

**Coloring the Lines through Culture? Race and Racialization in International
Relations**

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

Sema Binay

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Raymond Duvall

September 2016

Sema Binay
© September 2016

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude for the members of my committee. My advisor, Raymond Duvall has been very patient and encouraging as I was developing ideas and taking the time to write. He has been, and continues to be a source of inspiration for raising and thinking through tough questions. Joan Tronto was especially kind, supportive and generous with her time throughout the process. I owe a lot to her unwavering belief in my project, and I am grateful for her guidance. I also thank Antonio Vazquez-Aroyo and Eric Sheppard for being in my committee, for their encouragement and well-deserved critique.

Also, I appreciate deeply my colleagues who participated in our dissertation group, including Mark Hoffman, Charmaine Chua, Garnet Kinderwater, Eli Meyerhoff, Ismail Yaylaci, David Temin, and Darrah McCracken. I am also grateful to the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, for providing financial and intellectual support. Special thanks for Jessie Eastman, whose extensive administrative support was invaluable.

My dear friends, Evren, Eylem and Jen: I am unequivocally indebted for our conversations, your friendship and generosity.

Last, but not least, this dissertation could not have been possible without the unwavering support, love and patience of my dear husband. Thank you, David. I love you dearly.

To Leyla, with hope for a better future.

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the ways in which racial constructs processes of racialization operate in international politics and become consequential in constituting the contemporary global order. Specifically it asks: in the wake of the diffusion of domestic and international norms against racism, how are we to understand race and effects of racialization at the level of the international? In order to answer this question, I develop a theoretical framework of racialization that explains how human groups, including cultural and religious groups, are (re)defined as discrete entities with inherent dispositions and ordered hierarchically as to shape the actions and identities available for various actors. Although explicit racial hierarchies in inter-state politics became less prominent with decolonization and through international norms against racism, I argue that racialization continues to constitute domestic and global hierarchies through structural and productive power relations. As can be seen in racialization of Muslims and the debates about the rise of China, expressions of cultural difference and their association with various forms and objects of threat are a consequential medium through which racialization occurs in the contemporary global order.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction	1
The Puzzle and the Significance of the Question	5
The Project	9
Research Design	13
Chapter Outline	13
Chapter 2 -Towards a Global Theory of Racialization	20
Historical Lineages	22
A Racialized World Order?	48
Racialization in the Contemporary World Order	65
Chapter 3 - Finding Race in IR	68
Conceptualizing Absence	73
Early Twentieth Century to 1939: Race and the Origins of IR	82
Race in Post World War II International Relations	94
Anarchy and Sovereignty	103
Chapter 4 – Islamophobia and Racialization of Muslims	123
Religion and Racialization	129
The West-Christianity-Whiteness	132
Islam and Muslims in America	135
Muslims in the United States in the Twentieth Century	155
9/11, The War on Terror and Muslims	165
Chapter 5 - Racialization of China Debates	180
The Rise of China Debates: Either Opportunity of Threat	182
China as the “Other” of Liberal International Order	184
Early 20 th Century Racialized Imaginary of the International and the Yellow Peril	191
Chapter 6- Conclusion	201
Bibliography	207

Chapter 1: Introduction

The election of Barack Obama as the first black president of the United States in 2008 gave way to debates about whether the United States was now a “post-racial” society.¹ The idea, or rather the hope, of those who supported the post-racial hypothesis was that African Americans have achieved, or will soon achieve, racial equality in the United States, and that the United States could transcend its racial divisions, leading some to argue that in this era civil rights laws were becoming unnecessary.² Yet, substantial evidence reveals that this is not the case. Not only the attacks on Obama during his campaign that focused on his race and allegedly being a Muslim (Rachlinski and Parks, 2010), but also the more structural indicators such as the mass incarceration of African Americans at extraordinary levels (Alexander, 2012), and the achievement gap between Black and White Americans in terms of academics, employment and wealth (Paige and Witty 2009) show that race and racism continue to affect social, political and economic relations in the United States. Similarly, as Jones (2008) argues, despite the formal

1 See for instance “A New Post-Racial Political Era in America” NPR.ORG (Retrieved: 04.20.2016).

2 For example, In *Shelby v. Holder* in 2013, the Supreme Court invalidated a section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which required states with particularly severe histories of racial discrimination to obtain federal approval to change their electoral laws. In the ruling, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. emphasized the progress made in terms of abolishing voting tests, erasing racial disparities in voter registration and turnout, and attainment of political office by African Americans, and offered those changes as the background on which to refuse federal overseeing of voting rights.

transcendence of racism in modern institutions of world order, global inequalities in power and wealth retain a fundamentally racialized character produced through centuries of colonial dispossession.

Of course there has been undeniable progress in fighting racism through the twentieth century, yet, many scholars maintain that racism has not disappeared but has adapted to the normative environment that disavows explicit racial bias. Ian Lopez explains how race became central to American electoral politics via the appeals to a coded language, a process that he calls “dog whistle politics,” which operates on two levels: inaudible and easily denied in one range, yet stimulating strong reactions in another. Accordingly, the new racial politics presents itself as strongly opposed to racism but at the same time appeals to subliminal racial grievances and color-coded solidarity through references such as “the undeserving poor,” “illegal aliens,” or “sharia law” (2013: 5-6).³ Recent election campaigns by the presidential candidates that espouses mottos such as “take America back” or “make America great again” follow the same logic as they construct and appeal to racial resentment and grievances in order to receive support from working and middle class Americans by attributing their “insecurity” to racial difference.

The progress for racial equality in US politics due to the civil rights movement was paralleled by the proliferation and legalization of international norms against racism

3 Lopez argues that the hidden message racial dog whistle politics seeks to transmit violates a strong moral consensus and national values supporting equality and opposing racism. Thus, those blowing a racial dog whistle know that they would be condemned if understood as appealing for racial solidarity among whites, so the veiled references to threatening nonwhites are accompanied by emphasizing the lack of any direct reference to a racial group as well as accusing the critic for opportunistically alleging racial victimization (p. 4).

as well. Yet, if race is far from having disappeared as a factor that shapes peoples' lives and continues to matter in domestic politics via structural inequalities and appeals to a coded language, how did the normative changes at the international level affect the ways in which racial constructs shape international politics? In other words, do the legal, institutional, and normative commitments against racism render racial constructions irrelevant for the conduct of international politics? Or, is race still a relevant category of analysis for international politics? If so, what are the processes through which racial thinking operates and what are the effects of racial thinking in international politics? How are we to understand race and effects of racialization at the level of the international?⁴

Moving from these questions, my goal in this dissertation is to achieve a better understanding of the ways in which racial constructs and processes of racialization operate in the contemporary world order that is characterized by the acceptance of racial equality on legal and normative grounds. Did racial constructs cease to play a role in international politics after decolonization and proliferation of the norms of racial equality? If not, how are racial categories constructed and how do they operate at the level of the international? If racism adapts to new norms rather than disappearing, how do the historically existing categories of racial difference become articulated with the “new” perceptions of external threat? What are the results of such processes of

4 It should be noted that my argument is not limited to draw an analogy between the “domestic” and the “international” in terms of the effects of racialization. In other words, my argument is not that “if race still matters in domestic politics, it should also matter in international politics.” My goal is rather to analyze “the international” as an always already racialized constitution, as the ideas of race and racial difference emerged as global ideas from their inception and were not limited to any single constitution of nations, peoples, or states.

racialization for the production of world orders and for the groups that are racially categorized?

The central contention of my dissertation is that, despite the disavowal of explicitly racist discourses and acceptance of the norms of racial equality, processes of racialization and the resulting constructions of race continue to be consequential at the level of international politics. I argue that processes of racialization and the resulting constructs of race continue to have constitutive effects in the (re)production of world orders through the prevalence of the underlying belief that humanity is hierarchically divided into discrete groups, each defined by immutable and *ahistoric* characteristics, and that interactions between such groups are, if not determined, at least partially shaped by, the nature of these essential differences. Whereas in scientific racism, the immutable and ahistoric characteristics of racial groups were explained on the basis of biology, in the contemporary forms of racialization culture is essentialized as creating innate dispositions for group members (See Chapter 2). As such, “new” racial others are constructed as discrete groups with characteristics that have less to do with skin color but more with culture or religion, and their immutable differences are seen to be in possible, if not inevitable, conflict with the values of the modern/civilized/western whiteness. Such a hierarchical view of humanity and the continuing construction of racial “others” affect the perception and interpretation of “threats” at the international level through racialized lenses and contribute to the reproduction of the liberal world order with the central values of whiteness.

Furthermore, the processes of racialization and the constructs of race constitute

the conditions of possibility for certain discourses and practices that produce and reproduce structures of inequality and inclusion/exclusion. For example, racialization of Muslims into a discrete group of people culminates not only in rendering the lives and rights of Muslims vulnerable and disposable through the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” but also in limiting the possibilities of inclusion of Muslims in the liberal world order as equal members.

As such, racialization at the global level takes place within the liberal world order as its norms of racial equality and juridical sovereignty function to render continuous racialization invisible rather than eliminate it. Indeed, as the liberal world order is accepted to be the only legitimate framework to provide and guarantee freedom and equality for individuals as well for the sovereign states, racial hierarchies and exclusions continue to be less visible but still effective in ordering international politics. Processes of racialization at work in the debates about the rise of China show the exclusionary character of this world order by revealing how it is impossible to imagine a liberal world order under the Chinese leadership within this framework.

The Puzzle, and the Significance of the Question

The question of race in contemporary international politics constitutes a multifaceted puzzle. To begin with, recent research in disciplinary history reveals how race was a central concern in the formative years of International Relations as a discipline, as the historical conjuncture of the early twentieth century was occupied with questions about imperial administration and colonization (Vitalis 2005, 2010; Vucetic 2011; Lake and Reynolds 2008; Anievas et al. 2014). However, in the aftermath of World War II,

questions of race mostly disappeared from analyses of International Relations. Therefore, the first part of the puzzle deals with the question of why/how questions of race mostly disappeared from the discipline, despite the foundational importance of race as well as the resurgence of the questions of identity and culture in recent decades. This question has been getting some attention in the last two decades as IR scholars problematized epistemological and methodological limitations of the discipline, such as the discipline's positivist bias, preference of abstraction as the analytical device, and the taken-for-granted boundaries between the domestic and the international, in understanding the role of race in international politics (Doty 1996; Krishna 2001; Vitalis 2000; Henderson 2014). These arguments investigate the reasons for silencing questions of race within the discipline by focusing on what gets to be silenced or excluded from the boundaries of legitimate research in international relations. In other words, they aim to answer the question of “why,” i.e. to reveal the reasons behind the absence of research regarding race in international politics. What needs more attention, though, is the “how” part of the question because the problem is not just the “absence” of race as an analytical category within International Relations but further it is that the key concepts, assumptions and theoretical analyses of mainstream IR serve to silence racialization in the post World War II era.

In other words, I argue that the silence of the discipline of International Relations on questions of race cannot be fully understood by focusing only on the “absence” of race as an analytical category. In addition to this absence, we need to understand how the “presence” of the existing key concepts, assumptions and theoretical analyses of the

mainstream IR serve to silence racialization, and how the continuing employment of such analytical and normative tools further enables and espouses thinking implicitly, but not explicitly, in racialized terms in IR, in the post World War II era. For example how does the discipline conceptualize anarchy and sovereignty so that racial and imperial hierarchies and exclusions remain outside of the legitimate boundaries of International Relations? Or, how do IR's concepts of civilization, in continuing the Eurocentric vision and despite the claims of universality, envision the world as composed of differentially endowed groups of people that have varied capacities for self-governing, which legitimize the supremacy of the Western/white subjects.

The relative absence of questions of race in International Relations is also puzzling regarding the proliferation of constructivist research about international norms since the 1990s. The constructivist research agenda had given more attention to the role of ideational variables in guiding action, constituting identities and regulating behavior than Realism and Liberalism. Yet, the focus on the proliferation of what might be called the “good” international norms constitute the biggest obstacle against analyzing race as a constitutive idea that can produce unwanted effects (Thompson 2014). To give but one example, the only reference to “race” in *The Culture of National Security*, explains how the norms of racial equality that emerged from domestic debates over race relations eventually diffused globally through transnational politics (Katzenstein 1996:58). Accordingly, Klotz (1995 and 1999) approaches race through the question of the global norm of racial equality and traces how racial discrimination became increasingly delegitimized in domestic and international realms in order to show the causal power of

global norms in (re)defining state interests.

Nevertheless, if adopting the norm of racial equality does not eliminate neither racial constructs nor the global racial hierarchies and exclusions, how are we to understand the constitutive effects of the ideas and constructions of race regarding the identities and institutions? In what ways can the racialized worldview continue to have power and produce effects in the face of the international norms of racial equality? Furthermore, following Vitalis (2000), can we theorize white supremacy as a global norm underlying the contemporary world order? Vucetic argues that “what distinguishes IR from both humanistic and social scientific fields of which it is a part, is a systematic and persistent inability and unwillingness to dilute its dominant whiteness” referring to all those socio-intellectual structures that privilege and protect people of 'principally' European descent at the expense of everyone else (2014: 99). If IR has been unable, or uninterested in, encountering whiteness as a constitutive norm in international politics or as a central part of its disciplinary identity, how does this racialized perspective of the discipline affect research and analysis of international politics? Lake and Reynolds (2008) suggest that global whiteness was a racial project that was formed in international conversations that affected consciousness in the early twentieth century across the globe. What are the continuing effects of whiteness as a racial project?

Moreover, although analyses of critical IR scholars showed how the constructs of inside/out, us/them, and self/other reveal how an economy of abstract binary oppositions frame the discipline's thinking and legitimate the categorization of peoples and regions of the world, the question of the role of racial constructs in constituting otherness is rarely

raised. To the extent that “racial identity” is taken into consideration, it is analyzed either as a given, as an “independent variable” that affects foreign policy (Hunt 1987), or as only relevant in the constitution of the binary self/other but not in terms of the production of a racialized world order (Campbell 1992). Yet, if the binary constructs that shape the modern conduct and study of international politics are to be understood as a historical and contingent product of the social and political context of colonial modernity, racial constructs should not be seen as a logical and/or historical consequence of “self vs. other” thinking, but on the contrary they should be analyzed as a fundamental axis of the constitution of these binary oppositions that substantiated them with meaning. Insufficient attention to the ways in which racial difference is constructed and becomes articulated within a sense of identity limits our understanding of how the racialized perceptions of self and other become operational in interpreting danger and threats as well as in limiting possible ways of action in international politics. Furthermore, understanding the operations and consequences of racialization in international politics would enable us to make sense of the range and possible limitations of the responses to difference.

The Project

The goal of my dissertation project is to develop an analysis of the ways in which racial constructs and processes of racialization operate in international politics and become consequential in constituting the contemporary global order. Rather than an essentialist category of difference based on human biology, I take race to be a historical and contingent product of the processes of racialization which occur in specific space and

time, and under specific historical, political socio-economic and ideo-cultural conditions. Racialization refers to the processes through which any characteristic of persons comes to be essentialized, naturalized and tied to a set of somatic, physiognomic, genetic or cultural characteristics (Miles 1989; Omi and Winant 1994; Murji and Solomos 2005). Furthermore, through the processes of racialization, abstract categories of race are articulated with other references such as immigration, crime or welfare, to become a generative principle of identity constitution that conditions the possibilities and principles of mobilization and inclusion/exclusion. As such, processes of racialization classify people into racial categories, draw boundaries between such categories, condition the possible modes of relationship between these categories, and offer explanations and/or solutions for social problems. Furthermore, I draw upon theories of new (cultural, or differentialist) racism which argue that racial difference is increasingly becoming inscribed on cultural characteristics and differences rather than on hereditary, natural traits and external appearances, and that racial thinking operates through a more subtle, symbolic, and coded language (Barker 1982; Balibar 1991; Ansell 1997). In cultural racism, the characteristics of a given culture are essentialized, seen as innate and viewed as existing outside of historical change. Accordingly contemporary forms of racialization refer to cultures as conditioning their members by innate and immutable characteristics, e.g. Islam as inherently violent. It is this essentialized understanding of culture as immutable that differentiates racialization from just “othering.” Racially constituted subjects cannot transcend their “difference” and are not given the option for assimilation; structurally and discursively they are positioned to stay apart from the

dominant racial group. Given the disavowal of more aggressive forms of explicitly racist discourses at the level of international politics, analyzing how racialization works at the level of international politics requires attending to the fluidity of the processes of racialization as well as to how references to cultural or religious difference increasingly become the medium through which a more subtle and symbolic yet still effective racial thinking underlies international politics.

At the heart of the processes of racialization is a drawing of boundaries and ascribing the possibilities or denial of belonging to a political community. The boundaries and the nature of the political community at question vary from the borders of nation states to the realm of law and reason, or modernity and civilization at large. From the denial of due process rights to Muslim US citizens suspected of terrorist activities, to the racial profiling of persons from certain countries, at work is a process of thinking and associated practices that divide up the world between deserving and undeserving, and renders those undeserving as vulnerable due to their affiliation with a culture or religion.

On this background, I analyze the discourses about the rise of China and the rise of the Islamic threat after the end of the Cold War in the U.S. context, as two domains where the processes and effects of racialization crystallize at the intersection of the global context of power relations with the fears and anxieties about the perceptions of declining national power. The debates about the rise of China and the Islamic threat were symptomatic examples of a sense of threat in the Western world that revealed the anxieties about the characteristics of the emerging world order in the aftermath of the Cold War. These representations of threat could find a wide sympathetic audience and

frame public debates as they articulated the new sense of anxiety by tapping into the historically existing tropes of racial threats such as the “Arab terrorist.”

Admittedly, my main concern in this dissertation is with the mainstream IR that was established as a “white” discipline by excluding the experience and voices of the non-Western world. Notwithstanding the later emergence of critical theories that problematize this exclusion, the mainstream of the field carried on its “lack of correspondence between standard IR terminology, categories, and theories, and the third world realities” (Tickner, 2003: 296). For a recent study of the discipline in the non-Western contexts, see Tickner and Waeber (2009). This concern is also reflected in focusing on the U.S. context for analyzing processes of racialization. Accordingly, the focus on the U.S. is not only due to the shaping of IR as an American discipline in most of the twentieth century, but also is a result of both the hegemonic role of the U.S. in shaping the contemporary world order and the necessity to carry out analysis of racialization in a context-bounded manner.

