DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

Youth Activists' Insights on Past Events,
Present Efficacy,
and Future Prospects

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the Ukrainians who bravely stood up for their freedom in the Orange Revolution and continue to assert themselves as a proud democratic European nation.

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the democratic developments in Ukraine beginning with the 2004 Orange Revolution. After its break-off from the Soviet empire, Ukraine began democratizing its systems but continues to struggle with remnants of its communist past. The non-violent Orange Revolution was a democratic breakthrough in the recent history of the country, and youth activists were key agents in the revolution. Their perceptions of the revolutionary events, political self-efficacy as one of the identifiers of civil society, and futures of democracy in Ukraine will help to depict the socio-political climate inside the country and in Europe.

The dissertation employs three research methods: content analysis of extensive testimonials written by 19 youth activists (to generate information about youth activists' socio-political experiences during and after the revolution), a survey of 76 youth activists (to collect demographic and political efficacy data), and Ethnographic Futures Research interviews with nine youth leaders (to extrapolate futures of democracy).

Study findings on post-revolutionary developments are composed into 14 semantic themes that summarize youth activists' perceptions. Political self-efficacy results indicate high levels of internal and task-oriented efficacy among youth activists. This study also provides extrapolations of optimistic, pessimistic, and most probable futures of the Ukrainian democracy as projected by youth leaders.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Over the last decades, a wave of drastic changes swept across Eastern Europe, liberalizing and decentralizing political regimes and ending five decades of the Cold War. Ukraine, as one of the largest countries of the region, was no exception to the processes, and in the recent past, the country underwent two major liberalization processes – its break-off from the Soviet empire in 1991 and its nonviolent democratic Orange Revolution in 2004. The revolution thrived on one of its key agents – youth political activism, which was inspired by previous velvet revolutions in Serbia (2000) and Georgia (2003) and, in its turn, continues to inspire parallel processes in other oppressed nation-states of the region. Yet, consequences of the revolution and prospects for democracy remain unclear in Ukraine's volatile milieu.

Democratization processes are time and effort consuming. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) define establishment of democracy the following way:

> …the more or less total institutionalization of democratic practices, complete only when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as the only way to resolve conflict. It requires that political actors so fully internalize the rules of the game that they can no longer imagine resorting to nonelectoral practices to obtain office. (p. 235)

Ukraine does not meet all the requirements of a true democracy yet. Even though the country chose democracy over authoritarian rule, Ukraine is still hampered by the remains of its communist past and transitional challenges. Ukraine's recent democratization developments provide a unique research opportunity to explore dynamics of democratization and the conditions that are essential for democratic evolution.

Youth activists played a pivotal role in promoting democratic values and resisting authoritarian tendencies during the Orange Revolution. There is little research on youth activists' socio-political movements in Ukraine as well as on the level of their political efficacy and visions of the future. These issues are important both for the country's national development and for the international community, particularly for some transitional countries that are attempting to follow Ukraine's path of democratization.

This study is designed to explore recent democratic processes in Ukraine and extrapolate their possible future developments. Specifically, it strives to investigate Ukrainian youth activists' insights on the revolutionary and post-revolutionary events, political efficacy, and visions of the future. High levels of political efficacy indicate progressive democratic processes and are produced by such processes at the same time. Political efficacy remains a fairly unexplored phenomenon, particularly when it comes to such a key population stratum as youth activists. The vision of the future of Ukraine's democracy as projected by Ukraine's young leaders may contribute to shaping the body of futuristic knowledge about the country's prospective development.

Democracy as a polyarchic system has numerous specific and general definitions and interpretations. Dahl (1971) lists several minimum requirements of political democracy:

1. Freedom to form and join organizations.
2. Freedom of expression.
3. The right to vote.
4. Eligibility of public office.
5. The right of political leaders to compete for support.

6. Alternative sources of information.
7. Free and fair elections.
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

Even though this list is not complete and only reflects the structural essence of democracy, it captures an operational definition of democracy and allows me to analyze the phenomenon in the Ukrainian political system.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to investigate democratic developments in Ukraine during and after the Orange Revolution of December, 2004, as perceived by youth activists in the country. This study is also designed to generate futuristic insights on prospective democratic processes in Ukraine.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions served the focus of the study:

- How do youth activists in Ukraine perceive events during the Orange Revolution in the country?
- How do youth activists perceive their current socio-political efficacy in Ukraine?

- What are visions of possible political futures among youth activists in the country?

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Ukraine's transition from authoritarianism to democracy has been occurring sporadically. On the one hand, the country adopted democratic values and practices, such as an elected government, a market economy, and a democratic constitution. On the other hand, the reforms are slowed down by corruption, administrative-command traditions of the past, and economic challenges.

Due to Ukraine's key geopolitical status in East-Central Europe (Ukraine is one of the largest countries of the region and its development affects countries and societies around it), the country was the third-largest recipient of U.S. American aid after Israel and Egypt in the 1990s. Ukraine has also become a major participant in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace Program (D'Anieri, Kravchuk, & Kuzio, 1999). However, Ukraine's democratization progress has been limited and several of its governments have been accused of corrupt actions and flip-flop external policies between West and Russia.

The recent democratization breakthrough – the Orange Revolution of 2004 – gave Ukraine another chance for speedy democratic reforms and international recognition. However, the processes that followed receive mixed reviews from political experts. Even though some reforms have been reinforced and Ukraine gained a market economy status

and joined the World Trade Organization, such Orange Revolution goals as joining the European Union and NATO remain unaccomplished due to processes both within Ukraine and internationally.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Research on democracy in Ukraine is significant because exploring the political directions of the country will contribute to a better understanding of domestic democratic processes as well as socio-political tendencies in East-Central Europe. Such tendencies can be further considered by stakeholders in the domain of democratization (politicians, educators, researchers, NGOs, etc.). This study is significant because it may offer new insight into how to structure socio-political programs taking place in many different contexts around the world. The dissertation will be translated into Ukrainian to be readily available for Ukrainian policy makers and researchers.

Relative imbalance in social systems can open space for change, and youth activists may represent political agents capable of positive change and leadership. This study is significant because it may assist people in exercising their political rights, as outlined in a number of international treaties. Youth activists may have a higher potential of affecting current and future political developments, which is not shared explicitly by the general population.

The field of education began with its primary mission to make available to all students and other individuals the opportunity to acquire knowledge, skills, and/or expertise commensurate with their level of ability. This mission encourages openness to

new ideas and broader ways of understanding of various phenomena. In the past decades, educational methods and theories have been co-opted by sociology, philosophy, psychology, history, ethnography, anthropology, and other disciplines. Democracy is interdisciplinary in its nature and welcomes both qualitative and quantitative research. This dissertation is designed to embrace these cross-disciplinary perspectives; it focuses on democracy, and historical, ethnographic, psychological, and political perspectives are as relevant as the educational views.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is based on a constructivist conception of individual and collective political transformation of power (Christiansen, Knud, & Antje, 2001; Gill, 1996). The ongoing process of knowledge construction is enriched through reciprocal social interaction. This study, which employs three different methods, uses this general theoretical framework.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Three research methods were employed for the study. First, essays about revolutionary and post-revolutionary events were collected from 19 youth activists in Ukraine. Second, 76 youth activists participated in a political efficacy survey. Third, Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) interviews about the future of democracy in Ukraine were conducted with nine youth activist leaders.

ASSUMPTIONS

Certain assumptions should be stated before addressing the problem of democracy in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. Being a Ukrainian citizen, I am assuming that I will be able to establish a high level of trust with the study participants, which would allow me to collect meaningful and credible data in the field research. Another assumption is that youth activists in Ukraine share unique experiences that affect political events in the country, political self-efficacy, and visions of the future, which distinguishes them from other population strata. Finally, I am assuming that liberal democracies are transferable across cultures and countries.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

For the purposes of this study, the following definitions were employed:

Democracy (from Greek *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule)) is a form of government in which, in contradiction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy presupposes political equality among the people (Held, 1996).

Democratization is the means and methods by which the state moves to a democratic regime type, “to a more open, more participatory, less dictatorial society within the territory of that state” (Ghali, 1996).

Self-efficacy can be defined as "people's beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives" (Bandura, 1994, p. 71).

Youth activism is young people's "participation in any or all of the following:

- Protest events and direct actions (violent or non-violent);
- Ongoing advocacy campaigns to change the policies and behaviour of powerful institutions, including Governments, transnational corporations and international institutions;
- Consumer boycotts and other uses of market power to effect change;
- Information gathering and dissemination intended to attract media attention and raise the public consciousness with regard to issues of concern." (United Nations, 2005).

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation consists of six chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by Chapter Two, which synthesizes research literature pertaining to the topic, including sections on Ukraine's background, historical overview, Orange Revolution events, democratization approaches, political efficacy, and youth activism. Chapter Three highlights the three methods of the study – written testimonials, a survey, and Ethnographic Futures Research – and the rationale for their utilization. Chapter Four includes the data findings collected in the research process, and Chapter Five focuses on

data findings analysis. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes study conclusions and suggestions for further research.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Due to the size of Ukraine, a larger number of research subjects would have been a greater contribution to the research, however, limited resources and time did not allow for an increase in the study sample. A comparative study between youth activists from the pro-western and pro-eastern camps would have added to the depth of this research. However, these limitations were not significant enough to discontinue the study.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize an overview of literature relevant to understanding the recent democratic processes in a newly independent Ukraine. Due to the complexity and broadness of the topic, the research is focused on several domains within the body of literature that supports the topic.

The literature review consists of two parts – a contextual part and a theoretical part. The first part highlights the background information on Ukraine and briefly summarizes the history of the country. This part also describes events and outcomes of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

The second part of the literature review focuses on the phenomenon of democratization and its theoretical approaches. This part also provides an overview of political self-efficacy pertaining to the field of democracy. Additionally, the part includes descriptions of youth activism as a socio-political trend.

UKRAINE OVERVIEW

Ukraine is an old nation but a newly independent country that is undergoing profound political and economic changes after its break-off from the Soviet empire in 1991. Being the largest country completely within Europe, Ukraine is bordered on the north by Belarus, by the Russian Federation on the northeast and east, Moldova and Romania on the southwest, and by Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic on the west. It shares a Black Sea border with Turkey. There are 24 administrative regions

(oblasts), Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, and two cities of national authorization – Kyiv (former Kiev), the capital, and Sevastopol – in the country.

Population. In terms of population, Ukraine ranks fifth in Europe (after Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and France) and 21st in the world. Ukrainians are among Slavic people that belong to the East Slavonic subgroup of Indo-European ethno-linguistic family. Ukrainian people have always been native to Ukraine and lived on its territory for thousands of years.

As of July 2005, the Ukrainian population totals 47,425,336, with a population density of 79 people per sq km land area (ExxUN, 2005). Ukrainians account for 77.8% of the total population of Ukraine and dominate in most regions of the country - with the exception of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea. In certain areas, such as Volyn, Cherkasy, Poltava, Vinnytsya, Chernihiv, and Ternopil, Ukrainians account for 90-96% of the total population. The remaining population is made up of many minorities: Russians (17.3%), Belarusians (0.6%), Moldovans (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Bulgarians (0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Romanians (0.3%), Poles (0.3%), Jews (0.2%), and other nationalities (1.8%).

Soviet attempts of denationalization of Ukraine were unsuccessful. Despite all the hardships, Ukrainians managed to preserve a strong national identity:

> Ukrainians are sensitive about their new independence, their place in Europe and how others see them. An old nation but a new state, they are a proud people who want the world to acknowledge their existence, to take them seriously, to recognize them as a European nation, albeit a middle-sized one (like France, they say), and to know their blue and yellow flag and their national anthem. Above all, Ukrainians want the world to know that they are not Russians. (Richmond, 1995)

Yet, Ukrainians have a lot to accomplish in the processes of building the nation-state and strengthening the national identity.

For the purpose of the country's national consolidation, the Ukrainian authorities promote the multiethnic and multicultural status of the Ukrainian society. The state national policy condemns alienation of ethnic minorities and endorses the principles of tolerance and intercultural dialogue. Ukraine's most recent aspirations to join the European Union resulted in the government's emphasis on equality of all nations not only in Ukraine but in a free democratic Europe.

Economy. Formerly labeled as the breadbasket of Europe and later an important agricultural and industrial region of the Soviet empire, Ukraine now relies on Russia for many energy supplies, especially natural gas. The lack of significant structural reform and other planned-to-market transitional challenges have made the Ukrainian economy vulnerable to external shocks. After 1991, the government liberalized most prices and erected a legal framework for privatization, but widespread corruption and resistance to reform within the government and the legislature soon stalled reform efforts and led to some backtracking. GDP by 1999 fell to less than 40% the 1991 level. At the beginning of the 20th century, some improvements in Ukraine's economy occurred. Growth was a sturdy 9.3% in 2003 and a remarkable 12% in 2004, despite a loss of momentum in needed economic reforms.

The World Bank notes that real income decline over the transition period has resulted in an increase in poverty, leaving some 27% of the population poor – more than one out of four people; 18% of Ukrainian households are considered extremely poor. Official statistics report average monthly wage at approximately US$60 per month, with

nearly 81% of the population earning less than $90 per month (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2002).

Government and Politics. Ukraine continues to make steady progress toward developing a democratic state based on the rule of law. Ukraine's first post-Soviet Constitution was adopted on June 28, 1996. Power was formally divided among three branches of government – executive, legislative, and judiciary. Although the new Constitution has not definitively resolved the formal division of powers among the three branches of government, it has provided the Ukrainians with a strong, legal framework for addressing this challenge. More importantly, it has codified the fundamental rights of free speech, freedom of the press and assembly, and freedom of religion for all Ukrainians.

Ukraine's parliament, known as the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), has 450 seats, and members are elected to a four-year term. The Prime Minister, nominated by the President and approved by the Verkhovna Rada, heads the government and chairs the Council of Ministers. Ukraine's Presidency is the preeminent post in the country's government. The President is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and may veto Verkhovna Rada legislation.

Further political reforms are needed to bring the Constitution to more clearly delineated European standards and distribute power among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches more effectively. Ukrainian politics is still challenged by excessive state control and corruption, which stall economic reforms, slow down privatization, and endanger democratic liberties.

Education and Literacy. As in many countries with transitional economies that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the education system in Ukraine has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, undeniable achievements are apparent: basic education is accessible for all children, from pre-school to tertiary level; Ukraine has nearly 50,000 educational institutions, and the population has attained high rates of literacy and numeracy (United Nations in Ukraine, 2004); males and females have equal representation at universities; and the average knowledge of mathematics is relatively high compared to many developed countries. On the other hand, the success of the past was a result of the pressures of the planned economy (International Renaissance Foundation, 1997). The complete basic secondary education in Ukraine is compulsory, free of charge, and it can be received in different types of educational institutions.

The Ukrainian educational system is currently undergoing reforms of democratization, decentralization, and westernization. The authorities oftentimes struggle with the balance between what should be retained from the old centralized system and what should be restructured. One of the most recent reformist moves in higher education was Ukraine's admission into the Bologna process, which will allow elevating education to the European standards and recognizing of Ukrainian diplomas throughout Europe.

Multicultural Characteristics. Ukrainians constitute the ethnic majority in Ukraine, but due to the country's size and historical development there are significant cultural differences between even the groupings of the titular ethnic group. Even though Ukraine existed as one nation, its parts were divided among different empires in the past. The most significant cultural discrepancy involves the linguistic factor with a predominantly Ukrainophone Western Ukraine and Russophone Eastern Ukraine. These

differences manifest themselves in cultural preferences and geopolitical orientation. Ukrainian, as the only official language, is spoken predominantly in Western Ukraine, whereas Eastern Ukraine communicates in Russian or pidgin dialects – mixes of Russian words with Ukrainian grammar and phonetics. These cultural differences were also emphasized during the 2004 presidential campaign, in which the west voted for a pro-European Viktor Yushchenko and the east supported a Russia-oriented Viktor Yanukovych.

Some scholars claim that Ukrainians are notorious for their patience. When Ukrainians are asked why they are so patient, the answer often is: *Nothing unusual about that – we never lived a prosperous life* (Kolodiy, 2001). This pessimism in Ukrainian mentality has been blamed on the absence of civil society in Ukraine during the communist rule. If anything else, the communist regime succeeded at producing a *homo sovieticus* – an adaptive individual fearful of the authorities and incapable of fighting for one's freedoms (Nahaylo, 1999).

There are many other ethnic groups in Ukraine. Poles, Bulgarians, and Serbs have lived in Ukraine since the 18th century, Moldovans since the 16th century, Roma since the 15th century, and Jews since the 14th century. Most of the minorities identify themselves with other nations, but some of them, like Tatars, exist as a minority ethnic group within Ukraine (Hovorun & Vornyk, 1995). Some of Ukraine's ethnic minorities have assimilated into the wider culture. Representatives of ethnic minorities hold elective offices, and ethnic minority voters tend to support mainstream parties over ethnic- or religious-based parties.

In the 1940s, all Tatars were forced out of Ukraine and exterminated in Stalin's genocide. The survivors have been trying to return to their homeland during the years of Ukraine's independence. According to the State Committee on Nationalities and Migration (2005), many Tatars remain homeless, live in hostels or rent an apartment.

The situation of ethnic Russians in Ukraine varies by region. In Western Ukraine, Russians are less numerous and there have been instances of violence against this ethnic minority. In the Crimea, Russians constitute a 64% majority and are subjected to little governmental repression and less societal discrimination than ethnic Russians elsewhere in the country. Crimean Russians have attempted to limit Tatar access to housing, land, and jobs (Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, 2003).

The Jewish population in Ukraine has experienced hostile acts such as the vandalizing of synagogues and anti-Semitic expressions in the media. The Roma population is faced with situations of severe socio-economic disadvantage, manifestations of prejudice, discrimination, and violence on the part of the majority population and sometimes on the part of the authorities.

This general overview of Ukraine provides the context for the research on the democratic evolution of the country. The information summarized above is helpful when it comes to researching the recent socio-political processes in Ukraine.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Examining democratic developments in Ukraine would be incomplete without reviewing the history of the country, which is often referred to as the "keystone in the

arch" of security in Central Europe (D'Anieri, Kravchuk, & Kuzio, 1999). Ukraine dates back in its statehood to the 9th century A.D. when it constituted the core of the Kyivan Rus, a powerful state in Medieval Europe. During the period of the Kyivan state, Christianity was introduced by Prince Volodymyr (reigned 980–1015), who adopted (c. 988) Greek Orthodoxy from the Byzantines (Subtelny, 1994). The period is marked by significant diplomatic relations between Kyivan Rus and the rest of the continent; one of the rulers, Yaroslav Mudryy (Yaroslav, the Wise), was nicknamed *Europe's father-in-law* for his daughters' marriages to French and Hungarian kings (Holubets, 1993).

In the middle of the 13th century, the centralized power of Kyiv declined and other regional states emerged, the most influential of which was Galicia-Volhynia, located in what is now Western Ukraine. Galician King Danylo's reign was characterized by pro-western orientation caused mainly by the threat of the Tatar Golden Horde from the east. The king was officially crowned by Pope Innocent IV in 1253, and Galicia-Volhynia was classified as a kingdom by Western and Central European scholars of the time (Zharivsky, 2001). In the middle of the 14th century, the last Galicia-Volhynia monarch died without leaving a successor; the lands were taken over by Poland and Lithuania. Most of central Ukrainian territory fell under the rule of Lithuania as well (Hrushevsky, 1912; Subtelny, 1994).

Under the Lithuanian rule, Ukraine had significant autonomy; Ukrainian was the language of the state. In 1569, when Poland and Lithuania were joined into a commonwealth, most of Ukraine came under Polish rule (Szporluk, 1979). Meanwhile, the Black Sea shore ruled by Crimea khans was annexed to the Ottoman Empire in 1478.

Poland-Lithuania's persecution of Eastern Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Commonwealth's inability to protect eastern and southern Ukrainian territories from Tatars led to the establishment by Ukrainian Cossacks of a military order Zaporizhzhya Sich (Polonska-Vasylenko, 1995; Subtelny, 1994). The Cossacks represented freedom and defiance of feudalism, and their state, ruled by a Hetman, embodied traditions of early Ukrainianism. The Cossacks occasionally formed military alliances with Poland, Muscovy, the Crimean Khanate, Transylvania, and Sweden, but they strived to remain independent (Szporluk, 1979).

Gradually, Ukraine became too weak to stand alone, and the Cossacks sought alliance with the Orthodox Muscovy. In 1654, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyy signed the Pereyaslav Treaty with the Muscovy Tsar, which recognized Ukraine's independence but proclaimed Russian supremacy and was exceeded by Russia in the centuries that followed. In 1658, Ukraine attempted to throw off Russian protection by signing a treaty with Poland, but the Russo-Polish war ended in 1667 with the Treaty of Andrusiv, which divided Ukraine between the two countries along the Dnipro River (Hrushevsky, 1912). The Cossack Hetmanate continued its existence within the Russian empire and attempted to regain its independence by joining Sweden in the war against Tsar Peter I, but this attempt was unsuccessful. In retaliation, the tsar put an end to Ukraine's autonomy. In 1764, a Russian tsarina, Catherine II, abolished the Cossack Hetmanate, and tsarist troops massacred a Cossack garrison as well as the civilian population of about 15,000 (Mezentsev, 2004).

One of the important events that signified Ukrainians' strive for democracy in the Cossack Era was the Constitution signed, on April 16, 1710, by its chief author Hetman

Pylyp Orlyk. The historic document is alleged to be the first world's constitution to include the democratic principles of limitation of Hetman's authority, separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and a democratically elected parliament (The Willard Group, 2003). Thus, the articles in the Constitution not only proclaimed an independent Ukrainian State, but also synthesized farsightedly the main principles of development of democratic countries.

At the end of the 18th century, the Polish Kingdom was partitioned and Russia took over most of central and southern Ukraine, while west of Ukraine fell under the rule of Austria. Despite the foreign control, Ukrainian nationhood continued to develop in the relatively liberal Habsburg Empire; it even grew in the Russian Empire despite the bans on use of the Ukrainian language in the schools and publications (Subtelny, 1994). After the anti-tsarist revolution in Russia in 1917, various Ukrainian governments in Eastern Ukraine (Kyiv) and Western Ukraine (Lviv) attempted to establish independence. In 1919, the union of the two Ukraines was proclaimed, but the Soviet troops immediately occupied Kyiv and west of Ukraine fell mainly under the Polish rule (Polonska-Vasylenko, 1995). In the early 1920's, the eastern part of Ukraine was annexed to the Soviet empire as a Soviet Republic. Western Ukraine was forced into the Soviet empire after World War II, and the Crimea joined Ukraine in 1954.

The brutal Soviet rule engineered two artificial famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in Eastern Ukraine during which over eight million died:

> Ukrainians starved to death although no natural catastrophe had visited the land… the people starved while the Soviet Union exported butter and grain. While Moscow banqueted, Ukraine hungered. (Gregorovich, 1974)

During World War II, Ukraine was used as a buffer battlefield between German and Soviet armies, which cost Ukraine some seven million more deaths. Most of Ukraine's 1.5 million Jews were killed by the Nazis during the war; many were shot in 1941, at such sites as Babyn Yar (Gregorovich, 1995). Despite the theoretical egalitarian ideas, the Soviet times were tainted by intensive Russification of Ukraine, repression of oppositions to the ruling regime, and totalitarianism of the system. In 1986, one of the reactors of the Chornobyl nuclear power station exploded, contaminating a major part of Ukraine.

On July 19, 1990, the Ukrainian government passed the Declaration of Sovereignty, and on August 24, 1991, Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet empire. The first decades of independence are characterized by the process of democratization and the rediscovery of aspects of the country's rich culture and history that have been suppressed. At the same time, Ukraine is still struggling with the remnants of the Soviet administrative-command system.

In December 1991, Leonid Kravchuk was elected Ukraine's president but in 1994 was defeated by Leonid Kuchma, who served two terms until 2004. In 1994, Ukraine (the world's third largest nuclear power since the fall of the Soviet empire) ratified the Strategic Reduction Arms Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (International Nuclear Safety Center, 1996). On June 28, 1996, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted a democratic constitution of the country.

Ukraine conducted its most recent presidential elections in November, 2004. After an attempt to rig the election results and give victory to a pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, massive street protests in Kyiv and other cities in Ukraine and abroad – the

Orange Revolution – led to new elections on December 26, 2004, won by a pro-Western reformist Viktor Yushchenko.

The brief historical overview is provided to demonstrate Ukraine's statehood and democratic aspirations, characteristics of which are apparent in Ukraine's history. The historical context will contribute to the overall picture of the country's democratization framework.

ORANGE REVOLUTION

The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a bloodless civil uprising for rule of law, which resulted in the overthrow of a corrupt government, following fraudulent presidential elections. In the elections, Viktor Yushchenko, a former Prime Minister and an opposition leader who survived a dioxin poisoning during his electoral campaign (The Associated Press, 2004), faced his opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, a Prime Minister at the time of the election backed by President Kuchma. Yushchenko's agenda included further democratic reforms, integration with the European Union and NATO, battling corruption, and supporting the business sector. In his campaign, Yanukovych favored a centralized rule, integration with the Russian Federation, and distancing from the West.

The first round of presidential elections on October 31, 2004, was marred by fraud and irregularities; the second round of elections on November 21, 2004, was characterized by even more extensive falsifications on a national scale. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported, among others, the following irregularities:

- incidents of violence and intimidation of pro-opposition voters;
- expelling of election observers;
- unequal campaign conditions and abuse of state resources in favor of Yanukovych;
- multiple voting by the same individuals using absentee voting certificates;
- suspiciously high turnouts in some regions in Eastern Ukraine;
- the addition of a high number of voters (about 5%); and
- lack of attention to ballot security and counting procedures. (OSCE, 2004)

The deeply flawed presidential election resulted in massive protests by Ukrainians in the country and abroad. Thousands of Yushchenko's supporters, dressed in orange, his campaign color, took to the streets to protest the election fraud. The biggest demonstrations were concentrated on Kyiv's Independence Square (in Ukrainian, Maidan Nezalezhnosti or simply Maidan). Hundreds of Yanukovych's backers and the riot police concentrated around the Central Electoral Commission headquarters (The Economist, 2004). Table 1 highlights the chronology of the Orange Revolution based on compilations by Forbrig and Shepherd (2005) and Shchyrin and Shchyrin (2004).

Table 1. Chronology of the Orange Revolution

Date	Event
October 31, 2004	The first round of Ukrainian presidential elections determined two forerunners – Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych.
November 1, 2004	The Organization for Security and Cooperation expressed concerns at violations of democratic norms in the first round of elections.
November 21, 2004	The second round of presidential elections took place, which was marked by significant irregularities.
November	Yanukovych was hailed as a victor by Russian President Vladimir Putin based on

Date	Event
22, 2004	early returns. Yushchenko denied Yanukovych's victory based on massive violations reported by election observers. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, many with orange elements in their clothes, began to gather in the center of Kyiv under democratic slogans, such as "Freedom won't be stopped!" Tents were put up on Khreshchatyk Street.
November 23, 2004	Yushchenko was sworn in on the Bible as president in a symbolic ceremony of protest in the Verkhovna Rada. The national student strike began. Yuliya Tymoshenko announced the presence of Russian specialized military forces in Presidential Administration.
November 24, 2004	Yanukovych was declared winner by the Central Electoral Commission. The opposition denounced the results and expressed its openness to negotiations with participation of international intermediaries.
November 25, 2004	The United States, Canada, and the European Union refused to recognize the official election results. The Supreme Court ordered that election results not be published. China, Kazakhstan, and Armenia recognized Yanukovych's victory. Vladimir Putin of Russia congratulated Yanukovych for the second time.
November 26, 2004	The Luhansk regional council proclaimed formation of the southeast Ukrainian autonomous republic. The first round of negotiations with the assistance of international intermediaries took place.
November 27, 2004	The Verkhovna Rada denounced the official results of the presidential elections.
November 28, 2004	Regional leaders in Eastern Ukraine called for a referendum on the country's federalization.
November 29, 2004	President Kuchma accepted the need for new elections. Yanukovych expressed his openness to negotiations with Yushchenko.
November 30, 2004	Yanukovych offered to make Yushchenko his prime minister – an offer that was turned down. Mrs. Yanukovych delivered her infamous speech on old Soviet-style boots "made in the U.S.A." and "doped" oranges allegedly used to fuel the revolution.
December 1, 2004	The Verkhovna Rada fired Yanukovych's government. Yanukovych refused to step down. The second round of negotiations with international assistance took place.
December 2, 2004	Kuchma flew to Russia and met with Putin in an airport.
December	The Supreme Court declared the elections null and void and set December 26 as

Date	Event
3, 2004	a date for a new run-off between Yushchenko and Yanukovych.
December 4, 2004	The European Commission praised the decision of the Supreme Court. The Central Electoral Commission ratified the new election date.
December 5, 2004	The members of the Committee of National Rescue were announced.
December 6, 2004	The Russian Kremlin backed away from outright support for Yanukovych. The third round of the internationally-facilitated negotiations began.
December 7, 2004	The negotiation parties did not reach consensus. The format of the negotiations was exhausted.
December 8, 2004	Changes to the electoral law were made in the Verkhovna Rada to ensure fairer voting. The parliament simultaneously voted to reduce presidential powers in a year. The tent city remained on Khreshchatyk Street until the complete victory in the elections of December 26.
December 11, 2004	Doctors in Austria said Yushchenko had been poisoned with dioxin earlier in the campaign.
December 26, 2004	The rerun of the second round of the presidential elections was held. Yushchenko won with 51.99% of votes leaving Yanukovych behind with 44.20% of votes.
December 31, 2004	Yanukovych resigned the premiership.
January 23, 2005	After the Supreme Court rejected final appeals by Yanukovych, Viktor Yushchenko took the oath of office and was sworn in as Ukraine's President.

A number of encouraging democratic trends during the electoral process contributed to the positive outcome of the Orange Revolution. Many citizens seemed more confident in exercising their right of free expression, for example, by displaying campaign materials and symbols. Also, more than 300 journalists openly protested against the current regime censorship. Finally, the first televised debate between the two presidential campaign leaders took place, although it was followed by biased commentaries from Kuchma's analysts (OSCE, 2004).

Millions of Ukrainians engaged in the protests during the Orange Revolution. According to the statistical data released by a Kyiv-based think tank Democratic Initiatives (Kuzio, 2005b), 18.4% of population of Ukraine (about 5.5 million people) participated in the Orange Revolution. 34% of Yushchenko's voters and 9% of Yanukovych's voters participated. The difference between Yushchenko's "orange" supporters and those of Yanukovych in "white-and-blue" can be explained by two factors: first, civil society is weaker and more "managed" in Eastern Ukraine, which happens to be more populous. Only 10% of Yanukovych voters, compared to 30% of Yushchenko voters, believed citizens should take action to protect their rights (Buerkle, Kammerud, & Sharma, 2005). Second, fewer Yanukovych voters traveled to Kyiv due to their demographic differences with Yushchenko voters – the latter tend to be younger, hence more mobile, and better educated. About 45% of Orange Revolution participants were from Western Ukraine, especially from the three Galician oblasts: Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (69%), Lviv Oblast (46%), and Ternopil Oblast (35%) (Kuzio, 2005b).

Support of the world democratic community played a crucial role in the revolutionary rebirth of the Ukrainian democracy. International pressure and saviors as a factor in the liberalization of previously authoritarian countries (Sharp, 1993) proved to be fruitful for the Ukrainian revolution. The European Union, the United States, and Canada rejected the results of the second round of the presidential elections in the country. Additionally, the E.U. statement was issued early in the "revolution" (Gromadzki, Sushko, Vahl, Wolczuk, & Wolczuk, 2005). The negotiations during the election crisis were conducted with the facilitation of international politicians.

Shortly after his inauguration, President Yushchenko nominated Yuliya Tymoshenko for Prime Minister, and this nomination was supported by the Rada. Tymoshenko, 44 at the time, whom the Ukrainians called the *goddess of the Revolution* and the *Ukrainian Joan of Arc*, was ultimately named by *Forbes* the third most powerful woman in the world after Condoleezza Rice of the U.S. and Wu Yi of China (Forbes, 2005). At the XV International Economic Forum in Krinitsa, Poland, Tymoshenko was named person of the year in Central and Eastern Europe (UA-Reporter, 2005). In September of 2005, the Tymoshenko government was sacked because of corruption accusations of several top officials. Ukraine's political crisis was resolved by Yushchenko's establishing a new government.

Among some of the post-revolutionary political successes, observers name freer media (Fried, 2005), the government's attempts to fight corruption, Ukraine's regional leadership in the GUAM coalition (composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), the country's support for a peaceful resolution of the Transdniestria conflict, and democratization of Belarus (Ledsky, 2005). Additionally, Ukraine obtained a World Trade Organization membership, and the government is predisposed toward small- and medium-sized businesses, which should improve the country's economic climate (Kuzio, 2005a).

The Orange Revolution lifted people's expectations high both at home and abroad. However, the desired changes do not happen as rapidly as expected. The government was composed of representatives from different parties with different philosophies; reforms were not implemented effectively. The government's attempt to regulate gasoline prices in May, 2005, resulted in brief shortages. Re-privatization of

previously non-transparently purchased big enterprises reduced domestic and foreign investment; abrupt elimination of special economic zones, which had been used fraudulently, caused problems for some foreign investors (Fried, 2005). All these actions slowed the economic growth in the country.

The long-term outcomes of the Orange Revolution remain to be discovered, but the mixed short-term outcomes are actively debated by politicians, journalists, and researchers. However, the fact that the revolution occurred in a nonviolent way and inspired the international community is a significant event in the history of the world's democratization.

DEMOCRATIZATION APPROACHES

Literature on democracy offers a plethora of definitions, which can be roughly stratified into minimalist definitions (referring to institutional arrangements) and maximalist definitions (embracing broader concepts of democracy that focus on social and economic domains, such as participatory and deliberative models of democracy and feminist and multiculturalist models of democracy) (Boussard, 2003). For the purposes of this study, the following definition of democracy with the incorporation of its classical semantics is used:

> Democracy is derived from *demokratia*, the root meanings of which are *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule). Democracy refers to a form of government in which, in contradiction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy entails a political community in which there is some form of *political equality* among the people. (Held, 1996)

Hence, democratization can be defined as the means and methods by which the state moves to a democratic regime type, "to a more open, more participatory, less dictatorial society within the territory of that state" (Ghali, 1996). Ideally, the end of democratization is a consolidated liberal democracy with a government that is capable of preventing resumption of conflict (Patel, 2004). Dankwart Rustow was the first to suggest studying democratization as a phenomenon distinct from democracy *per se*, since causes of democracy and preconditions of it were not necessarily one and the same (Anderson, 1997).

Current democratization literature offers several compelling theoretical approaches that have been articulated and implemented empirically. These approaches are not classifications of scholars into different categories; rather, they are classifications of different foci, and the same scholars may represent different approaches. Even though the research literature on democratization is mixed and no single approach can be considered a dominant one, the theoretical resources provide a strong foundation for further research in democratization.

Among various classifications of democratization approaches, one of the simpler is offered by Stanger (2003) who outlines two principal categories of democratization theories: 1) structural analyses that focus on macrolevel variables of preconditions that facilitate successful democracies, and 2) process-oriented analyses that concentrate on microlevel variables of interaction between government and opposition political strategies on the way to democracy. Ekiert and Hanson (2003) break down this divide further into structural, institutional, and interactional categories. The European Stability Initiative (2005) classifies democracy assistance in Europe into three approaches:

authoritarian state-building (international structures exercise significant powers within a domestic sphere), traditional capacity-building (standard non-coercive instruments promote democratization and institution-building), and member-state-building (uniquely to the European continent, candidates for the E.U. membership implement E.U.-style regime changes). A review of the literature on democratization generated the following four major democratization approaches: the democratic transition approach, the bad legacies approach, the development approach, and the systems thinking approach.

Due to the recent falls of many totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe, Northern and Western Asia, and Latin America, the number of democratic governments increased by over a half since 1972 (Pigenko, 2001). The third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) gave rise to the "democratic transition" approach, which implies the same basic pattern of political development.

The early goal of the transition approach was to generate understanding of the processes that lead to democratic changes (Milton, 2005). This approach claims that democracy can develop by choice with the assistance of political forces. Rustow (1970) presents a four-element model of transition: Element 1 – a background condition of national unity; Element 2 – a long political struggle; Element 3 – a decision to embrace democracy; and Element 4 – a new democratic system.

Some researchers express concern that not all countries with aspirations of a democratic destination have been successful. According to Linz and Stepan (1996), "[m]ost political transformations away from once-stable non-democratic regime do not end in completed democratic transitions. Fewer still become consolidated democracies"

(p. xiii). Przeworski (1991) argues that political forces can further their democratic interests, but only if they adhere to the democratic procedure in the process.

The low transitional success rates are emphasized by critics of the transition approach who point out that only about 20 of the 100 countries classified as transitional are on the way to becoming true democracies (Carothers, 2002). This approach, however, remains one of the most influential in the field and is utilized by such organizations as Freedom House.

Another approach is the "bad legacies" approach, which assumes that democracy is less likely to root if the legacies of the authoritarian past are stronger. This approach emphasizes the interdependent relationship among interests, behavior, and institution affected by short- and long-term historical factors (Bunce, 1997). Wars, communism (authoritarianism, persecution of pluralism, violation of human rights, etc.), and an absence of democratic culture are listed as key factors that affect countries with bad legacies.

In societies with bad legacies, the process of democratization and even decentralization can occur at a slower rate (Inglot, 2003). Supporters of the bad legacies approach argue that countries most affected by negative legacies – in case of Ukraine, a communist legacy – will have a smaller chance of democratization:

> If former Communist parties come to power, then their elites will simply find new forms of clout disguised as new institutions. They no longer require a formal monopoly on power, but they can wield overwhelming power nonetheless. (Crawford & Lijphart, 1995, p. 178)

The bad legacies approach focuses on historical similarities and differences of post-crisis societies and traces the influence of legacies on current political dynamics

(Pigenko, 2001). This approach is losing its popularity in the field, but it is still dominant in international media coverage.

The "development" approach focuses on institutional design, or how the political institutions affect changes of regimes (Shugart & Carey, 1992). According to this approach, the choices in political institutions, e.g., the choice between a parliamentary or presidential form of rule, influence the regime stability. Some scholars (Lancaster, 1999) regard the economic level of citizens as a critical factor of successful democratization; others (Pigenko, Wise, & Brown, 2002) underscore the role of elites in democratization processes. Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that elite consensus on the distribution of power among political institutions is critical for democratic stability.

> A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power as a direct result of a free and popular voice, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by the new democracy do not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*. (p. 4)

The development approach is criticized for partial exclusion of locals from the political process. This theme is currently debated as the Ukrainian government is debating an administrative reform and a government transition from a presidential-parliamentary to a parliamentary-presidential republic.

Finally, the emerging "systems thinking" approach emphasizes non-linearity in democratization (Seppala & Ruohomaki, 2001). This approach rests on the postulate that elements of one system constitute a whole and their behavior should not be treated in isolation (Laszlo, 1972). The systems thinking approach is gaining popularity in the E.U. where one of the democratization goals is a better balance between locally driven input

and centrally designated guidelines (Youngs, 2003) Carothers (1999) sees this as the main change in democratization approaches, labeling it *real ownership*. For Ukraine, this approach implies moving away from the mode of catching up with more developed societies, since in that mode the country will always be behind, and taking a developmental leap instead. Table 2 summarizes the democratization approaches and their characteristics and criticisms.

Table 2. Democratization Approaches

Approach	Characteristics	Criticisms
Democratic transition approach	Focus on the process Change as a major agent	Low transitional success
Bad legacies approach	Bad legacies as determinants Historical analysis	Lack of comparability
Development approach	Focus on institutional design Structural analysis	Partial exclusion of peripheral elements
Systems thinking approach	Emphasis on non-linearity Democracy as a system	Relatively new and not well-developed

Additionally, Jolly (2003) identifies four democracy approaches within the literature on the phenomenon of democracy in the European Union: the efficiency approach, the vertical democracy approach, the horizontal democracy approach, and the socio-psychological approach. Advocates of the efficiency approach focus on the extent to which output can satisfy legitimacy requirements; the two foci of the approach are the existence of the European Union and policy-making processes in Europe. The vertical democracy approach encompasses levels of governing, particularly the links between the E.U. and national levels of government. The horizontal democracy approach discusses

how democratization can be increased via changes of division of powers among E.U. institutions. In the final approach in the classification, the socio-psychological approach, the primary focus is on the lack of a European demos and its implications for the future of the Union.

Traditionally, scholars describe key factors contributing to genuine democratization processes. Some of such factors are the following: a relatively strong political opposition, strong civil society organizations, open and pluralistic media, and civic education (Mann & Patrick, 2000; Merloe, 2002). Another important component of a democratic system is free and fair elections (Kumar, 2003). With the exception of more optimistic research on the democratization of Ukraine since the Orange Revolution (Forbrig & Shepherd, 2005; Kuzio, 2005a; Ledsky, 2005), scholars point out the lack of decisive and effective democratic institutions in the country (Kuzio, Kravchuk, & D'Anieri, 1999; May & Milton, 2005; Polokhalo, 1997). Overall, research on Ukraine's democratization bears elements of the four approaches highlighted above.

The empirical literature on Ukraine's democratization processes is mainly represented by survey or poll data and comparative measures conducted in the country. Oliver Vorndran (1999), for example, summarizes the Ukrainian political elite's attitude toward four cleavages (independence, anti-Soviet parliamentarism, private ownership/market economy, and opposing cooperation with Russia), pointing out that rightist parties support most or all of the cleavages, whereas leftist parties oppose most or all of them. Democratic Initiatives conducted polls over recent years on Ukrainians' freedom of speech, protection of rights, and membership in civic groups and the data suggest higher levels of democratization values and principles in the middle of 1990s and

their decline toward the end of the decade (D'Anieri, Kravchuk, & Kuzio, 1999). Ekiert and Hanson (2003) compare Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European countries in terms of political indexes, such as transition progress, economic freedom, country risk, press freedom, political freedom, and corruption perception. Their data appear to be pessimistic as compared to most of the countries in the region. In general, more studies are required to evaluate Ukraine's level of democratization, especially taking into account the new democratization developments.

POLITICAL SELF-EFFICACY

Political self-efficacy is an important component of advanced democracies and civil societies. Systems with a higher level of political efficacy are characterized by stronger fundamentals of democratic institutions and processes. Self-efficacy is primarily concerned with the field of social psychology and can be defined as "people's beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives" (Bandura, 1994, p. 71). An important aspect of self-efficacy is its subjective nature. Gecas (1989) pointed out the existence of different meanings and emphases for the concept of self-efficacy in the field.

When it comes to the question of the theoretical foundation of self-efficacy, two groups of theories addressed the phenomenon in the 1970s: motivational theories, which focus on motivational factors, and cognitive theories, which focus on expectancies and perceptions of control (Gecas, 1989). The second group of theories generated a distinction between personal, self-perceived control and general control of people over

their situations (Gurin, Gurin, & Morrison, 1978). A third group of theories emerged from Bandura's distinction between efficacy expectations (beliefs that one can successfully carry out a particular task) and efficacy outcomes (estimates that given actions will produce certain outcomes) (Bandura, 1997).

According to Bandura (1986), self-efficacy perceptions are a positively correlated function of four types of conditions:

1. previous enactments of the behavior or similar behaviors,
2. vicarious experiences with the behavior as communicated through live or symbolic (i.e., mediated) modeling,
3. verbal persuasion regarding capabilities to engage in the behavior, and
4. inferences from physiological states experienced when engaging in or anticipating the behavior.

Self-efficacy can develop not only based on an individual's own experiences, but on an individual's observations of how others deal with similar situations. However, vicarious experiences and verbal persuasion are less powerful than personal experiences (Bandura, 1977). Individuals who believe they possess capabilities in a certain area will be more likely to initiate new fulfillment behaviors; on the other hand, those who do not appreciate their strengths fully may be inclined to act within their capabilities and, thus, forego enhancement opportunities (Ward, Cooper, Cave, & Lucas, 2005).

Research shows that media, particularly computers and the internet, under favorable conditions can increase self-efficacy and political participation (Wilhelm, 2003). On the other hand, individuals experienced in political participation are more likely to adopt the internet as a medium for political communication (Jaffe, 1994). With

people's belief that their opinions have and important effect, self-efficacy rises, producing higher motivation to participate in democratic processes (Hacker, 2002). Concurrently, self-efficacy can be an important result of political participation (Finkel, 1985).

Self-efficacy affects human functioning through psychological processes. Bandura (1994) singles out four major categories of such processes: cognitive processes, motivational processes, affective processes, and selection processes. Early studies of self-efficacy included the following four items that were used to create a political efficacy scale (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954): 1) I don't think public officials care much what people like me think, 2) Voting is the only way that people like me have any say about how government runs things, 3) People like me don't have any say about what the government does, and 4) Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

Several researchers suggest a dual measurement approach to political efficacy: a personal sense of efficacy, or internal efficacy, and a system-oriented sense of efficacy, or external efficacy (Balch, 1974; Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). Even though the correlation between the two dimensions is apparent, the research on the causal relationship remains mixed (Kenski & Jomini, 2004). Lane (1959) was among the first scholars to identify the two political efficacy dimensions:

> It has, of course, two components – the image of the self and the image of democratic government – and contains the tacit implication that an image of the self as effective is intimately related to the image of democratic government as responsive to the people. (p. 149)

Thus, internal political self-efficacy encompasses beliefs about one's ability to understand and participate in politics, while external political self-efficacy denotes beliefs about responsiveness of government to citizens' demands (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). On the measurement continuum from the concrete and specific (e.g., task-specific efficacy) to the general and vague (broader notions of efficacy), political self-efficacy is usually positioned in the middle (Gecas, 1989).

Some scholars point out that development of efficacy measurements has not been as extensive as of other psychological constructs (Morrell, 2003). Others focus on the relationship between internal and external efficacy and other political variables (Kenski & Jomini, 2004). Sanders (2001) highlights the close relationship between efficacy theories and empowerment theories. Pollock (1983) found that different internal and external efficacy patterns were correlated with different types of participation activities. Innovation, opportunity identification, and entrepreneurship have been linked to self-efficacy as well (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003).

Researchers report correlations between political efficacy and such demographic factors as education, income, ethnicity, age, and gender (Fahmy, 2004; Kenski & Jomini, 2004; Morrell, 2003). For instance, Morrell (2003) observes that internal efficacy is positively associated with education; the most effective learning is grounded in experience that can play a primary role in developing self-efficacy (Train & Elkin, 2001). Gurin, Gurin, and Morrison (1978) suggest that race and ethnicity affect self-efficacy, while Gecas (1989) argues that men have greater sense of self-efficacy than women, and cultures that emphasize fatalism are characterized by a lower degree of self-efficacy.

International research on political efficacy is mainly concentrated around developing democracies or comparisons between systems with different levels of efficacy. Thus, Kim, Helgesen, and Ahn (2002) compared levels of efficacy in Denmark and Korea. Their findings suggest that the Danish showed relatively high political participation and efficacy, while the Koreans demonstrated a high degree of political alienation. Cuzán (2001) discusses the "feeling of political inefficacy" in Cuba as the principal reason for the low levels of political participation.

The empirical research on political efficacy in Ukraine appears to be scarce. Some scholars report low levels of political efficacy of Ukrainian citizens in general (Kuzio, 2002; Raik, Nokelainen, Kuokkanen, & Tuominen, 2005). Despite Ukrainians' high level of interest in their country's politics, their external efficacy was reported to be low with 69% of Ukrainians strongly or somewhat disagreeing that voting gives them influence over decision making in the country and 78% of Ukrainians strongly or somewhat disagreeing that they can influence government's decisions (Sharma & Van Dusen, 2003). However, researchers observed a significant change in political efficacy during and after the Orange Revolution, as the media and people became more politically active (Raik et al., 2005).

