such perspectives in the mainstream and the general dismissal of racism. In their fall 2009 television show "Everyone speaks Norwegian" (*Alle snakker norsk*) Queendom used humor to address the attitudes and expectations black women are met with in dominant Norwegian society. Viewers were partly forced and partly invited[27] to experience these attitudes (including intense surveillance of their afros, expectations that they do not speak Norwegian, and racialized sexual objectification) from the women's perspectives. Far from taking a position as victims of racism (a position white Norwegians may be more familiar and comfortable with, as one that invokes pity and ultimately can maintain hierarchical relationships), Queendom presents themselves as cool, classy, and urban[28] women who are irritated and angered – but not victimized, defeated, or kept back - by the treatment they often are targets of.

Queendom, as well as Tajik, Ertzgaard, and others who challenge dominant Norwegian racial constructions (e.g. Buntu and Prestø 2006; Gullestad 2002), share inter- and transnational frames of reference that are important. In a context where both academic and popular discussions of integration and difference are highly insular (e.g. Andersson 2007; Gullestad 2002, 152) and persistently present in the dominant public sphere, such inter- and transnational referents are crucial in broadening discursive repertoires. These referents are broadly shared amongst those who intervene in reiterations of dominant racial constructions (Gullestad 2002, 185). As Pred notes, however, migrants and their descendants generally are more likely to participate "in transnational public sphere[s]" and therefore filter "experiences of race … through nonlocal *current* referents, through elsewhere shifting circumstances as

well as through collective memories" (2000, 25). While Pred certainly ignores the effects of globalized youth cultures on understandings of race (e.g. Prieur 2002, 2004), inter- and transnational referents do appear to be particularly central to the narratives of belonging forged by Norwegians not seen as white.[29] It seems that it is by also looking outside of Norway's borders that a new Norwegian imaginary community can be created.

Considering race

I opened this dissertation with two quotes. In one, the character Mina in Adelheid Seyfarth's semi-autobiographical novel *Fars hus* (Father's house) describes how blackness comes to define her in Norway – and defines her out of existence. "The skin color that my father left some of to me," Mina notes, "took more from me than just my rights, like traveling and moving freely. Through the years I realized that the inheritance from my father took from me all rights to be who I was. Thus my right to be" (2005, 384). Here Seyfarth emphasizes that the ways white Norwegians understand blackness and Norwegianness significantly inhibits Mina's ability to create a coherent sense of self. Mina is born in the 1960s and grows up in small, rural village. Yet to be who she is – a black Norwegian from Finnskogen – is understood as impossible.

In the other quote, African American legal scholar Patricia Williams urges us to "consider, for just one moment, *race*" (1997, 61). She lists a series of topics that are culturally salient in the U.S. as things one talk about when avoiding talking about race; "hard work or personal responsibility or birth order or class or God or the good, old glories of the human spirit" (ibid.). While many of these specific topics have considerable less rhetorical traction in Norway, Norwegians also talk about everything but race. Instead, Norwegians talk of language skills, cultural difference, and gender inequity. But, much as these are also topics worthy of consideration, as Seyfarth's novel starkly illustrates, race remains central to constructions of Norwegianness - and therefore to life in Norway.

The mechanisms behind the construction of Mina's very being as impossible are neither fictional nor historical, but rather ongoing facets of Norwegian productions of race and nation. In order to make this impossibility possible, it is necessary to first confront race. Here I have shown that Norwegian national belonging is currently firmly grounded in racial formations that rely on ideas of naturalized difference based in (primarily) perceived skin color, and is therefore unable to create an imagined national community that encompasses all citizens. The claims to color-blindness that dominate Norwegian attempts to address integration, discrimination, and the necessity of new national imaginaries, undermines these goals through the failure to see race as a broadly produced category that structures current Norwegian society.

Though I hope to have shown here that productions of race are central to, rather than absent from, current Norwegian society, considerably more research is needed to uncover the multiple mechanisms through which Norwegian racial formations are produced and resisted. This is true both of historical formations, and of current reiterations. Thus, for example, while I have begun to scratch the surface of the developing formation of race in the 1970s, broader and more detailed analyses of this period are necessary. The changing approaches to difference, and, especially, to the management of difference, in the early 1970s are foundational to the Norwegian society that has since developed. This is true of constructions of immigrants, but also of gender and sexuality, ethnic minorities, youth cultures, and disability. Time and space constraints have led me to only briefly consider one of these strands, but they should be analyzed in conjunction, through a feminist intersectional framework. Such analyses would better allow us to understand the sorts of "truths" that seem "common sense" today with regard to normative desires, pressures, and management strategies, as well as forms of resistance to these.