In line with my constructivist approach, I take ideas about race to be symbolic technologies, or mechanisms by which meaning is produced, i.e. as shared forms of practice, sets of capacities with which people can construct meaning about themselves, their world and their activities (Laffey and Weldes, 1997). Through processes of racialization, then, ideas as symbolic technologies produce representations that constitute not only the identities of the actors involved but also the actions available to them. Accordingly, I analyze the discourses about the rise of China and of the Islamic threat as two realms of representation in which ideas about race play a constitutive role in

constructing the actors and the parameters of the debates.

Research Design

Methodologically, the nature of my project warrants a constructivist, rather than a positivist, approach that can account for the constitutive effects of inter-subjectively shared ideas about race for international politics. I employ a combination of discourse and content analysis of the representations of the rise of China and the rise of Islamic threat in the media, academic writings, and in U.S. government documents. In analyzing the content and the discursive structure of these sources my starting point is deconstructing key categories of meaning, such as the notion of religious and cultural differences, the constructions of whiteness, and the threats posed by rising China or Islamist fundamentalists, that operate to construct racial categories and signify racial difference. More specifically, I inquire into how perceptions of threat get to be operationalized by being grounded ultimately on physical traits as in the images of “Arab-looking” terrorists; how and to what effects the continuing employment of tropes such as “enemies within” constitutes Chinese-Americans and Muslims as racialized groups that are not easily assimilable; how historical tropes such as the “yellow peril” are re-invoked to account for the new realities; and how such racial constructs condition and limit the available policy proposals to address those “threats.”

Chapter Outline

In chapter 2, *Towards a Global Theory of Racialization*, my objective is to develop the theoretical framework for understanding the role of the idea of race and the processes of racialization in the contemporary liberal international order that is

characterized as post-colonial and marked by the legal and normative recognitions of anti-racism. I contend that this task requires conceptualizing both the historicity of the entrenchment of the idea of race, i.e. the acceptance that humanity is divided into different racial categories with differing inherent abilities, and the fluidity/change of such racial categorizations. In other words, we need to understand how the idea of race became so entrenched historically throughout modernity, as well as what makes the racial categorizations and experiences fluid and open to change. To that aim, first I present a conceptual and historical genealogy of the ways in which race has been thought through Western modernity. I argue that the resilience of the idea of race emanates from the racialized character of European modernity that translated human difference to racial difference through its interpretation of the colonial experience, rationality and empiricism. The resulting racial categorizations and identities of self and other heavily depend on and bear the marks of a Western sense of superiority⁵ that continues to affect contemporary thinking about race. The deeply entrenched ways of thinking about and acting on race, which were characteristic of Western liberalism, reveal the limitations of the explicit norms in eliminating racialized worldviews and policies. The second part of the chapter turns to theorizing the role of race in our contemporary global order. I develop a social constructivist conceptualization of *racialization* that explains how racial categories and meanings are (re)produced and transformed through social and political struggles. Secondly, I present a theoretical framework to conceptualize the constitution of world orders and hegemony that would help us recognize the modes and possibilities

⁵ Articulating diverse markers such as Christian, civilized, and white together in constituting the Western/non-Western or white/non-white dichotomies.

of change and stability in order to conceptualize racialization in the contemporary world order. I argue that the expressions of cultural difference and their association with various forms and objects of threat are a consequential medium through which racialization occurs in the contemporary era. In the expressions of threat, the claims about incommensurable “cultural differences” constitute the others as a threat to the Western set of institutions, values, and lifestyles. In racialization of these others, elements from various discourses of race through the twentieth century, such as the trope of yellow peril, or the image of the Arab terrorist, became articulated with new characteristics that supposedly belong to discrete groups such as “muslims.” Furthermore, the processes of racialization and the resulting constructs of race continue to be effective in depicting certain groups of people or political communities, whose lives are deemed to be less worthy, as incapable of actualizing the liberal democratic values as well as in conditioning the possibility of their inclusion in the global community of capitalist democracies.

In chapter 3, *Finding Race in International Relations*, my primary goal is to problematize the state of oblivion in International Relations in the post World War II era. To that aim, I first look into the role that questions of race played in the formation of the discipline of International Relations during the early twentieth century, then I analyze the ways in which the discipline engaged with, or was oblivious to the role of race in international politics in the aftermath of World War II. I argue that the insufficient attention given to the questions of race in International Relations is neither accidental nor intentional, but conditioned by the existing power relations of international politics as

well as by how various approaches of IR imagined international politics differently. The epistemology and the theoretical constructs of the discipline, which have been shaped in (and in response to) an already racialized order, conceal and silence racialization by interpreting the reality of international politics in a certain way that does not allow to bring in race. The dominant epistemology and theoretical constructs of IR are inherently unable to conceptualize racialization and racial hierarchies. To that aim, I then analyze how the conceptualizations of anarchy, sovereignty, and civilizations served to silence explicit attention to race and hence shaped the discipline's implicit racialization manifested in (dis)engagement with questions of race. I argue that the conceptions of anarchy and sovereignty silence attention to race through envisioning the international system as a non-hierarchical order with equal sovereign entities and hence leave the questions of racial and imperial hierarchies and exclusions outside the boundaries of the discipline. Furthermore, IR continues to employ a Eurocentric vision of civilizational supremacy that bestows agency and capacity for self-governing only to the Western powers while the rights and the lives of non-western peoples are viewed as less valuable and worthy of protection.

In chapter 4, *Racialization of Islam*, I turn to analyze how categorization of Muslims into a discrete group with certain defining characteristics can be understood as racialization. Ranging from personal prejudices to state policies, racialization of Muslims articulate them as a totality that is inevitably supportive of terrorism, and mark each member of this totality potentially as unworthy and dispensable, rendering their rights and freedoms vulnerable. In order to understand how Muslims became categorized into a

group that signify a threat against the identity and security of states and of political communities, I trace the historical conditions of possibility for the contemporary racialization of Muslims, from the articulation of whiteness with Christianity that was set against an essential Islamist subject as its constitutive outside, to the emergence and transformation of the trope of the “Arab” terrorist within the popular perception and through government policies before and after September 11, as well as the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” and the policies related to the “war on terror” starting in the 1970s and culminating in 2000s. On this background, I argue that the racialization of Muslims after September 11 was not caused by the attacks themselves but by preexisting social constructions that configured them as people who would readily conduct and approve of such attacks. These social constructions did not emerge on 9/11 but were the culmination of historical processes that involved constructions of whiteness, orientalist thinking, cultural stereotyping, and government policies. For decades prior to the 9/11 attacks, Arabs and Muslims not only had been presented in the western imaginary as a monolithic group with an inherent tendency towards violence, they were also targets of government policies that viewed them as a group inherently volatile, inclined to terrorism, and hence threatening to western interests. Thus, by the time September 11 happened, the stage for Arab and Muslim communities to be held collectively responsible for the attacks by western governments, media and citizenry was already set. Yet, the specific form that racialization of Islam took after 9/11 also is shaped by the discourse of “Islamic terrorism.”

In Chapter 5, *Racialization of the Rise of China Debates*, I argue that the sense of

uneasiness regarding the rise of China, which is common to both Realism and Liberalism, cannot be explained only by referring to the analyses of material aspects of power politics among states. Without analyzing how racialization still operates to construct identities and difference we cannot effectively understand the worries that the rise of China evokes in the Western world. Therefore I analyze the debates about the rise of China as a process of racialization that constructs China/Chinese as a cultural other, whose innate characteristics, such as irrationality or untrustworthiness, make them a source of internal and external threats. I argue that both in the scholarly debates about and the policy responses to the rise of China, China is constructed as a “racial other” that is inevitably different and incompatible with the principles of the contemporary liberal international order. It is this racial otherness of China that underlies and explains why the possibility of China dominating the international system is such a frightening prospect for the western liberal order. I argue that processes of racialization still operate at the core of international politics through constituting identities and framing the perceptions of threat, as well as limiting the possibilities of transforming the liberal international order into a more inclusive one. Revealing the mechanisms of racialization that construct China as an “other” of the international system shows how international hierarchies are constituted racially, and how the possibilities of inclusion and/or exclusion within the order are shaped by racialized identities.

In Chapter 6, *Conclusions*, I turn to the implications of the continuing salience of racial constructs and processes of racialization in international politics. What are the effects of the even more intense racialization of Muslims, immigrants and “Chinese

competitors” in the last couple years? What are the consequences of constructing racial others through a more explicitly racist language for international politics? How can the discipline of IR understand these developments in terms of world ordering?

Chapter 2: Towards a Global Theory of Racialization

The age of empire is over; apartheid and Jim Crow have been ended; and a significant consensus exists among scientists (natural and social), and humanists as well, that the concept of race lacks an objective basis. Yet the concept persists, as idea, as practice, as identity, and as social structure. Racism perseveres in these same ways. (Howard Winant, 2006: 987).

Against the claims that we live in a “post-racial” era of international politics that are symptomatic of the dominant treatments of the questions of race in International Relations, the central argument of my dissertation is that despite the disavowal of explicitly racist discourses and acceptance of the norms of racial equality, processes of racialization and the resulting constructions of race continue to be consequential at the level of international politics. Processes of racialization and the constructs of race constitute the conditions of possibility for certain discourses and practices that produce and reproduce structures of inequality and inclusion/exclusion. To put it differently, I argue that processes of racialization and the resulting constructs of race continue to have constitutive effects in the (re)production of world orders through the underlying belief that humanity is hierarchically divided into discrete groups, each defined by immutable and *ahistoric* characteristics and that interactions between such groups are if not determined, at least partially shaped by, the nature of these essential differences. Furthermore, racialization at the global level takes place within the liberal world order with its prevailing norms of racial equality and juridical sovereignty that are accepted to be the only legitimate framework to provide and guarantee freedom and equality for individuals.

The objective of the present chapter is to develop the theoretical framework for understanding the role of the idea of race and the processes of racialization in the contemporary liberal international order that is characterized as post-colonial and marked by the legal and normative recognitions of anti-racism. I contend that this task requires us to take two related steps. First, it is necessary to understand how the idea of race, i.e. the acceptance that humanity is divided into different racial categories with differing inherent abilities, became entrenched through the history of modernity. Second, we need to understand how racial categorizations are fluid and open to change through social constructions, i.e. even if the idea of race still prevails, how can racial categorizations change in terms of both who is included in which groups and how these groups are defined through processes of racialization. Taking these two steps would enable us to see how race as a social construct changes although racialized groups have always been characterized through essentialist ascriptions.

The first part of what follows is devoted to developing a conceptual and historical genealogy of the ways in which race has been thought through Western modernity. I argue that the resilience of the idea of race emanates from the racialized character of European modernity that translated human difference to racial difference through its interpretation of the colonial experience, rationality and empiricism. The resulting racial categorizations and identities of self and other heavily depend on and bear the marks of a Western sense of superiority (articulating diverse markers such as Christian, civilized, and white together in constituting the Western/non-Western or white/non-white dichotomies) that not only limits the possibility of non-western subjects for participating

in the contemporary world order as equal members, but further views them as threats against this order and constructs them as enemies and hence targets. This racialized legacy of modernity continues to haunt the contemporary world order as the social constructs of race became so deeply entrenched that it is very difficult to think of self and others without reference to race. Therefore, one of my main contentions is that an understanding limited to viewing anti-racism only in terms of the acceptance and internalization of explicit norms is not enough to comprehend the import of the deeply entrenched ways of thinking about and acting on race that were characteristic of Western modernity and liberalism.

While the first section aims to theorize the historicity of the entrenchment of the idea of race, the second part turns to the historical variation in the usage and meaning of the term race. There, I argue that theorizing the role of race in our contemporary global order first requires a social constructivist conceptualization of race that would recognize the dangers of essentialism, which continues to characterize many contemporary approaches to the notion of race, and enable us to deal with such dangers. I develop a social constructivist conceptualization of *racialization* that explains how racial categories and meanings are (re)produced and transformed through social and political struggles. Secondly, I present a theoretical framework to conceptualize the constitution of world orders and hegemony that would help us recognize the modes and possibilities of change and stability in order to conceptualize racialization in the contemporary world order. Lastly, I present a brief overview of how racialization happens in the contemporary world order.

Historical Lineages

The emergent consensus among historians is that the concept of race is a modern phenomenon, at least in Europe and the Americas. Although human collectivities developed group identities and articulated such identities through different criteria throughout history, including physical attributes of individuals, the hierarchical and exclusive racial categorizations started to emerge in Europe by the late medieval period and evolved to “scientific racism” in the nineteenth century through the rise of modern natural philosophy and its concern with taxonomy in the eighteenth century. It is in the West that the logic of racism was fully developed and implemented in the last six centuries, and it is that form of racism that had greater impact on world history than any other ways of categorizing human difference that can be found in other eras or geographical regions.

As Audrey Smedley maintains ethnic groups have always existed in the sense that clusters of people living in demarcated areas develop lifestyles and language features that distinguish them from others and they perceive themselves as being separate societies with distinct social histories (1998:691). In order to distinguish between members and outsiders all human groups seem to develop some type of group identity that can be based on tribal membership, kinship, spatial, linguistic, or religious characteristics. The articulation of this identity in corporeal, “phenotypic” terms can also be found in early texts and across geographies (Winant 2001:38). For instance, Kemp argues that the ancient Egyptians “delighted in type-casting their subdivision of foreigners. ... By means of clear conventions of classification, using facial shape, skin color and dress, they

identified particular groups” (2006: 23). Similarly, Frank Dikotter's (1992) *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* and Bernard Lewis' (1971) *Race and Color in Islam* both claim to have uncovered histories of racial thinking in, respectively, China and Islam (a term which Lewis translates geographically as the Middle East), and they assert that this form of thinking developed many centuries before the existence of Western racial science. Dikotter asserts the virulence of “racial consciousness” and “racial discrimination” among elite groups in both ancient and medieval Chinese society (pp. 2-3) as he translates Chinese terms (zu, zhong, zulei, minzu, zhongzu, renzhong) as race to stress the biological rather than the socio-cultural aspects of different peoples (pp. viii-ix; 2-3). Although they did not have the modern race concept based on biology, according to Isaac, the ancient Greeks and Romans nevertheless held proto-racist views that attributed “to groups of people common characteristics considered to be unalterable because they are determined by external factors or heredity” (2004: 38). Similarly McCoskey (2012) maintains that, the scholarly consensus that skin color was insignificant in the construction of ancient racial ideology notwithstanding, the ancients thought racially and that ancient representations of race influenced the development of modern racism.

Nevertheless, the view that ancient civilizations were characterized by the existence of racial thinking and proto-racism, is not universally shared. Hannaford (1996), explains the claims about the existence of racial thought in the ancient and medieval worlds as being almost entirely an invention of nineteenth century historians and pseudo-historians (such as Enlightenment biologists and zoologists) constructing huge *a priori* schemes for the universal classification of species. More specifically, Alastair

Bonnett finds Dikoter's application of "race" to pre-modern material to be highly problematic and argues that the term which Dikoter privileges as a synonym for race, "zu" refers mainly to "established, historical peoples" rather than to a discourse concerned with the objective classification of natural differences (1998: 1032). Thus, Bonnett argues that although Dikoter draws the ancient and medieval Chinese tradition of calling certain Chinese people white into his racialized schema, what emerges from Dikoter's sources is not a scientific but a self-consciously symbolic, mytho-poetic, rhetoric of white identity. Accordingly, although it is true that the Chinese perceived their own skin to be white and employed the category 'white' to help define their social collectivity, as whiteness was used to distinguish Chinese from non-Chinese peoples, "this attribute does not appear to have become fetishized to the exclusion of other physical traits" such as notions of smell and hair-color (p. 1033). Rather than an objective category (i.e. as in the notion that all Europeans are white irrespective of their skin complexion) whiteness for Chinese is descriptive, and it does not imply that other peoples could not be as, or even more, white in appearance.⁶ Color-coded identities and discrimination existed in the medieval "Middle East" as well, as the term "white" was routinely used to identify Middle Eastern peoples and distinguish them from darker skinned others, and white complexion was associated with membership of the social elite⁷. Nevertheless Bonnett emphasizes that:

... in neither society do we find the kind of fetishization of whiteness, its use as a central icon of identity, later evident among Europeans. The positive connotations

6 Encounters with Europeans did not destabilize Chinese white identities either: Europeans were seen as ash-white (Bonnett, 1998: 1034)

7 Arab slave merchants assigned the worst tasks to their dark skinned slaves while assigning more complex labor to light or tawny-skinned slaves (Fredrickson 2002: 29)

of whiteness were not reified into a natural attribute. The association of whiteness with positive qualities was far from being universal in pre-modern societies (1036).

Accordingly, referring to physical attributes to categorize and explain human difference does not necessarily imply the existence of a hierarchical and exclusive racial order, and whether such description of human difference through physical characteristics can be seen as pro-racist is a subject of debate among scholars. Kemp warns that, even when the ancient Egyptians' stereotyping was accompanied by demeaning opinions of the foreigner:

These measures [attempts at border control to check immigration] reflected a wish to control those who might enter and pose a threat to the lives and property of Egyptians. They did not aim to keep the country racially separate. Demeaning generalizations about foreigners and attempts to bar them from entering did not express absolute values but were heavily dependent upon context. Whatever their sense of superiority, Egyptians did not translate it into exclusion laws or into customs and behavior which formed an effective barrier (Kemp 2006: 26).

Not only the Egyptians, but Greek and Roman empires as well, tended to incorporate the peoples they encountered and conquered despite their physical and cultural differences. These ancient empires encompassed peoples with varied skin colors, hair textures and facial features, yet, biological variations among human groups were not given significant social meaning (Smedley 1998; 2005). Most ancient writers, including Aristotle, explained such differences as dependent on environmental factors such as the climate, and such physical differences did not constitute obstacles against social integration. Hannaford (1996) argues that in Greece and Rome the idea of race as an organizing principle was absent because the reconciliation of the bloody relationships found in family, tribe and clan with the wider demands of the community depended on

the development of the conceptions of politics and “the civic.” Accordingly, until the fifth century, the major divisions between people were understood as being between the civic and the barbarous (Hannaford 1996: 14). Nevertheless, “barbarians were not irredeemably so,” emphasizes Smedley as “nothing in the values of the public life denied the transformability of even the most backward of barbarians” (1998: 693). Along the same lines, Snowden points out that “ancient slavery was color blind,” as both whites and blacks were slaves, and that the ancient world “never developed a concept of the equivalence of slave and black; nor did it create theories to prove that blacks were more suited to slavery than others” (1996: 123).⁸ These accounts demonstrate that Egyptians, Greeks and Romans neither attached special stigma to one's skin color, nor did they develop hierarchical notions of race “whereby highest and lowest positions in the social pyramid were based on color” (Snowden 1983: 122).