Madsen and Snow (1991) point out that people have a feeling of self-efficacy in non-crisis times, whereas a crisis can generate a charismatic leader when self-efficacy is weak or non-existent and people seek "proxy-control." A charismatic leader is believed to possess such "proxy-control." During the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko's victory in the elections was attributed greatly to his personal charisma.

Overall, little attention has been paid to the task-specific measurement of self-efficacy. The search for literature on political self-efficacy of the Ukrainian youth activists did not produce any results. This phenomenon, however, deserves special scrutiny since it might have implications for both democratic developments in Ukraine and other transitional countries where youth movements are key pro-democratic agents. Additionally, the research would inform the Western world, which is interested in supporting the newly emerging democracies. The research section on self-efficacy is included to provide a theoretical basis for studying political efficacy of youth activists in Ukraine.

YOUTH ACTIVISM

The United Nations defines youth activism as *Youth activism* is young people's "participation in any or all of the following:

- Protest events and direct actions (violent or non-violent);
- Ongoing advocacy campaigns to change the policies and behaviour of powerful institutions, including Governments, transnational corporations and international institutions;
- Consumer boycotts and other uses of market power to effect change;
- Information gathering and dissemination intended to attract media attention and raise the public consciousness with regard to issues of concern." (United Nations, 2005).

Blumer (1946) describes activist movements as "collective enterprises to establish a new order of life," which "have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living."

Throughout history, young people, particularly students, have participated in socio-political protest movements. Early youth movements are mentioned by Aristotle:

> Youth have exalted notions because they have not yet been humbled by life or learned its necessary limitations … their lives are regulated more by moral feelings than by reasoning … [they] love too much, hate too much and the same with everything else. They think they know everything and are quite sure about it; this, in fact, is why they overdo everything (In McJeon, 1941, p. 1404).

Since ancient times, youth activism has been an integral part of the social dynamics of humanity. Only in the 20th century, such major youth movements occurred as the 1965-66 U.S. protest against the war in Vietnam (Degroot, 1998), the 1968 student uprising in France (Gordon, 1998), the 1968 student protest and counterculture movement in Mexico (Zolov, 1998), the 1973 student revolution in Thailand (Silverstein, 1976), the 1989 revolutions in Czechoslovakia and Romania (Edelman Boren, 2001), and the 1989-90 student movements in China and Taiwan (Wright, 2001).

The latest youth civic movements have been concentrated in the former communist bloc countries and include *Otpor* (Resistance) in Serbia, which defeated the Milošević regime in 2000; *Kmara* (Enough) in Georgia, which weakened the government of Shevardnadze in 2003 in the Rose Revolution; and *PORA* (It's time) in Ukraine, which undermined the Kuchma regime in the country's Orange Revolution of 2004. The geographic and chronological variety of youth movements demonstrates that youth resistance is a vital and recurring global socio-political phenomenon.

The Otpor youth organization in Serbia is one of the recent movements without a clear-cut ideology that contributed to the Velvet revolution in the country. Otpor was founded by several libertarians in October 1998. The organization included 4,000 members in 1999 and counted as many as 100,000 in 2001 (Chiclet, 2001). Otpor's massive campaign against the Milošević government was a "free-wheeling, anything-goes protest movement" with no hierarchical structure (Chiclet, 2001). The students were successful in their spontaneous expressions and strategies. One of the Otpor members surmised the spirit of the movement the following way: "Fear is a powerful but vulnerable weapon because it disappears far faster than you can recreate it" (Cohen, 2000, p. 46).

Georgia's civic organization of Kmara was primarily composed of students who were trained as observers for the 2003 presidential election. The organization received training from Serbian Otpor (Fairbanks, 2004). The philanthropist George Soros' Open Society Institute flew more than 1,000 Kmara members together with the opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili to Serbia to prepare them in three-day classes for nonviolent resistance (Van der Schriek, 2003), which was named the Rose Revolution, the event that brought down the corrupt Shevardnadze regime.

The PORA youth civic movement of Ukraine was organized in 2002-03 from the activists of the Ukraine without Kuchma and For Truth campaigns and focused primarily on the crucial presidential election of 2004. PORA established close ties with the Serbian Otpor (Kuzio, 2005). During the Orange Revolution, PORA contributed to organizing supporters and keeping things working in a peaceful manner to facilitate the revolutionary democratic changes.

Currently, youth movements are emerging in other post-communist countries afflicted with authoritarian regimes. In Belarus, the ZUBR (Bison) youth organization is struggling to end the rule of Lukashenka, known as Europe's last dictator (ZUBR, 2005). Russia's anti-Putin youth movement MY (We) established networks with Ukraine's PORA, as well as two other international youth organizations Kyrgyzstan's Birge and Kazakhstan's Kakhar (MY, 2005).

Comparative research on youth movements around the world is challenging due to the fact that such movements are characterized by fewer similarities than varieties. Hogan (1983) singles out at least two approaches to sources of student protest: the macroscopic approach and the microscopic approach. According to the macroscopic approach, students become active due to certain societal conditions, such as the absence of alternative influential political formations. The microscopic approach regards socialization experiences of individual young people as the source of student unrest.

Basing their research on the theory of social change with the implication of fundamental changes in society's core institutions, Brennan, King, and Lebeau (2004) delineate two distinct periods of social transformation – 'removing the old' and 'building the new.' The researchers focus on six global drivers of social transformation: globalization (increase in worldwide integration), democratization (implementation of democratic values and processes), 'supra-statism' and modeling (formation of international supra-territorial bodies), knowledge economies (investment in human capital and innovations produced by it), liberalization (introduction of freer and stronger markets with greater choice and competition), and regulation and accountability

(increasing trust through transparency). These factors can provide a context for a societal strive for change, thereby cultivating youth activism.

One component of youth movements is an ideology on which such movements are based (Blumer, 1946). Some scholars observe that youth's ideology, which forms a collective consciousness, is utopian in nature. Ideology and utopian visions can change overtime and acquire different meanings (Rhoads, 1998). Student movements are often sporadic and do not last for a long time due to the fact that student generations are short and change rapidly, posing obstacles for both leaders and followers (Altbach, 1989). With the achievement of desired goals, the reason for a civic revolution disappears, causing youth movements to subside.

Government response to youth movements can range from ignoring the protest to suppressing it violently (Altbach, 1989). In his book *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, a popular resource among youth activists in the recent revolutions in post-communist countries, Gene Sharp (1993) points out that violent rebellions can trigger a brutal reaction, which often leaves the protesters more helpless than before. The scholar stresses that dictators are usually equipped to apply violence on a grand scale; therefore, nonviolent protests are encouraged. Some of the preferred methods of nonviolent action include formal statements, group representations, symbolic public acts, public assemblies, withdrawal and renunciation, strikes, and calls for an international support (Sharp, 1993).

The internet is a powerful tool for sustaining young people's movements. The on-line milieu offers a number of resources to assist youth activism: information and data on civic topics, access to peer and adult experts, ease of communicating, shared strategies,

opportunities for young people to showcase their own creations, interchange with people of different cultures and perspectives, discussion forums, and inspiring portraits of young activists (Montgomery, Gottlieb-Robles, & Larson, 2004).

The youth activism phenomenon cannot be analyzed without taking into account its leadership aspect. Youth can acquire leadership in a variety of ways: from role models, through their peers and local community, and during participation in social activities (Linden & Fertman, 1998). Altbach (1989) describes three rings of activist participation: the core leadership, active followers who are willing to demonstrate, and a larger group of young people who support the broad goals of the movement. Outside the three rings, there is a group of uninvolved young people, some of whom oppose the movement, while most of whom are indifferent to it (Altbach, 1989).

Methods of educating youth about socio-political activism and passing civic engagement from generation to generation are an important segment of literature on youth activism. Gibson (2001) outlines four approaches to fostering youth civic engagement: civic education; service learning; political action, advocacy, and social/community change; and youth development. Proponents of formal civic education (McAlister, 1998; White, 1999) support the idea of developing new courses, which would teach the "fundamental processes and instruments of democracy and government" (Gibson, 2001, p. 6). They observe a decrease in youth's civil engagement with the reduction of civic education (Niemi, 2000). Advocates of the approach emphasize the relevance of the content of such courses to keep young people engaged and aware of the connection of course materials with the socio-political world.

The service-learning approach combines a community service experience with classroom instruction and reflection. Supporters of this approach (Battistoni, 2000; Wilson, 2000) believe that through service-learning, students can make a connection between theoretical knowledge about democracy and practical participation (Gibson, 2001). Additionally, service-learning affords young people an opportunity to get involved in public policy and more systemic change processes (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2001).

Political action approach proponents urge politicians to get young people involved in political processes and concentrate more on young people's issues (Gibson, 2001). Hepburn (2001) argues that "student service is often focused on improving students' personal feelings of relevance and belonging in the community" (p. 6). Thus, relating political agendas to youth's issues makes young people more interested in political life.

Finally, youth development approach experts consider civic activism to be a developmental process, which results in shaping a strong communal identity. This approach allows youth to offer their own solutions to community problems and provides encouragement rather than blame for, say, lack of participation (Gibson, 2001). Delgado (2002) points out several important aspects that should be taken into account when addressing youth development: cultural diversity, age, gender and sexual orientation, and abilities and disabilities. Some scholars (Byrne Fields, 2002) suggest combining all educational approaches to increase effectively the level of youth activism.

Youth activism in Ukraine intensified during the 2004 presidential election, which led to the Orange Revolution. Such organizations as PORA (It's time), Znayu! (I know!), and Chysta Ukrayina (Clean Ukraine) helped mobilize over a million Ukrainians in Kyiv

and other Ukrainian cities to participate in the Orange Revolution (Kuzio, 2005c). In 2005, PORA branched into black PORA, which remained a civic non-political organization, and yellow PORA, which registered as a political party. The significant role of the youth organizations in the Ukrainian Revolution demonstrated the potential of young people's voices. The movements deserve exclusive attention from researchers.

SUMMARY

This chapter summarized the literature pertaining to the study. In the final analysis, several key points became apparent from the literature on current democratic developments and youth activism in Ukraine. First, Ukraine is undergoing a challenging democratization process, which was recently reinforced by the country's velvet revolution, but still requires major reforms. Long-term consequences of the Orange Revolution and the changes that followed remain unknown, and even short-term effects of the revolution receive mixed reviews. Second, high levels of political self-efficacy in societies stimulate healthy democratic processes and are generated by such processes at the same time. Even though some background data demonstrate low levels of Ukrainians' self-efficacy with minor recent increases, little is known about the political self-efficacy of Ukrainian youth activists who are prospective political leaders of the future. Finally, youth activists in Ukraine have played a pivotal role in the country's recent progressive transformations. However, their vision of Ukraine's democracy, particularly its future, remains unclear.

Research on Ukraine's democracy after the Orange Revolution as perceived by youth activists might accumulate findings that would run the gamut from the positive, fueled by the upbeat spirit of the revolution to the neutral that would contain mixed attitudes, to the negative, caused by the unmet high expectations of the revolution. It is expected that youth activists' internal political self-efficacy levels will be higher than external self-efficacy levels due to the conservativeness of the Ukrainian political system. How youth leaders view the future of Ukraine's democracy appears to be less predictable and could fluctuate including western-type democracy models, systems representative of the Ukrainian authentic milieu, or even authoritarian patterns.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology and research methods used in this study. In the first part of the chapter, the research questions are reviewed. The second part describes the research methods used for the study and the rationale for their use. The third part of the chapter highlights the procedures used to collect study data. The fourth part describes methods of data analysis. Finally, the conclusion focuses on the limitations of the research methods used.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As mentioned above, the purpose of the study is to investigate past, present, and future democratic tendencies in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution of December, 2004, as perceived by youth activists in the country. The study addresses three primary research questions:

- How do youth activists in Ukraine perceive events during the Orange Revolution in the country? *(What/Who inspired their activism? What is the role of education in their socio-political choices? What were risks and benefits of their political participation? What are their descriptions of revolutionary events, strategies, resources, feelings, impressions, etc.? What do they feel they learned? What skills did they gain?)*

- How do youth activists perceive their current socio-political efficacy in Ukraine? *(What are their senses of personal qualifications, senses of system responsiveness, and confidence in particular tasks?)*
- What are visions of possible political futures among youth activists in the country? *(Is democracy a preferred future system? What are expected directions of Ukraine's democratic developments?)*

RESEARCH METHODS

Selecting a research methodology means choosing an inquiry framework and a set of procedures fitting the goals of the study. This choice is not between the right and wrong methods, but rather among different methodologies to achieve desired outcomes. There exist three principal research paradigms in the domain of social studies: quantitative research, qualitative research, and mixed research. For the given study, a mixed research approach was utilized with the following three methods used for generating and analyzing data: collecting and analyzing reflective essays, administering a survey, and conducting Ethnographic Futures Research.

Essays. The first research method employed for the study entails analysis of critical essays written by youth activists in Ukraine. An essay is an analytical or interpretive composition on a subject from a personal viewpoint. In the process of essay writing, people are able to present their personal perspectives on a subject, and the researcher can gain an understanding of the perspectives. Richardson (1994) describes

writing as a method of inquiry, and she expands the purpose of writing from that of a mode of "telling" to one of "knowing."

An essay outline is a list of questions or general topics that the researcher wants to collect in each essay. Although it is prepared to ensure that basically the same information is obtained from each research participant, there are no predetermined textual responses, and a variety of units of information can be generated. One of the greatest strengths of essay writing is that it has the ability to collect extensive and detailed data. Another rationale for using the essay writing method is its potential to capture information on situations, settings, styles, images, meanings, and nuances (Altheide, 1987). By producing reflective essays, participants have an opportunity to contribute to the research cognitively and emotionally; they have more time to process their thoughts and include the information they may not be comfortable sharing in a conversation (Beatty, 2000).

Content analysis was utilized as a data analysis technique for the study phase involving essays from youth activists. Content analysis is defined as "any technique for making inferences by objectivity and systematically identifying special characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1969, p. 14). Content analysis enables researchers to classify textual information and reduce it to more relevant, manageable data (Weber, 1990). Content analysis "consists primarily of coding and tabulating the occurrences of certain forms of content that are being communicated" (Rubin & Babbie, 1997, p. 421).

Content analysis procedures begin with constructing a research design to guide the study (Druckman, 2005). Some other steps of the methodology include:

- formulating the hypothesis and research questions;
- selecting the study sample;
- defining the study categories;
- outlining the coding process;
- implementing the coding process;
- determining reliability and validity; and
- analyzing the study results (Kaid & Wadworth, 1989).

The process is concluded by developing implications for research questions, making inferences about the population of the study, and acknowledging lessons learned in the research (Druckman, 2005).

The rationale for using content analysis in the study is the direct applicability of the method to textual materials (Weber, 1990). The technique allows both quantitative and qualitative operations. Content analysis has several additional advantages: it is unobtrusive, it accepts unstructured material, it can accommodate large volumes of data, and it is context-sensitive and therefore can process symbolic forms (McMillan, 2000). The strengths of content analysis were taken into account when collecting the essays for the study. The essay outline used in the study is included in Appendix A.1.

Survey. The second research method used in the study is a survey of political self-efficacy among youth activists in Ukraine. A survey is a method of collecting information about the characteristics, actions, or opinions of a large group of people known as a population (Tanur, 1982). Research surveys have three distinct characteristics: 1) the purpose of surveying is to generate quantitative descriptors of some

aspects of the study population; 2) survey data are collected by asking research subjects structured and predefined questions; and 3) data are generally collected about a faction of the study population, or a sample, and this information is statistically representative of the entire population (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).

Surveys can be administered in many different ways. Questions may be asked in person or via telephone-/internet-facilitated technology, or respondents may complete surveys in paper or electronic formats. Some surveys may combine several data collection techniques (Keeter, 2005).

The survey method entails four critical aspects: research design, measurement, sampling, and survey administration (Keeter, 2005). After selecting the research topic and posing research questions, the survey method was chosen during the research design phase due to the nature of political self-efficacy and its strengths in budget efficiency, convenience for respondents, simplicity of administration and analysis, and absence of interviewer bias.

The efficacy survey consists of two sections of questions: the subject matter and the demographic questions. The efficacy questions are posed to generate results, which should demonstrate the need for information and confidence training (i.e., a lack of internal political efficacy), the need for system-level education (i.e., a lack or external political efficacy), and the need for skills training (i.e., a lack of task efficacy). The demographic questions are included to gather descriptive information about the sample of Ukrainian youth activists and allow data analyses by various demographic groups.

The measurement of the efficacy survey is based on the research on political self-efficacy and its three aspects: internal efficacy (an individual’s sense of personal

qualifications for political participation), external efficacy (an individual's sense of the level of responsiveness of the political system), and task-oriented efficacy (an individual's ability to perform specific political actions) (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Mirić, 2005; Morrell, 2003). The three measurement subscales draw on previous research on internal, external, and action-oriented political self-efficacy highlighted in Chapter Two. The sub-scales measuring internal and external efficacy have been used multiple times in previous research, while the task-oriented efficacy sub-scale was used once with refugees and internally-displaced persons in Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia (Mirić, 2005). The instrument was adopted for this study because it allows the researcher to generate information on three major aspects of political efficacy, as well as sample demographics.

Since accurate lists of youth activists do not exist and no distinct sampling frame can be determined, purposive non-probability sampling was used in the study. The purpose of exploring the phenomenon of political efficacy determined the selection of the survey sample. Research participants have two key demographic characteristics: they are 18 years or older and actively participated in the events of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The sample selection aimed at obtaining a representative sample of youth activists including people living in various parts of Ukraine and those activists who were and were not members of formal youth organizations. Some youth organizations represented in the study did not issue formal memberships to protect their activists from the regime's possible aggression. The research procedures aimed at obtaining a representative sample, which would demonstrate meaningful relationships among data collected by the survey.

The survey administration began with piloting the survey among 20 Ukrainian students studying in Minnesota at the time of the study design. Ten students were asked to complete the survey questionnaire with a "think aloud" protocol. Interviewees were invited to discuss how they interpreted the survey questions, comment on the level of complexity of the questions, and justify their responses. All pilot participants were encouraged to comment on the content and form of the survey and provide suggestions for possible additional questions. The pilot administration was concluded by reviewing the pilot results and revising the survey. The study survey consisted of 23 questions, including 11 demographic questions for data analysis purposes and 12 efficacy questions to measure general efficacy levels as well as internal, external, and task-oriented efficacy (Appendix A.2, Survey of Political Efficacy).

Ethnographic Futures Research. The third method employed for the study is Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR). This method was chosen for the study due to the paucity of research on visions of the future among the Ukrainians, including Ukrainian youth activists. The EFR method is based on the scenario planning futuristic inquiry, a technique for improving decision making against a background of possible future environments. According to Wilkinson (1996), scenario planning can prepare us in the same way it prepares corporate executives: it helps us understand the uncertainties that lie before us and what they might mean; it also helps us "rehearse" our responses to those possible futures, and it helps us spot them as they begin to unfold.

The scenario planning method employs scenarios as research tools. In simple terms, a scenario is an internally consistent account of how the environment in which an organization operates might develop over time. A scenario is a tool for ordering one's

perceptions about alternative future environments in which today's decisions might be played out. The following are some additional definitions of scenarios:

- Scenarios are histories of the future (Johnston, 2002).
- Scenarios are a hypothetical sequence of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on processes and design points (Kahn & Wiener, 1967).
- A scenario is a story about how the future might turn out (O'Brien, 2004).

The ultimate product of the scenario planning process is not an accurate picture of tomorrow, since the future cannot be predicted precisely, but better decisions about the future are made possible. Van der Heijden (1996) suggests that the ultimate purpose of the scenario planner is to create a more adaptive organization, which recognizes change and uncertainty and uses it to its advantage.

The EFR method is defined by its developer, Robert Textor, as a "systemic inquiry into alternative futures that are considered to be possible or probable for a given population" (Textor, 1990b, p. 139). EFR attempts to determine the state of knowledge about a certain phenomenon, identify implications and consequences of a potential future, and describe possible alternatives (Domaingue, 1989). Additionally, Textor (1990b) points out that EFR is used to:

1. Describe alternative futures that are possible or probable for a particular population.
2. Determine the state of our knowledge (or uncertainty) about this or that possible future.
3. Identify implications and possible consequences of this or that possible future.
4. Provide early warning signs of undesirable possible futures.
5. Understand underlying change processes. (p. 139)

The purpose of EFR is to elicit from members of a social group their images and preferences (cognitions and values). In EFR, the idea is to align research participants according to their own value standards. This research method is comparable to the Cultural Futures Research, a method used in cultural anthropology:

> Just as the cultural anthropologist conventionally uses ethnography to study an extant culture, so he or she can use EFR to elicit from members of an extant social group their images and preferences (cognitions and values) with respect to possible or probable future cultures for their group. (Textor, 1990b, p. 141)

Textor (1978) specifies the three EFR scenarios and the order in which they should be generated: 1) an optimistic scenario, which describes what participants most want or desire, 2) a pessimistic scenario, which highlights what participants most fear, and 3) a most probable scenario, which focuses on what participants think is most likely to happen. The EFR method was modified for this study, and hypothetical sample scenarios were used during each interview to reinforce the research process. Interviewees were asked to reflect on the suggested scenarios, or, in case of disagreement with them, extrapolate their own visions of the most optimistic, pessimistic, and probable futures.

To help research participants with visualization of the relationships between the scenarios, some researchers (Domaingue, 1989; Textor, 1990a) propose using a scale of 1 to 100, with one representing the most pessimistic future and 100 representing the most optimistic future. The most probable scenario would fall somewhere in between. Domaingue (1989) suggests that research participants concentrate on about 10 when eliciting the most pessimistic scenario and about 90 when eliciting the most optimistic one.

The EFR method was chosen for this part of the study due to the dearth of information on mental maps and visions of the future among the Ukrainians, particularly youth activists. The study EFR script is included in Appendix A.3 (Ethnographic Futures Research Guidelines).

DATA COLLECTION

Youth activists from several Ukrainian oblasts and the capital of Kyiv participated in the study. These research participants were chosen because of their active involvement in the recent democratization processes and because they are potential political leaders of the country. The data were collected over a period of three months in on-site visits and via communication technology. Before each data collection stage, potential research participants were offered a description of the study, the anonymous and voluntary nature of participation in it, and the consent regulations that the study entails.

Essays. In the first stage of the study, 21 youth activists were asked to write extensive reflective essays addressing their experiences and feelings during and after the Orange Revolution. Depending on their contact preferences available on their organizations' Web sites, youth activists were contacted via telephone or e-mail with the description of the study, and the consent forms and essay outlines were distributed via e-mail. In 14 cases, these participants were recommended for the study by their organizations' leaders, as they performed such functions as spokespersons, reporters, or media coordinators. Additional seven participants volunteered to submit their essays for the study after they learned about it. Research participants were asked to complete the

writing task within one month. At the end of the essay collection process, 19 activists submitted their written testimonials for the study. Two activists failed to submit their testimonials due to their extensive involvement in work-related projects. Of all the research participants, eleven were male and eight were female. To ensure anonymity of participation in the research process, the authors' names were removed from the collected essays and each activist was assigned a random number. The essays were submitted in three languages. One essay was written in Russian (Activist 3); four essays were written in English (Activist 10, Activist 12, Activist 13, and Activist 19); the remaining 14 essays were written in Ukrainian. While several research participants reported residing in various Ukrainian locations at different points of their lives, their origins were mainly associated with the following cities: Kyiv (6), Ivano-Frankivsk (6), Lviv (5), Odesa (1), and Ternopil (1).

Survey. In the second stage of the study, an efficacy survey was administered to 76 youth activists in Ukraine for a duration of two months (December 2005 – January 2006). Research participants were previously recruited via telephone or e-mail over a period of three weeks. Participants were located in youth organization headquarters and Ukrainian universities. Before taking the survey, participants received from the researcher a verbal explanation of the study and survey procedures. Most participants (N = 59) took the survey online; a smaller group of activists who were recruited at the organization's headquarters (N = 17) completed a paper version of the survey. In both instances, the response rates were high – only two participants failed to complete online versions of the survey after accessing the survey link, and all of the participants who worked with the paper version completed the survey. One limitation of this particular

process and of online surveying in general is the likelihood that the survey link could be forwarded to more individuals than those presumed to constitute the study sample. However, the online survey tool made it possible to register every individual who accessed the survey even without completing it. In addition, the organized nature of the youth movements and the activists' genuine interest in the study add to the degree, to which these findings are representative of the population.

The survey demographic questions included in the second part of the survey generated information on participants' gender, age, level of education, influence of education on socio-political activism, nationality, area of residence, native language, organizational affiliation, and international experiences. Data obtained through the survey and highlighted in Figure 1 indicate that 58% of survey respondents were male (N = 44) and 42% of respondents were female (N = 32).

Figure 1. Participants' Gender



Figure 2 summarizes demographic findings on participants' age. According to the figure, the largest group of survey respondents (47%) were between 19 and 22 years old, which corresponds with the average age of university students. The second largest group

of 29% was aged between 23 and 26, and 12% or respondents were aged between 27 and 30. Seven percent of survey participants were younger than 19, and 5% of those who completed the survey were older than 30.

Figure 2. Participants' Age



Youth activists were categorized into three groups depending on the level of their education at the time of their participation in the survey: activists with secondary education (4%), activists with incomplete higher education (53%), and activists with complete higher education (43%). Additionally, 24% of respondents reported no influence of education on their socio-political activism, 35% observed some influence of education on their activism, and 41% of activists believed education determined their socio-political activism to a significant extent. Figures 3 and 4 show these data.

Figure 3. Participants' Level of Education



Figure 4. Influence of Education on Socio-political Activism



When asked about their nationality, most participating youth activists reported that they were Ukrainian (93%), 2% reported they were Russian, and 4% reported another nationality (Hungarian, Jewish, and Ukrainian and Russian). 84% of participants responded that their native language was Ukrainian, for 13% Russian was their native language, and 1% reported their native language as Siverian (a Ukrainian dialect, according to the respondent's description). One respondent did not answer the question about the native language, stating at the end of the survey that the question was not politically correct.

The demographic section of the survey also included two questions about participants' predominant lifetime location – one on the type of residential area (urban or rural) and the other about participants' location as stratified by five main regions in Ukraine. Eighty-three percent or 63 survey respondents reported they resided in urban areas, and 17% or 13 respondents reported rural areas as their places of residence. Figure 5 demonstrates participants' place of residence during the greater part of their lives, distributing the results the following way: Central Ukraine – 18% (N = 14), Western Ukraine – 66% (N = 50), Northern Ukraine – 1% (N = 1), Eastern Ukraine – 7% (N = 5), and Southern Ukraine – 8% (N = 6).

Figure 5. Participants' Residence in Ukraine



Finally, survey respondents were asked to comment on whether they had spent more than three months abroad and if they were formal members of a youth organization. According to the processed results, 71% of participants had no prior significant international experience and 29% of participants had had an international experience of over three months. Those with extended international experiences reported having traveled to the following countries (the frequencies of the countries are provided): the U.S.A. (6), Russia (4), Germany (3), Hungary (3), Poland (3), Greece (2), Belgium (1),

the Czech Republic (1), France (1), Georgia (1), Great Britain (1), Latvia (1), and the Netherlands (1). As for their youth organization affiliation, 8% of respondents were members of PORA (black), 16% were members of PORA (yellow), 3% were members of Student Brotherhood, 17% belonged to other organizations, 50% were not affiliated with a youth organization formally, and 6% failed to provide an answer (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Participants' Organizational Affiliation



Ethnographic Futures Research. In the final stage of the study data collection process, EFR interviews were conducted with nine youth activists between the ages of 20 and 29. These activists were identified through their organizations' contact information posted online. Two criteria used to select the research participants were their age (between 18 and 30 years old) and their leadership positions in the organizations they represented. The degree of the latter criterion differed depending on whether the organization adopted the principle of a leaderless structure. Five of the participants were female and four were male. The interviews were scheduled at a convenient time for the interviewees, and each lasted for about one hour. Prior communication was carried out by means of telephone or e-mail. The interviews were tape-recorded with the participants'

consent; background notes were taken during each interview. The recorded interviews were later transcribed verbatim and translated into English for analysis. Follow-ups via e-mail were conducted with three participants to make additional clarifications. Table 3 shows the participants' gender and location. To protect the interviewee's identities, their legal names were substituted by random pseudonyms. A description of the analysis of thesis data constitutes the next section of this chapter.

Table 3. Participants' Gender and Origin

	Pseudonym	Gender	Origin
1.	Olena	female	Lviv
2.	Svitlana	female	Ivano-Frankivsk
3.	Myroslav	male	Lviv
4.	Bohdan	male	Ivano-Frankivsk
5.	Taras	male	Kyiv
6.	Mariya	female	Kyiv
7.	Lesya	female	Kyiv
8.	Kateryna	female	Ternopil
9.	Vasyl	male	Kyiv

DATA ANALYSIS

Three separate analysis procedures were used to process the essays, surveys, and EFR interviews. The study was concluded by a meta-analysis of the three types of research findings.

Essays. Qualitative essay data were analyzed using the "constant comparative method" (Merriam, 1998). The incidents or ideas from one essay were constantly compared with those from other essays. Before the process of analysis, all materials were obtained in a similar format, and each piece of data was assigned a unique activist number for reference purposes.

The data were analyzed by means of coding and categorizing. Analytic coding of the data involved breaking the data down into units for analysis and categorizing the units. The units consisted of particular ideas appearing in the essay texts. During the research, the units and categories were continually refined and improved, and a set of generalizations was developed and modified in line with the findings from fieldwork. The analysis process was facilitated by the NVivo software.

Survey. The SPSS and Microsoft Excel software was used to analyze the survey data. The analyses included descriptive statistics, frequencies, and ANOVAs to generate the overall description of the sample, determine levels of political efficacy (as well as its components, internal, external, and task-oriented efficacy), and explore relationships among data variables. These results represent general democratization trends in Ukraine, as political efficacy is an important constituent of democracy.

Ethnographic Futures Research. For the analysis of the EFR data, three separate protocols – responses to the optimistic, pessimistic, and probable scenarios – were developed to organize the findings. Further, emerging data themes were identified based on the "open coding" process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). During open coding, the conceptual categories were identified and labeled, into which the observed phenomena were grouped. The next stage of analysis involved re-examination of the categories identified to determine how they were linked. The protocols were then analyzed using a systematic approach to understanding data. The NVivo software was employed to analyze the EFR data.

STUDY LIMITATIONS

The three methods used for the study have some limitations. These, however, are not significant enough to invalidate the study. Essay writing and EFR extrapolation methods are relatively time-consuming and labor-intensive for both study participants and the researcher. Some of the criticisms of content analysis include the tendencies that the codes miss nuances and innuendos that are the essence of interaction and the exclusive focus on what is said misses other aspects of the process of analysis (Druckman, 2005).

Some limitations to using the survey method are systematic and often inadequate sampling procedures, low response rates, weak linkages between units of analysis and respondents, and over-reliance on cross-sectional surveys where longitudinal surveys are more relevant (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). Additionally, purposive surveys do not

yield data as reliable as those generated by random surveys, since the mathematical rules that give statistics analytical weight cannot be strictly followed and must be loosely interpreted.

The limited number of youth organization leaders and, therefore, EFR interviews is another study limitation. Author's bias (being a Ukrainian national and supporting Ukraine's democratic vector), although taken into account, could influence the results of the research. Despite these limitations, the importance of the research questions and the lack of previous research in the field justify the effort of the study.

SUMMARY

Mixed methods (essay content analysis, survey, and Ethnographic Futures Research) were selected for this study to generate multiple forms of data in the triangulated research design to understand the perceptions of the recent past, present, and future of democracy in Ukraine. The next chapter offers a summary of study findings collected in the research process.

CHAPTER IV: RESERARCH FINDINGS

This chapter highlights research data collected for the project. Research findings are reported in the order of research questions posed by the study.

The first research question, “How do youth activists in Ukraine perceive events during the Orange Revolution in the country?” is addressed with the content of written testimonials authored by 19 research participants. Selected testimonials are highlighted in Appendix B.1.

The second research question, “How do youth activists perceive their current socio-political efficacy in Ukraine?” is answered with data collected by the efficacy survey of 76 respondents.

The third research question, “What are visions of possible political futures among youth activists in the country?” is elucidated by findings garnered from the interviews with nine research subjects. Appendix B.3 includes summaries of the nine EFR interviews.

RESEARCH QUESTION I: PERCEPTIONS OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

Multiple themes, which shed light on events and sentiments of the Orange Revolution, emerged in the 19 essays of youth activists, whose names were removed from the essays as guaranteed by the research statement of consent. These themes stand out because they are explicitly or implicitly present in the writing of all research participants. These themes are:

1. Reasons for activism
2. Role of education in activism
3. Revolution preconditions
4. Conceptualization of the revolution
5. PORA
6. Strategies and skills
7. Benefits and risks
8. Accommodations and resources
9. Nonviolent resistance
10. Feelings
11. Revolution around Ukraine
12. International support and recognition
13. Revolution heroes
14. Post-revolutionary outcomes and developments

These are not the only themes in the essays, but they are strong semantic nuclei of the writings, depicting the Orange Revolution through youth activists' perceptions.

These themes comprise a logical continuum of description of the revolution investigated by Research Question 1, starting with reasons for socio-political activism, role of education in shaping civic participation and conditions that caused the people's resistance. Next, portrayals of the Orange Revolution, as well as of one of its driving forces, the PORA youth organization, are offered. This picture is supplemented by narratives of skills, strategies, and impressions gained during the revolution, alongside depictions of some of its characteristics (resources, accommodations, nonviolent

resistance, etc.). The events are then described as they were happening around Ukraine and were perceived on the international arena. Finally, post-revolutionary outcomes and developments are summarized based on the content of the collected written testimonials.

In their synergy, the themes represent a meaningful monolith on the Orange Revolution. The essays become a means of channeling young people's voices, sharing their experiences, and constructing a clearer picture of the historic pro-democracy events in Ukraine.

Reasons for Activism. Various reasons were listed as incentives for activism in the essays collected in the research process. Activist 10, Activist 12, and Activist 19 were motivated by their need to defend their right for freedom of expression and speak up against the massive election falsifications. Activist 14 and Activist 15 were inspired by their friends and fellow Ukrainians. This inspiration resulted in Activist 15's need "to be next to the people that cared and were ready to overcome all hardships and state to the entire world that we are an aware and unified community." Activist 17 joined the revolutionary protest to prevent the election of a pro-Russian president. For some activists (Activist 3 and Activist 11), their desire for change determined their participation in the events of the Orange Revolution, many of which took place on Kyiv's Independence Square or Maidan (Nezalezhnosti).

> The fact that my life has not really changed much, that I am not in the midst of events, started irritating me. The sequence of "work-home" seems no longer meaningful and I feel the need to be on Maidan and participate in the Revolution together with my countrymen. But I still have doubts, I do not want to be a string puppet in hands of skillful PR technologists, but I long for changes and faith that this time it is for real. (Activist 3)

> As for my personal inspiration, I think I just got tired wanting from people at university, at school, at hospitals, at any governmental office or organization what

> I had the right to have, and what they would never provide or give me, just because they thought I did not ask it appropriately. By asking for a favour appropriately officials on all levels mean helping to become them less non-affluent. I got tired seeing those KGBers ruining the lives of other people and telling everybody that they are patriots and serve their country. I got tired running from one office to another when I needed some stupid "dovidka" (sorry, but I will not translate it, since this is a realia word) just because I had no relatives or friends in that institution. I also got tired of the external policy of Ukraine, which reminded me of Roman Janus, who was licking Russia's [behind] with one of its faces, hoping that the west does not see it, and begging for "investments in our economy" from the West with its other face explaining to them that we are on the route to establishing democratic ideals in our country. As a result, we lost (if there was still anything to lose) respect from both. (Activist 11)

In addition to her desire for democratic changes, Activist 13 was motivated by her wish to reassert herself as a Ukrainian:

> Though I did not believe in ultimate changes in Ukraine's politics, I was positive that the newcomers were in a much better position to introduce Ukraine to the democratic values than any of incumbents. Like many in Ukraine, I was getting tired of seeing lawlessness on the streets and in Ukraine's politics and economics. Another important issue for me during the Orange revolution was whether Ukraine's a national state, or a Russian colony. Ukrainians' self-identity crises under Kuchma's was very poignant and the Orange revolution gave me a chance to stand for my right to be Ukrainian and to live in an independent country. (Activist 13)

Activist 7 and Activist 9 were driven by their revolutionary idealism. For Activist 9, his "revolution of consciousness" was inspired by a play entitled *The Ukrainian Bourgeoisie Nationalist*. The main character of the play, Zenoviy Krasivskyy, a historic figure (a Ukrainian writer and political prisoner), becomes a target of intrigues of various forces – politicians, oligarchs, and statesmen – who try to use him for their own promotion by persuading him to stop his fight against the unfair regime. However, he refuses to listen to them, takes a gun, and goes to the woods to continue his partisan struggle. While Activist 9 was moved by the play, his collaborator describes idealism as a source of his revolutionary participation, which he attempted to share with others:

> I was doing it because it was the best I could do. I had one big dream and a very amorphous idea how to make it come true. I knew the people who had similar wishes and I communicated with them. At the time, we were not talking about a revolution yet. We simply believed that something needed to be done. Serbia (Otpor), Georgia (Kmara), Gene Sharp, nonviolent resistance – we did not have to invent a bicycle. We were pragmatists and realists and, therefore, we believed that a revolution (or something similar) was possible. The most difficult thing was to convince others. To accomplish it, we had to turn into idealists. If that is how revolutionaries are born, I had motivation to become one. However primitive this may sound, my surroundings (environment) turned me into who I am. (Activist 7)

For some young people, reasons for activism were prompted by their personal persecutions. Activist 8 got initially involved in civic protests because it was "romantic and simply trendy," but his "Rubicon" decision to oppose the Kuchma regime actively was reinforced by his arrest on the March 9, 2001 Ukraine without Kuchma aftermath eve during a militia raid conducted in the Kyiv terminal to retaliate against earlier anti-presidential demonstrations. Ironically, Activist 8 had not even participated in those demonstrations. Wearing a kerchief with an *I Want the Truth* slogan and heading to his Western Ukrainian hometown of Lviv were sufficient reasons for the activist's being detained and beaten up by militiamen. Even though he was not taken to the district department due to his young age, Activist 8 was so affected by the authorities' repression that it became a significant breaking point toward his decision to oppose the regime proactively:

> March 9, 2001, made me make a decision: to continue a more and more dangerous struggle or give it up altogether. Several reasons made me choose the former. It was a sensation that I was in the epicenter of the events and had a chance to change something in my own country; it was a desire to do everything possible to prevent the kind of lawlessness that I experienced on March 9, 2001; it was, after all, a desire to avenge the cops I hated. There were many actions ahead – more and less successful, and also repression – milder and tougher. But March 9 remains to be the day for me when I determined my civic position. That position ruled my actions during the following years. The actions, which actually were

> constant self-preparation for the so-called Moment X – the time when the authoritarian regime was thrown down. (Activist 8)

Role of Education in Activism. Of the eight activists who address the impact of education on their socio-political activism, four concur that education shaped their participation in the Orange Revolution significantly. Activist 4's degrees in sociology and journalism heightened his perception of manipulations of polling methodologies and survey questions during the election process and equipped him with tools of distributing objective information on the revolution among mass media. Activist 8 notes that his studies in the field of history enabled him to compare past events and learn from previous mistakes. His activism was inspired by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought against the Russian invaders during and after World War II, and it was analysis of historic events that contributed to structuring the PORA campaign around the principles of nonviolence and a leaderless, horizontal structure. Activist 8's knowledge of history also empowered him with a strong sense of responsibility for determining modern history. Activist 6 emphasizes a prominent influence of his civic education and training on his activism:

> Education for me is more of a status – a "lawyer" or something else. But a civic-political education played a much bigger role. But it started for me at the school of management as a manager and organizer. Then there was the "initiative" experience and then the seminars of the OTPOR, ZUBR, and KMARA. And then in the summer and fall of 2004, activists of Kyiv PORA were listening to my lectures, in which quality and accessibility could save an activist from the next detention or provocation. (Activist 6)

Activist 13 points out great value of her national and international education in determining her participation in the Orange Revolution:

> My education in L'viv National University, Central European University and London School of Economics armed me with valuable knowledge of international

> relations, international public law, comparative law, election systems, human rights, political science, and economics. In the course of my work on the final thesis at the L'viv National University I came to conclusion that by adopting the language of advanced international instruments and joining international institutions, Ukraine failed to negate the Soviet ideology and accept democratic principles of governing. (Activist 13)

Four other activists do not observe a prominent influence of their education on their socio-political activism. However, one research participant (Activist 14) mentions the importance of her patriotic family upbringing when it comes to her civic choices, and another participant (Activist 10) agrees that his education gave him knowledge of his citizenship rights. Activist 19 does not think that education correlated significantly with participation of Orange Revolution supporters because citizens with various educational levels joined the demonstrations around the country.

Revolution Preconditions. Even though the immediate reason for the Orange Revolution was the presidential election fraud, many preconditions of the revolution had been accumulating and smoldering for 13 years of Ukraine's most recent independence. The public protest was triggered by political and economic crises as well as deterioration of democratic values and practices in Ukraine.

> What happened in 13 years that the country that should have developed intensively got stuck in corruption and crime? Economic and demographic crises, brain drain, unemployment were shredding the young country without giving it the smallest perspectives for the future. Thinking about the situation you come to realize that the country is ruled by statesmen incompetent or indifferent to the fate of their people. Further actions of such leadership would have inevitably caused fatal outcomes for the country in its stage of formation. Every year, new democratic premises were lost: pressure on mass media, falsifications in electoral processes, corrupt handouts of positions in power institutions, persecutions of opposition. Instead of pursuing the perspective European community, the authorities in Ukraine directed its external politics toward the embrace of the painfully familiar "northern neighbor." (Activist 15)

The fear of handing over Ukraine to its "northern neighbor," Russia, and, thus, undermining Ukraine's sovereignty, mobilized youth oppositional movements and is noted to be another precondition of the Orange Revolution:

> It looked like for the guarantee of his safety, Kuchma decided to actually sell Ukraine to Russia. Our northern neighbor started behaving more than boldly and Ukrainian leadership responded with nothing but emphasizing the importance of preserving good relations. In Ukraine, they were preparing to mark the 350th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty on the state level and a year of Russia was announced in the country. Furthermore, a treaty about forming the Single economic space was signed, which alleged, not baselessly, attempts at a revival of Russia's empire ambitions. And a totally outrageous display of these ambitions was the attempt of Russian occupation of the Ukrainian Island Kosa Tuzla. The two last problems urged establishing by our community an initiative, which we called Opir Molodi (Youth's Resistance) – an abbreviated version was supposed to be OM – a unit of resistance in physics. (Activist 9)

As a remnant of the Soviet empire, the negative perception of nationalism was embraced by the Kuchma administration, and Ukrainian nationalists were labeled an extremist minority. Some activists, Activist 11 and Activist 15, were outraged by President Kuchma's statement, which he delivered in the Russian Federation, claiming that the Ukrainians constituted a people but not a nation.

> The reason why the nationalists were in opposition was the politics of the authorities which was directed toward eliminating of the Ukrainian values, language, culture, giving up national interests, etc. We gave up nuclear weapons, we gave up the world's unique strategic bombarding planes, we agreed to the Crimea's autonomy, etc. Parallel to this, there was a decline in living standards, degradation of the population, destroying of the educational system, etc. (Activist 5)

Activist 5 also describes more specific events, which became sources of public dissatisfaction with the post-Soviet regimes in Ukraine:

> In 1994, a war instigated by Russia could have started in the Crimea. Then, nationalists from all over Ukraine came to the Crimea and the Russian factor was eliminated. But the authorities gave in and granted the Crimea a status of an autonomy, which was anti-constitutional.

