A Middle-of-the-Road Peace Movement: Ethos and the Practical Pacifists

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to Jenny and Knute Bruenger:

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Abstract

Between the years of 1905 and 1917, the peace movement in the United States was dominated by an ideology known as Practical pacifism. The crux of this movement was a heterodox approach to preventing war that focused upon adopting a persona that appealed to the expanding middle-classes of the nation. This focus upon the character of the movement led the Practical pacifists to concentrate their persuasion upon their *ethos*, which defined both how they represented their movement and the other types of persuasion the movement used. This *ethocentric* discourse, a discourse focused upon persuading through character, allowed the movement unprecedented growth and support within the United States. Central to their creation of this ethos was the Practical pacifists’ ability to link their movement to defining tropes and discourses within the United States at the time: the idea of practical rationality; law, justice, and patriotism; Social Darwinism and the Civilization discourse; and economic stability and growth. Using rhetorical analysis to examine the ways the Practical pacifists linked their discourse to these mechanisms of cultural definition illuminates the ways these peace advocates created identification with their audience and reveals the limits of their *ethocentric* discourse.
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Introduction: *Ethos and the Practical Pacifists*

In 1895 Benjamin Trueblood, President of the American Peace Society, declared that the peace movement needed take steps to “command the attention and respect of the practical people of the world” (quoted in DeBenedetti 66). As the head of the oldest and largest non-sectarian peace organization in the United States, Trueblood hoped to forge a direction for the peace movement that would allow it to move beyond the stagnation it had suffered since the Civil War. At the Second National Peace Congress in 1909, Trueblood had a chance to reflect upon the successes of this new peace movement that he helped to shape. Borrowing a description from the former French President Émile Loubet, Trueblood declared: “International pacification is not a dream, not an ideal from cloud land, but progressive fact observable in every civilized country” (92). Trueblood continued:

No words could more fittingly summarize in a single phrase the present position of the reform which has brought us together. The Peace Movement has passed its theoretical period. It is far along toward the completion of its practical stage.

…The world was asleep when [previous generations] were dreaming their dreams of arbitration, of an international court of arbitral justice, of a congress of nations, of perpetual peace and the true grandeur of nations. It is now awake—a part of it at least—and with swift blows is carving into reality what they saw in the rough stone of humanity. (92)

Trueblood based his assessment upon the fact that many nations, including the United States, were more engaged in international treaties and conferences that worked to avoid the horrors of war, including two conferences at the Hague during which the dominant
powers of the Western world defined unacceptable wartime activities. Just as important to Trueblood was the fact that the number of peace organizations throughout the nation and the world were growing, the number of individuals who attended meetings like the one he was speaking at was increasing, and the type of people attracted to the movement was, in his opinion, rational men and women to whom the nation’s leaders listened. Although he never directly stated so in this speech, for Trueblood these three facts were inseparable, and he reflected this belief throughout his talk by constantly integrating the character of the people who work for peace along with the gains the movement had made throughout his arguments for why peace had become unavoidable. The movement had garnered influence in the United States to the point where top diplomats, cabinet members, and even a couple of Presidents were engaged with the movement. By appealing to the “practical people of the world” Trueblood believed that the peace movement had finally moved from a point where people just talked about the benefits of peace to one where specific goals working towards peace were being achieved.

As reflected in his speech, Trueblood had helped to create a peace movement that influenced people through the power of character. However, unlike other peace movements, theirs was not a character that was exceptional in the United States society; rather, Practical pacifism, as this movement was known, was focused upon uniting the character of pacifism with that of Americanism in general. The Practical pacifists created a character for the movement that appealed to an audience that they believed evinced the most prominent qualities of life in the United States, the middle-classes. By incorporating and highlighting middle-class values within their discourse, the Practical pacifists made their movement one that could be identified with the middle classes, and
therefore all Americans. Consequently they were a movement whose influence was dependent upon their *ethos* associating peace with the emerging role of the United States as a world power.

**Practical Pacifism and the Discourse of Peace**

Practical pacifism is the label that peace historians have applied to the dominating ideology in the United States peace movement in the years between 1905 and 1917, although most historians mark the start of its influence around 1895. During this time, the peace movement shifted from a period of relative stagnation in its growth and public influence into a strong, but short-lived, period of expanded membership and social acceptance (DeBendetti *Peace* 79). The members of the movement did not believe that challenging the militaristic tendencies of the nation prevented the United States from taking a more active and influential role in world affairs. Nor did they believe that the essential aspects of U.S. culture and the prevention of war were mutually exclusive; therefore, they did not require the cultural isolation demanded by earlier peace movements (Curti 197). The result was a peace movement that was more conservative in nature than it was in previous incarnations, one that did not see its goals separate from the political goals of the nation.

A notable aspect of Practical pacifism was the replacement of a singular dominant ideology at its center with a conglomeration of ideals and approaches used to prevent the outbreak of war. This heterodox approach challenged the established ideas about peace, pacifism, and what was necessary to prevent war; it also challenged the idea that the only means for the United States to become a dominant world power was through military might. The broad appeal and dispersed nature of the movement also meant that beyond
this desire to end war, there were few other connections between the members of the movement. Although there were shared themes and tropes in the rhetoric used by the Practical pacifists, when the details of the proposals were addressed, they were not unified and at times actually conflicted each other (Patterson 25-6). Although this incongruity can be viewed as an organizational shortcoming of Practical pacifism, I believe that it reveals that the movement placed greater emphasis upon having a consistent character than having ideological or program consistency. The message of Practical pacifism was that peace was consistent with the desirable character traits of the middle-classes, and it was only natural that the United States should orient itself toward the goal of ending war and encouraging peaceful relations among nations throughout the world.

The focus upon character along with the heterodox approach make the Practical pacifists an interesting social movement to study; however, this choice of the Practical pacifists raises questions about the social influence of their movement. Despite the successes of the Practical pacifists, the major histories of the United States peace movements have played down their role. In The Peace Reform in American History, Charles DeBenedetti opens his chapter on them by noting that the Practical pacifists “raised the peace reform to unparalleled levels of influence” (79); then he spends the rest of the chapter discussing the organizational shortcomings of the movement. In his book-long exploration, The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918, C. Roland Marchand comments that the membership of the movement should not be considered primarily peace advocates because of their diverse political and social allegiances, and he argues that their program for peace was only a “superficial overlay”
to link these disparate groups together (iv-vi). In his histories of non-sectarian pacifism, Peter Brock barely addresses the Practical pacifists other than to label them as naïve in their understanding of the “economic and social causes” of war and for their attempts to work through governmental institutions (*Pacifism* 923); he implies that they should not be considered actual pacifists because of their rejection of the non-resistance ideology (*Freedom* 301). Merle Curti, who concedes that the Practical pacifists probably created the best possible peace movement considering the social and political climate of the United States at the time, calls the Practical pacifists’ approach to peace “hollow” and “one-dimensional” (194-95). Even the most insightful historian of the Practical pacifists, David Patterson, also falls into this pattern. Despite his recognition of the benefits of their approach, Patterson blames the Practical pacifists’ lack of a unified stance on peace for the limited governmental influence they displayed during the period of their greatest social influence (33-4). Ultimately these scholars create the sense that, had Practical pacifism not been the dominant conception of the peace movement during the early-twentieth century, the movement probably would not have garnered more than a footnote in their scholarship.

The primary cause of this antipathy toward the Practical pacifists and their achievements lies in the approach that these historians used to analyze the movement, which can be seen to fall into one of two camps. The first approach, which is taken by DeBenedetti and Patterson, focuses on the organizations created by the movement and the political activities and accomplishments of those organizations. The second approach, used by Brock, Marchand, and Curti, treats the Practical pacifists as part of ideological history of pacifism within the United States, charting the contributions that
peace advocates made toward the continuation of pacifist ideology, usually defined as non-resistance, and their abilities to extend its precepts to other movements. Both of these approaches are biased against the work done by the Practical pacifists because in their focus on the weaknesses of the movement, these scholars fail to see the movement’s strengths.

As mentioned above, the Practical pacifists lacked centralized organizations that could function as the quintessence of their political achievements. Even though some of their institutions are still in existence today, most notably Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the World Peace Foundation, most of the peace societies and organizations originated by the Practical pacifists are no longer in existence (Patterson 34). Similarly, their major policy goal, the creation of an international body that arbitrates disputes between nations and provides peace keepers in conflict zones, was achieved in the form of the League of Nations after World War I, and later the United Nations; nevertheless, the Practical pacifists lacked a specific plan to establish such a body. So along with the lapse of time between the heyday of Practical pacifism and the establishment of the U.N., it is difficult to argue that the Practical pacifists held direct political influence that resulted in the successful establishment of their policy. When looking at the Practical pacifists’ legacy through the lens of institutional successes, it appears limited, despite some notable exceptions.

Those scholars, like Brock and Marchand, who examine the Practical pacifists as part of pacifism’s ideological historiography, an approach that could be a promising way to examine the Practical pacifism, tend to be more dismissive of the Practical peace advocates because these histories privilege the ideology of non-resistance. Even though
they acknowledge the impressive organizational skills demonstrated by the Practical pacifists, these scholars challenge the significance of the Practical pacifists because they abandoned traditional pacifist ideology, leading the Practical pacifists to be confined as an interesting side note in peace history. Indeed, some scholars question whether or not pacifist was an appropriate label for these peace advocates (See Brock Freedom, Marchand). Because the scholars privilege non-resistance, the Practical pacifists’ insignificance is an a priori conclusion, and their influence on pacifistic ideology can be easily ignored.

Instead of either of these approaches, I believe that a rhetorical approach can reveal a significant influence that the Practical pacifists had on the public understanding of the peace debate in the United States. By taking a rhetorical approach, I contend that the Practical pacifists are best understood by viewing them as a discourse community that tried to change the larger society’s understanding of the concepts of peace, pacifism, war, and militarism. This approach is informed by the work of rhetorical theorist Kevin DeLuca who argues that taking a rhetorical approach to social movements is to examine the changes they affect in the public understanding of their issue. Building off the work of Michael Calvin McGee, who argues that the essence of social movements was not their organizational structures but rather the sets of meanings the movement creates, DeLuca extends this argument stating that to understand the effects of social movements is to examine how they create “changes in the meanings of the world, redefinitions of reality, which such realities always being constructed through the filter of rhetoric” (36). According to DeLuca, social movements create these changes by locating points in the dominant discourse where they can either connect new ideas and meanings to the
discourse (38) or find ways to expose the discourse’s limitations and contradictions which fail to provide satisfactory meaning for events (42).

This description of how social movements act discursively matches the rhetorical activities of the Practical pacifists well. Their attempt to change the public discourse was to point out how the dominant discourse on war and peace failed to address the events of the modern world. As an alternative, they created a discourse about peace that linked to other dominant discourses about the nature of the United States as a world power. By creating common ground between influential discourses in the United States, the Practical pacifists made connections between the two discourses and challenged the meaning of peace for both the peace movement and the general public. The Practical pacifists created new ways to understand the issues surrounding peace both within the discourse of the movement and within the larger societal discourse, which functioned as a common ground that later peace advocates built upon.

Using this rhetorical approach to analyze the Practical pacifists avoids the aforementioned difficulties of focusing upon either their organizational structure or their continuation of non-resistant ideology. Because I focus on the Practical pacifists’ ability to change the discourse, their influence does not have to be limited to their immediate political success. Likewise, since I am interested in the new ways they provided the public to understand their movement and what they hoped to achieve, the Practical pacifists’ abandonment of non-resistance does not limit their influence, as non-resistance does not mark the only way the idea of pacifism can be expressed.

Another benefit of approaching the Practical pacifists rhetorically is that examining their discourse provides a unifying aspect to the movement that most
historians tend to find lacking. This disunity raises questions for the historians about which prominent peace advocates of the period should be considered Practical pacifists and which should fall into some other category. DeBendetti, who focuses upon the activities of peace organizations, must address individuals who were influential in the peace movement but who did not belong to formal peace organizations. Brock, whose work centers on an ideological history of radical non-resistance, decries the Practical pacifists in general, but then apologizes for individuals like Jane Addams and William Jennings Bryan—who were not non-resisters and participated in Practical pacifist enterprises—because they both claimed to be influenced by Tolstoy’s ideas of peace and their political leanings were more radical than those of other members of the movement.

Treating Practical pacifism in a primarily rhetorical way allows me to use the participation in a common discourse works as the unifying characteristic of the movement. With that in mind, I label as Practical pacifists any individual who engaged in the public discourse about war and peace using a specific set of themes, techniques, and tropes to make the representation of pacifists more mainstream and American, regardless of his or her organizational membership or intellectual heritage.

By taking a rhetorical approach to the work of the Practical pacifists, it becomes possible to view them as a movement that worked to change the public’s understanding of what it meant to be a pacifist. The central concept of this new form of pacifism was to make the issue of peace a matter of having the type of character—for both the individual and the movement itself—that would closely align with middle-class values in the United States. They achieved this by creating a sense of identification with the middle-classes associations between the peace movement and dominant cultural tropes and values of the
United States in the early-twentieth century. In doing so, the Practical pacifists produced arguments for peace that were less about the importance of peace than how pacifism better aligned with American values than militarism and how individuals who share their values should embrace the peace agenda. Ultimately, the success of the Practical pacifists’ discourse was their ability to create ethos for the movement that appealed to a key demographic in the United States: the middle classes.

*Ethos, the Art of Character Identification*

To understand how the Practical pacifists created their discourse, it is necessary to understand how I am using the term ethos. Despite being one of the three pisteis (artful means of persuasion) outlined by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1378a), ethos does not have the same in-depth understanding as its sister concepts, logos and pathos owing to a dearth of scholarly explorations into the concept. This in part is the result of the logocentric tradition in the study of rhetoric, which places argumentation, and therefore the idea of logos, as the forefront of rhetorical scholarship. According to this tradition, the focus of rhetoric is to produce the best argument possible, making logical appeals the heart of persuasion. This makes emotional and character based appeals secondary types of influence on the audience, which reinforces the logic of the argument in the best case scenario or distracts the audience from a weak argument in the worst (Lunsford and Ede 42). In this tradition, ethos does not elicit the attention that logos does as it is not central to argumentation, and because it can subvert from argumentation, it is to be treated with suspicion. Despite scholarly work that has challenged the logocentric approach and claimed the necessity of all three pisteis, this reclamation of the non-logical aspects of
rhetoric tends to focus upon pathos, although there have been notable exceptions of studies that have taken ethos as their focus.¹

This neglect of ethos might also have to do with the less definite nature of this type of persuasion. As Eugene Garver points out, “there are no special methods for ethos, as there are for pathos and logos” (195). Whereas the other two types of persuasion have clear techniques that can be located easily in the rhetorical act, the application of ethos tends to be less tangible, unless it is performed through rather direct means, which tend to be unsuccessful (195). The indistinct nature of ethos leads to the problem of its ontological aspects in the rhetorical act. Traditional interpretations of Aristotelian rhetoric view the three means of persuasion as autonomous from each other (Lunsford and Ede 42), ethos being direct appeals from the rhetor’s character. One location of these appeals has been the rhetor’s reputation: qualities of her or his character that are already known to the audience (Yoos 55). This sense of reputation would not have to be based entirely on the rhetor’s personality. It would also include contextual information such as the communication channel used for the rhetorical act, e.g., if someone writes an opinion piece in the National Review, it would be reasonable for the audience to assume his or her political leanings to be conservative even before they get to the argument. In this conception of ethos, the persuasion from character can only take place at the very beginning of the rhetorical act, and the rhetor must use logos and pathos either to support or to overcome this first pisteis (56-7).

¹ See Michael Hyde’s The Ethos of Rhetoric and James Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin’s Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory.
The difficulty of this conception comes into play when there appears to be no discernable reputation that the audience can rely upon. In these cases, ethos’s domain has been considered the ability for the rhetor to present herself or himself as someone the audience should believe. This approach eventually has collapsed into references to the rhetor’s own character and stylistic techniques that are used to show the audience that the speaker or writer knows how to use language like someone that the audience would trust (N. Johnson 106-11). The problem with the first of these approaches to ethos is that the artful nature is limited, A speaker only has limited control over his or her reputation, and, as mentioned above, direct reference to one’s own character seems more contrived than persuasive. As for equating ethos and style, this approach, although incorporating the art back into the representation of character, is still limited, as people express their character in a multitude of ways. When reducing ethos to style, we overlook other choices made during the rhetorical act that make the rhetor’s character persuasive, including the audience’s values and expectations (Halloran 63). Viewed as an autonomous part of the rhetorical act, ethos appears to be at best a weak type of appeal, and at worst, a type of persuasion that the rhetor has no control over.

As an alternative to the independent nature of the three pisteis, rhetorical theorists have proposed a model of logos, pathos, and ethos working interdependently to successfully persuade the audience members (Lunsford and Ede 42). In an interdependent approach, ethos works along with and through the other means of persuasion to work, as Craig Smith describes it, pervasively through the rhetorical act (13): “In short, ethos is not some category to be filled at some set point in a speech; it permeates the speech as it is mingled with other proofs” (14). Garver supports this view,
arguing that a rhetor’s character is represented through the choices he or she makes during the rhetorical act: “Why choose this decision and argument and not another? Why this example? Why these probabilities and signs and why weight them as you did?” (195). Although, Garver focuses on the connection between *logos* and *ethos*, I believe that *ethos* is exposed through the rhetor’s use of *pathos* as well. By invoking the suitable emotional responses through the rhetorical act, the rhetor represents her or his character in a favorable way.

Ideally, the rhetor uses this representation of character to express shared values and other types of commonalities with the audience; these associations create a sense of identification between the rhetor and the audience (Jarratt and Reynolds 48-49). Importantly, this approach does not exclude the style- and reputation-based approaches. Although stylistic choices are not the only marker of character, the pervasiveness of *ethos* makes them one of many ways that the rhetor’s character can be presented. Moreover, it seems unlikely that audience members would not weigh the rhetor’s character based upon previously gained information, and, therefore, it is unreasonable to presume otherwise; however, the rhetorical act as a whole can create a representation of the speaker’s character that could change the audience’s perception of the rhetor and make the previously gained information less important. The sense of identification helps the audience to trust (or in a failed attempt, distrust) the rhetor, which, according to Aristotle, is the basis of persuasion through *ethos* (Garner 176). This sense of trust through identification is one of the more powerful aspects of persuasion because “a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications” (Burke 46). Without trust
the rhetor’s motives are questioned and his or her arguments and emotional appeals become suspect.

**Practical Pacifism as an Ethocentric Discourse**

The challenge of examining *ethos*, then, is that it is embedded throughout the rhetorical act, and therefore, it is difficult to isolate its influence. In order to explore *ethos*, I believe that it is important to examine a discourse where character is the key form of persuasion. Such a discourse, for lack of a better term, would be *ethocentric*. Playing off the concept of logocentrism, an ethocentric discourse would not exclude the influence of logical and pathetic appeals; rather, the reason and emotion are driven by the representation of character in the discourse. Much as logical reasoning (supposedly) defines and limits the values and emotional aspects of scientific discourse, the rhetor’s desire to be associated with specific types of values and temperaments defines and limits the type of reasoning and emotional aspects of an ethocentric discourse.

Practical pacifism works as this type of ethocentric discourse. My examination of the books, pamphlets, articles, and speeches reveals their rhetoric focused as much on creating an appealing representation of the movement as it did on promoting their agenda. This is not to say that the arguments were notably illogical or lacked emotional connections with their audience; instead, the reasoning they used and the emotions they expressed were defined by the shared values of the Practical pacifists and the wider public. Ultimately, the persuasive nature of their arguments relied more upon their creating common ground with their audiences and less upon their logical or emotional appeals. These qualities lend themselves to this study of *ethos*. 
The trait of practicality was central to the Practical pacifists’ endeavors to connect their character to the values of their audience. Practicality functioned as a trope both of the American ethos as well as their own, and I explore their application of this idea in Chapter 1. Key to their use of the idea was the specific way they used the term “practical” to refer to the characteristics of rationality, honesty and straightforwardness, intellectualism, and being contemporary and moderate in one’s approach to the world. Once this definition is established, I examine the ways that the Practical pacifists represent themselves as being practical while they present both militarists and non-resisters as impractical. According to the Practical pacifists, both militarism and non-resistance were improper approaches for the United States to take because each was too limited and too extreme in how it addressed war: militarism in its exclusion of solutions that did not require force, and non-resistance in its exclusion of ones that did. By presenting these two ideologies as the extremes in the war debate, the Practical pacifists presented themselves as an alternative to a false binary that those approaches created: an individual must either support military might to solve international conflicts or reject any type of force to advocate for peace.

Despite presenting themselves as the ideal middle choice, the Practical pacifists had to address the strong appeal which militaristic thinking had within the United States. Examining the issue, the Practical pacifists recognized the way that the militarists connected with cultural values better than the pacifists traditionally had; the peace movement needed to replace these virtues in order to sever this connection in the public imagination. In Chapter 2, I explore these criticisms of traditional peace rhetoric and militarism, and examine how the Practical pacifists used analogy to develop a rhetoric of
substitution to provide alternative mores that created stronger connections to their audience than what the militarists provided. Through their plan to solve international conflicts by means of an international court of arbitration and police force, the Practical pacifists posited the rule of law and justice as substitutions for the rule of might and honor, the values they believed were at the heart of militarism. Additionally, they offered a sense of patriotism that was built upon the virtue of serving the country versus what they saw as the militaristic version of patriotism that demanded that citizens sacrifice for the nation. The result was that the Practical pacifists represented themselves as more thoroughly dedicated to the ideals of the nation than the militarists. This approach also allowed them to distinguish themselves from radical political movements, like the anarchists, who argued against war but also challenged the authority of the U.S. government and the nature of society. Through their act of substitution, they presented what they believed to be more central values to the American character, and they presented a way to gain peace that did not challenge the social structure of the United States.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I explore how the Practical pacifists used cultural tropes in their arguments to strengthen their connections to their audience. Chapter 3 focuses upon how the Practical pacifists incorporated popular applications of evolutionary theory and eugenics, and social evolution into their arguments. Importantly, both of these social theories tied the idea of development, biological and social respectively, to the character of the nation. By showing how war negatively impacted the area of eugenics, the Practical pacifists tapped into societal concerns about the decline in men of good character that happened when socially-defined “inferior” people reproduced, and directed
those concerns toward the carnage of war. The Practical pacifists also incorporated the theory of social evolution. Using this discourse of the developmental stages of societies (savagery, barbarianism, and civilization), they argued that the United States had developed beyond the stage where military might defined greatness, and that the unchecked militarism throughout the nation threatened to devolve it into a more uncivilized state. This allowed the Practical pacifists to oppose war without challenging the image of the United States as an emerging international power, including the imperial impulse to have dominion over foreign lands. Importantly, the adoption of these evolutionary discourses allowed the Practical pacifists to make connections with their audience’s materialistic impulses, equating evolutionary development to the maintenance of property and civilization and to the material comforts of middle-class living.

Chapter 4 continues this materialistic theme, as the Practical pacifists represented themselves as a movement that supported the business interests of the United States. This specifically pro-business approach was designed with the belief that business was the heart of U.S. culture: what strengthened business strengthened the nation. Extending this thought, businessmen best understood the general climate of the citizenry, and the business mindset represented the most American approach to problem solving. Therefore, the Practical pacifists desired to be pro-business and represented this businessman ethos in their rhetoric. To emulate the business mindset, they worked to frame the matter of war in simple terms of what was profitable for the largest portion of the economy: even though war helped certain sectors bring in big profits, peace allowed more businesses to thrive. Additionally, the Practical pacifists linked war to disruptions in market and in trade, building upon the social concerns about the unstable U.S.
economy during the turn of the century. Similarly, the Practical pacifists represented military preparedness and expansion as activities that weakened the U.S. economy because they removed capital and materials from the marketplace which could be invested in profit-making ventures. This appeal to the business sector had two purposes. It was designed to attract more business leaders to the movement. More importantly, this focus worked to define the peace movement as one that supported the business community, and by extension, U.S. interests in general.

Through these *ethos*-based connections, the Practical pacifists represented themselves in a way that appealed to the larger society in the United States and influenced the ideas of what a pacifist was within the peace movement. Despite the short-lived nature of their movement, these pacifists laid the foundation for a way to represent peace that changed how later peace advocates presented their cause to their public.
Chapter 1 Defining Practical, Defining Peace: The “Middle-of-the-Road”

Representation of Practical Pacifism

From 1895, when the American Peace Society’s President Benjamin Trueblood argued that the peace movement needed to “command the attention and respect of the practical people of the world” (quoted in DeBenedetti 66), to United States’ entry into the First World War, the idea of practicality was central to the identity that peace advocates had developed for their growing “mainstream peace movement” (DeBendetti Peace 69). The Practical pacifists used this identity to distinguish themselves from other groups who participated in the discourse on peace, whether they were pacifists or militarists. Not incidentally, the same general approach was taken with both sides: the Practical pacifists claimed that they were more aligned with American values, as manifested in the middle-classes, than any other group within the peace debate. With practical character as their measurement, the Practical pacifists were able to represent the advocates of military might as being untrustworthy because of their limited approach for addressing conflict. Likewise, the Practical pacifists distanced themselves from the stances of other groups who argued for non-resistance, declaring them too extreme in their ideology. In this way, the Practical pacifists represented themselves as the middle ground in the debate about war and peace, the practical way that best matched the interests of the United States.

“The Practical People of the World”

When the peace movement adopted the idea of practicality, they made it the definitive trope, functioning as a standard by which debates covering all aspects of war and peace should be judged. The idea of practicality was an important label to define both the nature of the Practical pacifists’ approach to international conflicts and the
character of the pacifists themselves. Practicality became a way for them to redefine their movement, to present a novel definition of what pacifism was, and thereby to persuade the U.S. public that a policy of peace was in the nation’s best interest. As Edward Schiappa states in *Defining Reality*, the act of redefinition is primarily a rhetorical act, as the act makes the claim that the old definition was not as accurate as the one being proposed and those who are using the new definition must persuade the rest of the discourse community that it is more appropriate (31). Additionally, redefinition is rhetorical because, when carried out successfully it alters not only language use but also “our understanding of the world and the attitudes and behaviors we adopt toward various parts of that world” (32). Proclaiming a pacifism redefined by the idea of practicality, the Practical pacifists wanted to shift perceptions in the United States about the character of pacifists from dangerous radicals who threatened to weaken the nation to rational reformers whose goal was to strengthen it. Looking at how the Practical pacifists defined “practical” allows for an understanding of the values they built their movement around and the character they believed the peace movement embodied.

One of the Practical pacifists who clearly stated what she meant by adopting the term practical was Lucia Ames Mead, an early-twentieth century philanthropist and peace advocate, who in her 1909 address at the American Peace Congress, defined practical as “to see the relation of cause and effect, to be governed by reason, not prejudice, to know a fallacy when we see it, and to aim straight for the mark” ("Common" 254). Looking at Meads’s definition, it is clear that practicality is a habit of the mind. This habit was a matter of both logic and perception, as her focus is upon the ability to see connections between events as much as knowing fallacies and depending on
reason. However, it is just as much a matter of character, as implicated by Mead’s warning against prejudice and her appeal that practical individuals “aim straight for the mark,” a variant of the “straight shooter” metaphor. According to Mead, it was not enough to be rational and understand events; practical people were also dedicated to the truth, despite cultural biases. In this way, the idea of practicality fused together rationality with the virtue of honesty.

