Ong for Everybody
An Introduction to Walter J. Ong’s Groundbreaking Technology Thesis and an
Annotated Classified Bibliography of Selected Related Works

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A NOTE TO THE READER

Ong’s mature work from the early 1950s onward can aid us in understanding our Western cultural history and enable us to get our cultural bearings in the world today. Not that he has said everything that can possibly be said about our Western cultural history. But in his multivariate account of Western cultural history, he has delineated for us a number of important variables, or factors, in the infrastructure of Western culture that we should not ignore.

The present annotated classified bibliography of selected works that can be related in one way or another to Ong’s seminal thought represents an attempt on my part to elucidate Ong’s creative thought as clearly as I can. In the spirit of Mortimer J. Adler’s *Aristotle for Everybody* (IX.9), I have tried to write the introduction and the annotations in *Ong for Everybody* in an accessible way. In the spirit of Ong’s own widely-cited essay “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction” (V.10), I have not presupposed that readers are already familiar with his thought. In addition, I have at times repeated certain points in the annotations, because I have not assumed that the readers will read all the annotations straight through as they appear in the text and remember what I had said in a previous annotation. Of course certain readers may prefer to read straight through the annotated classified bibliography as though the categories in the bibliography were chapters in a printed book. No doubt readers who want to can read the annotations straight through. However, readers may prefer to read the lengthy annotations more slowly and meditatively, which could include jumping around a bit from one lengthy annotation to another. Many of them have interconnected themes.

For an overview of the structure of the present bibliography, the reader should examine the categories of the bibliography listed above in the table of contents. When the reader comes to a lengthy annotation in the bibliography – some of which are in effect short essays – the reader might want to read enough of a given annotation to determine whether or not to proceed to read the entire annotation. However, as the reader proceeds to turn the pages of the bibliography and look over the various lengthy annotations, he or she will soon note that certain annotations are connected thematically with other annotations. At first blush, a given lengthy annotation might seem like a lengthy digression. However, certain annotations are connected enough certain other annotations that cumulatively they complement and supplement one another.

Certain works are listed in the bibliography in more than one category, most often works by Ong. To help the reader follow the various threads of materials, or themes, that I have incorporated into the bibliography, I have added cross-references after the first entry in a given thread of materials. On a smaller scale, I have also added briefer cross-references after selected works. In a few instances, I have repeated the cross-references after each work included in a given set of cross-references. In addition, in the various lengthy annotations, I have occasionally repeated certain points.

Next, to spell out the obvious, I do not expect the reader to agree with all the views that I express in the various lengthy annotations. As a matter of fact, Ong himself would not agree with all of my views – just as I myself do not agree with all of his views.
For example, I do not agree with his christocentric religious views; like Eric Voegelin, I am a theistic humanist, not an atheistic humanist (also known as a secular humanist) – or an agnostic. Moreover, I claim that all people are eligible to become mystics, if they want to try to. Furthermore, I claim that the historical Jesus was a mystic and that the kingdom (or reign) of God that he proclaimed is best understood as mystic experience.

Next, I should say a word about myself. Over the years I took five English courses from Ong at Saint Louis University, the Jesuit University in St. Louis, Missouri, starting in my junior year with his upper-division English course Practical Criticism: Poetry in the fall 1964 semester. Later in my life, I had the honor of co-editing five volumes of his essays, contributing introductory essays to four of them. In addition to publishing articles in professional journals based on his thought, I have contributed essays to four collections of essays exploring his thought. I have also published a book-length study of eleven of his books and selected essays, *Walter Ong’s Contributions to Cultural Studies: the Phenomenology of the Word and I-Thou Communication* (2000). A friend who was familiar with Ong’s influence in my life once described him as my muse. The Homeric epics famously start with the invocation of the muses. Thus if we were to judge by the example of the Homeric epics, maybe it’s not such a bad thing in life to invoke the muses -- or in my case, Ong as my muse. In any event, it strikes me that Ong can also serve as the muse for other Americans, perhaps including Native Americans, African Americans, Jewish Americans, Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans, and possibly other Americans as well.

Now, if we Americans were to expand the scope of our awareness to include our neighbors to the north, we might also be able to adopt the Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984), who at times did teach and lecture in the United States, as another muse. In addition, if we Americans were to expand the scope of our awareness to include Anthony de Mello, S.J., the Jesuit spiritual director from India who regularly toured the United States, we could adopt him as another muse. In any event, I myself have also adopted these other two Jesuits as my muses to keep Ong company as my muse. The other muses in my life who are represented in the present bibliography include the Jungian theorist Robert Moore of Chicago Theological Seminary, the Irish born and raised biblical scholar John Dominic Crossan of DePaul University in Chicago, the prolific secular Jew Harold Bloom in English at Yale University, the prolific philosopher-at-large and public intellectual Mortimer J. Adler, the perceptive philosopher Eric Voegelin, and the insightful classicist Eric A. Havelock. As a result, I invoke these nine muses in my life with regularity in the annotations in the present bibliography.

As I say, the Homeric epics begin with the invocation of the muses, so I take those invocations to mean that it is a good idea to have muses to invoke, eh? Because I grew up as a Roman Catholic, I would liken the Catholic tradition regarding the communion of saints to the invocation of the muses in the Homeric epics. For Catholics, the saints are in effect muses. So this is another example of how it is a good idea to have muses to invoke in one’s life. But my way of speaking here about muses is admittedly not a fashionable way of speaking today. Nor do I expect to start a new fashion by speaking this way. Nevertheless, it strikes me that certain academics consider particular authors to be exemplars in their lives. For example, Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas appear to me to serve as muses for certain academics. In other words, the name of each exemplar can be invoked at times in
a way that bears a family resemblance to the invocation of the muses in the Homeric epics. For the economist Paul Krugman, the muse in his life is the economist John Maynard Keynes. I mention this example to spell out here that I myself am also basically a Keynesian in terms of economic theory and policy. For me, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was an admirable exemplar of the spirit of American pragmatism.

However, I am well aware that many conservative Americans today regard President Ronald Reagan as their muse, just as many Catholic Americans regard Pope John-Paul II as their muse. I mention these examples to suggest that many Americans today do indeed have muses in their lives. In a way, our American culture wars today usually involve the radically different muses invoked by the different parties in the culture wars.

The present annotated bibliography is intended and designed to be my contribution to our American culture wars today. No, I am not a leftist, as are many academics today. But I am also not an unmitigated reactionary either, as are many self-styled conservative Americans. Basically, I believe that the spirit of American pragmatism should be the guiding principle as we continue to work out our American experiment in democracy. In short, I myself do not embody the spirit of Faulkner’s character in his novel *Absalom, Absalom!* named Thomas Sutpen.

Somebody quipped that democracy is the worst form of government – except for all the rest. This quip sums up my basic attitude about our American democracy. In my estimate, at the present time, the Republicans are up to no good. On the one hand, they favor trickle-down economics. But I favor trickle-up economics. On the other hand, the neoconservative Republicans in the administration of President George W. Bush started two wars that should not have been started at all. To his everlasting credit, the paleo-conservative columnist Patrick J. Buchanan was vociferous in denouncing the war in Iraq. In short, it is my fond hope that I myself may also serve the role of muse for those readers who read my annotations in the present annotated bibliography. As I have already stated, I do not expect readers to agree with everything I say in the annotations. However, even if some of my annotations provoke certain readers to disagree with me, I will nevertheless have thereby served the role of muse by provoking them to think through their own positions regarding those particular matters. In short, I aim to be evocative – that is, to evoke thought in the readers.

Finally, I want to say that Ong liked to say that we need both distance and proximity (closeness) to understand something. As a result of our Western cultural conditioning, we bring proximity (closeness) to our efforts to understand our Western cultural conditioning. But Ong’s perceptive multi-variate account of the infrastructures of our Western cultural conditioning can provide us with the distance we need to understand ourselves and our Western cultural conditioning.
When we consider what might contribute to helping people to live morally upright lives, does it make any difference whether people think that the sun revolves around the earth, or that the earth revolves around the sun? No, it probably does not. But does it make any difference if people believe in an atheistic version of evolutionary theory, or believe that God somehow created the cosmos? Once again, it probably does not. Ah, but what about social policy? Yes, there are social-policy implications in the sense of the social policies about what we teach in schools regarding these two respective issues. However, unless we subscribe to so-called social Darwinism, we are not likely to contend that either issue has serious implications for social justice.

But Walter J. Ong, S.J. (1912-2003) was an American cultural historian and philosopher. He formulated a philosophy of cultural history that does have serious implications for social justice, most notably for promoting literacy education and functional literacy not only in the United States but also around the world, where an estimated one billion people do not know how to read and write any language. Those one billion people will not be using computers and the Internet. In the United States, people who are not functionally literate with respect to their reading ability are usually socially disadvantaged, unless they happen to be extraordinary athletes or entertainers. For all practical purposes, people in the United States who are not functionally literate live in a residual form of oral culture. Thus functional literacy with respect to reading ability should be a social-policy goal in the United States.
Who Was Ong?

With a Ph.D. in English from Harvard University and three other graduate degrees to his credit, Ong first rose to prominence in the 1950s when white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) culture still dominated the United States. Despite the fact that he was not a Protestant, but a Roman Catholic priest, he could claim that he came from a somewhat Protestant background because his father Walter Jackson Ong, Sr., was a Protestant when Walter Jr. was growing up, and his father’s family were Protestants. But his mother and her family were Roman Catholics, so young Walter and his younger brother were raised as Roman Catholics.

The middle name “Jackson” in the name of both Walter Sr. and Walter Jr. commemorates that President Andrew Jackson was a family relative. The family name “Ong” is English; for centuries it was spelled “Onge”; it is probably related to the English name “Yonge.”

But by the time that Ong received his Ph.D. in English from Harvard University in 1955, the strident anti-Catholic spirit of American WASP culture was beginning to give way to a more expansive and inclusive spirit in the United States, despite Paul Blanshard’s stirring anti-Catholic books in the 1950s (XII.11; XII.12). Then in the 1960 presidential election, the Harvard-educated white Irish-American Catholic John F. Kennedy was elected president of the United States, narrowly defeating Vice President Richard M. Nixon. But of course President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963 -- for reasons that are debated to this day -- see Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56); Douglass (III.42); Janney (III.91). For its part, the Roman Catholic Church tempered its strident anti-Protestant spirit a bit at the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), which the strident anti-Catholic critic Paul Blanshard wrote a book about (XII.13). Thus on the one hand, we in the United States underwent the tempering of the strident anti-Catholic spirit of American WASP culture), about the time when the American Catholic subculture (or ghetto) in the United States, which Ong in the 1950s characterized as extremely conservative culturally (compared to French Catholics at the time, for example), was undergoing the tempering of the strident anti-Protestant spirit that had characterized it for centuries. These two temperings could be likened to the shifting of tectonic plates that produce earthquakes and tsunamis. We in the United States are still undergoing the aftereffects of these two cultural temperings, as more Roman Catholics have risen out of the American Catholic subculture that Ong in the 1950s characterized as extremely conservative culturally to play more prominent roles in the larger American culture of our time – as I write, six of the nine Supreme Court justices are Roman Catholics, a proportion that would never have happened under the pre-1960 WASP culture.
What Did Ong Discover?

As significant as these two cultural temperings have been in the United States to this time, they are best understood as byproducts of the far larger cultural shift in Western culture that Ong came to identify as the rise of communication media that accentuate sound (e.g., television, radio, telephone, sound amplifications systems, sound recordings, including movies with soundtracks). After World War II, the communication media that accentuate sound reached a steadily growing critical mass in the United States. Considering the broad sweep of human existence, Ong sees Western cultural history as unfolding in four historically successive waves:

(1) primary oral culture (i.e., pre-literate culture), which has never come to an end;
(2) manuscript or chirographic culture involving writing with the phonetic alphabetic writing;
(3) print culture with the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s; and
(4) secondary oral culture with the rise of communication media that accentuate sound.

More recently, photocopiers and printers attached to computers have vastly expanded the influence of Gutenberg print culture. But we should remember that an estimated one billion people in the world today do not know how to read or write any language, which means that they live in a residual form of oral culture and will not be using computers or the Internet.

Regarding these four successive waves of Western cultural development, Ong worked up what he styled a relationist thesis. According to Ong’s relationist way of thinking about cultural changes, probably all major cultural changes in Gutenberg print culture, for example, were connected to changes associated with the Gutenberg printing press, which served to advance and carry forward cultural developments that had originated in ancient and medieval Western culture such as visuality, the quantification of thought in medieval logic, and the inward turn of consciousness. According to Ong’s relationist way of thinking, modern capitalism and the culture of capitalism, modern science and the culture of modern science, and modern democracy in America and the culture of modern democracy in America, the Industrial Revolution and the culture of the Industrial Revolution, and the Romantic Movement and the culture of the Romantic Movement emerged historically in Gutenberg print culture. Thus in the final analysis, Ong’s impressive body of work from the 1950s onward can be understood as being about Western culture in general and American culture in particular.

But it remains to be seen still how many Americans are ready to undergo the cultural navel-gazing and deconstruction that Ong’s thought invites us to undertake. We Americans today are the products of Western cultural history as Ong has detailed Western cultural history. In short, Ong’s work from the 1950s onward is about us Americans and our cultural conditioning.
Ong’s Relationist Way of Thinking

But apart from the works listed in the present bibliography that can be related in one way or another to Ong’s thought, is his thought important enough for ordinary Americans to be interested in it?

Because Ong’s relationist way of thinking about major cultural developments is not yet a familiar way of thinking for most Americans, I should explain that Ong’s relationist way of thinking does not involve straightforward cause-and-effect claims. Relationist claims are usually claims about significant factors and the interaction of those factors with one another. So let me illustrate how this kind of relationist thought works.

(1) No print culture, no modern capitalism as we know it in Western culture.

(2) No print culture, no modern science as we know it in Western culture.

(3) No print culture, no modern democracy as we know it in the United States or elsewhere in Western culture.

(4) No print culture, no Industrial Revolution as we know it in Western culture.

(5) No print culture, no Romantic Movement as we know it in Western culture.

But so what?

So what happens in non-Western countries in the world today when the United States engages in democracy promotion?

Ong’s relationist way of thinking suggests that modern democracy is actually a juggernaut of cultural factors that emerged historically in Western culture. A clash of cultures is inevitable, but violence may not be inevitable.

Next, what happens when the globalization of the economy today leads to some form of modern capitalism making inroads in non-Western countries?

Once again, Ong’s relationist way of thinking suggests that modern capitalism is actually a juggernaut of cultural factors that emerged historically in Western culture. A clash of cultures is inevitable, but violence may not be inevitable.

Ong used to like to say that the English title of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents should have been Civilization and Its Discomforts. Instead of civilization, I will refer to refer to culture.

As democracy promotion makes inroads in non-Western countries today where democracy has not already been established, we should expect that there will be certain cultural and personal discomforts associated with the inception of democracy.

Similarly, as capitalism, or something like capitalism, makes inroads in non-Western countries today where it has not previously been native to the culture, there will
be certain cultural and personal discomforts associated with the development of capitalist economic arrangements.
Major Themes in Ong’s Thought

Without ever claiming to have rendered a complete and exhaustive account of the factors in Western culture that contributed historically to the emergence of print culture and of modernity within print culture, Ong identified and discussed certain key factors that contributed to the emergence of print culture and thus to modernity:

(A) orality
(B) literacy
(C) linear thought, as distinct from cyclic thought
(D) agonistic structures
(E) visuality
(F) the inward turn of consciousness
(G) the quantification of thought in medieval logic
(H) commonplaces and composing practices
(I) the art of memory and Ramist method.

As the mention of medieval logic suggests, all of these different factors had earlier historical developments before the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s.

Arguably one of the most significant transformations that occurred in emerging modernity involved what Ong styles agonistic structures. In Manliness (III.102), Harvey C. Mansfield in effect writes about agonistic structures. The title of his book involves the meaning of the Greek term andreia, which means both courage and manliness. In any event, Mansfield makes a telling observation about modernity: “The entire enterprise of modernity . . . could be understood as a project to keep manliness unemployed” (230). Yes, it could. In the history of modern literature, the rise of the mock epic should be understood as showing the waning of the old oral manliness and the code of the hero, as should the later rise of the antihero in literature. In general, the old oral orientation toward the heroic gives way to the inward turn of consciousness toward inner-directedness. Nevertheless, modernity cannot be understood as keeping agonistic structures entirely unemployed, for modern capitalism and modern science employ agonistic structures, as do old warrior religions such as Christianity and Islam. Moreover, in American popular culture today, we find an extraordinary fascination with the agonistic spirit in televised sports and in comics and action movies.
The Aural-to-Visual Shift in Cognitive Processing

For Ong, the corpuscular sense of life is expressed not only in world-as-view sense of life in ancient Greek and Roman and medieval and modern philosophy and more broadly in modern print culture but also in the oral sense of life as event. But as Plato and Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and Bernard Lonergan and Ong understand the human mind, the human mind transcends the corpuscular sense of life. The prolific conservative Roman Catholic writer Michael Novak does not seem to have understood the larger import of Ong’s thought about the corpuscular sense of life in depth, but Novak has studied Lonergan’s thought well enough to grasp how the human mind is different from the corpuscular sense of life that Ong writes about. In the introduction to the recent reprinting of his 1965 book *Belief and Unbelief: A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge* (X.37), Novak sets forth the following critique of the visualist tendencies in Richard Rorty’s thought:

Rorty thinks that in showing that the mind is not “the mirror of nature” he has disproved the correspondence theory of truth. What he has really shown is that the activities of the human mind cannot be fully expressed by metaphors based upon the operations of the eye [see Ong on visualist tendencies]. We do not know simply through “looking at” reality as though our minds were simply mirrors of reality. One needs to be very careful not to confuse the activities of the mind with the operations of any (or all) bodily senses [see Ong’s critique of the corpuscular sense of life]. In describing how our minds work, one needs to beware of being bewitched by the metaphors that spring from the operations of our senses. Our minds are not like our eyes; or, rather, their activities are far richer, more complex, and more subtle than those of our eyes. It is true that we often say, on getting the point, “Oh, I see!” But putting things together and getting the point normally involve a lot more than “seeing,” and all that we need to do to get to that point can scarcely be met simply by following the imperative, “Look!” [Or the imperative, “Hear!”] Even when the point, once grasped, may seem to have been (as it were) right in front of us all along, the reasons why it did not dawn upon us immediately may be many, including the fact that our imaginations were ill-arranged, so that we were expecting and “looking for” the wrong thing. To get to the point at which the evidence finally hits us, we may have to undergo quite a lot of dialectical argument and self-correction. (xv)

For a straightforward and useful account of Lonergan’s thought, the interested reader should see Hugo A. Meynell’s *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan*, 2nd ed. (U of Toronto P, 1991).

A word is in order here about the larger import of Ong’s thought about the corpuscular sense of life – or more accurately, about the two distinct corpuscular senses of life that Ong discusses: the aural corpuscular sense of life and the visual corpuscular sense of life. To be sure, he also allows that there is residual orality, involving a strongly
aural corpuscular sense of life that is also under the influence of the visual corpuscular
sense of life, but hovering, as it were, between the two. The larger import of Ong’s
thought about these two basic corpuscular senses of life is that they can enable us to get
our cultural bearings today regarding Western culture and the rest of the world cultures –
see Farrell (XII.38). In addition, Ong’s thought about these two basic corpuscular senses
of life can enable us to reflect on our Western cultural conditioning and education. Such
deep personal reflection about our Western cultural conditioning and education is related
in spirit at least to what C. G. Jung recommends when he advises us to become aware of
our collective unconscious. In this respect, the present document can be described as
providing an owner’s manual for people who grew up in and were educated in Western
culture.

Now, in *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (III.138), Ong has in effect
also set forth a critique of “confusing the activities of the mind with any (or all) the
bodily senses.” Ong refers to this kind of confusion in various terms: the corpuscular
view of reality, the corpuscular epistemology, and the corpuscular psychology – in short,
the corpuscular sense of life (65-66, 72, 146, 171, 203, 210). But in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition of philosophic thought that Lonergan and Ong and Novak draw on,
the human mind is not corpuscular. This is the import of the body/soul distinction with
which Ong and others in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of philosophic thought
work.

Like everybody else in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of philosophy, Ong
works with what is known in philosophy as the body/soul distinction, where the
distinctively human soul is understood to be the source of the human mind and
rationality. For an excellent and accessible discussion of how and why the intellect is not
material, the interested reader should see Mortimer J. Adler’s *Intellect: Mind Over Matter*
(IX.3; also see Adler [IX.2] and Fetzer [III.50]). In short, Ong works within the
nonmaterialist philosophic tradition of thought in Western culture.

In the final analysis, there really are only two basic philosophic positions: (1) the
materialist philosophic position (aka naturalism) and (2) the nonmaterialist philosophic
position. People who claim to be agnostics do not affirm the nonmaterialist philosophic
position, so they can be aligned with the materialist philosophic position.

In any event, when Ong refers to the corpuscular sense of life, he is accentuating
the sensory-based quality involved. The centuries-old philosophic tag-line is relevant
here: “Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.” But the intellect as such
is not material (i.e., not corpuscular in Ong’s terminology). So what would a
noncorpuscular orientation to life be like? It would presumably involve radical
reflectiveness about one’s conceptual constructs and predications.

Late in his life, Ong summed up his view of verbal discourse and communication
in “Hermeneutic Forever: Voice, Text, Digitization, and the ‘I’” in *Oral Tradition*
(I.134), which can be accessed at the journal’s website.

Next, I want to return to certain points Novak makes toward the end of the above
quote about how “our imaginations were ill-arranged.” He points out that “we may have
to undergo quite a lot of dialectical argument and self-correction.” Yes, to be sure,
ocasionally dialectical argument my result in self-correction. However, when our
imaginations are ill-arranged, as he puts it, this is usually the result of the combined
forces of our cultural conditioning, on the one hand, and, on the other, our personal
psychological baggage, figuratively speaking. But we should add to this already potent mix of factors that contribute to our imaginations being ill-arranged Ong’s perceptive insight about how we in Western culture today are experiencing, below the level of our conscious awareness, the shift in the tectonic plates of our Western cultural conditioning as we Westerners shift subtly from the hypervisualist orientation of print culture toward the new orientation that is emerging in us as a result of our contemporary conditioning in communication media that accentuate sound. In short, according to Ong, our Western cultural conditioning today is in transition from the old sensory world of print and hypervisualism to the new sensory world engendered by the communication media that accentuate sound. But of course in some ways this breakthrough to a new sensory world may seem like a breakdown of the old world and the old order. The great gift of Ong’s work is that he supplies us with the ways in which we can get our cultural bearings as we experience this breakdown that is a breakthrough.

Now, it seems to be part of the human condition that we acquire a certain amount of personal psychological baggage, figuratively speaking. As a result, we need to work to recognize our personal psychological baggage and become aware of how our baggage influences our thinking and our actions. In the spirit of what Ong refers to as the inward turn of consciousness, I have highlighted works that discuss our personal baggage, most notably Anthony de Mello’s posthumously published book of meditations on certain challenging gospel passages, which he claims can be elucidated by mystic awareness (I.42). In addition, he claims to have figured out the underlying pattern involved in our psychological baggage and has described how we can overcome our personal baggage. Briefly, he recommends awareness as the way to overcome our personal psychological baggage. But he cautions that this approach proceeds in its own way and at its pace. Thus his recommendation of awareness sounds like a comprehensive programmatic way to deal with our personal baggage, but there is the catch-22 that allows that after all in the end it is not predictably programmatic. His following eight excerpts from The Way to Love (I.42) about change and growth are worth considering carefully.

First excerpt: “There are two sources for change within you. One is the cunningness of your ego that pushes you into making efforts to become something other than you are meant to be so that it can give itself a boost, so that it can glorify itself. The other is the wisdom of Nature. Thanks to this wisdom you become aware, you understand it. That is all you do, leaving the change – [the] type, the manner, the speed, the time of change – to Reality and to Nature” (53-54).

Second excerpt: “Think of some change that you wish to bring about in your life or in your personality. Are you attempting to force this change on your nature through effort and through the desire to become something that your ego has planned? . . . Or are you content to study, observe, understand, be aware of your present state and problems, without pushing, without forcing things that your ego desires, leaving to Reality to effect changes according to Nature’s plans, not yours?” (56-57).

Third excerpt: “You are always dissatisfied with yourself, always wanting to change yourself. So you are full of violence and self-intolerance which only grows with every effort that you make to change yourself. So any change you achieve is always accompanied by inner conflict. And you suffer when you see others achieve what you have not and become what you are not.
“Now suppose you desisted from all efforts to change yourself, and from all self-dissatisfaction, would you then be doomed to go to sleep having passively accepted everything in you and around you? There is another way besides laborious self-pushing on the one hand and stagnant acceptance on the other. It is the way of self-understanding. This is far from easy because to understand what you are requires complete freedom from all desire to change what you are into something else.

“If what you attempt is not to change yourself but to observe yourself, to study every one of your reactions to people and things, without judgment or condemnation or desire to reform yourself, your observation will be nonselective, comprehensive, never fixed on rigid conclusions, always open and fresh from moment to moment. Then you will notice a marvelous thing happening within you: You will be flooded with the light of awareness, you will become transparent and transformed.

“[T]he transforming light of awareness brushes aside your scheming, self-seeking ego to give Nature full rein to bring about the kind of change that she produces in the rose: artless, graceful, unself-conscious, wholesome, untainted by inner conflict.

“Since all change is violent she will be violent. But the marvelous quality of Nature-violence, unlike ego-violence, is that it does not spring from intolerance and self-hatred.

“It is the kind of violence that arises within mystics who storm against ideas and structures that have become entrenched in their societies and cultures when awareness awakens them to evils their contemporaries are blind to. . . . “[T]he restlessness and dissatisfaction, the jealousy and anxiety and competitiveness that characterize the world of human beings who seek control and coerce rather than [allow themselves] to flower into awareness, leaving all change to the mighty force of God in Nature” (59-63).

Fourth excerpt: “And a strange change will come about in you, barely perceptible at first but radically transforming” (71-72).

Fifth excerpt: “Adults who have preserved their innocence also surrender like the child to the impulse of Nature or Destiny without a thought to become somebody or to impress others; but, unlike the child, they rely, not on instinct, but on ceaseless awareness of everything in them and around them; that awareness shields them from evil and brings about the growth that was intended for them by Nature, not designed by their ambitious egos” (74-75).

Sixth excerpt: “No defect, no neurosis is judged or condemned. . . . Those defects are probed, studied, analyzed, for a better understanding that leads to love and forgiveness, and you will discover to your joy that you are being transformed by this strangely loving attitude that arises within you toward this thing you call yourself” (109).

Seventh excerpt: “Every painful event contains in itself a seed of growth and liberation. In light of this truth return to your life now and take a look at one or another of the events that you are not grateful for, and see if you can discover the potential for growth that they contain which you were unaware of and therefore failed to benefit from.

“If you succeed in discovering this [negative feeling that an event in the past aroused in you], you will drop some illusion you have clung to till now, or you will change a distorted perception or correct a false belief or learn to distance yourself from your suffering, as you realize that it was caused by your programming and not by reality; and you will suddenly find that you are full of gratitude for those negative feelings and to that person or event that caused them.”
“Can you see every one of them as a necessary part of your development, holding out the promise of growth and grace for you and others, that would never have been there except for this thing that you so disliked?” (118-20).

Eighth excerpt: “It is this nonjudgmental awareness alone that heals and changes and makes one grow. But in its own way and at its own time” (146).

When we are eventually freed up from our accumulated person psychological baggage, we emerge as fully functional emotionally – in the terminology that Carl Rogers helped popularize, fully functioning persons. According to Anthony de Mello, our personal psychological baggage limits our capability for clear thinking (137-42). However, persons who have been freed from the personal psychological baggage will not necessarily always agree with one another about moral issues, for example. At that juncture, what Novak describes as dialectical argument will have to come into play.

Next, in my annotations to certain works in the bibliography below, some of which are not short, I have at times singled out statements by Harold Bloom of Yale University for comment. Harold Bloom is a national treasure to be cherished. I have always benefited from reading his books, even when I have found particular points to disagree with. In my annotations below, my disagreements with particular points that Bloom makes are highlighted. Despite my explicit disagreements, I am enormously thankful to Professor Bloom for having the courage of his convictions to say the very things with which I happen to disagree. If he had not said these things, then I could not disagree with him about them. For this reason, I am abundantly grateful to him for stimulating me to think about the very points with which I disagree. He has served as a useful foil against which I have developed my own thinking about certain matters.

For years now, Bloom has been intrigued with the anonymous biblical author known as the Yahwist, the author of the oldest parts of the Hebrew Bible, the parts known for their use of the tetragrammaton YHWH to refer to the monotheistic deity, which is Englished as Yahweh. Famously or infamously depending on your point of view, Bloom claims that the Yahwist was probably a woman. For among other things, the Yahwist undercuts the pretensions of men. Of course it is impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Yahwist was a woman, just as it is impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Yahwist was not a woman.

In any event, Bloom is intrigued with the voice of the Yahwist. This anonymous author captivates him, just as Shakespeare’s character Hamlet also captivates him. Now, Ong never tired of urging us to attend to voice, as Bloom regularly does. In this respect, Bloom is one example of the kind of literary critic that Ong wanted literary critics to be. As a matter of fact, Ong wanted to initiate undergraduate English majors at Saint Louis University into the practice of attending to matters of voice in poetry (in his course Practical Criticism: Poetry) and prose (in Practical Criticism: Prose). In Practical Criticism: Prose, Ong assigned us to read Marshall McLuhan’s *The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man* (New York: Vanguard P, 1951), which consists of short essays by a literary critic commenting on different voices in popular culture and experimenting in those very essays with different voices in responses to the voices being discussed. Because Ong would like to see American adults learn how to respond critically to the artifacts of popular culture, we might say that he wanted to see American adults be initiated into the art of the literary critic and learn how to respond to the appeals that different voices make on our attention.
Ong presents his basic argument for paying attention to voice in “Voice as Summons for Belief: Literature, Faith, and the Divided Self” (1.142). We should note that faith in this title does not necessarily refer to religious faith, even though religious faith may work in ways analogous to the ways in which faith works in literature. Faith works in literature by evoking our sense that the author of the work in question is making a genuine effort to speak from the depths of his or her consciousness in constructing the work of literature, as distinct from speaking from more superficial levels of consciousness, as the artifacts of popular culture examined by McLuhan and all forms of kitsch art do.

Bloom is intrigued with the voice of the Yahwist. The Yahwist constructed the character known in English as Yahweh, just as Shakespeare constructed the character known as Hamlet. The character Yahweh has a voice, just as the character Hamlet has a voice. At one time, Bloom put his trust in Yahweh. But Bloom reports that he no longer puts his trust in Yahweh or in the covenant. Fair enough. He is being honest and candid in telling us where he now stands. However, as we listen to Bloom’s voice as a literary and cultural critic, we should notice how his personal cynicism is expressed in certain points in his cultural criticism. In short, Bloom is far more reliable as a literary critic than as a cultural critic. As I explain in my annotations below, I find Ong preferable to Bloom as a cultural critic. Bloom is unsurpassed as a literary critic. But Ong is unsurpassed as a cultural critic.

Unlike Bloom, I did not grow up as a Jew. I grew up as a Roman Catholic. As a result, I did not receive the Jewish instruction to place my trust in the covenant. Nevertheless, in teaching an introductory-level survey course on the Bible annually at the University of Minnesota Duluth before I retired, I devoted most of the course to selections from the Hebrew Bible. As a result of teaching selections from the ancient Hebrew prophets, I came to the conclusion that the covenant is one of the greatest ideas in the Western tradition of thought. Despite the supercessionism of orthodox Christianity (i.e., the New Testament supersedes the Old Testament), self-described Christians are Jews spiritually. Tragically, early polemics between the yeasty followers of Jesus and their unpersuaded fellow Jews produced striking invectives against their unpersuaded fellow Jews, the consequences of which have reverberated tragically down the centuries. As a result of Christian persecution of Jews over the centuries down to and including the Holocaust, we should conclude that those Christian persecutors of Jews demonstrated by their persecution of Jews that they were not part of the covenant (i.e., not part of God’s people), but were acting contrary to the inner meaning of the covenant which calls for God’s people to recognize their mutual responsibilities toward other people. In other words, Christians are Jews spiritually. Self-described Christians want to claim that they are among God’s people. But God’s people are part of the covenant, so let self-described Christians show that they understand the inner meaning of the covenant through the ways in which they act.

Because I myself am no longer a practicing Catholic, I can join with Bloom in hoping to see self-described Christians abandon the various claims of orthodox Christianity. However, I do not expect to see Christians do this. Moreover, I do not join Bloom in advocating the emergence of secular culture to supercede the highly variegated Christian culture that dominates the United States today. Instead, my hope is that secularists such as Bloom and religious people in the monotheistic religious traditions
will live in morally upright and responsible ways. Granted, there is room for debate about how to live in morally upright and responsible ways.

In the following classified bibliography, I use twelve categories of thought to organize selected works that in one way or another contributed historically to the emergence of modernity in Western culture. As I hope the present bibliography and my annotations of certain works show, Ong’s thought is multivariate and ecological in spirit.
AN ANNOTATED CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY KEYED TO ONG’S *ORALITY AND LITERACY* (2002 EDITION)
I. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT ORALITY

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 1-76.

(I.1) Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World. New York: Random House, 1996. Accessible. Also see Fixico (II.8); Lee (I.100; I.101; II.11); Ong (I.139; I.140; I.143); D. M. Smith (I.168).

(I.2) Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart: A Norton Critical Edition: Authoritative Text, Contexts and Criticism. Ed. Francis Abiola Irele. New York and London: Norton, 2009. Also listed as Achebe (III.1). Also see Achebe (XII.1); Conrad (XII.22); Obiechina (I.127); Ong (I.131; I.137; XII.137); Pachocinski (VII.24a). Things Fall Apart is Chinua Achebe’s classic novel about an oral culture in a remote part of Nigeria and the inroads of the British empire into that part of the world.


(I.7) Anderson, R. Dean, Jr. Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul. Rev. ed. Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 1999. Topic: History of Rhetoric. Also see R. D. Anderson (I.8); Aristotle (I.10); Augustine (I.11b); Aune (I.12); Bercovich (III.9); Booth (XII.16a); Cameron (I.27a); Cicero (I.30a); Connors (I.32; I.33; III.30; III.31); Enos (I.57; V.3); Ericksson, Olbricht, and Ubelacker (I.58); Farrell (III.46; III.47); Garver (I.72; I.72a); Gibson (XII.50a); Grimaldi (I.76); Habermas (XII.61; XII.62); Hart (I.79); Kennedy (I.94; I.94a); Kinneavy (I.95); Koziak (III.110); B. L. Mack (I.104); B. L. Mack and Robbins (I.105); May (I.110; I.111); Mitchell (I.114); Ong (III.138; III.140); Porter (I.150); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Remer (III.152); Schiappa (I.161; I.162); Sloane (I.165; III.158;
III.159); Sullivan (III.162); Walker (I.190); Welch (I.194); Wilder (I.196); Winter (I.199).


(I.9) Anonymous. The First Book of Kings. Trans. Jay A. Wilcoxen. The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha. Ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katherine Doob Sakenfield, and James R. Mueller. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 340-73. The First Book of Kings is part of the lengthier work that critical biblical scholars refer to as the Deuteronomistic History. As the name suggests, the extended history known as the Deuteronomistic History begins with part of the Book of Deuteronomy and extends over six other books of the Hebrew Bible (aka the Old Testament). The Deuteronomistic History has been skillfully composed from several written sources, some of which are explicitly named. Had the books of the Hebrew bible not been written down, we obviously would not have them. But they are written transcripts for oral thought and Expression. In short, they do not give evidence of the distinctively literate forms of thought and Expression that emerged in ancient Greece and are known as philosophic thought. In addition to providing us with transcripts of oral thought and Expression as these came to be written down and preserved and transmitted, the portrait of Solomon’s wisdom in the First Book of Kings (4:29-34) also provides us with a sense of the educated man in an oral culture. Among other things, we are told that Solomon “propounded three thousand proverbs, and his songs numbered a thousand and five” (4:32). Later on, we are also told that Solomon “had seven hundred wives, all princesses, and three hundred concubines” (11:3). So we might want to take the numbers with a grain of salt. But proverbs are ways in which insights are stored and transmitted in an oral culture. Concerning the Christian Bible, which includes the Hebrew Bible as the so-called Old Testament, see R. D. Anderson (I.7); Anonymous, Gospel of John (III.2); Anonymous, Gospel of Mark (III.3); Aune (I.12); Bloom (I.19); Boman (IX.12); Borg (I.20); Borg and Crossan (I.21); Brueggemann (I.23); Bullinger (VII.4); Bultmann (IX.14); Byrskog (I.27); D. M. Carr (I.28); Cross (I.34 and I.35); Crossan (I.36, I.37, I.38, I.39, I.40, III.35); Crossan and Reed (IX.18); Crowe (I.41); Draper (I.48); Dundes (I.51); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55; I.56); Eriksson, Olbricht, and Ubelacker (I.58); Fowler (I.66); Fredriksen (III.71); R. E. Friedman (I.68 and II.9); Graham (I.75); Harris (I.78); Hart (I.79); Harvey (I.80); Horsley and Draper (I.85); Horsley, Draper, and Foley (I.86); Isser (III.89); Jaffee (I.89); Jeffrey (VII.11); Kelber (III.106); Kelber and Byrskog (I.93); Kennedy (I.94); Kinneavy (I.95); MacDonald (I.103); B. L. Mack (I.105); B. L. Mack and Robbins (I.106); Mitchell (I.114); Mobley (III.120); Neusner (I.120);
Niditch (I.124); Peters (I.147); Shaheen (VII.31); Stahmer (I.170); Voegelin (I.187); Wilder (I.196); Winter (I.199); Wolterstorff (I.200).


(I.10) Aristotle. *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. 2nd ed. Trans. with introduction, notes, and appendices by George A. Kennedy. New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. A classic. Topic: Rhetorical Theory. Also see Farrell (III.46; III.47); Garver (I.72); Grimaldi (I.76); Habermas (XII.61; XII.62); Koziak (III.110); Ong (III.138); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Sloane (I.165; III.158; III.159).


(I.11a) Aslan, Reza. *Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth*. New York: Random House, 2013. Accessible. Topics: Biblical Studies; Cultural Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Borg (I.20); Crossan (I.36; I.38; I.39; I.40; III.35); de Mello (I.42); Fredriksen (III.71); Harris (I.78). In terms of the three categories of character types (outer-directed, inner-directed, other-directed) delineated by David Riesman (X.44), the historical Jesus represented the outer-directed type, not the inner-directed type. Nevertheless, the historical Jesus was most likely a mystic, as Anthony de Mello (I.42) describes a mystic, not a zealot as Reza Aslan claims.


Collingwood (I.31); concerning disenchantment (aka secularism), see Gauchet (XII.50); Taylor (XII.160); concerning reenchantment, see Brown (I.22); Ong (II.14, esp. 104-25; and II.17).

(I.16) ---. Wandering God: A Study in Nomadic Spirituality. Albany: State U of New York P, 2000. Topic: Cultural Studies. For other works concerning spirituality, see Berman (I.15); Bloom (I.19; XII.14); Brakke (X.7); Brown (I.22); Burrow (X.8; X.9); Connor (X.11); Cushman (X.13); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Loyola (III.113); Menn (X.32); Ong (II.14, esp. 104-25; II.17; X.36; X.37); Schmidt (XII.151); Tade (X.46; Teilhard de Chardin (X.48); Voegelin (I.187); Wilshire (I.197).


(I.19) Bloom, Harold. Jesus and Yahweh: The Names Divine. New York: Riverhead Books/Penguin Group, 2005. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Bloom (III.11; IX.10; X.5; XII.14). In Jesus and Yahweh Harold Bloom says, “My culture is Jewish, but I am not part of normative Judaism; I decidedly do not trust in the covenant” (2). Fair enough. We know where he is coming from and where he now stands. However, one thread in the present work centers on “presence,” including Ong’s The Presence of the Word (I.140); Belting (IX.7); Cushman (X.13); de Mello (I.42); Eliade (I.53); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Loyola (III.113); Menn (X.32); Sokolowski (I.171); von Balthasar (I.189). Because Professor Bloom teaches at Yale University, I should point out that Ong’s 1964 Terry Lectures at Yale University were published in expanded form by Yale University Press as The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History. In other annotations, I have suggested that the experience of presence bespeaks the world-as-event sense of life, as distinct from the world-as-view sense of life. For this reason, Bloom’s discussion of presence is worth detailing in the present work. He discusses the Hebrew wording Ehyeh asher ehyeh, wording that names the deity whose name is Englished as Yahweh. Bloom says, “The traditional rendering is ‘I Am That I Am,’ which I explicate as ‘I will be present whenever and wherever I will be present’” (27). Later, Bloom says, “The name of Yahweh must after all primarily mean being present” (144). Later, Bloom refers to Yahweh in passing as “the Master of Presence” (149; his capitalization). Later, Bloom says, “After all, his very name intimates that his presence depends upon his will” (173). Later, Bloom says, “The mystery of Yahweh is in his self-naming as a presence who can choose to be absent” (200). But enough about presence! I do not know Hebrew, so I will leave it to experts in Hebrew to judge Bloom’s understanding of the words
Ehyeh asher ehyeh. But here’s Bloom’s key argument: “Whoever you are, you identify necessarily the origins of your self more with Augustine, Descartes, and John Locke, or indeed with Montaigne and Shakespeare, than you do with Yahweh and Jesus. That is only another way of saying that Socrates and Plato, rather than Jesus, have formed you, however ignorant you may be of Plato. The Hebrew Bible dominated seventeenth-century Protestantism, but four centuries later our technological and mercantile society is far more the child of Aristotle than of Moses” (146). Perry Miller (XII.100) shows that college-educated New England Protestants in the seventh century were Ramists. As a result, they used Ramist logic to interpret the Hebrew Bible. Gary Dorrien (XII.27) has studied how Kant and Hegel influenced later American Protestant thought. Donald Gelpi (XII.50a) refers to the dialectical imagination of American Protestants, which he distinguishes from the analogical imagination of Roman Catholic tradition. However, the historical Jesus was far more a child of Moses than of Aristotle. The historical Jesus probably never even heard of Aristotle or of Greek philosophy. So it is ironic that many self-described American Christians today appear to Bloom to be far more the children of Aristotle than of Moses. However that may be, in Ong’s terminology (I.143), the experience of presence bespeaks the world-as-event sense of life. But we Americans today are indeed the products of modernity and the world-as-view sense of life that was exemplified in ancient Greek philosophy by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and then carried forward in ancient and medieval culture through the inward turn of consciousness and then powered into stronger depths after the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. Nevertheless, through the influence of residual orality in the Roman Catholic tradition of thought and spirituality, the experience of God’s presence remained a cultural and personal ideal. However that may be, as mentioned, Bloom’s understanding of the Hebrew words Ehyeh asher ehyeh may not be supported by experts in Hebrew.

(I.20) Borg, Marcus J. Jesus: Uncovering the Life, Teachings, and Relevance of a Religious Revolutionary. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2006. Accessible. Topic: Biblical Studies. About the historical Jesus in a residual form of primary oral culture. Also see Aslan (I.11a); Crossan (I.36; I.38; I.39; I.40; III.35); de Mello (I.42); Fredriksen (I.71); Harris (I.78).


(I.26) Buzzard, Karen S. Falling. Holding Patterns: How Communication Prevents Intimacy in Adults. East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 2001. Topic: Therapy. Also see Buber (I.24); D. W. Johnson (I.92); Malone and Malone (I.107); Wadlington (III.168). According to John Bradshaw (X.7), the toxic shame binds our emotions (affects). This binding of our emotions produces many of the holding patterns that Karen Buzzard discusses — perhaps most of them. The holding patterns in our psychological lives that she discusses are the result of archetypal wounds. According to Jungian theorist Anthony Stevens (X.44d), our archetypal wounds require archetypal healing. Archetypal wounds are usually the result of nondeath losses. So they can be resolved by mourning our nondeath losses. As Bradshaw suggests, grief is the healing feeling.


(I.30a) Cicero. *Cicero: On the Ideal Orator* (De Oratore). Trans. with introduction, notes, appendixes, and indexes by James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. Topic: History of Rhetoric. Also see Boethius (VII.3a); Butler (V.1); Cicero (VII.5a; X.11a); Enos (V.3); May (I.110; I.111).


(I.36) Crossan, John Dominic. *The Birth of Christianity: Discovering What Happened in the Years Immediately After the Execution of Jesus*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998. Topics: Biblical Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Aslan (I.11a); Borg and Crossan (I.21); Crossan (I.38; I.39; I.40; III.35); Crossan and Reed (IX.18); de Mello (I.42); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55; I.56); Fredriksen (III.71); Harris (I.78); Pagels (I.144a; III.141). *The Birth of Christianity* is John Dominic Crossan’s learned lengthy account of how the grief-stricken followers of the historical Jesus and subsequent followers in the emerging church constructed their understanding of the import of the life and death of the historical Jesus. The grief-stricken followers of the historical Jesus searched the Hebrew scriptures for elements that they could weave together into a story. From their searches of Hebrew scriptures, they eventually constructed the greatest hero-story ever told. In addition, the grief-stricken followers of the historical Jesus had had apparition experiences, or hallucinations about him. In their grief over their loss of their friend and hero, they had misinterpreted their hallucinations about the deceased Jesus to mean that he had somehow been resurrected from the dead. To this day, many self-described Christians believe in the tall tale about the resurrection of Jesus.


(I.40) --- *The Power of Parable: How Fiction by Jesus Became Fiction about Jesus*. New York: HarperOne/ HarperCollins, 2012. Accessible. Topic: Biblical Studies. The historical Jesus, a local mystic in the ancient Jewish homeland, told captivating little stories known as parables trying to capture and express mystic awareness. In *The Way to Love: Meditations for Life* (I.42), Anthony de Mello perceptively explicates the mystic awareness that is expressed in certain puzzling gospel passages, which express the mystic awareness of the historical Jesus or of his followers. But the historical Jesus somehow ended up being executed under the authority of Pontius Pilate during the Passover festival in Jerusalem for supposedly being king of the Jews, a would-be political revolutionary. Nothing has come down to us that would support the claim that he was a political revolutionary. On the contrary, he was not political. John Dominic Crossan likes to say that the historical Jesus was engaging in non-violent resistance against the Roman empire in the Jewish homeland. Well, yes, the Roman empire was in place in the Jewish homeland. That was the political reality. And Jesus was dedicated to something else other than the political reality in the Jewish homeland. This something else was non-political in his time and is still non-political in our times. In short, the historical Jesus was not proclaiming that God would rule politically – Jesus was not proclaiming the political rule by God had come to the Jewish homeland. Instead, Jesus was proclaiming that the non-political rule by God had come to the Jewish homeland in his time – and God’s non-political rule is still available to all people around the world today. Nor was the historical Jesus proclaiming that he himself should be the warrior-king to bring about God’s rule in the Jewish homeland. The historical Jesus was not proclaiming himself to be the long expected Jewish messiah. I repeat, the historical Jesus was non-political. He was not proclaiming a political message. In plain English, he was not suggesting how God would rule a political government. On the contrary, he was suggesting that God’s style of ruling is not political – it’s non-political.
But what could this possibly mean? It means that when God reigns, as it were, over our hearts and minds, then God rules, as it were, over us. In effect, God is inside us, inside our hearts and minds, and God thus influences us from the inside. So when we have learned how to understand the two great commandments of the Mosaic law, we then have an inner experience of the Mosaic law. And our inner experience of the Mosaic law can be understood as the reign or rule of God inside us, inside our hearts and minds. Now, after Jesus was crucified and died, some of his grieving followers had hallucinations in which he appeared to them. Their hallucinations about his appearances set in motion a series of events in which his followers constructed an elaborate myth about his life and death, an elaborate myth set forth in various forms in the epistles of Paul the Apostle and in the four canonical gospels (i.e., written texts) and other writings that have come down to us. In the four canonical gospels, Jesus is portrayed as using parables. In his book *The Power of Parable: How Fiction by Jesus Became Fiction about Jesus*, Crossan examines parables in detail, especially those attributed to Jesus – the fiction by Jesus mentioned in the subtitle of Crossan’s book. The fiction about Jesus mentioned in the subtitle refers primarily to the four canonical gospels. To be sure, the four gospels are based on the historical Jesus and contain passing references to certain other historical persons and events. Nevertheless, the authors of the four canonical gospels were writing historical fiction, fiction based on certain historical persons and events. Crossan moves from characterizing as parables the fictions that Jesus used in teaching to characterizing as megaparables the four fictions known as the four canonical gospels. In a word, each of the four canonical gospels is a parable in spirit, or parabolic. As Crossan cleverly puts it, each canonical gospel is parabolic history or historical parable. I would make several observations here. First, regarding Crossan’s use of the term parable. Crossan works carefully to define and explain what he means by the term parable. Nevertheless, I understand what he means by parables as narrative proverbs. The book of Proverbs in the Hebrew Bible contains a number of collections of proverbs. Most of the proverbs collected in that book are short pithy proverbs. But some others in that book could be characterized as narrative proverbs. In the 1958 novel *Things Fall Apart* (I.2), the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe portrays certain characters as using both short pithy proverbs and narrative proverbs. In his perceptive article “Narrative Proverbs in the African Novel,” Emmanuel Obeichina discusses the narrative proverbs in Achebe’s novel *Things Fall Apart*. Obeichina’s article was published in the journal *Oral Tradition* 7 (1992): 197-230. (This article and others can be accessed at the journal’s website.) Scholars have studied proverbs from different cultures around the world. For an extensive bibliography of studies of proverbs, see Wolfgang Mieder’s *International Bibliography of Paremiology and Phraseology*, 2 volumes (VII.16). I belabor this point about proverbs to say that what Crossan discusses as parables fit into a far bigger category of short
narratives known as narrative proverbs. Next, Crossan’s term megaparables. Why does he coin this term? I know, I know, this coinage establishes a verbal tie-in with the term parables. Nevertheless, the conventional names for megaparables out of the ancient world are epics and myths. As Crossan defines and explains and uses the term megaparables, megaparables are epics and or myths. But they are not history, even though the four canonical gospels include characters based on historical persons. They are fiction, just as epics and myths out of the ancient world are fictions. But the four canonical gospels are constructed as hero stories. As works about a hero, they stand in the tradition of the Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Aeneid out of the ancient world. As Crossan knows, Dennis R. MacDonald has documented certain textual evidence in the Gospel of Mark that shows that the author was familiar with Greek expressions used in the Homeric epics. See MacDonald’s book The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark (I.103). I extrapolate from MacDonald’s evidence and make the inference that the author of the Gospel of Mark was deliberately fashioning a hero to match and perhaps surpass the Homeric hero Achilles. To make a long story short, when Achilles does at long last decide to return to the war with the Trojans, he makes this decision with the certain knowledge that he will not live to return home. Through a revelation that his goddess-mother gave him, Achilles knew that two possible fates awaited him: (1) he could leave the war now and return home alive or (2) he could return to the war, in which case he would not return home alive. Faced with this choice, he at long last decided to return to the war, thus sealing his fated death. In the spirit of one-upmanship with the Homeric epic, the anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark portrays his non-violent hero as predicting in advance his own death in Jerusalem not once, not twice, but three times. So we would have to be obtuse not to get the point that he knew beforehand that he was walking into his death in Jerusalem and that he kept walking toward Jerusalem. This is good storytelling. Over the centuries, far more people have known the story of Jesus the non-violent hero than have known the story of Achilles the violent hero. But Crossan prefers to refer to the epic hero story fashioned in Gospel of Mark as a megaparable. However that may be, we may wonder what kind of hero the anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark is fashioning, apart from being non-violent. The author is fashioning a non-violent hero to serve as a model of courage because he is willing to face his own predicted death. But that’s not all that the author is fashioning into his hero. Like many other early followers of Jesus after his death, the author is preoccupied with the servant songs in the book of Isaiah (specifically in the part of the book that critical biblical scholars refer to as Second Isaiah, a prophet whose identity is not known). As a result, the author is fashioning Jesus-the-hero to be a servant of God in an exemplary way. To be a servant of God is a great honorific in the Hebrew Bible. The author of the gospel of Mark is straightforward enough to put the following words on the lips of Jesus to clue us in: “[W]hoever wishes
to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first among you must be slave of all” (Mark 10: 43-44; quoted from Crossan 162). This is a remarkably straightforward expression of the author’s understanding of Jesus as servant of God. Now, let’s back up and consider the entire passage that Crossan quotes from Mark 10: 42-44: “You know that among the Gentiles those whom they recognize as their rulers lord it over them, and their great ones are tyrants over them. But it is not so among you; whoever wishes to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first among you must be slave of all.” Now, to this day, the rulers in political governments can be understood to rule over or lord over the governed, regardless of the kind of government that is involved. Thus the author of the Gospel of Mark implies that Jesus was not referring to a political government. It would be an enormous idealization to imagine a political government in which the great are somehow the servants of all the governed. No, the author does not seem to be imagining an institutional structure of any kind, idealized or not. Instead, the author appears to me to be spelling out through these words placed on the lips of Jesus how his followers should proceed to regard one another with respect to recognizing prestige and merit within the group. In any event, I take both what Crossan refers to as parables and what he refers to as megaparables to mean that the historical Jesus and the four canonical gospels emerged in the highly oral culture of the ancient world, as Ong has detailed the characteristics of the highly oral life-world in his book *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (I.139) and elsewhere. In other words, both the historical Jesus and the four canonical gospels need to be understood as embodying the psychodynamics of the oral life-world. This means that the historical Jesus and the four canonical gospels do not reflect the thought-world of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, except for the prologue to the Gospel of John. Except for the prologue to the Gospel of John, the four canonical gospels reflect the imagistic thought-world of ancient Greek and Roman epics and myths. Eric A. Havelock has studied the imagistic thought-world of the Homeric epics in detail in his fine book *Preface to Plato* (I.81). Unfortunately, however, the thought-world of ancient Greek philosophy would emerge victorious over the imagistic thought-world of the four canonical gospels, except for the prologue of the Gospel of John. The victory of the thought-world of ancient Greek philosophy emerged most decisively at the Council of Nicea with the formulation of the famous Nicene Creed, which Roman Catholics today recite at Sunday Mass. As I think back on this victory of the thought-world of ancient Greek philosophy today, this victory appears to me to have been virtually inevitable in light of the power and prestige of the thought-world of ancient Greek philosophy. Like many other people over the centuries, I myself find the thought-world of ancient Greek philosophy attractive. Nevertheless, I think there’s strength in the imagistic thought-world of pre-philosophic thought. For all practical purposes, Crossan has
undertaken to explore the possible strengths of the imagistic thought-world of pre-philosophic thought as expressed in various places in the Christian Bible in his new book. Also see Farrell (I.61); Jenkins (III.94).


Let me spell out the implications of Crowe’s essay for understanding Ong’s work. People in primary oral cultures has what Ong describes as a world-as-event sense of life, with which they employed the four levels of consciousness described by Lonergan and Crowe. Later, after the development of distinctively literate thought in Greek philosophy as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, people worked with what Ong characterizes as the world-as-view sense of life, with which they worked with the four levels of consciousness discussed by Lonergan and Crowe.

Next, let me spell out the implications of Crowe’s essay for understanding my own work regarding Arthur R. Jensen’s work on Level I and Level II cognitive development (see Farrell [IX.24]). Level II is an actuation of cognitive potential, a development of cognitive potential. I align Level I with the world-as-event sense of life; Level II, with the world-as-view sense of life. Now, let me spell out here that people at Level I employ all four levels of consciousness discussed by Lonergan and Crowe, just as people at Level II do also. Nevertheless, we should consider carefully an observation that Harold Bloom makes in Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present (IX.10). Even though Bloom does not use Ong’s terminology regarding the world-as-event sense of life and the world-as-view sense of life, Bloom uses his own way of speaking to construct a roughly equivalent contrast. Then he observes that “the two modes seem irreconcilable” (27). I prefer to work with Ong’s conceptual constructs, rather than Bloom’s. To be sure, people who have a strong world-as-event sense of life appear to be unacculturated in the world-as-event sense of life, just as people who have not actuated Level II appear to be unacculturated in Level II. But what about the reverse ways of proceeding? Bloom’s seems to suggest that the reverse is not possible – that people today whose “only way of thinking comes to us from the ancient Greeks” (27) cannot through cognitive empathy as it were enter into and understand the world-as-event sense of life as exemplified in the Hebrew Bible. Granted, there are particulars in the Hebrew Bible that may be difficult for scholars today to understand. For this reason, I want to skip over the Hebrew Bible for the moment. It seems to me that Plato and Aristotle and many other ancient Greek philosophers were capable of drawing on the world-as-view sense of life but also tuning into the world-
as-event sense of life. In *Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character* (I.72), Eugene Garver has illustrated and explained how Aristotle’s thought works in this way. If I were to borrow Bloom’s wording about “two modes,” I would say that Garver illustrates that Aristotle ably drew on the two modes that Ong describes as the world-as-event sense of life and the world-as-view sense of life. For Aristotle, Ong’s two modes were not seemingly irreconcilable. But I now want to turn to some tricky observations. The so-called Arian heresy was one of the most persistent heresies in medieval Christianity (see Farrell [I.61]; Jenkins [III.94]). But Arius and his followers represent the world-as-event sense of life. By contrast, the Nicene Creed represents the world-as-view sense of life as exemplified in ancient Greek philosophy. Centuries later, Unitarians basically sided with Arius and his followers in rejecting the Nicene doctrine of the divine trinity. Nevertheless, the orthodox Catholic tradition of thought to this day refers to presence, as Ong himself does in *The Presence of the Word* (I.140); also see Belting (IX.7); Bloom (I.20); Cushman (X.13); de Mello (I.42); Eliade (I.53); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Loyola (III.113); Menn (X.32); Sokolowski (I.170); von Balthasar (I.189).

