



Issue Linkage in the Climate Regime: Gender Policies in Climate Finance

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Abstract

Multiple international agreements, such as the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, express the norms of respecting and promoting the human rights of women and men and advancing gender equality. Studies show that climate change has disproportionate impacts on women due to socioeconomic status, restrictive gender norms, and lack of access to resources and services, but also that including women as stakeholders in planning and implementation leads to improved project outcomes. These findings highlight the need for specific and direct mechanisms for empowering women to enhance their position and efficiently support climate change mitigation and adaptation. Most major climate funds have adopted gender policies over the last decade in the interest of increasing gender equality. These funds control billions of dollars of bilateral and multilateral finance intended to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change, which gives them a unique position in translating gender policies into action. However, the gender policies of climate funds have been developed relatively recently, and it is unclear the extent to which they have been successful in advancing gender equality and enhancing the effectiveness of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation.

Here we explore the history of gender mainstreaming in international development policy to ground the discussion of current gender mainstreaming efforts in climate finance. We then critically examine the linkage of gender and climate itself to understand why gender mainstreaming is occurring in this field and to what extent the linkage of gender to climate is appropriate and/or useful. We provide a high-level comparison of existing multilateral and bilateral gender policies, and end with open questions and key takeaways as climate funds move from policy to implementation. Although our focus is primarily on the issue linkage of gender equality and climate change, gender is only one of dozens of fields being linked to climate, and therefore the conclusions are framed around both issue linkage broadly and the gender-climate linkage specifically.

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1. Introduction

At the international policy and institutional level, the goal of gender equality has been increasingly linked with climate change under the assumption that this issue linkage will create important synergies and co-benefits in climate adaptation and mitigation actions. However, there is some concern that the simultaneous pursuit of multiple objectives across many actors, policy areas, and institutions will dilute the responsibility, coordination, and efficiency in working towards climate change goals. Additional objectives need more resources, technical capacity, and coordination among increasingly complicated networks in order to achieve co-benefits, or risk diverting resources from primary objectives such as climate change mitigation and adaptation. While the logic and practice of the gender-climate linkage has been critiqued, it has become prominent in international climate change institutions. The institutions that provide finance for developing countries to address their climate change challenges (e.g. UN climate funds, World Bank climate funds, various bilateral aid funds) play a unique role in translating the gender-climate linkage into practice both by incorporating gender equality goals into a set of cross-cutting social and environmental objectives and by directing funding towards projects that have a clear climate and gender focus. Over the last 15-20 years, these funds have increasingly adopted specific gender policies guiding their governance, project selection, project support and implementation, and measurement and evaluation practices. Such policies aim to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of both gender and climate outcomes, but little has been done to evaluate the capacity of climate change institutions to realize both gender and climate goals or to understand how policies are being translated into practice. As the gender policies of these climate finance bodies begin affecting the global practice of mitigation and adaptation as well as the flow of billions of dollars in public and private climate finance, it is important to consider the advantages, limitations, and best practices of a closer integration of gender equality goals within the international climate policy regime.

A theoretical literature exists on the potential benefits and disadvantages of the linkage between women and the environment. However, when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of gender policies in the context of climate change, practice has gone far ahead of scholarship. International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and women's advocacy groups have lobbied institutions at the UN and World Bank to adopt a range of gender policies, which are now being operationalized around the world. Our goal is to take a step back and examine the rationale behind these policies, their scope in practice, how they differ across funds, and how they are being translated into practice. To develop a framework for understanding and evaluating the current success and future potential of gender policies in climate finance institutions, in Section 2, we first review the evolution of gender mainstreaming in development practice. In Section 3, we examine lessons learned from the women and environment movement. Section 4 traces the evolution of gender considerations in international climate policy and in particular, international climate finance funds. Section 5 synthesizes the key similarities and differences in gender policies across selected international climate funds, and Section 6 concludes with opportunities for future practice research.

2. Gender Mainstreaming

To understand and evaluate how gender has been linked to climate change through the policies of climate finance institutions, it is important to understand the history of gender mainstreaming as it has been applied in the context of international development. The idea of gender mainstreaming has existed for the last 40+ years as a way of integrating gender considerations into the social, economic, and political work of development agencies and international institutions more generally (Parpart, 2014). The competing theories underlying gender mainstreaming and the challenges it has faced in practice provide lessons and warnings for how to most effectively integrate gender in climate finance institutions.

Gender mainstreaming is a strategy that reorganizes and reshapes policy processes across all sectors and topic areas in order to address gender disparities or gender equality goals. In its original conceptualization, gender mainstreaming follows an ambitious goal of addressing gendered power relations in institutions at macro, meso, and micro levels that perpetuate inequality between men and women (van Eerdewijk & Davids, 2014). This goal has been embraced by the international community among institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank, as well as national governments. Gender mainstreaming tools are often used to assess policies and programs for effects on gender equality outcomes in the agenda setting, policy formation, budgeting, implementation, and evaluation stages of a project or program. Tools such as gender impact assessments are used as ex ante evaluations to determine whether a proposed policy or program reduces, maintains, or increases gender equality between men and women (EIGE, 2018). The use of the assessments challenge the assumption that the design and implementation of programs benefit all members of the public equally. Using such technocratic tools, these institutions must grapple with whether they are ‘transforming’ gender relations, or whether they have integrated gender into policies without considering the power relations both within international development institutions and in the program context.

2.1. Gender Mainstreaming in International Development

The concept of gender mainstreaming, particularly in international development, grew from the 1970s onward as women, gender relations, and economic development became conceptually linked as a method of advancing gender equality worldwide. Women’s movements in the global south criticized attempts by international aid institutions to incorporate women into development aid or target them for specific projects, which they claim did not target inequality. Through the momentum of these movements, gender considerations have since been incorporated into the decision making of bilateral and multilateral development aid institutions, NGOs, and national governments.

Several United Nations conferences institutionalized momentum from international women’s movements concerned with women’s rights and gender relations. Table 1 summarizes the contributions of UN World Conferences on Women over the last three decades. The majority of literature on gender mainstreaming lauds The World Conference on Women in Beijing as the impetus for the gender mainstreaming movement, which emphasized the inclusion of gender perspectives across a variety of policy arenas, including education, health, economy, and human

rights (United Nations, 1995). The United Nations definition of gender mainstreaming, which many international institutions have adopted, is “the inclusion of gender into the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the policies and programmes in all political, economic, and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated” (Parpart, 2014). Explicitly stated, the goal of gender mainstreaming in the UN system and other institutions that have endorsed it is “to achieve gender equality.”

In development theory, two different discourses related to gender came forth as the concept of gender mainstreaming emerged in the 1970s. These discourses were used to classify and reframe programming, set agendas, and shape development policy to include women in different ways. The discourse referred to as Women in Development (WID) was coined by development professionals in Washington DC in the wake of the American liberal feminist movement, and highlighted the importance of women’s productive labor in the labor force to improve economic efficiency (Brouwers, 2013). This contrasts with the Gender and Development (GAD) approach, which aimed to transform power relations using social and institutional change not only targeting women, but rather the gender power relations between men and women, with women often subordinate to men (Brouwers, 2013). GAD emerged in 1980s from socialist-feminist ideology, often from women’s groups in the Global South, to counter WID’s emphasis on the productive and reproductive capabilities of women. Many GAD strategies coincide with rights-based approaches (discussed more in Section 3.3) to development with principles of accountability and transparency, equality and non-discrimination, and participation and empowerment (Razavi & Miller, 1995). Both the WID and GAD approaches are incorporated into gender mainstreaming policy, but GAD’s transformative and structural approach lays the ground for incorporating “gender in all policies and programmes” outlined in the UN’s gender mainstreaming definition (Parpart, 2014).

WID and GAD conceptually offer two different strategies towards gender equality and women’s empowerment: specialize in projects for women and have separate organizational departments or units for women’s development, or use an analysis of gender relations to cultivate structural change in institutions and programs. While not mutually exclusive, these different approaches complicate a shared understanding of gender mainstreaming as a means to achieve gender equality. WID, with a focus on economic efficiency, and GAD with a focus on empowerment and structural change aligning with a rights-based approach, offer perspectives on gender mainstreaming that may be contradictory.

Table 1. Summary of UN World Conference on Women

Year	Meeting	Notable Outcomes
1975	The First World Conference on Women (in Mexico City)	Resulted in the subsequent decade being declared as the “UN Decade for Women.”
1985	The World Conference on Women (in Nairobi)	Highlighted the importance of strengthening women’s roles in peace and development “[t]o achieve the goal of development, which is inseparably linked to the goals of equality and peace, Governments should institutionalize women’s issues by establishing or strengthening in all areas and sectors of development” (United Nations, 1985).
1995	The World Conference on Women (in Beijing)	Emphasized the inclusion of gender perspectives across a variety of policy arenas, including education, health, economy, and human rights (United Nations, 1995).

2.2. Conceptual Issues in Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming across policy arenas and institutions faces four main challenges outlined from critics and proponents alike: 1) gender considerations may be integrated into the status quo rather than transforming institutions, 2) there can often be a disconnect between language used in policy and what happens in practice, 3) the goals of gender mainstreaming face difficulties in measurement and evaluation, and 4) the language around gender and gender mainstreaming is context-specific and is difficult to apply equally across all countries. These will be expanded on in turn.

First, some argue that gender mainstreaming integrates or co-opts gender into the status quo rather than transforming institutions to advance gender equality goals (Mukhopadhyay, 2014). Gender indicators are included in normal programming, without addressing the disparate power relations between men and women. For example, in the past 15 years, the amount of American aid labeled for the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment increased slightly from 8 to 18%, while still representing much less than half of aid resources (Goodman, 2012). Under the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System, which member states such as the United States use, aid is screened as targeting gender equality as either a “principle” or “significant objective,” or not targeting gender equality objectives (OECD, 2012). There are concerns from both development professionals and beneficiaries that gender mainstreaming initiatives act as a substitute rather than a complement for targeting women-specific initiatives, thus reducing the overall amount of funding to promote gender equality (Brouwers, 2013). In particular, 40% of aid targeted toward gender equality goes toward school enrollment for girls and another third towards basic health, but almost no allocations are made for gender equality initiatives in infrastructure, energy, transport, loans, and private sector development (Brouwers, 2013). A 2011 study completed by Elizabeth Ransom and Carmen Bain examined whether gender mainstreaming in development improved outcomes for women, specifically in the context of agricultural projects (Ransom & Bain, 2011). Unfortunately they found that because gender was

so thoroughly mainstreamed in the development field, it was perceived that fewer programs or projects needed to be aimed directly at women because gender was a required consideration in all efforts. Ransom and Bain's thorough analysis used the AidData data set and coded close to 6,000 projects completed over a 25 year period. Although the projects targeting women/gender increased over the period analyzed, only 300 projects (5.1% of the possible projects) targeted women/gender.

One concern around integrative versus transformative approaches expresses the current implementation of gender mainstreaming as a technocratic tool and "box checking" exercise (Manell, 2012). As a checklist, the success of gender mainstreaming in achieving gender equality is evaluated on gender indicator inputs and outputs and impact assessments, heavily reliant on data collection and technical expertise rather than a participatory democratic approach that emphasizes the both equal representation of women and men and their participation in decision making.

