# FRAGILE ENERGY: POWER, NATURE, and the POLITICS OF INFRASTRUCTURE in the 'NEW TURKEY'

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# ABSTRACT

This dissertation provides a reading of political power in twenty-first century Turkey through the lens of (energy) infrastructures. By tracing the country's bourgeoning energy infrastructures along their material, legal and financial dimensions, I examine energy's ability to do political work and securing societal consent in Turkey, at a time when the idea of development is being privatized and the challenge of climate change encounters the country's growing energy deficit. Relying on ethnographic and other qualitative methods collected along the path of energy infrastructures—including corridors of the bureaucracy, investment banks, construction sites, ribbon-cutting ceremonies, energy expos, local courthouses as well as electricity grids and hydropower penstocks—I argue that energy has played an under-recognized yet influential role in the establishment and sustenance of an authoritarian neoliberal experience, what is being dubbed by its founders, the *'*new Turkey*'*. Rather than collapsing the power harnessed from energy resources with political power, I introduce energy as a form of governmental rationality in the new Turkey that seeps into other realms of government from urban governance to counter-terrorism. The prowess of this emergent rationality, which I name as *energorationality*, stems from energy's unique qualities in bringing center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital and commons together, from its ability to suture a variety of unlikely actors, policies, and ideas to each other. By examining grassroots mobilizations struggling against energy infrastructures in Turkey's rural Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR), I also discuss the fragility of energorationality. Mining disasters, unexpected droughts, unreliable projections, unruly villagers and urban riots, put delicate project cycles into disarray. I

illustrate throughout the dissertation how energy infrastructures—small hydropower plants (small hydro, or SHP) in particular—, cause unexpected cracks as well as powerful sociopolitical alliances while converting uncharted rural and environmental settings into energy landscapes.

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

> *Understanding the interconnections between using fossil fuels and making democratic claims requires tracing how these connections are built, the vulnerabilities and opportunities they create, and the narrow points of passage where control is particularly effective. Political possibilities were opened up or narrowed down by different ways of organizing the flow and concentration of energy, and these possibilities were enhanced or limited by arrangements of people, finance, expertise and violence that were assembled in the relationship to the distribution and control of energy.* (Mitchell, 2011: 8-9)

> *If the textbook definition of energy is ability to do work…can energy do political work?* (Huber, 2013: xi)

My dissertation centralizes energy as a novel lens through which to analyze and evaluate the role of political power in 21st century Turkey. I study Turkey's aggressive energy program to understand how energy is (re)valued and (re)constructed at this turbulent conjuncture by assembling new social, political and ecological meanings and relations. Tracing Turkey's bourgeoning energy infrastructures (material, legal and financial), I ask how energy policies have facilitated the Turkish state's accumulation of political power and ability to secure consent at a time when the promise of development is eroding. Focusing on small hydropower plants (small hydro, or SHP) in the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR), and utilizing qualitative methods such as ethnography, archival research, focused groups and extended interviews, I argue that energy politics has become central to the establishment of an authoritarian neoliberal experience, dubbed as 'new Turkey' by

Turkey's governing Justice and Development Party (*Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP, JDP or AK Party).

I argue that energy politics, infrastructures and the politics of growth and development have contributed to the AKP's 14-year-old hegemony due to energy's unique ability to bridge center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital and commons. What's more, I argue that electrical grids and pipelines in particular have facilitated this hegemonic project. As I have trailed energy along its stops–from conference halls to production sites, from engineering firms to courthouses, from bureaucrat's desks to development banks—I maintain that it is this bridging function that is so potent for hegemonic formations. I also discuss, however, that this hegemony is unstable and fragile, and has provoked counter-hegemonic contestations. Throughout the dissertation, I illustrate how energy infrastructures convert uncharted rural and environmental settings into energy landscapes, by causing unexpected disruptions as well as powerful socio-political alliances.

My research illustrates that the value, urgency, priority, economic and political potential attributed to energy production and infrastructures have developed into an emergent form of rationality that influences a variety of governmental domains and that subsequently, produces specific political outcomes. This emergent governmental rationality—which I call *energorationality*—eases and legitimizes political action beyond the scope of the energy field by suturing actors, policies, and ideas together. Energoratianality does not mean the ultimate priority of energy concerns over other forms of government. Nor does it suggest a form of resource reductionism in which social and political change is reduced to

absence or lack of energy. Energorationality is a form of emergent rationality among other rationalities in which ideas, practices, and images of energy becomes a benchmark for political action in, a toolkit for problem solving, in variety of administrative domains. Each of the following chapters focuses on one such domain, such as neoliberal restructuring, state-capital relations, and administrative law. In the final chapter I focus on environmental and oppositional politics as a domain a new form of language is generated counter to energorationality. that has been transformed through energy infrastructures. Through an examination of the 30-year history of energy liberalization in Turkey, I show that energy has functioned as a powerful bridge between neoliberal restructuring and the developmental state. Energy investments provide a critical platform that allows entrepreneurs to enter into the AK Party's growth-oriented, construction-based economics. However, by highlighting the material infrastructures of small hydropower, I draw attention to the vulnerabilities of how political and economic power is accumulated around these sites as water is converted to energy. I argue that in opening up uncharted valleys and villages to new forms of accumulation, SHPs have in fact destabilized the very countryside (and its environment) in ways that run counter to those actors who aim to dominate it. On the one hand, the emergence of the private energy market in Turkey has generated a legal logic that spills over into other domains of regulation to facilitate myriad forms of socio-spatial intervention. These include large-scale infrastructure projects, urban and rural redevelopment programs, environmental governance and agricultural reform, which have all reconfigured the relation between nature and property. On the other hand, anti-energy infrastructure activism has led to the emergence of a new breed of environmentalism in Turkey that is grassroots, cross-class and provincial in character and anti-capitalist in its

language, both of which were absent from local NGO-based environmentalism prior to mid-2000s. This new wave of activism creates a broader oppositional politics in Turkey with a repertoire and tactics that articulated a form of objection in defense of life in its relation to space and non-humans, best exemplified in the impromptu Gezi uprising in the summer of 2013.

## 1.1 AUTHORITARIAN NEOLIBERALISM

Until recently, Turkey was promoted as a model country by a large spectrum of the international media. Often dubbed "the Turkish model," Turkey's exemplar status was predicated on its devout Muslim ruling cadre who committed to (procedural) democracy, was willing to cooperate with the West and was eager to undertake market reforms (Tuğal, 2016). This was a godsend in the post-9/11 world order. Celebrated as a successful combination of liberal democracy and moderate Islam, Turkey's performance over the course of 2002-2013 was exalted as an example that the rest of the Middle East could and should replicate. Hailed as "the twenty-first century's first Muslim power"[1] by *Forbes*, Turkey managed to bring together unlikely partners. As Tuğal (2016: 4) aptly puts it:

> *If American neoconservatives and liberals disagreed on a range of burning issues, they united in their embrace of what they called the 'Turkish Model.' Around the turn of the millennium, the celebration of the Turkish model also brought together divided American and European elites: investment in the Turkish model could perhaps suture the wounds of a disintegrating global order.*

[1] Kanani, R. "The rise of Turkey: the twenty-first century's first Muslim power", *Forbes*, 3 March 2014, URL. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2014/03/05/the-rise-of-turkey-the-twenty-first-centurys-first-muslim-power/#c0727334d939 (accessed 3 August 2016).

Yet by 2013, the consensus over Turkey started to crumble. Some rejected the Turkish model following the government's violent suppression of the Gezi revolt in the summer of 2013, while others began asking questions six months after an international corruption scandal implicated several government ministers, President Erdoğan, and his family. Yet, the country's eventual fall from grace was secured once the AKP government priorities, projections, and objectives regarding the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict diverged significantly from those of the global powers. Turkey's ambitious yet erratic involvement in the Syrian Civil War and its unwillingness to close its borders to jihadi traffic exhausted any possibility of the government maintaining a positive reputation in the international community, and made it an unreliable partner. The government's strong counter punch following the recent failed coup attempt[2] and subsequent imprisonment of thousands overnight continues to raise concerns about the limits of Erdoğan's regime.

Today, eulogies to the AKP model and Erdoğan's leadership are rapidly being replaced with harsh criticism and frustration. While the regime in Turkey is rightfully categorized as authoritarian, how the country ended up as such is not critically accounted for, or at best, has been sidestepped by scholars. International commentators who chastise the current Turkish regime seem to have forgotten their part in establishing that very same regime over the course of a decade. By solely implicating the regime, these commentators suggest that the deterioration simply occurred overnight. More often than not, the rise of

[2] The failed coup attempt on July 15th overlapped with my dissertation writing process. I was not in Turkey and had to follow the actions of the military, the people, and the regime second-hand: through my contacts and family members in the field, social media and news outlets in the USA. It is still too early to make a conclusive analysis about the effects of these events (and it is obviously beyond the scope of this dissertation).

authoritarianism is explained on cultural grounds, citing the AKP's Islamist roots, the very thing that made the party valuable to the international community ten years ago. Furthermore, the regime's authoritarianization is understood through the persona of Erdoğan, who is believed to be power hungry, intrinsically authoritarian or suffering from a Sultan complex. If Erdoğan, as suggested in a recent *Huffington Post* article[3], managed to keep his ambitions under control, Turkey would have been just fine:

> Indeed, if Erdoğan had retired from politics in 2011 with all the party's accomplishments, he would certainly go down in history as the greatest prime minister in the history of democratic Turkey. But, as with so many leaders, after a decade in power, corruption sets in, leaders lose their touch and grow isolated and power-hungry. Erdoğan is now in the process of destroying virtually everything his party created in the first decade of governance.

My dissertation research significantly complicates these cursory readings of the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey. First, instead of searching for authoritarianism in personal, cultural, or ideological traits of political Islam and its leadership, I look at material infrastructures, one aspect of the AKP economics that even the most ardent opponents support.[4] By doing so, I point to an inherent harmony between market reforms and authoritarianism, an unlikely link few observers are eager to explore. Second, my examination of energy infrastructures begins in the late 1990s and thus provides a longer

[3] Graham Fuller, "Gulen Movement is not a cult; it is one of the most encouraging faces of Islam today", *Huffington Post*, 22 July 2016 URL. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/gulen-movement-not-cult_b_11116858.html (accessed 20 August 2016).

[4] As late as February 2014, just a handful of months after Gezi, where millions stood against, among others, the aggressive urbanization policies of the government, an article in *Foreign Affairs* explained Erdoğan's success by stressing the construction and infrastructure boom, the very grounds that triggered Gezi in the first place: "A boom in infrastructure development and construction added to the good times. Since the outset of Erdoğan's tenure, the country's highway network has been expanded by more than 10,000 miles. The number of airports has doubled to 50, and Turkish Airlines now flies to more than 100 countries, more than any other in the World. New upscale housing complexes and shopping malls seem to flank every major city." (Dombey, 2014, as cited by Tuğal, 2016: 16)

perspective for the rise of authoritarianism than other work on the subject, debunking the assumption that it emerged from nowhere. This contribution challenges commonplace assumptions that conflate the history of neoliberalism with that of the AKP and that limit the rise of Turkey's neoliberal experience to the last few years. Finally, while I stress the growing authority of the central government, it is the work of tracing energy infrastructures from production facilities in the periphery to the corridors of Turkish bureaucracy in Ankara that allows me to present a more nuanced analysis of authoritarian tendencies: how they take root at different tiers of the state and in various corners of the country. This analysis supports my argument that the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey is not simply an Ankara-run operation; rather, it must be conceptualized as a broader transformation at different levels of the state and as the state intersects with capital, nature, and society.

## 1.2 HEGEMONY AND CONSENT

In this study I identify the AKP's political power as hegemonic, using the term in a Gramscian sense (1971).[5] By doing so, my intention is to highlight that the power of the AKP relies on winning the active consent of the masses through their self-organization, beginning with civil society (Buci-Glucksmann, 1982: 119). This is particularly crucial to keep in mind at a time when the AKP regime seems increasingly suppressive. Significantly, however, consent and coercion are two inseparable sides of political power. As Eagleton

[5] For Gramsci there are two ways of governance: through domination and/or through moral and intellectual leadership. These two forms are not mutually exclusive and can exists at the same time. Moral and intellectual leadership, which is very closely associated with what Gramsci understands from hegemony, can influence a society before the leadership formally control the government. Gramsci explains as such: "the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as "domination" and as "intellectual an moral leadership". A social group dominates antagonistic groups... it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power". (1971: 57)

notes, hegemony is "a governing power win[ning] consent to its rule from those it subjugates" (Eagleton, 1991: 112). In case of AKP's hegemony, winning consent includes but it is not limited to the party's consecutive election victories since 2002. On the one hand, it implies a form of power that sets the contours of public discussion, what Lukes (2005 [1974]: 18-30) calls a "third dimension of power".[6] On the other hand, consent requires a cross-class coalition in which political power manufactures consensus about the legitimacy of its rule by (temporarily) convincing strata beyond its immediate circle. This is also known as a hegemonic power bloc (*cf.* Poulantzas, 1974; 1975). This is not necessarily accomplished through an ideological trick (or false-consciousness), but is rather a matter of political strategy and leadership (Buci-Glucksmann, 1982: 117-118). AKP hegemony was so successful for a decade (2012-2012) that the party was able to win and maintain the active consent of a variety of groups. These groups included not only the majority of working and middle classes who never voted for Islamist parties prior to their support of the AKP, but also centrists, liberals and even certain socialist factions.

Other significant factors characterize the AKP's particular brand of hegemony. One critical factor was its promotion as a model that should be replicated by the rest of the Middle East, suggesting an overlap between the domestic project and larger international hegemonic formations that aimed to tame and incorporate the Middle East into the international system. It is also crucial to note that the AKP's hegemony was able to establish stronger roots because it was a response to a decade long "organic crises," in Gramsci's formulation,

[6] This agenda-setting type of political power, Swartz notes, is also manifested through "power to/power over" distinction in writings of many political sociologists (Swartz 2013: 43; see Giddens, 1976; Mann, 1986; Nueman, 2005; Lukes, 2005 [1974]).

which was triggered by cyclical economic crisis and a violent domestic war in the Kurdish region. In other words, the AKP was supposed to present an answer to a series of problems created by a previous hegemonic project that, in the end, fell apart. This brings us to a related issue regarding the limits of a hegemony. Hegemony must not be conflated with absolute power. In fact, Tuğal (2009) notes that the formation of AKP hegemony must not be considered an unmediated imposition of Islamism but rather as a passive revolution in which the Islamic challenge that influenced the civil society for decades was finally absorbed into capitalism.

This dissertation, however, is not about the formation of AKP hegemony *per se*.[7] However, by tracing the role of energy infrastructures in contemporary Turkey, I hope to shed some light on the mechanics of the AKP's hegemony, the blocs that have been foundational to its success, and how the party manufactures consent, as well as its fragilities. Given that no hegemonic project is complete without a spatial component (Jessop, 2005; Kipfer, 2002), this study's key contribution to the field is its examination of the role energy infrastructures and a construction-led growth model, which the AKP's hegemony heavily relies on. It is important to clarify, however, that the argument developed here is less about evaluating a party and its ideologies, and instead focuses on the possibilities and limits of infrastructure-based economics in generating consent and causing dissent in the formation and maintenance of a capitalist hegemony.

[7] See Öztan, 2014; Akça, 2014; Tuğal, 2009, 2016 for more detailed discussions dedicated to hegemonic struggles in Turkey and the formation of the AKP's hegemony.

## 1.3 ENERGY AS A FIELD

Throughout the dissertation, I make use of the Bourdieuian notion of field to denote specific socio-political spheres of struggle such as *the energy field* or *the anti-hydro activism field*. For Bourdieu, a field is a relatively autonomous subdivision of the social world in which agents (individuals, networks, institutions) and their positions are located vis-à-vis each other (Bourdieu, 1984: 223-253; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 94-144). What I find particularly useful in this approach is that it prioritizes competition and struggle as much as structure and continuity. I understand that a field is not the manifestation of an *a priori* power distribution; it is a setting where power is being shaped as a result of actors' changing positions. The field of energy in Turkey, to give an example from this study, was not destined for a liberalization as aggressive as it was in late 2000s. However, for other factors (such as global neoliberalization and IMF conditionality) the pace, content and intensity of the opening up of the energy market were shaped by the competition between its actors (the judiciary, private sector, political parties and labor) throughout the 1990s. As such, at its core, field analysis assumes relationality:

> To think in terms of field is to think relationally…What exists in the social world are relations—not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist "independently of individual consciousness and will" as Marx said (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96-97).

By emphasizing relationality and competition in the fields in question, I avoid reifying often taken-for-granted concepts, including neoliberalization, development and environmentalism. I complicate these concepts by highlighting dislocations and reconfigurations in each field, paying particular attention to energy (see Figure 1.1 for a sketch of the energy field). Similarly, acknowledging actors and their competition within

a field is a fertile way to counter deterministic readings of global hierarchy and a capitalist order.

**Figure 1.1: The Energy Field and Accompanying Processes**




For Bourdieu, the state must be understood from a field analysis perspective. In fact, the field of state is a meta-field in his sociology. It is central to, if not synonymous with, the field of power, the broadest possible plane that all fields are located on and on which they compete (Swartz, 2013: 36). Yet the field of state's special status does not make it a stable unitary body representative of a single view, class and/or ideology (although Bourdieu

admits the dominance of economy capital over the state field). The struggle in the field of state is largely an instituted struggle of "partially overlapping various bureaucratic fields…over the functions of social regulation in a society" (*Ibid*.: 130). Bourdieu and Wacquant defines state as:

> *An ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields (they often take the empirical form of commissions, bureaus and boards) within which agents and categories of agents, governmental and nongovernmental, struggle over this peculiar form of authority consisting of the power to rule via legislation, regulations, administrative measures in short, everything that we normally put under the rubric of state policy as particular spheres of practices (1992: 111)*.

I find this description of state useful, as the time period across which I trace the transformation of Turkey's energy field also contained a significant reshuffling of bureaucratic cadres, the advent of new governmental institutions, the privatization of others and the emergence of a new political tradition in administrative ranks. Struggles between new and old agents and related reconfigurations signal a dynamic field in the making, attuned to the political implications of shifting bureaucratic terrains as well as changing laws and regulations.

## 1.4 AN EMERGENT RATIONALITY: ENERGORATIONALITY

Social scientists have engaged energy as a field of inquiry for some time. The first systematic studies of the social, economical and environmental dimension of energy production and consumption can be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s.[8] Motivated by global waves of environmentalism and concerned by the energy crises of the

[8] For an exceptional early example, see Cottrell, 1955.

1970s and the risks of nuclear energy, scholars such as Laura Nader forwarded the idea that energy is a social problematic, not merely a technical or economical one (Adams, 1975; Lovins, 1976; Nader and Beckermann, 1978; Nader, 1981a; 1981b; Schnaiberg, 1980). While this early research was of critical significance in emphasizing the limits to growth, it had significant shortcomings, overlooking the production cycle as well as the importance of democratic debate and participation in making of energy related decisions; the micro-politics of energy infrastructures were not studied with an ethnographic curiosity.

Faced with the challenges of the Anthropocene—the contemporary epoch in which the human condition is increasingly inseparable from the non-human, and the social from the natural—energy has appeared once again as a lens through which many social science scholars strive to understand the conditions of modernity (Swyngedouw, 2015), democracy (Mitchell, 2011), uneven development (McNeish et al. 2015), capitalist consumerism (Huber, 2013; Jacob, 2016), everyday cultural practices (Strauss et al., 2013) and post-coloniality. Studying energy does not simply mean collapsing forms and energy availability into political outcomes as if the former automatically yields to the latter (Mitchell, 2011). What often matters more is the social and cultural relations and practices that are formed in the production, transmission and consumption of energy. In this sense, what differentiates this current wave of energy engagement from earlier examples is its simultaneous emphasis on the material and spatial, as well as the discursive and economic qualities of energy. To capture the multiple scales and facets of energy, new approaches examine energy closer to its infrastructures as they are transmitted along mines, turbines,

grids, plants and pipelines, simultaneously as they are codified in parliaments, challenged in courthouses, and funded by financial institutions (Star, 1999; Dennis and O'Neill, 2012; Anand, 2012; Simone, 2012; Larkin, 2013). While this new wave of research is inspired by a sharp critique of capitalist extraction and the role of natural resources in state-making, as in critical oil studies (Coronil, 1997; Watts, 2001; 2004), it also treats energy as a form of modern power, a form of bio-power (energopower) that is capable of setting in motion ideas and imaginaries, promising prosperity and development, even offering solutions to environmental catastrophes (Boyer 2014).

While influenced by the conceptualization of energopower, I prefer to use another term, *energorationality*, to first and foremost, emphasize the ability of energy to do political work in the 21st century as a form of rationality that can be transferred to (or can seep into) other fields of power. Throughout the dissertation, I illustrate how the discourse, tools and practices of energy are utilized to achieve political outcomes in economic policy, judicial and bureaucratic reform, urban renewal, natural resource and environmental management. The ways in which energy problems are solved become a benchmark for political action, producing, to borrow from Foucault, a regime of truth for governance (Foucault, 2010; Rabinow, 1991).

Importantly, energorationality is inspired by Foucault's notion of the rationality of government and his emphasis on the diffusion of power in modern societies (Foucault, 1991). A rationality of government is best described as "a way or system of thinking about the nature of practice of government, capable of making some form of that activity

thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced" (Gordon, 1991: 3). The dissertation not only illustrates the increasing relevance of energy thinking and its role in Turkish policy making, but also argues that energorationality has helped create new subjectivities such as the bureaucrat-cum-investor or the rural entrepreneur. Such subjectivities find in the extraction economy the opportunity to become articulated to the world and thereby achieve a sense of an economic self (see Figure 1.2).

**Figure 1.2: Rural Entrepreneurship**


*Grandpa: Is that fella Ali Ağaoğlu ( a famous real estate developer, energy investor—the Turkish Donald Trump)?*
*Heidi: No Grandpa! That's Peter, He is taking a walk through the meadow. You see Ali Ağaoğlu wherever you look!*
*Grandpa thought bubble: When the hell is this place's value going to appreciate?*

In his most recent study, which focuses on the role of water in Spain's political-ecological modernization, Erik Swyngedouw similarly borrows from Foucault when he describes the hydromodernization campaign in 20th century Spain as a "biopolitical national regime, centered on transforming people's lives" (Swyngedouw 2015: 4). Through dams, inter-river basin transfers, large scale irrigation and desalinization facilities, Spain, Swyngedouw argues, sought to achieve a modern state and a more prosperous population. While a governmental desire to create and distribute national wealth through large-scale socio-ecological engineering interventions is not absent in Turkey, what I suggest by energorationality is not limited to hydromodernization, which has been a powerful guiding principle behind large-scale energy/irrigation projects.

As a host to the Southeastern Anatolia Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi*, or GAP)—a multi-sector development project that consists of 22 dams, 19 power-plants and irrigation of 17,000 square kilometers—the idea of improving lives through hydromodernization is not new to Turkey. While GAP reveals much about the country's developmental ambitions and their limits[9], the type of rationality I point to is relatively newer compared to hydromodernization and assumes a different path for the prosperity of the population. The Turkish energorationality that I describe not only promises to transform people's lives through electricity but also signals what is acceptable and valuable in an economy that is driven by growth based on extraction and construction.

[9] The work of Leila Harris (2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 2009b; 2012) on the changing geographies of Turkish Kurdistan under GAP is instructive in this respect.

## 1.5 ETHNOGRAPHY OF (ENERGY) INFRASTRUCTURES

Following Susan Leigh Star's influential article (1999), I describe the foundational methodology of this dissertation as an infrastructure ethnography in which I trace a particular form of infrastructure, namely small hydro power plants, as they interact with a variety of actors, institutions, political discourses, cultural norms and geographical settings. Contrary to commonly held assumptions, infrastructures are not simply technical structures void of social and cultural dimensions. In fact, in their materiality intangible sociological categories (such as class, state and environment) and in their manifestations (power, violence, waiting), infrastructures become ethnographically graspable (Ferguson, 2012). As such, infrastructures emerge, as Rodgers and O'Neill argue, "as ideal ethnographic sites for theorizing how broad and abstract social orderings such as the state, citizenship, criminality, ethnicity and class play out concretely at the level of everyday practice, revealing how such relationships of power and hierarchy translate into palpable forms of physical and emotional harm" (2012: 402).

While infrastructures are ideal sites for ethnographic study, infrastructure ethnography cannot be limited to the examination of a single site in the strict sense of the word. The ethnography of an infrastructure requires a research design that traces it at all possible stages, "one in which ethnography might need to be conducted in government centers far from where the actual roads are constructed and might take into account politicians, technocrats, economists, engineers, and road builders, as well as road users themselves" (Larkin, 2013: 328). Following this line of thought, the field research that this dissertation relies on traces small hydropower plants not only through their projected sites of

construction, but also through the planning, licensing, funding and construction processes as well as the legal proceedings that centralize hydropower plants. Yet, infrastructures do not operate in a bubble; they are contingent on a variety of factors that often have little to do with the material conditions of the infrastructures. Therefore, "to maintain its focus on contingency, the ways in which forms of infrastructure can offer insights into other domains such as practices of government, religion, or sociality" (*ibid*). To this end, my fieldwork has been in close conversation with the broader discourses, desires and anxieties of the AKP's hegemony and is supplemented by empirical data on events (such as the Gezi Revolt) that, while outside the immediate scope of energy infrastructures to have a causal effect, are conjuncturally influential.

**Figure 1.3: Fieldwork Locations**


Spanning 30 months between 2010 and 2015, my dissertation fieldwork is composed of three pillars extending across three separate geographies in Turkey, tracing energy as it travels across scales (see Figure 1.3). The first pillar includes project site ethnographies

that I conducted in the EBSR, home to over 200 ongoing and future SHP projects. I traveled across the Artvin, Rize, and Trabzon valleys several times and spent five months in the region to observe how social, political and ecological frictions unfold as rural livelihoods and landscapes are turned into new energy geographies. The second pillar is my examination of the energy industry (energy bureaucracy and private energy sector),[10] which allows me to illustrate the kinds of coalitions and conflicts a thriving market produces. I reviewed policy documents, observed administrative litigations, attended sectoral panels, trade fairs, conferences[11] and interviewed fifty-five actors[12] working in the energy industry including bureaucrats, engineers, businesspeople, bankers and journalists. The majority of these interviews took place in Ankara and Istanbul. For the third pillar of my research, I undertook participatory action research, observing and participating in the anti-SHP movement. I have attended demonstrations, occupations, activist field trips, court hearings, expert explorations, and conducted in-depth interviews with key activists. I also conducted a detailed focus group interview with five environmentalist lawyers to better grasp the forms of objection, narratives, and representations emerging from this movement.

[10] The institutions my interviews are affiliated with includes but are not limited to **(1)** State Hydraulic Works, **(2)** Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, **(3)** Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, **(4)** Ministry of Water and Forestry, **(5)** Energy Markets Regulatory Authority, **(6)** General Directorate of Renewable Energy, **(7)** Turkish Electricity Transmission Company, **(8)** Electricity Producers Association, **(9)** Hydro Energy Industry and Businessmen Association, **(10)** Turkish Energy Foundation, **(11)** The Turkish National Committee of the World Energy Council, **(12)** Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects **(13)** Industrial Development Bank of Turkey.

[11] Here is a list of panels, fairs and conferences I attended as a participant observer throughout my fieldwork: **(1)** International Water Congress, May 22-24 May, 2013, Istanbul **(2)** International Congress on Environmental Impact Assessment, 8-10 November, 2013, Istanbul **(3)** 2nd Congress on Dams, February 13-15, 2014 - Istanbul **(4)** 23th International Energy and Environment Fair & Congress, April 22-26, 2014, Istanbul **(5)** Hydroenergia 2014, May 21-23, 2014, Istanbul **(6)** 9th Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (UCTEA) Energy Symposium 12-14 December, 2014, Ankara **(7)** Energy Markets Summit January, 2015, Ankara **(8)** 1st Hydropower and Dams Expo, January 22-14, 2015, Ankara.

[12] Twenty-five of these interviews were structured and lasted around an hour on average. The rest were semi-structured, conducted "on the go", and lasted around 30 minutes on average.

The first phase of my research, which included ethnographic fieldwork in the new energy geographies of EBSR, requires further elaboration. Trabzon, Rize and Artvin are the northeastern-most provinces along the Turkish Black Sea. While Trabzon is a mid-size province[13] with a population of 758,237, Rize and Artvin are two of the smallest provinces with populations 328,776 and 169,674 respectively, according to 2012 Population Data.[14] Around 230 small hydropower plants are expected to be operational in the region by 2023, making the region Turkey's new hydro geography. All three provinces share a borderline tropical climate that delivers record precipitation rates (a sharp contrast to arid Anatolia plains, the heathland of the country) and a rapid rise in elevation from the town centers by the seashore to approximately 3,000 meters in the Pontic Mountains. This combination of climate and geography has created a region where rivers and streams are relatively short, fast running and seasonal, only exploitable by small hydro solutions. This is why the region is over-targeted by hydropower projects and has become a hotbed for anti-small hydro activism.

In the EBSR, locals live around streams and valleys. Cities and towns are mostly located by a tiny band of flat land along the shoreline where a major stream meets the Black Sea. As one of the regions with the highest ratio of rural populations in Turkey, however, the Pontic Mountains host as much population as the cities along the shoreline do. The rural population is concentrated along the parallel valleys that rise up to the summits of the

[13] A province is an administrative unit in Turkey. There are 81 provinces in Turkey, each headed by a governor appointed by the central government in Ankara. A province is almost always named after its center city (or province center) which is governed by a municipality headed by a major. 81 provinces are divided into 957 districts. Districts are governed by appointed sub-governors, while the district center and towns are governed by municipalities.

[14] Turkish Statistics Institute, Population Data.

Pontics. Over the course of five-years, I regularly visited eight valleys[15] that were exposed to small hydro developments in varying degrees (planning, construction and operation) to provide an opportunity for comparison. My visits to the region lasted around one to three weeks and gave me the opportunity to spend a few days in each valley. My ethnographic focus included an examination of the anti-small hydro mobilization, logging narratives about locality, history and activism, observaing rural life and living arrangements as well as the the kinds of relationships residents have with streams and nature in general.

## 1.6 DISSERTATION OUTLINE

### 1.6.1 Chapter One - A Genealogy for Turkish Energy: From National Energy to Energy Hub

Chapter one traces key transformations in energy discourse, priories and policies in Turkey throughout the industry's one-hundred-year history, with a particular focus on its piecemeal liberalization in the last three decades. I argue that it is only possible to establish a better grasp on the role of energy infrastructures in contemporary Turkey—as well as the formation and maintenance of the the AKP's hegemony—by examining Turkish energy within its historical genealogy. While this genealogy highlights major breaking points in the history of Turkish energy, I avoid reducing energy politics to a single logic. I dispute the notion that Turkey's contemporary energy rush (and subsequent socio-spatial conflicts) can either simply be universalized as yet-another inevitable result of neoliberalization, or localized and framed squarely within the developmentalist tradition. While I do not deny that both neoliberalization and developmentalism are at play in the development of

[15] The valleys of my ethnographic focus were Tonya and Solaklı in Trabzon; İkizdere, Çağlayan and Arılı in Rize; Kamilet, Çoruh and Hopa valleys in Artvin.

Turkey's energy discourse, this chapter points to a variety of conjunctural factors—invariably imbricated by the power of energy—that bring neoliberal restructuring and the developmental state together to make them operational. Due to these conjunctural factors, energy has become a powerful assemblage, an influential rationality that seeps into other realms of government thanks to its ability to build coalitions, establish networks and foster subjectivities and that produces consent at different scales.

This chapter offers a periodization of energy politics in Turkey: Under *early liberal experimentation* (1902-1929) I remind the reader that energy was exclusively a private, and to a large degree, foreign-led industry when it was originally introduced during the late Ottoman Early Republican Era. The *National planning paradigm* (1930-1982) nationalized energy production and established key institutions of energy bureaucracy, which immensely impacted the country's economy and politics for decades to come. Turkey's neoliberalization is a long and convoluted story characterized by several ups and downs. I differentiate *early neoliberalization* (1923-2001) from *deep neoliberalization* (2001-2013) and trace the failures of the former, the eventual triumph of the latter, and the transition between the two by examining the piecemeal transformation of the energy sector. While I refrain from forwarding a narrative that explains Turkey's volatile and contested experience with neoliberalism on the basis of energy choices and policies, I point to a series of debates and breaking points in energy that have given meaning and momentum to the course of neoliberalization in Turkey.

The AKP's reign overlaps with the period in which Turkey's neoliberalization deepened and the energy sector almost completely opened up to foreign investment and capital. Writing against the tendency to automatically equate neoliberalization with the AKP, I offer a more nuanced picture, questioning how these processes—the AKP's success in building hegemony and neoliberalism's eventual intensification and spread in Turkey—might benefit from each other. Building upon a literature that insists on understanding neoliberalization in its irregularities—the unexpected coalitions it forms and the diverse rationalities it brings together—I trace the shortcomings and achievements of the energy industry to understand political power in the AKP era.

I allocate a separate section of this chapter to examining and evaluating the most recent (post-2013) developments in the energy industry under the title *post-neoliberalism*. By examining the distortions present in the open-market structure of the new energy regime during the past few years—to the advantage of a strong executive branch—I ask if neoliberalization has reached its limits in Turkey and further, what post-neoliberalism might look like. Unlike those who have high hopes for a post-neoliberal future, by examining the institutional grab in the energy sector and the heavy handed treatment of energy-related disputes in Turkey, I conclude that post-neoliberalism may as well be a new name for authoritarian neoliberalism, disguised as a state controlled economy.

### 1.6.2 Chapter Three - A New Infrastructure for an Old Energy: Understanding Turkey's Hydropower Renaissance

This chapter examines Turkey's hydropower renaissance as the central pillar of its energy rush, that is an under-regulated rush of capital to invest in energy infrastructures. In the

context of this rush and renaissance, I single out a particular form of infrastructure—small hydropower plants—that has contributed little to the total energy production capacity of the country. However, small hydropower plants have been central to the transformation of not only the energy industry, but also state-capital relations. While, my intention is by no means to reduce the transformation of the state and capital under the AKP's reign to a single infrastructure, the chapter offers a critical approach to articulating how political economical work energorationality is complicit in these transformations by tracing the bureaucratic, financial and spatial dimensions of small hydropower plants.

Chapter three begins with a discussion of the analytical and methodological value of studying infrastructures. Building upon the emerging literature on infrastructures, I remind the reader that far from being mere backdrops to more critical fields, infrastructures are themselves assemblages of multiple pieces, an amalgamation of technological, political and financial techniques (Larkin, 2013: 330). In this sense, I emphasize that studying infrastructures is also about studying relationships, not necessarily individual structures or things (Star, 1999: 379). I describe a key tension inherent in private infrastructures by parsing the role public infrastructures play in generating national pride and keeping the desire to develop alive (especially in the global South). Accordingly, I argue that state authority and the publicness of infrastructures become matters of negotiation once infrastructural politics are registered to market conditions.

Drawing attention to the surprising contrast in the perception of large dams and small hydro, I propose to take seriously the technical, material and geographic qualities of the

boom. I conceptualize small hydro as a form of infrastructure that holds diverse ideas, actors, locations and trends together around the notion of energy independence. By comparing and contrasting the general characteristics of the small hydro explosion in Turkey with global examples, I emphasize the unique conjuncture in which the Turkish boom took place. Despite its reputation as a renewable, low-impact local-friendly infrastructure, the popularization of small hydro has, first and foremost, been key to Turkey's energy liberalization efforts. I also assert that as space-making, landscape forming infrastructures, small hydro projects have been instrumental in the spread of neoliberalism across a vast territory while contributing a particular restructuring in state, society and market relations.

The highly deregulated shortcomings of the energy liberalization and problems with the sudden inflation of private hydropower plants are now widely acknowledged by energy bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, but to varying degrees. Officials tend to blame entrepreneurs' greed while investors complain about red tape. My objective in this chapter is neither to provide yet another apologetic explanation that 'privatization could have done better' or to point to some legislative areas that could have been regulated for an equitable energy policy. Rather, I am interested in illustrating how capital, state and society are intertwined through not just legislation, but also through nature and infrastructures, as a new market is constructed and experimented with. Precisely due to their infrastructural qualities, their small size, low-tech requirements, their spread across the Turkish countryside and their affordability, small hydropower plants have been instrumental in

constructing this market and have supported the establishment of a valuable information network between investors and the bureaucracy.

Here, I focus on Turkey's State Hydraulic Works, which is an important aspect of energy bureaucracy as well as one of the pioneer public institutions for development. I argue that the institution has undergone significant transformations parallel to the liberalization of the energy industry. As SHW continues to lose personnel and a monopoly over hydropower, its expertise has been reduced to a consultant position, catering to the needs of the newly emerging private energy sector. Public interest and the institution's regulatory roles have been downplayed, if not completely neglected. Yet this transformation should not be read as the ultimate triumph of the private sector over the state. Instead, I suggest that while the state's formal regulatory reach diminishes, the authority of the central government and its arbitrary power over both capital and the provincial state apparatuses tests new limits.

