

The Dialogue of the Deaf: A Discourse Analysis on the Construction
of the Catalan and Spanish Identities in News Media

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my mother and my father. Thanks for giving me everything you had and more, your unconditional support, your attention and your love. And to my brother, for his support and advice and for paving the way for me in so many aspects of life.

Abstract

This study analyzes the role of the media in the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, a prototypical case study for secessionism among developed countries. Despite the secessionist claims by part of the Catalan people, attempts to find a solution that satisfies both have failed, and the situation has gotten significantly worse in 2017-18. Moreover, most of the communication between the respective governments is mediated, so their images of the other are the ones portrayed in media. Hence, framing and discourse theory inform a content analysis to answer the following research questions: (1) How do national media construct Catalan identity in Spain? (2) How do national media construct Spanish identity in Spain? (3) How do Catalan regional media construct Spanish identity in Catalonia? (4) How do Catalan regional media construct Catalan identity in Catalonia? (5) How is the secessionist movement framed in both nation-wide and Catalan media? The analysis focuses on news at three milestones in Spain's history: The autonomic pacts in 1981, which informed the current distribution of central and regional powers; the secessionist demonstration in 2012, which resulted in the Catalan government's taking a pro-independence stance; and the ISIS terrorist attacks in Catalonia in 2017, which elevated the political tension between administrations.

Key words: secessionism, national identity, identity politics

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Chapter One: Secessionism in Spain

Introduction

In recent decades, national economies have experienced dynamics of globalization in order to keep being competitive. Several countries are bounded nowadays by shared production processes, trade agreements and even debt. Like virtually all other industries, the media industry has also reached a global status, after a necessary process of growing democratization of media technology. Media globalization has resulted in the creation of a multinational audience that consumes content from beyond the borders of its nation-state and demands first-hand information from around the world (Norris & Inglehart, 2009, p. 9).

For many years, it seemed that the evident economic and media globalization dynamics, paired with the establishment of supranational entities such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, were leading to an equivalent movement of globalization in the political sphere (Norris & Inglehart, 2009). However, there has been an emergence of nationalistic right-wing parties in Europe (and the United States) in recent decades that support strengthening border control and promote nation-first ideologies (Hollifield, Martin & Orrenius, 2014). Public support for these parties has experienced a rise after the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe in 2015 (mainly resulting from the violent conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, among other countries) and the wave of ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in Europe that started the same year. As a result, the idealized borderless Schengen area in the European Union, which once promised the free movement of people inside the countries signatories

to the agreement, is now challenged by a climate of insecurity (Cierco & da Silva, 2016; Fijnaut, 2015) or, as Almond (2016) has called it, border anxiety.

This project is informed by the assumption that the constitution of the European Union did not handle well the identities of (and inside) the member states, which did not accept a European identity that was too weak in comparison with their own. Hence, as result of this, we might see a further dispute of the current borders within the European Union, including the challenge of the Schengen area, the recently initiated process for the British exit from the European Union and an increase in the historical demands of secession by regions like Scotland, Flanders, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Corsica, among others. This study analyzed the case of Catalonia and Spain by examining how both national and Catalan news media have constructed the Catalan and the Spanish identity, and their images of one another, during three pivotal historical moments, with the goal of understanding how each society experiences the relationship with the other.

The Catalan case. Catalonia has been commonly used as a case study for secessionism in Europe (Barceló, 2017; Patrick, 2016; Pavković, 2016). According to Barceló (2017), Catalonia's historical economic advantage versus the rest of Spain, its linguistic singularity and the strong competition between statewide parties and Catalan parties in both national and regional elections make it a prototypical case study for secessionism among developed countries (Barceló, 2017, p. 103). Arguably, even though an official (i.e., legal under Spanish law) referendum for Catalan independence has never been held, the secessionist movement did not disappear after Spain's inclusion in the European Union in 1986, and the great recession that occurred in Spain in 2008

emphasized the secessionist claims. As an example, up to 1.5 million people—in a region of 7,496,276 inhabitants (IDESCAT, 2017)—demonstrated for independence during the day of Catalonia in 2012, according to *Time* magazine (Abend, 2012), an event that is analyzed in the present study.

Two years later, the Catalan government held a popular poll on November 9th to ask the Catalan population if they wanted a change in the status of Catalonia and its relationship with Spain, and if they wanted this change to be Catalonia's independence. Participation in this consultation was of 2,344,828 people (Generalitat de Catalunya, Sala de premsa, 2014). The constitutional court asked the *Generalitat de Catalunya* (the Catalan regional government) to interrupt any administrative action five days prior to the consultation. However, the Catalan government kept organizing and executing the popular consultation (Riart & Pruna, 2017). As a consequence, the president of the *Generalitat* at the time, Artur Mas, his vice-president and his *consellers* (advisers) of education and internal affairs, were investigated by national authorities and charged in 2017 with fines that totaled 5.2 million euros (García, 2017).

Therefore, this popular consultation was the precedent of the 2015 election in Catalonia, which was framed as a plebiscite by the independentist groups (Tugas, 2015). This election resulted in the creation of *Junts pel Sí*, an ad-hoc coalition meant to bring together the traditional secessionist votes. Even though only 47.7% of the votes were for parties clearly defined as pro-independence, this election resulted in the majority of seats in the Catalan Parliament being taken by supporters of the secessionist movement. On October 1st, 2017, the Catalan government held a new referendum for Catalonia's

independence. The days leading to the referendum were marked by tension. The Spanish police force *Guardia Civil* conducted a search in the department of economy and internal revenue of the Catalan regional government. Pro-independence citizens and organizations responded with protests around the department's building while the search took place, on September 20th (“Protesta ante la conselleria”, 2017). As a consequence of these events, the leaders of the independentist organizations *Òmnium Cultural* and *Assemblea Nacional Catalana* were sentenced to pre-trial detention in a lawsuit for sedition on October 20th, 2017 (Booth, 2017).

The referendum on October 1st was illegal under the Spanish constitution, which explicitly protects the unity of Spain. The police response by the Spanish government ended with 893 people hurt during the day of the vote (Cadanet, 2017), and a great number of videos and photos of the police charges shared on mainstream and social media. The results of the illegal referendum were 90.18% of votes for independence and 7.83% of votes against it, of a total of 2,286,217 counted votes, a voter turnout of 43.3% (Generalitat de Catalunya, Sala de premsa, 2014). The days after the referendum saw hard bargaining between the Catalan government threatening a unilateral declaration of independence and the Spanish government threatening the application of article number 155 of the Spanish Constitution, with both finally happening on October 27th, 2017 (Martín, 2017). Article number 155 of the Spanish Constitution states that the Spanish government can take any action necessary to make any autonomous community obey the constitutional law, if the regional government of this community has disobeyed it or has attacked the general interest (Pi, 2017). Some days after, eight members of the Catalan

government elected in 2015 were also sentenced to pre-trial detention on a charge of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement (Gallardo, 2017). As an exception, another member of the Catalan executive was sentenced to prison with a bail of 50,000 euros because he resigned before the unilateral declaration of independence (Roger, Manresa, Ferrer & Serra, 2017). Meanwhile, Carles Puigdemont, the Catalan president prior to the application of the 155 article, and four more members of his executive fled to Belgium. The Spanish secretary of justice sent an extradition order to the Belgian security forces but a Belgian judge sentenced Puigdemont and the four former *consellers* to be kept free until the trial with conditions such as being available and not leaving Belgium without permission (Forès, 2017).

In the context of the application of the 155 article, the Spanish government called for an election to the Catalan Parliament on December 21st, 2017. As a result, *Ciudadanos*, which is not an independentist party, was the winner of the election, with 36 seats. However, the pro-independence parties still managed to add up to the absolute majority (68 seats) of the Catalan Parliament, holding 70 seats (see Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017 for detailed distribution). The division and the imprisonment or exile of the members of the former government made it very hard to form a government in the Catalan Parliament. By May 2018, this was still unresolved. Meanwhile, other former members of the Catalan Parliament were charged with sedition and rebellion charges: Anna Gabriel, former deputy for the far-left independentist party *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*, fled to Switzerland, where the spokesperson for the Swiss justice department declared that an extradition was unlikely (Rincón & Pérez, 2018); and Marta Rovira,

general secretary of *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, also fled to Switzerland after being summoned by the Spanish Constitutional Court, charged with rebellion. After Rovira left, four more members of the Catalan Parliament and the former president of the Parliament, Carme Forcadell, were put in jail awaiting trial, with charges of rebellion, embezzlement or disobeying the state. One of Puigdemont's former advisers, Clara Ponsatí, left Belgium to take on her former job as a Professor in a Scottish university. She was released on bail by a Scottish judge (Cramb & Strange, 2018). Former Catalan president Carles Puigdemont gave talks in Denmark and Finland and was detained in Germany, on his way back to Belgium, by order of the Spanish judge in charge of the case. However, the competent German provincial tribunal dropped the charge for rebellion and released Puigdemont on bail. As the time of writing, he remained accused of embezzlement and the German justice was studying if he would be extradited to Spain, where he could only be tried for that (Müller & Carbajosa, 2018). A Belgium court released without bail the three former Catalan advisers left in that country, Toni Comín, Meritxell Serret and Lluís Puig (EFE, 2018). These events have inevitably escalated the Catalan-Spanish conflict to a European level. Additionally, the United Nations Human Rights Council published a press release asking Spain to drop the charges of rebellion against Catalan pro-independence leaders (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018). It is amid these fast-happening, major developments that this thesis is being written.

A relationship historically marked by tension. Some scholars date the start of the problematic relationship between Catalonia and Spain to September 11 (Catalonia's day) of 1714 (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017; Sant, 2017). That was

the day Barcelona fell after being under siege by the troops of Philip the Fifth. Once in power, the French monarch implemented several policies aimed at unifying the Spanish territory. Some of them included the abolition of all Catalan political institutions, the reform of the tax program and the imposition of the Spanish language as the only one allowed for administrative uses (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 81; Guibernau, 2014, p. 10). Despite its persecution, in the mid nineteenth-century Catalan culture experienced a *Renaixença* (Renaissance) consistent with the Romanticism movement across Europe. The literary movement was led by the Catalan bourgeoisie (Etherington, 2010, p. 1828), a new elite born from the Industrial Revolution, which in Spain mainly took place in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Guibernau, 2014, p. 10). The *Renaixença* meant the recovery of the Catalan language and literature and a boost for Catalan nationalism (Guibernau, 2014, p. 10).

Two centuries after the victory of Philip the Fifth, the Spanish central government yielded administrative competences to Catalonia, with the creation of the *Mancomunitat*, the precedent of the current regional government, the *Generalitat*. The regional government had competency in matters of education and healthcare among others, but it did not have the power to legislate (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 81). In 1919, the *Mancomunitat* started the process to create a regional Statute of Autonomy, after holding a referendum that resulted in the support of 98% of the Catalan electorate (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 81). This process was interrupted by the coup d'état by Primo de Rivera in 1923, which was supported by part

of the Catalan bourgeoisie in response to their fear of communism after the Russian Revolution (Smith, 2007, p. 9).

The dictatorship by Primo de Rivera was characterized by its goal of unifying Spain. As expected, this led to a strong oppression of the Catalan people and their culture. Every manifestation of Catalan identity was suppressed: The *Mancomunitat* was disbanded in 1924 and the Catalan language was only allowed in private environments (Alland & Alland, 2006, p.47; Cornellà-Detrell, 2011, p.5); journalists were censored; the Catalan flag was forbidden; and even the *sardana*, Catalonia's traditional dance, was banned (Ascunce, 2012, p. 73). The end of the dictatorship and the beginning of the Republic in 1931 brought a radical social advancement in human rights and political progress for Spain. Between 1931 and 1939 (end of the Civil War), women were awarded full legal status, adultery was decriminalized and the first national draft of the Law on Abortion, aimed at legalizing it, was introduced (Falcón, 1984, p.627; Newman, 2008, p.137; Pérez-Agote, Santiago, & Montañés, 2015, p. 160). In addition, the relationship between the central government and Catalonia experienced a massive improvement. Catalonia saw its Statute of Autonomy finally approved in 1931 with the support of 99% of the voters (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 81) and the Catalan language was restored to its official status (Newman, 2008, p.137). Furthermore, the repression during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship paradoxically strengthened Catalan culture (Cornellà-Detrell, 2011, p.5). As Newman (2008) puts it, in 1935 Catalan culture was re-flourishing in architecture, art, music, and literature, allowing the emergence of

exceptional artists like Gaudí, Miró, Dalí, Casals, Granados and Mompou, among others (p.137).

Unfortunately, only one year later, Spain's promising democracy was truncated by Franco's coup d'état in 1936 (Newman, 2008, p.137), which led to the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The Civil War was followed by the Francoist dictatorship, supported at least at the beginning by the Catalan economic and religious elites, whose experience of the war, according to Dowling (2001), "had been marked by terror and assassination from the Republican side" (p. 19). Despite the support from the elites, the repression of Catalonia (and the rest of Spain) by the Francoist dictatorship was much stronger than the one experienced in the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (Pagès i Blanch, 2013, p. 169). Again, every Catalan political institution was suppressed, the Catalan language was banned and the use of symbolic elements of Catalan identity forbidden (Guibernau, 2014, p. 10). In addition, political leaders in disagreement with the dictatorship were forced to go into exile to escape their imprisonment or execution (Guixé i Coromines, 2012). This was the case of Lluís Companys, the president of the *Generalitat* at the start of the Francoist dictatorship, who was arrested in his exile in France in 1940, interrogated and tortured in Madrid, and executed in Barcelona the same year (Guibernau, 2014, p. 10). Sadly, the same tragic ending was common not only for political figures but also for intellectuals, artists and virtually any person who was suspected of opposing the Francoist regime, across Spain. Under the motto "*España: una, grande y libre*" (Spain: one, great and free) Franco was determined to crush every sign of regional identities inside Spain. To quote Guibernau (2014): "The authoritarian state designed by Franco did

not accept dissent and used brute power in relation to the historical nations included within its territory. The regime's aim was to annihilate them as nations" (p.10).

The history of Catalonia has obvious parallels with other regions of Spain with their own identity and traditional secessionist claims, like the Basque Country. Before the Spanish succession war (1701-1714), each peninsular crown was regulated by general *fueros*, laws aimed at regulating rights and duties, as assigned by the King. However, after the war, Philip the V disbanded the *fueros* for Aragon and Valencia (1707), Mallorca, (1715) and Catalonia (1716), as explained above (de la Granja, de Pablo, & Rubio Pobes, 2011, p. 13). The provinces of *Álava* and *Guipúzcoa*, the lordship of *Vizcaya* and the Kingdom of Navarra (the current Basque Country and Navarra) were the only Spanish regions to keep their own *fueros*, thanks to their support of the Bourbon king in the war (de la Granja, de Pablo, & Rubio Pobes, 2011, p. 13). In 1878, the *foral* regime in the Basque Country was replaced by the *concierto económico*, which gave the territory broad tax and administrative competences, which allowed for the industrialization of the Basque coast (de la Granja, de Pablo, & Rubio Pobes, 2011, p. 11). In 1936, during the second Spanish republic, the Basque Country saw approved their first statute of autonomy, which would not last very long after the Spanish Civil war. Franco disbanded the *foral* institutions and *conciertos económicos* for the provinces of *Guipúzcoa* and *Vizcaya* in 1937 (de la Granja, de Pablo, & Rubio Pobes, 2011, p. 11). As in the rest of Spain, dissidents had to go into exile and the dictatorship exercised a tremendous repression of any sign of Basque identity.

The Francoist dictatorship lasted for 36 years. Some days after Franco's death in 1975, King Juan Carlos the First took over the country. He appointed Adolfo Suárez as the first Prime Minister of Spain in 1976. The monarch assigned Suarez the mission of leading the country's transition to democracy (for an extensive account of the process that resulted in the appointment of Adolfo Suarez, see Diego González, 2013). Two years later (1978), the Spanish Constitution was approved after a consensus was reached by the political parties that emerged from the first democratic election after the dictatorship (Guibernau, 2014, p.12). The 1978 Constitution is still in force.

During the Spanish transition to democracy, the Basque Country re-established its autonomy with the approval of its 1979 statute of autonomy, which recovered the privileges of the *fueros* and *conciertos económicos* for all its provinces (de la Granja, de Pablo, & Rubio Pobes, 2011, p. 11). These tax and administrative competences continue to be privileges, since they are currently held only by the Spanish autonomous communities of the Basque Country and Navarra. The contemporary history of the Basque Country, and arguably of all of Spain, has been profoundly marked by the emergence of the terrorist group ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), based on the premise that a violent fight is the only effective way to independence for the Basque Country. ETA killed Spain's prime minister in 1973, Admiral Carrero Blanco, who was ready to replace Franco after his death (Heiberg, 2007, p.26). After 43 years of terrorism, ETA announced a definitive stop of their violent actions in October 2011, leaving behind 829 fatal victims (Aizpeolea, 2011), mostly local officials, politicians, journalists, academics, policemen, and judges, perceived by ETA as enemies of the Basque country (Heiberg,

2007, p.19), but also civilians targeted at random. It is noteworthy that ETA's most lethal attack was the bombing of a supermarket in Barcelona in 1987. This, among other attacks in the city, indicates that Catalonia was not especially perceived as an ally by the terrorist group.

Olivieri (2015) builds on Conversi's (1997) distinction between Basque and Catalan nationalism. According to Olivieri, Conversi (1997) sees Basque nationalism as "exclusionary of immigrants and violently seeking independence out of fear of cultural annihilation" (Olivieri, 2015, p. 1611), and Catalan nationalism as more inclusive, prioritizing language over race to allow the integration of immigrants. Olivieri (2015) does not specify if these are immigrants from inside or outside Spain. It is worth mentioning here, though, that during the sixties, Catalonia experienced the arrival of numerous immigrants almost exclusively from other parts of Spain, especially Andalusia: Between 1930 and 1970, the Andalusian population in Catalonia increased from 70,000 to more than 840,000 people (Rondón, 2013). However, Olivieri (2015) notes that the Basque Country has become much more inclusionary in recent decades, while Catalonia has experienced the opposite due to an increase in the intensity of independentist claims (p.1611).

As to Catalonia, its autonomous government was restored in 1977, the still-active *Generalitat de Catalunya* (Guibernau, 2014, p.13). In addition, a new Catalan Statute of Autonomy defining the competencies of the autonomous government was approved with 88% of the votes in favor a few years later, in 1979 (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 82). In 2005, the then-president of the *Generalitat de Catalunya* drove

the first reform since 1979. The text was voted on and approved by the Catalan people and Parliament in 2006 (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 82; Xicoy, Perales-García, & Xambó, 2017, p.1041). That same year, a less ambitious version of that text was approved by the Spanish Parliament (led by the socialist prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero), and the Catalan statute was made effective (Xicoy, Perales-García, & Xambó, 2017, p.1041). Following these events, the *Partido Popular* (led by Mariano Rajoy, who at the time of this writing is the prime minister of Spain), appealed the Catalan statute and took the case to the constitutional court (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 82; Xicoy, Perales-García, & Xambó, 2017, p.1041). In 2010, the constitutional court declared some articles of the statute unconstitutional: The articles that defined Catalonia as a nation, the ones that suggested a new model for regional finances, and the ones aiming at the implementation of a bilateral and direct relationship between the Spanish central government and the *Generalitat* (Harguindéguy, Rodríguez-López & Sánchez, 2017, p. 82). Hence, the term nation was replaced by the term nationality in the *Estatut* that was approved in 2006.

As stated by the statute of 2006, the *Generalitat* has different types of powers (“Estructura institucional i competències”, 2014). There are exclusive powers, meaning that the autonomous government can legislate, regulate and execute on matters such as agriculture, cattle industry, internal watershed, associations and foundations, organization of saving banks, consumption, cooperatives, trade, mutuality for social care (*mutualitats de previsió social*), culture, Catalan civil rights, sports and leisure, housing, transportation, youth, language, territory and urban ordinance, territorial organization,

tourism, etc. At the same time, there are some shared powers with the Spanish central government, either by completely sharing authority or by the distribution of the actions that have to be executed. This is the case of education, healthcare, system of expropriation and contracts, credit ordinance, banking and insurances, stock markets, mining and energy systems, environmental protection, fishing, industry, planning the economic activity in Catalonia, defense of consumers, etc. Lastly, there are the so-called executive powers, in which the autonomous government executes the state legislation. These involve matters of hydraulic public property, penitentiary regulation, employment, intellectual and industrial property, measurement units, etc.

Regarding police power, the Law 2/1986, of March 13th includes in the 38th article that the autonomous police departments (the *Mossos d'Esquadra* in Catalonia) have the functions of looking out for the enforcement of orders and rulings dictated by the autonomous community; watching and protecting people, authorities, buildings, establishments and offices of the autonomous community, to guarantee the normal functioning of the facilities and the safety of the users of its services; inspecting the activities subject to the autonomous community's ordinances and reporting any illicit activities; and can use coercion to forcefully execute regulations by the autonomous community. This same article also specifies the functions that the autonomous police shares with the state police: Watch over the enforcement of the state laws and other rulings and guarantee the functioning of the essential public services; participate in the functions of the judicial police; watch over the public spaces, protect the demonstrations and keep the order in big human concentrations (the practice of this function corresponds

primarily to the autonomous police, without this being detrimental to the intervention of the state police, when this is deemed necessary by the autonomous authorities or by the state authorities themselves). Finally, the functions practiced in a simultaneous and undifferentiated way by the autonomous and the states police departments are:

Cooperation for the friendly resolution of private conflicts when they are needed to do so; the provision of assistance in accidents, catastrophes, public disasters, participating in the ways provided by the law, in the execution of the civil protection plans; and to watch over the enforcement of the rulings concerning nature and environment conservation. All of this becomes relevant and controversial in the case of pro-independence demonstrations and cases of terrorism, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

Catalan nationalism versus Catalan cosmopolitanism. For this research, three historical milestones were analyzed in the Catalan-Spanish relationship from the start of democracy, through the most massive demonstration for independence in Barcelona, to the present. These milestones were chosen for analysis because of two reasons, beyond historical relevance. First, being able to compare Spanish and Catalan identities before and after Spain's inclusion in the European Union gave me information about any influence that this event might have had on them. Second, the entry of Spain in the European Union in 1986 allowed for a new level of legal appeal for Spaniards. For Catalonia, it meant a new go-to supranational level that opened new possibilities, a higher economic and political security in case of independence and a quest for support in other countries, all without having to stop by the Spanish central government first. As an example, in January 2017 the president, vice president and the *conseller* for foreign

policy, institutional relations and transparency of the Catalan regional government gave a conference in the European Parliament, in Brussels. They explained to the participating European ambassadors that Catalonia was going to hold a referendum for its independence during that same year (“Discurs del president”, 2017).

In addition, the incorporation of Spain in the European Union has influenced the secessionist process. After the economic crisis of 2008, the Spanish government, in compliance with the European Union, implemented nationwide austerity measures. The measures involved cuts in the welfare state, which harmed a population that was already suffering the consequences of one of the worst recessions of all times. In Catalonia, this situation resulted in the emergence of a new discourse identifying independence from Spain with emancipation from the European Union and its austerity policies. In fact, in the 2015 Catalan election more than 8% of the votes went to *Candidatura d’Unió Popular* (CUP). This took place after several members of this party engaged in claims against the European Union, picturing a hypothetical exit not only as an alternative to austerity, but also as a way to avoid paying for Spain’s debt to the Union (“La CUP apuesta por salir de la UE...”, 2015). This discourse, however, clearly contradicts the campaign Help Catalonia (helpcatalonia.eu) by the independentist organization *Òmnium Cultural*, which asks for European mediation in the tense Catalan and Spanish relationship after the illegal referendum held on October 1st, 2017 and the consequent police charges.

Furthermore, there is a lot of confusion surrounding the future of Catalonia in the European Union, if secession were to happen. Among several other European leaders, the

Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, has repeatedly tried to discourage the secessionist movements in Europe (“Angela Merkel cierra la puerta a secesiones en Europa”, 2017). Specifically, she has asserted that in the case of a unilateral declaration of independence, Catalonia would not be part of the European Union anymore (“Merkel advierte a Mas que la UE no permitirá una Cataluña independiente”, 2015). However, since Catalans who were born before independence were born in Spain, they would still be rightful Spanish citizens and, therefore, also citizens of the European Union.

Finally, Catalan nationalism has some peculiarities that should be discussed here. While nationalism has been closely related to xenophobic and authoritarian attitudes, Guibernau (2013) claims that this political concept can also be used to describe “social movements led by peoples prepared to defend their right to exist and peacefully cultivate their own particular culture and language” (p. 15). Guibernau (2013) also identifies equality and universal freedom as main cosmopolitan values (p. 22). In her study, Guibernau (2013) distinguishes between the authoritarian-xenophobic kind of nationalism, which she calls “non-democratic nationalism” (p. 22), and the peaceful democratic movement aimed at cultivating people’s cultural heritage, which she calls “democratic nationalism” (p.22). She claims that Catalan nationalism, especially through the Assembly of Catalonia (an organization created in 1971 that represented the Catalan movement) defended freedom, democracy, dialogue and social justice (Guibernau, 2013, p. 26). As Guibernau (2013) put it:

It is my contention that, in some cases, the values intrinsic to democratic nationalism—social justice, individual freedom and deliberative democracy—and those of cosmopolitanism—the belief that all individuals are equal and free

and deserve equal treatment regardless of their origin—allow and favor the compatibility between the two (p. 26-27).

For this reason, Guibernau (2013) concludes that Catalonia's was a democratic nationalism that, by opposing Franco's dictatorship, shared national and cosmopolitan values.

Nevertheless, there is vast literature from the field of political science linking modern nationalist movements to populist rhetoric. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) place left-wing populism close to socialism and right-wing populism close to nationalism (p.21). However, Judis (2016) argues that, even when populist movements and parties do not like to use the term "nationalism," all of them are closer to nationalism than to globalism (p.156). Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) widen Mudde's (2007) now popular definition of populism by defining it as an ideology that divides society into two antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupted elite" and which defends that politics should reflect the general will of the people" (p.6). At first glance, it sounds like this could fit the Catalan case, if we consider that the Catalan nationalist movement opposes "the Catalan people" to the "Spanish elites," and especially if we take into account the central role of the demand of a referendum to hear "the will of the Catalan people." In fact, in their analysis, Xicoy, Perales-García and Xambó (2017) found that most nationalist newspapers, both Catalan and Spanish, structured their discourse under the polarized argument "we are the good guys, they are the bad" (p.1053).

Furthermore, Conversi and Jeram (2017) build on Sant's (2017) idea of a distinct Catalan character by providing an examination of Catalan nationalism as an uncommon type. In essence, this exceptionality resides in the fact that Catalan nationalism promotes

multiculturalism, not xenophobia (Conversi & Jeram, 2017, p. 63). Nationalism inherently distinguishes ingroup and outgroup members of the nation. When political rhetoric approaches this dichotomy in a way that confronts both sides, history has shown in repeated occasions that a rise of xenophobia can take place (Anderson-Nathe & Gharabaghi, 2017, p. 3). However, in their research, Conversi and Jeram (2017) argue that Catalonia's is an "intercultural nationalism" (p. 62). Similar to the nationalism in Quebec, Catalan nationalism has been constructed by implementing regional immigration policies that are not consistent with the ones proposed by the central government. Thus, the regional government's integration policies involve enhancing immigrants' sense of belonging in Catalonia before Spain. Importantly, this does not mean that xenophobic ideas are completely inexistent in Catalan nationalism, but it appears that they tend to be pointed at their fellow Spaniards more than at immigrant newcomers.

In addition, as was noted above, Catalonia itself is home to generations of immigrants from other parts of Spain (especially Andalusia and Extremadura). In fact, in a poll conducted by the *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* (2016), 39.7% of the Catalan population identify as both Catalan and Spaniard, 24.9% feel only Catalan, 23.2% feel more Catalan than Spaniard, 5.4% feel only Spaniard and 3.6% feel more Spaniard than Catalan.

Furthermore, De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) distinguish between nationalism and patriotism in their suitability as predictors of xenophobic attitudes. For them, patriotism refers to one's love and pride in one's national identification (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003, p. 178). This is a definition close to Anderson's (2006) nationalism, as an

elicitor of self-sacrificing love for one's nation. However, for De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003), nationalism involves a feeling of national superiority when compared to other nations (p. 178). Patriotism and nationalism are similar in matters of favoritism for one's nation, but nationalists are hostile towards immigrants and patriots are no more hostile to immigration than the average citizen (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003, p. 186). Therefore, following Conversi and Jeram (2017), the Catalan secessionist movement could respond to feelings of patriotism more than nationalism. In any case, hopefully this analysis will help explain Catalan nationalism either as a democratic nationalism (Guibernau, 2013), as a populist movement, an intercultural nationalism (Conversi & Jeram, 2017), a patriotism, a new nuanced kind of nationalism, or all of the above.

Present times: mediated communication. In summary, the current relationship between the central Spanish and the regional Catalan governments grows out of a turbulent history. The modifications *a posteriori* of the referendum to approve the statute of autonomy of 2006 outraged the Catalan public, culminating in the biggest demonstration for independence to date in 2012, two years after the law was reformed. Hence, this is arguably the event that marked the beginning of a new era of political tension between the Catalan and Spanish governments, and one of the case studies in this thesis. However, despite the obvious political tension caused by the current secessionist claims by part of the Catalan people, attempts by either government to find a solution that satisfies both have fallen short. This failure to engage in constructive conversation might be affecting their relationship. If, as Alexander Wendt puts it, identities and institutions depend greatly on their actions (Wendt, 1992), and I consider this includes their

communication, it follows that this lack of meaningful conversation is impacting the conflict in a way that still has to be clarified. Furthermore, while constructive conversation is lacking between the Catalan and the Spanish governments, both use public mediated discourse to refer to each other, especially through news media, for example by giving televised speeches or press conferences instead of holding official meetings with each other.

In addition, this study builds on Schnaudt, Walter and Popa's (2016) study of exclusive and multiple identities in European Union member states. According to the authors, citizens of territories with an exclusive identity only identify with the one, and perceive it as incompatible with others. However, populations holding multiple identities are able to identify at subnational and national levels simultaneously. The authors conclude that Catalans tend to hold an exclusive subnational identification, meaning that they perceive Catalan and Spanish identities as incompatible (Schnaudt, Walter and Popa, 2016, p.90). However, there is limited research examining what characterizes these identities and how they are maintained. Therefore, the research questions guiding this study were the following, as applied in critical junctures:

R1a: How do Spanish national media construct Catalan identity in Spain?

R1b: How do Spanish national media construct Spanish identity in Spain?

R2a: How do Catalan regional media construct Spanish identity in Catalonia?

R2b: How do Catalan regional media construct Catalan identity in Catalonia?

R3: How is the secessionist movement framed in both nationwide and Catalan media?

Furthermore, more research is needed to examine how the constitution of the European Union influenced identities inside member states and whether it enhanced historical demands of secession. The present study will contribute to this question by looking into the Spanish and Catalan identities before and after the inclusion of Spain in the European Union and the relationship between subnational and national identities in the country.

To answer the research questions posited above, a qualitative content analysis was conducted of news stories regarding three points in Spanish history: The design of the autonomic territorial distribution, the 2012 pro-independence demonstration in Barcelona and the 2017 terrorist attacks ISIS perpetrated in Barcelona and Cambrils.

Literature Review

The Role of Media in Constructing a National Identity. Research relevant to the current study has focused on analyzing the social construction of nations. Usually, citizenship in a nation-state is understood as the coincidence of state membership and nation identification (Brubaker, 1992, p. 182). Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010) point out how the expectation that every state should be a nation and every nation should be a state is misguided, since many successful democratic states in the world are culturally diverse (p. 50). According to Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010), Spain is an example of “robustly multinational society” (p.51), namely a state that has “strong cultural diversity, some of which is territorially based and politically articulated by significant groups with leaders who advance claims of independence in the name of nationalism and self-determination” (p. 50).

Sant (2017) studies the construction of Catalan nationhood in pedagogical materials and museums in Catalonia. In her work, Sant (2017) draws from Bhabha's (1990) distinction between two kinds of narrative about a nation: pedagogical (official narrative defining the nation) and performative (subaltern narrative, the nation as defined by its people). This classification of narratives works for the Catalan nationalist movement, since it can be attributed to dynamics between popular movements and cultural elites (Sant, 2017, p.109). She asserts that the pedagogical narrative of the Catalan nation is constructed in relation to sovereignty as its destiny, the willingness of sovereignty, and the Catalan character (p. 117). In the materials examined, the Catalan character emerges as "confidence in the individual, national sentiment and resilience" (Sant, 2017, p.112). Regarding the performative narrative of the Catalan nation, Sant (2017) claims that it is constructed through depictions of commemoration acts (p.117). For instance, the popular organization *Assemblea Nacional Catalana* (ANC) has been coordinating the most significant commemorations for September 11, since its constitution in 2011. As a conclusion, Sant (2017) affirms that in the text analyzed, the pedagogical narrative was predominant (p.117).

In addition, Martín Jiménez, Reguero Sanz and Pelaz López (2016) examine how the content broadcasted by Spain's national television network *Televisión Española* (*TVE*) from 1976 to 1979 helped develop a new Spanish national identity after the Francoist dictatorship. Their study provides support for a key role of *TVE*, one of the media organizations studied in this thesis, in the acceptance by Spaniards of the distinct cultural and linguistic characteristics of the different regions in Spain (Martín Jiménez,

Reguero Sanz & Pelaz López, 2016, p. 154). According to Martín Jiménez, Reguero Sanz and Pelaz López (2016), the content of *TVE*'s programming was vital for achieving its goal of smoothing Spain's transition to democracy. They conclude that it succeeded by conveying a new Spanish national identity that included decentralizing politics and allowed for the creation of autonomous regions (Martín Jiménez, Reguero Sanz & Pelaz López, 2016). However, both the independentists (Baquero, 2017) and the unionists (Díez, 2017) have been accusing the other side of breaking the rules of democracy, either by wanting to hold an (illegal) referendum or by not wanting to hold any referendum at all. Based on this, and on the proven role that TVE played in consolidating Spanish democracy during the transition, analyzing TVE news stories in later events could offer insight on how this idea has evolved in the Spanish media in recent years. The news programs analyzed were the ones aired on TVE1, the informative channel by TVE (TVE2 is the cultural channel).

Finally, the importance of media in shaping national identities is constantly restated in literature about nationalism. As a classic example of this literature, in *Imagined Communities* Anderson (2006) concludes that it was the rise of print capitalism that constructed communities of consumers of media and instilled solidarity feelings among members. Beyond that, Anderson (2006) sees the role of mass media as inculcators of nationalist ideology, as shapers of these imagined communities. As he puts it: "so often in the 'nation-building' policies of the new states one sees both a genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm, and a systematic even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative

regulations and so forth” (Anderson, 2006, p. 163). Anderson (2006) also touches on national identity; the author claims that, since its historical nature makes it impossible to be remembered, the nation has to be narrated (Anderson, 2006, p.204). By conducting this study, I aim to shed light into the matter of who narrates it. Specifically, by placing the media at the center of my research, I am making the statement that media are main narrators of national identities.

Framing Secessionist Movements. In the international relations and comparative fields, some scholars have also studied the role of news media in the portrayal of “us” and “them” (Benson, 2013; Dell’Orto, 2004). In his work, Benson (2013) analyzes how news media framed immigration issues and their impact in the actual policymaking both in France and the United States. Benson (2013) uses Entman’s (1993) definition of frame as a selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality... in such a way as to promote a particular *problem definition*” (quoted from Benson, 2013, pp. 4-5, emphasis in the original). The “problem definition” function of framing emphasized by Benson is especially important here, since the issue at stake is a political conflict, and, therefore, it is important to know what the problem is according to each side. In the field of mass communication, Gamson and Modigliani (1987) defined a media frame as a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143).

While the former definitions refer to media frames, Entman (1993) also offers a definition of frames that connects them with the receiver’s mental processes. According

to Entman (1993), individual frames are “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (p. 53). In other words, Entman (1993) defined individual frames as cognitive schemas that guide the receivers of a message in their interpretation of the information. My definition of framing is informed by the ones above. Thus, for the sake of this research, I consider framing as a communicative strategy on the part of both political figures and media that consists of making an aspect of reality more salient. In doing so, frames provide the receivers of the message with a guide for an interpretation of Catalan and Spanish identities and a definition of the secessionist process, and define the problem in their own terms. The attribution of quotes by politicians will help distinguish media framing from political framing. For an extensive overview of the definitions of framing in the field of media effects research, see Scheufele, 1999.

Other scholars have attributed an important role to media in secessionist movements. In her analysis of the dynamics of power and counterpower in the Catalan independence movement, Cramer (2015) defines the secessionist process as a multidimensional one, in the sense that it challenges the traditional “top-down” or “bottom-up” pressures for change. According to Cramer (2015), the effective use of digital media by skilled Catalan cultural elites has played a big role in this transformation. Furthermore, in her study, Cramer (2015) concluded that the ability of Catalan cultural elites to articulate and disseminate pro-independence arguments through online and offline media has been fundamental for the success of the civil pro-independence movement (p. 106).

In addition, Tobeña (2017) points at two main factors for the emergence of the independence movement in Catalonia: “intensive media indoctrination and social intimidation through monopolizing the public space with secessionist symbols and signs” (p. 79). According to Tobeña (2017), “media indoctrination” (p.83) results from the majority of the Catalan population with an active interest in politics (60%) following and trusting the domestic, national and international news through local or regional platforms (p.85; statistics are from the *Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió*, the official polling agency of the Catalan government, from 2013 to 2016). Tobeña (2017) points out that these platforms are directly dependent on the Catalan government and, therefore, susceptible to bias (p. 95). According to Spain’s main official polling agency, in 2014, the national television network *TVE* was the most preferred by Spaniards to get informed, with 27.9% spontaneously mentioning it as their favorite (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2014). Furthermore, in 2013, 56.4% of the Spanish population measured their trust in media in 4-6 points out of 10 (CIS, 2013).

If, based on Crameri’s (2015) and Tobeña’s (2017) arguments, the reliance and trust of a substantial part of the Catalan population on government-funded media played a big part in the emergence and maintenance of the independence movement, statistics showing reliance and trust of a big part of Spain’s population toward the national government-funded media could indicate a similar dynamic. This strengthens the justification for the present study, calling for further analysis of how both Catalan regional media and Spanish nation-wide media influence public opinion on the secessionist conflict.

Previous scholarship has analyzed news media framing in secessionist contexts. In their work on public relations, Ordeix and Ginesta (2014) examine the framing of the Catalan independence movement in articles from September to December of 2012 in three mainstream U.S. newspapers (*New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Time*). They reflect on the image of the conflict portrayed in these media: economic civil war in the *Wall Street Journal*, logical demands still from an economic approach in the *New York Times*, and international legitimation in *Time* (Ordeix & Ginesta, 2014). However, being foreign press, the framing as a diagnostic approach might be not as practically relevant toward finding a solution. This research focuses on the framing used by Catalan and Spanish news media with the goal of clarifying how the problem is viewed by each side. In addition, Dekavalla (2016) analyzes media coverage of the Scottish referendum for its independence from the United Kingdom in 2014. After a content analysis, Dekavalla (2016) concludes that news media framed the referendum very similarly to the way elections are often framed. They mainly used game frames (campaigns as a game between opposing sides), and policy frames (the referendum as a decision about economy and/or governance) (Dekavalla, 2016).

In addition, Xicoy, Perales-García, and Xambó (2017) conducted a content analysis of editorials of the daily newspapers with the highest circulations in Catalonia, the Basque country, Valencia and the rest of Spain. Their aim was to study the positions of these newspapers on the Catalan conflict. They analyzed the editorials in the days surrounding the constitutional court's unfavorable ruling towards the Catalan statute in 2010 and the pro-independence demonstration in 2012. Interestingly for this project,

Xicoy, Perales-García and Xambó (2017) concluded that the Catalan conflict has been the most important political issue in recent Spanish history (p.1052). They also found that the Catalan newspapers criticized the constitutional court's decision in 2010 and asked for a negotiated solution, and that the leading newspaper in Barcelona, *La Vanguardia*, called for a plebiscitary election in 2012 (Xicoy, Perales-García, & Xambó, 2017, p. 1053). Conversely, the Spanish nationwide newspapers that were analyzed supported the constitutional court's ruling in 2010 and stood by the unity of Spain, with *El País* arguing that the constitution could be modified only if the majority of the Spanish people wanted to do so (Xicoy, Perales-García, & Xambó, 2017, p. 1053). The current study builds on this project by analyzing the coverage by some of these newspapers of crucial events in the Spanish-Catalan relationship. I was able to contextualize the found frames with the newspapers' ideological positions defined by Xicoy, Perales-García and Xambó (2017).

Although many scholars have studied media framing of the “other” in international relations, less research has been conducted that applies these theses to secessionist movements. At the same time, even though research has been conducted to study the impact of media in the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, no study has analyzed news stories' framing comparatively in regional and national outlets. This study aims to provide evidence of how news media frames influence Catalan identity (“us”) versus the Spanish identity (“them”) and vice versa, by defining the problem differently depending on from where it is looked at.

Evolution and Changes in the Spanish Media Landscape. As Gunther, Montero and Wert (2000) put it: “over the course of just six decades, Spain underwent an

extraordinarily broad array of political experiences: from polarized, unstable democracy, to civil war, to authoritarian repression, to uncertain transition, to successful democratic consolidation” (p.3). These diverse political stages have impacted Spanish media greatly. As common in authoritarian regimes, Spanish media during the Francoist dictatorship were highly censored and ideologically homogeneous, aimed at serving the government. However, the Press Law of 1966 brought with it an increase in freedom of expression in the last years of the Francoist regime (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.6).

It was not until the appointment of Adolfo Suárez as prime minister in 1976 that the Spanish media landscape began to experience its most radical changes. According to Gunther, Montero and Wert (2000) media had, then, the main objective of re-socializing the public into the values and behavioral norms of democracy (p. 14). Regarding television, the only two channels available at that time were both part of the state-owned *Televisión Española. TVE*, fully controlled by the Ministry of Information during the dictatorship, experienced structural changes with the goal of protecting its independence from the government (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.14). As to the press, print media went from collaborating with the regime to facilitating the transition, with most print media supporting democracy (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.13). Dailies that had been present during the dictatorship, such as the ones affiliated with the regime or the ultraconservative monarchist *ABC*, were hostile to change (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.13). However, according to Gunther, Montero and Wert (2000), the appearance of new periodicals like *El País* (social-democratic) and *Diario 16* (liberal on social issues and conservative on the economy) in 1976 smoothed the country’s political progress. By

1979, *El País* was the newspaper with the highest circulation in Spain (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.15). As to radio, even when it was not as popular among Spanish society as television, private networks led the change toward better-quality reporting: responsive to immediate events, pluralistic and independent of the state (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.16).

The media system in Spain matches Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Polarized Pluralist Model (p.11). According to this model, among other characteristics, media are integrated in partisan dynamics (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.11). In Spain, this can be seen in the media's more or less subtle (depending on the channel) ideological profiles or leanings. Therefore, in order to have a precise idea of the Spanish media landscape, it is important to consider both the main political parties and the main media platforms. Only by laying out all actors is it possible to establish connections among them.

Several scholars date to 1978 the end of the transition, and to 1982 the beginning of the history of Spain as a consolidated democracy (Gunther, 1992, p. 39; Linz, Stepan, & Gunther, 1995, p. 99). This stage is marked by the domination of the political sphere by three state-wide political parties: *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) in the center-left, *Partido Popular* (PP, first called *Alianza Popular*) in the center-right to right and *Izquierda Unida* (IU) in the left.

In Catalonia, despite their variations in names and circumstantial alliances, the main political parties during the transition were *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), in the center-right, *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC), in the center-left, and the left-wing parties *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) and *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds*

(ICV) (Departament de Comunicació, n. d.). *Convergència i Unió* was the result of a coalition between *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*, in the center-right, and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*, a Christian Democratic party. The coalition has been the most voted party in every Catalan election since 1980, even though alliances between parties allowed for a government presided by *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* from 2003 to 2010 (La llista dels 129 presidents de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). *Convergència i Unió* had always been Catalan nationalist, but it did not establish Catalan independence as a goal until 2012 (Historia, n.d., para. 9). *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* has always been openly pro-independence (Història d'Esquerra, n.d., para. 1). *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds* has not been very clear with its position, observing independence as a legitimate option but an extreme one, and with some factions leaning more towards independence than others (“ICV no cierra la puerta a apoyar la independencia si se niega un nuevo estatus a Catalunya”, 2015; Font, 2015). Finally, *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* is against independence, just like its state-wide branch PSOE, and the party is pro-federalism (Qué es el Federalismo, n.d., para. 1).

Connections between the political actors mentioned above and media are abundant, although it is hard to make them explicit due to the challenge posed by the ideal of objectivity in journalism. Also, it is necessary to take into account that this review of the Spanish media landscape focuses on television and press, since the analysis is centered in the coverage by these media. Regarding television, new legislation was passed in 1980 to enhance the independence of the state-owned broadcast media (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.18). Up until 2006, however, the director general of

RTVE (Radio Televisión Española) remained appointed by the government. In 2006, the Law 17/2006, of June 5th, was passed that established that the director general of *RTVE* had to be voted for by two thirds of the members of the Spanish Parliament. The amount of nationwide channels increased after 1988 with the establishment of private television channels like *Antena 3* in 1989 and Silvio Berlusconi's *Tele 5* in 1990 (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.21), Prisa's *Cuatro* in 2005 ("Cuatro está de aniversario", 2015) and Mediapro's *La Sexta* in 2006 ("La Sexta", n.d., para. 1). A few years later, some of the media companies behind these channels consolidated: *Tele 5* and *Cuatro* merged in 2009 ("Telecinco y Cuatro se fusionan", 2009) and *Antena 3* absorbed *La Sexta* in 2011 (Gómez & Gallo, 2011). In addition, some more channels have been added inside each group; Mediaset España consists nowadays of *Telecinco*, *Cuatro*, *Factoría de Ficción*, *Boing*, *Energy*, *Diviní* and *Be Mad* ("Nuestros Canales", n.d., para. 1) and *Atresmedia* is formed by *Antena 3*, *La Sexta*, *Neox*, *Nova*, *Mega* and *Atresseries* ("Atresmedia televisión", n.d. para. 1). Important for the present research is that the political decentralization of Spain and the creation of the autonomic communities also impacted the media (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.21; Martín Jiménez, Reguero Sanz & Pelaz López, 2016). Catalonia and the Basque Country were the first ones to establish their regional channels, followed by other autonomous regions (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.21). In Catalonia, *Televisió de Catalunya* was born with *TV3* in 1983 with the objective of "contributing to the linguistic normalization and culture of the country" ("El Grup", n. d., para. 5). Later, more channels were added and removed

from the group, consisting of seven television channels at the time of this thesis: *TV3*, *33*, *3/24*, *Esport3*, *Super3*, *TV3CAT* and *TV3HD* (“El Grup”, n. d., para. 5).

Regarding the press, the generalist newspaper market had been dominated by *El País* and *ABC*, followed from far by *Diario 16* (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.19), when *El Mundo* printed its first edition in 1989 (“25 años de la Historia de España”, 2014). According to Gunther, Montero & Wert (2000), in only five years, *El Mundo*’s reported sales and readership equaling those of *ABC*, although not those of *El País* (p.19). Regarding Catalan autonomous press, the most widely read Catalan newspapers nowadays, according to the EGM summary report from April 2016 to March 2017, are first *La Vanguardia*, born in 1981 (“Evolución del mayor grupo de comunicación catalán”, n. d., para. 1) and then *El Periódico* (AIMC, 2017, p.8), available since 1978 (“El 35 aniversario”, n. d., para. 1).