I would suggest that the experience of presence is a manifestation of the world-as-event sense of life, or at least a residual form of the world-as-event sense of life. If people who are strongly acculturated in the world-as-view sense of life were to experience presence, they would probably categorize their experience as an experience of nature mysticism or at least mysticism. However, in *On Communitarian Divinity: An African Interpretation of the Trinity*, A. Okechukwu Ogbonnaya (I.128) works with African conceptual constructs to suggest new ways in which the orthodox Christian view of the divine trinity can be understood, ways that I would align with the world-as-event sense of life. Moreover, people who are strongly acculturated in the strong visualist tendencies of print culture will probably as a result become followers of Kant and rule out of consideration metaphysics and metaphysical thought. But Plato and Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas famously had no problem with metaphysics and metaphysical thought, because they were not as strongly acculturated in the visualist tendencies of print culture as Kant was. In the final analysis Bloom is of course correct when he says that “our only way of thinking comes to us from the ancient Greeks, and not from the Hebrews” (27). However, apart from the Roman Catholic tradition of thought down to this day, Bloom’s reference to “our only way of thinking” should probably be understood to mean the only way of thinking for academics today who accept Kant’s strictures against metaphysics and metaphysical thought.

(I.42) de Mello, Anthony. *The Way to Love: Meditations for Life*. New York: Image, 2012. Accessible. Also listed as de Mello (X.14). Topics: Biblical Studies; Mystic Experience; Spirituality; Therapy. Also see Agamben (X.2); Eliade (I.53); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Leclerc (I.99); Manuel (X.32a); Moore and Gillette (I.116); Sherry (X.44c). In this perceptive book Anthony de
Mello, S.J. (1931-1987), shares with readers his meditations on selected gospel texts. Each selected gospel text appears at the beginning of each chapter, followed by his meditation about it. In short, he uses his conceptual constructs to analyze and explicate and explain the mind of the mystic(s) who composed the text. But are his analyses of the various texts insightful, compelling, and cogent? If his various analyses are correct, then he has succeeded in explicating and explaining the mind of the mystic(s) who composed the texts. But this conclusion would imply that the historical Jesus and perhaps some of his followers, including followers who contributed to the composition of the four canonical gospels were themselves mystics. Does this implication that the historical Jesus and perhaps also some of his followers were mystics make any difference? Does it make any difference if they were mystics?


(I.46a) Doniger, Wendy. *The Hindus: An Alternative History*. New York: Penguin Books/Penguin Group, 2009. Topics: Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see de Mello (X.14); Doniger (I.46b); Krishnamurti (X.29); Nanda (III.127); Nussbaum (IX.55a); Oliver (I.129); Parks (III.142).


(I.52) Edwards, Mark W. *Sound, Sense, and Rhythm: Listening to Greek and Latin Poetry*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2002. Topic: Classical Studies. For other works regarding Latin and/or classical education, see Baldwin (VII.3); Binnis (XII.7); Curtius (VII.6); Hotson (XII.69; XII.72); Hurst (XII.57); IJsewijn (XII.74); P. Mack (XII.88); Mantello and Rigg (I.108); Moss (VII.20); O’Malley (III.131); O’Malley, Bailey, Harris, and Kennedy (XII.110; XII.111); O’Malley, Bailey, and Sale (XII.112); Ong (I.131: esp. 88-130, 177-205, 206-19; I.135: esp. 17-49, 147-88, 213-29; III.136; XII.92, 113, 116, 126, 129, 132, 133); Pavur (XII.139); Richard (XII.147); Shalev (XII.152); Winterer (XII.169; XII.170).


(I.55) Engberg-Pedersen, Troels. *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit*. Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 2010. Topics: Biblical Studies; Psychodynamics of Mystic Experience; Therapy; Religious Studies. Also see Buell (X.8a); de Mello (I.42); Dworkin (III.42a); Eliade (I.53); Sherry (X.44c). Is the expression “material spirit” a contradiction in terms? No, says Troels Engberg-Pedersen, professor of the New Testament at the University of Copenhagen, in his fascinating book *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit*. Engberg-Pedersen’s claim may come as a surprise to Christians and other people of religious faith who like to assail atheists and agnostics for being “godless,” as they put it. He delineates the “material spirit” by drawing on ancient materialist stoic philosophy, as distinct from immaterialist (i.e., non-materialist) philosophy such as Plato’s. Immaterialist philosophy postulates the transcendent divine ground of being (aka God). By contrast, materialist
philosophy does not. Nevertheless, ancient stoic philosophy is materialist and provides conceptual constructs for understanding the spiritual life in terms of the “material spirit,” as Engberg-Pedersen puts it. Because of the enormous influence of Plato’s thought over the centuries, most Christians have tended to read the writings of Paul the Apostle in light of Plato’s immaterialist philosophy. But Engberg-Pedersen shows that ancient materialist stoic thought can expand and deepen our understanding of Paul’s thought. That atheists and agnostics can have a spiritual life may not come as a surprise to non-religious people. But even non-religious people may be surprised at how Engberg-Pedersen’s analysis and elucidation of Paul’s writings opens up a way to understand those writings that can elucidate how atheists and agnostics can experience the spiritual life described by Paul. Because Paul is usually considered to be the second most important founder of Christianity, second only to the historical Jesus, Engberg-Pedersen in effect is robbing Christianity of its second most important founder and giving him over to the atheists and agnostics, if they want him. (For understandable reasons, many atheists and agnostics may not want him.) It is well worth the price of Engberg-Pedersen’s pricey book to read his detailed and impressive delineation of the key term pneuma (spirit) in Paul’s writings. As the subtitle of his new book indicates, Engberg-Pedersen opens up Paul’s thought enormously by discussing the material spirit (pneuma), which is to say a materialist way to understand Paul’s writings about the spirit (pneuma), as distinct from the immaterialist or non-materialist way of understanding those writings. But Engberg-Pedersen’s materialist way of understanding the pneuma in Paul’s writings does not necessarily threaten to overturn the traditional immaterialist or non-materialist way of understanding those writings that Christian theology has favored. Instead, Engberg-Pedersen opens the way of thinking about the material spirit, as he puts it, which is to say a way of thinking about the spiritual life of atheists and agnostics today as well as a way for atheists and agnostics today to understand Paul’s writings about pneuma (spirit). For understandable reasons, Engberg-Pedersen situates Paul’s thought-world in the contexts of competing ancient thought-worlds: Plato (and Aristotle to a lesser extent), Middle Platonism during the Hellenistic period, ancient Greek and Roman stoic thought, and ancient Jewish apocalyptic thought. However, even though Engberg-Pedersen repeatedly refers to the conceptual construct and personification that Paul refers to as “Satan,” Engberg-Pedersen does not explicitly discuss Zoroastrianism. During the period of time when the ancient Jewish homeland was under the rule of the Persian empire, before Alexander the Great conquered the Jewish homeland, ancient Jews came into contact with Zoroastrianism. During the later period when the ancient Jewish homeland was under Greek rule, ancient Jewish apocalyptic thought emerged. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that Zoroastrianism contributed to the emergence of ancient Jewish apocalyptic thought, including the conceptual construct of “Satan” as the adversary of God. (In
the book of Job, the adversary figure referred to as “Satan,” which etymologically means “adversary,” is not the adversary of God, but the adversary of humans such as Job.) That Paul the Apostle was an apocalyptic preacher is beyond debate. He was. Indeed, in accord with ancient Jewish apocalyptic thought, he had so convinced himself that the end of the world as we know it was about to occur that he expected to live to see it occur in his lifetime. But as we know, it has not yet occurred. Nevertheless, let us pause here and consider how we might feel if we thought that the end of the world as we know it was going to occur in the near future and that we would live to see it and experience it. Exciting thoughts, eh? Let’s also say that this upcoming event would include a great dividing of people into the good guys who would be saved and thereafter live in heaven on earth or earth in heaven, and bad guys who would be consigned to eternal pain and suffering in hell. Exciting thoughts, eh? For people who have convinced themselves that the present world is evil, this apocalyptic vision of the impending future might be welcome. Digression: Despite my serious reservations about the apocalyptic thought-world, I do want to credit the ancient Jewish and Christian apocalyptic tradition with one deep insight: Justice will not prevail in this world unless and until divine invention brings it about, which I do not expect to see in the near future. In plain English, our utopian efforts are not going to establish justice in the world. But this is no reason to stop striving to establish justice in the world, as long as we recognize that our efforts will be imperfect and incomplete, as President Obama’s efforts certainly have been. End of digression. As a result of Paul’s thoughts about the impending end of the world as we know it, he traveled around the Mediterranean world preaching that this momentous event was about to occur and urging people to get ready for it. Evidently, his excitement was catching, at least among certain people. But exactly how should people get ready for it? According to Paul, people should get ready for it by putting their faith in the conceptual construct and personification that he referred to as “Christ Jesus,” where the Greek-derived term “Christ” refers to the Hebrew-derived term “Messiah.” For Paul, the historical Jesus was Jesus the Messiah (Jesus the Christ, or “Christ Jesus” for short). Here I would like to interject Gabriel Marcel’s useful distinction between belief-in and belief-that. Belief-in refers to our experiences of belief in a person, which we can expand to include belief in the personifications known as “God” and as “Christ Jesus.” By contrast, belief-that refers to our experiences that certain stated propositional statements are true, so that belief-that means belief-that a certain proposition is a true statement. An example of a proposition would be the statement that the historical Jesus was the Messiah (aka the Christ). For Paul, this propositional statement is truncated down to the combination of words “Christ Jesus” that mean that Jesus is the Messiah. But for Paul, his claim about “Christ Jesus” is not a debatable claim; he does not want to invite debate about this claim. Instead, he wants evoke in people belief-in
“Christ Jesus,” who in Paul’s presentation is presumed to be a living person. So if we want to catch his excitement and enter into his excitement and share in his excitement, then we have to share his belief in this vividly imagined “Christ Jesus.” In short, Paul wants people to use their imaginations to imagine the personification “Christ Jesus” as a living person whose living presence one can feel in one’s psyche, as Paul himself claims to have felt such a presence in his psyche. Two comments are in order here. (Comment #1) In his treatise known as the Rhetoric, Aristotle identifies three different appeals that the speaker in civic debate uses to help make his arguments for a particular course of action persuasive: (A) logos (reason), (B) pathos (emotion), and (C) ethos. Paul as a speaker used pathos in the form of fear about the impending end of the world as we know it and about the impending great divide of people into good guys and bad guys. But he also relied heavily of his use of ethos to persuade people in his audience. To use ethos as an appeal, Paul projected his identity as a good guy and thereby invited the people in the audience to identify with him as a good guy. Thus through the process of projection and identification, Paul could communicate his sense of excitement about “Christ Jesus” in a way that people in his audience who were disposed to his message could catch on to what he was saying and thereby catch his excitement and make it their own. No doubt Christian proclamation has relied on this kind of use of ethos over the centuries. (Comment #2) I would say that Paul was inviting people to use what C. G. Jung refers to as active imagination to imagine the personification that Paul refers to as “Christ Jesus.” In the Christian tradition of prayer, a form of prayer based on passages of scripture was developed that involves the use of the imagination in meditation and contemplation. Arguably the most famous compilation of exercises designed to help a person engage in the use of imagination in meditation and contemplation is known as the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola (III.113). By using our imaginations in meditation and contemplation about certain passages in scripture, we today can replicate for ourselves in our experience the kind of imaginative experience that Paul was urging his listeners to undertake with respect to the personification of “Christ Jesus.” When we undertake this kind of imaginative work with reference to the personification of “Christ Jesus,” we may be able to experience in our psyches what Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette refer to as the archetypes of masculine maturity at the archetypal level of the human psyche. For example, when Paul imagines the Parousia (the Second Coming), he imagines “Christ Jesus” coming as the warrior-king, which has given rise to the Christian tradition of referring to “Christ the King.” In the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola, the second week is devoted to contemplating the kingdom of God and Christ the King. All the king imagery can be connected with the archetype of the king within the archetypal level of the human psyche. See Moore and Gillette’s The King Within: Accessing the King [Archetype] in the Male Psyche (I.115a). By accessing the energies of the archetypal
level of the human psyche, Paul and people who listened to him and people today can learn how to move from experiencing their ordinary psyches to experiencing the enhanced energies that can flow into us from the archetypal level of the human psyche. In the terminology used by Engberg-Pedersen, we can move from being people with ordinary psyches to becoming people whose psyches are enhanced by pneuma (spirit), one of the key terms that Engberg-Pedersen investigates. Let’s review. On the one hand, Paul was preaching that the end of the world as we know it was about to occur, which would probably strike terror into the hearts of the people who bought his line of thought. In Aristotle’s *Poetics*, he tells us that people watching a tragedy performed in Athens would experience pity and terror (or fear). From his discussion of watching a tragedy performed, we can conclude that people in the ancient world who listened to Paul and bought his line of argument about the impending end of the world as we know it probably did experience terror (or fear) about that prospect occurring in the near future, as Paul himself said it would. On the other hand, Paul invited them to save themselves from being on the wrong side when this apocalyptic event occurred by getting themselves on the right side by believing in “Christ Jesus.” Moreover, when they believed in “Christ Jesus,” they would experience a new form of life in their psyches. So what are we to make of Paul’s various statements about this new form of life that people who believed in “Christ Jesus” would experience in their psyches? This brings us back to what Engberg-Pedersen has undertaken to study in detail in his new book: pneuma (spirit) in Paul’s writings. Engberg-Pedersen painstakingly shows that we can understand the term pneuma in Paul’s writings as referring to the material spirit, as he puts it. In Engberg-Pedersen’s terminology, the energies of the archetypal level of the human psyche that Moore and Gillette write about can also be understood as the material spirit in our psyches, as distinct from the immaterial spirit of the transcendent divine ground of being (a.k.a. God) invoked in immaterialist philosophy such as Plato’s and in traditional Christian theology. Engberg-Pedersen works out his elaborate case for considering the pneuma in Paul’s writings as the material spirit by drawing extensively on stoic philosophy. Stoic philosophy was materialist, as distinct from Plato’s immaterialist philosophy. In plain English, this means that even people who hold a materialist philosophy and deny the existence of the transcendent divine ground of being (a.k.a. God) can have a spiritual life and can become people of the pneuma as described by Paul without assenting to Paul’s thought-world about “Christ Jesus.” However, because Engberg-Pedersen draws so extensively on stoic thought, I have to wonder if atheistic materialists today have to become something like the ancient stoics in order to cultivate the material spirit today. In this regard, I should mention that Albert Ellis has long acknowledged the influence of ancient stoic thought, including Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, on his development of rational-emotive-behavior therapy, which is widely used by clinical psychologists. No doubt the approach known as rational-
emotive-behavior therapy can help us learn how to stop emoting about many experiences in our lives and learn how to become more rational in our thinking about our lives, as the ancient stoic philosophers themselves became more rational about their lives. But people today may need to undertake a course of personal development more ambitious than rational-emotive-behavior therapy in order to learn how to access the archetypes of maturity at the archetypal level of the human psyche. I do not mean to sound flippant in what I am about to say. But Engberg-Pedersen belabor the point that the pneuma that Paul writes about includes a cognitive dimension, which is to say that the pneuma impacts and influences thought and how we think about the world. As a result of the cognitive impact and influence of the pneuma, it strikes me that in a way of speaking the activation of the cognitive dimension of the pneuma in our psyches can bring about the end of the world as we have known it and can thereby transform our way of understanding the world. However, in extrapolating this implication from Engberg-Pedersen’s discussion of the cognitive dimension of the pneuma, I do not mean to claim any great originality on my part. In his landmark book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (IX.48), the Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984) discusses how different cognitive developments result in certain kinds of conversions in our understanding, which he styles intellectual conversion, moral conversion, and religious conversion. These three conversions probably involve respectively the Magician archetype, the Warrior archetype, and the King or Queen archetype discussed by Moore and Gillette. For Lonergan himself, his intellectual conversion involved working with a non-materialist (or immaterialist) philosophy. But Engberg-Pedersen’s painstaking analysis of pneuma in Paul’s writings opens the way to allowing that intellectual conversion can involve working with a materialist philosophy, as can moral conversion and even religious conversion if we understand religious conversion as involving our sense of ultimate meaning and reality, which can be a materialist sense of ultimate meaning and reality, not just a non-materialist (or immaterialist) sense of ultimate reality and meaning. I myself favor the non-materialist (or immaterialist) philosophy. But I have a live-and-let-live attitude toward those people who embrace materialist philosophy, as the Soviet communists did, but they also famously outlawed religion. Because the Soviet communists outlawed religion, liberals today who embrace materialist philosophy (aka naturalism) would be well advised to try to avoid giving off the impression that they might prefer to see religion outlawed. Because of the tradition of freedom of religion in the United States, and because of the spirit of anticommunism in the United States due to the Soviet communists’ outlawing of religion, liberals who are materialists should work mighty hard to stress that they endorse the American tradition of freedom of religion, even as they strive to insist on their own personally right to freedom from religion. But religion has no place in the public square. Religious beliefs should not be allowed in civic
debate. Civic debate should center on reasons advanced in support of a proposed course of action (e.g., a proposed law) and reasons in support of not taking the proposed course of action. But such public-policy debates usually involve values, and our values involve our moral conversion in Lonergan’s terminology. For reasons beyond my admittedly limited understanding, certain American conservatives today have gotten away with styling themselves “values voters.” But their self-congratulatory self-description has the unfortunate implication of suggesting that other voters are not values voters. As I say, I do not understand how those conservatives have gotten away with using this self-congratulatory self-description, because it strikes me that all voters are values voters, even though some voters may vote on the basis of different values than other voters do. Broadly speaking, conservatives vote on the basis of conservative values, as they construe them, but liberals vote on the basis of liberal values, as they construe them. Thus our civic debates about policy issues are basically debates about our values. This brings me back to the discussion of materialist philosophy and non-materialist (or immaterialist) philosophy. Does the basic difference between materialist and non-materialist (or immaterialist) philosophy have any implications for any policy debate in the United States today? Yes, the difference between the two philosophic orientations does have implication for our ongoing national debate about abortion. Let me explain. Non-materialist (or immaterialist) philosophy in the Roman Catholic tradition of thought works with the body/soul distinction. Moreover, the distinctively human soul is regarded as immortal. Furthermore, the Catholic tradition of thought works with the doctrine of ensoulment. This doctrine states that each individual soul is created directly by God. But this doctrine raises the question about when ensoulment occurs. For example, does ensoulment occur at the moment when an egg is fertilized with sperm? If you answer in the affirmative, then you are going to have to allow that in the course of nature many, many fertilized eggs are destroyed. But remember that you just said that each has been ensouled with an immortal soul. As is well known, the Christian tradition of thought also holds that there will be bodily resurrection. As a result, each fertilized egg that has been ensouled with an immortal soul will experience bodily resurrection at the resurrection. But these are not the only problems that arise when you hold that each fertilized egg has been ensouled with an immortal soul. By definition of the human soul, each fertilized egg represents a full human being. Moreover, the deliberate destruction of fertilized eggs through human agency (not in the natural course of events) is murder, the deliberate taking of innocent human life. By the same token, the deliberate destruction of the fertilized egg at any later stage of development is also murder. For this reason, certain people are conscientious objectors to legal abortion in the first trimester. But is this view of ensoulment occurring with each fertilized egg a reasonable one, or an unreasonable one? Furthermore, if materialists and others consider this view of the fertilized
egg to be unreasonable, how are we going to debate this claim with people who consider it to be reasonable? Talk about having a debate about values! My own proposed solution suggests that we operationally define ensoulment with the distinctively human soul (i.e., life-form) as occurring when the fetus becomes viable and able to live outside the mother’s womb. To be sure, up to the point of viability, there is a life-form developing, but I consider this life-form to be an infra-human life-form.


(I.57a) Erikson, Erik H. *Childhood and Society*. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 1963. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Aries (I.9a); Bradshaw (X.7); A. Miller (I.112a; III.122a). In this rather disparate collection of essays, Erik H. Erikson (1902-1994) discusses two Native American groups: (1) the Sioux (109-65) and (2) the Yurok (166-86).


(I.60) Farrell, Thomas J. “Differentiating Writing from Talking.” *College Composition and Communication* 29 (1978): 346-50. Also see Farrell (I.61; I.62; I.63; III.45; III.46; III.47; III.48; VII.8; IX.23; IX.24; X.16; X.17; XII.37).


(I.62) ---. “Literacy, the Basics, and All That Jazz.” *College English* 38 (1976-1977): 443-59. Topic: Cultural Studies. Drawing on Ong’s thought, I work with the terms residually oral culture and secondary oral culture. He suggests that open admissions black inner-city students come from a residually oral culture because they have not achieved what reading teachers refer to as functional literacy. By comparison, white students from a secondary oral
culture may not have yet mastered the so-called basics of writing, but they have usually achieved functional literacy. Reprinted in Theresa Enos, ed., *A Sourcebook for Basic Writing Teachers* (New York: Random House, 1987: 27-44). Ong discusses this article in his article in his article “Literacy and Orality in Our Times,” which has become Ong’s most frequently reprinted essay (I.136).


(I.72) Garver, Eugene. *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1994. Topic: Rhetorical Theory. Also see Aristotle (I.10); Farrell (III.46; III.47); Garver (I.72a; X.22c); Grimaldi (I.76); Habermas (XII.61; XII.62); Koziak (III.110); Ong (III.138); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Sloane (I.165; III.158; III.159).


(I.76) Grimaldi, William M. A. “The Auditors’ Role in Aristotelian Rhetoric.” *Oral and Written Communication: Historical Approaches*. Ed. Richard Leo Enos. Newbury Park, CA; London; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990. 65-81. Topic: Rhetorical Theory. Also see Aristotle (I.10); Buell (X.8a); Farrell (III.46; III.47); Garver (I.72); Gregg (III.77); Habermas (XII.61; XII.62); Koziak (III.110); Ong (III.138); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Sloane (I.165; III.158; III.159).


(I.81) Havelock, Eric A. *Preface to Plato*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 1963. Topics: Classical Studies; History of Philosophy; Cultural Studies. Also see Havelock (IX.32; IX.33); Voegelin (I.188). Accessible classic study of the Homeric oral mentality that Ong never tired of citing. Ong never tired of referring to this book. No doubt vowelized phonetic alphabetic literacy was one salient factor in the historical emergence of the knower from the known that led to the emergence of ancient Greek philosophic thought as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, as Havelock notes. However, the salient factor was the human mind, as manifested in the questions raised and discussed over the centuries that led to Plato and Aristotle. For a study of the earlier Greek oral mentality out of which the separation of the knower from the known emerge, see Detienne (I.44).


(I.97) Kozol, Jonathan. *Illiterate America*. Garden City, NY: Anchor P/Doubleday, 1985. Topic: American Studies. People who have not attained what reading teachers refer to as functional literacy live in a form of a residually oral culture. In and of itself, there is nothing inherently wrong with not being functionally literate. However, in the United States today, functional literacy is important for many types of jobs. As a result, people who are not functionally literate are handicapped.


(I.99) Leclerc, Eloi. *The Canticle of Creatures: Symbols of Union: An Analysis of St. Francis of Assisi*. Trans. Matthew J. O’Connell. Chicago: Franciscan Herald P, 1977. Topic: Roman Catholic spirituality. Also see Agamben (X.2); de Mello (I.42); Manuel (X.32a). For another text in the Catholic tradition of thought that somewhat resembles the spirit of St. Francis of Assisi’s “Canticle of Brother Sun,” see the Contemplation to Attain Love in the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola (III.113; standardized section numbers 230-237). St. Francis is Italy’s most widely known saint. Pope Francis, a Jesuit who is the son of Italian immigrants in Argentina, has honored St. Francis by taking his name as pope, the first pope to do so. So Pope Francis is the first pope from Latin America, the first Jesuit pope, and the first pope to be named in honor of St. Francis of Assisi. The Jesuits historically were famous missionaries in Latin America. The 1986 movie *The Mission* is based on real events involving Jesuit missionaries in Latin America. So the first pope from Latin America also happens to be a Jesuit, which sounds like something a Hollywood movie might feature, but it is happening in real life. Whether or not the name that the new pope has chosen will help to make St. Francis of Assisi’s “Canticle of Brother Sun” more widely known -- and perhaps even more widely sung -- remains to be seen. But his “Canticle of Brother Sun” deserves to be more widely known and sung. Scholars who have studied Native American spirituality describe it as being characterized by the interbeing of cosmology and community. Earlier scholars in the cross-cultural study of spirituality had referred to a participation mystique. In short, people around the world are capable of experiencing what Mircea Eliade refers to as the sacred through the experience of nature mysticism. Like Pope Francis, Ong was a Jesuit. For Ong, the old Jesuit motto of finding God in all things meant developing a participation mystique – by self-consciously and deliberately
constructing ways in which to express the interbeing of cosmology and community. For Ong, the Victorian Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins deliberately constructed his own ways of expressing his sense of the interbeing of cosmology and community, and so did the Jesuit paleontologist and spiritual writer Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. However, St. Francis of Assisi’s “Canticle of Brother Sun” is not as christocentric as Hopkins’ poetry is or as Teilhard’s spiritual writings are. If a medieval Italian Catholic saint can escape from and transcend the imprisoning thought-world of medieval Christianity, perhaps there is hope that all the medieval Catholics today can also learn how to escape from their imprisoning christocentric thought-world. In theory, despite their christocentric thought-world, Christians can experience what Eliade refers to as the sacred through nature mysticism. Under the influence of the spiritual thinker Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986) from India, the twentieth-century Jesuit spiritual director and writer and lecturer Anthony de Mello (1931-1987) from India escaped from and transcended the imprisoning christocentric thought-world of Catholicism, most notably in his meditations in the book The Way to Love (I.42). As everybody knows, India was at one time a British colony. As a result, it is not surprising that both Krishnamurti and de Mello could speak English fluently. If de Mello can overcome and transcend his Western education and his Jesuit training, perhaps other Catholics can also do it, even conservative American Catholics. But it will not be easy for other Catholics or for any other Christians to do what de Mello did. He undoubtedly had an enormous cultural advantage working for him because he was born and raised in India. Writing in a different context about people whose cultural conditioning in basically Western cultural conditioning, the secular Jew Harold Bloom in English at Yale University has explained and emphasized the difficulty involved in escaping what he considers to be the basic Western cultural conditioning in parts of two different books. For example, in his book Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present (IX.10), Bloom makes the following observation: “Frequently we forget one reason why the Hebrew Bible is so difficult for us: our only way of thinking comes to us from the ancient Greeks, and not from the Hebrews” (27). Amen, I say to that much. In his later book Jesus and Yahweh: The Names Divine (I.19), Bloom further explains and elaborates how our Western cultural conditioning inculcates the basic thought-world of ancient Greek philosophy as exemplified in Plato and Aristotle: “Whoever you are [provided you’ve received a Western education], you identify necessarily the origins of your self more with Augustine, Descartes, and John Locke, or indeed with Montaigne and Shakespeare, than you do with Yahweh and Jesus. That is another way of saying that Socrates and Plato, rather than Jesus, have formed you, however ignorant you may be of Plato. The Hebrew Bible dominated seventeenth-century Protestantism [including New England Puritanism], but four centuries later our technological and mercantile society is far
more the child of Aristotle than of Moses” (146). Amen to that much, I say. Ong encapsulates this contrast between the Greek philosophic way of thinking and the ancient Hebrew way of thinking by working with the world-as-view sense of life (Greek and Western) as distinct from the world-as-event sense of life (ancient Hebrew and non-Western generally). In Eliade’s terminology, all people everywhere have always lived most of their waking moments in profane space and time. However, people whose cultural conditioning involves the world-as-event sense of life tend to have an edge over people whose cultural conditioning involves the world-as-view sense of life when it comes to being open to experiencing the sacred, as the medieval mystic St. Francis of Assisi did. Oddly enough, as stylized as the Disney 1995 animated musical *Pocahontas* is, it nevertheless nicely captures the world-as-event sense of life, albeit in a stylized way. The garden statues of St. Francis of Assisi in the United States today remind us that he talked to the birds and other animals, as many Americans today talk to their pets, and as young Pocahontas in the stylized animated musical talks with animals. So the world now has a new pope from Latin America who is a Jesuit of Italian descent and who has chosen to honor St. Francis of Assisi by taking the name Pope Francis. In the meantime, Hollywood has prepared Americans for this unlikely convergence of Catholic symbolism by giving us the 1986 movie *The Mission* and the 1995 stylized animated musical *Pocahontas*. Add to this mix all those garden statues of St. Francis of Assisi. Add to this mix the vogue for Native American spirituality that Philip Jenkins details in his book *Dream Catchers: How Mainstream America Discovered Native Spirituality* (XII.78). I wonder if mainstream America will now discover St. Francis of Assisi’s “Canticle of Brother Sun” and Anthony de Mello’s meditations in the book *The Way to Love* (I.42). The convergence of all this Catholic symbolism in the backward-looking Roman Catholic Church today may be intended by the cardinal-electors and by Pope Francis himself to call to mind enthusiastic Catholic zealots such as St. Francis of Assisi and the Jesuit missionaries in Latin America, but this convergence of Catholic symbolism could also signal an new openness toward mystic experience. I know, I know, Pope Francis and all the Catholic cardinals and bishops are doctrinal conservatives – they are not open to changing any of the doctrines that they cling to. Nevertheless, I have to tell you that they may have inadvertently given a big boost to the mystic spirit. The more Catholic mystics there are in the world today, the better. St. Francis of Assisi was a medieval Catholic mystic. To round off this lengthy annotation, I would also like to mention here that the learned twentieth-century Thomist Josef Pieper has published a short book of related interest: *In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity*, translated from the German by Richard Winston and Clara Winston (Chicago: Franciscan Herald P, 1965).


(I.103) MacDonald, Dennis R. *The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark*. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2000. Also listed as MacDonald (VII.15a). Topics: Biblical Studies; Classical Studies; Cultural Studies. In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon and Achilles take turns being unreasonable. By contrast, Hector and his wife Andromache are portrayed very sympathetically. However, in the end Achilles kills Hector. Then Achilles dishonors Hector’s corpse by dragging it around behind his chariot. In the Gospel of Mark, Jesus is put to death by crucifixion under the authority of Pontius Pilate. Just as Hector was killed by Achilles, so to Jesus is killed by Pontius Pilate on the trumped up charge of being King of the Jews, a charge that implies a violent revolutionary, not a non-violent resistance leader. In respect to ending up dead, Jesus undeniably resembles Hector. However, I would draw attention to certain other aspects of the Gospel of Mark. Not once, not twice, but three times that anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark portrays Jesus as predicting in advance his upcoming suffering and death, to the disbelief of his closest followers. After the local authorities of the Roman empire executed John the Baptist, the historical Jesus probably recognized that he also might be executed by the local authorities of the Roman empire. At that juncture, the historical Jesus could have stopped his own public ministry and quietly returned home so as to avoid endangering himself. But he did not stop. He heroically continued his public non-violent ministry. In this respect, the historical Jesus was undoubtedly heroic. However, the anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark was driven by his personal and cultural agonistic spirit to portray a non-violent hero on the order of Achilles. Achilles’ goddess-mother Thetis had told him that two possible fates awaited him: (1) he could return home from the Trojan war and live a long life, or (2) he could return to fight in the Trojan war and eventually die in the war instead of ever returning home. After Hector kills Patroclus, Achilles decides to return to fight in the war, thus guaranteeing his own death in the war. So Achilles knew in advance that he would die in the war, and he decided to re-enter the war. The anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark portrays Jesus as predicting his upcoming suffering and death three times so as to establish that Jesus is a hero on the order with Achilles, because like...
Achilles, Jesus knows in advance that he will die and he keeps on walking toward Jerusalem, where his death awaits him.


Moore, Robert and Douglas Gillette. *King, Warrior, Magician, Lover: Rediscovering the Archetypes of the Mature Masculine*. HarperSanFrancisco/ HarperCollins, 1990. Topic: Jungian Theory. In broad outline, Robert Moore’s basic claims about the masculine archetypes in the archetypal level of the psyche may be true. In addition, I have no problem with focusing on them as a way to get clear about them. But Moore also claims that not only boys and men but also girls and women have both the four masculine and the four feminine archetypes of maturity in their psyches. Furthermore, Moore is well aware that male puberty rites were designed to separate boys around the age of puberty from the feminine life-world of their mothers – presumably to enter more consciously into the masculine life-world. Girls around the age of puberty also need to undergo a comparable separation from the feminine life-world of their childhood. Around the age of puberty, both boys and girls experience what Erich Neumann refers to as the birth of the Hero in their ego-consciousness and thereby enter into the Hero’s journey that Joseph Campbell (III.23) describes. The so-called Oedipus complex that Sigmund Freud famously discovered is probably best understood as representing the male child’s desire around the age of puberty to kill his father and to marry his mother and her feminine life-world of his childhood, instead of undergoing the life transition to leave her feminine life-world and enter the masculine life-world represented by the father. However, apart from male puberty rites, Moore does not explicitly discuss the role of the feminine archetypes in the male psyche. But it strikes me that the feminine archetypes in the male psyche represent a deeper layer in the male archetypal level of the psyche, because the child in the mother’s womb develops a relationship with the mother that begins before the child’s
birth. For this reason, it strikes me that men need to outgrow not only immature forms of the masculine archetypes in their psyches, but also immature forms of the feminine archetypes in their psyches. No doubt women also need to outgrow both immature forms of the feminine archetypes and immature forms of the masculine archetypes in their psyches. Anthony Stevens (X.44d) points out that archetypal wounds require archetypal healing. Archetypal wounds of both the feminine archetypes and the masculine archetypes require healing. In Moore’s terminology, archetypal wounds produce “shadow” forms of the archetypes of maturity in the archetypal level of the psyche, as distinct from the optimal forms of the archetypes. In theory, the fully functioning individual person would be accessing the optimal forms of both the masculine archetypes of maturity and the feminine archetypes of maturity. But the Hero in the Hero’s journey discussed by Campbell (III.20) is usually portrayed as a masculine figure. The Hero represents our ego-consciousness from the time when we experience what Neumann (III.128) refers to as the birth of the Hero in our ego-consciousness around the age of puberty. At their optimal best, puberty rites help boys and girls undergo the life transition into the birth of the Hero and the Hero’s journey. In the male psyche, the Hero always has four sides to his masculine personality – the four sides named by Moore as the King, Warrior, Magician, and Lover, but usually with one, two, three, or four “shadow” forms of the masculine archetypes of maturity. According to Moore’s way of thinking, the four-sided masculine ego-consciousness may grow and develop gradually over the years of the Hero’s journey as it somehow learns to move from a “shadow” form of a given archetype of maturity to an optimal form. But Moore is silent about happens in the male psyche after the age of puberty regarding the feminine archetypes. In the Homeric epic the Iliad, the goddess Athena intervenes at times to help Achilles, and at other times, Achilles talks with his mother the (minor) goddess Thetis. Both Thetis and Athena play an overall supportive role in the fictional life of Achilles. In the Homeric epic the Odyssey, Athena also plays a supportive role in the fictional life of Odysseus. But Moore claims that all of us have four feminine archetypes of maturity in the archetypal levels of our psyches. As a result, when our ego-consciousness undergoes the birth of the Hero around the age of puberty, we should expect the as the young male undergoes initiation into the masculine life-world represented by the father and other father-figures, the feminine archetypes in his psyche are hovering in the background. However, Neumann’s (III.128) account of stages one, two, and three of the eight stages of consciousness suggests that for our pre-historic human ancestors the feminine archetypes in their psyches were hovering in the foreground. Following C. G. Jung, Neumann sees the ancient Egyptian myth of Osiris as representing the rebirth of the Hero Osiris, representing the rebirth of ego-consciousness in stage eight of the eight stages of consciousness. But the reconstruction of the deconstructed Osiris is undertaken by Isis. But the role of Isis in
reconstructing Osiris suggests that the masculine Hero (or ego-consciousness) is reconstructed by a feminine archetype, or by a constellation of feminine archetypes represented as Isis. Presumably the feminine archetype(s) represented by Isis is not one of the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes. If my reasoning here about the Hero’s journey is correct, ego-consciousness somehow works out a new relationship with the feminine archetypes of maturity in stage seven of the eight stages of consciousness, giving rise to the new femininity. Next, the new femininity of stage seven of ego-consciousness then somehow works out a new relationship with the masculine archetypes of maturity, giving rise to the new masculinity of stage eight. Now, it strikes me that the reconstructed Osiris, representing the emergence of the higher masculinity, resembles the spirit represented in the imagery constructed in Christian mythology of the Second Coming of Christ, provided that we understand the myth of the Second Coming of Christ as representing the inner psychodynamic of the emergence of the higher masculinity in ego-consciousness (which is open to both women and men). In other words, the myth of the Second Coming is not about how Christ is literally going to kill all bad guys in the world, so that the good guys can live with Christ in heaven on earth, or earth in heaven. Those would all be external events presumably. When we understand the myth of the Second Coming of Christ as representing the inner psychodynamics of the emergence of the higher masculinity in ego-consciousness, we recognize that the emergence of ego-integrity in stage eight involves dying to and discarding all the old ways in which our ego-consciousness has suffered from the limitations of our personal psychological history and our cultural conditioning. The bad guys inside our psyches are the “shadow” forms of the archetypes of maturity discussed by Moore. They need to die so that ego-integrity can emerge, manifesting the optimal forms of the four masculine archetypes of maturity and of the four feminine archetypes of maturity.

(I.115a) ---. The King Within: Accessing the King [Archetype] in the Male Psyche. New York: Morrow, 1992; revised and expanded ed., Chicago: Exploration P, 2007. Topic: Jungian Theory. There is a corresponding Queen archetype in the female psyche. In all cultures, people who have the titles “king” and “queen” within a certain group receive projections of the King and the Queen archetypes respectively from members of the group, and so the designated “king” and “queen” carry those archetypal projections from the members of the group. Just how well the “king” and the “queen” carry those projections usually determines the fates of the carriers. But in all cultures, the mother figure and the father figure for the children growing up also carry the projections of these archetypes from the children. But the mother figure and the father figure are not necessarily the only carriers of these projections from the children – relatives and friends and schoolteachers and clergy also frequently carry the projections of these archetypes from children. As a result, we usually have a number of mother
figures and father figures in our lives if we are lucky. However, if we are not so lucky, we can continue to go through our adult lives in search of worthy mother figures and worthy father figures. By virtue of their professional training, spiritual directors and psychotherapists are supposed to be such worthy persons because in Carl Rogers’ famous formulation they are supposed to be able to extend unconditional positive regard to persons in the proper ritual setting of spiritual direction or psychotherapy. However, apart from the contexts of spiritual direction or psychotherapy, people who manifest the quality that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* refers to a greatness of soul (aka magnanimity) are accessing the King or Queen archetypes in the archetypal level of the psyche. (Remember that “soul” is used in English to render the Greek term that would be transliterated as “psyche”; I admit that it would sound odd to render Aristotle’s expression as “greatness of psyche”; but perhaps we could settle for “greatness of spirit.”)

(I.116) ---. *The Lover Within: Accessing the Lover [Archetype] in the Male Psyche.* New York: Morrow, 1993. Topic: Jungian Theory. There is also a feminine form of the Lover archetype in the female psyche. In Plato’s *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, the part of the psyche that is referred to as the desiring part of the human psyche accesses the Lover archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche. Concerning the Lover archetype and our attachments, see Anthony de Mello (I.42).

(I.117) ---. *The Magician Within: Accessing the Shaman [Archetype] in the Male Psyche.* New York: Morrow, 1993. Topic: Jungian Theory. Also see Eliade (I.54); Grim (I.76); Huxley (I.87a); Masters and Houston (I.108a); H. Smith (I.168a). There is also a feminine Magician archetype in the female psyche. Trickster figures such as Odysseus are manifestations in folklore and oral tradition and in written imaginative literature of the Magician archetype. The part of the psyche that is referred to by Plato and Aristotle as logos (reason) accesses the Magician archetype at the archetypal level of the human psyche.

(I.118) ---. *The Warrior Within: Accessing the Knight [Archetype] in the Male Psyche.* New York: Morrow, 1992. Also listed as Moore and Gillette (III.124). Topic: Jungian Theory. Also see Koziak (III.110). There is also a feminine Warrior archetype in the female psyche. Heroic figures such as Hector and Achilles are manifestations in folklore and oral tradition and written imaginative literature of the Warrior archetype. The part of the psyche that Plato and Aristotle refer to as thumos (or thymos) accesses the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the human psyche. Thumos is the psychological home of our fight/flight/freeze responses.


(I.131) ---. The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive Essays and Studies. New York: Macmillan, 1962. Also listed as Ong (IX.57; XII.114). Topics: Cultural Studies; History of Technology.

(I.132) ---. Faith and Contexts. 4 vols. Ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup. Atlanta: Scholars P, 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1999. Also listed as Ong (XII.119). Topics: Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. In “Writing and the Evolution of Consciousness” (1985), reprinted in Faith and Contexts: Volume Three (1995: 202-214), Ong makes the following important statement: “The Platonic ideas are silent, immobile, in themselves devoid of all warmth, not interactive but isolated, not part of the human lifeworld at all but utterly above and beyond it, paradigmatic abstractions. Plato’s term idea, form, is visually based, coming from the same root as the Latin videre, meaning to see, and such English derivatives as vision, visible, video. Platonic form was form conceived of by analogy with visible form. Despite his touting of logos and speech, the Platonic ideas in effect modeled intelligence not so much on hearing as on seeing” (206). Nevertheless, in “Hermeneutic Forever: Voice, Text, Digitization, and the ‘I’” (1995), reprinted in Faith and Contexts: Volume Four (1999: 183-203), Ong agrees with something that Plato says: “In a given situation, interlocutors can of course come to a satisfactory and true conclusion, not by reason of words alone, but because the meeting of their minds, mutual understanding, is realized not alone through the words spoken but also through the nonverbal existential context, such as the unconsciously shared cultural or personal memories out of which and in which the words are spoken. Plato notes that truth can be arrived at only after dialogue within long mutual acquaintanceship, ‘partnership in a common life’ (Seventh Letter 341). Words alone will not do: The unsaid, in which words are embeeded, must be shared in interpersonal relationship. Communication in words-and-context will yield truth here and now, will satisfy the demands of the present quest for truth even though the context and the words themselves are incomplete and could, of course, absolutely speaking, be subject to further verbalization and the grasp of truth thereby enlarged or deepened” (187).


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*Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word.* London and New York: Methuen, 1982. Accessible. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies; History of Technology. The typographically reset second edition was published by Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group in 2002 with no new textual material by Ong, but with slight differences in pagination and an expanded index. However, in the following 13 places in the 2002 edition, Ong’s term “noetics” has been changed to “poetics” (page number/line number format): (1) 24/9; (2) 69/10; (3) 69/20; (4) 69/32; (5) 69/35; (6) 97/8; (7) 117/3; (8) 117/5; (9) 127/6; (10) 138/5; (11) 164/8; (12) 165/12; (13) 170/3. Professor Jozef Japola spotted these 13 changes in Ong’s text. Because Ong works with his own understanding of noetics and noetic structures, these 13 changes should be noted by people who are reading and researching Ong’s thought. Also see Logan (IX.47a).

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University. For a critique of Ong’s book, see Frank Kermode’s “Free Fall” in the New York Review of Books (March 14, 1968): 22-26. Kermode reprinted this piece as “Father Ong” in Modern Essays (London: Fontana Books/Collins, 1971: 99-107). Also see my detailed response to Kermode’s critique in my “Introduction” to An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry (I.138: 51). Toward the end of The Presence of the Word, Ong expresses hope about the potential positive impact and influence of the communication media that accentuate sound. Indeed their impact and influence had been rising steadily in the twentieth century, but even more strongly than ever before after the end of World War II. If we accept Ong’s way of thinking about the impact and possible influence of the communication media that accentuate sound, then we should note that their impact as part of our cultural conditioning occurs below the level of our conscious awareness, just as the historical impact and influence of the products of the Gutenberg printing press occurred in advancing what Ong styles our visualist cultural conditioning. For the sake of discussion, let’s say that Ong is right about the impact and influence of the communication media that accentuate sound as culturally conditioning our consciousness but at a deep level that we are not aware of. It would follow that many Americans who were functionally literate were in effect experiencing a shift in the tectonic plates of their consciousness (as their consciousness was shifting away from their visualist cultural conditioning in print culture), but without understanding that they were having this kind of deep shift occurring in their consciousness. No doubt this kind of deep shift in their consciousness was one factor in the ascendancy of cultural and political conservatism in the United States that was powered by the anti-1960s rhetoric that Philip Jenkins describes (III.93).

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(I.143) ---. “World as View and World as Event.” American Anthropologist 71 (1969): 634-47. Also listed as Ong (IX.61). Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see


(I.144a) Pagels, Elaine. *Revelations: Vision, Prophecy, and Politics in the Book of Revelation.* New York: Viking/Penguin Group, 2012. Topics: Biblical Studies; Classical Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Pagels (III.141). The vivid imagery of the book of Revelation expresses the essential spirit of what Ong characterizes as the sense of adversativeness of agonistic striving. No doubt we need to cultivate our own personal sense of adversativeness as we strive to act of meaningful ways in our lives. Through our sense of personal adversativeness, we engage the part of our psyches that Plato and Aristotle refer to as “thumos” (or “thymos”), the spirited part of our psyches. Plato and Aristotle see courage as the virtue connected with “thumos.” They also see courage as the mean between the extremes of over-doing the courage thing, or brashness, on the one hand, and, on the other, under-doing the courage thing, or cowardice. In a similar way, we can over-do our own personal sense of adversativeness – of being up against all variety of other people -- just as we can under-do our own personal sense of adversativeness through our pusillanimity. In other words, in terms of the imagery in the book of Revelation, we can over-do the spirit of adversativeness when we imagine ourselves to be the knight on the white charger conquering all evil-doers when we should not be trying to conquer all evil-doers, because we might just be mistaken about those supposed evil-doers being evil. Besides this possibility, and contrary to the envisioned goal of the warrior/king on the white charger in the book of Revelation, we should not expect that we humans are ever going to establish distributive justice for all once and forever thereafter on this earth in our collective human arrangements. Nevertheless, we can interpret the warrior/king on the white charger in the book of Revelation as representing symbolically what C. G. Jung and his followers refer to as the transcendent function, which must kick in in our psyches whenever we are to transition and move from one existential condition in life to another. In effect, Jung and his followers do regard the transcendent function in the psyche as comparable in spirit and scope in its work in the human psyche, to the warrior/king on the white charger in the book of Revelation. Moreover, what Jung and his followers refer to as the transcendent function is connected with what Robert L. Moore (X.36) refers to as the archetype of initiation – that is, initiation into learning a new existential condition in life, which usually includes a sense of loss of and mourning for the earlier existential condition(s) in life. Furthermore, the ways in which Jungians imagine the transcendent function working in the individual person’s psyche is compatible with the ways in which
Christians imagine the imaginary Christ the King (i.e., the warrior/king on the white charger in the imagery of the book of Revelation) working in the individual person’s psyche. In short, Jungians envision the emergence of personal psychological development as involving a kind of interaction between the transcendent function and ego-consciousness. For further discussion of the transcendent function within the psyche of an individual, see the papers in *The Transcendent Function: Individual and Collective Aspects: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress for Analytic Psychology, Chicago, 1992*, edited by Mary Ann Mattoon (Einsiedeln, Switzerland: Daimon Verlag, 1993). For further discussions of mourning, see S. Anderson (X.3); Bradshaw (X.7); Frank (X.20; X.21); Jeffreys (X.24); Koulouris (X.28); Pollock (X.41b).


(I.154) Rickford, John R. and Julie Sweetland, Angela E. Rickford, and Thomas Grano, eds. *African American, Creole, and Other Vernacular Englishes in Education: A Bibliographic Resource*. New York and London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group; Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 2013. Topic: History of Education. As helpful as it is for us to have this bibliographic resource, I should point out that the abstract (135-36) that is published with the bibliographic information about Thomas J. Farrell’s controversial 1983 article “IQ and Standard English” (IX.24) is so garbled in places that it is not only inaccurate but unintelligible. For me, the most galling part is the seemingly gracious statement “Abstract graciously provided by Thomas Farrell” (135). But that statement is not true, because I did not provide that abstract that is published in the book. To be sure, I did provide an abstract at one time. But somehow it was rewritten to become the unintelligible abstract that is published in the book. For example, the beginning part of a lengthy sentence in the published abstracts says, “Agreeing with him [Eric Havelock] that the source of those [the standard forms of the verb “to be”] is genetic rather than environmental” (136). But try to figure out the antecedents for the words “him” and “those” in the published statement. In square brackets I have inserted the apparent antecedents. However, Eric Havelock says nothing about the standard forms of the verb “to be” being genetic rather than environmental. So this part of the sentence makes no sense at all. In the remainder of the lengthy sentence in question, we find a reference to “Jensen,” who has not been mentioned previously in the published abstract. In any event, here is the abstract that I did at one time send to John Rickford of Stanford University: “Abstract for ‘IQ and Standard English’ in the December 1983 *College Composition and Communication* (470-84) [see Farrell (IX.24)]: This article is a follow up to, but a significant departure from Farrell’s ‘Literacy, the Basics, and All That Jazz’ in the January 1977 *College English* (443-59) [see Farrell (I.62)]. Drawing on Ong’s thought in both articles, Farrell distinguishes between (1) Black inner-city youth from a residually oral culture and (2) White youth from a secondary oral culture. In his 1977 article Farrell downplayed the importance of grammar instruction (‘the basics’), but in his 1983 article he draws on Eric A. Havelock’s work to stress the importance of grammar instruction, especially learning the standard forms of the verb ‘to be’ [see Havelock (IX.32)]. The author [Farrell] hypothesizes that learning the standard forms of the verb ‘to be’ helps
actuate the potential for what Arthur R. Jensen refers to as Level II cognitive development. He claims that his hypothesis is testable and urges studies to test it. Because of the oratorical dimension of the selections in the *McGuffey Readers*, those readers could be used for children in the experimental group. As of 2011, Farrell regrets that he does not mention Gary Simpkins’ ‘Bridge’ [G. Simpkins, Holt, and C. Simpkins (IX.77)] approach to reading instruction. [Abstract provided by the author.]” Also see G. Simpkins (IX.75; IX.76); G. Simpkins and F. Simpkins (IX.78).


(I.170) Sokolowski, Robert. *Eucharistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure*. Washington, DC: Catholic U of America P, 1994. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Ong’s *The Presence of the Word* (I.140); Belting (IX.7); Bloom (I.19); Cushman (X.13); de Mello (I.42); Eliade (I.53); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Loyola (III.113); Men (X.32); von Balthasar (I.189).


(I.188a) Vollmann, William T. *The Ice-Shirt*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1990. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Vollmann (XII.164a; XII.164b). This historical novel is volume one of the author’s Seven Dreams of North American Landscapes.

(I.188b) ---. *The Rifles*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1994. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Vollmann (I.188a; XII.164a; XII.164b). This historical novel is volume six of the author’s Seven Dreams of North American Landscapes.

(I.189) von Balthasar, Hans Urs. *Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa*. Trans. Mark Sebanc. San Francisco: Communio Books/Ignatius P, 1995. Topics: Classical Studies; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Ong’s *The Presence of the Word* (I.140); Belting (IX.7); Bloom (I.19); Cushman (X.13); de Mello (I.42); Eliade (I.53); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Loyola (III.113); Menn (X.32); Sokolowski (I.170).


(I.198) Wimsatt, James I. *Hopkins’s Poetics of Speech Sound: Sprung Rhythm, Lettering, Inscape*. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 2006. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies. Decisively corrects Ong’s influential 1941 Master’s thesis that was originally published, slightly revised, in 1949 and is reprinted in *An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry* (I.138: 111-74). Also see Nixon (II.12); Ong (II.15; II.16: 99-126; VIII.12; XII.118); Phillips (IX.63).


II. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT CYCLIC THOUGHT AND LINEAR THOUGHT

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 138-44. Ong connects cyclic thought with primary orality; linear thought, with writing and visuality; evolutionary thought, with print culture and what Ong refers to as hypervisualism; ecological thought, with what Ong refers to as secondary orality.


(II.3) Beinhocker, Eric D. The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economic. Boston: Harvard Business School P, 2006. Topics: Economic History; Evolutionary Theory. Also see Acemoglu and Robinson (III.1a); Appleby (III.4); de Sota (XII.25); Diamond (III.38b); R. H. Frank (III.60a); R. H. Frank and Cook (III.60b); Freeland (III.71a); B. Friedman (XII.48); Hacker and Pierson (XII.63); Krugman (XII.82; XII.83); Landes (III.111b); Marmot (III.117b); Mokyr (XII.103); Warsh (XII.165); Wilkinson and Pickett (III.171a).


2003. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Ballew (II.1); Eliade (II.6); Farrell (I.62a); Lee (II.11); Ong (I.143); D. M. Smith (I.168). Donald L. Fixico is himself Native American.

(II.9) Friedman, Richard Elliott. *The Hidden Book in the Bible.* San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998. Topic: Biblical Studies. Centuries before somebody put the two accounts of creation at the beginning of the Hebrew Bible, the Yahwist source (aka J) constructed a roughly chronological and linear sequence of historical events. In Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates tells the story of Er, in which we learn about the periodic recycling of souls, which is an example of cyclic thought. In Virgil’s *Aeneid*, we find a similar example of recycling of souls when Aeneas visits the underworld. Because the ancient Hebrews eventually came to think in terms of creation (i.e., the beginning) and end-time (the eschaton), our Western sense of linear time derives from them.


(II.14) ---. *Frontiers in American Catholicism: Essays on Ideology and Culture.* New York: Macmillan, 1957. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Concerning cyclic thought, see 54, 83, 112; concerning Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s thought, see 1, 37, 92. But concerning Ong’s view about possibly giving certain aspects of secular culture sacred meaning (i.e., sacramental meaning), also see Cox (XII.22b); Farrell (X.17); Ong (II.17).
(II.15) ---. *Hopkins, the Self, and God*. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 1986. Also listed as Ong (X.40; XII.121). Topics: Literary Studies; Jesuit Spirituality; Cultural Studies; Evolutionary Theory. Ong’s 1981 Alexander Lectures at the University of Toronto. Also see Nixon (II.12); Ong (II.16: 99-126; VIII.12; XII.118); Phillips (IX.63); Wimsatt (I.198).

(II.16) ---. *In the Human Grain: Further Explorations of Contemporary Culture*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Also listed as Ong (XII.124). Topics: Cultural Studies; Evolutionary Theory; History of Technology. See the index for “cyclicism,” Charles Darwin, evolution, history, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, time. Concerning Hopkins, see 99-126. Also see Ong (II.15; VII.12; XII.118); Phillips (IX.63); Wimsatt (I.198).

(II.17) ---. “The Mechanical Bride: Christen the Folklore of Industrial Man.” *Social Order* (Saint Louis University) 2 (1952): 79-85. Topics: Cultural Studies; Evolutionary Theory. This review essay is the first article in which Ong discusses the thought of the French paleontologist and religious thinker Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J.


III. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT AGONISTIC STRUCTURES

Note: See Orality and Literacy: 42-45, 69-70.


(III.1a) Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business/Random House, 2012. Topics: Economic History; Cultural Studies. Also see Appleby (III.4); Beinhocker (II.3); de Sota (XII.25); Diamond (III.38b); R. H. Frank (III.60a); R. H. Frank and Cook (III.60b); Freeland (III.71a); B. Friedman (XII.48); Hacker and Pierson (XII.63); Krugman (XII.82; XII.83); Landes (III.111b); Marmot (III.117b); Mokyr (XII.103); Warsh (XII.165); Wilkinson and Pickett (III.171a).

