

## Craig Swan

- Youth and education 1
  - Berkeley - Pomona College 1
  - economics 2
  - Free Speech Movement at Berkeley 3
  - Yale - graduate school 4
    - economics of housing 5-8
- Swan come to the University of Minnesota, 1969 9
  - strength of the Economics Department 9
  - teaching agenda 10
  - collegiality 11
  - tenure and promotion procedures 12
  - Ziebarth, E.W. - as dean 13
- University of Minnesota committees 14
  - subcommittee on retirement 14
  - Swan becomes associate dean of CLA, 1983 16
    - budget and planning 16
  - issues 18-
    - cultural diversity 18
    - teaching and research 18
    - hiring and promotion 19
    - Afro-American Studies 21
    - Women's Studies 21
    - language requirement 22-23
- Vice-presidents for Academic Affairs 24
  - churning of office 24
  - Keller, Kenneth 25
  - Humanities faculty search 25-26
  - move to break CLA into Humanities and the Arts, Social Sciences 28
  - place of sciences in CLA 29
- Swan - acting dean for two years 29-30
  - friction with Hopkins, Anne 29
- Troubles in University of Minnesota, circa 1990s 30
  - limited resources 30
  - competition of state university system 30
  - loss of Department of Defense grants 31
  - Andreas, Duane - funds for Economics Department with Spain 32
- Economics Department, 1990s 33
- CLA hiring, 1970s, 1980s 34
  - at beginning assistant professor level 34
- Rational expectations theory in Economics 35
- Problems of Central Administration 38-39
  - excessive number of vice-presidents 39
  - lack of shared vision 39-40

**Interview with Craig Swan**

**Interviewed by Professor Clarke A. Chambers  
University of Minnesota**

**Interviewed on October 4, 1994  
in the Office of Professor Clarke A. Chambers  
University of Minnesota Campus**

Craig Swan - CS  
Clarke A. Chambers - CAC

CAC: I'm interviewing Craig Swan of the Department of Economics. Currently, he is chair of the department there but he was in the dean's office for eight years in several different capacities. The day is October 4th, in the morning. The recording is being made in my office at 833 Social Science.

With that introduction, which is a brilliant one, Craig, say something just to warm up about your educational, your academic autobiography . . . how you got interested in this and that, and why you went to Berkeley, California, for your undergraduate, and how you got from Berkeley to Yale. Then we'll be off and running.

CS: I was born in the Bay Area in San Francisco and my parents lived just outside of Berkeley, so I grew up in the shadow of the University of California. My freshman year, I actually went to Pomona College in Claremont, California, and then transferred back to Berkeley in my sophomore year. I transferred for two reasons. One was that, although we weren't married at that time, Janet was at Berkeley and I wasn't, and the second was that Pomona was—when I was there—extremely homogeneous and pretty dull. Everyone was very much like me. There were women as well as men but almost everyone was white. There wasn't much broad diversity both in the sense of students but also in the sense of a broader sort of activities on campus. So I transferred to Berkeley in my sophomore year.

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CAC: Had you been an alumnus of Berkeley High though?

CS: No. I went to El Cerrito High School. My parents lived just over the county line.

CAC: Because Berkeley High would be an entirely different experience?

CS: Yes. [laughter] Well, these days I think maybe all high schools in California would be entirely different. The school district that I went to went bankrupt two years ago and was taken over by the state. But I went to Berkeley. I'd always had an interest in broad issues of public policy. That's in fact how Janet and I met through a high school organization that had some interests like that, although we went to different high schools. I also had I think some quantitative aptitudes and interest in bringing evidence to bear on particular issues. When I took economics those things seemed to come together which is I think why I ended up in economics. I went to Yale . . .

CAC: But your father was an economic . . .

CS: Yes, my father was also an economist. He had done graduate work in economics as an A.B.D. from Berkeley but essentially his career was at the Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco. He started there in I think about 1940, retired in 1972. To some extent it gave me some pause as to whether I should be working in the same field as my father but the interests came together. When it came time to think about graduate school . . .

CAC: Before that, were there any economists at Berkeley who really turned you on? As I remember the department at Berkeley there were some real peaks in their department.

CS: Oh, yes. Berkeley had a very strong department, and I remember some particular individuals. One actually who maybe had some of the strongest impact on me was at the time a graduate student at Berkeley, a man named Saul Hymans who went from Berkeley to Michigan in my junior year, and has been at Michigan ever since. I took a couple of courses from Saul, and was very impressed with him as an individual, and what he could do with economics. I remember also another man, Hy Minsky, who went from Berkeley to Washington University and is now retired. Hy worked in the area of monetary theory, and what was then money and banking, and is perhaps best known for his work on the risks of financial collapse and financial crises. He's now associated with the Levy Institute at Bard College as one of their visiting senior fellows. I also took work in econometrics with Dale Jorgenson who had started at Berkeley as an assistant professor, and was quickly promoted through the ranks, left in the late sixties—maybe he would have left anyway but the trouble at Berkeley I'm sure was a contributing factor—and has been at Harvard ever since. Jorgenson was also very impressive, a bit imperial but very impressive. There's another young man, David Laidler, who I wrote an honor's thesis with. Laidler went from Berkeley to Western Ontario, and his approach to a number of questions in economics is quite different than mine, but he was also really a very wonderful person to work with.

CAC: That's a remarkable list of able instructors who touched you.

CS: Yes.

CAC: And helped nail down your interest in the field I'm sure.

CS: There were other people whose work was primarily at the graduate level that I didn't have so much direct contact with but who certainly made being at Berkeley an interesting and exciting place. There were also a very interesting group of students at the time. There were three of my other classmates who went on to do graduate work in economics. Tom Sargent was a year ahead of me at Berkeley and went on to Harvard. A classmate of Tom's was a high school classmate of my sister, and a friend of mine, a man named Barr Rosenberg who went on to Harvard, and then went back to Berkeley in the Business School, and now has his own major firm in terms of financial investment advice. Berkeley at that time was just clearly a very special place.

CAC: It hadn't yet been disrupted by the tumult of the mid-sixties? You got out before then?

CS: Actually the last year we were there was the year of the Free Speech Movement. One of the things that convinced me was never underestimate the ability of a bureaucracy to screw up. [laughter] I was a high school classmate of Clark Kerr Jr. and I didn't really know his father but my father and Clark's father, Clark Kerr Sr., were graduate students together, and knew each other. My father had stories at the time of seeing Clark, usually on planes and travel, where Kerr's view of what was happening was somewhat different than the way things were unfolding on the ground. In particular, he wasn't the chief campus officer. I have the impression from my father that Clark Kerr thought the campus officials had provoked some of the responses by taking unnecessarily harsh positions.

CAC: [unclear] that he was a very controlling person?

CS: I was too young at the time and don't really have a sense of that.

CAC: Very able but very removed, very aloof?

CS: The one thing that I do remember that I thought epitomized what finally went on there was when Sproul Hall was occupied, and then when the police took everybody out, they called a campus special convocation in the Greek Theatre, which it filled, and it was. It holds 15,000 people. All the department chairs were up on the stage—if we ever come to this, I hope I wouldn't be one of those people here at Minnesota—because the purpose of the meeting was to announce to everybody the plan that would save the university from this tumult. There was a man, Robert Scalapino, who I think was chair of political science, who had engineered this plan. About the same time, Mario Savio walked out on the stage . . . Well, excuse me, I should back up. Kerr and Scalapino talked about this. I think it was mainly Scalapino. Then as the meeting was over, Savio came out to say a few words on the stage and was tackled by six campus police which just set the crowd off in tumult. The notion that he should be allowed to speak was one that everyone shared. I don't know what he was going to say, but finally after about fifteen or

twenty minutes, he was allowed to speak. All he did say was, "We'll be holding our regular rally in front of Sproul Hall, and anyone who wants to speak including Mr. Scalapino and the president are welcome," and he walked off the stage. [laughter] And you never heard anything more about the Scalapino plan because of that. It really was something that was trying to be imposed from the top down and seemed to me to be an example if one isn't careful about how large bureaucracies can screw up.

CAC: That's amusing. You get to Minnesota, to jump ahead—we'll go back to Yale—just in time for the occupation of Morrill Hall.

CS: [laughter] And well, in the interim at Berkeley, things had turned nasty.

CAC: Oh, really nasty.

CS: And violent, and what might have been, I think, some principal political approaches got tied up with a whole series of other things, and Berkeley was just an unpleasant place to be at the time.

CAC: When I was there after the war, it was the loyalty oath that ran a chasm right down through the student body, but never became activist, but it was just a drain on morale, and the administration was constantly trying to wrestle with that. You had no sense as an undergraduate of that residue of the nastiness of the loyalty oath?

CS: I knew about that, and in fact I was a student employee and had to sign some version of that. I remember thinking a bit about it at that time but I don't remember how I reconciled that. When I actually transferred to Berkeley, there was mandatory R.O.T.C. [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] at the time I applied. I wouldn't have done it, and talked with various people, Fritz Strip in particular, a member who sort of had an adjunct appointment in the Speech Department and was a local minister of some renown. When finally my draft board got around to classifying me, they wanted to classify me 1-A, and I was willing to accept I think a 1-AO classification, but as we went back and forth that issue never ever got resolved. My father-in-law had been in World War II heading a medical unit and he convinced me that there would be times when alternative service like that within the military would be the appropriate thing to do. The Vietnam War was a very different experience than World War II, and if push had come to shove there, I'm not quite sure what I would have done at that point. But before I got to Berkeley, R.O.T.C. was made voluntary instead of mandatory.

CAC: Then you went off to Yale. Now why did you go to Yale?

CS: Two reasons: one to go to the best school I could go to, and Yale was certainly one of those; and we were also interested in being on the east coast instead of being on the west coast just for a change, just to see some things different. At the time, most of the best economics departments were on the east coast and so that led us to Yale. Yale was a little more personable

than Harvard at the time which had a reputation that you never saw people, the classes. The entering class was bigger. It just didn't sound as attractive. Although I must admit the best letter I got in the sense of warmth was from Wisconsin. In retrospect, being in Minnesota and understanding the nature of the competition and pull of the coasts, I know why Wisconsin took the effort to write the sort of letter that they did. The other thing I remember is I got a letter—I was admitted at Stanford—from the director of graduate studies there that ended something about see you in the fall. Well, I did see him in the fall but not at Stanford because he moved from Stanford to Yale. With regard to Yale, it was primarily Jim Tobin who was the major reason for choosing Yale.

