CONTAINING BALKAN NATIONALISM: IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND
OTTOMAN CHRISTIANS (1856-1912)

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DENIS VLADIMIROVICH VOVCHEKNO

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Theofanis G. Stavrou

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Preface and Acknowledgements

When I entered the graduate program at the University of Minnesota in fall of 2002, I knew that my research would be in the area of Greek-Slavic relations. As a matter of fact, I started the program as a holder of the Basil Laourdas Fellowship, earmarked for students whose dissertation would focus on Greek-Slavic cultural relations in modern times. As a Laourdas fellow, I was able to devote my first year in the United States (2002-2003) entirely to my studies without any distractions. It was a unique opportunity to sharpen my research topic as I received suggestions from my advisor Professor Theofanis G. Stavrou. At first, I was going to do a biography of Archimandrite Antonin (Kapustin) who spent most of his career in charge of the Russian Embassy churches in Athens and Constantinople respectively, and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem (1850-1894). Professor Stavrou suggested that the focus on that significant personality would illuminate the most significant church developments in the Christian Orthodox world at the time including the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question.

Consequently, during my first archival trip to Russia in the summer of 2004, I used the Dunn Peace scholarship for that research agenda. Gradually, the focus of my dissertation became the Greek-Bulgarian Question and its broad political and cultural dimensions. Additional eighteen months of research in Greek and Russian archives became possible thanks to the support of the Allison F. Frantz Fellowship with the American School of Classical Studies at Athens and summer research grants from the Graduate School and the History Department of the University of Minnesota (2005-2006 and 2007). I appreciate all sources of support without which neither my studies nor my dissertation could be completed. I am extremely grateful to the staff of Greek and Russian archives I
worked in and especially to the Gennadius Library in Athens for their support and patience.

At the University of Minnesota, I have benefited greatly from many devoted scholars who helped me focus my intellectual curiosity. It is my pleasure to thank Professors Aminzade, Farah, Munholland, and Sampson for their kindness in reading the dissertation and providing insightful comments. Participating in their graduate seminars has shaped me as a social scientist and a historian of Modern Europe and Middle East. Professor Stavrou is a pioneer and an energetic promoter of Greek-Slavic studies in the United States. This dissertation would not have been possible without his constant inspiration, warm support, and gentle direction. Needless to say, all deficiencies and mistakes in the dissertation text are my responsibility only. Professor Stavrou’s family, Kyria Freda Stavrou and Soterios Stavrou, helped me understand many aspects of Greek and American life. I am particularly thankful to my wife Tanya for following me in all those trips and for supporting me through the long journey of my undergraduate and graduate studies.

Unless otherwise noted, all the dates are according to the Old (Julian) Calendar used in Russia and Greek lands in the period under consideration. It is 12 days behind the New (Gregorian) Calendar. In terms of spelling of Greek and Russian names and terms, I followed the Library of Congress guidelines with a few exceptions. Greek words are rendered according to Modern Greek pronunciation.
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my advisor Professor Theofanis G. Stavrou
Abstract

The dissertation is an analysis of the Russian relationship to Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. As a methodological approach, it uses the concepts of irredentism, Orientalism, and multiple modernities. The dissertation focuses on the debate around the Bulgarian Church Question in Russia and Greek lands. The discussion developed among intellectuals, ecclesiastics, and diplomats from the Crimean War to the First Balkan War (1856-1912) and inspired several visions of a supranational cultural and political union of Russia and its “unredeemed” populations in the Near East.

The study argues that in the period under consideration traditional Pan-Orthodox irredentism had to compete with the more modern ethnic-based Pan-Slavism. Based on those examples, the dissertation suggests that irredentism is a discourse of both similarity and difference. It helps consolidate the national identity of the core group by mobilizing it for the cause conveniently situated abroad. In line with Orientalist hallmarks, irredentism others and genders the unredeemed as helpless victims. In contrast to Orientalism, irredentist discourse others the purported Self and leaves more room for the agency of the unredeemed.

The three responses to the Bulgarian Church Question can be broadly defined as “Pan-Slavism,” “Pan-Orthodoxy,” and “Greco-Slavic world/cultural type” theory as a synthesis of the first two. These visions sought to resolve tensions between ethnic and religious elements in the identity of significant segments of the educated Russian society. All three visions were examples of Orientalist production of knowledge connected with
political power. They ultimately aimed at creating a non-Western civilization based on shared culture and centered on Russia. The existing scholarly literature considers the proponents of these visions as conservative, neotraditional, and “anti-modern” on the assumption that there can only be one liberal Western model of modernity. The dissertation uses the concept of multiple modernities to situate Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question within the broader context of “the invention of tradition” in *fin-de-siecle* Europe. It suggests the strength and evolution of traditional religious and dynastic identities and institutions on the eve of the First World War.
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Introduction

Argument

The dissertation argues that irredentism contributes to the construction of cultural identity of the “core group.” Specifically, it argues that Russia’s relationship to Christian and Slav populations in the Ottoman Empire helped consolidate and redefine its cultural identities. This study proposes to analyze Russia’s connection to its coethnics and coreligionists in the Balkans using the concepts of irredentism,\(^1\) Orientalism, and multiple modernities.\(^2\) To analyze continuity and change in that relationship, the dissertation focuses on the political and cultural implications of the Greek Bulgarian Church Question in Russia and Greek lands from the Crimean war to the First Balkan War (1856-1912). The study conceptualizes the variety of responses to that issue into three visions of a future cultural and political union of Russia and its “unredeemed” populations in the Near East. Specifically, those three responses can be broadly defined as “Pan-Slavism,” “Pan-Orthodoxy,” and “Greco-Slavic world/cultural type” theory as a synthesis of the first two.

Pan-Slavs in Russia and Eastern Europe promoted autonomy and independence of various Slavic nations from the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. After liberating the Slavs, Russia would continue to protect them in a Slavic federation. Only this political union would ensure the development of Slavic cultural historical type or civilization. The Pan-Orthodox opposed the Pan-Slavs because the latter marginalized all non-Slavic Orthodox groups in their present and future projects. Instead, they argued in favor of

\(^1\) In this study, irredentism is considered a political principle or policy directed toward the incorporation of irredenta or “the unredeemed” within the boundaries of their historically or ethnically related political unit

strengthening the traditional protection of Ottoman Christians via the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In the more or less undesirable case of the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Russia would build an “Eastern Union” based on Russian autocracy and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Pan-Orthodox sought to prevent Pan-Slav or Pan-Greek nationalism from affecting Russian cultural and political elites and the Patriarchate of Constantinople respectively. The aim of their containment project was to preserve peace among coreligionists to develop their shared cultural legacy into a Byzantine cultural historical type or civilization.

The proponents of the Greco-Slavic cultural type shared the same goals of preserving peace but they attempted to modify Russian Pan-Orthodox messianism by rationalizing Orthodoxy as part of cultural legacy supposedly common to all Slavs and Orthodox non-Slavs. With this in mind, the supporters of the Greco-Slavic cultural type promoted cooperation directly between national centers in Russia and the Balkans rather than through the traditional institution of Eastern Patriarchates. Together with the Pan-Orthodox, they saw a way to contain the divisive effects of nationalism in a form of federation.

In contrast to both Pan-Slavs and the advocates of the Greco-Slavic cultural type, the Pan-Orthodox insisted on the important role of the Church empowered vis-à-vis the state and modern hegemonic ideologies. The Pan-Orthodox saw the Patriarchate of Constantinople as a model for the reform of the Russian Church. What was common to all three visions was an attempt to resolve tensions between ethnic and religious elements in the identity of significant segments of the educated society in Russia and Greek lands.
All three ultimately aimed at creating a non-Western civilization based on shared culture and centered on Russia.

As the construction of the colonized and/or Orientalized Other is needed for the Western self, so does the image of helpless unredeemed help mobilize and create the identity of the unified core group. In conformity with Orientalist hallmarks, all three Russian irredentist constructs othered and gendered the unredeemed Ottoman Christians. They also redefined the place in history and culture of Russia, the “Christian East,” and Slavdom both for the Russians and for their coreligionist and coethnic populations. Similarly, “Orientalism claims the authority to represent the Orient and Orientals not just to ‘the West,’ but to the Orient itself.”

In another Orientalist gesture, all three visions described Russia’s coreligionists and coethnics “in terms of absences: of change, progress, liberty, reason, and so on.” Without Russian intervention and leadership, the Orthodox Christians and/or Slavs were incapable of protecting their physical survival, political independence, and cultural distinctiveness. These perceptions suggest that Russia’s irredentist relationship to the Christian East and Slavdom was a discourse of both sameness and difference. Thus, it was not in small measure the debate around the Bulgarian Church Question that turned the proponents of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and Greco-Slavic type from hair-

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splitting academics and isolated publicists into Orientalist producers of knowledge who attempted to influence Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.  

The existing scholarly literature considers people behind those visions as conservative, neotraditional, and consequently anti-modern on the assumption that there can only be one liberal secular rational progressive Western model of modernity.  

Instead, the concept of multiple modernities could be used to conceptualize those visions conceived in the spirit of “the invention of tradition,” “aesthetic modernism,” and “scientific” categories. All three responses to the Bulgarian Church Question used the scientific methodology of cultural historical types or civilizations developed by Nikolai Danilevskii by 1869. Drawing on that concept, the supporters of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and the Greco-Slavic cultural type were able to invent their constructs where none had existed before. The aesthetic modernism in their visions came from their revulsion with the hegemonic liberal secular rational progressive Western civilization.

Although there was a great deal of interaction among ecclesiastics, intellectuals, and policymakers in Russia and the Greek lands, the latter did not have a similar level of sophistication in modernizing their vision of Greco-Slavic relations. Some Pan-Hellenists were moderate enough to urge practical cooperation and partition of the spheres of

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6 The Invention of Tradition, eds. Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence (Cambridge ; New York ; Cambridge University Press, 1992)  
7 For checklists of ‘modernity’ elements see David-Fox, Michael, “Multiple Modernities,” 537
influence peacefully whereas their extremist cousins sought an all-out ideological and
even military conflictual relationship with the Slavs. Similarly, the Pan-Orthodox in the
Greek lands did not infuse their traditional vision with the spirit of the invention of
tradition, aesthetic modernism, or scientific categories.

In Russia, all three constructs operated the supposedly modern ethnographic
concepts\(^8\) to describe the division of population in the Ottoman Empire as composed of
different “elements.” But ‘pre-modern’ religious or confessional categories were just as
important for them. This seeming contradiction is in line with Michael David-Fox’ notion
of “combined development”\(^9\) of modern and premodern characteristics as well as Michael
Herzfeld’s distinction between “the outwardly-directed model” and “the introspective
self-view” in any cultural identity.\(^10\) This puzzling incongruity also illustrates Dipesh
Chakrabarty’s argument that “historical time is not integral, that it is out of joint with
itself” – the idea central to his project of uncovering historical alternatives to Western
European modernity.\(^11\) The combination of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, the theory of
Greco-Slavic cultural type and the attempts to solve the Bulgarian Question was one of
the first conscious and very articulate attempts in modern times to decenter both in theory
and practice the mainstream Western European modernity and divest it of its self-
proclaimed universalistic progressivist mission. In the argument of its proponents, the

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\(^8\) Holquist, Peter, “To Count, To Extract, To Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, eds. Ronald Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 112-113

\(^9\) David-Fox, Michael, “Multiple Modernities,” 537


Pan-Orthodox, Pan-Slav, Greco-Slavic alternative civilizational modernities existed in opposition to and parallel to their Western counterpart.

This kind of conceptualization of Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question will help situate them within the broader context of fin-de-siecle Europe. Specifically, I draw on Carl Schorske’s influential analysis of politics and culture in Vienna at the turn of the twentieth century. He explained the emergence of the seemingly anti-modern and neotraditionalist intellectual and political currents as the crisis of universalistic ideas of Enlightenment and liberalism.¹²

As regards the ability of religious identities to “modernize” and to resist ethnonationalism in a dynastic setting, my dissertation is relevant to the current historiographical debate on traditional European empires in the modern age. Histories of Europe determined by the outcome of the First World War usually feature a teleological account of “national awakenings” of the ethnic groups in the imperial core and periphery. They present a narrative of the unavoidable collapse of the allegedly outdated multinational empires of the Habsburgs, Romanovs, and Ottomans.¹³ Arno J. Maier’s The Persistence of the Old Regime is the most notable significant dissenting account.¹⁴ My dissertation seeks to go beyond his rather narrow socioeconomic focus by drawing attention to political, cultural, and intellectual issues.

**Background: Historiographical and Historical Context**

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¹³ A recent example of this is Ivan T. Berend’s, *Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998)
As suggested above, irredentism is “othered” and gendered in a way similar to other discourses of superiority such as colonialism and Orientalism where lack of agency, passivity, and openness to penetration lead to inferiority and ultimately to feminization.\(^{15}\) Conversely, masculinity was historically associated with agency and composure.\(^{16}\) However, irredentism is different from both Orientalist and colonial discourses because it others the purported Self – the irredenta are believed to be part of the same national or religious community. Also, unlike the colonized, the unredeemed have more agency in shaping the discourse of power relationships. They often actively contribute to the making of their inferior and othered image to sensitize homeland and move it to act in their behalf.

Portraying colonial men as either inadequate and emasculated or violent and in need of restraint provided an important legitimation for imperialist expansion. Helpless colonial women needed Europeans to “protect” them. Making a case for the Empire as largely a masculine enterprise, Philippa Levine writes, “Whether cosseted or brutalized women in such thinking (and it was commonplace British thinking in the period of Empire) were, like children, a group apart from men and a group to be defined and managed by men.”\(^ {17}\) Ireland, like other sites of colonialism, was depicted in highly gendered ways, e.g., as “the virginal young woman awaiting union, her role is to be wed


\(^{16}\) Mosse, George, *The Image of Man, the Creation of Modern Masculinity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

to John Bull or England.”\(^ {18}\) Russian perceptions of violent Muslim men also justified Russian colonial rule to “protect” Muslim women treated as “working cattle” from “an aggressive sexual threat.”\(^ {19}\)

In irredentism, othering takes a form of presenting the unredeemed as helpless victims and in need of direction and rescue by the powerful core kin group. The portrayal of the unredeemed as passive, powerless, defenseless, and ultimately as emasculated and feminized serves to mobilize the core group behind the irredentist cause. These images also enhance agency and virility of the core group at the expense of the victimized irredenta by urging the core group to assume traditional masculine roles of protectors and “Just Warriors.”\(^ {20}\) Thus, irredentist politics may tend to spike when the core group failed the test of masculinity such as in the aftermath of military defeats.\(^ {21}\) Although ostensibly launched to bring unity to the scattered nation, the images of passivity and powerlessness of the unredeemed create a fundamentally unequal relationship. Irredentism tends to create not a harmonious horizontal national community but rather resentment and resistance on the part of the irredenta if they are incorporated into the nation.

**Irredentism, Pan-Orthodoxy, Pan-Slavism, and Russian National Identity**

Reviewing the state of research in nationalism studies, Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre indicate that the most recent trend in the studies of nationalism has been to


\(^ {21}\) Goldstein, *War and Gender*, pp. 1-34, 252-301, 275
challenge the purported notion of a “unified culturally homogeneous community” central to nationalist ideologies. To deconstruct this narrative, the scholars of women’s studies, such as Nira Yuval-Davis, emphasized the gendered nature of nationalist discourses that tend to uphold patriarchy and confine women to domestic and reproductive roles. Joane Nagel synthesizes many of those findings in her study of the connections between masculinity and nationalism. Although irredentism has been prevalent in the past in various parts of the globe and is often expected to embroil even more of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into ethnic conflicts, it has not received enough critical attention. Coming from a sociological perspective, Rogers Brubaker developed his influential ”triadic relational interplay” to describe the dynamics of irredentism. It features a “homeland” and “national minority” in a nationalizing host state. Generally, sociological and political science literature on irredentism focuses on state actors, on domestic and international security implications of resulting secessionist conflicts and leaves irredentist discourse outside of analysis. Nor does it illuminate the ways

irredentism sponsored by non-state actors helps construct and consolidate the identity of the religious or national core group.

As a concept, irredentism has never before been used to analyze Russian Pan-Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism. Focusing on how irredentism helped shape Russian cultural identity, the dissertation seeks to contribute to the analysis of the factors responsible for the creation of modern national consciousness such as schooling, press, popular literature, visual media, and universal military conscription.  

From a different perspective, Vera Tolz stresses the centrality of Orthodoxy for Russian nationhood but at the same time she dismisses the importance of “the lands of the Bible” in the debates on the Russian identity.

This study argues that Pan-Orthodox and Pan-Slav irredentism was another vehicle that helped rally the Russians of all walks of life behind a unifying cause conveniently projected abroad and thus in the position to divert attention from internal divisions in the core group. It also highlights the specific role of the mass circulation press in irredentist nationalism. Far from disseminating the vision of a single horizontal community, irredentist propaganda helps consolidate the core group by othering the unredeemed.

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Drawing attention to the elements of colonialism in the discourse of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and Greco-Slavic world/cultural type theory, the dissertation also addresses an important omission in the standard works on Russian Orientalism.\(^{29}\) Thus, it is part of the agenda set by Adeeb Khalid to explore elements of Orientalism in various discourses in and about Russia.\(^{30}\)

**Bulgarian Church Question and Russia’s Orthodox East**

The Bulgarian church movement aimed at achieving independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople (1856-1912). In the theocratic Islamic structure of the Ottoman Empire, church independence meant cultural and legal autonomy. In February 1870, the Bulgarian Church was established by the Sultan’s decree without the consent of the Patriarchate. The Bulgarian issue was part of the modernizing and centralizing reforms of Tanzimat. Ottoman reformers sought to weaken the established religious Muslim or non-Muslim institutions to gradually empower lay elites. The latter would serve as the main support base in promoting Ottomanism – the creation of a multiethnic civic territorial nation including all Ottoman subjects irrespective of the creed.\(^{31}\)

This inability to reach a compromise mostly on the issue of jurisdictional and territorial delimitation of mixed Greek-Bulgarian areas led to the Local Council of Ottoman Christian Orthodox churches in September 1872. The Council proclaimed schismatics Bulgarian church movement leaders and those affiliated with them for

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\(^{29}\) In the Russian case, the concept of Orientalism is applied only to the consideration of the Muslim peoples in the Russian Empire. See, for example Brower, Daniel R. and Lazzerini, Edward J. eds, *Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).


bringing the heresy of *phyletismos* or ethnonational divisions into the Church. The schism accelerated the ongoing splintering of the previously united Ottoman Christian community, a series of local armed conflicts in Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace, ultimately snowballing into the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The agitation in favor of the Bulgarian church movement in Russia was a major part behind the rise of political Pan-Slavism.\(^{32}\)

The variety of contemporary responses will be the subject of rigorous analysis in later chapters. The existing scholarly literature touching on the Bulgarian Church Question greatly added to our knowledge of its major events and developments. But it suffers from important biases based on the teleological reading of local and general European history. Whether in its nationalistic or more objective form, it privileges the Pan-Slavs, Bulgarian or Greek nationalists over the allegedly outdated religious and dynastic alternatives. Most scholarly studies present a deterministic narrative explaining how Ottoman Christian provinces and their populations came to be partitioned and nationalized by 1912-1922. The issue is merely which irredentist propaganda was gaining the upper hand at a given time. The possibility of containing Balkan nationalism outside traditional imperial institutions in Russia or Ottoman lands and thus preserving a religious and imperial alternative is not discussed. National historians dominated the field and repeatedly presented the account of the gradual “unification” of “unredeemed brethren” with their “homelands.”\(^ {33}\)


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Although many contemporary Balkan historians consciously distance themselves from this triumphal nationalist narrative, they fail to overcome the bias in favor of modernization theory. Thus, the most recent Greek works project the story of the unavoidable destruction of the pre-modern Patriarchate of Constantinople by the new modern Western ideology of nationalism. The latter is depicted as irresistible and somehow prevailing over institutional and economical considerations in the minds of all actors involved. Although a radical departure from Greek nationalist historiography, the study by Paraskevas Matalas is limited to the pre-1872 period and is fundamentally handicapped by the neglect of the Russian factor, the absence of the sources form the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Russia. In contrast, the book by Dimitris Stamatopoulos is well-attuned to the complex and often contradictory interplay of nationalist, religious and imperial identities seen in the efforts of the Patriarchate to buttress its legitimacy and hegemony in the face of the new challenges of burgeoning mass-politics. But in the end the Patriarchate is portrayed as gradually losing its traditionally ecumenical role and inexorably adopting the nationalist paradigm. This perhaps unwarranted conclusion is due to the chronological limits (1873), the lack of Russian sources, and hence insufficient appreciation of the continued significance of Pan-Orthodoxy in the Russian foreign policy.

(Sofia, 1989); Dakin, Douglas, The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1972)


On the other hand, the literature touching on the Russian role is unable or unwilling to access alternative sources and tends to reduce complex attitudes and reactions to the Bulgarian Question to the inexorable rise of Pan-Slav sympathies in the Russian educated society and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{36} Using hitherto untapped archival materials and neglected print sources, this dissertation will offer fresh evidence and methodology to focus on supranational responses to the Bulgarian Church Question. This approach will help challenge the traditional paradigm of the so-called Eastern Question dominant in the historiography of the Russian relationship to the Near East. This mostly diplomatic literature concentrates exclusively on the rivalry of European Great Powers in the area over the spoils of the presumably dying Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{37} At the same time, my emphasis on the link between foreign cultural and political relations and the country’s identity will challenge those scholarly studies that concentrate exclusively on Russia’s domestic politics to look for evidence for the gradual demise of the country’s traditional religious and dynastic pillars and the rise of Russian nationalism in imperial policy making.\textsuperscript{38} As such, the dissertation builds on the tradition of the study of Greek-Slavic relations established at the University of Minnesota by Professor Stavrou.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37} As a more recent example, Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1991)
\textsuperscript{38} Weeks, Theodore R., Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia : Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, Ill. : Northern Illinois University Press, 1996)
\textsuperscript{39} Stavrou, Theofanis George, Russian Interests in Palestine, 1882-1914 : a Study of Religious and Educational Enterprise (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963); Batalden, Stephen K., Catherine II’s Greek Prelate : Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771-1806 (Boulder : East European Monographs ; New York : Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1982); Bruess, Gregory L., Religion, Identity and Empire
Bulgarian nationalists posing as Russia’s unredeemed Slavs indeed posed fundamental challenges to the continuity of Russia’s relationship to its coreligionists abroad, special dilemmas for the centuries-old confession-based Russian foreign policy in the Near East, for Russian self-image and cultural identity. In different ways, all three responses to the Bulgarian Church Question sought to reconcile those traditions based on Pan-Orthodox and imperial dynastic institutions and legitimation with new political Pan-Slav ethnonationalism. Specifically, all three responses to the Bulgarian Question - Pan-Orthodoxy, Pan-Slavism, and Greco-Slavic Cultural Type - drew on and attempted to transform the established discourse and ideology of Russian religious messianic irredentism in relation to the “Orthodox Christian East” (Pravoslavnyi Khrisiantksi Vostok), or Orthodox Christian populations in the Ottoman Empire, on one hand seen as the same (at least in creed) as the Russians but on the other as Orientalized and victimized under a “barbaric Muslim yoke.”

Forbidden to bear arms, ride horses or give witness against the Muslims, etc., Ottoman Christians were deprived of many symbols of masculinity. Islamic law enforced this defenselessness and discrimination – non-Muslims needed to pay a special tax for protection of their lives and property.40 The Russians understandably perceived their co-religionists as victims and posed as the only legitimate protectors lavishly granting requests for “alms” and diplomatic assistance to the Christian East.41

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41 Stavrou, Theofanis George, Russian Interests in Palestine, pp. 17, 23
Victimhood is still the most prevalent memory of Ottoman domination in the Christian Balkan tradition and in the historiography of South-Eastern European nation-states. Heroisation of hypermasculine brigands was not in the position to significantly alter the self-image of powerlessness of Balkan Christians. After all, the brigands are by definition exceptional characters against the background of the victimized majority population.  

All three visions were formulated in the revanchist mood of the Russian defeat in the “Eastern” or Crimean War (1853-56). The spread of Pan-Slavism in Russia is relatively well-studied and documented. Disseminated by professional scholars of theology and Slavic studies, Pan-Slav intellectuals and journalists, these ideas influenced individual Russian policy-makers. Thus, there was an Orientalist connection between power and knowledge. However, on the whole the official foreign policy remained very cautious and not influenced by Pan-Slavism until the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. This willingness to play by the rules of the European Great Power diplomacy provoked sharp criticism of Pan-Slav publicists. In their turn, the Government and censorship would often clamp down on their independent and critical stance.

The proponents of Pan-Orthodoxy and to a much lesser degree of Greco-Slavic cultural type had a similarly difficult relationship with the powers that be. However, the

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43 Khevrolina, V.M., Rossiiskii diplomat graf Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004), pp. 256, 304
44 Khalid, “Russian Identity,” 691-692
development of Pan-Orthodox and Greco-Slavic visions and their impact on the Russian handling of the Bulgarian Church Question remain largely unstudied. Generally, the discourse of Russian Pan-Orthodox messianism and Pan-Slavism did not receive enough scholarly attention. In her influential book, Maria Todorova drew on Edward Said but concluded that the Balkans are “imagined” as different from the Orient because they are not consistently othered, racialized and are gendered masculine. Although pointing to some similarities between Russian and Western European images of the Balkans, she treats Pan-Slavism as the discourse of sameness even when her own evidence suggests othering of the Slavs by the Russians as powerless victims. Victor Taki’s much more nuanced case study stresses the importance of difference based on “civilizational superiority” at the expense of identification with co-religionists in the early 19th century Russian perceptions of Moldavia and Wallachia. He mentions “sexual connotations” of that relationship and compares it to “a love triangle composed of the representatives of rationality in the person of a male military Russian, an apathetic Romanian boyar, irredeemably immersed in Oriental intrigue and abusive despotism and his pleasure-seeking sensuous wife.” Although pointing to this motif, Taki’s argument does not rely methodologically on Orientalism, gendered discourse analysis, or irredentism.

In the conclusion to his dissertation dealing with Russian-Greek relations in 1830s and 1840s, Lucien Frary writes that his study “makes a contribution to the rich body of

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48 Taki, “Moldavia and Wallachia,” 120
material on Orientalism.”⁴⁹ This claim may be true but comes as a surprise because Orientalism is not used as a methodological tool or even referred to anywhere else in his otherwise solid work.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to the study of the discourse of Russian relationship to its coreligionist and coethnic populations in the Christian East as it changed under the impact of political ethnonationalism, proliferation of other irredentist movements and scientific thinking in Europe. It argues that having an irredentist cause helps develop a cohesive identity of the core group at the expense of the irredenta. Irredentist activists in the core group spread the image of the unredeemed as helpless emasculated and feminized victims to motivate the core group to act in their behalf. They also produce knowledge about the unredeemed and put it to various political uses. Irredentist activists in the core group claim the authority to represent the irredenta both in the ‘homeland’ and for the unredeemed themselves. The dissertation demonstrates how Russian (and Greek) perceptions of their unredeemed Ottoman Christians helped create a self image of the core group based on superior masculine virtues, production of knowledge and power over their brethren abroad. The dissertation conceptualizes Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question as the Pan-Slav and Pan-Orthodox visions with the Greco-Slavic world or cultural type as a synthesis of the first two. These constructs were examples of irredentist ideology because they proposed different forms of political and cultural union of Russia and its coethnic and coreligionist populations.

The dissertation analyzes all three responses and focuses on the elements of the invention of tradition, Orientalism, and multiple modernities.

Structure

Chapter One focuses on the Orientalist othering and gendering of the Other in irredentism. Specifically, it concentrates on the Pan-Slav agitation spread by both Russian and Bulgarian irredentist activists in Russia and the resulting rise of Pan-Slavism in connection with the Bulgarian Church Question from the end of the Crimean war to the break between Russia and its Bulgarian irredenta (1856-1885). It shows how the Pan-Slavs attempted to change the image of the Greeks from that of coreligionists victimized by the Turks into the ethnic Other inimical to the Slavs. Although pinpointing some parallels between the perceptions of self and other in Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and the Greco-Slavic world theory, the chapter focuses on the dynamics of othering and gendering in Russian Pan-Slavism comparing it with Pan-Hellenism.

Chapter One argues that Pan-Slavism was an inconsistent attempt to modernize the pre-modern Christian Orthodox irredentism in order to appeal to the still largely pre-national audience at home. Russian Pan-Slavs paid more attention to their Christian Orthodox kinsmen in the Balkans and conflated the terms “Slavs” and “Christians” because they drew on the established ideology of Russian messianism in relation to the “Orthodox East (Pravoslavnyi Vostok).” The contradictions of Pan-Slavism meant that the latter, although being supposedly more modern, had not superseded Pan-Orthodoxy as the dominant element of Russian cultural identity or as a viable alternative irredentist ideology.
Chapters Two through Four are organized chronologically to concentrate on the interaction of three Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question – Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory (1856-1912). Methodologically, they rely on the Orientalist connection between the production of knowledge and political power. They also draw on the notions of the invention of tradition and combined development to trace the interplay of modern ethnonational and premodern confessional elements in the ideology and identity of the supporters of Pan-Orthodoxy, Pan-Slavism, and Greco-Slavic cultural type theory. The general argument is that the debate around the Bulgarian Church Question inspired not traditionalist or backward looking responses but rather modern visions of unprecedented transformation of domestic and international structures in Russia and the Near East. The debate around the Bulgarian Church Question enabled the proponents of all three responses to turn from hairsplitting academics into Orientalist producers of knowledge bent on influencing practical policy through existing power hierarchies. The conclusion ties together all threads of the argument in the end.
Chapter 1

Orientalist Othering and Gendering of Irredentism: the Case of Russian Pan-Slavism (1856-1885)

…Receptivity and femininity,
lack of agency and a great capacity
for assimilation and flexibility
make the Slavs a nation largely in need of others
they are not sufficient in themselves…

Alexander Herzen, *My Past & Thoughts*

**Introduction: Pan-Slavism and Contradictions of Irredentism**

In its discourse, like all irredentist nationalisms, Russian Pan-Slavism was imagined as the ideology and movement representing a unified national community. This agenda was facilitated by the use of the terms “race (*plemia*)” and “nation (*narod*)” both in relation to the Russians, different Slavic groups, and Slavs as a whole. The widespread desire for revenge for the defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56) turned non-political ideas of the Slavic cultural and spiritual unity into a propaganda tool of ultra-patriots. The demonstration effect of Italian and German unification provided another stimulus for the mobilization of an important segment of the Russian educated society. Given the perceptions of “Europe” as opposed to Russia during and after the Crimean War,
increasing numbers of intellectuals and policymakers saw the way to regaining Russian strength in joining forces with Russia’s co-ethnics abroad.\textsuperscript{50}

In response to such a challenge of the enemy, Russian thinkers generally tend to forget about the idea of Mother Russia’s femininity and to project an exclusively masculine identity of their country.\textsuperscript{51} As is the case with most nations,\textsuperscript{52} both masculine and feminine images of self-representation are available – “strong patriarchy for times of expansion; a vulnerable defenseless female victim for occasions of foreign invasion or threat.”\textsuperscript{53}

This post-Crimean mood of revanchism and Pan-Slavism disseminated by the professional scholars of theology and Slavic studies, Pan-Slav intellectuals and journalists influenced many individual Russian policy-makers to support the “Slavic cause” in the Austrian and Ottoman Empires.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, there was an Orientalist connection between power and knowledge.\textsuperscript{55} But on the whole the official foreign policy remained very cautious and not influenced by Pan-Slavism until the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. This willingness to play by the rules of the European Great Power diplomacy provoked sharp criticism of Pan-Slav publicists. In their turn, the Government and

\textsuperscript{52} Goldstein, War and Gender, p. 369
\textsuperscript{54} Khevrolina, V.M., Rossiiskii diplomat graf Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004), pp. 256, 304
\textsuperscript{55} Khalid, “Russian Identity,” 691-692
censorship would often clamp down on the independent and critical stance of the leading Pan-Slavs.\textsuperscript{56}

Den’ (1861-1865) was the first explicitly Pan-Slav newspaper in Russia. With 4,000 subscribers and the circulation of 7,000 copies by 1862, it enjoyed considerable success in the Russian educated society in early 1860s.\textsuperscript{57} In its first issue, Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov’s programmatic editorial proclaimed the unity of Russians and Slavs before the hostile West. In a typically irredentist fashion, it claimed the existence of a great Slavic nation (\textit{narod} or \textit{plem’a}) torn apart by its historic enemies. Russian journalists were called to combat the assault of the European anti-Slav press campaign “for ourselves and for the sake of our Slavic brothers.”\textsuperscript{58} Fourteen months later the same paper pointed out to the success of their counterefforts as “the Russian Slav, although only since recently, is paying attention to his co-national (\textit{soplemennik}), oppressed from all sides, and the feeling of national affinity and fraternity gradually grows among Russians from all walks of life.”\textsuperscript{59} This quotation shows that by virtue of being outside the “homeland,” the irredenta, in the Russian case, the Slavs, on many occasions serve an important function of bringing national unity and healing the social rift between the privileged and underprivileged ranks of the core group.

In the Moskva newspaper, on 25 January 1867 Ivan Aksakov encouraged the Russians and the Slavs to model themselves upon other contemporary irredentist movements in Europe asking a rhetorical question, “Are we to lag behind the

\textsuperscript{56} Petrovich, \textit{Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism}, pp. 104-28  
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Russkaia periodicheskaiia pechat (1702-1894)}, eds., A. G. Dementiev, A. V. Zapadov, M. S. Cherepakho\v{v} (Moscow: Political Literature Publishers, 1959), p. 414  
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Den’}, 15 October 1861 (1):15  
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Den’}, 13 January 1862 (3):19
Germans?” In his landmark *Russia and Europe*, Nikolai Iakovlevich Danilevskii established a “scientific” theory of cultural-historical types or civilizations and predicted a bright future for the youthful Slavic cultural type organized into a Russian-led federation. Danilevskii also sought to mobilize the Russians and the rest of the Slavs to act according to the *Zeitgeist* and to follow the way of Italian and German unification.\(^6\)

This image of a unified Slavic nation disseminated by the press throughout the Russian Empire indeed penetrated the minds of many readers. Asking the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society for directions on how to join the Serbian war effort against the Ottomans, many Russians professed “a joyful desire to volunteer into the ranks of the Slavic nation (*narod*)” to make an ultimate sacrifice for its “imagined community.”\(^2\)

Although all Slavs were proclaimed to form parts of the same nation separated by cruel enemies, the Russians were portrayed as the only active force. Their virile and martial qualities were especially pronounced against the background of victimized and passive religious and ethnic irredenta. Furthermore, Pan-Slav discourse was not successful in developing its own consistently ethnonational language and depended on the religious rhetoric and imagery of the established Pan-Orthodox irredentism. The analysis of the contradictions of Pan-Slav discourse challenges the conventional view that as the “modern” ideology it would inevitably supersede its religious messianic precursor. Thus, this chapter lays ground for the concept of “combined development” of both

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\(^{60}\) Fadner, Frank. *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karazin to Danilevskii, 1800-1870* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1972), p. 259

\(^{61}\) Danilevskii, N.Ia, *Rossiia i Evropa* (Moscow: Kniga, 1991 [1869]), p. 363

\(^{62}\) Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 1750 (Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society), op. 1, d. 233 (incoming correspondence), l. 30. (Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.). Other examples are GARF 1750-1-230:50, 15 August 1876; GARF 1750-1-230:37, 15 August 1876
“modern’ ethnernational and “premodern” religious messianic elements of identity among significant segments of the educated society in both Russia and Greek lands.

To demonstrate the contradiction between sameness and difference in the irredentist Pan-Slav discourse, the chapter is divided into five parts. The first part of the chapter explores how the discourse of Pan-Slavism “othered” and Orientalized the irredenta as powerless and inferior in two subsections on the images of yoke/the hunted game and racialization/familial hierarchy. It also draws attention to the significant difference between irredentism and Orientalism. Irredentism others the purported self but also leaves room for the agency of the irredenta or in the Russian case, Bulgarians. Unlike the colonized of Orientalism, the unredeemed actively contribute to the making of their own victimized, emasculated and ultimately feminized image to sensitize “homeland” and provoke an action on their behalf.

In the second part, the chapter focuses on the gendered discourse of Pan-Slavism centered on the perceptions of the unredeemed as emasculated “brothers,” coquettish women, and “damsels in distress.” It is divided into two parts focusing on how the press spread the gendered images of unredeemed Slavs and how those perceptions influenced Russian readership. In the third part, I explore how the resulting superiority complex combined with numerous policy disagreements led to the break between the liberated Bulgarian Slavs and their Russian saviors form 1878 to 1885. Then, the chapter briefly traces the perceptions of Self and Other in Russia from 1878 to 1912. Finally, I also attempt to compare the Russian case to the Greek one.
“Othering” Pan-Slavism: the Images of the Hunted Game and Yoke

In the wake of the defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), many Russians were still overcome by siege mentality and perceived all of Europe as hostile to Russia. The growing interest in the Slavs outside Russia sought to compensate for weaknesses demonstrated by the debacle. In the above mentioned first issue of the first explicitly Pan-Slav Russian newspaper *Den’* (1861-1865), its editor Ivan Aksakov wrote, “Our power in Europe lies in the sympathetic and kindred in blood and spirit Slavic world in general and the Orthodox one in particular.” But the very next sentence in the famous programmatic article “The Slavic Question” painted not the relations of fraternal unity but rather those of “othering,” “No Slavs are free from a foreign yoke except for those in Russia. Outside Russia, either the Germans or the Turks oppress the Slavic nation (*narodnost’*)…The true historical calling, moral right and obligation of Russia lies in liberating Slavic nations from the spiritual and material oppression and bestowing on them the gift of an autonomous (*samostoiatelnyi*) spiritual and, perhaps, political being under the mighty wings of the Russian eagle.”63

Russian Pan-Slavs attempted to sensitize and mobilize the Russian public to help relieve the plight of the Slavs. With this goal in mind, the Pan-Slavs portrayed all the Slavs outside Russia as totally passive, powerless, and in urgent need of Russian saviors and protectors. Writing about the “Russians,” i.e., Ukrainians or Ruthenians in Galicia, the *Den’* described them as “game” hunted down by the Austrians.64 In general, *Den’* painted a very hopeless picture of the situation of all Austrian Slavs supposed to be

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63 *Den’,* 15 October 1861 (1):15  
64 *Den’,* 28 October 1861 (3:13
exterminated or assimilated by a four-headed dragon. Each head stood for a more privileged nationality within the Austrian Empire, namely, the Poles, Dalmatian Italians, Magyars, and Germans. The dragon will sting and poison the Slavs on all sides and “that dragon will have a German stomach.” The images of yoke and the hunted game exaggerated passivity of the Slavs. In the spirit of revanchism, Russian Pan-Slavs saw the weak irredenta not so much as a power base in Europe but rather as a background against which Russian power could become more visible.

Unredeemed Slavs themselves took advantage of those perceptions in Russia and actively contributed to the making of their image as inferior and victimized with the ultimate goal of provoking “homeland” to act in their behalf. After the ideas of Western-style nationalism affected parts of Ottoman Christian educated elites, there followed internal differentiation in their previously united religious community. But the self-image and narrative of powerlessness and victimhood remained basically unchanged. As shown below, many accounts in the Russian Pan-Slav press referred to above and representing non-Russian Slavs as victims par excellence came from South Slavic contributors.

Specifically, Bulgarians added to the traditional Islamic Other the Greeks as their national enemy. After the Crimean War (1853-1856), politically active Bulgarian merchants and students in Russia began to agitate both against the Ottoman Sultan and the Greek leadership of the Ottoman Christian community. For this they needed to demonize the Greeks in the Russian eyes. Bulgarian merchants and students began

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65 Unlike other Catholic Slavs, the Poles were believed to be permanently deceived by the West and thus hopelessly lost to the Russian-led Slavic nation. For its hostility to Russia, Poland was “the renegade vanguard of a hostile Romano-Germanic world,” Petrovich, Emergence, p. 173
66 Den., 21 Oct 1861 (2):10
campaigning in Russia for their own national interests while presenting them as the cause of all Slavs. Since in the wake of the Russian defeat the destruction of the Ottoman state was no longer perceived as imminent, the Bulgarian national movement had to concentrate on securing some kind of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman theocratic framework this meant a form of ecclesiastical independence from the “Greek” Patriarchate of Constantinople. For this, Bulgarian nationalist immigrants tried to gain assistance from the Russian government by sensitizing the Russian educated public to the fate of their suffering brethren in the Balkans. This had a snowballing effect on the Russian Pan-Slavs in the exciting context of other pan-movements in Europe.

The pioneering and influential contribution to that effect was made by a Bulgarian student in Russia – Christo Daskalov. In October 1858, the Russkaia Beseda article launched a series of clichéd images of powerless Slavs versus predatory Greeks. All Russian Pan-Slav writers would subsequently adopt his imagery and rhetoric often making explicit references to that article. Daskalov alerted the readers to “the life and death struggle between two rival parties, the Greeks and the Slavs” and appealed to their sympathies for “the lot of the Christians in the East.” He equated the latter with the Bulgarians. He insisted that the Russians should be “highly interested in their coreligionists and coethnics.” Daskalov decried the glaring lack of knowledge about the South Slavs in Russia and the wrong understanding of Ottoman Greeks or Phanariotes as “Homeric heroes…and stalwarts and even saviors of Orthodoxy in the East.” This distortion of reality is “because the Phanariotes skillfully and systematically perpetuate this ignorance by presenting themselves as suffering from the Turkish yoke, living in primitive innocence and fighting for Orthodoxy.” Russian donations were embezzled and
used for continued strengthening of Islam and oppression of South Slavs. The Russians should be aware of the window of opportunity this deplorable situation creates for the Western plans in regards to the Balkans.\(^6^8\)

The Bulgarian author seemed aware of the predominantly religious identification of most Russians at the time. Despite a one-time reference to “coethnics,” Daskalov consistently stressed the Russian self-image as the protectors of Orthodoxy Christianity in the East against Islam, Catholics and Protestants to mobilize them for the Bulgarian cause. The author kept stressing the inadequacy of Ottoman Greeks to assist the Russians in that role. Their alleged corruption, greed, self-serving nationalism, morbid hatred of all things Slavic had led many Balkan Slavs away from the true faith.\(^6^9\) The characteristic images of cunning and powerful Greeks vs. gullible and oppressed Bulgarians/Slavs would become recurrent.

The powerlessness of the latter was consistently ratcheted up to contrast with the Russian might and thus to urge the Russians to act on behalf of their downtrodden and besieged brethren. “The unheard of spiritual yoke” of the Greeks had reduced the Bulgarians “to the level of the herd of animals” by making many of them “renounce and forget their native language and...change the faith of the forefathers.”\(^7^0\) Ancient ethnic hatreds and rivalries supposedly explained why even in the face of the common Islamic enemy the Greeks systematically sought to assimilate the Bulgarians by destroying Slavic

\(^{68}\) Daskalov, Christo, “Vozrozhdenie bolgar ili reaktsia v Evropeiskoi Turtsii,” Russkaia Beseda, 1858, (10):1-2

\(^{69}\) Ibid., pp.4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 21, 39, 41

\(^{70}\) Ibid., pp. 3-4
clergy, liturgy, art, and books.\textsuperscript{71} To be sure, the Turks were “the bloodsuckers” but much more merciful and just than the Phanariotes. Some Ottoman rulers remembered the glory of the Bulgarian kingdom they defeated and did not believe the tales of the Phanariotes about the exclusively Greek character of those lands. Some Turkish governors sponsored Bulgarian education as the central government in Istanbul contemplated the reformist edict of Hatti-Sherif of Gulhane to treat both Muslim and Christian subjects equally. But the Greeks were so powerful that they would have a good Turkish pasha removed by means of all kinds of insidious intrigues and would continue to use the Ottoman apparatus of repression to persecute few daring Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{72}

Greek “ravens” supposedly twisted the church canonical law to be able to fleece the “obedient sheep.” “Poor, simpleminded, god-fearing Bulgarians” were completely exposed to “unusual cruelty and depraved lifestyle” of many in “the alien clergy prone to vice and crime.”\textsuperscript{73} The word “depravity” suggesting sexual aggressiveness of the Ottoman Greeks directed at the Slavs would become another constant trope.\textsuperscript{74} The Bulgarians proved powerless to resist because “Phanariote prelates with their retinue” “had instilled in the Bulgarians the spirit of infighting, feud, and slavish patience…robbed and rob them with impunity and mercilessness, kill them with their own hands and their denunciations.”\textsuperscript{75}

Thus, “Bulgarians became Greeks” and were described by foreign travelers as such. Only the voice of the Russian scholar Yurii Venelin resurrected the Bulgarians to

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 6-12
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 14
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., pp. 16, 28-29
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 25
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 21
national life by publishing their history in Moscow in 1829. The appearance of Venelin was described as the response to “the prayers of poor Bulgarian monks.” He (and implicitly the whole Russia) was popularly perceived as a kind of ancient demigod, the reincarnation of the legendary King Marco, and the sage endowed with prophetic ability. Venelin’s book inspired the emergence of modern national Bulgarian education, press, uprisings, and the movement for the church independent of the Ottoman Greek prelates.

Although often lumping all Greeks together as enemies of the Slavs, Daskalov left open a possibility of cooperation between Greek and Bulgarian “progressive” nationalists vs. Ottoman Greek pre-modern obscurantist elites. In the concluding pages, he made sure to differentiate between Ottoman Greeks and “free Greeks” in the independent Greek Kingdom. He credited Pharmakidis, Soutsos, Pitsipios, and Kanellos with “exposing the activities of the Phanariotes and revealing to the Bulgarians what they did not even suspect.” Although many of them were themselves clerics, Daskalov conjured up the image of the common warfare against “the unique class” of “spiritual Phanariotes” equally resistant to “the renaissance of both Modern Greek and Modern Bulgarian education.”

Daskalov was referring to Westernizing Greek church reformers that supported the move of King Othon I to separate the Church of Greece from the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the government was consolidating its newly received independence.
from the Ottoman Empire after the Greek Revolution of 1821-1830. In line with the post-Reformation Western tradition of “cuius regio, eius religio,” the Greek government by book and crook brought local Greek bishops to unilaterally declare church independence from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1833. It took 17 years of sustained Russian mediation to repair the schism until the Patriarchate recognized the autocephalous status of the Church of Greece in 1850.80

Despite Daskalov’s effort to separate “good” Greeks from “bad” ones, the main Pan-Slav newspaper Den’ tended to indiscriminately represent all the Greeks as the enemies of the Slavs. Den’ further graphically demonstrates how the Greeks were suddenly singled out of the mass of non-Russian Orthodox Christians and began to be portrayed as aggressive oppressors of hapless and helpless Balkan Slavs. Raiko Zhinzifov, a Bulgarian student in Moscow, published a letter decrying the ignorance of most Russians about things Slavic.

He recounted a personal anecdote of talking to a Russian priest before proceeding to confession, the latter “seeing a non-Russian face” asked Zhinzifov where he was from. When the Bulgarian said that he was from Turkey, the priest remarked, “sure, I know – this is the place where the Turks oppress the Greeks.” Zhinzifov retorted by saying that he was not Greek but a South Slav, a Bulgarian. Pausing, the priest asked what his creed was. Having made sure that Zhinzifov was Orthodox Christian, the priest admitted never having heard about the Bulgarians. In exasperation, Zhinzifov added that he had had a

80 Frazee, Charles, The Orthodox Church & Independent Greece, 1821-1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); For the Russian contemporary of that reform see Kurganov, Fedor, Ustroistvo upravlenia tserkvi Korolevstva Grecheskogo (Kazan: University Typography, 1872). A year later Kurganov would publish another study in defense of the Ecumenical Patriarchate against the Bulgarian national movement and its Russian Pan-Slav supporters.
similar experience with Russian merchants and peasants, “I would always have to explain
to all of them that it is a mistake to think “Greek” stands for all Slavs.” This meant that
the Russians needed to transition from a religious world view to one characterized
primarily by the clash of different nations, “Would you really say that only because the
Greeks are Orthodox one can’t call them oppressors [of the Slavs] on the par with the
Germans and the Turks?” 81

There followed an editorial commentary on Zhinzifov’s open letter admitting the
sad truth of his words, “Not only are they [the Balkan Slavs] being burnt, cut to pieces,
disgraced by the Turks and oppressed by the Greeks, but also find so little comfort even
here in Russia.” 82 The Greeks would hence often be presented as “the age-old weapons in
the hands of the West” and close collaborators of the Turks. The West in cahoots with the
Greeks and the Turks regarded the Slavic lands as “the attractive prey” and “penetrated
peaceful Slavic villages.” 83 The “Greek” clergy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople
would be portrayed as ‘supported by the whole West and the Sultan who is obedient to
the West.’ 84 Quickly the expression the “double yoke” would become a common
metaphor used to describe gendered inequality, “The Turks and the Greek clergy are
equally burdensome to the Bulgarians or rather the latter in some respects are more
burdensome than the former.” 85

In the Zhinzifov’s article all victimizers of the helpless Slavs were finally and
definitively exposed to the Russian reader. That issue of the Den’ marked the beginning

81 Den’, 28 Oct 1861 (3): 13-14
82 Ibid., p. 15
83 Den’, 25 June 1863 (25): II
84 Den’, 6 Jan 1864 (1): 19
85 Den’, 22 Feb 1864 (8): 22
of a consistent representation of the South Slavs in the mainstream Pan-Slav press as under threat from all sides and in urgent need of a Russian savior. From then on, enhancing Slavic awareness would go hand in hand with buttressing the masculine virtues of the Russians at the expense of the unredeemed Slavs. Although it was made clear that the “Greeks” were no victims but rather “victimizers,” the word “Christians” would be often used interchangeably with the word “Slavs” in line with the age-old rhetoric of traditional Russian messianism.

This image of powerlessness disseminated by “the unredeemed” Slavs for the Russian audience was largely consistent with their own self-image. For example, the poetry of the same Raiko Zhinzifov writing in Moscow but for domestic Bulgarian consumption featured a series of metaphors of victimization, emasculation, and feminization. In his Gulab (Dove), the Greeks were endowed with unstoppable aggressive avarice and unlimited sexual appetites aimed at dominating the Bulgarians.”86 Evidently, Bulgarians of the day were in no position to resist such powerful enemies. The invocation of the spirits of heroic ancestors served only to underscore the lack of agency of their descendants as in Pesnia (Song) (ibid.: 87) and Son (Dream) (ibid.: 54-59). Not surprisingly, one of the most enduring symbols of Bulgaria was a widow or a mother who lost her children in Vdovitsa (Widow), Do bulgarskata maika (To a Bulgarian Mother), etc.87

Although the themes of feminization, emasculation and powerlessness were dominant, there were attempts to overcome them with some heroic images. There were a

86 Zhinzifov, Raiko, Suchinenia (Sofia: Bulgarskii pisatel, 1969), pp. 30-32
87 Ibid., pp. 75-77; 85-86
few calls to battle the Greeks with either sharp pens or swords in *Gusliar v Sobor* (*A Bard at the Congregation*). *Nedopeianna Pesnia* (*Unfinished Song*) argued that the Bulgarians needed “bloody battles” rather than “tears, prayers, altar victims, low bows.” Below, the chapter will examine how this heroic element in the Bulgarian self-image would become dominant in reaction to patronizing attitudes and discriminating policies of Russian liberators after the war of 1877-1878.

**Othering Pan-Slavism: Racialization, Lack of Independent Progress, Familial Hierarchy**

Although rejecting Western scientific racism, the Russian Pan-Slavics routinely professed to be one in nation and blood (*edinoplemenniki, edinokrovnye bratia*) with the Slavs. Still, they implicitly racialized at least the South Slavs. Generally, Western Europeans described “the mongrel nature of the Balkans” as “a racial mixture.” Russian Westerners, both liberals and radicals, shared Western European perceptions of the Balkan peoples. Thus, in the enormously influential classical comedy *Distress from Cleverness* (1824), the paragon of “progressive hero” Alexander Chatsky was inquiring about “what’s his name? that Turk? or Greek? one cannot say, that dark-complexioned (*chernomazenki*) man, on spindle shanks.”

The widespread perceptions of the South Slavs as both related to the Russians and racially contaminated show the contradictory nature of irredentism as the discourse of both sameness and difference. This attitude is clear in the popular illustrated magazine as

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88 Ibid., pp. 49, 89
89 Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, pp. 18-19
early as 1859. Indicative of the suddenly increased interest in the broad educated society in things Slavic, *Illustratsia* provided its apparently uninformed readers with the basics on the Bulgarians. Themselves a product of the “fusion” of the Slavs and “a Finno-Uralic nation related to the Hunns and Kuturgurs (sic),” “Bulgarians share the same origin as the Russians.” This fundamental affinity follows from “their language and appearance which reminds of the Slavic type.”

At the same time, *Illustratsia* described the Bulgarians as “generally swarthy with black-eyes and a straight nose, not as hooked (*gorbaty*) as that of the Turks. Like the latter, they shave their head leaving a long tuft of hair (*khokhol*).” After a description of the largely Turkish clothes, the author of the article however felt compelled to disabuse the readers of the impression of the Bulgarians as Asiatic. To apparently redeem the Bulgarians as Russian kin, the author endowed them with the ideal Slavic character: “Despite this half-savage outfit, rough features, and long moustache, Bulgarian physiognomy testifies to kindness and gentleness; submissiveness, gaiety, and light-heartedness…Brave horsemen, good farmers, and hunters, one would think of them as excellent soldiers but the Muslim oppression has made them fit only for slavery.” “The four-century-long yoke” deprived the Bulgarians of national (*narodny*) memories. As a result, “the poor Bulgarian has no history” which explains why unlike the Greeks and the other Slavs the Bulgarians did not strive for liberation. In contrast to the allegedly hypocritical, indolent, and stupid Turks, the Bulgarians are open, sincere, industrious, productive, smart, and attached to “patriarchal mores.” In a generally ambivalent portrayal of both sameness and difference, the author concludes, “One can still see an

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91 *Illustratsia*, 23 April 1859 (66): 248
Asiatic in the Turk, whereas one notices even underneath the rags a European in the Bulgarian.” Thus, the views of the educated Russian society on South Slavs were similar to Western European perceptions of mongrelized Balkans.

Although raised in the same European milieu of the Russian educated society, the Pan-Slavs sought to reject outright all Western models and stereotypes to develop an independent Slavic civilization. But the pervasive ideas of racialized difference underlay the declarations of sameness with the Slavs. An example of this tension is the critique by Den’s “South Slav” contributor of Nikolai Berg’s travelogue published in the influential Westernizing Sovremennik magazine (1836-1866). In 1863, Sovremennik had a significant 6,000 subscribers among “progressivist” elements of the educated society and “presented a great danger for autocracy as the focus of the propaganda of democratic and socialist ideas.”

