

Rethinking the Somali State

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Introduction

Somalia has been a failed state for over two decades and is beginning to fully recover as a nation. Beyond broader developmental issues, Somalia has lagged because it lacked a proper structure of government. Somalia has its fair share of humanitarian issues but this academic research paper is purely focused on developing the Somali state. I acknowledge Somalia has major security issues, but before Somalia can effectual address her security concerns she must iron out her political wrinkles. In *Rethinking the Somali State*, I focus on the process and procedures to achieve political stability by proposing an innovative model for achieving full statehood for Somalia: *Vision 2021*. In addition, I propose policy solutions to help tackle the major issues serving as obstacles to the three goals that were outlaid in the now defunct Vision 2016.

The Somali nation-state, Somalia, has had two republics: (1) the Somali Republic, 1960-1969, and (2) the Somali Democratic Republic, 1969-1991. By the end of 2016, the Somali people and the international community were hoping to create the Somali nation-state's third fully functioning republic through an ambitious plan called *Vision 2016*¹. This plan encompassed three major goals: (a) federalization of Somalia; (b) constitutional revision and a national referendum; and (c) one-person one-vote national election. Though noble, *Vision 2016*'s strategy was not palatable to the realities of Somalia's current political climate and thus

¹ *Vision 2016*'s strategy is being executed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with guidance from United Nations Assistant Mission to Somalia (UNSOM).

was a failure. Not one goal was fully completed. The scheduled presidential election was not even held by the end of 2016.

The Somali state was initially established by an amalgamation of two former colonial territories, *British Somaliland Protectorate* and *Somalia Italiana*, which united in 1960 to create the *Somali Republic*. The birth of the Somali Republic can be traced back to 1950 when the United Nations administered Somalia Italiana for ten years. Upon gaining independence Somalia governed itself under a multi-party system but this democratic experiment abruptly ended after nine short years. In 1969, General Mohamed Siad Bare executed a coup to create the *Somali Democratic Republic* and governed it under a communist system. After twenty-one years of dictatorship, a conglomerate of clan militias overthrew Siad Bare in 1991 leading to the collapse of the state.

There were many attempts to resuscitate the Somali state but all attempts were feeble. Success finally came on September 16, 2012, when former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was democratically elected to head Somalia's first post-transitional government, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), albeit, the FGS is governed by a provisional constitution. On February 8, 2017, President Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmaajo" was elected as Somalia's new head of state for a four-year mandate. The FGS is working on regaining full statehood for Somalia with the *United Nations Assistant Mission to Somalia* (UNSOM) serving as its international guide.

In order to understand and appreciate Somalia's current political climate, and to devise achievable solutions, we must analyze her modern sociopolitical history, beginning with an understanding of the importance of the Somali clan system, followed by an historical analysis of

her colonial history. Additionally, we will thoroughly discuss the Somali Republic's democratic experiment and briefly discuss the communist era of the Somali Democratic Republic.

This historical analysis will provide valuable insights and lessons towards rebuilding a democratic Somali state and will provide a framework for achieving Vision 2021. Vision 2021 is a revised and enhanced version of Vision 2016, and is accompanied by timetables to complete each goal. It provides a bottom-up approach to achieving full statehood for Somalia by the end of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's term in 2021. There are five goals in Vision 2021 and each goal is a building block to achieving full statehood in moderation.

Vision 2021 will accomplish the following goals: (a) regional one-person one-vote elections for all respective Federal Member States; (b) Federal Constitutional Convention for purposes of constitutional revision; (c) national referendum for Somalia's new constitution; (d) establishment of a fully functioning Somali National Army and the withdrawal of the *African Union Mission in Somalia* (AMISOM); and (e) one-person one-vote national election.

Methodology

My research is based on reviewing and analyzing multitudes of academic articles, books, documents and reports concerning Somali affairs, combined with my own academic and personal experience in Somalia. My analysis seeks to clarify procedures and techniques that were successfully implemented to create the Somali state, while identifying problems that accompanied its initial founding.

Rethinking the Somali State critically analyzes the reasons behind Vision 2016's failure and critiques its application. Additionally, it provides historical analysis on successful strategies during Somalia's creation, which can be applied presently during its recreation. My research concludes with policy recommendations to reestablish the Somali state.

I.M. Lewis's research is most referenced because he is the preeminent academic scholar on Somali studies, "he had been one of the pioneering social scientists to chronicle the process of state-building among Somalis from the mid-1950s onwards."² He first visited the Somali territories in 1955 for anthropological research,³ and throughout his life continued to provide valuable and reliable information on Somali studies. I frequently sought his unique insight by evaluating his treasure trove of research on Somali affairs.

The Somali Clan System

As an ethnic Somali, who was born and raised in the United States, I can intimately attest to the importance of the clan. It is the Somalis' social security system, it is the preeminent underlying identifying factor of our existence, it is our way of life, and it must be considered in any political plan. I have had the opportunity to travel to Somalia three times in

² Barnes, Cedrick. [review of the book *Milk and peace, drought and war: Somali culture, society and politics: essays in honour of I. M. Lewis*, by Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Luling]. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 86, No.6, Post-American Iraq (November 2010), pp. 1453.

³ I.M. LEWIS 1930-2014: A GREAT TREE HAS FALLEN. Samater, S. Said. <http://www.wardheernews.com/m-lewis-1930-2014-great-tree-fallen/>

my life, the first trip being *dagaan celis*, or “return to culture.” My parents sent me to Somalia for a summer to learn my native culture intimately. The other two times I visited Somalia was for academic purposes; the University of Minnesota School of Law’s Human Rights Center awarded me the *Upper Midwest Human Rights Fellowship* and the *Robina Human Rights Fellowship*, which allowed me to consider issues on a more academic level.

Through these experiences, and my own upbringing as an ethnic Somali, I have come to conclude that: *to be Somali is to belong to a clan*. In essence, to be Somali is to belong to a clan that other Somali clans regard as belonging to their system, regardless of how big or small that clan is. If one does not belong to a recognized Somali clan, then that person is not technically Somali. As I.M. Lewis observed, “[t]he entire Somali population can be comprised within one vast genealogy recording all the relationships of the numerous patrilineal descent groups into which Somali society is divided . . . Somali society is thus an agnatic lineage society . . .”⁴

There are four major Somali clan confederations, the *Big Four*, (1) Darood, (2) Dir, (3) Hawiye, and (4) Rahaweyn, and a multitude of smaller/minority clans. All ethnic Somalis, regardless of nationality, belong to one of the Big Four or smaller clans. Generally, every clan confederation and its subunits live in defined territories, therefore, clan loyalty is intrinsically tied to land. The Somali clan system is governed by the *Xeer*, Somali customary law.⁵ *Xeer* is the main dispute resolution mechanism used between clans and encompasses legal doctrines

⁴ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland I. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 245-46.

⁵ Van Notten, Michael. The Law of the Somalis. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 2005. Print. pp. 33.

that govern life, liberty, and property.⁶ Clans have figureheads who serve as their ceremonial leaders with lifetime appointments; these appointments are usually hereditary.⁷

The Somali clan system places great importance on elders, “[a]t every level of segmentation it is the elders of the nomadic hamlets who control political relations.”⁸ This explains why the international community have utilized clan elders in the process of electing members of Somalia’s parliament (House of the People), both, in 2012 and 2016. Without authentic democratic elections, clan elders are the most legitimate and representative of Somalia’s society. Due to its paternal and agnatic nature, the Somali clan system does not traditionally empower its womenfolk.

Unlike most African nation-states, Somalia is ethnically homogenous but its clan system serves as its great divider. “African nationalists in most colonial states, because of their multi-ethnic character, did not have the luxury of a ready-made, country-wide local foundation for nationalism.”⁹ Somalis, due to their ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity, were endowed with a more organic form of nationalism when compared to their African counterparts.¹⁰ Somali nationalism does have an Achilles heel, the clan system, therefore its

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.* at 248

⁹ Lewis, I.M. (2004) Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. *Africa* (Edinburgh University Press), Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.490.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

ethnic and cultural homogeneity is “accompanied by a pervasive system of *internal divisions based on the ideology of kindship, and hence invisible . . .*”¹¹

The Somali clan system has its pros and cons, but most experts acknowledge that it has historically hampered the Somali people’s social, economic, and political development. However, if utilized correctly it can be a tool that helps revamp the Somali state. The clan system is omnipresent within the fabric of Somali society and thus must be a variable when devising a political solution.