CAC: He was your advisor?

CS: I worked closely with him. It ended up actually, they had a man named William Fellner who was my thesis advisor because those things got started. Jim was on leave then but I worked closely with Jim and a number of other people who . . . Jim was in something called the Cole's Foundation. There are some aspects of the way Yale was organized which weren't so good. Jim was in the Cole's Foundation, and I worked closely with Jim, and a number of other people in the Cole's Foundation who worked with Jim. The department was organized in a series of old houses and when we were there most of the department was in four different places. The Cole's Foundation had come from Chicago to New Haven when Tobin who was invited to join the Cole's Foundation would not go from New Haven to Chicago. There was also a major effort in economic development and something called the Economic Growth Center which was just the name they put on a building. Then there were a couple other buildings. One of the problems was that the physical isolation also led to less contact than there might have been, and for young people who came to Yale if they were not in the Cowles Foundation or the Growth Center physically, it was really a very unpleasant place, because they just didn't have the informal contact that they were expecting and looking forward to. Over that ten year stretch or so, they've changed things somewhat now, but there were a number of people who were only there for a year or two and said, "This is not what I wanted." But for people who were in one place or the other, it was a tremendous opportunity for them.

CAC: You picked up your interest in the economics housing early on as a graduate student? Or where did that come from?

CS: I guess somewhere in the middle. I had broad interests in macroeconomics, and financial institutions, and this seemed to bring some of those things together. There were a couple of projects, course seminar things that seemed to lead in this direction. One thing led to another. My thesis work was in some econometrics work in terms of trying to explain some portfolio behavior of financial institutions. In some sense the way the data was available you think about commercial banks as being one thing . . . There are a series of other things that all had strong links and ties to housing markets and if you're going to think about . . . There's some question about sort of internal explanations about what they did, but also if you're going to think about

linking some of this stuff up with sort of what happens in terms of real activity—which I thought was important—housing markets were a natural place to make that link.

CAC: This was an established speciality within economics nationally at that time?

CS: Yes, although if you're going to think about the way a graduate curriculum is structured, there are six to a dozen major fields, and this would be a sub-area within one or two of those depending upon how you want to count that. But there were a group, and are a group, and continue to be a group of people, who work in the same general sorts of areas. In fact, there were a number of people. I spent a year in Washington in the early seventies at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and both from that time and other times there were a group of people that I knew who were in various government agencies, and especially people on the financial side. It was quite common for people who were out of academics like that to work for awhile in the government and then go to work [unclear] in the industry. A number of the people that I know who did that and made that switch in the early eighties have since been indicted by their various federal district attorneys—I don't know if district attorneys is the right term here—federal attorneys with regard to the S&L [Savings and Loan] scandal. I don't know the particulars about these cases but you see their names . . . off in Florida and Texas and southern California.

CAC: I'm guessing that from the mid-sixties when you're doing this into the mid-eighties is the high time for the S&Ls?

CS: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

CAC: You were in a hot field?

CS: Yes. Although even then, I was at the research department at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the early seventies, and all of these housing related things have initials like the Federal National Mortgage Association which is referred to as Fannie Mae.

CAC: Sure.

CS: In the late sixties something called the Government National Mortgage Association was established. It was referred to as Ginnie Mae. There was something called the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation which was referred to as Freddie Mac. The economists in the research department at the bank board whose initials would be FHLBB affectionately referred to it as FLUB, but that was a position that they could never get the board to agree to, and in retrospect they were right. [laughter] Actually the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was a backwater sort of place. It had a small board. When I was there, they had just made a major effort in terms of beefing up the research department, but they really didn't have a tradition, and I don't think they were able to sustain it. In many ways it was an example that epitomized George Stigler's aphorism that if an industry can't capture its regulatory body in five years, there's something wrong with the industry. [laughter] Well, there wasn't anything wrong with the



Savings and Loan industry. A lot of the board members—they would be political appointments—wouldn't have the same visibility as other things so there wasn't quite the same scrutiny. It wasn't uncommon to sort of do things, change regulations so you could argue . . .

CAC: And people in your field knew this was going on?

CS: Right. And make regulatory changes that you could argue had some justification but then go back in the private industry to exploit some of those.

CAC: Were you ever involved in policy issues on matters of housing, for example?

CS: As a consultant. Some of the work I think I did at the bank board had some impact, but also with HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development], and with primarily the House Banking Committee at one point. Work that I did I think has some impact and the contact you had with your friends in those sorts of positions. I remember once testifying before Senator [Robert] Lugar's Committee . . . some of the details of this I'm now forgetting. There was a slump in housing and he had some proposal to prime the pump. The last time they had done this it was essentially to bail out the inventory of builders; and many economists were quite critical of that saying, "Normal recovery's going to do this. Why do you need to put this extra subsidy on?" And it was something sort of like that, a similar sort of thing at the same time. This was in the early years of the Reagan Administration. I had a call then a couple weeks later—I thought this was very clumsy—from some secretary, and I mean a secretary type. They were having trouble at HUD staffing their research effort; and I was asked whether I was interested in some assistant undersecretary position and I said, "Why are you calling me?" She said, "The White House told us to"—and I had no contact with anybody in the White House—and I told her, "I doubt if I could pass the loyalty test of this White House." [laughter] That was sort of the end of it. It was extremely clumsy. Although Ed Schuh tells me that about the same time, he was approached to be the American Managing Director I think of the World Bank, and he said well, he could be interested. Things went on and then a couple days later someone came to see him and said, "You understand that if you take this position, you take your orders from us." Ed said, "You understand that if I'm going to do this, I'm the one making the decisions not you." And that was the end of the discussions that Ed had with the Reagan Administration.

CAC: I inquire down this line, just perhaps idly, because I remember reading many years ago an essay by Charles Beard, of all persons, in the 1920s on housing reform, public policy either at the local or the national level, and he said that housing reform is one thing that will never work, that the interests are too diverse, too entrenched, and too scattered, and that you cannot manipulate realtors, bankers, holding companies, etcetera . . . that it's just beyond solution.

CS: Well, you might argue that I might come to the same conclusion but from a very different view point. I think a number of these groups have had pretty effective trade lobbies. I don't know about in the 1920s.

CAC: Probably much less so.

CS: Probably much less so and I think just as technology and other things have enabled small groups of people to manipulate sort of larger groups . . . Lance Olson wrote an interesting book on the logic of collective action which talks about how one of the ways you keep these groups together is you provide real services for your members that have little to do with the political positions that you want to take, and then you use the sort of profit that this operation gives you to advance the particular agenda. AARP [American Association of Retired Persons] is perhaps the premiere example of that. But I think that these trade groups have become much more effective and they have particular interests where the public interest is a little more diffuse. So I think that some of these groups have had strong impacts. Much public housing policy in the United States has had a construction orientation that I think reflects the strength of builders and contractors. If subsidies are tied with units, if families need to move and are otherwise deserving it, who's their subsidy? Well, if you're concerned about housing, you maybe give the subsidy to the people, not to the building. The same, I think you could argue, would be true for some of these financial interests. It's maybe a whole separate set of other issues but then the confluence of events that gave rise to the S&L debacle . . . maybe it takes something like that for major change; but I think if someone looked carefully, they would see that there's been some reasonably successful rear guard action against the Resolution Trust Company and its ability to prosecute people, and proceed with sort of what's in the best public interest here. The other big issue with regard to housing is the subsidy that's given to homeowners, and that's a question that there are so many of them and . . .

CAC: The income tax deduction and the interest?

CS: Right. And also the fact that the implicit incoming kind you're getting is not taxed. There are so many of those—and homeowners tend to vote—that major changes there are going to be very, very slow. [laughter]

CAC: That's the scattering of interest that Beard was talking about?

CS: Sometimes scattering of interest means it's hard to organize the opposition to something.

CAC: Right.

CS: That's the usual argument about how . . . I don't know . . . you do something that raises the price by a penny or two and the interests are too diffuse from the consumer side, but the one producer is reaping that on millions and millions of units, and that means a lot to them.

CAC: In any case, you never ran out of an agenda for your research in housing as a sub field?

CS: No.

CAC: Bravo! So you got your Ph.D. and then you were on the market. Did you come to Minnesota direct—or you were in the government briefly?

CS: I had spent a summer in 1968 as a graduate student, as an intern at the Council of Economic Advisers. But in terms of sort of post Ph.D. work, I came directly to Minnesota.

CAC: This was in what year?

CS: In 1969. I came, and a young man named Charles Friedman from MIT came, and a few years later, Chuck went on to the Bank of Canada, and is now essentially head of their research operation. I remember being picked up at the airport by George Perry, and we came up the River Road, and I looked into the canyon and said, "That's a pretty big river." George said, "Yes, it's the Mississippi." [laughter] I felt a little embarrassed but knew that the Mississippi was in Minnesota but hadn't—I don't know whether I had gotten up very early that morning or what—really quite connected it with running right through the middle of the city.

CAC: If even a Greek knew it was a river, that's pretty good because they don't have many. [laughter] [Perry was of Greek birth.]

CS: As I say, my father was born in Minneapolis but his family moved to California when they were ten, and I'd never been to Minneapolis before this trip with George, and it was nothing about looking back to Minneapolis with fond memories or anything like that. It wasn't that there were unfond memories, Minneapolis just wasn't part . . .

CAC: But you knew you were coming to a very good department?

CS: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

CAC: Say something about that department when you came in 1969.

CS: As it turned out in subsequent events, the department was probably about as big then as it's been in the last twenty-five years. Walter Heller was back from Washington in late 1965 or 1966. He remained an active participant in public policy discussions. The essential core and strength of the department in economic theory was in place. Leo[nid] Hurwicz, John Chipman, Oz Brownlee, Jim Henderson . . . There were strong representations in a number of other areas. Anne Krueger was a mainstay in both international trade and economic development. There were a couple of young theorists, Hugo Sonnenschen and Tom Munsch. Hugo went on when his mentor moved to the University of Massachusetts, Hugo went there, and then went to Princeton, and then became dean at Penn, provost of Princeton, and now president of the University of Chicago. I'm sure that strong representation in econometrics, with Cliff Hildreth and John Chipman being the senior people there. A strong group in applied microeconomics, Herb Mohring, Ed Foster, Anne Krueger, John House, Jim Simler . . . it was a department that was recognized.