All in all, Gunther, Montero and Wert (2000) defend existing pluralism in the Spanish media by claiming that in 1993, *El País*, *RTVE*, *Telecinco* and *Ser* were perceived as favoring the PSOE while *ABC*, *El Mundo*, *Cope*, *Onda Cero* and *Antena 3* were perceived by the Spanish people as biased favoring the PP (p. 33). *RTVE* has been accused (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p. 21), and still is, of favoring the government in office at each time. This would explain why in 1993, it was perceived to favor PSOE (governing at that time). However, while this could be an accurate ideological mapping of the Spanish media in 1993, media and politics have experienced great changes since then. As mentioned above, new channels were included in Spanish television. More recently, Penadés and Urquizu (2011) conducted a study for the *Alternativas* Foundation,

close to PSOE (“Dime qué canal ves y te diré con qué partido simpatizas”, 2011). This research, which was carried out when PSOE was in office, concluded that the assessment of the government by the viewers of *TVE*, *Telecinco*, *ETB* (Basque), *TV3* (Catalan), *TVG* (Galician), and *TVCA* (Canarian) at that time, was very much the same as the average assessment by all the Spanish citizens (Penadés & Urquizu, 2011, p.7). In addition, the viewers of *Antena 3*, the more conservative channels of the digital television, and the regional channels in the communities that were ruled by PP in 2011, showed harsher criticism of the PSOE government and the economic situation (Spain was in its hardest years of the economic recession at that time) but they were less critical of PP than the rest of citizens (Penadés & Urquizu, 2011, p.2). Last, Penadés and Urquizu (2011) found that the viewers of *Cuatro*, *La Sexta* and the regional channels in the communities that were ruled by PSOE in 2011 were less critical of the government and had a more negative perception of PP than the rest of the population (p.2).

Regarding the causes for the disconnect between the Spanish and Catalan governments and their societies, I want to point out how hard it is for a Spanish citizen outside Catalonia to access Catalan media. Most Catalan television channels and radio stations use the Catalan language as their common language, as it is the case for the station analyzed in this project, *TV3*. This creates an access barrier for people who cannot understand Catalan. With respect to the Catalan press, most newspapers, including the one studied here, *La Vanguardia*, offer a version written in Spanish. However, even when the language is not a barrier, the availability of printed press can be. This means that it might not be as easy to find a Catalan newspaper outside Catalonia as it is to find a

generalist newspaper. Online versions of newspapers (also in both languages) might be able to mitigate this gap, but no data could be found about the exact readership of regional newspapers outside their region. In conclusion, the lack of access for a great part of the Spanish population to Catalan newspapers could contribute to widen the gap between both societies.

Evolution and Changes in the Spanish Political Landscape. New parties have been established in the political sphere in recent decades. Thus, some new connections have been created between political parties and media. In 2006, a new political party called *Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía* (Cs), literal translation in English “party of the citizens,” was constituted under the values of “citizenship, freedom and equality, laicism, bilingualism and constitution” (“Orígenes”, n. d., para. 3). The two last ones are especially important if we take into account that the party started as a civil platform in Catalonia that advocated for the rights of parents with children in Catalan public schools to choose the lingua franca in which their children were taught (now this is Catalan). In addition, the party advocates for the preservation of the Spanish Constitution, which other parties propose to reform to change the political status of Catalonia. *Ciudadanos* occupied three seats in the Catalan Parliament in their first election in 2006, and nine seats (275,000 votes) only four years later (“Orígenes”, n. d., para. 6). Afterwards, *Ciudadanos* expanded to become a statewide party, earning 32 seats (more than 3 million votes) out of 350 seats in the Spanish Congress in the last general election (Garrido & Barriocanal, 2016). According to CIS, *Ciudadanos* was perceived to be in the center-right by the majority of the Spanish population in 2015 (CIS, 2015).

In addition to *Ciudadanos*, there is one more party that has entered the Spanish political landscape in recent years. This is the left-wing populist party *Podemos* (We can). One of the main predecessors of *Podemos* was the 15-M movement, a grass-roots movement that in 2011 occupied the main squares of cities around the country to ask for a change in Spanish politics, since they did not feel represented by the bipartisan system anymore (15M, n. d.). Basically, like other similar populist movements, *Podemos* brought together the representative and the economic crises in Spain, and put them at the center of their political program and discourse (Casero-Ripollés, Sintés-Olivella & Franch, 2017). As a reflection of the demand for a more direct democracy by 15-M, *Podemos* is based on an assembly-like system (“Círculos”, n.d., para 1). *Podemos* was born as a statewide party in 2014. In their first general election in 2015, *Podemos* earned 69 seats (5.189.333 votes) in the Spanish Congress (“Elecciones generales 2015”, 2015). After this election, it was impossible to constitute a government in Spain, so there was a new election the following year. In 2016, *Podemos* united with local alliances such as *Barcelona en Comú*, nowadays in the city hall in Barcelona. The coalition earned 71 seats in the Spanish Congress (5.049.734 votes), becoming the third strongest force after PP (137 seats) and PSOE (85 seats) and before *Ciudadanos* (32 seats) (“Elecciones generales 2016”, 2016). Even though *Podemos* consists of different factions with different positions, the majority supports a referendum for Catalonia’s secession, but not the secession itself (Gutiérrez, 2016).

In Catalonia there was also a new party emerging: *Candidatura d’Unió Popular* (CUP), a “self-declared anti-capitalist, socialist, feminist and ecologist secessionist party”

(Sant, 2017, p. 109). *Candidatura d'Unió Popular-Alternativa d'Esquerres* earned three seats in the Catalan Parliament in their first election in 2012 (Departament de Comunicació, n. d.). Just three years later, *Candidatura d'Unió Popular-Crida Constituent* earned 10 seats (Departament de Comunicació, n. d.). In addition, some other changes took place in the latest election. Besides the creation of *Junts pel Sí* to add to the pro-independence parties (*Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Demòcrates de Catalunya* and *Moviment d'Esquerres*), a new party participated in the Catalan election of 2015: *Catalunya sí que es pot* (CSQEP). *Catalunya sí que es pot* (*Podemos, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Esquerra Unida* and *Equo*) earned 11 seats in the Catalan election of 2015, 2 less than *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds* in 2012 (Departament de Comunicació, n. d.). Some attributed this decrease in seats to the fact that CSQEP did not take a clear position on independence (Manetto, 2015). Finally, in 2015, *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* broke their coalition (Mateos, 2015). After, *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* founded a new party called *PDeCAT*: “a democratic, Catalanist, independentist, Europeanist, humanist and republican political party” (Presentació, n. d., para. 2).

Given these latest developments, some new links have been established regarding the ideological profiles of media. A study by CIS in 2016 made it possible to cross the remembered party for whom participants voted in the election of 2015 and their preferred television channel to acquire political information. The data showed that *La Sexta* was the most preferred channel to follow political information (CIS, 2016). In addition, according

to Spain's main official polling agency, *La Sexta* is preferred by voters of *Podemos*, *Izquierda Unida*, PSOE, and the Catalans *Esquerra Republicana* and *Convergència*, (the latter participated in that election under a coalition called *Democràcia i Llibertat*) (CIS, 2016). Lastly, voters of PP preferred TV1 and voters of *Ciudadanos* preferred *Antena 3* (CIS, 2016). Regarding the press and the radio, it is harder to find solid links beyond the ones mapped by Gunther, Montero and Wert (2000), mentioned above.

Differently from other independentist movements like the far-right Flemish Block (Court rules Vlaams Blok is racist, 2004), the Catalan independence movement is not tied to just one party or ideology. Thus, the Catalan independentist movement is intersectional, encompassing parties of diverging ideological leanings from far-left (CUP) to left (ERC) and to center-right (PDeCAT). Because of this, the present research took into account if the media analyzed is Spanish national versus Catalan regional instead of using ideological leanings. The Catalan independentist movement is based on historical particularities that apply only to the Catalan case. Some of these will be developed in the following section.

Theoretical Framework

The present work has theoretical implications, namely the advancement of knowledge about the role of media in constructing the image of "the other," when this is found in the same state. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we categorize ourselves into groups we identify with, and we compare them with the groups we do not belong to, hoping for the enhancement of our self-esteem. These dynamics result in the interpretation of social reality as a dichotomy of us versus them, broadly

studied in the field of international relations and especially focusing on immigration (Citrin & Wright, 2014; Hollifield, Martin & Orrenius, 2014; Schain, 2008; Triandafyllidou, 2016). An important part of the research in political science has focused on analyzing the discourse employed by some political parties, one that constructs an image of minority groups as a danger to the country's national identity (Citrin & Sides, 2008).

This thesis is based on Carey's (1992) cultural approach to mass communication. According to Carey's ritual model of communication (1992), the goal of mass communication is to maintain society in time by representing the values shared in that society (p.18). Hence, this study proposes that analyzing news stories in mass media will shed light on the values that have configured the Spanish and Catalan societies over time, and how these have evolved and in what direction (i.e., in a diverging fashion). Therefore, the frames used in mass media will yield important information on what it means to be Catalan and to be Spanish, both among Catalan and Spanish audiences, on how these populations make sense of the secessionist tension, as well as some of the political rhetoric that informs these choices.

I identify with the Kantian epistemological theory (Kant, 2005). Kant (2005) distinguishes between the *a priori* (p. 27) knowledge, which is not experienced (for example, mathematical propositions) and *a posteriori* (p. 27) or empirical knowledge, the one that we experience. Kant (2005) claims that when experiencing reality, our own internal structures that allow perception modify the knowledge we obtain from reality. In that sense, I understand that there is a reality independent of individuals, and that by

perceiving it, individuals modify it to create a construction that constitutes their perception of their reality. Mass media are important because in this case, they act like structures that shape our perception of reality.

The assumption of the influence of media on the audience's perception of reality has been mentioned several times in this research. In fact, this study draws from Berger and Luckmann's concept of the social construction of reality (1966), which proposes that language can be used to refer to reality but also creates it. The constructivist approach is commonly taken in international relations, where direct information of other nations is not available due to physical distance. In this case, direct knowledge is replaced with the one acquired from sources like media. This is the information we use to construct our perception of other nations. It is also an appropriate approach for this research because as Anderson (2006) puts it: "in fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined" (p.6).

Berger and Luckmann (1966) were not the only ones who claimed the role of language as an agent constructor of reality. The scholars from the structuralist and post-structuralist movements were also interested in analyzing the creation of meaning from language. According to Saussure (1959), any sign has a signifier dimension, which is its literal form, and a signified dimension, which is a result of our sense-making. Barthes (1999) built on this idea by saying that we can add meaning (connotation) to a sign (denoted) to obtain a myth. Myths serve as signs again and can be given connotations infinitely in a "semiology chain" (Barthes, 1999, p. 111). Barthes' concept of myth (1999) is useful in this project because it illustrates the layers of meaning. In my case, I

understand that by using language, media are using signs. Then, the audience adds meanings to these signs. In our case, however, I propose that media framing influences the connotations added by the audience, and therefore, it affects the way they construct their reality.

Similarly, this research uses discourse theory as part of its theoretical framework. In her *Michel Foucault* (2003), Mills clarifies Foucault's concept of discourse: "he has used the term discourse to refer to 'regulated practices that account for a number of statements', that is the unwritten rules and structures which produce particular utterances and statements" (p.53). In other words, for Foucault, discourse serves as structure for communicative practices. It is important here to note, just as Kress (1985) did, that discourse does not equal language, but refers to the meaning-making dimension of language and influences it. Since we cannot make sense of something we do not have words for, it derives from Foucault's approach that it is unlikely for us to see what is outside of the discursive structure. Therefore, this structure constructs our reality.

Furthermore, Foucault's concept of discourse is especially appropriate in this work because of its close relation to power. In *The Subject and Power* (1982), Foucault defines power as relationships. To put it in Foucault's (1982) words:

What characterizes the power we are analyzing is that it brings into play relations between individuals (or between groups). For let us not deceive ourselves: if we speak of the structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others (p. 786).

According to Foucault (1982), power relationships and relationships of communication support and use each other reciprocally. These concepts are key in this research, because the Catalan-Spanish relationship is clearly one of tension for power of

self-determination and sovereignty over one's territory. Moreover, Foucault's links between power relations and communication relationships strengthen our rationale for analyzing media framing to find out what is the problem definition for each actor involved.

In the case of Spanish and Catalan news media, the overlapping between power and communication relations is evident in the ideological stances taken by newspapers and TV channels. By ideology here I mean the same that Hall (1986) meant in his widely quoted definition:

By ideology I mean the mental frameworks—the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation—which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works (p. 29).

Applying Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Polarized Pluralist Model (p.11) to Spain, nationwide media are polarized and centralist (emphasizing the central government over the regional governments). In addition to several nationwide private television stations, there are two state channels. In Catalonia, regional media are also polarized, but there is only one regional television channel (there are several local stations, at the municipal level). Therefore, the ideological position of the media has to impact the framing of their coverage and, thus, the process of attribution of meaning to these events by the audience.

To make sense of how a Polarized Pluralist Model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.11) media system like the Spanish one can affect the creation of social meaning and identity, this study draws from Habermas' (1987) lifeworld concept. According to Habermas, lifeworld is the communicative arena that allows for the construction of one's differentiated identity inside a social environment, by processes of normative

socialization (p.40). I understand that the media structures will affect the way social meanings are disputed in the lifeworld. Thus, it follows that to understand the construction of a nation's identity, it will be essential to study that nation's media coverage of events, taking into account the configuration of the media system itself.

Furthermore, if we accept Wendt's statement on how identities depend on institutions (Wendt, 1992), it follows that news media messages influence Catalan identity versus the Spanish one and to some extent, Spanish identity versus the Catalan. This is not to say that media have no independent agency or that they are just "indexers" of the elite discourse. In fact, there are no straightforward answers to the extent to which media have independent agency or are just being passively used for governmental purposes. This study builds on the idea that there is a bidirectional influence between media, government and public opinion, as independent agents (Baum & Potter, 2008; Dell'Orto, 2013, p. 5). Hence, the rationale behind the study of media is precisely the important role they play in the secessionist process, constantly influencing and being influenced by governments and public opinion.

The media's influence is expected to be even greater in situations of insecurity, and exposure times tend to be longer in order to make sense of one's environment (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976). Therefore, it is expected that the power of media to affect identities will be even higher in a situation of conflict or threat. According to Hindman (2004), these events might include "natural and technological disasters and foreign and domestic political crises such as scandals, acts of war, and assassinations" (p.30). In addition, Hindman (2004), concluded that this increase in media dependency applied in

the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There is evidence, then, supporting the inclusion of the coverage of a terrorist attack as a possible shaper of national identity. Because of this, the 2017 ISIS attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils were analyzed in this study.

In addition, because it is a terrorist attack, this specific historical event is linked with what in the literature has been called the “rally-round-the-flag” effect. Scheufele, Nisbet and Ostman (2005), take Mueller’s (1970) and Bennett’s (1990) research on public opinion as examples of this. Hence, according to Scheufele, Nisbet and Ostman (2005), this effect can materialize in a higher presidential approval (Mueller, 1970) and consistency in the positions of media and administration (Bennett, 1990), and can influence people’s perceptions of the event covered by the media (p.198). Likewise, after a terrorist attack, the rally-round-the-flag effect can appear as an increase in public support for an enhancement of security measures resulting in a restriction of people’s civil liberties (see Scheufele, Nisbet and Ostman, 2005 for evidence pointing at mass media as a main cause for this effect after the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States; also, see Bozzoli and Müller, 2011 for evidence of this effect after the attacks of July 7, 2005 in the United Kingdom).

However, while Mueller (1970) found support for an increase in presidential approval ratings, Hindman (2004) found that after the attacks of September 11, 2001 partisan differences became a strong predictor of presidential approval (p.39). Therefore, an analysis of media coverage of the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils will contribute to this literature with the frames that were used in this case. In addition, it will be possible to

study whether these frames align with the position of the administration or not—and, more importantly for this project, which administration (Spanish or Catalan) do the frames used by media (and which media, nation-wide or regional) align with.

From the above, it can be derived that this research might have some practical implications. At the European level, understanding the role that regional identities play in the acceptance of a European identity could facilitate the maintenance and management of the Schengen area in the long run. Better understanding the fit between a supranational European identity and regional identities could be useful either to keep working towards a borderless space (promoting the European identity) or to better define its internal borders (emphasizing regional identities). About the Spanish and Catalan conflict, it is logical to think that if most of the main actors' communication is mediated, then their images of the other will also be the ones portrayed in media. In other words, Catalan and Spanish leaders mostly “fight their war” through public opinion, and therefore the media. They do so both through a high mediatization of their speeches and by relying on political and current affairs programming. Thus, this research is aimed at smoothing the path for future negotiations by making available to the public a detailed description of how both Catalan and Spanish media shape Catalan and Spanish identities¹.

Understanding who the other is will help put together the pieces of what they want, and why they want it, and, hopefully, it will lead to more fruitful conversations toward a mutually beneficial solution.

¹ Importantly, “Catalan media” is used throughout this thesis to refer to Catalonia’s regional media. In addition, “Spanish media” is used to refer to national or nationwide media. This is a straightforward way to distinguish each kind but in no case is this meant to imply that Catalan media are not Spanish.

Method

Design of the Research. This study used a discourse analysis of news media. It is hard to define what a discourse is, since it is a term so broadly used by different disciplines (Mills, 2004). Mills (2004) explains how Foucault distinguishes between discourse, which is the set of rules for the production of discourses, and discourses themselves, which are groups of assertions that are ratified as knowledge (p. 55). Epstein (2008) defines discourses as those “*articulatory practices*” that create the relations among words, and therefore, their larger meanings (p. 7, emphasis in the original). This is the definition of discourse used in this study, applied to an analysis that examines meaning structures above the level of sentences (Mills, 2004, p.119).

In addition, in his chapter about news media discourse analysis, Van Dijk (1991) recognizes the particularity of media messages (p. 108). He claims that we make sense of the world thanks to news stories, since “most of our social and political knowledge and beliefs about the world derive from the dozens of news reports we read or see every day” (Van Dijk, 1991, p. 10). Because of this, Van Dijk (1991) defends that mass communication discourse analysis should focus on news media. Van Dijk’s (1991) method is based on the analysis of themes, the text’s larger meaning; scripts, smaller unities of meaning such as specific wording; and the coherence between those (p. 112-113). In addition, Van Dijk (1991) argues that textual structures indicate the underlying meanings, and to make these explicit it requires an analysis of the cognitive, social, political and cultural context (p. 116).

For this research, I am aware of the importance of the political, economic and social context in every historical milestone that was analyzed in the Catalan-Spanish relationship. I acknowledge the relevance of context by drawing from Van Dijk's (1998) context models (p.317). When mapped into discourse structures, context models ensure that discourses are appropriate in the social situation. In other words, context and discourse are not to be analyzed separately. Doing so would create an artificial situation and invalidate our objective of a deep understanding of the impact of news media framing in the Catalan secessionist movement.

Regarding the analytical methodology, this project draws from Dell'Orto's (2013) interpretation of Fairclough's discourse analysis (p.27). In his work, Fairclough (2001) claims that, on the one hand, language is influenced by societies and, on the other hand, it affects its social context. This strengthens my argument toward the consideration of social context in discourse analysis. To shed light into the meanings taken for granted in news stories, I examined texts (the actual news stories), discursive and sociocultural practices (through existing literature and public opinion research) and the relationships between them (Dell'Orto, 2013, p. 27).

Thus, following Dell'Orto's adaptation of Fairclough's methodology, the primary research was conducted on media texts to identify discursive practices. On the production side, themes and scripts (as understood by Van Dijk, 1991) were detected and explored. Just as I considered the themes present in the texts, I also took into account the lack of representation in them. As put by Dell'Orto (2013), building on Fairclough's words: "Some such traces [of the discourse practice in the text] are implicit, because they are so

well known that they do not necessarily need to be mentioned specifically in order to affect construction of meaning” (p. 27). In addition, Epstein (2008) mentions how social constructs are historically contingent, meaning that the fact that they have been articulated around a set of meanings also implies that other meanings have been excluded, as a consequence of power relations (p. 9). Hence, to sum up, what is in the text matters just as much as what has been left out, and the reason why that has been left out.

In any case, these themes and scripts provided historically, culturally specific broad understandings of what national identity means for Catalan and Spanish peoples. They also made explicit their construction of the other. Finally, themes and scripts found or missing defined the collective framework used to understand the secessionist process, what I have referred above as their definition of the problem (Entman, 1993).

For the reception and distribution sides, I looked at secondary sources, mainly existing literature and public opinion polls. Even though this method cannot prove that media discourse caused changes in public opinion, an analysis of both yielded an estimation of the scope of the discursive practices identified in the primary research. Furthermore, even though causality cannot be proved, public opinion changes that coincide with changes in discursive practices can indicate that there probably is some influence from one to the other and vice-versa. Regarding the distribution side, printed press and television were analyzed to get a representative picture of the journalistic reporting carried out for the selected historical events. By choosing these two media platforms, I expect to cover most of the population’s media environment. Because of this,

I was able to get an idea of the pervasiveness of some news frames through the main media and, consequently, their potential impact on the population. I did not analyze social media because, even though they were popular (and arguably the main) information sources in the two most recent historical events, it would be complicated to retrieve these documents due to the lack of formal archiving. In addition, it would be also hard to get an idea of the reach that those kinds of posts had in those times. Finally, as mentioned above, people from Catalonia and the rest of Spain trust their public television highly, so this strengthens our argument to include public channels. Analyzing television and press allowed me to have an idea of the effects of most people's media environment.

Case studies. The discourse analysis of news media was implemented at three points in Spanish history: the design of the autonomic territorial distribution in 1981, the demonstration by Catalan people for Catalonia's independence in 2012 and the ISIS terrorist attacks in Catalonia in 2017. Again, these three critical junctures were chosen to illustrate historical milestones essential for the Spanish and Catalan identities and the Catalan secessionist process. Two criteria have been in place for the media selection. Since I was interested in the nationwide versus regional media distinctions, stations owned by the central and regional governments were analyzed in the case of television. For the press, the platforms analyzed were the most-read (nationally versus regionally) at the time of those historical milestones. In addition, the media selection did not take into account the platforms' ideological leanings (left or right) since, as explained above, it is largely irrelevant for this project.

First autonomic pacts. The first period of time that I analyzed comprised a week before and a week after July 31, 1981. This is the date of the “first autonomic pacts.” A period of two weeks was selected for the first two case studies to have enough breadth of coverage. These pacts determined the autonomic communities and their competencies (Aparicio, 2005). Evidence supports the assumption that media had an important role in facilitating the creation of autonomous regions (Martín Jiménez, Reguero Sanz & Pelaz López, 2016). Regarding television, there were only two channels available at that time, the state-owned *TVE1* and *TVE2*, since private television did not make an appearance in Spain until 1989 (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000, p.21). *TVE1* was considered for the analysis as it concentrated on political and informational content (leaving the cultural programs for *TVE2*).

The generalist newspapers with most readers during this period were: *El País*, *Abc* and *Ya*, with a respective average daily print run of 234,016, 135,554 and 112,310 newspapers between 1980 and 1981, calculated by the Office of Justification of Diffusion, *Oficina de Justificación de Difusión*, or OJD (“EL PAIS, primer periódico español por su difusión”, 1982). Therefore, *El País* was analyzed as a representative of nation-wide media; it was written in Spanish. Regarding the regional press, *La Vanguardia* was analyzed, with an average daily print run of 192,916 newspapers between 1980 and 1981 calculated by the OJD (“EL PAIS, primer periódico español por su difusión”, 1982). Due to the technical limitations in the digital archive, I used the printed editions of *La Vanguardia*, which were in Spanish. With the sports newspaper *As*, these are the only four newspapers that sold more than 100,000 daily newspapers during

that time (“EL PAIS, primer periódico español por su difusión”, 1982). *As* was not analyzed because its content is strictly about sports.

Pro-independence demonstration. The second milestone included a week before and a week after September 11th, 2012, the date of the biggest pro-independence demonstration in Catalonia, with an attendance of 1.5 million people according to *Time* magazine (Abend, 2012). About television, among the free-to-use channels, the most viewed in 2012 was *Telecinco*, with 17.9% of share (AIMC, 2012, p. 13). *Telecinco* was closely followed by *TVE1*, with 17.6% of share (AIMC, 2012, p. 13) and *Antena 3*, with a share of 14.6% (AIMC, 2012, p. 13). A bit far from these were *Cuatro*, and *La Sexta*, with shares of 5.3% and 4.7% respectively (AIMC, 2012, p. 13). *TVE1* was the television channel analyzed for this period to get the point of view of the state-owned TV. For the same reason, the Catalan regional television channel *TV3* was included in the analysis for this period. *TV3*'s share in 2012 was of 2% (AIMC, 2012, p. 13), from Monday to Sunday.

The generalist newspapers with most readers in 2012 were: *El País*, with 1,929,000 readers a day (AIMC, 2012, p. 6); *El Mundo*, with 1,181,000 readers a day (AIMC, 2012, p. 6); and *Abs*, with 648,000 daily readers (AIMC, 2012, p. 6). I analyzed *El País*, in Spanish. Regarding the regional press, *La Vanguardia* had 811,000 readers a day in 2012 and *El Periódico* had 613,000 daily readers in 2012 (AIMC, 2012, p. 6). I analyzed *La Vanguardia*, which was in Catalan. Due to the technical limitations in the digital archive, I used the printed editions of *La Vanguardia*.

ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils. For the third milestone I selected news covering the terrorist attacks from August 17th of 2017, the day of the attacks, to August 21st of 2017, the day the author of the terrorist attack in Barcelona was killed by the police. In relation to television, I looked into the public Spanish and Catalan stations with the goal of getting as close to the official positions as possible. Thus, I analyzed the television channel *TVE1* (Television Española) to represent the Spanish national perspective. *TVE1* has an online archive with the video files of the programs that covered the attacks. In addition, for the Catalan perspective, I analyzed news in the regional television channel *TV3*. *TV3* also has an online archive with the programs that covered the attacks.

For the press, I analyzed the newspapers with highest readership. According to the EGM (*Estudio General de Medios*) summary report from April 2016 to March 2017, the most read nation-wide generalist newspapers during that period of time was *El País* (AIMC, 2017, p.8). For this reason, I selected this newspaper for the current study, published in Spanish. As to the Catalan press, the most read regional newspaper during the beginning of 2017 was *La Vanguardia* (AIMC, 2017, p.8). This is the newspaper that I selected for this project. Due to the technical limitations in the digital archive, I used the printed editions of *La Vanguardia*, in Catalan.

Analysis

It is important to note that in the following analysis of news stories, I looked at the coverage not to see how it framed the events per se but to answer my research questions. For example, in the case of the terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, I

did not look at how Islamist terrorism was described, but I got at Spanish and Catalan identities and the secessionist process. To analyze the data, I followed three steps: data immersion, first cycle coding and second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013). The data was coded manually. Analytical memos (Saldaña, 2013) were used throughout the three-step process to reflect on the content of the data, my feelings about it, and the relationships between codes and categories. In the phase of data immersion (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013), I read the entire data corpus several times to familiarize myself with it. After reading the news stories thoroughly several times, I started with the pre-coding process (Saldaña, 2013). According to Saldaña (2013), pre-coding is part of the phase of data immersion, consisting of highlighting those pieces of data that stood out for the researcher during the first readings. These underlined words and passages helped me locate illustrative quotes in the following stages.

First cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) took place as the second step for data analysis, and a codebook was developed. I used descriptive and in vivo coding. I used descriptive coding (Saldaña, 2013) to get a broad sense of the media transmission of Catalan and Spanish national identities. Descriptive coding yielded several codes, which served as a list of “the data’s basic topics” (Saldaña, 2013, p. 88). In addition, I used in vivo coding (Saldaña, 2013). In vivo coding was useful to detect important scripts. Finally, I also used versus coding (Saldaña, 2013) to be able to understand data in an “us versus them” approach. This stage was characterized by the implementation of the constant comparative method (Charmaz, 2006), by which I continuously compared the

data applicable to each code and I then modified the code definitions or created new codes accordingly.

Finally, I conducted second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013), to collapse the codes into categories, which are on a more abstract level. Focused coding (Saldaña, 2013) was used with the objective of pointing out the most significant codes, or the ones with more analytic potential. This process yielded a number of categories and subcategories.

In my analysis, I excluded the sections of tabloid press, the editorials, the opinion, religion and sports sections, the movie listings, the stock market information and, for the press, also the infographics that were presented without an accompanying body of text, and the videos. I excluded these sections from my analysis because I was looking for the discourse in so-called “hard news,” such as that found in politics, economy, international or culture sections (cover pages were also included). Thus, I focused my analysis on the impact of a discourse that is hidden and deemed as objective facts. In addition, note that all translations from Catalan and Spanish to English are mine. Last, the exposition in the following chapters of the categories, subcategories and codes follows an order from more to less present in the data corpus, to give an idea of the pervasiveness of each in the media.

For the coverage of the autonomic pacts, the data corpus I analyzed consisted of 43 articles from the Catalan newspaper; 11 articles from the national newspaper; and two news stories from the national public television channel. For the coverage of the secessionist demonstration, the analysis corpus consisted of 145 articles from the Catalan

newspaper; 43 audiovisual files from 28 different news programs from the Catalan public television channel; 71 articles from the national newspaper and a transcript of the news stories covering the event in public national television, 25 pages long, single spaced. For the coverage of the terrorist attacks, I analyzed 108 articles from the Catalan newspaper; a transcript document that was 99 pages long, single-space, from the news stories in the Catalan public television channel; 134 articles from the national newspaper; and a transcript document that was 97 pages long, single-space, from the news in the national public television channel. Only news stories about these crucial events were included in the analysis (except for the autonomic pacts, where all news pieces that were retrieved in the search for autonomic pacts news were included due to scarcity).

Importantly, the abbreviations used to cite the news articles in the findings chapters need to be explained in order to facilitate their tracing. For the Catalan newspaper *La Vanguardia*, the abbreviated citations indicated the name of the newspaper through its initials (LV), the date of publication (European style) and the page number, since printed editions were used. Thus, an example of abbreviated citation would read LV, 06-09-2012, p. 14. Similarly, for the Spanish newspaper *El País*, the abbreviated citations also started with the newspaper's initials (EP), the date of publication (also European style) and, because online editions were used, the page numbers were replaced by an excerpt of the title and the paragraph number. For example, an abbreviated citation for a news story in *El País* could be EP, 10-09-2012, "El PP Catalán alerta..." , para. 8. Regarding the Catalan television channel TV3, the abbreviated citations indicated the airing times through the original name of the news programs. Hence, TNM meant

Telenotícies Migdia, the noon edition, and TNV meant Telenotícies Vespre, the afternoon edition. The abbreviated citations also included the date that the news programs were broadcasted in European style. Therefore, an example of abbreviated citation for a news program in *TV3* could be TNV, 06-09-2012. Finally, the abbreviated citations used for the Spanish national television channel *TVE1* followed a similar structure. First, the abbreviated name of the news program Telediario (TD), then the airing time (military time) and then the date it was broadcasted (European style). Thus, an example of abbreviated citation for a news story in *TVE1* could be TD15H, 17-09-2012.

Ultimately, the main goal of this research was to identify the frames used by Catalan and Spanish media to understand their definition of the problem in the Catalan secessionist process. In addition, discourse analysis made explicit the dominant discourses about national identities in Spanish and Catalan media. It is methodologically impossible to prove causality in the relationship between these discourses and generalized public opinion in Catalan and Spanish societies. However, by comparing the main themes uncovered in the analysis to public opinion polling, this study will contribute with indicators of an influence of media in Catalan and Spanish public opinion on national identity.

It is worth to underscore the difference between the voice of the media and the voice of the personalities interviewed or whose quotes are included in the reporting. Because of this, media could include quotes that are not necessarily in line with their ideological leaning. For example, in the coverage of the demonstration, all media constructed the Catalan-Spanish relationship as one marked by tension due to the Catalan

perception that Catalans were being disregarded by Spain and the Spanish perception that Catalans who embraced secessionist claims were being irresponsible towards Spain. This does not mean that these media subscribe to this statement. However, this is the discourse constructed by media through the journalists' voices on the one hand, and the inclusion of the (often political) actors' voices on the other hand. The fact that media have relative agency in deciding which voices are included in their discourse should also be acknowledged, although it is not discussed in this project. Hence, this thesis focuses on the analysis of the global discourse present in the media. Therefore, its final goal is not to define each medium's stance in the Catalan secessionist process but to identify the overall discourse that constructs Catalan and Spanish identities and the relationship between them. Also, the attribution of the quotes that are by politicians will help uncover political strategies that used the media as a tool to guide the construction of these meanings.

Finally, analyzing these messages before and after the inclusion of Spain in the European Union will help to further understand the impact of this event on the definition of the Spanish and Catalan identities. In turn, it is expected that shedding light on the public opinion reactions will help define their impact on the actual political action (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Jervis, 1976). This study starts from the assumption that the lack of dialogue between Catalonia and Spain is due to a failure from both parts in recognizing the other's position. Therefore, as a more practical contribution, this study hopes to analyze what these positions are and how they are constructed with the aim of

reducing distances and hopefully preparing the ground for future, fruitful and mutually beneficial conversations.

The next three chapters develop the case studies. First, they provide some context into the event and the reason why it was included in this project. Then, the findings of the analysis are discussed. Finally, a conclusion includes an explanation of how the media analyzed contributed to shape Catalan and national identities, and establishes links with public opinion trends. Chapter Two discusses how the coverage of the negotiations for the Spanish autonomic pacts in 1981 influenced the construction of the Catalan and Spanish identities at the time. This chapter highlights the main discursive practices shaping the modern relationship between Catalonia and Spain. Chapter Three is focused on the coverage of the most massive pro-independence demonstration in Catalonia to date, which took place in 2012. This chapter reveals a turning point in Catalan secessionism, whose coverage is marked by the media's opportunity to explain the situation through their lenses. The third case study is developed in Chapter Four. The analysis of the coverage of the 2017 ISIS attacks in Barcelona contributes by uncovering subtle discursive practices in a situation where the attention shifted from the internal conflict to a terrorist threat and where, consequently, the political tension escalated considerably. Chapter Five concludes with a synthesis of the evolution over time of Catalan and Spanish identities and their relationship, according to Catalan and Spanish media. Additionally, it builds a comparison of these concepts before and after the inclusion of Spain in the European Union. Also, it discusses the relationship between media, political figures and public opinion, and the directionality of the interactions

among them. Finally, it reflects on this work's limitations and the new questions that were raised in the research process.

Chapter Two: First Autonomic Pacts

This chapter and the next two explore the major findings of this thesis. Discourse theory informed a qualitative content analysis based on the classification of the main themes about Catalan and Spanish identities, and the relationship between them, used in media coverage of critical junctures in the history of Spain in (from less to more abstract) sub-codes, codes, sub-categories and categories. This organization gives an idea of how the three case studies were explained to the public, since media used them as guides to make some issues more salient than others or to interpret some questions in a specific way.

First, the press will be analyzed, starting with the most prominent Catalan newspaper, *La Vanguardia* and following with its Spanish equivalent, *El País*. While in the other two case studies to follow in Chapters 3 and 4 television coverage will be analyzed, first the Catalan channel, *TV3*, and then the national one, *TVE1*, during the time covered in this specific chapter, autonomous television channels were not developed yet. Thus, only the Spanish national television perspective will be covered in this chapter. At the end of each of the case study chapters, a review of public opinion research will shed light into public opinion trends, to see if they match media discourses.

On July 31 of 1981, the first autonomic pacts in Spain were signed. These pacts were meant to set guidelines for the distribution of power between the central and the regional governments. There was a distinction that favored Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia: These territories saw their Statutes of Autonomy approved before the pacts and it was agreed that the transfer of autonomous powers could be faster for

them than for the rest of the territories. As will be developed later, on the one hand this elicited fear in these three regions that the pacts would reduce the powers approved in their statutes. On the other hand, this resulted in conflicts with other Spanish territories.

The negotiations that resulted in the final signature were long and complicated, which was reflected in the absences the day of the signature. The only two parties that ended up signing the pacts, the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), engaged in negotiations that were attended by the conservatives, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and People's Alliance (AP). However, the representatives of the Catalan nationalists, Convergence and Union (CiU), and the Basque nationalists, Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), were not formally invited (Angulo, 1982, para. 14), even though CiU was in charge of the Catalan government at that time (La llista dels 129 presidents de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014) and PNV held the majority of seats in the Basque parliament (El PNV, triunfador de las elecciones de 1980, 1984).

Furthermore, even though PCE and AP were invited to participate in the negotiations, both parties left before it was time to sign the pacts. PCE argued that the law that was supposed to enforce these pacts, the LOAPA (Organic Law of Harmonization of the Autonomic Process), was unconstitutional. This is because the "harmonizer" aspect of LOAPA implied that in a situation of ambiguity, the state laws would surpass the statutes of autonomy. AP left the negotiation because they disagreed in matters of public expenses, powers assigned to deputations and election of regional parliaments.

In any case, the pacts that initiated the decentralization of powers in Spain to transition to democracy ended up being signed without the consensus of all political forces. With minor changes, this distribution of powers in 17 autonomous communities (plus two autonomous cities) and the central government in Madrid is the one that still stands nowadays in Spain. This event was deemed crucial because, arguably, it marked the beginning of the modern relationship between Catalonia and Spain.

For the analysis of the media coverage of the autonomic pacts, the data corpus analyzed consisted of 43 articles from the Catalan newspaper, 11 articles from the national newspaper, and two news stories from the national public television channel.² It is important to take into account that the analysis examined the coverage to answer the research questions regarding how national and regional media constructed the Catalan and Spanish identities in the coverage of the autonomic pacts in Spain and in Catalonia, and how the secessionist movement was framed in the coverage of the autonomic pacts by both nationwide and Catalan media.

The main findings of this chapter indicate that Catalonia was constructed as a territory where a nationalist government ruled some peaceful, though selfish people. In the national newspaper *El País*, the Basque and Catalan leaders appear blinded by self-interests, as they seem not to acknowledge the relevance of these pacts in the Spanish context. Meanwhile, in the Catalan newspaper, emphasis is placed on the insecurity toward the consequences of the pacts for the Catalan people. The Spanish national

² For this case study only, scarcity of articles available forced me to include in the analysis some articles that were not directly covering the pacts but that included information important for the purpose of the present work, like the news stories about the celebration of Saint James (article LV, 26-07-1981, p. 10, in *La Vanguardia*, and article EP, 26-07-1981, “El teniente general...”, para. 7, in *El País*).

television channel TVE1 emphasized the absence of the Basque parties in the pacts over the absence of the Catalan parties, probably due to the salience of Basque terrorist group ETA at the time. Regarding Spain, it is constructed as a country in evolution toward a solid democracy. This transition appears in both Spanish and Catalan media as a chaotic, uncertain process. While the national newspaper and television consider the autonomic pacts the last step to achieve Spain's democratic goal, the Catalan newspaper highlights the uncertainty after the signature. Ultimately, all media show that the relationship between both societies and administrations was marked by disagreement and tension.

Catalan press coverage of the autonomic pacts: *La Vanguardia*

This analysis included the articles of the printed version of the newspaper *La Vanguardia* from July 24th to August 7th of 1981 that were retrieved after looking in the digital archive for “*pactos autonómicos*”. This selection resulted in 43 articles. This is the only case study in which the Catalan newspaper was printed in Spanish, since its first version in Catalan was released in 2011 (Camps, 2016).

Us: Catalonia. Second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) produced three categories: **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. In the category **us**, there was the subcategory **Catalonia**. *La Vanguardia* based the construction of Catalonia on the character of the Catalan people and their relationship with the rest of Spain. Catalonia included two codes: **nationalists** and **Catalan people**. The code **nationalists** referred to all the regions with nationalistic aspirations in Spain, which include but are not limited to Catalonia and the Basque Country. The code **Catalan people** comprised the references to the typical traits of the Catalan personality.

Nationalists. The most prominent discourse in the category of Catalonia was nationalism. The code nationalists made reference to the fact that, unlike *El País*, the Catalan newspaper highlighted other Spanish regions with similar nationalistic aspirations as Catalonia and the Basque Country. This was reflected in the cases where allusions to Galicia, Andalusia, the Basque Country or Catalonia appeared together as examples of regional nationalism. The idea of regional nationalism responds to a movement in some autonomous communities toward identification of a unique identity different from the Spanish national identity, a demand of recognition of this different identity, and a quest for more autonomous powers from the central government. It is opposed to Spanish nationalism, which corresponds to a Spanish national identity shared by all Spaniards independently of autonomous communities, and that tends to defend the power of the central government over the autonomous communities. Thus, regional nationalism was constructed in *La Vanguardia* by laying out high-level meetings and pacts between leaders of these regions or alluding to their Statutes of Autonomy. This appeared to bring these regions together against the central government. At least, it seemed to emphasize the differences between them, creating a sort of dualism between Spanish nationalists (taking the Spanish as a united identity), and regional nationalists (each with an identity that is subnational to Spain):

Inside constitutional limits, the Spanish nationalists should include specific symbolic expressions by the Catalan, Andalusian or Basque nationalists. And these, should include some ways of understanding the Spanish matters that are completely alien to them (LV, 24-07-1981, p. 8).

The analysis uncovered a distinction of autonomous communities between those that got more autonomous competences faster, namely the Basque Country, Catalonia

and Galicia, and the rest. This issue of privilege of some autonomous communities over others was framed as a reason for conflict in some cases—for example in the case of Andalusia, which demanded equal treatment to the three privileged regions. This could be the beginning of the tension between Catalan leaders demanding increased recognition and other regions asking to be equaled to Catalonia, which will be a constant in the relationship between Catalonia and the rest of Spain:

We do not support the autonomic chaos that is taking place; we have attended the meetings because of national responsibility; we do not support the fact that Catalans and Basques are ahead; now they are trying to make the other regions equal (words by AP representatives Jorge Verstryngue and Álvaro Lapuerta; LV, 01-08-1981, p. 9).

In addition, *La Vanguardia* raised the issue of how complicated it was to decide which regions were worthy of such privileges:

The criteria for classification are unclear: historical public expression? Cultural-linguistic content? Political-economical capacity of the assertion? Control over this one by specific political parties? It would be enough to compare the Galician and Andalusian issues to see how risky it is to distinguish qualities of the different movements that demand more capability of political decision over their own business (LV, 24-07-1981, p. 8).

Even though nationalist movements other than the Catalan and the Basque were mentioned, an especially close relationship between these two was implied. This is possibly because these are historically the most clearly nationalist. This close relationship was built by often placing one next to the other in sentences, only referring to them when talking about regions with nationalistic aspirations, or by mentioning meetings between the Spanish and the two autonomous presidents:

The pact would have been more solid if [Basque and Catalan nationalist parties] PNV and CiU had participated. He [president of the government Calvo Sotelo] remembered that he had had conversations with the presidents of the autonomous governments and that he had wanted to tell them that the pacts will not affect

their communities, already constituted. “In the future—he said—I hope to be more in touch and to be able to end any distrust that might be left.” (LV, 01-08-1981, p. 6).

Much less often, nationalism was equaled to selfishness or to an unsupportive character, which matches with the greedy stereotype of Catalans in the rest of Spain:

They are trying to implement the mechanism of the autonomies in Spain and it is not easy to consider the necessary solidarity of some peoples with other ones (words by archbishop of Santiago, Ángel Suquía; LV, 26-07-1981, p. 10).

Catalan people. Besides unsupportive, Catalans were also seen as too dramatic:

Some Catalans need to get over the permanent feeling of offense (words by secretary of territorial administration, Rodolfo Martín Villa; LV, 07-08-1981, cover page).

It is noteworthy that both negative traits of the Catalan personality were represented by the quotes from people outside Catalonia. This could be interpreted as an outsider perspective offered by the newspaper. This should not be considered a stance taken by the newspaper. Even though a decision was made to include this content, there is a clear “us” defined that comprises Catalonia and *La Vanguardia*, and these are exceptions that show how Catalonia is viewed outside this “us.”

However, from a reflective point of view, Catalans saw themselves as reasonable people. This could be due to the constant comparison with Basque nationalism and the salience of the Basque terrorist group ETA:

We will have to do everything in our hands, *inside legality*, to defend our rights and institutions (emphasis added; words by Esquerra Republicana leader Maria Dolors Treserras; LV, 05-08-1981, p. 7).

Them: Spain. The category **them** comprised the subcategory **Spain**. *La Vanguardia*, constructed the country as a state still transitioning to its definitive form, from centralized to decentralized, and the tensions involved in the process. The

subcategory Spain included four codes: **young democracy**, **Spain of autonomies**, **Spanish nationalists** and **Spanish people**. Spain appeared in the newspaper as marked by the dictatorship (references comprised in the code young democracy). Also, the autonomic map seemed to be the essence of modern Spain (Spain of autonomies). The Catalan newspaper alluded to a nationalism that is of Spain as a united entity, not the regional nationalisms (Spanish nationalism). Finally, “Spanish people” explained how the Spanish personality traits were depicted.

Young democracy. Young democracy alluded to the messiness of the transition after the dictatorship, and its residual support (not that frequent in the data corpus), still present years afterward. For example, in the speech by lieutenant general Fernández Posse in the celebration of Saint James, he hinted that he supported the dictatorship. However, in LV, 01-08-1981, p. 9, it was mentioned that no authority knew of the content of this speech, meaning that they would not support it. Additionally, young democracy alluded to memories of the Spanish Civil War:

The “right to be different”, recognized by the Constitution of 1978, does not have an adequate political acceptance yet (LV, 24-07-1981, p. 8).

All conversations [...] serve not only to democracy but also to civil peace in Spain [...] if the pact helps the rapport among all the autonomous communities in Spain, it will be a pact that will contribute to the stability of our shared nation (words by Spanish politician Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez; LV, 05-08-1981, p. 7).

Spain of autonomies. Spain of autonomies alluded to the identification of an accomplished Spanish state with the autonomic territorial distribution. This is important, because it highlighted the importance of the autonomies in Spain, in the sense that it considered Spain only as composed by these autonomous communities. Therefore, a modification of this distribution would be a deep modification of the Spanish state. Then,

it follows that if this is considered the ultimate democratic organization in Spain, any change (such as an autonomous community becoming its own state) would be harmful for the state:

He [president of the government Calvo Sotelo] added that these agreements will put in order the construction of the state of autonomies and they 'are meant to rationalize the development of the autonomous communities and the state. "Only in a strong state there is room for strong autonomies." (LV, 01-08-1981, p. 9).

Spanish nationalists. Much less present in the text than the discourses above (one instance), there was an intention of pointing out that centralism responds to Spanish nationalism (the nationalism that is not of specific regions but of Spain as a whole). This was seen in the reluctance to give autonomous powers to the regions and in the implicit classification of a better (Spanish or centralist) and a worse (regional or peripheral) nationalism:

I mean the "Spanish nationalism" which the secretary [of territorial administration, Rodolfo] Martín Villa himself—and other spokespersons with different political profiles—proclaim strongly and consistently. It is a social phenomenon in which—like in all nationalisms—emotional attitudes and political projects converge. [...] Is it possible to set aside this "third nationalism" when the goal is to come with the design of a state and its role in the distribution of power? [...] From its confidence [the Spanish nationalism] it assigns nationalist labels of second and third class. [...] We are witnesses to the recovering of the "third nationalism" which, from the assurance of its traditional confidence, classifies the others (LV, 24-07-1981, p. 8).

Spanish people. And also with a minimal presence, a remark on the personality of the Spaniards, who appeared to be not really suited to fulfill their democratic duties. This reference was also included in the coverage of the event by *El País*, indicating a similar construction of Spanish people in both newspapers:

But democracy demands, besides rights and freedoms, duties and obligations; and given the individualistic and a bit anarchic personality of the Spaniards, oftentimes we forget about them or we do not take them into account (words by lieutenant general Fernández Posse; LV, 26-07-1981, p. 10).

It is important to take into account that this distrust of the ability of the Spanish people to function in democracy might be due to the ideological leaning of lieutenant general Fernández Posse towards Francoism.

Us vs. them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. According to *La Vanguardia*, the relationship between Spain and Catalonia was marked by disagreement, political tension and threats, shared by different political parties albeit for different reasons. The category **us vs. them** included the subcategories **disagreement, political tension, threats** and **status of Catalonia**. Disagreement alluded to the arduous stage of negotiation previous to the signature of the pacts. It included five codes: **absences in the pacts, a difficult issue, reproaching, persuasion, and giving the cold shoulder**.

Political tension comprised the references to the pressures of each party to see their interests fulfilled in the changing landscape that was Spanish politics. It included the code **political tension in Catalonia**. **Threats** implied the fears of the Catalan nationalists that the pacts would have negative consequences for Catalonia's future as an autonomous community. There were three codes inside this subcategory: **autonomy, statute** and **economy**. Finally, **status of Catalonia** went back to the question of what did Catalonia mean for the rest of Spain, and suggested options ranging from a nation to a region.

Disagreement and absences in the pacts. Regarding the absences in the negotiations for the signature of the pacts, there was a distinction between regional nationalist parties and the national parties, Communist Party—PCE and People's Alliance—AP, that left the table at the last minute. This distinction matters because the national parties left voluntarily due to the disagreement, but the regional parties were not

invited, and this seems to be perceived as an offense, due to how important they were in their autonomous communities. The Catalan newspaper considered the absence of the regional nationalist parties more important because the distribution of autonomous powers was a matter that affected them, and not inviting them was perceived as a sign of their being looked down upon:

[Rafael Ribó, spokesperson of PSUC, Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia]: “none of the four parliamentary state parties directly suffer the problem of the autonomy and, in spite of that, on their own and without checking with anyone, they will suggest autonomic programs”. However, the PSUC, according to Ribó, affirms that “the parliamentary parties of the nationalities should participate in these negotiations because it is they who are interested in moving the autonomic processes forward.” (LV, 26-07-1981, p. 8).