(III.2) Anonymous. The Gospel According to John. Trans. David M. Stanley. The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha. Ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katharine Doob Sakenfeld, and James R. Mueller. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 1365-93. Probably written in the decades of the 90s CE. The anonymous author of the Gospel of John was motivated by the agonistic spirit of pro-and-con debate to stand up for his convictions about the significance of Jesus and to denigrate the Jews of his time who did not share his convictions about Jesus by making the Jews of Jesus’ time in the story the villains. As the author portrays the Jews in the story that he constructed, they are roughly comparable to the suitors in the Homeric epic the Odyssey. Also see Crossan (III.35); Fredriksen (III.71); Carroll (III.23).

(III.3) Anonymous. The Gospel According to Mark. Trans. M. Jack Suggs. The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha. Ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katharine Doob Sakenfield, and James R. Mueller. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 1304-26. Probably written around 70 CE. The historical Jesus was a non-violent hero; his life and death were heroic. But the anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark constructed a hero story to rival the Homeric epic the Iliad. In the Iliad Achilles is told by his goddess-mother that two fates await him: (1) he can leave Troy and the war and go home, in which case he will live a long life; or (2) he can return to fight again in the war, in which case he will die in the war and not return home. After certain events unfold, Achilles chooses to return to the war and fight again, knowing full well that he will die in the war and not return home. With the well-known example of Achilles in mind, the Greek-educated
anonymous author wrote the Gospel of Mark in Greek in such a way that he portrayed the character named Jesus as predicting not once, not twice, but three times his own upcoming suffering and death in Jerusalem, and then walking heroically straight into Jerusalem to meet his predicted suffering and death. In this way, the anonymous author has constructed the greatest hero story ever told – he topped Homer! That’s the agonistic spirit at work – go up against the best Greek storyteller and surpass the best storyteller with your own carefully constructed story. Also see MacDonald (I.103).


(III.5) Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa theologiae: Latin Text and English Translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices, and Glossaries*. 61 vols. Cambridge, UK: Blackfriars; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1981. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Klubertanz (XII.81a); McInerny (XII.94a). Because medieval Islamic culture is not usually considered to be part of Western culture, Thomas Aquinas is arguably the greatest medieval Aristotelian philosopher. Both the Dominican and the Jesuit religious orders in the Roman Catholic Church have taught Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy over the years. As a result, Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy has been taught to more people and has been studied by more people in Western culture over the centuries than any other specific philosophy. Even though the agonistic spirit of pro-and-con debate is exemplified in the literary genre known as a dialogue (e.g., Plato’s dialogues), Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa theologiae* is arguably the most famous exemplification of the agonistic spirit in the Western tradition, because of the way in which Aquinas systematically lists real or imagined adversarial objections and then proceeds to reply to each objection one by one.


(III.6) Bakan, David. *The Duality of Human Existence: An Essay on Psychology and Religion*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Topics: Cultural Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Farrell (III.46; XII.37b); Helgeson (III.81); Ong (III.134); Sullivan (III.162). David Bakan (1921-2004) of the University of Chicago defines and explains two central tendencies in human nature, which he refers to as agency and communion. What he means by agency is the psychodynamism of the agonistic spirit discussed by Ong (III.134). Ong never tired of championing I-thou communication,
which involves communion. In The Psychology of Gender (III.81), Vicki S. Helgeson in psychology at Carnegie Mellon University works with Bakan’s terms of agency and communion. In my article “The Female and Male Modes of Rhetoric” (III.46), I have defined two modes of rhetoric that decidedly resemble what Bakan means by agency and communion. I make the following brief characterizations: “The thinking represented in the female mode [of rhetoric] seems eidetic, methectic, open-ended, and generative, whereas the thinking in the male mode [of rhetoric] appears framed, contained, more pre-selected, and packaged” (910; also see Sullivan [III.162]). In Western culture historically, agency is stereotypically masculine; communion, stereotypically feminine. But according to Bakan, we should work toward a balance of agency and communion in our lives. According to Bakan, a person who has over-developed agency but seriously under-developed communion is not a well-balanced person. By this standard, certain American men are not well-balanced persons. But we could argue that many American men have been encouraged to over-develop their agency, on the one hand, and, on the other, to seriously under-develop the communion dimension of their lives, because of biases in our Western cultural conditioning. Conversely, according to Bakan, a person who has over-developed communion but seriously under-developed agency is not a well-balanced person. By this standard, certain American women are not well-balanced persons. However, we could argue that many American women have not been allowed to develop their agency, on the one hand, and, on the other, have been encouraged to over-develop the communion dimension of their lives, because of biases in our Western cultural conditioning. But remember that in the 1960s Ong was saying that we in Western culture were already undergoing a shift in our cultural conditioning and consciousness because of the impact of the communication media that accentuate sound. As a result of this shift in our cultural conditioning and consciousness, perhaps many Americans will be able to work out a better balance of agency and communion in their lives. For example, when men today are urged to get in touch with the feminine side of life, this recommendation is best understood to mean that they should develop the communion dimension in their lives. In theory, a person could work out an optimal development of both agency and communion. Such an optimally developed person could be referred to as androgynous. I have discussed psychological androgyny at length in my essay “Secondary Orality and Consciousness Today” (XII.37b). In theory, a person could be seriously under-developed in both agency and communion. But I do not have a term to use to refer to such a seriously under-development.


(III.9) Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad: Anniversary Edition, with a New Preface. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 2012. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. American jeremiads can be understood as being examples of the kind of civic rhetoric that Aristotle refers to as epideictic rhetoric. However, in Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (III.138), Ong suggests that Ramism is monologic, which is to say that Ramism fostered the art of reason. Elsewhere, Ong works with the terms polemic and irenic. Because the art of discourse requires the refutation of the real or imagined adversarial position(s), the art of discourse is polemical in structure. By contrast, the art of reason is not polemical, but irenic. American jeremiads are argumentative in the sense of arguing about something that is indeed truly debatable and therefore seemingly polemical. However, because of the influence of Ramism, American jeremiads are not usually structured in such a way as to include a refutation of the real or imagined adversarial position(s). As a result, American jeremiads can be understood as a form of what Aristotle refers to as epideictic rhetoric, not a form of the kind of pro-and-con debate found in deliberative rhetoric or forensic rhetoric.


(III.10a) Biberman, Matthew. Masculinity, Anti-Semitism and Early Modern English Literature. Ashgate, 2004. Topics: Early Modern Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Carroll (III.21a); Crossan (III.35); Josephus (III.105); Nirenberg (III.128f).


(III.12a) Bottum, Joseph. An Anxious Age: The Post-Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of America. New York: Image, 2014. Topics: American Studies; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Dorrien (III.40); Jenkins (III.93); Levin (III.111d); Linker (III.111e); Steinfels (III.161a).

(III.13) Bowra, C. M. *Heroic Poetry*. London: Macmillan, 1952. Topics: Classical Studies; Literary Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Broich (III.14); Burckhardt (III.18); Campbell (III.20); Deme (III.38); Edwards (III.43); Hook and Reno (III.86); Isser (III.90); Kelber (III.106); McNamee (III.121); Mobley (III.123); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Moss (III.125); Nagy (III.126); Parks (III.142); Waith III.169); Whitman (III.171).


(III.19) Cairns, Douglas L. *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1993. Topic: Classical Studies. Also see Bennett (III.8a); Bowman (III.12b); Cash (III.23a); deSilva (III.38a); Foxhall and Salmon (III.68a); Freeman (III.71b); Krause (III.110a); McNamee (III.121); Newell (III.128a; III.128b; III.128c); Neyrey (III.128e); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Rosen and Sluiter (III.152b); Salzman (III.157).
(III.20) Campbell, Joseph. *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*. 3rd ed. *The Collected Works of Joseph Campbell*. Novato, CA: New World Library, 2008. Accessible. Topic: Comparative Mythology. Also see Houston (XII.72b); Neumann (III.128). In his classic book Joseph Campbell has discussed what he discerns to be the overall pattern of the life-stories of heroes who commit themselves to live heroic lives of virtue. (For another discernment of the most salient pattern, based on C. G. Jung’s work, see Erich Neumann’s *The Origins and History of Consciousness* [III.128].) Stories of imaginary heroes who committed themselves to live heroic lives of virtue are too numerous to enumerate here. But out of the ancient Western world have come stories about three historical persons who committed themselves to striving to live a heroic life of virtue: Socrates, Jesus, and Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. By definition, all saints canonized by the Roman Catholic Church are supposed to have led heroic lives of virtue. That does not mean that they were perfect. But it does mean that their efforts to live virtuous lives were heroic. More Americans should commit themselves to striving to live heroic lives of virtue, instead of living like anti-heroes such as Shakespeare’s character Falstaff. To Falstaff, the word “honor” is nothing but an empty sound signifying nothing but sound and fury. That’s the anti-hero for you. But the hero knows better. The hero values self-love and self-respect and self-regard. As a result, the hero is committed to striving to live a heroic life of virtue.


(III.21a) ---. *Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001. Topics: Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Biberman (III.10a); Blanshard (XII.13); Botticini and Eckstein (IX.12a); Crossan (III.35); Eisner (III.44); Fischel and Ortmann (III.64); Josephus (III.105); Neusner (I.122); Nirenberg (III.128f); O’Malley (XII.109); Sherry (X.44c); Ventresca (III.166a).


(III.27a) Clarke, Thurston. *Ask Not: The Inauguration of John F. Kennedy and the Speech that Changed America*. New York: Henry Holt, 2004. Topics: History of Rhetoric; American Studies. When I was in high school, I was so impressed with President Kennedy’s call to ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country that I wrote a short op-ed piece about it in the student newspaper.


(III.28a) Colby, Tanner. *Some of My Best Friends Are Black: The Strange Story of Integration in America*. New York: Viking/Penguin Group, 2012. Topic: American Studies. Also see King (III.108; III.108a); Patillo-McCoy (XII.138a); Sharkey (XII.152b). In-groups and out-groups have been formed in different societies over the centuries. For example, in ancient times, we find the Greek/barbarian categorization of a certain in-group (Greeks) versus the out-group (barbarians = all non-Greeks), the Jew/gentile categorization (gentiles = all non-Jews), and the Christian/pagan categorization (pagans = all non-Christians). In more recent centuries, in American culture down to the 1960s, we find that white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) dominated the prestige culture, relegating everybody else to the out-group (= all non-whites and all non-Anglo-Saxons and all non-Protestants). However, in each of these examples, the people in the supposed out-group usually were not one cohesive group. Instead, they were several out-groups. For example, blacks were one out-group, even though most of them were Protestants. Roman Catholics were another out-group, even though most of them were white. Jews were another out-group, even though most of them were white. And so on. Nevertheless, in American culture in the 1950s and 1960s, the black civil rights movement managed to win widespread support among certain whites, resulting in landmark civil rights legislation under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Tragically, President Johnson also escalated American involvement in the Vietnam war, and the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader of the black civil rights movement, was also involved in anti-war protests. Tragically, Dr. King was assassinated in 1968. His assassination sparked riots in certain parts of the country. After Richard M. Nixon was elected president in 1968, it fell to his administration to help restore law and order, on the one hand, and, on the other, restore peace and calm and hope among blacks by promoting affirmative action and so-called black capitalism. But in the years following Dr. King’s tragic assassination, his dream of racial integration met with resistance not only from many whites, but also from certain blacks. In his book *Some of My Best Friends Are Black: The Strange Story of Integration in America*, Tanner Colby says, “If children conform to the standards set by their peers, in the 1970s and 1980s the peer pressure for black children to keep with their own was intense” (page 33). In the terminology of in-groups and out-groups, they were being pressured to form a cohesive in-group of their own – ostensibly to resist certain efforts toward integration and to celebrate their own cultural heritage. Up to a certain point, this trend is understandable and even defensible. However, when peer pressure works to suggest that getting an education is somehow not a good thing, this kind of attitude about getting an education can be
self-defeating in the long run. Regarding the schools, Colby pointedly says, “To say that America’s schools are resegregating is to misstate the facts. They can’t resegregate. They’ve never integrated. The absence of artificial transfer programs to shuttle kids around just means we’re seeing the country for what it has been all along. What it never stopped being” (pages 204-205). Colby’s book is designed to be a kind of report card about Dr. King’s dream of integration – or at least a kind of report about it. Colby centers his attention on four places: (1) Birmingham, Alabama, where he went to school at suburban Vestavia during the heyday of busing to achieve racial integration; (2) Kansas City, Missouri, where he perceptively focuses on housing issues; (3) Madison Avenue, where he worked at one time as a copy writer in an advertising company; (4) Lafayette, Louisiana, where he spent his toddlerhood and the early years of his life. In this way, he proceeds to discuss integration in education, housing, work, and church. He interviewed certain people regarding issues about integration in each of these areas. In my estimate the interviews are the best parts of the book. (He now lives, with his wife, in Brooklyn, New York.) As Colby shows, J.C. Nichols started his high-status housing segregation in Mission Hills, an area in Kansas City, Missouri, decades before the white flight to segregated suburbs in more recent decades. Disclosure: I grew up in a white working-class neighborhood in Kansas City, Kansas, but I am quite familiar with Kansas City, Missouri, and with the white suburban areas in Johnson County, Kansas. In addition, in my first and second years in college, I attended Rockhurst College, the Jesuit college on Troost Avenue in Kansas City, Missouri. Now known as Rockhurst University, Colby discusses the neighborhood around it in his extended treatment of housing in Kansas City, Missouri. He describes Troost Avenue as the Berlin wall – with Rockhurst on the east side of Troost – the wrong side to be on to receive pizza deliveries. Just to the west side of Troost is the University of Missouri – Kansas City (UMKC). As Colby recounts, some faculty from UMKC and other home-owners east of Troost formed a broad neighborhood organization to protect their housing investments from the perfectly legal block-busting approaches of certain real-estate profiteers. Concerning advertising, Colby says, “Advertising is aspirational. It takes what people want to believe about themselves and then sells it back to them in the form of a car or a house or an iPod. At the end of the day, people don’t really aspire to whiteness or blackness. Back in Kansas City, J.C. Nichols wasn’t selling segregated housing. He was selling status. . . . The gold standard for any brand is to achieve a global status that transcends those [cultural and linguistic] barriers, that needs no translation. Nike. Apple. BMW. They’re not black. They’re not white. They’re just cool. That’s the brand that makes money. And the only way to be that brand is by connecting with each individual personally while still having a message that resonates universally. Which is why good advertising is really hard to do, and why most of it sucks” (page 213; his emphasis). But J.C. Nichols was not the only person selling
status. Arguably, all advertising is attempting to sell status. We Americans tend to be status-seekers, as Vance Packard pointed out decades ago in his book *The Status Seekers* (1959), the follow up to his widely read critique of advertising, *The Hidden Persuaders* (1957). But if advertising is aspirational, so were Dr. King’s speeches about integration. In Colby’s words, Dr. King took what many people wanted to believe about themselves and sold them on the justice and timeliness of the black civil rights movement. Even so, he wasn’t selling them a material commodity, exactly. Instead, he was selling them his dream of integration – a dream that many white Americans bought into, but by no means all whites. But what is Colby selling in his book? Basically, he is selling a tough-minded look at the efforts toward integration that Dr. King’s speeches helped inspire. To be sure, Colby interviewed certain people whose successes are worth reporting – and worth reading about. The aspirational dimension of his book comes from those winning stories of experiences of modest success. Yes, we Americans collectively should cheer for the people involved in the modest successes that Colby recounts. In addition, we should celebrate the end of Jim Crow laws in the South and the enlargement of the black middle class in recent decades. We also have greater diversity in the prestige culture in America today than we had in, say, the 1950s. However, for the most part, Colby is advertising the decidedly disappointing results of the efforts toward integration. From the time of President Johnson’s administration onward, we Americans collectively have expended an enormous amount of time and energy and money from the federal and state and local governments and from private sources in working on efforts toward integration. Our collective expenditures of these resources have been gigantic – leading to massive busing efforts and many other schemes involving magnet schools. The British poet Robert Browning famously wrote, “A man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a heaven for?” Thus far, Dr. King’s dream of integration has exceeded our grasp. Dr. King’s dream of integration is a vision -- it is visionary – just as certain statements in the Declaration of Independence are visionary -- aspirational. It’s a goal toward which we Americans can choose to work, if we want to. But to work toward the goal of integration, we should be as tough-minded as Colby is about just how hard meaningful integration is to work out. Yes, to be sure, there is a systemic dimension to the institutional structures in American society that work against integration. The systemic dimension should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, as Colby shows, we should not overlook the individuals, either. In the final analysis, the optimal form of integration will involve individuals who freely choose to help advance integration. In the meantime, Colby’s book shows that the time has come for tough-minded Americans to go back to the drawing board, as we say, and come up with new ways to help advance Dr. King’s dream of integration.


(III.36) Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. The experience of flow in work or play involves engaging the energies of what Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette (III.124) refer to as the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the human psyche. Anthony de Mello (I.42) also refers to flow. But he uses the idea of flow in such an expansive way that it would include not only the optimal experiences of Warrior energies, but also the optimal experiences of the other archetypes of maturity discussed by Moore and Gillette (I.121; I.122; I.123).


(III.41) ---. *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology*. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1993. Topic: American Studies. Also see Bottum (III.12a); Jenkins (III.93); Linker (III.111); Steinfels (III.161a).

(III.42) Douglass, James W. *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Carroll (III.22); Clarke (III.27b); Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56); Gibson (III.72e); Janney (III.91); Jenkins (III.93); Leaming (III.111b); Mahoney (III.115a); Nelson (III.127b); Newman (III.128d); Stone (III.161c); Wills (III.172). In my estimate, the best book
about President Kennedy’s assassination is *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters* by James W. Douglass, a Catholic peacenik. Douglass has thoroughly researched JFK’s assassination. The notes in his book fill up nearly 100 pages. Because of the sheer complexity of the events involved, Douglass provides a chronology of events from 1961 to 1963 on pages xxi–xxxi. In chapter one he gives us an overview. But in each subsequent chapter he dives in and gives us really detailed accounts of events involving an enormous number of people. Fortunately, his book includes a good index. Douglass borrows the term “the unspeakable” in his title from another Catholic peacenik, the Trappist monk Thomas Merton. As a matter of fact, Douglass quotes Merton frequently in this book. Indeed, Douglass describes Merton as “my Virgil on this pilgrimage” (x). Surprise, surprise, Douglass’s thesis is that President Kennedy, who sounded like a strident warrior in the Cold War in the 1960 presidential campaign (with his mistaken claim that there was a missile gap), was turning into a Catholic peacenik after his apocalyptic confrontation with the (now former) Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis. Disclosure: Because I participated in demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, I am also a peacenik. In any event, thanks to the non-violent resolution of that crisis, we are all still here today and able to talk about it. The world has never come so close to a nuclear holocaust as it did in the Cuban missile crisis. Subsequently, President Kennedy was working through back-channel correspondence with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev toward establishing peace between the two superpowers. Eventually, they did work out a test-ban treaty. President Kennedy was also working through back channels to establish peace with Fidel Castro in Cuba. Moreover, President Kennedy was not eager to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam, as his successor eventually did. Furthermore, President Kennedy was helping the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the black civil rights movement in the United States. One sly ad for Goldwater in 1963 said, “Kennedy for King/ Goldwater for President.” In addition, President Kennedy had effectively turned back the increase in the price of steel instigated by U.S. Steel and its allies in the steel industry. President Kennedy also had worked effectively to help support emerging nationalism in Africa. I should also mention here that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy was carrying on a crusade against organized crime, even though Douglass does not mention this crusade. In sum, there was no shortage of ways in which President Kennedy had done things that did not please certain powerful and influential people in the United States. But doesn’t peace sounds like a good idea? Evidently, peace didn’t sound like a good idea to a number of powerful Americans who conspired together to have President Kennedy assassinated and to set up Lee Harvey Oswald to be the patsy to take the blame. Those powerful Americans were locked into what former President Dwight Eisenhower styled the military-industrial complex, which Douglass refers to as the national security state. Their mentality was Manichaean, based on their militant anti-communism.
Some in the CIA were megalomaniacs; they hated peaceniks. As everybody knows, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had extensive experience in assassinations – inspired by their militantly anti-communism. Douglass has no doubt that the CIA was involved in President Kennedy’s assassination and in setting up Oswald to be the patsy and take the blame. Now, earlier, certain dreamers in the CIA dreamed up the ridiculous scenario that is known as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Fidel Castro’s Cuba. The CIA dreamers had hoped to trap the young President Kennedy into deciding to provide air cover for this ridiculous invasion. But President Kennedy did not act as they had hoped he would. As a result, the ridiculous invasion was a debacle. Nevertheless, President Kennedy took responsibility for the debacle because he had indeed signed off on the ridiculous plan. (The plan had started to be developed under former President Eisenhower.)


(III.44) Eisner, Peter. The Pope’s Last Crusade: How an American Jesuit Helped Pope Pius XI’s Campaign to Stop Hitler. New York: Morrow/HarperCollins, 2013. Topic: Church History. Also see Carroll (III.21a); Fischel and Ortman (III.64); Ventresca (III.166a).


Felson, Richard B. Violence & Gender Reexamined. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107b); Mills (III.122b); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129). Richard B. Felson “cites research suggesting that the motives for violence against women are similar to the motives for violence against men: to gain control or retribution and to promote or defend self-image.”

Fetzer, James H. Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits. Dordrecht, Netherlands; and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. Topics: History of Philosophy; History of Technology. Also see Palecek (III.141a). Both James H. Fetzer (born 1940) and I (born 1944) started teaching at the University of Minnesota Duluth in September 1987 – he in philosophy; me in composition (now known as writing studies). A prolific scholar, Fetzer was appointed in 1996 as one of the first ten Distinguished McKnight University Professors in the University of Minnesota. He retired from UMD in 2006; I, in 2009. His specialization is the philosophy of science. But he is not familiar with the generalized empirical method that Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984), has worked out in his philosophical masterpiece Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (IX.48). Unfortunately, Fetzer is not the only scholar in philosophy who has not studied Lonergan’s groundbreaking philosophical masterpiece. The 1978 Harper & Row paperback edition of Lonergan’s Insight features quotations from Stephen Toulmin of the University of Chicago, Time magazine, and Newsweek magazine that are worth quoting here at length. (1) Stephen Toulmin: “Insight is a masterly work, whose importance
reaches far beyond the boundaries of theology and Catholic philosophy. It has much to say of interest and significance to cognitive psychologists and to students of epistemology. Lonergan’s careful scrutiny of the procedures by which we put our creative intelligences to work is precise, lucid, and fascinating.” (2) *Time*: “In his grasp of the process of understanding that underlies every science, Lonergan is the twentieth century counterpart of a Renaissance Man.” (3) *Newsweek*: “With that boldness characteristic of genius, Jesuit philosopher Bernard Lonergan has set out to do for the twentieth century what even Aquinas could not do for the thirteenth: provide an ‘understanding of understanding’ that can illuminate not only the broad patterns of all accumulated knowledge but also reveal an ‘invariant pattern’ for further developments in human understanding.” As these quotations indicate, Lonergan’s *Insight* is relevant to Fetzer’s specialization in the philosophy of science. Moreover, Lonergan’s way of understanding human understanding is related in spirit to what Ong refers to as noetics and noetic structures. As a result, considered together, Ong and Lonergan have taken Western philosophic thought to an unprecedented new level, leaving Fetzer and many other academics in philosophy behind.

(III.51) ---. *Assassination Science: Experts Speak Out on the Death of JFK*. Chicago: Catfeet P, 1998. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Fetzer (III.55; III.56); Douglas (III.42); Janney (III.91); Nelson (III.127b); Palecek (III.141a); Stone (III.161c). I greatly admire James H. Fetzer’s persistent scholarly interest in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.


(III.54) ---. *The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Human the Only Animals with Minds?* Chicago: Open Court, 2005. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see MacLean (III.115).

(III.55) ---. *The Great Zapruder Film Hoax: Deceit and Deception in the Death of JFK*. Chicago: Catfeet P, 2003. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Janney (III.91); Nelson (III.127b); Stone (III.161c).

Assassination; American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Janney (III.91); Nelson (III.127b); Stone (III.161c).


(III.59) ---. Render unto Darwin: Philosophical Aspects of the Christian Right’s Crusade against Science. Chicago: Open Court, 2007. Topics: American Studies; Religious Studies; Evolutionary Theory; Abortion. Also see Gore (III.75); Nanda (III.127). I greatly admire Princeton-educated James H. Fetzer’s critique of the Christian right’s crusade against science. More specifically, I admire his spirit of engaging the Christian right’s critique of science, because we should not have to leave it up to the Harvard-educated politician Al Gore (III.75) to engage the Christian right’s crusade against science. In this book Fetzer also includes a fine chapter about the abortion debate. In this chapter he works with deontological moral theory to work out his own reasonable position regarding the admittedly weighty issue of abortion.


(III.62) ---. Sociobiology and Epistemology. Dordrecht, Netherlands; and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1985. Topics: History of Philosophy; Evolutionary Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Ong (III.134); Wilson (III.173a). In Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (III.134), Ong’s 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Ong says that his “book goes a bit farther than sociobiology ordinarily does. Indeed, if the term [sociobiology] is properly understood, what it [his book] deals with might be called ‘noobiology,’ the biological setting of mental activity (Greek nous, noos, mind). Intellect does not sit on the biological organism like a rider on a horse in a Cartesian or Platonic superdualistic world. Thought itself operates out of genetic as well as intellectual history. It has neurophysiological support or grounding. If a human being is truly a microcosm, as he or she in an even deeper sense than the ancients could have been conscious of, he or she will bring together the extremes of existence: the genetic heritage, which reaches back into the inorganic world, and the biologically unprocessable, genetically free-floating self-consciousness which is the only situs of human intelligence and of its
dialectical complement human freedom. (There is no knowledge or human freedom outside of individual personal consciousness)” (11). In connection with Ong’s claim here about noobiology, I should point out that Ong’s admittedly scattered comments about noetics and noetic structures have not been systematically studied to examine their coherence and cogency. No doubt Ong like to use the terms noobiology, noetics, and noetic structures because they can readily be connected with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s term the noosphere (see II.21). Regarding the ancient use of the term noos, see Menn (X.32) and Engberg-Pedersen (I.55).


(III.65) Fish, Stanley. Save the World on Your Own Time. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Topics: American Studies; History of American Higher Education. Also see Duberman (XII.30); Greenberg (XII.56); Jacoby (XII.74b). Even though Stanley Fish is not familiar with Bernard Lonergan’s Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (IX.48), Fish in effect recommends what Lonergan refers to as the detached, disinterested desire to know. No doubt the desire to save the world can at times be a commendable desire in its proper place. No doubt the desire for social justice can at times be a commendable desire in its proper place. After all, I have not heard any American politician step forward yet to say, “I’m not for social justice. I’m against social justice. I’m for social injustice.” Even conservative Republicans do not say such things. Moreover, the overly fervent pursuit of certain debatable means for supposedly saving the world usually involves over-reach and therefore usually results in generating a predictable backlash, regardless of whether the over-reach involving debatable means is carried out by self-described liberals or self-described conservatives.


(III.72b) Fromm, Erich. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72d); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); Menninger (III.121a); A. Miller (III.122a); Pinker (III.145).


(III.72d) ---. Escape from Freedom. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941. A classic. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Fromm (III.72b); Menninger (III.121a); Pinker (III.145). Erich Fromm works out a psychoanalytic account of authoritarianism in terms of sadomasochism. What he refers to as authoritarianism is the equivalent of what David Riesman (X.44) refers to as outer-directed (also known as tradition-directed). It is the basic personality structure of all humanity. But of course Fromm is studying the rise of what became an extremely virulent form of authoritarianism in Germany, which was accompanied by genocide against Jews under Hitler and the Nazis. Riesman’s outer-directed person represent Freud’s oral stage of psychosocial development; Riesman’s inner-directed person, Freud’s anal stage; Riesman’s other-directed person, Freud’s genital stage, or at least the spirit of Freud’s genital stage, if not always the optimal form of the genital stage.


Topics: American Studies; History of American Higher Education. The title “Contending with Modernity” aptly captures the spirit of agonistic adversativeness that has characterized Roman Catholic popes in recent centuries. In the nineteenth century Pope Leo XIII issued the encyclical *Aeternae Patris* (1879, urging educated Catholics to renew their interest in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). As a result of his encyclical, Catholic scholars in Europe and North America went to work studying the texts of Thomas Aquinas very carefully. Over the centuries, not only the Dominicans but also the Jesuits had championed the work of Thomas Aquinas. But Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical renewed scholarly study of Thomas Aquinas and helped advance the teaching of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy in Catholic higher education in the twentieth century. In North America, two noted French Thomists, Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, were widely read. In the United States, the Department of Philosophy at Saint Louis University, where Walter Ong as a young Jesuit scholastic (i.e., Jesuit seminarian in studies) studied philosophy as part of his Jesuit training, was the leading center of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy for several decades in the twentieth century. Leading Thomists at SLU included Robert J. Henle, S.J., George E. Klubertanz, S.J., and Vernon Bourke. Henle and Klubertanz were zealots for Thomistic metaphysics. In the course on metaphysics that I took from Henle in the spring semester of 1982 at Saint Louis University, he claimed that Kant was not familiar with Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics. In short, Kant had not done his homework. In any event, his and Klubertanz’s zealotry for Thomistic metaphysics influenced other American Catholic educators to emphasize Thomistic metaphysics as the way to begin the undergraduate study of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, which typically involved several required philosophy courses spread over the four years of undergraduate education in many American Catholic colleges and universities, including courses in the philosophy of human nature, the philosophy of God, and ethics – all taught from the standpoint of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Those students who understood what was being taught in those required philosophy courses received an excellent introduction to philosophic thinking. But of course not all the students who took the required courses in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy fully understood the philosophic thinking that was being taught in them. In any event, the required Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy courses were the most conspicuous way in which American Catholic higher education was involved in contending with modernity, but not the only way. Because Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy was emphasized so strongly in American Catholic higher education for several decades in the twentieth century, most college-educated American Catholics were not equally well grounded in the tradition of American pragmatism in philosophy, with the possible exception of those college-educated American Catholics who were educated in non-Catholic colleges and universities (e.g., John F. Kennedy was not educated in Catholic...
institutions of education). In the Catholic spirit of contending with modernity, American pragmatism in philosophy was often dismissed with short shrift in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy courses in American Catholic higher education, as were other modern philosophic traditions of thought associated with Kant and Hegel and others. If we think of higher education as a form of acculturation, college-educated students in American Catholic higher education were not being acculturated in American pragmatism in philosophy – or more generally, in the American intellectual tradition. Thus college-educated American Catholics who had received their college education as undergraduates in Catholic higher education were American Catholics being acculturated in the Old World through the emphasis on Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, because American Catholic higher education was dedicated to contending with modernity – the New World in which American Catholics just happened to be living. Conversely, scholars who specialize in the American intellectual tradition such as James H. Kloppenberg of Harvard University, who is himself a Catholic but he was not educated in Catholic higher education, do not appear to consider the work of American Catholics in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy to be part of the American intellectual tradition. In short, the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy that flourished in American Catholic higher education for most of the twentieth century was not part of American prestige culture at the time, nor has it received much acknowledgment and recognition by scholars of American intellectual history at non-Catholic universities. However, out of the Old World orientation of American Catholics arose John Courtney Murray, S.J., an American Jesuit who was instrumental in moving the Roman Catholic Church to recognize religious freedom officially at the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). Prior to going to Harvard University for his doctoral studies in English, Ong had been educated in Catholic educational institutions, receiving three graduate degrees during his Jesuit training from Saint Louis University. No doubt Ong’s Ph.D. from Harvard helped make him credible in American prestige culture in his day. In addition, Ong’s doctoral dissertation about the French logician and educational reformer and Protestant martyr Peter Ramus (1515-1572) involved American studies, because Perry Miller, who served as the director of Ong’s dissertation, had established in The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (XII.100) that virtually all college-educated New Englanders in the seventeenth century had been Ramists. As a result, Ong’s far more thorough study of Ramus and Ramism contributed to American studies, which under the influence of Perry Miller was emerging in American prestige culture as an important field of study. Thus Ong’s doctoral dissertation contributed to his credibility in American prestige culture in his day. For a perceptive survey of the influence of Kant and Hegel on modern Protestant theology, see Gary Dorrien’s Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology (XII.27).


(III.77) Gregg, Richard B. “The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest.” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 4 (1971): 71-91. Topic: History of Rhetoric. Also see Erikson (X.16a); L. J. Friedman (X.22a: 243-302); Grimaldi (I.76); Ong (III.140; XII.126). In *Identity’s Architect: A Biography of Erik H. Erikson* (X.22a), Lawrence J. Friedman perceptively discusses “Voice and Authenticity: The 1950s” (243-302). His discussion of how voice can be connected with a new level of authenticity and forcefulness (281) is centrally relevant to Richard B. Gregg’s discussion of the ego-function of protest rhetoric and also to Ong’s thesis about the psychodynamism of agonistic structures (III.140; XII.126). Actually, Ong’s own personal experience of the breakthrough in his thinking in the early 1950s can be understood as an example showing how he himself found his voice as a scholar and a new level of authenticity and forcefulness – see, for example, Ong (I.142).


(III.78a) Habermas, Jurgen. *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays*. Trans. Ciarin Cronin. Cambridge, UK; and Malden, MA: Polity P, 2008. Topics: History of Philosophy; Cultural Studies. In the philosophical essays in this collection, Jurgen Habermas works with the contrast of so-called naturalism and so-called religion. By so-called naturalism, he means the worldview of visuality and modernity in print culture in Western culture, which he characterizes as post-metaphysical. By contrast, he characterizes so-called religion as involving metaphysical thought. But because Habermas is not familiar with Ong’s groundbreaking work regarding the infrastructures of our Western cultural conditioning, and because Habermas evidently also is not familiar with Lonergan’s groundbreaking book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (X.30),
Habermas fails to examine the cultural conditioning in Western culture that produced the post-metaphysical bias that he obviously endorses, just as he fails to consider the alternative approach to metaphysical thought that Lonergan proposes. However, in my estimate, the post-metaphysical bias that Habermas obviously defends needs to be revisited and corrected. Also see Farrell (III.48); Nagel (III.125a); Ong (XII.124: 61-82); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Teilhard (II.21).

(III.78b) Hajdin, Mane. The Law of Sexual Harassment: A Critique. Selinggrove: Susquehanna UP; London: Associated U Presses, 2002. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Nathanson and Young (III.127b; III.127c); Patai (III.142a); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).


(III.84) Homer. The Iliad of Homer. Trans. and introduction Richmond Lattimore. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1951. It is extremely important to note that Iliad is not structured as a struggle of good guys versus bad guys. For example, Hector and Andromache are admirable compared to the Agamemnon and Achilles in the opening scene, in which the goddess Athena needs to physically restrain the powerful Achilles from dispatching Agamemnon and instruct him (Achilles) to give Agamemnon a good tongue lashing instead, which Achilles proceeds to do. In any event, the story about the seemingly endless war in Troy conveys the message that life, figuratively speaking, is like an endless war or struggle (Greek, polemos). In Christianity, the sense of life as a moral struggle or war is thematized by teaching Christians that they should be prepared to die for their religious faith. In Islam, the sense of life as a struggle or war is thematized in the term “jihad.”
The story of Odysseus can be understood as conveying the message that life, figuratively speaking, is like a never-ending contest or struggle (Greek, agon).


Janney, Peter. *Mary’s Mosaic: The CIA Conspiracy to Murder John F. Kennedy, Mary Pinchot Meyer, and Their Vision of World Peace*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012. Topics: American Studies; JFK Assassination; Hallucinogens. Also see Carroll (III.22); Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56); Douglass (III.42); Huxley (I.87a); Masters and Houston (I.108a); Nelson (III.127b); H. Smith (I.168a); Stone (III.161c); Wills (III.122). Unfortunately, it is not unheard of that a husband dumped and divorced by
his wife might kill her and perhaps also might kill her lover. But if he’s Cord Meyer, Jr., he might leave it up to his buddies to kill his wife’s lover and then his wife. Cord Meyer, Jr., had buddies who were professional assassins. He and his buddies worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA (which probably should be referred to as the Central Intelligence Assassins). In his book *Mary’s Mosaic*, Peter Janney shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Cord Meyer’s CIA buddies assassinated his former wife, Mary Pinchot Meyer. In addition, Peter Janney shows beyond a reasonable doubt that his own father, Wistar Janney, a high-ranking CIA official, participated in the assassination of Mary Pinchot Meyer. If Wistar Janney’s participation in the assassination of Mary Pinchot Meyer were not troubling enough for Peter Janney to deal with, wait until you read the rest of the story. For young Peter’s closest childhood friend was one of Mary and Cord Meyer’s sons, who was tragically killed by an oncoming car when he was trying to cross a busy highway. So through his father, Peter Janney probably knew all the high-ranking CIA officials that he discusses in this book as well as Mary Pinchot Meyer. It has been well established that Mary Meyer was one of President John F. Kennedy’s lovers. However, it is not well known that Mary kept a diary. In it, she presumably would have recorded information about how she had turned President Kennedy on to LSD. In James W. Douglass’ book *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why he Died and Why It Matters* (III.42), Douglass uses conceptual constructs from Roman Catholic theology to hypothesize an explanation of how and why JFK changed during his years as president. Surprise, surprise, LSD can prompt people to change. According to Peter Janney, Mary Meyer believed firmly in the power of LSD as an agent of personal change. As a result, she organized a small group of women to try to get powerful men in Washington to try LSD. She herself undertook to get JFK to try LSD. Evidently, he did take LSD under her guidance. As Peter Janney explains, she herself had been turned on to LSD by Timothy Leary and had learned from him how to guide others in taking LSD. As Douglass has shown in his book, powerful people in government and government-related businesses certainly had a motive to assassinate President Kennedy. As is well known, the CIA certainly had the means to assassinate President Kennedy. As Peter Janney explains, about one month after President Kennedy’s assassination, former President Harry S. Truman published an op-ed piece in the *Washington Post* sharply criticizing the CIA. As Peter Janney points out, evidently, Truman had figured out that the CIA had been involved in President Kennedy’s assassination. As Peter Janney reports, Mary Meyer had a home-delivery subscription to the Post. But did she see Truman’s piece? In any event, she did later see the work of fiction known as the Warren Commission Report. Unfortunately for her, she made the mistake of confronting her former husband about the Warren Commission cover-up. Peter Janney indicates that she may have also confronted James Jesus Angleton of the CIA about the Warren Commission cover-up. The CIA arranged to assassinate her in
order to silence her. In an elaborate scenario orchestrated by the CIA, she was shot at close range twice by a professional assassin. After she had been assassinated, Angleton himself also arranged to get his hands on her diary and take it. Just as Harvey Lee Oswald was set up to be the patsy for President Kennedy’s assassination, so too an African American man named Raymond Crump, Jr., was set up to be the patsy for Mary Pinchot Meyer’s assassination. But the prosecution had a weak case – only minimal circumstantial evidence against Crump. His skillful defense attorney, an African American woman named Dovey J. Roundtree, succeeded in inspiring the jurors with sufficient reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s case to win his acquittal. So when Peter Janney was a young boy, his best friend was killed by an automobile. Then when Peter Janney was a teenager in high school at a private boarding school, his best friend’s mother was murdered. Later in his life, Peter Janney learned that his best friend’s father’s CIA buddies arranged to have his best friend’s mother murdered and that his own father in the CIA, Wistar Janney, had participated in the execution of her murder. If you’ve read the longer version of William Faulkner’s story “The Bear,” you may be in a position to imagine the enormity of those tragic events in Peter Janney’s life. Frankly, it is a wonder that he has written such a remarkably lucid account of all those tragic events.


(III.93) Jenkins, Philip. Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of the Eighties. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Perceptive. Topic: American Studies. Also see Cox (XII.22a); Bottum (III.12a); Dorrien (III.40; III.41); Douglass (III.42); Duberman (XII.30); Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56); L. J. Friedman (X.22c); Greenberg (XII.56); Hale (III.79); Heath and Potter (III.80); Janney (III.91); Kurlansky (III.111); Levin (III.111d); Linker (III.111e); Masters and Houston (I.108a); O’Malley (XII.109); Ong (III.133; XII.121a); Skinner (XII.155a); Steinfelds (III.161a); J. Walsh (III.170); Wills (XII.168). In this admirable work Philip Jenkins sets for a perceptive interpretation of movement conservatism in American culture. Movement conservatism in American culture had its roots in the 1950s. For example, William F. Buckley’s ridiculous book God and Man at Yale (Chicago: Regnery, 1950) helped launch movement conservatism in American culture. But the excesses of various movements associated with the 1960s, including the excesses of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s so-called Great Society initiatives, proved to be the greatest boon bestowed on movement conservatism in American culture. Jenkins captures the spirit aptly be characterizing the spirit as anti-60s. For the anti-1960s crowd, the 1960s are associated not only with President Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, but also with both the black
civil rights movement that gained momentum in the 1950s and the women’s movement that emerged in the 1970s. For good measure, the anti-1960s crowd also includes in their expanded sense of the 1960s the Supreme Court decision in the 1970s to legalize abortion. The anti-1960s crowd has gotten enormous mileage out of their reactionary anti-1960s spirit. Their anti-1960s spirit exemplifies the psychodynamic that Ong in his book Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (III.134) refers to as the sense of adversativeness – as feeling up against something. Through targeting various targets to be up against, their sense of adversativeness has allowed them to establish as strong sense of an in-group versus and out-group. Ong has also discussed this tendency of forming an in-group and an out-group in his perceptive essay “The Barbarian Within: Outsiders Inside Society Today” (see item III.133). For the anti-1960s crowd, the 1960s symbolically represent the barbarians inside American society today – to use Ong’s figurative way of speaking. But I would reconfigure the way that the anti-1960s crowd aligns their sense of the in-group and the out-group. The long-standing historical configuration of the in-group in American prestige culture has been described as WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant). Because WASPS constituted the in-group historically in American culture, non-WASPS were lumped together as the out-group historically. However, when Harvard-educated Senator John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Vice President Richard M. Nixon in the 1960 presidential election, his election marked a sharp departure from WASP dominance in American prestige culture, because he was neither Anglo-Saxon nor Protestant. Moreover, even if he was motivated by pragmatic political considerations, he supported the black civil rights movement. In doing this and in other ways, JFK earned the wrath of the guardians of WASP hegemony in American prestige culture. As a result, JFK was assassinated by some of the guardians of WASP hegemony. Now, the black civil rights leader the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was very skilled in tempting white supremacists who were local guardians of WASP hegemony to overplay their hands in opposing his civil rights demonstrations. When they did overplay their hands, their reactionary efforts were photographed by the media and reported on the evening news in the living rooms of Americans across the country. At first blush, MLK’s strategies in tempting local guardians of WASP hegemony to overplay their hands may look like an exercise on his part if staging adversativeness. To be sure, he was staging adversativeness. However, he preached a message of non-violence. As a result, MLK represents the use of adversativeness in the service of non-violence. In a similar way, the demonstrations of the emerging contemporary women’s movement also represent the use of adversativeness in the service of non-violence. However, violence emerged when MLK was assassinated in 1968 and later when presidential candidate Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1968. There was also the violence of the riots in Los Angeles, and the violence of the police
at the time of the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968. Nevertheless, MLK’s commitment to the spirit of non-violence is instructive. David Bakan (III.6) and Vicki S. Helgeson (III.81) work with the contrast of agency versus communion, a contrast they see as a deep divide in the human psyche. The spirit that Ong describes as involving a sense of adversativeness usually accompanies agency, including the efforts in favor of agency made through public political demonstrations. But certain public political demonstrations can be carried out in the larger political spirit of communion. Because African Americans had been part of the out-group that was created historically through WASP hegemony in American prestige culture, the black civil rights movement associated with MLK’s spirit of non-violence can be understood as attempting the cultivate the larger political spirit of communion, at least with respect to public laws and customs (for example, the Jim Crow laws and customs). In certain respects, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant women had been the beneficiaries of WASP hegemony in American prestige culture historically. But certain white Anglo-Saxon Protestant women nevertheless joined the women’s movement that emerged in the 1970s. Self-styled feminists in the 1970s and later cultivated their sense of adversativeness by standing up to and denouncing male chauvinists, including of course white male chauvinists. No doubt their basic criticisms of male chauvinists were well founded, just as African American criticisms of Jim Crow laws and customs were well founded. However, as was the case with the criticisms of Jim Crow laws and customs, many of the criticisms advanced by feminists in the 1970s and later were aimed at advancing their sense of communion, at least communion within the larger political domains in American prestige culture. But Jenkins correctly notes that the anti-1960s crowd capitalized on the excesses of the black civil rights movement and the women’s movement to rally conservatives around their cause of resisting the excesses. Good riddance to the excesses. But are anti-1960s conservatives ever going to give up their resistance to the worthwhile advances that the black civil rights movement and the women’s movement helped bring about in American prestige culture?

(III.94) ---. *Jesus Wars: How Four Patriarchs, Three Queens, and Two Emperors Decided What Christians Would Believe for the Next 1,500 Years*. New York: HarperOne, 2010. Accessible. Topics: Church History; Cultural Studies. Also see Cox (XII.22a); Farrell (I.61).

(III.95) ---. *The New Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice*. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Topic: American Studies. Also see Massa (III.118). Political correctness dominates certain academic and media circles today. But political correctness has not yet ruled out public expressions of anti-Catholic attitudes in the United States. However, we should take into account the public roles of conservative American Catholics in their anti-
abortion zealotry. Incited by the religious zealotry of Pope John-Paul II and certain American Catholic bishops and priests, conservatives American Catholics have crusaded against legalized abortion in the first trimester. In light of their crusade against legalized abortion in the first trimester, Americans who support legalized abortion in the first trimester, many of whom could be described as the political correctness police in academia and the media, might understandably want to express invective against the Catholic anti-abortion zealots. Unfortunately, however, the public expression in the United States today of invective against Catholics calls to mind the centuries-old Protestant tradition in American culture of anti-Catholic invective and indeed of historical anti-Catholic prejudice. From colonial times onward, Protestants, by definition, celebrated the fact that they were not Catholic by being explicitly and overtly anti-Catholic. In response, American Catholics historically were anti-Protestant, or at least wary of American Protestants and American Protestant culture and practices. American Protestants historically represented the New World. By contrast, American Catholics historically tended to represent the Old World, because the Roman Catholic tradition of thought developed historically in the Old World of Continental Europe. In any event, over the centuries of American culture, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were the gatekeepers of prestige culture in American culture. Because of the strong anti-Catholic prejudice of WASPs, American Catholics historically developed their own parallel subculture in American culture, which certain Catholic sociologists have described as a ghetto culture. By and large, the broad trend in philosophy known as American pragmatism did not make any notable inroads in the American Catholic subculture, or ghetto. Conversely, the formidable Catholic tradition of thought did not make any notable inroads in the prestige culture in American culture dominated by American Protestants historically. Now, even if we were to cavalierly write off the formidable Catholic tradition of thought (e.g., the Catholic tradition of natural-law moral theory) as representing the Old World of pre-modern thought of Continental Europe as by definition unsuitable to being assimilated in the New World of modern thought of American prestige culture and its commitments to modernity, we should also note that Bernard Lonergan’s philosophical masterpiece *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (X.30) has not yet made inroads in American prestige culture. At least with regard to Lonergan’s *Insight* (1957), American prestige culture appears to be a closed-system of thought that has closed out Lonergan. Now, when we turn our attention from Lonergan to Ong, we should note that Ong’s Harvard doctoral dissertation was published in two volumes by Harvard University Press in 1958, Ong’s Terry Lectures at Yale were published by Yale University Press in 1967, and Ong had three important books published by Cornell University Press (in 1971, 1977, and 1981). To this day, Ong is the only Roman Catholic priest to have ever been elected president of the Modern Language Association (he served as MLA president in 1978). So he was not closed
out of American prestige culture, as Lonergan was. Nevertheless, Ong’s thought has not made deep inroads in American prestige culture, just as Lonergan’s thought in *Insight* has not. Why not? At least in part, Ong’s thought and Lonergan’s thought in *Insight* have probably not made deep inroads in American prestige culture because centuries-old anti-Catholic bias in American culture has worked against the assimilation of their admittedly challenging thought. However, apart from the possibility of Ong’s thought and Lonergan’s thought perhaps making inroads in American prestige culture, I would like to see more American authors criticize Roman Catholic moral theology. I have studied Roman Catholic moral theology, and I think it is open to question, to say the least (e.g., no masturbation, no artificial contraception, no legalized abortion in the first trimester, no divorce, no re-marriage after civil divorce, no communion for divorced Catholics, no same-sex marriage, no women priests, no married priests, no euthanasia, no physician-assisted suicide, no death penalty, etc.). In my estimate, Paul Blanshard (XII.11; XII.12; XII.13) in his day correctly criticized the Roman Catholic Church for certain questionable teachings. Today we in American culture need more Paul Blanshards to take on in public debate the questionable moral teachings of Roman Catholic moral doctrines doggedly advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops and their lay allies. Please do not misunderstand me here. I am not talking about simply directing invective toward the U.S. Catholic bishops or toward American Catholics more generally. Nor am I talking about simply making heartfelt denunciations of particular Catholic teachings. What this country needs now is informed pro-and-con public debate about Catholic moral teachings. In the name of being “prophetic,” certain U.S. Catholic bishops and their lay allies have entered the arena of public discourse and civic debate. However, in my estimate, nobody has effectively joined the debate against them. Let me explain briefly what I mean by saying this. In our law courts, the prosecuting attorney stands to say, “The accused is guilty as charged.” Then the defense attorney stands to say, “No, the accused is not guilty as charged.” In this way, the defense attorney formally joins the debate against the prosecuting attorney. Now, in addition to formally joining the debate against the prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney must stand ready to criticize the prosecution’s case against the accused step by step. Now, by analogy, informed pro-and-con debate against the teachings of the U.S. Catholic bishops and their allies should involve criticizing the entire theoretical scaffolding for their teachings. Granted, all moral reasoning involves using conceptual constructs and predications. But when was the last time that the Editorial Board of the *New York Times* examined and criticized in detail the moral reasoning advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops in an editorial? In addition to publishing editorials by the Editorial Board, the *Times* also regularly publishes essays by academics in philosophy in its feature known as “The Stone.” But when was the last time an informed critique of Catholic moral reasoning was published in “The Stone”? I know, I know,
if a critique were to be published in “The Stone,” then Catholics might want equal time for an author to present the Catholic viewpoint as an installment of “The Stone.” But this kind of statement versus counter-statement would involve pro-and-con debate, which is what I am advocating here. Apart from the various critiques published by the practicing Catholic and public intellectual Garry Wills, the moral teachings advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops have not been subjected to informed public debate and criticism. Now, when certain Catholic bishops and their allies enter the public arena of debate about admittedly moral issues, they see themselves as being “prophetic.” In American culture we have a long-standing Protestant tradition known as the American jeremiad. But American jeremiads have usually been debated in informed and spirited pro-and-con debate. So, apart from Garry Wills, why is there not more informed and spirited pro-and-con debate about the moral reasoning advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops and their lay allies? Or will it be the case that the leaders of American prestige culture will circle the wagons and close off American prestige culture from any meaningful debate with the pre-modern thought-world of Roman Catholicism, including Catholic natural-law moral theory, so that American Catholics will therefore continue to live forever in an American Catholic subculture, or ghetto, or counter-culture? Or will it be the case that U.S. Catholic bishops will circle the wagons and close off American Catholics from the influence of American prestige culture, which tends to be secular in its orientation today – and at times, even anti-religious?


(III.105) Josephus, Flavius. *Against Apion: Translation and Commentary*. Ed. and Trans. John M. G. Barclay. Leiden, Netherlands; and Boston: Brill, 2013. Also see Biberman (III.10a); Carroll (III.21a); Crossan (III.35); Nirenberg (III.128f). Good source of information about ancient anti-Jewish invective.


Cultural Studies. Also see Salzman (III.157); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Wright (III.174).


(III.107b) Kilmartin, Christopher and Julie A. Allison. *Men’s Violence Against Women: Theory, Research, and Activism*. Mahwah, NJ; and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see N. Ellis (III.44a); Felson (III.49); Houston (XII.72b); Jacoby (III.90a). In his famous dystopian novel *Brave New World* (1935), Aldous Huxley portrays the assembly-line reproduction of the human race in carefully monitored bottles. In this way, future science will liberate women from bearing children and thereby free them up for lives of sex, sex, sex. If and when women no longer bear children, there will probably no longer be any violence against women by men. However, as long as women continue to bear children, men’s violence against women will probably continue -- unfortunately. Because women bear children, the mother looms large in the psyches of all children. But male children tend to work to separate themselves psychologically from the powerful and at times seemingly overpowering feminine image in their psyches. In *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness* (III.134), Ong makes three interrelated claims that are important for understanding the male identity crisis in the United States today: (1) He claims that human males have a psychological need to work out and establish a distinctively masculine identity. (2) He claims that human males suffer from a distinct male insecurity, which is not the same as the insecurity that girls and women have. In other words, the distinct male insecurity requires the formation of a distinctively masculine identity, because the distinct male insecurity grows out of the overpowering image of the feminine in the psyche and out of the fact that only women bear children -- men don’t. (3) He also claims human males have to work out a distinctively masculine identity in the context of other males, not in the context of their mothers or sisters or lovers or wives. So male agonistic behavior give rise to rivalry and competitiveness -- usually involving other males as the real or imagined adversaries. Historically, as Arnold Van Gennep (III.166) shows, many cultures over the centuries devised male puberty rites to help young males at the age of puberty to work out a way to separate themselves psychologically from the overwhelming power of the feminine image in their psyches. Male puberty rites involved all-male cohorts in certain activities structured by older males, not by females. As Ong (III.136) shows, understanding the spirit of the male puberty rite can deepen our understanding of how Latin language instruction served as a male puberty rite. However, male puberty rites resulted at times in suicides. Suicides are the downside of male puberty rites. For this reason, I do not
recommend any attempt to resurrect male puberty rites. As to sublimated forms of the male puberty rite, we can point to boot camp in the armed services and to novitiate experiences in the religious orders in the Roman Catholic Church such as the all-male Jesuit order, which has a two-year novitiate and a later novitiate-like third year that is known in Jesuit parlance as tertianship. Other forms of all-male groups no doubt help provide socially acceptable ways in which boys and men could get together and cultivate the spirit of the specifically masculine identity that Ong claims that human males need to cultivate. However, at the present time, the culturally conditioned components of specifically masculine identity are undergoing understandable scrutiny for signs of white racism and male sexism. This understandable scrutiny has been prompted by recent advances by African Americans and other minorities, challenging the centuries-old American tradition of white supremacy, and by the women’s movement generally, challenging the even older tradition of male supremacy over women. Even though the legal, educational, and cultural advances by minorities and by women in recent decades in the United States are welcome and long overdue, those advances understandably challenge certain old components of the specifically masculine identity that has dominated American culture over the centuries - components based on white supremacy and on male supremacy. As a result, the old masculine identity is breaking down, so that a new masculine identity can break through. In effect, the masculine identity crisis in American culture today involves men living through the ancient Egyptian myth of Osiris. In the ancient myth of Osiris, which Normandi Ellis (III.44a) has ably translated, his sister puts the scattered parts of his dismembered body back together, except for a certain symbolic part. Out of his reconstructed body, the higher masculine identity emerges. Something like this reconstructive process is underway in our contemporary American culture. The old masculine identity has been deconstructed and dismembered. Now reconstruction must occur for the higher masculine identity to emerge and flourish. However, for the emergence of the new higher masculine identity to emerge and flourish, men will have to work out a win-win situation with women, so that in effect women also experience the emergence of the new higher masculinity in their own psychological development. So we need to have the new higher masculinity emerge for both men and women, because the new higher masculinity represents the optimal human psychological growth and development of human agency and flow as well as the spirit of communion - and of individuation and ego-integrity. This is the goal. In any event, when we turn our attention to men’s violence against women, we can extrapolate from Ong’s claim and say that the men involved in violence against women probably do not have a strong and secure masculine identity. Let’s consider three broad kinds of men’s violence against women. (1) Physical violence. Lacking a strong and secure masculine identity, certain men can feel threatened by women and respond
violently. (2) Rape of women unknown by the rapists. In many cases of sexual violence, it is hard to understand how the women made the rapists feel threatened. In such cases, the rapists most likely feel threatened by the powerful feminine image in their psyches. (3) Date rape. But in cases of date rape, the rapists usually know the women they rape, at least to some extent. Those rapists are not going to take “No” for an answer. As a result, they overpower their victims and rape them. In these three kinds of men’s violence against women, we see men using physical strength and violence to overpower women. At some level, the powerful image of the feminine in the psyches of those men is threatening them. They are countering the powerful threat they feel from the image of the feminine in their psyches by acting out violently against women. In short, they are using power against women because they feel threatened by the powerful image of the feminine in their psyches. Let’s review. Because human males are born of women, the mother looms large in the human psyche. As a result, boys and men need to work out age-appropriate ways to establish a specifically masculine sense of identity to countervail against the powerful image of the feminine in their psyches. However, the powerful image of the feminine in their psyches can be complicated by their own personal experiences of their mothers and by patriarchal cultural arrangements and attitudes. For example, some mothers abuse their power over their children. Such abuse can complicate the psychological lives of their children. But Ong’s claim about the need of human males to establish a sense of specifically masculine identity suggests that the only way that we as a culture can hope to combat men’s violence against women is to help men work out and establish a strong sense of masculine identity. Our human identities usually involve our identifications. For example, most boys and men identify with their fathers and other father figures in their lives. In addition, most boys and men identify with certain age-appropriate masculine role models. Now, it is not uncommon for boys and men to experience disillusionment at times with some of the boys and men with whom they had identified, including their fathers. It is not pleasant to experience this kind of disillusionment. It is an experience that we need to mourn. Nevertheless, after we have become disillusioned with certain identifications we have made, we need to avoid throwing out the bath water with the baby. Instead of throwing out the bath water with the baby, we should try to give credit where credit is due to our fathers and other male role models with whom we have identified. I mentioned mourning. There are two different kinds of mourning: (1) mourning the death of a loved one (also known as bereavement); and (2) mourning nondeath losses in our lives. Disillusionment with somebody we have admired and identified with involves mourning a nondeath loss. All nondeath losses involve experiencing abandonment feelings. For this reason, Susan Anderson’s The Journey from Abandonment to Healing (X.3) can serve as a guide for mourning all nondeath losses. Failed mourning of nondeath loss can lead men to violence at times, both suicide and violence against
others. Of course women can also experience failed mourning of nondeath loss, leadings at times to suicide and violence against other. In conclusion, I have suggested that Ong’s three interrelated claims can help us better understand certain aspects of men’s violence against women. However enlightening Ong’s thought may be for us, no easy solutions to the problems of men’s violence against women readily emerge from his perceptive thought. Nevertheless, Ong’s thought provides a useful and instructive framework for considering possible solutions to the problems of men’s violence against women. As odd as it may sound in this context, I would note here that Jean Houston (XII.72b) has recently called attention to how the 1939 Hollywood movie The Wizard of Oz, starring 16-year-old Judy Garland as Dorothy, contains mythic elements so that it resembles the psychodynamics of a puberty rite. With the 75th anniversary of this musical coming up in 2014, perhaps a campaign could be organized to get American teenagers to view it and then discuss Dorothy and her three companions. Perhaps the ever-clever Jean Houston could write up a series of discussion questions to be published as an appendix in a new paperback edition of her book about the movie. We are clearly in a position where trial and error will be the only way to proceed to try to work out new approaches to puberty rites for American teenagers. However, American culture today needs more fundamental fixing than what effective substitutes for puberty rites could possibly provide. The more fundamental fixing should include fixing the economic system and related issues.