Because of this dedication to a truthful representation of the events in the world, the peace movement desired to use means that provided them with the best understanding of it. Being practical defined the approaches these pacifists used to gather information and process it; practicality determined the epistemological basis of their arguments. In the Practical pacifists’ estimation, practical people turned to science for their answers, and these peace advocates intended their movement to be scientific and objective. As the longtime secretary of the Chicago Peace Society Charles Beals claimed in 1913, despite the

innumerable reason-weapons available for use in the campaign against force-warfare…the modern pacifist never feels safer or more gladly optimistic when, beneath his feet, he perceives the granite foundation of physical and sociological science. …We shall deal not so much with dreams—though constructive dreaming needs no apology—as with plain, prose facts, and try to get at the scientific meaning of said facts. (“From” 174)

Like Mead’s definition, what stands out in Beals’s statement is that practicality combined both the intellect and character of the individual. Practical individuals are focused upon facts, not assumptions or platitudes, and he distinguishes the Practical pacifists’ focus as
dealing with the tangible facts rather than intangible dreams. However, Beals is not interested in just any type of fact. He emphasizes that these “said facts” are scientific, implying their unbiased nature. Although Beals’s insistence that pacifism be based upon science functioned as an appeal to the status of the scientific approach and educated experts played in social, governmental, and business institutions at the time (Wiebe 147), it also helped define the qualities of the Practical pacifists. The use of “scientific” emphasized the presumably objective approaches the Practical pacifists used to address their subject matter. Likewise, the appeal to science focused on the educated nature of the movement, implying they understood the issues they debated. However, an equally important aspect of this dependence upon the new sciences of the time was their relative newness. The Practical pacifists worked for novel answers to questions about war and peace, offering compelling alternatives to familiar arguments for peace.

Practicality also demanded a steady temperament. The practical individual shunned extreme responses or solutions to problems. For the peace movement to create solutions to war that attracted the favor of the practical American, they needed to “cultivate a spirit of sober common sense among men, a sense which will cause them to think twice before going to extremes, and to hesitate before glorifying the war spirit” (McClellan 29). The characteristic of practicality in this statement is clearly based upon a sense of moderation and control, a point highlighted by the use of “safe,” “sober,” and “hesitate” along with the chastising to avoid extreme stances. Likewise, McClellan’s description of arguing in favor of militarism as “glorifying the war spirit” marked this behavior as an antithesis to moderate thinking, as high praise is not moderate; likewise, the religious associations with the term “glorifying” connote subjectivity in the praise and
an inability to question the object of praise. Additionally, glorifying, in a non-religious sense can also create the feeling of providing undue praise and inflation. The goal was for pacifism to embrace a measured approach that would protect Americans from the traps of extremity.

Importantly, McClellan included the idea of “common sense” as a significant quality of practicality. Although in contemporary times the idea of common sense is often used to represent thinking that is in opposition to rationality or intellectualism, the Practical pacifists were not using it in this way. Their use of the phrase was more in the sense of the universality of their arguments, that the “fundamental principles of the movement enter into the most common experience” (Woolley 99). Moreover, the Practical pacifists’ appeals to common sense complemented their reliance on science as a universal tool for understanding everyday experience. In this way they believed the claims they made about the world should match the daily experiences of the audience: “It seems perfectly clear to a balanced, thinking mind, a peace man’s mind for example, that more waste [caused by war] will not bring wealth or work for the needy” (R. Root 510). Presenting their arguments in terms of how war, militarism, peace, and pacifism all affected the daily lives of all people was another way that the pacifists anchored their movement in the empirical, everyday world. There was an appeal to community in this phrase as well: the feeling that these ideas represented a shared understanding about the world, one that was available to any individual who approached matters rationally rather than trust what others told them: “Let practical citizens use their own reason and refuse to be scared by vested interests” (Mead “Common” 259-60). This form of common sense
trusted individuals to reach the same conclusions as the peace movement once they had the correct facts.

However, the Practical pacifists were not referring to widely or popularly held ideas when they talked about common sense; often, their arguments debunked popular beliefs about war and peace by showing that the reverse was actually true. The suspicion that the Practical pacifists had toward the popular understanding of the issues surrounding war and peace were represented by Lucia Mead in the larger passage from which her definition of practical was taken above.

We hear much of the “practical” American. But if to be “practical” means to see the relation of cause and effect, to be governed by reason, not prejudice, to know a fallacy when we see it, and to aim straight for the mark, it is a serious question whether we as a people can boast of being practical instead of visionary in dealing with the greatest political problem of the age. (Mead “Common” 254)

Mead’s objection to popular understanding is clear by her repudiation of the “‘practical’ American” and her pejorative use of “visionary,” meaning delusional. Moreover, by claiming that ending war was the “greatest political problem of the age,” she reinforced her claim of the irrationality of the popular beliefs about peace. If the great majority of the public did not recognize peace as the most pressing political issue of that time, it showed that the majority did not understand the issue properly. Clearly, practicality provided a point of view that the masses did not hold.

From this analysis, a clear picture of what these pacifists considered to be a practical character emerges. Being practical meant individuals valued reason, not just as an ideal, but it also supported and enlightened everyday life. The Practical pacifists
rejected the traditional prejudice and the folk wisdom about the issue they were exploring, and instead looked to the facts of the matter and worked to make unbiased decisions based upon those facts. Additionally, they appreciated the knowledge gained from the developing scientific fields, especially the knowledge that was applicable to daily experience. They were also wary of overly emotional and sentimental responses, ones that would lead people to taking an extreme response.

What is telling about this definition of practical is how well it was matched to middle-class sensibilities and self-perceptions of the role they played in United States culture during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Both the Practical pacifists and the middle-classes appreciated the value of moderation and discouraged extreme responses to situations. They both valued the knowledge gained through the new sciences, while expecting that knowledge to coalesce with daily experience. Both saw themselves as a normative force in society, working to establish a common understanding of how the world worked and the appropriate way to interact in it.

This class association of practicality was reinforced by the type of individuals who composed the Practical peace movement. For the most part, they were from the white-collar world: businessmen; teachers, professors, and collegiate administrators; the clergy; social workers; and members in other middle-class social reform movements like temperance and woman’s suffrage. Additionally, the conferences held by the peace movement during the early-twentieth century had special sessions that focused upon what members in these careers or organizations were doing for the movement. Even the individuals of great financial means, such as Andrew Carnegie, Edwin Ginn, and Edwin Mead, were businessmen who amassed their own wealth rather than those whose fortunes
were inherited. More importantly, though, was that the representative figures in the
peace movement were all individuals for whom the middle-class life style had been
successful. Their status in society was gained through their dedication to the ideals of the
middle-class; additionally, they were aware of the influence that they and people like
themselves were gaining in society (Patterson 26-27). In the new world of bureaucracy,
it was the middle-class that both made the system work and influenced the decision
makers through their knowledge (Wiebe Search 153-54).

Significantly, the middle-classes were also the Practical pacifists’ primary
audience. The values that the peace movement claimed as their own were ones that
would have been appealing to the middle-classes. Moreover, even though they
understood that the middle-classes were not, for the most part, the individuals who made
the decisions on political policy, the Practical pacifists viewed the middle-classes as a
means to influence the social and political elites who did create policy, as discussed
below.

The Delusion of Militarism

As the idea of being practical became central for this peace movement to attract
their desired audience, practicality became a primary standard by which these pacifists
compared themselves to the supporters of U.S. military might. Instead of focusing upon
the ideas of peace or the use of military force as the crux of their distinction from the
militarists, the Practical pacifists made the peace debate about whether pacifism or
militarism offered the more practical approach to solve international disputes and further
the United States’ foreign policy. The Practical pacifists’ primary concern with
militarism was that it required individuals to adopt an impractical approach to the world.
Militarism did not allow for people to think clearly about the matters of world peace, as it was a point of view that was dependent upon modes of thought that specialized in preparing for potential problems rather than addressing the present international scene. This central assumption of militarism distorted the militarists’ understanding of the modern world and left them with an approach to the world that was both too narrow and too broad to be effective. The Practical pacifists used the disproportionate nature of militarism show how it was an inappropriate approach to international affairs and a danger to society when the civilian population of the United States embraced it.

When addressing disagreements between nations, it appeared to the Practical pacifists that the “military party, which believes that the matter can be settled only upon a military basis,” offered only a few solutions to a wide range of problems, whereas the “civil party, which very much deprecates this exaltation of militarism” looked for more options (Addams “Address” 330). With this setup the Practical pacifists established the impracticality of the militarist stance, as it could not provide solutions that did not require military force. On the other hand, the civil party—i.e., pacifists—were open to a variety of approaches. Additionally, though they worked to “depreciate” the “exaltation” of military solutions, the Practical pacifists did not reject them outright. Rather they judiciously considered them and their proper place in the discourse. The peace movement’s use of a variety of approaches allowed them an intellectual flexibility that militarism did not possess.

The militarists’ use of a singular approach meant that they often used blanket solutions to address a variety of conflicts, and the imprecise nature of this approach troubled to the Practical pacifists. The militarists’ narrow view was reflected in a popular
slogan used to defend military preparedness at the time, which the Practical pacifists represented as “an ancient pagan maxim”: “If you wish peace, prepare for war” (Jefferson 6). Trusting a maxim to handle all situations did not seem like the most prudent approach, as it did not take a direct measure of the situation, and so had no means of weighing its effectiveness. Moreover, the reference to “ancient pagan” emphasized the backwardness of the militarist ideal, outdated and opposed to progress. Similarly, the Practical pacifists attacked the militarists’ claim that military growth and preparedness prevented war by deterring the desire of “some one else to go to war with us. ‘Some one else’ is exceedingly indefinite.” (Carnegie “Baseless” 91). Carnegie’s attack upon the imprecise nature of the militarists’ approach helped to represent them as the group that was stuck in the intangible world of ideas. Rather than looking to the facts of the individual situations, militarists depended upon their preconceived ideology.

Further concerns the Practical pacifists raised against the rationality of the militarists centered on the issue of the United States’ defensive measures. The militarists, who at one time argued that the United States needed to prepare against probable foreign threats, had enlarged their goal so that by 1909 the peace movement believed that the militarist’s “ambition is now to protect her against all possible [enemies]” (Jefferson 10, emphasis in original). When they were limited by probability, the militarists had to base their defense suggestions upon the information they had gained about current international relationships. Essentially, the militarists functioned as experts working in their own field of specialized knowledge of the world. By changing to possible attacks, the militarists were no longer limited by what information could be gained from the material world; instead whatever scenarios they could image would be considered equally
valid. The end result in this shift from probable to possible meant that “military and naval officials fight imaginary foes when they think of possible invasions of enemies” (Carnegie “Baseless” 92). To the Practical pacifists, this crossed the line between specialized knowledge and delusion, because there were no empirical limitations placed upon the militarists’ warnings. Therefore, these claims could not be trusted, because the enemies:

exist only in the minds of those who, however practical when dealing with bricks and steel and coal, are visionary when they deal with problems of human nature and statesmanship, and see spooks and bogeys which are but the figments of their own imaginations. (Mead “Common” 254)

Drawing a direct comparison between militarism and business sense in Mead’s accusation highlighted the militarists’ disconnect from the material world. Whereas people in industry cannot ignore the state of their tangible resources, the militarists did not appear to have the same connection. Significantly, the reference to the strength of business sense worked to express the weakness of militaristic fantasy; it created a sense that the fallacy of militarism was as great as the nation’s business acumen.

Another technique that the Practical pacifists used to show the impracticality of militarism was to represent these stances as immature. In the statement above, Mead derided the militarist mindset by equating their concern over potential enemies to childhood fears of monsters, imaginary threats that mature people should not fear. The idea that the militarists concerns were childish was also expressed by Andrew Carnegie, who, in 1913, questioned the imprecise nature of militarists’ perceived threats in the world: “No one ventures to name the nation or nations that has the faintest idea of
quarreling with us; nor have we any idea of quarreling with any” (Carnegie “Baseless” 92). Along with questioning what nations actually wished to go to war with the United States, Carnegie downplayed these possible threats by referring to the militarists’ perceived threats of war as “quarreling,” equating the potential danger of these attacks to fighting among children. The infantilizing of the militarists’ warnings emphasized how disproportionate the fear was to the reality of the modern world.

This sense of disproportion was reinforced by the militarists’ attacks on the peace movement. Theodore Roosevelt, the most public defender of military might during the time period, call pacifists traitors to the country (Chambers 127); similarly, Admiral Alfred Mahan, the predominant advocate for United States naval dominance at this time, accused the pacifists of believing that “no other tolerated evil was wrong” in comparison to war (8). The extremity of these attacks drew peace advocates to equate the militarist mindset to a type of mental illness:

To deny [the militarist’s] assumptions or to question his conclusions, is to him both blasphemy and treason, a sort of profanity and imbecility worthy of contempt and scorn. He alone stands on foundations that cannot be shaken, and other men who do not possess his inside information, or technical training for dealing with such questions, are living in a fools paradise. The ferocity with which he attacks all who dare oppose him is the fury of a man whose brain is abnormally excited. (Jefferson 8-9)

Although Jefferson’s representation of the militarist rhetoric was done in parody, he did not misrepresent the types of attacks used by the militarists. Moreover, Jefferson does not merely claim that the militarists’ conclusions are delusional; rather, he shows the
flaws in their thinking by making parallels between militaristic reasoning and a belief system that demanded unquestioning faith: believing that their knowledge was unquestionable logically leads to perceiving any challenge as a hostile act. Jefferson logically showed how the irrationality at the core of militarism led its proponents to extreme stances. Likewise, Jefferson provided an effective attack on the special knowledge that is held by military experts and other officials who supported a militaristic approach of foreign affairs. Rather than deny the accuracy of this information, his accusation was that militarists put too much faith in that knowledge, which ultimately undermined the value of their opinions because they did not consider other equally valuable sources of information to influence their thinking.

The Practical pacifists’ largest concern about militarism was not the distorted viewpoint it created, but rather the wide acceptance of militaristic thought in the larger society. Even though they believed that militarism was a myopic approach to the world, the Practical pacifists acknowledged that this approach was useful to the military: “We expect those of our military and navy circles to dwell in their dreams upon possible attacks, devising counter-measures of attack and defense. ‘Tis their vocation”; nevertheless it was up to governmental leaders and the educated public to question the validity these threats (Carnegie “Baseless” 92). Carnegie’s critique raised concerns about the over extension of specialized knowledge. Just because an approach worked for one occupation, did not mean it was the best approach for all situations. Militarism in its proper place might be useful; however, once it was adopted by the larger population, it became dangerous as non-military men and women blindly accepted it and depended upon the knowledge that militarism provided. Furthermore, the longer the militarist
mindset was allowed to flourish within a society, the harder it became to fight the mentality, as “militarism grows by what it feeds on” (Jefferson 10). As more people in a society argue for a strong military, the more they start to “assume that social ends may be obtained without the application of social energies,” that only the military can be used to keep order or provide protection for a society (Addams Newer 211). The Practical pacifists believed that when military might was considered the only solution, citizens become lethargic in their imagination and depend upon force, rather than social engagement, to ensure a functioning society.

The Practical pacifists recognized that the danger of this lazy thinking might not be obvious in times of peace, however, in times of war it was clear to them that this mindset weakened the pillars of modern society. In an public address on her observations of Europe during the first year of World War I, Jane Addams noted that

the longer the war goes on, the more the military power is breaking down the safeguards of civil life and civil government, and that consequently it will be harder for civil life and for the rights of civil life to resuscitate themselves and regain their place over the rights and power of the military…. the more desperately the people cling to their armies for their salvation, the more absolute are the power and the glory of that army. (“Address” 331)

The crux of Addams’s report was the consumptive nature of militarist thought; once militarism becomes established, it requires that all of society be dependent upon the military. Any arguments against the militarist point of view needed to be suspended, making the military the ultimate source of security in society. Ultimately, militarism claimed that the only way that people could have peace in their lives was to trust the
military to provide it for them. The tyrannical nature of this stance led the Practical pacifists to claim that the militarists truly were the “peace-at-any-price men” (Jefferson 13). In using this popular epithet for pacifists to describe militarists, Jefferson reinforced the extremity of the militarist mindset. Typically, the phrase was used to express the idea that pacifists cared less about the nation than peace, but Jefferson used it to reflect that the sacrifices militarists required of societies was their most valuable assets, both monetary and cultural, so that the military could guarantee their protection.

A telling example of the infectious nature of militarism was produced by William Dean Howells in his story “Editha.” Published in 1905, “Editha” functions as Howells’ reflections on the cultural mindset in the United States during the Spanish-American War (Baum 147-48). The eponymous Editha Balcom is a young woman who, at the outbreak of war, wants her fiancé George Gearson to enlist despite his upbringing as a pacifist and his own misgivings about the motives behind the war. Eventually, George does enlist and is killed early in the conflict. In what she considered a generous and dutiful act, a grieving Editha travels with her father to console George’s mother in Iowa, only to be rebuked by Mrs. Gearson, who is relieved that George died before he could kill some other mother’s son or woman’s husband, “that he ain't livin' with their blood on his hands!” (142). However, Editha does not understand Mrs. Gearson’s point of view and believes her statements were made because “she wasn't quite in her right mind” (143).

As a cautionary tale about the cost to a society enamored by militarism, what is most striking about this story is Howells’s representation of how widespread militarism
in the public discourse influenced the actions of Editha and George. Early in the story it is clear that Editha’s views were shaped by the popularly held public opinion. Her arguments for George to enlist were commonplace, emphasizing nobility, honor, and to proof of love for country (and by extension her), and the narrator even comments that in her choice of arguments Editha had been “parroting the current phrases of the newspapers” because she did not want to “pick and choose her words” (127). The militaristic ideas had been widely circulated, and they allowed Editha to endorse them without thinking critically. Editha’s mindless approach to the matter of war continued through the story, despite having her ideas challenged first by George and later by Mrs. Gearson. The militarist approach allowed her to dismiss the ideas of others: accusing George of cruelly teasing her with his dissent and dismissing his mother as a woman driven mad by her grief.

Whereas Editha represented the widespread blind acceptance of militarism, George had a more complicated relationship with it. Even though he could not be described as more than lukewarm in his criticism of war at the beginning of the story, he did show a wariness of the jingoistic ideals espoused by Editha. When Editha talks about the noble nature of war, George comments that for most men war was about having “his courage tested … that's what it comes to, unless you're swept away by ambition or driven by conviction. I haven't the conviction or the ambition” (129). When Editha attempts to counter by arguing that this particular war was righteous, George responds, “It isn't this war alone; though this seems peculiarly wanton and needless; but it's every war--so

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2Rosalie Murphy Baum makes a similar observation in her essay “Editha’s War: ‘How Glorious!’” See Baum, pg 158.
stupid; it makes me sick. Why shouldn't this thing have been settled reasonably?” (129).

It is clear from the beginning of the story, that Howells presents George as critical of militaristic thought, conscious of the typical appeals used to encourage enlistment and aware of the irrationality of war.

Nevertheless, George ultimately succumbs to the military mindset, and looking at George’s account of his own enlistment reveals the role that widespread militarism played in it. The evening war had been declared, he attended a meeting at the town hall:

“There was a lot of speaking, and then some of the fools set up a shout for me. It was all going one way, and I thought it would be a good joke to sprinkle a little cold water on them. But you can't do that with a crowd that adores you. The first thing I knew I was sprinkling hell-fire on them. ‘Cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of war.’ That was the style. Now that it had come to the fight, there were no two parties; there was one country, and the thing was to fight to a finish as quick as possible. I suggested volunteering then and there, and I wrote my name first of all on the roster. …

“It's astonishing,” he said, "how well the worse reason looks when you try to make it appear the better. Why, I believe I was the first convert to the war in that crowd to-night! I never thought I should like to kill a man; but now I shouldn't care; and the smokeless powder lets you see the man drop that you kill. It's all for the country! What a thing it is to have a country that can't be wrong, but if it is, is right, anyway!” (133-34)

What is key is not just that George had rejected his former critical stance about war, but rather the types of arguments he used to justify his new stance: the belief that fighting is
the best way to end the conflict; the need to support the nation, right or wrong; the thrill of war that he early seemed cynical about. Just as important was the extremity of the position George takes. By his own admission he went from “sprinkling a little cold water” on the crowd, to “sprinkling hell-fire on them;” likewise, he went from questioning patriotic appeals to declaring that “there were no two parties; there was one country,” praising it as “a country that can’t be wrong”. He even expresses his excitement that war technology will allow him to better view the slaughter. He goes from opposing war because of its irrationality to embracing the most excessive aspects of that irrationality.

Importantly, Howells provided George with a meta-awareness of his conversion. He did not attend that meeting undecided about his stance of the war; his intent was to provide some calm rationality as a counterpoint to the jingoistic speeches that dominated the moment. But when his moment to speak came, he was engulfed in their state of mind. Once he had a sense of the militaristic mindset, he could make their fallacious rationales work in his own mind, i.e., stop questioning these widely accepted reasons. Additionally, the quick nature of his conversion emphasized George’s familiarity with the militarist discourse. As his intent in speaking at the meeting was to calm down the crowd, supposedly through the same types of questions that he shared earlier with Editha, it would seem unlikely he could create a successful argument for the war without being familiar with how to appeal to the crowd. His ability to create a rousing, impromptu speech implies a familiarity with the arguments and tropes used by the supporters of war. This familiarity allowed the discourse and the mood of the crowd to take over, and George turned from a war objector to the first man to sign up. Through George’s
conversion to the war, Howells represented the danger of militarism, by showing how it overtakes rationality and supplants it with its own extreme view of the world, and, just as importantly, how dangerously widespread and accepted the militarist mindset was in American society.

This threat of widespread militarism that had come to dominate the nation’s imagination in the early-twentieth century was a real concern to the Practical pacifists. They commented that it seemed the fallacies and distortions of the militarists’ way of thinking were espoused through influential media: newspaper editors, political speeches, and even the pulpit (Mead “Common” 254-55). Here the Practical pacifists hit upon the problem with militarism in public discourse: that if an idea becomes widespread enough, people stop questioning its validity. Once that happens, it is easy for individuals to stop being critical of the idea and slip into group think. In this way, the delusions of militarism could spread with the support of the public and their leaders. Despite what they considered the moderate personality of the typical American, militarism was familiar and widespread to the point where it marked a threat to the reason and provided them with an skewed vision of the world. Therefore, the goal of the movement was to engage the public and “relieve them from the torturing nightmare of militarism, with which they are still obsessed” (Trueblood 93-94). The Practical pacifists believed they provided a sane alternative to this extreme and unrealistic stance.

A Different Type of Peace, a Different Type of Pacifist

Practicality was not just a way for the Practical pacifists to represent themselves as possessing a better approach to the question of conflict than the militarists; the ideal of practicality helped to distinguish them from other advocates of pacifism. The Practical
pacifists’ character-based approach to their movement shaped how they thought and talked about the idea of peace. This influence made their version of peace clearly distinguishable from how it was defined by the proponents of non-resistance, which had been the dominant ideology among secular pacifists since the early nineteenth century (Brock *Freedom* 297-98). By redefining peace in the spirit of practicality, the Practical pacifists recast the image of the pacifist, an image that had been relatively stagnant since before the Civil War both among peace advocates and throughout the cultural imagination in the United States. This allowed them to create a pacifist *ethos* that was acceptable to the larger American public.

In the second half of the nineteenth-century, the ideology of non-resistance dominated the world of peace advocacy. During this period the most notable peace advocate was William Lloyd Garrison, whose ideas shaped the peace movement in the United States since before the Civil War until after the First World War (Brock *Pacifism* 922-23, *Freedom* 298, 303). Garrison also influenced pacifists throughout the world, including Leo Tolstoy, who was one of the best known pacifists in the Western World during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (*Freedom* 298). Garrison’s vision of pacifism was absolute non-resistance: “a Peace man, in the true acceptation of that term, is to be forever powerless (physically) against injury, insult, and assault—to trust solely to the living God for protection—to be incapable of returning blow for blow, either personally or by proxy” (qtd. in De Benedetti 44). At the end of the century, Garisonian non-resisters continued to dominate the peace discourse as well as the popular representation of pacifism. In his treatise *Reason v. the Sword*, the peace advocate Rev. John M. Washburn defines the “true peace-man” as an individual who “cannot fight,
though he is spoiled of his goods, thrown into noisome bastiles [sic], or suffers death” (quoted in Brock *Pacifism* 932). Likewise, Clarence Darrow, who besides his work in law was also an advocate for non-resistance, declared that pacifism was in complete defiance of “the theory of violence, and force, and punishment” (77).

Looking at these statements, the key to the non-resister’s definition of peace is the refusal to use violence or physical force on the part of the individual. The idea of violence or physical force covered a large range of actions that could not be carried out by or on behalf of the peace advocate: from killing, to corporal punishment, to physical self-defense. Additionally, peace was defined as an ultimatum. The use of the words “cannot,” “incapable,” and “solely” create a binary where there is no gray area about the types or amounts of acceptable force; either an individual opposed the use of all these means or they were not pacifists. Because the binary definition of what is excluded by peace is so broad, the number of individuals who could claim to be pacifists was small. This binary, along with the use of the word “true” to modify the label “peace man” created an exclusionary model of pacifism. Others may claim they support peace, but unless they were willing to meet the non-resisters’ standards, they were excluded from being pacifists.

The emphasis upon individual choices marked a significant aspect of the non-resisters’ approach to pacifism: it was centered around the activity of the individual. This was also reflected in Garrison’s and Washburn’s definition of the peace man. Not meant to specifically exclude women, the use of the singular “man” focused upon the individual in opposition to a group. Only individuals could refuse war and violence. This point was also driven home by Darrow’s critique against governmental use of punishment:
Do you want to change the conduct of men, whether grown individuals or children; take a child and whip a child, can you change his conduct? You may change his conduct, but can you change his heart? Conduct is only the outward manifestation of the inward individual. To change the individual you must change the heart, and then the conduct must be free….You can force men against their will to do certain things, but their hearts are a seething mass waiting for a time when they may accomplish other things by violence. (Darrow 82)

As it is clear in Darrow’s statement, the prevention of undesirable behavior is less important than the reason for the change in behavior. The failure of force is that it does not change the “inward individual,” the individual has not made a choice. An important consequence of this focus on the individual was that it defined the fight for peace as primarily an internal conflict. In essence, peace was a state of mind and an approach to the world, and not the lack of physical conflict. The avoidance of violence becomes the “outward manifestation” of the decision that was already made. The individual’s intent in action was privileged over the results of his or her action.