> On July 18, 1995, there was a big fight with the militia during the funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr. To please Russia, the authorities did not authorize the burial of the Ukrainian Orthodox Patriarch in the Saint Sofiya in Kyiv. There was a big fight between the Ukrainian parish members and UNSO members, and the militia. Two participants of the funeral were beaten to death. The Patriarch was buried by the entrance to the Saint Sofiya.
> On March 9, 2000 (the birthday of the national hero, Taras Shevchenko), a youth group took over a central office of the communist party of Ukraine and put forth demands of Ukraine's decolonization. If those demands were not satisfied, the young people threatened to burn themselves and the office. After negotiations, they gave up to the militia and received several years in jail each. At the time of the event, there was a mood in the rightist milieu that a national revolution had begun at last. But the authorities patched it all up skillfully. (Activist 5)

Activist 9 singles out another string of events, which became explicit and implicit preconditions of the Orange Revolution: journalist Gongadze's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his decapitated body (also described by Activist 6), the *Ukraine without Kuchma* protest (also described by Activist 5 and Activist 6) and arrests of students from Lviv, subsequent student protests in Lviv to get the arrested released, a student hunger strike to prevent dismissal of the Yushchenko government (Yushchenko was Prime Minister under Kuchma's rule at the time), and the actual dismissal of Yushchenko's team. The latter event became a revolutionary initiation for Activist 9:

> …Yushchenko was dismissed. After that, a bitter quietness started with tens of thousands of people standing as if they had been beaten up. Yushchenko came out and thanked everyone who supported him (he also mentioned the hungering students), and promised to be back. That was how he became an oppositionist. We also promised to be back. That was how we became revolutionaries. (Activist 9)

Conceptualization of the Revolution. In their written testimonials, five youth activists offer definitions of the Orange Revolution, which range from optimistic to pessimistic and from general to specific. Activist 13 defines the revolution as "a peaceful struggle for my election right." Activist 7 finds it challenging to capture the Orange Revolution in one definition due to its multifacetedness; however, he tries to summarize

the vocal nature of this social phenomenon: “The shadow of the homo sovieticus hangs over each of us. Silence is a bad habit for us, it is an escape from our own shadow which is capable of talking. Maidan broke the long-lasting silence and demonstrated to us that we are able to listen to ourselves without mediators or broadcasters. To put it more simply, it was a revolution of consciousness.” Another definition describes the revolution as an evolutionary process:

> The Orange Revolution term, which is used nowadays, is not exhaustive. Before December, we were trying to have a revolution but it turned out to be an evolution. Why? The revolution per se in its positive meaning is a coup (legitimized by society and not previous authorities) with a drastic change of power. Now, we received a legitimization from the previous authorities. And we see the confirmation of that trail: Kuchma is not in jail, almost all of government officials, the “birdies from Kuchma’s nest” are standing behind Lytvyn, and the former national democratic opposition is not represented among the authorities. This also concerns young activists of the modern epoch. What actually happened was an evolution, with the advance of the parliamentary elections there is an opportunity to get the desired effect, a sharp change of the rotten processes. (Activist 6)

Activist 17 is less positive in his effort to conceptualize the revolution, posing a number of questions, some of which are rhetorical in nature. He asks:

> Was it a revolution that happened last year? Or was it a string of events in November-December 2004 that did not contribute to improvement of lives of the only source of power – the people, who are usually remembered only before elections? Why is this land given to the Ukrainian people by God always in the epicenter of a deep crisis? What was the contribution for Ukraine of the two days I spent on Independence Maidan? What was the contribution for my city of the days I spent on Dumska Square in front of the Odesa City Council and Administration? Can we at least talk about social positives for my neighbors? (Activist 17)

Activist 19 remains neutral in her definition:

> The Orange Revolution can be defined as the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the corrupt government’s actions that caused dishonest presidential elections. The elections served as a catalyst for the people to come out to the streets and demand their voices to be heard and votes to be counted. (Activist 19)

"An incredible national uplifting, an expression of the Ukrainian spirit and patriotism" – that is how Activist 15 describes the Orange Revolution events. Convinced that the presidential plebiscite was being stolen from the rightful victor after the reports of major violations, Yushchenko's supporters took to the streets to demand that their candidate be recognized as the winner. Maidan attracted thousands of people as early as the eve of the second round of presidential elections:

> We understood that our people were tired after the tumultuous night and thousands of them would not have enough time to arrive from other regions. But we saw a striking picture – tens of thousands of people were already standing on Maidan and their number was growing constantly. It became clear – the Revolution got started. Freedom cannot be stopped!
> Further events remind me of some fairy tale, a real carnival. It seemed, a scent of freedom was reigning in the air, which was taken in greedily by the people gathered on Maidan. Joyous, hot orange colors shining everywhere were creating a true atmosphere of a celebration. (Activist 9)

The orange demonstration lasted for 17 days and was characterized by a high degree of determined participation to support freedom in Ukraine:

> Every day, new and new people come to substitute for their co-citizens and friends, and the atmosphere in Kyiv despite cold and hardships is very energetic and friendly. As a witness to all this I can state for sure: these people will never give up!!! I see cars honking in rhythm with the slogan "Yushchenko! Yushchenko!" It is happening not only downtown but also on any street of the city. And it happens not only to encourage one's supporters but to express one's joy as well. There are people on top of cars waving flags and shouting. Several new songs appeared to express the support to Yushchenko. Kyiv is really exuberant. Peaceful, smiling, kind, united people. For the five days of our stay in Kyiv, every meeting on Maidan began with a prayer. And we sincerely prayed to God to grant us the desired freedom. People will not leave Maidan until and unless Viktor Yushchenko is pronounced President of Ukraine. The fact of the matter is that it is not about Yushchenko. It is about freedom. I have not been happier in my entire life. I have not experienced greater love than the feeling I experience toward every single person I meet on Khreshchatyk. We are like one friendly family, dressed in orange. And without any modesty I can state that everyone who spent at least a day on Maidan is really a hero, and now I can really be proud of my country and my new-born Ukrainian nation. (Activist 14)

Protesters from all over the country joined local Kyivites, all of them wearing something orange to represent the color of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party. Despite heavy snow and freezing temperatures, the Orange Revolution participants were in a festive mood, united in both celebrating freedom and protecting the tent city from invaders:

> During the first two weeks, everyone was brothers, everyone felt as one. In the hundred-thousand-crowds, nobody was elbowing anybody. Even native Russian-speaking Kyivites were speaking Ukrainian. It was a true national solidarity. A great kind family. Later, when the fire subsided, there started appearing looters, moral freaks. A personal security service started functioning in the camp, which kicked out the drunk ones. The looters were beaten with sticks on their posteriors, were made to clean toilets, etc. (Activist 5)

> Here, such people met who had not seen one another in their hometowns for years. Around fires and tents, there were signs with names of places from which people staying there, came. Geography of Ukraine could be studied by them. Conversations were starting very easily. Everyone knew the most important thing about everyone else – the reason why they were there. (Activist 3)

> Seeing the ocean of people standing up for their rights and ready to freeze to death in order to change the regime was an impressive picture, which would be difficult to forget. The feeling of unity between people, euphoria, and excitement were omnipresent. People looked happy at Maydan. It seemed that Ukrainians suddenly realized their own importance. They have changed from rightless little screws in a big state machine to conversant with their rights and dignity participants of political processes in Ukraine. (Activist 13)

Young people served as one of the most proactive forces in the Orange Revolution. According to Activist 15, "We, the youth, became most active initiators of the revolution." Despite numerous obstacles, young people continued promoting the revolution both informally and by joining formal civic organizations. Their inspirational work resulted in overcoming fear of the authorities, engaging greater numbers of

revolutionary participants, and sustaining the resistance movement until the opposition's success.

> By the end of November 2004, it became clear that the technological component of creating the revolution exhausted itself. Since then, our struggle depended on us the least, on the methods and ideology popularized by us, on American valyanky [Soviet-made boots] and money, on drugged oranges, on huge tent cities, on all day and night concerts, and other attributes (both real and imaginary ones) of revolutionary tactics and strategy. We simply continued to work on our cause, hoping that our struggle would become a struggle of the rest of Ukrainians – the Ukrainians who were our spectators and closeted supporters during almost all of 2004. Now I think we managed to persuade them of the inevitability of the revolution: they came to Maidan with expectations of *something*, in search of a sight, in which they became participants themselves. Having come to Maidan in a capacity as viewers of the revolution, the people became its immediate initiators and participants. Cheering orange-Yushchenko slogans, each of them in the depth of their souls realized that *I am the revolution*. (Activist 7)

> In my opinion, the Orange Revolution was happening merrily and boldly. It was necessary for the Ukrainians to stop fearing the all-armed "Kuchmism" and become a threat for it themselves. Funny and daring actions of the Civic Campaign "PORA!" were a significant agent in battling the fear by the Ukrainian society and those events quite strongly set the tone of the spirit of the Orange Revolution itself. Our main strategy was to squelch the fear and apathy among people – that was why our supra-goal was and is building of the civil society in Ukraine. (Activist 8)

Coping with fear was one of the greatest challenges for young revolutionaries, as they constantly faced persecutions and risks described later in this chapter. The Kuchma regime was not the only source of fear for youth activists. Sometimes they were confronted with aggression by Yanukovych's supporters:

> The most important night was when we were supposed to hold the terminal before a projected invasion of white-and-blue convicts. At the time, we indeed experienced fear and hostility toward them – all negative feelings. We watched them as they were frustrated and walked along the rails holding metal sticks, and everyone expected that they would have to take the hit. All night was spent in such tension. We did not let them inside, held the door and watched them closely. By the morning the convicts dispersed.
> I will remember that night for the rest of my life. (Activist 15)

PORA. The youth civic campaign PORA became a vanguard driving force of the Orange Revolution, "a match that started the fire," as one of the organization's cofounders, Activist 9, referred to it. This all-Ukrainian information, education, and mobilization campaign launched to ensure fair presidential elections played a pivotal role in organizing and sustaining the resistance events. The PORA organization became a non-violent revolution trademark worldwide alongside the Serbian Otpor and Georgian Kmara. The campaign claimed to be independent from political parties and state organizations, but some statesmen tried to ascribe to its success after the revolution was over.

> Sometimes people rush into extremes – either completely equating the Revolution with the PORA activities or absolutely denying the impact of our organization on the orange events. PORA has never been the entire Orange Revolution – it played the role of a match that started the fire. But a match and a fire are not the same things although the latter would probably not happen without the former. The Orange Revolution was truly a people one, its basis was self-organization. And no matter how certain politicians try to subscribe to the idea of preparations, conducting, or overseeing the Revolution, it all is only an attempt to sell the real for the desired. (Activist 9)

The PORA campaign, as reported by Activist 9, was initiated in Western Ukraine during a trip to Hoverla, the highest peak in the country, located in the Carpathians. On October 4, 2003, a group of eight youth activists launched the Youth's Resistance OM organization with the final decision, "That's it. We are starting." (Activist 9). The first PORA-like action organized by the OM was a protest against Russia's invasion in the Ukrainian Island of Tuzla:

> We held protest at the Russian consulate in Lviv, which we surrounded by border poles with words "Do not cross! Danger!" Under the building, we parked an audio car, which constantly emitted messages in Russian in an official male voice: "Russian soldiers! Give up! Your resistance is worthless. On the Island of Tuzla, you will get hot soup, a warm bed, and a hundred grams" and in a pitiful female

> voice: “Vanya! Come home! Vanya, drop the weapon! I’m waiting for you!” That circus gathered a rather big number of young people and the OM made the news for the first time. (Activist 9)

This essay author continues by describing further trainings of youth activists disguised as university lectures and held in vacant university classrooms, studying such parallel youth movements as the Serbian Otpor and Belarusian ZUBR, following closely the Georgian Rose Revolution to learn from the Kmara’s experiences, and touring Ukraine to create a youth organization network in the entire country. Activist 8 classifies Lviv PORA campaign into two stages: developing the network (March – September, 2004) and mass protest events (October – December, 2004). He was involved in training a group of 30-40 activists who later carried out main organizational work and were in charge of training new members.

Activist 5 points out that the civic committee of resistance, “For Truth,” formed during the Ukraine without Kuchma campaign, laid ideological, empirical, and strategic basis for PORA in Kyiv. Some of the movement inspirers in the capital were participants of the 1990 Student Revolution on Granite, which was organized in support of Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet empire. Activist 7 notes that the PORA movement “started spontaneously, but it was expected,” and its first action of distributing flyers asking, “What is Kuchmism?” all over the country on March 29, 2004, gained desired attention and publicity from both the government and the opposition.

The PORA organization was founded on the principles of nonviolent resistance, leaderless structure, financial and political independence, and the members’ commitments not to use their participation in the campaign for personal career

advancement (Activist 9). These principles were derived from Sharp's ideology (1993) to guarantee the organization's uniqueness and success.

> The Civic Campaign "PORA!" managed to mobilize about a thousand activists in Lviv during the Orange Revolution. Such popularity was caused by PORA!'s originality against the background of other organizations. Civic Campaign PORA! was independent from parties, its structure was democratic and disciplined at the same time, its participants and leaders were young people, its activities were quite radical, though punished by repressions, still peaceful and nonviolent. These and other reasons attracted primarily students to PORA!, especially the ones who had not been involved in civic activism before, since there was no structure that would push them out or simply drew to itself. Thus, we managed to involve people who, despite the lack of a grounded knowledge of civic activities, were not spoiled by party salaries for their voluntary work. After all, the absence of experience was compensated by the enthusiasm of those people. (Activist 8)

After extensive discussions, the campaign's name, logo, and basic operational strategies were developed. While the PORA name [*It's time* in Ukrainian] satisfied almost everyone, discussions of the logo started with considering the Otpor fist, which was later adopted by the Kmara organization. But in their attempt to develop something unique, PORA founders generated two logo versions, a rising sun and a clock showing 11:55 (Activist 9). The former logo was chosen to represent the campaign, later known as black PORA, and the latter logo was used afterward in the yellow PORA campaign.

> The same winter of 2004, at the meetings we adopted such things as the name of the newly-founded organization and its logo. Without major arguments, we only decided that it was going to be a civic campaign, but not an organization as such. That is, participation in it would not entail any particular effort, admission, member IDs, or even a fixed membership. Everyone who shared our views could join us for participating in our events depending on their availability. At the time, such a formation was completely new and it was one of the movements, which attracted young people dissatisfied with the bureaucratization of other organizations. The idea of using printed materials of exclusively black and white colors was supported relatively easily as well. First, it reflected our slogans and symbolized our struggle (day vs. night, good vs. evil), second, as importantly, it was cheap. Black-and-white printouts saved us money and, besides, they stood out among the expensive colored posters of the authorities. (Activist 9)

Yellow PORA was formed in Kyiv in April of 2004. As Activist 9 states, this PORA branch emerged upon the Western Ukrainian activists' return from the Otpor training center in Serbia, where they had participated in seminars, discussions, and brainstorming sessions. The name of the campaign was adopted from the yellow color of its printed information materials, and representatives of the original black PORA channeled their efforts into collaboration between the two PORA groups. This synergy was more fruitful in outer regions of the country than in the capital.

> …at the time, it was decided not to emphasize differences between the two campaigns (by the way, the positioning was different from the very beginning – our campaign primarily targeted actions of direct impact, whereas the "yellow" one had a goal of information-educational activities), but try to work for collaboration. This concept gained wonderful results in the regions where the two campaigns merged into one body painlessly. However, this did not happen at the highest level in Kyiv. The leaders of Yellow PORA, whose campaign had a vertical management structure, unlike our leaderless one, did not wish to merge further. In particular, they were not happy about the leaderless principles, our tradition not to give journalists our last names, only first names, and our political independence, considering the fact that they had representatives of the Our Ukraine block in their political council (their structure was typical of political parties). (Activist 9)

Due to their oppositional resistance, over 300 PORA activists were subjects of the government's persecutions and repressions within eight months of the PORA campaign (Activist 9), in response to which young people organized mass protests. The protests served a twofold purpose: they defended the repressed activists and inspired more potential participants to join the campaign (Activist 8). With the increase of the government's aggression toward PORA activists (e.g., attempts to stage thefts, terrorism, and possession of drugs or plant fake money or weapons in the PORA headquarters), the scale and theatrical expression of PORA protests grew as well. Examples of such a protest were young people's demonstrations on central squares of their cities wearing tags

with the following: “Olya, 17, I like Mozart and ice cream. Am I a terrorist?” (Activist 9). The risks of involvement in PORA activities were high, and the campaign owed its success to devotion and persistence of its activists:

> During my work in PORA, the intensity level was very high. It was the most uncertain period, there was no support from anywhere. Activists were attacked, they were detained by the militia, beaten by strangers, intimidated, threatened to be expelled from universities, and even threatened physically. Because of that, only the biggest risk takers became activists. Until it became obvious that the revolution was irreversible, the number of activists was very low. But those who were activists at the time, were real zealots who were prepared to do anything. The risk level was the highest because the most valuable things were at stake – your life, health, and future. Generally, the period before the revolution was extremely disturbing and every colleague of mine understood that if we had lost we would no longer have normal lives. It is possible that the Security Service was keeping thick files on each of us and would have bothered us for a while after the elections. (Activist 4)

Post-revolutionary disillusionment did not escape the PORA campaign, whose black branch chose to develop into a civic organization later known as OPORA [*support* in Ukrainian]; yellow PORA was transformed into a political party, which later joined the orange government. The formation of the party was characterized by some controversies and the inclusion of people once unaffiliated with the campaign directly, while some activists were left outside the political process:

> Falsified last names, inexistent places, empty statements and threats to everyone and everything, a sharp increase of PORA members’ age – up to 40-50 years – all this threatens yet again to condemn the youth who will once again feel used and thrown out. For some reason, the dirty peripeteia of a small group of over-aged pseudo PORA members are more interesting to journalists than information about the real work of PORA activists. Their active work after the victory of the Revolution – resignations of bigger or smaller Kuchmists, actions to defend civil rights, serious projects of a civic weight, proposals of improving work of national services, establishing civic control, and many other things – remain beyond the information field. PORA became a phenomenon in the Ukrainian history but its activists are not going to be parasites on its past. For the people who created it, it primarily became an attempt to approach the notion of a “politician” in a new way. Unfortunately, even among the new authorities, there are few people who

> really can or at least want to work in a new way. The months that passed confirm: couloirs, intrigues, lies, unfortunately, were not left behind in the Kuchmism epoch, but gradually transfer into present days. But I believe one can state with optimism – it is just inertia. The ice has melted and no one will be able to turn the events back. I am convinced that thousands of guys and girls who lived through PORA will get a deserved place in society. They will substitute those from "yesterday" with those who can work in a different way than those from "yesterday," they will enter the culture, civil life, and, after all, politics. But they will come not through lies and falsifications like their predecessors did, but through persistent work and self-improvement – the way they can do it. Because it is their time [pora] – the time [pora] of the young ones. (Activist 9)

Strategies and Skills. Youth activists utilized a variety of strategies before and during the Orange Revolution to accomplish their goals. Pre-revolutionary strategies entailed extensive preventative work; one such strategy was to send hundreds of activists to work in southern and eastern regions where first round falsifications were concentrated (Activist 9). A significant amount of work was allotted to promoting the revolutionary movement and defending detained activists.

> Our main strategy was to provoke the authorities against us. The more of us were taken, the better for us. We were merely mocking them and encouraging others. Thus, it became trendy to go to jail and the youth were joining us massively. But apart from it, it was necessary to maintain distinct organizational unity. Because if someone was detained and no one else knew about it, it was useless. We developed a system of notification, in which people performing special tasks (gluing stickers, holding rallies, or simply distributing handouts), would always walk in pairs or groups and there should always be a person who would watch and inform me or the center about an arrest or provocations. If we knew where the militia were taking our people (to which department), we were distributing the info about it instantly among newspapers, radio, TV, and were calling the departments introducing ourselves as journalists, MPs, and demanded explanation on the reason of detention. Or we were sending out the phone numbers of the department to all activists, who in their turn, were sending it to their friends, and the system was working. Also, attorneys and opposition MPs went there immediately to try to "pull out" the detained person. In my case, three attorneys and three MPs arrived and a rally of 50 people gathered (who were singing songs and cheering me up). Such information and gatherings gave an extra opportunity for the opposition to validate its words about repressions with real facts. Amnesty International was also working with us very fruitfully, it provided me with an attorney and recognized me as a prisoner of consciousness. (Activist 6)

Events held by youth activists were characterized by artistic expression and comedic nature. Humor was skillfully utilized to alleviate tensions in aggravated, stressful situations and, thus, emotionally disarm the authorities' forces.

> So in the fall, PORA started work at its highest – street events, flash-mobs were held in all cities, building walls were covered with posters and graffiti. A unique feature of these events was their boldly funny, uppity tone. We used laughter as a weapon against the growing fear in the society, which was provoked deliberately by the authorities rolling down to the regime of a Soviet type. And our weapon was omnipotent indeed – sometimes the militiamen sent to our actions could not help but laugh with everyone else. But of course there have been serious moments and even dramatic ones – when our activists were detained and tried. But every detained activist knew that s/he would not be abandoned, hundreds of friends got together under the militia headquarters demanding his/her release. That was when the slogan, "Разом нас багато, нас не подолати" [We are together, we are many, and we cannot be defeated], sounded out loud for the first time. (Activist 9)

During the revolution, some strategies and tactics emerged spontaneously depending on the needs of each situation. While Activist 4 suggests that there was no clear organizing strategy for revolutionary activities and hours of hard work sometimes were dismissed by youth leaders, he was impressed with the people's self-organization on Maidan; activists would "join the work themselves with no directions. They saw that the place was dirty, for example, and they would start cleaning…" Activist 5 provides more insight in the organizing strategies during the revolution:

> Naturally, the most experience and impressions came from Maidan. Single people started directing the human uncontrolled sea. We were setting up the first tents even though there were almost no organized forces around. We were simply aligning activists, simple passers-by, giving them instructions in a military way, and it was working. We set up the first tents by the Conservatory on Independence Square on the election night. In the morning, we set up tents on the transport part of Khreshchatyk. People followed the orders. (Activist 5)

In order to motivate and sustain the orange resistance, youth activists performed various duties and tasks. Activist 3 and Activist 15 report that young people were divided

in groups of ten and each ten was appointed a leader, who would give further instructions. The two activists were involved in recruiting Kyiv students and guarding strategically important buildings.

> …my friends and I were on duty under the walls of the Cabinet of Ministers, Presidential Administration, rallied at the Verkhovna Rada, were night guards by the tent city, circulated issues of periodicals, guarded various strategic objects, particularly the terminal. Everyone made their own little contribution to the general great victory… Our feet were always wet, many people were sick, but there were a lot of medications and new shoes were given out. But despite the hardships I knew I would stand till the end… We could not always have rest at night, most of the nights, we guarded the tents or controlled strategically important objects. (Activist 15)

> There were more blockades of universities, the Ministry of Education, transport, a bold several-day blockade of the prosecutor general's office, when we, not to freeze to death, were dancing loudly under its walls 12 hours a day, there were night meetings on Kontraktova Square, when I climbed the Skovoroda monument for everyone to hear the following day's agenda. (Activist 9)

Activist 6, a PORA member, describes the following strategies, which he observed or carried out during the revolution: arranging events and concerts, appointing guards at strategic places, setting up informational and educational booths for passers-by, creating lists of the repressed, leading demonstrations to various locales, organizing tent cities and strike committees, and stopping buses that circulated absentee ballot voters to vote multiple times. Activist 9 offers his account of impeding vote-rigging by stopping these "каруселі" [carousels]:

> The day of the elections finally arrived. For us, it started very interestingly. We had received a piece of information before about employees of one of gas companies who were going to be taken outside of Kyiv to vote somewhere in Poltava Oblast under their bosses' supervision. We decided to prevent it and in the morning of November 21, we went to the point of the buses' departure. First, we unveiled slogans calling to stop lawlessness, started shouting slogans in a megaphone, finally, when the bus engines started, our guys and one girl lay under the wheels. The confrontation lasted for about an hour, eventually, people "loaded" on the buses started leaving for their homes. It was our first victory of

> the day. We had a whole lot of work in store entailing supervision of the electoral process, preventing irregularities, and, at night, when the counting process started, we guarded electoral sights from bandits. (Activist 9)

Use of various strategies by young people during their activism in the revolution contributed to shaping up their personal and professional skills and enriching their life experiences. Activist 4 reports gaining a lot in terms of his personal development and professional experience in the field of public relations. Activist 6 informs that he learned how to work with volunteers, organize events and concerts, conduct training seminars, negotiate with government officials, work with mass media, and develop information products. Even though Activist 10 says that he has not learned much from the revolution directly, he appreciates the experience he gained as well as his honed ability to think twice before performing a task and evaluate political processes more realistically. Other activists share about their gained skills and learned lessons:

> The following are the basic skills I gained and tried out during the Orange Revolution: leadership, team work, networking with mass media, organizing events of direct action. The most important thing for me is the experience of working with people, the ability to direct efforts of various activists to achieve common goals. My practice made me learn how to convince people, understand them, and later on, I even learned how to affect the process of building up of the world outlook of certain people. My public speaking skills came in very handy when I was conducting numerous meetings and speeches before multi-thousand crowds. In my work with mass media, I practically mastered the basics of a press-secretarial workshop, since I was coordinating the Lviv press-service for a certain period of time and later on, the all-Ukrainian one. Particularly, I learned how to conduct press-conferences, organize TV/radio broadcasts, and make sure an event was highlighted in the media. When it comes to the direct actions, I cannot even remember the number of rallies, flash-mobs, and strikes in the organization of which I was involved. Certainly, far from all of them were successful, but my general experience is sufficient to know how to achieve concrete goals by means of a direct action. (Activist 8)

> During my participation in the Orange Revolution, I learned a few things:

- Being a patriot without fearing this notion, not just in your words, but also in actions;
- An ability to find a way out of difficult situations quickly;
- A skill to overcome personal fears and insecurities;
- Trusting strangers and relying on them completely;
- Disregarding hardships on the way to reaching a goal;
- Sleeping on the floor (we slept on a theatre stage) ☺; and
- Most importantly, I learned to believe that there is nothing impossible in life. (Activist 14)

> Maidan taught me what I could not have learned in the best institutions and gave me what no other event somewhere else could give me. I learned how to be patient and tactful, disciplined whenever necessary, I understood that not everything could be gained by force or money. The main thing I brought home from Maidan was the hope that tomorrow we would have a free and independent Ukraine, a great country in Europe, who will remember that it used to guide us before. It will happen because nothing else can happen. (Activist 15)

Benefits and Risks. The 17 days of the revolution and processes that triggered these events, enriched youth activists with personal benefits, but they also posed a number of risks in opposing the semi-authoritarian political regime. In their written testimonials, youth activists reflect on their personal experiences and address some of these benefits and risks. Among personal benefits gained during the Orange Revolution, youth activists list personal growth, freedom, fame, stronger national identity, etc.:

> …we gained a country that got another chance for the future. I did not fight for power, I do not need it, I fought for change in the system, change in "the rules of the game." I did not make any money, not to mention power, but I rose a few steps in my personal development. And also the most important thing I gained – I saw the Ukrainian people who managed to get together for a common goal. To tell the truth, we had not expected this to be possible. (Activist 4)

> As a student, I had nothing to lose. I could only dare to gain something or avoid it. Everything I had was my unlimited personal freedom. Everything I needed was my readiness to be responsible for my personal freedom. I was ready to risk anything for that. The revolution gave me an opportunity to be responsible for my freedom and enjoy it. It was my greatest achievement. (Activist 7)

> The main achievement of the Orange Revolution for me is my experience. Besides, one could say, I became famous. Of course, no one asks me for autographs on the streets, but frequent speeches at meetings and other public gatherings as well as my constant work with mass media gave their results gradually. Accordingly, the circle of my connections increased. First and foremost, I made numerous friends all over Ukraine consolidated in our struggle with the "Kuchmism." Additionally, my active civic work allowed me to meet personally many representatives of the authorities, talented personalities, and businessmen. I can say that Maidan gave me the most important components of civic leadership: managerial experience, publicity, and a wide circle of connections. (Activist 8)

Activists 6 points out that his personal gains of the Orange Revolution outweigh the risks, which his activism entailed:

> I risked my life, health, and freedom, the most valuable stuff, having gained a new country, new approach, and attitude to me which I had never had. I also gained friends, brothers, and future professional partners. I also gained greater freedom, more rock 'n' roll, and more hopes. I feel I am a Ukrainian because I can speak Ukrainian without fear, organize cultural projects, participate in new campaigns, movements, initiatives with smaller risk to my life, health, and freedom. (Activist 6)

Several research participants describe their risks during the Orange Revolution, with the exception of Activist 11 who felt safe during the rally due to the multitude of people involved. For most, their activism was marked by various risks and fears.

> The risk… I was expelled from the last year of my university program. Because I stopped attending classes. Of course I will renew it, but I was and am having problems with my parents because of it. There was a risk of going to jail on a fabricated charge, because of planted explosives, there was a risk of disappearing somewhere in a dark alley, there was a risk of becoming a victim of the militia's beatings on Maidan. There were a lot of risks. Some activists were beaten up. They attempted to beat up [an activist's name] on the first night of Maidan but he managed to escape. But the main risk was on Maidan during its first two-three days. We were prepared to both defend and attack. First and foremost, morally. (Activist 5)

> The most important things I risked were my life, my freedom, and my education. When it comes to the first one, I was attacked twice by hooligans. During the last attack, one of my friends ended up with a broken skull. When it comes to freedom, apart from several detentions in militia district departments, I have the

> experience of an administrative court, which, to tell the truth, lifted the convictions off me. When it comes to education, the rector of my educational institution received several letters from the head of the oblast militia with a request to hold "prophylactic discussions" with me and several of my friends. But the rector ignored the letters out of principle. Although I could not have been expelled from the University on political grounds – as my civic work load increased, I studied less and less. Again, I lucked out with the rector – in a session after the Orange Revolution, he prohibited expulsion of students. (Activist 8)

> I was afraid that the people's protest would be suppressed, was fearing for my safety and the safety of millions of Ukrainians on Maidan. Everyone risked their lives, no matter how hackneyed this may sound: every morning, after sleeping in our clothes, we woke up with a troubling thought that the government might use troops to suppress the waves of resistance. We risked losing our jobs, being expelled from our institutions, we risked our health. I am not talking only about the supporters of V. Yushchenko – people of both camps were at risk since the result of the Orange Revolution was impossible to predict. (Activist 14)

Accommodations and Resources. The Orange Revolution events were facilitated in the spirit of goodwill and hospitality, which Kyiv residents offered for revolutionary participants. Free-of-charge catering was provided by individuals of different social ranks as well as orange-oriented political forces. Maidan inhabitants kept the square clean and orderly.

> Here comes a good point to conceptualize what really was going on Maidan. It was a people catharsis that happened then. Finally people could feel part of the processes that were happening in the country, declare that the people are not "sheep" but a thinking, powerful force. Maybe it was the response to all the farce that had been taking place during the pre-election races. A lot of positive energy was concentrated on Maidan which was nourishing, filling, and cleansing everyone: the poor, the rich, the politicians, and those who despised politics. Even if the tent city was organized and financed by the orange politicians, even though the slogans politicians threw from the stage were well-thought and rehearsed, no finances or slogans will force people, despite their gender or income, views and beliefs, to fraternize and support one another. An eloquent situation comes to mind when there was a $1000000 Hummer parked on Maidan and the sign on it read "Hot Tea." When the orange supporters gave food and clothes to the miserable workers from eastern oblasts, whom the authorities packed into buses straight from work, like sheep, took to Kyiv and ordered to shout for Yanukovych, but forgot to give them food… (Activist 1)

> Upon my arrival in Kyiv and seeing the sea of people, I developed a firm belief: "These people cannot be conquered by anyone!" I had never been so proud to be a Ukrainian before. I was struck by the incredible niceness of the participants of the Orange revolution, the desire to help one another. People offered warm clothes, medicine, hot food. There were a lot of stations organized where we could rest, warm up, get a bite, talk on the phone to my family in Ivano-Frankivsk who were worried about me and all of us. For the rally participants, there were places set up where they could get some sleep and get hot lunches. I sensed the "smell of freedom" for the first time. It was such a euphoria that cannot be described by words. Those who were not on Maidan at the time, cannot feel or understand it. Each of us was filled with pride for our Ukrainian people and with a feeling of happiness. Truly, there was God's goodness and an angel's wing over Maidan. (Activist 2)

> What impressed me the most? The hospitality of Kyivites who constantly approached groups of Orange Revolution participants with hot food and beverages. Having asked one lady if she was really doing it for free, I became ashamed after I heard her response: "Are you standing here for money then?" Material values were meaningless, legs and arms were numb with cold – it was hard to stand motionlessly in frost but courage and pride for being a small element of creating history of the country of Ukraine were emerging and strengthening in my heart. (Activist 14)

> Nobody was afraid of frost or cold, you could expect support and help from everywhere. Kyivites were handing out tea, sandwiches, hot soup, warm clothes, hosted the visitors overnight… Despite the fact that tens of thousands of people were on Khreshchatyk day and night, it was clean and orderly. There was well-organized catering service providing coffee, tea, broth. Women and girls were cooking. I remember one incident: a trendy jeep approached us at midnight, the driver asked us where he could unload his car and opened a load of groceries. (Activist 15)

One of the essay authors took an ethnographic notice of ads circulating to accommodate guests of Kyiv:

> Some of the ads I saw on poles were quite precious: "The Revolution has to be clean. Come and get clean at Vul. Polyovoho [number], Apt. [number]," "If you need warm mittens and socks, please call [number]," "Shelter for the night available, Vul. Kakhovskoho [number]."
> People were helping one another, they opened their homes, gave away their things, money, and shared everything they could. Everyone was like a brother to everyone else. (Activist 3)

Two distinct characteristics of the Orange Revolution were respect and politeness, with which participants of the resistance movement treated one another. Such courteous behavior also contributed to reducing the likelihood of conflicts both within and between social gatherings participating in the revolution. More importantly, a heightened civic awareness seemed to bring out the best in the people standing on Maidan.

> What impressed me the most at the time was the high culture displayed by the people on Maidan. Despite the low temperatures, nobody was drunk, everyone was polite. In that tense situation when any minute repression could begin, it was a demonstration of an extremely high spirit and civic consciousness. (Activist 1)

> Nobody was drinking or being rowdy. Everyone was very polite to one another and even caring. Wow! I could not even have hoped for such drastic changes. (Activist 3)

> The strong-mindedness of people standing up for their freedom turned them into noble knights. This could be sensed in everything – communication, behavior. Everywhere, politeness, desire to help, people were not ashamed to be kind, to be heroes. In such moments, you were bursting with pride for being a Ukrainian, being part of this proud people. (Activist 9)

> First impressions were a complete surprise: everywhere on the streets and in the subway we saw people looking nothing like inhabitants of large industrial centers with their everyday troubles and fuss, the usual life stood still – people were rushing to Maidan. Like little streams, from everywhere people were moving in friendly groups filling up the endless orange sea of Faith, Hope, and Love. Everyone felt they were a little part of the great Ukrainian people… One could feel care and brotherhood everywhere. I was looking at the sea of people. So many of them got together like this for the first time. And I was genuinely happy that the then authorities and opponents of the Revolution would see that it was not a crowd where anyone could have been knocked down and stumped. On the contrary… Someone accidentally pushed someone and you hear a mutual apology. I had not seen such goodwill. Leaders of the Orange Revolution appear on stage. Everyone around is cheering: Our president – Viktor Yushchenko! Together we are many! We cannot be defeated!.. (Activist 15)

In their resistance, Orange Revolution participants relied on both monetary and non-monetary resources. The source of funding of the revolution is one of the controversial aspects of this social phenomenon. Speculations range from assumptions

that the funds were provided entirely by the West to beliefs that the money was allocated within Ukraine solely. Throughout the essays, there are very few references to financing of the Orange Revolution. Activist 9 reports cooperating with an international fund representative, a Lvivite by origin but a resident of Greece at the time, who financed PORA training seminars. However, other expenses, like printing posters, were covered by the students' own money. Another activist describes her perception of funding:

> Here it is important to say that the November events in Ukraine became significant not only for this country. There were changes of accents taking place in the world. Countries were watching how Russia was losing one more vassal, how nervous because of it was the "ruler of all Russia" – Putin. Everyone understood that the anti-Russian block was being financed by Russia's opponents on the political arena, that events in Ukraine were stimulated by funds of the great players in political poker. I do not want to get too deep into this issue because it is unpleasant for me to recollect that such conclusions I made specifically in the fall of 2004. I understood perfectly that any revolution, coup, had to be financed at someone's expense. Where would Lenin have been without German money? It is unpleasant to realize that your country, your nation, is a piece on a chess board, but you cannot help it. The world has become too small and interfering in matters of other countries has already become a tradition. I think it was the excessive attention of European organizations and American politicians that prevented the acting president from ordering troops into Kyiv. (Activist 1)

Inspired by the revolution, Ukrainians supported the events financially as well. A significant amount of funding came from donations from Ukrainians around the country and abroad.

> There are lists of people on the streets who donated what they could spare: from 5 hryvnyas [US$1] from a schoolboy to 500 hryvnyas [US$100] from a businessman. The lists grow every day. (Activist 3)

When it comes to non-monetary resources, Activist 4 considered the people and their willingness to cooperate to be his greatest resources in the revolution, while Activist 9 relied on experiences of his peers from Serbia, Belarus, and Georgia and learned from their trainings on "organizing communication systems, safety precautions, and mass

events," as well as their advice on "motivational change." Activist 8 views information technology and young people's ability to use it efficiently as a valuable resource for the revolution:

> Another side of the Orange Revolution, to which I want to draw your attention, is the use of modern information communications. It is difficult for me to picture the turmoil events of the PORA! activity during all of 2004 without cell phone connection, internet, and laptops. Due to the major spread of cell phones, we had an opportunity to engage a significant number of people in our actions. For instance, when in 2004, one August morning, they repressed the Sumy students; within eight hours PORA held a rally at the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in most oblast centers of Ukraine. The ability to operatively create and transmit information even under extreme conditions allowed us to save time and increase the effectiveness of our efforts greatly. It should be noted that many strategic projects of PORA! were created with the help of a laptop on the lap of a male or female PORA! member wherever they had to be. (Activist 8)

The orange forces' ability to take advantage of the drawbacks of the white-and-blue campaign was another resourceful strategy described by Activist 1:

> While carrying out a retrospective analysis of the events, one can say that the camp of the "orange" politicians won because their opponents did not have wise political promoters. The problem of the Yanukovychists was that they trusted the Russian specialists too much, who tend to consider the people a herd, who will swallow anything as long as there is a lot of it. They thought that the "brainwashing" through advertisement and propaganda on all channels but Channel Five, was sufficient to zombie the entire nation. However funny this may sound, the orange politicians almost always made use of the drawbacks of their opponents' campaign, because they had few of their own gains. (Activist 1)

Nonviolent Resistance. From the very beginning, the Orange Revolution was branded as a nonviolent resistance movement, which, similar to other colored revolutions in the region, adopted Gene Sharp's nonviolent strategic basis, highlighted in his book *From Dictatorship to Democracy* (1993) and mentioned in Activist 7's essay. This pacifist nature of the revolution served as a guarantee of safety for revolutionary participants, since, in case of violent resistance, the semi-totalitarian regime would have

found it justifiable to use violence in response and its force potential was significantly higher than that of the opposition. Additionally, the nonviolent revolution became a source of pride for its activists solidifying the Ukrainians as a peace-loving people.

> Life had stopped in Ukraine: factories, offices, schools, and other institutions were closed, because we all knew that something more important was now going on in our country, and this demanded our participation and our determination to stay there as long as it was possible. There was never any aggression, no one got drunk, and we were all standing there peacefully showing the whole world that we are a civilized nation capable of protecting our ideals and our vision of the future of the country. (Activist 11)

> Most historians say that without weapons no great event took place. But our people proved that even such a great event as a revolution can be done without any weapon. Due to this event, I realized that every problem can and should be solved in a peaceful way without any violence. (Activist 12)

> The most important characteristic of the Orange Revolution was the fact that everything happened without a bloodshed, the Ukrainians proved that they are a civilized humane nation capable of solving problems on a global level through diplomacy. Ukraine proved that it had potential to join the E.U., being its irreplaceable strategic partner. (Activist 18)

Nonviolence was exercised by the orange camp not only toward the authorities but also toward their white-and-blue clad opponents who supported Viktor Yanukovych.

> "The white-and-blue" – this was the name for Yanukovych's supporters – were moving in Kyiv freely. They could be seen in lines for food in the tent city, they were arguing with their opponents there. It was significant that guys in white-and-blue scarves were able to go through the Maidan crowd freely, even though it was very hard to do – that's how tightly everyone was standing next to one another. But no one wanted to provoke a conflict, so the opponents were given the right of the way. We are having a peaceful Revolution and it has to remain as such. (Activist 3)

> Often, multi-thousand groups of people moving in Kyiv – on Khreshchatyk, Lesya Ukrayinka Blvd. – were objects to various provocations. For instance, a group of 30-40 people dressed in white-and-blue suddenly started heading in our direction. But we were disciplined and created a passage for them. But soon they dissolved in the million crowd of the orange people. (Activist 15)

Feelings. In their essays, youth activists describe a gamut of feelings they experienced during the events of 2004, varying from negative to positive. The weeks before the revolution and the first days of the rallies were characterized by fear and uncertainty. However, most of the revolutionary days were filled with joy, euphoria, national pride, and a sense of accomplishment.

Since youth activists were unable to predict the magnitude of the support of the opposition and the outcomes of the Orange Revolution, the fear of the unknown was prominent before the events and at its onset. There was also a rumor of a violent suppression of the protest by the government and reports that troops were concentrated in Kyiv (Activist 2 and Activist 4), which only made the anxiety grow.

> I realized perfectly that my role was very insignificant, but multiplied by millions of the same people it was a huge force. If I am a true patriot of my country, if I wish a better life for my future children and grandchildren, if I want to live just like other people in developed countries of the world, I cannot simply watch the development of events in the capital, I have to be there. Together with others we headed to Kyiv by bus. To tell the truth, it was a little scary – the night before, nobody slept at all – everyone was worried by the serious fears that the authorities would send armed troops against their own people. (Activist 2)

> The only thing of which I was afraid was provocations. There were too many people on Maidan who at any moment could turn into a crowd that destroys everything on its way. Deep down, I wanted all these thousands of people, at the same moment, to take over the Government Building, Verkhovna Rada, Presidential Administration, and then lynch Kuchma and Co. But there was an understanding that it would not result in anything good. Many people would die and mostly not the best people would gain power because the world is designed so that people with high morals do not strive for power. (Activist 4)

> During March-November, I was constantly overwhelmed with a fear, a fear for the people who got involved in the cause, a fear of what was going to happen to them, a fear of what you would say to their parents. But in the revolution days, there was no fear – we were all together, we all felt really invincible. We felt that it was really our time [pora]. (Activist 9)

As the revolutionary events unveiled on Maidan, the feeling of fear was replaced by joy and enthusiasm. Activist 1 describes feeling "a true uplift" of her spirits, and in Activist 3, the revolution ignited a feeling of freedom similar to "a flip of wings." Activist 14 observes that Orange Revolution participants were mesmerized by the euphoria of accomplishing a long-awaited goal.

> The emotions and feelings were all very positive, and all those feelings of joy, of importance and of our common aim helped us a lot, because I never felt tired after standing the whole day in the square in such cold weather. It was especially pleasant to see familiar faces of people whom I had not seen for some years, and understanding that the Orange Revolution brought us all together was adding to the total euphoria of that time. (Activist 11)

> Standing on the maidan and chanting slogans with others, I was surprised at how I was getting more energy and enthusiasm. All other problems became secondary and my attention was concentrated on one optimistic thought: I will not leave until the event is over and I will keep coming here every day under any circumstances until Yanukovych concedes. (Activist 18)

The Orange Revolution was founded on principles of nationalism and patriotism and, therefore, research participants observed a rise in national awareness during the events. Activist 3 quotes a woman she saw on Maidan: "Now, I am not ashamed of the nation. One can only be proud of it." Others also describe feelings of patriotism and admiration:

> It is important to point out that the majority of people were standing on Maidan not for some abstract democracy. And perhaps the people in charge of the process well before the Maidan events, were fighting not for democracy. But for Ukraine. Because I have not seen people ready to die for democracy but I have seen people ready to die for their Motherland. Democracy was a tool to some extent but never a goal. The majority of people came to Maidan because they simply were offended that they were considered to be sheep, simpletons who could be manipulated. Two basic senses were dominant – patriotism and human dignity. (Activist 5)

> I was happy and felt being part of a strong people and my heart trembled with the thought of the revival of patriotism of the Ukrainians. I was so inspired by the thought of victory that I could not even imagine that we would fail. (Activist 15)

> Personally, my feelings during the Orange Revolution events can be described as admiration with the people and pride for being a Ukrainian. During all the previous years, a rare person could admit that he/she was proud to be a Ukrainian. After the November 2004 events, when the world turned its attention to our country, we all shouted that we are the nation that refused to tolerate the fraud and injustice. There was also a feeling of solidarity with everyone who supported the nation's endeavors for free and fair election processes. (Activist 19)

The Ukrainian anthem played a consolidating role in raising national awareness during the Orange Revolution, and even representatives of other nations joined the Ukrainians in singing it on Maidan – "everyone was singing the Ukrainian anthem solemnly no matter what nationality they were yesterday" (Activist 15).

> Earlier, when the Ukrainian anthem was played on TV or radio, my family members were listening to it calmly enjoying the positive motive. These days, however, my relatives with no prior arrangements got up and placing their hands over their hearts, solemnly, with teary eyes, sang the anthem of their country. This feeling of unity of a little particle of Ukraine added to the confidence that we were going to win. (Activist 2)

> Suddenly it gets quiet – the radio broadcast of Yushchenko's speech is on. The volume is at full strength. At the end of the speech, they played the national anthem of Ukraine. Everyone in the café with no exception gets up and sings along with Maidan. Then we cheer "Yu-shchen-ko!" for another five minutes. Yes, one cannot forget this. (Activist 3)

Several activists were pleased with their achievements in the revolution. In Activist 9's words, "we stood firm and finally overcame fully. And even though the victory was celebrated two months later than we had anticipated, it was still dear to us." Another activist shares his sense of accomplishment in his essay:

> Yes, I am part of my people's history. I do not care that I am only a student today. I do not even care that I do not have a spot among our authorities, even though I have strength to change some things for the better. The most important thing is I did not live my life in vain. I did accomplish something. And I will accomplish

> more. I did not do it for money or any other rewards, I simply felt that I had to be on Maidan. Because I am a Ukrainian. (Activist 15)

All over the country, people could feel the positive spirit of the revolutionary events. Activist 16 describes the feelings she experienced in Odesa during her participation in the Train of Friendship, a car tour around Southeastern Ukraine:

> But something incredible happened afterwards. We approached the Odesa entrance point and our column entered a sea of cars embellished with orange colors and their passengers stepped out to cheer and smile at us waving their hands. They cheered "Freedom cannot be stopped!" Those present on Maidan know what the spirit of unity and solidarity means – realization of the fact that at the same time, hundreds and thousands of people feel and think the same as you. Odesans thanked us for coming and we thanked them for being there. There it was – the Ukrainian idea. Perhaps, it is the very greatest expression of love for your neighbor. Joy, euphoria, pride are too poor and pale words to describe the boundless wealth of human feelings. (Activist 16)

Revolution around Ukraine. Even though Kyiv became the heart of the Orange Revolution, orange and white-and-blue rallies were held all over Ukraine, primarily in large cities. Western Ukrainians offered strong support for the revolution by coming to Kyiv to denounce the fraudulent elections and by staging protests in their cities. Several activists offer their descriptions of the Orange Revolution as it was happening in the Western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk:

> Ivano-Frankivsk immediately after Lviv supported Maidan. On the square, local politicians, celebrities, and artists were speaking, groups of young people were wandering – on their jackets there were slogans "Yes!" and "Yushchenko" made of orange sticking price labels, one could hear slogans and music, the crowd was exchanging the latest news, clips from Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities were projected straight onto a wall of the administration building, they were showing similar crowds of people gathering, the tent city was built, enlisting of volunteers, who were sent to Kyiv by buses, was conducted. My husband went as well, but at his own expense, he was enlisted in a medical team and also worked on Maidan. On the very same day, my friend gave birth to a daughter – life was going on! (Activist 1)

> Our oblast literally declared independence from the central authorities in Kyiv claiming that it would not follow the orders of the "new president" Viktor Yanukovych. This can be considered an urge for independence and hints at national self-expression of the region, which, unfortunately did not last long. This fact signifies a high national consciousness of Ivano-Frankivskers who were prepared for radical steps to defend their constitutional rights and national interests. (Activist 10)

> The Ivano-Frankivsk maidan reminded me of movie scenes. For the first time, the Ukrainian people united to assert that we are a true European nation, a sole Ukrainian people, who took to the streets to prove to such people as Yanukovych that we are not scapegoats, we will not remain silent when we are obviously told lies, and we will not allow any falsifications.
> Despite the cold weather, people did not go back to their warm dwellings, they were prepared to risk their health, safety, job, and school to express their outrage at the situation in the country. There were people of all ages on the square: youth, pensioners, adults who brought donations for the strikers in Kyiv. Businessmen of all kinds came to offer transportation, warm clothes, food, asking what else could be done to provide more comfort on maidans. (Activist 18)

Another revolutionary event that happened outside of Kyiv, primarily in Southeastern Ukraine, was the Train of Friendship car tour. The goal of the Western Ukrainian tour was to unite with the Ukrainians living in the southeast, inform them of their civil rights, break through the information blockade in the region, and "declare that 'Freedom cannot be stopped!' in the claxon language" (Activist 16). Train of Friendship activists intended to tell the truth about the Maidan events rather than campaign for the orange movement. The principal organizers of the tour were PORA and the Lviv civic organization Center of Spiritual Revival; both centers distanced themselves from the Yushchenko headquarters to prevent hostility in the southeast. About 50 cars embellished with orange ribbons and banners with almost 200 people participated in the Train of Friendship tour. The route stretched for 3,700 kilometers (2,300 miles) and encompassed the following major southeastern Ukrainian cities: Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Odesa,

Mykolayiv, Kherson, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Yalta, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Poltava (Activist 16).

Activist 16 was a participant in the tour; she reports that southeastern destinations offered mixed receptions for the Train of Friendship – they were both greeted by the orange supporters and blocked by the white-and-blue ones. Odesa, one of the first destinations of the tour, was a perfect example of such a polarized reception. The Train of Friendship was initially welcomed by cars with Orange Revolution supporters, but then its rout was blocked by the white-and-blue forces who refused to negotiate with the "invaders" (Activist 16). The militia had to be involved to break the blockade and guarantee the Train of Friendship's constitutional right to move across the country freely.