(III.108) King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. Ed. Clayborne Carson. New York and Boston: Grand Central Publishing, 1998. Topics: American Studies; American Protestant Spirituality. Also see Burrow (X.9); Colby (III.28a); Farrell (VII.8); Hansen (VII.10a); King (III.108a); Mieder (VII.17); K. D. Miller (VII.18). In my junior year at Saint Louis University, I heard Dr. King speak on campus on Monday afternoon, October 12, 1964. Evidently, he was the first Baptist minister ever allowed to speak publicly on a Jesuit campus. On October 14, 1964, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In the spring semester I traveled by chartered bus with some other college students from the St. Louis area to join Dr. King’s march from Selma to Montgomery, Albama, where I heard him speak on March 25, 1965.


(III.109) Kinzer, Stephen. The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War. New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2013. Topic: American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Sherry (X.44c). Media coverage recently reminded us that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963. The conspirators set up Lee
Harvey Oswald as the patsy to take the blame for the assassination. Next, they had Jack Ruby kill Oswald to silence him. Most likely the conspirators included certain disgruntled guys in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as well as then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. In The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, Stephen Kinzer shows the extensive experience that the CIA had in instigating destabilization and regime-change efforts abroad. For example, he carefully details their destabilizing efforts in Iran (119-46), Guatemala (147-74), Vietnam (175-215), Indonesia (216-46), the Congo (247-83), and Cuba (284-307). Foster and Allen Dulles were lawyers, not plutocrats. But they became wealthy by doing legal work for plutocrats. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950s, Foster served as Secretary of State; Allen, as the director of the CIA. In effect, Kinzer deepens our understanding of the American civic religion in the 1950s. However, he does not happen to use the term civic religion. Nevertheless, Kinzer in effect explains that the American civic religion was decidedly anti-communist in the 1950s. But President Kennedy violated the American civic religion that had directed the CIA’s various destabilization campaigns in different countries in the 1950s. Now, from colonial times onward, the majority of Americans had been Protestants. In addition, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) had dominated the prestige culture in American culture. But Senator John A. Kennedy’s narrow victory in the 1960 presidential election marked the first time that a Roman Catholic had been elected president of the United States. However, even though he was a Roman Catholic, he had been educated in WASP educational institutions – most notably Harvard. During the presidential campaign, he sounded like a fervent anti-communist, as did other Democrats and Republicans at the time. At that time, the Roman Catholic Church was also officially anti-communist, because the communists were officially anti-religion. In other words, both the Roman Catholic Church and the American civic religion were officially anti-communist. But that is not all that the American civic religion involved in the 1950s. It also involved a strong belief in American capitalism. Kinzer quotes Foster Dulles as making the following statement: “‘For us there are two kinds of people in the world,’ Foster once said. ‘There are those who are Christians and support free enterprise, and there are the others’” (320-21). Us vs. Them. As we will see, fear was the motivating force behind “us.” As we will also see, no neutrality was allowed. But at that time, the Roman Catholic Church did not officially “support free enterprise,” as Foster Dulles understood this. Thus there was a difference between the official position of the Roman Catholic Church at that time and the position espoused by Foster Dulles. Now, in his first papal exhortation, Pope Francis recently criticized capitalism. If Foster Dulles were alive today to read the pope’s criticisms of capitalism, he would no doubt declare that the pope is not one of “us” because he does not “support free enterprise,” but instead criticizes it. Now, in Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for
Martha Nussbaum, who describes herself as an Aristotelian, defends the role and importance of political emotions in general and love in particular. Political emotions help people to come together to form political alliances. In *Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender* (III.110), Barbara Koziak explains the importance of the part of the psyche known in Greek as thumos (or thymos) in motivating people to take political action together. Now, during the experiment in participatory democracy of male citizens in ancient Athens, Aristotle observed in his treatise on *Rhetoric* that civic orators made three kinds of appeals to their audiences: (1) logos (reason), (2) pathos (emotion), and (3) ethos (identity, asking their fellow Athenians to identify with them). In our American experiment in representative democracy, candidates for elective office and government officials usually still make these three kinds of appeals to their fellow Americans: (1) logos, (2) pathos, and (3) ethos (identity, asking their fellow Americans to identify with them). As Kinzer explains, the Bolshevist Revolution of 1917 in Russia had inspired fear in President Woodrow Wilson and other Western leaders at the Paris Peace conference in 1918-1919 at the end of World War I, which the Dulles brothers participated in (32). During the Cold War, the pathos component was fear – fear of the Soviet Union, and fear of world-wide communism supposedly directed by Moscow. The ethos component was based on being loyal Americans. In the midst of anti-communist hysteria in the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy, himself a Roman Catholic from Wisconsin, excelled in denouncing supposedly un-American people in the American government. No American wanted to be suspected of being “un-American.” This accusation usually meant that the accused person did not believe fervently in the American representative democratic government and/or American capitalism. The accused could even be suspected of being a spy. Kinzer suggests that the Dulles brothers and President Eisenhower in the 1950s were determined to wage their global war against communism because they were “reassured by a diffuse, supra-rational assumption that American power must always prevail in the end” (297). I refer to this kind of supra-rational assumption as the American civic religion. Kinzer claims that Foster and Allen Dulles “were shaped by missionary Calvinism and America’s pioneer tradition, believed that godly and satanic forces were at war on earth, and felt called to crush the satanic ones” (227). Elsewhere, Kinzer quotes Max Weber to explain the sharp binary of good versus evil that the Dulles brothers worked with: “They assimilated what the sociologist Max Weber described as two fundamental Calvinist tenets: that Christians are ‘weapons in the hands of God and executors of His providential will’ and that ‘God’s glory demanded that the reprobate be compelled to submit to the law of the church’” (115-16). So for Foster and Allen, the Cold War was really a holy war. Because the communists were officially opposed to religion, their official position reinforced the sense that the Dulles brothers and many other anti-communist Americans had
that the Cold War was a holy war. In the view of the Dulles brothers and
President Eisenhower, neutrality was not an acceptable option for non-
communist nations around the world. In other words, communism was
supposed to be the common enemy of all non-communist nations in the
world. With the full collaboration of President Eisenhower, the Dulles
brothers geared up the CIA for a wide range of dark arts, including
destabilizing unacceptable regimes. For example, with President
Eisenhower’s approval, the CIA planned the invasion of Fidel Castro’s
Cuba. But the invasion was carried out in 1961 after President John F.
Kennedy had taken office and had approved it. It turned out to be a
disaster. As a result of that debacle, President Kennedy subsequently
relieved Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell of their CIA positions. (Kinzer
claims that Allen Dulles had serious health issues for months before
Kennedy relieved him of his CIA position.) Kinzer carefully details how
President Eisenhower had acted over the years regarding various CIA
operations. Kinzer suggests that Richard Bissell, who
was primarily
responsible for the invasion plan, had most likely expected President
Kennedy to supply air cover for the invasion, as President Eisenhower
almost certainly would have. But did Kennedy’s later removal of Allen
Dulles and Richard Bissell prompt certain disgruntled CIA officials to
assassinate Kennedy -- bringing then-Vice President Lyndon B.
Johnson into their conspiracy to handle the cover-up afterward? Kinzer does not
explore this possibility. However, he could have explored this possibility
in at least general terms. Let me explain. In his fine book JFK and the
Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters (III.42), James W.
Douglass suggests that JFK was assassinated because he was a peacenik in
a government in which peaceniks were not over-represented, to put it
mildly. As Douglass has detailed, President Kennedy stands as a decided
contrast with Foster and Allen Dulles – as detailed by Kinzer. For
example, JFK’s attitudes toward the Soviet Union, Cuba, Latin America in
general, Africa in general, and Indonesia stand in sharp contrast with the
views of the Dulles brothers and of the CIA. According to Douglass,
President Kennedy was using back channels to explore avenues of peace
with Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and with Fidel
Castro in Cuba. Neither the Joint Chiefs nor the CIA would have
welcomed President Kennedy’s peace overtures with Khrushchev and
Castro. Instead of using President Kennedy’s policies as points of contrast
with the policies of the Dulles brothers, Kinzer works with a polemical
framework. Here’s how Kinzer sums up his concern about the Dulles
brothers: “Their actions frame the grand debate over America’s role in the
world that has never been truly joined in the United States” (327). So what
does it mean for a debate to be joined? In a criminal trial in the United
States, the prosecuting attorney claims that the defendant is guilty as
charged. The defense attorney then claims, “No, he (or she) is not guilty as
charged.” This is an example of how a debate is joined. Now, in a criminal
trial, the prosecuting attorney could charge the defendant with more than
one crime. The defense attorney could join the debate by declaring charge by charge that the defendant is not guilty of any of the charges. So what, exactly, is “the grand debate over America’s role in the world that has never been truly joined in the United States” – according to Kinzer? He says, “Many Americans still celebrate their country’s [supposedly] providential ‘exceptionalism’” (328). But how many Americans today still celebrate our country’s supposedly providential exceptionalism? Granted, certain conservatives do. But the Republican candidate for president did not emerge victorious in 2012. According to Kinzer, this supposed exceptionalism involves “the view that the United States is inherently more moral and farther-seeing than other countries and therefore may behave in ways that others should not” (3). But Kinzer also claims that there is a related “belief that because of its immense power, the United States can not only topple governments but guide the course of history” (3). In theory, the debate about the role of the United States in the world could involve all the key points identified by Kinzer. However, I suspect that the grand debate about the role on the United States in the world is not ever going to be joined. In other words, I do not expect that there will ever be a grand debate. After all, President George W. Bush had a sharp bipolar view of the world that clearly resembled the sharp bipolar view of the anti-communist Americans such as the Dulles brothers and Eisenhower. Moreover, President George W. Bush used his bipolar view of the world to launch his regime change against Saddam Hussein in Iraq – based on the fear that Saddam allegedly had weapons of mass destruction. As this example shows once again, fear is the culprit. By inciting fear, elected and appointed government officials can help generate hysteria.


(III.110) Koziaik, Barbara. Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2000. Topic: History of Philosophy; Rhetorical Theory. Also see Aristotle (I.10); Farrell (III.46; III.47); Garver (I.72); Grimaldi (I.76); Habermas (XII.61; XII.62); Nussbaum (IX.55a); Ong (III.138); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Sloane (I.165; III.158; III.159). The part of the human psyche that Plato and Aristotle refer to as thumos (usually rendered as the spirited part) is the psychodynamism of what Ong refers to as agonistic behavior and the psychodynamism of our fight/flight/freeze reactions. For all practical purposes, thumos as Plato and Aristotle use the term is the equivalent of what Jung and his followers refer to as an archetype (i.e., a deep structure of the psyche). More specifically, thumos as Plato and Aristotle use the term is basically identical to what Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette (III.124) refer to as the Warrior archetype. (Moore and Gillette have written a whole book about the Warrior archetype in the male psyche, but
they unequivocally claim that there is also a Warrior archetype in the female psyche.)

(III.110a) Krause, Sharon R. *Liberalism with Honor*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 2002. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Cairns (III.19); McNamee (III.121); Nussbaum (IX.55a).


(III.111a) Landes, David S. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. New York and London: Norton, 1998. Topics: Economic History; Cultural Studies. Also see Clemens (XII.21a); Farrell (XII.38); Ferguson (XII.42); Huntington (III.88); Landes (IX.39b); Morris (XII.103b); Romney (III.152a).


(III.111c) Lesser, Zachary and Benedict S. Robinson, eds. *Textual Conversations in the Renaissance: Ethics, Authors, Technologies*. Aldershot, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006. Topics: Early Modern Studies; Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Also see Ong (III.138); Sloane (III.158); Smarr (III.159a).

(III.111d) Levin, Yuval. *The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the Birth of Right and Left*. New York: Basic Books/Perseus Books Group, 2014. Topics: History of Rhetoric; Cultural Studies. Also see Bottum (III.12a); Linker (III.111e); Nussbaum (IX.55a); Sherry (X.44c). Yikes! Yuval Levin’s book *The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the Birth of Right and Left*, based on his 2010 doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, is clearly designed to be a feel-good read for American conservatives and thereby contribute to their recuperation in time to pull out significant victories in the 2014 mid-term elections. However, just as contemporary Republicans are up to no good politically, so too Levin is up to no good in this book, as I will explain momentarily. For understandable reasons, many American progressives and liberals today are probably not as familiar with the political views of Edmund Burke (1729-1797) and Thomas Paine (1737-1809) as Levin is. As a result, many progressives and liberals today might quickly skip over Levin’s book. But it might be a mistake for them to ignore or underestimate what Levin is up to by giving his fellow American conservatives today a feel-good book to read to bolster their spirits in time for the 2014
mid-term elections. No, there’s not a word in Levin’s book about possibly repealing Obamacare – if Republicans can gain enough seats in Congress in the 2014 mid-term elections to over-ride President Obama’s predictable veto. Ah, wouldn’t that be the greatest victory for the Republican obstructionists in Congress? No, there’s not a word in Levin’s book about the obstructionist tactics of Republicans in Congress over the last two years. No, there’s not a word in Levin’s book about the Republicans’ efforts to overturn and reverse legalized abortion in the first trimester. No, there’s not a word about outlawing the teaching of evolutionary theory in public secondary education, or about requiring equal time in public education for so-called intelligent-design theory, or about requiring textbooks to advertise that evolutionary theory is a theory, not a fact. As a matter of fact, Levin characterizes Burke as favoring evolution as a model for political change, because Burke clearly does not prefer the kind of political revolution that occurred in the French Revolution. Question: Would supposedly acceptable political evolution resemble the spirit of social Darwinism – dog eat dog, eh? In any event, Levin does not say a word to criticize his fellow conservatives today. Instead, he says something like the following to his fellow conservatives today: “Time out, guys! We’ve got the winning way for American politics to proceed because we American conservatives carry on the spirit of the British conservative Edmund Burke. I’ve studied Burke’s conservative views and Thomas Paine’s radical views. Paine’s radical views resemble in spirit all those radical views today that we conservatives dislike. So we in movement conservatism should refresh our understanding of Burke’s views, because he is the founding father of our movement conservatism. If we re-dedicate ourselves to our founding father’s rationalizations of conservatism, his views will help us prevail in the 2014 mid-term elections and in the 2016 elections.” I am sorry to say that conservative Chicken Littles might just buy into Levin’s set up, because they might find it flattering to buy into Burke’s rationalizations of his conservatism – in the 18th-century British political system, which is significantly different from our American political system in the 21st century. Now, we have all heard about generals who are prepared to fight the last war. If conservative Chicken Littles today buy into Levin’s flattering set up, then they might be equipped to participate in the 18th-century British debate about the French Revolution. But they will not be well prepared to participate in the important debates of our times. The important debates of our times involve our understanding of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and the body of American law. The Declaration of Independence is a philosophical statement. It is a byproduct of 18th-century Enlightenment philosophic thought. It is an idealistic statement. It is a visionary statement. It is a utopian statement. It is a radical statement. It is an extremist statement. So if conservative Chicken Littles denigrate Paine’s thought for being idealistic, visionary, utopian, radical, and extremist, then let them say the same things about the Declaration of
Independence – and then self-deport to Britain, if Britain will accept them. We do not need to have conservative Chicken Littles today re-fighting Burke’s war with Paine. Now, if you look around for a fall guy to replace Paine, you might select Jurgen Habermas and his idealizations for discourse ethics. Granted, certain American academics have read Habermas’s books. Many of his books have been translated from German into English. Habermas’s idealizations for discourse ethics could be characterized as Paine on steroids. But will Levin’s book inspire conservative Chicken Littles today to start firing away in the arena of civic debate at Habermas’s idealizations for discourse ethics, instead of firing away at Paine’s 18th-century thought? I doubt it. Or will Levin’s book inspire conservative Chicken Littles today to fire away at Paine’s 18th-century thought? For example, will they say, “Paine’s ideas about the rights of man are bunk -- philosophical theory, not fact”? Oh, boy, we have no rights, because Burke and American conservatives like him don’t like Enlightenment philosophical theory, just as certain American conservatives today don’t like evolutionary theory. (I deliberately refer to Burke’s views as his rationalizations because I do not want to suggest that his views are based in philosophical theory. They are not. His rationalizations are just his rules-of-thumb for practical reasoning about political issues.) Or will Levin’s book inspire conservative Chicken Littles today to say, “There you go again – sounding utopian -- just like Paine”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding utopian – just like the Declaration of Independence”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding radical – just like Paine”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding radical – just like the Declaration of Independence”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding extremist – just like Paine”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding extremist – just like the Declaration of Independence”? But perhaps you catch my drift. Levin’s book is designed to make conservatives feel good about being conservatives – just like the British conservative Edmund Burke. In short, Levin’s book is a feel-good book for conservatives. For understandable reasons, conservatives may be feeling a bit down as a result of the 2012 election results. So Levin’s book is designed to make them feel good about being conservatives by reading all of Burke’s rationalizations about his 18th-century conservatism in the British political system. Burke and Paine were among the many authors in the late eighteenth century who published pamphlets in which they debated the American Revolution and the French Revolution. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) was inspired by the debate to write A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) – a work that resonates still in the women’s movement today. Her husband William Godwin (1756-1836) was inspired by the debate to write An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793). So Burke and Paine lived in heady times. Burke and Paine were both British. They were both prolific writers. Neither one of them was a Tory. On the contrary, they were both Whigs. Each considered himself to be a liberal. But Paine participated in both the
American Revolution and the French Revolution – and published a work that helped advance each. Thomas Paine’s pamphlet *Common Sense* (1776) famously helped galvanize sentiment for the American Revolution. His *Rights of Man* (1791), a critique of Burke’s views, supported the French Revolution. However, as Levin notes, late in his life, Paine published a strong critique of Christianity titled *The Age of Reason* (published in three parts in 1794, 1795, 1807). As a result, Protestant preachers at the time denounced him as something like the devil – the Great Satan, as it were. Basically, Paine was a Deist. To this day, because of the predictable backlash to his critique of Christianity, Paine is usually not remembered by most Americans as one of our Founding Fathers. From a distance Burke had supported the American Revolution, but he did not write anything noteworthy about it. However, he was understandably terrified at the thought of something like the French Revolution occurring in his homeland. So he wrote the pamphlet that is known by the short title as *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). But the full title reveals more about the scope of his concerns: *Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings of Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Paris*. As Levin explains, Burke’s invoked audience of a gentleman in Paris is a charade. Burke is clearly addressing his fellow Brits. In the spirit of giving credit where credit is due, I should give Levin credit for working out a fine comparison and contrast of the thought of these two authors. He has written an informed and readable study in the history of ideas. However, as I’ve indicated, I do not think that he published this book simply to impress us with his scholarship. Instead, he uses his careful historical scholarship to advance movement conservatism in the United States today. Now, the assassination of Julius Caesar was designed to bring about a regime change. It prompted a debate. For example, Cicero wrote a famous defense of the assassination of Julius Caesar – and he subsequently paid the ultimate price for doing so. I would situate Burke’s writings about the French Revolution in the larger context of the debate about Julius Caesar’s assassination and regicide to bring about regime change. I was surprised that Levin did not happen to advert to the body of literature about regicide to bring about regime change. In addition to his scholarly comparison and contrast of the thought of these two authors, Levin makes a claim on our contemporary awareness by suggesting that Burke and Paine somehow represent of the birth of the right and left today. In effect, he proposes that American conservatives today should see Burke as the founding father of movement conservatism and Paine as the founding father of all the ideas that drive American conservatives crazy. In short, the right and the left – as understood by American conservatives. Of course many conservative Chicken Littles today may find Levin’s claim about Burke being their founding father convincing. But I think movement conservatism today is up to no good, which is why I characterize American conservatives today as conservative Chicken Littles. For
understandable reasons, Burke was a reactionary, because he did not want to see a political revolution in England comparable to the French Revolution. Granted, conservative Chicken Littles in the United States today are characteristically reactionaries. All kinds of ideas drive them crazy. But it is a form of flattery for them to imagine that they are somehow carrying on the conservative spirit of Burke. Bunk! They are just a bunch of noisy reactionaries. But Russell Kirk’s book *The Conservative Mind* (Regnery, 1953) helped galvanize movement conservatism that has afflicted American politics and culture for more than a half century now. Kirk championed the British reactionary Edmund Burke as the founding father for movement conservatism. But isn’t it kind of un-American for American conservatives to adopt the British reactionary Edmund Burke as the founding father for movement conservatism? After all, wouldn’t it be more patriotic for American conservatives today to adopt an American as their founding father? Burke was an apologist for the British way of life, including the hereditary monarchy and the hereditary aristocracy – neither of which has existed in the United States. So why do Burke’s views appeal to movement conservatives? This British conservative and American conservatives today tend to have a conservative temperament – temperamentally, they tend to be conservative. So birds of a feather flock together. The basic thrust of Levin’s book about Burke’s views is to help American conservatives today feel good about being conservatives. But if Kirk’s book helped galvanize movement conservatism in the 1950s and 1960s by extolling Burke as its founding father, Levin’s book aims to strengthen movement conservatism today by installing Paine as the great exemplar of all the kinds of ideas that drive conservative Chicken Littles crazy – in effect, the founding father of the left in the United States. From the point of view of conservative Chicken Littles, Levin’s selection of two 18th-century pamphlet writers as the supposedly paradigmatic exemplars of the right and the left today simplifies the thinking of conservative Chicken Littles today enormously. In other words, Levin has supposedly constructed two Procrustean beds for conservative Chicken Littles to work with – two sizes fit all: One size for the conservatives (Burke), and another size for the left (Paine). Of course the conservative Chicken Littles had suspected as much all along. But now they have a learned guy with a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago assuring them that they can now understand their Manichaean thought-world in terms of the two historical exemplars that Levin has selected. Because most progressives and liberals today have probably not studied Paine’s views as carefully as Levin has, they will probably shrug at the fact that he has set up Paine as the fall guy – to take the fall against Burke’s conservative views, which Levin himself clearly prefers. But make no mistake about it – Levin’s book is not designed to convince progressives and liberals to give up their views and instead embrace Burke’s views. No, Levin’s book is designed to help the already converted to feel good about being conservatives by suggesting to them that they are carrying on Burke’s British conservative spirit in our
American political system today, where we do not have a hereditary monarchy or a hereditary aristocracy – both of which Burke wanted to preserve. As a thought experiment, we might ask, “Couldn’t a progressive and liberal author today take a hint from Levin and construct a supposed founding father for American conservatives today, on the one hand, and, on the other, a supposed founding father or founding mother for American progressives and liberals today to use to simplify their thought-world?” In theory, yes, an American progressive and liberal author could undertake to do this. However, I do not expect to see anybody undertake to do this. But let me explain why not. I have referred to movement conservatism. But I do not see progressives and liberals today as constituting a movement that is comparable to movement conservatism today. I know, I know, American conservatives are a fractious lot. For example, they often indulge in the I-am-holier-than-thou game by referring to other supposedly suspect Republicans as RINOs (Republicans in name only). Nevertheless, movement conservatism does, unfortunately, exist as a movement, regardless of how fractious its members may be. I hope that their fractious disagreements with one another today lead at long last to the demise of movement conservatism – because I’d prefer to see an ideological regime change on the American right. However, Levin’s book aims to reinvigorate the fractious movement – just in time for the 2014 mid-term elections. I should add that American progressives and liberals are also a fractious lot – arguably even more fractious than American conservatives. For this reason, I do not expect to see a progressive and liberal movement emerge in the near future that would be comparable to movement conservatism. Because I do not admire movement conservatism, I would not want to see a progressive and liberal counterpart movement emerge. In conclusion, I can understand why the French Revolution prompted Edmund Burke to fear a possible revolution in Britain – especially with Thomas Paine talking and writing favorably about the French Revolution. However, as everybody knows, we in the United States have never had a hereditary monarchy or a hereditary aristocracy. Therefore, we have never been in danger of having a revolution to overthrow them. As a result, I find it much harder to understand why Burke’s views appeal to movement conservatism. But thanks to Russell Kirk’s book *The Conservative Mind* (1953), mentioned above, Burke is the founding father of movement conservatism. Movement conservatism emerged in the 1950s during the Cold War. In the Cold War, Americans feared the Soviet communists, just as Burke feared the revolutionaries in the French Revolution stirring up a similar revolution in Britain. But the Cold War has ended. So movement conservatism should end. It’s time for a regime change – but Levin wants to reinvigorate the old regime of movement conservatism. During the Cold War, American conservatives appear to have become habituated to their ratcheted-up fear. This is why there are so many conservative Chicken Littles today. Their habituated fear is activated by all kinds of ideas that drive them crazy. In short, their habituated fear makes them hyper-
vigilant. The habituated fear of conservative Chicken Littles today is multi-directional. They are hyper-vigilant – on the lookout for possible threats to their traditional ways of carrying on their lives. They understand that Yuval Levin is just using Thomas Paine as a historical example of a threat to the conservative ways in Britain that Burke defended. But they understand that American conservatives today need to be hyper-vigilant to fight off other threats to conservative ways posed by progressives and liberals who can be understood by conservatives as carrying on the spirit of Paine today, even though they themselves may not think of themselves as carrying on Paine’s spirit. Therefore, Burke still deserves to be the founding father of American conservatives today as they engage in multi-directional wars against threats to conservative ways. Granted, Yuval Levin may be making a proverbial Hail Mary pass by publishing this book about Burke and Paine for American conservatives. It remains to be seen how many of them will catch on to it. However, if very many of them do catch on to it, this will not be good news for the Democrats or for progressives and liberals in the 2014 mid-term elections or in 2016. Then again, conservatives may be too preoccupied with searching for and destroying supposed RINOs to bother reading Levin’s book. Progressives and liberals might want to keep an eye on Levin’s book. If his book catches on and finds a lot of conservative readers, those readers will come away from reading it feeling really good about being conservatives like Burke. Feeling good about being conservatives might help fire them up for the 2014 mid-term elections and for the 2016 elections. In the meantime, if progressives and liberals want to read good book, I’d recommend that they read Martha C. Nussbaum’s new book Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (IX.55a).

(III.111e) Linker, Damon. The Theocons: Secular America Under Siege, New York: Doubleday, 2006. Topics: American Studies; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Bottum (III.12a); Dorrien (III.40; III.41); Jenkins (III.93); Levin (III.111d); Steinfels (III.161); Wills (XII.168).

(III.112) Lloyd, G. E. R. Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1966. Topics: History of Philosophy; Classical Studies. Also see Gelpi (XII.50a); Klubertanz (XII.81a); McInerny (XII.94a); Ong (III.134). Tracy (XII.161b).

(III.113) Loyola, Ignatius. The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius: A Translation and Commentary. Trans. George E. Ganss. St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1992. Also listed as (X.31). Topics: Roman Catholic Spirituality; Jesuit Spirituality. Robert L. Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has characterized Jesuit training as Warrior training (i.e., training in learning how to access the energies of the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche). But Jesuits aim to be non-violent warriors who strive to follow the example of the non-violent Jesus. This is indeed a
truly apt way to characterize Jesuit training. As part of their Jesuit training, novices in the Jesuit order make a thirty-day retreat following the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius Loyola. By doing this, Jesuit novices learn how to restructure their agonistic tendencies in their personal effort to become non-violent warriors capable of following the example of the non-violent Jesus. But making a thirty-day retreat following the *Spiritual Exercises* also involves an enormous inward turn of consciousness. Concerning Satan and demons, see Brakke (X.8); Forsyth (III.67); Pagels (III.141); Russell (III.153; III.154; III.155; III.156).


(III.115) MacLean, Paul D. *The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions*. New York and London: Plenum P, 1990. Topic: Neuroscience. Also see Siegel (III.157a). Paul D. MacLean contends that the human brain is made up of three separate brains, which function together interactively in the way that he characterizes as constituting the triune human brain. What MacLean refers to as the reptilian brain is the biological base for all agonistic tendencies in all animals, including the human animal.


(III.117) Mansfield, Harvey C. *Manliness*. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2006. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Loyola (X.31); S. Mansfield (III.117a); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Ong (III.132; III.134; III.135; III.136; III.137); Pieper (X.41a); Tillich (III.164). In this controversial book Harvey C. Mansfield of Harvard University makes one important observation that I do not consider to be controversial: “The entire enterprise of modernity . . . could be understood as a project to keep manliness unemployed” (230). His point is well taken. For example, Shakespeare’s character Othello will no longer be a heroic cultural role model in modernity as he was in a residually oral late medieval culture.
a similar way, Achilles and Hector and Odysseus and Aeneas and Beowulf and Sir Gawain and King Arthur will no longer be heroic cultural role models in modernity as they were in their respective oral cultural contexts. However, Jesus as portrayed in the Gospel of Mark will endure as a non-violent heroic cultural role model in modernity. As a result, I might modify Mansfield’s claim a bit to say that modernity will not keep non-violent manliness unemployed. Ong has suggested that modernity is powered by a strong tendency toward irenicism and away from polemicism, as exemplified in Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramism. The strength of the modern tendency toward irenicism and away from polemicism will lead gradually over the centuries to the demise of the old oral heroic cultural ideal of manliness exemplified in the warrior such as Achilles and Hector and Odysseus and Aeneas and Beowulf and Sir Gawain and King Arthur and Othello. The gradual demise is exemplified in the “mock heroic” poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now, Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has pointed out that Jesuit training is Warrior training (i.e., training in learning how to access the energies of the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche). His point is well taken. But Jesuit training is training for non-violent warriors. With this understanding in mind, I would generalize from the example of Jesuit training and say that all people in modern culture should cultivate being non-violent warriors. In short, all people in modern culture should strive to be heroic in their own eyes and in their own self-regard and their own self-respect. To be blunt, the alternative to being heroic is being depressed. We all need Warrior training to help us be effective non-violent warriors and thereby avoid being depressed, inasmuch as it is possible to avoid being depressed.

(III.117a) Mansfield, Stephen. *Mansfield’s Book of Manly Men: An Utterly Invigorating Guide to Being Your Most Masculine Self.* Nashville: Nelson Books/Thomas Nelson/HarperCollins, 2013. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hook and Reno (III.86); Kennedy (III.106b); Loyola (X.31); H. C. Mansfield (III.117); McNamee (III.121); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Ong (III.132; III.134; III.135; III.136; III.137); Pieper (X.41a); Tillich (III.164). The title *Mansfield’s Book of Manly Men: An Utterly Invigorating Guide to Being Your Most Masculine Self* is pretentious and pompous. But the title “Manly Men” would have been apt and sufficient – without a subtitle. Unfortunately, the title of the book suggests that being pretentious and pompous is manly – “Hey, guys, look at me – I put my name in the title in case you’re not smart enough to notice that I’m the author of this book!” Talk about self-promotion! I hope that nobody else follows his example. In my estimate, we do not need any further books with titles like “Farrell’s Book of Manly Men” or “Kennedy’s Book of Manly Men” – or the like. Incidentally, Senator John F. Kennedy did publish a book titled *Profiles in Courage* (III.106b) – but without putting his last name in the title. In any event, the ancient Greek word “andreia”
means courage and manly. Can girls and women be courageous? Sure. Can boys and men be courageous? Sure. But Plato and Aristotle claim that the virtue of courage is the mean between the extremes of being brash and being cowardly. They do not think we humans are born virtuous. So they see the virtue of courage as something we must work to cultivate in ourselves. However, they would probably say that we do not usually work to cultivate being brash or being cowardly. For them, being brash and being cowardly tend to come more spontaneously to us than being courageous does. In other words, for them, there are two broad ways to miss the mark and be unvirtuous. In Plato’s dialogues known as the Republic and the Phaedrus, we learn about three parts of the human psyche: (1) the rational part, (2) the desiring part, and (3) the spirited part (Greek, “thumos” or “thymos). Courage, as just explained, is the virtue cultivated in connection with the part of the psyche known in Greek as “thumos” (or “thymos”). Stephen Mansfield’s title sounds brash, to put it mildly. According to Plato and Aristotle, being brash is the bipolar opposite of being cowardly. So in the spirit of giving credit where credit is due, let’s at least give Stephen Mansfield credit for a title that does not sound cowardly. In effect, in his book Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (III.134), the published version of his 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Ong studies the psychodynamism that Plato and Aristotle both refer to as “thumos” (or “thymos”), but Ong does not happen to advert explicitly to their discussions. Instead of referring to the Greek word “thumos” (or “thymos”), Ong settles on using the term agonistic to characterize the typical way in which this psychodynamism works. The Greek word “agon” means contest, struggle. (The extreme opposite of an agonistic spirit would be a catatonic state. In other words, clinical depression involves depression of the agonistic spirit.) The most important contribution that Ong makes in his book-length study of male agonistic tendencies is that boys and men need to work out a specifically masculine sense of identity. Moreover, according to him, boys and men need to work out a specifically masculine sense of identity in relation to other boys and men. (Ong does not happen to advert to girls and women working out a specifically feminine sense of identity in relation to other girls and women. However, this appears to be the case for girls and women.) Arguably, an earlier counterpart to Stephen Mansfield’s book is Brian S. Hook and R. R. Reno’s book Heroism and the Christian Life: Reclaiming Excellence (Westminster John Knox Press, 2000). But also see Maurice B. McNamee’s compendious book Honor and the Epic Hero: A Study of the Shifting Concept of Magnanimity in Philosophy and Epic Poetry (III.121) and Robert Faulkner’s recent study The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and Its Critics (III.48a). But let’s also note that the famous Protestant theologian Paul Tillich published a fine book titled The Courage to Be (III.164) and that the conservative polemicist Harvey Mansfield in political science at Harvard University published his
controversial book titled *Manliness* (III.117). For a Catholic treatment of the cardinal virtue of courage (also known as fortitude), see Josef Pieper’s book *The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance* (X.41a). (The cardinal virtue of temperance is also known as moderation.) In addition, the Jungian theorist Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary published a series of five books in the early 1990s that he co-authored with Douglas Gillette about the four masculine archetypes of maturity: (1) the King archetype, (2) the Warrior archetype, (3) the Magician archetype, and (4) the Lover archetype. (According to them, girls and women have a feminine set of archetypes parallel to each of these four masculine archetypes: (1) the Queen archetype, (2) the Warrior, (3) the Magician, and (4) the Lover.) Their book *The Warrior Within: Accessing the Knight [Archetype] Within the Male Psyche* (III.124) is most relevant to Stephen Mansfield’s book, because courage involves accessing the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the human psyche. As they see the Warrior archetype, they describe it as having three basic forms: (1 & 2) two bipolar “shadow” forms and (3) an optimal form. The two bipolar “shadow” forms of the Warrior archetype involve being brash and being cowardly. In other words, for them, as for Plato and Aristotle, there are two broad ways to miss the mark – and most of us tend to miss the mark a lot. According to Moore and Gillette, optimal masculine development of maturity involves the optimal development of each of the four masculine archetypes of maturity. In theory, they may be right about this. However, they have not worked out effective practices to help men learn how to experience the optimal forms of the four masculine archetypes. So in effect, they have left the door open for Stephen Mansfield to try his hand in helping white Protestant men work out a fresh way to establish a specifically masculine sense of identity (to use Ong’s term). On a deeper level I do not understand Moore’s vision of how men might advance psychologically toward the four optimal forms of the masculine archetypes of maturity. Let me explain the difficulty I have with his vision. He claims that all boys and men also have a set of four feminine archetypes of maturity in the archetypal level of their psyches. However, he is silent about how men need to resolve psychological issues in their psyches involving the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes of maturity. But just how far can men hope to advance toward the optimal forms of the masculine archetypes of maturity without also paying attention to and resolving the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes in their psyches? For example, if a man were able to access the optimal forms of the four masculine archetypes, but was locked into “shadow” forms of the four feminine archetypes in his psyche, he might work superbly with other men. But he would probably have serious problems working with women. As everybody knows, today women are in the work-force. So today men also need to work to resolve issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms of the four feminine archetypes in their psyches – even men who have
learned how to access the optimal forms of the four masculine archetypes need to do this. Various forms of misogyny are signs that the persons manifesting them have not resolved issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms of the four feminine archetypes in their psyches. In a similar way, various forms of misandry are signs that the persons manifesting them have not resolved issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms of the four masculine archetypes in their psyches. So I agree with Ong that boys and men need to establish a specifically masculine sense of identity. For men, working out a specifically masculine sense of identity involves the four masculine archetypes of maturity discussed by Moore and Gillette. However, to repeat, in addition to working out a strong sense of masculine identity, men also need to resolve issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms of the four feminine archetypes of maturity.


(III.121) McNamee, Maurice B. *Honor and the Epic Hero: A Study of the Shifting Concept of Magnanimity in Philosophy and Epic Poetry.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. Topics: Cultural Studies; Literary Studies. Also see Aristotle (X.3a); Bennett (II.8a); Bowman (III.12b); Buell (X.8a); Cairns (III.19); Cash (III.23a); deSilva (III.38a); Farrell (III.45); Faulkner (III.48a); Foxhall and Salmon (III.68a); Freeman (III.71b); Friend and Glover (III.72a); Krause (III.110a); Newell (III.128a; III.128b; III.128c); Neyrey (III.128e); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Rosen and Sluiter (III.152b); Salzman (III.157).
(III.121a) Menninger, Karl A. *Man against Himself*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938. A classic. Topic: Psychoanalytic Theory. Also see Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72b); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); A. Miller (III.122a); Pinker (III.145). Karl A. Menninger, M.D., works with Freud’s famous terminology of eros and thanatos, the life-instinct and the death-instinct, to examine self-destructive tendencies in detail. No doubt the human psyche contains self-destructive tendencies as well as other forms of destructive tendencies. Through a series of graphs (395-97), Menninger diagrams his basic argument. He posits a supposedly natural course of human development and growth. In this imaginary schema, the instincts involving eros and aggression – which are parallel to Plato’s desire and thumos, or thymos -- are free to proceed to run their natural course of growth and development and thereby achieve their supposedly natural goal. But each human person undergoes traumatic experiences, some of which are repressed from conscious memory. Repressed or not, those traumatic experiences impacted the ways in which the instincts are experienced and expressed, thereby diverting the human person from the supposedly natural goal of those instincts. However, traumatic experiences are universal. They are part of the human condition. Therefore, Menninger’s conceptual construct of the supposedly natural goal of the human instincts is a romantic idealization, because the natural course of human life involves the experience of traumatization. Therefore, the goal of human life is to work toward freeing oneself from the impacts of traumatization to the extent that this is possible to do. Nevertheless, Menninger’s account of narcissism is perceptive. He says, “Nothing inhibits love [of others] so much as self-love [i.e., narcissism]” (381). “Narcissism is a thirst that is never slaked, and blocks the real enjoyment of anything” (383). “Few indeed escape some of the cloying handicap of narcissism” (382).


(III.122a) Miller, Alice. *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence*. Trans. Hildegarde Hannum and Hunter Hannum. New York: Noonday P/Farrar Straus Giroux, 1990. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Bradshaw (X.7); Erikson (I.57a); Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72b); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); A. Miller (I.112a); Menninger (III.121a); Pinker (III.145).


(III.127b) Nathanson, Paul and Katherine K. Young. *Legalizing Misandry: From Public Shame to Systemic Discrimination against Men*. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2006. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127c); Patai (III.142a); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).

(III.127c) ---. *Spreading Misandry: The Teaching of Contempt for Men in Popular Culture*. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2001. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127b); Patai (III.142a); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).

Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Stone (III161c). Phillip F. Nelson assumes that then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson initiated the plot to assassinate President John F. Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963. But Nelson shows no evidence of having considered the possibility that anyone else could have initiated the assassination plot. No doubt murder had been a part of Johnson’s way of proceeding as he rose through the political ranks in Texas. However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had experience in staging elaborate assassinations such as President Kennedy’s assassination. So did Johnson, or one of his men, bring certain CIA officials onboard for the assassination plot? Or did certain disgruntled CIA officials hatch the assassination plot and then bring Johnson aboard, because he would be crucial to the coverup after President Kennedy’s assassination? I think that the assassination plot began with certain disgruntled CIA officials who then brought others into the conspiracy. But I don’t think that any of the CIA officials involved in the conspiracy would have been so foolish as to leave an incriminating paper trail behind in the CIA files.

(III.128) Neumann, Erich. *The Origins and History of Consciousness.* Trans. R. F. C. Hull. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1954. A classic. Topic: Jungian Theory. Also see Campbell (III.20); N. Ellis (III.44a); Farrell (XII.37b); L. J. Friedman (X.22a); Houston (XII.72b); Neumann (X.36e). In this work Erich Neumann has skillfully synthesized numerous points from C. G. Jung’s numerous writings to produce a coherent account of the origins and development of ego-consciousness according to Jung. In his big collection of essays titled *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture* (III.140), Ong sums up Neumann’s Jungian account of the eight stages of consciousness in one paragraph-length sentence: “The stages of psychic development as treated by Neumann are successively (1) the infantile undifferentiated self-contained whole symbolized by the uroboros (tail-eater), the serpent with its tail in its mouth, as well as by other circular or global mythological figures [= Erikson’s Trust vs. Mistrust], (2) the Great Mother (the impersonal womb from which each human infant, male or female, comes, the impersonal femininity which may swallow him [or her] up again [= Erikson’s Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt], (3) the separation of the world parents (the principle of opposites, differentiation, possibility of change) [= Erikson’s Initiative vs. Guilt], (4) the birth of the hero (rise of masculinity and of the personalized ego) [= Erikson’s Industry vs. Inferiority] with its sequels in (5) the slaying of the mother (fight with the dragon: victory over primal creative but consuming femininity, chthonic forces) [= Erikson’s Identity vs. Role Confusion], and (6) the slaying of the father (symbol of thwarting obstruction of individual achievement, [and also symbol of thwarting obstruction] of what is new) [= Erikson’s Intimacy vs. Isolation], (7) the freeing of the captive (liberation of the ego from endogamous kinship libido and emergence of the higher femininity, with woman now as
person, anima-sister, related positively to ego consciousness) [= Erikson’s Generativity vs. Stagnation], and finally (8) the transformation (new unity in self-conscious individualization, higher masculinity, expressed primordially in the Osiris myth but today entering new phases with heightened individualism – or more properly, personalism – of modern man [and woman] [= Erikson’s Ego-Integrity vs. Disgust, Despair]” (10-11). Concerning personalism, see Burrow (X.9; X.10); Lonergan (X.30; X.30a); Ong (X.39; X.40). Freudians refer to the psychological integration of stage eight as involving the emergence of ego-integrity. Robert Moore refers to it as involving the emergence of the optimal self system. Lawrence J. Friedman (X.22a: 452) reports that late in his life Erik H. Erikson further delineated the inner struggle for Ego-Integrity vs. Disgust, Despair. Erikson says that ego-integrity is characterized as (i) Luminous, not Obscure; (ii) Active, not Inactivated; (iii) Central, not Peripheral; (iv) Whole, not Fragmented; (v) Coherent, not Incoherent; (vi) Continuous, not Scattered; (vii) Generative, not Impotent; (viii) Inclusive, not Isolated; (ix) Aware, not Numb; (x) Indivisible, not Divided; (xi) Chosen, not Bypassed; (xii) Safely Bound, not Invaded. Even though Erikson’s twelve “not” descriptors are enormously informative, the Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of Chicago Theological Seminary claims that there are sixteen “shadow” forms of the eight archetypes of maturity (four masculine archetypes of maturity and four feminine archetypes of maturity). In theory, I would expect ego-integrity to be most adequately characterized by sixteen “not” descriptors, instead of just twelve. However, Moore (I.115a: 200-01) acknowledges that he has used Theodore Millon’s system of psychopathology to identify the eight “shadow” forms that accompany the masculine archetypes of maturity. In Modern Psychopathology: A Biosocial Approach to Maladaptive Learning and Functioning (Philadelphia; London; Toronto: Saunders, 1969), Millon uses technical terminology to list eight maladaptive coping strategies: (i) passive-detachment, (ii) active-detachment, (iii) passive-dependence, (iv) active-dependence, (v) passive-independence, (vi) active-independence, (vii) passive-ambivalence, (viii) active-ambivalence. But Moore also claims that each human person has both four masculine archetypes of maturity and four feminine archetypes of maturity. So if Millon’s eight maladaptive coping strategies are also characteristic of the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes of maturity, then, in theory, this would bring us back to expecting a total of sixteen “not” descriptors to characterize ego-integrity – admittedly, with a certain similarity among eight respective “not” descriptors. This way of proceeding would give us eight “not” descriptors regarding our relationships with men (e.g., not passive-detachment = not characterized by passive-detachment in relationships with men) and eight “not” descriptors regarding our relationships with women (e.g., not passive-detachment = not characterized by passive-detachment in relationships with women). Because our relationship with our mother begins when we are in our mother’s womb, our projections of
the feminine archetypes of maturity probably begin when we are in our mother’s womb. For this reason, the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes may be deeper in our psyches than are the “shadow” forms of the masculine archetypes. If this is the case, it would be far more difficult for us to resolve the backlog of unresolved mourning of our nondeath losses involving the feminine archetypes. Because of men’s violence against women apparently involves men feeling threatened by the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes in their psyches, this would mean that men’s violence against women will require the men involved to resolve their backlog of unresolved mourning of nondeath losses involving the feminine archetypes in their psyches. But that is not an easy task for anyone to undertake. According to Neumann, all of us live in a feminine life-world in stages one, two, and three of the eight stages of consciousness – before the birth of the Hero in stage four, roughly around the time of puberty. In the second edition of The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who we Are (III.157a), Daniel J. Siegel discusses nine domains of integration in the new epilogue: (1) Integration of consciousness, (2) Bilateral Integration [of the left and right hemispheres of the brain], (3) Vertical Integration [of a range of neural processes, including the brain in the skull, the intestinal input, and the heart’s input], (4) Memory Integration, (5) Narrative Integration, (6) State Integration [state of being, or state of mind], (7) Interpersonal Integration, (8) Temporal Integration, (9) Transpirational Integration [a kind of “integration of integration”] (380-86).


(III.128d) Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York: Warner Books, 1992. Topic: American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Gibson (III.72e); Jenkins (III.93); Mahoney (III.115a); Turse (III.165).

Nirenberg, David. *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition*. New York: Norton, 2013. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Biberman (III.10a); Carroll (III.21a); Crossan (III.35); Josephus (III.105).

Nisbett, Richard E. and Dov Cohen. *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South*. Boulder, CO: Westview P, 1996. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Bowman (III.12b); Cairns (III.19); Cash (III.23a); Farrell (III.45); Freeman (III.71b); Friend and Glover (III.72a); Krause (III.110a); McNamee (III.121); Newell (III.128a; III.128b; III.128c); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Salzman (III.157).


Nussbaum, Martha. *Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2004. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Cairns (III.19); Cash (III.23a); McNamee (III.121); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129); Nussbaum (IX.55; IX.55a; X.38; X.38a). Because honor-shame cultures have been widespread historically, certain residual forms of shame from those earlier cultural traditions have become embedded in the cultural conditioning and customs and even laws that have continued into modern times.

O’Malley, John W. *The First Jesuits*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 1993. Also listed as Marchand (XII.93a); O’Malley (XII.107); Vollmann (XII.164b). Topics: Jesuit History; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. The Gutenberg printing press of the 1450s helped launch an unprecedented upsurge in basic literacy and formal education in Western culture. Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and his Protestant followers were part of this upsurge – remember that all those Ramists in seventeenth-century New England that Perry Miller (XII.100) writes about founded Harvard College in 1636. The newly founded religious order in the Roman Catholic Church known as the Society of Jesus (aka the Jesuit order) played an enormous role in the upsurge of formal education, as John W. O’Malley ably details (200-42). Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has aptly characterized Jesuit training as Warrior training (i.e., training in learning how to access the energies of the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche). Jesuit education can also aptly be characterized as Warrior training in spirit, at least prior to the delayed impact of the Second Vatican Council in the Roman Catholic Church (1962-1965). See Philip Gleason’s *Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century* (III.73). In Ong’s terminology, the Roman Catholic tradition represents a residually oral cultural sensibility that is in many ways pre-modern. For example, the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy that the Jesuits, the Dominicans, and other Catholic educators taught represents a residually oral sensibility
because both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas lived in highly oral cultures. However, as a result, popes and other Roman Catholics have had difficulty adapting to modernity. Instead of adapting to modernity certain popes and other Roman Catholics dedicated themselves to contending with modernity in order to preserve and transmit Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. But Ong attempted to channel the agonistic spirit of his co-religionists by challenging them to “Christen” modernity by using their own values to relate positively to modernity. Mutatis mutandi, any group could undertake to use its own cherished values to relate positively to modernity. See Ong’s “The Mechanical Bride: Christen the Folklore of Industrial Man” (II.17).


(III.133) ---. “The Barbarian Within: Outsiders Inside Society Today.” The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive Essays and Studies. New York: Macmillan, 1962. 260-85. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hale (III.79); Heath and Potter (III.80); Jenkins (III.93). Reprinted in An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry (I.138: 277-300). In this essay Ong works with the contrast of Greeks versus barbarians. In his “Address Before the Massachusetts General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” delivered on January 9, 1961, President-elect John F. Kennedy sounded like a Greek as he invoked not only John Winthrop’s famous imagery of a city on a hill but also Pericles’s famous boast about Athens being the model to be imitated. See Sarah Vowell (XII.164c: 245-48).

(III.134) ---. Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness. Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell UP, 1981. Accessible. Ong’s 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University. Topics: Cultural Studies; Evolutionary Theory. Also see Farrell (III.45; III.46); Fetzer (III.62); Gregg (III.77); Huizinga (III.87a); Lloyd (III.112); Ong (III.132; III.135; III.136; III.140); Wilson (III.173a). The women’s movement over the last half century has helped to precipitate the contemporary crisis in masculine identity. Even though Maurice B. McNamee, S.J. (1909-2007), does not happen to refer explicitly to masculine identity In his compendious book Honor and the Epic Hero: A Study of the Shifting Concept of Magnanimity in Philosophy and Epic Poetry (III.121), his historical study in effect shows the shifting concept of masculine identity in the portrayals of epic heroes in Western culture. But if the portrayals of masculine identity in epic heroes shifted over the centuries, then we should not be surprised that the contemporary
crisis in masculine identity signals the need for a deep shift in masculinity for boys and men in Western culture today. In his perceptive book *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness*, the published version of his 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Ong argues that boys and men need to develop a distinctively masculine identity. I know, I know, you could argue that girls and women need to develop a distinctively feminine identity. Fair enough. But Ong focuses his main line of argument on human males. At times, it seems to me that he is trying to explain what he sees as male agonistic tendencies for the benefit of women, especially feminists. In the subtitle of his book Ong mentions contest. The ancient Greek word “agon” means contest, struggle. In his earlier book *The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History* (1967, pages 192-286), the expanded published version of his 1964 Terry Lectures at Yale University, Ong uses the term polemic (from the Greek word “polemos” meaning war, struggle). However, he subsequently came to prefer to use the term agonistic instead. In plain English, boys and men tend to be competitive. How many people have NEVER noticed this? By comparison, girls and women do not tend to be as competitive as boys and men. But that’s not all. (1) According to Ong, boys and men need to work out a personal sense of masculine identity. (As I’ve indicated above, girls and women need to work out a personal sense of feminine identity.) (2) According to Ong, boys and men work out a personal sense of masculine in agonistic behavior in relation to other boys and men. (Girls and women work out a personal sense of feminine identity in relation to other girls and women.) (3) According to Ong, boys and men need to establish a personal sense of masculine identity because the mother (or mother-figure) looms large in their psyches. This is also true of the psyches of girls and women.) (4) According to Ong, because the mother (or mother-figure) looms large in their psyches, boys and men may at times sense their struggle to work out a personal sense of masculine identity as a struggle against the feminine mother (or mother-figure) in their psyches and perhaps also against girls and women in their lives, including the mother (or mother-figure). In plain English, they feel threatened by the feminine figure in their psyches. (5) According to Ong, it is part of the human condition that the mother (or mother-figure) looms large in the psyche. Therefore, part of the challenge of developing one’s ego-consciousness is to struggle against the powerful feminine force in the psyche. (6) According to Ong, in theory, it is possible for boys and men to work out a distinctively masculine sense of identity without denigrating girls and women and feminine behavior and qualities. In plain English, according to Ong, masculine does NOT have to mean anti-feminine. However, I hasten to add that Ong does not turn his attention to discussing possible physical, sexual, or emotional abuse by the mother or mother-figure. But the Jungian theorist Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary claims that men who rape women are
acting out their fear of the threatening feminine figure in the psyches that most likely is the result of being abused by the mother or mother-figure.


(III.138) ---. Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958. Also listed as Ong (IX.59; XI.9; XII.132). Topics: History of Education; History of Philosophy; History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory; History of Technology. Also see Connors (III.30; III.31); Lesser and Robinson (III.111a); Sloane (III.158; III.159); Smarr (III.159a). Ong characterizes following Ramist method as a way of composing one’s thoughts as monologic, because in theory Ramists do not explicitly advert to or argue with the adversarial position. Instead, in theory, they concentrate on presenting their own line of thought, regardless of any real or imagined adversarial position(s). In this way Ramists eschew the kind of pro-and-con debate that Thomas O. Sloane (III.158; III.159) describes. Pro-and-con debate involves what Robert J. Connors (III.30; III.31) refers to as argumentation. But in theory, Ramists proceed to compose their thoughts in the way that Connors refers to as explanation. Indeed, one should be able to explain one’s own thoughts. However, in theory, explaining one’s own position does not explicitly involve pro-and-con debate with the real or imagine adversarial position(s).


as Ong (VII.24; XII.135). Topics: History of Rhetoric; History of Technology.

(III.141) Pagels, Elaine. *The Origin of Satan*. New York: Random House, 1995. Topics: Biblical Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Brakke (X.8); Forsyth (III.67); Loyola (III.113); Pagels (I.144a); Russell (III.153; III.154; III.155; III.156).

