

HOLLMAN v. CISNEROS

Deconcentrating Poverty in Minneapolis

**Report No. 6:
The Experiences of Dispersed Families**

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Center for Urban and Regional Affairs
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UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

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INTRODUCTION

The consent decree in *Hollman v. Cisneros*, signed in 1995, committed the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and their co-defendants to a series of dramatic policy changes. First, four north side public housing projects and dozens of scattered-site public housing units would be reviewed for possible demolition or disposition. Second, the defendants would create up to 770 units of replacement public housing in nonimpacted areas of the city and suburbs. Third, the displaced residents of the demolished scattered-site and north side public housing were to be relocated with public assistance. Fourth, the 73-acre north side site was to be redeveloped. Fifth, hundreds of tenant-based housing subsidies would be made available to Minneapolis public housing residents to enable them to move out of areas of race and poverty concentration. Sixth, changes in the operation of the Minneapolis Section 8 program would occur to make it easier for participants to exercise geographic choice. Finally, an affordable housing clearinghouse would be created to provide low-income families a centralized source of information about housing options in the metropolitan area.

The Center for Urban and Regional Affairs (CURA) at the University of Minnesota was contracted by the Family Housing Fund of Minneapolis–St. Paul and by the State of Minnesota in 1998 to conduct an evaluation of the implementation of the consent decree. This is the sixth in a series of eight reports generated by the consent decree.

This report examines the experiences of *Hollman* families in their new neighborhoods based on in-person interviews.

THE EXPERIENCES OF DISPERSED FAMILIES

This report examines the experiences of *Hollman* families in their new neighborhoods. The analysis is based on in-person interviews with random samples of families in five different groups. The first three groups are those who have moved as a result of the *Hollman* settlement. These include families involuntarily displaced by the demolition of public housing, families who voluntarily moved into replacement units, and families who voluntarily used the mobility certificates. Two other groups of households were interviewed as comparison groups: participants in the city's regular Section 8 program, and a group of "stay-at-home" public housing residents still living in concentrated neighborhoods. A total of 618 interviews were completed between June 1999 and February 2000. The completed sample includes 195 displaced households, 32 residents of replacement housing, 18 families who have used the special mobility certificates, 200 regular Section 8 participants, and 173 stay-at-home public housing households.¹ At the time of data collection, little progress had been made in developing replacement units and great difficulty had been encountered in successfully utilizing the mobility vouchers, thus the number of households in these groups is smaller compared to the others. In addition to the interview data, census information is used to help characterize the neighborhoods in which the survey respondents live.

VOLUNTARY VS. INVOLUNTARY MOBILITY

The *Hollman* consent decree incorporates two different strategies for deconcentrating Minneapolis public housing residents. First, a group of residents living in the north side public housing projects lost their units to demolition. These families were involuntary participants in the deconcentration effort in the sense that they were forced to relocate. Families who moved into the replacement housing and those who used the special mobility certificates, on the other hand, applied to the program voluntarily. In the analysis to follow, the responses of those in replacement housing and those who have used the special mobility certificates are combined into a single "voluntary group." Figure 1 shows the study subgroups and how respondents are categorized. The analysis presented in this report focuses on the effect of voluntary and involuntary mobility programs. Thus, the report analyzes and compares the experiences of two treatment groups, the voluntary and involuntary participants in

¹ For more information on the survey process, see Minnesota Center for Survey Research 2000.

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the *Hollman* deconcentration program, and two control groups, the Section 8 and the public housing families.

The voluntary and involuntary mobility strategies share the same policy objectives—the deconcentration of poverty, the reduction of social problems associated with concentrated poverty, and the improvement of living environments for the families involved. Nevertheless, there are important differences between these approaches. In the displacement approach, families are forcibly moved out of their previous homes, their units are typically demolished or converted to market-rate housing, and they are given assistance in relocating to other homes and apartments in the area. Forced relocation efforts affect the entire subsidized population of a development and therefore impact a wide range of families. The displacement approach targets those developments in which poverty is most highly concentrated and those developments facing the greatest physical and social challenges. Because this approach typically focuses on a single, older subsidized housing development, the impact on existing poverty concentrations is usually quite significant. On the other hand, the deconcentrating impacts of displacement are not as great at the relocation stage because families that are displaced through demolition or conversion are not restricted in their choice of relocation neighborhood. Thus, it is possible that they may move to other neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.

The voluntary mobility approach differs on all of these dimensions. In voluntary programs, families apply for assistance to move out of poverty neighborhoods. At the same




Figure 1. Study Subgroups

time, mobility programs typically screen applicants and, as a result, select participants most likely to succeed in middle-income neighborhoods (Hogan 1996). This approach restricts the range of families assisted much more than does the displacement approach. The impact on existing concentrations of poverty is also more diffused than in the displacement approach because applicants may come from a variety of disadvantaged neighborhoods rather than a single housing development. However, deconcentration after relocation is guaranteed because most mobility programs require participating families to move to neighborhoods of low poverty. While this program feature guarantees deconcentration of poverty, in effect it also restricts the mobility choices of participating families.

The *Hollman v. Cisneros* case provides a natural opportunity to analyze voluntary and involuntary approaches within the same community and housing market—a research strategy that has not been used in any previous study.

HYPOTHESES

Previous research has shown that both approaches produce improvements in the living environments of families (see *Report No. 1: Policy Context and Previous Research on Housing Dispersal*). Typical research designs compare the relocation experience of families with their self-reported situation prior to relocation, or alternatively, to the experience of a control group of families that did not move. In this study, both methods of analysis were employed. As with previous research, this study tested the Program Hypothesis: *Families involved in the deconcentration program will report improvements in their living conditions relative to their previous places of residence and relative to control groups.*

Yet the question persists as to how forced displacement and voluntary approaches differ for the families involved. Thus, an additional hypothesis, not typically addressed in previous research, was also tested, namely that these methods differ in their impacts on families. The Method Hypothesis states: *Displaced families will report fewer improvements in living conditions and more problems in relocation compared to voluntarily mobile families.*

ANALYSIS

In this analysis, the program and method hypotheses are examined in a repeating pattern. Tests are reported that summarize survey responses across the four treatment and control groups. This is done in two ways. First, responses are presented for items concerning respondents' judgments of their current neighborhoods, allowing a comparison of current conditions across all four groups. Second, pre-move and post-move neighborhood judgments for the two treatment groups are presented, allowing an analysis of the change in conditions from their previous neighborhoods to their current communities. Program effects exist where families who have been deconcentrated report significantly better conditions in their living environments compared to families who have not been deconcentrated,

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or compared to their experiences prior to moving. Method effects exist when the two treatment groups (displaced and voluntary) differ from each other in their reported conditions, or when differential program effects occur. In addition, results are presented for multivariate tests that were conducted, controlling for the differences in demographic characteristics across groups, to determine whether the program or method effects stand up in the face of demographic differences across the groups or whether they are artifacts of those differences.²

Characteristics of the Respondents

Descriptive analysis of the sample shows important differences across the four groups. Households who volunteered for mobility are significantly younger on average (mid-30s compared to early 40s) than members of the other groups and reported significantly higher incomes (\$221 to \$324 per month) than other respondents (see Table 1). On both of these items, displaced families differ from the voluntary group but not from the control groups. Displaced households also are typically larger than the control group families, although not statistically different from the voluntary group. Displaced households are much more likely to be Southeast Asian (57%) than the other groups (for which Southeast Asians accounted for no more than 26% in any single group) and there are relatively fewer African Americans and European Americans in this category than in the other groups. Finally, members of displaced households are significantly more likely to lack a high school education and to have spent more than five years on public assistance than members of the other three groups. These group differences were used as control variables when testing for program and method effects. There were no statistically significant differences among groups with respect to the likelihood that respondents were employed at the time of the interview.

² The multivariate analysis of program and method effects incorporated a series of four regression equations for each of the dependent variables. Respondents' answers regarding social interaction, neighboring, satisfaction, and other items represent the dependent variables in multiple regression equations in which the demographic questions and treatment group dummies are included as explanatory variables. In the first equation estimated for each dependent variable a single treatment/control group variable was used, coded "1" if the respondent was in either treatment group and "0" if the respondent was in either control group. These equations tested whether reports of current conditions varied across treatment and control groups. But they did not test for different treatment effects across treatment groups (i.e., method effects). Thus, a second set of equations was created in which two dummy variables were used, one coded "1" if the respondent was involuntarily displaced and another coded "1" if the respondent was in the voluntary group. These two variables were then examined for their impact relative to the third omitted category, the control group. This allowed a separate judgment of program effects for each of the two treatment groups. One could argue that these equations, in fact, test for both program and method differences simultaneously. If the coefficient for one of the treatment dummies reaches statistical significance when the coefficient for the other one does not, or when the signs for the two variables contrast, method effects could be said to exist. But to directly test the proposition that the coefficients for the two treatment groups differ, the equations were repeated, making the displaced group the omitted category. The statistical significance of the coefficient for the voluntary group in these equations indicates whether a method effect has occurred.