After that he [Basque president Carlos Garaicoetxea] pointed out that the autonomic agreements ‘have been done in a peculiar way since, while the convenience of dealing with state problems is invoked, problems that directly affect us, are being dealt with between the government and the four majority parties.’ (LV, 29-07-1981, cover page).

The president [Calvo Sotelo] highlighted that the construction of the state of autonomies is very important and that it should move forward even without some political forces. “But the fact that UCD and PSOE, the two state majority parties, are willing to continue with the pact is important and sufficient and will not imply cuts in the statutes already in force.” (LV, 01-08-1981, p. 9).

However, allusions to the absences of PCE and AP were also very present in the data corpus. This emphasized the lack of consensus in these pacts, which were supposed to move Spain farther from its authoritarian past:

The intense negotiations to develop the state of autonomies ended last night, after eleven, with the signature of the pacts by Calvo Sotelo, president of the government, and the general secretary of PSOE, Felipe González, since PCE and AP left at the last stage of the conversations (LV, 01-08-1981, cover page).

We would have preferred for these pacts to be signed by everyone who sat at the negotiation table (words by Spanish president Calvo Sotelo; LV, 01-08-1981, cover page).

They kicked us out of the meeting [...]. We think it is a huge political mistake, we were forced to accept everything (words by PCE representatives Carlos Alonso Zaldívar and Enrique Curiel; LV, 01-08-1981, p. 9).

A difficult issue. The disagreement among parties was reflected in the absences at the final moment, but also it was shown in the descriptions of the negotiations as a task that was both very hard and key to democracy. This built on the idea that these pacts were considered essential for Spain's progress toward a solid democracy and therefore, even without consensus, they had to be reached. This neglecting of the difference of opinion for the sake of peace and democracy will be a constant theme in the relationship between Catalonia and Spain:

This ends the long negotiation by the representatives of the four national parties and starts what, without doubt means, according to the same sources, a path for the resolution of the most serious problem faced by the Spanish democracy (LV, 26-07-1981, p. 9).

The autonomic "summit", the key for the future agreement that tries to re-direct all the Spanish autonomic landscape (LV, 28-07-1981, p. 7).

Reproaching. Additionally, there were some reproachful remarks from the parties that were in the signature to those who did not attend it, especially the regional nationalists. However, the document that was the base of these pacts was approved by UCD and PSOE months before the actual signing. Both parties engaged in a round of negotiations that were attended by AP and PCE. The representatives of *Convergència i Unió* and *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* were not formally invited. Given this context, the reproaches could be interpreted as additionally offensive by these autonomous communities.

[General secretary of PSOE] Felipe González, said that indeed, "I think it was a historical mistake, but on their side." (LV, 01-08-1981, p. 6).

It is a serious mistake—claimed [general secretary of the Socialist Party of Euskadi] Txiki Benegas—that they were absent of those state meetings, of huge historic relevance, and that, from the outside, they tried to put barriers to a very important state agreement. Whether they were invited or not, the responsible thing to do was to demand their participation and not to just give a statement looking down on the negotiations (LV, 04-08-1981, p. 9).

Persuasion. Less frequently, there were some attempts at convincing the regional nationalist parties that the agreements were not going to affect their autonomous communities negatively. Then again, instead of dialoguing with them and putting them at the same level as the leaders of national parties, these appeared to diminish them by trying to persuade them:

[PSC leader] Joan Prats absolutely agreed with the content of the pacts and disagreed with the versions that some people gave about them: “these pacts can’t be judged only from a Catalan perspective, but as stabilizers of the democratic state, they are state pacts. From this state perspective—argued Prats to ‘La Vanguardia’-, the pacts are very positive: in 1983 the state of autonomies will be a reality, which will imply a transformation from a centralized state to an autonomic one. But even from the Catalan politics point of view, the pacts have to be seen as positive. First, because they respect the Statute and also, because they establish clear rules in the relationships between state and autonomies, ending the conflicts [...]. Finally, they are positive because if we are really objective and prioritize the national interests over the party ones, the pacts are an opportunity to end the tensions with the state and to start working all together to solve the big problems in Catalonia, like the people’s civil unity and a good functioning of the Catalan institutions for a good public administration.” (LV, 04-08-1981, p. 9).

Giving the cold shoulder. Finally, another strategy by the politicians to deal with the disagreements regarding the pacts was just to leave the disagreeing parts completely out of the negotiations. This disregard was negatively perceived by Catalan nationalists:

It is surprising among the circles of international politics that the autonomic issue has been tried to be dealt with from Madrid (words by Roca Junyent, spokesperson of the Catalan minority in the Spanish Congress of Deputies; LV, 01-08-1981, p. 8).

Political tension. Since it was a situation of relative chaos leading to the final design of the autonomic map, there were frequent references to tension between the central and the regional administrations. It is worth noting that these tensions make sense if we take into account that regions were totally repressed during the dictatorship and, therefore, their aspirations of autonomy had been postponed up until that very moment.

On the other side, the aforementioned perceptions of offense and disregard toward Catalonia were not shared by Spanish representatives. On one occasion, it was implied that these discourses were part of an electioneering strategy by Catalan politicians:

Some have the idea that the contrapositions between the two administrations, the Generalitat and the state, are an offense or an insult—like you said before—to Catalonia. When someone argues with one of my decisions, I have no reason to say that that is an offense to Spain; if at all, it could be a decision or criticism against a Spanish ruler. But when someone argues about a decision by the Generalitat of Catalonia, this is considered an offense, when it is only about arguing over a decision by the rulers of Catalonia. It is not an affront. [...] I have the feeling that there is a constant manipulation (words by secretary of territorial administration, Rodolfo Martín Villa; LV, 07-08-1981, cover page).

Political tension in Catalonia. This political tension was not only between Catalan and Spanish administrations, but also among Catalan institutions. The code political tension in Catalonia focused on the differences and disagreements between the Catalan parties and administrations, uncovering the fact that not all Catalan parties were united or nationalist:

In this situation, the result of the autonomic “summit” in Madrid could seriously complicate the political landscape in Catalonia after September, without being possible to guess at any results. A firm pact between CiU, Esquerra and [Catalan UCD] Centristes is nowadays unconceivable, after seeing the tough attitude from [those in CiU] convergents and ERC toward the policy of harmonization, which invariably, affect the Centristes [because UCD was in the Spanish government] (LV, 28-07-1981, p. 7).

Threatened autonomy. Once we move on from the subcategories disagreement and political tension, the third most present in the data corpus was the subcategory threats. Threats alluded to the nationalist parties, and very especially the Catalan ones, forecasting negative consequences of the autonomic pacts for their autonomy, their statutes and their economy. Regarding their autonomy, there were fears that the Catalan parliament would not have legislative capacity and that it would lose powers that had

been just recognized by the recently enforced statute, against the central government. In any case, the dominant feeling was that the autonomic pacts would push the *Generalitat* into the background to prioritize the central government, in political and economic matters. This is marked by a negative feeling that the Spanish representatives were trying to trick the Catalan politicians into supporting something that was harmful for them, exacerbated by the fact that Catalonia had historical demands for more autonomous powers and this was an agreement that seemed to fall short of recognizing them. This was a perspective shared both by the Catalan government and by other nationalist parties. Additionally, the “harmonization” aspect of the law was interpreted by a minority as a way to homogenize Spain, namely to remove the regional cultural diversity.

Only renowned members of the party in the Catalan government [CiU] have expressed their “profound concern”. [...] The spokesperson for CiU in the Catalan parliament, Macià Aalavedra, affirmed yesterday to “La Vanguardia” that “we are very concerned because even when we are assured that the politic pacts will not affect the Catalan autonomy, this will hardly be excluded from their economic-financial consequences that will result in a reduction of the statute. Additionally, we are very concerned by the Organic Law of Harmonization because it gives the government the previous ability to harmonize and the Catalan parliament will be in a situation of simple decentralization, dependent and not possessing an authentic political autonomy. Finally, in a very specific way we are concerned about the consequences for Catalonia of the implementation of the interterritorial compensation fund, since we cannot forget the serious problems of infrastructure and unemployment.” (LV, 04-08-1981, p. 9).

Rafael Ribó [spokesperson of PSUC, Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia] expressed his concerns since “the signature of the UCD-PSOE pact regarding the autonomies is a very alarming event for Catalonia [...] they try to suddenly solve an ancient problematic. And they are trying to do so with measures that, if implemented, would be a real humiliation for the autonomic aspirations. [...] There will be no real autonomy anywhere, only simple decentralizations under every type of control from the central administration. [...] toward a unifying unique model that doesn’t respect the different degrees of collective consciousness. [...] It is more urgent and necessary than ever for all the Catalan parliamentary parties [...] to meet so they can assess all this.” (LV, 04-08-1981, p. 9).

Threatened statute. As to the Statute of Autonomy, there were fears that the autonomic pacts would reduce its power or even make it useless, especially due to the “harmonizer” aspect of the law LOAPA, which implied that in a situation of ambiguity, the state laws would surpass the statutes of autonomy. This is important because the statute was one of the most celebrated accomplishments of democracy in Catalonia. Again, this reinforced the feeling that Catalans had waited very long to have more autonomous powers and once they achieved them, these pacts could partially reverse them:

The “harmonization” could affect the statutes [...] The replacement of the word “order” by “harmonization” in the name of the law that will regulate the autonomic process could affect the Statutes of Autonomy already approved—the Basque, the Catalan and the Galician—, according to the statement by the representative of [People’s Alliance] Alianza Popular after the session of the autonomic “summit” [...] [representative of AP, Jorge Verstryngge]: “because some things that have been done should be changed” and this word allows for the modification of even an approved statute (LV, 24-07-1981, p. 9). “They are attacking our already transferred Statute of Autonomy, which was voted by the Catalan people and approved by the Courts and, even if [these agreements] imply a de-centralization, they also promote the deputations and reduce the real autonomy.” (words by Esquerra Republicana leader Maria Dolors Treserras; LV, 05-08-1981, p. 7).

Threatened economy. Additionally, the threat of the autonomic pacts towards the regional economy focused on the Interterritorial Compensation Fund, which appeared to put Catalonia in a situation of disadvantage relative to other autonomous communities. Importantly, the economic argument for independence, based on the perception that Catalonia is being despoiled by Spain, will be central in future secessionist claims, as will be developed in the analysis of the coverage of the 2012 demonstration in Barcelona. This argument has its base in this agreement, which set the guidelines for a system that

would establish a contribution from the most prosperous regions of Spain to the least wealthy ones:

In commenting on the first numbers that are appearing regarding the harmonization, [Catalan adviser of economy and finances Ramón] Trías Fargas, after pointing out that surprisingly the Generalitat still does not have the complete texts, has explained the total expected investment is of 825,000 million pesetas. In that amount, there are 450,000 million of real investments in new projects, from which 180,000 go through the Interterritorial Compensation Fund. “Of these 180,000 million—told the adviser to Europa Press—, only a minimum part goes to Catalonia” (2,304 pesetas per person, in Catalonia; 15,782 pesetas per person, in Extremadura). In other words, Catalonia will participate with a 7.41 percent in the Compensation Fund. [...] This number (7.41 of the participation of Catalonia in the Fund) results from neglecting the word and spirit of the LOFCA and the statute. [...] Because other indexes considered by the law are ignored, like the minimum level of services and the deficit of equipment that specifically favor Catalonia. [...] Because when, for example, [the fund] talks about migratory balance, it only considers the emigration, which represents a poverty index favorable for Extremadura and Andalusia, but not immigration, which represents an index of need for public investment in regions like Catalonia. [...] [The fund] gives little importance to the unemployment index—in which Catalonia exceeds the national average—and, conversely, it gives too much importance to territory, which is an index that can be perverse from a social viewpoint (LV, 06-08-1981, p. 7).

Status of Catalonia. Finally, the status of Catalonia was discussed by nationalists raising the question of Catalonia being a nation. The presence of this discussion was minimal in the data corpus. Additionally, it was very specifically tied to the celebration of the day of Catalonia and the choice of the slogan for the event:

The slogan of the [Catalan day] “Diada” will not be “we are a nation” [...] It should be pointed out that the draft includes an explicit reference to Catalonia as a “nation” even though the slogan is not “we are a nation”, slogan that centered the act of June 24th in the Barça stadium and that was afterward suggested to be the central slogan of the September 11 celebration (LV, 26-07-1981, p. 8).

On the other hand, members of the Spanish government just referred to Catalonia as a region dependent on the central administration:

At the end of the day, the law is above everything and the state law is above any other law (words by secretary of territorial administration, Rodolfo Martín Villa; LV, 07-08-1981, p. 7).

To sum up, *La Vanguardia* set a discourse that constructed Catalonia as a territory that had patiently and peacefully waited for a long time to get the autonomous powers it deserved and that would not let them go now. *La Vanguardia* clearly communicated to a Catalan audience, which colored all coverage. For example, this was reflected in the importance given to the uncertainty of the consequences of these pacts for Catalonia and the offense implied in the absence of Catalan leaders in the negotiations. Additionally, *La Vanguardia* included the complete texts of the project of law for the interterritorial compensation fund and the autonomic pacts. The newspaper also highlighted the section “Homogeneity and Simultaneity” of the pacts for its readers, because as it says, this section “establishes that these criteria must be implemented in the autonomous communities and the pre-autonomic entities, and makes some remarks regarding the situation of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia” (LV, 04-08-1981, cover page). This shows an effort to clarify the situation for the Catalan audience, acknowledging that was one highly concerned by the pacts.

The Catalan newspaper constructed the Spanish identity based on its recent authoritarian past, which made the transition to democracy a chaotic and uncertain process. In this sense, the newspaper distinguished between Spanish and regional nationalisms, the first one driven by a centralization force and the second by a demand of more autonomous powers for the communities. *La Vanguardia* implied that the uncertainty in this process was especially concerning for Catalans, since they had just approved their Statute of Autonomy, one of the most celebrated accomplishments in Catalonia since democracy. Additionally, this effort in highlighting uncertainty could

invite the readers to suspect the intentions of the pacts' signers. This becomes more probable when added to discourses implying foul play from them towards Catalan leaders.

In the construction of the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, *La Vanguardia* set a discourse that was mostly negative, highly marked by disagreement and tension. According to the Catalan newspaper, this is due to these opposing nationalistic forces (the centralist Spanish and the regional Catalan). Importantly, the pacts were mostly framed in a negative light by making their possible negative consequences more salient than the positive ones.

In the following section, the coverage of the autonomic pacts by the Spanish newspaper *El País* will be analyzed. Unlike *La Vanguardia*, the Spanish newspaper prioritized the relevance of the pacts for a successful transition to democracy. Logically, it did not focus so much on the consequences of the pacts for Catalonia and it did not explain what the pacts meant in detail, probably assuming the readers were not as concerned.

Spanish press coverage of the autonomic pacts: *El País*

This analysis included the articles of the printed version of the newspaper *El País* from July 24th to August 7th of 1981 that were retrieved online after manually searching for the news related to the first autonomic pacts day by day in the newspaper digital archive. This selection yielded 11 pieces analyzed.

Us: Spain. Second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) yielded three categories: **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. The category **us** included the subcategory of

Spain. *El País* based its construction of Spain in its truculent past (Franco's dictatorship), its hopeful future (a solid democratic state) and the people that were going to make that possible: Spaniards. Thus, the subcategory Spain comprised three codes that contributed to the construction of Spain as a new democracy whose government was still trying to figure things out: **young democracy**, **Spain of autonomies** and **Spanish people**.

Young democracy. The code young democracy alluded to those references to Spain as a country that was working towards the consolidation of its new democratic system. This is similar to the findings in *La Vanguardia*, although it is more complex in *El País* since there were two clear dimensions of this new situation. First, there were implicit indicators of a certain feeling of chaos and confusion regarding the daunting task of building a proper state from scratch. This confusion was reflected in the need to clarify hierarchies among institutions (central and regional), to balance the more (politically, through their statutes, and economically) advanced communities like the Basque Country and Catalonia with the rest, and to find consensus:

We think that a mature democratic system is based on opinions and not on power positions (words by Miguel Herrero de Miñón, spokesperson of Grupo Centrista, a branch of UCD; EP, 28-07-1981, "Herrero: 'No concibo que...'", question. 12).

Spain of autonomies. This first dimension is especially important. This is where *El País* differed from *La Vanguardia*, because the pacts were depicted as the final step of the transition to democracy, where this daunting process came to an end. This made them essential and could have diminished any opposition (like those by the Basque or the Catalan leaders):

For [secretary of territorial administration, Rodolfo] Martín Villa, the importance of the agreements—some political-administrative and other economic-

financial—is found in the fact that they signal the final design of the autonomic map, the general criteria for the organization of the institutions, the parliamentary assemblies, the government organisms, the relationships between them, the electoral system...The political-administrative agreements also draw a clear scheme of competences, with a final design of homogenization that is necessary for the evolution of the state (EP, 1-08-1981, “El Gobierno y el PSOE firman los acuerdos...”, para. 1).

Second, there were some allusions to the ghost of the dictatorship. The Francoist dictatorship appeared to be still very present at the time. This is not illogical if we take into account that Franco died only six years before the autonomic pacts were signed. For example, in (EP, 26-07-1981, “El teniente general...”) lieutenant general Fernández Posse encouraged support for democracy and the King:

In this Spain, if we want to do great things and achieve a stable democracy, which is what the Spanish people asked for, we have to support the people that are able to help our monarchy, our King, to maintain unity (para. 5).

However, he also showed sympathy for Franco and some of his most characteristic values. It is important to point out his reference to the importance of Spain’s territorial unity, which would reflect the conservative perspective toward regional nationalisms, namely that they have to be limited or the army could get involved:

We can’t block out our previous chief of state, generalísimo Franco, promoter of that Spain and of our democratic Monarchy [...] and he deserves all respect, he who directed the destinies of Spain, devoting to her [Spain] all his life, because it is of great nations and noble to people to remember always the heroes that built them (para. 4); All of us have the duty to defend Spain, *its territorial unity* and its constitutional law, duties that the constitution delegates very especially to the army (emphasis added, para. 7).

In addition, the code “Spain of autonomies” comprised those references that equaled the Spanish state to the autonomic territorial design. This is very relevant because it shows that a change in this map would be a serious attack to the construction of the Spanish state from its very beginning:

The secretary of territorial administration, Rodolfo Martín Villa, said he thinks the agreement is ‘an important step, decisive I would say, in the construction of the state of autonomies, in the construction of Spain itself, and I think everyone should be happy (EP, 1-08-1981, “El Gobierno y el PSOE firman los acuerdos...”, para. 11).

The autonomies, in the first place. Right now, the state is under consideration, it’s not configured, and that is serious (words by Miguel Herrero de Miñón, spokesperson of Grupo Centrista, a branch of UCD; EP, 28-07-1981, “Herrero: ‘No concibo que...’”, question. 6).

Spanish people. As to Spanish people, there was only one reference to the personality of Spaniards that alluded to a paternalistic view of these citizens of a recent democracy that might not be able to behave in this new situation. This reference was also included in the Catalan newspaper, indicating a similar construction of Spanish people:

But democracy demands, besides rights and freedoms, duties and obligations; and given the individualistic and a bit anarchic personality of the Spaniards, often times we forget about them or we do not take them into account (words by lieutenant general Fernández Posse; EP, 26-07-1981, “El teniente general...”, para. 7).

It is important to realize that, once again, the ideological leaning of lieutenant general Fernández Posse appeared to be close to Francoism, as explained before. But additionally, it is also very relevant to realize that Spanish people were not present in the coverage of this political decision. That could be another sign of democratic immaturity or it could also be interpreted as a weak unified Spanish identity beyond the sum of the diverse regional identities.

Them: Catalonia. The category **them** included the subcategory **Catalonia**, with two codes: **Catalans**, and **Basques and Catalans**. In *El País*, Catalonia was constructed as a rich territory populated by unsupportive people and nationalistic leaders, similar to the Basque Country. The code Catalans described the personality of the Catalan people. Conversely, the code Basques and Catalans connected the two peoples, united by similar

nationalistic aspirations. In any case, the case of the Basque Country was more salient at this time, due to the activity of terrorist group ETA.

Catalans. Catalan people and their leaders were deemed as greedy. This was first due to being one of the richest regions in Spain, and second, because of their disconformity with the [Fund of Interterritorial Compensation] Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial, which forced an economic contribution from the richest to the poorer regions in Spain. Some examples are references to the need of solidarity among regions:

Regarding the economic-financial agreements, [secretary of territorial administration, Rodolfo] Martín Villa pointed out “something that we all say in our speeches but that we don’t always do: the solidarity with the regions, with the autonomous communities that have fewer resources.” (EP, 1-08-1981, “El Gobierno y el PSOE firman los acuerdos...”, para. 11).

Ramón Trías Fargas, Catalan adviser of economy and finances at the time, raised an argument about the autonomic pacts that would be the base for the modern economic pro-secessionist claims. This is based on the supposed unfairness of the Fund of Interterritorial Compensation for Catalonia. According to him, it only took into account indexes that favored other regions in detriment of Catalonia. To this argument, the Spanish secretary of economy at the time would reply that this fund was not meant to harm wealthier regions, but to equal resources among regions:

It doesn’t mean that we will make the richest regions poorer to make the poor richer, since the implementation of the redistributive effect will be done in a way that no region is harmed regarding the current levels of investment. No region will lose economic level (EP, 06-08-1981, “Los pactos autonómicos incluyen...”, para. 17).

Thus, these interactions denote political tension but moreover, they contribute to the stereotype that Catalonia was a rich and greedy region.

In addition, even though not frequently, Catalans were also deemed as somewhat arrogant:

Explicitly, the ex-vice-president of the government Abril Martorell used to say of Barcelona: “I don’t pay the deficit of city halls that have mounted police, feathered helmets and delusions of grandeur.” (EP, 06-08-1981, “Los pactos autonómicos incluyen...”, para. 11).

However, Catalans also appeared as a peaceful society. It is impossible to ignore that this was due to the constant comparison with the other main nationalistic group in Spain, the Basques, and the influence of the attacks by ETA. Hence, violence was always discussed in terms of other nationalistic groups, especially the Basque one, but less often in terms of other separatist movements like the one in Corsica (France). Moreover, violence was never discussed in terms of Catalan nationalism.

Most of the press revolted against the secretary to show their concern about “the danger that ETA means for the Spanish democracy.” (EP, 29-07-1981, “El tema vasco centra...”, para. 7).

Referring to the Corse case: “violence is always condemnable [...] we are at a time where the solution needs to be political, not military.” (words by French secretary of internal affairs Gaston Defferre; EP, 29-07-1981, “El tema vasco centra...”, para. 7).

Basques and Catalans. Related to this, there was the code Basques and Catalans. This code referred to the constant grouping and comparison of both societies. Hardly ever were they mentioned separately in the data corpus. In fact, most of the time they were not even mentioned explicitly but just grouped together as the nationalist ones:

When asked about the absence of the nationalist parties and the fact that this could be a historical mistake, he [Calvo Sotelo] said: “I would have liked if they had been represented”. The general secretary of PSOE, Felipe González, added: “Indeed, I think it was a historical mistake, but on their side.” (EP, 1-08-1981, “El Gobierno y el PSOE firman los acuerdos...”, para. 4).

Us vs. them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. *El País* also set the discourse about the relationship between both societies as one marked by

disagreement and political tension. Hence, the category **us vs. them** included the subcategories **disagreement** and **political tension**. This is similar to *La Vanguardia* but with some nuances. For example, the absences in the pacts were also very present but those of the national parties were deemed as more important than those of the regional nationalist parties. Disagreement comprised references to the pacts involving hard negotiations, and the strategies by each party to come to a signature on time. Disagreement included five codes: **absences in the pacts, a good solution to a difficult issue, giving the cold shoulder, reproaching** and **persuasion**. Political tension referred to the pressures by the nationalist parties and the central government.

Disagreement and absences in the pacts. Regarding disagreement, there were frequent references to the absences of several parties in the pact signatures. This is important because of its democratic relevance, meaning the fact that not all parties were represented in such a milestone for the country. But besides this, it also showed that the negotiations could not reach an agreement for all parties initially invited, and that the two main parties moved forward anyways. It is worth to highlight the differences in the treatment of the absences of People's Alliance and the Spanish Communist Party, depicted as regrettable ones:

The Communist Party and People's Alliance did not sign these pacts, despite the fact that they participated in their creation along the meetings that took place in the autonomic summit (emphasis in the original; EP, 1-08-1981, "Gobierno y PSOE firmaron...", para. 2).

[President of the government Calvo Sotelo] was sorry that [the Communist Party] PCE could not make it to the end of the autonomic negotiation (he wasn't aware at that moment that [People's Alliance] AP also left) (EP, 1-08-1981, "Calvo Sotelo descarta...", para. 4).

Meanwhile, despite their relevance to the issue discussed, the absence of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties was frequently not even mentioned as an important one. For example, this is evident in the following extract, since it did not include the Basque and Catalan nationalists, who were not invited to negotiate:

When asked about the absence of the parties that left the table in the afternoon, the president of the government said: “I would have preferred for these pacts to be signed by everyone who sat at the negotiation table.” (EP, 1-08-1981, “El Gobierno y el PSOE firman los acuerdos...”, para. 3).

A good solution to a difficult issue. Additionally, there were frequent allusions to the difficulty of the autonomic process and the pacts as a good solution. This is relevant because it reinforces the idea that a diversity of opinions turned into consensus was not necessary to reach a worthy agreement:

The final stage of the negotiation took more than 10 hours yesterday before reaching the sign Government-PSOE (EP, 1-08-1981, “Gobierno y PSOE firmaron...”, para. 3).

In fact, it could be implied that the presence of the regional nationalist parties would have made this process more complicated. For example, the following examples raised the question of why it was so hard to reach an agreement. Also, the solution might be related to the fact that the nationalist parties were not invited to negotiate and sign these pacts. Last, it is worth to note that the good solution they could find was, at the end of the day, one that left the regional nationalist parties out of it:

At the end of the day, the goal of these pacts is to bring order, rigor, and rationality to the autonomic process (EP, 1-08-1981, “El Gobierno y el PSOE firman los acuerdos...”, para. 6).

Giving the cold shoulder. Hence, another strategy by the parties to deal with disagreement was to ignore the parties that disagreed with the pacts. This is consequential

because it fueled the Catalan perception of disregard, as it was also recognized in the Spanish newspaper:

But at the same time, he [Calvo Sotelo] reaffirmed that the core of negotiation, constituted by the Government and the biggest party in opposition, “it is enough to make sure they are enforced” [referring to the absence of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties in the pacts] (EP, 1-08-1981, “Calvo Sotelo descarta...”, para. 4).

In any case, political observers point out that the achievements of the socialist mayor could make the detractors of the autonomic agreements even angrier, and especially the nationalists of the Generalitat, who were left out (EP, 06-08-1981, “Los pactos autonómicos incluyen...”, para. 13).

Reproaching. Another political strategy to deal with disagreement was based on the signing parties reproaching those who were not at the negotiation table. Surprisingly, this is pointed at the Catalans and the Basques, who never got to sit at the table (Angulo, 1982, para. 14), instead of at the national parties, who left due to disagreements.

Persuasion. Lastly, the signing parties also tried to persuade the nationalist ones to agree to the pacts. This sort of paternalistic attitude, consisting of just convincing them of the advantages of the pacts after they were signed, instead of listening to their opinions beforehand, contributed to diminish the regional leaders. However, this was the only instance in the data corpus:

[Calvo Sotelo] affirmed that he made and will continue to make the possible efforts to convince the Basque and Catalan nationalists that the pacts will not affect the statutes of their communities (EP, 1-08-1981, “Calvo Sotelo descarta...”, para. 4).

Political tension. Regarding political tension, it was not as present as the references to disagreement. It included allusions to tension between nationalist and non-nationalist regional parties over something else than the pacts, like the power over

Barcelona's city hall, subsidies, alliances between state parties and its regional branches against the nationalist Catalan government, and local matters of this kind:

This pact, secret until now, is not external in its political reading to the rivalry between the socialists, who rule the [Barcelona's] city hall and the nationalists of Jordi Pujol (EP, 06-08-1981, "Los pactos autonómicos incluyen...", para. 1).

To sum up, *El País* set a discourse that constructed Catalonia as a territory populated by peaceful albeit selfish people. The Spanish newspaper constructed regional nationalism as equal to selfishness, both in the case of the Basques and the Catalans. However, the nationalistic aspirations of the Basque Country were more salient. This makes sense if we take into account that the Basque terrorist group ETA was active at the time.

Regarding Spain, *El País* constructed Spanish identity as marked by the dictatorship but close to overcoming it. The emphasis was placed on the importance of the autonomic pacts to accomplish a solid democracy. Hence the selfishness of regions that were reluctant to cooperate, since they appeared to be unable to put their interests aside to work for the common good. Importantly, the construction of the Spanish people was undefined, which could hint that the nationalism of Spain as a whole was not very solid or was still very close to fascist memories in the collective conscience.

As to the Catalan and Spanish relationship, its construction was, like in *La Vanguardia*, based on disagreement and tension. However, *El País* set a discourse that prioritized the signature of the pacts over everything else. This reinforced the idea that the pacts were key for the consolidation of the Spanish state and the culmination of the

transition to democracy. However, this also put the central government over the autonomous communities.

In the following section, the coverage of the autonomic pacts by the Spanish national television channel will be analyzed. The coverage of TVE1 was very similar to that of *El País*. It highlighted the importance of the pacts for Spanish democracy and it reflected the salience of Basque nationalism over Catalan nationalism.

Spanish TV coverage of the autonomic pacts: TVE1

There were only two news pieces about the autonomic pacts in national TV during the selected period time. Due to its antiquity, the material available in the archive of the channel from that period of time was scarce. It is not possible to know if there were more stories because some full news programs were not archived. Because of this, no codebook was built, and the highlights of the pieces will be exposed next. One of the news stories pointed out the relevance of the pacts, which

will set the profile of what some day will be the final configuration of the Spanish autonomic map (TD21H, 2-08-1981).

It also talked about the absences in the signature of the pacts, quoting the vice-president of People's Alliance in the Basque Country on how the Union of Democratic Center and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party wanted to impose the autonomic pacts on the other parties, which brings back the ghost of the dictatorship in Spain, in front of such an imposition. They also quoted the president of the Basque Nationalist Party, Xabier Arzalluz, on the importance of the autonomic statute:

If the government respects their commitment with the Guernica statute, we will do so too (TD21H, 2-08-1981).

The general secretary of the Basque socialists thought that the absence of Basque representatives in the meeting that resulted in the pacts were a “serious mistake.” Importantly, Txiqui Benegas meant a serious mistake on the regional nationalists’ side, as was explained in the coverage by *La Vanguardia*. The presence of the Basque politicians in this matter is highlighted, very possibly due to the salience of pro-independence terrorist group ETA at the time. Finally, Miquel Roca Junyent, spokesperson of the Catalan minority in the Spanish Congress of Deputies is quoted to accuse UCD and PSOE to want to rule together all aspects of Spanish political life. The other news piece (TD15H, 2-08-1981) just made a brief reference to Basque Nationalist Party leader Carlos Garaikoetxea and his opinion that the autonomic offer by the government was insufficient.

Regarding public opinion, a poll by the [Center of Studies and Economic Communication] Centro de Estudios y Comunicación Económica accessed by *El País* found that the Spanish people were skeptical about these autonomic pacts (Frialdad de los españoles..., 1981). This news piece explains that most of the Spanish population did not think that the autonomic map would improve their economy, and that it would worsen the tax policy (Frialdad de los españoles..., 1981, para. 1). However, they thought that regional investments, resource administration, expectations of employment, cultural environments and educational matters would improve (Frialdad de los españoles..., 1981, para. 1). Importantly, the aspect they felt most pessimistic about was the relationship with other autonomic communities, because, even though they expected better commercial

relations, they also expected less employment mobility (Frialdad de los españoles..., 1981, para. 6). Also relevant for this project, the area that most Spanish felt optimistic about was the one about culture and education (Frialdad de los españoles..., 1981, para. 8). Finally, the article highlights that the interviewees who feel most positive toward the autonomies were Basques, Canaries, and Catalans (Frialdad de los españoles..., 1981, para. 9) although the authors added a warning on the representativeness of the regional samples. Arguably, these positive feelings could result from an optimistic state after the repression of regional singularity by the dictatorship.

Conclusion

Catalonia was constructed as a territory where a nationalist government ruled some peaceful albeit rather selfish people. The Spanish newspaper put more emphasis on the nationalist claims by the Basque Country, probably due to the activity of terrorist group ETA. Still, in *El País*, the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties appeared as too self-centered in their own business to see the relevance of these pacts for the sake of Spanish democracy. In the Catalan newspaper, nationalism in these regions was also very much pointed out, but from the perspective of insecurity toward what these pacts would mean for the Catalan people. In a way, the emphasis on how insulting the absence of the nationalist parties in the negotiations was could imply that they were not even given the chance to advocate for the best outcomes for their region, which would also hint at an underlying support for them as trustworthy politicians.

Regarding Spain, in both newspapers it was depicted as a country in evolution, coming from a dark recent past under a harsh dictatorship, trying to climb its way up to

an accomplished democracy. This transition appeared in both newspapers as a chaotic, uncertain process. The Spanish newspaper placed more emphasis on the design of the autonomic map as the ultimate step to configure the modern Spanish state. Probably that is why it focused on cooperation from all parties involved, instead of really explaining the consequences for each region. Conversely, the Catalan newspaper highlighted the uncertainty for Catalonia after these pacts and therefore invited to question them. Also, although to a very minimal extent, *La Vanguardia* acknowledged that there was such a thing as Spanish nationalism, that the dictatorship was marked by it, and that it was exactly this force that pressured in the opposite sense as the regional nationalisms.

Finally, both newspapers showed that the relationship between both societies and administrations was marked by disagreement and tension. In the strategies to overcome disagreement, *El País* highlighted the importance of the pacts for Spanish democracy and, therefore, it implied that the end justified the means in the sense that if what it took for the pacts to succeed was the absence of some of the parties involved, then so be it. *La Vanguardia* also did that, but it nuanced the disagreement on the pacts with some background information. The Catalan newspaper provided information about the political tension caused by the nationalist aspirations of some regions like Catalonia. In addition, it contrasted the aspirations with Catalonia's status in Spain. And finally, it informed its readers about its possible future status, describing the possible negative consequences of the pacts for Catalan autonomy and economy.

This project uses a methodology that cannot prove causality between the construction of Spanish and Catalan identities and changes in public opinion. However,

looking at public opinion research will determine if it moved in the same direction as the discourses set by these media. It is important to consider that this could mean that media are affecting public opinion, public opinion is affecting media or both at the same time. In any case, there were shared trends between both, as will be developed next.

The CEO (*Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió*, the Catalan polling agency) started gathering information on Catalan public opinion on politics in 2005, so there is no information available on the independentist sentiment before then. In addition, the independence of Catalonia was not even mentioned in the public opinion surveys by the CIS in Spain. This, paired with the notoriety of the independentist movement in the Basque Country and ETA, did not leave room for questions about Catalan nationalism for the periods regarding this case study. Furthermore, the CIS (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Spanish Center for Sociological Research) digital archive is missing numerous reports of the results of older studies. What should be taken into account is that from 1980 to 2003, the Catalans elected Jordi Pujol i Soley, from *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*. CDC was a party antecessor of *Convergència i Unió (CIU)* and *Partit Català Democràtic Europeu (PDeCAT)*, parties home of independentist leaders and presidents of the Catalan government Artur Mas and Carles Puigdemont. However, although Pujol was pro-Catalan nationalism, he was never (openly) pro-independence during his presidency.

In addition, a sociological study carried out in 1996 for the CIS examined the stereotypes of some autonomous communities both among the broad Spanish population and in the regions themselves. This study was produced 15 years after the autonomic

pacts, and it could be deemed as not reflective of the stereotypes present then; however, it should be taken into account that it takes a long time for stereotypes to crystallize and, thus, the stereotypes included in this research were probably accepted as conventional wisdom long before 1996. In the study, Sangrador García (1996) includes autostereotypes—how the members of a community perceive themselves—and heterostereotypes—how the members of a community are perceived by other communities (p.111). According to Sangrador García (1996), the image of Catalans then was better defined than those of other communities but very complex, as it was guided by a strong bipolarity attraction-rejection (p.123). The rest of Spain thought that Catalans were, overall, greedy. They also saw them as closed-off, proud, selfish, individualistic, disagreeable and untrusting (it is not easy for them to trust someone). However, Catalans were also perceived as hard-working, entrepreneurs, pragmatic and intelligent (p.123).

So, the Catalan and Spanish identities and the relationship between the two societies appear charged with tension in this first case study, in which the modern autonomy of Catalonia within Spain was defined. The next chapter addresses how those discourses evolved when the tensions grew into open cries for secession, after the 2012 pro-independence demonstration in Barcelona.

Chapter Three: Pro-independence Demonstration

This is the second chapter exploring the major findings in this thesis. Through the use of discourse theory, this analysis made explicit the discourses guiding the media coverage of this event and focused on the themes of Catalan identity, Spanish identity and the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. This chapter follows the same structure as the other case study chapters. First, the press coverage will be analyzed, then television coverage, starting with the Catalan media (the newspaper *La Vanguardia* and the regional public television channel *TV3*) and following with the Spanish media (the newspaper *El País* and the national public television *TVE1*). Finally, public opinion trends will be laid out to compare them with the media construction of Spanish and Catalan identities, looking for a common direction to indicate an influence.

On September 11, 2012, a demonstration supporting the independence of Catalonia took place in Barcelona. Although the number of participants differed greatly according to the source, with 1.5 million according to the police (Barcelona's local police *Guàrdia Urbana* and Catalan regional police *Mossos d'Esquadra*) and 600,000 people according to the Spanish government's local office in Barcelona (Bollier, 2012), no one could deny the relevance of the march, the most massive in Catalonia's history.

The day after, the president of the Catalan government, Artur Mas, gave an official speech in which he acknowledged the will of the people who demonstrated and embraced Catalan nationalistic aspirations. This was the first time that independence was seriously considered by the Catalan government. As such, this is important because the event had plenty of media coverage. Moreover, this gave media the opportunity to

explain the situation, the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, the perceptions of one another and the arguments for and against the independence of Catalonia.

Because of this, the discourse regarding Catalan identity in media evolved from nationalism understood as the demand for autonomous powers and recognition of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in the coverage of the autonomic pacts, to nationalism defined as the demand for recognition of Catalonia as a nation in the coverage of the 2012 demonstration. By the nation-state ideal, which implies that states are legitimized by the common identity shared by a population in a territory, which makes them a nation (Benner, 2012, p.23), the recognition of Catalonia as a nation is tied to independentist demands of secession.³ Furthermore, the introduction of independentism in mainstream Catalan politics and the demands for a state escalated from this moment on. Thus, in the next chapter, findings will uncover how the fact that the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils happened shortly before the illegal referendum for Catalonia's self-determination colored media coverage of the attacks with political tension between administrations.

Importantly, 2012 was, arguably, the hardest year of the most serious economic crisis in the history of Spain, which led to Spain's asking for aid from the European Union that same year (Pérez, 2012), resulting in austerity measures that greatly harmed the Spanish people. This is relevant because Catalonia was also hit by this crisis, forcing the autonomous government to ask the central government for aid, and to also impose harsh austerity measures on the Catalan population. To justify these actions, the Catalan

³ Secession, independence and sovereignty are used interchangeably in this thesis.

leaders created a discourse that placed great emphasis on the unfairness inherent in the Interterritorial Compensation Fund, a fund enforced with the autonomic pacts in 1981 (covered in the previous case study), that supposedly put Catalonia in a situation of disadvantage versus other autonomous communities. To alleviate this situation, the Catalan autonomous president, Artur Mas, and the Spanish president, Mariano Rajoy, scheduled a meeting in which the first suggested a new fiscal treatment for Catalonia. This was known as the fiscal pact, and was a measure approved by the majority of the Catalan Parliament. The meeting took place after the demonstration, therefore after Mas started leaning closer to secessionism, and a new fiscal pact was never achieved.

For the analysis of the media coverage of the secessionist demonstration, the data corpus comprised 145 articles from the Catalan newspaper *La Vanguardia*; 43 audiovisual files from 28 different news programs from the Catalan public television channel *TV3*; 71 articles from the national newspaper *El País*; and a transcript of the news stories covering the event in the public national television channel *TVE1*, 25 pages long, single spaced. It is important to take into account that only news stories about the demonstration were included in the data corpus. In addition, the analysis of the media coverage was guided by the research questions regarding how national and regional media constructed the Catalan and Spanish identities in Spain and Catalonia through the coverage of the secessionist demonstration, and how the secessionist movement was framed in the same coverage by both nation-wide and Catalan media.

The main findings in this chapter suggest that Catalans were constructed as a peaceful democratic society with European aspirations. While Catalonia was defined in

Catalan media as different from Spain in matters of economy, identity and history, Spanish media did not make this difference so salient. Discourses regarding Spanish identity are not very present in the data corpus, which could indicate that the Spanish identity was taken for granted or that it was hard to define a Spanish identity that is more than the sum of the identities of the autonomous communities. In any case, even though the presence in the text is very minimal, in Spanish media Spain was constructed based on its past, especially the civil war and the dictatorship. In all media, the discourses constructing the relationship between Catalonia and Spain were marked by tension. This tension is reflected in the construction of Catalonia as disregarded, abused, offended and oppressed by Spanish representatives and Spain as put at risk and blackmailed by Catalan representatives. Also, this tension is constructed as a political strategy on both sides to win votes. In Catalan media, secessionism appears to be legitimized by a majority of Catalans, taking the demonstration as proof, and emphasizing it as the reason why the government embraced such ideas.

Catalan press coverage of the demonstration: La Vanguardia

This analysis included the articles of the printed version of the newspaper *La Vanguardia* from September 4th to September 18th of 2012, which were retrieved after looking in the digital archive for “*manifestació independència*” and “*Diada*”. This selection resulted in 145 articles. The edition used was the one printed in Catalan.

Us: Catalonia. In this case study, as in the other two, second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) yielded three categories: **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. The category “us” comprised the subcategories **Catalonia** and **secessionism**. *La Vanguardia*

set a discourse of Catalonia that was marked by an extreme sensitivity towards and demand for national recognition. Catalonia included four codes: **Catalan people**, **Europeanism**, **Basques and Catalans** and **Catalan language**. As to secessionism, *La Vanguardia* framed the characteristics of the Catalan secessionist movement based on a series of arguments for independence. This subcategory resulted in nine codes: **economic argument**, **identity argument**, **grassroots movement**, **evolution to officiality**, **historical milestone**, **historical argument**, **intersectional movement**, **a solution for everything** and **legal argument**.

Catalan people. The most prominent discourse in the category of Catalonia concerned the Catalan people, which comprised “us”. The code Catalan people implied that Catalans were unique from the rest of Spaniards in that their main quality was that they are peaceful. This could mean a detachment from Spain’s violent past either in the civil war or in the Francoist dictatorship. However, this could also mean a detachment from the other main secessionist region in Spain, the Basque Country. The relevance of the terrorist group ETA in the modern history of Spain discredited Basque nationalism under the argument that the Spanish government was not willing to negotiate with terrorists. Thus, this could be a discourse that draws a peaceful path towards a secession, the Catalan way. It is important to consider that affirming oneself as a nation is the first step to be recognized as such and to be legitimized as a state afterward. Moreover, it was implied that the Catalans were a peaceful society and therefore intended on keeping it that way in all steps towards secession:

And the government of the Generalitat wants to make the best of this opportunity to showcase the image of a Catalonia that affirms itself “as a nation” strongly,

but in a peaceful, democratic and festive way. [...] The expectation of a massive demonstration led the president of the [Catalan National Assembly] ANC, Carme Forcadell, to ask for “tranquility, calm and serenity” in the march so it moves forward peacefully (LV, 06-09-2012, p. 14).

[General secretary of PP María Dolores de] Cospedal should know that the march is a demonstration of freedom of speech, that is against no one but in support of Catalonia (words by UDC leader Josep Antoni Duran Lleida; LV, 11-09-2012, p. 19).

Similarly, Catalans often appeared to be civil people, and above all, a welcoming society. This seemed to be a discourse that reinforced the idea of Catalan nationalism as one that supported multiculturalism, not xenophobia (Conversi & Jeram, 2017, p. 63):

And second, this historical stage that we are living in will need the effort, empathy and good behavior of all Catalans, no matter where they are from, where they come from, or the language they speak. [...] Ours is a heterogeneous society, fortunately. This new, last and sudden multiculturalism enriches us as people and makes us more open, more welcoming, more awake. Precisely, the societies formed thanks to cultural contributions and diverse origins of their components are more dynamic and richer societies. This is a *country* that, due to conviction of necessity, has built a model of welcoming society that is now one of our main resources (emphasis added, italics in the original; LV, 11-09-2012, p. 20).

In the same direction, but with less presence in the data corpus, *La Vanguardia* constructed Catalans as dialoguing and democratic. This again reinforced the idea that a future secession of Catalonia would have to be peaceful. It might imply that independence should be negotiated with Spain. However, it might also reinforce the idea that a binding referendum for self-determination is needed, which will become popular in the years to come until reaching October 1st, 2017. Furthermore, it could also contribute to making Catalans proud of their ways to achieve their national goals. In any case, a consequence derived from this discourse is that it made it appear that, if there was no agreement, it could not be the Catalans’ fault since they seemed naturally predisposed to reach consensus:

In fact, the proposal approved by the Catalan Parliament, according to Mas was only named fiscal pact because pacts are in Catalans' genes (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 8).

Additionally, it was frequent to characterize the Catalan people as resistant. This could be to add on their peacefulness. Actually, as will be developed later, the constructed relationship between Catalonia and Spain was strongly marked by discourses regarding the abuse by the latter of the first. Thus, this insistence on resistance could mean that Catalans rather endure and resist than fight back. For example, this was reflected in allusions to the difficulty of negotiating the fiscal pact with the Spanish government and the intentions of Catalan leaders to keep trying with emotional resistance, in the forecasting of setbacks in the process to independence and the Catalans' capacity to resist them, and in the call to resist any provocations and keep the process peaceful:

Therefore, the motto in the government and in CiU is "resistance" (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 17).

Importantly, although less frequent in the text, it was made explicit that this resistance was due to their civil dialoguing character and not due to fear, since the Catalan people were depicted as brave:

They only leave us a way: to face it and to confront it. And to make clear that even if this is a long and hard adverse time, we will reverse it, we will overcome it and we will leave it behind (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; LV, 11-09-2012, p. 18).

Europeanism. In this context of nationalistic exaltation, those leaders who supported more autonomous powers and recognition for Catalonia as a nation (nationalists) and those leaders who supported a Catalan state (secessionists) made sure to clarify that they did not want an autarchic Catalan state. Instead, their aspiration was to

be independent from Spain but still in the European Union, as can be seen in the slogan of the secessionist demonstration: “Catalonia, new state in Europe.” They also hoped that Europe would mediate to facilitate the separation. Some examples of this Europeanism were as follows:

“Many people will look at us from outside” said the spokesperson of the [Catalan] government, Francesc Homs—“and we have to make the best out of this window that we will have everywhere, and beyond our borders to show who we are, what we think, what we defend and how we reaffirm ourselves as nation” (LV, 06-09-2012, p. 14).

It is obvious that a massive participation presented as a peaceful and democratic statement for Catalonia’s sovereignty could not go unnoticed for Madrid, nor for Brussels (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 16).

Catalonia looks at Europe and Europe looks at Catalonia: without avoiding the questions that the rise of the secessionist debate raises, but without going beyond the traditional “no comment” regarding the deepest issues and the references to international Law to solve any secession inside the European Union (LV, 12-09-2012, p. 20).