Second, there is a gap between the rhetorical or policy commitment of gender mainstreaming written into policies and the measurable outcomes of improved gender equality in the implementation of these policies. This critique is analyzed along a continuum of total failure to lack of tangible results in certain sectors to insufficient political will to fully implement in institutions and organizations. Moser (2005) calls this gap between policy and implementation "policy evaporation" when good intentions get lost in a bureaucracy. Brouwers uses meta-evaluation in 2013 to follow up on the OECD/DAC Review of Gender and Evaluation from 2003, which evaluated the success of gender mainstreaming across several bilateral and multilateral actors. Her findings show conformity in gender policy across agencies, but disparate results for gender equality outcomes. Participants cite lack of training for donor and implementing agencies, no accountability for reporting requirements on gender indicators, lack of leadership in the agency, and external obstacles as reasons for substandard or unclear gender equality outcomes (Brouwers, 2013). Gender budgeting, an analysis of the different effects of budgets on women and men, is also used a tool to tie gender-specific inputs and outputs with outcomes. However, 'gender inclusiveness' in budgets is sometimes measured as concrete references to sex, gender, or gender equality in budget documents rather than an increase in funding for gender-equality promoting projects. In addition, a separate OECD donor aid review in 2009 found that 54% of screened aid targeted gender equality either as the principle or a significant objective in a project. However, it should be noted that when considering the full amount of allocable aid amongst all member countries (\$94.7 bill USD), the proportion drops to 26% because some member countries do not screen aid that does not fall into the targeted category, artificially inflating the results (OECD, 2012). Additionally, only 4% of screened aid target gender equality as the principle objective of a project. While Sustainable Development Goal 5 of "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls" has met some progress in some targets for decreased child marriages, decreased female genital mutilation, and increased representation of women in national parliaments, overall issues in consistent measurement and evaluation across countries and agencies preclude gender equality impacts from being compared and thus portray uneven or inadequate implementation of policy (UN, 2017).

Third, there are difficulties in measurement and evaluation of development indicators through the lens of gender. Gender outcome indicators, both qualitative and quantitative, face

confounding factors and difficulties in direct attribution of inputs and outputs to outcomes. For example, while the overall number and proportion of girls enrolled in primary and secondary school has increased, the reduction in disparity between boys and girls may be a result of fewer boys completing their education, and furthermore says nothing about the quality of education they receive (Brouwers, 2013). Moser (2005) cites a “lack of effective, consistent, and systematic evaluation of gender mainstreaming outcomes and impacts” as a shortfall in gender mainstreaming. In addition, many gender analyses include qualitative methodologies such as interviews and focus groups which are more expensive to implement and seen as less rigorous and replicable, increasing administrative burden on projects with already tight budgets. In practice there is a lack of sex-disaggregated data at a country level, or a lack of data collection practices for the program that capture different disparities between men and women, thus identifying problems. For example, only 70 countries have population-based surveys on the prevalence of violence against women (Goodman, 2012).

Fourth, the different cultural and institutional contexts of the implementation of development programs make it difficult to translate the concept of gender mainstreaming effectively across all contexts. There are cultural differences at a national scale on the political, social, and economic rights of women and thus for the meaning of gender equality. The term “gender mainstreaming” therefore faces different perceptions in different national contexts, and is not easy to translate into languages other than English (Brouwers, 2013). In South Africa, NGO practitioners are unconvinced by gender mainstreaming, citing a dilution of gender and women’s issues, the bureaucratization of addressing gender inequality coupled with few additional resources, and ignoring other power inequalities like race and class that they view as more prevalent in South Africa’s history (Manell, 2012).

The main challenges can be summarized as follows: the concept and practice of gender mainstreaming was not incorporated effectively into all institutions and is not commonly understood as a means to achieve gender equality and gender mainstreaming as it is currently implemented is not effective at achieving gender equality or development outcomes. Literature evaluating and interpreting the effects of gender mainstreaming bemoans the “call for more of the same: more resources, stronger institutions, more accountability, and greater commitment” (Parpart, 2014). The gap between policy and implementation is not unique to gender mainstreaming in the development sector, but serves as a caution for other sectors. Measurement of gender equality indicators is essential to quantifying project results and determining the gap between policy, implementation, and outcomes. However, it is argued that the most important strategy to overcome the difficulties of gender mainstreaming is forming institutional consensus that highlights gender equality as a policy objective rather than using gender mainstreaming merely as a tool in organizational processes (Allwood, 2013). Gender mainstreaming in development has been successful in its rhetorical commitment in policy, but has far to go for achieving goals of gender equality.

2.3. Key Takeaways and Knowledge Gaps from the Development Sector

- Mainstreaming gender into the development sector represents a huge task, as it will for the climate regime. This task needs human and financial resources committed in the

two-track method--both mainstreamed and targeted initiatives. The climate sector should acknowledge concerns that in the twin track strategy of specialization and mainstreaming, mainstreaming may serve as a substitute rather than a complement to specialization, which could result in a reduction in funds earmarked for women.

- The inclusion of gender considerations in the development sector is based on an assumption that reducing gender inequality reduces poverty, but faces difficulties establishing this connection in a systematic way.
- It may be easier to incorporate gender into some sectors rather than others: in development, there has been robust incorporation of gender issues into health, education, nutrition, agriculture sectors, but much less so into infrastructure, energy, transport, loans, and private sector development (Brouwers, 2013).
- Should the development and climate sectors expand “easy” gains in outcomes in these areas, or should they foray into policy areas less conceptually linked to gender?
- What are the gender-related results we want and how does that interact with the outcomes we want for climate?

3. Gender-Environment-Climate Linkage

The theories and motivations underlying the linkage of women and the environment are equally important in understanding the linkage of gender to climate change in climate finance institutions. The history of the women-environment linkage helps explain the political discourse that made gender a central theme in current climate change policy, and the theories of women’s vulnerability continues to shape strategies for addressing gender inequalities in and through climate action (Arora-Jonsson, 2011). As the history of gender-mainstreaming provides lessons for the incorporation of gender considerations across institutional practices, the history of gender-environment linkages offers lessons on how to most effectively address gender issues in the context of climate change and climate finance.

3.1. Gender and Environment Linkage

The linkage of women and the environment emerged largely in parallel with gender mainstreaming in the development context in the 1970-80s from ecofeminist philosophy which characterized women as spiritually linked to the environment, the “givers of life” and thus the “rightful caretaker[s] of nature” (Resurrección, 2013). A 2014 study in the Annual Review of Environment and Resources explains, “Ecofeminist scholars posited that women are, by virtue of their biological relationship to reproduction, more closely linked to nature and thus both more likely to be harmed by its degradation and also more likely to be the ones responsible for its conservation” (Meinzen-Dick, Kovarik, & Quisumbing, 2014). At a 1985 world conference on women in Nairobi, stories of indigenous women in India protecting trees from industrial logging efforts brought the idea of women as caretakers of nature to the global stage (Resurrección, 2013). Several years later at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the women-environment link was formalized, with a call for specific programming involving women as key stakeholders in environmental conservation and sustainability efforts.

Following Rio, feminist scholars criticized the women-environment linkage for over-generalizing women's roles across cultures and for placing more caretaking burdens on women, but the linkage has persisted in environmental discourse. These scholars "sought more multi-dimensional explanations for women's and men's dispositions, decision-making and variable use and management of environmental resources and challenged women-as-victim-then-as-agent stereotypes" (Resurrección, 2013). In a 2002 essay published in *Gender and Development* comparing resource use for energy between men and women, Margaret Skutsch notes that, "it is very difficult to make a strong case for a real gender difference, not least because income factors may have a much more important and confounding influence on energy use than gender" (Skutsch, 2002). Similarly, in discussing the relationship between gender and sustainability, researchers at the International Food Policy Research Institute state, "Gender alone is just one of many factors that can condition an individual's choices; age, social status, and caste, among others, can create differences among women that make them far from homogenous." They examine several studies showing that if given the same opportunities and resources as men, women would actually behave less sustainably than men (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). Although not all complexities are captured, the women-environment linkage was eventually expanded to include men, gender relationships, and more variation across cultures and society.

Despite numerous critiques of the gender-environment linkage, many feminists have "embrace[d] simplification of identities in order to insert gender agendas into institutions that otherwise have different priorities" (Resurrección, 2013). Essentially, the gender-environment narrative may be overly simplistic, but it can be very politically useful. With regard to energy resources specifically, Skutsch notes that "the opportunity to 'hijack' climate funds to direct renewable energy technology towards women's real needs, so long underestimated or ignored, should not be lost, even if this requires insertion of special clauses in the texts, and special sub-funds to finance them" (Skutsch, 2002). Many scholars and activists take this practical view.

3.2. Gender and Climate Linkage

Although the women-environment linkage was initially missing from international climate change discussions, a narrative around gender gradually emerged in the climate regime in parallel with deepening linkages between climate and a broader set of social issues. The narrative claims that women are fundamentally more vulnerable to climate change due to:

- (a) a strong connection with and reliance on natural resources that may be affected by a changing climate, generally with very little legal authority to make resource decisions
- (b) constraining gender roles that leave women less able to survive in natural disasters
- (c) the high percentage of individuals in poverty who are female

Much like the women-environment linkage, the narrative of inherent female vulnerability has been heavily criticized for its basis in unverified statistics and generalizations, particularly (b) and (c). There is an oft-repeated case study about a flood in Bangladesh where it is said that the ratio of women to men who perished was 14:1. After searching for a source for this number, Arora-Johnson found it had no accurate basis (Arora-Jonsson, 2011). Counter-narratives tell of a natural disaster in Nicaragua where gender roles led to a higher death rate for men instead of women. Although it is unclear if the vulnerability label is always appropriate for women in

natural disaster contexts, it is clear that social/cultural gender roles affect the social vulnerability of individuals in disaster scenarios. Similarly, Arora-Johnson questions the frequently repeated statistics claiming more women than men live in poverty, explaining, “no scientific study is ever cited to document percentages such as the assertion that 70% of all poor people are women” (Arora-Jonsson, 2011). What does appear to be true, however, is that women in poverty tend to have less control over the natural resources they (and their children) depend on. This commonly leaves women in poverty more vulnerable than men in poverty to the effects of climate change.

A key feminist critique of the ‘vulnerable victims’ narrative is that gender is often conflated as the cause of vulnerability. Resurrección explains:

Vulnerability is not an intrinsic characteristic, or does not derive from a single factor such as ‘being a woman,’ but is indicative of historically and culturally specific patterns of practices, processes and power relations that render some groups or persons more disadvantaged than others. Vulnerability is therefore a dynamic condition shaped by existing and emerging inequities in resource distribution and access, the control individuals are able to exert over choices and opportunities, and historical patterns of social domination and marginalization (Resurrección, 2013).

Numerous case studies have illustrated the truth here. One study in rural China found that women were less likely than men to adapt their farming practices to match changes in climate, but the study also found that men and women in the community had a statistically significant difference in education, with “male household heads having a significantly higher educational level than female household heads” (Jin, Wang, & Gao, 2015). In this scenario education may be the true cause of vulnerability, although gender is also correlated.

In *Climate and Development*, Jost et al. (2016) examined the ability of men and women to adapt to changes in climate in Uganda, Ghana, and Bangladesh. They found vast differences in gender roles and social norms across these three locations, which made it challenging to draw straightforward conclusions. However, they did note that across all countries, women were adopting farming practice changes less frequently than the men. These women stated that financial limitations and resource restrictions prevented them from adopting new practices. Here again, although women are certainly more vulnerable to a changing climate, the vulnerability is unrelated to their gender. In this study, women’s climate vulnerability is tied to a lack of access to financing and resources. In their conclusion, the authors note that “the main challenge for the climate change community is to move beyond the current simplistic understanding of smallholder women as a homogeneous group that is inherently nature protecting, but unable to adapt to climate change because of their overwhelming vulnerability.” (Jost et al., 2016)

3.3. Human Rights Framing

Some scholars are now advocating the use of a human rights framing to encourage co-benefits for women in climate adaptation and mitigation, mirroring the transformations in development towards a rights-based approach. A rights-based approach changes the narrative by de-emphasizing vulnerability and instead focusing on cultural resilience and adaptability. While

many approaches to climate justice focus on intergenerational justice or justice between states, a “human rights approach necessarily refers to individuals as the subjects of legitimate claims” (Bendlin, 2014). This means that beyond addressing climate vulnerability, a rights-based approach addresses all factors that contribute to an individual’s vulnerability - a changing climate and gender, but also discrimination and unequal power relationships (Bendlin, 2014). Bee et al. (2013) state hopefully, “An integrated approach, grounded in a rights framework, has the potential to address the structural causes of poverty and vulnerability without casting vulnerable populations as passive victims.”