> In Odesa, for the first time, I saw cars with blue ribbons and white-and-blue flags. In the streets of Odesa, a true struggle between the orange and the white-and-blue was going on. The Odesans say that their forces are equal – 50-50, but they admit to it only in private candid conversations. In reality, some claim that Odesa is for Yanukovych, and others that it is for Yushchenko. (Activist 16)

Yalta, a major Crimean city, was not very welcoming for the Train of Friendship either, but the orange rally was protected by the militiamen again:

> We arrived at the Yalta pier. Maybe you know the place: against the background of mountains and palm trees, Lenin is pointing with his hand at a McDonald's. This time, it looked even more fantastic: snow-covered mountain tops, palm trees, the sea, the great revolutionary of the last century, the symbol of the American mass culture, people with orange flags who were cheering "Yushchenko!", around them, people with white-and-blue attributes who were trying to cheer "Yanukovych!" over the Yushchenko cheer, and this beautiful composition was locked into a circle of militiamen. The waves were rolling over and hitting the land loudly pouring water on careless passers-by.
> There are many white-and-blues in Yalta, they dominate, so to speak. And young people there wear white-and-blue attributes and, as they sing in one song, "За Януковича пасть порвут" [They will rip your jaws for Yanukovych].
> …But in the Crimea, there were not only those who showed their middle fingers and other obscene gestures, there were many people who greeted us, who came out in their cars to meet us, etc. There were many people who did not express

> their support publicly but made it clear conspicuously: we are with you, we support you. It must be tough to have an orange soul and hide it from the blue reality. We are also with you, do not be afraid! Speak your mind! (Activist 16)

The eastern city of Donetsk was a stronghold of Yanukovych's forces who blocked the main roads to prevent the Train of Friendship from entering the city. The Train's attempt to take side roads and at least drive through the city resulted in several punctured tires on some of the cars (Activist 16).

> I regret, regret deeply, that the stereotype that Donetsk is a closed zone was confirmed. Thinking not like everyone else is harshly prosecuted. I regret that I did not have an opportunity to see and talk to the wonderful people living in Donetsk despite their voting preferences. I am sorry that the people waiting for us in Donetsk – Yushchenko's or Yanukovych's supporters – were not able to see or hear us. I am even sorry for the radicals who burned dolls of Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Poroshenko on a Donetsk square on that day, and who were unable to see for themselves the "orange plague" they hated so much.
> I regret that there is a city in my country, which I cannot visit being the way I am and where you are not allowed to express your political preferences and your thoughts. I regret that I was not able to dismantle the myths built around the Donbas capital. (Activist16)

International Support and Recognition. One of the factors that led to positive outcomes of the Orange Revolution was the support from the European Union and the United States, which promoted the revolution in their mass media in response to the slamming informational campaign from the Russian Federation. Additionally, international politicians were involved in negotiations between the Kuchma government and the opposition.

> …after the Orange Revolution especially significant was the support of the Western countries, particularly of the E.U. This support helped to balance the negative influence of the Russian authorities, who still view Ukraine as one of their provinces totally dependent on them. The support from the West (and I mean not the material, but the moral support) helped our country to see that we are not alone, that we are well perceived in the West, and that United Europe, Canada, the U.S. and other influential countries are ready and willing to view us as one of their full-right partners. (Activist 11)

Ukraine's international image improved dramatically during and after the Orange Revolution. Owing to the positive depictions of the civilized nonviolent resistance, the country enhanced its relations with some of its western neighbors and became more recognizable for its strive for freedom on the global arena.

> Those events became a turning point in relationships between Ukrainians and their closest neighbors. A few months before, Poles, Russians were treating us like "little brothers." In November, everything changed, at last the Ukrainians gained long ago deserved respect from the nations. Our students in Poland felt it, Ukrainian workers abroad, working mainly with Poles, felt it as well. And in Russians' commentaries, mostly critical in nature, I sensed envy because in their stifling imperial-Putin atmosphere, one could only dream about such a Maidan! (Activist 1)

> The Orange Revolution radically changed the vision of Ukraine in the West. Now we look not like another Kuchmanistan in East Europe, but like a civilized country undergoing major democratic changes. This is a great bonus to the Ukrainian people and to our authorities, now it is up to us to make full use of this positive image of Ukraine and to become a truly European country. (Activist 11)

> In October-November 2004 I was in Gdansk on the program "Study Tours to Poland." During this internship I got to know that a lot of Polish had changed their point of view toward Ukraine for the better due to the spirit of the Ukrainian people during those orange days. It was very pleasant to hear from some Polish such a phrase as "Poland with you." (Activist 12)

Revolution Heroes. The main public figures of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Viktor Yanukovych, received special attention in the essays of some activists. Viktor Yushchenko is portrayed as a "charismatic" leader, "a highly qualified economist, renown super-banker" (Activist 2). Yushchenko's charisma contributed to attracting millions of revolution participants to Maidan:

> At the time, no one was paying attention to names in tickets and passports – people were massively hypnotized by the orange euphoria of the prospect of their sweet dream coming true, and V. Yushchenko, in my opinion, was a means of getting their dream to come true, a victim of the totalitarianism remnants, and an

> embodiment of traits of a charismatic leader capable of raising the people to do impossible things. (Activist 14)

Yushchenko's post-revolutionary depiction is faded due to some disappointment that followed the revolution and unpopular steps taken by the president. Yushchenko is viewed as "too tolerant" and incapable of forming a professional team (Activist 2).

> The myth about the Ukrainian Messiah falls apart every day, one cannot always come out of water dry, or, moreover, walk on it… Calming down people's outrage by social donations along the rising prices ahead is worthless. How can we build an equal partnership relationship with Russia while kneeling before it? Why did Moses have to lead the chosen people out of Egypt if he is leading them back again? (Activist 17)

At times, Viktor Yushchenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko are depicted together, both through their traits and actions:

> It seems to me that the basis of the November events was formed at the moment of Viktor Yushchenko's poisoning. It was very symbolic. This man always lacked charisma. However cynical this may sound, but his ugliness gave him a trail of human suffering, which opened people's hearts much better than any campaign or slogans. Ukrainians, even though they are Europeans, tend to have a mentality that provokes compassion in response to crippling, not disgust similarly to their more western neighbors who consider health a trump. When Yushchenko was standing next to Tymoshenko, it looked like a show of the fairy tale "Beauty and the Beast" in which the beast and the beauty were both good characters with beautiful souls. While Yushchenko symbolized suffering and courage, Tymoshenko represented beauty, womanhood, and, again, courage. And everything that was happening around them was reminding people of a fairy tale. (Activist 1)

> In the multi-thousand crowd covering densely the distance from Maidan to Bankova [Street], a corridor was formed quickly, along which Yushchenko and other leaders started walking. On Bankova, the road was blocked with trucks with sand and hundreds (that many we saw at the time) of militiamen and men from the Bars [*snow leopard* in Ukrainian] specialized unit. The crowd started cheering "Bars, we love you!" Girls started giving them flowers. And a miracle happened – several hundreds of Bars members moved away. It seemed it was a final victory. Tymoshenko appeared on a truck and announced that the Bars switched to the side of the Revolution, Yushchenko was in the administration building and the following day Kuchma would transfer his powers. After these words, the scene of the triumph by the Verkhovna Rada repeated. Not far from us, we saw guys from

> the Belarusian ZUBR who got a bottle of brandy somewhere and were drinking shots to the victory. (Activist 9)

Yuliya Tymoshenko is perceived as a decisive politician, who continuously came to Maidan to raise revolutionary spirits and even urged storming the Presidential Administration, Cabinet of Ministers, and Verkhovna Rada (Activist 15).

> One cannot underestimate the role of Yuliya Volodymyrivna – the "goddess of the revolution," as she was called. That woman possesses not only incredible energy, ambitions, and adventurism, but also a bright intellect and political intuition. She is a great PR person and organizer. Tymoshenko was making the right moves, assuming the position of a persistent harbinger of the good and freedom. She was the one who did not lack charisma at all. The roles were distributed very appropriately. The Ukrainians are a nation with a well-demonstrated Oedipus complex and that is why the acceptance of the woman who makes way for the leader with her "bosom" sacrificing her own strength, was quite natural. In this situation, the relation between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko was equal to that between a mother and son – a couple which is yet another Ukrainian archetype. And behind the couple there were "brothers" – Yushchenko's followers. And everybody was forgetting that many of them came from the rival party, that some of them could be fully classified as oligarchs, and based on the level of their income cannot be ones of the people, and that all the politicians on stage were a team nurtured and ripened during the Kuchma times. At the time, nobody talked about it on Maidan. (Activist 1)

Epithets used to describe the government-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych are less flattering: "pro-authorities," "the only one," and "proFFessor" ["профффессор" is a reference to Mr. Yanukovych's title, which he misspelled on his public CV] (Activist 2). Another activist focuses on Yanukovych's public image during the presidential campaign:

> I recall a ridiculous clip from Yanukovych's ad in which he, in sportswear with a thick gold chain around his neck (is that the future president of a European country?), was leaning with care over a boy. That was better than a comedy show and what was even funnier was his wife's speech. Her phrase about "drugged oranges" that were allegedly being consumed on Maidan, became a classic of people's humor. Taking all this into account, could Yanukovych be considered a serious opponent? (Activist 1)

Post-revolutionary Outcomes and Developments. The Orange Revolution did not bring about all the changes it touted, but youth activists address some of the positive outcomes of the revolution in their testimonials. The events at the end of 2004 played a vital role in strengthening Ukrainians' national identity, ending the semi-authoritarian Kuchma regime, securing freedom of expression, and reinforcing freedom of mass media.

Activist 1 points out that the revolution revitalized the nation-building process in Ukraine, allowing the country to experience its self-identification and believe in its potential. Activist 15 offers a similar assertion:

> Maidan united the Ukrainians into an invincible monolith. This is the greatest gain of the Orange Revolution. Every one of us felt their civic duty, believed in changes for the better, and was ready to defend their future till the end. (Activist 15)

Another positive change brought about by the Orange Revolution was the end of the Kuchma rule and the rotation of the political elite. While the orange authorities did not prove effective in immediately reforming the country, the termination of stagnating Kuchmism was beneficial for Ukraine.

> The revolution is going on. We became different and we continue to change. The revolution is a process which does not have a concluding phase. The Orange Revolution answered the question "What is Kuchmism?" and asked a string of more important questions which most of us have no guts to answer. The revolution is destruction of previous traditions and invention of new ones, it is denial of the existing rules of game (or a game with no rules, to be more exact) and a proposal to play by new rules. We finally realized that the Ukrainian nation is a notion which exists in reality. We stopped believing in myths which were real only yesterday. The greatest achievement of the revolution is that we dared to speak fully out loud about what we disliked. But we have not yet learned to explain distinctly what we want and what we like. (Activist 7)

> At the beginning of 2004, I was not certain that so many people would rise and did not know of what the Kuchmists were capable. I just wanted to do everything possible and impossible for us to win and I had no time to think about such questions. Everything that was happening on Maidan in 2004 some present-day

> "hooray-orange" individuals called nonsense in 2003 when they were offered to join creating PORA! But the faith in success and readiness to go to the end worked miracles – we did achieve what we wanted and did put our big nail in the Kuchma regime's coffin. Thinking about those times, I understand how expensive such miracles may cost. (Activist 8)

Personal freedom is reported by Activist 3 as another significant gain of the Orange Revolution. Activist 11 also suggests that freedom of expression increased after 2004:

> The main and most important change for me is the spirit of freedom that is now all over the country. We stopped being afraid of the authorities. Now we start to understand that we are more powerful than the authorities. Not always do the latter also understand that, but I think we will soon be able to explain it to them. After the Soviet Union collapse all the time we were afraid to say something against someone who was more stupid, but of a higher rank. Well, now many people do not care any more about the ranks and freely express their disagreement. It has even become fashionable to disagree with the authorities after the Orange Revolution. Such changes, I am sure, will inevitably lead to Ukraine's becoming a developed and civilized country. (Activist 11)

The Orange Revolution brought about some other positive outcomes, one of which was canceling visa requirements for visitors from most countries in Western Europe and North America (Activist 10). One of the most prominent and palpable achievements of the revolution was securing mass media freedom in the country.

> I am happy for the main gains of the post-revolutionary government: freedom of speech, changes in social policies (for the majority of ordinary citizens the increase in pensions, childbirth payments, and raising the minimal wages to the level of the survival minimum are extremely significant), change of the attitude toward Ukraine and Ukraine's status in the world. (Activist 14)

> Thomas Jefferson once pointed out, "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." This is the basis of the European choice of Ukraine and free media seem to be the only gain of the Orange Revolution. All the other slogans about the effectiveness of the "team" which received power are groundless because nothing has been accomplished. (Activist 17)

> I consider the major change brought by 2004 events to be the freedom of expression, one of the fundamental human freedoms, that is currently practiced by the media. However, quite often journalists and politicians do not know the right ways to exercise this freedom. The revolution has brought the opportunity for transparency in government. However, the politicians lack professionalism and experience in implementing their daily tasks transparently for the public. (Activist 19)

"From a sweet dream to a bitter reality" – that is how Activist 14 sums up the events that followed the Orange Revolution. Indeed, the 17 days of national resistance raised people's expectations too high to be accomplished in a near future; several activists' visions of post-revolutionary development are interwoven with disillusionment and disapproval of the new orange authorities. Activist 2 and Activist 10, for example, believe that the new government was formed merely on the criterion of participation in the revolution, and the criteria of professionalism, experience, and decency were not taken into account. Activist 2 also regrets that the promised separation of business and politics was not realized, and Activist 10 disapproves of the new laws to increase pensions for Ukrainian members of parliament and grant them immunity. Activist 6 supports the changes after the revolution with caution, as he believes that the government's re-privatization of some properties was unnecessary and should have been substituted by regulating tax policies. Other activists describe their perceptions of developments after the revolution:

> After the revolution, no miracle happened. But I did not expect it to happen. Although I expected a lot of things to happen: the leaders of that regime would go to jail, the old body of the authorities would be dissolved, the Ukrainian Security Service would be dismissed, etc. This did not happen. Moreover, NOTHING HAPPENED! The ministers changed but the same state employees kept their positions. The old system of power was functioning in corrupt relations instead of legal ones. The new authorities did not introduce legal relations and did not punish the corrupt. When it became clear that there would be no punishment, the old state employees continued to do what they had done before in their positions –

> being corrupt. What would they be afraid of? The worst thing that the new authorities would do is have them fired. But having been fired, some oblast administration chairs were allowed to keep their business built on corruption. Thus, neither the new state employee nor the old one has anything to be afraid of. Moreover, if we were standing on Maidan against the criminal authorities, against falsifications of the elections, against crimes toward Ukraine and its people, then why after a year of the new authorities is not ANYONE punished for that? And the crimes were not qualified as such. Then there were no such crimes? If there were no crimes, then the new authorities took over the power by force illegally. That is what it looks like… The biggest disappointment is absence of changes. Any changes. Only words. Sometimes I regret that no force outcome was deployed on Maidan. It would have put the question distinctly "either – or." We did not kill the old system and it is simply digesting the new one. (Activist 5)

> After the Orange revolution many anticipated sudden changes and a fairy-tale ending: "and they all lived very happy ever after…" But it was not possible. Political processes, especially if imposed without violence, are time-consuming. Observing the post-election split of the orange revolution political allies, dismissal of the Orange allies' coalition government, corruption scandals, inflation, and stagnation of the economics growth created grounds for disillusionment in the new government. (Activist 13)

Some youth activists offer mixed reactions to the events that followed the Orange Revolution. They express an understanding that the goals set by the revolution cannot be accomplished in a short period of time and require hard work.

> On November 26, fair elections took place. We elected democracy, freedom, and justice. And on January 25, during the inauguration, I was listening on Maidan how the people's President was sworn in. Tears of joy were in my eyes for our long-awaited victory, about which I had dreamed so much! Current hardships will pass and we will live in a European country. The great Maidan taught everyone – demand more because you are worth the best. We left Maidan as winners convinced that tomorrow's life would change for the better and ready for hard persistent work for the ideals of the revolution. But more and more time passed and people started losing their hope because they did not see concrete changes. But there are changes, even though I would like more of them. More often do I see sadness and reproach in the eyes of older people who greeted the President not so long ago and were genuinely happy, but now they say they do not believe in the better, that they were fooled. Sometimes, I regret it myself. I do not understand why. Maybe because I will never forget the old Kyiv grandma who walked across the entire city to bring us pies that she baked from scratch… But despite the negative thoughts, I am still proud I live in a peaceful Ukraine that the

> world notices more and more. The attractive orange spark of Maidan was not lit in vain – it is meant to warm up many more generations of Ukrainians toward productive civilized life. (Activist 15)

> Orange Revolution is not only the change of government; it is mainly the change in people's minds – transformation in thinking and acting. The changes do not happen in a day, month or even a year. It will take years for Ukrainians to adopt and enjoy democratic values like freedom of speech, transparency in governance, equal access to justice, right for peaceful assembly, etc. (Activist 19)

Activist 8 approaches the post-revolutionary events analytically and dismantles four myths, which dominated concurrent public opinion in the country. He exposes the first myth that "the Orange Revolution has not changed anything" by referring to the facts that the revolution resulted in preventing Yanukovych's fraudulent presidency, improving Ukraine's international image, and empowering the Ukrainians as a nation. In reference to the second myth, "Everyone was honest and decent on Maidan and now everyone got corrupt," the activist points out that even though Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were better candidates for top political positions than many others, their reputations were not immaculate: Yushchenko was a supporter of Kuchma's policy at one time and the origin of Tymoshenko's capital was controversial. However, Activist 8 believes this should not disillusion the nation or diminish the deeds of those who were prepared to stake their lives for the revolutionary ideals. The third myth, "The 'orange' politicians betrayed the ideals of Maidan and so there is nobody to vote for," is contested with an urge that the orange team should be supported despite its internal conflicts (the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government, Yushchenko's political compromises with Yanukovych, etc.), in order to avert Yanukovych's Party of Regions' victory at the upcoming parliamentary elections. Activist 8 denounces the fourth myth, "It is politicians' fault that improvements in the country's life are happening slowly," with Exupéry's quote: "You remain

responsible… Forever... For what you have tamed," implying that ordinary Ukrainians are just as responsible for developments in their country as those to whom they delegated power. Finally, Activist 8 concludes:

> Over a year ago an average Ukrainian citizen was facing the choice: either supporting the corrupt regime silently or fighting it actively. Today, the situation looks different: either remain a *homo sovieticus* and care only for oneself despite one's country's interests or consistently stick to the ideals of the Orange Revolution and be a strong supporter of one's country's well-being. (Activist 8)

RESEARCH QUESTION II. POLITICAL SELF-EFFICACY

Survey data are reported here in the order in which research participants encountered the study questions. Efficacy scale findings provide information on levels of internal, external, and task-oriented efficacy. Analyses of results by demographic categories are presented in a descending order of their statistical significance.

The self-efficacy survey results shown in Table 4 indicate that most respondents perceive themselves to be politically well-qualified and are capable of performing specific political actions. Even though many survey respondents have positive expectations of the political system's responsiveness toward their needs, some results suggest that external efficacy levels are lower.

Although survey responses ranged across the scale, the *disagree* response was chosen least frequently. The only exceptions to this tendency were responses to the statements containing negations or being negative semantically.

Of all the survey items, perceptions of being involved in politics and being able to express one's political disagreement generated the most support. Ninety-one percent of

survey participants responded *agree* or *somewhat agree* to the item "Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances," and 93% of participants answered *agree* or *somewhat agree* to the statement "People like me can voice their political disagreement." The latter statement also generated the most absolute agreement (63%). The least absolute disagreement, with 0% answering *disagree*, was expressed to the aforementioned "People like me can voice their political disagreement" statement and the "People like me can get the media to pay attention to them" statement, confirming participants' confidence in their ability to utilize mass media for achieving their political goals.

Most survey respondents (79%) were completely or partially confident in their ability to participate in politics if they chose to do so. The majority of youth activists who participated in the survey (75%) considered themselves to be well-informed about politics in Ukraine. Survey respondents also appeared to be fairly confident in their political skills. When addressing the task-oriented statements about their skills of organizing protests and using the internet for political purposes, 72% and 77% of participants, respectively, reported that they could, perhaps, perform these two tasks. Voting was fully or partially perceived as an effective means to influence the government's actions by 69% of youth activists.

Even though 70% of research participants answered *agree* or *somewhat agree* to their ability to get government officials to pay attention to them, about as many of them believed the authorities were unresponsive: the statement about the government's indifference to what people think was supported completely or partially by 71% of respondents. Two survey items with negative connotations ("Sometimes Ukrainian

politics is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on" and "People like me don't have any say about what the Ukrainian government does") generated low levels of approval with 40% and 36% of *agree* and *somewhat agree* combined answers respectively.

Table 4. Political Self-efficacy Survey Results

	Survey items	Mean	Agree percent (number)	Somewhat agree percent (number)	Somewhat disagree percent (number)	Disagree percent (number)	Total number of respondents
1.	Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances.	3.46	58% (44)	33% (25)	7% (5)	2% (2)	76
2.	I am better informed about politics in Ukraine than most people in my country.	3.11	39% (30)	36% (27)	21% (16)	4% (3)	76
3.	People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them.	2.97	32% (24)	38% (29)	26% (20)	4% (3)	76
4.	People like me can participate in politics on	2.91	45% (34)	34% (26)	14% (11)	7% (5)	76

	Survey items	Mean	Agree percent (number)	Somewhat agree percent (number)	Somewhat disagree percent (number)	Disagree percent (number)	Total number of respondents
	an official level, if they choose.						
5.	I know how to organize protests.	3.07	45% (34)	26% (20)	17% (13)	11% (8)	75
6.	People like me can voice their political disagreement.	3.57	63% (48)	30% (23)	7% (5)	0% (0)	76
7.	Voting is the way that people like me have a say about how government in Ukraine runs things.	3.04	41% (31)	28% (21)	26% (20)	5% (4)	76
8.	Sometimes Ukrainian politics is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	2.70	8% (6)	32% (24)	43% (33)	17% (13)	76
9.	I don't think public officials	2.11	24% (18)	46% (35)	24% (18)	5% (4)	75

Survey items	Mean	Agree percent (number)	Somewhat agree percent (number)	Somewhat disagree percent (number)	Disagree percent (number)	Total number of respondents
in Ukraine care much what people like me think.						
10. People like me can get the media to pay attention to them.	3.07	33% (25)	41% (31)	26% (20)	0% (0)	76
11. People like me don't have any say about what the Ukrainian government does.	2.75	12% (9)	24% (18)	42% (32)	22% (17)	76
12. I know how to use the internet to further my political aims.	3.16	49% (37)	28% (21)	14% (11)	9% (7)	76

In additional comments invited by the final open-ended survey question, respondents expressed both optimistic ideas, such as "I believe in Ukraine's future" (Respondent 18) and "The time will come and people like me will change the country for the better completely" (Respondent 76) and pessimistic ideas:

> Ukraine is currently in a very complicated situation and the victory of the "orange forces" in the 2004 presidential election worsened the matters. The main problem is the victory of three clans: the Tymoshenko bloc, the Our Ukraine Union, and

> the Regions. Most members of these political forces are not Ukrainians, have had power to a smaller or greater extent before, and have not accomplished anything! The 2006 elections are elections of "a cat in a sack" because the majority of people will vote for one person – Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, or Yanukovych – without thinking about how they are voting for anti-Ukrainians who are on the party lists below Line 20. And implementation of the constitutional reform will cause a complete anarchy (when two or more people are responsible simultaneously and no one is responsible at the same time), which is worse than a dictatorship and will cause a collapse of economy and the Ukrainian nation… (Respondent 59)

Efficacy Scales. Self-efficacy survey results were also analyzed to calculate efficacy scale means, which reflect research subjects' perceptions of the general level of political efficacy as well as some of its aspects. Table 5 shows efficacy scale results for the four-item scale adopted from Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (Chapter II) and revised for the Ukrainian context. Each of the four answer choices was assigned a value from four to one with the order of the values reversed for statements containing negations. The efficacy mean obtained as a result of this analysis is 2.65, demonstrating a moderate level of political efficacy.

Table 5. General Efficacy Scale

Survey items	Values assigned to responses				Individual item mean	General scale mean
	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree		
1. Voting is the way that people like me have a say about how government in Ukraine runs things.	4	3	2	1	3.04	2.65
2. Sometimes Ukrainian politics is so complicated that a	1	2	3	4	2.70	

Survey items	Values assigned to responses				Individual item mean	General scale mean
	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree		
person like me can't really understand what's going on.						
3. I don't think public officials in Ukraine care much what people like me think.	1	2	3	4	2.11	
4. People like me don't have any say about what the Ukrainian government does.	1	2	3	4	2.75	

The survey was designed to measure three aspects of political self-efficacy – internal efficacy, external efficacy, and task-oriented efficacy, as described in Chapter 3. Similarly to the previous efficacy scale, a four-point scale was developed for this analysis based on the four response choices. Survey items were grouped into three subgroups to reflect the three efficacy aspects, and overall efficacy scores were computed for each subgroup. Data analysis resulted in a relatively high mean for internal efficacy (3.14 on a four-point scale); this mean also happens to be the highest of the three efficacy aspects measured, suggesting that youth activists feel considerably efficacious when it comes to perceptions of their own socio-political capabilities. The external efficacy result is moderate with the mean of 2.81 on a four-point scale and is the lowest of the three scores indicating some lack in the political system's responsiveness to youth activists' needs.

Finally, the task-oriented efficacy mean is also high with the 3.10 score on a four-point scale and is comparable to the internal efficacy datum. This finding implies that youth activists feel rather confident in performing certain tasks to achieve their political goals. Table 6 demonstrates these data.

Table 6. Three Efficacy Sub-scales

Type of efficacy	Survey items	Individual item mean	General scale mean
Internal efficacy	1. People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them.	2.97	3.14
	2. People like me can participate in politics on an official level, if they choose.	2.91	
	3. People like me can voice their political disagreement.	3.57	
	4. I am better informed about politics in Ukraine than most people in my country.	3.11	
External efficacy	1. Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances.	3.46	2.81
	2. People like me don't have any say about what the Ukrainian government does.	2.75	
	3. Sometimes Ukrainian politics is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	2.70	
	4. I don't think public officials in Ukraine care much what people like me think.	2.11	
	5. Voting is the way that people like me have a say about how government in Ukraine runs things.	3.04	
Task-oriented efficacy	1. I know how to organize protests.	3.07	3.10
	2. People like me can get the media to pay attention to them.	3.07	
	3. I know how to use the internet to further my political aims.	3.16	

Difference by Demographic Categories. One of the goals of the survey analysis was to test data for the significance of difference among political efficacy components by demographic characteristics. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were computed at the $p < .05$ level to identify statistically significant differences among the initial 12 political efficacy survey items when analyzed by ten demographic factor variables from the second part of the survey instrument. Table 7 summarizes ANOVA findings, which are detailed in Appendix B.2. Only significant difference results are included in the table.

The ANOVA results showed most differences for the demographic variables of youth organization membership (seven efficacy items), gender (six efficacy items), and experiences of living abroad (five efficacy items). Item 1, "Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances," generated the most differences across demographic variables (five demographics) and two items – Item 3, "People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them," and Item 12, "I know how to use the internet to further my political aims" – resulted in significant differences for four demographics. Analyses of variance produced no statistically different results among efficacy items when run by the age demographic variable. Additionally, no significant difference was observed for Item 8 ("Sometimes Ukrainian politics is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on") and Item 10 ("People like me can get the media to pay attention to them") when these items were analyzed by all demographic variables.

Table 7. ANOVAs by Demographic Variables

Demographic variable	Number of items	Survey item	Sig. (p < .05)
Organization membership	7	Item 1	.004
		Item 2	.000
		Item 3	.011
		Item 4	.003
		Item 5	.000
		Item 11	.018
		Item 12	.000
Gender	6	Item 1	.000
		Item 2	.000
		Item 3	.002
		Item 5	.007
		Item 6	.054
		Item 12	.001
International experience	5	Item 4	.004
		Item 5	.029
		Item 6	.002
		Item 7	.001
		Item 12	.014
Urban or rural	3	Item 7	.035
		Item 11	.042
		Item 12	.030
Influence of education	2	Item 1	.013
		Item 9	.047
Ethnicity	2	Item 1	.023

Demographic variable	Number of items	Survey item	Sig. (p < .05)
		Item 3	.003
Language	2	Item 1	.016
		Item 6	.009
Education	1	Item 3	.052
Place of residence	1	Item 2	.072

Efficacy item analysis by youth activists' organization membership showed the most variability – seven statements (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, and 12) differed significantly for these demographic strata (Figure 7). The Student Brotherhood Organization representation was too low (fewer than five members) to be reported here. The first statement about usefulness of political involvement under some circumstances accumulated 100.0% of full or partial support from both PORA groups and activists from other organizations, while only 81.5% of activists with no formal youth organization memberships agreed with the statement fully or partially. The second statement about survey participants' being better informed about Ukrainian politics than most people in the country was supported fully by all yellow PORA members, fully or partially by all black PORA members, and fully and partially by most members of other organizations, with only 7.7% of representatives of the latter category disagreeing with it partially. Only 55.3% of those without formal organizational memberships agreed with the statement fully or partially. The third statement, "People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them," generated full or partial agreement from 83.3% of yellow PORA members, 100.0% of black PORA members, 77.0% of members of other

organizations, and only 55.3% of activists with no formal youth organization memberships. The fourth statement about the ability to participate in politics officially, if desired, was supported fully or partially by both PORA groups and by 92.3% representatives of other organizations; only 63.1% of individuals without organization memberships responded to the statement with *agree* or *somewhat agree* choices. The fifth statement about the knowledge to organize protests was supported fully or partially by most activists with formal organization memberships, with the exception of 8.3% of black PORA members who answered *somewhat disagree* to the statement. Only 50.0% of activists with no organization memberships agreed to Statement 5. The 11th statement, "People like me don't have any say about what the Ukrainian government does," generated 83.3% of full or partial disagreement from yellow PORA members, 91.7% from yellow PORA members, 61.6% from members of other organizations, and 50.0% of activists with no formal organization memberships. In addition, none of yellow PORA members gave an *agree* response to the statement, and none of black PORA members provided a *somewhat agree* response to the statement. Finally, all activists with formal organization memberships agreed completely or partially with Statement 12 about the use of the internet to further one's political aims, with the exception of 8.3% of black PORA members who responded with a *somewhat disagree* statement. In contrast, only 55.2% of youth activists with no formal organization memberships agreed with the statement completely or partially.

Figure 7. Difference by Youth Organization Membership



Data analysis of 12 efficacy items by the gender demographic variable identified significant differences for six survey items: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 12 (Figure 8). The first statement, “Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances,” generated more agreement from male respondents (95.5% agreed to the statement fully or partially) than female respondents (84.4% agreed to the statement fully or partially). The second statement, “I am better informed about politics in Ukraine than most people in my country,” garnered more full or partial agreement from male respondents than from female ones (93.1% of males and 50.0% of females). The third statement, “People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them,” received *agree* and *somewhat agree* responses from 77.2% of men and 59.4% of women. The fifth statement, “I know how to organize protests” was supported fully or partially by 86.3% of men and 50.0% of women. Similarly, 97.8% of men and 87.5% of women agreed completely or partially with Item 6, “People like me can voice their political disagreement.” No *disagree* responses were given to this item by both women and men. Finally, 88.6% of men and only 59.4% of women agreed fully or partially with the task-specific efficacy Item 12, “I know how to use the internet to further my political aims.” None of male participants disagreed completely with this item. In all six cases, the rate of the *agree* response from men was at least 17.0% higher than that given by women.

Figure 8. Difference by Gender



Figure 9 displays differences between demographic groups obtained as a result of efficacy data analysis by the international experience variable. Five efficacy items (4, 5, 6, 7, and 12) differed significantly depending on youth activists' previous international experiences or absence thereof. The fourth item, "People like me can participate in politics on an official level, if they choose," received *agree* and *somewhat agree* responses from 100.0% of youth activists who had spent at least three months abroad and 70.0% of youth activists who had no prior significant international experiences. The fifth item about the knowledge to organize protests was supported by 90.9% of activists with previous significant experiences of living abroad (no *disagree* responses were given by this demographic group) and 63.0% of activists with no such experiences. All

respondents with international experiences agreed completely or partially with the sixth item, “People like me can voice their political disagreement,” and 90.8% of those with no international experiences agreed completely or partially; 9.3% partially disagreed with the statement. *Agree* answers to this item from individuals with international experiences outnumbered the same answers from individuals with no international experiences by 39.0%. The seventh item, “Voting is the way that people like me have a say about how government in Ukraine runs things,” was supported completely or partially by 90.9% of activists with international experiences and by only 59.3% of activists with no international experiences. Finally, the twelfth item about using the internet to advance

Figure 9. Difference by International Experience



one’s political goals got *agree* or *somewhat agree* responses from 90.9% of activists with significant international experiences and 70.3% of activists who had not had such

experiences. None of activists who had spent over three months abroad responded with a *somewhat disagree* answer to this item.

Political efficacy items were also analyzed by participants' urban or rural origin. Figure 10 demonstrates these findings. Statement 7, "Voting is the way that people like me have a say about how government in Ukraine runs things," generated *agree* and *somewhat agree* responses from 63.5% of participants who had spent most of their lives in urban areas and 92.3% of participants who had spent greater parts of their lives in rural areas. No *disagree* responses were given by activists from rural areas. Statement 11, "People like me don't have any say about what the Ukrainian government does," gathered full or partial agreement from 39.7% of activists from urban areas and partial agreement (no *agree* responses) from 15.4% activists from rural areas. The 12th statement

Figure 10. Difference by Area of Residence



about participants' ability to use the internet to further their political aims resulted in *agree* and *somewhat agree* responses from 79.4% of respondents from urban areas and 61.6% of respondents from rural areas.

One demographic question focused on the extent to which research participants considered their education to be a stimulus for their socio-political activism. When survey responses were analyzed by this variable, two items – the first ("Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances") and the ninth ("I don't think public officials in Ukraine care much what people like me think") – showed statistically significant differences (Figure 11). Of the respondents who did not believe that their education affected their activism, 94.5% agreed with the first item completely or partially. No such respondents disagreed with the statement completely. Of those who believed that their education influenced their activism to some extent, 77.7% responded to the item with an *agree* or *somewhat agree* answer. All of the participants who considered their education to be a significant factor in their activism agreed with Item 1 completely or partially. The ninth item received 83.3% of *agree* or *somewhat agree* responses (and no *disagree* responses) from those who did not perceive education as an activism factor. Of those who thought that their education played some part in their activism, 14.8% agreed fully and 63.0% agreed partially with Item 9. Of those survey participants who perceived their education as a significant activism factor, 54.8% agreed with Statement 9 completely or partially.

Figure 11. Difference by Perception of Education as an Activism Factor



Some differences were observed when frequency analyses for Item 1 ("Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances") and Item 3 ("People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them") were run by the ethnicity demographic (Figure 12). However, the sizes of the "Russian" and "Other" groups are too small (fewer than five individuals) to draw strong generalizations.

Figure 12. Difference by Ethnicity



Two efficacy items – Item 1 ("Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances") and Item 6 ("People like me can voice their political disagreement") – differed statistically when analyzed by the language category. Figure 13

shows these differences. Only two groups (Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers) were large enough to compare differences. According to the analysis results, 95.4% of Ukrainian speakers and only 60.0% of Russian speakers agreed completely or partially with Item 1. No *disagree* response was generated from those who reported Ukrainian as their first language. Additionally, 85.4% of Ukrainian speakers and 80.0% of Russian speakers supported Item 6 fully or partially. The two groups' *agree-somewhat agree* distribution differed significantly (Figure 13). Both groups expressed no complete disagreement to Item 6.

Figure 13. Difference by Language



Figure 14 summarizes differences in participants' responses to the third survey item, "People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them," these differences became apparent depending on their level of education. The number of participants with a high school level of education is low (fewer than five) and their 100.0% full or partial agreement with the statement should be generalized with caution. Activists with an incomplete higher education outnumbered their peers with a complete higher education in their full or partial agreement with the statement by 19.9%.

Figure 14. Difference by Levels of Education



The only efficacy item that generated statistically significant differences when survey data were analyzed by participants' location was Item 2, "I am better informed about politics in Ukraine than most people in my country." Figure 15 summarizes the findings. Item 2 was supported fully or partially by 92.3% of activists from the central part of Ukraine (no *disagree* responses were offered by this category of participants), 66.0% of activists from the western part of Ukraine, 83.4% of the eastern part of Ukraine, and 100.0% of activists from the southern part of the country. The number of activists from the northern part of Ukraine was too low (fewer than five) to draw statistical generalizations.

Figure 15. Difference by Location



RESEARCH QUESTION III. VISIONS OF UKRAINE'S FUTURES

In the Ethnographic Futures Research stage of the study, nine youth activists were presented with an optimistic, pessimistic, and most probable hypothetic scenarios of Ukraine's development in ten years and were asked to imagine that they were top government officials in a decade and either comment on the presented scenarios or extrapolate their own visions of Ukraine's futures. To keep interviewees' identity anonymous, as guaranteed by the introductory statement of consent, random pseudonyms were assigned to each research participant.

Optimistic Future. Five research participants commented on their agreement with the proposed optimistic scenario of Ukraine's future in ten years. Two participants (Svitlana and Lesya) expressed partial agreement with the scenario, and one more participant (Vasyl) mostly disagreed with the scenario, calling it "not very plausible" and stating that most of the scenario elements would remain goals in a decade. Myroslav and

Mariya suggested that Ukraine would need not 10 but 20-35 years for the optimistic goals to be accomplished. They both agreed that Ukraine needed a full rotation of elites since current statesmen's views and strategies were "shaped by Sovietism" and Ukraine needed skilled politicians with effective management skills. Myroslav stated:

> I think such an optimistic scenario can be anticipated in 20-30 years when the youth generation which was standing on Maidans in 2004 being brought up on these ideals and changed under the influence of the Orange Revolution, will not only be an active member of society but will be able to take responsibility for its development. So it will be 30-50-year-old people who will be members of the political elite. So when such a change of political elites takes place, then such a scenario can be realized. Now, we are going through a transitional period, we can talk about the final retreat of communist elites from power, we can now jokingly say that communists left and komsomol members rule the country. The current post-communist ruling elite is a transitional period between the old communist elite and the elite typical for a European country. We are in a similar transitional period to that in Poland or Lithuania at the beginning of the 90s. So I think we need another 20 years. (Myroslav)

Ukraine's Overall Development. The participating youth activists saw Ukraine in ten years closely associated with the European Union. Vasyl believed that Ukraine would reaffirm itself on the domestic and international arena and cooperate with the E.U. on a higher scale. He forecast an associated membership in the Union but considered the full membership requirements too rigorous to be fulfilled in a decade and the admission of the ten new E.U. members raised the Union's cautiousness when it comes to further enlargement. Lesya agreed that the E.U. membership should be Ukraine's strategic goal, but the terms of membership were vague and should be outlined more distinctly so that Ukraine can shape its internal processes correspondingly. Kateryna envisioned Ukraine to become a full member of NATO and an associated member of the E.U. Mariya thought that Ukraine would be in the E.U. in ten years but Russia would be a member as well. She asserted that there was a need for effective information campaigns to educate the

Ukrainians about the E.U. and NATO memberships, due to the lack of people's awareness on these issues.

Democratic Future. The EFR participants were in agreement that democracy was an optimal path of development in Ukraine's future, although Vasyl and Kateryna believed it to be an inherent Ukrainian democracy without specifying its intrinsic features. Mariya believed that a Swedish socialism model was a better fit for the Ukrainian system than the U.S. American model. Lesya underlined the importance of such democratic constituents as freedoms, elections, and the protection of human rights; Kateryna was concerned about the protection of minorities' rights. Bohdan and Vasyl favored the existence of NGOs who would provide effective, accountable, and feasible programs of control of the authorities and objective evaluations of democratic processes.

Six activists addressed the phenomenon of civil society in Ukraine. Three of them forecast that civil society would be established in the country in ten years, while another three participants felt that the Ukrainian society needed more time to adopt inherent democratic fundamentals. Bohdan and Taras believed that Soviet traditions were still present among Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution only started cementing civil society in the country. Svitlana thought that Ukraine needed at least 50 more years to shed the Soviet heritage and develop a true civil society. Vasyl and Myroslav were more optimistic in their prognoses, noting that the Ukrainian people's socio-political activism and consciousness would increase in ten years due to the Orange Revolution. They also believed that because people demonstrated during the revolution – a psychological rebirth of the nation – they were capable of standing up for activism (people rose up), responsibility (people were not afraid to take responsibility for the future of their

country), and solidarity (people united despite their different party affiliations, etc.). Kateryna also favored the possibility of a developed civil society in ten years with strong civic organizations and institutions to support it.

Five interviewees agreed that mass media in Ukraine were already printing unbiased information freely. Lesya pointed out that in an optimistic future, Ukrainian society would need the media business to build the culture of media because "both dirty and non-dirty news is reported nowadays." She admitted, however, that "dirty press" would always exist to a certain extent. Olena found it worrisome that some media were owned by politicians and were therefore biased. She believed that in the future, such affiliations would be reduced and media would be less dependent on their owners. Vasyl emphasized the importance of implementing civic television programs since they promoted pluralism. Finally, Svitlana considered media freedom to be the biggest gain of the Orange Revolution.

Economic Future. Svitlana's optimistic future of the Ukrainian economy entailed a system based on the development and application of knowledge and innovative thinking. Taras seconded innovative trends in economy as well, since natural resources would be limited in the long run and Ukraine would need alternative sources of energy. This would also reduce Ukraine's economic dependence on imports of oil and gas from Russia, which are often infused with a "Soviet-like imperialistic policy." Taras also considered the unjustified price hikes for Russian energy resources to be a positive impulse for the Ukrainian economy toward modernization and upgrade. A crucial element of Ukraine's improved economic system in a decade, according to Mariya, was a

strong middle class, which, in Olena's opinion, needed to be strengthened by financial aid programs for the poor.

Some research participants projected structural reforms in the economic system, particularly in integrating world economies and adjusting tax policies, which should be more liberal and transparent (as forecast by Lesya and Vasyl) and decentralizing the economic network, so that not only Kyiv, but other regions in Ukraine become economically advanced (as forecast by Taras). Two youth activists addressed the presence of corruption in the Ukrainian economy. Lesya pointed out that corruption is an element of any country's economic system and is present to certain degrees even in developed economies. To eradicate corruption, Svitlana believed that the Ukrainian government needs to increase salaries for the middle class and introduce a harsher legal punishment for corruption-related violations.

Bohdan expressed his disagreement with the suggested optimistic scenario of Ukraine's economy in a decade:

> As for economy, I do not see such development, since the current government does not have specific programs, but only slogans. If I were president, I would stop regulating economy and make it completely market-based. It is possible that people will live rich lives, but our people have specific mentality. A great number of Western Ukrainian people work abroad and send money home. I have friends whose parents send them $300-400 monthly and they do not want to study or look for jobs. So in ten years, those people will not be educated and capable of earning money. (Bohdan)

Socio-political Future. Several research participants addressed the question of an optimistic future of Ukraine's socio-political system. Olena believed that in the future Ukrainian political elite would be elected based on their professionalism, experience, and diverse representation of various social, ethnic, professional, geographic, and religious

groups. She also emphasized the importance of separation between government officials and members of parliament to maintain the division between power branches. Kateryna expected equal rights and access to services between statesmen and the people who elected them. She stated that "government officials should bring themselves down to the level of ordinary people, give up privileges, and use the same services as ordinary citizens. Then, they will make decisions that will improve their lives and lives of other citizens."

Of five youth activists who addressed the future of the healthcare system, only Kateryna anticipated it to be provided free of charge. Olena believed that free healthcare was an outdated element of the old Soviet system, and Bohdan recommended implementing an insurance-based system with only a small segment of funding from the state budget. Lesya believed that healthcare services would ideally be free for those who could not afford them; everyone else would pay through a system of lowered taxes to avoid the long waiting lists that typically accompany free social services.

Educational Future. Three interviewees (Bohdan, Kateryna, and Vasyl) were convinced that education in Ukraine in the optimistic future would be free of charge, accessible, and of high quality. Two other interviewees (Lesya and Mariya) believed that education should be accessible but not free with the exception of instructional programs for students who were not able to afford educational funding. They feared that free services would decrease overall quality of education.

Mariya expected the educational system to be more modernized and nationalized, similar to the reforms that took place in a top higher education institution in Ukraine, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. She proposed implementation of such elements in the

educational system as grants, brain drain prevention programs, and westernized majors (e.g., MBA programs). Kateryna projected a structural educational reform in management and administration in order to phase out decision-makers with old Soviet approaches. She also supported modernization of the educational field to meet the demands of the modern Ukrainian society, which needs more professionals in instruction and healthcare, areas whose prestige declined during Ukraine's independence and need to be regained. Svitlana favored a more focused system of education in which students did not have to take courses that were not directly related to their fields of study and would not be needed in their future areas of expertise. Taras envisioned a better technologically equipped educational system with a wide implementation of information technology due to the challenges of the 21st century.

Youth Activism Future. Youth activists had various visions of youth movements in Ukraine's future. Mariya and Vasyl believed that young people would become more active in ten years and they would be more involved in political decisions, from which Ukraine would only benefit since the new generation would not be tainted by the Soviet system. Mariya also considered it important for the authorities in Ukraine to sustain young people's activism and enthusiasm based on the Orange Revolution success. Olena, on the other hand, believed that, while young people were typically one of the most active social strata, their activism would decline in an optimistic future since youth typically became more active when political situations worsened.

Research participants expressed a range of opinions on the involvement of youth in the country's government. Kateryna and Mariya forecast that young people would be employed by the government based on their experience and education. Olena pointed out

that government officials should not be given employment priorities based on their age but should be hired based on their professionalism. Lesya did not think that many young people would hold governmental positions since the authorities and youth characteristically did not get along. Besides, the Ukrainian traditions of prioritizing older people's opinions would still be too strong in a decade to give young people greater access to power. She, however, hoped for some lustration in the government so that people previously involved in corrupt regimes were prevented from holding key decision making positions in the future. Bohdan felt that young people did not have sufficient funds to be able to run for the Ukrainian government positions. Based on post-revolutionary events in Ukraine, he felt somewhat betrayed by the political forces. This feeling was shared by other members of the organization he headed:

> We were told, "you are young people, with no experience, so you cannot run in the elections yet." But when we were needed for strikes, demonstrations, we were always welcomed. We were used by the political forces and now they will not give us access to power. (Bohdan)

Impact of the Orange Revolution. The theme of the influence of the Orange Revolution on Ukraine's future was not incorporated in the proposed scenarios but emerged in all three extrapolations of futures (optimistic, pessimistic, and probable). In their visions of Ukraine's optimistic future, four interviewees (Mariya, Myroslav, Taras, and Vasyl) considered the revolution to be a breaking point in Ukraine's history, which triggered irreversible changes. Myroslav viewed the Orange Revolution as the true beginning of a movement toward democracy for not only political elites and certain parties, but for the Ukrainian people in general. Taras looked at the revolution as a break-off of Ukraine from its Soviet past and Russia, "the successor of the Soviet Union," a

trend that would increase in the future. Vasyl thought that the revolution gave rise to innovative thinking in Ukrainian society since it affected people's perceptions not only in politics but also in other areas.

Personal Future. All research participants tied their optimistic personal futures to Ukraine; all of them commented primarily on their career prospects. Five activists aspired to hold governmental positions, two activists planned to pursue jobs in academia, and two more activists hoped to work in the mass media area. Lesya and Kateryna believed they would have governmental decision making careers in the field of international relations. Vasyl was interested in national-level politics, while Taras hoped to be involved in regional politics, which, according to his anticipations, would require more attention in the future. Myroslav intended to combine his career of a politician with a history professorship at a university with his own school of followers. Both Olena and Svitlana planned to hold positions in Kyiv higher education institutions, but Olena also hoped to be involved in NGO-style social work outside of politics, performing such tasks as project design and grant writing. In her optimistic future, Mariya intended to own a media business and Bohdan planned to hold an independent journalist position.

