

63  
M1013

**CURA**

**RESOURCE COLLECTION**



**TRAINING CENTER for Community Programs**

in coordination with the Office of Community Programs,  
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs

THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL STYLES  
OF MINNEAPOLIS INDIANS:  
AN INTERIM REPORT

**University of Minnesota**

THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL STYLES  
OF MINNEAPOLIS INDIANS:  
AN INTERIM REPORT

THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL STYLES  
OF MINNEAPOLIS INDIANS:  
AN INTERIM REPORT

by  
Arthur M. Harkins  
and  
Richard G. Woods

Training Center for  
Community Programs  
in coordination with  
Office of Community Programs  
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs

University of Minnesota  
Minneapolis, Minnesota

December, 1969

Contents

Minneapolis -- The Physical and Social Environment . . . . . 1  
Anti-Poverty Programs and Minneapolis Indians. . . . . 4  
The New Urban Chiefs . . . . .16  
Responses of Chiefs to Indian Programs . . . . .19  
Control of the Indian Image . . . . .21  
Agency Treatment by Urban Chiefs . . . . .22  
Control of the Indian . . . . .24  
Footnotes

## Minneapolis -- The Physical and Social Environment

This report deals with the urban adaptation styles of Indians in Minneapolis. Its foci are the program approach to social change, the setting in which change programs occur, and the styles of participation and leadership that Indians and whites exhibit in this change context.

Minneapolis is chosen rather than Minneapolis and St. Paul, because the two Indian populations seem to function somewhat separately, because the St. Paul Indian population is considerably smaller than the one in Minneapolis, and because the level of activity involving Indians in Minneapolis in most respects is much higher. Although Minneapolis Indians are our focus, the "Twin Cities" constitute the larger physical and social setting for urban Indian life in southern Minnesota, and deserve some description at this point.

The Twin Cities lie in the southeast portion of the state and at the uppermost navigation point of the Mississippi River. The river flows from west to east through north Minneapolis, then turns south to form part of the boundary between the two cities, and turns east again through the southern section of St. Paul. The two cities occupy a physical setting which has unusually great physical variety, including lakes, streams, abundant farmlands and wooded areas. There is a variety in the weather as well, with distinct differences between seasons. Winters are relatively severe with the first fall freeze occurring usually very early in October and the last spring freeze typically about the first of May. Winter snowfall averages between forty and fifty inches and, on the average, there are from ninety to one hundred days with snow cover of one inch or more. January produces the lowest average monthly temperature: 14°. Summers are pleasant with average mean daily temperature (June -- August) of 70°. <sup>1</sup>

The Twin Cities metropolitan area constitutes a transportation, commercial, recreational and cultural focal point not only for Minnesota but also for a much larger region, commonly referred to as the "Upper

Midwest". The circulation system from western Wisconsin to central Montana, from the Canadian border to southeastern South Dakota and northern Iowa is dominated by the Twin Cities.<sup>2</sup> Minneapolis and St. Paul are served by seven passenger airlines, nine railways and over one hundred truck lines. Truck and rail volume ranks third nationally. The navigable part of the Mississippi River extends into the center of Minneapolis, and the city is headquarters for five barge lines, transporting coal, oil, shale, grain and steel. Three inter-city and six intra-city bus lines serve Minneapolis.<sup>3</sup>

Home for about thirteen hundred manufacturing establishments, approximately seventeen hundred wholesale businesses, and about four thousand retail stores, Minneapolis also is headquarters for the ninth Federal Reserve District. The current employment configuration reveals non-agricultural employees in a wide variety of manufacturing and non-manufacturing industrial categories with almost four-fifths of the total employment occurring in non-manufacturing, especially retail and wholesale trade; finance, insurance and real estate; service and miscellaneous; and federal, state and local government.<sup>4</sup>

Unemployment for the Twin Cities metropolitan area is relatively low, with current monthly rates falling around the two percent mark.<sup>5</sup>

A characteristic of private industry in the area seems to be that no one manufacturer or single industry dominates. In 1967 the area's two largest firms employed only four percent of the total employment and the eighty-five largest had only thirty percent of the total.<sup>6</sup> Major industries include machinery, electronics, food processing and products, textiles and apparel, printing and publishing, and primary and fabricated metals.<sup>7</sup>

Minneapolis is noted for its vigorous pursuit of the arts, both classical and contemporary. The city supports two art museums -- the Minneapolis Institute of Arts and the Walker Art Center -- and it is the home of the famous Minnesota (formerly Minneapolis) Orchestra. There are

numerous amateur and professional theaters, including the well-known Tyrone Guthrie Repertory Theater, which began operations in 1963. The Minnesota Dance Theater and the Center Opera Company are two recent additions to the cultural fabric of the city. Besides housing the Minnesota Orchestra in its Northrop Auditorium, the University of Minnesota is the site for the Office of Advanced Drama Research. Each spring, the Metropolitan Opera presents selections from its repertory at Northrop Auditorium, and visiting artists, ensembles and plays are presented through the University's Artists Course and the Theater Guild. Visitors to Minneapolis from the state and from the Upper Midwest region often are attracted by cultural events, and several cultural organizations in the city regularly export productions to towns in the region.

Besides the standard recreational activities found in many metropolitan areas, the Twin Cities are the home of the Minnesota Twins of the American Baseball League and the Minnesota Vikings of the National Football League. The Minnesota North Stars in the National Hockey League began play in 1967. The University of Minnesota Gophers provide Big Ten football games for the sports spectator, and all other major college sports are presented throughout the year at the University.

Central to the recreational life of Minneapolis is its unusual system of lakes and parks. Within the city are one hundred and fifty-two parks covering five thousand and five hundred acres and including twenty-two lakes. Based upon a 1965 population estimate of 489,000, the park system provides one acre of park land for every eighty-eight Minneapolitans.<sup>8</sup> A network of parkways and boulevards enables the motorist to circle the city completely, driving through the principal parks and around many of the lakes. Sailing, swimming, fishing, water skiing, canoeing, ice skating and ice fishing are all possible within the city because of the park system. Golf, tennis, horseback riding, bowling and softball are among the other sports which may be pursued. Hunting and fishing in the countryside surrounding Minneapolis are major attractions for sportsmen.

The mayor-council form of government is used in Minneapolis, with a city council as the chief governing body and a mayor, elected for a two-

year term, and limited to a few executive powers, including control of the police department. The council is composed of thirteen aldermen, one from each of the city's voting wards. Each alderman is elected to serve for two years. Another feature of local government, which is of importance to members of minority groups, is the twenty-one member Minneapolis Commission on Human Relations. The Commission oversees the operation of a City Department of Civil Rights, which has a Director appointed by the Mayor. The Civil Rights Department is charged with public education and community mobilization on civil rights matters and with enforcing the city's civil rights ordinance, which bars discrimination in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and public services.