3.4. Gender Mainstreaming in the Climate Regime

Nevertheless, the portrayal of women as the ‘vulnerable victims’ of climate change is politically valuable and continues to persist. The hypothesis that women are both natural environmental stewards and at higher risk as the environment changes is the key impetus for gender mainstreaming in the climate field. Women, therefore, become key stakeholders in both mitigation efforts - utilizing their natural stewardship for the environment - and adaptation efforts - reducing their vulnerability to a changing climate. Today, international-level discussions create policy to encourage co-benefits for gender equity and climate mitigation/adaptation.

To achieve these co-benefits, climate funds are incorporating gender language into their policies, following a ‘gender mainstreaming’ strategy much like the development field. However, as discussed in Section 2, many concerns exist about the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming. Practitioners and scholars alike fear that including gender language in climate fund policy may not create co-benefits for gender equity as desired. Wong (2016) analyzed several climate case studies and warns that simply increasing female participation in climate projects is not an indication of success. Wong explains, “The costs and benefits of formal participation and resource allocation are not often evenly distributed between men and women. Greater participation amongst women, without adequate understanding of underlying factors, would simply increase their workloads without empowering them”. (Wong, 2016) Gender mainstreaming in the climate regime should therefore be approached with caution.

3.5. Key Takeaways and Knowledge Gaps from Gender-Environment Linkages

- Despite numerous critiques, the gender-environment linkage proved politically useful and therefore has persisted in the global discourse.
- Many scholars and practitioners believe women are fundamentally more vulnerable to climate change due to the high percentage of women in poverty, constraining cultural gender roles, and limited financial/social control over natural resources.
- Key critiques of the gender-climate narrative focus on the issue of conflating gender as the cause of vulnerability instead of a correlated factor.
- Climate funds are increasingly incorporating gender language into their policies in an effort to mainstream gender considerations into all projects, despite lessons of caution from the development field.

4. Gender and Climate Finance

Climate finance is among the most important vehicles for implementing gender-equitable climate action, particularly in the developing country context. This is because the climate finance regime supports action towards the implementation of global climate goals that reflect agreed upon goals. While climate finance can be difficult to define and measure, it is broadly considered as public and private finance for climate change adaptation and mitigation both domestically and internationally (OECD, 2015a). Under this definition, both domestic private investment in renewable energy, and public international aid to address the impacts of climate change would count as climate finance. The Climate Policy Institute estimates total climate finance in 2016 at \$383 billion. Of that total, \$141 billion is public finance of which \$85 billion flows internationally through multilateral, bilateral, and specific climate fund institutions (Buchner et al., 2017).

Both public and private climate finance can play a role in implementing gender-equitable climate action, either by investing directly in supporting women's livelihoods and empowerment or by investing in sectors and technologies that benefit women most. However, public institutions play an important role in creating policies and providing monitoring and evaluation of gender sensitive outcomes that can direct both public and private finance toward investments with better gender outcomes. Through the disbursement of grants and loans, public climate finance institutions can select programs that support gender equality and empowerment or enforce requirements that funded projects add elements to support these goals. A secondary goal of public climate finance is often to encourage private co-financing for projects and further private investment (OECD, 2015a). In this way, public institutions can help direct private finance toward more gender-equitable climate projects.

The effectiveness of climate finance in achieving gender goals can be influenced both by its explicit gender policies for funding decisions and internal governance and the form of its financial mechanisms. The kinds of factors affecting climate finance effectiveness in achieving gender co-benefits include:

- Explicit gender policies governing project selection and requirements for project design, implementation, and evaluation.
- Fund governance structures including gender representation, the existence of a gender focal point or gender team, and gender-responsive training across the institution.
- The level of funding available to institutions for supporting projects.
- The thematic focus of the fund or institution.
- Characteristics of the financial mechanisms used: grants versus loans, large versus small grants, mobilization of private finance, and lending practices.
- The access modality used for finance including the kinds of actors who have access to finance for the implementation of projects.
- Measurement and Evaluation practices including gender-disaggregated baseline and outcome measurements and gender-specific outcomes.

These factors can affect how financing reaches women and if it achieves certain gender-specific goals. Certain factors may present tradeoffs between efficiency and effectiveness, such as grant size. Small grants may be more effective at directly reaching women, but transaction fees may make them less efficient financial tools. The presence of these factors and how they are implemented within different institutions may also lead to comparative advantages for achieving gender goals in climate projects.

Various actors influence the relationship between gender and climate finance at the international level either through the implementation of financing for climate projects, advocacy on best practices, or both. Key institutional actors include:

- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Climate Funds: Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, Global Environment Facility
- The Climate Investment Funds of the World Bank: Clean Technology Fund, Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, Forest Investment Program, Scaling Renewable Energy Program
- Bilateral Climate Funds and Aid Organizations: Some countries have specific climate funds such as Germany's International Climate Initiative while other development aid organizations engage in climate-related projects
- Private market mechanisms: carbon trading markets such as the Clean Development Mechanism and W+ carbon standard developed by Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture and Natural Resource Management

Understanding the interrelationships between these actors can help researchers and policymakers understand how different kinds of gender mainstreaming practices are spread and implemented throughout the climate finance regime. This can also help practitioners find the best places to access resources or put pressure on institutions to hold them accountable or change policies on gender. Here we will explore the key actors in more depth, examining the gender policies and their shortcomings for influential multilateral and bilateral funds, and several emerging market-based mechanisms.

4.1. Multilateral Funds

Several prominent multilateral climate funds have recently adopted specific gender policies (Schalatek, 2015). An analysis of these funds and their policies helps illustrate how the principles of gender equality are being articulated in the climate field and the differentiated capabilities of governance and funding structures for translating policy into practice. Below are brief outlines of the Adaptation Fund (AF), Green Climate Fund (GCF), Climate Investment Funds (CIF), and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and their respective gender policies. The AF adopted its gender policy in 2016 (Adaptation Fund, 2016); the GCF has had a gender language included in its guiding language since its inception in 2010 and approved its gender policy in 2015 as part of operationalizing the fund (Schalatek, 2015); the CIF undertook a gender action plan in 2014 in response to a 2013 gender review (Aguilar et al., 2013), which led to the adoption of its gender policy in 2017 (CIF, 2017); finally, the GEF was the first to implement a gender mainstreaming policy in 2011. For more background on the funds, see Appendix.

Table 2. Gender Policies of Multilateral Funds

Fund	Plan Year	Key Objectives	Gender in Project Selection	Measuring, Monitoring & Verification	Institutional Support
Adaptation Fund	2016	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) To achieve more effective, sustainable, and equitable outcomes 2) Equal opportunity for men and women to adapt to climate change 3) Mitigate risks to men and women from program activities 4) Fill knowledge gaps on gender 5) Consult actively with men and women 	Explicitly excludes projects without articulated gender considerations from receiving Fund resources	Implementing entities are required to undertake an initial gender assessment and be subject to gender responsiveness screening by AF and external partners. The Policy also requires monitoring and evaluation to include gender specific indicators and gender-disaggregated data where possible.	New implementing entity applicants are required to prove their institutional capacity for implementing the Gender Policy and existing entities are required to build their gender capacity where necessary. Readiness grants and other resources are made available to implementing entities to build this capacity.
Green Climate Fund	2010	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Positive contribution towards gender equality. 2) Applied to all projects 3) Accountable for results 4) Aligned with national gender norms 5) Gender balance in fund leadership 6) Thoughtful resource allocation 	A gender analysis must be completed which informs a gender action plan to be included in a project proposal. Required for all project proposals.	All projects must carry out a project-specific gender action plan, monitoring specific qualitative and quantitative indicators that correspond with the project's gender goals.	Entities receiving direct access funding must have a gender policy in place to receive accreditation. If they do not, GCF will help the entity develop one.
Climate Investment Funds	2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Commitment to women's agency in a "transformational change context" 2) The primacy of MDB gender policy 3) Commitment to accountability and learning 4) Collaboration with other climate finance institutions 	The Fund works with countries to develop an Investment Plan, and requires gender expertise represented on their team during this process.	The CIF gives primacy to MDB policies in implementation, but tracks the benefits and the outcomes of project with gender disaggregated data. The CIF also tracks the number of investment plans that have implemented gender policies.	The policy encourages the national level best practice of having a gender focal point but does not require this of pilot countries. The CIF reports that it has received increasing requests for technical support on addressing gender issues and has produced several reports on best practices.
Global Environment Facility	2011	To create positive synergies between improved environmental management and greater gender equality.	Since 2011, all new projects are required to conduct a gender analysis and develop gender responsive results-based frameworks.	The GEF implements annual assessments of existing GEF agencies to review the satisfaction of minimum requirements of the Policy on Gender Mainstreaming and compliance of new partner agencies with the Policy. The Inter-Agency Working group (IAWG) on Gender also serves as a monitoring and verifying mechanism.	Since 1996, the GEF has been prioritizing the women's involvement in stakeholder participation. The GEF is periodically updating its guiding principles and requirements for gender mainstreaming across its governance and operations through introducing the Gender Equality Action Plan, IAWG, and new policy on gender equality.

4.1.1. Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund is unique in that it is governed by a board with a majority of developing country representatives. The AF also pioneered a “direct access” funding modality in which accredited bodies known as Implementing Entities (IEs) can request funding directly from the Fund (Bird, Watson, & Schalatek, 2017). Designated Authorities (DAs) are representatives of developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol who endorse applications for accreditation by IEs and project proposals from their own countries. IEs, which can be national, regional, or multilateral, can submit project proposals to the Fund and are responsible for selecting Executing Entities (EEs) to implement funded projects. IEs include national government agencies, regional partnerships, multilateral development banks, and INGOs (Adaptation Fund, 2018b). The “direct access” modality of the AF is meant to give country ownership of projects and flexibility in how they are implemented.

The Adaptation Fund had no specific gender reference in its initial Operational Policies and Guidelines (OPG). In 2010-2011 the Adaptation Fund NGO Network began lobbying the Adaptation Fund to include language on gender and vulnerable populations (Foss, 2017). In response to these efforts the AF Board added specific references to gender in their OPG (WEDO, 2011). In 2013 the Board went further by adopting the Environmental and Social Policy (ESP), which included gender equality as one of 15 core principles required for funded projects (Foss, 2017). The gender considerations of the ESP were extended in 2016 by the adoption of the Gender Policy and the Gender Action Plan. The Gender Policy lays out requirements for the Board and Implementing Entities to include gender considerations in multiple aspects of all funded projects. The AF Gender Policy is comprehensive in its applicability to the Board, Secretariat, DAs IEs, and EEs and applies to projects of any size. The policy explicitly excludes projects without “articulated gender considerations” from receiving Fund resources (Adaptation Fund, 2016).

New IE Applicants are required to prove their institutional capacity for implementing the Gender Policy and existing IEs are required to build their gender capacity where necessary (Adaptation Fund, 2016). Readiness grants and other resources are made available to IEs to build this capacity. IEs are also required to undertake “an initial gender assessment” and be subject to gender responsiveness screening by AF and external partners (Adaptation Fund, 2016). The Policy also requires monitoring and evaluation by IEs to include gender specific indicators and gender-disaggregated data where possible. Finally, the Policy makes resources available for both the AF Board and IEs to implement the Policy.

Due to the recent adoption of the Adaptation Fund Gender Policy, it is difficult to gauge if it has affected the project approval or IE approval processes. However, the Fund has updated some of its operational documents to reflect changes and objectives of the Gender Policy. Twenty projects have been approved since its adoption, and 14 IEs have been accredited (of 45 in total), as of January 2018 (Adaptation Fund, 2018b). There is also evidence that the adoption of the Environmental and Social Policy changed the frequency at which gender was referenced in project proposals. In our research, we found that from 2010 to 2013 (before the ESP was adopted), funded project proposal to the AF made an average of 43 gender references (n=27), as compared to 116 gender references from 2013-2016 (n=28). This evidence suggests that the

gender equality principle of the ESP was effective in changing the language and potentially the content of proposed projects. The Gender Policy will likely continue this trend. It is harder to assess how the Policy will affect the implementation of projects, but the AF published a guidance document in 2017 with detailed suggestions for IEs to effectively meet the requirements and objectives of the Gender Policy (Adaptation Fund, 2017).