Berg referred to South Slavs as “Negroes of Europe” and argued that the South Slavs were inferior to Western and Eastern Slavs and other Europeans not only as unhistoric peoples doomed to be subject to Austrian and Turkish domination but also as dark in coloring. In an editorial comment, Den’ reminded the readers of the glory of medieval Bulgarian and Serbian kingdoms and took a particular issue with the term “Black Slavs.” It was wrong for the author to call them black just “because of their dark eyes and hair and swarthy complexion. Had the author not explicitly referred to those traits, one could have been misled to think that those “black” Slavic nations are none

92 Sovremennik, 1863 (1) and (2):63-119
93 Russkaia periodicheskaia pechat (1702-1894), p. 252
other but Negroes.”⁹⁴ Although Den’ sought to remove the “black” stigma from the South Slavs, it nevertheless implicitly acknowledged that they looked different from the Russians. Far from neutral, dark coloring had long been a negative characteristic. As part of the Russian self-image, fair coloring justified “traditional feelings of superiority over the dark-skinned peoples of Central Asia and Transcaucasia.”⁹⁵

In addition to racialization,⁹⁶ this polemic of Den’ with Sovremennik brings another Orientalist motif as it reminded of the grandeur of medieval Bulgarian and Serbian kingdoms.— that of the absence of change and progress. Like Western Orientalists, Russian Pan-Slavs freely acknowledged “the glory of civilization” of non-Russian Slavs, “but such glory rested in the safety of the distant past.” In a related Orientalist vein, Pan-Slavs tended to describe Russia’s coethnics “in terms of absences: of change, progress, liberty, reason, and so on.”⁹⁷ Such attitudes were behind the earliest perceptions of even the most “heroic” Slavs. In early 1800s, to Russian observers, “uncouth, somewhat wild, but kind and noble” Montenegrin highlanders were living symbols of “our Slavic ancestors.” Similarly, another traveler felt “as if he were taken into a new world, introduced to my ancestors of the ninth and tenth centuries, and conversed with Ilya of Murom, Dobrynia, and other ancient heroes.”⁹⁸ Either frozen in time or the hunted game under a yoke, the Slavic potential for development was only possible through Russian help and intervention.

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⁹⁴ Den’, 2 March 1863 (9):19
⁹⁵ For this reason, in the Soviet propaganda films, even the Nazis almost always had dark complexion and dark hair. Pisiotis, Argyrios K., “Images of Hate in the Art of War” in Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia, Richard Sites ed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 145
⁹⁸ Dostian, I. S., Russkaia obshestvennaia mysli i balkanskie narody ot Radisheva do dekabristov (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp. 150, 156
Apart from the images of the yoke, the hunted game, and racialization, familial metaphors were another variation on the theme of passivity and difference. The Slavs were commonly “othered” as implicitly or explicitly junior brothers or children. Andrei Nikolaevich Muraviev was Russia’s most famous 19th-century lay writer on ecclesiastical topics. Having some Pan-Slav leanings, he characteristically thought that “the Bulgarians trust us [the Russians] in everything like children and are ready to imitate us in everything.”

As on the illustrations below, the image of children side by side with that of women are two dominant portrayals of the Slavs.

As juniors or minors, the Slavs needed to be in the Russian sphere of influence to enjoy “protection” from the numerous enemies of Slavdom. This essentially irredentist vision was justified in a variety of ways. Thus, Nikolai Danilevskii acknowledged the distinctiveness of Slavic nations (narod) from the Russians at the same time pointing to “such a close relationship between them that the freedom and honor of these kindred beings concerned them in the same way as their own and are absolutely inseparable from each other.” In his words, this “familial relationship” made necessary some sort of state unity, preferably in a federal structure.

The historically active leading role of the Russians as defenders of constantly endangered “freedom and honor” of the rest of the Slavs justified the adoption of Russian as the official language of the future federation. Thus, a traditionally masculine role of defenders enabled Russian superiority over the other Slavs. The actual underplaying of the existing distinctions among Slavic peoples led Danilevskii to reject “independence of

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99 GARF, f.730 (N. P. Ignatiev), op. 1, d. 1005 (letter to Ignatiev), l. 1
100 Danilevskii, Rossia, p. 227
any minor ethnographic difference” and the validity of “particularistic Serbian, Czech or Russian ambitions” in favor of “one Pan-Slavic ambition.” This lumping together of all Slavs is also clear from the use of the same Russian words for “nation” and “race” (narod, plem’a) both in relation to individual Slavic nations and to the Slavs as a whole.

The metaphors of yoke, the hunted game, racialization, the lack of independent progress, and familial hierarchy helped portray non-Russian Slavs as “othered” voiceless passive victims in need of Russian protectors and saviors. As in Orientalism, these metaphors of othering create a series of typically Orientalist “absences: of change, progress, liberty, reason and so on” which “dialectically define (affirm)” the core group. In the Russian case, the resulting self-image included freedom, agency, power, fair coloring, and a superior place in the familial hierarchy.

**Gendering Irredentism: Russia’s Emasculated “Brothers,” Coquettish Women, and “Damsels in Distress,” 1856-1878**

The images of passive defenseless victims are usually feminine roles that necessarily complement and support masculine roles of active protectors and liberators. Apart from this general dichotomy, feminization of the irredenta is created through perceptions of “unredeemed brothers” as emasculated through their cowardice or rhetorical absence and victims of rape. These perceptions were direct influence of traditional Russian Pan-Orthodox irredentism towards Ottoman Christians and

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102 Khalid, “Russian Identity,” 693
103 Goldstein, *War and Gender*, pp. 275, 301, 304, 306
104 Dostian brings evidence that suggests the mobilizing importance of the perception of “coreligionists” during the Greek Revolution of 1821-1829. She also reproduces the allegorical image of Greece depicted as
continued to be central in the representation of the Balkan Slavs in the Russian Pan-Slav press from the end of the Crimean War and well beyond the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878.\textsuperscript{105}

In press reports about the South Slavs, “Slavic brothers” usually either fled or lay dead. They were in no position to protect their women and children. The latter two were typically portrayed side by side in the accounts of rape and massacres to better sensitize the Russian reader or viewer to the helplessness of the South Slavs. Thus, the images of rape mediate between many abovementioned metaphors of “othering” the Slavs such as yoke and hunted game. The relationship between rape and racialization of the Slavs was very close because of implied contamination by victimizers racialized on the pictures below. The rhetoric of the Pan-Slav press and its readers often referred to “Asiatic bloodsuckers,” “Asiatic Turkish barbarians,” “cruel Asiatic horde,”\textsuperscript{106} or even as “disgusting and despicable Arabs, of whom especially [infamous are] Bashi-Buzuks and Circassians.”\textsuperscript{107}

Their victims were “Christians.” In the Pan-Slav discourse, this term was used interchangeably with the word “Slavs,” in line with the age-old religious irredentism. Thus, a correspondent from Monastir (today’s F.Y.Republic of Macedonia) wrote to the readers of the “Slavic section” of the Den‘ newspaper that despite the declared Ottoman

\begin{quote}
\textbf{balknaskie narody, pp. 130-131} \\
\textsuperscript{105} In fact, the feminization of the “unredeemed” was clear in wartime Soviet propaganda. It often relied on “the enormous suggestive effect that the violation of females had on (male) soldier as defenders of society.” The images of “beautiful helpless women with hands tied” often represented Nazi-occupied areas. They were depicted “in an obvious sensual pose” with the appeal to the Red Army soldier “not to let the conqueror “ravage his beloved one” in Argyrios, “Images of Hate,” p. 143 \\
\textsuperscript{106} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d.277, ll. 16, 57 \\
\textsuperscript{107} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d.278, l. 89
\end{quote}
reforms “Christians in Turkey” still could bear no weapons or testify in courts against Muslims. All Turks including those in positions of authority allegedly had no regard for the lives of the Christians. Thus, the victims of brigandage tended to be predominantly Christian since the police would not investigate those cases. Numerous lurid examples conveyed the idea that the physical bodies of the Slavs were absolutely defenseless and exposed. “The Christian man is deprived of any possibility of self-defense” and was usually depicted as totally emasculated. For example, at the village of Karamani in the vicinity of Monastir in the wake of a Muslim brigands’ raid “men took to their feet to escape death whereas the women and children, remaining in the village, were subjected to the most horrible sorts of torture and violence.” The word choice in the Pan-Slav press emphasized this notion of a total lack of security of “life and honor.” The Balkan Slavs were rarely actors but for the most part were acted upon. They almost invariably “suffer from” or “are subjected to.”

The element of rape literally embodied and mediated all other ideas that went into the making of the image of the Slavs, such as powerlessness, subjection, and inevitable loss of identity. “Poor victims of rape often have nothing else to do but to fulfill the desire of the strong,” to convert to Islam, and to disappear in the harems. These feminization and exoticisation of the Balkan Slavs are in conformity with the hallmarks of Orientalist discourse – “eastern cruelty” alongside of a strong appeal projected through “scenes of harem, baths, and slave markets.” All this was supposed to have a

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108 Den.’ 19 October 1863 (42): 19
109 Den.’ 6 January 1862 (12): 14

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“documentary” air and to stand for “a society that was not Christian and had different moral values.”

The constant motif describing all sorts of victimization of Balkan Slavs often tended to prevail over the established perceptions of the more “heroic” groups of Slavs, most notably, the Montenegrins and the Serbs. Even reports ostensibly about resistance would be completely overshadowed by the images of rape and massacre. In 1861-1862, the tiny Montenegrin principality put up “heroic resistance” against Ottoman forces. However, there were few stories or images of “heroes” in the Pan-Slav press. Instead, the Pan-Slav press would feature pieces by Russian or local Balkan correspondents concentrating almost exclusively on how “the Turks give rein to senseless revenge, burn, rob, cut to pieces, disgrace children, rape girls and women.” As the Den’s correspondent in Serbia pithily concluded, the lot of “Christians” in Turkey was “death to men and disgrace (poruganie) to women.”

Strikingly, the post-Crimean war context saw further othering and feminization of the “heroic” Montenegrins. An example of it comes from The Slavs of the Balkans and Adriatic: Essays in Statistics, Ethnography, and History. In a typically Orientalist mix of “science” and prejudice, a well known Slavist, Professor Makushev portrayed rugged highlanders of Montenegro as powerless and passive in two ways. On one hand, rank and file Montenegrins were completely devoted to the Russian Tsars as the sole legitimate

11 Stevenson, Francis S., A History of Montenegro (London: Jarrold & Sons, 1912), p. 191
12 E.g., not an ostensibly Pan-Slav organ, Illustratsiia featured few heroic images, 22 March 1862 (212); July 12 1862 (227); 4 October 1862 (239)
13 Den, 2 June 1862 (34): 17
14 Den, 5 January 1863 (1): 16
protectors of Orthodoxy and Montenegro since Peter the Great. On the other hand, Montenegrin elites “are expecting their salvation only from France, are obsequious to it, and are adopting its fashions.” Significantly, for Makushev, Dowager-Princess Darinka symbolized this dangerous openness to Western penetration and “seduction.”

The Pan-Slavs typically invoked this image of coquettish women in connection with the clearly masculine Pope who symbolized the West in the tradition of religious messianic irredentism. In Danilevskii’s ostensibly scientific account, from times immemorial, the Pope “like the tempting Satan” attempted “to subject at all cost the nations of the Greek and Slavic Christian Orthodox world.” Unless brought into a closer union with Russia the Slavs in general and their intelligentsia in particular were in danger of “losing their Slavic character” via “either religious or political or civilizational seduction” by the West. Instability, changeability, lack of composure and restraint are the very qualities with which the Westerners traditionally feminized the Russians themselves. It is tempting to suggest that the Russians countered these Western gendered stereotypes of Russia by imagining themselves as unshakeable defenders of Orthodox Christianity against the background of “unstable” Slavic coreligionists.

Perpetuated in “scientific” accounts, such as Makushev’s and Danilevskii’s, those gendered perceptions of the Slavs as coquettish women influenced Russian foreign policy decisions and illustrated again the Orientalist connection between knowledge and power. On 10 January 1867, the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, N. P. Ignatiev was

115 Makushev, V., Zadunaiskie i adriaticheskie slaviane: ocherki statisticheskie, etnograficheskie i istoricheskie (St Petersburg: Izdatelstvo redaktsii “Literaturnoi Biblioteki,” 1867), pp. 151-52
116 Danilevskii, Rossia, pp. 319-320, 358
117 Riabov, “Matushka-Rus,” p. 79
urging his Government to support the Bulgarian movement for a church independent of
the “Greek” Patriarchate of Constantinople. The policy of keeping the ecclesiastical
status quo in the Ottoman Empire would result in “the mass of the Bulgarian people
giving themselves to the Union [with the Roman Pope]” because the Bulgarians wrongly
believed that “under Western auspices they would save their nationality from the Greek
conquest.”118 Forty four years later, on 28 February 1911, another Russian Ambassador
to Constantinople, N. V. Charykov, wrote to the Foreign Minister in St Petersburg that
“the Bulgarians are unruly, everybody likes showing off, their masses are unstable … and
can fall an easy prey to Catholic and especially Protestant propaganda, always around and
ready to act.”119

During the so called “Eastern Crisis” (1875-1878), this consistent representation
of Slavs as emasculated and feminized would pre-dominate among both liberal and
conservative Russian authors and publications. Although not explicitly affiliated with
Pan-Slavism, they tapped into the rich tradition of Russian Pan-Orthodox irredentism
towards Ottoman Christians. As elsewhere in Europe, the reports of the atrocities
perpetrated by the Ottomans against their Christian subjects stirred up a crusading spirit
urging intervention on their behalf. The most prevalent images responsible for this
mobilization in support of “unredeemed” coreligionists were those of violated women
and mutilated children.120 This agitation in Russia also contributed to the decision of the

118 Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii (AVPRI), f.180, op.517/2, d.3242, l. 4
119 AVPRI, f.180, op.517/2, d.3471, ll. 36-37
Russian Government to declare war on the Ottoman Empire which lasted from 1877 to 1878.\footnote{Hosking, Geoffrey, \textit{Russia : People and Empire, 1552-1917} (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 371}

In 1876, all sectors of the Russian society were on the wave of widespread sympathy for the struggle of Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Ottomans started in 1875 and supported by Montenegro and Serbia in July 1876. In this atmosphere, Peter Chaikovsky wrote his \textit{March Slave}. The composition combines an old Serbian folk melody and the Russian imperial anthem “as a musical metaphor symbolically pointing to the growing ties between these two Slavic peoples.”\footnote{Milojkovic-Djuric, Jelena, \textit{Panslavism and National Identity in Russia and in the Balkans, 1830-1880: Images of the Self and Others} (Boulder, East European Monographs, 1994), p. 99} But these two musical themes have different weight and suggest a gendered hierarchy rather than harmony and equality. Historically, the Russian literary discourse feminized peasants.\footnote{The prime example is Herzen’s famous novel \textit{Who is Guilty}? - McNeal, Robert, “Women in the Russian Radical Movement” in \textit{Journal of Social History}, 1971, 5 (2): 147. The feminization of the peasants vis-à-vis the masculine urban worker would continue into the Soviet period during the Revolution of 1917 and beyond. Stites, Richard, \textit{Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution} (New York. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 86} The \textit{March Slave} presents the Slavs as existing on merely an ethnographic level clearly subordinated to the powerful Russian Empire as the only source of positive development.

An interesting variation on the theme of the masculinization of the Russians vis-à-vis their unredeemed kinsmen is the female figure of Russia liberating an obviously grateful but passive motley crowd of South Slavs (figure 1).\footnote{“New Year of 1877 – War or Peace?” \textit{Vsemirnaia Illuistratsia}, 1 January 1877 (417): 1, drawing by K. Broche, engraving by E. Dammueller} Here Mother Russia is equipped with all military paraphernalia such as the sword and the shield adorned with the double-headed eagle. This Russian state symbol signals a strong masculine presence –
the state being normally represented as masculine across many cultures. These characteristics de-emphasize typically feminine traits of Mother Russia and point to the traditionally masculine self-representation – “strong patriarchy for times of expansion” rather than of “a defenseless female victim for occasions of foreign invasion of threat.”

A very similar image of Mother Russia “adorned in regal armor” symbolized Russian expansion in the Far East in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. This image was featured on Russian broadsheets or lubki - the medium that enjoyed Russians of all walks of life including illiterate peasants. Thus, this martial and virile image of Mother Russia reached far beyond the educated readership of Vsemirnaia Illustratsia.

Even during the initial stage of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 when the Slavic peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina often defeated the armies of the Ottoman Empires, the portrayal of the Slavs would still center on powerless victims of rape and massacre (figures 2 and 3). A rare variation on the same theme of emasculation and feminization was the image titled “South Slavic women fighting a Turkish unit (figure 4).” With their men taken out of the picture, women were left to fend for themselves. Although amazons are revered as part of classical antiquity, in modern times female group violence is seen as “an aberration, an eruption of not wholly disciplined subjects, partial outlaws”

125 Goldstein, War and Gender, p. 369
126 Goscilo and Lanoux, “Lost in the Myths,” p. 24
127 Norris, A War of Images, p. 117
129 “The Fight of South Slavic Girls with the Turkish Unit,” Niva, 21 September 1875 (38): 596-97, drawing by Franz Zverin, engraving by Veber
rather than as the evidence of positive martial qualities.\textsuperscript{130} Thus, the rare image of fighting Slavic women points to the emasculation of their absent men.

Far more “normal” are the perceptions of the Slavs as female victims and “brothers” unable to fulfill their masculine roles as defenders. Figure 5 is one of many contemporary examples of the imagery produced with these assumptions of the powerlessness of the Slavs. It is the depiction of the brutal suppression of the Bulgarian Uprising of April 1876 by the Ottomans. The Slavic man died fighting and is diminished in importance. His irrelevance is emphasized by his position on the lowest level of the picture. Without her man by the side, the Slavic woman is completely helpless and exposed. Her helplessness is underscored by the presence of the child in the picture dominated by three clearly racialized cartoon-type images of Turks.\textsuperscript{131}

That fallen fighter was the closest \textit{Niva} and \textit{Vsemirnaia Illustratsia} came to give their due to the Slavic “heroes” of 1875-1878. In contrast, in 1876, the unusually balanced \textit{Pchela} did feature two images of fighting South Slavic men\textsuperscript{132} along with more typical pictures of enslaved female victims and powerless tortured Serbian men.\textsuperscript{133} However, the impact of those two heroic images on the readership must have been limited. After all, \textit{Pchela} was a very short lived magazine (1875-1878). Evidently, it could not compete with \textit{Vsemirnaia Illustratsia} (1869-1898) and \textit{Niva} (1870-1917). The latter was “the magazine for family reading, the most widespread “thin” journal of pre-

\textsuperscript{130} Elshtain, \textit{Women and War}, p. 169; Goldstein, \textit{War and Gender}, p. 127
\textsuperscript{131} “A Bulgarian Village Robbed by the Bashibuzuks and the Circassians,” \textit{Vsemirnaia Illustratsia}, 28 August 1876 (400): 164 - 65, engraving by A.Daugel
\textsuperscript{132} “Scenes of the Herzegovinian Uprising,” \textit{Pchela}, 1 February 1876, #3: 9, drawing by Broming, engraving by Baranovskii; “In the Land of Slavic Fight for Freedom: Bulgarian Volunteers in an Ambush,” 19 September 1876 (36): 8
\textsuperscript{133} “Albanians and Circassians Setting Fire to the Village of Tishitsu with Kerosine,” \textit{Pchela}, 19 September 1876 (36): 13

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Revolutionary Russia.” It sold impressive 9,000 copies a year already before 1875-1878, 55,000 by 1880, 115,000 by 1891, and 235,000 copies by 1900.\textsuperscript{134}

Far more common was the presence of Russian men saving Slavic women. Gendering is clear from female-dominated images of the liberated Slavs expressing gratitude to Russian soldiers (figures 6 and 7).\textsuperscript{135} As visual media generally, these pictures both reflected and shaped the perceptions of the audience.\textsuperscript{136} Image 7 is an example of traditional broadsheets or lubki that flooded all the corners of the Russian Empire in the hundreds of thousands. Lubki were immensely popular among Russians of all walks of life. With comments of peddlers who traded them in the Russian countryside, lubki provided a rare opportunity for illiterate peasants to connect to a wider world generally and the events of the Russo-Turkish war specifically.\textsuperscript{137} Although both the publishers of illustrated magazines and of lubki had to obtain an imprimatur for their production from the censors, they did not receive government subsidies and had to cater to the tastes of their consumers to survive and prosper. Far from being state-sponsored propaganda, images needed to make sense to the audience to be commercially successful.\textsuperscript{138}

Total absence of even fallen Slavic men was even more common for most Russian Pan-Slavs and their sympathizers. Thus they readily identified with Konstantin Makovskii’s “The Turks in Bulgaria” first exhibited in St Petersburg early in January

\textsuperscript{134} Russkaia periodicheskaia pechat, p. 530
\textsuperscript{135} “Happy New Year,” Vsemirnaia Illustratsia, 1 January 1878 (469): 1, drawing by K. Broche, engraving by B. Braune; “For Faith and Slavs,” poster of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, Russian State Public Historical Library, Rare Book Department, OIK 1940, Streltsov’s publishing house, 1878
\textsuperscript{136} Norris, Stephen, A War of Images: Russian Popular Prints, Wartime Culture, and National Identity, 1812-1945 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), p. 8
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., pp. 99-102
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., pp. 73-74
1878 (Figure 8) and reproduced in the same Pchela.\(^{139}\) This characteristic title suggested that raped and slaughtered women and children represented Bulgaria as a whole and reflected Russian perceptions of South Slavs as powerless, emasculated, and feminine. The widely shared “truth” of this fact is clear from the editorial commentary in Tserkovnyi Vestnik:

What happens on the picture “The Turks in Bulgaria” is indeed horrible though absolutely realistic to judge from the testimony of countless eye-witnesses. Inside a poor and cramped Bulgarian church one can see one of the terrible and striking scenes of the Bulgarian Uprising. Two Bulgarian women in the sanctuary sought refuge from the beastly Turks who had already exterminated the whole village, as is their custom, with no regard for age and sex. The ferocious pursuers burst into the temple. Of course, fierce followers of Mohammad and enemies of Christianity are not going to be stopped either by the holiness of place or the beauty or helplessness of these women. One of them already lies lifeless stabbed by the beastly Bashibuzuk right by the altar where she was probably praying in her last minutes. The same or perhaps a worse lot awaits the other woman. The Circassian and the black Egyptian, the two representatives of the fearsome Sultan’s army, like scavengers, attacked their prey. It is clear that the baby will protect the poor Bulgarian woman neither from disgrace nor from death and torture. Stricken with grief and despair, half-mad from the horrible shock, she is about to drop the baby from her weakened hands…\(^{140}\)

Again there were no fighting heroes in the Bulgarian Uprising against the Ottomans in April 1876. The Scripture covering the fallen woman, the crucifix, and the whole background of an Orthodox church once again show the influence of traditional Russian religious irredentism in relation to Ottoman Christians. The child falling out of the hands of the other poor victim and racialized victimizers are already familiar characters. These images of defenselessness of “Beautiful Souls” were supposed to

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\(^{139}\) As part of the Russian Artistic Section at the World Fair in Paris in 1878 it was titled “A Bulgarian Female Martyr,” Pchela, 9 February 1878 (8): 130-131, painting by K.E.Makovskii

\(^{140}\) Tserkovnyi Vestnik, 14 January 1878 (2):14
mobilize the Russians into quintessentially masculine roles of defenders and “Just Warriors.”

This editorial description of the painting shows that Russian publicists both reflected and shaped the perceptions of South Slavs in the educated society. Although founded only in 1875, *Tserkovnyi Vestnik* quickly became Russia’s major ecclesiastical periodical with 7,200 subscribers by 1899. Even clearer than the editorial comment, the letters of volunteers and donors from all walks of life demonstrate how the press shaped the prevalent perceptions of South Slavs as powerless men, helpless women and children. Thus, the press helped consolidate the Russian nation behind the common cause abroad. But the cohesion of the “core” group was achieved at the expense of othering the “unredeemed.” On 24 October 1875, the commander of a military unit in the region of Kostroma who started a subscription in favor of Bosnians and Herzegovinians described his motivations as follows:

As one reads news reports and articles in the magazines about the Herzegovinian uprising and descriptions of today’s condition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one is inevitably struck by the horrors of our Slavic brothers in the East of the same creed with us. Fathers and sons are cut down by the ferocious followers of Islam who trample down the sacred human rights. Mothers and daughters with their babies flee to their kin in Montenegro and Serbia. On one hand, [one is presented with] Mohammedan fanaticism torturing the non-Muslims with no regard for sex, age, and desecrating and destroying the shrines, on the other, the defenselessness of the Sultan’s Slavic subjects with no opportunity to escape the oppression by the ferocious followers of Mohammedanism that drove the Slavs to despair. All this makes a striking scene.

This passage is interesting not only in its confusion of “Christians” and “Slavs” but also in the seeming relish in visualizing the details of the suffering. The emasculated

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141 Elshtain, *Women and War*, p. 4; Goldstein, *War and Gender*, pp. 275, 369
143 GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 81,79
“Slavs” are cut down and thus taken out of the picture which centers instead on fleeing helpless females and babies. Although this letter is exceptionally detailed, many other volunteers and donors also mentioned the press coverage of the Eastern crisis as their prime motivation. The perceptions of the Slavs among the readers are indeed highly consistent with those images of helplessness and powerlessness disseminated by the press. These similarities testify to the mobilizational power of such depictions in irredentism.

Thus, G. Bespalov from the Terek Cossack Host area sent his contribution after he was moved to tears “reading news reports and seeing the destruction of our poor unfortunate Slavic brothers Serbs and Montenegrins by the cursed, cruel, and merciless Turks, reading and seeing such a sad condition of poor orphans, widows, and cripples left without shelter and protection.”

Reading press reports, Staff-Captain Alexander Stepanov volunteered to fight for the Slavs because he likewise “could not help shedding tears hearing everywhere the weeping of poor compatriots persecuted and beaten by malicious Turks.”

Two young men, nobleman Ivan Sokolov and peasant Ivan Nosov, jointly volunteered to fight in Serbia after “reading reports about unheard of Turkish atrocities that brought us to tears over the plight of our Christian brothers! The children are being fried and the parents are being forced to eat them under the most horrible of tortures. The daughters are being raped in the eyes of bound parents. How terrible!” Not just the educated society members but also common illiterate peasants were directly affected by

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144 GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 282, l. 20 (Essentuki, 11 August 1876)
145 Ibid., l. 92 (Kostroma, 14 August 1876)
146 GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 238 (Borov district, August 1876)
the press coverage. After several rounds of monetary contributions to their Christian brothers in Bosnia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Serbia, the peasants of the village of Vysokovo heard from the newspapers that “poor Christians had to stop blood from their wounds with straw.” They decided to send some linen through their churchwarden.\textsuperscript{147}

It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1876-1878 the portrayals of Balkan Slavs as helpless victims moved many Russians across their vast empire to develop traditionally masculine ideas of themselves as protectors and “Just Warriors.”\textsuperscript{148} In his memoirs, conservative publisher and disillusioned Pan-Slav Prince Vladimir Mesherskii remembered that common mood of “religious crusade” bestowing on the Russians “the smug role of liberators and saviors.”\textsuperscript{149} Indeed, most Russian volunteers joining the Serbian and Montenegrin war effort against the Ottoman Empire were motivated by “the desire to be defenders of the Slavs,”\textsuperscript{150} “to protect Orthodox Slavs,”\textsuperscript{151} to serve the cause of “our poor humiliated and suffering Slavic brothers,”\textsuperscript{152} to defend “freedom, human rights of my brothers and disgraced honor of their wives and daughters.”\textsuperscript{153} “to avenge the blood of innocent girls and children (sic) on the cursed Muslims.”\textsuperscript{154} Numerous donations were made “to support Slavic families in Bosnia and Old Serbia suffering from

\textsuperscript{147} GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 287 (Kashin district of Tver province, 6 August 1876)
\textsuperscript{148} Elshtain, \textit{War and Women}, p. 4
\textsuperscript{149} Mesherskii V. P., \textit{Moi vospominaniia}, pp. 356-361
\textsuperscript{150} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d. 91, l. 30 (a telegraphist from Morshansk, 2 August 1876)
\textsuperscript{151} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d. 91, l. 6 (a retired subaltern officer from the village of Borshevo, Tambov Province, 23 September 1876)
\textsuperscript{152} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d. 91, l. 69 (a resident of St Petersburg, 6 August 1876)
\textsuperscript{153} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d. 91, l. 71ob (a lieutenant of the Serpukhov infantry regiment, 24 July 1876)
\textsuperscript{154} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d. 91, l. 111 (a resident of Kursk, 22 August 1876)
the burdensome inhuman oppression of the Asiatic Turks,“\textsuperscript{155} constantly “fearful for their freedom of religion, their property, the honor of their wives and daughters.”\textsuperscript{156}

Among the hundreds of letters of volunteers asking to be directed to the Serbian army there were extremely few letters that emphasized the image of the Balkan Slavs as heroic rebels. For example, Lieutenant Grudinski from Libava “had long cherished the desire to join the ranks of courageous Slavic fighters”\textsuperscript{157} or Dmitri Abdulov, a nobleman from Tver, volunteered to join “the Slavs in the fight against the barbarians.”\textsuperscript{158} Likewise, those Russians who made donations during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78 overwhelmingly tended to describe the Slavs as helpless victims. The very few contrasting cases where the Slavs were perceived as fighting heroes only serve to underscore the prevalent image of powerless and “suffering Orthodox Christians.” For instance, A.Kaznacheev from Moscow made a donation of 25 rubles to “our Slavic brothers fighting for the just cause.”\textsuperscript{159} This paucity of characterizations of Slavs as heroes in the letters to the Moscow Slavic Committee corresponds with a very limited number of such images in illustrated magazines discussed above.

Far common and lasting image of Slavic men was that of emasculated cowards. Already powerful in Den’ in 1860s, this perception is strongly emphasized in the hugely popular novella titled Under the Russian Banner that saw three editions after 1878 well into the twentieth century. Reading the press reports and the letters of their son fighting the Turks in Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, family members were

\textsuperscript{155} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d. 276a, l. 111ob (personnel of the Porkhov Police Department, 29 October 1875)
\textsuperscript{156} GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 270, l. 12 (I.S.Aksakov to the Society of Merchants, 4 February 1876)
\textsuperscript{157} GARF, f. 1750, op.1, d. 280, l. 83 (2 August 1876)
\textsuperscript{158} GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 238, l. 21 (2 July 1876)
\textsuperscript{159} GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 276, l. 18 (19 June 1876)
wondering, “Why are their fathers and brothers not protecting them? They took to their.
heels to save their own lives, didn’t they? They themselves had left their children to [the
mercy of] the executioners.” The main character, Sergei, concluded that the future of
Bulgaria lay in the Russian-led children, teenagers, women and old men because more
often than not “healthy strong men would be scattered by the mere rumor of the coming
Turks. They would leave their families exposed to the barbarians thinking only how to
save their lives.”

The 1903 story by I. I. Sokolov “In the Heart of Russia” adds treacherousness and
stinginess to the image of the Balkan Slavs as remembered in Russia. The fictional
account focuses on a Russian village at the time of the war and how returning soldiers
shared their experience with those at home. Despite loud declarations of affinity with the
Russians, “little brothers” betrayed the Russians in battle and shared food only under the
threat of Russian bayonets. Significantly, Sokolov dedicated his piece to the 25th
anniversary of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Published in the journal for Russian
educators, the story could reach even a wider audience through Russian schools. The
same characterizations of Balkan Slavs as niggards and emasculated cowards abound in
the eyewitness accounts of those Russians who went to Serbia and Bulgaria in 1876-
1878.

In addition to popular literature and memoirs, the monument to the Moscow
Grenadier Regiment veterans of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 is a clear

160 Krasnitskii, A.I., Pod Russkim Znamenem (St Petersburg: Izdatelstvo Tovarishestva M.O. Vol’f, 3d
dition, 1905 [1878]), p. 161
162 An influential example is Mesherskii, Moi vospominaniia, (Moscow: I. Zakharov, 2001, first published
in 1897), p. 368
illustration of how those gendered themes of Russian superiority over liberated and “grateful” Balkan Slavs influenced popular perceptions and memories. Funded by public subscription, the monument opened 28 November 1887. The subscription campaign itself and the work of public committees to select a project they could agree on show that the monument reflected widely accepted ideas and memories of the war of 1877-1878. Its four bas-reliefs also enshrined the same perceptions of the Balkan Slavs as emasculated “brothers” and victimized “sisters” and children to be saved by Russian heroes. They featured an enchained kneeling South Slav man and beseeching Slavic woman in folklore dress towering over him, a female Slav desperate to save herself and her child from a dehumanized and racialized Turk menacing above her. The last bas-relief depicts an old Russian peasant blessing his soldier son with the Bible to fight the Turk for the liberation of the powerless Slavs (figures 9, 10, 11, 12).

Contradictions of Pan-Slavism in liberated Bulgaria: 1878-1885

The imagery and propaganda meant to mobilize the Russians to their role of saviors understandably nurtured a superiority complex vis-à-vis their newly found irredenta. If the Russians did not intervene, the Balkan Slavs were destined to be robbed, tortured, and raped. If the moment of liberation ever came, it would not be that of brotherly harmony. Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas Avksentiev volunteered “to protect the Slavs in Turkey” confident that “soon Turkish Christians would need help and leadership.”

163 This implication of memorials built on public subscription is powerfully argued by Merridale, Catherine, Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia (New York: Viking, 2001), p. 308. Stephen Norris also accepts this argument in A War of Images, p. 218
164 GARF, f.1750, op.1, d.233, l. 11 (1 November 1876)
But these hierarchical relationships between the irredenta and the core group of “the homeland” make it difficult to build a horizontal “imagined community” of equal co-nationals. Russian saviors occupied most key posts in liberated Bulgaria after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 until 1885 and would not allow Bulgarians to rise to positions of leadership, most notably, in the military. Out of this discontent in the Bulgarian educated society there developed a trend towards the heroisation of the self-image strengthened as a reaction against the overbearing and patronizing attitude of the Russian liberators after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, most prominently in the writings of Zacharii Stoianov.165

The Russian “advisors” firmly believed that on their own the Bulgarians were unable to run their military forces or to play any other leading role in the administration.166 Only the Russian officers in charge of Bulgarian forces were supposedly able to maintain order in the autonomous Bulgarian-populated Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia. Russian Military Agent in the province’s capital of Philippopolis (now Plovdiv), Colonel Ekk, objected to the removal of any Russian officers from the province’s military forces. He believed that “the [Bulgarian] soldiers themselves love our officers more than their own officers. They see in them experienced caring leaders who both teach and spare them.” Ekk supported the view that the Bulgarians would always need Russian leadership in all areas of life.167

Having to play by the rules of the game of European Great Powers, the Russian government discouraged further Bulgarian expansion into other Balkan areas of the

165 Stoianov, Zacharii, Ochizny vernyie syny (Sofia, 1989), pp. 10-11
166 Russian State Imperial Army Archive (RGVIA), f. 401, op.4/928-1881, d.35, l. 78ob (2 August 1881)
167 RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4/928-1881, d.35, l. 86ob (24 August 1881) and l. 104 (15 September 1881)
Ottoman Empire. This policy understandably bred discontent and resentment of the advocates of Bulgarian irredentism. By refusing to be led, the Bulgarians were not playing the role assigned to them by the decades-long Pan-Slav propaganda and Russia’s strategic interests in the area. This disagreement in turn made Russians repeatedly accuse Bulgarians of “ungratefulness” and finally “abandon” them when the Bulgarian Principality embarked on independent foreign policy and annexed Eastern Rumelia in 1885.168

**Self and Other after the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 in Russia**

The perceptions of self and Other had not changed substantially over the course of the Bulgarian Church Question (1856-1912). Both the “modern” “Pan-Slavs” and “premodern” “Pan-Orthodox” shifted from a “pre-modern” image of Ottoman Christians as an undifferentiated unified mass of suffering helpless and thus inferior co-religionists. Both the “Pan-Slavs” and “Pan-Orthodox” singled out the Greeks as masculine actors in their own right. The main difference was in positive or negative connotation of that agency. For both of them, the feminization and othering of all coreligionists became the main part of the image of Arab and Slav Ottoman Christians. While the image of Russian coreligionists and coethnics was characterized by both sameness and difference, the Others pure and simple were the “Turks” and “the West.” Their main feature was religion-based difference and related perceived contrasts of Slavic and Orthodox nations with ‘Western civilization.’ Anti-liberalism and anti-semitism were new variations on the theme of the Western religious Other.

168 Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia*, p. 256
In a moderated version of “Pan-Slavism,” Vasilii Teplov projected a more positive image of the Greeks, more negative depiction of the Slavs, and a traditional messianic Russian image. While harshly criticizing extreme Greek nationalists for inventing the Schism and heresy of phyletism (see introduction and especially chapter 3 for more details), Teplov portrayed the Greeks as traditional defenders of Orthodoxy through the Eastern Patriarchates, not numerous but enterprising and sophisticated.\(^\text{169}\) In the same spirit of Filippov and other “Pan-Orthodox,” Teplov depicted the Bulgarian Slavs not just as helpless victims of aggressive Greeks, Turks, and Westerners but also as often putting nationalism, convenience, and profit over religion. In other words, the image of the Slavs was not just that of “damsels in distress” but also that of adulterous women easily “seduced” by the “Jesuits” and willingly selling out to Catholicism.

“Deprived of the firm moral foundation they had in the uninterrupted communion with the Great Church [Ecumenical Patriarchate], the Bulgarians began to shake in their religious convictions and many of them succumbed to the calumny of the enemies of Orthodoxy and betrayed the faith of their fathers.”\(^\text{170}\)

Of course, the Russian self-image was the most prestigious one in Teplov. Its main characteristic was religion - an unswerving commitment to Orthodox Christianity, “the deeply Orthodox Russian people will turn away from Bulgarians if they persist in their extreme demands forgetting about the spiritual in pursuit of the material.”\(^\text{171}\) In contrast, because of pernicious Western influence, the Greeks and especially the Bulgarians often tended “to look at the faith as merely a national banner.” Left to

\(^{169}\) Teplov, Vasilii, Greko-bolgarski tserkovnyi vopros po neizdannym istochnikam (St Petersburg, 1889), p. 223  
\(^{170}\) Ibid., p.218  
\(^{171}\) Ibid., p.226
themselves without Russia’s involvement, they would never come to reconciliation in Orthodox unity.\textsuperscript{172}

Compared to the previous periods, for the opponents of the Pan-Slavs or the supposedly traditionalist Pan-Orthodox “party,” the “Other” had elements of both continuity and change as regards the images of the anti-Orthodox Other and non-Greek Ottoman Christians as well as the significance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for the Russian monarchy and the Russian Church. The “Pan-Orthodox party” still perceived Western education and religious propaganda as the main sources of the Bulgarian national movement. In the Bulgarian Church Question, the Western Other evolved to antisemitism from 1880s on both for mainstream “Pan-Slavs” and strikingly for “Pan-Orthodox” as well. Liberalism, Catholic/Protestant propaganda, and the Jews were facets of the same Western danger to the Russian Empire and the Orthodox Church. The Jewish usurers plagued Christian Orthodox farmers in Russia and Rumania.\textsuperscript{173} Famous Slavicist and pro-Serbian publicist Professor Apollon Maikov supported the reluctance of the Rumanian Government to enforce article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin. In the opinion of “Pan-Slavs” and “Pan-Orthodox” alike, the Jews and other religious minorities could not have full citizenship rights.\textsuperscript{174}

The control of speculative capitalists (\textit{birzheviki}) and Jews explained the anti-Greek bias of the liberal press in Russia.\textsuperscript{175} Ostensibly Pan-Orthodox \textit{Vostok} kept track of the publications where Jews were editors and contributors which was the justification to distrust major dailies such as \textit{Golos}, \textit{Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti} and \textit{Moskovskie

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., pp. 221-222
\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Vostok}, 8 May 1879 (2):28
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Vostok}, 12 August 1879 (16): 243-6
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Vostok}, 13 December 1879 (25): 382
\end{flushright}
Vedomosti. Durnovo’s editor Durnovo took issue with the economic explanation of the Bulgarian Schism in Novosti by “probably one of the Foreign Ministry officials.” According to him, the Patriarchate of Constantinople never depended solely on Bulgarian dioceses to proclaim the Schism out of desperation of Bulgarian defection. Durnovo dismissed that economic rationale as too centered on the filthy lucre and thus Jewish. At the same time, Durnovo did not oppose capitalists as such and believed that contributions of Ottoman Greek bankers benefited the Patriarchate of Constantinople rather than making it subservient to Greek irredentism.

Five years later, Durnovo denounced the same Novosti as “a Jewish newspaper and an organ of the Bulgarian Exarchate” for its support of church strife in Macedonia.

Vostok highlighted anti-Semitic articles from mainstream “Pan-Slav” press, e.g., that by Professor Koialovich in Tserkovnyi Vestnik titled “Yids spread Latindom in Russia.”

In 1901, Durnovo blamed the bureaucratic barriers between the Tsar and his people, stifling free church life not in small measure on “Bulgarian terrorists led by “Jew Gringmut,” the editor of “pseudoconservative” Moskovskie Vedomosti. The same Gringmut distorted true Slavophilism - he infiltrated the Moscow Slavic Society and turned it into a body of Macedonian Bulgarian extremists. Ignorance of things Orthodox was getting worse because the Jews took over “almost all of Moscow press.”

As a variation on the anti-Semitic/anti-Western theme, one of the contributors of Orient Orthodoxe, Sophia Bakunina, explained the deadlock in the Bulgarian Question on

176 Vostok, 31 May 1880 (47): 166
177 Vostok, 17 September 1880 (59): 263
178 Vostok, 18 December 1885 (332): 423
179 Vostok, 13 November 1880 (67): 331
180 Pravoslavnyi Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe, 8/21 August 1901 (1): 4
181 Ibid., 17/30 March 1902 (11): 169-170
182 Ibid., 27 January/9 February 1902 (4): 63
“bourgeois egoism and materialism not just in Russia but in all countries.” As their prime champions, “careerists” and opportunists had no motivation to combat Russian expansionist nationalists and “Bulgarophiles.”

One of the most important hierarchs of the early twentieth century Russia, Antonii of Volyn, combined his support for Joachim III in the Bulgarian Question with the backing for the Union of the Russian People or “Black Hundreds” in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1905. However, Antonii denied the accusations of promoting Judophobia and of inciting pogroms. Although he often denounced Jewish profiteers, he considered his main interests to lie in “monasticism, the change of church administration, patriarchate, communion with Eastern churches, the struggle against Latindom, the transformation of the spiritual instruction, the creation of a new direction in Orthodox theology, Old Belief (edinoverie), liturgical regulations, Slavophilism, Orthodoxy in Galicia,” and restoration of old temples in his dioceses.

Another “Pan-Orthodox” for whom the Western Other had liberal, Roman Catholic, and Jewish facets was Iona, “Archimandrite of the Holy Apostolic and Patriarchal Ecumenical Throne.” In 1900s, he served as the priest at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, the main representative of the Russian Church in the “East.” In one of his several pamphlets dedicated to Patriarch Ioachim III, he called for Russia to strengthen its traditional role as the defender of Orthodoxy against “Vatican” by supporting the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Vatican worked in cahoots with liberals and Jews to undermine the Orthodox Church and its main stalwart, i.e., the Russian

183 Pravoslavnyi Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe, 8/21 October 1901 (9): 139-140
Empire, both from without and within. Thus, Iona explained the lack of US support for Russian in the Russo-Japanese war on the Jewish influence, “Indeed, Vatican and Jews, Vatican and liberalism – all those are seemingly irreconcilable notions, but the goal justifies the means.”

As will be shown below, Leontiev considered the Bulgarian church movement as an example of Western egalitarian nationalism and bourgeois liberalism. The stereotypes connecting Jews with liberal capitalism were common across Europe and among Russian Pan-Slavs. The connection between anti-Semitism and anti-liberalism in the Bulgarian Question signaled the belonging of the “Pan-Orthodox” to the “Pan-Slav” mainstream and “modern” populism. Typical of mainstream European anti-Semitism, “Pan-Orthodox” and “Pan-Slavs” distinguished between “good” capitalism serving the “Pan-Orthodox” interests and “bad” speculative and Jewish capitalism aimed against them.

An Attempt at Comparison

The Greek case is not a perfect one to compare with Russian Pan-Slavism because they were so close in time and space. Only qualified area specialists can answer the question of whether othering and gendering irredentism were historically specific epiphenomena limited to late-nineteenth-century Eastern Europe or are characteristic of other settings as well. Thus, drawing a parallel between Greek irredentism and Pan-Slavism is useful as an encouragement for more comparative analysis of irredentist discourses.

185 Iona (Archimandrit Sviateishego Apostolskogo i Patriarshego Vselenskogo Prestola), Rimskii Papa i Pravoslavnyi Vostok. Ocherki i etiudy po voprosu o sovremennom otnoshenii Rima k Rossii i Blizhnemu Vostoku (St Petersburg, 1913), pp. 34-35
186 Thaden, Conservative Nationalism, pp. 140-141
Looking at the case of Greek irredentism yields similar conclusions. As in the Russian case, irredentist propaganda portrayed the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire as highly susceptible to inimical outside penetration. “The enslaved Greeks” were victims of “Ottoman barbarism” and increasingly of Pan-Slavism. Even Greeks of Asia Minor were seen as threatened by it.\(^{187}\) Its danger was particularly acute for “Slav-and Arab-speaking Greeks.” These so called Bulgarized and Arabized Greeks in the Balkans and Syria respectively were Greek in habits, ways, religion, blood and racial features.\(^{188}\)

To sensitize the Greek public to the lot of their kinsmen, Pan-Greek nationalists described the latter as in danger of imminent loss of Greek identity via “seduction by Pan-Slav propaganda” and threat of violent death in the hands of armed agents of “Pan-Slav Committees.” Pan-Greek activists sought to mobilize the Greek state and individual Greeks to heavily invest into school networks and to form Greek armed units to resist “Pan-Slav” bands in the Ottoman Empire. The arrogant and condescending attitude of “the free Greeks” often provoked resentment and bitterness on the part of “the enslaved” kinsmen. The resulting hierarchical relationship often led to distrust and division between them both before and after unification. For example, in the latter half of the nineteenth century Greek monks on Mount Athos could not get along with each other and ended up forming separate monastic communities composed of those from the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire respectively. The Greek Consul in Ottoman Thessalonica deplored this situation and urged his government to send Greek nationalist priests to

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\(^{187}\) Greek Foreign Ministry Archive (AYE), file 76 - 1875, no. 265, Antalia, 26 May 1875
\(^{188}\) AYE, collection “Embassy in Constantinople” - 1878, no. 1782, Constantinople, 15 June 1878
Mount Athos to educate Ottoman Greek monks in true Greek national ways. Otherwise the latter could be “seduced” into the Pan-Slav camp.  

The cursory analysis of Greek irredentist imagery again suggests generic parallels with the Russian case. Greece was usually depicted as female for domestic consumption, most commonly as a naked woman or in an ancient tunic victimized by unscrupulous Greek politicians. When the unredeemed were in the picture, they were usually portrayed as helpless women threatened by the invariably male oppressor. If Greek homeland came into the picture, it was in the form of a martial Amazon or goddess Athena in full military attire. But usually when dealing with the irredenta, Greek homeland was represented by its king or a prime-minister. For example, the poster of the time of the Greek-Turkish War of 1920-1922 features Greek Prime-Minister Eleftherios Venizelos liberating the enchained woman “Asia Minor” from the Turkish Sultan.

The situation was likewise similar to Russian Pan-Slavism when the long-awaited moment of national unification came. In the wake of the Greek defeat in the war of 1920-1922 against Turkey, around 1.5 million Greeks had to flee from Asia Minor to mainland Greece. The preceding irredentist propaganda created the image of “the enslaved Greeks” as helpless, powerless and implicitly inferior to “the free Greeks.” The unredeemed suffered from even more discrimination as unwelcome economic refugees in an impoverished country. Their lack of integration into the nation is clear from Greek interwar politics where Asia Minor refugees voted as a separate block. In this they were

189 Gennadius Library Archive (Athens), Stephanos Dragoumis Collection, file 32, no. 1051, ll.99-101, Thessalonica, 24 August 1887
190 Neos Aristofanis, 17 February 1891 (9), 3 March 1891 (23), 9 June 1891 (24), 16 June 1891
191 Greek Historical Museum, Poster Collection, no. 4953/17
joined by the unredeemed kinsmen in the “new lands” annexed by Greece in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The “Slav-speaking Greeks” were the majority in the “new lands” at the time. According to the preceding Greek irredentist propaganda, they were Greek in everything but language. Thus, interwar years brought them fierce discrimination, resettlement, and forced assimilation campaigns which led to various forms of resentment and resistance to the “homeland.”

Conclusion

Irredentist discourse is similar to that of Orientalism in its reliance on the Other created via images of passivity and gendering. The process of othering and gendering the irredenta leads to the creation of the self-image of the core group. As the case of Russian irredentism suggests, Pan-Orthodox and Pan-Slav agitation helped bring cohesion to the Russian national identity. The press, prints, illustrated magazines, posters and even musical themes disseminated the images of inferior yoke, the hunted game, racialization, lack of independent progress, familial hierarchy and the gendered perceptions of the “unredeemed” as emasculated “brothers” and “damsels in distress.” Many Russians of all walks of life rallied behind the cause conveniently situated beyond Russian borders and thus obscuring internal national divisions.

But irredentism is different from Orientalism in othering the purported national self through the images of yoke, the hunted game, racialization, familial hierarchy and through the gendered perceptions of the “unredeemed” as emasculated “brothers,”

coquettish women, and “damsels in distress.” These images and metaphors of powerlessness and victimization are disseminated not in small measure by the politically active irredenta themselves and are supposed to sensitize and to mobilize the core group to help relieve the plight of the unredeemed. But they also lead to a fundamentally unequal and divisive relationship between the irredenta and the core group.

The analysis pointed to another contradictions of Pan-Slav discourse – its dependence on the religious language of the established Pan-Orthodox irredentism. This inability to employ consistently ethnonational rhetoric challenges the conventional view that as the modern ideology it would inevitably supersede its religious messianic precursor. Thus, this chapter lays ground for the concept of “combined development” of both modern ethnonational and premodern religious messianic elements of identity among significant segments of the educated society in both Russia and Greek lands.
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Chapter Two

Modernizing Orthodoxy: Responses to the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question in Russia and Greek Lands (1856-1870)

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Crimean War (1853-1856), nationalistic members of the Bulgarian community in Russia and Constantinople along with their Russian Pan-Slav supporters took the pen to demonize “the Greeks” in the Russian press. Their goal was to enlist the backing of the Russian public opinion and possibly of the Russian policymakers for the “Slavic cause.” This vilification campaign did not go unchallenged. Prompted by the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the leadership of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church sponsored the official rebuttal of the first Bulgarian anti-Greek articles in the Russian press in 1858. Despite the widely shared fears about the possibility of the Bulgarians going Catholic, the mainstream Russian ecclesiastical periodicals continued to uphold the authority of “the Greek” Patriarchate of Constantinople and to call for moderation and reconciliation of all sides.

On the other hand, with the sympathy for the Slavs widespread in the Russian educated society, most lay publicists backed “the Slavic cause” and the Bulgarian nationalist demands for their Church independent of the Patriarchate throughout 1860s and 1870s. This Pan-Slav agitation was countered by a few vocal Pan-Orthodox lay writers. The latter, themselves coming from the Slavophile and Pan-Slav background, made a choice in favor of the strength and integrity of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the autonomy of the Russian Orthodox Church from the state. While countering the pro-
Bulgarian propaganda of the Slavic cause, they adopted the terms of the Pan-Slav discourse that had singled out the Greeks from the previously undifferentiated mass of victimized Ottoman Christians to recast them as the powerful and devious oppressors of the Ottoman Slavs. The Pan-Orthodox accepted this drastic change of the Greek image but insisted on the positive impact of Greek power and agency. The continued leadership role of the Greeks within the Ottoman Christian community was necessary to resist the pressure from the Islamic state as well as “the seduction” of the Catholic proselytizing.

Thus, both responses operated the supposedly “modern” ethnographic concepts\(^{194}\) to describe the division of population in the Ottoman Empire as composed of different “elements.” But pre-modern religious or confessional categories were just as important for them. This seeming contradiction is in line with Michael David-Fox’ notion of “combined development”\(^ {195}\) and Michael Herzfeld’s distinction between “the outwardly-directed model” and “the introspective self-view” in any cultural identity.\(^ {196}\) This puzzling incongruity also illustrates Dipesh Chakrabarty’s argument that “historical time is not integral, that it is out of joint with itself” – the idea central to his project of uncovering historical alternatives to Western European modernity.\(^ {197}\) The combination of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, the theory of Greco-Slavic cultural type and the attempts to solve the Bulgarian Question was one of the first conscious and very articulate attempts in modern times to decenter both in theory and practice the mainstream Western


\(^{195}\) David-Fox, Michael, “Multiple Modernities,” 537


European modernity and divest it of its self-proclaimed universalistic progressivist mission. In the argument of its proponents, the Pan-Orthodox, Pan-Slav, Greco-Slavic alternative modernities existed in opposition to and parallel to their Western counterpart.

This phenomenon is further illustrated by the emergence of the voices advocating a cultural and political rapprochement between the Slavs and the Greeks based on their shared belonging to the newly invented “Greco-Slavic cultural type.” This supposedly self-contained civilization was a compromise between the two seemingly diametrically opposed views of the Pan-Slavs and the Pan-Orthodox Russia publicists. The chapter argues that it was the Bulgarian Church Question that moved this otherwise academic discussion to formulate practical public policy suggestions. The debate around the Bulgarian Church Question enabled the proponents of all three responses to turn from hairsplitting academics into Orientalist producers of knowledge bent on influencing practical policy through existing power hierarchies.

Much like the Russian lay publicists of both rival parties, those new voices belonged to the individuals who on occasion expressed outspoken Pan-Slav views. However, unlike the Pan-Orthodox, the supporters of this middle way from the beginning were more open to the possible independence of the Bulgarian Church of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. They declared Orthodox Christianity to be the essential background to the Greco-Slavic cultural type and attempted to formulate a more “modern” scientific vision to give national distinctions a higher profile. Also, they sought to establish closer ties between the Greeks and the Slavs directly rather than traditionally through the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This early synthesis between the seemingly irreconcilable Pan-Orthodox and Pan-Slav views on the Bulgarian Question would be further developed.
after 1870 when the polarity of the two conflicting interpretations on the place of Russia within the wider Orthodox Christian world was revealed with an even greater intensity.