(III.141a) Palecek, Mike. *The Dynamic Duo: The White Rose Blooms in Wisconsin: Kevin Barrett, Jim Fetzer & the American Resistance*. Ed. Chuck Gregory. San Bernardino, CA: CWG P, 2013. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies; JFK Assassination. Also see Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56). One focus of Mike Palecek’s 450-page anthology *The Dynamic Duo* is on my former colleague at the University of Minnesota Duluth (UMD), James H. (“Jim”) Fetzer. Jim (born 1940) and I (born 1944) both started teaching at UMD in the fall of 1987 – he in philosophy, and I in writing studies (as my former department is now known). He retired from UMD in May 2006; I, in May 2009. After Jim retired from UMD, he and his wife moved to a suburb of Madison, Wisconsin, to be near their daughter and her family. (Kevin Barrett also lives in the Madison area.) Within philosophy, Jim’s specialization is the philosophy of science. He has established a distinguished publication record in his field. As a public intellectual, Jim is probably most widely known for his work on JFK’s assassination. He has edited three anthologies of essays about JFK’s assassination (III.51; III.55; III.56). I greatly admire Jim’s persistent and perceptive scholarly inquiries into the death of President John F. Kennedy. However, as a public intellectual, Jim has also been active in analyzing 9/11 and other well-known events. Kevin Barrett has also been active in discussing 9/11. Palecek’s anthology provides a wide range of materials about their various investigations as public intellectuals. Now, long before I started at UMD in 1987, I had been familiar with the expression about “the clunched fist of logic and the open hand of rhetoric.” Jim represents the spirit of “the clunched fist of logic.” In short, he is characteristically overly insistent about his own views. (Disclosure: Yes, I like to urge my views on others, but I usually try to avoid sounding as assertive as Jim does.) In addition, he tends to talk very fast – faster than, say, television newscasters typically talk. Rat-tat-tat. (Disclosure: No, I do not talk as fast as he does.) So if $2 + 2 = 4$ (in a decimal-based system of math), then the spirit of “the clunched fist of logic” + fast talking = what? How about a television infomercial? Rat-tat-tat. Razzle-dazzle. In a television infomercial, the fast talk is designed to move us to assent quickly, without further reflection, to the information that has been presented and order the product. In Jim’s fast talk, the fast talk appears to be designed to move us to assent quickly, without further reflection, to the information contained in his argument and buy into his argument. (Disclosure: Yes, I would prefer to have people eventually buy into the arguments I present, but preferably after they have
had sufficient time to digest my arguments and consider them carefully.) One further point. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle worked with the idea of the mean between the extremes as the way to conceptualize the virtue of courage. For them, courage was the mean between the extremes of being brash and being cowardly. Jim tends to be brash. (Disclosure: Yes, I can remember times when I have been brash.) Now, in the anthology James Manns in philosophy at the University of Kentucky sympathetically details how and why Jim was not granted tenure there (78-85). Briefly, the tenured faculty in philosophy there could not bring themselves to hold their noses and vote to give their brash junior colleague tenure, even though he had established a distinguished publication record. Despite his publications, they decided that they would prefer not to have their brash junior colleague around for years and years to come as a tenured colleague. In any event, this episode shows that Jim has paid a price at times for being brash. Why does Jim tend to be brash? Evidently, he himself has no insight about this, or else he chose not to tell us his insight about this tendency in response to Palecek’s questioning him about his life. (Disclosure: No, I have not been interviewed about my life for publication. In this respect, I am not able to put myself in Jim’s shoes in his interview with Palecek.) Fortunately, you can read Palecek’s anthology without being distracted by these characteristics of Jim’s typical demeanor, because the medium of the printed book somewhat mutes and filters out these distracting features of his behavior. In addition, print invites further reflection. And you should always reflect carefully on things Jim says, as you should always reflect carefully on things other people in the public arena say, including things I say in this customer review. Now, Jim and Kevin Barrett (born 1959) are the dynamic duo mentioned in the main title. At one time, they served as the hosts of a radio talk show with that name. The anthology includes transcribed interviews conducted by Palecek with each of them. In those pieces, Palecek asks each of them in turn about his life. I found the biographical information about each of them informative, but not especially insightful. The anthology contains a number of other pieces by various authors, including Palecek, covering a wide range of topics related to Jim’s and/or Kevin’s interests. And a selection of photographs; a bibliography of books, articles, and radio shows; and a useful index. (Disclosure: I am quoted in the anthology stating some of my impressions about Jim [169-70].)


Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127b; III.127c); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).


(III.142c) Patai, Daphne and Noretta Koertge. *Professing Feminism: Education and Indoctrination in Women’s Studies*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127b; III.127c); Patai (III.142a).


(III.145) Pinker, Steven. *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Viking/Penguin Group, 2011. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72b); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); Menninger (III.121a); A. Miller (III.122a).


(III.152) Remer, Gary. *Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1996. Topic: History of Rhetoric. Not surprisingly, Gary Remer does not happen to advert to Ong’s *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (III.138). Ong characterizes Ramism as monologic. Ramism encourages authors and speakers to develop their own line of thought, but without explicit refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions. In contrast, the art of discourse does engage in explicit refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions. In this way, the art of discourse is dialogic in spirit, not monologic in spirit. Elsewhere, Ong uses the terms polemic and irenic. Because of the refutation, the art of discourse is polemical. Because Ramism eschews the refutation, Ramism is irenic. Ong also elsewhere sees Ramus and the Ramist educational movement as part of the larger movement that is known to us as Renaissance humanism. For this reason, the extensive Ramist educational movement undoubtedly contributed to what Remer describes as the emerging rhetoric of toleration.

two degrees from Harvard, perhaps it is not surprising that he quotes Havard Professor David S. Landes’ *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (III.111b). In three different places (55, 265, 280), Romney quotes with approval Landes’ claim that “culture makes all the difference [in economic development].” For the sake of discussion, let’s suppose that somebody objects: “No, culture does not make all the difference.” What will this objector go on to say? For example, will he or she object to the word “all” and say that culture only plays a certain role, an important role perhaps, but second to the role of what – creative entrepreneurs perhaps, or perhaps the government? But arguably the government is part of the culture, so the role of the government should not be discussed as though it is somehow separate from the culture. Moreover, unless the creative entrepreneurs are foreigners to the culture, they themselves are presumably the products of the culture. So perhaps they should not be discussed as though they were themselves somehow separate from the culture. In any event, Ong’s multivariate account of the infrastructures of Western cultural history complements Landes’ emphasis on culture as the most decisive factor in economic development.


(III.157) Salzman, Philip Carl. *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East*. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books/Prometheus Books, 2008. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Kepel (III.107); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Wright (III.174).

Siegel, M.D., a child psychiatrist at the UCLA School of Medicine, is mighty fond of his own ideas. He has learned the trick of getting high on his own ideas – he sounds almost euphoric throughout the second edition of his book *The Developing Brain: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who We Are*. In addition, he positively loves to use technical jargon. Please don’t misunderstand me here. I have no doubt that our relationships and our brains interact. For years C. G. Jung and his followers have discussed how archetypes work in babies as they form relationships with the mother-figures and father-figures and others. Presumably the archetypes that babies project onto caregivers are based in the babies’ brains. The Jungian theorist Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary (I.115a) refers to the archetypes that babies projected onto the mother-figure and the father-figure as the Queen archetype and the King archetype, respectively. John Bowlby and his followers have enormously expanded attachment theory. Attachments involve what Jung and his followers called archetypes. As is well known, brain research has also grown tremendously in recent years. No doubt Siegel is familiar with much of the professional literature about the brain. But here is one concern I have: Just how tentative are the professional studies of the brain? For example, if certain studies of the brain are really tentative and exploratory, should we take Siegel’s almost euphoric enthusiasm about certain points with a grain of salt, as they say? Basically, Siegel wants to advance what he styles as interpersonal neurobiology (IPNB). By definition, IPNB involves relating studies of interpersonal relationships and studies of neurobiology. By definition, relating A and B to one another involves integrating them with one another. It is the prospect of such integration that Siegel finds so exciting. Incidentally, Jung and his followers have been discussing integration for years. What they refer to as integration is the equivalent to what Freudians refer to as ego-integrity. So both Freudians and Jungians are in favor of integrations, and so is Siegel. In the epilogue (379-87), Siegel delineates nine domains of integration. Siegel works with studies in attachment theory (91-145). In attachment theory, optimal attachments are described as secure attachments. These secure attachments (117-120) stand in contrast with nonsecure attachments. (Secure attachments are coded as B on the Adult Attachment Inventory that Siegel refers to.) On page 99, Siegel identifies three different forms of nonsecure attachments as manifested in adults, which he discusses later in the book: (Coded as A on the AAI): dismissing attachment (120-27, 324-26); (Coded as C on the AAI): preoccupied attachment (130-34, 326-28); (Coded as D on the AAI): disorganized/disoriented attachment (136-41). This brings us to the professional literature about neurobiology. On page 124, Siegel says that “the region of the brain most central to attachment also appears to be the primary mediator of autonoetic consciousness.” I appreciate the careful wording here: “appears to be.” But what is autonoetic consciousness? On page 125, Siegel says, “Autonoesis is the mind’s ability to perform mental
time travel with a sense of self in the personally experienced past, as described in Chapter 2 [46-90].” But here’s the catch: According to Siegel, adults who are characterized by the dismissing attachment pattern may not have memory in their noetic consciousness of certain events in their autobiographical memory. So we are considering two distinct kinds of memory in adults: (1) autobiographical memory of certain events in the distant past (i.e., noetic consciousness); (2) the memory of one’s sense of self, including one’s emotions, at an earlier age (i.e., autonoetic consciousness). Because John Bradshaw, Alice Miller, Susan Anderson, and others have popularized the conceptual construct of the Child Within (also known as the Inner Child), perhaps I can invoke this helpful construct here. When our autonoetic consciousness as described by Siegel is working optimally, we as adult can feel the feelings that we felt at children at earlier times in our lives. When we work with the construct of the Child Within, we aim to revisit the feelings that we felt at earlier times in our lives. But Siegel suggests that we as adults will not be able to do this if we happen to be characterized by the dismissing attachment pattern. This observation leads Siegel to posit that “differing brain structures support autonoetic [consciousness] versus noetic recollection [in autobiographical memory]” (125). In addition, Siegel cites studies that suggest that the differing brain structures involved: (A) the left hemisphere circuits appear to be involved in noetic consciousness (autobiographical memory); and (B) the right hemisphere circuits appear to be involved in autonoetic consciousness. These points may be correct. But so what? Will adults who are characterized by the dismissing attachment pattern benefit from knowing that their left hemisphere circuits are involved in their noetic consciousness (autobiographical memory), on the one hand, but, on the other, that their right hemisphere circuits are not evidently activated (their autonoetic consciousness)? I seriously doubt that they will benefit from knowing such stuff. But I am going to stop here. I understand that academics are expected to publish. Publish or perish, eh? I further understand that medical researchers receive big bucks to conduct their research, including brain research. At times, Siegel is careful enough in the ways in which he words his statements about the studies he is discussing. In addition, he often eventually indicates the tentativeness of the studies in neurobiology that he has discussed. Nevertheless, his almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas appears to be designed to prompt people to jump of the IPNB bandwagon. I, for one, am not going to jump on the IPNB bandwagon. But who are the people he wants to jump on his bandwagon? He appears to want to appeal to people who are attracted to stuff that has the aura of medical science – for example, psychiatrists. So if you are predisposed to being impressed by studies of neurobiology, then you might be impressed with Siegel’s work. Moreover, if you are predisposed to being impressed by an author’s almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas, Siegel will not disappoint you. I would like to know which part of his brain is involved in his almost euphoric enthusiasm for
his own ideas. My impression is that the brain chemistry involved in his almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas is powerful stuff. Albert Ellis helped us learn how to recognize when we are catastrophizing — that is, how we tend to think thoughts that make us feel down and depressed about something. But Siegel has learned how to get high on his own ideas. So I will style his tendency as triumphalizing — that is, feeling a sense of triumph and enthusiasm as the result of one’s own ideas. Siegel’s almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas exceeds sober exuberance.


(III.158) Sloane, Thomas O. On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric. Washington, DC: Catholic U of America P, 1997. Also listed as Sloane (XII.156). Topics: History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Farrell (III.46; III.47); Lesser and Robinson (III.111a); Ong (III.138); Sloane (III.159); Smarr (III.159a). Thomas O. Sloane focuses on the pro-and-con debate protocol in traditional rhetoric in Western culture. But not only the verbal art known as rhetoric, but also the verbal art known as dialectic inculcated the spirit of pro-and-con debate. In Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (III.138), Ong shows how Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramism in effect moved away from the protocol of pro-and-con debate in favor of setting forth one’s own line of argument without the refutation of real or imaginary adversarial positions or possible objections.

(III.159) ---. “Reinventing Inventio.” College English 51 (1989): 461-73. Topics: History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory. Also see Farrell (III.46; III.47); Johnson and Johnson (III.101); Sloane (III.158). Cicero thought that the standard step known in Latin as inventio (known in English as invention), the step of trying to discover possible arguments one could use in debate, would be advanced by conducting pro-and-con debate with oneself about one’s own thesis statement. One would first negate one’s own thesis statement by adding the word “not” to the predicate, thus forming the antithesis of one’s own position. Next, one would formulate arguments that could be advanced in support of the antithesis statement. Next, one would set about formulating counter-arguments to those arguments, because one could use the counter-arguments in one’s own presentation in the debate to advance one’s own thesis statement. For examples of how the spirit of pro-and-con debate can be incorporated into lesson plans for use in the classroom, see David W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson’s Creative Controversy: Intellectual Challenge in the Classroom, 3rd ed. (III.101).

Studies; Cultural Studies; Literary Studies. Also see Lesser and Robinson (III.111a); Ong (III.138); Sloane (III.158).


(III.161c) Stone, Roger with Mike Colapietro. *The Man Who Killed Kennedy: The Case Against LBJ*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Nelson (III.127b). We Americans collectively represent the “new Adam.” This is part of our cultural heritage, part of our cultural DNA. You remember the story of Adam and Eve in Genesis. In the Christian tradition of thought, the story of Adam and Eve is also known as the story of the Fall. However, for the “new Adam” there has not been any Fall. As the collective “new Adam,” we Americans are “innocents” – as the biblical Adam was “innocent” before the supposed Fall. We Americans are such “innocents” that we prefer to imagine that a coup d’etat did not occur on November 22, 1963, in Dallas. Some Americans even prefer to imagine that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone shooter who shot President John F. Kennedy with a magic bullet that also hit Governor John Connally, who was seated in front of Kennedy. But Lee Harvey Oswald was a patsy. The conspirators set him up. Then they had Jack Ruby kill him. In *The Man Who Killed Kennedy: The Case Against LBJ*, Roger Stone, a well-known Republican, outlines the conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. We can all be thankful that LBJ and his co-conspirators and the Warren Commission did not pin President Kennedy’s assassination on the (now former) Soviet Union or on Fidel Castro. However, the time has come for us to set aside the fiction about Oswald and recognize that a coup d’etat occurred in Dallas on November 22, 1963, when President John F. Kennedy was
assassinated. His assassination was a coup d’etat that made then Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson the new President of the United States. President Kennedy was assassinated at a time when the Cold War was going strong. Fortunately, LBJ and his co-conspirators did not try to attribute JFK’s assassination to the (now former) Soviet Union or to Fidel Castro. Instead, they elaborately framed Lee Harvey Oswald as the patsy. Then they had Jack Ruby kill Oswald to silence him. However, even though the Cold War is now over, many Americans prefer to believe the myth about Oswald supposedly being the lone gunman. But Stone weaves memories and information about a number of Republicans into the book. For example, he reveals that when Richard M. Nixon watched the television broadcast on November 24, 1963, about Jack Ruby killing Oswald, Nixon recognized Ruby as a “Johnson man.” Nixon knew Ruby as a paid informant in the 1940s for the House Un-American Activities Committee. On page 392, Stone quotes the following statement made by Noam Chomsky in Budapest when he was asked about the energy that has gone into investigating Kennedy’s assassination: ‘‘Who knows and who cares,’’ he replied. ‘‘Plenty of people get killed all the time. Why does it matter that one of them happened to be John F. Kennedy? If there was some reason to believe there was a high level conspiracy, it might be interesting, but the evidence against that is overwhelming. And after that, it’s just a matter of if it happened to be a jealous husband or the Mafia or someone else, what difference does it make? It’s just taking energy away from serious issues to the ones that don’t matter.’’ Stone uses Chomsky’s dismissive statement as a springboard to set forth his own reply to him: ‘‘Why care about a murder that happened fifty years ago? The Kennedy assassination goes hand-in-hand with the popular distrust of the government that sprung up in the late 1960s. The assassination of Kennedy dug the foundation of distrust; the lies that landed us in [the] Vietnam War and the Watergate break-in commented it. In order to win back the trust of the people, it is the government’s responsibility to come clean’’ (392-93). In theory, I agree that the government should come clean about President Kennedy’s assassination. However, I do not expect to see this happen. Why not? Let me explain why not. The dark forces that LBJ conspired with to assassinate President Kennedy (Big Oil, the CIA, the Mafia, the Cuban exiles) are forces that are still around in this nation. Those dark forces, especially the CIA, would work might hard to prevent the government from coming clean about President Kennedy’s assassination. Moreover, the dark forces would be aided and abetted by the news-media establishment, which has diligently served as the gatekeeper of the myth about Oswald being the lone shooter. The news-media establishment has a vested interest in maintaining the myth that they have worked so diligently to maintain for decades now. Nevertheless, adult Americans need to be disabused of the myth about Oswald supposedly being the lone assassin of President Kennedy. I agree with much of Stone’s case against LBJ. However, I do not think that LBJ
initiated the plot to assassinate JFK. I think that certain disgruntled CIA officials initiated the idea and then brought LBJ into the plot to gain his cooperation in the cover-up.


(III.164) Tillich, Paul. *The Courage to Be*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1952. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Loyola (X.31); H. C. Mansfield (III.117); S. Mansfield (III.117a); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Ong (III.132; III.134; III.135; III.136; III.137); Pieper (X.41a).


(III.166a) Ventresca, Robert A. *Soldier of Christ: The Life of Pope Pius XII*. Cambridge, MA: and London: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 2013. Topic: Church History. Also see Carroll (III.21a); Eisner (III.44); Fischel and Ortmann (III.64).


(III.168) Wadlington, Warwick. *Reading Faulknerian Tragedy*. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1987. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies; Personalism; Therapy. Also see Farrell on Faulkner (III.45); on Personalism and
Therapy, also see Buber (I.24); Buzzard (I.26); D. W. Johnson (I.92); Malone and Malone (I.107).


(III.172a) ---. *Explaining America: The Federalist*. New York: Doubleday, 1981. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Bailyn (III.5a); Maier (III.115b).


IV. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT WRITING SYSTEMS

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 77-114. I should note here that writing systems accentuate visuality, so works about writing systems could be classified in the category about visuality, as could works about print culture.


V. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT WRITTEN AUTHORSHIP


VI. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE ART OF MEMORY

NOTE: See *Orality and Literacy*: 33-36, 136-52. I should note here that external memory-aides are visual, so external memory-aides help accentuate visuality. But the external memory-aides usually involve the use of images, so in this respect they can be aligned with the imagistic thinking that Eric A. Havelock identifies as oral thinking, as distinct from the more abstract forms of thought that he sees as distinctively literate thought – in short, the kind of thought frequently found in Plato’s writings, except for the myths in Plato’s writings. (The images in comics and photographs and movies and television can also be aligned with imagistic thinking.)


VII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT COMMONPLACES AND COMPOSING

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 107-10. Biblical scholars today maintain that the Book of Proverbs in the Hebrew Bible is a composite of several collections of proverbs from different time periods. In the early modern period, Erasmus (1466?-1536) was one of the more distinguished compilers of proverb-like sayings, as his Adages shows. In television news today, the sound bite carries forward the spirit of the drive to get things summed up crisply and briefly. In addition to finding it handy to recycle familiar proverbs and other well-known figures of speech, orators and writers over the centuries also found it convenient to follow established formulas for organizing extended orations and written essays (e.g., introduction, thesis statement, background material, definition of terms and/or problems, supporting arguments, refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions and possible objections, and conclusion).


(VII.2) Adler, Mortimer J., ed. The Syntopicon. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Great Books of the Western World. 2nd ed. Vol. 1 and 2. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Adler (IX.1; IX.2; IX.3; X.1); Lacy (XII.83b). In The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for cultural and Religious History (III.137: 80-81, 85), Ong distinguishes cumulative commonplaces from analytic commonplaces. Cumulative commonplaces are more or less fixed expressions that can be worked into a speech to provide amplification of certain points. By contrast, analytic commonplaces are used as aid in composing and organizing one’s thoughts. In effect, Mortimer J. Adler’s prodigious Syntopicon is a vast compilation of the 102 “great ideas” that Adler culled from the works collected together in both editions of the Great Books of the Western World show that there was and is a discourse community in Western culture. The great ideas are common conceptual constructs in the Western tradition of thought, which can be subdivided into numerous subtopics and related terms, as Adler and his assistants have subdivided them in the Syntopicon. The great ideas and the subtopics are the conceptual constructs out of which intertextuality is constructed. In effect, they function as what Ong styles analytic commonplaces. In Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications, 1543-1630 (XII.69), Howard Hotson says that “Ramism is less a ‘system’ than a loose and shifting concatenation of largely commonplace ideas and techniques” (16). In effect, Hotson is describing Ramism as involving the use of what Ong styles analytic commonplaces.


(VII.3e) Borg, Marcus and Ray Riegert, eds. *Jesus and Buddha: The Parallel Sayings*. Berkeley, CA: Ulysses P, 1997. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Crossan (VII.5b); Dalai Lamai (VII.6a); Erikson (VII.7b).

(VII.4) Bullinger, E. W. *Figures of Speech Used in the Bible: Explained and Illustrated*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1968 (original London, 1898). In this 1,100-page compilation, E. W. Bullinger (1837-1913) uses the familiar terminology of the commonplace tradition in Western culture to classify and describe numerous passages from the Christian Bible.


(VII.5b) Crossan, John Dominic. *The Essential Jesus: Original Sayings and Earliest Images*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco/ HarperCollins, 1994. Topics: Biblical Studies; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Borg and Riegert (VII.3e); Dalai Lamai (VII.6a); Erikson (VII.7b)


(VII.7b) Erikson, Erik H. “The Galilean Sayings [of Jesus] and the Sense of ‘I’.” *Yale Review* 70.3 (1981): 321-62. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Borg and Riegert (VII.3e); Crossan (VII.5b); Dalai Lamai (VII.6a); de Mello (X.14). This essay is exploratory in spirit. Erik H. Erikson (1902-1994) had planned to incorporate it into a short book about the historical Jesus. But he did not carry out this plan.


(VII.10) ---. *Homer’s Traditional Art*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1999. Topics: Classical Studies; Literary Studies. Also see Foley (I.64; VII.9; IX.26); Horsley, Draper, and Foley (I.86); West (VII.34).

(VII.10a) Hansen, Drew D. *The Dream: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Speech That Inspired a Nation*. New York: Ecco, 2003. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see King (III.108; III.108a); Mieder (VII.17); K. D. Miller (VII.18; VII.18a).

(VII.11) Jeffrey, David Lyle, ed. *A Dictionary of Biblical Tradition in English Literature*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans, 1992. Topic: Literary Studies. Also see J. Shapiro (XII.152a). For all practical purposes, the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New Testament have been actively mined by literary authors so that biblical stories and biblical expressions have become part a commonplace tradition in literary works. For a


(VII.17) ---. “Making a Way Out of No Way”: *Martin Luther’s King’s Sermonic Proverbal Rhetoric*. New York: Peter Lang, 2010. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Burrow (X.9); Farrell (VII.8); Hansen (VII.10a); King (III.108; III.108a); Lechner (VII.14); Lord (VII.15); K. D. Miller (VII.18; VII.18a); Obiechina (I.127); Ong (I.140); Plett (VII.26); Rieder (VII.30a; VII.30b). The German-born American scholar Wolfgang Mieder of the University of Vermont has devoted himself to studying proverbs. Among the many books he has published is a thousand-page bibliography of studies of proverbs, *International
Now he has published an exhaustive 550-page study of proverbs and proverbial expressions in Martin Luther King’s rhetoric. Each of the sixteen chapters has a chapter title that begins with a suitable proverb in quotation marks followed by the theme addressed in the chapter. On pages 15 to 19, Mieder lists the top ninety-seven of King’s favorite proverbial tag-lines and gives the frequency of each in parentheses after each one. Mieder reports that “King’s repertoire of proverbial quotations, proverbs, proverbial expressions, and proverbial comparisons comprises 436 different texts” (19). On pages 207 to 541, Mieder gives passages from King’s rhetoric, including 1,092 proverbial references in their context that Mieder identified in his examination of around 6,000 pages of published texts of King’s rhetoric. The entries are alphabetized by a key word in the proverbial tag-line at the top of each entry, with the key word in boldface print, followed by the contextualizing passage in which the tag-line occurs, rounded off by the bibliographic reference at the end. Before undertaking his ambitious study of King’s rhetoric, Mieder had published shorter books about proverbs and proverbial expressions used by Abraham Lincoln (2000), Frederick Douglass (2001), and Barack Obama (2009), and Mieder skillfully integrates points from those three books as well as points from his many other books in this book about King. Mieder’s book about King’s sermonic proverbial rhetoric is sui generis among books about King, because of its focus on proverbs and proverbial expressions. Mieder’s study and Keith D. Miller’s study of King’s compositional skills in Voice of Deliverance: The Language of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Its Sources (VII.18a) open the way for us now to understand how orators and writers for centuries used variations on the formulary compositional techniques used by the singers of tales that Albert B. Lord studies in The Singer of Tales (VII.15), a work that Mieder does not mention but should have. With respect to King’s compositional techniques using formulary expressions such as proverbs and proverbial expressions and often employing set themes to compose certain passages, King stands in a long tradition of singers of tales who used formulary expressions and set themes and of orators who used different kinds of commonplaces – cumulative commonplaces that resemble formulary expressions and analytic commonplaces that resemble set themes, to borrow Walter J. Ong’s way of describing those two kinds of commonplaces. Ong discusses these two kinds of commonplaces in his book The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History (I.140: concerning commonplaces, see the index for the term “commonplaces”). For a sense of the life-world of people who have a living tradition of proverbs, see Chinua Achebe’s novels Things Fall Apart (I.2) and No Longer at Ease (XII.1). But don’t make the mistake of thinking that Achebe and King were uneducated because of the fondness for the old oral tradition represented by their fondness for proverbial material. Both Achebe and King were educated and skillful users of oral-
traditional materials. Perhaps Wolfgang Mieder will now undertake to write a book about Chinua Achebe’s use of proverbial material in his different novels. In the meantime, though, I would call attention to Emmanuel Obiechina’s article “Narrative Proverbs in the African Novel” in the journal *Oral Tradition* (I.127), which can be accessed at the journal’s website that the University of Missouri maintains.


(VII.18) Miller, Keith D. *Martin Luther King’s Biblical Epic: His Final, Great Speech*. Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 2012. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Burrow (X.9); Farrell (VII.8); Hansen (VII.10a); King (III.108; III.108a); Mieder (VII.17); K. D. Miller (VII.18a); Rieder (VII.30a; VII.30b).

(VII.18a) ---. *Voice of Deliverance: The Language of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Its Sources*. New York: Free P, 1992. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Burrow (X.9); Farrell (VII.8); Hansen (VII.10a); King (III.108; III.108a); Mieder (VII.17); K. D. Miller (VII.18); Rieder VII.30a; VII.30b).


(VII.30a) Rieder, Jonathan. *Gospel of Freedom: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail and the Struggle that Changed a Nation*. New York; London; New Delhi; Sydney: Bloomsbury P, 2013. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Farrell (VII.8); Mieder (VII.17); K. D. Miller (VII.18; VII.18a); Rieder (VII.30b).

(VII.30b) ---. *The Word of the Lord is upon Me: The Righteous Performance of Martin Luther King, Jr*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Belknap P/Harvard UP,
2008. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Farrell
(VII.8); Mieder (VII.17); K. D. Miller (VII.18; VII.18a); Rieder (VII.30a).

(VII.31) Shaheen, Naseeb. *Biblical References in Shakespeare’s Plays.* Newark,
Literary Studies.

(VII.32) Smith, Charles G. *Shakespeare’s Proverb Lore: His Use of the Sententiae of
Leonard Culman [1498?-1562] and Publilius Syrus [First Century

(VII.33) ---. *Spenser’s Proverb Lore: With Special Reference to His Use of the Sententiae
of Leonard Culman and Publilius Syrus.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP,

VIII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT READING

(VIII.1) Altick, Richard D. *The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public, 1800-1900*. 2nd ed. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1998. Topic: Cultural Studies. A classic study of print culture. Other classic studies of print culture include Eisenstein (XII.32); Febvre and Martin (XII.40); Habermas (XII.61); McLuhan (XII.96a); Ong (XII.132; XII.133). More recent studies of print culture are now far too numerous to be enumerated in the present document, but certain notable ones are listed in Category XII.


IX. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT VISUALITY

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 115-21. I should note here that writing systems accentuate visuality, as does the printing press, but I have dealt with them in two separate categories in the present classified bibliography.

(IX.1) Adler, Mortimer J. Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy. New York and London: Macmillan, 1978. Accessible. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Adler (VII.2; IX.1; IX.2; IX.3; X.1); Crowe (I.41); Lacy (XII.83b); Nussbaum (IX.55).


(IX.5) Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. 2 vols. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Adler (IX.1); Aquinas (III.5); Aristotle (I.10; X.3a); Copleston (III.34); Garver (I.72); Koziak (III.110); Lonergan (IX.48); Mann (IX.49); Nightingale (IX.53); Nussbaum (IX.55); Ong (IX.59); Sorabji (VI.9a). Almost everything I have published is based on Aristotle’s insight regarding act and potency – act actuates potential. To be sure, my understanding of Arthur R. Jensen’s account of Level I and Level II cognitive development is based on my aligning Level I with orality and residual forms of oral cultural conditioning in the world-as-event sense of
life; and Level II with the world-as-view sense of life. However, in addition, I see Level II as actuating cognitive potential. In short, I do not equate the relative under-development of Level II that concerns Jensen as a decisive absence of cognitive potential, as Jensen seems to see it, but simply as a relative unacted cognitive potential due to highly oral cultural conditioning.


(IX.7) Belting, Hans. *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art.* Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1994. Topics: History of Art; Cultural Studies. Also see Ong’s *The Presence of the Word* (I.140); Bloom (I.190); Cushman (X.13); de Mello (I.42); Eliade (I.53); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Loyola (III.113); Menn (X.32); Sokolowski (I.170); von Balthasar (I.189).


(IX.10) Bloom, Harold. *Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present.* Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 1989. Topics: Literary Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Bloom (I.14). In a remarkably straightforward way, Harold Bloom makes observations that I would align with Ong’s thought: “Frequently we forget one reason why the Hebrew Bible is so difficult for us: our only way of thinking comes to us from the ancient Greeks, and not from the Hebrews. No scholar has been able to work through a persuasive comparison of Greek thinking and Hebrew psychologizing, if only because the two modes themselves seem irreconcilable” (27). What Bloom here refers to as “our only way of thinking” does indeed come from the Greeks, as he says, not from the Hebrews. For all practical purposes, Bloom is here referring to what Ong means by distinctively literate thought and expression. For all practical purposes, what Bloom refers to as “Hebrew psychologizing” is an example of the world-as-event sense of life that Ong associates with primary orality and with residual forms of primary oral cultures. By contrast, Greek thinking represents the world-as-view sense of life that Ong (IX.61) discusses. As a result of the powerful cultural conditioning of print in the print culture that emerged historically after the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press, what Bloom refers to as the “two modes” of
(1) Greek thinking, on the one hand, and, on the other, (2) Hebrew psychologizing have indeed seemed irreconcilable, as he says. In a similar way, as a result of our Western cultural conditioning in print culture, what Ong refers to as the world-as-view sense of life and the world-as-event sense of life have seemed irreconcilable with one another. However, Anthony de Mello (I.42) suggests in effect that what Ong refers to as the world-as-view sense of life is a prison. So de Mello urges us to work toward escaping from this prison.


(IX.17c) Critchley, Simon and Jamieson Webster. *Stay, Illusion! The Hamlet Doctrine.* New York: Pantheon Books, 2013. Also listed as Critchley and Webster (X.12a). Topics: Literary Studies; Psychoanalytic Theory. Also see Nightingale (IX.53). The artful Plato provides us with the contrast of philosophy versus poetry – which involves an unfortunate denigration of the spirit of poetry that Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster set out to challenge by rectifying how we view tragedy. They say, “Tragedy is not some prephilosophical expression of a traditional way of life” (191). Using a short quotation that is attributed to Gorgias as a touchstone, Critchley and Webster claim that “tragedy is always something spectated; it always involves a theoretical or cognitive distance” (191). Here is how they explain their own reasoning: “As is well known, the ancient Greek word for ‘theory’ (theoria) is linked to theoros, the spectator in a theater, and can be connected to the verb that denotes the act of seeing or contemplation (theorein)” (16). Critchley and Webster also say that “we don’t believe that there is psychical existence without fantasy” (189). Fantasy may be involved in sublimation, which they define as “the transformation of passion” (200). Passion is related to desire.


(IX.24) ---. “IQ and Standard English.” *College Composition and Communication* 34 (1983): 470-84. Also see Farrell (IX.23); Flynn (IX.25); Nisbett (IX.54). Because learning to read proficiently is the key to making the aural-to-visual shift in cognitive processing that Ong writes about in *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (IX.59), I regret that I did not know about Gary Simpkins’ reading research, listed below in the category on visuality (IX.75), at the time when I wrote this article. I have no problem with the idea of using non-standard forms of English in readers to promote reading instruction for African American elementary-school students. In addition, I regret that I did not think to say in my discussion of the *McGuffey Readers* that new readers might be prepared with orally resonant selections that might work as well as the *McGuffey Readers* have worked. The aural-to-visual shift in cognitive processing that Ong writes about is connected with the actuation of cognitive potential – the kind of cognitive ability measured, however imperfectly, by IQ tests, especially the kind of cognitive ability that Arthur R. Jensen refers to as Level II. What he refers to as Level I cognitive abilities are as well developed in
children who come from a strongly oral cultural background as in children who come from a more visually oriented cultural background. But Level II cognitive abilities are not usually actuated in people from a highly oral cultural background unless and until they have individually undergone the aural-to-visual shift. For this reason, Simpkins’ research about reading instruction is best understood as involving the aural-to-visual shift in cognitive processing that is connected with actuating cognitive potential of Level II. Nevertheless, we do need to remember the tendency known as “backsliding” because individual children from a strongly oral cultural background can indeed make short-term gains on IQ measures as the result of intensive educational programs, only to have those gains disappear after the students leave the intensive educational program.


(IX.32) Havelock, Eric A. *The Greek Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 1978. Topics: Classical Studies; History of Philosophy. Also see Havelock (I.81; IX.33); Voegelin (I.188). Havelock devotes an important chapter to detailing the history of the ancient Greek verb “to be” (233-48). Also see Charles H. Kahn’s *The Verb “Be” in Ancient Greek: With a New Introductory Essay* (Indianapolis and Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing, 2003). The verb “to be” is best understood as representing the stasis or static sense of vision that Ong associates with the world-as-view sense of life (see Ong’s “World as View and World as Event” [IX.61]).


(IX.33a) Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State U of New York P, 1996. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Caputo (IX.14a); Sherry (X.44c). To what extent did the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) support the programmatically anti-Semitic ideology of Adolf Hitler’s Nazis in Germany? With the recent publication of some of Heidegger’s private philosophical notebooks in German, this question is being revisited once again. Jennifer Schuessler has published an informative review of the relevant passages and their resonances with Heidegger’s other writings: “Heidegger’s Notebooks Renew Focus of Anti-Semitism” in the *New York Times* dated March 30, 2014. Schuessler says, “The so-called black notebooks, written between 1931 and 1941 and named for the color of their oilcloth covers, show Heidegger denouncing the rootlessness and spirit of ‘empty rationality and calculability’ of the Jews, as he works out revisions to his deepest metaphysical ideas in relation to political events of the day.” According to Schuessler’s article, “Richard Polt, a professor of philosophy at Xavier University in Cincinnati, pointed to the student notes from a seminar that ran from 1933 to 1934 (published in German in 2009 and released in English in December), which showed Heidegger speaking of ‘Semitic nomads’ who will never understand the nature of ‘our German space.’” Evidently for Heidegger, “our German space” was supposed to be a kind of refuge from Jews, the “Semitic nomads.” So these two key passages can be aligned with Nazi ideology. For Heidegger, the story of modernity is the story of alleged decline. This alleged decline involves “the dehumanizing effects of modern technology and [of] much the modern philosophical tradition itself” – to quote Schuessler. This alleged decline involved Heidegger’s account of “the nature of being,” as Schuessler points out. According to Heidegger’s account of the nature of being, people in the pre-modern past had a sense of being that has somehow been lost in modernity. Now, Heidegger came from a Roman Catholic background. For a period of time, he was in the Jesuit religious
order in the Roman Catholic Church. (Governor Jerry Brown of California was also in the Jesuits when he was a young man. Disclosure: I myself was in the Jesuits for about eight years.) For centuries, Roman Catholic popes have been denouncing modernity, but without naming Jews as alleged agents of modernity. For example, the recent German pope, now Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI (previously known as Joseph Ratzinger), regularly criticized modernity for its supposed secularism and alleged relativism. In a short book he co-authored with Marcello Pera, *Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), Ratzinger even employs the same imagery that Heidegger uses: rootlessness. But Ratzinger does not single out the Jews for special attention. So let’s consider the imagery of rootlessness. If we were to think about our human ancestors who were hunter-gatherers, I guess we could describe them as rootless. In addition, if we consider Heidegger’s indictment of modern Jews are “Semitic nomads,” then I guess that we could say that all our human ancestors who were hunter-gatherers were also nomads. However, because Heidegger singles out modern Jews as “Semitic nomads,” I think that we should turn our attention to the story of Abraham in Genesis. As the story goes, Abraham abandoned his roots and became a nomad in response to what he understood as the voice of God speaking to him. Religious Jews of all stripes look to Abraham as their father in faith. Moreover, Christians of all stripes, including Roman Catholics, look to Abraham as their father in faith. Furthermore, Muslims of all stripes look to Abraham as their father in faith. But if Abraham is the exemplar of the life of religious faith in the monotheistic deity conceptual construct, then life appears to be a nomadic journey involving rootlessness. However, you could argue that the story of Abraham’s nomadic journey is aimed at finding a new homeland and putting down roots there. But this interpretation of the story of Abraham seems to allow room for Heidegger’s “our German space” – but not necessarily in the anti-Semitic way he himself uses in his contrast of “Semitic nomads” with “our German space.” In any event, because Heidegger’s view of modernity coincides with the view of modernity espoused by 19th-century and later popes, how much, if at all, did his personal anti-Semitism influence the development of his philosophic thought during his Nazi years? To what extent, if it all, did he buy in to Nazi ideology during his Nazi years, and how did this influence his philosophic thought, if it did? But if Heidegger’s philosophic thought has been tainted by his personal anti-Semitism and/or by the Nazi ideology, hasn’t the Declaration of Independence been tainted by the racist views of the white slave-owners who helped formulate it? And how many authors, if any, have not been tainted by anti-Semitic views and/or racist views and/or sexist views and/or classist views – and the like? After all, aren’t all of sinners? Let the person without sin cast the first stone. As Schuessler notes, Heidegger’s philosophy has exerted its strongest influence [in France], through thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Derrida.” In 1967, three of Derrida’s
books appeared in English translation in the United States. With the publication of those three books, Derrida’s influence in certain academic circles in the United States began to rise. Derrida’s critique of logocentrism resembles Walter J. Ong’s critique of the corpuscular sense of life involved in the visualist tendencies of distinctively literate thought and expression from ancient Greek philosophy but especially accentuated by the Gutenberg printing press and its impact. See Ong’s book *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (IX.9: 65-66, 72, 146, 171, 203, 210). Derrida’s critique of logocentrism also resembles Bernard Lonergan’s critique of what he refers to as “naïve realism” in his book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (IX.48). Derrida’s critique of phonocentrism involves a critique of what Ong refers to broadly as orality, which includes the world-as-event sense of life of preliterate peoples as well as other forms of orality involving literate peoples. In any event, Ong came from a American Catholic background, and he became a Jesuit priest. As noted above, Heidegger advanced the anti-modernity agenda of 19th-century and later Roman Catholic popes with the same kind of backward-looking nostalgia. In contrast, Ong did not embrace the anti-modernity agenda of the Roman Catholic popes. He was not backward-looking, but forward-looking. While Heidegger was basically a technophobe, Ong was basically a technophile, but not an uncritical one. Ong advertises his basically positive view toward technology in the title of his book *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (I.139). He further accentuates his basic point in his articles “Writing is a Humanizing Technology” (1983), “Writing and the Evolution of Consciousness” (1985), and “Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought” (1986). Ong’s basically positive view toward technology, including not only writing but also the Gutenberg printing press and other forms of technology, led to the charge that he was a technological determinist. This charge was also made against Ong’s former teacher and friend Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980). McLuhan is the author of the book *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (XII.96a), in which he borrows Ong’s thesis in his book *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (IX.9), but amplifies it in his own ways. McLuhan is also the author of the book *Understanding Media: Extensions of Man* (XII.96e). McLuhan’s *Understanding Media* was his breakthrough book. But Ong did not have a breakthrough book. As a result, McLuhan became far more widely known than Ong did. Now, in 1937, Marshall McLuhan became a convert to Roman Catholicism. To one degree or another, he bought in to the anti-modernity themes of the 19th-century popes. For example, he was an old-fashioned Thomist like the French Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain. Even though McLuhan in the late 1950s read Bernard Lonergan’s book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (IX.48), he did not become a newfangled Thomist like Lonergan. As a result, McLuhan was somewhat disappointed when the Second Vatican Council in the Roman Catholic Church (1962-1965)
effectively down-sized the importance of Thomistic philosophy and theology in the church. As a Jesuit, Ong had studied the old-fashioned Thomistic philosophy and theology as part of his Jesuit training. However, he did not cling to the old-fashioned Thomist philosophy the way that McLuhan did. Now, just as Ong was basically a technophile, but not an uncritical one, so too McLuhan was basically a technophobe, albeit a highly reflective one. But, as mentioned, both Ong and McLuhan were charged with being technological determinists. At first blush, it is hard to imagine that these two Catholics could be considered to be determinists in any serious sense of this term. For freedom of choice is the basic principle of Catholic moral thought. No free choice = No moral culpability = No sin. So I need to introduce a distinction between determinism (i.e., no free choice) and determinative (i.e., a contributing influence). Neither Ong nor McLuhan was a technological determinist. But both viewed technology as playing determinative roles in our cultural conditioning. But McLuhan in *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (XII.96a) is closer to Heidegger’s anti-modernity view than Ong is in any of his books. In addition, McLuhan is closer to Heidegger’s view about the supposedly dehumanizing effects of modern technology than Ong is. In conclusion, I would urge the people today who are interested in studying Heidegger’s thought to turn their attention instead to studying Ong’s thought and McLuhan’s. I know, I know, they were both Roman Catholics. By definition, Roman Catholics are conservatives, aren’t they? Orestes Brownson certainly thought they should be. In certain ways, McLuhan was a social conservative. For example, many feminists might see some of his views as typical of a white male sexist out of the 1950s. Between them, though, Ong and McLuhan, most notably in *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (XII.96a), offer two contrasting syntheses of a new order – beyond Heidegger’s or Derrida’s. But I clearly prefer Ong’s synthesis over McLuhan’s.


(IX.39a) Kretzmann, Norman; Anthony Kenny; Jan Pinborg; and Eleonore Stump, eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1982. Also see P. Mack (XII.89); Ong (IX.59).


(IX.44) Levinson, Paul. *Digital McLuhan: A Guide to the Information Millennium*. London and New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 1999. Topic: History of Technology. Also see Logan (IX.47a; XII.85c); McLuhan (XII.96; XII.96a; XII.96b; XII.96c; XII.96d; XII.96e); Postman (XII.143; XII.144).


(IX.55) Nussbaum, Martha C. “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.” *Political Theory* 20 (1992): 202-46. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Adler (IX.9); Aquinas (IX.4a); Crowe (I.41); Newell (III.128b); Nussbaum (IX.55b). Basically, Martha Nussbaum is an Aristotelian. So am I. A universal declaration of human rights presupposes a universal human nature. But the conceptual construct we use to describe a universal human nature must be rooted in the philosophic position of realism, or else in Bernard Lonergan’s variant of this position that he styles as critical realism. So no universal human nature, no universal human rights. But no declaration of universal human rights = no standard for estimating social justice. Therefore, I greatly admire Martha Nussbaum for defending Aristotelian essentialism.

(IX.55a) ---. *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 2013. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Bradshaw (X.7); Farley (IX.22a); Havelock (IX.32); Koziak (III.110); Krause (III.110a); Morrison (X.36c); Newell (III.128b). Martha C. Nussbaum’s timely new book is a tour de force – not only both perceptive and profound but also easy to read. Professor Nussbaum argues that love is necessary for social and political cohesiveness in liberal democracies such as the experiments in democratic governance in the United States and India. (Out of considerations of space, I am only going to highlight certain parts of her book here. In doing so, I will omit many of her specific examples, including all of her examples about India.) Basically, Nussbaum’s argument about why love matters for justice is related, roughly, to the motto “fraternity” from the French Revolution, but without
the old gender bias of the term “fraternity.” Historically, the famous experiment in participatory democracy in ancient Athens involved something akin to love – male bonding among the male citizens (women and slaves and visitors were not citizens). In short, fraternity. Historically, the most famous advocates of social justice were arguably the ancient Hebrew prophets such as Amos and Isaiah of Jerusalem and Hosea. In their day, the ancient Hebrews lived under a monarchy, not a democracy. Nevertheless, Amos, Isaiah of Jerusalem and Hosea and other ancient Hebrew prophets had their own ideas of the covenant that they urged upon the ruling class whenever they saw it necessary to do so. Their own understanding of the covenant demanded that the ruling class look after the well-being of all Hebrews in an all-inclusive way – the spirit of fraternity writ large. In short, the ancient Hebrew prophets are the precursors of Nussbaum’s new book, even though she does not happen to mention them explicitly in her book. They are the precursors of her new book in the sense that they pioneered the genre she refers to as normative political philosophy, even though they may not have been the only ones to have pioneered this genre. Digression: Because the covenant is usually not considered in discussions of political philosophy, I can understand why Nussbaum does not discuss the ancient Hebrew prophets’ understanding of the covenant. However, I find it harder to understand why she does not mention Eric A. Havelock’s *The Greek Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato* (IX.32). End of digression. Even though the motto “fraternity” was not explicitly part of the American Revolution, something akin to fraternity no doubt existed among the men known as the American revolutionaries and the Founding Fathers. Those men rallied around the idealistic document known as the Declaration of Independence. The American revolutionaries first had to win the American Revolution before they could proceed to found a new country with its own constitution. As we know, they did win, and then they proceeded to debate the provisions of a new constitution. For the purposes of governance, the Constitution is the document that we turn to, and we still debate the meaning of certain provisions and of certain amendments that have been added to it over the years. Nevertheless, if we want to understand the American spirit, we usually turn to the idealistic Declaration of Independence. As Nussbaum notes, President Abraham Lincoln effectively rewrote the ideals expressed in this document in his famous Gettysburg Address. As a result, to be an American today, Americans are expected to embrace Lincoln’s understanding of the meaning of the ideals Declaration of Independence. So Americans today are expected to love American ideals. In short, Americans are expected to be idealistic. The viability of the American experiment in democracy depends on American ideals and on Americans embracing those ideals. Now, Nussbaum borrows the term “radical evil” from Kant to refer to the many-sided enemy of social and political love. Basically, she is an Aristotelian. However, she excels at using Kant’s thought to her advantage.
in this book, most notably in her many-sided discussion of the psychodynamics of radical evil. She says that “the central ‘narrative’ of ‘radical evil’ [is] the effort to cope with helplessness and finitude” (198). To one degree or another, all of us have to cope with helplessness and finitude. (I can understand why she encloses Kant’s term in quotation marks the first time she uses it, but I do not understand why she keeps enclosing it in quotation marks thereafter. Is she afraid that she will be thrown out of the University of Chicago for referring to radical evil? If the spirit of political correctness at the University of Chicago has determined that no one on the faculty should refer to radical evil without enclosing the words in quotation marks, then she should create a politically correct substitute term to use instead.) Nussbaum says that “‘radical evil’ gets its start in the form of tendency to subordinate other people to one’s own needs” (172) – as infants do. “From this early situation of narcissism grows a tendency to think of other people as mere slaves, not full people with needs and interests of their own” (172). Nussbaum’s perceptive account of the origins and psychodynamics of shame (esp. 168-74) nicely complements John Bradshaw’s discussion of toxic shame versus healthy shame in Healing the Shame That Binds You (X.7). Nussbaum’s perceptive account of the origins and psychodynamics of shame leads her to use the term “anthropodenial,” which she defines as “the refusal to accept one’s limited animal condition” as a human animal -- “anthro” here means human (173). She then characterizes anthropodenial as based on the expectations of the infant: “To expect to be complete (or continually completed) is to expect to be above the human lot. Infants cannot imagine a human sort of interdependency, since they are not aware that human life is a life of need and reciprocity and that, through reciprocity, needs will be regularly met. Their helplessness produces intense anxiety that is not mitigated by trust in the world or its people” (173). But Nussbaum sees trust in the world and its people as the basic erotic thrust upon which she establishes her argument for love as necessary for social and political cohesiveness. She sees the infant’s “love of light, and, more generally, that generous outward-seeing movement of the mind, finding the world fascinating and curious, that is both intelligent and emotional” as providing the basis for wonder and love (174). Now, Nussbaum’s overall discussion of the tragic spectatorship and the comic spectatorship (257-75) is brilliant. She sounds as though she herself had lived in ancient Athens during the Athenian experiment with participatory democracy (of male citizens, not of women or slaves or visitors). For that discussion alone, give Nussbaum an “A” for empathy. Empathy is one of her many strengths. She is also extremely learned. Now, in Stay Illusion! The Hamlet Doctrine (X.12a), Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster also discuss tragic spectatorship in ancient Athens, but they do not discuss comic spectatorship. In a short chapter (15-17), they discuss the famous passages in Plato’s Republic in which the character named Socrates “had a huge problem with theater” (15). Because the real person named Socrates
was sentenced to death in the restored democracy in Athens on trumped up charges, Plato understandably was wary of democracy. In the view of Critchley and Webster, Plato invented philosophy “to displace theater with a drama of its own” (15). But Critchley and Webster do not advert to the Homeric epics as dialogue-heavy models that Plato’s dialogues resemble at least with respect to being dialogue-heavy. Of course Plato’s dialogues are not action-packed as the Homeric epics are. But Critchley and Webster’s basic point stands as valid. “Plato’s stroke of theatrical genius was to replace the tragic sufferings of Oedipus, Ajax, or whoever with another loftier heroic ideal: the dying Socrates” (16). But that’s not all. “Plato sees as the great danger of tragedy, the danger of deception that leads to a theatrocratic political regime based on nothing more than the affective effects of imitation and illusion” (17). He was thinking of the theatrics involved in the trial of Socrates on trumped-up charges. In addition, Plato worried about how the tragedies performed in Athens contributed to culturally conditioning the kind of mindset involved in Socrates’s trial of trumped up charges. In other words, to what extent did tragic spectatorship in Ancient Athens contribute to the death sentence against Socrates by his fellow Athenians? However, Critchley and Webster correctly note that Plato in effect may have thrown out the bath water with the baby. They counter Plato by suggesting that the deception involved in the fiction or fraud or illusion of “the dubious legends of tragedy and the fake emotions they induce [may] leave the deceived spectator in the theater wiser and more honest than the undeceived philosopher who wants to do away with theatrocracy” (17). Perhaps. Digression: For a relevant discussion of the illusions involved in fiction, see Thomas D. Zlatic’s “Faith in Pretext: An Ongian Context for [Melville’s novel] The Confidence-Man” (XII.175). End of digression. But Critchley and Webster also advance a different kind of argument against Plato. Plato famously advances the argument in favor of philosophy as theory – that is, theory as presumably distinct from and superior to action-oriented and emotion-laden theatrics. Critchley and Webster cleverly note that “the ancient Greek word for ‘theory’ (theoria) is linked to theories, the spectator in a theater, and can be connected to the verb that denotes the act of seeing or contemplation (theorein)” (16). The implication of their etymological lesson here is that tragic spectatorship in the theater is similar in spirit to the kind of contemplation that Plato advocates for philosophy. In this way, Critchley and Webster suggest that tragedy should be open to examination by philosophers, as Nussbaum ably undertakes to examine tragedies in ancient Athens. Digression: For a relevant study, see Andrea Wilson Nightingale’s Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greece: Theoria in Its Cultural Contexts (IX.53). End of digression. Now, Nussbaum also deserves an “A” for her use of the Scylla and Charybdis imagery (211-25), which she borrows from the Homeric epic the Odyssey. In the famous episode in the Odyssey known as the slaughter of the suitors, Odysseus strings his powerful bow and fires arrow
after arrow to kill the suitors and restore justice to his homeland. In her own non-violent ways, Nussbaum fires one figurative arrow after another in *Political emotion: Why Love Matters for Justice*. This book is a tour de force.

(IX.55b) ---. *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. Cambridge, UK; and New York: Cambridge UP, 2000. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Nussbaum (III.130a; IX.55a; X.38; X.38a). What Martha Nussbaum means by the capabilities approach can be understood in terms of Aristotle’s discussion of act and potency. Act actuates potency (i.e., potentiality). Capabilities are potentialities, or human potential. Incidentally, Jean Houston’s work in the human potential movement can also be understood in terms of Aristotle’s discussion of act and potency.


loading of this tendency as visualism and hypervisualism. Also see Andrea Wilson Nightingale’s *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context* (IX.53).


(IX.61) ---. “World as View and World as Event.” *American Anthropologist* 71 (1969): 634-47. Also listed as Ong (I.143). Topic: Cultural Studies. Reprinted in Ong’s *Faith and Contexts: Volume Three* (1995: 69-90). In *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (IX.59), Ong refers to the corpuscular sense of life with various terms: corpuscular view of life, corpuscular epistemology, corpuscular psychology (65-66, 72, 146, 171, 203, 210). Both the world-as-view sense of life and the world-as-event sense of life involve the corpuscular sense of life. In *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (IX.48), Bernard Lonergan explains how understanding involves reflecting on sensory data and making judgments about what conceptual constructs and predications are most reasonable and tenable. But Lonergan himself works within the larger cultural context that Ong refers to as the world-as-view sense of life. However, Anthony de Mello, S.J. (I.42) in effect urges people to undertake becoming mystics so that they can escape the cultural prison of the world-as-view sense of life and experience the flow of the world-as-event sense of life. What de Mello means by flow would include the various examples of flow that Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi discusses in his book *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (III.36). However, Csikszentmihalyi’s examples seem to me to be examples of the optimal flow of energies involving the Warrior archetype, as described by Moore and Gillette (I.118). But de Mello seems to me to work with a much broader and expansive understanding of flow that would include more than just the optimal flow of Warrior energies.


(IX.65) Plato. *Complete Works*. Ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Trans. different translators for each work. Indianapolis and Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing, 1997. Topic: History of Philosophy. See Copleston (III.34); Cushman (X.13); Dancy (IX.19); Havelock (I.81, IX.32); Henle (IX.36); Jordan (IX.38); Marenbon (XI.8); Menn (X.35); Newell (III.128b); Nightingale (IX.53); Ong (I.134); Rabieh (III.147b); Rhodes (X.43); Stewart (I.149; IX.81a); Voegelin (I.188).

(IX.65a) Prier, Raymond Adolph. *Thauma Idesthai: Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek*. Tallahassee: Florida State UP, 1989. Topics: Classical Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Hahn (IX.31a); Nightingale (IX.53).


X. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE INWARD TURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 174-76.

(X.1) Adler, Mortimer J. Desires Right & Wrong: The Ethics of Enough. New York: Macmillan; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan; Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991. Topic: History of Philosophy; Therapy. Also see Adler (VII.2; IX.1; IX.2; IX.3); Lacy (XII.83b).

(X.2) Agamben, Giorgio. The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2013. Topic: Roman Catholic Spirituality; Therapy. Also see de Mello (I.42); Leclerc (I.99); Manuel (X.32a). The Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of Chicago Theological Seminary has aptly characterized Jesuit training as Warrior training (i.e., training in learning how to access the energies of the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche). However, it strikes me that the novitiate period in the training of all religious orders in the Roman Catholic Church involves Warrior training. In short, Warrior training appears to be a necessary preparation for becoming a mystic, as all people who enter religious orders in the Roman Catholic Church aspire to become. It takes courage to become a mystic. This is why would-be mystics should engage in Warrior training.