4.1.2. Green Climate Fund

The GCF is unique from a gender standpoint because it was the first multilateral fund to include a comprehensive gender policy from the beginning of its operations (Schalatek & Nakhooda, 2016). The fund's organizing charter, the GCF Governing Instrument, included a directive to consider gender (Schalatek, 2015). Liane Schalatek of the Heinrich Boll Foundation explains the unique position of the GCF, saying, "The GCF has thus the opportunity as well as the challenge to 'get it right' from the very beginning - a process fraught with promise, progress and peril and dependent on the prioritization of some key actions" (Schalatek, 2015). To fully implement a "gender-sensitive approach" the GCF board adopted both a three year gender action plan and a gender policy. The policy consists of six key principles (GCF, 2014):

- 1) Commitment to making a positive contribution towards the goal of gender equality.
- 2) Comprehensive application to all projects of the fund, regardless of scope.
- 3) Accountability for results, monitored both qualitatively and quantitatively.
- 4) Aligned with national gender norms and priorities
- 5) Achieve a gender balance in all key leadership and decision making entities within the fund
- 6) Allocate resources in a way that contributes positively to gender equality

In addition to the fund-level gender policy, to receive direct access GCF funding (not through a multilateral agency/organization), a national or regional entity must achieve accreditation from the GCF. The accreditation process requires that the organization has a developed gender policy of their own in place, and GCF offers assistance in creating the policy if it is not already in place (Schalatek, 2015).

The GCF provides useful tools to national and regional entities to assist in gender mainstreaming. For each GCF Result Area (such as energy access, low-emission transport, or forestry and land use, among others) the GCF indicates what demographic data should be collected by the agency (GCF & UN Women, 2017). For all gender analysis completed by the GCF, the stated primary objective is "to understand how women and men are affected by the problem that the project will address" with a secondary objective to understand where women may be able to act as "agents of change" for climate action (GCF & UN Women, 2017). The gender assessment - collecting and analyzing demographic data - must be included in GCF project funding proposals, and is used to guide an Action Plan for project implementation (GCF, 2014). The Action Plan should provide specific quantitative and qualitative indicators to show progress towards project-specific gender goals.

Although it is early in the life of the GCF, the fund already faces numerous critiques regarding their approach to gender equality and equity. First, the GCF is criticized for principle (4) above

which gives a huge amount of authority to countries to interpret their gender policy “in line with individual country circumstances,” which could allow for a continuation of inequality justified through social/cultural practices (Schalatek, 2015). The GCF also faces strong push back on their early inability to implement principle (5) at the board level, which today is not even close to modeling the targeted gender balance (Schalatek, 2015). The “transformative” goal of the fund has also been interpreted to mean projects with big budgets that leverage significant private co-financing reflected in the definition of the “small grant” category as projects between \$10 and \$50 million. Focusing on large projects can attract private investment and decrease transaction costs, but it may also make it harder to direct money toward local women’s organizations. As of February 2018, only 11% of GCF projects have been funded at levels under \$10 million and their median project size is in the \$50-250 million range (compared to the AF whose largest projects are around \$10 million and average is closer to \$6 million). More time is needed to assess whether the GCF can successfully and consistently implement its gender policy at the project level, but expectations are high for this influential fund.

4.1.3. Climate Investment Funds

The CIF is unique in its programmatic approach to financing as compared to the project-based approach of the other climate funds (Trabacchi, Brown, Boyd, Wang, & Falzon, 2016). Before projects are financed the CIF works with pilot countries to establish investment plans that are in line with other national programs and priorities. The MDBs then act as implementing entities who finance projects under each country’s investment plan using concessional loans and other financial mechanisms. This approach helps countries build capacity in developing unique investment plans consistent with national priorities, it ensures a consistent flow of financing through the MDBs for long-term projects, and it seeks to leverage private finance to further support country’s investment plans (Trabacchi et al., 2016).

In 2013, the CIF conducted a gender review carried out by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. This review found attention to gender lacking in CIF programs and provided suggestions for improving the CIF’s performance (Aguilar et al., 2013). These findings spurred the first phase of the CIF gender action plan (FY 2015-2016), with the goal to “mainstream gender in CIF policy and programming in support of gender equality in climate-resilient, low carbon development investments in CIF countries” (CIF, 2014). The gender action plan also recognized that the CIF’s goal of “transformational change” is not possible without including social and gender considerations and that the “imperative” for gender mainstreaming at the CIF is “for reasons of efficiency, effectiveness, and ultimately for the goals of equity and inclusion” (CIF, 2014). A second phase of the gender action plan has since been implemented (FY2016-2020) and a CIF gender policy was adopted in 2017 (CIF, 2017).

Due to the structure of the CIF and its relationship with the MDBs, the gender policy emphasizes the primacy of MDB policies and states that the CIF policy is “operationalized” by the MDBs through the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects in pilot countries (CIF, 2017). Therefore, the principle way in which the CIF implements its gender policy is through the country investment plan process, the coordination of gender mainstreaming across its funds, and development and sharing of knowledge and best practices. In order to meet these responsibilities, the CIF has a gender working group consisting of

representatives from each MDB and the gender policy requires that the CIF have sufficient staffing at the junior and senior levels to implement the plan and introduces a gender category to be among its observer constituencies. The policy also states that the CIF should have gender expertise represented in its work on helping develop country investment plans and that all investment plans and projects should include how they will address gender considerations. Finally, the policy “recognizes” and “encourages” the national level best practice of having a gender focal point but does not require this of pilot countries (CIF, 2017).

The latest report of the gender action plan in 2017 pointed to improvements in the CIF’s consideration of gender since its gender review in 2013 as well as areas where more work is needed. The CIF reports that it has received increasing requests from pilot countries and MDBs for technical support on addressing gender issues and has produced several reports best practices in certain sectors. The percentage of projects and investment plans specifically addressing gender has increased across the 4 funds of the CIF. Notably, the disparity on gender mainstreaming between funds from different sectoral areas has also decreased, meaning the CIF has done a better job of increasing gender mainstreaming in mitigation and energy projects, which had previously lagged behind adaptation projects in incorporating gender considerations (Aguilar et al., 2013) (Climate Investment Funds, 2016). Finally, monitoring and evaluation on issues of gender has improved, but the CIF notes that its system for integrating this data needs improvement.

The CIF was arguably the last of the major climate funds to begin systematically incorporating gender considerations in its operations. In some ways, gender was included in the CIF through the policies of the MDBs who implement CIF projects, but the IUCN review in 2013 found that this was not providing an adequately consistent or robust gender mainstreaming framework (Aguilar et al., 2013). Its unique structure and programmatic focus gives the CIF less direct oversight of how gender mainstreaming is implemented at the project level, but also allows the funds to be more engaged in planning process of country’s overall investment strategy. The CIF senior gender specialist, Anne Kuriakose, stressed the importance of this role saying, “as countries plan for large-scale transition to clean energy, provision for upstream gender planning in these investments becomes crucial” (Kuriakose, 2016). As the CIF works with countries to develop investment plans meant to attract private investment, the CIF may have a unique position in influencing the gender practices of private business, either by favoring private investors with good practices or helping channel private investment to sectors that traditionally benefit women.

4.1.4. Global Environment Facility

Since the GEF’s beginning, a public participation policy has been applied in GEF projects to ensure both women’s and men’s involvement (GEF, 2008). In 1996, the GEF started to prioritize the importance of stakeholder participation especially for the disadvantaged groups (e.g., indigenous people, women, poor households) in and around project sites (GEF, 2012). Overtime, the 18 Agencies developed their own gender policies and strategies, and as result, about 40 percent of reviewed GEF projects that were approved and implemented between 2003 and 2006 included some kind of action to mainstream gender issues (GEF, 2008). Also, about 20 percent involved components, outcomes, or activities that specifically target women, and in

some cases men, to adequately address the gender dimension, and GEF kept moving forward by making gender issues part of the GEF's six focal areas to enhance the value of projects and advance gender equality (GEF, 2008).

In 2011, the GEF adopted a policy to mainstream gender with the aim to create positive synergies between improved environmental management and greater gender equality (GEF, 2008). This meant that all new projects must conduct a gender analysis and develop gender-responsive results-based frameworks. These were the GEF's key first steps to ensure that women's needs, voice and participation are addressed in project design and implementation. In 2014, the GEF developed the Gender Equality Action Plan (GEAP) with its Agencies to implement the gender mainstreaming policy with a greater commitment. The GEAP addresses five key elements: project cycle, programming and policies, knowledge management, results-based management, and capacity development, over fiscal years 2015 to 2018 (GEF, 2015). In October, 2017, a new policy on gender equality was approved at the 53rd meeting of the GEF Council in Washington, DC to set out the guiding principles and mandatory requirements for gender mainstreaming across the GEF's governance and operations (GEF, 2017). The new policy introduces mandatory requirements in three areas: 1) Project and program cycle; 2) Monitoring, learning and capacity development; 3) Agency policies, procedures and capabilities; and 4) Compliance.

Certainly, there are gaps and challenges associated with GEF's consistent and intensive gender mainstreaming policies. The main challenge has been identified by the GEF portfolio reviews that while the integration of gender in GEF projects has improved, it is not comprehensive and also varies between focal areas and their programs and projects (GEF, 2015). It has been unclear how these gender specific considerations may tackle the global environmental issues in each focal area. Referencing from the Overall Performance Study 5 (OPS5) which included a sub-study on the GEF's policy on gender mainstreaming, while 73 percent of the 'gender-relevant' GEF projects have mainstreamed gender in design and implementation in different degrees, only 35 percent of them adequately addressed gender mainstreaming with gender sensitive or gender responsive approaches and indicators (Brewster, 2013). A recent monitoring report: IEO Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming in the GEF, revealed that gender consideration in project documentation rose from 57 percent to 98 percent. However, more recent analysis of GEF-6 projects conducted by the GEF Secretariat suggests further improvements in terms of quality at entry of the gender consideration in project documentation (GEF, 2017). To make the GEF's gender mainstreaming policies give a more meaningful impact on promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls, implementing a more thorough and honest monitoring and reporting of the projects on their performance will be vital.

4.2. Bilateral Funds

The United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Germany, Norway, and France are among six of the top ten Official Development Assistance (ODA) donors, and also substantial contributors to UNFCCC and MDB climate finance. In addition to multilateral funding, these donor states also have either a specific bilateral climate or environmental fund, or a thematic climate focus in their development program. In general, gender mainstreaming, gender equality, and women's empowerment are thematic focuses in these ODA donor's development regimes, often in

reference to multilateral accords or goals such as the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and the Beijing Plan for Action.

Other multilateral institutions such as the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) outline criteria for evaluating development assistance, and have developed a gender equality marker which screens aid as targeting gender equality as a principle objective, a significant objective, or not targeted as a project objective (OECD, 2012). GENDERNET, DAC's Gender Network subsidiary, brings national development agencies and multilateral observers together to develop common approaches to gender equality. The DAC works to coordinate aid efforts among donor countries, and each OECD donor uses DAC evaluation criteria to screen its aid. In 2015, a DAC report found that around a third of DAC members' bilateral climate aid targeted gender equality, but only 3% targeted gender equality as a primary objective (OECD, 2015b). Although this represents as an overall increase in targeted funds over the years, there are substantial gaps in the reach of bilateral climate funding targeted toward gender equality, including energy and infrastructure.