Pessimistic Future. When presented with the pessimistic scenario of Ukraine's future, six youth activists expressed their full or partial disagreement with the presented version. Kateryna and Myroslav did not consider such a scenario feasible because of the Orange Revolution, which contributed to maturity of the Ukrainian nation. Taras assumed that such a scenario could only be triggered by an external factor since he predicted no causes for such developments within Ukraine. The other three research participants did not agree with the scenario and found it to be "too pessimistic."

Ukraine's Overall Development. In her response to the hypothesis in the proposed pessimistic scenario about Ukraine's division into several countries, one participant, Kateryna, extrapolated the country's pessimistic future similar to its present: the country would be "torn between West and East, between the E.U. and Single economic space, …split between Ukraine's west and east," but she did not project dramatic divisions into several countries. Similarly, Mariya did not consider separatism plausible even in a pessimistic version of the country's future. She saw no objective grounds for a split, unless they were orchestrated from abroad. Three other activists (Bohdan, Myroslav, and Taras), who did envisage a split of Ukraine in its pessimistic future, also pointed out that it would be instigated by an external factor. Myroslav recommended implementing strategic programs to eliminate history and mentality discrepancies in Ukraine so that the "geopolitical bomb" could not be used by Ukraine's enemies in the future. Even though Bohdan did not rule out an increase in separatist movements in a pessimistic future of the country because of foreign agents and a federalization agenda of the Party of Regions headed by Viktor Yanukovych, he was hopeful that such splits would not occur:

> Ukraine is unitary – from Lviv to Donetsk. The divisions into easterners and westerners, Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, Orthodox believers and Greek Catholics are very primitive. With a sound policy of Ukrainization, Ukraine could be all Ukrainian in 15 years. I believe in Ukraine's unity because when we were all ripped apart 300 years ago and still managed to unite, nothing can destroy our country after that. (Bohdan)

Three participants addressed the possibility of a civil war in Ukraine's pessimistic future; they all were in agreement that a civil war development was unlikely or, according to Taras, would only happen if initiated by other countries interested in

weakening Ukraine. Lesya did not anticipate wars, but she feared Ukraine would return to authoritarianism. Olena did not believe in the possibility of a civil war because Ukraine had previously gone through two world wars and because the bloodless Orange Revolution was a proof that the Ukrainians could resolve problems nonviolently. The generalization of the peace-loving Ukrainian mentality was also brought up by three activists (Bohdan, Mariya, and Taras) to challenge the presented assumption that terrorist acts would be possible in Ukraine's future. These research participants considered outbreaks of terrorism highly unlikely and only Bohdan did not exclude their possibility in the Crimea.

Some activists offered their visionary policies of Ukraine's strategic development to preclude the negative scenario. Myroslav suggested that strive for progress should be an inherent component of the country's future; the authorities attempted to turn the country back either to the Soviet past, or the Kuchmist past, or even to the Orange Revolution past without offering anything new, but the new policies should be reformist and future-oriented and should incorporate a potential to unify east and west of Ukraine. Taras envisioned Ukraine's path of development as independent from both the western (the European Union and the United States) and eastern (the Russian Federation) blocks because in both settings Ukraine would have to give up part of its sovereignty. Exercising its leadership locally among its neighbors and forming alternative unions similar to the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) would strengthen Ukraine on the global arena.

Democratic Future. Several activists expressed their vision of pessimistic futures of democracy in Ukraine and recommended a number of preventative ways of stemming

regressive developments. Lesya projected a return to authoritarianism because the Ukrainian people might be nostalgic for a Soviet-like iron-fisted leader who would instill democracy for them. Mariya predicted that mass media would still be dependent on political forces but not to such an extent as in pre-revolution times. And Olena did not see a lack of media freedom as a serious problem in the country's future in a decade since Ukraine, similarly to other countries, was following a traditional evolution pattern of gaining political and civic rights first and then securing socio-economic rights.

Myroslav pointed out the negative impact of the merged political and business systems on Ukraine's future and believed that these systems could only be separated by a strong civic sector. In his opinion, people should be informed about methods of defending their interests and the authorities should simplify registration processes of civic organizations and develop an internal Ukrainian grant system alongside international grants. Bohdan also expressed his support for well-functioning civic organizations, whereas Kateryna emphasized the importance of guaranteeing freedom of speech, providing access to fair justice, protecting human rights, and maintaining transparency in the state system. Lesya agreed with the significance of having free media and NGOs that would exercise societal control over the authorities, but, in addition to these priorities, she recommended educating Ukrainian citizens about democracy through debates, explanatory campaigns, greater publicity, and reciprocal communication with the authorities to prevent them from getting disconnected from the rest of society.

Economic Future. In their discussions of pessimistic futures of the Ukrainian economy, several activists forecast economic crises of various degrees. Mariya, Svitlana and Taras did not rule out an increase of a gap between the rich and the poor, unlike

Bohdan who thought that society would pressure oligarchs to share their capital with poorer population strata. Bohdan and Svitlana also predicted high levels of corruption because people would be forced to engage in bribery out of necessity or tradition, while Taras thought that corruption would lessen by means of technological control. He also assumed that some neighboring countries would be interested in weakening Ukraine economically out of competition. In this context, Russia emerged as the most potential rival for Ukraine (according to Kateryna, Olena, and Vasyl). Vasyl stated the following:

> Pessimistically speaking, Russia will try to take over Ukraine's political and economic systems trying to implement the Belarus model. It is important to develop short-term tactics of activities, not long-term strategies. E.U. and U.S. experiences show that development of short-term tactics in many areas results in a multiplication effect. If such tactics are implemented simultaneously in many areas and on many levels, they prove to be very effective. (Vasyl)

Olena agreed that the country's economic sector may not be very capable or competitive in the pessimistic future, but she perceived Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy resources as a stimulus for reforming the Ukrainian economy: in the event of Russia's decision to increase prices for oil and gas, Ukraine would be forced to seek alternative resources, modernize economic branches, and implement innovations.

Research participants also provided their suggestions of strategies to prevent or overcome possible economic crises. Kateryna recommended a more sound and effective information campaign on administrative reform, which would bridge the gap between rural and urban areas, and on Ukraine's prospects of joining NATO, which is "not only a military organization, but also a political and economic one that increases people's living standards." Vasyl advised stabilizing relations with Russia and developing a strategic economic partnership with the country, but he believed Russia should recognize

Ukraine's European aspirations at the same time. Mariya proposed rebuilding, modernizing, and revitalizing infrastructure and battling corruption by intense publicity and discussions about it in communities. She pointed out that coal industry had low long-term potential as it would be exhausted in about 20 years and Ukraine needed to invest in economic branches with greater long-term prospects. Bohdan recommended refocusing the economy from producing raw materials to goods manufacturing technologies. One of his corruption reduction strategies was controlling state officials, not at the earning level, but at the expenditure level so that they were held accountable for all their expenses. Because Ukraine has great agrarian potential, Bohdan was adamant about increasing efficiency in cultivating land and modernizing Ukraine's agricultural sector, not through donations, but through the hiring of "qualified managers and professionals and modern technologies that would improve the market." Additionally, he recommended channeling foreign investment into the agricultural branch and improving the tax system. Bohdan also proposed implementing alternative energy resources (e.g., hydro, wind, and solar power stations) to replace atomic options. Mariya did not view atomic power stations as a potential threat since, in her opinion, the nation had learned a lesson from the Chornobyl disaster.

Socio-political Future. Two interviewees, Bohdan and Svitlana, allowed the possibility of a political crisis in Ukraine's pessimistic future in ten years. Bohdan stated that the crisis rooted in politicians' inability to support the national idea and failure to keep their promises after they got elected. To resolve political crises in Ukraine's future, Bohdan proposed creating advisory organs in the parliament and presidential administration, which would oversee adherence to the laws of the Constitution and

increase punishment for abusing the National Law. Additionally, he recommended forming a commission, which would analyze the Constitution for consistency among laws.

Among other social hazards in Ukraine's future, Bohdan listed human trafficking, torture, and bullying in the army, to get rid of which, he thought, Ukraine needed at least 50 years. Bohdan and Olena pointed out the need for a pension reform to improve support for the retired; Olena called for changes in the healthcare system, specifically for children with disabilities who, to her mind, were misdiagnosed and then further mistreated in specialized institutions. Since Ukraine was experiencing one of the fastest growing HIV/AIDS epidemics in Europe at the time of the interview, Olena also offered her pessimistic scenario of the future of Ukrainian healthcare:

> It is 2015. Ukraine's population is 41 million. The percentage of population infected with HIV/AIDS is 3.7 or even 4. Children massively die from AIDS before 10 years of age. Apart from the demographic problem, the country has a socio-political one, since the work force is dying out at a young age. HIV/AIDS infection is uncontrollable and is no longer limited to risk groups. It is, unfortunately, not such a remote forecast, a nearer one. And it will be a very serious problem. There are many programs to fight this threat and, presently, they are trying to help Ukraine. The biggest problem with such programs until recently was the unwillingness and incapability of the Ministry of Healthcare to provide the right treatment. The Ministry, until recently, was purchasing drugs which cost $6,200 per person yearly, while there is a $550 alternative. For some reason, unprofessional or national one, or something else, such destructive men in power were not able to think globally, and funding of such programs almost stopped. International organizations and alliances will not be effective with their effort if not supported by the government. (Olena)

Some activists regarded a strong unifying ideology as an essential element of Ukraine's socio-political progress. Myroslav considered it important to develop a visionary model, which would be a product of extensive societal discussions, deemphasize regional and social divisions, and satisfy a majority of the country. Bohdan

saw foundations of a national ideology in reviving nationalism, which was a taboo in the Soviet empire. Taras thought that the Ukrainian language was a predominant agent in nurturing patriotism and nationalism and empowering the Ukrainian nation. Its status, therefore, was changing from the language of repressed intelligentsia to a more widespread and prestigious linguistic phenomenon.

Educational Future. In their musings about pessimistic developments in the educational system, some youth activists predicted that the educational system would not receive enough funding for the necessary reforms. Mariya, therefore, recommended channeling investments into education because, in long-term projections, they would pay off by establishing an educated, competitive nation. Olena underscored the need for institutional reform to make Ukrainian educational institutions capable of adjusting to change and innovations. Taras pointed out the necessity of further Ukrainization of the system of education and promotion of the Ukrainian language starting in top progressive educational institutions. Kateryna suggested that the educational system needed further democratization and westernization and Ukrainian educational institutions needed to employ more educators with experiences of teaching abroad. She also recommended launching exchange and internship programs with western schools and universities and conducting conferences and seminars for disseminating advanced methods of teaching and research. Finally, Kateryna emphasized the importance of technology in education and securing internet access for every institution.

Bohdan and Vasyl expected that the brain drain might intensify in the future, since gifted people were not able to market their innovations in the country and had to

take them to Western Europe. To reduce this risk, Bohdan advocated for cooperation with donor organizations and the establishment of a crediting tuition system for gifted youth.

Youth Activism Future. Five interviewees addressed the pessimistic future of youth movements in Ukraine, and most of them suggested that suppression of youth movements was unlikely either due to the "immunity" the country developed after its past "diseases," like during the Orange Revolution (according to Kateryna and Mariya), or the government's fear of being retaliated against after they hand over power (according to Bohdan). Taras considered the Ukrainian authorities to be generally too peaceful and non-radical toward their people, as based on the history, to repress youth protests violently, and aggression toward young people and their disappearance would be possible only when coming from abroad. Some participants projected that in the worst case scenario, young people would be apathetic (Mariya), passive (Kateryna), or disillusioned just like after the Orange Revolution (Vasyl). Kateryna, however, suggested that youth's disinterest in politics was a sign of stability in the country, whereas political and social crises generally perpetrated youth activism.

Impact of the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution was perceived by some activists, namely, Mariya, Myroslav, and Svitlana, as one of the main reasons why the presented pessimistic scenario was not possible. In Svitlana, the revolution "awakened patriotism" and made her more citizenship-conscious. For Myroslav, the Orange Revolution had an even more profound effect:

> A failure of the Orange Revolution could have triggered such a scenario. If Yanukovych and the forces that supported him had come to power, they would have adopted a totally different decision making system in Ukraine, which would have been a deeper, more extreme variant of Kuchmism. On the other hand, the population participating in the Revolution would not have put up with it. This

> tension would have been constant and could have caused the pessimistic scenario. But now, people have become different and they will not allow going back down so much. The events of 2004 became a platform that allows us to move upwards. How high we rise depends on our work, but at least we will not fall below this platform. (Myroslav)

Most Probable Future. After being introduced to the most probable scenario extrapolated for the research instrument, one activist (Svitlana) agreed with all of its components and another activist (Bohdan) agreed with most of the scenario. Kateryna found the scenario to be too pessimistic and Olena thought that it was a description of the future in two years rather than in a decade. Furthermore, Myroslav and Taras thought the most probable future scenario described the contemporary situation in Ukraine. Myroslav anticipated Ukraine to move further ahead with establishing civil society and a pro-western, European ideology and not a pro-Russian one.

Ukraine's Overall Development. Most research participants addressed the question of Ukraine's membership in the European Union. Bohdan and Svitlana did not think the country's E.U. membership in a decade was a possibility, and Olena even questioned the existence of the E.U. in its present entity. Svitlana believed that only accession in the World Trade Organization would be feasible and the E.U. membership was not to be expected for another 25-30 years; Bohdan justified Ukraine's inability to meet E.U. membership qualifications primarily by poorly monitored borders with Russia, challenges of the Ukrainian transitional economy, and unresolved political crimes. He also exemplified the European Union reluctance to admit new members by Turkey's experience, as that country had been struggling with joining the E.U. for decades. Kateryna and Vasyl, on the other hand, predicted that Ukraine would become an associated member of the European Union. Kateryna expected that Poland's lobbying

would provide Ukraine with the necessary assistance; Vasyl believed that Ukraine needed time for not only economic or political shift, but also for a cultural one, with the Ukrainians starting to perceive themselves as true Europeans and think in pan-European terms. He also accentuated the need for promoting Ukraine internationally, developing the Ukrainian brand to improve the country's image on the continent, and developing stronger ties with European countries individually.

Four activists (Bohdan, Mariya, Olena, and Svitlana) forecast that Ukraine was not going to join a military alliance with Russia. Mariya believed that Ukraine should remain a militarily neutral nation, and she was hopeful that the Russian navy currently located in Ukrainian territory in the Black Sea would leave the country by the due date. In contrast, two interviewees thought that Ukraine should join NATO in the near future because this organization would facilitate the Ukrainian army reform toward the contract basis (favored by Kateryna, Olena, and Vasyl) to liberalize excessive conscription laws and make military service prestigious and attractive for young people. Bohdan also viewed the NATO membership and a means of protecting Ukraine from Russia's aggression – persistent presence of the Black Sea navy and instigated controversy over Ukraine's ownership of the Crimea Peninsula. Kateryna and Taras anticipated some international tensions with Russia, since this country generally disapproved of Ukraine's western vector of development. Taras hypothesized that Ukraine's northern neighbor might respond by further funding pro-Russian leftist parties, youth movements, and religious organizations, but he did not expect these technologies to harm Ukraine significantly.

Bohdan saw great potential for the country's local leadership drawing on the GUAM alliance and suggesting that Ukraine should assert its authority in the Transdniestria conflict in Moldova and the Zmiyinyy Island dispute with Romania. In his opinion, Ukraine could also become an advocate of the Newly Independent States in Europe, since progressive politicians from these countries were now coming to Kyiv and not Moscow for consultations and, when elected domestically, they would maintain strong diplomatic relations with Ukraine empowering it internationally.

Democratic Future. Three interviewees (Mariya, Olena, and Svitlana) predicted that violations of human rights would occur in Ukraine in ten years only sporadically. Mariya pointed out that such violations were happening in every society and required a great deal of effort to be eradicated; Olena added that it was essential to develop a reliable mechanism of correcting violations of civil rights. As for mass media, Svitlana expected them to be completely free in a decade.

Economic Future. In their extrapolations of the most probable economic future, research participants surmised that Ukraine's economy would undergo reforms and improvements, but it would still face challenges, such as corruption. Kateryna, Olena, and Svitlana forecast a partial presence of corruption in the Ukrainian economic system, and Kateryna and Olena indicated that even developed countries are infiltrated with corruption to a certain extent. To reduce levels of corruption, Kateryna believed that the government should increase transparency and accountability, position mass media as watchdogs, and maintain a constant reciprocal dialog with the electorate to stay responsive to its needs.

Bohdan and Svitlana thought that a common currency zone with Russia would not be viable, unlike Vasyl, who thought that such a zone could only be introduced on equal membership conditions and not on those similar to the drafted Single economic space model, in which Russia proposed to be responsible for a greater share of decision making. Bohdan, Kateryna, Mariya, and Olena envisioned an overall economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia.

To attract greater international investment, Vasyl proposed creating a favorable investment climate by stabilizing the economy, reforming the legislature, and enforcing transparency. Mariya stated that in the reformist process of the economic system, the government needed to establish a team of professionals who would prioritize economic branches with greater potential. Taras recognized such a potential in Ukraine's agriculture and food industry:

> There will be no revival of Ukraine without reviving its rural areas. The latter performed not only economic but also educational functions, preserving the language – the heart of the nation. Without modernizing the agrarian industry, all other industries will be lagging behind, holding back the metal industry, science, etc. It will be like a suitcase without a handle – you do not want to leave it behind but you cannot carry it along either. (Taras)

Taras also made an observation that countries generally followed three economic stages – development, stability, and decay – and, sometimes, opportunity gaps emerge between these stages. He classified Ukraine's stage as developmental, unlike that of the E.U., and considered it to be an opportunity for Ukraine's developmental leap to fill a gap in the European and global economy.

Socio-political Future. Several research participants, including Olena and Svitlana, predicted structural reforms in the political system. Mariya and Svitlana

envisioned the future Ukrainian political system as multi-party with pluralistic initiatives. Mariya voiced her personal preference for a political system with several parties and not bipartisan, as it would be easier for voters of each particular party to hold their representatives accountable. She also expected the political system to stabilize, develop regular election cycles, and reduce aggressiveness in campaigning. Vasyl supported the idea of multiple parties in the Verkhovna Rada, providing the ideological platform for the country's development, but he hoped that a unified team would be formed in the government to equip the executive branch with effective tools to implement of reforms.

Olena was critical of the concentration of political power in Kyiv, which resulted in political corruption in Ukraine's periphery. She also disapproved of the current mechanisms of electing political representatives based on a single party list for the entire country. She described the current political parties in Ukraine as "extremely centralized, corrupt, with no transparent funding, no transparent formation of electoral lists, and the same political lists for the entire country." Olena pointed out that politics merged with business since party members were expected to make financial contributions for their seats in the parliament and tried to make even more financial gains after they got elected without the fear of being answerable individually when sheltered by their parties. To increase political accountability and transparency, Olena preferred to go back to electing each MP on an individual basis and not on a proportional party basis. She also emphasized the importance of delegating some power to other oblasts. Vasyl did not anticipate significant political changes in the Ukrainian oblasts, but he believed that people would be less concerned with politics and more with their economic welfare in a decade.

Educational Future. Three research participants addressed the future of the educational system stating that it would undergo some reforms and become more marketable. Vasyl regarded the current educational model as 80% effective, indicating that Ukrainian students were competitive abroad after gaining education in their home country. He identified the need for more international programs to exchange knowledge and experience and westernize the Ukrainian education further by introducing critical thinking approaches and focusing academic majors. He viewed the future educational system in Ukraine as apolitical and independent from views of any particular party. He also underlined the prominent role of education in empowering the Ukrainian nation:

> The educational system will shape the Ukrainian mentality, spiritual development, and sense of ownership. The Ukrainian language, literature, and culture should be integral components of the educational system. We are all part of one Ukrainian society and we need to raise the level of the Ukrainian language. (Vasyl)

Additionally, Vasyl anticipated greater technological facilitation in education and internetization of all educational levels to make the field more advanced, accountable, and transparent.

Bohdan focused on social needs of students anticipating increases of stipends, provision of educational loans, and raising students' standards of living in general. He concurred with Vasyl on bringing education to western standards to make Ukrainian diplomas compatible abroad, so that graduates did not have to retake standard examinations to be employed internationally.

Olena was mostly satisfied with the state of K-12 education but hoped that the system of higher education would be reorganized. While she approved how the sciences were taught, with some reservations due to the absence of extensive hands-on

methodology, she thought that the area of the arts instruction was “obsolete” and needed to be revolutionized. Scholars needed to get rid of the “marginal approach to the arts,” treating them as specifically Ukrainian and isolating them from the global knowledge, and teach the arts utilizing global gains and ideas instead, since “political science is political science in Ukraine, Italy, France, or the United States.” She also pointed out the dearth of translated textbooks and the need for new textbooks written by Ukrainian scholars.

Youth Activism Future. Research participants’ extrapolations on the most probable future of youth activism ran the spectrum from youth’s political passiveness, when young people “do not know who the prime minister is,” which is not necessarily a negative indicator because it signifies political stability (Mariya), to young people being just as active in a decade owing to NGO support and other factors (Kateryna and Vasyl). Kateryna had the following vision of Ukrainian youth activism in the future:

> Youth will do the same in a decade, young people are always the same – their values are different from those of older people, they are more liberal, not tied to a place of residence, more mobile, have more freedom in choosing their profession, education, etc.

Bohdan agreed with the presented most probable scenario on the account of the absence of a single ideology to unify youth due to differences in perceptions of some historic events (e.g., Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Holodomor, etc.) between western and eastern Ukrainians, but he argued that young people could be united around social challenges, such as educational reform needs, for example. Bohdan believed that young people would be “exploited” by political parties in the future because youth are the cheapest dynamic labor force.

Impact of the Orange Revolution. The revolution and the values and beliefs it embodied were one of the leitmotifs of the interviewing process. In their visions of the most probable future, youth activists outlined an array of further actions, which needed to be taken by the nation to implement the promises of the Orange Revolution. Myroslav believed that sustaining the Maidan postulates was the next important goal, especially in the light of the post-revolutionary disillusionment generated by mostly unaccomplished goals set by high expectations of the revolution. Mariya pointed out that the Orange Revolution did not bring new people to power since both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were representatives of the old system, so the next developmental stage would entail a systemic renewal of the political elite, although it would not necessarily be absolute classic lustration.

SUMMARY

The study findings indicate that youth activists were a major driving force in the democratic Orange Revolution, they exhibit high levels of internal and task-oriented political efficacy, and, in their extrapolations of Ukraine's futures, the country is generally perceived to be on the path of democracy within Euroatlantic structures. In the next chapter, these research findings are analyzed in the context of the three questions posed by the dissertation and linked to the research literature.

CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how the data findings discussed above apply to research literature and the three questions posed by the study:

- How do youth activists in Ukraine perceive events during the Orange Revolution in the country?
- How do youth activists perceive their current socio-political efficacy in Ukraine?
- What are visions of possible political futures among youth activists in the country?

ESSAY CONTENT ANALYSIS

Essay content analysis was conducted to address Research Question 1: How do youth activists in Ukraine perceive events during the Orange Revolution in the country? The principal finding is that research participants are democracy-oriented and see themselves as primary agents in Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Essay data summarized in Chapter IV indicate that youth movements are perceived to have both triggered and sustained the revolutionary events. These data corroborate parallel research on Ukraine's 2004 revolution, which suggests that those under 30 years of age were three times more likely to join the Orange Revolution than other age groups (Stepanenko, 2005).

Preconditions of the revolution described in the essays include the democratic crisis, anti-presidential protests (such as the Ukraine without Kuchma campaign), the murder of journalist Gongadze, etc. Some of these preconditions are highlighted in works of contemporary scholars and regarded as changes that radicalized youth and prepared them for the victory in the revolution:

> The anti-Kuchma protests from 2000 to 2003 attracted between 20,000 and 50,000 participants, primarily young people. They failed in their main purpose of unseating Kuchma through either a democratic revolution or early presidential elections. At the same time, these protests created a hard core of young activists and dedicated civil society volunteers, reduced apathy among young people, and helped convince many Ukrainians that it was time for change. These changes in society created the backdrop for the Orange Revolution. (Kuzio, 2006b, p. 71)

Another important finding generated in the research process was the set of reasons for socio-political activism before and during the Orange Revolution (Chapter IV). According to Arel (2005), pro-European civic nationalism played a significant role in mobilizing Ukrainians during the 17 revolutionary days. Research findings confirm that nationalism and patriotism were prominent driving forces, which stimulated civic activism during the Ukrainian revolution. Some other reasons for activism reported by research participants were the urge to defend the right for freedom of expression, desire for change, persecution by the authorities, and revolutionary idealism.

Surprisingly, essay writers do not always (explicitly) recognize education as a decisive stimulus for youth activism. Some do assert that their education shaped drastically their decisions to join the protest. In one instance, informal education is perceived to have played a role in an activist's civic activism. However, it is also argued that the revolution attracted participants with various education backgrounds, and,

therefore, it is assumed that a correlation between education and political participation needs further research.

Parallel democratizing political events in other countries of the region served as examples to follow for the revolutionary activists in Ukraine. When comparing electoral revolutions in Slovakia, Serbia, and Georgia, Bunce and Wolchik (2006) underline the importance of innovative strategies utilized by youth activists in those revolutions and their being unaffected by the old totalitarian systems:

> …youthful activists brought fresh approaches, new techniques, and a great deal of energy to the campaigns to unseat unpopular and often corrupt authoritarian regimes. They also brought to these campaigns an asset that older political leaders, particularly those who were or had been active in partisan politics, could not: their lack of experience with the politics of the old regime. Untainted by the compromises many members of the opposition had made, young activists were able to appeal to segments of the population who were disillusioned by politics as usual and the old regime.

Similarly, in Ukraine, youth activists replicated or invented sets of techniques and strategies to advance their revolutionary mission. These strategies, as reported by the research subjects, included delegating activists to regions under informational blockades, placing organized mass phone calls to get the detained activists released, guarding places of great strategic importance, working in pairs or groups for security purposes, collaborating with mass media, using humor to minimize conflict, and basing activities on principles of nonviolence. Gene Sharp's ideology of nonviolent resistance (Sharp, 1993) is manifested in most written testimonials. PORA members reported using such methods of nonviolent action as symbolic public acts, strikes, and public assemblies. These approaches served as tools to break through the fear and apathy of large numbers of voters. Such strategies and methods may have contributed to development of personal

and professional skills for youth activists and an accumulation of personal and national benefits, which add to the list of study findings discussed above.

Youth activists' self-portrayal as being less tainted by the Soviet system and their unwillingness to remain a "homo sovieticus" are reflective of the bad legacies democratization approach discussed in the literature review chapter (cf. Inglot, 2003; Pigenko, 2001). Tellingly, the old legacy of the Soviet empire is often denounced and perceived as an obstacle to Ukraine's democratization. Of note is research participants' young age viewed as an advantage and source of hope for the country's democratic future.

One scholar describes the Orange Revolution as "the creation of civil society in real time, before your eyes, in the sense that, for the first time in Ukrainian history, an organized society acted as a counter-weight to the state" (Arel, 2005, p. 4). Even though there were previous, less populous attempts of public protests in the history of Ukraine's new independence, they were not nearly as effective and colossal as the Orange Revolution. Indeed, despite its later setbacks, the electoral triumph of the opposition is rendered by research participants as a major historic event of national catharsis accompanied by feelings of euphoria, national pride, and accomplishment.

The results on formation and evolution of the PORA campaign highlighted in Chapter IV shed light on the organizational structure and internal dynamics of this important component of the revolution as perceived and narrated by PORA members themselves. The grassroots of the campaign, its division into the black and yellow branches, and its post-revolutionary role provide a solid ground for future inquiry. PORA activists' choices could affect democratic reforms and sustainability of democracy,

particularly if they, being potential future leaders, pursued active participation in the political process in the country – either as government officials or NGO leaders.

During the revolution, the opposition dominated the internet as a political venue (Way, 2005). Some youth activists confirm that their proficiency with information technology and the widespread use of computers and cell phones benefitted their goals, as the young people were able to communicate effectively and respond instantly to the needs of the revolution. Such IT capabilities as disseminating information and data on civic topics, interchanging with people of different cultures and perspectives, and recruiting other activists, were successfully exploited by youth activists.

The high level of importance of international support for the revolution found in the research literature is echoed by the collected essays as well. The European Union and the United States are attributed roles of foreign saviors, whereas Russia's anti-Orange Revolution stance is criticized. Interestingly, in the youth activists' portrayal of democratic processes in Ukraine, the case of the Russian Federation is often used to contrast democracy and semi-authoritarian iron-fisted leader regimes. Research suggests that these discrepancies go back to the end of the 20th century:

> Attitudes toward democracy among young Russians and Ukrainians began to change in the late 1990s. Russians saw democracy as the problem, associating it with chaos and trauma, while Ukrainians concluded that insufficient democracy was the problem. Russians blamed democracy, while Ukrainians sought it. (Kuzio, 2006b)

Youth activists qualify democracy as a desired form of government in Ukraine. Perhaps, the previous decades of foreign domination contributed to the strive for freedom and right for self-determination among the Ukrainian activists, and democratic ways of life are not challenged, in contrast to some social trends and opinions in Russia. When

attempting to conceptualize the notion of democracy, several essay authors draw on western models and attributes of democracy.

> We always had this dilemma that all were equal, but some were more equal. Well, now I think the "more equal" are becoming more like the equal. Of course this is a gradual and, I would even say, a long process, but I am confident that eventually we will reach the point when we will be able to say that we live better. I personally can say right now that I live better than I used to live before the Orange Revolution. I am certainly not satisfied with everything happening in the country now, but I am sure that I never will. This is my understanding of democracy – people are constantly dissatisfied and constantly wanting something else. And I am sure that the same situation is in most democratic countries all over the world. I do not think there is a single democratic country, where all people would say that they are satisfied with everything. (Activist 11)

> I'm glad that such a phenomenon as 'freedom of word' began to exist in the Ukrainian mass media. Nowadays, the Ukrainian news is much more objective than it was just over a year ago. Of course it is a great step to a real western-type democracy. I don't like to prognosticate anything but I think that everything will change for the better after parliamentary elections in spring 2006 on condition that they are objective. These elections will allow to create majority in the Parliament. In my opinion democracy should not be a typically Ukrainian one. We should follow the western model of democracy and first of all we should clearly understand what democracy is for developed countries and their definition of this concept. (Activist 12)

> When I was a teenager, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Ukraine started its transition from totalitarianism to democracy. Ukraine has undergone a long way of transformation from the authoritarian state to a semi-democracy, (i.e., a state with nominal existence of democratic institutions but absence of such important pillars of democracy as free speech, enhanced protection of human rights, the rule of law and good governance) to a democratic state, brought to existence as a result of the Orange revolution. (Activist 13)

One of the important outcomes of the Orange Revolution was Ukraine's mass media freedom, which determined the OSCE's qualification of the 2006 parliamentary elections in the country as "free and fair" (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2006). Research findings support the fact that the level of media freedom increased considerably along with people's personal freedom of expression. However,

some activists note that media owners and journalists still need to perfect their skill of channeling the newly acquired freedom into creating products of higher professional standards.

After the Orange Revolution succeeded in ousting the semi-authoritarian Kuchma regime, the youth activists who had participated in the protests were left with the choice of what to do next. Even though many young people had expressed distrust in politics and politicians, some of them chose to join the field by reforming as a political party (e.g., yellow PORA). Others decided to maintain their distance from the new government and serve as watchdog civic organizations to control the political leadership externally (e.g., black PORA). With the end of the people's protest and establishment of a more democracy-oriented government, most young people returned to their everyday lives; some were proud of the gains of the revolution (end of the Kuchma era, freedom of expression, independence of mass media, strengthened national identity, etc.); others were disillusioned by the lack of post-revolutionary improvements (unpunished political criminals, continuous corruption in the government, failure to separate politics from business, unjustified compromises with the new opposition, etc.). However, most understand that democratic reforms require significant periods of time to be implemented and regard the Orange Revolution as a positive, extraordinary phenomenon.

SELF-EFFICACY SURVEY ANALYSIS

Research Question 2, "How do youth activists perceive their current socio-political efficacy in Ukraine?" was addressed by the efficacy survey of 76 respondents.

The main findings from the survey, detailed in the previous chapter, are that youth activists report having high perceptions of their internal efficacy and are capable of performing tasks for accomplishing political goals. External efficacy perceptions are mixed; some of them are not as high, signifying that the Ukrainian political system is not always responsive to youth activists' needs. There are also some differences in these perceptions depending on a number of demographic factors, namely, gender, level of education, influence of education, area of residence, location, language, youth organization membership, and international experience.

The high levels of youth activists' political efficacy reflect some findings in the literature, which indicate that self-efficacy can be a result of political participation (Finkel, 1985). Active involvement in the Orange Revolution and a positive outcome of such involvement may have contributed to higher perceptions of self-efficacy. Also, some researchers observed a general increase in confidence in political efficacy among the Ukrainian people after the events of the Orange Revolution (Raik et al., 2005), so the confidence in political efficacy among principal revolutionary agents does not come as a surprise. The extensive support for the first external efficacy survey item about usefulness of political involvement in some circumstances corroborates this argument as well.

Two other highly supported items received no *disagree* responses from research participants. The first item, "People like me can voice their political disagreement," is associated with internal efficacy. High levels of agreement with this statement may be correlated with one of the gains of the Orange Revolution – securing freedom of expression in Ukraine. In fact, after the revolution, Ukraine has become to the former

Soviet bloc countries what the United States has been for the rest of the world – a haven for those prosecuted for political or religious reasons:

> Since the 2004 Orange Revolution ushered in a vigorous, sometimes chaotic democracy, Ukraine has become an island of freedom and tolerance in an ex-Soviet bloc still dominated by authoritarian regimes, and journalists, political activists, artists, and business professionals have flocked here. (Danilova, 2008)

The second item, "People like me can get the media to pay attention to them," pertains to youth activists' task-specific efficacy. As 74% of respondents agreed fully or partially with this item, it confirms the improvement in media freedom after the Orange Revolution also observed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2006). Interestingly, this item demonstrated no statistical variability when analyzed by all demographic factors.

Two external efficacy statements about Ukrainian politics' being too complicated at times and youth activists' not having any say about what the Ukrainian government does were supported by over one-third of survey respondents implying that many of them did not perceive the Ukrainian political system to be responsive to their needs. Moreover, the external efficacy statement about public officials' indifference to survey respondents' opinions generated complete or partial support from 71% of youth activists demonstrating tendencies of lower external efficacy levels, which also became apparent in the efficacy scale analysis.

The victorious conclusion of the Orange Revolution may have boosted youth participants' confidence in the task-specific components of political efficacy. Hence, three items associated with performing political tasks (getting government officials' attention, organizing protests, getting mass media's attention, and using the internet for

political purposes) received no less than 70% of full or partial support from survey participants and the task-oriented scale average totaled in 3.1 on a four-point continuum. The high support of the usefulness of media and the internet corresponds with the findings of some researchers who discovered that both mass media and the internet increase political self-efficacy (Wilhelm, 2003) and individuals experienced in politics to adopt the internet as a means of accomplishing political goals (Jaffe, 1994).

Variability of efficacy statements analyzed by demographic variables generated several interesting findings. The high levels of political self-efficacy reported by activists with formal youth organization memberships indicate that development of youth programs and organizations in Ukraine could be actively facilitated by the government and community, as they contribute to shaping efficacy awareness and skills. Similarly, survey data show that international experiences boost political self-efficacy and, therefore, educational and professional programs incorporating such experiences should be implemented on the national scale.

Analysis of efficacy items by the age independent factor resulted in no statistical differences. Survey participants were, for the most part, close in age, so absence of significant differences across age strata could be anticipated.

The external efficacy statement about usefulness of political involvement produced the most variability across demographic categories and was supported to a greater extent by male survey participants, individuals who considered their education as a factor in their activism, those whose first language was Ukrainian, and activists with formal youth organization memberships. The task-oriented efficacy item about youth activists' ability to get government representatives' attention was primarily supported by

male respondents, individuals with high school education, and those activists who had formal youth organization memberships. Differences in perception of the survey item about use of the internet depending on such ethnographic variables as gender, area of residence, youth organization membership, and international experience demonstrate that certain factors have potential of shaping youth activists' skills of using the internet resources for accomplishing their political goals. Generally, male youth activists, residents of urban areas, individuals with formal organization memberships, and activists with significant prior international experiences reported higher internet utilization rates for political reasons.

Data analysis by the gender variable showed that male survey participants have a greater sense of efficacy than female ones. Male youth activists expressed more agreement than female youth activists with the external efficacy statement about the usefulness of political involvement and two internal efficacy statements about being better informed of politics in the country and being capable of voicing one's political disagreement. Additionally, female youth activists were less likely to agree with three task-oriented items: getting government officials' attention, organizing protests, and using the internet for political purposes. This might be determined by some traditional organizational or leadership expectations of men rather than women in the Ukrainian society. These findings also support Gecas's assertion that in some societies, males demonstrate higher levels of self-efficacy than females (Gecas, 1989). In a civic education study, Craddock (2006) observed that Ukrainian male students benefitted more and exhibited more attitudinal changes than their female counterparts after participating in a civic education curriculum *We Are Citizens of Ukraine*. These findings could be

determined by male learners' more conservative viewpoints and exposure to new ideas and methods, having more to gain, or their predilection to guess more often on questions and thus simply reflect a more aggressive response pattern (Mondak & Anderson, 2004). The gender differences in efficacy perceptions point to the need of civic awareness programs and youth organizations for the female population in Ukraine.

ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH ANALYSIS

Research Question 3, "What are visions of possible political futures among youth activists in the country?" was addressed by nine EFR interviews. The primary findings of the EFR process were the youth activists' visions of Ukraine's futures, the goals they set for the country's development, and the strategies they generated to accomplish these goals (Chapter IV includes a detailed account of the findings). The modification of the EFR method – incorporating three sample scenarios in the interview – served as a conceptual starting point, a platform that empowered research participants with alternative versions of Ukraine's future.

During the process of discussing the optimistic scenario, some research participants tended to incorporate the most probable scenario as well and needed to be reminded that the latter would be discussed in the final phase of the interview. Of the three scenarios, the optimistic and pessimistic seemed to draw equally high levels of interest from most research participants, despite the general EFR tendency of research subjects' being less enthusiastic about the pessimistic scenario (Textor, 1978). The most probable scenario elicited the least interest from most research participants. One activist

even chose not to elaborate on it, stating that she had expressed most of her opinions on the subject matter in her two other scenarios.

Overall, youth activists tended to avoid extremely positive or extremely negative extrapolations. When projecting the 1 (most pessimistic future) to 100 (most optimistic future) EFR scale, proposed by Domaingue (1989) and Textor (1990a), most research participants' scenarios were concentrated within a 10-90 continuum, which corroborates Domaingue's observation. All interviewees formulated their optimistic futures with great ease; however, none of them attempted to project one's pessimistic future.

An interesting finding was the emergence of the theme of the Orange Revolution and its impact on Ukraine's future across all three scenarios. This component was not built into the research instrument scenarios, yet it came out as a distinct theme in the scenarios. In all three cases, the revolution was seen as a factor that triggered a true movement toward democracy and would minimize anti-democratic challenges in the future.

The optimistic scenarios contained views supporting the bad legacies democratization approach concentrating on the necessity of rotation of the Ukrainian elites and removing individuals affected by Sovietism from significant decision making processes. Ukraine's close association with the Euro-Atlantic structures emerged as a theme in all three scenarios but was particularly prominent in optimistic extrapolations. Democracy was a preferred system of government but some of its definitions and characteristics differed across scenarios. The socio-political future was addressed by support of diverse representation and professionalism in these areas. Economy was allotted a noteworthy amount of thought, with the focus on innovative approaches and

ways of eradicating corruption. In education, the emphasis was put on accessibility and high quality accompanied by westernization and Ukrainization reforms. There seemed to be no unanimous vision of the future of youth activism, as some interviewees believed that youth would become more active while others argued that young people's activism would subside. In their personal futures, youth activists envisioned themselves as successful professionals and stressed that their preference would be to pursue careers in Ukraine and not abroad.

The pessimistic scenarios often included not only negative extrapolations, but also counter-arguments or ways of coping with them. Naturally, these scenarios generated more prevention strategies than the optimistic or most probable scenarios. Thus, projections of further divisions among Ukrainians due to socio-political and historical factors were accompanied by assertions that Ukrainians were capable of overcoming such divisions, just as they had been done in the past. In the pessimistic future, Ukraine's democracy was threatened by an authoritarianism instilled by the Soviet empire for decades. Most activists viewed Russia as a potential threat to the Ukrainian economy in the future, but they also recognized this competition as a stimulus for modernizing the economic sector. Some activists predicted political crises in the country due to the absence of a national unifying ideology and contradictory laws in the Constitution. In the pessimistic future, education was depicted as lacking funding, reforms, and marketability. Finally, among negative trends in youth activism, research participants singled out young people's apathy, passiveness, and disillusionment.

The most probable scenarios were constructed from both positive and negative extrapolations. In their most realistic projections, research participants did not see

Ukraine's E.U. membership accomplishable in ten years, although some did not rule out the possibility of Ukraine's association with the European Union. Interviewees forecast that democracy would become more solidified in a decade and only sporadic violations of human rights would occur as they were possible in any society. Corruption was perceived as another phenomenon that could be found in any economic system and was to be expected to be present to some degree in Ukraine's future. For Ukraine's legislative branch, interviewees predicted a multi-party political system, which would be reinforced to avoid polarization in the country and ensure parties' accountability. Education was expected to undergo westernization and nationalization reforms. Interviewees' visions of the most probable future of youth movements ranged from young people's passiveness to their high levels of activism.

As it was mentioned above, in addition to offering their visions of Ukraine's optimistic, pessimistic, and most probable futures, youth activists generated a number of strategies of either enforcing positive outcomes or avoiding negative setbacks. These strategies, therefore, can be stratified into those of facilitation and prevention. Table 8 summarizes strategies recommended by youth activism during the research process.

Table 8. Facilitation and Prevention Strategies

	Facilitation strategies (frequency)	**Prevention strategies (frequency)**
Overall development	Joining the European Union (5) Joining NATO (4) Exercising local leadership (2) Outlining E.U. membership terms more distinctly (1) Developing future-oriented policies with a	Developing strategic programs to eliminate historical and mentality divisions (1) Ensuring the departure of the Russian navy by

	Facilitation strategies (frequency)	Prevention strategies (frequency)
	strive for progress (1) Developing programs to bridge Western and Eastern Ukraine Joining the WTO (1) Promoting Ukraine internationally (1) Developing an authentic Ukrainian brand (1) Forging stronger ties with European countries individually (1) Becoming an advocate for the NIS in Europe (1)	the due date (1)
Democracy	Creating civic organizations to support civil society (3) Ensuring media freedom (2) Introducing accountable and feasible NGO programs of control of the government (1) Conducting evaluations of democratic processes (1) Strengthening media ethics and culture (1) Creating civic television programs (1) Developing a Ukrainian grant system similar international ones (1) Maintaining transparency in the government system (1) Educating Ukrainian about democracy through debates, campaigns, and dialog with the authorities (1)	Reducing media dependence on political forces (1) Separating business from politics by a civic sector (1) Developing mechanisms of fighting violations of civil rights (1)
Economy	Prioritizing knowledge and innovation principles (3) Modernizing and upgrading the economic system (2) Improving the tax system (2) Investing in branches with greater long-term	Reducing Ukraine's dependence on imports of natural resources (2) Battling corruption by publicity, positioning mass media as

	Facilitation strategies (frequency)	Prevention strategies (frequency)
	potential (2) Modernizing the agrarian sector (2) Decentralizing the system, focusing on other regions (1) Increasing salaries for middle class (1) Refraining from regulating economy (1) Bridging urban and rural areas by an administrative reform (1) Joining NATO to stimulate economy reforms (1) Developing a strategic partnership with Russia (1) Supporting the middle class (1) Intensifying integration in the world economy (1) Implementing alternative energy resources to replace atomic ones (1) Reforming economic legislature (1) Making a developmental leap instead of constantly catching up (1)	watchdogs (2) Increasing transparency and accountability to reduce corruption (2) Utilizing technology to fight corruption (1) Developing short-term economic tactics (1) Creating financial aid programs for the poor (1) Introducing a harsher legal punishment system for corruption crimes (1)
Politics and social services	Retaining a multi-party political system (2) Separating government officials from members of parliament (1) Ensuring the division among the three branches of power (1) Establishing equality between the electorate and elected officials (1) Creating an advisory organ which would analyze the Constitution for consistency and guarantee adherence to it (1) Designing a unifying national ideology (1) Guaranteeing diverse representation of the	Reforming healthcare for children with disabilities (1) Intensifying battling HIV/AIDS (1)

	Facilitation strategies (frequency)	Prevention strategies (frequency)
	political elite (1) Developing regular election cycles (1) Decentralizing politics and delegating some power to oblasts (1) Implementing an insurance-based healthcare system (1) Empowering the status of the Ukrainian language (1)	
Education	Nationalizing/Ukrainizing education (3) Westernizing education (3) Implementing information technology in the educational system (3) Offering more focused academic majors (2) Modernizing education (2) Delegating administration responsibilities to younger generations (1) Guaranteeing accessibility and quality of education (1) Introducing a grant system (1) Allocating investments in the system (1) Reforming institutions so that they are able to adjust to change and innovations (1) Employing professionals with international experiences (1) Introducing exchange and internship programs (1) Holding professional conferences and seminars (1) Depoliticizing education (1) Demarginalizing the humanities (1)	Establishing a loan-based tuition system (2) Creating brain drain prevention programs (1) Increasing stipends (1)
Youth activism	Increasing young people's political involvement (1) Sustaining youth activism (1)	Avoiding exploitation of youth for political purposes (1)

	Facilitation strategies (frequency)	Prevention strategies (frequency)
	Conducting some lustration in the government (1)	
	Creating a single unifying ideology for young people (1)	

SUMMARY

Discussion of study findings within the context of research literature provides a more comprehensive account of youth activists' perceptions of democratic processes in Ukraine and presents a number of facilitation and prevention strategies recommended by research participants. The concluding chapter summarizes overarching study findings, offers implications for future research, and draws on prospects of Ukraine's development of democracy.

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter synthesizes some possible conclusions to the research questions posed initially as well as implications for future research and forthcoming directions of Ukrainian democracy. It is acknowledged here that the conclusions drawn in the chapter are based only on the snapshot of the country's development captured within the study chronology, but they are still meant to ignite debate, interest, and further research in the field of international development and democratization.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Findings generated by all three research methods indicate that democracy is the prioritized strategic preference for Ukraine, and the Orange Revolution, in which youth activists played a key role, reinforced this preference. It is clear that research participants do not consider alternatives to democracy when it comes to the question of the country's development. The youth activists' testimonials, self-efficacy survey, and Ethnographic Futures Research interviews all confirmed the existence of free mass media as a strengthening fourth estate in the country; they also corroborate the increasing use of technology by Ukrainian citizens for furthering their socio-political goals. Both the written testimonials and EFR interviews validate the empowering impact of the Orange Revolution on the Ukrainians' national identity and sense of patriotism. These two methods are also synchronous in reiterating the Western vector of Ukraine's future.

Part of the study mission was to capture the events of the Orange Revolution and these findings are grouped into 14 semantic themes (reasons for activism, role of education in activism, revolution preconditions, conceptualization of the revolution, PORA, strategies and skills, benefits and risks, accommodations and resources, nonviolent resistance, feelings, revolution around Ukraine, international support and recognition, revolution heroes, and post-revolutionary outcomes and developments). The research participants suggested that, despite the hindrances and crises on Ukraine's path from autocracy to democracy, this historic phenomenon put Ukraine on the world map as a progressive, pacifist nation. This fact should not be overshadowed by the post-revolutionary disillusionment; although the impact of the 2004 events may not be as palpable for the moment, some of the findings indicate that it is proving to bring about sustainable positive changes. Furthermore, this time in Ukrainian history should be capitalized globally to promote Ukraine on the international arena and give hope and prospects to other nations striving for democracy.