### 1.6.3 Chapter Four - Energizing Legality: Energy Infrastructures, Law and Temporality

This chapter focuses on the influence of energorationality on administrative law. Never-ending lawsuits initiated by local residents have stagnated and stalled many energy projects; given this reality, I argue that temporal uncertainty has become an unbearable liability for energy capital. To overcome the delays in capitalist time, the government has chosen to protect energy infrastructures in a special regime of urgency, which I argue not only impacts administrative law but also influences other domains of administration and provides a useful framework for governmental action.

Moving away from the series of failed and successful legislations made possible by energy's liberalization (covered in detail in chapter two), this chapter examines how energy infrastructures are contested in courthouses. Administrative law has become a battlefield on which local residents sue a branch of administration over a permit, license or a decision that makes a given energy company's infrastructural project possible. While litigation often revolves around procedural details and rarely set jurisprudence regarding the essence of land-use and environmental conflicts, it often delays a project for the duration of the litigation, providing valuable time for local activists to organize while causing a crucial disruption in capital's time. Trapped between engineering priorities, the repayment of green energy loans, endless court cases and a series of local entanglements, uncertainty becomes a source of anxiety in energy infrastructure disputes while providing a strategic tool for those parties that can afford to take advantage of waiting. Beyond its function as an arbiter, the administrative law matters a great deal to the temporal politics of energy infrastructure disputes.

To accelerate this politics of temporality, the government has deemed energy worthy of urgent treatment and offers fast track solutions to mediate infrastructural projects' legal processes. This chapter carefully examines the emergence and implementation of two particular legal mechanisms: the urgent expropriation (UE) procedure and urgent judicial proceedings (UJP). While the former expedites land-grabs, the latter speeds-up litigations that delay the progress or completion of energy infrastructures. These legal tools are central to the regime of urgency, allowing energy companies to circumvent the judiciary's capacity to regulate energy infrastructures and the privatization of the energy sector.

Despite their extraordinary power, urgency tools have failed to create a seamless accumulation climate for the energy sector. The impact of the regime of urgency lies elsewhere. I argue that the emergence of the private energy market in Turkey both created its legal reasoning and framework and has seeped into other domains of regulation to facilitate myriad forms of socio-spatial interventions such large-scale infrastructure projects, urban renewal programs, earthquake preparedness, environmental governance and national security in relation to the Kurdish problem. While legal tools and arguments designed to assure fast and secure private energy production have become the new legal standard—redefining the relations between nature and society, productive and idle, urgent and mundane alongside private and public property—ethey give the executive branch a level of authority that the government has otherwise lacked.

The chapter dedıcates a section to the political repercussions of the urgency imposed upon certain aspects of the administrative law. I argue that behind the scenes of this intervention to the administrative law lies a strong critique of the judiciary as a source of oversight[16] over democratic politics and the liberal economy. According to this critique, the court's insistence on cancelling privatization decisions is a manifestation of a particular bureaucratic rationality that disrespects and distrusts the elected executive. In this line of thought, legal bureaucracies have been portrayed as the representatives of the old Turkey to the extent that they put up legal obstacles against the AKP's desires. What's more, intervention into administrative law emerged as a requirement of a larger political

[16] Often referred to as military and/or bureaucratic tutelage (*vesayet* in Turkish). See Mango, 1983; White, 2007; Akça and Balta-Peker, 2012.

transformation. As such, the seepage of energorationality into the judiciary realm strengthens the AKP's hegemony at the expense of a weak judiciary branch.

### 1.6.4 Chapter Five: An Unexpected Objection: On The Scope of Anti-Energy Politics

This chapter examines the public opposition against small hydro projects in Turkey, in tandem with the country's hydropower renaissance from the late 2000s to now. I illustrate that anti-small hydro activism has triggered an upsurge in environmental mobilization thanks to its geographical reach, participant demographics, group tactics and oppositional language. This upsurge in environmental mobilization is unprecedented in that it is grassroots-level, provincial, happens across class and has been influential throughout Turkey for its authentic critique of the AKP's neoliberal developmentalism. Indeed, this new wave of activism has provided broader oppositional politics in Turkey with a repertoire, tactics and a perspective that was best exemplified in the impromptu Gezi uprising in the summer of 2013 and its aftermath.

I refer to anti-small hydro activism as an 'unexpected objection.' Over the past decade, hundreds of grassroots environmental collectives popped up across Turkey, even in its remotest corners, with no prior experience in political activism. Each movement has been named after a town, a village or an entire valley. Because of the sheer number of small hydro projects, the majority of these collectives were founded to protect streams and rivers in their wake. It is surprising how significant this opposition against renewable and relatively low impact infrastructures is to Turkey's contemporary environmental awakening. This chapter asks how small hydro projects have been so contentious in the

geographies where they are being built, and what this means for Turkey's hydropower renaissance. By addressing the many socio-environmental tensions hydropower plants instigate, I focus on the diverse forms of dispossessions they elicit across the Turkish countryside: dispossessions of land, irrigation, drinking water and subsistence farming. By focusing on the Eastern Black Sea Region where water is abundant, the cultivation of tea, its largest cash crop, does not require irrigation and private land-grabs are limited, I contend that the source of dispossession in environmental conflicts is not always as clearly defined as one would expect.

I turn to the movement itself to answer a challenging question: how have the people of the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR) become pioneers in the anti-small hydro mobilization (especially considering the region's water-rich status). My fieldwork reveals that underneath the dynamism of environmental struggles in the region lays a particularly vibrant urban-rural connectivity that stretches from isolate villages of the Pontic Mountains, to the cities and the towns of the region by the Black Sea, and from there all the way to the metropoles hosting high number of immigrants from the region. Building upon a series of discussions on the history and sociology of internal migration in Turkey and the contemporary rural living conditions in the EBSR that enables dual residency (Öztürk et al. 2013), I aim to spatial explanations to both the discontent with the infrastructure boom and the dynamism underlying mobilization. By emphasizing the living arrangements of most activists, which give them the luxury to claim both the urbanite and villager positions, I argue that, among others, energy infrastructure projects along the Eastern Black Sea coast threaten a particular type of lifestyle pursued along the urban-rural

continuum. Although I do not deny that crude forms of land and water grabbing directly threatens substance economies in certain regions, by stressing on the urban-rural continuum as a factor, I point to the role social reproduction in infrastructure fueled disputes.

To understand the relationship between rural and urban, provincial and state, it is important to interrogate exactly who and what Turkey's environmental awakening currently threatens. President Erdoğan and his surrogates dismiss it as being ill-intentioned, ideological, or A conspiracy of foreign powers. Critical observers (Arsel *et al.*, 2015; Adaman *et al*., 2016) understand that the environmental awakening does not fall neatly under a scheme of environmentalism of poor vs. rich, drawing attention to activists' political motivations. They argue that the bourgeoning grassroots activism in Turkey is best defined as "the environmentalism of the malcontent," providing mobilization for those left with no outlet under an Erdoğan authoritarian neoliberalism regime.

I find that both explanations relegate environmental movements to the sidelines, rendering them mere derivatives of politics. To the contrary, I argue that these emergent forms of environmental activism have *influenced* politics. In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the surprising ways in which grassroots environmental mobilizations have impacted larger oppositional politics in Turkey. To do this, I focus on one humble yet powerful phrase from the new oppositional lexicon: *yaşam alanı* (life space). Prior to Gezi, this catchphrase had been circulating among urban activists against privatization and renewal projects, and rural activists against extraction, construction and energy production

projects. Closely associated yet different from the increasingly popular concept of the "commons," *yaşam alanı* connotes spaces of refuge that have maintained a high level of autonomy from the value circuits of capital accumulation. It also connotes a safe space to breathe, enjoy and express oneself. The notion of *yaşam alanı* allows for articulations both between myriad grievances against various spatial interventions and across alternative political horizons. Activists' common goal of defending *yaşam alanı*(s) allowed them to successfully articulate various political agendas during the Gezi Resistance, which in turn enabled the revolt's delocalization in the aftermath of the month-long occupation. The phrase was uttered countless times by the occupiers of the Gezi Park.[17] Influenced by grassroots mobilization in the country, the Gezi occupation was not simply in defense of an existing life space, but entailed a claim over a shared space in the making signaling the political horizon of Turkey's environmental awakening (*cf*. Karaman, 2013a; Erensü 2013, Erensü and Karaman, forthcoming).

[17] The first of the four demands announced by Taksim Solidarity on the first day of the occupation was: "Gezi Park will remain as a park. We will allow neither [the] Topçu Barracks [the proposed hotel + mall complex] project, nor anything else that would violate nature and *our life spaces*" (Bianet, 2013, emphasis ours).

C H A P T E R – T W O

# 2 A GENEALOGY FOR TURKISH ENERGY: FROM NATIONAL ENERGY TO ENERGY HUB

Turkey's hydropower renaissance—the unprecedented increase in the country's hydropower capacity and number of plants—owes its existence to a series of market friendly legislations pass in the early 2000s. However, the liberalization of Turkey's energy sector is itself a long story. Parallel to Turkey's overall experience with neoliberalism, the opening-up of Turkey's energy markets was initiated quite early, yet took decades to be realized. The first systematic efforts to liberalize the sector started in the first quarter of the 1980s. The process progressed piecemeal on a highly tortuous path, and was met with bureaucratic and judicial resistance throughout the 1990s until it was framed as an inescapable necessity to recover from economic downturns (and meet an IMF assistance package condition) by the turn of the century. This long process was eventually operationalized and implemented in the early 2000s by consecutive AKP governments. The current state of Turkish energy is shaped not only by a neoliberal blueprint, but carries the marks of its unique and elongated history and is shaped by the political economic preferences of the AKP term. For this reason, the hydropower renaissance, particularly the inflation of small hydropower plants, can be best understood at this knotty juncture, where AKP politics and Turkey's energy history meets the country's meandering relationship with neoliberalism.

This chapter traces the transformation of energy discourse, priories and policies in Turkey throughout the industry's -hundred-year history, with a particular focus on its piecemeal liberalization in the last three decades. To better grasp the role of energy infrastructures in the formation of the AKP hegemony and its recent authoritarian turn, the chapter seeks to locate contemporary Turkish energy within its historical genealogy. Unlike other critiques, I dispute the notion that the current energy boom (and subsequent socio-spatial conflicts) in Turkey can either be simply universalized as yet-another inevitable result of neoliberalization, or can be localized and framed squarely within the developmentalist tradition of the Turkish state. While I do not deny that both neolibelization and developmentalism are at play in the development of Turkey's energy discourse, this chapter points to a variety of conjunctural factors—glued to each other by the power of energy—that bring neoliberal restructuring and the developmental state together to make them operational. Due to these conjunctural factors, energy has become a powerful assemblage, a mighty rationality that builds coalitions and produces consent at different scales. I argue that, especially in the last decade, addressing energy needs has generated a particularly formidable rationality, a powerful yet fragile tool for political power.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the literature on neoliberalism and discusses how it should be best conceptualized to account for local iterations and variations in time, such as the ebbs and flows in Turkey's energy policies. The second section provides an overview of the general contours of the Turkish energy field, discusses how it is predicated upon its lack, and lists its shortcomings as they are reflected in official documents and international reports. My third section is the longest

one, and it periodizes the history of energy infrastructures in Turkey using five categories: early liberal, national planning, early neoliberal, deep neoliberal, and finally, post-neoliberal. I pay particular attention to the recent authoritarian turn in Turkish politics its political-economical meaning as it is revealed by energy infrastructures. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the emergent rationality that has intensified around the increased weight of energy in Turkey's political economy, foreshadowing how the impact of this rationality will be unpacked in the following chapters.

## 2.1 TRACING NEOLIBERAL REFORMS

Market friendly de/re-regulatory reforms are easy to come by, yet many times, it is a challenge to conceptualize them under a single seamless umbrella of neoliberalism. Implementations often unfold in hybrid forms, the way neoliberalism is operationalized diverges significantly from the teaching, and its particularities may seem to overshadow the paradigm. The fundamental challenge is that despite its ambitious "utopian vision for a free society and economy," neoliberalism almost always appears in "impure" forms (Peck, 2010: 7) and therefore deserves to be called a "perplexing amorphous political economic phenomenon" (Peck, 2004: 394).[18] This is precisely why "defining neoliberalism is no straightforward task," as McCarthy and Prudham unapologetically confess (2004: 276). Neoliberalism, Saad-Filho and Johnson (2005: 1) agree, is impossible to theoretically define because it "straddles a wide range of social, political and economic phenomenon at

[18] For a more systematical attempt to define neoliberalism's different levels of operation as (a) an ideological hegemonic project, (b) a policy and program, (c) a state form, and (d) governmentality see, England and Ward, 2007. Also see Springer 2012 as an attempt to reconcile the Marxian political economical approaches to neoliberalism with neoliberalism readings inspired by Foucauldian post-structuralist inclinations.

different levels of complexity." Likewise, Jessop defines neoliberalism as a "polyvalent conceptual assemblage… with many disputes over its scope, application and limits" (2002: 453). But if all of these definitions suggest that neoliberalism is so pervasive, encompassing and omnipresent, would that also mean that, in a sense, everything is neoliberal; nothing can escape it? Disillusioned with the vague "buzzword" status of the term, some scholars even argue that neoliberalism in fact does not exist, in the sense that its theoretical conceptualization does not serve much value (Barnett, 2005).[19]

No matter how rascal (Brenner et al., 2010: 184) and elusive (Wacquant, 2009: 306) the term may sound today and how fatigued scholars might get from conceptualizing it (Springer, 2016), tracing neoliberal transformations in their peculiar iterations continue to reveal much about the contemporary world, its politics and economics. In fact, one of the strong suits of recent massive critical neoliberalism studies has been its capacity to account for neoliberalism's ability to take a root in a variety of geographies in coalition with unexpected social, political and ideological allies. Neoliberalism's unexpected coalitions include, but are not limited to, neo-conservatism in the USA (Brown, 2006); the populist left turn in Latin America (Saad-Filho, 2013), state-socialism in China (Ong, 2006; Rofel, 2007; Zhang and Ong, 2008), post-Apartheid politics in South Africa (Bond, 2004; Miraftab, 2004); and Islamism in Turkey (Tugal, 2009; Karaman, 2013b). Tracing neoliberalism highlights the unique circumstances of distant geographies as they co-mingle with a variety of local factors. This has enhanced our understanding of both individual

[19] For a critique different variant of neoliberalism skeptics, see Springer, 2009.

locations under scrutiny and neoliberalism itself, as long as the policy transfers triggered by neoliberalism are not taken for granted and assumed automatic.

Despite the diversity of inclinations in the literature regarding how to approach neoliberalism, there seems to be an agreement on a series of conceptual caveats that help us fine-tune our understanding of the phenomenon. Inspirited by the "variegated" character of neoliberalism that unfolds unevenly at different localities, these caveats may not constitute a seamless theory. However, they guide researchers to trace neoliberal transformations, particularly in the context of the global South, without necessarily reifying the concept (Brenner et al., 2010). In fact, the fundamental assumption is that despite its hegemonic qualities, neoliberalism is best understood in its local peculiarities, contradictions, unexpected outcomes and the surprising coalitions it manages to form.

The first conceptual caveat emerging from the literature is the notion that neoliberalism is not necessarily a noun, but rather a process better captured by the verb *neoliberalization* (Springer, 2015: 6; also Peck, 2002). Neoliberalization admits that neoliberal transformation is not static and monolithic, but is rather highly dynamic, malleable and does not necessarily point to an end-state (Peck, 2002: 383). Neoliberalization, therefore, indicates that the shape, format and intensity of any form of neoliberal transformation takes its eventual shape at the local level and is contingent upon modifications over time. This means that as important as the original teachings of neoliberalism may be, "*actually existing neoliberalism*(s)" are bound to be divergent as "national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes,

regulatory practices, and political struggles" (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349). This is not merely an acknowledgment of path-dependency, but also points to an awareness that neoliberalization is a *mobile technology* that could be utilized anywhere for "governing free subjects with other political rationalities" (Ong, 2007: 4; also see Brown, 2006).

One explanation for why neoliberalization looks for "strategic entanglements with politics" (Ong, 2007: 3) is its desire to remedy the socio-economic deprivation that market solutions might cause. To borrow Polanyi's terminology, neoliberalization seeks to re-embed economy into society through certain alliances. Neoliberalization thus includes episodes of *roll-out,* in which the consolidation of state apparatuses and introduction of new forms of regulation accompany and supplement the initial episodes of *roll-backs*, or the destruction of the welfare state, the cornering of organized labor, the privatization of public assets etc. The fact that roll-out neoliberalism is integral, in fact intrinsic, to its better-known twin, roll-back neoliberalism, reminds us that it can be defined as a *creative destruction*. Accordingly, the social structures that a given economy is embedded in cannot be entirely obliterated; rather, they are at best replaced by fixes that do not conflict with the market's fundamentalist principles while still managing to provide a feeling of security for disenfranchised groups. Although the theory implies a series of subtractions from the system (i.e. smaller roles for the state, labor, safety nets), it is crucial to note that neoliberalization requires a new set of regulatory forms and guarantees first to flourish and then to survive.

Finally, despite the legal and technical language of market-friendly reforms, it is a mistake to confine neoliberalization to the realm of economy, treat it as a bundle of trendy policy

options, or worse, limit it to legislation. Changes in public policy react to—sometimes complementing, other times lagging behind—discursive formations and governmental techniques that influence what is sayable and thinkable, if not directly legislation itself. Neoliberal reforms in the global South may appear as sudden unexpected interruptions, as they are usually propelled by economic and political crisis and/or imposed by powerful international actors. However, neoliberal reforms gain traction and find legitimacy thanks to a climate already sympathetic to neoliberal ethics. The aim of the following section is to provide an historical background for Turkey's energy sector to understand and appreciate the path dependent, piecemeal, hybrid and contradictory character of its neoliberal transformation alongside the discursive climate that produced it.

## 2.2 THE PROBLEM WITH TURKEY'S ENERGY

Executive summaries on Turkey have traditionally begun by celebrating its impressive growth potential with a cautionary hint on its chronic energy bottleneck. As an emergent market, the Turkish economy is expected to grow steadily and it actually has by, for example, doubling the size of its economy in the last decade.[20] Yet, any growth, including GDP growth, requires energy. Demand for energy grows as the economy grows and urbanization advances. Turkey is no exception to this rule. During the time the country's GDP doubled in the last decade, electricity consumption grew by 70 percent while natural

[20] Between 2004 and 2014, Turkey's GDP grew by 104 percent. The twelve years under AKP governments (2003-2014) average annual GDP growth rate has been 4.7 percent. Although these impressive figures help Turkey to perform better then many emerging markets (average annual growth rates is 3.34 percent for South Africa, 3.4 percent for Brazil, 4.2 percent for Chile and 2.5 percent for Mexico for the same period), some critics question the buzz around Turkey's growth rates (World Bank, 2016). Among others, they particularly remind that the annual growth rate average since the foundation of the republic is no different the AKP years (Eğilmez, 2013). See Chapter 3 more on the role of growth oriented economics in contemporary Turkey.

gas demand doubled.[21] The pressure to meet increasing demand made Turkey's electricity sector the fastest growing in the world in 2010 and 2011, with an average of 9 percent annually (Deloitte, 2013: 8). Experts believe that growth potential in Turkey's energy sector is far from realized; energy demand is expected to continue to surge in the next few decades as the country is "still lagging behind the per capita energy consumption" compared to the OECD average (*Ibid*).[22] Official projections predict that energy demand will reach 620 TWh by 2030, almost 2.5 fold of contemporary levels (WWF, 2014: 10).[23]

The problem with rising energy demand as paralleled to economic growth is that it puts an increasingly alarming burden on the country's energy dependency, as Turkey lacks traditional primary energy resources. "One of [Turkey's] most pressing macroeconomic concerns," as one business outlet succinctly puts it, is "the dual challenge of possessing one of the world's most rapidly growing energy markets while containing little known hydrocarbon resources" (GBR, 2015: 1). Turkey's oil dependency is around 90 percent, while it is almost fully dependent regarding natural gas. Roughly since the mid-1980s, Turkey has imported more energy than it produces domestically, as far as primary energy supply is concerned (see Figure 2.1). In 2014, Turkey's energy imports were as three times large as its own production. Turkey's annual energy bill paid to its neighboring countries, which amounted roughly around $50 billion until oil price plummeted in 2014[24], is

[21] MENR, Table of Balances.
[22] By 62.8 BTU per capita Turkish citizen consumes one third of the OECD citizen who consumes 182 million BTU per capita OECD average (Deloitte, 2003: 8).
[23] Projections do vary and they are often exaggerated to encourage local and international investors as well as legitimize controversial policy choices through a sense of urgency.
[24] Daily Sabah, "Turkey energy import costs $50 billion on average", 2 October 2014 URL: http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2014/10/02/turkeys-energy-import-costs-50-billion-per-year-on-average (accessed on 5 June 2016).

considered to be the main reason for its greatest weakness: its current account deficit (the gap between spending and income).[25]

**Figure 2.1: Primary Supply in Turkey (million tep)**




**Source: MENR - Tables of Balance**

The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to illustrate how badly Turkey needs energy and how serious its energy dependency is. From an historical standpoint, Turkey was never energy independent, although it is difficult to deny how radically its dependency on foreign energy resources has amplified over time, particularly compared to the OECD average (see Figure 2.2). Rather than being carried away by the alarming figures that quantify Turkey's

[25] For the last decade, Turkey consistently holds the worst (largest negative) current account balance as a percentage of GDP indicator among the OECD countries as well as emerging market. In 2010-2015 period, the indicator fluctuated between -9.8 percent and -5.8 percent (World Bank, 2016). See chapter X for more on what a large current accounts deficit tells about Turkish economics under AKP.

energy dependency, this chapter is more interested in the different ways in which the need to fuel the Turkish economy and national development have manifested in the country's energy policy. Instead of taking Turkey's energy deficit for granted, the chapter aims to understand the kind of political rationalities that the energy deficit has mobilized over time and how those rationalities have travelled and interacted with other forms of rationalities.

**Figure 2.2: Energy Dependency (energy production/TPES)**




Source: MENR – Tables of Balance, World Bank

## 2.3 FOUR WAVES OF TURKISH ENERGY POLICY

### 2.3.1 Early Liberal Experimentation (1902-1929)

What is often forgotten amidst the heated discussion on the privatization of state-run public services is the existence of a *laissez-faire* period proceeding the emergence of the welfare state. When they were first introduced to the urban masses in the 19th century, many publi

services (such as water, electricity, sewage, public transportation, etc.) were provided by private companies.[26] The Ottoman Empire was no exception. In the Ottoman state, the nineteenth century was marked by the integration of the Empire into the capitalist world economy (Kasaba, 1988). One of the key characteristics of this period was the direct foreign investments the Empire attracted to modernize its industrial and urban infrastructure. Foreign companies were required to secure individual permits—referred to as concessions in the literature—from the Ottoman state to operate in a particular industry or work on a specific project.[27] The concessions, however, were highly political in nature; this stemmed from the Empire's vulnerable status in world capitalism, simultaneously in decline and in search for modernization (Kasaba, 1988). Consequently, the concessions obtained by the leading companies of the imperial powers were often in return for temporary financial support or military protection (Pamuk, 1987: 7). Ottoman concessions were so attractive that they stirred fierce competition among European companies (Shahvar, 2002). The charm of the Ottoman concessions were twofold: on the one hand, concessions often provided the privileged company with the monopoly status over a sector in a given city or region. On the other hand, and more importantly, the trading privileges that come with concessions were guaranteed by Ottoman capitulations, or "extra-territorial privileges enjoyed by foreigners residing in the Empire" (Ahmed, 1998: 19). Capitulations, which were initially offered as gifts to European states by the Sultan beginning in the mid-

[26] By looking the role of private governance of urban water services in early 20th century, for example, Harris (2013: 120-121) urges us to acknowledge debates over private vs. public ownership of public services go far back to late 19th century.

[27] The sectors that foreign concession companies operated includes, but not limited to, telegram networks (Bektas, 2000; Shahvar, 2002), railway (McMeekin, 2010), electricity, mining, and port management. For foreign companies' role in İstanbul's transformation in late 19th century see Dinckal (2002).

sixteenth century, became an economic liability and weakened the sovereignty of the Empire (Pamuk, 1987, also see Ahmad, 1998).

The Empire's first electric generator was a small water mill in the southern city of Tarsus. Completed in 1902, the generator had a 2 kW dynamo and could only power a limited number of streetlights (Hepbaşlı, 2005). The Ottoman's first major power plant was *Silahtaraga Power Plant* built in central Istanbul in 1913 by Hungarian Graz Electric Company in partnership with *Banque de Bruxelles*. A year after its completion, Graz Electric Company sold the plant and the concession of providing electricity to Istanbul to a Belgian company called Sofina (Akçura, 2007). Fired by coal from Zonguldak and Northern Istanbul, the plant had an installed capacity of a little over 13 MW and singlehandedly powered the city until 1952. The plant was closed down in 1983and gentrified into a university campus in 2007.

After the First World War and following the Turkish War of Independence fought against the proxies of the Allies, excising the shame of Ottoman capitulations was of utmost priority for the victorious Ankara government.[28] In 1923 the capitulations were all abolished by the Treaty of Lausanne, which heralded the birth of the new Republic. However, the young Republic continued to adhere to a relatively liberal economy until the Great Depression while, at the same time, fostering a national bourgeoisie from scratch where and when possible.[29] Therefore the early Republic years welcomed foreign investors

[28] On the public perception of Ottoman capitulations at the turn of the century, see Ahmed, 2000.
[29] The liberal economic tendency of the early Republican era is subject to heated debates amongst economic historians. While some recite the manifesto of the first Economy Congress held in İzmir in 1923 as the proof of the early Republic's genuine interest in liberal principles, others point to government led

and showed a cautious interest in cooperating with European markets (Pamuk, 2012: 180-183). The reflection of this preference was new coal-powered plants built and run by mostly German, Belgium, Italian and Hungarian capital (Hepbaşlı, 2005: 317). The first power plant in Ankara, the new capital, was a diesel generator jointly built by German MAN and AEG (*Ibid*). The first Turkish electricity company, *Kayseri ve Civarı Türk Elektrik Inc*, was founded in 1926 (*Ibid*).[30]

It could be argued that late Ottoman and early Republican experience with liberalism between the mid-nineteenth century and the Great Depression might have eased the neoliberal transformation (particularly in public services) that started in the early 1980s. Yet the early liberal experience was mostly haphazard, leaving behind few long-lasting institutions. Most importantly, both late Ottoman and early Republican approaches to the liberal economy had been highly pragmatic and geared towards reforming the weakened state structure. Local entrepreneurs neither demanded nor established collaboration with foreign capital and institutions largely remained top-down initiatives. Ottoman and Young Republican interest in liberalism was less motivated by economic principles than by increasing the central government's reach, capacity and power (Pamuk, 2012: 158-159). In the absence of local bourgeoisie and significant treasury reserves, the governing elite showed little hesitation opening up to the world economy, with the hopes to modernize the state. This state-led, top-down, highly pragmatic style of the first acquaintance with

agriculture and banking decisions designed towards self sufficiency (Pamuk, 2012: 180-184; Finefrock, 1981). This unique state-led liberalism experiment came to an abrupt end with the Great Depression yet left lost-landing marks on the collective memory of the country's political economy.

[30] It is worthwhile to note that *Kayseri ve Civarı Türk Elektrik Inc.* is still an active in producing and distributing electricity in interior Anatolia and have never been nationalized and remained as one of the exceptions of the state planed era.

liberalism is as noteworthy as the experience itself. The reflection of this centrally supervised liberalism by 1930 in the electricity sector was 48 power plants with installed capacity equal to 74.8 MW. Each plant was a private (and mostly foreign) enterprise, completed either with the initiation or permission of the central government, first the Sublime Porte in Istanbul until the collapse of the Empire and then the new government in Ankara.

### 2.3.2 National Planning Paradigm (1930-1982)

The young Republic had to conclude its experimentation with liberalism rather abruptly. The Lausanne Treaty had deterred Turkey's repayment of Ottoman debts and in return, had maintained Ottoman tariff rates until 1929 (*Ibid*: 176). 1929's signficance was further accentuated by the Great Depression, which depressed agricultural prices and hampered the emergence of a national bourgeoisie. These developments forced the Ankara government to embark on a new approach to managing the economy. First, tariffs on agricultural products and cotton were raised. Follow this, the first five-year industrial plan envisioning an increased state role in national economy was passed in 1934. The plan was prepared with the assistance of economy advisors from the USSR. The young Republic's governing elites coined the term *devletçilik* (statism) to differentiate the centrally planned and run economy from liberalism. However, it largely applied to communism. Post-Depression governments preferred a more controlled economy, initiating a wave of nationalizing a number of foreign-owned factories and let the state be active in production of goods and services through state-run enterprises. Statism, accompanied by a mixed

model of planned industrialization and fostering domestic production through import substitution mechanisms, finally created a new cadre of national industrialists.

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that statism and planning ruled all aspects of the economy consistently for the fifty-year period following the Great Depression (Millor, 1990). From the 1950s onwards, with the transition to a multi-party system, there were periods during which government loosened the state's grip on its planned economy. The 1960s witnessed steadily high growth numbers as local capital blossomed under the protectionist economy, averaging 6 percent in GDP and 10 percent in manufacturing per annum (Pamuk, 2014: 238). In the 1960s, economic priorities drastically shifted from agricultural substances and modernization to industrialization and urbanization, both of which not only increased energy demands, but also created a desire for electricity (*Ibid*, 2014: 245).[31] Nevertheless, industrialization was not completely left to the invisible hand. An untold division of labor emerged wherein the textile, home appliance, pharmaceutical, and automotive industries were left to the private sector while the state maintained its monopoly over strategic and capital-intensive sectors such as mining, steel, petro-chemical, and energy (*Ibid*: 237). The curious case of the dirigisme-style division of labor between state and capital, along with a bourgeoning national bourgeoisie under state supervision and protection, not only characterized the 1960s and 1970s, but also constituted a precedence in the country's political economical culture that would have long-lasting

[31] Mass internal migration from the countryside to cities was one of the key characteristics of 1970s. Coupled with the specialization of Turkish capital in home appliances demand for electricity, at one level, was a yearning for modernity and welfare. Quintessential consumption good of this yearning was refrigerator: Number of households with a refrigerator almost tripled jumping from 25 percent in 1970 to 72 percent in 1980 (Pamuk, 2014: 241).

effects.[32] Despite the seemingly paternalistic relationship between the state and capital, the establishment of the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSİAD) in 1971 and its increased political weight in the following decades suggest that the Turkish bourgeoisie's dependence on the state is neither absolute nor unconditional (Yalman, 2009, Buğra, 1994).

In terms of energy infrastructures, this period (1930-1982) was represented by two major shifts, the first dominated by nationalizations, and the second by the emergence of energy bureaucracy and planning. Between the Great Depression and the end of the WWII, all privately owned and operated energy infrastructures were nationalized (Hepbaşlı, 2004: 317).[33] Completed in 1948, *Çatalağzı* Coal-Power Plant was the biggest accomplishment of the new energy paradigm. The Plant, which was commissioned to a British consortium, was owned and run as a *kamu iktisadi teşebbüsü* (Public Economic Enterprise)[34] and powered the entire Marmara Region, which would soon become the country's industrial epicenter. With its 300 MW capacity, *Çatalağzı* still operates as one of the few remaining power plants owned and operated by the state.

Alongside operationalizing energy infrastructure, real impact of the national planning era on the energy field was the establishment of a series of energy-related institutions and the

[32] In fact, the nature of state-capital relations and the actual legacy of import-substation based protectionism of national bourgeoisie generates the most heated debated for those who study the political economy of Turkey. (*cf.* Yalman 2009; Buğra, 1994; Keyder, 1987; Boratav, 1983, Isık, 2014)
[33] With the exception of *Kayseri ve Civarı Türk Elektrik Inc.* Pamuk, (2002: 185-196) reminds that purchase of foreign energy companies went rather hassle free due to the shrinking global economy and uncertainties caused by the Great Depression.
[34] The first CEO of the plant, Salim Eken, for example, was concomitantly acting as a vice president of Etibank, a state-owned bank specialized to finance mining exploration and infrastructures. URL: http://www.cates.gov.tr/tarihce/tarihce.html (accessed 08 June 2016).

emergence of a new engineer-cum-bureaucrat cadre that came to administer them. Most of these organizations (see Table 2.1), designed according to the planned economy principle, soon became the most prestigious posts for bureaucrats to occupy. On the one hand, energy bureaucracy was one of few on-job training opportunities young engineers (and economists) could find in the absence of a fully-fledged domestic industry.[35] On the other hand, as *icracı* (line) institutions, state-run energy organizations were in charge of the distribution and expenditure of a sizable portion of the government spending. Organized at the local level through regional branches across the country, they provided an unmatched networking opportunity for career bureaucrats. As a consequence, state-planning era energy bureaucracy not only trained competent engineers, economists and administrators, but also produced seasoned politicians. Süleyman Demirel, seven-time Prime Minister and Turkey's 9th President (1993-2000), started his career in ESRA and was Director General of SHW in the late 1950s. He was hailed as the *King of Dams* as his name was associated with the ambitious Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), a multi-sector development project centered around seventeen hydropower plants. Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister of the neoliberalizing 1980s and the 8th President of Turkey (1989-1993), was vice-Director General to ESRA in late 1950s.

Turkey's planned economy managed to trigger large-scale industrialization in big cities in the 1960s and produced subsequent large-scale urbanization in the following decade. On the energy front, the outcome of this transformation was drastic: energy consumption increased by three fold in two decades, jumping from 11.21 mtoe in 1960 to 33.47 mtoe

[35] It is illustrative that SHW was referred as *okul* (school) for young engineers and recruited very competitive university graduates.

1980s (Yılmaz *et al*., 2005: 261). However, despite state-led efforts and the first of large dam campaign of 1970s[36], primary energy production only doubled from 9.54 mtoe in 1960 to 18.85 mtoe in 1980 worsening the country's energy deficit (see Figure 2.2).

**Table 2.1: Emergence of The Energy Bureaucracy**

| Abbreviation Turkish/English | | Institution | Date | Purpose | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Etibank | 1935 | Raising capital to fund costly energy exploration and production efforts. | Privatized (1998), now defunct |
| MTA | MREI | Mineral Research and Exploration Institution | 1935 | Exploration of natural resources, utilization of existing reserves, particularly coal and oil. | Active |
| EIE | ERSA | Electric Resources Survey Administration | 1935 | Research on the country's electricity potential and planning of its development. | Renewable Energy Administration (since 2011) |
| DSI | SHW | State Hydraulic Works | 1953 | Administration of watersheds and infrastructures; building/administration of hydropower plants with EIE. | Active |
| TPAO | TP | Turkish Petroleum Inc. | 1954 | State-run conglomerate responsible of exploration, extraction and distribution of domestic and imported oil and oil products. | Split into multiple companies (1990s), partially privatized |
| ETKB | MENR | Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources | 1963 | Long term planning of the country's energy policy, supervision of energy bureaucracy. | Active |
| TEK | EIT | Electrical Institution of Turkey | 1970 | Distribution, transmission of electricity, maintenance of the national grid. | Split into three (1994), mostly privatized |

The most impactful energy-related development of the 1970s was the OPEC oil crises of 1973 and 1979. As a net oil importer, Turkey was significantly hurt by each crisis.

[36] Keban Dam, located in Eastern province Elazığ, was the highlight of Turkish dam building in 1970s. 1330 MW in installed capacity, Keban Dam was completed in ten years (1965-1975). When completed its reservoir became the third largest lake in the country relocating of 25.000 villagers (Kolars, 1986). Originally a self-standing project, Keban is now integrated with the GAP project.

However, the latter crisis' impact was intensified by political instability and a foreign exchange crisis in 1979 (Rodnik, 1990). Negative growth and hyperinflation were accompanied by shortages of basic goods, particularly energy. Despite the new hydropower plants, energy consumption breakdown by primary source of energy was 47.8 percent petroleum, 23.8 percent wood and dung, 19 percent hard coal and lignite, and 7.5 percent hydropower (*Ibid*). Coal and oil shortages were so severe, it was alleged that even the office of the Prime Minister could not be heated for a short period.[37] Fuel and coal shortages, as well as price fluctuations, impacted virtually every aspect of life from transportation to home cooking.[38] Routine power outages and long lines in front of LPG retail stores continue to visually define the late 1970s and the planned economy's failure. Throughout the 1980s, energy shortages and never-ending LPG lines were used as powerful rhetorical tools to legitimize opening up the economy, enacting neoliberal reforms and privatizing the energy sector.

### 2.3.3 Early Neoliberal (1983-2001)

The eventual response to the deep crises of late 1970s a neoliberal shock therapy that would be globally ubiquitous for years to come (Klein, 2007). The economic program presented on January 24th, 1980 (referred to as the January 24th Decisions) by Demirel's minority government devaluated Turkish Lira against US Dollar, lifted barriers against imports, ended a set of agricultural subsidies, proposed measures to suppress wages, and introduced

[37] Upon seizing the office in 1979, Demirel responded to the crisis with his infamous "the state is in need of 70 cents" remark, and blamed the social democratic government preceding his for the nation's energy predicament (Özel, 2014: 34).