Finally, a fourth equation was estimated using the pre- and post-move responses, computed as change scores, for the two treatment groups. These change scores were the dependent variables in equations that included a single dummy variable (coded "1" if the family is among the displaced group and "0" if they are voluntary participants in the mobility program) and the same set of demographic variables previously described. (Control groups did not, of course, experience the "treatment"—which was to change residence—and thus they were not asked questions about any previous residence.) The coefficient for the treatment variable is yet another check for the existence of method effects.

Table 1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
Respondent Characteristics	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
Pct. African American	40	66	***	58	***	—	61	***	—
Pct. Southeast Asian	57	18	***	3	***	***	26	***	—
Pct. employed	36	48	—	45	—	—	39	—	—
Pct. on public assistance more than five years	47	20	***	31	**	—	26	***	—
Pct. less than high school education	44	31	—	30	**	—	31	*	—
Number of years at current address (mean)	1.9	1.5	—	3.8	***	***	5.4	***	***
Monthly income (mean)	\$1,131	\$1,352	*	\$1,110	—	*	\$1,028	—	**
Household size (mean)	4.95	4.98	—	3.19	***	***	4.28	*	—
Age of respondent (mean)	42	36	*	41	—	*	40	—	*
<i>n</i>	195	50		200			173		

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ based on χ^2 for numbers given in percentages, or on t-tests for differences in means.

There is another important way in which the sample subgroups differ—the length of time they have been at their current addresses. As expected, the treatment groups reported a much shorter period of residence at their current addresses (just less than two years) than did the control groups (just less than four years for the Section 8 group, and five and one-half years for the stay-at-home public housing group). For some items examined below, especially the neighboring behaviors and social experiences of respondents, length of time in residence was added to the demographic control variables listed above.

Neighborhood Characteristics

The primary objective of the deconcentration efforts in *Hollman* and other programs like it around the country is to improve the neighborhood conditions of poor families. Geo-coding of addresses allows analysis of the census characteristics of the neighborhoods inhabited by the survey respondents. The data presented in Tables 2 and 3 allow a judgment as to whether the socioeconomic conditions of deconcentrated families have improved. In Table 2, and in many of the tables that follow, the socioeconomic data are presented in columns a, b, d, and g. Table 2, for example, shows that the average neighborhood to which displaced families relocated had a 33.3% minority population, and 13.8% of the households were female-headed. Respondents who were voluntary mobility participants live in neighborhoods that average just 13.4% minorities and 6.8% female-headed households. Columns d and g present the same information for respondents in the Section 8 and public housing control groups. The rest of the columns indicate whether or not the differences between the groups are statistically significant.³ Column c reports the findings from the comparison of the two

³ For example, to indicate that the difference between the two groups has less than a 5% chance of being a random outcome, a single asterisk is used. Two asterisks indicates that there is a less than 1% chance of the difference being random, and three asterisks indicates the probability is less than 1 in 1000.

Table 2. Characteristics of Respondents' Current Neighborhoods

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
Neighborhood Characteristics	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
Pct. minority	33.3	13.4	***	34.9	—	***	44.3	***	***
Pct. no high school education	9.4	5.5	***	8.4	*	***	12.0	***	***
Pct. female-headed families	13.8	6.8	***	13.4	—	***	16.3	*	***
Pct. employed	70.3	77.8	***	70.6	—	***	72.9	*	*
Pct. on public assistance	15.7	7.6	***	17.1	—	***	21.3	***	***
Pct. children in poverty	34.5	14.3	***	40.0	*	***	58.5	***	***
Pct. population in poverty	24.3	9.5	***	25.7	—	***	29.6	***	***
Pct. very low income	32.6	17.3	***	36.3	*	***	42.8	***	***
Median household income	\$24,290	\$37,133	***	\$22,051	**	***	\$18,865	***	***
Pct. homeowners	53.6	72.6	***	42.7	***	***	29.6	***	***
Pct. low-rent units	17.8	7.9	***	19.0	—	***	22.5	**	***
Pct. low-value homes	71.7	44.9	***	71.6	—	***	60.7	***	**
Median home value	\$63,731	\$87,834	***	\$67,039	—	**	\$83,395	***	—
<i>n</i>	195	50		200			173		

Note: Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001 based on t-tests for differences in means.

Table 3. Pre- and Post-Move Neighborhood Characteristics for Treatment Groups

	Involuntary			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	<i>p</i>	Pre-move	Post-move	<i>p</i>
Pct. minority	85.4	33.1	***	42.4	13.4	***
Pct. with no high school degree	30.6	9.4	***	15.4	5.6	***
Pct. female-headed households	27.5	13.7	***	16.7	6.7	***
Pct. employed	39.5	70.3	***	63.3	77.4	***
Pct. on public assistance	55.3	15.7	***	27.7	7.7	***
Pct. of children below the poverty level	74.4	34.7	***	47.3	14.1	***
Pct. of population below the poverty level	68.2	24.4	***	38.2	9.4	***
Pct. very low income	71.7	32.7	***	45.2	17.4	***
Median household income	\$9,352	\$24,254	***	\$20,954	\$37,191	***
Pct. homeowners	7.5	53.4	***	31.9	73.3	***
Pct. units low-rent	73.6	17.7	***	37.8	8.1	***
Pct. homes low-value	94.2	71.4	***	60.1	45.1	***
Median value of homes	\$52,206	\$63,871	***	\$73,496	\$88,094	***
<i>n</i>	195			48		

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001 based on t-tests for differences in means.

treatment groups and is thus a direct examination of the method hypothesis. In Table 2, for example, the difference in average neighborhood racial makeup between the displaced and voluntary groups (as measured by the percentage of the population that is minority) is highly significant. This finding provides support for the method hypothesis, which suggests a differential experience in relocation across the two treatment groups. Columns e and f present the *p*-values for the comparison of the Section 8 group with the displaced and the voluntary

treatment groups, respectively. Thus, continuing the example and using the percentage of the population that is minority, one sees that the difference between the displaced and the Section 8 groups is not significant at the .05 level (column e), while the difference between the voluntary group and the Section 8 control group is highly significant. These findings suggest that the program hypothesis is not supported for the displaced group but is supported for the voluntary group. It also should be noted that such an example of a differential program effect is further evidence of a method effect. The final columns, h and i, repeat the analysis for the public housing control group. The shaded items indicate a significant relationship that is in the opposite direction predicted by the program hypothesis.

Table 2 indicates strong support for the method hypothesis (that there are differences between the displaced and the voluntary groups) and somewhat less consistent, although still strong, support for the program hypothesis (that there are differences between the treatment and control groups). Displaced families moved to neighborhoods with a higher percentage of minority residents on average compared to voluntary participants (33 to 13%). Displaced families are also located in neighborhoods with less income, on average, than families who voluntarily relocated. The percentage of families with very low incomes (less than \$15,000), the percentage of the adult population on public assistance, and the percentage of children and total residents living below the poverty level are all considerably higher for the neighborhoods of displaced families than for those of the voluntarily mobile. This is, of course, what would be expected given that voluntary participants were obliged by program rules to relocate to neighborhoods that had both minority and poverty concentrations below the threshold set by the consent decree. *Report No. 5: Relocation of Residents from North Side Public Housing* shows that 58% of displaced *Hollman* households remained within a three-mile radius of the north side site, 87% remained in the central city, and 50% moved to other neighborhoods that were characterized as minority concentrated, poverty concentrated, or both.

On most items, however, the displaced group is no different than the regular Section 8 control group (see Table 2, column e). Of the five items for which there is a statistically significant difference, one of them (percentage of the population lacking a high school degree, which is shaded in the table) is in the opposite direction to that predicted by the program hypothesis. Thus, there is only weak support for the program hypothesis in the case of the displaced Section 8 group comparison. There is more support for the program hypothesis, however, when the displaced group is compared to the stay-at-home public housing control group. Here all the differences are statistically significant, although 3 of the 13 are in the direction opposite of that expected.