CAC: You knew that?

CS: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

CAC: If one thinks of the college at that time, in the mid late sixties, there were certain star departments, probably still are, but economics was one, geography another, perhaps agriculture economics, perhaps . . .

CS: Probably psychology.

CAC: Psychology and in the Institute, of course, chemical engineering. Did you have any sense of how that core of persons in four or five major fields, important fields, were in place when you came? How had they built that department that you came into?

CS: I had more of a sense about the Department of Economics. Right. One of the things I think that made a critical difference was that you felt part of the broader intellectual enterprise from the very beginning in some subtle and not so subtle ways. In terms of other interviewing that I did, in some cases it looked like you could teach sections of principles until you were retired. I think the principles of economics is important but I don't think you hire someone just to do that. Jim Simler made a very particular point, and it was clear then throughout, that the department here were first to senior faculty as assistant professors and above. It isn't that there's a distinction from the professorial rank. It's clear that you have to worry about tenure and that it's different groups that make those distinctions but in the sense . . .

CAC: The gap was between the assistant professor and a cadre of graduate students?

CS: Right. And in the sense of being part of a broader of intellectual community and a broader social community . . . I mean that was clear from the very beginning.

CAC: So you got to teach what you wanted to teach right away?

CS: Right. And these things were negotiated but without any sort of problem. Things were very collegial and you didn't feel that there were artificial barriers between young people and more senior people. That's something that the department has been successful in maintaining ever since. It existed before and has been maintained ever since.

CAC: Did that mean at that time when you came that the really basic courses for undergraduates were offered by advanced graduate students?

CS: A number of them were although as the department was bigger then, there was more senior faculty teaching of undergraduates, and it's been the case when numbers are a little bit lower. The department I think has always felt that the long term interests of the department are best served by sustaining the quality of the graduate program; and so that sort of takes, if you like,

a certain amount of faculty teaching effort, and as the numbers go up and down beyond that, then it has strong implications for the senior faculty involvement with undergraduate teaching. It isn't that you would hire someone who would teach undergraduates but in the sense of the ability of everyone to participate there.

CAC: You said informal ways as well. How was that sense of collegiality establish in a department of that size for a newcomer?

CS: I think people making the special effort, even things like lunch, being included in lunch groups from the very beginning. The department is pretty careful about committee work that it assigns to assistant professors. Pretty early on, even as an assistant professor, I was on a recruiting committee one year where it's a little more substantive work, and you learn a little bit more I think than being on the Building and Grounds Committee, or something like that. Participation in work shops, seminars, participation in graduate student committees, where it's substantive sort of work . . . assistant professors couldn't chair committees but you got involved right from the very beginning, and I think it's those sorts of things that help.

CAC: What you needed to do as a very junior new person to achieve tenure was clear to you?

CS: Yes.

CAC: And fair?

CS: I think it was fair.

CAC: I inquire because I've talked to a certain number of people from—not Economics—scattered departments in which there is expressed the notion that the ordeal of gaining tenure now in the nineties is a far more difficult, some have even used the word cruel, process than it was twenty-five years ago. Now one may discount a certain amount of that by nostalgia and the passing of years but it's a recurring comment.

CS: In some sense, I think that there may be something to that along some sort of following dimensions. We're in an age of contraction not expansion of higher education so that someone who didn't get tenure a number of years ago could look forward to a wide range of other alternatives, and that's just less clear these days, so I think that sort of raises the anxiety. The tenure and promotion process has become much more formal and some of that is due process stuff.

CAC: Legalistic?

CS: Right. But I think it tends to raise the stakes of the whole thing a bit more and I wouldn't be surprised—the tenure period has been lengthened—if in some sense the broader set of expectations of like the college Promotion and Tenure Committee are raised a little bit.

CAC: So one has to pass that hurdle as well as the departmental?

CS: Yes. At the college level, one could argue that the hurdle has been raised somewhat. As the college hurdle gets raised, departments react to that, too. When I was in the dean's office, as people retired, I used to look at personnel files when I would be called on to make remarks and also just to have a sense of things. There used to be the blue sheets that we don't do anymore. Since about the late seventies, early eighties, the only thing in personnel files in the dean's office are PAFs, Personnel Action Forms, but before that there would be all sorts of other things.

CAC: When I was chairman 1971 to 1976, I had to do those damn blue sheets on forty-five people.

CS: Every year!

CAC: Every year!

CS: Yes. But it gave you a sense about things and you also had this sense that the promotion and tenure process at that time was a little more casual. It was at some point in the seventies . . . I don't know whether it was "Easy" [E.W. Ziebarth] or whether it was Frank [Sorauf] . . . I know Frank did some particular things. I don't have a sense . . .

CAC: We can talk about that later.

CS: Yes. But the process became a little more formal and you sort of have the sense before then that the process was much more informal during perhaps much of the sixties. I can understand people's sense that in some sense it's a more difficult process.

CAC: I'm quite certain my memory is accurate on this but who knows. The first retrenchment was 1971, spring of 1971. It was a small one, just a little blip but it shocked people. There was that summer a special committee appointed by Ziebarth having retrenchment and how the college should respond to it later. One of the recommendations of that committee was for a college-wide tenure review.

CS: Oh, okay.

CAC: . . . and Mr. Ziebarth, if my memory is correct, didn't like that recommendation. He thought that was the dean's prerogative. [laughter] And he resisted it but he took it, so that by 1972 or 1973 that committee . . . Then it takes him another year or two to get, you know, case law so that it is in the mid seventies I think that the college committee comes to be a real hurdle.

CS: My sense of the sort of the oral tradition there was that the role of the committee was strengthened when Frank [Sorauf] was dean. He was appointed in 1973.

CS: When that happened in 1971-1972, I guess I . . . well, we were gone 1972-1973. Let's see, 1971 would have been my third year, and I'm sure I was reading the *Daily* but as an assistant professor, I was protected from sort of that broader sort of campus politics, and in that sense it wasn't burned into my psyche the way some of the subsequent stuff was. [laughter]

CAC: We'll come to the burning psyche in a moment. This one is burned in my psyche, I will tell posterity, because I chaired that committee that summer, and we worked without any compensation over six weeks. [Fred] Lukermann was on it. [Frank] Sorauf was on it. A lot of people who subsequently became college officers were on it. It was the hardest thing I ever did, and when we turned it in "Easy" was such a gentleman, as you know, and he was so punctilious about doing the right thing. I never had a letter of thanks for that committee from him.

CS: Oh, wow. That's quite surprising.

CAC: It is . . . unless it was lost in the mail as you understand but I was chairing history at the same time, and I thought oh boy . . . I continue to admire and have great affection for "Easy" but it occurred to me later that he saw this as encroachment upon the dean's authority.

CS: I see.

CAC: Finally, he accepted it in good grace but in the short run, he had a hard time. It was hard on me.

CS: He had health problems in there at some point, too.

CAC: It was constantly.

CS: Because John Turnbull was acting dean there for awhile. But these personnel files, "Easy" took a personal interest in all sorts of people across the college and these personnel files have notes on all sorts of . . .

CAC: I would write an article earlier when he was dean and I'd get a letter from him. He'd read it at night. He had insomnia because he was not well, had a bad back, and he would write a little personal note. He'd read the article and commented on it.

CS: Right.

CAC: So that's why this response was something of a surprise and a shock.

CS: [laughter] That's why I'm a little surprised for exactly the same reason.

CAC: How did your interest in the college then come? You were working on your own agenda, and getting tenure, and you were teaching, and you were attending these workshops. When is your first real moving out into the college?

CS: I should think about that. It probably started at the university level instead. I always thought that some form of college/university service was part of what faculty members should do, and over the years I feel that Minnesota's been very good for me, and I feel a certain amount of loyalty.

CAC: Citizenship?

CS: It's citizenship . . . that one should return that. I don't think you can ask someone who you've just hired to do that. I do think that's something that an institution has to earn.

CAC: You have to be socialized for awhile.

CS: Right.

[End of Tape 1, Side 1]

[Tape 1, Side 2]

CS: The culprits here that I remember are Scott Means and Mahmood Zaidi. Scott I think was chair of that committee and would talk about the issues that he had to deal with. Scott went to Cornell in maybe 1975 and just retired two years ago. I remember Zaidi was . . . I don't know whether he was chair of the Consultative Committee or involved on it, but he called me up about something and said, "Would you help us out with this?" I said, "Okay." The next thing I know, I'd been appointed to chair some sub-committee. There was some early stuff on retirement that Leo Hurwicz and I got involved with and then at various times I was on or off the senate committee . . .

CAC: So first it was due to your skills in economics and analysis that recommended you?

CS: Right. And this business that Leo and I got involved with, I still have a copy of what we wrote. The university at the time had retained a big consulting firm, and their way of analyzing the system was to pick twenty-five individuals and give them letters instead of names, and then simulate out what would happen to them if interest rates, and so on, looked the way they did. What Leo and I did was to write down some mathematical expressions that represented how the system worked, and then talk about what would happen to the system if various macro things—like the relationships between interest rates and inflation, issues about productivity, and growth, and real income—what would happen if those things changed, which I would argue gave you a much clearer understanding about how the system worked in different environments; where what these consultants were doing was one environment, and simulating a bunch of people, and didn't



have any sense about how the system worked under different environments. They were getting paid and we weren't. But I think that we helped a little bit because some of the things that we thought weren't issues and that prompted us to do this work, people finally decided weren't issues. I've never kept track of all this stuff. I think I was a member of the University Senate in there somewhere, but I'm not sure.

CAC: Senate membership blurs.

CS: Yes. And I would say the same thing about college assembly, too. At one point when Roger Benjamin was associate dean, I was on the Budget Committee for a couple years, and my sense was that Roger and Fred [Lukermann] took that committee seriously. You were sort of thrown into the middle of things because you knew some things about your own department, and you would have friends maybe in other departments, but you didn't really have a sense of sort of the nitty gritty issues the way that they were all facing. That was sink or swim sort of stuff. John Borchert was on that committee. Norm Garnezy. Pauline Yew who has just been named dean of the humanities at UCLA. Yokim Consholtisalsa. I'm going to do some other people a big disservice but those are the names that come immediately.