It can be claimed that these societies were ethnocentric, in the sense that they believed in the superiority of their own culture and lifestyle, yet many historians recognize that race and racism are not mere ethnocentric dislike and distrust of the Other. Ethnocentrism and ethnic conflict are widespread and often have deep historical roots, but they are not necessarily universal or inevitable (Smedley 2005: 18). The difference between ethnocentrism and racism is that while ethnicity was recognized as plastic and transmissible, race conveyed the notion of differences that could not be transcended: despite the existence of disparaging and discrimination, assimilation is an option and

⁸ Similarly, in *Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks*, Snowden argues that “the careers of Negroes and other dark-skinned peoples in predominantly white societies illustrate another notable aspect of the racial pattern in antiquity; blacks suffered no detrimental distinctions that excluded them from opportunities -occupational, economic, or cultural- available to other newcomers in alien lands (1983: 94)

expectation for the “ethnically” different, whereas the message for the racialized other is “no matter how much like us you are, you will remain apart” (Steinberg 1989, 42). Accordingly, it is when the differences that might otherwise be considered ethnocultural are viewed as innate, indelible, and unchangeable that a racist attitude exists (Fredrickson, 2002: 5). Racism as such is more than theorizing about human differences or sense of superiority against other groups, as it “sustains or proposes to establish a *racial order*, a permanent group hierarchy that is believed to reflect the laws of nature of the decrees of God” (6). It is this sense of unalterability and exclusion, not just being based on biology, that characterizes the modern notions of race and racism, the formation of which started in the late medieval era and culminated in “scientific racism” of the 19th century. However, it should also be noted that, to the extent that culture is assumed to be unchangeable and essentialized, extreme forms of ethnocentrism can turn to racism as well. It is the contention of this dissertation that the contemporary form of racialization depicts cultures as unchanging and determinative so as to allow “culture” to do the work of biological race and function as the basis of hierarchy and exclusion.

The word “race” entered the Spanish, Italian, French, English and Scottish languages during the period 1200-1500 and was a general categorizing term similar to and interchangeable with such terms as type, kind, sort, breed and species. Throughout the Middle Ages and up until the 17th century, religion and language were the most important criteria of identity (Hannaford 1996; Smedley and Smedley 2005). However, it was within this language of religion, specifically through the tension between the universal claims of Christianity and exclusionary treatment of particular non-Christians

that the early precedents of racism emerged.

The attitudes of European Christians towards Jews became more hostile in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and laid a foundation for the racism that later developed (Fredrickson, 2002: 19). It can be argued that the first real anticipation of modern racism was the treatment of Jewish converts to Christianity in fifteenth and sixteenth century Spain. In order to establish a uniformly Christian state, the Catholic monarchs Isabel and Ferdinand expelled first the Jews in 1492, and then the Muslims in 1502. Large numbers of both groups converted to Christianity to avoid expulsion, but the authenticity of their conversion was questioned and not only their religious faith and practices but also their lineage were subject to the Inquisition. Those who converted to Christianity were identified and discriminated against due to the belief held by some Christians that the impurity of their blood made them incapable of experiencing a true conversion (Hannaford 1996, 122–126; Fredrickson 2002, 31–35). The discrimination based on the doctrine of purity of blood (*limpieza de sangre*) was more racial than religious as it represented “the stigmatization of an entire ethnic group on the basis of deficiencies that allegedly could not be eradicated by conversion or assimilation” (Fredrickson, 2002: 33).

As Spanish society was being purged of Jews, Moors and other converted descendants, Spain was also colonizing the New World and encountering another kind of difference. Starting with the fifteenth century, exploration and voyages around the world produced numerous encounters with distant lands and peoples. An early precedent of conceptualizing the difference of newly encountered peoples lies in the attitude of the Spanish during the conquest and colonization of the Canary Islands. While the native

Canarians were first seen as “wild men” and enslaved, upon the church's protest that reducing such “innocent” pagans to servitude hindered their conversion, the surviving indigenes were eventually freed, converted, and successfully assimilated through intermarriage into the Spanish settler population (Fredrickson, 2002: 36). The ensuing conquest of the Americas and the conceptual turmoil about human differences reflect this bifurcated view of others as representing either primal innocence or subhumanity. Columbus' encounter with the Native Americans reflects this bifurcated image as well: he viewed those Indians who greeted him with friendliness as simple children of nature who could be converted to Christianity whereas the hostile Indians were seen as “cannibals” who must be subdued by force or exterminated (36). The dichotomous image of the Indian as either a noble savage to be civilized or a wild beast who could at best be tamed and at worst should be exterminated underlies the ensuing debates about how to conceptualized human difference encountered in the New World.

Todorov maintains that “it is in fact the conquest of America that heralds and establishes our present identity ... [No date] is more suitable, in order to mark the beginning of the modern era, than the year 1492”(1984:5). Initially, the accounts of such encounters, particularly through travelogues, revealed a sense of wonder on the part of the Europeans that had reported and commented on the differences between those distant peoples and the Europeans. In the early stages of discoveries and conquest, the crucial question of human variation, of “difference” was widely addressed both informally and officially. At first, Europeans needed to make sense of that difference. Pagden explains that, “For all Europeans, the events of October 1492 constituted a 'discovery'. Something

of which they had had no prior knowledge had suddenly presented itself to their gaze. A 'New World' had now to be incorporated into their cosmographical, geographical, and, ultimately, anthropological understanding" (1993:5). According to Pagden, the discovery of America posed for Europe "the most daunting of the problems;" "the possibility, and for many the impossibility, of cultural commensurability"(2). Where things were incommensurable, or when they did not conform to the pre-existing European 'conceptual grid,' they were treated as marvels and wonders (10). In *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (1992) Greenblatt also views the accounts of early modern travelogues and descriptions of the New World in terms of marvel and wonder, claiming that wonder is the primary emotional response to radical difference, preceding reason.

However, while for Greenblatt wonder can lead either to renouncing or to legitimating possession of the new territories, implying that we have the possibility of choice, for Pagden, Todorov and others, the European sense of superiority limited that choice from the beginning. A much cited example is the famous debate between Sepulveda and las Casas, held at the behest of the Spanish Crown, concerned with the Indians' possession of reason and their status as humans. In this debate the terms of discussion seem to be religious at first glance: "Did the Americans have souls? Were they, then, humans to whom their conquerors would have obligations, or animals, who could be subjugated without limit, indeed harvested? Should they be converted to the true faith? Were they, perhaps, humans of an inferior type, naturally suited for slavery?" (Todorov, 1984; Winant, 2001: 28).

The terms of the debate seem to be religious at first glance, but we can also see that from the very beginning, the perceptions of the human difference constituted the ground for demarcations of inclusion/exclusion, as well as of equality/inequality. While in this debate between Sepulveda and las Casas, las Casas' argument, who claimed that the Indians possessed reason hence they could be converted to Christianity, prevailed, both perspectives indeed involved a radical commitment to transformation of the Indians and to the potential annihilation of the Indian culture. As Todorov argues, the Indians were caught in a double-bind built into the logic of this particular either/or: either they were seen as human, but their fate was to be converted to Christianity and be provided with an alternative civilization, or they were not seen as fully humans so they would be enslaved and their own culture would be destroyed (148). Therefore, according to Todorov, the destruction that accompanied the Spaniards' conduct could not have taken place, had it not been conditioned by their notion of the Indians as inferior beings, halfway between man and beast (146).

The belief in inferiority of the Indians was closely associated with the Europeans confidence in their own rationality and possession of language, which positioned them to understand the "other" to a much higher degree than the "other" is able to understand them. The resulting obliteration of one culture by another was as much conditioned by that sense of superiority as it was motivated by the desire for wealth. In this coincidence of discovery and destruction, Todorov sees a systematic attempt of Western Europe to eliminate the other, through the development of hermeneutics that combined understanding with conquest and the elimination of the other's voice and physical

subjugation: Since the period of the conquest, “for almost three hundred fifty years, Western Europe has tried to assimilate the other, to do away with an exterior alterity, and has in great part succeeded. Its way of life and its values have spread around the world; as Columbus wished, the colonized people have adopted our customs and have put on clothes” (45).

Similarly, for Pagden, what distinguishes the European response to such encounters in viewing their own culture as superior and the other cultures as inferior is that the European view was based “not merely upon an intuitive response to difference, but upon a claim about the way the world has been constructed” (6). Integral to that claim are the ideas that nature had been created in a state of potentiality, whose actuality could only be realized through the purposeful action of men; that transforming nature is a crucial part of what it is to be a man; and that using science to control nature was a sign of civility, whereas those who did not were either “savage” or “barbarian.” While nature was still conceptualized as a hierarchical system with assigned position and status for every being, classification of human races took place within a framework in which the European was perceived as the familiar and “civilized,” while the peoples of other lands were of “strange habits and mores” (Eze, 1997, 5).

However, it should also be noted that the religious idiom through which these early forms of racism were grounded was also limited by the universalism and the promise of Christianity: the salvation of the entire human race. Because these early forms of racism deviated from Christian universalism they lacked the systematic exposition and promulgation that would give them substantial ideological authority (Fredrickson, 2002:

51). It was not until the emergence of the scientific thought of the Enlightenment that modern racism based on physical topology was developed. Therefore through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the notion of race evolved from being a general categorizing term to signify common descent, and shared characteristics, to designate ethnic groups more specifically. In this process, Europeans' encounters with "Others" through geographical discoveries, the practice of slavery, and the rise of modern natural philosophy and its concern with taxonomy in the eighteenth century constituted important formative moments (Allen 1994; Hannaford 1996; Smedley 2005). By the Revolutionary era, the term race was widely used, and its meaning had solidified as a reference for social categories of Indians, Blacks, and Whites (Allen, 1994, 1997; A. Smedley, 1999). By the end of the eighteenth century, "race" and associated words suggesting commonality of descent or character were developed into popular modes of thought and expression in many European languages so that they constituted an idiom in which people related themselves to others and developed conceptions of their own attributes in the processes of constructing national identity and unity, and by the nineteenth century racism had become a powerful ideology of imperialistic policies (Hannaford 1996: 5-6; Banton, 1980: 21-2; Arendt, 1973). Race, then, signified a powerful ideology about human differences as well as an unprecedented way of structuring society. In this historical course from the fifteenth to the twentieth century "race thinking" evolved to racism through a process of mutual constitution of racial categorizations and the social, political and economic structures of the period.

With the Enlightenment's declaration of itself as the "Age of Reason," which was

based on the assumption that reason could historically only come to maturity in modern Europe, Enlightenment philosophy was instrumental in codifying and institutionalizing both the scientific and popular European perceptions of the human species. It can be argued that as the sense of wonder faded, the accounts of the initial encounters with the non-European others became a pillar on which racial categorizations were framed within the Enlightenment belief in rationality, progress and science, and the natives of the New World were to be seen as inalterably primitive and inferior in the developmental hierarchy.

Beyond those initial encounters, Western identities, and those of its others have continually been formed and created by actual and imagined encounters with the non-Western others of modernity (Hall 1992, Rattansi 1994). These formations took place within the processes of the capitalist construction of a global economy through imperial exploitation and colonial domination, as well as of the creation of modern-nation states, and in the development of Enlightenment thought. Thus, following the subjugation of the Americas, enslavement of Africa was another constitutive moment in affecting the development of racial categorizations. While slavery served the developing capitalist system that transversed the Atlantic and provided the exploitable mass labor nascent capitalism required, slave traders and plantation owners had a crucial interest in representing the blacks as fit for no other fate (Winant 2001, 25; Rattansi, 2007, 30-31). As a result of the European expansion into Africa and other parts of the world, corporeal properties of peoples, such as skin color, hair and other phenotypical differences, started to be seen within an epidermal schema employed to anchor difference and place different

groups of humankind into distinct types. In this process the globally integrated market economy of capitalism emerged through conquest and colonization and the increasingly complex distribution of labor required the creation of a worldwide racial division between Europe and the “others” (Winant, 2001, 25). This racial division also establishes a hierarchic conception of the world by the Western imperial powers. For instance the British constructed the world through a kind of civilizational league table: Division One included the White Anglo-Saxons with the rest of the European countries, Division Two comprised the “yellow barbarians,” Division Three was reserved for the “black savages” of Africa, and Australia as well as the “white Irish savages” (Hobson 2007: 592). Accordingly, the constructed inferiority of the “barbarians” and “savages” opened the way for the justification of imperial policies.

As Winant argues, only by ordering the social world along racial lines, only by assigning racial identities to all beings, only by generalizing a racial culture globally was the new world order able to constitute itself as a social structure at all (30). This racial ordering would have been impossible without the scientific inquiries into and efforts to categorize racial difference, which gained prominence during the Enlightenment. As the criteria of natural history and the idea of a naturally ordered hierarchy became the basis for inquiry into legitimate government, Enlightenment writers contributed to the emergence of a self-conscious idea of race. The shaping of the Western identities and of their “others” took place as this modern racial order was shaping as an imperial order:

By evolving systems of enslavement and conquest that differentiated their 'nationals' (soldiers, settlers) from the proto-racial 'others' who were the conquered and enslaved, imperial nations also consolidated themselves. They were not only the French, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British; they were also

the whites, the masters, the true Christians. A distinction crystallized between rulers and ruled that was readily 'phenotypified', corporealized. This duality, complicated eventually by creolism, and the sometimes ambiguous status of workers, soldiers and peasants ... nevertheless laid out the national-political axes of the modern racial order (Winant 2001, 23).

It is this legacy of the Enlightenment and the formation of Western identities within the imperial order that established the articulation of whiteness with Western superiority and Christianity that continues to underlie the contemporary processes of racialization. As will be shown in the following chapters, this legacy enables the contemporary racialization of Muslims, and of the debates about the rise of China through its continuous salience, despite the existence of the norms of anti-racism.

The development of a *scientific* theory of race was a product of fierce debates among scientists and philosophers at the end of the eighteenth century, and theories regarding the “nature” and the usefulness of the race category varied widely (Eigen and Larrimore, 2006, 1). While the varying positions adapted by the eighteenth century philosophers reveal a conflicted legacy of Enlightenment thought regarding the idea of race⁹, for many scholars the numerous writings on race by Hume, Kant and Hegel played a strong role in articulating Europe's sense not only of its cultural but also racial superiority (Eze, 1997, 5). In those writings, “reason” and “civilization” became almost

9 The recent debates regarding the relationship of Enlightenment philosophy and race reveal several lines of arguments. One line of arguments claims that, modern philosophy, or at least some of the major schools of thought within it -rationalism, empiricism, liberalism, social contract theory- is deeply racist (Goldberg 1993; Eze 1997; Mills 1997). On the other hand, others argue that racism expressed by some major modern philosophers has no significant implications for their epistemology or ethics, and can be detached from their philosophical views (Valls 2005; Malik 1996). Furthermore, there are arguments about whether rationalism or empiricism were compatible with racist doctrines. Bracken (1978) and Chomsky (1975) argue that rationalism is inhospitable to racism, but empiricism lends itself to racist doctrines. Against this, Searle (1976) and Squadrito (1979) argue that historically it is empiricism that has been the more progressive force.

synonymous with “white” people and Northern Europe, while unreason and savagery were conveniently located among the non-whites, the “black,” the “red,” the “yellow,” outside Europe. Furthermore, it can be argued that such categorizations were not merely consequences of the efforts to justify unequal economic or political relations but were also epistemological products of the Enlightenment way of thinking and had their own set of logics with specific assumptions, concerns and goals.

To begin with, the Enlightenment’s epistemological drive to name the emergent set of conditions, to analyze, to catalog and map them led to the creation of scientific catalogs of racial otherness and of the varieties of racial others. While anthropology and biology defined a classificatory order of racial groupings along physical and cultural matrices, general categories like ‘exotic’, ‘oriental’, and ‘East’, as well as more specific ones like ‘Negro’ and ‘Indian,’ emerged along with epistemological subdisciplines like ‘sinology’. Spatial distinctions between East and South also defined differences within the order of the exotic: while being a place of violence and lascivious sensuality, those of the East were acknowledged to have civilization, language and culture; lacking culture and language Africa of the South was the Old World of prehistory. Correspondingly, there started to emerge the racial self-definition of the West with its own hierarchical scales of classification moving upward from dark-skinned and passionate Southern Europeans to fair skinned and rational Northerners. Furthermore, the catalog of national characteristics emerged in lock step with the classification of races (Goldberg, 1993: 29-30).

For instance, a rather well-known quote from Hume’s *Of National Character*, is

offered to reveal not merely the existence of racial categorizations but also the inherent racism of his views:

I am apt to suspect the negroes [sic] and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures among them, nor arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tatars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom, none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people without education will start up amongst us and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly. (Eze 1997: 33)

However, this footnote should also be contextualized within Hume's essay, where he sets out to adjudicate different claims about the determinants of national characters, i.e. moral or physical. By moral causes, he means social considerations such as custom, government, economic conditions, and foreign relations, whereas physical causes are the qualities of the air and climate, "which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving particular complexion, which, though reflection and reason may sometimes overcome it, will yet prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners." (31) After setting the terms of the debate as such, Hume is quick to dismiss the physical causes as the determinants of national characters and differentiating between the Jews, Arabs, Greeks, Turks etc -with the English being superior to all, he insists that national characters are a function almost completely of moral causes; where the physical causes of the air and climate are allowed

to have some effects, such as in differentiating between the inhabitants of the far north and of the tropics, even such effects were owing more to mediation through habits such as poverty and indolence. Thus, while viewing *national* differences as social and allowing exceptions in offering generalizations about them, for Hume, *racial* differences were inherent: all species of men, other than whites were *naturally* inferior to the whites.

Hume's justification of this claim was empirical: only whites had produced anything notable and ingenious in the arts or sciences, and even the lowest of white peoples has something to commend them, while the "negroes," even those living in Europe had no accomplishments they could cite. Original natural difference between the "breeds" could be the only explanation, and furthermore, this inherent nature admits of no exceptions (Goldberg 1993: 31).

In *Observations on the Feeling of Beautiful and Sublime*, Kant cites Hume's footnote approvingly: "So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color. The religion of fetishes so widespread among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry that sinks as deeply into the trifling as appears to be possible to human nature." (Eze, 1997: 55) While Hume identified the English as superior among all national characters, at the top of Kant's classification "the German ... has a fortunate combination of feeling, both in that of the sublime and in that of the beautiful" (surpassing both the Englishman and the French who seem to have predominantly only one half of the feeling), whereas the "Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling." Examining the "relation of the sexes" "in the lands of the black," he cites a story and concludes as such:

Of course, Father Labat reports that a Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for haughty treatment towards his wives, answered: ‘You whites are indeed fools, for first you make great concessions to your wives, and afterward you complain when they drive you mad.’ And it might be that there were something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.” (57).