[38] Liquid Propane Gas (LPG) was, and still is, the most common energy source for cooking in Turkey. LPG cylinders are sold at neighborhood level, require refilling often and provide a first hand contact with petroleum-based energy even for those who do not own an automobile. Its tangible ubiquity can only be compared with self-service fuel filling experience in the US.

a stimulus program to encourage an export-led growth model (Boratav *et al*, 1996; Arıcanlı and Rodrik, 1990). Although the Demirel government was soon toppled by a military intervention (allegedly to end street-level violence between political factions), the junta embraced the economic program sketched on January 24th and appointed one of the authors of the program, Turgut Özal, as the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey's interim government (Pamuk, 2014). Three years later, Özal's newly launched *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party, also known as ANAP) secured a majority government at the first post-1980 general election, providing the opportunity to intensify the neoliberalization program Özal helped launch.

Opening up the energy sector was one of the first priorities of the early neoliberal agenda, particularly because statist energy policies were seen as one of the fundamental catalysts of the economic crises of late 1970s. Law no. 3096 was enacted in 1984. Entitled *Authorization of Enterprises Other Than the Turkish Electricity Administration to Produce, Transmit, Distribute and Trade Electricity*, it was the neoliberal government's first attempt to encourage private actors to partake in the energy industry. The purpose of the law was to create a framework in which private entities could build and/or operate power plants without completely leaving the energy sector to market forces. Accordingly, independent power producers (IPPs) would be able to produce electricity under three different schemes: (a) for self consumption (auto-producer), (b) by leasing existing state facilities (transfer of operating rights - TOOR), by building new facilities with the condition to transfer them to the state after a set period (build-own-transfer - BOT). Under Law no. 3096, energy ceased to be an exclusively state sector, but this did not extinguish

the state authority over the market. However, by including transmission, distribution, and trade alongside production in their approach to opening up the market, the new government sent a signal that their ultimate goal was the sector's complete liberalization as early as 1984.[39]

This first step towards market liberalization did not come to fruition anytime soon. There were only a limited number of investors willing to gamble on the energy sector's unclear future. By the end of the century, only twenty-two new privately operated power plants were opened under the BOT scheme with a capacity totaling around 2275 MW, which corresponded to less than 10 percent of the country's entire electricity generation portfolio at the time (Özkıvrak, 2005: 1343). Scholars have argued that one reason for the lack of investor enthusiasm was judicial resistance against the sector's liberalization (Gülen, 1998; Çakarel and House, 2004; Hepbaşlı, 2004; Özkıvrak, 2005; Yılmaz and Uslu, 2005; Çetin and Oguz, 2007; Erdoğdu, 2007). In a series of legal battles, the details of which are discussed in the next section, high courts effectively halted the industry by annulling several key clauses in the new energy laws and establishing regulations that made the sector's liberalization possible. For this reason, the 1984 framework law was followed by a series of new laws, supplementary bylaws and executive orders, each of which sought to make it more appealing for the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs to invest in the sector (See Table 2.2).

[39] To put the Turkey's eagerness towards energy sector liberalization into perspective it is worthwhile to energy liberalization efforts did not start in the world before early/mid 1990s with the with the notable early exception of Chile which embarked upon its liberalization program in 1982, just two years before Turkey (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001).

**Table 2.2: Legal Restructuring of Energy Industry in Turkey**

| Date | Legal # | Law (L) / Bylaw (B) / Executive Order (E) / Constitutional Amendment (C) | Content / Importance |
|---|---|---|---|
| **1984** | 3096 | Authorization of Enterprises Other Than the Turkish Electricity Administration to Produce, Transmit, Distribute and Trade Electricity **(L)** | As a first step towards the liberalization of the energy sector, this framework law recognizes that Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, (and upon affirmation of State Planning Organization), may grant permission to the investors to construct and operate electricity production facilities. To this end, three methods are defined. Build Operate Transfer (BOT) allowed private enterprises operate energy production facilities that they build with the condition of their eventual transfer to the state in 99 years (later revised as 49). Transfer of Operational Rights (TOR), on the other hand, enabled investors to operate (and collect revenues of) existing state owned energy facilities through lease like contracts for set periods of time. Energy produced has to be sold to Turkish Electric Administration. The third method is the Auto-producer that allows the consumption of the produced energy in the owner's own facilities. |
| **1993** | 3974 | Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK) Privatization **(L)** | TEK, the main authority in the electricity industry as the publically owned vertically integrated entity, was separated into two corporatized entities (Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission Company – TEAŞ and Turkish Electricity Distribution Company – TEDAŞ) with the perspective of privatization. The law attempted to privatize the two entities through sale of ownership rights yet this clause was canceled by the Constitutional Court (Atiya *et al.* 2012: 20). |
| **1994** | 3996 | Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) Law **(L)** | To encourage private investment into the energy sector, the law aimed increasing the attractiveness of BOT contracts by offering treasury guarantees and tax exemptions. Specified particular certain arrangement as anon-concessionary, thus could be subjected to prıvate law. The Constitutional Court found the law unconstitutional and annulled it in March 2016 (Cakarel and House, 2004; Gürcan, 1998; Atiyas). |
| **1996** | 96/8269 | Build-Operate-Own (BOO) **(E)** | Introduced BOO method, which -unlike BOT- allowed investors to own the generators they built and operate. BOO contacts were subjected to international arbitration. Annulled by the Council of State. |
| **1997** | 4283 | Build-Own-Operate Law **(L)** | Provided legal framework and offered treasury guarantees for BOO contracts as the executive order 96.8269 was struck down by *Danıştay* (Council of State) on the basis that the decree requires parliamentary mandate. |
| **1997** | 97/9853 | Build-Own-Operate By-Law **(B)** | Complements Law no. 4283. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **1999** | 4446 | Privatization Amendment **(C)** | One of the series of constitutional amendments passed in 1999 was an addition to item 47 that define the conditions of nationalization. Originally the item 47 of the constitution defined only *Nationalization* and was titled as such. 1999 amendment was revised the title as *Nationalization and Privatization*, provided legal basis for the liberalization of energy sector (among others) and, to a large degree, prevented the high courts' annulment of privatization contracts. |
| **2001** | 4628 *(now 6446)* | Electricity Market Law **(L)** | Unlike Law No. 3096 this framework law envisioned complete liberal restructuring of the energy sector and eventual withering away of the state involvement. Introduced Energy Market Regulatory Body as an autonomous institution to supervise the emergence and heathy sustenance of a competitive energy market. Adopted licensing of energy production rights instead of multi-piece BOT, BOO and TOR methods. |
| **2003** | 25150 | Water Usage Rights Regulation **(B)** | Regulation about Procedures and Principles for Contract Agreements in Water Usage Rights for Production in Electricity Market. Requires for all existing and future hydroelectricity producers (license holders) to sign a water usage rights agreement with State Hydraulic Works (SHW) that would allow them to lease river sections on which the plants will operate. Increased legal legitimacy of private Hydropower Plants. |
| **2005** | 5346 | Renewable Energy Law **(L)** | Aims at encouraging investments in renewable energy generation facilities. Defines support mechanisms, purchase guarantees and prices. |
| **2008** | 26939 | Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Bylaw **(B)** | One of the seventeen amendments/changes in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Bylaw. Until 2000 hydroelectric power plants (HEPPs) with 50 MW installed capacity or below were exempt from EIA. Upon public opposition threshold was lowered first to 10 MW and then to 0.5 MW in 2008 and 2011 changes, respectively. Yet, it should be noted that many HEPPs with installed capacity 10 MW and below had secured licenses prior to 2008 EIA Bylaw change. |
| **2013** | 6446 | (New) Electricity Market Law **(L)** | Replaces Law No. 4628 and introduces pre-license procedure. Aimed at hindering a black market for licenses, defines a series of and somehow costly procedures to be fulfilled prior to acquiring production licenses for Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA). Indirectly acknowledges speculative license transfer under Law No. 4638, aka *çantacılık* (the briefcase trade). |
| **2014** | 6545 | Urgent Judicial Proceeding **(L)** | Aims at shortening proceeding period and alleviate judicial work load in administrative cases. Urban and environmental conflicts are particularly targeted as permits and EIA reports that authorize disputed projected are tried under administrative law. Shortens law suit filing period, curtails suspension of execution orders and appeal procedures. |

Out of desperation, TOOR and BOT contracts were made highly attractive through treasury guarantees and tax exemptions while a new method called Build-Own-Operate (BOO) was introduced in 1997. BOO contracts allowed IPPs to own the property rights of the electricity facilities that they built and operated.

The failure of the early liberalization had significant repercussions, each with long-lasting consequences. First, the installed capacity expansion's pace drastically slowed in light of uncertainties regarding the future of the market. By 1996, thirteen years after the enactment of Law no. 3096, only six IPPs were in operation (Çakarel and House, 2004). Between 1993 and 1998 the total installed capacity in electricity production rose from 20,337 MW to 23,354 MW (TEIAS, 2016), while the energy demand in the 1990s increased by a record 7 percent per annum (Atiyas *et al.*, 2014). Thanks to the completion of large dams that had been planned in the 1970s and undertaken by SHW in the following decade, improvements in hydropower installed capacity were important additions to the energy portfolio. However, they were not enough to shrink the deficit.[40] Secondly, the vicious cycle of underinvestment, wherein the private sector shies away from investments due to legal uncertainties and the state divests with the expectation of private entry, put Turkey's energy balance in a dire financial situation. The limited number of foreign investors entering the market were motivated by long-term take-or-pay guarantees and above- market prices, which put an immense fiscal burden on the national budget for years to come (Çakarel and House, 2004). A third outcome (and cause) of the energy deficit in the 1990s was the

[40] Ironically enough, two decades between 1980 and 1990 are not only marked by early neoliberalization but the same period is also the golden age of hydropower –or the pinnacle state-hydraulic paradigm (Bakker, 2010)– as many large-dam projects were completed in this era such as,

introduction of natural gas to the energy portfolio, which was intended to diversify primary energy sources. Although natural gas significantly diminished national dependency on oil, it increased Turkey's overall energy dependency, as its natural gas reserves are next to nil. As a result, the majority of IPP additions to the electricity generation portfolio were natural gas power plants (*Ibid*.). Finally, the increased burden of the energy bill on the budget made a series of corruption allegations visible. Turkish High Courts of Accounts litigations on the irregularities in the design and implementation of IPP contracts as well as bidding processes (or lack thereof) illustrated the significance of the energy field as a site where the government could engage in nepotism and the distribution of public rents (Atiyas *et al.* 2012: 22). In an uncommon trial by Turkish standards, the Constitutional Court tried two Ministers of Energy and Natural Resources along with a number of energy bureaucrats, and ex-Minister Cumhur Ersümer was found guilty on corruption charges.[41]

The transition of the Turkish economy from an inward looking import-subsidizing model to an export-oriented one open to global markets was hailed by the international finance community as one of the early examples of neoliberalism (Özel, 2012: 120). During the first several years of this new experience, economic growth as well as relatively controlled inflation were seen as an affirmation that neoliberal principles could effectively work in developing contexts (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003). However, the winds changed rapidly in the early 1990s, often dubbed the economy's "lost decade" (Öniş and Şenses, 2009: 3). Anxious to attract foreign capital, the economy of the early neoliberal Republic relied on

[41] Three year long trial ends former minister acquitted, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 28 June 2007, URL: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/three-year-long-trial-ends-former-ministers-acquitted.aspx?pageID=438&n=three-year-long-trial-ends-former-ministers-acquitted-2007-07-28 (accessed 15 June 2016)

high levels of domestic and foreign debt, short-term capital flow and a rentier class that was dependent on the government for high interest rates (Öniş and Şenses, 2009 :2 citing Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The return of fiscal deficits (deteriorated partially by the energy deficit) and high inflation accompanied by political instability and the war fought against the Kurdish insurgency accentuated the vulnerabilities of Turkey's early neoliberalization attempt. Within the span of eleven years, the country was struck by four major episodes of economic crises, in 1990-1991, 1994, 1999, and 2000-2001, respectively (Pamuk, 2012: 281). The last and deepest crisis brought a landslide transformation in party politics and notable shifts in accumulation patterns.

### 2.3.4 Deep Neoliberalization (2001-2013)

#### *2.3.4.1 Crisis, Energy and Conditionality*

Chronic stagnation in the real sector, lingering payment disparity, disequilibrium in the banking sectors and massive outflows of foreign capital culminated in the 2000-2001 crises, the worst meltdown of the crisis-ridden early neoliberal experience (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The 2000-2001 economic crises had devastating social, political as well as economic consequences. Within a matter of days $3.5 billion foreign currency left the stock exchange.[42] GDP contracted by 7.4 percent in real terms, while wholesale inflation soared to 61 percent (Yeldan, 2016: 12;). Turkish Lira lost half of its value; overnight, interest skyrocketed 6000 percent (Pamuk, 2012: 285). The crisis

[42] "MGK'da anayasa firlatma krizinin 10. yılı" [10th anniversary of the crisis] *NTV*, 17 January 2011, URL:http://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/turkiye/mgkda-anayasa-firlatma-krizinin-10-yili,1BMjiPUws0S1BrB8UVAp9Q/lMoFrr_OpkGuwOWLSzkup (Accessed 15 June 20016).

led to a severe contraction in real wages as they fell 20 percent abruptly in 2001, while unemployment rose 2 percent in 2000 and then 3 percent in 2001 (Yeldan, 2016).

Despite the fact that Turkey had been in close cooperation with international finance institutions (IFIs) since the early 1980s, that pre-crisis economic programs had been designed and monitored by the IMF, the country's post-crises recovery formula did not depart from neoliberal principles (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The arguments that put the blame on corrupt bureaucracy, nepotism, weak coalition governments, lack of political will and half-hearted implementation of the reforms prevailed as best explanations of the crises (*Ibid*). Social frustration with the economic downturn did not explicitly target the IMF, nor were there mass demonstrations posing a systemic critique comparable to those experienced in Latin America.[43] Consequently, Turkey's recovery remedy was predicated on deepening preexisting neoliberal reforms through the assistance of yet another IMF stand-by agreement.[44] The new assistance program aimed to secure fiscal austerity, complete structural adjustments, accelerate privatizations, and discipline public expenditures, as well as reform the banking system (Cizre and Yekdan, 2005; Öniş and Rubin, 2003). However, this time, the program tacitly acknowledged the possible shortcomings of leaving the market on its own: the new IMF program devised autonomous regulatory institutions to supposedly minimize vulnerability, arbitrariness and volatility of the market (Pamuk, 2014: 286).

[43] Explanations regarding the absence of radical street level opposition in post-2000/2001 crises vary. Presence of informal social networks, family ties and the vibrant urban-rural connection that offers the ability to take refuge in the countryside in case of bankruptcy are cited factors that differentiate the Turkish case from its counterparts, such as the contemporaneous economic crisis in Argentina (see Öniş, 2009).
[44] 2000/2001 economic crises hit in the middle of a two year-long IMF stand-by package. That was the 18th assistant program Turkey signed with the IMF. After the interruption of the crises 19th package was signed in 2002.

The electricity sector, whose early opening-up failed to generate the expected outcome, was key to this new approach. The Electricity Market Law (EML – Law No. 4628) was passed in 2001 with the aim of creating a truly private market from scratch. The EML focused on unbundling industry activities (state monopoly), privatizing public assets (power plants), and establishing a "financially strong, competitive, efficient and transparent" market, one subject to private law and overseen by an autonomous body called Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA).[45] Inspired by the UK model, designed with the assistance of the World Bank and Deloitte, the new law was seen as "a text-book" electricity reform (Erdoğdu, 2005). EML instituted MRA as an independent body, governed by its own board composed of ten members, all of whom were appointed by the Cabinet for six years of service with the condition of not working for the sector for two years after their term. Although it is a public institution, like many examples of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), EMRA was not dependent on a ministry. The primary role of EMRA was to implement the licensing regime that replaced previous IPP schemes. Thus, one of the primary functions of EMRA was to protect the market from political influence and distribute valuable energy production permits in an impartial manner. EMRA was also responsible for monitoring the IPPs compliance with the conditions of licensing, and imposing fines in case of noncompliance. Moreover, EMRA was responsible for writing and implementing secondary legislation, and provides retail services to non-eligible consumers. EML also disintegrated the electricity sector by unbundling generation, wholesale, and transmission into three separate public companies, introduced (and defined

[45] The institution was first named as Electricity Market Regulatory Authority, yet soon revised as Energy Market Regulatory Authority as its area of jurisdiction was expanded.

restrictions to) competition in non-monopoly segments, allowed open access to networks, outlined how to proceed with the privatization of state plants, and monitor costs in generation and wholesale.[46]

The 2000/2001 crises not only led to deepening neoliberalism with the help of regulatory (roll-out) measures, but also triggered a sea change in electoral politics. The general election held on November 3rd, 2002 was a major blow to almost all establishment parties. Four parties who shared 75 percent of the legislative seats prior to the election were pushed out of the parliament as they failed to gather enough votes to pass the 10 percent national threshold. AKP was allowed to form a single party government by securing 66 percent of the seats via 34 percent of the popular vote, first step of a sea change in Turkish politics.

#### *2.3.4.2 Energy and the Birth of AKP hegemony*

Founded only fifteen months before the election, AKP was an outcome of a split in the political Islamist lineage that had achieved remarkable electoral successes throughout the 1990s led by the *Refah* (Welfare) Party. Energizing the masses with its populist *adil düzen* (just order) motto, *Refah* had carried Istanbul with 21 other cities in the 1994 local elections and won the 1995 general elections in an unprecedented victory. Refah was first removed from office via a swift intervention by the military and then banned by the constitutional court for being the epicentre of anti-secular activities.[47] AKP was founded by a reformist cadre from the *Fazilet* (Felicity) Party, a successor of *Refah* and yet another banned party of political Islam in Turkey. Coming from a tradition of banned parties, AKP, from the

[46] On the details of Electricity Market Reform, see Atiyas and Dutz, 2003; Özkıvrak, 2005; Hepbaşlı, 2005; Atiyas et al., 2012.
[47] For more on rise and fall of Refah, see Gülalp, 1999.

very first day, took the utmost care to distance itself from political Islam. This included embracing the EU membership perspective, norms and the authority of the Western alliance, and most importantly, the superiority of global capitalism, all of which had been criticized veraciously by the representatives of political Islam prior to the birth of AKP. These sharp changes in their platform did not alienate the base of political Islam. In fact, by taming radical elements and reconciling with capitalism, AKP expanded its base and it comfortably clinched election victories in a series of elections following its first term. In a subtle process of what Tuğal (2009) calls passive revolution with reference to the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci (1971), political Islam, led by AKP, managed to exert a long-lasting hegemony thanks to its absorption into global capitalism.

The hegemonic formation of AKP was multi-layered, rising on to the top with the help of several unexpected alliances. In terms of the economy, AKP's first term (2002-2007) was a honeymoon: a remarkable success story. With the help of the IMF program, Turkey returned to positive growth rates, averaging 5.8 percent GDP expansion from 2003 to 2009. Inflation was tamed and brought down to single digits. Turkey achieved fiscal discipline and public debt was lowered significantly. Predicated upon this rapid recovery from the 2000/2001 crisis, the AKP government was hailed with admiration by Turkish and international business circles traditionally suspicious of political Islam. Business-friendly government policies led to the re-entry of foreign capital, which had left the country without looking back in 2001. Loyal to its founding principles, AKP not only stuck to the IMF program, but also took a proactive role in its execution. In fact, AKP has proven itself to be much more successful in implementing neoliberalization than its counterparts in the

1980s and 90s. AKP's privatization performance is a case in point. Despite the fuss, between 1985 and 2000—roughly throughout the early neoliberalization period—the revenue generated from privatization was around $8.4 billion. The pace of privatization, a routine complaint of IMF regarding Turkey's performance, accelerated beyond expectations under AKP, amounting to $62 billion over the period between 2003 and 2013 (Öniş, 2011; Eğilmez, 2014). A wide range of business owners (big and small, metropolitan and provincial, domestic and international) plundered public assets, bestowing upon AKP a broad-based support within the bourgeoisie that few governments had enjoyed before (Öniş, 2011).

The most remarkable accomplishment of AKP has been its maintenance of strong ties with the urban working middle/lower classes while showing no hesitation in catering to the capital. Through an elaborate neoliberal social policy regime (social assistance and workfare programs) AKP has been quite successful in garnering the consent of unorganized, informal or unemployed social classes (Akça *et al*. 2014: 31). Under its governance, most social assistance has been channeled through Islamic grassroots organizations and municipalities, providing a unique power to the giving hand to know, hand-pick and establish long-term ties with recipients and blurring the divide between right and charity. With its preference for haphazard charity distribution (i.e. random coal assistance) over universal subsidy programs, AKP established a personal relationship with some segments of the urban poor.

In the international arena, the first AKP term also heralded the birth of the so-called Turkish Model. The security paradigm of the post-9/11 world order accentuated the AKP's initial success as a conservative Muslim government willing to partake in capitalism and globalization without making much fuss about secularism. Pointed to by Western leaders and the international press as an example for the rest of the Islamic world, the Turkish Model was essentially the "marriage of formal democracy, free market capitalism, and (a toned down) conservative Islam" (Tuğal, 2016: 4). Alongside the cross-class support AKP managed to garner domestically, its international legitimacy and model status have been critical for the formation of its hegemony.

To return to energy, it should be noted that as it came to power in November 2002, AKP certainly did not have a significant role either in the energy controversies of the 1990s or in enacting the EML in 2001. In fact, the Felicity Party, the political Islamist party in 2001 prior to the AKP split, had not voted for the Electricity Market Law and appealed to the Constitutional Court for its repeal. However, AKP not only embraced the precedent set by the EML, it has been unapologetically proactive in its execution. Although AKP was not the architect of the new energy regime, it became its diligent implementer by passing complementary legislation, encouraging businesspeople to invest in the energy sector and standing behind controversial projects.

Under AKP, the energy sector, which had been stagnating by the turn of the century, has developed into one of the most attractive sectors in Turkey. Investments picked up speed particularly in the second half of the 2000s upon the completion of supplementary

regulations. Both the privatization of state assets (plants and electricity distribution companies) and new electricity generation licenses attracted considerable attention. The Turkish energy sector became one of the world's fastest growing by reaching above 9 percent growth rate in 2010 and 2011. From 2008 to 2015, the total investment volume in the energy industry surpassed $50 billion.[48] The country expects to attract $120 billion in investments to meet its 2023 centennial of the republic goals.[49] The dynamism of the sector was such that it alone carried 32 percent of all privatization and private sector transactions in 2012. In terms of foreign direct investment, electricity and gas sectors helped to significantly improve these numbers, amounting to $19.3 billion over the period between 2006 and 2015. Since 2009, Turkey's energy sector has consistently made the top three FDI attracting sectors, switching positions with manufacturing and finance and insurance. However, the lion's share of the distribution licenses are shared by domestic players. An average of $6 billion has poured into new electricity production infrastructures annually since 2008.[50] The advent of the liberalized energy sector as a new unexplored lucrative market was one of the catalysts of the post-2000/2001 crises recovery, particularly as it absorbed the exodus from shrinking sectors such as textile (Eberliköse, 2013). While energy emerged as a new accumulation model, Forbes magazine reported that 82 of 100 richest people of Turkey had active operations in the energy sector in 2013, making the sector the country's most profitable alongside real estate.

[48] 'Enerji sektöründe iflas kaygısı' [Bankruptcy anxiety in the energy sector], *Enerji Panorama*, 25, July 2015, pp.33-35, p. 33.
[49] 'Turkey needs to invest 120 billion in energy until 2013 says Erdogan', *Hurriyet Daily News*, 20 January 2015. URL http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-needs-to-invest-120-billion-in-energy-until-2023-says-erdogan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=77197&NewsCatID=348 (accessed 10 June 2016).
[50] Ibid.

The unprecedented eagerness to invest in energy boosted the installed capacity in electricity supply. From 2002 to 2014, installed capacity in hydropower and thermal power more than doubled, leading to a surge in total capacity by 117 percent, from 31,845 MW to 69,519. As government officials proudly advertise every now and then, under AKP, more installed capacity was operationalized in the course of 2002-2014 than it had been in the first 80 years of the Republic. Total electricity generated also jumped from 129,400 GWh to 251,964 GWh. Wind energy, almost non-existent a decade ago, now accounts for 6 percent of the total installed capacity.[51] Despite a considerable delay, the first set of solar farm licenses were distributed in 2015. Additionally, in 2010 the country's first nuclear power plant deal was sealed with Russia's state-owned corporation Rosatom, only to be followed by a second agreement in 2013 with a Japanese-French consortium. The next significant item on Turkey's energy agenda is to utilize the country's entire coal potential by 2023. To this end, a new coal extraction campaign is underway, opening new mines and expanding existing ones. Additionally, Turkey is planning to add a jaw-dropping 80 new coal power plants to its portfolio, one of which will allegedly become the world's biggest.[52]

## 2.4 A NEW WAVE? POST-NELIBERALISM (2013 ONWARDS)

### 2.4.1 Dark side of the Energy Frenzy

Turkey's energy frenzy however is not entirely impressive and marketable, although the numbers cited above suggest otherwise. In fact, it is those numbers that have been stirring

[51] Turkish Electricity Transmission Co. (TEIAS). URL. http://www.teias.gov.tr (accessed 20 May 2016).
[52] "Is it too late to stop Turkey's coal rush?", Guardian, 06 August 2015. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/06/is-it-too-late-to-stop-turkeys-coal-rush (access 15 June 2016).

a bankruptcy anxiety across the sector for some time.[53] Many energy companies are reportedly struggling to keep up with loan repayments for a variety of reasons (see chapter X for details). A recent study examining energy projects' realization speeds confirms that the fears are not entirely baseless. Accordingly, projects with project realization ratio over 35 percent, amount to a mere 26 percent of all projects. Half of all projects have 10 percent or below completion ratio (Türkyılmaz, 2015: 27).

At the heart of this bankruptcy anxiety, on the one hand, lies the untold weaknesses of AKP economics. Despite all the glamour, the impressive growth rates in AKP years were achieved in spite of two major shortcomings: the growth has been a jobless growth, one that is unable to generate employment, and it was speculation-led, relying heavily on the foreign credit that was globally available in the 2000s that targeted emerging markets like Turkey in a quest for quick returns (Yeldan and Ünüvar, 2016; Adaman and Akbulut, 2013). Despite AKP's critically acclaimed economic success, unemployment, which rose to double digit numbers with the 2000/2001 economic crises, never fell to single digits, let alone 6 percent, of the pre-crisis level.[54] More pertinent to energy infrastructure investments is the soaring indebtedness of the private sector; while public finances were relative restrained in the post-2000/2001 crises, in the five years between 2008 and 2013, short-term external debt stock of the private sector almost doubled, jumping from $55.5 billion to $100.9 billion (Yeldan and Ünüvar, 2016: 22). What makes debt (and growth) speculative is the very short-term character of these loans. Short-term debt accounts for 87

[53] "Enerji sektöründe iflas kaygısı" [Bankruptcy anxiety in the energy sector], *Enerji Panorama*, 25, July 2015, pp.33-35, p. 33.
[54] Non-agriculture unemployment was 9.3 percent in 2000, rose to 12.4 percent in 2001 escalated between 17.4 and 12.0 percent in the next 12 years. (Yeldan and Ünivar, 2016: 18)

percent of the total debt stock of the private sector (*Ibid*). Concerned with the mutually reinforcing impact of the dual fallacies of joblessness and speculative money flows, Yeldan and Ünüvar (2016: 19) summarize the post-2001 growth pattern as follows:

> *A major distinct feature of the Turkish economic scene in the post-2001 crisis era was its relatively high interest rates and costs of credit. Operating under an environment of global financial expansion, this fact has led to a rapid expansion of foreign capital inflows, especially in the form of short-term speculative 'hot' finance. The underlying speculative nature of such flows was a witness to the fact that they were not necessarily part of 'green field investments' that could expand labor demand by creating new jobs and bringing new advanced technologies.*

The energy sector suffers from—or rather, was built upon—both of these weaknesses. Turkey's debt-ridden accumulation pattern (*ibid*) fueled growth and facilitated an unprecedented level of investment in sectors that promised guaranteed returns. Real estate in urban centers and extractive industries, as well as infrastructure projects in rural areas, emerged as the best possible destinations for foreign loans to be channeled into. Yet, as Turkish currency began to significantly depreciate beginning in 2013, the energy sector's debt has become the sword of Democles hanging over the private sector. Droughts, optimistic investment projections, rising electricity prices, and the energy license black market also feed into the speculative character of the business, parallel to the general growth pattern of AKP economics.[55]

On the other hand, the energy sector's vulnerability is not simply a product of certain economic trends and miscalculations. Another reason underlying the hardship currently faced by some energy investments is the societal dissent against them. Investing in energy

[55] For all of these factors that hinder the ability of energy companies to pay pack their loans, see chapter 3.

infrastructures at such a high rate and intensity corresponds to an aggressive spatial transformation in which (often rural) residential settings are transformed into energy landscapes in a rather abrupt fashion. One of the most dynamic and effective social movements that emerged throughout Turkey's AKP years is the grassroots activism that opposes the intrusion of coal mines as well as thermal and hydro power plants into rural livelihoods. Starting around late 2000s, the opposition has matured in scope, reach and political language, emerging from individual land use conflicts (initially mostly around small hydropower plant developments), and now can be framed within the energy justice movement framework. Discussed in detail in chapter Y, the opposition, along with the litigations they have initiated, exerts formidable pressure on the spotless image of the energy world by causing significant delays in projects' completion, if not halting them altogether. Nowadays, it is almost a rarity for an energy infrastructure to be built without facing litigation. The sheer number of energy infrastructure-related environmental conflicts has forced the government to find innovative, unorthodox and often heavy-handedly executed solutions to circumvent regulations without completely alienating rural residents, some of whom are staunch AKP supporters. Below, I discuss how AKP responded to some of the bottlenecks in the energy sector and ask whether the contemporary comeback of state authority in energy policy corresponds to a new era that goes beyond neoliberalism as we know it.

### 2.4.2 Reading Authoritarian Neoliberalism Through Energy

On May 13th, 2014 an underground fire in Soma coalmines took 301 lives, earning it the embarrassing title of the deadliest mining disaster of the 21st century. Located in the small

town of Soma in Western Turkey (in the Aegean Region), Soma mining operations were publicly owned until 2005 when its royalties were given to *Soma Holding* to boost production and efficiency as part of the government's policy to maximize the utilization of domestic coal resources for energy production. In return for a fixed royalty, the coal extracted by the private contractor in Soma was guaranteed to be purchased by the state to be burned in the still state-owned Soma coal-power plant. More coal was extracted in Soma mines under the new management while the cost of extraction plummeted significantly. The company's CEO stated in a 2012 interview that the coal in Soma used to cost US$130-140 per ton when mined by the state, and they were committed to maintain a price of US$23.80 per ton, including royalties. This was of course only possible at the expense of diminishing salaries, worsening job security and workplace safety, and disrespect for labor rights. When aggressive cost-cutting measures including mining, long-working hours and lay-offs of experienced workers conjoin with absence of rescue chambers[56], the death toll in Soma multiplied.

It soon became apparent that Soma was more than a simple failure of regulation or an unfortunate byproduct of privatization. Soma was the quintessential neoliberal disaster and a horrible reminder of both the catastrophic consequences of privatizing public services and the seemingly benign adherence to the motto of efficiency. Importantly, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's approach to handling the tragedy suggested that a new chapter in neoliberalism might be in the making. Against critiques, Erdoğan dismissed the disaster as "faith" (will of god), and referred to deadly mining explosions from 19th century

[56] Rescue chambers are emergency shelters used in underground facilities, mostly in mines.

England calling it the "usual" outcome of mining business[57]. When he visited Soma a few days after the disaster, the small town welcomed him with widespread protests that Erdoğan and his entourage responded with violence and intimidation. One of his aides was photographed kicking a protestor laying on the ground in the fetal position. The victim, a miner, was taken under custody and forced to publicly apologize.[58] Erdoğan, too, physically harassed a Soma resident and yelled at another: "if you boo the Prime Minister of this country, you get a slap." Why did Erdoğan lose his decorum so spectacularly and take the Soma incident so personally?

It was later revealed that Soma Holding had close connections with the government. In addition to the coalmine royalties, the company had enjoyed some questionable tender bids in Istanbul's urban transformation campaign. But beyond cronyism, which is not unheard of in Turkish politics, the details of the connection between the government and the company insinuated a rather organic relationship that goes beyond business as usual. Based on miner testimonies she collected in Soma, journalist Suzy Hansen (2014) captures the depth of the relationship:

> *A.K.P., which has been in power for more than a decade now, needed the coal for electricity, for construction projects and, as the miners saw, for gifts to dole out at election time. The country's prime minister and now president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had bags of coal delivered to poor Turks during his last three campaigns. Most miners supported the A.K.P. If the party didn't win, their bosses told them, you won't have jobs. Sometimes, the miners said, they were paid their daily wage to take a bus to the A.K.P.'s famous, techno-thumping rallies, which often gave the*

[57] "The mine disaster that shook Turkey" *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 November 2014, URL. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/the-mine-disaster-that-shook-turkey.html?_r=0 (accessed 15 June 2016).
[58] "Dayak maduru madenci çıktı" [The victim turns out a miner] *Cumhuriyet*, 21 May 2014 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/74353/Dayak_magduru_madenci_cikti.html (accessed 15 June 2016).

> *impression that the entire nation had gathered in impromptu parties of collective joy. The miners, too, waved their hands in the air and screamed.*

The question of how the people of Soma, who only ten years prior were mostly small-scale but self-sufficient olive producers, were convinced to work in such terrible conditions was answered a few months following the disaster thanks to yet another energy-related dispute. On November 7th, 2014 a six-acre olive grove including 6,000 mature olive trees was bulldozed in Yırca, a village only a twenty-minute drive away from Soma. The bulldozing ended a months-long confrontation during which the villagers of Yırca were intimidated, threatened and beaten by private security guards of the Kolin Group—another conglomerate that developed a stronghold in the country's infrastructure and energy fields during the AKP era. The reason behind the grab and clearance of the Yırca Grove, which was the sole income source of some 120 households, was to build a second coal power plant in order to absorb the Soma mines' overproduction. The license holder of the future plant, the Kolin Group, would have never acquired the Yırca Grove without the help of the AKP government. The Cabinet expropriated the grove only three days before the Soma disaster, and land use rights were leased to Kolin for 49 years for energy production purposes. The violent appropriation of the land was made possible by *emergency expropriation*, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, a procedure AKP has reinvented to boost infrastructure investments and that has led to the violent displacement of citizens with limited means. The new expropriation techniques are secured and supported by a series of changes in administrative law to obstruct citizens' ability to appeal and to minimize court intervention, expanding AKP's mandate over energy.

To be fair, the recent revival of heavy-handed state involvement in the energy field is not limited to the authoritarian handling of land allocations and violent suppression of energy disputes. For some time, AKP has been determined to assert its influence in energy, not only to suppress societal dissent *for the market*, but also to exert its authority *in the market*, a market liberalized in 2001. It is now difficult to argue that EMRA is still an independent regulatory agency (just like other IRAs) as envisioned by the 2001 Electricity Market Law (Özel, 2012: 124-125). The first signals of the regulatory capture were given by Ali Babacan, then-Deputy Prime Minister, when he declared that "it is time for the independent agencies to delegate their authority" (Bekmen, 2014: 69). True to the spirit of this position, AKP passed a decree in 2011 that allows relevant ministries to inspect IRAs (*Ibid*). My contacts at EMRA confirmed that the government influence in EMRA is undeniable: as one high-ranking expert put it "even the janitor hires need the approval of the government" (*interview with the author*, February 2014). As the government's influence on EMRA grew, complaints from the sector became more visible on a variety of issues ranging from price mechanisms to licensing, from tendering cost and procedures to abrupt alterations in energy regulations.

The government not only exerts its authority by increasing its grip on the market but also establishes alliances, demanding recognition of its authority in return for business opportunities. To address the slowing down of project completion in the sector and prevent the black market from functioning, on May 2nd, 2014 EMRA decided to seize the electricity production licenses of projects that do not progress in a timely manner. Initially, some 30 companies, including pioneers in the sector, lost licenses and faced debarment from

operating in the energy sector for three years. Coined "May 2nd syndrome," the decision threw the energy sector into disarray and led many investors into questioning the market's health.[59] A few months later, EMRA revised its decision and added a clause to offer amnesty to the barred companies if they provide evidence that would prove the delays were induced by factors beyond the will of the investor. Although the vacillations in energy policy are often resolved in a way that benefits the investor, in the final analysis, what they generate is the reaffirmation of the central authority over the sector. The investors I interviewed see these frequent changes in regulation as arbitrary and believe the government is influenced by societal factors such as land use disputes and price concerns. Yet, the sector's disarray forces investors to lobby hard for revisions, seek government intervention on behalf of business and, when those demands are met, prompts them to establish close ties between the party and the sector.