CAC: You were in good company.

CS: Oh, yes, very good company, and people who had the sort of the nature of the judgments, and what was important that they were bringing to these judgments, was I think very clear, and exactly the right sort of thing. It seemed clear to me that Roger and Fred took the advice of this committee very clearly.

CAC: And it gave Lukermann a chance, and Benjamin, to see you in action?

CS: Yes.

CAC: So that was a connection that came to becoming associate dean in 1983?

CS: Yes. I never asked Fred directly but I assume that that was the case. If we're moving on here, I should also mention for posterity, I was on a curriculum committee one year when John Howe was associate dean; and I was mightily impressed with the way John ran that committee because that is something that discussions could go on without coming to conclusions and focus, and John let everyone have their say but it was also clear that he understood that the work of the committee needed to be done in a reasonable amount of time, and that this was not something that was going to take months, and months, and months. That was somewhere in the late seventies. I don't remember the particular year.

CAC: . . . committee internships, looking ahead to what you didn't know was coming?

CS: Yes, right. [laughter]

CAC: So you did become associate dean in 1983 and what kind of portfolios then did you acquire? What was your assignment, mission?

CS: My title was associate dean and executive officer which was the title Roger had had, and title Nils [Hasselmo] had had, and the title that John Turnbull ended up with. My understanding is that John was really the first executive officer of the college. That gave the person who had that, the way Fred organized it, major responsibilities in the area of budget and planning. Fred also talked with me from the very beginning. He used the words co-deanship, and it wasn't that we sat down and drew up any formal document, but it was clear that from the beginning, and as it worked out, that as we worked and got to know each other that he was giving me personal authority in sort of some broad ranges, that I could make decisions without having to check everything with him. The magnitude of that, I mean it was more at the beginning, and you certainly kept him informed but . . . We would talk about direction, and principles, and things like that. Then the [unclear] decisions were simply implementing the sort of agreed upon directions.

CAC: I should think that would have been blurred at the margins.

CS: Oh, it is. It is. I felt in terms of . . . I wouldn't have used the word at the time because I don't know if I would have known it, but it certainly was empowering.

CAC: For you?

CS: Oh, yes. But at the same time, I don't feel that anything was taken away from Fred. Now we're looking back over eight years, six years with Fred, and so things evolved, and there was this I think strong sense of trust that went back and forth; and other chairs have told me that it was possible then, and easy then is the better word than possible, to get information and decisions out of the dean's office quickly. But I think that was partly what Fred did for me but also the way the dean's office worked at the time.

CAC: Some others have reported—and I know that you have comments on this—that sometimes when you'd left the office you didn't know what Lukermann had in fact agreed to.

CS: Oh, that would happen. Yes. [laughter]

CAC: I think more so than with Frank Sorauf, for example?

CS: Oh, I'm sure that's true. That happened with me when Fred would make some particular sorts of comments and commitments, but on broader areas I think—as I suggested to you on the note that I sent you before we started . . . certainly toward the end—I thought I actually understood what Fred was saying in terms of sort of broad directions, and reasons for moving in particular ways, and so on. [laughter] To some extent, people listen selectively and . . .

CAC: Sure.

CS: And any dean wants to be supportive and when Fred would say, "Yes, we'll provide support," he didn't always mean the things that people thought they meant. After you worked with him for awhile, you knew what he meant when he said things like that.

CAC: It may have made it more difficult for chairs than for persons in house all the time.

CS: Could be, but I think Fred understood that, because Roger had the same sort of authority. I mean, there was nothing special about me here.

CAC: That's Roger Benjamin?

CS: Right? I think Fred tried the same thing with Arturo Madrid and it didn't work. I think Fred understood that he needed someone who would be a little clearer maybe and look after some of these details to try to minimize the misunderstanding and confusion. Fred would often talk with people and say, "Go see Craig about it," or "Go see Roger about it." At that point then you could hammer out . . .

CAC: You were there with Roger and what was his . . . ?

CS: No, no. Roger had left.

CAC: Okay.

CS: Roger took the position at Pitt [University of Pittsburgh] at some point over the summer of 1983 and Fred called me in August of 1983 completely out of the blue. I had no idea what was happening. I don't remember now when I knew that Roger was going to Pitt but it wasn't all that much in advance. I really was taken completely by surprise when Fred called.

CAC: There wasn't a search committee then?

CS: Well, Fred felt he needed someone right away. He couldn't enter the year without someone. I was appointed as the acting at first and then there was a search during the year. Fred called me about three days before Janet and I were leaving for two weeks of backpacking in Colorado and I said, "I'm flattered but I can't make a decision until I get back." I assume that Fred, among others, had talked with Jim Simler—in fact, I know he did. What they said, I don't know but they had talked with Jim and I don't know who else. I don't think I need to know.

CAC: You said that Lukermann was very clear about directions and goals, and when you came in . . .

CS: What I said was that I thought I could clearly understand what he was saying. What indeed was clear might be a different matter. [laughter]

CAC: Okay, I'm sure that you're clear on that. That being the case, then in 1983 what did you perceive quickly as major directions and goals?

CS: I think there were still issues that were left over from the Chambers Committee before it: issues about what came to be the cultural diversity requirement; issues about second language instruction and the change in the language requirement; broad issues in internationalizing the curriculum in terms of sort of major issues with regard to undergraduate issues; and Fred's clear and unwavering connection between the importance of research and teaching, that you can't have good teaching without a strong research base, and that sort of underlay all the notions about hiring and faculty development issues. It was just clear from the beginning. Sometimes people want to talk about faculty positions in terms of the undergraduate curriculum. From economics I was sort of predisposed to think about these things in some other ways that were very consistent with Fred's. It may be because of the unity of economic theory where we'd always done hiring by thinking first about the graduate program, and not so much in terms of fields—you've got to pay some attention to that—but finding the very best people we could, and then a sense that these people could have broad responsibilities in terms of the undergraduate curriculum.

CAC: But it may be that that was the culture in geography as well as in economics out of which, I'm quite certain, both of you came.

CS: Could be.

CAC: See, [John] Borchert among others had really fortified that in geography.

CS: Right. And I came to appreciate in some other parts of the college that there could be bigger distances between colleagues but at the same time the notion that you worked for the very best people is something that I don't think you can lose sight of in any sort of hiring efforts. One of the most interesting things consistently over the period of time in the dean's office was that Fred tried to interview all candidates for all positions. Toward the end, it was a little harder to sustain that with all the assistant professor candidates and there were, quite frankly, some fields, statistics in particular, where Fred just had less interest. It was like in January, February, like this continuing seminar in the liberal arts. We didn't talk about pensions, and housing, and things like that, we talked about the issues that were of interest . . .

CAC: So you were privy to these conversations?

CS: Fred would gather anyone he could to join in.

CAC: This made a long day for you?

CS: Oh, yes. But in some sense, I think it also meant that you knew the college and the quality of the college is fundamentally determined by the quality of the faculty. So you knew people in a way that you couldn't know them if you were simply signing documents. It made things much more real and in other ways I think it motivated you to put in these longer hours, too. [laughter] I mean, Fred knew what he was doing then. We're now probably coming to the end of the time, but I still get a thrill when I see people that I felt I had something to do with hiring, who have succeeded, and I'm a little sad when people that I've been involved with there haven't had the subsequent success that everyone had hoped for.

CAC: And you still carry these in your memory and imagination?

CS: Oh, yes. There are people, men and women that I feel very paternalistic about. I would never want to tell them that. [laughter]

CAC: I shan't inquire.

CS: But in some cases, there could be twenty, twenty-five years difference here, so they're probably a little old to be my children, but not all that far apart.

CAC: I'm going to back up a minute. You said, when I asked about directions and goals, the internationalizing of the undergraduate curriculum or of college courses, foreign language, the multi-cultural things, could you tick off whether those goals, whether those directions then were achieved, and how they were achieved? What was Lukermann's success in getting the college to move toward his direction?

CS: I think it was on those dimensions actually quite reasonable. I should back up a little bit, too, here. Fred always saw that the process parts of things were important and he was willing to start things where he didn't know what the answer was going to be because of the process. There are not a lot of administrators who will do that. I actually think that that was a strength that Fred had. I'm not going to remember the years now but somewhere maybe in 1986, 1987, the college adopted a cultural pluralism requirement. A year or two before the college adopted a major change in second language requirement.

CAC: But the former was something that Lukermann really did a lot of politicking for.

CS: Oh, yes.

CAC: I meant that as a question mark.

CS: Well, both of them he did in the sense of setting up the committees, in terms of talking about these issues, and pushing these issues. There was something called PP&B at the time. That didn't work so well in some other sense.

CAC: What's that?

CS: That was Council on PP&B, Program, Planning and Budget.

CAC: Oh, yes. All right.

CS: The Budget Committee was drawn out of that. The Budget Committee in the early eighties essentially looked at position requests and made recommendations to the deans. The sense was that the deans had some discretion at the margins, but 80 to 90 percent of the committee's recommendations were going to be accepted. I think during the period of severe retrenchment in the early eighties, the college would have badly splintered if it hadn't been for that committee because I think times were . . .

CAC: And did Lukermann attend that committee?

CS: No, but Benjamin did. It made advice to the dean.

CAC: I see. Then you [unclear].

CS: Yes. Times were really quite tough but I think it was a sense that we're all in this together and that faculty are having a real voice in making some of these determinations. In that sense I think it was very important. Frank had started things hiring Mary Bilek and Fred pushed things even more about sharing information, comparative information, so that . . .

CAC: With professional staff?

CS: Professional staff developing that but then sharing it with departments.

CAC: I see.

CS: So department chairs could see how their department stacked up against others. There was this PP&B thing and its role was a little ambiguous between the Budget Committee, and the college assembly, and department chairs where you had to deal with in terms of actual implementation, but Fred would use those opportunities to push his particular agendas. He'd use individual discussions with chairs and faculty to help to build the consensus for the directions in which he wanted to go. So I think he was quite careful and skillful about some of that. The first time with regard to the cultural pluralism, it didn't work and there still were tensions as to whether on the one hand some people would say, "What we're really doing is creating enrollment demand for it." [unclear] studies departments where it had gone to zero.