In contrast, there is uniform and strong support for the program hypothesis when the voluntary group is considered. On average these families live in neighborhoods with significantly less economic disadvantage than either of the control groups. The only exception to this pattern is the lack of statistical significance for the difference in median value of homes

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in the neighborhoods of the voluntarily mobile and the stay-at-home public housing comparison group. The contrast in program effects for the two treatment groups (i.e., the fact that there is less consistent support for program effects for the displaced group) reinforces the finding that method effects exist.

For members of the treatment groups, the census tracts of their previous addresses were also analyzed so that a pre- and post-move comparison might be made. Without exception, both the voluntary and the displaced groups, on average, moved to neighborhoods that compared favorably with the areas in which they had previously lived. Differences in means tests for all of the neighborhood characteristics considered were significant for both groups (see Table 3).

Multivariate analysis indicates that the program effects endure, even with the introduction of control variables. Program effects occur across all measures for the voluntary group. For the displaced group, there are positive program effects on all measures except employment rate, percentage of low-rent units, percentage of low-value homes, and median value of homes. For this last measure, there is actually a negative program effect; that is, when controlling for demographic differences across groups, displaced households relocated to neighborhoods that had, on average, lower median home values than the neighborhoods inhabited by the control groups.

For most items, the magnitude of pre- to post-move changes for the displaced group is significantly greater than for the voluntary group. This reflects the extremely high levels of disadvantage that characterized the two census tracts from which the displaced families came. These two tracts were dominated by the more than 1000 units of public housing that existed on the 73-acre redevelopment site and thus the poverty, income, and minority statistics for that neighborhood were far out of line with those of any other neighborhood in the entire city.

The Housing Search

Deconcentration efforts typically involve poor families moving away from neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. Although the goal is for families to move to a better neighborhood, the act of searching for housing can be time-consuming and expensive. In this section we examine the moving process, the difficulties faced by families, and the choices they made.

Families who were involuntarily displaced reported looking at an average of just less than 5 housing units to make their choice. Voluntary participants, on average, looked at 3.92 different units (difference not statistically significant). Both of these figures are significantly more than the average public housing resident reported (1.85), reflecting the greater amount of choice available to these families. Section 8 program participants reported looking at 7.5 units during their most recent housing search. By far, the majority of the respondents in all of the groups (60 to 75%) reported looking at 4 or fewer units, while a smaller percentage within each group reported looking at more than 10 units.

Respondents were asked how difficult it was to find units that met certain criteria such as affordability, size, and safety. Table 4 shows the percentage of respondents who answered either “difficult” or “very difficult” to these questions. The data show virtually no difference in search difficulty between the involuntary and voluntary program participants. The absolute percentages of respondents who reported difficulties in the housing search is notable, however. For most items, between 60% and 66% of the respondents reported difficulty in the search process which, for most respondents, took place in an increasingly tight housing market in 1997 and 1998.

On several items, the program participants reported greater difficulties in the housing search than did the Section 8 and the public housing comparison groups. Both the involuntary and the voluntary groups found it harder to find a location near friends and family and near public transportation than did the Section 8 group. The involuntary group also reported more difficulty than both comparison groups in finding units that had enough space, and more difficulty than the public housing group in finding an affordable unit.

Controlling for other characteristics in the multivariate analysis shows that the racial makeup of the respondents was more important in determining housing search difficulties than was program group. Southeast Asian, African American, and Native American respondents were significantly more likely than White respondents to report difficulties in the housing search process (data not shown).

Location and Housing-Type Preferences

A large majority of program participants wanted to move into a single-family home (75% of the involuntary group and 70% of the voluntary group). There is, in fact, no real difference in the housing preferences of respondents across the four groups, except that

Table 4. Difficulties in the Housing Search Process

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
When you were looking for housing, how easy was it to find...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
a safe location?	62	62	—	66	—	—	55	—	—
a desirable area?	61	67	—	60	—	—	59	—	—
an affordable house or apartment?	63	61	—	61	—	—	55	**	—
adequate space?	66	50	*	54	**	—	42	***	—
a location near friends/family?	60	62	—	38	***	**	53	—	—
a location near public transportation?	34	30	—	15	***	***	23	***	—
a landlord willing to accept Section 8?	53	47	—	37	—	—	not applicable		
<i>n</i>	195	50		199			173		

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents who answered “difficult” or “very difficult.”

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Mann-Whitney U test.

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Section 8 participants were slightly less likely to mention single-family home as the preferred housing type and somewhat more likely to mention apartment building.

Among involuntary participants, 55% reported that they found a home in the location they wanted, compared to 58% of the voluntary group members. This is similar to the percentage for the Section 8 group (53%), but higher than that reported by the public housing control group. Only 44% of the public housing group reported finding a unit where they wanted. This finding suggests a slight benefit from the choice provided to program participants.

Most of the respondents focused their housing search in Minneapolis. More than two-thirds of the involuntary group (70%) looked for housing only in the central cities (overwhelmingly Minneapolis). This was identical to the percentage for the Section 8 group, and statistically similar to the 86% of public housing residents who likewise narrowed their search to the central cities. The exception to this pattern was the voluntary group, who were much more likely to include suburban communities in their housing searches. In fact, just 32% of voluntary participants looked only in the central cities, while 68% looked in the suburbs of the region. Voluntary mobility participants also were more likely to look outside the inner-ring suburbs for their housing (40% compared to only 9% of the involuntary group).

Reasons for Moving and Choosing Current Neighborhood

Respondents who were forced out of their public housing units due to the demolition of the north side projects were asked if they wanted to leave their old units. A total of 40% answered yes, while 60% indicated that they did not want to leave. The desire to stay in the old units was greatest among Southeast Asian residents, 73% of whom indicated they did not want to move (compared to only 43% of African American residents). Among those whose first language is not English, 75% did not want to move. Finally, 76% of the displaced respondents who had been on public assistance long-term (more than five years) also reported that they did not want to move.

All survey respondents were asked why they chose their new neighborhood. The results are listed in Table 5. The involuntary mobility and public housing respondents were most likely to say that they had no choice of the neighborhood to which they relocated. This is understandable for public housing residents who must go where there are vacancies in the Minneapolis public housing stock, but it is more difficult to understand for displaced families. These families had no programmatic restrictions placed on where they could relocate. However, given that it is the most frequently mentioned response for displaced families, it is clear that relocatees felt significantly constrained in their housing search.

The mobility choices of low-income families are constrained by a number of things, including their incomes, the availability of affordable housing, and the willingness of landlords to rent units to them. On the other hand, in some cases families make choices for

Table 5. Reasons for Choosing New Neighborhood

	(a)	(b)	(d)	(g)
Why did you choose to live in this neighborhood?	Displaced	Voluntary	Section 8	Public housing
No choice	38	23	15	39
It was affordable	8	7	16	10
It was familiar	1	3	5	1
Convenient to family/friends	16	4	20	10
Because of the house/apt.	7	11	10	12
Safety	4	14	5	4
It was a good neighborhood	23	33	22	19
<i>n</i>	195	50	199	173

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of all responses given by respondents in each category. Respondents could give multiple answers.

positive reasons—that is, they choose a neighborhood because of its positive attributes. It is possible to examine more closely the data in Table 5 to investigate the degree to which respondents listed as a reason for their choice of housing either a positive attribute or a constraint they faced during the housing search. The first three items listed in the table are constraints experienced by low-income families; that is, the families chose their current neighborhoods because they felt they had no choice, it was the only one they could afford to live in, or they limited themselves to areas with which they were familiar. The last three items in the table (the nature of the house, the safety of the neighborhood, and the quality of the neighborhood) represent positive attributes of the places they chose. The other item in the table, convenience and proximity to family and friends, might be a positive attribute for families with unlimited choice in the housing market. But very often for low-income families who need to be close to work, to a bus line, or to family and friends who help with childcare, such a response may represent another constraint on their house search.

We aggregated responses for the last three items in Table 5 to examine if any of the four groups reported these positive reasons for choosing their neighborhoods more frequently than other groups. In fact, there is a pattern to the responses. The involuntary group reported these positive neighborhood attributes 34% of the time, essentially the same rate at which the Section 8 and public housing comparison groups mentioned them (37% and 34%, respectively). Respondents who participated in the voluntary mobility portion of the *Hollman* settlement, however, mentioned these positive attributes 58% of the time. This suggests that they did not feel as constrained in their housing choice as the other groups and that they moved into neighborhoods because of positive elements that attracted them. The involuntary group felt significantly more constrained in their choices than did the voluntary group and their responses were, in fact, indistinguishable from the comparison groups' responses on this issue.