Basques and Catalans. In addition, journalists at the Catalan newspaper tended to mention the Basque country, implicitly drawing a connection between the Basques and the Catalans. Importantly, despite nuances, this connection between Basque and Catalan nationalisms is a constant in all the case studies in this project. This could be because their demands have followed a very similar trend, first for more autonomous power and then escalating in some sectors to independence, since the autonomic pacts in 1981. It is interesting to see that there were two discourses, that of making the similarities with the Basque Country salient but also that of distinguishing the Catalan way of achieving national recognition, marked by peacefulness:

Some days ago, the former [Basque president] lehendakari sent a video to the Catalan National Assembly defending the right to self-determination of the Catalan and the Basque peoples because it means “defending democracy.” But the re-appearance of [former Basque president] Ibarretxe regarding the secessionist demonstration is also due to the PP. “[Catalan president] Artur Mas

has become the new Ibarretxe”, said yesterday the leader of the Catalan PP, Alicia Sánchez-Camacho (LV, 15-09-2012, p. 17).
The clear borders that the Basque politics have lived these last years have moved now to Catalonia (LV, 18-09-2012, p. 17).

To reinforce the differences between Basques and Catalans, *La Vanguardia* put special emphasis on what distinguished them. This raised a question regarding the circumstances of these articles, namely an environment marked by the effort by the nationalist Catalan leaders of differentiating Catalonia from absolutely everyone else in Spain:

Catalonia is not the Basque Country and the average Catalan is starting to be wary of the Basque-Navarre cluster, the most privileged in Spain. [...] Part of the Spanish right, however, is obsessed since a long time ago, with applying to Catalonia the bitterness and social rupture that terrorism provoked in [Basque Country] Euskadi (LV, 14-09-2012, p. 11).
But the main problem here, in my opinion, comes from a mistake in the transition [to democracy], which mixed the national problem laid out by Catalonia and [Basque Country] Euskadi with the necessary decentralization of the state. The Catalan national peculiarity was not recognized enough, unlike the Basque one (LV, 16-09-2012, p. 23).

Catalan language. As to the Catalan language, there were two approaches. On the one hand, Catalan was depicted as an endangered language, in need of protection. This issue by itself raised the question of who was putting the survival of the Catalan language at risk, which appeared to hint at the Spanish government, and who was in charge of saving it, which seemed like it was the Catalan government. This was done by including a majority of Catalan voices speaking in favor of the protection of the language and the integration of this question in the institutional events of the “day of Catalonia,” called Diada:

At 11:30 a.m. in the park of the Ciutadella the main event of the Diada will take place, co-organized by the government and the Parliament and open to the citizens, and that this year want to emphasize the defense of the Catalan language after the “aggressions that has suffered” from several state institutions, according

to [spokesperson of the Catalan government] Francesc Homs (LV, 06-09-2012, p. 14).

On the other hand, Catalan was presented as a part of the identity of Catalonia that excluded the rest of Spain. This was reflected only in one instance in which Catalan was presented this way and it was through the voice of the president of Extremadura. Extremadura is another Spanish autonomous community, one that lost a lot of population to Catalonia in the sixties due to unemployment. The president of Extremadura at the time was known for his repeated attacks on Catalonia. Interestingly, by comparing the role of Catalonia in Spain with the role of Germany in the European Union during the economic crisis, the president of Extremadura acknowledged the economic relevance of Catalonia within Spain. However, this comparison also had negative connotations, as the austerity measures imposed by the European Union, led by Germany, elicited a strong resentment among Spanish people towards the country.

The president of Extremadura demands that Catalonia not think only in Catalan [...] The president of the [government of] Junta de Extremadura, José Antonio Monago warned yesterday that “Catalonia cannot think only in Catalan, the same way that Europe cannot speak only German.” (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 24).

Additionally, there was an instance in which—almost as if he were replying to this idea—the Catalan president at the time, Artur Mas, highlighted the importance of bilingualism for Catalans:

“Speaking Spanish is a high-level asset, it is convenient for Catalans to speak Spanish”, said Artur Mas. The president of the Generalitat thinks that it is not probable that Spanish will stop being a commonly used language (LV, 15-09-2012, p. 13).

Economic argument for independence. Together with the subcategory Catalonia, the subcategory secessionism formed the category “us” in *La Vanguardia*.

Regarding secessionism, the economic argument for independence was the most present one in the text. This makes sense if we take into account that the party with majority of seats in the Catalan Parliament at the time, CiU, committed to negotiating with Spain a new financing model for Catalonia to gain control over taxes:

Catalonia has better internal energy to live better than we live. We produce enough resources and enough wealth to live better than we do. The most urgent battle and the most important challenge is the fiscal sovereignty of *our country*. Specially now (emphasis added; words by Catalan president Artur Mas; LV, 11-09-2012, p. 18).

The [Catalan] president wants to “bet all in” for the defense of the fiscal pact, a proposal that has the support of 75% of Catalans, according to the poll by the [Center for Opinion Studies] CEO last June, and that will be negotiated September 20th in the meeting that [Catalan president Artur] Mas will have at the [Spanish presidential office] Moncloa with president Mariano Rajoy (LV, 07-09-2012, p. 16).

Regarding the fiscal pact, [Catalan president Artur] Mas highlighted that Catalonia does not want more resources now but wants to leave the common regime of autonomic financing and to be able to collect and manage its taxes (LV, 07-09-2012, p. 17).

Identity argument for independence. Importantly, identity was the second-most present argument for independence. Identity was constructed as a shared set of cultural, linguistic, historical traits and future expectations. For example, the celebration of the day of Catalonia was framed as an occasion to demand the recognition of Catalan identity. This is because the Diada is a commemoration of the end of the siege of Barcelona by the Bourbon monarch Philippe V in September 11th of 1714, which was followed a harsh repression of the Catalan signs of identity such as the language.

Now, 35 years later [the demonstration for the Statute of Autonomy], the impact of the demonstration of the Diada is still unpredictable, among other reasons because the demand of autonomy has evolved towards the demand of sovereignty and independence and in a Spanish context that is now more unyielding (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 16).

The [Catalan parliament] Chamber awarded its Honor Medal to Òmnium Cultural and Càritas Catalunya, whose task, either by defending the Catalan language and culture or by fighting poverty and margination, summarizes the

essence of the Catalan identity, its national and social double soul (LV, 11-09-2012, p. 20).

Again, it confirmed what, cyclically, has been one of its identity signs: seeming a fictional country based in a true story and, at the same time, being a real country that, against all odds, denies the accusation of living a fake history (as if the other countries' was real) (LV, 12-09-2012, p. 13).

The [constitutional Court] sentence that the political Spain applauded enthusiastically and catalanism took with desolation and by discarding the middle route. Catalanism, then, had to choose between two extremes: submission or rupture. Obviously, it was not going to choose submission. Even though many Spaniards believe so, catalanism is not a mental illness but an identity. And people do not stop feeling how they feel because some judges say so (LV, 14-09-2012, p. 13).

Grassroots movement. As for the secessionist movement per se, it was frequently framed as a popular grassroots movement. This is important, first, because it legitimized the movement as supported by a majority of the Catalan people:

This is the first time that it is the citizens themselves who take the initiative and confuse the politicians (words by protest singer-songwriter Lluís Llach; LV, 11-09-2012, p. 55).

“I haven’t changed, *the country* changed”, says the former president [of the Generalitat] to explain his ideological evolution (emphasis added; LV, 12-09-2012, p. 20).

The Diada demonstration was necessary to perceive the warning signs: the idea of secession moves people; the seed of the Catalan state has sprouted, and there are many people willing to prove it. For good or for bad, the scenario and the relationship Catalonia-Spain have changed. They have changed abruptly (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 11).

Evolution to officiality. Second, insisting on the grassroots origins of the secessionist movement and on its strong support made it seem like the Catalan government acted democratically by embracing those claims. There were very frequent references to the evolution from this grassroots stage to political officiality, since the Catalan government subscribed to secessionist ideas right after the demonstration:

Artur Mas gave yesterday a speech of unequivocal sovereigntist orientation: “Every day that goes by—he said—more and more Catalans include themselves in the sentiment and the concept that it is us, the seven and a half million people that comprise Catalonia today, who must freely decide our future as people and as nation and this is a solid reason for hope” (LV, 11-09-2012, p. 18).

The [Catalan] president himself recognized it when he admitted that besides the command by the [Catalan] Parliament regarding the fiscal pact, “now we have a command by the people, that cannot be ignored, because a ruler cannot cut the wings of people’s excitement. I identify with the popular cry” (LV, 14-09-2012, p. 11).

Historical milestone. Regarding the demonstration, there were a few references to the precedents of the demonstration. Previous massive demonstrations crucial for the history of Catalonia and its relationship with Spain included the one in 1977 demanding the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the one in 2010 to show discontent with the sentence by the Constitutional Court that reduced the modern statute. However, the Catalan newspaper treated the secessionist demonstration of 2012 as a turning point in Spanish politics. References to the pro-independence demonstration being the most relevant historically are frequent in the data corpus:

“You have to be aware that there is no way we go back...well there is one...for us to put our pants down, and I am not willing to do it.” This vulgar sentence was pronounced last Friday by a man so polite as Artur Mas, president of the Generalitat, in front of the rest of the Catalan political leaders that support the economic agreement for Catalonia, and describes the political turning point that the country is living (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 16).

Forecast of massive participation in a Diada that will be a historical turning point [...] The sentiment previous to the Diada increased the feeling of historical milestone, a continuation of the one experienced on July 10th of 2010 when the most massive demonstration in history rejected the sentence of the Constitutional Court against the Statute that ignored the Catalan popular will democratically expressed through a referendum (LV, 11-09-2012, p. 18).

Historical argument for independence. Other than that, a historical argument for independence was frequently used to explain the size of the secessionist drift in Catalonia. It was less present than the economic and the identity arguments. However, it comprised historical references concerning the truculent relationship with Spain. These references seemed to be shared by all Catalans and they were framed as if they had led up to the current situation. For example, these were related to the defeat of the Catalan

troops against Philippe V in 1714, the abolition by Franco's dictatorship of the Catalan statute that was in force during the time of the Spanish republic, and its following re-establishment and return of the Catalan political leaders from exile and the reduction of the autonomic powers considered in the Catalan statute in 2010.

An intersectional movement. Regarding the pro-independence movement, it was depicted as an intersectional one, capturing different segments of Catalan society and supported by parties across the ideological spectrum, from left to center-right:

The point is for them to come and enrich this protest, like dozens of thousands of Catalans from everywhere geographically and ideologically will do (LV, 11-09-2012, p. 20).

A solution for everything. Additionally, there were some minor allusions to independence as a global solution for everything gone wrong in Catalonia. While the previous arguments focused on specific dimensions such as the economy, the identity or the history, these references constructed independence as a sort of panacea for the Catalans:

That is why fiscal sovereignty means national and social affirmation (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; LV, 11-09-2012, p. 18).

Legal argument. Finally, there were a few references to a legal argument. The legal argument was laid out not so much to support independence but in favor of holding a referendum for self-determination. The argument consisted of highlighting the importance of political figures representing their people. To do so in a better way, only a referendum could show exactly how many Catalan people supported independence and how many did not.

Them: Spain. The category them consisted of the subcategory **Spain**. Spain only included the code **unification**, and its presence in the text was very residual. There was only one instance referring to the will of a Spanish political leader to unify the peoples in Spain:

Regarding the external dimension, it is obvious that the new PSC moves further from its catalanist direction, in the same direction of the project that Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba defended in the primary elections of PSOE: “Only one voice in all Spain” (LV, 04-09-2012, p. 9).

However, despite the fact that references to Spain per se are minimal, Spanish national identity was constructed in *La Vanguardia* through its relationship with Catalonia, and it was overall a negative one. As it will be developed shortly, the relationship between both societies depicted Spain as an abusive, offensive, oppressive, careless state over Catalonia. Meanwhile, Catalonia appeared to be seen by Spain as a blackmailer, irresponsible, naïve society, without legitimate reasons for wanting to secede.

Us vs. them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. The category us vs. them included the subcategories **Spain to Catalonia**, **Catalonia to Spain** and **political tension**. The subcategory Spain to Catalonia described how the Catalan newspaper constructed the Catalan-Spanish relationship from the Catalan perspective. Catalonia to Spain offered the Spanish perspective. Finally, political tension referred to the mutual accusations of making electoral profit out of the situation, and the description of the relationship by the parties involved. Spain to Catalonia included five codes: **disregard**, **offense**, **abuse**, **threat** and **lack of freedom**. Catalonia to Spain comprised six codes: **irresponsibility**, **blackmail**, **naïve solution**, **concern**, **blame** and **contradiction**.

Even though the number of codes was higher, the overall presence in the text of this subcategory was much less than Spain to Catalonia. Probably this is due to the fact that the newspaper was committed to explain the causes of the massive secessionist demonstration in Barcelona. Last, political tension developed two codes: **electioneering** and **relationship**.

Spain disregarding Catalonia. Regarding the construction of the Catalan-Spanish relationship from the Catalan perspective, the perception that Catalans were disregarded, ignored, or not taken into account was the most present in the data corpus. This was also framed as one of the main reasons for the Catalans' disenfranchisement with the Spanish state:

And if we can't make it because Spain turns its back to us, very probably we can approach thing different in the future (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; LV, 07-09-2012, p. 16).

In any case, the main receiver was the president of the central government Mariano Rajoy, to whom [PSC leader Pere] Navarro asked "to get involved in the Catalan question and to stop hiding" and to give an answer to the unhappiness that was expressed in the protest (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 8).

We [in Spain] had surveys that warned us of the rise of secessionism, and we ignored them. We had half the towns supporting sovereignty and we underestimated them. We knew that it was cool among the young ones to self-define as independentist, and we thought it was an anecdote. We were told that disenfranchisement was growing and they said it was to hide the internal problems. [...] I think Spain still doesn't believe it, many think this is a minor movement. [...] That is why I think that Rajoy fell short when he spoke about trouble and hullaballos and when he asked for caution. Messages and mentality should change (words by Fernando Ónega López, a Spanish journalist and speechwriter for the first Spanish president elected after the Francoist dictatorship, Adolfo Suárez; LV, 13-09-2012, p. 11).

Interestingly, one such form of disregarding Catalonia appeared to be by controlling the salience of the Catalan question in national media. The fact that the Spanish public television broadcaster *TVEI* (included in this analysis later in this chapter)

did not give the secessionist demonstration the importance it deserved was admitted by the channel (Gómez & García de Blas, 2012), and acknowledged by political leaders and other media:

What is the most probable response by president Rajoy? To act like it is logical that TVE places the news on the protest in Barcelona in the fifth position in the news program, to pat [Catalan president Artur] Mas's back and to insist in this friendly reminder to the confused Catalans that the priority is the unemployment and the crisis, as if they lived in a bubble and these two pests weren't reaching it. If Rajoy really thought that Catalans are Spanish, to whom he is devoted in body and in soul, he would understand that he cannot reply to them that it is not time to address what concerns them. And, above all, he would assume that the first step to solve a problem is to recognize its existence (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 8). Spanish Radio and Television (RTVE) yesterday admitted their mistakes. After minimizing the importance of the demonstration of September 11th and placing it in fifth position in order of importance in their news program at 9 p.m. on Tuesday—a day without any other historic events—, the direction of the public broadcaster admitted the mistake to this newspaper (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 12).

Spain offending Catalonia. Catalans also appeared to be offended by the alleged attacks thrown at them from Spanish representatives, like presidents of other autonomous communities. Attacks against Catalonia appeared to be common especially in speeches by the president of Extremadura, and to a lesser extent by the presidents of Castilla-La Mancha and Galicia.

A month later, in the debate about the state of the region held last June, he suggested that Extremadura should “lead the resistance against this unsupportive enterprise called Catalan fiscal pact” that, according to him, can be summarized saying that “Catalonia demands and Extremadura pays.” [...] The vice-president of the Generalitat, Joana Ortega, said that words like Monago's “help” to make the demonstration of the Diada “more massive”, because they “encourage people to attend the protest to defend their country and their dignity.” (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 24).

The weight of the debt—43,954 million euros in the second trimester, more than 13,476 million in bills this year and the increase of 34.9% of interest—has forced the Generalitat not only to request aid, but to become the scapegoat of the leaders of PP. In the latter weeks, the presidents of Galicia, La Rioja and Extremadura have pictured Catalonia as a beggar territory when in reality it is a net contributor to the state accounts (LV, 16-09-2012, p. 27).

Spain abusing Catalonia. In addition to these two very salient perceptions of the Catalan-Spanish relationship, Catalans were depicted as being repeatedly abused by the Spanish state, and very specifically by its financing system. This makes sense if we take into account the context of crisis and that the meeting to negotiate the fiscal pact was coming up. This discourse of economic abuse was reinforced by the discourse regarding the unfairness of the Interterritorial Compensation Fund, enforced with the autonomic pacts in 1981, which the fiscal pact was meant to alleviate. It appeared that such unfairness had forced Catalonia to request aid from the Spanish government.

The [Esquerra Republicana–ERC] local office sent a letter to the [Spanish] secretary of inland revenue, Cristóbal Montoro, in which it was demanded for him to “take his hands out of the Catalan accounts.” (LV, 07-09-2012, p. 17). The message is unequivocal: Catalonia does not want to be the scapegoat of the atrocious Spanish crisis (LV, 12-09-2012, p. 14).

“I don’t have any arguments against independence because that is how Spain wanted it. It is making *our country* unfeasible and we cannot accept this situation any longer”, he [former president of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol] explains (emphasis added; LV, 12-09-2012, p. 20).

This does not mean [Spanish presidential office] Moncloa does not recognize the “feeling of abuse” that exists in Catalonia and among the Catalans, but they think that the Catalan politicians should do some soul-searching and ask themselves to what extent they are responsible for this growing frustration in the Catalan society (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 11).

Lack of sensitivity versus the Catalan identity, fiscal deficit immutable for years, financing systems that punish the Catalan tax effort, an effort of investment by the state under the population, invasions of competences, and “cropped” statutes...It’s the list of historical abuse shown this week by the [Catalan] president Artur Mas and that opposes, in his opinion, the sense of state shown by Catalonia to the greatest challenges of the Spanish democracy (LV, 16-09-2012, p. 26).

Spain threatening Catalonia. Regarding threat, there were a few allusions to Spanish leaders warning nationalist leaders of potential negative consequences if they continued in this direction. These were normally very vague, such as implying a possible discontinuation of support in the Catalan Parliament, bringing up the law to hint at legal

repercussions, or comparing Catalonia with the Basque Country to suggest that the secessionist movement could turn aggressive:

Rajoy's government asked for caution in this kind of demonstrations, because "these debates are dangerous." (LV, 08-09-2012, p. 13).

Spain repressing Catalonia. To a smaller extent, the perception of Catalonia was that Spain was limiting its freedom. In most cases, it was implied that independence would be a way to achieve Catalonia's complete freedom:

We are not as free as we would want but we are not dead like some would want (words by spokesperson of the Catalan government, Francesc Homs; LV, 07-09-2012, p. 16).

If there is no economic agreement, the journey of Catalonia towards freedom, is open (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; LV, 12-09-2012, p. 19).

It would definitely be interesting to see if this perception became more salient over the years, especially after the police charges to avoid the illegal referendum of October 1st, 2017 and the fact that elected Catalan leaders were sent to jail awaiting trial afterwards.

Catalonia, irresponsible versus Spain. As to the opposite perspective, the one describing how the Catalan newspaper constructed the Catalan-Spanish relationship from the Spanish perspective, it appeared that Spanish leaders mostly thought that the secessionist drift of the Catalan people and politicians was irresponsible. To understand this, it is important to take into account that in 2012, Spain was submerged in the harshest economic crisis of its history, asking the European Union for aid in its peak that year (Pérez, 2012):

From the Spanish government, they say that the Spanish economic situation is hard enough and that these debates should be avoided, since they send an image of distrust toward the stability of Spanish politics, and that they do not convey

trust in the future, since the measures adopted are being questioned (LV, 08-09-2012, p. 13).

That is why he [Rajoy] asked the Catalan rulers, the government and the opposition to “focus on what is really important” [...] But [Rajoy] he asked for reflection, given the situation that Spain and Catalonia are experiencing right now: “What I can say is that in these times it is very important to be cautious, to know what Spain is going through, to know what are each other’s problems.” [...] And that is why the president of the government insists regarding these demands that centered the Diada: “if there is a time in the recent history of Spain when it is essential that we work together, it is now.” (LV, 12-09-2012, p. 15).

Catalonia blackmailing Spain. Additionally, the Spanish representatives seemed to feel that Catalans were adding pressure to the economic crisis by using their resources as leverage for negotiation, which appeared to be interpreted in Spain as blackmail:

The criticism also came from the president of Murcia, Ramón Luis Valcárcel, who accused [Catalan president] Artur Mas of having a “blackmail attitude” in using the economic contribution of Catalonia [to the rest of Spain] as an argument for independence and to “lead” the secessionist demonstration (LV, 14-09-2012, p. 13).

Catalonia, naïve according to Spain. Independence was also seen as a naïve solution to Catalonia’s demands of economic and national sovereignty, by those who did not support it, which was not necessarily only Spanish people or representatives:

And it requires the maximum honesty in analyzing the consequences, that are not as simple as saying “a Catalan state will fix this.” (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 11).

Importantly, the inclusion of these voices should not be interpreted as a stance taken by the newspaper. Even though a decision was made to include this content, the different voices were clearly defined. In addition, despite the presence of different perspectives, it should be taken into account that some were more pervasive than others. It is worth to remember that this analysis presents the findings in the order from more to less present in the text.

In addition to including the discourse describing the secessionist movement as naïve, *La Vanguardia* also included a counter-argument. Responses to those who thought that Catalan nationalist leaders were being naïve came from Artur Mas himself:

The “paradise landscape” syndrome, a concept coined by the [Catalan] president, related to independence as an immediate goal and as the panacea for all evils, also worries the [Catalan] government, since they are afraid that if the fiscal pact process is too slow, a tsunami will overtake the parties and institutions (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 17).

Catalonia, reason for concern. Logically, seeing this situation, the Spanish politicians showed concern. It was important to highlight that references to concern were directed towards the fact that the Catalan government encouraged the participation in the secessionist demonstration and towards the fact that it was so massive:

Concern. The Spanish government is concerned that hundreds of thousands of Catalans have gone into the streets under a secessionist flag (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 11).

Catalonia blaming Spain. Even though less present in the data corpus, there was the perception that Catalonia was unreasonably blaming Spain for all its evils:

But the central government, besides being concerned, also rejects the idea of Spain as guilty of all the evils in Catalonia: “The Spanish government will not allow, under any circumstance, for Spain and its government to be placed as the enemy of Catalonia.” (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 11).
A third block believes that this is the classic reaction of nationalism: to blame the state for its own evils (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 11).

Contradictions. In addition, some politicians against independence raised the contradiction inherent in wanting to negotiate a fiscal pact to improve the tax conditions of Catalonia in relation to Spain and, at the same time, wanting to secede. This could be seen as a political strategy to undermine the secessionist movement:

[PSC leader Pere] Navarro asked the president of the Generalitat to put “ambiguities” aside and choose between independence and fiscal pact, goals that the PSC leader sees as incompatible (LV, 13-09-2012, p. 8).

To these, the Catalan government replied that fiscal sovereignty was the first step for national sovereignty:

Obviously, the president referred to the main political goal of his term, the fiscal pact, making it clear that “the most urgent battle and the most important challenge is the fiscal sovereignty of *our country*”, but he wanted to emphasize the social interest of national recognition: “fiscal sovereignty is at the same time an action of national affirmation and an action of social affirmation, to the extent where the first damaged without it are the individual and concrete people, with names and last names.” (emphasis added; LV, 11-09-2012, p. 18).

Political tension and electioneering. As to political tension, it can be seen in the accusations from both parties to the other of using the economic crisis and the rise in disenfranchisement of Catalonia towards Spain to gain votes in the elections that were to take place soon. This is important because it follows that there was a perception that these two positions represented a majority of people in each side. For example, there was an accusation that Mariano Rajoy allowed the presidents of other autonomous communities to attack Catalonia because that seemed to make them gain social support in those regions. On the Catalan side, the accusation was of Artur Mas wanting to capitalize on the social discontent in Catalonia while not being really serious about pursuing independence:

The importance of the demonstration is surpassing the parties. Each will interpret it their way. [...] Actually, the demonstration makes obvious the distancing between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, deepened by the incompetence of politicians that are stubbornly encouraging conflict for selfish interests instead of solving it (LV, 11-09-2012, p. 28).

Catalonia and Spain. Finally, there were some explicit allusions to the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, obviously seen through the lens of the writer and filtered by their own support to the Catalan secession or lack thereof. Interestingly,

instead of blaming each other, these descriptions seemed to be dominated by a sense of mutual disappointment, annoyance or fatigue:

It seems obvious then, that in the latter decades, an identity radicalization has taken place in broad segments of the population in Catalonia. But this radicalization, even though in the opposite sense, has also spread to the rest of Spain, where the supporters of centralization have gone from 25% to 40% in only a year and a half. To sum up, the polls describe a mutual disappointment (LV, 09-09-2012, p. 18).

To sum up, *La Vanguardia* set a discourse that constructed Catalonia as a territory with a unique identity and populated by peaceful, civic, democratic, welcoming, resistant people. The Catalan newspaper placed emphasis on the uniqueness of Catalan identity, making the discourse regarding the Catalan language salient and distinguishing Catalans from Basques despite shared nationalistic aspirations. The Spanish identity was not defined in detail by itself, but it was constructed through the Catalan-Spanish relationship. Thus, Spain appeared to treat Catalonia mostly with disregard, while Catalonia appeared to act irresponsibly towards Spain. Secessionism was constructed as a grassroots movement, supported by a majority of the Catalan civil society, that was based in economic, identity and historical arguments. Additionally, *La Vanguardia* focused on the Europeanist nature of the Catalan secessionist movement, consistent in rejecting the Spanish national identity but embracing the European supranational one.

In the following section, the analysis will focus on the coverage of the secessionist demonstration by the Spanish newspaper *El País*. *El País* nuanced the characterization of the Catalan people by offering a not-so-peaceful side. Unlike *La Vanguardia*, there were a few discourses regarding Spanish national identity. The construction of Spain was marked by the country's dark past. As to the secessionist

movement, the Spanish newspaper placed more emphasis on the support by the Catalan government than on its origins in Catalan civil society.

Spanish press coverage of the demonstration: *El País*

This analysis included the articles in the online version of the newspaper *El País* from September 4th to September 18th of 2012, which were retrieved online after manually I searched for the news related to the pro-independence demonstration in the morning, afternoon and night segments in the newspaper digital archive. This selection yielded 71 pieces analyzed. Note that ‘Eskup’ reports, clippings of news about a topic, were included. However, videos and original documents such as the original letter by King Juan Carlos I and the *Generalitat* press release on the institutional message by the Catalan president for the Diada, were not included.

Us: Spain. Second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) yielded three categories: **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. The category **us** included the subcategory of **Spain**. This subcategory comprised only a code: **dark past**. *El País* constructed Spain by setting a discourse that linked the potential social division resulting from the pro-independence stance of the Catalan government to another time of social division, namely the Spanish civil war:

The call from CiU to participate in the demonstration could bring us serious problems in the future, it could provoke civil confrontations between us. Their attitude is irresponsible and dangerous (words by PPC leader Alicia Sánchez Camacho; EP, 10-09-2012, “El PP Catalán alerta...”, para. 8).

This gives an idea of the position held by politicians against independence, which will be developed further later on. The construction of Spain did not go any further based on explicit references to the country or its people in the text. However, as I will continue to

explain, based on the allusions to its relationship with Catalonia, the overall picture is, surprisingly, a negative one.

Them: Catalonia. The category them included the subcategories of **Catalonia** and **Secessionism**. Catalonia was mostly constructed in *El País* through its people and its language, and also through its relationship with other nationalisms in Spain. The point to make was that the Catalan people and language were different from Spanish ones. It included three codes: **Catalans, Basques and Catalans** and **Catalan language**.

Secessionism included the traits and arguments by the supporters of the Catalan secessionist movement. It developed seven codes: **economic argument, evolution to officiality, identity argument, historical argument, a solution for everything** and **historical milestone**.

Catalan people. Regarding Catalans, in the Spanish newspaper as in the Catalan one, they were constructed as peaceful people. The discourse set is that in their demands for national recognition they did not intend to diminish anyone, and they were not looking to create conflicts:

We are not marching against anyone, but in favor of Catalonia (words by a protester; EP, 11-09-2012, “El autobús 47”, para. 5).
And he [Catalan president Artur Mas] was listened to with a lot of attention in his very direct and well-structured intervention from which the public highlighted its constructive spirit when defending “the Catalan state” without looking down on the Spanish plurality (he frequently referred to Spain as a group in which he included Catalonia and to which Catalonia has contributed to) (EP, 13-09-2012, “Mensajes claros y ausencias notables”, para. 2).

But unlike *La Vanguardia*, *El País* also showed a side of Catalans that was not so peaceful. For example, this was reflected in the participation in the demonstration of one Catalan politician who had declared his intention of not attending it due to discrepancies

with the pro-independence slogan. The leader of Democratic Union of Catalonia Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida was called *botifler*, which means traitor in Catalan and was historically used to describe those Catalans supporting the troops of Phillip V in the War of Succession. The participants also tried to attack him throwing coins at him even when, due to an injury, he was temporarily in a wheelchair.

According to the articles in *El País*, Catalans were also democratic people, with European aspirations. This discourse reinforced the idea the Catalan nationalism is not isolationist or autarchic, since its aspirations included being part of the European Union. Interestingly, the Catalan identity was constructed here as different from the Spanish identity, but inside the supranational European identity:

The text explains the Catalan situation after the march of September 11 and highlights the pro-European aspiration of the Catalan secessionists: “a clear and democratic process is necessary to guarantee the democratic and political rights of the Catalans—European citizens—, and also the rights of the European citizens with non-Spanish nationality residing in Catalonia.” (EP, 18-09-2012, “CiU, ERC e ICV piden...”, para. 3).

Catalans were described as those people who live, work in and love Catalonia. Therefore, by setting such a broad definition, Catalan society was framed as one friendly to foreigners. This reinforced the idea that Catalan nationalism is a multicultural nationalism. Thus, Catalan society appeared to be an open and welcoming one:

The children of those who emigrated to Catalonia at the beginning of the sixties are now 50, their children were born here and are fully integrated thanks to that principle repeated in the transition, that “Catalan is everyone who lives and works in Catalonia.” (EP, 16-09-2012, “Independentismo de corazón...”, para. 19).

“Catalan is whoever wants to be it”, says now [Catalan National Assembly–ANC leader] Carme Forcadell (EP, 16-09-2012, “Independentismo de corazón...”, para. 20).

In addition, even though not very present in the text, Catalans were depicted as supportive. This is important because it contrasted with the classic stereotype of Catalans as greedy people. The Spanish newspaper made a clear effort to explain the economic and financial demands of Catalonia, which were central in the discourse due to the Catalan demand for a negotiation of the fiscal pact:

Catalonia is supportive with every autonomous community in Spain, but the deficit per habitant in the country has been doubled in these years, going from 1,076 euros in 1986 to 2,251 euros in 2009 (EP, 12-09-2012, “El pueblo de todos los pueblos”, para. 4).

Only in one instance, and those were the words by the Catalan president Artur Mas, were Catalans referred to as a brave and enduring people. This was very minimal compared to the discourse of Catalans as a resistant people in *La Vanguardia*:

Despite defeats, [the Catalan people] never behave as a defeated (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; EP, 10-09-2012, “Mas asegura...”, para. 5).

Basques and Catalans. The Catalan people were implicitly deemed as nationalists, drawing a connection with other traditionally nationalistic territories in Spain, like the Basque Country. This was a relationship that, it appeared, started before the dictatorship but got closer after the autonomic pacts:

The president of Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, said the protest was a “very clear demonstration” of the need to “re-think” the state of autonomies, as she demanded again yesterday, because neither Catalonia nor the Basque country “feel better integrated” in Spain after 33 years (EP, 12-09-2012, “Santamaría aboga por...”, para. 6).

Unlike the Catalan newspaper, the Spanish one did not make such a big effort in differentiating the Catalan and Basque cases. However, there were some exceptions based on their history, economy, societies and politics, highlighting a more united secessionist movement in Catalonia than in the Basque Country:

The unity that the Catalan Parliament has shown defending almost everything regarding its identity is missing in the Basque case, where the parties lean more towards highlighting differences with their enemies (EP, 17-09-2012, “Una política más fragmentada...”, para. 1).

Catalan language. The Catalan language was treated like an endangered sign of the Catalan identity. It also seemed to be a sensitive topic for Catalans, on occasions present in attacks aimed at them:

When [former Spanish president José María] Aznar won the election, he got scared of hearing that the people of Madrid, who were gathered due to the victory, yelled in Génova street [PP headquarters]: “¡Pujol, enano, habla en castellano!” [They were calling names to former Catalan president Jordi Pujol and telling him to speak in Spanish]. That was not an improvised slogan, resulting from a happy night by the right; it was designed with effort during months and years, and it was the result of a mean interpretation of the political history and the cultural history that unites and separates both entities. Some weeks before, a newspaper in which the victorious leader had his public mirror, published a news piece in which they pointed out the persecution of the Spanish language in the schools in Barcelona. Some journalists showed Aznar the cover page while having breakfast together. Pointing at the news, the one who would later become president said: “we will end this.” (EP, 16-09-2012, ““Amics i coneguts””, para. 3 and 4).

Economic argument for independence. The subcategories Catalonia and secessionism comprised the category “them” in *El País*. Catalan secessionism was depicted as a movement that had grown based on several arguments. The most present in the data corpus was the economic argument, namely that an independent Catalonia would be wealthier than if it remained in Spain:

I don't normally come to this demonstration but I am fed up [...] fed up of seeing that in the rest of Spain they spend money in projects that are unnecessary and unsustainable that we all pay for and that above all, we are treated as if we were thieves and they use the Catalans to win more votes in other communities (words by a protester; EP, 11-09-2012, “Hemos venido a hacer...”, para. 3).

There would still be problems but they would be our own. We work and work and if giving to Spain more than what we get back we are doing just fine, it is clear that we would be better off (words by a protester; EP, 11-09-2012, “Hemos venido a hacer...”, para. 11).

All parties, even the PP, agree that something needs to be done to help the fiscal deficit of a community that goes from fourth to tenth position in resources after

contributing to the interterritorial solidarity (EP, 10-09-2012, “Del pacto fiscal a la secesión”, para. 4).

Evolution to officiality. The secessionist movement appeared to have been taken over by official entities and elected representatives. While *La Vanguardia* placed the emphasis on the grassroots origins of the movement, *El País* highlighted the fact that the movement was supported and endorsed by the actual Catalan government and its president, Artur Mas. This was important because it could be seen as a way to undermine the movement. The first approach suggested legitimacy of the movement, demanded by the people to be followed by their elected representatives. Meanwhile, the second approach framed the movement as directed by the political leaders, hinting at an electoral strategy or party interests:

“The message is unequivocal. Mas has said it several times: Catalonia is moving”, said Francesc Homs, spokesperson of the Catalan government, referring to the fact that the Catalan nationalism has moved towards secessionist claims (EP, 10-09-2012, “El independentismo echa un pulso...”, para. 7).

The Catalan political centrality has moved towards secessionism (EP, 11-09-2012, “¡Menudo lío!”, para. 1).

The Catalan president presented himself as a ruler pushed by his citizens. He was very clear: he had a plan, which has the fiscal pact, but the demands in the streets surpassed him: “[...] We have always tried the agreement, but things evolve and after not being watched and not being listened to, things are this way.” (EP, 13-09-2012, “Mas plantea en Madrid...”, para. 2).

Identity argument for independence. Much less present in the text than the economic argument was the identity argument. This was based on the perspective that Catalonia holds a unique national identity, different from the Spanish one. This was reflected in references to the oppression of the Catalan identity. Examples of this included an institutional event to cover the shield of Phillippe V in the façade of the Catalan Parliament with the Catalan flag. In fact, the Catalan flag had been there before.

The Spanish newspaper mentioned that the event included a light show and the reproduction of the speech by the former Catalan president Francesc Macià, who in 1932 attended the first restitution of the shield, retired afterward during Franco's dictatorship. Additionally, *El País* offered a reflection on the role of Catalan media in the construction of a Catalan identity. It concluded that, by targeting a Catalan audience, they contribute greatly to its cohesion, which benefits them because they are perceived as the media of the Catalans:

“The idea of us is a social construction”, explains Jordi Argelaguet, director of the [Catalan] Center of Opinion Studies (CEO). “Once the idea of us is defined, when that group perceives that it is being questioned, they come together even more.” The mass media in Catalan, in general very professional, which tend to present everything that occurs in the world from the perspective of the Catalan national interest, contribute to that cohesion powerfully. The dominant discourse tends to amplify the affronts, and it feeds back from its effects, in a way that those media are identified as ours and that gives them the leadership in Catalonia (EP, 16-09-2012, “Independientismo de corazón...”, para. 17).

Historical argument for independence. Regarding the historical argument, it was based on the historical events that led up to this sentiment in Catalonia, namely a history marked by Spanish centralist nationalism in which Catalans patiently waited until it was their time to demand more autonomous power. This was reflected in references to the Francoist dictatorship or the modification of the Statute of Autonomy in 2010:

Then, in 1977, we fought to take a boot off us, Franco's, now we are at the end of that road (words by a protester; EP, 11-09-2012, “Hemos venido a hacer...”, para. 9).

This professor remembers the precedent that was the “atrocious sentence by the Constitutional Court about the Catalan statute” after the appeal by the PP. “That was a political pact between the state and Catalonia that was voted on a referendum and in which the Constitutional [Court] should have never intervened”, she said (EP, 13-09-2012, “Mensajes claros y ausencias notables”, para. 5).

A solution for everything. Independence was frequently depicted as a naïve solution. This was constructed by highlighting that secessionists thought independence would bring an improvement to Catalonia without considering the potential negative consequences of secession. This could be interpreted as a way of disregarding the Catalan secessionist movement:

And it connected with a society that sees in independence a potion that will heal all of its illnesses (EP, 10-09-2012, “Del pacto fiscal a la secesión”, para. 1).

Historical milestone. As to the demonstration per se, *El País*, like *La Vanguardia*, gave it the treatment of a historical milestone. This was done by highlighting the dimensions of the demonstration and the political consequences of its secessionist nature:

Everyone thinks there will be a before and an after September 11 of 2012 (EP, 11-09-2012, “El autobús 47”, para. 1).

Additionally, the Spanish newspaper mentioned previous demonstrations to emphasize that none was like that one. Previous demonstrations were brought up and contrasted with the festive atmosphere of the one in 2012:

The elder ones remembered the big protests, those with a million protesters: the one in 1977 that asked for the autonomy, the one in 2000 that condemned the attack by [Basque terrorist group] ETA that ended with Ernest Lluch’s life, the one in 2003 against the war in Iraq, the one in 2010 against the sentence that cropped the statute. This time in a festive event, with the feeling among the protesters that this time this is serious (EP, 11-09-2012, “Hemos venido a hacer...”, para. 8).

Us vs. them: the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. *El País* constructed the Catalan-Spanish relationship as marked by tension from both sides. The category us vs. them, included the subcategories **Spain to Catalonia**, **Catalonia to Spain** and **political tension**. Spain to Catalonia referred to how the Spanish newspaper

constructed the relationship from the Catalan perspective. It included five codes: **disregard, abuse, offense, lack of freedom, and threat**. Catalonia to Spain described the relationship from the Spanish perspective. This subcategory comprised seven codes: **irresponsible, contradictions, naïve solution, blame, victimization and blackmail**. The third subcategory, political tension, alluded to the mutual accusation of making electoral profit out of the situation and the assessment of the Catalan-Spanish relationship. Thus, it comprised two codes: **electioneering and relationship**.

Spain disregarding Catalonia. In *El País*, like in *La Vanguardia*, Catalonia appeared to feel disregarded by Spain. This was reflected in instances in which the Catalans felt they were ignored, like when the Constitutional Court reduced the statute after it was approved by the Catalans in a referendum, or when members of the Spanish government refused to comment on issues regarding Catalonia or to engage in a dialogue with Catalan representatives.

In any case, the demonstration will channel the indignation against the central government, which has disregarded the demands from Catalonia; doesn't keep to its commitments (the competitiveness fund and the Third Additional Disposition); and shows little sensitivity toward the fiscal deficit. All this adds up to the sentence by the Constitutional Court, which cropped the Statute voted by the people (EP, 9-09-2012, "La Diada más...", para. 7).

I cannot go to the protest because I represent 7.5 million Catalans with different sensitivities. But I also cannot hide our project, the one of national transition and the right to decide. It would be good if the people outside Catalonia listened with attention to what will happen today (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; EP, 11-09-2012, "Mas advierte que...", para. 3).

None of the different Spanish governments have responded to the demands from Catalonia (EP, 12-09-2012, "El pueblo de todos los pueblos", title).

Like *La Vanguardia*, *El País* reported on the admitted mistake by Spanish public television broadcaster *TVE1* to not consider the secessionist demonstration relevant enough to be placed at the beginning of their news program:

After the large amount of criticism received Wednesday for having placed the news about the Catalan secessionist march, [the group that includes TVE1] RTVE took this afternoon a step forward and admitted they committed a “mistake of assessment” in placing the issue in the fifth position in order of importance in the TVE news program at 9 p.m. (EP, 12-09-2012, “RTVE admite que cometió...”, para. 1).

Spain abusing Catalonia. In addition to this lack of recognition, Catalans seemed to feel abused by the Spanish state, especially in economic matters. Importantly, on a few occasions, the Spanish newspaper elaborated that this feeling was based on facts such a lack of investments and a fiscal deficit. This contributed to legitimize the economic demands of Catalonia and also promoted a better understanding and empathy towards the secessionist movement:

The feeling that Catalonia is mistreated in the rest of Spain, especially by the Spanish government, combined with a call from the Catalan government and the crisis (EP, 11-09-2012, “Hemos venido a hacer...”, para. 2).

We are tired for them to pee in our mouths and then tell us that it is raining (words by a protester; EP, 11-09-2012, “El autobús 47”, para. 3).

The word “hartazgo” [to be “harto” is to be fed up] defines well a very generalized sentiment that reached a peak with the sentence by the Constitutional Court on the statute. [...] The frustration was huge in Catalonia. The sentence by the Constitutional Court was celebrated by the PP as a victory over the Catalan nationalism, and it was. But the price was the definitive rupture of the trust between them. [...] In July of 2010, hundreds of people protested in Barcelona against the sentence. Silence. [...] Two years later those and many more went into the streets, not to defend the statute anymore but to demand independence (EP, 16-09-2012, “Independentismo de corazón...”).

In their dialectic of confrontation, the secessionists do not speak about deficit but about “fiscal despoil” and as often as they can, they go back to the mantra “Madrid is stealing from us”, a message that is as simple as effective. The problem is that they are helped by the facts: the budgets on investments are never implemented, the financing dispositions of the statute are forgotten, and when Catalonia demands the rail corridor of the Mediterranean, the government makes its best to prioritize the central one (EP, 16-09-2012, “Independentismo de corazón...”, para. 14).

Spain offending Catalonia. Similarly, in the Spanish newspaper the relationship between Catalonia and Spain was constructed through discourses that reflected that Catalans were often attacked by Spanish political representatives:

He didn't respond to the leaders of the People's Party in Galicia, who attacked Catalonia for taking that aid (EP, 06-09-2012, "Mas convocará...", para. 2). However, [PSC spokesperson Jaume Collboni] he was understanding with the expected attendance by hundreds of thousands of people "because of the historical exceptional time, of frustration and outrage" that the Catalans feel due to the "regressive model with the welfare state" that is directing the PP (EP, 10-09-2012, "El PSC abrirá...", para. 8).

Spain repressing Catalonia. Also, Catalonia appeared to interpret that the Spanish state was actively repressing its freedoms and Catalan secessionists seemed to identify the movement with a quest for freedom:

My heart, my spirit and my commitment are with you. Your cry is mine because being it for the fiscal pact or for the own state, or for our dignity, they go in the same direction: more justice and freedom for Catalonia (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; EP, 10-09-2012, "El independentismo echa un pulso...", para. 3). [Catalan president Artur Mas] said this is a "normal" process in a nation that has the desire of freedom and want to progress with its own state (EP, 12-09-2012, "Mas lanza el...", para. 2).

Spain threatening Catalonia. Last, the Catalan representatives appeared to be warned by the Spanish politicians that negative consequences would follow if they continued to endorse the secessionist movement. On a few occasions these warnings were indeed framed as threats:

A power that the current Constitution, as mentioned in its article 8 the "territorial integrity", is left in hands in the Armed Forces (EP, 13-09-2012, "Cataluña disputa el poder...", para. 2).

Catalonia, irresponsible toward Spain. Conversely, *El País* constructed this relationship from the Spanish perspective through discourses highlighting that Catalonia

was acting irresponsibly toward the tough situation in Spain, provoked by the economic crisis:

In these times caution is very important, seeing the situation of Spain, knowing each other's problems. Catalonia has important problems, there are more than 700,000 unemployed people, Catalonia has deficit problems and debt, we are trying to help them, the challenge that today Catalonia has is to grow and create employment (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; EP, 11-09-2012, "Rajoy intentará...", para. 4).

Contradictions. In addition, those political leaders against the secession of Catalonia pointed out some contradictions in some of the Catalan government's arguments. Like in *La Vanguardia*, the contradiction between asking for a negotiation of the Spanish financing model and wanting to secede was raised in *El País*:

The socialists understand that it's impossible to be at mass and be tolling the bell [Spanish idiom], and demand for Mas to choose between the fiscal pact and the independence. The first is to stay in Spain, the second, to leave, says PSC. [...] [President of the Generalitat Artur] Mas does not see it that way and insists that they can demand to have their own inland revenue department as a first stage to accomplish secession. "Without fiscal sovereignty there is no political sovereignty" says the CiU leader (EP, 16-09-2012, "Mas se verá con Rajoy...", para. 3 and 4).

However, *El País* also placed emphasis on the contradiction of the *Generalitat*'s request for aid to the central government, and the secessionist demands:

On the one hand, [Artur Mas'] his bases insist on the "national transition" to the diffuse full sovereignty, to which the fiscal pact is the first stage. On the other hand, the Generalitat has asked for aid worth more than 5,000 million euros to the Autonomic Liquidity Fund, dependent on a central government that is about to formalize its own petition for aid to the EU (EP, 10-09-2012, "Del pacto fiscal a la secesión", para. 3).

Catalonia, naïve according to Spain. The Spanish newspaper framed the Catalan secessionist demands as naïve per se, but also given the tough economic situation in Spain and in Europe at the time. Although this discourse was not very frequent, it contributed to reinforce the idea that secessionist demands were irresponsible. Moreover,

unlike *La Vanguardia*, *El País* did not place emphasis on the responses to this approach by Catalan representatives like Artur Mas:

Once the thesis that 16,500 million euros leave Catalonia and never come back is elevated to the category of universal truth—the famous fiscal deficit— independentism and sovereigntism disregard the situation of crisis in the economies of southern Europe and affirm that if they were a state, Catalonia would be among the first European powers (EP, 10-09-2012, “Del pacto fiscal a la secesión”, para. 1).

Catalonia blaming Spain. Regarding blame, Spanish PP leaders, in the government at the time, made clear that they felt Catalan secessionists unfairly blamed them and Spain for all the evils in Catalonia:

Although in the PP they are especially outraged with the Catalan nationalists, whom they blame for trying to make the [central] government responsible for the cuts that they are carrying out, the bridges are not completely burned and, in fact, the aid for Catalonia has been negotiated in the highest level (EP, 11-09-2012, “Rajoy intentará...”, para. 5).

Catalonia playing victim. Similarly, even though not very present in the text, the Spanish newspaper depicted Catalans as a people who in the past had tended to tackle their problems by “playing victim.” This makes sense if we take into account that all Spanish people suffered the crisis greatly. However, the Catalan argument was based on their nuance that they would not suffer from it so much if the Catalan government had more power over their finances:

Things are this way now in Catalonia. The Diada left a feeling of period and new paragraph. Of a change of stage. Good-bye to the victimization paradigm (EP, 16-09-2012, “Independentismo de corazón...”, para. 22).

Catalonia blackmailing Spain. Last, the Catalan secessionists appeared to use independence as a tool for blackmailing the rest of Spain:

[President of the Generalitat Artur] Mas affirmed that he is not relying on that advancement but he implied that he might be forced to do it if “some political

operations” fail, alluding to the fiscal pact (EP, 06-09-2012, “Mas convocará...”, para. 1).

Political tension and electioneering. Regarding the tension between Catalonia and Spain, both sides were accused of using the rise in secessionist demands in Catalonia for electoral purposes:

Rajoy will not confront the nationalists, but he will let, like he does often, his right arms, throw the harshest attacks, like Cospedal did last Monday, to make the Spanish nationalist voters happy (EP, 11-09-2012, “Rajoy intentará...”, para. 6).