CAC: Well, it looked politically correct.

CS: Yes, yes. That wasn't a term that was used at the time but subsequently that certainly has become part of the discussion. But I think Fred was clear from the beginning that this was not course work for minority students, but rather was really important for all students, and that as the world in which these students were going to live, and the university had to live, it was going to be much more diverse . . . it was in our own broad self-interest. In that sense I think Fred was just in some sense ahead of a lot other people. These ideas are now commonplace but they weren't commonplace . . .

CAC: When in statistical fact, it was clear that the majority of students in African-American Studies were not African-Americans?

CS: Right.

CAC: From the beginning?

CS: Right. Fred and Roger essentially had put some major departmental restructurings in place. There were still some sort of ongoing things that you needed to deal with . . . Now you get into some of these things that are really quite sensitive and quite political but essentially the current term is affiliation with—in particular Chicano Studies and American Indian Studies with American Studies—is a direction that we had been moving and would have wanted to move for some time. The college just wasn't going to have the resources to have major groups of people in these departments.

CAC: Except for African-American and Women's Studies, right?

CS: But even Women's Studies has a small core faculty with lots of affiliated people . . . but except for African and Afro-American Studies. Part of that I think was history, and more fundamentally it's a little less clear that to what extent those are disciplines—separately from places where people trained as historians, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, economists, literature scholars—that should come together around both research questions and strong interests of curriculum. My sense on this is that at the undergraduate level, it makes sense to have majors and disciplines and in let me call it major areas of interest, and we can argue what's major and what isn't. But area study seems to me to be a reasonable thing to have an undergraduate major in. At the graduate level that's less clear to me. There it seems to me that programs ought to focus, real Ph.D. programs, ought to focus on disciplinary areas; and then you have research centers, or minors, or something, where you have areas of interest. Part of the whole idea behind the American Studies affiliation, restructuring, whatever you want to call it, is that there you have—some people would argue that's an area of interest—a larger intellectual group where people can interact, where someone could come in with an interest in Chicano Studies or American Indian Studies, but a frame work for analyzing these questions is going to have some commonalities across all of those issues as well as broader questions in American culture.

CAC: Just a way of maintaining an independent autonomy as Chicano Studies or . . . ?

CS: So you've got to bring those people together and cooperate sort of on that level. That's, I think, worked reasonably well.

CAC: I'm going to back up just a little. I find that in some of my interviews, they become conversations which I think is their strength. [laughter] The manual book says, "Oh, no." I'm supposed to be entirely a man from Mars..

CS: This man from Mars knows a lot about the college and university. [laughter]

CAC: You're talking about the directions that Fred wanted to carry on beyond the Chambers report, language, cross-cultural, multi-cultural and internationalizing. He wanted those in 1980 also?

CS: Right. No, no, no. I mean they're all in the report.

CAC: No, they aren't in the report except very skinny, very skinny.

CS: Okay. Seeds. Seeds.

CAC: I remember a conversation that he and I had. I said, "We have seven major recommendations"—I don't think that the metaphor that the plate is full was there—but the plate was full. If you were going to carry the other reforms we had, I said, "I don't think we can do ten. I think we've got to do seven." Ha. So that he kind of signed off is my memory of it.

CS: Sequencing in some sense?

CAC: Sure and return to them which I think was again administered and to be wise, I don't think we could have carried. It might have brought down the whole other set of reforms if we had added those on, particularly the foreign language. That was the hardest thing to reintroduce.

CS: Getting that message out and in an understandable form to high schools, students and advisors.

CAC: Oh, oh, oh.

CS: Many people have an incentive not to understand which I think adds to the problem. It had a major impact on enrollments and structuring of high school curriculum, too.

CAC: Oh, it just had to. It's my sense that Roger Page had to be that liaison essentially. Is that correct by then?



CS: I don't know. I should ask you. When is who going to read these tapes and so on?

CAC: Anybody can read them when I deposit them by the terms of this one. If you wish to close the whole thing, you can close it with your permission any time you want, I mean right now.

CS: Roger [Page] and Fred had, I think, a somewhat difficult relationship. I don't think things worked out from Roger's view point in the way that—well, I know that they didn't—he would have thought they might.

CAC: Or the way they had [unclear].

CS: Right. Russ Hamilton had a lot to do with pushing some of the second language agenda within the college and we hired a man—whose name I can't remember at the moment now who had been involved with I think the State Department of Education—to do a lot of that initial contact work that way. There were people from high schools and the State Department of Education on the relevant task forces and then implementation committees, so those links were developed in a series of ways like that.

CAC: That took longer. That was far more difficult because it had an impact upon secondary schools everywhere.

CS: And the requirement was—even when it was finally adopted—going to be phased in, and you had people who didn't think it was going to be, and so when it finally was and students were faced with the reality of this, there were issues there.

CAC: And you had to face that as acting dean later?

CS: Oh, there was still residual stuff of that sort. Because of the budgetary problems, we had gotten into a situation where a lot of the beginning language courses were taken by juniors and seniors because even under the old requirement, they needed a year. Essentially what we were saying was you could take two years but there are strong incentives . . . or you have to take two years but there are strong incentives to do at least the first year in high school. So the hope was that we could change the resources from first year to second year language instruction. Well, to do that you also need to start with students who are bright when they come to the university because if they can't get that right away there's just atrophy in terms of these skills that they can't use. At the same time, there was this backlog because we weren't dealing with students right at the beginning. In protracted negotiations with the Central Administration, we worked out some schemes to work off the backlog as well as making as many sections as we could available for students. That was a process that was going to take three or four years.

CAC: That raises another issue that we should talk about and that is the relationship of Johnston to Morrill Hall. Your tenure there for eight years was Magrath and early Keller, right?

CS: Yes, I should think about this because I think there was Peter, Ken, then there was Dick Sauer and Nils. So there were four presidents.

CAC: You stayed on into Nils?

CS: The first six months or so. No. Excuse me. The first year and a half.

CAC: Okay. Would you say something about the relationships of the college to the Central Administration then?

CS: The other thing we could do is [unclear] counting, but I'm going to miss some people. There were even more academic vice-presidents that we dealt with.

CAC: Yes, more of a churning there than in the presidency.

CS: Yes. That was really quite unfortunate.

CAC: Fred had known the vice-president's office because he'd been there with Shepherd.

CS: Fred said that he figured out Central Administration first and then he became dean because he knew then how Central Administration worked. Academic Affairs was, and as far as I can tell still is, severely understaffed. I don't know how many people there are because sometimes it does seem like there are a lot of people, but it's sometimes the wrong mix of people. It was forever difficult to get on people's calendars when you had issues that needed to be dealt with . . . just finding the time. At first it was dealing with Al Link, then more Ken directly, then the players just kept changing. Academic Affairs didn't always know where things were at the time. When Roger [Benjamin] brought Mary Bilek over, she had, I think, strong conceptual skills about bringing together the budget with problematic information. The position that she had had before didn't have someone in that position before and so the information base that people were using . . . Well, I don't know what it was but I think it added to their difficulty about making decisions. There was someone there but they had a very different frame of reference and much more out of sort of finance, accounting type background.

CAC: You're suggesting that Bilek went from the Arts College to Central Administration?

CS: Oh, she did.

CAC: That was because of Roger Benjamin?

CS: Right. Maybe Ken brought her over but certainly the prospect that Roger was going to be there was on the horizon or maybe even Roger did it. That I don't quite remember. It was that change that was clearly there. Discussions with Academic Affairs varied a lot depending on whoever was academic vice-president. Fred and Ken would yell at each other every meeting,

but they'd been doing that for years and they could handle that. I don't think it got in the way of a longer term relationship. My views about Ken are rather complex because he's clearly a brilliant man and I thought his basic vision for the university under Commitment to Focus was exactly right. He turned out to have terrible skills at relating to Minnesota more generally. Part of the downfall was some of his making but also mischief on a lot of other people's parts. Ken bears some but not full responsibility for that. But at the same time there were some elements of his style about academic administration that I think could have been better, certainly could have been different, but I think could have been better. Ken always wanted to win arguments; so while you might prevail in something you were trying to convince him of doing, it was always at some cost. The question was whether you let that be personal or not and you usually didn't want to because that would just get in the way of things. If there was a character flaw, I think that was the character flaw. He was articulate, just everything you wanted . . .

CAC: In a large number of basic issues, directions, and goals, he and Lukermann would have been in agreement?

CS: Oh, yes. But Ken came out of a particular mold in I.T., and I'm not sure he had a full appreciation for what the other parts of the liberal arts could bring. As he was trying to make changes in the university, the CLA [College of Liberal Arts] was a convenient whipping boy for him. That part I never really fully understood. That was the hardest . . .

CAC: Now, you're suffering this as acting dean which you were for two years?

CS: Ken was gone by then, but yes. When I was acting dean that was still an important part of the relationship with Morrill Hall. To some extent, some people might say that Ken came out of a mold where if you weren't bringing in multi-million dollars of grants, somehow you weren't as important. I'd like to think that isn't the case but I don't know. I mean sometimes his actions were certainly consistent with that and especially on the Humanities side, we were clearly weaker and still are than we should be. I think what you can expect are other things, not necessarily big grants, but other things that people can do that would be comparable within their field, and some people were doing it; but we didn't have as many people as you would want to have. That's what we were trying to do in terms of hiring and things like that.

CAC: When was the mega-search in the Humanities on? Was that when you were dean?

CS: Do you know, that was when Fred was dean, I forget the years. Ted Farmer chaired that committee. I'm sure he will never forget.

CAC: That was one way to do it.

CS: That's right. And it took some effort. Ken was president at the time I think, because we initially had some talks with the Bush Foundation that refused in the end to support that initiative. Ken did come through with some support, discretionary support, that he had of his

own there. But it was a bit of an effort. He was president by that time so it would be 1986 maybe. That's also interesting because we used to get criticized for having too many interdisciplinary programs and a concern that somehow we weren't paying enough attention to disciplines. Fred and I always felt that you can only have strong interdisciplinary programs if people come from strong disciplinary bases, but the rhetoric now was all on interdisciplinary this and that and part of that relates to Anne Peterson who's no longer here. But I think she was, without thinking, applying models from the biological sciences sort of everywhere without thinking about how to do it in other parts of the university.

