David Berg


Youth - Minneapolis 1-
    Trained to be CPA 1
Berg - accountant for University of Minnesota, mid 1950s 2
    Champion, Hale 3
Increase in research funding, circa 1955-75 4
    role of federal government 4
    health sciences 4
    research pushed by Central Administration 4
    overhead costs 5
        distribution 6
        issue of "offset" 7
        questions distortion of research by funding 7
        classified research 8
        aerospace 8
Planning by Central Administration, 1969 10-
    liaison with state legislators 11-
    Searle, Rod 11
    need for accountability 11
Berg - consultant to Governor Wendell Anderson, 1970-71 11
    Haynes, John 12
    Smith, Don 13-14
    Keller, Kenneth 15
    Middlebrook, William 15
    Willey, Malcolm 16
    Wenberg, Stan 16
        rural Republican majority 16
    Peterson, Donna, 1990s 17
Status of University of Minnesota 17-
    competition of state universities 18
Commitment to Focus, 1985 19
Closing of Waseca 19
    Crookston not closed 20
Budget restraints and central planning, circa 1971 20
    Retrenchment and Reallocation 21
    leads to Commitment to Focus 23
    Perpich, Governor Rudy - role 23
    appropriations and enrollment 23
    competition for state funds 23
Changing morale at university 24
    faculty turnover 24
    faculty loyalties shift to disciplines 24
        careerism 25
        specialization 25
        "merit" 26
    spread of salaries 27
        decline of generalists 28

increase in grievances 28
increase in mid-level administration 29
no time for reflection 30
Vietnam War 31-32
police on campus 31
minority program 33
General College 33-36
Non-traditional students 36-37
gender balance 36
Role of vice-president for Student Affairs 38
Vice-presidents for School of Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics and Health Services 39
Shifts in School of Education 40
Higher Education Coordinating Board 41
Nursing 41-
Undergraduate program in College of Management 42-43
Role of Board of Regents 43-46
Minnesota open meeting law 44
Legislative budgets 46-47
"specials" 46-47
Vice-presidency for Academic Affairs 48-50
Shepherd, Gerry 48
Chase, Hal 49
Benjamin, Roger 49
Problems of middle-management 50
Shifts in state economy 51
High-Tech Council 51
Suburban majority in state legislature 52
Extension Service 52-
Minority populations 53-
Shifts in Land-Grant mission 55
Long-term planning 55
financing complexities 56
G.I. Bill 59
Grievance systems 60
Burdens of accountability 60
Personal rewards to Berg 61
Distance learning 62

**Interview with David J. Berg**

**Interviewed by Professor Clarke A. Chambers**
**University of Minnesota**

**Interviewed on November 7 and 8, 1994**
**in the Office of David J. Berg, Morrill Hall**
**University of Minnesota Campus**

David Berg - DB
Clarke A. Chambers - CAC

CAC: I'm interviewing David J. Berg who has been in Central Administration for a long time and has seen many things come and go. It is the 7th of November . . . Monday in the morning. The interview is being conducted in his office in Morrill Hall.

David, I suggested earlier when we were off tape that we'd start as I do with everyone with a little bit of autobiography. How does one design a career, if one does, when one is very young? [Start with] a bit about your early education. You were active in the private sector for awhile before coming to the university, so maybe we could just get an autobiographical background.

DB: I'm out of the public schools in Minneapolis. My mother was an immigrant and my father was the son of an immigrant. I was raised in northeast Minneapolis. By the dint of my father being willing to let me live at home after high school, I was able to get through the university and got a bachelor's degree in accounting in 1951. I went to work for a local publishing, actually, a national public accounting firm.

CAC: Did you have an early predisposition toward accounting?

DB: No. As a matter of fact, I came into the university with the intention of being English literature major. After a year or two, it occurred to me that I probably wouldn't eat if I continued to do that. So as about a sophomore, I went to my advisor in the English Department and said I was switching my major to accounting. He turned pale and said it was a terrible thing to do. But I did it anyway. I thought I was going to be a CPA [Certified Public Accountant]. When I went to work for the CPAs, I found I didn't like it. I guess that's not too unusual. A lot of people will tell this kind of story. I liked the accounting but I didn't like the CPA work. For one thing the social and professional life was too constrained. In those days, one was expected

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to go out and pub crawl with the partners on Friday night and you had to wear a hat. You'd probably get dismissed if you didn't wear tie and so forth. I got rather sick of it and decided that really wasn't what I wanted to do, so I quit.

CAC: Even the university had a dress code in those days.

DB: Yes, that's true. It did, although it wasn't nearly as bad. It's interesting that one of the things I liked about the university is it was a whole lot less constraining when I got here. When I quit the CPAs, I quit actually with no place to go and went job hunting. I got a job in the construction industry and I became chief accountant for a group of firms that was manufacturing mill work and building houses in the Ramsey and Anoka County area which went fairly well for a couple years until we got caught in the suspension of all GI [Government Issue] loans in 1953. We had about fifty houses under construction with constructions loans on them. So the whole thing went down the tubes, and as a matter of fact, they owed me a lot of money when I left. Again, I was without anything to do and at that time with a wife to think about because I had married shortly before that. So I began looking around and lo and behold there was an advertisement for a junior accountant at the University of Minnesota. I had never had any thought of working for the university. But I did have to put some food on the table, so I came over here, interviewed with the then Assistant Chief Accountant Al Cheese. He may still be alive, I'm not sure. Dear man. He said to me, "Why in the hell would you want to work for the university?" [laughter] I said, "I need to make some money." He said, "Fine. You're hired." I told my wife, "Well, I'll work there for a year and if nothing happens, I'll look for something else." In a year, I got promoted to senior accountant in the Research Administration Office under Dick Elliott.

CAC: And by now, it's the mid fifties?

DB: This would be about 1955 or 1956, thereabouts.

CAC: Was that in the research office in the graduate school?

DB: No. It was in the what was then called the business office, reporting to the controller and the chief accountant.

CAC: And that comes to be the office now directed by Tony Potomi?

DB: Yes, same office. As a matter of fact, I was instrumental in hiring Tony years ago.

CAC: How large a staff in the mid fifties in that office?

DB: I think we had three. When I came into it, we had maybe four professionals, the director, myself, and two professional contract officers and a clerical staff of about ten, something like that.

CAC: What's the order of that size of the office now?

DB: Oh, I have no idea.

CAC: It would be enormous.

DB: Much, much larger. There must be thirty professionals now and Lord only knows how much clerical staff. Although clerical staff maybe has not grown all that much, largely due to various office automations and so forth. Things have changed somewhat. In those days . . . you can hardly remember the day when you would call the secretary in and dictate a letter. I can remember doing that. As a matter of fact, there's a secretary one floor up here who took letters from me years ago. Nobody would do that today. I know, I write my own letters or at the very most, I may dictate into a machine and the secretary writes it but very few people anymore use secretaries the way they did then.

CAC: How long were you with that office of research?

DB: I worked there from 1956—though I don't remember this clearly—until 1969.

CAC: Those were the days of the great expansion, as far as research funds were concerned.

DB: Yes, huge expansion. The staff expanded. I was hired in as the cost accountant who did the Federal Indirect Cost Study. But I gradually did a lot of other things, as a matter of fact, was expected to in the first place. The Cost Study was then only part of one person's duties. I rose to be assistant director and probably would have been director; since Dick Elliott then, unfortunately, had cancer and was about to die, though it took him awhile to do it. But in 1969, Hale Champion who had become vice president for finance under Moos [Malcolm Moos] showed up one day in the office and said, "I'm looking for a young man who knows the place and is willing to be assistant to the finance vice president. Would you be interested? You've been highly recommended," and blah-blah. I said, "I'll think it over." I went home and said to my wife, "What do you suppose I ought to do?" She said, "You think it would be a raise involved?" I said, "Well, I wouldn't do it unless there was some kind of raise." [laughter] She said, "What do you suppose they'd give you?" I was making $13,000 a year then. I said, "He'll probably offer me $14,550, something like that. Is that worth it?" "Oh, yes," she said, "you better make the jump. That's $1500 a year." So I went back and I said to Hale, "It sounds interesting. You've described some things that would be a little different. I'm kind of bored with having done much the same thing for a long time,"—twelve years I guess it was—"so I'll do it." I said, "What are you going to pay me?" He said, "Do you suppose $18,000 would be adequate." I said, "Oh, my god! I guess it would. Yes, I'll take that." [laughter]

CAC: I hope you didn't act too surprised.

DB: So I went to work for Hale who was a very interesting person.

CAC: Now before we get into that story, I want to back up a bit because I've heard from so many persons whether middle management of administration or professors or research scholars . . . Comment on the expansion of research in this university which was almost exponential during the years that you were in that office. Could you say something more about how that expansion took place?

DB: It is true that there was a huge expansion. When I came into that, we were collecting possibly $5,000,000 a year in overhead on research.

CAC: This would have been from private foundations and government contracts?

DB: Yes, largely from the Federal Government but from some other sources . . . maybe $5,000,000. I don't know what our volume might have been but it certainly was below $20,000,000 in 1955; and it expanded very rapidly through the fifties, and particularly in the early sixties, and particularly after Sputnik went up when suddenly the Federal Government became very interested in basic research and applied research.

CAC: Now did that affect primarily the IT and the mathematics or was it more widespread than that?

DB: Yes, although at the same time, there was a tremendous expansion in health science related research as well.

CAC: The health science didn't have its own control of that?

DB: No.

CAC: It was done centrally with that office?

DB: Done centrally and still is really. We also got into a more pro-active stance. I don't think this is generally realized. It reflects a sort of general observation that I would make that every new set of administrators seems to think that the ideas they have are new. They seldom are and frequently things that we've never done before are in fact things we have done before. Dick Elliott became very pro-active in seeking research. When I first came into it, it was sort of if a faculty member got a research contract or a grant, we handled the necessary paper work and the billings and the reports, but we didn't go out looking. In the early sixties particularly, we began to be quite pro-active and began to try to inform faculty of opportunities. Now that's done a lot more professionally now. That development did start early on and it isn't as if people didn't think about doing it, they did. I think sometimes the faculty regarded us as being too pro-active and it is possible to be too pro-active. In my view, one shouldn't certainly force faculty to do creative work they're not interested in doing simply in order to attract funding to the university—particularly if that funding doesn't fully cover the costs involved which it often doesn't. That period ended in 1969.

CAC: I want to ask a couple more questions about this period because there has been a concern expressed by many others whom I've interviewed about the accumulation of overhead funds and their centralization, and then how they're distributed. I'm sure you're aware that in the medical school, for example, there's a sense that their overhead "crosses Washington Avenue," as they put it and they don't get back as much as they've generated. That's just one example. Could you comment upon the distribution of overhead?

DB: The issue again is not a new issue. I can remember dealing with it I suppose the first year I was ever in research contracting. The overhead rate, of course, is to recover overhead costs. The university by and large has never used it for that purpose and as a result, of course . . .

CAC: But that's open fiction. Everybody knows that.

DB: Yes. That's deliberate.

CAC: The funding agencies know that?

DB: Sure, they do.

CAC: All right.

DB: We don't have to use it. There's no legal reason why it has to be used for overhead costs. But that creates the presumption that somehow or other the faculty has created free funding by accepting overhead bearing research. That is not true. The people across Washington Avenue, in my view, probably do produce a lot more overhead than they get back just as, for instance, the Mathematics Department does since the actual attributable overhead for paper and pencil research is very little. But there's no pretense either that funds should go back exactly as they are created and the Federal Government would realize that. There's really two ways to look at overhead and the various universities are on both sides of this. Some universities in fact do use the overhead as it's generated. The amount that's for Physical Plant, heating, is given to the Physical Plant and they use it for that.

CAC: By certain percentage formulas?

DB: Yes. And we could conceivably do that. I think there's a mistake in doing it in that if you do it that way—Potomi and I have argued about this forever. We're really not at odds about it but it does seem to me that some of the overhead that's generated ought to go back to the generator simply as an incentive, so that the faculty member feels that there is some benefit directly to his or her department, or personally. I don't mean money personally, but better working conditions or the opportunity to do some things that are not otherwise funded or whatever . . . seed money. This makes a lot of sense and since I'm a great advocate of incentives within the university structure, I think it is a good idea to do as we have done. However, the

whole concept of overhead is probably the most misunderstood thing on the part of faculty of anything I've ever dealt with around here. It seems impossible . . .

CAC: I think I would confirm that.

DB: . . . ever to get it through what that is and that it really represents real costs. I think most faculty think of it as profit. It definitely is not profit. It's an alleviation of what would otherwise be a loss.

CAC: What was the process for decision making on using those funds? How much did return to the generator of the grant? How much do you use for this and that?

DB: In my time in research contracting, we didn't return anything to the department. That's a development of probably the early seventies. I don't remember exactly what year but it's one of the things we began to advocate in this office along about 1973, 1974. Without checking back, I would think the first budget where we actually returned money would be 1975 or 1976, something like that.

CAC: What use was being made of these funds in the sixties when there were so many of them coming in?

DB: We gave them to Physical Plant and the library, largely. Some of them underwrote Central Administration. That's a little bit touchy, of course. Some, I don't know what it is now, but then maybe four or five points of a forty or fifty point overhead was, in fact, reimbursement for Central Administration. We used some of it that way but most of it tended to be assigned in the budget to either the libraries or to Physical Plant.

CAC: Having in mind posterity, someone who's going to be listening to this five or ten years from now if they were reasonably intelligent, could they from the records determine how those funds were distributed during the sixties?

DB: Yes.

CAC: The records are clear on that?

DB: Every budget will show you what happened there. I believe every year, statements were issued as to how that was budgeted. Now, another thing I should add to this is that at that time, the state attempted to offset all overhead against the state appropriation.

CAC: Yes.

DB: That began to change in the early seventies. Actually of course, they didn't offset it all because during the sixties the growth was so fast that we made overhead faster than the state could offset it.

CAC: But they were, in fact—the legislature during the sixties—appropriating less monies having this in mind?

DB: Yes, right. They would make a gross appropriation and then they would offset what they thought our income on overhead would be as well as some other things. In those days, the earnings on the University Fund—which we were not allowed to use—it was offset against the appropriation. Another case of really bad incentives. That's one of the accomplishments that David Lilly carried out in his time was to get that freed up so that we have some use of it rather than simply offsetting it against an appropriation. All of that is part of the change from very tight micro-managing legislative control to more trust in the university to manage itself.

CAC: You find there's an increase in trust over that last twenty-five years?

DB: Legislatively. The legislature has set us a lot freer than we were at one time. That's something I knew nothing about until about 1969 when I, in fact, came into the Central Administration as opposed to really specialized work with research contracting and accounting.

CAC: I'm going to ask you one more question about research before we move over to Morrill Hall. I think your perception is an accurate one that faculty generally have no idea . . . it's a great mystery how these funds are generated, and how they're distributed. Secondly, I think that there is a perception in some places, not as universally shared, that the availability of funds during the sixties from private foundations but particularly from the Federal Government introduced a kind of distortion into the research agendas of various departments and programs. And from your point of view, can you comment on that?

DB: I've heard the thought before but I hadn't been thinking about it recently.

CAC: I picked it up in some of my interviews.

DB: I don't see that that happened in the arts and humanities or the social sciences, possibly because the opportunity wasn't there, I don't know. If you think about the hard sciences, I don't believe, I can't observe that there was much change in what they were interested in. Our Physics Department, for instance, was certainly interested in atomic and sub-atomic physics long before the big funds were available to do that.

CAC: Yes.

DB: I don't know enough about chemistry to know what they're interested in, but I didn't see any obvious changes in what they sought to fund.

CAC: And they had difficulties with the defense budget grants?

DB: We had a number of classified contracts in the sixties and you may remember that there was a considerable dispute about whether the university should accept classified research. Interestingly enough, that dispute didn't arise until after there was very little classified research to get. You can draw your conclusions from that, but we finally came to the point where we said we would not accept classified research. My perception is by the time we did that, there was very little classified research to accept. Maybe the two things are connected, I don't know. Where I do think that availability of research money made a lot of difference was in the Health Sciences where the emphasis given by the National Institutes of Health at various times, I think has shaped the research agenda a lot there. There really is no other source for those people that amounts to anything. They have occasionally gone to the state and asked for research money that they couldn't get from the Federal Government; but the state really isn't into research very much, except in the agriculture area and mining, in its time. Today we don't have a lot of research money from the state in hard sciences or Health Sciences, very little. There's a spotty history of that. But I do really think that they've been shaped a lot by availability. Certainly the interest in cancer research and in heart research, the central emphasis on those things has shaped what has happened in our medical school a lot.

CAC: The medical schools around the country.

DB: And everywhere. The bulk of research in our Health Sciences has tended to go toward—I don't know what you would say—the popular diseases. I think that's probably inevitable.

CAC: How would an historian ten years from now go about looking in the restricted contracts?

DB: It's pretty hard to do that.

CAC: You mean those are still confidential documents?

DB: Yes, I imagine they're confidential to this day. We had contracts all the way to top secret. Actually, as contract administrator in the late sixties, I was cleared through secret I believe. Maybe we didn't have any top secret contracts; but we had a lot of confidential ones, secret contracts, quite a few largely in the aero . . . Oh, incidentally, that's something that was shaped by federal funding. I had forgotten that.