(X.3) Anderson, Susan. The Journey from Abandonment to Healing. New York: Berkley Books, 2000. Topics: Nondeath Mourning; Therapy. Also see Bradshaw (X.7); Critchley and Webster (X.12a); Frank (X.20; X.21); Fromm (III.72d); Janov (X.23a); Jeffreys (X.24); Koulouris (X.28); A. Miller (I.112a; III.122a); Moore (X.36); Pollock (X.41b); Stevens (X.44f). To show the importance of Susan Anderson’s detailed account of mourning nondeath losses, I want to discuss the contributions made by Erich Fromm, Robert Moore, and Anthony Stevens in order to establish the context for considering her account of mourning nondeath losses. Failed mourning of nondeath losses is the root condition that gives rise to what Fromm refers to as the authoritarian character. Fromm worried about what he styled as the authoritarian character, which is the default character type of all humanity at all times. As the antidote and preferred alternative to the authoritarian character, Fromm advances the person who has been liberated as the result of the optimal experience of psychoanalysis. So this is Fromm’s in-group, the avant garde. In Escape from Freedom (III.72d), Fromm explains that people who have
the authoritarian character are “the kind of persons whose whole life is in a subtle way related to some power outside themselves” (172). But all people live their lives “in a subtle way related to some power outside themselves.” By living this way, we are not escaping from freedom, as Fromm claims. On the contrary, this is the way in which we are exercising our freedom. This is simply the human condition. We are social animals. In David Riesman’s terminology (X.44), outer-directed character types (also known as tradition-directed) are authoritarian; inner-directed character types are authoritarian; other-directed character types are authoritarian. As a result of being authoritarian, we humans go about forming in-groups, which are formed to stand over against a real or imagined out-group. No authoritarian tendencies = No in-groups = No social cohesion. (If you want to live alone in the desert, you could escape from your authoritarian tendencies.) Next, I want to examine further Fromm’s explanation of the psychodynamics of the authoritarian character and connect his explanation with the work of the Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of Chicago Theological Seminary (I.115a). So how would Moore explain the psychodynamics involved in what Fromm refers to as the authoritarian character? Moore likes to say that when we project the King archetype in the archetypal level of our psyches onto somebody, we are giving away our power. In other words, we should stop projecting the King archetype onto others and instead learn how to access the energies and power of the King archetype in our psyches. (Moore claims that we also have a Queen archetype in the archetypal level of our psyches.) In Escape from Freedom (172-76), Fromm describes what he refers to as magical helpers – that is, helpers in our lives who seem to have a kind of magical touch in our lives. He allows that such magical helpers can include “a teacher, a husband, or a psychoanalyst” (176). In other words, when we project the King archetype onto somebody, we thereby enlist that person as a magical helper in our lives. Because Moore claims that we also have a Queen archetype in the archetypal level of our psyches, I assume that we would also be able to enlist a magical helper by projecting the Queen archetype onto her. As long as magical helpers are respectful of us and responsible and ethical in their relationships with us, they may play constructive roles in our lives until we are ready to stop projecting the King archetype and/or Queen archetype and instead access the power of the King archetype and the Queen archetype in our lives. In any event, Moore’s observation about giving away our power dovetails with Fromm’s basic concern about the authoritarian character – that people who have the authoritarian character will give away their power to people who are not trustworthy – and to movements that are not trustworthy such as fascism in Germany under Hitler and in Italy under Mussolini and communism in the former Soviet Union under Stalin and in China under Mao. It’s not hard to understand how dangerous it is if people give away their power to untrustworthy individual persons and/or untrustworthy movements. For understandable reasons, we may not be able to find enough trustworthy persons to serve as magical helpers in our lives. For this reason, we should undertake to stop projecting the King archetype and the Queen archetype (according to Moore, all people have both of these archetypes in the archetypal level of their psyches). Instead of projecting archetypes, we should work to access the energies and power of the archetypes.
These two steps sound straightforward enough. But it’s not easy to carry out these two steps. We engage in projecting the King archetype or the Queen archetype because of archetypal wounding that occurred when we were small children or later in life. In The Two-Million-Year-Old Self (X.44f), Jungian theorist Anthony Stevens says that archetypal wounding requires archetypal healing. In other words, the King archetype and the Queen archetypes in our psyches have goals that have been frustrated along the way in our lives. As a result, the King archetype and the Queen archetype need to be healed as it were so that they can be optimally empowered in our psyches. But what about our magical helpers, the trustworthy people onto whom we have projected the wounded King archetype or the wounded Queen archetype? Why don’t our projections onto magical helpers produce archetypal healing of our archetypal woundedness? Well, at times, they may. As a result, we may grow and develop. However, at other times, our magical helpers may just provide us with temporary relief of our archetypal woundedness, instead of providing us with archetypal healing. In any event, the would-be healer can help us go only as far as he or she has gone, but no further. This appears to be a law of our psychological nature. Simply stated, I cannot give you what I myself do not have to give. Your psychotherapist cannot give you what he or she does not have to give. The key ingredient in archetypal healing involves mourning. We need to mourn our nondeath losses in life in a healthy way. In the self-help book The Journey from Abandonment to Healing (X.3), Susan Anderson describes the course of healthy mourning of nondeath losses, which, by definition, involve abandonment feelings. When we do not mourn our nondeath losses in a healthy way, this results in unresolved mourning. Unresolved mourning leads to depression, often accompanied by suicidal thoughts. In other words, the anger involved in the unresolved mourning of nondeath losses is turned inward, producing depression. Finally, we need to consider what happens to a man when he does not give his power away by projecting his King archetype onto another man. Instead, he learns how to access the energy of his King archetype in his psyche. As a result of accessing the King archetype in his psyche, he will probably be more careful about giving his power away, but if he wants to join with others in any organized group effort, his authoritarian tendencies will have to kick in.

(X.3a) Aristotle. *Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A New Translation*. Trans with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2011. Topics: History of Philosophy; Classical Studies. Also see Buell (X.8a); de Mello (X.14); Faulkner (III.48a); Garver (X.22g); McNamee (III.121); Sparshott (X.46c). What Anthony de Mello (X.14) refers to as awareness is equivalent to what Aristotle refers to as contemplation.

In the examples of myths that Joseph Campbell discusses in his classic study *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (III.20), the hero undertakes the perilous journey and returns with the boon of life. For all practical purposes, John Bradshaw has undertaken the perilous journey of serious mourning and returned with the boon of life. According to Bradshaw, healthy grief is the boon of life. Grief is the healing feeling, he likes to say. Now, in the story of the cave in Plato’s *Republic*, the philosopher who works his way out of the cave and sees the light of the sun then goes back into the cave to work with others who are still struggling in the cave and have not yet seen the light of the sun. Figuratively speaking, Bradshaw has returned to the cave and worked to help others undertake serious mourning. In addition, he has written books and given lectures and workshops. In his book *Healing the Shame That Binds You* (1988; expanded and updated ed. 2005), Bradshaw sets forth an explanation as to how and why some people may be incapable of serious mourning. He says that people who are incapable of serious mourning are suffering from toxic shame that binds their emotions, except for the emotion of anger. For Bradshaw, grief is an emotion. He characterizes grief as the healing feeling (i.e., the feeling that can allow healing to occur, when healthy mourning has run its course). However, when toxic shame binds our emotions, our capacity to experience grief in a healthy way is bound (i.e., limited so that we do not mourn in a healthy way). When we are incapable of serious mourning in a healthy way, our experiences of mourning in an unhealthy way leave us with unresolved (i.e., uncompleted) mourning. Paradoxically, Bradshaw’s prescription for healing toxic shame is grief work, because, according to Bradshaw, grief is the healing feeling. In other words, according to Bradshaw, a person who is incapable of serious mourning, as Dr. Justin A. Frank claims George W. Bush is, will overcome this inability through the experience of
serious mourning. This is probably the case. But I would point out that it is not easy to engender serious mourning in oneself or in others. Moreover, serious mourning can be an overpowering experience leading at times to a mental breakdown. So if you want to experience serious mourning as the way to overcome being incapable of serious mourning, you should be forewarned that you might experience a mental breakdown instead. Serious mourning resembles clinical depression, a form of mental breakdown. Bereavement (i.e., serious mourning due to the death of a loved one) is not clinical depression because it is bereavement. In other words, it is obvious that a loved one’s death precipitated one’s bereavement. But nondeath losses can also precipitate serious mourning, as Susan Anderson describes in her fine book The Journey from Abandonment to Healing (X.3). However, it strikes me that clinical depression, a form of mental breakdown, should be understood as a signal that the person needs to experience serious mourning in a healthy way, if this is possible for the person to experience. Similarly, the symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) should be understood as signals that the person experiencing the symptoms of PTSD needs to experience serious mourning in a healthy way, if this is possible for the person to experience. No doubt certain other kinds of symptoms should also be understood as signals that the person experiencing the symptoms needs to experience serious mourning in a healthy way, if this is possible for the person to experience. But serious mourning in a healthy way is a powerful experience. So when the symptoms are already showing that ego-consciousness is being overpowered, the first order of business for the individual person should be to work out a suitable containment pattern, which usually involves the help of one or more other persons such as psychotherapists and Exquisite Witnesses, to use J. Shep Jeffreys’ term in his book Helping Grieving People – When Tears Are Not Enough: A Handbook for Care Providers, 2nd ed. (X.24). By working out a suitable containment pattern, the individual person may be able to develop the inner strength in his or her ego-consciousness to undertake the arduous and at times perilous work of serious mourning. The most famous imagery that I know of for containment occurs in the Odyssey when Odysseus is tied to the mast of his ship with his ears plugged as his ship navigates Scylla and Charybdis. Navigating your way through Scylla and Charybdis is a perilous journey. In real life, President Abraham Lincoln did undertake the work of serious mourning while he was in office. But it remains to be seen if President Barack Obama will follow President Lincoln’s example and undertake serious mourning while he is in office. For understandable reasons, President Obama may prefer to work out a suitable containment pattern instead. After all, President Lincoln was assassinated. For understandable reasons, President Obama may prefer not to run the risk of being assassinated if he can help it. Unfortunately, we do not understand how to help people experience serious mourning in a healthy way. Nevertheless, by definition, serious mourning in a healthy
way is a containment experience that is comparable to the containment experiences that babies need to experience when they are distressed. By definition, containment experiences help us contain our abandonment feelings. When individual persons voluntarily seek help through psychotherapy, they are usually seeking help in establishing a containment pattern in their lives that will enable them to cope more effectively with their abandonment feelings. At times, containment is the best way to proceed, especially if containment helps the individual person develop inner strength. Serious mourning in a healthy way requires a certain amount of inner strength, because mourning can be an overpowering experience leading to a mental breakdown. Serious mourning involves what C. G. Jung refers to as legitimate suffering.

(X.8) Brakke, David. *Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 2006. Topic: Roman Catholic Spirituality. Also see Forsyth (III.67); Loyola (III.113); Pagels (III.141); Russell (III.153; III.154; III.155; III.156).

(X.8a) Buell, Lawrence. *Emerson*. Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap P/ Harvard UP, 2003. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Aristotle (X.3a); Buell (X.8b; XII.17a); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Gelpi (XII.50a); McNamee (III.121); Mieder (VII.17b); Ong (X.40; XII.130a); Sherry (X.44c); Wilshire (XII.169). Because I was favorably impressed with Lawrence Buell’s new book *The Dream of the Great American Novel* (XII.17a), I decided to go back and read his earlier book, *Emerson*. Evidently, Buell is a life-long Emerson fan. As a result, I learned much from Buell’s book. But I also noted a few odd things. I will briefly discuss six items here. (1) For example, in Buell’s lengthy and instructive account of Emerson’s view of Self-Reliance (Buell’s capitalizations), I learned that Emerson’s “aim was to theorize greatness on the world stage” (87). Fine. I can understand that much. But I do not understand why Buell does not even advert in passing to Aristotle’s discussion of the great-spirited person in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (X.3a). Also see McNamee (III.121). (2) To take another example, Buell refers to possible “platform communion” with Emerson in his public lectures (page 103). But if and when such platform communion occurs, it surely involves what Aristotle refers to as the speaker’s ethos in his treatise on civic rhetoric (I.10). Also see Grimaldi (I.76). When I turn to the index in Buell’s book, I find multiple page references for the entries Plato/(Neo)Platonism, and E (394) and Socrates/Socratic (396). But there is no index entry about Aristotle, because Buell mentions Aristotle only in passing (201). (3) In a similar way, Buell is incisive and instructive in his various comments about the American Protestant tradition of thought. But he is silent about any possible historical sources of Protestant thought in the Christian tradition of thought before the Protestant Reformation. Gee whiz, Professor Buell, Harvard University, where you teach American studies, still has a Divinity
School. Scholars there could bring you up to speed about such things as the history of the divinity of the self/soul (16) and the apophatic mystic tradition in Christianity before the Protestant Reformation (see especially Buell’s “long list of proposed essentializations” in Emerson’s thought, including nous, on page 132). Evidently, Buell is not even familiar with the minor classic about the apophatic mystic tradition known as The Cloud of Unknowing. For an informed scholarly discussion of nous from the standpoint of a secular humanist, see Troels Engberg-Pedersen’s book Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (1.55). (4) To take another example, Buell discusses at length the question of whether or not Emerson could be considered to be a philosopher (199-241). However, even though Buell discusses Nietzsche perceptively at different places (see the index for all the specific page references to Nietzsche), he takes it for granted that Nietzsche should be considered a philosopher. But see Claude Pavur’s book Nietzsche: Humanist (Marquette University Press, 1998). Indeed, if we were to accept Pavur’s argument for considering Nietzsche as a humanist, then we might also see Emerson as a humanist. (5) My next example of an opportunity that Buell misses involves his failure to mention John Henry Newman’s famous quip that “the whole man moves” in his discussion of Emerson’s thought on pages 283-84. He quotes Emerson as writing about “generat[ing] the energy of the will” (I added the bracketed addition here). Emerson then goes on to say, “There can be no driving force except through the conversion of the man into his will, making him the will, and the will him” (283-84). (Buell mentions Newman in passing on pages 46, 185, and 357n40.) For a learned discussion of Newman’s point that “the whole man moves,” see Walter Jost’s book Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman (XII.79a: 76-84). (6) But, arguably, the greatest oversight in Buell’s fine study of Emerson’s thought is his failure to discuss Jesuit spirituality in connection with Emerson’s thought about Self-Reliance. I know, I know, the expression “self-reliance” is usually not mentioned in connection with Jesuit spirituality. So I can forgive Buell for not making this connection. However, Buell’s elaborate explanation of Emerson’s thought about Self-Reliance invites making this connection. Anthony de Mello, S.J. (1931-1987), the Jesuit spiritual director and lecturer from India, writes about spirituality in his posthumously published book The Way to Love (X.14) in ways that parallel certain points in Emerson’s thought. But he also makes a number of points that Emerson does not make. In any event, I learned much from Buell’s running discussion of Nietzsche and Emerson. But I learned the most from Buell’s extended discussion of Emerson’s thought per se, especially from his discussion of Self-Reliance.
Bugbee (X.8c); Farrell (I.62a); Fixico (II.8); Mooney (X.35a); Ong (X.40a); D. M. Smith (I.168); Wilshire (XII.169).

(X.8c) Bugbee, Henry. *The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form*. 2nd ed. Athens, GA; and London: U of Georgia P, 1999. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Buell (X.8b); Mooney (X.35a); Ong (X.40a).

(X.9) Burrow, Rufus. *God and Human Dignity: The Personalism, Theology, and Ethics of Martin Luther King, Jr.* Notre Dame, IN; and London: U of Notre Dame P, 2006. Topics: American Protestant Spirituality; Personalism. Also see King (III.108); Mieder (VII.17); Miller (VII.18).


(X.12a) Critchley, Simon and Jamieson Webster. *Stay, Illusion! The Hamlet Doctrine*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2013. Also listed as Critchley and Webster (IX.17c). Topics: Literary Studies; Psychoanalytic Theory. Also see Bloom (X.6); Boitani (VII.3d); de Mello (X.14); Fromm (X.22d); Koulouris (X.28). In this wide-ranging short book of 48 bite-sized thought-provoking essays about Shakespeare’s most famous play, Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster discuss Hamlet’s mourning and melancholia in connection with Sigmund Freud’s famous 1917 essay “Mourning and Melancholia” (119-25). In Shakespeare’s famous play, young Prince Hamlet’s father, King Hamlet, has died. As a result, young
Hamlet is mourning his father’s death. But his mother has proceeded to marry the dead king’s brother in rather short order. As a result, young Hamlet’s understandable mourning of his father’s death has turned into what Freud terms melancholia. Today we would say that young Hamlet is experiencing complicated grief. Based on my own experience of complicated grief, I would say that Hamlet’s mourning of his father’s death has been complicated by his nondeath loss of his idealization of his mother, because she has married the deceased king’s brother so shortly after the king’s death. Susan Anderson (X.3) has described the process of mourning mourning nondeath loss. According to her, the process of mourning nondeath loss includes an advanced step of rage. But when rage is turned inward, it produces depression (Freud’s melancholia) and also at times the bipolar opposite – a manic reaction. Young Hamlet manifests both depression and manic reaction. In general, when complicated grief occurs, it probably involves the concurrent activization of mourning nondeath loss. In other words, the concurrent activization of mourning nondeath loss turns bereavement into complicated grief.


(X.14) de Mello, Anthony. *The Way to Love: Meditations for Life*. New York: Image, 2012. Also listed as item (I.42). Topics: Biblical Studies; Mystic Experience; Spirituality; Therapy. Also see Agamben (X.2); Aristotle (X.3a); Critchley and Webster (X.12a); Eliade (I.53); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Fromm (X.22d); Fromm and Suzuki (X.22g); Leclerc (I.99); Manuel (X.32a); Moore and Gillette (I.116); Sherry (X.44c). In this perceptive series of meditations, Anthony de Mello, S.J. (1931-1987), explains certain challenging gospel passages by elucidating how a mystic understanding could inform our understanding of the challenging texts. In doing this, he centers our attention of what he refers to as attachments. Instead of craving our attachments and clinging to them, he urges us to cultivate the optimal spirit of nonattachment or unattachment. Because de Mello was a Jesuit spiritual director, we should note that the spirit of nonattachment or unattachment that he recommends is also recommended in the Principle and Foundation section of the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola (standardized section number 23). What Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette (I.116) describe as the Lover archetype in the archetypal level of our psyches is involved in our attachments -- not only in our craving them and clinging to them, but also in our optimal spirit of nonattachment or unattachment. As noted, de Mello points out that we tend to crave our attachments and cling to them. In Moore and Gillette’s terminology, the craving and clinging involve one or the other “shadow” forms of the Lover archetype. But the mystic antidote that de Mello recommends to replace our craving and clinging tendencies is
nonattachment or unattachment. I would suggest that the attitude and orientation of nonattachment or unattachment involves what Moore and Gillette refer to as the optimal form of the Lover archetype. In addition, de Mello explains how awareness is involved in bringing about natural change and growth. What Moore (X.36) describes and explains as the archetype of initiation is involved in what de Mello describes as natural change and growth. Finally, I would say that in this posthumously published book of de Mello’s meditations and in his lifework as a retreat director, de Mello was a shaman in spirit. In other words, he was drawing on the shaman energies of the Magician archetype in the archetypal level of his psyche that Moore and Gillette discuss in their book The Magician Within: Accessing the Shaman [Archetype] in the Male Psyche (I.117).


(X.16a) Erikson, Erik H. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. New York: Norton, 1958. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Gregg (III.77); Friedman (X.22a: 243-302); Meissner (X.34a).


(X.19a) Francis, Pope [formerly known as Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, S.J.). “A Big Heart Open to God: The Exclusive Interview with Pope Francis [Conducted in Italian by Antonio Spadaro, S.J.]” America 209.8 (September 30, 2013): 14-18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38. Topics: Jesuit Spirituality; Religious Studies. This lengthy interview of Pope Francis was published in English in the Jesuit-sponsored magazine America and in other languages in 15 other Jesuit-sponsored magazines
around the world simultaneously. The editor of a Jesuit magazine in Rome, Antonio Spadaro, S.J., had conducted the interview in Italian, using questions submitted by various Jesuit magazine editors around the world. Pope Francis is the first Jesuit to be elected pope. Unlike the Benedictines, the Franciscans, and the Dominicans, the Jesuits have no branch of women religious, just as the Roman Catholic Church has no women priests. In recent decades, women religious around the world have been far more credible witnesses to gospel teachings than have the all-male Catholic bishops and the all-male Catholic priests and the all-male Jesuits.

(Disclosure: Many years ago now, I was in the Jesuits for approximately eight years. However, for many years now, I have not been a practicing Catholic.) Evidently, Pope Francis was not given the list of questions before the interview. As a result, his responses appear to be extemporaneous. But the Jesuit who conducted the interview did not ask Pope Francis any challenging follow-up questions asking him to clarify anything or to give examples of what he meant. Why bother to have a face-to-face interview, if the interviewer does not ask any challenging follow-up questions? For example, in response to the interviewer’s question about who he is, Pope Francis first says that he is a sinner. Then upon further reflection, he adds, “Yes, perhaps I can say that I am a bit astute, [and] that I can adapt to circumstances, but it is also true that I am a bit naïve” (16). Then he returns to the theme that he is a sinner. OK, at times, he is a bit astute. At times, he can adapt to circumstances. At times, he is a bit naïve. And the interviewer asks no questions. However, as I will discuss momentarily, later in the interview, Pope Francis gives us reason to wonder about his statements regarding women. Do he thinks those statements show how he can at times be astute, or how at times he cannot adapt, or at times how he is naïve? In the lengthy interview, Pope Francis uses a lot of Catholic mumbo-jumbo, the kind of Catholic mumbo-jumbo that usually appeals to conservative American Catholic theocons who tend toward papalolotry. However, so much of this interview is given over to Jesuit mumbo-jumbo that I would say that this published interview is by far the best Jesuit propaganda in recent decades. Not surprisingly, the pope is thoroughly grounded in Jesuit spirituality. But it remains to be seen if this will help him be an effective pope. In any event, buried in the pope’s vast outpouring of Catholic mumbo-jumbo were a few pointed remarks criticizing the Roman Catholic Church for over-emphasizing its teachings against legalized abortion in the first trimester, artificial contraception, and same-sex marriage. Pope Francis says, “We cannot insist only on issues related to abortion, gay marriage, and the use of contraceptive methods. This is not possible. I have not spoken much about these things, and I was reprimanded for that. But when we speak about these issues, we have to talk about them in context. The teaching of the church, for that matter, is clear[,] and I am a son of the church, but it is not necessary to talk about these issues all the time” (26). Wow! American Catholic theocons are not going to be happy with Pope Francis. As a matter of fact, they might want
to organize a recall election to have him removed as pope and have the cardinal-electors re-convene and elect another pope more to their liking. Not surprisingly, the secular news media in the United States helped get the word out about Pope Francis’s criticisms of the over-emphasis on certain well-known Catholic teachings. But let’s not get carried away here with the selective coverage of the U.S. news media. After all, Pope Francis did not criticize the church’s teachings, which I would say deserve to be roundly criticized and rejected. On the contrary, his specific criticisms come down to trying to curb the religious zealotry of Catholic theocons. In effect, he is urging them to stand down from their favorite political emphases, because there is more to the church’s overall teachings than just their few favorite hobby-horses. In plain English, Pope Francis is criticizing tactics used to supposedly witness to and thereby supposedly advance the cause of winning over the hearts and minds of people to the church’s teachings. But he is not criticizing the substance of the church’s ridiculous teachings, as they deserve to be criticized. In the interview, Pope Francis actually devotes more time and attention to expounding his positive views of the church and what it should be than he devotes to expounding his few pointed criticisms of over-emphasizing selected church teachings. But his positive views of the church are so general and so over-arching that American Catholics who favor emphasizing the church’s faith-and-justice teachings might not feel that their favorite hobby-horses have been endorsed by the pope. Nevertheless, the good news is that Pope Francis clearly and unequivocally says, “I have never been a right-winger” (20). But the bad news is that he clearly indicates that he is a male chauvinist if there ever was one. When Pope Francis was asked about the role of women in the church, here is how he responded: “I am wary of a solution that can be reduced to a kind of ‘female machismo,’ because a woman has a different makeup than a man. But what I hear about the role of women is often inspired by an ideology of machismo. Women are asking deep questions that must be addressed. The church cannot be herself without the woman and her role. The woman is essential for the church. Mary, a woman, is more important than the bishops. I say this because we must not confuse the function with the dignity. We must therefore investigate further the role of women in the church. We have to work harder to develop a profound theology of the woman. Only by making this step will it be possible to better reflect on their function within the church. The feminine genius is needed wherever we make important decisions. The challenge today is this: to think about the specific place of women also in those places where the authority of the church is exercised for various arenas of the church” (28). Give the man a prize for out-doing the Vatican’s notorious claim about women religious in the church being influenced by so-called “radical feminism” -- by coming up with a far more sweeping indictment of a supposedly female ideology of machismo. The man is a male chauvinist if ever there was one. He’s against the ideology of female machismo, because he favors the ideology of male...
machismo that has dominated the Roman Catholic Church in recent centuries. So should the Roman Catholic Church be renamed the Roman Catholic Church of Male Patriarchy, or the Roman Catholic Church of Male Chauvinism, or the Roman Catholic Church of Male Machismo? Granted, at least Pope Francis appears to speak positively about the “essential” role of women in the church. Indeed, if all the Catholic women around the world today abandoned the church, there would not be many practicing Catholics left. So Pope Francis would be well advised to re-think his claim that “woman has a different makeup than a man.” Yes, women and men admittedly have different anatomical features. For example, women have wombs and give birth to children. Men don’t. Men have more testosterone and less estrogen. But in the final analysis, just how important are these differences in physiological makeup? Why should the Roman Catholic Church put so much emphasis on gender politics by claiming that women should not serve the church as ordained priests? Why not? Didn’t ancient gender politics influence the portrayal of women in the canonical gospels? I know, I know, Pope Francis says that he did not receive a good education in philosophy. Referring to “decadent Thomistic commentaries,” he says, “Unfortunately, I studied philosophy from textbooks that came from decadent or largely bankrupt Thomism. In thinking of the human being, therefore, the church should strive for genius [such as “the genius of Thomas Aquinas”] and not for decadence” (38). Fair enough. Would some genius please tell Pope Francis that his statement that “woman has a different makeup than a man” sounds remarkably out-dated as a philosophical position? In my estimate, the only tenable philosophical position is that women and men both have a human nature, regardless of the obvious anatomical and physiological differences between them. Now, if both women and men have the same basic human nature, then they are born equal and should have equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as the American Declaration of Independence puts it. But should women in the Roman Catholic Church have the same rights that men do? For example, should Roman Catholic women have the right to become validly ordained priests, or to become cardinals, or to become pope? But if Roman Catholic women are to be denied the right to become validly ordained priests, or cardinals, or the pope, on what grounds should they be denied these rights – on the grounds of debatable interpretations of culturally conditioned scriptural texts? Because the Jesuits do not have a branch of women religious, perhaps we should not be surprised that Pope Francis is a male chauvinist. Nevertheless, not only Roman Catholic women religious but also other Roman Catholic women should pray for him to have a change of heart and mind about the alleged ideology of female machismo and the alleged “different makeup” of a woman. In addition to praying for him to have a change of heart and mind, both Roman Catholic women religious and other Roman Catholic women should speak out against his out-dated views. Indeed, all women and men of goodwill who are concerned about
the rights of women, including their legal right to abortion in the first trimester, should speak out against Pope Francis’s out-dated views. Somebody always has to bring up the rear. But in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, the rear has really fallen way behind. So let Pope Francis bring up the rear if he wants to. But tell him to bring the rear up from the mid-20th century and the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) in the Roman Catholic Church, because we are now in the 21st century. He’s back there with the American television show Father Knows Best, as are many conservative American Catholics.

(X.20) Frank, Justin A. Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President. 2nd ed. New York: Harper, 2007. Topics: Kleinian Psychoanalysis; Therapy. Perceptive, empathic, and penetrating. What difference does it make, if any, if the president of the United States is incapable of serious mourning? What benefit, if any, is there to being capable of serious mourning? Justin A. Frank, M.D., is a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. As a psychoanalyst, he follows Melanie Klein’s approach to psychoanalysis, using her model of our psychological condition. I read Dr. Frank’s book Obama on the Couch (X.21) before I read Dr. Frank’s earlier book Bush on the Couch (2004; rev. ed. 2007). In his book about President Barack Obama, Dr. Frank sets forth a far more lucid explanation of Melanie Klein’s thought than he does in his book about President George W. Bush (GWB). In addition, Dr. Frank’s book about Obama includes a helpful glossary of psychoanalytic terminology toward the end of the book. In his book about GWB, Dr. Frank suggests that GWB probably suffers from the kind of learning disability known as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). But Dr. Frank’s most important diagnosis of GWB is that he suffers from megalomania (200-06, 231). However, the most moving and at times poignant part of Dr. Frank’s book is his recurring discussion of the death of GWB’s younger sister Robin in October 1953, when GWB was about seven years old (2-3, 14-16, 68, 84, 105,187, 224-225, 246). Evidently, GWB’s mother and father did not themselves mourn Robin’s death in a healthy way, thereby tragically depriving GWB of the kind of nurturing he needed to learn himself how to mourn in a healthy way. Dr. Frank discusses the importance of mourning extensively (xvi, 15, 16, 67, 68, 110, 185, 187-188, 255). He concludes that “[a]cceptance of who we are, with all our limitations, requires serious mourning – something that Bush is incapable of doing” (255).

(X.21) ---. Obama on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President. New York: Free Press/Simon & Schuster, 2011. Topics: Kleinian Psychoanalysis; Therapy. Accessible and insightful. Because Dr. Frank diagnoses President George W. Bush as suffering from megalomania, it is not surprising to find that Dr. Frank discusses mania in his book about GWB (202, 232, 254). Because Dr. Frank differentiates megalomania from what I will refer to as simple mania (he refers simply to mania, without a modifying word or
prefix), it is not surprising to find that Dr. Frank also works with the term manic in places in his book about Obama (34, 52, 221). However, after Dr. Frank’s extensive discussion of mourning in his book about GWB, mentioned above, I was surprised to find that Dr. Frank refers to mourning only once in his book about Obama (97). But Dr. Frank’s extensive discussion of how Obama’s otherwise nurturing mother did not herself exemplify for young Barack healthy mourning about her own nondeath loss of Barack’s Kenyan father or help young Barack himself learn how to mourn his nondeath loss of his father in a healthy way. Because Dr. Frank connects GWB’s being incapable of serious mourning with his megalomania, as diagnosed by Dr. Frank, why is Dr. Frank silent about how Obama’s mother evidently failed herself to engage in serious mourning her nondeath loss of Obama’s father and also failed to help young Barack learn how to mourn his nondeath loss of his father in a healthy way? I do NOT mean to suggest that President Obama suffers from the kind of megalomania that Dr. Frank diagnoses GWB as suffering from. However, if Obama does not suffer from megalomania, does he suffer from what I referred to above as simple mania? What I am here referring to as simple mania, to differentiate it from megalomania, may not be uncommon in American culture. See John D. Gartner’s book The Hypomanic Edge: The Link between (A Little) Craziness and (A Lot of) Success in America (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 2005) and Peter C. Whybrow’s book American Mania: When More is Not Enough (New York and London: Norton, 2005). In any event, I want to quote a telling passage from Dr. Frank’s book about Obama: “Still there is no question that Obama’s passion lies in the drive to heal the split he sees as red and blue. And he sees speeches as transformative, no matter what actions are taken” (33). Now, if John Bradshaw is correct is claiming that grief is the healing feeling, then Obama’s drive to heal the split he sees as red and blue should lead him to advocate grief work, as Bradshaw does. However, instead of advocating grief work as the way to bring about healing, Obama gives big-sounding speeches that have no connection with grief work. Nevertheless, he evidently sees his big-sounding speeches as transformative, as though healing and the transformation that accompanies healing were brought about by listening to big-sounding speeches instead of by undertaking the work of mourning in a healthy way. I know, I know, people do not live on bread alone. For the sake of discussion, I am willing to allow that certain people may find Obama’s speeches uplifting and encouraging. I understand uplifting and encouraging speeches have a valid place in our public lives. But people also do not live on big-sounding speeches alone. Besides that, I do not understand why Obama sees the split between red and blue states as something that he should work to heal. Does he really imagine that he is going to heal megalomaniacs? For understandable reasons, Obama might prefer not to be assassinated by megalomaniacs. However, it strikes me that he should undertake a policy of containment regarding the megalomaniacs not only in red states but
also in other parts of the world today. As Dr. Frank intimates, the first task at hand for President Obama is to work out a more realistic understanding of his mother and his father and their relationship. But to do this, Obama would have to undertake the work of serious mourning of nondeath losses in his early life. In other words, the real split that Obama should work to heal is the split in his own psychological world. As Bradshaw says, grief is the healing feeling. To help himself heal the split in his own psychological world, Obama needs to undertake serious mourning. If his grief work were to heal him from the split in his own psychological world, then he would emerge far more capable of following a policy of containment of the megalomaniacs in red states, instead of hoping in vain that he will somehow heal them through his big-sounding speeches. To be sure, the megalomaniacs in red states do indeed truly need to be healed of their megalomania. However, they are not going to be healed by big-sounding speeches. To be healed, they will have to undertake serious mourning. In the meantime, in the presidential campaign of 2012, President Obama should use big-sounding speeches to rally blue-state liberals against the red-state megalomaniacs. The Republicans are up to no good. So liberals should work against Republicans running for elective office.


(X.22c) --- (with assistance from Anke M. Schreiber). *The Lives of Erich Fromm: Love’s Prophet*. New York: Columbia UP, 2013. Also listed as L. J. Friedman (III.67a). Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Therapy; Cultural Studies. Also see Critchley and Webster (X.12a); de Mello (X.14); Fromm (X.22d); Malone and Malone (I.107); Sherry (X.44c). In this perceptive and penetrating biography, Lawrence J. Friedman explains that Eric Fromm (1900-1980) became friends with David Riesman (1909-2002) after Riesman had seen Fromm for professional psychotherapy. I would say that both men were exemplars of what Riesman (X.44) refers to as inner-directed persons – as was Ong, and as am I. What Fromm refers to as authoritarianism involved a noxious and virulent form of what Riesman refers as the outer-directed character type, not an optimal form. As a result of being inner-directed, both Fromm and Riesman were understandably wary of the emerging other-directed persons in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States and elsewhere, which Riesman and Fromm saw as the lonely
crowd. I understand their critiques of other-directedness, which they feared could give way to the noxious and virulent kind of authoritarianism that Fromm had studied. But I think that their critiques of other-directedness are unduly negative. Perhaps inner-directed persons will always look askance at other-directed persons, as Arthur Miller looks askance at Willy Loman in The Death of a Salesman. On the one hand, it strikes me that other-directed persons do not have a monopoly on living tragic lives, because inner-directed persons may also live tragic lives. On the other hand, it strikes me that inner-directed persons do not always experience the greatness of soul that Fromm did and that President John F. Kennedy, an other-directed person if ever there was one, did.

(X.22d) Fromm, Erich. *The Art of Loving*. New York: Harper & Row, 1956. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Therapy; Cultural Studies. Also see Critchley and Webster (X.12a); de Mello (X.14); L. J. Friedman (X.22c). According to Lawrence J. Friedman (X.22c), “In all, the book [The Art of Loving] sold roughly twenty-five million copies in fifty languages” (183). When I was an undergraduate, I had read *The Art of Loving*. Then in my junior year at Saint Louis University (1964-1965), I attended a reception and dinner in honor of Erich Fromm and his wife early on a Sunday evening, April 25, 1965. Fromm was scheduled to deliver a public lecture on campus later Sunday evening. During the reception, Fr. Ong dropped in to greet Fromm and his wife briefly. But Ong then quickly departed from the reception.

(X.22e) ---. *To Have or to Be?* New York: Harper & Row, 1976. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Religious Studies. Also see de Mello (X.14); Marcel (X.32b). Lawrence J. Friedman (X.22b) reports that Pope John-Paul II “spoke of To Have or to Be? As a great spiritual book with humane values – not the problematic values of consumption and the marketplace” (327).


(X.23a) Janov, Arthur. *The Feeling Child*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973. Topic: Therapy. Also see Bradshaw (X.7); A. Miller (I.112a; III.122a). Because the part of the human brain known as the hypothalamus is so important, Arthur Janov characterizes it as the hormonostat (102). Evidently hallucinogens work by impacting the hypothalamus. Concerning hallucinogens, see Huxley (I.87a); Masters and Houston (I.108a); H. Smith (I.168a).

(X.24) Jeffreys, J. Shep. *Helping Grieving People – When Tears Are Not Enough: A Handbook for Care Providers*. 2nd ed. New York and London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2011. Topics: Bereavement; Therapy. As a result of my own experience of bereavement, I started reading works by other people about their own personal experiences of bereavement such as Joan Didion’s book *The Year of Magical Thinking* (New York: Knopf, 2005). In addition, I started reading works in the professional literature about loss and mourning, including Freud’s famous essay “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917). Incidentally, if you are going to read only one thing about serious mourning, read Freud’s essay. There’s a fine mind at work in that essay. Then I recently read the second edition of J. Shep Jeffreys’ book *Helping Grieving People – When Tears Are Not Enough: A Handbook for Care Providers*. In my case I am not trying to be a care provider for anybody else but myself. Jeffreys ably covers certain works in the professional literature that I had read as well as other works that I had not read. In the spirit of giving credit where credit is due, he surveys the professional literature and summarizes what each author says without trying to adjudicate competing claims made by different authors. But his own contribution is in the overall editorial apparatus that he uses in organizing the book and in the direct editorializing that he occasionally provides as he proceeds, most notably on pages 46–49. As Jeffreys explains, attachment theory as advanced by John Bowlby and others dominates the professional literature about loss and mourning. Briefly stated, we form attachments, which are also referred to as attachment bonding and attachment bonds. We feel a sense of loss in our lives when we experience the loss of an attachment bond with someone or something (including the loss of our dreams in which we had invested ourselves). In other words, no attachment bond = no experience of loss = no experience of mourning a loss. As Jeffreys indicates, there are two broad categories of loss: (1) loss due to the death of someone significant in our lives, which is also known as bereavement, and (2) nondeath loss. When we speak of the death of a loved one, we usually think of the death of a marital partner or a romantic lover or a family member, where we have established a personal
two-way love relationship with another individual person. However, I would note that presidential candidates in the United States try to win our votes and approval. In a sense, they try to win our love. When they succeed in winning our love, then we run the risk of falling out of love with them, in which case we may experience our own falling out of love with them as nondeath losses. To be healed of such nondeath losses, we will have to undergo the work of mourning our losses that Susan Anderson describes in her book *The Journey from Abandonment to Healing* (X.3). Tragically, at times, certain politicians such as President John F. Kennedy and other public leaders such as the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., may be assassinated. In those cases, because of the love that we invested in the public figures, their assassinations result in our bereavement. As Jeffreys discusses nondeath losses, it turns out that nondeath losses can include a wide range of losses, because we can and usually do form a wide range of attachments in our lives. As Dr. Justin A. Frank reminds us in his fine book *Bush on the Couch* (X.20) we have seen, the Bush family experienced bereavement due to the death of Robin Bush. But we have not seen bereavement due to a loved one’s death enter the life of young Barack Obama. However, as I will discuss below, young Barack Obama did experience the nondeath loss of his Kenyan father, and his mother also experienced the nondeath loss of young Barack’s father. So loss = loss of attachment bond. Whenever we experience loss (i.e., the loss of an attachment bond), we need to mourn our loss. At first blush, this sounds straightforward. But there is a serious complication. Depending on our earliest attachment bonding, we may or may not be able to mourn in a healthy way. Jeffreys refers to our earliest attachment bonding in terms of secure attachment bonding and nonsecure attachment bonding. Blessed are those who formed secure attachment bonds with both mother and father. Blessed are those who formed secure attachment bonds with either mother or father. Blessed are those who formed secure attachment bonds with other significant persons in their lives. Secure attachment bonds are needed in order to undertake serious mourning in a healthy way. As a result, we need to speak of (A) a healthy way of mourning, which, as mentioned, is connected with secure attachment bonding, and (B) an unhealthy way of mourning, which is connected with nonsecure attachment bonding in our earliest experiences in life. Jeffreys identifies three patterns of nonsecure attachment bonding (52-57 and 307): (1) anxious-ambivalent nonsecure attachment bonding; (2) dismissive-avoidant nonsecure attachment bonding; and (3) fearful-avoidant nonsecure attachment bonding. Any one of these three nonsecure attachment bonds will produce the conditions for the kind of grief work that John Bradshaw writes about. From what we know about young GWB’s family life, it is hard to imagine that he experienced a secure attachment bond with either his mother or his father. Of the three patterns of nonsecure attachment bonds that Jeffreys discusses, GWB most likely experienced the fearful-avoidant nonsecure attachment bond. Of the three
patterns discussed by Jeffreys, this one strikes me as the one most obviously connected with megalomania. However, from what we know about young Barack Obama, it appears likely that he did indeed form a secure attachment bond with his mother. But it does not appear likely that he formed a secure attachment bond with his father. Instead, it appears most likely that young Barack Obama formed a dismissive-avoidant attachment bond with his father. For example, Candidate Obama famously dismissed the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, who had been a father figure in Obama’s life in Chicago, and threw him under the bus when Wright proved himself to be a liability of Candidate Obama’s presidential campaign. (Concerning Wright and Obama, see the index of Dr. Frank’s book for specific page references.) Dr. Frank does not diagnose President Obama as being incapable of serious mourning. On the contrary, Dr. Frank says that President Obama has got some work to do still regarding his father and mother. People who experienced nonsecure attachment bonding in their early lives will not be able to mourn losses in their lives in a healthy way, unless and until they somehow experience what Bradshaw refers to as grief work and what Dr. Frank refers to as serious mourning and an accompanying new kind of containment experience that they had not experienced early in life. Containment experience is the opposite of abandonment experience, and vice versa. In the professional literature about loss and mourning, the terms “resolved” and “unresolved” are used. When the healthy mourning process has run its course and been completed, the mourning process is described as having been resolved. However, people who are not able to mourn in a healthy way do not experience the resolution of their mourning process. As a result, their uncompleted mourning process is described as unresolved. Unresolved mourning remains in their lives – perhaps to be resolved at a later time, if and when they later learn how to experience a new pattern of containment experience to replace their old pattern of abandonment experience. The mourning process is work, the work of mourning. The mantra to feel the feelings applies to the mourning process. In addition to feeling the feelings of mourning, one needs to express one’s feelings somehow, sharing them with others who are able themselves to serve as Exquisite Witnesses (or care providers), as Jeffreys describes them. The Exquisite Witnesses serve the purpose of containment. The emerging process of containment facilitated with the help of the Exquisite Witnesses enables the mourner to learn a new pattern, the pattern of containment, to replace the old dysfunctional pattern of abandonment. However, as Jeffreys emphasizes, there is no one right way to mourn. Jeffreys forewarns would-be Exquisite Witnesses to be alert to experiencing what he vividly terms Cowbells. He tells a personal story to explain his use of this term (5). The basic point is that the Exquisite Witness needs to be alert to how she or he is responding to the mourner. In other words, the mourner is expressing her or his feelings. As the Exquisite Witness listens attentively and empathetically, the Exquisite Witness may experience feelings in herself or himself that
signal some unfinished business (i.e., unresolved mourning) from the past. Now, regarding the work of mourning nondeath losses, such as the nondeath losses that young Barack Obama and his mother experienced, I would suggest that Susan Anderson’s book *The Journey from Abandonment to Healing* (X.3) is basically about mourning nondeath losses. Even though she focuses on the experience of being abandoned by one’s marital partner, or by one’s lover, she is basically discussing abandonment feelings. In nondeath losses, we experience abandonment feelings. For this reason, her book can be read by anyone experiencing abandonment feelings connected with nondeath losses. At her website, Susan Anderson, C.S.W., makes her essay “Suffering the Death of a Loved One” (2006) available. The URL for her website is www.abandonment.net. In this essay, she emphasizes that mourning losses due to death is not the same as mourning nondeath losses, even though both kinds of losses involve attachment bonds. Anderson’s claim that mourning the death of a loved one (bereavement) is not the same as mourning nondeath losses strikes me as an important claim. Her efforts to explain as explicitly as she could how the two mourning processes are different helped me sort out my own experiences into the two broad categories discussed by Jeffreys, mentioned above: (1) mourning the loss due to death and (2) mourning nondeath losses. However, Anderson herself does not explicitly discuss how mourning the death of a loved one (also known as bereavement) might be accompanied by mourning a backlog, as it were, of unresolved mourning of nondeath loss or losses.


(X.25a) ---. *Jung’s Seminar on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: Abridged Edition*. Ed. and abridged James L. Jarrett. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998. Topics: History of Philosophy; Jungian Theory; Therapy. Also see Sherry (X.44c); Neumann (X.36e). Jung suggests that we should see the proclamation that God is dead as a report of Nietzsche’s own personal experience. Nietzsche was the son of a Protestant pastor and had as a result presumably assumed that God was alive and well somewhere. For Nietzsche, then, the experience of the supposed death of God was a significant experience. In theory, his experience of the death of God to him could have been a potentially positive experience. However, in actuality, things did not work out well for him. Jung also suggests that we should see the figure of Zarathurstra as representing the archetype of the wise old man in Nietzsche’s psyche.


(X.28) Koulouris, Theodore. *Hellenism and Loss in the Work of Virginia Woolf*. Surrey, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011. Topic: Literary Studies. Also see Critchley and Webster (X.12a). I found Theodore Koulouris’ book to be a wonderfully engaging study. However, I did not find Koulouris’ writing style to be wonderfully engaging, to put it mildly. He does not write short sentences very often. But he ably contextualizes Virginia Woolf’s life and work in her times. Virginia Woolf was married to Leonard Woolf. Her maiden name was Virginia Stephen. Her father was Leslie Stephen, an agnostic. Virginia Woolf is often regarded as a feminist writer among a group of feminist writers known as first-wave feminists. From the 1970s onward, second-wave and later feminist scholars have enriched our resources for understanding Virginia Woolf’s life and work. Koulouris ably draws on the scholarly resources now available about Virginia Woolf. However, he also manages to find previously unexplored angles of her life and work to explore in his new fascinating study, most notably her study of ancient Greek. But of course Virginia Stephen undertook her study of ancient Greek within the larger historical context of British Hellenism in her day. (There has not been an American counterpart to British Hellenism.) Koulouris mentions and briefly discusses Virginia Woolf’s 1937 published eulogy for Janet Case, who had been her first tutor for her private lessons in Greek years earlier (65). As a result of her early lessons in Greek with different tutors over the years, Woolf could read Greek with relative ease, but “she was unable to compose in Greek” (37). From the time of Erasmus and Thomas More and others, including Peter Ramus, in the educational movement that we refer to as Renaissance humanism onward, formal education in Great Britain and in the American colonies involved cultivation of Latin and Greek, and the veneration and emulation of ancient Greek and Latin works. During the roughly thousand-year period known as the Middle Ages, Latin had been the lingua franca of educated people and of formal learning. And Greek was not unknown. But the style of medieval Latin authors did not compare well with the style of Cicero. But Erasmus and Thomas More were concerned with style in their Latin writings. For them, Cicero was understandably the great exemplar of style in Latin. But Cicero’s decidedly rhetorical style was kind of long-winded and windy – or, in the word that Koulouris dwells on in his engaging study of Virginia Woolf, voluble (volubility arises as the result of cultivating what Erasmus refers to as “copia”). Incidentally, Koulouris, who mentions Erasmus and Thomas More only in passing and doesn’t mention Cicero at all, writes skillfully precise but nevertheless lengthy sentences that are not unlike the voluble style that he painstakingly delineates, the voluble academic and public style that Virginia Woolf
reacted against. Virginia Woolf’s reaction against voluble people reminded me of Emily Dickinson’s short poem “I’m Nobody! Who are you?” She compares being nobody to being somebody. In Virginia Woolf’s terminology, those people in the world who think they are somebody tend to be voluble. I understand that educated men may be over-represented in the group of voluble people. I understand that voluble people can seem unduly self-important and overbearing at times, especially to the group of people who would agree with Dickinson that they are nobodies in the world. For the nobodies, private conversations can be wonderful. I-thou communication can be memorable. In addition, academics who make classroom presentations and all variety of people who speak in public, including people who talk in public on television and radio talk shows running the risk of loving to hear the sound of their own voices. But it strikes me that being voluble is probably always going to be part of public speaking, as distinct to speaking in a private conversation that is not being broadcast on radio or television or being recorded for broadcast or for the purposes of oral history. I’ve briefly explained the word “Hellenism” in the title of Koulouris’ book, so it remains for me next to explain the word “Loss” in his title. When Virginia’s mother died, Virginia was thirteen (70, note 94). No doubt the custom of funeral orations delivered in public to a live audience at a funeral or a memorial service continued in Great Britain during Virginia Woolf’s entire lifetime. However, her father, Leslie Stephen, was famously an agnostic. His agnosticism ruled out church services for him and his family, including his daughter, Virginia Stephen. (But Koulouris is silent about any funeral orations that may have been part of the family’s graveside burial service.) Koulouris explains that “after her mother’s death Woolf suffered her first mental breakdown” (37). Bereavement due to the death of a significant person in one’s life such as one’s mother is a powerful experience for anyone to undergo at any age. But Virginia was only thirteen, and she was not a paragon of psychological strength. In any event, her experience of bereavement due to her mother’s death was more than she could handle psychologically, resulting in her first mental breakdown, the first of several. Under the enormous impact of bereavement due to her half-sister’s death and her father’s death and her older brother’s death, Virginia had to endure a lot of psychological suffering. Over a span of eleven years, Virginia lost not only her mother but also her half-sister and her father and her older brother (7). For an example of a voluble and public form of mourning someone’s death, Koulouris discusses the voluble Jacques Derrida’s memories following the death of Paul de Man, as an expression of mourning (69; also see 10). To be sure, Derrida’s memories of Paul de Man were published in a publication. The word “publication” does contain the word “public.” So Derrida’s memories of Paul de Man are available to the reading public. However, for an example of a voluble and public form of mourning, I would have thought that Koulouris would have mentioned Pericles’ famous funeral oration, as reconstructed from
memory by Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*. But Koulouris does not mention Pericles or Thucydides. But Pericles delivered his famous funeral oration in public to a live audience. To be sure, we Americans today still have the custom of having funeral orations delivered in public to a live audience at a funeral or memorial service. In the case of somebody as important to our civic enterprise as Hector and Beowulf were to their respective civic enterprises, funerals or memorial services might even be broadcast by television or radio, so that the funeral orations might reach people who were not present in the live audience at the funeral or memorial services, just as printed funeral orations might reach people who had not been present. However, in addition to bereavement due to the deaths of four significant persons in her life, Virginia also had to undertake to mourn other significant losses in her life that were not due to the death of an significant person in her life, but were all the same significant losses in her life. For example, the losses in her socio-cultural life due to her gender. The losses that Virginia experienced in her life due to her gender are, mutatis mutandi, losses comparable to the losses that many girls and women around the world historically down to the present time have experienced to one degree or another. For this reason, Virginia Woolf’s enormous body of work can be seen as a resource for feminists today. However, we should remember Virginia’s social location. Virginia Stephen was the daughter of a prominent upper-middle-class family. She did not come from a lower-class background. Yes, we could describe her as having been home-schooled. But her father was in the habit of reading aloud to his family, and she did have access to her father’s extensive library. In addition, she did receive private lessons in Greek, even though she did not receive the kind of formal education that her older and younger brothers received. As a young woman, she socialized with her older brother’s classically educated friends from Cambridge University, marrying Leonard Woolf. As long as she socialized with classically educated men from Cambridge University in the social group that has become known as the Bloomsbury group (or simply Bloomsbury), she was living in a social context in which she would daily be reminded of her already acute awareness of her lack of a formal education. But let us not forget Shakespeare. As the title of T. W. Baldwin’s monumental two-volume study *William Shakspere’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke* (VII.3) reminds us, Shakespeare in his day also did not have the full benefit of a formal education in his day. But what he did have by way of formal education was good enough for him to get by on in English, even if he was not fluent enough in Latin or Greek to write poetry or prose work in either of those languages. In any event, out of this enormous matrix of loss and of mourning, Virginia’s creative spirit emerged as almost indomitable -- up to the end of her life. For Virginia, the work of mourning contributed to her literary creativity. Let’s be as clear here as we can be. She was going to have to work out her work of mourning, or else she would run the risk of succumbing to the powerful undertow of bereavement and mourning.
leading to another mental breakdown or to suicide. So she set to work. However, in the end, she did commit suicide. Her suicide shows how powerful and overpowering bereavement and mourning can be at times for some people. However, I myself prefer to work here with a far more comprehensive way of contextualizing her life and work than the admittedly learned and highly circumstantial way of contextualizing her life and work that Koulouris ably works with. War was a way of life in the ancient world and in many other predominantly oral cultures around the world in ancient and medieval and modern times. In oral cultures, warfare required courage and manliness (Greek, “andreia” means both courage and manliness) battle often involved up-close physical combat. Ancient Greek men worked out at the gym to stay fit as warriors. The so-called games in the ancient Olympics involved warrior-training exercises. In imaginative literature, exemplars of warrior courage include Achilles and Hector and Odysseus and Aeneas and Beowulf and Othello and Okonkwo in Chinua Achebe’s novel *Things Fall Apart* (I.2). Oral epic poetry celebrated the heroic ideal. As Virgil’s *Aeneid* shows, the heroic ideal of oral epic poetry survived the emergence of phonetic alphabetic writing and the emergence of the written epic. But an alternative heroic ideal emerged with the heroic death of Socrates in Plato’s *Apology* and the heroic death of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark and the three other canonical gospels. Thus Socrates and Jesus exemplified the non-violent heroic ideal of cultural resistance. Later, after the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press, the anti-hero emerged as exemplified by Falstaff’s critique of honor. Why be courageous and die in the process when you can eat, drink, and be merry, eh? Of course the famous literary heroes I have mentioned are male characters, and so is Falstaff. But Virginia Woolf’s life of creative mourning of loss strikes me as resembling the live of non-violent resistance of the historical Socrates and the historical Jesus. Her creative life on non-violent resistance was heroic. She did not live the life of an anti-hero. On the contrary, she lived a heroic life of courage and resistance in the face of mental breakdowns.


(X.29a) Lewis, Richard D. *When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures*. 3rd ed. Boston and London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2005. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Riesman (X.44). Richard D. Lewis works with three basic cultural types: (1) Linear-actives, (2) Multi-actives, and (3) Reactives. Linear-actives strikingly resemble David Riesman’s inner-directed character types; Multi-actives, Riesman’s outer-directed character types; and Reactives, Riesman’s other-directed character types. According to Lewis, Germany, Switzerland, and Luxembourg provide the strongest examples of cultural conditioning that produces Linear-actives, followed
closely by the United States and the United Kingdom. Historically, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom spearheaded the Industrial Revolution. As a result, it is not surprising that Lewis sees these three countries as providing cultural conditioning that produces Linear-actives – Riesman’s inner-directed character types. Riesman and his friend Erich Fromm were both inner-directed character types, and both of them worried about the the other-directed character types that they saw emerging around them in American culture in the 1950s. No doubt American cultural conditioning to this day produces a certain number of inner-directed character types, most notably academics and business entrepreneurs. As a result, Lewis has correctly characterized many Americans as Linear-actives. Nevertheless, Lewis’s cultural schema actually bepeaks and encourage a strong other-directedness.

(X.30) Lonergan, Bernard. *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. 5th ed. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Vol. 3. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 1992. Also listed as Lonergan (IX.48). A classic. Topics: History of Philosophy; Personalism; Therapy. Also see Ellis (X.16); Lonergan (X.30a); M. D. Morelli (X.36b); Nadler (X.36a); Newman (X.36f). When we consider the inward turn of consciousness, Bernard Lonergan’s *Insight* deserves special recognition for its concerted and self-conscious cultivation of the inward turn of consciousness and self-awareness and self-appropriation. In this work Lonergan famously champions the pure, detached, disinterested desire to know. Now, Anthony de Mello (I.42) claims that “[t]he royal road to mysticism and to Reality . . . passes through the world of actions that are engaged in for themselves without an eye to success or gain – or profit actions” (66). If de Mello’s claim is correct, then the pure, detached, disinterested desire to know in one’s intellectual work would be one way to proceed down the royal road to mysticism and to Reality.

(X.30a) ---. *The Lonergan Reader*. Ed. Mark D. Morelli and Elizabeth A. Morelli. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 1997. Topics: History of Philosophy; Therapy. Also see Lonergan (X.30); M. D. Morelli (X.36b); Nadler (X.36a). In Part One of *The Lonergan Reader* (29-359), the Morellis have expertly selected key parts of Lonergan’s *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (X.30) that help interested readers follow Lonergan’s central line of thought in his philosophical masterpiece. In Part Two (361-597), they have included numerous selections from his various other publications over the years. As far as I know, no one has examined Lonergan’s views of subjectivity and conversions in connection with the ancient and medieval ideas of deification discussed by Norman Russell (X.44b) and A. N. Williams (X.50a).

Sources, 1992. Also listed as (III.113). A classic. Topics: Roman Catholic Spirituality; Jesuit Spirituality; Therapy. Through the repeated detailed instructions calling for application of the sense to meditating of specific biblical passages, Ignatius Loyola leads people to engage in the kind of imaginative meditation that resembles what Eric A. Havelock (I.81) refers to as imagistic thinking. This kind of meditation opens the way for the person to engage in what C. G. Jung refers to as active imagination. See Jung (X.25).