In this sense, another hypothesis is for the [Catalan] government to postpone the budget and to call for anticipated election to capitalize the success of the September 11 protest (EP, 12-09-2012, “Mas lanza el...”, para. 5).

Catalonia and Spain. Additionally, there were descriptions of the relationship between societies by both sides, clearly diverging and giving an idea of how deep the disconnect was between them:

[Catalan president Artur Mas]: “I think that between Catalonia and Spain there is a mutual fatigue. Catalonia is tired of not progressing and Spain is tired of the way Catalonia does things. In Catalonia they think they contribute with a lot and that they are not respected. And Spain thinks Catalonia always demands and always complains.” [...] [PP Spanish politician Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón]: “It is not true what Artur Mas says. Spain is not tired of Catalonia. Spain admires Catalonia, it does not understand itself without Catalonia. Catalonia has enough merit to lead Spain. That task is, no doubt, a challenge and it can be harder, but is much more fascinating than leaving.” (EP, 13-09-2012, “Mas plantea en Madrid...”, para. 10 and 11).

To sum up, *El País* constructed Spain as marked by the civil war and the Francoist dictatorship, although the construction of the Spanish national identity was not done in great detail. Catalonia was constructed by the Spanish newspaper as a territory populated by peaceful welcoming people, who are no saints. Catalans also appeared to be nationalists, which *El País* framed as an attribute that made them similar to Basques. The relationship between Catalonia and Spain was marked by Spaniards disregarding

Catalans and Catalans being irresponsible toward Spaniards. In addition, there were mutual accusations of using the rise of secessionism in Catalonia for party interests. Interestingly, *El País* assigned media an important role in the construction of this relationship. As to secessionism, *El País* made more salient the support of the movement by the Catalan government than its grassroots movement, which could undermine the movement's legitimacy.

The press in general constructed a discourse that was very descriptive of the Catalan identity, but not so much of Spanish national identity. This could be because the focus was placed on the secessionist demonstration that took place in Barcelona. All press analyzed highlighted the peacefulness of Catalan society, with an emphasis by the Catalan newspaper on its Europeanist nature. In addition, both newspapers constructed the Catalan-Spanish relationship as one marked by tension due to Spain's disregard of Catalonia and Catalonia's irresponsibility towards Spain. The Catalan newspaper placed more emphasis on the uniqueness of Catalan identity, and the grassroots origins of the secessionist movement. Meanwhile, the national newspaper highlighted the connections between Catalan and Basque nationalisms and made more salient the fact that the Catalan government embraced secessionist claims.

The following two sections will analyze the televised coverage of the secessionist demonstration. While the press coverage tended to rely on the journalists' voices, the television reporting relies more on direct quotations. As to the discourse constructed on television, it was common in both channels to describe Catalan identity in more detail than the Spanish national identity. Catalonia was constructed by the television channels

as a peaceful society. Regarding secessionism, the Catalan channel accentuated the grassroots nature and the European aspirations of the movement. The Spanish one, however, made the movement's turn to officiality more salient. This is important because it could illustrate legitimizing (in the case of the Catalan channel) or delegitimizing (in the case of the Spanish national channel) strategies that would question the independence of public media from the (regional/national) governments. As to the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, it was depicted as tense, as seen in the Catalan perception of abuse and disregard by Spain and a Spanish perception of irresponsibility by Catalonia.

Catalan TV coverage of the demonstration: TV3

This analysis included the news programs aired on the Catalan autonomic television channel *TV3* from September 4th to September 18th of 2012. I asked the documentation department at *TV3* for the news pieces aired in this period of time that were related to the demonstration. This resulted in 43 audiovisual files from 28 different news programs. There were no news stories from September 15th. The files ranged from 21 seconds to 36:20, the news programs aired on September 11th and 12th being the longest ones. Only the news that was completely unrelated to the demonstration was excluded in the analysis. Owning the files allowed me to familiarize myself with the data and condense the stages of transcription and codebook building. (Note that the live broadcast of the speech of inauguration of the Parliament by former president Francesc Macià (TNV, 10-09-2012) was excluded from data analysis because it was considered that it spoke of another time in history).

Us: Catalonia. As in the press, the analysis of television through second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) yielded three categories: **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. The category **us** comprised the subcategories **Catalonia** and **secessionism**. In the construction by *TV3*, the subcategory **Catalonia** condensed the Catalan identity, which consisted of discourses regarding the values shared by the Catalan people, the viewers of the channel and the Catalan language. **Catalonia** included six codes: **Catalan people**, **Europeanism**, **local audience**, **Basques and Catalans** and **Catalan language** and “**country**”. **Secessionism** was constructed based on the arguments for independence and the characteristics of the movement and the demonstration. **Secessionism** resulted in seven codes: **economic argument**, **evolution to officiality**, **historical milestone**, **identity argument**, **grassroots movement**, **historical argument**, **intersectional movement**.

Catalan people. The picture of the Catalan people was very nuanced in *TV3*. The Catalan television constructed Catalans as complex people—demanding and, at times, divided over those demands:

I think that Catalans never miss any chance of missing any chance. Because we also end up being divided, there is always an argument to make, for a long time, the main activity in the *Diada* was booing those giving the floral gifts [Catalan personalities and politicians], it's so negative. Party interests are one thing but the country is asking for other things, at this time (words by Jaume Cabré, writer awarded the Honor Award of the Catalan Letter in 2010; *TNV*, 06-09-2012).

There were numerous references to the demonstration being a peaceful, civic, festive event, a reflection of the Catalan personality. This reinforced the idea that was pervasive also in the (Catalan and national) press, of the Catalan people being a peaceful society:

To demonstrate this democratic and peaceful spirit in expressing strong convictions in a civic way, like the people of Catalonia always do (words by Catalan government's spokesperson Francesc Homs; TNV, 10-09-2012).

However, there was an instance in which the Catalans were referred to as so peaceful they were stupid, in the sense that they did not see their demands accomplished because they kept it too peaceful. This could be explained by the common perception that the Catalans have been oppressed by the Spanish government on repeated occasions. This common perception was uncovered in the analysis of the press and it will also be developed in the analysis of the construction of the Catalan-Spanish relationship in television:

It was the homage to the life and work of Joan Sales the one that provoked one of the few and brief interruptions of the event: "Joan Sales said, 'for 500 years, the Catalan people have been stupid. Is this about quitting being Catalan? No. This is about quitting being stupid.'" [read by journalist Mònica Terribas]. After that, the audience starts yelling "independence" (TNM, 11-09-2012).

And in this sense, *TV3* was the only medium that included the news of a more aggressive event at the Diada:

Far from the place of the big demonstration, in the Fossar de les Moreres, a group of people wearing hoods, self-defined as secessionists, burnt three flags. The European first, and then the Spanish and French one, both at the same time. This happened in the afternoon and was not part of the events associated with the massive demonstration that collapsed Barcelona (TNV, 11-09-2012).

The fact that *TV3* was the only medium to report on this event could mean, on the one hand, that they have pressure to show a balanced picture of Catalans, not an idealized one. By showing these events, they could have been protecting themselves from accusations of hiding content. On the other hand, showing a more nuanced picture of the Catalan identity could also mean they are showing a picture they know very well, implying that it is also theirs.

Europeanism. Far from supporting isolationism, the Catalan secessionist demands appeared to invoke European aspirations, namely to be a member-state of the European Union. There were several references to the world and Europe looking at Catalonia, considering other countries and other nations as potential mediators in the secession but also informing them of the situation. In addition, a few instances referred to the fact that seceding from Spain would not mean giving up on the European Union:

And this is the sign that will lead the march by the [Catalan National Assembly] Assemblea Nacional Catalana with the slogan “Catalonia, a new state in Europe”. The organizers say that their goal is to bring together many people but they also make clear that this will be a secessionist demonstration and that other signs will not count, in allusion to some parties and entities that have said they wanted to attend it with their own signs (TNM, 05-09-2012).

We are in a borderless Europe. Everything is absolutely fine, they do not have to give up anything to be Catalan (words by president of the Catalan National Assembly–Assemblea Nacional Catalana, Carme Forcadell; TNM, 10-09-2012).

Local Audience. Additionally, Catalonia has its regional TV, targeted towards a Catalan audience, from and to Catalan people, in Catalan language. This was made obvious repeatedly in *TV3* by promoting their own hashtags for viewers to comment on the day of Catalonia, their program scheduling reflecting the relevance of the events of this day, or commenting on ratings that show they were leaders in share in Catalonia. Importantly, Catalan nationalist leaders referred to Catalonia as “our country.” But beyond that, the news reporters and presenters at *TV3* did so too, for example in the news programs TNM, 10-09-2012, TNM, 11-09-2012 and TNV, 11-09-2012. It seems like the frequent use of the script “our country” in the Catalan television contributes to the creation of a Catalan country in the collective imaginary of the Catalan audience but, also, it places *TV3* as the legitimate television channel of the so-called country, which could respond to a commercial strategy.

Basques and Catalans. Regarding the relationship with other nationalist collectives in Spain, Catalans and Basques were often put together. However, the Catalan nationalists appeared to look up to the Basque economic agreement with Spain and to consider that Basque nationalism was more consolidated until then:

Having a fiscal model like the Basque would be perfect but if that is not possible, at least, let's not do anything stupid (words by Josep M. Lloreda, owner of KH Lloreda, a family business of cleaning products; TNM, 04-09-2012).

After the Diada, Catalan secessionism seems to have acquired an impetus that leaves behind the Basque one, that was more solid traditionally (TNV, 16-09-2012).

Catalan language. The Catalan language appeared to be a key part of Catalan identity and culture, and one that was perceived to be attacked by some Spanish institutions and that the Catalan representatives felt in need to defend:

The defense of the language has been the unifying thread versus the systematic attacks, they said, that it suffers from the judicial and political realms, and it was done through the songs and reading of texts by authors which were paid tribute to in their birth or death anniversaries, like Antoni Maria Alcover. Actors like Pep Tosa, Emma Vilarasau or Pepa López have contributed with different accents to the Catalan in all readings (TNM, 11-09-2012).

Economic argument for independence. As to the Catalan secessionist movement, the case of TV3 is very interesting because they conducted interviews with Catalan personalities at the end of the news programs. The interviewees gave their opinion about the relationship with Spain and this created some arguments and counter-arguments for secession. The argument that was more salient, one more time, was the one related to economic matters and the fiscal pact:

This does not mean that if we continue to be inside the [Spanish] state we will not contribute economically to the state, like everyone else and like I think everyone would agree to this. But obviously, if most of the money paid in Catalonia stayed in Catalonia, I think we would have saved hospital floors, kindergarten classrooms...from closing (words by Àlex Casanovas, actor; TNM, 05-09-2012).

That's excessively complicated. Because since everything is so twisted, that you don't really know "no, you owed me this", "no, that didn't count" ... it's something so complicated that I think it is not so much. If we had our money home everything would be simpler (words by Carles Gaig, cook; TNM, 09-09-2012).

However, there were some counterarguments in economic terms, all of them by

the Catalan personalities interviewed at the end of the news programs:

Catalonia is part of Spain and if we try to break this I think it would be a mistake for everyone. [...] From a business viewpoint, our clients are from all over Spain. Therefore, I have to oppose the independence of Catalonia because as a Catalan company we could lose a lot of clients or have losses. Therefore, I would say that for the Catalan people it wouldn't be bad or absolutely bad but for the Catalan industry it could be pretty bad because "it's a Catalan product, no thanks", this has happened already and could happen again. And then, what do the companies have to do? Leave Catalonia? We would kill Catalonia. We have to be careful. It's not an easy issue. I think everything needs to be done with love and making sure that everyone participating agrees with it (words by Josep M. Lloreda, owner of KH Lloreda, a family business of cleaning products; TNM, 04-09-2012).

Evolution to officiality. Additionally, TV3 placed a lot of emphasis on the evolution of the secessionist movement until it became official and embraced by the Catalan government. This makes sense because it was the first time a Catalan government discussed secession since the Spanish transition to democracy after Franco's dictatorship:

The demand was for the politicians to listen. Be sure that we will listen. That we've listened. That we've heard the voice of the people (words by president of the parliament, Núria de Gispert to president of the ANC, Carme Forcadell after the march; TNV, 11-09-2012).

After, replying to journalists he did mention it but he talked about fiscal sovereignty and always framing it in a wider process, what he called the way to sovereignty. It's a significant detail of an appearance that the president wanted to be especially solemn and symbolic. As proof, the European flag that was standing next to the Catalan one. The flag of the European Union is not usual in his appearances precisely, the day after a demonstration which slogan was "Catalonia, new state in Europe." (TNM, 12-09-2012).

For the first time a president of the Generalitat demands a state [for Catalonia] in Madrid. It is an unprecedented fact since the restoration of democracy. Artur Mas justified the need for Catalonia of state structures after remembering that for 35 years it has tried to fit in Spain (TNM, 13-09-2012).

Historical milestone. In that direction, the demonstration was depicted as a turning point, as an unprecedented historical milestone that would change the relationship between Catalonia and Spain forever. In fact, previous demonstrations were not as frequently mentioned as they were in the press coverage:

There is no precedent for such a massive presence of buses entering Barcelona neither in previous demonstrations nor important soccer games. The more than 700 buses that have been hired up until now are collapsing the private transportation sector in some areas (TNM, 05-09-2012).

The [Catalan] government is convinced that this year's September 11th will be historical. Everything points at a massive mobilization, especially in the afternoon, when the independentist march will take place (TNM, 10-09-2012).

Identity argument for independence. The second most prevalent argument given for independence was the unique national identity of Catalonia. There was an emphasis on the fact that national recognition should lead to the demand for a state for Catalonia:

I think we offered the world, and Europe, but also the rest of the world, the image of the best Catalonia. And not only the image of the best Catalonia but the very powerful message of freedom aspirations and of wanting to be a normal people among the countries and nations in the world. Yesterday's cry was very clear and at the same time, if you allow me to say this, very normal. A nation that, to keep being itself, and to progress, just asks for a state (TNM, 12-09-2012).

Grassroots movement. In addition to giving importance to the movement's official turn, TV3 also emphasized that everything started as a demand of the Catalan people. Then, the discourse was echoed by the Catalan authorities and very especially the president of the *Generalitat* Artur Mas:

We want to show our government, our institutions that people are ready and that we need them to walk a step forward (words by Carme Forcadell, president of the entity organizer of the march, the Catalan National Assembly; TNM, 05-09-2012).

Historical argument for independence. The historical argument for independence was the least pervasive in the data corpus, but it still was referred to frequently:

We have spent the last 300 years like this. 300 years. If in 300 years we haven't been able to understand each other and respect each other, I don't think this can be fixed. I don't speak for myself, but we have to speak for our children, for our grandchildren...what will their future be? The same we've had. Well, I think it's time to be determined, no pun intended (words by Carles Gaig, cook; TNM, 09-09-2012).

The institutional event to re-establish the Catalan flag in the façade of the Catalan parliament was broadcasted live in the news program. The event was marked by a reproduction of the opening remarks by former president of the *Generalitat* Francesc Macià, who inaugurated the parliament on December 6th of 1932. The speech was included in the institutional event to celebrate the chamber's 80th anniversary in 2012. Importantly, Francesc Macià proclaimed the Catalan Republic as a state in an Iberian Federation on April 14th of 1931. The event included also references to the Catalans' pursuit of self-government, freedom, democracy and their defense of individual and collective rights, trunked by the Francoist dictatorship. The narration referenced the Catalan anthem and went on to admire those who kept the Catalan language alive during that period, highlighting the endurance, tenacity and strength of the Catalans. Finally, the Catalan flag replaced the shield of Philippe V, and voiceover referred to the flag as a symbol that belongs to Catalans, and that was an affirmation of the democratic maturity of Catalonia as a nation, and of the right of the Catalans to be free.

In addition, like in the economic argument, there was a counterargument for the historical argument too, alluding to the fact that the history of Catalans is also Spanish history:

It's always been a complicated relationship but we are sentenced to understand each other. Thus, we have to make an effort, all together, thinking that we are part of Spain, that we are part of Europe...and precisely the goal of the European Union was to be stronger, not to be separated in pieces (words by Josep M. Lloreda, owner of KH Lloreda, a family business of cleaning products; TNM, 04-09-2012).

Intersectional movement. Finally, although not very often, the movement was depicted as one intersectional in the Catalan society:

We can see people from everywhere, waving [secessionist flag] estelades, entire families, old and young that have filled this city, that have filled Barcelona with the only goal of making their voice heard (TNM, 11-09-2012).

Them: Spain. The category them, would normally include the subcategory **Spain**. However, there were no direct references to Spain, the Spanish people or the Spanish national identity. This is a similar case to that of *La Vanguardia*. Therefore, it might be idiosyncratic that the Catalan media covering the demonstration focused on the construction of Catalan national identity, which was salient and at stake at the time. This cannot be confirmed with this analysis. However, it would make sense if they focused on Catalonia over Spain, due to their regional audience. In addition, this would differentiate them from Spanish media.

In any case, as in *La Vanguardia*, in *TV3* the Spanish national identity was constructed through its relationship with Catalonia. Spain was often depicted as a state that abuses, oppresses and offends Catalonia. Meanwhile, the Catalan representatives mostly appeared to Spain as irresponsible blackmailers.

Us vs. them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. Similar to the press, the Catalan television channel constructed a relationship marked by tension. The category us vs. them included the subcategories **Spain to Catalonia, Catalonia to Spain** and **political tension**. The subcategory Spain to Catalonia in *TV3* constructed the Catalan-Spanish relationship from the Catalan perspective. It included six codes: **abuse, disregard, lack of freedom, offense** and **threat**. Catalonia to Spain showed the Spanish viewpoint and also comprised six codes: **irresponsibility, blackmail, contradictions, victimization, concern, and media manipulation**. Finally, political tension referred to relationship between both societies, with the code **relationship**.

Spain abusing Catalonia. Regarding Spain to Catalonia, the feeling of abuse by Spain was the most pervasive in the text:

We have to be supportive, why not? toward the rest of Spain but we cannot let anyone scam us, we have to be as coherent as possible to help, helping is not letting someone take something from you (words by Josep M. Lloreda, owner of KH Lloreda, a family business of cleaning products; TNM, 04-09-2012).

I perceive an oppression towards the Catalan people, not only in the economic aspect but also in the cultural one. And what you cannot do is to try to remove a culture or the symbols that define it (words by Andrea Fuentes, sportswoman, bronze and silver medals in synchronized swimming in the Olympics in London; TNM, 07-09-2012).

We are fed up with being subjugated, with being despoiled, with them taking our rights from us, with them taking our language from us, with paying and still having to hear that we are stupid. This has ended (words by anonymous protester; TNV, 11-09-2012).

Artur Mas made a preface on the economic situation in Catalonia and Spain and he clearly said that the state always is detrimental for Catalonia, has drowned Catalonia and that the people, he said, is fed up (TNM, 13-09-2012).

Spain disregarding Catalonia. Additionally, Catalonia appeared to feel disregarded by Spain. For example, Catalan leaders asked Spanish representatives to hear the demands of the Catalans, their unrest in political and economic matters. Also,

emphasis is placed on statements by Spanish politicians belittling the demonstration before it took place, and not commenting on it after:

Mariano Rajoy did it in his first interview on the Spanish public television since he won the election. He said exactly this [Mariano Rajoy]: “this is not the time for trouble, confrontation and controversy. It is the time for unity, collaboration and cooperation. Let’s set priorities. And please, be aware, that right now is not the time for hullabaloo in Spain.” (TNM, 11-09-2012).

But the president of the party and of the Spanish government, Mariano Rajoy, still hasn’t said anything after the demonstration and [Catalan president Artur] Mas’ conference in Madrid (TNM, 14-09-2012).

Spain repressing Catalonia. Similarly, Catalonia was depicted as oppressed by Spain, in the way that Spain restricted its freedom. As in the press, this reinforced the idea that independence equals freedom:

Catalonia is clearly moving towards freedom. It’s not only this morning’s events, the floral gift, it’s not only the institutional event, but it’s mainly the popular demonstration that we hope will be an unequivocal cry in favor of the freedom of the country (words by general secretary of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Oriol Pujol; TNM, 11-09-2012).

Spain attacking Catalonia. Also, even though to a lesser extent, Catalans seemed to feel attacked by Spanish representatives of the central government, of other autonomous communities, or by the leaders of Catalan branches of national parties:

Being aware that lots of eyes will look at Catalonia tomorrow, the [Catalan] government called for participation, that has to be peaceful despite the lies that, they say, some other communities have told (TNM, 10-09-2012).

Spain threatening Catalonia. In addition, the relationship seemed to be perceived as one of threat by Spain toward Catalonia. For example, the leader of the Catalan branch of PP, representing the position of the national party, threatened the Catalan government with ceasing their political backing if they continued to embrace a secessionist position. However, this discourse had minimal presence in the coverage by TV3:

Thus, if the priority of Mr. Artur Mas' government right now is not the crisis, as he showed yesterday in his speech, but it is to take Catalonia through unknown paths, take Catalonia to a separation from the rest of Spain, the Catalan People's Party cannot be next to him but will be clearly against him, guaranteeing the Constitutional Catalonia, the Catalonia that feels Catalan and Spanish (words by Catalan PP leader Alicia Sánchez Camacho; TNM, 11-09-2012).

Media manipulation. Last, there was an accusation of media manipulation from the Spanish media to their national audience:

Before when we met we were a clan and everything was perfect. I've been noticing since some years ago that the relationship is getting dirty somehow, it's getting masked because there is an issue of sloppy media and they are starting to believe those media (words by Carles Gaig, cook; TNM, 09-09-2012).

Catalonia, irresponsible versus Spain. Conversely, *TV3* constructed the relationship from the Spanish perspective by making salient a discourse that secessionism was irresponsible:

From the Spanish government, a warning for the Generalitat and the Catalan parties, since their calls for participation in the demonstration of the Diada can provoke risks and instability. From Mariano Rajoy's executive, they ask for caution and responsibility because they literally said: "these things are dangerous" and they remind that the announcement from the Generalitat that the Catalan government will request aid resulted in the agency Standard & Poor's lowering the qualification of Catalonia's bonds (TNV, 07-09-2012). In times of economic crisis, stability and trust are key. And some of these positions, for sure are not helping (words by Spanish vice-president Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría; TNV, 14-09-2012).

Also, *TV3* was the only medium to include Catalan president Artur Mas' response alluding to the legitimacy of the movement:

And from Madrid they tell us "hey! The Constitution! And the Law!" And I say, okay, the Constitution, the one that you twisted against us through the sentence by the Constitutional Court. That is the Constitution that has to protect us? The one that they twisted against us even though we had been defending it for years. 'The Law, the Constitution, the Law'. And the people? And their will? And their voice? And democracy? And the votes...is this not important at all? This is also very important and has to be considered and taken into account (TNV, 14-09-2012).

Catalonia blackmailing Spain. The second most pervasive code describing the relationship from the Spanish perspective in *TV3* was regarding blackmail by the Catalan authorities of the Spanish political leaders. This included presidents of other autonomous communities, as the questions of the Interterritorial Compensation Fund and the fiscal pacts unavoidably affected them:

When this is used as an argument for independence, I think that we are talking about blackmail more than anything. Things have to be called by what they are. And this intends to be an attitude of blackmail. And nothing more. And I say this as a Spaniard, from Murcia. Because as a Spaniard I have all the right to give my opinion regarding the consequences related to Spain. And Catalonia is Spain (words by president of Murcia, Ramón Luis Valcárcel; TNM, 13-09-2012).

Contradictions. In a few instances, there were contradictions raised regarding political leaders changing their mind about attending the demonstration or not.

Additionally, the other contradiction raised referred to the demands of the Catalan government, intending to negotiate a new fiscal pact but embracing secessionist claims:

You cannot be today a secessionist and tomorrow a moderate and a good person in the [Spanish] Congress of Deputies. For me, according to my dictionary of the Catalan language, this is called being a hypocrite (words by PPC leader Dolors Montserrat; TNV, 08-09-2012).

The voice that we heard in yesterday's demonstration was one for independence. And [Catalan president] Artur Mas has to tell us if we will go for independence or if he continues going for the fiscal pact (words by PSC leader Pere Navarro; TNM, 12-09-2012).

Catalonia playing victim. Additionally, there were a few mentions regarding Catalonia "playing victim." These mentions referred to a hypothetical political strategy that would justify more radical actions such a referendum for self-determination and the reminder that the Catalan people voted for the Constitution, meaning that it was not imposed on them:

There will be a demonstration, [Catalan president] Artur Mas will try to make electoral profit out of it, he will say no to the fiscal pact with Spain because they have done an unrealistic proposal instead of proposing a feasible fiscal pact and a fiscal pact of everyone...and after this probably more “playing victim” and a consultation with the law for consultations (words by Ciudadanos leader Albert Rivera; TNM, 10-09-2012).

Catalonia, a reason to be concerned. Spanish representatives and the leaders of regional branches of national parties appeared to be concerned by the rise of secessionism, especially because of the uncertainty a situation like that would provoke:

I’m really concerned by the fact that we have a president of the Generalitat that is initiating this process and creating this situation in Catalonia. And now he has to tell the Catalans that in four days or whatever, there will be borders with Aragon, customs with Aragon, borders with Castellón and borders with the Balearic Islands. Because this is what he is suggesting (words by Catalan PP leader Alicia Sánchez Camacho; TNV, 12-09-2012).

Media manipulation. Interestingly, just like there were accusations of media manipulation from the Catalan to the Spanish side, there were also similar accusations in the opposite direction:

This demonstration has had a logistics support from the *Convergència i Unió* government itself, even using the public broadcasting channels, that belong to everyone, that belong to every Catalan. TV3 is not the television channel of the government of *Convergència i Unió*. TV3 is the television of all Catalans (words by PPC leader Alicia Sánchez Camacho; TNM, 10-09-2012).

Catalonia and Spain. Finally, there were some explicit descriptions of the Catalan-Spanish relationship. Very important to alleviate a hypothetical disconnect between both societies, *TV3* was the only medium that included a wide range of descriptions and opinions:

The relationships between Spain and Catalonia, unfortunately, if we take a historical look, have always been complicated, because not only at a government level, also at a people level, at a sports level, at all levels... (words by Josep M. Lloreda, owner of KH Lloreda, a family business of cleaning products; TNM, 04-09-2012).

I have never had any problems when working outside Catalonia. And when people from outside Catalonia have come here, there haven't been any problems either. I think that in other segments, in other places, in other communities, they want us to believe that we have problems and I don't know why because we have never had any problems (words by Àlex Casanovas, actor; TNM, 05-09-2012). It's true that the rest of Spain needs to make an effort to understand Catalonia. That is true. Second, it is true that without Catalonia, Spain wouldn't exist. But at the same time, Catalonia, without Spain, wouldn't exist either (words by vice-secretary of communications of the People's Party Esteban González Pons; TNV, 12-09-2012).

During decades we tried to transform the Spanish state to make it ours. If this is not possible because maybe Catalonia is not strong enough to achieve that, if this is the case, what has to be understood is that Catalonia needs a state. Catalonia needs the tool of a state because any nation could have it. And Catalonia needs the tool that is a state. I think that's the cry of the people in the streets (words by Catalan president Artur Mas; TNM, 13-09-2012).

To sum up, the construction of Catalonia by the Catalan television channel was very nuanced. Regarding Catalan people, they appeared as sometimes peaceful, sometimes not, sometimes united in demands, sometimes not. These nuances proved that *TV3* felt comfortable enough and legitimized enough as the Catalan television to be able to make contradictions salient. Related to this, the Catalan television constructed itself as such, and placed great emphasis on its role in Catalan society. Regarding secessionism, *TV3* included a vast plurality of voices and opinions, which could alleviate the gap between the Catalan and the Spanish societies. Also, secessionism was, like in *La Vanguardia*, not opposed to Europeanism. Additionally, the regional public channel made salient that this was first time that a Catalan president embraced secessionism, but also that the secessionist movement had grassroots origins. Spain was again not really constructed in terms of its national identity. This could be because of the emphasis that *TV3* placed on its Catalan audience or because the event covered placed Catalonia at the center, and not Spain. As to the Catalan-Spanish relationship it was constructed as

marked by tension, reflected in an abuse of Catalonia by Spain and an irresponsible behavior by Catalonia. Interestingly, *TV3* pointed at accusations of media manipulation from both sides.

In the following section, the analysis will focus on the coverage of the secessionist demonstration by the Spanish national television *TVE1*. A few discourses constructed Spain as a country whose people are united, democratic and respectful of diversity. Catalonia was constructed by the Spanish public broadcaster as a peaceful society with nationalistic aspirations. As to secessionism, the Spanish television placed emphasis on its officiality over its grassroots origins. The relationship between Catalonia and Spain appeared to be based on disregard towards Catalans and irresponsibility towards Spaniards.

Spanish TV coverage of the demonstration: *TVE1*

This analysis comprised the news programs aired on *TVE1*, the informative channel of the Spanish national television. The 30 news programs aired from September 4th to September 18th of 2012 were reviewed and the news programs related to the secessionist demonstration of September 11th were transcribed. This resulted in a transcript document that was 25 pages long, single-spaced, and these were all included in the analysis. It is important to consider that, as they admitted, *TVE1* did not assign the Diada the importance it deserved (Gómez & García de Blas, 2012).

Us: Spain. Second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) produced the categories **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. The category **us** included the subcategory **Spain**. Spain was constructed in *TVE1* as a country with a tragic past still present (due to the

civil war and the Francoist dictatorship) but populated by people who opposed those authoritarian and violent values and made the country progress and overcome that dark past. Hence, Spain comprised the codes **Spanish people** and **dark past**. However, it is important to point out that although the construction of Spain in *TVE1* was one of the richest in the media analyzed in this chapter, it was not as detailed as the construction of Catalonia, in this and the other media. This could be to avoid fueling a view of the public television channel as a tool of the Spanish government that is only centered in Spain even when the action is happening mostly in one of its autonomous communities.

In any case, Spanish people appeared to be supportive of values such as unity, democracy, equality, pluralism, diversity and tolerance. Due to the circumstances, all these values implicitly referred to the rich diversity in Spain and the rise of Catalan secessionism:

It's a time in which values like pluralism, diversity, tolerance, and respect toward different opinions should also be taken into account (words by Josu Erkoreka, Basque National Party spokesperson in the Deputy Congress; TD15H, 17-09-2012).

Regarding Spain's dark past there were a few references to the civil war and Franco's dictatorship:

The second part of the letter alludes to the values of the transition, to which the King refers as one of the most brilliant moments of our complex history (TD15H, 17-09-2012).

Them: Catalonia. The category them included the subcategories **Catalonia** and **secessionism**. Catalonia was constructed in *TVE1* based on its people and their relationship with other communities in Spain. It comprised the codes **Catalan people** and **Basques and Catalans**. The Spanish national television constructed the Catalan

secessionist movement as a multifaceted movement with grassroots origins, turned official due to the demonstration. This subcategory comprised ten codes: **economic argument, evolution to officiality, grassroots movement, secessionism hard process, a solution for everything, identity argument, historical argument, historical milestone, intersectional movement, and Europeanism.**

Catalan people were depicted as peaceful, a construction shared by all media:

We are a people that do not agree with the current situation, that say it in caps, clearly and that protests peacefully, positively and without asking anyone for nothing, only to be what we want to be (words by spokesperson of the Catalan government Francesc Homs; TD15H, 10-09-2012).

Catalans were also depicted as a resilient and united people. However, this was made explicit mostly by Catalan representatives, and the president Artur Mas in particular:

Everything is possible if there is will, wide support and capacity to resist. I think we have that *as a country* (emphasis added; words by Catalan president Artur Mas; TD15H, 12-09-2012).

Basques and Catalans. As to the relationship with the Basques, it appeared to be one of respect, mutual identification and complicity:

[Mariano Rajoy] He cannot go against the wishes of the society, in this case the Catalan society, like I hope he will not go against the wishes of the Basque society... (words by Basque Nationalist Party leader Iñigo Urkullu; TD21H, 12-09-2012).

Economic argument for independence. Regarding the other sub-category inside the category them, the one concerning the secessionist movement, the economic argument for independence was once again the most present in the text. Reasons for this might include the economic crisis in Spain and the negotiations for Catalonia's fiscal pact. However, it also raised the question of its influence on Catalans' stereotype as greedy in the rest of Spain:

We pay for everything and in exchange we have to hear that we are unsupportive, and we are fed up with this (words by an anonymous protester; TD21H, 11-09-2012).

The president of the Catalan Generalitat was in Madrid this morning, where he insisted that Catalonia needs a state, two days after the secessionist demonstration in Barcelona and that he assumed yesterday this demand. Artur Mas said that in his opinion, a big part of the problem comes from financing and he did not deny advancing the elections if he does not achieve the fiscal pact for Catalonia (TD15H, 13-09-2012).

Evolution to officiality. Just like in the other media, the movement was constructed as one initiated in the civil society and then turned official:

For [Catalan president] Artur Mas, the demonstration was a clear cry by people that want to become a state. And he affirmed that he will act consequently (TD15H, 12-09-2012).

When asked if [Artur Mas] he would let go independence if he achieved the fiscal pact, he replies: “I wouldn’t be able, this is what I was telling you, when I’m asked this way, I always say the same, I can’t say this is over because that would mean to bury the own evolution of any nation, Catalonia included.” (TD15H, 14-09-2012).

Grassroots movement. Unlike *La Vanguardia*, *TVE1* placed more importance in its evolution to officiality than in its grassroots origins, which could contribute to diminishing the legitimacy of the movement. Nevertheless, there were a few references to Catalan secessionism as a movement of the people:

We had to go out in the street and tomorrow our politicians will have to pick up where we left it today and work for the independence of Catalonia (words by an anonymous protester; TD21H, 11-09-2012).

Secessionism hard process. Secession was frequently referred to as a hard and long process. This was mostly reflected in statements by Catalan president Artur Mas. This could be because Mas was protecting himself from being called unrealistic or naïve. However, placing emphasis on these claims could also be interpreted as a way to discourage secessionists:

The [Catalan] president thinks that Catalonia has initiated a national transition that will have obstacles, and he asked for institutions and citizens to work together (TD15H, 12-09-2012).

A solution for everything. Despite this, there were a few references that defined the demonstration as actively framing independence like the best (or only) solution for Catalonia's demands for identity, economic and social recognition:

From [Plural Left] Izquierda Plural they ask for respect for the demonstration, which they describe as historical, in which they say, both the identity feeling and the demand to overcome the crisis, converged (TD15H, 12-09-2012).

Identity argument for independence. Catalan national identity was not depicted as a main argument by the Spanish public broadcaster. However, public statements by Catalan president Artur Mas demanding national recognition were broadcasted:

Let's ask. In democracy this must be the more direct and clear way of knowing, right? Let's ask. Whom? Those who intend to be a nation (TD15H, 13-09-2012).

Historical argument for independence. Similarly, the historical argument was barely mentioned in the data corpus, even though there were some references to the legitimacy of the secessionist claims due to a history that harmed Catalonia:

These last three decades, in which it has not been possible to configure a nice state, in which we would feel comfortable and that was kind to the demands by Catalonia, these three decades were starred by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. And now they come to us with a federalist proposal (words by general secretary of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Oriol Pujol; TD15H, 15-09-2012).

Historical milestone. Additionally, the demonstration was also not seen as a turning point in Catalan and Spanish politics. This contrasts with the treatment given in other media but it makes sense if we take into account that *TVEI* did not place such emphasis on the grassroots dimension of the movement:

In fact, it was *probably* one of the most massive ones held here in Catalonia in the latter years (emphasis added; TD21H, 11-09-2012).

An intersectional movement. There was just one instance reinforcing the intersectionality of the secessionist movement:

The demonstration has taken place in a festive environment, it was a very heterogeneous demonstration, we could see old people, young people, a lot of families (TD21H, 11-09-2012).

Europeanism. In addition, there was an allusion to Catalan secessionists' European aspirations. Therefore, compared to Catalan media, *TVE1* did not refer to the Europeanist dimension of the Catalan nationalism:

The president of the Generalitat, Artur Mas, said that he expects this demonstration will be peaceful and he trusts what Catalonia wants will be understood from outside (TD15H, 11-09-2012).

Us vs. them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. Like in all the previous media analyzed, *TVE1* made salient the tension between both societies in its construction of their relationship. So, the category us vs. them included the subcategories **Spain to Catalonia**, **Catalonia to Spain** and **political tension**. The subcategory Spain to Catalonia described how the Spanish public broadcaster constructed the relationship from the Catalan perspective. Spain to Catalonia developed the codes **disregard** and **threat**. Catalonia to Spain offered perspectives from the Spanish side. Catalonia to Spain comprised six codes: **irresponsibility**, **blackmail**, **contradictions**, **naïve solution**, **affront** and **victimization**. Political tension included the codes **relationship** and **electioneering**.

Spain disregarding Catalonia. The relationship between Catalonia and Spain appeared to be marked, according to the Catalan side, by an attitude of disregard from the Spanish side:

The government of [Catalan president Artur] Mas asks Rajoy not to “play deaf” to what will happen tomorrow in Barcelona (TD15H, 10-09-2012).

For [Catalan vice-president] Joana Ortega, this is a turning point, and *she appeared convinced* that the state will listen to the voice of the Catalan people. [Joana Ortega]: “...from the 20th on, and the important thing is for the state government to know how to read this amount of people, these Catalan people who went into the street to demand what is fair.” (emphasis added; TD21H, 11-09-2012).

In the second quote, it is important to note that, arguably, the vice-president appeared more hopeful in her demand for attention from the central government than she was convinced.

Spain threatening Catalonia. To a lesser extent, this relationship also appeared to be influenced by a sense of threat from the Spanish authorities:

The secretary of external affairs said that, looking at Europe, only the biggest survive and the smallest have the risk of drowning and he also says that he thinks division is no good. [Secretary of external affairs José Manuel García Margallo]: “from a European point of view, in a time when we are moving, like you were saying, towards more Europe, precisely so Europe can still count, can still be relevant in the world, to divide what is there does not seem like a good phenomenon.” (TD15H, 12-09-2012).

Catalonia, irresponsible versus Spain. Conversely, according to the Spanish side, the relationship was marked by the Catalans’ irresponsibility regarding the situation of crisis in Spain:

The [Spanish] vice-president insists that the priority right now is to create employment and she asked for responsibility (TD15H, 12-09-2012). PSOE asks the [Spanish] government and the Generalitat of Catalonia for dialogue and responsibility (TD15H, 12-09-2012).

Catalonia blackmailing Spain. Similarly, the Spanish side could perceive the Catalan demands for recognition as a blackmail strategy mostly to achieve the fiscal pact:

Hours before the demonstration, the [Catalan] president Artur Mas expects it to show patriotic affirmation and in response to a British journalist, he sent a warning for Mariano Rajoy if he does not pay attention to his demand of a fiscal pact (TD15H, 11-09-2012).

Contradictions. Additionally, there were some contradictions raised regarding the discourse of the Catalan nationalist leaders from those politicians against secessionist ideas. For example, there was the contradiction between asking to negotiate the fiscal pact with Spain and also embracing secession:

But [Catalan president Artur Mas] hasn't even started negotiating the fiscal pact and he has already declared independence. Would you negotiate a financing model with a country that says it wants...or with an autonomous community that says it wants to leave Spain? Well, the truth is he did just the opposite of what he should have done to be able to negotiate a financing model (words by Catalan PP leader Alicia Sánchez Camacho; TD15H, 14-09-2012).

Catalonia, naïve according to Spain. To a lesser extent, there were some references to independence as a naïve solution, in the sense of it being sold as an easy way out when it is not, especially because there were a lot of issues that would need to be re-defined:

He has to speak clearly and tell the Catalans which way is this one he wants Catalonia to take, to set borders with the rest of Spain and leave Catalonia outside the euro (words by Catalan PP leader Alicia Sánchez Camacho; TD15H, 12-09-2012).

Catalonia affronting Spain. Additionally, the endorsement of the secessionist demonstration was constructed as a sign of affront against the central government. This was especially true for the Catalan branch of the People's Party, which was ruling Spain at the time:

Catalan PP leader [Alicia Sánchez Camacho] accuses the [Catalan] government of promoting a Diada of confrontation against Rajoy's government (TD15H, 10-09-2012).

Catalonia playing victim. And last, there was an instance in which the Catalan people demanding secession were regarded as "playing victim," and it alluded to the fact that Catalans rejected a Constitution they voted for:

Others remind that the Constitution was voted for after the first democratic election, and it got more yays in Barcelona than in Madrid. [Tomás de la Quadra, Professor of Administrative Law at Universidad Carlos III]: “When 91% of the voters vote in 1978 for the Spanish Constitution, they vote for a procedure and they vote for the autonomic system, this was not an imposition.” (TD15H, 16-09-2012).

Catalonia and Spain. As to the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, there were some explicit mentions. They differed depending on the viewpoint, but they all agreed in that the relationship was damaged:

The opposition leader [the leader of PSOE, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba] sent a warning on the damage in the relationship between Catalonia and the rest of Spain (TD21H, 12-09-2012).
[Catalan president Artur] Mas’s diagnosis is that Catalonia is tired of Spain and vice versa. Without mentioning independence, he insisted that Catalonia needs to be a state and suggested a referendum (TD15H, 13-09-2012).

Political tension and electioneering. Additionally, there was just an instance in which the Catalan government was accused of distracting the voters with the demonstration. This needs to be contextualized after the intense cuts that the government of CiU applied to the Catalan welfare system due to the economic crisis:

[Unity for Progress and Democracy] UPYD reminds that millions of Catalans did not participate in a demonstration that, according to them, intends to hide the problems of the CiU government (TD15H, 12-09-2012).

To sum up, *TVE1* did not point out the construction of the Spanish national identity either. However, the few discourses identified constructed Spain as a country whose people are united, democratic and respectful of diversity, despite its past marked by the civil war and the Francoist dictatorship. Catalonia was constructed by the Spanish public broadcaster as a peaceful society. Catalans were also depicted as nationalists, which brought them close to the Basques. As to secessionism, *TVE1* underscored its evolution to officiality before its grassroots origins, which could contribute to question

the legitimacy of the movement. Additionally, *TVE1* did not accentuate the identity argument for Catalonia's independence. The relationship between Catalonia and Spain was constructed based on the Catalans' perception that they were being disregarded by Spain and Spaniards' perception that Catalonia was being irresponsible towards them. Additionally, there were mutual accusations of using the secessionist conflict as an electoral strategy by politicians on both sides.

As to the discourse constructed on television, it relied on direct quotes by the politicians more than the press. Besides that, it was common in both channels to describe the Catalan identity in more detail than the Spanish national identity. Catalonia was constructed by the television channels as a peaceful society. Catalans also were depicted as nationalists in their majority. Regarding secessionism, the Catalan public broadcaster focused on the relevance of the first time that a Catalan president ever embraced secessionist ideas, while making the grassroots nature and the European aspirations of the movement also salient. The Spanish one, however, did put more emphasis on the movement's turn to officiality, which could compromise its legitimacy. The relationship between Catalonia and Spain was constructed as tense, seen in the Catalan perception of abuse and disregard by Spain and a Spanish perception of irresponsibility by Catalonia. While the Catalan television focused on a mutual accusation of media manipulation, the national television focused on mutual accusations of electioneering.

Conclusion

Catalonia was constructed by the Catalan media as a region of Spain that had economic, identity and historical reasons to demand secession. The Catalan people

appeared as patient, peaceful, civic and democratic. Secessionism was depicted as supported by most Catalans as a response to the perceived oppression by (economic through taxes and cultural though attacks on the language) and neglect from the Spanish government towards the Catalans, and the lack of recognition from other autonomous communities. In addition, according to Catalan media, Catalan secessionism was not promoted by an isolationist nationalism but one with European aspirations. Catalan media implied a relationship with the Basque Country but also, emphasis was placed on the different economic situations and consolidation of nationalisms. According to Spanish media, Catalan society was constructed as a (mostly) peaceful, resistant, united, brave, welcoming, supportive, democratic, European one. Little emphasis was placed on the uniqueness of its identity (only *El País* refers to the Catalan language). In that sense, Catalan nationalism was depicted as very similar to the Basque one, even though *El País* also pointed at the differences between both societies and compared a more united Catalan nationalism with a more divided Basque one, while highlighting the importance of the Catalan language in Catalonia.

Regarding Spain, it is striking that the Spanish national identity was barely constructed in Catalan media as an independent entity but only in relation to Catalonia. Although it was not richly constructed in Spanish media either, Spain appeared as a country still marked by historical events such as the civil war and the dictatorship. In *TVE1*, Spanish people were depicted as diverse and respectful of this diversity. This absence of the construction of the Spanish identity in all media analyzed could be interpreted in several ways, even though none could be confirmed with this analysis. It

could be an issue of the Spanish identity, which could be hard to define as a national identity that is over the supranational identities of the autonomous communities and that means more than the sum of these.

Conversely, it could be an issue of media coverage. For example, it could be that media took for granted the Spanish identity, which would indicate an opposite trend from the one defined above, namely a Spanish national identity greatly consolidated. Also, media could be emphasizing the construction of Catalan national identity in their coverage of the demonstration because it was salient, central to the event, and being debated the time. Also, on the one hand it would make sense if Catalan media focused on Catalonia over Spain, due to their regional audience. In addition, this would differentiate them from Spanish media. On the other hand, Spanish media could be protecting themselves from fueling a view of the national media as a tool of the Spanish government (this is especially relevant for *TVEI*) that is only centered in Spain even when the action is happening mostly in one of its autonomous communities.

In fact, as it was mentioned above, *TVEI* admitted that they did not assign the demonstration the importance it deserved in their night news program (Gómez & García de Blas, 2012). This was covered by *La Vanguardia* and *El País*, and commented on by political leaders. In this analysis, it was interpreted as a contribution to the construction of the discourse of disregard from Spain to Catalonia. However, in some of the coverage it was implied that the national public broadcaster was being used to serve the interests of the central government, ruled by the People's Party at the time. Furthermore, it

contributes to the debate of media manipulation, which was explicitly alluded to in most media (except for *TVE1*) and that is directly relevant for this project.

While the newspapers placed emphasis on the mistake by *TVE1*, *TV3* constructed the relationship between Catalonia and Spain as one marked by mutual accusations of media manipulation. This is very relevant, since *TV3* is a public regional channel, and therefore, it was directly alluded to in the debate. The accusations were mutual, from an interviewee in *TV3* blaming national media for a perceived change in some Spaniards' opinion of Catalans, to the PPC leader Alicia Sánchez Camacho blaming the Catalan government, ruled by CiU at the time, for using *TV3* as a political tool to satisfy their interests. Finally, *El País* also included an excerpt by an expert statistician concluding that by targeting a Catalan audience, Catalan media constructed themselves as such, which legitimized them to contribute greatly in the construction of discourses regarding the Catalan identity. This argument is very similar to that by Anderson (2006) on how media, by imagining their audience, actually contribute to the creation of this imagined community, or nation. Importantly, the fact that *TV3* referred to Catalonia as “our country” on several occasions could contribute to the argument that *TV3* had an important role in the construction of the Catalan national identity. Especially it is worth to consider that this was not a discourse used in the coverage of the autonomic pacts, maybe because *TV3* was not active at that time yet. In any case, it is striking that Spanish media are not considered to fulfill a similar role. It would be revealing to examine if this is really a question of legitimization or of expertise in audience targeting.

In all media, the relationship appeared to be marked by tension. Catalan secessionism was depicted as an option supported by most Catalans and criticized by most Spaniards. Catalan secessionism was supported mostly by economic and identity arguments and the historical argument to a lesser extent. Meanwhile, Spanish media did not make the identity argument as salient. Additionally, while Catalan media depicted it as a grassroots movement, turned official after the demonstration, Spanish media tended to place the emphasis on the fact that the Catalan government embraced secessionist claims, implying it was led by politicians and not by the civil society. This could have consequences for the legitimization of the movement.

Furthermore, in all media, the relationship between Catalonia and Spain was one of accusations. Catalonia was depicted as disregarded, abused, offended and oppressed by Spanish representatives. Conversely, Spain seemed to be jeopardized economically by the Catalan secessionist demands and appeared to be subject of blackmail by the Catalan representatives. In this game, accusations were mostly pointed at representatives and not the Catalan and Spanish peoples. However, there were mutual accusations of electioneering. The electioneering accusations could be interpreted as if these depictions of each other were supported by the people and not only that, also effective electorally. Mutual accusations of electioneering were present in all media except for *TV3*. However, *TV3* included accusations of media manipulation on both sides, while *El País* assigned an important role to media in the construction of the Catalan-Spanish relationship.