Children’s Experiences

Previous research in Chicago and other cities has shown that the children of poor families are among the beneficiaries of mobility programs that take poor families out of high-poverty neighborhoods. Changes are especially noticeable in the school environments of children and in their socialization patterns.

The questionnaire included a short series of questions about the experiences of children in their new neighborhoods. Table 6 shows the percentage of respondents who “agreed” or “somewhat agreed” with a series of statements about their children’s experiences in their new homes.⁴ The first three rows in this table deal with children’s experiences in school. Responses for these items support neither the program nor the method hypothesis. That is, there is no statistical difference between the responses of the displaced and the voluntary groups (indicating a lack of method effect), nor is there any statistically significant difference in response between either of the treatment groups and either of the control groups (indicating lack of program effects) for any of the three items. Furthermore, the multivariate analysis controlling for demographic differences across groups confirms the lack of program or method effects (data not shown).

Table 7 presents the pre-test/post-test differences in rankings for the two treatment groups.⁵ The findings for the first three items related to children’s school experiences reinforce the conclusion that neither program nor method effects occurred. For the displaced group there is only one significant change in pre- and post-move attitudes and that is in the wrong direction (respondents are less likely to agree that their children are receiving enough attention from their teachers post-move compared to what they felt was happening prior to their relocation). Among the voluntary group, there is no statistically significant change on any of the items.

Table 6. Children’s Experiences

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
My Child...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
likes school	84	78	—	78	—	—	83	—	—
does well in school	76	87	—	81	—	—	72	—	—
gets attention from teacher	82	85	—	70	—	—	79	—	—
has friends in neighborhood	53	73	*	66	—	—	53	—	*
plays with others in neighborhood	49	77	***	68	***	—	51	—	**
<i>n</i>	158	48		143			148		

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement. Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Mann-Whitney U test.

⁴ The test statistic is the Mann-Whitney U, which tests for differences in rankings across two independent samples.

⁵ The pre-to-post-test analysis tests for differences within a single population. Thus, the test statistic used is the Wilcoxin Signed Rank test.

Table 7. Children’s Experiences in School, Pre- and Post-Move for Treatment Groups

My Child...	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
likes school	89	84	—	87	78	—
does well in school	85	76	—	87	87	—
receives attention from teacher	88	82	*	74	85	—
has friends in the neighborhood	74	53	***	67	73	—
plays with others in the neighborhood	76	49	***	71	77	—

Note: Answers coded from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Wilcoxin Signed Rank test.

The final two items examined in Tables 6 and 7 relate to children’s social experiences. On these two items there are significant differences between the displaced and the voluntary group respondents. Compared to the voluntary mobility group, respondents who were displaced from their homes were significantly less likely to agree with the statements indicating their children have friends in their new neighborhoods and that their children play with others in the new neighborhood (see Table 6).

This method effect is also evident in Table 7. With respect to the pre- and post-move conditions, the mean responses of the displaced group change significantly (and in the “wrong” direction); however, there is no such change among respondents in the voluntary group. Taken together, the findings suggest that displaced respondents considered their children to be more socially isolated after their relocation than did those respondents who voluntarily relocated. When controlling for group differences, the method effect disappears for the item related to having friends in the neighborhood. The method effect remains, however, for the last item, “plays with others in the neighborhood” (data not shown).

There are contradictory program effects for the two items related to children’s social experiences. Respondents in the displaced group reported significantly less social interaction for their children on the last item (“plays with others in the neighborhood”) than did respondents in the Section 8 group (suggesting a negative program effect), but they are statistically indistinguishable from the public housing control group. On the other hand, the voluntary group is statistically indistinguishable from the Section 8 group and reported greater social interaction for children across both measures than did the public housing group.

The multivariate analysis for these two items (data not shown) indicates support for a program effect on both items for the voluntary group and a lack of program effect for the displaced group. The multivariate analysis also shows that Southeast Asian respondents consistently reported significantly less social interaction for their children.

Neighboring Behaviors

Among the hypothesized benefits of moving to lower poverty neighborhoods is the possibility of lower income families benefiting from the greater levels of social capital that exist in

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middle-class neighborhoods (Briggs 1998). As Briggs argues, there are two types of social capital that can benefit families: the type that helps them to *get by* on a daily basis (e.g., a ride somewhere, a cup of flour, or 30 minutes of informal childcare) and the type that helps them to *get ahead* (e.g., job tips, references, and connections). Either type of social capital exchange, of course, requires that people talk to their neighbors. In neighborhoods of concentrated poverty where, perhaps, high crime levels have driven people behind their doors, social capital exchanges can suffer. Furthermore, research has shown that in very poor neighborhoods, people's social networks are often smaller and more redundant than is the case in middle-class neighborhoods. This limits the formation of the social capital that allows people to better their situations. In this section, we examine the respondents' neighboring behaviors and social experiences.

Social Experiences

One in four respondents in the involuntary group reported getting help from neighbors when moving into their new home or apartment. This is slightly higher than the 14% of the voluntary mobility participants (a difference that is not statistically significant). One fourth of the involuntary group respondents also reported that they had been treated badly by a neighbor in their new neighborhood. Again, this is not significantly different from the voluntary group, in which mistreatment was reported by just less than one-third (32%) of respondents. It is difficult to say whether these numbers are high or low without comparable information about others (the comparison groups were not asked this question).

When respondents were categorized by race, the data show that African Americans were more likely to receive help moving in compared to the other racial groups, while Southeast Asian respondents were significantly less likely to receive help from neighbors (data not shown). There are no differences across racial categories in reported mistreatment from neighbors. This does not mean, however, that the mistreatment was not related to race. Indeed, 32% of those who gave a reason for their mistreatment at the hands of their new neighbors mentioned race. This did not vary by the location of the family; 32% of those living in the city who reported mistreatment by neighbors and gave a reason for it mentioned race, compared to 31% of those in the suburbs. Southeast Asian respondents were much more likely to mention race as the reason for troubles with neighbors than were African Americans (43% to 17%).

Respondents were also asked about the presence of friends and family in their current neighborhoods. Table 8 presents the results. The data show that two-thirds of the voluntary group (66%) report having made new friends in their neighborhoods, compared to only 43% of the involuntarily displaced families. In this respect the voluntarily mobile are similar to the Section 8 comparison group, in which 63% of respondents reported new friends in the neighborhood. The public housing comparison group falls somewhere in the middle and is not statistically different from the voluntary or the involuntary group.

The table also shows the proportion of new friends made by the respondents who are of the same race as the respondent. Interestingly, the Section 8 comparison group reports, on average, the highest percentage of same-race friends (73% of the new friends made by this group are same-race). Both the involuntary and voluntary mobility groups have significantly fewer same-race friends compared to the Section 8 group (54 and 45%, respectively). Once again, the public housing group is in between the extremes represented by the treatment groups and the Section 8 group.

There are few differences across the groups in the likelihood of having a close friend in the neighborhood or having family members living in the neighborhood. Voluntary mobility participants are less likely than the Section 8 group to report having a close friend in the neighborhood, and the involuntary group is actually more likely to report having a family member living nearby than the public housing group. None of the other differences between groups are statistically significant.

Neighboring and Community Involvement Behaviors

Respondents were asked how frequently they engage in a series of different neighboring behaviors and were asked to answer on a scale from “never” to “daily.” Tables 9 and 10 show the percentage of respondents who reported engaging in the behaviors more than two to four times a week. Table 9 reveals a mixed pattern of program effects, most of them negative. Displaced respondents reported being less likely than both control groups to have said hello to their neighbors, have talked with them for more than 10 minutes, had lunch or dinner with a neighbor, or have borrowed a neighbor’s car. It should be noted that except for the first two items in this table, the particular neighboring behaviors examined here were quite rare. Less than 10% (and in most cases less than 5%) of the respondents reported engaging in most of the behaviors listed. The two most common social interactions examined are verbal communications. Yet, on these two items, negative program effects occurred for the displaced group while no effects occurred for the voluntary group. These results indicate, at least preliminarily, a negative program effect—that is, deconcentration has

Table 8. Respondents’ Friends and Family in Current Neighborhood

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
Pct. with new friends in neighborhood	43	66	**	63	***	—	52	—	—
Pct. of new friends who are of same race as respondent	54	45	—	73	*	*	61	—	—
Pct. with close friends who live nearby	34	22	—	39	—	*	35	—	—
Pct. with family members who live nearby	41	24	*	32	—	—	26	**	—

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on χ^2 , except for the second item for which a difference in means test was used.