CAC: I've interviewed a couple of biologists and the cross-disciplinary work they have to do is built into the field.

CS: Exactly. So to some extent, sometimes there's a sense that that's the model that we ought to use everywhere. The model is different in different areas. That mega-search turned up . . . made some just very strong appointments, several of whom have now left the university.

CAC: I think four of the six are still here.

CS: I'd have to look to be sure. I know George Lipsitz was one of the first to leave. I'm not quite sure where Ray Chow is these days.

CAC: History has kept its two.

CS: Right.

CAC: [unclear]

CS: Yes. It was also the time that there was all this upheaval on Literary Studies.

CAC: Oh, yes.

CS: That was sort of part of what was going on on the Humanities side at the time.

CAC: Was that a challenge for you as an economist to pick up what was going on there?

CS: Of course. Although I think there's some subtleties of this that I still don't understand. There's a certain over exuberance in any initial, presumably, revolution that was certainly part of this; but I think the easier thing was to identify people regardless of what they were doing who were bright, had some coherence to their views, who were part of how you could build programs. The hard part is how do you do that when say a bigger group of colleagues are still doing what they did fifteen or twenty years ago—which is part of the problem with the English Department.

CAC: And in a certain view, classical Humanities Department?

CS: Yes. I have less day to day contact there. We hired a number of younger people in classics—probably more than many people realize—or would have otherwise have chosen but I think some people who were at least open to newer and alternative ways about thinking. That's more I think of an evolutionary process.

CAC: But in Johnston Hall, the dean's office, you and Fred knew that . . . I mean you had to be abreast of these new ways of asking questions?

CS: Yes. Right. The breadth of Fred's knowledge and understanding is just very impressive.

CAC: He did this by the ear? He picked these things up by conversation?

CS: And he's quite well read and he can see to the heart of matters very quickly. So I think he had a very strong base from his own interests in history of thought and geography. Geography spans so many different areas that it took him into so many different areas. Then he just gets to the heart of matters very quickly and that was part I think of his own interest in terms of interviewing people. That was also part of this broader, continual process of learning.

CAC: Mr. Lukermann had nine, ten years in the dean's chair?

CS: Eleven.

CAC: Then you were acting dean for two years?

CS: Right.

CAC: During this time the search was on for a full time, a regular dean?

CS: Not quite. That's why I say it was a year and a half with regard to Nils being president. I'm not going to get the right years here but Fred stepped down . . . made the announcement in late June, I think. As appropriate, a group of CLA chairs went to see Shirley Clark about How are we going to get the search going for a new dean? Shirley said, "The first question is how many deans?" Maybe Nils was on board by this time. Maybe it was two and a half years, I don't remember. Shirley said, "How many deans?" In terms of an acting dean, I was an obvious choice . . . wouldn't have to be the only one. When asked about this, I said, "Well, I am willing to do this for a year but you should understand that I oppose the separation of the college," which was an idea that harked back to the Campbell Committee, and maybe even before then.

CAC: Separation of the college?

CS: Yes, to have a College of Humanities and the Arts and to have a College of the Social Sciences.

CAC: Oh, okay.

CS: I said, "I oppose that." It was probably the strongest collective action that the college faculty has taken in the last six years, eight years, for everyone except the Music School to tell the president they thought this was a bad idea. It wasn't unanimous but was as damn close to it as you could get to it.

CAC: You were actually dean when this conversation was going on?

CS: I was acting dean at that point. I think Nils finally threw in the towel in late January, early February.

CAC: Why would Nils, a humanist, have been seduced by such an idea?

CS: I don't really know. He talked about smaller units where if you weren't careful I suppose the dean could micro-manage departments. He would never say that but I think that was his model that—not micro-management—maybe you'd have more deans arguing for . . .

[End of Tape 1, Side 2]

[Tape 2, Side 1]

CS: This notion about dividing the college . . . the more fragmented structure was what Nils was familiar with at Arizona because of the way that they were organized there, although they didn't have as many other colleges as we had. My opposition was that I thought this group was going to be administrative, and would also actually be a step backwards from the sort of working relationships that Fred had fostered, and had helped to develop across anyone's definitions of Humanities and Social Sciences. Many units would have a very hard time deciding what they wanted to do. There was a story that the Philosophy Department at Arizona was in the Social Sciences and the question was Why? and the chair of the department said, "Because we knew we couldn't get into the college of Natural Sciences."

CAC: When I came here, the History Department had been asked to go to Social Science or Humanities and I'm told—the legend was then—that everybody laughed and said, "We're going to go to Social Science because we'll be the most important." [laughter] "But if we go into Humanities, we'll be outweighed by English." So it was a political decision, and knowingly so, everybody laughed.

CS: Right. Fred had, with others and I too, the loss impunity of the arts and sciences. This seemed to be making something like that even more difficult.

CAC: Just a minute. I'm going to interrupt you here because a substantial number of persons whom I've interviewed have said, "Well, it was the loss of the sciences in 1957-1958 that really began the decline of the Arts College. Once you separated basic disciplines in the sciences out, then the college was in trouble."

CS: That could well be. I don't have a personal history of that because CLA was what it was when I came but I could believe that. There's important ways in which that rings true.

CAC: But you didn't feel as dean and associate dean that the difficulty of reaching out to chemistry, and physics, and math, for example, made your task more difficult for undergraduate instruction?

CS: There were tensions with regard to how students moved between those programs that was exacerbated by the budget situation that wouldn't have existed if we'd been together. In some sense, we were organizing in a way we weren't concerned with that, but I think if they had been part of the college, the organization would have been a little different. I think that we could have handled it. I don't think that that would have in any sense been overwhelming.

CAC: But a further fragmentation is what came when you were there? And that didn't . . .

CS: Right. But it was a long time into January or February before the president, as I say, threw in the towel on this issue; and then it took longer to get the search for the new dean up and going. And there was a meeting where pressure was brought to bear on me to stay for one more year and that was also brought by some of my friends and colleagues in the college which was a little harder to put off. But that's why I ended up two years instead of just one.

CAC: You were a candidate to be the dean?

CS: Yes, although I had some ambivalence about that. There were days when I would be very excited. Then there were some of the days when you dealt with the realities of some of these things where some of that looked a little less exciting. I think Nils came into the presidency with some of the Morrill Hall baggage about CLA, that we were unruly.

CAC: But he'd been associate dean.

CS: I know. I know. When Anne Hopkins was hired as vice-provost for Arts, Science and Engineering, she was essentially told that her first task was to try to get CLA in shape, and Ann and I had some difficult personal times as we worked that out. I think she came to understand that that was not her job, but before she'd had a working relationship with us that's what people she was reporting to were telling her.

CAC: What did that mean? In what ways was the government control lacking or whatever?

CS: I think what it meant was that you second guessed everything. There was a lack . . . There wasn't the level of trust and understanding that you would normally expect. It just affected so many other things. Anne's a very strong individual and I'm sure there would have been some tensions about that anyway, but it would have been much easier to deal with those if there hadn't been this other sense that she had about what she was supposed to do. As I say, we worked that through but there were times when our personal relationship . . .

CAC: It was hard to do as acting dean?

CS: Oh, yes. That's why I say there were times when there were some strains here in terms of personal relationships. I like Anne a lot and I respect her quite a bit. I think that she has been, in recent years, one of the few voices in Central Administration speaking up for the importance of the arts and sciences.

CAC: Now, you've expressed—in the note you sent me but also in a few conversations—that you are, as many of us are, anxious about the capacity of the university to sustain the values and the quality that you're committed to throughout all these years, and the rest of us. Is it time to move to that question?

CS: I think it's complicated. Part of it is broader social issues, and so on, but I think if we're not careful the university could lose its commitment and understanding of what it means to be a major research university. I wish that I had a clearer sense of the commitment in Morrill Hall here. It's very difficult for anyone there. The university budget has been under strain. There are all these pressures to do this and that and whatever. I think that outside the university, more generally in the state, people take the university as a research university for granted, and so want to push it in other directions. With limited resources, we can't . . .

CAC: You mean and take it for granted that that will go on anyway?

CS: Right. With limited resources you can't do that in quite the same ways. I think the state has made what's turned out to be a very serious—the dynamics of this—a very serious mistake when it allowed for this proliferation of campuses. So you have a number of legislators out state who now see their particular role as defending their campus. We have almost twice as many campuses as Wisconsin—not the university but if you count all of higher education—sixty-two as opposed to thirty-five. So you get a dilution of the state's resources that way, and in terms of the scramble for this, that's where I think sometimes I'm not sure where the university's going to end up. Jim Infante talks about a restructuring of higher education, and I think he's probably right, where we'll end up with—we have forty major research universities at the moment—twenty-five.

CAC: Oh, I see, in the country?



CS: Yes, in the country. So you're going to lose some along the way and at least he says that he wants to be sure Minnesota is one of the twenty or twenty-five. But there are times when some of the decisions that are being made make me wonder if that's in fact where we're going to end up. Part of those decisions are made in St. Paul but sometimes we shoot ourselves in our foot, too.

CAC: With the decline of research funds from government foundations, NIH [National Institute for Health], NSF [National Science Foundation], and NEH [National Endowment for the Humanities] to a lesser degree, how does one substitute and maintain that research without finding funds elsewhere?

CS: I think the big decline is in the Defense Department actually and as that undergirds other things . . .

CAC: Was there ever much defense money in the Arts College?

CS: No, not so much here but talking about the university as a whole.

CAC: Alright.

CS: There are things called indirect cost monies where the university is providing facilities for research grants for which research activity can take place and it's right that the university get reimbursed for that. That forms a research pot for the university as a whole. Where this total funding is under pressure, there's less of that resource to sponsor research for the university as a whole. A university works through a complicated series of cross subsidies. I think you have stronger medical schools, stronger technology, when you have stronger arts units. The best universities have both of those. We're not just the Medical University of Minnesota. We're not just the Technology University of Minnesota. I think the most thoughtful people in those units say the same things. Similarly I think that we have a stronger Arts College when the Medical School isn't under siege, and when you have other units of the university that you can point to with pride; so I think it works sort of both ways. So we all lose when there's this bigger loss. I mean the push on private funding, the push for industry relationships, and the need to control those in important sorts of ways so that . . .