A look at public opinion research will determine if the society experienced trends that match the discourses set by these media. Regarding Catalan public opinion, a poll

conducted by the *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* at the beginning of November 2012 showed that at that time, 71.6% of Catalans thought Catalonia had reached an insufficient level of autonomy from Spain, compared to the 18.6% that thought that it had reached a sufficient level (CEO, 2012). In the same CEO poll (2012), 44.3% of the sample thought that Catalonia should be an independent state, 19.1% thought it should keep its current status as an autonomous community inside Spain and 25.5% thought it should be a state inside a federal Spain. However, according to *La Vanguardia*, while the support for secessionism rose in Catalonia, support for centralism in Spain also increased. In 2012, it went from 25% to 40% (Castro, 2012). Therefore, we find that in 2012, the tendency was for both positions to grow apart.

According to *El Mundo* data (2015), based on a compilation of surveys by the CIS, in November of 2012, 25.1% of Catalans claimed they felt only Catalan while 6% of Spanish claimed they felt they only belonged to their autonomous community. In October of 2012, 41.4% of Catalans said they agreed with the possibility of living in a country that would allow autonomous communities to become independent states, while only 10.2% of the Spanish population agreed with that statement (El Mundo data, 2015).

However, the study on public opinion by the independent polling agency Metroscopia, commented in *El País*, showed that eight out of ten Spaniards living outside Catalonia would agree with the secession if it was supported by a wide majority of Catalan people and if it was in consensus with the rest of Spain (Toharia, 2012). Other relevant data are that two out of three Spaniards thought that Catalonia's secession would have negative consequences for both Catalonia and Spain, and that the abuse and

disregard felt by Catalonia was just a feeling and not a reality (Toharia, 2012). Toharia (2012) explains that, according to the data by Metroscopia, two out of three Catalans did not feel recognized by Spain, and that the same rate of Spaniards said that is not true. Apparently, this was interpreted in Spain as the Catalans “playing victim” (Toharia, 2012). In conclusion, public opinion trends go in the same direction of the media discourses found in this analysis.

Thus, the Catalan and Spanish identities and the relationship between the two societies seem marked by increasing confrontation at this second case study, in which the dominant political discourses in Catalonia evolved when the government openly embraced secessionist claims. The following chapter examines how those discourses of confrontation escalated and colored the media coverage of the 2017 ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils.

Chapter Four: ISIS Terrorist Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils

This is the third and last chapter exploring the major findings in this thesis.

Discourse analysis uncovered the discursive practices that organized the media coverage of the terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIS in Barcelona in the summer of 2017. This chapter follows the same structure as the other case study chapters. First, the analysis will focus on Catalan (*La Vanguardia*) and national (*El País*) press coverage and then on Catalan (*TV3*) and national (*TVE1*) television coverage. Finally, public opinion research will offer a point of comparison with the construction of Spanish and Catalan identities by media, with the goal of looking for a possible overlap.

On August 17th, 2017, ISIS perpetrated a terrorist attack in Barcelona. A van entered the popular street of La Rambla, killing 13 and injuring pedestrians who were there at the time. One more person died days later in the hospital, and another victim was found in the car the van driver hijacked to escape. The day after, the terrorist group tried a similar attack in the neighboring city of Cambrils. Fortunately, the effective intervention of *Mossos d'Esquadra*, the Catalan police, avoided a more lethal attack, although one pedestrian was attacked before the *Mossos* shot the perpetrators, and she passed away in the following days.

The days that followed were characterized by mourning, demonstrations, official declarations and the search for the van driver by the *Mossos d'Esquadra*. In this context of tension and emotions on edge, some extraordinary situations took place, and were covered by the media: For example, the Catalan adviser for internal affairs, in charge of security and *Mossos d'Esquadra* in Catalonia, distinguished Catalan and Spanish

nationalities when reading the list of victims after the attacks; and the major of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* was interrupted during a press conference and asked to stop speaking in Catalan and start speaking in Spanish.

This study argues that although they might appear as anecdotes, these events illustrate deeper questions of national identity. Furthermore, the generalized dissatisfaction in Catalonia with the result of the autonomic pacts from 1981 onward, and especially the introduction of independentism in mainstream Catalan politics after the secessionist demonstration in 2012, led to an illegal referendum for Catalonia's self-determination on October 1st of 2017. The date of the referendum was set long before the La Rambla tragedy took place. This allowed for the tension between Catalan and Spanish administrations, ruled respectively by Carles Puigdemont (JxSí, PDeCAT) and Mariano Rajoy (PP), to build up as the date was approaching. This presented an additional challenge for the administrations after the attacks, because they were divided over the possibility for Catalonia to hold an independence referendum the following month but had to appear united against terrorism.

Following media system dependency theory (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976), the degree of ambiguity and threat in one's social environment will impact one's media dependencies. Therefore, the context of high need for information after a terrorist attack gives media a chance to offer extensive coverage and allows for stronger effects on the Spanish and Catalan audiences, which is another reason why the coverage of this event was included in the current project.

For the coverage of the terrorist attacks, the data corpus consisted of 108 articles from the Catalan newspaper; a transcript document that was 99 pages long, single-spaced, from the news stories in the Catalan public television channel; 134 articles from the national newspaper; and a transcript document that was 97 pages long, single-spaced, from the news in the national public television channel. It is important to note that only news about the attacks was included in the data corpus. That would mean that, for example, journalistic pieces about the background on the environments where the cell planned the attacks were excluded. In addition, the analysis of the coverage was guided by the research questions tackled in this thesis.

The main findings of this chapter indicate that Catalonia was constructed as a singular region in Spain. While the Spanish media recognized this uniqueness, the Catalan media constructed a discourse that contributed to opening up the possibility of a feasible Catalan state. Regarding the Spanish national identity, Spain was constructed as a European open, Western, civilized and democratic country. While the Spanish media constructed it as a united country, the Catalan media placed emphasis on other regions that were also somehow particular within Spain, namely the Basque Country. As to the Catalan-Spanish relationship, its construction was marked by discourses regarding a strong political tension underlying mutual respect. Secessionism was framed in terms of unity of the administrations or lack thereof. This was reflected in the emphasis that political figures against independence placed in calls for unity after the attacks.

Catalan press coverage of the attacks: *La Vanguardia*

This analysis included the articles of the printed version of the newspaper *La Vanguardia* in Catalan language, from August 17th to August 22st of 2017, which were retrieved after looking in the digital archive for “*atemptat Barcelona*”. One more day was included here than in the Spanish newspaper, whose online editions were examined, because the perpetrator of the attack in Barcelona was taken down in the afternoon of the 21st and thus, the news story was printed in the edition of the following day. This selection yielded 108 pieces analyzed.

Us: Catalonia. Second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) yielded three categories: **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. The category **us** included the subcategory of **Catalonia**. *La Vanguardia* constructed Catalonia as a state or country, with its own police, its own media targeting local readership, and strongly drawn borders, and defined Barcelona as the country’s capital city, while placing it at the same level as other European capitals. It is important to remember that in the previous chapter regarding the secessionist demonstration, the public regional television channel *TV3* also referred to Catalonia as a country explicitly, which could indicate that the discourse had been gaining momentum with time, reaching a high in 2017. Catalonia included eight codes: **our police, the map, Barcelona: looking inside, Barcelona: looking outside, local readership, Catalonia as a state, “the Catalan capital”** and **“our country”**. In this stage, the code **our police** developed five sub-codes, due to the pervasiveness and relevance of this topic in the news stories: *Mossos* the Catalan police, *Guàrdia Urbana*, leadership of *Mossos*, effectiveness of *Mossos* and unfairness to *Mossos*. The category **us**

also included the subcategory **Catalans**, which enclosed mentioning traits of the Catalan identity such as language, values, and references to the Catalan lifestyle. It included two codes: **Catalan people** (including the sub-code flaws, related to some behaviors after the attack that were not so noble) and **Catalan language**.

Our police. The most prominent discourse in the category of Catalonia concerned the Catalan police, *Mossos d'Esquadra*, which was clearly referenced as part of “us”. Journalists at *La Vanguardia* also mentioned the *Guàrdia Urbana* several times, even though comparatively much less than the autonomic police force, and very often to indicate that they made a great team with *Mossos*. Very frequently, *Mossos* were treated as the truly legitimate Catalan police. This was done by explicitly calling them “the Catalan police” (LV, 18-08-2017, p.5; LV, 18-08-2017, p. 15; LV, 22-08-2017, p.19). This choice of wording implied that Catalonia would be ready to defend its homeland security as a new country, as it was explained in one instance in the data:

The Mossos d'Esquadra have become the most effective state structure for the [Catalan] government and the independentist block and [...] after their effective intervention after the jihadist attacks last Thursday, they are more popular among the citizens (LV, 22-08-2017, p.19).

Mossos were also treated as the Catalan police by referring to them as just “the police,” taking for granted that in Catalonia that will mean the *Mossos*:

Why did he run over the two police agents (LV, 18-08-2017, p.5).

Finally, this also included references to *Mossos* really taking care of Catalans:

How could the driver advance such a long distance, almost 600 meters, in a space with so much police presence, of Mossos and Guàrdia Urbana, without anyone trying to stop him. Shoot the vehicle. In every image, tough videos that were shared in social networks, you could see uniformed police officers assisting the victims. They prioritized helping the injured, urgently taking the ones that were

still breathing to hospitals. This was the explanation that was given about the incident last night (LV, 18-08-2017, p.5).

However, journalists at *La Vanguardia* stated on repeated occasions that there was a collaboration between these police departments and the state ones (*Policía Nacional* and *Guardia Civil*). The investigation was led by *Mossos*, so sometimes it was even stated that the cooperation went one specific way, putting the *Mossos* in charge. This clearly gave the Catalan police a commanding role and framed the *Mossos* as the main authority in security matters in Catalonia:

The police and the Guardia Civil are collaborating with the Mossos in the investigation (LV, 18-08-2017, p.5).

[Major of Mossos] Trapero announces the dismantlement of the terrorist cell that attacked Barcelona and Cambrils (LV, 22-08-2017, p.10).

The congratulations to Mossos arrived from Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil... (LV, 22-08-2017, p.19).

In addition, the effectiveness of *Mossos* was frequently highlighted, even calling them heroes at some point (referring to the agent who killed four terrorists in Cambrils):

Maximum protection for the most wanted hero, Mossos try to safeguard the agent who shot down four terrorists (LV, 21-08-2017, p.13).

Finally, the authority of *Mossos* was controversial in matters of terrorism, because it is a competency that is not necessarily theirs (*Mossos* were not included in the Europol network before the attacks). Therefore, there were a few references to this fact in the data corpus:

The president of the Generalitat defended yesterday the right of the Catalan police to participate in security international forums right at the same time when a letter by vice-president Oriol Junqueras to Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría asking for the updating of the resources that the state has to transfer to the Generalitat in order to finance this police force was made public (LV, 22-08-2017, p.19).

Our map. The imaginary country of Catalonia was also evoked in the news pieces by making reference to visual or textual illustrations of how the events played out.

First, their infographics and maps were very often reduced to Catalonia, pointing out the terrorist network and their settlements in the region. This makes sense because it is indeed a Catalan newspaper but, arguably, it did set a collective framework limited only to Catalonia. Second, they drew connections between the cities involved in the events and helped the readers picture the borders, from Barcelona (location of the first attack) to Cambrils (location of the second attack) including Vic (one of the vans was found there), Sant Just Desvern (the Barcelona attacker hijacked a car that was found there), Alcanar (where the house where the terrorists were preparing the explosives for their attacks blew up), Ripoll (terrorists' hometown), Subirats (where the Barcelona attacker was found and killed) and some of the victim's hometowns (Rubí, Sant Hipòlit de Voltregà and Vilafranca del Penedès), and other towns. These references helped draw the territory of Catalonia and its borders:

Without anyone suspecting, the squatters, terrorists in reality, prepared an attack in Barcelona from one of the furthest points in Catalonia, right in the southern extreme of the *country*, close to the border with Castelló (emphasis added; LV, 18-08-2017, p.6).

Barcelona: looking inside. With respect to Barcelona, the news stories offered an inside and an outside look to the city. From the inside look, the journalists talked about its people, their way of living and their values. The discourses highlighted the generosity, bravery, solidarity of the *barcelonins*—optimistic and hard-working, people who enjoy life and live in peaceful coexistence:

The city that protested the [ETA's] Hipercor attack and the Iraq war with tears and repressed anger, the same that crowded the streets to ask for the arrival of refugees, proved that it has something that any terrorist attack will never be able to destroy: courage. Some locals opened their homes to tourist families that could not go to their hotels and were wandering without aim. Police agents and

emergency workers off duty forgot about shifts and vacations. The shopkeepers turned their shops into shelters (LV, 18-08-2017, p.8).

This city, so many times rebellious, always proud, is not willing to bend its knee to the savages (LV, 19-08-2017, p.25).

Multiculturalism in the city is also a value that was mentioned frequently:

Radical Islamists, who chose La Rambla in Barcelona as a symbol for multiculturalism and who shot another poisonous arrow to Western civilization.” (LV, 19-08-2017, p.23)

“As if suddenly we understood that we have to wholeheartedly defend the tolerance and the welcoming spirit that are engraved in the Barcelonian DNA... (LV, 20-08-2017, p.42).

Barcelona: looking outside. From an outside look, Barcelona was very often regarded as connected to the world, a European capital, and a very touristy destination. This could contribute to the idea that emerged in the previous chapter regarding the secessionist demonstration, of a Catalan nationalism that has European aspirations. This was done by mentioning the presence of tourists in the city, even among the victims of the attack:

Among the 13 deceased, several nationalities: Argentinians, Venezuelans, Germans, Belgians... (LV, 18-08-2017, p.5).

Also, this attack was frequently placed in the context of other terrorist attacks in European cities, especially to Nice, Paris, London, Berlin and Brussels. Only on a few occasions (two), the 9/11 attacks were recalled:

Millions of human beings will always remember what they were doing on September 11th of 2001, when they found out about the World Trade Center attack. A generation of Barcelonians will forever remember what they were doing on August 17th of 2017 (LV, 18-08-2017, p.9).

In addition, there were also a few instances (six) in which the journalists mentioned the March 11 bombings by Islamist terrorists that killed nearly 200 people in Madrid in 2004, which is by far the deadliest terror attack in Spain to date. The 3-11

attack in Madrid was only mentioned two more times than the references made to the Basque terrorist group ETA (ETA carried out the bombing of a Hipercor supermarket in Barcelona in 1987 that killed more than 20 people). This placed Barcelona closer to Nice, Paris, London, Berlin and Brussels, European cities struck by terrorism, than to Madrid.

In fact, the Spanish capital was often absent in these references:

The mayors of the big cities struck by terror also condemned the attacks, like [Mayor of New York City] Bill de Blasio, who said that the New York police is following the attack; [Mayor of Paris] Anne Hidalgo, who said that Barcelona and Paris are cities of “love and tolerance”, and [Mayor of London] Sadiq Khan, who stated that “London is next to Barcelona against the demon of terrorism.” (LV, 18-08-2017, p.17).

Nice, Berlin, London, Stockholm and now Barcelona...[...] For the jihadists, what happened in Barcelona, Nice, Berlin, London, Stockholm or in the Boston marathon is a reason to be happy... (LV, 18-08-2017, p.19).

Local readership. Additionally, *La Vanguardia* was clearly targeting a local readership. Throughout the data corpus, most of the references and descriptions of the city of Barcelona took for granted that the readers knew where to place each spot in the city. This discourse defined who the newspaper considered “us”: Catalans, mainly residing in or familiar with Barcelona. For example, even though the official name of one of the major downtown squares is Plaça de Catalunya, they more frequently called it Plaça Catalunya, a wording more frequently used by locals. Also, journalists tended to mention local spots without further explanation of their location:

One of his brothers burst in great speed from Canaletes [...] he advanced until he was next to the Liceu. There, he abruptly stopped, got off the van and got lost in the little streets of Raval (LV, 18-08-2017, p.3).

Catalonia as a state. A few times Catalonia was given almost the status of state, especially by putting both governments at the same level or treating Spain the way any foreign European country would be treated, and not as their own. For example, in LV,

20-08-2017, p.13, the members of the terrorist cell were introduced. The news piece highlighted that Moussa Oukabir was born in Catalonia while Mohamed Houli Chemlal appeared as born in Spain.

The Catalan country's capital. Similarly, the newspaper used some interesting wording contributing to this sense of Catalonia as a state. Hence, in vivo coding was used (Saldaña, 2013) to capture those discourses. Although not very often (six instances), the Catalan newspaper used “Catalan capital” to refer to Barcelona:

The Islamists added the Catalan capital to the list of cities afflicted by Islamist terror (LV, 18-08-2017, p.3).

Gathering for a moment of silence in the Plaça Catalunya of the Catalan capital (LV, 18-08-2017, p.16).

Similarly, there were a few occasions when Catalonia was referred to as a “country.” Importantly, in the previous chapter regarding the secessionist demonstration, the public regional television channel *TV3* was the only one that referred to Catalonia as a country explicitly. The fact that *La Vanguardia* also referred to Catalonia as a country in the coverage of the attacks could suggest a consolidation of this discourse. Interestingly, despite these discourses, it is relevant to point out that among the selected articles, there were no reports on how the *conseller* of internal affairs distinguished between the Spanish and Catalan nationalities of the victims, which is what the newspaper was doing implicitly, as noted above.

Catalan people. Regarding Catalans, *La Vanguardia* constructed Catalan identity based on the language and values, and references to the Catalan lifestyle. For example, the acts of generosity and solidarity by the Catalans after the attack were very much expanded on. This could indicate that these were traits of the Catalan personality. The

newspaper could be using solidarity stories to fight the stereotype that Catalans are unsupportive and greedy, very widespread in Spanish popular culture:

This scene has been seen in every hospital. “Catalonia has enough reserves to attend to the extraordinary needs of blood of this afternoon.” (LV, 18-08-2017, p.10).

Catalan society was also described as a peaceful, welcoming one:

Catalonia has been a land of peace, we won’t allow a minority to end our way of being, which has been built along the centuries (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; LV, 19-08-2017, p.16).

[Catalan president] Puigdemont’s thesis is that Catalonia “either autonomous or independent, will be committed against terrorism and will make available its talent, effort and resources for every country that wants to share this goal.” (LV, 19-08-2017, p.27).

With regard to the Catalan lifestyle, enjoying life and leisure was also brought up:

Some people walking peacefully in La Rambla, a beautiful day in August [...] leisure is endangered and with leisure, our model of life (LV, 18-08-2017, p.7).

There was only one instance in which flaws of the Catalan population were discussed, regarding the fact that some people shared really gruesome images of the attack and the victims on social media.

Catalan language. In addition, the Catalan language was pointed out as one very important sign of identity. Even though references to the Catalan language were not very numerous, they appeared to be powerful, as a factor that brought people together, for example to show support to the victims and their families. But also, to show “how well integrated” the terrorists were in Catalan society, it was pointed out that they spoke the Catalan language perfectly:

Meanwhile, in Lanteira they celebrated a moment of silence, cries of “No tenim por!” [we are not afraid, the motto of the protests after the attacks] with an Andalusian accent (LV, 19-08-2017, p.17).

He [one of the perpetrators] spoke Catalan well; better than I do (LV, 18-08-2017, p.6).

Them: Spain. The category **them** included the subcategory **the other**, with four codes: **Muslims, Spain and Spaniards, tourists** and **an ally: the Basques**. For this project, the most relevant code was **Spain and Spaniards**. Although not very present in the text, the treatment of a kind of fraternal relationship between Basque Country and Catalonia was also relevant for this project, since they both have secessionist movements. Therefore, the codes **Muslims**, focused on their integration, and **tourists**, constructed as a collective that had to be especially taken care of because the economy depended greatly on them, will not be further explained.

Spain and Spaniards. Spain was constructed as a Western, democratic, open-minded country. It is important to note that most of these statements were made by leaders of political parties that do not support independence for Catalonia. This could be shared or not by *La Vanguardia*, but the Spanish national identity was constructed by the voices of these political figures that emerge in the newspaper:

[Terrorists] they will not weaken the strength of our rule of law. [...] “the strength of our democracy and our values is today firmer than ever.” (quote found in PSOE’s statement; LV, 18-08-2017, p.17).

Spain will not stop being an open country because of the terrorists (words by Ciudadanos leader Albert Rivera; LV, 18-08-2017, p.17).

Terrorism affects us all... but it does not scare us, it will not defeat us; our peaceful and democratic coexistence, our union and our values are infinitely stronger (words by Felipe VI, LV, 20-08-2017, p.21).

The tolerant, open and welcoming country we are... (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; LV, 21-08-2017, p.17).

An ally: The Basques. References to the relationship with the Basque Country were implicit and not very present in the text. However, the similar (even though still different enough) relationship of the Basques and the Catalans with the central government made these an indicator of a special relationship relevant for the present

work. On the one hand, there was the comparison of the jihadist attack in Barcelona and Cambrils to the terrorist attacks perpetrated by ETA:

In the past we fought and succeeded against our internal terrorism (LV, 18-08-2017, p.11).

Especially present was the bombing by ETA of the supermarket Hipercor in 1987 in Barcelona. ETA's terrorism was clearly referenced in one way or another four times throughout the data corpus. This brought the two regions together since the Basque Country was the autonomous community with more mortal victims in attacks by ETA (Europa Press, 2011). Thus, the two autonomous communities appeared to be united in the pain caused by terrorism. On the other hand, there were several mentions of the *Ertzaintza*, the Basque police, that drew a parallel with the *Mossos d'Esquadra*. Importantly, the only autonomous communities that have an autonomous police force independent from *Policía Nacional* are the Basque Country, Navarre and Catalonia:

In the meeting, presided by Zoido, there will be the Secretary of State of Security, José Antonio Nieto; the highest authorities of *Policía Nacional* and *Guardia Civil*, the persons in charge of the Intelligence Center against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO), the CNI, the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and the *Ertzaintza* (LV, 19-08-2017, p.19).

In addition, there was one statement by the Basque president after the attacks. He was not the only autonomous president who was quoted, but the content of his communication spoke about the parallelism between Basque and Catalan societies in terms of also having an autonomous force of police (the *Ertzaintza*) and equating the Catalan and Spanish presidents (and implicitly himself too) by putting them at the same hierarchical level:

I offered the collaboration of the *Ertzaintza* with the *Mossos* or with the state police, if it was necessary. I conveyed my condolences to [Catalan] president

Puigdemont and president Rajoy for the people who died or were injured, and I showed them our solidarity (words by Basque president Íñigo Urkullu; LV, 18-08-2017, p.17).

Us vs. them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. Finally, in the category **us vs. them**, there were two subcategories. The first one was **unity**, comprising references to the unity of administrations (Catalan and Spanish) against terrorism. Also, **unity** was constructed in *La Vanguardia* by mentioning or implicitly referencing the underlying tension due to the secessionist process. There were four codes inside unity: **fake unity, real unity, calls for unity** and **Catalan unity**. The fake unity code was especially present by using wording that implied that there was no real unity due to some underlying political tension, or that insisted so much on the existence of real unity it gave an impression of “overdoing it” only for display purposes. The second subcategory was **Catalonia inside Spain**, which was constructed through instances when it was taken for granted or explicitly mentioned that Catalonia is a region or an autonomous community inside Spain. **Catalonia inside Spain** included two codes: **Catalonia as a region** and **plans for independence**.

Fake unity. Regarding unity, the wording used implied very often that political unity was more an intended image than a reality. There was an exaggerated emphasis on institutional unity that seemed to indicate that it was not as real as it may seem. This was supported by scripts that made it sound like the parties made a big effort to come together, that implied that Spanish president Mariano Rajoy was an outsider in the situation, highlighting an attempt to collaborate or the conveyance of a message of cooperation, instead of a reality of unity. Scripts underscoring the image or the

appearance of unity also implied that what mattered was to convey this message, and it was not as necessary for it to be true:

Rajoy, Puigdemont and [Barcelona Mayor Ada] Colau decide to put differences aside and start coordinating (LV-18-08-2017, p. 16).

President Rajoy contacted Puigdemont to express his solidarity and to make available the state services (LV, 18-08-2017, p.16).

“We the politicians are trying to work coordinately at the same level that the professionals have established” admitted the adviser Antoni Comín (LV, 19-08-2017, p.17).

It’s about conveying a message of unity. What makes us more effective in the fight against terrorism is unity (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; LV, 19-08-2017, p.26).

The image of unity that was given... (LV, 19-08-2017, p.26).

In addition, given the importance of *Mossos d’Esquadra* in this situation, it is striking that the central government did not meet with them the night of the attack.

Instead, the Spanish representatives met with the leaders of *Guardia Civil* and *Policía Nacional*:

Meeting with the authorities of the Guardia Civil and the Policía Nacional at the local office of the government in Barcelona [...] Rajoy, the vice-president Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, the secretary of internal affairs, José Ignacio Zoido, and the delegate of the central government in Catalonia, Enric Millo, met at night in Barcelona with the authorities of the Guardia Civil and the Policía Nacional (LV, 18-08-2017, p.16).

The underlying tension in these instances was made more explicit in other instances in which Spanish representatives avoided the questions by the press regarding disagreements with the Catalan government, the representatives of the administrations worked separately or the journalists brought up the secessionist process:

[Spanish vice-president Soraya Sáenz de] Santamaría avoided the questions of the journalists about supposed disagreements between the central government and the Generalitat when dealing with the attack. “From the first moment, there has been a combined task, this is the line that we must keep following in our work” she insisted (LV, 20-08-2017, p.21).

After Friday’s meeting, the government’s president, Mariano Rajoy and the Generalitat president, Carles Puigdemont, met and appeared separately, both

leaders sat together to coordinate the actions of the security forces (LV, 19-08-2017, p.26).

Every administration and the majority of the parties, that after the attacks are trying to convey some unity despite the latent tension due to the independentist process (LV, 22-08-2017, p.20).

At one point, it was explained that the tension between administrations was so high it was even affecting decisions in matters of security, like taking the army into the streets. These were very important decisions after a terrorist attack:

The use of troops may be well received now, after the experience of many Spaniards in the streets of France or Belgium, but no one can ignore that the presence of the army in the streets of Barcelona, just shaken by terrorism, but in the middle of the independentist process that the ones in charge of the Catalan institutions intend to bring to a unilateral referendum, could add tension and aggravate the situation, already complicated (LV, 20-08-2017, p.15).

Real unity. In spite of these examples of fake unity, there were quite a few instances that reflected real unity between the Spanish and Catalan governments:

Institutional unity to defend “democracy and against brutality.” (LV, 18-08-2017, p.16).

Democracy and its intrinsic values, freedom and equality, are over the terrorist violence, together we will defeat those who try to divide civilizations by using violence (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; LV, 18-08-2017, p.16). The terrorists won’t ever defeat the united people who love freedom over brutality. All Spain is with the victims and their families (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; LV, 18-08-2017, p.16).

Calls for unity. Also regarding unity, and to some extent reinforcing this discourse that a real unity was lacking, there were often examples of politicians calling for unity after the attacks. This could be interpreted as a lack of unity, since it seems so obvious to come together after such a tragedy that it should not be repeated so insistently. It is worth to note that the independentist leaders confirmed the unity of forces, especially in security matters. Meanwhile, the political leaders against independence insisted more on the need for unity:

And it is time for unity, which no one doubts will come true. Unity of all the institutions. The state, the Generalitat, the town hall of Barcelona. The unity of all society to give support and solidarity to the victims. (LV, 18-08-2017, p.11). No matter the ideas we have, whom we vote for, and whom we disagree with, those who believe in democracy and in free and open societies, are called to be united... (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; LV, 21-08-2017, p.17). “What happened in Barcelona is more than enough reason for all of us to put aside our differences, what take us apart, and to work in the same direction” stated the PPC president, Xavier García Albiol (LV, 19-08-2017, p.27).

Additionally, and going a bit further, in one of their appearances together, Rajoy appealed to unity while Puigdemont referred to ‘the admirable reaction of the [possibly Catalan] society’ (LV, 22-08-2017, p.20).

Catalan unity. Finally, still dealing with the concept of unity, there were a few instances in which it was implied that there was real unity but only among the Catalan administrations—*Generalitat, Conselleries, Mossos d’Esquadra* and city governments:

The president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, and the mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, were grateful in their appearance (LV, 18-08-2017, p.15). The [Catalan] government and the town hall of Barcelona summoned yesterday together, a big united protest to condemn terrorism... (LV, 20-08-2017, p.16).

However, this is not always the case (although this was the only instance in which division among the Catalan administrations was found):

Colau blames the [Catalan] government for the lack of protections in La Rambla (LV, 19-08-2017, p.23).

Catalonia as a region. Regarding the construction of Catalonia as part of Spain, it was reflected very often in referencing the 3-11 bombings in Madrid, when Catalonia was explicitly described as an autonomous community, or in the official reports on the victims’ nationalities. These references were found frequently in the text, but they were less present than the sub-categories Catalonia and Catalans:

Even before the World Trade Center attack in New York, Catalonia was, by far, the Spanish community with more radical Islamist activity, even though it was in

Madrid, with the horrifying attack to the train system, where they inflicted their deadliest attack to this day (LV, 18-08-2017, p.11).

The Catalan community has absorbed the biggest amount of people of Islamic religion in all Spain (LV, 18-08-2017, p.11).

Only 12 Spaniards were hospitalized yesterday (LV, 19-08-2017, p.16).

Plans for independence. Finally, another way of constructing Catalonia as a part of Spain was to report on the plans for independence by some political leaders. This encompassed Catalan politicians expressing their desire to continue with the secessionist movement after the attacks. It is striking that the plans for independence would come up in the context of a terrorist attack, almost suggesting that the unity between administrations is temporary. These instances, however, were not very frequent:

The attack will not change the calendar of the independentist process, including the laws for rupture, that will be approved by the Parliament in the next weeks, the demonstration on [Catalonia's] national day, that is expected to be "historic", and the unilateral referendum for independence, programmed for O-1 [October 1st] (LV, 19-08-2017, p.27).

[The leader of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and vice-president of Catalonia at the time, Oriol] Junqueras guarantees that the attacks will not affect the [secessionist] process: "They must not alter the democratic life." (LV, 22-08-2017, p.20).

To sum up, *La Vanguardia* set a discourse that constructed Catalonia as a country (actually explicitly defining it as a country), based on its own police, its own media, its borders and its capital Barcelona, a truly European city. The Catalan country constructed by *La Vanguardia* had a unique identity that consisted of the values of generosity and solidarity, a lifestyle based on enjoying life and a language that brought all Catalans together. The Catalan newspaper constructed Spain as a Western, democratic, open-minded European country. Regarding the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, *La Vanguardia* constructed it as a very tense one. This tension was based on discourses that suggested that the Catalan and Spanish administrations were not as united as they could

be after a terrorist attack. Interestingly, Catalonia appeared as a region of Spain. Thus, *La Vanguardia* explicitly regarded Catalonia as part of Spain, but it also explicitly defined it as a country, and reinforced the second idea with implicit discourses.

In the following section, the analysis will focus on the coverage of the terrorist attacks by the Spanish newspaper *El País*. *El País* constructed Spain as a united country. Unlike *La Vanguardia*, the Spanish newspaper did not place much emphasis on the uniqueness of the Catalan identity. Thus, Barcelona was regarded as an important Spanish city. Still, *El País* did set a discourse that constructed Catalonia as a particular region of Spain. As to the relationship between both societies, the Spanish newspaper also made tension very salient.

Spanish press coverage of the attacks: *El País*

This analysis included the articles of the digital version of the newspaper *El País* from August 17th to August 21st of 2017 that were retrieved after looking in the digital archive for “*atentados Barcelona y Cambrils*”. As a result, 134 articles were analyzed. It might seem surprising that the national newspaper yielded a larger number of articles for this analysis. This could be because the online version of *El País* allowed the Spanish newspaper to offer updates more frequently than the printed version of *La Vanguardia*, which was the one analyzed for this project.

Us: Spain. As in the analysis of *La Vanguardia*, second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013) again resulted in three categories: **us**, **them** and **us vs. them**. The category **us** included the subcategory of **Spain**. Spain was constructed by the Spanish newspaper as a united country that considered Barcelona as one of its main cities, that

was integrated in the European Union by sharing its values and cultivating a strong relationship with fellow member states, that had two effective state police departments and that, as a state, could officially issue nationality documentation. Spain included seven codes: **Barcelona: a Spanish city, Spain: a European country, Barcelona: a European city, Spain: Western, open, civilized, Spain: united, Guardia Civil and Policía Nacional and Spanish Nationality.**

Barcelona: A Spanish city. For obvious reasons, Barcelona was very present in the articles. The city was constructed by the journalists at *El País* as one more Spanish city, without many particularities. This could be seen in talking about the warnings that were given to Spain by ISIS, to which the organization responded attacking Barcelona (thus, part of Spain), in the news piece EP, 18-08-2017, “El Estado Islámico asume...”. Similarly, this was also the case for the reporting on ISIS’s claim of responsibility in the attack and the existing warnings by the organization, targeting Spain. In addition, there were literal references to Barcelona as a Spanish city or comparing it with other Spanish cities. In that sense, the references to the 3-11 bombings in Madrid were much more present here than in the Catalan newspaper (27 versus six) and the references to the Basque terrorist group ETA were slightly less present (three versus four). This emphasized the shared history between Madrid and Barcelona, and placed them closer together due to the unfortunate events:

Foreign political personalities show their support to the Spanish city in the social networks after finding out about the attack (EP, 18-08-2017, “Global solidarity wave...”, heading).

The Islamic State (ISIS, in the acronym in English) hit yesterday the heart of Barcelona and left at least 13 dead and more than 100 injured in the worst attack

in Spain since 11M, and the first jihadist one since then (EP, 18-08-2017, “Un atentado terrorista...”, para. 1).
 [President of the Community of Madrid, PP leader] Cristina Cifuentes affirmed “the love and support” to Barcelona for what happened, and remembered that Madrid “already faced terrorism when it occurred some years ago in the worse attack in Spain’s history”, in a reference to 11-M (EP, 18-08-2017, “El abrazo de Madrid...”, para. 7).⁴

Spain: A European country. In addition, the articles did a good job of placing Barcelona at the same level as other cities in Spain and Spain at the same level as other countries in the European Union. This discourse contributed to the idea that Spain was a united country and reinforced its connection to Europe. One of the strategies used to do so was prioritizing the display of maps of Spain and Europe over maps of Catalonia alone. Another strategy consisted in giving weight to the countries that suffered previous attacks over the cities. This choice placed the focus on the states more than the cities, and that differed from the one in *La Vanguardia*. For example, in the news piece (EP, 18-08-2017, “Rajoy conversa con Merkel...”), on the international reactions to the attack, three pages were dedicated to the reaction of international presidents and prime ministers. Only the last paragraph was dedicated to the reaction of the mayors of Paris and London. Other examples of the focus on a state level included:

The [Spanish] president put emphasis on the fact that “one of the biggest problems in Europe is the fight against terrorism.” (EP, 18-08-2017, “Rajoy y Puigdemont...”, para. 3).
 Spain, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden have suffered terrorist attacks against pedestrians since last summer [...] Besides Barcelona, Nice, Stockholm, Berlin, Paris, and London (three times) suffered terrorist attacks with

⁴ This news story belonged to the section of Madrid local news in El País. It was retrieved and analyzed because it fulfilled the selection requirements. However, the Catalan printed edition of *La Vanguardia* did not include this story. A following search revealed that the online version of *La Vanguardia* included a section of Madrid local news where this story was included, and the President of the Community of Madrid, Cristina Cifuentes, was quoted in showing her “love and support” to the victims of the attack (LV, 17-08-2017, “Cifuentes muestra su solidaridad con las víctimas de Barcelona”, para. 1).

a driver running over pedestrians in the last year (EP, 18-08-2017, “Ocho atentados con atropello...”).

Barcelona: A European city. However, *El País* did not ignore Barcelona’s international recognition. The journalists very often constructed the city as a European capital and they often mentioned the city’s touristic potential. This included mentioning the fact that the victims belonged to several nationalities, or giving descriptions of the kind of people who were in La Rambla at the time (mostly tourists), almost depicting the city center as a European or global hub. This category also comprised comparisons to other European cities:

I live in Barcelona. I feel like I’m a target for these people. The people who live in the big European capitals are targets for these people (EP, 17-08-2017, “Javier Cercas...”, para. 9).

Spain: Western, open, civilized. Similarly, among Spain’s characteristics as a country it was often highlighted that it was a Western, open, civilized and democratic state. In a sense, this also made Barcelona, in all its international projection, also a paradigmatic Spanish city:

Let’s not forget that the Spanish people are united in some values that we take pride in such as democracy, freedom and human rights (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; EP, 18-08-2017, “Rajoy pide en Barcelona...”, para. 3).

Spain: united. Moreover, the newspaper tended to include implicit and explicit references to Spain as a homogeneous state or country, without mentioning the different [autonomic] security forces, and directly relating the attack in Barcelona to the Spanish context:

The anti-jihadist operations in Spain experienced in 2017 a notable increase, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The security forces summed this year, before the attack in Barcelona, up to 36 interventions in national land... (EP, 17-08-2017, “51 detenidos...”, para. 1).

Guardia Civil and Policía Nacional. As a state, Spain has state security forces.

These are the *Guardia Civil* and the *Policía Nacional*. They were given more importance in the Spanish newspaper than in the Catalan one. Especially, sources from these departments were consulted and cited throughout the articles:

“But the same person can match all the profiles. Therefore, there needs to be some caution to theorize about something that is hard to categorize”, explained some sources of the Information Headquarters of Guardia Civil (EP, 17-08-2017, “51 detenidos...”, para. 6).

This is the opposite of the strong dependence of *La Vanguardia* on the Catalan autonomic police. However, *Mossos* was still the main source for *El País*. *Mossos* were referred to and quoted more than the state police forces in the national newspaper, which makes sense since they directed the investigation of the attacks. But the state forces were more present in *El País* than in *La Vanguardia*.

Spanish Nationality. Finally, in the category regarding Spain there were references to the Spanish nationality. These included official reports of victims, nationalities of the perpetrators and finding official documents (e.g. passports) during the searches that took place as part of the investigation:

The same sources add that, inside the Fiat van, they found a Spanish passport. [...] the driver, of Spanish nationality, who died (EP, 18-08-2017, “Un atentado terrorista...”).

Them: Catalonia. The category **them** included three subcategories: **Catalonia**, **Muslims** and **tourists**. Only the subcategory Catalonia was relevant for this project. Thus, the subcategory Muslims, regarding the integration of the community in Spain and the radicalization process of the perpetrators, is not going to be discussed further. It is worth noting, however, that beyond the treatment of Muslims in the article, the journalists

centered in Madrid their research on the integration of the Muslim community in Spain, in relationship with the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils. Regarding the subcategory tourists, the focus was placed on the dependence of the Spanish economy on tourism and the negative economic consequences that the attack could have in that matter. Since it is not relevant for the present work, it will not be developed further either.

Catalonia comprised six codes: *Mossos*, **values of Catalans/Barcelonians**, **the Catalan language**, **“the Catalan capital”**, **a particular region** and **Basques and Catalans**. In this stage, the code values of Catalans/Barcelonians developed the sub-code **flaws**, concerning reactions to the attack that were not ideal. Catalonia was constructed by *El País* as a territory with its own government, its own police, with people with a certain personality and values, who speak a certain language. For these reasons, while Catalonia was constructed a region of Spain, it was considered a particular region that had relationships with other regions in a similar situation (such as the Basque Country). This construction seemed to contradict the discourses of Barcelona as a Spanish city, but it is important to underscore here that despite its particularity, Catalonia was still constructed as a region within Spain.

Their police. Due to the nature of the event, terrorist attacks in Catalonia, *Mossos* were very present in the data corpus. In some news pieces where *Mossos* appear, other local sources appear too (CatSalut, [Catalan] adviser of Internal Affairs, Joaquim Forn, Mayor of Cambrils, Camí Mendoza, *Generalitat* sources). This is the case in EP, 18-08-2017, “Los Mossos abaten...” and in EP, 18-08-2017, “Un atentado terrorista...”. This raised a question of familiarity of the journalists with the local context. In any case,

Mossos were also a big source of information about the investigation for *El País* and, as in *La Vanguardia*, they often were called just “the police” sometimes. However, the major of *Mossos d’Esquadra* Josep Lluís Trapero was mentioned numerous times in the Spanish newspaper.

The construction of *Mossos* was not as the hyper-effective police that appeared in the Catalan newspaper. This was reflected in the reports of errors in the investigation and lack of communication between the autonomous and the state forces:

Despite this evidence, nothing looked suspicious to the investigators of the autonomic police. “There has been a lack of intelligence”, says a judicial source expert in terrorism. “We haven’t been able to detect them”, regret sources of the Catalan police. Sources of the Ministry of Internal Affairs go beyond that and consider that the Catalan police incurred in a “serious mistake in analyzing the information.” (EP, 19-08-2017, “Cinco interrogantes por resolver”, para. 1). Sources from the antiterrorist fight claim that *Mossos* did not inform on what happened [explosion in Alcanar] the Policía Nacional or the Guardia Civil, a day before the double attack in Barcelona, in Alcanar, where supposedly everything started (EP, 19-08-2017, “La conexión de Alcanar”, para. 6).

However, there were some cases of praise for *Mossos*. The first one referred to the *Mossos* agent who killed four terrorists in Cambrils. The fact was mentioned but still it was not highlighted as a heroic act (like in *La Vanguardia*):

After that, the confrontation started: only one agent killed four of the occupants (EP, 18-08-2017, “Los yihadistas buscaron...”, para. 4).

The second one can be found in the news piece EP, 20-08-2017, “Los Mossos lidian con la gran prueba del ISIS”. The task of the *Mossos* was praised through the whole story based on the speed in the investigation and the arrests, their intervention in Cambrils that avoided a bigger massacre, the mentions of the spontaneous homages by the citizens, and the congratulations of the Spanish and the Catalan authorities. In addition, *Mossos* were also very often called “the Catalan police” and it was recognized

that they played a role in the political tension between Catalonia and Spain. In using this script, *El País* contributed to reinforce the idea that *Mossos d'Esquadra* were the legitimate police in Catalonia.

Catalan people. As to the Catalans and Barcelonians, their values, personality and lifestyle were hardly distinguished. The newspaper highlighted the solidary reactions by the citizens after the attacks. For example, the news piece EP, 19-08-2017, “El silencio de los héroes anónimos” was three pages long and it was wholly dedicated to reporting on acts of solidarity by the citizens of Barcelona. Other examples included mentioning the large number of people who donated blood, the taxi drivers who helped evacuate the city center, or the anonymous citizens who offered their house to host people who could not access their apartments or hotels:

The authorities asked the citizens to stay at home, but a lot of them left to try to help the victims or donate blood. In fact, the hospitals had to announce that they already had enough plasma to take care of the injured (EP, 18-08-2017, “Un atentado terrorista...”, para. 6).

Regarding Barcelona, the success of a multicultural model was often mentioned. As to the Catalan society, there were some references about it historically being a very welcoming one. This could contribute to reinforcing the concept of multicultural nationalism, although it was not so clear since the multiculturalism was far more emphasized than the nationalism:

Barcelona will continue to be a city of peace, democratic, proud of its diversity and coexistence (words by mayor of Barcelona Ada Colau; EP, 18-08-2017, “Colau: ‘No permitiremos...’”, para. 1).

At home we are very sad. We have a lot of freedom in here, the Catalans respect us (words by Bilal, a Spanish citizen born in Pakistan; EP, 18-08-2017, “‘También sufrimos...’”).

The Catalan model is based on welcoming and tolerance. [...] Catalonia has always been a welcoming society. [...] For decades, we have been building a

shared tale in which we have trusted in the capability of the Catalan society to cope with its future challenges (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; EP, 20-08-2017, “Es mucho lo que queda por hacer”, para. 2, 5 and 6).

Anecdotally, in (EP, 18-08-2017, “‘También sufrimos...’”), a news piece on cases of successful integration of the Muslim population in Barcelona, the author described the shirt that one of the witnesses was wearing:

He is wearing a shirt of the festival Ravalat [a pun with the name of the borough Raval and the imperative form of the verb rebel, in Catalan], a yearly event of the alternative left in this borough of the Catalan capital. The shirt shows a little girl painting over an image of the Francoist Police beating protesters (para. 8).

It made it sound like to fit in the Catalan and/or Barcelonian society, newcomers have to adopt ideas of the Catalan alternative left, very much associated with independence.

Also at an anecdotal level, there were some stories that showed that the Catalan and/or Barcelonian societies were not perfect. This sub-code was named flaws because it comprised actions and behaviors that were definitely not honorable. However, these actions were clearly tied to the situation of the attacks and not intrinsic to Catalan society:

People who from their house or their workplace, with a shocking coldness, recorded voice notes about new killings and dangers that supposedly were happening in other parts of the city. The voice notes started circulating through social networks, especially Whatsapp (EP, 18-08-2017, “Los bulos de Whatsapp...”, para. 3).

On a more cultural level, there was a recognition by *El País* of the importance of language for the Catalan society. This was reflected in the emphasis placed on the use of Catalan as a way to express solidarity with the Catalan people. This suggests that it was common ground, that the Catalan language matters more and dearly to Catalans:

Someone left notebooks so people could write messages such as “Daesh: no tenim por” [we are not afraid, in Catalan in the original] (EP, 18-08-2017, “Barcelona recupera...”, para. 6).

We, the people from Madrid, wanted to say: Visca Barcelona [long live Barcelona, in Catalan in the original] (EP, 18-08-2017, “El abrazo de Madrid...”, para. 3).

Spain joins Barcelona’s “no tinc por.” (EP, 18-08-2017, “España se suma...”, heading).

The King assumed as his own the cry “No tinc por!”—“No tengo miedo” [I am not afraid] which put to an end the moment of silence in Plaça de Catalunya (EP, 19-08-2017, “Los Reyes visitan...”, para. 3).

Catalan language. Additionally, the Catalan language is also mentioned in the Spanish newspaper as an indicator of the integration of the terrorists.

“The village, shocked, tries to explain how young boys who studied, played and grew speaking perfect farmer’s Catalan are today tragic news.” (EP, 21-08-2017, “Cómo el imán de Ripoll...”, para. 1)

Even [terrorist] Moussa Oukabir, a 17-year-old minor, who never showed their radicalization until the end. Who until then, played soccer like one more. And who even spoke perfect Catalan (EP, 19-08-2017, “Era imposible imaginar...”, para. 4).

Since they were kids they had visited Punt Òmnia. It is one of the 124 centers that the Generalitat has in Catalonia for people at risk of social exclusion. There, [terrorist] Moussa Oukabir, among others, found a place where we could do homework, perfect his Catalan and get support (EP, 21-08-2017, “Cómo el imán de Ripoll...”, para. 8).

The four of them spoke Spanish and Catalan perfectly (words by a relative of one of the terrorists; EP, 21-08-2017, “Mi nieto no se ha educado en Marruecos’...”, para. 3).

However, *El País* also expanded on the Catalan model of integration: This referred to the welcoming facet of the Catalan people but, in a broader sense, it re-opened a debate that had been broadly discussed in Spain, the use of Catalan as the lingua franca in school. The *Generalitat* offered free extra Catalan classes inside and outside Catalan schools, aimed at facilitating the integration of newcomers in Catalan society, which in this case proved flawed.

Solidarity and generosity acts were also narrated, but less emphasis was placed on those kinds of stories and oftentimes they were framed as a trait of Spaniards in general

or as to reassure the readers that these stories would smooth over the economic consequences that the attack would have on tourism:

Maybe we should start assessing the impact on the model of coexistence that has been established in the Catalan society in recent decades (EP, 20-08-2017; Es mucho lo que queda por hacer”; para. 1).

A particular region. Even though not very frequently, *El País* contributed to the construction of Catalonia as a particular region of Spain. First, this was done by referring to Barcelona as “the Catalan capital” (EP, 18-08-2017, “‘También sufrimos...’”, para. 8); (EP, 18-08-2017, “España se suma...”, para. 1); (EP, 19-08-2017, “Las 24 horas que aterrorizaron a Cataluña”, para. 1), among others. Second, this recognition was also evoked by making reference to the borders of this territory that is Catalonia:

The Montecarlo suburb is just a few kilometers away from Alcanar, (Tarragona), the last town in Catalonia in the border with Valencia (EP, 18-08-2017, “El alcalde de Alcanar...”, para. 1).