Thus, deriving a “Negro’s stupidity” from the fact of his blackness, Kant reworks Hume’s correlation of race and nature back into a strictly causal relation (See Goldberg 1993: 32). In *On the Different Races of Man* (1775), Kant argues that there are four distinct varieties of human species (the races of Whites; the Negro race; the Hunnic-Mongolian or Kalmuck- race; and the Hindu or Hindustanic race) each with specific “natural dispositions.” In his lectures on *Physical Geography*, Kant’s opinions on the geographic distribution of peoples: “the tallest and most beautiful people ...are on the parallel... which runs through Germany” and his hierarchically arranged innate characteristics of the races remains the same as in the *Observations*: “the inhabitant of the temperate parts of the world, above all the central part, has a more beautiful body, works harder, is more jocular, more controlled in his passions, more intelligent than any other race of people in the world”, as “humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites.” (Eze,1997: 58).

While Hume’s empiricism encouraged the tabulation of perceptible differences between peoples, and from this he deduced their natural differences, Kant’s rationalism proposed initial innate distinctions to explain the perceived behavioral disparities. Thus, both rationalism and empiricism, resting ultimately upon assumptions about the truth as the correspondence of idea to reality and knowledge as mind mirroring nature, are in their own way equally open to racist conjecture and, served historically to authorize

racist exclusions (Goldberg, 1993: 45). Furthermore in the nineteenth century, utilitarianism came to rationalize racial rule by justifying colonialism and systematizing its institutions. In utilitarian theory, each social subject is treated as equally and impartially as the best judges of their own happiness, of the goals they set themselves and of what they take their happiness to consist in. However, in practice the natives of India and Africa were increasingly characterized as less than fully human, or pre-human. By viewing the natives as less-than human, colonial rule was justified in the name of broadening their liberty by bringing them up to the general civilizing and utilitarian benefits of western development. Viewed to be as children, the natives were to be directed in their development by rational, mature administrators concerned with maximizing the well-being of all. Thus the 'civilized' subjects furnished the criterion of calculation and hence controlled the outcome (35). Although, the paternalistic colonial administration was justified as such “until the governed sufficiently mature and can assume the civilized model of reasoned self government,” the point to be emphasized is that the standards by which any measure of equality and civilization were set and remained uniform as the European and Western: in issuing moral commands autonomous agents could impose upon others their own principles and impose them in the name of universality and objectivity (33).

David Goldberg maintains that one way for Enlightenment philosophers, which were committed to moral notions of equality and autonomy, to avoid inconsistency on the question of racialized subordination was to deny the rational capacity of the natives, to deny the very condition of their humanity (1993: 32). From very early on, as

rationality became a mark of human subjectivity so also a condition of necessity to be extended full moral treatment, rational capacity set the limits upon the natural equality of all those beings ordinarily taken to be human. Goldberg's argument is that the moral order of modernity fails to explicitly exclude racial/discriminatory exclusions while implicitly authorizing them by constituting racial others outside the scope of morality. While moral formalism of modernity establishes itself as the practical application of rationality, "as the rational language and the language of rationality," it is concerned principally with a complete, rationally derived system of self-justifying moral reasons logically constructed from a single basic principle. However, "in ignoring the social fabric and concrete identities in virtue of which moral judgment and reason are individually effective, in terms of which the very content of the moral categories acquires its sense and force, moral modernity fails to recognize the series of exclusions upon which the state of modernity is constituted" (39). Thus, when viewed against the culturally developed and articulated language of everyday and intellectual life in terms of which morality is lived out (the thick description in terms of which the moral notions apply or fail to apply, and in terms of which discriminations are made and acquire legitimacy), the commitments to principles of universality appear to be sustained only by the reinvented and rationalized exclusions of racial particularity.

Therefore, in this view of the relationship between racism and Enlightenment philosophy, racial ideologies are traced back to the categories of thought invented by the Enlightenment. Accordingly, concepts of reason and universalism and scientific methods of observation and categorization bear the imprint of racial thought because through such

categories a racial typology became manifest. To put it differently, the very means that the Enlightenment philosophies developed for understanding the world also led them to divide humanity on racial lines.

Against this, critics argue that belief in reason, espousal of the scientific method and a universalist conviction do not of themselves imply a racial viewpoint. From this second line of thought, Kenan Malik claims that Goldberg uses the term modernity to mean at one and the same time a historical period, a specific form of society and a particular intellectual outlook and hence conflates two different meanings of modernity: modernity in the sense of an intellectual or philosophical outlook which is associated with the Enlightenment and holds that it is possible to apprehend the world through reason and science; and modernity that came to mean the particular society in which these ideas found expression, i.e. capitalism (1996: 41). According to Malik, we should not assume that the racialization of social discourse was implicit in the categories of Enlightenment thought, but it was the way these ideas and concepts expressed themselves through the development of modern capitalist society that resulted in their reification, e.g. the idea of reason was transformed into a transcendental category, and social subjects were transformed into an abstract atomistic subject (42). In this view, through Enlightenment philosophy, humanity had for the first time a concept of human universality that could transcend perceived differences, and racial difference and inequality can only have meaning in a world which has accepted the possibility of social equality and common humanity. Yet, although the logic of Enlightenment universalism was at heart emancipatory, the particular form adopted by Enlightenment universalism

depended on the balance of social forces, and where social forces drawing on the logic of Enlightenment discourse were weak, the contradictory attitude of the capitalist class towards equality ensured that increasing limits were placed on its expression (68-69). Accordingly, it was not racial categorization but the social needs of modern society and the particular forms of capitalist society that undermined the emancipatory potential of Enlightenment ideology and created new divisions that seemed to be as permanent and natural as the old ones of feudalism. As social problems augmented through the nineteenth century, the conviction that inequality was in the natural order of things solidified, and it was out of this conviction that the modern concept of race arose (70). At the source of the social meaning of race in modernity, then, lies the contradiction between an ideological commitment to equality and the persistence of inequality as a practical reality. Race accounted for social inequalities by attributing them to nature.

Although Malik sets up his argument as a criticism of Goldberg's, it is actually missing the point of the latter. For Goldberg, as discussed above, the contradiction between the formal commitment to equality and the concrete lived practices of inequality is crucial to understand the racialization of modernity. In other words, Goldberg is not arguing that concepts and categories of the Enlightenment gave way to racial categorization on an intellectual plane alone, but it was in the way in which modes of thinking (rationalism, empiricism, methods of classification and ordering as well as the norms of beauty and value) came to make sense of reality and concrete particularities that the restricted nature of their formal universalism became apparent.

However, there is another dimension of the debate, a central theme of almost

anything written about race in modernity, that puts Goldberg's and Malik's views in contradistinction to each other. It might assume different forms, but at the center it is the debate about the relationship between race and class. In respect to this, according to Malik, racialization occurs at the level of ideological justifications, or at the level of superstructure (even if he doesn't use the terminology himself). But for Goldberg, racial definition and discourse have from their outset followed an independent set of logics, related to and intersecting with economic, political-legal and cultural considerations, but with assumptions, concerns, projects and goals that can properly be identified as their own (27). For instance, he asks that, while slavery may be explained largely (though not exhaustively) in economic terms, why was it at this time that racial difference came to define fitness for enslavement, and why some kinds of racial difference rather than others -in other words, why would economic exploitation discriminate, and do it in that specific way? (26). If the racial definitions have their own logic, then, emergence of racial difference on its own terms as a significant feature of social definition could then be invoked as the rationalized grounds for enslavement (27).

Malik's argument is not necessarily economic reductionist in the strict sense of the term, as he, too, like almost any other contemporary scholar of race, advocates for historical contextualization, but the way in which he takes for granted the universalism of Enlightenment to signify the emancipatory project, and establishes the chain of causality in a uni-directional way ("is it not race that gives rise to inequality but inequality that gives rise to race" p. 39) precludes the question of whether there is indeed something about the abstract and formal universalism of Enlightenment and modernity that gave

way to racial exclusions. Furthermore, he seems to explain away the function of racialized difference merely as a justification and naturalization of (economic) inequality whereas the history of racial discriminations (to the point of extermination), shows that racialized orders might create their own dynamics that cannot be reduced to reasons of economic inequality.

Fanon's analysis of colonial domination is but one case in point. For Fanon, colonial domination was much broader than economic exploitation. He argues that, “in the colonies the economic substructure is also superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich” (1963:40). Fanon's account suggests that colonial racism should not be seen as a (superstructural) consequence of economic imperialism, but as the organizing principle through which specific forms of surplus-value extraction took place. Fanon himself put it thus:

...this world, divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species. The originality of the colonial context is that economic reality, inequality, and the immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities.' (1963: 39-40).

It is indeed in this historicity of colonialism and modernity that the classifications and taxonomies of race were formed and normalized. These normalized race relations, as Hesse argues “were actually constituted through the colonial designations of Europeanness and non-Europeanness in various assemblages of social, economic, ecological, historical and corporeal life” (2007: 646). The colonially constituted “European/non-European” distinction was biologized and territorialized onto diverse human bodies as colonial difference was translated as racial difference throughout

modernity. Thus, I argue that it is this racialized nature of modernity, as well as the deeply entrenched legacies of the Enlightenment and modernity, which shape the contemporary forms of liberalism with its ways of thinking, norms and values, in which the resilience of the idea of race resides. Furthermore, modernity's epistemological dependence on formal and abstract universalism, which in reality requires exclusionary concrete particularisms, as well as on empiricism and rationalism, might explain how and why the idea of race continues to exist despite the numerous denunciations by science about its biological foundations.

Nevertheless, despite its resilience it is also the case that race is not a static concept with a single sedimented meaning but has an adaptive capacity to define population groups, and by extension, social agents as self and other, differently in various historical moments. Understanding the historical fluidity of racial categories and possibilities of transformations in racial identities directs our attention to the social constructedness of race, and its specific historical configurations in the contemporary world order.

A Racialized World Order?

As one of the leading scholars of the “racial formation” approach, Howard Winant is hugely influential in promoting the argument that race has no fixed meaning but is constructed and has transformed socio-historically through competing political projects, as well as through the necessary and ineluctable link between the structural and cultural dimensions of race in the United States. His observations about the shift in racial politics after World War II would be shared by many other scholars, especially by the

theorists of the new racism. Furthermore, he attempts to analyze the new racial hegemony as a global phenomenon. However, as laudable as Winant's account is, it also illustrates some significant theoretical and conceptual problems, which are also common to other similar approaches that, although providing some valuable starting points, nevertheless fall short of developing comprehensive analytical tools for understanding the contemporary global racial order. In this section, through a critique of Winant's conceptualization of the new global racial hegemony, I argue that existing constructivist accounts of a racialized global order are under-developed and suffer from remnants of conceptualizing race as a biological, immanent feature of human beings and groups.

To begin with, in their groundbreaking *Racial Formation in the United States*, Omi and Winant define race as:

a concept that signifies and symbolizes socio-political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for the purpose of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process (1994, 55).

This approach to understand race as a fluid social construct where the racial order is organized and enforced by the continuity and reciprocity between micro-level and macro level social relations is the basis of Omi and Winant's theory of "racial formation," i.e. "the process by which social, economic and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings" (61). Later, Winant attempts to theorize the continuing effects of racialization in the contemporary era at a global level in *The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, Justice* (2004). In this work one of the main objectives of Winant is to "untangle the

dynamics of a world racial system that has undergone a comprehensive crisis and reorganization over the past few decades” (x). He characterizes this reorganization as a racial “break” or “rupture” that was a global political realignment and conceptualizes it as a transition from racial domination to racial hegemony, which occurred in the later half of the twentieth century. Accordingly, this global shift in the worldwide racial system, which started after World War II and culminated in the 1960s, was a product of the converging of many challenges to the old forms of racial hierarchy; anticolonialism, antiapartheid, worldwide revulsion at fascism, the U.S. Civil Rights movement, and U.S.-USSR competition in the world's South all called white supremacy into question to an extent unparalleled in modern history. Nevertheless, Winant points out that following the worldwide anti-racist, democratizing tendency from the late 1940s on we are witnessing a second phase, which started in the 1970s, in which the anti-racist challenge was incorporated and contained as racism had adapted to the unprecedented set of democratic and egalitarian demands prevailing in the postwar order. According to Winant, therefore, a new racial politics developed: “a reformed variety that was able to concede much to racially based democratic and egalitarian movements, yet could still maintain a strong continuity with the legacies of imperial rule, conquest, enslavement, and so on.” (xiii).

The distinctive characteristic of the new racial hegemony is that while it incorporates many formerly oppositional viewpoints -rooted in the anti-racist movements that burgeoned after WWII- and promotes a ‘moderate’ reformism, the underlying social structure of racial exclusion and injustice remain largely untouched (xix). This new hegemony fosters the claim that “the world has entered a stage of post-racialism,” and

claims of color blindness and non-racialism, as well as appeals to cultural pluralism and meritocracy constitute its other central features. This leads Winant to argue that:

Thus, to comprehend the present racial system, whether globally or locally, requires us to move beyond concepts of white supremacy that have their origins in a world of explicit colonialism and out-front segregation and apartheid. Of course, I do not suggest that white supremacism ended, that segregation is now a thing of the past, or even that the colonial era has definitely been surpassed; rather I think that these socio-political structures have been transformed and regrooved in ways that demands new understandings and analyses from racism's critics and opponents. (xii).

Accordingly, he conceptualizes the contemporary global racial situation as fluid, contradictory and contentious. Globally, the North-South divide continues to be color-coded and relies on a worldwide racial division of labor, while indirect rule and debt traps sustain the racially organized exploitation of much of the world's population. Meanwhile the U.S. has grown used to its role as a leading superpower and culturally hegemonic society and displays a complex combination of the old and new racial systems: significant concession to anti-racist movements is countered with the utter repudiation of the movements' more radical demands so as to leave the questions about the distribution of income and wealth as well as of political participation largely off the agenda (19-21). Therefore, the conflicts generated by the anti-racism movements have been contained but not resolved, no new world racial system has yet been created; instead the problems of the old system have come to a head. Winant foresees that over the coming period both globally and locally, race will continue to play its traditional role of stigmatizing signifier, and political systems will continue to be organized racially; while incorporating the 'docile' racial others to the circuits of capital and exploiting their

labor, leaving those that are unwilling or unable to join in the illegal, dangerous and deadly zones of existence.

Winant's attempts to theorize the new contours of a global racial system are laudable as he emphasizes the fluid and constructivist nature of building a system of racial hegemony and as he points to the continuing salience of racial thinking. Nevertheless, his account is also typically beset with conceptual and theoretical problems that render such an analysis of global racial system vulnerable to problems. To begin with, I argue that Winant uses the concept of hegemony more as a short-cut signifier than a tool of analysis with theoretical leverage. In his analysis the most significant function of the concept of hegemony is to denote the end of “racial domination” and to introduce the possibility that some of the less radical demands of the anti-racist movements have been accepted by the system -hence, they have been “incorporated”- while exclusions and injustices based on race continue to shape individuals’ lives. There is also an emphasis on the fact that, though perhaps less explicitly and less unabashedly, white supremacy still exists and is powerful. This picture tells us that racial domination ceases to be total in the aftermath of the World War II, thanks to the concessions to the anti-racist movements, but not much about how the new “hegemony” is constructed: It seems like neither the structures of privilege nor the identity of the main actors who had been and continue to be benefiting from a system of global racial exploitation have changed much. The questions of what makes the continuation of the elements of the old racial formation possible and how they are incorporated to the new racial formation find no satisfactory answers either. Furthermore, Winant’s “worldwide racial system” seems

mostly to consist of adding national/domestic systems of racial formations together. While it is important to acknowledge that “racial conditions are generally understood to vary dramatically in distinct political, economic, and cultural contexts” (97), it is not clear whether there is anything specific to the “global racial system,” or whether it merely means that racial conditions are present in most national cases so it is a global system. “South” and “North” are used as nouns to signify pretty much the rich developed countries versus the poor underdeveloped ones in the same general way. I argue that, to a certain extent, all of these problems are emanating from a deeper and more problematic aspect of Winant’s approach: Despite all the emphasis on the social *constructedness* of race in the racial formation approach, the idea that there, indeed, are racial differences among different types of bodies continues to lurk behind the surface and reifies the concept. As quoted above, Omi and Winant conceptualize race as such:

... a concept that signifies and symbolizes sociopolitical conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for the purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process. There is no biological basis for distinguishing human groups along the lines of “race.” (2001: 317, n.1)

Elsewhere, Winant claims: “To be raceless is akin to being genderless. Indeed, when one cannot identify another’s race, a microsociological ‘crisis of interpretation’ results.” (1993: 5). Or: “One of the first things we notice about people when we meet them (along with their sex) is their race.” (Omi and Winant 1994: 59). These statements indicate that:

- a. there are different types of human bodies with different biologically based characteristics;
- b. some of these characteristics are socially and historically selected for racial signification;
- c. race is something clearly visible, as it is linked to one's

physiognomy; d. racial categorizations and identifications are inevitably connected to identities and identifications. Despite Winant's emphasis on social construction, Miles and Torres find in his approach the assumption that race is an objective quality inherent in a person's being, that every human being is a member of a race, and that such membership is inscribed in a person's visible appearance (1999: 31). Although it can be argued that these statements can be read as indicating that the social construction of race has become so deeply entrenched that one cannot think of self or others without reference to race, there is a deeper problem in invoking a visual form of corporeality in defining race. I argue that whether these statements imply that indeed there are racial differences among different types of bodies is the less important problem here: in an already racialized political order we attribute meaning to human bodies through racial categorization; that there is no biological basis does not make race less real. Nevertheless, I agree with Hesse's claim that this view "encourages a reading of race through some exclusive attachment or attribution to the body as a discrete entity" (2007: 645) and this constitutes a bigger problem: not taking into account full implications of the ways in which corporeality became the privileged idiom through which human difference was conceptualized in Western modernity. Once again, the body, the visible and empirical is posited to be the basis on which difference is conceptualized, at the expense of understanding the constitution of difference historically and politically, as a product of colonial relationality that *produced* the demarcations of difference *as racial* by subsuming a series of markers, such as land, climate, customs, language, bodies, history under the notion of "race."