Understanding the continuous processes of racial formation and their inflection with age, gender, sexuality, and class is crucial if feminists – scholars, activists, policy makers, and others – are to be able to further goals of equality. As Razack (2008) notes, laws and policies designed to protect women will always fail if they are racist.

In Norway, liberal feminism is a mainstream and institutionalized framework, and today much of the self-proclaimed feminist efforts are focused on the perceived need to protect women who are not perceived as white from cultural practices that are non-normative in Norway. These efforts are largely shaped with little input from those they are supposed to serve (Siim and Skjeie 2008), and with even less recognition of their complicity in further entrenching racialized divisions. In this manner, the widespread analytic illiteracy with regards to race leads to feminist efforts being undermined.

The racializing processes that I have analyzed here are powerful and while I have mainly focused on their production in sites of visible power, these processes often function in capillary (Foucault 1980, 96) ways that are difficult to identify and challenge. Yet Norwegian racial formations are neither complete nor unchallenged. In particular, Norwegians who are not understood as white show strength and determination as they forge lives in Norway that defy dominant processes of racialization, and this is in itself an enactment of a new Norwegian imaginary. I end this dissertation with the words of Queendom's Asta Busingye Lydersen, who points to such an imaginary in her vision for the Norway to come. Her optimism is infectious and gives hope; it also shows what is at stake in ensuring that all who are at home in Norway can be Norwegian.

> I so look forward to the Norway that will emerge in ten to twenty years. There has been so much victimizing of "immigrant youth" with oppressed girls and boys in gangs, but there are incredibly many great, active, and resourceful youth coming up now. It is a huge generation that will whiz in to business, politics, and media. Give Norway a few more years, and it'll be really amazing.[30]
> (in Buntu and Prestø 2006, 48).

NOTES

[1] *Utrop* describes itself as "Norway's first and only internet site, newspaper, and TV that has news, entertainment and current affairs about multicultural Norway" (www.utrop.no/Om-oss-22). It was established online in 2001 and has since added a twice-monthly printed paper as well as online TV programming.

[2] State funding of voluntary associations in Norway is widespread, in large part because these are viewed as part of the democratic fabric of society (e.g. Hernes 1988; Predelli 2008).

[3] Tajik also lists wearing clothing styles that do not differ from those worn by the majority (26); speaking unaccented Norwegian, and preferably a dialect, and being female and therefore a "victim" (but not a subject) rather than a "perpetrator" (31) as other criteria.

[4] The same messages were repeated in a report the following evening (*Dagsrevyen* 5 January 2010).

[5] *Det er selve betegnelsen brune og hvite barn jeg reagerte på. Barn er tross alt ganske alminnelige mennesker, enten de er brune eller hvite*

[6] *utnevner NRK hudfarge og etnisk bakgrunn til våre fremste kjennetegn*

[7] *med negativt utgangspunkt*

[8] *i drøftingen av kulturforskjeller, innvandring og integrering*

[9] *det er politisk korrekt å si flerkulturell eller innvandrer*

[10] Both actual immigrants and Norwegians who are not seen as white appear to be represented on the commission, though all are identified according to which country other than Norway they are associated with. See http://www.kim.no/templates/PersonOversikt.aspx?id=1197

[11] Eighteen representatives of political parties and state departments as well as 17 representatives of "immigrant" organizations are appointed by the government for four-year periods coinciding with each Parliamentary election period.

[12] "Immigrant" groups and individuals not seen as white also appear to predominantly be seen to only have standing to speak to issues of immigration and integration.

[13] MiRA emerged out of the Foreign Women's Group, which was started in 1979 by international students at the University of Oslo. MiRA took on its current name and form in 1989.