In addition to the differences over the respective weight of religious versus ethnic identities, the Pan-Orthodox, the Pan-Slavs, and the proponents of the Greco-Slavic world/cultural type theory were divided on the issue of church-state relations. Consistent with their advocacy of supranational allegiances, the Pan-Orthodox or Byzantine party argued in favor of strengthening the institution of the multinational confessional dynastic autocratic empire. Central to this task was giving more independence to the Church as the main source of legitimacy for such a state. According to the Pan-Orthodox, by supporting the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople rather than the Bulgarian movement, Imperial Russia as well as the Ottoman Empire would confirm their supranational dynastic legitimating image and ideology both domestically and internationally. Conversely, a truly supranational ecumenical Church was possible in a dynastic confessional empire.

**Engaging with the Pan-Slavs (1856-1860)**

The rising discourse of Pan-Slavism clashed with the older and more established tradition of religious irredentism. Just as Pan-Slavism borrowed from Pan-Orthodoxy, the latter changed under the former’s influence. Religious irredentism no longer treated all “suffering” Orthodox Christians as a whole but had to differentiate between distinct ethnicities. The Pan-Slav images of powerless Slavs (and Arabs too) and powerful Greeks were adopted by the Pan-Orthodox with the reversed value judgment. However, the core of traditional religious irredentism would be preserved – Russia’s mission was
expressed to be the protector and potentially the liberator of all Orthodox Christians “under the Muslim yoke.” The South Slavs (and the Arabs) were endowed with the same qualities as all Ottoman Orthodox before. Unlike the Pan-Slavs, the Pan-Orthodox argued that Russia needed to intervene in the East to support powerful Greeks on whom the strength of Orthodoxy in the East rested. Without the Greek prelates, the Slavs (and Arabs) would be “seduced” into the Unia, Protestantism, and Islam.

In light of this mutual influence of old and new irredentism “pure” version of religious irredentism was becoming increasingly rare in 1860s. The influence of Pan-Slavism on traditional Pan-Orthodox discourse was stemmed by the intervention of the Holy Synod. The 1858 articles of Alexander Rachinskii (Pan-Slav, Russian Foreign Ministry official (1859) and a consul in Ottoman Bulgaria (1860-1861) in Russkii Vestnik and Christo Daskalov Russkaia Beseda provoked a protest from the Ecumenical Patriarchate conveyed to the Over-Procurator of the Holy Governing Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church by Lascaris, a Greek student at the St Petersburg Spiritual Academy. In his letter to the Foreign Minister and the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople Butenev Ober-Procurator Count Alexander Tolstoy characterized the articles as “the product of the suggestions of Western propaganda.”

198 “D.” [Rachinskii, A.V.], “Turetskie dela,” Russkii Vestnik, 1858, 13 (2): 245 - 265
“D.” [Daskalov, Christo], “Vozrozhdenie bolgar ili reaktsia v Evropeiskoi Turtsii,” Russkaia Beseda, 1858, II (10):1-64

199 Russian Imperial Foreign Policy Archive (AVPRI), fond 161/3, collection 233, part I, Tolstoy to Gorchakov (cc: Butenev), June 19 1858, pp.237-238.


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Their aim was not to bring about sympathy towards the needs of the Bulgarians.
The insults of the hierarchy were supposed “to implant in the Russian people hatred for
the co-religionist Greek people and to their Church from which our Fatherland has
received the light of the Christian faith.” In Tolstoy’s prediction, the grave domestic
consequence of the campaign for the Bulgarian cause would be the empowerment of the
Old Believers to further criticize the official Orthodox Church. Internationally, it would
weaken Russian influence “in the East” in case of “loss of the trust of the Greek clergy
which forms the main Christian Orthodox element in the Turkish Empire.”

This ostensibly Pan-Orthodox statement is a great example of the influence of the
Pan-Slav views on the division of population into nations on the traditional religious
irredentist discourse – the Ecumenical Patriarchate is called the church of the Greek
people. However, the text reveals the continued primacy of the religious world view over
the nationalist one – “the Greek clergy” is subsumed within “the Christian Orthodox
element.” This relative dominance of religious “population statistics” is clear from the
view of the Other, namely, Western (read: Catholic) propaganda and the Islamic Turk.

The Foreign Ministry was to convey the apologies of the Russian Holy Synod to
the Ecumenical Patriarchate through the Ambassador in Constantinople. To prevent
“such senseless and harmful articles,” it was necessary to impose prior censoring of

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Bulgaria (N.Y.: Arno Press & New York Times, 1971); Clarke, James F., “Protestantism and the Church
Question,” The Pen & the Sword: Studies in Bulgarian History by James F Clarke, ed. by Dennis
P.Hupchick (East European Monographs, Boulder:distrib. by Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1988);
Merdzanov, Ivan, “Die Habsburgermonarchie und die katholischen Missionen in den Bulgarischen Landen
im 18.-19. Jh.,” Bulgarian Historical Review, 1994 (2): 31-59; Genchev, Nikolai, “Franzia i Bulgaro-
Gruitskite tserkovni otnoshenia prez 50-70-te godini na XIX v.,” Historicheski Pregled, 1976, vol. 32 (4): 31-
56; Genov, Rumen, “Bulgarskoto tserkovno-natsionalno dvizhenie v krai na 60-te godini na XIX v. prez
Precarious Symbiosis: Ottoman Christians & Foreign Missinaries in the 19th c.,” International Journal of
Turkish Studies, 1985-86, vol. 3 (2): 53-67

AVPRI, ibid., p.238
writings concerning the administrative organization of the Church and not just those related to its dogma. This decree was the will of the Tsar circulated by the Minister of People’s Enlightenment.²⁰¹

On its part, the Russian Foreign Ministry resumed the diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire severed by the Crimean war (1853-1856) with the traditional commitment to “support the Church and Christian populations” vis-à-vis the oppression of the Islamic state and Western religious proselytizing.²⁰² After 1856, the Ottoman Empire was in the process of Tanzimat reforms ultimately aimed at creating a civic nation based on the equality of all Ottoman subjects regardless of the creed. This reform was guaranteed by all European Great Powers according to the treaty of Paris that concluded the Crimean War (1856). For Russian diplomats, this situation created both challenges and opportunities for asserting their claimed right to ‘protect’ Ottoman Christians. Generally, the Russian diplomats were skeptical of the whole Tanzimat project. Thus, the second post-Crimean war Russian Ambassador Lobanov-Rostovskii called “une idée chimerique” with “plus de poesie que de verite.”²⁰³

In this post-Crimean context, local Russian consuls were supposed to “find means towards extinguishing the quarrel over national differences (raznoplemennost) that arose among our coreligionists.” Russian representatives would keep the Bulgarians from

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²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 238ob
demonizing the Greeks as a whole and would persuade “the Greek pastors of the Church” to grant the Slavic liturgy and the teaching of Bulgarian at parish schools. Mutual concessions would immune the Bulgarians against “the encroachments of Western missionaries.”

Thus, in the instructions of the Russian Foreign Ministry, there was an attempt to take into account national distinctions but religion remained strong on the cognitive map of Russian elites. Clearly, this Pan-Orthodox policy had the political goal - to preserve Russia’s traditional religious clientele in the area. Russian leadership always appealed to the duty of protecting Ottoman Christians rather than the Slavs in the attempts to bring the pressure of the other European Great Powers to bear collectively on the Sultan’s government. But the obsession with the threat of “Rome” went beyond cool political calculations and reflected the religious and dynastic legitimation in Russia proper. More often than not, Russian policy formulations expressed the fear of the danger posed by the Catholic/Protestant Other to the “Orthodox world” rather than the concern over losing Russian influence to individual Western powers.

Although many consuls had Pan-Slav sympathies, they considered excessive the demands for a separate Bulgarian hierarchy unauthorized by the Ecumenical

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Patriarchate. Some officials of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople did not approve of the Pan-Orthodox line of the Russian Holy Synod. They argued in favor of a clearly Pan-Slav pro-Bulgarian policy because the Patriarchate would “subject us to its Greek-Byzantine view.” But the Pan-Slav approach never came to predominate. Whenever a local consul seemed too supportive of Bulgarian aspirations at the expense of the unity of the Orthodox Church, the Russian Ambassador intervened to bring his subordinate back to the Pan-Orthodox track of urging mutual concessions and moderation in the Bulgarian Church Question.

In addition to the pressure on the Russian Foreign Ministry and the more severe censorship of all church related publications, Over-Procurator Alexander Tolstoy felt the need to rebuff Daskalov’s anti-Patriarchate articles specifically. The task of vindicating the honor of the Patriarch of Constantinople attacked by Bulgarians and Russian Pan-Slavs fell on Tertii Ivanovich Filippov. At first glance, he was an unlikely man for that job. Whenever his name is mentioned in the existing scholarly literature, it receives a one-sided treatment. Edward Thaden discusses T. I. Filippov along with other “promising young Muscovites of the 1830s and 1840s” influenced by Russian nationalist and Pan-Slav views of Moscow University Professors M. P. Pogodin and S. P. Shevyrev. Filippov himself in the letter to Pogodin in the summer of 1852 identified the latter as a major inspiration of his life, “I consider you among the people whom I owe, I dare not say

206 N. Mukhin to the Foreign Ministry, 24 September 1856, ibid., p. 71
207 E. P. Novikov to E. P. Kovalevskii, Deputy Foreign Minister, 17 May 1860, ibid., p. 389
208 Consul in Varna A. V. Rachinskii to Ambassador A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii, 28 May 1860, ibid., p. 401
salvation for I am far from it, but at least my coming back to the way becoming a decent man. Whatever happens between us afterwards, I will always be grateful to you.”

Filippov, along with other “junior editors,” namely, Apollon Grigoriev, A. N. Ostrovskii, and E. N. Edelson, helped Pogodin’s Moskvitianin “briefly attain a degree of popular success in the early 1850s.” The journal collapsed on Pogodin’s stinginess and interference which alienated “the junior editors.”

According to Michael Petrovich, in the period from 1841 to 1856, Moskvitianin was the only Russian journal to systematically promote Pan-Slavism before the Crimean War. Every issue discussed Slavic news thereby bringing “a knowledge of the other Slavs to an apathetic Russian public.” It had more influence abroad than at home and had to give way to more vigorous and innovative publications in the more liberal and competitive post-Crimean War era.

After leaving Moskvitianin, Filippov and Koshelev started “a new Slavophile journal” in 1855. Filippov revealed a lot of his early convictions in his intimations about the new publication with Count Alexander Tolstoy on August 5 1855. In fact, it was Koshelev, Khomiakov, and Samarin (all prominent Slavophiles) to move this project. Its main goal was “to expose Western lies.” “Although you in your rather strict judgment find them quite Westernized, nevertheless they sincerely respect and profess (although giving some liberal interpretation) Orthodoxy, Nationality, and Autocracy.” The future journal was supposed to counteract the new Moscow journal Russkiy Letopisets to be

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209 Russian State Library, Manuscript Division, fond “M. P. Pogodin” 231/II-34-64, T. I. Filippov to M. P. Pogodin, p.8
210 Thaden, Edward, op.cit., p.23
212 Thaden, Edward, op.cit., p.35

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edited by Katkov. Filippov characterized him as “the Schellingean and the enemy of our national trend (narodnoie napravlenie).” As was discussed in Chapter 1, Katkov was also the publisher of Moskovskie Vedomosti and Russkii Vestnik where some anti-Greek articles by Daskalov would appear. The founders of the new “national” journal offered Filippov the position of the editor which he found “flattering, profitable, morally elevating” and “the kind of activity to his best liking.” Filippov hoped that job would be useful for the society and was asking for Tolstoy’s opinion.213

Clearly, the common denominator between Tolstoy and Filippov was opposition to the ‘West.’ The conservative Russian state establishment had long suspected the Slavophiles of being crypto-liberals.214 Anti-rational and anti-secular proclivities led both Filippov and Tolstoy to appreciate the political teaching of “sacred history” by Father Matfei of Tver’. The latter apparently brought the two together and served as the connecting link between them. Thus, Filippov used the Biblical quote to explain Russian predicament in the closing days of the Crimean War, “The recent events leave no shadow of a doubt that we are the New Israel.”215

The same Father Matfei wrote Filippov that Tolstoy was going to employ him in the Holy Synod. Filippov seized this opportunity to quit his editorship of Russkaia Beseda which he now considered waste of one year of his life. Because of the general disorder in the journal and personal conflict with Koshelev he had to sacrifice his opinion, making concessions contrary to his conscience.216

213 GARF, fond “T. I. Filippov” 1099-1-1265, T. I. Filippov to A. P. Tolstoy, Rzhev, 5 August 1855, pp.1ob-2
214 Thaden, Edward, op.cit., p.22
215 GARF, 1099-1-1265, p.16, 22 May 1856
216 Ibid., p.3, 11 November 1856
For Filippov Slavophilism/Pan-Slavism took a back seat to anti-Westernism in his ideas of the Russian “national” identity. Working in the Holy Synod, he urged Tolstoy to arrange for two Orthodox Arabs, Abuda and Solomon, to be accepted into the St Petersburg Spiritual Academy. This encouragement would attract “more Syrians into our lands.” The reason they both should concern themselves about it was that “I know our rapprochement with the East ranks foremost in your thoughts.”

Further delineation from the mainstream Pan-Slav line happened shortly after the publication by “D.” in the February issue (1858 no 9) of the Russkii Vestnik. Another anti-Greek piece by Daskalov would follow shortly in no 10 of the Russkaia Beseda – the journal Filippov left in 1856. Although writing a rebuttal to it was an official assignment, Filippov did not compromise his convictions for that. He sincerely believed that the Bulgarians were treating Orthodoxy lightly to achieve their national goals. Because of his employment in the Holy Synod and a personal connection to Over-Procurator Tolstoy, Filippov was in a unique position to affect public policy and the public opinion. With this connection between knowledge and political power, Filippov was acting as an Orientalist disseminating his Pan-Orthodox ideas for and about unredeemed populations of the “Orthodox East.”

As his rebuttal was appearing with official sanction in installments in August 1858 in Moskovskie Vedomosti, he expressed concern to Tolstoy about the Bulgarian national leaders considered moderate and pro-Russian. Russian based ethnically Bulgarian Palauzov published a study of the short-lived union of the Bulgarian Church with Rome in the 13th c. in the Bulgarian journal Bulgarskie Knizhitsi. The Unia was

217 Ibid., p.9, 1 November 1856
defined as an innocuous recognition of the authority of the Pope without the adoption of Catholic dogma. Filippov judged the piece as highly harmful because it inspired “D.” in Russkii Vestnik to make parallels with the contemporary situation in Bulgaria and “in general there was no good reason to resurrect in national memory this affair, almost completely unknown before.” “And this Palauzov is the Russian censor,” lamented Filippov.218

The editor of Bulgarskie Knizhitsi, Mutiev, was going to publish Old Church Slavonic texts without the permission of the Patriarch. Only the extreme Bulgarian pro-French nationalist Alexander Exarch dared do that before. Not that there was anything wrong with Slavonic texts but “now even if willing to make concessions, the Patriarch cannot renounce this right just like our Holy Synod cannot do that either.” Bulgarian-born Russian consul in Philippopolis Naiden Gerov further welcomed the new privilege granted the Bulgarians in that city – to appeal to the Ottoman court bypassing the Patriarchate. All these novelties weakened the authority and violated the prerogatives of the Patriarch bestowed on him by Mehmet II, the Conqueror of Byzantium.219

The withering away of the power of the Patriarch in Filippov’s mind would lead to the swelling of the ranks of the Unia – the movement towards recognizing the Pope as the head of the Orthodox Church. The Balkan Slavs unlike the Russians in similar circumstances were particularly prone to “seduction.” Thus, in the letter to Tolstoy he approved of the plans of another moderate Bulgarian nationalist Rachinskii to translate into Bulgarian the book by the Russian priest Flerov on the historical role of Orthodox fraternities to resist the Unia in Polish-held parts of “South-Western Rus’” or Ukraine

218 Ibid., p.54, 4 August 1858
219 Ibid., p. 54ob
after 1596. This organization would not be desirable since “the mood in Bulgaria today and that of South-Western Russia at the time of the Unia are entirely different. One needs to keep the Bulgarians in Orthodoxy whereas the Russians in the XVI and XVII centuries in thousands went to martyrdom for Orthodoxy.”

Filippov suspected that the main motivation of the moderates like Rachinskii in this project was not resisting Catholic propaganda but furthering the Bulgarian national cause without radically breaking with the Patriarchate. Historically, the Orthodox fraternities were established under the supreme supervision of the Patriarch but actually controlling local bishops. This distrust of the moderates notwithstanding, Filippov actively cooperated with the moderate Bulgarians to strengthen the authority of the Patriarch. Thus, he granted Rachinskii’s request and sent his article from Moskovskie Vedomosti for translation and publication in Bulgarskie Knizhitsi.

This response to two anti-Greek articles by “D.” in Russkii Vestnik and the one by Daskalov in the formerly Filippov’s Russkaia Beseda was couched in the spirit of Pan-Orthodox unity in contrast to “D.” The latter was reproached for neglecting “the common cause of all Orthodoxy” in his excessive vituperation and “irritation.” The Russians should take that interest to heart and be completely impartial to “our national affinity (plemennoie rodstvo) with the Bulgarian people or special natural advantages and significance of the Greeks in the history of the Church.” But ultimately the message of Filippov (and of the Holy Synod) was not reassuring to the Bulgarians. Filippov took issue with the accusation that the Patriarchate was appointing Greek bishops because of

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220 Ibid., p.55
221 Ibid., also p.70 Moscow, 4 April 1859
its nationalistic agenda with the ultimate view to Hellenizing the Slavs. Filippov recognized that most bishops were Greek not only in Slavic areas but also in Syria. This leadership role was justified by “unusual gifts of the Greek nation (narod) and their superior intelligence vis-à-vis other nations (plemena) of the East, the advantages of its spiritual training, unshakeable firmness in the profession of faith, unchangeable allegiance to the traditions of the Apostles and Church fathers in all matters of church teaching and administration, great or small, from the Divine dogma to simple ritual.”

In Filippov’s line of argument, the cause of Orthodoxy in the East depended on the continued leadership of the Greeks. Orthodox Christianity was created, preserved, and propagated almost exclusively by the Greeks. The Slavs themselves, such as Bulgarians and Russians, adopted the true faith from the Greeks. Contrary to most Pan-Slavs, Filippov considered Cyril and Methodius Greeks and not Slavs. Unlike other Christian Orthodox nations (plemena), the Greeks preserved their education “in the four centuries of the Turkish yoke.” This unique resilience had enabled the Greeks “to continue to repulse the cunning encroachments of Rome to obtain possession of the East under the pretext of achieving unity of the Church.” This superiority notwithstanding, the Patriarchate had ten Bulgarian bishops both in Greek and Bulgarian lands. Among Bulgarian dioceses, Filippov counted traditionally Serbian areas such as Rashko-Prizrena and Bosnasaray.

The stalwarts of true Orthodoxy were juxtaposed with the nationalist Bulgarian troublemakers putting forward illegitimate demands, dangerous for the common Orthodox cause. While vilifying the Greeks, “D.” did not mention the radical Bulgarian

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222 “Otvet G-nu D.”, Moskovskie Vedomosti, 5 August 1858 (93):865
223 Ibid., pp.865-66
party arguing for the establishment of the totally independent Bulgarian Patriarchate. Filippov questioned the legitimacy of the medieval Bulgarian Patriarchate per se and took an issue with the resort to historical rights. If followed generally and consistently, the latter approach would overturn the order of things and lead to chaos. Filippov thought inappropriate to have two independent churches within one political unit. He explicitly equated the Ottoman and the Russian empires – neither of them should tolerate such a situation fraught with instability.  

Filippov criticized as unfounded “D.”’s charges of the Patriarchate’s promoting Hellenization. Filippov brought evidence that Bulgarian language was used in many schools and Slavic liturgy was unhindered everywhere and even alternated with the Greek one in the Patriarchate’s Academy on the island of Khalki. Making clear his official credentials, Filippov quoted a passage from the official report of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople to prove that the ban on Russian-printed Old Church Slavonic books was not to blame on the Patriarchate but on the self-serving intrigues of the pro-French radical Bulgarian nationalist Alexander Exarch.

The charge of Greeks’ putting an excessive financial burden on the Slavs was shifted on the Ottoman authorities. Replacing a Greek bishop with a Slav would not relieve the situation since most of the revenues was siphoned by book and crook from Christian communities into the coffers of Turkish officials. Filippov quoted from “a foreign scholar” to prove that “D.” and other enthusiasts of the Ottoman reforms were wrong to support the case for setting wages for the clergy. This novelty would only lead

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224 “Otvet G-nu D.”, Moskovskie Vedomosti, 7 August 1858 (94): 874
225 Ibid., p.875
to the increase in direct taxes levied by the Ottoman government but would most likely result in the decrease in the amount and quality of Christian community services.\footnote{226 “Otvet G-nu D.”, Moskovskie Vedomosti, 9 August 1858 (95): 885}

Filippov seemed to believe in national primordialism – in his accounts Greeks, Bulgarians, and Russians were historical agents already in the Middle Ages. What is interesting and less common, he specifically attacked the myth of “ancient hatreds.” The article argued that the enmity between the Slavs and the Greeks was of very recent origin and ran along generational lines. “The fathers” were impervious to “irritating insinuations” and “newly invented hatred.” When their educated “sons” brought Bishop Chrysanthos to the Turkish court, “the whole population of the diocese of Philippopolis” testified to his virtues and their respect and love to him.” In response to “the slander” of the Metropolitan of Sophia by the Tsaregradskii Vestnik, “the citizens of Sophia, Bulgarians as well as Greeks sent a letter of protest to the slanderer.”\footnote{227 Ibid., p.886} The letter published in full in the ancillary issue featured signatures of local notables such as merchants and guild masters.\footnote{228 “Otvet G-nu D.”, Moskovskie Vedomosti, 14 August 1858 (97): 904}

By refuting anti-Greek/anti-Orthodox allegations, Filippov moved to establish the main culprit in the attacks against the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In this search for the real enemy, it is clear that Filippov and his supporters clearly revealed the prevalence of “the premodern” world outlook. On their cognitive map, the enemies were defined in religious rather than national terms. Thus, in a characteristic passage Filippov made clear that “Bulgarian youth is directed by some dark force.” The specter of “Roman propaganda”
was hovering throughout Filippov’s piece, especially, in his opening thesis statement in no 93.

After systematically debunking “D.”’s argument, Filippov devoted the rest of no 95 and the whole of no 96 and no 97 to demonizing the Pope. “D.” himself unwittingly gave direct evidence in his article in *Russkii Vestnik* “that the adherents of the Bulgarian movement are not averse to the Roman propaganda.” Alexander Exarch, the editor of *Tsaregradskii Vestnik*, did not necessarily profess the Latin creed “or any other for that matter” but was certainly on the pay of the Jesuits. The support of the Bulgarian cause in the French journals in Constantinople also seemed to authenticate the suspicion of their complicity and involvement. To foment dissension in the Orthodox fold, the Catholics went against their traditional hierarchical principles and backed the flock against the prelates.229

Filippov did not attack nationalism per se. Russia welcomed “joyful renaissance of the Bulgarians to the life of the mind inaugurated by our famous Venelin.” But “the cunning West had taken advantage of the inexperienced barely awakened consciousness of the poor nation to fill it with the poison of hatred towards its pastors and brothers.” Here the whole Bulgarian nation and not just the Western-educated youth described above is endowed with all the characteristics of “minors.” The Catholic propaganda seized on “some problems” (*neustroistvo*) between the flock and the clergy rooted “in the general Turkish order of things.” The all-powerful Propaganda made Greeks culpable in the eyes of Bulgarians. The goal was to attract into the Unia the Bulgarian part of the

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229 “Otvet G-nu D.”, *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, 14 August 1858 (95): 886
Orthodox flock and separate it from the Greeks who were “its only fearsome opponents in the East, watchful guards of Orthodoxy, victorious over all kinds of heresy.”

To thwart the spread of Catholicism and its “divide and rule” tactics would be in accordance with the religious obligations of Russians as good Orthodox Christians and in their Great Power interest in the Near East. Russians should concentrate all efforts on reconciling their brothers in Christ with each other without delving into their rights or wrongs or pronouncing judgment about the abuses.

Filippov made the general case in favor of the unity of Russia and Eastern Orthodox Slavs and Greeks against the dominating impulses of the Pope. On one hand, this appeal was highly traditional – national differences are largely overshadowed by the common religious bond. On the other hand, the Greeks are portrayed in a novel light. Following the Pan-Slavs’ lead, Filippov portrayed them as powerful actors but their power is not self-serving but rather transcends nationalistic agenda to shield the Slavs (and the Arabs) unable in themselves to resist “seduction” of the Pope.

Filippov’s openly pro-Greek stance does not seem to follow from his Pan-Slav background. But as was the case with many people of the Slavophile tradition, the religious Other loomed larger than the national one. Filippov’s sincerely religious motivations behind authoring the rebuttal of “D.” are clear from his confession to M.P. Pogodin more than eight years later in early 1867. On one hand, for Filippov “the hateful thing” about his reaction piece was the official backing behind it. The article was accompanied by the letter from the Holy Synod that banned any rebuttal to it. That letter “reminded of the tone of the Third Section (Russian political police)” as Filippov found.

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230 “Otvet G-nu D.”, Moskovskie Vedomosti, 12 August 1858 (96): 894
231 Ibid.
out shortly from the objections by the publishers of Russkii Vestnik and Moskovskie Vedomosti. Katkov and Kruse. Filippov had scruples about having indirectly assisted bureaucracy to curb freedom of expression.232

On the other hand, in 1867 Filippov continued to totally identify with the message of his 1858 article. He still felt the righteous indignation at Daskalov, “Thousand clearly invented examples apart, did the whole tone not smack of the lie and Liberal affectation? Was not the memory of the saint martyr Gregory V offended there?”233 Obviously, there is a contradiction here. Not considering freedom of expression “a Liberal affectation” he mainly saw it in anti-clericalism. He continued to believe in the special role of the Greeks as “the nation endowed by the Lord with divine gifts” and “the force of intellect, experienced and ready to act, in the know of all ins and outs in the East.” Russia could not afford to spurn them “into the service of our direct enemies.” Filippov urged Russian mediation even more than in 1858 since Russia’s mission was “to bring reconciliation between the brothers.”234

In July 1860 Filippov’s bona fide Pan-Orthodox convictions were tested again in another debate with the Pan-Slavs although the reference to Filippov’s article was implicit rather than explicit. In no 122, 132, and 142 of a major St Petersburg lay newspaper Severnaia Pchela Bulgarian-born Russian censor Palauzov took an issue with Filippov’s piece of 1858 generally and specifically with his claim about the canonical illegitimacy of the medieval Bulgarian Patriarchate.

232 RGALI (Russian State Archive for Literature and Art), fond “M.P.Pogodin” 373-1-361, February 15 1867, p.13ob
233 Filippov was incensed at Daskalov’s referring to Gregory V as “the victim partially of phanaticism, partially of the just revenge of the Turks” see “Otvet G-nu D.”, Moskovskie Vedomosti, 14 August 1858 (97):905
234 RGALI, fond 373-1-361, 15 February 1867, p.14ob
Since Palauzov called this assertion “dishonorable”, Filippov decided to respond in an article based on historical evidence about the Bulgarian Patriarchate. In the letter dated July 8 1860, Filippov felt obliged to ask Tolstoy’s permission to do that because the original response to “D.” had been sent to Moskovskie Vedomosti on behalf of the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod. Filippov also asked Tolstoy to use his influence unobtrusively to get the new article published either in the lay periodical Nashe Vremia or the ecclesiastical Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie.  

The thrust of Filippov’s new piece was directed not just against the new encroachment on the historical prerogative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire. The larger issue was the opposition of Filippov, Count Tolstoy and their supporters to the interference of the state into the affairs of the Church generally. Historically, to appease newly Christianized fearsome Bulgarian Tsars, Byzantine emperors overwrote the Patriarchate of Constantinople to recognize the Bulgarian Patriarchate. But this imposed settlement did not make the Bulgarian Patriarchate fully legitimate from the viewpoint of church canons. Filippov was going to conclude his piece saying that “the history of constraints on the freedom of church decisions cannot serve as a model for our actions and should not be a reason to repeat acts of violence towards the Church.” Another reason the Bulgarian Patriarchate could not be reestablished was that Bulgarians lacked independent statehood.

Publishing this article ran into serious obstacles. In 1858, the Holy Synod and the Foreign Ministry agreed not to let anything on the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question published in the Russian press. Thus, Palauzov was forbidden to publish the final

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235 GARF, fond “T. I. Filippov” 1099-1-1265, T. I. Filippov to A. P. Tolstoy, 8 July 1860, p. 73
236 Ibid., 2 August 1860, p.83
installment of his serialized reaction to Filippov’s response to “D.” But Count Tolstoy and the most authoritative Russian hierarch of the time, Metropolitan of Moscow Filaret, were determined to have the projected article by Filippov published one way or another. In this effort, they were joined by Prince Sergei Nikolaevich Urusov (Director of Holy Synod’s department for spiritual education) who suggested sending Filippov’s article to Berlin for publication. The Prince entrusted this task to the Archpriest of the Russian Embassy in Berlin Seredinskii.\footnote{Ibid., 24 August 1860, p.85}

After some revisions recommended by Count Tolstoy and Metropolitan Filaret, Filippov’s article was sent to Seredinskii along with the letter from Prince Urusov. Filippov showed his article to “a lot of people of diverse intellectual background.” and received positive feedback. Some suggested sending it for publication in Greek newspapers. “I hear that the opinion of the many favors us rather than Palauzov – cursewords did not do my opponent any good.”\footnote{Ibid., 7 September 1860, p.89}

This moment marked the high point of confidence of the traditionalist Pan-Orthodox party vis-à-vis their Pan-Slav opponents but also the limits of it. Earlier in 1860 Count Tolstoy attempted to definitively convert the Tsar to his vision and policies. He reacted to the view of Prince Lobanov-Rostovskii, the new Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, that the ecclesiastical side of the Bulgarian Question was merely a mask for the political struggle between “Greek fanatics of the Kingdom and the islands” and “the rising Bulgarian nation (narodnost’).” Although agreeing about the political nature of the conflict, Tolstoy argued against any change in the organizational structure of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in favor of the Bulgarians. He reasoned that granting separate
Slavic hierarchy is irrelevant in the national political issue. Instead he urged the Russians as “the only powerful Christian Orthodox nation” to stay clear of any partisanship in order to bring reconciliation between “our feuding co-religionists.”

Alexander II felt that Russia was doing just that supporting the case for the Slavic hierarchy. The marginal notes of the Tsar reveal a typically Pan-Slav line of argument – the Greeks betrayed the cause of Orthodoxy in their blind pursuit of the nationalist agenda. Russia “was not protecting Bulgarians from the Greeks but rather Orthodoxy from the threat of oppression by the Greek element.” To be sure, the Tsar feared a possible break between the “Greek Church” and the Russian Church. At the same time, like all so-called Russian “Pan-Slavs” he was even more terrified by the prospect of “all Turkish Slavs going Catholic or Uniate.”

The same vacillation between the unswerving adherence to Pan-Orthodoxy and some tilt in favor of the Bulgarians is revealed in the Tsar’s marginal notes on the memorandum probably also submitted by Tolstoy in 1860. Its author clearly set the priorities for the Russian foreign policy in the Ottoman Empire. Albeit “vital and sacred,” the commitment to “alleviation of the plight of the Slavs’ needed to come second to “our foremost and most holy obligation” to support “the Holy Church.” Although the Tsar deemed this view “in its essence absolutely correct” but he felt the Russians could no

240 Notes in ibid.
longer continue “to merely witness the abuses of the Greek clergy without doing anything for the Slavs.”

These two seemingly opposing views in fact reveal the same largely religious outlook and policy goals. The “Pan-Slavs” seem to forget about “the modern” worldview when they panicked at the prospect of “losing” the Bulgarians to the Catholics. Much like for Tolstoy and his circle, “the Orthodox element” took a precedence over the Slavic one in this case. Both saw Russia’s mission consisting in the defense of Orthodoxy. “The Pan-Slavs” sought to replace “the Greeks” in this role whereas the Pan-Orthodox insisted on strengthening the traditional Ottoman Christian leadership. Both groups considered the Slavs as powerless to resist “propaganda” and in need of protection from either “the Greeks” or “the Russians.”

These points of convergence between the two seemingly opposed camps explain why Filippov’s ideas were indeed widespread in the Russian intellectual and ecclesiastical circles. Many private archives contain his memoranda in handwritten copies. For example, Filippov’s rebuttal to Katkov was added to the archive of Optina monastery. Katkov justified his decision to publish the article by D. in his Russkii Vestnik as an attempt to bring the Russian educated society to support the Bulgarian movement for church independence and thus reduce the attraction the Unia held for them.

Filippov’s memo about the Adrianople issue is held in the Optina papers and in the archive of Andrei Muraviev, the famous lay writer on ecclesiastical topics. Filippov referred to one of the numerous local conflicts that formed part of the Bulgarian

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\[241\] AVPRI, fond 161/3, collection 233, part 4, p. 2615

\[242\] Russian State Library, fond 214-1-58, pp. 1-9ob
Question. He reminded of the role of the Greeks as the guardians of Orthodoxy against the encroachments of the West and called for reconciliation among coreligionists in Adrianople. Filippov took issue with the modern way of viewing populations as conflicting national groups. Instead, according to him, the Bulgarian Church Question was not “the struggle of “the Greek element” with the Slavic nation but rather an internecine fratricidal feud.”

By request from Count Tolstoy Filippov asked for and received extensive background information on the canonical law, the history of the medieval Bulgarian Patriarchate, and vicissitudes of the Russo-Greek ecclesiastical relations from the most eminent Professor of the Moscow Spiritual Academy Alexander Gorsky. Filippov shared with him his convictions about the lack of historical legitimation for the projected Bulgarian Patriarchate, the practical difficulty of delineating its boundaries in so many mixed population areas of European Turkey.

Another letter to Gorsky was delivered by Dmitrii Kavelin, Filippov’s colleague and brother of influential Leonid Kavelin, the future head of the Russian mission to Jerusalem (1864-1865) and the priest at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople (1865-1869). In that letter of May 26 1860 Filippov already expressed his admiration for and hope for the reelection of the former Patriarch of Constantinople Gregory VI who would continue to serve as Filippov’s main inspiration in his second term in office (1867-1870). Filippov also confided to Gorsky his unhappiness about the anti-Russian mood in Greece and in the Greek press in connection with the Bulgarian Church Question. Filippov felt

243 Ibid., pp. 10-11ob and also fond 188-11-5, p.48
244 Russian State Library, fond 78 (A. V. Gorsky)-33-14, Filippov to Gorsky, 6 May 1860, pp.15-16
pity about the Russians’ having alienated “out of two our friends in the East [the Slavs and the Greeks] the one we probably need more in our policies.”

That detailed information about the growing anti-Slavic and anti-Russian feeling in Greece was provided by Archimandrite Antonin (Kapustin), the priest of the Russian Embassy in Athens. For all that, Antonin believed the Greeks “are worthy of our compassion rather than animosity and punitive measures on our part.” Much like the Ottoman Government, “all the Greeks” and the Patriarchate of Constantinople perceived the threat to their interests from the rise of national movements in the Ottoman Empire. Antonin predicted that the Bulgarian church would slip from the Patriarchate’s control but “this would not put an end to the hostility between two Christian Orthodox nations (plemena)” for territory in Thrace and Macedonia.

Despite his pessimism about their final reconciliation, Antonin did his best to promote it in practice. He supported the promotion of the pro-Russian Archimandrite Zacharias Mathas to the Bishop of Santorini. He also backed the reprint of the rare Greek edition of the liturgy in honor of “Bulgarian” saints. That project was undertaken by Sophocles Oikonomos, the son of Constantinos Oikonomos, the famous pro-Russian leader of Greek conservatives. He also added the brief appendix about all “Russian” saints along with the preface “likewise written in the spirit of unity, peace, and love, which are supposed to inspire the two co-religionist nations (naroda).”

Antonin’s counterpart in Constantinople, Archimandrite Peter (Troitskii), worked in the same direction with the Greek prelates of the Oecuminal Patriarchate. While

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245 Ibid., 26 May 1860, pp. 17-18
246 Russian State Library, fond 214-60, Antonin to Count Tolstoy, early 1858, pp. 29-29ob
247 Ibid., 5 May 1860, pp. 79-79ob
Antonin was more flexible and merely followed the official line of the Russian Holy Synod, Peter adopted almost wholesale the viewpoint of the Patriarchate. He recounted the Patriarch Joachim II as saying to him in a conversation that “Bulgarians behave with us like Jews. The Jew while striking somebody in the chest always shouts at him “Why are you beating me? How dare you? etc.”

This is the first but not the last time when the anti-Semitic feeling and images entered the debate on the Bulgarian Church Question. Unlike Antonin talking about “the Slavs” vs “the Greeks,” Peter had a more nuanced understanding of how nationalism penetrated the Bulgarian church. According to his memo, Bulgarian merchants, guildmasters, and landholders, the so-called chorbadzhii, both at home and in the diaspora (Odessa, Bucharest) were behind the movement for the Bulgarian church independence. Peter denounced them as actually going against the interests of the Church in pursuit of “their nation’s separation and achievement of civil rights for it.” He saw the possibility of the reconciliation between Bulgarians and Greeks in making Bulgarian hierarchy the sole guardian of the Bulgarian people free of its subservience to the rising Bulgarian bourgeoisie.

Much like Filippov, Archimandrite Peter considered the accusations against the Patriarchate as either exaggerated or slanderous and the Bulgarian national movement the product of Western propaganda. According to him, it was disseminated by French agents during the Crimean War. By replacing “the adroit Greeks” with “gullible Bulgarians” in the Episcopal sees, the West planned to open the gates to the “propaganda.” This change


249 Ibid., p. 284
in the leadership would make it possible to turn Bulgarians into Catholics and thus alienate them from Russia.\textsuperscript{250}

The most influential Russian hierarch, Metropolitan of Moscow Philaret, read the reports of Archimandrite Peter with a grain of salt. He believed the “Greek” hierarchy had a long way to go before it would make good on its pronouncements on the support for the Slavic liturgy, Bulgarian language schools, and appointments of Bulgarians to the Episcopal sees.\textsuperscript{251} Filaret objected in principle to the argument of the Patriarchate that the Church could not recognize national distinctions in its midst. Filaret identified this position with the stance of the Roman Catholic church.\textsuperscript{252} He supported the right of the flock to have the clergy knowing their language to understand the liturgy and the teaching of the Church.\textsuperscript{253}

These concessions notwithstanding, Philaret believed it necessary to preserve the spiritual supremacy and to strengthen the power of the “Greek” hierarchy over the Christian Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire. Its weakening would enable the foreign religious propagandas to make inroads into the Orthodox fold and thus undermine Russian influence in the Near East.\textsuperscript{254} The Ottoman government supposedly had the same pernicious goals in mind when it encouraged the newly convoked Congress of the Christian Orthodox community (\textit{Ethnosynelevsis}) to increase the power of the lay element vis-à-vis the clergy and transfer all taxation from the Christian Orthodox

\textsuperscript{250} Russian State Library, fond 214-1-29, Peter to Count Tolstoy, March 9 1857, pp. 21ob-22, 8 August 1859, p. 23ob
\textsuperscript{251} Metropolitan Filaret about Archimandrite Peter’s letters, 5 March-10 September 1859, Sobranie mnений i otzyvov Filareta, mitropolita Moskovskogo i Kolomenskogo po delam pravoslavnoi tserkvi na Vostoke (St Petersburg: Sinodalnaia tipografia, 1886), pp. 146-156
\textsuperscript{252} Metropolitan Filaret to Over-Procurator A. P. Akhmatov, 27 March 1863, ibid., p.272
\textsuperscript{253} Metropolitan Filaret about the memo on the Bulgarian Church Question, October 1867, ibid., p. 293
\textsuperscript{254} Metropolitan Filaret to A. M. Gorchakov, 28 January 1861, ibid., pp. 190-193
leadership to the Ottoman center. Gregory, Metropolitan of Novgorod and St Petersburg, agreed with Philaret that this measure along with setting the fixed wages for the Orthodox hierarchy would lead to the increase of the taxes levied by the Ottoman government from the Orthodox Christians.255

The Early Connection between the Bulgarian Church Question and the Greco-Slavic World/Cultural Type Theory

The controversy around the Bulgarian Church Question, generally, and Metropolitan Gregory, specifically, served as the link between active political and church life and the otherwise academic attempts at the cultural meeting of Russian and Greek minds. Gregory was supposed to be the chairman of the would-be “Greek-Russian Scholarly Society” organized at the St Petersburg Spiritual Academy. Its declared aim was to acquaint both nations with ecclesiastical and lay literature of each other “to thereby further the rapprochement between the Greeks and the Russians.” The indicated methods were translations and publications from Greek into Russian and vice versa, sponsoring the teaching of Greek in Russian educational institutions, keeping track of noteworthy cultural events in Greek and Russian press, book reviews, lectures by guest speakers, correspondence between the members in Athens, Constantinople, and Russia.256

These activities were supposed to remind the Russians of the pivotal historic role of the Greeks as the guardians of Orthodoxy. The society aimed at restoring the close ties between the two parts of the Orthodox world weakened by the pernicious Western influence. The main contributors were expected to be Russian Philhellenes and the

255 Russian State Library, fond 214-1-28, Metropolitan Gregory to Count Tolstoy, 23 April 1858, p. 58
256 Russian State Library, fond 214-1-30, pp. 40-40ob
members of the Greek community in Russia. The whole undertaking was declared private but the cue came from the Russian Ambassador to Greece Ozerov. The proposal for the establishment of the Society was drafted by Gavriil Destunis. He solicited the support of the Tsar, Count Tolstoy, Metropolitan Philaret, and General Alexander Golovin, the secretary of the liberal-minded Grand Duke Constantine, the patron of the Russian Navy.\textsuperscript{257}

The other activists for the establishment of the Greek and Russian Scholarly Society included Demis, Rudzevich, Metaksas, and the two Gerakovs.\textsuperscript{258} Another influential member of the Greek community named Bernardaki presented the project to the Metropolitans Philaret, Gregory, and other officials.\textsuperscript{259} After seeing it, the Tsar Alexander II referred the matter to the Foreign Minister who in turn forwarded it to the Council of Ministers where “it was put to rest.”\textsuperscript{260}

Another abortive project aimed at strengthening Russia’s ties to the “Orthodox East” was the would-be establishment of “the Spiritual School of Fine Arts in Athens.” When consulted about the matter, Archimandrite Antonin pointed to two main difficulties, namely, too high a cost of the keep of the students (600 silver rubles per each) and the lack of the qualified faculty. To address the latter, Antonin proposed two members of his Church staff. Although on the model of the famous French Archeological School, the Russian School was supposed to stress not classics but what we might call

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., pp. 45-60
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., pp. 62-64ob
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., p. 32
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., p. 28
today Byzantine studies. The curriculum was to include church architecture, icon painting, church music and singing.\textsuperscript{261}

Interestingly enough, these two attempts to systematize and institutionalize Greek and Russian cultural relations were part of the agenda set by the representative of the seemingly opposing Pan-Slav camp. In early 1858, Vladimir Lamanskii published “A Few Words on Russian Relations with the Greeks” in \textit{Russkaia Beseda} (the same journal would publish the article by Daskalov directed against the “Greek” Patriarchate of Constantinople later in 1858). Just finishing his Master’s Degree in St Petersburg, Lamanskii was becoming a leading Slavic scholar and one of the main ideologues of political Pan-Slavism. In his doctoral dissertation published in 1871 he argued that “the Greco-Slavic world was a cultural unit which should be studied as a separate and independent historical entity.”\textsuperscript{262}

Many of these ideas were adumbrated in his 1858 article. Seen in the context of the Bulgarian Question, it further complicates the one-sided view of Lamanskii and his like as “Pan-Slav.” Also, Lamanskii’s article was published in the journal formerly edited by Filippov who never broke his ties with the Pan-Slav circles. In 1860s and 1870s, Filippov and Lamanskii collaborated closely in the St Petersburg Slavic Society.\textsuperscript{263}

Lamanskii called for the systematic study of the relations between the Greeks and the Russians and their mutual influence on each other. For this he believed it necessary to resume the teaching of classical Greek, to establish the chairs of Modern Greek and Greek history (since 4\textsuperscript{th} c. A.D. all through the Ottoman period) at the departments of

\textsuperscript{261} Russian State Library, fond 214-1-60, p. 28
\textsuperscript{262} Michael Boro Petrovich, \textit{The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism}, op.cit., pp.63-64
\textsuperscript{263} RGALI (Russian State Archive for Literature and Art), fond “M.P.Pogodin” 373-1-361, 28 August 1872, p.13ob
History and Philology of Russian universities, and “to start intellectual and literary communication with the Greeks.” Translations and publications about Greeks in Russia and vice versa were seen necessary for the advancement of national consciousness in both countries.\footnote{264 Lamanskii, Vladimir, “Neskolko slov ob otnosheniakh russkih k grekam” in \textit{Russkaia Beseda}, 1858, vol. IV(12): 133-136}

The relative neglect of Greek themes was another sign of the isolation of Russian literature from the Russian people and their strong sympathy to Greek Orthodox coreligionists.\footnote{265 Ibid., p. 127} The Russian educated public should be ashamed of “its ignorance of its co-religionist brethren who are so attached to us and who have rendered enormous services to us, having enlightened Rus’ with Christianity, having given her and all Slavdom the great teachers, St Apostles Cyril and Methodius” and many others later.\footnote{266 Ibid., p.137} Sustained cultural contacts between the Greeks and the Russians would increase their national self-confidence by liberating them from the dependence on Western Europe. Whereas the prejudiced Westerners did not see the language of “barbarians and semi-savages” worthy of an effort, Russian was expected to become popular among Greeks.\footnote{267 Ibid., p.128} Although not alien to the “Romanic and Germanic” Europe, the Greeks and the Slavs were drawn closer together by their shared religion.\footnote{268 Ibid., p.135} The study of Byzantine history and literature would contribute to the advancement of Slavic studies and a better understanding of Western culture.\footnote{269 Ibid., p.134}

In the same issue of \textit{Russkaia Beseda}, the Bulgarian Church Question provided an opportunity for another prominent “Pan-Slav,” Vasilii Cherkasskii, to link
these still academic ideas of Greco-Slavic unity to public policy. Like the contemporary prominent Pan-Slav diplomat Nikolai Ignatiev, the future wartime governor of Russian-occupied Bulgaria called for an aggressive foreign policy in the Ottoman Empire disentangled from any alliances.  

Russia needed to act quickly to win the hearts and minds of her co-religionists away from the West. Russia’s “legitimate task is to liberate the Greco-Slavic world in the East and at the same time to bring mediation and reconciliation between two nations (narodnosti) based on the principles that are rational, fair, and just for both sides.” For this, the Russians had to consciously rely both on the principle of nationality and religion or “racial and religious affinity” and to brush aside any petty selfish concern or any traditional authority standing on the way to that “supreme rational law.”

Similarly, when in Constantinople in the summer of 1864, Vladimir Lamanskii was alarmed by the pitch of conflict and wrote to convince Ivan Aksakov that mainstream Russian “Pan-Slavs” “got carried away.” They identified too closely with the anti-Patriarchate campaign of Bulgarian nationalists, “The Greeks really do have some rights…One must protect the Bulgarians against the Greeks where necessary but we, the Russians, should view the Greeks with our own eyes.” This rationale suggests that Orthodoxy was understood as a cultural element that made Russia different from the West rather than a body of doctrine and authority.

The policy advocated by Prince Cherkasskii was very different from the preservation of the complete authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate advocated by Count Tolstoy, Filippov, and Metropolitans Gregory and Philaret. At the same time, it

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271 Ibid., p.91
272 Quoted in Nikitin, S.A., “Natsionalnoie dvizhenie,” 219
also differed from the wholesale support of all Bulgarian aspirations at the expense of the
Patriarchate as in the case of Michael Katkov. Some “Pan-Slavs” like Lamanskii and
Cherkasskii blazed the trail for the middle way that would appeal to an even greater
number of “Pan-Slavs” after 1872.

The Pan-Orthodox Response to the Common Fear of the Unia in Bulgaria

The mood of confidence of the Pan-Orthodox party evaporated after September
1860. The most recent ban on the publications on the Bulgarian Question was again
forgotten. A new outpouring of Pan-Slav articles urged the Russian educated society and
the government to have the Patriarchate grant the Bulgarians “their own” church. That
rhetoric again shared the same old Leitmotif – the threat (spread by Bulgarians) or the
fear (among Russian Pan-Slavs) of the Bulgarians going Catholic. In late 1860 there was
a rapidly growing Bulgarian movement into the Unia. The Russian foreign policy
remained Pan-Orthodox but the Russian educated society was outspoken in favor of the
Bulgarian demands. But this unexpected intensity testified to the strength not of the
ethnic Slavic component of the Russian identity but rather of its traditional Orthodox
element. The motivation was to preserve the integrity of the Orthodox flock against the
“seduction” by the traditional religious Other.

Thus, Foreign Minister A. M. Gorchakov communicated to Ambassador
Lobanov-Rostovskii the alarm felt by the Tsar at the news about “the disposition among
the masses of Bulgarians to abjure the Orthodox faith and covert to Catholicism.” The
Russian leadership still disapproved of “their exaggerated pretensions expressed in
tumultuous ways.” But in view of the growing Catholic influence, Lobanov-Rostovskii
was given a free hand “within the limits which we neither should nor could overstep” to
convince the Bulgarians of the Russian Tsar’s affection and sympathy of the same kind “that our sovereigns have constantly entertained for our coreligionists under Muslim domination.”

Writing in 1902, Grigorii Trubetskoi called this shift “unconscious replacement of the confessional principle with the national one.” For fear of losing the Greeks and the Bulgarians, Russian diplomats tried to please both sides which caused them to suspect the sincerity of those maneuvers. In his line of argument, Russian diplomats should not have overreacted to the threat of the Unia and should have unwaveringly adhered to the confessional principle. Instead, the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Constantinople should have “shown more firmness as regards certain unfounded claims of Bulgarian ringleaders (vozhaki).”

The above instruction, however, did not mean ignoring the canonical law and working directly through the Ottoman government to establish the Bulgarian national church. To prevent the Bulgarian “defection” to Catholicism, Russian Ambassador urged Patriarch Joachim II to grant concessions such as guarantees of Slavic hierarchy, liturgy, and schooling. But the latter insisted on the prior submission of the rebellious Bulgarian bishop Hilarion.

In desperation, Lobanov put the blame first on the Patriarchate, then on the Bulgarians, and both of the sides. At one point, he concluded that the Bulgarians could not long balance between “the seductions of one clergy which is well disciplined, with

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273 A. M. Gorchakov to A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii, 19 November 1860, Rusia i bulgarskato natsionalno-osvoboditelno dvizhenie, 1856-1876, p. 484
275 A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A. M. Gorchakov, 29 November 1860, ibid., p. 494
integrity, generous in providing charities and promising all sorts of material assistance
and all the benefits of civilization – and the obstinate immobility of a clergy which is
ignorant, greedy, blind in their contemptible selfish calculations to the eternal interests of
the Orthodox Church and its noble mission among Eastern Christians.”

Far from demonizing the Patriarch alone, Lobanov also criticized the uncooperative stance of
Hilarion with his ambition to become the Bulgarian national Patriarch. He was
suspected of acquiring that title from the Pope. Although not openly supporting the drive
to Rome, he was seen as amassing more popular support for his claim to national
leadership. In that context, even Patriarch’s concessions would not bring the Bulgarians
to the Orthodox fold. Similarly, the Russian Church leadership praised “the
magnanimous and wise tolerance” shown by Patriarchs Cyril VII and Joachim II (since
October 1860) who refrained from excommunicating the openly insubordinate Bulgarian
clergy and laymen. However, in those six months the Patriarchs were not reconciliatory
enough but neither were Bulgarians willing to turn to their “legitimate pastor.”

With the Russian reconciliation effort failing on the unwillingness of both sides,
Lobanov lost any hope of stemming the Bulgarian movement for the union with the
Roman Catholic Church. He perceived it, however, not as a well-calculated loss of
influence and clientele to a Western rival. Lobanov worked closely with the French
Ambassador and was confident that the latter had no part in the Catholic proselytizing
among Bulgarians. The earlier pro-Catholic movement on Crete petered out for lack of
anticipated political and financial support from France but “the Bulgarian movement, on

276 A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A. M. Gorchakov, 21 December 1860, ibid., p.514
277 A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A. M. Gorchakov, 20 December 1860, ibid., pp. 507-508
278 A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A. M. Gorchakov, 28 December 1860, ibid., p. 523
279 Metropolitan Filaret to Alexander Tolstoy, 27 December 1860, Sobranie mnenii, p. 171
the contrary, is purely religious and the conflict (differend) develops without any relation to the attitude of the French Embassy.”

In keeping with his “correct line of behavior charted from the very beginning of the dispute,” Ambassador de Lavalette informed Lobanov of having refused financial aid requested by the Catholic clergy to attract more converts. Rather than being a political defeat in the Great power game, the perceived mass conversion of the Bulgarians was seen as a blow to Orthodoxy which testifies to significant “premodern” elements in the consciousness of the Russian elites.

Lobanov’s successor, throughout 1860s, Ambassador Nikolai Ignatiev (1864-1877) continued to promote direct negotiations between the Patriarchate and the Bulgarian movement opposing the intervention of the Ottoman government. Like Lobanov, Ignatiev identified Bishop Hilarion and Stoian Chomakov as the leaders of the extreme Bulgarian nationalist wing (ultra-bolgarizm). They were opposed to any reconciliation with the Patriarchate and argued in favor of establishing the Bulgarian church by the Sultan’s decree because they served the Ottoman “divide and rule” policy and sought self-aggrandizement.