This privileging of intent over results also shaped the non-resister’s relationship with the government. At the heart of the non-resisters’ critique of the government was the idea that “every human government is upheld by physical strength, and its laws are enforced virtually at the point of the bayonet” (Garrison 15); in other words, every government resorts to force if individuals do not obey its pronouncements. Because of the intent of the government, the non-resisters believed there were a variety of civic behaviors in which the pacifist could not participate. Non-resisters’ opposition to
violence of in any form meant that they would not fight in wars nor hold any post in the military; in addition they believed that:

We therefore voluntarily excluded ourselves from every legislative and judicial body, and repudiate all human politics, worldly honors, and stations of authority. If we cannot occupy a seat in the legislature, or on the bench, neither can we elect others to act as our substitutes in any such capacity. (Garrison 15)

The result of privileging intent was that the non-resisters also privileged the individual over the society, as represented by government institutions. The use of “repudiate” marks both the non-resister’s separation from the government and their refusal to accept its authority. The use of force by governments meant that the state’s control over individuals through law and punishment were invalid over the behavior of the individual, although this repudiation did not prevent the non-resister from suffering the government’s wrath (Darrow 78, 80). Again, the idea of exclusion is key to non-resisters’ representation of the pacifist, although in this case it was a self-exclusion from government. The ideal was for the individual to make himself or herself separate from the institutions of the nation because there was no way to ensure that they were not based upon force. For the most part, governmental bodies were irrelevant to promoting pacifism, as their methods just reinforced the idea of power through violence. The only behavior that governments could do that would support the non-resisters’ vision of peace was immediate disarmament (Garrison 15, Darrow 81). Aside from that possibility, the government only represented a barrier to achieving a peaceful world to the non-resisters.

In comparison to the non-resisters’ definition of peace, the Practical pacifists defined peace much more narrowly. Lucia Mead defined the goal of the Practical
pacifists in her 1912 book *Swords and Plowshares*: to end the travesty of war (91).

Advocates of Practical pacifism did not consider all uses of force illegitimate; rather, they opposed “only deliberate killing of human beings; [peace advocates] themselves often share in righteous and necessary conflicts which do not involve the deliberate killing of innocent men” (92). She also criticized the non-resister standard, referring to it as “muddle-headedness which discerns only a difference in degree and not in kind between organized killing and … the wholesome thrashing of a schoolyard bully” (93). Her criticism was rooted in the idea of practicality, challenging the rationality of individuals who believed that all forms of violence were essentially the same.

Clearly, this standard of peace was much more nuanced than that of the non-resisters. The objection Mead made to considering all forms of conflict as the same was reinforced by how she modified the actions she described: what made war horrible was a different kind of force, one that was “organized” and “deliberate” with killing as the end goal. Besides indicating that there were different types of violence, Mead’s references to “innocent men” and the “schoolyard bully” raised the question about the character of individuals to whom physical force was applied. This established a situation where force can have positive effects, which she emphasized by deeming them “righteous and necessary” and “wholesome.”

Defining peace more narrowly than the non-resisters allowed the Practical pacifists to define who was a pacifist in a much broader sense. As Brock comments in *Pacifism in the United States*, the Practical pacifists “aimed to embrace all who wished to eliminate war” (923). Whereas non-resisters had traditionally considered themselves the only type of pacifism, the Practical pacifists considered pacifism as consisting of a
variety of approaches, all of which had equal claim to the label pacifist. Jane Addams commented that there were “many types of pacifists, from the extreme left, composed of non-resistants [sic], through the middle-of-the-road groups, to the extreme right, who can barely be distinguished from mild militarists” (“Patriotism” 353). This more inclusive idea of pacifism made the Practical pacifists appear more accessible, as one did not have to conform to a single ideal to work for peace. Compared to the exclusionary nature of the non-resisters’ representation of pacifism, the appeal of the Practical pacifism becomes more evident. They did not force individuals to take what was popularly considered an extreme stance in order to embrace the peace movement, nor did they consider that the acceptance of certain uses of force disqualified an individual from working to condemn war and curtail the influence of militaristic thinking in public policy.

Another way this openness represented the practical nature of the peace movement was, in the words of William Jennings Bryan, that it allowed the movement to draw “arguments in favor of peace from every source” (Response 85). The references of the different “sources” for peace, along with Beal’s statement above about the “innumerable reason-weapons” used to argue against war (“From 174), represented the variety of rationales used to argue for the benefits of peace. The Practical pacifists’ acceptance of any individuals who opposed war meant that there was no orthodoxy against any individual’s reasons for opposing war. This approach privileged the attainment of peace above all other differences, including matters of personal belief. Bryan’s statement above was part of a response to a presentation at the First National Peace Congress in 1907 that used evolutionary theory to argue against war. He continued:
We have drawn some to-night from sources that I had not expected. I had hoped we should be able to bring about peace by resting entirely upon the theory that man is made in the image of his Creator, but I am glad to have peace brought to us even from the theory of man made in the image of the ape. (Response 85)

As an adamant opponent to the theory of evolution who would later head the prosecution team in *Scopes v. State of Tennessee,* Bryan made a powerful concession through this statement. What is significant about it was that Bryan did not try to find common ground between evolutionists and creationists through peace. Instead, he plays upon the divergence of the two approaches by highlighting the differences between the two camps, referencing “the image of the Creator” as well as “the image of the ape.” Peace did not bridge these two paths of thoughts; however, both led to the benefits of peace. Therefore, Bryan was willing to tolerate arguments for peace that went against his religious beliefs. This openness reflected the idea that the end result of gaining peace was more important than the reasons behind each individual’s quest for peace, a reversal of the non-resisters’ stance.

The privileging of results also meant that the Practical pacifists embraced the idea that governmental bodies provided an appropriate means to create peace, to the point where they believed peace could not be achieved without governmental support. Lucia Mead claimed that the means to prevent war between the nations would be “the same method that keeps the peace between Kentucky and her neighbors,” i.e., governmental jurisdiction (“Common” 256). Because they were focused upon war, and not violence in general, the Practical pacifists expected governmental bodies to prevent its outbreak.

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3 More popularly known as the “Scopes Monkey Trial.”
This shift in focus allowed the Practical pacifists to dismiss the problem of changing the character of individuals, a problem which could never be achieved in certainty. Defining pacifism in this way allowed the Practical pacifists to change the debate from being one about internal conflict to one concerning societal conflict.

This shift changed the focus on the peace movement’s rhetoric from trying to convert the masses to trying to influence individuals who held sway in the society. The Practical pacifists recognized that “a very small body of men really govern every country” and that these men could “bear other men and measures forward by sheer force of will” (Warfield 255). The appeal to one man forcing his will upon others clearly distinguished this approach from what non-resisters advocated. There was no intent to change the internal man, as the image Warfield used was of one man carrying others to a new position. By embracing this aspect of government, the Practical pacifists both acknowledged the disproportion of power in society and viewed it as a potential mechanism for good. Critics of the Practical pacifists have noted that that this stance is elitist, especially compared to early peace movements that were interested in converting the masses (Patterson 27). Patterson attributed this elitism to the influence of the Mugwump tradition of top-down political and social change that was prevalent among social reformers of the early twentieth century (28). Functioning within the Practical pacifists’ paradigm, this focus upon the elites marked a sense of practicality, as their approach was based upon their understanding of how society worked.

Besides this top-down vision of societal change, the Practical pacifists’ focus on influencing the political leadership of the nation represented another aspect of practicality: the ability to distinguish between a goal that is attainable and one that is not.
This aspect of their focus on the political elite was well represented by Lucia Mead: “A comparatively few influential persons in a few influential countries can end international war, and will end it. The majority of the 1,500,000,000 on the planet will have little to do with it” ("Common” 257). Mead’s comparison between the number of people with influence and the number without it also works as a comparison between the non-resister’s ideal of individual conversion to the Practical pacifists’ leader-centered approach. Mead’s citation of the world’s population emphasized the impracticality of the non-resisters’ approach; to convince 1.5 billion people seemed unlikely. On the other hand, if you only need to convince a handful of individuals, then the goal was more likely to be achieved.

The potential drawback to this approach was the matter of access to this elite group of decision makers. Most members of the peace movement did not hold an audience with the social and political elites, and even those who did were not always successful at persuading on the individual level.⁴ Therefore, it would have been unreasonable for them to expect their unsolicited advice to political leaders would be taken seriously. Their practical solution was to convince people whom they believed they could influence—scholars, clergy, lawyers, and businessmen—who together could grab the government’s attention (Mead Swords 94). By recruiting these individuals, the peace movement could become the “intelligent organized public sentiment, to which governments are compelled to listen” (Trueblood 93). Although what is at first

⁴ A case in point was Andrew Carnegie, who believed that his role of being a captain of industry gave him the right to advise the President of the United States on the issues of international affairs. He sent letters to Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson with the expectation that they would take respect his opinion as a representative of American sentiment or as representing an influential type of American intellectualism. It was clear that the Presidents did not view him that way. See Wall 305-06.
noticeable about the Practical pacifists’ circle of influence is that they are all members of the middle classes, it is equally important to note that they viewed their target audience as well-defined professional groups. This focus showed their awareness the their target audience was a socially significant force; additionally, they showed an understanding of how professional groups and experts influenced public policy and effected change in the United States. By becoming the dominant ideology among these groups, the Practical pacifists believed that they could take their movement, which was traditionally “dependent upon individual initiative,” and get it to “move in the pulses of the body politic” (Warfield 256). Attracting the members of the advising class, the Practical pacifists hoped to sway the political forces who, in their opinion, could end war.

The result of this redefinition of peace through the lens of practicality meant that the Practical peace movement was significantly different from what the non-resisters had created. This difference became the basis of how the Practical pacifists represented themselves as an alternative voice in the discourse on the issues of peace.

**Against All Extremism**

The focus upon practicality by the Practical pacifists allowed them to distinguish the character of their movement from earlier incarnations of the peace movement; however, they used the issue of character to represent their movement as less of a continuation of the peace tradition and more of a new direction for peace advocates. To this end, the relationship between peace organizations that advocated strictly for non-resistance and those that adopted Practical pacifism were essentially non-existent, and many of the older leaders and organizations of the peace movement were left out of this new incarnation (Curti 198-99). Likewise in their rhetoric, the Practical pacifists also
worked to distance themselves from the stances of the non-resisters, despite being a movement that claimed to embrace all who wished to end war. By placing practicality as the standard by which to judge the approaches for achieving peace, the Practical pacifists were able to devise a rhetoric that allowed them to acknowledge common goals with non-resisters while it undermined the efficacy of non-resisters for being too impractical in their demands.\(^5\)

This inclusionary/exclusionary nature was marked in many statements made by the Practical pacifists. Returning to Addams’s statement about the spectrum of peace advocates, on the surface it is a statement of inclusion, as Addams places a variety of ideologies in her range. Nevertheless, it worked to exclude the non-resisters, because, even though they were included by name as a type of pacifism, they represented an extreme stance. Moreover, the extremity of the non-resisters’ beliefs are amplified when looking at how Addams describes pacifists on the other end of the spectrum, what she defined as the pacifists on “the extreme right, who can barely be distinguished from mild militarists.” Even though this group was an “extreme” of pacifism and were “barely distinguishable” from a militarist stance, the inclusion of “mild” in this statement emphasized the moderate nature of this side of the spectrum. This contrast makes the non-resister stance seem all the more irrational.

The Practical pacifists also distinguished themselves from the non-resisters as they addressed the critiques of the peace movement. When they found a situation where the critics of pacifism took issue with the non-resister’s approach to peace and claimed

\(^5\) The Practical pacifists also distanced themselves from other groups who advocated against war, most notably anarchists and socialists who are addressed in chapter 2 and chapter 4 respectively, on the basis that their stances did not align with middle-class, American values.
that it represented the beliefs of the peace movement, the Practical pacifists would expound on how the majority of pacifists actually held a different stance or how the non-resister approach was an extreme caricature of the real pacifist stance. This allowed the Practical pacifists to distinguish themselves from the non-resisters as they discredited a stereotype of pacifism. The decrying of the better known non-resister stance allowed the Practical pacifists to attack their critics for misrepresenting the peace movement and reinforce the idea that non-resistance was too radical of an approach to peace.

One of the areas that the Practical pacifists used this technique was on the stance of disarmament. Whereas non-resisters demanded that all nations immediately disarm, Practical pacifists did not believe this would be an effective way to prevent war, as it left the disarmed nations vulnerable to ones that were still armed.

Peace advocates are often assumed to urge disarmament. None but the impracticable extremists desire to take a third step before they have taken the first, and no men of prominence in the peace movement belong to this class.

Disarmament must be preceded by reduction of armaments. Reduction of armaments must be preceded by limitation of armaments. (Mead Swords 87-88)

Mead’s representation of the issue presented a means to simultaneously validate the goal of disarmament and undermine the validity of the non-resisters’ approach to it. She began by dismissing an incorrect assumption about peace advocates, and then proceeded to walk her audience through a Practical pacifist’s stance on the issue. Her use of steps working from limitations, to reduction, to elimination made her stance seem well reasoned and systematic, and she created a sense that slowly working towards disarmament was a less drastic approach for the typical citizen to accept. In comparison,
Mead made the non-resister stance seem more erratic and illogical. Again, the label “extremist” was used to represent the non-resisters, modified with “impractical” for extra emphasis. Moreover, Mead’s statement “no men of prominence” relegated non-resisters to the fringe; those irrational voices might be part of the movement, but they were not the ones shaping it. The result of this technique was that the larger peace movement appeared more mainstream and respectable, as the non-resister ideology became more ostracized.

However, the Practical pacifists’ attacks on non-resistance were not always so subtle in the means to discredit it, nor did they always acknowledge the goals the two camps shared. Understanding that the public did not consider non-resistance as an appealing approach, the Practical pacifists worked to spread the message that in the larger peace movement, the “doctrine of non-resistance is no longer seriously considered… thoughtful men of today have looked deeper into the real problem of peace” (Reynolds 278). The Practical pacifists wanted it to be clear to the larger public that the peace movement understood the radical nature of non-resisters. Even though the two groups shared similar goals, it was clear from the Practical pacifists’ representation that they considered non-resisters as undiscerning ideologues. Similarly they declared that they opposed the ideas of “those infatuated agitators for peace who would have us, at this day, practice the absurd Tolstoian policy of non-resistance. That would be suicide” (Hudson 414). Looking past the obvious prerogatives, Hudson’s criticism of non-resisters as irrational is emphasized by his use of the phrase “infatuated agitators for peace.” By referring to them as agitators, Hudson accused non-resisters of doing nothing productive to achieve their goal. By referring to them as infatuated, Hudson implied that non-
resisters were not thinking rationally about the problem of war. The word infatuated took on an additional level of reproach with the reference to Tolstoy, implying that non-resistance was not a well thought out stance, one that was dependant upon Tolstoy’s popularity at the time. These criticisms, along with the attacks on the non-resistance ideology as “absurd” and suicidal, eclipsed the fact that non-resisters and Practical pacifists were working towards a mutually inclusive goal. Importantly, in their criticism of the non-resisters, the Practical pacifists appropriated the militarists’ criticisms against the peace movement. By representing non-resisters as peace advocates who did not understand the complexity of the peace issue, the Practical pacifists were able to scapegoat the shortcomings of the peace movement onto the non-resisters. They validated the discomfort that Americans had with the vulnerability that non-resistance required of its followers and the conflict between non-resister ideals and U. S. political desire.

Representing a Middle-of-the-Road Option

Being practical allowed the Practical pacifists to distinguish themselves from both militarists and from non-resisters. By framing the movement this way, these peace advocates were able to situate Practical pacifism as an ideology that was in between non-resistance and militarism, creating the appearance of being a middle option for people who were bothered by the spread of militarism in the society, but who were equally uncomfortable with the type of stances that non-resisters claimed were necessary to advocate for peace. Believing that their audience neither viewed themselves as “forever powerless,” nor as individuals who believed the only solution to conflict was to fight, the
Practical pacifists represented their movement as an alternative choice in the discourse about war, one with which the middle-classes could identify.

This self-representation as the middle way was achieved by several techniques. Beyond using coded labels, such as “practical,” “reasonable,” and “serious,” the Practical pacifists worked to make their stances seem as commonplace as possible. One technique was to challenge the idea that peace was radical. In response to the claim that ending war was a revolutionary idea, Charles Beals replied that “within a century one might have argued that ‘slavery always has existed, therefore, slavery always will exist.’ Such an argument is out of date today” (“From” 178). By drawing a parallel to the issue of slavery, Beals showed how formerly radical ideas become socially acceptable over time. By equating the peace movement to the efforts of the abolitionists, they show that they were progressive in their thinking, but not a threat to any major values of the society.

Another way the Practical pacifists created the appearance of holding a rational, middle-ground approach was to present their stances in opposition to strawman versions of the non-resisters’ and the militarists’ approaches. Lucia Mead illustrated how the Practical pacifists claimed this central position through an anecdote in her book *Swords and Plowshares*:

A naïve newspaper reporter once assumed that my objection to international war would involve condemnation of football; and another youth based his supposed disagreement from my position upon his having been obliged to threaten to knock down an insulting companion if he repeated his insult. “But you would not kill him, would you?” I inquired. “Of course not,” was his horrified response. “But I
was talking about killing,” I rejoined. “Oh, is that the point? Killing? Yes, yes, yes, I see,” was his relieved reply. (92-93)

When the young man objected to what he considered an unreasonable option to solve his circumstance, Mead provided him with another unreasonable solution. When faced with the two extreme options, the fallacy of his thinking became clear. Moreover, because Mead did not provide her audience the lesson from this story, it allowed her readers to reach this conclusion through their own reasoning: that it is not a choice between solving conflict by killing or doing nothing, that there is a solution in between those extremes.

It is also important to note how the objectors to pacifism were represented in this story. Mead’s description of the reporter as a “naïve” man who “assumed” he knew what peace was about and the other man as a “youth” with a “supposed” dispute with her highlighted the uninformed nature of her opponents. Importantly, though these labels undermined the validity of their stances and fallaciousness of their arguments, Mead does not present them as stupid, but as lacking the correct information. This implied that the problem with most people who opposed the peace movement was that they made rational complaints based upon improper knowledge. Mead’s handling of the young man reinforces his ability to reason once he had the correct information. Additionally, Mead is not critical of her opponents’ values for initially choosing sport and honor over peace; rather, she showed them that Practical pacifism did not require them to choose between peace and other things they valued.

The ability to avoid positioning their audience where peace conflicted with other values the audience held dear was a definitive aspect of the Practical pacifists and marked a sense of practicality in their approach to peace. It showed their ability to be reasonable
and moderate as to avoid conflicts between peace and other cultural values. Although they never denied the value of peace, the Practical pacifists recognized that in the world they lived the “cry of peace for the sake of peace, for the mere absence of conflict, is no longer heeded” (Reynolds 278). They needed to find other ways to make peace a practical approach for the United States to adopt, and they decided that highlighting the supporting role that peace played in the success of the nation could win their audience. This went so far as for the Practical pacifists to argue less about the inherent goodness of peace than how compatible it was with other values held by the middle-classes and how it supported national values: law, justice, patriotism, civilization, manliness, consumerism, and economic success. Ultimately, this resulted in a pacifism that had peace as its focus, but not its ultimate goal.
Chapter 2: “Law Replaces War”: Law, National Character, and the Rhetoric of Substitution

In the years 1905-1918, the advocates of Practical pacifism moved away from the traditional appeals made by the peace movement. Along with their belief that non-resistance was too extreme to be effective, the Practical pacifists believed that the advocates of non-resistance were too dependent upon appealing to Americans’ sentimentality. This focus upon emotions prevented the peace movement from providing the public an actual alternative to war; instead it expected that when people were moved by the appropriate emotions they would choose to abstain from fighting. This seemed like a naïve approach to the Practical pacifists, as they saw that the strong influence militarism held in the public imagination neutralized the emotional appeals against war. Instead of depending on the sentimental approaches, the Practical pacifists worked upon an approach that would capitalize on the strengths of the nation. Their solution was to create a substitute for war through the use of law, which they believed would be effective because it used a system that Americans were already dedicated to and provided an alternative outlet for the emotional and moral feelings that had been expressed through warfare. Their program of replacing war with law also allowed the Practical pacifists to represent themselves and their movement in ways that aligned them with the national desires for influence in international politics.

The Influence of Militarism on the American Public

One of the primary ways that the Practical pacifists distinguished themselves from the advocates of non-resistance was that the Practical pacifists considered non-resistance an ideology based upon human sentimentality. As expressed by Jane Addams in 1907,
traditional pacifists who advocated non-resistance appealed to their audiences’ feelings of pity for the victims of war and their sense of prudence, because war could cause them to become its victims. The non-resister’s hope, according to the Practical pacifists, was that these emotions would persuade individuals to abstain from fighting (Newer 7-8). While the Practical pacifists did not abandon these appeals in their arguments, they did not believe that this approach alone was a practical solution for the problem of war.

To improve upon these arguments, the Practical pacifists chose an approach that went beyond the simple act of abstinence from war. While it might succeed to prevent an individual from fighting, appealing to abstinence did not prevent atrocities that one nation piled upon another (Reynolds 278); nor did it provide a solution to the problems that caused war (Addams Newer 7-8). While the old ideals of the peace movement appealed to the best instincts of humanity, the Practical pacifists did not believe or expect all leaders and nations to live up to their best qualities. Likewise, they recognized that the absence of fighting did not always equate to a peaceful situation. When treated unjustly by a more powerful nation, the weaker nation might not be strong enough to resist; though this act may not result in warfare, “such peace is worse than war” (Reynolds 278). Taking “human nature as a whole,” it appeared to the Practical pacifists that “its wars are its best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self” (W. James 12) when considering the alternative of trusting all people to act out of sympathy.

Just as important to the Practical pacifists, the non-resisters’ appeals were no match for the powerful hold that militarism had on the American public, as the public intellectual William James noted in 1910, “military instincts and ideals are as strong as ever” (6). The peace movement’s descriptions of “war’s irrationality and horror is of no
effect upon” (4) the average American; in fact, such details might be counterproductive, as “horrors make the fascination” with war (4). Indeed, the “military party denies neither the bestiality nor the horror … It only says that war is worth them” to escape the banality of modern life (12). No matter what arguments the peace movement might produce to indict the brutality of warfare, if “anti-militarists propose no substitute … no moral equivalent of war … they fail to realize the full inwardness of the situation” (13, emphasis in original). The appeal of war was as much a matter of imagination and allegiance as it was about actions.

The internal nature of war was not lost upon the Practical peace movement. They recognized that the excitement induced from the descriptions of battle made it clear that “some substitute for the thrills of war is needed” (Thorndike 6). Beyond appealing to Americans’ desire for excitement, the Practical pacifists noted that militarists argued war “stirs the nobler blood and the higher imagination of the nation” with ideals that led to patriotism and sacrifice for the greater good; without war Americans would lose these qualities (Addams Newer 26). Without a way to address the emotional and moral functions of war, the Practical pacifists believed that “military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their place among our ideals until better substitutes are offered” (W. James 3) and would be doomed to fail in the face of the influential pull of militarism.

The inability of traditional peace rhetoric to combat the influence of militarism on the American public was illustrated in Mark Twain’s short story “The War Prayer.” Dictated in 1905, Twain presented the excitement that the public had with the prospect of war. In the story an unnamed country is preparing to go to war:
The country was up in arms, the war was on, in every breast burned the holy fire of patriotism; the drums were beating, the bands playing, the toy pistols popping, the bunched firecrackers hissing and spluttering… daily the young volunteers marched down the wide avenue gay and fine in their new uniforms, the proud fathers and mothers and sisters and sweethearts cheering them with voices choked with happy emotion as they swung by; nightly the packed mass meetings listened, panting, to patriot oratory which stirred the deepest deeps of their hearts, and which they interrupted at briefest intervals with cyclones of applause, the tears running down their cheeks the while…With the volunteers sat their dear ones, proud, happy, envied by the neighbors and friends who had no sons and brothers to send forth to the field of honor, there to win for the flag, or, failing, die the noblest of noble deaths. (394-95)

In this build up to war, a church service is held to bless the soldiers and “aid, comfort, and encourage them in their patriotic work” (395). During the service, the emotional appeals of militarism were worked into the prayer asking God to help the soldiers be “strong and confident, invincible in the bloody conflict” so that they and their country could gain “imperishable honor and glory” (396).

During this service, an “aged stranger” (396) interrupts to show the people gathered there the harsh realities of war that lay behind the talk of glory and honor. Claiming to bare “a message from Almighty God,” (396) he explained to them what they were really asking God to do by helping the soldiers when they “go forth from the sweet peace of our beloved firesides to smite the foe” (398):
tear their soldiers to bloody shreds with our shells… cover their smiling fields
with the pale forms of their patriot dead… drown the thunder of the guns with the
shrieks of their wounded, writhing in pain… lay waste their humble homes with a
hurricane of fire… wring the hearts of their unoffending widows with unavailing
grief… to turn them out roofless with little children to wander unfriended the
wastes of their desolated land in rags and hunger and thirst. (398)

The old man presented war in its most brutal and its victims in the most pathetic light
possible. Still, his representation of war failed to win over converts; the people believed
“the man was a lunatic, because there was no sense in what he said” (398).

Although not a member of the peace movement, Twain captures both failures of
traditional peace appeals that were described by the Practical pacifists. Despite his
accurate depictions of war, the old stranger’s appeals failed because to his audience his
words had “no sense,” a phrase which encompasses both reasoning and the sensation that
they create in those who hear them. In addressing reason, the stranger did not provide a
way to prevent these atrocities nor a way that the war could be curtailed; he only had a
desire for individuals to refrain from the fighting. As for the sensation that his words
created, his representation was based upon pity for the enemy: focusing upon the “pale
forms” and “bloody shreds” of their soldiers; their “unoffending widows” and “little
children” suffering “hunger and thirst”; their “smiling fields” and “humble homes” being
turned into “desolated land.” However, these appeals had little effect on people who
experienced the sensations expressed through militarism: exciting events like parades
and speeches which stirred hearts, choked voices and brought people to tears; the
opportunity to pursue honor and nobility. Importantly, militarism encouraged the
audience to associate themselves with the experiences of the victors of war, which created such strong sensations that people were willing to sacrifice loved ones to achieve it. Pity for the enemy could not compete with the emotional high of militarism, nor did the possibility that the audience members could be victims of war enter their minds. The failure was not the result of the audience being unaware of the horrors of war; it was because the old man failed to provide an alternative to war and because there was no room for that type of sentimentality in the militarist mindset.