### 2.4.3 The Problem with Post-neoliberalism

What comes after neoliberalism? Following the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 there has been signficant interest in the possible defeat (or retreat) of neoliberal hegemony and what the socio-economic order after neoliberalism would look like. For instance, "neoliberalism," Cecena argued, "met its definitive end with the crisis that erupted in 2008" (2009: 33). Citing Karl Polanyi, Altaver added that "the inherent tendency of disembedding markets from society and nature has halted" as failures of capitalism became apparent in the financial meltdown (2009: 82).

[59] "2 Mayıs İptallerine Mücbir Sebep İncelemesi" [Revising May 2nd decision], *Enerji Panorama* 10, 2014: 18-20.

The interest in the end of neoliberalism stems from two primary sources: the popularization of critiquing neoliberalism and the spread of anti-neoliberal, anti-capitalist and anti-austerity movements, as well as the re-appearance of state in planning post-crisis restructuring, either through reinstituting redistributive welfare policies or via organized corporate bailouts (Springer, 2015). Obviously, the two factors are closely related. Growing distress and resentment about the ills of capitalism has forced governments across the world to take Keynesian-like measures at least to alleviate the burden of the crises, some populist, some technocratic.

While the blow to neoliberal capitalism after the global economic crisis at the discursive level is less questionable, whether or not it is a deathly one is debatable (see, Springer, 2005; Peck *et al.*, 2010). Springer (2015) reminds us that the eagerness to call the end of neoliberalism drives from its misconceptualization as a static set of policies. If understood as a process in its verb form, neoliberal*ization*, it is already highly malleable—including haphazard state intervention—in its implementation. Hence, what is perceived as post-neoliberalism could well be conceptualized as a variation of neoliberalism.

Although I agree with Springer (2015, also Brand and Sekler, 2009) that the hasty celebration of the end of neoliberalism risks us losing sight of the continuities and variations in neoliberalism, I want to draw attention to the rather surprising optimism of post-neoliberal imaginaries. Most of these optimistic accounts, no matter how cautious or eager they are to announce the death of neoliberalism, associate post-neoliberalism with a more democratic future. Accordingly, post-neoliberalism, which heralded discontent with

contemporary capitalism and the state's return to the realm of economic activity in the name of the public, is expected to inevitably open up more egalitarian and participatory opportunities rather than close them off. One of the best examples of this optimism is found in Grugel and Riggirozzi's (2012) analysis of the post-crises policies undertaken by left-leaning Latin American governments and social movements. Although they rightfully acknowledge that the progressive policies they choose to review operate "within the confines of the market-oriented export-led growth," Grugel and Riggirozzi understand post-neoliberalism as "an attempt to deliver a democratic and inclusive social contract" (2012: 15). But what if the state's comeback as post-neoliberal lends itself to authoritarianism rather than an inclusive democracy (*cf.* Bruff, 2014)? Is it possible that a potential path out of neoliberalism is to re-embed economy into society not through alternative economies or collective rights and welfare allowances but through a mighty central power that does not hesitate to use arbitrary force to address the instabilities of capitalism?

Whether Turkey has switched gears in neoliberalism or chosen to adhere to an entirely different vehicle in the post-Gezi uprising period is a curious question. Particularly at a time when the celebrated Turkish model is in shambles (Tuğal, 2016), making sense of Turkey's authoritarian turn could enhance our understanding of the contemporary nature of neoliberalism (or capitalism in general). There are two main problems with declaring the birth of authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey via a politics of energy infrastructures. Scholars have already argued that authoritarianism is not exogenous to neoliberalism (Hall, 1985, Harvey, 2005; Springer, 2009): privatizations, displacements, dispossessions all

require some degree of heavy-handed state involvement if not all-out violence. The very fact that early neoliberal experience was made possible by silencing of the political left and labor unions in the 1980 military intervention attests to how neoliberalism could and has benefitted from authoritarianism. Cronyism, on the other hand, has always played a role in different episodes in Turkish economic history, as mentioned above. What is qualitatively distinctive about the late AKP era, however, is the narrowing gap between the state, the government and certain factions of capital that support and finance the party (*cf.* Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014).

The corruption scandal that broke out in December 2013 was unique, providing valuable insight regarding the nature of this new form of authoritarian cronyism in Turkey. Dubbed as the "mother of all corruption scandals,"[60] it was based on a two-year long intelligence gathering activity initiated by a criminal investigation that was only possible thanks to a fracture in the government bloc. On the surface, the investigation was about Reza Zarrab, a businessman who reportedly engaged in illegal trade activity to by-pass US sanctions to Iran. The trade was made possible by a high-end bribe scheme in which four ministers were also implicated. The investigation's cunningness was in its method. As the money and the relationships were traced, the probe snowballed until Erdoğan and his family members' phones were tapped. After an initial panic, AKP managed to prevent the investigation from progressing; however, the recordings had already been leaked on YouTube in their entirety, making hours of audio and video surveillance available to the public.

[60] "Why Turkey's Mother of all corruption scandals refuses to go away?", *Foreign Policy*, 6 January 2015, URL. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-of-all-corruption-scandals-refuses-to-go-away/ (accessed 15 June 2016).

The recordings were dismissed by Erdoğan as fabrication. The long list of accusations pointing to high-ranking AKP members, including bribery, corruption, fraud and money laundering, were disqualified and never taken to the courts, as AKP successfully purged the cadre behind the investigation. However, the hours-long private conversations available online (genuine or fake) provided revealing details on how the tenders for big real-estate and infrastructure projects were arranged, how bankrupt newspapers were distributed among a loyal group of businessmen and funded by a financial pool subsidized by infrastructure moguls, how commentaries on surrogate news channels were closely monitored by Erdoğan himself and how energy tycoons were expected to pay tributes to Erdoğan's son (Eroğlu, 2016).

Despite the detailed revelations of the leaks, AKP was not harmed by the scandal in terms of electoral success. Rather, the scandal alleviated the party's deterioration following the Gezi Uprising that took place in the summer of 2013. AKP won the March 2014 local election by a safe margin and Erdoğan was elected the 12$^{th}$ President of Turkey in August 2014 by gaining 52 percent of the popular vote. Although many observers explained the public's indifference on the grounds of the historical ubiquity of corruption in Turkey, I disagree that AKP's constituency did not care about the scandal. To the contrary, for many, those recordings illustrated the prowess of Erdoğan and his government in restraining the capital by levying, in a sense, secret taxes that could not be enforced in an open market. "Erdoğan" as one AKP supporter in Rize (who was also an avid proponent of HEPPs in the region) told me, "is so cunning, he is getting all these HEPPs done for free, generat[ing]

energy for the country and then forc[ing] the rich to pay their fair share for the cause" (*personal interview*, March 2014). Whether "the cause" refers to the party, the government, the state, the people or devout Muslims is in the eye of the beholder and secondary in importance.

## 2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has traced the Turkish energy industry's history and its transformation over the last hundred years. By examining how energy policies reacted to some of the fundamental turning points in Turkish economic history as well as how crises in energy triggered those transitions, the chapter clarified the continuities as well as the ruptures in the sector. By expanding on the remarkable development of the sector in the last decade, I have also argued that energy played an exceptional role in the formation of AKP's hegemony and its political economy. Yet, going beyond the simple allegory that energy "fuels" the economy, the aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that different energy policies engender different institutions, form different class coalitions and open-up and close down different political possibilities amounting to an influential rationality with repercussions beyond the field of energy (Mitchell, 2011). This emergent rationality, which I prefer to call *energorationality*, however cannot be reducible to energy alone—or its absence, in the case of Turkey—as it interacts with, and is fed by, diverse fields, social anxieties and hegemonic projects. I argue that beyond providing a lens to the last decade or so of Turkish economic and social policy, energy, understood as a form of rationality, has been instrumental first in selling the image of AKP hegemony and then helping legitimize its growing authoritarianism. I contend that the rising importance of energy in

Turkey, particularly under AKP rule, cannot be read as an automatic and inevitable outcome of Turkey's energy deficit or merely as a matter of economic reality, as many natural resources specialists and economists prefer to theorize. In fact, throughout this chapter we have touched upon a number of fields that have impacted the emergent *energorationality* throughout its historical development. I have explicated that the historical shifts between liberal, planned and neoliberal approaches to energy governance not only reflects economic needs of the Republic but also ideological shifts in the ruling bloc, as well as global developments and altering inter and intra class positions. The following chapter will expand on the class dimension touched on here by focusing more on how energy infrastructures under particular conditions foster, or hinder, new forms of accumulation opportunities. My fourth chapter will examine the legal aspect of the energy frenzy, focusing on how legality was subjected to rationalities of energy under the disguise of fighting against bureaucratic tutelage.

C H A P T E R – T H R E E

# 3 A NEW INFRASTRUCTURE FOR AN OLD ENERGY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S HYDROPOWER RENAISSANCE

*Müjdat was my ride to one of the more accessible villages of Artvin, the easternmost province of Turkey, neighboring Georgia. A stream was running through the village, as is common in all villages in the Mountainous province. And like all streams of Artvin, it was targeted by a small hydro power plant with less than 5 MW installed capacity. We were supposed to meet with the village elders to hear their experiences with the company that holds the small hydro license. We knew that they were particularly eager to talk about a somewhat heated encounter with the subcontractors who started initial construction of the SHP. The subcontractors eventually had to leave, first because of local resistance and then thanks to a court order based on an ill-prepared environmental impact assessment (EIA) report. Although faith in the SHP was still unclear and the company's return with better crafted paperwork was highly probable, this was one of many successful resistance stories in Artvin, and Müjdat was personally involved and excited to share it with me.*

*We spent a couple of hours in the village, listening to the elders' environmental struggle and how they attributed it to the region's left-wing political heritage. We were amazed by how vigilantly the villagers defended their stream and were inspired by how every village in Artvin was collectively resisting small hydro in solidarity and in close cooperation with the Green Artvin Association, of which Müjdat is also a member. We were also surprised by the level of political argumentation presented by the villagers and the connections they established between the SHP project in their village and the state of the Turkish economy. As we returned to Artvin City, an administrative centre of the province, Müjdat and I both felt a ghost in the car. Travelling along the once mighty Çoruh River one of the fastest running rivers in the world and whose deep valley cuts the province in half, we saw that it was no longer running as a result of a series of large dams erected on its course.*

> *Artvin, the anti-small hydro opposition stronghold of the country is also host to some of the nation's largest dams in operation (or under construction). Curiously, these dams receive with little objection from the people of Artvin, most of whom are aware of the environmental sacrifice zone status. Müjdat did not wait for my prompt and addressed the ghost of Çoruh: "[if] we had acted earlier", he told me in sighs, "both the river and the stream could have been recued easily." When he realized I was not satisfied by the kind of apologetic answers that characterized his point, he shifted to a more intimate mode. "Well, if you want me to be honest with you, here is my answer!" he started to whisper as if he was ready to reveal the secret. Some fifty years ago, he explained, every single household had a relative lost in the rapids of the Çoruh. "It is simply too big, too strong" he reminded me. "No one could imagine those dams, which have been rumoured about for decades, could ever be built one day. And when they started to build them it was too late. I mean, after all, who could ever stop the dam that stops Çoruh the Great?" (Personal interview, August 2013).*

Pipes, airports, wires, sewage, dams, ports, highways, bridges, railroads and cables—Infrastructures matter. And not only in a narrow and rather dull techno-policy sense; they matter politically, economically, materially, discursively and affectively. Infrastructures are enablers. They are built networks that enable other networks to work by facilitating the flow of goods, services, people, ideas and resources (cf. Larkin, 2013). Access to urban infrastructure designates the worth of a neighborhood. The distribution of infrastructures across regions, cities and districts reflect socio-economics inequalities and further reinforce them. Populations are governed from afar thanks to the efficient penetration of infrastructures or their selective and differential utilization. The absence of infrastructure defines underdevelopment and a place's distance from modernity. Infrastructures often draw the perceived line between nature and society and exemplify humankind's so-called dominance over nature. It is infrastructures that help us to compress time and space. Some infrastructures fail spectacularly, producing unwanted byproducts which are expected to

be addressed by yet another set of infrastructures. Certain infrastructures are sources of awe and desire, while many are considered uninteresting and rendered invisible as the environmental justice literature has illustrated. And in some cases, like Müjdat's explication of human perception of, and interaction with, infrastructures, they can never be taken for granted. They are outcomes of complex entanglements of magnitude, and are shaped by both geography and history.

My dissertation research takes its cue from an ostensibly simple yet curious question that dispels the taken for grantedness of infrastructures as predictable edifices: what is it that makes small hydropower plants (aka small hydro or SHP) so central to both Turkey's recent energy drive and its counter environmental mobilization, given that the country is already a global frontrunner in large dams? Based on a close reading of the small hydro boom and an analysis of project sites, investors, infrastructure contractors, hydropower bureaucrats, energy fairs and panels, this chapter (and the next) illustrates the kind of power infrastructural networks generate at the intersection of the state, markets and nature. It is important to note that I am not interested in small hydro for small hydro's sake. Yet, it is only by interrogating the technical qualities of an infrastructure like small hydro that one can fully grasp the social, economic and political tensions triggered by the emergence and spread of energorationality.

This chapter is composed of four sections. In the first section, I will overview some contemporary approaches to the study of infrastructure to better elucidate the analytical importance of focusing on small hydro. The next section introduces small hydro technology

and expands on the underlying reasons for the infrastructure's popularization across the global South. The third section traces the general characteristics of the small hydro boom in Turkey and locates it in the country's hydropower renaissance. Section four discusses the spatial role small hydro has played in the geographical expansion of Turkey's energy politics as well as neoliberal authoritarianism. The next chapter will further elaborate the role small hydro played in the emergence of the private energy sector.

## 3.1 WHY STUDY INFRASTRUCTURES?

In recent years, infrastructures have captured the attention of researchers from diverse social science disciplines. Many anthropologists, architects, geographers, sociologists, environmental studies scholars and urban researchers have begun to take infrastructures "more seriously," either by directly focusing on them or designing research that is heavy informed by built structures otherwise neglected in their mundane invisibility. It is certainly not the first time that dams, roads and airports are highlighted in research articles, dissertations and books written by social scientists. What distinguishes the contemporary interest from earlier examples is an analytical effort to bring infrastructures to the foreground rather than treating them as background information or not 'a given'. Influenced by science and technology studies, the current focus on infrastructures seeks to find fresh and revealing perspectives in the "imbrication of infrastructures and human organization" (Star, 1999: 379). Studying infrastructures should not be a naïve involvement in empiricism; it is an interest in the "complex and contingent contractedness of techno-systems" (Ferguson, 2012: 558). More than being mere backdrops, or systems of substrates performing an assigned function (Ibid: 380), infrastructures are assemblages of multiples

pieces, an amalgamation of technological, political and financial techniques (Larkin, 2013: 330). In this sense, what is studied through an inquiry into infrastructures is not a thing; it is always a relationship (Star, 1999: 379, citing Bateson, 1978: 249). While energy is central to my research as an emergent form of rationality, the real potent of techniques of governance become discernable in the concreteness of physical structures. My emphasis on small hydro is motivated precisely by the unexpected ability of this infrastructure to bring together divergent and often conflicting relations, ideas, actors and geographies.

This is not to suggest, however, that small hydro developments (or infrastructures in general) are a seamless fabric embracing and concealing difference and conflict in perfection. To the contrary, infrastructures eventually (sometimes expectedly) fail. When they perform, more often than not they perform selectively, rendering certain populations and geographies worthwhile while marginalizing others in disconnection and abjection (Anand, 2012; Rodger and O'Neill, 2012).

Similar to their socially stratifying effect, some infrastructures serve certain communities at the expense of others. As Star aptly puts it "one person's infrastructure is other person's difficulty" (1999: 380). This is particularly valid for infrastructures that heavily depend on extractive techniques. The provision end of an infrastructure rarely resembles its extractive end. Energy infrastructures in particular expand over multiple locations and perform diverging functions at different scales. The immanent threat of climate change and the technologies proposed to mitigate its effects attest to the scalar challenges of energy infrastructures. Howe et al. point to the paradox of infrastructures in that they "both

mitigate and magnify precarity in the Anthropocene" (2016: 555). Significantly, this paradox is not between different and competing forms of infrastructures; the same infrastructure could produce different environmental outcomes at different scales. While renewable energy infrastructures offer solutions to alleviate some of the problems caused by more conventional carbon-based energy infrastructures, their success at the global scale will eventually be based on how and to what extent they are implemented on a local scale (Boyer, 2012). Given that small hydropower plants contribute to global climate mitigation perspectives and implementations as a carbon-free renewable alternative, we must interrogate whether they are perceived as such in the valleys and villages in which they are being built.

Fortunately, the contemporary literature on infrastructures is increasingly cognizant of uneven geographical development and the utilization of built technologies. While they share a great deal in common, scholars acknowledge that infrastructures in the global South perform differently than their counterparts in the global North, if they perform or exist at all (Howe et al., 2016). The better-life promise of infrastructures, for the most part, is still captivating in the global South. The affective allure, or what Harvey and Knox call the "enchantment" of infrastructures, is alive and well in the parts of the world yet to enjoy the benefits of development. What is interesting about the infrastructures in the global South, however, is not their lack (in fact, some metropoles of the global South use top-notch technological systems, infrastructure in many parts of the post-industrial world are prone to decay). Rather, the variations in infrastructural implementation are characterized by innovative forms of translation (adaptation of infrastructures to local culture and

geography) and doubling (utilization of infrastructures for alternative functions) (Latour, 1993; Larkin, 2013). Comparing Turkey's small hydro boom with theır counterparts throughout the world illustrates that the real significance of infrastructures unfolds in their local context as they often fulfill different functions than they are built to serve.

Another aspect of infrastructures regularly emphasized in the literature is the ideological load they carry. In his work on contemporary Soviet urban infrastructure and architecture, Humphrey (2005) reminds us that ideology is a form of political practice manifested in material objects as much as it is inscribed in texts and speeches. Infrastructures—the way they are constructed, distributed, function—reveal a great deal about state formation and power. In fact, more than being a mere material embodiment of state authority, some infrastructures construct state spaces by drawing new landscapes and transforming the old (Brenner and Elden, 2009; Harvey and Knox, 2012; Rodgers and O'Neill, 2012). While the ideological messages infrastructures convey rarely disseminate without becoming lost in translation—meaning that their ideological massages have certain limits— (Harvey and Knox, 2012), as collectively experienced commonly shared spaces, infrastructures often reflect a sense of publicness despite their socio-ecological failures.

The field of public infrastructures is changing at an alarming pace undermining their public value. Emerging markets invest in large scale projects at an unprecedented rate while infrastructure is undergoing a revival in the global North as a part of post-crisis stimulus efforts. Dubbed as "the biggest investment boom in human history," approximately $ 6-9 trillion is spent on large-scale infrastructure projects annually, amounting to 8 percent of

total global GDP (Lyvbjerg, 2014). While some projects are funded, constructed and owned by the public, many of today's infrastructures are private, complicating the public qualities of them. This chapter specifically addresses this tension embedded in private infrastructures and questions how state authority and the publicness of infrastructures become a matter of negotiation under particular market conditions and in light of speculation.

## 3.2 SMALL IS THE NEW LARGE: REVIVAL OF SMALL HYDROPOWER PLANTS

Up until the late 2000s, there was only one word in the Turkish vernacular to describe the infrastructures of hydropower. *Baraj* (adapted from French *le barrage*, or "dam" in English) was used to indiscriminately refer to a large variety of hydraulic structures whether used for irrigation, consumption or energy. In the last decade, however, Turkey has witnessed the penetration of a new term in everyday parlance. *HES*, short for *hidroelektrik santrali* (hydroelectric power plant), is now the term used most frequently to refer to majority of hydropower structures. One notable exception to this timeline is State Hydraulic Works (SHW), for which *HES* has always been the technically preferred way of indexing hydroelectric power plants. The adoption of the term *HES* by the general public, for whom linguistic abbreviations are uncommon, is new and unexpected.

This seemingly trivial change in terminology, in fact, shows a great deal about Turkey's hydropower renaissance. In the last decade and a half, with the liberalization of the energy sector, the country's hydropower portfolio has been dominated by a new form of

infrastructure technically know as small hydropower plants in principle, small hydro is not much different from large hydro. Each harnesses the power of a river by letting water pass through the blades of a turbine. As the turbine rotates under the pressure of moving water, a generator attached to the turbine creates electrical power. However, small hydropower plants require a new name as they look nothing like a *baraj,* which has a well established image in the collective memory, indeed it is featured on the now defunct one billion lira bill.[61]

### 3.2.1 Small vs. Large Hydro: A Matter of MWs?

The primary difference between large and small hydro is that the latter does not require a large reservoir—the hydrologic feature that makes a hydropower plant a *baraj*—to operate. Instead, a typical small hydro exploits the vertical distance between two sections of a river by directly capturing its kinetic energy without collecting and elevating river water in a reservoir, although it might make a small foray to regulate the water's intake (see Figure 3.1). (1) The highest point of the system becomes the intake; (2) from the intake, the stream is diverted into a channel or a tunnel that follows the counter of a hillside to bypass the riverbed; (3) when optimal vertical distance is reached, the stream in the channel is left to free flow inside a pressurized penstock pipe; (4) and is finally released back to the river bed after going through turbines inside a powerhouse.

[61] TL 1,000,000 banknote, which features Ataturk Hydropower Plant on its back side, was in circulation between 1995 and 2004 until Turkish Lira redenomination by the removal of six zeros from the currency.

**Figure 3.1: A Typical Small Hydro Plan**




Courtesy by Deniz Erk and Bertan Kılıççıoğlu

Despite the dissimilarity in physical infrastructure, the differences between small hydro and large hydro are not always officially recognized. Small hydro is rarely acknowledged as a separate energy infrastructure category. Data of small hydro, for example, is rarely parsed out and usually falls into a generic hydropower category. The European Small Hydropower Association (ESHA) defines small hydropower as "a plant with an installed capacity of up to 10 MW."[62] However, 10 MW is not a mutually agreed upon metric for identifying small hydro. The threshold for small hydro is as low as 1.5 MW in Sweden, as high as 30 MW in Brazil, and even 50 MW in China and Canada (IPCC, 2015: 450).SHW

[62] ESHA brochure. Available at http://www.esha.be/fileadmin/esha_files/documents/Policy/ESHA-Policy_sheets_-_new.pdf (accessed 20 May 2016).

of Turkey does not differentiate HEPPs according to their size, but according to the facility type. SHW recognizes two categories: HEPPs with dams and run-of-the-river HEPPs. This classification however does not tell us much about the size of the plant. This is because while almost all SHPs are run-of-the-river, not all run-of-the-river HEPPs are small. The MW yardstick in the Turkish case is regulated by the EIA Bylaw, which requires an EIA review for HEPPs with an installed capacity larger than 10 MW. However, until 2000, that threshold was as high as 50 MW. In 2002, it was lowered to 10 MW from 25 MW thanks to a revision in EIA bylaw. Prior to 2011, many sizable projects were built without ever being subjected to an environmental assessment.

### 3.2.2 Something Old, Something New

In a world where states desperately seek new methods to harness utilizable power, small hydro is an old technology, despite the interest it is currently attracting. It is, in fact, the oldest mode of generating electricity for mass consumption and certainly proceeds the advent of large dams.[63] The first small hydropower plants were water mills which were readily available across the world for hundreds of years as a power source for grinding, rolling and hammering. Beginning in the mid-19$^{th}$ century, mills were replaced by water turbines (Paish, 2002: 538). With the improvements in dam engineering and the political and financial support of the state-hydraulic paradigm (Bakker, 2005; Linton, 2010), more power could be harnessed at once by blocking rivers with concrete and rock to store more water. The first half of the 20$^{th}$ century, thus, was the advent of large-scale hydropower in

[63] The first ever urban street electrification was achieved in Surrey Town of Godalming in 1881 thanks to hydropower. An alternator was attached to a watermill located on River Wey, a tributary of Thames (Tulker, 1977: 126).

which small hydro was gradually sidelined with a few exceptional geographies (Paish, 2002: 539).

Contemporary small hydro is not significantly different from the primitive models of the early 19th century. The main difference is that while the watermills were as powerful as the natural flow of the river, now that we are able to manipulate the fall, volume, and speed of the stream by letting water pass through a tunnel system, contemporary models can harness more power. In fact, even rerouting a stream is not a new technology altogether. Ancient engineers were aware that watermills worked more efficiently when a stream was directed to the mill in a more controlled fashion. Nevertheless, developments in tunneling technology and the plummeting cost of tunneling equipment have made the most ambitious small hydro projects—which basically require rerouting streams within a closed tunnel system for miles to exploit a higher head (vertical distance between two river sections)—possible and affordable.

Despite questions about whether differentiating hydropower plants by size scientifically makes sense[64], there has been a concerted effort in the last two and a half decades to recognize small hydro as a distinct energy infrastructure. The European Small Hydro Association (ESHA) was established in 1989 as a founding member of the European Renewable Energy Council. The International Center on Small Hydro Power (ICSHP) was

[64] An IPCC report entitled "Renewable Energy Resources and Climate Change Mitigation" (2012) that provides facts and figures on small hydro and lists its advantages nevertheless states that "Classification according to size, while both common and administratively simple, is –to a degree– arbitrary: concepts like 'small' or 'large hydro' are not technically or scientifically rigorous indicators of impacts, economics or characteristics" (441).

founded in 1996 as a non-profit institution under the auspices of United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

### 3.2.3 The Anti-Large Dam Momentum

The discovery of small hydro as a distinct category, unsurprisingly, corresponds to an era in which large dams, particularly in the global South, received heavy criticism and were widely protested due to their social and environmental impacts. The resentment toward large dams culminated in the commissioning of the World Commission on Dams, which was initiated by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN). In its final report the World Commission on Dams seriously questioned the social, environmental and economic worth of large dams, concluding that "an unacceptable and often unnecessary price has been paid to secure those benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by communities downstream, by taxpayers, and by the natural environment" (WCD, 2000: xviii). As large dams fell from grace and large-scale developmental projects started to be criticized severely, small hydro emerged as the safer investment model in the hydro world. International environmental organizations such as Rivers Internatıonal and Greenpeace also pointed out the untapped potential of small hydro as cheap, sustainable, locally designed, financed, and executed solutions that could help tackle growing energy problems in the global South[65]. To their credit, small hydro solutions

[65] Rivers International, the pioneer of international river conservation and ardent opponent of large dams, is known for its support for small hydro as an alternative to large dams. In a 2010 report the organization express an optimism for small hydro as such: "it became clear that smaller primarily locally financed, built and managed projects could help meet Nepal's electricity needs in a more affordable way. Today, many smaller hydro projects have been built throughout the country, increasing generation capacity by 294 MW. These alternatives, which took less time to develop and were primarily locally designed and built, provide electricity at about half the cost of the original Arun III proposal" (Rivers International, 2010). Greenpeace, too, pointed to small hydro as a viable alternative—for example, as a response to Brazil's aggressive dam campaign along the Amazon. Greenpeace suggested that instead of damming the Amazon, Brazil should

have provided some social benefits in Asia and Africa by contributing to rural electrification efforts (ICSHP, 2013).

The unexpected hit that large dams took from a well-organized coalition of grassroots and environmental activists from the global South and North triggered a small scale chain reaction in the world of water management. Coupled with concerns over the quality and price of the water, the opposition against the large dams challenged "modern water," or the idea that water can be managed uniformly and effectively by keeping ecological, cultural and political factors at a distance (Linton, 2010: 8). The challenge reverberated at World Bank headquarters–the primary financier of the large dams–forcing the bank to reconsider its funding and evolutions schemes (Goldman, 2006). Although, it is difficult to argue that the global anti-large movement marked an end to large-dam construction, finding financial resources for controversial projects has been quite challenging since the 1990s. Anti-large dam struggles are now more visible at the global scale, which has led to delays and even the cancelation of many large scale projects although the reputation loss fail to threaten government funded large scale projects such as the Three Gorges Dam in China.

### 3.2.4 Small Hydro as the Infrastructure of Self-Reliance? The Chinese Experience

The Chinese experience with small hydro deserves special attention, as more than one third of world small hydro capacity is located in China. Thanks to different waves of anti-poverty campaigns, China managed to electrify 95 percent of its countryside between the 1960s

launch a renewables campaign which could be "complemented with… retrofitting or repowering ageing dams [and] building small hydro plants…" (Greenpeace, 2014).

and 1990s (Zhang and Kumar, 2011: 774). This was achieved through a variety of small sized power plants, first and foremost small hydro. Small hydro has helped local electrification, as establishing new local grids was cheaper than expanding existing central grid in a country like China where a large rural population is dispersed across a vast territory. Chinese electrification efforts picked up speed in late 1970s. As the central government handed over the management of local electricity system to the local governments, municipalities, and village communities their number, diffusion, popularity and effectiveness grew (Peng and Pan, 2006). In 2002, China accounted for 15 GW of the world's then-small hydro capacity of 40 GW (Paish, 2002: 540). The last phase of China's rural electrification campaign started in 2001 and was called the China Renewable Energy Rural Electrification Program. Around 8 million people in 2000 townships benefitted from the program, which relied on 377 new small hydropower plants and mini grids (Zang and Kumar, 2011: 774).

What is noteworthy about China's utilization of small hydro in rural electrification is that the entire program was originally promoted as a collectivist self-reliance campaign under the motto "self-construction, self-management and self-consumption" (Bhattacharyya and Ohiare, 2011: 679). True to this self-reliance principle, China's small hydro portfolio is composed of very small hydropower plants with capacities below 500 kW (Paish, 2002). But beyond its technical capacity, Peng and Pan (2006) stress that China's the social emphasis on small hydro led to the rural electrıfication campaign's development component. They suggest that developing rural electrification through the use of local means and actors was "not just to offer electricity access to rural areas but to maximize the

function of electricity" in boosting agricultural production, educational development as well as the local economy (*Ibid*: 84). Inspired by the Chinese experience, the aim of ICSHP, which was founded under the auspices of the United Nations, was to export small hydro led electrification to other parts of the global South as a local development model.

While the connection between small hydro and rural development is noteworthy, we should not overlook the fact that China is now a world leader, not only in small hydro but hydropower in general, and is unapologetic about it. China's enormous Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River is a point of national pride and the world's largest power station (with 22,500 MW entire capacity, it is almost equal to Turkey's total hydropower capacity). Importantly, its construction displaced an estimated 1.2 million people (Hemin et al., 2001: 201). Therefore, the fact that celebrated rural electrification campaigns pioneered by small hydro take place simultaneously with mega development projects conducted by the central government at the expense of displacing and dispossessing local people. Nevertheless, the history of small hydro in China, once read against the Turkish case below, helps us to appreciate the conjunctural determinacy of energy politics by illustrating how very similar energy infrastructures can generate diverse outcomes when applied in different contexts and for different political goals.

### 3.2.5 Climate Change and The Renewables Turn

The relevance of small hydro has been further augmented in the last decade as the climate change agenda has gradually grown into a major policy issue. Relying on mature technology, hydropower is in an advantageous position compared to others options. While

the symbolic infrastructures of the renewables turn are wind and solar, hydropower is still the most attainable and affordable energy source for many countries. For instance, although global renewable energy capacity, excluding hydropower, grew 85 fold from 2004 to 2014, more MWs were added in hydropower during the same period than to any other renewable energy generation system (REN21, 2015: 19). This comparison is particularly remarkable when we consider that countries in the global North have (almost) already realized their hydro potentials.

Although the renewables turn on paper can benefit every forms of hydro, as a minimally intrusive run-of-the-river technology, small-hydro projects have attracted particular attention.[66] Hydropower projects are the largest contributors to Joint Implementation (JM) and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), and therefore, to the carbon emissions markets (IPCC, 2012: 457). With minimum inundation issues, small hydro projects are well-positioned for such mechanisms.

For example, the World Bank revised its approach to hydropower and started to put more emphasis on small hydro. From 2003 to 2008, 48 percent of the World Bank's hydropower funds were directed towards small scale run-of-the-river projects, while larger dams with storage accounted for 28 percent of their expenditure (World Bank, 2009). The European Union, which has committed to a relatively protectionist Water Framework Directive

[66] Despite large dams improved their image thanks to the renewables turn their status as a sustainable technology is still debated and the proponents of the large dams feel to make their case with every single Project and find new terminology such as sustainable hydro to carve a respectable space fort he technology. (Frey and Linke, 2002; Vucijak *et al.*, 2013)

(2013) to protect water quality across the continent, has recently begun to recognize small hydro as a separate entity:

> *Small hydropower schemes are mainly run-of-river with no need to create a reservoir. Because of this fact, small hydropower systems can be considered an environmentally friendly energy conversion option, since they do not interfere significantly with river flows and fit in well with the surroundings. The advantages of small hydropower plants are numerous and include grid stability, reduced land requirements, local and regional development and good opportunities for technologies export.*[67]

While the climate change mitigation goals make renewables, including small hydro projects, much more desirable, it is an empirical question if interest in renewables stems from climate change or the financial and technological opportunities offered and conditioned by these goal. While, at macro level answering this question maybe of secondary importance, success of renewable technologies depends on their implementation on local scale. Turkey's discovery of small hydro attest to this dilemma.

## 3.3 TURKEY'S SILENT DISCOVERY OF SMALL HYDRO

Small hydro is the most ubiquitous energy infrastructure in contemporary Turkey; it is the locomotive of its energy market and the central pillar of its hydropower renaissance. In 2002 there were 71 small hydropower plants with capacities under 10 MW in the country (Balat, 2009: 2157). In May 2016, the number of licensed small hydropower plants, including those under construction and past the planning stage, numbered 451. When current plans are completed in 2023, the centennial of the Republic and the deadline for all official investments and projects, Turkey is expected to have increased its small hydro

[67] European Commission, research and innovation web page, energy section, 11 August 2015 URL. http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/eu/index_en.cfm?pg=research-hydropower (accessed 30 June 2016).

portfolio by almost sevenfold in two decades. However, like Turkey does not categorize hydropower plants by size, it also does not have a dedicated small hydro program. What's more, there is no special initiative for small hydro. Turkey's Renewable Energy Law, which was passed in 2005, includes hydropower indiscriminately, and hydropower of all sizes enjoy the same feed-in tariffs. On the other hand, carbon trading is not a motivation for Turkish small hydro, as the country is only eligible to engage in voluntary markets. Despite the global reputation of small hydro as a renewable technology, it is not easy to suggest that small hydro is a central pillar of a well thought out renewables campaign in Turkey. To its credit, the government has committed to increasing the share of renewable sources in the country's installed capacity to 30 percent by 2023. However, it is unclear how and to what extend this target informs actual policy preferences, given that there are 80 new coal power plant projects to be constructed in the next decade (Carrington, 2015) while the distribution of solar farm licenses has just begun.

Moreover, unlike many countries in the global South, Turkey's interest in small hydro is not for rural electrification. Small hydropower plants are connected to the central grid and thus do not provide off-grid advantages for the local communities that inhabit the area where they are built. Access to electricity is not a primary issue in Turkey; the electrification ratio has been at 100 percent at least for two decades. We must ask, then, what explains the small hydro phenomenon in Turkey? I argue that interest in small hydro as a form of infrastructure not only defines Turkey's energy frenzy in many aspects, but can only be understood within the constraints of that frenzy. The proliferation of small

hydro in Turkey is directly related to its construction as well as to the needs and capacities of the private energy market and the politics of infrastructure in the Turkish economy.

### 3.3.1 Quantifying Turkey's Small Hydro Boom

I begin by location the small hydro boom within the boundaries of Turkey's hydropower renaissance. By adding 21.85 GW of new capacity, Turkey became the fourth fastest growing nation in power capacity in 2014 behind China, Brazil, and Canada–three of the top five largest countries on earth (REN21, 2015: 20). Following the energy industry's liberalization, which succeeded a series of laws and regulations passed in the 2000s (see Chapter 2 for details), hydropower has begun an unprecedented growth trend with the involvement of new private actors. Between 2003 and 2015, Turkey's installed capacity in hydropower jumped from 12,000 MW to 24,000 MW. In other words, the installed capacity operationalized within twelve years exceeded the total amount operationalized before the reign of AKP. According to the projections made for the Republic's centennial—with the completion of those that are in planning phase—Turkey's total hydropower installed capacity is expected to double once again, almost to the level of 48,000 MW. This means the number of total hydropower plants, which numbered 531 in August 2015, will hit almost 1,400 by 2023, with the completion of 133 projects currently under construction and another 721 projects that are at the planning stage (see Table 3.1).