[14] Siim and Skjeie (2008) argue that "immigrant" groups have had considerable influence on Norwegian policy making in relation to forced marriages. Yet the evidence for this is uneven: for example, on the one hand, groups such as MiRA-Senteret, KIM, and others are cited as opposing central legal proposals in Ot.prp. 75 for 2006-2007 (on the new Immigration Act), but this both in a context where most of those consulted opposed the proposal, and when the political tide had turned against it. In contrast, in the development of proposals for legal and policy changes with the view to combat forced marriages, MiRA-Senteret has not been afforded recognition as having special expertise. Indeed, in Ot.prp. 109 for 2004-2005 (on the new Immigration Act and protection against forced marriages), their views are summarily dismissed – presumably because they were in the minority and were opposing proposals that had political support. In other words, MiRA has some influence, but this is arguably insufficient and in some instances (such as in relation to forced marriages) disproportionately small compared to their expertise. MiRA does not appear to be seen being experts when their views are contrary to dominant ones.

[15] *verken nåværende eller tidligere regjerning vært lydhør for minoritetskvinners stemmer i denne debatten.*

[16] Here I use "multicultural" to literally mean youth who are deeply enmeshed in two or more dominant cultures: thus Norwegian-Pakistani or Sami youth can be multicultural (but may not be), whereas youth who listen to punk music are not *therefore* "multicultural." Many multicultural youth in Norway are perceived as white, and I do *not* use the term as signaling a position within Norwegian racial formations.

[17] Leaving aside here questions of whether these goals are met, and whether the state is moving towards a liberal rather than social democratic outlook (Østerud 2005).

[18] In particular Abid Q. Raja and Hadia Tajik, but also e.g. Loveleen Brenna, Nazneen Khan-Østrem, Manuela Ramin Osmundsen, Majoran Vivekananthan, Iffit Qureshi, and Usman Rana. Notably, all but Osmundsen (who is a black French lawyer) have family ties in South Asia: there are very few people of African descent who appear in the dominant media landscape outside of its sports and entertainment pages, and even fewer who challenge the reductive binary between "immigrants" (or particular migrant groups) and "Norwegians." This may be significant in terms of the role models and imagined futures

available for Norwegian youth of African descent, as well as for the ways in which black Norwegians are racialized as particularly suited for elite sports and entertainment, but not as intellectual and expert contributors to Norwegian society.
[19] Tajik has been one of Oslo's Labor representatives since fall 2009.

[20] *Som barn har jeg både pugget arabiske Koran-vers på ferie i Pakistan, og sunget norske salmer i en av Misjonssambandets barnehager på Tau. I oppveksten tilbrakte jeg både tid hos jenteforeningen til Sanitetskvinnene på Bedehuset i Bjørheimsbygd og på norskpakistanske fester i Stavanger.*

[21] *Bygdedyret* (literally "village animal") is a concept first developed by the writer Tor Jonsson. He describes it as a set of rules such as "do not stand out," "know your place in the group," "be critical of all that is new, strange, and different," and the like.
[22] *Jeg ble kjent med bygdedyret under oppveksten i Bjørheimsbygd i Rogaland, men har også møtt det blant norskpakistanere og norskmuslimer i Oslo.*
[23] *Gutter og jenter av min generasjon er en del av "det nye norske vi". Det betyr at vi ikke sorterer nordmenn etter hvilken etnisk bakgrunn de har.*
[24] The campaign was put together by the national Anti-Racist Centre, the Oslo youth center Agenda X (which is tied to the Anti-Racist Centre), and the youth-wing of the Oslo branch of the Labor Party.
[25] It seems to be Ertzgaard's fame and popularity that caused there to be a debate at all. Three years earlier the organization Afrikan Youth in Norway (with which Ertzgaard has been involved) published a pamphlet taking issue with various ways in which white Norwegians, and in particular the Norwegian press, represented Africa and Africans. *Neger* was one of the words that the organization said should not be used. At the time, the pamphlet was not only dismissed but ridiculed (see Lydersen 2007).
[26] What happens in interpersonal interactions and private settings is another matter, and I have no evidence regarding the word's usage there.
[27] Early in the program viewers are eavesdropping on a conversation between the four women where they describe racist treatment and their reactions to it. Following this educational scene, viewers are later invited to share the women's experiences of racist objectification. In a refusal of a clear demarcation between "white" and "black," one of the self-identified black women of Queendom (Monica Ifejilika) plays the upper-class, unconsciously racist, white woman who is both their patron and the source of their objectification.
[28] In "Everybody speaks Norwegian" Queendom (who play themselves – or perhaps fictional versions of themselves) are described as "urban" and an urban-rural gap is part of the storyline. It is somewhat unclear whether "urban" here is used as code for "black" in the way it can be in e.g. the U.S. ("Urban" in Norway is just as likely to be coupled with "latte-drinking" and be a way of condemning what is seen as the [implicitly "out of touch" with "real people" and hypocritical] mostly white, middle-class, well-educated left.)
[29] For example, Queendom's framing of their own Africanness appears to be grounded both in their familial ties to Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Uganda (respectively) *and* to notions of African identity that seems heavily filtered through North American Africentric discourses, while Hadia Tajik in part explains her Norwegian identity through a family history where each generation has a new national identity – often fiercely held: she is the daughter of a Pakistani mother who in turn is the daughter of Afghani parents, who in turn were the children of Iranians (Tajik 2001b).
[30] *Jeg gleder meg sånn utrolig til det Norge som blir til om ti-tjue år. Det har vært så mye stakkarsliggjøring av "innvandrerungdommen" med undertrykte jenter og gutter i gjenger, men det er så utrolig mye bra, aktiv og ressurssterk ungdom på gang nå. Det er en svær generasjon som kommer til å suse inn i næringsliv, politikk og i media. Gi Norge noen år til, så blir det såååå bra.*