Thus, Ignatiev supported the election of Patriarch Gregory VI (1867-1871) and despite the opposition of the Ottoman government promoted his project of establishing of an autonomous and territorially circumscribed Bulgarian Exarchate. Ignatiev did his utmost to ensure the acceptance of the long-awaited solution to the Bulgarian Question and was incensed by the new territorial demands made by Bulgarians. Although clearly a

280 A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A. M. Gorchakov, 20 December 1860, Rusia i bulgarskato natsionalno-osvoboditelno dvizhenie, 1856-1876, pp. 508-509
281 A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A. M. Gorchakov, 28 December 1860, ibid., p. 528
282 N. P. Ignatiev to Deputy Foreign Minister Petr Stremoukhov, 26 January 1865, Kiril, Patriarkh Bulgarski, Graf N. P. Ignatiev i bulgarskiat tserkoven vupros. Issledvane i dokumenti (Sofia: Sinodalno izdatelstvo, 1958), pp. 208-209
283 N. P. Ignatiev to P. N. Stremoukhov, 28 February 1867, 2 May 1860, ibid., pp. 239, 241
“Pan-Slav,” Ignatiev opposed their threat “to elect the bishops without the participation of the Patriarch” as “leading to a dangerous schism in the Great Church [of Constantinople].”\(^{284}\) For the same reasons, in his talks with the Ottoman officials, Ignatiev lashed out against their project establishing the seat of the future Bulgarian church in Constantinople. This solution would perpetuate the division, competition for scarce resources, and “would naturally push them [Bulgarians] to seek material support for the functioning of the national church in the union with Rome.”\(^{285}\) In a similarly “premodern” view, Ignatiev perceived the threat of Catholic and Protestant proselytizing in traditional messianic terms of danger to Orthodoxy rather than as a loss of Russian influence to individual Western powers.\(^{286}\)

Whereas Pan-Orthodox ideology and practice predominated in the Russian foreign policy in the Bulgarian Question, the Russian educated society leaned in the Pan-Slav direction and supportive of the Bulgarian demands justifying this preference with reference to the fear of their going Catholic. If in September 1860 Filippov and the other Pan-Orthodox felt on the winning side, by December 1860 they perceived themselves completely isolated from the mainstream of the Russian educated society. Now Filippov believed publishing his article about the illegitimacy of the Bulgarian Patriarchate was untimely. Filippov feared “everybody would understand the article as unconditionally directed against any change in the relations of the Bulgarian Church to the Ecumenical Patriarch (underlined in the original).” He was afraid that the Russian public’s reaction in case of a very likely success of the Unia in Bulgaria, “the whole blame will be attributed

\(^{284}\) N. P. Ignatiev to P. N. Stremoukhov, 19 September 1867, ibid., p. 247
\(^{285}\) N. P. Ignatiev to P. N. Stremoukhov, 11 June 1868, ibid., p. 259
\(^{286}\) N. P. Ignatiev to A. M. Gorchakov, 4 June 1868, ibid., p. 258
to the article – why bear such a heavy burden?” The feeling of crisis was sparked by a diplomatic report informing that “Bulgaria goes Latin (*latinstvo*) unless given their own Patriarch.” Although some Bulgarian leaders were willing to settle for a Metropolitan, it was widely shared in Russia that one way or another separation was inevitable. “This is absolutely correct. We are facing the dilemma: either a separate church administration or Latindom,” wrote Filippov.\(^\text{287}\)

In this atmosphere of panic the Pan-Orthodox party recognized the need for administrative separation of the Bulgarian church. The very lengthy 70-page meticulously documented and supported article about the illegitimacy of the Bulgarian Patriarchate would forever remain untimely and never see the light of publication.\(^\text{288}\) However, the Russian Church leadership continued to consider the demand for a Patriarchate excessive. In line with Metropolitan Filaret’s recommendation, Russian Ambassador sought to limit Bulgarian demands to an autonomous archbishopric under spiritual supremacy of the Patriarchate.\(^\text{289}\) This position of the recognition of the principle of separation was miles away from the Pan-Orthodox view Filippov so eloquently argued from 1858 on –that the Greeks should continue to protect the Slavs from “the seduction” of the Unia after remedying some abuses of their leadership. Henceforth, the Pan-Orthodox would advocate a properly negotiated divorce between the two parties. Unlike most of the Russian educated society, Filippov and other Pan-Orthodox would become more or less immune to the fear of the Unia after this universal shock of late 1860.

\(^{287}\) GARF, fond “T. I. Filippov” 1099-1-1265, T. I. Filippov to A. P. Tolstoy, undated draft letter to Tolstoy, pp.92-93
\(^{288}\) GARF, 1099-1-109
\(^{289}\) Metropolitan Filaret to Alexander Tolstoy, 8-10 December 1860, *Sobranie mnenii*, p. 162
The debate on the virtues of the ‘Greek’ leadership of the Ottoman Christian community flared up again in mid-1860s. In *Russkii Vestnik* in October 1864, diplomat Vasilii Nekliudov made even clearer than Filippov the connection between supporting the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This dual thesis would find its consistent expression in the writings of Konstantin Leontiev after 1874.

Nekliudov approved of the Russian official stance against the nationalization of the landholdings of Eastern Christian communities in Rumania. Without powerful Greek hierarchs, the Slavs and the Arabs would succumb to the “seduction” of Catholic and Protestant missions. To resist Western political and religious influence in the Near East, Russia needed to strengthen the Greek leadership of the Christian Orthodox Church. He argued this policy rather than Pan-Slavism would be consonant with the traditional Russian policy of protecting all Orthodox Christians regardless of national affiliation. This policy would also be more appropriate to the task of supporting egalitarian reforms, building peaceful relations, and even an alliance with the Ottoman Empire in the post-Crimean War context.290

This provocative piece led to the debate with Mikhail Volkov and “D. A-ii” in *Den.* Volkov argued conversely that Russia’s true base of support was not in the self-serving Greek hierarchy but in the masses of Slavic brethren. Increasing the wealth of the prelates would not strengthen religious devotion of their neglected flock. The Slavs would abandon Orthodoxy unless given a national church.291 Since the Greek hierarchy appropriated most of the revenue from the land property in Rumania, nationalization of it

would not hurt Ottoman Orthodox Christians and would benefit Rumanian Orthodox. There could also be no long-term accommodation, not to say an alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Russia could not tolerate persecution of Christians which no egalitarian would stop as long as the Ottoman Empire remained an Islamic state.  

In his speech at the solemn occasion of the general assembly of the University of Odessa, Professor of Byzantine studies V.M. Grigorovich lectured about the relations between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Bulgarians in the early tenth century. Drawing direct parallels to the vexed Bulgarian Question of 1860s, Grigorovich denounced power hungry and overly aggressive expansionist Bulgarian and Byzantine leaders who fueled internecine wars between their coreligionist peoples. Furthermore, the Bulgarians generally driven by the “slavish imitation of all things Byzantine.” The Bulgarian church “was little revered by its flock” and “without a word [of protest] submitted to the arbitrariness of mighty sovereigns” bent on becoming Emperors in Constantinople or creating a Bulgarian version of Byzantium at home.  

By contrast, the Patriarchate of Constantinople was allegedly not overrun by political influences. Rather, “worthy of its ecumenical vocation and containing the passionate irascibility of rivalry, [the Patriarchate] nurtured the need for inner transformation among nations which would lead to reconciliation.” With this as a model for the Bulgarian Question of 1860s, Grigorovich urged “to not overstep the boundaries and refrain from claims contrary to Christian reconciliatory spirit.” Similar to other “Pan-

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293 Grigorovich, V.I., Kak vyrazhalis otnoshenia konstantinopolskoi tserkvi k okrestnym severnym narodam i preimushestvenno k bolgaram v nachale X stoletia, Godichny torzhestvenny akt v Imperatorskom Novorossiiskom Universitete, 30 Aug 1866 (Odessa, 1866), p. 42
294 Ibid., p.27
Orthodox party” members, Grigorovich saw “the noise of nationalism (*shum o narodnostiakh*)” as not an organic movement but merely an outside influence of “the false prophet.” The ideas of reciprocity Slavs with other nations and the Church were totally different from exclusive nationalism, “Who could not help noticing the march {of the false prophet} from his forerunners bringing the splintering of the whole, the weakness of authority, movement, fervor?”

**The Bulgarian Question in Russian Ecclesiastical Periodicals in 1860s**

Traditionally conservative, ecclesiastical periodicals tended to take longer than the rest of the Russian educated society to change and to bring more subtlety into the traditional portraying of all Orthodox Christians as powerless to resist the proselytizing “seductions.” This process is well demonstrated in *Strannik*. It portrayed the unified image of the Catholic Other against the likewise undifferentiated Orthodox Christians of the East. The Roman propaganda “spares no material effort to provide for outward prosperity of all Orthodox Christians seduced into Catholicism.” The resulting spread of Catholic propaganda threatened “to considerably reduce the number of the Orthodox all over the East” failing immediate and effective counterefforts. The situation is most dangerous on the Greek-populated island of Crete. To illustrate this menace, *Strannik* provided an excerpt from a major secular newspaper in St Petersburg *Severnaia Pchela* describing the ongoing and impending conversion of many Cretans hoping to find relief from Islamic persecution.

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295 Ibid., p., 45
296 *Strannik*, April 1860 (1): 135-6
Amidst this adversity in the Orthodox East the only hope was the recent appointment of the Russian consul to Crete “who will be able as far as possible to counteract the efforts of the Roman Catholic propaganda against Orthodoxy.” Citing extensively from another secular newspaper, Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, Strannik showed that Russian intervention was likewise needed to resist insidious Jesuit propaganda among the Serbs and Czechs. Overall, the article in Strannik betrays the signs of the traditional siege mentality and the feeling of fighting a losing battle in the perennial struggle between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. “Such is the character and mode of action of the Roman propaganda, same in the present and in the past! It employs all the means to spread the power of the Roman high priest and almost invariably more or less achieves its goal not only among the oppressed Orthodox Christians of the East but also, to the disgrace of Orthodox Russia, among some of our compatriots who are resident abroad.”

The Strannik piece shows how little the 1858 articles by Daskalov affected traditional religious irredentism in both secular and ecclesiastical periodicals by 1860. The Bulgarian Uniate movement which grew over 1860 and 1861 was instrumental in drastically changing the tone of the Russian press against the Greeks. However, most ecclesiastical publications eschewed from demonizing the Greeks or the Patriarchate. Instead, they often took a dim view of the Bulgarian nationalists and rather advocated reconciliation on the terms that would uphold the authority of the Patriarch.

The same Strannik is the case in point. The periodical was ill at ease facing the new necessity to take a more differentiated approach to the co-religionists in the East.

297 Ibid., p. 137-141
298 Ibid., p. 141
This conservative stance explains the generally disapproving attitude towards “the Bulgarian religious movement which makes a sad impression on us.” The first Slavs to adopt Orthodoxy, “the Bulgarians kept it in purity and integrity in the course of the millennium despite their political insignificance.” The Strannik expressed the views of many prelates who refused to be pressured by the fear of the Unia in the lay circles into supporting the establishment of the independent Bulgarian church, “Now periodicals and newspapers are circulating sad news about the Bulgarian religious movement. We hear from here and there that Bulgaria has adopted the Unia and the Bulgarians became Catholics.”

Strannik went on to explain that conversion of only a handful of Bulgarians to the Unia was the result of the Bulgarian national movement. The Russian church did not necessarily have to condemn it as such but could not approve of its implications for the Orthodox Church, “Recognized as a separate nation (narod) by the last Porte’s edict (hatti-humayun), Bulgarians wanted to have their national spiritual representatives as well and were up to (zateiali) political separation from the Patriarchate of Constantinople.” The demands for Slavic bishops for Slavic areas, the Slavic liturgy, and Bulgarian instruction in schools were “clear evidence of the need of the nation, aware of its forces and searching for ways of channeling them.” The tone of the article suggested that there was no need for political nationalism for Bulgarians to be good Orthodox. This anti-national attitude justified the Patriarch who “did not deem it timely to satisfy Bulgarian aspirations towards nationality (natsionalnost’).”

299 Strannik, 6 June 1861, vol. 2 (6): 152
300 Ibid.
“Irritated” (not a good Christian virtue), the Bulgarians took the novel politicization of religion further and began demanding “complete separation from the Patriarchate and their own independent national hierarchy.” The discussion of the issue at the *ethnosynelevsis* or the Council of Orthodox Christian community did not bring reconciliation. In response to Bulgarian demands, the Grand Vizir advised the Bulgarians to submit to the Patriarchate. Here a handful of them showed total lack of deference to established secular and religious authorities. “Incited by the Catholics,” they began to advocate joining the Unia among many other Bulgarians.  

The author of the article described the real threat of “losing” Bulgarians to the Pope who promised them a separate Uniate Patriarchate. Only faced with this prospect did he explicitly welcome “the strengthening of the movement for the national Bulgarian church.” Strannik saw it only as the means to combat the unexpected and serious danger of the spread of the Unia. So it approved of the new Sultan’s decree as “the remarkable document.” The latter did not impose any restrictions on the authority of the Patriarch merely advising him to provide a seminary to train Bulgarian clerics, to teach Bulgarian language and literature in Bulgarian schools, to appoint Slav-speaking bishops to vacant seats in Slavic dioceses and look favorably at the local requests for specific candidates provided they had necessary prerequisites, etc.  

This obvious and unexpected division of Orthodox Christianity had to be rationalized and possibly solved. In anticipation of Danilevskii’s Greco-Slavic type, Strannik wrote, “United with the Greeks by the bond of common faith and with the Bulgarians by the double bond of faith and blood, let us wish both of them peace, love,  

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301 Ibid., p.153  
302 Ibid., p. 155
and concord.” To sum up, the article aimed at dispelling the fears of the Bulgarians going Catholic, prevalent in the Russian educated society around 1860. In the concluding paragraphs, the article essentially defeated its purpose and acquired an alarmist tone hoping against odds that conversions to the Unia would stop. However, at no time did Strannik vilify the Greeks or question the leadership and legitimacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople in the manner of the Pan-Slav press. Like Filippov and Count Alexander Tolstoy, Strannik showed “the combined development” of both “modern” ethnic and “premodern” religious elements.

In 1865, Strannik similarly responded to the growing fear of the Slavs’ perceived readiness to switch to the Unia. It affirmed the inextricable connection between Slavic identity and Orthodoxy. The resolute upholding of both accounted for the intense interest the Russians were taking in the Ottoman Slavs whose commitment to Orthodoxy was under threat. Catholicism was absolutely alien and ruinous to “national institutions” representing as it did the product of the decay of the Roman civilization and feudalism. The same with Protestantism which was the highest stage of feudalism and Catholicism. Only Orthodoxy kept “national institutions” intact by supposedly eschewing politics and society. At the time when many still pagan Slavs succumbed to the assimilationist and destructive German/Catholic drive, “humble monks from the East, Cyril and Methodius, brought the guarantee of life” to the rest of them. This immunization ensured the survival and development of “independent and original national principles” of Slavdom now

303 Ibid., pp.156-157
“alien (chuzhdyi) to any foreign admixture.” Protected by the Orthodox Church, they were preserved even under the age-old Muslim yoke unto the brighter future.\(^{304}\)

Again, Strannik did not buy into the Pan-Slav rhetoric wholesale. It did not blame the perceived flight of the Bulgarians into Catholicism on the “Greek” Patriarchate of Constantinople. Instead, Strannik sketched the contours of Danilevskii’s Greco-Slavic cultural type by envisioning the unity of the Slavs and the Greeks symbolized by the “humble monks from the East.” Nor would other major ecclesiastical journals attempt to undermine the authority of the Patriarchate at the crucial years of the great Uniate scare of 1860 and 1861.

Khristianskoie Chtenie went as far as to choose to question the integrity and the motifs of the leader of the Bulgarian church movement, Metropolitan Illarion. The demand for Bulgarian bishops was not quite legitimate because for quite some time there were already such bishops ordained by the Patriarch of Constantinople. The magazine suggested that the whole Bulgarian church question was fueled by Bulgarian bishops aspiring to even greater power. These unhealthy ambitions were exemplified by Illarion, the Metropolitan of Macariopolis. The moment he was appointed to his diocese “began to systematically incite people to liberate themselves and their church from the control of the Patriarch and the Council.” For this he gained the support of “the patriotic party of the Bulgarian people” with the ultimate goal of “becoming himself the Patriarch of all Bulgaria.” No wonder the magazine upheld the decision of the local Council of Eastern Orthodox churches to defrock Illarion and other Bulgarian clerics found in violation of

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\(^{304}\) “Obozrenie tserkovnykh del u slavian turetskikh”, Strannik, 1865 (5): 76-80

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Orthodox canons. However, despite countering nationalist challenges to traditional church authority the article ended up supporting the firman urging the Patriarchate to promote Bulgarian language, bishops, etc. Much like Strannik, it was horrified at the prospect of “losing” Bulgarians to Catholics such as Lazarist Bore who “having a perfect command of Bulgarian, he managed to seduce 4,000 gullible ones.”

Even the more pro-Slav church periodicals did not question the authority of the Patriarch. Tserkovnaia Letopis described the issue as the clash between “two nationalities –Greek and Slav (mostly Bulgarians). . which threatens to lead to their separation not in the spirit of faith but in matters of church administration.” Tserkovnaia Letopis understood Bulgarian demands for decentralization of the Patriarchate administration to be also the expression of the needs of a nation conscious of its forces and searching for ways to apply them. Although using the exact same wording as Strannik, the magazine did not have qualms about implicating the Church in political nationalism.

As part of the Orthodox tradition, centralization led to many abuses in the context of the Islamic state. Having to humiliate themselves before the infidel, church hierarchs increasingly lost prestige and respect of the flock. To bribe Ottoman officials into confirming their appointments, the prelates became mired in the dealings with the “usurers” or “the mysterious Phanariotes.” The latter would usually take advantage of the formers’ right to tax the flock and lower clergy who would inevitably see the prelates as corrupt. Church centralization made the division between them to appear as going along ethnic lines. The imperative of efficiency and control led to preferential appointment of

305 Khristiansloie Chtenie, 1861 (11): 347-9
306 Ibid., pp. 355-7
307 Tserkovnaia Letopis “Dukhovnoi Besedy,” 7 January 1861, p.9
308 Ibid., p.15
Greek bishops to Slavic areas in order to make local hierarchs dependent on the
Patriarchate and “to have them as the loyal agents bent on precise implementation of its
orders.” Some Greek prelates neglected the welfare and education of the population they
did not feel any attachment to often promoting Greek instead of learning Slavic.\footnote{Ibid., pp.12-13}

The growing discontent in Slavic areas picked up steam in 1830s and led to the
demands for decentralization and Slavic bishops elected by the local people. “True to old
traditions,” the Patriarchate did not make concessions which unleashed “fervent energy”
of the Bulgarians. They began “complaining to the Turkish government and
demonstrating against the Greek church authorities.” This radicalization led to the
demands of the Bulgarian Patriarch and complete administrative separation from the
Greeks.\footnote{Ibid., pp.15-16}

Although generally sympathetic to the Slavs, the article did not portray the
Patriarchate as part of the Greek nationalist project. Some hierarchs who promoted
Hellenization did not represent the Patriarchate with its own conservative institutional
interests. To urge both sides to compromise, \textit{Tserkovnaia Letopis} repeated the exact same
appeal \textit{Strannik} did, “United with the Greeks by the bond of common faith and with the
Bulgarians by the double bond of faith and blood, let us wish both of them peace, love,
a familial metaphor, “The old man, rich in experience, and the passionate young man
with his ebullient energy can live in harmony under one roof, in the same family, each of

\textit{Strannik}
them can help each other in a complementary relationship.” The typically Slavophile view of the Slavs as the young race of the future in this case implied that the Bulgarians needed the Greeks for direction and guidance. These ideas voiced in the church press put the emerging ideas of the Greco-Slavic Cultural Type theory even firmer in the context of the Bulgarian Church Question.

The upholding of traditional church authority along with mutual concessions was seen as the guarantee of the preservation of the Orthodox Christian community in its hostile environment. In general, the ecclesiastical magazines began to increasingly differentiate between different national groups within the Ottoman Christian community conforming more and more to prevalent essentialist nationalist views. They adopted from the Pan-Slav press an implicit or explicit assumption that without assistance from outside the Slavs were powerless to resist “seduction” of proselytizing propagandas. By contrast, the Greeks were perceived as impervious to them. Likewise, more often than not church press implicitly viewed the Ecumenical Patriarchate as “Greek.” Here the similarity ended. The Pan-Slavs advocated direct Russian intervention and establishment of independent national churches to undermine the appeal of conversion from Orthodoxy. To achieve the same goal, the ecclesiastical periodicals welcomed mutual compromise and limited concessions to national aspirations but generally stressed the need for continued support of traditional authority.

In the press as among Russian policymakers, an important factor that also worked to this effect was the generally felt obligation to present the united front and uphold the image of the Orthodox world vis-à-vis its Western rivals. Even ardent Pan-Slavs who

312 Ibid., p.10
often would vilify the Greeks in general and the “Greek” hierarchy specifically tended to counter similar criticisms of the “Greek church” made in the West. This peculiar tendency combined with the obsession with the proselytizing “seduction” to testify to the continued prevalence of the religious worldview even among the most nationallyistically “advanced” Russians. An example of this trend is in V.Pevnitskii’s “The Western View of the Bulgarian Question” published by the major ecclesiastical journal Trudy Kievskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii.

In the midst of the same Uniate scare of 1861, this organ of the Kiev Spiritual Academy engaged in the debate with Lenorman’s article in the French Catholic periodical L’Ami de la Religion (# 266, April 1861). The latter argued that the Bulgarian church movement was the product of Russian Pan-Slavism and pointed to the Unia as the only way for Bulgarians to achieve independence both from the Greeks and the Russians. According to V.Pevnitskii, “ancient hatreds” between the “cunning” Greeks and the “gullible” Bulgarians went too far back in time to be engineered by the Russians.313

Besides, pro-Bulgarian voices were heard only in the Russian press and informal conversations, “People with influence do not share these Slavic sympathies, at least they do not want to sacrifice their sense of legality for them; there focus on the support for the Patriarch and even in Russia a more or less passionate voice against the Greeks had as its consequence restrictions and official disclaimer.” Russia’s best interest was in preserving the unity of friendly Christian Orthodox nations.314
The Bulgarian dream of “a truly national popular elected church” had to face too many odds. The most imperative need was to stem the growing movement from the Patriarchate to the Unia, so alien to the Slavic spirit. To preserve their national identity, the Slavs needed the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Astonishingly, Pan-Slav Pevnitskii writes, “The Patriarch of Constantinople adheres to Orthodoxy and ensure the purity of faith among his flock not out of mundane calculations alone. He is installed as the guardian of Orthodoxy and is being advised now [by L’Ami de la Religion] to convince his flock to betray the faith which he himself will continue to profess.”

Earlier in 1861, the same Trudy Kievskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii (TKDA) featured another “Russian Voice in defense of the Greek Church.” The author, signed as “I. I. M-skii,” joined a certain Russian named Sushkov who made a case for the “Greek Church” in the letter published in the French newspaper Le Nord (reprinted in the Russian newspaper Syn Otechestva 1861 #16). It was in response to the “hatred of strict Papists to the Greek Church and its Patriarchs” generally and specifically to the speech in the French Legislature by the Ultra-Montane Deputy Graniet-de-Cassagnan. The latter “painted a most grim picture of Eastern Patriarchs and the Eastern Church” to warn against stripping the Pope of his secular power.

TKDA agreed with Sushkov that the Greek Patriarchs were Christian martyrs under the Muslim yoke since the seventh century who could not prevail over “wild despotism of powerful barbaric conquerors” and “fanaticism of the Ottoman Empire.”

According to TKDA, Sushkov’s letter was part of the local Russian tradition of noble

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315 Ibid., pp.285-8
316 Ibid., p.295
apologetical writings “in defense of the Greek Church and its hierarchs” defamed and despised by the “Papists” at the time when local lands were part of the Catholic Poland. The constant motif of those defamations was that the Patriarchs did not enjoy respect and even neglected their flock.”

In the same 1861 the Russian Orthodox-turned-Jesuit the former Prince Gagarin made the very same accusations in his article “Russian Institutions in Holy Land” in the French Catholic journal L’Ami de la Religion. Tserkovnaia Letopis took the side of the “Greek” Patriarchate of Jerusalem. In a situation very similar to that in Bulgaria, Gagarin pointed to the Arab Orthodox Christian flock neglected by the alien Greek hierarchy as the fertile ground for Catholic propaganda. Tserkovnaia Letopis took the issue with Gagarin saying that all parish priests were Arabs and performed the liturgy and all Orthodox rites in the language common people could understand.

Furthermore, to better educate the parish clergy Patriarch Cyril set up two schools and the Greek-Arabic printing press. There may be abuses on the part of those in charge of the day-to-day running of those projects who may be “infected with national partiality.” But for that one can not blame Patriarch Cyril who “has the natural gift of keen intelligence and great experience which makes him far superior to some Greek prelates.” Tserkovnaia Letopis also rebutted the point about the excessive wealth in the hands of the Greek hierarchy. Relying solely on Russia for financial support might lead to persecutions and reprisals in times of crisis. Russia should provide aid to the local Orthodox Christians but indirectly via the Patriarchate itself. To fund its educational projects and charities, the Patriarchate needed its own sources of income. Most of it was

318 Ibid., pp. 73-75
coming from the landholdings in Moldavia and Valachia and was increasingly drying up. The weakening of the Patriarchate would only work to the benefit of the French-backed Catholic proselytizing missions.319

**Conclusion to Chapter Two**

All three Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question sought to reconcile “premodern” religion and “modern” political ethnonationalism. In this effort, those visions showed the “combined development” of both ethnographic and religious population categories. Far from being conservative or backward-looking, all of them were variations on the theme of “the invention of tradition.”

Similarly, Filippov’s background and deep involvement in Slavophile and Pan-Slav philosophy, ideology, and organizations usefully complicate the one-sided characterizations of him as an isolated Grecophile in contemporary Russian and Bulgarian literature.320 For most of his Russian contemporaries Filippov remained a literary figure with significant contributions to Russian literary criticism and folklore. He would remain active in the St Petersburg Slavic Society until his death in 1899.

One would wonder what had brought Filippov, his supporters, and most ecclesiastical periodicals together. On the surface was the preference for traditional Russian foreign policy orientation towards the Patriarchate of Constantinople. But Tolstoy, Filaret, and Urusov perceived the Russian Embassy in Constantinople as too conciliatory to “exaggerated” demands of the Bulgarian movement. They went out of

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Their way to circumvent the Foreign Ministry to get Filippov’s article published covertly using their power as the leaders of the Holy Synod of the Russian Church. The main motivation seemed to lie in the desire to assert the authority of the Church independent of the state.

They clearly protested against domination of the Russian state over the Russian church when they argued against the right of the Bulgarians to have the Turkish sultan restore the Bulgarian Patriarchate without consent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. It is noteworthy that one of the main critics of this synodal system installed by Peter the Great was the embodiment of this system the secular official presiding over the Holy Synod, Ober-Procurator Count Tolstoy. He and Metropolitan Filaret would remain the main inspiration for the Russian supporters of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. For all of them the Greek Bulgarian Church Question would always be linked with the need to strengthen the position of the Russian Church vis-à-vis the intrusive Russian state.

The proponents of the Greco-Slavic world view Cherkasskii and Lamanskii clearly did not share that view. They advocated the direct connections and reconciliation of Greek and Slavic national centers bypassing the “antiquated” authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. What all three responses to the Bulgarian Church Question had in common was the Orientalist production of knowledge about the Ottoman Christians both for the Russian society and the Balkan peoples. Pan-Slavs, Pan-Orthodox, and the “Greco-Slavs” articulated ideas about the place of Greeks and Slavs in the past, present, and future. To implement their diverging visions, all three camps attempted to influence the leadership of the Russian Church, Foreign Ministry and the Russian educated society. As shown in chapters three and four, this connection between political
power and production of knowledge would continue after 1870 with more crystallized conceptualization of Pan-Orthodoxy and the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory.
Chapter Three

The Independence of the Bulgarian Church and its Consequences

(1870-1878)

Introduction

This duel between the more numerous Slavophiles or Pan-Slavs and the less numerous Grecophiles or Pan-Orthodox continued over the 1860s and early 1870s. Both sides claimed to represent the “true” interests of Orthodoxy and Slavdom. In both cases the cognitive map of the world was centered on Russia. The Pan-Orthodox propounded a pre-modern messianic vision of Russia leading the Orthodox world of Slavs and non-Slavs alike and supporting the Patriarchate of Constantinople with which Russia was seen as inextricably linked both spiritually and politically. Their Pan-Slav opponents sought to exclude the Greeks perceived as selling out to the West in the blind pursuit of Slav-hatred and overly ambitious nationalistic agendas. Thus, in the Pan-Slav vision Russia needed to supplant or bypass or punish the Ecumenical Patriarchate as infiltrated by extreme Greek nationalists and subservient to them. Russia needed to lead Orthodox Slavs without the “corrupt” Patriarchate and promote Orthodoxy among Catholic Slavs.

Similarly, in the Greek world (the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire) there was a division between the ethnocentric “Pan-Hellenists” and the “Pan-Orthodox.” The former claimed for Greece all Orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire. On the surface, “pan-Hellenists” seemed to follow a “pre-modern” religious messianism. On the deeper level, their vision was not religious but “racial” – they proclaimed all Ottoman Orthodox Christians to be “really” of ethnic Greek descent. They explained the
uncomfortable fact of their lack of knowledge of Greek as a superficial assimilation by Slavic, Rumanian, Turkish, and Arabic invaders of the Byzantine Empire. The Pan-Orthodox party of the Greek world in close collaboration with their traditionalist counterparts in Russia sought to contain outside or submerge under an overarching Orthodox Christian identity national peculiarities.

Although there were moderate Pan-Slav voices like that of Andrei Muraviev’s already in 1870-1872 the gap between these polar extremes was somewhat closed by a synthesis of the two only at the time of the Eastern crisis of 1875 to 1878. The sense of the impending dissolution of the Ottoman Empire brought an attempt to achieve reconciliation of the parties of the Greco-Bulgarian Church Question in Russia. In the Greek world, there was a much lower level of sophistication in an attempt to formulate a synthesis of “modern” ethnocentric and “pre-modern” Pan-Orthodox visions. There were moderate Greek nationalists similar to the Russian Andrei Muraviev who attempted to avoid a clash of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Hellenism. But at no time did the Greek lay or ecclesiastical intellectuals effectively develop their own versions of synthetic ethnoreligious civilizational models or did they engage with the Russian models of that kind.

The renewed mediation of the Greek-Bulgarian conflict by parts of the Russian educated society led to the revision of both the traditional “pre-modern” nation-blind Pan-Orthodox vision and the too ethnocentric Pan-Slavism. The compromise between the two was the application to the Bulgarian Question of the otherwise academic theory of the Greco-Slavic Cultural Type or Civilization. The creative tension between “pre-modern” religion and “modern” nationalism illustrate Dipesh Chakrabarty’s notion of the
The combination of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, the theory of Greco-Slavic Cultural Type and the attempts to solve the Bulgarian Question led to some of the first conscious, very articulate, and practical attempts in modern times to decenter the mainstream Western European modernity and divest it of its universalistic progressivist mission. The three alternative modernites existed in opposition to and parallel to the “Western civilization.” All three responses to the Bulgarian Church Question would continue to operate in line with the Orientalist production of knowledge. They sought to redefine the place of Ottoman Christians in the past, present, and future both for Russia and Balkan peoples themselves. In the same vein, the proponents of those visions would be able to influence the leaders of the Russian Church, diplomats, and the educated societies in Orthodox lands.

In the midst of insurrections and wars of 1875-1878 against the Ottoman government, the Russian major official ecclesiastical journals such as Khristianskoe Chtenie and Tserkovnyi Vestnik as well as the majority of secular publications often appreciated the “soft line” on the Bulgarian Question in some Greek Diaspora newspapers such as Kleio, Vyzantis, and Anatolikos Astir. All of them featured the same unflattering image of Greece proper. Against this background, “oppressed” Orthodox Christians under the “Turkish yoke” often fared better than “free Greeks” in those publications. Although edited by the Pan-Slav Professor of the St Petersburg Ecclesiastical Academy I.E.Troitsky, in the crucial years of the Eastern crisis of 1875-78 Tserkovnyi Vestnik rather vigorously advocated Greek and Slavic Orthodox unity generally and the solution of the Bulgarian Question specifically. Unlike earlier Pan-Slav

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press, such as Den’, Troitsky’s organ did not lump all the Greeks together as implacable enemies of Slavdom but distinguished between “moderates” and “extremists.” These reconciliatory gestures in Tserkovnyi Vestnik were appreciated by Kleio of Trieste. This attitude was also characteristic of the analysis of the Bulgarian Question by A.A.Dmitrievsky and I. Golubinsky and many contemporary Russian diplomats including N.Ignatiev and V.Teplov (to be developed in the following chapters).

Troitsky’s project did not call for a return to a “premodern” past supposedly rid of conflicting national aspirations. Neither did it advocate submerging all national differences in the supreme allegiance to the Orthodox faith. His advocacy of the Greco-Slavic unity was a modern project connecting to public and foreign policy the “scientific” theory of cultural types by Nicholas Danilevsky, Vladimir Lamanskii’s Greco-Slavic cultural type theory, and, last but not least, the contemporary ideas of Konstantin Leontiev.

The promotion of the Greco-Slavic type or civilization stemming from Orthodoxy was a conscious attempt to reconcile traditional religious consciousness and new acute national awareness. N.Danilevsky’s Rossiia i Evropa was indeed a sort of Bible in its broad influence and variety of interpretations. Some chose to emphasize its Pan-Slavic elements, some focused on its vision of the perennial struggle of Byzantine Greeks later allied with Orthodox Slavs against the West generally and the Pope specifically, while some attempted to reconcile the two versions.

All Russian Grecophiles or Pan-Orthodox highly appreciated the work of N.Danilevsky as well. K.Leontiev and T.Filippov published about the Bulgarian Question in early 1860s and early 1870s. In the spirit of the “invention of tradition,” they
formulated very similar ideas of Greco-Slavic unity drawing on Danilevsky’s coherent
vision, civilizational methodology, and “modern” “scientific” vocabulary. But the Pan-
Orthodox privileged the role of the Greeks more than the proponents of the Greco-Slavic
cultural type did. All of them either used to be Pan-Slav sympathizers like K.Leontiev or
remained so like T.Filippov, and N.Durnovo who were lifetime members of the St
Petersburg and Moscow Slavic Committees respectively as well as of various Slavic
societies abroad. This continued affiliation of the Pan-Orthodox with “Pan-Slavism”
facilitated the influence of their ideas on the mainstream Russian educated society.

Both Pan-Slavs and Pan-Orthodox claimed popular legitimacy in their different
visions of Russian identity and the views on the Bulgarian Question. The former
emphasized the allegedly growing Slavic and hence national consciousness of the
common Russian people. The latter did not engage in such wishful thinking and rightfully
stressed the essentially religious consciousness of Russia’s popular masses clear from the
donors and volunteers to the Moscow Slavic Committee during the Eastern crisis of
1875-1878.

The Clash of the Extremes: “Pan-Slavism,” “Pan-Orthodoxy,” and the
“Resolution” of the Bulgarian Question (1870-1872)

Over the 1860s, the intervention of the Ottoman government into the Bulgarian
Question steadily increased to culminated in the firman of February of 1870. It
established the Bulgarian Exarchate hierarchically to the Ecumenical Patriarchate but
with its seat in Constantinople and no limits to its potential territorial expansion. Article
X allowed for the extension of the Exarchate if at least two thirds of Orthodox Christian
population of a given area desired to join it. In spite of the clear ethnic appeal of the
Bulgarian Exarchate, the firman for its establishment was consistent with the theocratic structure of the Ottoman Empire. For Ottoman purposes, the Bulgarian Exarchate was a religious community that could potentially include any Orthodox Christians regardless of linguistic or ethnic background.\textsuperscript{322}

Many Bulgarian nationalist publications believed the firman to be the resolution to the Bulgarian Question. Since the Archbishopric of Ohrida was allegedly abolished solely by the Sultan’s decree in late 1700s, it could be reinstated in the form of the Exarchate by another decree of the Sultan without the consent of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Unlike the Russian Pan-Slav authors, Bulgarian writers in the Russian press hardly considered the consent of the Patriarch even a necessary formality.\textsuperscript{323}

A typical example of the attitude of moderate Russian Pan-Slavs was in the 1871 book by the eminent authority in church history E. Golubinskii. He explained the Bulgarian church movement as a legitimate reaction to the suppression of Bulgarian nationality by the “Greek Phanariotes” of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Golubinskii treated national liturgy and hierarchy as the necessary trappings of nationhood.\textsuperscript{324} He justified the ethnic based church by interpreting “Neither Jew, nor Greek” as sanctioning equality among Christian nations. However, unlike extreme Bulgarian nationalists, Golubinskii believed that the autonomous church status conceded by Patriarch Gregory VI before the firman of 1870 had secured the basis from which the Bulgarian nation could develop. Golubinskii insisted that in the interests of Pan-Orthodox unity the

\textsuperscript{322} Konortas, Paraskevas, Othomanikes theoriseis gia to Oikoumeniko Patriarheio, 17os-arhes 20ou aiona (Athens: Alexandreia, 1998), p. 307
\textsuperscript{323} Constantine Zhinzifov, “Greko-bolgarskii tserkovnyi vopros,” Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie, 1870 (7): 212-223
\textsuperscript{324} E.Golubinskii, Kratkii ocherk istorii pravoslavnykh tserkvei bolgarskoi, serbskoi, i rumynskoi ili moldovyalashskoi (Moscow, 1871), pp. 176-181
Bulgarians needed to agree to the compromise solution offered by the Patriarch although it limited their territorial aspirations. Even after the issue of the firman, the recognition of the Bulgarian Exarchate by the Patriarch was necessary.\textsuperscript{325}

The Greek newspapers were very sensitive to the reactions to the decree establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate. Anatolikos Astir, newspaper affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople at the time, protested the appraisal of the Bulgarian Question as basically solved even in official Russian newspapers. It referred to the pronouncements of the “elderly Metropolitan of Derkon” and to other Greek newspapers such as Neologos and Kleio implicitly suggesting that all segments of the educated Greek society in the Ottoman Empire and beyond were unanimous in their protest – be they either of pro-Russian, or moderate or extreme Greek nationalist leanings.\textsuperscript{326}

The generally moderate Kleio went a step further and opened its pages to articles decrying Russian involvement in the Bulgarian Question. It published translations of German newspaper articles treating the Bulgarian church movement as the spearhead of Russian-sponsored expansionist Pan-Slavism.\textsuperscript{327} These perceptions were “confirmed” in the translations of anti-Greek Pan-Slav articles from the German and Russian press.\textsuperscript{328} At the same time, Kleio highlighted an article from the organ of the Russian Government ridiculing the very idea of Pan-Slavism and insinuations of its influence on Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{329}

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid., pp. 190-192
\textsuperscript{326} Anatolikos Astir, 16 April 1871 (900)
\textsuperscript{327} Kleio, 27 May 1872 (571); 15 July 1872 (578)
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., 1 April 1872 (563) by Kanitz from Allgemeine Zeitung; ibid., 29 May 1872 from Birzhevie Vedomosti of St Petersburg
\textsuperscript{329} Kleio, 1 January 1872 (550)
However, even more balanced articles in *Kleio* put the blame for the escalation of the Bulgarian Question on the perceived shift in Russian foreign policy from Pan-Orthodoxy to Pan-Slavism after the Crimean War (1853-1856). Even when local roots of the Bulgarian nationalist discontent were acknowledged, the abuses by Greek prelates of the Patriarchate were explained away on the corrupt Ottoman system. Obliged to buy their offices from the Government, the high clergy allegedly had no choice but to increase taxation of their flock to satisfy insatiable Ottoman officials. At the same time, the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not pursue hellenization of its Slavic flock. It followed from those articles that local administrative and financial abuses were not sufficient causes of the Bulgarian Question. Consequently, Russian-sponsored “Pan-Slavism” was the main driving force fanning Bulgarian nationalist passions against the Greeks generally and the Ecumenical Patriarchate specifically. The turn away from “Pan-Orthodoxy” to “Pan-Slavism” supposedly explained the refusal of the Russian Holy Synod to support the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s call for an Ecumenical Council.\(^{330}\)

This protest against real or imagined failings of the Russian foreign policy, Holy Synod, and educated society at large in the Bulgarian Question was also voiced in Russia proper. But in 1870s the Russian Pan-Orthodox response to the pro-Bulgarian majority did not enjoy the strong support from the Russian government and the Church as it did in 1858-1860. Count Tolstoy left the Holy Synod in 1861. The Synod followed the late Moscow Metropolitan Filaret’s line of caution and non-intervention into the Bulgarian Question from 1860s on. However, intellectually, the publications of Pan-Orthodox Filippov, Kurganov, and Leontiev were more mature and consistent than the response of

\(^{330}\) *Kleio*, 20 May 1872 (570); 10 June 1872 (573)
the Pan-Orthodox party in 1858-60. Prompted by the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question, Leontiev built on the writings of Filippov to develop Byzantinism as a separate civilization with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Russian autocracy playing central roles there. As a clear formulation of the Pan-Orthodox view, Leontiev’s Byzantinism led Professor Troitskii to formulate a synthesis of Pan-Orthodox and Pan-Slav ideas in the form of the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory.

Although officially sponsored, Filippov’s rebuttal to “D” or Daskalov in Moskovskie Vedomosti was not developed as his views changed in the wake of the Uniate fear of 1860 and 1861. Filippov did not have a chance to continue his debate with the pro-Bulgarian party – his piece on the history of the Bulgarian Patriarchate remained unpublished. Although he gradually adjusted his views on the legitimacy of the Bulgarian Church and its significance in Russia starting from early 1860s, he was moved to publish them only from 1870.

In the immediate aftermath of the issue of the firman, Filippov published an article in the journal of the Ministry of People’s Enlightenment that revealed the continuity of most of his ideas as well as the adjustments referred to in his letters to Count Tolstoy in the wake of the Uniate grande peur of 1860-1861. Filippov continued to unabashedly assert intellectual and spiritual superiority of the Greeks over the other Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. But at the same time, Filippov accorded more legitimacy for Bulgarian national aspirations. To be sure, in his opinion, the flames of the Bulgarian Question were still fanned by outside forces, “joint efforts of the common enemies of the Orthodox East, Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants.” However, the Bulgarian national movement was rooted in the “renaissance of the Bulgarian nation
started by the scholarly activities of our Venelin, still in living memory.” In contrast to
his 1858 article, the Bulgarian revival could not have been accommodated within the
existing framework of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its ethnically Greek leadership.331

Like the whole of the Russian educated society of all shades, Filippov continued
to be influenced by the Pan-Slav differentiation between powerful Greeks and helpless
and passive Slavs. Although somewhat corrupted by the association with the Ottoman
government, the Greeks should be credited as “skilful and enduring fighters for the sacred
cause of the whole of Orthodox world.” Greeks alone were able to withstand both “crude
violence of the Turks” and “refined perfidy (kovarstvo) of infidel Europe.”332 By contrast,
up to the early 19th century, the Bulgarians “had been immersed into the deepest
darkness,” dead as a nation until they heard Venelin’s “joyful resurrectionary
(voskresnyi) tidings.” As a major concession on Filippov’s part is the recognition of the
rightfulness of the Bulgarian struggle for their language and leaders. The problem was
with the methods they chose to achieve their national goals.333

Another departure from his views of 1858 was his willingness to allot the blame
to both parties. To be sure, the main culprits were the young Bulgarian intelligentsia
educated in the West and Western missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire but also
influenced by “Polish and Hungarian emigrants.” Their lack of appreciation of religion
combined with the divide and rule tactics of the Ottoman government to bring the
Bulgarian Question to the impasse. In addition to these usual suspects, Filippov deplored

331 T. I. Filippov, “Vselenskii Patriarch Grigorii VI i greko-bolgarskaia raspria,” Zhurnal Ministerstva
Narodnogo Prosveshenia, February 1870 (2): 245-7
332 Ibid., p. 248
333 Ibid., p. 254
the intransigence of Patriarch Joachim II whose tenure (1860-1863) “represented the saddest period in the history of the Greek-Bulgarian conflict.”

His more or less balanced treatment of the issue was consistent with his appeal to the Russian educated public and the government to be less biased against the Greeks and to play a mediating role. Slavs and Greeks were both Russia’s Orthodox brothers connected to Russia through the work of Greek SS. Cyril and Methodius. Politically, both nations were equally important to Russian influence in “Eastern affairs” as well. “More educated and experienced in statecraft, the Greeks are the most developed element of the Orthodox East” whereas Bulgarians were not fully mature but superior in numbers and quickly developing. Russia could not afford to alienate either one. With the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire, “the union of all Orthodox nations of Turkey is critical to the success of their common cause.”

As was not apparent in 1858, the Bulgarian Question pushed the Church to the limits of its supranational commitment. Pan-Orthodox Filippov was ready to walk the fine line between territorial and ethnic principles of church organization as envisaged in Gregory VI’s plan of 1867. The latter proposed an autonomous Exarchate based on “all purely Bulgarian dioceses” and a minimal dependence of the Exarch on the Ecumenical Patriarch. Patriarch Gregory VI gave full approval to Filippov’s article dedicated to the Patriarch in the first place. Gregory VI directed a request to Filippov through the President (rektor) of the St Petersburg Spiritual Academy Professor Ianyshiev for copies of Filippov’s article. Filippov eagerly obliged and again confirmed his role as a supporter.

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334 Ibid., pp. 255-257
335 Ibid., p. 251
336 Ibid., p. 245
337 Ibid., p. 290
of Patriarch’s policy of Pan-Orthodox reconciliation “which was rejected to the chagrin of many children of the Russian Church.”

The idea of church independence of the state broached in Filippov’s correspondence with Count Tolstoy in 1860 received a clear elaboration in 1870. In another article of that year in Russkii Vestnik Filippov characterized the issue of the Sultan’s firman as an example of state intervention into an area that should always be beyond the reach not only of non-Christian authorities but of Orthodox rulers as well. The real solution of the Bulgarian Question would be to convoke an Ecumenical Council as urged by Patriarch Gregory VI.

Although inspired by the Patriarch’s appeal, Filippov’s sophisticated defense of it preceded similar attempts in the Greek world. A year later in 1871 in Constantinople Metropolitan of Derkon Neophytos sponsored the publication of a pamphlet making a case for the Ecumenical Council as the only appropriate solution of the Bulgarian Question. It was authored by Georgios Plethonides who signed as M. H. G. The author was affiliated with the Typos newspaper refuted the Bulgarian nationalist argument that there was no need for an Ecumenical Council since not the Orthodox dogma was in question but merely administrative adjustment. Plethonides denounced the Bulgarian case as dictated by “badly-intentioned nationalism” and argued that the decree of the Sultan had not solved the Bulgarian Question. The Sultan interfered with strictly

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338 GARF, f.1099-1-733 T. I. Filippov to Gregory VI, 3 September 1870, p. 1
340 The author’s name given in Stamatopoulos, Dimitris, I Metarrythmisi kai ekkosmikefsi (Athina: Alexandria, 2003), p. 482
ecclesiastical affairs and substituted “race” for clear territorial delimitation as the only legitimate basis for church organization.\textsuperscript{341}

According to Plethonides, the purity of dogma is ensured by the strict upholding of all canons. The Ecumenical Councils themselves (321-847) enacted a body of canons pertaining both to dogma and administrative organization. The state should respect this independent source of authority of the Church. The latter in its turn was supposed to assist the state in upholding public order and morals of the society. These common goals of the state and the Church were jeopardized when the state abused in ecclesiastical matters. Some Byzantine emperors who did that were supposedly influenced by the pagan Roman tradition of emperors as high priests or pontifices maximi. “Good” Byzantine emperors respected the autonomy of the Church, helped enforce its decisions thus abiding by “render unto God what is God’s.” Plethonides attempted to prove that the same applied even more to the Ottoman Empire where the ruler was not Christian. The Ottoman Government needed to allow the Patriarchate to proceed with the convocation of the Ecumenical Council and to help enforce its decisions in regards to the solution of the Bulgarian Question.\textsuperscript{342}

The support for the Ecumenical Patriarchate was directly linked to the idea of restoring the same institution in Russia and thus increasing independence of the Church from the State. In the letter to the now retired Count Tolstoy Filippov decried further encroachment of the State on the prerogatives of the Church in Russia. This issue came to the fore when the judicial powers were taken from the bishops. To remedy the situation,

\textsuperscript{341} M. H. G., I Die\v{e}krinisis tou Voulgarikou zitimatos (Constantinople: K. Plethonides Publications, 1871), p. 27
\textsuperscript{342} Ibid., pp. 13-20
Filippov thought it necessary to restore both the periodical convocation of the local councils of the bishops and the Patriarchate which “had been destroyed at the same time by the ambition of the genius tyrant.” Filippov argued for the abolition of the Holy Synod designed by Peter the Great with the express purpose of “enslaving the Church.”

The Ecumenical Council would bring together not only “Greek” churches but also those of Russia, Serbia, and Rumania who were sympathetic to the Bulgarians. Since the latter objected to it, they felt to be on the wrong side. In pursuit of their personal ambition and emboldened by the self-interested Ottoman Government, Bulgarian nationalist leaders misled “poor Bulgarian people.” The Bulgarian prelates who gathered together in Constantinople to set up the Exarchate were in defiance of basic church discipline and regulations and already in an open schism with the Patriarchate. Following Filippov’s lead, the “Grecophiles” would consistently advocate such a Council to solve the Bulgarian Question and to bring about the reform within the Russian Church.

Filippov further supported the idea of the Ecumenical Council in the serialized article written in the immediate aftermath of the Local Council of Orthodox Churches of the Ottoman Empire of September 1872 that declared the Bulgarian Exarchate’s leaders and followers as schismatic. Filippov took an issue with the editor of Sovremennye Izvestia and argued that Gregory VI was totally justified to call for the Ecumenical Council after the rejection of his conflict resolution project of 1867. The alternative

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343 GARF, f.1099-1-1265. T. I. Filippov to A. P. Tolstoy, 4 January 1872, p. 150
345 Ibid., p. 51
Government projects of 1868 went against the fundamental regulations of the Orthodox Church against parallel ecclesiastical authority in the same diocese.\textsuperscript{346}

To justify the condemnation of the uncanonical Bulgarian Exarchate, Filippov used a rather bold analogy originally suggested in the Greek press.\textsuperscript{347} The Russian Church would have likewise condemned a similar movement for the restoration of the independence of the Georgian Church.\textsuperscript{348} “Grecophiles” would henceforth link the Bulgarian Question to the problem of ethnic diversity within the Russian Church and Empire.

To explain the decision of the 1872 Council of Constantinople against phyletism or “racially” based church organization, “Slavophile”- turned - “Grecophile” Filippov had to be absolutely clear as to where his own loyalties lay. Establishing the pattern for his followers, he defined \textit{ethnophyletism} as the sacrifice of the interests of the Church in favor of those of the nation (\textit{narodnost}) by one of the members of the supranational Orthodox Christianity. Furthermore, Filippov accused the Bulgarians of “shamelessly” accepting their church from the Sultan. This act violated the idea of church independence of the state and went against church law. Filippov confirmed the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions from the canonical point of view. He referred to such Pan-Orthodox figures as I. Tantalidis and Gregory VI present at the 1872 Council to prove that the latter could not be ignored as allegedly composed of Greek nationalists. In what would become the article of faith for the Pan-Orthodox party, Filippov identified the convocation of the


\textsuperscript{347} For example in Anonymous, \textit{Les Slavianophiles en Orient} (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1872?), p.14

bigger truly Ecumenical Council to overwrite the verdict of the 1872 Council and thus remedy the Bulgarian Schism.\textsuperscript{349}

Filippov saw the Ecumenical Council as the cure-all for all Russia’s church problems and key to “bringing us back to the true church life, of which we were deprived for a long time, to restoring to us the salutary principle of council (soviet), to resurrecting in us the otherwise completely frozen sense of our ecumenical union with co-religionist nations (narod).” The awakening of the Church from “its lethargy” is the only hope for “a future of Russia and the Slavic world.” This union of the Russians, Slavs, and the Greeks was envisaged as a world apart along the lines of the Greco-Slavic Cultural type. In Filippov’s mind, the Church was “our only salvation and the only claim to fame before the rest of the humanity. We will have to borrow everything else from others but we could share with more advanced nations the light of the truth preserved by the Church. Even if this does not happen, for ourselves it is the source of life, renewal, and enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{350}

The Greek newspapers appreciated Filippov’s stance in defense of the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, of the Local Council of August-September 1872, and the idea of the Ecumenical Council to lift the Schism and finally solve the Bulgarian Question. The influential \textit{Kleio} of Trieste (Austria) praised \textit{Grazhdanin} of St Petersburg, its editor Professor Gradovskii, and its publisher Prince Mesherskii for having given a platform to Filippov’s views.\textsuperscript{351}

\textsuperscript{350} RGALI, 373-1-361, T.I. Filippov to M. P. Pogodin, 25 August 1870, p.30ob-31ob
\textsuperscript{351} \textit{Kleio} 11 November 1872 (595)
According to Kleio, the other Russian publications were rather blindly supportive of Pan-Slav and Bulgarian interests as they saw them. Even when some of them gave credit to Filippov’s ecclesiastical expertise such as Akademicheskaia Gazeta, they themselves stressed not disinterested financial and political motifs that drove the Patriarchate and broadly the Greek world to the Schism from Slavdom. Kleio took note of a reconciliatory gesture in Akademicheskaia Gazeta which denounced a Slavophile clique but not the whole Greek people. Owing so much to the Greeks historically, Russia could not side exclusively with the Slavs against them.\(^{352}\)

Although Filippov believed he was representing the true interests of Russia and “the Slavic world,” he felt alienated from the rest of the Russian educated society on this issue at the time.\(^{353}\) In fact, many ecclesiastics, intelligentsia, and officials were either able to come to the similar conclusions or were directly influenced by Filippov’s views in favor of the Ecumenical Council and/or continued authority of the Patriarchate. Thus, Filippov’s impact became immediately felt in 1870-1872 and steadily grew ever since.