To overcome the obstacles of militarism’s influence, the Practical pacifists’ devised an approach that focused upon providing a rational plan that provided an alternative to war that solved conflicts rather than avoided them and that engaged dominant American values. Essential to their approach was the act of creating substitutions, which provided a rhetorical advantage over the traditional approach which only encouraged a negation of the war act. Instead of negation, which focuses the audience’s attention on the idea or actions that need to be avoided, substitution offered a different concept for the audience to embrace, resulting in a symbolic separation that prevented them from having to refer back to the ideas of war or militarism. This allowed the Practical pacifists to propose an alternative focus for the energies and values dedicated to the militarist way of life. Another rhetorical advantage of using substitutes is the implied equalities within the act of replacement. For a substitute to be successful, the replacement must be able to stand in for what is to be replaced. Therefore, if the Practical pacifists produced a successful substitution for war, there should be no lingering need for war and militarism in their audiences’ mind, undermining the claim that war served an important purpose in society.
As Individual is to Nation, National is to International

To address the ineffectiveness of the sentimental pacifism and to produce a substitution for war, the Practical pacifists chose to embrace an analogy about international affairs espoused by the critics of pacifism. One of the critiques against applying non-resistance on an international level was its dependence upon eliminating all conflict between individuals. Even though certain individuals and groups might succeed in upholding this pacifist ideal, there were many more who did not. Additionally, legitimate misunderstandings could cause conflicts to arise despite the best intentions of those involved in the dispute. Because people could not prevent conflict on the individual level, there was little hope that humans could control it on the international level; therefore peace would only be possible when all people instinctually avoided conflict (Mead “Common” 256). At the core of this argument was the belief that national character and behavior were analogous to individual character and behavior. From a logical point of view, this analogy does not work: individuals cannot adequately represent the complexity of a national body, as either a basis of character or to find a motive for behavior. Similarly, the ability for an individual to act out of his or her worst qualities does not represent the amount of coordination and maintenance required to carry out a military operation. Despite the fallacious oversimplification of this analogy, the Practical pacifist accepted it and drew their own conclusions based upon it to promote their alternative to war.

When discussing the nature of international affairs, these peace advocates declared that nations were “nothing more than a vast aggregation of individuals held together by a community of interests, with all the breadth and the limitations, with all the
strength and the weaknesses, with all the virtues and the vices of its component parts” (McClellan 28). Nor did they deny that human nature was free of its own violent ways. They claimed that humans were “children of the past” and “not quite free from the fighting instinct yet” (Addams “Woman’s” 253). In agreeing to this analogy and to the basic characteristics of human nature, the Practical pacifists created some common ground between themselves and the advocates of militarism. This helped the Practical pacifists present themselves as reasonable, realistic thinkers, as opposed to the idealistic non-resisters. Equally important, the adoption of their opponents’ analogy set a baseline for the acceptability of the peace agenda. Having shared assumptions between the two sides made any arguments that came out of these assumptions appear reasonable by extension; therefore, their opponents could not claim that their solutions were unrealistic. Additionally, this eliminated an unnecessary disagreement between themselves and the militarists. By accepting their opponents analogy as a shared model for understanding the world, the Practical pacifists were able to move their debate away from one about human nature, and move it toward discerning what methods actually worked for handling conflict.

Even as these peace advocates conceded that conflict between nations was not something that would disappear in the immediate future, they argued that international conflict did not necessarily need to result in war. To support this argument, the Practical pacifists turned to the individual/nation analogy. Even though they conceded that conflicts between individuals were a reality in society, they pointed out that the vast majority of conflicts were solved without resorting to violence, let alone the opponents trying to kill each other. After all, murder and other forms of violent behavior were not
commonplace in society (Mead *Swords* 44). Therefore since conflicts between nations “differ only in degree, not in kind, from disputes between groups or divisions of the people of the same nation” (Wickersham 17), then what prevented individual violence within a nation would also prevent military violence at the international level.

When looking at the national level, they noticed that in certain places violence was more likely to break out than in others. “The armed man in the frontier mining camp” was not as safe as an unarmed individual going along “Wabash avenue [sic] or on an Illinois farm” despite his weapon (Mead “Common” 258). The difference between these locations was the level of lawlessness there. Having a weapon could not assure an individual’s safety as well as the strength of law could. The vast majority of Americans did not refrain from “arson” and “homicide” because they feared “the hangman’s noose”; rather it was because they understood and respected the ideal of law (Mead *Swords* 45). The peace movement proposed that the key to preventing violent conflicts was not having a society of individuals without faults, but rather having a legal system that kept the peace despite the shortcomings of its members, as “our Constitution [had] for forty-six states, without all the people within those states becoming saints” (Mead “Common” 257). Additionally, modern law functioned on many levels in American society to provide “order and peace…for the benefit of all” without producing conflict between those different levels of sovereignty (Fairchild 291-92). Believing that Americans had “found [law] beneficial in our national life” and that there should be “at least equal benefits from its extension to wider spheres” (Davies 96), the peace movement argued for a model of an international legal body that resembled the multileveled government of the United States. Such a system would create law designed to prevent conflicts between
sovereign nations while allowing them their own autonomy in internal affairs (Davies 98).

However, the Practical pacifists acknowledged that even a well-structured system of laws did not eliminate all conflict between individuals, so the same would be true about international law. Therefore, they needed a means of solving these inevitable conflicts. Looking at conflict on the individual level, the peace advocates argued that there were “but three ways to settle a controversy” available to the individual: “(1) by agreement, (2) by fighting it out, and (3) by submitting the question to the determination of an arbitrator” (Wickersham 18). Drawing on the nations-as-individuals analogy, the Practical pacifists asserted that these three options were also available in international disputes. When agreement was not achievable, the option of arbitration was available to the disputing countries; moreover, arbitration had been used successfully by the United States to solve conflicts in the past. Since the nineteenth century, the United States had been party to eighty-three arbitration hearings, which allowed them to solve their disputes and avoid military action (Carnegie Endowment 20). Additionally, arbitration was not “costly and wasteful of life and treasure” as war was (Wickersham 18). All these benefits made arbitration an ideal “substitute for war …adequate for the adjustment of all their disputes, without resort to force, in a way to conserve the honor and vital interests of the separate governments” (Trueblood 97).

Moreover, the peace advocates were clear that arbitration would not put America at a disadvantage. A 1914 pamphlet published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to “advance the cause of arbitration by showing how frequently and successfully it has been resorted to” (iii) listed the arbitration hearings that the United
States had been party to since the nineteenth century. Out of eighty-three cases the arbitrator sided with the US in fifty-two instances and in seventeen cases, both parties were found to have merit, leaving only fourteen of the disputes where the decision was against the U.S. (20). This left the United States vindicated at least two-thirds of the time it used arbitration, over four-fifths of the time if the split decisions were included. Moreover, the Carnegie Endowment also presented the economic rewards that accompanied the decisions, and the United States was awarded three-quarters of the financial awards of the cases to which it was a party. Even after deducting the financial settlements from when the arbitrators had decided against it, the US had received over $46,000,000 in settlement awards (20). The message was clear: arbitration would not threaten either America’s sense of integrity in international affairs or its economic interests.

To assure the consistency and impartiality of the arbitration system, the Practical pacifists argued the necessity of having an international court who would act as the arbitrator. This international court, like the United State Supreme Court, would be “composed of selected individuals of unimpeachable honor” (Davies 97) to assure that “the sentiment of the civilized world should accept [its decisions] as just” (Wickersham 19). The creation of such a court would “render war between the powers of the world scarcely thinkable” (Trueblood 97).

Despite their enthusiasm for arbitration, the Practical peace advocates recognized the possibilities that not all nations would willingly acquiesce to the decision of an arbiter and that some leaders of nations might flout international law to forward their own gains. To handle these prospective concerns, they proposed a solution that once again was based
upon local governance: there needed to be a police force that would function to enforce the laws and decisions. Not acting upon the whims of an individual leader or nation, this unit would only be employed after a ruling of the court and an “unsuccessful litigant” refused to “accept an adverse finding with cheerful acquiescence” (Wickersham 19). In this way, law could be enforced “in unusual cases by the sanction of force” (Davis 99). This limitation to its power allowed the proposed police to subdue “any dishonorable party… who may wish to try his might against the right of the civilized world” (Thorndike 4), while assuring that it was never used for aggressive means. In this way, the armed police force would be keepers of the peace.

By promoting peace through international law, the Practical pacifists produced a solution to war that addressed the inability of non-resistance to prevent war. Unlike an approach that just asked individuals to avoid war, the Practical pacifists presented steps that nations could take that would make avoidance possible. Likewise, their system provided protection and compensation to any nation that was wronged by another. Most importantly, they presented a solution that was already established and the could be used to address a variety of potential conflicts. The Practical pacifists had developed a rational alternative to war.

Though the plan embodied the ideals of the Practical pacifists, it nevertheless suffered from logical shortcomings, due to their plan being based upon analogy, rather than an in-depth understanding of law. Most obvious was the lack of details about how to establish these institutions and how to encourage nations to partake in the system. The best answer they could provide was another analogy: because the political powers of the world came to the Hague conferences on peace, surely they will support this system
which extended the goals of the conference (Trueblood 98). Similarly, their belief that all nations would be willing to submit to the rulings of an international court was based upon the fact that the legal system in the United States was respected throughout the world and that U.S. citizens followed the rule of law. Because the Practical pacifists were dependent upon analogy, they never developed the necessary steps to make their plan a reality. Instead, they put their faith in the idea that because law worked on the national level, it would by extension work on the international level.

Despite this logical problem in their arguments, the nation-as-individual analogy had rhetorical advantages. With this analogy, the peace advocates made a complicated problem more relatable and thereby familiar. The primary audience for the peace advocates, the social and political elite of America, would likely have positive connotations of government and law enforcement and would consider these institutions vital for keeping order in American society, representing the barrier between civil society and the unrelenting passions of the populace (Merchand 55). By presenting international law this way, the Practical pacifists capitalized on their audiences’ positive associations with the role that law played in American life. Furthermore, this analogy made references to the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court, which guaranteed the American nature of this plan. Both were symbols of protecting individual liberties during the early twentieth-century, especially the Supreme Court, which worked to protect individuals from the intrusions placed upon them by overly zealous reformers in local governance (Friedman 24). These American institutions reflected the idea of the international legal system as a protective body, one that would not impinge on national
sovereignty. What they were offering was not a strange new system to be forced upon Americans; rather, it was the natural extension of a familiar institution.

**The Rule of Law not the Rule of Force**

While the Practical pacifists’ plan was helpful to address the lack of a focused plan provided by previous pacifists, it also presented their movement as being dedicated to more significant American values than those advocated by the militarists. The focus upon legal means of solving international disputes allowed the peace advocates to link their movement to two powerful concepts in American culture: *the rule of law* and *justice*. Significantly, both *the rule of law* and *justice* are examples of what rhetorical theorists refer to as ideographs. Similar to the writing system, rhetorical ideographs are “one-term sums of a [political] orientation” (McGee 429). Specifically, they “represent in condensed form the normative, collective commitments of members of a public” (Condit and Lucaites xxii). Because of the collective nature of their meaning, their use implies “that each member of a community will see as a gestalt every complex nuance in them” (McGee 429). Ideographs are not assertions or claims; rather they “enact their meaning by expressing an association of cultural ideals and experiences” (Edwards and Winkler 297), and thereby “symbolize the line of argument” that any member of a community would provide “as a defense of a personal stake in and commitment to the society” (McGee 429). Because of this feature, ideographs are both easy for the members to recognize and difficult for those members to dispute (McGee 429-30). By using these two ideographs, the Practical pacifists presented their program as a way for their audience to represent their dedication and commitment to American culture. Because law and
justice are foundational ideas to the American identity, the Practical pacifists provided a new way which the audience could understand the peace debate.

By advocating a plan that was based upon legal means of solving conflict, the Practical pacifists were associating peace with following the rule of law. They emphasized the importance of this value, commenting that “the American commonwealth has based its faith upon the idea of law” (Davies 96). This ideal “embodied … the belief that right makes might, that law is the final arbiter”(Mitchell 41). This characteristic was grounded in the history of the United States, as “this government founded its origin in a declaration of substantive law” (Davies 95) and therefore have “committed themselves so completely to the guidance of reason as imbedded in law” (Mitchell 41-2). Represented in this way, there appeared to be no ideal more American than following the rule of law.

Moreover, the peace advocates created a binary where the rule of law functioned in opposition to what they saw as the ideology behind militarism, the rule of force. According to the Practical pacifists, the advocates of militarism mistakenly believed that the power of law was dependent upon the amount of force behind it (Mead “Common” 257). The ideology exposed the militarists’ trust in the power of force, in opposition to trusting the power of law. Likewise, militarists reinforced this ideal by constantly producing “a fresh cry for more guns” that would assure America’s security and respect in the world (Jefferson 5). This binary between war and law was reinforced by the way that the Practical pacifist described war. War was a “wild, lawless, cruel institution” (Trueblood 96), which was greater than typical illegal actions “for national spirit once aroused to unreasoning demands is more difficult to restrain than individual
lawlessness” (Wickersham 18). By advocating for war, militarists supported “the subversion of law and the exaltation of crime and violence” (Wickens 255).

While granting that “[all] governments use force,” the Practical pacifists claimed it was the power of law that made a nation strong (Mead “Common” 257). Additionally, the United States military did not demand the respect of the world:

Our beloved land did not first become a world power when Dewey sank a few old Spanish ships. Ever since the Constitution was ratified and began to serve as the basis of dozens of national constitutions written since, we have been a world power, and have been recognised as such. It was once our pride and glory that we need not burden ourselves with the millstone of militarism that the great powers of Europe have hung around their necks. (Mead Swords 27)

Rather than adopting the European trust in armaments, the Practical pacifists believed that the United States needed to embrace its tradition of trust in law. This dedication to the rule of law assured that nation possessed “the stablest [sic] of governments because it uses the least force to maintain itself” (Mead “Common” 257). A trust in this type of power was what the Practical pacifists considered the root of the peace movement: “this age is ready for great achievements, and if we are loyal workers in the cause of international arbitration our lot is cast amid hopeful surroundings” (Clancy 286). As the peace advocates cast it, there was no room to trust both law and might. When presented as a choice, they believed it was clear that the citizens of the United States “necessarily stand on the side of the rule of law. Any other position would be self-negation” (Davies 95).
This distinction was also at the heart of the Practical pacifists’ designs for the international police. As an entity that would be sanctioned to use force, it was significant that the international police advocates distinguished between it and military organizations. To make this distinction, the Practical pacifists focused upon the role that the police played in society. The purpose of the police was always “to promote judicial settlement of every wrong” (Mead “Common” 255) whereas armies and navies “never compel offenders to go to court” (Mead Swords 45). The relationship that the police had to the law also justified its potential use of force, as opposed to the military: “the police, which use the minimum of force to secure a judicial decision, and armies and navies which use the maximum of force and avoid a judicial decision” (Mead “Common” 255). This relationship with law determined whether the use of force was acceptable. Because their actions were limited by law, police could be trusted to use force without the fear that this power would be abused, whereas the military only trusted force and thereby was apt to abuse it. By subjecting police action to controls of law, the Practical pacifists could laud and advocate the workings of the police while still being critical of military uses of force.

Key to the Practical pacifists plan to replace war was their representation of law that separated the power of law from the threat of force. Their system was designed to establish the appropriate ways nations should interact with each other through regulatory bodies. Even with the component of a police force, this representation was dependent upon the normalizing aspects of law. The Practical pacifists did not believe that peace was gained by using the police to force nations into submission; rather, force was only to be used in situations where a nation refused to submit to the norm. By representing law
as a regulatory, normative system, the Practical pacifists created a plan that allowed control to be asserted upon the individual nations, while the threat of force faded into the background (Foucault 144). This separation of the two ideas allowed the Practical pacifists to invert the relationship between law and force. Law was the primary influence that kept order in the civil society, and law determined the times when force would be necessary. Through this representation, the Practical pacifist’s association with law made their ideology appear more powerful than that of the militarists.

While associating their movement with the rule of law, these peace advocates also worked at representing their cause as a quest for justice. Although justice is a closely related concept to law, the two ideals are distinct, as one can have unjust laws and get justice outside of the law. Further separating the two ideas, there was a tradition in the United States of opposing what were considered unjust laws, from the framers of the Constitution to the Abolitionists to the Populist and Progressive reformers. Therefore, it was important that the Practical pacifists represented the cause of international arbitration as a just cause. Nevertheless, there were contemporary precedents for the Practical pacifists to argue that justice was best gained through legal means. Starting in the late eighteenth century and continuing into the twentieth century, social reformers viewed the legal system, including legislatures as well as courts, as a tool to correct the imbalances of power and to address society’s injustices (Hall 197). Social problems were often fixed by a change in their legal status, creating a mentality that law was the solution to establish a just society (Hofstadter Age 248). Equally important, the federal courts, and especially the Supreme Court, created a reputation as institutions that assured that laws were just, even though they defined justice differently from the social reformers.
(Commager 362). These factors made it easier to link the expansion of law with a quest for justice, and thereby made it reasonable for the Practical pacifists to believe that their middle- and upper-class audience would be attracted to the association of these two ideas.

Playing off this association, the peace advocates claimed that their plan for a law-based alternative to war represented a quest for justice: “With the conviction that the spirit of injustice…is the great obstacle to international peace, the advocates of peace have become champions of Justice” (Reynolds 278). The goal of the peace movement was to create a legal system “to which nations could go for justice” (Hornblower 221). Their dedication to legal mechanisms to avoid war showed that they viewed the “principal of justice the supreme force” (Mitchell 41). To strengthen this association, many peace organizations adopted scales as a symbol for their groups, because “the scales of justice, not the dove or olive leaf, is the best symbol” for the peace movement, whose primary goal was to “substitute the system of law for the system of war” (Mead Swords 46).

While linking the ideas of law and justice, the peace movement also worked to separate the idea of justice and war. The military did not care “about justice in these international affairs… war does not settle an ethical question” (107), rather it only had one goal: “aim at victory, irrespective of justice” (46). In place of justice, militarism trafficked in the idea of honor, an especially dubious endeavor, since the militarists wanted to settle “questions of ‘honour’ by explosives” (106). Just as important, the peace movement criticized how the word honor was used to support war: “that the phrase ‘honour’ is elastic enough to include any possible question that may arise” (Hornblower
Likewise, the pacifists claimed that focusing on honor distracted Americans from the responsibility that their nation had in maintaining good foreign relationships:

The most misunderstood word in our language is that word “honor.” We must protect our “honor,” or our country may be dishonored. No man ever dishonored another. No country can ever dishonor another that does not dishonor itself.

(Applause) Another man may abuse you, or may wrong you. Therein he dishonors himself. But with the man who does no wrong, his honor remains intact. That word “honor” is the most dishonored word in our language.

(Carnegie Response 409)

However, the militarist’s idea of defending honor through war “arouses the more primitive antagonisms,” by which “the spirit of fighting burns away all of those impulses, certainly towards the enemy, which foster the will to justice” (Addams “Patriotism” 364). It was “a false sense of honor” that submitted that “the carnage of a field of battle” could decide the righteousness of a cause (Wickens 258); military success was not “the decision of reason and justice, but the triumph of brute force” (Dalton 35). In this way, the militarists desire to solve “international disputes by violence is abhorrent to honor and justice” (Thorndike 3). Like their representation of law, the Practical pacifist’s inverted the relationship between justice and honor proposed by their opponents. Just actions defined how honorable a nation was. Therefore, since pacifism was the ideology dedicated to justice, it was the best to assure the America’s honor remained intact.

This juxtaposition of values made the peace movement appear more American than the supporters of militarism. Significantly, it appeared that the Practical pacifists presented an American approach to the problem, rather than an internationalist approach.
Because their approach was at heart the American solution to international conflict, they represented their international legal bodies as an extension of American power in the world, instead of an impediment upon it. This made the Practical pacifists appear as supporters of the American desire for international influence.

Moreover, the references to the European nature of militarism allowed the Practical pacifists to engage the concerns over immigration during this time period. One of the worries was that immigrants from Europe were bringing political ideologies that threatened the American way of life, most notably anarchism. Despite some anarchist ideology being pacifistic in nature, and because of some well publicized acts of violence, including the Chicago Haymarket bombing and the assassination of President McKinley, the popular image of the anarchist was of a violent radical intent on destroying the pillars of American life (Lutz and Lutz 72-73). This ideology was considered threatening enough that after 1903 the United States government prevented the immigration of individuals who were anarchists, and after 1906 it required than newly naturalized citizens take an oath that they never had held anarchistic beliefs (Jacobson 94). The Practical pacifist’s representations of pacifism and militarism grafted well to this dynamic. The emphasis on the European nature of militarism, along with the militarists’ disregard of law and justice and dependency upon force to achieve their goals made them similar to the anarchists. In essence, the peace advocates argued that America needed to replace dangerous “foreign” ideas and practices from Europe with those that upheld “native” American values.

The act of focusing their audience upon these two ideals affected more than just the way that their audience understood the character of the peace movement, it also was
designed to affect the way that their audiences viewed themselves. By focusing the debate around law and justice, the Practical pacifists encouraged their audience to focus on these aspects of the American identity. This technique is more obvious in some places, like the claim that Americans have more fully dedicated themselves to the idea of the rule of law than any other nation (Davies 95) and that they put more faith in the ideal of law and justice than in military might (Mitchell 41). However, the use of law and justice to affect the audience’s perception of the American character was made in less overt ways. Returning to the arbitration pamphlet produced by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the reason provided by the institute for publishing the results of previous arbitrations was because it had been a successful tool to use in the past (iii). However, the implicit message of this pamphlet was that Americans did not have to be afraid to use arbitration: the United States was a just country that was ruled by law. If it was not, then it would have not received favorable decisions in the vast majority of cases. In that way the previous successes defined the nature of the American identity. By getting their audience to focus upon the aspects of the American character that reinforced the importance of law and justice, the Practical pacifists provided their audience with a self-image that aligned their values with those of the peace movement.

“The Moving Forces of the Modern World”

Another important characteristic of the Practical pacifists’ movement was their representation of both law and justice as causatives: forces of nature that cause events to happen. This use is particularly significant for law, as there are actual mechanisms and bodies that define how law works in the world. When looking at their arguments, it is clear that the Practical pacifists were not very interested in their international legal
system as a governing body per se. They spent very little time discussing the structure of the legal bodies, the types of laws that would be needed, or a clear plan for establishing such an entity. While their plans did call for such institutions, the Practical pacifists’ justification for adopting the legal program was based upon the principle that law had the power to control human actions. In particular, law is represented as a power that subjugates individuals and nations to itself (Davies 100). Likewise, the police, who had dedicated themselves to the law, were represented as incapable of acting outside the limits it placed upon them (Mead Swords 46). Importantly, the growing influence and respect of law that was “forcing itself into the relations of the world” (Bailey 273), which happened despite the rise of militaristic behavior among the world powers. According to the peace movement, this growing influence would be “sufficient to bring about the observance of law … without the recourse to force” (Davies 98).

While representing justice as a causative is less surprising than law, as justice has no tangible mechanisms directly associated with it, it is more typically used as a goal to be achieved. However, the peace movement also presented it as an agent in the world. They represented justice as “an inviolable moral power” (Clancy 282), a “power that leads to victory” (Reynolds 278). The awareness of “international justice is developing year by year” throughout the world (Bailey 273). Just as importantly, justice did not need a nation’s army to verify its presence in the world. Since justice was “already determined by reason, what is the use now determining it by war?” (Hudson 411). Justice itself was “lying in ambush, as it were, to manifest itself” (Addams Newer 236) and establish “the kind of peace only justice can secure” (Reynolds 278).
This representation of law and justice was prolific throughout the rhetoric produced by the Practical pacifists and appeared in a variety of paraphernalia produced by the peace organizations. A good example is a pin made for the Massachusetts Peace Society in 1911. The pin is a red circle with a gold rim, where golden scales adorn a white field and the slogan “Law Replaces War” is arched over the scales in gold lettering. The slogan captured the essence of the Practical pacifists’ plan without going into much detail, and it presented their basic argument in a way that was easy to grasp: law can fulfill the purpose of war for settling international disagreements. Additionally, the scales are presumably the aforementioned scales of justice which would have strengthened the association of law with justice and the ability of law to bring about justice.

However, the structure of the slogan “Law Replaces War” also reflects the causative nature of law. The key term in the slogan is the verb “replaces,” which establishes the relationship between the concepts of law and war. The present tense of “replaces” expresses the idea that the act of replacing of war with law is an ongoing process. It is not something that will happen at some point in the future, nor is it hindered by the fact that war still currently exists. It is an iterative event that is currently happening and will continue to happen. Along with the present form of the verb, the slogan itself is agentless. There is no other noun to carry out the replacing, leaving the sense that law itself is acting to replace war. The scales give the sense that this replacement is an act of justice, and so the end of war through law works to spread justice. In this way, both law and justice are sempiternal forces that work to bring about peace with or without the support of people.
Significantly, the peace advocates represented the spreading dedication to law and justice as happening independent of human help. What was at stake was whether Americans wanted to “orient ourselves aright to the moving forces of the modern world” to advance “the great cause of international justice and peace” (Mitchell 45). The result of this representation was that law and justice were not institutions or goals to work for; rather they were an unbeatable force. This presented a choice between working toward the inevitable outcome or fighting a futile battle against it. By representing law and justice this way, the peace debate became a dispute where only one side possessed the characteristics of being lawful and just.

Moreover, how the Practical pacifists represented the power of law and justice and America’s relationship to them was a claim about the United States’ unique role in the world’s history. Appealing to the idea of American exceptionalism, the nation’s founding ideals were the two powers shaping the twentieth century. Ideally, the twin forces of law and justice should have assured United State’s role as an influential nation in the world. However, the people had chosen to adopt the traditional European ideal of militarism. Represented this way, the debate between pacifism and militarism became a choice between embracing what made the United States an exceptional nation or choosing a direction that was both outdated and worked against the uniquely American way of life.

**Patriotism and the American Character**

Even though the Practical pacifists’ plans to replace war with law were designed to weaken the hold of militaristic zeal among American values, these peace advocates addressed another aspect to the emotional ties that advocates of militarism had used to
embed their ideology into the American conscience. Much of the militarists’ defense of their agenda was carried out in the name of patriotism, and they used this association to represent love of country with military service. Unlike the technique of replacing war with law and honor with justice, the Practical pacifist could not simply replace patriotism with another ideal. To downplay the importance of patriotism, or to reject it completely, meant that an individual did not love his or her country. Therefore, the peace movement acknowledged that the “greatest factor in the history of nations has been the spirit of patriotism” (Wickens 254). They claimed that, when properly understood, patriotism aided in the development of national character and strengthened the citizens’ respect for the rule of law (Addams Newer 74).