The dissertation research of youth activists' political self-efficacy sheds light on their leadership capabilities and the responsiveness of the political system to their needs. Survey findings suggest that youth activists perceive themselves to be politically efficacious and skilled at performing political tasks; however, the political system is reported sometimes to be unresponsive to societal needs. This part of the study is significant because the information in this thesis could assist people in exercising their political rights guaranteed by national and international treaties. Empowering Ukrainians with a strong sense of political efficacy could strip them of the old Soviet-programmed

anticipations of an iron-fisted leader telling them what to do and enable them to make their choices for themselves instead.

Finally, the dissertation results on optimistic, pessimistic, and most probable visions of Ukraine's democratic futures have the potential of informing democratization reforms in Ukraine. This research method also produced young leaders' strategic recommendations to stimulate positive developments of democracy as well as preventative techniques to avoid negative developments in the country.

Dissemination of these research results on the past, present, and future developments of democracy in Ukraine as perceived by youth activists has a strong potential to frame a better understanding of domestic and international socio-political processes in the region and be considered by democratization stakeholders, such as politicians, policy makers, researchers, and educators. The significance of the study lies in its insights into designing socio-political programs administered in various contexts globally. The study was undertaken to hear voices of young Ukrainian activists who are capable agents of change thanks to their leadership qualities, professional skills, technology fluency, and progressive views less influenced by the old Soviet empire system. Some of the research participants currently hold decision making positions in the socio-political system of Ukraine and already influence national and international democratic developments.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The dissertation offers several pathways for future research. Findings in this project show that Ukraine's Orange Revolution was inspired by other parallel movements in the region and, in its turn, has the potential to inspire other democratization movements in nearby countries in Europe and Asia, as well as democratization trends around the world. Successful democratic movements in Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan have already been inspired by the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, but similar events were suppressed violently in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan (Samokhvalov, 2005). Further conceptualization of such liberalization movements, as well as developments that followed them in Ukraine, might be a significant research endeavor, which would inform international development programs globally. While the comparative analysis of non-violent democratic revolutions in post-communist societies attracted some research efforts (cf. Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; Kuzio, 2006a; McFoul, 2005), further contrasting studies need to be conducted, particularly, with the consideration of Ukraine's historic events.

Another research direction ignited by the dissertation findings lies in investigating the current state of democracy in Ukraine and its future prospects as perceived by civic activists. Some research participants indicated that they preferred a western model of democracy in Ukraine; others pointed out that the country needed its authentic model of democracy and not a mere western import. The question of the archetype of democracy in Ukraine invites further research. The possible futures component of the study can be illuminated by the Ethnographic Futures Research method utilized in this work.

While some study findings were collected from Eastern Ukrainians, most of Orange Revolution participation was supported by youth activists from Western Ukraine. A like study of perceptions of democracy in Eastern Ukraine, which has been demonstrating an increase in civic activism after the revolution, would contribute to a more complete picture of national socio-political trends in the country.

DIRECTIONS OF UKRAINE'S DEVELOPMENT

The Ukrainian Orange Revolution validated two popular political leadership beliefs. The first belief is attributed to Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud (1753-1793): "revolution is like Saturn, it devours its own children." The second belief often accompanies the first and is based on examples from history: "revolutionaries make poor statesmen." Both Viktor Yushchenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko failed to deliver on most of the promised changes and their failure undermined people's trust in them. As president of the Kyiv Euro-Atlantic University Oleh Rybachuk pointed out, "Our country is welcome in the world. But those who are running the country at the moment get a vote of no confidence" (Wagstyl & Olearchyk, 2008). Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko formed their political teams based on the candidates' activism in the revolution and cronyism rather than professionalism – a concern often addressed in the findings of the study – which later resulted in backstabbing and allegations of corruption.

The post-revolutionary Orange alliance between a liberal Yushchenko and a radical Tymoshenko had split by late 2005. Constant squabbling in the Orange camp, which followed the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government, enabled Yanukovych to

stage a comeback and take over the Prime Minister post until 2007, when Yushchenko dissolved the Rada and called for a snap election. As a result, a paper-thin Orange coalition regained control of the parliament. One of Yushchenko's more prominent political accomplishments in 2006 was the bill passed by Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada branding the 1932-33 Great Famine, or Holodomor, as an act of genocide by the communist regime against the Ukrainian people. The future of the Orange democratic coalition remains unclear as both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko block each other's initiatives and exchange public accusations, staging a platform for the upcoming 2010 presidential election rather than implementing much needed yet unpopular reforms.

Yet, the absence of drastic reforms after the revolution became a blessing in disguise for the Ukrainian nation, as painful reforms would have undermined the Ukrainians' aspirations for democracy. Similar processes took place in the Russian Federation where effects of Yeltsin's democratic reform shock therapy in the late 1990s discouraged the public and enabled Putin to return toward authoritarianism. In Georgia, President Saakashvili attempted some dramatic systemic reforms after the Rose Revolution that also suffered setbacks, particularly since they were accompanied by centralization of presidential power and suppression of peaceful protests. In this light, democratic changes in Ukraine are perceived to be more sustainable than those in Georgia (Asatiani, 2007).

The two parliamentary elections that followed the Orange Revolution were recognized as fair by the international community, and their outcomes were impossible to predict in contrast to the staged elections in the Russian Federation, for example, where the political successor was hand-picked by the ruling elite and promoted by controlled

mass media. Even the Ukrainian opposition headed by Yanukovych is forced to play by more democratic rules in its political participation (Motyl, 2008). Despite the political crises and divided elite, Ukraine's economy is on the rise, attracting international investment and resulting in increasing wages and decreasing unemployment (Wagstyl & Olearchyk, 2008). The country was also granted a market economy status in 2006 and joined the World Trade Organization in 2008.

This work is dedicated to the journalist who spoke up against his authorities to stand up for the truth, the little girl on YouTube who was just learning how to speak but was already singing the Ukrainian anthem having heard it so many times, the soldier who would not turn his weapon on his fellow citizens, the pensioner who treated the protesters with pies she had baked from scratch and carried by foot across the city, the businessman who considered supporting the revolution financially to be a perspective investment, and, finally, all the young people who made profound sacrifices for the good of their country. Youth activism has diminished after the Orange Revolution, which can be justified by several reasons. Some activists felt they had put their brick in the wall of their country's development and returned to their routine lives. Others put their activism on hold because of the post-revolutionary disillusionment or marginalization by new political elites. Still others, like those in PORA, chose to remain politically active but branched into groups that pursued autonomous paths – some remaining in civic organizations, others forming parties and joining local and national governments. Overall, as Ukraine is distancing itself from authoritarianism and moving toward a true democracy, the youth continue to work for their country with a more depoliticized attitude and, perhaps, will recognize the impact of the revolution on the country's development only in the long run. As Motyl

(2008) observes, “Younger generations of Ukrainians, especially students, are developing the healthy skepticism, entrepreneurial spirit, and cocky self-confidence that characterize many young people in the West.” This work demonstrates that young people in Ukraine are more receptive to new ideas and values offered within the context of democratization. However, their apathy, disillusionment, and decline of activism are alarming, as they may result in setbacks of the democratic progress and reemergence of repressive leadership. The dissertation findings suggest that youth development should be revitalized in the country to utilize the great potential embodied by young people. This study closes with a quotation by Activist 7, who describes in his essay the younger generation of Ukrainians:

> We live in a world of numerous stereotypes which cuff and limit our freedom. We are forced to break stereotypes of our parents and of parents of our parents. We do not understand their values because they do not understand them themselves. For a majority of them, they are big abstractions that do not assume any responsibility or explanations. By our own words and needs, we give them a new meaning and are ready to fight for these values to become real. The Orange Revolution boosted our confidence in our strength and showed that our next victories are in store for us. The revolution became part of our past of which we are proud. We have no time for disappointment or nostalgia. We are too young, self-confident, and ambitious to live only in the past when the future gives birth to new challenges. (Activist 7)

APPENDIX A

STUDY INSTRUMENTS

APPENDIX A.1. ESSAY OUTLINE

Democracy in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: Youth Activists' Insights on the Revolutionary Past and Post-revolutionary Present

Please write an extended essay addressing the following questions:

1. What/who inspired you to take part in the Orange Revolution of December 2004 in Ukraine? What was the role of education in your socio-political activism? What did you learn? What skills did you gain? What were some risks and benefits of your activism?
2. How did the Orange Revolution happen from your individual standpoint? Please describe the events in which you were involved, strategies you employed, resources you used, your feelings, and impressions.
3. What is your vision of the post-revolutionary democratic developments? Do you approve or disapprove of the current changes?
4. Is there anything else you would like to add?

APPENDIX A.2. SURVEY OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

You are invited to take a survey about political efficacy. The survey will take 5-10 minutes to complete. Please put one check mark (✓) to answer each survey question.

Political Efficacy Questions	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree
1. Political involvement can be useful for people like me, in some circumstances.				
2. I am better informed about politics in Ukraine than most people in my country.				
3. People like me can get government officials in Ukraine to pay attention to them.				
4. People like me can participate in politics on an official level, if they choose.				
5. I know how to organize protests.				
6. People like me can voice their political disagreement.				
7. Voting is the way that people like me have a say about how government in Ukraine runs things.				
8. Sometimes Ukrainian politics is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.				
9. I don't think public officials in Ukraine care much what people like me think.				
10. People like me can get the media to pay attention to them.				
11. People like me don't have any say about what the Ukrainian government does.				
12. I know how to use the internet to further my political aims.				

Demographic Questions
13. What is your age? ☐ Under 19 ☐ 19-22 ☐ 23-26 ☐ 27-30 ☐ More than 30
14. What is your gender? ☐ Male ☐ Female
15. What is your education? ☐ Secondary school ☐ High school ☐ Vocational institution ☐ Higher education (incomplete)

☐ Higher education (complete)

16. To what extent did your education influence your socio-political activism?

☐ None
☐ Some
☐ Great

17. What is your ethnicity?

☐ Ukrainian
☐ Russian
☐ Belarusian
☐ Moldovan
☐ Crimean Tatar
☐ Other (please specify)……...

18. In what area did you spend most of your life?

☐ Urban area
☐ Rural area

19. In which part of Ukraine did you spend most of your life?

☐ Center of Ukraine (Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast, Poltava Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Vinnytsya Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast)
☐ West of Ukraine (Lviv Oblast, Ternopil Oblast, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, Zakarpattya Oblast, Chernivtsi Oblast)
☐ North of Ukraine (Volyn Oblast, Rivne Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Chernihiv Oblast, Khmelnytskyy Oblast)
☐ East of Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, Sumy Oblast)
☐ South of Ukraine (Sevastopol, Autonomous Crimean Republic, Odesa Oblast, Mykolayiv Oblast, Kherson Oblast, Zaporizhzhya Oblast)
☐ Other (please specify)……

20. What is your native language?

☐ Ukrainian
☐ Russian
☐ Other (please specify)……..……

21. To which youth organization do/did you belong, if any?

☐ PORA! (yellow)
☐ PORA! (black)
☐ ZNAYU
☐ Student Brotherhood
☐ Other (please specify)..……
☐ I do not belong to any youth organization

22. Have you spent three months or more abroad?

☐ Yes (please specify the country (-ies))……..……...
☐ No

23. Is there anything else you would like to add?

APPENDIX A.3. ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH GUIDELINES

Imagine that you are a top official in the Ukrainian government ten years from now. I will describe three different scenarios of the future of Ukrainian democracy – optimistic, pessimistic, and most probable – and I will ask for your feedback. You can either agree to the scenarios and offer your thoughts on them, or describe your own alternative scenarios.

Optimistic Future

It is 2015. Ukraine has a well-established civil society and strong democratic system. The country is a member of the harmonious European community with transparent and prosperous economic practices. Ukraine itself has developed an economic system based on knowledge development and application as well as sustained innovative thinking. People live affordable lives. Health care, education, and other human necessities are free of charge. Pluralistic mass media report unbiased information openly. Most democratic practices and institutions (elections, freedoms, governmental and non-governmental organizations, etc.) are well-developed in Ukraine and protect its citizens' rights. Young people are socially and politically active and the authorities are responsive to their needs. Additionally, young people have their representatives in the government.

Pessimistic Future

It is 2015. Ukraine is divided into several states after a civil war and a war with Russia. Several parts of Ukraine were turned into satellites of its neighboring countries. Its citizens are treated as second-rate people. The broken infrastructure caused economic and political crises with high levels of corruption. The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing and no strong middle class is established. People's human rights are constantly violated, media are not free, and human trafficking and torture are common practices. There are continual threats of terrorist acts and outbreaks of another war. The environmental situation is critical because of explosions on atomic power stations and industrial negligence. Several attempted youth movements were violently suppressed by the authorities. Many youth activists are missing and many more are in prison for opposing the regimes.

Most Probable Future

It is 2015. Ukraine is struggling with establishing a democratic system. The country cannot delineate its international position in Europe. On the one hand, Ukraine was granted an association of limited membership in the European Union. On the other hand, Ukraine joined the currency zone and military alliance with Russia and several other post-Soviet states. Ukraine's economy is still in a "catching up" mode and is infested with corruption. Democratic values are promoted in the relatively free media, but, in reality, there are frequent violations of human rights. Ukraine's reforms are stagnating due to dissonances on the governmental level and lack of visionary strategies of development. Youth activist groups remain divided in their ideologies and activities – some support Ukraine's westernization, others side with pro-Russian forces; some prefer to remain purely civic organizations, others have joined the political system.

APPENDIX B

STUDY FINDINGS

APPENDIX B.1. SELECTED ESSAYS

Activist 7

This revolution had no beginning and it is useless to expect its quick ending. Nobody knows for sure if it was a true Revolution and what this revolution was. Any attempt to describe it, in the best case, will signify a dilettante and nearsighted position of the describer. In such cases, "silence" will be the most objective element of analysis (in terms of social anthropology). What strikes and causes a sudden surprise cannot be described in words. Silence conceals in itself much more information than a deliberately or casually provoked conversation. The shadow of the homo sovieticus hangs over each of us. Silence is a bad habit for us, it is an escape from our own shadow which is capable of talking. Maidan broke the long lasting silence and demonstrated to us that we are able to listen to ourselves without mediators or broadcasters. To put it more simply, it was a revolution of consciousness. Too little time has passed to interpret the events that happened adequately avoiding at the same time conjunctive influences and societal controversies heated up by politicians. Too much time has passed to describe the general emotional context and internal mood of the revolution without rigging and excessive skepticism. It is a perfect time to provoke myself to break my own silence not to lose my personal view of the revolution and my place in it in the plethora of revolutionary rhetoric.

Revolution without Participants. I spent several hours on Maidan (total) – it constituted about 24 hours altogether. I did not lead human crowds and did not cheer revolutionary slogans. I was in the tent city only once and it looked like a tourist trip. I was far away from Kyiv (in a semi-empty orange Lviv), did not watch TV much, listened to some radio, and talked on the phone a lot. I oversaw people bring food, money, and other things to the revolutionary Maidan, we kept a precise account of everything and sent it all to Kyiv. I communicated with many students who wanted to get to Kyiv quickly, distributed them into groups, handed out tickets or money for tickets, gave them phone numbers at which they were supposed to contact our people in Kyiv. Part of the people I had to turn down (I did not have enough tickets for everybody) and I asked them to come the following day. I did not call on people to go to the streets and do things TAK [an orange slogan, *yes* in Ukrainian] and not TOMU SHCHO [a white-and-blue slogan, *because* in Ukrainian] (or v.v.). I did not look for allies and persecute enemies, it was difficult for me to differentiate between the two altogether. My world consisted of not just one (orange or white-and-blue) or even two (black and white) colors…

Everything I was doing was fighting myself, or rather the several monsters that lived inside me and devoured one another: the conservative-rural sovok yesterday (I was born and brought up in a village) <-> the urban post-modern uncertain tomorrow (I study in a city). Thus, the revolution was beginning.

It was my revolution but I was not its participant, just like everyone else. Anyone can say "I am the revolution" and will not be wrong. A pronounced word is more than a reality. It was a revolution without participants. It was a sight with one actor – viewers/listeners. I know many people who invested a part of themselves in the revolution, they categorically do not recognize honors and rewards, medals and certificates or invented labels, such as "distinguished revolutionary," "honored

participant." Such notions devalue what we were fighting for. We got a unique experience (and not just unforgettable memories which need to remain in history), which is a determinant of a successful future. The revolution viewers/listeners cannot be classified by an ideological, political, religious, age, professional, territorial, linguistic, geopolitical, or any other criterion. It was a synergy and if at least one component had fallen out of it (e.g., there were no white-and-blues), the revolution would not have happened.

PORA. Our Revolution. For me, it all began at a university in which asking questions is considered a virtue: Lviv National University Named after Ivan Franko. Everything started in the city, which asked a lot of questions and gave no response options: Lviv. Everything started in the country whose authorities had a hundred answers to any of your questions and none of them was right: Ukraine. Everything started spontaneously, but it was expected.

On March 29, 2004, a bunch of people who were so different that were forced to act together not to be turned into recluses, asked themselves "What is Kuchmism?" It sounded so loud that others were able to hear us. Thus, PORA started as well as one of the most complex stages of our revolution, which reached its final stage in November of 2004.

I was doing it because it was the best thing I could do. I had one big dream and a very amorphous idea how to make it come true. I knew the people who had similar wishes and I communicated with them. At the time, we were not talking about a revolution yet. We simply believed that something needed to be done. Serbia (Otpor), Georgia (Kmara), Gene Sharp, non-violent resistance – we did not have to invent a bicycle. We were pragmatists and realists and, therefore, we believed that a revolution (or something similar) was possible. The most difficult thing was to convince others. To accomplish it, we had to turn into idealists. If that is how revolutionaries are born, I had motivation to become one. However primitive this may sound, my surroundings turned me into who I am. In March of 2004, my faith in success was the biggest and I was mesmerized by the idea of a revolution. In October, I was on the border of disappointment. I had enough experience, a minimum of necessary knowledge, shaped skills and habits of revolutionary struggle, and full readiness for risk. During half a year, PORA staged bold anti-Kuchmist scenes to draw attention from a scared and passive electorate, which was being manipulated again to be tricked later. Most of the fights we won, but I was more and more often haunted by the sense that we were losing the war.

REVOLUTION. By the end of November 2004, it became clear that the technological component of creating the revolution exhausted itself. Since then, our struggle depended on us the least, on the methods and the ideology popularized by us, on American valyanky and money, on drugged oranges, on huge tent cities, on all day and night concerts, and other attributes (both real and imaginary ones) of revolutionary tactics and strategy. We simply continued to work on our cause, hoping that our struggle would become a struggle of the rest of Ukrainians – the Ukrainians who were our spectators and closeted supporters during almost all of 2004. Now I think we managed to persuade them of the inevitability of the revolution: they came to Maidan with expectations of *something*, in search of a sight, in which they became participants themselves. Having come to Maidan in a capacity as viewers of the revolution, the people became its

immediate initiators and participants. Cheering orange-Yushchenko slogans, each of them in the depth of their souls realized that *I am the revolution*.

The rest of my friends and I (PORA) did not make the revolution, we only tried to persuade others that it was possible and demonstrate what it should look like.

As a student, I had nothing to lose. I could only dare to gain something or avoid it. Everything I had was my unlimited personal freedom. Everything I needed was my readiness to be responsible for my personal freedom. I was ready to risk anything for that. The revolution gave me an opportunity to be responsible for my freedom and enjoy it. It was my greatest achievement.

Post-revolution. The revolution is going on. We became different and we continue to change. The revolution is a process which does not have a concluding phase. The Orange Revolution answered the question "What is Kuchmism?" and asked a string of more important questions which most of us have no guts to answer. The revolution is destruction of previous traditions and invention of new ones, it is denial of the existing rules of game (or a game with no rules, to be more exact) and a proposal to play by new rules. We finally realized that the Ukrainian nation is a notion which exists in reality. We stopped believing in myths which were real only yesterday. The greatest achievement of the revolution is that we dared to speak fully out loud about what we disliked. But we have not yet learned to explain distinctly what we want and what we like.

The revolution became possible because of a contribution and role of the youth in mobilization of the Ukrainian society. Current students are a generation which started its education in an independent Ukraine. I know about what these students are thinking and how they are thinking. We live in a world of numerous stereotypes which cuff and limit our freedom. We are forced to break stereotypes of our parents and of parents of our parents. We do not understand their values because they do not understand them themselves. For a majority of them, they are big abstractions that do not assume any responsibility or explanations. By our own words and needs, we give them a new meaning and are ready to fight for these values to become real. The Orange Revolution boosted our confidence in our strength and showed that our next victories are in store for us. The revolution became part of our past of which we are proud. We have no time for disappointment or nostalgia. We are too young, self-confident, and ambitious to live only in the past when the future gives birth to new challenges.

Activist 9

A revolution begins with the revolution of consciousness. That is why I can state with confidence that my revolution began in December 2000. It happened after the premiere of a later scandalously famous play "The Ukrainian Bourgeoisie Nationalist." The play rendered wonderfully the atmosphere of the epoch of the second Kuchma rule – when such notions as patriotism, betrayal, and conformism were mixed into one pile. The main character, Zenoviy Krasivskyy (who, by the way is a historic personage, a famous political prisoner who died suddenly in 1991 and thus avoided the possibility of experiencing Kuchmism in real life), finds himself in the center of intrigues of various forces that want to use him for their promotion – it is his former coworkers, who are now respectable members of parliament, and "new Ukrainians," and representatives of the

authorities. Everybody is trying to persuade him that it is enough to fight, that it is time to settle comfortably in this life even if he had to overlook things against which he has been fighting so adamantly during previous years. But Krasivskyy makes another decision – to fight until unfairness is gone. He, being an old, old man, takes a gun and goes to the forest – the struggle goes on.

The provocative spirit of the play was not limited to the fact that its authors selected a real person as its leading character and transferred him to 2000 and in some other characters one could easily recognize some famous politicians, but the fact that the background of the paper programs of the play was the transcripts of Kuchma's conversations with his employees from the notorious Melnychenko tapes. The premiere happened to coincide with the beginnings of the civic action "Ukraine without Kuchma," which was increasing its spins.

At the time, I tried not to pay too much attention to the political events and was absorbed fully into history research. In September 2000, when the opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze disappeared, I was in the Slovak city of Trnava, where I was studying with excitement some documents about the struggle of the Czechoslovak army with the Bandera units. For 2000-2001, I was planning to release two books on the subject (my first books, by the way), so I was actually living somewhere in 1947, not 2000. So the events related to Gongadze's disappearance did not impress me too much, although before that I was interested in politics and was even a member of a party – the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (it must have been caused by my fascination with history of the Ukrainian liberation movement, the struggle of the OUN and UPA), which I left in 1999.

So the first news about Kuchma being involved in the murder (they were calling it murder confidently at that point) of the opposition journalist, increase of people's dissatisfaction, the beginning of the "Ukraine without Kuchma" action, and the first tents on Khreshchatyk did not impress me too much. But I was impressed by the "UBN" play. It became clear to me that one cannot live only in history, one cannot close their eyes on today's unfairness.

The protest actions quieted down during the New Year's holidays in 2000 (I think that pause undermined the increase of the protest) and reemerged at the end of January 2001. That was when I became a participant of the actions. Initially, it was very interesting to go to Kyiv, participate in multi-thousand demonstrations, and feel being part of the big body, which was about to overthrow the Kuchma regime. We insightfully yelled "Away with Kuchma!" despite the frosty air, and burned the president's portraits lit up the dark winter nights. But it became clear soon that the protest was not developing – the tents were on Khreshchatyk as before, people gathered periodically into big crowds and walked to the Verkhovna Rada, Presidential Administration, there were spectacular trials held against the "criminal regime." It was becoming clear that an expected sharp increase of the societal protest mood was not going to happen. Besides, one could distinctly feel the indifferent attitude of Kyivites toward the protesters, most of whom came to the capital from other regions. The stagnation also lead to the oppositionists starting to fight over who was more in charge. Representatives of the Socialist Party and the UNA-UNSO were fighting over heading the "Ukraine without Kuchma," the Reforms and Order party started taking over the youth protest wing of the civic committee "For

Truth!" It was sad to watch it and it was even sadder to see that there were almost no people who wanted to resist it.

Finally the breaking day of March 9, 2001, came along. Kuchma decided to lay traditionally a wreath of flowers to Shevchenko's monument in Kyiv and the oppositionists – to prevent him from doing it. First confrontations with the militia started but the real fight with it started later near the Presidential Administration, which the demonstrators decided to storm following who knows whose orders. Blood was spilled, there were victims on both sides. But Kuchma was the only one who took advantage of the situation – the very same night all TV channels were showing a horrible picture – maddened opposition members beating up the guards of order. The demonstrators were labeled as terrorists who were trying to break the constitutional order in the country.

While the TV was broadcasting these apocalyptic pictures the regime was acting – tens of front running rallying guys from the UNSO were arrested, a real ambush of Lviv students was conducted at the terminal. The second action was particularly brutal – to be detained all you needed was to be young and speak Ukrainian. Students were beaten up, their faces thrown to the ground, and loaded in buses.

I was not in Kyiv that day, I did not go expecting that it would be another traditional demonstration – tours to administrative buildings, slogans "Away with Kuchma!," and going home. At the same time, among the ones who went, there were many of our friends. As soon as we learned about the collision in Kyiv, we (the ones who did not go this time) went to the headquarters on Kryva Lypa Street in Lviv. There, we tried to figure out the names of everyone who went to Kyiv but it turned out to be not an easy thing to do – everyone's attitude at the moment of the departure was so matter-of-fact that no decent list of the departing people was compiled. Here you would often meet Mykolas, Halyas, and Andriys – no last names. The mess grew as parents started calling demanding information about their children who were in Kyiv.

In this atmosphere, we started a meeting, the goal of which was to plan our actions in response to repression. At the very beginning, an absolutely ridiculous debate started under which brand the protest would be held – Civil Campaign "For Truth" or Student Brotherhood. The thing was, SB at the beginning was the basis for "For Truth," its members were the majority among the detained in Kyiv. This argument demonstrated very well what moods were present in the opposition milieu at the time. Despite the noble tasks, too much time was wasted on such more than secondary questions as under whose flag or brand the action will be held and who would be interviewed by journalists, etc. The meeting lasted a very long period of time, until the action was finally planned.

The following morning, we surrounded the main building of the Lviv National University Named after Ivan Franko leaving a narrow passage, which we called the corridor of shame. Through the corridor, those could pass who despite our protest "strived for knowledge." Using a megaphone, I called on students to join us. Then we came up with our main slogans – "today classes, tomorrow jail," "together we are power." The university action was a great success: we gathered hundreds of students who headed to the second largest educational institution – Lviv Polytechnics. There, Polytechnics students joined us and together the crowd of several thousand went to the Lviv Administration. By the way, it was my first time to lead such a big crowd and for the first time, I enjoyed being in charge of so many people. It was nice to hear my every

slogan to be repeated by the crowd and sounded out a hundred times louder. By the slogans “Freedom for students” we shook up Lviv authorities so much that the governor invited us to hold negotiations. There he declared that he had nothing to do with the repression against students but he was forced to write a petition to be sent to Kyiv to demand that the students be released.

The event turned out to be really loud. Lviv had not remembered such demonstrations since 1989. The same day, some students were released, but not all of them. So the following day, we held another multi-thousand manifestation of students. Finally, all students were freed. It was a victory. It seemed it was supposed to inspire further breakthroughs. But it was not so, that victory was the last one. In general, after March 9, the entire opposition movement subsided dramatically. Even another brutal step on the part of the Kuchma authorities failed to mobilize it again and give it dynamics. I am talking about the dismissal of Prime Minister Yushchenko. With the start of his leadership in the government, things in the country started to get better, the population was paid huge wage debts, a hope for the better emerged. Despite the fact that Yushchenko then was not in opposition to Kuchma, he had great support among people. When information about a possible resignation of the prime minister appeared for the first time, Ukrainians from all parts of the country came to Kyiv to support the prime minister. My friends and I also participated in those trips which very soon started to resemble Ukraine without Kuchma demonstrations – inspirational speeches from politicians, hundreds of party flags, and… nothing else.

That was when we realized that we had to do something. We are a small circle of friends and acquaintances from a civic organization “Young Enlightenment,” later activists of the civic campaign “For Truth.” At the time, we got completely disillusioned in “For Truth,” Ukraine without Kuchma, and decided to do something independently. The step we took was a desperate one but we were hoping that it would become the beginning of the new stage of development of the oppositional movement. We decided to go to Kyiv and repeat the deed of our predecessors – students of 1990: to start a hunger strike. But in contrast from what the students did, we were on strike not against the government but to support it. The idea came about unexpectedly in communication between me, my future wife [name], and our friend [name]. First, we were afraid of the idea ourselves, but then we realized that if we did not go for it, we would betray our own ideals. We decided to convince others to join us. I delivered the main speech, the girls were helping. To our surprise, we were not received like idiots, and the majority of listeners agreed to participate. Thus, ten of us got together. We decided not to represent any organizations and not to go under any other flag except for the national one. We introduced ourselves to journalists as “hungering students,” although we had a graduate student among us and a high school student [name] (we only learned that he was a high school student on the way to Kyiv). On the train, we joked a lot, we tried not to think about what tomorrow would bring. But tomorrow came about very quickly and the jokes were replaced by serious conversations – about when and how we would start, on whose support we could count. Thanks to our acquaintance [name], a Batkivshchyna [*Motherland* in Ukrainian] party employee, journalists were sent notifications about the beginning of the hunger strike. Journalists’ presence was supposed to be the guarantee of our safety in the first moments, so that we were not “raked in” by the militia.

Having paired up, we came up to the Verkhovna Rada. The first thing we saw was militiamen, the next one – cameras. The way back was cut off. Out of our pockets, we got some prepared in advance bands with words “I am on hunger strike” on them and sat on the sidewalk in front of the Verkhovna Rada. Journalists noticed us before the militiamen and approached us first. It all began.

The next four days (that was how long we had to be on hunger strike on the square in front of the Verkhovna Rada) we were the center of attention. Mass media representatives were constantly around us (I had not given so many interviews ever in my life before), militiamen and the SBU explained to us the complexity of the situations and our responsibility, representatives of various political forces wanted to recruit us at any cost – they actually offered us money, later on, when people heard about us, ordinary civilians started approaching us – some with their complaints, others with offers to help. We were pleasantly surprised by young socialists who on the very first day brought us mattresses and blankets without asking anything in return. But we did not get to sleep on them for a long time – the militiamen were exchanged and the new person in charge ordered to get rid of the mattresses. But the first night under the Verkhovna Rada was wonderful – we were lying on the mattresses about 50 meters from the parliament building with only starts above us. When it started to rain (and this was happening between April 22 and 26), we covered ourselves with a large piece of cellophane. Almost no one slept the first night, many interested people were approaching us and conversations never ended. One of our guests, a Mohylyanka student, became one of us by joining the hunger strike. That was when we met [name], the then editor of the famous opposition site Maidan, and a participant of the student hunger strike before then. From him we learned many interesting things about politics and specifics of a hunger strike. By the way, we started feeling hunger as such only on about third day, perhaps the constant new impressions dulled it. Colleagues from “For Truth” visited us as well and the leaders, casually at first, suggested that we held the action under their flags and then warned us that we were splitting up the oppositional movement. Regular “For Truth” members approached us as well and got all excited promising to join us. But a few hours passed and the guys never showed up. Later, hiding their eyes, they explained that they were prohibited to join the hunger strike.

During those days, the parliament tried to pass a motion for dismissal, so people from all of Ukraine arrived to the place holding mass rallies. I had a chance to speak at one of them as the leader of the hungering students. Judging from the looks on their faces, they regretted giving me the chance. I openly stated that, unfortunately, politicians were not trying to save the prime minister, but first and foremost were promoting themselves and their parties, and only organized people were capable of saving the prime minister who would unite despite party differences. The crowd received my speech with ovations, journalists rushed to interview me, and the politicians never invited me to speak the following days. Although they came over to talk to us trying to find out “for whom we were working.”

Trouble happened the last night – one of our girls, [name], got sick and was taken to the hospital by an ambulance. Then we were warned that the following day the government was to be dismissed no matter what and a provocation similar to that on March 9 was being staged during which people would attempt to storm the Verkhovna

Rada. In the morning, tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered at the parliament, hundreds of thousands of signatures to support the government were delivered to the Verkhovna Rada. A session started in the Rada and an endless rally outside of it. Our MPs seemed to have forgotten their real battleground and instead of speaking at the parliamentary rostrum, they would not stop talking into microphones on the street. But it was understandable – there they were closer to the electorate and could impress it more with their inspirational speeches. It came to the point that during the vote for government dismissal, the crowd called on certain politicians to go back to the building to vote against it.

But Yushchenko was dismissed. After that, a bitter quietness started with tens of thousands of people standing as if they had been beaten up. Yushchenko came out and thanked everyone who supported him (he also mentioned the hungering students), and promised to be back. That was how he became an oppositionist. We also promised to be back. That was how we became revolutionaries.

Our friends and acquaintances treated us differently after our return. We had to listen to a lot – admiration by our courage, motherly reproaches, and voices behind our backs claiming that we had got paid. But we were not very impressed by these talks – "dogs must bark and the caravan must go on."

Our words about being back were not just a beautiful conclusion which was meant to distract us from the defeat. We were indeed preparing for the revenge. The situation in the country did not particularly cooperate with us – a total apathy spread, Kuchma, having defeated the hated oppositionists, was celebrating a victory. Attempts of politicians to start another wave of protests did not yield anything. Viktor Yushchenko's block's victory in the elections of 2002 resulted in this force's defeat in the parliament, where a pro-Kuchma majority was formed. The loudly advertised by Yuliya Tymoshenko event "Rise, Ukraine" in September of 2002 lasted… only one day. The "For Truth" civic campaign seized its existence by the end of 2001. But we were slowly looking for people similar to us, people who could take on the case not hoping to gain something for themselves, but simply because it needed to be done. Obviously, it was not the only thing we were doing, we did not become a stuck monks-revolutionaries who devoted their lives to the revolution. We were having fun as before, traveling a lot (the Carpathians, Black and Azov Seas, Khortytsya, Kholodnyy Yar), running educational projects within the "Young Enlightenment" frame. By 2004, I managed to get married and write a dissertation.

We focused seriously on establishing a youth opposition organization in the second half of 2003. We were mobilized not only by the approaching presidential elections, but the events in the country. It looked like for the guarantee of his safety, Kuchma decided to actually sell Ukraine to Russia. Our northern neighbor started behaving more than boldly and Ukrainian leadership responded with nothing but emphasizing the importance of preserving good relations. In Ukraine, they were preparing to mark the 350th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty on the state level and a year of Russia was announced in the country. Furthermore, a treaty about forming the Single economic space was signed, which alleged, not baselessly, attempts at a revival of Russia's empire ambitions. And a totally outrageous display of these ambitions was the attempt of Russian occupation of the Ukrainian Island Kosa Tuzla. The two last problems

urged establishing by our community an initiative, which we called Opir Molodi (Youth's Resistance) – an abbreviated version was supposed to be OM – a unit of resistance in physics.

The beginnings of this organization are rather romantic. We had been thinking about starting a youth protest movement for a while. But the final decision – "That's it. We are starting." – was made on October 4 during a wonderful trip to Hoverla. The weather was nice for the season and after climbing the highest mountain we walked for a few more kilometers through the Chornohirskyy Backbone to the Nesamovyte Lake (the highest lake in Ukraine) in which we even swam (see the date!). The return from the mountains was incredible – it was pouring like a wall through which we tried to go down to Vorokhta. It was there where after all the discussions about perspectives and threats each of us personally made up their mind to take upon the cause. There were eight of us – everyone said "Yes!"

The events that followed developed very quickly. We held the first OM events against Ukraine's accession into the Single economic space (distributing posters with pictures of the great famine of 1933 and a slogan "We were in the SEC already," sending letters from the youth to MPs with a call not to vote for the accession) and against Russia's vying over Tuzla. The second event can already be considered a PORA-like one. Not because it was conducted under the PORA brand, but because its style resembled actions of its campaign. We held a protest at the Russian consulate in Lviv, which we surrounded by border poles with words "Do not cross! Danger!" Under the building, we parked an audio car, which constantly emitted messages in Russian in an official male voice: "Russian soldiers! Give up! Your resistance is worthless. On the Island of Tuzla, you will get hot soup, a warm bed, and a hundred grams" and in a pitiful female voice: "Vanya! Come home! Vanya, drop the weapon! I'm waiting for you!" That circus gathered a rather big number of young people and the OM made it the news for the first time.

Besides the events, we started holding systematic meetings of activists, the circle of which grew noticeably. The meetings were held in vacant university rooms. Since we could not know for sure which room would be available at the time we needed it, we would leave a note on the message board with an understandable for outsiders message "OM 313," which meant that we were in Room 313. We discussed the political situation in the country, argued, evaluated possibilities of changes. Separately, we informed the attendants with the history of the Serbian oppositional movement Otpor and the Belarusian ZUBR. To inform about the events of 2000-2001 in Ukraine, we used the movie "The Face of Protest." Such information was necessary because a majority of our activists were 17-19-year-old guys and girls who had not been particularly interested in politics before then. We had heated discussions, arguments, and generated interesting ideas. Sometimes staff would kick us out of the room having heard the noise and rocket, sometimes they thought we were in class – I would play the part of a professor with students who were listening attentively.

After some time, we managed to conduct a few two-day weekend trainings. Obviously, we reported those to the Center of Youth Activities in the Lviv Administration under some innocent topics.

At the same time, we contacted a group of people in Kyiv (we met them during the “For Truth” civic campaign). Officially, the seminars were to inform their participants about the basics of development of civil society. In reality, we talked more about creating and oppositional youth movement as a ground for possible changes in the country. The guys from the Serbian oppositional Otpor were among the seminar trainers. They were real heroes for us since they defeated the Milosevic regime. Talking to them was really inspirational – “If they were able to do it, we can, too!” Very soon, we became not only participants in the seminars, but also co-organizers. It happened due to one interesting guy named [name]. He was from Lviv originally but resided in Greece at the time, he was a representative of one of the international funds, which financed the seminars. After previous conversations, he decided to talk to us separately. I remember the meeting took place in my office (I worked for the Litopys UPA printing house). [name] at the time looked like a respectable man to whom we tried to explain what we were going to do. Now it seems funny because nowadays we are close friends with [name], but at the time, he was our chance to get support for our activities. Here, I must emphasize that our previous activities were based on our own funds, we simply chipped in to print posters, purchase glue, etc. But we realized that with those resources we would not be able to develop significantly. That was why we had high hopes for the meeting with [name] as the fund representative. As a result of the conversation, “he liked us” and we became co-organizers of the seminars mentioned above. Our partners were guys from Kyiv who introduced themselves as the milieu of the Maidan site. Thus, the basis for creating PORA was established.

During the fall-winter of 2003-04, we traveled with those seminars over almost all of Ukraine. Our audiences were activists of local organizations and people we knew from the events of 2000-01. Not all of participants understood the goal of these meetings, some simply did not treat the opportunity for young people to change something in their country seriously. Serb’s justifications were brushed aside by phrases like, “our people are different.” But in November 2003 another justification came about – the victory of the Rose Revolution in Georgia. We watched their revolution attentively on TV and stingily looked for the information online. The Georgian victory and the decisive participation of the Kmara! youth movement in it were provoking us again. As a result of our trips around Ukraine, we managed to create a network of the youth organization in the entire country.

Parallel to the structural development were some other extremely important for the establishment of the organization things. First and foremost, after lengthy discussions, we determined a set of foundational principles:

1. Non-violent resistance;
2. Leaderless structure;
3. Financial and political independence; and
4. Prohibition to use participation in the campaign for personal career growth.

The source of our principles was primarily the experience we gained in the campaigns of 2000-01. Because it was the use of force on March 9 that became a breaking point, after which the campaign subsided. Besides, struggle for leadership, party control over the movement, and attempts to use it for a personal PR were serious diseases undermining the movement from inside. When designing concrete means of realization of

the principles in practice, we relied on the experiences from Serbs, Belarusians, and Georgians. Generally speaking, from our friends from abroad, we received many useful pieces of advice of technical nature (organizing communication systems, safety precautions, and mass events) but the most important thing was the motivational charge.

The same winter of 2004, at the meetings we adopted such things as the name of the newly-founded organization and its logo. Without major arguments, we only decided that it was going to be a civic campaign, but not an organization as such. That is, participation in it would not entail any particular effort, admission, member IDs, or even a fixed membership. Everyone who shared our views could join us for participating in our events depending on their availability. At the time, such a formation was completely new and it was one of the movements, which attracted young people dissatisfied with the bureaucratization of other organizations. The idea of using printed materials of exclusively black and white colors was supported relatively easily as well. First, it reflected our slogans and symbolized our struggle (day vs. night, good vs. evil), second, as importantly, it was cheap. Black-and-white printouts saved us money and, besides, they stood out among the expensive colored posters of the authorities. That point was the end of consensus on our external attributes. Everything else was adopted during heated discussions. The PORA! brand did not appear like a blessing from above, nobody shouted Eureka! afterwards. It was a result of a compromise: it became clear that further discussions would not yield any results, so we decided to stick to the name as such that satisfied everyone more or less. Now, it is a bit funny to hear musings of various political analysts about how correctly and precisely the brand had been selected. The logo was finalized with just as many problems. First, we were considering the Otpor fist, which also became Kmara's symbol. A certain attraction of the opposition youth movements spoke in its favor, but what spoke against it was the somewhat aggressive nature of the symbol as well as our national uppity – we are not worse than the Serbs, we can come up with something ourselves. As a result of long discussions, we were left with two main versions – a clock showing 11:55 and a rising sun. I personally was a supporter of the former logo (which, by the way, was used by so-called Yellow PORA), but the latter one was selected.

So everything was ready for the start. The day, or rather the night of PORA appearance was the break of March 28-29. Then, in 17 oblast centers posters with the question "What is Kuchmism?" appeared. The very first action provoked repression – militiamen detained 11 activists. The guards of law (unfortunately, they do not guard law itself) did not even know on what grounds they had been detained. That was why the majority got away with a detention for gluing posters in unauthorized places. There were some unique individuals who tried to incriminate the PORAists… the offense of the president's honor and dignity. The first exam in safety, we passed with excellent grades – as a result of massive phone attacks and activists' appeals to the militia, all the detained were released by the morning.

In April, our series of seminars was over and its conclusion was a trip of ten activists to the Otpor training center in Serbia. I was among those who went. In Serbia, we had a very busy time – constant seminars, discussions, and brainstorming ideas. Upon our return to Ukraine, we faced an interesting and rather unpleasant situation. Another PORA appeared with an interesting logo – a clock showing 11:55. Our first impression

was that the authorities carried out a provocation against us and the organization was created to undermine us. At the time, PORA became rather famous, its printouts were all over Ukraine and newspapers were writing about it. As a result of our investigation, we found out that Yellow PORA (the name was adopted from the color of its printed materials) suddenly emerged from the Khvylya Svobody campaign. How and why did [name], who headed Khvylya Svobody decide to rip off our name is unknown to the end still. But at the time, it was decided not to emphasize differences between the two campaigns (by the way, the positioning was different from the very beginning – our campaign primarily targeted actions of direct impact, whereas the "yellow" one had a goal of information-educational activities), but try to work for collaboration. This concept gained wonderful results in the regions where the two campaigns merged into one body painlessly. However, this did not happen at the highest level in Kyiv. The leaders of Yellow PORA, whose campaign had a vertical management structure, unlike our leaderless one, did not wish to merge further. In particular, they were not happy about the leaderless principles, our tradition not to give journalists our last names, only first names, and our political independence, considering the fact that they had representatives of the Our Ukraine block in their political council (their structure was typical of political parties).

Everyone else did not know about these problems (we were afraid that this could be used against us), not even all activists knew, since they could obviously be disappointed by such information. That was why then, in the spring and summer, they did not bother us at all, people worked with inspiration and self-devotion, and the authorities' attempts to scare us were nothing but additional mobilization. The Serbs were right: "Repression grows – Otpor [*resistance* in Serbian] grows." Indeed, the authorities gave us a wonderful PR, tens of articles appeared about the terrorist organization PORA and its plans to carry out an armed coup in the country. People understood: since the authorities lied about those guys and girls so thoroughly, they must be doing something indeed. As a result, our numbers grew, especially since people realized the risk of joining us.

Apart from the actions, the summer was used to train the newly joined activists who did not go through previous seminars. For that purpose, we conducted several regional training camps and in September, we held an all-Ukrainian one in the Carpathians. The final camp was not a training one, it was an opportunity to work through our detailed plans of our activities for the period of August-November. Particularly, we were discussing our preparations for mass resistance actions in case the elections were falsified. We had no doubt that the elections would be falsified, so our primary task was to prepare people for defending their votes. It was not easy to work – it was summer, the forest, mountains, river. But we still managed to outline a detailed calendar plan which included almost everyday events starting in September.

So in the fall, PORA started work at its highest – street events, flash-mobs were held in all cities, building walls were covered with posters and graffiti. A unique feature of these events was their boldly funny, uppity tone. We used laughter as a weapon against the growing fear in the society, which was provoked deliberately by the authorities rolling down to the regime of a Soviet type. And our weapon was omnipotent indeed – sometimes the militiamen sent to our actions could not help but laughing with everyone

else. But of course there have been serious moments and even dramatic ones – when our activists were detained and tried. But every detained activist knew that s/he would not be abandoned, hundreds of friends got together under the militia headquarters demanding his/her release. That was when the slogan, "Разом нас багато, нас не подолати" [We are together, we are many, and we cannot be defeated], sounded out loud for the first time.

At the same time, in October, to be exact, the authorities realized that PORA was becoming a threat to them. They decided to strike a hard blow on the activist network – activists were detained on any grounds ("theft," "possession" of drugs, fake money, weapons), taken to jail, offices were planted with grenades and explosives. Pro-authority media screamed about the PORA terrorists. At the time, by the way, we held an action in response – our activists, mainly guys and girls who were 17-20 years old went to central squares of their cities with tags of the following content: "Olya, 17, I like Mozart and ice cream. Am I a terrorist?" The event impressed passers-by who understood the preposterousness of the authorities' accusations. But that would not stop them. For me, the most dramatic moment was the detention of my friend [name] from Chernihiv. He was planted an explosive and fake money and incriminated creating an armed terrorist group – for 19-year-old guy, they fabricated accusations worth of 18 years of imprisonment. To support him, we held a mass action – almost for the first time in the history of Chernihiv, more than a thousand students took to the street demanding that their colleague be released. But such actions were no longer effective. We realized that we would either win or we would never set our friends free, moreover, we could very quickly become their neighbors in prison. Overall, in eight months of our activities, over 300 people were subject to repression.

Thus we approached the elections. Everyone understood that it was not just a presidential election but an election of the country's future. Correspondingly, the authorities and opposition mobilized all their forces. Expecting riots, the authorities drew to the Central Electoral Committee hundreds of troops, tanks, and water cannons. But the first round did not put an end to the confrontation: its finale was postponed by three weeks – till November 21. Both sides were trying to use the remaining time maximally effectively. Considering the results of the first round, we started sending hundreds of our activists to work in southern and eastern regions where the authorities' irregularities were particularly bold.