CAC: Aerospace?

DB: The Aerospace Department and the Rosemount Aeronautical Laboratories and that whole development. Rosemount Aeronautical Laboratories was a huge operation in the mid fifties and early sixties.

CAC: Again, this is post Sputnik, really.

DB: Yes, pretty much post Sputnik. They had a lot of secret contracts. That department under John Akerman bloomed. It was one of the major research departments in the university and, of course, now is not. It's a creditable Aero[space] Department but it certainly is not a leading research department in the sense that Akerman and his department was. A very interesting man, John Akerman. One of the more colorful people that I've encountered in a career of a lot of colorful people. [laughter] I'm not sure how good an academic John may have been. I'm not qualified to judge but my judgement is that he was more an organizer and a promoter than he was an engineer, frankly. And he did a marvelous job of doing that. But that certainly was influenced tremendously by availability and interest at the federal level. That had passed right over my head until you sort of nudged it.

CAC: That's about the only function I have is giving a nudge. Okay? [laughter] And to press on some details. Are there other things about the graduate research office that we should share now? We may come back to parts of it.

DB: I might talk just a little bit about . . . your mentioning graduate research office. Actually, the office I was connected with was not the graduate research office, although part of my assignment in 1969 when I went to work for Hale Champion was to "lias" with what was then created, the graduate research office. There had not previously been one. There was a lot of argument and there still, to some extent, is a lot of argument about whether that whole operation ought not to be run out of the graduate school. Well, in fact, now it does report to the vice president for research and dean of the graduate school. It was decided along about the 1969-1970-1971 period that there would be two offices, one of which would be on the academic side and the other would do, essentially, the scut work and it's been sort of that way, although that office has come and gone in the graduate school. Sometimes, it's quite active. Sometimes it isn't. Right now it has been quite active in recent years but for a long period, it didn't do very much. I think it is better coordinated now than it was at one time. There was, to some extent, a rivalry there in the early seventies. That wasn't very productive. It didn't make much sense.

CAC: From my experience, in the early sixties Jack Darley was kind of doing it all by himself.

DB: Yes. Right. And what can one person do by himself?

CAC: He did a lot of help for me. [laughter]

DB: Luther Pickrel was in charge of that office for awhile and I worked with and for Luther Pickerl for awhile. I think he was too ambitious and more interested in acquiring the function rather than making it work. I'm trying to be a little bit gentle about this because I think his intentions were very good. But he really visualized that as all coming together under an assistant dean of the graduate school or an associate dean which in his mind was him.

CAC: Yes.

DB: That frankly didn't work, partly because I don't think he had enough skill and understanding about the day to day operation to really handle it. He had some very good ideas about promoting research, however, within the university and might have done more than he actually did. He sort of lost a battle internally and wasn't able to do some of the things he might have liked to have done.

CAC: We may come back to some of these issues, but in 1969, then, you take on this new position here?

DB: Right. That was assistant to the vice president for finance at that time and I worked in that job from, oh, I suppose the beginning of 1969 until the fall of 1970 actually, a fairly a short time but a very challenging time because we created an analytic group in the graduate school reporting jointly to the graduate dean and the vice president for finance. It was, I would say, the first analytic unit in the university—I'm talking about fiscal and policy analysis. We collected a group of young economists and operations analysts and we began to look at things that nobody had looked at before. When I first came into it, the university could tell you how many students it registered fall quarter and that's all it knew about students. It didn't know anything about how many credit hours were taught or who taught them. It couldn't tell you what the equivalent full time student load was. We didn't have a very accurate count of our faculty—still don't incidentally, but we have had in the interim. Right now we're suffering from the effects of the new accounting system which has lost us some of the ability we had under the old one, in certain areas. It was really scandalous how little we knew about our own operation and it was becoming obvious that the legislature would like to know a little more about it. You may have seen in my outline that I talked about the change in blind faith even in the early seventies when I first worked with legislators. They had a kind of a blind faith in the university. They thought, the university was good. You gave them money and they did good things with it. That was beginning to change about 1969, 1970, 1971.

CAC: Do you know what made it change?

DB: Professionalization of the legislature, I think had a good bit to do with it.

CAC: Ah. You mean they became full time career . . .

DB: Became more full time, yes. And hired more staff who became more inquisitive. When I first got into the legislative work, I remember meeting . . . Stan Kegler took me or maybe it was Stan Wenberg took me to a Campus Club lunch. He said, "You're going to meet one of the most influential senators from our standpoint in the state of Minnesota." And here comes this old farmer, whose name I've forgotten so I can't tell you who he was. It'd probably come to me if I thought long enough.

CAC: I'm guessing he's Republican.

DB: He was Republican. There's a phrase about this, you know, Shit on his shoes. He was like that, I mean almost literally. I thought what does this guy know about higher education? We sat down to lunch, and he began to talk, and he knew a lot about higher education, but he knew it on a very idealistic, abstract, populist level. People today think maybe that Republicans weren't populist but they were very populist in those days. They were very concerned with the university as a means of socio-economic access to people, to young people particularly, but also access to success for older people too, the extension activity. He was quite a revelation to me but he was kind of the last of that breed I think. I think he may have been the last I ever knew like that. I wish I could remember his name. He was a very interesting fellow. He must have left the legislature about 1971. But along about that time, you were getting people like Rod Searle who became chairman of our house committee about 1969.

CAC: From Waseca.

DB: You're right. I was absolutely terrified of Rod Searle when I first got in to legislative activity. And he now laughs about that and I too, actually. He's a marvelous man and I know him well and still see him once in awhile.

CAC: He was one of the first career politicians in that sense?

DB: I don't know if I would exactly describe him as a career politician but he was in office a long time. He eventually became speaker of the house; and he sort of took it as a major thing in his life to legislate—more so I think than many of the sort of part time legislators that went before him. He's just an example but he happened to be in a very powerful position from our standpoint at that time and was dissatisfied with the kind of accountability he was seeing from the university. He felt we were spending a lot of money that we didn't need to spend and we were not really justifying it very well. He was one of the first to say, "I've got to have something more concrete about what you're doing and what you're delivering." He got pretty aggressive about it. I remember a meeting of his committee in the regents' room which was probably in 1970 at which he really lit in to Don Smith and Malcolm Moos and said, "You people are too complacent, and you feel you're beyond criticism, and it's time that you became a little more accountable to the state." Well, Smith took that to heart. I don't know to what extent Moos did. It was sometimes hard to tell. But Smith certainly took it to heart and said, "We better create some analytic ability and the ability to report better to the legislature. That's where I became involved with that. We did a fair amount of that in preparation for the 1969 and 1971 legislatures.

In the fall of 1970, Wendell Anderson got elected governor and the day after the election, Gene Eidenberg, who was then associate V.P. for administration reporting to Smith, came to me and said, "The governor needs to do a budget, and he's got a lot of staff problems, and he wants us to lend him some people for the transition. Would you be willing to go over and consult on budget?" I said, "Sure, that sounds like it would really be fun." So about November 10th or so

of 1970, I went over and reported to the governor's office and served in the governor's office from then through about June or July of the following year.

CAC: You were advising on issues other than the university or just higher education?

DB: The agreement was that I was not to work on higher education at all.

CAC: I see.

DB: Because of possible conflict of interest and by and large I did not. Although you know, I was there so they obviously asked me some questions but I didn't do budget analysis on higher education. But I did a lot of other budget analysis and really enjoyed it. That was a tour of duty that I wouldn't trade for anything.

CAC: Who was his commissioner of administration at that time?

DB: I should be able to remember but, frankly, I cannot remember who the commissioner of administration was at the moment.

CAC: We can check. John Haynes came to represent the governor . . .

DB: John Haynes was sort of the governor's right hand person.

CAC: Particularly on education.

DB: But he was not commissioner of administration. Haynes was concerned a lot with tax policy and I think he advised a lot on higher education, although I wasn't able to see much of that. I worked a good bit with John Haynes, very bright person.

CAC: He was a graduate student at that time in history.

DB: Yes, I know. He was probably more interested in history than he was in politics.

CAC: It was a bad market. He couldn't find a job.

DB: Yes, well maybe so. He was very good at what he did.

CAC: Extraordinarily able, yes.

DB: He was one of the first people to propose that the Minnesota income tax should be tied to the federal tax to simplify matters. We worked on that quite a bit. We didn't get it through at the time.

CAC: Eventually.

DB: Eventually, it was done, yes. We went through that session which was a very active session. It was the session in which we contrived, essentially by ruse, to elect Josie Johnson regent—first woman, first Black ever to be elected regent. I worked a lot with Tom Kelm. I don't know whether you know Tom. Tom, of course, had I think the partly undeserved reputation of being sort of the typical wheeler dealer politician. He was chief of staff to Wendell Anderson at the time. I found Kelm to be a very idealistic person who was willing to try to change things in the right direction. His campaign to get Josie Johnson elected regent was a good example of that. I think Tom is the person who did that and in spite of his reputation as a wheeler and dealer and a lobbyist—he's still lobbying of course—there's a lot more to Tom Kelm than people think, and I don't mind saying so. That was a long session. When we got done with it, Wendell Anderson and Tom Kelm asked me stay on but I was kind of anxious . . . There were several of us from the university over there. Duane Scribner was over working there then, too. He stayed on a little longer than I did. And Jerry Christianson. Christianson was commissioner of administration. That's it.

CAC: Thank you.

DB: Maybe he wasn't at that time. I think he was in the planning office maybe. He came over on loan and then went to work and eventually was I think commissioner of administration. But several of us were over there. I came back in July of 1971 and thought I was coming back to the same job . . . walked into Don Smith's office and he said, "We've got to create an office to do fiscal and policy analysis. I want you to head it up. Sit down and figure out what you need and make me a proposal." So I did and created what is essentially now Management Planning and Information Services. Part of that came from a feeling that the then Office of Institutional Research was not doing policy relevant to research. It was doing sort of "wouldn't it be interesting" kinds of things and Smith was not very satisfied with that. Essentially, they decided to start over again and one of our charges was don't do any . . . you can do scholarly research but it's got to be policy relevant or you're not doing what you're charged with doing. We've tried to stick with that throughout all these years.

CAC: Let me interject a moment here about Mr. Smith. Of persons I've known on Central Administration, he was profoundly faculty.

DB: Yes.

CAC: And faculty, particularly for the humanities—he was from speech communications—don't often have that crispness of administrative control which many people have commented upon to me.

DB: Smith knew what he was doing.

CAC: But where did that come from? You worked with him rather closely. How do you account for that phenomenon?

DB: Inborn, I don't know. [laughter]

CAC: So it is a matter of personality and character? Because it came as a surprise to some.

DB: I did not know Smith before he became administrative V.P.; I don't think I'd ever met him. But I worked with him a lot from about 1968 on until he left the university. Those were some of the best days we ever had; because number one, he was in effect an executive vice president which Malcolm Moos badly needed because he could not function as an inside president. He was a pretty good outside president I think.. He was presidential. He made good speeches. He was quite insightful about politics and what was happening in the field of higher education. He was a good national statesman I think. But he wasn't able to run the university and Smith was. Smith may have been an unusual combination in that he was from the faculty, widely respected as a faculty person. He was not from sort of the bean counting faculty.

CAC: Right, right.

DB: He was from humanities or letters and yet he had the ability. He was very quantitative and very analytical and he could pose the questions. He had somehow acquired a lot of the maxims that we have in this business, the type of thing where he would say, "A pretty accurate answer now is much more valuable than an absolutely accurate answer when it's too late." A lot of faculty I think would not take that attitude. [laughter] But you've got to do it because decisions have to be made now and he knew that. I really can't tell you how much I admired, and still admire, Don Smith. I think he was very good at what he did. I think he went on to be very effective in Wisconsin as well, although I know less about that but certainly my colleagues down there thought the world and all of him when he was there.

CAC: And it was he who gave you the green light to set up MPIS?

DB: Yes, and of course, with the consent of Hale Champion who was also very interested. Hale, of course, wasn't long for this particular post. He got, in my view, essentially bounced out of here for reasons I never have totally understood. It had to do with, I think, internal politics. He wasn't exactly demoted since he went on to be vice president at Harvard immediately. Smith was really the driving force as long as . . .

[End of Tape 1, Side 1]

[Tape 1, Side 2]

DB: . . . de facto is the executive vice president and can make decisions short of the president because the size of the organization, and its complexity, and the sociological nature of

universities is such that no living human can really do the job of president of a multi-veristy. I think probably Nils Hasselmo comes about as close as anybody but he can't do it either. He simply can't. And he's not to be faulted for that so there's got to be a lot of delegation, and preferably delegation to one person to make decisions short of a real battle over something. We had that with Moos and Smith. I don't believe we've had it very effectively since then ever.

CAC: I get a sense from some of my informants that Mr. [Kenneth] Keller, for example, acted as his own chief of staff.

DB: And he wasn't able to, in my view. And I know a lot about that. But I think a good part of Keller's problem is that he did try to do too much. Another part is maybe that what he did delegate wasn't always carried out as well as it should have been and he had problems with a board that really wasn't supportive of him. Keller was a very effective academic vice president and came about as close to being an executive vice president I think when he was academic V.P. as anybody has since then. It may be that we'll see that again. With the present reorganization, it's hard to tell what may happen.

CAC: That's not history yet so we can't . . .

DB: Yes, can't really tell. But from the time that Smith left until the present time, the organizational structure has not varied a great deal. In principle, the academic vice president is the number two person in the system, but it is not always clear that that is an executive vice president or a chief executive officer situation. The creation of two senior vice-presidents in the system has made it look more like a . . . I don't know what the word that goes with troika is . . . but a "duoika" where you have two people who presumably are the decision makers short of the president. Now historically that has not worked well. I think it's working fairly well currently but Hal Chase and Jim Brinkerhoff, for instance, who were more or less in that situation, came almost to physical war over disagreements from time to time. At one point, one of them went home and said he wouldn't return to work until he had his way. I won't say which one at this point. [laughter]

CAC: What you're talking about is the old tradition that Middlebrook and [Malcolm] Willy represented and which you saw from the outside, if not intimately.

DB: Yes, well, fairly intimately at the end of it, at least. I don't know how that worked early on; but when I got involved with that in the end of the sixties, there was no question as to who was dominate in that pair. Middlebrook ran the university until he quit, until he was gone. In my experience, he was more powerful than the presidents he served. He was the legislative liaison, for all practical purposes. He would go over and testify in the legislature and refuse to tell them things. He'd keep a budget book in his lap, under the table. They'd ask him questions and [unclear] tell them. He was able to say to legislators, "I'm not going to tell you that" and they would take it.

CAC: That's back to the sense of trust that existed in the fifties.

DB: Yes and they did trust him, there's no question. He was an extraordinary person as well. Bill Middlebrook was one of the more impressive people I've ever met. Willy I think [was] far more scholarly and more concerned with scholarly issues and he was willing to let Bill Middlebrook run things, in my view—as long as his views were heard.

CAC: The time came then that the university had to have professional lobbying direction after Middlebrook? Or did Wenberg work with him and under him?

DB: I don't think Wenberg ever worked under Middlebrook. He began to lobby I think when Larry London was financial vice president, partly because London did not like lobbying work. He wasn't cut out for it. London was not a hale fellow, social sort of person . . . very nice pleasant man. I knew him quite well, worked for him, and with him; but he wasn't the sort of person who was able to do the kind of lobbying that occurred in those days which was a lot of social activity and entertainment, lunching with the legislators. Stan Wenberg practically lived at one of the major restaurants over in Midway, the name of which I can't remember anymore.

CAC: I think it was the Criterion, wasn't it?

DB: The Criterion, yes. I spent a lot of time in the Criterion, too—gained a lot of weight. [laughter] Stan entertained there virtually every noon when the legislature was in session.

CAC: He was kind of an old-fashioned lobbyist in that sense?

DB: Yes. He was. And he also—and this is another change . . . The Minnesota Legislature had been controlled by the Republican Party from 1938, I think without exception. Both houses had been Republican until about 1973 when the DFL captured the house, I believe in 1973. But there was a period of thirty-five years when the Republican Party dominated. There were I guess a couple DFL governors during that period but the legislature never had a DFL majority.

CAC: I'm speculating, not only Republican domination but rural, outstate, greater Minnesota.

DB: Right. Now Stan Wenberg pitched his lobbying to the Republican Party. He did not have contacts in the DFL much. He knew those people but he didn't pay much attention to them. I think his attitude was that the Republicans were in control and they were probably going to stay in control. And also a change now that has happened . . . In those days you lobbied a very few people. There were two or three people in the house and maybe one person in the senate who made any difference to higher education. If you could convince those people, you had it made. The rest of the legislature would follow along. Very powerful people in general—particularly in the senate—and I now have a blank, but the senator from Little Falls who was in charge of higher education on the senate side for many, many years . . .

CAC: Was that Rosenmeier?

DB: Rosenmeier, yes. If you had Rosenmeier convinced, you had the senate convinced. My take on it is that when Wenberg spent all of his capital on the Republicans and most of it on the rural Republicans. When that began to change, Wenberg was a little bit out in the cold.