A recent study rates the "quality of life" in Minnesota quite high. In 1967 all fifty states were measured in a social, economic, and political study conducted by Dr. John O. Wilson of the Midwest Research Institute in Kansas City. As criteria for the rankings, Wilson chose the goals established by the Eisenhower Commission on National Goals: status of the individual, individual equality, democratic process, education, economic growth, technological change, agriculture, living conditions, and health and welfare. To measure a state's progress toward achieving these goals, Wilson selected ninety-one separate indicators, then ranked each state within each goal area. The final ranking, termed the Social-Economic-Political (SEP) index, results from averaging each state's ranking in each goal area. As a result of Wilson's SEP study, Minnesota was accorded the number two ranking among all states, after California.<sup>9</sup>

#### Anti-Poverty Programs and Minneapolis Indians

Perhaps because of the obvious high quality of life in Minnesota, the spectre of inner-city poverty in Minneapolis is difficult for many citizens to accept. According to the 1960 census, 13.9% of the families in Minneapolis had incomes under three thousand dollars. Since then, numerous Indian families have migrated to Minneapolis, and several studies of Indian family income and Indian relief recipients confirm the common observation that Minneapolis Indians tend to inhabit the most deteriorated



housing in the city's poverty "target areas", and reflect a grossly inadequate level of income.<sup>10</sup>

Hennepin County Mobilization of Economic Resources (MOER) is the local community-action agency required under the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act to receive and administer anti-poverty funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity. It is governed by a board of residents of poverty areas (including Indians), public officials, representatives of private welfare agencies, and at-large members. Besides a program development staff, MOER supervises the Citizens' Community Centers, four agencies for social service and community organization in poverty neighborhoods. One of these centers, located on the south side of Minneapolis, is exclusively Indian. MOER provides partial or total funding for the Pilot City Center, the Legal Services Program of the Legal Aid Society, the Concentrated Employment Program, Head Start, Neighborhood Youth Corps (both In School and Out of School), New Careers, the Parent and Child Development Center, Twin Cities Opportunities Industrialization Center, Project STAIRS, the Southside American Indian Youth Center, and the North Side American Indian Teen Center (through Pilot City Center).

Additional comments about specific anti-poverty projects may be helpful.

Pilot City Center is a federally-funded center designed to coordinate all the social services in an area of more than fifty thousand people on the north side of the city and to propose and coordinate whatever new services are needed. Funding has been secured from the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the U. S. Department of Labor (USDL), and the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in addition to the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The Center is governed by a board of resident representatives, and Indian staff members are employed to help serve Indian residents.

Twin Cities Opportunities Industrialization Center is a predominantly black-staffed and black-directed agency operating a free prevoca-

tional "feeder" program and free vocational training programs for disadvantaged persons. Funds have been obtained from OEO, HEW, USDL and private donations. Indian staff members function in counseling, recruiting, instructional and clerical positions. In the past, the agency has had some trouble in maintaining enrollment of Indian trainees.<sup>11</sup>

Model City is a five-year program to revitalize an area of over five hundred blocks with nearly sixty thousand residents in the south central section of Minneapolis, where a majority of Minneapolis Indians live. A one hundred-member Policy and Planning Committee with sixty elected neighborhood members is the chief mechanism for ensuring that the residents themselves play a major role in deciding how they want the area revitalized. The City Council has ultimate authority to approve the plans. Current funding is from HUD and HEW. The federal government gives priority to requests for federally-funded projects in the Model City area in Minneapolis and in seventy-four other cities designated under the Demonstration Cities Act. In addition, the cities will receive a bonus from the federal government equal to eighty percent of whatever money the city provides to match federal spending in the area, providing that the bonus is used for additional new projects in the Model City area. At the time of this writing, planning efforts had just been completed, and major funding had not yet occurred.

The Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) is a program attempting to bring together in one place all the elements for a manpower program for almost one hundred fifty thousand persons in the south and east side poverty areas of Minneapolis. The USDL provides funding through MOER. Administration of the program recently was placed in the hands of the Minnesota State Employment Service. For unemployed and under-employed persons, the program includes such features as recruitment, intake, orientation, counseling, education, medical and social supportive services, job development, placement and follow-up. Controversy affecting the program has centered around charges by Indians that blacks have discriminated against Indians in the organization.

The Youth Opportunity Center is a division of the Minnesota State Employment Service which provides testing, counseling and placement in jobs or training for youths aged sixteen through twenty-one. Funding is through the USDL.

The Minneapolis Public Schools operate several programs dealing with problems of race and poverty. Its Human Relations Center, operating with funds from the U. S. Office of Education (USOE), plans for curriculum changes and community involvement and staffs human relations training to improved human relations in the schools. Its Urban Affairs Division, funded through the school board, attempts to maintain a direct relationship with teachers, administration, community agencies and parents in order to facilitate action on urban problems. The Division developed the system's human relations guidelines and is responsible for implementing them. The Teacher Aide Program provides several hundred aides, including Indians, to serve in elementary and secondary schools, mostly in their own neighborhoods. Funding is from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act under USOE and the New Careers Program under OEO. The School Lunch Program seeks to provide adequate nutrition for children of low-income families. USOE provides the funding. The Lincoln Learning Center is an experimental storefront junior high school established to find more effective means for meeting the educational needs of potential dropouts. Experimentation with organization of the school day, team teaching, intensified school-home relationships, new materials, and new approaches to instruction are the main methods. Funding is from USOE and the Minnesota State Department of Education.

Prominent among the private agencies and programs is the Minneapolis Urban Coalition. Patterned after the national Urban Coalition, the Minneapolis organization consists of approximately seventy business, labor, church, service agency, education, civil rights, minority and poor representatives joined to attack poverty and racial problems in the community. The organization has its own full-time staff and is regarded as a very powerful and influential force which directs its efforts toward removing the deeply rooted potential causes of racial disorder. Funding is by

donations of money and staff by individual businesses. Indian representatives are members of the Coalition.

The Minneapolis Urban League, founded in 1925, is a social service, planning and community organization agency established to promote interracial efforts and to develop civic leadership to solve problems of minority people in housing, education, employment, health and welfare. Projects have included job development and placement, on-the-job training programs, a Labor Education Advancement Program (LEAP) to involve minority youths in building trades apprenticeship programs, minority sensitivity training for employers, minority teacher recruiting for the Minneapolis Public Schools, counseling and referral for individuals and families, and consultation with business, trade groups and government agencies on housing and other minority problems. The United Fund, private donations, and USDL have been sources of funding.

The Minneapolis chapter of the National Alliance of Businessmen seeks to provide summer and permanent jobs for youth and hard-core unemployed persons. Funds are provided by USDL and the organization is partly staffed by executives on loan from their corporations. There are Indian staff members. The Metropolitan Employers Voluntary Plans for Progress Council is an organization of metropolitan area firms formed to promote affirmative action in equal employment, training and upgrading.

There are three exclusively Indian anti-poverty programs funded by MOER.