The Practical pacifists’ lauding of patriotism was complicated by the existence of humanist and internationalist focuses in their rhetoric. These qualities made the peace movement a target for supporters of militarism. While the Practical pacifists represented their agenda to bring about a “parliament of man—a federation of the world” (Bailey 273) as an extension of American ideals, their opponents labeled such expressions as unpatriotic values: “internationalism stands towards patriotism exactly as free love stands toward a clean and honorable and duty-performing family life” (Roosevelt 127). Significantly, critiques like Roosevelt’s worked to associate the international outlook with radical movements, like communism and anarchism, which had members that tied leftist politics with a critique of marriage and other normative sexual practices (S. James). This type of association made pacifism appear as an international threat, and therefore their plans needed to be seem less cosmopolitan and more patriotic.
Because the Practical pacifists could not argue against the importance of patriotism, they criticized the way that militarists tried to monopolize the idea. They felt that the way the militarists defined patriotism as based upon military service meant that there was “nothing in which the public needs revival of instruction more than in regard to this same quality, patriotism” (Bailey 271), because the public’s conception of it “although as genuine as ever before, is too much dressed in the trappings of military prowess and defence [sic]” (Addams Newer 214). The way militarists defined patriotism as “something that is peculiarly connected with the army and navy more than with the professional man, or business man, laborer, farmer, or crafts man” (Mead Response 275). This “false sense of patriotism which has influenced many of our people” (Bailey 286), and led to a situation that unnecessarily limited who should be considered a patriotic citizen. The limited nature of militaristic patriotism forced individuals to take pride in the actions of others rather than to value their own contributions to the nation. The result was that most citizen’s patriotism only could be achieved by proxy: “The individuality of men was lost in the aggrandizement of the few. Independence was swallowed up in ambition, patriotism came to have a new meaning” (Jordan “War” 131). Because of this, people “esteem ourselves for the skill of ‘our’ generals, swell with pride at ‘our’ army’s valor, and appropriate as a personal dignity the heroism of which we read” (Thorndike 7). In addition, individual Americans could take pride in their country without any contributions to it on their own part.

The lure of militaristic patriotism was that it provided the citizens of the nation with “that extraordinary form of self-respect which comes from belonging to a state that is rich, or a city whose baseball team holds the championship, or a nation victorious in
war” (Thorndike 6). This sense of belonging overrode any ideas of justice and encouraged individuals to believe the “right kind of patriotism is to stand by your country under all conditions, ‘my country right or wrong’” (Shaw 286-87). This easy form of patriotism led to a lack of morality on behalf of the citizenry: “It lures young men not to develop, but to exploit; it turns them from the courage and toil of industry to the bravery and endurance of war, and leads them to forget that civilization is the substitution of law for war” (Addams Newer 218). In the end, it resulted in a patriotism based upon “an intense hatred of other nations” (Beals “Patriotism” 461).

A further problem with this type of patriotism, according to the Practical pacifists, was that it downplayed the seriousness of the matters for which the patriotism was applied. The “team” mentality made individuals view warfare as a type of entertainment: “spectators are moved to hilarity and amusement; bayonet practice, the stabbing of imaginary heads and breasts and legs with the deadly steel, is surrounded with the glamour of a game” (Mead Swords 65). With the seriousness of war reduced to a game, the Practical pacifists feared that many citizens did not consider the consequences of warfare. Instead, they supported military actions as they might another type of violent distraction:

They are jealous of national dignity because they ‘like to see a good scrap.’ They do not believe in compromise because it is ‘tame.’ They would like to show Germany or Japan what we could do in a war! A war is good to read about while it lasts and to brag about afterward…The ultimate emotional value of war is only as monstrous dogfight for them to stare at and talk about. (Thorndike 6)
Feelings of patriotism became linked to “the horrifying spectacle of two mighty peoples engaged in the death struggle” (Wickens 255) as entertainment for people who were “provincial and selfish, animated with hate, and with a gun as [their] emblem” (Beals “Patriotism” 464).

Because of the strong emotional response to a militaristic patriotism, the Practical pacifists found it to be doubly troublesome. The emotions this type of patriotism aroused undermined reason, for “when a nation enters war, men’s minds are driven back to the earliest obligations of patriotism, and almost without volition the emotions move along the worn grooves of blind admiration for the soldier” (Addams “Patriotism” 353). The ability of militaristic patriotism to subvert reason was empowered by the strong need to belong, a desire that was difficult even for the strident opponents of war to ignore, for even “the pacifist, like the rest of the world, has developed a high degree of suggestibility; we too share that sensitiveness to the feelings, the opinion, and customs of our own social group” for the strong emotions stirred by this type of patriotism (363). By undermining reason and reinforcing the group mentality, the Practical pacifist saw militaristic patriotism turning all of people into “the despicable mob… In its cheap enjoyments we all share” (Thorndike 6). They considered this understanding of patriotism as a threat not only to the peace movement, but also to the American character.

As an alternative to a patriotism that appealed to the emotions, which were too easy to trap oneself in, the Practical pacifists encouraged “a patriotism big enough and fine enough to fit the new conditions and the best thought and the highest ideals” (Beals “Patriotism” 254). At its heart was the need “to change this false emphasis and show that service of country is the duty of every citizen every month of every year. Good
citizenship is the larger part of patriotism” (Mead Response 275). While lacking the excitement of battle, the “valiant deeds of peace are the more heroic because [they are] not inspired by strains of martial music, but executed in response to the call of the new patriotism” (Wickens 259). The result was that this “new patriotism” encouraged individual citizens to stop looking to attach themselves to the achievements of others and instead find ways that they themselves contributed to the success of the nation and take pride in those actions:

In so far as boys and girls learn that any act whatever that makes their city of country a better place for good people to live in is an act of good citizenship—that efficient labor, skillful professional service, healthy and noble pleasures are important feature of citizenship—they will abandon shoddy patriotism.

(Thorndike 8)

In this way, the peace movement would teach “this country that it is just as noble for one to live for his country as it is to die for his country on the battlefield” (Washington 311). Instead of searching for the select few who were admired for their great deeds, everyone could be a patriot as long as they contributed to society and lived its ideals.

Equally important, this relationship shifted the relationship between the individual and the group. Instead of the individual getting lost within the group, the individual is actively creating the larger group through his or her participation. With the responsibility of creating the choices for the group placed upon the individual to decide, they would not fall to the demands of the masses or the heads of states but rather trust their sense of values: “A real patriot says: ‘My country if she is right, but if she is wrong, then by every power of my being will I seek to make her right’” (Shaw 286-87). The Practical
pacifists’ ideal patriotism was based upon the idea of service to the country, rather than sacrifice. By substituting service, the peace advocates allowed citizens to contradict the nation if it leads to the greater good; whereas patriotism based upon sacrifice meant that the edicts of the nation would always trump the morality of the individual.

By fostering this type of patriotism, the Practical pacifist also desired to remove the entertainment aspect of war. They believed that the focus upon the good citizen would break down the mob mentality and help people gain “their sober senses” (Thorndike 10). With the negative influences gone, “people of the country no more hanker after a look at the war-game than they hanker after bull-fights or the trial by fire” (10-11). Patriotism was no longer limited to a single spectacle or agenda, but to the everyday workings of the nation. In that way the time that should “inspire patriotism, is not in time of war, but in time of Peace” (Shaw 286), and war would reduced to being viewed as “a pitiable accident, like the wrecking of a train by an incompetent switchman” (Thorndike 11). By eliminating the requirement of military conquest to fulfill the citizens’ sense of belonging, the Practical pacifists removed the glamour of the war game.

In basing their idea of patriotism upon the good citizen rather than the soldier the Practical pacifists were also shifting the idea of patriotism away from a value system that focused upon correct action to one that was based more upon good character. In their form of patriotism it is not the role the individual plays for the nation; rather it was the motivation behind the role that he or she plays. The Practical pacifists created a patriotism that they believed was more ethical and realistic about war. Additionally, it was more democratic as it allowed all Americans to participate in the “energetic fight for the inward means of national dignity” (Thorndike 11).
Despite providing an alternative to militaristic patriotism, the Practical pacifist recognized that to “substitute a rational patriotism for self-congratulation at the exploits of a military ‘team’ involves teaching ourselves to take pride in what we have earned and to prize only worthy achievements. Both tasks are hard” (Thorndike 7). Unlike the power of law and justice, encouraging “this civic passion” needed active support, “blowing on the spark till the whole population gets incandescent, and … a stable system of morals of civic honour builds itself up” (W. James 16). Though advocacy and education, the Practical pacifists desired to encourage an idea of patriotism that would be just as potent as militaristic patriotism.

The idea of replacing militaristic patriotism with one based upon citizenship reinforced the national characteristics and desires. The Practical pacifists supported the importance of patriotism, even though they believed its focus had been misplaced. In the same way, the desire to belong to a group and to take pride in the successes of the nation were also reinforced; the peace advocates were just providing outlets for these desires that better aligned with the national ethos. In creating their critique of the “team” mentality in militaristic patriotism, the Practical pacifists provided a way to belong that also aligned with the value of individualism. Likewise, taking pride in one’s nation was also a good trait, as long as the individual only took pride in the positive aspects, like an engaged citizenry and economic strength.

Nevertheless, this replacement worked as a criticism of the American character. Through this discussion about the proper nature of patriotism, the Practical pacifists criticized the Americans for being too easily influenced by emotions instead of reason. The draw of the “shoddy” patriotism espoused by the militarists was the strong emotional
boost. This form of patriotism was volatile, but it was also characteristic of Americans, as even the peace advocates admitted to be influenced by it. Although the patriotism offered by the peace movement was one based upon reason and worked to counteract those emotions, they acknowledged that it would be difficult to break away from the emotionally-based patriotism. At the root of this argument, the Practical pacifists were claiming that the American character was too sentimental and not practical enough.

Significantly, this criticism also worked as a rhetorical argument. When their audience considered the arguments, the Practical pacifists also supplied the guidelines by which their audience should judge the debate between militarism and pacifism. They argued that Americans should be moved by reason and more reserved emotions, instead of being moved by the strong emotions and group mentality. While this has been a traditional rhetorical technique, it worked well for the Practical pacifists specifically because they rejected using strong emotional appeals in their arguments in favor of logical and ethical appeals. More importantly, though, is that they did not have an equivalent emotional appeal for the euphoric feelings provided by militarism. Therefore, it was in their best interest that they prepared their audience to recognize the emotional aspects of their opponents’ stances while claiming that rational and ethical arguments outweighed emotional ones. For them, the ideal audience member, and by extension the ideal citizen, was rational and held strong control over his or her emotions. In this way, the Practical pacifists’ use of law worked as a trope for the American ethos. Law represented the characteristics of disinterestedness and rationality, the characteristics that they believed that they and their audience shared, and the ones they wanted shaping U.S. society.
Rhetoric of Substitution

In this way, the Practical pacifists created a program for world peace based upon replacing parts of foreign policy and the American character that they perceived as needing substitution. At the root of these substitutions was a belief that the peace movement offered a way to approach international conflict that was more aligned with the values of the American character than those offered by militarism. For every key institution, ideal, or ideology presented by militarism, the peace movement replaced it with one that they considered more dominant in the circles of influence in American society: law for war, justice for honor, the police for the military, “native” American values for “foreign” European traditions, service for sacrifice, civic patriotism for militaristic patriotism. The end result was a representation of their type of pacifism as a superior replacement for militarism.

This approach allowed for two significant advantages for the peace movement. The first was that it created an ideal future that would not be difficult for people to grasp. It did not require that much change in society or human behavior, just that when international conflict arose, nations would seek legal means to solve it rather than try to kill each other. This made their plan seem less utopian than it was, especially being dependent upon the necessity of people be checked by law, because it was closely aligned with how their audience understood the world. This familiarity would have made any changes they advocated seem reasonable in nature.

The second advantage was that it allowed the peace movement to be critical of the militaristic bent in American culture without forcing it to attack the American values or ambitions at the root of the public’s fascination with militarism. They were critical of
certain choices made by governmental leaders that had moved the national agenda away from the essence of the American character; however, this behavior was represented as deviations from this character, ones instigated by specific individuals and organizations that advocated militarism. What the Practical pacifists objected to was the means by which the government chose to fulfill American aspirations to be a world power, not the aspirations themselves. In fact, the peace advocates argued that being a world power was an important aspect of the national character. The substitution was simply a matter of replacing what they considered a better way to reach these ends than the means offered by the militarists.

Through these acts of substitution, the Practical pacifists created a solution to the problem of war that never considered its causes. They were able to avoid raising questions about the nature of conflict or whether the structure of society might encourage acts of aggression. In this way they avoided the types of criticisms that were at the heart of the anti-war stances held by other groups: socialists, anarchists, and even groups of traditional non-resisters. Their approach was an endorsement of American values and way of life. The argument that they could solve the problem by choosing to replace the negative behavior with a positive one showed the strength of the American system; like law, society could “naturally develop step by step as new needs arise” while its core values and purpose “remains the same” (Davies 100). By choosing to represent the problem of war in this way, they could be careful not to offend their intended audience, who, like many of them, had been very successful in American society.
Chapter 3 The Barbaric Militarist: Practical Pacifism’s Use of Evolution, Civilization and the Narrative of Progress

During the first two decades of the twentieth-century, the idea of evolution permeated the arguments of the Practical pacifists. Theories of human evolution, in both their biological and social forms, appealed to the peace advocates as evolution worked both as a model of continuity as well as a model of progress. They saw it as a powerful means to question the relevance of the militaristic ideals, which the Practical pacifists believed represented the less evolved nature of the barbaric world. Incorporating the idea of evolution into their arguments, the Practical pacifists attacked the militarists’ support of war in two ways. By applying the ideas of biological evolution and eugenics to war, they challenged the claim that war helped to develop the necessary characteristics of manhood that would be needed for the United States to continue upon its path of international greatness. Additionally, by adopting the ideas of social evolution through the discourse of civilization, they questioned war’s role in supporting modern civilization and argued that it retarded the nation’s development. Both uses of evolutionary theory resulted in a materialist focus in their arguments against war, a focus that aligned with their middle-class audiences’ values and identity. Nevertheless, this discourse also created a conflicted stance among the Practical pacifists on the issues of imperialism and the necessity of Western nations to dominate less-developed societies.

As the dominant voice in the peace movement of the early-twentieth century, the Practical pacifists incorporated the most influential discourses in the United States of the time in order to attract their target audiences of the middle-classes. The Practical pacifist’s discussions about the dangers of war and the benefits of peace often included
statements that to a modern reader seem to have little to do with the larger topic, such as the following from Jane Addams in a speech about women’s role in peace keeping:

“whether we call ourselves evolutionists or not… it has so changed our point of view that unconsciously we realize …things which are now the results of the things which have gone before us” (“Woman’s” 253). Although this statement seemed to have little relevance to women and peace, Addams elevated the character of the peace movement by connecting that movement to one of the preeminent concepts in American thought.

In the late years of the nineteenth-century, Americans were enthralled by “philosophies and political theories built in part upon Darwinism or associated with it” (Hofstader Social 5). Despite the ideological threat that Darwin’s ideas produced in religious circles, its systematic and scientific approach appealed to the United States’ growing intellectual class and well-educated middle class (Commanger 87). Although he significantly changed the paradigm of the biological sciences, Darwin’s most enthusiastic advocates in the nineteenth century were found in the social sciences. Through the work of theorists like John Fiske, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Sumner, ideas from Darwinist evolution spread throughout many intellectual disciplines and were incorporated into various fields that studied social phenomena: history, anthropology, sociology, economics, political sciences. In these forms, evolutionary theory was used to reduce the social success of individuals to the benefit of their genetic background (Hofstader Social 4). Importantly, the application of evolution to these new fields of study required an adaptation of the core concept. Whereas biological Darwinism focused on the characteristics of a species that gave it advantages in their environment, the social applications focused upon creating a society where the predetermined “most fit”
individuals, typically middle- and upper-class white males, could thrive. Even though these extensions of the evolutionary theory worked against the ideology of the self-made man, social evolution was appealing as a means to justify the success of the American upper-classes as “in harmony with nature” (Commanger 89), so that by the early-twentieth century, the idea of evolution had won the minds, if not the hearts, of American society. The peace movement’s embrace of evolution marked its members as contemporary thinkers and progressive in their approach to the problem of war.

However, Addams’s extolling of evolution was not merely an appeal to cast the peace movement in a positive light; the evolutionary model provided the Practical pacifists with a powerful tool to represent the damages of war and militarism. Whereas the Practical pacifists used the ideas of law and justice to represent their approach to international conflict as a more American option than the solutions provided by the militarists, these arguments failed to show the physical repercussions of war other than the damage which took place upon the battlefield. Especially if war did not take place on a nation’s soil, the losses of war appeared limited to the death of soldiers, and, depending on the treaty that ended the war, money and land. Despite these outcomes, defenders of war could argue that it was not so destructive; war was an episodic event which provided a moment of loss that would be overcome. The power of evolutionary theory was that it provided a means to show that the damages of war were never limited to that brief moment of the battlefield; war disrupted society for years and generations after the fighting ceased. By adopting the evolutionary model for their arguments, the Practical pacifist found a means to show how warfare afflicted the whole of a nation, both through biological and sociological means.
War and the Loss of Masculine Virtues

The Practical pacifists used their evolutionary critique of war to attack a widely promoted idea about war: that it aided in the development of “masculine virtues,” the necessary characteristics for men to possess so their society can continue growing in cultural strength and be a dominant power in the world. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century gender ideals were infused with evolutionary concepts, as it was believed these virtuous masculine traits were those gained through struggle in the natural environment through the ages. Although the specific incarnations of these traits were somewhat enigmatic, they generally were associated with physical strength, strategic reasoning, and an assertive or aggressive personality. Still, the lack of definitiveness did not reduce the cultural value of the idea that masculine traits progressed society. As these traits allowed humanity to survive during its primitive stages, it was believed that these characteristics were equally important for having a strong modern nation. The continued success of the nation was dependent upon men developing the appropriate qualities, as these qualities led men to advance human development, create civilization, and allowed that civilization to develop into a world power (Bederman 185-6). However, being born male was not enough to assure that American men would become manly; modern men needed to develop the proper characteristics as men throughout history had, through physical struggles (Pettegrew 17).

According to advocates of this idea, the problem for modern men was that the industrialized nation was a mixed blessing for the middle and upper-middle classes. Even though office work and fiscal affluence provided them security from the economic and physical hardships experienced in the unindustrialized world and among the working
classes, these factors also robbed them of opportunity to develop the characteristics of manliness because their work did not engage them in a physical struggle. In a sense, society had evolved to where cultural norms and daily lifestyle no longer supported men’s innate developmental needs (Pettegrew 5). More dangerously the modern world was making men too feminine, because according to this view, masculinity functioned in a binary with femininity. Femininity, while being desirable in women, excluded them from being effective leaders. Therefore if men did not develop the proper qualities, they could not direct the nation on the path toward world prominence, and they left the United States in danger of becoming decadent and effeminate because they were overly civilized (Bederman 186). The solution was for these men to engage in activities that provided them a substitute struggle that allowed them to connect to their “inner-brute” that would lead to appropriate character development: sports, hunting, and warfare (Pettegrew 16-17). Of these alternative struggles, warfare was the most powerful as it was a true struggle for existence and not a symbolic substitute, like hunting and sports. In this way, the military claimed to take the best individuals in society and make them better by strengthening their character (249).

The Practical pacifists attacked this line of thought by challenging the basis of these beliefs. They noted that the advocates of militarism claimed war’s necessity was that “it stirs the nobler blood and the higher imagination of the nation, and thus frees [civilization] from moral stagnation” (Addams Newer 26-27). According to this line of thought, the end of war would mean “farewell to the race of heroes in the land… many great qualities would exist no more”; nevertheless, the peace advocates used evolution to show that “reverse is proven true” (Carnegie “Baseless” 98). The Practical pacifists
believed that war could ultimately cause the loss of these characteristics in civilized men through the means of biological devolution. Between the years of 1909-1914, this point of view was advocated primarily by David Starr Jordan, President of Stanford University and a prominent advocate of Darwinism and eugenics in the United States at the turn of the twentieth-century (Black 65). Although other peace advocates adopted these ideas and incorporated them into their criticisms of war, Jordan’s credentials made him uniquely qualified to use evolutionary biology to campaign against war.

The basis of Jordan’s argument was the Darwinian concept of the *survival of the fittest*, because of the “fundamental fact of biology that the laws in heredity which apply to man are those which govern the lower animals” (Jordan “Manhood” 400). When looking at animals, Jordan noted that the parents who have the best characteristics had the best offspring; thus, “the fundamental law” of heredity decreed that the quality of individuals “you breed from determine the future” (400). Adopting a social Darwinian view of humanity meant that “a race of men is essentially like a herd of animals. If similar processes are followed its nature is changed in the same way and the same degree” (“War” 130). Ultimately, these laws also determined the fate of nations, as the quality of a people was “determined by the qualities of those of its members who leave offspring” (130). Despite the variety of social reasons that could be provided, Jordan believed no state “has improved save through selection of the best parentage. None has fallen save through the choice of inferior stock for parentage” (400). What is significant is that Jordan established the question of character as one of scientific, rather than societal understanding. This distinction was intensified by Jordan’s use of the scientific argot; he spoke of “facts” and “laws of biology,” in opposition to the opinions of the
advocates of rugged masculinity, who merely had a sense that positive qualities were in decline. Even though he provided no specific measurements of the characteristics, the scientific frame made Jordan’s argument appear more concrete than his opponents. Additionally, Jordan prioritized human biology to the point where he excluded societal aspects and reduced all of human advancement to heredity.

Because the success of a culture was biological, the threats to a nation were also biological in nature. Natural disasters and disease sometimes eliminated people with the best qualities, but “whatever influence may cause the destruction of the strong, the brave, the courageous, the enterprising, will ensure a generation which shall show these qualities in lower degree” (Jordan “Manhood” 400). This is because instead of natural selection, the passing on of heredity “becomes subject to the operation of another law, the operation of reversed selection, or the biological ‘law of diminishing returns’” (“War” 138).

Moreover, Jordan warned, it was not just natural causes that resulted in reversed selection. Human society also created situations where the best stock were lost, and war was a primary source of this loss because its modus operandi was killing: “It is a costly thing to kill off men, for in men alone and the sons of men can national greatness consist” (“War” 147). The individual soldier’s death eliminated “more than one [individual] in the man’s life” (“War” 137). Jordan claimed, the “bullet that pierces his heart goes to the heart of at least one other” of the potential future generation, as men who were “destroyed by the action of social or political forces, these leave no offspring, and their kind in time fails to appear” (130). Significantly, Jordan’s reintroduction of societal influences on character was as artificial selection in opposition to the natural selection of biology. As this construct reinforced the importance of the biological in his argument, it
also highlighted the artifice of the claim that war improved masculinity. Instead of addressing the struggles that life produced for them, the proponents created their own challenges, ones that unnecessarily endangered the best men in the society. Unlike natural selection, which privileged the strong, healthy, and mentally alert, this unnatural form of selection put those same men into situations where those skills did not guarantee that they would succeed.

The focus on biology raised the question about the type and quality of men the military put at risk in times of war. Typically soldiers were “the young men of the nations, men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five;” i.e., men who were in their reproductive prime; additionally, the traits found in men who would volunteer to defend their nation were the same characteristics that made them good leaders in society (Jordan “Manhood” 403). When these men die in war, their potential to produce the next generation of leaders is gone. For Jordan, these facts led to the “inevitable result” that nations that engaged in warfare would discover dwindling numbers of men with “the qualities which are sought in the soldier,” and by extension future leaders (403).

Despite the loss of these characteristics in future generations, Jordan warned that the damage might not be noticeable in the immediate future. The loss of the natural leaders did not mean that nobody would lead the nation; it would just be led by men who were not as well equipped. Additionally, this loss would not “appear in the effacement of art or science or creative imagination,” because the men who “excel in these regards are not drawn by preference … to the life of the soldier” (403). However, Jordan believed that in this scenario, where, if another war arose, the lack of good leadership meant that this time any man might be sent to the slaughter of war. The philosophers, artists, and
scientists would be sacrificed in battle; only the most decrepit would be spared conscription, and “for better and for worse…it is they that determine what the future of the nation shall be” (403). Thereby the “seeds of destruction lie … in the influences by which the best men are cut off from the work of parenthood” (“War” 134), a situation that left “the nation crippled” (“Manhood” 403). His disability reference created a body metaphor in his description, as well as played upon the known corporal damage caused by war. The better classes of men, those with masculine virtues and to a lesser extent those with intellectual strengths, represented the limbs and the brains of the nation. The nation, like soldiers who came home missing limbs or with head trauma, would survive without its young men lost in war but not improve.

While Jordan’s argument was based primarily upon evolutionary theory, he also used examples to illustrate his points. Turning to history, Jordan declared that the “fall of Rome was not due to luxury, effeminacy, corruption, the wickedness of Nero and Caligula,” rather it was from the Romans diminishing the quality of their population through war (“War” 131-32). His choice of the Roman Empire functioned as an a fortiori argument; if he could show that his theory of biological devolution explained the decline of that great civilization, then no modern nation could be exempt from its influence. Looking at Roman history, Jordan noted that the Romans initially had great success from war and brought glory to their leaders; nevertheless, the growth and spread of their empire required ongoing military campaigns which whittled away the Roman men with the best characteristics. To Jordan, these battles meant that the quality of “men was lost in the aggrandizement of the few” (131). Still, this loss was not initially recognized because “the life of Rome still went on. But it was a different type of Roman
which continued, and this new type repeated in Roman history its weakling parentage” (“War” 132). This weakening of the gene pool deprived Rome of both a powerful army and effective leadership and “at the end the Roman world yielded to the barbaric, because it was the weaker force” (135). The destruction of the Ancient world’s greatest civilization was through its own dependence on war; a fact that robbed the world of civilization’s benefits until early modernity: “The divergence between what might have been and what has been is measured by the parentage of strong, capable and courageous men slain on the bloody fields of glory” (“Manhood” 403).

Moreover, Jordan did not limit his examples to the Ancient world. By providing other examples, Jordan was determined to show that his theory “applies not to one nation alone nor to one group of nations, but in like degree to all nations that have sent forth their young men to the field of slaughter” (Jordan “Manhood” 403). As a modern example of decline, he turned to the French. Using a description that Jordan attributed to the French themselves, he labeled the modern French society as “decadent” (137), with a falling birth rate and the average stature of men was at least two inches shorter than a century before (138). To Jordan, the obvious reason for this decline was the Napoleonic wars, where innumerable French soldiers had died, their remains scattered throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. When the able-bodied men in Napoleon’s army dwindled, Jordan quoted him as saying “A boy can stop a bullet as well as a man” (“War” 137). The use of boys as soldiers further depleted the source of France’s potential. This made France’s decline happen over a generation, rather than many generations like the Romans. The more men war destroyed, the sooner the nation’s weakness became apparent.
As a counter example, Jordan turns to Arthur Knapp’s *Feudal and Modern Japan*. Jordan notes that several times in the book, Knapp comments with amazement on “the great marvel of Japan’s military prowess after more than two hundred years of peace” (142). If the act of war honed the virtues of soldiers and leaders, then the Japanese should have lost these qualities; instead, “these virile virtues” were found to be “unimpaired” (142). For Jordan, the evidence pointed to the obvious:

We can readily see that this is just what we should expect. In time of peace there is no slaughter of the strong, no sacrifice of the courageous. In the peaceful struggle for existence there is a premium placed on these virtues. The virile and the brave survive. The idle, weak and dissipated go to the wall. (“War” 142)

Peaceful nations continued to maintain the best character traits in their populations, whereas the “warlike nation of today is the decadent nation of tomorrow… and in the nature of things it must ever be” (142).