CAC: Excuse me. Just for clarification, it begins to change along two lines now if I'm hearing this story correctly. One is the move toward full-time legislation and the second was the increase in power of the DFL.

DB: Party control.

CAC: So that you have two things going on. They coincide.

DB: Yes, I would say that is right. And the third thing I think is the broadening out in who you have to lobby and that's a far more recent thing. I would say that that is something that has happened only since about the late eighties.

CAC: And you mean by that what?

DB: Where you really have to get to all the legislators.

CAC: I see.

DB: If you look at the way Donna Peterson operates this today, she may concentrate on people who are members of our money committees, for instance; but she tries to get to all the legislators, everybody whether they're on our committee, whether they appear to have any interest in higher education. That's partly because you don't have in the legislature anymore this sort of specialization where if the chair of the higher ed committee comes in and says, "Here's what we ought to do," everybody used to say, "Okay. Rosenmeier knows how to do this." And they'd all vote for it, even people from the opposition party, frequently. That isn't nearly so true anymore. There are experts but their views are not taken as uncritically as they once were. It's important to sell particularly the whole majority caucus, not just the experts.

CAC: I'm trying to think how to lead us on this. It really involves a changing perception of the mission, and the status of the University of Minnesota, and higher education generally. Why don't you talk a little bit about that?

DB: I've got some of that in the notes I made. The university, of course, at one time was a virtual monopoly, a phrase I've used here. That's not really true. It's never been a monopoly. An interesting illustration is that in this state, it used to be that when you said the university, everybody knew what you were talking about. It was the Twin Cities campus of the University of Minnesota. When I was a kid and you said, "I'm going to go to the university," nobody had

any idea you meant you were going to Mankato State or something. [laughter] That was true right down the line for a long time. Particularly in the sixties, the state began to expand its higher education system and it expanded a lot. The teacher's colleges became state colleges and eventually state universities. They grew from a few to many. In about 1970, we were opening a new campus every thirteen weeks in Minnesota for awhile. We now have sixty-five campuses in Minnesota . . . maybe sixty-six, I'm not sure . . . I think probably sixty-six currently. That's more campuses per population than any state except Alaska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. And of course, those are very sparsely populated states. Minnesota has expanded its physical higher education plant, or post-secondary education plant beyond anybody else, any other state of its type, so we're spread very, very thinly.

CAC: That brings about a real competition for funds?

DB: Oh, yes, absolutely. In addition to the competition for funds, it's sort of blurred the perception of the University of Minnesota and it's changed this sort of view that . . . Well, we used to be the Land-Grant University and the State University; and in a sense we still are, but we have even argued, and we did at the time of Commitment to Focus, that the old concept of the land-grant mission isn't the same as it once was. Now one of the things I've observed is when you say land-grant to people, they have all kinds of different ideas of what that means. I don't like the term myself. I think it's obsolete. I don't think it has a very clear meaning. But what it used to mean to a lot people is that it was the people's university. It was <u>the</u> public access university. Well, there's access all over Minnesota. We're accessed to death in Minnesota. We've had this policy in the sixties out of Higher Education Coordinating Board—and that the legislature bought into—that we were going to have a post-secondary institution within thirty-five miles of every citizen in Minnesota. Terrible public policy, just awful. In effect, we've done it. It's there. But we're spread so thin that it's hard to tell whether we can really maintain anything; and to some extent it is true, as some people have alleged recently, that the state is maintaining access at the expense of the faculty, and at the expense of quality in higher education. I would buy completely into that, that we've tended to sacrifice quality for access. We haven't seen the worst of that yet; but if we continue along the lines we're going, we will see it, and this place could become the University of East Dakota if we don't do something about it. There are various things that can be done about it, one of which is that we become less a state university and more a semi-private university, as has happened in Michigan, and to some extent in Pennsylvania, and some other places. I don't know if that's the right way to go. Stan Wenberg used to say that Minnesota in terms of higher education has champagne tastes and a beer budget. That was said twenty-five years ago and it's truer now than it was then in many ways. The state does not want to face up to what it costs to maintain a high quality education system.

CAC: Now, when I hear the term being used the last seven, eight, ten years that the Twin Cities campus is a flagship . . . that is a effort then to recapture the centrality of the university and this system of higher education?

DB: Yes, or its mission differentiation, the things that we do that others do not do. I think Keller was trying to do that too with Commitment to Focus. Governor Rudy Perpich, in 1985 or 1986, essentially said to Keller, "I want a plan that will distinguish the university from other educational institutions." Keller, virtually overnight, sat down and wrote the Commitment to Focus Plan, the original Commitment to Focus paper.

CAC: He could do that because he'd been doing it for six, eight years.

DB: He did. We'd been doing a lot of analysis.

CAC: And some of it out of your office.

DB: Yes. And so also out of the planning effort that Nils Hasselmo lead under [C. Peter] Magrath, which was a thankless task because Nils was given the responsibility but very little authority to make it happen. But actually that was a useful process and a lot of the basic work had been done, although Commitment to Focus had some ideas in it that had not been previously discussed. The closure of both Crookston and Waseca was brooded there and, at the time, we wrote Keller an appreciation of the Commitment to Focus paper. I remember saying in there that that was a Dog that wouldn't hunt because I didn't think politically you could close either one of them. It turned out to be possible to close one of them but that's one of the major events, watershed events.

CAC: How was the decision made to close Waseca rather than Crookston?

DB: A fairly careful set of analyses went into that. We looked at what opportunities surrounded the two campuses. We looked at the possibility of conversion physically to some other use. In Waseca, there are just ample opportunities for people within easy reach of Waseca. That's not nearly as true in Crookston. There are much vaster areas up there. The Crookston campus would be virtually unusable for any other purpose. The Waseca campus is, in theory at least, fairly easily convertible to a number of other uses.

CAC: Apparently now, to a prison.

DB: It's probably going to be a low security prison which is one of the things we said it probably could be used for. But it could be used for a lot of other things. It could be adapted as a senior citizens' residence, for instance. It could even, perhaps, be converted to a whole series of town houses with amenities. I don't know if that would be a very marketable commodity in Waseca but it possibly could be done. Very nice campus. Really too bad in one way to close it, just in a physical sense, because it was built very carefully. It was very carefully designed.

CAC: But these were the kinds of assignments that your office had to undertake?

DB: Yes. We've done a fair amount of that.

CAC: And again, thinking of the historian, five, ten, twenty years from now, that flow of reports and paper work is preserved in archives?

DB: Yes, all of those that somebody didn't decide shouldn't be preserved ever for anybody's eyes.

CAC: Oh, you think there are a lot of them?

DB: Oh, not very many. I think all of this is pretty much public. We've tended to refer these things to archives whenever it occurs to us and archives keeps reminding us we should do this. So I don't think much has been lost. We did the analysis on the Crookston campus as well. Should it be closed or were there other things that could be done with it? And made the recommendations . . . Actually Crookston came within an eyelash of being closed because when we got the assignment to do an analysis, everybody in the Central Administration assumed that the next move was to close Crookston. As a matter of fact, I went into it thinking that probably would be our conclusion and it wasn't, for a number of reasons.

CAC: I'm going to interject again. I hope this doesn't shake the flow here. What other issues was your office, MPIS, asked to address? I mean it comes to be central in retrenchment and reallocation and Commitment to Focus.

DB: We've done a lot of that over the years. You may remember or you may not that it was proposed at one time that Morris and Southwest were duplicative activities and that one or the other or both should be closed, or that the whole thing should be consolidated either at Marshall or Morris. We were deeply into that, particularly in trying to illustrate that, in fact, those are not similar campuses. They're very different. We even did legislative testimony on that. One of my analysts wrote at length on it, produced a report which pointed out the differences, and suggested that actually rather than closing those four-year institutions, what should be closed out in that area were a number of two-year institutions—created a lot of political problem. That was one of the few times that somebody suggested to me that one of my analysts should be fired for his views. I won't say who suggested that but I told him, "If you force me to do that, I'm going public with it," and he backed off.

CAC: These developments as you're describing them very recently were always within . . . This is a form of statement that is a question within the context of retrenchment and reallocation. So it is the tightening of budget that drives this process?

DB: I believe nothing would happen in planning if it weren't for budget constraint. It's before my time—and I'm probably doing what I criticize others for doing, you know, that history began when I got here—but it's certainly my take that there was no academic planning in this place until the budgets got tight about the early seventies or so. The first planning I ever saw, and it

certainly was disorganized, was the budget crisis of 1971 that you were mentioning you walked into as Chairman of the History Department which really wasn't very much of a crisis, but it is interesting what a cultural shock it was. I mean, nobody had ever seen a retrenchment around here in living memory. I'm sure there were some, particularly in the thirties. I know there were some in the thirties; but from World War II until 1971, I don't think we'd ever had anything except formula increases.

CAC: Incremental rather than decremental.

DB: Incremental increases, yes, and largely formula rather than planned. Now starting with 1971—I once looked at this—from 1971 until now, I think there's only—as I recall the result—been two years when we have not done differential budgeting. Sometimes, there are formula components to the budget; but in only two years have we ever said the Operations and Maintenance Fund, whatever you've got, you got 5 percent more. So two out of about twenty-four, twenty-three budgets. So the change was when money got tight. And the two years when we didn't do it differentially were years in which for some reason the state had a lot of money and we got a good appropriation.

CAC: I can imagine a situation in which fiscal restraint would lead to retrenchment and some implied judgments being made how severe a retrenchment at one place rather than another but where the idea of reallocation? Was this natural? Did one have to invent over-retrenching in order to reallocate within the university system?

DB: No, that idea comes out of the Kennedy Defense Department.

CAC: Heavens! How on earth did it get here?

DB: Well, it got here partly with Hale Champion who had worked in that administration, and had worked for the then defense secretary, whose name escapes me at the moment. The defense secretary under Kennedy —oh, I'm sorry under Johnson, I guess—was doing a lot of analysis of budgeting methods; and that was one of the methods he used was to ask everybody to say, "If we cut you 5 percent what will you do? If we raise you 5 percent what will you do?" There also was at that time a fad for zero-based budgeting which is utterly impractical in any organization in my view, at least the way it was outlined, but it has some of the same aspects. It just goes a lot further, you know. If you start from nothing what does it take to fund your operation? Well, it's absolutely ridiculous to do that in a univerisity. You don't say to the Liberal Arts College, "How would you reconstruct the Liberal Arts College?" Some of it is obvious, you've got to have an English Department, you've got to have a History Department. Some of these things you don't ask. What you want to do is operate on the margin where you can in fact think about what can change. Marginal budgeting gets a bad press because it's the only way you can do budgeting. You have to think about the margin because that's where you act. It's the only place you can act.

CAC: The strategy then of R&R, retrenchment and reallocation, was not peculiar to Minnesota?

DB: No.

CAC: Other universities must have taken . . .

DB: We were I think fairly early because we did it in the 1971 budget, and at that time, I don't think there were many other universities who were faced with much of a fiscal crisis. I don't think they were doing it.

CAC: We were ahead of the curve in that regard?

DB: We were somewhat ahead of the curve, yes. I began hearing about this in other places along about 1976 or 1977. That may be partly because it was in 1974 or 1975 that I began to get very active with the other major research university budgeting and institutional research people, and was a founding member of the Association of American Universities Data Exchange which is still very active and very useful. So I got to know more what was happening within some of the other major universities. Initially, I don't think they were doing this. Now, I think virtually everybody does it.

CAC: The severity of Commitment to Focus as distinguished by its severity—this is in the form of a question—was because the process of retrenchment and reallocation had been underway a long time?

DB: That's the difference. Yes, right. Throughout the seventies we did, sporadically, retrenchment and reallocation, and as I say, I don't think there was but two times that we didn't actually ask some units to retrench so that more could be given to others. There was some planning to do that against; but the more intense planning, or the planning statement that made it explicit what we intended to do, and which way we intended to go, didn't occur until Keller sat down over a weekend, and set it down on paper, and sent it over to Rudy Perpich, and said, "Here's what I intend to do."

CAC: Is it your sense that the legislature was aware of the complexity of this process of R&R?

DB: No, I don't think they were and I don't think the governor was. I don't think that Perpich when he came into office had much feel yet. He had still a sort of instinctive feel that the university was an economic engine for the state, but he had no idea of costs or of how well we were financed relative to other state universities. One of the interesting experiences I had during the Keller Administration was to present to Rudy Perpich our analysis of how well we were funded by various disciplines relative to the AAU universities which showed us considerably under funded in a number of areas and over funded . . . I'm using . . .

CAC: I understand.

DB: . . . funded more than average . . . in my code here . . . don't take it that I mean we necessarily were over funded. But there weren't many areas where we looked really good, and Perpich sat in that meeting and he carefully looked at what we presented; and then he looked at me carefully and he turned to Keller and he said, "I don't believe this!" I said, "Well, Governor what don't you believe. Do you believe that we're lying to you?" "No." He had known me when I was over lobbying the senate for Anderson. He said, "No, it isn't that I don't believe you. I think you're honestly telling me what you believe, but I think you can do better. If you're under funded it's because you're spread too thin." And that's right. He was right about that I think. "And also, you're inefficient," of course. They all say that. And that's true, too. Any organization this size is inefficient.

CAC: Particularly in higher education because . . .

DB: Sure, right. To some extent you want to be inefficient in higher education, at least selectively and in certain places. You want to turn people loose to do what interests them rather than what has an immediate pay-off. But we did in fact convince him of the accuracy of that data and we convinced the legislature in 1987, as well. That's part of the reason why they agreed to the Commitment to Focus Contract, as we talked about it, which is just running out this year. Then till now, we've been under this agreement that we would reduce the number of undergraduates, improve our graduate to undergraduate ratio which we did very quickly and very well I think, and that the legislature would endeavor not to reduce our funding because our numbers of students were going down.

CAC: That implied contract was struck when with whom?

DB: Legislature in 1987, essentially with the chairman of the then Money Committees—who carried it in the legislature—Lynn Carlson who's still chairman and Gene Waldorf who was chairman in the senate at the time. It was quite clearly understood. To their credit they never reneged on it in any way. They haven't I think fully performed what they had hoped to, but they've made every effort to perform, and I certainly wouldn't fault them about it. We're better funded today than we would have been without that agreement—there's no question about that—probably not as well funded as we had hoped to be; but that's partly a result of the state's funding problems, and the competition that this state and other states and the Federal Government have as to what they're going to fund. We're in competition essentially with the old and the young; K-12, the cost of maintaining the elderly in nursing homes, and corrections which is basically a phenomenon of the young as well. K-12 has not been a very serious competitor for funds with higher education in recent years. It's a big item but it hasn't been expanding as a proportion of the state budget. But what has been expanding is health and welfare, and corrections. In health and welfare particularly, the care of the elderly has been a big competitor for money. It's hard to go over and compete when you're competing with grandma in the nursing home and . . .

CAC: These are demographic changes and economic changes that are really quite beyond the capacity of this institution to address. I would like to move—because I'm sensitive of the clock

as it ticks along—to the change in the university community. You have listed under that category a number of concerns that so many others have commented on; but I find more diversity in that comment than on other areas of the university's history the past thirty, forty, fifty years. I hear often, and I'm not surprised to see it, but I would like your response to the change in faculty staff commitment and morale. This just comes up everywhere. What's your perception?

DB: When I came here, after a little bit . . . well, when I first came I didn't think I'd be around long. The first few years I was here and maybe down another ten, it seemed like most of the people I knew thought it was a privilege to work here. I still think it's a privilege to work here. They were attached to the institution. That was true of faculty as well as staff and it seemed to me that there was . . in spite of the constant complaint, you know, that you always hear from the Civil Service that they're treated as second-class citizens. When I was in the Civil Service, I had some of that experience, too. But in general, people seemed to be engaged in a collective effort to do something they all believed in. I don't see that very much anymore. There's a lot of hostility among class groups within the university. There has been the movement toward unionization, and although I would have to say that the AFSCME [American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees] Union talks a good game about wanting to make the organization run better, I think we have to wait and see if in fact that's really going to work. I think it can work. I'm not opposed to unionization. I think it might improve things. Certainly in the old days when the Civil Service was represented by an appointed committee of faculty who were called the Civil Service Committee, that wasn't a very satisfactory situation. The other thing that strikes me is that people are much more peripatetic.

CAC: Now you're talking professional administrative staff as well as Civil Service?

DB: And faculty. Although the statistics might not say so, we have a fairly constant faculty turnover in the area of 4 or 5 percent a year from all causes.

CAC: That is including retirement?

DB: Including death, retirement, changes to other jobs, whatever, which is not a high turnover.

CAC: That surprises me that it's that low.

DB: It surprises us, too, and it hasn't been rising, although I would sort of expect it to. Yet you have this impression that—I have this impression, maybe others do too—faculty are more tied to their disciplinary areas now nationally than to the institution. They're more loyal to disciplinary areas and less inclined I think—this is a big concern for a lot of people—to exchange professional views and to socialize across disciplinary areas. I see a certain amount of difference there . . . I didn't put it down here but you can see the decline of the Campus Club. I can remember the days when I first was admitted to membership in the Campus Club which I thought was a big deal then . . .

CAC: It was.

DB: It was at the time, particularly for a person who was then a civil servant. It was very active up there, and there was a lot of socialization, and there were a lot of committees, and people lunched together who were not in the same department. Administrators would be up there and available for faculty to talk to, and that has really deteriorated, and I don't see it very much anymore.