**Table 3.1: Development of Turkey's Hydropower Potential (August 2015)**

| Projects | Ownership | Number of PLANTS | Capacity (MW) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In operation | SHW | 65 | 12,369 | %54.8 |
| | Private | 396 | 10,599 | |
| | Other | 76 | 2,333 | |
| | Total | 537 | 25,301 | |
| under construction | SHW | 4 | 1,940 | %14,8 |
| | Private | 129 | 4,901 | |
| | Total | 133 | 6,841 | |
| Planded | SHW | 82 | 1,582 | %30,4 |
| | Private | 639 | 12,429 | |
| | Total | 721 | 14,011 | |
| | | | | |
| *Total Projected (2023 Targets)* | ***SHW*** | *151* | *15,891* | *%73,2* |
| | ***Private*** | *1,164* | *27,929* | |
| | ***Other*** | *76* | *2,333* | |
| | ***TOTAL*** | ***1,391*** | ***46,153*** | |

Source: State Hydraulic Works (SHW) Department of Hydroelectric Energy Data

The most pronounced characteristic of Turkey's hydropower renaissance is the ownership structure of the power plants, which is changing rapidly from public to private. Not only are an overwhelming majority of new power plants are private enterprises, SHW have privatized most of its portfolio, with the exception of the largest, most strategic ones. In 2003, for example, well before the transition to the licensed distribution system in hydroelectricity, only one tenth of the country's hydropower capacity was owned and operated by private companies. The private sector-state ratio for the installed capacity skyrocketed from its 2003 1:10 level to 1:1 in 2014. It is projected that this ratio will be

updated in 2023 as 3:2 in favor of the private sector. When we repeat the same comparison by number of plants instead of capacity, the juxtaposition only becomes more striking. By 2013, 83 percent of hydropower plants will be private. According to SHW, private entrepreneurs spent approximately 16 billion dollars for the 362 new SHPs that went into operation in the 11 years since 2003. The magnitude of the investment currently planned by the private sector for the completion of the SHPs that will go into operation from now through 2023 is expected to be around 60 billion dollars. In early 2015, the number of HEPPs being built by the private sector was 139, while for SHW the number was only 4.

If privatization is the bread of Turkey's hydropower renaissance, small hydro is its butter. Almost half of the hydropower licenses (451 of 913) approved by EMRA are composed of projects with capacities smaller than 10 MW (see Table 3.2). However, because of their size, their contribution in terms of power is not proportional to their number. In other words, there are too many plants with too little cumulative contribution to the country's electric production potential; 49 percent of the plants make up a mere 6 percent of country's the capacity.

**Table 3.2: Hydropower Plants in Turkey by Installed Capacity**

| | Number of Plants | % in Total Number Plants | Capacity (MW) | % in Total Capacity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **< 9.9 MW** | 451 | 49.40 % | 2,162 | 6.42 % |
| **10-24.9 MW** | 227 | 24.86 % | 3,620 | 10.75 % |
| **25-49.9 MW** | 115 | 12.60 % | 4,005 | 11.90 % |
| **50-99.9 MW** | 55 | 6.02 % | 3,852 | 11.44 % |
| **100-499.9 MW** | 54 | 5.91 % | 9,844 | 29.24 % |
| **500-999.9 MW** | 8 | 0.88 % | 4,644 | 13.80 % |
| **1000 < MW** | 3 | 0.33 % | 5,535 | 16.44 % |
| ***TOTAL*** | *913* | *100 %* | *33661* | *100 %* |

Source: Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) – Electricity License Data

The smallest 451 SHPs combined are not worth one Atatürk Dam (the largest hydropower plant in the country) in terms of capacity of generated electricity. Given that most future projects–there are around 500 projects in line for EMRA licenses–are small in installed capacity, it is fair to suggest that Turkey's hydropower portfolio will be dominated (in terms of number of facilities) by small hydro once 2023 targets are met.

## 3.4 PRIVATIZATION AND SPACE: MAKING ROOM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

Small hydro may contribute little in terms of power; however, they have had a sizable spatial impact on the Turkish countryside. With few exceptions, the geography of the hydropower renaissance is different from Turkey's traditional hydropower geography. Large dams are more suitable for old powerful rivers with huge discharge capabilities; high heads are not attainable in short distances. These old Turkish rivers, and thus large dams, are located in the northern and southern ends of Central Anatolia (along the *Kızılırmak-Yesilırmak Basin* in the North or *Seyhan-Ceyhan Basin* in the South), most notably in Turkish Kurdistan along the Tigris and Euphrates watershed. Until the mid-2000s, hydropower and dams were associated with the Tigris and Euphrates, the Kurdish geography and the Southeastern Anatolia Project (see Chapter-2). With the advent of small hydro, however, the geography of hydropower in Turkey has completely changed. Small hydro is ideal for mountainous regions where young seasonal streams with relatively moderate discharges flow with large heads (Paish, 2002). Small hydro requires river head rather than water volume, and thus penetrates into new geographies that have never been dammed before. The distribution of hydropower plants across Turkey's provinces attests

to this fact. Figure 3.1 illustrates how Turkey's hydropower projects are scattered across the country's 81 provinces.[68] Small hydro projects are concentrated in a number of provinces (particularly those in the Eastern Black Sea Region) which had close to no energy infrastructures until the mid 2000s. Trabzon, Rize, Artvin, Ordu, Giresun in the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR), and Maraş and Antalya in the Mediterranean Region have become the ultimate hydropower centers of the country in a few years thanks to the number of projects they have hosted, even though the power generated by those projects may not be very significant.[69] What these provinces have in common are high precipitation rates, mountainous topography and sizable altitude differences in short distances that would enable high head stream formation.

[68] The data used for the map is from 2010 when the 2023 projections were more optimistic (1800+ instead of current estimation of 1400+) in terms of the number of hydropower plants. Despite the fact that many projects have been canceled, the distribution of the plants has not changed. The reasons underlying this shrinkage will be discussed later in the chapter.

[69] Artvin, where the dialog between Müjdat and I took place, is an exception in the sense that the province hosts both large and small components of the hydropower renaissance.

**Figure 3.2: Hydropower Plant Intensity of Province**




DATA: TMMOB, 2010. Hydropower plant projections decreased by 20 percent since 2010

The spatial footprint of small hydro is not limited to opening up new geographies to the infiltration of energy generation infrastructures. In many cases, it is the intensity of small hydro and the sudden inflation of energy infrastructures in valleys with sizable rural populations that explains the curious case of anti-small hydro activism in Turkey. Because the small hydro boom in Turkey is not driven by rural electrification and the electricity produced by the plants is transmitted to the central grid, the projects are not constrained by local needs and demands. As a result, the streams suitable for small hydro are exploited by multiple back-to-back projects in which one plant channels the stream into a new diversion system at the point where a previous plant discharges.

There are several ways to explain the proliferation of small hydro. The first is as simple as arguing that "it is now their turn." As a strategic choice, "SHW understandably," as a senior SHW bureaucrat told me, "preferred to complete the most ambitious, the largest projects" in the 1970s, and 1980s. Therefore, "it should not be surprising that what [was] left behind, with some notable exceptions, are smaller projects" (personal interview, January 2015). From the perspective of energy supply security, it makes sense to complete the most ambitious projects first to assure maximum energy per investment. That is why today we have more small hydro projects than large ones. However, jaw-dropping volume and speed of the small hydro boom is still in need of further explanation. How could, for example, a 55 km deep valley (Solaklı, Trabzon) be planned to host a total of 36 small hydropower plants? What is the logic behind approving more than a hundred small hydro projects in Rize, a province that is much smaller than Delaware in area?[70] According to

[70] Rize is 1513 square miles while Delaware, the second smallest state of the USA, is 1954 square miles.

which master plan were hydropower licenses distributed? To what extent was Turkey's small hydro boom envisioned and monitored by state authorities?

I have directed these questions to current and past SHW personnel to get an idea of how the boom is perceived by the experts and architects of the water-energy nexus in Turkey, at least prior to its eventual liberalization. Although most bureaucrats were torn between the record-breaking expansion of hydropower capacity and the diminishing control of SHW over the quality of energy infrastructure, only a few went so far as to challenge the industry's liberalization. Trained in SHW in 1990s, when the institution was underinvested with the expectation that liberalization was imminent, most water-energy bureaucrats whom I spoke with were pleased to see that hydropower plants are blossoming across the country. A limited number of opponents either revised their positions or, as a mid-ranking officer cynically told me, retired to start careers in the private sector. This does not mean that SHW personnel approved of the private sector altogether. They often complained about the built-quality of some plants and certainly did not approve of how the plants that are recklessly constructed with no respect to the social and natural environment. Their apologetic complains, however, stem from professional competition rather than a systemic critique. They disparage, and rightfully so, some of the new actors and ambitious bosses in the field and point to rookiness and greed as the root factors underlying some of the shortcomings the sector has been experiencing. Even the most progressive SHW bureaucrats rarely question privatization, "not because [they] are in love with companies, but because there is no other way" to reduce the energy deficit as one retired SHW bureaucrat put it (Personal interview, April).

Despite the cynical TINA attitude of water-energy bureaucrats, a closer look at the way the hydropower sector has opened up for investors is definitive proof that some alternatives are more business-friendly than others. The following anecdote narrated by a former SHW Director General, for example, reveals much about how market formation under neoliberalisation and the privatization of public goods and services could unfold unexpectedly at the intersection of infrastructures and nature:

> *Ok, I understand your frustration. But, let me answer your questions through personal memory from my SHW year. It was before the 2000s; I was still directing the organization. We are going over the long-term investment plans with one of my branch managers. He wanted to go over the Rize Province plans and projections and asked me when we should start building some of them. Given the topography of Rize, they were all small projects ranging between 3 to 30 MW ın ınstalled capacity. I told him, 'look, why would we take precious SHW resources and time to bother with these small projects?' We knew that privatization was imminent. 'Let the private sector deal with it,' I said. But do you know how many projects SHW had planned for Rize back then? SHW, the great, with all its resources and expertise, had planned to build 32 plants in Rize. And it did not mean that we would be interested in building all of them even if we had time and resources. The private sector is not like the state of course, they are far more creative and ambitious than the state. Do you know how many total projects Rize has right now? 136! Now calculate the amount of money and energy we saved for the country! (personal interview, April 2013)*

What the former SHW General Director was proud of, and fascinated by, was this: with minimum prior experience in energy, private enterprises have been much more effective in making the most out of Turkey's streams and rivers than SHW, with their decades of experience. This was achieved by not only building faster and operating more efficiently, but by discovering potential in the weakest river and having the audacity to grab the stream

flowing between two villages or two steep cliffs at 2,000 meters. The private sector has been 'creative' and 'ambitious' enough to find 136 potential projects for small hydro where SHW was only able to imagine a mere 32.

What the Rize anecdote acutely reveals is that the liberalization of the energy industry has been, in actuality, more than a basic privatization of energy infrastructures. What was opened up for bidding was not only existing infrastructure or projected infrastructures but an unspecified, unconstrained space to build infrastructures. In this sense, the liberalization of the energy sector, conducted without constraints and proper regulation, is qualitatively different than more familiar forms of privatization of, say a state enterprise or a public service. Driven by the urgency to secure energy supply, the unencumbered liberalization of the energy sector renders spatial units, not just publically owned institutions, enterprises and services, subject to privatization. In the absence (or in some cases, in disregard) of master plans, watershed planning, grid integration projections and adequate environmental regulation, private actors from all walks of the business world have scrambled to find an unclaimed river section to draw a small hydro project on.

The relationship between energy infrastructures and space is not merely a theoretical abstraction, nor it is a bureaucratic phenomenon to only be realized in the corridors of SHW. How local activists in the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR) talk about the valleys that are and are not occupied by hydropower speaks directly to the spatial character of energy liberalization. Opposition in EBSR (and in many other parts of Turkey) is organized at the valley level rather than at the level of individual villages or project-by-project. While

there are topographic and historical reasons behind this choice, the way private infrastructure penetrates the countryside certainly plays a role in the overlap between space and privatization. A valley, for the locals of EBSR, is neither completely free from private intruders or is tainted as the entry of the smallest hydropower plants believed to pave the way a series of other power plants, stone pits and different types of mining ventures. Valleys with no small hydro are considered *temiz* (clear), while others are understood as *kayıp* (a lost case) or *satılmış* (sold out)—those that can not be saved despite the strongest struggle. While all or nothing approach of the opposition renders some struggles sectarian and reactionary, their rejection of evaluating projects independent from each other illustrates a certain awareness regarding the spatial repercussions of the scramble for hydropower.

### 3.4.1 A New Place for SHW in the Expanding Space of Hydropower

SHW occupies a unique position in this scramble as a public institution responsible for executing a variety of duties that may or may not reinforce each other. These duties include protecting the integrity of water basins and wetlands, securing clean water supply for consumption as well as realizing an area's hydropower potential. While the SHW mission statement give the former two duties priority over the last, individual and group goals may be imbricated with primacy of daily routine, particularly after the sector's liberalization. The Department of Hydropower at SHW's headquarters in Ankara experiences a heavy workload, which provides us with some understanding as to how water-energy bureaucrats' job descriptions might have changed in the last decade. During my visits to the department, I was surprised to see the amount of phone calls my interviewee and his two senior engineer

colleagues had to answer. Our conversation was interrupted countless times by these calls, which were often the inquiries of hydropower investors, energy consultants, construction companies or someone higher-up in SHW calling on their behalf. When I carefully probed into the content of the inquiries, I was surprised to hear that few pertained to the technical details of hydropower construction. They either focused on clarifying the detailed bureaucratic steps of the application procedure or sought extensions, temporary exemptions and were made to test the exploitability of rumored loopholes. The department's SHW personnel were expected to provide an overview of the water usage right agreement application drafts to interested investors before they are approved and passed them to EMRA for licensing. While they were overwhelmed by the volume of the inquiries and complained about the quality of some questions, the engineers were not necessary bothered by the process.

When I implied that SHW does not allocate the same energy to local protestors, one engineer replied in fury from the far corner of the office: "Who would not wish that these projects were all in-house? Do they think the state have all these resources? After all, we are developing the *milli servet* (national wealth) here. It is not like we are assisting them [the investors] for our own interest." "But what about the complaints about the reckless construction practices and the can suyu [lifeline water] violations?" I insisted. "That is not on us! What can we do if our people are greedy?" replied the engineer as he left the office grumbling. A few minutes later, probably embarrassed by his colleague's behavior, my interviewee shared a more nuanced explanation: "we are aware that some complaints are sincere after the lost years of the 1990s–and, you know, there is the strong will of the

government–SHW did not have much intention to check these project to see whether they add up. Honestly, if it had some calculation on it, we authorized, never checked if it adds up" (personal interview, March 2013). Later in our conversation, I was also told that, particularly the in the first a few years of the boom, SHW did not expect the department to verify if MW project forecasts matched the discharge and velocity data available for proposed sites. Neither were they asked to analyze how multiple small hydro projects would interact with each other in a single basin. It was clear that they did not have the personnel for such an undertaking anymore, regardless. Buoyed by the hype of the boom, SHW, despite its geographical reach with 26 regional directorates across the country, had contributed to the scramble forj the Turkish countryside. While the energy policies and the halters of the energy boom are controlled by the central government, SHW has played a critical role in the scramble of the Turkish countryside for infrastructural purposes. Not only the expertise of SHW was given in the service of the capital, but also its regulatory position was hampered.

What the eulogies of Turkey's hydropower renaissance and the celebration of the private sector's creativity and boldness obfuscate is the legal, political and infrastructural background that made the boom possible. The failed experience of early attempts at liberalization is clear evidence that the private sector is not always ready for energy investment when circumstances are not entirely convenient (see Chapter-2). When I asked Mr. Barkan, the chair of the Turkish National Committee to the World Energy Council (WEC-TNC), how he explains the unprecedented number of small hydro projects, HE reminded me about the private sector's hesitance in the 1990s. Mr. Barkan, who also is

CEO of one of the biggest and most well-established energy companies in Ankara, complained about the timidity (not the boldness) of the private sector, saying:

> *Our private sector is a little bit coward[ly] to be honest with you. They hate to jump into the water which they cannot see the bottom of. You must have heard the stories of the 1990s...I was on the state side of the affair back then. The state literally begged the private sector for investment; they provided myriad initiatives and unmatched guarantees. The result was a disappointment. [The private sector] used this and that issue as an excuse and preferred living off interest for a decade rather than putting one stone over the other. Now, they have to invest, and small projects are best for many to test the waters. I do not think anyone cares much about green energy, although I truly believe in it. But, eventually, it is because [small hydro] is almost risk-free, and can be undertaken by any investor (personal interview, April 2013).*

## 3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter introduced the curious case of Turkey's small hydropower boom, the central object of the hydropower renaissance and most developed domestic aspect of the country's energy security. Drawing attention to the surprising contrast in the perception of large dams and small hydro, I proposed to take the technical, material and geographic qualities of the boom seriously. I conceptualized small hydro as a form of infrastructure that holds diverse ideas, actors, locations and trends together around the notion of energy independence. By examining the general characteristics of the small hydro explosion in Turkey in comparison with global examples, I emphasized the unique conjuncture in which the boom took place. I have argued that despite its reputation as a renewable, low-impact local-friendly infrastructure, the popularization of small hydro in Turkey has been first and foremost key to its energy liberalization efforts. I also asserted that as space-making, landscape forming infrastructures, small hydro projects have been instrumental in the spread of neoliberalism

across a vast territory while contributing a particular restructuring in state, society, and markets relations.

The highly deregulated shortcomings of the energy liberalization and problems with the sudden inflation of private hydropower plants are now acknowledged by many—including energy bureaucrats and entrepreneurs—to varying degrees. Officials tend to blame entrepreneurs' greed; on the other hand, investors complain about red tape. My objective in this chapter, however, was not to provide yet another apologetic explanation that 'privatization could have done better' or to point to some legislative areas that could have been regulated for an equitable energy policy. Rather, I am interested in illustrating how capital, state and society are intertwined not only through legislation, but also through nature and infrastructures, as a new market is constructed and experimented.

I have also argued that SHW, one of the pioneer public institutions for development, has undergone significant transformations parallel to the liberalization of the energy industry. As SHW loses personnel and a monopoly over hydropower, its expertise has been reduced to a consultant position, catering to the needs of the newly emerging private energy sector. Public interest and the institution's regulatory roles have been downplayed, if not completely neglected. This transformation, however, should not be read as the ultimate triumph of the private sector over the state, or more precisely, government authority. By providing an overview of the birth and growth of the private hydropower market in Turkey, my next chapter not only introduces new actors, but also attests to its unorthodox and irregular development, defying economic projections, plans and regulations. Continuing

the focus on the infrastructural qualities of small hydro, the next chapter will illustrate the vulnerabilities of the private hydropower sector and the growing role of governmental authority, despite the liberalizing industry.

C H A P T E R – F O U R

# 4 ENERGIZING LEGALITY: ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURES, LAW AND TEMPORALITY

*It was raining heavily in Fındıklı, one of the many small coastal towns squeezed on a narrow strip of flat land between the Black Sea and the mighty Pontic Mountains. Mr. Tufan, a retired primary school teacher, and I were sitting on the porch of a small tea-house at the heart of the town that afternoon, idly watching the rain overwhelm the almost deserted town square. "You," sighed Mr. Tufan, "arrived the wrong time this time around. There is not much to see!" He was contrasting that fall day with my previous visit a summer ago. Then, the small town was bustling as migrants returned home from big metropoles during the summer holiday season. More importantly, I had arrived that summer during a massive demonstration against hydropower that resulted in the people of Fındıklı successfully chasing an Ankara committee out of their towns. Composed of an investor, an engineer and three bureaucrats from Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, the committee's intention was to hold a so-called "public information meeting" regarding a series of small hydropower plants planned to be built in two deep valleys stretching from both sides of Fındıklı to the pinnacles of the Pontics. Unlike this gloomy fall afternoon, the summer of 2012 was a time of constant unrest, mobilization, and fun.*

*"But now, it must be nerve-wrecking," I reacted, "to wait in uncertainty like this." I was referring to the current situation: the projects threatening the area immediately surrounding Fındıklı were neither under construction nor definitively canceled. Two separate administrative lawsuits were tried in local courts in this case. One was related to the environmental impact assessment of a small hydro project, and the other focused on a revision of the Fındıklı countryside's protection status as it appears on master plans. Both lawsuits were approved by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and were initiated by local activists. Concerned about the dishearteningly long litigation processes—which often ultimately favors activists but almost always fails to permanently cancel projects—I was curious about the morale and motivation of the local movement. Mr. Tufan disagreed with my assessment. "Nerve-wrecking?" he replied in disbelief. "Look around son!" he was pointing*

*at others (mostly men) sitting and chatting in the tea-house. "Do you see anyone around here who would mind waiting? We have all the time in the world, but does the company? That, I don't know."*

Timely progress is a crucial factor for the project cycle of energy infrastructures. Bureaucratic procedures, loan repayments, laying the groundwork for construction, operationalizing the facility in the right season, and gaining the consent (and land) of local residents are critical, time-constrained steps in building state-mandated infrastructure. More than a simple project input however, as the case of Fındıklı illustrates, time interacts with the capitalist temporality and intermingles with political action in spaces of contention. While growing academic interest in infrastructures has primarily focused on the new spaces they produce, the kind of desires they instigate and the ways people interact with them on a daily basis, particularly through a temporal lens, has been significantly understudied.[71]

Departing from the judicial command over time and the act of waiting in uncertainty (Ayujero, 2011; 2012; Conlon, 2011; Squire and Bagelman, 2012; Erdem, 2015), this chapter examines how energy infrastructures interact with the law to comprehend the critical role temporality plays in energy disputes. My conversation with Mr. Tufan is a reminder of two critical dimensions of the legal struggles connected to many energy infrastructures in Turkey: the temporalities of the administrative law (1) plays as major a role in energy infrastructure disputes as the content of the law, (2) does not equally affect every party involved in a given dispute. Eventually, the time spent in uncertainty during

[71] For recent studies that call for attention to infrastructural temporalities see Hetherington, 2014; Braun, 2016; and Bosworth, 2016.

the legal proceedings becomes a source of anxiety in which both the resistance the companies need act upon. To tilt this politics of temporality in favor of the energy infrastructures, government deems energy worthy of urgent treatment and offers fast track solutions for the legal processes of infrastructural projects. At this juncture, the chapter closely examines emergence and implementation of two particular legal mechanisms: Urgent expropriation (UE) procedure and urgent judicial proceedings (UJP). While UE eases land-grabs, accelerates expropriation processes and inhibits rural residents whose lands have been appropriated from appealing, (UJP) speeds up the judicial proceedings of permits, actions and licenses prepared for infrastructural projects. These legal shortcuts are to circumvent the law's capacity to regulate—and limit, where necessary—energy infrastructures and the sector's privatization.

While these legal interventions aim to speed up administrative law with the goal of securing a healthy energy supply for the nation and the seamless accumulation of capital, I also argue that they benefit from other sources of political struggle. The chapter includes a section on the political repercussions of the urgency imposed upon certain aspects of the administrative law. I argue that, at the background of this interventions to the administrative law also lies a strong critique that of the judiciary as a source of oversight (aka tutelege) over democratic politics and liberal economy. In this logic, cancellation by the courts of privatization decisions in general and decisions pertaining to the privatization of energy are the manifestation of a bureaucratic rationality that undercut the elected executive and development of the country. In this line of thinking, legal bureaucracies have been portrayed as the representatives of the *old Turkey* to the extent that they put up legal

obstacles against the AKP's desires and intervention to administrative law emerged as a requirement of a larger political transformation. As such, the seepage of energorationality into judiciary, I insist, among other outcomes, strengthens AKP hegemony at the expense of a weak judiciary thanks to the newly designed legal tools of urgency.

On the other hand, despite interventions the administrative law still constitutes a significant tool of resistance for local movements, too. As private energy infrastructures spread across the Turkish countryside, so did the administrative lawsuits filed against them. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that it is unlikely for a project to be operationalized without facing any form of legal litigation.[72] From the perspective of investors, however, the problem with being sued is less the outcome of the court decision than the time lost in the process. Projects often make a comeback, since the best a court can usually do is cancel an administrative action that permits a project, but not the project itself. Yet as Mr. Tufan adeptly summarizes, waiting in uncertainty is not easy for companies as one might expect. Faced with uncertainty, it is not easy to keep local resistance movements motivated and ready for the next cycle of struggle either. Trapped between engineering priorities, green energy loans repayments, endless court cases, and a series of local entanglements, time becomes, on the one hand, a challenge in energy infrastructure disputes and on the other, a strategic tool for those who can afford to take advantage of waiting. Politics of temporality in this case is defined by the parties' struggle with waiting and uncertainty.

[72] Unfortunately, I lack proper data on the number of cases filed against energy infrastructures. The most useful information available is a parliamentary question addressed to the then-Minister of Urbanization and Environment regarding the number of Administrative lawsuits filed against the Ministry regarding the cancellation of EIA permits for small hydro projects. Written in December 2013, the answer of the Minister lists 65 project EIA permits of which taken to the courts. Although suing a project on the basis of a faulty EIA is the most common form of lawsuit one could file against an energy infrastructure it is not the only one.

It is possible that the sense of emergency called for the completion of energy infrastructures have solved all the problems in the energy sector. Nonetheless, I believe that the impact of the regime of urgency lies elsewhere. I argue that the emergence of private energy market in Turkey not only created its legal reasoning and framework but also that this reasoning has seeped into other domains of regulation to facilitate myriad forms of socio-spatial interventions, such as large-scale infrastructure projects, urban renewal programs, earthquake preparedness, environmental governance, and national security in relation to the Kurdish problem. While I admit that legal tools and arguments that were designed to assure fast and secure private energy production has become the new legal standard that came to redefine the relations between nature and society, productive and idle, urgent and mundane alongside private and public property, they bestow on the executive a judicial authority that it lacked otherwise.

The chapter has three sections. The first section summarizes how the judiciary came to be seen as an obstacle to neoliberal transition in 1990s through the cancellation of a series of high-profile energy projects. I trace the critique of the so-called "bureaucratic oversight" thesis as it travelled through the 2000s and has become one of the founding pillars of the AKP's hegemony and Turkey's energy infrastructure boom. Section two introduces the urgent expropriation procedure that, while aiming to expedite the completion of private energy infrastructures, also contributes to invigoration of the state's central authority. The third section examines another urgency measure, urgent judicial proceedings, which were

designed to accelerate the pace of land-use (mostly infrastructural) disputes, but triggered unforeseeable outcomes. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on law and waiting.

## 4.1 A USEFUL DISCOURSE: BUREAUCRATIC OVERSIGHT

Confrontation of energy infrastructures with law did not started with the AKP reign. Nor did the attempts to accelerate the pace of the administrative law to match urgency of energy infrastructures. In the eyes of the capital and governing elite, the judiciary emerged as an obstacle to the neoliberal agenda way before AKP made it to the political scene. Energy lays at the epicenter of the conflict over neoliberal transition due to the number of projects struck down by high courts. The early efforts to open up the energy industry to private sector, which started in 1983, did not maturate partially due to the absence of comprehensive legal (de)regulation up for the task (see chapter 2). Particularly in 1990s, the judiciary became a battlefield in which many large-scale private energy investments were halted for violating existing protectionist legal framework and several energy related laws and bylaws were annulled on the grounds of unconstitutionality (Gülen, 1998, Atiyas and Oder, 2008, Atiyas et al. 2012). Delays in the completion of private power plant coupled with disinvestment in the public sector with the prospect of eventual privatization of the industry (Hepbaşlı, 2005). As a result, capacity development in energy sector significantly lagged behind and the country's energy supply shortfall further deteriorated.

The failure of the early energy liberalization was explained by many scholars as a consequence of a strong opposition within the bureaucracy (e.g Erdoğdu, 2007: 989). Some complained that the tardiness of bureaucratic processes scared energy investors off , while

others read the so-called bureaucratic resistance as an attempt to protect *status quo* disguised in a nationalist reflex (eg. Gülen, 1998).[73] Many blamed the judiciary as the main reason underneath the failure of early liberalization efforts and accused the entire branch of government of having an ideological bias that limits the will of the executive. The problem of bureaucratic resistance grew into a convincing argument as one of the crucial outcomes of the energo-legal battles of 1990s. The resistance, the logic followed, had to be broken and bureaucratic processes must be simplified for the advancement of Turkish economy and its integration with the world markets.

Embracing the neoliberal agenda from very outset, AKP did not hesitate to adopt the bureaucratic resistance argument. More critically, however, the complaints about bureaucratic resistance and the business unfriendly pace of judiciary has become an important pillar of a much stronger discourse under AKP. Coming from the tradition of Islamism, AKP had reasons to keep an eye on the bureaucracy, particularly the judiciary and military. For one, in 1997, before his carrier in the parliamentary politics Recep Tayyip Erdogan served four months imprisonment for "inciting hatred based on religious difference".[74] All three Islamist parties prior to AKP were banned; one by the 1980 Junta,

[73] By providing a close reading of the energo-legal battles of 1990 Atiyas and his colleagues offers a much more nuanced explanation to accounts for the high court decisions that hindered the liberalization of the energy markets (Atiyas and Oder, 2008, Atiyas et al. 2012). They, first of all, emphasize that the liberalization and privatization efforts lacked constitutional support. The concept of privatization was introduced to the constitution only in 1999 (see chapter 2). Second of all, the issue of public interest, which lied at the hearth of judicial interventions, was a debate that was not concluded in the absence of relevant legislation. As energy was seen as a public service and private energy production was subject to public, not private, law. High courts did not have much choice but to review every single step of private energy enterprises which slowed the pace of the investments and scare investors off. Finally, usually it was labor and professional unions that filed the lawsuits against these investment, suggesting (although Atiyas his colleagues neglect to mention) a strong class motive behind what is seen as a bureaucratic resistance.

[74] The reason of the conviction was a poem Erdogan recited that included verses "the mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers...." "Turkey's

two by the Constitutional Court in 1999 and 2001. Moreover, the last time the political Islam was in power in 1998, the coalition government collapsed following a chain of events precipitated by a military memorandum. Against this backdrop, AKP has been in search for a fine line – a political language – that would keep the party out of trouble, but at the same time sustain a critique of Judicial authority. The emerging critiques of the early neoliberal era that depicted the legal system as slow, old-school, ideological and biased provided a fertile ground for the task.

AKP espoused the bureaucratic resistance thesis but enhanced its political-economical content to criticize the role of military and bureaucracy in Turkish politics. Accordingly, the intuitional culture of Turkish bureaucratic tradition, the critique suggests, is such that the unelected public officials are indoctrinated to perceive themselves as the true guardians of the Republic. Consequently, the argument goes, Turkish democracy and especially the executive branch is under constant supervision of bureaucracy elites who do not hesitate to intervene once perceive the status que is in danger. The argument, eventually, becomes a populist systemic critique in which a variety of grievances assembled to call for a strong unchecked executive rule. On a regular basis, Erdoğan artfully bring the different, and potentially conflicting, components of the critique together as he did on December 17th, 2012 at an award ceremony in Konya.

> *The system is rigged and he have (the problem of) bureaucratic oligarchy and the judiciary… This is where we stick at. Outsiders say "You have 326 PMs, so who cares?" Yet this thing called separation of powers stands in front of you as an obstacle. It says "you have a playing field…" You come across the judiciary where you expect the least. Legislative-Executive-*

charismatic pro-Islamic leader", BBC, 4 November 2002. URL. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2270642.stm (accessed 15 July 2002).

> *Judiciary must primarily be concerned with the interest of the nation and then the interest of the state. Yet, if you delay my investment for three or sic months, and if it becomes one or two years, you can not account for this loss neither to the history, nor to the people you are buried to this soil… In the past decade, we have strived to maintain harmony within different branches of government. Because otherwise, we know by experience, that economic growth is not possible. 24 April e-memorandum[75], for example, was an unsuccessful attempt thanks to our determination. (Konya Business Awards Ceremony, 17 December 2012)*[76]

This anti-establishment discourse, which revolves around a central thesis *askeri ve bürokratik vesayet* (military and bureaucratic oversight - MBS), has been the centerpiece of the AKP hegemony for a decade helping the party to form and maintain a broad based coalition. In addition to the traditional constituency of Islamism and right wing conservativism, the AKP's grand coalition for a long while included big business as well as small and medium size capital owners, young professionals and liberal intellectuals.[77] The permeability between democratic/populist aspirations, desires for an unchecked executive power and the dreams of an unregulated market was maintained thanks to the military and bureaucratic oversight thesis in which restriction and acceleration of judicial authority played a pivotal role.

One of the critical turning points in the AKP's struggle against military and bureaucratic oversight was the 2010 Constitutional Referendum that was held for the ratification of a

[75] E-memorandum is a short statement released the general staff in April 2007 that reminded the government Turkish Armed forces is the guardian of secularism days before the upcoming presidential elections. Since the wife of Abdullah Gül, AKP's presidential nominee wore headscarf, the statement was understood as a memorandum advising AKP to reconsider its candidate.

[76] "Bürokrasi ve yargı karşımıza dikiliyor" [Bureaucracy and judiciary stands against us] *Milliyet*, 17 December 2012. URL. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/burokrasi-ve-yargi-karsimiza-dikiliyor/siyaset/siyasetdetay/18.12.2012/1643111/default.htm (accessed 15 July 2016).

[77] The discourse that hold the coalition together was also supported by a particular reading of Turkish politics and society that has been quite influential in social sciences starting from late 1980s.

series of constitutional amendments. While the referendum package included amendments on a variety of topic including individual liberties, social and economic right (as well as abolition of Article 15 that provides protection to the perpetrators of 1980 military coup), its center of gravity was a comprehensive judicial reform.[78] These amendments either limited the authority of the judiciary or enabled government to redesign the judicial cadres. The amendment that was most directly pertinent to energy infrastructures offered a new sentence to the judicial review section of the constitution that reads "Judicial power is limited to the review of the legality of administrative actions and acts, and in no case may it be used as a review of expediency".[79] The change sparked controversy amongst the urban and environmental activists who accurately interpreted the change as the elimination of the ability of the judiciary to strike down investments on the basis of public interest doctrine.[80]

The impact of the referendum on the judiciary was significant. The campaign contributed to further strengthen the reach and attractiveness of the bureaucratic oversight thesis, while the results were read as the last nail on the coffin. Most consequentially the judicial cadres underwent a major staffing. Thanks to the new positions created by the amendments AKP managed to position favorable cadres in high-courts who appointed more AKP friendly

[78] The referendum, which was supported by 58 percent of the popular vote, approved several changes in the judicial system most of which enhanced the authority of the executive. By increasing the number of seats in the Constitutional Court and The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (from 11 to 17 and from 7 to 22, respectively) the referendum aimed at reaching balance of power in the high courts that is more favorable to AKP politics.

[79] Article 125, as amended on September 12, 2010; Act No. 5982

[80] Ilgın Özyaka Özlüer (2010) provides a more nuance argument as to the logic of the amendment. Özyaka Özlüer reminds that a similar statement is already presence in the administrative law. However, while review of expediency is a concern for every legal system, it is impossible to demarcate review of expediency from legality. Therefore, the amendment, she argues, is not to eliminate the public interest doctrine (because it is the heart of administrative justice). It is rather a strong signal to towards a redefinition of public interest which, for her, tilted in favor of the urban and and environmental movements up until the referendum.

judges and public prosecutors in lower regional courts.[81] During this period, the judicial oversight thesis was also embraced by the judiciary itself thanks to the influx of AKP friendly cadres to top positions. The quote below from the Hüseyin Karakullukçu, President of Danıştay (Council of State), the nightmare institutions of investors in 1990s, illustrate the sharp institutional transformation and the shortening gap between the executive and the judiciary: "we halt everything (investments). No more halting! From now on there is progress… whatever beneficial to the nation and state will be constructed. There is no other way! Stop this (project), stop that (project). What good is it?" (cited in Yeşilyurt, 2015: 408).

## 4.2 ENERGY AT FULL THROLLE-1: URGENT EXPROPRIATION

### 4.2.1 Hurry in the Valley: The Case of Loç

I first heard about the immediate appropriation procedure in the summer of 2010 during an early phase of my research. I was in the Loç Valley—an early inculcator of the anti-small hydro struggle located in Kastamonu Province of the Western Black Sea Region—to attend a river watch.[82] I was part of a convoy of activists there to attend a weekend-long event

[81] Lacked necessary support to fill the new positions in the Judiciary, at this critical juncture AKP strengthened its untold coalition with the Gülenist (religious) movement. Gülenists, who emphasize education and public service, had already many sympathizers in the judiciary and the police who helped enormously to the consolidation of AKP hegemony until a nasty break-up in 2013. While AKP did its best to uproot the Gülenists from the bureaucracy, Gülenist, in desperation, are believed to perpetrate the bloody failed coup attempt of June 15th 2016. AKP-Gülenists coalition in the judiciary, and its break up, some argue was also left by the urban and environmental movements. I was told by environmental lawyers that with the advent of the coalition it became much harder for local movements to even communicate with the judicial bureaucracy. Over the course of 2007-2013, "the judicial bloc was impenetrable unlike late 1990s when we always had an open phone line to Ankara" told me a senior lawyer. With the fall of the coalition, same lawyer admitted "it feels like we are back in 1990s again, we enjoy sympathy and are kept informed".

[82] River watch is a commonly observed resistance method in which the local movement sets up a permanent encampment by the river where a hydropower station is zoned to be built. Strategically located to control traffic, the river-watch primarily deters construction activity while legal processes have yet to be finalized. However, they also act as the headquarters of the resistance and attract national attention as locals organize communal dinners and entertainment around the site of future hydropower.

organized by valley residents hoping to draw national awareness to their cause. The convoy was composed mostly of *Karadeniz İsyandadır* (Black Sea Uprising) activists and families from the Loç Valley who lived in Istanbul; the event was also attended by three members of an off-road biking club, wild-life enthusiasts, university students, an intern lawyer, and a freelance journalist. Although motivations varied, we were there to show solidarity with the resistance and learn more about the dispute.