The Southside American Indian Youth Center and the North Side American Indian Teen Center are storefront recreational "drop-ins" for inner-city Indian teenagers. Both employ full-time adult directors. The North Side Center is governed by a Teen Council, an Adult Board composed of parents, and an Advisory Board made up of businessmen and interested local residents. It was originally formed by a group of young Indians who broke away from the Upper Midwest American Indian Center as a protest that their needs had been overlooked.<sup>12</sup> According to the funding proposal for the

North Side Teen Center, it functions to "provide an opportunity for the Indian young people to develop individual and group identity, to practice leadership, to learn to accept responsibility in making decisions, to give Indian teens the confidence to participate actively in the broader society." Besides serving as a pool hall and a "drop-in" center for Indian youth, the organization has sponsored such activities and projects as being the host organization for a "little city hall" run by the Minneapolis Police Department to improve its community relations, constructing a canoe, conducting beadwork classes, showing movies secured through the University of Minnesota, sponsoring a hayride, and attending ballgames and powwows as a group. OEO funds are provided through Pilot City Center. At this writing, the governing body of Pilot City Center had raised some questions about the administration of the Teen Center, and the Teen Center's Adult Board had voted to withdraw from Pilot City and seek funding directly from MOER.

The South Side American Indian Teen Center is governed by a Teen Council, and it serves as a "drop-in" center and pool hall for Indian youth. Activities have included tutorial services provided in cooperation with the University of Minnesota, Indian history and culture classes, and art classes. Funding is by OEO through MOER.

Besides being hampered by relatively low levels of funding, the teen centers have never quite fulfilled their potential as educational out-stations for Indian dropouts and other alienated Indian youth. Cooperative efforts with the Minneapolis Public Schools and the University of Minnesota have occurred, but the interest and involvement of Indian youth has been difficult to sustain over time. One problem has been that some Indian militants who visit the centers counsel Indian young people to quit school and abandon education in favor of employment. Another difficulty is that the teen centers, in the view of some observers, sometimes become caught in a web of conflict with and between the Indian adults who staff the centers, sit on advisory boards, and in other capacities attempt to articulate with these relatively new urban Indian organizations. The status and income opportunities presented by the teen centers sometimes give rise to inter-personal and inter-group conflicts within the community of Indian adults, and it is difficult to prevent these conflicts from affecting the operation of the centers.<sup>13</sup>

At the same time, the very existence of two Indian teen centers in Minneapolis suggests that many members of the Indian community attach considerable importance to the well-being and development of Indian youth. That is indeed so. Members of the white community are often unaware of the severe problems of Indian youth, since Indian young people live in out-of-sight inner-city ghettos and do not trouble suburbanites; however, Indian adults are aware of the problems, including drinking, drugs, and sex. (One recent survey of one hundred inner-city Indian adults in Minneapolis, for example, asked the respondents to react to this statement: "Too many young people in this neighborhood get into difficulties with sex and drinking." Fifty percent of the Indian respondents agreed, another thirty-six percent were undecided, and only fourteen percent disagreed.)<sup>14</sup> But seldom are they willing to discuss these problems in public or with the Indian young people themselves.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, Indian adults often give the impression that they hope their young people may be able to lead the way in establishing an urban Indian identity,<sup>16</sup> and adequate funding of such activities is therefore important to them:

These concerned Indians see a certain irony in the fact that the white establishment has responded with money and programs for black youths who have given vent to their alienation and bitterness through verbal hostility and, sometimes, destruction of property. All the while -- with little notice and consequently a lesser response -- Indian youths have been quietly and tragically destroying not property, but themselves.<sup>17</sup>

The Upper Midwest American Indian Center was originated in July, 1961 and was initially supported by dues, donations and social fund-raising events sponsored by members. For a time, the Center operated with OEO funds and, in July, 1969, it became a United Fund agency. The Center's Board of Directors consists of twenty-four Indian members and six non-Indian members. About half of the members come from the inner city of Minneapolis and the rest from the Greater Minneapolis area. The Center's goals are:

1. To promote the affiliation of all American Indians and their non-Indian friends into a non-political and non-sectarian educational, civic and cultural organization;

2. To promote fellowship among American Indians of all tribes and to create bonds of understanding between Indians and non-Indians;
3. To assist interested Indians and their families in relating to the modern urban social structure;
4. To foster the educational and economic advancement of the American Indian people;
5. To encourage artistic and avocational pursuits by American Indian people;
6. To preserve and foster American Indian arts, crafts and cultural values.

The Center provides information and referral services to help Indian families just arriving in the Twin City metropolitan area to find employment and housing. It operates an Indian Guest House, which serves as a rehabilitation center for Indian men who have problems with alcoholism. It administers a scholarship fund used to pay for coaching, to buy uniforms and athletic equipment for Indian youth, to pay for music and dancing lessons for Indian children, and to pay for incidental fees for Indian children. Finally, the Center provides temporary housing for Indian families coming into the Twin City area for the first time by operating two Newcomer Centers, houses on the near-north and south sides of Minneapolis.

Project STAIRS, although funded as an anti-poverty program with OEO funds from MOER, will be discussed in another report as an Indian education program. Indian Upward Bound, another exclusively Indian education program funded with money from USOE directly, will also be described at that point.

Other Indian organizations in Minneapolis have arisen largely around social and political interests. Usually operating with very little funding, they are not anti-poverty organizations, yet their support is sometimes sought and obtained on issues involving urban Indians and the poverty program. Acting either independently or through the Urban American Indian Federation, they are increasingly able to articulate the views of numerous urban Indians who have formed voluntary associations. Among these

organizations are the City-Wide Indian AFDC Mothers, Concerned Indian Citizens, Inc., American Indian Advancement, the Twin Cities Tribal Council, the Concerned American Indian Citizens of Minneapolis, the Broken Arrow Guild, the Sioux Council, the American Indian Student Association at the University of Minnesota, and the Minneapolis Indian Dance Club.

Although not strictly an Indian anti-poverty agency, since it is funded by private sources, the independent American Indian Movement (AIM) must be described here because its militant stance on matters concerning anti-poverty programs is important. A chronology of AIM activities during the first year or so of its life may help to describe the nature of the organization.

Funded in July, 1968, the organization immediately established a committee to collect facts on the number of Indians employed in the city, especially by the city, school, county and anti-poverty agencies. Part of the rationale for the new group was to eliminate organizational fragmentation which was characteristic of the Minneapolis Indian community and which hampered Indian representation on various boards and agencies. It was acknowledged that attempts to form pan-Indian coalitions had failed in Minneapolis before due to lethargy, infighting and jealousies, poor planning and lack of publicity.<sup>18</sup> The response of the white community to the formation of AIM was immediate: an AIM representative was appointed to the Minneapolis Capital Long-Range Improvement Committee on the following day.<sup>19</sup> Shortly thereafter, AIM reported that, based upon an estimate of twenty-four thousand blacks and ten thousand Indians in the area, there should be approximately one Indian per two black persons employed in the city government and anti-poverty programs. The Indian organization also concluded that Indian employment fell far below that ratio, that only one Indian was employed at a salary of more than five thousand dollars per year, and that there were no Indians on the administrative staffs of the city government and poverty programs.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, AIM leveled its first specific charges of employment discrimination against Indians at TCOIC, the black-dominated employability development agency in Minneapolis.<sup>21</sup>