CAC: Many, many people comment on this. And then I say, "Why do you suppose that happened?"

DB: Some of it is physical. When we expanded across the river of course, things are a little different. Most of the faculty used to be virtually within walking distance of the Campus Club.

CAC: It's a long walk.

DB: Now it's not the case and there are facilities over there. I think the social science, and law, and business, Humphrey Institute faculty tend to lunch in the Humphrey cafeteria or one of the other ones over there. But even that concentrates people who have somewhat narrower interests in one place and the medical faculty maybe is someplace else. If you go to the Campus Club now, you tend most of the time to see the hard science people up there, a lot of them. I can go up there and I'll see a table of physicists and chemists, and you look up and down the line and the people I know at least, there's nobody else there.

CAC: How do you account for the identification with the discipline nationally? I mean it's really kind of a careerism that you're talking about. From the perspective of Morrill Hall, Central Administration, how did you perceive that process? Why did it happen? Where did it come from? Everybody talks about it. The fact is not new to me.

DB: I don't know how true this is but the proliferation of disciplinary journals might have something to do with it. I think the emphasis on publish or perish . . . The phrase has been there since I first came into this business, but I don't think that it was nearly as much a problem at one time as it now is. It used to be possible to look around this campus and point at very distinguished professors who had not published a professional article in years and years and years and yet who were very well thought of, who were excellent teachers . . .

CAC: And were up to date in their field.

DB: And knew what they were teaching. Today I would have a hard time pointing to anybody like that.

CAC: So you're suggesting that a reward system or an incentive system bears upon this?

DB: We keep moaning about how the reward system overemphasizes research and creative activity but that's all we do about it. We moan about it, and it gets worse and worse and worse, in my view. And it gets more and more individual.

CAC: Now do you have a sense of when the rewards begin to shift in emphasis? What you're describing, I think I've heard elsewhere and it would be consistent with my own perceptions. It comes, I'm thinking, in the early mid-seventies and then in an accelerated pace in the eighties.

DB: Even in the sixties though, sort of the expansion of research activity in the hard sciences and the Health Sciences particularly I think began to focus people on the production of journal articles, for instance. When I was in the business office, one of the things we used to do when we did the budget every year is we would see what was then called the blue sheets, which was the promotion and tenure [unclear].

CAC: That was an endless realm of paper, the blue sheets.

DB: More and more it would be Professor Joe Blow published . . . and you would get a long list. I remember Bob Holtz saying one time, "The way to evaluate publications is you multiply by the number of pages and divide by the number of authors." That I think reflected sort of his view of the value of simply citing publications for promotion and tenure.

CAC: Sure, but also for merit. I'm wondering, do you think this emphasis was generated at the departmental, at the faculty level or was there an involvement of the whole university system in this?

DB: I certainly don't think it was done consciously by the central leadership. At least I never observed that it was because everybody centrally, as I say, has bemoaned this as long as I can remember. I can remember Gerry Shepherd, which has got to be twenty-five years ago now, moaning about how there's too much emphasis on research and not enough on teaching and service. Yet, at that time he was evaluating these promotions.

CAC: When there was 3 percent, 5 percent, 5.2 percent available for salary increases . . . okay? Again I'm making a statement but really it's a question. I remember receiving through the college from Central Administration a memorandum that . . . with such limited funds we shouldn't worry about cost of living across the board, but rather really emphasizing merit. When the signal came down to the departments, they interpreted merit largely in scholarly terms.

DB: Sure. Exactly.

CAC: I think there was an involvement of the Central Administration and then the College Administrations. Is that accurate?

DB: Yes. I had forgotten that but I guess that has happened and certainly we would argue that all raises have supposedly been based on merit for many years now. It's maybe ten years since we actually said, "This is across the board," partly because we haven't had enough to make it worthwhile to do that I suppose. I suppose that has to do with what is thought of as merit and certainly we've said, "Yes, do this on a merit basis." And I think the result has been that merit has been interpreted to be creative activity or publication or whatever.

CAC: Are there reports the last twenty-five years let us say or fifteen years from this office on the spread of salaries within departments, having in mind an emphasis upon merit, and particularly upon publication as a sign of merit? Wouldn't your office ever look into that so there would be documents that someone could find on that?

DB: Well, we've looked at the spread of salaries quite a lot and we do comparisons of disciplinary salaries. One thing that has changed I believe, over the years, is that there is a much wider spread by discipline and what people are paid than there used to be.

CAC: You mean from one discipline to another, from economics to language?

DB: Yes.

CAC: I'm suggesting also that, and in only areas that I know well, that there's an increasing spread in a rank of associate to co-professors from top to bottom?

DB: Sure. Years ago we would never have had the case where the lowest paid professor made less than the highest paid assistant professor but that's true here now. There are a good many.

CAC: And associate professor?

DB: Right. That has increased. Part of that I think, however, has to do with the tenure system and the fact that it's virtually . . .

[End of Tape 1, Side 2]

[Tape 2, Side 1]

CAC: . . . that many persons have spoken about and I'm looking at some of the way you put it in your outline when you speak of disciplinary decentralization. Is that the sort of thing that we have in mind here?

DB: Well, what I'm thinking about is sort of the disappearance of the generalist both in the faculty and in the administration.

CAC: That's an important point. So let's explore it.

DB: I can recall when sort of the faculty leadership consisted of a lot of generalists, people who understood other people's disciplines, who were widely read, possibly over extreme differences where you had social scientists or people in letters taking an interest in hard science or even in Health Science. That seems to be less true today. It seems to me people are far more specialized in what they do and maybe that has to do again with size, with physical dispersion where people are sort of ghetto-ized. Where in the old days the Art History Department might be located next to the Physics Department, you don't find that anymore. On the administrative side, the same thing has happened. We used to have people who knew all about the legal implications of things. They knew something about personnel administration, accounting, investment. Those are all specialized things now.

CAC: It's difficult for any person in Central Administration to have that sideways knowledge.

DB: Pretty hard.

CAC: You've had to because of the nature of your job.

DB: To a large extent but we're fairly specialized too in some respects. In the past, we've done analyses of investment policy around here. I wouldn't dream of doing that today. We've got an Investment Department to do it. In fact, part of the reason why they do now report a lot on retirement funds for the faculty and people on the faculty retirement plan is that we agitated for years and said, "People need better information on which to make decisions." Finally, Roger Paschke took us up on that and he now does what I think is an excellent job of it. But he's the specialist. He's the one who knows that. Law has become very complicated. I wrote a piece for the faculty newspaper a couple years ago when somebody raised the question of proliferation of administration. I was pointing out that when I came into the administration here there was one lawyer and he wasn't really occupied full-time. He did mostly real estate law. That's Joel Tierney who recently retired. Today we've got a floor full of lawyers and everything we do we're sued for, and everything we don't do we're sued for. You're at hazard for virtually every move you make and it isn't just the administration, it's the faculty too, as you know.

CAC: Yes.

DB: The most innocent word or action may suddenly bring a passel of lawyers down on you.

CAC: This is a cultural in change in society more broadly and not peculiar to this institution.

DB: In the fifties grievances were unheard of around here. Nobody would have thought of that. If somebody did you dirt, you might go to the supervisor and say, "I'm really irritated with this. Would you talk to them," or something. You would never have gone to a grievance officer and got into a process of grievance. The only time the faculty would have done it was over an issue of academic freedom which is proper, and should have happened, and did happen occasionally; but it didn't happen very often, in my memory. Today we've got a person who does nothing but

grievances. I think in very short order, he'll have too much to do. We've got three different grievance systems operating around here, in addition to access to the courts, if people choose to do it. That's all different than it was.

CAC: That's a national phenomenon.

DB: Yes, it is. Very frequently you see in the *Chronicle of Education*—and every once in awhile around here will raise the issue—the growth in universities has been in mid-level management. Absolutely true. If you look at the statistics, where the money goes, the number of people, it's all in the mid-level of management. And why is that? It's because we now have all kinds of federal regulations, reporting responsibilities, we have to account for everything. I read a report just the other day which gigged our Student Aid Office for not refunding two dollars on one of their student aid programs. God only knows what the accountants were paid for doing that report. Where is our money going? It's going into that sort of thing and it's not going into direct instruction or the sort of thing that we're directly responsible for delivering. I think it's a shame but I don't know what to do about it.

CAC: You're describing a situation that makes it extraordinarily difficulty for administrative officers at any level to stay in office long enough to have a continuity of policy. Is that correct?

DB: We've had a lot of turnover.

CAC: How do you account for the turnover? I'm guessing that what you're describing is certainly a major part of it. It just grinds you down.

DB: It's hard not to get in trouble; that's one thing. The Keller Administration came down for that reason largely, but it's also I think, as I said earlier in the interview, it's very hard for anybody to endure it very long at the very top levels. It is so difficult for a president or vice-president around here to keep up with what's demanded of them. As a result, their tenures have not been very long. I think we've been very lucky in that there's been a lot of continuity of policy between the Keller and Hasselmo Administrations. Nils came into office saying, "I'm not here to change anything that Ken Keller was doing, in terms of academic planning or policy." He did want to change some of the perception of it or misperception of it, but he didn't really want to change the direction in which Keller was going. I've been amazed, frankly, that Hasselmo has lasted as long as he has. How soon it will wear him out, I don't know. He's about my age, maybe a year or so younger. I marvel that he can keep up with what he's asked to do. I think that's what has done it largely.

CAC: One of my respondents I was interviewing said that everybody works so hard in Morrill Hall, particularly at the vice-presidential level and higher middle management, that no one has anytime to think, to reflect.

DB: I think that's been a problem. I certainly personally have felt that many times. You're faced with constant deadlines. In fact, it's rather interesting in the present planning process, the staff group that's been doing that . . . I've sort of observed that we keep saying, "Well, what do we have to do Friday? What's our agenda Friday? When do we have to get this out to the deans?" When what we really ought to be doing is taking a day, and sitting down, and thinking at length about what the real issues are that haven't been addressed, doing some environmental scanning . . . what haven't we yet observed that may be incoming? We are beginning to do a little of that. When I set this office up, one of the things I did was divide it into what I sometimes call the fire fighters and the long range thinkers, and try to keep the get-it-out-tomorrow stuff in one end of the office, and let the others do longer range research. Steve Hoenack particularly has taken some pride in doing that kind of thinking and trying to anticipate what we're going to want to know down the line someplace. I hope as we move toward a slightly new arrangement of planning that we'll be able to remember that you've got to set that aside, do something of the sort.

CAC: I would guess also that with the increasing complexity and burden of accountability that there is a corresponding difficulty in communicating with the larger citizenry of the university.

DB: Yes. I'm amazed sometimes about what people don't know even internal to the university. I would just speculate that if you asked a hundred faculty and staff around here to describe, for instance, the Commitment to Focus agreement and planning effort to change the univerisity's confirmation, I would bet that half of them wouldn't know what you were talking about—in spite of the fact that there's been lots and lots of communication about it. That it is really very important to these people, it seems to me, to their working conditions, to their life's work, their future in many cases.

CAC: You described earlier that their focus is on career, and scholarship, and publication.

DB: I think in many cases that's true.

CAC: And the complexity of understanding it.

DB: There's also maybe a justified cynicism about university administrations. I think many faculty perceive and probably many Civil Service staff perceive that the administration is doing things <u>to</u> them, not for them or in their behalf. And to some extent, that is the way it is. We're called upon to carry out unsavory activities in a lot of cases. Maybe unsavory isn't . . . unwelcome activities.

CAC: Let's switch quickly then to certain dramatic events that you've observed from the Morrill Hall perspective, starting with the crisis of 1971 which is the budgetary crisis, and you've kind of commented about that before.

DB: Yes, that's what I meant by that.

CAC: Let's move then, to the Vietnam War and how you saw that.

DB: I think that was probably the most passionate period I've seen on this campus ever. It wasn't just the student body either by a long shot. It was virtually everybody who felt very strongly about the U.S. involvement in that war. There was quite a difference in attitude between town and gown on that which was exacerbated by the fact that we had in the mayoral office, at the time, Charlie Stenvig who was pretty much a flag and motherhood type of person and who was an ex-policeman, if he wasn't then a policeman. He was definitely out of sympathy with what was happening on this campus. Something that I never thought would happen was the strike that was called which I thought would wind up being a case of the students and some of the faculty not going to class for a few days. In fact, to my utter amazement, some of the labor unions joined the strike. Not all, but some observed the student picket lines and would not make deliveries. Some of the Civil Service staff walked out, which I didn't think they would do, and it shows how strong they felt about it. I got involved personally in some negotiations between the student leadership of the strike and Morrill Hall, and got a phone call one day in which Neil McCracken—who was then assistant to the academic vice-president—said, "Some students I know who are in the leadership of the strike want to know if there is an administrator that they could meet with and could trust. I think you are it. Would you meet with them?" I said, "Yes, I will. I'm somewhat in sympathy with them in any case." They wanted to know how far they could go without the administration cracking down on them. So I went and talked to . . . I suppose it was Gerry Shepherd at the time, and a couple of other people and said, "What can I tell these people? And I want you to be honest with me. Don't flimflam anybody." I don't remember the terms anymore but I went and met sort of secretly with them. People were very paranoid. I mean, they thought the FBI was on campus.

CAC: They were.

DB: They probably were, I don't doubt it. Certainly there were police agents on campus from the local and maybe the state police. So we had this secret meeting. I also met a certain a professor behind a tree one time to give him a document that was public information what he thought was going to get him in trouble. He's still around and I won't mention who it is. I was highly amused with it. The tree is still out here. I can remember sneaking behind a tree. [laughter] Well, the police came on campus, of course. It so happened we were having a meeting, probably a budget meeting, in Gerry Shepherd's office. It was five or six of us in there and suddenly everybody's eyes began to water. We said, "What the heck is going on?" Well, of course, the police were out there throwing pepper gas. It was intense enough so that although they were at the other end of the mall, we had to call the meeting off actually. It was disruptive enough so that we were all tearing, and sneezing, and having a heck of a time. That didn't get as violent as it might have gotten. I don't recall . . . certainly no one was killed as happened at Kent State. Some students were I think manhandled and possibly beaten. That probably could have been handled better but I'm not sure that it could. It was a mistake ever to have the Minneapolis police on campus. That was a critical error on somebody's part and I think that it was done unilaterally by the mayor without consultation with the university leadership.

CAC: This was the occasional when Mr. Moos himself was out of town?

DB: Yes, he was. But they should certainly have called Shepherd or someone else and talked about it but I do not believe Stenvig did that. He mobilized the police force down here under the 10th Avenue Bridge and at some point simply said, "Go break it up." They had barricades I believe in Washington Avenue. I did not observe that riot because I was up here at the time, but we certainly saw the pictures and the aftermath. Now many people said that the trouble we had with the legislature at the time stemmed from their dislike of the student and faculty position on the Vietnam War. That's not my perception at all. I don't think that was it. I never observed legislators being punitive about that. And I think I'm at odds with a lot of other people in that view.

The takeover of Morrill Hall, of course, stemmed from a whole different issue. It had to do with feeling that the university was not addressing minority concerns which it probably wasn't—certainly not adequately. It was kind of an interesting experience. I think we were all terrified of the takeover . . . I don't know if we were all terrified. We were certainly all rather apprehensive about them. They were, for that time, a rather intimidating crew of people. I don't know to what extent you remember Anna Stanley, for instance.

CAC: I had her in class.

DB: Yes. She was a very different sort of person and we had not heard language like that or aggressiveness of that kind. Later on, I began to appreciate that this was a pretty bright person who I think was doing this in a calculated way, and achieved some of her purposes I believe. They were fairly cooperative. They let us in and out—some of us. My personal story is I think they perceived me as not a person that was involved in making the kind of decisions that they were interested in. Also at first, they didn't realize that there was an entrance to Morrill Hall from Northrup garage. As a result, for a number of days until they realized that entrance was there, we had access without any difficulty. Then one day there was a very large student at that door who said, "Where are you going?" I said, "I'm just a humble civil servant and I need to get to my office." And he said, "You got anything to do with the president's office?" I said, "No." He said, "Okay. Come on in but you may not get out again." [laughter] But I did. I know ways to get out of this building. I think everybody took that strike fairly seriously, although a lot of people were appalled at those tactics. They had never seen anything like it before. Similar things were happening on other campuses and some of them were worse. Paul Cashman particularly I think had a very idealistic and honest response to that and wanted to do the right thing. Did we do the right thing? I don't know. We established all these little programs for minorities, some of which may have done some good, some of which probably haven't done much good, and all of which, in my view, have been far too fragmented. We should have had a more unified approach, at least to each minority group. Whether you can get a unified approach to the minority groups collectively is another issue. It seems to be very difficult to do and maybe we can never do that; but we threw resources around, and I don't think we did the best we could with them. I'm not sure it helped a great deal to create a bunch of understaffed

minority studies departments. It's only after twenty years that we're getting to the point where we have a creditable Afro-American Studies Department. I think in the last few years, you can look at that department and say, "Yes, it has a lot of academic merit." I don't think we've gotten that far with either the Chicano or American Indian Departments. I'm not sure whether we can or whether we should have that kind of department here. It's maybe the sort of thing that ought to be specialized regionally, or something like that. Or maybe we should concentrate—as we have to some extent—American Indian Studies at the Duluth campus where there are many more American Indian students, and where they seem to be more comfortable, and where the program seems to have been better thought out, in my view. I don't know as there's a great deal more I can tell you about that Morrill Hall takeover. I think in general it was beneficial and maybe what it says to you—both the Vietnam strike and the takeover—that there are points in a university's history where only somewhat violent activity can cause a change.