The day of the elections finally arrived. For us, it started very interestingly. We had received a piece of information before about employees of one of gas companies who were going to be taken outside of Kyiv to vote somewhere in Poltava Oblast under their bosses' supervision. We decided to prevent it and in the morning of November 21, we went to the point of the buses' departure. First, we unveiled slogans calling to stop lawlessness, started shouting slogans in a megaphone, finally, when the bus engines started, our guys and one girl lay under the wheels. The confrontation lasted for about an hour, eventually, people "loaded" on the buses started leaving for their homes. It was our first victory of the day. We had a whole lot of work in store entailing supervision of the electoral process, preventing irregularities, and, at night, when the counting process started, we guarded electoral sights from bandits. In about second half of the night, pro-authorities media started broadcasting persistently about a convincing victory of

Yanukovych. It was clear that they wanted to make him president as soon as possible not to let people get to grips with the information.

That was why, when walking to Maidan in the morning to the meeting of all supporters of the opposition, we were afraid to see a small group of people. We understood that our people were tired after the tumultuous night and thousands of them would not have enough time to arrive from other regions. But we saw a striking picture – tens of thousands of people were already standing on Maidan and their number was growing constantly. It became clear – the Revolution got started. Freedom cannot be stopped!

Further events remind me of some fairy tale, a real carnival. It seemed, a scent of freedom was reigning in the air, which was taken in greedily by the people gathered on Maidan. Joyous, hot orange colors shining everywhere were creating a true atmosphere of a celebration. The strong-mindedness of people standing up for their freedom turned them into noble knights. This could be sensed in everything – communication, behavior. Everywhere, politeness, desire to help, people were not ashamed to be kind, to be heroes. In such moments you were bursting with pride for being a Ukrainian, being part of this proud people.

The second day of the Revolution was the most interesting and happy in my life. In the morning, students arriving in Kyiv from various cities of Ukraine surrounded Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. After some time, students of this institution together with their rector joined us and a group of several thousand started heading to Maidan, which by the time already become a heart of the Revolution. I had the honor of reading our demands on behalf of the revolutionary youth before the still acting old authorities and announce a deadlineless all-Ukrainian student strike. I was standing on the main Maidan stage and saw hundreds of thousands of people there, sensing their strength, their unity. It was a living embodiment of the slogan “We are together, we are many, and we cannot be defeated.” The revolutionary wave carried me to the top and I could see and feel the entire force of the orange sea.

At the end of my speech, I called on all the present students to accompany us to Shevchenko University. The huge group now included tens of thousands of students. It was cold, people lost their voices quickly from endless shouting, but, to my surprise, I did not lose my voice. Shevchenko University We had to break into Shevchenko University by pressing with our weight against the guards and we had to force the rector of the university to support students demands. But we won and later we gained another victory near the largest university in Ukraine – Kyiv Polytechnics.

The evening was near, we were extremely tired, but nobody went home, everyone went back to Maidan and from there, to the Verkhovna Rada. Something unbelievable was happening there. The broadcast of the session suddenly stopped. Later, someone announced that Yushchenko was sworn in as president. People got maddened from joy, rushing to hug one another, hugging both strangers and closest friends. Afterwards, everyone started returning to the Maidan stage where the new president of Ukraine was expected to speak. That was when Yuliya Tymoshenko called on people to escort the new president to his administration on Bankova Street. In the multi-thousand crowd covering densely the distance from Maidan to Bankova, a corridor was formed quickly, along which Yushchenko and other leaders started walking. On Bankova, the road was blocked

with trucks with sand and hundreds (that many we saw at the time) of militiamen and men from the Bars [*snow leopard* in Ukrainian] specialized unit. The crowd started cheering "Bars, we love you!" Girls started giving them flowers. And a miracle happened – several hundreds of Bars members moved away. It seemed it was a final victory. Tymoshenko appeared on a truck and announced that the Bars switched to the side of the Revolution, Yushchenko was in the administration building and the following day Kuchma would transfer his powers. After these words, the scene of the triumph by the Verkhovna Rada repeated. Not far from us, we saw guys from the Belarusian ZUBR who got a bottle of brandy somewhere and were drinking shots to the victory.

Unfortunately, after a while, it turned out that not everything said was the truth: Yushchenko was not in the administration building, its yard was guarded by thousands of troops and Kuchma obviously was not going to hand over his power the following day.

I wrote so much about the second day of the Revolution because it was one of the most tumultuous days at the stormy times. The following days were also very interesting and incredible but the second day is at the most important one for me.

There were more blockades of universities, the Ministry of Education, transport, a bold several-day blockade of the prosecutor general's office, when we, not to freeze to death, were dancing loudly under its walls 12 hours a day, there were night meetings on Kontraktova Square, when I climbed the Skovoroda monument for everyone to hear the following day's agenda. There was also a downfall when Yushchenko agreed to negotiations with the authorities. The downfall, which caused hysteria among some of the girls and doom hopelessness among the guys. We had to fight all of it, instill faith in our victory, although sometimes I was tempted to howl myself from the fact that no one was instilling that faith in me. But we stood firmly and finally overcame it fully. And even though the victory was celebrated two months later than we had anticipated, it was still dear to us.

Perhaps, I described my participation in the Revolution too little and devoted it less space compared to the preconditions of the Orange Revolution. But that probably happened because the events before November 22 were a difficult road for me whereas the weeks of the Revolution went by like minutes. During March-November, I was constantly overwhelmed with a fear, a fear for the people who got involved in the cause, a fear of what was going to happen to them, a fear of what you would say to their parents. But in the Revolution days, there was no fear – we were all together, we all felt really invincible. We felt that it was really our time [pora].

From the moment the Orange Revolution ended, there have been lively discussions conducted about PORA's role in its organizing and conducting. Sometimes people rush into extremes – either completely equating the Revolution with PORA activities or absolutely denying the impact of our organization on the orange events. PORA has never been the entire Orange Revolution – it played the role of a match that started the fire. But a match and a fire are not the same things although the latter would probably not happen without the former. The Orange Revolution was truly a people one, its basis was self-organization. And no matter how certain politicians try to subscribe to the idea of preparations, conducting, or overseeing the Revolution, it all is only an attempt to sell the real for the desired.

Not the most pleasant events for PORA activists started after the victory of the Revolution. Like mushrooms after rain, self-proclaimed "fathers" of the organization started to appear, even some politicians whose support PORA had never received started claiming their affiliation to the organization. A number of activists who had more time than others (due to their smaller involvement in street activities) to shine on TV started allowing themselves to speak on behalf of the entire campaign. Somewhat subtly, they started calling themselves its "leaders." The attempts of other activists to clarify the true situations break against the indifference of journalists who needed "recognizable faces, familiar names." Eventually the attempt of the "promoted" and "newly-proclaimed" activists to form a political party PORA behind other people's backs exposed the underground conflict. At the time, the information about black PORA appeared – an organization that believed the only possible format of continuing its activities was a civic organization, and yellow PORA, which rushed to create a party. The process of the registration of the party itself turned into dirty undermining of the PORA brand. Falsified last names, inexistent places, empty statements and threats to everyone and everything, a sharp increase of PORA members' age – up to 40-50 years – all this threatens yet again to condemn the youth who will once again feel used and thrown out. For some reason, the dirty peripeteia of a small group of over-aged pseudo PORA members are interesting to journalists more than information about the real work of PORA activists. Their active work after the victory of the Revolution – resignations of bigger or smaller Kuchmists, actions to defend civil rights, serious projects of a civic weight, proposals of improving work of national services, establishing civic control, and many other things – remain beyond the information field. PORA became a phenomenon in the Ukrainian history but its activists are not going to be parasites on its past. For the people who created it, it primarily became an attempt to approach the notion of a "politician" in a new way. Unfortunately, even among the new authorities, there are few people who really can or at least want to work in a new way. The months that passed confirm: couloirs, intrigues, lies, unfortunately, were not left behind in the Kuchmism epoch, but gradually transfer into present days. But I believe one can state with optimism – it is just inertia. The ice has melted and no one will be able to turn the events back. I am convinced that thousands of guys and girls who lived through PORA will get a deserved place in society. They will substitute those from "yesterday" with those who can work in a different way than those from "yesterday," they will enter the culture, civil life, and, after all, politics. But they will come not through lies and falsifications like their predecessors did, but through persistent work and self-improvement – the way they can do it. Because it is their time [pora] – the time [pora] of the young ones.

Activist 14

Question 1. I grew up in a family of intelligentsia, in which human values, education, and unity of the country of Ukraine were nurtured and discussed openly. Therefore, Ukraine's long-awaited independence in 1991 was, perhaps, one of the brightest events not just for the country but also for my family. 13 years passed: much has changed in Ukraine during the period but the fundamentals of the Soviet ideology which rooted deeply in the country and the Ukrainians' heads constantly reminded about

themselves mainly because often the same people “having changed their colors” were in power.

After November 21, 2004 (the second round of elections), my personal forecast was quite pessimistic and, I will admit honestly, if it were not for the activism of my friends, my actions would probably have been nothing more than participation in waves of mass protest of 60,000 people in Ivano-Frankivsk who gathered near the building of the oblast administration to express their discontent with the “rape” of Ukraine. It was my friends who contacted a local center of the Plast organization and registered as volunteers to travel to Kyiv.

Education did not play a significant role in my socio-political activism in November-December of 2004. I do not belong to any youth or student organization; during my studies in the university, I do not recall a single event or episode which would later on cause my participation in the Orange Revolution. In my case, my patriotic family upbringing played a great role. However, the example of the student activists of my institution – Pre-Carpathian University – can also be considered one of the significant factors that affected my behavior.

During my participation in the Orange Revolution, I learned a few things:

- Being a patriot without fearing this notion, not just in your words, but also in actions;
- An ability to find a way out of difficult situations quickly;
- A skill to overcome personal fears and insecurities;
- Trusting strangers and relying on them completely;
- Disregarding hardships on the way to reaching a goal;
- Sleeping on the floor (we slept on a theatre stage) ☺; and
- Most importantly, I learned to believe that there is nothing impossible in life.

I cannot say I am a consciousless citizen, but there was a fear in my soul still: I was afraid that the people’s protest would be suppressed, was fearing for my safety and the safety of millions of Ukrainians on Maidan. Everyone risked their lives, no matter how hackneyed this may sound: every morning, after sleeping in our clothes, we woke up with a troubling thought that the government might use troops to suppress the waves of resistance. We risked losing our jobs, being expelled from our institutions, we risked our health. I am not talking only about the supporters of V. Yushchenko – people of both camps were at risk since the result of the Orange Revolution was impossible to predict.

As a result of my activism, I gained the confidence in the future of the country, which had been in me for a while in a hibernating state. I distinctly realized my place as an instructor and educator in the creation of a democratic Ukraine: 1) being a high class specialist; 2) not taking bribes; and 3) educating students with strong personalities and sense of patriotism (it may sound primitive, but it is a fact).

Question 2. On Friday, November 26, next 150 young people from Ivano-Frankivsk, with me among them, started heading to Kyiv. At the time, no one was paying attention to names in tickets and passports – people were massively hypnotized by the orange euphoria of the prospect of their sweet dream coming true, and V. Yushchenko, in my opinion, was a means of getting their dream to come true, a victim of the

totalitarianism remnants, and an embodiment of traits of a charismatic leader capable of raising the people to do impossible things.

In Kyiv, the group from Ivano-Frankivsk was assigned to a center of the Chysta Ukrayina organization and during the five days of our stay there, we had an extremely intensive agenda of events. Having settled in a theatre not far from Khreshchatyk, we instantly received the first task – blocking the Cabinet of Ministers. What impressed me the most? The hospitality of Kyivites who constantly approached groups of Orange Revolution participants with hot food and beverages. Having asked one lady if she was really doing it for free, I became ashamed after I heard her response: "Are you standing here for money then?" Material values were meaningless, legs and arms were numb with cold – it was hard to stand motionlessly in frost but courage and pride for being a small element of creating history of the country of Ukraine were emerging and strengthening in my heart.

Without the support of Kyivites, excellent organizational skills of leaders of Our Ukraine and youth centers, and a significant moral and financial support from abroad, the successful outcome of the Orange Revolution would probably have been impossible. I remember the hypnotic speeches of politicians on Maidan, strikes near three universities, Presidential Administration, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Education and Science, Verkhovna Rada, etc. Here is a brief excerpt from my letter to friends upon my return home from Kyiv [in English]: "Every day, new and new people come to substitute for their co-citizens and friends, and the atmosphere in Kyiv despite cold and hardships is very energetic and friendly. As a witness to all this I can state for sure: these people will never give up!!! I see cars honking in rhythm with the slogan "Yushchenko! Yushchenko!" It is happening not only downtown but also on any street of the city. And it happens not only to encourage one's supporters but to express one's joy as well. There are people on top of cars waving flags and shouting. Several new songs appeared to express the support to Yushchenko. Kyiv is really exuberant. Peaceful, smiling, kind, united people. For the five days of our stay in Kyiv, every meeting on Maidan began with a prayer. And we sincerely prayed to God to grant us the desired freedom. People will not leave Maidan until and unless Viktor Yushchenko is pronounced President of Ukraine. The fact of the matter is that it is not about Yushchenko. It is about freedom. I have not been happier in my entire life. I have not experienced greater love than the feeling I experience toward every single person I meet on Khreshchatyk. We are like one friendly family, dressed in orange. And without any modesty I can state that everyone who spent at least a day on Maidan is really a hero, and now I can really be proud of my country and my new-born Ukrainian nation." Impressive, right? I would never have thought that being realistic, pragmatic, and to some extent, even cynical, I was capable of such feelings. It happened, no matter how banal it may sound, and not a single person can feel these multi-level vibrations of the soul without living through it.

Question 3. From a sweet dream to a bitter reality? Maybe. I do not belong to the category of people who criticize prematurely. I understand that the government and President need a lot of time to fulfill their pre-election promises. However, what is happening in the government nowadays is far from the "transparency and democracy" for which we stood on Maidan. Criminal cases against representatives of V. Yushchenko closest surrounding, rumors of illegal financing of their pre-election campaign, tensions

among the closest allies – all that troubles me deeply. I will be honest: since I do not consider myself a politically savvy person, I find it difficult to make sense of the mess. I can hardly judge professionally on President's change of the government, but my completely subjective impressions of the previous prime minister Y. Tymoshenko were negative, unlike those of most of Western Ukrainians'. I considered and continue considering her to be an "utterly smart and charismatic layman in politics." Therefore, I think the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government was irreversible and President, having realized (probably timely) his mistakes made the right decision. Some euphoria, perhaps a naïve one, is caused in me by the sales of the Kryvorizhstal plant: I am expecting a sound handling of the billion amounts filling up the country budget. I am happy for the main gains of the post-revolutionary government: freedom of speech, changes in social policies (for the majority of ordinary citizens the increase in pensions, childbirth payments, and raising the minimal wages to the level of the survival minimum are extremely significant), and change of the attitude toward Ukraine and Ukraine's status in the world.

Question 4. From me as a pessimist: politicians cannot be completely honest. To have significant changes, not one generation of Ukrainians has to change to have a completely different mentality.

From me as an optimist: gradually but confidently, the government is demonstrating its competence and ability to accomplish set goals. People gained faith in an opportunity to live in a democratic country, the model of which they are creating themselves.

Activist 16

Kyiv – Cherkasy

The idea to hold the car tour Train of Friendship along south-eastern regions of Ukraine was up in the air since the first days of the revolution, when car drivers embellished their cars with orange ribbons and banners and were racing along city streets and honked at one another and pedestrians to express solidarity and support, and declare that "Freedom cannot be stopped!" in the claxon language.

The basis of the Train of Friendship was a desire to bond with south and east inhabitants, share our thoughts and opinions with them, tell them about their civil rights and about what we had experienced on Maidan in Kyiv since November 21, and, most importantly, get closer, get to know the Ukrainians from all parts of the country better. The main organizers of the tour were the Civic Campaign PORA and the Lviv civic organization Center of Spiritual Revival. The organizers emphasized during the first press conference that Viktor Yushchenko's headquarters had nothing to do with the tour. "We are not going to campaign, but to see, to listen, and to tell the truth about Maidan, to try to break through the information blockade in these regions" – that was the main goal of the campaign.

Overall, about 50 cars and almost 200 people participated in the drive. The route 3,700 kilometers long went through Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Yalta, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Poltava.

For me, everything began in the UNIAN, from which a bus took journalists from the press conference to the meeting point – supermarket Billa on the circle road.

Many cars were already parked at the supermarket with flags of different colors. We were a little late but we needed to make some final preparations.

We went in a column of 50 cars, which was not easy to do. You had to stick to a certain speed, distance, and, most importantly, be disciplined. If someone needed to stop to use a restroom, the entire column had to stop. That was why at the beginning, walkie-talkies were distributed among the drivers, cars in the column were subdivided into tens, and each of the ten was appointed a leader. Besides, the entire column had a leader and the car closing the column had an equally important role.

On the first day, no incidents happened during the drive. The road militia on the rout Kyiv-Cherkasy were very nice: they waved at us, honked, and saw us off with long lasting looks.

Having entered Cherkasy, we followed a multi-kilometer rout and ended up in the downtown. The reaction of passers-by was calm and joyful. We honked at the inhabitants of a tent city near the building of the Cherkasy Oblast Rada.

We parked near a square with a monument to Bohdan Khmelnytskyy, by a coffee-shop "At Bohdan's." The stage was already set up on the square. As soon as we got out of the cars, passers-by walking home from work started asking us when the concert would start and who would perform.

As the tour organizers explained, in every large city there was a stage which we took along and set up to deliver a small performance. We got help from musicians, photo artists, graphic designers, DJs, and artists who participated in the tour.

Unfortunately, a concert in Cherkasy did not happen. There were some technical problems with electricity. The city mayor gave permission to hold the event but the head of the enterprise, which was supposed to supply power, refused to support the event. Of course, we were disappointed. But around the stage, we put up photographs depicting the 17 days of the Orange Revolution on Independence Maidan. People were approaching the stage, standing there, and leaving after a brief conversation. So absence of a single broadcasting center affected negatively our possibility to tell people the truth about Maidan. To at least somehow compensate for the absence of a performance, car drivers formed a small column and ran loudly along central streets of the city. Nothing really happened, although I suspect that if something had happened, it would have been very nice and positive because Cherkasians are very hospitable and peaceful people.

After spending a night in a hotel, we headed to Kirovohrad and the next night – to Odesa. I was hoping the organization would be better there and we would have a better chance to talk to the residents of the city more. But the most important thing was, according to the TV host and journalist Vakhtang Kipiani, to see and hear the people who lived in the regions that really voted this way and not the other, so that people in Kyiv knew that such people did exist and there are many of them, perhaps not 15 million, but it was very important to find out how many there were, to know how many voters voted in our elections as opposed to how much electoral mass did.

Kyiv – Odesa

Everything started on the way from Kirovohrad to Odesa or even earlier than that. The bus driver went on a small strike – he said for some reason that he would not go to

Odesa, that he allegedly had warned about going only to Kirovohrad. After some begging of the driver, the bus started moving but not for a long time – in a field, at a crossroads between Voyevodsk and Novohryhorivka, we got a flat tire. We had to pull over and replace it. After almost an hour of the unavoidable stop we had to catch up with the column, which we did after a while.

In half an hour, we were supposed to be in Odesa. There, we had a stage set up and we were supposed to stage a full performance with participation of musicians and shows of clips from Maidan. Besides, at the entrance to Odesa, a column of cars with Odesans was supposed to join us, who came out to greet us. But at the same time, we were receiving very controversial messages that either 40 or 400 cars with Yanukovych's supporters were waiting for us with the intentions to stop us somehow and next to Kulyk Field where the concert of the Train of Friendship was supposed to take place, there was a rally of the white-and-blue people who did not feel like making friends with us at all. We did not want to trust the bad news and tried to take it as some warnings or intimidations.

But something incredible happened afterwards. We approached the Odesa entrance point and our column entered a sea of cars embellished with orange colors and their passengers stepped out to cheer and smile at us waving their hands. They cheered "Freedom cannot be stopped!" Those present on Maidan know what the spirit of unity and solidarity means – realization of the fact that at the same time, hundreds and thousands of people feel and think the same as you. Odesans thanked us for coming and we thanked them for being there. There it was – the Ukrainian idea. Perhaps, it is the very greatest expression of love for your neighbor. Joy, euphoria, pride are too poor and pale words to describe the boundless wealth of human feelings.

The Odesans joined our column and we all headed to the city. And there, a not very pleasant surprise from other Odesans was waiting for us. Yanukovych's supporters blocked the road and formed a spontaneous rally on the driving lane. We were forced to stop and wait. Someone went to negotiate.

There were about 300 of them. People of various ages with white-and-blue flags. They came in cars parked on both sides of the road. The people were standing on the driveway and letting through only the cars, which, in their opinion, did not carry orange plague to their city.

"Shame on the orange cellulite!," "Lawlessness will not be tolerated!," "Go back to Kyiv – this is our city!," "Yushchenko will not go through!," "Odesans supporting the orange, get out and live permanently in Kyiv," orange plague, American valyanky [Soviet-made boots], nashism, fascism, which will not be allowed – this was an approximate count of our accusations.

Traffic militia were also standing on the road trying to coordinate traffic. They were behaving calmly and indifferently – as if nothing extraordinary was happening.

The people with white-and-blue signs were not determined to negotiate at all, anger and frustration were up in the air. I am not demonizing or exaggerating. I have to add, however, that the orange Odesans were behaving as aggressively. They were as angry that they were not allowed into their own city, that Bodelan, the mayor, did a lot of damage, that Yanukovych's supporters made them feel ashamed and apologize for their city. "We are ashamed of them, trust us, in our city, most people are normal and sane,"

they said. The Odesa drivers were feeling determined, they were ready to break through the blockade of their opponents by force. Thus, we became witnesses and hostages of a civil "cold war" in one city.

As I learned later, Odesa is indeed divided into two hostile camps. Odesans say that in general it is normal. Always apolitical and carefree, they simply used the political struggle in the country to revive constant tension: between Moldovans and Slavs, among regional inhabitants, among criminals, among various interest groups. Such is their Odesa nature.

I took a risk of going to the camp which did not want to see us very much to put up a few yellow sun stickers of our unity action. A man with a white-and-blue flag caught me doing that, "What are you sticking there?! You want to have problems?! Come along, we will make things clear. Either you are going to take off all the stickers or we are going to go make things clear." I found a few of our representatives and hid behind them.

We tried to establish at least some contact with Yanukovych's supporters to explain that we were not going to campaign and it was a tour of friendship throughout Ukraine and that they were welcome to join us as well. But our words were crashed against a wall of total unwillingness to listen. They did not come here to talk to us, they came here to kick us out. And that was the problem. They shouted offensive slogans, some were very aggressive and attempted to provoke a fight. In general, I got the impression that they simply wanted to beat us up accusing us of starting a civil war at the same time. There was a woman who was hysterically shouting all the time, she seemed absolutely crazy. Although there were a few people among them, with whom we managed to talk after ten minutes without mutual offenses, simply showing them our point. But when we started talking about letting us into the city, Yanukovych's supporters instantly switched to "No to orange plague!" The biggest problem was that they were provoked by the orange Odesans who had greeted us. Thus they viewed us as their opponents. When I offered a white-and-blue man to join us, he looked at me with a great surprise, he would have never done it because orange people were in the column.

We managed to invite two young men who got cold to come and warm up on our bus. They were very friendly and we had a very pleasant conversation. One of them, [name], was an adamant supporter of Yanukovych. He wanted to become a Party of Regions member and, therefore, he volunteered in all events to support Yanukovych. The young man had a higher education, was employed. He came to the rally after work. He told us he had filled out an application in the Yanukovych camp and now he received a call and was invited to come to the rally. He brought along his friend, the other young man who came to our bus. His name was [name], he was not even 18 yet, studied in naval forces part-time and "was pro-Yushchenko." He came to the rally out of curiosity. Despite the young age, he was quite knowledgeable of the political situation in Ukraine and his hometown and told us many interesting things. He said that this event for him was a wonderful class in sociology or political science and he was glad he came over. Their friend, also a young man, stayed with the rally, he was a true Yanukovych fan and even brought a sleeping bag with him to stay and block the road for the entire night. This was distinctly different from all the rallies in Yanukovych's support in Kyiv, where people were brought by force and for money and in an hour those people left. These

people here were as decisive as we even though there were three hundred of them and a thousand of us.

We stayed there for about four hours. On the other side of the blockade, Viktor Yushchenko's camp people were waiting for us, the former Odesa mayor Hurvits was also there. He tried to interfere and get the militiamen to remove the blockade. But nothing could be resolved. We were terribly late for our concert even though we received constant calls from there to let us know that Odesans were waiting for us.

The orange Odesans lost their patience. So they simply blocked the road on their side. Not a single car could enter or leave the city any more. There were more and more cars. The militia had no choice and finally decided to intervene and lift off the blockade by Yanukovych' supporters.

The problem was also in the loss of the shape of our column, since, in all the euphoria, the orange Odesans broke us apart in some places. We decided to build a very shapely column together with the Odesans and go through the blockade thanks to the militiamen. Exactly that happened. A Berkut unit arrived. Ten guys in uniforms, with poles/bats but no shields simply divided Yanukovych' supporters in two parts forming a live corridor and we entered through it. The white-and-blue people were disappointed, they were shouting offensive things at us. But for the orange folks, it was a true triumphant march. That was the first victory in a stand-off in their little "cold" war. It was a victory for us as well but we were definitely late and our performance was undermined. It was well after midnight and we went straight to the hotel.

When we passed the border and entered the city as a column, the white-and-blue people got into their cars and followed us. Independent cars that had been waiting in the blockade, followed us as well. Trucks turned on their emergency lights to express solidarity with us. The white-and-blue people tried to avenge and block orange cars. Ironically, our goal "It's time [pora] to unite!" was accomplished: the supporters of both candidates were moving in one column.

This is the beginning of an interesting story about the clash between the orange and white-and-blue in Odesa. The most interesting thing in it is the fact that Yanukovych' supporters in Odesa are also a civil society and the Ukrainian people. Of course they all were different, but they could hardly be called electorate. They are very aware of what they are doing even though the truth for them was different.

Odesa

Since we were unable to hold our meeting at the prescheduled time, we were forced to revise our plans and decided to stay in Odesa one more day to hold our event.

In Odesa, for the first time, I saw cars with blue ribbons and white-and-blue flags. In the streets of Odesa, a true struggle between the orange and the white-and-blue was going on. The Odesans say that their forces are equal – 50-50, but they admit to it only in private candid conversations. In reality, some claim that Odesa is for Yanukovych, and others that it is for Yushchenko. Besides, the color of the Odesans depends on whether they would support current Mayor Bodelan (the authorities) or former Mayor Hurvits (the opposition).

We staged our concert on Kulyk Field which is located across from the terminal. We were traditionally welcomed by the orange people and Yanukovych's supporters who did not want to join our celebration settled down on the other side of the street. Some of

them, mainly the youth, were very nice, were handing out their campaign flyers, which were mainly dark PR against the opposition candidate. One of them was telling people approaching their tent, “Definitely come to vote, vote for whoever you want, but definitely come!” But not all white-and-blue people were that nice – some ripped off ribbons of the orange ones right on the street, shouted very radical slogans, such as, “We will not put up with Yushchenko’s presidency,” “let us get separated.” And also in Odesa I saw white-and-blue schoolchildren for the first time.

The Odesans say that the confrontation divided the city very brutally and supporters of both candidates often display intolerance against each other even though repressions are mainly directed toward the orange ones. In general, a rivalry spirit reigns in Odesa, which is absent in Kyiv. The orange people in Odesa are not simply defending democracy, it is a sport, a gambling game.

A few tens of cars and a couple of bicyclists of the orange people joined us in Odesa. The cars were parked along the road. The people stepped out of the cars, opened doors, took out flags, turned up revolutionary hits, and started having fun. And even when lights went off on the street for some reason, we did not stop our celebration. The Odesans organized a piece of Maidan for us on Kulyk Field.

When our column started moving out of the city, people came out of stores to wave at us. The Odesans saw us off in their cars and said goodbye with loud honking. Our column left the south Ukrainian capital. And suddenly orange cars started passing us – it was the Odesans who were back to see us off one more time shaking hands with us, waving, and smiling at us. Politicians became secondary. Yushchenko, Yanukovych, elections, electoral campaign – all was forgotten. The only meaningful thing was the smiles, music, and atmosphere. We were sole heroes – citizens of our country which we loved equally and for which we were fighting. Glory to Ukraine, glory to Odesa!

Mykolayiv

Since we were behind the schedule and had spent an extra day in Odesa, we had to revise our plan. We were expected in Mykolayiv all day, but we only made it there in the evening. We decided not to stay there for another day because the Crimea was next, so we only delivered a press conference for the regional media.

At the city entrance, we were greeted by our friends – artists from The Orange Square and Mykolayiv businessmen. They gave us food and helped us financially. In Mykolayiv, on our parking site, a less warm reception was awaiting. Some VIP from the oblast ministry of internal affairs came to tell us that no one was waiting for us there and no one wanted to see us: “Get out of here! You are lucky you are late. We could barely restrain people.”

A day before our planned arrival, Viktor Yanukovych came to Mykolayiv. And on the day of our arrival, his supporters, mainly grandmas, took apart the stage which was prepares for us.

In general, the situation with freedom of speech, freedom of expression of one’s civic stance is rather difficult. Only one viewpoint can be expressed. There are three big plants in the city and their employees are threatened by the possibility of selling the plants to the Americans if the “pro-American” candidate wins the elections. The oblast governor, Kruhlov, is one of the separatists.

City residents were complaining about Yushchenko's staff work in the city. The headquarters were dominated mainly by representatives of Narodnyy Rykh [People's Movement], which were mainly engaged in educational activities and not in the electoral campaign. That's why the city gave greater support to the candidate from the authorities than the oblast. Election observers in the second round were brought by local businessmen and not campaign representatives.

Perhaps, the fact that we were unable to support the Mykolayivites directly and show a piece of Maidan to them in their city was the most upsetting thing for me. I felt sorry. But a few Mykolayivites joined our Train of Friendship.

Blockade in Armyansk

We learned about the Armyansk blockade early on when we were in Kherson. As we later found out, they had been waiting for us since 11 a.m. But we made it to this first Crimean town only after 7 p.m. There were about 150 people on the road who formed a live blockade at the city entrance. The blockade was only for our cars, because all the others, including trucks, were able to pass on. There were only five militiamen who were supporting the blockade silently.

The road blockers were Armyansk residents. There were many children and youth among them. They were holding Russian flags with inscriptions "Russian community of the Crimea" and stretched slogans with Yanukovych's symbols. According to them, they came there voluntarily – some saw that people were blocking the road and came to join, others came after they learned that "Yushchenko's people" were coming. However, there was a man among them who was running the group and giving out orders through a megaphone.

From the start, the atmosphere was very tense. Unlike in Odesa, inhabitants of Armyansk surrounded our cars tightly and they were not afraid of walking among our rows and cars. They felt very powerful.

We got out of the cars immediately and tried to establish some contact. The first man who addressed us treated us to some coffee. He had a long conversation with my Estonian friend about his service in the Soviet Army in Estonia. Then he started telling us how during Yushchenko's prime-ministry, electricity and water in the city were turned off. Therefore, you could not vote for him in any case. When we realized that he had not changed our minds, he got a little offended.

I started a conversation with a few young guys. They were interested in why I came, whether I was not afraid, why I needed it, and what my journalism work was about. They were ready to listen and, therefore, I was able to talk. I talked very long, telling them about my political views, about events on Maidan, about electoral falsifications, about censorship on TV, about oligarchs, about Kuchma, about Russia's influence. They agreed that election falsifications were bad but Yanukovych for them was a comparatively better choice than Yushchenko. They supported him despite his previous imprisonment, of which they were well aware, despite the fact that his wife was telling stories about drugged oranges, which they found sincerely funny. However, I doubt it I succeeded to convince them that people came to Maidan because of the call of their hearts. They mentioned their acquaintances who had made two-month salaries for supporting Yushchenko. It looked like the duties of the people who brought Yanukovych's supporters included convincing others that they were actually making

money in the Orange Revolution. But I was grateful to my new acquaintances for their conscious stance and tolerance.

However, not everything was that simple. There were many aggressive, drunk people among the blockade participants, who were provoking a fight. They did not want us to go to the Crimea and they were very insistent in their wish. They started by ripping off orange ribbons from the first cars they surrounded and tying white-and-blue ones on instead. Then they attempted to take down an orange flag from our car, which almost started a fight. The Armyansk women present there were afraid of possible violence outbreaks no less than we were. And when we tried talking to them, saying kind words, the most sensitive ones started crying. They were already cold and tired and also afraid, but, according to them, "they had to stand for theirs."

The tension grew. The blockers tried to push our car toward the back, then attempted to puncture the tires. The front part of the car at the head of the column was damaged the most.

At that moment, local Crimean Tatars came to the place of the blockade, they were Yushchenko's supporters and wanted to help us. But it seemed to aggravate the situation even more. Some Russian speaking Crimeans were saying that they would not support Yushchenko because the Tatars were supporting him. Local divisions layered over national ones. A fight started between the Slavs and Tatars of Armyansk.

The number of militiamen was consistently low at the time when Cossacks from Krasnoperekopsk drew up to help out the Yanukovych supporters. They started throwing eggs at cars.

The help came from involvement of a deputy of a local council and the local prosecutor general. Our car tour coordinator, explained to them that we were simply exercising our constitutional right to move freely and express our views peacefully. The man responsible for organizing the blockade started to look frightened. The prosecutor told him that preventing people from moving freely and blocking the road was violating the Constitution and Ukrainian laws and added that criminal cases were opened in Odesa against the people who had organized the blockade of the road two days before. The man started expressing his justifications by saying that the people came voluntarily and would not want to leave, then our coordinator simply pointed to the megaphone.

He told the people that they had carried out their duty and now had to leave especially because the next blockade in Krasnoperekopsk was waiting for our car chain. The people stepped to the sides and our column moved through. They were waving blue ribbons at us and many were smiling. The blockade lasted for about three hours but ended quite happily for us.

We were on our way to Simferopol. Tatars were following us in their cars. In Krasnoperekopsk, several cars met us and people stepped out to greet us with orange flags. It was after midnight already, but people still came to greet us. The next station of the orange people was closer to Simferopol. It was 1 a.m., but people were still waiting for us. We needed one another's support. We are together, we are many, and we…

Simferopol – Yalta

From Simferopol, we went directly to Yalta. The Crimea is no less beautiful in the winter than in other seasons. Not too many people or cars, just nature. Everyone of our participants who was in the Crimea for the first time, fell in love with the peninsula at

first sight. In Yalta, for the first time, I saw grandmas who were showing obscene signs to the orange people. There was a plethora of such grandmas in Yalta. In general, there were many pensioners in Yalta. And in general, we came across such shallow grandmas.

We arrived at the Yalta pier. Maybe you know the place: against the background of mountains and palm trees, Lenin is pointing with his hand at a McDonald's. This time, it looked even more fantastic: snow-covered mountain tops, palm trees, the sea, the great revolutionary of the last century, the symbol of the American mass culture, people with orange flags who were cheering "Yushchenko!", around them, people with white-and-blue attributes who were trying to cheer "Yanukovych!" over the Yushchenko cheer, and this beautiful composition was locked into a circle of militiamen. The waves were rolling over and hitting the land loudly pouring water on careless passers-by.

There are many white-and-blue people in Yalta, they dominate, so to speak. And young people there wear white-and-blue attributes and, as they sing in one song, "they will rip your jaws for Yanukovych."

After the meeting and the walk of the orange people on the Yalta pier, we got into our cars and went to the hotel in Livadiya. Even the hotel staff were not too happy to see us, despite the fact that all hotels were empty at the time and our large group was a source of income. We had a mini day off and everyone relaxed a little, savored the local beer "Crimea," and got together in one another's rooms celebrating first victories and St. Nicholas night. But the dames from the hotel pronounced us completely stoned, drunk, and high and pointed to our place on Maidan.

But in the Crimea, there were not only those who showed their middle fingers and other obscene gestures, there were many people who greeted us, who came out in their cars to meet us, etc. There were many people who did not express their support publicly but made it clear conspicuously: we are with you, we support you. It must be tough to have an orange soul and hide it from the blue reality. We are also with you, do not be afraid! Speak your mind!

While in Yalta, we were discussing lively the coverage of our tour on TV. The participants were definitely displeased at how the blockade in Armyansk was covered on all national channels. "They showed only the white-and-blue demonstrators, how there were many of them, everything was one-sided, and all channels ripped the coverage off one another" – such was the diagnosis. But everyone was pleased and pleasantly surprised at how our confrontation in Armyansk was covered by the Crimean television – very objectively and adequately to what actually happened.

Donetsk

Before going to Donetsk, there were many discussions about whether we should go there or not. I think that all participants of the Train of Friendship received calls from their acquaintances, friends, and parents with requests to give up the idea of going to the prime minister's hometown. But we wanted to go to Donetsk more than any other city underlining multiple times that the region was most important for our Train of Friendship. We were afraid of this trip the most, but we were also anticipating it the most. We were saying that if we were not going to go to Donetsk, no one else would dare go there.

We left Zaporizhzhya at 8 in the morning in order to get to Donetsk in daylight and so that a possible blockade did not ambush us in the dark. Our minimum plan was to

enter the city, our maximum plan left a lot to dream about. The organizers were telling us good news that allegedly there were negotiations held with representatives of local authorities for us to be able to enter the city. Besides, unlike the previous blockades in Odesa and the Crimea about which we had been warned, there was no information about possible activities against us in Donetsk. On the one hand, it added to our optimism, on the other hand, it was hard to believe that we would be able to enter the city so easily.

About 50-70 kilometers before the city, we were met by four road militia cars and a car with parliamentarians and Yushchenko's staff which were supposed to escort us into the city. Besides, we were told that we were going to be met by cars from Donetsk taxi driver unions and people from the Association of martial arts. We were also informed that representatives of local authorities were even ready to provide a stage in Donetsk for us and that our stay was going to be limited to two hours. The news was hopeful. But before the city, we were met by people who introduced themselves as Yanukovych's campaigners. They said that they understood that we made our choice and they made their choice and it was normal, and offered to take us to the city but insisted that we did not step out of the cars. On the one hand, it was not a bad offer, but on the other hand, we wanted to talk to Donetskites because it was the most important thing. Besides, these people might have simply misled us trying to minimize the effect of our stay in the city. They were saying that at the time, people with aggressive feelings toward us were coming to the streets and they could not guarantee our safety. Also, according to them, the situation was constantly changing, so even after a few minutes after these negotiations, they told us that the tension in the city increased and they recommended taking us out of the city through a side road. One of the journalists who came from Donetsk to meet us was telling us that there was no concentration of people on the streets at least two hours before although some media were reporting that rallies of Yanukovych's supporters were being organized on two squares. The most suspicious thing for me was that those guys were against us giving a press conference for journalists that were already expecting us. "What do you need it for? You want a sensation?! They already know enough about you," – said one of the people who introduced himself as a Yanukovych camp representative. Besides, there were constant conversations about the authorities that were supposed to arrive. We were not sure what authorities they were talking about because representatives of the regional authorities were present there already and so were traffic militiamen.

The organizers gave a press conference, although someone had already spray-painted and threw eggs at their van, and we headed for Donetsk. No one set any obstacles for us but traffic militia cars were no longer escorting us. We reached the side road. The road to the city was blocked with cars parked sideways in one or two rows. It is hard to say now how many cars with white-and-blue flags there were because everything was happening too fast in too great tension, but there were many, more than 50, perhaps, twice as many than our cars. Since the column was not able to enter the city, we turned to the side road without stopping. On both sides of the road, there were cars and people. The people stepped out of their cars, shouted, approached our cars very closely as we were moving along the corridor, they were throwing eggs, stones, and plastic bottles at our cars. Among the people, there were the Yanukovych representatives with whom we had held negotiations. We were driving and the cars with white-and-blue flags were behind us

either trying to pass us or following us, until two of our cars got punctured tires from sharp triangles scattered on the road. The column stopped, the drivers stepped out of the cars guarding them and looking at the road. They were changing the tires quickly, with no car jack, almost on the way. We were constantly followed by the white-and-blue people. The drivers were telling us later that they had tried to surround one of our cars with two or three their cars or create hazardous situations. We did not pass more than a few tens of meters when tires on two more cars were punctured. We had to replace them. We had to move on but the question was how to move when the entire road was covered with sharp objects. There was no traffic or regular militia. Only us and them. It was almost dark. Finally the traffic militia arrived which was supposed to escort us from there on. But as soon as we took off – more punctured tires, including those of the police cars.

When we were waiting, we managed to communicate with the followers in the cars with white-and-blue flags. A couple from Donetsk said that they had arrived there with other 10-20 cars to follow us into the city and knew nothing about the blockade on the road. They were shocked at everything that had been happening no less than we were, and they were worried that the negative image of Donetsk will worsen further: “Not all people in Donetsk are so aggressive.” Another young man was saying that the blockade was only an obstacle to his business and is beneficial only for us to show Donetsk in a negative light and for our PR. Some were even assuming that we threw the sharp objects on the road ourselves.

I believe that among the white-and-blue participants, there were normal people with positive attitudes toward us, who did not want to harm us in any way. But what was happening to us was a small war, a war between representatives of one people. For them, we were enemies who wanted to invade their city with no invitation or the right, they came out to guard the borders of their territory. “Why did you come here?” – this question we heard from the white-and-blue people not only in Donetsk but during the entire tour. For those radicals who were ready to do anything not to let us into the city, Ukraine was indeed divided in half: them and aliens. Those who were not with them, were against them.

I regret, regret deeply, that the stereotype that Donetsk is a closed zone was confirmed. Thinking not like everyone else is harshly prosecuted. I regret that I did not have an opportunity to see and talk to the wonderful people living in Donetsk despite their voting preferences. I am sorry that the people waiting for us in Donetsk – Yushchenko’s or Yanukovych’s supporters – were not able to see or hear us. I am even sorry for the radicals who burned dolls of Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Poroshenko on a Donetsk square on that day, and who were unable to see for themselves the “orange plague” they hated so much.

I regret that there is a city in my country, which I cannot visit being the way I am and where you are not allowed to express your political preferences and your thoughts. I regret that I was not able to dismantle the myths built around the Donbas capital.

I call on all Donetskites [in Russian]: “Stop! Think about what you are doing and who will suffer from it the most. Do you want your city to be associated with criminals, considered to be a dangerous place, a closed zone, a Ukrainian Middle Asia? Remember the Christian values, tolerance, love for your neighbor. Open your ears, your eyes and then your souls will be able to hear and see.”

APPENDIX B.2. ANOVA RESULTS BY DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Demographic variable	Survey item	Groups	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Organization membership	Item 1	Between Groups	8.733	5	1.747	3.803	.004
		Within Groups	32.149	70	.459		
		Total	40.882	75			
	Item 2	Between Groups	15.600	5	3.120	5.255	.000
		Within Groups	41.558	70	.594		
		Total	57.158	75			
	Item 3	Between Groups	10.548	5	2.110	3.253	.011
		Within Groups	45.400	70	.649		
		Total	55.947	75			
	Item 4	Between Groups	13.727	5	2.745	3.918	.003
		Within Groups	49.049	70	.701		
		Total	62.776	75			
	Item 5	Between Groups	22.623	5	4.525	5.302	.000
		Within Groups	59.732	70	.853		
		Total	82.355	75			
	Item 11	Between Groups	11.495	5	2.299	2.939	.018
		Within Groups	54.755	70	.782		
		Total	66.250	75			
	Item 12	Between Groups	22.127	5	4.425	5.960	.000
		Within Groups	51.978	70	.743		
		Total	74.105	75			
Gender	Item 1	Between Groups	6.222	1	6.222	13.286	.000
		Within Groups	34.659	74	.468		
		Total	40.882	75			
	Item 2	Between Groups	14.462	1	14.462	25.065	.000
		Within Groups	42.696	74	.577		
		Total	57.158	75			
	Item 3	Between Groups	6.720	1	6.720	10.102	.002
		Within	49.227	74	.665		

Demographic variable	Survey item	Groups	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
		Groups					
		Total	55.947	75			
	Item 5	Between Groups	7.705	1	7.705	7.638	.007
		Within Groups	74.651	74	1.009		
		Total	82.355	75			
	Item 6	Between Groups	1.407	1	1.407	3.818	.054
		Within Groups	27.264	74	.368		
		Total	28.671	75			
	Item 12	Between Groups	10.659	1	10.659	12.432	.001
		Within Groups	63.446	74	.857		
		Total	74.105	75			
International experience	Item 4	Between Groups	6.704	1	6.704	8.847	.004
		Within Groups	56.072	74	.758		
		Total	62.776	75			
	Item 5	Between Groups	5.152	1	5.152	4.938	.029
		Within Groups	77.204	74	1.043		
		Total	82.355	75			
	Item 6	Between Groups	3.649	1	3.649	10.792	.002
		Within Groups	25.022	74	.338		
		Total	28.671	75			
	Item 7	Between Groups	9.415	1	9.415	12.124	.001
		Within Groups	57.466	74	.777		
		Total	66.882	75			
	Item 12	Between Groups	5.806	1	5.806	6.290	.014
		Within Groups	68.300	74	.923		
		Total	74.105	75			
Urban or rural	Item 7	Between Groups	3.905	1	3.905	4.588	.035
		Within Groups	62.977	74	.851		
		Total	66.882	75			
	Item 11	Between Groups	3.625	1	3.625	4.283	.042
		Within	62.625	74	.846		

Demographic variable	Survey item	Groups	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
		Groups					
		Total	66.250	75			
	Item 12	Between Groups	4.616	1	4.616	4.915	.030
		Within Groups	69.490	74	.939		
		Total	74.105	75			
Influence of education	Item 1	Between Groups	4.587	2	2.294	4.613	.013
		Within Groups	36.295	73	.497		
		Total	40.882	75			
	Item 9	Between Groups	4.473	2	2.236	3.198	.047
		Within Groups	51.054	73	.699		
		Total	55.526	75			
Ethnicity	Item 1	Between Groups	3.997	2	1.998	3.955	.023
		Within Groups	36.885	73	.505		
		Total	40.882	75			
	Item 3	Between Groups	8.407	2	4.204	6.455	.003
		Within Groups	47.540	73	.651		
		Total	55.947	75			
Language	Item 1	Between Groups	5.422	3	1.807	3.670	.016
		Within Groups	35.459	72	.492		
		Total	40.882	75			
	Item 6	Between Groups	4.234	3	1.411	4.158	.009
		Within Groups	24.437	72	.339		
		Total	28.671	75			
Education	Item 3	Between Groups	4.360	2	2.180	3.085	.052
		Within Groups	51.587	73	.707		
		Total	55.947	75			
Place of residence	Item 2	Between Groups	6.427	4	1.607	2.249	.072
		Within Groups	50.731	71	.715		
		Total	57.158	75			

APPENDIX B.3. ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH

INTERVIEW SUMMARIES

Olena

Optimistic Future. Free healthcare is unfeasible in the capitalist development, it is a rudiment of socialism. Good social protection programs for the poor are necessary – it is a great goal, but free services – we have already been through that, those are not effective. Mass media already are printing unbiased materials. But what is worrisome is the fact that media are owned by certain politicians and are often affiliated with them, so one can feel a certain bias to that. But overall, information is delivered well. But it is important to reduce such affiliations to make media less dependent on their owners. But I think these changes will be happening soon. Young people have been and will always be active. There usually is a core active group. The only thing is if the future is nice and bright, they will not be politically active. So their activism increases with worsening in the political situation. But in general the youth comprises the most active group in the world. If you mean that youth will be in the government and the average age of a state employee lowers, I do not understand that. I do not discriminate people by age. With such an attitude, soon children and babies will be government representatives. Government selections should be based on the fact that various social strata are represented. We are talking about religious groups, social groups, employment groups, geographical diversity groups, ethnic groups. Because this is the basis of democracy – representation of as large as possible quantity of groups with such interests. First and foremost, state employees have to be professional. Such specialists would have to have experience. A state employee has to be involved in his/her government business and not politics. And vice versa – a politician has to work in politics and not become a governmental representative. Such an amalgamation in the Yushchenko government, when politicians also work in the government, is not the most suitable one. If among the government officials there are more people under 40 years old, it is a good thing. But is not, it is alright. The main criterion is not age, the main criterion is the level of professionalism in the person's duties. I find it unfortunate that people's appointments to certain positions depend on their political affiliation, on whether the person represents a certain force. Government appointments should be based on professional criteria solely. I personally do not want to be in the government in 10 years. I would like to teach at a university. I would not mind participating in social project design, grant writing, which would unite forces of the government, NGOs – it is my sphere. But work in the government is not.