The Colonial Era

The British and Italians encountered the various Somali clans during their colonial conquest of Africa. Ironically, the Somali clan system assisted the European colonials in their conquest for Somali territories. “[D]espite their sense of cultural identity, they did not constitute a single political unit. Foreign aggression thus encountered not a nation-state, but a congeries of disunited and often hostile clans . . .”¹² In addition to the clan structure, the way in which the British and Italians (and later the UN Trusteeship) governed the northern and southern parts of Somalia, respectively, has had a lasting impact on the development of the Somali state.

British Somaliland Protectorate

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 43.

The British Empire laid claim to northern Somalia, what would become the *British Somaliland Protectorate*, in 1884.¹³ The British were able to negotiate with the various clans that resided in the area due to their fear of Abyssinian (i.e. Ethiopian) expansion; the Brits had signed treaty agreements with the Gadabuursi, Isaaq, Issa and Warsangeli clans.¹⁴ The quiddity of the treaties stipulated that “the members of the tribal sections represented became ‘British Protected persons’, and in their lands (still to be defined) Britain was recognized, in return, as the paramount power even while ultimate sovereignty and ownership remained vested in the tribes . . . Legally, Somaliland was never a colony.”¹⁵

In 1899, a Somali anti-colonial movement known as the *Dervish* arose from the Protectorate led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan.¹⁶ The conflict between the Dervishes and the British would last for two decades, ending with the defeat of Abdille Hassan in 1920.¹⁷ After the defeat of the Dervishes, the British began to enhance their administrative capacity and infrastructural development in the Protectorate.¹⁸ “It is only since the destruction of the Mad Mullah [Abdille Hassan] in 1920 that the country [Protectorate] has had any real chance of

¹³ Millman, Brock. *British Somaliland: An Administrative History, 1920-1960*. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print. pp. 15

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.* at 16.

¹⁶ Lewis, I.M. *A Modern History of the Somali*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 68-69.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* at 80.

¹⁸ Kittermaster, H.B. (Jul., 1928). *British Somaliland*. *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 27, No. 108, pp. 335-337

progressing.”¹⁹ Some of the projects the British initiated were road construction from the coastal area to the hinterland, medical services, schooling, drilling water wells and providing veterinarian services to facilitate the pastoral economy of the nomadic population.²⁰

World War II brought conflict to the Horn of Africa, where the British and Italian empires fought for supremacy of the region. Mussolini captured the British Somaliland Protectorate in August 1940 and incorporated it into the Italian East African Empire, which also included Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia Italiana.²¹ After seven months, the British recaptured the Protectorate, liberated Ethiopia from Mussolini’s grips, and captured Somalia Italiana.²² The British now had control of both British Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia Italiana, and governed the respective territories under a British Military Administration.²³ The British governed Somalia Italiana until 1949, when it handed it over to the UN Trusteeship, keeping Somaliland as a Protectorate.²⁴

The sociopolitical development under the British Somaliland Protectorate was not as intensive and sophisticated as in Somalia Italiana under the new UN Trusteeship.²⁵ The British

¹⁹ *Ibid.* at 335.

²⁰ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 104.

²¹ *Ibid.* at 116.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.* at 116-17.

²⁴ *Ibid.* at 128.

²⁵ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 352.

did not have a policy of granting the Protectorate independence until December 1958.²⁶ This is the reason why the Protectorate's Somalization programs were initiated much later than Somalia Italiana's, whose independence was decided in 1949. "According to J.H.A. Watson (Foreign Office), it was impossible to maintain British rule over Somaliland once Somalia became independent. There was an urgent need, he argued, for a rapid devolution of power to the Protectorate . . . Somaliland was to be granted its independence in 1960, which would coincide with the date of independence of the Trusteeship Territory [Somalia Italiana]."²⁷

The first democratic election took place in February 1960, four months prior to independence, for the Protectorate's Legislative Council.²⁸ The two main political parties of the Protectorate were the *Somaliland National League* (SNL) and the *United Somali Party* (USP).²⁹ The initial political platform of the SNL did not promote unity with Somalia Italiana, but rather advocated for the Protectorate to be its own country, a "policy of independence within the Commonwealth."³⁰ In addition, it was representative of the Isaaq clan centered around Hargeisa, Berbera, and Burco.³¹ The political platform for the USP was for the Protectorate to

²⁶ Mohamed, Jama (2002). Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The Decolonization of Somaliland. *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 117, No. 474, pp. 1198.

²⁷ *Ibid.* at 1998-99

²⁸ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa's First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 30.

²⁹ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 347.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. *Africa (Edinburgh University Press)*. 2004, Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.499

merge with Somalia Italiana to form the Somali Republic. It was representative of the Gadabuursi, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli clans, respectively centered around Borama, Las Anod, and Las Qoray.³²

Women were not offered suffrage in this election, which caused concern for the British in the Protectorate.³³ Sir Douglas Hall, late Governor of the Protectorate, explained, “One of our main worries was how the women would behave. They had no vote, but they were surprisingly politically-conscious, and there is nothing that an administrator dislikes more than a riot of women. However, the Somalis themselves decided that the election should be orderly, and it was. There were no incidents worthy of the name and for the whole of February 17th not a woman was to be seen.”³⁴

There were one-hundred and fifty polling stations, and an estimated 82,000 males casted their votes (80%-90% voter participation rate).³⁵ The SNL won twenty of the Legislative Council’s thirty-three available seats, with the USP coming in second place gaining twelve seats.³⁶ Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal, who led the SNL, became the “Leader of Government Business” of the Legislative Council, in essence its president.³⁷ Somalization also followed with all six districts of the Protectorate “in the direct charge of Somali officials.”³⁸

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Hall, Douglas (1961). Somaliland’s Last Year as a Protectorate. *African Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 238, pp. 7.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 153-54.


³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

To facilitate its newfound policy of granting the Protectorate independence, the British hosted a constitutional conference in London on May 2, 1960, in which the Protectorate's delegation was led by Igal.³⁹ The conference concluded on May 12, and "ended with the signing of a report by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, which formally specified the date of independence of Somaliland (26 June 1960), and its union with Somalia (1 July 1960)."⁴⁰

Somalia Italiana and the United Nations Trusteeship

The British colonized northern Somalia while the Italians colonized the southern part. *Somalia Italiana*, Italy's colony, was first established in 1882 "when the Sultan of Zanzibar ceded the ports of Brava, Merca, [and] Mogadishu . . ."⁴¹ In 1899, the Italians extended their sphere of influence by signing treaties with the leaders of the Majarrean clan: Sultan of Hobyo and Sultan of Majarreeria.⁴² Somalia Italiana's territorial confines would further be expanded when the British gave the Italians the far-south Somali city of Kismayo.⁴³



³⁹ *Ibid.* at 1200

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 51.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Reece, Gerald (1954). The Horn of Africa. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 30, No.4, pp. 443

Somalia Italiana was peaceful and for the most part the local Somalis did not rebel like the Dervish in the north. “A large subsidy came from Rome and . . . Somalis got a good deal of work which made them fairly well disposed towards the Italian administration. The desert folk were not interfered with very much and, as is their custom, they kept as far away from officials, troops, and police as they could. The Italians were very actively engaged on the making of roads and the erection of buildings.”⁴⁴ Italy would continue to govern Somalia Italiana until Italy’s defeat in World War II.

After the Allies emerged victorious in World War II, one of the many issues they had to solve was what to do with Italy’s colonial possessions. The Allies decided that Somalia Italiana’s fate would be decided by the newly established United Nations.⁴⁵ The UN General Assembly in 1949 agreed that Somalia Italiana would be placed under a United Nations Trusteeship, which came under a British protectorate at the time of Italy’s defeat, administered by Italy in which “Italian Somalia has to be recognized as an independent state in ten years . . .”⁴⁶

The Trusteeship agreement officially commenced on April 1, 1950 and sought to gradually prepare Somalis for self-governance and eventual independence in 1960.⁴⁷ In order to accomplish this goal within a decade’s time “the agreement put special emphasis on the education system, which was considered ‘the best instrument for promoting the social,

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* at 444

⁴⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 19.

⁴⁶ UN Resolution 289, 21 November 1949.

⁴⁷ Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 360.

economic, political and moral progress of the population of the territory.”⁴⁸ In addition to giving the Italians administrative duties, the UN had its own Advisory Council based in Mogadishu to observe the developments towards Somali independence.