The more practical implication of this problem is that reading race through corporeality is the most significant way in which race is reified. These approaches not only presume that “obvious” visible divisions such as black/white are inherent and precede the social processes of signification and attribution of meaning, they also imply the existence of “racial groups” as biological categories and hence as objects of sociological analysis by reifying the notion of race.¹⁰

One of the most striking aspects of popular and academic debates about the role and significance of race is the continuing prevalence of the concept of race despite the scientific acceptance that the notion of race has no basis in human biology¹¹. As Paul Gilroy puts it, when writing about race we easily give in to a “pious ritual in which we always agree that “race” is invented but are then required to defer to its embeddedness in the world and to accept that the demands for justice nevertheless requires us to enter the political arenas that it helps mark out” (1998: 842). To put it differently, the question is

10 Following the social transformations around questions of race that took place in the 1960s, there emerged a noticeable growth in theorisation of race and racism, and what is called the “sociology of race relations” in general. Michael Banton’s *Race Relations* (1967) and John Rex’s *Race Relations in Sociological Theory* (1970) were the two significant early examples of the scholarly research and debate in constituting the American “race relations” paradigm, and a highly dualistic vision of “racial conflict” between “blacks” and “whites” has been a long and well established structuring dynamic of the debate. This framework has also diffused across the globe, adopted, but also sometimes adapted, as in the British political uses of black (see Bonnett 1999: 203; Modood 1999).

11 Research in human genetics highlights that there is more genetic variation within than between human groups, where those groups are defined in terms of linguistic, geographic, and cultural boundaries. Although, human population history has led to correlation between genetic variation and geographic distribution, scientists argue that “genetic clusters are far from being equivalent to socio-political racial or ethnic categories.” Thus they “recognize that social experiences and conditions inform racial identity, making such identity a poor proxy for genetic ancestry,” and “caution against making the naïve leap to a genetic explanation for group differences in complex traits such as IQ scores, tendency towards violence, and degree of athleticism.” (Lee et.al 2008; 404-2)

why to implicitly or explicitly deploy a concept that we explicitly recognize as lacking biological validity. The responses to this question vary significantly: on the one hand race is still deployed as a category of analysis in order to explain individual and collective inequalities and discrimination; on the other hand some scholars explicitly reject using the concept of race analytically and politically, while others call for shifting the conceptual locus to the analysis of racisms and/or the processes of racialization. While the variety of these responses help us map out the contours of contemporary scholarship on questions of “race,” each of these positions also has implications regarding the questions of how to study the effects of racial categorizations as well as of how to resist against various forms of racism. The demise of scientific racism and the ascendant claims of the scientific community that deny the existence of any biological basis for dividing the human species into groups based on the idea that certain physical traits, such as skin color, are tied to attributes of behavior, intellect and morality reinforce the idea that “race” does not exist as a fact of nature, but “it” does exist to the extent that “race” is an integral part of a classificatory system through which a racialized social order is reproduced and maintained (Torres et al.1999: 5).

Indeed, the very fact that, despite the existence of such scientific arguments at least since the 1930s, people continue to believe that races exist and produce social consequences can be offered as a solid ground for continuing to use “race” as an analytical category. What happens then is that, while academics “deny” the existence of race as based on biological categories, they are nevertheless forced to use the language of (binary) racial categorizations in order to speak about the effects that the social

constructions of race create. The big challenge in this picture lies in the question of whether by using “race” as an analytical category in order to claim that individual and collective behavior is determined or motivated by a really-existing phenomenon labeled “race” contributes to legitimizing and reinforcing the widespread public belief that “races” exist (Miles and Torres 1999: 20). The possible problem here reveals a risk for all academic work on race: on the one hand conflating the language of everyday common sense regarding “race” with academic discourse leads not only to a lack of distinction between the object and tools of academic study but also to further reification of race by the analyst beyond the practices in everyday life. On the other hand, the resulting creeping of essentialist assumptions into analyses gives way to studies that, even if they start from constructivist premises, end up conflating racial categories with existing groups and building up arguments that take the social, not biological, pre-existence of racial groups such as “blacks” and “whites” for granted and overlook the processes of signification and politics of categorization.¹² In this process, the challenge of analyzing how the processes through which the population is divided into categorical groups and meaning of such categories are produced through significations get to be overlooked.

Indeed racial categorizations reveal considerable fluidity across and within different socio-political systems. For instance, while in the United States racial classification has historically been structured around a binary black/white color line (constructing white as a pure category and indicating anyone who is racially mixed as non-white), in South Africa three racial categories are recognized: black (referring to any

¹² See Mara Loveman's (1999) critique of Anthony Marx's *Making Race in the US, South Africa and Brazil: Taking Making Seriously*.

member of any aboriginal tribe of Africa), white (anyone who in appearance is white), and colored (person who is not white or black). On the other hand in Brazil a series of intermediate categories indicating variations between lighter and darker ends of the scale reveal a less strict, though no less inegalitarian, conception of race. The fluidity of racial categorizations, even in the black/ white framework of the U.S., become further illuminated when the changes in the category of “white” are observed historically. Accordingly, the category of “white” has always been subject to challenges as diverse groups of people struggled to be included. For instance Roediger (1991) shows how the Irish, who were faced with serious discrimination upon immigration aggressively distinguished themselves from the black slaves and freedmen, and used them as a springboard to assert their own whiteness (Also see Saxton 2003 and Allen 1994). While the Irish took nearly a century to be included in the category of “white”, Italians, Greeks, and Eastern Europeans were considered ineligible in the same category of white well into the twentieth century¹³ (Sweet 2005, 107-108).

Given the social and historical fluidity of racial categorizations, understanding how the processes of racialization construct racial categories requires us to distinguish between “race as an analytical concept” which bears the danger of reproducing directly the common sense ideologies of the everyday world, and “the idea of race” which directs attention to the processes of structuring and representation through which people come to use the idea of race as a mark of difference. The latter approach would continually

13 “Before World War II, some Italian-American children in the South were forced to attend segregated schools for children of the Black endogamous group. Eleven Italian-Americans who tried to pass as members of the White group were lynched in 1891 New Orleans and five more were lynched for the same reason outside the Madison Parish, Louisiana courthouse in 1899” (Sweet, 2005; 108)

emphasize that seeing race in one's physical attributes is not inevitable, but is a product of a processes of signification which entails the idea that one's skin color marks their social being: it is not the case that people *see* "race," but that "they observe certain combinations of real and sometimes imagined somatic and cultural characteristics, to which they attribute meaning with the idea of "race" (Miles and Torres, 1999: 32). To put it differently, the biological referents are always socially constructed, meaning that rather than referring to a pre-given or already constituted object, "race" actually constitutes the object itself by bringing together into a unity a number of elements that formerly co-existed independently of one another: in other words, race retroactively constitutes and naturalizes the groupings to which "it" appears to refer and that "it" identifies in "its" own name (Torres et. al. 1999: 6, Goldberg 1993: 81). Accordingly, a difference in skin color does not need to be essential to the process of marking as other somatic features or the absence of somatic differences can be signified in order to racialize. As Miles and Torres emphasize "the racialized 'enemy within' may be identified as a threatening presence even more effectively if the group is not 'obviously different' because 'they' can be imagined to be everywhere."

And yet, within a racialized political order in which the skin color has already been signified to be the mark of difference, the categories of race serve to be easy reference points when identifying who "belongs" and who does not. The power of race, then, comes not only from the way it constructs and rationalizes orders of difference, but also from the way it naturalizes group relations by giving social relations the façade of long duration through reducing, essentializing and fixing difference. The

conceptualization of racialization, then, follows the notion that since “race as such” doesn’t exist, for a group of individuals endowed with common/similar physical attributes to become/to be called a race, it has to be made or categorized into one.

Accordingly, Miles’ definition of racialization refers to:

Those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectivities. ... The concept therefore refers to a process of categorization, a representational process of defining an Other (usually, but not exclusively) somatically (1989: 75).

While Miles’ definition of racialization puts the greater weight on the basis of the biological, I follow a broader conceptualization of racialization for describing the processes by which racial meanings are attached to particular issues and with the manner in which race appears to be a, or one of the, key factors in the ways they are defined and understood (Murji and Solomos, 2005:3). Racialization in this sense becomes the lens or the medium through which race-thinking operates. The focus on the process here, enables us to see how racial meanings structure other understandings of causes or consequences of problems, to see the continuities and changes in racialization processes and racialized meanings, and to analyze the dynamics through which newer activities and cultural forms come to be understood or explained in racial terms. As such, rather than a descriptive category of race, studying the processes of racialization would enable an opening for discourses and practices to be seen as complex and shifting configurations of the biological and cultural, with a variable intertwining of race, ethnicity, nation, gender, class and sexuality. Focusing on processes of racialization, through which people are classified into racial categories, the boundaries between those categories are drawn, and

the ways in which relationships between those categories of people are imagined enables us to avoid both reifying the concept of race and assuming an identification between the racial categories and concrete groups that embody those categories. Such an analysis would explore how the shifting meanings of race are produced, reproduced, and transformed through social and political struggles; it would detail the mechanisms through which issues and debates become racially marked or signified; and it would examine the bases of differential racialization as a mode of power that defines not only the “others,” but also the configuration of “whiteness” in racial and/or cultural terms. Analyzing the historically dynamic and contingent processes of racialization would also enable us to examine the implications of such boundary drawing practices in relation to the forms and possibilities of relationships among and integration between racialized categories.

At this point, it should also be noted that the discursive constitution of identity/difference through racialization does not mean that “race” is simply invented, or that it is an inert object available for various manipulations. As Persaud maintains: “to accept the latter would actually de-historicize the complex process of racialization and would assume, *a priori*, that which has to be explained –namely, the making of a racialized imaginary” (1997:183).

Accordingly, the ways in which and the extent to which race functions as an articulatory principle of mobilization/exclusion are underpinned by specific configurations of social forces, and the balance of those forces. In order to analyze how race is politically and culturally activated in struggles over the nature of world order the

question we need to ask is “how race becomes a constitutive moment in the complex and overdetermined processes of structuration in the emerging world order?”

I use the term “world order” in line with a critical IR tradition drawing upon Cox’s delineation. Cox proposes the term “world order” in order to achieve a historical and structural understanding of global power relations.¹⁴ One of the main objectives of Cox’s framework is to put emphasis on the configuration of social forces and processes and global dynamics of power relations in order to go beyond the International Relations approaches that are state-focused. Rather than taking institutions and social and power relations for granted, Cox calls them into question by concerning their origins and the possibilities of change and as such directs attention to questioning the prevailing order of the world. He raises the fundamental questions of how existing social or world orders have come into being, how norms, institutions or practices therefore emerge, and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform the prevailing order. Furthermore, unlike conventional IR theories, which reduce hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on the economic and military capabilities of states, Cox develops a neo-Gramscian perspective to broaden the domain of hegemony. This understanding of hegemony includes expressions of broadly based consent that is manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forces occupying a leading role within a state but then projected outwards on a world scale. Within a world order, a situation of hegemony may prevail "based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration

¹⁴ Cox uses the term “world order” in preference to “inter-state system” and “world system” because it is relevant to all historical periods and more indicative of a structure having a certain duration in time so as to avoid the equilibrium connotations of “system” (152).

of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (1981: 139). Accordingly, if hegemony is understood as an "opinion-moulding activity," rather than brute force or dominance, then consideration has to turn to how a hegemonic social order or world order is based on values and understanding that permeate the nature of that order (1992: 151). A central question then is how inter-subjective meanings, i.e. shared notions about social relations, shape reality, which is not merely the physical environment of human action but also the institutional, moral and ideological context that shapes thoughts and actions (1997: 252).

In this framework, a world order configuration involves a persistent pattern of international relations -or global social relations- over time (Gill, 1997:15).¹⁵ The term "world order" refers to the particular configuration of forces which successively define the problematic of war and peace for the ensemble of states. It is a historical structure, and in a particular configuration of a world order three elements reciprocally combine to constitute an historical structure: *ideas*, understood as inter-subjective meanings as well as collective images of world order; *material capabilities*, referring to accumulated resources; and *institutions*, which are amalgams of the previous two elements and are means of stabilising a particular order. In such an analysis there are broadly two kinds of ideas: one kind consists of inter-subjective meanings, or those shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour (e.g. the notion that people are organized and commanded by states which have authority

¹⁵ World order is interrelated with the other two spheres of activity, namely social forces and forms of state: each of these three spheres interacts with each other but there is no one-way determinism as each contains and bears the impact of the other two.

over defined territories); and the second kind are collective images of social order held by different groups of people, in other words differing views as to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meaning of justice and public good, etc. Cox maintains that whereas inter-subjective meanings are broadly common throughout a particular historical structure and constitute the common ground for social discourse, collective images may be several and opposed, the clashes of which point out the potentials for alternative structures (1981:136). Drawing upon Cox's framework, I argue that "race" can be analysed both as an inter-subjective idea regarding the nature of the conditions of existence of human groups with the attending expectations of behaviour, and as giving way to collective images of a social order based on racialized relations of power, with the attending forms of legitimization. As such, ideas involving constructions of race affect and are affected by both the material capabilities and institutions in the composition of the historical structure of world order.

In inquiring into the constitutive role of ideas for world order I follow a critical constructivist approach that views ideas as social and inter-subjective, and raises "how possible" questions (rather than the neo-positivist type of causality questions), which focus on how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects so as to give way to particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others (Doty, 1993; Wendt 1987, Laffey and Weldes 1997). Accordingly, to analyse how the ideas about race become constitutive of the world order requires understanding how race is effective in making available sets of categories that enable practices of classification and differentiation; how the underlying constructs of race set

the limits and intelligibility of debates as well as other related ideas; and how such ideas become the ground on which problems and the range of acceptable responses to those problems are defined. So, how do racialization and the resulting conceptualizations of race and racial difference operate in our contemporary world where anti-racism is the official norm in domestic societies and the international realm?

Racialization in the Contemporary World Order

To begin with, it is of paramount importance to recognize that race, from its inception, has been a global idea. Emerging at the age of empire and nation-building, the idea of race was born in the transnational realm and was central to the global discourses of modernity, empire and capitalism. While processes of racialization reveal specific and differential characters through local, national and global contexts, as an idea encompassed in ideologies about how society should operate and order be maintained, race has been employed and abused as a “central organizing axiom of and among modern Western societies” (Thompson 2015:46). Throughout Western modernity, a racial system of classification operated globally in order to demarcate differences between Europeans and the “others,” who supposedly displayed characteristics such as not responding to reason, being emotional, lazy and childlike, and unfit to rule in general. In categorizing the “others” as such, the racial worldview not only did justify the exclusion of those racial others from the social, economic and political privileges of the so called “western civilization” but also constituted and sanctioned the unity of an otherwise amorphous category of European whiteness with the attending privileges of membership.

While within the imperial and colonial system of domination the racial hierarchy

was formal, in the aftermath of decolonization they became more informal as the idiom of racialization became less biology oriented and more culture based. I argue that the expressions of cultural difference and their association with various forms and objects of threat are a consequential medium through which racialization occurs in the contemporary era. In the expressions of threat, the claims about an incommensurable “cultural difference” constitute the others as a threat to the Western set of institutions, values, and lifestyles. In racialization of these others, elements from various discourses of race through the twentieth century, such as the trope of yellow peril, or the image of the Arab terrorist, became articulated with new characteristics of such others: the yellow peril no longer points at Japan, but is evoked to describe the “threat” that China represent against the Western institutions and values, or the image of the Arab terrorist is expanded to designate Muslims as a global threat of terrorism. In chapters 4 and 5, I argue that the processes of racialization and the resulting constructs of race continue to be effective in depicting certain groups of people or political communities, whose lives are deemed to be less worthy, as incapable of actualizing liberal democratic values as well as in conditioning the possibility of their inclusion in the global community of capitalist democracies. In the form of Islamophobia, ranging from personal prejudices to state policies, racialization of Muslims articulate them as a totality that is potentially, if not inevitably, supportive of terrorism, and mark each member of this totality as unworthy and dispensable, rendering their rights and freedoms vulnerable. Respectively, racialization can be observed in the rise of China debates, which continue to construct the Chinese as a cultural other, whose innate characteristics such as irrationality or

untrustworthiness make them a source of internal and external threats. While the “sources” of threat are racialized as such, the target of these threats is also racialized since “whiteness” as a transnational form of racial identification, global in its power and personal in its meaning (Lake and Reynolds, 2008, 3), continue to be effective in defining the civilizational superiority of the West-European-Christian articulation. In the constructions of these threats against Western civilization, the available set of categories are still constructed through the West versus “others” logic, and the allegedly innate characteristics of such groups are articulated with cultural values and symbols they represent. Furthermore, the racial ideas about inferiority and superiority continue to structure the intelligibility of the discourses around those “threats,” as they also designate the parameters of inclusion and exclusion.

Chapter 3: Finding Race in International Relations

Although the norm of racial inequality was never accepted as deeply by subordinate peoples as by their imperial masters, of course, the Europeans nonetheless obtained a measure of legitimacy that permitted them to subjugate people around the globe between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. Although hard to see when viewed through contemporary lenses, only with legitimacy granted by a collective to a dominant state could Britain have ruled all of South Africa, for instance, with a mere 75000 troops (in 1898). This is not to blame the victim, but only to acknowledge that the European Empires rested at least partially on beliefs of racial inequality that were internalized by dominant and subordinate peoples alike. (Lake, 2009: 37)

David Lake's above comments in *Hierarchy in International Relations* (2009) are symptomatic of the treatment of questions about race within the discipline of International Relations. Although to be commended for helping to open up the question of hierarchy in the discipline of International Relations against the dominant assumption of anarchy, Lake nevertheless does not inquire into the consequences of racial inequalities in shaping international hierarchies. Even when he maintains that "European empires were long based, and even justified, on a norm of racial inequality," this notion of racial inequality becomes a buttress for the legitimacy of colonization as it was "internalized" by the colonized peoples. As such, Lake does not merely omit but rationalizes the violence of imperial and colonial domination in the name of an alleged legitimacy conferred upon the colonizers even by the victims of such domination, which for him could only be possible thorough the internalization of the beliefs of racial inequality by those who were supposed to be the inferiors. Furthermore, Lake continues

to position struggles against slavery, imperialism, colonialism and racial inequality within the parameters that were set by the “liberal notion of human equality,” “taken up by critics of empire, and more importantly, indigenous elites,” helping “push on a door opened by prior and broadly accepted liberal principles.” Accordingly, while the acceptance of the norm of racial equality came to signify the fact that “it is increasingly difficult to justify external rule,” the extension of the liberal principle that all humans are inherently equal to the realm of inter-state relations prepared the ground for the modern notions of international legal or juridical sovereignty, ultimately leading to the concept of national self-determination (Lake, 2009: 38). Lake acknowledges that “the principle of sovereignty, “was never meant as a description of practice nor as a foundation for a positive theory of international politics, but rather as a normative ideal in the service of the project of state building” (p. 39). Furthermore, the principle of juridical sovereignty is often breached by dominant or formerly dominant states seeking to preserve their authority, and the principle of equality is routinely ignored by great powers when it serves their interests. Nevertheless, in his framework, not only do the new states use the idea of sovereignty in an attempt to overcome the continuing allegiances and authority of former colonial rulers, but the adjective “racial” to signify the nature of inequalities within the international system basically ceases to exist in the aftermath of decolonization.