Pessimistic Future. A civil war is out of the question. Ukraine is a country which survived two world wars on its territory, therefore, it will not go through another civil war. The Orange Revolution is proof to this since it happened without any bloodshed. We are a peace loving nation. But I can describe a pessimistic future. It is 2015. Ukraine's population is 41 million. The percentage of population infected with HIV/AIDS is 3.7 or even 4. Children massively die from AIDS before 10 years of age. Apart from the demographic problem, the country has a socio-political one, since the work force is dying out at a young age. HIV/AIDS infection is uncontrollable and is no longer limited to risk groups. It is, unfortunately, not such a remote forecast, a nearer one. And it will be a very

serious problem. There are many programs to fight this threat and presently, they are trying to help Ukraine. The biggest problem with such programs until recently was the unwillingness and incapability of the Ministry of Healthcare to provide the right treatment. The Ministry, until recently, was purchasing drugs which cost $6,200 per person yearly, while there is a $550 alternative. For some reason, unprofessional or national, or something else, such destructive men in power were not able to think globally and funding of such programs nearly stopped. International organizations and alliances will not be effective with their effort if not supported by the government. AIDS is only one problem. If now we do not start addressing other socio-economic problems, such as healthcare, pension reform, educational institution reform toward enabling educational institutions capable to adjust to change and innovations, we will end up with badly-educated ill, sometimes mentally ill people. Children born with deviations are not diagnosed and treated properly at early stages. Such children are transferred to specialized schools and then to a mental institution – and we are paying for all this. That is how we get a higher percentage of mentally disabled people in Ukraine. There is no reforming of power-ineffective enterprises, but here we have a stimulus – the oil crisis helped. People will be forced to shift from oil and gas to newer technologies. But in general, Ukraine is not a competitively capable country. I do not think that freedom of speech will be a serious problem. We are following a traditional developmental pattern – first we gained our political civic rights and then we will have to gain our socio-economic rights. Such developments were typical of other countries where basic needs and rights determined further democratic development. So this is our chance. Personally, I would not like to get sick in this country in the future.

Most Probable Future. My impression is that you are describing 2007 at most, not 2015. My first question is whether the European Union is going to exist. I doubt it very much that it will exist in the same form as it is nowadays. I do not foresee Ukraine to join a military alliance with Russia. An economic one yes, but not a military one. Why would Russia support the Ukrainian army? NATO should support it, not Russia. Why join someone who has no funds to help you to develop your army? Ukraine's army will be transferred to the contract mode. Corruption will be there, it exists always, in all countries, but its level is another question. I would like to believe that it will subside. Civil rights violations should not be happening on a wide scale, but perhaps, in individual instances. The question is not about civil rights violations, the question is whether there is a mechanism of correcting them. A reform of political parties should take place in Ukraine. Presently, there is the single largest electoral district in Ukraine on the proportional system. Political parties are extremely centralized, corrupt, with no transparent funding, no transparent formation of electoral lists, and the same political lists for the entire country. What we get out of this is the possibility to concentrate all political power in Kyiv, centralization in the country, all decisions are made exclusively in the capital. This results in shadow financing of political parties – corruption again. This gives us an opportunity to turn the electoral campaign into a profitable business for political parties. Because, first, there will be return of funds spent on the electoral campaign, and, second, to get a seat in a political party people will be expected to contribute money. Third, there will be a complete separation between voters and the people they elect. Because in a majority system, you elect an individual realizing that you expect something

from the person. It is difficult to hold accountable the whole party as opposed to an individual. All that is scary and needs to be reformed. Because if this is not reformed, we will get a parliament consisting of a few parties with shadow financing, party representatives will be selected to the parliament using unknown criteria, the parliament will possess an enormous amount of power after the constitutional reform, the prime minister will be appointed who virtually will rule the country – all these scary things. Therefore, reforms should happen. Ten years from now, my children will be youth. I am sincerely hoping that they will be studying in Ukraine and do not go to study abroad. Education needs to be reformed as well. K-12 education is more or less acceptable. It was alien to Ukraine and it will remain alien. It is not very comprehensible but at least subjects are taught normally, the teaching approach is more or less normal, at least in the schools where my child is a student. But I would definitely reform higher education. I would reform the arts, change courses a little, adjust the educator staff. The situation with the sciences although I would use more hands-on methodology. But the arts instruction is obsolete. Very often, there is a lack of literature on which educators could rely. The Ukrainian science if very separated from the western science. If you do not speak several foreign languages, you are doomed. We need to translate the literature, write our own, stop thinking that there is our Ukrainian science and there is some foreign one out there. Political science is political science in Ukraine, Italy, France, or the United States. We need to dump this marginal approach to the arts that we are very special, we will deal with our own, and we do not need someone else's ideas.

Svitlana

Optimistic Future. Developing civil society and a strong democratic system in ten years is practically and theoretically impossible. Ukraine needs at least 50 years to strengthen its democratic system and get true civil society. The majority of the Ukrainian nation is so ideologically spoiled that many years will pass before we have a society which would correspond true democratic criteria. Even nowadays mass media are not prosecuted for printing unbiased materials. I think that the biggest gain in one year after the Orange Revolution is freedom of speech and freedom of expression. I and people around me are not afraid to express their opinion openly. That is the only true gain. Economic system is based on developing and application of knowledge and innovative thinking. The government should not have increased salaries for members of parliament and judges by so many times but for ordinary doctors and teachers instead. And then when doctors take bribes while receiving high salaries, then they can be arrested and punished. Otherwise, the government itself makes them take bribes by not increasing their salaries. Education and healthcare seem to be among the most corrupt areas in the country, in my opinion. Education should be more focused. Presently, students have to take many classes which they will not need in the future. Personally, I would like to continue teaching at one of higher education institutions in Ukraine, I would like it to happen in Kyiv, and I would like to have my own place to live. I would like to be really satisfied with my work – I would like to see my students get international grants and internships, higher education institutions with no unprofessionalism. I see now that some people are not in the field, to which they really belong. For example, people incapable of

learning English come to study it because it is popular or because it is the only place where their parents could send them. And I will also be a candidate of sciences.

Pessimistic Future. I do not agree with this. I think the Ukrainian society reached the level of maturity which would not allow 80% of this scenario. But I do not rule out an economic or political crisis. And I do not rule out a high level of corruption either. Also the gap between the rich and the poor is possible. Everything else is impossible after last year's events and due to our level of development. The Revolution awoke some emotions in our people. In me, it awoke patriotism since I was rather indifferent before. Of course I was patriotic still because otherwise I would have been abroad now. A true patriot of Ukraine should live in his/her country. People give bribes because they see others around them do it and they also do it out of necessity.

Most Probable Future. I agree with absolutely everything. Ukraine's membership in the WTO is most probable, while its membership in the E.U. is possible after 25-30 years. Ukraine's economy would be infiltrated with corruption only partially. Ukraine is unlikely to join the currency zone and military alliance with Russia. A lot depends on the upcoming parliament elections. Mass media will be completely free. Human rights violations will only happen occasionally. I really would not want us to be a laughing stock in the world because of conflicts and physical fights on the government level. There has to be a difference of opinions since the government cannot consist of representatives of only one party but it should be approached in a civilized manner. In ten years, members of parliament will be people who will not be capable of such things due to their upbringing and mentality. As for me, I would be satisfied even with a teaching job in my hometown, not necessarily in Kyiv.

Myroslav

Optimistic Future. This scenario can be called very optimistic indeed. I would like to believe in it but I do not think Ukraine will reach this level of development in ten years. The thing is Ukraine just started on the path of democracy. I believe the Orange Revolution was a starting point because since that moment, not only representatives of some political parties or elites, but all people started their movement toward democracy. And this movement cannot be completed in ten years. And I think such an optimistic scenario can be expected in 20-30 years when the youth generation which was standing on Maidans in 2004 being brought up on these ideals and changed under the influence of the Orange Revolution, will not only be an active member of society but will be able to take responsibility for its development. So it will be 30-50 year-old people who will be members of the political elite. So when such a change of political elites takes place, then such a scenario can be realized. Now, we are going through a transitional period, we can talk about the final retreat of communist elites from power, we can now jokingly say that communists left and komsomol members run the country. The current post-communist ruling elite is a transitional period between the old communist elite and the elite typical for a European country. We are in a similar transitional period to that in Poland or Lithuania at the beginning of the 90s. So I think we need another 20 years. Personally, I am trying to combine several paths. On the one hand, I want to realize myself as a historian and, on the other hand, realize myself as a socio-political figure. And my

constant swings and attempts to combine both are challenging at the moment. I am constantly swung to one or the other side. So there can be two scenarios – I can either be a professor, teach at a university, and have my own school, or a representative of a political entity, which would try to change something in this country. I think that the two scenarios will be connected partially, because I believe that a political program should be based on historical roots typical for the Ukrainians. And even being in politics, I would invest myself into increasing the role of true history in Ukraine's development – an ideology would be based on history. Because I believe that this is the way that can lead Ukraine to the level of this optimistic scenario, since history holds nice examples of such developments. Now, as we are celebrating the first anniversary of the Orange Revolution, we do not pay attention to the most important aspect of it. We pay attention to the external entourage, orange colors, megaphones, tents, etc. and as a result of this, the Revolution is being turned into a cheap operetta, which can be easy to repeat. But we do not pay attention to the fact that the Revolution was a much deeper psychological process, a process or rebirth of people. The most important lesson that the Revolution has taught is the fact that people are capable of standing up for very important values that can unite them. Such values which can be our platform, are activism (people rose up), responsibility (people were not afraid to take responsibility for the future of their country), and solidarity (people united despite their party affiliations, etc.). Unfortunately, the first anniversary showed that most of the authorities did not understand the lessons of the Revolution, therefore, I believe it is important to rely on the true history of the Ukrainian people, because it is our unique asset which we should utilize.

Pessimistic Future. I am convinced that this scenario will not happen simply because of the events of 2004. A failure of the Orange Revolution could have triggered such a scenario. If Yanukovych and the forces that supported him had come to power, they would have adopted a totally different decision making system in Ukraine, which would have been a deeper, more extreme variant of Kuchmism, on the other hand, the population participating in the Revolution would not have put up with it. This tension would have been constant and could have caused the pessimistic scenario. But now, people have become different and they will not allow going back down so much. The events of 2004 became a platform that allows us to move upwards. How high we rise depends on our work, but at least we will not fall below this platform. There should be a notion of the state ideology. The authorities should articulate and people should understand what kind of country we are building. Unfortunately, nowadays, I still have not heard from the authorities about the model of the country's development. They are using general phrases, but these phrases do not make much sense. First thing, it would be useful to develop a model that would satisfy everyone as a result of wide societal discussions. I think such a model exists, if it does not satisfy everyone, it satisfies the majority. Of course there will be marginals – extreme left, extreme right – who will disagree with it. Such an ideology should become a platform for unification of all healthy Ukrainian forces. Thus far, such an ideology does not exist and we are stuck in one place. The primary element of such ideology should be an approach, which is not accepted by everyone yet, that the Ukrainian country is the most optimal way of development of the Ukrainian nation. Unfortunately, there are still political forces out there which doubt this

approach, who question the unity of Ukraine, want to annex it to Russia, divide it, or liquidate it. That was one of the poles. Another pole should be democracy – as the way of rule in the country and internal culture of all civic and political organizations. This should be a priori, accepted without doubt, and forces which oppose it should be considered as such that hamper the country's development. And another ideological pole is strive for progress. Because they often try to turn us back – either to the events of a few decades old – the communist past, or the events of a few years old – the Kuchma past, and then there are forces which are trying to turn us back to the events of the Orange Revolution without offering anything new. So the next important element would be proposing progress, prospect for the future in all fields – economy, culture, etc. A very important component of the ideology would be unification of the east and west of Ukraine. There indeed exists a very serious mentality split, which is historically determined, but nobody takes steps to cope with it. I would design strategic programs to eliminate the split. Because this split can be one of geopolitical bombs used against Ukraine in case Ukraine gets in the way of one of the neighboring countries and the latter is possible. And another important element is establishing civil society in Ukraine. It is being talked about a lot but very little is done for it. The separation between business and politics is debated a lot but it will not happen until there is a civic sector which would separate them. People should be taught how to defend their interests on the lowest level as well as using democracy on the highest level. The authorities should simplify the process of registration of civic organizations, develop an internal Ukrainian and not just international grant system to support these organizations, since most of our civic organizations are funded by external resources – grants, dependent primarily on the goals of the grants. Hence the Ukrainian country can set its own grant priorities and support such organizations.

Most Probable Future. This scenario reminds me of the events of 2005. I am hoping that Ukraine in ten years will move ahead, not necessarily to the optimistic future described above, but, nonetheless, further ahead with establishing civil society and pro-western European ideology and not a pro-Russian one. If we do not do anything, this scenario is likely to happen, but I am hoping that despite the post-revolutionary shock, the Ukrainians will be able to mobilize and based on the Maidan values influence the authorities to improve them. What is described in this scenario is likely to happen if the current authorities rule in ten years and if people are not able to influence the authorities. Because such a scenario is acceptable for both the current authorities and for the old authorities that were in charge before the Revolution, because the scenario allows uncertainty.

Bohdan

Optimistic Future. I do not believe that civil society will be established in ten years. Certain traditions are necessary for it to be established. The Orange Revolution only started creating it. Our mistake was the same as in 1990, when we thought that we accomplished what we wanted and now we are going to rest. And now we do not have sufficient funds to control the authorities. And these days, you cannot do anything without money. People are becoming less interested in politics and do not want to go to

vote. As for economy, I do not see such development, since the current government does not have specific programs, but only slogans. If I were president, I would stop regulating economy and make it completely market-based. It is possible that people will live rich lives, but our people have specific mentality. A great number of Western Ukrainian population work abroad and send money home. I have friends whose parents send them $300-400 monthly and they do not want to study or look for jobs. So in ten years, those people will not be educated and capable of earning money. As for healthcare, it is free nominally now, but in reality, you have to pay money for everything. Healthcare should be insurance-based and only a small segment of it should be state-funded depending on competition. The same concerns education – my education is funded by the state, but we still have to pay money for classroom repairs, for gifts for professors, their books sold at a higher rate than in bookstores, etc. As for NGOs, it is possible that they will be freer. But they have to learn how to fund specific programs with great accountability and feasibility. In the future, youth will not be able to have its representatives in the government because it does not have enough money. Besides, we do not need political immunity, unlike individuals with a criminal past who are paying the high fees to enter the parliament and be unreachable to law. We were told, "you are young guys, with no experience, so you cannot run in the elections yet." But when we were needed for strikes, demonstrations, we were always welcomed. We were used by the political forces and now they will not give us access to power. Personally, in the optimistic future, I would like to write – write the truth and work either for a TV channel or something like that. I would not want to be employed by a channel that tells me what to write. I would like to write what I want and sell it to a channel that will air it.

Pessimistic Future. This scenario seems too pessimistic. In my vision of the pessimistic future, the Party of Regions will recapture power. They are talking about the split of Ukraine into several smaller states, but the only cause of the split will be federalization of Ukraine, for which this party stands. But no one really wants federalization of Ukraine, this is not reasonable. Just like there were sentiments in Western Ukraine a few years ago to split off and form a monarchy. But when Russia started building the dam to annex Ukraine's island, even Donetsk started speaking Ukrainian. Russia is perceived as a neighbor. We like our neighbors and try to be nice to them, but when they try to take over our apartment, we defend ourselves. Ukraine is unitary – from Lviv to Donetsk. The divisions into easterners and westerners, Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, Orthodox believers and Greek Catholics are very primitive. With a sound politics of Ukrainization, Ukraine could be all Ukrainian in 15 years. I believe in Ukraine's unity because when we were all ripped apart 300 years ago and still managed to unite, nothing can destroy our country after that. Our neighbors are too weak to turn us into their satellites. Belarus and Moldova have their own problems. Poland is the only country which is economically stronger and could claim Western Ukraine, but Russia would not allow it to take over Ukraine politically. Russia is dealing with crises itself. The only developed parts in Russia are Moscow and St. Petersburg, but all the periphery is lagging behind. And if Ukraine becomes prosperous economically, it might annex some of the Russian periphery and not v.v. In the 21st century, nobody conquers anyone any more, but economic dominance is possible. I agree with the high level of corruption and political crisis, since politicians are not capable to support the

national idea. Every time, we are promised that these elections are last ones and everything is going to be perfect afterwards. But this is not possible. Currently, there is no ideological unity in Ukraine, unfortunately. Nationalism which united all western nations was so tabooed during the Soviet empire time that it is frowned upon in Ukraine nowadays. Nationalism should be distinguished from patriotism. I do not think that the gap between the rich and the poor will increase because oligarchs will be forced to share with people, because people can simply rise up against the system with uncontrolled capital. I do not think explosions will happen because no matter whether the government is Ukrainian or anti-Ukrainian, they all care about safety. Youth movements are not likely to be suppressed since the authorities will be afraid that they will be punished after their term. And they will also learn from mistakes of the past, which should not be repeated. Activists can disappear because the old system is still prevalent in Ukraine. Even when a powerful figure retires, they can still affect the situation. It is hard to judge about terrorist acts since they are so unpredictable. Currently, Ukraine managed to remain neutral and there have been no terrorist acts. Crimean Tatars could possibly be involved in something, but they actually fight the Russian population on the peninsula and side with the Ukrainian population on the principle my enemy's enemy is my friend. Human trafficking and torture cannot be eradicated in a decade, I think you need at least 50 years for that. The same concerns the army – it is all in people's mentality. If I were the head of the government, I would focus all of my effort on economy because if people live comfortable lives, they are content in other areas. We need to refocus our economy from producing raw materials and goods to technology that manufactures the goods – we need a technological breakthrough (e.g., exporting not just steel, but car parts, not just raw leather, but processed leather products). I would try to support civic organizations. I would create and advisory organ at the parliament and presidential administration and increase punishment for abusing the Constitution. And I would create a commission which would analyze the Constitution and control the consistency among laws. I would offer more support to the retired, students, etc., because if they see that the country takes care of them, they will care for the country. State officials should be controlled not at the salary level, but at the expenditure level – they have to be accountable for all their expenses. That is when corruption becomes visible – if you make $1,000 but spend $15,000. I would also increase support for gifted youth. There are many gifted people in the country who have their inventions. The country is unable to fund those inventions and innovations and if those people are smart, they will go to Western Europe and sell their ideas there. We need to cooperate with donor organizations and initiate the crediting tuition system for gifted youth. Alternative power stations should replace atomic ones. Hydro, wind, and solar energy resources should be implemented. I would increase efficiency of cultivating land, especially since Ukraine is an agrarian nation and 50-60% of population live in rural areas. We need to support villages but not through donations, but with employment of qualified managers and professionals and modern technologies which would improve the market. Foreign investment should be channeled into the agrarian market as well. The tax system should be improved, so that businessmen pay fair taxes.

Most Probable Future. I agree with most of it, but I think that even in 2015 Ukraine will not receive an association membership status in the E.U., since Turkey has

been struggling with it for about 40 years. We have problems with the border with Russia and until we lock it up so that potential terrorists stop entering, the E.U. will not want to deal with us. We have a population of 48 million poor people, transitional economy, political murders, unresolved Gongadze case, now even the orange team is suspected of corruption, so I do not see the reason why the E.U. would want to admit us. I am also unsure about the military and currency unions with Russia. Our primary interest in Russia is economic cooperation. The hryvnya is more stable and reliable these days and Putin's dictatorship in Russia with all the oil company scandals does not make Russia very appealing. We also need a sound system of privatization, not forceful take-overs of enterprises. The Chechen war in Russia is likely to last for another ten years and nobody in Ukraine will want to join a military union with Russia to go and die in Chechnya. Russia is not that much more military advanced to attract Ukraine and our goal is NATO. When we compare Russia to NATO, we see that the latter has more advantageous criteria. We can sign bilateral treaties with Russia and stay members in such alliances as the GUAM, particularly because we have a leadership potential in it. We also have to realize our leadership in the Transdniestria conflict and the Zmiyinyy Island conflict with Romania. We can also become an advocate of the former USSR republics in Europe. Progressive politicians from those countries are now coming to Kyiv, not Moscow. When they come to power in their countries, they will maintain relations with us and in that case, the Western world will take into account the Kyiv representation, not the Moscow one. And that way we will be able to weigh in the world decision making and decide for ourselves which military and other alliances we want to join. We can simply reach the NATO criteria but remain a neutral state, which is stipulated by the Constitution. Now, Russia is positioned as our enemy through the presence of its navy in the Crimea, occupancy of our lighthouses, claiming Crimean Peninsula. But if we were members of NATO, we would not have all these problems. I agree that youth movements will not have a unified ideology. We do not have a single state politics when it comes to interpreting history – ideology is based on history. Yushchenko fights for recognition of the UPA – it is very important for me as a Western Ukrainian. But it means a totally opposite thing to someone from Eastern Ukraine, who was taught by their parents that UPA soldiers had sided with Hitler. There should be state-approved documents which interpret history, including the UPA, Holodomor, and other events. And young people will seek commonalities not in those controversial issues, but something else. There were young people that voted for Yanukovych. But they all became one with the orange side people when there was a water outage in their dormitory. Youth can unite around the issues of increasing of stipends, raising the level of life, giving loans, bringing diplomas up to European standards so that students do not have to retake exams, etc. During communism, they said, let us all work hard so that our grandchildren have a bright future. But I think we should have a happy life now, not in the future. Political parties tend to exploit the youth because the latter are the cheapest labor force and are capable of distributing handouts, campaigning, etc. One of the favorable ways of survival for civic organizations is winning a grant, but those are hard to get.

Taras

Optimistic Future. I do not believe in absolute democracy, absence of prejudice, etc. To be able to talk about the future, we have to be aware of the past. The 70 years of the Soviet past created a powerful Soviet person and the person did not disappear with the new boundaries and boards of state institutions. The Soviet people stayed, but the orange people are emerging as well. I do not even consider myself devoid of the Sovietism because the system left an imprint on me – we were born in it and we witnessed it even though it was just a little bit, but we were also brought up by Soviet people. The more time passes, the greater the breach between the Soviet past and the new Ukraine. And the Orange Revolution events played a breaking part in this. We lack a new system and are living in chaos when even presidential orders are not carried out and private property can be withdrawn forcefully from business owners etc. The old system collapsed and the new system has not been built yet. The Orange Revolution was an important starting/breaking point and before this point, there were a few more important events like the Revolution on Granit and Ukraine without Kuchma. Since Ukraine is tied to its Soviet past, Russia's influence remains great. So the Revolution broke Ukraine off the influence with Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union. The breach in the future will increase now that it is not promoted by Ukrainians as much as it is forced by the Russians. Because we live in the information world, the times of face-to-face convincing and agitation are over. Information creates everything. Information is terrorism, it is weapon in the 21st, 22nd centuries, etc. And even the information created by the Russian mass media about fascists and Americans coming to power in Ukraine, put up a wall between us. So Russia will move away from Ukraine, which is positive for our country. When you look in the future 10-20 years ahead, gas is something that does not last and the world is turning to alternative sources of energy. For instance, they are building a powerful electric reactor in Europe which will be able to supply power to half the continent, so the entire continent will be able to cut down oil and gas purchases from Russia. The increase in gas prices on Russia's behalf is a further breach between our country and Russia with its Soviet-like imperialistic policy. This is also positive because Ukraine's economy that is 70-80% dependent on energy resources will be modernized, upgraded to be less dependent on this. The future then will be without Russia, with stronger borders and greater spread of the Ukrainian language. So in about ten years, we will reach the same level of economic cooperation with Russia as we have it with Poland nowadays. Personal future: a statesman (not just a clerk, but a decision-maker) although not as much interested in it, another possibility – a politician although now this does not look very prospective, unless it is on a regional level. I am not an expert in Ukraine's national politics and therefore, I am not interested in national-level politics, but I am interested in regional politics. Another drawback of the Soviet system is the existence of the center and everyone else looking up to it. The center (Kyiv) is considered to be the only developed, democratic place, although Lviv is another exception in the western region, but all other regions have great economic potential but their business, economic, or political technologies are on the level of the mid-90s. So bridging the center and regions is the main part of work. The paradox, for example, lies in Ukraine's space technologies and advanced satellites or rockets, and the satellite flying above a grandma in a village who is using outdated tools to cultivate land. So the regions seem attractive

with all the work that needs to be done and I envision myself part of this. And I do not rule out business of course, which should be an integral part of my career.

Pessimistic Future. Ukraine's division into several countries is possible taking into account its history. Because Ukraine was divided not once into even more than two countries. But reasons for that were not internal but external. Civil wars can also be triggered by external factors. War with Russia, being satellites of other countries, corruption – are also possible due to an external factor because only external forces are interested in having a weak Ukraine. Neighboring countries will be interested in Ukraine's poor economy to get rid of competition. Ukrainians in the country are not interested in undermining their own economy. Developed communications will control corruption. The increase of the gap between the rich and the poor is also a possibility. Presently, there is no developed middle class in Ukraine, but there is dynamics of development of the middle class. Terrorism in Ukraine is possible only if it spreads around the world. Terrorism is more spread in some Asian countries due to customs, lack of resources, inability to compete with mega-countries, it is an underground phenomenon. And their religion allows that. Ukraine and terrorism are two incompatible things, unless something changes in ten years significantly and terrorism becomes a wide-spread phenomenon. Suppression of youth movements is possible but the Ukrainian authorities have never been radical toward their own people. Again, this is possible under the influence of an external factor and presence of occupants on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine is too big a country to have a completely centralized power system, because it is impossible to appoint absolutely devoted people to a small group of authorities all over the country. There was a scenario during the Orange Revolution, developed by Pavlovsky [a Russian political adviser] most likely, to defame youth organizations as terroristic ones and stage a few terrorist acts in the subway on their behalf. This would have been possible in Russia, but not in Ukraine, because even the Ukrainian authorities would not have allowed it. So I believe the pessimistic scenario is possible only if there is an external factor. In the past, Ukraine was most successful when it was independent. Otherwise, it was in decay, colonization, lack of development, etc. This is possible due to the fact that Ukraine's political and national elite is not established. Intelligentsia is fighting among themselves, but people tend to unite around such things as national dignity, consciousness, and certain patriotic beliefs. Ukraine missed out on the moment of this formation when other European countries were in the process of delimiting their borders and asserting their languages. The language is one of the main agents of nation formation but it was discredited in Ukraine and received only a secondary role. And only now the orange events changed the status of the Ukrainian language from the language of a repressed intelligentsia to the language of the Ukrainian elite and speaking Ukrainian is more prestigious even in Donetsk. To protect ourselves from the negative developments, we have to start with school, educational institutions. We could start with selecting a few progressive educational institutions where the elite is educated and developing patriotism and nationalism are important. People may have various beliefs but when they have common tangential points, it is a serious unifying factor. This would build a significant basis for establishing a unified nation. And radical reforms which are not feasible at first sight, are necessary. For instance, part of the former and current authorities need to be imprisoned. But the ruling authorities cannot do such a thing to their colleagues. There

are two developments of events: a natural one, when everything happens as it is, goes with the flow; and a personal one, a more difficult, less realistic one. If Ukraine were to choose a personal path of development, it would entail punishing the guilty, offering statesmen alternative, higher salaries, realizing mass projects, establishing staff reserve, supporting small and middle business, establishing a strong middle class, and delegating more power to local governments. Moving from one system to another will result in stagnation, a setback, but it will develop a basis for progress. There is the west – Europe and the U.S., there is the east – Russia. We cannot possibly be with Russia. Going west is good, reaching the level of their life is beneficial, but you will still play a role assigned to you by them. The third option would be to be the leader in your own region. We can influence such countries as Belarus and Moldova. When you manage to exercise leadership locally, you manage to compete with countries with greater economic potential than your own. It is important to create alternatives for unions, one of such alternatives is the GUAM.

Most Probable Future. This scenario is a certain description of the current situation. The democratic system is being established nowadays. Does Ukraine need the E.U.? On the arena of international politics and to move away from Russia we do need the E.U. Right now, leftist youth movements of Vitrenko and Symonenko have become more active. This is very typical for the situation – when Russia loses control over a country, it tries to finance or create inside organizations which would defend its interests. Politics is business. Political parties can be approached and offered funding for political lobbying in the parliament. Vitrenko's rating is not high enough to make serious financial investments in them from the Ukrainian business. The only financial source is pro-Russian forces. The Moscow Patriarchate is an unofficial residence of Russia's secret services in Ukraine. This can develop further but the technologies will remain technologies – they will not go beyond flag waving and yelling. They will not be able to affect the situation seriously. They can only be an additional factor and heat up conflict situations. There are also nationalist organizations on the marginal level. But absence of a unified national organization signifies the fact that Ukraine has passed the stage of a national struggle, which started at the beginning of the 90s. They tended to stay away from influential positions of power and the Soviet system remained in its place. The E.U. is living its final times, the U.S. is drowning in terrorism, economic struggles. These entities were created long ago and they had stages of development, stability, and decay. It is hard to say whether those systems are going through stages of stability or decay, but I am sure they are not going through the developmental stage. When there is a gap between stages, a smaller entity can realize its potential by filling the gap and making a leap. Ukraine's potential is in its food industry and fertile soils. The country has a developed industry and agrarian sector. There will be no revival of Ukraine without reviving its rural areas. The latter performed not only economic but also educational functions, preserving the language – the heart of the nation. Without modernizing the agrarian industry, all other industries will be lagging behind, holding back the metal industry, science, etc. It will be like a suitcase without a handle – you do not want to leave it behind but you cannot carry it along either.

Mariya

Optimistic Future. This is a very pretty picture, but I do not think this is possible in ten years. I would give it 30-35 years. To accomplish all this, we need not only political will but managers on the power level. Unfortunately, at the moment, we have people in power who are shaped by Sovietism. We need a complete rotation of our elite, we need new managers and politicians. We cannot follow the American pattern of democracy, what we need is the Swedish socialism. The Orange Revolution triggered some irrevocable changes. Youth will be involved in politics more actively as long as it does not lose faith. We have to support youth's economic interests now to demonstrate that since it succeeded once, the outcome of the success is sustainable. The government should have well-designed state policy and keep youth interested and involved in decision making, and make policy, not politics. We need a strong middle class. The educational system should be modernized and similar to that in Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. We need more managers, good MBA programs. Grants, educational programs, and technical education are essential. In the future, Ukraine will be in the E.U., but Russia will possibly be a member as well. We were not able to follow the path of the Baltic countries or Poland, so now we need to distance ourselves from Russia and prioritize the E.U. and NATO membership, starting with effective information campaigns, since people do not even know what those organizations are. Education and healthcare should be accessible but not free. Brain drain problems should be addressed. Personal future will entail owning a personal media business but only in an improved system with liberal taxes. I am not likely to be in the government, but I would be interested in being involved in promotional campaigns.

Pessimistic Future. Split of Ukraine into several countries is not realistic. The separatist moods emerged during the Revolution and were mainly instigated by external forces. There is no objective ground for a split of Ukraine, these ideas are mostly imported from outside. Ukraine is not a homogenous nation even though the Ukrainians are dominant, but there are no grounds for separatism. It is not uncommon to speculate about this subject, especially before the elections, and the Crimea, for example, is brought up every time. We are rebuilding infrastructure and we need to modernize it. It is important to distribute accumulated capital properly among industrial branches and this will result in revitalization of infrastructure. We cannot constantly make money in the metallurgy field because its potential will be exhausted in about 20 years. Infrastructure is not ruined as much as it is outdated. The levels of corruption are getting lower because it is publicized and discussed in community. This is the first step of eradicating corruption. The number of the poor increases and it is important for the government to select the right direction – not investing in branches with quick enrichment but are less prospective (like metallurgy, coal production), or funding other initiatives and branches that have more potential in the future. Investing in education, healthcare is important, this will result in establishing a stronger middle class. Mass media will still be dependent on political forces, but I hope what we had last year will not happen again. Terrorism and wars are not our problems. Our mentality does not support such notions. Environmental politics is in the gutter but I do not think we will allow another crisis after Chornobyl – we got burned once. I do not envision problems with youth movements, the problems may lie in absence of quality youth movements. When young people see that youth

movements are not effective, they will have no desire to join such movements. Suppression is not likely but youth's apathy is possible. The immunity has now been developed since the country has already had this sickness. I was shocked at the magnitude and powerfulness of last year's events and I think it was the right choice to make.

Most Probable Future. Ukraine's future is in Europe, we should only be trade partners with Russia. Military alliance with Russia is not very probable and I hope that at the end of the contract of the Black Sea navy, Russia's military will leave Ukraine's territory. I have nothing against NATO, but I know that public opinion about it is biased and there is a lack of information. I think Ukraine should remain a neutral country in terms of military alliances and I do not think Russia poses a military threat. We should work to reach the European standards of living and that way we will be able to join the E.U. We will still be catching up in ten years because our government does not have distinct developmental strategies, there is no plan. There is no prioritizing of economic branches or an effective team to determine these priorities. In the future, Ukraine's political system will be a multi-party one and there will be no problems with representation since parties will be better formed. I am against a two-party system, it is more beneficial for Ukraine to have several parties which would form a coalition and coordinate their activities. Parties will be more accountable that way and we will not have problems in the government. Human rights violations are possible in any society and they will be happening in Ukraine, they will not be prevented in ten years since this process requires a lot of work. Youth may be more apolitical, but it is a good thing, because they say that when people do not know who their prime minister is, it is a good thing. The political processes will stabilize, people will voice their preferences through elections, and constant campaigning is impossible. I hope that our elite will be renewed, we do not necessarily need lustration like in Poland, we need elite renewal. Even the Orange Revolution did not bring new people because Yushchenko and Tymoshenko are representatives of the old system.

Lesya

Optimistic Future. Ukraine's likely future in a decade would have to come out of the optimistic and probable scenarios. Corruption is an element of any country's development – it is present in well-developed countries as well. Reforms are an ongoing process, even advanced democracies keep reforming themselves. Social services should not be free. There should be free access for those who cannot afford them (e.g., free healthcare for the poor). Taxes should be lower and then each individual should pay for the services he or she needs. Because free services entail either long waiting lists (queues) or the quality is low. For instance, Denmark offers free healthcare but to be able to see a doctor, one has to get on a long waiting list. I am a supporter of liberalism. We have independent, unbiased mass media even nowadays, we have biased, non-biased media – whatever you like. What we need now in the media business is to build the culture of media, because both dirty and non-dirty news is reported nowadays. Of course, there will always be dirty press. Freedoms, elections, protection of human rights – there is great progress in these areas. Authorities are not always responsive to societal needs in

any country. It is unlikely that the youth would have its representatives in the government since the authorities and youth typically do not get along. There are a few young politicians in the government now, but we will not have such examples as in Estonia where the prime minister is 30. This is due to our traditions of recognizing older people. In the communist past, the government was mainly composed of older people, but we are getting rid of these habits and are forming governments based on professionalism. We do not have lustration in Ukraine, which is needed. The E.U. should be our strategic goal, but the membership concept is very vague, we need to outline better so that we can control internal processes correspondingly. In my personal future, I would like to be involved in decision making on the national level, I am interested in international relations. Because I have eclectic interests, I am not sure about the position yet.

Pessimistic Future. I do not envision any wars, what is possible is a return to authoritarianism. There is a temptation of a strong hand, a pragmatic leader. Democracy offers a set of tools to turn a vertical model of power into a more horizontal one. But social hardships, a crisis, and world tendencies might result in people's appeal toward greater authoritarianism. Politicians should remain wise in such situations and prioritize, along with policy makers and other decision makers, a common national interest. We also need free media, NGOs, societal control over the authorities. Sometimes, charismatic, rational leaders are not understood by society because it is hard to say what or who is standing behind them. Society should be critical of itself. There were charismatic leaders in the past that had negative impact on their countries (e.g., Hitler in Germany). There is a popular belief that democracy will only work if it is implemented by a strong hand. But the idea of democracy is that we all should be involved in building the system and society needs to be educated on such issues. We need debates, explanatory campaigns, more publicity, maximum communications, and feedback. We need to make sure that the top authorities are not disconnected from the rest of society.

Kateryna

Optimistic Future. In ten years, there will be developed civil society with civic organizations and institutions in Ukraine. Ukraine will become a member of NATO and an associated member of the E.U. Healthcare, education, other human services will be free of charge and better quality. Mass media are already unbiased and print whatever they wish. Government officials should bring themselves down to the level of ordinary people, give up privileges, and use the same services as ordinary citizens. Then, they will make decisions that will improve their lives and lives of other citizens. Youth should be included in the government, but it should be professional youth who has experience and education from abroad. They should be paid high salaries and be compensated for their educational expenses. Ukraine should remain friendly with both Russia and the West, but we should implement western democratic values – human rights, media freedom, etc. But we should remain friendly with Russia because almost half of Ukraine communicates in Russian. All minorities should have the same rights and opportunities – discounts, educational opportunities, etc. Ideally, education is free and accessible for all social groups and national minorities and preferably in the languages of national minorities. The educational system needs a reform – a total change of the top authorities, management in

the Ministry of Education where Soviet thinking is preserved. Teacher's profession is not valued, it is not prestigious. It should be prestigious to be a teacher, doctor, librarian, and other intelligentsia representative. Nowadays, it is prestigious to be a lawyer, economist, businessman, manager, etc., but the supply of these positions is above the current demand. There is nothing in the western democracy model that I would not like to be implemented in Ukraine. But consumerism is an element that I would not like to develop in Ukraine. Personal future – in Ukraine if it is an E.U. and NATO member, working for an international organization in a decision making position, perhaps related to business.

Pessimistic Future. Since Ukraine experienced such a phenomenon as the Orange Revolution, it will never go back to the given scenario. My pessimistic scenario would present Ukraine in the same state as it is now – torn between west and east, between the E.U. and Single economic space, no effective social services, split between Ukraine's west and east, which was instigated before the elections by such politicians as Vitrenko, the communists, and presence of such politicians in the parliament. Ukraine's population would be provoked to unbalanced actions. Ukraine would be economically dependent on Russia which would not sell us oil and gas. But this is not very plausible because money turns the world around and Ukraine is a relatively rich country, e.g., the Kryvorizhstal deal boosted the budget. Youth would be passive in the worst case scenario, but judging from last year's events, youth presented itself in the best possible light both in the west and east. Youth may not be as active in the future, but when youth are not as interested in politics, it is a sign of a more stable situation in the country. In developed countries, very few young people vote and are politically active. Political and social crises raise youth's interest in politics. One of the top priorities is provision of social services – education, healthcare, culture, freedom of speech, access to fair justice, and protection of human rights. A gap should be bridged between rural and urban areas, and an administrative reform is necessary. The government did an unsatisfactory job in the information campaign of the administrative reform and it remains very vague. Providing more information and transparency in general, greater access to all kinds of information. The country should have a sound information policy. If it is accession into NATO, mass media should constantly inform public how NATO is defined, how it is not only a military organization, but also a political and economic one which increases people's living standards. This also concerns reforms, membership in the E.U., WTO – neither the authorities nor mass media inform our people about these notions in an appropriate way. Internet access is particularly important. Spread of technology, the internet in the educational system is essential. Mastering foreign languages is important as well. Even presently the internet reached every school. Ukraine will catch up with Europe in a decade. We need to reform the educational system. We need a more democratic and westernized system which would employ educators with experiences of working in western institutions. We also need to introduce exchange and internship programs in cooperation with western schools and universities and conducting conferences and seminars for disseminating advanced methods of teaching and research.

Most Probable Future. This scenario is too pessimistic. I am in favor of an optimistic direction with a Ukraine with a strong democratic system and developed civil society and an associated membership in the E.U. Poland is Ukraine's big lobbyist in the E.U. and that should help our country. We will need an intense information campaign,

reformist laws in the Verkhovna Rada. The military system should be reformed to establish an army on a contract basis. This will make the system attractive for young people who want to join the army to get paid and become professionals. The army should provide high salaries, technical equipment, ammunition, and participation in peaceful trainings abroad. Youth will do the same in a decade, young people are always the same – their values are different from those of older people, they are more liberal, not tied to a place of residence, more mobile, have more freedom in choosing their profession, education, etc. A war with Russia is not plausible, this idea is only instigated by radical politicians in both countries. Economy plays an important role, both Ukraine and the E.U. are tied to Russia economically. We may have some intercultural tensions, but they should not be aggravated. We cannot intervene in Russia's internal affairs but I hope that in ten years the situation with freedom of speech will improve in Russia. Corruption will remain the main problem, it is present in developed countries as well. To reduce it, we need to increase transparency, accountability, have mass media as watch dogs, conduct meetings with MPs of all levels, etc. The government should realize that it is not elected forever, that it will have to be accountable and it gets paid from our taxes.

Vasyl

Optimistic Future. Many of these scenario elements will remain goals. Mass media will be more pluralistic, the implementation of the civic/public television is very beneficial since it promotes pluralism. This scenario is not very plausible. Ukraine will establish itself better on the domestic and international arena and will cooperate with the E.U. on a higher scale. Ukraine's associated membership is possible, but full membership in ten years is premature. E.U. entrance requirements are very rigorous for membership candidates and joining of the new ten countries affected the E.U. negatively, and Europeans are very cautious when it comes to admission of new members and enlargement of the E.U. As for the internal matters and democratic transformations inside Ukraine, elections will be more democratic due to the recent events. The role of governmental and particularly non-governmental organizations will increase in Ukraine's political life. Ukraine's democracy will be unique to the country's system since European democratic values will be hard to implement in Ukraine. It will be hard to instill something different in Ukraine due to its culture and mentality. Ukraine's democracy will mostly coincide with foundations of any democracy, providing freedom of speech, increase of access of society in governing the country. NGOs will guarantee people's access to power. NGOs are less biased and are more likely to evaluate objectively and support democratic processes in Ukraine. People's socio-political activism and political consciousness will increase in ten years due to the recent events, which changed people cardinally and left imprint on their political consciousness. Education and other social services should be not only free but also high quality. To guarantee better quality, the budget should be more socially-directed. Tax regulatory policies should be rerouted. It may cause dissatisfaction with business circles but we need to increase the budget income relying on international loans since Ukraine has good credit in international institutions. Youth will be more active, gain greater access to power since it will have the potential to revive Ukraine and since it will not be affected by the Soviet system. Innovative thinking

is a starting point after the Orange Revolution. People's perceptions are changing not only in politics, but in other areas. People started realizing that human beings are of great value and their rights should be provided and guaranteed, that they are capable of standing up for their rights and when you fight for your rights, you demonstrate your value. Personal future – definitely in Ukraine in the political area with an average but comfortable standard of living.

Pessimistic Future. It is difficult to imagine such a situation and conditions that would cause such a situation. Decay in politics or economy of Ukraine can be predicted. Economic instability is possible but not to such a high extent as described in the scenario. Complete impoverishment of the nation is not possible but crises are feasible. Ukraine cannot integrate in the E.U. without taking into account Russia's interests. It is not a way out for Ukraine to give one up for the other, Ukraine needs to seek compromise between the two and set corresponding priorities. On the one hand, we declared the pro-western vector of development but, on the other hand, we need to maintain a friendly economic partnership with Russia. The worst case scenario would be completely breaking off from Russia and such an initiative would come out of Russia, so we should compromise and not rush where we are not welcomed (I mean the E.U.) but develop a good partnership with Russia because Ukraine and Russia complete each other. We should be careful with making pro-western statements because we are dependent on Russia's oil and gas. But Russia should recognize Ukraine's European aspirations and Ukraine should also seek alternative providers of oil and gas to be less dependent on Russia. But other countries will also want to sell at high prices and barter relationships with Ukraine are no longer appealing because of corruption, shadow mechanisms, and waste of money. We have our own potential – the oil deposits in the Black Sea by Island Zmiyinyy, which caused the tension with Romania, which claims that it is not an island but only a rock that cannot be considered Ukraine's territory. Youth would be disillusioned with broken ideals, similarly to how the ideals of the Revolution are being broken now. And due to political and economic crises in the country, there may be an overall process of disillusionment of the nation. There is a possibility of a mass brain drain, so state policies should change to prevent this. Ukraine should not join Asian blocks since they did not prove to be effective. Pessimistically speaking, Russia will try to take over Ukraine's political and economic systems attempting to implement the Belarus model. It is important to develop short-term tactics of activities, not long-term strategies. E.U. and U.S. experiences show that development of short-term tactics in many areas results in a multiplication effect. If such tactics are implemented simultaneously in many areas and on many levels, they prove to be very effective. If in the worst case scenario, I personally would have to live abroad and look for a better life there. But it is important to make changes in personal lives and not whine to everyone how difficult life is.

Most Probable Future. There is a possibility of antagonism alongside with pluralism in society. There will be forces supporting their positions and there will be their opponents. Internationally, Ukraine should not rush where it is not expected because the E.U. membership entails not only a leap in the economic or political development, but also a leap in the cultural development. For Ukraine, to be able to join the E.U., we need changes of generations so that social consciousness changes and Ukrainians feel they are part of the pan-European processes and can call themselves true Europeans. So an

associated membership is possible but nothing more. We need a Ukrainian brand, promotion of Ukraine internationally, and development of ties with European countries separately. This will attract greater investment in Ukraine, for which we need to provide a favorable investment climate, since investors are scared away by instability, unfavorable laws, and non-transparent regulations (e.g., Austria as one of the greatest investors in Ukraine fears to invest its money because it does not know what will happen to it tomorrow). There is a possibility of a monetary block with Russia, Belarus, and Moldova, but on equal membership conditions, but not the Single economic space model. Economic priorities will include raising living standards of the Ukrainians, attracting investments since Ukraine has great potential. The Soviet educational model is 80% positive and our students are competitive abroad. There should be international programs so that students can gain education and experience in other countries. Our education will be more marketable. We need to develop critical thinking approaches and increasing focus on majors. The educational system will shape the Ukrainian mentality, spiritual development, and sense of ownership. The Ukrainian language, literature, and culture should be integral components of the educational system. We are all part of one Ukrainian society and we need to raise the level of the Ukrainian language. The area of social services will not change drastically. Internetization is a difficult but necessary process that is currently mishandled by misuse of funds, so we need greater transparency and accountability in the field. To provide qualified professionals in all areas, we probably need 50 years, not 10. Teaching should be conducted apolitically, it should not be dependent on a certain political party or view. It will take a while for generations to change since older people are reluctant to give up their status. Positions should not be discriminated by age, but some generational processes should take place before developmental gains become apparent. Periodic economic reforms should be of top priority, so that the system does not stagnate. In politics, we need pluralism in the Verkhovna Rada but one team in the government. The parliament should provide the ideological basis for the country's development and the government should perform executive functions. Youth will remain active even in small towns due to NGO activities and representations around the country. Provincial life will not change significantly in a decade and people there will be less concerned with politics and culture but more with their economic welfare. The army reform and creating a professional contract-based army is likely because Ukraine does not need the army it has now.

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