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Table 9. Neighboring Behaviors

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
In your neighborhood in the past six months, how often did you...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
say hello to your neighbors?	52	68	*	74	***	—	67	***	—
talk with neighbors for more than 10 minutes?	27	44	*	43	***	—	37	*	—
borrow things from your neighbors?	2	6	—	1	—	—	1	—	—
use your neighbor's telephone?	3	8	—	4	—	—	1	—	—
have lunch or dinner with your neighbors?	3	0	—	2	*	—	2	—	—
borrow your neighbor's car?	1	0	—	0	—	—	0	—	—
watch neighbor's child or have them watch yours?	5	10	—	7	*	—	7	—	—
<i>n</i>	195	50		199			173		

Note: Answers coded from 1 (daily) to 6 (never). Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents who reported engaging in the behaviors at least two to four times per week. Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ based on Mann-Whitney U test.

Table 10. Neighboring Behaviors, Pre- and Post-Move

In your neighborhood in the last six months, how often did you...	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
say hello to neighbors?	71	52	***	80	68	—
talk with neighbors?	52	27	***	60	44	**
borrow things from neighbors?	6	3	*	6	6	—
use neighbor's phone?	5	3	***	2	8	—
have lunch/dinner with neighbors?	3	3	**	2	0	—
borrow neighbor's car?	0	1	—	2	0	—
watch neighbor's child or have them watch yours?	11	5	**	6	10	—

Note: Answers coded from 1 (daily) to 6 (never). Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents who reported engaging in the behaviors at least two to four times per week. Shaded cells indicate a relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ based on Wilcoxin Signed Rank test.

reduced displaced respondents' neighboring behaviors and consequently increased their social isolation. Voluntary group respondents, on the other hand, show no difference from the control groups on any of the items.

Table 10 suggests more widespread negative program effects than does Table 9. For all items but one, the members of the displaced group show negative program effects—that is, less neighboring after their moves than before. This occurs for only a single item (talking with neighbors) among voluntary participants.

All respondents were asked whether they were involved in community or volunteer activities in their neighborhoods. The data are presented in Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 shows that members of the involuntary group are less involved in community activities than

are the voluntary movers, and are significantly less involved than the two comparison groups. One-third of displaced respondents reported being involved in community activities, compared to one-half of the voluntary group respondents, 54% of the Section 8 group, and 53% of the public housing group. Both treatment groups reported less volunteerism in their current neighborhoods compared to the Section 8 and public housing groups.

Table 12 shows the pre- to post-move changes in involvement among the two treatment groups. The data indicate a decline in community activity and volunteerism among the involuntarily displaced families, and no significant change among the voluntary group members. The displaced respondents reported that prior to moving, 44% were involved in community activities. After relocating, that figure was down to 33%. Likewise with volunteering: 27% reported doing so prior to moving, but only 12% reported volunteering in their new communities.

Together these tables show moderate to strong support for method effects. On two of the seven items examined in Table 9, for example, the displaced group reported less activity than the voluntary group. Displaced respondents reported talking with neighbors less frequently than did the voluntary group, and they reported using their neighbors' phones less frequently as well. The data in Tables 11 and 12 show similar differences between the voluntary and involuntary groups.

Table 11. Community Activities of Respondents

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
In this neighborhood, have you or your children been...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
involved in community activities?	33	50	*	54	***	—	53	***	—
a volunteer for any organization?	12	10	—	26	***	*	28	***	*
<i>n</i>	195	50		200			173		

Note: Figures in cells are percentage of respondents answering “yes.” Shaded cells indicate a relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis.

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on χ^2 .

Table 12. Community Activities of Respondents, Pre- and Post-Move

In this neighborhood, have you or your children been...	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
involved in community activities?	44	33	*	52	50	—
a volunteer for any organization?	27	12	**	22	10	—
<i>n</i>	195	195		50	50	

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents answering “yes.” Shaded cells indicate a relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis.

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on χ^2 .

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Neighboring behaviors, however, are arguably an area that could be highly dependent upon demographic characteristics, and thus final judgment depends on a multivariate analysis that controls for the important differences across groups. Indeed, multivariate analysis provides almost no support for either program or method effects. When controlling for other items, differences across treatment groups and between treatment and control groups disappear for all but one item—the use of a neighbor’s telephone, which remains more common for the voluntary group relative to the control groups. Most important in determining these neighboring behaviors was whether or not the family was Southeast Asian (Southeast Asian families being less likely to report neighboring across most of the items) and the age of the respondent (who was also the head of household—older respondents reported less social interaction). The length of time a respondent had lived in his or her current home was not significantly related to any of the social interaction items when treatment groups were compared to control groups, but it was important in explaining the change from pre-to post-move levels. The longer a family had been at their new location, the more likely they were to report an increase in neighboring compared to when they lived in their previous neighborhoods.

It could be argued that an increase in social activity is too much to expect of a program that moves people out of their current communities and into new ones that are often quite distant geographically and socially. Some might argue that the lack of a negative program effect for most social interaction items is the most that could be expected and is actually an encouraging finding. The social capital argument, however, assumes some level of meaningful contact between the deconcentrated families and their new, more affluent neighbors. The data reported here suggest that for the involuntarily displaced group, the frequency of social interactions has diminished after moving. The increase in social isolation was greatest among Southeast Asians.

Closer examination of the voluntary group reveals significant differences in neighboring behaviors between those living in replacement housing and those who used the mobility certificates (data not shown). These two groups have been aggregated in the analysis thus far, but for the indicators of social isolation there are important distinctions. Those living in replacement housing report significantly higher levels of neighboring on most items. This is, in all likelihood, due to the nature of the replacement units. Although the replacement units were located in nonpoverty- or nonminority-concentrated parts of the metropolitan area at the time the survey was conducted, all of the replacement units were in fairly large subsidized projects. In contrast, families using mobility certificates were typically in market-rate apartment buildings. The voluntary group members who were living in replacement units, then, were living in mini-environments that mirrored (at least in income profile) the communities from which they came. The social interactions they reported are unlikely to be with higher income residents. Their immediate neighbors are also residents of subsidized housing. Thus, there is some concern that the social interactions necessary to activate the social capital effects described above may not be occurring for these families, and that some

of the findings reported here are an artifact of this situation. Unfortunately, the size of these subgroups is too small to permit further analysis at this time.

As another test of the social experiences of deconcentrated families, we examined the possibility that program participants were uncomfortable with racial dynamics in their new communities. When asked how satisfied they were with the racial makeup of their current neighborhoods, treatment group respondents did not differ from the control groups and the displaced group members actually reported greater satisfaction post-move than they had prior to moving (data not shown). Furthermore, when asked whether racial intolerance was a problem in their neighborhoods, the displaced group reported it to be less of a problem in their new neighborhoods, and they reported it to be less of a problem compared to both control groups. There were no effects, either across groups or across time for the voluntary group. These findings are corroborated by multivariate analysis.

Neighborhood Satisfaction

Given the significant change in the socioeconomic characteristics of their new neighborhoods (shown in Tables 2 and 3), it is plausible that both the voluntary and involuntary mobility participants would report significant increases in neighborhood satisfaction. Respondents were asked about the degree to which they were satisfied with eight separate neighborhood characteristics. The data are shown in Tables 13 and 14. There is only sporadic and inconsistent evidence for program effects related to neighborhood satisfaction. Both of the treatment groups, for example, rated the bus service in their neighborhoods less positively than did the Section 8 control group, but rated the schools more positively. The displaced group rated bus service less positively than did the public housing control group, and rated the proximity of healthcare lower than both control groups. On the other hand, significant and positive program effects occurred for satisfaction with neighborhood grocery stores and parks, although the difference for the displaced vs. Section 8 group comparisons does not reach statistical significance.

The pre- and post-move differences shown in Table 14 are also inconsistent. On only one of the eight items (bus service) did both the displaced and the voluntary groups show significant change in the same direction. On another three items, both groups showed no change, and for the remaining three items there was significant change in one group and not the other. The complexity of this pattern suggests the highly differential nature of the components of neighborhood satisfaction. Bus service was less satisfying in the new neighborhoods for both groups. Proximity to friends and family and to healthcare was less satisfying to the displaced group over time, but not so for the voluntary group, and so on. Three of the four program effects for displaced respondents are actually negative, indicating that when change occurred on these items it generally was not for the better.