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Appendix A

The Interview Process and Rationale

The interviews that this chapter builds on were conducted in Norway during the summer and fall of 2007 and in early 2008. I spent a total of seven weeks in Norway during this period: five in July-August 2007, one in October 2007 and one in March 2008. During the first visit most of my time was spent locating potential participants, and only two interviews were conducted during this visit. In total I conducted 13 semi-structured[1] interviews with 15 participants: two couples (four participants) were interviewed together, as were two siblings. I met with one participant twice. Interviews were conducted in Norwegian (my first language) and all interviewees spoke Norwegian either exceptionally well or fluently. Twelve of the interviews were recorded and transcribed; for unknown reasons the last interview did not record and I only have notes. Fourteen interviewees have been provided with full transcripts of their interview, and have been invited to comment on or alter their earlier answers.[2] Two interviewees withdrew from the study after reviewing the transcript of their interview. The participant whose interview did not record has been provided with my notes from the interview, and I have followed this up with a phone call to ensure that my notes accurately reflect her views. I have translated the excerpts from the interviews that appear here, attempting to stay as close to the language of the interviewee as possible. To do so, rather than rely on literal translations that in English would suggest a stilted language and confusing logic, I have tried to reflect the style of speech. This means that, for example, where interviewees spoke fluent Norwegian the translation is into fluent English but with the incoherencies of speech intact.

In recruiting participants I was looking for those who had moved to Norway between 1945 and 1975, and consequently the potential participants in this study had lived in Norway between 35 and 60 years. They could therefore not as a starting point be assumed to be in close contact with the embassies of their countries of origin, or necessarily even national interest organizations such as the Czech-Norwegian Forum, Norwegian-Slovak

Association, or the Norwegian-Hungarian Association. Recruiting participants was therefore initially a challenge.

I employed several methods to locate participants: first, I alerted family and friends in Norway about the project, and I met eight of the participants as the result of contacts through family and a friend of a friend. Secondly, I contacted all the national associations I could find. This was a less successful strategy than I had hoped, in large part because I received little response to my attempts at making contact. Though this situation without a doubt was affected by July being a "vacation month" in Norway, I am not in a position to speculate as to other reasons most of the associations did not respond. However, the Norwegian-Slovak Association proved very graciously helpful and put me in touch with all the Slovak participants. The Norwegian-Hungarian Association also responded with offers of help, but at that point I had located several Hungarian participants through other routes, and was unsure whether I would have time to interview more. The Norwegian-Hungarian Association also alerted me to their publication on the 1956 Hungarian uprising (Norsk-Ungarsk Forening 1996).

Third, I contacted the Greek Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Oslo: as religious institutions these are central community nodes and they represent the predominant religions in the countries of origin of the migrants I was hoping to talk with. I subsequently met with a staff member at the Catholic Church and was able to leave a stack of fliers in the church. A representative from the Greek Orthodox Church initially expressed interest, but we then lost touch for unknown reasons. In part due to time constraints and in part because I was reluctant to approach people without an introduction, I did not attend services at either church, though doing so might have increased the probability of meeting potential participants. None of the participants were located through religious institutions.