Amongst the accomplishments of the Trusteeship, the most notable highlights were the four democratic elections that took place. In 1954, the first municipal elections were conducted, followed by the first national legislative elections in 1956.⁴⁹ In 1958 and 1959, the second municipal and national legislative elections occurred, respectively.⁵⁰ Prior to colonialism and national independence, Somali sociopolitical structures were solely based on paternal kinship ties (i.e. clans) managed and organized around the *Xeer* (customary law), therefore making Somali society “quintessentially stateless.”⁵¹ With the advent of the Trusteeship, Somalis began to organize themselves politically through parties, although these political parties still maintained strong paternal kingship ties.⁵² In actuality, clan relationships played an important part in the Somali people’s democratic experiment throughout the Trusteeship era. “Clan division appears to be the most evident and major partition of Somali society . . . The SYL

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Lewis, I.M. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. *The World Today*, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 290-91.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 365.

⁵² Ware, Gilbert (1965). From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960. *Phylon*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1965), pp. 175-76.

[Somali Youth League], the strongest declared pan-Somali movement in this period, had political supremacy but did not manage to eliminate clannism from political competition.”⁵³

Somalis first tasted electoral democracy with municipal elections in March 1954, although only males were allowed to vote. Since Somali society was quintessentially stateless, the “inexperience of the political parties with modern electoral systems and the political immaturity of the masses persuaded the United Nations and the Administering Authority to extend gradually the suffrage in Somalia.”⁵⁴ Sixteen political parties partook in the 1954 elections, but only two parties emerged as authentic political vanguards. The two parties were the *Somali Youth League* (SYL) and the *Hizbia Digil-Mirifleh* (HDM); of the two-hundred and eighty-one seats available, the SYL won one-hundred and forty-two and the HDM won fifty-seven.⁵⁵ The results effectively made the SYL the “ruling party” while the HDM served as the “opposition party.” It should be noted that the HDM’s political and economic platform propagated that Somalia should be a federal state, in effect making them the first Somali proponents of federalism.⁵⁶ These elections were deemed successful and highly participatory

⁵³ Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 361-65.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* at 177.

⁵⁵ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 352.

⁵⁶ Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 365.

with more than 75% of registered voters partaking.⁵⁷ Part of its success is owed to the census that was conducted prior to the 1954 elections, in which thirty-five towns and villages participated.⁵⁸

Following the elections, the Administering Authority presented a “series of Seven-Year Development Plans for the period 1954-1960 . . .”⁵⁹ and its purpose was “evaluating the country’s economic improvement.”⁶⁰ Another post-election development was the introduction of the Somali national flag, which was “presented to the UN mission in Somalia in September 1954.”⁶¹ The last major task for the Administering Authority was to lay the ground work for the 1956 general elections for the Legislative Assembly.

Like the 1954 elections, the first general legislative elections were restricted to male voters who were twenty-one and older.⁶² Sixty seats were available to Somalis, while ten seats were designated for minority communities: Italians, Arabs, Indians, and Pakistanis.⁶³ Of the

⁵⁷ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 374.

⁵⁸ Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 372.

⁵⁹ Lewis, I.M. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. *The World Today*, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 292.

⁶⁰ Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 376.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* at 378.

⁶² Lewis, I.M. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. *The World Today*, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 290.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

sixty available seats, the SYL won forty-three while the HDM won thirteen.⁶⁴ The SYL's leader, Aden A. Osman, became the President of the Legislative Assembly;⁶⁵ he would later become the first president of an independent Somalia. That year also marked the *Somalization* of the Trusteeship territory, with the Legislative Assembly in majoritarian hands of Somalis as well as all Provincial and District Commissioners.⁶⁶ A milestone had been achieved with the advent of elections for the municipalities and Legislative Assembly. "Throughout the trusteeship years, the United Nations called not only for the training of Somalis for governmental posts but also for *Somalization*, that is, wider participation by Somalis in the governmental process."⁶⁷

The 1958 municipal elections were the first *truly* democratic elections because Somali women were finally allowed to vote, which resulted in 85.5% of registered voters voting.⁶⁸ Somali women did not shy away from the ballot box, "despite all predictions to the contrary and despite the male bias of traditional Muslim society, [Somali women] showed great interest."⁶⁹ In addition to woman suffrage, the voting age was lowered to eighteen years, which resulted in an increase of the voter registrar, with 156,636 voters in the 1958 elections

⁶⁴ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 352.

⁶⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa's First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 29.

⁶⁶ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 356.

⁶⁷ Ware, Gilbert (1965). From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960. *Phylon*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1965), pp. 180. (emphasis added).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* at 178.

⁶⁹ Lewis, I.M. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. *The World Today*, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 290.

compared to the 50,740 in the 1954 elections.⁷⁰ The last elections of the Trusteeship took place in 1959 for the Legislative Assembly.⁷¹ These four elections prepared the Trusteeship territory for independence, and would set the foundation for Somalia's political structure.

Electoral democracy was now firmly embedded in the Somali sociopolitical culture. Since the Italians were the Administrative Authority of the Trusteeship, they introduced a form of governance which was "copied from the Italian political model," but in reality, it "could not manage the dynamics of the clan system effectively."⁷² The foundation of Somali society is based on clan relations, and the Italian democratic system, which was imported to the Somalis, was "not respectful of the Somali traditional structure, Italy promoted the adoption of a form of state inappropriate to the Somali people."⁷³ This inappropriate political structure of Somali society would play a detrimental role in the Somali Republic, and even today hinders the emergence of a politically stable Federal Government of Somalia (the FGS currently uses this same Italian-imported structure). Even the fall of the Somali state can be partially blamed on the un-Somali political foundation of the country. As Basil observed: "Somali society has torn itself in pieces, not only because the institutions set in place in 1960 gave play to the rivalries of

⁷⁰ Ware, Gilbert (1965). From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960. *Phylon*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1965), pp. 180.

⁷¹ Lewis, I.M. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. *The World Today*, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 291.

⁷² Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 379.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

clan-structured society, but, worse, impelled these rivalries with new methods and resources.”⁷⁴

Colonial Era Summation

The British and Italians differed in their process of colonizing their respective territories in Somalia. The Italians under the UN Trusteeship prepared their territory for independence starting in 1950, while the British did not even consider notions of independence until the very end of 1958. The British rushed through their process of self-governance and Somalization within four months, while the Italians gradually implemented their process from 1954 until eventual independence in 1960.

When Somalia Italiana (southern Somalia) and the British Somaliland Protectorate (northern Somalia) merged to form the Somali Republic, southern Somalia was better prepared and thus more influential. The national capital became Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia Italiana, and the Somali Republic’s form of governance was modeled after Italy. Additionally, the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the House of the newly independent Somali Republic all hailed from the south.

Somali Republic (1960-1969)

The Somali Republic is unique amongst its African nation-state peers because its territorial confines were not drawn by Europeans, but rather by Somalis who united two

⁷⁴ Davidson, Basil, *The Search for Africa* (London, 1994), 284-85.

colonial territories to create an African nation-state whose jurisdiction was not identical to the original colonial lines. In April 1960, the political leaders of the Protectorate and Trusteeship “agreed to the speedy unification of the two Somali territories.”⁷⁵ The Protectorate received independence on June 26, 1960 while the Trusteeship received it on July 1, 1960. Somali Independence Day is therefore officially celebrated on June 26th, while its Republic’s Day is celebrated on July 1st.

Prior to independence of the two Somali territories, leaders from the Trusteeship sent the draft constitution for the Somali Republic to the leaders of the Protectorate; except for the addition of one article, leaders of the Protectorate accepted the draft constitution in totality.⁷⁶ Upon independence, “[t]he first act of the unified Northern [British Somaliland Protectorate] and Southern [Somalia Italiana] parliaments was the approval of the Union Act by acclamation.”⁷⁷

Somali studies scholar, I.M. Lewis, observed that “[t]o appreciate the full import of this immediate consequence of union it is necessary to realize that, despite the patriotic fervor which acclaimed the formation of the Republic, the most all-pervasive element in politics remained the loyalty of the individual to his kin and clan.”⁷⁸ He would further add that clan “remained the most pervasive, the most commanding, and above all the most insidious. No other single line of communication and common interest connected so directly and

⁷⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 30.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* at 31.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 166.

incontrovertibly the pastoral nomad in the interior with his kinsmen in the civil service, in the National Assembly, or in the cabinet itself. No other bond of mutual interest had so many far-reaching ramification in all aspects of private and public life.”⁷⁹

In addition to clan ties, dual-colonial identity hampered the integration of the two halves, north-south axis, of the Somali Republic. The northern half’s legal, administrative, and political system was based on British traditions, while the southern half’s on Italian traditions. Also, political and economic power became concentrated in the south, since Mogadishu served as the capital of the Republic and seat of the National Assembly. Due to southern domination of the Republic, northerners, especially those with ties to the SNL, felt unfairly cheated in the dispensation of national power because “[t]he north sacrificed more than the south” for the sake of unity.⁸⁰ As we will observe shortly, this almost led to the demise of the nascent Somali Republic.