During a delicious dinner prepared for the large group in huge caldrons, we sat around the campfire by the river-watch to hear locals' account of the struggle. The hydropower plant targeting the Derekani River that runs through the valley was a 21 MW capacity run-off-the river structure owned by Orya Energy, a subsidiary of Orya Holding, a well-established steal-pipe manufacturer cum real estate developer. In tears, Loç Valley residents narrated their experience with Orya and how their everyday lives turned upside down within a year and a half.[83] The valley, which is home to roughly 800 year-round and 2,000 summer residents in four villages, was divided from the beginning of the project's planning phase and was further torn apart by Orya's aggressive one-on-one persuasion strategies.

To divide locals, Orya used a strip of land belong to the villagers along the embankments of Derekani River as a persuasion tactic. Tellingly, the project did not require a large plot

[83] Six years after my initial visit, Loç Valley's battle with Orya and its hydropower project was still underway. The two EIA reports Orya provided from the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization were both annulled by higher courts. In the meanwhile, both the resistance and Orya tried to utilize the time between court proceedings. While Loç Valley residents organized a month-long sit-in in front of Orya headquarters in İstanbul, the company attempted to initiate construction several times. Each of theses attempts instigated clashes between Loç residents, subcontractors and the project's security personnel. As of 2016, Orya still holds the license for the hydropower project and advertises it on its website. As of May 2016 there was no Orya presence in Loç, while 117 Loç residents faced criminal charges for allegedly "violating private property."

of land. If we liken the Loç Valley to a spoon, the project's water intake was planned on the handle, at a higher altitude where the valley is more narrow and rugged. The upper section of the valley was zoned as forest in cadastral records, and thus belonged to the state. Orya did not have an issue to lease out the necessary plots for the construction of the intake in the upstream from the Prime Ministry,[84] as the project was already permitted and EIA approved. The pipe system that would carry the river's water to the plant along the diversion reach was designed as a tunnel system and did not required extra land. However, the downstream, where the valley resembles the bowl of a spoon surrounded by villages on the hillsides, was a different matter. The company desperately needed downstream to build the plant, the worksite and a road access to reach the upstream construction.

While measuring less than two acres, the land parcels on which Orya set its sights were critical to the project's completion, and became the source of a heated, emotional feud among villagers. The parcel where we sat around the campfire, for example, was owned by the village legal entity; it was used as a recreational area where collective gatherings and *bayram* (Eid) celebrations often take place. Those who wanted the parcel to be leased to Orya argued that the hydropower would benefit the entire valley, citing the company's social responsibility commitments.[85] Those opposing the project were anxious, believing the plant would trigger an overall decline in the valley's livability and accused proponents of being on Orya's payroll. While the fate of this collectively owned village parcel was the

[84] Since 2013, permits for the sale and lease of state lands are handled by the Ministry of Water and Forestry.
[85] ORYA's commitments are still available on its official website and includes items such as improvement of the loose gravel roads connecting four villages to each other, restoration of the village infirmary and mosque, providing scholarship for the students from the valley, and distribution of wood purchased form the regional forestry bureau. URL. http://www.oryaenerji.com.tr/hakkimizda.aspx (accessed 10 May 2016)

source of immense local disagreement and distress, Orya had already begun taking other small parcels along the river for the plant's construction. I asked one owner of a parcel targeted by Orya, a 65-year-old man who went by "Uncle Halim," if the company ever coerced him into selling his lot. Uncle Halim, who lived in the valley his entire life, was surprised by my question and replied in anger:

> *Uncle Halim: What company? I lost my land before I was even able to have a word with them.*
>
> *Sinan: What do you mean lost? Did they trick you?*
>
> *Uncle Halim: No! It is the state that tricked me. They seized my land and rent[ed] it out to Orya before I found out.*
>
> *Sinan: Oh? Ok, but uncle, how could they do such a thing without your knowledge?*
>
> *Uncle Halim: Yes, without my knowledge!...I found the money in my bank account. Muhtar (the headman) dropped by one day. "Uncle Halim", he said "how lucky you are!" "Why?" I asked. "Check your bank account" he replied smiling. When I did, I could not believe my eyes. How would I know? They had deposited money to my account. Then we checked and found out that the state confiscated my property. I said I did not want it. I did not touch the money; I have no land for sale. Then we met our lawyer, thankfully. Now the case is [being] seen by the courts. I knew no HES, son (he meant the hydropower plant). They had approached my son initially. I had no idea. He told me that someone is interested in the land, but he declined. I said to myself 'who would bother to buy that lot?' but forgot about it later. That's how I learned about the HES. I still cannot wrap my head around how this could be legal.*

### 4.2.2 Reframing Urgency Through Energy

While its legality is still disputed, when used for cases like the one in the Loç Valley, the practice that enabled the confiscation of Uncle Halim's land has a legal basis, called *Urgent Expropriation* (UE). With origins dating back to 1940, UE is an exceptional expropriation

procedure designed to speed up regular expropriation procedures in the case of extraordinary circumstances that require immediate administrative action. While the procedure was rarely implemented prior to 2000, UE has become a routine mechanism under AKP, utilized for appropriating land for a variety infrastructural projects, particularly for energy investments.

Uncle Halim found out his land was expropriated after the fact because a land transfer must be finalized within seven days of the cabinet approving a UE decision. The property owner must to be compensated at fair market value before the transfer takes place, yet all other procedures, which would take months under regular expropriation, are dealt with after the fact. Those whose properties are confiscated only learn of the seizure once they find a lump sum deposited in a bank account opened in their name in the state-owned Ziraat Bank.[86] Meanwhile, the state becomes the owner of the property and can then rent it to private entities. While the regular expropriation procedure progresses incrementally in a series of legal proceedings (akin to imminent domain in the U.S.), UE is an administrative action and as such, a case is only tried if the payee opens an administrative lawsuit against the expropriation. Yet, more often than not, the company that applied for a UE decision takes advantage of their legal head start and initiates construction. If there is no resistance on the ground–for example, the river-watch in the Loç Valley–the company proceeds with construction as quickly as possible until court makes a suspension of action decision. The courts, as many lawyers warn activists, tend to comply with UE decisions once construction

[86] Due to the urgency of the matter (expropriation has to be completed in seven days) there is not enough time for the administration to attain payee's existing bank account. A new account is opened on his behalf to save time and energy.

is near complete and local resistance is absent. As one lawyer who has been involved in many hydropower plant cases put it "judges really feel the weight of halting a million-dollar development investment once there is more than a foundation on the ground" (personal interview, May 2014).

Although the main beneficiary of UE is small hydro, it was not originally designed with energy projects in mind. When it was first forwarded in 1940 in the midst of the World War II and then more concertedly spelled out in 1956, UE was intended to give the cabinet an exceptional measure with which to confiscate private land and property for military purposes in case of a war.[87] Some concrete examples mentioned in the article include real and personal properties (such as bakeries, factories, medical tools and facilities) that could be directly utilized by military forces. Thanks to UE, the cabinet was given the authority to by-pass the detailed confiscation procedures that would otherwise hinder the abilities of an active army.

Despite its extraordinary power, the UE had only been used a handful of times up until the early 2000s. Its rediscovery by the AKP was thanks to a loophole in article 27 of Expropriation Law No. 6208 (or rather, its being interpreted as a loophole). The condition for the cabinet to make UE decision is stipulated in the article as "in case of homeland defense" but is followed by the phrase "or circumstances urgency of which would be determined by the cabinet." By tapping into this loophole and understanding "urgency" as

[87] UE first appears in legal codes as such in 1956 with the enactment of Confiscation Law No. 6830. However, its roots can be traced back to 1940 and the Law for Confiscations for the Needs for National Security (Law No. 3387) in which the definition and procedures of UE appears without a proper name (Karaman, 2015).

broadly as possible, AKP devised a highly potent legal mechanism and used it to accelerate a large swathe of mostly private investments.

**Table 4.1: Urgent Expropriation Decisions by Industry**

| SECTOR | # | % |
|---|---|---|
| Hydropower Plant | 216 | 30.6 % |
| Power Line Transmission & Distribution | 118 | 16.7 % |
| Highway, Railway, Road Construction | 81 | 11.5 % |
| Wind Farms | 57 | 8.1 % |
| Urban Renewal | 48 | 6.8 % |
| River & Stream Restoration | 46 | 6.5 % |
| Irrigation & Wastewater Treatment | 40 | 5.7 % |
| Natural Gas and Petroleum Distribution & Transmission | 18 | 2.6 % |
| Coal Power Plant | 11 | 1.4 % |
| Geothermal Power Plant | 9 | 1.6 % |
| Other | 60 | 8.5 % |
| Grand Total | 704 | 100 % |

Source: Yeşilyurt, 2015

AKP cabinets began to sign UE decisions from the mid-2000s onwards and by the early 2010, UE procedure had almost entirely replaced ordinary expropriation procedure, particularly regarding energy related investments. While there had been only nine UE cases approved by the cabinets in 1990, and six in the 1990s as a whole, according to one calculation, UE decisions skyrocketed under AKP rule, reaching a whopping 834 decisions between 2002 and 2014 (Kaya, 2016: 81). Out of 704 UE decision signed by the cabinet from 1983 to 2015, hydropower plants tops the charts, corresponding to 30.6 percent of total EU decisions (Karaman, 2015: 160). The cumulative share of all energy related EU decisions amount to 61 percent (see Table 4.1).

UE decisions signed by the cabinet are only the tip of the larger UE iceberg, however. Overwhelmed with the sheer volume of UE decisions, the cabinet had to share its authority

over of permitting UE cases with other public and regulatory bodies. The list of institutions that could make UE decisions includes but not limited to the Energy Markets Regulatory Authority (EMRA), the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI), the Turkish Electricity Distribution Corporation (TEDAŞ), and the General Directory of Highways and Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ). These entities were thus authorized to make appropriation decisions not easily appealable on courts. Unfortunately, the data on the expropriations conducted by these institutions are not publicly available, with the exception of EMRA. Nor is it possible to reach healthy figures regarding the size of land confiscated by UE decisions. The EMRA made around 957 UE decisions between 2004 and 2015 (Kaya, 2016: 81). Significantly, the fact that 60 individual UE appeal cases were taken to European Court of Human Rights in 2011 provides clues about the scope and aggressiveness of expropriation processes in contemporary Turkey, and the growing contention against them (Karaman, 2015: 70).

### 4.2.3 The Invisible Hand of What?

The absence of data regarding UE decisions made by non-EMRA institutions suggests an inclination to keep confiscation procedures not only swift, but most importantly, under the radar. On the other hand, Danıştay has cancelled many UE appeals on the grounds that the cases at hand do not explicitly call for urgent administrative action. Despite the deficiency of data, the populations targeted by the UE procedures is not a mystery. Given the dominance of energy infrastructures in UE decisions, as well as their rural locations, we could safely guess that property transfer travels from petty-commodity producers towards small/medium/big capital owners (Kaya, 2011; 2016; Karaman, 2016; Erensü, 2016).

In reference to the dubious character of these procedures, Kaya (2016) has given UE the nickname "the invisible hand of the market." While I agree that the rediscovery of UE is directly linked to capital accumulation—particularly in terms of project financing and the need to circumvent and suppress public discontent—I also want to draw attention to UE as a form governmental technology.[88] The reason UE, once an unknown niche procedure, is used today for a variety of governmental purposes is that it is a useful tool to discipline citizens while incorporating them into the speculative authoritarian neoliberalism to which AKP owes its very existence. UE not only secures land and time for capitalist accumulation but also creates new networks of relationships and subject positions. UE decisions are never made in a vacuum, nor are they purely technocratic procedures. They function in a highly uncertain and speculative climate in which capital owners, engineers, bureaucrats, local representatives and rural residents all find themselves vulnerable to the processes of waiting at the contours of executive power. While those who invest in infrastructures that call for UE are more likely to emerge triumphant, the waiting that undergirds the will of the central government and its bureaucratic apparatus consolidates its power and authority both over a variety of subject positions and across uncharted territories.

[88] I understand the term governmental technology to mean "more or less systematized, regulated and reflected modes of power… that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of power over others, following a specific form of reasoning (a "rationality") which defines the telos of action or the adequate means to achieve it" (Lemke, 2002: 53). In the most basic terms, technologies of government mediate different forms of power and translate traditional forms of domination to governmental power that prioritize conduct of a conduct. Foucault contends that "we must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic games between liberties–strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others–and the states of domination, which are what we ordinarily call power. And, between the two, between the games of power and the states of domination, you have governmental technologies" (Foucault, 1988: 19).

It is rather challenging to account for speculation within the context of an expropriation procedure that is designed to be completed in just seven days. After all, UE is an emergency procedure and, in theory, leaves no room or time for speculation. Despite the theoretical pace of the process, in actuality, the window of uncertainty that is cracked open by expropriation is rarely limited to seven days. Although taken by the government The UE is initiated by private entities. They apply to the administration for an UE decision and guarantee to cover the compensation costs. Before trying the UE option, however, companies first investigate if the local residents are inclined to sell the property at stake. Importantly, UE is the last resort for companies that seek a stable working environment. While public land is the ideal site for companies that get along well with the administration, land purchase is the second best alternative. Companies use the UE card to purchase land by scaring local owners, telling them that expropriation will not offer the same compensation as they could. This process particularly harms the fabric of local communities in a project site, as individual land bargains pit residents against each other. Companies opt for an UE request when residents resist selling their property or the land needed for a project is composed of multiple plots owed by different families (which is usually the case in the Eastern Black Sea Region).

Ahmet Zerkoğlu, a fifty-two-year-old senior engineer working for an Ankara-based infrastructure and energy company was one of my key informants regarding the small hydro project cycle. An engineer who worked on four different small hydro projects (one of which was halted by an annulled UE decision) summarized company preferences regarding land purchases as follows:

*You would not lose sleep over a land purchase that is double or triple the market value, or even more. For several reasons…Thanks to the purchase, you establish relationships in the village. You never know when you will need them next…Also, why would you want to deal with the bureaucracy and a possible litigation process…The government is very welcoming for UE requests. Yet, a boss prefers to take care of his own business rather then owing a favor to someone when there is no need…well, it is a whole different story if you need to owe…And of course, the prospect of [the] constant flow of money from a complete hydropower plant outweighs the initial expenditure…particularly if you just acquired the bank loan for the project (personal interview, February 2014).*

### 4.2.4 Urgency Meets Security: Expropriating the Kurdish Question

The government recently utilized UE in a completely new context, revealing more about the scope and usefulness of this particular appropriation procedure. On March 23th, 2016, the cabinet signed a UE decision that confiscated 6,300 parcels in historic Sur District of Diyarbakır, the political and cultural heartland of the Kurdish region. Home to approximately 1200,000 residents and encircled by 40-feet high stone fortification, Sur is a thousand-year-old settlement and was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 2015 thanks to over 250 civil and monumental architectural structures. However, the narrow streets of Sur swarmed by a ferocious urban warfare between the Turkish security forces and Kurdish PKK fighters as the so-called peace process relapsed into a new wave of violence by summer 2015.[89] Sur remained under 24-hour curfew for three months during which it was shelled by tanks and raked by armed vehicles and machine guns to uproot the young PKK militia and their barricades. At least 48 civilians died and thousands had to flee leaving their home, shops and livelihoods behind.

[89] In March 2016, International Crisis Group estimated that the recent wave of aggression sparked by July 2015 displaced more than 350,000 people, killed 250 civilians along 350 police and soldiers as "security forces deploy tanks and other heavy weaponry to urban centers and the PKK engages in asymmetric urban warfare to prevent the government from retaking full control." URL. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/b080-the-human-cost-of-the-pkk-conflict-in-turkey-the-case-of-sur.aspx (Accessed 10 June 2016). Number of PKK casualties are unknown.

When the curfew was finally lifted mid-March 2016 and the last standing resistance was broken, one third of the district was completely decimated and the rest was in shambles. The UE decision confiscates 60 percent of the district and evicts around 50,000 to 70,000 predominately Kurdish citizens (Arslan, 2016). The government, however, assures that no Sur resident will be harmed as then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu promised "Sur will be build like Toledo[90] (Spain). Everyone will want to visit and appreciate its architectural texture" (Lepeska, 2016). Upon the completion of the TOKI project, Davutoğlu pledged, "all Sur residents—including the squatters and renters—will have a modern unit" (Konuksever, 2016). Yet, it was unknown how and when this challenging task could be accomplished (especially now that the district is completely bulldozed) and whether new units would be offered free of charge. Following the example of Sur, the cabinet take UE decisions regarding a handful of other districts in Kurdish cities of Southeast Turkey that were destroyed by the armed conflict.[91] The lawyers, who sued all of these expropriation attempts, insisted that the decisions could be characterized as occupation rather than a confiscation as the projects neither included public participation not appeared to be transparent. Moreover, urban regeneration projects subject to UE decisions all include heavily fortified police stations inside the contested districts.

[90] Like Diyarbakır, Toledo is an ancient city, also a popular tourist destination. The city was sieged, occupied and partially destructed by the Nationalist forces after two months long clashes against Republican forces in the early stages of Spanish Civil War.

[91] "Turkish gov't takes 'urgent expropriation' decision for properties in southeast", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 11 April 2016, URL. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-takes-urgent-expropriation-decision-for-properties-in-southeast.aspx?pageID=238&nID=97619&NewsCatID=341 (accessed 15 July 2016).

UE's utilization as a militarized instrument in Turkey's chronic Kurdish problem validates its prowess and usefulness as a governmental technology. Rediscovered as a procedure to facilitate and accelerate energy infrastructure construction projects; UE soon became an indispensable instrument to address a variety of socio-spatial conflicts. Although it was transferred to a variety of governmental fields and used in different types of land-use disputes, reshaping UE as a new political instrument was only possible through the legitimacy and urgency of Turkey's rush to energy. UE not only enabled the transfer of land and property from petty-commodity owners to big capital owners (as well as commodification of commons) but also incorporated citizens into a speculative economy. It also enhanced the government's central authority and maneuverability across time and space.

## 4.3 ENERGY AT FULL THROLLE-2: URGENT JUDICIAL PROCEEDING

Once an UE decision or an EIA permit is taken to the court, a tense waiting process begins for all parties. The litigation process, which takes place in local courts and then Danıştay (Council of State) in case of an appeal, takes months, sometimes, years to finalize. Waiting in uncertainty, however, does not necessarily mean waiting idly. Judicial proceedings include multiple hearings, arguments of the defendants sometimes including testimonies of the local residents, defense of the administration, expert field exploration and opinion etc. All parties, the administration, the company, and the local resistance prepare for each component of the judicial proceedings. The culmination of this process is the suspension

of execution decision (SED).[92] Defendants, almost always, request for a SED of whatever administrative action they are sueing. A court takes a SED if administrative action in question is believed to cause irreparable harm when implemented before the final judgement is made. Once taken, the project's field operation come to a complete halt.[93] A SED not only signals a final outcome that may be favorable for the resistance, but also buy some precious time for them. For companies, particularly those lack alternative revenue flows, SEDs are worrisome, as Ahmet Zerkoğlu explains:

> *SEDs are major upsets for projects. They mess with the project and repayment cycle and make the company look bad in the eyes of the of the banks for future projects. It is spring time, the weather is improving, you have plans to start the construction hoping to complete it in a year to harvest the melting snow of next spring and the rain of summer, boom, they drop the SED! You definitely lose a spring and possibly two… Also, imagine that you struck a deal with several subcontractors. Now, how are you supposed to keep your word? You lay some of them off. Huge headache!... (For example), we have a (small hydro) license located in a very challenging location (later turns out it is in Fındıklı where Mr. Tufan is from). The license sits somewhere in the cabinet. Currently we are sleeping over it. No need to lose time and money on it. There is another company pushing hard for the same valley. We will wait and see (how they will fare). (personal interview, February 2015).*

Revelations provided by Mr. Zerkoğlu shed light on the politics of temporality that the energy infrastructures operate within. First of all, they illustrate that energy companies are highly vulnerable to waiting prompted by local resistance and court decisions. The reason is that waiting put the loan and accumulation cycle into disarray which in return harms the company's balance of payments and credibility. Secondly, delays mess up with the fragile

[92] Also known as 'stay of execution', suspension of execution is a court order that temporarily halts a governmental action, decision, ordinance or a lower court decision until a final verdict is given. A suspension of execution decision of a decision or an act is taken when its execution is considered to cause irrecoverable harm.

[93] Although I have witnessed project that continue construction under the disguise of neatening of the worksite especially in the absence of a watchful opposition

project completion timeline which is organized around seasons. Small hydro electricity production, which is sensitive to seasonal changes in stream flows, is particularly impacted by waiting as the delay stipulated by the courts may have a longer shadow on the actual construction. Thirdly, given the spatial character of infrastructural penetration in the countryside through which a valley with prior investment becomes an easier target (see chapter 3), politics of temporality is not only a battle between the investor and the locals. While companies feel the pressure to start construction immediately after securing a license, they also shy away from being the first infrastructure investor in a valley with a strong resistance.

Leading energy companies have long lobbied to speed up the pace of the administrative proceedings. Some have gone far enough to insinuate that EIA and SED must be annihilated for a healthy investment environment, I have witnessed one such lobbying attempts first hand in Energy Market Summit held in Ankara in February 2015. The summit, which was organized by EMRA in the luxurious JW Marriot, hosted President Erdogan and then-Minister of Energy and Natural Resources. Their opening addresses followed by four keynote speakers each representing four leading players in the energy sector: Mustafa Koç from Koç Group, Güler Sabancı from Sabancı Holdings, Mehmet Nafiz Zorlu from Zorlu Group, and Nihat Özdermir form Limak. First three bosses, who are considered as the traditional Turkish Bourgeoisie, underlined the importance of competition and liberalism in energy industry in rather congenial manner. Nihat Özdemir of Limak, an infrastructure conglomerate owes its wealth to AKP era (Buğra and Savaşkan,

2014) on the other hand, aggressively targeted the SED and EIA procedures and called for their elimination by utilizing a patriotic/corporatist discourse:

> *…the state needed us, called us and we replied without questioning started to invest… But someone who know with what intention comes along and manage to stop billion-dollar worth investments easily by using ridiculous excuses (referring to SEDs) … and the courts of the state let this happen. We should prevent this from happening… Mr. Minister, I respectfully utter this: don't make us rich overnight, but don't make us poor overnight either. (Energy Markets Summit, 20 January 2015, Ankara)*

Özdemir's remarks are noteworthy not only because he unequivocally declares the keystone application of the administrative law as obstacles to capital accumulation, more specifically the infrastructure boom. He also cunningly reminds the audience, including President Erdoğan, that the construction lead economy is a national project in which the state (read the government) and the capital are partners that are in need of each other.

Özdemir and his colleagues are not the only group of people who complain about the slow pace of the judiciary in Turkey. Citizens, politicians as well as public prosecutors and judges, who are expected to review four time what their counterparts in the EU do, all complain about that even the simplest case takes months to finalize. To speed up the legal processes in the administrative law the government resorted to another acceleratory measure titled as *the Urgent Judicial Proceeding* (UJP). Added to the Administrative Jurisdiction Procedure Law (No. 2577) as an amendment (article 20/A) on June 18th, 2014, UJP expose what is understood as urgent and what slows judiciary down in its justification presented to the parliament.

> *Litigations under the administrative procedure are all subject to the same proceeding methods. However, some administrative litigations are qualitatively different than others. These cases must be concluded without any delay… Legal*

> *uncertainties occur when judicial proceedings that require immediate attention, such as tenders, privatizations and urgent expropriation disputes, are not attended immediately. The amendment contributes to the administrative jurisdiction by introducing urgent judicial proceeding similar to the examples found in Europe.*[94]

While the justification of the laws points to tenders, expropriations and privatizations as the source of legal uncertainty, by looking at its scope it is understood that UIP directly and exclusively targets urban and environmental land use disputes (Özlüer, 2014). The law is applied to lawsuits filed against four types of administrative action: (a) UE decisions, (b) EIA approvals, (c) sale and rent of land under Tourism Promotion Law (Law No. 5761) and (d) cabinet decisions taken under the scope of Renewal of Law on the Transformation of the Areas under Disaster Risk (Law No. 6306). UJP aims to accelerate the judicial proceedings of administrative actions listed above by primarily shortening the time limits allowed for the components of the proceedings. While citizens are expected to file a lawsuit against an administrative decision within 60 days, for cases fall under UJP the time allowed is limited to 30 days. Similarly, in UJP cases the courts must begin the review process within 7 days after the lawsuit submitted, and appeals must be submitted in 15 days once the verdict is notified. Under UJP, citizens cannot request for an SED prior to filing a lawsuit as a precaution against harms that occur very rapidly. Also, in UJP cases SEDs are final, they cannot be appealed in a higher court.

Given the claim that UJP was designed after similar European jurisdictions, Yeşilyurt (2015) offers a comparison by reading UJP against its French equivalent 2001 *référé*

[94] Turkish Parliament, 24th Period, 4. Legislative Year, No. 592, 15 November 2014. URL. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss592.pdf (accessed 15 July 2016)

reform introduced to *Code de Justice Administrative*.[95] Although both reforms aim at expediting the review of administrative litigations, Yeşilyurt argues that the way in which UJP hopes to achieve this goal differs significantly from *référé.* The reform in France, which is to a large extend orchestrated by the Administrative Judiciary itself, tries to solve the tardiness by strengthening judicial review and reinforcing the powers of the judges. *Référé* consolidates the court's ability to annul administrative action (in other words SED) by providing it a self-standing proceeding. UJP, in contrast, purposes to attain an efficient judiciary by shortening the application, review and appeal periods. Moreover, by subjecting SED to UJP, the reform in Turkey downplays the annulment institutions. Rather than empowering the judges, UJP seek to centralize dispute resolution by transferring some of the responsibilities of lower courts to Danıştay.

Yeşilyurt concludes the comparison by suggesting that what UJP intends to accelerate is accumulation cycles of the capital, although elimination of the legal workload is the surface cause. It is hard to debunk this assertion once the politics of infrastructure temporalities are studied and continuing investor pressure on legislature for simplification of the legal procedures is observed. However, the intention to render administrative law business/investment/infrastructure friendly is one thing, actually achieving that goal is another. In a focus group interview I asked five environmental lawyers[96] how UJP has impacted unfolding of urban/environmental lawsuits. They all agreed that upon the

[95] The comparison makes particular sense as the Turkish legal system has drawn much from the French civil law tradition since its inception.

[96] All of the lawyers attended to the focus group are members of Environmental and Ecology Movement Lawyers Association. The age of the participants ranges between 27 and 40. The group was composed of 2 women and 3 men. The focus group was conducted in January 2015. I contacted the participants in 2016 for follow up questions.

enactment of UJP, lawyers and activists have to be more alert to flow administrative decisions that could be easily overlooked in a headman's office or on announcement board in the governorship building. The lawyers concurred that with its strict deadlines, UJP has impaired citizens' ability to open a lawsuit against the administration, particularly for certain administrative actions (such as an UE decision) that has the tendency to stay under the radar, and for particular geographies (the countryside) whose access to knowledge is more irregular.

Despite the consensus over that UJP has narrowed the operational capacity of the administrative law, the lawyers hesitated to jump into conclusions suggesting that UJP have been an outright disaster for the urban and environmental struggles. The reason was that the administration, too, struggle much to meet the challenging deadlines under UJP, the defense texts the administration prepared for each case all look alike and lack vigor. "In fact, we (the lawyers of the movement) fared much better" a junior lawyer advocated, "because we are better equipped to keep up with the new pace thanks to our organic connection to the field. After all, we are the ones working with the locals". A senior lawyer replied "well, that's right but we are also hearing that the lawyers of the Ministry (of Urbanization and Environment) are asking for help now… from the companies that wrote the EIA reports, the very object of many litigations". A third lawyer wanted to reach a broader conclusion:

> *It is true that UJP did not produce the outcomes we thought it would. It is evident for them too; they are planning to amend the law again. Yet, the power of such changes lies somewhere else. UJP signals a certain expectation that is so clear: "do not stand in front of these investments!". And the judges will eventually absorb this massage given the highly politicized climate of the country and the judiciary.*

## 4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the impact of the emergent rationality of energy infrastructures (energorationality) on the judicial realm. As energy investments delay and stagnate due to legal battles fought against local resistances, the government intervened in the legal process to help the smooth the completion of energy investments. By novel forms of expropriation and judicial proceedings, energy production was embellished with a coat of urgency and provided with a fast track option to circumvent legal procedures. The urgency emphasis that raised these procedures to prominence has a powerful potential for the government that goes beyond accelerating the pace of the investments. Therefore, I argued that the urgency attributed to energy infrastructures not only eroded the role of judiciary but also enhanced the authority of the central government. I also posited that the transformative impact of energy infrastructures on the judicial system has become a benchmark for governance by seeping into other fields, such as the Kurdish Question. Despite their powerful mandate, I also suggested that there are limits to manipulating the pace of the judiciary, and attempts to circumvent legal procedures often backfire.

While the chapter revolves around the intersection of law, infrastructure and political power, it could also be read from the perspective of waiting. The literature on temporality in state-society power dynamics suggests that waiting has a disciplinary impact on disadvantaged people. As, for example, sociologist Javier Ayuero's work (2011, 2012) on environmental conflicts and bureaucratic processes suggest, delays produce conforming subjects as waiting triggers uncertainty and anxiety. Those who cannot afford the prospect of uncertainty tend to abandon resentment and comply with authority.

Anthropologist Erdem Evren's recent study on Yusufeli Dam provides some significant insights on the power dynamics that are at play in state-led large infrastructure projects. Unlike others (Adaman et. al, 2014) who explain the absence of substantial anti-large dam opposition in Turkey on the basis of the unyielding societal consent for the idea of development, Erdem examines the consent from the perspective of waiting. He reminds us that there was initially a strong resistance in Yusufeli (the town that will be inundated by the dam named after her), yet it died out during the ten-year-long process. Waiting in uncertainty first transformed the resistance of the people of Yusufeli into a tough negotiation with the state over the terms of compensation, and then to all-out surrender. However, not all infrastructures are the same, some may be more prone to delays while others not. The case of small hydro, however, is surprisingly different as Mr. Tufan, the retired teacher, suggests above. Resistance is stronger, longer lasting and much more adamant to pursue long legal battles when it comes to small hydro projects. Particularly in Eastern Black Sea Coast, with the exception of a few early starters many projects were taken to the courthouses. The next chapter explores what lies underneath the dynamism of anti-small hydro activism.

C H A P T E R - F I V E

# 5 AN UNEXPECTED OBJECTION: ON THE SCOPE OF ANTI-ENERGY POLITICS

*On December 5, 2010, almost two and a half years before the Gezi revolt, Istanbul witnessed a series of colorful protests that brought a variety of urban and environmental causes together. Led by the leading anti-small hydro group, the Black Sea Uprising Platform (Karadeniz İsyandadır Platformu – KIP), the protest program had three components. The first part consisted of the reading of a press release at Galatasaray Square – a popular activism hot spot – in the presence of some 40-strong KIP members along with groups in attendance for support, who had gathered behind a canvas banner that read "No to the Unnatural Law". The press release was a quite agitative statement against a draft legislation titled as Protection of Nature and Biodiversity Law. "This draft law", a KIP member read out loud from a print-out letter sent out to all main newspapers, "aims at lifting the obstacles in front of those projects that degrade nature and destroy life in the name of the need for energy!" Her diatribe was interrupted repeatedly by uplifting slogans: "Don't be silent, cry it out loud, Black Sea is Uprising!", "Streams are roaring, Black Sea is free!", "Down with all dams, stand up right now, us from cities, you from villages!" The next stop was Borusan Center for Arts and Culture, which was only a few hundred steps away from the square. The crowd walked up to the Center on Istanbul's world-famous Istiklal pedestrian street by signing chants and regional songs from the Black Sea and accepting approving claps from the passers-by. The agitation of the crowd and the sharpness of the slogans intensified as the crowd reached the Center, since the intention was not to make use of the Center but the protest its benefactor, Borusan Group. Founded in 1944 as a steel company Borusan Group grew into an industrial conglomerate in 1970s and most recently ventured into energy following the liberalization of the sector. Its first investments in the sector were two small hydro projects undertaken in collaboration with German EnBW in Ispir, one of the southern valleys of the Pontics. The projects were highly contested; the discontent not only led to an administrative litigation but also clashes between the locals and the subcontractor, its private security and later the gendarmerie. KIP was in touch with the resistance in Ispir and there were a couple of Ispir-born participants accompanying the protest that day. The demonstration outside the Center lasted around 20 minutes during which the most repeated slogan was "Borusan's art is killing life!" Following this second protest, the group crossed over to Istanbul's Asian side and*

> *joined a larger group of urban activists (urban platforms, neighborhood associations and the Chamber of Architects) to hold another demonstration by the historic stairs of waterfront Haydarpaşa Train Station. Active since 1909 as the busiest train station of the nation, Haydarpaşa was subject to a lot of controversy due to the government's plan to privatize it, along with the adjacent port, to be turned into a luxurious residence/shopping complex. The demonstration lasted for an hour, the activists demanded that the station remain in public use, shared testimonies and memories about the space and exchanged old photos of the building. The demonstration was marked by two slogans: 'Hands off My Living Space!' and 'No to Urban and Rural Transformation'. The event ended in peace as the KIP activists encouraged all to take part in an impromptu folk dance while Black Sea music was aired through a megaphone.*

Since late 2000s Turkey has been experiencing an unprecedented upsurge in environmental mobilization. On one hand grassroots groups are popping across the countryside as new rural protests make the headlines every other week. Turkey's infrastructure boom, particularly energy infrastructures, is turning pristine villages into busy construction sites, triggering land and water grabs, disrupting local livelihoods. Ordinary villagers turn into environmental activists overnight, new environmental platforms such as KIP gain salience as more established environmental NGOs lose their monopoly in the field. Many provincial towns and cities hold first-ever protest rallies, often organized against an investment with possible environmental harm while administrative litigations challenging environmental impact assessments are flooding courthouses.

On the other hand, there is a growing urban demand to follow and take part in the environmental upsurge reverberating from the countryside to the metropoles. Newspapers employ reporters specialized to cover environmental disputes. Ecology collectives are formed in big cities to work for fair, affordable and sustainable trade of produce. Urban activists travel to the countryside to show solidarity with the grassroots environmental

struggles. Bookstores now have dedicated environment sections which constantly expand thanks to new manuscripts and translations of a great range of classics from Murray Bookchin's the Ecology of Freedom (1982) to WorldWatch Institute's Annual Reports (2015), from Rachel Carlson's Silent Spring (1962) to John Belamy Foster's Marx's Ecology (2000).[97] Political parties – the ones positioned on the left of the spectrum at least – organize panels and establish environmental commissions to comprehend the growing environmentalist momentum and, if possible, benefit from it. Urban movements resort to the notion of urban commons as much as they utilize more conventional discourses of the right to shelter. As a result, urban forests, municipal parks and underutilized public parks are the political causes that attract a new breed of young activists, Gezi Revolt being the most spectacular of all.

While there has been much interest in theorizing the Gezi Revolt as a spectacular and impromptu event (Tuğal, 2013; Arat, 2013; Kuymulu, 2013; Özkırımlı, 2014; Yörük, 2014; Öncü 2014; Eken, 2014; Öğütle and Göker, 2014; Yörük and Yüksel, 2014; Wacquant, 2014; İnceoğlu, 2015), only some have attempted to document and conceptualize Turkey's bourgeoning environmental movement (Harris, 2014; Arsel et al., 2015), which was, in fact, a major inspiration for the Gezi Revolt itself (Erensü, 2013; also Akbulut 2015; Özkaynak, 2015). The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap. By examining this bourgeoning movement in tandem with the country's aggressive infrastructure economy, this chapter seeks to elaborate on the underlying motivations and the political potential and limits of Turkey's environmental upsurge. By highlighting the role of opposition against energy

[97] All four books (and many others on environmental matters) have been translated in to Turkish and published over the course of 2011-2015.

infrastructures—particularly anti-small hydro mobilization—in the upsurge, I discuss how the leakage of energorationality into other domains of governance (such as the economy, bureaucracy, judiciary, development and environmental management) is countered by its opponents and has led to the emergence of an alternative political language. I argue that this new oppositional language not only made visible the vulnerabilities of energorationality and infrastructure-led developmentalism, but also pointed to a political horizon that could challenge the unbreakable AKP hegemony as the Gezi riot so sharply illustrated.