In the donor countries outlined below, both climate change and gender have been integrated into the development regime. However, unlike the multilateral climate funds, most bilateral climate funds do not have a comprehensive gender policy or action plan, which may be due to the multi-agency management and administration within each government or the climate fund incorporated as an ancillary component of the development program. In some cases, considerations of gender impacts follow guidelines from multilateral organizations such as UN REDD+, OECD DAC, or the Green Climate Fund. In other cases, the state's development agency has a gender policy or action plan that outlines commitments to gender equality and plans for implementation. Gender impact assessment is primarily focused on the proposal and evaluation stages of the project, with guidelines to consider and plan to counter negative gender impacts required in project proposals as well as to evaluate gender impacts upon project completion. Although institutionalizing a commitment to achieving gender equality in development and climate finance, many of these guidelines are general and open to interpretation, which could result in an uneven application across implementing partners and projects.

Table 3. Gender Policies of Bilateral Funds

Fund	Plan Year	Key Objectives	Gender in Project Selection	Measuring, Monitoring & Verification	Institutional Support
United Kingdom (International Climate Fund)	2010	Abides by DfID guidelines: development assistance for poverty reduction should contribute to reducing inequality to persons of different genders	Programs are required to consider the impacts on women and girls to ensure appropriate design, to be tracked during implementation wherever possible	Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) performs independent evaluations of UK ODA and evaluated ICF in 2014. (MORE on gender indicators)	Climate and Development Knowledge Network provides knowledge management, technical assistance, negotiations and research for developing country decision makers, with gender as a theme.
Norway (International Climate and Forest Initiative)	2007	No fund-specific gender policy; abides by guidelines from UN REDD, NORAD, and Foreign Affairs Ministry-- To increase the opportunities available to women and girls, promote their right to self-determination, and further their empowerment	Address gender considerations, among other issues, when developing and implementing REDD+ national strategies or action plans	NORAD's Evaluation Department conducts continuous evaluations of NICFI and its component parts (MORE on gender indicators)	NICFI's sub-fund, the civil society funding scheme, prioritizes funding for INGOs based in the Global South and providing direct funding to national institutions
Germany (International Climate Initiative)	2008	Follows Green Climate Fund's Environmental and Social Safeguards, which include standards on gender for accreditation for its implementing agencies. Development agency BMZ's strategy includes gender mainstreaming, empowerment, and development policy dialogues to strengthen gender equality	Implementing agencies should have policies related to gender equality, and experience implementing activities targeting women	Gender goals set by Gender Action Plan II are monitored through annual status reports. External consultants will review implementation and effectiveness at end of period. Government ODA experts and advising implementing organizations will support monitoring efforts.	Implementing partner GIZ's Climate Finance Readiness Program supports regional and national climate institutions, advises on national climate strategy development (NAMAs and NAPS), helps develop NDAs to access GCF
United States (USAID)	2010	Integrate gender equality and female empowerment into USAID's work; strength development outcomes by integrating climate change in Agency programming, learning, policy dialogues, and operations	Gender analysis is a mandatory requirement that is to be integrated into all parts of policy process including strategic planning, project design and approval.	Bureaus and country offices must perform gender analyses in Country Development and Cooperation Strategies, Development Objectives, and Immediate Results.	Office of Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment manages Gender Advisors for technical assistance and gender trainings in projects. Financially supports GIZ's Climate Finance Readiness Program
Japan (Japan International Cooperation Agency)	2009	Mainstream gender perspectives into policy planning and measures that are not directly intended to benefit women. Strengthen Japan's support for developing countries to promote gender equality and women's empowerment.	Understand different living conditions and needs of women and men at project planning stage, and take into account when implementing projects; identify gender-responsive projects	Projects are monitored and evaluated in consultation with the Office for Gender Equality and Poverty Reduction.	Technical assistance is one of Japan's areas of development assistance. JICA supports a few TA projects on gender, as well as environmental and disaster risk management. TA includes dispatch of experts, training of local officials, and supply of equipment

4.2.1. United Kingdom International Climate Fund

Created in 2010, the International Climate Fund (ICF) provided £3.87 billion through March 2016 from the Department for International Development (DfID), the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and the Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), with DfID providing the bulk of the funds. In the wake of the 2015 Paris climate accords, the UK renewed their commitment to climate finance and the ICF by promising an additional £5.8 billion from 2016 – 2021. Between 2011 and 2016, nearly three quarters of the £4.97 billion spent was directed to developing countries via multilateral funds such as the CIF, GEF, and GCF, or £3.58 billion (Pearce & Hickman, 2017). Approximately 8% of the UK's foreign aid (ODA) budget goes to climate-related projects. Among the climate-related projects, ICF aims for a funding split of 50% towards adaptation, 20% to forestry, and 30% to low carbon development (International Climate Fund, 2011). Around one-fifth of ICF's funding goes to country-specific projects, with Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya as the top recipients. Other bilateral regional funding also primarily goes to Africa and Asia (Pearce & Hickman, 2017).

While bilateral and multilateral funding sources are not always differentiated in project descriptions, in many cases different UK-government funded schemes put out requests for proposals for projects in a selection of priority developing countries with various thematic and sector focuses. In the database, there are 16 open funds tagged with 'Climate Change' and 'Girls and Women' sector focuses. Funds are primarily open to NGOs and private sector entities, with only two funds open to local governments (DfID, 2018b). Although all funds open to NGOs are open to national organizations, for funds with a regional or global focus rather than country project grants, DfID suggests that national NGOs build partner coalitions or join with international NGOs (DfID, 2018a). In addition, DfID outlines a minimum grant size of £800,000 and states that there might not be an option for advance payments of grants ahead of project implementation, suggesting that these funding mechanisms would only be feasible for organizations with substantial financial capacity, likely with international connections. Indeed, one of the recommendations from its independent evaluator ICAI in 2014 was that "the ICF should deepen its engagement with developing country governments and national stakeholders, including through greater emphasis on capacity development" (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2014). The access modality for finance from ICF may limit the kinds of actors who have access to fund, including women and women's organizations.

The ICF indicates 'women and girls' as a crosscutting theme across its funding focus on adaptation, low-carbon development, and forestry: "Women and girls: All ICF programmes will be required to consider the impacts on women and girls to ensure appropriate design and this will be tracked during implementation wherever possible" (International Climate Fund, 2011). This aligns with DfID's mandate through national legislation, the International Development (Gender Equality) Act, which passed in 2014. The legislation states that it is desirable for ODA for poverty reduction "to contribute to reducing inequality between persons of different gender," and that gender-related differences should be accounted for in project needs, but lacks clarity in how reducing inequality is measured and operationalized (International Development (Gender Equality) Act, 2014).

As of 2008, DfID also had a gender outcomes section in its logframe manual for performance management and evaluation, but acknowledged barriers in staff motivation and capacity to include gender in logframe evaluations:

It is important to bear in mind that almost any mention of gender/women in the logframe is better than nothing, and advocacy activities should be geared to this end. This ensures that at least some attention is paid to gender issues in processes of management, resource allocation, and monitoring – and it opens the door to increasing attention to gender issues in review processes. (DfID, 2011)

It is clear that efforts in the UK via the ICF and DfID have been made to incorporate gender equality into project design, measurement, and evaluation of both development and climate projects. However, gender considerations in the ICF lack the robustness and purpose of the multilateral climate funds, and do not compose a substantial portion of its thematic approach or operations.

4.2.2. Norway International Climate Forest Initiative

Norway's International Climate Forest Initiative (NICFI) was established at the UNFCCC COP 13 in 2007, where the government announced that Norway would allocate up to 3 billion NOK (\$383 million USD) annually to reduce deforestation in line with the newly adopted REDD+ program. Through the end of 2016, NICFI reported a disbursement of around 18.8 billion NOK (\$2.4 billion USD). NICFI has bilateral partnerships with around a dozen countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, multilateral partners, and a civil society fund. Approximately one quarter of disbursements went to multilateral channels, primarily the World Bank-operated Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the Forest Investment Program (FIP) operated through the CIF, and UN REDD. Around 10% of the funds (\$38 million USD) went to the NICFI civil society funding scheme, which is operated by NORAD, Norway's international development agency (Norad, 2016). The civil society fund is eligible to civil society actors involved in reducing deforestation and forest degradation in targeted developing countries, and rarely, inter-governmental agencies outside the UN. For-profit entities are generally not eligible for funding, but local government or commercial actors may be local partners when considered the best option. Cross-cutting issues must be taken into consideration in the project proposal, including, environment and climate, anti-corruption, and gender equality perspectives, and incorporated into the project where relevant (Norad, 2014b).

NICFI does not have a standalone gender policy, but rather abides by gender guidelines from its partners like UN REDD. In 2010, Decision 1/CP.16 from COP 16 suggested that countries "address gender considerations, among other issues, when developing and implementing their REDD+ national strategies or action plans," and at COP 17 the Decision 12/CP.17 informed countries how gender considerations be incorporated into their Safeguard Information Systems for REDD (REDD+ SES, 2012). NICFI is also influenced by guidelines from its umbrella agencies such as NORAD and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an Action Plan for Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation in 2007 to extend until 2013. A small subsection on the environment and sustainable development around women in developing countries outlined commitment to active participation in natural resource management by women and men, equal property and land

rights for women, and acknowledgement of women’s local knowledge on climate change and natural disaster adaptation strategies (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). The action plan also highlighted ownership, country context, and support for civil society in working with partner countries on their own development targets.

The subsequent 2016 Action Plan titled “Freedom, Empowerment and Opportunities” describes Norway as a pioneer for gender equality and focuses on five priority areas, including education, violence against women, and political, economic, and reproductive rights (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). The plan also references the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals as building on international human rights obligations and tackling structural obstacles to women’s equality. When identifying key challenges for women’s rights, climate change is highlighted as “affecting food production, migration levels and the environment, [which] can have humanitarian consequences that often hit women, particularly women farmers, harder than men” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). The focus on the rights of women in development strategy could utilize the transformative aspects of gender mainstreaming to achieve gender equality. However, although mentioned in the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s gender equality action plan, climate change is not linked to gender other than in connection to the disproportionate effects on women, which relate more to a narrative on women’s vulnerability to climate change than examining or shifting structural factors perpetuating inequalities that a rights-based approach might promote.

In a 2012 evaluation of the NICFI civil society scheme managed by NORAD, evaluators highlighted a few projects with explicit attention to women and gender issues, but overall thought gender and biodiversity lacked attention. “With one exception, where gender-specific interventions were developed and piloted, projects seem to be largely gender-blind” (Norad, 2012). In addition, the evaluation cited a general lack of capacity or understanding of gender issues from NICFI’s partner countries (Norad, 2014a). A 2017 evaluation of NICFI outlines its gender-sensitive approach as following the UN guidelines and commitments to gender equality, but highlights that gender indicators measure outputs rather than outcomes: “However, at both the multilateral and bilateral levels too much attention is given to the number of women participating in project/programmes activities, rather than on the outcomes of this participation (such as whether they have improved access to services, resources, information, training, etc.)” (Norad, 2017). A ‘counting’ of women in project indicators in many ways is an improvement on baseline sex-disaggregated data and may show trends that provide evidence to move the needle on both gender equality and climate change. However, the inclusion of gender indicators in reporting may be considered a box-checking exercise for rather than an established value promoted by NICFI and adopted by its implementing partners.

4.2.3. Germany International Climate Initiative

The International Climate Initiative (IKI) was founded in 2008 as part of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) in order for Germany to meet its commitments to the Convention of Biological Diversity, and later, the nationally determined contributions of the Paris Agreement and support of the UNFCCC. The fund also represents a part of Germany’s contribution to the collective commitment made in Copenhagen in 2009 to jointly mobilize \$100 billion a year towards climate finance. The fund

has four primary focuses: mitigation, adaptation, REDD+ forestry initiatives and conserving biological diversity (IKI, 2018b). From its inception in 2008 through 2016, IKI has given £2.3 billion to more than 500 projects apart from its commitments to multilateral funds such as the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund. Around half of the funds have gone towards mitigation, a quarter towards adaptation, and 15% towards REDD+ forestry and 10% to conserving biodiversity. IKI works primarily in low and middle-income regions. All ODA eligible countries are eligible for IKI funding, but IKI has 14 priority countries, including among others, Brazil, Russia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and South Africa (IKI, 2017). Germany development bank KfW and development organization GIZ are the primary implementing organizations for many of the projects. Germany announced in 2015 in Paris that it would double its climate funding from two to four billion euros annually (Appunn, 2017).