After voting on the Union Act, all 123 members of the united Somali national assembly (90 seats for the south and 33 for the north) voted for Aden Abdillah Osman to be the transitional president of the new Republic until the 1961 constitutional referendum.⁸¹ The SYL leader, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, was tapped by Somalia’s President to become the Republic’s prime minister.⁸² The transitional government had a one year mandate, in which its two major

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* at 172

⁸¹ Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 392-93

⁸² Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 32

goals were integrating the northern and southern halves of the country and hosting a national referendum on its provisional constitution.⁸³

The constitutional referendum, which was held on June 20th, 1961, was considered a test of confidence for the new Republic and its transitional leaders.⁸⁴ In the north, the SNL boycotted the referendum and of the 100,000 recorded votes half voted against it.⁸⁵ As observed “the major opposition turned out to be from the central part of the Northern region [Hargeisa-Berbera-Burco triangle].”⁸⁶ Nonetheless, the constitution garnered enough national votes and the referendum was considered to be “overwhelmingly free and fair.”⁸⁷ On July 6th, 1961, after three ballots, Somalia’s national assembly voted for Aden Abdillah Osman to become the country’s president. In return, President Osman reappointed Shamarke to be the country’s prime minister.⁸⁸ The Prime Minister’s governing coalition contained cabinet members from the SYL, SNL, and USP⁸⁹, but within months, the new administration would face a national problem.

As aforementioned, northern Somalis with ties to the SNL were not happy with the political and economic distribution of power in the new Somali Republic and in December 1961,

⁸³ *Ibid.* at 33

⁸⁴ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 172

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 34

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* at 35

⁸⁸ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 172-73

⁸⁹ Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 393

rogue officers from the north tried to stage a coup.⁹⁰ During the Protectorate era, the SNL's original political platform was for the north to be its own nation-state under the British Commonwealth; it would later change its platform to resemble the USP's and SYL's unionist stance.⁹¹ The goal of the failed coup was to make the north secede from Somalia proper. I.M. Lewis states that "the real object of the revolt, no doubt strongly sympathized with, if not directly aided and abetted, by elements within the SNL, was to break with the south and destroy the Republic."⁹² Loyal soldiers and police quickly arrested the ring-leaders of the failed coup, quelled the unrest, and a year later, the Sandhurst-trained officers were tried in a court of law.⁹³

The next few years of the Republic were focused on harmonizing the north-south tension of Somalia. The Somali government understood that more attention needed to be given to the north and the Administration implemented new development and industrial projects for it.⁹⁴ In addition, the Administration focused its national efforts towards "reintegration and reform of the civil service; finding a major power to train and arm the Somali military; and development planning."⁹⁵ It wasn't until the end of 1963 that both halves of the Somali Republic would be legally and administratively integrated.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 347.

⁹² Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 174

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* at 175

⁹⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa's First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 37

The next major goal for the administration was to host the general elections of 1964, but the Republic would face a national crisis prior to it. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia had been brewing since prior to independence because of a border dispute, and in early 1964 all-out war erupted between the two nations when Ethiopia unilaterally attacked Somali territory.⁹⁷ Somalia held its general elections for its national assembly on March 30th, 1964.⁹⁸ Prime Minister Abdirashid famously addressed the nation by stating that, “We will vote with one hand and fight with the other.”⁹⁹ The first Somali-Ethiopian war ended with mediation from Sudan.¹⁰⁰

The 1964 elections witnessed the demise of the SNL and USP, and the entrance of two new political alliances, the Somali National Congress (SNC) and the Somali Democratic Union (SDU).¹⁰¹ By now, northern disgruntlement had been assuaged, and these new political alliances “signified the collapse of the northern-southern regional axis, and indicated the common commitment of all the political leaders to the Republic as a unitary state.”¹⁰² The SYL triumphantly won that election by gaining sixty-nine of the 123 seats, the SNC and SDU would garner twenty-two and fifteen seats, respectively, while the HDMS garnered nine seats (the

⁹⁶ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 178

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 201

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 46

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 394

¹⁰² *Ibid.* at 395

remaining eight seats went to others).¹⁰³ As noted, “the manner in which the elections were conducted, and the extent to which opposition parties participated in them, reaffirmed the Republic’s continuing commitment to the principles of parliamentary democracy.”¹⁰⁴

President Osman was reelected and he appointed Abdirazak H. Hussein as his prime minister.¹⁰⁵ Premier Hussein was known as a reformist and a “politician of considerable personal charisma and courage.”¹⁰⁶ His main objectives were “public service reform; corruption; and preparation for the next presidential election.”¹⁰⁷ His tenure as premier is known for curbing corruption, which had become a major problem in the nascent Somali Republic.

One element of the Premier’s reform agenda was the establishment of the Public Service Commission, which was “given the task of reviewing all promotions and demotions of civil servants.”¹⁰⁸ This would eventually lead to three ministers as well as other civil servants being dismissed; the reform agenda targeted three types of employees, “the corrupt, the incompetent, and individuals engaged in leaking national security information.”¹⁰⁹ Another bold reform agenda of Premier Hussein was having all his cabinet members declare and register

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 201

¹⁰⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 48

¹⁰⁶ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 202

¹⁰⁷ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 48-49

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* at 53

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* at 52-54

their assets.¹¹⁰ These reforms would later haunt, both, the President and his Prime Minister, when the 1967 general elections came around. Members of Parliament were not fond of Premier Hussein's new style of *good governance*.¹¹¹

Even though incumbent President Osman had the official endorsement of his SYL party¹¹², former Premier Sharmarke, who also a member of the SYL, was able to mobilize the national assembly to vote him in as the new president of the Somali Republic.¹¹³ The president-elect would in turn nominate Haji Ibrahim Egal as his prime minister; this was the first time in the Republic's history that a northerner was given the premiership.¹¹⁴

Somali-American scholars Ahmed and Abdi Samatar have stated that the Osman-Hussein government should be held in high regard, in terms of governance, due to their "combined contributions as exemplary of what courageous and noble spirit mean. Their clairvoyance to discern what was imperative for a different and more enabling future, coupled with a resolute belief in the necessity of constitutional practice to the making of a mature political community, are inspiring for Somali and African time, desperate for both."¹¹⁵ More importantly, President Osman and Premier Hussein's acceptance of defeat, and handing over

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* at 53

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* at 54-55

¹¹² *Ibid.* at 56

¹¹³ Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 396

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa's First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 60

the keys of the state to their electoral opponents, made them “Africa’s first genuine modern democrats . . .”¹¹⁶

The 1967 elections would serve as a major turning point for the Somali Republic, and its demise would soon follow after two years. With the reformists gone and Sharmarke and Egal back in power, clan ties became more apparent. These problems peaked during the subsequent 1969 elections, a total of 1002 candidates, representing sixty-two political parties, the majority being clan-based parties, contested these elections.¹¹⁷ As usual, the SYL won the overwhelming majority of the seats (seventy-three), and once again President Sharmarke and Premier Egal became head of the state and government, respectively. The Somali populace believed the government rigged the elections or that many irregularities took place.¹¹⁸ As observed, “official corruption and nepotism [i.e. clannism] seemed to be flourishing on a scale hitherto unknown in the Republic . . . The National Assembly was no longer the symbol of free speech and fair play for all citizens. On the contrary, it had been turned into a sordid market-place where deputies traded their votes for personal rewards with scant regard for the interest of their constituents.”¹¹⁹ Between January 1969 and October 1969, £500,000 (758, 000 USD) were given to various members of the National Assembly.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* at 6-7

¹¹⁷ Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 397

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* at 399

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Payton, Gary. The Somali Coup of 1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp. 501

Under these scathing conditions, a national tragedy transpired that derailed Somalia's democratic experiment. On October 15, 1969, President Sharmarke was assassinated by one of his guards, and on the morning of October 21, the Somali military executed a coup d'état.¹²¹ "The National Assembly was closed, political parties were declared illegal, and it was announced that the state would be governed by a Supreme Revolutionary Council."¹²²