The idea of the “decadent nation” worked to connect Jordan’s biological argument to an economic morality. Decadent can refer to decay or a decline, in the sense that Jordan was discussing biological devolution; however, it also signifies indulgence and wastefulness. An idea of economy predominates these examples, in the sense of the proper care of scarce resources. In Jordan’s examples, the nations that failed were those that viewed militaristic glory as the key to a nation, and in the pursing that goal, they wasted their human resources. The alternative would be to emphasize economic prudence by placing a premium on the men with the best characteristics. As the militarists wasted the best men in war, Jordan presented this mindset as inappreciative of
the most important resource of the nation. War was an extravagance that would biologically bankrupt the nation.

Jordan’s representation of humans as hereditary resources was reinforced by the way Jordan referred to humans as stock from which heredity was to be gained. These references dehumanized humanity; men stopped being individuals who might provide some contribution to society and became a conglomeration of superior or inferior traits. As Jordan reduced humans to biological traits for the next generation, he raised questions about the quality of the traits which one generation of fathers could provide to their offspring. In his discussion of the fall of Rome, Jordan claimed that “‘Vir gave place to Homo,’ real men to mere human beings” (“War” 133), which echoed the idea of investing in better quality objects. In this case, both “men” and “human beings” could be used to produce the next generation; nevertheless, in the sense that Jordan used these terms, the latter just had the form but none of the substance of the former. As reproduction was a matter of quality, it was better to reserve the premium resource for this purpose. This association of ideas made the militarists appear immorally indulgent in their advocacy for war.

Jordan’s arguments provided a foundation from which other peace advocates could argue against the emasculating effects of peace. Although few completely adopted his biological determinism, many other Practical pacifists used his evolutionary arguments as additional support for their more sociologically-based appeals. Pointing to the conservative nature of peaceful uses of masculine traits, Practical pacifists challenged the idea that only war could produce masculine men. Since biology determined masculine characteristics which would not disappear when applied to peaceful
applications, it only made sense that masculine virtues be transferred “from brutal blood-spilling to scientific and moral warfare” (Beals “From” 193). These new challenges would provide plentiful opportunities for men to apply their best qualities:

The world calls for a new kind of heroes—heroes to combat quietly and manfully with the wants and struggles of a race which confronts social problems of a magnitude to try the bravest hearts; intellectual heroes, moral heroes, heroes of philosophy, heroes of science; heroes who shall have no brass bands and drums and glad cheers to lead them, and so greater heroes than day of war ever knew.

(Hudson 413)

According to the Practical pacifists, the only thing that war provided was social spectacle. The pageantry of war only made it more indulgent, and the “deeds of peace [no] less heroic because less spectacular” (Wickens 259). This criticism expanded Jordan’s claims about the decadent nature of war. The effort and energy applied to promoting war both wasted resources that could be solving societal problems and played to vanity and self-aggrandizement. Peace appealed to the better virtues of men and produced tangible results for society.

Likewise, though they tended not to represent biological devolution from war as the sole reason for the downfall of nations, the Practical pacifists used war’s destruction of the strong as a powerful argument against conscription and the militarist’s desire for a standing army. This concern about undermining the hereditary health of the nation through militarism was worked into a criticism of the dangers of European-style militarism infiltrating American culture. Europe’s standing armies meant “Conscription enters into the homes of all of those countries and takes out of those homes the best blood
within them” (Catt 283). In recruiting for the military “the best physical specimens of the nations are carefully selected to be for a very brief hour the nation’s pride, the flower of chivalry, and then, too often to become ‘food for cannon’” (Lord 61). The danger was impressive as “two hundred thousand commissioned officers and about four million men regularly under arms in Europe alone” (75). In opposition to Europe, the United States did not require men to serve in the army, so that the best men of the nation could achieve great feats outside the realm of warfare.

These arguments were appeals to Anglo-Americans’ fears about racial denigration, which were wide-spread during the early-twentieth century. The fear that interracial breeding would weaken the characteristics of the Anglo-American society, many individuals opposed immigration as a way to protect American bloodlines (Jacobson 154-55). Interestingly, the Practical pacifists also worked to refocus those fears, which were spurred on by growing numbers of what Anglo-Americans had considered inferior races from Europe and Asia. Rather than appealing to these racially-based fears, Practical pacifists argued that it was the quality of the individuals that mattered. Despite their nations of origin, the people who immigrated to America tended to possess good characteristics, because America allowed them to capitalize on these very qualities (Lord 75), and they were “ready to adapt themselves to a new and vigorous civic life” (Addams Newer 51). In this way these immigrants continued on the “blood of the founders,” not in the sense that they came from England, but because the had the traits of “free-born men, be they Roman, Frank, Saxon, Norman, Dane, Goth or Samurai” (Jordan “War” 148). Essentially, these individuals were born with the qualities to be good U.S. citizens, no matter what race they were.
It is worth noting that Jordan left off three ethnic groups that had significant numbers in the United States: Africans, Eastern European Jews and Orthodox Catholics of Slavic heritage, and the Chinese, unless he intended the reference to Samurai to cover all Asians, which seems unlikely to someone who was an expert in eugenics. Likely his choices of inclusion and exclusion marked a recognized difference in the level of comfort that he believed Anglo-Americans had with the different ethnicities, which was also reflected by the legal status of these racial identities. Segregation, naturalization acts that treated all Eastern Europeans as suspected political radicals, and the Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited Chinese immigration, marked all these groups as inferior. Because governmental policy had deemed these groups as unworthy Americans, it is unlikely that their inclusion as those who carried the “blood of the founders” would have been appealing to the Practical pacifist’s audience. By excluding these ethnicities, the peace advocates could more effectively argue that it was not the new Americans that threatened American characteristics, but forces that eliminated the men with quality characteristics.

Ultimately, the Practical pacifists’ use of biological evolution to argue against war was based upon the quality of individuals lost in war. Had the military recruited or conscripted the sick, criminals, or the slow witted, all characteristics believed to be caused by genetic influence on character, it appears that there would be no basis to argue against war in this fashion. Since the military did not want these types of individuals any more than the rest of the nation, the Practical pacifist could take what supposedly be a strength of the military, that they took the best and brightest individuals and helped to shape them into the leaders of the nation, and turned it into a significant weakness. As the military was an organization that selected the strong and the smartest men from the
population to only put them in harm’s way, the Practical pacifists could represent it as a primary threat to the nation rather than its primary defense.

**The Discourse of Civilization and the Peace Movement**

Besides attacking war and militarism using biological evolution, the Practical pacifists also worked social evolutionary theory into their arguments by incorporating the civilization discourse. A widely used conceptual model at the turn-of-the-century in the United States, the civilization discourse developed out of the emerging field of anthropology into a wide array of social and scholarly discourses (Stocking 117). Even though the ideas of civilization and the use of it as a label to distinguish or favor one society from another was nothing new in Western culture, by the turn of the twentieth-century the evolutionary model had been incorporated into the discourse. This adoption made the discourse about more than cultural values; it became a discourse about the inescapable nature of human development (Bederman 29-30). The discourse was a conglomeration of traditional cultural prejudices, first-hand observation, and a loose understanding of Darwinism used both to explain social difference and to justify Western imperial dominance in the world. At the heart of the discourse was a narrative of social development, an evolutionary tale that explained the noticeable social and material differences among the worlds’ societies by separating the cultures of the world into different stages of social development, which were dependent upon a variety of customs, technologies, material goods and cultural institutions that had been observed globally. While the proponents of this world view varied the number of stages that humanity had gone through to reach its current state, the most widely used number was three (Wiebe
“Search” 141), which roughly equated to the scheme of savages, barbarians, and civilizations.

At the bottom were savages, societies that were considered to be one step away from a herd of animals by turn-of-the-century Westerners (Stocking 130). Their social organization was based upon familial relationships that at their highest level formed tribes; they had minimal material goods, including clothing; and they had only the most primitive technologies which helped them hunt and gather resources (Jacobson 51). Additionally, the savages were thought to be intellectually inferior, ruled by their instincts and emotions (Stocking 128). Next came barbarians, who had developed agriculture and had domesticated livestock which provided their societies with more stability. Intellectually more developed than savages, barbarians also had developed crafts and rudimentary trade skills (Stocking 116), which allowed them to accumulate more domestic goods, either through craft work or through trade with other groups (Jacobson 51). The barbarians had a larger social structure of “loose aggregates” based upon needs such as safety and access to natural resources (Wiebe “Search” 141). Because of this, leadership in barbarian society was based upon strength and the ability to conquer other societies (Bederman 25). At the top were civilizations, which were societies that held well established borders, like nation states (Wiebe “Search” 141), and were marked as having specialization in the social structure, both through the type of labor people did (Jacobson 50) and by gender roles (Bederman 25). Cultural institutions like a legal system, education, and representative government were also central to this identity. Moreover, civilizations were technologically advanced to the point that their
citizens were no longer dependent upon the natural resources in their immediate surroundings for survival (Jacobson 50).

The mechanism that determined the movement of a society through the different stages was an adaptation of social evolution that was combined with the concept of racial characteristics, in which an individual’s biological race determined his or her intellectual, moral, and personality characteristics (Bederman 27). In this combined theory, the characteristics that each society passed on represented the best qualities of that society; nature only allowed the individuals with the best characteristics to survive. Each generation moved its society up through the development scale; however, the predisposed racial traits affected the speed by which this happened. Despite the knowledge that the less developed societies would eventually reach the level of civilization, Westerners’ current inhabiting of a civilized society meant they would always be racially superior to their non-Western counterparts. This double standard made it possible to impose expectations and moral judgments upon the inhabitants of the non-Western world, without having to regard them as equals. Additionally, this inequality justified political and social interference by the West in non-Western lands, as the Western nations could justify such actions as filling a role that helped the less developed nations achieve civilization status (Jacobson 50).

The inequality between stages was the heart of how the Practical pacifists used this discourse. Even though they could not argue that war had never benefited societies, nor could they claim that force had never progressed civilization, they could argue against the appropriateness of civilized people depending upon military might to progress the nation. The Practical pacifists believed it was time for the most advanced nations to
stop killing men to solve disputes, like the other qualities of uncivilized societies that they had put behind. The most obvious way the Practical pacifists employed the civilization discourse was to label pacifists and militarists as civilized and uncivilized respectively. The Practical pacifists developed the idea of civilized pacifists and barbaric militarists, as both militarism and barbarism focused upon physical prowess and pacifism and civilization emphasized intellect and institutions that kept violence at bay.

When representing the state of the world, the Practical pacifists argued that “at the bottom is the small savage community in a perpetual state of warfare; at the top an orderly society stimulated and controlled by recognized ideals of social justice” (Addams Newer 23). Because of this standard, “the man who kills his fellowman in battle as a means of settling disputes remains barbaric” (Carnegie Response 415). Likewise, the peace advocates’ claim that for “civilization is to advance, we must have peace” (Dalton 35), meant that the growth and influence of the peace movement represented “progress, not only of the movement represented, but of civilization itself” (Woolley 97). On the other hand, the society that lifted up the soldier as a model citizen had no claim to civilization: “So long as we tolerate man-killing as a profession we are barbaric. Yes, savage” (Carnegie “Baseless” 100). Carnegie’s reference to the professionalization of the military was key to this form of criticism. The Practical pacifists believed that the use of force was sometime justified, yet it seemed inappropriate to have members in a modern civilization whose only function was to wage war.

For the Practical pacifists, productivity was at the heart of civilization. “Arts, science, and literature are developed by peace,” and contributed to the development of society (Dalton 35), where as “great armaments form the foulest blot upon the fair face of
civilization” because their only function is to destroy (Wickens 257). Similarly, the Practical pacifists believed that the “soldier of today who kills his fellows as ordered” was “the hero of barbarism,” whereas the peace advocate was “the hero of civilization who serves and saves” (Carnegie “Baseless” 99). This sense of productivity, pitted war and civilization as the antithesis of each other, because “War and savagery make constant contest with peace and civilization” (Brooks 336). By looking at the relationship between savagery and war, it was clear “war must be eliminated or civilization must perish” (Beals “From” 193).

Beyond the act of labeling, the Practical pacifist used this system to define the difference in character between the militarists and pacifists. A civilized society encouraged its members to pursue knowledge and truth, as civilization eliminated “force as an ultimate appeal and the race must, in self-defense, become a race of philosophers” (Hudson 413). Because the Practical pacifists were aligned with the goals of civilization, the “peace movement places the emphasis upon the man who can think rather than upon the one who can fight; it would make right stronger than might” (Woolley 100). This love of truth meant the “peace party makes no ‘mollycoddle’ plea about hardship and pain; it has no craven fear of death” (Mead Swords 106). Because they lacked an overpowering sense of fear, the Practical pacifists did not “seek the protection of force—armies and battleships;” rather, they pursued “the more secure protection of trust and confidence” (Dalton 36), which the Practical pacifists claimed as “the chief sign of civilization” (Brooks 336). The peace movement encouraged Americans to “promote friendship and confidence among nations and advance the cause of peace” (Dalton 36), which was modeled through their plan to establish a legal alternative to war: “We calmly
set up international tribunals, not because we are afraid to fight, but because we are strong enough not to fight” (Devine 1268). Since “confidence grows upon that which it feeds” (Brooks 336), Americans could “subordinate selfish interests to the common good, allay passion, promote self-control and give to individual, nation and race opportunity to ‘set the noblest free’” (Woolley 100), instead of worrying about having enough weapons to protect themselves. By pursuing non-militaristic means to create security, the Practical pacifists argued that the United States could pursue its goals in the international scene with “confidence in the continuance of present happy relations with all and cease expanding either army or navy” (Carnegie “Baseless” 92). It was through these means that “the dream of yesterday becomes the confident hope of today and the realized fact of tomorrow” (Pennington 272).

In opposition to their representation of the character of pacifists, the Practical pacifists claimed that militarists held the barbaric ideal of the “ethics of war” in that “might makes right” (Dalton 35); they did not care whether they were on the side “which is right but that which is strong” (Carnegie “Peace” 3). This trust in might also discouraged the intellectual and moral benefits that civilization had developed in men: “Can the man who hires himself to kill his fellowman for so much a month, as he is told to do by his commanders be called a developed man? I think he is behind his age” (Carnegie Response 415). According to the Practical pacifists, this trust in strength was rooted in other characteristics of both militarists and barbarians: fear and distrust. In the same way that “the distrust we find among the men and women of any given nation of barbarians” marked an uncivilized people (Brooks 336), distrust was rooted in the mind of the militarist. Militarists throughout the world did not believe in the power of law to
prevent war because “they do not trust each other; each suspects sinister designs in the other” (Carnegie “Peace” 7). This distrust resulted in a sense of fear that the “one way to maintain international peace … is by keeping our army and navy in such a state of preparation that there will be no temptation on the part of some one else” (Carnegie “Baseless” 91). Any movement toward securing peace through treaties and arbitration led them to experience nothing but “a constant increase of jealousy and suspicion, of fear and panic” (Jefferson 6), despite the fact that the “dreaded foe has never appeared; [the militarists’] fears were groundless” (Carnegie “Baseless” 91). In this way, “fear lies at the basis of all war—lies in that it is fundamental to war; lies in that it misleads and is positively false” (Brooks 339): it prevents people from seeing the good in the world and it encourages them to trust in physical strength for their security.

Representing the modern soldier as savage takes on a less metaphorical tone in a 1913 editorial comic by Robert Minor, which was originally published in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and republished in *The Survey*, a sociology journal which published many articles on the peace movement and editorials against militarism (Figure 1). The cartoon has a soldier looming over an enemy soldier on the ground. The soldier on the ground looks defeated and scared, as the man standing over him has a rifle with a bayonet pointed at his neck, ready to strike. Besides the sense of danger in the image, the strongest impression is the similarity between the two soldiers. They share the same build and have similar expression which makes them seem interchangeable and that, if the situation was reversed, the man on the ground would kill this enemy. The most notable feature these characters share is their physical build, both look impressively strong; however, when looking at their facial expressions, both men look frightened.
Although this would be understandable for the man on the ground, it seems strange for the man with the advantage of having a weapon. Moving to their facial structure, certain characteristics stand out: they both have small foreheads and elongated jaws. These are characteristics of Neanderthals, and it gives the both men a sense of being less evolved and lacking intellectual prowess. This second aspect is reinforced by the dialog: The man on the ground asks, “What have you got against me?”, to which is replied, “Nothing. But our masters have ordered us to fight.” This image undermines the idea of the brave, heroic soldier fighting for love of country. Here are two men in the field of battle who do not even know what they are fighting for, terrified of facing each other, but yet each seems ready to kill the other. They kill because they cannot question the orders they have been given and they are scared of their enemy. These characters not only act brutishly, they are completely un-evolved.

Through this association of militarists with the characteristics of the uncivilized societies and peace advocates with the qualities of civilization, the Practical pacifist provided a rhetorical “shorthand” for describing the character traits of each group. To a public familiar with this discourse, it would be clear that associating militarists with barbarians and savages was to represent them as aggressive and unintelligent. Likewise, the pacifists were being represented as intellectually and morally superior to the militarists. Even though it was clear they were creating social bias against their opponents, it was equally important that they have this association worked in the form of a binary. Because less developed societies were thought to engender valuable characteristics of manliness, the Practical pacifist could not just call militarists brutes. By placing the association in the form of the familiar binary of civilization versus
Figure 1: “What have you against me?” Editorial cartoon by Minor from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Notice that the facial features of the two soldiers resemble those of Neanderthals. (Minor 708)
barbarians/savages, the Practical pacifists encouraged their audience to choose a side of the binary with which to identify themselves. Ideally, this would have caused their audience to connect only the shortcomings of the uncivilized with the militarists, while associating with the positives of civilization with themselves.

This use of the civilization discourse also allowed the Practical pacifists to reverse popular associations about the effect of fear on each group’s character. Traditionally, peace advocates have been accused of cowardice and the militarists were lauded for bravery. Through the associations they created, the Practical pacifists took what could be considered one of the best characteristics of the militarist mindset, being prepared for the worst-case scenario, and turned it into the liabilities of being fearful and distrustful. Likewise, it allowed them to turn the character flaw of being overly-optimistic into the character strength of confidence. Just as important, these characteristics played a role in how the Practical pacifists’ represented each groups’ comfort with progress. Pacifists embraced and trusted progress, whereas militarists feared it and caused stagnation, either by refusing to accept it or by literal destruction through war. Since progress was the only way a society made it to the civilized stage, this made the militarists seem uncomfortable with the influence of civilization.

The unsuitability of militarism for the civilized world was strengthened as the Practical pacifists incorporated the idea of social development into their arguments. To further exploit the social prejudices embedded in the civilization discourse, the Practical pacifists incorporated its underlying narrative of social development into their arguments, recounting how humans had developed from the primitive stages to modern society. Taking the findings of recent anthropology and archeology work, as well as details from
history, the Practical pacifists presented their own version of the narrative of societal development, one that focused upon the effects of war and peace as humans moved from savagery to civilization. Although it was the outcomes of social evolution that mattered most to the peace movement—“that the subsidence of war was inevitable as society progressed….that every stage of human progress is marked by a further curtailment of brute force” (Addams Newer 23)—the retelling of the story held rhetorical significance.

Narrative is an important tool for persuasion in public discourse, as it presents a different paradigm for understanding the issue at hand than the typical presentation of facts by experts, an approach to discourse labeled “the rational world paradigm” by rhetorical theorist Walter Fisher. The rational world paradigm is based upon an idea of hierarchy, one in which certain individuals are considered more fit to lead than others, and that formal argumentation is the best mode to establish who is in which category. Additionally, it is heavily dependent upon the *ethos* of the expert to determine the truth of a situation through facts and specialized cultural understanding (268). As an alternative, Fisher suggests that a narrative paradigm is used when stories are used to explain a social issue. Building upon the assumption that “humans are essentially storytellers” (272), the effectiveness of the narrative paradigm is that it places the new information in a form that people are familiar with and use on a regular basis. This makes the new information seem more accessible than if it were presented through the rational paradigm. Unlike rational discussions, narratives do not depend upon the *ethos* of technical experts; instead, the key to effective persuasion through narrative is whether the audience recognize itself in these stories. Questions about the credibility of the story are based in the audience’s recognition of whether the story seems possible, and whether “what rings true in the
stories [matches] with what they know to be true in their lives” (272). Even though it does not completely reject questions about the factual accuracy of the story, the narrative paradigm privileges the sense of whether the narrative accurately represents the audience’s values and understanding of the world. This last feature of the paradigm was key for the pacifists’ use of their social development narrative, as it allowed them to make connections to the values of their target audience in a way that simply presenting historical facts and scientific findings would have been unlikely to create.

Appealing to the discoveries of the new sciences, the Practical pacifists presented the earliest stages of societal development as a time when all of humanity were savages, “a brutish, repulsive beast” struggling to survive in a world where “individual prowess determined the issue of every difference” (Pennington 272). Brute force was the determiner of survival, as food was gained through hunting “animals larger and stronger than himself…And, in all probability, when the prey was taken, the human hunters struggled amongst themselves for its possession” (Beals “From” 176). In these conflicts, “the winner … was he who had the heaviest club, the strongest arm or the thickest skull” (Pennington 272), and “the victorious human hunter doubtless ate his human victim” (Beals “From” 176), as human remains had been discovered among the animal remains, and in similar condition as the animal remains, at sites of prehistoric human dwellings. Looking accounts of contemporary primitive societies, the pacifists also noted that in the savage stage, kinship marked the “bond of primitive society,” and interactions with groups beyond kinship was “marked by universal belligerency” (Borchard 97).

Over time, individuals developed new ways to bring stability to their lives. Through “domestication of animals” and “the coming of agriculture,” society was
“brought to a higher stage” (Brooks 337). But despite these developments, humans were not free of peril: “There were backwards tribes and people who still preferred to live by fighting, instead of by toil, and who coveted the fat flocks and golden harvests of their industrious neighbors” (Beals “From” 176). Therefore the most advanced people needed to band together defend against their savage enemies. These external conflicts meant that “for a time advancing civilization brought but an increase” in the violence of war (272). Because it provided an impetus for people to reach out beyond their families, “war bequeathed to mankind … this ability to go out together” (Addams “Woman’s” 252) and functioned as the “gory nurse that trained society to cohesiveness” (W. James 6). The dangers of the time required humanity to form social relations beyond kinship, and a “tribal code of morality arose” teaching that, while violence was acceptable against other tribes, “justice should be practised [sic] towards one’s [fellow tribesmen]” (Hull 277).

Because of this level of social development, the barbarian stage, despite still being warlike, marked growth from savagery (Brooks 337).

As tribes grew into more complicated social organizations, humanity developed the makings of a civilization: “the home, one husband, one wife, church, school, state and it was through the ages that men have discovered that these are better than that which came before” (Brooks 337). Likewise, it was slowly through the ages that humanity “discovered that peace is better than war” (337), and with that discovery came changes in behavior. To deal with disputes inside the community “courts of law and equity arose, based on the need of humanity,” so that, when disputes between individuals arose, they were “settled in court… and not in personal combat with the bludgeon or the knife” (Pennington 273). Through the development of law, civilized societies were able to
avoid internal conflict. Similarly, the Practical pacifists argued that civilization also
influenced external conflicts, as behavior in war became less brutal. In the earliest stages
of war, sacrifice and cannibalization of the enemy was common; “later instead of eating
their prisoners, they sold them into slavery; and later …they exchanged them as prisoners
of war, *a la civilization*” (Brooks 337). Just as important, was that as the development of
civilization made war less brutal, it also made the destruction in war more tragic:

> War…destroyed the greatest library of ancient times, the Alexandrian; war it was
> that shattered the proudest monuments of Egypt, Babylon and Rome; by the
> blasphemy of war was the Parthenon of Athens ravished in on fearful night; the
> most glorious remembrance of the grandeur that was Greece. (Hudson 412)

Lacking great institutions and architecture, war among uncivilized peoples did not cause
such grandiose destruction.

As the most developed societies in the world approached the twentieth century,
many advancements had been achieved without the resort to war: “a civilization of peace,
with its world-wide commerce, its ocean cables, its telegraphs and railroads and its
million printing presses, is the quiet and certain spread of culture” (Hudson 412). The
Practical pacifists argued that modern civilization’s material benefits were not achieved
through the mechanisms of warfare, plundering, and domination of trade routes, but
through ingenuity and open trade (A. Johnson “Commerce” 8-9). The progress of
civilization no longer needed brute force; rather, it needed people of character to improve
their legal, economic, and intellectual well being. By abandoning war and taking on
these new causes, humanity “having come all the way from cave-dwelling to flat-
dwelling…will go on to new and higher attainments” (Beals “From” 193).
Attainment is the key idea in this narrative, as the story reflects not so much a story of Darwinist evolution, where random events define the fittest, but rather a story about how society had developed because individuals had strived for improvements. This would have made the narrative appealing to their target audience, as it mirrored the middle-class narrative of social mobility. Reinforcing that idea, the great gains of civilization that the Practical pacifists end their narrative with are essentially a description of the ideal middle-class lifestyle: monogamous marriage, a house, education and sharing of information, and the ability to purchase goods. A significant aspect of this narrative is how it reduced civilization to a gathering of material possessions. The most notable aspect of the savage stage of humanity, besides its brutality, was the lack of material goods. The comments on caves, clubs, and hunting reduces the savages’ material possessions to objects found in nature. Likewise, all the benefits that were listed for the savage stage, a strong arm and thick skull, are corporal. As humans progressed to the civilized stage, most of the advances commented upon were the securing of goods. Even with the references toward modern acts of creating and sharing knowledge, what was mentioned were the technologies used and not the knowledge itself.

Significantly, war is initially associated with meeting physical needs for survival, and as the narrative continues, the Practical pacifists associate war with the loss of possessions. The great losses to civilization from war were not the individuals who died, but rather, for example, the wondrous buildings and objects held in the Alexandrian library. Destruction of property was associated with individuals who did not appreciate the toil and industriousness of those who possessed it. This narrative emulated the middle-class concerns about their precarious status in the social structure and fears about
destitution. It also tapped into the work ethic that the middle classes attributed to themselves, the sense that their position in society was through steady toil and delayed gratification. This sense of the effort to attain the comforts of civilization was reinforced in the morals that the Practical pacifists drew from the narrative: “Civilization through the years has not come to us by the stroke of any pen or the speech of any man. It has come through pain and time” (Brooks 336). The Practical pacifists implied through this narrative that the advocates for war, which could only destroy the material gains of civilization, did not appreciate the effort required to achieve this level of material prosperity.

Because of the cost to develop a society into a civilization, those who were to achieve it needed to adhere to the law of social development: “As old systems fail to meet new conditions and new ideals they are discarded” (Pennington 272). It was this law that the militarists failed to abide by; instead of arguing about the usefulness of war to modern civilization, the Practical pacifist found militarists “justifying it by its past record and reminding us of its ancient origin” (Addams Newer 210). These arguments were just “echoes of the past; that war having existed from the earliest times has been and must remain and ineradicable element of humanity” (Carnegie “Baseless” 98). This marked the militarists as out of touch with modern civilization. Nevertheless, militarists refused “to admit for a moment that war may be a transitory phenomenon in social evolution” (W. James 8). According to the militarists, war was not merely an institution of society, “it is interwoven with every fibre of human growth and is at the root of all that is noble and courageous in human life” (Addams Newer 210), a “a biological or sociological necessity, uncontrolled by ordinary psychological checks and motives. War is, in short,
a permanent human obligation” (W. James 9, emphasis in original). The idea that humans were obliged to kill each other for no reason other than it had always been done, made war seem less about heroic action and more of a perverse tradition from which modern humanity should be able to distance itself.