Multivariate analysis on all of these items suggests that when demographic differences are controlled, consistent and positive program effects for both treatment groups occur only

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Table 13. Neighborhood Satisfaction

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
How satisfied are you with...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
bus service in the neighborhood?	75	64	—	86	***	***	77	*	—
schools in the neighborhood?	77	77	—	60	**	*	72	—	—
nearness to place of worship?	56	49	—	57	—	—	49	—	—
nearness to friends?	58	72	—	60	—	—	59	—	—
nearness to healthcare?	76	65	—	80	*	—	81	*	—
childcare in the neighborhood?	44	63	—	40	—	—	48	—	—
grocery stores in neighborhood?	86	84	—	69	***	**	62	***	***
parks and playgrounds in neighborhood?	76	88	—	70	—	*	66	*	*
<i>n</i>	195	50		199			173		

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents answering “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Mann-Whitney U test.

Table 14. Neighborhood Satisfaction, Pre- and Post-Move

How satisfied are you with...	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
bus service in neighborhood?	81	75	*	85	64	*
schools in neighborhood?	81	77	—	79	77	—
nearness to place of worship?	57	56	—	66	49	—
nearness to friends?	76	58	***	76	72	—
nearness to healthcare?	85	76	*	82	65	—
childcare in neighborhood?	47	44	—	62	63	—
grocery stores in neighborhood?	81	86	*	72	84	—
parks and playgrounds in neighborhood?	74	76	—	59	88	**

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents answering “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Wilcoxin Signed Rank test.

for the grocery store and parks items (data not shown). The voluntary group experienced a negative program effect for satisfaction with bus service. The analysis also indicates method effects for satisfaction with bus service and proximity to place of worship. In both cases, the voluntary group registered less satisfaction than displaced families. These findings are consistent with the fact that voluntary group members are more geographically scattered than are the displaced households due to the restriction that they relocate to nonconcentrated neighborhoods. Taken together, these items indicate that neighborhood satisfaction is not a monolithic concept, especially as it relates to families recently relocated from very poor neighborhoods. Program participants saw significant improvements in some elements of their new neighborhoods, but also registered less satisfaction with other elements.

Neighborhood Problems

The program hypothesis suggests that families who move out of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty will report a significant reduction in a range of visible, problematic neighborhood conditions. Tables 15 and 16 reveal that this is the case for the *Hollman* families. Table 15 shows a pattern of consistent support for the program hypothesis. On all items and for all comparisons, the two treatment groups reported fewer neighborhood problems (graffiti, public drinking, drug use, and abandoned buildings) than did the control groups. For example, only 13% of the displaced group and 18% of the voluntary group reported that drug use is a problem in their neighborhoods, compared to 47% of the Section 8 group and 33% of the public housing respondents.

Furthermore, the data in Table 16 suggest that program effects occurred for both treatment groups. The pre- to post-move differences are large and significant for all items. For example, 39% of the displaced group rated graffiti a problem in their old neighborhoods, compared to just 9% in their new neighborhoods. The percentage of voluntary group respondents who rated graffiti as a problem dropped from 32% pre-move to just 4% after the move. The patterns shown for these items in Tables 15 and 16 represent the best-case scenario for deconcentration programs. That is, there are large and statistically significant differences between the treatment and control groups in their assessments of their current neighborhoods (see Table 15), and there are large pre- to post-move improvements for both

Table 15. Severity of Neighborhood Problems

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
In your neighborhood, how much of a problem is...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
graffiti?	9	4	—	17	***	***	11	**	**
public drinking?	19	12	—	39	***	***	29	**	*
drug use?	13	18	—	47	***	***	33	***	**
abandoned buildings?	9	12	—	27	***	**	16	*	*
<i>n</i>	195	50		199			173		

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents answering “moderate problem” or “major problem.”

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Mann-Whitney U test.

Table 16. Severity of Neighborhood Problems, Pre- and Post-Move

In your neighborhood, how much of a problem is...	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
graffiti?	39	9	***	32	4	***
public drinking?	48	19	***	50	12	***
drug use?	44	13	***	51	18	***
abandoned buildings?	31	9	***	34	12	**

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents answering “moderate problem” or “major problem.”

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Wilcoxin Signed Rank test.

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of the treatment groups (see Table 16). This pattern indicates consistently positive program effects and the absence of any method effects.

The multivariate analysis reproduces the pattern of uniform support for the program hypothesis. Controlling for the demographic differences between groups, the treatment group as a whole, and the two treatment subgroups separately, report significantly fewer of these neighborhood problems than did the control groups (data not shown). In addition, as in the bivariate analysis, there were no differences in the magnitude of pre- to post-move change across the two treatment groups.

Housing Satisfaction

In addition to questions about their neighborhoods, respondents were asked to evaluate their housing units. They were asked to evaluate satisfaction with their housing units generally, and with the size, cost, and quality/condition of their homes or apartments. The analysis shows weak to moderate support for the program hypothesis. Both treatment groups report higher housing satisfaction than both control groups (see Table 17). There seem to be no program effects related to the size of the unit and contradictory effects related to cost. Voluntary group members reported significantly higher satisfaction with housing cost than did the Section 8 control group, but the displaced group reported significantly less satisfaction with cost than did the public housing group. This latter finding can be explained by the fact that all of the displaced families came from public housing where their rents were limited to 30% of their incomes and utilities were included. After displacement, most families had moved out of public housing and had been faced with either a down payment or rent deposit and with paying for their utilities.

Another interesting pattern seen in Table 17 is the relatively low satisfaction of regular Section 8 households with the quality and condition of their units relative to all of the other groups, both treatment and control. The data here suggest that either these units do not compare favorably on quality and condition with public housing, replacement housing, and

Table 17. Housing Satisfaction

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
How satisfied are you with...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
your home in general?	80	84	*	66	**	**	73	—	*
the size of your home?	80	78	—	74	—	—	8	—	—
the cost of your home?	75	86	*	70	—	*	87	***	—
the quality of your home?	78	84	—	60	***	***	77	—	—
<i>n</i>	195	50		199			173		

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents answering “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ based on Mann-Whitney U test.

even the housing to which displaced families relocate, or that Section 8 participants had higher expectations for the quality of their units that are not being met.

Table 17 shows evidence of a slight method effect for overall housing satisfaction and for cost of housing. In both cases, the voluntary group reported higher levels of satisfaction than did the displaced group. For example, although the percentage of those in both groups satisfied with their housing and with the cost of their housing is high (more than 75% in all cases), it is slightly higher among the voluntary group members. Table 18 shows even more evidence in support of the method hypothesis. Although both treatment groups show positive change in satisfaction with their homes in general and with the quality of their homes, the magnitude of the change is much greater for the voluntary group. In addition, the voluntary group shows significantly greater satisfaction with the size of their homes from pre- to post-move, while the displaced group shows no difference. Finally, the voluntary group is more satisfied with the cost of their housing post-move, while the displaced group is actually significantly less satisfied than they had been.

These findings are reinforced by the multivariate analysis. The treatment group as a whole is more satisfied than the control group in general housing satisfaction and in housing quality when all demographic variables are introduced. But variable effects are evident for the two treatment groups on housing cost and quality. The analysis shows greater pre- to post-move changes for the voluntary group on all four housing satisfaction measures (data not shown).

Safety

The questionnaire also elicited information on respondents’ sense of safety in their new neighborhoods. Table 19 presents some of the data on perceptions of safety. On three items there is evidence of strong program effects. *Hollman* families reported feeling safer in their current neighborhoods than did the comparison group members, they were more satisfied with the level of safety in their neighborhoods, and they reported that their children feel safer in their new neighborhoods. For example, 78% of the displaced group and 90% of the voluntary group reported feeling safe in their current neighborhood, compared to just 64% of the Section 8 group and 63% of the public housing group. There is also slight evidence of method effects, as the voluntary group members reported slightly higher perceptions of

Table 18. Housing Satisfaction, Pre- and Post-Move

How satisfied are you with...	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
your home in general?	72	80	*	46	84	***
the size of your home?	77	80	—	64	78	*
the cost of your home?	88	75	***	62	86	**
the quality of your home?	72	78	*	48	84	***

Note: Figures in cells are the percentage of respondents answering “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Shaded cells indicate a negative program effect (i.e., a statistically significant relationship that is opposite of the direction posited by the program hypothesis).

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Wilcoxin Signed Rank test.