The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) also contributes substantially to Germany's climate action commitments, providing £3.4 billion of official budget assistance, along with £5.2 billion in loans, equity investments, and financing from capital market funds in 2016, ostensibly coordinating its multilateral and bilateral efforts with BMUB. The funds are split pretty evenly between mitigation and adaptation, and around 85% goes bilateral efforts (BMZ, 2017). BMZ conceptually links the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda to the Paris Agreement as global charters for the future, combining decreasing poverty with mitigating climate change, effectively linking its climate and development policy (BMZ, 2016). Though contributing substantial amounts of funding, there are critiques of Germany's accounting of climate finance that cite a double counting development projects as climate finance even when mitigation or adaptation only make up a small part of the project (Appunn, 2017).

The IKI does not have its own gender policy or an explicit focus on gender but as of 2017 aligns with the Green Climate Fund's Environmental and Social Safeguards, which do include standards on gender for accreditation for its implementing agencies, asking that "institutions have policies related to gender equality, and experience implementing activities targeting women" (GIZ & WRI, 2015). In its interim and final grant reports, there is an evaluation indicator for proportion of women served, and a spot to describe co-benefits of the project, which could include gender. In its project portfolio, IKI highlights its implementing partner, the consortium GenderCC-Women for Climate Justice and its Gender into Urban Climate Change Initiative (GUCCI) project, which received a £1.9 million grant from BMUB. The project was piloted in Indonesia, South Africa, and India, and focuses on capacity building for national organizations, training of gender and climate change experts, and the development of monitoring and evaluation methods of local policy for environmental and social impacts (including gender). Efforts to include local women's organizations and increase women's participation were also included in the project results (IKI, 2018a).

IKI has a few key projects that focus on gender equality and climate change objectives that highlight building capacity in local organizations to work on national climate and gender policies, which include transformative aspects of expanding women's participation in climate policymaking. However, IKI does not have an overall focus on gender issues. While BMZ has a cross-sectoral gender equality strategy in its development policy and coordinates its efforts to

some extent with IKI and BMUB, it is unknown to what extent gender action strategies are embraced across agencies.

4.2.4. United States Global Climate Change Initiative

The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCCI) was established in 2010 through President Obama's Policy Directive on Global Development. Between 2010 and 2016, GCCCI spent between \$300 and \$400 million each year through congressionally appropriated grant-based assistance (USAID, 2017b). GCCCI focuses on three pillars: clean energy, adaptation, and sustainable landscapes, focused deforestation similar to the UN's REDD+ program. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administers most of the bilateral funds, but other agencies such as the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation also support fund administration.

One of USAID's strategic objectives seeks to mainstream climate change into the organization by "strengthen[ing] development outcomes by integrating climate change in Agency programming, learning, policy dialogues, and operations" (USAID, 2012a). Climate change and its effects are portrayed as a threat multiplier for other issues like food security, conflict, and migration. One of its guiding principles for climate programming includes using gender-sensitive approaches. The principle uses both women as 'nature's caretaker' and vulnerability language described in section 3, where "women often possess special skills and experiences relevant to climate change, especially knowledge of local ecosystems, agriculture and natural resources management" but they are also "disproportionately vulnerable to the effects of climate change" (USAID, 2012a). Implementation of gender-sensitive approaches primarily include consideration of vulnerable populations such as women, LGBT, and indigenous populations in program creation and evaluation.

USAID also has a Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, created in 2012. The policy does not specifically discuss gendered impacts of climate change, but does discuss natural disasters and conflict, that "women and girls often suffer disproportionately due to socially-constructed norms, breakdowns in law and order, or disrupted livelihoods due to displacement" (USAID, 2012b). USAID also utilizes gender mainstreaming as a strategy to integrate gender throughout the program cycle and across departments:

Gender integration involves identifying, and then addressing, gender inequalities during strategy and project design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Since the roles and power relations between men and women affect how an activity is implemented, it is essential that project managers address these issues on an ongoing basis. (USAID, 2012b)

It is clear that integrating both climate and gender into development has been a priority of development aid organizations and USAID in particular. In the development sector, both the integration climate change and gender are framed as opportunities for economic growth. For gender equality goals, women have huge potential as underused human capital because of social and political obstacles to their participation in society (USAID, 2015). Climate change can be addressed through the development of new technologies, and USAID can help mobilize private sector climate investment into developing countries via Overseas Private Investment Company

(OPIC) (USAID, 2012a). Both strategies allow an agency like USAID to hedge its bets between rights-based strategies found in the GAD framing of development and the economic growth strategies found in WID to attract funders and supporters with varied interests.

The Automated Directives System for USAID, which outlines the operational policies of the organization, mandates the use of gender analysis across the policy cycle. Bureaus and country offices must perform gender analyses in Country Development and Cooperation Strategies, Development Objectives, and Immediate Results. There is no agency-wide framework for gender analysis, but frameworks used should include sex-disaggregated descriptive statistics and evaluation across six domains: laws and policies, cultural norms, time use, access to assets/resources, and power and decision making (USAID, 2017a). As of 2011, there are also seven output and outcome indicators for gender that are to be used in performance management plans, including indicators like “Number of laws, policies, or procedures drafted, proposed, or adopted to promote gender equality at the regional, national or local level” (USAID, 2012b). In the past ten years, gender considerations have been integrated into many aspects of USAID operations. However, absent an analysis on gender equality outcomes, USAID’s gender integration strategy faces the challenges outlined in Section 2.2, particularly of gender mainstreaming as a technocratic tool and box-checking exercise (Manell, 2012).

The change in political administration has changed the nature of the United States’ participation in climate finance. In March 2017, President Trump rescinded Obama’s Executive Order 13653, “Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change” and in June 2017, he announced the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Edwards & Igoe, 2017). The president has expressed his desire to “stop payments of US tax dollars to UN global warming funds” in light of regulations that hurt American producers and consumers, including eliminating funding for GCCI in budget cuts to USAID and the State Department (Edwards & Igoe, 2017). Although it may be too soon to evaluate the impact on ODA and climate finance, the United States provides an explicit example of the global uncertainty that emerges when the goals of a new administration do not comply and severely undermine international accords on climate finance. Future research could indicate whether changes in national political administrations substantially affect either funding or policies regarding bilateral or multilateral climate objectives, or whether climate change commitments have staying power beyond election cycles.

4.2.5. Japan International Cooperation Agency

Japan does not have a specific climate fund, but channels much of its climate-specific aid for developing countries via the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), its international development agency. Other climate and environment efforts take place through the Ministry of the Environment as well as the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO), which support the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), a market mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to promote low-carbon technologies with participating developing countries (JICA, 2017b). JICA spends about one third of its ODA on multilateral contributions, and of the remaining two-thirds, around \$5.6 billion USD go to grants and technical assistance and \$1.4 billion USD went to loans in 2016 (JICA, 2017a). JICA cites the Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Agreement as part of an international

framework surrounding development cooperation, informing its work on climate change initiatives (JICA, 2017a).

JICA has four main focuses in its climate change work: 1) Promoting low-carbon, climate-resilient urban development and infrastructure investment, 2) Enhancing comprehensive climate risk management, 3) Supporting climate policy and institutional development, and 4) Enhancing conservation and management of forests and other ecosystems (JICA, 2016).

While “Gender and Development” is a thematic issue in JICA’s portfolio, gender and climate change do not seem to be purposefully integrated. JICA follows OECD’s “DAC Guidelines for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-Operation,” and also outlines gender mainstreaming as a process towards achieving gender equality. JICA cites a need for more data: “It is critical to collect and comprehensively analyze fundamental data needed for plans and projects by gender, age, ethnicity and religious affiliation” as well as the evaluation of gender impacts: “It is essential to review areas and projects that at first glance may appear not to require a gender perspective and provide support based on the different roles of men and women” (JICA, 2018). JICA’s Environmental and Social Guidelines has funders evaluate their project along a list of environmental and social impacts, where gender is one of several dozen potential impacts listed (JICA, 2010). JICA also has a Strategy, Approach, and Framework for gender equality and women’s empowerment in development. Its strategic objectives allow the agency to screen and categorize aid along three goals: “Gender equality projects” promote Gender-Responsive Policies, Strategies and Institutions, “Projects targeting women” promote women’s empowerment, and “Gender-integrated projects” promote gender integration in programs and projects (JICA, 2011). In 2009, only 1.9% of screened technical assistance projects were categorized as “Gender equality projects;” no loans or grant projects had this categorization (JICA, 2011). A few gender-integrated projects are also related to climate change and environmental sustainability, such as projects like “Establishing a Sustainable System for Water Use with a Gender Perspective” in Senegal and “Biodiversity, Forest Management and Women’s Participation” in Tamil Nadu, India (JICA, 2011). However, while overall climate goals seem well-integrated into development projects through Japan’s commitment to sustainable development goals, the prevalence or proportion of gender-related projects that involve climate change is unclear since the Gender Strategy’s publication in 2011.

4.3. Market-Based Mechanisms

Market-based mechanisms have long been proposed by economists as an efficient way of addressing environmental problems. Market-based mechanisms differ from so-called command and control policies that dictate pollution levels or the technologies that must be used to mitigate environmental harm. Instead, market-based systems apply some form of cost to pollution and let market signaling dictate the lowest cost way to achieve pollution reductions. These mechanisms often come in the form of a pollution tax or a tradable permit system. At the international level, a tradable permit system has been implemented in both mandatory and voluntary markets through the use of carbon offset credits. These credits allow governments, companies, or individuals to reduce their carbon emissions by purchasing credits representing tons of mitigated emissions from third-party activities. In theory such systems allow for more cost-effective methods for reducing carbon emissions, but verification and measurement issues

can complicate these systems in practice. While these market-based mechanisms may create social co-benefits through the projects they incentivize, the flexibility of these systems makes it more difficult to mandate and verify these co-benefits compared to the climate funds above. However, there have been efforts to incentivize the inclusion of such co-benefits including specifically for women through standards and verification mechanisms. Market-based mechanisms have been able to raise significant amounts of investment for carbon mitigation projects, so it is important to consider their gender differentiated impacts.

4.3.1. Clean Development Mechanism

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established under article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 as a way of reducing carbon mitigation costs toward the Kyoto goals by allowing Annex B countries to offset emissions by buying Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) credits from non-Annex-B countries. Between 2001 and 2011 the CDM issued over 750 million CER (each equivalent to 1 ton of carbon emissions offsets) generating between \$9.5 and \$13.5 billion in revenue and stimulating around \$215 billion in investments for mitigation projects (Kirkman, Seres, Haites, & Spalding-Fecher, 2012). While there is debate over the measurement of CERs and their true “additionality” in offsetting carbon emissions, the mechanism has had a significant impact on clean energy investments in the developing world. In recent years, a lack of confidence in the accounting standards of CERs has led low prices and a deflation of the market, but there has been discussion at the UNFCCC of replacing the CDM with a similar, but more robust, Sustainable Development Mechanism under the Paris Agreement.

The CDM does not have any specific gender requirements for certified projects, but it does have a dual mandate of reducing carbon emissions and promoting sustainable development in host countries. The sustainable development goal is where there is the most potential for projects to include gender co-benefits. However, the focus of the verification process has been on assuring additional carbon offsets while sustainable development goals—which are much harder to quantify—are often based on assurances given by project implementers (Olsen, 2007). The CDM has taken some steps to encourage investment in projects with social benefits including gender benefits. The CDM has many methodologies, or project types, that can be used for creating carbon offsets and it has created a women and children icon indicating the project types most likely to have gender benefits. This icon is intended to encourage investment in these types of projects for socially-minded investors. The CDM has also allowed for the pooling of smaller projects in the verification process, which lowers the cost of verification for small projects that are often more likely to benefit women such as improved cookstoves, biogas, or rural electrification. Though these steps make it easier for investors to choose projects that may benefit women, the CDM has no requirements for the inclusion of gender considerations.