The crucial problem here is two-sided. On the one hand, the introduction of the norms of racial equality and juridical sovereignty constitute the limits of the debate within IR about the role of race in shaping the world order. On the other hand, the liberal

international system and its prevailing norms are viewed as providing the only legitimate framework to capture the source and significance of anti-colonial/imperial/racist struggles. As such, constructions of race and consequences of racial inequalities can not have any significant role in the analysis of international hierarchies within this liberal normative order.

Lake's dismissal of consequences of racial constructs can be explained by the progress made in the second half of the twentieth century in curbing the prominence and effects of racism in international politics. To cite just one example: in 1919 Japan's demand to include a clause on racial equality in the covenant of the League of Nations was rejected out of hand by the United States and other Western countries. In 1919 to accept that all humans were equal in a fundamental sense was deemed inconceivable as racism was widely taken for granted and justified. In our contemporary world, the principle of human equality is accepted to be the common norm. In the aftermath of the second World War, around three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers. Furthermore, as the processes of decolonization and civil rights movements progressively broke down the racial hierarchical system, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various other legal instruments prohibited racial discrimination in the aftermath of World War II.

However despite the normative progress, studies show continuous evidence of racial discrimination in housing, employment, police treatment, sentencing, health provisions and a host of other domains in countries that have *de jure* equality, resembling

patterns strikingly similar to those of the past.¹⁶ Furthermore, even a cursory look at the Human Development and Human Security Reports reveal continuous regional differentiation of the patterns of poverty, inequality, discrimination and violence on a global level, which suggests the enduring effects of the racialized order of the colonial period.

Yet, in the period from the end of World War II, to the end of the twentieth century, questions about the role of race in international politics had been largely absent from the mainstream accounts of International Relations. This silence around race has two dimensions. On the hand one, race mostly dropped out of the lexicon of IR in the aftermath of the second World War. On the other hand, the centrality of questions of race for the emerging field of International Relations in the early twentieth century got erased from the historiography of the discipline as well: in telling the formation of the discipline through the alleged “great debate” between Idealism and Realism of the interwar years, IR effectively disavowed the concerns of the scholars of the period regarding race, racial hierarchies, colonialism and racism.

The silence surrounding race in post-WWII International Relations continue to intrigue scholars especially when two points are taken into consideration. The first is, recent scholarship on the origins of the discipline reveal that for the opening few decades of the twentieth century, race was widely and explicitly considered a fundamental ontological unit of politics, and it was thought that to understand international relations it was vital to understand the role that racial difference and superiority of the “white” races

¹⁶See Winant 2001& 2004; Sidanius and Pratto 1999 for North America, Ford 1991; Winant 2004 for Western Europe, Broome 2002 for Australia.

played (Krishna 2001; Bell 2013: 1; Vincent 2011; Vucetic 2011; Lake and Reynolds 2008). Secondly, decolonization, as it gained momentum in the aftermath of the second World War, affected not only the superpower competition but also the pattern of international relations. Yet, after 1945, the research agendas in IR paid little, if at all, attention to how decolonization would affect the international system and global racial hierarchies.

The first goal of the present chapter is to understand this state of oblivion in International Relations in the post World War II era. To that aim, the question this chapter starts with is: Why did questions of race mostly disappear from the analyses of International Relations despite the origins of the discipline that engaged with such questions explicitly, and the resurgence of the questions of culture and identity in the discipline in recent decades?

I argue that different contextual, political, and epistemological reasons characterize the status of race in IR in different periods: 1. From early twentieth century until the second World War, questions of race were at the forefront of International Relations. 2. From the end of the second World War until 1979: behavioralism, parochialism, and realism rendered the questions about race to the sidelines. In addition, the few examples of studies that attempted to analyze the role of race in international politics in this period remained within the "relations among races" paradigm that takes the existence of racially discrete groups for granted and recoils away from problematizing the processes of racialization that (re)constitutes such racialized constructs to begin with. 3. From 1979 to 2000s, structural realism's dominant paradigm

of anarchy/sovereignty precluded raising questions about race and racial hierarchies. Realism's abstract structuralism and status quo bias, and Liberalism's inherent particularism (in believing the West's superiority, etc.) were the main reasons.

Conceptualizing Absence

For the discipline of International Relations, which has "shown a famous aversion to complex and multiply contested concepts" (Persaud and Walker 2001: 373), race has proven to be an especially challenging case. Not easily fitting into the discipline's conception of the bounded state and division of the levels of analysis (the individual, the state and the international), race has been largely absent from the lexicon of mainstream IR theories in the aftermath of World War II. Although similarly complex concepts such as the economy and gender have been subject to calls for attention as to their relevance in the constitution of global orders, questions about the role of race continued to remain within the margins of the discipline in the second half of the twentieth century.

Few exceptions aside, race is pretty much absent in the mainstream accounts of International Relations in the post 1945 period until the last decade or so. In her 1993 article, Doty's surveyed the leading IR journals of *World Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *International Organization*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and *Review of International Studies* for the period of 1945-1993 to find only one article with the word race in the title, four with the term minorities and thirteen with the term ethnicity. I conducted a similar survey of the same journals for the period from 1993-2012 and found 5 articles having the concept of "race" in their title or abstract.

This absence of race from the mainstream IR is surprising if we consider that

questions of race and racism continued to be salient for the conduct of international politics in the post-World War II era. As Paul G. Lauren, who wrote one of the very few books on politics of racial discrimination from an international relations perspective, acknowledges:

The first global attempt to speak of equality focused upon race. The first human rights provisions in the United Nations Charter were placed there because of race. The first international challenge to a country's claim of domestic jurisdiction and exclusive treatment of its own citizens centered upon race. The international convention with the greatest number of signatories is that on race. Within the United Nations, more resolutions deal with race than any other subject. And certainly one of the most longstanding and frustrating problems in the United Nations is that of race. Nearly one hundred eighty governments, for example, recently went as far as to conclude that racial discrimination and racism still represent the most serious problems for the world today. (Paul G. Lauren, 1998: 4)

Persaud and Walker (2001: 374) further maintain that the significance of race in IR "goes much beyond various multilateral and other diplomatic achievements" since "race has been a fundamental force in the very making of the modern world system" and in the representations and explanations of how it works. Why and how then, race, which has been "at the center of gravity for a substantial part of the modern world system" has been absent in the discipline of International Relation, especially after World War II?

In the last two decades, critical scholars focused on the ways in which teaching and research in International Relations make race and racism invisible and proposed avenues for systematically including them in the discipline (Vitalis 2000; Callahan 2004; Hobson 2007; Chin 2009; Chowdhry and Rai 2009). Furthermore two edited volumes by Chowdhry and Nair (2002), and Jones (2006) made the case for bringing race and racialization to the center of the study of international relations with an explicit focus on

and support from post-colonial literatures. A special issue of *Alternatives* in 2001 featured articles that focused on a number of questions related to the role of race in the conduct and study of international politics: racial assumptions in global labor recruitment and supply (Persaud 2001); race and education of IR (Krishna 2001); “racialization” of IR theory and representations of Africa (Grovogui 2001); racialization of Third World in security studies through the “nuclear apartheid” argument (Biswas 2001), and the construction of global white supremacy in racialization of global politics (Watson 2001). More recently, a special issue of the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, in 2013, was devoted to articles that examined the various ways in which race and racialization figure in the reproduction of global hierarchies. The articles in this issue were also later published in an edited volume titled *Race and Racism in International Relations*, (Anievas et al. 2015). The attempts of these scholars to problematize the absence and marginalization of questions of race from the study of international politics bear witness to the profundity of the exclusion and marginalization, as they venture into both explaining the silence and justifying the relevance of the questions of race for the discipline.

This renewed interest in the questions of race in international relations emerged especially among critically oriented scholars, and the absence of race in IR have been problematized in different ways. For example, Robert Vitalis (2000: 333) argues that contemporary writing about international relations in the US is marked by a powerful tendency towards ‘silence and evasion’ about the ‘Afro-American presence,’ and the intellectual life is governed by the norm against noticing race as some questions continue

to be overlooked (e.g. how white supremacy shapes culture and history, how and why theory is segregated to an Anglo-European core and a set of black texts located on the distant periphery, and what are the Afro-American influences and the constant interplay of traditions on American life). Vitalis thinks IR's silence about race comes from what he calls "domestic institutions," which indeed indicates the constitution of political science departments along more conservative lines and the sheer paucity of non-white scholars (335-36). For Roxanne Doty the reasons for the silence are epistemological: the dominant understandings of theory and explanation in International Relations preclude conceptualizations of complex issues and concepts, and either result in their marginalization or being forced into "constraining modes of explanation and conceptualization" (1993).

In agreement with Doty, Sankaran Krishna argues that the status of race in IR is affected by the methodological orientations that often privilege abstract theorizing over historical analyses. Krishna recognizes abstraction as an inescapable analytical device that makes knowledge possible. Yet, abstractions are never devoid of power relations, he maintains, and as such they simultaneously contain as they reveal (403). For Krishna, then, abstraction is but a *strategy of containment* that serves to maintain the ideological coherence of the discipline: as a *strategy of containment*, abstraction works to "discipline what is considered legitimately within the purview of 'proper' IR discourse and what ought to be left" out (402). Usually presented as the desire of the discipline in theory building, abstraction, though, is indeed premised on a desire to escape history. Abstraction operates through bracketing "questions of theft of land, violence and

slavery,” and as such leads to rationalizing and eliding the concrete details of historical processes, such as the violence and genocide that create dispossession on a global scale and underlie the unequal global order (2001: 401-402). As the violence, genocide and dispossession that accompanied the emergence of modern international system of sovereign states become unspeakable, they cannot be included in conceptualizations of sovereignty and the international as the encounter between sovereign states. The “strategy of containment,” the term Krishna borrows from Frederic Jameson, “allows what can be thought to seem internally coherent in its own terms, while repressing the unthinkable... which lies beyond its boundaries.” It is a:

...means at once of denying those intolerable contradictions that lie beneath the social surface, as intolerable as that Necessity that gives rise to relations of domination in human society, and of constructing on the very ground cleared by such denial a substitute truth that renders existence at least partially bearable. (Jameson 1981: 53 and Dowling 1984: 54 quoted in Krishna 2001: 406).

Leaving question of race outside of what is considered to be the legitimate boundaries of the discipline, IR can repress the unthinkable, i.e. its own foundations on discourses that justified, abstracted, and rationalized the genocide of the populations of the so-called new world, the enslavement of Africans, and colonization of the Asians. Furthermore, leaving the historical and concrete experiences of such violence outside the boundaries of the discipline enables IR to conceptualize its foundational terms such as sovereignty through abstraction and maintain the semblance of internal coherence. Thus, it is not that abstraction itself is an obstacle against theorizing race and racialization, but that when IR scholars cannot think or speak about race, abstraction serves to omit historical experiences of colonization, slavery and dispossession from theorizing about the

international system. In other words, what is made to, or was allowed to, appear in IR's lexicon, assumptions, categories of analysis and predictions, is that which conceals the silent presence of race, outside of the boundaries of the discipline but crucial in shaping the history and study of international politics. Therefore, it is not so much that race disappears from IR but that race serves as the crucial epistemological silence around which the discipline is written and coheres (Krishna 407). Similarly, Persaud and Walker argue that we can observe this silence around race in IR in how the discipline chooses its sources and makes its archives, and in how the narratives are constructed and endowed with meaning. It is also linked to invisibility, which entails "the removal (not necessarily through conscious action) from a field of enquiry, either concrete aspects of social relations, or of certain forms of thought about them" (Maclean 1981, quoted in Persaud and Walker 2001: 374).

I agree with Krishna and others that the discipline is written and coheres around the silence about race, yet, the question of why scholars of IR were unable to bring race to their research agenda in the aftermath of the second World War continues to remain puzzling. Krishna seems to argue that repressing the unthinkable, i.e. IR's own foundations on discourses that justified, abstracted, and rationalized the genocide and dispossession, is the reason for silence. At the same time, however, he claims that the discipline of international relations was and is "predicated in a systematic politics of forgetting, a willful amnesia on the question of race" (401). The willful and systematic character of this amnesia contradicts the goal of repression through the strategy of containment. If amnesia is repressing the "unthinkable," how can it also be willful and

systematic? This framework either bestows great intentionality on the actors that engage in willful and systematic forgetting, in which case a better term than “amnesia” is required; or, denies intentionality or agency altogether by situating the reasons for silence beyond the boundaries of the thinkable. Furthermore, the claim for “willful amnesia” finds too much continuity and consistency in the field of IR, and does not take into account how the kinds of problems scholars addressed and the arguments they made, as well as the conceptual language of the discipline changed in the aftermath of WW II.

I agree with Thompson that the notion of amnesia indicates an “unintentional forgetting of how the modern world system was founded in, and continues as a hierarchical racial order” (2015: 45). As such, amnesia obscures the power involved in purposeful evasion, and disavows intent. Thompson suggests that “racial aphasia” is a better concept to understand IR's approach to race, or our collective inability to speak about race, as it indicates a “calculated forgetting, an obstruction of discourse, language and speech” (45).

Thompson borrows “aphasia” from Ann Stoler, who uses the term to explain a similar silence around France's colonial history (2011). However, Thompson's phrase “calculated forgetting,” and the accompanying sense of intent, cannot be found in Stoler's text, as she emphasizes that “colonial aphasia is “...not an appeal to organic cognitive deficit among the 'French' (125).” It is not a matter of ignorance or absence, according to Stoler, and it is “about more than malicious intent, historical illiteracy, of bad faith of individual actors” (128). In Stoler's framework aphasia indicates an occlusion of knowledge, irretrievability of a vocabulary, a limited access to it, a simultaneous

presence of a thing and its absence, a presence and misrecognition of it (145).

Accordingly, aphasia is:

a dismembering, a difficulty speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things. Aphasia in its many forms describes a difficulty retrieving both conceptual and lexical vocabularies and, most important, a difficulty comprehending what is spoken. (125)

As indicating both loss of access and active dissociation, Stoler argues that “aphasia highlights -far more than 'forgetting'- important features of the relationship among French historical production, the 'immigrant question,' and the absence/presence of colonial relations” (139). Stoler's reading of aphasia, then does not avow intent, nor does it refer to a “calculating” agency: it does not search for intentionality among actors. Rather it enables us to focus on how the silence around race is constituted structurally and productively, and how the inability to talk about race affects our perceptions of the current issues. As such, I found the notion of aphasia more helpful for understanding the silence around race than the notion of “forgetting.”

In this framework, I argue that IR's problem is not so much “forgetting” race, but rather how the dissociation with the colonial past generates for IR a difficulty of speaking, of having the proper language and concepts to talk about race as affected by that colonial past and affects the present. Accordingly, if IR's silence around race were merely a product of amnesia, Krishna's strategy of “contrapuntal analysis” (404) to restage, contrapuntally, the encounters between the West and the rest in order to understand why and how IR discourse has evolved the way it has, would have been enough to overcome the amnesia. In other words, remembering would have addressed

forgetting and enabled us to talk. However, if the silence points to a deeper difficulty to conceptualize race within IR discourses, as aphasia indicates, then the problem is neither a mere forgetting that can be solved by “remembering,” nor an inability to deal with the “complexity” of race that can be solved by developing better conceptual tools. International Relations' dissociation with imperial relations of power and subordination in the aftermath of the second World War generated an epistemology and theoretical frameworks in the discipline that are inherently unable to conceptualize racialization and racial hierarchies. To understand the roots of IR's silence about race, it is significant and necessary to reveal both the historicity of the concepts inherent to those theoretical frameworks, for instance to show how sovereignty emerged and evolved in and through the encounters with Europe's others, and their implication in practices of imperialism. But, it is not enough to understand how this silence is (re)produced in the discipline, occluding the analysis of racialization in world politics in the contemporary era.

However, as Stoler warns, “as a metaphoric concept aphasia only does so much work.” Thus we need:

... a better understanding of how occlusions of knowledge are achieved and more insight about the political, scholarly, and cognitive domains in which knowing is disabled, attention is redirected, things are renamed, and disregard is revived and sustained. At issue is both the occlusion of knowledge as a political form and “knowing” as a cognitive act (153).

Following this framework, in what follows I analyze IR as a “scholarly/cognitive domain,” in which occlusions of knowledge about race occurred both in the production of knowledge as a cognitive act and as a political form shaped by the historical and political context within which the discipline existed. I argue that in each period, a

different combination of the historical/political contexts with different epistemological and methodological priorities conditioned the production of knowledge about race in the discipline.

Early Twentieth Century to 1939: Race and the Origins of IR

Ideas about and constructions of race played significant roles in the conduct of international politics since the age of European exploration and colonization, if not before. From the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, constructions of race served such purposes as to distinguish the Europeans from the “others” they encountered in the New World, and to legitimate and justify colonization of the so-called “backward races.” By the early twentieth century, International Relations was becoming a separate and definable discipline, while scientific racism became commonplace and the eugenics ideas spread to many countries. In this context, race was one of the most powerful ideas that shaped the study of international politics.

How did the context of colonialism and imperialism affect the emergence of the discipline of IR? In the last two decades, few IR scholars inquired into this question and revealed how the early scholars of the discipline were concerned with the constitutive effects of the experience of colonialism and imperialism. Vitalis (2005) argues that IR's origins predate the conventional post-WWI account and that key developments that took place between 1900 and 1910 were formative. In his account, the context of empire plays a key role as most pioneers in the field were teaching and writing about nationalism and imperialism and inquiring into the problems of colonial administration as well as problems of “uplifting backward races.” Vitalis demonstrates many of the “founders” of

IR were either theorists of race or experts of colonial administration for whom “races and states were the discipline-in-formation’s most important twin units of analysis” (2005:161). One among those was Paul Reinsch, who was America's first expert in colonial administration and who taught the first courses on international relations in the U.S.. In his *World Politics at the end of the nineteenth century*, which might be considered one of the first monographs in the discipline, Reinsch discussed how imperialism was transforming international relations as states "attempted to increase the resources of the national state through the absorption or exploitation of undeveloped regions and inferior races" (1900: 14). Olson and Groom maintain that Reinsch's work is only one of the many examples revealing how the discipline of international relations had its real beginning in studies of imperialism and "studies of imperialism at the time were firmly grounded in racist assumptions of white supremacy” (1991: 47).