Establishment of an "Indian Patrol" to prevent alleged police harassment of Indian residents along Franklin Avenue on the south side of Minneapolis was the next AIM move, and AIM members asserted that Indian complaints were being sluggishly handled by the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights.<sup>22</sup> AIM spokesmen declared the patrol a success, but reiterated charges of discrimination by organizations funded through OEO.<sup>23</sup> Racial conflicts became apparent as an AIM spokesman was quoted as saying: "We don't want to fight the OEO, but we ought to start calling it a black OEO and quit deceiving the Indian population and the poor whites. Neither is being reached by their funds now. As far as we're concerned, it is a black movement. The thing we need to do now is find other means to finance ourselves."<sup>24</sup>

Discrimination charges were filed by AIM with the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights against the Minneapolis Tribune for an allegedly derogatory cartoon.<sup>25</sup> AIM members took an active part in charging a Minneapolis patrolman with simple assault in connection with the alleged beating of a sixteen-year old Indian youth,<sup>26</sup> but the patrolman was subsequently acquitted.<sup>27</sup> City Hall was picketed by AIM members to protest the decision and to complain that the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights had not acted on six complaints against police officers accused of beating Indians.<sup>28</sup>

An AIM complaint that the moderate Indian staff members of the Southside Citizen's Community Center were ineffective<sup>29</sup> was to lead to the eventual designation of the Southside Center as an Indian Citizens' Community Center and AIM representation on the staff and board of the Center. Support for six AIM projects was received from a newly revitalized Urban American Indian Federation of Minnesota -- a federation of twenty-three Twin Cities Indian organizations -- in the form of a vote of confidence. The projects were: a call for more volunteers for AIM's Indian street patrol and a request for financial support from the Urban Coalition; joint seeking of funds for an Indian center; support for an Indian Citizens' Community Center; seeking United Fund support for centers for Indian teenagers in north and south Minneapolis; seeking a pledge from the National Alliance of Businessmen for two hundred jobs for Indian youth; and asking

the United States Department of Justice to investigate Indian complaints against the Minneapolis Police Department, as filed with the city Department of Civil Rights.<sup>30</sup>

Arrest of the AIM chairman on a charge of obstructing arrest was followed by a formal complaint of police brutality in the arrest being filed with the Minneapolis Civil Rights Department.<sup>31</sup> Negative relations between some members of the Indian community and the Minneapolis Police Department reached an ugly peak in an AIM-sponsored meeting called to confront the Minneapolis police chief with charges of brutality and harassment of Indians on the south side.<sup>32</sup> The police officer who had arrested the AIM chairman was formally charged with simple assault in the arrest,<sup>33</sup> but soon afterwards the chairman was again arrested for alleged traffic violations.<sup>34</sup> Worsening relations with the police department prompted a formal AIM request to the Urban Coalition for funding for the Indian street patrol; at the same time, AIM requested that five "token Indians" be removed from the Urban Coalition because of non-attendance at meetings and be replaced by active Indian representatives.<sup>35</sup>

Charges that blacks were discriminating against Indians in the Concentrated Employment Program were made by a group of Indian CEP employees not identified with AIM. An Indian spokesman was quoted as saying that "We have been subjected to intimidation and verbal abuse, particularly about our culture and Indian heritage, of which we are very proud." He charged that blacks had taken over the program and that Indians were badly under-represented in policy-making and administrative positions.<sup>36</sup> This prompted an investigation of the CEP program by the Urban American Indian Federation. The Federation secretary stated that "Indians are being more or less left out and pushed to the bottom. . . . When they [CEP] have meetings, Indians are always shouted down and sometimes are threatened verbally."<sup>37</sup> Later, AIM proposed to the Urban American Indian Federation a boycott by Minneapolis Indians of federally-funded anti-poverty programs in Hennepin County. The AIM chairman explained that such action was calculated to cut off federal funds from the projects because of a requirement that all minority groups be represented in anti-poverty agencies. A regional OEO official disagreed, and the Hennepin County Community Action Program Director suggested that

Indians should be careful about making charges of discrimination because most of the Indian-oriented organizations had all-Indian boards of directors while other agencies usually had racially mixed boards.<sup>38</sup> Pressure on the CEP program by AIM and other Indian community representatives apparently convinced regional OEO officials, who released a report stating that Indians were discriminated against by black employees of the program. Minneapolis CEP officials said the allegation was untrue.<sup>39</sup>

In the meantime, the AIM chairman had been arrested again for alleged robbery<sup>40</sup> and once again on charges of drunken driving.<sup>41</sup> A Minneapolis police officer was charged by an AIM member with discrimination in furnishing public services, but the charge was later dismissed.<sup>42</sup> Later, AIM representatives succeeded in getting the Urban Coalition to appoint a committee to meet with the Minneapolis mayor to "support efforts to rid the police force of its racist elements."<sup>43</sup>

AIM representatives recommended that the new guidelines being drawn up for the Department of Indian Work of the Minnesota Council of Churches provide the following: (1) that the entire staff of the Department be Indian; (2) that a personnel committee -- rather than the Director -- screen and recruit staff to ensure that staff members were chosen who would fairly represent the Indian community; (3) that the churches employ their influence as an organized body in meeting the urgent need for adequate housing for Indian people; and (4) that the churches assume a positive role in influencing legislation created or supported by Indian people.<sup>44</sup>

Not all of AIM's abrasiveness has been directed toward the white and black communities. A particularly bitter feud developed between AIM and members of the Upper Midwest American Indian Center. Several UMAIC members were displaced from their jobs at the OEO-funded Southside Citizens' Community Center by AIM militants. Subsequently, UMAIC was given support by the Minneapolis United Fund in its application for membership and for a project to develop a comprehensive Indian center in the Model City area of south Minneapolis. Development of such a center had long been discussed and had been recommended in special studies by white organizations<sup>45</sup> and had been supported by newspaper editorials.<sup>46</sup> The effect of the United Fund

support was to make possible funds through Model City in addition to those provided by the United Fund.<sup>47</sup> The UMAIC promptly appointed a director for the proposed center.<sup>48</sup> But three AIM members of the United Fund's Urban Committee decided to withhold active participation in the committee because they did not like the choice of UMAIC to develop the Indian center. According to the AIM committee members, UMAIC was generally unpopular with inner-city Indians, it had failed to involve the total Indian community in plans for the center, it had a board of directors which was white-dominated, and it had appointed a director for the new center as a result of a "secret" agreement with the United Fund.<sup>49</sup> AIM members succeeded in persuading Model City officials to withhold Indian center funds from UMAIC until a new and more representative board of directors was elected. According to one AIM representative, the UMAIC board contained "too many whites, Indians married to whites, and Indians from the suburbs."<sup>50</sup> UMAIC members bitterly retorted that AIM representatives failed to show up for meetings called to resolve grievances and that AIM was asked to nominate persons to serve on the UMAIC board but did not respond.<sup>51</sup> Rather than interfere in the AIM-UMAIC dispute, a United Fund committee voted to ask AIM to submit proposals for its own admission to United Fund membership.<sup>52</sup> AIM submitted its own center proposal for Model City funding, and the dispute between the two Indian organizations hardened. At this juncture, the Urban American Indian Federation entered with its own proposal for a center, intended as a compromise effort. AIM resigned from the Federation, its members angry over being consistently outvoted at Federation meetings.<sup>53</sup> At this writing, the Indian center controversy had not been resolved and Model City funds had not been allocated.