Somali Democratic Republic (1969-1991)

The Commander of the Army, General Mohamed Siad Bare, became the President of the country, and following communist lexicon, renamed it the *Somali Democratic Republic*.¹²³ Scientific Socialism became the new ideology of the Somali state, and through it the vestiges of clannism and corruption were, purportedly, buried.¹²⁴ Like other communist countries, President Bare developed a pervasive security apparatus known as the National Security Service, and its function was to be the "long and strong arm of the state, with unlimited power to search, detain, and even torture and kill suspected dissidents."¹²⁵

¹²¹ Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 400

¹²² *Ibid.* at 399

¹²³ *Ibid.* at 401

¹²⁴ Lewis, I.M. The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism. *African Affairs*, Vol. 88 No. 353 (Oct. 1989), pp. 573

¹²⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I. Underdevelopment in Somalia: Dictatorship without Hegemony. *Africa Today*, Vol. 32, No. 3 *Somalia: Crises of State and Society* (3rd Qtr., 1985), pp. 28

Somalis initially welcomed the military takeover of the state due to the corrupt and nepotistic nature of its democratic experiment. “In the view of the most disillusioned critics, democracy had lapsed into commercialized anarchy, and strong rule of a new type was desperately needed if the state was to be rescued from its present morass of poverty, insecurity, and inefficiency, and set on the road to progress.”¹²⁶

President Bare focused on developing Somalia’s infrastructure, economy, and its human capacity. His greatest feat of developing Somalia’s human capacity is arguably developing orthography for the Somali language; prior to 1972, the language was purely oral. He chose the Roman script for the Somali language, and would launch “intensive nation-wide urban and rural literacy campaigns in 1973 and 1974.”¹²⁷

Since two-thirds of Somalia’s economy was based on “the rural sector (pastoral, agriculture, and fisheries),” another development objective of his was “the control of animal disease; the extension of agricultural crash programs; and an improvement of food grain production and marketing . . .”¹²⁸ His development of the industrial sub-sector was somewhat fruitful, “public establishments grew from fourteen in 1970 to forty-six in 1974.”¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 400

¹²⁷ Lewis, I.M. The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism. *African Affairs*, Vol. 88 No. 353 (Oct. 1989), pp. 574

¹²⁸ Samatar, Ahmed I. Underdevelopment in Somalia: Dictatorship without Hegemony. *Africa Today*, Vol. 32, No. 3 *Somalia: Crises of State and Society* (3rd Qtr., 1985), pp. 32.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* at 33.

Even though President Bare espoused the ideology of socialism, he still relied on Somalia's traditional sociopolitical structure, clan ties, to rule. His inner power circle was dubbed the "MOD clique," in which the M represented his clan, the O represented his mother's clan (i.e. his maternal clan ties), and the D represented the clan of his son-in-law, who controlled security affairs.¹³⁰ Until Somalia's defeat in the 1978 Ogaden War, President Bare was able to govern and rule Somalia through the delicate balance of a "two-dimensional political structure, with clandestine clan politics at the core and surface socialist nationalism for everyone else. . . ."¹³¹

Somalia and Ethiopia fought an intensive war from 1977-78 over the Somali inhabited region in eastern Ethiopia: The Ogaden (also referred to as *Western Somalia*). Ethiopia had gained possession of this Somali territory via a treaty with Britain in 1954.¹³² Overtime, a Somali liberation movement with intentions of freeing its territory from Ethiopian rule emerged, the *Western Somali Liberation Front* (WSLF). "Following successful risings against Ethiopian rule in neighbouring provinces by allies of the Somalis, the forces of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), aided by troops from Somalia, began in the summer of 1977 to push the Ethiopians out of the Ogaden. The Somali victory was, however, short-lived. The conflict triggered a seismic shift in super power alignments in the Horn of Africa with the

¹³⁰ Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. *Africa* (Edinburgh University Press). 2004, Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.501

¹³¹ *Ibid.* at 502

¹³² Brown, Latham D.J. The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1956), pp. 259

Russians turning to support the Ethiopians and enabling them to regain control of the Ogaden.”¹³³

Bare’s military junta suffered major losses after this war which resulted in “widespread public demoralization and to an upsurge of ‘tribalism,’” and lead to disgruntled military officers attempting a failed coup in April 1978.¹³⁴ Those who were able to escape would later form the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somalia’s first armed-opposition group with intentions of overthrowing President Bare.¹³⁵ Years later, additional armed-opposition groups would be formed to help oust President Bare, most notably the Somali National Movement (SNM) and United Somali Congress (USC).¹³⁶ These factions did not differ in politics per se, but were just armed guerilla rebels of their respective clans.

These armed factions, amongst others, justified their rebellion against Bare’s regime due to his “mismanaging the Ogaden war; sending members of tribes other than his own to die in the Ogaden war; nepotism; tribalism; ‘fascist rule’; running ‘an absolute and despotic dictatorship’; [and] the ‘undermining of the faith and Islamic way of life of the Somali people . . .

¹³³ Lewis, I.M. The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism. *African Affairs*, Vol. 88 No. 353 (Oct. 1989), pp. 574-75.

¹³⁴ Lewis, I.M. The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism. *African Affairs*, Vol. 88 No. 353 (Oct. 1989), pp. 575

¹³⁵ Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. *Africa* (Edinburgh University Press). 2004, Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.503

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

. .”¹³⁷ These armed factions would eventually succeed, and President Bare vacated *Villa Somalia* (the Presidential Palace) in January 1991. His final overthrow “was achieved through the clan-based militias and guerilla organizations.”¹³⁸ Subsequently, the Somali state collapsed and its failed state status would remain intact for the next two decades.

Siad Bare’s dictatorship was seen by many in Somalia as treating the Darood clan as first-class citizens, while treating the rest as second. This helped sow the seed of discontentment amongst Somalis. “The only substantial difference, now, was that the volatile relations between these clan units across the whole country had been raised to a fever pitch by the experience of Darod (particularly Marehan) hegemony and oppression, and the bitter fighting which, with modern weapons, wrought death and destruction on an unprecedented scale.”¹³⁹

Somalia as a Failed State

After the fall of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1991, the Somali state broke down into a triadic structure (see map¹⁴⁰). The SNM took control of northern Somalia, the SSDF took

¹³⁷ Ododa, Harry. Somalia’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations. *Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21. No. 3 (Jul., 1985), 295

¹³⁸ Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradigm. *Vol. 74 Issue 4*, pp.504

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ The Economist.



control of eastern Somalia, and the USC took control of southcentral Somalia.¹⁴¹ The SNM unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in May 18 1991, claiming jurisdiction of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.¹⁴² The SNM named their secessionist entity the Republic of Somaliland, but it is unrecognized by the world community.¹⁴³ The SSDF pursued a path of autonomy, calling their territory Puntland on May 5 1998, and saying it desires “to be the cornerstone of a future federal Somalia.”¹⁴⁴ Southcentral Somalia, and most importantly Mogadishu, became a violent and lawless area due to warlordism.¹⁴⁵ Mogadishu, once known as the “Pearl of the Indian Ocean,” during the 1990s became a “chaotic graveyard.”¹⁴⁶

Somaliland

Northern Somalia is currently administered by an armed secessionist movement, “Somaliland”, wanting to secede from Somalia, but it should be highlighted that sizable populations in the north adhere to the belief in a united Somalia. It is not farfetched to say that Somaliland, and its secessionist ideology, is an existential



¹⁴¹ Duffield, Andrew Scott. When Do Rebels Become State-Builders?: A Comparative Case Study of Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 13, pp. 1

¹⁴² *Ibid.* at 6.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* at 4.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* at 9.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* at 15

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* at 16

threat to Somalia. What the *Republic of Biafra* was to Nigeria is what the *Republic of Somaliland* is to Somalia.

The secessionist Republic of Somaliland is the brain child of the rebel group *Somali National Movement* (SNM), which politically represented the Isaaq clan.¹⁴⁷ After Siad Bare's fall in January 1991, the SNM's first provocative move was to attack and disarm the Gadabuursi clan that reside in the Awdal province. The SNM conducted a "full-scale assault on Borama [largest city in Awdal] on February 5, and armed operations in Zeila [coastal city in Awdal] later in the month."¹⁴⁸ The people of Awdal have been under secessionist occupation since that attack in 1991. Later in 2007, Somaliland's military attacked the eastern territories incorporating Las Anod into its secessionist entity.