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safety than did the involuntary group members on two items. There are no differences across any of the groups on perceptions of how safe children feel at school (although the percentages are uniformly high across the groups).

The pre- to post-move comparison reinforces the notion that the move made by *Hollman* families resulted in a greater sense of safety (see Table 20). The voluntary group members reported greater sense of safety on three items compared to their previous place of residence. The percentage of voluntary group members who reported feeling safe in their neighborhoods rose from 54 to 90%, while the percentage who reported that their children feel safe in the neighborhood rose from 46 to 87% after the move. The involuntary group reported feeling safer and being more satisfied with the safety of their neighborhood, but no change occurred relative to the sense of safety among their children.

All of the multivariate tests reinforce the existence of program effects and the absence of method effects. Thus, the personal safety issues present close to a best-case scenario for the *Hollman* deconcentration effort. Even in these matters of safety, however, there seem to be some differences in the benefits realized by the voluntary and involuntary participants.

Table 19. Respondents' Perception of Safety

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
Pct. who feel safe in current neighborhood	78	90	—	64	***	***	63	***	***
Pct. satisfied with safety of current neighborhood	74	88	*	57	***	***	57	***	***
Pct. reporting their children feel safe in current neighborhood	69	87	*	59	*	***	55	**	***
Pct. reporting their children feel safe in school	90	87	—	79	—	—	81	—	—
<i>n</i>	195	50		199			173		

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Mann-Whitney U test.

Table 20. Perceptions of Safety, Pre- and Post-Move

	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
Pct. who feel safe in current neighborhood	63	78	***	54	90	***
Pct. satisfied with safety of current neighborhood	59	74	**	44	88	***
Pct. reporting their children feel safe in current neighborhood	65	69	—	46	87	***
Pct. reporting their children feel safe in school	89	90	—	87	87	—

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on Wilcoxin Signed Rank test.

Victimization

Respondents were also asked whether they or their neighbors had been the victim of a crime in the previous six months. Table 21 presents the findings. Rows 1 through 3 indicate the percentage of respondents in each treatment or control group who reported having been a victim of the crime listed. Rows 4 and 5 show the percentage of respondents who reported that their neighbors have been the victim of the crime listed. The bottom two rows are summary indices. The first, labeled VICTIM, indicates the percentage of respondents who reported any of the crimes listed in rows 1 through 3. This variable is a measure of whether or not the respondent (or his or her children) was the direct victim of one of the crimes listed. The second summary variable, EXPOSURE, is a summary of rows 1 through 5, and thus measures whether the respondent was a direct victim or had a neighbor who was a direct victim.

The table shows no difference between the two treatment groups, and a sporadic tendency for the two treatment groups to report lower levels of victimization and exposure to crime than the Section 8 and the public housing comparison groups. This is especially evident when the two summary variables are examined. A total of 22% of the Section 8 group and 16% of the public housing group reported being the direct victims of one of the crimes listed, compared to only 8% of the involuntary group and 6% of the voluntary group. Similarly, 36% of the Section 8 group and 35% of the public housing group reported being exposed to the crimes listed either directly or through a neighbor, compared to only 16% of the involuntary group and 9% of the voluntary group. These data reinforce the perceptual data reported in Tables 19 and 20.

The pre- to post-move changes, shown in Table 22, indicate greater reduction in crime victimization and exposure among the involuntary group, although the voluntary group

Table 21. Exposure to Crime and Victimization

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
In the past six months has/have...	Displaced	Voluntary	a-b p value	Section 8	a-d p value	b-d p value	Public housing	a-g p value	b-g p value
your home been broken into?	4	2	—	10	*	—	9	—	—
you been robbed or attacked?	1	0	—	4	—	—	2	—	—
your children been robbed or attacked?	3	4	—	10	*	—	5	—	—
your neighbor's home been broken into?	7	6	—	20	***	*	20	***	*
your neighbors been robbed or attacked?	5	0	—	6	—	—	10	—	—
VICTIM (1-3)	8	9	—	22	***	*	16	*	—
EXPOSURE (1-5)	16	6	—	36	***	**	35	***	**
<i>n</i>	195	50		199			173		

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on χ^2 .

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also shows improvement on some items. Interestingly, the only pre- to post-move improvements among the voluntary group members are related to their neighbors' victimization, not their own.

Employment

It has been argued that the deconcentration of the poor out of disadvantaged central-city neighborhoods has a positive impact on their ability to get jobs. This is thought to be directly related to the greater availability of jobs in less disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also indirectly related to social capital effects (see Briggs 1998; Wilson 1997). Data from the *Hollman* survey indicate that 36% of the displaced respondents were employed at the time of the interview, compared to 48% of the voluntary respondents, 45% of the Section 8 control group, and 39% of the public housing control group. None of the intergroup differences are statistically significant. Although just more than 15% of the treatment group members gained a job after moving, just less than 15% currently do not have a job but had one before moving. The large majority of treatment group members have seen no change in their employment status since moving.

Members of the displaced group were more likely than members of the voluntary group to have gained a job since moving (16% compared to 8%). A significantly lower percentage of displaced group members were employed at the time they moved compared to the voluntary group (32% to 64%). Of those currently unemployed, 79% of the displaced group have never had a job since moving, compared to just 58% of the voluntary group.

Members of the voluntary group reported a significantly higher mean wage level than did the displaced group (\$9.76 per hour compared to \$8.59 per hour). The displaced group's mean wage level is also significantly lower than that of the Section 8 control group (\$9.60 per hour), although not statistically different from the public housing group. There are no statistically significant differences between the voluntary group and either of the two control groups on wages.

There are no other program or method effects for any of the other measures of employment quality examined. The average hours worked per week, the commute (measured in the number of minutes it takes to get to work), and the prospects for moving up in the job do

Table 22. Exposure to Crime and Victimization, Pre- and Post-Move

	Displaced			Voluntary		
	Pre-move	Post-move	p	Pre-move	Post-move	p
Home has been broken into	13	4	**	14	2	—
Have been robbed or attacked	7	1	**	6	0	—
Children have been robbed or attacked	7	3	—	6	4	—
Neighbor's home has been broken into	27	7	***	32	6	**
Neighbors have been robbed or attacked	16	5	**	23	0	**
VICTIM (1-3)	20	8	**	17	6	—
EXPOSURE (1-5)	35	16	**	36	9	**

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 based on χ^2 .

not differ from one group to the next (data not shown). Nor are there differences across any of the groups in the likelihood of members to have more than one job, be a salaried employee, or have health benefits (data not shown).

Multivariate analysis on employment quality measures shows a consistent lack of program effects across all subgroup comparisons and for all items. In addition, a multivariate analysis of the likelihood of being employed at the time of the survey interview also shows no program effects. The treatment group as a whole, and the displaced and voluntary groups separately, were no more likely to be employed than the control groups and no more likely to have higher quality employment (as measured by hours worked, wage level, commuting time, and opportunity for moving up).

In sum, displaced group members were much less likely to have been employed at the time of relocation than members of the voluntary mobility group. They were, however, more likely to gain a job after their move. However, for those unemployed at the time of the interview, members of the displaced group were more likely to never have had a job since moving. The rate of employment post-move is not different across the treatment groups and is not different from the rates for the two control groups. Furthermore, there is no difference between the treatment and control groups on any of the measures of job quality. This lack of program effect, shown across all measures, is confirmed by the multivariate analysis.

SUMMARY

On the whole, the findings presented here are mixed concerning the impacts of both voluntary and forced mobility. Several patterns emerge from the preceding analysis. First, there is only a sporadic pattern of support for the program hypothesis that participants in the deconcentration effort (either voluntary or involuntary) will report improvements in their living conditions and will report better conditions than a control group of similarly situated but not dispersed public housing residents.

Second, program effects tend to be the largest and most consistent on the issues related to personal safety and neighborhood incivility. That is, when asked about their own sense of safety and the safety of their children, both the displaced and the voluntary group members reported significant improvements in their post-move neighborhoods relative to their own pre-move residence and relative to the control groups. This pattern was repeated for items related to the existence of “street problems” such as public drinking, drug use, and graffiti. What deconcentration has unequivocally done for families is to allow them to feel more at ease about these issues. These findings are consistent with others reported for the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program (HUD 1999) and among households deconcentrated in Yonkers (Briggs 1998).