#### The New Urban Chiefs

Minneapolis Indian professionals and quasi-professionals tend to be in their 20's or early 30's. In the case of the professionals, they are people with at least a high school diploma, and more often than not, they have some years of college or a college degree. In two or three isolated cases, they are people with work past the bachelor's degree. The quasi-professionals, who may be employed in positions very much like those of the

professionals, are without any college work, but most of them do have a high school diploma.

Both the professionals and the quasi-professionals tend to be employed in programs that have sprung up since the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. It occasionally develops that persons who are quasi-professional actually occupy higher status positions and earn more money than those who are legitimately professionals, according to the prevailing standards. But both categories of young Indian men are able to work in relatively high-paying and high-status jobs because the requirements of those jobs have been altered, or because new jobs without very specific requirements (but related to the urban Indian population) have come into being.

These young Indian men are thus employed mainly in the poverty program area, and they are largely men who are comparatively articulate and socially skilled, particularly within bureaucratic frameworks. There are exceptions in the case of the quasi-professionals: these young men are often not very articulate, and are usually hard-pressed to function in a bureaucratic setting. They tend to be controlled by the professionals, although control shifts take place as personality and factional matters affect each case of "friendship".

There is a second way in which professional and quasi-professional Indians have achieved status in Minneapolis. For some of these Indians, access to the news media is a weekly or bi-weekly occurrence. Indeed, the news media often compete in seeking these people out for their judgments about the nature and meaning of some matter related to Indian life. The audiences for the professional and quasi-professional Indians who are catered to by the mass media tend to be largely white and middle-class, on the one hand, and largely blue-collar and Indian on the other. The chief impact of the information and opinions given to the media by the professional and quasi-professional Indians is made upon certain elements within the white middle-class. For the most part, the media language of these Indians goes over the heads of the Indian blue-collar people, and is probably not

often heard by more distressed Minneapolis Indians. Thus, the major Indian population element which critiques urban Indian action programs in Minneapolis is the professional and quasi-professional Indian category, and it is the source of the new urban Chiefs.

"Chiefting" is the process of assuming a non-existent Indian leadership role for the benefit of whites, the self, and select cronies. No one can successfully "chief" in the urban setting without the approving response of whites. Originally, the development of Chiefs among the (now) Minnesota Chippewa had been stimulated by the requirements of the fur trade and the necessity of dealing with the government of the whites. Trader and government officials alike preferred to deal with entire social groups through as few persons as possible, so that a "leadership" was developed suitable for dealing with outsiders of importance to the Chippewa people. But such "leadership" was very uncommon to the Chippewa indeed, for their leadership patterns were traditionally based upon the temporary takeover of the group by an individual for a specific purpose. After that purpose was no longer present, the "leader" disappeared back into the group as an equal. The original emergence of a "permanent leadership" was therefore an artifact of white economic control and influence, and not the result of any "natural" developments within Chippewa tribal culture itself. Typically, these Minnesota Indian people have been a rural poverty population, living in enclaves surrounded by insensitive and largely exploitative non-Indians. Indian "leadership" has typically been able to do little toward alleviating the problems of reservation Chippewa, in large part because this leadership is usually not representative of the interests of the people, and is more directly responsive to the demands of interlocutory roles with white agencies.

In reservation politics and in the case of the urban poverty program interlocutors, neither group really "leads" any Indians, if one assumes that leadership means a following of persons willing to be led to specific goals through actions carried out by persons of their choice, and over whom they have significant control. Reservation "leaders" usually lead no one and are not structured personally or socially to do so.

Chiefing professionals and quasi-professionals have sporadic followings among Minneapolis Indian young, but gather their important responses from urban white middle-class people and persons in executive anti-poverty positions. They have two distinct advantages over their reservation counterparts: they tend to operate in formal structures with minimum mechanisms to dethrone them; and they depend even less than reservation leaders upon Indian understanding and followership in order to persist and thrive.

#### Responses of Chiefs to Indian Programs

There are six types of responses that seem to typify the reactions of the professional and quasi-professional Indian Chiefs to Indian research and action programs carried out in Minneapolis.

- (1) Indifference (approving). This response is reserved for programs which validate largely mythological notions about contemporary urban Indian life. Chiefing professionals and quasi-professionals often promote such myths, which permit them to thrive without significant critical response by Indians or important whites.
- (2) Backstage put-down. Attempts to discredit action program personnel are usually not troublesome for any lasting period of time with other Indians, but are often lastingly effective with white persons. The range of backstage put-downs can run from idle cocktail party gossip to letters requesting dismissal of the offenders.
- (3) Public criticism of the program as program. The least problematic of the six response categories. Usually, the Chief's knowledge of programmatic research or action assumptions and techniques is minimal. Their critical response to the implications of research findings and recommendations is almost entirely based upon the threat to their roles as interlocutors between "the Indian community" and the "majority society".

- (4) Public character assassination attempts. Of these responses, many take the form of open challenges at public meetings, statements in newspaper articles, letters to editors, or remarks on radio and television. Again, their lasting impact is mostly upon whites.
  
- (5) Careful use of current Indian mythology to sway opinion. Here, the professional or quasi-professional Chief interested in preserving his interests from the eroding effects of alternative viewpoints can sway both Indian people and whites (but again, particularly the latter) by appealing to "history" to explain why unwanted points of view must be wrong. The general tenor of these manipulations takes the form of a romantic, idealized Indian image-construction based upon a threadbare Noble Savage theme. The technique can have important negative effects on whites confused over whether "Indians really should change" or whether "Indians really have changed."
  
- (6) Contrived role of the "battered Indian". This is a "put-on" role, especially effective on television and in newspaper mug shots. In this instance, the urban Chief assumes the role of the hurt, confused, and simple Indian person beset by whites who are attempting to meddle with his "identity as an Indian". The technique is also useful in closed meetings, or on intimate radio broadcasts. It serves to make the offending point of view appear callous and indifferent to the effects of its promulgation upon individual Indian psyches.

Indian-oriented development and research programs in Minneapolis have had the following general effects related to the existence and condition of urban Chiefs.

- (1) Research and action programs put more people on the scene who were potential "authorities" on urban Indians.



- (2) The research often came up with findings which were not the kind the Chiefs could appreciate. Their public standpoint on the condition of the Indian and his relationship to the surrounding urban society was often jeopardized.
- (3) Certain public information roles which had fallen entirely to the Chiefs, such as newspaper and radio and television analyses of the Indian scene, underwent shaking and erosion.
- (4) A dialogue within the Indian community began, sometimes resulting in less than favorable reflections cast upon previously unscathed Chiefs.
- (5) Relationships with certain white power interests with whom the Chiefs had been working, and upon whom they depended, began to show signs of erosion.
- (6) The Chiefs began to suffer some relationary and power changes within their own group.