(X.35) Menn, Stephen. *Plato on God as Nous*. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1995. Topics: History of Philosophy; Psychodynamics of Mystic Experience; Therapy. Also see Moran (X.36a); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); van Beeck (X.48c).

(X.35a) Mooney, Edward F. *Wilderness and the Heart: Henry Bugbee’s Philosophy of Place, Presence, and Memory*. Athens, GA; and London: U of Georgia P, 1999. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Buell (X.8b); Bugbee (X.8c); Ong (X.40a).

Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary, the archetype of initiation is involved in natural change and growth, including mourning both non-death loss and loss due to somebody’s death and other kinds of life-world transitions in the course of life such as the transition into old age. For about ten years, I got to experience the co-occurrence of three psychological events: (1) bereavement (Freud’s mourning) due to the death of my former teacher and friend Walter J. Ong, S.J. (1912-2003); (2) mourning a backlog of unresolved mourning of certain non-death losses in my adult life (Freud’s melancholia); and (3) the transition into old age (Erikson’s stage eight: ego-integrity versus disgust, despair). The melancholia that can accompany bereavement is a totalizing biochemical experience.


(X.36d) Nadler, Steven. The Philosopher, the Priest, and the Painter: A Portrait of Descartes. Princeton and London: Princeton UP, 2013. Topics: History of Art; History of Philosophy. Short and accessible introduction to Descartes’ Meditations. Also see Augustine (X.5a); Lonergan (X.30; X.30a); Novak (X.37); Ong (X.40); Teilhard (X.48).


(X.36f) Newman, John Henry. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Notre Dame, IN; and London: U of Notre Dame P, 1979. Topics: History of Philosophy; Religious Studies. Also see Jost (XII.79a); Ker (XII.80b); Lonergan (X.30); Newman (XII.104a); Ong (X.40). In today’s parlance, Newman’s Grammar of Assent can be understood as a postmodernist critique of the philosophers of modernity. Bernard Lonergan (X.30) was deeply influenced by Newman’s Grammar of Assent.

(X.38) Nussbaum, Martha C. *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994. Topics: History of Philosophy; Therapy. Also see Cushman (X.13); Lain Entralgo (I.98); Lloyd and Sivin (I.102); Nussbaum (III.130a; X.38a); Sorabji (X.44d).

(X.38a) ---. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge, UK; and New York: Cambridge UP, 2001. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Nussbaum (III.130a; IX.55a; X.38). In Jesuit spirituality and in other Catholic traditions of spirituality, the expression “discernment of spirits” is commonly used. The basic idea is that we should work carefully to evaluate the various movements of the spirit within us. Of course the movement of the spirit within us can involve emotions and upheavals of emotion. But what is the intelligence that these emotions, or upheavals of emotion, are communicating to us? To evaluate and assess the intelligence that emotions are communicating to us, we need to engage in careful discernment.


(X.40) ---. *Hopkins, the Self, and God*. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 1986. Accessible. Also listed as Ong (II.15; XII.121). Topics: History of Philosophy; Literary Studies; Jesuit Spirituality; Cultural Studies; Evolutionary Theory. Also see Buell (X.8a).


(X.44) Riesman, David with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney. *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*. Ed. with a foreword by Todd Gitlin. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2000. Accessible. Also listed as Riesman (XII.147a). Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Lewis (X.29a). In this widely known book David Riesman works with three categories of character types: (1) the outer-directed person (also known as tradition-directed); (2) the inner-directed person; and (3) the other-directed person. Riesman himself was an inner-directed person. In terms of well-known literary characters, King Lear exemplifies an outer-directed person, and young Prince Hamlet exemplifies an inner-directed person. In Arthur Miller’s play *The Death of a Salesman*, Willy Loman exemplifies an other-directed person. In real life, President John F. Kennedy exemplified the other-directed person, as did President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush. However, President Barack Obama exemplifies the inner-directed person.

(X.44a) Roland, Allen L. *Radical Therapy: Surrender to Love and Heal Yourself in Seven Sessions (Not Seven Years)*. Novato, CA: Origin P, 2002. Topic: Therapy. Also see S. Anderson (X.3); de Mello (X.14); Teilhard (X.48). Allen L. Roland claims that his approach to therapy was inspired, in part, by the thought and life of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J.

(X.44c) Sherry, Jay. Carl Gustav Jung: Avant-Garde Conservative. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Topics: Cultural Studies; Jungian Theory; Therapy. Also see Buell (X.8a); Burckhardt (III.17; III.18); James Carroll (III.21a); de Mello (X.14); Dorrien (XII.28); Eliade (I.53; I.54); Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); L. J. Friedman (X.22a; X.22b; X.22c); Grim (I.76); Heidegger (IX.33a); Jung (X.25; X.25a; X.26); Kinzer (III.109); Levin (III.111d); Moore and Gillette (I.115a; I.117; I.118); Neumann (III.128); Ong (III.140). Jay Sherry’s painstakingly thorough book Carl Gustav Jung: Avant-Garde Conservative situates Jung in the intellectual context of his times. In addition to being a historian of psychoanalysis, Dr. Sherry is a scholar trained in Germany in German intellectual history. Dr. Sherry portrays Jung (1875-1961) as what we in the United States today would call a likely Republican voter. However, even though Jung once ran for a minor elective position in Switzerland – and lost – he usually claimed to be non-political because he did not tend to advocate specific political policies. But Dr. Sherry says, “Jung’s sensibilities were essentially those of a conservative humanist rather than a liberal humanitarian” (210). As Dr. Sherry makes clear, the humanists whose thought most influenced Jung were Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), both of whom lived in Basel, where Jung grew up. Earlier, for a long period of time, the Renaissance humanist Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) also lived in Basel, as Dr. Sherry notes (22). But Jung was not especially influenced by Erasmus’s thought, probably because Erasmus was a Roman Catholic but Jung was not. Jung “was raised in the Swiss Reformed Church” (20). However, in his mature years Jung was also a critic of Christianity, criticizing “the four exclusions of Christianity” – “the repression of nature, animals, primitives, and creative fantasy” (64). As Dr. Sherry notes, “Jung held an English-language seminar on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra from 1934 to 1939” (151). Because Dr. Sherry does not happen to mention it, we should note that Nietzsche was enthusiastic about Ralph Waldo Emerson’s idea of self-reliance, as Lawrence Buell points out in his book Emerson (X.8a). So we could say that Emerson’s idea of self-reliance contributed indirectly, via Nietzsche, to Jung’s development of the idea of psychological individuation (the Freudian equivalent idea is ego-integrity). Buell says, “John Dewey admired Emerson immoderately. . . . Dewey’s Emerson was ‘the Philosopher of Democracy’” (158). By contrast, Nietzsche could be described as the Philosopher of the Nazis. As is well known, a streamlined version of Nietzsche’s thought was popularized among the Germans and influenced Adolf Hitler’s thought. Jung was fascinated with Hitler, but he was not quick to detect what a threat Hitler was. Hitler and the Nazis represented Emersonian self-reliance on steroids, as do today’s conservative libertarians in the United States. Dr. Sherry considers the humanist tradition of thought to be conservative. Of course Thomas Jefferson and John Adams were also products of the humanist tradition of
education, as was President Franklin D. Roosevelt later on. But Dr. Sherry does not mention Jefferson or Adams, even though he does mention Roosevelt in passing. If we were to follow Dr. Sherry’s classification of the humanist tradition of thought as conservative, then we would also classify the thought of 19th-century Roman Catholic popes as conservative as well. To this day, the Roman Catholic tradition of thought tends to be conservative, except for certain aspects of the Catholic tradition of social justice. In the Roman Catholic tradition, the elaborate educational training of Jesuits was part of Renaissance humanism, and Jesuit education, both secondary education and undergraduate education, in the United States was strongly oriented toward humanist education at least until the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) in the Roman Catholic Church. In any event, Ong’s Jesuit education and his educational training as a Jesuit was in the humanist tradition. As an orthodox Roman Catholic priest, he could be characterized as a conservative – in the way in which Dr. Sherry characterizes Jung as a conservative. Ong’s thinking was at the time and still is avant-garde thinking. So Ong can also be characterized as an avant-garde conservative. DIGRESSION: For a history of anti-Semitism in the Roman Catholic Church, see James Carroll’s book Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History (III.21a). For a survey of modern liberal American Protestant theology, Gary Dorrien’s three volumes titled The Making of American Liberal Theology (XII.28). END OF DIGRESSION. In any event, if we were to take President Franklin D. Roosevelt as an exemplar of a liberal humanitarian, then we would have to say that Jung, by contrast, was basically non-political in the sense that he did not usually propound specific political proposals. According to Dr. Sherry, Jung was interested “in exploring the psychological basis of human behavior and culture rather than promoting social programs for ameliorating human suffering” (210). However, Dr. Sherry reports that Jung made the following comment in a 1936 interview: “A decent oligarchy – call it an aristocracy if you like – is the most ideal form of government” (15; also 162). Jung’s preference resembles in spirit at least Jefferson’s famous reference to a natural aristocracy. But of course Jefferson was strongly opposed to having a hereditary aristocracy. For Jung, the French Revolution represented the Left (61). After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, communism also represented the Left for Jung. He was anti-communist (210). During the Cold War, after World War II, Jung was a staunch anti-communist, as were most Americans. Now, if we were to take the contrast that Yuval Levin works with in his recent book The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the Birth of Right and Left (III.111d), we would have to align Jung with Edmund Burke (1729-1797), not with Thomas Paine (1737-1809), even though Jung did not usually advocate specific political policies. For Jung, the Symbolist movement in the arts represented the avant-garde (61). However, when the movement known as modernism in the arts emerged later on in his life, he had a strong distaste for it (47, 191). So did Adolf
Hitler, who considered modernist art to be degenerate. But Dr. Sherry does not mention this point of similarity between Hitler and Jung. Now, after commenting on “Jung’s anecdotal anthropologizing” (80), Dr. Sherry then includes the following quotation: “‘He had opinions about everything’” (81). Throughout his book Dr. Sherry provides an ample array of Jung’s many opinions. Now, if we understand what Jung terms intuition to be the psychological function that we employ whenever we detect patterns (80), then we could say that Jung’s own intuition was in over-drive in producing his numerous opinions based on his anecdotal anthropologizing. For understandable reasons, people might get tired of listening to Jung’s anecdotal anthropologizing. Dr. Sherry reports that “Jung characterized Hitler as the medicine man leader in contrast to the other two [Mussolini and Stalin] who fit the profile of the chieftain type” (165). According to Dr. Sherry, Jung thought that “Hitler was highly susceptible to information coming from the unconscious and so was in tune with the collective unconscious of the German people” (165). Oddly enough, if we were to take Jung’s claims about Hitler being a medicine-man leader type seriously, then we would have to note that Jung himself had certain characteristics that he attributes to the medicine-man type, as Jung’s recently published Red Book (2009). But of course he was not a political leader. For the sake of discussion, let’s say that Hitler may have been “the medicine man leader” type. Would this way of understanding Hitler have helped President Roosevelt or Winston Churchill formulate more effective ways to cope with him? I doubt it. Would understanding Mussolini and Stalin as “the chieftain type” leaders have helped Roosevelt or Churchill formulate more effective ways to cope with them? I doubt it. But Allen Dulles and other guys in the spy business would probably like Jung’s kind of profiling – you know, the kind of guys who told us that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly the chieftain-type leader, like Mussolini and Stalin, not the medicine-man leader type like Hitler. For further discussion of Allen Dulles, see Stephen Kinzer’s book about the Dulles brothers (III.109). In any event, I take Jung’s characterization of Hitler as the medicine-man leader type to mean that Jung saw Hitler as embodying an aspect of the spirit of the shaman that Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette discuss in their book The Magician Within: Accessing the Shaman [Archetype] in the Male Psyche (I.117). I take Jung’s characterization of Mussolini and Stalin as the chieftain-type leaders to mean that Jung saw them as being warrior-kings in spirit. Warrior-kings combine aspects of the archetypal energies that Moore and Gillette discuss in their book The Warrior Within: Accessing the Knight [Archetype] in the Male Psyche (I.118) and The King Within: Accessing the King [Archetype] in the Male Psyche (I.115a). In the Homeric epic the Iliad, the chief male Greek characters are portrayed as warrior-kings: Agamemnon, Achilles, Odysseus. In the Hebrew Bible, Moses is portrayed as one example of the shaman-type leader. But King David is portrayed as one example of the warrior-king. In
the Christ myth in Christianity, in the Second Coming, the Christ figure is envisioned as the triumphant warrior-king. Now, according to Dr. Sherry, Burckhardt and many German intellectuals singled out “the Jew” as “the prime catalyst of the process of modernity” (25). Modernity here appears to mean late 19th century and early 20th century. (However, in certain other places in the book, modernity clearly refers to the Enlightenment.) Not surprisingly, Jung also subscribed to this view – and advanced it later on after his famous break with Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Freud of course was a secularized Jew. Dr. Sherry says, “Adopting Burckhardt’s view of the assimilated Jew as the ‘agent of modernity’ he [Jung] was alienated more from their atheism rather than their ethnicity” (40). After Jung’s break from Freud, Freud, according to Dr. Sherry, dismissed Jung’s new methodology as “‘Aryan religiousness’” (41). For his part, after his famous break with Freud, Jung constructed the elaborate contrast between Germanic and Jewish psychology (118). In a nutshell, Jung held out for an experience of religiousness over against Freud’s explicit atheism. The experience of religiousness that Jung held out for was Rudolf Otto’s experience of the numinous. Basically, what Otto refers to as the experience of the numinous is the equivalent of what Mircea Eliade refers to as the experience of the sacred in his book *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (I.53). Also see Anthony de Mello’s book *The Way to Love* (X.14). But we should note that atheists and agnostics and people of monotheistic religious faiths and people of polytheistic religious traditions can all experience the numinous. We could say that the experience of the numinous is an equal opportunity employer. However, Jung and Freud had not figured this out. As I read Dr. Sherry’s book, I noted all the words associated with roots imagery: roots/ rootedness (8, 59, 115, 126, 128, 212); rootless/ rootlessness (25, 54, 59); uprooted/ uprootedness (9, 127, 191, 211). In the contrast that Jung constructed between Germanic psychology and Jewish psychology, he characterized modern Jews as rootless – uprooted, presumably from their ancient Jewish religious roots (he always seems to be referring to secular Jews). By contrast, Jung characterizes Germans as having roots. But our human ancestors were hunter-gatherers, before they became farmer and established roots in certain places. So if Jung’s idea of a collective unconscious is valid, then all of us are carrying collective-unconscious memories of our hunter-gather ancestors as well as of our farmer ancestors. In conclusion, Dr. Sherry has written a superb scholarly account of Jung’s life and work, contextualizing his thought in the relevant thought of his times. Dr. Sherry’s book nicely complements Lawrence Friedman’s book *The Lives of Erich From: Love’s Prophet* (X.22a).


(X.44f) Stevens, Anthony. *The Two Million-Year-Old Self*. College Station: Texas A&M UP, 1993. Topics: Jungian Theory; Therapy. Anthony Stevens claims that archetypal wounding requires archetypal healing. All archetypal wounding involves experiencing abandonment feelings. Therefore, archetypal healing requires mourning the losses involved in archetypal wounding. But there are two different kinds of mourning: (1) mourning the death of a loved one (also known as bereavement); and (2) mourning nondeath losses in life. Both of these kinds of mourning may be involved in archetypal healing.


(X.48c) van Beeck, Frans Jozef. “Divine Revelation: Intervention or Self-communication?” *Theological Studies* 52 (1991): 199-226. Topic: Psychodynamics of Mystic Experience. Also see Engberg-Pedersen (I.55); Menn (X.35); Moran (X.36a); van Beeck (I.186). I do not see how Engberg-Pedersen (I.55) could rule out the possibility of what van Beeck refers to as “intervention” (i.e., the influence of the transcendent divine
ground of being in the otherwise intrapsychic experience of mystic experience in meditation).


XI. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE QUANTIFICATION OF THOUGHT

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 127.


(XI.9) Ong, Walter J. Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958. Also listed as Ong (III.138; IX.59; and XII.132). Topics: History of Education; History of Philosophy; History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory; History of Technology. A classic study of print culture. Regarding the quantification of thought, see especially 53-91. In The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive Essays and Studies (I.131), Ong explains the overall import of the quantification of thought in medieval logic: “In this historical perspective,
medieval scholastic logic appears as a kind of premathemics, a subtle and unwitting preparation for the large-scale operations in quantitative modes of thinking which will characterize the modern world. In assessing the meaning of [medieval] scholasticism, one must keep in mind an important and astounding fact: in the whole history of the human mind, mathematics and mathematical physics come into their own, in a way which has changed the face of the earth and promises or threatens to change it even more, at only one place and time, that is, in Western Europe immediately after the [medieval] scholastic experience [in short, in print culture]. Elsewhere, no matter how advanced the culture on other scores, and even along mathematical lines, as in the case of the Babylonian, nothing like a real mathematical transformation of thinking takes place – not among the ancient Egyptians or Assyro-Babylonians or Greeks or Romans, not among the peoples of India nor the Chinese nor the Japanese, not among the Aztecs or Mayas, not in Islam despite the promising beginnings there, any more than among the Tartars or the Avars or the Turks. These people can all now share the common scientific knowledge, but the scientific tradition itself which they share is not a merging of various parallel discoveries made by their various civilizations. It represents a new state of mind. However great contributions other civilizations may hereafter make to the tradition, our scientific world traces its origins back always to seventeenth and sixteenth century Europe [in short, to Copernicus and Galileo], to the place where for some three centuries and more the [medieval] arts course taught in universities and parauniversity schools had pounded into the heads of youth a study program consisting almost exclusively of a highly quantified logic and a companion physics, both taught on a scale and with an enthusiasm never approximated or even dreamt of in ancient academies” (72; emphasis added).

XII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT PRINT CULTURE

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 115-35.

(XII.1) Achebe, Chinua. No Longer at Ease. London: Heinemann, 1960. Also see Achebe (I.2; III.1); Conrad (XII.22); Obiechina (I.127); Ong (I.131; I.137; XII.137); Pachocinski (VII.24a). Classic novel about young Nigerians who have been acculturated in print culture through formal education living in the midst of older Nigerians in a residual form of primary oral culture. Over the course of my teaching career, I taught Chinua Achebe’s novels Things Fall Apart and No Longer at Ease more often than I taught any other works of imaginative literature of comparable length. In The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History (I.140), the expanded version of his 1964 Terry Lectures at Yale University, Ong discusses Achebe’s No Longer at Ease so perceptively that it is worth quoting at length here: “In his sensitive novel No Longer at Ease, concerned with the acculturation of his native Nigeria, Chinua Achebe cogently portrays (126-27) the awesome impression which knowledge of writing has made on a thoughtful elderly man, who is fascinated by its order and stability and rather given to explaining this order and stability to illiterate kinsmen. He urges them to meditate on Pilate’s words (which he quotes in oral fashion, that is, thematically, not verbatim, suppressing Pilate’s ‘I’): ‘What is written is written.’ The same man is even more impressed by print. He never destroys a piece of printed paper, but in boxes in the corner of his room saves every bit of it he can find. Order so assured as that of printed words deserves to be preserved, whatever the words say. It appears reasonable that such experience of this spectacularly ordered environment for thought, free from interference, simply there, unattended and unsupervised by any discernible person, would open to the overstrained psyche the new possibility of withdrawal into a world away from the tribe, a private world of delusional systemization – an escape not into violence or tribal magic, but into the interior of one’s own consciousness, rendered schizoid but once and for all consistent with itself” (136-37). Yes, Ong here does explicitly characterize the interiorization of literacy and literate modes of thought as delusional systemization, rendering the consciousness of those of us who have interiorized literacy and literate modes of thought schizoid. Digression: In the posthumously published book The Way to Love (I.42), the Jesuit spiritual director from India Anthony de Mello urges us to cultivate awareness in the hope that by cultivating awareness we will eventually be freed from our cultural conditioning and programming. For those of us who have learned through our formal education to be functionally literate, our Western cultural conditioning and programming includes our
interiorization of literacy and literate modes of thought. As a result, if we were to undertake to cultivate awareness, as Anthony de Mello urges us to do, we would in effect also be seeking to be freed from the schizoid consciousness that the delusional systemization that our cultural conditioning in literacy and literate modes of thought has engendered in us. But we should also note here that Ong explicitly describes the psyches of people in primary oral cultures as being “overstrained” (his word). As a result of their psyches being overstrained, people in primary oral cultures might welcome the measure of relief to their overstrained psyches that interiorizing literacy and literate modes of thought would give them. However, when we turn our attention to the kind of awareness that Anthony de Mello urges us to undertake, we should note that people in primary oral cultures, and perhaps also certain people in residual forms of primary oral cultures, would have a decided edge in cultivating the mystic awareness that he urges us to cultivate, because they do not have the schizoid consciousness that Ong says accompanies the interiorization of literacy and literate modes of thought. In short, mystic awareness comes more naturally to people in primary oral cultures than it does to us Westerners whose cultural conditioning in the print culture of the West has solidified our schizoid consciousness. End of digression. In an interview published as “Named for Victoria, Queen of England” in the journal New Letters 40 (1973): 14-22, which is published out of the University of Missouri - Kansas City, Achebe revealed that his own father, who was an Anglican catechist, had served as the real-life model for the elderly man he portrays in the ways that Ong describes above: “‘My parents’ reverence for books was almost superstitious. . . . My father was much worse than my mother. He never destroyed any paper. When he died, we had to make a bonfire of all the hoardings of his life’” (20).

(XII.2) Alter, Robert. Pen of Iron: American Prose and the King James Bible. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010. For other studies of the English Bible, see Bloom (XII.15); Bobrick (XII.16); Bullinger (VII.4); Campbell (XII.18); Crystal (XII.24); Hamlin and Jones (XII.64); Harrison (XII.65, XII.66); Jeffrey (VII.11); McGrath (XII.93); Nicolson (XII.105); Norton (XII.106); Ryken (XII.149).

(XII.3) Anderson, Amanda. The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2001. Topic: Cultural Studies. Ong liked to say that we need both closeness (proximity) and distance to understand something. Part of his claim and of Eric A. Havelock’s claim about the impact of ancient Greek phonetic alphabetic literacy on the development of abstract philosophic thought from the pre-Socratics onward to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle is that the written texts supplied distantiation that enabled the development of the more abstract conceptual constructs with which philosophic thought works. When we come to Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and his followers in
early print culture, we should note that their trademark, as it were, involved the construction of elaborate arrays of unfolding dichotomies (usually; occasionally, we find a triple branching). By constructing these arrays of dichotomous terms, Ramus and his followers were distancing themselves from their visual constructs. Of course printed books themselves are visual constructs, just as handwritten manuscripts are. With respect to storage and retrieval, both manuscripts and printed books provide distance. Distance in turn frees up the human mind to move on to new adventures in learning, because the old is now safely stored up in written manuscripts and printed books. Independently of Ong and of Havelock, Amanda Anderson explores the potential of cultivated distance by examining certain Victorian writers in detail, including George Eliot, John Stuart Mill, Charlotte Bronte, Matthew Arnold, and Oscar Wilde. For a deeply thought-provoking defense of the cultivation of learning about the past as the way to establish the kind of distance that is needed for intelligent and insightful understanding of major cultural developments, see Ong’s “Communications as a Field of Study” in The 1977 Multimedia International Yearbook, edited by Stefan Bamberger (Rome: Multimedia International, 1976: 7-25).

(XII.4) Appleby, Joyce. Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism. New York and London: Norton, 2010. Also listed as Appleby (III.4). Topics: Economic History; Cultural Studies. Also see Acemoglu and Robinson (III.1a); Beinhocker (II.3); de Sota (XII.25); Diamond (III.38b); R. H. Frank (III.60a); R. H. Frank and Cook (III.60b); Freeland (III.71a); Friedman (XII.48); Hacker and Pierson (XII.63); Krugman (XII.82; XII.83); Landes (III.111b); Marmot (III.117b); Mokyr (XII.103); Warsh (XII.165); Wilkinson and Pickett (III.171a). Joyce Appleby discusses what she refers to as the culture of capitalism (4, 20-26, 119-20). I consider what she refers to as the culture of capitalism to be a specific subset of print culture as it emerged historically in Western culture. In The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism. 2nd ed. (Lanham, Maryland; and New York: Madison Books, 1991), Michael Novak discusses the certain social dimensions associated with modern capitalism in print culture. In The Universal Hunger for Liberty: Why the Clash of Civilizations is Not Inevitable (New York: Basic Books, 2004: 33-35), Novak discusses cultural systems and moral ecology. Also see de Sota (XII.25); B. M. Friedman (XII.48); Habermas (XII.61); Mokyr (XII.103); Ong (XII.132); Poovey (XII.142); Stark (XII.157); Warsh (XII.165).

(XII.4a) Barry, John M. Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul: Church, State, and the Birth of Liberty. New York: Viking/Penguin Group, 2012. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Vowell (XII.164c). Ong’s family ancestors left East Anglia on the same ship that brought Roger Williams to Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631. At that time, their
family name was spelled Onge; it is probably related to the English name Yonge.

(XII.4b) Benoit, Raymond. *Single Nature’s Double Name: The Collectedness of the Conflicting in British and American Romanticism*. The Hague, Netherlands; and Paris: Mouton, 1973. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Farrell (XII.37b); Hoeveler (XII.68b); Ong (XII.135); Veeder (XII.163b).


Sacvan Bercovitch’s lengthy preface to the 2011 edition of *The Puritan Origins of the American Self* (orig. 1975) is a gem. It’s worth the price of the book. In it Bercovitch recounts his life as a secular Jew and Canadian immigrant to the United States and his life as a distinguished scholar in American studies. According to Bercovitch, the New England Puritans were the first colonists to refer to themselves as Americans (xxxviii). At the time, all other colonists used the term to refer only to Native Americans, not to themselves. Among other things, Bercovitch shows that Barack Obama was a copy-cat. He copied the expression “change we can believe in” from a July Fourth orator in 1850 (xxvii and xxxix). Obama’s stated desire to “restore our image as the last, best hope on earth” was copied from President Lincoln (see pages xxviii and xxxix). In short, in his presidential campaign, Obama was calling on us Americans to renew our American identity, the identity of the American Self that Bercovitch ably explains in the preface to the 2011 edition of his book. After reading Bercovitch’s preface, I have come to the conclusion that certain New England Puritan writers were extremely imaginative. The imaginative spirit of the Homeric epics lived on in those writers. The imaginative spirit of the biblical author known as the Yahwist (author of J) lived on in them. The imaginative spirit of St. Paul and the anonymous authors of the four canonical gospels lived on in those authors. Of course the imaginative epic spirit also lived on in the Puritan poet John Milton, most notably in *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*. As is well known, Caesar Augustus (Octavian), who is rightly considered to be the founder of the Roman empire, commissioned Virgil to write the epic that is known as the *Aeneid*. Evidently, Virgil was not satisfied with his completed draft and planned to revise it further. However, before he could undertake to revise it, he died. He had stipulated that his draft should be destroyed. But Caesar Augustus over-ruled him and published his work. He seemed to understand that people do not live on bread alone. Certain New England Puritan writers also understood this as they composed their imaginative epic. Collectively, they are the founders of the American Self, as Bercovitch puts it. For better or worse, those writers are the founders of the manic-depressive American culture that Americans have lived in both before 1776 and after
Bercovitch himself does not emphasize the term manic-depressive as I plan to do here, even though he uses the term in passing (page xxxiii). I am the one using this term to emphasize what Bercovitch ably describes. However, in emphasizing this characterization, I do not claim to be making an original observation that nobody else has made. See, for example, John D. Gartner’s book *The Hypomanic Edge: The Link between (A Little) Craziness and (A Lot of) Success in America* (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 2005) and Peter C. Whybrow’s book *American Mania: When More is Not Enough* (New York and London: Norton, 2005). In his fine book *Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President* (X.20), Justin A. Frank, M.D., psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, contends that George W. Bush manifested the symptoms of megalomania, which Dr. Frank differentiates from simple mania. It strikes me that Gartner and Whybrow are discussing simple mania in their books, not megalomania. In any event, according to Bercovitch, the strategy of the New England Puritan jeremiad, as he styles the genre that emerged as an integral part of their emerging imaginative epic, became the strategy of the typical jeremiads in American civil religion. The strategy was to sound the alarm at the possible prospect of the terrible failure of the meaning of America – that is, the meaning of America in their imaginative epic. A failure would deny hope itself of the meaning of America. For all practical purposes, the meaning of America for those writers was connected with their imaginative epic regarding the covenant, an idea they borrowed from ancient Hebrew scripture. The strategy of sounding the alarm about the possible terrible failure was a summons to covenant renewal. The summons of renewal was a call to draw back from and avoid the abyss of the failure of the meaning of America as envisioned in their imaginative epic – an abyss the depths of which no man or woman knows (xxxiv). When I characterize their way of thinking as manic-depressive, I mean that the abyss they imagined represents the depressive polarity. Whereas the imaginative epic about the covenant represents the manic polarity. In my estimate, what Bercovitch described as the American Self (his capitalization) is manic-depressive. It’s in the American cultural DNA as it were to be manic-depressive. Now, once you catch on to the abyss that is lurking out there at the prospect of failure of the meaning of America, then you will be able to understand how and why “American optimism” is designed to be a strong check against plumbing the depths of the abyss. Granted, Charles Dickens’ character Mr. Micawber in *David Copperfield* was not an American. Nevertheless, Mr. Micawber’s optimism can be understood as related in spirit to “American optimism.” Now, despite Obama’s rhetorical efforts to try to revivify the American Self and the American sense of the covenant, I have to wonder if the American civil religion has died and is therefore beyond being revivified. After all, Jonathan Kozol has published one jeremiad after another calling attention to illiteracy in America, but to no avail. So what’s wrong? is Kozol simply not skilled enough as a jeremiad writer to evoke a suitable response? Or
has the American civil religion of old died? I know, I know, I myself may be speaking from the depths of the abyss regarding the lack of response to Kozol’s jeremiads about illiteracy in America. Nevertheless, illiteracy in America is a problem that should be addressed. But enough about the failure of the American covenant! Bercovitch explains how later writers contributed to the imaginative epic that the New England Puritan writers had started. But Bercovitch does happen to mention the spirit of epics in oral tradition, a spirit that Virgil imitated in writing the *Aeneid* and Milton, in writing *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*. According to Bercovitch, later American writers worked out a model of the American Self that had two distinctive parts: (1) a figure of spiritual commonality whose uniqueness lay in his or her determination to do his or her “own thing” in his or her “own way” and (2) individualism enshrined as self-interest to signify a cultural ideal of personal self-fulfillment (xxxvi). When you put these two features together, how is this model supposed to work out? Here’s how Bercovitch puts it: “And rhetorically, success in America was available to all. Examples of success were to be identified with, not envied or submitted to, and through identification they were to be celebrated as confirmations of equality, proof-texts of your possibilities” (xxxvi-xxxvii). Remember that we humans form our individual personal identities through our identifications with certain persons in our lives. But individual persons have different talents. According to Bercovitch, “The exceptional talent represented an exceptional nation” (xxxvii). Inasmuch as we produce exceptional talents, we can celebrate those exceptional talents as evidence of our exceptional nation that enable such exceptional talents to be developed. In theory, all of us have some talents that we can develop and thereby make our own social contribution (i.e., the American covenant). In short, we may not all be equal in talent, but we are all equal in the sense that all of us in theory can develop our talents so that we can make our own social contribution. As Bercovitch notes, in the evolving American imaginative epic as developed by later writers, “Failure was un-American” (i.e., the abyss) and “Success was the American Way” (xxxvii). Ah, but what all may be understood as success, eh? For example, is money the only measure of success, so that the more money you have, the more successful you presumably are? But couldn’t you have a lot of money and be a miserable example of a human being? If you have a lot of money, what else can you do with it besides spend it? In theory, you could hoard up your money. But you cannot take your hoard of money with you when you die. So you might as well spend it, or you will have to pass it on to others through your will. So accumulating money alone does not seem like the best measure of success. But this brings us to the next step. Besides making a lot of money, what other kinds of things do we Americans admire people for doing? If we as individuals have different talents, then we should be “measured” (as it were) with respect to our talents and how we have used our talents to make a social contribution. As perverse as this may sound, this way of measuring people would allow us to evaluate
Kozol as a talented writer of jeremiads, even though his jeremiads about illiteracy in America have failed thus far to produce any concerted action to combat illiteracy in America. In short, we can give him credit for fighting the good fight against illiteracy in America, even though he has not slain the dragon against which he has been fighting for so long. In effect, Kozol has called attention to the positive potentiality of literacy and to the potentiality of our emerging American culture to have more functionally literate citizens in our country than we have at the present time. The American cultural theorist Ong whose English family ancestors left East Anglia on the same ship that brought Roger Williams to Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631, also worked diligently over the years to call attention to the positive potentiality of literacy, most notably in his book *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (1.139), which has gone through more than thirty printings in English and has been translated into eleven other languages. In later publications Ong repeatedly emphasized the positive potentiality of literacy: “Writing is a Humanizing Technology” (1983), “Writing and the Evolution of Consciousness” (1985), “Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought” (1986), “Orality-Literacy Studies and the Unity of the Human Race” (1987). But like Kozol’s jeremiads about illiteracy in America, Ong’s claims about the positive potentiality of literacy have not turned the tide of our contemporary American culture toward combating illiteracy in America in positive ways. But perhaps events during Ong Centenary Year in 2012 will help call new attention to his emphasis on the positive potentiality of literacy. I hope so. I also hope that President Obama’s speech in Osawatomie, Kansas, on December 6, 2011, helps turn the tide of our contemporary American culture toward a renewal of the American covenant. Thus far, President Obama’s performance as president has not been exactly inspiring. He has a well-established track record of making big-sounding speeches and of talking a better game than he plays as president. People do not live on bread alone, but they also do not live on big-sounding speeches alone. Big-sounding speeches should be followed up with meaningful action. In his book *Obama on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President* (X.21), Dr. Frank has offered a detailed analysis of Obama’s personal psychodynamics, including a perceptive analysis of why Obama talked a better game as a presidential candidate than he has played as president. It should come as a surprise to no one that Dr. Frank does not find the symptoms of megalomania in Obama that he found in GWB. Even though Dr. Frank himself does not spell it out explicitly in his book about Obama, it strikes me that Obama manifests simple mania, not megalomania, as Dr. Frank defines and explains these two kinds of mania in his book about GWB. Now, in his book about Obama, Dr. Frank spells out more explicitly the psychological tendency to resist change than he does in his book about GWB. If Dr. Frank is right about our psychodynamic to resist change, then the psychodynamic that he identifies as central to megalomania is the same psychodynamic that leads us to
resist change. In terms of the American Self defined and explained by Bercovitch, what Dr. Frank describes as simple mania is the central psychodynamic of the American Self, on the one hand, and, on the other, the central psychodynamic not only of the American jeremiad but also of the American civil religion, both of which emphasize the American covenant. But what Dr. Frank describes as the central psychodynamic of megalomania is also the source of our resistance to change.


(XII.6) Berman, Morris. *Social Change and Scientific Organization: The Royal Institution, 1799-1844*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1978. Topic: History of Science. Modern science is at home in Western culture, especially in the United States. As a result, when I taught the introductory-level course Literacy, Technology, and Society at the University of Minnesota Duluth, I used to tell the students that the course was about them and their cultural conditioning. In the twentieth century, Nobel Prizes were awarded in the following numbers: (1) Medicine or Physiology: the United States 45; the United Kingdom 18; and Germany 14; (2) Physics: the United States 42; the United Kingdom 19; and Germany 17; (3) Chemistry: the United States 37; the United Kingdom 22; and Germany 14. Concerning the history of modern science, also see Bird and Sherwin (XII.8); Blackwell (XII.9; XII.10); Ferris (XII.43); Frasca-Spada and N. Jardine (XII.46); Gribbin (XII.59); Harrison (XII.65; XII.66); O’Malley, Bailey, Harris, and Kennedy (XII.110; XII.111); Ong (III.65; XI.9; XII.114: 72); Saliba (XII.150); Stark (XII.157); Whitehead (XII.167); Wills (III.172); Yeo (XII.172).


(XII.8) Bird, Kai and Martin J. Sherwin. *American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer*. New York: Knopf, 2005. Topics: History of Science; American Studies; History of Technology. Also see Monk (XII.103a); Wills (III.172). Unfortunately for everybody in the world, but most especially for the people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, J. Robert Oppenheimer had to learn the hard way the point of Mary Shelley’s cautionary tale about the spirit of modern science, *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus*. Thus far, only one nation in the world has been so barbaric as to use atomic bombs.


(XII.15) ----. *The Shadow of a Great Rock: A Literary Appreciation of the King James Bible*. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2011. Accessible. Topic: Religious Studies. This new book will probably not become a best-seller, as Bloom’s *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (X.6) did. However, Bloom’s new book really should be read in conjunction with his book on Shakespeare. But also see Alter (XII.2).


(XII.17a) Buell, Lawrence. *The Dream of the Great American Novel.* Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap P/ Harvard UP, 2014. Topics: American Studies; Literary Studies. Also see Hochman (XII.68a); Ong (XII.127a); Reynolds (XII.145a); Scholes and Kellogg (I.163). Figuratively speaking, Lawrence Buell is juggling a lot of balls in the air in his fine book *The Dream of the Great American Novel.* He is a skilled juggler. He doesn’t drop any of the many balls he is juggling. In addition, he sings and dances along as he juggles his many balls. He’s a one-man show – a delightful showman. I have not read all of the American novels or all of the literary criticism that he has. But he explains himself with admirable lucidity about each novel – and about everything else he discusses. Had he been performing his juggling act in the Winter Olympics in Sochi, he would have won the gold medal because of his style and artistry and because of his technical execution in his muscular intellectual athleticism. Buell candidly says that “the GAN idea itself is and has always been more a demotic than an academic enthusiasm” (387). But he is obviously an academic, and he conspicuously draws on the thought of other academics about the various American novels that he discusses. He is enthusiastic in his own scholarly way about certain American novels, and at times, he even seems mildly enthusiastic about the idea of certain American novels being worthy candidates for the Great American Novel. To establish a sense of order for his undertaking, he works with four scripts, as he styles them, for how certain novels might become candidates for being considered the Great American Novel. However, the American novels that he singles out for extended discussion in connection with one of the four scripts are usually referred to in numerous other places throughout the book. If you are interested in American novels, you will almost certainly find his book rewarding to read. Buell discusses a wealth of topics regarding American culture. If you have grown up in American culture, or have lived in it for a few years, you will almost certainly find topics in this book that resonate strongly with your own experiences of American culture. I did. Nevertheless, I would note that our American experiment in democratic government emerged historically in print culture in Western culture – in the centuries following the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. For example, the New England Puritans included a good number of college-educated people who read books and wrote books. They had been educated at Cambridge University. They founded Harvard College in 1636. When we flash forward to the American Revolution and the founding of this country, we find a good number of educated people were involved in both. To spell out the obvious, the American novels that Buell perceptively discusses were written by functionally literate Americans to be read by other functionally literate Americans. In other words, both the writers and the readers have had the benefit of enough education and enough leisure to write and read novels, even if some of them were autodidacts. By contrast, people in primary oral cultures (i.e., pre-literate cultures) usually participate in a living oral tradition of
storytelling. Indeed, it seems likely that African American slaves brought to the United States against their will had participated in oral traditions of storytelling in their native cultures. For example, the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe highlights the native tradition of oral storytelling (narrative proverbs) in his widely read novel *Things Fall Apart* (I.2). In addition, Native Americans participated in living oral traditions of storytelling. In a similar way, many ethnic European immigrants may also have participated in living oral traditions of storytelling in their countries of origin. But what connections, if any, are there between these various oral traditions of storytelling and the traditions of storytelling in the American novels that Buell discusses? As we know, newer forms of storytelling have emerged to compete with American novels – most notably movies and television. Arguably, many movies and television shows are escapist in spirit. Nevertheless, their appeal to the American people is undeniable. But American novels will no doubt continue to be written by and to be read by the literati. However, their impact on American people may be limited – except for those comparatively few novels that can make a claim to being the Great American Novel, or at least a plausible candidate for this claim.


(XII.18a) Caputo, John D. *On Religion*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Bloom (XII.14); Cox (XII.22a); Critchley (XII.23a); Derrida and Vattimo (XII.26a); Dorrien (XII.27; XII.28); Gelpi (XII.50a); Habermas (III.78a); James (XII.74c; XII.74d); Kristeva (XII.81b); Marty (III.118); P. Miller (XII.101a; XII.101b; XII.101c); Ong (I.140; I.142); Rotenstreich XII.147a); Vattimo (XII.163a); Wills (XII.168); Worthen (XII.171b); Zizek (XII.173a).


(XII.22) Conrad, Joseph. *Heart of Darkness: A Norton Critical Edition: Authoritative Text, Backgrounds and Contexts, Criticism*. 4th ed. Ed. Paul B. Armstrong. New York and London: Norton, 2006. Also see Achebe (I.2; XII.1); Ong (I.131; I.137; XII.137). This Norton Critical Edition of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* includes Chinua Achebe’s controversial essay “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*” (336-49). Despite my enthusiasm for teaching Achebe’s two novels *Things Fall Apart* and *No Longer at Ease*, I was not impressed with Achebe’s revised 1988 version of his 1977 essay criticizing Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* for alleged “racism” (Achebe’s term). In the Norton Critical Edition of Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart* (I.2), edited by Francis Abiola Irele, we find reprinted (200-08) the published interview of Achebe conducted by Caryl Phillips, the British-educated novelist of African descent who was born in 1958 in St. Kitts in the West Indies. It was originally published in *The Guardian* on Saturday, February 22, 2003. In his interview with Achebe, Phillips questions the aging Nigerian novelist closely about Achebe’s charge that Conrad is a thorough-going racist in *Heart of Darkness*, which is set in the 1890s in King Leopold’s Congo empire. At one point in the interview, Achebe faults Conrad for not being bigger than his times because he did not have a benevolent view of Africa. When pressed by Phillips to give an example of somebody of Conrad’s time who was bigger than his times, Achebe gives Livingstone as an example. But what exactly shows that Conrad did not have a benevolent view of Africa? Phillips ventures to say, “Conrad does present Africans as having ‘rudimentary’ souls.” Achebe replies, “Yes, you will notice that the European traders have ‘tainted’ souls, Marlow has a ‘pure’ soul, but I am to accept that mine [as an African] is ‘rudimentary’?” So there we have it. Achebe’s charge that Conrad is a racist comes down to Achebe taking wording in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* personally as though the wording characterized him and all other Africans. However, as others have pointed out, the wording in question comes from Marlow. Nowhere in the text is there a suggestion that Marlow’s views are above being questioned. In my estimate, the best argument about textual evidence that should lead us as readers to question Marlow’s statements is J. Hillis Miller’s 2001 essay “Should We Read *Heart of Darkness*?” Miller’s essay is reprinted in the 2006 fourth edition of the Norton Critical Edition of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (463-74), where Achebe’s revised 1988 version of his 1977
essay is also reprinted (336-49). It’s great and commendable for Achebe to question Marlow’s statement about the supposedly “rudimentary” souls of Africans. But Achebe should also question certain other statements that Marlow makes. As to the condition of Marlow’s soul, why does Marlow lie to Kurtz’s Intended (her name is not given) back in Europe when he tells her that Kurtz’s last words were her name? Elsewhere, he has tells us what Kurtz’s last words were. In addition, Marlow has tells us that he detests lies. But what he tells Kurtz’s Intended is a straightforward lie, not the truth about Kurtz’s last words. After Ong visited Kinshasa and Lubumbashi and made friends with certain Africans in 1974, he wrote a penetrating essay about Marlow’s lie to Kurtz’s Intended entitled “Truth in Conrad’s Darkness” that appeared in *Mosaic: A Journal for the Comparative Study of Literature and Ideas* (XII.137). Because Ong’s perceptive and thought-provoking essay about Conrad’s admittedly tricky novel appeared in the same year that Achebe’s article originally appeared, Achebe did not have the benefit of reading Ong’s insights about Conrad’s novel. Nor did Ong have the benefit of reading Achebe’s thought-provoking essay about Conrad’s novel before he published his own views about it. But I have had the benefit of reading both essays – and J. Hillis Miller’s 2001 essays as well as essays by other authors who responded to Achebe’s charges against Conrad. In addition, I found Caryl Phillips’ careful 2003 interview of Achebe, mentioned above, informative and instructive. In conclusion, if Marlow supposedly has a “pure” soul, perhaps this is best understood as meaning that there is a certain kind of innocence about Marlow.

(XII.22a) Cox, Harvey Gallagher. *The Future of Faith*. New York: HarperOne, 2009. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Bloom (XII.14); Caputo (XII.18a); Cox (XII.22b); Crichtley (XII.23a); Derrida and Vattimo (XII.26a); Dorrien (XII.27; XII.28); Farrell (I.61); Gelpi (XII.50a); Habermas (III.78a); James (XII.74c; XII.74d); Jenkins (III.93; III.94); Kristeva (XII.81b); Marty (III.118); P. Miller (XII.101a; XII.101b; XII.101c); Ong (I.140; I.142); Rotenstreich (XII.147b); Vattimo (XII.163a); Wills (XII.168); Worthen (XII.171b); Zizek (XII.173a). In light of the vociferous anti-1960s rhetoric of certain American conservatives that Jenkins (III.93) has discussed, it is important to note here that Harvey Cox sees a new age of the spirit as emerging from the 1960s onward.


(XII.26a) Derrida, Jacques and Gianni Vattimo, eds. *Religion*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Caputo (XII.18a); Cox (XII.22a); Critchley (XII.23a); Habermas (III.78a); Kristeva (XII.81b); Ong (I.140; I.142); Rotenstreich (XII.147b); Vattimo (XII.163a); Zizek (XII.173a).


(XII.29a) Douglas, Ann. *The Feminization of American Culture*. New York: Knopf, 1977. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see G. Collins (III.29); Coontz (III.33); de Beauvoir (III.37); Farrell (XII.37b). The strident feminism of the late 1960s and 1970s is best understood as a further advance in the already ongoing feminization of American culture. Drawing on Erich Neumann’s description in *The Origins and History of Consciousness* (III.128) of the higher femininity in stage seven of the eight stages of consciousness, I see the feminization of American culture as related to the emergence of the higher femininity of stage seven of the eight stages of consciousness. However, the stridency of feminists in the 1960s and later resulted in a predictable backlash, most notably among
conservative white men who seem to be resisting the challenges of stage seven in the eight stages of consciousness. At the same time, most self-described American feminists seem to be resisting the challenges of the higher masculinity of stage eight. Ong (III.140) claims that personalism (e.g., Martin Buber’s I-thou encounter) represents an expression of the higher masculinity of stage eight (11).


(XII.32) ---. *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe*. 2 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1979. Topics: Early Modern Studies; History of Technology. A classic study of print culture. Other classic studies of print culture include Altick (VIII.1); Febvre and Martin (XII.40); Habermas (XII.61); McLuhan (XII.96a); Ong (XII.132; XII.133).


(XII.37b) ---. “Secondary Orality and Consciousness Today.” Media, Consciousness, and Culture: Explorations of Walter Ong’s Thought. Ed. Bruce E. Gronbeck, Thomas J. Farrell, and Paul A. Soukup. Newbury Park, CA; London; New Delhi: Sage, 1991. 194-209. Also see Bakan (III.6); Benoit (XII.4b); G. Collins (III.29); Coontz (III.33); de Beauvoir (III.37); Douglas (XII.29a); Hoeverler (XII.68b); Houston (XII.72b); Ong (XII.135); Veeder (XII.163b).

(XII.38) ---. “The West Versus the Rest: Getting Our Cultural Bearings from Ong.” Explorations in Media Ecology 7 (2008): 271-82. Topics: Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Also see Clemens (XII.21a); Ferguson (XII.42); Huntington (III.88); Kupchan (XII.83a); Landes (III.111b); Morris (XII.103b).


(XII.41) Feingold, Mordechai and Joseph S. Freedman and Wolfgang Rother, eds. The Influence of Petrus Ramus: Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences. Basel, Switzerland: Schwabe, 2001. Topic: Early Modern Studies. Also see Freedman (XII.47); Hotson (XII.69; XII.72); P. Mack (XII.88); Milton (XII.102); Ong (XII.132; XII.133; XII.135); Sharratt (XII.153; XII.154; XII.155).

(XII.42) Ferguson, Niall. Civilization: The West and the Rest. New York: Penguin P, 2011. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Clemens (XII.21a); Farrell (XII.38); Huntington (III.88); Kupchan (XII.83a); Landes (III.111b); Morris (XII.103b).


(XII.50a) Gelpi, Donald L. *Varieties of Transcendental Experience: A Study of Constructive Postmodernism*. Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier Book/Liturgical P, 2000. Topics: History of Philosophy; Religious Studies. Also see Bloom (XII.14); Buell (X.8a; X.8b); Caputo (XII.18a); Cox (XII.22a); Critchley (XII.23a); Derrida and Vattimo (XII.26a); Dorrien (XII.27; XII.28); Farrell (I.62a); Fixico (II.8); Habermas (III.78a); James (XII.74c; XII.74d); Kristeva (XII.81b); Lloyd (III.112); Marty (III.118); P. Miller (XII.101a; XII.101b; XII.101c); Ong (I.140; I.142; I.143); Rotenstreich (XII.147b); D. M. Smith (I.168); Tracy (XII.161b); Vattimo (XII.163a); Wilshire (XII.169); Wills (XII.168); Worthen (XII.147b); Zizek (XII.173a). In this learned study Donald L. Gelpi, S.J., regularly works with the contrast of the dialectical imagination of American Protestants and the analogical imagination of the Roman Catholic tradition of thought (82, 132, 164, 172, 174, 192, 193, 206, 223, 224, 280, 281, 282). Briefly, he characterizes the dialectical imagination as displaying a uniform preference for disjunctive, either-or thinking (82). By contrast, he characterizes the analogical imagination as seeking “as much as possible
to think in both-and rather than either-or terms” (132). Concerning the analogical imagination, Gelpi refers us to David Tracy’s *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (XII.161b), but not to Lloyd (III.112). Unfortunately, Gelpi does not mention either Perry Miller’s discussion of Ramist dialectic in New England (XII.100) or Ong’s far more extensive discussion of Ramist dialectic (XII.126; XII.132). Concerning the later influence of Hegel and Kant on the dialectic of ideas in American Protestant theology, see Dorrien (XII.27).


(XII.56) Greenberg, David. “Agit-Prof: Howard Zinn’s Influential Mutilations of American History.” *The New Republic* (March 25, 2013): 44-49. Topic: American Studies. Also see Duberman (XII.30); Fish (III.65); Jacoby
In this review essay about Martin Duberman’s *Howard Zinn: A Life on the Left* (XII.30), David Greenberg concludes that Howard Zinn “never seemed aware of” the responsibility to his “readers to include the bad with the good, the ignoble with the noble . . . in the pursuit of intellectual honesty” (49).

(XII.57) Gregory, Brad S. *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 2012. Topics: Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Gauchet (XII.50); Gillespie (XII.51); Ong (II.14: 104-25; II.17); Roy (XII.148); Taylor (XII.160).


(XII.62) ---. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. 2 vols. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon P, 1984-1987. Topics: History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory. Also see Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151). A classic study about communicative action in print culture in Western culture. Habermas does not happen to advert explicitly to Ong *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (III.138). In effect, Habermas centers his attention on what Ong refers to as the art of reason, not on what Ong refers to as the art of discourse. For Ong, the art of discourse involves pro-and-con debate with a real or imagined adversarial position(s). By contrast, Ramist method is monologic in spirit because in theory, it involves concentrating one presenting one’s own line of thought without any reference to a real or imagined adversarial position(s). In theory, Ramist method eschews the kind of explicit pro-and-con debate that Thomas O. Sloane (III.158; III.159) champions.
After reading Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson’s new book about the great expansion of income inequality in recent decades, *Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class* — and on the lower class as well, I have come to the conclusion that we should paraphrase scripture to read as follows: “From everyone to whom much has been given [in income], much will be required [in taxes]; and from the one to whom much has been entrusted [such as the money manager of other people’s money], even more will be demanded [in taxes]” (Luke 12:48; NRSV). In his 1939 State of the Union address, Franklin D. Roosevelt famously said, “To us much is given; more is expected.” So there is a famous precedent for invoking the spirit of this biblical passage in our political discourse. Hacker and Pierson see FDR’s New Deal in a very positive light because of its commitment to redistributing material wealth through legislative interventions. Because of their strong interest in redistributing material wealth through legislative interventions, Hacker and Pierson work with the terms “nonmaterial” issues/grounds and “postmaterialist” to characterize various issues that would do little to help redistribute material wealth to the middle class and lower class. For example, they characterize both pro-choice and pro-life advocates as being concerned with nonmaterial issues. Regarding nonmaterial issues, the authors’ neutrality about them can be summed up by their rather crudely worded statement, “We have no dog in this fight” (page 204). Other nonmaterial issues include affirmative action, women’s rights, civil rights, and environmental concerns, which the authors see as upper-middle-class issues that would do little to help redistribute material wealth to the middle class and lower class. In plain English, “the Democrats lost their capacity to speak of the economic concerns of the little guy” (184). Whether they understand it or not, most Americans have been the losers in the rise of winner-take-all politics, except for the tiny percentage at the top who have been winners. In the authors’ view, both Republicans and Democrats begat the great expansion of economic inequality in recent decades, because both groups contributed, but not necessarily equally, to the legislative rise of winner-take-all politics. Their book is remarkably readable and even mildly entertaining at times. No doubt we should cultivate a sense of humor about the grim rise of radical conservatives in American politics. To jolt us into greater awareness about legislative developments, Hacker and Pierson start with the obvious superficial media coverage of politics, which usually is characterized as treating elections of political candidates as horse races (i.e., whose ahead in the polls and by how much, and the like). Because the rise of television has also produced a phenomenal rise in professional-sports on television, perhaps it is not surprising that media coverage of electoral contests...
decidedly resembles media coverage of sports contests. The media do cover electoral contests as horse races. How many American adult have not noticed this? But contests are contests, eh? Well, no, not exactly, Hacker and Pierson point out. After all, there are many legislative contests that are not all that well covered by the media because they usually unfold in a very slow process and the details are often hard to understand unless you understand the technicalities involved. Granted, the media usually do cover the outcomes of the legislative contests, the actual final legislation that gets enacted into law. But not the boring details of the legislation, or the boring details of the legislative contests themselves, which is where real political combat occurs. The well-known saying has it that the devil is in the details, and this is certainly true of legislation. The details of legislation are the central focus of Hacker and Pierson’s book. In their view, the contests about the details in legislation involved are real political combat, not the electoral contests. Hacker and Pierson set out to rectify the situation a bit by bringing us up to speed about the legislative details that cumulatively over recent decades, roughly from 1978 onward, have produced the winner-take-all politics highlighted in the title of their book. Even though I was familiar with the general pattern of political developments that the authors detail, I learned about a number of legislative details that I had not known about previously, perhaps because of my own inattentiveness to certain matters at the time of their unfolding. In one of their many attempts to be entertaining, Hacker and Pierson tell us that there have been no good guys in white hats in the sad story they recount of the seemingly inexorable rise of winner-take-all politics. Radical conservatives such as Phil Gramm and Newt Gingrich have been the bad guys in the black hats, not moderate Republicans such as Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, both of whom seem liberal compared to the radical conservatives. But the Democrats have not been the good guys in the white hats. As Hacker and Pierson recount the story of the rise of winner-take-all politics, no good guys in white hats emerge. Both Republicans and Democrats begat the deregulation that culminated in the economic crisis of recent years. Let us be clear here. From Hacker and Pierson’s account of the rise of winner-take-all politics, Presidents Carter and Clinton do not emerge as bad guys wearing black hats. The bad guys wearing the black hats are the radical conservatives. But Hacker and Pierson see the decisive rise in winner-take-all politics as occurring from the late 1970s onward. In their recounting, both Republicans and Democrats begat winner-take-all politics. Hacker and Pierson refer repeatedly to the Christian right and the religious right (139, 146-49, 160, 201-04, 205, 234-35). But the authors do not discuss Catholics, except to note that John F. Kennedy was a Catholic (page 202). However, as Garry Wills discusses his fine book Head and Heart: American Christianities (XII.168: 523-30), conservative antiabortion Roman Catholics have worked closely with conservative antiabortion evangelical Protestants in recent years to strengthen the voter turn out for the Republican party.
Nevertheless, Hacker and Pierson do point out that in the 1980s and 1990s the Republican party “[a]ttract[ed] a huge new GOP voting block brought to the party for cultural reasons” (211). One of those cultural reasons was the antiabortion movement, and many conservative antiabortion Catholics were among the new voting block brought to the GOP in the 1980s and 1990s and later. I should point out that Hacker and Pierson themselves suggest no possible way to break up the appeal of radical conservative Republican candidates. However, it strikes me that Wills has set an important example for other liberals to follow by lining up arguments against the different antiabortion arguments advanced by the different Christian groups. The potential payoff to debating with antiabortion Christians is to get them to stop voting for Republican candidates on the basis of this one issue alone. No doubt debating with antiabortion Christians will be a slow and arduous undertaking. Has anybody else advanced any ideas about how to combat the well-funded radical conservatives? As I stated, Hacker and Pierson haven’t. Finally, as is well known, FDR has long been considered a traitor to his class for helping the little guy. In light of his example, perhaps the Democratic party should try to cultivate more traitors to their economic class to help the little guy. In any event, Democratic politicians should figure out more ways in which the Democratic party might help advance the economic interests of the little guy.