Although not directly engaged in the Bulgarian Church question, Vladimir Lamanskii continued to develop his earlier ideas of the unity and interdependence of the Greco-Slavic world in his 1871 book Concerning the Historical Study of the Greco-Slavic World in Europe.\(^{354}\) Writing after the proclamation of the Bulgarian Schism of September 1872, Filippov’s Pan-Slav adversaries did not doubt the strength of his influence which tended to subvert the unity of the Pan-Slav camp. The editorial

\(^{352}\) Ibid., 16 December 1872 (600)
\(^{353}\) Ibid., 18 March 1872, p. 38ob-39
\(^{354}\) Vladimir Lamanskii’s book Ob istoricheskom izuchenii Greko-Slavianskogo mira v Evrope (St Petersburg, 1871) is the elaboration of his “Neskolko slov ob otnoshenii russkhk k grekam”, Russkaia Beseda, 1858, vol. IV (12): 103-40
commentary in Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie praised the neutrality of the Russian Church that stayed out of the Greek-nationalist dominated Council of Constantinople of 1872 on the Bulgarian Question. That was a prudent act on the part of the Russian church leaders and it made possible to consider the excommunication of the Bulgarian prelates a non-binding decision. Even those of “our disguised and undisguised, conscious and unconscious Greco-philics who are now reproaching the Russian Church for not participating directly in that affair” would not really like to lend universal validity to the Bulgarian schism.355

“An Orthodox Russian” exposed Filippov as “a literary figure who came out of the Slavophile circle” and was covering up “with the Slavophile banner the Grecophile tendencies opposed to Slavic interests.” Unlike in 1858, Filippov’s impact was more widespread in early 1870s because it went unchecked. The Slavophiles became more willing to compromise their principles. Some of them went so far as to praise “the articles full of Grecophile biases.” Those articles were welcomed in the publications “sympathetic and seemingly affiliated with the Slavophile trend.” To crown it all, one of those articles was solemnly read [by Filippov] on May 11 at the special session of the [St Petersburg] Slavic Committee in commemoration of SS Cyril and Methodius, the Illuminators of the Slavs.356

Although opposing Filippov, the famous Slavicist scholar P.Tesovskii likewise credited him as representing a whole trend in “our literature and our society” – “the ones who openly sympathize with the Greeks revolt against the very idea of the autocephaly of the Bulgarian church and in a prejudiced way prove that all the ecclesiastical well-being

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of Bulgarians is only possible on the condition of the dependence of the Bulgarian church on the Patriarch on Constantinople.”

In a typical act of support for the decision of the Russian Church Tesovskii argued against the calling of the Ecumenical Council at least over the Bulgarian Question. According to most Pan-Slav publicists, the Ecumenical Council might pressure the Bulgarians towards accepting a compromise solution but such outcome would not bring true reconciliation.

Filippov’s influence indeed spread easier because he remained part of “Slavophile circles” both in 1870s and throughout his life. In the fall of 1869, as he was working on his article in support of Patriarch Gregory VI, he delivered an enthusiastic speech at another special session of the St Petersburg Slavic Society to welcome the visiting Metropolitan of Serbia Mikhail. The prelate was educated in Russia, known as a “Pan-Slav,” and well-connected in the intellectual, ecclesiastical, and diplomatic circles. In his speech, Filippov called for renaming the German-sounding “St Petersburg” into a more Slavic sounding “Petrograd.” He also prayed that “God might grant that Russia and those of her faith and blood might one day present a peaceful united front strong enough to resist the violations of Slavonic rights in every quarter.”

Although very much a member of the Pan-Slav society, Filippov perceived himself intellectually isolated on the Bulgarian Question. So he was encouraged when he thought he found another like-minded Russian. The Greek newspaper *Neologos* of Constantinople published in no953 on February 26 1872 a letter from a certain Nikolai Mikhailovich Voskresenskii of Moscow enjoining the rebellious Bulgarian bishops to

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358 Ibid., pp.104-105
359 Fadner, Frank, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karamzin to Danilevskii, 1800-1870* (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 1982), p. 253
submit to the paternal authority of the Patriarch. That is how Filippov learned about him and was asking his long-time friend, benefactor, and the famous scholar and publisher Mikhail Pogodin if he could make more inquiries about Voskresenskii in Moscow.\textsuperscript{360}

Filippov’s correspondence with Pogodin is another example of his continued insider status in the Pan-Slav society. As Filippov was asking Pogodin’s advice on how best to make his case for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Pogodin in tune with the mainstream Pan-Slav society wrote in support of Bulgarian church independence movement. In contrast to Filippov, Pogodin did not accept the Bulgarian Schism passed by the Local Council of September 1872. In denying the legitimacy of the Bulgarian Exarchate, “the Greeks” were motivated by the “unspiritual” pursuit of material gain and Greek national interests. It was the reason why they excommunicated and persecuted Pogonin’s friend the reconciliatory Patriarch of Jerusalem Cyril. Still, to Pogodin not all Greek people or clergy were irredeemable. The source of polarization and conflict was in “a certain party favored by the Turks” that launched a defamation campaign against the allegedly sinister Russian designs in the “East.” After a recent personal visit there, Pogodin became convinced that “all Christian churches in the East and all monasteries on Mount Athos hope solely on Russia.”\textsuperscript{361}

Filippov clearly disagreed with this messianic view and advocated a lower profile for Russia in “the East” and reliance on and support of the continued authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate instead. But this serious difference over the Bulgarian Question and the proper role for Russia did not preclude friendship and communication between Filippov and Pogodin or other “Pan-Slavs.” In fact, in 1875 Pogodin proved open-minded

\textsuperscript{360} RGALI, 373-1-361, T.I. Filippov to M. P. Pogodin, 18 March 1872, p. 38ob-39
\textsuperscript{361} Pogodin, Mikhail, a letter dated 16 May 1873 in “Neizdannyie pisma” (Moscow, 1878), pp. 114-115
enough to approve of and even to sponsor the publication of *Byzantinism and Slavdom* by another Pan-Orthodox Konstantin Leontiev to be discussed below.\(^{362}\)

Voskresenskii’s letter that encouraged and excited Filippov was published as a separate pamphlet later in 1872.\(^{363}\) According to the First Dragoman (Interpreter) of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, the letter is written by an author competent in church law and the Patriarchate welcomed the support of a Russian and a Slav.\(^{364}\) The letter acknowledged the correctness of the decision of the Patriarchate’s Synod. The Bulgarian bishops who officiated on the feast of Annunciation (January 6 1872) without the permission of the Patriarch in effect declared themselves in an open schism with the Patriarchate. Russian Ambassador to Constantinople Ignatiev characterized the letter as “steeped in the ultra-Greek spirit” and asked the Foreign Ministry to find out more about who the author was.\(^{365}\) After an investigation, the Over-Procurator of the Russian Holy Synod informed the Foreign Ministry that no trace of Voskresenskii’s was found and the Metropolitan of Moscow believed it to be an assumed name.\(^{366}\)

In early 1873, taking its lead from the moderate Greek *Vyzantis* newspaper of Constantinople, Russian *Khristianskoie Chtenie* wrote that “Voskresenskii” was a penname used by Archimandrite Grigorios Zigavinos. He allegedly acted with the blessing of extreme Greek nationalist leaders centered on the *Neologos* newspapers. The

\(^{363}\) I Epistoloi tou Nikolai Mikhailovits Voskresenskii pros tous paranomisantes Voulgarous Arkhieris (Constantinople, 1872)
\(^{364}\) AVPRI, f.161/3-233, part 3, 20 March 1872, p. 1724ob
\(^{365}\) Ibid., Ignatiev to Stremoukhov, 29 February 1872, p. 1690
\(^{366}\) Ibid., P. Iu. Tolstoy to V. I. Vestman, 3 November 1872, p. 1959

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Rector of the Moscow Spiritual Academy Father Blagorazumov confirmed that there was no Professor Voskresenskii in his institution.\(^\text{367}\)

Although the leadership of the official Russian Church did not support the idea of the Ecumenical Council, it strongly encouraged direct negotiations between the two parties of the dispute instead. Since these negotiations were not successful, the Russian Church leaders recognized the issue of the firman establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate as justified by the gridlock. At the same time, they did not consider it sufficient for a legitimate Orthodox church and urged the Bulgarian leaders to receive the consent of the Patriarchate. The Russian Holy Synod understood that the Ecumenical Patriarchate needed the Ecumenical Council to oppose the interference of the Ottoman Government into ecclesiastical affairs. However, the Russian Church leadership feared the Council would expose the disagreement between the Slavic and Greek churches over the Bulgarian Question. According to the public statement of the Over-Procurator of the Russian Holy Synod, the Bulgarian Church did not pursue a total break with the Patriarchate and their differences were not important enough to merit the convocation of the Ecumenical Council. Furthermore, the Ottoman Government was unlikely to accept the decisions of the Council if they contradicted the firman it had issued.\(^\text{368}\)

The Russian Church leaders interpreted as their victory the replacement of Gregory V by Anthimos VI at the helm of the Patriarchate in 1871. They saw Anthimos as determined to solve the Bulgarian Question as a local problem without agitating for an

\(^{367}\) Khristianskoie Chtenie, 1873 (5): 163
\(^{368}\) Izvlechenia iz vsepoddaneishego otcheta Ober-Prokurora Sviateishego Sinoda Grafa D.A.Tolstogo po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedania za 1870 god (St Petersburg: Russian Holy Synod Publications, 1871), pp.211-213
Ecumenical Council. The change of leadership made the Russian Holy Synod hopeful for a turn to reconciliation in 1871 and 1872.  

Pan-Orthodox, Pro-Russian, and Pro-Ottoman Factions among Ottoman Greeks in the Bulgarian Question

The stance of the new Patriarch and likeminded hierarchs was supported by the Ottoman Government and a segment of the Greek lay community. The influential Anatolikos Aster and other moderate Greek nationalist newspapers of Constantinople supported the project of Anthimos VI. It also accused Courier d'Orient newspaper, affiliated with the French Embassy and Catholic proselytizing missions in the Ottoman Empire, of inciting the Bulgarians against negotiating with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. At the same time, Aster highlighted cases of continued support of Orthodox churches in the Ottoman Empire by Russian charities.

The spokesman of this moderate segment of the Greek educated society in the Ottoman Empire was Alexander Karatheodoris, an important Ottoman official and an intellectual. He inherited his pro-Russian stance from his father as was the case with the influential Patriarchate’s Spokesman in the Ottoman Government (Megas Logothetes) Stavrakis Aristarkhis. Other prominent lay “moderates” were traditionally pro-British but likewise owed their prominence to important positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy such as the Governor of the island of Samos Ioannis Mousouros, his brother Constantine

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369 Izvlechenia iz vsepoddaneishego otcheta Ober-Prokurora Sviateishego Sinoda Grafa D.A.Tolstogo po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedaniya za 1871 god (St Petersburg: Russian Holy Synod Publications, 1872), pp.181-183
370 Anatolikos Astir, 27 November 1871 (924)
371 Ibid., 30 November 1871 (925)
372 Ibid., 15 December 1871 (938)
Mousouros, and Ioannis Fotiadis, Ottoman ambassadors to London and Athens respectively. However, they often became disenchanted by the failure of Western Powers to act on their declared goals of preserving peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{374} In contrast, they often appreciated the conduct of Russian foreign policy in favor of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and respectful of Greek interests “in the East.”\textsuperscript{375}

Both groups of “the moderates” were united in the support of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire but also in the newly decreed legal equality of Christian and Muslim subjects of the Sultan. They favored the increased representation of “Greek” and other Ottoman Christian elites in the Ottoman Government and in the autonomous Christian majority areas such as the island of Samos. Their vehement opposition to secession of those areas and irredentist policy of the Greek Kingdom became clear in the wake of the Cretan Uprising of 1866-1869.

In the letter to Photiadis, Constantine Mousouros lamented “the prolonged tragic scene” of the destruction of his ancestral Crete. He denounced “chimerical and fantastic dreams” of expansionist Greek nationalism in general and the adventurous policy of “Mad George,” the then Greek Prime-Minister Deligeorgis. Mousouros had no illusions about the Western Powers and contrasted their hypocritical humanitarian declarations with “paternal” forbearance of the Ottoman Government towards the Cretan rebels.\textsuperscript{376} Fotiadis from his post in Athens confirmed that “deranged hotheads” took charge of Greek politics - “everyone went mad and I believe I am literally in a mental asylum.”\textsuperscript{377}

\textsuperscript{374} Gennadeios Library Archive, Constantine Mousouros Collection, file 12, I. Fotiadis to C. Mousouros 14 March 1868, p. 19b
\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., file 11, I. Mousouros to I. Fotiadis 18 May 1866, p. 246a
\textsuperscript{376} Ibid., C. Mousouros to I. Fotiadis 14 August 1866, p. 349a
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid., I. Fotiadis to C. Mousouros 16 November 1866, p. 352a
To prevent such conflicts, Ottoman Christian officials of both Greek and Bulgarian backgrounds took part in many Government-sponsored committees busy hammering out compromise solutions to the Bulgarian Question since 1866. As their active member himself, Alexandros Karatheodoris offered his views at the crucial General Congress (genikes synelevseis) of the lay and clerical representatives of the Ottoman Orthodox community on 30 January 1872. He asserted that Patriarch Gregory VI’s project so ardently supported by Filippov and the governmental firman of the Bulgarian Exarchate were an adjustment of one of the proposals of Greek-Bulgarian mixed lay committees.378

Karatheodoris preferred direct negotiations between the two parties to an Ecumenical Council which was likely to polarize the issue further if the parties involved had not reached a compromise on their own. According to Karatheodoris, under Patriarch Anthimos V the solution to the Bulgarian Question was to be reached within a few days but was derailed by the illegitimate officiating by three rebellious Bulgarian nationalist prelates on the day of Epiphany on January 6 1872. Upset and personally discouraged as Karatheodoris was by this “coup,” he suggested “to forget about the sad coup” and continue to work on the compromise solution in disregard of Greek nationalist agitation by “those who are always vociferous about their feelings about the Church and the Nation.”379

In the letter to his brother Constantine Mousouros, Ottoman Ambassador in London, Ioannis Mousouros, the Governor of Samos, went even further than

378 Karatheodoris, Alexandros, O Logos (Speech made on January 30 1872 at the session of the General Assembly of the Christian Orthodox community) (Constantinople, 1872), p.11
379 Ibid.,pp.12-14
Karatheodoris. He denounced Patriarch Anthimos VI as “prediluvian” and the only one to blame for the heightening of conflict. He should have granted the Bulgarian prelates their request to officiate on January 6 1872. Even after the Epiphany liturgy, Anthimos VI should have forgiven them as a Christian rather than condemned them. Excommunications only pushed towards a schism which no other Orthodox nations would recognize. Ioannis Mousouros hoped on the newly elected Bulgarian Exarch Anthimos I. He also believed the talks between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate could resume based on the firman and the not too different original project by Patriarch Gregory VI.380

Much of the Greek press indeed interpreted the “coup” as the betrayal by Bulgarians of the joint commitment to solve the Bulgarian Question within the bounds of moderation, goodwill, and decency.381 But after initial shock and indignation, the moderate Greek press began to discern signs of moderation in the Bulgarian movement. Now the hopes of reaching a negotiated settlement and clear delimitation of the Bulgarian Exarchate were pinned on Anthimos, ethnically Bulgarian Metropolitan of Vidin, and his supporters. Anthimos stayed in his remote diocese and was not compromised by the actions of rebellious Bulgarian bishops living in Constantinople. He was educated in Russia and supported by the Russian Embassy. All these credentials made Anthimos appear as an acceptable candidate for the position of the Bulgarian Exarch, vacant since the establishment of the Exarchate in February 1870.382

380 Gennadeios Library Archive, Constantine Mousouros Collection, file 12, I. Mousouros to C. Mousouros 22 February 187268, pp. 252b, 252g
381 Anatolikos Astir 8 January 1872 (945), 15 January 1872 (947), 26 January 1872 (950), 29 January 1872 (951), 9 February 1872 (954)
382 Ibid., 19 February 1872 (957)
The alternatives to reconciliation based on careful territorial delimitation of the Bulgarian Exarchate from the Patriarchate would lead to more conflicts. To Karatheodoris, such would be the result both of the schism tantamount to “a declaration of the religious war against people (laos)” and of the introduction of “racial distinction” into the Church. Its unorthodox novelty aside, the latter would be a source for unending trouble as it would lead to two Orthodox churches in one area for ethnic Greeks and ethnic Bulgarians respectively.\textsuperscript{383}

The cautious stand of the Russian church on the Ecumenical Council over the Bulgarian Question was rationalized as a measure likely to exacerbate tensions. The Bulgarians clearly rejected the idea fearing being outnumbered and pressured into accepting some solution less advantageous than the firman of the Sultan. Many contemporaries at the time and today’s scholars likewise believe that given the Bulgarian refusal the insistence of the Patriarchate and its supporters on the Ecumenical Council and seemingly Pan-Orthodox integrity generally in the Ottoman Empire tended to play into the hands of extreme Greek nationalists. They hoped that to subsequently assimilate all non-Greek Orthodox under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{384}

Not coincidentally, the above mentioned publication of Georgios Plethonides in favor of the Ecumenical Council was sponsored by the Metropolitan of Derkon Neophytos. The latter was perceived as the cleric intent on achieving the office of the Patriarch by arousing nationalistic passions in the Greek community of Constantinople. Neologos and Typos newspapers providing a sounding board for those “radical

\textsuperscript{383} Karatheodoris, Alexandros, \textit{O Logos} (Speech made on January 30 1872 at the session of the General Assembly of the Christian Orthodox community) (Constantinople, 1872), p.10
\textsuperscript{384} Konortas, Paraskevas, \textit{Othomanikes theoriseis}, p. 307
nationalistic circles.” They also enjoyed the support of major Greek Ottoman bankers such as Ioannis Psyharis and Georgios Zarifis.\(^ {385}\) The anti-Slavic stance of those lay members of the Orthodox community was not just a product of the Greek nationalist passions. Rather, it was a means to compete for power with the clerical leadership of the Ottoman Orthodox community. Many of its lay members feared further erosion of their influence if they went along with the monopoly decision making by the prelates in “spiritual” matters such as the Bulgarian Question.\(^ {386}\)

Thus, the Ecumenical Council started as the measure advocated by Patriarch Gregory VI as the last legitimate Orthodox solution to the Bulgarian Question in 1871 was used in 1871 and 1872 by the most nationalistic Greek elements to prevent any compromise with the Bulgarian leaders. This intransigent “Pan-Orthodoxy” among Ottoman Greeks began to be sponsored by the Greek Government especially under Prime-Minister Deligeorgis. Despite opposition from the King of Greece Georgios I, Deligeorgis sent Archbishop of Syros Lycourgos on a secret mission to Constantinople to help thwart negotiations and bring about a definitive break with the Bulgarian Exarchate. The parting of ways with Orthodox Slavs was meant as a turn of Greece from the allegedly Pan-Slav Russia to England.\(^ {387}\) These efforts from within and without the Ottoman Greek community led to the Local Council of Ottoman Orthodox churches that declared the Bulgarian church leaders and their communicants schismatic in August and September 1872.\(^ {388}\)

\[^{385}\] AYE, Razis to Foreign Minister, 1872, ?; Stamatopoulos, Dimitrios, Metarrythmisi, pp. 314, 329
\[^{386}\] Ibid., p.327
\[^{388}\] Ibid., p.329
Russian Church’s Efforts towards Reconciliation

The Russian Church leaders condemned the illegitimate officiating on 6 January 1872 by three Bulgarian bishops. But it counseled against Patriarch’s applying excessively strict and “irrevocable” punishment to them. In 1872, it repeated its judgment of 12 March 1871 about the Bulgarian Exarchate. Without the consent of the Patriarch, the Exarchate establishment by the decree of the Islamic authorities had no legitimacy according to the church law. As the prospect for moderation of the parties evaporated, the Synod adopted a hands-off approach. Not just Filippov but Ambassador Ignatiev as well urged a more active intervention of the Russian Church as a mediator of the Greek-Bulgarian dispute. Perceiving the situation as becoming too politicized, the Russian Holy Synod preferred not to interfere with “the conflict of Greek and Bulgarian nationalities (natsionalnosti).” The Synod allowed Ambassador Ignatiev to summon Archimandrite Antonin, head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, to Constantinople but refused to grant him the status of a representative of the Russian Church.

Another unofficial envoy of the Russian Church was a typical example of the attitude of its functionaries to the Bulgarian Question experiencing disillusionment with Pan-Slav approach to church problems. Generally, it was also the pattern of many educated Russian “Slavophile” intelligentsia like Filippov himself. Initially, Confessor of the Duchess of Wuertemberg, nee Romanova, well-connected Archpriest (Protoierei) Bazarov was sympathetic to the Bulgarian demands. As he got to know the situation better, he came to support the Patriarchate. Writing from St Petersburg to the Foreign Ministry, Bazarov suspected that the intransigence of “the Phanariotes” in the insistence

389 AVPRI, f.161/3-233, Tolstoy to Prince Gorchakov, 8 March 1872, p. 1695ob
390 Ibid., An Excerpt from the Proceedings of the Holy Synod, 18 August 1872, p. 1885ob-1886
on the purely canonical basis of the Bulgarian Question was due to their allegiance to expansionist Greek nationalism and the consequent fear of the Slavs. However, Bazarov firmly believed that the Exarchate needed to be recognized by the Patriarch for the good of the Bulgarians themselves. To have this solid foundation of their church, the Bulgarians needed “to make a concession to the just demands of the Patriarch” and to conclude “a friendly agreement” on the number of the dioceses.\footnote{Ibid., Archpriest Bazarov to the Foreign Ministry, 12 March 1872, p. 1697ob-1699}

Shortly after that, Bazarov started his reconciliatory tour of the Christian Near East. On May 16 1872, he wrote to the Foreign Ministry from Athens. He secured the agreement of the Metropolitan of Athens to give a prior notification to the Russian Church of all his actions in the Bulgarian Question, especially, in the business of sending its representative to the Local Council in Constantinople. Bazarov talked to the Greek King George I and they agreed that moderation and reconciliation in the Bulgarian Question would follow if Russia and Greece put pressure on the Bulgarians and the Patriarchate respectively.\footnote{Ibid., 16 May 1872, p. 1793ob}

In Constantinople Bazarov had a meeting with Russian-educated Bulgarian Exarch Anthimos and other Bulgarian Exarchist prelates. They said they were horrified at their excommunication but blamed the escalation of the problem on the intransigence of the Greeks. To justify many instances of illegitimate officiation and ordination they had performed, they alleged the already familiar danger of losing masses of “the people” to the Unia. “In the fit of patriotic enthusiasm” the Bulgarian church leaders “passionately” talked of taking Constantinople from the Greek hands. Bazarov suddenly felt as if “in the
club of revolutionaries determined to use every means to achieve “the national (narodnoi)” goal.”

Furthermore, Bazarov stated to the Bulgarian bishops that the Russian Church could not but admit the Patriarchate to be on the right side in the dispute. The Russian Church would support the independent status of the Bulgarian church only if it were obtained with the consent of the Patriarchate. When more complains against the Greeks ensued, Bazarov bid farewell to “these personalities pathetic in every respect.” By contrast, Bazarov found in the Patriarchate “composure and confidence in their authority (vlasti)” but also the alarming tendency to blame the disturbances and acts of disobedience not just on a few leaders but on the Bulgarian people as a whole. In conclusion to his report, Bazarov urged a more active intervention of the Russian Church both to support the canonical demands of the Patriarch and to show some concern for the Bulgarian Church as well. This well-intended conclusion had been the leitmotif of the Russian foreign and ecclesiastical policy from the beginning of the Bulgarian Question. To make it more practical, Bazarov recommended to introduce the office of an independent ecclesiastic representative of the Russian Church in Constantinople to establish better liaison with the Patriarchate. Alexander II and the Foreign Ministry were opposed to the idea of an independent ecclesiastic policy. In his marginal notes the Tsar wrote, “I have my doubts about that and they are shared by Ignatiev). 393

Thus, the Russian Church leadership chose to not become more actively involved in the “East” and instead to distance itself from the disputes between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate leading to the Schism of September 1872.

393 Ibid., 19 May 1872, pp. 1819ob-1822
They believed the situation had become too tense and polarized for Russian Church active mediation to make any difference. By staying outside the fray, they hoped to be able to preserve Russian Church’s integrity as an impartial mediator by the time the passions would cool down. In general, the report of the Over-Procurator painted a self-righteous picture of the relations between the Russian Church and Orthodox Churches of “the East.” The deadlock in the Bulgarian Question meant “a diminution of the Apostolic spirit among some of our Eastern coreligionists. Throughout the crisis, the Russian Church remained “the protectress of the highest interests of Orthodoxy.” The overall message of the report was to put the blame for the Schism on the influence of extreme Greek nationalism on the Patriarchate. The Russian Church claimed the traditional messianic Pan-Orthodox rather than Pan-Slavic role in “the East.” While assuming a hands-off approach to the Bulgarian Question, the Russian Church leadership in a highly patronizing tone reaffirmed their commitment to providing material assistance to “Eastern” churches and “furthering the spread of Orthodox enlightenment among them” regardless of nationality.

In his account of the build-up to the Schism, the Over-Procurator of the Russian Holy Synod reproached both the uncanonical officiation by three recalcitrant Bulgarian bishops on the feast of Epiphany on January 6 1872 and the Patriarchate Synod who excommunicated them. According to the Over-Procurator, in both actions the Bulgarian and Greek hierarchs were influenced by their respective local lay communities. However, the proclamation of the Schism was a wrong response to the crisis dictated by extreme

394 Izvlechenia iz vsepoddaneishego otcheta Ober-Prokurora Sviatieishego Sinoda Grafa D.A.Tolstogo po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedania za 1872 god (St Petersburg: Russian Holy Synod Publications, 1873), pp.214-215
395 Ibid., p. 222
Greek nationalists. The Russian Holy Synod joined Cyril, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, in opposing the Schism and urging moderation and reconciliation instead. Since this stance of the Russian Church was well-known, its leaders decided to leave unanswered the messages of both Patriarch Anthimos V and Bulgarian Exarch Anthimos I about the Schism as motivated by “nationalistic passions.” At the same time, the Russian Church did not recognize the Bulgarian Church since it had been established by a governmental decree rather than with consent of the Patriarchate.396

Some voices among the educated Greek society shared this interpretation of the Schism as a product of nationalistic passions run rampant on both sides. In the immediate of the Schism, Kleio of Trieste published two letters praising the newspapers for its moderate stance against the extremely nationalistic and Slavophobe Neologos of Constantinople. The correspondents also identified with the reconciliatory efforts by Patriarchs Gregory VI and Anthimos VI. They denounced the influence of “street press, charlatans, and crowds” on church leaders of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate as the main driving force behind the failure of negotiations and the proclamation of the Schism. According to those letters, the Bulgarian side deserved at least a hearing at the Local Council. The issues of unauthorized officiation on Epiphany in January 1872 and of territorial delimitation of the Exarchate were not serious enough to merit the punishment of the Schism within Orthodoxy.397

The Russian-educated Metropolitan of Serbia Mikhail concurred with the position of the Russian Church. The Serbian Church would not recognize the illegitimate Bulgarian Exarchate. Mikhail likewise condemned Bulgarian leaders as too nationalistic.

396 Ibid., pp. 215-221
397 Kleio, 16 September 1872 (587)
in the pursuit of maximizing their territory at the expense of ethnically Greek and Serbian lands. Mikhail stressed the need for cooperation among Ottoman Christian communities in anticipation of political liberation from the Ottomans which would automatically settle all church disputes over jurisdiction and delimitation. For this, Russia and specifically Ambassador Ignatiev needed “to keep the Bulgarians on the way of truth and concord.” Mikhail wrote this letter to Andrei Muraviev who in his turn provided his friend Ambassador Ignatiev with a copy.398

As the most important lay author on things spiritual and especially “the Christian East,” Muraviev was in a good position to supply advice and information to Ignatiev. His popularity and authority were strengthened by his long-time friendship with the most famous 19th-century Russian hierarch, Filaret of Moscow whose 440 letters to himself Muraviev was able to publish.399 Much like Bazarov, Muraviev was initially sympathetic to the Slavs and suspicious of the influence of Greek nationalism in the Ecumenical Patriarchate. As the dispute over the division of the dioceses between the future Bulgarian Church and the Patriarchate reached its height, Muraviev implored Ignatiev to make sure Okhrida stayed in the Bulgarian hands. As part of the medieval Serbian Patriarchate, Okhrida had to return to “the Slavs.” Or else the bodies of the deceased Serbian Patriarchs of Pec “would be dug up by the Greeks from their graves.” Like all “Pan-Slavs,” Muraviev feared if the demands of the Bulgarians were not met, they could go Catholic or Protestant.400

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398 GARF, f. 730-1-3437, Metropolitan Mikhail to Andrei Muraviev, 3 April 1872, pp. 3-4
399 Muraviev, A. N. ed., Pisma Filareta, Metropolita Moskovskogo k A. N. Muravievu (1832-1867) (Kiev, 1869)
400 GARF, f.730-1-3472, Muraviev to Ignatiev, 11 December 1869, p.33-33ob
When the Sultan’s firman established the Bulgarian Exarchate in February 1870, Muraviev “rejoiced in the success of the Bulgarian cause” His joy was saddened by the negative impression of Orthodoxy’s failure to solve the Bulgarian Question without the intervention of the Ottoman authorities, “Only one thing is regrettable in the Greco-Bulgarian affair, that the problem of church organization is resolved by the Sultan’s firman rather than by the Greek hierarchy on its own; that is the reason the Westerners are finding fault with us.” Sympathetic to “the Slavic cause” as he was, the religious Western Other and the interests of the Orthodox world as a whole figured prominently in his mind.

Like most Russian “Pan-Slavs,” Muraviev believed the firman could serve as a basis for a modified canonical solution. As the hope for reconciliation of the parties evaporated, Muraviev became increasingly disturbed by the intransigent demands of the Bulgarian leaders. Muraviev was shocked by the acceptance by the Bulgarians of the Turkish-style title of the Exarch and their insistence of on Constantinople as the seat of Exarch and his Synod in the very heart of the Ecumenical Patriarch’s domain. He asked Ignatiev to have the chief Bulgarian radical nationalist Chomakov removed from Constantinople along with his Greek counterpart Cleovoulos. Muraviev also asked Ignatiev to put pressure on the most outspoken Russian Pan-Slav Professor Nil Popov to keep him from lashing out in the press in support of the Bulgarians.

In these efforts to moderate the extremists on all sides, Muraviev found Filippov’s articles of 1870 very helpful in moderating the Bulgarian side. On several occasions Muraviev advised Ignatiev on how to use Filippov’s arguments to undermine the

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401 Ibid., 18 March 1870, pp.41-42
402 Ibid., 14 June 1870, p. 50
historical and canonical validity of Bulgarian claims to territory and power. To encourage Filippov, Muraviev asked Ignatiev to obtain a letter of acknowledgement from the Ecumenical Patriarch to Filippov. This and other examples of Filippov’s influence revise the traditional treatment of the total lack of support for his ideas.

Convinced by Filippov, Muraviev abandoned his earlier emotional support for assigning Ohrida to the Bulgarian Exarchate. Like Filippov, he placed great expectations on Gregory VI and the Ecumenical Council. In a remarkable Pan-Orthodox gesture, he urged Ambassador Ignatiev to criticize in official circles “the absurdity” of the letter of the Russian Synod to the Patriarch Gregory VI rejecting his idea of the Ecumenical Council. Andrei Muraviev wanted Ignatiev to emphasize the bad impression the letter made in the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

With the failure of the Ecumenical Council because of the Russian Church’s unwillingness, Muraviev supported the idea of the Local Council of the churches of the Ottoman Empire as the last chance to solve the Bulgarian Question. Muraviev agreed with Mikhail, Metropolitan of Serbia, that “the Ecumenical Patriarch could not turn the firman into a church canon.” Muraviev informedIgnatiev that he had instructed Metropolitan Mikhail as a prospective delegate to the Local Council “to mind not only the Slavic interests but the Pan-Orthodox ones as well.” For this, Muraviev urged Mikhail to pacify the Bulgarians through his agents.

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403 Ibid., 23 May 1870, p. 43ob; 404 Ibid., 10 July 1870, p. 53
405 Markova, Zina,  
Bulgarskata ekzarkhia, 1870-1879  
(Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1989),  
p.254; Nikitin, S.A.,  
Slavijskie komityty v Rossii  
v 1858-1876  
(Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1960), p.124
406 Ibid., 10 May 1871, p. 89ob  407 Ibid., 28 May 1870, pp. 46-47
408 Ibid., 10 July 1870, pp 52ob-53
In his attempt to reconcile the two sides, he engaged in the correspondence with the Bulgarian Exarch Anthimos I and the Patriarchs Gregory VI and Anthimos VI well publicized through one of the major ecclesiastical periodicals. Although occasionally pro-Bulgarian in tone, he urged both sides to moderation and exposed the reading public in Russia to the variety of views on the Bulgarian Question.  

Muraviev prepared a special memo for the Foreign Ministry and the Russian Synod on the need to solve the Bulgarian Question at the Ecumenical or a Local Council and to send a Russian representative there. Outside the leadership of the Russian Holy Synod, many important ecclesiastics and intelligentsia supported the idea of the Ecumenical Council. Often Pan-Slav sympathizers, they believed the Council to be the only way to stop the disillusioned Bulgarians from going into the Unia en masse. In general, the Council was seen as the only way to extricate the Bulgarian Question of its political complications, namely, the influence of expansionist Greek nationalism and the allure of the promises of the Ottoman government to satisfy Bulgarian aspirations. In addition to solving the Bulgarian Question, the Ecumenical Council would also remedy many problems in the Russian Church, for example, that of the Old Believers.

These were the views of Archimandrite Leonid among many, the former head of Russian Ecclesiastic Mission in Jerusalem (1864-1865) and the priest at the church of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople (1865-1869). Although he could not get on well with Cyril the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Leonid’s career did not suffer from this failure because

410 GARF, f. 730-1-1005, some time in 1870, pp. 1-3
411 RGALI, 373-1-206, Archimandrite Leonid to M. P. Pogodin, 12 March 1869, pp.3-4ob
Metropolitan Filaret invariably backed him. He would become the Abbot of the most prestigious Russian monastic and educational institution Sergieva Lavra. As referred to in chapter 2, his brother had connections with Filippov.

Archimandrite Antonin (Kapustin), Leonid’s successor as the head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, also supported the idea of the Ecumenical Council for similar reasons. Unlike Leonid, Antonin was more optimistic about the continued ability of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to act as a supranational Pan-Orthodox body. He welcomed the appeal of Patriarch Gregory VI to summon the Ecumenical Council as the sign of at least an aspiration on his behalf towards independence from the pervasive influence of Greek nationalism on the Orthodox Churches in the Ottoman Empire. Like Leonid, Antonin believed that the Ecumenical Council would expose Greek nationalist-minded prelates and allow for an unprejudiced adjudication of the Bulgarian Question. Antonin’s pessimism about the possibility of everybody’s agreeing to the Council was justified by the unwillingness of the Russian Church to support the idea.

Signs of Rapprochement at the time of the Crisis around the Bulgarian Question

If the Russian Holy Synod was more or less open towards the changes in the status quo, the knee-jerk reaction of Russian imperial institutions was for continued authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch over all Ottoman Christians. In a remarkable statement of affinity of the three Eastern European empires, the censor in Warsaw ordered the editor of the local Russian-language paper Varshavskii Dnevnik to stop publishing the “articles sympathetic to the Slavs of Austria and Turkey.” In the censor’s

412 Archimandrit Nikodim (Rotov), Istoria russkoi dukhovnoi missii v Ierusalime (Leningrad: Spiritual Academy, 1959), p. 201
413 GARF, f. 730-1-2294, Antonin to Ignatiev, 5 January 1869, p. 107
opinion, the latter Slavs had not only separatist but also secessionist aspirations. The articles in their support were particularly “inappropriate” in the official newspaper in the Vistula province “where our Government strives for the reconciliation and unification of the Poles with the predominant population of the Empire.”

The timing of the order (28 August 1871) coincided with the heightening of the Bulgarian Church Question and its intensive coverage in the Russian press. Clearly, the Internal Ministry was not particularly open towards the changes in the status quo of the Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire.

Furthermore, D. Boudouris, the Greek Ambassador to St Petersburg, did not feel isolated in a hostile environment although “many serious men…famous for their Philhellenism” felt that as a result of the Bulgarian schism Greece would be drawn from Russia to the West. In contrast to the moderate and reconciliating stance of the Russian Government and the Church, the Russian public “could not always remain impartial in its judgment of the regrettable events that took place in Constantinople recently.”

According to him, one could not talk of the hatred for all things Greek in Russia at the time. True, the Russian Church, the Tsar, the Foreign Ministry and the educated society at large did not approve of the Bulgarian Schism pronounced at the Council of Constantinople. In particular, official and unofficial circles were shocked by the excommunication of the Patriarch of Jerusalem Cyril by his own Synod for the opposition to the decisions of the Council. In this connection, the Tsar decided not to send the proceeds from the various sources of income of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem in

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414 GARF, f. 730 (N.P. Ignatiev)-1-648, Warsaw Censor to the Editor of Varshavskii Dnevnik, 28 August 1871, p. 1
415 AYE, 1872, file 76.1b, #227/98, St Petersburg, 18 December 1872
416 Ibid., file 76.1 #43/18 St Petersburg 7 March 1872
Russia. In spite of these tensions, the extreme Greek nationalist newspapers were exaggerating the anti-Greek feelings in Russia. Specifically, they were wrong in their assertions that on the official Russian documents the dignity of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was slighted. On the contrary, Russian documents invariably featured the full title of the Patriarch.417

As the above suggests, the relations between Russia and the Greek world in the crucial years 1870 to 1872 were not entirely negative and not wholly poisoned by the Bulgarian Question. At the height of the Bulgarian Question in 1871, one of the major ecclesiastical periodicals, Khrścieńskie Chtenie, although leaning towards the Bulgarian side, published the letter by Gregory VI to the Russian Synod written in 1869. The Patriarch denounced nationalism as a Satanic plot to destroy the body of the Church because its spirit is indestructible. The Bulgarian movement was part of it because “careless of things heavenly, many had given themselves to the worldly things.” Not open to any reconciliating gestures of the Patriarchate, the Bulgarian leaders insisted on the essentially political demands – the ethnic identity of the pastors with the flock.418

There was another important event that reminded both the Russian and Greek educated public of close religious ties between the two parts of the Orthodox world in the crucial years 1870-1872. I am referring to the transfer of the relics of Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V martyred in 1821 during the Greek Revolution against the Ottomans. The body of the brutally murdered Patriarch was taken from Constantinople to Odessa and became one of important Orthodox relics that attracted pilgrims from all over Russia. At the time of the Greek Revolution and the years that followed it, the “national

417 Ibid., #220/91, St Petersburg, 19 Nov 1872
418 Khrścieńskie Chtenie, 1871 (3): 420-421
martyrdom” of Gregory V became a central element in the national mythology of modern Greece. In 1870, the Greek Government requested the transfer of the relics from Odessa to Athens to be enshrined in the main Greek church, the Metropolitan Cathedral. The whole project met with opposition from famous intellectuals such as Andrei Muraviev. He believed that the relics of Gregory V became such a popular and important object of veneration in Odessa and Russia at large that their “abduction” would be a great loss to Russian Orthodox culture.  

The timing of the transfer in the spring 1871 helped to somewhat dampen the passions fanned during the critical point in the Bulgarian Question. Thus, to strengthen the ties between the two parts of the Orthodox world, in his review of 1871, the Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod extensively discussed the granting of the request of the Greek Kingdom for the transfer of the relics. That was the occasion to placate the Greek national sensibilities and to remind the readers of the traditional Russian protecting role in “the East.” The report confirmed the Greek national myth of Gregory as “the stalwart fighter and martyr for the independence of the Greek people.” It also stressed “the memories of the hard days of slavery and oppression, heroic struggle for independence, many victims of the struggle, and finally of the freedom won and consolidated with the magnanimous support of coreligionist Russia.”

This occasion brought many high society Greek and Russian dignitaries in Odessa and Athens caused a veritable outpouring of Pan-Orthodox pronouncements in both Greek and Russian publications across the whole of political spectrum. The Russian press

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419 GARF, f 730-1-3472, A. N. Muraviev to N. P. Ignatiev, Kiev 10 May 1871, p. 89ob
420 Izvlechenia iz vsepoddaneishego otcheta Ober-Prokurora Sviateishego Sinoda Grafa D.A.Tolstogo po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedania za 1871 god (St Petersburg: Russian Holy Synod Publications, 1872), pp. 184-186
painfully aware of the generally Slavophobe tone of the mainstream Greek press carefully noted and welcomed the change.\footnote{Hieromonk Nikolai, “Perenesienie ostankov Sviateishego Patriarkha Konstatinopolskogo Grigoria V iz Odessy v Afiny,” \textit{Khristianskoie Chtenie} 1871 (5): 905-935}

These pronouncements did not mark a shift towards reconciliation between the Slavs and the Greeks but rather a respite in hostilities. Indeed, many Greek prelates such as Archbishop of Syros and Tenos Lycourgos who eulogized Holy Russia on that occasion in the spring of 1871 would actively foster the Bulgarian Schism a year later. Even then he would stop short of demonizing Russia. On April 25 1871 in Athens, Lycourgos recounted the history of the Greek Revolution against the Ottomans in 1821 and of Gregory V’s role there. In connection with the martyred Patriarch, he carefully secured a prominent place for Orthodox Russia in the Greek national narrative by venerating “the most humane Russian Emperor,” “pious Russian people,” “pious and most powerful Russia,” “the fraternal feelings of noble and Philhellene Russians,” and “gratitude” of the Greeks towards them.\footnote{Lykourgos, Alexandros, \textit{Logos paneigyrikos eis tin 50etereda tou yper anexartisias Ellinon kai ten ex Odessou eis Athinas anakomiden tou leipsanou tou aoidimou Patriarhou Gregoriou V} (Ermoupolis, 1871), pp. 25-26}

Certainly, it was not a change of heart for the First Secretary of the Greek Synod Averkios Lambiris. On April 10 1871 in Odessa, he sang a paean to “the pious Russian Emperor and his Orthodox” on behalf of “the eternally grateful Hellenic people.”\footnote{\textit{Khristianskoie Chtenie} 1871 (7): 139-143} A year later in his public speech in Athens he welcomed the Bulgarian Schism and lambasted Russia’s alleged sponsorship of Pan-Slav conspiracies that it caused a
diplomatic scandal and his eventual removal from the high position in the Greek position.424

But the public display of Pan-Orthodox goodwill on occasion of the reburial of Gregory V added more strength to the rather complicated picture of the Greeks even in the mainstream pro-Bulgarian press. Not all Greeks were demonized as enemies of Slavdom – there was often a distinction between the extreme Slavophile Greek nationalists versus moderate Greeks in favor of reconciling Orthodox nations. In the same Khristianskoie Chtenie in 1871, Archimandrite Nikolai, the priest of the church of the Russian Embassy in Athens, wrote about the moderate stance of the ecclesiastical periodicals in the Greek Kingdom in regards to the Bulgarian Question and their agreement with the position of the Russian Synod against the convocation of the Ecumenical Council.425

Like Filippov, in their account of the Council of Constantinople of 1872 Moskovskie Vedomosti and Khristianskoie Chtenie took care to consistently differentiate between the Greeks while usually treating all Bulgarians as the unified mass behind their right cause. Khristianskoie Chtenie emphasized “the hopes of the moderate party of the Hellenic nation (naroda) expressed in the appeal by Professor Tantalidis” shattered by “the efforts of the extreme Greek nationalist party” in the Patriarch’s condemnation of the Exarch and other Bulgarian nationalist prelates in the spring of 1872.426 In anticipation of the Local Council and the Bulgarian Schism of September 1872, the same publication favorably contrasted Patriarch Sofronios of Alexandria to the Synod of the Church of

424 See below
426 Khristianskoie Chtenie, 1872 (6): 353; Moskovskie Vedomosti, 2 March 1872 (53)
Greece which embraced the idea of the Council to condemn the Bulgarian Exarchate.

Sofronios, “as a servant of peace and love, the elder believed it to be his duty to come to Constantinople to serve as a mediator between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate.”

According to *Khristianskoie Chtenie* and *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, he was joined by the Archbishop of Cyprus and the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem of whom only the latter, Cyril, was not swayed by “the party of extreme nationalist Greeks” and “the crowds of the Greek people (naroda).”

According to *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, even after the Synod of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem excommunicated Cyril and removed his Greek and Arab supporters in Palestine, there remained powerful moderate Greek voices. Thus, the Constantinopolitan *Vyzantis* newspaper criticized the Archbishop Lycourgos for his embarking on a witch hunt for Pan-Slavism on Mount Athos after he had helped bring about the Local Council and the Bulgarian Schism of September 1872.

In an attempt to be more balanced, *Moskovskie Vedomosti* went so far as to open its pages to more Pan-Orthodox voices. A certain N argued that both the Greeks and the Bulgarians had nationalist agendas of promoting Slavic and Greek liturgy and their respective languages of instruction in local schools. According to N, the Bulgarian demands were more contrary to the church canons. There was nothing wrong in having Bulgarian priests for Bulgarian-speaking parishes but there could not be two Christian Orthodox bishops in the same city. The author denounced the claims of the Bulgarian Exarchate to cities with long-standing Greek bishop seats and areas with mixed or even

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427 *Khristianskoie Chtenie* (7): 514

428 Ibid., (10): 324-5; *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, 14 September 1872 (230); 29 September 1872 (243)

429 *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, 25 December 1872 (327)

430 Ibid., 30 November 1872 (303)
predominantly Greek population. As N argued, it was perfectly legitimate for a Greek or a Bulgarian priest to be subordinated to a Bulgarian or a Greek bishop respectively and for those bishops to have extraterritorial town churches (podvorie) in each other’s dioceses.  

Moskovskie Vedomosti further exposed its readers to the Pan-Orthodox view of the Bulgarian Question when it published the open letter to the editor from the Greek Archimandrite Grigorios Palamas. Palamas reproached the Russian press for being one-sidedly pro-Bulgarian and condemning all of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek nation as the enemies of Slavs and Russia. Palamas urged the Russian press to remember the age-old ties between the Greek nation and church and Russia. Palamas essentially restated the reasons earlier brought by Filippov in Russkiii Vestnik and Grazhdanin. He again stressed the ecclesiastical side of the Bulgarian Question deemphasized in Russian mainstream publications. The Bulgarian nationalists turned away from negotiations with the Patriarchate, their Mother Church, to appeal to the Islamic Government. On top of this scandalous act came the rebellious behavior of their prelates vis-à-vis the Patriarch and insistence on “racial” foundation of the Bulgarian Church. If Russia succeeded the Byzantium as the new center of Orthodoxy, then Russia needed to convene an Ecumenical Council as the only way to lift the Bulgarian Schism.  

The Aftermath of the Schism: 1873-1878

In 1873, one of the foremost Russian experts on church law and the Christian Orthodox East, Theodore Kurganov, wrote a study of the Bulgarian Question. He

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431 Moskovskie Vedomosti, 27 November 1872 (300)
432 Moskovskie Vedomosti, 4 February 1873 (30)
published it in one of the major Russian ecclesiastical periodicals of the Kazan Spiritual Academy at which Kurganov was a Professor. His aim was to show that the actions of the leaders of the Bulgarian church movement inexorably led to the proclamation of the Schism rather than the allegedly power-hungry and anti-Slav leadership of the “Greek Church.” According to Kurganov’s confession, one of his main motivations for writing the study was the review of his Master of Theology Thesis “The Establishment of the Church in the Kingdom of Greece.” In that scholarly and balanced analysis, Kurganov argued that the decree of the Greek Royal Government was not enough for church independence according to the canons of the Orthodox Church. The necessary condition for the legitimate establishment of the Church of Greece was the consent of the spiritual leader, the Patriarch of Constantinople. Kurganov’s thesis was published in a book form in 1871 shortly after the similarly uncanonical establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate by the Sultan’s decree and was accused of having “the clerical-Byzantine tendency” or the pro-Phanariot bias. 433

Kurganov responded that “coming from the Slavophile perspective, the reviewer distorts the facts and falsely conveys my thoughts . . intentionally adjusting the issue to the way the Bulgarian Question is understood in Russia.” 434 Muck like Filippov, Kurganov stressed the idea of the freedom of the Church and condemned the Byzantium as “the period of the struggle of the principles of freedom of the Orthodox Church against the cult of the monarchic (edinoderzhavnyi) Roman Caesarism.” After 1453, the

433 Kurganov, Fedor, “Istoricheskii ocherk greco-bolgarskoj raspri” in Pravoslavny Sobesednik, 1872 (1): 17, n.3
434 Ibid., p.20
condition of the Patriarchate of Constantinople deteriorated because that “monarchic despotic authority” turned “from coreligionist to infidel.”

Like Filippov, Kurganov stressed that the Ottoman system of bribes and gifts led to simony, abuses, and corruption in the Patriarchate of Constantinople which weighed heavily on local Ottoman Christian populations. This situation was reminiscent of the conditions in the Catholic Church on the eve of Reformation. There was a need for reform and separation of some areas from the Patriarchate where one could envision "the introduction of a free rational canonical order of church administration and life.” But Kurganov was not sure if the reform was possible in the ecclesiastical and political context created by the Ottomans.

According to Kurganov, Bulgarian national revival was contemporaneous with but not an integral part of this need for church reform. National “awakenings” in the Ottoman Empire came under the influence of Western ideas but these purely in its Islamic structure political aspirations necessarily took the form of the movement for ecclesiastical independence. The Church became a tool of national interests. The demands of the Bulgarian national leaders led to the introduction of the national principle into the principle of the confessional unity (tserkovno-ispovednyi). This contradiction would result in the establishment of two coreligionist church authorities in the same area. Kurganov stressed the anti-canonical consequences of this division. Although they were supposed to have the same goals because of the same creed, they would go against each other on account of the national principle. The abnormal implications of this situation

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435 Ibid., p. 23
436 Ibid., pp. 63-67
437 Ibid., p. 89
totally justified the rejection of such Bulgarian demands by the leadership of the Patriarchate of Constaninople.\textsuperscript{438}

Another similarity between Filippov and Kurganov was the latter’s insistence on the Ecumenical Council as the solution to the Bulgarian Question. Likewise, Kurganov disapproved of the rejection of this idea in 1868 by the Russian Synod which in turn emboldened the Bulgarian leaders to further pursue the uncanonical path. To achieve their unjust aspirations, the Bulgarian leaders resolved to appeal to the Ottoman Government and to coerce the Patriarchate into granting their demands. According to Kurganov, contrary to the perceptions of the mainstream Russian press, the Bulgarians were actually behaving like victimizers rather than like victims. The Patriarchate went out of its way to grant them a national church in keeping with the canons. So it could not accept the Sultan’s firman about the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate because it envisioned two Orthodox bishops in the same area and set no territorial delimitation to the Exarchate’s borders.\textsuperscript{439}

According to Kurganov, the Bulgarian leaders deliberately pushed the Patriarchate to the Schism by refusing to renegotiate the firman and by committing numerous defiant acts of church insubordination. At the same time, the Exarchate leaders presented themselves as victims of the Patriarch’s intransigence. According to Kurganov, most Russian publications including \textit{Khristianskoie Chtenie} and \textit{Moskovskie Vedomosti} took at face value “the tendentious lie” of the Bulgarian Exarch’s epistles.\textsuperscript{440}

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid., 1873 (2): 258-9
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid., (10): 117-137
\textsuperscript{440} Ibid., (11): 360-361
Kurganov openly sided with Filippov - the Schism was legitimate and binding even for the Russian Church. Kurganov went into detail exposing “the racial bias” (plemennoie pristrastie) of the Russian press reactions to the Schism. He specifically took issue with the typically Pan-Slav assertions of the liberal Golos newspaper that the Slavs allegedly kept their faith in a much more intact and pure form and usually expelled Greek priests from their lands. Even relatively moderate Andrei Muraviev became a target for Kurganov’s criticism for juxtaposing the Slavs versus the Greeks in his correspondence with Patriarch Anthimos VI. In contrast, Kurganov supported the condemnation of the Bulgarian church movement as an example of the new heresy of phyletismos or “racialism” not permissible in the Church. In his mind, this act meant that “among the Greeks there is not only a higher percentage but generally a higher number of people renouncing national interests and rising to the idea itself, to its relationship to the teaching of the Church on dogma and canons.”

In contrast to Kurganov and to his own later self, in 1873 Konstantin Leontiev seemed to fit into the Pan-Slav mainstream. At the time he was in Constantinople in the process of retirement after his ten-year-long tenure as a Russian consul in various postings in the Ottoman Empire. According to his own admission of 1884, in 1873 like Nikolai Danilevskii, his major philosophical influence, Leontiev believed too much in the Slavs.

The majority in the Russian educated society believed their country to be the only mainstay of true Orthodoxy while considering both the Greeks and the Bulgarians guilty

441 Ibid., pp.378-386
of bringing their national agendas into the Church. Nobody could at least openly approve of the rebellious uncanonical acts by Bulgarian nationalist prelates but most believed the Schism too strict a punishment. Likewise, in 1873 Leontiev believed that “the Bulgarians were incomparably more right.” According to him, many Russians condemned their challenge to the Patriarch as illegitimate but hoped the Patriarch as a good pastor would forgive them. He emphasized, “Whoever says to forgive, recognizes the guilt.”

Unlike Filippov or Kurganov, Leontiev in 1873 did not throw his weight to protect the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the only institutional bastion of true Orthodoxy against Western-inspired Balkan nationalism. Leontiev decried the Bulgarian Question as the anathema to his personal faith and Orthodox ideals (lichnoie serdechnoie Pravoslavie). In fact, he implicitly equated the Ecumenical Patriarchate with Greek nationalism when referring to Athens and Phanar as two strong centers of Hellenism.

The thrust of Leontiev’s article was twofold – to debunk the myth of Pan-Slavism for the Greek and Western European audience and to remind the Russian readers of the great role of their country as the traditional protector of Orthodox Christians of the East and the future leader of an Eastern civilization based on Constantinople. With his first goal and audience in mind, Leontiev detailed the examples of inter-Slav strife and pointed to the examples of Russia’s past and present support for the Greek and Orthodox Christian cause in the Ottoman Empire. Without Russian support, the Greeks were too weak even against the Bulgarians alone. Greek nationalist politicians needed to limit their

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443 “Panslavism i greki” in Leontiev, Konstantin, Vostok, Rossia, Slavianstvo: filosofskaia i politicheskaia publitsistika, dukhovnaia proza (1872-1891) (Moscow: Republika, 1996), p. 44. Originally published in Russkii Vestnik 1873 (2)
444 Ibid., p.45
445 Ibid., p.51
expansionist ambitions to Greek populated islands and Ottoman provinces of Thessaly and Epirus.\footnote{446} In the undesirable case of its collapse, he assured the Greeks of their privileged role as “entrepreneurs of the East (kommissionery Vostoka)” in the future Russian-led anti-Western commercial and military union of “Eastern” nations.\footnote{447}

For his Russian audience, Leontiev stressed Liberal constitutionalist aspirations of all Slav nationalist elites. The Bulgarians were his special target in their working against Russian Pan-Orthodox anti-Catholic policies and in their conflicting rather than cooperating with the other Balkan Slavs.\footnote{448} Faced with the threat of continued German expansion, Russia did not need to rely on the Slavs only. On a grander scale, if the West betrayed its own Christian, aristocratic and classical ideals, then Russia’s great mission would be in uniting the Orthodox and Islamic East against the onslaught of godless Liberalism and socialism.\footnote{449}

The reason this article was published in Russkii Vestnik was that its Pan-Slav editor, Mikhail Katkov, saw it as a means to defuse the accusations against himself of sponsoring Pan-Slav conspiracies current in the Western European and especially Greek press of the time.\footnote{450} Accordingly, in the following issue of Russkii Vestnik Katkov published another article by Leontiev. It likewise undermined the myth of Pan-Slav unity in the Bulgarian Question and exposed the disruptive effects of nationalism on Christian Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire.
This time Leontiev focused on the ethnically Greek, South Slav and Russian monastic communities of Mount Athos and its environs. The main conclusion Leontiev wanted to leave the Russian reader with was that there still remained many pro-Russian and Pan-Orthodox Greeks among monks and villagers of the Ottoman Empire. Again in contrast to Filippov and Kurganov, Leontiev did not privilege the Patriarchate as the last resort of Orthodoxy. According to him, the bishops of the Patriarchate were “cunning and cautious” politicians. With the Russians, they would talk about Pan-Orthodox interests. Pressured by extreme Greek nationalists often from among Greek nationals and consuls, they would encourage Slavophobe feelings of Greek village elders.\(^\text{451}\)

To preserve the still living Orthodoxy in the East, Russia needed to contain Western inspired ethnic nationalism off the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Even more than in the previous article Leontiev emphasized that the preservation of Orthodoxy in the East uncontaminated by conflicting nationalist passions was possible only in the dynastic and deeply religious Islamic empire. Only in the Ottoman setting would Russia be able to continue to act as “the pillar of Orthodoxy.” In another contrast to Filippov and Kurganov, Leontiev pointed to the Greeks as the main troublemakers or “enfants terribles” in the East. Treating the Greeks as the main culprits, Leontiev urged Russia “to forgive [them] prophetically without [their] conversion which will follow soon.”