There have been third party efforts to add verification methodologies for social and gender goals. In 2003, the World Wildlife Foundation and other NGOs started the Gold Standard to verify and incentivize sustainable development goals in CDM projects. The Gold Standard assesses projects’ adherence to additional stakeholder engagement and sustainability monitoring and measures them along 12 sustainable development indicators including gender. Projects that receive certification are then marketed a supporting the sustainable development goals and sold at a premium. While the program is voluntary, it issued over 10.3 million carbon

credits in 2016 and it was estimated that projects could produce as high as \$177 in added social value per ton of carbon off-set for some project types (Gold Standard, 2017). The Finnish Foreign Ministry also developed a gender spectacles tool that serves as a rapid assessment for the potential of gender benefits across different types of CDM projects. This tool allows for the selection of project types with the highest likelihood of producing gender co-benefits. While these two third party tools can incentivize investment in projects with social and gender benefits, both are voluntary mechanisms.

4.3.2. The W+ Standard

As an extension of the sustainable development verification mechanisms of CCB and the Gold Standard, the organization Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (WOCAN) launched a W+ standard that tracks benefits specifically for women in 2013 (WOCAN, 2016). The argument for the W+ standard is that women in the developing world are chronically under-financed, which can exacerbate the gender gap and stymie women's potential to make transformative change in their communities. A number of studies have shown that women's empowerment can lead to more reinvestment in families, higher agricultural yields, and overall economic growth (Gurung & Pearl-Martinez, 2015). To encourage investment in women and women's organizations, the W+ standard quantifies benefits for women across six domains: time, income and assets, health, leadership, education and knowledge, and food security. After W+ projects are completed, their benefits for women are verified and converted into W+ credits as "determined by the number of women receiving benefits, and the level of impact for each domain used" (WOCAN, 2016), which can be bought by organizations wanting to fulfill their CSR targets or individuals who want to support women's empowerment. This model is based on carbon credits and can be added to carbon mitigation projects in the form of W+ verified carbon credits as a way of assuring added social value. Of the revenue generated by W+ unit sales, at least 20% must go to the women who benefited from the project and the rest funds the verification process and goes back to the project implementer (Gurung & Pearl-Martinez, 2015).

The W+ standard is still new--there are currently 8 W+ projects and 3 that have created verified benefits--but has generated excitement for its potential to spur investment in women and its innovation method for quantifying and monetizing realized benefits for women (WOCAN, 2016). Substantial investment in W+ credits or W+ verified carbon credits could provide substantial financial incentives for projects to include gender benefits in their design and WOCAN's verification methods would assure that these benefits are being realized. However, it is unclear how much revenue has been raised from the sale of W+ units or what the demand for these units will be. Unlike CERs, there is no financial incentive to invest in W+ in order to lower costs for mandated emissions reductions. W+ operates, therefore, more like voluntary carbon offsetting systems, but the units of generated benefits are not as easy to understand or as marketable as individuals or companies wanting to be carbon-free through offsetting. However, the W+ standard may serve as a unique mechanism for donors interested in supporting women's empowerment to support verified benefits or as gender-specific addition to carbon credits for actors willing to pay a premium for gender co-benefits like the Gold Standard. Perhaps the most intriguing part of the W+ standard is its methodology for quantifying gender benefits. Similar methodologies could be a way for the various financial mechanisms listed

about to track their performance on their dual goals of addressing climate change and gender equality. As climate funds continue developing their gender policies and as the next generation of the CDM (the SDM) is developed, these methodologies could be considered.

5. Discussion

5.1. Findings for Climate Issue Linkage from Studying Climate-Gender Linkage

An examination of current practices linking gender equality to climate change in climate finance offer broad lessons for issue linkage in the climate regime at large. Though the linkage of gender has been very visible in recent years, other issues such as human rights, international trade, indigenous rights, biodiversity, and international development have also been linked to climate change to various extents. These linkages beg the question of why different issues have been connected to climate change and whether this linkage improves climate outcomes, outcomes of linked issues, both, or neither. It may be that the level of funding and prominence given to addressing climate change has attracted advocates for other issues to engage with the climate regime or that the fundamental existential threats of climate change and the pervasiveness of its causes and solutions across society has connected previously disparate issues. Whatever the reason, given that issue linkage is occurring throughout the climate regime, what are the lessons that can be learned about how this is occurring within different institutional contexts of the climate regime, how it is being practiced at multiple levels from multilateral institutions to national governments to local contexts, how can this linkage can be most beneficial simultaneously for climate and linked issues, and how can progress toward these multiple objectives can be evaluated?

The first observation about issue linkage in the climate regime is its interaction with the regime complex of global action on climate change. The regime complex is a description of the decentralized organization of multiple institutions with different foci (across scale and issues) and authorities (e.g. national governments, the UN, NGOs, or private capital) shaping global climate change policy (Keohane & Victor, 2011). This kind of organization has several implications for the linkage of issues with climate change. First, the regime complex of climate change tends to lead to more uneven implementation of policies across the multiple institutions included in its structure. This can be seen in the number of years it took for gender policies to be adopted by all the major climate funds (from 2011 to 2017) and the various ways in which these policies have been implemented. This uneven policy implementation has led to opportunities for experimentation and learning. However, it may also create the possibility of forum shopping and slower policy adoption, depending on the organizational incentives of governing bodies.

Second, the multitude of actors and authorities in a regime complex may also dilute responsibility, coordination, and efficiency in pursuing non-primary goals. For example, before the Climate Investment Funds implemented its own gender policy, it deferred responsibility for considering gender to the institutionally distinct multilateral development banks that implement its investment plans, which each have their own gender policies. As a second example, though the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol requires projects to

also support sustainable development goals, it has mostly left the articulation of sustainable development outcomes to project developers and the verification and implementation of these outcomes to third parties and the countries in which mitigation projects are funded. Without clear delineation of responsibility and authority for ensuring that actions intended to impact linked issues perform to expectations, the institutional complexity of international climate policy may make it harder to coordinate efforts and to efficiently pursue secondary goals as compared to organizational structures with more clearly defined roles amongst a complex system of actors.

Finally, the regime complex of global climate policy also provides a unique opportunity for learning across institutions, geographic regions, and sectors. The diversity of actors and institutions linking climate change and gender equality enables different actors to collaborate and experiment with new ideas and share best practices across multiple foci. For example, the Green Climate Fund could learn from the measurement and valuation practices of the W+ standard developed by the advocacy group Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (WOCAN). It is also worth asking the question if efficiency ought to be the primary metric for issue linkage if focusing only on the primary goal of addressing climate change means systematically leaving certain groups behind. Though perhaps not as efficient as a more centralized governance system in some respects, the regime complex of climate change may be ideal for pollinating ideas and piloting policies (such as linking gender equality, indigenous rights, or biodiversity within climate finance) in different contexts to learn what works before scaling up. (Sabel & Victor, 2016).

The second observation taken from the examination of gender policies in climate finance is that issue linkage comes in many different forms and may be considered with a range of criteria. Linkage may vary based on the number of institutions or organization involved and their respective levels of authority, power, and capacity. The number and salience of goals may also affect the capacity for effective linkage and how issues are linked. Some organizations or institutions may give primacy to one goal over another, whereas others may see two or more goals as equally important or simultaneously determined. Examples of different kinds of issue linkage may include the following:

- 1) Multiple institutions working for separate goals with loose coordination on implementation of their goals.
- 2) Single institutions working toward a single primary goal with one or more secondary goals (“co-benefits”) that may shape implementation significantly, on the margins, or not at all (but simply are measured).
- 3) Single institutions working toward multiple objectives simultaneously.




Figure 1. Schematic Representation of Issue Linkage Institutional Forms

Issue linkage in the climate “regime complex” can be achieved under institutional forms, represented in three modes schematically above (from left to right): 1) Multiple institutions working for separate goals with loose coordination on implementation of their goals; 2) Single institutions working toward a single primary goal with one or more secondary goals (“co-benefits”) that may shape implementation significantly, on the margins, or not at all (but simply are measured); and 3) Single institutions working toward multiple objectives simultaneously. In practice, implementation of issue linkage may combine elements of these three forms institutional forms.

We propose that these various types of issue linkage in the climate regime can be broadly compared on a spectrum from strong to weak linkage. Strong linkage refers to institutions that have made goals such as climate mitigation and adaptation and gender equality central to their mission and integrated into all their practices. This is related but distinct from the idea of gender mainstreaming and should be considered more as a qualitative evaluation of how multiple goals are pursued in implementation than as a description of how policies are crafted. Weak linkage, on the other hand, refers to strategies that seek to improve secondary goals on the margins whether as “co-benefits” to primary goals or requiring certain kinds of reporting methods on secondary goals in the pursuit of a primary goal. By making the distinction between strong and weak, we intend to describe how issue linkage is practiced and not evaluate the effectiveness of the linkage. It is possible that weak linkage may be more economically efficient and even result in better outcomes for secondary goals in some cases.

There are certain considerations and potential tradeoffs between strong and weak linkage. Strong linkage requires higher start-up costs. These costs may come in forming institutions with multiple goals and capacities built in to their inception or the organizational overhaul required to practice strong linkage in an institution that previously only had one primary goal. Consequently, strong linkage may provide more long-run efficiency and policy coherence across the goals being pursued. This efficiency may come from the development of multiple capacities or synergies created between goals. However, there may be fundamental tradeoffs between pursuing multiple goals that may depend on organizational capacity. For example, organizations that are initially focused on one goal may experience “mission creep” that degrades organizational performance in the process of shifting toward pursuing multiple goals.

The third observation is that issue linkage seems to play an important role in coalition formation within and outside the climate change regime. Climate linkage can serve as a mechanism for “expanding the tent” of institutions and organization engaging in climate action by including issues like gender equality, social justice, or economic development. Climate change may also serve as a focal point for advocates of other issues to rally behind. The amount of attention given to climate change may be particularly advantageous for actors hoping to raise the salience of their own overlooked areas of interest. The events at Standing Rock, where American Indian protesters blocked the expansion of an oil pipeline that threatened to contaminate their drinking water, likely raised awareness about the mistreatment of indigenous peoples in the U.S. because it became linked with the fight against climate change (whether or not this was the intent of the original protesters). Observations of how issue linkage has facilitated coalition building in advocating for gender equality provides lessons for how advocacy groups can use issue linkage as a tool to build coalitions across issue areas.

The fourth observation is simply that measuring multiple objectives requires significant organizational capacity. The best evidence of this fact is the contrast between the Clean Development Mechanism’s robust measures for carbon accounting and its virtually non-existent mechanisms for verifying sustainable development goals. Progress toward many social goals (like gender equality) are more difficult to measure and verify than carbon emission reductions, but combining both goals in a single mechanism (and combining evaluation of progress toward both goals for individual projects) compounds the demands on verifying organizations. Using multiple criteria for evaluation makes it harder to measure progress and update implementation strategies in response to empirical evaluation. This challenge is especially acute in project finance, as success can be defined in multiple ways, making it difficult to measure how effectively finance was used and to compare across projects or programs. There is no simple, agreed-upon way to weight different kinds of outcomes for projects with multiple objectives (e.g. adaptation vs. mitigation, social vs. technical), especially when tradeoffs exist. Innovative accounting methods for social benefits like WOCAN’s W+ may simplify comparisons by converting outcomes to comparable metrics, but this kind of accounting requires time, value judgments, and assumptions that can make the process less efficient and transparent. This measurement difficulty is a fundamental challenge for effective issue linkage and therefore an area ripe for innovation.