However, by 1913, the Practical pacifists insisted that Americans “remember that the human race progresses; …that the past is not to be considered, but the present,” and the present showed that humanity had “outgrown the age of war” (Carnegie Response 415):

In his primal jungle he was just ‘an animal among animals,’ a red-handed and red-fanged killer, an eater even of his fellow-man. …We have come so far that we shall not turn back to cannibalism and jungle life. Never again will the world tolerate Seven Years’ Wars, Thirty Years’ Wars and Hundred Years’ Wars. Never again will war be the normal state of society and peace the exception.

(Beals “From” 192)

Just as humanity had discarded the more savage acts of warfare—man “no longer eats his fellows, or buys and sells them, or sacrifices prisoners of war, or puts vanquished garrisons to the sword, or confiscates private property, poisons wells, or sacks cities” (Carnegie “Peace” 3)—the Practical pacifists believed that “Future ages are to regard this heinous crime [of warfare] as we today regard those of past times” (Carnegie “Baseless” 100). This focus upon change made the defenders of war seem in denial about improvements in society.

The Practical pacifists recurring references to cannibalism allowed them to represent war as a dangerous activity. The image of cannibals has been used as a trope of
the ultimate “other” in the representations of civilization in the West (see Guest), and the
Practical pacifists used this trope to reinforce their other arguments against the militarists’
uncivilized behavior. By associating cannibalism with warfare, the pacifists made a
familiar institution seem foreign and repulsive. Moreover, used within the peace
discourse, cannibalism represented the nature of warfare, as the pacifists listed it as an act
of warfare or as the aftermath of a violent human conflict. Like cannibals who not only
killed their fellow humans but also consumed the body, war’s damage was not limited to
the battlefield but also the entire society. The savage mentality at the heart of militarism
would eat away at a civilized nation and lead to its destruction; for “as the savage society
comes under the dominion of a common moral consciousness, it moves up [toward
civilization], and in proportion as the civilized society reverts to the use of brute force, it
goes down” (Addams Newer 23). According to the peace movement, the militarists’
appeals to the “primal instinct of man” threaten to move society to abandon “all the
accumulated restraints of centuries of education, progress and civilization” in order to
“assert itself in all its original savagery” (Wickersham 18). The Practical pacifists saw
this reversion in character as threat to civilization, as it could cause “the destruction of the
painfully acquired bonds of equity, the ties of mutual principle, which are wrought with
such effort and loosed with such ease” (Addams Newer 23). Modern humanity existed in
a “perennial contest between might and right” (Wickersham 17), and trust in the power of
might was an all-consuming threat to civilization.

Emphasizing the positive aspects of change was key to how the Practical
pacifists’ used their narrative of social development. Although change was the
foundational idea in evolution, as mentioned above, this story of societal development
was about individuals creating their own change. Importantly, self-created change was also the underlying narrative to the American ideals of self-improvement and social mobility, and both of these ideals were key to middle-class identity. As presented in this narrative, militarists did not believe humanity had the ability to change, whereas the pacifists attributed all of humanity’s advancements to its ability to undergo change. Although not a perfect re-telling, the rise of civilization significantly mirrored the narrative of the rise of the middle-class. Emphasis on hard work and choosing a better way of life would have appealed to middle-class values, as would have the threat of downward mobility, either as a class or a society. Whereas the militarists’ tales of battlefield glory encouraged individuals to engage in a fantasy of a more exhilarating life, the pacifists’ narrative engaged their audience with a story that mirrored the real struggles of their everyday life. In this way, the militarists’ talk about the glory of war represented as a dangerous diversion, one that distracted the nation from doing what was necessary to succeed; one that could lead to the nation’s downfall. The militarists’ stories engaged their audience’s emotions, whereas the pacifists’ appealed to their audience’s sensibilities.

The peace movement’s application of the ideas behind the civilization discourse worked to bridge their values with those of the American middle-classes. Essentially, the Practical pacifists claimed that the world worked exactly how the middle-class thought it did, that the rules that had provided their successes in were universal rules that governed all societies. Through this act of universalizing middle-class mores, the middle-classes became the central actors in the peace movement’s version of civilization’s development,
which both reinforced their values and created a greater stake for them in the preservation of civilization. Peace became insurance to protect the fruits of their labors.

**War, Imperialism and the Spread of Civilization**

Assigning universal application to American living took on another aspect within the Practical pacifists’ incorporation of the civilization discourse. One key feature of the discourse was its emphasis on spreading civilization by introducing its benefits to uncivilized societies. The traditional means of spreading civilization had been through the conquest of foreign lands, thereby creating empires of civilization. Although Practical pacifists advocated a variety of approaches to spread the benefits of civilization, dealing with the issue of imperialism was not so simple. Significantly, by embedding the civilization discourse within their arguments for peace, the Practical pacifists created an uneasy relationship between their plans to end war and the role of imperialism within their rhetoric.

The Practical pacifists wanted to represent the peace movement as having the same motivation that “sent Livingstone to darkest Africa, and today is moving the strongest nations to send their missionaries and teachers to lighten the way of the weakest” (Wickens 260). As civilization and peace were inseparable, the spread of Western influence in the world meant that it was necessary to establish peaceful practices in the savage world, along with Western education, science, and governmental institutions (Bryan “White” 217). Moreover, they equated the means to achieve peace with other philanthropic efforts to spread the benefits of civilization: “Reasonable men are now inoculating their less civilized brethren with the feeling that the settlement of international disputes by violence is abhorrent to honor and justice” (Thorndike 3).
These types of connections reflected the belief that the stimulation of the “other tastes” of civilized life insured “that the peace of nations may bring an added zest and richness to life” (3). The spread of civilization meant that “differences in race, customs, manners, language, and distance—once such effectual barrier to international affairs—are fast being swept aside,” and improved the nature of international relations in the world (Dalton 35). For the Practical pacifists, spreading civilization worked as a humanizing activity; it made foreign individuals less alien by having common cultural connections between nations. Even though they acknowledged that connections had fiscal advantages for American businessmen, it was the sense of familiarity that was important to the peace advocates. They believed that familiarity would reduce the need for war because people would better understand each other and have common ground to find a peaceful solution to the problem.

This dedication to the spread of civilization created an interesting relationship between the Practical pacifists and the imperialist expansion of Western nations. Even though the imperialistic goal of placing all of the world’s lands and peoples under the control of Western civilizations helped spread civilization; on first glace the members of the peace movement seemed uncomfortable with aligning themselves with imperialism. However, since the Practical pacifists lacked a hard-line approach to the issue of force, many members of the peace movement appeared ambivalent toward the issue of imperialism. Their discomfort with the idea of imperialism was most noticeable concerning the United States’ imperialistic acquisitions from the Spanish-American war. A number of prominent peace advocates criticized what they considered the U.S.’s shift to imperialism, focusing upon the U.S. rule in the Philippine islands. William Jennings
Bryan believed that imperialism made “force—brute force—the only foundation of government” (“Imperialism” 37), Jane Addams claimed that imperialism confused civilization with “the controlling of weaker men through brute force” (quoted in Hansen 139), and Lucia Mead argued that the conquest of these lands was “an arrogant and offensive position” that ignored the national ideal that “independence is a right” (“Swords” 128). At the heart of this critique was the concern that the United States had rejected its own traditions and that imperialism made the nation dependent upon force.

Nevertheless, the Practical pacifists also acknowledged that these lands marked valuable acquisitions for United States trade, though this acknowledgement was often accompanied by questioning if American lives were worth increased trade (Bryan “Imperialism” 41, Mead “Swords” 134, Jones 225). And the solution provided by the Practical pacifists reinforced the importance of trade: neutralization of the Philippines (Jones 224). To the Practical pacifists, neutralization meant that America should develop a “paternalistic relationship” with the islands where “the need of temporary guidance and control” by the United States was justified until the Filipinos were ready for self-rule (Mead “Swords” 121-22; 133 ). After that short period, the U.S. would aid the Filipinos in their movement toward a modern nation through trade relations (133-34). Additionally, the U.S. would still play a protector role to prevent other nations from invading the Philippines, presumably until the international police was formed, but not dominate the nation with the military (Jones 225). Although this scenario did not fit the Practical pacifist’s critiques of imperialism, it was clear that they believed Western nations had a right to determine the proper fate of none Western peoples, because of the West’s innate superiority. Though this relationship did not necessarily create benefits for
Americans to the exclusion of Filipinos, the Practical pacifists’ argument that they were not advocating an imperialistic relationship was based more in semantics than political practice. Neutralization would allow the benefits of empire, while avoiding the negatives of a military occupation.6

The ambivalence of the movement’s stance was more clear when the Practical pacifists shifted from the specific topic of U.S. imperialism to the more general idea of Western nations dominating non-Western societies. Opposing imperialism because one nation forced its rule upon foreign people for “its own selfish gain” did not stop the peace movement from arguing that “a group of strong nations may provide control and guidance to the savage races” (Mead Swords 135). Because of their narrowly defined idea of imperialism, based in the idea of one nation forcing its political and economic will on a foreign people, the Practical pacifists could support a group of nations carrying out the same behavior they would condemn from an individual imperial power. In their understanding, the collective nature of the imposing force prevented the individualized gain at the heart of imperialism. Therefore, the collective action on the part of civilized nations removed imperialism’s threat to international relations. They believed imperialism’s harm to maintaining peace was the animosity it caused between world powers because one powerful nation was challenging the influence of the others. If a group of world powers acted in concord, then no animosity could arise between them.

Moreover, this ambivalence was shown through the Practical pacifists’ discussion of the role that representative government played in bringing about world peace. Citing

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6 Ultimately, this was the route that the U.S. government took in 1916, when Woodrow Wilson signed the Philippines Autonomy Act. See Jacobson, 246.
Emmanuel Kant’s observation that nations with representational governments were more peaceful, and therefore this type of government was a necessary precursor to assure perpetual peace, the Practical pacifists argued that the growing number of representative governments meant that world peace was realizable in the near future. Declarations about how “all the peoples of the world have achieved in some measure representative government” (Holt 433), besides being an overly optimistic view about the status of representational government in the world, were indifferent to the means by which that government was installed. Likewise, claims that representational government had “taken war out of the hands of kings for the satisfaction of personal and dynastic ambitions” (Borchard 104) ignored the issue of means. The peace advocates seemed indifferent to whether these advancements were made through internal development of the society or they were forced upon one society by another.

This ambivalence bordered upon advocacy for the use of force when advocates of the international police force claimed that it would “keep any nation Friday from relapse into wholesale murder, arson, and political cannibalism” (Thorndike 3). The use of “nation Friday” to evoke the subservient savage of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe made it clear that this threat of force was directed toward the non-Western world, and that the responsibility of the benevolent West was to control uncivilized nations as a means to uplift them. Significantly, this was not necessarily contradiction in their pacifist ideology. Unlike non-resistance, Practical pacifism was not opposed to all uses of force; it allowed force to be used if greater harm would be caused by not using it. However, it is not clear how Practical pacifists would decide whether a situation required the use of force, as one of the international police’s functions was “prevent war between such
outlying regions as still are savage” (Mead “Common” 256). Mead’s reference to savage areas might be taken metaphorically, i.e., any nation that participates in war is a savage society, her description of these areas as outlying—laying outside of the civilized world—makes it clear that she is referring to what would have been considered uncivilized lands. As the necessary tools for peace, such as a trust in rule of law and confidence in other people, were considered markers of civilized cultures, the discourse implies that barbaric nations could not be trusted to follow international law; it would be pointless to try to make treaties with them until they became civilized. Therefore, it was not unthinkable for Practical pacifists to argue that civilized nations should use force with barbaric people if the goal was to help the uncivilized advance their cultures to the point where they could be subject to international law. This way the Practical pacifists were assured that the uncivilized peoples of the world would not disrupt peace or the progression of civilization. These actions would have been in line with the Practical pacifists’ views on force, especially if the use of force on the indigenous peoples by the occupying force was kept to a minimum.

This ambivalence and indirect advocacy might reflect an uncertainty on the Practical pacifists’ part about the U.S. public’s feelings toward imperialism. In the years after the Spanish-American War, the question about whether the United States government should pursue imperialist policies was hotly debated. The question of imperialism came down to whether it was a necessary step for the United States to become a world power, not to mention a memorial to the Americans who had died to attain and hold onto these lands, or was it a drain on resources, as well as a betrayal of national ideals (Jacobson 245-46). This would have made it difficult for the peace
movement to take a clear stance. Even though many Americans did not want to waste their countrymen’s lives in a quest to control foreign lands, it was clear that the appeal of empire was attractive to a nation that had begun seeing itself as a world power. The stance they did hold was ambiguous enough that they could still be attractive to either camp in the imperialism debate.

More importantly, though, this awkward relationship with imperialism seems to be a result of how the Practical pacifists had defined themselves as a movement. As discussed in chapter 1, despite peace being the defining characteristic of the movement, the Practical pacifists privileged other ideals, such as law, justice and economic advancement, as the end goals of the movement. The establishment of civilization throughout the world trumped the demand that nations only use of peaceful means to spread it, because once civilization was established, peace would follow. Even though it placed them in the paradoxical situation of being peace advocates who may have to turn a blind eye against the use of military force to achieve their goal, this displacement of peace might have made the Practical pacifists’ arguments appealing to a larger audience. This stance also allowed them to oppose the violent aspects of their narrowly defined imperialism while reinforcing the superiority of civilized nations over uncivilized ones.
Chapter 4: The Business of Peace and the Waste of War: Economic Arguments against Militarism

Many of the arguments put forth by the Practical pacifists in the years of 1905 to 1918 focused upon the toll that militarism and war were taking upon the American economy. Likewise, the peace advocates often spoke about the positive results that peace had brought to the American business community. In taking on the issue of the economics of war and peace, the leadership in the peace movement hoped to attract members of American business community to join the cause for international peace. The leaders of the peace organizations believed making their cause attractive to the business community would allow peace advocates to achieve a persona associated with the successful businessman: practical, reasonable, and socially conservative. This business persona would allow the peace advocates to assume a “neutral” position when making their arguments against militarism.

Appealing to Businessmen

The decision of the Practical pacifists to specifically focus upon the business community was made based upon the role business men were playing in the United States. Attracting businessmen to the cause of peace would pull another sector of influence into the movement, and leaders of the peace organizations believed the business community was a likely ally. The business community was considered a significant area of influence for several reasons. As Wiebe has pointed out in *Businessmen and Reform*, during the first part of the twentieth century business men, as a general group, were already participating in the world of social and political reform, often in very influential roles. The wealth that they had to offer the organizations that they patronized made them
important contributors to reform organizations; just as important, though, was the extensive number of professional organizations that thrived throughout the business community that provided easy networks of influence (212). The peace movement wanted to present itself as another active community that provided business leaders an opportunity to show their spirit of civic duty and would make best use of the skills that allowed them to succeed in their professions (Marchand 75). Additionally, the leaders of the peace organizations believed that there was already a shared interest between the desires of the peace movement and the business community, even if the average businessman was not aware of it.

Beyond these important financial and organizational supports the business community represented, the recruitment of businessmen also was important for the way the Practical pacifists hoped to represent the peace movement to the larger American public. The ethos of the American businessman possessed high cultural capital at the time. Businessmen were viewed as individuals of significant political clout, because of their financial and networking influences; at the same time, they were thought of as spokesmen for the typical American, because their fortunes were made by appealing to the masses and meeting their needs. Additionally, the business community was thought to be comprised of individuals who were pragmatic thinkers beyond the influence of the type of sentimental thinking that the Practical pacifists believed undermined the goals of the peace movement (Marchand 81-82). The addition of the business community would help the peace movement recreate the persona of the peace advocate as a significant cultural reformer.
To carry this out, the peace movement needed to show the harms that militarism and warfare inflicted upon the economy, while promoting peace advocacy as a pro-commerce cause. This would not be an easy task. The American Socialist party had spent the latter half of the preceding century equating war with the exploitation of capitalist commerce. In 1915, the party promoted the stance of American neutrality in the European conflict along with their program of societal reform, because “capitalism, inevitably leading to commercial rivalry and imperialism and functioning through the modern state with its vast armaments…leads to war” (in Chambers 62). At the same time, there were members of more traditional peace organizations that focused upon nonresistance and believed the emphasis on attracting the economic elite diluted the message of peace (Holmes 65). It was important to make the merger between the two communities as one that bolstered both sides. In this way, the arguments put forth had to be both economically conservative and ideologically grounded.

To help achieve this, the peace movement depended upon the ethos of their speakers. A primary way this was achieved was to have the economic appeals presented by a variety of individuals who had clout in the two communities: notable businessmen, such as Andrew Carnegie of U.S. Steel and Edwin Ginn of Ginn and Company Publishing; economists, such as Alvin S. Johnson of Cornell University and John B. Clark of Columbia; public officials, such as Secretary of Commerce Oscar Straus and Secretary of State Elihu Root; as well as prominent figures in the peace community, such as David Starr Jordan and Lucia Mead. The strength of this approach was that it allowed for a variety of expertise that made the arguments appear matter-of-fact. It was not just the economic or pacifist view that supported this merger but both camps. In addition, the
peace advocates established a favorable character through developing a sense of goodwill towards their audience. Through these two approaches, the peace movement made their arguments appear well-rounded and the melding of the two communities natural.

**Economic Arguments against War**

To attract the interest of the business community, and to show a connection between the nation’s economic well being and peace, the Practical pacifists needed a sophisticated approach to the matter of war and economics which would allow them to argue against militarism while they distanced the peace movement from radical politics. To do this, the peace advocates needed to break the association between military actions and economic expansion. They approached this by showing what the business community, and the rest of the nation by extension, had to lose from war. Ideally, not all men would be expected to take their place on the battlefield, and the most influential leaders of the business world would have been past their primes for such heroics. Nevertheless, the peace advocates found a way to make the threat of war a personal threat for the business community. If war did not threaten the lives of businessmen, the peace movement made it clear that it threatened their livelihoods.

When looking at the economic affects of war, the peace advocates drew from contemporary events. Using the Balkan Wars as an example, the peace advocate Robert Root pointed to the economic results: “the records in Vienna, Austria, show that the business failures in January, 1913, were five and one-half times as many as the failures in January, 1912” (511). Because business thrived in situations where the return on the investment was most likely, the cost of war, along with the social instability it created, worked against the interests of business: “War and commercial certainty, like disgruntled
litigants, are not on speaking terms” (Mohonk 25). Beyond the economic instability caused by warfare, the cost of building an army and fighting a war would leave any country that might be considered a victor in oppressive debt (Jordan “Appreciation” 575). The peace advocates were clearly playing to the concerns that their audiences had about the stability of the market place, as the closing years of the nineteenth century and opening years of the twentieth century were a period of great economic instability.

Another approach of the Practical peace movement was to disassociate war from trade. One way that the Practical pacifists handled this situation was to discuss the positive link between war and trade as an issue of the past. Much like their arguments for linking peace to civilization, peace advocates argued that the progression of society had changed the nature of international business and economics. Because of this, peace advocates could argue that although “the competition of commerce to get the materials for industry or to market goods has been the chief incentive and occasion for the world’s warfare” (Taylor 353), the development of civilization meant that “war and commerce, united through a thousand years, are now in fact divorced” (A. Johnson “Commerce” 4).

The peace advocates argued that the great profits gained by war was the result of discovering and opening new markets or securing lands with valuable resources: “A fortune was easily to be had through the exploitation of existing differences in value scales” (A. Johnson “Commerce” 7). It was this disproportionate balance of these initial contacts that made them “exceedingly remunerative to the first comers” (7), and securing them was worth the expense of going to war and protecting the profits from both external threats and the uprisings of the exploited peoples. However, “profits of such character could not be permanent” (8), and as time continued the return on the investment
plummeted. According to the peace advocates, the time had come where “political control over new territory may gratify pride and minister ambition, but can have only a slight effect to advance [economic] welfare” (E. Root 33). Existing in a world without new markets to be tapped, the cost of war outweighed the economic benefits of the aggressive action.

Once they had shown that the great profits from trade with undeveloped nations was not a likely source of future economic growth, the peace advocates pointed to trade between developed nations as the new source of wealth and stability. By the late nineteenth-century, the growth in American agriculture and industry had made trade a necessity to keep the economy afloat (Jacobson 16). The Lake Mohonk Conference explained the relationship in their 1911 pamphlet “Business Men’s Bulletin No.10”:

We manufacture and raise more goods and produce in eight months than we consume at home in a twelve. The four months’ surplus must be either exported or the home capacity for consumption greatly increased. Merchants who have secured foreign markets not only open the avenues to their own output, but by lessening the competition at home, materially assist the man whose business is local. (24)

The necessity of trade to prevent surplus and keep the economy stable created a world where “the wealth and progress of other lands are the direct source of wealth and progress of one’s own” (Strauss 64). According to the peace advocates, the growing “freedom of trade regardless of political control” (33) had little respect for the political bickering between countries: “England’s largest, best customer, paradoxial[sic] as it may seem, is Germany, her supposed worst enemy” (R. Root 509). Looking beyond the
political conflicts and concerns of the day, the “wise businessman … is considering the
to-morrows of trade as well as the to-days” (Mohonk 24). By taking an economic
approach to international affairs, the Practical pacifists could dismiss outdated grievances
between the United States and other nations. Like a successful business, the peace
movement focused upon concerns for the future rather than the problems of the past.
Likewise, the Practical pacifists could ignore the supposed threat of Japan, because “the
future growth of international trade lies largely in the far East and when that day comes
Japan’s friendship to us will be as valuable as is England’s today” (Schmidlapp 523).
The importance to international trade resulted in a situation where modern nations had
“all become so necessary to each other that we cannot get along, or even exist very long
without each other” (Taylor 353). For this reason, the importance of international trade
meant international stability was paramount and acted as a barrier to war. Peace and
prosperity were “indissolubly joined together” so that “what God has economically
joined, let no man put asunder” (Levering 521). The peace advocates made the loss of
trade appear so daunting that “the prize of aggression must be great indeed to
counterbalance the injury sustained by war with both production and commerce” (E. Root
33).

The link between stability and economic growth required that the United States
not stand idle while other nations engaged in war. The interconnectedness of trade meant
that, if war broke out overseas, the U.S. economy could still be harmed. The Boxer
Rebellion, which took place in China, had enough effect on the United States cotton
industry that a number of mills were forced to close (Capen in Marchand 79). This
interconnectedness assured that “‘no nation liveth unto itself nor dieth into itself’ in the
complex relations of the twentieth century civilization” (R. Root 509). Therefore, “any interruption of these necessary international relationships menaces human existence, costs too much for any people to afford” (Taylor 353). By looking at the facts relating to modern business and warfare, the peace advocates felt certain that “war is the arch-enemy of such progress” (R. Root 514). Therefore, it was significant to avoid warfare to assure continued economic health.

What is more significant, however, is the way that the peace advocates represent the nature of business. Traditionally, business has been described as a competition for limited resources; however, the Practical pacifists’ rhetoric highlighted the interdependency that allowed modern industry and trade to flourish. Rather than presenting commerce as a win or lose situation, the model presented by the peace movement was one where one person’s business success lead to the benefit of another, not only in complementary areas (the producer of resources and the industry that creates a product out of them) but even between “competing” businesses (the man who sells his sewing machines overseas makes room for the man who sells his domestically). Interdependence was the reason the Practical pacifists could claim that the bind between business interests and peace were indissoluble and the reference to divine blessing was used: the Practical pacifists were making a claim about the nature of business in the twentieth century. They did not just represent their opinion about business; rather they assert that the core of business was cooperation. By focusing upon the more cooperative aspects of business, the peace advocates made it easier for their audience to associate business practices with peace.
Another way the Practical pacifists strengthened this tie was to emphasize that capitalism and trade did not automatically lead to war, as the socialists claimed. Even though they acknowledged that business and trade was at the root of many historical aggressions, their descriptions broke this connection. Using language like “disgruntled,” “divorced,” and the lack of “speaking terms” highlights the gulf between militaristic and business ideology. Likewise, Johnson’s discussion to the short-termed profits gained through force referenced to character of the method, implying that the aggressive nature of the approach poisoned the possibility of having long term profits. The Practical pacifists created a sense that businessmen who were not looking for a quick buck understood that true wealth could not be gained by force, which undermined the conspiratorial nature of the socialists’ critique.

Despite this change in focus in the nature of commerce and weakened connection between war and business, the approach to the market took essentially a non-reformatory stance. Their economic arguments are based upon the idea that capitalism is self-corrective, that even the necessary changes to check past excesses were inspired by the demands of the market. The peace movement did not present a new way to do business, nor did they suggest that the end goals of the market place were a problem; rather, they embraced business practices and the profit motive in their appeals. Additionally, they were not asking the business community to sacrifice for the betterment of society. They required no changes in society other than an acknowledgement of what was in the nation’s best interest for the long-run. All the peace advocates asked of their audience was that they recognize that the numbers do not add up between the expense of war and
the possible economic gains. All that the peace advocates asked of the business community was to choose enlightened self-interest.

**Economic Arguments against Preparedness**

Having established the economic threat that war posed for United States, the Practical pacifists believed that the next pertinent question was how to prevent war from happening: “Whether through a lavish expenditure in preparing for war, or the more economic basis such as has been practiced in this country until within recent years” (Schmidlapp 522). Since it was clear that the government was taking an aggressive approach to military preparedness and expansion, the peace advocates asked their audience to look at the results:

Now we are among the foremost in naval expansion. Has this tended to either lessen other nations’ fear of us or to make us less anxious for our own safety? Is not the very existence of these large armaments the greatest source of alarm among the nations? (Ginn 154)

Rather than discouraging international strife, the building of arms seemed to encourage it, to the point where “preparations may perhaps best be treated as war itself in its primary form.” (A. Johnson “Expansion” 5). If preparedness did not seem to help international relations, then why was it continued? The only answer that the peace advocates could find was that the “present system means a great deal of business for somebody; there are large contracts to be secured” (154). The peace advocates needed to present this fact carefully. By addressing this point, the peace advocates hoped to show themselves as realists. However, in trying to focus their audience upon the bottom line, they needed to avoid promoting the money to be made in armament production and
reestablishing the capitalism and war connection. One way was to represent the money gained from preparedness as “a great selfish force” (Ginn 154) and “a corrupt dollar…graft” (Jordan “Appreciation” 573), which allowed them to separate the business of armament manufacturing for the rest of the legitimate economy. In this way, the corruptive nature of the business was limited.