These views were similar to mainstream opinions in the educated society and the Russian Church. Although the Holy Synod did not officially respond to the declaration of the Bulgarian Schism, its affiliated magazines denounced it as the work of extreme Greek

nationalists. The Schism was the last in a series of Greek ecclesiastical policy decisions that led to divisions since early Christianity.\textsuperscript{452} It pitted off not only the Slavs against the Greeks but also the Arabs versus the Greek leadership of the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch.\textsuperscript{453} The victorious extreme Greek nationalist party reportedly diverted income and donations from Russia from local schools and charities exclusively to the Greek cause and personal enrichment. As a result, Arab Christians there were less willing to resist the material temptations of Western propagandas.\textsuperscript{454} In accounts like that, presumably all the Greeks were portrayed as largely outside the Orthodox pale totally antagonistic to the Slavs and the Arabs in their blind pursuit of Greek nationalistic agenda.

At the same time, the mainstream Russian opinion on the Bulgarian Question intensely looked for signs of moderation among the Greeks and their willingness to negotiate with the Bulgarian Exarchate with the ultimate view of lifting the Schism. In its first issue of 1873, \textit{Khristianskoie Chtenie} welcomed the publication in the no 602 of \textit{Kleio} newspaper of Trieste of an unsigned letter essentially accusing the mainstream Greek opinion of exploiting the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the interests of Greek nationalism and at the expense of Orthodoxy. The author denounced the Bulgarian Schism as an unjust and self-righteous act of the people totally alien to true interests of the Church.\textsuperscript{455}

The Russian press praised the anonymous author of the pamphlet titled “L’eglise orthodoxe, le schisme, et le Patriarche de Jerusalem Cyrille,” for being favorable to the
deposed and excommunicated Patriarch of Jerusalem Cyril and by implication against the Bulgarian Schism. Another Pan-Orthodox Greek hero was Archimandrite Callistratos, the abbot of the famous Sinai monastery. According to the report of Antonin, the head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, extreme Greek nationalist members of the monastic community attempted to depose Callistratos for his disapproving of the Schism and the rise of Greek nationalism in the Church. \footnote{Khristianskoie Chtenie, 1873 (7): 542-543} Khristianskoie Chtenie also welcomed the election of Antonios, the Bishop of Corfu, to the highest position in the Church of Greece, that of the Metropolitan of Athens. The Greek Government reportedly opposed his candidacy because in 1872 Antonios hesitated to sign the letter to the Patriarch Athimos VI recognizing the Bulgarian Schism. At the time he also recommended not to announce the Schism from church pulpits in Greece until the reactions of other independent churches outside the Ottoman Empire became known. \footnote{Ibid., pp. 534-535}

The Russian press eagerly covered all rumors about the ongoing Ottoman Government sponsored Greek-Bulgarian negotiations aimed at lifting the Schism. \footnote{Khristianskoie Chtenie, 1873 (9): 170-171} The extreme Greek nationalists were supposedly becoming marginalized as “the majority of the Greeks are coming to the conviction that the Schism proclaimed by the Greeks themselves can deal the interests of Hellenism a mortal blow, and we believe that before long all of them will come to their senses completely except for a handful of Pan-Hellenists obsessed with the “Great Idea” who systematically undermine the interests of the Orthodox Church in its name.”\footnote{Ibid., pp. 172-173}

\footnote{Khristianskoie Chtenie, 1873 (8): 750-752}
The Russian educated society also gloated over the troubles of the Patriarch Anthimos VI faced with the growing opposition centered on the moderate Vyzantis newspaper of Constantinople. The condemnation and demonization of Anthimos VI in Russia implied that most Greeks were redeemable. He was increasingly portrayed as the bete noir whose removal would defuse the situation. Anthimos “set astir the Church of God and disgraced the numerous nation with the mistaken title of schismatics to please a handful of swindlers.”

All this period 1873-1875 after his retirement and return to Russia, Leontiev still considered himself part of the Pan-Slav mainstream and “relied on the Slavophiles as on my own kin, as on the fathers, as on elder and nobler relatives who are supposed to rejoice in the juniors’ developing their teaching further even in case the natural course of development would bring those juniors to wholly unexpected conclusions like mine.”

By 1875, his new ideas crystallized into a vision based on the principles of the Pan-Orthodox party. So when he approached prominent Pan-Slavs Mikhail Katkov and Ivan Aksakov asking to help publish his new work Vizantism i Slavianstvo or Byzantinism and Slavdom, he was rejected. In spite of this setback, Leontiev did not become a pariah in the mainstream educated society. He received support from Fedor Berg, the publisher of Russkii Mir newspaper and most importantly from the veteran Pan-Slav Mikhail Pogodin. The latter used his connections to publish Byzantinism and Slavdom.

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461 Ibid., pp. 176-179
462 Leontiev, Konstantin, Moia literaturnaia sudba. Vospominania (Moscow: Russkaia kniga, 2002 [1935]), p.66
463 Ibid., p.50
464 Ibid., p.59
In Leontiev’s own admission, his conversion from earlier “Pan-Slavism” to “Pan-Orthodoxy” came as a result of Filippov’s articles “full of firmness and clarity” published in 1870-1872 in favor of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Without much knowledge of church canons, Leontiev moved in the same direction following “instincts and demonstration effect (po nagliadnost)” “first and foremost disgusted at the way those Liberal Bulgarian boors (khamie) were putting on airs vis-à-vis the Church in which I personally believe and historically venerate (underlined in the original).” Out of their solidarity on the Bulgarian Question, Filippov and Leontiev grew to become very close lifetime friends.465

In his landmark Byzantinism and Slavdom, Leontiev elaborated on Danilevskii’s “modern” “scientific” ideas to come up with the idea of a separate Byzantine cultural type or civilization. As Danilevskii’s Slavic cultural type, Leontiev’s construct was an example of the “invention of tradition.” In line with Orientalist production of knowledge for and about the Other, the proponents of both visions sought to influence public policy and public opinion. His 1873 vision of the future Russian-centered Eastern federation was more or less a replica of Danilevskii’s description of the emerging Slavic cultural type. As mentioned above, the Greek nation centered on the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Athens would enjoy a privileged but a subordinate position in it. In contrast to the 1873 construct, Leontiev’s 1875 concept sharply distinguished between the Greeks in the independent Kingdom of Greece and the Patriarchate. Leontiev held both nationalist Greeks and Slavs suspect of being infected by Western liberalism. As he saw in 1875, any future union of the Slavs and Greeks with Russia would be centered on

465 RGALI, f. 2980-1-1023, Leontiev to Filippov, Moscow, 8 January 1876, p.2
the twin pillars of the Orthodox Church embodied in the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Russian autocracy.

According to his formula, “For their existence, the Slavs need the might of Russia. The power of Russia needs Byzantinism.” Leontiev saw Byzantinism as “the only secure anchor of our conservatism (okhranenie) not only for Russia but for all Slavs. Without the structure and discipline of Byzantinism, the Slavs are “an inorganic mass, easily split into pieces, easily merging into republican Europe.” This was a theoretical justification of the arguments the Pan-Orthodox of Filippov, Count Tolstoy et al. brought earlier. Specifically, Leontiev’s formula provided a kind of logical coherence to the persistent Russian fears that without Greek administrative and/or spiritual leadership of the Ecumenical Patriarchate the Orthodox Slavs (and the Arabs) would be unable to resist “the seduction” of Western religious propagandas.

Thus, the period from the granting of the firman of the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate to the proclamation of the Bulgarian Schism and immediate reactions to it saw two extreme positions take shape in Russia on the Bulgarian Question. One was advocated by the members of the Bulgarian community in Russia, Ottoman Bulgarians writing in Russian publications, and last but not least pro-Bulgarian Pan-Slav Russian publicists. They considered the Bulgarian Question solved with the Sultan’s firman. Its Russian supporters believed the Patriarch’s consent was needed and thus encouraged negotiations between the two parties. This pro-Bulgarian Pan-Slavs interpreted the Schism adopted by the Local Council of the Orthodox Churches in the

Ottoman Empire as the sign of “Greek” intransigence and unwillingness to reach a compromise with the “Slavs.” According to them, the Schism was the ruse used by the Greek nationalist minded hierarchs to hurt the interests of the Slavs. Thus, the Schism was non-binding for other Orthodox churches.

Until the proclamation of the Schism there was a convergence between the Pan-Slavs and the Pan-Orthodox in that both were in favor of negotiations between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate. Furthermore, many among the Pan-Slavs agreed with the proposal of Patriarch Gregory VI to convolve an Ecumenical Council to definitively solve the Bulgarian Question despite the fact that the Russian Synod and the Bulgarian leaders opposed the Council. Even after the hardening of the division between the “Greeks” and the “Slavs” after the Schism of 1872, the mainstream Pan-Slav elements in Russia called for renewed negotiations with a view to lifting the Schism. Their hope was that “moderate” Greeks would see the error and unjustness of the Schism and prevail over their “extreme” nationalist compatriots.

By contrast, the Pan-Orthodox party in Russia argued that the Bulgarian nationalist leaders deliberately sought the Schism and continuously provoked the Patriarchate by their rebellious anti-canonical acts. Most importantly, the leaders of the Bulgarian church movement appealed to the Ottoman Government thereby disregarding the authority of the Patriarchate. The Pan-Orthodox in full agreement with the Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory VI advocated the Ecumenical Council as the only possible solution to the Bulgarian Question both before and after the Schism. Although Filippov was the only writer to vociferously promote that view in the press in 1870-1872, his influence was quite noticeable in the educated society at the time. Since 1873, he was
joined by prominent thinkers and scholars such Fedor Kurganov and Konstantin Leontiev.

**A New Synthesis during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878**

The uprisings of 1875 and 1876 in Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Thessaly, and Crete as well as the war against the Ottoman Empire started by Montenegro and Serbia in their support raised hopes in Russia of the coming liberation of Balkan Christians from the Ottomans. The conflagration inspired widespread public sympathy for Ottoman Christians in general and Slavs specifically. The Slavic committees in Moscow, St Petersburg and their affiliates in other areas led vigorous campaigns to bring about an active Russian intervention in favor of Balkan Christians which contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The period from 1875 to 1878 saw renewed discussion of the future of Russia, Slavs and other Ottoman Christians and the solution of the Bulgarian Question figured prominently there.

The attitude of the mainstream Pan-Slav society towards these issues in the beginning of the Eastern crisis can be gauged from the landmark Slavic Collection (*Slavianskii Sbornik*). The first volume published in 1875 leaves one with the picture of the world of unremitting life-and-death struggle between the Slavs on one hand and their Greek, Germanic, Muslim enemies. The two sides were depicted as totally antagonistic and alien to each other in a Darwinian struggle of the survival of the fittest of all species.

Coming from the “ethnological” perspective, the prominent Slavic scholar Anton Budilovich identified “the Greek element” among German, Rumanian, Albanian, Italian, and Turkish “elements” threatening “the Slavic element” in Central and South Eastern
Europe. In this process of “othering,” shared Orthodoxy apparently did not make any difference, “Nowadays any alien (inorodets) lords it over the Slav: here the German, there the Magyar, or the Rumanian, or the Italian, or the Greek, or the Turk, or the Jew.”

However, the different voices increasingly made themselves heard during the Eastern crisis of 1875 to 1878. Thus, Leontiev clarified his vision of the union of the Greeks and the Slavs. Comparing their national characters to that of the Russians, Leontiev saw “the ideal in the combination of them.” According to his “attempt at national psychology,” Russian “unbound warmth” and intensity of the religious and aesthetic sentiment needed to be complemented by structure and discipline of their Balkan coreligionists. Unlike the Russians, South Slavs and Greeks were more committed to the outward institutional forms of religion.

To bring about that harmonious union of mutually complementary Christian nations, Leontiev pointed to the need to solve the Bulgarian Question. In his 1878 article, he explained to the Russian audience that Greece did not join the armed struggle of Russia, Rumania, and the Balkan Slavs against the Ottoman Empire because nationalist Greek elites continued to perceive Russian-sponsored Slavs as the enemies to their ambitions. Russia needed to reassure the coreligionist Greeks by resolutely intervening in

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467 Anton Budilovich, “O sovremennom polozhenii i vzaimnykh otnosheniakh Slavian zapadnykh i iuzhnykh,” in Slavianskii Sbornik, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1875), pp. 593-595

the solution of the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question in the interests of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.\footnote{“Vragi li my s grekami?” in Leontiev, Konstantin, Vostok, Rossiia, Slavianstvo: filosofskaiia i politicheskaiia publitsistika, dukhovnaia proza (1872-1891) (Moscow: Respublika, 1996), p. 158. Originally published in Russkii Mir 1878 (9)}

Leontiev’s reconciliatory gestures coincided with the similar initiatives from among the mainstream pro-Bulgarian Pan-Slav Russian society. Specifically, Professor of the St Petersburg Spiritual Academy Ivan Troitskii eschewed from demonizing the Greeks as sitting on the fences, biding their time, and thereby betraying the Christian Orthodox cause. As the editor of the new major ecclesiastical periodical Tserkovnyi Vestnik, in 1876 Troitskii launched a series of articles justifying the inability of the Kingdom of Greece to join the war against the Ottoman Empire on strategic grounds. He went further proclaiming the unity of the Greeks and the Slavs as part of the Greco-Slavic cultural type.\footnote{“Raziasnenie polozhenia zaniatogo grekami svobodno i Ellady v borbe slavian s turkami” in Tserkovnyi Vestnik, 4 September 1876 (35): 4-6; “K voprosu ob edinomyslii mezhdou grekami i slavianami”, ibid., 16 October 1876 (41): 1-2; “Sblizhenie mezhdou grekami i bolgarami” ibid., p.14; “Religioznaia storona vostochnogo voprosa,” ibid., 6 November 1876 (44): 1-4; “Rossia, Gretsia i Zapadnaia Evropa vo vremia Krymskoi voiny,” ibid., 13 November 1876 (45): 1-4; “Istoria kak orudie k vozbuzhdeniu plemennoi vrazhdy mezhdou grekami i russkimi”, ibid., 20 November 1876 (46): 1-3; “Odno iz vernykh sredstv k nравственному edineniu grekov s nami i s slavianami,” ibid., 27 November 1876 (47): 1-3}

Coming from the major Russian ecclesiastical periodical, Troitskii’s overtures to the Greeks did not go unnoticed in the “moderate” Greek press. Kleio of Trieste did not openly embrace the theoretical framework of Troitskii’s Greco-Slavic type theory but welcomed the editor of Tserkovnyi Vestnik attempts at the rapprochement between the two parts of the Christian Orthodox world. In his turn, Troitskii took care to emphasize these positive reactions to his initiative on the pages of his magazine.\footnote{“Otkliki s Vostoka” in Tserkovnyi Vestnik, 4 December 1876 (47): 5-6}
Troitskii must have taken the cue from Danilevskii’s theory of cultural types where the author traced the origins of the incipient Slavic cultural type to the age-old struggle between Catholicism and Western powers versus the Orthodox Church centered on the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the declining Byzantine Empire. However, Danilevskii de-emphasized the role of the Greeks in the glorious future of the Slavic cultural type. By contrast, Troitskii stressed “the Greco-Slavic reciprocity based on the Church” because he wanted to see the Bulgarian Question solved. The same combination of theoretical and practical consideration explained the prominence of the “Greek” Patriarchate of Constantinople in Leontiev’s Byzantinism. That must have been another decisive influence on Troitskii in addition to Danilevskii. The fact that Troitskii followed and appreciated Leontiev’s writings is clear from the favorable review of Leontiev’s “An Attempt at National Psychology” article Troitskii gave in an editorial to his Tserkovnyi Vestnik.

Indeed, many of the key ideas came to Troitskii from Leontiev vintage 1873 rather than 1875. Thus, clearly addressing the Greek audience, Troitskii reassured them that Russia had never pursued a Pan-Slav policy in the East but always followed its Pan-Orthodox mission. In line with his vision of the Greco-Slavic cultural type, Troitskii consistently encouraged attempts to solve the Bulgarian Question and bring the Greeks to join the fight of the Balkan Christian Slavs against the Ottomans. He took notice of any

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472 “K greco-slavianskoj vzaimnosti” 30 October 1876 (43): 1-3;
473 “Religioznost grekov i uzhnykh slavian sravnitelno s religioznostiou russkih” in Tserkovnyi Vestnik, 17 June 1878 (23): 1-3
474 “Panslavizm,” ibid., 25 December 1876 (51): 1-3
sign of reconciliation in the Bulgarian Church Question mentioned in the “moderate” Greek and Bulgarian press and highlighted them in Tserkovnyi Vestnik.\footnote{Tserkovnyi Vestnik 4 January 1875 (1): 11; 15 February 1875 (7): 6-7; 5 April 1875 (14): 10-12; 19 April 1875 (15): 10-12; “moderate” Bulgarian Vek newspaper’s criticism of the leaders of the Bulgarian national movement and the Exarchate 24 April 1875 (20): 10-11; 28 June 1875 (25): 15-16; 14 February 1876 (7): 13; 17 April 1876 (15): 13; 16 October 1876 (41): 14}

Again, in the spirit of Leontiev’s 1873 articles, Troitskii emphasized that the unifying cultural legacy of Orthodoxy but did not privilege the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the major Pan-Orthodox institution. To be sure, to Troitskii not all Greeks were Slavophobes. Just like on the pages of Khristsianskoie Chtenie in the immediate aftermath of the Schism of 1872, Tserkovnyi Vestnik depicted most favorably Greek common people and “moderate” lay publicists from Vyzantis, Eon, and Kleio newspapers. At the same time, Troitskii mentioned about individual hierarchs such as Patriarch Joachim II as exceptions that proved the rule that the “Phanariotes” were hopelessly corrupt and hell-bent on taking advantage of the Orthodox Church in their personal interests. In the tradition of the pro-Bulgarian Pan-Slav press, the prelates of the Ecumenical Patriarchate were usually portrayed as in cahoots with the “horrible Turk” and nationalist politicians from the Kingdom of Greece. This view was clear in Troitskii’s own editorials and in the articles he included into his magazine.\footnote{“Polozhenie Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v Chernogorii,” ibid., 11 October 1875 (40): 16-18; “Konstantinopolskaia patriarkhiia, greki i slavianskaia borba,” ibid., 14 August 1876 (32): 1-2; “Iuzhnyie slaviane,” ibid., 28 August 1876 (34): 2-4; Protoierei A. Ivanov, “Drevnie tatary i novyiie turki,” ibid., 18 September 1876 (37): 6-7}

However, to bring reconciliation between the Greeks and the Slavs during the Eastern crisis, Troitskii sometimes accepted articles that justified the loyalist pro-Ottoman attitude of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Archpriest (protoierei) A. Ivanov compared the condition of the Patriarchate to that of the Russian Church at the time of the
Tatar domination. He argued that the context of Muslim control explained the outward subservience of the Patriarchate and the condemnation of the Christian Slavic uprisings of 1875 and 1876.477

Thus, Troitskii’s advocacy of the Greco-Slavic cultural type was quite different from the insistence of the Pan-Orthodox party on the continued power of the Ecumenical Patriarchate over all Ottoman Christians regardless of ethnic distinctions. Troitskii’s project was a synthesis of Pan-Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism. At least in theory, the latter emphasized ethnic ties at the expense of religious distinctions whereas the former called for transcending “racial” differences and upholding traditional dynastic and religious identities based on supranational world view and institutions. In fact, like for all “Pan-Slavs,”478 Orthodoxy was of fundamental importance to Troitskii. He merely formulated it theoretically by explicitly basing the union of Greek and Slavic nations on the shared Orthodox legacy but without the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As a result of this synthesis, the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory seemed to proceed from a more “modern” secular worldview.

At the time of Troitskii’s synthesis, similar changes began to be felt in the mainstream Pan-Slav society already during the Eastern crisis. The third volume of the Slavic Collection published in 1877 can probably be seen as an attempt to shift from the antagonistic view of the relations between the Greeks and the Slavs dominant in the first volume published in 1875. Rather than putting the Greeks alongside other “alien elements,” the same Anton Budilovich was now discussing the “Greco-Slavic cultural world” as opposed to “Romano-Germanic Europe.” The term had apparently become an

477 Protoierei A. Ivanov, “Drevnie tatary i novyie turki,” ibid., 18 September 1876 (37): 6-7
478 See chapter 1 and 2
accepted part of mainstream Pan-Slav discourse and also included “Lithuanians, Magyars, Valachians, Turks, and Albanians.”

Although he referred favorably to both Danilevskii and Lamanskii as his inspiration, Budilovich was much closer to the former rather than the latter in his de-emphasizing the role of the Greeks in the Greco-Slavic cultural type. The significance of the Greeks was all in the past. They gave all the Slavs the early unifying element of Orthodox Christianity from which many Slavs were later snatched away to Catholicism but could always go back to this “Greco-Slavic Church.” The Greeks also provided the Slavs with the most appealing architectural Byzantine style.

Thus, the Greeks greatly helped create a common cultural foundation to make the Greco-Slavic “cultural-historical type” quite distinct from the Western European civilization. But Russia succeeded Byzantium and “the world center of Orthodoxy is Moscow rather than Constantinople and Jerusalem” although the last two retained their historic prestige and pride of place. As a numerically negligent nation, the Greeks needed to abandon their dreams of nationalist expansion and to join the Russian-led Slavic family to avoid extinction. To emphasize close blood relation between the Greeks and the Slavs, Budilovich referred to another Pan-Slav scholar Alexander Gilferding. The latter accepted the theory of Fallmereyer about the dilution of ancient Greek blood in the course of early medieval Slavic and Albanian invasions of

480 Ibid., p. 28
481 Ibid., pp. 9-10
482 Ibid., p.49
483 Ibid., p.39
Greece. Like Gilferding, Budilovich welcomed these findings as tying the Slavs and the Greeks even closer together.484

The same condescending attitude towards the Greeks was pronounced in the references to the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question. The reviewer unfavorably compared Leontiev’s Byzantinism and Slavdom to “the similar but more sober and calm articles on the Slavic-Byzantine Question by Khomiakov, Stur, Danilevskii, Lamanskii, etc.” According to the reviewer, Leontiev unjustly criticized the Bulgarians “for their quarrel with the Phanariote Greeks whom the author totally identifies with their great ancestors of the medieval period.”485 The same volume of the Slavic Collection also featured an article on recent Bulgarian history by the famous Bulgarian scholar Marin Drinov of the Russian University of Kharkov and a publication of the autobiography of the early 19-century Bulgarian bishop Sophronios of Vracha with a commentary. Both of these pieces portrayed the Phanariote Greeks together with the Ottoman Turks as merciless oppressors of Bulgarians.486

The period after 1878 would see Pan-Slavs such as Budilovich change to Pan-Orthodoxy and/or the proponents of the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory. This change would come under the influence of Filippov, Leontiev, and the disillusionment with “ungrateful” Bulgarians after 1885. After 1878, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory would continue to elaborate their versions of invented tradition of the relationship between Russia and Ottoman Christians. In line with

484 Ibid., p.43
485 “Kritika i bibliografia” in Slavianskii Sbornik, vol. III (St Petersburg, 1877), p. 22
Orientalist production of knowledge, their competition for political backing for their visions would actually intensify from 1878 to 1912.
Chapter Four

Responses to the Bulgarian Church Question in Russian and the Greek Lands (1878-1912)

Introduction

The period after 1878 witnessed further development of three different views on Orthodoxy and Russian identity in response to the Greek Bulgarian Church Question – the more or less Pan-Orthodox vision with a privileged place for the Greeks, more or less anti-Greek Pan-Slavism, and the Greco-Slavic cultural type as a combination of the two. As before, there were no clear-cut boundaries between these visions and their supporters. All of the constructs were conceived and disseminated in line with Orientalist production of knowledge and the modern “invention of tradition.” There were significant overlaps of ideas and those who expressed them as a result of the lively debate in the relatively narrow circles of the Russian and Greek educated societies.

In the struggle against the traditional Islamic and Western religious enemies, the Pan-Orthodox “party” still saw the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the main protection of non-Greek Ottoman Christians who were allegedly unable to resist the same “seductions” of the West and particularly of the Roman Pope. The Ecumenical Patriarchate still held a great attraction as a model for the Russian state and the Russian church because it was a central element to some kind of separate non-Western civilization.

The efforts to resolve the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question inspired new criticisms of the treatment of minorities by the Russian Holy Synod. The Pan-Orthodox “party” demanded to redress the situation of the Old Believers, Bessarabian and Georgian Orthodox in Russia. The Ottoman Empire continued to receive a rather positive
evaluation as a society that best promoted the unity, reconciliation, and even the very identity of Orthodox Christians. At the same time, in the more or less undesirable event of its collapse, the Pan-Orthodox “party” could occasionally espouse the idea of the “liberation” of Orthodox Christians from the Austrian Catholic or Muslim “yoke” and the formation of an “Eastern Union” or even a “Balkan federation” of Ottoman Christian nations.

Pan-Orthodoxy was not a cause of blind escapist traditionalists. Far from being “pre-modern,” the Pan-Orthodox “party” affected parts of the Russian government, Church, and intellectual community in Russia and the Greek world as one of the possible responses to the challenges of secular rational Western modernity confronted multiethnic confessional dynastic empires. Under the Pan-Orthodox influence, more Pan-Slavs joined their ranks or became proponents of the Greco-Slavic cultural type as another possible answer to the same problems of building a common identity and legitimating power in traditionally diverse societies ill suited to become Western style nation-states. The non-Western civilization both of them were envisioning would take the form of a confessional federation of national churches and/or nation-states to contain the worst effects of modern political nationalism on the mosaic of ethnically diverse societies in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

After 1878, the debate on the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question provided an opportunity for the increasingly vocal and emboldened Pan-Orthodox to question the claims of the pro-Bulgarian Pan-Slavs to the legacy of Russia’s main right-wing conservative school of thought that of classical Slavophilism. The post-1878 controversy
around the Bulgarian Question continued to inspire many efforts to redefine foreign policy and church-state relations in Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

Thus, as in 1850s through 1870s, the Bulgarian Church Question enabled the adherents of all three visions to transform themselves from hairsplitting academics into Orientalist producers of knowledge. All three responses claimed the “scientific” authority to represent their “unredeemed” coreligionists and coethnics both for Russia and for the irredenta themselves. In the efforts to solve the Bulgarian Church Question, they sought to influence politics domestically and internationally to ultimately bring about the unification of Russia and the “Christian East” in conformity with their visions.

The True Heirs of Classical Slavophilism: Pan-Orthodoxy vs Pan-Slavism

The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and its aftermath brought the Pan-Orthodox “party” renewed confidence in the future success of their cause. They continued to feel as a minority in the Russian educated society. At the same time, they rightly perceived their growing influence on Russian lay intellectuals, the official Russian church and the government in the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question.

This confidence was reflected in the Pan-Orthodox claims for the mantle of classical Slavophilism or specifically for the Slavophile credentials for their own vision of the anti-Western anti-liberal supranational civilization. Konstantin Leontiev first made that bid when he was trying to publish and popularize his above mentioned landmark Byzantinism and Slavdom in 1874-1875. His views on the primacy of the Church over “Slavic race,” autocracy over the individual, and nobility over legal equality met with
support in some government circles\textsuperscript{487} and eventually of Alexander II.\textsuperscript{488} At the same time, Leontiev encountered the opposition of the senior descendants of classical Slavophiles. He perceived Prince Vasilii Cherkasskii and especially Ivan Aksakov to be wavering on the paramount role of Orthodox Christianity in the Slavic way of life generally and in the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question specifically. This led Leontiev to discern “a chasm that often exists between a teacher and a disciple who went further along the same road.”\textsuperscript{489}

In 1878, Leontiev wrote in the Grazhdanin newspaper about the relation of the Slavophile tradition to Orthodoxy and the Greek-Bulgarian Church Question at the time of the negotiations leading to the cessation of hostilities between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and the treaty of Berlin. Leontiev argued that the general Slavic rather than the narrowly Balkan Slavic interests required the support of the Slavs for the Patriarchate of Constantinople against the Bulgarian Church movement. Although both the Bulgarians and the Greeks with the Schism of 1872 pursued parochial nationalistic agendas, the age-old Patriarchate along with the Russian autocracy was the institutional bedrock of the future “Eastern-Orthodox alliance.”\textsuperscript{490}

Although (and because) the Congress of Berlin of 1878 had limited Russian and Bulgarian gains from the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the Pan-Orthodox “party” was growing in influence in the educated society, the Church, and the government. The

\textsuperscript{487} Leontiev, Konstantin, Moia literaturnaia sudba. Vospominania (Moscow: Russkaia kniga, 2002), p.64
\textsuperscript{488} Nelson, Dale, Konstantin Leontiev and the Orthodox East (Unpublished Ph.D.dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1975), p.317
\textsuperscript{489} Leontiev, Konstantin, Moia literaturnaia sudba. Vospominania (Moscow: Russkaia kniga, 2002 [1935]), pp. 72-73
\textsuperscript{490} “Khram i Tserkov” in Leontiev, Konstantin, Vostok, Rossia, Slavianstvo: filosofskaia i politcheskaia publitsistika, dukhovnaia proza (1872-1891) (Moscow: Respublika, 1996), pp. 164-166. Originally published in the Grazhdanin, 1878 (10-12)
most active Pan-Slav committee – Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society – was closed because of its open criticism of Russian foreign policymakers as “the betrayal of the cause of Slavdom” to please “Europe.” Another major example of this trend was the 1879-permission by the Interior Ministry to Nikolai Durnovo to publish the openly Pan-Orthodox Vostok newspaper. One of the major “Slavophile” newspapers, Sovremennyie Izvestia published by N. P. Giliarov-Platonov, supported Durnovo’s initiative of Durnovo as its former employee from 1876 to 1879. It welcomed the agenda of Vostok because it aimed at bringing Russia back to its traditional role of the protector of all Orthodox Christians – the principle broken in the Bulgarian Church Question.

Similar to Tertii Filippov in his background and interests, Nikolai Durnovo was a lifelong member of the Moscow Slavic Society. As part of it, he was instrumental in establishing in 1872 in Moscow the town church (podvorie, metochion) of the Metropolitanate of Serbia. He was also very active in raising money and organizing Russian volunteers during the anti-Ottoman uprisings of 1875-1876 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian-Montenegrin-Turkish war of 1875. As appears from Ivan Aksakov’s efforts to bring him back to Pan-Slavism, Durnovo became converted to Filippov’s Pan-Orthodox views on the Bulgarian Church Question as early as 1878.

His Pan-Slav background was clear in the editorial program in the first issue of Vostok 2 May 1879. His statement was itself modeled on the famous programmatic

491 Thaden, Conservative Nationalism in 19th century Russia, p. 139
492 Sovremennyie Izvestia, 11 April 1879 (98)
493 Manuscript Division of the Russian State Library (NIOR RGB), f. 239 (Nil Popov)-8-32, p. 2
495 Manuscript Division of the State Historical Museum (OPI GIM), f. 177-1-10, p. 16bob (I. S. Aksakov to N. D. Durnovo, 13 January 1878)
article of 15 October 1861 by Ivan Aksakov who was the editor of the first Russian Pan-
Slav newspaper Den’ and many similar subsequent publications. Taking the main motifs
of Ivan Aksakov’s editorial, Nikolai Durnovo shifted the emphasis from the Slavs to the
Christian Orthodox “Greco-Slavic world.” The latter in contrast to Ivan Aksakov’s belief
in Slavdom was the main ally of Russia in Europe. Aksakov stressed the freedom of
powerful Russians against the background of the Slavs oppressed by “Germans or
Turks.”

By contrast, Durnovo emphasized Russia had been consistently protecting and
promoting reconciliation among coreligionist nations of the Greco-Slavic world. Russia
had never fought for the Slavs “among whom there are worshippers of the false prophet
Mohammad” and West-supported Catholic Croats and Poles themselves oppressing
Orthodox Serbs and Ruthenians respectively. Just like Aksakov contrasted mighty
Russians with the weak Slavs, Durnovo concluded with the triumphant vision of
powerful Russia liberating helpless and hapless Orthodox Christians. Central to that
dream was the collapse of Austria-Hungary and Turkey as “moribund and crumbling
empires built on alien nationalities (narodnosti).”

Rejecting religiously and ethnically heterogeneous supranational structures,
Durnovo, Leontiev, and Filippow promoted their vision of an ethnically diverse but
religiously homogeneous supranational entity for the Orthodox world. It was open
specifically to Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Rumanians while non-Slavic and non-
Orthodox minorities were not adequately discussed. In the Orientalist vein, Durnovo,
Leontiev, and Filippow developed their Pan-Orthodox intellectual constructs to redefine

496 Vostok, 2 May 1879 (1): 1-2
497 Ibid., p.2
the place of Ottoman Christians in the past, present, and future both for Russia and Balkan peoples themselves.

To foster ties between them, Russia needed to return from perceived Pan-Slavism of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 to its traditional Pan-Orthodox policy in the Near East. Durnovo saw the main source of division in the Bulgarian Church Question that separated the Bulgarians from the Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians, and Russians. While not demonizing common Bulgarian people, Durnovo following the other members of the Pan-Orthodox “party” blamed the Schism on the Western-educated and liberal-minded Bulgarian intelligentsia that put their exclusive national interests over Orthodoxy.498 As in the case of Filippov and Leontiev, the interests of Orthodox Christianity took precedence over the demands of the Pan-Slav nation.

Durnovo’s “Greco-Slavic world” was evidently inspired by Vladimir Lamanskii’s “Greco-Slavic world” and Leontiev’s “Byzantineism” and “Eastern Orthodox Alliance.” But Durnovo went further in allying himself with similar projects in the Greek world. He was a member of Leonidas Voulgares’ “Eastern Federation” and “Hellenismos.”499 In Vostok (1879-1886), Durnovo consistently promoted the idea of the Russian-led Eastern or Balkan Federation of Christian Orthodox nations.500 Vostok’s Athens-based correspondent and self-described “Philhellen” Ivan Petrov also promoted the idea of the Balkan Union to resist Austrian expansion into the area.501

498 Ibid., p. 10
499 OPI GIM, f. 177 (N. N. Durnovo)-1-31, pp. 16-32ob (N. Kazazis to N.N. Durnovo, 1899-1907), pp. 39-40ob (editors of La Confederation Orientale to N. N. Durnovo, 1888)
500 Vostok, 24 January 1880 (30): 25; Vostok, 6 April 1880 (40): 105
501 Vostok, 22 June 1881 (118): 351
This combination of cultural distinctiveness and political organization of the Pan-Orthodox civilization was a leitmotif of the bilingual Pravoslavnyi Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe. After running into trouble with the censorship for his criticism of the Russian Holy Synod and the Imperial government, Nikolai Durnovo published that successor to Vostok in a more liberal Rumania in 1901-1902. One of its regular Pan-Orthodox contributors, Countess Ina Kapnist, reaffirmed the vision of “the mighty union of Orthodox nations with their separate culture” to be led by Russia in opposition to encroachments of the alien West. Durnovo disseminated these notions as none other but “the Slavophile idea – no idea of ephemeral interests but the idea of blood and faith, the idea of life itself.” Born with the rise of Muscovy in the sixteenth century, these principles were supposedly coming to fruition at the turn of the twentieth century.

Although always under one thousand copies in circulation, Vostok truly became the missing link, the meeting place, and the sounding board of the Pan-Orthodox “party” both in Russia and the Near East in 1879 to 1886. According to Durnovo, over sixty Orthodox hierarchs were among subscribers and at least three Russian Metropolitans sent letters of approval to Vostok in 1880. Durnovo sought to popularize the writings of Filippov and Leontiev throughout the period. He asked Filippov to invite Leontiev to

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502 Pravoslavnyi Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe, 1/14 October 1901 (8): 127. In the major Russian “thick journal” Russkaia Mys, (“Po Makedonskomu voprosu,” 1903 (2):156-163), she argued against excessively aggressive irredentist policy of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Exarchate in Ottoman Macedonia at the expense of historic rights of Orthodox Greeks and Serbs.

503 Ibid., 16/29 August 1901 (2):31

504 Vostok, 27 July 1880 (53): 218

505 Ibid.
contribute to Vostok which he did describing the newspaper as “very sympathetic” to their common cause.\textsuperscript{506}

In his three articles titled “Letters of a Hermite” in Vostok, Leontiev built on his ideas of “Byzantnism and Slavdom” and further developed the connection to classical Slavophilism and the significance of the Bulgarian Church Question for Russia and his “Byzantine” cultural type. In “Bulgaromania” (bolgarobesie), he further conceptualized the Bulgarian Question within the context of the struggle between conservatism and liberalism across Europe at the time. In his framework, Ottoman Greeks generally and the hierarchy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate specifically represented the conservative principle whereas the Bulgarian movement and its Russian Pan-Slav supporters promoted emancipatory rational secular liberalism.\textsuperscript{507}

These trends within the Bulgarian Church Question had dire consequences for Russia because “never before in the history of Russia and Slavdom has the principle of racial (plemennoi) Slavism had to conflict with Orthodox canons and traditions.” Divorced from religion, nationalism tended to promote the ideas of universal liberty and equality of the French Revolution of 1789. The resulting Westernizing homogenization according to Leontiev was different from “cultural Slavophilism which was supposed to blossom from the unshakeable and ancient roots of Orthodoxy” and went against the anti-Western grain of the teachings of classical Slavophiles such as Alexis Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevskii. Leontiev argued that the contemporary “liberal Pan-Slavism is death first of all for Russia” whereas his own “Orthodox Pan-Slavism is salvation.” The latter would

\textsuperscript{506} Tertii Filippov to Konstantin Leontiev, 8 March 1879 published in “Brat ot brata pomogaem…” ed. O.L.Fetisenko, Nestor, 2000 (1): 169
\textsuperscript{507} “Pisma otshelnika: Bolgarobesie I,” Vostok, 10 June 1879 (7): 99-101
be in conformity with classical Slavophilism because “the policy of Orthodox spirit must be chosen over the policy of the Slavic flesh, the agitation of Bulgarian meat.” The need to ensure the primacy of Orthodoxy in the East made it necessary to preserve the theocratic Islamic framework of the Ottoman Empire for the foreseeable future. 508

In other issues of Vostok, in the spirit of Leontiev, Durnovo also supported this pro-Ottomanism. For example, he denounced the Bulgarian Exarchate as a tool of Bulgarian expansionist irredentism in Macedonia. For this reason, he urged the Ottoman Government to give no credence to unfounded claims of popular demands for Bulgarian Exarchist prelates in Skopje, Ship, and Bitol. Durnovo published a letter from Philippopolis in the Bulgarian dominated province of Eastern Rumelia that became autonomous of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The Greek minority in the province suffered increasing persecution by the Bulgarian majority. The unchecked ethnic tension brought to local Greeks a kind of nostalgia for the Ottoman rule of the province when both ethnic groups had the same rights as Orthodox Christians. 509

This advocacy of supranational institutions of the Church and multiconfessional empire gave a clearer expression to the thoughts previewed in his “Byzantinism and Slavdom” of 1875 especially with the statement that “the principle of autocracy and the principle of Patriarchal authority are so closely connected as to be virtually the same.” 510

Consequently, Leontiev declared Pan-Slavs in the wrong for having considered the South Slavs and specifically the Bulgarians as the repository of the “ancient Slavic

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509 P. S-s, “Iz Filippopolia”, Vostok, 19 February 1880 (34): 82, 83
spirit” and “pristine fresh Christianity.” These classical Slavophile ideals were incompatible with the Bulgarian movement’s “racial (plemennoi) Machiavellianism destroying the Church.” The original Christian Orthodox values were more likely to be found among Ottoman Greeks who had been able to preserve them from the Byzantium to the Ottoman domination. 511

Leontiev indirectly promoted the same idea in his 1879-obituary of the prominent monastic figure Father Kliment Sederholm. Leontiev emphasized how Sederholm was a spiritual disciple of Ivan Kireevskii and Alexis Khomiakov, Tertii Filippov, and Count Alexander Tolstoy. The influence of classical Slavophiles led German Protestant Sederholm to Orthodoxy and explained his support for the venerated Patriarch Gregory VI and the Ecumenical Patriarchate against the Bulgarian church movement. 512

As the editor of the Varshavskii Dnevnik newspaper, throughout 1880 Leontiev continued to argue that the Pan-Orthodox “party” was the only group of the educated Russian society to uphold the classical Slavophile ideals. Leontiev concluded that the central vision of the founding fathers of Slavophilism such as Alexis Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevskii was “the period, original in ideas and forms, of a multicolored Slavdom “in the great unity of Orthodoxy [emphasis in the original].” He contrasted this “cultural Slavophilism” with “political Pan-Slavism.” “The strange hallucination of racial nationalism” often forced the Russians “to follow unwillingly with our might foot along the path trodden by a small but strong hoof of South Slavs.” This “purely national

principle” led to “cosmopolitan, i.e., anti-national democratization” and liberalization of Europe. The way to realize the classical Slavophile ideals was in preserving supranational structures such as the Church and multinational Ottoman and Austrian Empires.513

The “correct” line of succession ran from the classical Slavophiles to Nikolai Danilevskii and ultimately to Konstantin Leontiev himself. According to the latter, Nikolai Danilevskii was “the real interpreter and the independent disciple of Ivan Kireevskii and Alexis Khomiakov” because he developed the theory of the cultural-historical types and insisted on the need for an original Slavic civilization culturally distinct from the Western hegemony.514 With this essence of classical Slavophilism intact, Leontiev went as far as to strip away all its non-essentials. From the pages of the conservative Grazhdanin newspaper, Leontiev kept urging all those affiliated with Pan-Slavism/Slavophilism to rally behind the cause of the healthy reaction up to the last year of his life, 1891. For that, they needed to stay true to anti-Westernism and to renounce all epiphenomenal Slavophile ideas such as equality of rights, opposition to the society of ranks and orders (bessoslovnost’), “support for Bulgarian atheists in their rebellion against the ecclesiastical rights of the Ecumenical Patriarch,” freedom of press, etc.515

The main features of this “true” Pan-Orthodox Slavophilism was the acceptance of non-Slavic Greeks and Rumanians as Orthodox coreligionists as equals within a confederation affiliated with Imperial autocratic Russia and the insistence on the greater

freedom of the Church from the modern domineering state in Russia and the Ottoman Empire. According to Nikolai Durnovo, these principles were espoused by many political, spiritual, and intellectual actors such as the Emperor Nikolai I, Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, Innokentii, Archbishop of Odessa, Alexei Khomiakov, Kireevskiis brothers, Iurii Samarin, Nikolai Danilevskii, Nikita Giliarov-Platonov, the editor of Sovremennye Izvestiia newspaper, General Rostislav Fadeev, Tertii Filippov, Aksakovs brothers. At the turn of the twentieth century, Moscow University Professor of Slavic studies Apollon Maikov and General Alexander Kireev continued their tradition.  

In actual fact, although Kireev supported many Pan-Orthodox initiatives such as the calling of an Ecumenical Council, he did not subscribe to Byzantinism. Furthermore, he disassociated from Leontiev as “a reactionary who lost his faith in Slavdom and national policy, preaches Arakcheevshina and has nothing to do with the Slavophiles.” Some other mainstream Slavophiles shared the negative stereotype of all things Byzantine. Thus, in his obituary of Katkov, Orest Miller argued that the latter’s ideal of the state was “the largely German type of a police state” adopted in Russia under Peter the Great. That alien state had much to do with “the Byzantine state type which was a political temptation for us at the ancient time when according to the trenchant remark of Metropolitan Makarii, the Greeks played the role later adopted by the Germans.” Both the Byzantine and German ideals were different from the Slavophile view that “the state

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516 Pravoslavnyi Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe, 23 August 1901 (3): 36-37
517 Trubetski, S. N., “Protivorechia nashei kultury,” Slavianofilstvo: Pro et Contra: Tvorchestvo i deiatelnoost russkikh myslitelei i issledovatelei (St Petersburg: Izdatelstvo Russkoi Khristianskoj gumanitarnoi akademii, 2006 [orig 1894]), p.646. Trubetski referred to Kireev’s “Nashi protivniki i nashi soiuzniki” report to the St Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Society on 19 December 1893. It is published in A.A. Kireev, Sochinenia. Vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1912), pp. 149-158. Kireev responded to Trubetski in “Spor s zapadnikami nastroiashei minuty,” ibid., pp. 159-206

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derives its real force in the real communion with the land, in finding from the land itself its needs and aspirations which is possible only with the free voice of the land."  

Although claiming the classical Slavophile line of succession, it was Leonitiev’s vision of “Byzantinism” that bilingual Pravoslavnii Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe continued to disseminate most explicitly. As Vostok in 1880s, its fin-de-siecle successor had to deal with the accusations of pro-Greek and pro-Serbian bias. Thus, Durnovo rejected the charges of Bulgarophobia put forward in the liberal Vestnik Evropy. Pravoslavnii Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe was not against the Bulgarian Exarchate per se. Following Leontiev, it opposed “progressivists and atheistic demagogues.” It did not seek to subordinate the Exarchate to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Rather, the Exarchate should be autocephalous within a union of Orthodox nations.  

Another watershed event contributed to the voicing of the principle of the religious authority as the bedrock of state legitimacy even among mainstream “pan-Slavs.” The break between the “ungrateful” Bulgarian Principality and Russia took place in 1886 in connection with the 1885 unification of autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria proper uncoordinated with Russian diplomacy.  

For contemporary diehard Pan-Slavs such as Sergei Sharapov, it was especially painful to see veteran Pan-Slav Nikolai Giliarov-Platonov turn against “little brothers (bratushki).” In his newspaper Sovremennyie Izvestia, where Nikolai Durnovo used to work from 1870 to 1876, that former Professor of Moscow Spiritual Academy sounded anti-Slavic and pro-Ottoman very much in the manner of Konstantin Leontiev. Giliarov  

Miller, O. F., “Slavianofily i Katkov,” ibid., pp. 448-449 [orig. in Russkii Kurier, 28 October 1887 (267): 2]  
Pravoslavnii Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe, #16, 9/22 December 1901, p. 250
denounced Bulgarians as exploiting Russia and appreciating it only as a tool for their parochial nationalist interests. He argued that the Bulgarians did not deserve Russian blood and treasure sacrificed for them. In the future, Russia would do best allying itself with the Sultan to keep restless Slavs at bay and preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. To defend unredeemed Bulgarian brethren, Sharapov sought to reaffirm the traditional Pan-Slav view that the interests of Bulgarians and Russians were identical. He also invoked the view that consoled many other Pan-Slavs on many occasions, namely, that one could not blame the acts of a handful of godless Westernized elites on the whole Bulgarian “people” the majority of whom are devoted to the Orthodox Church and Russia.

Petr Matveev’s disillusionment in the Slavs came along with the renewed emphasis on the authority of the Church and its strength vis-a-vis the state. In 1881-1882, with his degree in law, Matveev was an editor of the Proceedings of the Imperial Geographic Society where he contributed on folk juridical customs. Before the break between Russia and Bulgaria, Petr Matveev was a Russian advisor with the Justice Department of Eastern Rumelian administration. In his personalized Organicheskii statut Vostochnoi Rumelii written before the break between Russia and Bulgaria, Metveev appeared as an unabashed “Pan-Slav.” He rejoiced in the rapid Bulgarization of the autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia. “The Greek and Turkish plaster crumbled” as the opportunist local elites hastened to reclaim their Bulgarian identity. Its

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520 Sovremennyie Izvestia, 1886 (227), (228), (229) as quoted in Sharapov, Sergei, ed., Neopoznannyi genii. Pamiati N. P. Giliarova-Platonova. Statii, zametki, pisma i vyderzhki, sobrannye i preredaktirovannye Sergeiem Sharapovym (Moscow, 1903), pp. 78-79
521 Russkoie Delo, 1886 (19): 1
essential part was the devotion to Russia and admiration of “Russian generals and soldiers – benefactors of the Bulgarian people.”522

This triumphalist tone celebrating the longawaited unity of Russians with their junior unredeemed brethren completely disappeared in his Bolgaria posle Berlinskogo Kongressa. Strikingly reminiscent of Leontiev were his lamentations of the lack of any “historically developed classes of population.” With no “ranks and orders (soslovi)” the Bulgarian people allegedly had no “memories of independent historical life – ties to the past were broken without trace.” That lack of social stratification and traditions explained “extreme passivity, not to say, herd instinct” of the Bulgarian people. Thus, “bold adventurers” from among Westernized Bulgarian intelligentsia seized power.523 Nor did the Bulgarian clergy develop into “a body of national aspirations and desires” to oppose “the most religiously indifferent intelligentsia in Europe.” The Bulgarian clergy was supposedly so weak as to be unable to resist the encroachments of Catholic and Protestant propaganda in Bulgaria proper. The root of the evil according to Matveev was in the uncanonical standing of the Bulgarian Church and its break from the Patriarchate of Constantinople “accompanied by the decline in religious faith and spiritual authority in the Bulgarian people.” Matveev referred to the same opinion of “the most serious and conscientious participants of the struggle and break of the Bulgarian Church from the Patriarchate such as Stoianov-Burmov, Mark Balabanov, Gavriil Krustovich.”524

522 Matveev, Petr, Organicheskii statut Vostochnoi Rumelii. Istoricheskaia stranitsa iz deiatelnosti nashei diplomatii na Balkanskom poluostrove (Moscow, 1886), pp.95, 98
523 Matveev, Petr, Bolgaria posle Berlinskogo kongressa. Istoricheskii ocherk (St Petersburg, 1887), p.IX
524 Ibid., p.X
But Matveev’s criticism of the Bulgarian Exarchate went further than the views of even more moderate Pan-Slavs and Bulgarian nationalists as shown by the above reference to Stoianov-Burmov’s article in Vestnik Evropy in 1888. He effectively challenged the main argument made by Pan-Slavs as well as Bulgarian nationalists in Russia in justification of the iconoclastic Bulgarian church movement. Essentially, Matveev restated the early point of the Pan-Orthodox deemphasized by Filippov in 1870-1872 but reinforced by Leontiev and Durnovo - the Bulgarian church movement was no vanguard of the struggle of the Bulgarian nation or people against the “Phanariot yoke” but rather a work of a handful of Westernized Bulgarian intelligentsia manipulated by Catholic and Protestant propaganda. Also in the spirit of the Pan-Orthodox party, Matveev decried instrumentalization of the Church by politicians and total subordination of the Church to the state.

These two Pan-Orthodox pieces were not just a momentary impression influenced by the widespread shock of the Russian educated society at the “ingratitude” of little Slavic brothers. For years to come, Matveev continued to criticize the un-Orthodox goals and methods of the Bulgarian Exarchate and Bulgarian nationalist leaders in general in the major conservative Russkii Vestnik magazine in 1889. Even in his choice of the loaded title “Bulgarian Schism” rather a more euphemistic Bulgarian Question Matveev showed solidarity with the Pan-Orthodox – the Pan-Slavs did their best to minimize the significance of the decision of the Council of 1872.525

In the review article of 1895 in the same Russkii Vestnik, Matveev’s critique was even more forceful. In addition to five Ottoman centuries of national caesura, he

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525 Matveev, Petr (signed as P.A.M-v), “Bolgarskii ras kol,” Russkii Vestnik, 1889 (10)
identified opportunism inherent or developed in the Bulgarian character as an explanation of nearly all Bulgaria’s misfortunes. Opportunism in religious life was fully manifest in the Bulgarian Question when “Bulgarian leaders of the church conflict with the Patriarchate rejoiced and triumphed in the incomplete solution to the church question by the Sultan’s firman” instead of seeking a reconciliation based on Orthodox canons. The most recent evidence of the decline of the prestige of the Bulgarian Church vis-a-vis the Catholic-leaning state and among the people generally was the unobstructed passage of the amendment to the Bulgarian Constitution. Now the heir apparent did not need to be of the Orthodox creed.526

The conversions of Pan-Slavs like Giliarov and Matveev to Pan-Orthodoxy did not eliminate the debate. Even after 1885-1886, a “pure” Pan-Slav version of the Bulgarian Question blamed the “Greeks” for the escalation and continued impasse in the major Russian ecclesiastical periodical in 1890. Although the anonymous author mentioned about more and less moderate Bulgarians, he totally absolved them of any responsibility even for the unauthorized officiation on the Epiphany of 1872. Most importantly, the author accepted the Bulgarian nationalist version of the 1767 abolition of the autocephalous status of the Archbishopric of Ohrida. The sultan’s firman was necessary and sufficient for the restoration of the Bulgarian Church in 1872 as it supposedly was for its closure in 1767. The Patriarchate was itself to blame for breaking church canons in 1767 and especially for concocting a heresy of phyletism to promote its extreme Greek nationalist agenda.527 This approval of the intervention of the Government

527 “Greko-bolgarskii tservkovnyi vopros i ego reshenie,” Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie, November-December 1890: 747-750
into the church sphere could not put Pan-Slavs in a strong position to advocate the principle of strengthening of the Russian Church vis-a-vis the Government.