(XII.68a) Hochman, Barbara. Uncle Tom’s Cabin and the Reading Revolution: Race, Literacy, Childhood, and Fiction, 1851-1911. Amherst and Boston: U of Massachusetts P, 2011. Topics: American Studies; Literary Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Buell (XII.17a); Reynolds (XII.145a).

(XII.68b) Hoevele, Diane Long. Romantic Androgyny: The Women Within. University Park and London: Pennsylvania State UP, 1990. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Benoit (XII.4b); Farrell (XII.37b); Ong (XII.135); Veeder (XII.163b).

(XII.69) Hotson, Howard. Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications, 1543-1630. Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 2007. Topics: Early Modern Studies; History of Education; Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Howard Hotson argues that Ong’s understanding of Peter Ramus’ thought is illuminating in many ways, but inadequate for understanding the Ramist pedagogical movement and its successors. In the process of criticizing and correcting Ong’s apparent misunderstandings of the Ramist pedagogical movement, Hotson does not diminish Ong’s stature as a cultural theorist regarding the aural-visual shift in cognitive processing. Moreover, after setting forth his supposed critique of Ong’s thought in his introduction, Hotson then proceeds to sum up Ramus’ achievement, or lack thereof, in the following statement, with which Ong would not disagree: “Historians of philosophy, first of all, generally agree that Ramus, far from being revolutionary, exercised little philosophical originality and that in replacing the rigorous demonstrative logic of Aristotle with the topical logic derived from Agricola he [Ramus] abandoned a tool capable of dealing with scientific problems for a humanist dialectic of little use beyond merely literary pursuits. The appeal of Ramism within German has been related by one leading historian to an ethos marked far less by Puritanism than by late Renaissance humanism, ‘a cultured milieu which aimed to broaden rather than restrict the basis of intellectual inquiry’” (17-18). Also see Ong’s “Humanism” (XII.122). As Hotson points out Ramist dialectic (or logic) was not “capable of dealing with scientific problems,” as Aristotelian logic was and is (see Lonergan [IX.48]; Nussbaum [IX.55]). However, even though Roman Catholics were the custodians of the Aristotelian logic, they did not set the world on fire in dealing with the scientific problems involved in the Galileo affair. See Blackwell (XII.9; XII.10).


(XII.71) ---. Paradise Postponed: Johann Heinrich Alsted and the Birth of Calvinist Millenarianism. Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic


(XII.72a) Houston, Jean. *Lifeforce: The Psycho-Historical Recovery of the Self*. New York: Delacorte P, 1980. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Farrell (XII.37b); Neumann (III.128). In this highly imaginative work, the ever-clever Jean Houston basically follows Gerald Heard’s *The Five Ages of Man: The Psychology of Human History* (New York: Julian P, 1963) – his 47th book to be published. Heard’s and Houston’s fifth human age is the post-individual, planetary, ecological human; their fourth age, the individual, humanic, self-sufficient human; their third age, the mid-individual, ascetic, self-accusing human; the second age, the proto-individual, heroid, self-assertive human; their first age, the pre-individual, co-conscious human (Houston: 29). Their first age corresponds with Ong’s primary oral cultures. In Western culture historically, their second age appears to cover antiquity from about the time of the earliest writing systems; their third age, the Middle Ages; their fourth age, the Renaissance and early modern period; their fifth age, the Romantic Movement in literature and the arts down to the present and the Industrial Revolution down to the present – in short, modernity in Western culture. But I prefer to work with Erich Neumann’s (III.128) eight stages of consciousness, rather than with Heard’s and Houston’s five ages. Their first age includes stages one, two, and three in Neumann’s eight stages of consciousness. Their second, third, and fourth ages include Neumann’s stages four, five, and six of consciousness, respectively. But their fifth age conflates Neumann’s stages seven and eight. I prefer not conflate those two stages, but to see each stage as separate from the other. Nevertheless, I enjoyed reading her account of how she encountered an elderly gentleman that she later came to recognize as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J. (218-20). When she was 13 years old, she was running with her dog on a street in Manhattan. She literally ran into an elderly gentleman and knocked him down. She helped him up, and they spoke briefly. Subsequently, she encountered him out on a walk, and they walked along together while he spoke with her. Much later in life, she figured out that the elderly gentleman whose name she had learned to pronounce as Mr. Thayer or Mr. Thayer was Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J. (II.21; X.48). In this way, 13-year-old Jean Houston and her dog acted out an imaginative journey on the streets of Manhattan that strikingly resembles the imaginative journey of Dorothy and her dog Toto in the 1939 movie *The Wizard of Oz*. Thus we can see Jean Houston’s future life foreshadowed in this episode in her life – Jean Houston is Dorothy, and the Hollywood movie makers who
made *The Wizard of Oz* foreshadowed Jean Houston’s life. When Ong was based in Paris in the early 1950s, he read Teilhard’s work and thereafter never tired of referring to Teilhard. So both Ong and Jean Houston became life-long Teilhard fans.

(XII.72b) ---. *The Wizard of Us: Transformational Lessons from Oz*. New York and London: Atria Books/Simon & Schuster; and Hillsboro, OR: Beyond Words, 2012. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies; Therapy. Also see Farrell (XII.37b); Masters and Houston (I.108a). In my living room I have a 36-inch-tall figurine made by a local woman artist of a Native American woman shaman with outstretched arms, her open hands facing palms upward, as in a prayer of supplication. I think of Jean Houston (born 1937) as a contemporary American woman shaman. The shaman represents one way to manifest the mature optimal form of the Magician archetype of maturity discussed by the Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary (I.117). Some background information about Jean Houston is in order. She has previously published a book about the Homeric epic the *Odyssey* and a big book about the ancient Egyptian myth of Osiris. People who are experiencing a mid-life crisis are undergoing a life transition into a new stage of consciousness that is represented by Odysseus’s journey back to Ithaca. But people who are experiencing the later life transition into old age are undertaking a deconstruction and reconstruction of their lives and ego-consciousness that is represented in the ancient myth of Osiris. But Jean Houston’s latest book centers on the 1939 Hollywood musical *The Wizard of Oz*, starring 16-year-old Judy Garland as Dorothy. For the 75th anniversary of the movie, the Judy Garland Museum in Grand Rapids, Minnesota, where she was born on June 10, 1922, is planning a festival for June 10-14, 2014. Perhaps Jean Houston was looking ahead to the 75th anniversary of the movie when she wrote her book *The Wizard of Us: Transformational Lessons from Oz*. In this wide-ranging short book Jean Houston provides (i) plot summaries of certain parts of the movie’s storyline and (ii) perceptive interpretations of each part and (iii) self-help exercises for the reader to undertake, if she or he wishes to, and (iv) wide-ranging commentaries about our contemporary situation. At the end of the book, she uses letters of the alphabet from A to M to construct an alphabetized “Manifestation Plan” (188-193). I will start with a word about (ii) her perceptive interpretations. In her perceptive interpretations of each part of the movie, she draws on Joseph Campbell’s book *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (III.20) to show how his collation of certain key points in myths about the Hero’s journey can help us understand the larger mythic import of each part of Dorothy’s Hero journey. Jean Houston is perceptive enough to figure out that girls and women also experience the Hero’s journey. She says, “In this [her] book we use the term hero to denote both genders. Women have always been [heroic] and continue to accomplish heroic feats with the difference that their emphasis has tended to be on
process rather than product – making things cohere, relate, develop, and grow. While the heroine may be less strident, she is nevertheless courageous and brings a new focus to the inner experience being of equal value to the outer action” (2). The Hero in the Hero’s journey represents our ego-consciousness on its journey through life. In the case of Dorothy’s journey in the movie, she is experiencing the birth of the Hero in her ego-consciousness. Roughly, most of us experience the birth of the Hero around the age of puberty. But if the movie centers on a psychodynamic that most of us experienced around the age of puberty, then the movie might be good for young people around the age of puberty to see. But Jean Houston’s book does not seem to me to be aimed at people around the age of puberty. I suppose that some young people around the age of puberty could read her book. But even the self-help exercises in the book seem to me to be aimed at people who are beyond the age of puberty. Next, a word regarding (iv) her wide-ranging commentaries about our contemporary situation. In her commentaries about our contemporary situation, Jean Houston works with the thesis that contemporary breakdowns are breakthroughs to a new consciousness. Her commentaries do not seem to me to be aimed at young people around the age of puberty. Oh, sure, young people around the age of puberty should be able to read her commentaries and understand them. But her commentaries seem to be aimed at somewhat older readers who sense that we are experiencing some kind of societal breakdown in American culture today. As is well known, conservative Americans today tend to see American culture as undergoing various kinds of breakdowns. But how many conservative Americans today would be open to Jean Houston’s claim that we are undergoing a breakdown that is a breakthrough? For many conservative Americans, breakdown is breakdown. Period. Circle the wagons and try to resist the breakdown with all your might. In the final analysis, it strikes me that Jean Houston’s commentaries are aimed at middle-aged (say, over 30) and older Americans who are willing to see themselves as living through a breakdown that is a breakthrough. Now, a word about the details of the story. The theme that there’s no place like home emerges toward the end of the movie. However, this theme also seems to express the longing that Odysseus feels to leave Calypso’s island, where she has enslaved him as her sex provider, and return home to his wife and son in Ithaca. Hmm. Along the way, Dorothy’s companion the Straw Man undergoes a deconstruction as thorough as the deconstruction that Osiris undergoes. Happily, Dorothy’s other companions are able to reconstruct the Straw Man successfully, just as Osiris is eventually reconstructed, except for one symbolic part that is missing in the reconstructed Osiris. Hmm. The Straw Man is best understood as one of the two bipolar “shadow” forms of the Magician archetype of maturity discussed by Moore (1.117). The Tin Man is best understood as one of the two bipolar “shadow forms of the Lover archetype discussed by Moore (1.116). The Cowardly Lion is best understood as one of the two bipolar “shadow” forms of the Warrior
archetype discussed by Moore (I.118). Because of her gender, Dorothy represents the Queen archetype discussed by Moore. However, before Judy Garland played the role of Dorothy in the movie, many Americans had fallen in love with her. As an actress and singer, 16-year-old Judy Garland playing Dorothy in the movie represents the energy of the Lover archetype -- as all artists do, according to Moore. Jean Houston quotes the psychoanalyst David Magder: “The Scarecrow, the Tin Man, and the Cowardly Lion represent syndromes with which most therapists are familiar: low self-esteem based on the sense that one is not intelligent or capable of dealing with the world as one would like to, or a sense of inability to respond emotionally or effectively, and anxiety or fearfulness in dealing with the day to day problems of living” (168). Now, toward the end of the movie, the unmasked Wizard of Oz goes back into his official role and grants each of Dorothy’s three companions something that is supposed to represent what each of them does not have. The Scarecrow receives a diploma, the Tin Man, a heart-shaped watch; the Cowardly Lion, a medal for meritorious conduct and extraordinary valor. No doubt we do need to receive recognition and validation from others in order to develop our potentialities. Finally, my conclusions. Drawing on my understanding of Erich Neumann’s book *The Origins and History of Consciousness* (III.128), his synthesis and systematization of C. G. Jung’s work into a sequence of eight stages of consciousness, I above suggested that Odysseus’s journey back home to Ithaca can be understood as symbolically representing the Hero’s journey in the mid-life crisis – the journey into Neumann’s stage seven of consciousness. Neumann describes stage seven of consciousness as leading to the rise of higher femininity. Ann Douglas has detailed the historical rise of higher femininity in American culture in her book *The Feminization of American Culture* (XII.29a). Neumann follows Jung in identifying the deconstruction and reconstruction of Osiris as a symbolic representation of the Hero’s journey into stage eight of consciousness. In certain academic circles in recent decades, our Western cultural heritage has been deconstructed with the same kind of vigor that Osiris was deconstructed. I wonder if the deconstructionists will undertake the reconstruction, as Bernard Lonergan does in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (X.30). If they don’t, they risk sliding into the disgust and despair that Erik H. Erikson sees as one possible tendency of stage eight in the life cycle. As I noted above, the Straw Man represent one of the two bipolar “shadow” forms of the Magician archetype discussed by Moore. Whenever we undergo a life transition such as the birth of the Hero in our ego-consciousness (Neumann’s stage four), we need to undergo certain kinds of new experiential learning. Figuratively speaking, our thought-worlds need to be deconstructed so that they can then be reconstructed with our new experiential learning. In this way, the major transitions in the life cycle involve a breakdown that is a breakthrough, as Jean Houston likes to say. In accord with Jean Houston’s own statements about puberty rites and the
movie *The Wizard of Oz*, I have indicated that the movie is deeply attuned to the birth of the Hero in our ego-consciousness around the age of puberty. As I’ve indicated, the birth of the Hero represents Neumann’s stage four of consciousness. Jean Houston is calling all the people who read her book to revisit the birth of the Hero in their ego-consciousness around the age of puberty. By revisiting the birth of the Hero in our ego-consciousness, we can renew our lives, regardless of our present age. How many among us do not feel a need to renew our lives? Toward the end of the movie, the famous Wizard of Oz is unmasked as just a one-man special-effects operator. Nevertheless, through this book Jean Houston as a woman shaman aspires to be the Wizard of us who read her book and take it to heart. In plain English, she is trying to be a special-effects operator in our lives. In *Get Happy: The Life of Judy Garland* (New York: Random House, 2000), Geral Clarke reports that President John F. Kennedy “sometimes called her for a private concert – a few bars of ‘Over the Rainbow’ sung a capella over the phone” (348) -- her signature song from *The Wizard of Oz*. We have no way of knowing if he was just captivated with the sound of Judy Garland singing this song, or with the lyrics of the song, or with the mythic spirit of the birth of the Hero that the movie captures – or possibly with all three. But we do know that as a young Navy officer, Jack Kennedy became a war hero after his PT boat was destroyed in the Pacific. Then after he became president of the United States, he enjoyed listening to Judy Garland sing a song that would likely have taken him back to revisit the birth of the Hero in his ego-consciousness.


(XII.74b) Jacoby, Russell. “Making It.” *The New Republic* (September 2, 2013): 34-39. Topic: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies; American Studies. Also see Fish (III.65). In this perceptive survey of Stanley Fish’s scholarly career, Russell Jacoby concludes, “He has always defended self-interest. With friends like him, the humanities needs no enemies” (39).


(XII.81b) Kristeva, Julia. *This Incredible Need to Believe*. Trans Beverly Bie Brahic. New York: Columbia UP, 2009. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Caputo (XII.18a); Cox (XII.22a); Critchley (XII.23a); Derrida and Vattimo (XII.26a); Habermas (III.78a); Ong (I.140; I.142); Rotenstreich (XII.147b); Vattimo (XII.163a); Zizek (XII.173a).


(XII.83a) Kupchan, Charles A. *No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Clemens (XII.21a); Farrell (XII.38); Ferguson (XII.42); Huntington (III.88); Kenny (XII.80a); Landes (III.111b); Morris (XII.103b).

(XII.83b) Lacy, Tim. *The Dream of a Democratic Culture: Mortimer J. Adler and the Great Books Idea*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Adler (VII.2; IX.1; IX.2; IX.3 X.1). How cultured should American voters be? For Americans to vote, it helps if they can read the ballot. For this reason, formal education in the United States, a systematic form of acculturation, is required by law. But Mortimer J. Adler and Robert Maynard Hutchins and their collaborators who promoted the set of books known as the *Great Books of the Western World* (1952; 2nd ed. 1990) envisioned lifelong learning as the pastime for American adults in their leisure time. In this way, they envisioned the dream of a democratic culture of cultured voters that Tim Lacy examines in his book *The Dream of a Democratic Culture: Mortimer J. Adler and the Great Books Idea*. The approach to the Great Books that Adler and Hutchins championed involved close reading. Indeed, the Great Books Movement that emerged in the 1920s paralleled the emphasis on close reading espoused by the then-emerging New Criticism in transatlantic literary studies as exemplified in the critical works of T. S.
Eliot, F. R. Leavis, I. A. Richards, Cleanth Brooks, and Robert Penn Warren. In Roman Catholic circles, the emphasis on close reading involved close reading of the original texts of St. Thomas Aquinas in international Thomistic studies. Of course international Thomism began to wane in influence after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). Transatlantic New Criticism began to wane in literary studies in the 1970s. After the expanded edition of the *Great Books of the Western World* was published in 1990, interest in the Great Books idea began to wane. Nevertheless, the spirit of close reading advanced by the Great Books movement, transatlantic New Criticism, and international Thomistic studies has persisted in academic circles down to the present time. But Adler and Hutchins complemented their emphasis on close reading with a strong emphasis on engaging in conversation with the ideas in the texts – and in conversation with others who had read the texts in small groups. Of course autodidacts working alone with the texts can also engage in spirited conversation with the texts. In other words, for Adler and Hutchins, great books did not represent “a static kind of tradition” (2). Instead, those texts represented living voices from the past that we can engage in conversation. In my estimate, Lacy does not give Adler sufficient credit for compiling the two volumes of the *GBWW* set known as the *Syntopicon* (VII.2). Compiling this massive cross-referencing on the themes discussed in the books in the set was an ambitious achievement. The documentation provided in the *Syntopicon* shows the spirit of conversation that has been carried on in the set of Great Books. In today’s parlance, we could say that the *Syntopicon* shows the spirit of intertextuality in the books in the set.


Logan, Robert K. *McLuhan Misunderstood: Setting the Record Straight*. Toronto: Key Publishing House, 2013. Topics: History of Technology; Cultural Studies. Also see Levinson (IX.44; IX.45; IX.46); Logan (IX.47a); McLuhan (XII.96; XII.96a; XII.96b; XII.96c; XII.96d; XII.96e); Ong (XII.129a). I am not a fan of Marshall McLuhan. But Robert K. Logan is. My, oh my, he is such a fan that I cannot find one serious criticism of anything McLuhan ever said in Logan’s short book *McLuhan Misunderstood: Setting the Record Straight* (2013). In the spirit of setting the record straight about McLuhan, I would like to discuss a few key points about him here. Logan is a Canadian, as McLuhan (1911-1980) was. Logan holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT. For many years, he taught physics at the University of Toronto, where McLuhan taught English. Logan met McLuhan in the 1970s, and he’s been writing enthusiastically, and uncritically, about McLuhan’s thought ever since. Logan is Jewish. McLuhan was a convert to Roman Catholicism.

First, let me set the record straight here about what Logan does not undertake to do. On the one hand, he does not undertake to set forth certain critiques of McLuhan that might be based on some misunderstanding of his thought. But Logan does not even advert directly to any critiques of McLuhan’s thought. In this connection, I should mention that Gary Genosko has collected critiques of McLuhan’s thought in the three-volume set titled *Marshall McLuhan: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). On the other hand, of the points of McLuhan’s thought that Logan discusses, he does not discuss explicitly how any of those points were allegedly misunderstood by any specific critics of McLuhan’s thought. In short, Logan is an uncritical McLuhan enthusiast. He is such an uncritical enthusiast that I cannot find one serious criticism of anything McLuhan ever said in Logan’s short book – no criticisms made by his critics, and no criticisms made by Logan. Next, in the spirit of setting the record straight about McLuhan, I would like to discuss a few points about him here. After McLuhan had completed his studies in English at Cambridge University, he taught English at the University of Wisconsin-Madison for one academic year (1936-1937). During the spring semester of that year, he was formally received into the Roman Catholic Church. This shows that his religion was important to him, because by becoming a Catholic he was sealing his fate in academia – as a Catholic, he would never become a professor at Harvard University, because of the anti-Catholic bias in white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture at the time. Next, from 1937 to 1944, McLuhan taught English at St. Louis University, the Jesuit university in St. Louis, Missouri. He took a one-year leave of absence to return to Cambridge University in 1939-1940, I believe, and worked further on his doctoral dissertation on Thomas Nashe in the context of the learning of his times. He completed his dissertation in 1943. McLuhan’s dissertation has been published as the book *The Classical Trivium: The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of His Time* (XII.96). As Logan notes (181), McLuhan published an article titled “The
Analogical Mirrors” in the Kenyon Review 6.3 (Summer 1944): 322-32. It’s about the Victorian Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins. (Logan incorrectly gives his name as John Manley Hopkins on page 181.) This article by McLuhan is reprinted in the book The Interior Landscape: The Literary Criticism of Marshall McLuhan 1943-1962, edited by Eugene McNamara (XII.96b: 63-73). McNamara clusters this article with five other pieces by McLuhan under the caption in the table of contents “Part One: The Nets of Analogy” (xi). As this caption indicates, McNamara finds McLuhan working with the nets of analogy in the six pieces grouped together in this section of the book. So let’s discuss analogy. G. E. R. Lloyd has published a perceptive book titled Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought (III.112). George P. Klubertanz, S.J., in philosophy at St. Louis University published the book Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (XII.81a). Ralph McInerny in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame published the book The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas [Aquinas] (XII.94a). The Catholic priest and theologian David Tracy at the University of Chicago Divinity School published the book The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (XII.161b). The Jesuit priest and theologian Donald L. Gelpi at the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley published the book Varieties of Transcendental Experience: A Study in Constructive Postmodernism (XII.50a), in which he regularly contrasts the Protestant dialectical imagination and the Catholic analogical imagination (82, 132, 164, 172, 174, 192, 193, 206, 223, 224, 280, 281, 282). As Lloyd’s study shows, argumentation by analogy was used in early Greek thought. Later on, the analogical imagination became central to Catholic thought – for example, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. But later still, the dialectical imagination became central to American Protestant thought. Briefly, Gelpi characterizes the American Protestant dialectical imagination as displaying a uniform preference for the disjunctive, either-or thinking (82). By contrast, he characterizes the Catholic analogical imagination as seeking “as much as possible to think in both-and rather than either-or terms” (132). Unfortunately, Gelpi does not mention Perry Miller’s discussion of Ramist dialectic in his book The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (XII.100) or Ong’s far more extensive discussion of Ramist dialectic in his book Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (XII.132) – both of which McLuhan was familiar with. In his own 1943 Cambridge University doctoral dissertation, McLuhan was concerned with detecting the influence of Ramist dialectic on Elizabethan prose styles. Historically, what Gelpi refers to as the American Protestant dialectical imagination was based on Ramist dialectic. Evidently, McLuhan became a convert to Roman Catholicism, at least in part, because he preferred the Catholic analogical imagination over the Protestant dialectical imagination. Now, in a letter to Jacques Maritain, the famous French Thomist philosopher, dated
May 6, 1969, in the *Letters of Marshall McLuhan* (XII.96c: 369-71), McLuhan says, “My first encounter with your work was at Cambridge University in 1934. Your *Art and Scholasticism* was on the reading list of the English School. It was a revelation to me. I became a Catholic in 1937” (371). McLuhan also says, “Analogy of proper proportionality . . . is a mode of awareness destroyed by literacy, since the literate man insists on visual connections where being insists on awareness” (371). Now, regardless of the beauties of the Catholic analogical imagination, I do not expect to see the analogical imagination catch on among American Protestants. In a wonderful subheading Logan refers to “McLuhan’s Anti-Academic Bias and Academe’s Anti-McLuhan Bias” (141). So here’s my take on these two “anti” biases: McLuhan was fascinated with the Catholic analogical imagination. But many academics are not fascinated with it. Logan also refers to McLuhan as a trickster figure (44). This is a really apt characterization of McLuhan. However, I would suggest that McLuhan assumed the role of a trickster figure because he understood that he was intrigued with the Catholic analogical imagination and that many people were not. In any event, McLuhan-the-trickster shifts his point of view in dazzling ways in his books *The Mechanical Bride* (XII.96d) and *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (XII.96a). In other ways, McLuhan also cultivated the trickster role as part of his public persona. (In contrast, Ong never played the trickster role. Then again, he was not as intrigued with the Catholic analogical imagination as McLuhan was. Nor was Ong an old-fashioned Thomist, as McLuhan was. Nor was Ong a technophile, as McLuhan was. Basically, Ong was a technophile, but not an uncritical one.) Next, I want to turn to Logan’s discussion of emergence and complexity theory (113-118; 123-131). I would like to point out to Logan that in the late 1950s McLuhan read Bernard Lonergan’s book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (X.30), in which Lonergan discusses emergent probability. But Logan does not mention Lonergan’s discussion of emergent probability. Incidentally, Lonergan also famously shifts his point of view in certain chapters— that is, he shifts from the point of view he had maintained in previous chapters. In a similar way, McLuhan famously shifts his point of view from essay to essay in his experimental books *The Mechanical Bride* (XII.96d) and *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (XII.96a). Next, I want to mention Logan’s discussion of Aristotle’s four causes (124-125). It’s fine for Logan to quote Aristotle. However, Logan does not even mention Thomas Aquinas. But we know from McLuhan’s letter to Maritain that McLuhan claimed to have read Aquinas. For an accessible account of Aquinas’s appropriation of Aristotle’s four causes, see Edward Fesser’s book *Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009: 16-23). In his bibliography Logan also lists McLuhan’s article “Joyce, Aquinas, and the Poetic Process” in the journal *Renaissance* 4.1 (1951): 3-11. But Logan does not list the book *Joyce and Aquinas* by William T. Noon, S.J. (New Haven: Yale UP, 1957). From the 1930s onward, the two leading centers of Thomistic philosophy in North America were Saint
Louis University and the University of Toronto. Thus for the better part of his adult life, McLuhan taught English in one or the other of the two leading centers of Thomistic philosophy in North America. Arguably Thomas Aquinas was the leading medieval Aristotelian in Western culture. As a result, Thomistic philosophy is also known as Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. So for Logan’s purposes, it is relevant for him to examine Aristotle’s thought about the four causes. However, because McLuhan had studied Aquinas’s thought, it would also have been relevant for Logan to examine Aquinas’s thought about the four causes. In any event, McLuhan’s interest in the four causes shows that he was an old-fashioned Thomist like Maritain. However, after Vatican II, old-fashioned Thomist philosophy has been on the wane in Roman Catholic circles. In contrast to Maritain and McLuhan, Lonergan was not an old-fashioned Thomist, but a newfangled one – best described as a Lonerganian. (Teilhard and Ong were not old-fashioned Thomists, even though each of them had been trained in old-fashioned Thomist philosophy and theology as part of their Jesuit training years before Vatican II. But they were not Lonerganians either.) In his bibliography Logan does not list McLuhan’s 1943 Cambridge University doctoral dissertation, which was published in 2006 (XII.96), as noted above. Logan does list McLuhan’s article “Bacon, Ancient or Modern?” in the journal Renaissance and Reformation 10.2 (1974), but without giving the inclusive page range. But I should point out here that McLuhan served as the director of Maurice B. McNamee’s 1945 doctoral dissertation at Saint Louis University titled Bacon’s Attitude Toward Grammar and Rhetoric in the Light of the Tradition. But enough!

In conclusion, Logan offers an extremely selective and uncritical view of McLuhan’s thought. A more adequate account of McLuhan’s thought would have to be more inclusive – and better informed. In addition, a more adequate account of McLuhan’s thought would have to be less uncritical. Figuratively speaking, McLuhan did not get a base hit every time he stepped to the plate. But Logan makes it sound as though McLuhan hit only grand slam home runs. Because Logan’s enthusiasm for McLuhan is so uncritical, I suspect that his book will not help rehabilitate McLuhan among academics today. But I could be mistaken about that. We’ll have to wait and see.


of the psyche). For this reason, *The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus* could also be listed in the category on agonistic structures, as is the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola. But I prefer to list *The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus* in the present category on print culture because historically the Jesuit order emerged in print culture and because the Jesuit order was and is a bit different in orientation from medieval religious orders such as the Benedictines, the Franciscans, and the Dominicans. The Basque soldier and courtier Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556) was the founder of the religious order in the Roman Catholic Church known as the Society of Jesus (known informally as the Jesuit order). He is also the compiler of the minor classic work in spirituality known as the *Spiritual Exercises* (III.113). He was roughly contemporary with the French logician and educational reformer and Protestant martyr Peter Ramus (1515-1572). In his 1967 encyclopedia article titled “Humanism” (XII.122) Ong sees both the Jesuit educational movement and the Ramist educational movement as parts of the larger educational movement associated with Renaissance humanism. Concerning the Jesuit educational movement, see Pavur (XII.139); concerning the Ramist educational movement, see Hotson (XII.69; XII.72).

(XII.87a) Lynch, William F. *The Image Industries*. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959. Topics: History of Rhetoric; Cultural Studies. Also see McLuhan (XII.87a); Postman (XII.143).


(XII.94a) McInerny, Ralph. *The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961. Topics: History of Philosophy; Religious Studies. Also see Klubertanz (XII.81a); Lloyd (III.112); Tracy (XII.161b).


(XII.96) McLuhan, Marshall. *The Classical Trivium: The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of His Time*. Ed. W. Terrence Gordon. Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press, 2006. Topics: History of Rhetoric; History of Philosophy; Early Modern Studies. Also see Bercovitch (XII.5); P. Miller (XII.100); Ong (XII.129a; XII.132; XII.133). This book contains the text of Marshall McLuhan’s 1943 Cambridge University doctoral dissertation. When he was teaching English at Saint Louis University, he was working on his doctoral dissertation. At that time, Ong was in graduate studies in English and in philosophy at Saint Louis University, as part of his Jesuit educational training. McLuhan called Ong’s attention to Perry Miller’s discussion of Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramist logic in his book *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (XII.100). Several years later, Ong proceeded to graduate studies in English at Harvard University, where he did his massively researched doctoral dissertation on Ramus and
Ramist logic under Perry Miller. Ong’s dissertation, slightly revised, was published in two volumes by Harvard University Press in 1958: *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (XII.132) and *Ramus and Talon Inventory* (XII.133). *Ramus and Talon Inventory* includes the dedication, “For Herbert Marshall McLuhan who started all this.”

(XII.96a) ---. *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1962. Topics: Cultural Studies; History of Technology. A classic but flawed study of print culture. Also see Ong (XII.127a; XII.134a). Ong reviewed McLuhan’s book in the Jesuit-sponsored magazine *America* 107.24 (September 15, 1962): 743, 747. Ong’s review is reprinted in *An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry* (XII.131: 307-08). For understandable reasons, McLuhan and Ong are often thought of as espousing similar and indeed compatible ideas. But it is important to understand that Ong is not McLuhan, just as McLuhan is not Ong. For example, in *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, McLuhan repeatedly refers to “retribalization” as though this hypothetical possibility were a realistic possibility. However, following a centuries-old pattern of defining something by saying what it is not, Ong famously defines secondary orality as not primary orality. He associates secondary orality (i.e., orality fostered by communication media that accentuate sound) with literate forms of thought, because literate forms of thought were involved in developing the communication media that accentuate sound. If secondary orality were the same as primary orality, then there would presumably be no point in dubbing it “secondary orality.” Moreover, if secondary orality were the same as primary orality, then McLuhan’s hypothetical “retribalization” would seem likely to occur as a matter of course. However, Ong also works with the contrast of cyclic thought versus evolutionary thought. But even the hypothetical possibility of “retribalization” would seem to imply a form of cyclic thought (i.e., return to the original oral cultural conditions that Ong refers to as primary orality). That said, McLuhan was far more widely known in the 1960s and into the 1970s than Ong was at any time in his lengthy lifetime. For a time in the 1960s and 1970s, McLuhan seemed to be ubiquitous. However, a tsunami-sized backlash of hostility among academics emerged against him. His hostile critics threw out the baby with the bath water, as they say. The backlash against McLuhan among hostile academics opened the way for Jacques Derrida, who had published three books in 1967, and deconstruction to rise to widespread popularity in certain academic circles. Moreover, just as McLuhan had been more widely known in the 1960s and 1970s than Ong was, so too Derrida became more widely known in certain academic circles from 1967 onward than Ong was at the same time or later. In short, Ong’s thought was never lionized as McLuhan’s thought was for a time or as Derrida’s thought was at a later time. Ong’s thought has never been fashionable. Perhaps Ong’s thought has never been swept
up in the spirit of the times up to the present time because he really hoped to usher in a fresh new spirit of the times. The present classified bibliography of selected works is designed to help advance this hope for a fresh new spirit of the times to emerge.


(XII.96d) ---. The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man. New York: Vanguard P, 1951. Topics: History of Rhetoric; Cultural Studies. Also see Berger (XII.5a); Lynch (XII.87a); Postman (XII.143). From Paris, Ong dispatched a review essay about McLuhan’s first book to Social Order 2.2 (1952): 79-85. In this piece Ong briefly delineates the thought of the French Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.


(XII.100) ---. *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1939. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Ong (XII.132). In this classic work in American studies, Perry Miller shows that educated New England Puritans were Ramists, followers of Peter Ramus’ work in logic (also known as dialectic). Among other things, Miller reports that he found only one self-described Aristotelian in seventeenth-century New England – everybody else was a self-described Ramist. As Ong shows, before the advent of the French logician and educational reformer and Protestant martyr Peter Ramus (1515-1572), the arts course of studies in the medieval university was dominated by what was referred to as the Aristotelian tradition of logic, even when new additions were added that were not found in Aristotle’s writings about logic. The influence of the arts course of studies in the medieval university emerged before the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. After the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s, the extensive Ramist educational movement and the extensive Jesuit educational movement and other educational developments associated with Renaissance humanism emerged that were decisively different from the arts course of studies in the medieval university. See Ong (XII.126; XII.132); Hotson (XII.69; XII.72); Pavur (XII.139).


(XII.102) Milton, John. *A Fuller Course in the Art of Logic Conformed to the Method of Peter Ramus* (Artis Logicae Plenior Institutio, ad Petri Rami Methodum Concinatta). Ed. and trans. Ong and Charles J. Ermatinger. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton: 1666-1682*. Ed. Maurice Kelley. Vol. 8. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1982. 206-407. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Ong’s historical introduction (139-205). Because John Milton had studied Peter Ramus’ logic extensively enough to write a textbook based on Ramus’ work, perhaps it is not surprising that Milton announces the “logic” of his purpose in *Paradise Lost* as being to justify the ways of God to man, as Ong has noted. However, if it is “logical” for Milton to state his purpose in *Paradise Lost*, as Ong has suggested that it is, then we should note that Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), who did not
study the logic of Peter Ramus (1515-1572), states the purpose of the religious believer in this life in the section of the *Spiritual Exercises* (III.113) titled “Principle and Foundation” (standardized section number 23).


(XII.109) --- *What Happened at Vatican II*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 2008. Topics: Church History; Religious Studies. Also see Blanshard (XII.13); James Carroll (III.21a); Jenkins (III.93). Ong completed his lengthy Jesuit training long before the Second Vatican Council in the Roman Catholic Church took place (1962-1965). Before Vatican II, the Roman Catholic Church was strongly committed to contending with modernity, as Philip Gleason (XII.52) puts it in the title of his book about Catholic higher education in the United States before
Vatican II. For a critique of the pre-Vatican II church, see Blanshard (XII.11; XII.12). Vatican II formally switched the Roman Catholic Church to taking a more irenic stance toward other religions and certain other aspects of modernity. As a result of his Jesuit training, Ong was undoubtedly equipped to join his co-religionists in contending with modernity. No doubt he had to struggle within himself to adapt to the more irenic stance taken by Vatican II. An example of Ong’s anti-Protestant zeal can be found in his spirited 1951 essay “The Lady and the Issue,” which he reprinted in 1967 in In the Human Grain: Further Explorations of Contemporary Culture (XII.124: 188-202). But Ong (II.14) was also capable of criticizing certain tendencies in the pre-Vatican II church. However, in time, he did adapt to the more irenic stance – most notably in “Voice and the Opening of Closed Systems” (XII.125: 305-41). In the systems terminology that Ong uses in this essay, the pre-Vatican II church was a closed system. But Vatican II announced that the church would move toward being an open system, or at least more open than it had been in recent centuries. Toward the end of this essay, Ong advances open closure as the ideal position that individual persons should aim to work out in their lives. According to Ong’s way of thinking, open closure would allow persons to cling strongly to his or her principles, but still be able to engage in open discussion with others. But his idea of open closure can also be extended to the church and to other organizations.

(XII.110) O’Malley, John W. and Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, and T. Frank Kennedy, eds. The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 1999. Topics: Jesuit History; Cultural Studies. For other works by and/or about Jesuits (including some by Ong), see Copleston (III.34); Crowe (I.41); de Mello (I.42); Doran (X.15); Gelpi (XII.50a); Henle (IX.4a; IX.36); Klubertanz (XII.81a); Lonergan (X.30; X.30a); Loyola (III.113; XII.87); P. Mack (XII.88); McNamee (III.121); Nixon (II.12); O’Malley (XII.107; XII.108; XII.109); O’Malley, Bailey, Harris, and Kennedy (XII.111); O’Malley, Bailey, and Sale (XII.112); Ong (II.15; II.16: 99-126; VIII.12; X.39; XII.115; XII.118); Phillips (IX.63); Tade (X.46); Teilhard de Chardin (II.21; X.48); Wimsatt (I.198).


(XII.121) ---. *Hopkins, the Self, and God.* Toronto; Buffalo, NY; London: U of Toronto P, 1986 (paperback 1993). Also listed as Ong (II.15; X.40). Topics: Literary Studies; Jesuit Spirituality; Cultural Studies; Evolutionary Theory. Also see Buell (X.8a); Ong (XII.130a).

Grain (XII.124: 52-59). Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Also see Skinner (XII.155a).


(XII.127a) ---. “Literature, Written Transmission of.” The New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 8. Ed. William J. McDonald et al. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 833a-838b. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Also see Buell (XII.17a); Ong (XII.134a); Scholes and Kellogg (I.163). Reprinted as “Written Transmission of Literature” in An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry (XII.131: 331-44). In the bibliography accompanying this encyclopedia article, Ong comments as follows on McLuhan’s The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (XII.96a): “a racy survey, indifferent to some scholarly detail, but uniquely valuable in suggesting the sweep and depth of the
cultural and psychological changes entailed in the passage from illiteracy to print and beyond” (838b).


(XII.129a) ---. “McLuhan as Teacher: The Future is a Thing of the Past.” Journal of Communication 31.3 (1981); 129-35. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see McLuhan (XII.96; XII.96a; XII.96b; XII.96c; XII.96d; XII.96e). When Walter J. Ong (1912-2003) was a young Jesuit scholastic in graduate studies in philosophy and in English at Saint Louis University, he encountered the talkative young Canadian Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980), who taught English there from 1937 to 1944. Not everybody was willing to listen to McLuhan, who tended to deliver monologues. But Ong listened to him willingly. Subsequently, Ong supported and promoted McLuhan’s work, at least up to a certain point. But Ong was not uncritical of McLuhan. In any event, both were part of the ferment of the 1960s and 1970s. McLuhan’s breakthrough book Understanding Media (XII.96e), along with his book The Gutenberg Galaxy (XII.96a), made McLuhan one of the more widely known intellectual figures in the 1960s and 1970s. Ong never had a breakthrough book, and he was not as widely known as McLuhan was in the 1960s and 1970s. But McLuhan’s celebrity status generated a growing number of critiques of his thought by other academics. By the time of his death, this critical reaction was strong. Nevertheless, Ong’s loyalty to his former teacher and life-long friend comes through resoundingly in “McLuhan as Teacher.”


(XII.130a) ---. “Newman’s Essay on Development in Its Intellectual Milieu.” Theological Studies 7.1 (1946): 3-45. Topics: Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Reprinted in Ong’s Faith and Contexts: Volume Two (1992: 1-37). Also see Ker (XII.80b); Jost (XII.79a); Newman (X.36e; XII.104a); Ong
In the early 1940s, Ong was very interested in Newman’s thought.

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Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958. Also listed as Ong (III.138; IX.59; XI.9). Topics: History of Education; History of Philosophy; History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory; History of Technology. Also see Boethius (VII.3a; VII.3b); Cicero (VII.5a); Hotson (XII.69; XII.72); P. Mack (XII.89; XII.91); McLuhan (XII.96; XII.96a); Kretzmann et al. (IX.39a); Ong (XII.126; XII.133); Peter of Spain (IX.62a); Stump (IX.81b). This work is Ong’s classic study of print culture. Reprinted with a new foreword by Adrian Johns by the U of Chicago P in 2004.

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Ramus and Talon Inventory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958. Also listed as Ong (IX.60). Topics: Early Modern Studies; History of Philosophy. Also see McLuhan (XII.96; XII.96a); Ong (XII.132). Bibliographic listing and brief description of more than 750 volumes by the French logician and educational reformer Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and his followers and related works. With the financial assistance of two Guggenheim fellowships, Ong was able to live abroad for about four years, staying in Jesuit residences. He worked in more than 100 libraries in the British Isles and Continental Europe tracking down the more than 750 volumes (mostly in Latin) listed. Concerning the verbal art known as rhetoric, see Lawrence D. Green and James J. Murphy’s Renaissance Rhetoric Short-Title Catalogue 1460-1700 (XII.55). For studies of Ramus and Ramism, see Feingold, Freedman, and Rother (XII.41); Freedman (XII.47); Hotson (XII.69; XII.72); P. Mack (XII.88); Milton (XII.102); Sharratt (XII.153; XII.154; XII.155).

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observation about the general import of McLuhan’s overall project in his programmatically experimental book of short exploratory essays with colorful captions: “If the human community is to retain meaningful possession of the knowledge it has accumulated, breakthrough to syntheses of a new order are absolutely essential. McLuhan aids one such breakthrough into a new interiority, which will have to include studies of communications not merely as an adjunct or sequel to human knowledge, but as this knowledge’s form and condition.” Of course Ong’s overall body of work aids another – alternative and competing -- breakthrough synthesis of a new order. In short, we should see Ong and McLuhan as engaging in what Ong terms agonistic behavior toward one another as each pursues the trajectory of the development of his own thought. In this regard, Ong is not McLuhan, just as McLuhan is not Ong. At times, the trajectory of each man’s thought appears to be parallel with the other man’s thought – and perhaps even at times complementary with the other man’s thought, so that a reader might be understandably tempted to blend one man’s thought with the other man’s thought. But I am in favor of keeping Ong’s thought separate and distinct from McLuhan’s. However, I understand that in his review of The Gutenberg Galaxy Ong was trying to give McLuhan credit where credit is due. But in the spirit of giving credit where credit is due, I want to call attention to what Ong claims in the above-quoted passage about how the human community needs to work out new syntheses of thought in order to “retain meaningful possession of the knowledge it has accumulated.” Shortly after both Ong and McLuhan had each worked out his new synthesis, it became fashionable for certain people to refer pejoratively to supposedly “dead white males” and also to supposed “male patriarchy.” Apart from being handy ways to excuse oneself from studying any of “dead white males” and from carefully examining the psychodynamism of “male patriarchy” (as Ong [III.132; III.134; III.135; III.136; III.137: 192-286], to his credit, examined with respect to male agonistic tendencies), those two expressions strike me as also obliquely expressing something of the spirit that Ong himself refers to in the above-quoted passage – the spirit that the human community needs to work out to “retain meaningful possession of the knowledge that it has accumulated” – thanks in part to “dead white males” and also even thanks in part to “male patriarchy.” Yes, to be sure, male agonistic tendencies have tended to produce “male patriarchy” as a byproduct in the past. But we should try to avoid throwing out the baby with the bath water as we examine male agonistic tendencies. After all, when we decry examples of “male patriarchy” in the past and in the present, we are engaging our own agonistic tendencies. Now, because Ong’s own extensive examination of male agonistic tendencies is a key part of the overall new synthesis that he has offered us through the body of his work, I would suggest that he is one dead white male whose thought still deserves our attention -- and even our careful study.
(XII.135) ---. *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture*. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1971. Also listed as Ong (III.140; VII.24). Topics: History of Rhetoric; Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Reprints two important studies by Ong about Ramus and Ramism (142-64 and 165-89). Regarding the Romantic Movement in literature and the arts, also see Benoit (XII.4b); Farrell (XII.37b); Hoeveler (XII.68b); Veeder (XII.163b).


(XII.139) Pavur, Claude, trans. *The Ratio Studiorum: The Official Plan for Jesuit Education* [Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Iesu]. St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2005. Topics: History of Jesuit Education; Early Modern Studies. In his 1967 encyclopedia entry titled “Humanism” (XII.122), meaning Renaissance humanism, Ong sees the Jesuit educational movement as part of the larger educational movement of Renaissance humanism, just as he sees the Ramist educational movement as part of Renaissance humanism. Over 50 years of collaborative Jesuit effort went into producing this 1599 document, which was preceded by earlier versions in 1586 and 1591. Concerning Jesuit higher education in the United States, see Kathleen A, Mahoney’s *Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America: The Jesuits and Harvard in the Age of the University* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 2003).


(XII.143) Postman, Neil. Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. 2nd ed. New York: Penguin Books, 2006. Accessible. Also listed as Postman (I.151). Topics: Cultural Studies; History of Technology; History of Rhetoric. Also see Lynch (XII.87a); McLuhan (XI96d; XII.96e); Riesman (XII.147a). This book includes two fine chapters on the historical development of print culture, plus a cogent analysis of what Ong refers to as secondary orality today.


Riesman (X.44). Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Postman (XII.143). As is well known, Sigmund Freud discusses three stages of psycho-sexual development: (1) the oral stage; (2) the anal stage; (3) the genital stage. Freud’s point is that all humans at all times have had the three psycho-sexual stages to traverse on a personal level. But Erich Fromm’s counter-point is that at different times and in different places social conditioning has worked to shape the character types that have emerged around each of the three stages of psycho-sexual development. In The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character, originally published in 1950, Riesman discusses three character types: (1) the outer-directed character type (also known as tradition-directed); (2) the inner-directed character type; (3) the other-directed character type. As Riesman shows, all three of these character types have been represented in American culture in the twentieth century. In effect, this makes American culture a microcosm of world today, but not necessarily a microcosm of the percentages of each character type in various cultures around the world today. However, from colonial times onward, the prestige culture in American culture has been dominated by inner-directed character types. Both Riesman and Fromm were inner-directed types, and both worried about the emerging other-directed character types. But to understand the emerging other-directed character types better than Riesman and Fromm did, I would suggest that each of Riesman’s character types builds on one of Freud’s stages of psycho-sexual development: (1) Riesman’s outer-directed character type builds on Freud’s oral stage of psycho-sexual development; (2) Riesman’s inner-directed character type builds on Freud’s anal stage of psycho-sexual development; (3) Riesman’s other-directed character type builds on Freud’s genital stage of psycho-sexual development. Riesman’s outer-directed character type is the default character type of all humanity at all times. This character type basically lives in and is oriented by what Ong (I.143) describes as the world-as-event sense of life. For example, the world-as-event sense of life permeates the Hebrew Bible and the ancient Hebrew conceptual construct of the covenant. Arguably, the spirit of the covenant expressed by the ancient Hebrew prophets Amos, Isaiah of Jerusalem, and Hosea is the most enduring conceptual legacy of the Hebrew Bible for the world today. Of course good and evil and admixtures of them can be found among outer-directed persons at all times, including the ancient Hebrews. Riesman’s inner-directed character type emerged historically in the Western world with the advent of ancient Greek philosophy as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle. This character type basically lives in and is oriented by what Ong describes as the world-as-view sense of life. In Ong’s estimate, the world-as-view sense of life was enormously expanded in Western culture by the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s, which had a powerful impact on the development of American culture from colonial times down to the present. Arguably, modern capitalism capitalizes on inner-directed character types,
and so does modern science. Of course good and evil and admixtures of them can be found among inner-directed persons. The other-directed character type is a more recent development in Western culture. With Ong, we can see Martin Buber’s I-thou communication (I.24) as desirable and perhaps as the optimal form of expression of other-directed persons. In conclusion, the central challenge we Americans face today culturally involves learning how to access and actuate the powerful genital stage of psycho-sexual development not just in our personal lives, but also in our social lives. I do not see this challenge as an invitation to engage in orgies or in serial hook ups, both of which have been around for centuries regardless of the character types in the cultures. On the contrary, I see this challenge as calling for deeper and more personal relationships than orgies or serial hook ups typically involve. In short, we should work toward optimally forms of other-directedness involving I-thou communication.

(XII.147b) Rotenstreich, Nathan. On Faith. Ed. with a foreword by Paul Mender-Flohr. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1998. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Caputo (XII.18a); Cox (XII.22a); Critchley (XII.23a); Derrida and Vattimo (XII.26a); Habermas (III.78a); Kristeva (XII.81b); Ong (I.140; I.142); Vattimo (XII.163a); Zizek (XII.173a).


(XII.152a) Shapiro, James, ed. Shakespeare in America: An Anthology from the Revolution to Now. New York: Library of America, 2014. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies; Literary Studies. Also see Bloom (X.6); Kastan (XII.79b); Vollmann (XII.164a).


Gillespie (XII.51); Gregory (XII.57); Ong (II.14: 104-25; II.17); Roy (XII.148); Taylor (X.47).


(XII.163a) Vattimo, Gianni. *Belief.* Trans. Luca D’Isanto and David Webb. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Caputo (XII.18a); Cox (XII.22a); Critchley (XII.23a); Derrida and Vattimo (XII.26a); Habermas (III.78a); Kristeva (XII.81b); Ong (I.140; I.142); Rotenstreich (XII.147b); Zizek (XII.173a).

(XII.163b) Veeder, William. *Mary Shelley and Frankenstein: The Fate of Androgyny.* Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1986. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Benoit (XII.4b); Farrell (XII.37b); Hoeveler (XII.68b); Ong (XII.135).


(XII.164a) Vollmann, William T. *Argall.* New York: Viking Penguin, 2001. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see McLuhan (XII.96); J. Shapiro (XII.152a); Vollmann (I.188a; I.188b; XII.164b). Volume three of the author’s Seven Dreams of North American Landscapes. Written in Elizabethan English, this ambitious historical novel centers on Captain
Samuel Argall (c.1572-1626) and the Jamestown colony, including
the story of Captain John Smith (c.1580-1631) and Pocahontas (c.1595-1617).

Studies; Cultural Studies; Jesuit History. Also see Marchand (XII.93a);
O’Malley (III.131); Vollmann (I.188a; I.188b; XII.164a). Volume two of
the author’s Seven Dreams of North American Landscapes. This massive
historical novel is about the French Jesuit missionaries to New France
(now known as Canada) in North America.

Also see Barry (XII.4a); Bercovitch (XII.5); McLuhan (XII.96); P. Miller
(XII.100); Ong (XII.132; XII.133). Sarah Vowell draws extensively on
John Winthrop’s writings and on Roger Williams’s in discussing the
Massachusetts Bay Colony and related matters. But she devotes the final
pages of her book to discussing President-elect John F. Kennedy’s
“Address Before the Massachusetts General Court of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts” on January 9, 1961. In his speech Kennedy invokes not
only John Winthrop’s famous city on a hill imagery, but also Pericles’s
famous boast that Athens is the model for the rest of the world. So I would
characterize Kennedy as representing what Ong (III.133) discusses as the
Greek position.

Studies; Economic History.

(XII.166) Weedon, Alexis, Jane Roberts, Pamela Robinson, Ian Gadd, Eleanor F.
Shevlin, and Stephen Colclough, eds. *The History of the Book in the West:
Topics: Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Regarding works in
Latin, see Ong’s *Ramus and Talon Inventory* (XII.132) and Lawrence D.
Green and James J. Murphy’s *Renaissance Rhetoric Short-Title Catalogue
1460-1700*. 2nd ed. (XII.55). Studies of book history are emerging with
greater frequency and greater coverage than ever before. Ong liked to say
that we need both proximity (closeness) and distance to understand
something. The recent growth of studies of book history shows our newly
emerging distance from print culture, the cultural matrix out of which
printed books emerged after the emergence of the Gutenberg printing
press in the 1450s. Because the recent growth of studies of book history
shows our cultural the distance from the print culture that emerged from
the Gutenberg printing press, this cultural distance can also double as
evidence that we in Western culture today are being culturally conditioned
by a new cultural matrix, which Ong refers to as secondary oral culture.
But for Ong, secondary orality (i.e., the orality associated with
communication media that accentuate sound such as sound amplification systems, telephones, radio, movies and videos with sound tracks, television, audiotapes) is not primary orality. If Marshall McLuhan’s use of the term “retribalization” in *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (XII.95) is understood to mean a return to what Ong refers to as primary orality, then Ong’s understanding of secondary orality appears to be decidedly different from McLuhan’s understanding of what he styles electric orality. For McLuhan, electric orality is by definition tribal (a term that McLuhan uses but does not carefully define and explain). But for Ong, secondary orality by definition is not primary orality, which means that our contemporary cultural conditioning in our secondary oral culture is not likely to lead to anything seriously approximating retribalization. Nevertheless, our contemporary cultural conditioning in our secondary oral culture may lead to greater psychological and cultural distance from the print culture that emerged after the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. But Ong also hoped that our cultural conditioning in our secondary oral culture would enable us to deepen our understanding of primary oral cultures, so that we in Western culture today might be able to “we” and “us” to people in primary oral cultures and residual forms of primary oral cultures, and to their poetry and the kinds of experiences expressed in their poetry. In this way, Ong was hopeful that our secondary orality in Western culture today would be deeply humanizing for us to experience, or at least potentially deeply humanizing for us to experience. Indeed, Ong saw his own work in cultural history and cultural theory as humanizing.


(XII.168) Wills, Garry. *Head and Heart: American Christianities*. New York: Penguin P, 2007. Topics: American Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Bottum (III.12a); Dorrien (III.40); Jenkins (III.93); Linker (III.111e); Steinfels (III.161a); Worthen (XII.171b).


(XII.169) Wilshire, Bruce. *The Primal Roots of American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2000. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Buell (X.8a; X.8b); Farrell (I.62a); Fixico (II.8); Gelpi (XII.50a); Ong (I.143); D. M. Smith (I.168); Wilshire (I.197).

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Worthen, Molly. *Apostles of Reason: The Crisis of Authority in American Evangelicalism*. New York: Oxford UP, 2013, forthcoming. Topic: Religious Studies; American Studies. Also see Fetzer (III.59); Gelpi (XII.50a); Gore (III.75); Marty (III.118); Miller (XII.100); Ong (XII.132); Rechtien (VII.29; VII.30); Wills (XII.168). By coincidence, Molly Worthen’s main title, *Apostles of Reason*, happens to echo the key term of the subtitle of Ong’s *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (XII.132). Ong basically aligns Ramists and Ramism with the art of reason, as distinct from the art of discourse. In addition, Ong aligns Ramism and Ramists with the hypervisualism induced by print culture after the Gutenberg printing press emerged in the 1450s. For the sake of discussion, let’s say that these basic alignments that Ong makes are essentially correct. As I have pointed out in other annotations, Ong also claims that the contemporary communication media that accentuate sound are conditioning our consciousness on a deep level, thereby engendering a shift in our consciousness. I have likened this deep shift in our consciousness to the shifting of tectonic plates in the earth’s composition. No doubt this deep shift in our consciousness is registering in the consciousness of American Protestant Evangelicals, just as it is registering on the consciousness of all other Americans. In addition, I have argued in other annotations that the prestige culture in American culture has been undergoing a significant historical shift away from the historical dominance of prestige culture in American culture by American Protestants, or white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). I have argued that the election of Senator John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential election was a watershed for the old WASP dominance of prestige culture. As a result of this significant historical shift away from WASP dominance of prestige culture in American culture, American Protestant Evangelicals today now find themselves more or less excluded from cultural respectability in American culture today. In short, they may understandable feel that they are now part of the out-group, whereas their historical American Protestant Evangelical ancestors were indeed truly part of the in-group in WASP-dominated American culture. No doubt both the shifting tectonic plates of our deep consciousness and the shift away from the historical dominance...
of WASPs have contributed to the understandable unease that many contemporary American Protestants Evangelicals feel. In aden, many contemporary American Protestant Evangelicals are leading the charge in what Al Gore characterizes in the title of his book as The Assault of Reason (III.75). But how can it be that the historical descendants of the Ramist apostles of reason are today among the leaders of the assault of reason?


(XII.173a) Zizek, Slavoj. On Belief. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Caputo (XII.18a); Cox (XII.22a); Critchley (XII.23a); Derrida and Vattimo (XII.26a); Habermas (III.78a); Kristeva (XII.81b); Ong (I.140; I.142); Rotensteich (XII.147b); Vattimo (XII.163a).