The centrality of race for the emerging discipline was also evident in the publishing of the first IR journal in the United States. Within the context of expanding the boundaries of dominion over peoples and resources beyond the formal territories of the US, as a first incarnation of what was later to become *Foreign Affairs*, the *Journal of Race Development* started to be published in 1910 “making the case for a research agenda on the progress of backward races and states” (Vitalis, 2005: 163). The introductory article of the first issue envisages the journal to be a “forum for the discussion of the problems which relate to the progress of races and states generally considered backward in their standards of civilization” (Blakeslee, 1910:1). Taking up a “scientific effort” to understand the “world-wide race problem,” on the background of

the increased importance of these lands in the political and economic life of the West, the journal sets itself up to “determine the attitude which those who are advanced should maintain towards those who are backward” (p.2). The JRD brought together leading Progressive Era social scientists from many fields who debated an expansive vision of America's role in the new century to lead the world in the project of uplifting of the "backward" or "dependent" races, which included colonial subjects (e.g. Philippines), sovereign states (e.g. China and Liberia), and "dependent" people within America's own borders (e.g. "the Indian" and "the Negro"), through different forms of interventions that ranged from tutelary, paternalistic administrative/colonial endeavors to something similar to development aid (Blatt 2003: 2). Thus the core project of the JRD was based on a notion of "civilization" in which race, culture and political institutions formed a complex that can be mapped onto evolutionary processes, and through which racial differences could be changed for better via education and political reform, even if they couldn't be erased. Although their views were grounded on conventional scientific and popular wisdom of the time and understood races to be primary social units with shared physical and socio-political traits, in general, the authors of the JRD also saw themselves as advocates of "dependent peoples" against those who exploit them or see them as a threat or enemy:

[The Journal] aims to present, the important facts which bear upon race progress and the different theories as the methods by which developed peoples may most effectively aid the progress of the undeveloped; ...not how weaker races may best be exploited, but how they may best be helped to be stronger (Blakeslee, 1)

The *Journal of Race Development* was renamed the *Journal of International*

Relations in 1919, and became *Foreign Affairs*, the house publication of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, in 1922. Reeves argues that the move from race to international relations would seem to represent both a qualitative and quantitative change in subject matter: yet, to the journal editors the change was obviously less dramatic, given that Volume 10, the *Journal of International Relations*, just followed on from where Volume 9, the *Journal of Race Development* left off (2004: 26).

During the interwar years, the focus on race in International Relations continued to be present, albeit with a change of tone. In this period, alarmist sentiments that warned against a “race war,” which would be a consequence of non-white races’ gaining “race consciousness,” become more prevalent than the “benevolent” approach common to the authors in the *Journal of Race Development*. In a sense Du Bois' claim that "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line," became a commonly expressed sentiment. Yet, this sentiment was expressed also from a position that worried about the decline of white supremacy, and signaled this sense of decline while heightening the fears of an impending racial warfare between the whites and non-whites. For instance, in *The Rising Tide of Color Against White-World Supremacy*¹⁷ (1920), Stoddard warned that with the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, “that yellow triumph over one of the great white powers,” “the legend of white invincibility was shattered, the veil of prestige that draped white civilization was torn aside” (154). In Raymond Leslie Buell’s *International Relations* (1925), which was to be one of the earliest best-selling textbooks of the discipline, one of the opening chapters is entitled

17 “A book that quickly became the best known example of white crisis literature on both sides of the Atlantic” (Bonnett, 2003: 324)

"The Conflict of Color," where he discusses issues like the possibility of an inter-racial war, the demands for racial equality and the necessity for racial segregation. Buell states: "While it is almost impossible to define what is meant by 'race' as far as groupings within the whites are concerned, there are certain definite physical characteristics which distinguish the Negro, the Indian, and the Mongolian from the white man of Europe and North America, even more sharply than cultural traits distinguish one 'nation' from another." Accepting physical characteristics to be the basis of distinguishing races from one another, Buell nevertheless views the emergence of racial problems as a result of the establishment of colonial empires:

When... the whites came in contact with the darker races the chief result was an attitude of arrogant supremacy toward peoples not strong enough to resist the white man's rule. European nations who asserted that dealings between themselves should be based on equality and justice, declared that in dealings with the peoples of Africa and Asia, White Supremacy should be the only guide. Nevertheless, as long as the darker peoples remained submissive, unconscious of their power, the racial question did not become acute (56).

However, the non-white peoples were rapidly developing a national life and military power as could be seen in Japan's being the only non-Western nation to be recognized as a great power, India and Egypt's clamoring for independence, and North Africa's threats to revolt against the White Man's Rule. These developments threatened the principle of white supremacy, and the sense of danger that in the coming century wars will be fought over race was becoming obvious: "The future relations of the white to the non-white races is one of the most important problems which students and statesmen have to solve" (57). Similarly, Alfred Zimmern, the first scholar in the world to hold a dedicated chair of IR, wrote in a seminal text on the British Empire:

The task is indeed urgent, for the white man's prestige in the old sense of the word, has become greatly weakened... Well do I remember, as though it were yesterday, the impression made upon my mind when, as a young lecturer in Ancient History at Oxford, I read of the first great victory of the Japanese over the Russians. I went into my class and told them I was going to lay aside Greek history for that morning, 'because', I said, 'I feel I must speak to you about the most important historical event which has happened, or is likely to happen, in our lifetime, the victory of a non- white people over a white people'. [(Zimmern 1926, 82 quoted in Bell 2013: 2-3)]

Although these sentiments can be read as specific to a particular historical context, they also exhibit a long-standing tradition of thinking that characterizes not only Western philosophy in general, but also international relations in particular. Zimmern's worries about the declining prestige of white man is only exacerbated with the astonishment that the Japanese victory creates: What makes the "victory of a non-white people over white people" such an important historical event is not just the possible reversal of long-standing imperial and colonial hierarchies, or the apprehension that this reversal creates in white people. Behind all these, Zimmern's statement reflects a sense of surprise, a sense that something previously unimaginable was happening. This non-white victory, the unimaginable thing, is more confounding because during the interwar years fears about the non-white races threatening white supremacy were also intertwined with a vision that at the same time imagined the "lower races" as incapable of self-governing.

Jeanne Morefield argues that:

In many ways Zimmern's approach to the empire appears to almost exactly mirror a long-standing tradition within British liberalism, a tradition that resurfaces within the works of thinkers diverse as John Stuart Mill, and J.A. Hobson. As with these thinkers, Zimmern's understanding of non-white peoples as morally and politically immature allowed him to elide some glaring political inconsistencies. In particular, it allowed him to champion a liberal doctrine based on universal equality while denying political autonomy to millions by relocating political power from the realms of liberal civil equality and positing it in the

loving, but deeply hierarchical shelter of the family. (2005: 105).

Thus, previously imagined to be morally and politically immature, non-white people's military victory over white people seems even more astonishing and worrisome. Denying rights of non-intervention and sovereignty to non-white societies has deep roots in Western liberalism, particularly in John Stuart Mill's liberalism, and this legacy, as Beate Jahn shows, finds an expression in the contemporary liberal theories of democratic peace as well (2005). This sense of threat, or fear, intertwined with the sense of superiority that imagined non-whites as incapable of self-governing was met with critiques voiced prominently by non-white scholars.

For instance in the United States, the new NAACP, founded in 1911, and its important journal, *the Crisis*, under the editorship of Du Bois, drew increasing attention to the struggle for self-determination at home and, by the time of war, abroad (168). In his 1915 analysis, "The African Roots of War," Du Bois predicted a war of the Color Line, and after World War I, he directed his energy to reviving the Pan-African Congress as a means to represent worldwide black peoples' interests in the peace negotiations in Paris in 1919. Another example of the critical African American voices was Ralph Bunche, who was the first African American to gain a PhD in political science from an American University, and who received the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize for his late 1940s mediation in Israel. Bunche's *World View of Race*, was published in 1936, in which he examined how race was used in the modern world and what made race. He argued that race was used toward political and economic ends, noting that the "inequality of peoples" was becoming an organizing theme for political and economic life across the globe

(Holloway 2002, 164). Bunche criticized the scientific interpretations of “biological race” and called for a sociological understanding of race that views race as a social product of environmental and social conditions: in his view, race was a false, but convenient construction used by the powerful for economic advancement (166).

However, Vitalis argues that although Bunche wrote one of the early theoretical statements on racism, empire, and international relations, his work goes largely unread and unrecognized along with all other African American and Caribbean intellectuals within the tradition of IR (2005: 161). In the period before the second World War, while a small number of black political scientists earned PhDs from prestigious universities they could find employment only in historically black colleges and universities, without financial support or grants, published in obscure journals and little known presses, and their work was overlooked and undervalued. In this vein, Walton and Smith maintain that: “Racism’s manifestations in academia allowed much valuable work to remain unseen. Not only was the results of their research made invisible, but these scholars themselves became invisible in the profession” (2012: xiv). I found that this picture has not changed much, and what Vitalis (2000) calls the “norm against noticing” both the non-white scholars and their contributions in IR prevails. My search on commonly used textbooks, general reference books and even the “revisionist” works of historiography of the discipline showed that Bunche or du Bois and their contributions to IR are not discussed, or even referred to. In *International Studies Quarterly* from 1967 to 2010, the flagship journal of International Studies Association, there is not a single reference to either Bunche, or du Bois. In *International Organization*, from 1947 to 2012, there are

some references to Bunche in relation to his role as the UN's chief mediator in Israel, but no discussion of his work, and only one reference to Du Bois in an article about Pan-Africanism (Emerson, 1962).¹⁸ Among other International Relations works that I could not find any discussion of either scholar are: Brian Schmidt's *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (1998); Torbjorn Knutsen's *History of International Relations Theory* (1997); *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Carlsnaes et.al. (2002); *Globalization of World Politics*, edited by Baylis et. Al (2013); *Introduction to International Relations*, edited by Jackson and Sorenson (2015).

The “norm against noticing” though is not limited to the contributions of scholars of color. Those concerns of the early twentieth century scholars, such as imperialism, colonialism and race mostly disappeared from the historiography of the discipline. Not only Bunche and du Bois, but also fears for a racial war and anxieties about colonialism have not been included in the conventional stories of the origins of IR. Dismissing most of the debates about race and colonialism, the conventional historiography of International Relations narrated the origins of the discipline as emerging out of the great debate among the Idealists and Realists in the 1930s and 1940s: what Miles Kahler terms “the foundational myth of the field” (1997). According to this myth, a great debate took place between rival paradigms of idealism and realism, and as World War II challenged the idealists' vision of a peaceful world order realism emerged as dominant paradigm

18 International Organization, and International Studies Quarterly are the two top journals, ranked by IR scholars in a 2011 survey, see *Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries*, by Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney, available at: http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/documents/trip/trip_around_the_world_2011.pdf
I conducted both searches on Jstor in May 2016.

explaining the persistent struggle for power among nations (Long and Schmidt, 2005: 4). Thus, despite the significance of questions about race and colonialism in the formative years of the discipline, and the breadth of scholarship representing both apprehensions about a “race war” and critiques of the racial order, this part of the history of IR did not get much attention until the last two decades.

Recent scholarship on the disciplinary history of IR challenged this narrative by presenting a more complex picture of the issues, the scholars and the actual debates that took place in those early formative years (Long and Wilson 1995; Kahler 1997; Schmidt 1998 and 2002). In this new picture, the birth of IR appears to be intertwined with the concerns about the problems and the future of colonial administrations in the years before World War I. For instance, Long and Schmidt identify imperialism and internationalism as the dual themes that were paramount when the field began to take a recognizable form, and that it was the dynamic interaction between imperialism and internationalism -and not the much discussed realists vs. idealists debate- that initially drove international theory (2005:1). Others challenged the characterization of the “idealists” as such, claiming they have been misrepresented and were more sophisticated and closer to realists than suggested by this myth (Osiander 1998; Kahler 1997). Even whether the debate took place or not has been questioned, and “there seems little evidence that the realist-idealist debate ever occurred at all in the form in which modern IR writers suppose” (Ashworth 2002: 35; also Wilson 1998; Schmidt 1998).

Nevertheless, in their survey into IR textbooks, de Carvalho and collaborators found that despite this proliferation of revisionist histories, IR textbooks continue to

employ what they call “the myth of 1919” in depicting the formation of the discipline, which is a bigger version of the great debate myth. They conclude that :

the notion of something called idealism still persists in the IR imagination, even if slightly less unproblematically than before, and that the wholly exogenous/external events story of the emergence of the discipline and of idealism in 1919 as noble responses to World War I, as well as subscribing to the victory of realism in 1945 following the carnage of World War II, still remain largely uncontested within current IR textbooks (2011: 753).

This difference in telling the origins story of the discipline indicates a significant problem that is beyond a mere question of historiography. Firstly, when the prevailing history of the discipline claims that a great transformation took place in the 1930s that resulted in realism eclipsing idealism, many of the ideas and issues that were of great concern to the actual scholars of the period disappear from the picture and get discredited and marginalized from the field of legitimate enquiries. For the scholars of international politics in the early twentieth century the troubled relations among races was at the heart of international politics, as they widely shared the worries about the rising of the "non-white" world to challenge the supremacy of white races and the possibility of impending global racial conflicts based on color differences. Thus, questions about colonial administration and race were foremost among those issues that were of great concern and constitutive of the incipient discipline in its early years, but then were erased from the mainstream of the discipline. Secondly, focusing on the realism vs. idealism paradigms at the expense of analyzing the impact of the colonial and imperial context serves to obfuscate the ways in which the belief, widespread and unquestioned in that period, in the racial hierarchy of peoples was embedded in the international institutions of the

period as well as in the analytics of the discipline. This obfuscation becomes even more problematic when we consider that the discipline was, and has remained, concerned primarily with relations between and issues of concern to the great powers, the hegemons, the large and powerful in the global political economy. While the discipline's historical reference points were drawn almost exclusively from Europe's "internal" history and the field of IR has been dominated by North American, European, and to a lesser extent Australian scholars, the thoughts and acts of the rest of the non-Western world have been marginalized (Jones 2006: 2; Also see Hoffmann 1977; Waeber 1998: Crawford 2001; Smith 2000 and 2002; Acharya and Buzan 2007)¹⁹. This exclusion serves to render the violence that imperialism and its racial hierarchies inflicted on the non-Western world not only invisible but also implicitly justified.

Therefore, while themes of imperialism and problems of colonial administration were central to the debates within the formative years of the discipline of International Relations, many prominent figures of the discipline expressed a racial worldview that rested on the belief of white supremacy and inferiority of the non-European races. This belief in white supremacy could be framed within either the "scientific" theories of race, or within a cultural Eurocentrism that nevertheless viewed the world through hierarchically organized racial categories. Accompanying the belief in white supremacy, there was also a widespread sense of defensiveness that reflected the fears about racial upheavals and the perception of threat that non-whites represented against the political

¹⁹ My main concern here is with the mainstream IR that was established as a "white" discipline by excluding the experience and voices of the non-Western world. Notwithstanding the later emergence of critical theories that problematize this exclusion, the mainstream of the field carried on its "lack of correspondence between standard IR terminology, categories, and theories, and the third world realities" (Tickner, 2003: 296). For a recent study of the discipline in the non-Western contexts, see Tickner and Waeber (2009).

and economic privileges of the white nations. By omitting the effects of this historical context and the dominant themes in the historiography of the discipline, scholars of international relations forget the complicity of the discipline in imperial efforts as well as in the widely shared racial belief in white supremacy. For many, the second World War represents a break in this state of affairs within the discipline. The next section focuses on the changes in International Relations regarding race after the World War II.

Race in Post World War II International Relations:

The end of the second World War and revulsion at the Nazi Holocaust, together with the critiques against scientific racism (with anthropologist Franz Boas leading the way), signify a turning point for breaking up with “scientific” racism in Western academic thought (Hobson 2014: 81). Not only the horrors of Nazi racism, but also the challenge of the social movements for decolonization and civil rights that questioned the global structures of racial hierarchy, contributed to that turning point in the aftermath of World War II. As the norms of racial equality were accepted in international institutions, and decolonization gained momentum in the post WWII era, scholars of International Relations assert that after 1945, IR replaced politics of racial intolerance with a more tolerant and benign discourse of racial equality (Hobson 2002: 82; Gong 1984; Klotz 1995). Yet, at the same time, Long and Schmidt suggest that the post-war ideological context was so heavily pitted against colonialism and imperialism that scholars consigned these notions ‘to the dustbin of history’, only to replace them with ‘pseudonyms and related concepts’ such as structural violence, dependency, hegemony, and so on that designated the same reality (2005: 11).

In the aftermath of WW II, two main developments shaped International Relations. On the one hand, Realism became a dominant way of thinking about international politics, although liberalism continued to exist, too. On the other hand, claiming to be a “scientific” method, behavioralism became widely adopted by IR scholars. At the same time, these developments took place within a context of growing role of the U.S. in world politics, which in turn provided a suitable environment for the developing IR community to offer their expertise and opinions not only for politicians but also through institutional channels (Hoffmann 1977). In the aftermath of 1945, the study of international relations was dominated by the U.S academic community in much the same way as the U.S dominated world politics (Smith 2002). For IR this led to a narrow understanding of world politics and a tendency to see the world through decidedly U.S. lenses. As Smith argues, the U.S. discipline of International Relations constructs a field of knowledge and the actors within it in such a way as to mask its own involvement in the reinforcement and reconstitution of these practices: in other words, IR engages in the politics of forgetting its own role in the practices of international relations. Regarding the role of race in international politics, the most important consequence of this forgetting has been glossing over imperialism from world politics, while at the same time taking the “progressive” function of imperialism for granted.

To begin with Realism, in Hans Morgenthau's classic, *Politics Among the Nations*, imperialism is presented not as a policy that the West had deployed against the East, but as a regular universal strategy of great powers in relation to each other. Morgenthau defined imperialism as a foreign policy that aims at “acquiring more power

than [a great power] actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations” (Morgenthau 1967, 36-7). He claims that this definition is ethically neutral and objective, as opposed to other “pejorative” definitions of imperialism. However, this definition can be applied to any foreign policy that seeks to change the status quo and “becomes the default action of any powerful state that is not pursuing a status quo policy” (Salter 2002: 117). This definition not only sanitizes or empties the concept of imperialism of its European/Western particularities, but also relegates one of the crucial dynamics of world politics since the fifteenth century to a “stagnant backwater in the vibrant and mainstream Western story” (Hobson 2014: 85). By focusing on intra-Western relations, Morgenthau's definition ignores the more complex discussions of imperialism in the early twentieth century IR, but also naturalizes existing imperial divisions and policies carried in non-Western spaces.²⁰ Indeed, for Morgenthau the age of imperialism was an age of stability. He maintains that “In the period between 1870 and 1914, the stability of the status quo in Europe was the direct result [...] of the opportunity of changing the status quo in outlying regions without incurring the danger of a general conflagration” (356).