Third, this was also achieved by distinguishing between Spanish and Catalan/Barcelonian societies:

The message conveyed the “support” and “proximity” of Pope Francis to the “many injured, their families and the Catalan and Spanish society.” (EP, 20-08-2017, “El Rey, Gobierno y Generalitat...”, para. 5).

And last, with very minimal presence but extremely remarkable, by placing the Catalan autonomous president and the Spanish president at the same level explicitly and through the script ‘the presidents’:

The Mossos, a police department with a combined nearly 17,000 agents, has received these days numerous praises, starting with the presidents Mariano Rajoy and Carles Puigdemont (EP, 20-08-2017, “Los Mossos lidian con la gran prueba del ISIS”, para. 3).

Basques and Catalans. Nevertheless, Catalonia is not the only region in Spain that was constructed as particular in some way. As an autonomous community that also has historically defended secessionist claims, the Basque Country shared this “special status” with Catalonia. This also brought both communities together in the Spanish citizen’s imaginary. Even though they were not very present in the articles, there were some references to a close relationship between the Basques and the Catalans. This can be seen in official statements, the attendance of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) to the antiterrorist pact meeting even though they did not subscribe to it, and the participation of [the Basque police] *Ertzaintza* in several meetings gathering antiterrorist experts.

Us vs. Them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. Last, in the category **us vs. them**, there were two subcategories, which were similar to the ones in *La Vanguardia* but included some different codes. The first one was **unity**. Unity was constructed by the Spanish newspaper as based on a rally-‘round-the-flag effect of the administrations after the attack, the references to the fact that this effect is not genuine, the calls of political figures for unity of the Catalan and Spanish administrations against terrorism and unity only in Catalan administrations. Thus, this subcategory included the same four codes found in the Catalan newspaper: **fake unity**, **real unity**, **calls for unity** and **Catalan unity**. The second subcategory was **Catalonia inside Spain**, which constructed the relationship between the two societies as marked by the fact that Catalonia is, indeed, part of Spain: **political tension**, **hierarchy of governments**, **national readership**, **Catalonia as a region** and **plans for independence**.

Fake unity. The subcategory unity was constructed based on the underlying political tension due to the secessionist process and a call to overcome it to fight something bigger, namely terrorism. This can be seen in the journalists' use of scripts such as "unity," "coordination" and "collaboration" very pervasively. However, as it has been argued before, the emphasis placed on this unity might imply that it needed to be reinforced so eventually it became true:

With the independentist challenge at its peak, the government is acting with maximum diplomacy. Sources from [Spain's presidential office] Moncloa keep in mind that in those times the coordination of the response to the events is a competency of the Catalan authorities until it is confirmed that they were terrorist attacks. Rajoy and Puigdemont talk on the phone. Every involved party defines the situation as a practice of coordination in which "all administrations are in touch", although any official meeting or joint appearance of representatives from both administrations has taken place (EP, 18-08-2017, "Rajoy pide en Barcelona...", para. 5).

The problem is that this psychologic effect can be counterproductive: the presence of the army in the streets of Catalonia could be misinterpreted six weeks before the "all in" bet by the Generalitat with the illegal referendum on 1-O [October 1st] (EP, 19-08-2017, "El Gobierno se inclina...", para. 5).

Rajoy and Puigdemont have described the meeting of the coordination committee that they both attended in Barcelona as "beneficial". (EP, 18-08-2017, "Rajoy y Puigdemont...", para. 2).

Later that day, Carles Puigdemont sent a message of unity against terrorism. Next to his vice-president, Oriol Junqueras, and the Mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, Puigdemont condemned the events and was thankful for the collaboration among the security forces. "There is no division *here*", he said (emphasis added; EP, 18-08-2017, "Un atentado terrorista...", para. 13).

Regarding the example above, Puigdemont stated that there was no division among the police forces, but by specifying where there was no division, it can be understood that there was division in other matters.

[Madrid's] city council, that will light up the Cibeles fountain with the colors of the Ciudad Condal [Barcelona] on Friday night [...] The leader of [political party] Ciudadanos, Begoña Villacís, asked to place flags of Barcelona in every city hall [...] after that, both monuments will light up with the colors of the flag of Barcelona, until the sun rises (EP, 18-08-2017, "El abrazo de Madrid...").

This last example raised a question about the flag. Since the attacks were in Barcelona and Cambrils, the flag should be Catalan. So, it is worth it to think about why the flag of Barcelona was chosen over the flag of Catalonia, and what the reaction would have been in Madrid if their monuments and administrations had shown the Catalan flag.

Last, in some other instances the division can be noted between Catalan and Spanish administrations while still trying to display unity, focusing on the appearance over the reality:

Institutional unity for a minute. The meeting among the Spanish and Catalan representatives during the moment of silence in Plaça de Catalunya resulted in an image of institutional unity impossible in the latter years. Felipe VI, with the government president Mariano Rajoy, and Catalan PP politicians, arrived there from paseo de Gràcia, where they parked their official cars to participate in the first row of the gathering. The president of the Generalitat was waiting for them there, with all his advisers and the president of the Parliament [in Catalan in the original], Carme Forcadell (EP, 18-08-2017, “‘No tinc por!’, Barcelona screams”, para. 12 and 13).

Also, there were quotes by representatives of the Spanish government (and stories of other Spanish cities) expressing their solidarity with the Catalan people. This was done sometimes as a shared suffering (more common in *El País*):

All Spain is moved today by the same feelings as the ones here in Barcelona (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; EP, “Rajoy pide en Barcelona...”, 18-08-2017, para. 3).
and sometimes as a sympathetic claim (more common in *La Vanguardia*): Prime Minister Rajoy contacted Puigdemont to express his solidarity and to make available the state services (LV, 18-08-2017, p.16).

This is consequential, since the latter seemed to distance Catalonia from the rest of Spain.

Real unity. However, even though it was less present in the data corpus, *El País* also did a good job of evoking real unity:

After 60 seconds in silence, presided by the Spanish and Catalan highest political authorities—led by the king Felipe VI, the government president, Mariano Rajoy, the president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont and the mayor, Ada Colau, as

well as the political leaders of PSOE, Pedro Sánchez, Podemos, Pablo Iglesias and Ciudadanos, Albert Rivera—, the attendees, looking serious, burst into a long applause that lasted for several minutes while yelling “No tinc por!”, unanimously (EP, 18-08-2017, “‘No tinc por!’, Barcelona screams”, para. 3). Puigdemont gave these statements on [radio station] Onda Cero, in which he wanted to highlight the unity and collaboration climate and between the Mossos d’Esquadra, the Guardia Civil and the Policía Nacional (EP, 18-08-2017, “Puigdemont afirma que los atentados...”, para. 1). His ‘satisfaction and pride’ in the “solidary” response by the Spanish society, the task done by the security forces and the behavior of the political institutions. An example of unity, he said, that he hopes will go further in the future “against other economic or social challenges.” (words by José Luis Zoreda, president of a tourism lobby; EP, 19-08-2017, “El atentado en Barcelona golpea...”, para. 8). A crisis cabinet, composed by the autonomic authorities, the local office of the government, the Mossos d’Esquadra, the Guardia Civil and the Department of National Police are meeting in Barcelona to study the situation (EP, 18-08-2017, “Un atentado terrorista...”, para. 13).

Importantly, in the last example, the newspaper ignored that national and autonomic organisms met separately the day before.

Calls for unity. Given that the unity of administrations was not as solid as some would desire, some public figures expressed their belief that unity was needed to win against the terrorists. On the way, this unity could be useful to overcome the political tension that had been building up leading to the illegal referendum for independence scheduled for less than a month and a half after the attacks:

Coordination is important among security departments and forces, but it is also important among administrations and politicians. This is what people want and what makes us more effective (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; EP, 18-08-2017, “Rajoy y Puigdemont...”, para. 3).

Catalan unity. Last, regarding this imperfect unity, there were a few references to unity only within the Catalan administration, but these were fewer than in *La Vanguardia*:

The president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, appeared Friday night with the Govern [in Catalan in the original] vice-president, Oriol Junqueras, and the

mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, to condemn an attack of “very serious dimensions.” (EP, 18-08-2017, “Puigdemont: ‘doblegaremos...’”, para. 1).

Political tension. With respect to the status of the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, there were frequent references to political tension. At this stage the new code was separated from “fake unity” because these references suggested tension without explicitly referring to unity of the administrations. Some examples reflected tension among the people. Others included the discourses regarding the possibility of transferring more powers to *Mossos* and giving them access to international anti-terrorist databases:

The participants attended the demonstration [moment of silence after the attacks] without any slogans, they were not carrying signs or flags. You could only see a [independentist flag] Estelada and a Catalan flag with a black bow. [...] When a woman, standing on one of the benches surrounding the square, waved a little Spanish flag, the people next to her yelled at her: “there are no flags!, there are no flags!”. After answering them with a “I am Catalan”, she put the flag away, earning a collective applause (EP, 18-08-2017, “‘No tinc por!’, Barcelona screams”, para. 9).

The Catalan president has defended the task of the Mossos d’Esquadra in the police operation opened after the jihadist attack in Barcelona’s city center. “They have earned being able to be where they need as police”, about the petition by the Generalitat to let them in the police organisms of international coordination (EP, 18-08-2017, “Puigdemont afirma que los atentados...”, para. 3).

Included in this code was the news about how the Catalan adviser of Internal Affairs distinguished between the Catalan and Spanish nationalities of the fatal victims. This discourse was placed here and not under the code Spanish nationality because it could be interpreted not so much as a matter of officiality but as a mistake that illustrates very well the political tension between administrations, exacerbated by the social pressure after the attacks:

The Catalan Internal Affairs adviser distinguishes between Spanish and Catalan victims of the attack. [Joaquim] Forn says that among the dead there are two “Catalan” people and two more “of Spanish nationality.” [...] The Catalan adviser of Internal Affairs, Joaquim Forn, distinguished the mortal victims of the attack in Barcelona between Catalan and Spanish, as if they were two different

nationalities [...] even though the Catalans, since they are Spanish, also possess Spanish nationality (EP, 20-08-2017, “El consejero catalán de Interior...”, para. 2).

Additionally, a tweet by *Societat Civil Catalana*, an independent organization aimed at keeping the Catalan society integrated in the rest of Spain, was included in this article.

Hierarchy. In addition, the wording used in some articles implied the relations of power between governments and security forces, reflecting the hierarchy of administrations:

And then the key moment comes. Mossos confirms that the events are part of a terrorist attack. The government has to take over the operations (EP, 18-08-2017, “Rajoy pide en Barcelona...”, para. 9).

Rajoy has been extremely cautious so no one can accuse him of wanting to make political profit out of the tragedy, like [Spain’s ex-president] Aznar did with the 11-M: he went to Barcelona to meet Puigdemont and he accepted the preeminence of the Crisis Cabinet set up by the Generalitat. He didn’t even summon the National Security Board, even when this is the worst terrorist attack in Spain in 14 years (EP, 19-08-2017, “El Gobierno se inclina...”, para. 7).

The government president, Mariano Rajoy, spoke on the phone with the president of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, and with the leaders of the opposition parties after the attack (EP, 18-08-2017, “Un atentado terrorista...”, para. 13).

It is noteworthy that the last example hinted at the readership of *El País*, who are people from across Spain. Therefore, the journalists did not need to call the Spanish government “central” and also, they added “of Catalonia” after *Generalitat* [the Valencian government, for example, is also called *Generalitat*].

National readership. Other appeals to a national readership could be seen in the way they explained the local spots, not taking for granted the readers’ familiarity with the city. For example, *Plaça de Catalunya* (its official name) was more commonly used than *Plaça Catalunya* (how the locals call it):

The biggest, at the beginning of La Rambla, in the Canaletes fountain, and where everything ended, on the mosaic by Miró in front of the Liceu (EP, 18-08-2017, “Barcelona recupera...”, para. 1).

The Raval, a borough next to Las Ramblas with a numerous Muslim population... (EP, 18-08-2017, “También sufrimos...”, para. 6).

Catalonia as a region. Regarding the status of Catalonia inside Spain, *El País* tended to focus on the role of Catalonia as an autonomous community in Spain, as seen by the use of scripts such as “the community,” “the autonomy” and “the autonomic police”:

The community has become this 2017 the autonomy where the security forces have developed more interventions (EP, 17-08-2017, “Cataluña, ‘punto caliente’...”, heading).

Plans for independence. Finally, there were a few instances in which the Catalan independentist leaders stated their wish to continue with their plan regardless of the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils. As in the Catalan newspaper, the fact that there was a secessionist process going on meant that it is accepted that Catalonia is, in fact, an autonomous community in Spain. It could be striking that secessionism was mentioned at all, since it is unrelated to the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, and therefore it seems illogical even to question if these events would affect the political movement. In addition, it seems somewhat insensitive for politicians to discuss a controversial political issue like this one while the attacks were so recent and the investigation ongoing, which suggests how strongly these tensions were felt:

The president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, denied today that the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils will modify his “roadmap”, consisting of organizing an independence referendum on October 1st, a goal that has opened a deep division between the central government and the autonomic one (EP, 18-08-2017, “Puigdemont afirma que los atentados...”, para. 1).

To sum up, *El País* constructed Spain as a united country, with Barcelona as an important Spanish city. The Spanish newspaper placed emphasis on the discourses regarding Spain as a member state of the European Union that has good relationships with the other member states and shares their values. Catalonia was constructed by *El País* as a particular region of Spain, in having its government and police, and being populated by people who are supportive and welcoming, speak their own language and regard it more dearly than Spanish. As to the relationship between both societies, like *La Vanguardia*, the Spanish newspaper made tension very salient. The tension could be seen in exaggerated unity displays that conveyed the opposite message. Additionally, in discourses constructing the Catalan-Spanish relationship, *El País* often regarded Catalonia as a region of Spain.

The press overall constructed a discourse that highlighted the solidarity and generosity of the Catalan society. Both newspapers emphasized the importance of the Catalan language for Catalans. Also, both newspapers constructed the Spanish identity based on the values of the European Union and Western democracies. As to the relationship between societies, both referenced Catalonia as a particular region of Spain, with the Catalan newspaper hinting at the feasibility of a Catalan country. In addition, the press emphasized the tension between administrations after the attacks. Importantly, both newspapers hinted at their either local or national audience, which helped frame their position in the Catalan-Spanish relationship.

The following two sections will analyze the televised coverage of the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, which was similar to the press coverage. The

television channels emphasized the solidarity and generosity of the Catalan society and the multiculturalism of Barcelona. The city was constructed as the Catalan capital in *TV3* and considered a principal Spanish city in *TVE1*. Regarding the Spanish national identity, both channels highlighted the values of democracy and freedom. As to the relationship between the Catalan and the Spanish societies, the televised coverage constructed it as one marked by tension, with *TVE1* underscoring their unity after the attacks.

Catalan TV coverage of the attacks: *TV3*

This analysis included the news programs aired on the Catalan autonomic television channel *TV3* from the night of August 17th to the night of August 21st of 2017 (nine news programs). The news programs were transcribed. Only the news stories that were completely unrelated to the attacks were excluded from the transcription. This yielded a transcript document that was 99 pages long, single-spaced, and these were all included in the analysis.

Us: Catalonia. For the purpose of this project, focused coding (Saldaña, 2013) yielded the same categories that were mentioned above: **us**, **them**, and **us vs. them**. However, the coverage of the attacks by the Catalan TV resulted in the addition of some subcategories that were not present in the analysis of the press. The exposition of the analysis will still follow an order from more to less present in the data corpus. Nevertheless, with the goal of avoiding redundancy, the subcategories and codes that were unique for *TV3* will be further expanded on, while those repeating previous ones will be more concise.

The subcategory Catalonia implied that Catalonia was constructed by the Catalan television as a territory in Spain that, at the very least, had some particularities. It included codes regarding the Catalan police, grieving displays and solidarity after the attacks, Europeanist aspirations, the territorial limitations, the Catalan TV and its local audience and treating Catalonia as a state. Thus, Catalonia included 10 codes: **our police, the map, grieving displays, solidarity** (including the sub-code **flaws**), **Europeanism, local audience, Catalonia as a state, our TV, “the Catalan capital”** and **“our country”**. The sub-code **flaws** branched from **solidarity** and not **Catalan people** because it was tied to the reactions after the attacks and not to ever-lasting societal values. Additionally, the code **police** developed the same five sub-codes present in *La Vanguardia*, even though the pervasiveness of them changed: *Mossos*, the Catalan police, *Guàrdia Urbana*, effectiveness of *Mossos*, unfairness to *Mossos* and leadership of *Mossos*. The subcategory **Catalans** also repeated the two codes **Catalan people** and **Catalan language**.

Our police. *Mossos* was the primary source for *TV3* too, so mentions of the police force were very pervasive in the data corpus, including explicit references to the major Josep Lluís Traperó. The journalists also included references to *Guàrdia Urbana*, although just a few:

And we have even seen some spontaneous solidarity and gratefulness displays towards the work done by the Mossos d'Esquadra. It was in the time in which in the moment of silence, several people, several of the ones gathered in Plaça Catalunya, spontaneously applauded the Mossos d'Esquadra, the security forces that were deployed at the time. A proof of the gratefulness that we have seen and lived in the latest hours (TNM, 18-08-2017).

In addition, like in *La Vanguardia*, *Mossos* were portrayed in *TV3* as a highly effective, professional police force. This could contribute to a legitimization of *Mossos* as a police force that could take over more powers that nowadays belong to the state forces:

Obviously, we are far from any triumphalism and we wouldn't want to act in that way. I think this is not the time, especially after the number of victims that was there. But it is true that we are working in different lines of investigation that are starting to yield results and that is a reason to be satisfied (TNM, 18-08-2017). [The Belgian press] praised the work done by the security forces *Mossos* d'Esquadra and *Guàrdia Urbana*, which they described as cautious, quick and effective (TNM, 18-08-2017).

And related to this possible contribution by Catalan media, it is noteworthy that in *TV3*, the codes unfairness to *Mossos* and leadership of *Mossos* were more present than in the other media, and frequently tied together. Unfairness to *Mossos* was constructed based on references to the barriers that the Spanish government was putting to *Mossos* in the investigation of terrorism acts. It included the secretary of Internal Affairs claiming the terrorist cell was dismantled before the *Mossos* said so, the Catalan government asking the secretary of Internal Affairs to include *Mossos* in the European loop of information by giving them access to the databases Interpol and Europol, and comparisons to other regional police bodies such as the Basque Country police, Ertzaintza:

At this moment, we are still at a level four of warning and the secretary Zoido said the terrorist cell is practically dismantled but *Mossos* denied it and say it is they who will decide (TNM, 19-08-2017).

In addition, within the code leadership of *Mossos*, there were references to *Mossos* being the main source of information for journalists and the main authority in the investigation over other police forces. This included the *Mossos*' declaring the cell dismantled and the major of *Mossos* confirming or not information:

Mossos keep the operation open to investigate possible help and collaborations that the terrorists could have received, but they do state that the cell is [now] dismantled (TNV, 21-08-2017).

This close relationship between effectiveness and unfairness to *Mossos* is anything but inconsequential. Building an image of a super-police that was treated unfairly by the central government might very possibly elicit unease among the audience towards the Spanish government.

Our map. The constant references to Catalan towns and cities, especially focusing on the scenarios involved in the investigation configured the map of “where the action is happening”, and limited it to Catalonia. Similar to *La Vanguardia*, which also included few references to other Spanish cities, in *TV3* the displays of grief such as moments of silence were frequently reported from the capitals of the four provinces in Catalonia: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona. In fact, allusions to grieving and grieving displays such as altars in La Rambla or the condolence books at city hall in Barcelona were very present in the data corpus, though not very relevant for this project. Similarly, the status and number of victims were reported on very frequently but will not be explained further here.

Solidarity and grief. Another code that was among the most pervasive was about solidarity, comprising exemplary reactions after the attacks like a major blood donation, volunteer translators at hospitals, citizens helping people stuck in traffic:

And we highlight an anecdote: the one about a translator, who lives here next to the Clínic [Hospital] and she told us that she could speak several languages, and she could come help the doctors and nurses in the emergency room if it was necessary or even to keep company to the injured or the family to take care of them in a moment of shock, and this stress situation, at a time when they probably feel lonely and far from home (TNV, 17-08-2017).

As seen in the other media analyzed, there were also a few comments on not-so-exemplary reactions, basically spreading violent images of the attacks. However, in the case of *TV3*, these circumstantial flaws were very quickly balanced with a more positive side on opposite actions on social networks to show respect for the victims and fight hate and fear.

Europeanism. Importantly, in *TV3* it was implied that Barcelona, and therefore Catalonia, had strong ties with Europe. These European aspirations, tied with the fact that Spain is not referenced often (the 3-11 attacks are referenced five times), could reflect a will to be part of the European Union, without being part of Spain, a goal only achieved through independence. This sort of Europeanism was built through placing Barcelona next to important European capitals:

And they are next to us in this aggressive act that took place in the streets of our city, our capital. London, Brussels, Paris, and other European cities have suffered the same experience. Today it was Barcelona's turn [...] We have shown them our support, to the European cities that have gone through the same. Today it will be these cities that will show us their support (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; TNV, 17-08-2017).

In addition, these European aspirations were also evoked by mentioning European organisms and public figures such as the European Union, the European Parliament and its president, the European Commission and its president, and the European Council.

Lastly, Europeanism in the sense of a shared European identity was also reflected in direct mentions of Europe in relation to the attacks:

I want to show my solidarity after this tragedy that happened in our city. The truth is that we should fight against this pest that is destroying all Europe (words by an anonymous citizen in Barcelona; TNM, 20-08-2017).

Local audience. Like *La Vanguardia*, the other Catalan medium analyzed in this project, *TV3* also hinted at a local audience that was familiar with the city of Barcelona and Catalan geography. Also, there were references that constructed the television channel as the Catalan television channel. This was a strong rationale to place the codes regarding Catalonia and the Catalans inside the category **us** and not **them**:

We all are Barcelona, we will keep living, we will keep walking in Les Rambles, we will keep welcoming visitors from all over the world, we will keep giving information on time and freely, like always, thanks for your trust, and good night (TNV, 17-08-2017).

Catalonia as a state. There were some instances in which Catalonia was, at least, treated as a particular autonomous region in Spain and, at most, as an already independent state. It was often taken for granted that Catalonia operated as an independent state from Spain, or journalists treated Spain and its government as foreigners:

Precisely early in the afternoon, the adviser for External Affairs, Raül Romeva, met with the French and the German secretaries at the airport. The secretaries also met with the vice-president Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, and adviser Romeva, to learn the ins and outs of the situation. The French secretary explained that he wanted to convey, in person, the solidarity of the French government (TNV, 18-08-2017).

Yes, it was in the middle of a great expectation from the media, present here at Palau, from here, but also lots of international ones, when the president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, adviser Forn and also the mayor of Mossos appeared, with the authorities from the Internal Affairs department and the security force (TNV, 21-08-2017).

It is important to note that it was Carles Puigdemont and not Mariano Rajoy who made the announcement that the perpetrator of the attack in La Rambla had been taken down.

Our TV. A few times *TV3* gave itself a special status as a Catalan TV channel. The journalists did that by implying a close relationship with the Catalan police and

therefore, privileged access to information. In addition, twice they finished the news program revealing the audience shares that placed them as leaders in Catalonia. Not for nothing *TV3*'s slogan is *la teva* (yours, in Catalan):

Because of the interest it aroused, from everyone, *TV3* was yesterday an informative reference and led the audience of the day, with a share of 18.8%. The special programs for *TV3* and 324 achieved an accumulated audience of more than 2 million 600 thousand viewers. The most seen program was the night news program, with a share of 36.9%. High following also of the special program shown at 10 p.m. and that became the second most seen program. About 600 thousand users followed the current events through the Internet portal of *TV3* and Catalunya Ràdio (TNV, 18-08-2017).

The Catalan country's capital. Very few times the scripts referring to Catalonia as a country and Barcelona as its capital were used:

The Eiffel tower turned its lights off last night in honor of the victims in Barcelona. Other buildings in New York, Brasilia, Tel-Aviv, honored the victims in the *Catalan capital* and Cambrils (emphasis added; TNM, 18-08-2017).

Catalan people. Concerning the Catalan identity, there were several references to Catalan values and language. Catalans were depicted as welcoming, peaceful, democratic people who are brave, solidary and knew how to rise to the occasion:

We have to prove that we are not afraid, carry on, we the Catalan people are strong and we have to carry on (TNM, 18-08-2017).

The “no tinc por” [I'm not afraid] that today could be heard spontaneously in the moment of the gathering, I think that expresses the best weapon that a decent, welcoming, peaceful society, one that loves freedom, has to give to the terrorist threat (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; TNM, 18-08-2017).

Catalan language. In addition, the Catalan language was referenced in *TV3*, as in other media, as a hint at the quality of integration of newcomers and as part of the Catalan identity that creates community. This was reflected in the King's articulation of some words in Catalan:

It was shy, but we could verify that effectively, Felipe VI said “no tinc por” [I'm not afraid] (TNV, 19-08-2017).

Spain. The category **them** comprised the subcategory **the other**, with four codes: **Muslims, tourists, Spain** and **Spaniards**. References to Muslim communities regarding their integration and condemnation of the attacks were very present in the data corpus, as were references to tourists, especially concerning the fact that most of the victims were visiting the city at the time of the attacks. Since this project focuses on Catalan and Spanish identities, these codes will not be described in detail.

Spain and Spaniards. There was very little information coded under Spain and Spanish people. Spain was described as a country in the European Union that has strong ties with other member states. Therefore, it was implied that since Spain was a European Union member, the Spanish society would be a Western society that shared the values of democracy, diversity, human rights and freedom:

The [Spanish] secretary of Internal Affairs didn't want to give any details about the investigations and he described as very good the collaboration and cooperation between Mossos d'Esquadra and he said he is in constant contact with the police forces from other countries in Europe to be able to establish connections with the cell that attacked Barcelona and also to be able to activate the protocol of search and arrest (TNM, 19-08-2017).

Their relationship. The category **us vs. them**, developed two sub-categories. **Unity** was constructed in the Catalan television as a consonance or not among all administrations, the unity of only the Catalan administrations and the unity of only the Spanish administrations. **Unity** comprised six codes: **real unity, fake unity, calls for unity, people's unity, team Catalonia** and **team Spain**. The other sub-category was Catalonia inside Spain, which constructed Catalonia as a Spanish territory. It was descriptive of the relationship between these entities. **Catalonia inside Spain** included

five codes: **political tension, hierarchy of governments, international perspective, Catalonia as a region and plans for independence.**

Real unity. Regarding unity, very often journalists reflected a real unity of the Catalan and Spanish administrations against terrorism. These instances were more present in *TV3* news programs than they were in the press articles:

[Rajoy] did have phone conversations during all the afternoon, with president Carles Puigdemont, and with all the leaders of the political parties in the opposition. And just some minutes ago, in the Congress, he gave a statement in which he says that all political parties are united, without breaches, against terrorism (TNV, 17-08-2017).

King Felipe VI and the president of the Spanish government, Mariano Rajoy, arrived together at the square, next to president Puigdemont, vice-president Junqueras, the rest of the Catalan government and the representatives of all the political parties. This was the image of unity that they wanted to convey against terrorism, above ideologies (TNM, 18-08-2017).

Yesterday the Catalan and Spanish governments reunited the crisis cabinets separately even though they all were in Barcelona. Today, they did it together. The place was the conselleria of Internal Affairs and the cabinet was led by Carles Puigdemont and Mariano Rajoy (TNM, 18-08-2017).

Fake unity. Even though they were not as frequent as the examples of real unity, there were some instances in which it was implied that the image of unity that the administrations wanted to convey did not correspond to the real situation:

Today's investigations and yesterday's attacks have been useful for the top authorities to give an image of unity. The unity has been effective beyond the cameras and microphones, regarding the cooperation in the police operations (TNV, 18-08-2017).

To address this "fake" unity, public figures often highlighted the importance of the unity of the administrations. Again, these calls for unity could be counter-productive, since by saying that the administrations' goal must be unity, it was implicitly stated that unity was not achieved yet:

An image of unity of all the political parties, he said, that has to be shown to the society (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; TNM, 18-08-2017).

Calls for unity. It is very important to stress that these calls for unity were very often made by politicians against independence, which could add a second reading to these calls for unity, beyond terrorism, against secessionism. For example, in the same public appearance Rajoy used the following words, which could imply that it was not usual for the two administrations to cooperate and that it was a priority to behave as if they were a team, meaning they are not:

It is very important for us to be capable of working together. To be capable of exchanging everything that we need to exchange and to be capable to act as a team (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; TNM, 18-08-2017).

Also, while Puigdemont used that joint appearance to admire the Catalan society,

Rajoy called for unity:

We got up today determined to win, determined to win this war against terrorism and to do it with the best weapon that our society has: the solidarity, the coexistence, the freedom, the respect (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; TNV, 18-08-2017).

Every political force, independently of their way of thinking, is decided to pull together with the same intensity and the same spirit of victory against terrorism (words by Spanish president Mariano Rajoy; TNV, 18-08-2017).

Similarly, in TNM, 21-08-2017, the Spanish secretary of Internal Affairs Juan Ignacio Zoido called for unity after the meeting of the antiterrorist pact. In his statement he encouraged all politicians to put aside their political differences to fight terrorism and invited all the political parties that had not signed the anti-terrorist pacts before to do so. While Zoido called for unity, *Esquerra Republicana* and PDeCAT leaders used that opportunity to ask for more privileges for *Mossos*, for example access to the information of the European police forces. They argued that *Mossos* earned it in their intervention and that they needed this access to improve the protection of the citizens.

People's unity. There were some references to the unity of the people, independently of that of the administrations. These consisted of references to the numerous attendees to the protests and anonymous testimonials that referred to the union of the people after the attacks:

It happened in other places before, now it was our turn, and we hope that this will stop happening, because we all are people regardless of our political ideology (TNV, 20-08-2017).

Team Catalonia, team Spain. But in *TV3* it was also very frequent to show the unity of just the Spanish administration on the one hand and the unity of just the Catalan administration on the other hand. Discourses constructing the unity of “the Catalan team” were more present than those constructing the unity of “the Spanish team”:

And here at the Palau de la Generalitat this crisis department is assembled, this is: mayor of Barcelona, government of Generalitat and authorities of Mossos d'Esquadra (TNV, 17-08-2017).

In Barcelona he will meet with the Spanish vice-president Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría and with the secretary of Internal Affairs, who moved to the government's local office, where Enric Millo, their representative, will give them information about all the details after attending the meeting of the crisis at the Palau de la Generalitat (TNV, 17-08-2017).

Importantly, as shown in the last example, it was the representative of the government's local office who informed Spanish president Mariano Rajoy, instead of a member of the Catalan government.

Furthermore, these two teams were described as separate on a few occasions. For example, in TNV, 19-08-2017:

And the monarchs came here, as you were saying, with the vice-president Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, and also with the representative of the government in Catalonia, Enric Millo. They offered this floral present and at that time, we could hear the cry “no tinc por” [I'm not afraid], which the king joined. [...] We also could hear slogans in favor of Catalonia, Spain and the king. After, Carles Puigdemont and Ada Colau offered their floral present. They came from Plaça

Sant Jaume, where the president of the Generalitat signed the condolence book at the city hall.

Political tension. This separation could be a result of the political tension between administrations, due to the secessionist process—a tension that was both explicitly and implicitly referenced on several occasions:

After the attacks, the anti-terrorist fight took on a new dimension. We have to remember that we come from a climate of political arguments and quarrels about the coordination of the police departments that have to fight to avoid terrorist attacks and also about the access of Mossos d'Esquadra to the state anti-terrorist organizations (TNV, 18-08-2017).

The conversations between the president of the Generalitat Carles Puigdemont and Mariano Rajoy also grabbed our attention. A conversation joined later by the King. And when leaving, we also saw how the Spanish vice-president Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría spoke with the Catalan vice-president Oriol Junqueras. Conversations whose content we obviously don't have information about but what we can say is that times like these are good ice-breakers and above all grab our attention in this context of institutional tension due to the process for sovereignty (TNM, 20-08-2017).

Convention put Rajoy and Puigdemont together, one next to each other at the birth façade. And when the monarchs arrived... [people yelling]: ¡Viva el Rey! ¡Vivan los Reyes! ¡Viva! ¡No tenim por! [Voice-over]: Felipe VI ended up joining the conversation between the two presidents. And another dialogue that *grabbed our* attention: the one between the Spanish vice-president, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, and the Catalan vice-president, Oriol Junqueras. *Circumstances brought them together today* and they didn't avoid the exchange of some words (emphases added; TNV, 20-08-2017).

Interestingly, a few times it was implied that this division was also reflected in the societies, by distinguishing between the Catalan and the Spanish one:

The Spanish society and the Catalan society expect from the politicians precisely this. It is the unity of all the democratic people versus a common challenge (words by leader of PSOE Pedro Sánchez; TNM, 18-08-2017).

Catalonia as a region. It was mentioned above that the discourses that treated Catalonia as a state were very frequent in *TV3*. However, the discourses that took for granted that Catalonia was a region inside Spain were also very frequent in *TV3*. It is noteworthy that the first type of discourses was implicit and the second type explicit. This

is telling because it could reflect an effort by the Catalan television to protect itself from accusations of being used by the Catalan government and the secessionist process. These accusations would have some precedent, as it was seen in the previous chapter regarding the coverage of the secessionist demonstration in 2012. Either to avoid this or just to be precise in their scripts, it is important to realize that there was an implied discourse that regarded Catalonia as a country and that could be interpreted as the stance of the Catalan television channel. In any case, first, discourses constructing Catalonia as a region of Spain regarded Barcelona as one more Spanish city, or explicitly referred to Catalonia as part of the Spanish state:

The people arrested had been in several cities, several places of the Spanish geography, including Catalonia, and had been connected to different police interventions (TNV, 17-08-2017).

Second, Catalonia was constructed as a region of Spain by offering an international outsider perspective in which no distinction was made between Catalonia and Spain:

Islamic State has advertised the method of running over people in the several magazines and videos that they disseminate in the social networks, and they have placed Spain, the Iberian Peninsula, the Andalus, as targets to attack, also crowded touristic targets (TNV, 17-08-2017).

The image conveyed by Spain this morning in Plaça de Catalunya in a strong image, of a country's unity and also of the unity that is expected in Europe in the war against terrorism (words by Jean-Yves Le Drian, French secretary of External Affairs; TNV, 18-08-2017).

Third, Catalonia was constructed as a region of Spain by reminding the audience of the secession plans of the Catalan government, since to achieve independence, a territory must be considered part of a country first. However, it is worth to point out there was only one reference to the plans to secede by Puigdemont's government.

Conclusively, this discourse was less present in *TV3* than in the press (one instance versus three in *La Vanguardia* and versus two in *El País*).

And we are convinced, we are determined to keep this way of building a city, building a country, building the world (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; TNV, 19-08-2017).

To sum up, like *La Vanguardia*, *TV3* constructed Catalonia as a region of Spain with the potential to be a country. Importantly, this imagined country was also constructed by the Catalan television as very close to the European Union. Additionally, the Catalan society appeared as a supportive one. As to the Spanish national identity, it was not described in detail in *TV3*, a case like the one encountered in the previous chapter regarding the secessionist demonstration in 2012. Despite that, Spain appeared in *TV3* as a Western society that defends democracy, diversity, human rights and freedom. Regarding the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, as in the press, tension between the administrations was made salient, but *TV3* underscored the unity of the administrations. However, in *TV3* people appeared united. Additionally, *TV3* offered an international perspective that emphasized that abroad Catalonia is not perceived as a unique national identity but as part of Spain.

In the following section, the analysis will focus on the coverage of the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils by the Spanish national television *TVE1*. *TVE1* set a discourse that constructed Spain as a united, Western democracy and Catalonia as a region of Spain. The Catalan society in *TVE1* appeared as a welcoming, democratic, brave one. As to the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, *TVE1* also emphasized the unity between both administrations after the attacks.

Spanish TV coverage of the attacks: *TVEI*

This analysis comprised the news programs aired on *TVEI*, the informative channel of the Spanish national television. The nine news programs aired from the night of August 17th to the night of August 21st of 2017 were transcribed. Only the news stories that were completely unrelated to the attacks were excluded from the transcription. This resulted in a transcript document that was 97 pages long, single-spaced, and these were all included in the analysis.

Us: Spain. In the stage of second-cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013), focused coding (Saldaña, 2013) again resulted in the categories: **us**, **them**, and **us vs. them**. However, like the coverage of *TV3*, the coverage of the attacks by the Spanish television resulted in the addition of new subcategories. The category **us** comprised the subcategory **Spain**. Spain was constructed by *TVEI* based on implicit and explicit references to Barcelona being an international city, very important in the European context, but also to Barcelona as a very important Spanish city. Similarly, Spain was constructed as an important European country, united and sharing the values of Western democracies. Spain is also a country that has a national broadcaster targeted to a national audience. Additionally, as every state, Spain holds a set of state security forces. To a smaller extent, Spain was evoked in relation to the people that are of its nationality. Spain yielded eight codes: **Barcelona: a European city**, **Barcelona: a Spanish city**, **Spain: a European country**, **Spain: united**, **Spain: Western democracy**, **national TV**, **Guardia Civil and Policía Nacional** and **Spanish nationality**.

Barcelona: A European city. Barcelona was constructed in a dichotomy between discourses constructing the city as a main European capital and discourses bringing it back to the Spanish context. On the one hand, there were scripts that placed Barcelona very close to European cities:

The modus operandi of the attack in Barcelona reminds of other attacks suffered in Europe in the latter years. They used trucks, vans and cars in Nice, London, Berlin or Paris run over people indiscriminately or over members of the security forces (TD21H, 17-08-2017).

Also, there were explicit references to Barcelona and Catalonia that connected them to Europe and the European Union in general:

Also, the international community has shown its solidarity after the attacks in Catalonia: Germany, France, United Kingdom, or the European Union have expressed their shock and solidarity with Barcelona (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

And finally, there were also references to the multicultural values of the city:

A brave and open-to-the-world city, a city that is very proud of its diversity and of being a cosmopolitan city, and that will continue to be... (words by Barcelona mayor Ada Colau; TD21H, 17-08-2017).

Barcelona: A Spanish city. On the other hand, there were scripts that brought Barcelona closer to Spain than to Europe:

Barcelona has always been a reference in tolerance, a reference in freedom, a reference in diversity and the terrorists and the fanatics will not steal from Barcelona and Catalonia what they mean to the rest of people in Spain (words by Podemos leader, Pablo Iglesias; TD15H, 18-08-2017).

Another way to do this was equaling Barcelona to other Spanish cities, and especially mentioning Madrid to show a close relationship:

This city [Madrid] that keeps the scar of 11-M open, in which 193 people died and 2000 were injured, especially feels for the attacks in Catalonia (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

[Mayor of Madrid, Manuela Carmena:] “ask us anything you need, Madrid is available for you, as we know, we lighted the Cibeles building with the flag of Barcelona and we want that to be a symbol of the extent to which we identify

with your pain.” [Mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau]: “We love their city and their city also suffered terrorism in a brutal and terrible way and, therefore, it is very important for us that Manuela wanted to be today here.” (TD15H, 20-08-2017).

It is worth to note that this last example brought up again the issue of the flag.

Since the attacks took place in two Catalan cities and not only in Barcelona, it is logical to think that the flag displayed in Madrid should be the Catalan one. This raises a question about why was the flag of Barcelona chosen instead, and if the reasons could hint at a possible adverse reaction by some citizens of Madrid, if one key monument of the city like Cibeles had displayed the Catalan flag.

Spain: A European country. Importantly, it might seem contradictory to establish that Barcelona is both European and Spanish at the same time. *TVE1* solved this by also giving Spain the status of an important European country. This was reflected in the messages of solidarity sent from European Union organisms and the offices of European chancellors and prime ministers. Also, this was accomplished by interpreting the terrorist attack in Barcelona as an attack on all of Europe and what it represents. To a lesser extent, this connection was also drawn by listing the nationalities of the victims, or by mentioning the collaboration between police forces of different member states.

Spain: united. In addition to being a European country, and in spite of the importance of Barcelona in the European and Spanish maps, Spain was also given the treatment of a united country:

Flags at half-mast in a lot of city halls. Pamplona, Málaga, Madrid. The president of the Community [Madrid] wanted to send a calming message: “I would like to convey a message of tranquility a calming message, to the people of Madrid and to all the people that are visiting us these days”. Ovarions in other communities like the Valencian one, where the sadness was obvious. [President of the Valencian Community]: “This is not an attack against a city, it is not an attack against a country, it is an attack against all the good people in the world”. Black

crepes in memory of the victims during the homage in Galicia. The fear, said the president of the [Galician government] Xunta would only show weakness: “We will not, in any case, back off in defending our principles and our values”. Bells tolling in Extremadura to condemn this attack. [President of Extremadura]: “The more united and strong we are the better we can fight against this new pest of the XXI century”. [Moments of] silence in the Basque Country and Andalusia. And also in Ceuta and Melilla. *Unity across Spain* to censor this terrorist brutality (emphasis added; TD21H, 18-08-2017).

Spain: Western democracy. Additionally, in being a member of the European Union, Spain incorporated values shared by all the members. These values were related to Western democratic societies, like freedom, human rights, democracy, peaceful coexistence, unity and security. In addition, the relationship between Spain and the other member states was constructed as a close and supportive one:

Mariano Rajoy received calls of support from Merkel, Macron, May and Trump. Flags at half-mast or lights with the colors of the Spanish flag take place across the world (TD21H, 18-08-2017).

This last example mentioned that the colors of the Spanish flag were used in displays of support around the world. This is interesting because since the Spanish and Catalan flags share the same colors (red and yellow), it would be hard to know which flag was used.

National TV. In its status as state, Spain also possesses a national public broadcaster. By using self-references, *TVE1* constructed its image as the Spanish national television:

According to the experts, the victims that survive the attacks must learn how to face the shock of what they have lived, but also the memory. Because of that, the narrative by the media is key. We asked psychologists how the treatment of the news by the media affects the victims (TD21H, 20-08-2017).

As a national television channel that broadcasts its content to the entirety of the country, some discourses at *TVE1* suggested that journalists were aware that not all of the channel’s audience was familiar with Barcelona:

We are at a few meters from Plaça de Catalunya, we are reporting from Plaça Universitat, for those who are familiar with the city. [...] Apparently, he didn't act on his own, a second man had rented another van, which was located in Vic, 70 kilometers from Barcelona (TD21H, 17-08-2017).

Guardia Civil and Policía Nacional. Spain also has state security forces:

Guardia Civil and *Policía Nacional*. References to these were less present in the text than references to the autonomic police *Mossos d'Esquadra*. This makes sense because it was the latter who led the investigation. However, the collaboration among all departments was brought up in a few occasions:

“Total collaboration” of Policía Nacional, Guardia Civil and Mossos d'Esquadra. The president of the government, Mariano Rajoy, has guaranteed it this morning in the meeting he had in Barcelona with the vice-president, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría and the secretary of internal affairs, Juan Ignacio Zoido, to analyze the situation after the double attack yesterday (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

Spanish nationality. Finally, the Spanish nationality was mentioned a few times, strictly to identify the victims:

Regarding nationalities, there are six victims of Spanish nationality, one of them with nationality Spanish and Argentinian (TD15H, 21-08-2017).

Them: Catalonia. The category **them** included the three subcategories

Catalonia, Muslims and **tourists**. Catalonia was the only subcategory relevant for this project. Thus, the subcategories Muslims, focused on the condemnation of the attacks and the integration of this community in the Spanish society, and tourists, focused on the victims and the economic impact of the attacks, will not be expanded further.

Catalonia was constructed by the Spanish television as a region of Spain with some particularities, including its own language, values, and police department.

Catalonia incorporated six codes: **solidarity, grieving, Mossos, a particular region, the Catalan language** and **Catalan people**. Interestingly, there were some noteworthy

absences in the construction of the Catalan identity by *TVE1*, compared to the other media. First, Barcelona was referred as “the Catalan capital” only twice in the complete data corpus. Second, there were no references to a special relationship between Catalonia and the Basque Country. Thus, the code Basques and Catalans: allies, was not present here. It is worth pointing out that there were three references to the Basque pro-independence terrorist group ETA versus seven references to the 11-3 bombings in Madrid by Al-Qaeda, which also contributed to placing Barcelona closer to Madrid than to the Basque Country.

Grief and solidarity. There were numerous references to reactions of solidarity and grieving from locals and visitors in Barcelona after the attacks. Since these were not especially relevant to answer questions of identity in this project, they will not be expanded further:

Solidarity spread into the roads. Several volunteers gave food away to those who got stuck in their cars when they were trying to enter Barcelona. Also, the taxi drivers helped a lot of people go back home (TD21H, 18-08-2017). In this walkway, the Canaletes fountain, symbol of Barcelona, has become an improvised altar in which hundreds of people have left flowers, candles and drawings in memory of the victims (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

Mossos. Concerning *Mossos d’Esquadra*, they were definitely regarded as an authority in the investigation. First, their intervention was thanked and praised. Second, they appeared as a main source of information for the journalists at *TVE1* but also for international journalists:

In the following hours all the people dead in the attack could be identified. This is what the chief of Mossos said in his appearance with Puigdemont and the adviser for justice for the foreign press (TD15H, 20-08-2017).

However, there were some notable points in the discourse regarding *Mossos*. Like in *El País*, journalists at *TVE1* mentioned the fact that the agent who took down four terrorists in Cambrils was trained by the Spanish legion. Moreover, it was suggested that it was this experience in the legion and not his experience as *Mosso* that encouraged his admirable behavior. The fact that the agent had been part of the legion before was denied by the department of *Mossos d'Esquadra* itself (see the footnote in Villareal, 2017) and was not reported at all in Catalan media:

And in the past, he trained with the legion, and that is the reason why he had great ability to use weapons, and manage tense situations (TD15H, 20-08-2017).

In addition, there was a difference in the treatment by *TV3* of the discrepancies between the secretary of Internal Affairs and the department of *Mossos d'Esquadra* and that by *TVE1*. The *TV3* approach was divided in the code unfairness to *Mossos*, which included the secretary of Internal Affairs claiming the terrorist cell was dismantled before the *Mossos* said so, the code leadership of *Mossos*, which comprised the *Mossos'* reply to the secretary claiming that it was them who had to say if the cell was dismantled and calling its dismantlement, and the code political tension, which included Puigdemont's statement that the Spanish secretary could not have expressed himself correctly:

At this moment, we are still at a level four of warning and the secretary Zoido said the terrorist cell is practically dismantled but *Mossos* denied it and say it is they who will decide (TNM, 19-08-2017).

The only fugitive jihadist is still wanted and, according to *Mossos*, the cell that attacked Catalonia is not yet dismantled (TNM, 19-08-2017).

Maybe the secretary didn't explain himself correctly but I think that there is no disagreement among police departments either (words by Catalan president Carles Puigdemont; TNV, 19-08-2017).

Conversely, the approach in *TVE1* focused on directly tackling the issue by denying any discrepancies, which was coded as *Mossos*:

Government and Generalitat have denied disagreements between them about the investigation of the attacks and affirm that Zoido's statements claiming that the jihadist cell is already dismantled *are technically correct*, and that the investigation continues. And the secretary has added that the communication with the police departments in Catalonia is constant. [Secretary of internal affairs, Juan Ignacio Zoido]: "Today Mossos d'Esquadra were with us and, also today, the Ertzaintza were with us. And when I have been in Barcelona I have seen how the Policía [Nacional] and how the Guardia Civil were included in every center of coordination". [Catalan president Carles Puigdemont]: "Maybe the secretary didn't explain himself correctly but I think that there is no disagreement among police departments either *because the collaboration is magnificent.*" (emphases added; TD21H, 19-08-2017).

A particular region. *TVE1* recognized the particularity of Catalonia and it did so by often equating it with countries:

While waiting for the confirmation of the Catalan authorities, other governments have informed about the victims. Didier Reynels, the Belgian prime minister [...]. The Italian secretary of external affairs has informed about [...]. Meanwhile, sources from the Portuguese government also have informed about [...]. The French secretary of internal affairs, Gérard Collomb, explained that [...]. The German external affairs spokesperson, Martin Shafer, also informed about... (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

But to a lesser extent, it also did so by recognizing its borders:

Disappointment, rejection and surprise and profound sadness are the most shared feelings in the municipality in the Catalan pre-Pyrenees (TD21H, 20-08-2017).

And in an instance, the particularity of Catalonia was constructed by pointing out the prosperity of the area. It is important to underscore that this discourse could also contribute to reinforce the idea that Catalonia's was a welcoming and multicultural society:

The family members and relatives of Francisco were telling us that he was a very homely person, that he leaves two sons and a daughter and that his family, as many other, had to emigrate to Catalonia when he was just a kid, to make a living (TD21H, 18-08-2017).