CAC: Those relationships are in colleges other than the arts?

CS: Right but it's important for the university as a whole. Actually over the time that Fred was dean, research funding in CLA increased . . . it bottomed out in the early eighties but then increased sort of every year thereafter. Fred put special efforts into that in the Office of Research Development and sometimes particular people made that office very successful. In some cases psychology [unclear] as long as the quality of the faculty is there. It happens by themselves. They don't need a lot of help but there were other parts of the college that needed help. I think that office worked very successfully. In fact in recent years that effort's been scaled back a bit.

CAC: Your stars in Economics found large foundation grants in what ways, what places?

CS: Not so much foundation grants although in the early sixties there was a project called the Upper Midwest Study . . .

CAC: Borchert's Geography?

CS: The part of that that I'm familiar with is Jim Henderson and Ann Krueger in Economics and it was probably Walter [Heller] behind the scenes getting that going.

CAC: Okay.

CS: We had some major graduate student funding for graduate students from Spain that Walter also helped to organize . . . that was a personal connection with Duane Andreas. These people were called Andreas Fellows and it must be the most successful program of graduate fellowship that I know about in the country.

CAC: And just with Spain?

CS: Just with Spain.

CAC: Why would Andreas of agricultural fame have them think of Spain?

CS: He wanted to export soy beans and soy bean oil to Spain. Walter didn't have anything to do with that but this was I think in some sense a way that Andreas could pay back favors in Spain maybe. I don't know.

CAC: Was this a funded program, I mean a capital?

CS: No, no. Year to year. Just year by year. And when Walter passed on, we haven't been able to sustain that commitment. Andreas told us to go work with someone else who wanted to change the dimensions of the program in ways that it just hasn't worked out. The students who have gone back to Spain all have important positions in the government, in private industry, and universities in Spain. There's a term in Spanish—my Spanish isn't very good—[unclear] *Minnesotans* which is used in the press in Spain. These are people of great prominence and importance. The first Andreas Fellow went from here to an appointment in mathematics and economics at Berkeley, and is now on the faculty at Harvard, and most recently president of the Econometrics Society. There were things like that. But over the longer term, we've had significant NSF funding which reflects the quality of the science done by individuals, and Leo Hurwicz who had NSF funding essentially for all of his career would be the epitome of that.

CAC: What happens when we lose Leo by retirement? You can't replace that right away, that contact, that reputation?

CS: No. I think part of issue is . . . the way I would say it is that retirements are not unexpected events; and so a department needs to be careful in terms of the hiring that it makes in the years preceding someone's retirement, and the standards it uses for promotion and tenure, and the climate within the department, with all sort of things like that, to sustain the nature of quality, and to sustain the commitment to what a department thinks is important.

CAC: Well, we're back where we began with the culture of a department, and its commitment, and its history.

CS: Yes. I think it has importantly to do both with identifying individuals and then having an environment where individuals can succeed.

CAC: And the resources to hire?

CS: Yes, although I think . . .

CAC: And the resources to attract good graduate students as in the Spanish? Question mark.

CS: Yes, although I think that the key to all of that is the quality of the faculty you have in the first place. Deans want to support successful departments. Good students win competition. Good students are attracted by good faculty and then look good in all sorts of other comparisons.

CAC: But do I hear implicitly a thought that without sufficient financing, external and internal, that's difficult to sustain? One may ride for five, ten years but it's difficult to sustain without the resources?

CS: Oh yes. I think that probably has to be. That maybe goes without saying, but it's resources but it's also the commitment of people. This is secondhand but I think there's a sense among many of the old timers in many of the social science departments that—I think it was once put to me—there was a loss of nerve in many of the Humanities Departments at one point.

CAC: What does that mean as a descriptor?

CS: It means people weren't making—this was before I was involved in the dean's office . . .

CAC: I understand.

CS: This means people weren't making the tough personnel decisions, and weren't prepared to terminate people when they should have, and that hiring decisions were made on a series of other criteria rather than quality . . . political infighting, this or that, but not the quality of the work of the individuals.

CAC: Whatever historian is listening to this, this would be an important thing to look at. When I came here, the English Department was still great, and it really was. It wasn't riding on reputation, it still had it. I think as early as the early 1960s that had really dissipated, and I don't know why, but it may be that whoever is seriously considering it should look at what you're saying right now.

CS: Yes. Yes. By the time I was in the dean's office, it was true the English Department had a long way to go, and sometimes you had rhetoric from parts of the university's Central Administration that we can turn the university around in five years. Well, it isn't going to be five years. In five years, you can be better off than you were today but then you lay a base for what can happen before . . . My own sense with regard to history—you might have your own perspectives here—I think Frank made one serious mistake when he was dean. Maybe he made more than one, but one of the mistakes that was serious was that hiring was only done at assistant professor levels. There was some tremendous turnover in History in terms of numbers at that time, and a lot of assistant professors were hired, and those people you can't expect are going to have the reputation, the impact, to sustain a program that more senior colleagues are going to have. Many of these people have developed into important people, but I think if there had been a different mix of hiring at that time . . .

CAC: We were always advised that that was the economics of it.

CS: I know. Frank just said, "That's all we're going to do." We were under some of the same strictures. We didn't have the turnover of similar magnitude there. That hit us more in the eighties in Economics. I think that that as a way of proceeding can be a serious mistake. You've got to look at sort of the whole age and rank distribution and a series of other things.

CAC: And the Lukermann Administration attempted to do that?

CS: Right. Hiring was much more flexible across ranks. You always face budget constraints but hiring was much more flexible across ranks and depended upon particular situations.

CAC: Let me try this on you because I didn't come into my interviews with it in mind, but you remember thirty-three, and I've heard from many different colleges, Education, IT, Biological Sciences, etcetera, as well as the Arts College, that one of the things that happened from the early sixties, mid sixties—it's not a date but a process—was increased specialization in all fields, and that that specialization made it increasingly difficult for any department of any substantial size to maintain a collegial spirit. The word fragmentation has come up that things were fragmented and then it's difficult, that being the case, and it rises out of the inherent move toward specialization which in research has been necessary the last thirty years, but it breaks down collegiality. Do you have any response to that as you've looked at many different departments?

CS: I think that's probably true. That is an important issue and in some departments like English, and maybe some of the other language and literature departments, when you get sort of major changes in the way scholarship is done, it has a generational influence. It just adds to that fragmentation. That was one thing that surprised me about Psychology. That's really quite divided that way and clearly a very strong department with a set of very strong individuals with outstanding scientific and scholarly credentials of their own. They are much more rigidly divided. I actually thought that one of the most encouraging things that happened was what happened in the History Department where I think Fred and Roger had started this but it took a little while longer—and you may have a different perspective from the inside—but from the outside it had been wings, and there was tension between the wings; but then there was a move to try to find themes that cut across wings, that would bring people together, issues like the Early Modern Center so that you didn't have the European historians, the non-Europeans, the American historians. You could have things that would pull people together, broader issues in social history and women's history and a whole . . .

CAC: That came out of theme and methods rather than out of the traditional geographic and chronological traditions.?

CS: Right.

CAC: What you're reasoning here is a real contradiction because in English it's fragmenting and in History you're saying it was synthesizing?

CS: Well, I think it's different ways to try to think about things. Fred and I used to say that you could always divide up the world by time, and place, and then within place you could talk about political, cultural, social history. You could always make that matrix bigger than any amount of resources would ever be, and rather than emphasizing things like that that put people in separate little boxes, let's think about things that would bring people together. In that sense Economics might have an advantage over a number of other disciplines because of the nature of the discipline. While people do particular work in particular areas, in terms of economic theory that permeates so much. There's more I think of a common ground, certainly more than in Psychology where you have neuro people on the one hand with counseling people on the other hand, and I think that the distances there are just much greater.

CAC: I don't know how to ask this question because I'm so ignorant of it but the development of rational expectations theory was not alone at Minnesota but Minnesota made a major contribution to that?.

CS: Yes.

CAC: Now that wasn't a divisive theory that came . . . I mean it didn't fragment the department?

CS: No. That's certainly true.

CAC: Where does that come from and what impact did it have?

CS: I think Minnesota was from 1972 to the present . . . I wouldn't want to give up on the future yet . . . although this is now a part of everyone's, all economist's, tool kits but at the time it was the most exciting place to do microeconomics in the world.

CAC: Did the department stumble on this because you hired some people who just happened to then do this wonderful thing or was it more planned?

CS: I don't know if it was planned. I remember some of the original ideas come out of some work by Bob Lucas at Chicago, but people like Neil and Tom, Neil Wallace and Tom Sargent, and then Jack Kareken, who were both in the department, and also involved with the research department at the Federal Reserve Bank at the time, were I think some of the first to see the broader implications of what Wookas was talking about, and had a commitment to following ideas through to their logical conclusion. Some of the issues about rational expectations, they were talking about sort of implications with regard to macro issues and macroeconomics, but the modeling strategies and approach share a lot with the way microeconomic theory has always been done. In terms of micro theory, mathematical economics, we have as strong a program as any program in the world. So I think that this was in some sense a place where it was natural that with these particular individuals that some things would . . .

CAC: And two of the three are now gone?

CS: Right. That's also an interesting issue because there are particular issues . . .

CAC: And Kareken's in another college?

CS: Right. He's in the Finance Department although he's still a member of our graduate faculty. When I first came there was bad blood between the Economics Department and the Business School because of the divorce that occurred in the early sixties and had been simmering over the fifties. But over time, as people retired and so on and memories grew dim, I think people sort of forgot why some of that was there, but more fundamentally certain parts of the business world made major commitments to graduate education. So we now have very good relationships with Finance, with Accounting, with Industrial Relations [IR] . . .

CAC: And your graduate students work with persons in those other colleges?

CS: Yes. In some of those programs students take courses with us. We have some courses we joint teach with Finance. There are students who take courses in Accounting and IR, so the nature of that relationship is quite different. While there's some particular issues with regard to all of these particular decisions—I mean Jack was offered a chair—it reminds me a little bit of farm foreclosures because when times are tough, in terms of farming, farm foreclosures go up but not every farm gets foreclosed. So there are always particular reasons why this guy got into

trouble and that person didn't, but the fact that there are more of them at the same time is something that is fully understandable in terms of sort of the macro issues of the time. There are particular issues with regard to each vacancy that we've had but the financial times of the university I think helped to create an environment where others can take advantage of particular circumstances. Tom [Sargent] went through a very messy divorce, and had very difficult personal relationships with his wife, and wanted some distance on her. It was nothing about the department or the university. Neil's issue is in some sense maybe a little more complicated and Neil's a much more private person—it's a little bit like male menopause, that's my term, and Ken Keller told me about Neil Amundson in Chemical Engineering; there's some similarities there—but also his wife has some serious health problems that are harder to deal with in the winter. So there are other particular things.