The Chiefs have generally countered these problems effectively. Their main weapons have already been outlined, but these are applied chiefly against whites. A more potent weapon is employed to keep the Indian population in line. We shall deal with it now, and reflect upon its implications for future trends in urban Indian social relations.

#### Control of the Indian Image

The dualistic sort of imagery that the Chiefs project of both urban and rural Indians has the following general romantic elements: Indian people are more "human" and "sensitive" than whites, and they have a "better value system" than whites, primarily because they do not subscribe to the middle-class patterns of consumption and display, or to certain other Protestant Ethic elements. On the other hand, the Chiefs insist upon presenting Indians as a cynical, discouraged people wrongfully treated by

contemporary as well as historical white influences: a people who are justified in continuing to allow their cynicism and defeat to influence their responses to the mechanisms of white society.

The Chiefs actively suggest that for most Indians to remain essentially poor, powerless and without confidence is virtuous, because they have been wrongly treated. The further implication, "Once a white, always a white", is clearly present. There is little room for change within a perspective of such dualism. There is the continuation of the guilt of the white and the hurt of wronged and resentful Indian.

Such a contrived impasse cries for "explanation" and allows the interlocutor Chief to develop his role as spokesman for the Indian community and interlocutor for the whites. It also allows him to become economically advantaged. It discourages the development of indigenous leadership to challenge the chiefing role, and it places an automatic intellectual and moral stricture on any white or Indian who would attempt to redefine the intercultural situation:

#### Agency Treatment by Urban Chiefs

The Chiefs have assumed the additional role of baiting many Minneapolis social service agencies in a general kind of way, usually around the notions of "bureaucratic insensitivity" and "racism". But they do not provide, in any sense, alternative practical guidelines or goals for the agencies that would allow the agencies to improve their Indian-related functions through altered philosophies and programs. For example, a schoolteacher may publicly cry out in a spasm of emotion that she has discovered her "true" white racist qualities, but the typical Chief response to this declaration is likely to be anxiety, and the rough suggestion that the teacher "has done her thing" for her own "kicks". The Chief usually continues that such revelation on the part of whites can never lead to change, since "only Indians can help Indians". The Chiefs rarely mention the fact that many Minneapolis agencies have active Indian recruitment programs underway, but are either unable to find Indian employees even

when agency standards are revised, or are unable to retain Indian employees once they are brought aboard.

Agencies do need to change. They often recognize it, but they do not know how. In this regard, they get little if any help from status-anxious Indian "leaders" in the chiefing role. An Indian red power advocate recently assailed the city welfare agency for requiring too much paperwork of Indian clients, but he did not offer any alternative to the information-gathering and client-processing techniques currently an aspect of the welfare processing mechanisms. This lack of alternatives to existing and often cumbersome and degrading techniques is a major factor in the continued employment of these methods by agencies, and a major factor in the continued employment of entrepreneurial Chiefs as public critics.

To the "chiefing" Indian poverty professional or quasi-professional, who is actually conducting Indian projects in Minneapolis? All the "wrong" people -- whites building academic careers on the backs of Indian respondents, and duped Indian sell-outs playing patsies to some variant on white neo-colonialism. Who is perceived to legitimately conduct Indian urban research? No one -- unless that research is engaged in by persons from whom no threat bodes in findings, or implications from findings or in disagreement with a carefully structured tribal alienate/noble savage dualistic image of the Indian. Who would be most desirable performing in urban Indian research and action roles? The Indian poverty Chiefs themselves, of course. Some Chiefs hint publicly at the many profound "findings" that have become known to them through their roles as Indian historians, ethnographers, philosophers, authors, programmers, religious leaders, and guardians of Indian interests.

Employing recent research findings as a basis, and working within the interests of Minneapolis Indian people not in the chiefing group, several Indian education programs have been developed and funded by local and national government agencies. Because these programs require staffs and boards, and because they have money to spend, they provide an immediate threat to the security of the Chiefs. One major education program recently

funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity was under constant fire by entrepreneurial Chiefs who saw it as a direct attack upon their livelihoods. Prior to that, the research which led to the development of a proposal to the Office of Economic Opportunity was publicly and privately discredited. With that large education program beginning to roll into operation in 1969-1970 under the directorship of an all-Indian board, the Chiefs called for a boycott of the program and prepared counter-proposals to the same agency for roughly identical services to the Indian population. Certainly, this kind of competition is not atypical within cities where competing groups vie intra-ethnically for limited anti-poverty funds. But in this instance, the intentions of the Minneapolis Chiefs were privately stated as obstructionary, not as attempts to gain additional educational and related services for the Indian community. These Chiefs have been "on record", in private discussions, as being in favor of no Indian programs at all. The destruction of threatening white and Indian counterparts to the role of interlocutor and entrepreneur has been and is being attempted.

#### Control of the Indian

Retaliations like program blockage are effective only if the tactics are suitable. So far, the Minneapolis Chiefs have employed a singularly deadly approach to control of the Indian population. The federal education program which many working-class Indian adults helped to develop was structured around the notion that Indians can develop, run, and critique their own programs, and that they need not lose their "Indianness" in the process. Accordingly, a very persistent theme in the defensive propaganda of the Chiefs is that any change on the part of a participating Indian person -- and the specifics are never made clear -- means that that person is either less Indian, or no longer Indian at all. For many urban Indians, especially the Minneapolis Chippewa young people, identity crises are the major problem of life. To be told that participation in a special education program signifies a loss of "Indianness" is to be told something not only unsettling but often terrifying. The Chiefs are aware of the strong adaptive and acculturative influences playing on Minneapolis Indians, and of the often confused, ambivalent, and defensive responses to them. Their

strategic use of such factors to insure a perpetual Indian separation from major urban institutions and agencies is thus practical and intelligent, as well as cynical and manipulative.

So far, there is no defense against the dualistic image strategy. The moral and policy questions for white professionals aware of the problem and involved in its day-to-day dynamics are great. Indeed, the temptation is constantly present to intervene drastically, perhaps by discrediting the Chiefs personally and publicly. But the battle is not really between professional whites and Chiefs so much as it is between rival philosophies of community development, and among Indians themselves. Under the philosophy we have accepted and related here, white professionals must almost uniformly play the role of hired technician to action programs,\* or that of "objective" (i.e., prudent) researcher, and leave chiefing and the problems related to it where they ethnically and morally belong -- in the collective hands of the Indian people themselves.

What are some of the consequences of anti-poverty programs and Indian militancy, especially when Chiefs are involved, upon urban Indians in Minneapolis?