How can we account for "the emancipatory potential of the environmental imaginary" that so unexpectedly came into being in contemporary Turkey (Peets and Watts, 2004)? What lies underneath the emergence of Turkey's grassroots environmental awakening? What is it that makes the small pockets of resistance so politically relevant and impactful beyond their scale? To answer these questions, I will read Turkey's grassroots environmental movement in the making against the body of work that seeks to discuss the unique conditions and prospects of environmental struggles in the global South. I will benefit from, and contribute to, the discussions that revolve around the concept of environmentalism of the poor. I will particularly engage with a newly developed theoretical framework, "environmentalism of the malcontent", that explains the mobilization in Turkey as a political channel through which long-lasting dissatisfactions with the country can be articulated (Arsel et al., 2015). While I agree with the authors that the Turkish case does not squarely fit to the rather limited definition of "environmentalism of the poor"—and thus it fruitfully extends that theory—I argue that "environmentalism of the malcontent",

too, suffers from a reductionism that renders environment secondary to the realm of politics. Instead of examining political backgrounds of activists and bringing their malcontent to the forefront, I rather highlight the spatial characteristics of the movement that constantly oscillates between urban centers and rural periphery, establishing unexpected coalitions and setting alternative ideas and practices into motion. Inspired by the occasions such as KIP's multi-actor, multi-focus demonstration narrated above, I seek to do justice to environmental imaginaries and practices in triggering social change by forming coalitions that are across class, ethnicity, region and scale.

The chapter consists of four sections. The first one will review the literature on the form of environmentalism mobilizations organized by marginalized and disadvantaged communities. I will also elaborate on the possibilities how the recent wave of environmentalism in Turkey can speak to the existing literature, particularly the environmentalism of the poor. The second section introduces the Eastern Black Sea Region, Turkey's new hydropower geography and heartland of grassroots environmental activism. The third section breaks down the elements of anti-small hydro activism field and dwells upon its unique spatial characteristics. The last section dwells upon the political implications of Turkey's new environmentalism by tracing circulation of certain ideas, practices, and a political lexicon across the urban-rural continuum.

## 5.1 Environmentalism of What?

### 5.1.1 Revising Liberation Ecologies?

To be sure, popularization of environmentalism, its embrace by the poor as well as racially, ethnically and regionally discriminated populations, and the advance of grassroots activism as an alternative to more organized forms of urban-based NGO environmentalism can hardly be considered a new phenomenon both in the global South and North. In the last decades of the twentieth century, bourgeoning grassroots environmental mobilization was a major political development in the global South while environmental justice movements were changing the meaning, language, and demographics of US environmental movement. From late 1990s onwards mobilizations on both fronts have been widely discussed as variants of a new environmental current and defined through different conceptualizations such as liberation ecology (Peet and Watts, 1996), environmentalism of the poor (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997; Guha, 2000; Martínez-Alier, 2002), livelihood ecology (Gari, 2000), global environmentalism (Greenough and Tsing, 2003), global political ecology (Peet *et al*., 2011) and global environmental justice (Pellow, 2007; Sikor and Newell, 2014; Martinez-Alier et al., 2014; Martinez-Alier et al., 2016) and more recently global climate justice (Timmons and Parks, 2006).

To be sure, not all of these conceptualizations overlap seamlessly and there some variations in how each understand environmentalism of the disadvantaged communities. The variations predominately stem from the academic traditions and political movements each one of them are rooted in. For example, the environmental justice literature is inspired by the civil right movement in the USA and for a long while exclusively interested in racial

inequalities underneath the distribution of environmental harms and benefits. It focuses on an aspect of the American society that bears the legacy of institutional racism in the country. Environmentalism of the poor and livelihood ecologies approaches, on the other hand, were developed by scholars who were working on rural movements and the post-colonial condition in the global South. The literature these scholars produce, is built upon a particular reading of environmentalism that is shaped by the survival and sustenance of the local populations and, unsurprisingly, do not show much interested in the urban poor in the global North. Despite these difference they have much in common especially in the way they challenge that environmentalism is a post-material engagement for upper-classes of industrialized nations as it put forward by the post-materialism thesis of Ronald Inglehart (1997). Studying the Southern forms of engagement with the environmental problems proves that there are varieties of forms of engagement with the nature (some material some not) as there is more than one way of being environmentalist—although many activists do not embrace the term wholeheartedly. It also demonstrates that access to environmental services and exposure to environmental harms are highly stratified by race, class, gender, ethnicity and one position in global and national division of labor. While there are several recent attempts to bring different variants of this literature together, revise its components and point to new directions for the research agenda (Sikor and Newell, 2014; Anguelovski and Martinez-Alier, 2014; Baviskar, 2003; 2010; Mohai *et al.*. 2009; Pellow and Brulle, 2005), it is not the aim of this chapter to provide yet another synthesis. However, by examining an aberrant case of environmentalism in which activists are neither neither subsistence level farmers nor affluent urban classes I hope to point to a possible direction in which theories of environmentalism that reads ecology and liberation next to each other

of the can be revised. The chapter's contribution in that sense is its insistence to recognize a form of environmentalism that is being nourished not by the rural or urban conditions per se, but a dynamism between the two. I believe that conceptualized as such, the Turkish case can expand the literature at a time when the boundaries between the urban and rural are becoming blurrier and agriculture as we know it is transforming rapidly in the global South.

Given the history of the movements defined as environmentalism of the poor and the maturity of the literature, Turkey is quite a late-comer to the field. In fact, it is odd that the country did not have any sizable grassroots environmental justice momentum until recently with the notable exception of the struggle fought by Bergama villagers against a gold-mining development in late 1990s (Çoban, 2004; Arsel, 2005; Özen, 2009). Environmentalism in Turkey, to a large extent, remained a top-down upper-class activity pioneered either by local branches of international NGOs such as WWF, Greenpeace-Mediterranean and Birdlife International, or elite-sponsored projects such as TEMA Foundation.[98] Despite running several successful issue-based conservation campaigns, public outreach of these organizations has been haphazard, limited and inorganic.[99] Therefore, while the emergence of a grassroots environmental opposition is a critical development for Turkey, it may well be considered a peculiar or, even a parochial, delay from the perspective of "third world political ecology" (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).

[98] Established in 1992, TEMA (The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats) had leading industrialist and retired bureaucrats in its founding have been in good terms with the state for a long time and collaborated with the government agencies over multiple large-scale preservation and regeneration projects.

[99] For a critical evaluation on the capabilities and shortcomings of Turkish environmental organizations, see Paker et al. 2003

However, I believe that Turkey's environmental upsurge is not an insular case and the analytical value of discussing it is not limited to a conversation on the limits of energorationality and counter-hegemonic politics. The delayed grassroots environmental awakening has the potential to expand the literature on the environmentalism of the poor. I argue that precisely through its peculiarities, Turkey's emergent environmental mobilization can help us to address the literature's silences and challenge several crude binaries that it is built upon.

### 5.1.2 Environmentalism of the Malcontent?

In a recent article Arsel *et al*. attempt to grapple with the peculiarities of the delayed wave of grassroots environmentalism in Turkey (2005, also see Adaman et al. 2016). They aim at defining the variety of environmentalism in the making in Turkey by focusing on a particular anti-energy infrastructure struggle in small town called Gerze of Sinop Province located in mid-Black Sea Region. Sparked off in 2008, Gerze ran a successful campaign against a coal power plant project that was planned to be built in Yaykıl, one of the villages attached to Gerze. The permit of the project which was held by the Anadolu Group—the producer and distributor of Coca-Cola products and owner of the most popular beer brand Efes—was eventually canceled by the Danıştay (Council of State) in June 2015 after seven-year-long hard fought struggle. Pioneered by Green Gerze Platform (*Yeşil Gerze Platformu* - YEGEP), which was formed in 2009, Gerze's struggle against Anadolu Group was exposed to symbolic and physical violence by the state several times and was named by the Sierra Club as one of the ten victory cases in 2012 (*Ibid*.: 378).

What was the motivation underneath the noteworthy success of Gerze's anti-coal power struggle? Based on 40 interviews conducted with the key actors of the resistance in Gerze Arsel *et al*. defines at least two core groups that lead the movement: the villagers of Yaykıl who are petty-commodity farmers and a group of Gerze residents who are educated with an history in left-wing politics. This coalition, the authors argues, defies both the analytical frames of environmentalism of the poor and environmentalism of the rich. The farmer, although 'asset poor' and concerned with the future of farming in the region does not necessary experience as deprıvation and destitute (*Ibid*.: 374). In fact, while they are not in a position to "negotiate the terms of integration into capitalist markets", in terms of daily life standard they are comparatively better off in average Turkish farmer. The urban group, in the other hand, can not be squarely defined as middle class in terms of living standards and consumption patterns although they had certain social and political capital at their disposal. Upon these complexities in activist demographics, rather than categorizing the case of Gerze along the environmentalism of the poor, environmentalism of the rich axis, Arsel *et al*. turns to political motivations of the participants for an explanation. One commonality that the core Gerze activists share is their past involvement in left-wing politics. This is reflected in how they make sense of the struggle in Gerze and at times giving the impression "that environmental issues were not so much on their agenda prior to coal power plant proposal" (*Ibid.*: 385). Therefore, in a sense, the activists' concern regarding the environmental wellbeing of Gerze is overwhelmed by their revolutionary worldview resentments about the general affair of things. In fact, the core activist groups' political assumptions are so pronounced suggesting that their motivation "went beyond livelihoods, health concerns or feeling of belonging" to a point to possibly see

environmentalism as a "convenient vehicle" for other agendas (*Ibid.*: 391-92 citing Cribb, 1988: 2). The authors define the kind of activism in Gerze as environmentalism of the malcontent, which

> *describes the way in which long-lasting dissatisfaction with broader processes marking the development trajectory of the country combined with personal experience in radical political action enabled a group of urban, mostly retired residents of Gerze to successfully collaborate with peasant activists against the construction of the power plant by deploying arguments regarding its potential negative impacts.* (*Ibid*.: 371)

The reason why I allocated a rather extended space to elaborate on the environmentalism of the malcontent framework is that what Arsel *et al*. observe in Gerze is quite comparable to type of activism that I observed in my dissertation fieldwork. The demographics of the anti-hydro struggles in the Eastern Black Sea Region is complex and not reducible to environmentalism of rich vs. poor dichotomy. There are resourceful villagers as well as those who are not, both active in a form of agriculture that is rather recreational thanks to its diminishing economic worth. There are the retired ex-socialists living in the neighboring town and good at organizing. There is second and third generation Black Sea diaspora determined to bring the struggle to the metropole to increase its visibility. There are those who yearn to migrate to the city and there are urban dwellers waiting to return back to the village. Therefore, I agree with Arsel *et al*. that such complexity is hard to be captured by the existing frameworks of environmentalism. However, I am not convinced that environmentalism of the malcontent captures the bourgeoning grassroots environmentalism in Turkey either. First of all, it fails to account for the villagers of Yaykıl; they are not the one who are malcontent. Secondly, it does not give credit to the possibility of emergence of a "genuine" environmentalism out of the initial motivation of discontent.

Thirdly, and most importantly, it reduces environmentalism to politics and thus dismisses the political potential that ecological struggles could generate no matter what the initial motivation are. By paying attention to spatial qualities of grassroots mobilizations and their mobility across the urban-rural continuum I aim to provide an alternative account for the Turkey's emergent environmentalism that arisen against the land-use disputes triggered by an (energy) infrastructure boom in the countryside

## 5.2 EASTERN BLACK SEA REGION

> *In a mountain village not long ago, I was balancing on a tiny stool in the grass, savoring delicious lunch goodies that were spread before me on a communal tray… With cowbells tinkling in the background, tractors hauled hay in the meadows above. A waterfall plunged down the slopes across a steep valley. I could have sworn that I was in the Alps. Except that the sweet little towhead girl running around us wasn't named Heidi. (John Osied, 2015 – Luxury Section, Forbes)*

### 5.2.1 Location, Location, Location

Turkey resembles a horizontal rectangle located between the Balkans and the Aegean Sea on the one hand, the Caucuses and the Middle East on the other. The northern edge of this rectangle is the Black Sea coast that stretches between the Bulgarian border in the West and Georgian border in the East. The bulk of northern territories to the East of Istanbul comprises the Black Sea Region, a belt that is roughly 1,400 miles longitudinally, 100 miles latitudinally. The six easternmost provinces out of the nineteen provinces of the entire region make up the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR).[100]

[100] Regional classification in Turkey suffer from serious inconsistencies. 81 provinces do not neatly fall under the seven regions; some provinces stretch over more than one region. On top of this complication, as a EU candidate country Turkey adopted NUT (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) system which divided Turkey in twelve regions (NUT1) instead of existing seven and introduced 26 sub-regions (NUT2). The conventional regional categorization is still in use, while the NUT system is also recognized

The most distinctive geographical feature of the Black Sea Region is the Pontic Mountain Range, which runs through the east-west axis isolating the tiny strip of seashore from the rest of the Anatolia plains almost like an uninterrupted wall. Pontics are particularly high, steep and impassable in the eastern part of the region reaching 4,000-meter altitude. Shaped by the Pontics, the EBSR can be divided into four lateral geographical zones from north to south: the shoreline, the valleys, the highlands and the mountaintops. Majority of cities and towns are lined up along the shoreline by the mouths of the rivers and streams that cascades through the valleys of the Pontics. The valleys hosts hundreds of villages scattered disorderly across the hillsides covered with tea or hazelnut gardens at low altitudes and dense conifer forests at high. Where valleys converge starting at 1,200 meters lies patches of Apline meadows, locally known as *yayla*, that traditionally serve as pasture for the livestock and summer resort for the local population. At above 2,500 meters rises the summits of the Pontics, a popular destination for outdoor enthusiasts and climbers.

For those who traverse the Black Sea Region along the east-west axis all four zones are not visible. For a first time traveler it is hard to believe that the region is one of the most rural regions in the country. The only highway[101] of the region, which connects the city of Samsun to the Georgian Border along the shoreline, passes by an almost continuous urban

as a statistical classification. For example, recently established development agencies are organized at the level of new NUT system, while the concept of sub-regions are still unknown to the general public. Throughout the dissertation I stick to the common parlance and name the territory that is composed of six easternmost provinces (Ordu, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Trabzon, Rize, Artvin) as the Eastern Black Sea Region. I have been to all six but Gümüşhane as part of my fieldwork, yet majority of my data is based on Trabzon, Rize and Artvin provinces.

[101] D010 aka Black Sea Coastal Road is often referred to as the Tayyip Highway, after the first name of the President as its construction was finally operationalize under his term in 2007 following 19-year long controversial construction period.

fabric for many miles and rural settings remain mostly out of sight, hidden in valleys and mountain meadows. However, EBSR ranks third among 26 sub-regions countrywide in terms its rural population, which was 42.3 percent in 2011.[102]

Pontics determine the climate of the Black Sea as much as it shapes its geography. The moist low-pressure systems condense above the Black Sea and gain altitude as winds carry them towards northern slopes of the Pontic. Air masses quickly cool down with elevation, raising the relative humidity and causing precipitation. Particularly the eastern portion of Turkish Black Sea receives record levels of precipitation and is considered to have a humid subtropical climate according to Köppen Climate Classification (see map 5.1).[103] Year-round high precipitation rates nourish tea and hazelnut cultivation, the lush forests and *yayla*s, as well as hundreds of fast running rivers, streams, and tributaries stimulating the appetite of the hydropower industry.

[102] Compare this with Turkey's average which was 77.2 percent urban to 22.7 percent rural. TUIK – Turkısh Statistical Institute.
[103] Yearly precipitation averages of Trabzon, Rize and Artvin provinces are 929 mm, 1,458 mm, and 1007 mm respectively while the country's yearly average is around 574 mm. Averages for the towns and cities are much higher, reaching for Rize, for example, 2,400 mm. Turkish State Meteorological Service Data, available at URL. http://www.mgm.gov.tr/veridegerlendirme/yillik-toplam-yagis-verileri.aspx (accessed 10 August 2016)

**Figure 5.1: Annual Precipitation in Turkey**




### 5.2.2 Destiny of a Region: Emigration

If the Pontics characterize the Black Sea topography, it is immigration that epitomizes its demographics. Due to the lack of arable (and flat) land, geographic and climatic hardship, people of the Black Sea Regions (*Eastern Black Sears* for convenience), particularly men, have sought employment opportunities elsewhere since late 19$^{th}$ century (McCarthy, 1973). While many migrated to metropoles of the then-Ottoman Empire, a sizable portion travelled to Russian, Ukrainian and Polish cities because a northbound voyage across the Black Sea was simply more convenient than traversing the Pontics to reach Istanbul or Izmir (Biryol, 2010; 2012). The emigration trend in the region continued after the foundation of the Republic yet turned domestic after the Bolshevik Revolution and reached its peak over the course of mid-1960s to mid-1990s, the core decades of Turkey's rural-to-urban migration. In 1960, Black Sea shoreline population constituted 14 percent of Turkey's total population. This ratio first plummeted to 11 percent in 1990, then to 8

percent in 2003 (Güvenç, 2008). Although the pace of domestic migration has abated, Eastern Black Sea still struggles to keep its young, educated population in the region, competing with the violence-stricken Kurdish cities in terms of emigration trends. Net migration ratio of the region is minus 9 percent, one of the highest negatives in the country (Doka, 2014: 37). As a result of youth emigration the ratio of 60+ population to general population is 11.6 percent in the region while Turkey average is 7.5 percent (*Ibid.*: 30). More than half of the Black Sears reside in a city different from the one they are registered in (in most cases meaning the city where they and/or their parents were born) (See table 5.1).

**Table 5.1: Registry vs Out of Province Residency**

| | Province Registry | Out of Province Residency | Province Residency / Province Registry | Most Resided Out of Province Cities |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Trabzon*** | *1,418,361* | *723,529* | *48.4 %* | *Istanbul, Kocaeli, Ankara* |
| ***Rize*** | *717,570* | *439,158* | *38.8 %* | *Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir* |
| ***Artvin*** | *412,411* | *271,319* | *35.7 %* | *Istanbul, Bursa, Ankara* |

*Data: TUIK - Turkish Statistics Institute*

The history and volume of domestic Black Sear emigration dwindled the population of the region yet created pockets of Black Sea neighborhoods in many cities, particularly in Istanbul. Although migrants from the Black Sea—or as I call it the first domestic diaspora of Turkey—were discriminated against and made fun of due to "their rural manners and unusual accents", within decades Black Sears came to prominent positions in business, politics, arts and intellectual life leaving long-lasting marks in the metropole (Yüksel and Biryol, 2014; Solmaz and Morgül, 2014, Heyyamola, 2016, Kolivar and Çelik, 2007). In fact, as one activist told me, with its Trabzon, Rize and Artvin born citizens Istanbul is, in

a sense, a Black Sea city because "after all there would be no bread for the Istanbulite if it was not for the Black Sear."[104]

### 5.2.3 Cash Cropping, Single Cropping, Share Cropping…

Lack of proper employment opportunities is the fundamental reason underneath the chronic emigration problem that EBSR has been facing. The first reason is that the economy of the region is still heavily dependent on agricultural production. EBSR is, in fact, the region in which the share of agriculture in employment is the highest. (see Table 5.2). One must carefully qualify the type of agricultural activity in the region, which, for the last 60 years predominantly depends on types of cash-crops, tea and hazelnut, state being the main buyer.

**Table 5.2: Employment by Sector**

| | Agriculture | | Industry | | Services | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2011 | 2012 | 2011 | 2012 | 2011 | 2012 |
| Turkey | %25,5 | %24,6 | %26,5 | %26,0 | %48,1 | %49,4 |
| Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR) | %53,6 | %55,2 | %14,8 | %13,4 | %31,8 | %31,4 |
| EBSR Ranking (2012) | 1/26 | | 24/26 | | 26/26 | |

*Data: TUIK - Turkish Statistics Institute*

Although they are still the motors of the region's economy, in the last twenty years both crops (hazelnut more than tea) have significantly lost their economical value as the state

[104] The activist, who is a mid-aged male a retired engineer, refers to the fact that an overwhelming majority of Istanbul's bakeries are owned and run by the migrants of the Black Sea Region, an occupational tradition that goes back to the early Black Sea migrants' experiences in the patisseries of Moscow, Kiev and Warsaw in late nineteenth century. (See Biryol, 2009)

gradually diminished its support and lowered the subsidies as part of liberalization efforts. Although the cultivation of both cash crops provide employment opportunity for millions, their value added to the economic activity is limited, as expected from an agricultural activity (see Table 5.3).

**Table 5.3: Added Value by Sector**

| | Agriculture | Industry | Services |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Turkey** | 9 % | 27.5 % | 64.2 % |
| **Eastern Black Sea Region** | 12.7 % | 27.5 % | 63.5 % |

*Data: TUIK – Turkish Statistical Institute*

It is ironic that, both crops were introduced and promoted by state planners and agriculturalists to remedy the region's underdevelopment problem in the aftermath of WWII (Zihnioğlu, 2008). For decades, tea and hazelnut channeled government cash to the region, brought the villagers in the valleys down to the shoreline to invest in the towns and marked the republic's most successful regional development achievement. Yet, the very same project that brought prosperity to the region is now considered as a 'curse' by many locals, a form of dependency that, perhaps, prevented other forms of socio-economic activity to take root in the region. Now that the government subsidy is minimized and tea/hazelnut gardens per family are much smaller after a generation or two of inheritance division, agricultural income is a bonus rather than a stable income for many families.

Many families are ambivalent about their tea/hazelnut gardens. Most agree that the income from agriculture is not worth the labor that goes into picking the tea and hazelnut and waiting in line for hours to sell it to the state. Despite diminishing revenues and enthusiasm, however, few consider to give up and withdraw from agriculture. Fikret, a thirty-year-old,

recently married customer representative I met in a local anti-hydro demonstration in Artvin's Arhavi district helped me to understand the ambivalence around the tea gardens. I had travelled to Arhavi from Istanbul for the demonstration and I had assumed that Fikret, a Arhavi local, would stay little more before he returns to his job at a bank branch in Istanbul:

> *Sinan: Do you have a garden? It is almost picking time, isn't it?*
>
> *Fikret: Yes, we all have it here. Is it that time of the year already?*
>
> *Sinan: So, you don't pick, I suppose?*
>
> *Fikret: Only for the guests from Istanbul… Between you and me, it is a burden than anything else. I am almost thirty-two, thus far I haven't seen anyone picking up tea leaves in joy. TV shows bring celebrities here and take their picture in the tea gardens as they pick a few and then people think that is easy. No, it is boring and not worth it anymore. We have an average garden, around four, five hectares (approximately 10 acres). Throughout the season there are three rounds of yields; with each yield we make little more than 1,500 liras (around 500 dollars). Sometimes government pays it months after. What is the point really? No one can live off of it.*
>
> *Sinan: So why not sell it? Why would you care if the small hydro would have a negative impact on your yield or not?*
>
> *Fikret: No, you simply don't sell your tea garden. It is next to our village home, it is what I will leave to my children. And after all, you need to have something to come back to.*

The most tangible manifestation of the local population's growing ambivalence towards tea/hazelnut cultivation is the growing salience of sharecropping (*yarıcılık*). Sharecropper is an ideal solution for those who want to continue to be a producer yet cannot bother with

the tedious work of picking the product. A sharecropper picks the yield on behalf of the patron of the land in return for half or one third of the income depending on the agreement. Sharecroppers are rarely the local poor as one might expect. They are often seasonal workers from neighboring Georgia or Turkish Kurdistan who travel to the Eastern Black Sea coast during summer precisely for this reason. As many of my informants insisted, hiring a sharecropper cannot be dismissed merely as laziness; it shows a desire (and luxury) to keep the village life going despite the decreasing economic value of the products.

Sharecropping is not something every family could afford. Those who are connected to close kin networks prefer picking products collectively. Others take annual turns within the larger family. In any case, with or without a sharecropper, what tea/hazelnut in the EBSR uniquely bestow to their producers is a great degree of mobility few farmers could enjoy. Both tea and hazelnut require minimum attention beyond the harvest time. Thanks to the generous precipitation rates in the region, neither tea nor hazelnut requires irrigation. While harvest time necessitates too much labor, it is often a few days of intense work for an average size family with an average size garden. A tea producer does not need to attend to his tea garden more than twenty days a year including the upkeep, picking, and waiting for the delivery processes; it is even less for the case of hazelnut. Combined with the special geographical features in which each valley cascades down to a town or city by the shoreline, agriculture in the Eastern Black Sea Region is an activity that can be undertaken from a distance. With the improvement of transportation infrastructures many tea and hazelnut producers have chosen to migrate to the cities and towns of the region (or to metropoles like Istanbul and Ankara) instead of enduring the rough winter conditions of

rural life. Therefore, tea and hazelnut cash crops in Turkish Black Sea generates a unique form of producer who has both rural and urban residency, someone who could be a farmer and a, say, high-school teacher at the same time.

In a recent article that discusses the changing character of rural settlements and settlement patterns in Turkey, Öztürk *et al*. draw attention to the understudied rural-directed movements in a country that is rapidly urbanizing.[105] By looking at a variety of permanent, temporary, cyclical and seasonal movement patterns of urban-to-rural movements they describe different forms of village settlements in the making. While some of these forms resemble the so-called counterurbanization examples in the global North in which urban upper/upper-middle classes gradually gravitate away from the urban core (Halcafree, 2008; 2012), the rural-directed movements in Turkey show more diversity. Other than traditional agricultural villages, Öztürk et al. outline, for example, suburban villages, a new commuter belt settlement around metropolitan centers, or retirement/summer villages in which the new ex-urban residents do not engage with commercial farming, or semi-agricultural villages where residents are integrated to labor markets beyond agriculture (2014: 382-383). The villages that resist small-hydropower structures in the EBSR may be considered under what they name as semi-seasonal semi-agricultural villages that are often deserted in the winter and used as summer resorts for many while some commercial agriculture still persists. Öztürk *et al*. define these new forms of mobilities, which escape the conventional

[105] According to the official figures ın 1970 only 38 percent of Turkey resided in urban settings. This number grew to 43.9 percent in 1980 and thus skyrocketed to 59 percent in 1990, 64.9 percent in 2000 and 76.3 percent in 2010. Following a legislation passed in 2013 administrative borders of metropolitan municipalities were expanded to overlap with the provincial border. Since there are 30 metropolitan municipalities in Turkey, the change—which was passed for electoral politics standpoint— effectively raised urbanization to 92.1 percent over night. Data: TUIK Turkish Statistical Institute.

definitions of migration and urban studies, as "dual settlement" or "multiplace hybrid life" and argue that:

> *Lived spaces are thus created that span geographically distant places and are made into multivalent living structures through human relationship and (other) socio-economic networks. Eschewing considerations of threshold (minimal criteria for what counts as migration), we combine these with the more localized hamlet/village-to-town/city and rural farming oriented migrations/mobilities outlined, as well as the movement practices linked to the development of urbanite retirement/summer and commuter villages (above), to develop an overarching conception of rural-urban connectedness, a dialectic generalised as dual settlement or multiplace hybrid life (Ibid. 382).*

The social, cultural, and historical meaning of the emergent multiplace hybrid lives Öztürk et al. conceptualize is best understood and appreciated in reference to the dichotomous terms *sıla* and *gurbet*, which lack direct translations in English (Zirh, 2012: 1760). *Sıla* is where the natal home is, often at the scale of village. *Gurbet*, in contrast is any place other than *sıla* or, "the non-homey" (*Ibid.*). The one who lives in *gurbet* is *gurbetçi* and is believed to yearn for *sıla*. *Gurbet* and *garip*—which means poor, lonely or subaltern—comes from the same Arabic root which means to be estranged, to fall apart, to be alienated (*ibid.*). Alienation of *gurbetçi* is by default and it cannot really be remedied by the *gurbet*'s employment and secure income opportunities, the very reason of being in *gurbet* in the first place. Despite the years spent and financial security acquired in *gurbet,* many dream of returning back to *sıla*.

> *Therefore, the journey towards gurbet was never thought of as being one way nor was the duration of separation conceived as being permanent. The simple aim is to earn enough in order to improve living conditions in sıla. In this sense, the act of leaving becomes a kind of mission. Those who are able to do so should sacrifice a certain period of their lives for the sake of their families. Those who have stayed at home expect the immigrants to return to where they belong. (Ibid.)*

A mutliplace hybrid life renders the *sıla* vs. *gurbet* tension bearable and sustainable.[106] In today's transportation technologies *gurbetçi* can visit *sıla* on a regular basis. Although the phrase *bizim buralarin gurbetçisi çoktur* (we have too many *gurbetçi*s) is often said to complain about the fact that the region is not self-reliant, *gurbetçi* is no longer *garip* thanks to the new airports and Tayyip Highway, which cut the bus ride from Istanbul to the region by half. While retired-returnees make up a significant portion of the summer population of the EBSR villages, one does not need to wait for retirement to establish a sustained relationship with *sıla*. While it was a luxury for a *gurbetçi* to go back to the EBSR to observe religious holidays twice a year, now families from Ankara, Istanbul and Bursa are flying to the EBSR for extended holiday excursions in the motherland. There is only one condition to sustain such dual settlement arrangement: to have a *şenlikli* (well-looked after, populated, prosperous) house in the village. Unlike central and eastern Anatolia, where withdrawal from agriculture is sharp and irreversible (Keyder ve Yenal, 2013), tea and hazelnut help to keep the households *şenlikli*, keep the connection to *sıla* alive and well. To keep the ancestral village house *şenlikli* for the years during which the *gurbetçi* family cannot travel back to *sıla*, the sharecropper is asked to not only pick the products but also stay in the premises or do the routine maintenance.

While *sıla* and *gurbet* dichotomy is helpful to explain the affective dimension of the rural-directed movements in Turkey, return to *sıla* is not simply a practice of nostalgia, or fulfillment of a patriarchal tradition. While urban-directed migration is often to pursue a

[106] While gurbet is often used for villager making a living in a metropole or abroad multiplace hybrid live in the EBSR also includes families which have a village home in the valley (maybe also a cabin up in the meadows), yet live in big cities of the region (such as Rize and Trabzon) or one of the shoreline towns located where the valleys meat Black Sea (such as Arhavi, Fındıklı and Of).

university degree and/or to work, there are many reasons as to why families temporarily and permanently return to the village. Village is a safe harbor, a secure shelter one can turn to when worse comes to worst. I met many returnees who migrated back to the village following a job loss or financial hardship. During economic crises, villages of the EBSR serve a safety net function for families that need to scale down away from judging eyes. The refuge status of rural life is not limited to material aspects of the simple, low profile of the village. A running joke about the tranquility of the countryside amongst the locals suggests that if one avoids bears, village is the safest place to be. After all, even 'if the atomic bomb explodes", as a returnee told me, "we would be just fine and life would simply go on here, up in the mountains" (Personal interview, September 2014).

Emergent forms of multiplace hybrid lives in Turkey do not simply remain as dry demographic categorizations, they rather trigger new socio-spatial imaginaries and lead to the establishment of unexpected coalitions. In the remaining part of the chapter, by focusing on such imaginaries and coalitions, I will further elaborate on urban-rural connectivity induced by dual settlement in the EBSR as a crucial factor that explains both the motivations underneath the contestation of energy infrastructures and the dynamism of anti-small hydro mobilization.

Parallel to the sheer number of small hydro power plants, their geographic reach and the fact that they have been the pioneers of the country's energy rush (see Chapter Three) anti-small-hydro activism has a special role in Turkey's environmental upsurge.

## 5.3 THE FIELD OF THE MOVEMENT

Anti-hydro activism is a multi-actor field. It is possible to acknowledge at least five components of the field operating at different scales. (1) grassroots resistance, (2) anti-hydro solidarity platforms that grassroots resistances can choose to affiliate with, (3) kinship (*hemşehri*) associations in the metropole, (4) urban-based environmental NGOs, (5) urban/ecology activist circles. While some of these components regularly work together, it is hard to claim there is a perfect harmony and collaboration among them. In fact, at times the anti-hydro field may seem competitive as different organizations may claim ownership over this struggle or that demonstration. Figure 5.2 provides a rough sketch of the anti-small hydro activism field. The number of shapes and connecting lines are not numerically accurate; yet they aim to give a rough idea about the concentration of struggles across the field and the overall positioning of environmental platforms and organizations vis-à-vis each other.

There are two main axes that spatially divide the field. The horizontal axis separates the field along urban and rural lines, while the vertical line differentiates the struggles in the Black Sea Region from those taking place in other regions of the country. Individual struggles are obviously all located in the rural part of the field, which is why it is drawn relatively larger. While organizing at the local level is a must for a successful resistance, making a struggle visible in the urban stage is a something every struggles can do. Since the explosion of small-hydro business, the Black Sea Region is the new hydropower geography of the country (See Chapter Two). As a result, the number of struggles is higher and the connections between individual struggles are stronger in the region (represented in

the left side of the vertical axis) than the cumulative of the rest of the country (right side of the vertical axis).

**Figure 5.2: Anti-Hydropower Activism Field**




*Individual Hydropower Struggles*: The core component of the anti-hydro activism field is the individual anti-hydro struggles organized at the most local scale possible.[107] Local

[107] The focus of the majority of the local anti-hydro mobilizations are all small-hydro projects. The most notable exceptions are relatively weaker mobilizations against Yusufeli (Erdem, 2015; 2016) and Ilısu Dam (Ilhan, 2016). Yusufeli Dam (540 MW) is located in Çoruh Valley and will inundate Yusufeli town in

resistance is the front line of the resistance. While information regarding all future hydropower projects are currently available to the public now in the early years of the boom it was a handful of interested locals who found out about these investments and informed the village(s) neighboring the projects. The size of local resistance depends on the geographic features of the rural setting and where the hydropower plant is located. Isolated villages need to struggle alone while valleys with multiple villages in close proximity to each other organize at the valley level and these resistances tend to be stronger and longer lasting. That is why the EBSR, which hosts a dense rural population cascading down to a small town down by the shoreline that allows the only possible entrance to the valley, offers the ideal geographical conditions to organize and check for intruders who appear to be measuring the stream flow or entering into preliminary land bargains.

*Muhtar*, the elected village headman, is a key figure for all local struggles. As the sole official contact of the village it is the headman who is supposed to be in touch with the governor's office, local branch of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, gendarmerie, and the energy company's contractor. However, in many cases *muhtars* are the first to be compromised precisely because of their proximity to the local sources of power. While early mobilizations took place under the leadership of *muhtars*, as *muhtar*s were bought and/or convinced by the energy projects, the opposition formed platforms, that is, unofficial

Artvin while Ilısu Dam (1,200 MW), located on Tigris as a part of Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) will flood parts of ancient Hasankeyf.

entities usually named after the village, valley, or the stream that is targeted by the small-hydro.[108]

Establishing a platform provides the opposition with a name, a structure, a division of labor but does not burden the villagers with filing an application for association status, which may attract unwanted official attention. Platforms spread news about projects to everyone in the village and the village diaspora, persuade them to join the cause and most importantly initiate the legal process by getting in touch with a lawyer. They organize rallies and publish handouts to raise awareness. When the time is ripe, platform members strive hard to find as many plaintiffs as possible for a lawsuit to be opened against the development. The number of plaintiffs often provides a good estimate about the size of the resistance.

In the absence of a local core set of contesters, an anti-hydro struggle cannot flourish. No matter how intense the outside interest, diaspora support and urban solidarity is, at the end of the day there needs to be active mobilization at the local level to at least keep the information channels open for the larger movement and the legal case.

*Kinship (Hemşehri) Associations*: Grassroots mobilizations need outside support as otherwise their resistance may run the risk of remaining parochial and invisible. First stop to check for support is the village diaspora living in the big cities. Hemşehri (kinship)

[108] Some examples are *Arhavi Doğa Koruma Platformu* (Arhavi Nature Protection Platform) in Arhavi, Artvin; *Şavşat Dereleri Koruma Platformu* (Şavşat Rivers Protection Platform) in Şavşat Artvin, *Fındıklı Dereleri Koruma Platformu* (Fındıklı Rivers Protection Platform) in Fındıklı, Rize; *Tonya Çevre Platformu* (Tonya Environment Protection Platform) Tonya, Trabzon; *Loç Vadisi Koruma Platformu* (Loç Valley Protection Platform) in Cide, Kastamonu; Alakır Nehri Kardeşliği (Alakır River Fellowship) in Kumluca, Antalya.

associations located in metropoles are not only a great opportunity to establish an urban post for the resistance, they also have the potential to serve as an institutional support thanks to their already existing legal status. However, the survival of *hemşehri* associations depends on one thing: charitable donations by the successful businessmen who are from the same village. The very existence of the *hemşehri* associations is to serve as a support network and ease rural migrants' transition to the life in the metropole, such as providing scholarships for the village students studying in the metropole. Also, more recently, *hemşehri* associations try to attract investment to the ancestral village or simply raise funds to improve the village infrastructure (Bayraktar, 2003). All, of these activities require the associations to work closely with the capital owners who have migrated from the village and been successful in the city. Donors of the associations are, at the same time, potential subcontractors for the future energy projects thanks to their local knowledge and network. Even if this is not an option, small-hydro investors may approach the donors to pressure the association to stay, at least, neutral in the conflict. As a result, the relationship between grassroots resistance and *hemşehri* associations may deteriorate rapidly after an initial collaborative start.