Many experts view Somaliland through a narrow lens, often citing that it is democratic, "The Republic of Somaliland, the secessionist northwestern slice of Somalia that declared independence in 1991, has a far better democratic track record than any of its neighbors . . ."¹⁴⁹ Though Somaliland's progress is commendable, its political motives are more sinister.

Historically, the Isaaq have a sociopolitical ideology of *clan supremacy*. Though belonging to the Somali clan confederation of *Dir*, the Isaaq have dismissed this. "The Ishaq [Isaaq] are classified by other Somali as Dir, but themselves deny this grouping, claiming that they are a clan-family of Arabian descent in their own right and without the intermediacy of

¹⁴⁷ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 266.

¹⁴⁸ Lidwien Kapteljns. Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Reinous Legacy of 1991. pp.158.

¹⁴⁹ Kaplan, Seth (2008). The Remarkable Story of Somaliland. *Journal of Democracy, Volume 19, Number 3*, pp. 143.

other Somali ancestors.”¹⁵⁰ During British colonialism, “the Isaq [Isaaq] refused to be called Africans, or even Somali . . .,”¹⁵¹ and when British authorities tried to administer a poll-tax on them as Somalis “the Isaq [Isaaq] rejected their passes because they were described as Somalis, whereas they now called themselves Sharif Isaq Arabs.”¹⁵² When the Somaliland National League (SNL) was first created, its political platform did not initially advocate for unity with other Somalis, but rather for the Protectorate to be its own nation.¹⁵³ When the Somali Republic held its constitutional referendum in 1961, it was the SNL that boycotted it, and it was their respective cities (Hargeisa, Berbera, and Burco) that voted against it.¹⁵⁴ To add insult to injury, it was SNL supporters who planned the failed coup of 1961. Again, “the real object of the revolt, no doubt strongly sympathized with, if not directly aided and abetted, by elements within the SNL, was to break with the south and destroy the Republic.” Lastly, in May 1991, the Somali National Movement unilaterally declared secession from Somalia, completing the task their SNL forefathers could not in 1961. Their historical overlying sociopolitical theme cannot be denied, Somaliland’s *raison d’être* for secession is based on clan supremacy.

¹⁵⁰ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland I. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 245.


¹⁵¹ Turton, E.R. (1974). The Isaq Somali Diaspora and Poll-Tax Agitation in Kenya, 1936-41. *African Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 292, pp. 327.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* at 340

¹⁵³ Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 347.

¹⁵⁴ Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 2, pp. 34

Not everyone in northern Somalia shares this view, however. The clans that were represented by the colonial era *United Somali Party* (USP) still desire to be part of Somalia proper, and have started minor rebellions in the north (see map: lighter area represents unionists).¹⁵⁵



Puntland State of Somalia

The Puntland State of Somalia, located in the north-eastern part of former Somalia Italiana, is the brainchild of the *Somali Salvation Democratic Front* (SSDF).¹⁵⁶ Puntland is a union of clans under the Darood,¹⁵⁷ most notably the Majeerteen sub-clan.¹⁵⁸ The SSDF were Somali unionists and “there was never apparently any suggestion of decisively breaking from Somalia, as Somaliland had done.”¹⁵⁹

The SSDF encountered some hurdles between 1991-98 before officially creating Puntland. Bare’s fall resulted in a political vacuum and gave way to numerous security

¹⁵⁵ United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, *Report on Somalia*, S/2014/726 (13 October 2014), available from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* at 10.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Lewis, I.M. *A Modern History of the Somali*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 286-87.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* at 287.

threats.¹⁶⁰ The most notable threat came from the United Somali Congress (USC) based in southcentral Somalia, “the S.S.D.F. found itself defending its traditional grazing rights in Mudug region against the determined efforts of ‘Aideed’s Habar Gidir Sa’ad militia, who were bidding fair to become a general scourge of the whole country.”¹⁶¹ This particular conflict ended in 1993 when Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf, commander of the SSDF, and General Aideed of the USC, signed the *Mudug Peace Agreement*.¹⁶²

By 1998, the SSDF, along with their respective clan elders, “established the new ‘Puntland state of Somalia’ as an autonomous local entity, with [Abdulahi Yusuf] as its first elected President . . .”¹⁶³ Since 1998, Puntland has successfully conducted five presidential elections, in which their parliamentarians are elected via a clan formula similar to how Somalia’s House of the People was elected in 2012 and 2016. Puntland’s parliamentarians elect their president.

Southcentral Somalia

Southcentral Somalia’s clan makeup is highly diverse so it had more rebel groups than Somaliland and Puntland, “[a]s opposed to Somaliland and Puntland, where violence was

¹⁶⁰ Duffield, Andrew Scott. When Do Rebels Become State-Builders?: A Comparative Case Study of Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 13, pp. 11.

¹⁶¹ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 287.

¹⁶² Duffield, Andrew Scott. When Do Rebels Become State-Builders?: A Comparative Case Study of Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 13, pp. 12.

¹⁶³ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 288-89.

concentrated more or less in the SNM and SSDF respectively, in [southcentral] Somalia it was diffuse. In effect, the market-place for violence was much more competitive, with no group achieving anything close to a monopoly position.”¹⁶⁴

Though no group achieved a monopoly position, the *United Somali Congress* (USC) was the most dominant player; the USC “concentrated on providing security and pursuing the interests of the Hawiye kin group.”¹⁶⁵ The *United Somali Congress* (USC) did not focus on building a regional administration like the SNM and SSDF did, but rather, unsuccessfully, sought to be the Somali national government, “the USC failed to produce a blueprint for how Somalia would be governed . . . The lack of political program for the sharing of power between groups produced an even greater security challenge than Barre’s totalitarian government by paving the way for warlordism.”¹⁶⁶

Conflict was further exacerbated when a high-ranking member of the USC, businessman Ali Mahdi, declared himself the President of Somalia prior to General Aideed’s arrival to Mogadishu.¹⁶⁷ Aideed did not accept this and war broke out between their two factions.¹⁶⁸

The USC’s lack of visionary political leadership for a national government, combined with its internal factional war, resulted in southcentral Somalia’s complete disintegration.¹⁶⁹ In

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Duffield, Andrew Scott. When Do Rebels Become State-Builders?: A Comparative Case Study of Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. *Bildhaan*, Vol. 13, pp. 15.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* at 16.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* at 17.

the 1990s, warlordism terrorized the inhabitants of southcentral Somalia, ‘Mogadishu was thus the centre of waves of destruction and terror which radiated outside the city unpredictably.’¹⁷⁰

Reestablishing the Somali State (1991-2012)

Since its fall in 1991, there has been “fifteen attempt[s] by the international community at re-establishing the Somali state.”¹⁷¹ Of these fifteen attempts, two stand out: (1) The Arta peace process and (2) the Nairobi peace process.¹⁷² The Arta peace process, known as the Somali National Peace Conference, concluded in August 2000 with the establishment of a Transitional National Government (TNG); both Somaliland and Puntland boycotted the process.¹⁷³ Throughout its existence, the TNG was unable to gain control over Somalia, it did not even control Mogadishu. The TNG eventually failed, and in its place emerged a Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

¹⁷⁰ Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 264.

¹⁷¹ Kasaija, Appuli Phillip (2010). The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008-2009: Results and problems. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28:3, pp. 262

¹⁷² *Ibid.* at 266-69

¹⁷³ Le Sage, Andre. Sovereign Disguise for a Mogadishu Mafia. *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 29, No. 91, *Sovereignty, Democracy & Zimbabwe's Tragedy* (Mar., 2002), pp. 132

The TFG was established in August/October 2004 after the outcome of the Nairobi peace process.¹⁷⁴ The two most significant political outcomes of this conference were the acknowledgment that Somalia would be a federal state, and the establishment of the ‘4.5 formula,’ in which “power was to be shared between the four main clan-families of Somalia . . . together with the minority clan-families, which constitute the 0.5.”¹⁷⁵ Puntland participated in this conference, but Somaliland did not.