CAC: When one looks at other campuses, even nearby Wisconsin, we had less overt violence here than elsewhere.

DB: We never had, for instance, the bombing that occurred there, although certainly many people in the Central Administration, and I suppose elsewhere, were very apprehensive that we were going to have something like that happen. There certainly were SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] people on campus and others who wouldn't have perhaps stopped at that if the occasion had presented itself.

CAC: The archives I was directing at that time was in a warehouse out on Highway 280 and they removed the sign of the university and the flags so that it wouldn't be generally identified as a university facility.

DB: Yes.

CAC: I'm afraid with your clock, we've run out for now.

DB: Yes, I guess we just about have since I've got . . .

[pause]

CAC: We're picking up the interview the following day. We had to stop on Monday the 7th. This is Tuesday the 8th and I'm back in the office where we did the interview yesterday. We're picking up on some events, some developments from the point of view of Central Administration. We'll see where the conversations carries us. Before we come to Eastcliff and that event, why don't we pick up with the reform of General College [GC]. That was kind of a basic reform as part of Commitment to Focus to get all of the college missions in order.

DB: One of the things that was in the original Commitment to Focus paper, and flowed out of the planning that was done in the early eighties under Nils Hasselmo's direction, was a proposal

that General College had really changed completely from its original mission which really was to provide an entry point for students who had the abilities but couldn't show the credentials to be admitted to some of the other colleges of the university. It had also become an entry point for many minority students for whatever reason—still is but to a lesser extent. One of the things we had observed is that General College had a lot of students for whom there was no obvious reason that they were unprepared. It drew a lot of students out of very good high schools in Minnesota, and some rather good ones in Wisconsin, and served a lot of Wisconsin students under the reciprocity agreement—still does although less so than it did. So one of the things Keller proposed in his paper is that General College, number one, should discontinue its entire upper division and quit awarding any kind of degree. At that time it was awarding the A.A. for two years of work and was also awarding a B.A., which may have had a slightly different designation, but it was a bachelor's degree for four years of work. Keller's argument was that that, number one, overlapped with the mission of some of the other institutions in the state and that it was not the original idea of what GC should do. That was a quite readily accepted proposal. There was not a lot of debate about that. Some, possibly minority groups, thought that it was downgrading their college, in quotes, but we were successful I believe in persuading people that what we were really doing is to try to avoid ghetto-izing minority education. So that proposal was well accepted, and has been carried out, and today General College awards no degrees at all, other than I think last year there were a couple of grandfathered A.A. degrees. This year, they awarded none whatever, 1993-1994. The transfer rate out of General College into CLA [College of Liberal Arts], IT [Institute of Technology], and other colleges has increased, and as nearly as we can tell those transfer students are doing quite well. So it would appear that that's one of the proposals that was well thought out, was saleable, and has been carried out.

CAC: Did the existence and strength, and growing strength, of Metro[politan] University in St. Paul have a bearing on that?

DB: It certainly does have, although at the time I'm not sure it had a great deal of bearing because we didn't know much about what would happen there. The State University System hadn't come forward with any plans really for Metro at that point. They were still pushing Metro as a free-standing upper division college largely which was there to credit people with life experience and credential them. That's now all changed and Metro currently, under plans put forward by the State University System, Metro will now become a metropolitan four-year college on pretty traditional lines. I believe that's going to happen. The university's been somewhat schizophrenic about that. I think we've thought a lot about whether we're not giving away part of our natural market. On the other hand, if what we're trying to do is to preserve, and increase if possible, quality at all costs rather than go for size and numbers then it makes sense to say that that's a fairly reasonable mission differentiation. Let Metro do that work, try to specialize in it if possible to the extent that they can remediate students to the point where they can enter the univerisity as transfer students at the junior level. That will be a desirable thing probably which brings us into another whole issue: whether the university should continue to have a more or less square shape or even an inverted pyramid with more than half of the eventual graduates entering

as transfer students or whether we should be moving toward a more traditional pyramidal arrangement where your largest class is the freshman class.

CAC: That's still undecided?

DB: Pretty much undecided.

CAC: [unclear]

DB: Well, I think that that's still being debated at this stage. There are people in the administration certainly who feel that it's unnatural that you not have a pyramidal situation with most students entering as freshmen and spending four years here. On the other hand, the structure of the state's higher education systems is such that it argues for the opposite situation which is in fact the one we've got. It has some implications. When we look at graduation rates, for instance, and progress, we look at freshmen cohorts. Well, freshmen cohorts are less than half of everything we do here. So while our record is terrible, frankly, on that score, part of the reason has to do with ignoring the rather good success we have with transfer students. The university graduates more B.A.s in any given year than the size of its freshman class and always has. That tends to get overlooked.

CAC: I know that there is that point of view expressed for many years. I heard Mr. Hasselmo even the last two or three years talk about it, that is, the expectation of graduating a higher percentage of students in four years. I've talked to a certain number of faculty who see that at the University of Minnesota the longer period of time for undergraduate instruction may have a positive side, which is to say a lot of students don't drop out but stop out and work or travel, and then come back in again more experienced. Does that . . . ?

DB: Yes, the answer to all this isn't clear. If you look at our four-year graduation rates, they're the worst you can find almost anywhere in a major public university. Five-year rates are bad. They're the worst in the Big Ten.

CAC: But if one wants to say bad or worse, there's some people say that's a pretty good thing.

DB: Right. When it may be. However, if you go out to eight years—which is about as far as you ever need to go—we still don't look very good. We're still closer but I think we aren't even to the point of Ohio State. My own position has always been that yes, we've got a problem. It probably isn't as much of a problem as people make it out to be because we have a different kind of student body, because many of our students do want to stop out. It's not bad for a student if it can be arranged to take a year and travel in Europe, or Asia, or somewhere, get a little broader perspective, even work for a year. We shouldn't always assume that a four-year lock-step degree. It probably isn't the ideal.

CAC: That assumption seems to run strong in the rhetoric of Central Administration.

DB: I think that's partly the point from which Nils Hasselmo comes, although he certainly is open-minded about the discussion but Nils is out of . . . his own experience was with a four-year liberal arts college.

CAC: But Keller and Magrath did the same thing.

DB: Sure.

CAC: Spoke the same words.

DB: Yes. But you have to remember too that these people who are in these leadership positions tend to be people who came out of that experience. Of course, everybody in a leadership position tends to be like that for one reason or another. I myself went through to a bachelor's degree in less than four years, partly because I had to get through so I could earn some money. I would never have gotten the degree if I hadn't done that.

CAC: I had to get through fast so I could go to the war. [laughter]

DB: Yes, well, that's another aspect of things. Another thing of course you see—or have seen, I think we'll see less of it now—is students who decided to do a hitch in the service after high school and then come back. One of my sons did that, as a matter of fact. That was by design. He wanted to do it. I think it was good for him. He saw the world. He was a much more sophisticated student when he returned.

CAC: I think many of us matured faster in the Armed Service than any other experience that we had.

DB: Yes.

CAC: Is there any way that Central Administration has been able to trace what I would call non-traditional students, not by gender or by race but by age group; which is to say there seems to me there are certain programs at the University of Minnesota that attract students who are coming back. I mean they aren't stop outs. They're students in their thirties, for example. Is that part of the discussion or perception that Central Administration has?

DB: It's part of the discussion but we have not done much research on it, to be frank. I probably know as much as anybody, almost anybody, about this and I'm not aware that we've done much following of that kind of case. One of the things we're proposing now in the Central Planning Group is, in fact, to begin to trace in detail the records of sampling cohorts of freshmen and of transfer students, and by age, ethnic group, gender—although gender doesn't really seem to have much affect. Gender is not an issue here really in terms of students. It's certainly an issue in terms of faculty or staff. But we're close to fifty-fifty. It isn't obvious that there are programs that are closed on a gender basis. Obviously there are programs that are unbalanced

gender wise but not nearly as much as they used to be. Many, many more women in the engineering programs, in the Carlson School of Management. When I went through the accounting program, there were no, I mean zero, women in the accounting class. When I first got into accounting, a woman accountant was almost unheard of. I think the university was one of the few places that was hiring any women juniors when I came here. There was one woman junior in our accounting department hired at the same time I was and there was one senior accountant who was a woman. There had been one principal prior to World War II which I must say has got to be very unusual because there were very few of them. There are a lot of women now in agriculture and in natural resources which used to be male enclaves. The Law School is quite well balanced. I don't think it's fifty-fifty but it's probably something like sixty-forty now. The veterinary class is more women than men and that used to be . . .

CAC: That's part of the Small Animal Program?

DB: Largely Small Animal although the old prejudice that women can't do Large Animal veterinary I think is passing, too. I can remember the veterinary dean arguing that women simply were not strong enough to do Large Animal veterinary work. This is many years ago. It's not a recent theme. There are certainly women who are perfectly strong enough to do that. They're not all in Small Animal. Some of them are in Large. But that's really turned around. I suppose that class was, if you went back twenty years, probably at least 90 percent men, maybe more. It's now more women than men. So that has changed. Nursing hasn't changed very much but Nursing has never closed to men. You come to the issue of how much social engineering one wants to do with these things. As long as your program is open without any gender bar, possibly it's best to let people decide what they want to do and not worry too much about that.

CAC: Coming back to General College briefly . . . there is an assumption made by lay persons, but also by a lot of faculty, that General College historically was an entry point for athletes and that it played that role particularly with the football team.

DB: Yes, there's some truth to that although I don't think there is anymore. I think at one time it was a place where you put largely football, hockey, and basketball players who might not otherwise be able to maintain a passing situation. I think that's reformed a lot in the last few years. The current coaches of the three major money sports I think are all committed to not doing that sort of thing. Although I haven't seen the count recently, the last one I saw General College was not even the most likely place for athletes. I'm talking about football, basketball and hockey.

CAC: Historically, it was more the case?

DB: Yes, historically it's been the case. It doesn't have to be General College. Some schools create other kinds of special programs for athletes. We don't happen to have one, at least that's being used that way. I'm not sure that we have to as long as the attitude around here is the one that Keller and Hasselmo have put forward which is that we don't have to win every

championship or go to the Rose Bowl every other year. What we have to do is field a competitive team.

CAC: That relates to the legend that the university does better in the legislature if there's a winning team.

DB: You know I used to think that was a myth but I have become to believe that there's a lot to that.

CAC: How can that be measured?

DB: I don't know.

CAC: From your experience . . . is it anecdotal?

DB: It's anecdotal. For one thing, you get over there and you're testifying in the legislature, and you're talking to legislators and staff, and if there's been an athletic triumph, or the team has been invited to a bowl game, or has upset Wisconsin or Michigan, or something, there's just a pleasanter mood. [laughter] They want to talk about that. They take pride in it. Just in recent history, whatever else Governor Carlson has done with or to the university and higher education—he certainly hasn't in his first term seemed to be any friend of higher education—he's an enthusiastic supporter of the university basketball team. It gave a rather interesting in not too long ago for our alumni director to write him a letter saying, "Gee, we're really happy that you support Minnesota athletics so enthusiastically. Is it possible maybe you could support some of the other things we do." [laughter] She got a very reasoned friendly reply from the governor saying in essence, I've done what I had to do during my first term but now things are going to change. Now we're going to have a partnership. Today is election day and we'll see what happens.

CAC: Observers have noted that the present chair of the Board of Regents is a close friend of Mr. Carlson.

I want to continue this just for a moment. To what degree, the last twenty-five years, has the vice-president for Student Affairs—whatever title he's carried, or she—played in Morrill Hall decisions bearing on these issues of General College, for example, or student admissions or transfers, etcetera. Has that been a major contribution from that office?

DB: I would say that that is the case. Certainly Paul Cashman, when he was vice-president for Student Affairs, was a major player in that kind of issue and, in fact, in most issues. I think Cashman more than the other Student Affairs V.P.s that I have observed was sort of a full participant in a broad range of decisions. Now Cashman, of course, was long gone. I think he was gone in the early Magrath Administration. Since then Wilderson certainly was very interested in admissions issues and particularly in minority issues. And I think he had a lot of

influence on the people he worked for. I think he was far less influential in issues that went beyond that kind of question. Yes, I think they've certainly taken a pro-active role.

CAC: And would confer with the Economic Affairs Office, for example?

DB: Yes, largely. I think there's been a discomfort from time to time as to whether Student Affairs really ought to be a separate vice-presidency or whether it ought to be a sub-group of the Academic Affairs vice-presidency, as it is in many institutions, and as it was prior to Paul Cashman being vice-president.

CAC: There was for years a Dean of Students.

DB: Dean of Students, yes. Admissions Office essentially reported to Malcolm Willy, indirectly, as I recall. Part of the reason that was changed is that it was perceived that that office in that arrangement wasn't very pro-active on issues that went beyond registration systems, and seeing that students were properly registered, and awarding them a properly calligra-graphed diploma, and so forth. That changed at just about the same time that a number of other things changed around the beginning of the seventies which is about the time, as I said yesterday, when this office was created. That vice-presidency was created about that same time, and for largely the same reasons; because it was perceived that the offices then charged with those tasks were not concentrating on the emerging issues, but were either taken up with traditional tasks, or were fascinated with non-policy relevant research, in the case of the office of . . .

CAC: The elevation was intended to increase the contribution on broader policy?

DB: Right.

CAC: I don't have the calendar in mind of the creation of vice-presidency in the School of Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics. Was there always a vice-presidency for the Health Sciences?

DB: No. Vice-presidency for the Health Sciences was created along about the same time.

CAC: Early seventies?

DB: I think probably the early seventies.

CAC: Would the same thing be true of the St. Paul campus?

DB: And the St. Paul campus a little later than that, partly as a result of the agricultural interests in the state feeling that if there were vice-presidents for Health Sciences there ought to be a vice-president for agriculture and related activities. Now in effect however, prior to that becoming a vice-presidency, you had a person as—I guess the title was Dean of the Institute of Agriculture,

Forestry, and Home Economics—Bill Hueg who may not have been a vice-president by title but was definitely a vice-president by influence.

[End of Tape 2, Side 1]

[Tape 2, Side 2]

CAC: . . . change its mission. Again, I'm guessing a lot of this happens in the seventies. Then I know less about Nursing.

DB: Yes, some of it started to happen in the seventies, but the three things you've mentioned all were also part of the Commitment to Focus paper. A lot of the planning, as I've said before in these interviews, had occurred previously, and Keller to some extent simply sat down and wrote it all out and made it definite. The Education College was evolving away from B.S. teacher training as early as maybe the late sixties already. But they still were doing a lot of that; and one of the things that Keller said was, "There are twenty-seven teacher training programs in Minnesota, other than our own, for entry level K-12 teachers. There's no reason we should be in that business unless some special reason can be given why we should maintain some program. So we will get out of that business and we will get into the business of training teacher trainers, producing M.E.D.s and Ph.D.s in Education and Ed.D.s, training the administrators of the K-12 system; and we will retain a few special programs where we do have some advantage, largely in Special Education where there aren't a great many programs in the state, and where we have an extraordinarily strong Ed[ucational] Psych[ology] Department which can contribute to that." So we have retained that and a couple of other small programs; and I'm not at this point able to tell you why the others have been retained, but they have some synergy with other things that are being done in the college.

In addition, of course, more recently our Education College, more or less on the basis of its own planning, decided that it would go along with the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission and begin to train entry level teachers in a five-year program where the first four years would be done in other colleges acquiring the disciplinary skills and knowledge; and the education component would essentially be done in a fifth year, and the award would then be essentially a five-year bachelor degree. I think it's called something else. They get a bachelor's degree in the disciplinary area and a five-year education teaching certificate, or some such thing. At the time they made that decision, I think a lot of us thought that they were going to, perhaps, shoot themselves in the foot on the theory that students confronted with the alternative of a five-year program or a four-year program, 27-four-year program, might opt to take the shorter route. In fact that was wrong and that decision on the Education College's part has proved to be a good one. They have a very strong class of these five-year people; and at least on the basis of the few years that we've had people coming out of that program, they seem to get better positions and better pay. They apparently have hold of something useful there. That whole education evolution I think was well thought out, and has been carried out very carefully, too, and in the face of what has been I think the most severe retrenchment of any college in the university.

Personally I'd have to comment that that is the result of the fact that at the beginning of the major retrenchment period all the objective data said that the College of Education was the most richly funded college in the university—a possible exception of Agriculture at the time and Agriculture has sustained a lot of cuts also.

CAC: These changes in Education, how many of them were the product of negotiation or conversations with the State University System, for example, which is a major place of training K-12 teachers?

DB: Originally I don't think that there was much interchange at all with the State University System about this or about any aspect of Commitment to Focus, but since then there's been a lot. The two systems have done a lot of joint planning and opening up of transfer opportunities. We have come to the point now where I think we've gone about as far as we can possibly go in making credit transfer easy among the four public higher education systems.