In February 2014, I was on a bus from Istanbul to Artvin's Arhavi district to attend an anti-small hydro demonstration that was planned to be built at a location near Arhavi town center. Arhavi's *hemşehri* association ISTAD (Istanbul Arhavians Association) covered the costs of the bus I was travelling by as well as the two other buses. The president of the association was travelling with us too and he was more enthusiastic about the demonstration than anyone else. The next day he was one of the five speakers who gave a

speech to three thousand people gathered by the future plant site. In his agitating talk he promised that ISTAD would be with the resistance no matter what and work as the Istanbul branch of the opposition. However, the more the opposition targeted the license holder of the small-hydro project (MNG, a logistics giant whose owner is from Arhavi) the more hesitant ISTAD has become to the point that the association recently completely withdrew from the struggle. Later an activist informed me that through a generous donation MNG helped ISTAD to double the amount of scholarships they distributed monthly.

*Mainstream Environmental NGOs*: The stance of established urban-based environmental NGOs on the issue of small-hydro can best be described as passive, non-institutional approval. With the exception of *Doğa Derneği* (Nature Foundation – a local partner of Birdlife International) all other three mainstream environmental NGOs (Greenpeace Mediterranean, WWF, and TEMA) preferred to keep a distance from the grassroots mobilization rising in opposition to small-hydro. While the personnel of these organizations have always been sympathetic towards the anti-small hydro struggles, the organizations have never actively participated in the demonstrations or worked closely with one of the local struggles (that is why these organizations are located in the urban part of the field drawn above with no real connection to rural struggles).

There are at least three reasons underneath this hesitation. The small hydro activism, from its very first days developed independent from the mainstream urban-based environmentalist circles, which until recently had a monopoly over the field. They were caught off-guard and failed to adopt a proper line of communication with the grassroots

movements. The second reason is closely connected to the first one. As Turkey's uncontested environmental pioneers for the last two decades, these organizations did not have experience in working with grassroots mobilizations as secondary partners. While they were experts in running protection projects, attitudinal-change campaigns and raising environmental awareness, lobbying and writing commentaries for draft legislations, partnering with a local mobilization in a contested land-use dispute was not their strong suit. Finally, for a long while, mainstream environmental organizations had difficulty in coming to terms with the fact that the strongest environmental mobilization in the nation's history developed around a technology that was allegedly renewable and low-impact. They have been campaigning for renewable solutions for years and did not have the conceptual tools to make sense of the small hydro mobilizations and join their cause. Their hesitation to publicly support the rural mobilizations soon became a soft spot for mainstream environmentalism in Turkey as grassroots activists accused these organizations of being the mouthpiece of capital and started to question the sources of their donations.

*Doğa Derneği*[109]*,* tried hard to engage with the anti-hydro mobilization from very early on. They initiated a loose umbrella structure called *Water Assembly of Turkey* in 2010 for a more efficient information exchange among the small-hydro stricken villages and valleys. Although the assembly was a huge success for a year or two in raising awareness and introducing struggles to each other, it fell apart due to a series of disagreements between

[109] Founded in 2002, Doğa Derneği (Nature Association) the one of the fourth main actor of the environmental NGOs in the country with WWF-Turkey, Greepeace-MED, and TEMA. Started as a bird observation society the association is now active in various environmental protection campaigns. Affiliated with BirdLife International, Doğa Derneği has 250 members and 670 volunteers mostly in Istanbul and Ankara.

*Doğa Derneği* and grassroots struggles (particularly those in the EBSR). While the schism that initiated the demise of the assembly was a dispute over the course of the movement, many ex-members today imply that the real reason in practice was a failure to reconcile the different approaches and languages of urban and rural based oppositions.

*Fellowship of Streams - DEKAP*: One of the most authentic institutions of the anti-small hydro mobilization is the Fellowship of Streams Platform (*Derelerin Kardeşliği Platfromu*, DEKAP). Founded in Rize's Fındıklı district at a quite early stage in late 2005, DEKAP evolved, in a sense, into a confederation for individual anti-hydro struggles, particularly in the EBSR. Local anti-small hydro movements can affiliate themselves with DEKAP and attend their regular general assemblies in which future strategies are discussed and determined. Being a DEKAP affiliate guarantees well-attended and loud demonstrations and a very beneficial informational support. Whenever an affiliate struggle faces a new challenge or wins a legal victory, it is DEKAP that announces it and spreads the news.

Compared to the front line anti-hydro struggles, DEKAP has a pronounced left-leaning discourse that shapes its slogans, chants, press releases etc. The reason is that most of the key members of DEKAP are either current members of left/socialist political parties and/or have been a part of the revolutionary movement of 1970s.[110] In this sense, DEKAP membership demographics resemble that of YEGEP, which forms the basis for the notion of "environmentalism of the malcontent" as described by Arsel et al. (2015). Similar to

[110] In contrast with the contemporary dominance of right wing politics (mostly AKP), socialist mobilization was very strong in the EBSR prior to the 1980 Coup. A series of newly published manuscripts ( ) reveal how radical left took root in the EBSR in the 1970s by forming unexpected coalitions with the region's kinship structure.

YEGEP activists, DEKAP activists, too, tend to conceptualize the individual struggles within larger socio-political analysis and do not hesitate to call their cause anti-capitalist. While its approach is deemed too radical by several frontline activists and regularly cause tensions in demonstrations, it is hard to deny the role of DEKAP in molding what Harvey calls militant particularisms (1995) around a common political language that helps the movement go beyond NIMBYism, Another critical detail that needs to be underlined is that DEKAP was founded by the individual initiative taken by its founding members while their political parties had no interest in environmental disputes for a long time. Therefore, despite DEKAP members' disposition to impose a particular political program on the rural struggles, it was their efforts that finally opened the eyes of the socialist groups to environmental matters and rural counter-mobilizations.

Despite their undisputable contribution to the evolution of individual land-use struggles into a region-wide environmental mobilization, DEKAP is profoundly criticized by younger activists and small-hydro opponents who are not subscribed to socialist politics. Its representation- based structure (making sure that all political parties and valleys are represented) is found old-school and cumbersome; the way it makes decisions is perceived to be hierarchical and its communication with the larger public and non-DEKAP members is argued to be sectarian and non-engaging. Moreover, DEKAP's strict description of what constitutes local as year-round residency causes serious discontent within the larger anti-hydro movement. While DEKAP's emphasis on local vigilance deters companies, their dismissal of rural-directed interest hinders the organization's ability to be active in urban settings. At the heart of this critique emerged a new Black Sea focused anti-hydro collective

platform called Black Sea Uprising with the hopes to make the movement accessible to a larger audience.

*Black Sea Uprising*: The most dynamic and innovative form of activism that came out of the anti-small hydro movement is the Black Sea Uprising Platform (*Karadeniz İsyandadır Platfromu*, KIP). While as critical in discourse as DEKAP is, KIP departs from DEKAP in being young, performative, highly mobile, non-hierarchical, colorful and more importantly eager to have a presence in the urban activism scene.

Founded in late 2009, KIP's oppositional language features elements that go beyond the painstakingly sectarian and crude discourse of the Turkish left with its emphasis on locality, human-nature relationship and culture. KIP demonstrations include unapologetical use of local languages[111], costumes, slogans, games, music and dance as well as the critique of the companies and the government. KIP pays attention not to depict the energy disputes in the Black Sea Region as conflict over resources. It rather conceptualizes the opposition around the notions of local identity, rural autonomy, importance of self-sustaining communities and human-nature harmony, some of which can be found in the following passage from a press release distributed in 2011:

> *People of Black Sea have been docile and known as malleable thus far. But until recently no one destroyed the tree that he knows as sacred,*

[111] There are at least four local languages spoken in the Eastern Black Sea Region along with Turkish. A number of mountain villages speaks a version of Ancient Greek remnant of the Kingdom of Pontus which was conquered by the Ottomans in the 16th century. Lazi and Hemsini (two Caucasian languages) are well known in a handful of districts in the east of Rize. There are villages and two towns fluent in Georgian along the Georgian border. Assimilation of the ethnicities these languages into Islam and Turkishness is not new and can be traced back to late the 18th century (Meeker, 2002; Ildiko-Hann and Hann, 2001). While the overlap between the advent of environmentalism and the growing interest in local languages and histories is certainly a noteworthy coincidence, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. For studies on the growing interest in the local cultures and languages of ECSR see Biryol, 2014; Taşkın, 2016.

> *appropriated its blessed water, exploited the valleys that people treated as home. This is why the people of Black Sea never rose up before despite conditions of abject poverty. They have always been known as a joyful people. Yet, when the nature of Black Sea is unlawfully interfered with, when its environment is loutishly exploited, then it is time for Black Sea to rise up. (KIP, 2011)*

Although KIP's activism agenda predominately revolves around small hydro projects, the platform takes pride in having a holistic take on the political ecology of the region as such:

> *Without a doubt small hydro projects, which are projects of commodification of water, are not the only reason of the uprising of the Black Sea people. There are also, stone pits, dams, thermal power stations and a nuclear plant that target the region from almost every corner. Black Sears read these projects correctly as the cutting off of the blood veins of the region. This situation is perceived as a question of existence: "If my water is gone, my valley is gone; if my valley is gone, then I am gone too, my language, culture and history are gone as well.*

What makes KIP interesting is that it is a travelling political collective in the sense that they are both urban and rural. This is a trait that reflects the demographics of KIP members who are mostly second (or third) generation rural-to-urban migrants. Born to *gurbetçi* families with Black Sea ancestry, KIP members grew up in Istanbul (or other metropoles) yet never lost contact with *sıla*. Many KIP activists narrate that their teenager years were divided across two distinct spaces: neighborhoods of Istanbul during school time, and the valleys of the Black Sea Region during the winter and summer holidays that are spent with grandparents. As activists, they follow the same mobile settlement arrangement by touring the environmental dispute geographies of the region during summer months and organizing demonstrations, concerts and sit-ins in winter months in Istanbul.

Unlike DEKAP, individual struggles need not become KIP members, but they work with the struggles on a campaign basis. In this arrangement KIP is responsible for organizing

the Black Sea diaspora in Istanbul and designing well-attended, spectacular protests that would increase the visibility of the rural struggle. In what KIP calls as 'acts of disclosure', KIP members, the diaspora and urban activists sit-in and picket in front of either the headquarters of companies or their affiliates and partners in order to reveal the urban connections of destructive rural infrastructure projects. The point of these acts of disclosures for Zeynep, a 30-year-old accountant and long-time KIP activist, is to "bring the everyday ordeal of the Black Sear to the city and make it a part of the everyday ordeal of the ordinary Istanbulite" (personal interview, November 2013). In one such occasion along with the Istanbul-based diaspora of Ogene village in Trabzon, KIP activists located a human-size pipe in front of Sekerbank, the funder and partner of a small hydro project in Çaykara. To enter the bank that day, Şekerbank costumers had to physically go through the pipe, the inner surface of which was covered with photos from the Ogene countryside and clashes between the villagers and the company security. The other partner of the project, Okan Group, was protested outside Okan University, which was founded a decade ago by a trust donated by the Group. The date of the protest was strategically chosen to correspond with the registration day on which students visit the university with their parents.

On the other hand, KIP activism along the urban-rural axis is not a one-way street. In years KIP helped many urban activists to visit the Black Sea countryside either through 15-day-long field trips called life travels (*yaşam yolculuğu*) or through extended weekend trips to attend emergency demonstrations when a particular struggle was in need of immediate public support. These urban/rural encounters, which are always open to misunderstandings due to mutual prejudices and cultural differences, in time led to the formation of

unexpected alliances and circulation of ideas, tactics, and discourses. I contend that the political relevance of Turkey's emergent grassroots environmentalism should be traced in these encounters as well as the ideas that they give rise to. In the remaining part I will briefly touch upon one of the examples in which the political meaning of urban-rural dynamism of the movement became most visible and impactful.

Although KIP's mission was to bring the rural discontent to the urban core, it was surely not the only source of such encounters. The connections between the emergent grassroots environmentalism in the countryside and urban-based politics were intensified through other means and they were not limited to the Black Sea region. Also, it would be misleading to suggest that these encounters were all problem-free. In many occasions, cultural differences and mutual prejudices caused tensions causing some collaborations to fail.[112] Nevertheless, despite disappointments and the movement's failure to grow into a nation-wide unified front I believe that the political relevance and success of Turkey's emergent grassroots environmentalism can be traced in the encounters as well as the ideas that they give rise to along the urban-rural continuum. In the remaining part I will briefly touch upon one of the many examples in which the political meaning of urban-rural dynamism of the movement became most visible and impactful.

[112] One such failed project is the Great Anatolian March (*Büyük Anadolu Yürüyüşü*), in which some twenty individual anti-hydro struggles simultaneously march to the capital from their region of origin in finally to hold a sit-in in front of the parliament in Ankara. While the march begins with high hopes in Spring 2011, it was broken into multiple splits upon disaggreements between urban and rural participants.

## 5.4 LIFE AS A POLITICAL METAPHOR: AFTERSHOCKS OF RURAL MOBILIZATIONS

> *Gezi Park will remain as a park. We will allow neither the Topçu Barracks [the proposed hotel+mall complex] project, nor anything else that would violate nature and our life spaces.* (emphasis mine)
>
> *First of the four demands of Taksim Solidarity, announced following the occupation of the Park and the Square. June 01, 2013*

### 5.4.1 The Gezi Moment

Toward the midnight of May 27th, 2013 an email circulated within the activist circles of Istanbul announcing the arrival of heavy equipment vehicles in Taksim Square to initiate the expected demolition of Gezi Park, one of the few remaining green spaces in central Istanbul. That night around 50 activists heeded the call, rushed to the park, successfully halted the cutting-down of a dozen trees, forced the vehicles to retreat and decided to hold on to the park by setting up a resistance encampment. Right before the break of dawn, a violent police crackdown dispersed the activists and resumed the demolition. As the protestors grew in number so did the consecutive early morning crackdowns until the park and the entire Taksim square were occupied by hundreds of thousands by the noon of June 1st following round-the-clock street clashes. In four days time, what started as a sit-in urban protest had turned into a full-fledged anti-governmental revolt in which myriad of grievances against the authoritarian, discriminatory, and neoliberal rule of then-Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan were voiced by different segments of the society. Barricades were constructed around the square to block off possible police attacks. June 1st marked the first day of what was later dubbed as the "Gezi commune." Until the big police raid of June 15, Taksim square, Gezi Park and its vicinities remained occupied by the protestors and the

very heart of Istanbul would be completely free from state apparatuses. Meanwhile, anti-government protests as well as excessive use of police force spread to other cities. According to a report by the Ministry of Interior over 2.5 million people actively participated in 5,000 demonstrations held across 79 provinces out of 81 in the first 20 days of the events[113]. Nine civilians were killed, at least 8,000 were heavily injured, more than 3,000 protestors were arrested and 12 lost an eye due to tear gas capsules.[114] The impact field of the Gezi revolt went beyond June 2013; what is referred to as *Gezi spirit* continues to mobilize opposition and dominate the cultural scenery as well as political debates.

Since summer 2013 much has been written about what may have triggered an uprising of the scale of Gezi. While commentators and scholars pointed to the authoritarian neoliberal practices of the AKP economics and located the Gezi revolt within the broader impact field of the Arab Spring, or Occupy Movement, or the anti-austerity protests that were then shaking the European capitals, the government chose to dismiss it as a foreign led coup attempt. Within this plethora of analysis few showed genuine interest in examining the connections between Gezi and the type of space-based environmental mobilizations that preceded (and proceeded) the revolt. In fact, Gezi reverberated across the country's grassroots environmentalism geography. Small towns and villages of the EBSR, particularly those with an active struggle held demonstrations in support of Gezi; many prominent activists rushed to Istanbul to take part in the events, and KIP had a dedicated corner in the park that overflowed with visitors throughout the days of the occupation. My

[113] http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/2-5-milyon-insan-79-ilde-sokaga/gundem/detay/1726600/default.htm
[114]http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/022/2013/en/0ba8c4cc-b059-4b88-9c52-8fbd652c6766/eur440222013en.pdf

intention here is not to offer an alternative explanation for Gezi. However, I believe that examining the links between Gezi and Turkey's grassroots environmental mobilization has the potential to illustrate the political work urban-rural encounters are capable of doing, although it would be reductive to explain a spontaneous event like Gezi through a simple cause and effect logic.

### 5.4.2 Circulation of A New Lexicon

In terms of the extent to which these highly diverse mobilizations and encounters were able to develop a common political lexicon, one humble yet powerful phrase stands out: *yaşam alanı* (life space). Prior to Gezi, this catchphrase had been circulating among urban activists against commodification, privatization, and commercialization of urban spaces, as well as urban renewal projects, and among rural activists against extraction and energy infrastructures projects. Closely associated yet different from the increasingly popular concept of the "commons," *yaşam alanı* connotes spaces of refuge that have maintained a high level of autonomy from the value circuits of capital accumulation. It also has connotations of a safe space to breathe, enjoy and express oneself. The notion of *yaşam alanı* enabled not only articulations between myriad grievances against various spatial interventions but also alternative political horizons. Deniz Özgür (2013), an Istanbul-based activist[115], elaborates on the connection and continuity between a wide-range of *yaşam alanı* struggles and the Gezi Revolt as such:

[115] Deniz was among a handful of activists who spent the night of May 27 in their tents in the middle of the park "on guard", a practice that has been widely used in anti-SHP protests in rural areas (Erensu, 2013b). In an interview conducted right after the Gezi Revolt, Deniz admits that that prior to Gezi, urban activists used to envy the dynamism of the rural movements in their collective sprit and innovative tactics (Karaman and Erensü, 2013).

> *This pillage [of AKP rule] directed against the common wealth of the entire society – namely, all the richness of the cities and the countryside, urban and rural services, agricultural lands, creeks, valleys, forests, water basins, neighborhoods, schools, hospitals, historical and cultural monuments – has spurred especially those living in rural areas to wage long-running struggles to defend their life spaces [yaşam alanı]…This entire process including the ensuing destruction of nature has been etched in collective memory. Those who most ambitiously embraced the Gezi Park revolts and first announced solidarity were precisely those groups who had long been leading struggles for their life spaces.*

It was the common goal of defending *yaşam alanı*(s) that successfully articulated various political agendas during the Gezi Revolt, and enabled their delocalization (Erensü, 2013b). The revolt was not however simply in defense of an existing life space, but entailed the claim over a shared space in the making (*cf*. Karaman, 2013b; Erensü, 2013c). During the days of occupation (June 1-15), Gezi Park housed hundreds of tents, and groups from a variety of political causes including environmentalists, feminists, Kemalists, nationalists, socialists, communists, anti-capitalist Islamists, anarchists, pro-Alevi, pro-LGBTQ, and pro-Kurdish rights, and football fan groups. Park residents established an infirmary, a communal kitchen, a nursery, a library, a communication office, and a market garden. Monetary exchange was banished from the grounds. In short the park residents were impatiently rushing to produce and proliferate what had been under attack over the last decade: their *yaşam alanı*(s).

While there is disagreement over which grassroots struggle was first to coin the term, the term *yaşam alanı* proved itself to be handy, disseminating across various movements and becoming even more popular with the Gezi events. For these activists, *yaşam alanı* is a useful definition of what they defend, as it is applicable for both urban and rural struggles; it embraces all activists from different walks of life (farmers, student, retiree, return and

cyclical migrants, housewives etc.); it rejects the dichotomy between nature and human; and it helps to differentiate grassroots activists from mainstream environmental organizations.

### 5.4.3 Delocalization of Gezi and *Yaşam Alanı*

The use of the term continued even after Gezi and played a part in the delocalization of the form of objection raised in the park. I was in the EBSR before the local elections of March 30th, 2014, the first nation-wide election after the Gezi Revolt. By simply checking the billboards, attending the political rallies and reading the political programs of the candidates it was clear that the local environmental issues dominated the election through and through. Opposition candidates were eager to harness the momentum of Gezi. They, on the one hand, sought to secure the support of grassroots organizations, on the other, held forum style assemblies true to the spontaneous, non-hierarchical spirit of Gezi. In Tonya, Trabzon, Environment Protection Platform actively campaigned for a candidate who had been selected through an unprecedented democratic primary process (candidates are often decided by the party leaders) led by the platform. In Fındıklı, Rize the candidate challenging the incumbent AKP mayor was running on a campaign shaped around the notion *yaşam alanı* to appeal to the DEKAP-led environmental struggle in the district. In Çamlıhemşin, Rize, and Arhavi, Artvin small hydro projects were crucial topics of the race (see Figure 5.3).

Environmentalism as the protection of *yaşam alanı* also strongly resonated with the contemporary language of Kurdish politics and People's Democratic Party (*Halkların*

*Demokrasi Partisi*, HDP)[116]. The interest of Kurdish political movement in ecological matters is in fact older than that of Turkish left. Abdullah Öcalan's—the imprisoned leader of the illegal Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)—Bookchin-inspired "theory for an ecological society" which calls for decentralization and rural communitarianism to revitalize the war-stricken Kurdish countryside has had huge influence on Kurdish intellectuals (Yarkın, 2011). One bold, but not so successful, application of this ecological opening was the ecologically friendly agriculture village projects in Yüksekova and Viranşehir, sponsored by municipalities run by Kurdish politicians (*Ibid*.). Some of these ideas are now being tested in northern Syria and rendering the Rojava revolution even more noteworthy.

[116] Founded in 2012, HDP is a relatively new political party that was born out of an alliance between the mainstream Kurdish political movement and multiple Turkish socialist fractions.

**Figure 5.3: Election Propaganda in the EBSR**


Above: Major candidate of the major opposition party, "Let's protect our *Yaşam Alanı*" – Fındıklı, Rize
Below: Major candidate, Independent, "Fırtına River will run free" – Çamlıhemşin, Rize

HDP's recent emphasis on the environment, however, seems to be in dialogue with the grassroots environmental awakening in the country, the Gezi moment and the idea of *yaşam alanı*. Since its foundation in 2012, HDP kept an eye on the grassroots mobilizations and, on several occasions, secretly sent envoys to show solidarity with the communities, most of which have been, to put it mildly, notoriously skeptical towards the Kurdish cause. Building upon these small but sustained connections, HDP initiated a nation-wide Ecology

Assembly in which grassroots movements could scale up local disputes and struggles. The assembly may still be taking baby steps, but such initiatives nonetheless helped HDP to reach out and establish some new relationships. In August 2014 Presidential Elections and June 2015 General Elections HDP ran two successful campaigns both of which were designed around the notion of "new life" sharing much in common with *yaşam alanı*. In the latter election, Professor Beyza Üstün, an activist scholar known very well by the mobilizations in the EBSR thanks to her public lectures on environmental hazards of energy infrastructures, ran on the HDP ballot and was elected to the parliament.

The roots of sympathy and synergy between local resistance movements and HDP politics in fact go deeper and are only visible to those who follow the grassroots mobilizations closely. The burgeoning form of ecological activism in Turkey is, at the same time, a place-making activity as the term *yaşam alanı* successfully captures. Whether in the countryside or the city, activists protesting an undesired energy project or a mega-infrastructural investment on the grounds of their negative impacts to neighboring communities inevitably find themselves in a position to define and defend the authenticity of a place. That place is then invaded by construction vehicles, residents' voices are silenced, and protestors are beaten up by security forces. Moreover, so many times have I come across local activists who, disillusioned by police/gendarmerie brutality, sympathize with Kurds and finally shed their sense of disbelief regarding the violence Kurds ın Turkey have been subject to all along.

This is precisely why the notion of the protection of *yaşam alanı* finds echoes in Kurdish politics, which has strived for the acknowledgement of a local culture, territory and economy for decades. They may currently correspond to a fraction of votes, yet the ecological and spatial struggles captured in the phrases *new life* and *life space* have immense political potential to generate unexpected alliances that go beyond election cycles into the long run.

## 5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter aimed at investigating the opposition raised against Turkey's aggressive energy economy and spread of energy infrastructure across the Turkish countryside. Upon examining the anti-small hydro mobilization, its geographic and demographic features I suggested that the recent wave of environmentalism in Turkey is neither a manifestation of post-material society nor does it fall under the analytical framework of the environmentalism of the poor. To better appreciate its dynamism and the forms of objection it manifests, I suggested that the grassroots activism in Turkey must be understood in its spatial features rather than in its motivations which are falsely assumed to be readily available, decipherable and static. By highlighting the processes and structures such as cyclical and seasonal migrations, dual settlements, multi-place hybrid lives and domestic diasporas I argued that the vitality of environmental mobilizations owes much to the rich web of movements across Turkey's undervalued urban-rural continuum.

From a political ecology standpoint one can still wonder who the winners, somehow losers and real losers of these environmental disputes. Moreover, following the building on the

literature of primitive accumulation/accumulation by dispossession one can rightfully question who is being dispossessed of what in this picture (Harvey, 2003; Glassman, 2006: Perrault, 2013). Then again, it is valid to ask how class analysis is impacted once the framework of the environmentalism of the poor vs. rich is sidelined. My purpose in stressing on the spatial dimensions of the grassroots mobilizations is not to deny that some crudest forms of land grabbing are in action in certain energy disputes. Some villagers, particularly in regions with weak or no oppositional mobilization, are forced out of agriculture and rural life over night. However, in many other places, dispossession is limited and/or agricultural production—which is already nothing but a yearly bonus for seasonal villagers—is not harmed in the short run. On top of all these, I point to a spatial form of dispossession that actually has series class dimension especially once we understand the urban-rural continuum having an unreplaceable social production value (*cf.* Roberts, 2008; Sneddon, 2007; Hall, 2012).

I also elaborated on the political implications and discussed the political impact field field of such mobilizations. By tracing the circulation of a particular lexicon, *yaşam alanı* I suggested that Turkey's environmental awakening contributed to development of a new type of oppositional politics and established links between environmental grassroots movement on the one hand and Gezi revolt, local election and Kurdish political movement on the other.

My intention was not to depict the grassroots environmental mobilizations in Turkey as a project that is complete and successful. To the contrary, despite victories in certain pockets,

the mobilizations are far from overturning infrastructure-based economics in and putting a permanent dent in Turkey's neoliberal authoritarian turn. I neither intend to reduce the entire oppositional politics to grassroots mobilizations. However, I suggest the organizational innovation of these mobilizations, their reach across the spatial, cultural and class lines, and the alternative imaginaries they stipulated points to alternative trajectories that could challenge both energo-rationality and neoliberal authoritarian hegemony in the long run.

# 6 CONCLUSION

Turkey is in constant state of turmoil at least for the last three years following the Gezi revolt that damaged the government's self confidence so spectacularly. The political instability in the country is particularly troubling for the last twelve months. As a fellow citizen of the country and a Turkey researcher, during the writing process of this dissertation I got up every morning with the anxiety to find out, at best a new political scandal or an imprisonment of an opponent of governing AKP party, or worse, a new suicide bombing attack hitting one of the urban centers or a government-led atrocity targeting Kurdish cities. More recently, a new addition to the list is friends and colleagues losing positions in the academia for things they say and write.

To many international observers these developments are shocking and surprising. How come a country that was shown as an example to the entire Middle East with its economic vitality, parliamentary democracy and moderate Islamic government go down hill into an authoritarian abyss? Although it was never really the driving research question for me, this dissertation, at one level, provides a new perspective on the rise and fall of the so-called Turkish model. Rather than reducing rise of authoritarianism in Turkey to the culture and ideology of the political Islam or personal ambitious character of its leader President Erdogan (like most observers do), I look at the realm of infrastructures—in both sense of the word—to tell a more nuanced and complex account. By both sense of the word, I refer to infrastructure as opposed to superstructure in Marxian sense as well as physically infrastructures that are designed to aid human life.

By tracing energy infrastructures along their spatial, environmental, legal and financial dimensions (particularly those of small hydropower plants) my dissertation provides an analysis of political power in 21st century Turkey through the lens of energy. To rephrase it differently, in this dissertation I examine Turkey's aggressive energy program to understand how energy is (re)valued and (re)constructed at this turbulent conjuncture by assembling new social, economical, political and ecological meanings and relations. While I do not believe that the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey can be explained by a single logic, I centralize energy boom to gain a novel perspective through which limits and possibilities of political power in contemporarily Turkey can be analyzed and evaluated.

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So what is this aggressive energy boom all about? Turkey witnessed an unprecedented energy boom following the liberalization of its market in early 2000s. Between 2008 and 2015 investments in the energy industry surpassed $50 billion.[117] Turkish energy sector became one of the world's fastest growing by reaching above 9 percent growth rate in 2010 and 2011(Deloitte, 2013: 8). An average of $6 billion is poured into new electricity production infrastructures annually. Within a decade country's total installed capacity in electricity more than doubled. Energy business attracted a mass migration from dying industries. Forbes magazine reported that 82 of 100 richest people of Turkey had active

[117] Daily Sabah, "Turkey energy import costs $50 billion on average", 2 October 2014 URL: http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2014/10/02/turkeys-energy-import-costs-50-billion-per-year-on-average (accessed on 5 June 2016).

operations in the energy sector in 2013, making the sector the country's most profitable alongside real estate.[118]

Examining bourgeoning energy infrastructures, I argue that energy has been a key to the establishment of an authoritarian neoliberal experience, what is being dubbed by its founders, *new Turkey*. I claim that this was due to energy's unique qualities in bridging center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital and commons while connecting nature and civilization, resource and consumption along electrical grids and pipelines. I maintain that it is this bridging function that is so potent for hegemonic formations. I also discuss, however, the bridge is unstable and fragile as it offers cracks for counter hegemonic contestations. I illustrate throughout the dissertation how energy infrastructures, in converting uncharted rural and environmental settings into energy landscapes, cause unexpected cracks and disruptions as well as powerful sociopolitical alliances.

***

A few caveats are in order to clarify what I intend not to do in this study. First, I do not aim to reduce Turkey and its experience with authoritarianism to a matter resource extraction. Especially in the context of the middle east the assumption is that energy abundance creates a democratic deficit—often referred to as oil curse. In fact, studying energy in a country that lacks energy, I hope, has the potential to enhance so-called resource course literature. What I am rather interested in the political possibilities opened up and or down by energy choices and their implementation not only for the government but for multiple actors. This

[118] En zenging 100 Türk'ten 82'si enerjici" [82 of riches 100 Turks are in energy] *Enerji Günlüğü*, 03 May 2014 URL. http://www.enerjigunlugu.net/icerik/7391/en-zengin-100-turkten-82si-enerjici.html#.V8bNm5MrKHo (accessed 10 July 2016).

is why the dissertation is not necessarily about AKP or its leader although they inevitably appear many times throughout the study. I am interested in the link between energy infrastructures and political power in a more diffused manner. While I argue that energy boom has strengthened the government's hold over the discourse of development, the periphery, judiciary, and certain portion of the capital, its win is neither absolute nor goes uncontested. But more importantly I do not suggest that energy begets power for whoever controls. The power of energy, I argue, stems from somewhere else. It stems from the seepage of energy discourses, priorities, concerns, and solutions into other fields of governance as components of a useful toolkit. I illustrate that truth claims produced in the energy field is borrowed by other fields of action as common sense solutions. The prowess of this emergent rationality, which I name as *energorationality*, stems from energy's unique qualities in bringing center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital and commons together, from its ability to suture a variety of unlikely actors, policies, and ideas to each other.

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Building upon Susan Leigh Star (1999) I call my method an energy ethnography in which I trace a particular form of infrastructure—namely small hydro power plants—as they interact with a variety of actors, institutions, political discourses, cultural norms and geographical settings. Spanning over five years between 2010 and 2015, my dissertation fieldwork is composed of three pillars extending across three geographies in Turkey in tracing energy traveling across scales. The first pillar includes project site ethnographies that I conducted in the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR), home to around 200 ongoing and future small hydropower projects. I visited the region multiple times over years for

stays that are 3 to 6 weeks long, I traveled across the valleys of Artvin, Rize, and Trabzon to observe how social and ecological frictions unfold as rural livelihoods and landscapes are turned into new energy geographies. Second pillar consists of the examination of the energy industry (both its private and public actors) to be able to illustrate the kind of coalitions and conflicts that a bourgeoning market produces. I have reviewed policy documents, attended sectoral workshops and conferences, and interviewed with 60 actors working in the energy industry as bureaucrats, engineers, businessmen, bankers and journalists; most of whom are located in Ankara and Istanbul. For the final pillar, I undertook participatory action research, both observing and participating in the anti-SHP movement. I have attended demonstrations, occupations, activist field trips, court hearings, expert opinion explorations and conducted in-depth interviews with lawyers working for the movement in order to better grasp the forms of objection, narratives, and representations that the anti-energy opposition has given rise to.

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The dissertation consisted of four main body chapters following an introduction that I discuss theoretical and methodological problems. Each chapter revolves around a field impacted by energomentality, namely macroeconomic, state-capital relations, judiciary and political opposition.

The first of the four provides a genealogy for the last 100 years of Turkish energy. I trace the fundamental raptures ın Turkey's energy regime and discuss how these ruptures overlap with the key turning points in the country's economic orientation. I examine this history under 4 periods. (1) Early liberal experimentation (1908-1929) in which the country's

energy start-up infrastructures were completely outsourced to the private sector, mainly the European capital. (2) National Planning Paradigm (1929-1982) in which state owned produced and plan the entire industry. (3) Early (or Proto) Neoliberalism (1983-2001) in which private energy production schemes were tested under state control and (4) finally since 2001 energy reform I have been going thru a deep neoliberalization which the industry was almost completely left to the private sector and state power was shared between the private actors and a newly formed independent regulatory body. By particularly focus on early and deep neo-liberal periods and the transition between the two I offer a neoliberalization of energy narrative that goes beyond the AKP reign. While the surface reason behind the energy reform of 2001 was an energy supply crisis, I argue that it was ın fact a fertile conjuncture in which multiple issues came together to be solved by the energy reform fix. Some of these problems were AKP specific, while others pointing to the crisis of early neoliberalism that AKP inherited. In the final section of the chapter, I discuss whether it is the right time to think about the arrival of a post-neoliberal period based on the more audible voice of the opposition in Turkey and return of an increased governmental control over the sector. I conclude by suggesting that post-neolibelism may not simply be the come-back of the welfare state as some optimists argue but rather just a more authoritarian-corporatist version of late neoliberalism.

Next chapter introduces and examines small hydropower plants as a form of infrastructure. I remind that in the absence of oil and natural gas resources, a boom in hydropower infrastructures fueled Turkey's energy frenzy. In terms of annual growth in hydropower portfolio Turkey competes with Brazil, China and Canada. I name this boom as Turkey's

hydropower renaissance, a second wave of expansion of country's hydropower structure. Because unlike 1970s and 1980s, the golden age of Turkish damming, the investments are (a) mostly private (b) predominately concentrated on small-size run-off-the river type projects (c) low in power yet high in number (d) stretches over a completely new geography that was not dammed before. I argue that despite its reputation as a renewable, low-impact local-friendly infrastructure, the popularization of small hydro in Turkey has been first and foremost key to its energy liberalization efforts. The smallness of the energy investments motivated a variety of entrepreneurs to jump into the energy sector and become energy investors overnight. I also assert that as space-making, landscape forming infrastructures, small hydro projects have been instrumental in the spread of neoliberalism across a vast territory while contributing a particular restructuring in state, society, and markets relations.

The third body chapter focuses on the mark that energorationality left on the judiciary, more specifically the administrative law and proceedings. While return to investment rates were 5 to 7 years, and companies used to make million dollars per MW in the early years of the boom, now the business leaders are quite unhappy. Many investments stagnate due to natural factors but mostly due to legal battles fought against local resistances and delay in project financing cause some companies to withdraw or worse bankrupt. Pressured by the capital, the government intervene to the legal process to help the smooth completion of energy investments. Through new legal tools energy production is now embellished with a coat of urgency as a fast track options are provided to circumvent legal procedures. I particularly draw attention to two new governmental technologies of urgency (1) the urgent

appropriation procedure and (2) urgent judicial proceedings. The urgency emphasis these procedure generate has a powerful potential for the government that goes beyond the goal of accelerating the pace of the energy investments. That is why the transformative impact of energy infrastructures on the judicial system has become a benchmark for governance by seeping into other fields, such as the urban renewal projects and the Kurdish Question. They are being used in other fields to ease urban gentrification and turning Kurdish cities into disciplined zones of control. Despite their powerful mandate, I reminded there are limits to manipulating the pace of the judiciary, and attempts to circumvent legal procedures often backfire.

In the last body chapter, I look at the opposition emerged against the energy infrastructure's aggressive land and water grabs in the countryside, particularly the Eastern Black Sea Region – where the investments are plenty and opposition is strongest. Upon examining the anti-small hydro mobilization, its geographic and demographic features I suggest that the recent wave of environmentalism in Turkey is neither a feature of a post-industrial/post-material society nor does it fall under the analytical framework of the environmentalism of the poor. To better appreciate its dynamism and the forms of objection it manifests, I claim that the grassroots activism in Turkey must be understood in its spatial features rather than the its motivations which are falsely assumed to be readily available, decipherable and static. By highlighting the processes and structures such as cyclical and seasonal migrations, dual settlements, multi-place hybrid lives and domestic diasporas I argued that the vitality of environmental mobilizations owes much to the rich web of movements across Turkey's undervalued urban-rural continuum. I also elaborate on the political implications

of such cross-class, cross-scale mobilizations. By tracing the circulation of a particular lexicon, *yaşam alanı* I suggest that Turkey's environmental awakening contributes to development of a new type of oppositional politics and established links between environmental grassroots movement on the one hand and Gezi revolt, local election and Kurdish political movement on the other.

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