- (1) Many reservation Indians who have migrated to Minneapolis lack the experience and the formal requirements, such as education, to obtain psychologically and economically rewarding employment.<sup>54</sup> Some of these urban Indians see anti-poverty programs as one of the few available sources of good jobs and power, and the development of a militant Indian organization (AIM) in Minneapolis can be traced directly to a desire for a fair share of anti-poverty program employment and influence.
- (2) To get a larger share of the jobs and benefits available in anti-poverty programs, Indian militants have developed and utilized confrontation and "demand" tactics. Such behavior

\* This report is a partial exception to that rule.

is very disturbing to many other urban Indians. Indeed, Indian militants in Minneapolis often are criticized by other Indians for being "Afro-Indians" and for engaging in tactics said to be "not the Indian way."<sup>55</sup>

- (3) Part of the development of Indian militancy in Minneapolis probably is due to the aggressive pursuit of jobs and program control by blacks, which necessitates some sort of competitive behavior by Indians in order to secure a share of anti-poverty resources. Thus, conflicts between inner-city minority populations, as in the Minneapolis CEP program, can be intensified by the operation of anti-poverty programs. To the dismay of Minneapolis anti-poverty strategists, programs have sometimes operated to "divide and conquer"; the end result has been diminished community organization in disadvantaged areas. Indians in Minneapolis anti-poverty programs tend to respond as Indians and not as members of a larger disadvantaged class.
- (4) Probably because of the long history of unsatisfactory and even destructive relationships with federal policies and programs in particular and white domination in general, most Minneapolis urban Indians are not actively involved in anti-poverty programs, and many even doubt the reality of Indian-controlled and Indian-operated programs. The cynical commentary, "It's just another Federal program", reflects an attitude of long-standing popularity in the Indian community and does much to prevent many Indian people from becoming implicated in new programs. Reaching the apathetic, the distrustful, and the doubtful constitutes the most difficult challenge for Indian leaders in Minneapolis who are concerned with mobilizing Indian community support for, and participation in, Indian ventures.

- (5) Anti-poverty and militant Indian organizations in Minneapolis have provided a forum for the development of Indian activists and spokesmen.<sup>56</sup> Indian militancy in particular has been consistently rewarded by local press attention. The public dramatization of the plight of urban Indians in Minneapolis undoubtedly has resulted in many gains for Indians, such as representation on boards and commissions; employment in government, poverty programs, and industry; and funding of exclusively Indian organizations. Public attention has given the Indian male a voice and an opportunity to begin working out an urban Indian identity.
- (6) There have been drawbacks, however. Minneapolis Indian spokesmen have articulated well the inequities and injustices suffered by Indian people in the past and in the urban setting today, and they have demanded what they consider to be just treatment from whites and blacks. "Just treatment" includes freedom from what Indians say is police harassment, it involves the elimination of negative image-building material from advertising and textbooks, and it means economic improvement -- often with the implication of an indemnity for past wrongs suffered at the hands of white society. Failure to gain an appropriate response to these needs -- especially economic needs -- results in alienation from the "system" and, in Minneapolis, that includes the school system. Alienated militants, who see the public schools as a vehicle for propagating a way of life destructive to Indian interests, have been known to counsel Indian youths to drop out of school and get a job instead. Indians with college degrees are sometimes labeled "sell-outs".

In short, what urban Indian spokesmen in Minneapolis protest, what they do not like about white-dominated society, and what they propose not to do have become increasingly clear to Indians and non-Indians alike. What is unclear from the articulation and behavior of Indian spokesmen is what

urban Indians propose to do, including the role models for Indian men and women in urban society considered to be "Indian" as well as the general posture of urban Indians on specific issues. What is not "the Indian way" is clearer than what is "the Indian way" and the activities of Indian professionals and quasi-professionals who deliver presentations describing "Indian values" drawn from anthropologist's writings about reservation-era Indians do little except cloud understanding of what it means to be an urban Indian. There is some rhetoric about Indian involvement, Indian self-determination, Indian participation, Indian decision-making, and Indian competence, but there is a lack of consensus and understanding about how to do these things in ways that can be identified as "Indian". Without such models, immobilization of the Indian population is an understandable condition. Indian-controlled programs in Minneapolis need to be more visible to Indians, because they provide the rare opportunity of trying out ways of accommodation to the urban environment to see how they work, and because what is learned from these programs can be passed on to other urban Indians. Part of the lack of positive identity models for the Indian community is due to concentration of the mass media on the drama of confrontation; Indian professionals in all-Indian programs who advocate courses of social action for Indians have difficulty in reaching large audiences.

Perhaps a more important deterrent is the great need for urban Indians in Minneapolis to get together and face common problems with a view toward developmental steps and to work out mutually supportive ways of achieving larger gains for all Indians. The cement of community organization becomes extremely crucial as a deprived minority faces the difficult task of adjustment to urban life without the loss of identity. To that end, there may have to be fundamental changes in the nature of Indian political processes and decision-making. To expect the rich diversity of opinion within the Indian community to evaporate would be unrealistic, but Indians may have to develop new ways to resolve differences so that action can be taken to seize opportunities.



Minneapolis is a city beset with most of today's inner-city ills, including inadequate financing, and it is a city which reacted to the confrontation tactics of a handful of black militants by electing a former policeman Mayor on a "law and order" platform. Minneapolis Indians -- short of participation in a violent revolution -- may be faced with limited alternative ways of adapting to urban life with a measure of self-determination. These alternatives include wresting a larger share of a wilting anti-poverty program and participating actively in changing the major institutions of the city, including the schools, to better accommodate Indians. If the latter approach is viewed by Indians as valid, then new pressures will develop. Indians will have to learn how to function within predominantly white organizations; they will have to master the inner workings of those organizations; they will have to find allies in the change process within these organizations; they will have to exercise internal pressures for change; they will have to coordinate their activities with sources of outside pressure; they will have to explain their activities to members of the Indian community. The development of Indian competence and expertise will be a crucial prerequisite to the acquisition and exercise of self-determination by Indian people in Minneapolis. That development may be aided or hampered by educational institutions, and the form and structure of Indian education at all age levels may be a critical issue.

Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>John R. Borchert and Donald P. Yeager, Atlas of Minnesota Resources and Settlement, (St. Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota State Planning Agency, Documents Section, 140 Centennial Building, 1968 [revised 1969]), pp. 14, 15, 18; Economic Research Department, Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, "Facts about the City of Minneapolis", (Minneapolis: mimeo, March, 1969), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Borchert and Yeager, pp. 232 - 236.

<sup>3</sup>Economic Research Department, Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, "Minneapolis - St. Paul SMSA General Economic and Market Data", (Minneapolis: mimeo, 1969), p. 44.

<sup>4</sup>Non-agricultural Employment in Minneapolis by Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Categories (August, 1969):

Total Non-agricultural Employment	301,597	
Manufacturing	65,512	
Durable Goods		40,216
Lumber and Furniture		1,287
Primary & Fabricated Metals		6,891
Non-electrical Machinery		12,775
Electrical Machinery		6,567
Other Durables		12,696
Non-durable Goods		25,296
Food & Kindred Products		9,549
Textiles and Apparel		3,133
Paper, Printing & Publishing		9,229
Other Non-durables		3,385
Non-manufacturing	236,085	
Construction		12,224
Transportation		12,641
Public Utilities		10,821
Trade		79,371
Wholesale Trade		31,352
Retail Trade		48,019
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate		26,546
Insurance		11,384
Government		37,628
Federal		6,798
State		15,973
Local		14,857
Service & Miscellaneous		56,854

Source: Minnesota State Employment Service, "Twin Cities Metropolitan Area Employment Trends", Vol. IV, No. 9 (September 25, 1969), p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Economic Research Department, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Economic Research Department, Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, "Facts About Minneapolis", (Minneapolis: mimeo, August, 1969), p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> 1967 SEP Study Rankings for Minnesota:

Status of the Individual. . . . .	10
Individual Equality . . . . .	1
Democratic Process. . . . .	4
Education . . . . .	9
Economic Growth . . . . .	3
Technological Change. . . . .	11.5
Agriculture . . . . .	19
Living Conditions . . . . .	10
Health and Welfare. . . . .	1
Final Ranking . . . . .	2

Source: Minnesota Department of Economic Development, The Quality of Life in Minnesota, (St. Paul, Minnesota: no date):

<sup>10</sup> Joe Rigert, "Minneapolis is Becoming a Haven of Have-Nots", Minneapolis Tribune, March 24, 1969.