Catalan language. In addition, the particularity of Catalonia was recognized in *TVE1* by referring to its own language and the values of its people. The Catalan language

was considered as an important part of the Catalan identity and the Catalan society, and its power to bring people together was evoked very often:

In Catalan, the King repeated that sentence that yesterday was heard in Plaça de Catalunya, *no tenim por, we are not afraid* (TD15H, 19-08-2017).

The monarchs, he wrote, cry today with this Barcelona that, he affirms, won't be defeated and will keep its peaceful and democratic coexistence. To end, a sentence in Catalan: "Barcelona, sempre al nostre cor". Barcelona, always in our hearts (TD21H, 19-08-2017).

Catalan people. Regarding the Catalans themselves, they appeared as welcoming, democratic, brave people. From the examples below it was interesting to note that in the first example, the journalist underscored that this description of the Catalan character was by Carles Puigdemont. This could suggest that *TVEI* did not necessarily subscribe to it. From the second example, it is striking that a distinction was made between the Catalans and the Spanish:

The president of the Generalitat condemned terrorist violence and said that brutality will never defeat the democratic character of the Catalan people who, *he affirmed*, have always been welcoming people (emphasis added; TD21H, 17-08-2017).

These are the outraged words of a Muslim woman that lives in Barcelona. Thanks to the Catalans and the Spanish she lives well, she said in Las Ramblas, where dozens of people have applauded her (TD21H, 19-08-2017).

Catalonia is not afraid of anything (words by anonymous testimonial; TD21H, 20-08-2017).

Us vs. them: The relationship between Catalonia and Spain. The category **us vs. them** included the subcategories **unity** and **Catalonia inside Spain**. One more time, unity was constructed based on evidence of real unity among administrations, calls for unity, hints that the administrations were not as united as they tried to show, unity of only the Catalan administrations, unity of only Spanish administrations and unity of the citizenship facing the terrorist attack. Unity comprised six codes: **real unity**, **calls for**

unity, fake unity, Catalan team, Spanish team and unity of people. The subcategory Catalonia inside Spain included references exactly to that, the construction of Catalonia as an autonomous community of Spain. It comprised four codes: **Catalonia as a region, political tension, international perspective and hierarchy of governments.** In this category there was also a notable absence with respect to previous media. There were no references to the plans by secessionist leaders to continue their secessionist agenda despite the attacks. This could be seen as a way to reinforce the idea of unity between administrations.

Real unity. *TVE1* was, of the media analyzed, the one that included most references to real unity of administrations and police departments:

It was a joint appearance of Mariano Rajoy and Carles Puigdemont that ended up with a strong handshake, the third one today (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

There was the king, Felipe VI, the president of the government, Mariano Rajoy, and the president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont and the mayor Ada Colau, also showing that unity of all institutions against terror (TD21H, 18-08-2017).

Juan Ignacio Zoido was in [Spain's presidential office] Palacio de la Moncloa with the president of the government Mariano Rajoy but before, in the office for internal affairs he heard the opinions of the highest authorities in Policía, Guardia Civil, Mossos d'Esquadra, Ertzaintza, [intelligence services] CNI and CITCO (TD15H, 19-08-2017).

Additionally, there was another discrepancy between the coverage of the national and the regional television channels. In the coverage of the meeting of the anti-terrorist pact by *TV3*, the Spanish secretary of internal affairs Juan Ignacio Zoido was shown calling for unity. Then, independentist Catalan leaders were shown giving statements asking for more privileges for *Mossos*. Meanwhile, in the coverage of the same meeting, after Zoido's call for unity, *TVE1* showed Basque and Catalan nationalist leaders, also calling for unity, mentioning institutional loyalty, highlighting their willingness to fight

against terrorism and the cooperation and collaboration between institutions (TD21H, 21-08-2017).

Calls for unity. As to calls for unity, it is worth to note that here too most of the calls were done by political figures against Catalonia's independence, raising a question about the nature of the unity that was being asked for. For example, some of these political leaders asked for unity independently of ideologies (TD15H, 18-08-2017), others asked their fellow politicians to put differences aside (TD15H, 18-08-2017), others encouraged support for the [Spanish] government to fight for democracy (TD15H, 21-08-2017), and the television channel highlighted this aspect in the context of the signature of the anti-terrorist pact:

Beyond those who will end up signing, there is a commitment. For this meeting not to be a one-time thing, but something regular. A commitment, that of putting disagreements aside, and work side by side (TD21H, 21-08-2017).

Fake unity. In addition, even though proofs of unity were very pervasive in the text, references to this unity not being as solid as some might intend were also very present. In the examples below, it is striking that *TVEI* claimed Catalan president Carles Puigdemont and president Mariano Rajoy both highlighted the good collaboration between the administrations. But in fact, and as they added at the end, Puigdemont focused on social coexistence.

In their speeches, both Rajoy and Puigdemont talked about adding up, joining strengths to end with the terrorists definitively both have highlighted the good collaboration between administrations and have praised the task of the security forces. Rajoy supports team work and Puigdemont alludes to the spirit of coexistence and solidarity (TD21H, 18-08-2017).

Team Catalonia, team Spain. Similarly, it is frequent that the Catalan administrations appeared united on one side and the Spanish administration also appeared

united on another side. This could be seen as another way to reinforce the discourse of fake unity:

In this same sense mayor Ada Colau called the citizens to attend the joint moment of silence summoned by all the Catalan institutions to be united against brutality (TD21H, 17-08-2017).

Even though less present, there were also discourses that constructed a sort of Spanish team:

Rajoy will meet in Barcelona with the government's vice-president, Sáenz de Santamaría, and with the secretary of internal affairs, who also travelled there (TD21H, 17-08-2017).

People's unity. Finally, there were quite a few references to the unity of the citizens against terrorism, which contributed to the idea that the Catalan and Spanish relationship was marked by tension but mostly at an administrative level, and not so much at the level of the people:

A picture of unity against terrorism to which hundreds of citizens have joined to show their solidarity with the victims and rejection to terrorism (TD21H, 18-08-2017).

Catalonia as a region. In the subcategory of Catalonia inside Spain there were numerous references to Catalonia as a region of Spain:

Shock in all Spain and solidarity with Catalonia for the worst terrorist attack in our country since 3-11 (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

Catalonia has been the center of attention of the agents all this year. It was the autonomous community with more interventions against jihadism and where more people have been arrested (TD15H, 18-08-2017).

Political tension. In addition, there were some instances in which it was implied that there was political tension between the state and regional administrations:

According to Juan Ignacio Zoido the terrorist cell of the attacks in Barcelona is dismantled. Mossos believe there is still some work to do (TD15H, 19-08-2017).

In matters of political tension, it is worth to highlight the news piece about the mistake of the Catalan adviser of internal affairs in matters of nationality of the victims:

And controversy for the statement by [Catalan adviser of internal affairs] Joaquim Forn after the double attack in Catalonia. The adviser of internal affairs of the Generalitat, in a public appearance last Friday, distinguished the Catalan from the Spanish victims: [Joaquim Forn]: “we have already identified seven people. We have an Italian woman, a Portuguese woman, a woman with double nationality Spanish and Argentinian, two Catalan people and two people of Spanish nationality”. People’s Party [PP] and the [Socialist Party of Catalonia] PSC claim that this attack can’t be used to defend party interests (TD21H, 20-08-2017).

Importantly, this news story was completely omitted in the Catalan media *La Vanguardia* and *TV3*, but it appeared in the Spanish media *El País* and *TVE1*. However, *TVE1* made a similar mistake:

With Pau, they are 15 dead people. Seven women and eight men. Among them, two kids, the young Catalan 3-year-old, and the other 7-year-old Australian-British minor. Six dead were Spanish (TD15H, 21-08-2017).

Interestingly, later on, the Catalan young victim and his family were referred to as if they all were from Andalusia, where his great uncle, another mortal victim, was born:

The Catalan town is devoted to support this family from Lanteira, in Granada (TD15H, 21-08-2017).

International perspective. In addition, there were references to Barcelona, and therefore, Catalonia, being part of Spain. Interestingly, this was a discourse constructed by international leaders, for example based on their messages of support to the Spanish (not the Catalan) government after the attacks. Among these international leaders were the president of the United States Donald Trump, the former president of the United States and the former first lady Barack and Michelle Obama, (TD21H, 17-08-2017), the German chancellor Angela Merkel, (TD15H, 18-08-2017), the Chinese secretary of

external affairs (TD15H, 18-08-2017) and the French secretary of internal affairs (TD21H, 19-08-2017).

Hierarchy. Lastly, and closely related to political tension, there were some instances that evoked the hierarchy and powers of governments of each administration and even police departments:

In Barcelona he will meet with the vice-president Sáenz de Santamaría, and the secretary of internal affairs Juan Ignacio Zoido. From there, they say in [Spanish presidential office] Moncloa, they will coordinate the necessary interventions to reinforce security and to attend to the injured (TD21H, 17-08-2017). And this afternoon, the vice-president of the government, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, met in Barcelona with the German and French secretaries of external affairs. The three countries studied how to advance the European coordination in anti-terrorism matters (TD21H, 18-08-2017).

Interestingly, a detail about the example above—according to *TV3*, the Catalan adviser of foreign affairs was also there:

Precisely early in the afternoon, the adviser for External Affairs, Raül Romeva, met with the French and the German secretaries at the airport. The secretaries also met with the vice-president Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, and adviser Romeva, to learn the ins and outs of the situation (TNV, 18-08-2017).

To sum up, *TVE1* set a discourse that constructed Spain as a united, Western democracy with cities of national and European relevance like Barcelona. As to Catalonia, it was constructed by the Spanish television as a region of Spain with a society that embraces its own language. The Catalan society in *TVE1* appeared as a welcoming, democratic, brave one. As to the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, both television channels constructed a relationship that made salient the unity between both administrations after the attacks. However, they still included some discourses that suggested tension between them.

The television coverage of the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils was similar to that by the press. The coverage of the attacks on television emphasized the solidarity and generosity of the Catalan society and the multiculturalism that characterizes Barcelona. However, while the city was constructed as the Catalan capital in *TV3*, it is considered a very important Spanish city in *TVE1*. Regarding the Catalan identity, the importance of the Catalan language for Catalans was noted in both television channels too. As to their construction of the Spanish national identity, both television channels highlighted the fact that Spain belongs to the European Union and shares values like democracy and freedom with the other member states. The relationship between the Catalan and the Spanish societies was constructed both by *TV3* and *TVE1* as one marked by tension, even though the channels underscored their unity after the attacks. Interestingly, the two public broadcasters considered they were fulfilling a social function, and mentioned it in their coverage of the attacks.

Conclusion

There were striking differences and similarities between the coverage of the 2017 attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils by the Spanish and Catalan media. Catalonia was depicted as a particular region inside Spain. Catalonia was constructed as a singular Spanish region by making salient the importance that the Catalan autonomous government, police force, defined borders, media, capital city, close relationships with European countries, values and language had for the Catalan population. This recognition went from just that, in the Spanish media, to almost receiving the status of a state or at least raising that possibility in Catalan media.

Regarding Spain, the country was constructed as a member of the European Union, that was open, Western, civilized and democratic—and also a country that had its own state security forces, national media and important cities like Madrid or Barcelona. Lastly, Spain was also referenced as a state that can issue official documentation. In the Spanish media, it was also highlighted that it was a united country. Conversely, in the Catalan media that was not the case, as they gave more importance to Catalonia as a region than to Spain as a country. In addition, the Catalan media highlighted that there are other regions that shared this particularity in Spain, such as the Basque Country.

As to the relationship between societies, it was depicted as one composed by a surface of mutual respect and a lot of underlying political tension. This tension could be seen in the demands for more privileges for the department of *Mossos d'Esquadra* by the Catalan police and government, highlighted in the Catalan media. It could also be seen in the framing of secessionism in terms of the unity (or not) between the Catalan and Spanish administrations. This could be seen in the very pervasive displays of fake unity or calls for unity. Moreover, in the latter, it is important to realize that those who called for unity were mostly political leaders against the independence of Catalonia, which gave the call for unity against terrorism a second reading on unity of Spain. The references to Catalonia's independence in the coverage of the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils might be striking, since the topics were completely unrelated. Thus, this could be interpreted as an indicator of the extreme salience of this issue in Catalonia and Spain at the end of the summer of 2017, probably due to the proximity of the date of the illegal referendum of October 1st for Catalonia's self-determination.

Additionally, the underlying tension could be found in the absences of coverage in the media. In the news stories analyzed here it could be seen that the Catalan media selected for this work did not cover the mistake by the adviser of internal affairs Joaquim Forn in distinguishing the nationalities of Catalan and Spanish victims of the attacks. This absence could be seen as due to the interpretation by the Catalan television that this event was not remarkable, either because it was just a mistake resulting from a high-pressure situation or because it was not seen as a mistake. Or it could also be that *TV3* did not want to engage the secessionist debate over a mistake that happened in a delicate situation, namely the report of victims in the terrorist attacks. In addition, the Spanish media added a news story on the training in the Spanish legion received by the agent who shot four out of five terrorists down in the attack in Cambrils. This fact was denied by *Mossos d'Esquadra* but it was still included in both Spanish media analyzed here. This could indicate a more fluent communication of *Mossos* with the Catalan media than with the national media, or a biggest consideration from the Catalan media towards the Catalan police department.

Interestingly, each medium used discourses that constructed a local (*La Vanguardia*) or national (*El País*) readership in the case of press, and a local (*TV3*) or national (*TVE1*) viewership, in the case of television. This was reflected in their references to Barcelona, and very explicitly in taking for granted the familiarity of the audience with the local spots and organisms. This question raised the same argument that was discussed in the previous chapter regarding the coverage of the secessionist demonstration of 2012. That is, according to Anderson (2006), by imagining their

audience media actually contribute to the creation of nations, especially consequential for the Catalan media. In addition, in the case of television, there were self-references that contributed to the legitimization of the channels as fulfilling social functions. This is very probably related to the public nature of these stations, which placed the medium as relevant for one or another society, distinguishing them. On the one hand, *TV3* reported on the television ratings of the coverage the day of the attacks, implying that their legitimacy as the Catalan television and the quality of their journalism made Catalans resort to them in a situation of distress. On the other hand, *TVE1* meta-referenced the role of media in tragic situations like terrorist attacks, informed about the characteristics of a correct and respectful coverage, and argued that they were fulfilling them.

Importantly, this political tension is not surprising if we take into account that only two months before the attacks, the Constitutional Court admitted an appeal by People's Party and *Ciudadanos* against the Catalan law of budgeting, which included a consignment for the organization of the illegal referendum of October 1st. After admitting the appeal, the Constitutional Court also warned Puigdemont and his government of the consequences of not obeying its sentence, including criminal prosecution (EFE, 2017). Thus, it is then logical that the relationship between administrations was adversely affected by these actions.

In addition, this analysis did not include the events of August 22 (except in *La Vanguardia*, because the published version was used in the analysis). This criterion excluded an event that resulted in the emergence of some political tension referred to the Catalan language: In a press conference before the van driver was killed, the major of the

Mossos d'Esquadra, Josep Lluís Traperó, was asked a question in Catalan, which he answered in the same language. Because of that, he received complaints from some of the journalists, to which the chief responded that he was going to answer the questions in the language that they were asked. The journalist or journalists who were offended by that comment left the conference as a protest. Seeing this, Traperó commented “bueno, pues molt bé, pues adió” (a sentence using both Catalan and Spanish and meaning, “well, very good then, good-bye then”). His response went viral in the following days, reaching the first place as trending topic in Twitter in Spain (Torresi, 2017). The opinions were divided as to the appropriateness of using Catalan in a press conference instead of the more widely understood Spanish. The defenders of the chief of *Mossos* remarked that the police department normally used Catalan, Spanish, French and English to inform the public about the attacks (“‘Bueno, pues molt bé, pues adió’: la respuesta viral”, 2017).

Public opinion research will reveal if the societies experienced trends in the same direction as the discourses set by the media coverage analyzed above. A poll conducted by the *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* at the end of October 2017 showed that at that time, 64.6% of Catalans thought Catalonia had reached an insufficient level of autonomy from Spain, compared to the 23% that thought that it had reached a sufficient level (CEO, October 2017). In the same CEO poll (October 2017), 40.2% of the sample thought that Catalonia should be an independent state, 27.4% thought it should keep its status as an autonomous community inside Spain and 21.9% thought it should be a state inside a federal Spain. The levels of independentist sentiment at this point were really high. Indeed, when asked if they wanted Catalonia to be a state independent from Spain, 48.7%

said yes and 43.6% said no (CEO, October 2017). This might be because of the effect of the political events that took place earlier that month (illegal referendum, violent police charges, unilateral declaration of independence and application of the article 155 of the Constitution and dissolution of the Catalan government, with preventive prison for some members of the Parliament).

Since levels of independentism might be unusually high at this point, it would be useful to find a poll that took place after the terrorist attack but before the referendum held October 1st. However, the previous poll took place before the attack. Still, it can give an idea of the change from that summer to that fall, although it should be taken cautiously, as like it has been said above, the rise of independentism cannot possibly be attributed only to the terrorist attack.

According to the CEO public opinion survey held in July 2017, 32.8% of the Catalan population considers the relationship between Catalonia and Spain Catalonia's third main problem, only after unemployment (43.2%) and close to political dissatisfaction (33.7%). Regarding the questions about the political status of Catalonia included in this same poll, 62% of Catalans thought Catalonia had reached an insufficient level of autonomy from Spain, compared to a 26.4% that thought that it had reached a sufficient level (CEO, July 2017). In addition, 34.7% of the sample thought that Catalonia should be an independent state, 30.5% thought it should keep its status as an autonomous community inside Spain and 21.7% thought it should be a state inside a federal Spain (CEO, July 2017).

As to the general Spanish public opinion, the CIS (2017) conducted a poll in which the independence of Catalonia was spontaneously mentioned in fifth place as the main problem in Spain. It was mentioned less frequently than unemployment, corruption and fraud; the politicians; parties and politics in general; and the economy. And right before international terrorism, a remarkable point since the poll was conducted in early September, barely a month after the terrorist attacks in Barcelona. In addition, in November, the independence of Catalonia became the second main problem for the Spanish population (Rodella, 2017).

So, the Catalan and Spanish identities and the relationship between the two societies appear marked by distance and conflict in this third case study centered on the media coverage of the 2017 ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils. The next chapter addresses the general conclusions of the three case studies, with the goal of shedding light into the role of media in the construction of the Catalan and Spanish identities, the Catalan-Spanish relationship and the Catalan secessionist movement.

Chapter Five: Conclusions

This thesis analyzes press and television coverage of three crucial turning points in the relationship between Catalonia and Spain to examine how regional and national media constructed Catalan and Spanish identities. The historical milestones analyzed were the autonomic pacts in 1981, because they informed the current distribution of central and regional power; the secessionist demonstration in 2012, because it was the first time the Catalan governments took a pro-independence stance; and the ISIS terrorist attacks in Catalonia in 2017, because they elevated the political tension between the two administrations. Discourse and framing theories informed an analysis that explored the media coverage of these events to answer the research questions guiding this thesis: (1) How do national media construct Catalan identity in Spain? (2) How do national media construct Spanish identity in Spain? (3) How do Catalan regional media construct Spanish identity in Catalonia? (4) How do Catalan regional media construct Catalan identity in Catalonia? (5) How is the secessionist movement framed in both nation-wide and Catalan media?

This project will contribute to the literature on international relations and identity politics by identifying the role that media play in a political conflict such as the Catalan secessionist movement. More specifically, there is limited research examining what characterizes the Catalan and Spanish identities and how they are maintained. This research aims at filling this gap in the literature. In addition, little research has been conducted on the study of media framing of the “other” in secessionist movements, let alone considering regional and national outlets. This project contributes to bridging this

gap with evidence of how news media constructed the Catalan identity (“us”) versus the Spanish identity (“them”), and vice versa, by defining the problem differently depending on from where it is looked at.

The previous chapters comprised the analysis of the journalistic coverage in national and regional press and television of three milestones in Spain’s history: The signature of the autonomic pacts in 1981, the massive secessionist demonstration in Barcelona in 2012 and the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona in 2017. The data corpus was composed of 512 news stories for the press, and 2 news stories, 43 audiovisual files from 28 different news programs and 221 pages, single-spaced, of transcripts for television. Only news about the events of interest was included in the analysis (except for the autonomic pacts, where all news pieces that were retrieved in the search for autonomic pacts news were included due to scarcity). Additionally, it is important to consider that in the analysis I looked at the coverage not to see how the event was framed per se, but to answer my research questions.

Catalan and Spanish Identities

Regarding the main findings, the major discourses found across all media constructed the Catalan identity as different from the Spanish identity. However, the Catalan media tended to emphasize this difference and to make the Catalan demand for national recognition more salient than the Spanish media. Interestingly, discourses constructing the Catalan identity were more present in the data corpus, both in regional and national media, than discourses regarding the Spanish identity. The framing of secessionist claims also evolved over the thirty years examined from a pure demand of

recognition of the Catalan identity to an official demand of independence. This was also reflected in the construction of the relationship between both societies, always marked by tension but escalating as time passed. Interestingly, most of the main discourses were repeated across each event, although the emphasis placed in some or others nuanced the overall picture.

Catalan identity was constantly depicted by the Catalan media as based on the values of pacifism, democracy and dialogue, but also endurance and resistance. Catalonia has always been considered a unique region of Spain, by Catalans. And through the years, Catalan people have felt that these differences have not been respected, but rather neglected, abused and oppressed. In the case studies included in this project, these perceptions seemed to be based on the fact that the Catalan nationalists were not invited to the negotiations of the autonomic pacts and the fact that the Catalans who demonstrated in Barcelona were disregarded and called irresponsible by the central government. And even when these differences were recognized later in the coverage of the terror attacks, the exaggerated displays and calls for unity by the central government could be perceived as an attempt to ask Catalans to put aside their differences with Spain, ignoring that these differences seemed to be part of their core identity.

Regarding Catalan nationalism, I raised before the question of explaining if Catalan nationalism was a democratic nationalism (Guibernau, 2013), a populist movement, an intercultural nationalism (Conversi & Jeram, 2017), a patriotism, or a new, nuanced kind of nationalism. In my analysis, I found evidence of Catalan nationalism having characteristics of all these. The Europeanist aspirations and the guiding axis of a

referendum for self-determination bring the Catalan secessionist movement close to Guibernau's (2013) democratic nationalism. Additionally, the discourse I found, depicting the Catalan people as abused and oppressed by the Spanish government, corresponds to the definition of populism by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). However, in the opposite sense, the discourse I found from the Spanish perspective that Catalans were irresponsible and selfish in their claims, particularly fiscal ones, provides support for the analysis by Xicoy, Perales-García and Xambó (2017), who concluded that most Catalan and Spanish nationalist newspapers based their discourse on the argument "we are the good guys, they are the bad" (p.1053). Additionally, I did not find xenophobic codes in my analysis, and I did find that the Catalan society was constructed as an inclusive and welcoming one, which could fit in Conversi & Jeram's (2017) concept of intercultural nationalism. Thus, applying the distinction by De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) that nationalists are hostile towards immigrants and patriots are no more hostile to immigration than the average citizen (p. 186), Catalans would lean more toward patriotism.

Spanish media depicted Catalans as also civic-minded, peaceful, democratic people, something that appeared to be marked by the contrast with the existence in the Basque Country of the terrorist group ETA. However, Catalans also were depicted as self-centered and somehow selfish, as they were perceived to care more about their fellow Catalans than about their fellow Spaniards. This was reflected in the autonomic pacts by pointing out that Catalan representatives were blinded by nationalism and could not see how important for Spain and its history the pacts were. It was also very salient

during the 2012 demonstration, as Catalans seemed to think they could overcome the economic crisis faster if they seceded from Spain and the Spaniards thought it would be harder to overcome the crisis as fast without Catalonia. And in the coverage of the attacks, Catalans could be perceived as not being able to pause political tension in order to focus on solving the terrorist investigation.

Regarding the Spanish identity, it was perceived by Spaniards as marked by the resilience and strength of a society that had successfully overcome extremely hard situations such as a civil war or a long dictatorship, but that still had those memories very present. There was some fear of it happening again, so there was an active attempt to avoid confrontations of that kind, namely among Spaniards. I found that this was reflected in the autonomic pacts by emphasizing the relevance of the pacts for Spain's transition to democracy, the big accomplishment that it was to achieve an agreement at the time, and the emphasis on cooperation and consensus in the media coverage. In the 2012 demonstration, this was seen through the emphasis on Spain as a respectful, diverse society and in the central government's avoiding a conflict with the Catalan nationalists by letting the situation "cool off." In the attacks, Spanish media depicted a Spain that had left behind its darkest past to totally embrace the values of unity (at least against terrorism), democracy, openness and civility.

As to the perception of the Spanish identity in Catalan media, it was interestingly often constructed based on the relationship between those societies, of course placing the Catalan one at the center, and focusing on how it was affected by the Spanish one. In the autonomic pacts, this was reflected in the juxtaposition of Spanish and Catalan

nationalists and the emphasis on the consequences of these pacts for Catalonia. In the secessionist demonstration, this was seen in the emphasis placed on the Catalan pro-independence movement, its arguments and characteristics. Additionally, this was seen in the coverage of the attacks in that more importance was given to the Catalan territory and its relationships with other similar territories in Spain. In any case, the Spanish identity was constructed as an external agent whose actions on Catalonia were highly consequential.

As to the Catalan-Spanish relationship, it was depicted, by all media and in all case studies, as one marked by tension. In the Catalan media, this tension was reflected by placing emphasis on the Catalan nationalistic aspirations and contrasting them with the current situation of Catalonia inside Spain. This was reflected in the autonomic pacts by the didactic explanation of the present and future consequences of the pacts for Catalonia. In the demonstration, this was seen in the depiction of Catalonia as being disregarded, abused, offended and oppressed by Spanish representatives (although it is noteworthy that this discourse was present in both Spanish and Catalan media). In addition, the Catalan media placed emphasis on the grassroots dimension of the Catalan secessionist movement, making it legitimate as the “voice of the people.” In the attacks, this tension was reflected in Catalan media by giving importance to the need for more autonomous powers for the Catalan police and government.

In the Spanish media, the relationship was also depicted as marked by tension. In the coverage of the autonomic pacts, the tension seemed to be a price that Spanish representatives were willing to pay to achieve the consensus that was so needed in Spain

to stabilize democracy. In the coverage of the 2012 demonstration, Spain appeared to be subjected to blackmail by the Catalan representatives and economically vulnerable to the Catalan secessionist demands (again, this was the construction in both Catalan and Spanish media). In the attacks, Spanish media focused on the status of Catalonia as just a region of Spain, and placed emphasis on the precedents and consequences of the attacks, in the Spanish context.

Additionally, it is striking that, in all media, Catalan secessionism appeared to be supported by most of the Catalan people. However, the 2017 election to the Catalan Parliament reflected the division in the Catalan society. While pro-independence parties (JUNTSxCAT, ERC-CatSí and CUP) won 70 seats (2,079,340 votes), the rest of parties present in the Catalan Parliament won 65 seats (2,228,421 votes). It is noteworthy that the Spanish electoral law allows for a situation where a larger number of votes might not reflect a larger number of seats. Regardless of seats or votes, there are very similar numbers in both sides, which suggest a serious division.

Through all case studies, Catalan secessionism appeared in Catalan media as the result of Catalans' being tired of waiting –either after being asked to put their nationalistic aspirations on pause for the sake of the transition to democracy in 1981, to overcome the economic crisis in 2012 and to fight terrorism in 2017. Conversely, also in all media, it seemed that absolutely all Spaniards were against Catalonia's secession or even against the Catalan government's demands for more autonomy. Nevertheless, a study on public opinion by the independent polling agency Metroscopia showed that eight out of ten Spaniards living outside Catalonia would agree with Catalonia's

secession if it was supported by a wide majority of Catalans and negotiated with the rest of Spain (Toharia, 2012). In all case studies, it appeared in Spanish media that the secessionist process was a result of the Catalans' unsupportiveness and irresponsibility toward the rest of Spain, by being willing to risk the stability of the new Spanish democracy in 1981, Spanish financial solvency in 2012, and the war on terror in 2017. This approach is widening the gap between both societies and it could make empathy and dialogue less probable, as time goes by. Importantly, I am not saying the journalists do this on purpose. An analysis of media pieces will never be enough to infer the intention behind them, I am aware of that and that is why I do not intend to do so.

However, on a more optimistic note, there has been an evolution on the recognition of Catalan uniqueness in Spain. Catalonia is a territory with very definite signs of identity reflected in its language and culture, and a history marked by times in which they were repressed. As such, a common discourse referred to a demand by Catalonia for its identity to be recognized, and then protected. In 1981, Catalonia was depicted as a region that started with privileges, being one of the first autonomous communities to have its Statute of Autonomy approved. However, it seemed like it was expected for the other communities to catch up to the status of Catalonia in the years following the pacts (except the Basque Country and Navarra, which had economic privileges). In 2012, however, Spanish media recognized that Catalonia was a special region in Spain. One of the main events that took place in between is the evolution of the Catalan secessionist movement into officiality, starting with the 2012 pro-independence demonstration, and reflected on its media coverage. It would be logical to think that the

fact that the Catalan government embraced secessionist ideas and placed them at the center of everyday politics and conversations resulted in an increase of recognition in the rest of Spain –however, this is not the same as saying an increase in support or understanding, or an improvement in the relationship.

Inclusion of Spain in the European Union

Another major event taking place between 1981 and 2017 was the entrance of Spain in the European Union in 1986. There were references to the European Union in the coverage of the secessionist demonstration. These included, first, the intention and will of Catalan independentists to stay in the European Union in case of a hypothetical secession; second, the argument by the representatives against independence on how setting new borders would go against the European dynamics of removing the Union's internal borders for European citizens; and third, the statement by European Union representatives on the consequences of a secession in a member state. In 2017, the coverage of the attacks also included references to the European Union. In Catalan media, there was an emphasis on placing Barcelona close to European capitals, united by the tragedy of having suffered similar attacks. This is important because this link was made instead of connecting the ISIS terrorist attack in Barcelona with the 2004 attacks in Madrid by Al-Qaeda, the deadliest in Spanish history. In all media, the construction of Spain was of a member of the European Union and thus open, Western, civilized and democratic. Before the attacks, Spain's past of violence and authoritarianism was hanging like a phantom over the public imaginary, but this was not the case in the

coverage of the attacks, where Spain's democracy was depicted as solid, strong and able to endure.

Therefore, it is logical to assume that the inclusion of Spain in the European Union had an influence in the Catalan and Spanish identities and in the relationship between them. Examining the coverage of Spain's inclusion in the European Economic Community by press and television informed this assessment of the influence that this event had on the Spanish and Catalan identities. For this, the procedure was different from the case studies. The analysis did not follow the three steps of data immersion, first cycle coding and second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013; Tracy, 2013). Instead, data was explored to look for evidence of this influence, so there are rough indicators, and should be taken as such and not as a result of a systematic analysis.

The data examined consists of news pieces from the week before January 1, 1986 to the week after. This is the date of effective inclusion of Spain in the European Economic Community (España y la Unión Europea, n.d., para.1). Regarding the press, the generalist newspapers with most readers in 1986 were *El País*, with an average daily print run of 360,398; *Abc*, with an average daily print run of 235,107 and *Diario 16*, with an average daily print run of 134,534, calculated by the OJD ("EL PAÍS, periódico que registró mayor crecimiento", 1988). So, for this period *El País* was studied. About the regional press, *La Vanguardia* and *El Periódico* had an average daily print run of 194,553 and 150,912 respectively in 1986 calculated by the OJD ("EL PAÍS, periódico que registró mayor crecimiento", 1988). *La Vanguardia* was the regional newspaper selected.

For data collection, the printed version of *El País* was not available. The digital version was accessed and the content was manually reviewed in the sections of morning, afternoon and night that was related to the inclusion of Spain in the European Economic Community in 1986, in the timeframe of interest. This yielded 33 articles. In *El País*, the main discourse was the inclusion in the European Economic Community as a way to allow Spain to advance in economical, technological and political matters with the cooperation of the other member states.

In addition, the other main discourse constructed a defense of the end of the autarchic system enforced by the Francoist dictatorship and the start of a new era for Spain based on dialogue and openness. The entrance in the European Economic Community and the cooperation with other member states could be seen as a way to legitimize Spain as a consolidated democracy. By embracing those new values, namely democracy, dialogue, openness, collaboration, the Spanish identity integrated the European identity, to a point where they seemed to converge. This discourse was also reflected in the coverage of the ISIS terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, in which the Spanish identity was very much constructed through its belonging to the European Union. By setting the discourse on a level of inter-state relationships, the subnational identities, such as Catalonia's, were not really addressed:

Integration in the EEC will provide Spain with a suitable dimension to better solve its big problems. We are convinced that, in the middle and long term, what will be good for Europe, will also be good for Spain (words by Abel Matutes, EEC commissary; EP, 2-01-1986, "Construir la nueva Europa", para. 16 and 17). The historical reality was responsible for cruelly demonstrating that [...] the integration, above of national borders, is the most convenient formula to progress and improve everyone's welfare. Technical and technological advances open new lines of communication and understanding every day. And today we know that the great problems of the world can only be solved in a lasting and peaceful way

through dialogue and cooperation (words by Manuel Marín, EEC commissary; EP, 2-01-1986, “No estamos y solos”, para. 1).

For *La Vanguardia*, the printed version available in the newspaper’s digital archive was used. The search consisted in news including the key words “Europa”, “CEE” and “comunidad económica europea” in the dates of interest. This resulted in 73 news pieces. The main discourse in *La Vanguardia* was the demand of recognition for the Catalan subnational identity, as has been constant in the rest of case studies in this thesis.

Regarding the Catalan identity, it appeared marked by the aspiration for progress. Interestingly, the cultural section of *La Vanguardia* included a piece in Catalan (the rest of the edition was in Spanish) by the writer Pere Calders. In it, the author spoke about the differences between Catalans and Spaniards in accepting the entry to the European Economic Community. According to Calders, unlike Spain:

Catalonia lives looking to the north, while what we call the rest of the Peninsula has a strong tendency of looking to the south (words by writer Pere Calders; LV, 31-12-1985, p. 38).

With that, Calders implied that Catalonia looked forward to progress, while the rest of Spain was stuck in the past. In fact, he went on to elaborate this by adding that Catalans were looking forward to entering the European Economic Community because, unlike Spaniards, Catalans were aware that the economic requirements imposed by the Community for Spain’s admission were going to make the country progress.

Therefore, the Catalan identity appeared to be linked to the European identity, in the shared pursuit of progress, which Catalonia seemed to match thanks to its productive capacity:

“For Catalonia, Europe is not a goal in itself. Catalonia has never worried about being in Europe; what has been a concern is to build Europe, because we have

always felt Europeans,” said [spokesperson of the Catalan minority in the Spanish Congress of Deputies Miquel] Roca Junyent [...] “We have been faced with difficulties”—he said—because they fear our ability to compete and the potential, a potential in which Catalonia plays a very important role for its location and for its Europeanism.” (LV, 05-01-1986, p. 15).

Regarding the relations between Catalonia and the Economic Community, of which the adviser of the Department of Economy and Finance said that “they have always been very intense, since almost half of our foreign trade has been made with the countries of the EEC.” (LV, 07-01-1986, p. 43).

In addition, the Catalan and European identities seemed connected in the defense of shared values such as quality of life and freedom. For example, Calders added in his piece that in any case, starting to be part of an organism that supported quality of life and freedom could only be positive for Catalans, implying that those values were missing in Spain.

As this example suggests, the relationship between Catalonia and Spain appeared to be negative, constructing a discourse of a Catalonia that was hopeful that the entry of Spain in the European Economic Community would allow for more autonomy and recognition, and a Spain that seemed to deny this argument. For example, Calders added that Catalans had been warned by Spanish representatives that the entry in the European Economic Community would not mean more autonomous powers for the Spanish communities, since the European Economic Community prioritized member states over subnational regions. Also, the spokesperson of the Catalan minority in the Spanish Congress of Deputies, Miquel Roca Junyent, added that, despite the effort of the Spanish representatives to set a discourse that focused on the role of states in the European Economic Community, this was the time to defend the role of the regions too:

On the other hand, the reformist leader [spokesperson of the Catalan minority in the Spanish Congress of Deputies Miquel Roca Junyent] criticized the recent statements made by a prominent Spanish politician who defined the Europe of

the states as the only possible goal, from a political point of view. For Miquel Roca, this is a term already forgotten by European politicians, underlining that “the great objective of the immediate future is the construction of the Europe of the peoples [pueblos].” (LV, 05-01-1986, p. 15).

It is striking to see that the discourses that were set by the press coverage of the inclusion of Spain into the European Economic Community at the very beginning were still present in the last case study included in this thesis analyzing the media coverage of the ISIS terrorist attacks in Catalonia. This was the case of the embracing of European values and their integration in the Spanish identity, the close relationship between Catalonia and the European Union in terms of values and progress, and the demand for national recognition by Catalonia and the resistance to do so by Spain.

As to television coverage, as mentioned above, only the state-owned channels *TVE1* and *TVE2* were available in 1986, so *TVE1* was considered. There were 39 news programs available during the dates of interest for news stories related to the inclusion of Spain in the European Union. The transcription of those news stories resulted in a document of 15 single-spaced pages. The main discourse in *TVE1* was the total fusion of Spain and Europe. This discourse reinforced the one set by the other Spanish medium, *El País*, regarding the convergence of the Spanish and the European identities. For example, close to New Year’s Eve, the night news program closed with a speech reflecting on the pros and cons of Spain’s inclusion in the European Economic Community. In this speech, the journalist also named items representative of the Spanish culture, and items representative of several European countries, suggesting that after Spain became part of the European Economic Community, they would all represent the same culture. It is important to highlight that, in listing the Spanish cultural references, they were chosen

from a diverse set of autonomous communities, implying building a narrative that seems to indicate that all the autonomous communities were Spanish and Spain was European:

But from the moment we choke with the last grape of New Year's Eve, not only will we enter the European Community, but the European Community will enter in us and, by the way, without making compliments at the door. Thus, the first day of the year: bon jour, good morning, guten tag, buon giorno will be said buenos días too. They will be Spanish then, Spanish for European, things like the music of Beethoven, Santa Claus, the Neapolitan pizza, the tulips of Holland, the British phlegm. And they will be European, for Spanish things like the churros, the siesta, the Basque hake, the flamenco tail gown dress, the processions or the game of Chinos. We will take to Europe the Burgos Cathedral, the Camino de Santiago, which by the way, was the first European road, the Roman city of Tarragona, the Alhambra of Granada, or the Giralda. And the Eiffel Tower, the House of Commons, the Colosseum in Rome, the Sanctuary of Delphi, the Kurfürstendamm in Berlin or the Cologne Cathedral will be a little more ours (TD21H, 29-12-1985).

Additionally, the demands of national recognition by Catalonia were also present in *TVE1*. However, it is important to note that the airing time of the main instances was at midnight, so not a lot of emphasis was placed on these discourses:

A hundred political, social and cultural organizations representing 18 stateless nations, participate today in the conference of stateless nations of Western Europe. This meeting, which takes place in Barcelona, will last until Monday. The conference aims to articulate a set of common actions based on the following premises: the demand for a Europe of peoples and not of states, the right to self-determination of peoples, respect for methods to fight to obtain national rights and solidarity with nations that fight for their emancipation (TD00H, 27-12-1985).

As has been discussed before, proving causality between the discourses constructing the Spanish and Catalan identities in the media coverage of Spain's inclusion in the European Union, and the changes experienced in public opinion, is methodologically not possible for this project. However, public opinion research could give an idea of possible overlapping trends between media and the sentiment in the

Spanish and Catalan societies. Therefore, public opinion regarding Catalan and Spanish identities will be explored next.

Regarding public opinion, it was mentioned before that Catalans are often stereotyped as being greedy, closed, proud, selfish, individualistic, disagreeable and untrusting among the rest of Spanish people. However, Catalans are often also perceived as hard-working, entrepreneurs, pragmatic and intelligent (Sangrador García, 1996, p.123). Hence, Sangrador García (1996) concluded that these traits seemed to reflect an affective rejection with a positive recognition at a more instrumental level (p.123), which coincided with the Spanish stereotypes of the European (p.141). This could mean that the positive instrumental perception that belongs to Catalans is closer to that of the Europeans than it is to that of the Spanish (Sangrador García, 1996, p.141). In addition, the Catalans were perceived in 1996 as the most separatist group, after the Basques (it would be interesting to see if participants would have assigned Catalans the first position nowadays). As a last note, Sangrador García (1996) pointed out that while there tended to be similarities between autostereotypes and heterostereotypes, this was not the case for Catalans (p.123), which makes sense since theirs was such a negative stereotype.

An influence of media in Catalan and Spanish identities

The sections above explained how the Catalan and Spanish identities, their relationship and the Catalan secessionist movement were depicted in national and regional media at three milestones in Spanish history. For each of them, public opinion research showed that the state of public opinion in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain

pointed in the same direction as my results. Therefore, this could show an influence from media to public opinion.

However, this raises new questions: Are party identification, party interests or ideological positions influenced by media or vice versa? I looked at media as indicative of the media's own framing of identities and as evidence of how politicians use the media to frame identities. For the media's own creation of discourses, I looked at the scripts by the journalists themselves. For the strategies by politicians, I looked at the discourses that emerged through their voices and quotes in media. Effective or not, I did find an attempt by politicians to contribute to the creation of these discourses that was constant over time, for example by giving speeches or press releases, which reinforced my argument that a big part of the communication between Catalonia and Spain is mediated.

Although purposeful encounters with the press were easy to regard as political strategies, it was hard to distinguish whether such political influence was intended or not beyond those. In fact, a question raised in the introduction referred to the rally-'round-the-flag effect, namely an increase in higher presidential approval (Mueller, 1970), consistency in the positions of media and administration (Bennett, 1990) or predictability of partisan differences for presidential approval (Hindman, 2004). I found that in this case, the terrorist attack did not bring administrations together, nor public opinion, despite the pervasiveness of discourses regarding calls of unity by political representatives. Furthermore, the increase in support for secessionism in Catalonia and the indifference for international terrorism in Spain after the attack, ranked in opinion surveys below secession as a problem for Spain, could tentatively be indicators of a

further detachment from each other and a rapprochement among those sharing the same identity, at least in Catalonia. This would provide support for Schnaudt, Walter and Popa's (2016) conclusion that Catalans tend to perceive Catalan and Spanish identities as incompatible. However, more studies should explore this contention in order to clarify these dynamics.

In any case, I then interpreted that public opinion research contributed with evidence on how the public makes sense of these identities. It could be that media reflected the changes in ideology and identity and that an exploration of their construction in media was indeed a proof of public opinion's influence on media. Or it could be all of it at the same time. However, in placing the media at the center of my research, I picked up on Anderson's (2006) argument on national identity. This is that since nations are historical constructs and their lifespan is longer than people's, in order for a nation's history to be remembered, it must be narrated (Anderson, 2006, p.204). By conducting this study, I am considering media as main narrators of national identities. Therefore, the relationship I am interested in for this project is the one from media to public opinion. This is the question that guided the project and I found evidence that there was some influence in this direction. For example, in 1981 the construction of a discourse regarding Catalonia as a nationalistic region that demanded the recognition of its identity (but not independence yet) in Catalan media was reflected in the election of nationalist (not secessionist) Jordi Pujol as president of the *Generalitat* in 1980. On the contrary, the discourse constructing Catalans as greedy was reflected in the pervasiveness of such a stereotype across Spain (Sangrador García, 1996, p.123).

Furthermore, I found that national and regional media were contributing to the disconnect between the Catalan and Spanish societies. This could be partly because most of Catalan media are in Catalan or just not as popular in the rest of Spain. This for sure creates a problem of access that I have referred to previously. Additionally, this applies in the opposite direction. It is important to remember that Catalan regional media are more popular and trusted than national media in Catalonia (Tobeña, 2017, p.95). Moreover, I argue that if discourses create and limit our perception of reality in a way that is hard to question (Mills, 2003), and media creates or propagates these discourses, then it makes sense that national media will create and limit the Spaniards' perception of reality while regional media will create and limit the Catalans'.

For example, this was seen in the analysis of the media coverage of the secessionist demonstration of 2012. In this case, Catalan media constructed Catalonia as a region with economic, identity and historical reasons to demand secession from Spain. In addition, secessionism was depicted as a response to perceived oppression and neglect from the Spanish government towards the Catalans. Interestingly, there was a matching trend in Catalan public opinion, since in November of 2012, 71.6% of Catalans thought Catalonia had reached an insufficient level of autonomy from Spain (CEO, 2012). However, this did not match Spanish public opinion, since a study conducted that same year showed that two out of three Spaniards thought the abuse, disregard, and lack of recognition felt by Catalonia was not a reality (Toharia, 2012). In addition, according to this study, this was interpreted by the Spanish participants as the Catalans' "playing victim" (Toharia, 2012), a discourse only present in Spanish national media.

Thus, this describes a more important problem than access. This is a deeper disconnect between societies, that is rooted in their perception of reality. Therefore, it is

not so surprising for some people to want to materialize this disconnect between Spain and Catalonia. If we look at the analysis of the case studies, we will see that in most of them, the media talked to either a national or a regional audience. This is important because this is, according to Anderson (2006), what makes a nation, a nation.

Importantly, however, this is a sort of “unbalanced” disconnect, since it is easier for a Catalan to see how a Spaniard defines himself, and how a Catalan is defined in national media, than the other way around. If there is a motivation to do so, that is another question.

Limitations and future directions

This project had some limitations. The first two were related to scope. First, the analysis of the coverage of the inclusion of Spain in the European Union was originally planned to be a fourth case study. In seeing that I did not have time to include four case studies, I decided to delete this one because the process of inclusion was long and the conversation in media was ongoing from the preparation of Spain to fulfill the requirements of the community, through the signature for the adhesion in June 1985, to the actual enforcement in January 1st of 1986. For this reason, I found it likely for the discourse to be basically set by a week before and after the effective inclusion of Spain in the E.E.C. Also, having a case study before and another one after this event allowed me to establish evolution trends. However, future studies could focus on this time, from the beginning of the negotiations between Spain and the European Economic Community until the enforcement of the adhesion in 1986. This further exploration would give an idea of the influence that the introduction of a supranational identity could have in a

territory with such strong national and subnational identities. This is important because it could explain the recent rise in public support for nationalistic and populist discourse across the European Union in the latter decades.

Second, this project initially included the analysis of radio, to capture fully the citizens' media environments. Once again, when I realized that this was too ambitious, I decided to exclude the data I collected from radio programs because I expected a lot of similarities between the content of television and radio stations. This is because nationwide ones are state-owned and the regional ones are owned by the Catalan Government. Regarding radio stations news programs, they tend to be scheduled more frequently in shorter or longer formats. In addition, radio schedules have been historically more flexible in order to cover events in real-time. For these two reasons, I thought that news programs would tend to be less in-depth. However, I would encourage future studies to include the study of radio, especially for older case studies, in which data tends to be scarcer. This is because I believe radio could contribute with a follow-up kind of dynamic, with more real-time coverage.

The third limitation was related to time. Despite the importance of the illegal referendum of October 1st 2017 in Catalonia, and its consequences, this project did not include it as a case study. This is because this project was very advanced by the time these events took place. To compensate for this, however, events that were ongoing provided the background against which I wrote the present work. Related to this is the fact that the consequences of this referendum are still developing at the time I write these

lines and will probably continue as the project is finalized. Therefore, I assume there will be some events taking place that I will not be able to capture.

In conclusion, this project conducted a discourse analysis of Catalan and national Spanish media in historical milestones in Spanish history, namely the autonomic pacts in 1981, the massive secessionist Catalan demonstration in 2012 and the 2017 ISIS terrorist attacks in Catalonia. This analysis addresses the questions about how regional and national media constructed Catalan and Spanish national identities, the relationship between them and the Catalan secessionist process. With answers to these questions, this project will contribute to shed light into the role of media in the construction of national identities and, therefore, to clarify their influence in an era marked by identity politics. Furthermore, this project defines how Catalan and Spanish identities are constructed by media and explains their evolution in a context of escalation in the demands of secession by Catalonia. In doing that, this work also contributes to explain the influence of media in secessionist movements. Finally, in offering each party's perception of the other and their relationship, and each party's definition of the problem, this thesis could contribute to a better understanding of each other and, arguably, provide its small contribution to a mutually beneficial solution in the Catalan-Spanish case.

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