CAC: Sure.

CS: I think the broader sort of environment as there have been retrenchments, serious retrenchments in the college, the first place a dean can grab money is vacancies. We have more turnover than any other department in the college. We always have and I imagine we always will.

CAC: Economics?

CS: And so does every Economics Department in the country.

CAC: Because there are more options?

CS: And more internal mobility.

CAC: More career options?

CS: Yes, but also more people move. Maybe it's among the very best programs that there are more chairs than there are players, unlike the children's game where you have one too few, but there's always mobility in that sense and we're not immune to that.

CAC: Do many spin off into private consulting?

CS: Nationally that happens. It hasn't happened so much with people who have . . .

CAC: For the national profession, it means there is more [unclear]. I mean no one wants an historian or a philosopher.

CS: Well, I think it's harder. I wouldn't say no one wants them but it probably in some sense is harder.

CAC: I've noticed as an historian that when there's a conference or a workshop, they frequently call on an historian to be first, and what he really is a call to worship. And that having been done, he's forgotten.

CS: Yes. [laughter] Some of the more thoughtful people . . . When I was in the dean's office you met people who would be called movers and shakers, and all in all I was much more impressed than I thought I might be. There were some people who I thought were quite shallow and had lots of money but there were a number of people who were actually quite thoughtful. Now, it may be that they're at a time and a point where they can afford to be but all in all I came away much more positively impressed than I thought I might have been.

CAC: About the capacity of the college and the departments to work?

CS: Oh, well, I was talking about . . . let me back up. When you talked about historians being the call to worship, I was talking about outsiders. I have very positive memories of the time I was in the dean's office—to some extent you want to look back on your own stuff that way, so someone else is going to have to say whether I was mistaken. But both inside the dean's office, there were very good people to work with, and I don't know whether it was the luck or what but I don't think that's the rule, and it certainly was not the norm in Morrill Hall which is a whole other issue. But at the same time, I also thought that the college as a whole was moving in what I thought were the right and very positive directions. You don't tenure everyone you hire but I felt good about the direction hirings were going. I felt good about the sort of candidates that departments were able to attract, by in large. We worked with any number of departments in particular issues. I remember some searches in Sociology, one in particular that failed in the sense of not making a hire, but it gave them a whole new way to think about hiring . . . successes in the History Department. We made a number of appointments in Economics in terms of talking about this renewal issue. I mean there were a whole series of things like that that you could feel just really very good about.

CAC: You provoke me to ask a question that had not been in my mind about the nature and the quality of persons attracted to collegial administration, and your experience was the Arts College, but I've heard similar things from other colleges . . . and always skepticism about Central Administration and the persons . . . Is there a structural problem in Central Administration?

CS: I think so.

CAC: If so, what is the structural problem? There are good people around that were the same persons.

CS: I think from my perspective there are two issues, one of which I think is easier to understand, the other of which I don't. Somehow there seems to be a gulf when people get into Morrill Hall. I always felt that in the college, it was us, where us included the dean's office and the rest of the college, that we were working together for a particular objectives.



CAC: Now, that wasn't individual personalities? That's a systemic structure?

CS: Maybe it was Fred but I always felt that way.

CAC: But I think people felt it with other deans. I'm trying to see whether it's just *ad hominem* or whether there's a systemic thing operating.

CS: From my observation, this happened over any number of people, so it much be something more systemic. Somehow with Morrill Hall it was them. Us was Morrill Hall and them was everybody else. I think the bigger issue—there's a second issue—is that this university has too many vice-presidents. These vice-presidents all have a certain amount of ego or they wouldn't get to be vice-presidents, and they spend too much time looking after their own turf, and keeping tabs on each other because there are too many of them. People aren't willing to sublimate their own personalities for the common good, which is something that was quite clear that that's the way the dean's office was going to work, at least when Fred was dean. And it did. That was part of the joy about working with people there. But I think in Morrill Hall, you've got too much turf battle.

CAC: And part of the turf—let me state it as a statement but it really is a question—is that the Health Sciences and the St. Paul campus represent clusters of substantive fields, whereas the others are defined in functional terms, the other vice-presidents, Finance, Administration, etcetera. Can you respond to that?

CS: I think that we had dean's meetings where there would be Fred, and the three associate deans, and two staff people—Nancy MacKenzie, and either Mary Bilek, or Mary Bloomquist—but essentially it was people who had a shared academic vision. You get these meetings in Morrill Hall and you don't have that because you have people that come from such disparate backgrounds. For some people, the university is just like any other business. They've got some huge number of employees. They've got some things they've got to do. It could be Daytons or it could be the Mall of America. I'm maybe being a little unfair but I don't know if I'm being very unfair. So as you get some of these groups narrowing down, you don't have quite the same set of shared vision; and my sense is that the meetings in Morrill Hall have too many people, that everyone comes with two or three staff people which adds to this notion about turf protection. "I can't look bad in front of my own staff." I can't say, "I don't know." I can't say, "I need time to think about it. We need a position otherwise what are these people going to think?" I think those things may interact. Also, this university meets too often. There are too many meetings. It's this whole issue about consultation, and you can have so many meetings you don't have consultation, and I think sometimes that's what we border on. Virginia Gray is chair of the Finance and Planning Committee. She told me the sorts of things she goes to. She must hear the same thing ten times before it's through with groups that are marginally different because of all these other committees she's on. Well, because of that people in Central Administration spend so much time talking to themselves, they don't talk with the rest of the university; and things I think work best when you have people like Gerry Shepherd, Ken Keller, who came up from the

faculty who knew the university. In recent years, we've had a large number of outsiders who don't know the university and don't have the time to get to know the university. The situation for the president I think is a little more complicated because Nils does know the university, but at present his calendar is impossible to begin with; so you can't expect that the president's going to do it. One of the things that I thought was critical about the way Fred organized the dean's office was that he empowered all the associate deans, so that chairs knew that they could get to Fred through some other way if they had to. It wasn't that they had to wait for Fred. There were a set of relationships there so the whole thing worked better. Well, I don't think that happens in Morrill Hall and so things get concentrated. It makes it even more difficult for single people to maintain a set of contacts, and it makes it easier to think about a bunch of people who don't know what I'm doing, and don't appreciate what I'm doing, and somehow the thing needs to be turned around.

CAC: The persons I've interviewed have had sometime appointments . . . maybe four, five years in various posts in Morrill Hall, and they all report that the damn place is too busy.

CS: Right.

CAC: And finally they can't take it. Everybody works too hard . . . no time for reflection.

CS: Right. I think if they didn't meet as often, that would be a place to start. [laughter] There are probably some other ways that you could make life a little easier for people. I remember when this proposal to split the college—the University of Texas had been split and then they reorganized into a College of Liberal Arts and a College of the Sciences—I was talking with the dean at Texas about how that had happened and he said, "Gee, I don't know. Let me think." He said, "Well, I think the president asked some people to look into this, and they thought about it for awhile, and then we had a meeting with the president and she said, 'What do you recommend?'" They said, "We recommend that you bring as much of this back together as you can." And she said, "Let's do it!" And that was the end of it. I asked him if there were reports, documents, arguments that had been developed that he might be willing to share. He said, "There was no paper work on this." Now, sometimes that can also lead to sort of decisions made behind closed doors in small groups.

CAC: Sure. [unclear]

CS: But it also suggested an ability and a will to take action at times in a way that was certainly a lot more efficient in terms of people's time, and we need to find the appropriate golden mean in there that I don't think we've found.

CAC: You're now fifty, fifty-one years old.

CS: Yes.

CAC: And back at this chair of Economics after a long stint in Central Administration at the college at least. You have twenty years to go. How are you going to stage those which could be very fruitful years? The fifties and sixties can be very productive, very rewarding.

CS: I don't know if I've thought about that entirely. I think I'd be willing—if my colleagues were interested, and the dean were interested—to think about one more term as chair and then you stop doing that. These things have to cycle. Jim Simler was chair for twenty-seven years . . . twenty-two years.

CAC: And how does one explain that exception?

CS: He was nominated every three years by his colleagues to the dean. He was very good at it. Everyone understood that. He was willing to do it . . . it just happened . . . and that isn't me. I wouldn't want to rule that out for departments as such, but I think that it's probably better over the longer run if these positions are shared, and there's a broader base of experience for a department, for a college.

CAC: Say of a cadre of former chairs who were colleagues?

CS: Yes, and people who understand the broader sense of issues that one has to deal with and things like that. I think it was also easier . . . Well, when Jim started, it was an expanding period and I think it's harder for someone to sustain that sort of record like Jim did during a period of declining resources, too.

CAC: I asked the questions I did, and it's not a very objective way of putting it, because I've interviewed older persons, and perhaps like adolescents leaving home, they have to find excuses why they don't like the home they have now to leave . . . I mean when they retire, looking forward to imminent retirement in one to five years, something like that. Many of these persons say, "Oh boy, I'm glad I'm retiring. I don't want to face the next twenty years." This may be fatigue. It may be age. It may be rationalization for the fact that they must retire. I was asking you as a younger person, you see, what sense you have of the future of yourself in this institution the next twenty years?

CS: I don't know if I have a lot of time to think about that.

CAC: I don't want to press it but I ask it for that reason. The older persons seem, many of them, to think that gosh, we're well out of it. There's nothing but trouble the next ten, fifteen years.

CS: I can certainly understand why people would think that. I hope they're wrong. I want to believe that we're going through—if this the farm crisis example—something that we're going to get over and going to get beyond. I don't know that, but I certainly hope that that's the case. That's sort of what's motivated particular other things I've been willing to get involved with, that

I see as again something that maybe I may be able to make a contribution here at the moment.  
So I don't want to be quite so pessimistic . . .

[End of Tape 2, Side 1]

[End of Interview]

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