CAC: And the Higher Education Coordinating Board [HECB], do they play a role in any of these matters of any major significance?

DB: Gadfly, I would say largely.

CAC: If there powers are only advisory.

DB: That's right, pretty much advisory. They have at times been I think a useful gadfly in conveying legislative concerns, although I think those legislative concerns get conveyed directly a good bit too. But HECB has provided a forum for these systems to meet on neutral ground with presumably objective or neutral people present to moderate the discussions. But what really happens here is you get progress in that area only when both systems and the institutions involved believe it's in their own interest to do it. At that point you really don't need a Higher Education Board staff to make it happen, I don't think. In most areas, I'm not a fan of the Higher Education Coordinating Board; and in fact I'm not sure that now that there's a merger of the other public systems that there is a role for the HECB anymore. I think that will be an issue in the upcoming legislature. The legislature has asked HECB essentially to give them some reasons why they shouldn't be stood against the wall and shot in this next session. They're busily at work trying to think of things that they do that no one else can do. There may be some things. We'll see how that plays out.

CAC: Changing mission in Nursing was what?

DB: Keller thought that the problem in Nursing . . . and now I've got to go back and correct what I just said because the most over funded college in the university by comparison with other institutions in the mid-eighties was Nursing—smaller college, much smaller than Education or Agriculture, of course. Keller thought that the way to cure that was to get out of the R.N program, the bachelor degree Nursing program—I shouldn't have said R.N, I mean the bachelor

of Nursing program—and concentrate on training teachers of nurses and specialist nurses at the terminal master's level. That in my opinion was a mistake. It was one of two mistakes that I could see in the Commitment to Focus document, in terms of the economics of the institution at least—and I'll get to the other one presently. The Nursing School was told to go in that direction, and they duly began to reduce their undergraduate class, and try to increase their graduate instruction. The net result was that what we were spending per student in Nursing rose instead of declining, which I think any economist might have been able to tell Keller at the time—and I think some did—but he had a different idea of that. I think that mistake has now been realized and in the last round of planning and budgeting, we were in the interesting position of saying to the Nursing dean, "Why are your costs so high. You've got plenty of room. Why don't you expand your undergraduate class and your costs will go down." Her reply was, "The reason we haven't done that is we were told not to do it." That will change I think now.

CAC: What other institutions train nurses in the state?

DB: There are several and I can't really recite them all.

CAC: But not to the extent of the state university . . .

DB: Not nearly as much. I think two or three of the state universities have nursing programs. St. Scholastica has one and there may be one or two others.

The other mistake I think that Keller made, and it was based on a different . . . not on an economic misunderstanding but on a educational judgment I guess you might say. . . or even maybe an educational prejudice. I'd go as far as to say that. He felt that the School of Management which was then quite largely undergraduate—they were doing a lot of M.B.A., very little Ph.D. at the time—and he felt that a bachelor's degree in Business is not a degree that a research university ought to give, that business as a profession was best taught at the master's level with the exception of accounting. That was his position, that the Management School should get out of all bachelor's programs except accounting, and should reduce its undergraduate enrollment from, I think they were maybe 1700 or 1800 at the time, to about 700 or 800 at the most, and maybe further than that. And in fact, they have done that. They haven't gotten rid of all bachelor's degrees other than accounting; but they're down to where their undergraduate class is about 700, and they've expanded both the master's and Ph.D programs a lot. Now that has not had such bad economic effects, in some respects, partly because undergraduate business is a cheap program. You can do it without spending a whole lot of money and do it quite well without spending a whole lot of money. So costs in the business school have not gone up because they reduced their undergraduate class. But they have gone up quite a bit because we've invested a lot in trying to get that business school into the top five or ten business schools in the country. And we're making some progress. It's beginning to be recognized as one of the excellent business schools, but it's been done at a very large cost to the university budget. A lot of the retrenchment that has occurred in other places has been redirected to the Carlson School.

Also of course, we've brought in a lot of money from Curt Carlson and others because of the fact that we undertook to try to make that one of the outstanding management schools. But I do think, as a personal opinion, that the judgement that we should reduce the undergraduate class was not probably a very useful judgement. There's endless student demand for undergraduate business training. And one of the things that happened there is that curiously enough when people could not get admitted at the junior level to the Carlson School—which was done by raising the grade point average to where you can almost not get in without a straight 4.0 now—they turned to other majors and flooded a number of other majors. The Speech major got flooded with people who otherwise would have gone into Business Administration. For awhile the Agricultural Business major boomed. I think that's a little less now, but for awhile they didn't know quite what to do with all the people who wanted admission to that program

CAC: These come under the category of unintended consequences. They're hard to guess, aren't they?

DB: Yes, that's right. I don't know as anybody could have anticipated that a second choice for putative Business majors would be Speech, but that's in fact what happened. Perhaps, you guess that.

CAC: I'm guessing Journalism, too.

DB: Well, Journalism certainly, for whatever reason, boomed. At the time I thought that the main reason why we had all these Journalism majors was the romance of investigative journalism in the mid-seventies largely. That's when the boom occurred but it hasn't slacked off very much even today. The Journalism School can't take nearly as many majors as they would like.

CAC: I'm going to shift the conversation for a moment. One of the most delicate concerns or areas of interest that I found in my interviews is the relationship of the university to the Board of Regents, in part because they operate in the sphere that doesn't intersect—on a regular basis at least—with many administrators and certainly with very few faculty, maybe also that politically it's more sensitive; but I catch a sense from talking with many people that different boards take different perceptions of what their authority and what their missions are. From your point of view, can one trace that, or are there fundamental changes that are going on, or is this a matter of personality of who is chair of the board, for example?

DB: I think it's partly personality but I think it's more than that. When I first got involved with the board, it was more like I visualize a corporate board or a foundation board to be. The chairman tended to take a very high-minded position to represent the university politically at a very abstract level. The board itself tended to take the attitude that they would back the administration, and if they couldn't back the administration virtually unanimously there must be something wrong with the administration and that their function was . . . I can remember it being said that the major, if not the sole, function of a Board of Regents was to choose a

president and to get rid of one if necessary. That continued pretty much into the Keller Administration. I don't think the board . . .

CAC: There was a time in late Moos . . .

DB: Well, yes, Moos had a little trouble with the board but not very much I don't think and Magrath was terrified of a regents' vote that wasn't unanimous. Many of us said to him at the time, "It isn't the end of the world if you can't get all twelve regents to vote for everything you propose." But he really wanted to have a unanimous board at all times. Now my insight into the departure of Magrath is that the board told him that his time was up here. I'm not sure why that happened. I have never entirely understood it; but I do not believe that he would have accepted a presidency at Missouri—which was clearly a step down, at least at the time . . . I think it would be now too—unless he had inferred that his time here wasn't long. That was done without a lot of brouhaha. He just announced he was leaving, resigning, and taking another job. But something went on behind the scenes there. That's another thing that has changed. That kind of interaction was not done publicly in those days. And it has been done publicly since then from time to time and certainly at the time . . .

CAC: Has it been done publicly because the press is more aggressive or because of things internal to the university?

DB: I think to some extent it has to do with the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. It is currently illegal for three regents to meet together without announcing that they're going to do so. That law was passed in the seventies—I can't recall just when, probably about 1975 or so—the so-called Tennison Law. The purpose of that was to make the deliberation of public bodies as public as possible and I think the intentions are good. I think in some cases, however, the affects are maybe counterproductive, where one is forced to wash dirty laundry in public, or to have unseemly fights that hurt the institution when that isn't the intention. But, you know, we have to live with it and every good has its evil I suppose. There are things I'd like to change about the open meeting law but in general I think it's been good. It certainly has improved our ability to understand what's going on at the legislature. We used to see conference committees go into closed door meetings. They'd come out with a bill; and we hadn't the least idea why the decisions were made, and we might not even have an idea of what the intentions were unless the staff was willing to tell us that. Now we can sit there and listen to what they say, and take notes, and we know in fact what they're trying to accomplish, and what has happened. I'm straying a little bit from the question you asked me.

CAC: You sense the regents are more activist? They've come to be the last four, five, six years?

DB: Oh, yes. I think there's been a slight cycle. The board under Charles McGuigan had people who—including Chairman McGuigan—wanted to interfere with the day-to-day operation of the university, in my opinion. We had a lot of people . . . we had some regents who really wanted to make decisions at a fairly detailed level, and in fact it was at that period, I mentioned

yesterday, that somebody tried to get me to fire a staff member over a position he had taken. That occurred during that board . . . backed off; but the mere fact that anybody would conceive of the idea that a staff member should be fired for doing objective analytic work, I found appalling at the time. It's almost as appalling as firing a faculty member for the nature of his or her research. After the McGuigan board, I think that things began to turn a again a little bit. David Lebedoff had a very good idea of how a board should operate, and while he certainly didn't want to go back to a bunch of ancient white men dosing in their chairs—which might have characterized the board twenty years ago or twenty-five—he also was very careful himself not to interfere in administrative decision making. Where other regents wanted to do that, Lebedoff tried to restrain it. I believe the fact that the then vice-chairman of the board did not succeed to the chairmanship—which is the first time I can ever remember that that happened—was a result of a judgement on the part of the other regents that she was too interested in micro-management. I give that as a personal opinion for posterity, but I have reason to believe that that's what happened. I think other people might confirm that. Beyond the Lebedoff board and getting down to boards that are far more recent . . . get down to the current board where you don't have a lot of seasoned regents there. You have a chairman, who while I think her instincts are to get into fairly detailed decision making, she is a professional in this area and knows in her mind that she should not do that. I think she makes every effort not to do it, and I think she probably can be relied upon to make at least some efforts to restrain other regents from doing it too. It's not unusual for a regent, when first elected, not to understand what the role is; and most of them I think gradually acquire a feeling that they ought to back off a little bit on detail and talk about policy. There is a fine line there. I have to admire Jean Keffeler's struggle, number one, to force the administration to be specific about things—which I think is the role of the regents; they should do that—and at the same time not be constantly overruling administrative decisions, or questioning them, or undermining the administrative position.

The other thing that I think has changed quite a bit with the board is that I don't believe that the board in the sixties or seventies paid much attention to the faculty. They might occasionally have a dinner with the regents professors. I don't think they ever had any formal reporting relationship with the governance system for many years. I'm not sure when that began. But today the chairman of the University Senate, chairman of the SCC, reports regularly to the board and is free to say whatever is on the mind of the faculty or the senate. The board contrives to meet very regularly with the faculty representatives, and also with staff representatives, and they didn't used to do that.

CAC: There is the risk of the president being undercut by that direct contact.

DB: Yes, there is some risk of that. On the other hand, it opens the possibility of having more consensus among stakeholder groups in the university. We're going through that right now with the question of the legislative request we've brought forward. If we had been operating under the old system I think both the faculty and the staff and probably the students would have said, "The request is insufficiently ambitious. It consents to tuition raises. Why don't you take a

position that tuition shouldn't rise at all? Why don't you ask for large faculty and staff salary increases?" The fact that we work more with the stakeholder groups, and that the board has heard from them separately, I think has at least opened the possibility of a consensus and a united front before the legislature. The worst thing that can happen to us is the end-running kind of activity in the legislature where the administration comes in and says, "Here's what we're asking for. Here's our plan," and a union group, or a faculty group, or a staff group, or group representative of one part of the university has a whole different agenda.

CAC: Both Health and Agriculture have had direct access for a long time.

DB: Oh yes. And there has been some end-running. I think to be perfectly honest, Bill Hueg did a fair amount of end-running in his time, sometimes to the ultimate advantage of the university; but it's not the way we need to be perceived. I think Lyle French, however, as Health Science V.P., I think avoided end-running and was really a team player. Lyle spent a lot of time in the legislature testifying for things that had nothing to do directly with the Health Sciences.

CAC: How is this coordinated? I mean there is a chief lobbyist—whatever title he may have—and then there are these other representatives, and then there are groups that have had a long special, for example. I'm thinking of the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs [CURA] which has had a special appropriation for over twenty years.

DB: Yes, as have many others. Technically there are only four special appropriations today, but within those four are about thirty-two sub-appropriations which we can tinker with; but we do it at our peril because everyone of them has a constituency in the legislature.

CAC: What constituency does CURA, the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, have?

DB: They service a lot of municipal agencies. They do a lot of research that's important to local legislators and county board members, city council members. They have I think a large constituency among municipal level planners and state planners . . . a surprising amount of support. It would be quite difficult to make any substantial cut in CURA. And I think partly has been due to really excellent leadership in CURA over a long period of time and currently. I marvel at how effective Tom Scott is given the fact that he appears to be totally laid-back about what he does. How is it coordinated? In recent years—I would say since Stan Kegler's time—the typical arrangement is there's a chief lobbyist who may have some generalized assistants. I've served that role. George Robb has in his time. I'm not a lobbyist, but I do a lot of work with particularly the money committees, and with their staffs, largely on technical and money issues, and on responding to legislative questions; and occasionally I do do some lobbying, although I probably shouldn't admit that on tape since I'm not a registered lobbyist. But it's only when the occasion arises. I'm not pro-active that way. The chief lobbyist in recent years has two, typically two, sort of assistant or specialized lobbyists: one for health science issues—that's currently Vic McManus—and one for agricultural issues—and that's Dick Hemingson currently. There's a lot of coordination among them. In recent years, I don't believe there's been any

difference in agenda. Part of the reason that's done is that we need representation in committee meetings which sometimes are meeting concurrently. We've found that if an issue comes up in the university, it's about the university and the university is not represented, the legislators do not like that. So we try to contrive to have somebody present at every legislative hearing where we might conceivably be called upon to say something, or take a position, or at least take note of what they're concerned about. As you know, the legislature has special concerns in Agriculture and in recent years in Health Sciences and there are initiatives in those areas that are sort of outside the university's general legislative request. We've gotten money through the Agriculture Committee in recent years from time to time, and we now currently have a fair amount of money that's coming to us through Minn-Care, or whatever it's now called, the attempt to provide health insurance to Minnesotans who can't otherwise afford it. The university receives some 2.2 million a year, or something like that, through that program; and that's not in our direct appropriation, but we need to be represented there. So that's the arrangement that we've had in recent years. I think it's worked fairly well. At present at least, I do not have a big concern about end-running in the legislature. Another thing that has changed that has prevented that somewhat . . . one of our major concerns used to be that in legislative testimony—which we don't schedule that's at the behest of the legislative committees . . . they schedule what they want to hear four or five sessions—the general gripe about that was that we spent as much time on testimony on some small state special appropriation as we did on our general operations and maintenance appropriation. Every director of a state special would be over there and do a two hour presentation on the talented youth math program or labor education special, or something like that; and then we'd get an hour to talk about our entire operations and maintenance appropriation. I'm overstating but we'd get maybe two sessions.

CAC: I understand.

DB: Maybe four hours but it was totally out of balance. That's been changed by the legislature itself and in the last several sessions we have not had separate testimony about the state special appropriations except by request. They were interested in the Super Computer Special because there were a lot of questions about how that was being used so we did do special testimony on that last time, but that's only because it was a current issue. We got a lot more time on more broadly based issues of student aid, and tuition, and faculty salaries, and program planning—what we intended to do. I think that's a much healthier situation than it used to be. Another change, —and this carries us back a little bit to the Board of Regents—until I would say the chairmanship of Dave Lebedoff, regents never appeared at the legislature or very rarely. During Lebedoff's chairmanship, they began to show up, and be introduced at committee meetings, and occasionally testify—although that's fairly rare—and to actually lobby the legislature which in my view is one of their functions, and which they never did for many years. I think most of the people who served on the Board of Regents sort of felt it was above them to engage in actual lobbying of legislators. Today many of them do lobby. Some of them are really very active in lobbying and partly maybe that's because they have to lobby to get elected now.

CAC: Yes.

DB: And many of them do.

CAC: When did the change in the process of election to the board take place?

DB: Well, the Regents Advisory Committee legislation was passed I think in 1987, maybe 1985 or thereabouts, and what that did is it created a committee of presumably disinterested citizens, non-political citizens, who review candidates—either nominated or self-nominated candidates for regent—and pass along to the legislature a list of candidates that they believe would be acceptable, I believe typically a list which includes one or more candidates from both major political parties in every legislative district that's up for election or for the at large seats. So far the legislature has in fact . . . Since the passage of that law as far as I know, every regent that has been elected has been one that had been passed by the Regents Advisory Committee. I think the effect of that has been that it makes for more activist regents, people who see the job as more than an honorary position. And that probably is all to the good. I think it is anyway.

CAC: But it makes the president's task of shepherding extraordinarily difficult.

DB: Yes, right. You have the possibility that you've got regents over there lobbying against the university's proposals; and I have been told by staff at the legislature that that has happened in the past, that we had at least one regent going around saying, "You should not vote for the university's proposals." I'm not going to name names there.

CAC: That's fine. I'm going to shift again just a little bit. While we've been talking here and I've been listening carefully, I was jotting down, beginning with Gerry Shepherd, those persons who occupied the position of Academic Affairs and it's a long list if one includes the acting.

DB: It sure is.

CAC: There seems to be more churning, more turnover in that position than in other vice-presidencies or in the presidency itself. Is there something systemic going on here?