The Somali state experienced twelve years of various transitional governments, 2000-2012; the transitional phase ended “with the announcement of a post-transitional federal government in 2012 [Federal Government of Somalia] . . .”¹⁷⁶

In August 2012, based on the 4.5 formula, clan elders appointed members for Somalia’s post-transitional parliament, and subsequently that parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamed as Somalia’s first post-transitional president.¹⁷⁷ President Mohamed’s victory was widely accepted by Somalis due to the fact that he was “viewed as part of a ‘constructive elite’ that had stayed in Mogadishu throughout the 20-year crisis and built schools, universities, hospitals, and business.”¹⁷⁸ The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is the first government to gain official diplomatic recognition from the community of nations since the fall of the

¹⁷⁴ Kasaija, Appuli Phillip (2010). The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008-2009: Results and problems. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28:3, pp. 265

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Menkhaus, Ken. State Failure, State-Building, and Prospects for a “Functional Failed State” in Somalia. *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science*. Nov. 2014, Vol. 656 Issue 1, pp. 154

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* at 168

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Somali state in 1991. Currently, the FGS's "capacity is weak, budgets modest, corruption high, and institutionalization low."¹⁷⁹

As of the writing of this paper, the mandate for the FGS's first administration is over; Somalia successfully elected new members of parliament in December 2016. These elections differed slightly from the 2012 elections. In 2012, 135 clan elders selected all members of parliament (House of the People); in 2016, the same 135 clan elders selected an approximate 14,000 electoral college members, who in turn elected Somalia's new members of parliament (House of the People). Somalia's parliamentarians elected the new President of Somalia on February 8, 2017. The Federal Government of Somalia's second administration has a four-year mandate ending in 2021.

Insights and Lessons

I have spent a good portion of my analysis of Somalia's sociopolitical history on two eras: the UN Trusteeship, 1950-60, and the Somali Republic, 1960-69. I find that these two eras are the most analogous to Somalia's current political situation, and therefore offer us the best insights and lessons. Today, Somalia finds itself trying to regain statehood with international guidance from the United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UN SOM). This resembles the 1950-60 era, when Somalia was preparing herself to gain statehood for the first time with international guidance via the United Nations Trusteeship. The political platform for Somalia's

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* at 164

third republic is a multiparty parliamentary democracy, just as it was during the Somali Republic era, 1960-69, albeit it will be a federal state and not a unitary state.

The Trusteeship era gives us invaluable guidance on how the international community prepared Somalis for statehood. We learn that the major focal point for preparing Somalis for self-governance was placed on education. Institutions of higher learning were established, and enrollments of primary and secondary education were expanded.¹⁸⁰ The United Nations enhanced Somalia's educational system to develop its human capacity for good governance. Today, Somalia's educational system is in shambles due to two-decades plus of civil strife, and Somalia's youth have suffered the most. The United Nations Development Programme estimates that seventy percent of Somalia's population is under the age of thirty, which means the overwhelming majority of Somalia's population suffered from the lack of traditional education systems.¹⁸¹ Strangely, the FGS and UNSOM sought to introduce nationwide elections by the end of 2016 without properly preparing the Somali populace via an educational system. The lesson here is that much emphasis should be placed on establishing an educational system which promotes primary and secondary schools across Somalia, with special emphasis on adult-based schooling for those who came of age during the stateless era.

Another valuable lesson from the Trusteeship era is the gradual democratization of Somalia. The Trusteeship introduced democracy to Somalia in moderation, with municipal

¹⁸⁰ Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 360.

¹⁸¹ *Somalia Human Development Report 2012: Empowering youth for peace and development*. United Nations Development Programme. 28 Sep 2012.

elections taking place two years prior to national elections. The FGS and UNSOM planned to have a national election by the end of 2016, yet no Federal Member State (or Interim Administration) has ever had one-person one-vote elections within their respective territories. The wiser approach would be to have one-person one-vote regional elections in all the respective Federal Member States first to gradually establish democracy in Somalia prior to having a national election.

We learned during the Somali Republic's era that transposing an Italian-state model ignores the unique nature of Somalia's traditional sociopolitical foundation, the clan structure. To borrow from the Chinese, what is needed in Somalia is "democracy with Somali characteristics." Washington, D.C.'s democracy and London's democracy differ in composition, yet both are authentically democratic. Therefore it is only natural that Mogadishu's democracy will differ as well. Somalis can no longer ignore the clan structure in their political calculus, something they acknowledged in the Nairobi peace process. What is now needed is the permanent institutionalization of the clan structure in the national political fabric of the new Somalia. If Somalia is to fully regain statehood, her modern democratic foundation must complement her traditional clan structure.

An additional lesson we learned from the era of the Somali Republic is that the lack of good governance hampers the political development of the Somali state, and eventually leads to unwanted outcomes. Corruption and nepotism weakened the fabric of the Somali Republic, and if not checked, will also weaken the new emerging Somali state. Somalia's former president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, acknowledged the need for good governance in his foreword in *Foreign Policy of Somalia*. He states: "It is now accepted that poor governance has

been one of the major causes of the collapse of Somalia's socioeconomic development.”¹⁸²

What is needed is a technocratic civil service and national/regional administrations free of corrupt vices. Enhancing Somalia's educational system will help in this endeavor.

When one properly analyzes Somalia's modern sociopolitical history and the goals enshrined in Vision 2016, one reaches a practical conclusion that the three major goals (federation of Somalia, constitutional revision and national referendum, and one-person one-vote national election) were not genuinely attainable in such a short time. The Somali state collapsed in 1991, becoming the world's quintessential failed state, and has suffered from over two decades of civil strife, which include civil war, warlordism/lawlessness, piracy, and violent extremism. Though noble, the timetable of Vision 2016 was not fair to the Somali nation and people. Under the theme “Transitioning Towards Democracy,” Vision 2016 was formulated in Mogadishu in September 2013 with the endorsement of the United Nations.¹⁸³ In retrospect, we can admit that it was naïve to believe that the recovering Somali state was capable of completing those goals in three years. What is now needed is a reassessment of how to complete the three major goals outlined in Vision 2016 by the year 2021.

¹⁸² “FOREIGN POLICY OF SOMALIA.” <http://www.mfa.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Somali-Federal-Policy.pdf>


¹⁸³ “VISION 2016: TRANSITIONING TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CC8QFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.villasomalia.gov.so%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2014%2F12%2FVision_2016_report_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf&ei=qnlKVZf2K8jisAXz04CID&usg=AFQjCNFN4XTHacKA6iRPCPN_G8Up6Vui8Q&bvm=bv.92291466,d.b2w

The Federal Government of Somalia and the international community need to rethink the Somali state, or more precisely, rethink how Somalia will achieve full statehood. In the section below, I provide timetables to achieve the three major goals and provide policy solutions on how to reach them by 2021. Specifically, I am advocating for a more detailed approach to achieving the three outlined goals by providing a different formula, a bottom-up approach. This more detailed version, *Vision 2021*, lays out more realistic and logical parameters for Somalia to re-attain statehood.

Rethinking the Somali State: *Vision 2021*

In order to achieve the goals of constitutional revision, followed by a national referendum, and one-person one-vote national elections, Somalia's federalization process must first be completely finalized and institutionalized. The full federalization of Somalia's regions has not authentically transpired yet, and official demarcation of Somalia's regional states has not been completed.

The south, what used to be Somalia Italiana, is in the final process on federalizing into six potential states (see map¹⁸⁴). Somalia's Provisional Constitution stipulates that "Based on a voluntary decision, two or more regions may



¹⁸⁴ "SOMALIA'S FEDERAL FUTURE: LAYERED AGENDAS, RISKS &

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/somalias-federal-future-layered-agendas-risks-and-opportunities#sthash.UKnpfEhx.dpuf>

merge to form a Federal Member State.”¹⁸⁵ The regions are based on the Somali Democratic Republic’s provincial administrative boundaries at its fall in 1991. There were/are eighteen regions in Somalia proper, with five provinces situated in the north and thirteen in the south.

As of today, Puntland State is the only *official* Federal Member State, but the FGS and UNSOM have helped create four Interim Administrations that will presumably become official Federal Member States. These four are: Interim Jubaland Administration (Jubaland State), Interim Southwest Administration (Southwest State), Interim Galmudug Administration (Galmudug State), Interim Hirshabelle Administration (Hirshabelle State). The last remaining region/province in the south is Banaadir. What shall happen to Banaadir is still up in the air.

Jubaland and Southwest states encompass three regions, and Hirshabelle State encompasses two. Some are proposing that Banaadir become a Federal Member State, which runs counter to the “two regions or more” requirement stipulated in the Provisional Constitution. It should be noted that Mogadishu is, literally, the only city in the Banaadir region. Puntland encompasses two whole regions, and specific districts of three other regions.