Still, compared with the Bulgarian nationalist viewpoint expressed in Russia after 1878, even this Russian Pan-Slav seemed much more “Pan-Orthodox.” According to the anonymous Pan-Slav author, the Schism had to be lifted at all costs to restore Orthodox unity. The ideal solution would be to convene a council greater than the one in 1872. Unfortunately, the circumstances in 1890 did not seem favorable to the idea of something like an Ecumenical Council when the Patriarchate was fighting tooth and nail to assert its civil and cultural autonomy from the centralization campaign of the Ottoman Government.\footnote{Ibid., p. 754}

Also, the same prelates who declared the Schism in 1872 would be likely to appear at a new council. It followed that the best solution would be a direct agreement between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate. The author believed that the Bulgarian prelates needed to make the first step to reconciliation - to issue a letter of penitence although not for the heresy of phyletism but for insubordination. The Patriarch needed to reassure them in advance that their “sacrifice” would be appreciated. This “concession” would enable the Patriarch to abolish excommunication of the Bulgarian hierarchs and their flock. Patriarch’s next step would be to open negotiations “to finally come to agreement and reconciliation most desirable for both parties and for the whole Orthodox Church.”\footnote{“Greko-bolgarskii tservkovnyi vopros i ego reshenie,” Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie, November-December 1890: 754}
This inconsistency or tension between “modern” nationalist and “pre-modern” religious rationales among Russian Pan-Slavs is largely absent in the account of F. Stoianov-Burmov. Typically for even “moderate” Bulgarian writers, he considered the Bulgarian Question solved with the firman because it secured the institutional skeleton of the nascent Bulgarian nation. The Schism of 1872 had no significance as merely a Greek nationalist stratagem. Thus, no steps to lift or restore Orthodox unity needed to be taken. One needed to support the work of the Bulgarian Exarchate aimed at promoting Bulgarian nationalist interests.⁵³⁰

To counter the continued pro-Bulgarian agitation in Russia, as close friends and collaborators, Durnovo, Filippov and Leontiev continued to disseminate Pan-Orthodox ideas and attracted articulate followers in the Russian educated society in 1870s, 1880s and 1890s. These neophytes from “Pan-Slavism” to “Pan-Orthodoxy” or to the vision of the Greco-Slavic cultural type voiced support of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in various periodicals and as members of the Imperial Palestine and Slavic societies all the way to 1912.

The most active promoter of the Greco-Slavic cultural type during the Eastern crisis (1875-1878), Professor Ivan Troitskii engaged in a lively and argumentative correspondence with Filippov from 1877 to 1887. Still, he refused to follow the tradition of supporting the institution of the Patriarchate of Constantinople as part of Russia’s messianic role in the “Christian East.” He continued to believe that the “East” and the Greeks generally exploited Orthodoxy for their nationalist agenda. As a result, there was no opportunity for Russia to promote genuinely Pan-Orthodox ideals

among its coreligionists. He blamed the perpetuation of the Bulgarian Schism solely on extreme Greek nationalist publicists and the anti-Slav public mood they shaped.  

According to Troitskii, the Russian Church had nothing to learn from “Eastern churches” and “is the only one able to revive the fading church life of the East with the hot breath of its own healthy life.” This dictum is fundamentally Orientalist in its logic of the absence of change and progress. Like the Pan-Slavs and the Pan-Orthodox, the proponents of the Greco-Slavic cultural type claimed the “scientific” authority to represent the Greeks and the Slavs both for Russia and its unredeemed coethnics and coreligionists.

After the Eastern Crisis (1875-1878), Anton Budilovich became one of the most active advocates of the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory. For this Professor of Russian and Slavic studies at the University of Warsaw, this stance was a major departure from his earlier purely ethnographic Pan-Slavism. In 1875, he warned about the dangers to “the Slavic element” in Central and South Eastern Europe. In this process of othering, shared Orthodoxy apparently did not make any difference, “Nowadays any alien (inorodets) lords it over the Slav: here the German, there the Magyar, or the Rumanian, or the Italian, or the Greek, or the Turk, or the Jew.”

The change of attitude towards Greeks and Orthodoxy came as a result of Filippov’s influence. The latter writing to Leontiev took pride in having brought one of those “one-sided but smart Slav-lovers” “to acknowledge my views on the Greek-

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531 GARF, f. 1099-1-2737, pp. 2-3 (I. E. Troitskii to T. I. Filippov, 20 June 188)
533 Anton Budilovich, “O sovremennom polozhenii i vzaimnykh otnosheniakh Slavian zapadnykh i iuzhnykh,” in Slavianskii Sbornik, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1875), 593-595
Bulgarian conflict.”\textsuperscript{534} As the editor and founder of \textit{Slavianskoie Obozrenie}, in 1892 Budilovich vigorously promoted closer unity of the nations of the Greco-Slavic cultural type in the very midst of the mainstream Russian Pan-Slav scholarly community. An important part of this agenda was his advocacy of the calling of the Ecumenical Council of all Orthodox churches as a solution to the Bulgarian Church Question. In this Pan-Orthodox project Professor Budilovich was directly inspired by Filippov.\textsuperscript{535} But unlike Filippov, he urged the Patriarchate to accept the accomplished fact of the independence of the Bulgarian Church and assigned the responsibility for the Schism not only to Westernized Bulgarian nationalists but also to the Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{536}

As an Orientalist producer of knowledge connected to power politics, Budilovich promoted the concept of the Greco-Slavic cultural type to help stop internecine violence in Ottoman Macedonia. In journal articles and separate pamphlets, he argued in favor of autonomy rather than partition for that province as the birthplace of the cultural type founded by SS Cyril and Methodius. Budilovich urged their now feuding Greek and Slavic spiritual descendants to find reconciliation in the shared homeland and provide a model for a greater future Greco-Slavic entity.\textsuperscript{537}

In 1891, the same \textit{Slavianskoie Obozrenie} started by Anton Budilovich saw the first publication of Professor Lamanskii’s seminal \textit{Tri Mira Aziisko-Europeiskogo}
Materika. Lamanskii used his earlier ideas of the Greco-Slavic Cultural Type as the centerpiece of proto-Eurasianism which directly inspired P.N. Savitskii in his programmatic pamphlet of 1921. As Budilovich’s successor at the helm of Slavianskoie Obozrenie, Professor Palmov turned the monthly into a yearbook and carried on the commitment to provide information about academic and day-to-day life of “Slavs or nations of the Greco-Slavic cultural type generally” in fin-de-siècle Russia.

In the mainstream conservative press, Filippov and Leontiev in particular were often able to influence the editorial policy of Grazhdanin owned by Prince Vladimir Mesherskii’s. The latter himself was a disappointed Pan-Slav and welcomed articles against the Bulgarian church independence movement from Filippov, Leontiev, as well as from the latter’s disciples such as I. I. Kristi, L. N. Denisov, and A. A. Aleksandrov. Filippov was able to influence the editorial policy of Russkoie Obozrenie, the magazine under the patronage of Over-Procurator Konstantin Pobedonostsev. A.A. Alexandrov, the editor of Russkoie Obozrenie since 1892 but also one of Leontiev’s disciples, parted with the Syrian Arab contributor Professor Georgii Murkos because Filippov characterized him as “the enemy of Eastern Patriarchates.”

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539 Slavianskoie Obozrenie. God vtoroi. Sbornik statei po slavianovedeniu, ed. I. S. Palmov (St Petersburg, 1894), pp. II-IV
540 Mesherskii, V.P., Moi vospominania (Moscow: I. Zakharov, 2001 [1897]), pp. 356-366
541 RGALI, f. 2980-1-1023, p. 76 (K. N. Leontiev to T. I. Filippov, 26 November 1882)
542 Ibid., l. 98 (Leontiev to Filippov, 24 November 1884). An example of their pro-Patriarchate writings is in P. Sergievskii [I. I. Kristi], “Chto poseesh, to i pozhmesh (po povodu novoi knigi K.Leontieva),” Grazhdanin, 17 October 1885 (82): 12 - 13
544 GARF, f. 1099-1-1340, p. 15 (A. A. Alexandrov to T. I. Filippov, 5 December 1892)
In his turn, Nikolai Durnovo was able to influence Apollon Maikov (1826-1902), an important Slavic scholar, Professor of Moscow University (1857-1859), and the Director of Imperial theaters in Moscow since 1885. As an active supporter of the “Slavic cause,” Maikov helped secure scholarships and academic transfers for Slavic students using his position as the personal secretary of Moscow Governor General (1873-1893). He was an active contributor to a number of conservative publications including Durnovo’s Vostok but also Beseda, Novoie Vremia, Russkie Vedomosti, Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, and Svet. Since 1886, he led the effort to secure the permission to reopen the Moscow Slavic Committee. It was closed down in 1878 for its criticism of Russian moderate foreign policy within the European Concert and specifically for the treaty of Berlin that dramatically reduced Russian gains from the victory over the Ottoman Empire (1877-1878). When the Slavic Committee was resurrected in 1893 as the Moscow Slavic Mutual Aid Society, Maikov became its Chairman.  

In his correspondence with Durnovo, Maikov supported Durnovo’s criticism of the stifling control of the Russian state over the Russian Church embodied by the figure of Over-Procurator K. P. Pobedonostsev. Maikov also welcomed Durnovo’s publications directed against perceived Russian state backing for Bulgarian irredentism carried out through the Bulgarian Exarchate. Maikov was able to provide financial assistance to enable Durnovo to publish Orient Orthodoxe/Pravoslavnyi Vostok in Rumania.  

As the regular contributor to the foreign policy section of the major Russian “thick” journal Russkaia Mysl, Maikov promoted the same Pan-Orthodox vision of

546 OPI GIM, f. 177-1-10, pp. 83-120 ob (A. A. Maikov to N. N. Durnovo, 1895-1902)
Russian messianic role in the “Christian East.” For this, Russia needed to uphold the institutions of the “Eastern Patriarchates” unable to fend for themselves against Catholic and Protestant religious propaganda. To avoid further cracks in the unity of the Orthodox Church, Russia had to be an active and impartial mediator among its Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, Romanian, and Arab coreligionists. To empower Orthodox churches in those nation-states both against their excessively Westernized governments and Western proselytizing, Russia would do best securing autocephalous status for them. At the same time, Maikov resolutely argued in favor of the legitimate way to proceed on the road to autocephaly. The Council of 1872 rightfully condemned the way pursued by the Bulgarian Exarchate as “impassioned and maladroit.”

Equality among autocephalous churches would ensure reconciliation and cooperation of the Orthodox nations vis-à-vis “the educated, resourceful and rich Jesuits” who “oppress, seduce, and forcefully divert them into different faith.” The resulting “spiritual union” would prevent Orthodox churches from “straying aside as happened with the Serbian Church or from offending each other as is happening in the Bulgarian Church whose representative, Exarch, recently voiced in his Synod impassioned and unbecoming accusations against the Greek Church.” Thus, Maikov reiterated the traditional perception of unredeemed coreligionists as powerless to resist the age-old Catholic or Protestant crusade. Unless brought into some kind of union with Russia, they were doomed to succumb to the seduction of the West. Maikov shared the Pan-Orthodox agenda styled after Leontiev and Durnovo of containing nationalism within a sort of federation based on the communion of autocephalous churches.

547 Maikov, A. A., “Pravoslavie na Vostoke,” Russkaia Mysl, 1884 (3): 146
548 Ibid., pp. 150-151
A particularly important convert from Pan-Slavism to Leontiev’s Byzantinism was Vladimir Gringmut.\footnote{RGALI, f. 2980-1-1024, p. 167 (Leontiev to Filippov, 6 January 1887)} He was a junior editor of Moskovskie Vedomosti under Michael Katkov. After Katkov’s death, he gradually took over that major Russian daily in 1896.\footnote{Tvardovskaia, V. A., „Tsarstvovanie Aleksandra III“ in Russkii konservatizm, p. 288} He also promoted Leontiev’s views on the Bulgarian Church Question and the need for Pan-Orthodox Russian foreign policy in Russkoie Obozrenie.\footnote{Spectator [V. A. Gringmut], “Nashi bratia,” Russkoie Obozrenie, 1890, vol. IV (7): 372 - 384} Another Pan-Slav publisher, Sergei Sharapov, came under Leontiev’s influence and accepted for Russkoie Delo contributions from his disciples such as Anatolii Aleksandrov, Iosif Fudel, and Nikolai Umanov.\footnote{RGALI, f. 2980, op. 1, d. 1024, l. 41 (Leontiev to Filippov, 29 April 1888)} In the later period, Iosif Fudel and Alexander Burnakin in particular vigorously argued in favor of Leontiev’s Byzantinism, “Eastern Orthodox Union,” eventual centralization of all national Orthodox churches under the Patriarchate of Constantinople all the way to the First World War.\footnote{Fudel, Protoierei Iosif, “Sudba K. N. Leontieva,” Moskovskie Vedomosti, 12 November 1910, no. 261: 6; “Vostochnyi Vopros (pamiat K. Leontieva),” Moskovskie Vedomosti, 12 November 1911, no. 260: 2; Burnakin, A., “Tsargrad i Vseslaviansstvo (prorochestva K. Leontieva),” Novoie Vremia, 2 November 1911: 32}  

During the Great War itself, Russian literary critic and thinker A. S. Glinka-Volzhskii promoted Leontiev’s ideas as he tackled head-on the uneasiness and “ambivalence” among classical Slavophiles about all things Byzantine. Glinka reasserted Leontiev’s vision of Byzantium as “the deepest nutrient root.” He argued that “the binomial formula of Russia and Slavdom must be complemented by the first and essential member into East (Byzantium), Russia and Slavdom.”\footnote{Glinka-Volzhskii, A. S., “Sviataia Rus i russkoie prizvanie,” Slavianofilstvo: Pro et Contra: Tvorchestvo i deiatelnost russkikh mysliitelei i issledovatelei (St Petersburg: Izdatelstvo Russkoi Khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii, 2006 [orig 1914]), p.744} For him, the dilemma of Russian messianism was two-fold, “either to entrench themselves full-strength behind Holy Rus
and all concrete originality, to safeguard the historical legacy, even if self-willed but their own native Russian, nationally distinctive, typical, exceptional, unique, even if based on the Eastern-Byzantine foundational principle, or to give themselves to the universal synthesis of ideal Christianity as a mere idea and a hope.” According to Glinka, Leontiev’s vision of “the Russian idea” as “ancient ecumenical Eastern Orthodoxy and Byzantinism” was the first response to “the Slavophile antinomy.” The second response was Soloviev’s “universal Christian synthesis.” Glinka saw the compromise between the two in Dostoevskii’s expressing both views at different times and in different writings. Later into the war, S. A. Askoldov reaffirmed Leontiev’s right judgment about the unreliability of Balkan Slavs when Bulgarian joined Central Powers against Russia and its allies. For him, this act was one of the many signs of the crisis of Russian messianism and Slavophilism which “in a certain sense died.”

Among Russian émigrés, the term Byzantinism shed its negative connotations to adopt the meaning given to it by Leontiev. In his analysis of Slavophilism, Georgii Florovskii juxtaposed the “culturally rich” Western Europe and “creatively virgin “East,” “Byzantino-Slavic” world. In the views of contemporary Slavophile-minded Russian thinkers, Leontiev’s Byzantinism is a positive term perceived as denoting the font of the “the kindred spiritual-religious type.” Just like Western Europeans found inspiration in ancient pagan culture during Renaissance, so could Russia at present enrich itself by creatively tapping into the Byzantine source of its cultural national tradition.

555 Ibid., pp. 748-751
Significantly, it is revealing of the mindset of the editors at least that Panarin’s piece concludes the landmark collection of primary sources on Slavophilism published in 2006.\textsuperscript{558}

**Struggling for the Influence on Russian Foreign Policy, the Orthodox Church in Russia and the Ottoman Empire**

As in 1850s through 1870s, both the supporters of Pan-Orthodoxy and of Pan-Slavism influenced the attitude of the Russian diplomats and the Russian Church. In the period from 1878 to 1912, the interest of the leadership of the Russian Church in lifting the Schism started from a very high point but gradually petered out. However, at any point there were individual prelates outside the helm of the Russian Holy Synod taking initiative in the direction of reconciliation on Pan-Orthodox terms. More consistently than in 1870s, the Pan-Orthodox “party” advocated the support for the institution of “Eastern Patriarchates” not just as the bedrock of Russian foreign policy but upheld them as the model for reorganization of the Russian Church and state.

As for Russian foreign policy, its goals remained generally Pan-Orthodox among main policymakers although there were outspoken Pan-Slavs especially. As in earlier periods, pro-Bulgarian decisions stemmed from the fear of Catholic propaganda which again testifies to the significance of “combined development” of traditional religious messianism and modern ethnographic consciousness. After Ignatiev’s tenure in Constantinople (1864-1877) and especially after the break between newly liberated Bulgaria and Russia (1885-1896), there was a shift away from invoking the intervention

\textsuperscript{558} Panarin, A.S., “Sposobna li postroit tsarstvo khristianskaia dusha?” [orig. Moscow, 2001], ibid., pp. 916-7
of the Ottoman government into the Bulgarian Question. Often over the noncommittal position of the Holy Synod, Russian diplomats sought to work with the Patriarchs of Constantinople towards lifting the Schism and restoring the united front of Orthodoxy. As earlier, Russian policymakers saw its value in and of itself against the perceived onslaught of Catholic proselytizing rather than just as a trump card in their competition with various Western powers.

Overall, there was a lot of tension between the Russian Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople at the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Patriarch Ioachim III perceived Russia as fully supporting political Pan-Slavism at the time generally and encouraging the rebellious Bulgarian Exarchate specifically. The Patriarchate stopped short of taking “appropriate steps”, i.e., up to declaring the Russian Church schismatic because Russian army priests in Bulgaria participated in the liturgy and Holy Communion along with the priests of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The response of the Russian Holy Synod matched the aggressive and hostile tone of the Patriarch. For the first time since after the Schism of 1872, the Russian Church broke silence over the Bulgarian Exarchate and condemned the Schism.\textsuperscript{559} However, this response remained a draft albeit approved by Emperor Alexander II. The Russian Church and the Government entrusted the Ambassador to Constantinople Prince Lobanov-Rostovskii to choose the moment of handing the response. In the meantime, he was supposed to act in the spirit of reconciliation on the Patriarch Joachim III.\textsuperscript{560}

\textsuperscript{559} AVPRI, f. 161/3, collection 233 (1850-1884), part IV, 3 March 1879, pp.2466-9
\textsuperscript{560} Ibid., 13 March 1879, p. 2472
This spirit of reconciliation with the Patriarchate led to the Russian Church’s avoiding serving and taking communion with Bulgarian prelates on their visits to Russia. *Vostok* welcomed this moderation and corrected the liberal *Novoe Vremia* newspaper misinforming its readers that the Holy Synod had actually sent the harsh response to the Patriarchate.\(^{561}\)

Nikolai Durnovo became even more enthusiastic when Count Dmitrii Tolstoy resigned from his position as the Over-Procurator of the Russian Holy Synod (1866-1880). *Vostok* joined *Sovremennye Izvestia* edited by the former Professor of Moscow Spiritual Academy N.P.Giliarov-Platonov to harshly criticize the results of Tolstoy’s tenure. The Pan-Orthodox “party” blamed the Schism of 1872 almost exclusively on the inactivity and procrastination of the Holy Synod’s leadership at the time. Specifically, Count Tolstoy refused to send Russian representatives to the projected Ecumenical Council summoned by Patriarch Gregory VI in 1871. Furthermore, Durnovo alleged that in 1872 Tolstoy singlehandedly had put on hold the incomes of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and foreign monasteries in order to pressurize Greek nationalists at the helm of Ottoman Christian churches into lifting the Schism and other Greek nationalist ecclesiastical policies. As a result, “thousands of Christians fell from Orthodoxy and the Mother Church ran into great hardships.”\(^{562}\)

Domestically, Durnovo lashed out against Tolstoy for introducing Old Church Slavonic liturgy universally and thereby suppressing the rights of Moldavian and Georgian Orthodox Christians in Russia while lending support to the Bulgarians demands

\(^{561}\) *Vostok*, 2 May 1879 (1): 5  
\(^{562}\) *Vostok*, 27 July 1880 (53): 218
for church independence. In tolerance to diversity, unswerving adherence to the true Orthodox tradition, and especially firmness in relations with the Pope’s encroachments, Vostok, Bereg, and Varshavskii Dnevnik agreed with Neologos of Constantinople – “Orthodoxy in Russia needs help of Eastern Churches.”\(^{563}\)

Taking its cue from Anatolikos Aster of Constantinople, Durnovo informed his readers that the question of the restoration of the Moscow Patriarchate might be discussed when “Eastern Patriarchs” would come to Moscow for the occasion of the sanctification of the new Moscow Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The idea of the invitation of the Patriarchs was raised at the session of the St Petersburg Society of the Lovers of Spiritual Enlightenment.\(^{564}\)

When the same issue was raised by another Greek newspaper – Neologos of Constantinople, Durnovo argued enthusiastically in favor of the restoration of the Patriarchate. This reform would elevate the Russian Church and liberate it from its perceived subjugation to government officials. The future Russian Patriarch would run the Church together with the Synod of about seven hierarchs plus a representative of the Georgian Church which would regain its autocephalous status. This structure would be patterned on the organization of “Eastern Patriarchates” which managed to preserve Orthodoxy “despite many centuries of the heavy Turkish yoke.” Durnovo believed that the autocephalous churches of every Orthodox country needed to be raised to the status of the Patriarchate. In the future Russian-led Balkan Union, those Patriarchs would

\(^{563}\) Vostok, 5 May 1880 (43): 131-134  
\(^{564}\) Vostok, 19 February 1880 (34): 86
congregate in Constantinople or in other capitals of the confederation to discuss church affairs of the whole Christian Orthodox world.\textsuperscript{565}

This overt agitation coincided with the same ideas about the restoration of the Russian Patriarchate and generally the more oppositional stance vis-a-vis the Government among many Russian bishops.\textsuperscript{566} Durnovo found an early ally in the person of the Archbishop of Don Mitrofan (\textit{Zadonskii}). The latter wrote in support of Russia’s relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and especially of the principle of episcopal authority threatened by rebellious Bulgarians. Archbishop Mitrofan linked the Schism to the issue of the projected church reform in Russia,

“In practice, the slightest weakening of the Christ-given bishops’ power may cause religious scandal and hesitation among Orthodox people, undermine bishops’ moral, religious and any beneficial influence on the flock, clergy, and laity, provide the heterodox Christians, heretics, and Old Believers with a pretext to criticize and mock at the dignity of bishops and the Orthodox Church in general and its inability to defend its rights, distance the Russian Church from the type of the original Christian Church, the Greek Church, may lead to the division between the Russian Church and the Greek Churches, and may move the Russian Church closer to the Presbyterian Church, weaken spiritual authority generally and chip away at the dignity, weight, and significance of the Orthodox Church in the eyes of the whole world."\textsuperscript{567}

\textsuperscript{565} Vostok, 6 April 1880 (40): 105-106
\textsuperscript{566} Basil, John, Church and State in Late Imperial Russia: Critics of the Synodal System of Church Government (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and Eastern European Monographs, 2005), pp. 7-33
\textsuperscript{567} Vostok, 1 July 1879 (10):157
Durnovo perceived a wave of change rising in the Russian Church in connection with the departure of Tolstoy from the Holy Synod. *Vostok* highlighted the proposal of the *Rossia* newspaper to call congresses of local bishops “to give a proper direction to the church life in general.” As for interchurch relations, Durnovo welcomed increased attention to the plight of the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch impoverished by the hold put on their Russian revenues, He referred specifically to the report of Vasilii Khitrovo at the session of the St Petersburg Society of the Lovers of Spiritual Enlightenment.\(^568\)

In early 1880s, Durnovo took issue with Professor Georgii Murkos, voicing the resentment of many Syrian Arab Orthodox nationalists against their Greek prelates at the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch.\(^569\) Murkos provocatively argued that the situation of Arab Orthodox suffering the abuses and hellenization by the “corrupt” Greek clergy was identical to the situation of Bulgarian Slavs “struggling” against the “Phanariot yoke” of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Durnovo did his best to undermine credibility of Murkos as allegedly secretly working for Catholic propaganda. Without the “Greek” church leadership, Arabs, like Slavs, would be unable to resist the “seduction” of the Jesuits. As part of Greek-Russian exchange of ideas, Durnovo adopted the Greek irredentist argument of ethnic Greek origin of all Arab-speaking Syrian Orthodox Christians.\(^570\) Still, in early 1880s, Durnovo did not see the leadership of the Russian Church and Pan-Slavs conspiring with Murkos as he would in 1890s.

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\(^{568}\) Ibid., 9 May 1880 (44): 142


\(^{570}\) *Vostok*, 24 September 1880 (60): 276; *Vostok*, 6 December 1880 (70): 354
While supporting the strengthening of episcopal and patriarchal authority, Vostok distrusted parish priests as agents of the bureaucratic Holy Synod. Durnovo argued that the parish itself needed to control its funds. This proposal led the official paper of the Moscow diocese Moskovskie Tserkovnyie Vedomosti to accuse Vostok along with Sovremennye Izvestia of “propagandizing Protestant ideas.” In response, Durnovo referred to the Ecumenical Patriarchate as his main inspiration.\(^{571}\) In this connection, the major church papers Tserkovnyi Vestnik of St Petersburg and Tserkovno-Obshestvennyi Vestnik characterized Vostok as the mouthpiece of Moscow candle-mongers and churchwardens “alarmed by the Government’s plan to curb their abuses of church economy.” There was probably truth in both charges. Durnovo denied both of them but reiterated that Vostok was in favor of parish control over parish income and the wages of parish clergy. He also admitted his opposition to church monopoly on candles which supposedly resulted in the supply of bad quality candles.\(^{572}\)

In his Vostok period (1879-1886), Durnovo’s support for Old Believers was there but not as open as later. Vostok attacked the ban on “the solemn and public liturgy” by the Old Believers as “scandalizing (soblazn) for Orthodox believers” while “Roman Catholics, Protestants, and other creeds considered heretical are allowed temples for liturgy in their own languages.”\(^{573}\) At the same time, he did not support Staroobriadets and Poriadok newspapers advocating religious freedom for Old Believers. “Ruled by bureaucracy,” the mainstream Russian Church was not free itself. The Old Belief would attract everyone from the bureaucratic Russian Church “with its spiritual dignitaries and

\(^{571}\) Vostok, 18 May 1880 (45): 151  
\(^{572}\) Vostok, 15 January 1881 (78): 31  
\(^{573}\) Vostok, 20 January 1881 (79): 37-38
officials” based on nothing but government monopolies, wages, and pawnshops for priests.\textsuperscript{574}

The debate around Tertii Filippov’s book titled \textit{Contemporary Church Questions} (\textit{Sovremennyie Tserkovnye Voprosy}) put into sharp relief the connection between the questions of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Old Belief on the agenda of the Pan-Orthodox party. It represented another episode of the decades-long controversy over the Bulgarian Question between “pre-modern” Pan-Orthodox religious party and allegedly “modern” Pan-Slavs. Although technically a sideline hobby to his full-time position of the State Comptroller, Filippov’s contributions to church life gave him an unrivalled reputation of the pre-eminent expert in canonical law. This fame was increasingly causing envy of the Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod Konstantin Pobedonostsev himself.\textsuperscript{575} In his 1882 book, Filippov put together his writings since 1860s including his Pan-Slav speech welcoming Metropolitan of Serbia Mikhail in 1869. The main argument of the book was in favor of the calling of an Ecumenical Council of the Orthodox Church to lift two schisms – around the Bulgarian and Old Belief Questions.\textsuperscript{576} Filippov’s argument was supported in the official publication of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in several issues in the summer and fall of 1882. One of its contributors, Constantinios Vafeidis, wrote an extensive review that recounted the history of the Russian Church and its relations to the Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{577}

\textsuperscript{574} \textit{Vostok}, 1 March 1881 (89): 114
\textsuperscript{575} Mesherskii, Vladimir, \textit{Vospominania} (Moscow: Zakharov, 2001 [1897]), p.635
\textsuperscript{576} Filippov, Tertii, \textit{Sovremennye Tserkovnye Voprosy} (St Petersburg, 1882)
\textsuperscript{577} \textit{Ekklesiastiki Aletheia}, 30 June 1882, 7 July 1882, 21 July 1882, 5 August 1882, 18 August 1882, 1 September 1882, 8 September 1882, 6 October 1882
But a major ecclesiastical journal Moscow-based Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie took issue with Filippov’s diagnosis of the problems of the Orthodox world and his solutions. Durnovo denounced “its editor and candle-trader” Preobrazhenskii as

“the notorious ringleader (vozhaka) of Moscow liberal priests together with the famous editor of Tserkovno-Obshestvennyi Vestnik M-r Popovitskii, laughable Arab theologian M-r Murkos and Protestant theologian Belliustin from Kaliazin who attack supposedly only the Ecumenical Patriarchate but in actuality the Orthodox Church itself which in their mind is long overdue to be reformed into a Protestant church with married hierarchs at its head.”

Father Sklobovskii from Ostrogozhsk wrote a particularly devastating critique of Filippov’s book in two issues of Preobrazhenskii’s Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie. He considered Filippov as part of the lamentable trend of laymen intervening into “the inner sanctuary of the Church in essential matters of faith.” Thus, the tables were turned around. Filippov and the Pan-Orthodox around him argued in favor of greater church independence of the state. Sklobovskii essentially restated the same argument made by the Bulgarians in Russia and their Pan-Slav sympathizers from 1858 through 1870s. The Bulgarian Schism was to blame not on extreme Bulgarian nationalists or the divide and rule tactics of the Ottoman Government but rather on the intransigence of extreme Greek nationalists that had taken over the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus, Sklobovskii explicitly justified the issue of the Sultan’s firman establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate in February 1870 and the interference of the Ottoman government into the affairs of the Orthodox Church.

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578 Vostok, 10 October 1882 (201): 394
579 Sklobovskii, D., “Zametki na knigu T.Filippova Sovremennye Tserkovnye Voprosy (St Petersburg, 1882,” Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie, 1882 (9): 104
580 Ibid., p.117
Whereas Filippov admitted Bulgarian national revival and the abuses of the clergy as part of Ottoman corruption as reasons for Bulgarian church movement, he stressed Western influence in the un-Orthodox methods pursued by the Bulgarian national leadership to reach legitimate Bulgarian national church goals. In contrast, Sklobovskii emphasized that from beginning to end the Bulgarian church movement was the product of Bulgarian popular agency.\textsuperscript{581}

At the same time, rather inconsistently Sklobovskii and as well as other Pan-Slavs welcomed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire into Russian-sponsored Christian independent nation-states. In contrast to Filippov and other “Pan-Orthodox,” Sklobovskii and Pan-Slavs gave virtually no credit to the Patriarchate of Constantinople in defense of its flock from Western propaganda and “any unbridled Turkish physical moral and religious violations (nasilia) of Christians.” Russia alone was able “to rein the Turks in.” Thus, the liberation of “Turkish tyranny” of Greece and other Ottoman successor-states was an unmixed blessing. Similarly, the establishment of national churches free from the corrupt “Turkish” accomplice, i.e., the Patriarchate of Constantinople, was a “relief” for Greece and other Ottoman Christian nations.\textsuperscript{582} Sklobovskii saw an appropriate framework for them in “the federation of separate nations (narodnosti) autonomous of each other” rather in the restored Byzantine Empire centered on Greeks.\textsuperscript{583}

Countering Filippov’s interpretation of the Bulgarian Schism, Sklobovskii differed in the cure for it as well. Not touching on the dogma, the problem did not merit

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid., p.134
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid., pp.107-108
\textsuperscript{583} Sklobovskii, D., “Zametki na knigu T.Filippova Sovremennyie Tserkovnyie Voprosy” (St Petersburg, 1882,” Pravoslavnoie Obozrenie, 1882 (10): 137
the calling of the Ecumenical Council but had to be solved locally by the Patriarchate of Constantinople alone. Thus, the Russian Church’s opposition to the Ecumenical Council in 1871-1872 was wise in that it allowed to contain Greek nationalist intrigue from affecting the other autocephalous churches outside the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Sklobovskii conceded the uniqueness of the Bulgarian Exarchate named after an ethnic group rather after a specific area. But the potentially conflicting claims over the same territory by the Exarchate and Patriarchate were not listed as official justification for the Schism of 1872. Generally, the national principle in the Church was not so horrible an aberration as to justify an invention of a heresy of phyletism.

Nikolai Durnovo was quick to check the effort of Sklobovskii and his fellow Pan-Slavs to portray Filippov as an isolated voice in the Orthodox world. According to Durnovo, in 1871-1872 the Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod Dmitrii Tolstoy was supported only by Metropolitan of Lithuania (later of Moscow) Makarii in the opposition to Patriarch Gregory VI’s call of the Ecumenical Council over the Bulgarian Question. The majority opinion of the hierarchs of the Russian Church such as Metropolitans of Moscow Innokentii, Arsenii of Kiev, Filofei of Tver (later of Kiev) was in favor of the Ecumenical Council. Filippov’s ideas found supporters in Professor Kurganov, Konstantin Leontiev, and N.I.Giliarov-Platonov, the editor of Sovremennyie Izvestia, who “as the former Professor of Spiritual Academy could not help condemning uncanonical Bulgarian acts.” Durnovo also criticized Sklobovskii for relying exclusively

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584 Ibid., p.326
585 Ibid., p.347
586 Ibid., p. 348
on pro-Bulgarian sources and referred him to official patriarchal minutes of the Schism, Greek, and Serbian newspapers such as Neologos, Aion, Thrake, Istok, and Sion.\textsuperscript{587}

As another sign of the strength of Pan-Orthodox tendency, Durnovo welcomed the first issue of Pravoslavnyi Palestinskii Sbornik, a new publication by Vassiliii Khitrovo, “an enthusiastic supporter of Orthodoxy who many times traveled to Holy Land.” As Khitrovo’s earlier publications, the new one was objective as well.\textsuperscript{588}

Durnovo believed that the “Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society” started by Khitrovo would continue the traditions of Russian messianism in the “Christian East” of vigorously resisting the West by strengthening the established Orthodox churches. Thus, he supported the cooperation of the ostensibly private Palestinian Society with the Russian Foreign Ministry against the proliferation of Western religious propaganda in the Holy Land. Durnovo urged the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople to insist on the confirmation by the Ottoman Government of the candidates to the Patriarchal throne elected by the Synod of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. In Durnovo’s mind, this event would put an end to the perceived hands-off policy of Russia towards its coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire. Russia needed to intervene actively in ecclesiastical problems such as the illegitimate removal of the distinguished Metropolitan of Serbia Mikhail by the Serbian King. Furthermore, Russia’s interests would continue to suffer from the prolonged residence of Bulgarian Exarch in Constantinople whose unsanctioned presence

\textsuperscript{587} Vostok, 14 November 1882 (208): 448-450
\textsuperscript{588} Vostok, 6 October 1881 (137)
in the heart of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was fueling the Greek-Bulgarian conflict and creating fertile soil for Roman Catholic propaganda sponsored by France and Austria.\textsuperscript{589}

The new Over-Procurator Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1880-1906) indeed made a decision to strictly abide by the canonical regulations in regards to the Bulgarian Question. In principle, his stance remained consistent with the Orthodox canons but shifted from the more active initial support for the Patriarchate of Constantinople to the appearance of neutrality secretly favorable to the Bulgarians by 1890s.

But initially, Pobedonostsev acted on the principles and the direct recommendations of the Pan-Orthodox “party.” Defining the new policy of the Russian Church on the Bulgarian Question, he essentially reiterated the major points in the Pan-Orthodox program. He criticized his predecessor for inactivity and insisted “one needed to do something to reconcile the two opposing sides (emphasis in the original).” He pledged to have the Holy Synod work actively towards that goal. This newly enhanced responsibility of the Russian Church for the peace in the Orthodox world had clear overtones of the traditional Russian messianism in relations to the “Christian East.”\textsuperscript{590}

Whereas his predecessor and the majority opinion of the Russian educated society blamed the Schism on Greek intransigent nationalism, Pobedonostsev put the blame squarely on the Bulgarian Exarchate. Following the Patriarchate and the Russian Pan-Orthodox, he condemned the policy of the Bulgarian prelates of establishing a Bulgarian “racial” hierarchy parallel to the existing network of the Patriarchate. He even went a step further writing to the likeminded Ambassador Novikov that “the regulation of the

\textsuperscript{589} Ibid., 31 March 1883 (232): 169-170
\textsuperscript{590} AVPRI, f. 161/3-233 (1850-1884), Pobedonostsev to Giers, 12 November 1880, pp. 2507-2508ob 242
Ecumenical Councils banning the existence of two coreligionist bishops in the same city was not supposed to help maintain outward government order but had a much deeper meaning touching on the dogma of church unity.” In contrast to the Patriarchate, the Bulgarian Exarchate did not seem inclined to reconciliation. Specifically, rather than to cooperate with Russia and the Patriarchate, the Exarch chose to insist on Bulgarian church influence in Ottoman Macedonia in the “European Commission” in charge of implementing the Berlin Treaty than concluded the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Nevertheless, Pobedonostsev asked Novikov to engage in the reconciliation process Marko Balabanov as one of the few Bulgarian politicians more moderate and less hostile to the Church.591

Furthermore, Over-Procurator refused to help strengthen the Bulgarian Church vis-à-vis the Bulgarian Government. He took issue with the fact that the statute of the Bulgarian Church had been drawn up solely by the Bulgarian Government and, more fundamentally, that “the Bulgarian Church does not have canonical communion (obshenia) with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.” Pobedonostsev wrote to Giers that one needed to make it clear to the Bulgarian Exarch that he needed to restore “the union and communion with the Ecumenical Patriarch.“

The normalization of the canonical standing would lend the Bulgarian Church “that firm moral foundation” needed to resist the attack of the Bulgarian Government on the church prerogatives. Pobedonostsev saw the moment for reconciliation particularly appropriate because of the initiatives of Patriarch Joachim III and the Russian Ambassador Evgenii Novikov in that direction. The Bulgarian Exarchate was clearly on

591 Ibid., Pobedonostsev to Novikov, undated, pp. 2510-2512ob
the wrong side and needed to follow their suggestions. Specifically, all members of the Holy Synod of the Russian Church unanimously believed that the uncanonical stay of the Bulgarian Exarch in the city under the undisputable jurisdiction of the Patriarch was a major irritant. The Exarch’s move out of Constantinople would be the first step to reconciliation.592

It was with the same view of strengthening the Church vis-a-vis the state that Vostok covered the efforts of the Patriarchate and the Bulgarian prelates to come to an agreement. Vostok even more explicitly than Pobedonostsev drew a parallel between the Bulgarian Question and the situation of the Russian Church. Durnovo emphasized the negative role of the Russian representative or “Imperial Commissar” in Bulgaria Lukianov who although “totally incompetent in church affairs” coauthored with Bulgarian Liberal Stoilov the uncanonical statute of the Bulgarian Church. Rather than on church canons, it was ostensibly based on article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin permitting freedom of worship and religious cults in autonomous Bulgaria and the rest of the Ottoman Empire.593

The Church in the Bulgarian Principality was proclaimed part of the Bulgarian Church area headed by the Exarch seated in Constantinople. This statute clearly aimed at expanding Bulgarian irredentism through the Exarchate into Ottoman provinces of Thrace and Macedonia met with the opposition of the Bulgarian counterpart of Pobedonostsev – the more conservative and moderate Minister of Foreign and Church Affairs Marko Balabanov. He insisted that the Bulgarian Church functioning according to

592 Ibid., Pobedonostsev to the Foreign Minister, 9 December 1880, p.2517ob-2518ob
593 Vostok, 31 October 1879 (19): 287-288
that statute would further remove the prospect of church peace because the Exarch, dependent solely on the Sultan’s firman, would be able to break canons with impunity. Balabanov enjoyed support of prominent Bulgarian prelates such as of Kliment Branitskii, Grigorii, and Meletii – Metropolitans of Turnovo, Cherven, and Sofia respectively. However, the statute went through the Parliament of Bulgarian Principality with the support of Liberals such as “Papist” Tsankov and “atheist” Slaveikov, Karavelov, Chomakov, and Molov. Durnovo argued that this perpetuation of the uncanonical status of the Bulgarian Exarchate was a Turkish and “Jesuit” plot aimed at promoting disunity among Ottoman Christians. Apart from the Ottoman Government, the main beneficiary would be the Roman Pope who “in this quarrel [between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate] were always able to find opportunities to seduce Bulgarians to Catholicism.” 594

The anti-Schism stance of many Bulgarian prelates came with the similar initiative of Patriarch Joachim III. The requirements of the church canons would be met if the area of the Bulgarian Exarchate were confined within the political boundaries of the Bulgarian Principality. 595 The ensuing negotiations between the Exarch and the Bulgarian prelates, the Bulgarian Prince Alexander Battenberg and Patriarch Joachim III in November 1879 foundered on the disagreement over the territorial extension of the Exarchate into Ottoman provinces. 596

Given this pro-Patriarchate stance of Pobedonostsev in 1880s, the Pan-Orthodox “party” considered him on of their own. Tertii Filippov, then State Comptroller, enlisted

594 ibid.
595 Vostok, 7 November 1879 (20): 303
596 Vostok, 29 November 1879 (23): 350
Pobedonostsev in the specific cases of providing material aid to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. He asked the Over-Procurator to “set” the former Ambassador Ignatiev (then Interior Minister) at Bunge, the Minister of Finance, to secure a subsidy of 25,000 rubles. Filippov was sure that “Ignatiev would be pleased to at least partially atone for his grave sin against the Patriarchate and the whole Church.” Filippov was hopeful that the occasion of the subsidy would pave the way towards lifting the Bulgarian Schism. In addition to such specific policy decisions, Pobedonostsev habitually visited with Filippov, Leontiev, and Golitsyn (then owner and co-editor with Leontiev of Varshavskii Dnevnik) at Filippov’s place in St Petersburg.597

Another initiative for the “restoring and strengthening of Orthodoxy” came on 13/25 September 1881 from Konstantin Katakazi, a prominent member of the Greek-Russian community and the former Ambassador to the United States. With his “ancestral knowledge of all Eastern questions and personal 30-year-long diplomatic experience,” Katakazi was advocating the urgent need for Russian foreign policy “to return to the Orthodox principle (pochva) from which we have been removed in the last 25 years not so much by enemies but rather by our own mistakes and unilateral desires.” With this Pan-Orthodox goal in mind, Katakazi suggested the calling of an Ecumenical Council in Moscow to coincide with the coronation ceremony of the new Russian Emperor Alexander III. Katakazi suggested to consult Count Ignatiev about the matter as “the statesman who has learned and experienced all things concerning the East.”598

597 Filippov to Pobedonostsev, 4 May 1881, K.P.Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenty, Volume 1 (Minsk: Harvest, 2003), p.167
598 OR RGB, 230-4390-14, Katakazi to Pobedonostsev, 13 September 1881, pp. 3-4
In the two attached memoranda, Katakazi elaborated that the main task of the autocephalous churches at the Ecumenical Council in Moscow would be to restore “unity in its pristine integrity.” For that, they first of all needed to lift the Bulgarian Schism which was “une funeste et deplorable scission.” In addition, they would regulate rather vague relations between the “Patriarches d’Orient” and the Churches of Greece, Serbia, and Rumania. The Council in Moscow would also standardize rituals and practices, establish relations and remove animosity between the “Eastern Patriarchates” and the Bulgarian and Armenian Churches. The Council would help strengthen Orthodoxy as the traditional lever of Russian foreign policy “en Orient” by “reaffirming the religious identity linking Christian populations to each other and to Russia.” Apart from its international political and ecclesiastical significance, domestically, the Council would serve as the weapon against “the dangers of anarchism, secularism, and revolution that undermine the foundations of monarchy by subverting religion and promoting atheism.”599 These evils of Western secular progressivist modernity were no theoretical concerns in the immediate aftermath of the shock of the assassination of Emperor Alexander II on 1 March 1881 by the populist anarchists who hoped that act would spark a peasant revolution in Russia.

To make the Ecumenical Council happen in Moscow, Katakazi suggested specific preliminary measures in his attached memorandum. A special committee of lay and clerical experts would prepare the Council’s agenda on divergent Orthodox rituals. He recommended sending “a capable ecclesiastic with the deep knowledge of the Orient and Greek accompanied by a diplomatic official” to obtain the consent of the Patriarch of

599 Ibid., pp.5-10
Constantinople. He even had a specific man for the job – the head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission to Jerusalem Archimandrite Antonin.

Katakazi was confident that Patriarch Joachim III would approve of the Council in Moscow as “a pious, loyal, and energetic man convinced of the necessity to reestablish Orthodox unity.” Another argument in favor was the seventeenth-century precedent when Patriarch of Constantinople went to Moscow for the Council of the Russian Church. “Obedient to the Ecumenical Patriarch,” his counterparts in Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria would follow. Katakazi expected some difficulty with the Church of Greece but hoped on Greek King George I’s influence to make the Metropolitan of Athens more favorable to the idea of the Council. He was also confident in the positive response from the Churches of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria who would normalize their canonical standing at the Council.

To ensure cooperation or neutrality of Austria-Hungary in cases of the Serbian Patriarchate of Karlowitz and the Rumanian Church, Katakazi suggested reassuring the the Habsburgs and German Chancellor Bismarck that the Council would not involve the changes to the Treaty of Berlin as regards Austria and “the Orient.” As on all other stages of pre-Council preparation, Russian Foreign Ministry would take the initiative in the matter especially in securing the consent of the Sultan to the dispatch of the Ottoman Christian prelates to Moscow.600

Pobedonostsev indeed forwarded the letter to Ignatiev and the latter admitted that he was familiar with the problem – “in 1871, I myself started the Ecumenical Council to prevent the schism of the Bulgarian church and impressed that proposal on the late

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600 Ibid., pp. 13ob-16ob
Patriarch Gregory VI.” However, Ignatiev was convinced that in 1881 the circumstances were less favorable than in 1871 and there were many pros and cons to think over.601

However, despite the official opposition, as late as 1888, Pan-Orthodox advocacy of the Ecumenical Council continued to attract support of the most dedicated mainstream Pan-Slavs. Thus, famous lay theologian and retired army general Alexander Kireev (1833-1910) argued in favor of the Council to resolve the Bulgarian Church Question and other problems of the Orthodox Church. If successful in that, the Orthodox world would be able to unite against the continued onslaught of the Roman Pope and the whole West behind him. Like Filippov, Kireev identified with the same initiative of Patriarch Gregory VI of 1870 because at the time “the idea of the Patriarch was enthusiastically accepted by almost all Orthodox autocephalous churches; it found great support in Russia as well even among those outside the church hierarchy and only petty concerns about political complications stood in the way of the benevolent initiatives of the wise Patriarch.”602

In 1882, in spite of the increasing anti-Greek Pan-Slav voices in the press, “the Pan-Orthodox” perceived the tide of the Russian public opinion and the government turning in its favor. Vostok made a reference to the official handbook on military statistics by General Obruchev to counter the assertion made by Arab Professor Georgii Murkos of the numerical weakness of the Greeks in Asia Minor. According to Durnovo, the clamor of anti-Greek Pan-Slav publicists Murkos, Katkov, Father Preobrazhenskii, Father Bellustin, and Popovitskii was offset by the influence of Tertii Filippov, Vostok, and “all truly Orthodox people.” Their success led to the return of the Russian revenue of

602 Kireev, A. A.,“O sozyve Vselenskogo Sobora,” originally published in 1888, Sochinenia. Vol. 1 (St Petersburg: Suvorin, 1912), 390-91
the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and foreign monasteries by Emperor Alexander III’s. Also, as Vice-President of the Palestinian Society, Filippov spoke about working hand in hand with rather than against the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. This Pan-Orthodox cooperation meant that the influential Palestinian Society would not raise “national Arab or Bulgarian questions.” Finally, as Durnovo perceived, the Holy Synod of the Russian Church threw its full weight in defense of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the Bulgarian Question.  

Vostok approved of the efforts of Pobedonostsev to highlight Pan-Orthodoxy on the foreign policy agenda of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Church. Thus, Durnovo interpreted in this light the return of most of the revenue of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and foreign monasteries (mostly on Mount Athos) from the lands in the Russian Caucasus and Bessarabia. The Imperial decree ended the nine year-long hold imposed to punish Greek nationalist-dominated Ottoman Christian churches for the Bulgarian Schism of 1872. According to Durnovo, the main motivation of the Imperial Government was coming to terms with the danger of “losing” Arab Orthodox to Western religious propaganda.

The same approval of Russian foreign policy in the Bulgarian Question came in connection with the article in the Pan-Slav Rus’ newspaper edited by Ivan Aksakov. The latter described the persecution of the Bulgarian Exarchate and schools in Macedonia by Ottoman authorities and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Rus’ correspondent from Macedonia argued that given the pro-Patriarchate stance of the Russian Embassy there

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603 Vostok, 30 December 1882 (220): 545-547
604 Vostok, 10 July 1881 (123): 289
would be mass exodus of Orthodox Slavs to Roman Catholicism rather than reconciliation of the two sides of the Bulgarian Question. Durnovo praised the policy of the Russian Embassy in support of the Patriarchate as ultimately leading to the solution of the Bulgarian Question. He dismissed as exaggerated the charges in Rus’ of hellenization of Orthodox Slavs allegedly pursued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  

Vostok was only too happy to report the negative reaction of the Bulgarian press to the condemnation by the Russian Holy Synod of the Exarch’s establishment of its own Synod in Constantinople – a move sure to antagonize the Patriarchate and further polarize the two sides of the Bulgarian Question.  

Overall, even mainstream Russian press had become less “Pan-Slav.” According to Durnovo, most Russian publications stopped publishing stories of persecutions of defenseless Bulgarians by the Patriarchate. This change came after the revelations of the oppression of Greek and Rumanian minorities in the Bulgarian Principality and anti-Serbian policies in the Ottoman dioceses under the purview of the Bulgarian Exarchate such as those of Nish, Pirot, Skopje, Debr, Okhrid, etc. Durnovo also welcomed the officially approved study of the Bulgarian Question by Vassilii Teplov, the former employee of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople. Teplov submitted a memo highlighting the main thesis of his study to Foreign Minister Giers who forwarded Over-Procurator Pobedonostsev for consideration. The latter approved of Teplov’s memo as

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605 Vostok, 9 September 1881 (129): 441-442  
606 Vostok, 26 April 1883 (245): 205  
607 Vostok, 11 February 1882 (166): 73
“detailed and fairly objective” and recommended publishing it “to clarify this important matter to our society.”

His work was serialized in Russkii Vestnik over 1882 and honored with the Uvarov Award by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in its final book form in 1889. It is important to analyze Teplov’s study because both mainstream Russian Pan-Slavs, Russian state leadership and the Pan-Orthodox “party” more or less accepted it. Thus, Durnovo appreciated Teplov’s argument of the invalidity of the Sultan’s firman of 1870 because the Exarchate did not abide by the articles 3, 4, 6, and 9 stipulating the occasions of subordination of the Bulgarian Exarch to the Patriarch of Constantinople. With the firman technically null and void, the Exarch had to make the first step towards reconciliation with the Patriarch to establish the Bulgarian Church on a firm foundation of Orthodox canons.

Vasilii Teplov’s book was the first study of the Bulgarian Question to draw extensively on the Russian diplomatic sources. According to the Bulgarian scholar Zina Markova, the study is still valuable for the scholarship today because it relied on Russian diplomatic sources. Compared to Sklobovskii and other traditional “Pan-Slavs,” Teplov was more balanced. In contrast to Leontiev’s cultural-historical type, “Byzantinism” stood for the system of “treason and pettiest egoism,” corruption and intrigue. “Byzantinism” did create a lasting influence but a totally negative one – its

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608 AVPRI, f. 161/3-233 (1850-1884), p. 2540 (K. P. Pobedonostsev to N. K. Giers, 12 February 1882)
609 Teplov, Vassilii, Greko-bolgarskii tserkovnyi vopros po neizdannym istochnikam (St Petersburg, 1889)
610 Vostok, 5 December 1882 (214): 497
“demoralization” weakened the medieval Bulgarian kingdom, its Greek culture continued
“to alienate people from the ruling classes.”

Like other “Pan-Slavs,” he believed in the power of “ancient hatreds” in the
Bulgarian Question as part of the age-old struggle between the Greeks and the Slavs for
the control of the Balkans. When the “Turks” destroyed the Bulgarian Kingdom in 1393,
they also stripped the Bulgarian Patriarchate of Tarnovo of its ecclesiastical
independence. This act went against the Islamic policy of leaving the existing religious
institutions intact and was probably due to the intrigue of the then Patriarch of
Constantinople. Now in control of the Bulgarian church, the Patriarchate allegedly
pursued its policy of hellenization.