DB: It's a tough job. Historically I think from the time that Don Smith left the university down right to the present time, the person in that job tends to take the heat for whatever happens and as a result gets shot at a lot. It's also the position that if there's going to be change in the system, if there's going to be planning, if there's going to be retrenchment and reallocation, that's the person that's got to make it happen. To the extent that it happened at all prior to Ken Keller becoming Academic V.P., Gerry Shepherd had to do it. I had occasion to observe Shepherd in interaction with faculty, for instance, when he made certain decisions and Gerry had a hard time with some of these things. I watched him on one occasion have a shouting argument with people who were his former colleagues in the Institute of Technology in which he finally said, "I think this is outrageous for you to almost"—I'm paraphrasing—"almost persecute me about this. This

is something I have to decide. I've decided it as best I can. I expect people to play along with this." He essentially said to the two professors he was talking to—I was there to provide the background information on why he had made the decision—he said to them, "I'm done talking to you about this. Get out!" You probably knew Gerry Shepherd.

CAC: Very, very well as a neighbor as well as a colleague.

DB: For such a even tempered and gentle person as Gerry Shepherd to be driven to that kind of reaction . . . I mean I was shocked. I had never seen him in that kind of mood.

CAC: You're suggesting there's as much stress on that office as on any, including the presidency?

DB: I think possibly more than any other position in the university. Now some people handle it better than others. Hal Chase was never bothered by this.

CAC: He wasn't there very long.

DB: But he wasn't there very long, partly because he opted to do something else. I think it would have been very useful if he had been able to serve longer than he did. Hal was a marvelous person. I probably enjoyed working with Hal Chase about as much as anybody I ever have worked with. He had a quantitative mind. He was the kind of person that you could argue at any level with him and he wouldn't hold it against you. Incidentally, Jim Infante is such a person as well and a joy for the same reason. But Hal maybe might have had a strain too if he'd been there long enough. I think Keller as Academic V.P. was under a lot of strain and I think he handled it fairly well. He carried it over into his presidency, and as president I believe he acted in effect as his own Academic vice-president. That may have contributed to the ultimate almost Greek tragedy that occurred there where he perhaps was just pushed beyond the limits of what anybody could take care of or oversee. But everybody right down the line I think has had this problem, and even when Roger Benjamin was V.P.; although Roger I think probably wasn't under as much strain, partly because Keller did a lot of the things that I might have expected Benjamin as V.P. to do. Roger was under strain too I believe. They all have been.

CAC: The whole system, as you properly noted, of reallocation is very traumatic for persons down the line, being chair persons or program heads.

DB: Very hard to do, yes. I know we've had an increased turnover in deans and it's my impression that we've had quite an increased turnover in department heads as well, although I haven't actually looked at that in any statistical way.

CAC: I think the Arts College they just churn. It's really standard now, three years, sometimes six, but that's it. Most often it's just three years.

DB: It's partly because many people otherwise in the old days would have been taking their turn as chair and maybe been chair for a good many years. It wasn't any great stress to do it. Perhaps today people say, "Why should I have this? I don't need this trouble."

CAC: It's showing up in a lot of the interviews I'm having.

DB: It's very difficult to make management work in the place when you have a group of managers at the department level very few of whom ever signed up to do anything like that.

CAC: And are lacking in experience and skill.

DB: Yes, right. Which, of course, is partly the reason why we—originally this office and now Carol Currier's office—has instituted this sort of . . . It's not really as extensive as it ought to be but I think it's a useful program for . . .

CAC: I interviewed Tim Delmont who is historically in charge of that.

DB: That's Tim's baby. He conceived of that, came to me and said, "I think we ought to do this. Can we find a way to do it?" We did find a way. I think it now is working quite well. Actually it worked quite well from the outset, and for whatever reason when I go and lecture to that group or hold a seminar with them, people always say it's useful. So I hope it is.

CAC: Future historians I hope won't get [unclear] out by telling the story of everybody as president. That's not the way historians go about their business but it does remain a mystery of Mr. [Lynn] Kuhi whose tenure was very brief and he started out fresh. I think he's the only one from outside. Everybody else knew the university from the inside.

DB: I'm not sure I can throw much light on that. That was kind of a Saturday night massacre. We went home Friday night thinking that Lynn was in good status and Monday he was out. To this day, I'm not quite sure why. I believe that . . . at least my observation is that Lynn Kuhi was not as pro-active as some of his predecessors and that the president may have felt that he needed to get somebody more pro-active into the job. That's the best light I can shed on it. I do not believe that that turnover had anything to do with misbehavior or lack of personal trust.

CAC: Sure. There's a lot to learn in the job and I should think it would be very difficult for an outsider to do that.

DB: It's also true, for what it's worth, that many people, in the administration at least and I know some faculty members, felt strongly that Shirley Clark should have had that job.

[End of Tape 2, Side 2]

[Tape 3, Side 1]

DB: . . . affected the university. One of the notes I made to myself has to do with the change in the economic structure of the state as recently as the late fifties or the sixties. The major industries in the state were agriculture and mining, and the state was still deriving a lot of income from mining even then. The decline of the taconite industry and the virtual disappearance of the high-grade iron ore industry has change things a great deal. And agriculture . . . well, you still hear people saying that agriculture is the major industry in Minnesota. It isn't by any objective standard and hasn't been for a long time, and certainly small farming is a minuscule part of economic activity in Minnesota today. That has to do partly with the rise of corporate farming or family partnership farming, larger scale and more technological farming, more intensive capital. So the decline of those two industries has also shifted the political balance somewhat; and it's shifted it in the direction of two other industries, one of which is health care and all the associated health-related industries, and the other is technology and particularly the computer industry. So that in terms of political influence today, I would think that organizations like Medical Alli[ances] which represents the medical technology companies and so forth, the High-Tech Council which represents computer and related industries, other high-tech industries . . . these are at least as influential as are the health care people as either agriculture or mining. Mining is virtually disappeared as a political force.

CAC: The latter two interests—I think you're absolutely accurate—are part of the economic climate generally of the state and particularly the metropolitan area. How do they have access to the university? Is it direct, indirect? What is that relationship?

DB: To some extent we rely on lobbying groups to help our case. The High-Tech Council has evolved from where they were interested both internally and at the legislature in lobbying only for programs that were of direct interest to them to where they now lobby in support of the university's general planning and request.

CAC: They keep themselves informed in detail on the university?

DB: Yes.

CAC: And to what liaison? How do they enter Central Administration? Or does Central Administration go out to them?

DB: We've done a good bit of going out to them but in the case of the High-Tech Council at least, we haven't had to because they've come to us a great deal.

CAC: Whom do they come to typically?

DB: The academic vice-president, commonly the dean of technology is usually a player in these things. During the period that Herb Johnson was the executive director, if that's the right title,

of the High-Tech Council, he came to me a lot; and we did some coordinated data gathering, and publicity writing about the university's influence on the state and its economy which resulted in a couple of pieces called "An Unacknowledged Industry," or something like that—I've forgotten the title of it now—and a sequel to that that was done two years later trying to point out the positive effects of the university on the state's economy and employment. Under Johnson they were very pro-active in that way and I think they continue to be; although I've had a little less to do with them in the last two years, so I'm not quite sure what they're up to right now. The Business Partnership has also been fairly active; although they tend not to be advocates of the university specifically, but of positions having to do with how the state approaches the funding of higher education. The Business Partnership has been supportive of a high tuition, high student aid philosophy which is one of the things we'll come to presently I think.

We've also seen, of course, the urbanization of the state. Until the 1993 legislature, the state legislature was controlled by rural interests, since statehood I would say. The 1993 legislature, as a result of the reapportionment on the 1990 census, shifted that control; and there's a balance now where the rural legislators do not have a majority control, nor do the urban legislators, and the suburban legislators tend to be the swing group. There's the interesting question of how that will play out in terms of issues: whether one will see an alignment of the rural and suburban, or the urban and suburban, or conceivably even the rural and urban legislators, on the theory that a lot of what is needed in this state is investment in the inner cities, and in transportation problems of the inner cities, and that that may be traded off for continued investment in rural economic development. So while instinctively you wouldn't think that rural and urban is the likely coalition, it's not impossible that that's exactly what will happen.

CAC: Going way back, of course, it was the Farmer Labor coalition.

DB: Yes, exactly, sort of an unholy pairing in some senses and yet it's lasted for a long, long time. Of course, the DFL seems to be a marriage of three mutually incompatible interest groups; but it hasn't, except occasionally, hampered the party very much. So the same kind of unlikely alliance could occur politically and where is the university in that? Well, we certainly have put a lot of emphasis on inner city issues. I think we're seen as serving that interest. I think we continue to be seen as serving rural interests. The Extension Service and the Agricultural Research Station are immensely popular in rural Minnesota, and elsewhere to some extent. If one looks relatively at where the university spends its money, one of the places where you would say we spend a lot more money than other major research universities is in actuality on extension. I'm talking about agriculture or cooperative extension. But by all accounts that money is well spent in terms of getting support out of the state population. I'm not sure that cutting back on that would gain us anything. It probably would not. What has been attempted there is to say, "Agricultural or rural extension is still necessary and maybe is even more necessary." Maybe the shift can occur in the direction in bringing the arts to rural communities or bringing the Extension Services expertise to urban and suburban communities.

CAC: It was just two years that the opera reached out, the university opera [unclear].

DB: Enormously popular initiative on the part of the Extension Service. I think that that change in emphasis has been brought about largely by the current directory, Pat Borich, who's about to retire. Pat I think saw what needed to be done there, and I think he's carried it out pretty well in the face of a certain amount of opposition from people who continue to regard the Extension Service's mission as placing somebody in the field talking to the farmer about how he's doing his work. They're still doing that but it seems to me there's a lot less demand for that than there once was. Number one a lot of farming is now large scale. They really don't need a lot of advice that they can't get by phone or don't get out of the agricultural, agri-business companies; and the small farmers to the extent that they've survived have survived by being pretty smart about what they're doing, and perhaps don't need as much help as they once did either.

I wanted to move on a little bit to the increasing minority population, and what that has meant to us, and what it's likely to mean in the future. We certainly were not sensitive to minority education prior to the mid-seventies. The issue was not at the center of things around here at that time. I think it became much more a major topic of conversation in the late seventies, and has only now become something that we want to make statements about and set ourselves goals; and we're doing that right now, as you may know. We have before the regents proposals to set a goal by the year 2,000 of increasing minority graduation by 50 percent with an ultimate goal of not seeing any difference between majority and minority graduation rates, also trying to get more minority students into the system, and particularly since it's not all that hard to get them in as freshmen to get them through the first year, which has turned out to be the problem. Now we've got another problem in that not all minorities are under-represented. The Asian's who have been here a long time, largely the Chinese and Japanese and to some extent the Koreans, are not disadvantaged. As a matter of fact, they come into the university at a higher rate than whites. They persist better. Their graduation rate is better. They have higher grade point averages. They may suffer from some discrimination, and I'm not the one to comment about that, but I think it's probably less so than some of the other minority groups. They are not a performance problem; and in fact we may be headed in the future to the problem that Berkeley has had where white students began to say that they are being excluded because the place is being monopolized by Asian students. The appearance of the *Bell Curve* recently has intensified discussion about this. Although a future historian won't be interested in my views, I think the *Bell Curve* is being horrible misrepresented by the press and others. We've got a challenge on our hands as to how to deal with minorities without unduly favoring them and creating reverse discrimination. I think a positive issue—I have no idea how to deal with it but it's one I think that we're all at least subconsciously aware of and worried about—is whether the increased incidence of racism that we've seen on this campus and other campuses in the last few years doesn't have something to do with backlash against what is perceived as reverse discrimination. That's a very delicate thing to deal with.

CAC: It partakes I would guess of a larger sensitivity of the surrounding society as well. It's not the whole university's initiative.

DB: That's exactly true; but we have to walk a very fine line about these things and Nils Hasselmo, as you know, has done a lot of agonizing about this. There are groups on campus that you'd like to shut up or kick off instinctively and the university can't do those things.

CAC: Yes and shouldn't.

DB: And shouldn't do it, and I think Nils has taken a very strong line on that, and I think he's right. He's in exactly the right position but he'll take a lot of heat about it. Demography says that the students coming out of the Minneapolis and St. Paul high schools after the turn of the century will be more than 50 percent minority students. If we sit here with 10 percent minorities, something's wrong because our major service area is in fact the seven county municipal area—talking about the University of Minnesota Twin Cities. We should not be satisfied with a representation of minorities that represents the state of Minnesota because our service area isn't the whole state. So our aspirations have got to be higher than that; and if we don't achieve something that is close to 40 or 50 percent in the early part of the next century, we've done something wrong somewhere.

CAC: Including the Southeast Asian and the Latino?

DB: That would include those groups as well. You can look at it in finer way too and exclude the long resident Asian groups in which case you're looking at an even different set of numbers; although the Asian group in the Twin Cities public schools is growing faster than any other minority group, so it might even ease the statistics, I'm not quite sure. But it is a source of worry and the historical portion of what I'm saying about this is that we didn't get serious about this nearly soon enough. The first serious things that I saw done—other than hand wringing—were Ken Keller's initiatives with the Minneapolis and St. Paul public schools in which he tried to make agreements with them that if they would bring through a cohort of minority students with special programming and targeted at college admission that we would then provide extraordinary aid to those students when they got here. That worked with the St. Paul system. The Minneapolis system did not follow through on it. But we now have one of those cohorts here. I think they started last fall, the first cohort. The second will be coming in. The majority of those people who were in that St. Paul public school cohort did in fact wind up at the university, and it will be very interesting to see if their achievement is better than the average of those minority groups.

CAC: That's a little known story.

DB: Yes, right. Not a lot of people do know.

CAC: Well, perhaps better to have it quietly done if it's to be done effectively.

DB: Could be. I think many of us feel that the problem of getting minority students to the bachelor's degree starts in the K-12 system.

CAC: Yes.

DB: And if we don't do something there, we won't do anything.

CAC: Lets' shift to these items that are more reflective in their quality. You speak, and in quotation marks, of the past maturation of the industry, meaning the educational industry.

DB: What I'm talking about there . . . From the time of the Territory and the time of statehood in this state, there's been this sort of feeling—and it's not just here, it's true all over the country—that state universities and Land-Grant universities were sort of the open door to social mobility and to success in life, and that because of that they should be funded as nearly as possible entirely from tax money. That was carried to the point of not just undergraduate education but graduate education and professional education, and in some states still is carried to that point where there are or were recently states in which M.D. students paid the same tuition as undergraduate students. I've talked to people in Texas and in North Carolina—it's a few years ago—who were astounded that anybody would believe that a candidate for the M.D. or for the J.D. should be charged anything different than what we would charge an entering freshman. There are still a lot of places where people are amazed that two undergraduates may pay different tuitions based on the cost of what they're receiving. I think the university was somewhat of a pioneer in that area. We've had differentiated tuition for a long time, at least since after World War II. I'm not sure if there was any differentiation in the thirties, never been able to find out really. I suppose it's in the archives somewhere, but I guess I've never really spent enough time trying to find out. Differentiation goes back a long way. The industry has matured in the sense that people more and more are beginning to say that the personal gains of higher education today are greater in relation to the total than they once were. If you think about the value to the early state of Minnesota of educating people to be teachers, and to the professions, and so forth . . . enormous social value that was shared by everybody. But that's far less true today and the data show here and elsewhere . . . There's a chart on the wall which I can't expose to the future historian which shows the differences in lifetime income, annual income, over a lifetime of work that come to people at various levels of education. Well, there is an enormous difference between a bachelor's degree and a high school diploma. Let's see, by eyesight, it's an average annual difference of $22,000 and we're speaking in 1994. That would obviously inflate over a period of years. So, the individual is gaining a great deal from higher education. I should also say that those differentials are increasing over time in recent years. That happens to be 1992. I've got data that goes back for about twenty years on this and the differentials at every level have increased almost consistently over that whole period, and that is part of the maturation of the industry. Another maturation incidentally is that graduate schools have produced so many Ph.D.s that there is no longer a presumption that a person that gets a Ph.D. is going to spend their life teaching in a college. What we thought might be a great shortage of faculty in the late 1990s, as a cohort of faculty retires, is now beginning to look like it will not be a shortage of faculty and may even be a glut.

CAC: In part because universities are downsizing?

DB: That in part because this university and some other universities are downsizing, but largely I think because the production of Ph.D.s nationally is very large compared with what it used to be. There's also a concern that in certain fields that production is strongly non-citizens or resident aliens. In many fields in the future, we may see very few faculty who in fact are citizen Americans, or started that way. Maybe they will become citizens. So there's a maturation there too; but I think the major one is that it's becoming more and more evident that there isn't as much justification for the ideal of a free education to those who can benefit from it. I think that's gone.

CAC: Almost by default. I read that in a very gross way the university's income is divided in thirds—is that a rough estimate?—a third from legislation, a third from tuition, and a third from outside sources.

DB: It's a simplification but it's fairly close. Actually instructionally the legislature—if you ignore private sources—the legislature currently is providing about 58 percent of the instructional costs over all instructural fields and tuition generates about 42 percent. So that's the division there, but that ignores what we get out of private contributions either directly for instruction or indirectly because research or public service activities have a benefit to instruction, if nothing else, in providing employment for graduate students and others.