Finally, it is important to note how the linkage of gender equality in climate finance institutions highlights the opportunity cost of not linking social issues with climate change. If the world is to meet the 2 degrees C goal laid out by the Paris Agreement, trillions of dollars will need to be mobilized for investment in multiple sectors for mitigation and adaptation in addition to the mobilization of non-monetary resources. This mobilization will undoubtedly transform large parts of the economy and society. If these resources are channeled under existing institutional structures, existing power dynamics are likely to be reinforced and deepened. Undertaking this transformation without considering non-climate impacts therefore carries significant opportunity costs. In other words, achieving the world’s climate goals will require a fundamental restructuring of society that can either lead to more or less equitable outcomes for marginalized countries, communities, and people around the world. The transformation required to address climate change may offer the best opportunity to address a number of other social issues facing the world today. This opportunity also has the potential to dive diverse institutions across scales

and sectors to engage with the climate regime to achieve their objectives. This is perhaps the most compelling argument for linking social issues with climate changes and making sure these linkages are made most effectively.

5.2. Open Questions and Future Directions for Gender-Climate Linkage

Myriad challenges and opportunities emerge as gender specifically is linked to climate change and becomes a strategic priority for climate finance institutions. All multilateral funds now have a gender policy in place, and gender equality is one of several cross-cutting goals for new climate finance institutions. In contrast with the straightforward gender policies in place at multilateral funds, bilateral fund climate-focused finance is more closely linked to development goals than to gender equality goals explicitly. As demonstrated in the table above, the way that these institutions engage with national and regional entities for project implementation varies widely, and therefore the interpretation of gender equality in policies and the manifestation of those policies in practice varies widely as well. Should these institutions implement a top-down interpretation of gender equality, or rely on local, culturally sensitive gender norms? Projects with a view of gender equality outcomes as defined by the climate funds themselves may theoretically result in greater gains for women, but if local context is ignored the projects may fail in implementation. Alternatively, if local gender norms that are out of step with international norms are prioritized, in many regions, the movement towards gender equality may be miniscule at best. How the climate funds should navigate the spectrum of global gender norms across scales as they push for equality is an open question.

Across the climate regime there is concern that widening issue linkage could stall climate action under certain circumstances. For the gender-climate linkage specifically, the lack of globally agreed gender norms stands in contrast to international norms around climate where there is broad, contractually established agreement. There is unquestionably a risk that climate progress could be slowed if disagreement about gender blocks project implementation. For example, if the GCF requires projects to consider gender dimensions in local decision making, there could theoretically be a project that checks many or all other climate mitigation boxes (such as cost-effective emissions reductions or co-benefits in ecosystem services) that doesn't move forward due to opposition to the imposition of international gender norms that do not align with local norms. The GCF would be required to insist that the project should not move forward, despite meaningful climate mitigation benefits. At a minimum this sort of disagreement could cause months or years-long project delays which the urgency of climate change cannot afford. In addition, the dilution of responsibility within the regime complex explored above (multilateral institutions deferring to national institutions or even to implementing agencies within countries) could simply mean that gender-progressive climate projects will only be implemented in countries where gender equality is already prioritized. This could theoretically widen the gender equality gap globally by catalyzing improvements in regions where conditions for men and women are already fairly equal, while stalling progress in regions where the gender equality gap is already large.

As climate funds push for multiple objectives, such as climate mitigation, adaptation and gender equality, there must be broad acknowledgement that achieving those objectives will require

much more than just financing. Many multilateral funds include requirements for national and regional capacity building around gender equality, but the tools and training that enable those efforts must be robust and well-funded themselves to be successful. Are climate funds really the best organizations to build this capacity? They may be, simply due to the fact that they are envisioned as key facilitators of the flows of global capital. However, given the urgency of climate change, perhaps their funds and efforts should remain directly focused on adaptation and mitigation efforts without the distraction of additional objectives. Is it good enough for climate funds to set a goal of not making life less equal for women? This sort of precautionary, “do-no-harm” approach might be a more realistic and implementable strategy than requiring co-benefits across a multitude of linked issues, especially gender equality.

At this point, gender mainstreaming in climate finance policy as a process is largely complete in the sense that it has been adopted in the technical rules of all leading organizations, but it remains to be seen if effective implementation will follow. The ‘virtue and vulnerability’ narrative appears widely in communications and policies of bilateral and multilateral institutions, but is considered outdated and even potentially damaging because it conflates gender as the root cause of vulnerability. The true causes of women’s vulnerability are much more nuanced and regionally varied such as poor education systems, lack of control over resources, and culturally established gender norms. An acknowledgement in organizational narratives that vulnerability is not an ‘intrinsic characteristic’ inherited due to an individual’s gender is a necessary first step to identify where and how to target efforts to reduce vulnerability and create meaningful impacts for women in their projects. Shifting the narrative focus from a gender equality framing to a humans rights framing is one option to embrace the nuances of climate vulnerability and more expediently improve outcomes for women and men.

Looking forward, it is critical to consider and define the limits of what the climate regime can accomplish for gender equality. International climate finance institutions have been considered here, but they represent only one area of linkage - national and subnational climate policies and other institutions within the regime complex also have a role to play. What opportunities have yet to be realized? Where are the biggest limitations? The international community will not solve gender equality solely through climate finance, and recognizing the limitations of these institutions may be the best way to assess realistic opportunities for change. For the gender-climate issue linkage specifically, practice is far ahead of scholarship, and more research is needed to delve into these open questions.

In researching issue linkage in the climate regime, it is clear that practice is well out ahead of scholarship. Advocacy groups have been pushing for years to have issues such as gender equality, indigenous rights, and economic development included in the climate change discussion and policy-making process. In just the last 8 years every major multilateral climate finance institution has adopted some kind of gender policy that governs how they select, implement, and evaluate climate projects they fund. There has also been innovation by non-profits and practitioners in creatively measuring and quantifying social impacts to better include these outcomes in the evaluation of climate projects. It is therefore critically important that scholarship catch up to this practice in order to make connections across sectors and actors; facilitate learning and the development of best-practices; and to evaluate the driving forces behind issue linkage in the climate regime, its impacts, and the opportunities it offers.

6. Conclusion

The increasing acceptance of the gender-climate linkage is reflected in the development of gender policies in many—but not all—multilateral and bilateral climate funds (Schalatek & Nakhooda, 2016). As a critical mechanism for the multilateral regime to more equitably and effectively respond to climate change, these funds represent a potentially transformational force in international development. However, the funds have faced substantial challenges during their inception and initial implementation of gender considerations. The growth and evolving practices of multilateral climate funds makes it critical to develop an understanding of how they are used and could be made more effective. A critical lens has not yet been systematically applied in the literature to examine the complementarities, conflicts, and best practices of promoting gender equity in climate change finance.

Climate funds may have institutional advantages for pursuing the goal of gender equality. Integration of climate change policy in all levels of governance may provide a more effective vehicle for gender policies than traditional development aid (Alston, 2014). Including gender considerations in mitigation and adaptation projects may also lead to more inclusivity and buy-in from communities, increasing the sustainability of these projects. Finally, synergistically linking multiple objectives may lead to a more efficient use of resources in addressing both gender equity and climate change.

On the other hand, climate funds may have certain limitations in effectively linking the goals of gender equity and climate change mitigation and adaptation. Linking gender to climate may lead to double counting of official development assistance that leads to less financing for gender or climate initiatives. Gender considerations in all climate projects may lead to the selection of projects with the highest level of social co-benefits—but not the highest climate impact—creating inefficiency in pursuing climate goals. Finally, implementing gender initiatives in projects without the appropriate expertise and oversight may lead to nominal gender mainstreaming without fully realizing the goal of gender equity. As we move forward with our research, we are interested in exploring the following questions:

- Does gender mainstreaming into climate policy and financial institutions have an impact on the effectiveness of climate change mitigation and adaptation?
- Are there potential gender norm conflicts created when setting gender policies at the international level that are implemented at the national level?
- What is the body of evidence supporting the incorporation of gender policies into climate finance institutions on the grounds of vulnerability, systematic inequalities, specialized societal roles, and/or political feasibility?
- What are the advantages and limitations of climate funds in pursuing the goal of gender equality?
- What funds or practices stand out for effectively implementing gender-responsive climate policies?
- Should the development and climate sectors expand “easy” gains in outcomes in these areas, or should they foray into policy areas less conceptually linked to gender?

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Appendix: Climate Funds Background

Green Climate Fund

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a multilateral climate fund established in 2010 under the UNFCCC Cancun Decision 1/CP.16 (Schalatek, 2015). The GCF is focused on supporting developing countries as they respond to climate change, through both mitigation and adaptation. The fund's mission is to "promote a paradigm shift to low-emission and climate-resilient development, taking into account the needs of nations that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts" (GCF, 2017). Initially, US \$10.2 billion was pledged from 37 UNFCCC member countries, eight of which are developing countries. This large financial backing makes the GCF the largest multilateral fund assisting UNFCCC developing countries on both mitigation and adaptation goals, however it should be noted that only US \$5.09 billion has been deposited and President Trump cancelled US \$2 billion, making it unclear how much the GCF will be able to raise in the future. The GCF is the key action institution tasked with carrying out the transfer of US \$100 billion annually from developed to developing countries, as per the 2009 Copenhagen pledge (Schalatek, 2015). To that end, the fund will pay closest attention to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and the African states (GCF About). After establishing a board in 2012, and launching its initial resource mobilization in 2014, the first investments decisions were made in 2015. By 2016 the fund was fully operational, with 35 projects underway worth US \$1.5 billion (GCF, 2017). The GCF provides financing in the form of loans, grants, equity, and guarantees.

Global Environmental Facility

In October 1991, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) by resolution of the related interagency arrangements between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Bank (World Bank, 2018a). First, the GEF started as a pilot program to assist in the protection of the global environment and promote environmentally sound and sustainable economic development. On the eve of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the GEF was restructured and moved out of the World Bank system to become a permanent, separate institution. Since 1994, however, the World Bank has served as the Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund and provided administrative services.

The GEF has a unique governing structure where an Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat, 18 Agencies, a Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) and the Evaluation Office facilitate the conventions, and the projects are carried out in participant countries under the GEF Agencies. Over the last two decades, the GEF has provided over \$17 billion in grants and mobilized an additional \$88 billion in financing for more than 4000 projects in 170 countries (GEF, 2018). Today, the GEF is an international partnership of 183 countries, international institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector that addresses global environment issues within the GEF's six focal areas – biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, persistent organic pollutants, and ozone depletion (GEF, 2018).

Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund was established in 2001 under the Kyoto Protocol to support adaptation projects in developing countries that are parties to the Protocol and began operations in 2009 (Bird et al., 2017). Since its inception, the AF has disbursed about \$460 million to fund 70 projects in over 56 countries, and nearly \$1 million in readiness financing to support project preparation (Adaptation Fund, 2018a). The Fund is financed through 2% of the contributions to Certified Emissions Reductions under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as contributions by national governments and currently has a balance of \$411 million as of February 2018 (World Bank, 2018b). As the carbon market through the CDM weakened and the GCF has gained prominence as the main financial mechanism of the Paris Agreement, the future of the AF became uncertain (Warnecke, Tewari, Kreft, & Hohne, 2017), but deliberations at the UNFCCC have continued to highlight the importance of the AF with the decision at COP 23 that the AF shall serve the Paris Agreement (Rein, 2018).

Climate Investment Funds

The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) were established by the World Bank and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in 2008 to create “transformational change towards climate resilient, low carbon development in developing countries through scaled-up financing” (CIF, 2014). The CIF uses grants, concessional loans, equity, and guarantees to spur investment in mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries according to each country’s investment priorities (CIF, 2008). The CIF is comprised of four funds, the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP), the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), and the Forest Investment Program (FIP). The funds have different programmatic foci covering both mitigation and adaptation, and jointly control \$8 billion in resources from 14 contributor countries, which funds 300 projects in 72 countries and is expected to leverage \$52 billion in co-financing (CIF, 2016).