While this primordialism was typical of “Pan-Slavs,” because of the influence of
Filippov’s writings Teplov differed from the mainstream Bulgarian nationalist narrative
in the issue of the abolition of the Archbishopric of Ohrida by the firman of the Sultan
Mustafa in 1767. This issue had a fundamental importance for the Bulgarian church
movement in 1860s and 1870s. They argued that a new firman like that of 1870 would be
both necessary and sufficient to restore an independent Bulgarian Church abolished by
the firman of 1767. The consent of the Patriarch was not necessary because his
predecessor himself likewise relied allegedly solely on the Ottoman Government.
Following Filippov, Teplov took issue with the Bulgarian version of the events. After
1393 and certainly by 1767, the Archbishopric of Ohrida was no longer a Bulgarian
national church but rather an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The

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612 Teplov, op.cit., p.8
613 Ibid., p.11
hierarchs of the Archbishopric themselves petitioned the Patriarch Samuel to abolish the privileged status of their diocese. The firman of the Sultan merely confirmed the union agreed upon by the prelates themselves.614

This refusal to subordinate the Church to the nation and the state runs throughout the book. The support for the principle of Christian Orthodox unity was not only a foundation of the Russian policy in the Ottoman Empire but also part of the Russian self-image. Teplov consistently emphasized the desperate ends Ambassadors Ignatiev and Novikov went into to secure a canonical foundation for the newly established Bulgarian Exarchate from 1870 to 1882.615 In contrast to the traditional Pan-Slav image of Bulgarians as a unified indistinguishable “people” behind their right cause, Teplov stressed the intransigence and extreme territorial aspirations of Bulgarian national leaders exploited by the Ottoman Government playing the divide-and-rule game.616

In another departure from “Pan-Slavism,” Teplov highlighted the Pan-Orthodox policy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Bulgarian Question. The reconciliating projects of Gregory VI and especially of Anthimos VI gave the Bulgarians “all guarantees of their aspirations.” But the Bulgarians never showed appreciation and always refused to make a compromise. Thus, a measure of Bulgarian “gratitude” was the unauthorized officiation on Epiphany day 6 January 1872.617 There followed the Schism of 1872 which Teplov, however, condemned as the triumph of extreme Greek nationalism over Orthodoxy and consequently lacking any validity for the Russian

614 Ibid., p.75
615 Ibid., pp.75, 180
616 Ibid., pp.80, 97
617 Ibid., pp.55, 100
Church. Still, Teplov did not portray all Greeks as chauvinists. He blamed individuals such as Deligeorges, Greek Prime-Minister at the time, his agent provocateur in Constantinople Archbishop of Syros Lycourgos, and the power-hungry Metropolitan of Derkon Neophytos.618

Even when describing the events after the liberation of Bulgaria by Russia from the Ottoman Empire, Teplov paints the “Greeks” in a more positive light than the leadership of the fellow Slavs. In contrast to the more moderate Patriarch Joachim III,619 Bulgarian Exarch Iosif looked like a hierarch subservient to the Bulgarian nation-state and putting Bulgarian territorial expansion well above Orthodox unity. Teplov approvingly detailed the mediation efforts made by the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Holy Synod to move the Bulgarian side to compromise and to lift the Schism.620

Indeed, even when Ambassador Evgenii Novikov was succeeded by Alexander Nelidov in late 1883, this Pan-Orthodox line continued. To be sure, Nelidov was no Grecophile. He emotionally called the Greeks “ungrateful” as he had to counter the policies of Prime-Minister Harilaos Trikoupes directed against the perceived Russian invasion of Mount Athos and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. He attempted to contain Greek nationalism from the Patriarchate and repeatedly counseled Patriarch Joachim III against accepting “the protection which Greece seeks to adopt in his respect.”621

The Russian Foreign Ministry was optimistic that after the explosion of Russophobia in 1870s “practically in all segments of the Greek society over our moderate

618 Ibid., p. 118
619 Ibid., p.172
620 Ibid., pp.198-199, 211
621 AVPRI, f. 151-482 (1880-1884)-3555/1, pp. 3-5 (A. I. Nelidov to N. K. Giers, 1/13 December 1883)
and impartial policy,” the Ottoman Greeks were no longer willing “to risk old friendship of Russia.” Although Russian policymakers in St Petersburg perceived the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the historical bedrock of Greek national interests, “we cannot refuse it our assistance without undermining the significance of Russia as an Orthodox power and without betraying our history.” Were Russia to oppose Greek national interests, it would strengthen the pro-Western and anti-Russian ideology of “the extreme Greek nationalist party” for the masses of the Greek people. As confirmed by Nelidov himself, unlike their elites, they supposedly “preserve as sacred the feeling of gratitude towards Russia” because “popular masses believe the concrete proof of the benevolence of the Imperial Government rather than the modern theories preached by the ringleaders of Hellenism.”622

Fearful of antagonizing the “Greeks,” Nelidov attempted to persuade it was untimely to demand of the Ottoman government the issue of licenses (berat) for Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia. At the same time, in a major effort at centralization the Porte launched an assault to strip the Patriarchate of its legal jurisdiction over its flock. Unconvinced, Bulgarian Exarch Iosif turned to the British Ambassador for leverage in dealing with the Ottoman government.623

Clearly, the fear of ”losing” the Bulgarians to Russia’s rivals increased as the uncertain situation continued into 1885. Nelidov pushed Ottoman Foreign Minister Said Pasha to act on his promise of sending Bulgarian bishops to Ohrida and Skopje. When Said Pasha referred to the opposition of the Patriarchate, Nelidov noted that “without

622 Ibid., pp. 7-9 (N. K. Giers to A. I. Nelidov, 19 December 1883)
623 Ibid., pp. 32ob (memo on the state of church affairs at the Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1884-1885)
touching on the canonical side of the problem” the Porte could invoke its firman of 1870 in accordance with which Bulgarian bishops were authorized to serve in the same localities even before the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878.\textsuperscript{624} Nelidov took the matter to the Sultan himself and sought to convince him that sending the Bulgarian bishops to those predominantly Slavic areas was the only way to deliver them from Catholic and Protestant propaganda because local populations would not recognize the prelates sent by the Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{625} When Patriarch Joachim IV communicated the protest of Ottoman Greeks, Nelidov restated his reasons but alleged Russian neutrality.\textsuperscript{626} In this instance, as Ignatiev did in 1870 with the firman establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate, Russian foreign policymakers again broke the principle of avoiding the intervention of the Ottoman government into the affairs of the Orthodox Church. But as in other seemingly Pan-Slav gestures, there is a “premodern” fear of the religious Other.

Consistent with this Pan-Orthodox rationale was Nelidov’s initiative to reconcile the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate at the same time. He attempted to convince the Exarch that the Bulgarian Church based on the firman alone. With a pro-Greek policy change, the Porte could change it. Nelidov argued that achieving an agreement based on Orthodox canons would eliminate the danger of the Schism and the threat of foreign religious propaganda. On the other hand, those Bulgarians “whose national freedom would be temporarily limited within the Patriarchate” would be guaranteed against the

\textsuperscript{624} Ibid., pp. 115ob-116 (A. I. Nelidov to N. K. Giers, 7/19 February 1885)
\textsuperscript{625} Ibid., pp. 122ob-123 (A. I. Nelidov to N. K. Giers, 12/24 February 1885)
\textsuperscript{626} Ibid., pp. 133-135 (A. I. Nelidov to N. K. Giers, 7/19 March 1885)
abuses by the Greek clergy. Exarch Iosif rejected the offer because he was sure that the Bulgarians would not accept it.  

Generally, as mentioned in the first subsection of the chapter, after the break between Russia and Bulgaria (1885-1886), there was widespread disillusionment with unredeemed Slavic brethren in Russia. To capitalize on those currents, Greek Ambassador in St Petersburg suggested to his government “to cultivate our Orthodox bond to the great Northern Empire” to obtain Russian support for achieving Greek national interests. This Pan-Orthodox policy would not compromise Greece before other Great powers but like nothing else would increase Greek influence in Russia “especially on the people.” As a result of the break between Bulgaria and Russia of 1885-1887, Mavrokoðatos also registered a marked decline in pro-Bulgarian sympathies. In the Russian educated society, “Bulgarians would never gain the same favor as before despite all the efforts of some fanatical Slavophiles.”

In truth, some defectors from Pan-Slavism actively sought to influence the narrow circles of Russian foreign policy makers in the Pan-Orthodox direction. The case of Alexander Ionin is an example of the post-1885 crisis of Russian Pan-Slavism and is similar to that of Petr Matveev mentioned in the first section of the paper. Actively involved in Slavic committees, Russian Consul General in Montenegro before and during the Eastern crisis (1875-1878) he became the Consul General in Bulgaria in 1883.

Ionin was moved by the Russian-Bulgarian break of 1885-1886 to criticize the

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627 Ibid., pp. 145-146 (A. I. Nelidov to N. K. Giers, 23/4 May 1885)
628 Greek Archive for History and Literature (ELIA), collection 494 (Harilaos Trikoupes), folder 6, p.10b (Nikolaos Mavrokoðatos to Harilaos Trikoupis, 5 July 1888)
629 Ibid., p. 17b (N. Mavrokoðatos to H.Trikoupes, 11/23 May 1888)
performance of the Bulgarian church movement vis-à-vis the Patriarchate. In May 1888, serving as the Ambassador in Brazil (1883-1892), Ionin wrote a memo to Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamzdorf. The main point was condemnation of the influence of the Pan-Slav and revanchist elements in the Russian society on Russian foreign policy. Those passions explained the loss of direction and clear goals in the Near East. The liberation of coreligionists as the bedrock of Russian policy “has been irrevocably narrowed by the Slavophile tendency and General Ignatiev himself for the most part has dealt the very principle a very sensitive blow with the Bulgarian Schism.”

According to Ionin, the vague Pan-Slav ideas led to the unrealistic treaty of San-Stefano which undermined the basic elements of the solution of the Eastern Question: “Christianity, equality and balance among Balkan nations, and Russian state interest.”

The break between Russia and Bulgaria (1885-1886) resulted from the ambition and self-interest of the Bulgarian intelligentsia put into power by Russian policymakers. The character of new Bulgarian state elites was clear already in the Bulgarian Church Question when “those leaders roamed the whole of Europe converting from Orthodoxy to Unia and Protestantism and then back to Orthodoxy.” Those comments sound a familiar note in their aristocratic contempt for “petty and greedy people only yesterday serving as doctors and interpreters in the Turkish army, taxcollectors, clerks at the banks of Constantinople, dropouts of Russian seminaries.” Indeed, Konstantin Leontiev was

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631 GARF, f. 568 (V. N. Lamzdorf)-1-56 (memo from A. I. Ionin to V. N. Lamzdorf, May 1888), p.24ob
632 Ibid., p. 26ob
633 Ibid., p. 65ob
aware of his influence on his “close acquaintance” and colleague in the consular service in 1860s. 634

Almost ten years later, another reconciliation effort sponsored by Ambassador Nelidov failed on the perceived intransigence of the Bulgarian Exarch Iosif. In contrast to “the unusually tolerant and peaceloving mood of the Greek high clergy” and even to the “more reasonable” Bulgarian government, Iosif relentlessly pursued irredentist policies. Far from being committed to the ideal of “the expansion of Bulgarian national influence,” Iosif sought to extend the jurisdiction of the Exarchate in order to maximize his own personal power. 635

The Pan-Orthodox streak in Nelidov’s handling of the Bulgarian Church Question strengthened as a result of Nelidov’s correspondence with Filippov from 1876 to 1897. In 1876, Nelidov served as an advisor at the Embassy in Constantinople and an interim Charge d’Affaires in Ignatiev’s absence. Nelidov intimated to Filippov his hopes for an agreement between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate as a result of growing persecution by the Islamic state. 636 Shortly after his appointment as the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, A. I. Nelidov expressed his views on the need to promote a more reconciliatory and Pan-Orthodox policy as the only way to disarm Greek hostility in the “Christian East” in 1880s. He opposed the policy of his subordinate V. F. Kozhevnikov, Russian Consul in Jerusalem, who encouraged Arab Orthodox Christians against their Greek prelates. Instead, Nelidov argued that “in this for us there should be neither Scythian, nor Hellene, and we should by no means imitate some crazy Athenian

634 RGALI, f. 2980-1-1027, p. 32 (K. N. Leontiev to I. I. Fudel, 20 October 1890)
635 AVPRI, f. 151-482 (1896)-3521, p. 7ob (N. I. Nelidov to N. K. Giers, 1/13 April 1896)
636 GARF, f. 1099-1-2252, p. 2 (Nelidov to Filippov, 22 March 1876)
politicians to reduce the interests of the Orthodox Church to the level of some national (племенnoi) rivalry between us and the Greeks we ourselves have brought to national (народnoi) life.”

When in charge of the State Financial Control Commission (State-Comptroller), Filippov further inspired and helped Nelidov. One of the steps in that Pan-Orthodox direction was the establishment of the Russian Archeological Institute in Constantinople aimed at exploring the shared Byzantine legacy. As a typically Orientalist enterprise, the Institute was supposed to encourage “the study of the history of Eastern Christian enlightenment and the establishment for our co-religionist Orthodox world a firm scientific fulcrum to resist the moral Western pressure unhampered by anything especially in science.” Thus, the Institute was supposed to be an instrument enabling the Russian Pan-Orthodox to claim the “scientific” authority to represent the shared Byzantine tradition and culture for the “Christian East”

Nelidov’s successor as the Ambassador in Constantinople, Ivan Zinoviev, continued the Pan-Orthodox policy in the Bulgarian Church Question. His resolution to uphold the supranational mission of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is clear from his handling of the initiative by Chairman of the Bulgarian Holy Synod Metropolitan of Sofia Grigorii to end the Schism and reconcile the Bulgarian Exarchate with the Patriarchate. In June 1898, Grigorii approached Russian Consul General in Sofia Bakhmetev and undertook to have Exarch Iosif to recognize the supremacy of the Patriarch and to move out of Constantinople to Ohrida. He was sure in the success of his

637 Ibid., p. 5ob (Nelidov to Filippov, 29 December 1883)
638 Ibid., l. 9 (Nelidov to Filippov, 11 January 1890)
project if Russia managed to secure the issue of two licenses (berat) already promised by the Porte to Bulgarian bishops in the Macedonian dioceses of Poliani and Melenik.\footnote{AVPRI, f. 151-482-3595, pp. 1-2ob (A. N. Bakhmetev to I. A. Zinoviev, 23 June 1898)}

Writing to his superiors in St Petersburg, Zinoviev exposed Grigorii as an opportunist always siding with the strong hand who as Metropolitan of Rushuk prayed for the Ottoman victory in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and later sided with the anti-Russian party in liberated Bulgaria. As Zinoviev saw it, “the Bulgarians” treated the Bulgarian Church Question as strictly political. Unable to secure desirable concessions from the Patriarch, “the Bulgarians themselves provoked the Schism to consolidate their influence in the expectation of the collapse of Turkey.” If they secured the dioceses of Melenik and Poliani, “the area of the Bulgarian Exarchate would engulf the whole of Macedonia and coincide with the borders of Bulgarian of the Treaty of San Stefano – the aspiration of all Bulgarian patriots without exception.” For Bulgarians and Metropolitan Grigori, the reconciliation with the Patriarchate was secondary to the fulfillment of their national interests. Zinoviev argued that it was not in Russian interest to strip the already humiliated “Ecumenical Church” of the two dioceses it needed both for its prestige and material sustenance. Rather, the Patriarchate needed “our care and our moral as well as our material support.”\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4-8 (I. A. Zinoviev to the Foreign Ministry, 2/14 July 1898)}

Russian Foreign Minister and Tsar Nicholas II himself agreed with Zinoviev’s skepticism of the sincerity of Grigori’s reconciliation project. They similarly believed that for its protagonists the Bulgarian Church Question turned into the issue of “political ethnography.” Thus, Russia would not help seize the two dioceses from the Patriarchate.
and would instead continue to support it.\textsuperscript{641} The assumption underlying these criticisms of Russia’s coreligionists was the messianic self-image of unshakeable defenders of true Orthodoxy.

By 1909-1911, two new developments made Russian policymakers more hopeful of the positive chances for lifting the Schism. Ambassador Charykov sought to take advantage of the renewed emphasis of the new regime of the Young Turks (1909-1920) on equality of all Ottoman subjects. Charykov attempted to convince the Ottoman government through its main Great Power sponsor German Ambassador that reconciliation of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate would be in keeping with the official policy of “reconciliation of all population elements.” Settling the Church Question would help consolidate the Young Turkish regime by ending the protracted bloody conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians in Ottoman Macedonia.\textsuperscript{642}

At the same time, Charykov hoped that vigorous policies of centralization pursued by the Young Turks would bring Ottoman Greeks and Bulgarians closer together in an attempt to preserve traditional cultural and legal autonomy of minority communities. This effort required lifting the Schism which in its turn depended on the cooperation of the governments of Greece and Bulgaria.

Another major new factor opened prospects in that direction. Patriarch Joachim III was in his second term from 1900 and “his personality is bringing reconciliation into Greek-Bulgarian relations.” Charykov believed reconciliation was possible on the basis of the firman of 1870 “as the guarantee of Bulgarian independence in case the Greeks

\textsuperscript{641} Ibid., pp. 9ob-11 (Foreign Minister to I. A. Zinoviev, 17 July 1898)
\textsuperscript{642} AVPRI, f. 180-517/2-3471, pp. 64ob-65 (N. V. Charykov to Foreign Minster, 10/23 November 1910)
would change their mind.” As the situation calmed down, the Bulgarian Exarch would abandon his residence in Constantinople for one of the dioceses. The whole process would be mediated by the Russian Ambassador which would reaffirm Russia’s traditional role as “the protector of Orthodoxy in the East.” Bulgarian Exarch Iosif did not make this task easier as he insisted on the full validity of the firman of 1870 and his continued residence in Constantinople as the conditions for reconciliation with the Patriarchate.

Russian Charge d’Affaires in Sofia S. N. Urusov was quite pessimistic about the prospects of reconciliation. According to him, the main problem lay in the fundamentally different perspectives of the two sides on the Bulgarian Church Question. On one hand, “the Bulgarians, being of little faith (maloveruiushie) but calculating, skillfully take advantage of their illegitimate and by no means inconvenient position to come into contact with the Patriarchate based on the principles of Realpolitik.” By contrast, the Patriarchate, “being Ecumenical in character and as the embodiment of sacred traditions and unshakeable canonical dogmata, certainly cannot renounce its innate purely ecclesiastical view on things.” Thus, Urusov did not believe the Patriarchate was likely to approach reconciliation on the terms of the Bulgarian Exarchate – “as a political deal.” Conversely, the Exarchate would attempt “to draw selfish profit” and would demand “more or less substantial compensation” for abandoning its advantageous position.

As in earlier efforts to resolve the Bulgarian Church Question, in 1900-1910s, Russian policymakers demonstrated the “combined development” of acute ethnographic consciousness and age-old messianic ideas.

643 Ibid., pp. 11-13ob (N. V. Charykov to Foreign Minister, 5 May 1912)
644 Ibid., p. 36ob (N. V. Charykov to Foreign Minister, 28 February 1911)
645 Ibid., p. 41 (N.V. Charykov to Foreign Minister, 2 January 1911)
646 Ibid., pp. 50-50ob (S. N. Urusov to Foreign Minister, 2 December 1910)
Clearly, Russian foreign policy makers tended to be more consistently Pan-Orthodox rather than Pan-Slav. The low regard for Bulgarians as lacking in firm character and unreliable in their devotion to Orthodoxy is clear from the report by Ambassador N. V. Charykov who characteristically wrote to the Foreign Minister in St Petersburg that the Bulgarians are unruly, everybody likes showing off, their masses are unstable and can fall an easy prey to Catholic and especially Protestant propaganda, always around and ready to act.  

In contrast to Russian diplomats, head of the Russian Church, after 1882, Over-Procurator K. P. Pobedonostsev increasingly lost interest in the mediation of the Bulgarian Church Question and increasingly adopted neutrality favorable to the Bulgarian Exarchate.

An example of the growing pro-Bulgarian tilt in Pobedonostsev’s policy making was the secret mission of Sergei Kerskii, Assistant Chief of the Chancellery of the Holy Synod of the Russian church in 1886. Pobedonostsev acted on the wrong intelligence provided by the Russian police and sent him to Mount Athos in Ottoman Greece to help prevent the robbery of the Russian St Panteleimon’s Monastery there. Importantly, while in Constantinople, Kerskii visited “the Ambassador, General Consul, Archimandrite Arsenii [the priest of the Russian Embassy’s church], and [Bulgarian] Exarch Iosif” but apparently not the legitimate head of the Ottoman Christians, i.e., the Patriarch of Constantinople.  

Evidently, Pobedonostsev was gradually shifting to the Pan-Slav ecclesiastical policy in the “East”, i.e., the messianic mission to be carried out by Russia alone rather than through the Patriarchate perceived as hopelessly infiltrated by Greek nationalists. An

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\[647\] Ibid., pp. 36ob-37 (N. V. Charykov to Foreign Minister, 11 February 1911)

\[648\] Kerskii to Pobedonostsev, 8 December 1886, in K.P. Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenti, p. 150
example of this still largely religious and messianic frame of mind is the letter to
Pobedonostsev from Mikhail Katkov, the influential Pan-Slav editor of the conservative
daily Moskovskie Vedomosti (1863-1887). Katkov was sharing “the agony of my soul” –
warning against the Danish Prince Voldemar as a candidate for the throne of the
Bulgarian Principality. Russia should not allow a Roman Catholic dynasty “in an
Orthodox country we have liberated [from the Ottomans] in the East where Russia is
God-appointed protector of the Orthodox Church which is the only thing that gives
Russia significance and strength.”

Still, Pobedonostsev took pains to publicly emphasize the unity of the Orthodox
Church. An example is the celebration of the 900th anniversary of Russia’s conversion to
Christianity in 1888 that brought together delegates from all Orthodox churches.
Pobedonostsev eulogized and toasted the Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch
and especially the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the source of Russia’s faith.

By 1896, the Russian Church under his leadership continued to recognize the
Bulgarian Schism of 1872 – “to avoid a church conflict with the Greeks we do not allow
the Bulgarian clergy to openly officiate with ours.” At the same time, the Russian Church
secretly supplied the Bulgarian Church with the Holy Myrrh. But Pobedonostsev was
opposed to any further rapprochement with the Bulgarian Church fearing that the Russian
government and the Russian Church might get implicated into “all that turmoil,
confusion, disorder going on in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia.”

649 Katkov to Pobedonostsev, 2 November 1886, ibid., pp. 169-170
650 Kiev, 15 July 1888, ibid., pp. 398-399
651 GARF, f. 543, op. 1, d. 623, ll. 5-6 (Pobedonostsev’s memorandum, 28 January 1896)
Although careful to abide by the church regulations in the Bulgarian Church Question, Pobedonostsev and Russian foreign policy were more openly supportive of Arab Orthodox church movement. Their joint efforts led to the election of the first ethnically Arab Patriarch of Antioch in 200 years. But as in the Bulgarian case, the rationale of Russian policy makers was clearly not Pan-Slavic - after all they helped the Arab national movement. In line with Russian messianism, many Russian diplomats and Over-Procurator Pobedonostsev came to believe that the Greek clergy in Syria became too corrupt and nationalistic to be able to defend Orthodoxy against Western proselytizing. As he wrote about the situation in Antioch to Professor Georgii Murkos, the main spokesman for Syrian Arab Orthodox nationalists in Russia, “The Greeks have long ago sold and are still selling their Church to turn it into a tool of intrigue and greed! But God is administering his justice on them as well.”

The renewed sharp criticism of “corrupt Greek clergy” ended the brief honeymoon between the Pan-Orthodox and the Pan-Slavs ushered in by Pobedonostsev’s taking the office of the Over-Procurator in 1880. The mainstream Russian press including the journal of the Imperial Palestine Society increasingly accused “the Greek Church” of failing in its mission to keep its Slavic and Arabic flock from succumbing to the temptations of Western religious propaganda. Defections from the Orthodox Church supposedly resulted from the misappropriation of revenue especially of Russian contributions. Instead of using their income to education, good morals, and welfare of its flock, “Greek” prelates allegedly fleeced Russian pilgrims in Holy Land, embezzled

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652 Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), f. 1608 (G. A. Murkos)-1-80, p. 3 (K. P. Pobedonostsev to G. A. Murkos)
Russian donations or invested that money into Greek language and culture in schools and liturgy. Since “Greek” prelates put their nationalist agendas over the true interests of the Orthodox Church in the “East,” Russian government, Church, and educated society needed to support national churches among the Bulgarian Slavs and the Arabs to better resist the “seductions” of Western religious propaganda.⁶⁵³

“The Pan-Orthodox party” espoused a kind of Russian messianism different from the “Pan-Slavs.” In their more traditional “pre-modern” vision Russia would fulfill its messianic role by supporting the “Eastern Patriarchates.” Thus, the Pan-Orthodox in addition to the Bulgarian Church Question defended the integrity of “Greek clergy” in Syria and Palestine. Durnovo and Ivan Denisov, one of Konstantin Leontiev’s disciples (see subsection one), took issue with the accusations of the “Greek” clergy. They argued that in Palestine and elsewhere, Russian Church and Foreign Ministry generally and the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society specifically needed to cooperate rather than to conflict with the “Eastern Patriarchates.” The Pan-Orthodox never lost hope of returning the Russian Church back on track and blamed specific individuals for temporary Pan-Slav diversions. Thus, Vostok blamed the conflict between the Palestinian Society and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem over the supervision of schools and building of new churches in Palestine on Archimandrite Antonin, the Head of Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem.⁶⁵⁴ Ivan Denisov rebuffed as inexperienced, biased, and impressionable ideas Eliseev’s charges of “Greek” monks preying on Russian pilgrims to

⁶⁵³ An example of this attitude is in Eliseev, A. V., “Tserkov na Vostoke,” Pravoslavnyi Palestinskii Sbornik, 1883 (4): 7; Idem, S russkimi palomnikami na Sviatoi Zemle vesnoiu 1884 goda (St Petersburg, 1886)⁶⁵⁴ Vostok, 19 March 1885 (314): 286
Holy Land. Pobedonostsev’s decreasing commitment to the support of “Eastern Patriarchates” and the switch to perceived “Pan-Slavism” or Russian-centered religious messianism did not go unnoticed for the “Pan-Orthodox.” Vostok increasingly criticized the Holy Synod for not putting enough pressure on the Bulgarian Exarchate towards reconciliation – “Russia is not holding high the banner of Orthodoxy.”

Nikolai Durnovo’s self-imposed role of the arbiter of Orthodoxy and growing criticism of the Russian Church leadership ultimately led Pobedonostsev to gradually turn against Vostok. Initially, Pobedonostsev was mildly annoyed. In 1881, he explained to Nikolai Ignatiev, then the Interior Minister, that in 1879, Pobedonostsev helped secure the permit for Durnovo to publish Vostok “relying on the recommendations of Moscow ecclesiastics (dukhovnyie litsa).” But soon Pobedonostsev concluded Durnovo to be “a church fool” (tserkovnyi durak) “to be silenced without judgment or condemnation.”

However, gradually Pobedonostsev stopped treating Durnovo so lightly and dismissively. In fact, he came to interpret the activities of Durnovo as subversive of the existing structure of the official Russian Church. Pobedonostsev went so far as to put Durnovo under surveillance by Russian secret police and diplomatic agents who carefully monitored the moves of Durnovo and his supporters both in Russia and especially during his visits to Constantinople, Greece, and Rumania. Pobedonostsev motivated his request for surveillance referring to Durnovo as “one of the embittered zealots of the so called old piety and of misunderstood ecclesiasticism (tserkovanst).” Durnovo’s interference in

655 Denisov, I.N., Po povodu knigi A.V.Eliseeva “S russkimi palomnikami po Sviatoi Zemle vesnoi 1884 goda”, (St Petersburg, 1886)
656 Vostok, 19 April 1885 (317):.303
657 GARF, f. 730-1-3679, pp. 133-133ob (K. P. Pobedonostsev to N. P. Ignatiev, 21 November 1881)
domestic and foreign policies caused tension in interchurch relations. After the closure of Vostok, Durnovo extensively published abroad “giving no restrain to his anger bordering on madness at many respected public figures and Russian prelates.” Durnovo’s pamphlet published in Leipzig Russkaia Tserkov v ober-prokurorstvo K. P. Pobedonostseva was a major example of his writings “full of ignorant gossip, reprimand, and even accusations of criminal offences.”

Pobedonostsev even (unsuccessfully) petitioned Moscow Governor General Prince Dolgorukii to ban Durnovo to reside in Moscow and St Petersburg as “the narrow fanatic in the direction that is clearly deleterious for the Russian Church and able to incite society (sloi obshestva).” On this occasion, Pobedonostsev intimated that Durnovo’s Vostok was closed because it “disseminated reprimands and slander against Russian church policies, Russian prelates and clergy and exalted the Greek hierarchy in the name of false canonical principles.” After the closure of Vostok in 1886, according to Pobedonostsev, Durnovo managed to actually intensify his “agitation.” In particular, drawing on his connections in the “East,” “he continues to spread his slander against the Russian Church which given our existing relations [with the East] leads to extremely harmful consequences for all our policies.” Among Durnovo’s worst offences, Pobedonostsev specifically singled out the publication of the pamphlet Poborniki Pravoslavia directed against the Imperial Palestine Society in Moscow in 1892.

According to Pobedonostsev, Durnovo came into contact with Old Believers in Moscow and even directed the mission of Melnikov to Constantinople to request the Patriarch to

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658 GARF, f. 102-d3-1890-227, pp. 2-2ob (K. P. Pobedonostsev to Interior Minister I. N. Durnovo)
recognize Austrian-based hierarchy of Old Believers. If successful, this act “would threaten us with innumerable problems.”

As follows from Pobedonostsev’s exasperation, Durnovo and the other Pan-Orthodox were not to be silenced in Russian church matters. With the help of the members of the Greek community in Russia, Serbian and Greek nationalist publicists abroad, Durnovo was really able to make his voice heard in Russia and the Greek world as well. Furthermore, Nikolai Durnovo was able to draw on the financial support of Russian Old Believers, Apollon Maikov, Serbian and Greek irredentist societies to publish the bilingual Pravoslavnyi Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe in Rumania in 1901-1902 when Russian state pressure led local authorities to close it.

In his report to the Foreign Ministry forwarded to the Interior Minister, Russian Ambassador in Athens M. K. Onou detailed numerous contacts Durnovo made in his brief stay in Greece both among statesmen and activists of irredentism. Onou concluded that “as regards the relations of Russia with the Orthodox East, Durnovo sought to take over the place of Tertii Filippov [who died in 1899] and who was well-known for his high appreciation of the title of Epitropos of the Holy Sepulchre and honorary member of various Greek societies.”

In 1901, Durnovo’s Orient Orthodoxe reaffirmed the connection between the Bulgarian Schism and the Old Belief, the relationship between church and state in the Ottoman and Russian Empires first made clear by Filippov in his 1882 Sovremennye Tserkovnyie Voprosy collection. As shown above, these themes were raised in Vostok in

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659 Ibid., p. 21-21ob (K. P. Pobedonostsev to the Office of Moscow Governor General, 11 March 1892)
660 OPI GIM, f. 177-1-10, pp. 119-120ob (A. A. Maikov to N. N. Durnovo, 14 June 1902)
661 GARF, f. 102-SS-986-1900, pp. 133-133ob (M. K. Onou to Foreign Ministry, 10 August 1900)
1880s as part of the reform program for the Russian Church. But in 1901, Durnovo’s Orient Orthodoxe made it central to its agenda to combat Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod “almighty Pobedonostsev with the Slavic and Palestinian Societies.” They allegedly supported “Pan-Slavism” and the Bulgarian Exarchate against the “Greco-Eastern Church,” Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians, and Georgians. This subversive attitude of the Holy Synod of the Russian Church to other Orthodox nations was a clear reflection of the unhealthy bureaucratic barriers between the Russian Autocrat and the Russian people domestically. Those anti-national and anti-monarchical policies of Pobedonostsev found support in the “pseudo-conservative press.” Durnovo declared himself in agreement with this judgment of Prince Ukhtomskii, the publisher of influential Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti. These Pan-Orthodox and “true” conservative voices were now on the rise “because the strengthened Old Believers directly and openly declare their protest against the struggle waged by the Russian Spiritual Department against Greco-Eastern Patriarchates.”

Indeed, the major Russian daily Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti became another important venue where Durnovo was able to criticize from the Pan-Orthodox perspective Russian church policies both domestically and abroad (1895-1900). Its influential owner Prince Ukhtomskii as a personal friend of Tsar Nicholas II was beyond the reach of the powerful Russian censorship.

The choice of location for Orient Orthodoxe in Rumania was also due to the significant community of Old Believers there and their developed networks in Russia proper. Durnovo publicized the efforts of segments of Old Believers to rejoin the

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662 Pravoslavnyi Vostok/Orient Orthodoxe, 16/29 August 1901 (2): 5
663 Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, 31 July 1898 (207); 26 August 1898 (233); 17 October 1898 (285)
664 GARF, f. 102-OO (Special Department of Police)-1898-12-3-A, p. 36 (perlustrated letter of Andrei Drossi to Pavel Lefi, 8 January 1897)
Orthodox Church by having the Patriarchate of Constantinople to legitimize their hierarchy. His advocacy of the Old Believers’ cause was part of his agenda of reforming the Russian church supposedly on the model of “Eastern Patriarchates.” It entailed restoring the Patriarchate in Russia, empowering episcopal authority, and at the same time establishing control of the parish over the funds and the appointment of parish priests. After such a reform, the flock would no longer flee from its pastor into sects. In his own words, “the return of the canonical church organization, reconciliation of “the Department” [Holy Synod] with the Constantinople Church, the return of freedom to the Church, the recognition of the people as the body of the Holy Church and the guardian of piety would strengthen the Church and keep it from schisms and sectarianism.”

Outside of Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti and Orient Orthodoxe, from 1890s on, Durnovo was able to increasingly contribute to major Russian publications in defense of “Eastern Patriarchates” in the Bulgarian Question and their role model for the Russian Church. Durnovo continued to consistently promote Filippov’s ideas and especially Leontiev’s Byzantinism in the form of either Russian-led “Eastern Union” or “Balkan Federation” in anti-Bulgarian pro-Patriarchate pamphlets. Translations of his articles usually done by Sophia Bakounina appeared in Greek nationalist publications such as Ellenismos and Kairoi to inform Greek audience of Russian supporters of “Eastern Patriarchates.” For example, through Kairoi Durnovo wrote about Metropolitan of

666 Durnovo, N.N., Bolgarskaia propaganda v Makedonii i Makedonskii Vopros (Moscow, 1899); Panslavistskaiia propaganda na Pravoslavnom Vostoke i Rossii (Moscow: Russkaia Pechatnia,, 1908); Imeuiat li bolgary istoricheskie prava na Makedonii, Frakiu i Staruiu Serbiu? (with a parallel Greek text) (Moscow, 1895); Gosudarstva i narody Balkanskogo poluostrova. Ikh prosheshshee, nastroishee, buduieshee, i bolgarskaia krivda. Istoricheskie, etnograficheskie, i polemicheskie stati, posviashenyie vostochnomu voprosu (Moscow, 1890)
667 OPI GIM, f. 177-1-29, p. 27, (S.M. Bakunina to N. N. Durnovo, 27 June 1899), p. 53ob (S.M. Bakunina to N. N. Durnovo, , 29 June 1899)
Vladimir and Suzdal Sergii who “sincerely loved the Greek nation” and insisted on observing the Schism in Russia. In sessions of the Russian Holy Synod, Sergii found a likeminded supporter in the person of Metropolitan of St Petersburg Antonii. Neither allowed co-officiation with Bulgarian clergy – the issue especially acute in Russian spiritual academies where students from many Orthodox countries studied and lived together. Sergii and Antonii challenged Metropolitan of Moscow Vladimir. The latter explained he did not consider the Schism adopted by the Local Council of Constantinople in 1872 binding for churches not present there. Since Over-Procurator Pobedonostsev condoned Vladimir’s behavior, Metropolitan Sergii walked out of the sessions of the Russian Holy Synod whenever Metropolitan Vladimir was attending.668

Furthermore, in 1896 in the major conservative Grazhdanin newspaper, Durnovo countered the Pan-Slav articles about the post-1453 corruption of the “Greek” clergy in Bogoslovskii Vestnik by Professor of Moscow Spiritual Academy Aleksei Lebedev. In his characteristically exaggerated style, Durnovo explained Lebedev’s critique of the “Greek” clergy as part of Lebedev’s “Protestant ideas” such as denial of incorruptibility of the relics etc with which he allegedly poisoned the minds of his students.669

As in earlier periods, the debate about the Bulgarian Question was tied together with the question of episcopal authority and the restoration of the Russian Patriarchate. This connection became particularly clear in the public discussion about the reform of the Russian Church in the more liberal context of the aftermath of the Revolution of 1905.670

The same Professor Lebedev became one of the most prominent spokesmen for the

668 Kairoi, 8 January 1900. Excerpt found in OPI GIM, f. 177-1-29, p. 128ob
669 Andreev, I.D., Aleksei Petrovich Lebedev (St Petersburg, 1908), p.13
670 Basil, Church and State in Late Imperial Russia, p. 25
reform of the Russian Church along “Protestant” lines. It is indicative that in the same issues of Bogoslovskii Vestnik (in January, February, and March 1907) Lebedev repeatedly attacked the corruption of the “Greek” clergy in the Ottoman Empire touching again on the Bulgarian Question. At the same time, he referred to the examples in the early Christian church to advocate the election and general control of not just parish priests but even of the bishops by the laity in Russia.671

According to Lebedev’s biographer, Lebedev felt on the losing side and even persecuted. As Metropolitan of St Petersburg told Lebedev himself, in the Holy Synod the latter was long a paragon of a Professor moving “in a harmful direction.” In 1907, a certain Philalethes, or “truth-lover” in Greek, (most likely to be Durnovo’s penname) responded to Lebedev’s criticism of the “Greek” clergy in a pamphlet circulated in Moscow. In 1906, in a special report to the Holy Synod, Archbishop of Volyn Antonii (Khrapovitskii) pointed to Lebedev along with Prince Trubetskoii and Vladimir Soloviev, serving as bad models for other liberal professors.672

Archbishop Antonii actively participated in the Bulgarian Question and not coincidentally “made it the main goal of his life to effect the rebirth of Patriarchate in Russia.” According to his anonymous biographer, other hierarchs and ecclesiastics supported him only to the extent that it did not damage their careers. These fears were due to the opposition of the Russian government and specifically K.P.Pobedonostsev who considered Antonii a freethinker and a reformer.673

671 Ibid.
672 Ibid., p.14
673 Pisma Blazhenneishego Mitropolita Antonia (Khrapovitskogo) (Jordanville, Holy Trinity Monastery Saint Job of Pochaev Typography, 1988), pp. 16-18
As the rector of Moscow Spiritual Academy in 1890s, Antonii favored Greek and Serbian students. He saw them as “the representatives of those ancient Eastern Churches to the mutual communication (vzaimoobshenie) with which he strove with all his soul.”

Antonii became active in the cause of lifting the Bulgarian Schism when he was still the Bishop of Ufa (1900-1902). Apparently, the first time Antonii came into contact with Patriarch of Constantinople Joachim III was the occasion of the latter’s second term (1901-1912). Antonii rejoiced in the reelection to glorify in his leadership “Hellenic nationality” (narodnost) wishing that the pristine (prezhnii) spirit of ecclesiastical Christian conduct (obshezhitie) could increase in other Orthodox nations” at the expense of “political intrigues.” Overtaken by the latter, Orthodox nations became like “Western heretics who speaking so much about humanity reveal nothing but beastly struggle for worldly riches and the pursuit of pleasures.” Antonii envisioned Joachim III as “bringing back the glory to the Holy Church and the time of the Councils, of miracles, of people’s forgetting earthly obstacles and of their common union in the Ecumenical Church.”

To act on this spirit, in his later correspondence with Joachim III in 1910-1911, Antonii suggested ways to lift the Bulgarian Schism. Antonii considered applicable the example of the treatment of those clerics and laymen returning from the Unia to Orthodoxy. In his Western Ukrainian diocese, the Unia was an acute problem Antonii combated from the pulpit, in the local press, and in separate pamphlets. From the defense he went into the offensive to reclaim for Orthodox the Uniates in the neighboring Galicia.

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674 Sbornik izbrannykh sochinenii Blazhennishego Antonia, Mitropolita Kievskogo i Galitskogo (Belgrad: Slovo, 1935), p. XXIII
675 Ibid., p. 57
676 Antonii of Ufa to Joachim III, 1901, ibid., p. 138
677 “Perepiska Arkhiepiskopa Volynskogo i Zhitomirskogo Antonii sa Vselenskim Patriarkhom Ioakimom III,” Volynskie Eparkhialnye Vedomosti, 1911(6) and in Svet, 21 November 1910 and 1 February 1911
Despite the opposition of Austrian authorities, Antonii was able to extend his jurisdiction across the border because Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III agreed to appoint him as his Exarch of Galicia and Carpathian Rus.678

The Russian Ambassador to Constantinople N. V. Charykov contacted Antonii through Count Aleksei Bobrinskii, a prominent rightwing member of the Russian State Duma or Parliament and the leader of the conservative “Council of the United Nobility.” Charykov hoped to draw on Antonii’s ideas in Russian diplomatic efforts to help lift the Bulgarian Schism.679 At the same time, as the editor of the diocesan paper Volynskie Eparkhialnyie Vedomosti, Antonii consistently opposed the ideas of control of parish laity over clergy as inspired by “leftist newspapers” and leading to further revolutionary agitation. Instead, he promoted an ideal of paternalistic “fusion of clergy with parishioners in a devoted and quiet prayer.” He also argued in favor of the strengthening of episcopal authority vis-a-vis the state and laity in Russia.680

Antonii’s special relationship to “Eastern Patriarchates” and the Greek world generally became even more manifest after the death of Joachim III in November 1912. Archbishop Antonii officiated at the funeral service in Greek at the church of the Greek Embassy in St Petersburg immediately after receiving the news of Patriarch’s passing. According to Professor Ivan Sokolov, Antonii “delivered a brilliant oration on the life and works of the deceased hierarch” in the presence of the Greek Ambassador Psyho, Consul General Evmorphopoulo, Greek community in Russia, and many faithful. He also wrote a poetical dirge on the passing of Patriarch Joachim III later published in the Greek

678 Pisma Blazhenneishego Mitropolita Antonia (Khrapovitskogo), op. cit., pp. 48-49
679 AVPRI, 180-517/2-3471,p.19, Archbishop Antonii to Ambassador Charykov, 14 August 1911
680 Volynskie Eparkhialnye Vedomosti, 9 March 1911 (11): 241
Proodos newspaper 2 December 1912 #3079. There he stressed Pan-Orthodox themes and specifically Joachim III’s efforts towards the reconciliation of Greeks, on one hand, and Arab and Slav Orthodox Christians, on the other, in the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Bulgarian Question. Antonii compared Joachim III to Moses “reconciling churches and nations among themselves and everyone to God.”

The author of that account about Joachim III and Antoni was Professor of St Petersburg Spiritual Academy Ivan Sokolov. Like Filippov, he was a member of the Imperial Palestine Society and also the editor of the Journal of the Imperial Palestine Society (Soobshhenia IPPO). He founded Pravoslavnyi Grecheskii Vostok (1913-1916) to better focus on promoting Greek-Russian church cooperation and he was optimistic about the positive legacy of Patriarch Joachim III and his likeminded Pan-Orthodox collaborators.

During the First World War, Antonii, then the Archbishop of Kharkov, continued to vigorously uphold the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1916, the Russian Holy Synod discussed the future of Constantinople and the Patriarchate in the event of the annexation of that area to Russia. There surfaced the idea of leaving the Patriarch the title of the Exarch of Constantinople subordinated to the Russian Holy Synod as happened with the Catholicos of Georgia earlier. Invited to the Holy Synod on this occasion, Antonii argued that the Russian Holy Synod needed to become part of the Patriarchate rather than the other way around. According to him, the victory in the war would be morally satisfying for the Russians only “if the holy city of Constantine, equal to the apostles, and the see of the pre-eminent hierarch of the whole world would regain

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681 Sokolov, Ivan, Pravoslavnyi Grecheskii Vostok, Vypusk 3 (St Petersburg, 1916), pp.12-13
its significance as the torch of Orthodox faith, piety and learning and if it would unite the Slavic North, Hellenic South, Syro-Arabic and Georgian East and would also attract back to the Church Russian Old Believers, Bulgarian renegades (otshepenets), Austrian Uniates, and Eastern heretical monophysites of different names.”

In the Orientalist vein of the connection between power and knowledge, Antonii provided the specifics of his Pan-Orthodox geopolitical vision of the liberation of the Orthodox East. They included the restoration by Russia of the Orthodox Byzantine Empire which would bring together Greece and Greek Asia Minor with Constantinople under a Greek autocrat and the Ecumenical Patriarch. Thus, Russia would repay the Greek nation for “liberating us from the Satan’s bondage” and “making us Christian.” Also, Russia would acquire a reliable ally in its mission in the Near East. To accomplish that, Russia would take possession of a broad swath of land stretching from South Caucasus to Damascus and Iaffa. This acquisition would give Russia the Mediterranean coast of Syria and Palestine connected to the Caucasus by rail. One would need to preserve “the language and parish communes” of Orthodox Arabs in the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem. At the same time, Russia would encourage the settlement of Russian farmers and artisans “while clearing the wilderness and Mohammedan settlements which would themselves begin to be deserted under Russian rule.” Within ten years, colonization would turn Palestine and Syria into “Vladimir or Kharkov provinces” where there would be space for purely Russian culture, Russian language, for Russian trade and industry” via the Volga river, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus to the Mediterranean. All Russian Christians would flock there “to venerate the Lifegiving

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682 Pisma Blazhenneishego Mitropolita Antonia (Khrapovitskogo), op. cit., p. 53

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Russian spiritual renaissance would be complete when “even our aristocratic ladies and gentlemen would gradually forget Carsbads and Parises and would get to know Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth.”  

In addition to Antonii, one of the most active Russian admirers of Joachim III was Archimandrite Iona, the priest of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople. Far from being a Grecophile, he denounced the legacy of Greek Prime-Minister Harilaos Trikoupes for his perceived overtures towards the Union with Rome and the secret anti-Russian treaty Trikoupes allegedly concluded with his diabolic Bulgarian counterpart Stefan Stambolov in late 1880s. Very much like Leontiev, he was critical of Westernized liberal politicians in Balkan nation-states and promoted the principle of Patriarchal authority as the only reliable bulwark against Western proselytizing in the “Christian East.”

Along with other Pan-Orthodox, Professor Sokolov saw the culmination of their efforts in the First Balkan War of allied Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire (1912). He interpreted it as “the Greco-Slavic crusade against the Crescent” finally united into the Eastern Confederation. Sokolov contributed to this short-lived triumph of Orthodox unity in his earlier articles and pamphlets dating at least to 1883. Ivan Sokolov sought to contain nationalism in a form of a theocratic federation led by the Russian Tsar. Along the lines of Leontiev, Filippov, and Durnovo, Sokolov became a fervent champion of a future Eastern civilization centered on the Russian Empire and the revitalized Ecumenical Patriarchate. To prevent internecine conflicts like

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683 Ibid., pp. 54-55
684 Iona (Archimandrit Sviateishego Apostolskogo i Patriarshego Vselenskogo Prestola), Rimskii Papa i Pravoslavnyi Vostok. Ocherki i etiudy po voprosu o sovremennom otnoshenii Rima k Rossii i Blizhnemu Vostoku (St Petersburg, 1913), p. 27
685 Ibid., pp. 122-124
686 Sokolov, Ivan, Pravoslanyi Grecheskii Vostok, Vypusk 2 (St Petersburg, 1913), p.17
the Bulgarian Church Question, all Arab and Slavic churches of the “Orthodox East” would be given their national hierarchy. Based on this principle, even splinter non-Orthodox churches of the Copts, Nestorians, etc. In this task of reconciling national aspirations within the Orthodox Church, Russia would continue its Pan-Orthodox it consistently pursued in the Balkans. “Having established so many national churches under Greek hierarchical supremacy,, Russia was called to establish a number of national churches in the Far East of the Asiatic-African continent.” Thus, Sokolov reaffirmed the argument of the Pan-Orthodox “party” that without the “Greek” leadership Arabs and Slavs would be powerless to resist Western proselytizing.687

687 Sokolov, Ivan, “Kogda i kak mozhit sovershitsia okonchatelnoie osvobozhdenie vostochnyh khristian?” Offprint from the Strannik magazine (St Petersburg, 1883), pp. 23-24
Conclusion

The dissertation uses heretofore-untapped archival sources and methodology that has never been utilized with the purpose of analyzing continuity and change in Russia’s relationship to Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Specifically, the study uses the concepts of irredentism, Orientalism, and multiple modernities with the focus on the reactions to the Bulgarian Church Question in Russia and Greek lands. The foregoing analysis suggests several conclusions about irredentism generally, the political and cultural dynamics between Orthodox centers specifically, the vibrancy of supranational alternatives in Russia and Europe on the eve of the First World War.

The dissertation argues that irredentism contributes to the cohesiveness of the cultural identity of the national or religious core group in at least two ways. Irredentist activists portray the unredeemed as helpless victims oppressed by the host state to mobilize mass support of the core group. Irredentist agitation provides the core group with a unifying cause that obscures social and other divisions to focus the whole society on the “suffering brethren” abroad. In this process, they other the unredeemed as hunted game, racially different, incapable of independent progress or even sustaining their identity against assimilation, and as junior members of the familial hierarchy. They also gender the unredeemed as emasculated cowards, coquettish women, and “damsels in distress.” Irredentism also strengthens the cultural identity of the religious and national core group as it creates the visions of the union of the unredeemed and the core group where the former are stripped of any agency and potential for development. All three Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question – Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and
the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory – envisioned Russia liberating its irredenta and uniting them into a single cultural and political unit.

To situate irredentism vis-à-vis other discourses, the dissertation argues that by othering the unredeemed in those ways, irredentism exhibits similarities with colonialism and especially Orientalism. All three discourses shared the following hallmarks – the images of passivity, stagnancy, racialization, gendering of the Other, and the production of knowledge about the Other. As the colonial or Oriental Other are needed to construct the identity of the West so are irredenta needed to consolidate the identity of the religious and national core group. Also, all three discourses help justify political and cultural intervention and domination over the Other.

The perception of the latter as being both same as and different from the Russians created a series of Orientalist motifs. The supporters of all three visions claimed the scientific authority to represent Russia’s coethnics and coreligionists both for Russia and for the Christian East. Like Western Orientalists, Russian Pan-Slavs, Pan-Orthodox and the proponents of the Greco-Slavic cultural type freely acknowledged “the glory of civilization” of its “unredeemed brethren” “but such glory rested in the safety of the distant past.” Since presently all non-Russian Orthodox Christians or Slavs were hopelessly oppressed, their potential for development was only possible through Russian help and intervention. Only Russian initiative and action were able to develop their existing shared cultural legacy into a separate non-Western civilization based on the invented Pan-Slav, Pan-Orthodox, and Greco-Slavic traditions and visions. The Bulgarian

Church Question was instrumental in turning the proponents of those constructs into Orientalist producers of knowledge in their attempts to influence church politics and diplomacy.

As the colonial moment, the unification of the core group with the unredeemed tends to produce discrimination against the unredeemed leading to their discontent and even resistance. These implications of irredentism are analyzed in the first chapter concentrating on how the Pan-Slav agitation helped mobilize Russians from all walks of life in favor of Balkan Slavs from 1856 to 1878. Chapter One also highlights the contradictions of irredentism focusing on how Bulgarian nationalist activists and their Russian Pan-Slav sympathizers sought to change the image of the Greeks among Russians. In the context of the Bulgarian Church Question, the Greeks turned from “oppressed coreligionists” into oppressors of the Slavs closely allied with the Turks and Western European powers. The attempted demonization of the Greeks was crucial in Pan-Slav efforts to transition the Russians from religious to ethnonational cognitive map. In this, Pan-Slavism proved unable to develop its own consistently ethnonational language and depended on the religious imagery and vocabulary of traditional Pan-Orthodox irredentism. The chapter shows the effects of the main contradiction in irredentism – the tension between sameness and differences of the core group and the unredeemed. It demonstrates how after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 patronizing attitudes and discriminating policies of Russian liberators led to the long lasting break with the initially grateful Bulgarians. For comparison’s sake, the chapter also briefly explored a parallel between Pan-Slav and Pan-Hellenist irredentist projects.
Chapter One also pinpointed the differences between irredentism on one hand and colonialism/Orientalism on the other. Unlike the latter, irredentism others the purported self because the unredeemed are proclaimed to be part of the same national or religious group. In contrast to the colonized or Orientalized populations, the irredenta have more agency and power. Chapter One demonstrates how Serb and Bulgarian nationalists actively cooperated with Russian Pan-Slavs in creating their own victimized image and disseminating it through Pan-Slav publications. Their goal was to mobilize the core group in their interests of seceding from the Ottoman Empire and establishing their nation-states. However, it would be a crude oversimplification to argue that they used that image instrumentally to elicit and to exploit the sympathies of gullible Russians. Seemingly supporting this view are the popular poems of one of the most prominent Bulgarian activists in Russia Raiko Zhinzifov. Some of them remind the Bulgarians of their glorious past to urge them to violently overthrow the foreign yoke. However, equally if not more prominent was the image of Bulgarians as helpless victims of political oppression, economic extortionism, and sexual aggression by the Ottoman overlords and Greek prelates. The poems were in Bulgarian thus clearly intended for consumption at home rather than in Russia.

In addition to irredentism and Orientalism, the dissertation drew on the concept of multiple modernities to help challenge two established historiographical orthodoxies. The scholars of Russian intellectual history attach the conservative and anti-modern labels on those whom I conceptualize as the proponents of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Orthodoxy, and the Greco-Slavic cultural type. The study sought to challenge that accepted view and to contextualize those thinkers, publicists, and politicians within the general crisis of
Enlightenment and liberalism in fin-de-siecle Europe. All three Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question sought to reconcile premodern religion and modern political ethnonationalism. In this effort, those visions showed the “combined development” of both ethnographic and religious population categories. Far from being conservative or backward-looking, all of them were variations on the theme of “the invention of tradition.” For this, they drew on the scientific methodology of Nikolai Danilevskii’s “cultural historical type” to sketch out a future civilization to emerge from the political and cultural union of Russia and its unredeemed coethnics and coreligionists.

The high degree of intellectual sophistication of three Russian responses to the Bulgarian Church Question as well as their significant influence on many Russian policymakers suggest the vibrancy of traditional religious and dynastic institutions in the Russian and Ottoman empires on the eve of the First World War. Russian ecclesiastics, thinkers, publicists, and politicians often cooperated successfully with their counterparts in the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Greece to influence the educated society in Orthodox lands as well as concrete policy decisions ultimately aimed at establishing a separate non-Western civilization.

The ability of traditional religious and dynastic institutions to resist hegemonic Western modernity is especially clear from the opposition of the proponents of Pan-Orthodoxy and Greco-Slavic cultural type theory to Pan-Slavism. All three were similar in their aspiration towards a unique civilization based on shared religious and ethnic elements and led by the Russian monarch. All three had the same pre-modern Western Other – the Roman Pope and Protestantism. The advocates of Pan-Orthodoxy and the Greco-Slavic cultural type theory were different from Pan-Slavs in their effort to
avoid a confrontation between Balkan Slavs, most importantly the Bulgarians, and non-
Slavic Orthodox Christians, most notably the Greeks. The Pan-Orthodox sought to
contain Pan-Slav and Pan-Hellenist influences from affecting the traditional institutions
of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Russian autocracy. Most Pan-Orthodox also
held the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the model for the Russian Church. Therefore,
they argued in favor of the restoration of the Moscow Patriarchate abolished by Peter the
Great. Although just as monarchist, the supporters of the Greco-Slavic cultural type
theory sought to promote interethnic peace through Balkan national centers thus
diminishing the significance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In the more or less
undesirable case of Ottoman collapse, both of those visions saw some sort of “Eastern
Union” as the most appropriate form to reconcile their ethnonational differences and to
develop the potential Byzantine or Greco-Slavic civilization. They explicitly referred to
the model of federation in the outlines of that future political and cultural unit. Their
federative solution to the modern and still relevant challenge of political
ethnonationalism is consistent with the recommendations of the contemporary experts
who focus on defusing and containing ethnic conflicts in the world today.
Bibliography

In addition to material used in the dissertation, the bibliography includes works which I drew on as background readings. All items will be helpful for scholars interested in a more comprehensive contextualization of the topic under consideration as they are all directly relevant to religion and nationalism in the late nineteenth century Russian and Ottoman Empires as well as having bearing on irredentism, Orientalism, and multiple modernities.

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