Another approach to address this problem was to put that the money gained into context. This way the peace advocates could acknowledge that “war preparations do furnish a certain amount of employment” (R. Root 511), while arguing:

The point for the taxpayer to consider is that money put into the employment of men in making armaments cannot be put into the making of sorely needed railroads, engines, and machinery, into steel bridges and steel buildings and farming tools, as it might be if left in the pockets of the taxpayers, who would then be free to spend it for such constructive purposes. (Mead Swords 82)

By listing the civilian projects that military contracts could fund, the Practical pacifists provided a context by which their audience could judge whether the economic gains by “mills of death and destruction” (R. Root 513) were enough to justify continued support. Importantly, this context raised a question about who truly paid for military expenses. Although the contracts came from the government, the money to fulfill those contracts came from “we the people” (R. Root 511). In this way the peace advocates made transparent the source the government’s revenue was taxes and war bonds. The government did not earn money in the way a
business does, rather it received money from sources “which select working men for their victims” (Clark 6). By focusing upon taxes and bonds, the Practical pacifists transformed the government from a source of income for the manufacturers of armaments into a competitor for economic resources that could be used in other ways. This allowed the peace advocates the opportunity to consider how efficiently the government spent the money it had taken away from working people and the results of these actions.

Even as they highlighted that the source of the money that was gained by government contracts, it was just as important to cite the amounts that the American government actually spent. The peace movement needed to prove that the amounts taken away from the economy were extravagant. Questioning the ever-expanding military expenditures, the peace advocates touted the disproportionate amount of money going to the military. A single battleship cost $12,000,000 to build and additional $1,000,000 to run for each year of its useful life, somewhere between fifteen and eighteen years (R. Root 511). In 1908, the United States government spent $193,000,000 on military expenditures (A. Johnson Expansion 9); by 1910, it spent $283,000,000 on the Army and the Navy “forty-three and one half per cent, nearly one half” of its budget (Carnegie 92). By 1911, “the United States, protected by two oceans, without an enemy in the whole world, is paying about seventy cents out of every dollar of its income, leaving only about thirty cents of every dollar to spend on all national necessities and constructive work” (Mead Swords 25, emphasis in original). These growing numbers led the peace movement to argue that no amount would satisfy the desires of the militarist agenda.

In addition, the peace movement questioned the necessity of a large military at a time of peace. Often they focused on the number of military bases currently in operation
in the United States. “We are maintaining forty-eight army posts where a dozen would be enough” (Jordan “Appreciation” 574). In addition to the excessive numbers, the location of bases seemed dubious, as a number of U.S. military bases were located in places that were of little strategic importance (Jordan “Appreciation” 574). The expanding size of the military to “preserve peace” was suspect. Similarly, the demands to increase the size of the Navy was problematic. Andrew Carnegie questioned the reasoning behind ordering more battleships to be built when the thirty-three dreadnoughts in the U.S. Navy made it the third greatest in the world, behind England and Germany (92). When considering the great expenses that were involved, the Practical pacifists observed that military preparedness and expansion were “a great burden upon the industries and the general business interests of the country, even granting that much might be said in defense” (Levering 518). The Practical pacifists identification of wasteful expenditures while highlighting their enormous price tags worked with their nod to the United States Constitution and the idea of taxes victimizing citizens to reference the grievances of the American Revolution. This sense that the governments oppressive waste of citizens was not only abusive, but it also opposed the spirit of the nation and threatened to destroy the American way of life.

The dangers of military expenditures functioning as a heavy burden upon the economy was the focus of a political cartoon that by Oscar Cesare, which was reprinted in The Survey in 1913 (see Figure 2). In the image, Cesare represented the burden of military expenditures through a recreation of the image of Atlas, albeit with some significant modifications to the image. The most obvious change was that instead of one man holding the world there were four, one for each segment of the economy: labor,
capitalists, manufactures, and merchants. Additionally the globe they support was bound with the materials of war, battleships and armaments, and pieces of paper representing the economics of war: taxes, war bonds, and loans.

What is telling about this image is that the figures that carry most of the weight are the capitalist and the merchant. This image does not reflect the suffering of the working classes, but rather its focus is those at the top level of the American economic system. Importantly, all sectors of the economy are shown being burdened by military expenditures; however, it is the businessman who suffers the brunt of the cost. The posture of the characters is also significant. Unlike the traditional image of Atlas, who kneeled steadily under his heavy load, these four figures are standing in a quite unconfident fashion. The figures’ struggle with their task highlights the taxing nature of militarism, and the fact that they are standing makes the possibility of them toppling seem ever present, evoking an image of economic collapse. The over-all message of the image is that the costs of military preparedness might be too much even for the great Titans of American industry.

This line of argument was augmented by shifting the focus from the tangible costs of war to the intangible. Despite the enormous amounts spent upon the materials of war, the peace advocates did not believe that these expenses were the worst economic harms that came out of the war taxes; instead, they argued that the potential gains that were lost by this wasted money harmed the economy the most:

Have you heard anything about a tight money market during the past six months?

Yes, for almost a year. Have you heard anything of a serious decline in all the best
Figure 2: “The World is Overpopulated and Overarmed.” Editorial cartoon by Cesare from the New York Sun. The characters are labeled (from left to right) “Laborer,” “Capitalist,” “Merchant,” “Manufacturer.”
recognized securities in the land...Have you heard of great corporations, large manufacturing industries not being able to secure the money necessary to make needed expansion? (Levering 516)

The peace movement revealed that expanding the military was coming at the expense of business community’s financial success. Money spent on military expenditures was money that would not be available to reinvest into the economy. Robert Root argued that the great outrage of military expenses were not just the potential cost of $30,000,000 for one battleship; more important was the fact that the ship would not give back to the economy and was destined to “adorn a scrapheap,” whereas an industrial town like Torrance, California only cost $8,820,000 to build and would “increase in wealth and value each year and pay dividends to capital, give profitable employment to many laborers and add to the sum of human happiness” (511-12). Every battleship equaled three potentially viable industrial centers that would never be realized.

It was important that peace advocates raised their audiences’ awareness of these “losses incurred by a check on production,” because these costs were “comparatively unseen but real and far reaching” (Clark 3). It was not just the business community that suffered when resources were lost to them, but the society as a whole: “States and Cities having to postpone their offering of new and necessary issues or forced to pay almost unheard of rates of interest” (Levering 516). It was this type of argument that the peace movement used to link the concerns of the business community with the concerns of their non-business audience who were interested in local development and expenditures to improve the social conditions of the nation.
Where would the country be in point of well-being if we could restore forests, irrigate dry plains, create water powers, and cross and recross the land with water-ways for heavy traffic? Where would we be if we could stamp out tuberculosis, hookworm, cancer and rabies, and put an end to the introduction and spread of plagues, and where if we could teach useful arts freely to all who need such instruction? Even this, however, does not measure the benefits of avoiding military expenditure. (Clark 5)

Despite this passage being particularly utopian in nature, it does highlight the conservative nature of these economic arguments. The lack of social progress in the nation did not require an over-haul of the traditional system of doing things. Lack of capital was the prime obstacle preventing the cultivation of natural resources, the development of national infrastructure, the elimination of disease, and the problem of unemployment. Nor was it a matter of redistributing the wealth. The money to achieve the perfect world was available if the government would end its “waste on needless army posts, fourth-rate navy yards, unnecessary battleships and ‘Militia Pay Bills,’” (R. Root 513).

More importantly, it is not the allocation of governmental funds that would achieve these things. The peace movement was not advocating for the government to develop a program that encouraged social development with the money that was being used by the military. Rather, the solution was for the government to “cut down or rather, ‘cut out’ the war taxes” and let industry fix the national social ills (R. Root 513). It was this belief in the power of the marketplace to advance the United States that the peace movement could claim that “things economic and things moral are less widely separated
than we sometimes think” (Clark 3). By focusing upon the domestic need needs and economic aspirations of the nation, it was easier for the peace advocates to present the militaristic agenda of the government as being more harmful than protective.

**Preparedness and the Goodwill of Pacifism**

The question about the ability of military expansion to prevent war raised a dilemma for the peace advocates. Though they could show the ineffectiveness of expansion and even could show the possible harms caused by such behavior; however, without an alternative solution to prevent war, their arguments would seem hollow. The Naval League’s motto in 1912, “Battleships are cheaper than battles” (Mead *Swords* 76), implied that no third option could be found. As the Practical pacifists advocated law as a viable third option, they noted that the business world also provided a means of continued goodwill between nations: trade. Businessmen needed to know their markets in order to be successful; in this way, “Commerce among nations means increased understanding” (Schmidlapp 522). With this knowledge, businessmen could help the government better understand these other countries, and encourage friendship abroad (A. Johnson “Commerce” 13). In addition, the vested interest that business had in keeping international trade running made it the perfect tool to encourage positive relations between the nations; no nation could make unreasonable demands nor refuse any reasonable concession without threatening its own economic welfare (14). “The ship laden with merchandise that sails from our ports is the harbinger of peace” (Schmidlapp 522). Schmidlapp’s use of “harbinger of peace” played upon the more familiar “harbinger of war” and reversed the image of “laden” ships leaving port, an image that often referred to an invading army. Playing off the sense of effort put into a war effort,
the Practical pacifists implied that not as much effort was necessary to encourage peace. The very act of increasing their own profits allowed the businessman to insure continued goodwill between nations, which in turn assured continued profits.

Because they showed how the militaristic approach to keeping peace did little to guarantee peaceable relations between nations and economically harmed the United States, peace advocates questioned the intent behind such the militarist agenda. One reason was the gap between the actual and imaged expertise that the militarists possessed. “To understand explosives is one thing; to understand racial and economic tendencies and to make friends instead of enemies is quite another thing. The business man, the economist, and statesman should know about these things; the professional soldier as such is not an expert in them” (Mead Swords 72). If political and cultural leaders believed that military knowledge was the ultimate form of prevention, then they were misguided. Worse still, this misplaced reverence led into an economically and morally questionable situation:

A tailor may make excellent coats, but it is not his function to decided how many coats a customer shall have, nor when he shall wear them. Neither should the naval expert decide how many battleships we need. He does not know our needs. He knows only how our fleet compares with others, and that he wants a job.

(Mead Swords 72)

The advocates of militarism had created a dangerous situation by depending upon individuals who clearly had a conflict of interest. The peace advocates could not claim the same understanding of the battlefield, but they knew the nature of business: “Is it natural to suppose that the men securing these valuable contracts can be looked to for
their curtailments?” (Ginn 154). By showing their audience the economic benefits of peace and by questioning the financial motives of their opponents, the peace advocate’s appeal to the business community depended upon the concept of goodwill.

In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines goodwill, along with virtue and practical knowledge, as a primary component for producing a persuasive ethos (1378a5). Traditionally in rhetoric, the concept of goodwill has been presented as the speaker’s choice of deciding to provide the best possible advice for the audience’s advantage. Knowledge and virtue needed to be complemented with a sense of goodwill; without it the other two characteristics are not necessarily enough to win the trust of the audience. Just because a speaker might be an expert in a field or have good credentials does not mean that he or she is convincing to the audience; the audience could think that the speaker is using this knowledge and appearance of virtue to take advantage of them (1378a6). In situations where goodwill does not already exist between a speaker and the audience, Aristotle suggested that it could be expressed in an argument by taking a stand that was clearly going to benefit the audience but would not benefit the speaker (1385a2). This would show the virtues of the speaker, that he is looking out for more than himself, and the superiority of the argument put forth, that it must be good if someone would argue for it even if he had nothing to gain.

For the peace movement, the development of goodwill with their business audience was crucial. Although expressing knowledge about the economic realities of the twentieth century was key to attracting the business community, it was just as important to show that the peace movement held the nation’s economic interests at heart, a connection that could not be assumed on the part of the peace movement. Besides the
balance sheet aspect of their arguments, the agenda the Practical pacifists set forth did not economically benefit themselves. The speakers, for the most part, were not businessmen who would receive direct economic gains from the cessation of military expansion. Even the prominent business figures, like Carnegie and Ginn, were in the later part of their careers, when they would not be in position to directly reap the benefits of the newly freed wealth. That would go to their primary audience, the general business community. Even though they would enjoy the tax relief and social benefits which came from the abolition of war taxes, the way they structured their arguments, this was not a special gain; all Americans would benefit in this way.

Just as important, the peace movement undermined the *ethos* of militarism through economic arguments against war and military expansion. The peace advocates questioned the goodwill presented by those proposing military preparedness and expanding the armed forces during times of peace, and at the same time increased their own sense of goodwill. In the case of the Practical pacifists’ rhetoric, the peace advocates highlighted the ways in which the militarist agenda was being pushed upon the public at their expense and to the militarists’ gain. By presenting the issue in this fashion, it made the military knowledge a liability and undermined the authority of the militarists’ position: “The world would have had many fewer wars, had warriors attended strictly to the technicalities of their profession and not attempted to meddle or advise in matters in which they are conspicuously untrained” (Mead *Swords* 72). The power dynamic of expert knowledge was reversed; military knowledge was important to win wars, but not to prevent them.
The Ethos of the Businessman

Beyond the sense of goodwill, the peace advocates wanted to show that they and the business community had shared values. By making reference to economic matters, like the shortfall of capital available for private enterprise, and by discussing the matter of war in economic matters, the Practical pacifists created a persona of pro-business reformers for themselves. However, as Marchand has pointed out in *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918*, it was questionable whether the adoption of this persona was actually helpful for bringing members of the business community to the peace movement in more than a superficial capacity. Although businessmen did attend both local and national gatherings, few became active members in peace organizations who were not already engaged in peace advocacy before 1905 (85-6). Also, it was potentially alienating to their primary audience to suggest that businessmen needed to have a financial incentive to care about the well being of the nation and that they had no interests outside of making money (77). But if the adoption of the pragmatic, business persona did not work for turning business leaders into strong advocates for peace, it did have two rhetorical advantages.

The first advantage of adopting this persona was it allowed the Practical pacifists to represent the pro-business nature of the movement. Although they failed to garner a significant level of involvement from the business community, the peace organizations did have an issue that had piqued the interest of the businessmen. Prominent business leaders did attend national conventions where arguments in favor of international law and arbitration were made. Even with this low level of involvement, the peace advocates could make an association between the two communities. This association could help the
peace movement in its goal to revise and complicate the popularized characterization of
the peace debate. They could defend themselves against the claim that achieving
international peace meant working against the financial goals of the nation. True peace
advocates were not those who threatened the future of the United States; rather, they were
protecting the economic well-being of nation.

More interesting, though, is that by adopting the *ethos* of the businessman, the
peace advocates created a place from which they could air potentially objectionable
statements, that of objective citizen critics. In the United States, pacifism was not as
widely held value system as militarism had been, as most citizens identified militarism
with ideas of patriotism and national security. Therefore, to directly attack the values of
militarism as a pacifist would be less effective because it would be expected. The
emphasis on the practical, fact-and-figures orientation and non-sentimental nature of the
business persona was useful for the peace movement, despite its questionable
effectiveness as a recruitment tool in the business community, because it provided the
Practical pacifists a non-polarized position from which to present their accusations.
These peace advocates did not directly claim that the military and its supporters were
morally corrupt. Rather peace advocates acted in the way they claimed a business leader
would, presenting facts and figures, which directed the audience to certain “disinterested”
conclusions. Therefore, it was not by adopting a pacifist mindset that allowed the
audience to draw the conclusion that militarists might not be completely pure in deed;
rather, it was by approaching the issue with a business mind. This persona helped the
peace advocates level the playing field of *ethos* by changing the dynamic between a two
disproportionately valued ways of approaching the world (militarism/pacifism) to two equally valued ideologies (militarism/capitalism).
Conclusion: The Remnants of Practical Pacifism and the Limits of Ethocentric Discourse

When looking at the Practical pacifists, it becomes clear that they formed a movement that understood how to connect with the values of the nation. When the Practical pacifists began their approach to pacifism, militaristic ideals were high within the nation; still, by the time war broke out in Europe in 1914, they were one of many voices that opposed the United States’ involvement in the conflict. The growth and expansion of the movement, which included attracting public figures to their cause, is a testament to their ability to connect with the values and character of the middle-classes during the early part of the twentieth-century. Their success with these connections allowed the Practical pacifists to change the way later peace movements represented themselves and the nature of war, despite the collapse of their own movement during the First World War. Their use of an ethocentric discourse led the Practical pacifists to meet the rhetorical needs of their time and leave an enduring influence on pacifism in the United States, even though the discourse was not enough to assure that Practical pacifism would maintain its ideological dominance.

As a movement, the Practical pacifists applied their character-based rhetoric to link their movement to already established qualities of the national character. As was shown above, the Practical pacifists identified themselves with the traits of practicality—being rational, moderate, law abiding, just, patriotic, civilized, and economically minded—that allowed their audience to associate the movement with their own self-image and made the appeal of the movement stronger. Additionally, the peace movement’s use of rhetorical ideographs bridged the values between the national
mainstream and what had been a fringe movement in the United States. This approach allowed the Practical pacifists more prominence in U.S. society than any previous peace movement. Their use of dominant cultural tropes and discourses about the nature of the United States and its citizens, civilization, masculinity, and economic security allowed them to identify their movement with both traditional American values and a nationalistic vision of the United States as a world power. Socially conservative and nationalistic in nature, the Practical pacifists found way to equate these qualities with the goal of international peace and create a sense that the means for international peace was within reach for the United States.

As things turned out, the Practical pacifism did not lead the United States into an era of world peace, and once the U.S. entered World War I, their representations of peace and pacifism disappeared from the nation’s popular imagination. During the war and in the decades after, pacifists were widely represented as treacherous figures who opposed American values and supported subversive politics, like communism (Snider 69-73). Moreover, Practical pacifism did not return to its position of prominence in the post-war peace movement; rather, the post-war movement adopted an ideology of social progressivism informed by the ideals of passive resistance (DeBenedetti Peace 108-09). Although the peace movement at large did not adopt the politically conservative, nationalistic, and imperialistic aspects of the Practical pacifists’ agenda, the Practical pacifists’ influence is still recognizable in the way that later pacifists represented themselves and the peace movement has represented the character of war.

Returning to the standard established by DeLuca, the influence of the Practical pacifists is shown by how they affected the public understanding of war and pacifism by
changing the way the movement was characterized. Despite the loss of prominence in both the movement and the larger society, the Practical pacifists’ representations of the matters of war in peace as character issues continued by later peace advocates. Specifically, their influence is most notable when looking at the connection between pacifism and patriotism and the representation of war as contemptuous of civilization and the economic wellbeing of the nation.

The idea that pacifists were patriotic was a theme that the peace movement reinforced after the United States had entered into World War I and throughout the two decades after (Snider 78). The result of the ongoing association between pacifism and patriotism resulted in the conscientious objector movement during World War II, where pacifists worked to keep their refusal to kill other humans from being seen as a refusal to support the United States and to fight injustice in the world. Gaining the right to serve their nation either in non-combatant roles in the military or though community works projects, the conscientious objectors were engaged in activities that helped the national agenda while still maintaining their objection to killing (DeBenedetti Peace 138-40). This particular blend of nationalism and pacifism, despite the non-resistance objection to personal use of force, clearly had its roots in the Practical pacifists’ ideal of service-oriented pacifistic patriotism and not in the non-resisters’ demands that pacifists abstain from political life. Whereas the non-resisters would have demanded that pacifists remove themselves from public service, pacifists after World War I continued the call for pacifists to be involved in public life and supportive of the nation even though the nation was at war.
Like the representation of pacifists as patriots, the attacks on the character of militarism and war resulted in a new way to identify the peace movement with mainstream American values. The Practical pacifists’ representation of war and militarists as being indifferent to civilization in quest for victory received additional support from the new war technology used in World War I. The ability for armies and navies to use weapons of mass destruction made war appear out of control, with military leaders applying new technology to defeat the enemy with disproportionate consequences (DeBenedetti “Alternative” 62). This sense only grew with the development of nuclear weapons and the onset of the Cold War. In their desire to be victorious in war, the military had developed weapons that could destroy all the advances that humanity had gained (Katz and Katz 269). The arguments about the economic cost of both war and militarism were continued by the peace movement in the years following World War I, with the new killing technologies and economic hardships experienced in Europe reinforcing the wastefulness of the whole enterprise (DeBenedetti “Alternative” 59).

Additionally, the ongoing expenses that the United States government has fed into the appeal of the pacifist as economic conservative ethos, making the Practical pacifists arguments all the more relevant. Because of the enormous sums to be made in military contracts and the expense of maintaining the largest, best equipped military in the world, the idea that avoiding war is economically prudent carries great weight, especially when the government fails to support other public institutions. The idea that war causes undo stress on the national economy is still salient to the point that in 2009, the President of the United States can add ending a military engagement as bullet point of his plan to strengthen the economy (“President”).
Despite these successes, the United States’ entry into World War I marked the end of Practical pacifism. Even though they had created an appealing approach to peace, the Practical pacifists ultimately could not break the link between militarism and nationalism in a time of war, even for the members of its own movement. Many of the members the Practical peace movement found the pacifistic message of the movement to be in conflict with the sense of nationalism in the movement promoted, and they decided the peace message that was wanting. Some peace organizations, most notably the American Peace Society, solved this dilemma by taking a neutral stance on the war effort (DeBendetti Peace 98). Nevertheless, many of the Practical pacifists’ groups just disbanded, and those members who were still dedicated to the ideals of peace created new organizations, ones that were much more politically radical and international in character (Patterson 33). Looking at the history, it seems at first glance that the Practical pacifists had failed in their goal of connecting with values of their audience. However, by comparing their rhetoric with that behind the propaganda created by those who wanted the United States to intervene in World War I, a different representation of their effectiveness emerges. Looking at these opposing arguments, there is a strong similarity in the ways that the peace movement argued against U.S. involvement in war and the interventionists argued for the nation’s involvement in the Great War; both groups engaged in many of the same tropes and social discourses towards their individual ends.

The most obvious connection between these two groups is how they both used the Civilization discourse in their arguments. As I showed in Chapter 3, the Practical pacifists used this discourse to argue that the United States was too advanced as a nation to be dependent upon military force to achieve its goals; nevertheless, it would be
possible to use force in situations where lesser developed nations threaten civilization’s spread and growth. The interventionists used a remarkably similar approach to persuade the nation to enter the war to oppose Germany and its allies: instead of representing the German people as part of civilized Europe, they were represented as a barbaric people whose military success was threatening civilization in Europe and the United States. The most notable example of this was to refer to the Germans as “Huns,” (Scunda and Moran 29) a reference that achieved their goal in two ways. First, it stripped the Germans of their status as a Teutonic people, which put them at the same level of civilization as Scandinavians and the English, and by extension Americans as the nation’s cultural heritage was traced through the Anglo-Americans. Instead, they were tied to an Asiatic people who had infiltrated Western civilization. The second part was that the Huns had invaded Europe, an event that was represented in the early-twentieth century as barbarians attacking civilization. By referring to the Germans as Huns, the interventionists presented the argument that the United States would not be fighting a war against another civilized nation; rather, the U.S. would be protecting Civilization against rampaging barbarians. When represented this way, even the Practical pacifists would have had a hard time arguing against intervention.

Another similarity between the interventionists and the Practical pacifists were the values they listed as the heart of their movements. Like the Practical pacifists who considered law and justice central to their movement, the interventionists did not present the involvement of the United States as a matter of glory or national honor, but rather it was a fight to defend the rights of others. More importantly though, the war was represented as a fight to preserve “democracy and justice” (Scunda and Moran 30), and
represented the actions of Germany during the war as great breeches of justice. Although the interventionists did not use the exact same ideographs the Practical pacifists used, the similarity tapped into the same cultural values. As a type of governance, democracy implies the rule of law while being more specific to American values. As was discussed in Chapter 2, even the Practical pacifists supported the use of force to insure justice and the rule of law. Moreover, by representing it as “the war that will end all wars” (29) and that their actions would bring “peace and security to all nations” the interventionists were able to represent themselves as peace makers (29). By framing the war in this fashion, the interventionists tapped into the same idea of legitimate uses of force that the Practical pacifists depended upon in their peace agenda.

Finally, the interventionists’ representation of the reasoning behind the decision to go to war resembled the practical approach advocated by the peace movement much more than the emotional extremism that the Practical pacifists claimed that militarists used to get the nation go to war7. The arguments presented to go to war were based upon the Germany’s violation of the Sussex Pledge and their plans in the Zimmerman Telegram to start a war with the United States via proxy of Mexico (“American”). The Sussex Pledge was negotiated between the U.S. and Germany to prevent civilian deaths from German submarine attacks; Germany’s refusal to abide by it showed the failure of legal means in this situation.8 The Zimmerman Telegram showed that the threat of Germany was not just a possibility or a delusion. These two aspects together showed that

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7 This is not to say that the traditional militarists appeals were not used to sell Americans on entering World War I, specifically, emotional reminders of the deaths from the Lusitania sinking. Likewise, once the nation entered the war, appeals to masculinity were used to bring in recruits.

8 Additionally, it showed the threat of Germany to world trade, as they included commercial vessels as their targets.
the United States was not rashly joining a war. Rather, peaceful solutions were attempted with an enemy who had no intention of abiding by them. The interventionists made it appear that the United States entered World War I because of careful deliberation, and only after other peaceful means to avoid conflict with a culturally inferior opponent failed.

Looking at the appeals used by the interventionists, it is clear that they were approaching the American public along the same lines as the Practical pacifists, and for similar reasons. This shows that the Practical pacifists understood their audience, and recognized how they could represent the character of their movement in a way that the nation could respect and support their alternative approach to making the United States a world leader. In this way, it becomes clear that with the approach of identifying the movement with the middle classes, the Practical pacifists had made the most effective movement they could for the time (Curti 194).

Examining other similarities between the Practical pacifists and the military interventionists exposes the strengths and weaknesses of ethocentric rhetoric. One significant similarity between these two groups is that both started their advocacy when their stance was unpopular in the wider population. Whereas the Practical pacifists began their campaign after the United States’ highly lopsided military success of the Spanish-American War, the interventionists argued for military action when the overall feelings of the nation were opposed to becoming involved in the foreign war (Scunda and Moran 28). Because they worked against the general mood of the nation, both the interventionist and the Practical pacifists attached their causes to larger cultural tropes and discourses. Significantly, both groups developed support for their movements in a relatively quick
fashion, considering the social opposition to their stances. What this shows is that
ethocentric discourse is an effective tool for developing support for ideas or movements
that are not widely accepted. When an idea is uncomfortable or just foreign to an
audience, the ability to have the audience identify with either the rhetor’s character or the
values expressed through the idea appears to be an efficient way to create a sense of
comfort with the idea.

Another aspect of ethocentric discourse is revealed by the fact of the succession
of the same types of appeals being effectively used by first the Practical pacifists and
later by the interventionists: character appeals are not ideologically stagnant. Although
appeals to character are a means by which a discourse are used to reinforce ideology, they
are ineffective on their own to create ideological consistency in an audience. The ability
of the interventionists to effectively use highly similar appeals in a cause just opposite of
the Practical pacifists’ shows the ineffectiveness of ethocentric discourse for creating a
long term approach for a social movement. For the Practical pacifists to have had a long
term movement, they would have had to had developed their rhetoric to move beyond a
dependence upon character. Because they believed that the establishment of international
bodies that would ensure world peace was on the horizon, they believed that they only
needed to convince people that this approach best matched the character of the nation.
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