CAC: It's very difficult to break it out between the different missions of the university, is it not . . . I mean the research and the instructional?

DB: Yes. We do it but it's difficult. There's a lot of difficulty in doing it. So that has raised the issue of who pays for higher education and who doesn't pay, and that has been gradually becoming more central to planning discussions and to legislative activity for the last ten years perhaps. An event there was the proposal by Senator Gene Waldorf in 1989, I believe it was, that the state reverse its presumption that they will pay two-thirds of instruction and tuition will pay a third. That's in statute in Minnesota and it's still in statute . . . Well, it's the other way around. The statute says that the state will pay two-thirds of instructural costs. Now a statute can't force a legislature to appropriate, so that's an ideal. You couldn't sue under that statute, for instance. But what Waldorf proposed in 1989 was that we reverse that, and that we begin to assume that the student will provide 67 percent of the instructural costs, the state will subsidize the institution for 33 percent; and along with that, he wanted to increase student aid for undergraduates by a very large amount, not as much as would be saved but close to it. One of our arguments—I was personally involved in this at the time—was that's fine, you want to increase undergraduate student aid but you're increasing the presumption for graduate students and professional students as well. Although the bill itself didn't pass to reverse the appropriation, the immolating provision that he put in did pass, and the university got a large appropriation to hold down tuition for graduate and professional students which we still have in our base. And they haven't seen fit to do anything about that possibly because they see the undergraduate situation creeping up as a result of actual decision making, rather than a principled change in the law. There's a lot of advocates for raising tuition levels and raising student aid. I would say that

Governor Carlson probably advocates that position, although he has not been terribly vocal about it. I know that his principal educational aid does advocate it and I know that there are people in the State Department of Finance who advocate that. There's less support for it in the legislature. I would say that the key people on the house side are almost violently opposed to that philosophy. They are, for purposes of shorthand . . . their populous, they believe still that low tuition is the best student aid and they have fought very hard to keep tuition as low as they possible can. On the senate side I believe you do have some legislative advocates of high tuition, high aid.

CAC: There would be representatives of these various points of view on the Board of Regents as well?

DB: I'm not aware of anybody on our Board of Regents now or previously who has ever openly said that they advocated high tuition, high aid and many of them, of course, have been very vocal about the other position.

CAC: Right.

DB: We've had this discussion fairly recently on the current board and I heard nobody advocating the high tuition position. Now that doesn't mean necessarily that some of them might not hold that view. In all honesty, I couldn't suggest to you any of the current regents who are likely to hold that view.

CAC: Well, for what it's worth, I think a lot of the faculty are nostalgic for the older tradition.

DB: I'm sure that's right. My personal view is that the analysis would lead me to the conclusion that student aid is a better use of state appropriations than institutional subsidy on several levels, and of course, we're a long way from going to total student aid. If you look at Minnesota's appropriation for instructural purposes, the split between appropriations to the student and to the institution is currently about 89 percent institutional subsidy and 11 percent student aid. So it isn't as if we've gone willy-nilly toward a student aid philosophy, but we're certainly tending in that direction; and to some extent that's the result of the Federal Government reneging on its commitment to student aid. If you look at the last ten years, what's now called the Pell Grant Program has not kept up . . . In fact, it isn't even as good now as it was ten years ago. They keep raising the authorization but they don't appropriate for it.

CAC: Meantime the money with inflation is getting less valuable.

DB: That's right. So the Pell Grant today is not nearly as good as a student aid device as it was ten years ago. And it's forcing a lot of students into borrowing possibly at the wrong time. So there again, that whole view of the relationship of tuition and institutional subsidy again reflects a maturation in the public's view of the industry.

CAC: If I'm reading your words correctly, this university and many other universities have not adjusted fully to the kind of analysis that you're making.

DB: I think that's right.

CAC: This real serious lag . . .

DB: The only place in this country . . . maybe it's not the only place . . . The outstanding example of the opposite is the state of Vermont which has gone almost totally to student support and has very high posted tuition and also a very high student aid program.

CAC: A lot of private colleges have gone the same way.

DB: Yes, right. One of the problems that's been presented by this is as the state withdraws subsidy—which is what has happened in Minnesota and nationally to public universities—states have been gradually withdrawing their subsidy to the university. The university to replace that resource has raised tuition. As the major public universities have raised tuition, the competitive effect has been to allow the private universities to raise their tuition. And they've done so, and in fact they've done it even more than the public universities both in percentage terms and in dollar terms. But the privates have not had to replace public subsidy; so they have used their increased tuition revenues to increase their faculty salaries in major part, and to increase their student aid, and the data will show that starting in 1980 about, and down to the present time, that has caused faculty salaries between the public and private universities to diverge. Where they were almost equal in 1980, there's a difference of $20,000 or more in the most recent year. And a thing that one would worry about there is that we're headed for a two-tier educational system.

CAC: And from the point of view of university faculty, they see that failure to keep pace as a subsidy that they're making to higher education.

DB: Yes, and ironically enough to private higher education in one sense. Now how long public university faculties will continue to do that is another issue. An economist would say that at least over the long run, the good faculty won't be working at public universities anymore. They'll go to the opportunities of the privates. I don't believe that's happened to any great degree yet but that doesn't mean it won't happen, and you also have to consider the equity issue quite aside from just the economic analysis.

CAC: Sure.

DB: Is it good public policy or is it fair public policy to head for this differential situation, particularly if you think about the fact that at least in a state like Minnesota a lot of the ability of those private schools to raise tuition is based on the availability of student aid which comes out of tax money. There's a huge issue there which never arose until the last ten years.

CAC: It takes a long time for a Central Administration to move and to gain the support from constituent groups that they have to move.

DB: Another fear we've had . . . I revealed here on the tape that I myself am kind of inclined toward the high tuition philosophy; but the argument I've made against it, and which I think is an issue currently too and has been to some extent, is once you start going down that slippery slope toward withdrawing institutional subsidy where does it stop? Does the state in fact replace that institutional subsidy with student support? So far Minnesota's been pretty good about that but I would be very dubious that that would continue. But there's another issue imbedded there too which is that the state benefits from the education of every student whether that student is rich or poor. There is a public benefit and the state ought to pay for that public benefit. There's an extraneity that benefits everybody and you can't simply say, "All benefit goes to the individual."

CAC: Historians refer at that point to the GI Bill as a prime example of how it really worked.

DB: That's exactly correct.

CAC: That GI Bill generation is getting pretty old now.

DB: Yes, right. And we haven't had anything quite like it since, although at least the proposals that the Clinton Administration's put forward go a long that same line to some extent.

CAC: Well, very modest.

DB: I don't think he seems to be able to get very much to do it but the GI Bill is probably the outstanding example of a really good program of student aid. It worked marvelously well.

CAC: It won't surprise you because you're so well informed about the university things generally that talking to a great range of persons—a lot of professors who have not been engaged in any major way, and just a few committees, and not any administration at all—they are sensitive to the burden of the psychological, and the time, and the energy, and the financial burden of the growing burden of legal expenses, of the amount of paper work that's required at every level.

DB: Yes.

CAC: And from the point of view of Central Administration, you would have a more global perception of that but it's felt, I hear, at every level. It's one of the discouragements. You spoke earlier of department chairs, the discouragement there . . . that the office is more bureaucratic than ever it was.

DB: That's true. There isn't a great deal more to be said about it but that it really is true. It's changed enormously.

CAC: And there seems to be no way out of that box.

DB: The only way out of it that I can see is for some of the mandates that have been laid on us to be either repealed or funded. A large part of the problem in my opinion is not that the mandates are there so much as the fact that the mandates are given to us but nothing comes with them.

CAC: That's what states complain of the Federal Government.

DB: Right. And I wouldn't complain as much about the state of Minnesota in that respect—although there are some instances—but the Federal Government is a terrible sinner here. We're doing all kinds of things that we never used to do, that we've never received any funding to do, and therefore obviously if we've doing them, we've done them by cannibalizing our direct activities. It's the only explanation. It's not that those things are maybe not good things to be doing. Do we need an Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Office which we didn't have prior to federal legislation? Yes, we probably need it. Do we need all the lawyers we've got? Well, yes, we need them. It's too bad that we need them but we do. Things have gotten much, much more litigious than they once were. Do we need the elaborate system of grievances? I guess we need it. We've got to afford due process and the courts are much more sensitive today than they used to be to whether due process has been afforded.

CAC: Just plain working faculty plug into this on the judicial committee. One term on the judicial committee and it's apparent right away what that burden is.

DB: Yes, it really is. It goes beyond that too to the other grievance systems.

CAC: The grievance systems in Civil Service.

DB: Yes. Civil Service, and P and A [Professional and Administrative], and others. I've served on a couple of third level grievance committees or hearings myself, and they can be terribly time consuming, and sometimes even emotionally draining. The real issue of this proliferation is Are we doing things we don't have to do? I think we do to some extent do things we don't have to do. Sometimes maybe . . . there's two levels of that. We may have to do them because if we don't do them we'll get in trouble, but are they useful? My personal opinion is we do a lot of things that are probably not very useful but we do them because it is expected that we do them. Is it useful for me technically to have to say to a new employee in my office, "Watch out for the cords that may be on the floor. You may trip and fall."? By law, I'm supposed to do that. Society is full of this you know. You buy a product on the market, and by the time you read through the legal warnings on the box, and get the instructions on how to plug it in, you've spent half your time. We're subject to all sorts of things like that too. Was it useful for the state to say that we have to require that all incoming students show immunization? I suppose it's marginally useful. It's quite costly and we didn't get funded at all for doing that. The state requires a lot of reporting and they've become sensitive to that. There is a place where the wheel

has begun to turn. I've seen the legislative request go from a point when the people in the Business Office used to turn out a dittoed document of about twenty pages maybe and they would do it with maybe two weeks work to where we now are in legislative request activity of some kind all the time, continually. Every month almost there's something that's going forward, that builds toward either the Capitol or current legislative request; and along the line the legislature has said since about the early eighties; maybe even before that, the legislature has continued to say, "And oh, by the way, as long as you're going to be making a legislative request, why don't you tell us how many credit hours you taught off campus, and in what locations, and who you taught them to," or "How much of your instruction is going to senior citizens?" or . . . an endless number of reports . . . "Justify to us the fact that you spent as much on libraries and instructional equipment as you did in the previous biennium and tell us what you spent it on. Give us a list of instructional equipment you bought." I'm struggling for examples and maybe that's enough. There are a great many like that, and these reports get written into either the appropriation bill or into the law; and we continue to make these reports and the question is, Is anybody looking at them? Well, recently some of the legislators have begun to say, "We're part of the problem here. Tell us what you're doing that's costing you a lot of time, and activity, and diverting you from other things that we could repeal?" They don't read these things anyway in many cases.

CAC: Can't.

DB: In recent years, we've produced both an institutional plan, a great long institutional plan every year, and also the systems have been asked to produce an inter-institutional higher education plan. Now for my sins, I got appointed to be the university representative on the writing committee that did that a year ago, and it took <u>weeks</u> of time to write that plan. It was submitted and during the last legislature, we did a little inquiry as to who had read that and nobody had read it. No legislator that we could find had read the plan or wanted to. Very few, if any, staff members had read it. Well, they did in fact repeal that requirement in the last legislature.

CAC: It doesn't help significantly in the internal management of the university either, I'm guessing.

DB: No, not that one didn't certainly. The university's plan, if it's done right, can be useful and they retained that. Each system does have to submit an annual plan, and as matter of fact, we have a deadline of December 15th to get that written.

CAC: Historians who are bold enough to attempt institutional history have to be aware of the larger context in which all of these things are going ahead and we complain rightly, we observe the increasing complexity in size and difficulties, legal difficulties of administering. This is true of all . . .

[End of Tape 3, Side 1]

[Tape 3, Side 2]

CAC: . . . with other interviews that I have done, a lot of information is given, a lot of observations and examples which are extraordinarily useful for future historians or just persons interested in this very complex institution. I wonder at this point that we're nearing end of my outline and yours, if there are any kind of overall reflections? I came in 1951. You came a bit later but it's been a long time, our years here . . . thirty, forty years.

DB: I have a reflection which may or may not be of any interest to what you're doing; but as I approach the end of my work at the university, it has been I think the most worthwhile thing I could ever have done. I'm highly pleased with it.

CAC: The personal rewards have been great?

DB: Yes, right. I certainly am much happier than I would have been if I had followed my original intentions, unless I had become a writer of the great American novel as I originally thought as a freshman here. But I certainly have been happy here and it's been a varied and stimulating kind of existence. As a non-academic, I wish that I had known more faculty sooner than I did. It would have been enriching to me and it might have been enriching to them. It's hard to say. But I have known a lot faculty, and I've liked a lot of faculty, and I can say that there have been very few people either in the faculty or in the administration that I have genuinely disliked. There have been a couple. [laughter] I can't say that there haven't but in general, it's been a very good experience in that sense, and what I fear for the future . . . We hear a lot of talk now . . . Let me back up a bit. The way that education is done, instruction is done at this univeirsity and I think at almost all American universities, has not changed a great deal in my time. What goes on around here now with the undergraduates—except for the presence of certain technological things that we didn't have—the method of delivery isn't very different than it was when I went to my first class in 1948. At the graduate level, I occasionally teach a session of one or more graduate seminars around here and what I see going on is no different than what I had when I was in graduate school . . . occurs in the same way, assignments are much the same, people are assembled in the same place, a group of graduate students goes out somewhere and has a beer and talks it over afterwards . . . same thing we did when I was in the Public Affairs Program. What's going to happen in the future? Well, now everybody is now saying, "We're going to deliver all kinds of education by distance education." And with the advent of really high-tech computer and CD [compact disk] technologies, what's going to happen is that the University of Minnesota will, in order to teach international relations, will purchase the copyrighted lectures of some eminent Harvard professor, Henry Kissinger, or somebody. Everybody all over the country will in fact be lectured to by Henry Kissinger. Then there will perhaps be discussion groups or there may not be. Those discussion groups might occur on interactive computer. There's some of that going on right now both of the licensing of teaching and also of teaching by computer or mail-transfer. You can take independent courses from the University of Minnesota now without ever setting foot on the campus and without ever using the U.S. mail if you and the instructor are both set up on the Internet. Finally things are actually

happening. We are teaching courses where the student is 500 miles away and many people feel from an economic standpoint, and otherwise, we've got to go that way.

CAC: It certainly fragments community though, doesn't it?

DB: And that's the point I was about to make. Maybe it's just the old man syndrome, or something, but I cannot imagine either undergraduate or graduate education going on in the complete absence of a residential experience of some kind by which I mean at least presence on the campus and personal interaction with other students and with the faculty. And I have a strong fear that we're headed down that road.

CAC: I have colleagues who are far more technologically sophisticated than I am who now do most of their research at home. They used to come to campus to use the library, and in the library they would see colleagues, and they'd have lunch, and they'd see students, and they'd be in their office. Now an increasing number of my colleagues do this all by high powered computer at home. They meet their responsibilities. They come to campus for their courses and for office hours but it's not the same kind of commitment to a place. I get a sense that it's very isolating.

DB: Of course, we may be engaging in a sociological fallacy here too. The other observation I'd make is that there are two kinds of people, at least two kinds . . . in this respect there's two kinds of people: there are those who can stand to do that, the computer nerd who doesn't care whether he or she ever sees another human being personally, and what I think is the majority of people who do in fact want some kind of a social interaction on a personal level.

CAC: I'm surprised, just the last four or five years the number or people in your second category who are in fact following—not completely—but a strategy of the first.

DB: Maybe what we have to do is . . . ought to set the Sociology or the Psychology or Education Departments to work trying to figure out if in fact you depreciate the quality of the result if you do things that way. My insight is that you probably do, or inference . . .

CAC: [unclear] hour or two point of conversation that so many faculty whom I have interviewed put it in those terms that there has been a fragmentation and a failure of community. They entered in the fifties or sixties and it was a sense of a shared enterprise, and it still is of course to a substantial degree. There's a very substantial sense of loss along that line.

DB: If you think over the very long period of the evolution of universities, you know back to the thirteenth century when universities began . . . when you had a univerisity in which you had a professor of law, natural law perhaps, and one of philosophy and one of medicine, and they weren't all that different from each other, they overlapped a lot, and one would teach another's subject, and gradually disciplinary areas have fragmented and people have become more and more specialized . . . and in Europe at least research has become separated from instruction in

many areas and public service never was there probably, although I don't know that much about that in European universities . . . and now in addition you get the physical separation, not only the separation in terms of disciplinary speciality but the physical separation . . . and you wonder if the univerisity isn't in the process of destroying itself if it doesn't institute some kind of a norm that would force something else.

CAC: Then it will be reinvented.

DB: Well, it will, I'm sure.

CAC: I share your skepticism about what we're saying now that this may be the nostalgia of two elderly—mature at least—gentleman who have had the earlier experience and seen it change a great deal. Well, I'm sure that we could continue for a long time but I'm prepared to say thank you very much!

DB: And I'm prepared to say thank you. I enjoyed it.

CAC: Very informative.

[End of Tape 3, Side 2]

[End of Interview]

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