<sup>11</sup> Twin Cities Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc., Proposal for Funding, 1969, (Minneapolis: mimeo, no date), p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Youth Groups Ask Funds for Own Summer Programs", Minneapolis Tribune, April 5, 1968.

<sup>13</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Groups Clash Over Youth Leaders", Minneapolis Tribune, March 28, 1969.

<sup>14</sup> League of Women Voters of Minneapolis and the Training Center for Community Programs of the University of Minnesota, Indians in Minneapolis, (Minneapolis: April, 1968), p. 12.

<sup>15</sup> Joe Rigert, "Indian Youths: Destroying Themselves?" Minneapolis Tribune, June 24, 1968.

<sup>16</sup> Joe Rigert, "Young Indians Are 'Finding Themselves'", Minneapolis Tribune, June 27, 1968.

<sup>17</sup> Joe Rigert, "Indian Youths: Destroying Themselves?" Minneapolis Tribune, June 24, 1968.

<sup>18</sup> Anonymous, "City Indians Form Coalition and Elect Temporary Chairman", Minneapolis Tribune, July 30, 1968.

<sup>19</sup> Anonymous, "First Indian is Appointed CLIC Member", Minneapolis Tribune, July 31, 1968.

- <sup>20</sup> Anonymous, "City Indian Coalition Seeks Job Equity", Minneapolis Tribune, August 7, 1968.
- <sup>21</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Coalition Plans Action", Minneapolis Tribune, August 6, 1968.
- <sup>22</sup> Anonymous, "Indians to Patrol Franklin Avenue to Deter 'Harassment' by Police", Minneapolis Tribune, August 20, 1968.
- <sup>23</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Patrol Curbs Arrests, Leader Says", Minneapolis Tribune, September 18, 1968.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Cartoon Subject of 2nd Rights Parley", Minneapolis Tribune, September 20, 1968.
- <sup>26</sup> Anonymous, "Policeman Charged in Indian Assault", Minneapolis Tribune, November 16, 1968.
- <sup>27</sup> Anonymous, "Patrolman Acquitted of Assault Charge", Minneapolis Tribune, November 21, 1968.
- <sup>28</sup> Anonymous, "Naftalin Heeds Indian Demands", Minneapolis Tribune, November 22, 1968.
- <sup>29</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Group to Ask Federal Funds for New Office in City" Minneapolis Tribune, January 31, 1969.
- <sup>30</sup> Anonymous, "One Indian Group Gives Initial Support to Other's Programs" Minneapolis Tribune, March 22, 1969.
- <sup>31</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Charges Brutality", Minneapolis Tribune, March 22, 1969.
- <sup>32</sup> Anonymous, "Indians Meet Dwyer, Charge Police Brutality", Minneapolis Tribune, March 26, 1969.
- <sup>33</sup> Anonymous, "Policeman Charged in Bellecourt Arrest", Minneapolis Tribune, March 28, 1969.
- <sup>34</sup> Anonymous, "Police Trail, Seize City Indian Leader", Minneapolis Tribune, April 2, 1969.
- <sup>35</sup> Anonymous, "Indians Ask More Aid for Citizens' Patrol" Minneapolis Tribune, April 11, 1969.
- <sup>36</sup> Anonymous, "Indians Claim Bias by Negroes in Job Program", Minneapolis Tribune, April 23, 1969.
- <sup>37</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Federation to Probe Alleged Anti-Poverty Bias", Minneapolis Tribune, May 5, 1969.

<sup>38</sup> Anonymous, "City Indians to Weigh Poverty Work Boycott", Minneapolis Tribune, July 11, 1969.

<sup>39</sup> Anonymous, "Hennepin CEP Draws Fire of U. S. Officials", Minneapolis Tribune, August 15, 1969.

<sup>40</sup> Anonymous, "Bellecourt Arrested on Robbery Charges", Minneapolis Tribune, May 23, 1969.

<sup>41</sup> Anonymous, "Bellecourt Arrested for Drunk Driving", Minneapolis Tribune, June 13, 1969.

<sup>42</sup> Anonymous, "Indian Charges Police Officer with Bias", Minneapolis Tribune, June 24, 1969; Anonymous, "Bias Charge Against Police Officer Voided", Minneapolis Tribune, July 6, 1969.

<sup>43</sup> Anonymous, "Coalition Hears Blessing and 'Damns'", Minneapolis Star, September 5, 1969.

<sup>44</sup> Anonymous, "Indians Ask Changes in Church Body", Minneapolis Tribune, June 19, 1969.

<sup>45</sup> Richard G. Woods and Arthur M. Harkins, Indian Employment in Minneapolis, (Minneapolis: Training Center for Community Programs, University of Minnesota, April, 1968), pp. 41 - 42.

<sup>46</sup> Anonymous editorial, "Another Report on Urban Indians", Minneapolis Tribune, June 4, 1968.

<sup>47</sup> Anonymous, "Indians Take Interest in Model City", Minneapolis Tribune, May 26, 1969.

<sup>48</sup> Anonymous, "Robert Carr to Head New Indian Center", Minneapolis Tribune, May 30, 1969.

<sup>49</sup> Anonymous, "Center Plan Disappoints Indians; They Balk at Aiding United Fund", Minneapolis Tribune, June 26, 1969; Anonymous, "Indian Center Aides Reply to Grievances", Minneapolis Tribune, June 29, 1969.

<sup>50</sup> Anonymous, "Model City Holds Indian Center Funds", Minneapolis Tribune, July 18, 1969.

<sup>51</sup> Anonymous, "New Indian Center Has Mixed Luck", Minneapolis Tribune, July 21, 1969.

<sup>52</sup> Anonymous, "Poor May Get Greater United Fund Role", Minneapolis Star, August 12, 1969.

<sup>53</sup> Anonymous, "Model City Officials to Receive New Proposal for Indian Center", Minneapolis Tribune, September 24, 1969.

54 Woods and Harkins, p.21; pp. 35 - 37.

55 "Myth of the 'Silent American'" (editorial), Minneapolis Tribune, April 15, 1969.

56 Ibid.

The Social Programs &  
Political Styles of Mpls.  
Indians: An Interim Report.  
Harkins, Woods.

Copy 2 INDIAN AMERICANS  
-----

The Social Programs & Political  
Styles of Mpls. Indians: An  
Interim Report. Harkins, Woods.

Copy 2

INDIAN AMERICANS