Fourth, I put up fliers in a range of venues, including public libraries and health centers in Oslo, and also in an Italian specialty shop whose proprietor was willing to introduce the study to some of the older Italians who frequented the shop. The latter may have proven

a fruitful strategy if I had had more time in Oslo, including more time to follow up with the proprietor. While "hard copy" fliers proved unsuccessful, I had more luck with an electronic notice on the staff web pages of my former employer, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. The Directorate has a large staff, many of whom are part of or involved with immigrant communities in Norway. As a result this notice, I was contacted by a more recent Greek immigrant who not only put me in touch with the Greek interviewee, but also took me out for coffee (despite my best attempts to reverse those roles, given that he was helping me) to tell me about the Greek immigrant community in Norway.

The three remaining participants were recruited through the snowball method. Additionally, several of the participants offered to put me in touch with potential participants that I ended up not having time to follow up with. Overall this study would have benefited significantly from a longer field-work period.

I interviewed nine women (two later withdrew and are not part of this discussion) and six men from Norway, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, and Greece. The migrants arrived in Norway as refugees, asylum-seekers, laborers and through marriage,[3] while the Norwegian participant is married to one of the migrants. Participants were born between the late 1920s and the mid 1940s, and were thus roughly between 60 and 80 years old at the time of the interviews in 2007 and 2008. Five were in their early- to mid teens when they arrived, but only two of these arrived as part of a family unit.

Participants have a range of educational backgrounds, from less than five years of formal schooling to a doctoral degree. Six of the participants have attended university, one has a professional degree, and three are trained as skilled laborers. Those who arrived in Norway as adults or in their mid-teens have brought skills and higher education with them from their countries of origin. However, those with university and/or professional degrees have all continued or added to their education in Norway.

Most of the interviewees were able to use their education and training in Norway, though those with higher education were only able to do so after additional studies in Norway. Participants were or are engaged in a wide range of jobs, including in international trade and finance, in the health sector, in creative industries, in industry, and in the service sector. All were or had been married to an opposite-sex partner, of whom four were or had been married to a partner from their country of origin (the other nine were or had been married to a white Norwegian). All but one had at least one child, and all but one of the children had grown up with the interviewees.

In introducing myself and the project to potential participants, I described myself as a Norwegian PhD student at the University of Minnesota, USA, interested in migrants' experiences in relation to how they have been perceived and incorporated into Norwegian society, as well as in documenting their experience of moving to Norway. Before each interview I discussed the consent form with the participant(s), and also asked if they had any questions about the project. None asked questions about the project at that point, and during the course of the interview only two participants expressed any further interest in the details of the research. I discussed my rationale for and thoughts about the project with these participants in greater detail.

Upon meeting, a number of participants remarked on my "non-Norwegian" name (the majority of the interviewees met me when I had no typical Norwegian name), prompting me to talk about being the child of an immigrant to Norway. In several interviews either this, and/ or my own experiences as a migrant, were used by participants as a way of establishing similarity and as a reference point to explain their own views or experiences.

Overall, participants appear to have approached the interview situation with similar ideas of what it means to be interviewed: as Frankenberg (1993, 30) notes, the directionality and form of interviews is well established (in media-saturated societies) and hard to alter –perhaps especially in one-time encounters. Thus, although I was happy to discuss my own views and experiences, interviewees seem to have been comfortable with the role of being interviewed, and few showed any interest in asking questions themselves.

Similarly, while I asked guided questions I mostly let participants speak at length to each question, taking their stories in a variety of directions, and on several occasions this prompted participants to pause and urge me be more directive and ask more questions.

Feminist researchers have emphasized the importance of accounting for the role and identities of the researcher in order to bring to light her role in the research process: feminist researchers are "reflexive" and "situate" themselves in relation to the research process and participants (e.g. Fonow and Cook 2005). Interrogating such practices, Rose (1997) points to the potential pit-falls of reflexive writing; it can give a false sense of transparency that comes close to Haraway's "god-trick." Rose suggests that a more productive strategy is to acknowledge the gaps in meaning that are opened up when diverse knowledges meet (1997, 318). Here, while the power differentials that are inherent to academic research must certainly be kept in mind, I have found these gaps in meaning and in priorities more urgent. For example, a feature of the interviews is the extent to which questions of national belonging and national identity are not a concern for participants. This means that contrary to accepted feminist practice (e.g. Swarr 2003, 22, 29) I do impose a particular set of questions on the interview setting and on the narration; however the lack of concern with these questions, the interpretation that participants brought to questions of belonging, and the gaps in meaning that arose, in itself speaks to dominant discourses of the nation.