Third, there is little support for the program hypothesis in two areas where it could have been expected: neighborhood satisfaction and employment experience. Neighborhood satisfaction was seen to be highly variable, with program respondents reacting favorably to some

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aspects of their new communities and unfavorably to others. For the majority of items, however, there was simply no effect either way. Research on MTO and *Gautreaux* has also shown that dispersed families register lower levels of satisfaction with some public services such as transportation and access to healthcare after making a move to their new neighborhoods. Yet previous research indicates much greater *overall* satisfaction with the new neighborhoods among dispersed families. The survey instrument used to collect data in the Minneapolis case, however, did not include an overall question about neighborhood satisfaction. Instead of requesting a summary judgment of the neighborhood, we asked about a number of specific elements related to neighborhood environments. The findings in Minneapolis reinforce the conclusion that neighborhood satisfaction is a multidimensional concept, parts of which may be enhanced by dispersal and other parts that may be damaged by it.

Similarly, there were no employment effects resulting from the moves that families made. The Twin Cities economy during the period of the interviews was extremely strong, yet the deconcentrating moves that these families made did not translate into a significant improvement in labor force participation or in the quality of jobs held. For the involuntarily displaced, most of whom did not move out of the central city, relocation did not, perhaps, put them in any greater proximity to areas of job growth in the region. But the data also show that the voluntary group members, most of whom relocated to suburban areas, also did not seem to reap any employment benefits from the move.

Fourth, the lack of program effects for some items is not necessarily a failing. With respect to measures of social isolation, it is perhaps too much to expect, as the program hypothesis suggests, that dispersed families will actually increase their neighboring behaviors. In fact, if these families can make the transition to their new neighborhoods and not report significantly less social interaction, then this constitutes good news for the program. As argued earlier, the social capital arguments for deconcentration of poverty require some level of social interaction between the program families and their new neighbors. When controlling for individual differences across groups, there were essentially no program or method effects detected. Thus, the summary judgment must be that the program did not reduce or increase social interaction among participants.

Fifth, there was fairly consistent support across a number of items for the method hypothesis that families forced into deconcentration would report fewer benefits from their moves. This pattern emerged for items related to the social interaction of children and several items regarding neighborhood and housing satisfaction. In these areas, the voluntarily mobile report a happier scenario than do the displaced households. This is, of course, the area of concern for which there is no real precedent in the literature. This analysis represents the first direct comparison of voluntary and involuntary means of deconcentration and suggests that there is a difference on many items.

CONCLUSION

The findings reported here indicate somewhat less widespread support for the program hypothesis than that reported for MTO, *Gautreaux*, or other mobility programs operating elsewhere. There are several potential explanations for this. First, these results are based on the short-term experiences of the families studied. Most of the families dispersed as a result of the *Hollman* decree have lived in their new neighborhoods for less than two years. This may account for the lack of program effect in some areas. Employment provides a good example. It is unlikely that the only barrier to employment faced by *Hollman* families is spatial mismatch. Merely relocating to areas where jobs may be more plentiful may not be enough to generate substantial increases in rates of employment. Even if this were so, the majority of those displaced by the demolition of units did not, in fact, move out to suburban locations. Most relocatees stayed within a three-mile radius of their old addresses. If more indirect neighborhood effects (such as role model effects, greater access to employment and training, or benefits from different social networks) are to generate greater levels of employment, these will take more time to work.

Nevertheless, at the time of the interview, many treatment group members had been in their new apartments for several years. We incorporated length of residence as a control variable in our multivariate analysis, and the data did not indicate that it had an effect on the degree of social interaction or on employment efforts.

Second, most previous studies are of voluntary mobility or scattered-site programs in which families choose to participate. The very fact of participation for the families examined in other studies suggests selection bias. These families are either more motivated, less dysfunctional, or more dissatisfied with their previous living conditions than are nonparticipants. Inclusion of involuntary participants is bound to reduce the level and scope of program effects. Although this explanation may account for fewer overall program effects, it does not explain the fact that even among voluntary participants program effects are more sporadic than what is reported in other studies.

Third, the *Hollman* deconcentration includes a sizable immigrant population that is not typical of other dispersal efforts. The large Southeast Asian population in Minneapolis public housing was strongly critical of demolition and relocation. For the most part, they did not want to move, and their post-move experiences have been less positive than those of others. Like the previous explanation, however, this one does not account for the more sporadic effects experienced by voluntary participants.

It could be that the neighborhood conditions experienced by those in Minneapolis were not as bad prior to deconcentration as those experienced by subsidized families in other cities. Although one might argue that the extent of central city neighborhood problems is not as severe in Minneapolis as it is in Chicago, Baltimore, and other cities in which mobility studies have occurred, the data presented in Table 1 suggest that program participants

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did experience significant improvements in objective neighborhood conditions (as revealed by census data) after moving.

What is probably most meaningful in the Minneapolis case is the distinction between voluntary and involuntary means of deconcentration. On one hand, it could be argued that the *Hollman* case provides a rigorous test for the method hypothesis. This is because the conditions from which the displaced families came—the two census tracts that make up the 73-acre site where the public housing was torn down—were extreme in comparison to the rest of the city. Even the worst of the other neighborhoods in Minneapolis and St. Paul did not come close to the concentrations of poverty and disadvantage that characterized the original project site for displaced families. Thus, even though they were less likely to go to suburban areas and even though they relocated to areas with greater disadvantages than did the voluntary group, displaced families did experience significant improvements in neighborhood conditions across the board. By this argument, the fact that any method effects showed up at all suggests a significant problem for policy makers.

On the other hand, the displacement of families from the project site in 1998 and 1999 was accompanied by a prolonged political fight, and it took place in the midst of an affordable housing crisis in the region. The notoriety of the case may have heightened families' awareness and resentment of their plight and could have led to either a more critical evaluation of their new environments or a more romantic assessment of their previous residences. Furthermore, the *Hollman* case involved the displacement of a large population of recent Southeast Asian immigrants, more than half of whom did not wish to leave their north side homes. The multivariate analysis demonstrated in many cases that in this population, and among older families, relocation was a less beneficial experience. In this scenario, then, there is some surprise that there were not more method effects revealed by the analysis.

On balance, the evidence from the *Hollman* case in Minneapolis highlights the strengths and weaknesses of poverty deconcentration strategies. Families can be moved to "better" neighborhoods, and they can come to feel at ease about some aspects of those neighborhoods. But the experiences of these families are not universally positive. This is especially the case for families whose moves are forced by the demolition or conversion of their previous homes. The method effects demonstrated in this analysis suggest that mobility programs are best kept voluntary. This, of course, has direct implications for the continued vouchering out of older subsidized projects as well as for the HOPE VI program, both of which incorporate involuntary deconcentration. The limits of involuntary deconcentration are twofold. First, many families may not wish to move out and will experience post-move problems because of that. Second, displaced families tend not to move to neighborhoods as far away (in both social and spatial terms) as their original neighborhoods. In the Minneapolis case, half of the displaced households moved to other neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, and a high percentage moved to neighborhoods that were becoming poorer and more minority over time.

The Minneapolis case also provides some evidence for the difficulties of implementing voluntary programs. In Minneapolis, more than four years after the signing of the consent decree in *Hollman v. Cisneros*, less than 50 replacement units had been built (out of a required 770)—this, in a region with a metropolitan governance body and a history of regional cooperation. Political resistance to scattered-site subsidized housing makes the replacement housing strategy difficult (see *Report No. 8: Replacement Housing*), and as slow as it has been in Minneapolis, studies suggest it is even slower elsewhere (Popkin et al. 2000).

In addition, fewer than 50 mobility certificates had been successfully leased up (out of more than 700 made available) during the first five years of the program. The use of mobility vouchers in the *Hollman* case has been hampered by market conditions. An extremely tight housing market has rendered the mobility voucher as useful as “confederate money” in the words of one local housing advocate (“Lucille’s Kitchen Cooks *Hollman*” 1999).

U.S. housing policy has been firmly committed to deconcentrating poverty during the past 10 years. The demolition and decommissioning of large concentrations of public and publicly subsidized housing might be justified by the improvements produced in those communities. It could be the case that reducing those concentrations of poverty leads to the reintroduction of private capital investment in those communities. Coupled with renewed public sector attention, these neighborhoods might become revitalized and problems of crime, delinquency, and joblessness might be reduced. Whether this is, in fact, the case is a matter for other studies (and is the subject of ongoing HUD evaluations of the HOPE VI program). The evidence presented here on the *Hollman* case in Minneapolis suggests that the other justification for such action, the contention that the displaced and relocated families will experience benefits from the process, is problematic.

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