Galmudug State, in theory, is an amalgamation of two regions, Galguduud and Mudug, but Puntland claims jurisdiction over northern Mudug province, specifically its districts of Galdogob, Galkayo, and Jariban (see: Constitution of the Regional Puntland State of Somalia, Article 6. Section 1.). This leaves the remaining two districts of Mudug province, Harardhere and Hobyo, within the jurisdictional confines of Mudug State. Therefore, Galmudug State will not be an amalgamation of two provinces, but rather one and one-half of a province, which also

¹⁸⁵ Provisional Fed. Const. June 12, 2012, art. 49, §6 (Som.).

runs counter to the “two regions or more” requirement stipulated in the Provisional Constitution. In addition, Puntland claims jurisdiction over certain districts of eastern Sool and Sanaag regions, which are also claimed by Somaliland.

So there are three major obstacles confronting the territorial aspects of the federalization process of southern Somalia. These are: (1) Puntland’s and Galmudug’s overlapping claim to Mudug province, (2) Puntland’s and Somaliland’s overlapping claim to Sool and Sanaag, and (3) Banaadir and Galmudug States’ disqualification to be Federal Member States under the Constitution, since they only encompass one region, and one and one-half regions, respectively. The FGS and UNSOM must quickly solve these three obstacles.

In order to complete the federalization process the “Boundaries and Federal Commission” should be fully institutionalized immediately, as stipulated in chapter 10 of the Provisional Constitution. It currently exists, but is not truly functional, but once thoroughly established can be the venue for dispute resolution for Federal Member States’ (FMS) to resolve the various territorial conflicts. Also, amending the Provisional Constitution’s criteria of “two or more regions” as a requirement to be a FMS to “one or more regions” will ameliorate the current dilemma facing the emerging state of Galmudug, and potentially Banaadir.

Even though it is evident that one-person one-vote national election was not attainable in 2016, electoral democracy should still be reintroduced to Somalia in the next two years. Instead of focusing on first having a national election, the FGS and UNSOM should work towards having a one-person one-vote regional election in Puntland State; this election should happen as soon as possible. Puntland State is the first official Federal Member State (FMS) of the new Somalia, therefore having a successful one-person one-vote election for its regional

government would signal to the other regional states that electoral democracy is attainable. This would make Puntland State the first FMS to have one-person one-vote election, and would be a symbolic victory for democracy's reintroduction to Somalia. There is no better place to reintroduce it than Puntland.

One of FGS's major goals was reached by December 2016, i.e., fully institutionalizing Somalia's parliament by having an upper house. Somalia's parliament is supposed to be bicameral, but during 2012-16 functioned as a unicameral parliament (the House of the People only existed). Like America's Senate, Somalia's Upper House, "House of the Federation," is designed to be the chamber where Federal Member States are given equal number of seats regardless of population and territorial size.

I would recommend entirely scrapping the idea of a "House of the Federation." We have observed that ignoring Somalia's traditional sociopolitical structure, while strictly importing western models, does not serve the Somali state adequately. What is needed is for Somalia's Upper House to be the chamber where clan representatives are institutionalized (i.e. "House of Chiefs"). The same 135 clan chiefs who appointed members to Somalia's parliamentarian House of the People in 2012, and appointed the 14,000 electoral college for the 2016 election, should serve in official capacity in the "House of Chiefs." The House of Chiefs should have the responsibilities of stabilizing clan disputes, normalizing clan relations, and reserving traditions.

The observations of I.M. Lewis sheds further light: "if further progress is to be achieved in state-formation, Somali politicians will surely have to come out of 'denial' and start seriously exploring *how clan and lineage ties can be utilized positively . . .* Here a less Eurocentric and less

evolutionary view of lineage institutions by Western commentators, social scientists, and bureaucrats might help to create a more productive environment for rethinking clanship (i.e. agnation) positively.¹⁸⁶ He further states that “[i]f the continuing force of clanship had been frankly recognized and acknowledged and means sought to accommodate it politically, rather than pretending it did not exist, things might have turned out differently for Somalia.”¹⁸⁷ If a fully functioning and viable Somali state is to permanently reemerge, it is imperative to take Somalia’s traditional clan structure into account. The *House of Chiefs* will purposefully serve this endeavor.

Finally, Somalia must change its 4.5 clan formula since it is not based on a scientific census but rather clan discrimination. Four clans are given equal representation in the House of the People, sixty-one seats each, while a conglomeration of “minority clans” are given half representation, thirty-one seats.¹⁸⁸ I would advocate for a 5.0 formula to give the “minority clans” equal seats in the House of the People because the 4.5 formula is politically discriminatory.

Once a post-2016 Federal Government of Somalia is in place, it should focus on accomplishing the goals set out in Vision 2021. To complete these goals necessary steps must be initially taken.

¹⁸⁶ Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. *Africa* (Edinburgh University Press). 2004, Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.508-09. (emphasis added)

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* at 506

¹⁸⁸ Hanson, Stephanie, and Kaplan, Eben. Somalia’s Transitional Government. *Foreign Affairs*.

<http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-transitional-government/p12475>

The FGS's new administration, in accordance with the various FMS, must prepare all FMS for regional one-person one-vote elections by 2019. FMS will have their regional elections at different times, but must all be accomplished by the second quarter of 2019. This will allow for electoral democracy to be gradually reintroduced to the entire Somali nation via a bottom-up approach. It will also put in place the necessary mechanisms (census, voter register, polling stations, etc.) for an eventual constitutional referendum and national one-person one-vote election. It should be noted that these necessary mechanisms are currently non-existent throughout Somalia, a further indication of the unrealistic timetable imposed by the original Vision 2016.

Once all Federal Member States have directly-elected representatives for their respective regional governments, a "Federal Constitutional Convention" should be hosted by the first quarter of 2020. If Somalia is to complete her federal social contract, she must iron out the wrinkles of her style of federalism. What differentiates federalism from other forms of government is the dual-sovereign notion of "vertical separation of powers." This notion disseminates governing powers between two main entities, the federal government and the state governments (i.e. Federal Member States), and each entity may not encroach upon the other entity's governing powers.

In the United States, the federal government controls foreign affairs, national defense, and monetary policy, *inter alia*, while the state governments control public health, safety (e.g. policing), and educational affairs, *inter alia*. The dual-sovereign concept encompasses two parallel entities, federal and state, governing in unison. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the various FMS governments have yet to properly negotiate what governing powers

are delegated to the federal government and what powers are reserved for state governments. Somalia's social fabric is slowly being sown back together through a federal system and the tenets of her vertical separation of powers must be codified. This can only be viably done through a national dialogue between Somalia's various FMS stakeholders.

In 1787, America's thirteen states met in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention (also known as the Federal Convention) to discuss how to form a more perfect union. The United States Constitution was the brain-child of the convention. The convention addressed the issues of federal delegated powers and reserved state powers, in addition to the tripartite system of government (Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches). Each state sent delegates to the convention to ensure its interest were properly represented, and these delegates returned to their respective states to lobby their citizens to vote in favor of the new US constitution in a national referendum.

A similar convention must be held in Somalia to ensure Somalis, of all clan and regional affiliations, have their interests properly represented. This will ensure for an all-inclusive constitutional revision process. Subsequently, the national referendum for Somalia's new permanent constitution should take place by the third quarter of 2020.

An additional goal of Vision 2021 is for Somalia to regain control of her national security and policing powers. Currently, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is providing the brunt of Somalia's security, and it is obvious that it cannot immediately leave, but also cannot remain in the country indefinitely. A gradual approach is needed. I recommend that from 2017 through 2021 all Federal Member States contribute an equal number of recruits (e.g.

5,000 per regional state) for the Somali National Army. This will allow for the establishment of an all-inclusive Somali National Army and will allow AMISOM to depart from Somalia by 2021.

Once these goals are accomplished, Somalia will finally be ready to host its one-person one-vote national election by first quarter of 2021. To conclude, *Vision 2021* will accomplish the following goals: (a) regional one-person one-vote elections for all respective Federal Member States; (b) Federal Constitutional Convention for purposes of constitutional revision; (c) national referendum for Somalia's new constitution; (d) establishment of a fully functioning Somali National Army and the withdrawal of AMISOM; and (e) one-person one-vote national election.

"[I]n contrast to the rest of Africa where states are struggling to become nations, the Somali people represent a nation struggling to become a state . . ." - Frank J. Mahony