My primary motive in using interview data was to get a view of how individuals negotiate national belonging under what I expected were significantly changing circumstances (see introduction). However, because the post-war migration of Southern and Eastern Europeans to Norway is an understudied topic with few written sources, a secondary objective and motive was to document aspects of this migration. Interviewees thus spoke both to the circumstances of their arrival and settlement in Norway and to their changing sense of national belonging. These interviews do not establish a generalizable historical truth, nor have I been concerned with the "veracity" of the accounts (though I have every reason to believe that interviewees' description of their arrival and settlement in Norway accurately reflect their recollections – it has merely not

been my goal here to confirm this through other sources). Rather, I am interested in what these stories might tell us about processes of identity formation, particularly in relation to dominant discourses of belonging. Such processes are necessarily always unique, reflecting individual circumstances and attitudes, yet read in conjunction their significance moves beyond the individual.

The interviewees "speak out of particular positions in the complex of social relations characteristic of [a particular society at a particular historical time]. These accounts appropriate and make sense of salient features of social relations within which [the interviewees] have been implicated and within which they have acted and struggled" (Popular Memory Group, quoted in Gengenbach 1994, 625). Thus, for example, I discuss the interviewees' concern with establishing themselves as never, or only on an extremely rare occasion or two, having been the target of discrimination. Here, the concern with creating a narrative about a life in Norway that is free of discrimination is as interesting as the contrast these narratives offers both with other aspects of the interviewees' stories, and with written sources. This concern highlights a set of competing dominant discourses of belonging, otherness, and the "proper" direction of xenophobia and racism. As views of particular negotiations of these discourses, then, these narratives show complexity that would be lost in more quantitative studies, while illuminating societal structures in ways that have significance beyond each individual's unique experience.

NOTES

[1] See appendix B for an English translation of the interview guide.

[2] Five interviewees were sent electronic copies of their transcript. Eight were sent two hard copies of their transcripts, as well as a stamped return envelope. Two were sent one hard copy of their transcripts and this was followed up with a phone call.

[3] I am unclear about the technical immigration basis for one of the participants, but as this participant's *reasons* for moving to Norway are clear, I have not considered this technicality important.

Appendix B
Interview Guide

Name, age, country of origin, family in Norway and in country of origin [age, gender, relationship to respondent: do not need identifying information].

Please tell me about the situation that led up to your coming to Norway?

Potential follow-up questions:

- what was the situation like in the previous country of residence
- why/under what circumstances did you leave
- did you decide to come to Norway or did you come here more by accident or circumstance
- did you travel alone or with someone

When you first got here:

- How did you find work?
- How did you find housing?
- How did you make friends? Who were they?
- What was your social life like?

What was it like being [nationality] in Norway at this time?

Potential follow-up questions:

- language barriers
- community of [nationality]
- discrimination
- locals being curious/friendly/hostile

Did you experience Norwegians as being very different from yourself?
Do you think the Norwegians you met thought you were very different from them?
Has any of this changed over time (how/when/why)?

How did you learn Norwegian?

Potential follow-up questions:

- Did you learn at work and/or take a course
- Did you learn Norwegian immediately or after a while

Where did you work?
What was it like to work there (incl. colleagues)?
Did you change jobs?
[If child when arrived, ask about school.]

Where did you live?
What was it like to live there?
Did you move?
Who were your neighbors? Were you friendly with them?

Did you become a Norwegian citizen? If so, why/why not?
In the early 1970s there was a lot of focus in the media on the immigration of workers from Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco. Can you remember what you thought of this at the time (both the immigration and the media focus)?

What do you perceive to be the similarities and differences between the sorts of experiences that you have had living in Norway, and those you think e.g. the Pakistani migrants may have had?

What sort of relationship do you have to [country of origin] today?

If interviewee has children: Your children have grown up here. What sort of relationship do they have to [interviewees' country of origin]? Have your children generally been perceived as Norwegian (explicate)? If relevant, ask similar questions about any grandchildren.