Strikingly, and also paradoxically, Morgenthau also observes that one of the causes of imperialism was “the existence of weak states or of politically empty spaces” that are attractive and accessible to a strong state (36). While being an implicit

20 This is in striking contrast to another classical realist work, E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years Crisis* (1939). Carr's critique of the “harmony of interests” thesis can also be read as a stark critique of imperialism and white supremacy. Revealing the actual power relations and interests behind the discourses of “common interests in peace or economic prosperity,” Carr exposes how the privileged classes or nations represent their own particular interests as the universal interests of human race

acknowledgement of colonial imperialism, this statement also perpetuates the distinction between the true sovereignty of Western powers and the “politically empty spaces of the periphery.” This spatial distinction views the political entities outside of the West as not having sovereign rights and hence as not being “equal members” of the international community. Thus, whereas the IR scholars of pre-1945 period thought imperialism was the central focus on international politics, after 1945, as IR focused more on relations among Western powers, not only were the non-Western entities devoid of any agency but also imperialism ceased to indicate the violence and oppression of non-Western peoples. Furthermore, the European sense of superiority, as one of the pillars of the imperial and racial hierarchies continues to haunt IR theories in viewing decolonization as a triumph of Western moral ideas (Hobson 2014: 86). In this vein, Morgenthau claims:

[i]n the wake of its conquest, the West brought to Asia not only its technology and political institutions, but also its principles of political morality. The nations of the West, taught the peoples of Asia by their own example that the full development of the individual's faculties depends upon the ability of the nation to which he belongs to determine of its own free will its political and cultural destinies, and that this national freedom is worth fighting for; and the peoples of Asia learned that lesson (1967: 344-45)

In this framework, as Western imperialism appears almost as a “benign teacher,” the East becomes a passive learner that cannot have an agency of its own to reject the imperialist violence. As such, the realist thinking about sovereignty became one that bestows sovereign rights only to the proper international agents, and distinguishes between sovereign states and other forms of political entities in which the sovereign power was lacking in any concrete terms. Guilhot argues that in the period of decolonization, as international law ceased to discriminate between European and non-European spaces,

realists declared that it offered a poor guide to politics, and that sovereignty was not a legal entitlement, but a political fact (2014: 700). Accordingly, in the aftermath of World War II, as the scholars of international politics were faced with the problem of the dissolution of empires, realism as an intellectual project offered a way of understanding the world in terms of concrete differences based on a differentiated spatial order, and of making political discriminations by challenging the claims of racial and cultural equality. As such, realism was at odds with decolonization, with its universalistic claims, moral language, revolutionary rhetoric and explicit demands of equality. Indeed, other main theoretical works published in the 1950s, were silent about decolonization and race (Kaplan 1957; Waltz 1959; Fox 1959; Herz 1951).

Focusing on the relations between established state powers and the institutions those created, IR in the 1960s and 1970s generally viewed the phenomenon of newly independent post-colonial states from the perspective of Western politics, while excluding the viewpoints and concerns of the “Third World” intellectuals. Nevertheless, during the 1960s and 1970s, a small number of IR scholars "introduced" race as an object for study (Rosenau 1969-70; Shepherd and Lemelle 1970; Tinker 1977.) When questions about race made that first wave of appearance in IR literature during 1960s and 1970s, the scholars, who were motivated by the questions brought forth by decolonization and civil rights movements were nevertheless concerned with protecting the existing world order managed by the developed states. Indeed, their concerns were similar to those of the interwar years scholars who were worried about the possibility of a global race war: “already the most destructive war in the history of mankind has been fought in the name

of racial supremacy. Another one could be fought eventually in the name of racial equality” (Lemelle 1970: xv). Similarly, Karl Deutsch, who offered a theory of race as a “built-in, rapid, inexpensive, and reliable signaling device” that could be used to identify “a group of persons on the basis of some physical characteristics, very quickly, very cheaply, very reliably, and without elaborate procedures for verification” (1970: 123), was worried about the possibility of nonwhite peoples achieving nuclear parity with the whites and having “enough weapons to kill all the whites in the world” (149).

Chapters by Deutsch and others in the volume of *Race Among Nations: A Conceptual Approach* (1970), which was edited by G. Shepperd and T. LeMelle, reveal the attempts to address the lack of theoretical tools to understand race in international politics. In the same volume, James Rosenau offered a conceptual framework with racial identity as the independent variable and conflict as the dependent variable. Rosenau's framework attempted to theorize how “racial consciousness” and behaviors that reflect racial consciousness connect to international conflict behavior. Similarly, George Shepherd Jr. viewed race as an independent variable; he thought that race gave a visible dimension to hierarchy and could intensify the ethnic economic rivalries between sub-systems in the international system.

A common characteristic of those attempts to understand the role of race in international politics in 1960s and 1970s is that, influenced by behavioralism, they viewed race as a “cause,” or an independent variable that is based on physical differences. I agree with Doty's argument that treating race as an independent variable as such permits biology/genetics to re-enter through the backdoor as it is presumed that

physical characteristics such as skin color and hair texture stand for real and subtle differences (1993: 450). The resulting conceptualizations of race, then, end up taking race as a given, a real and self-evidently neutral fact. In this way, not only is the political nature of race obscured but also the historical and social practices which construct race are excluded as a subject of analysis. Doty's conclusion that the notion of race in those studies had no clear notion of politics, exclusion and power at the center of the concept becomes inevitable (449). Thus, these few IR works in 1960s and 1970s, as discussed above treat race as an already given, natural fact, and attempt to conceptualize effects of race in international politics through analyzing what they consider to be actions based on racial identifications. As such, they focus on examination of the impact of already taken for granted categories of racial identities/constructs.

Later, a few other IR studies attempted to analyze the implications of racist practices of state and non-state actors (Tinker 1977; Vincent 1982; Winant 2000), or the effects of racism on foreign policy (Hunt 1987; Lauren 1988). While these studies contributed to our understanding of the role of racism in world politics, the questions of how race becomes what it is, or how the discipline might be implicated in racialization went unnoticed. Furthermore, despite these few IR scholars who raised the question of race in international politics, “interest in race was not sustained and never did cut to the heart of IR as an academic discipline” (Doty, 445).

In the 1980s, one of the most important obstacles against theorization of race in international politics was Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979), which has dominated the discipline until the last decade. Waltz defined the international system as

anarchy and sustained the focus of realism in “great power politics”: “In international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves”(72). He distinguished between anarchic and hierarchical systems so that in the hierarchical systems “some are entitled to command, others are required to obey,” but in anarchies such requirements do not hold and command over material capabilities rather than role functions determine the structure.²¹ As such, anarchy signifies a generative structural condition that conditions sovereign actor's interactions in the international system: in the absence of a central governing authority in the international system, the distribution of material capabilities determines the structure of the international system, and this leads the actors to fear each other and become preoccupied by guaranteeing their own survival, which they try to achieve through increasing their military might on the basis of the principle of self-help (Waltz 1979; also Mearsheimer 2001). In Waltz's depiction of the international system, states become abstract offices defined only according to how they are positioned in relation to one another. The abstraction from unit attributes or interactions, Waltz claims, enables us to arrive at a systemic theory of international politics. Although he maintains that pure orders do not exist, Waltz nevertheless concludes that to distinguish realms by their organizing principles is proper and important (115). While the nature of the international system is accepted to be anarchy, the units operating in this system are assumed to be sovereign entities, and, particularly since 1945 nation states. For Waltz, sovereignty

²¹Sampson argues that this distinction comes from mid-twentieth century British anthropologist Nadel's specification of social structures through positional terms -of relationships between abstract roles rather than individuals. In Nadel's framework there are two contrasting types of structures; in one, actor' roles can be defined in relation to actors in other roles and hence become dependent on those relationships. In the other, no such dependency exists and the different roles relate to each other on the basis of differential command over resources.

implies a relationship of formal equality and entails that between sovereign states “none is entitled to command; none is required to obey” (1979: 88). Sovereignty, thus, entails that the state “decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems” (Waltz 1979:96).

I argue that Waltz's theory of international politics served to silence racialization in international politics in two major ways. Firstly, Waltz's theory continues to be status-quo oriented. As Waltz claims that “systems are either maintained or transformed” (111), he sides with the maintenance of the existing system and rejects the possibility of transformation of the international system into a hierarchical system through colonialism, due to two possible scenarios. On the one hand, he reasons that if a primitive society is unable to rule itself, “no body of foreigners, whatever their military force at command, can reasonably hope to do so. If insurrection is the problem, then it can hardly be hoped that an alien army will be able to pacify a country that is unable to govern itself.” (188-89). On the other hand, Waltz is also skeptical of colonial powers' claims to serve the general interests. He states that, although powerful states act for the world's common good, and not only for their own sakes, “the common good is defined by each of them for all of us, and the definitions conflict. One may fear the arrogance of global burden-bearers more than the selfishness of those who tend to their own narrowly defined interests” (205). However, behind the seeming critique of colonialism espoused by Waltz here, the actual choice that frames his thought is rather between two different kinds of colonial rule, and Waltz prefers the policy of indirect rule to the more interventionist civilizational missions. That the choice is between two forms of colonialism, and for

instance not between the hierarchy of colonialism and a non-hierarchical, egalitarian international system, reveals the implicit acceptance of hierarchy in the international system as a constitutive but under-theorized principle. Relatedly, as it is apparently beyond the limits of the possible to imagine a non-hierarchical international system, the alleged equality of sovereignty that functionally undifferentiated units would have also becomes an impossibility for some of the states to reach, as they are continuously depicted as subjects that lack the capacity for self-governance.

Secondly, Waltz's theorization of anarchy and sovereignty exemplifies many of the ways in which the key concepts, assumptions and theoretical analyses of the mainstream IR serve to silence racialization in the post World War II era. Envisioning the international system as a non-hierarchical order with equal sovereign entities leaves the questions of racial and imperial hierarchies and exclusions outside the boundaries of the discipline. The continuing employment of such analytical and normative tools, then further enables and espouses thinking implicitly, but not explicitly, in racialized terms in IR.

Anarchy and Sovereignty

The two most important concepts that constitute the general framework within which the discipline of International Relations theorizes and understands the international system are anarchy and sovereignty. Anarchy, understood as the lack of a central rule-enforcing authority in the international system, is generally accepted to be the fundamental characteristic of international relations. Contrasted to the domestic political systems where the institutions of the government establish a clearly demarcated

hierarchical order, anarchy indicates the lack of such a hierarchical order in the international system. In turn, the operating units in this anarchic international system are assumed to be sovereign entities, that have juridical legal authority for policy making within their borders, an authority which is recognized as such by other juridically equal entities. This requirement for recognition by other similarly recognized states as “one of them” makes sovereignty an inherently social concept. Robert Jackson calls this “juridical sovereignty” maintaining that sovereignty is a juridical idea and institution endowing the sovereign state with territorial jurisdiction exercised on an exclusive basis (Jackson, 1999: 432). This juridical authority within a territory is exclusive because sovereignty has been characterized as “indivisible,” as Morgenthau argued “sovereignty over the same territory cannot reside simultaneously in two different authorities, that is sovereignty is indivisible” (1948: 350). Sovereignty also implied a relationship of formal equality, which entails that between sovereign states “none is entitled to command; none is required to obey” (Waltz 1979: 88). Thus the discipline of IR envisions the international system to be composed of independent states whose governments are the principal authorities both domestically and internationally.²² Through the norms of equal sovereignty, non-intervention and reciprocity, sovereignty provides the normative foundation upon which the society of states rests within the framework of anarchy. Sovereignty and anarchy together produce a systemic understanding of the international system that lacks hierarchical order, as well as of the relations between political units in

²² This holds for the debates about “interdependence” as well, since interdependence is seen as an expression, and not a limitation of sovereignty. Even the literature on globalization maintains that, while it lost some authority to control economic outcomes, the sovereign state retains its viability. Accordingly, the “retreat of the state” in the economic realm, by no means points at the end of the sovereign state in international politics.

the international system in which “none is entitled to command, none is required to obey.”

This general framework, however, is complicated by the complexity of views of anarchy and sovereignty in the main theoretical approaches of IR. In addition to the contestations and critiques of hierarchy and sovereignty, as will be discussed below, each school of thought in IR interpreted the nature and the consequences of this nexus between anarchy and sovereignty differently. As discussed above, for Realists, anarchy gives way to power politics among states, as it creates a self-help system and a zero-sum game situation, for each actor's gain in power is seen as another's loss. In liberal theories, although states live under conditions of international anarchy, anarchy can be regulated through various means such as international institutions, economic interdependence and liberal democratization. Liberal theories of IR view both the state and the international system as constituted through a plurality of differentiated actors, not just sovereign states, whose competitive interests can be achieved through cooperation. For them, anarchy does not mean a zero-sum game either; through cooperation actors can achieve mutual benefits. Thus, according to Liberals, international interactions may be governed by criteria other than a strict security rationale (Doyle 1997; Moravcsik 1997). For constructivists, anarchy is a social construction, or in Alexander Wendt's famous phrase, “anarchy is what states make of it; “anarchy does not have an inherent logic, but is socially constructed by practices and processes such as self-help or power politics (1992). Accordingly, self-help and power politics do not follow logically or causally from anarchy as anarchy is only a permissive condition whereas actors' interests,

identities and interactions are shaped by social norms and practices. Wendt (1999) differentiates between three cultures of anarchy, i.e. Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian, each creating different patterns of interactions among international actors. While for realists and most liberals, sovereignty is an attribute of the state, for constructivists it is a social discourse produced and reproduced through certain practices which promote the state as the sole authoritative political agent in international society, and prescribe certain actions and rights as legitimate (Lake 2003; Hobson and Sharman 2005). Constructivists view sovereignty as influenced by other norms and practices and accordingly subject to social and historical variation.

International Relations' conceptualization of anarchy largely originates from the conceptualization of the state of nature by social contract theorists. Accordingly, IR scholars project the characteristics of the hypothetical conditions of human interactions prior to the establishment of society/government to the level of international politics. In that projection, anarchy, characterized by the absence of a central governing authority at the international level, becomes a condition of existence for states and shapes the interactions between them. However, as Milner argues, anarchy does not indicate chaos or disorder since persistent elements of order in international politics have been noted by many scholars (1991, 69-70). Even structural realists find orderly features and regularized patterns of state behavior when they observe international politics. Therefore, the lack that the concept of anarchy centers around is not viewed as a lack of order, but a lack of government; states in the international order are seen as being in a state of nature, which lacks a common authority to govern. Yet, just as Hobbes' state of nature is very

different from Locke's state of nature, the absence of a central governing authority can give way to different interactions among states (Wendt 1999).

As fundamental for the discipline of International Relations as they are, these two concepts have also been subject to much investigation and criticism in the last two decades. Both anarchy and sovereignty have been contested in regard to the incompatibilities and changes between their conceptualization and the historical and political realities, as well as to the limitations they pose for understanding and theorizing world politics. For instance, in *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (1995), Jens Bartelson approaches numerous political and philosophical representations of sovereignty and the configurations of knowledge that make them possible. His genealogy traces the “history of battles between different interpretations” of sovereignty (76) and he explains those different interpretations in connection to the historical production of knowledge. Bartelson suggests that sovereignty is not something that has an ontological content, but it has a function: “to frame objects of inquiry by telling us what they are not” (51). The function of sovereignty in international relations is to demarcate the boundaries between the inside and the outside, to differentiate the domestic from the international, so that those boundaries appear as self-evident rather than discursively constructed through complex interworkings of power and knowledge. Regarding the “indivisibility” of sovereignty and inquiring into deviations from Westphalian sovereignty, Krasner (1993, 1999) finds a wide range of authority relationships in international relations that reveal substantial variation in sovereignty between different political actors. He argues that “the principles associated with both Westphalian and international legal sovereignty have

always been violated” (1999: 24). Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are best understood as examples of hypocrisy: rules might adhere to or violate the norms according to their interests. Thus, according to Krasner, sovereignty has almost always been internally divided between different authorities, and externally compromised through conventions, contracts, coercion or imposition (1999: 25). Similarly, the concept of anarchy has been contested by scholars who argued that hierarchies matter in distinct ways for world politics. They maintain that hierarchies are a ubiquitous feature of international politics, and that such hierarchies generate social, moral and behavioral dynamics that are different from those created by other arrangements (Bailey-Mattern and Zarakol, 2016, p.5). As briefly discussed in the opening of this chapter, David Lake, in *Hierarchy in International Relations* (2009), draws upon a relational conception of authority (that binds the ruler and the ruled into a social contract) and views sovereignty as divisible and constituted by a bundle of rights and authorities. Lake challenges the assumption of anarchy by showing that states exercise authority over one another in varying degrees in international hierarchies, and that international hierarchy rests on mutual recognition that this conferral of authority and rights is legitimate. In a similar vein, Donnelly argues for decoupling anarchy and sovereign inequality, maintaining that formal inequalities are standards of almost all historical international societies (2006: 144-145). In an attempt to extend critiques of sovereignty to rethink the character of the international system, Hobson and Sharman maintain that the Westphalian frame of sovereignty is not enough to understand the plurality of polities in the modern international system: Rather than an anarchical system of sovereign like units, “the

modern international system has comprised a mixed anarchical/hierarchical system populated by states but also political units that do not enjoy ultimate authority in certain politico-juridical areas” (2005: 71). The present dissertation moves in conversation with such critiques, and aims to contribute to this research agenda by showing how IR's concepts of anarchy and sovereignty function to erase from view and to silence the formation and effects of racial categorizations and hierarchies at a global level.

Notwithstanding the proliferating critiques, anarchy and sovereignty continue to occupy a central place in different conceptualizations of international relations. Bartelson argues that all the critiques of “indivisibility” of sovereignty have done “little to change the ways in which the concept of sovereign state has been defined and used within modern political science and international relations” (2011: 86). Accordingly, sovereignty has been foundational to the differentiation of modern political life into a domestic and international sphere, and without sovereignty modern politics could hardly be comprehended or justified. If sovereignty can not be washed away from the edifice of IR, neither can anarchy. Reviewing the recent proliferation of works on international hierarchies, Janice Bially Mattern and Ayse Zarakol maintain that “few scholars explicitly frame their research around the fact of formal international anarchy anymore. Even fewer invoke it as a cause of state behavior” (2016: 630). However, they emphasize that as a discipline:

IR (still) approaches the study of world politics through the prism of anarchy. The very idea of an 'international' [i.e. inter-state] space of political relations that is conceptually and analytically distinctive from other kinds of political relations, persists. IR is marked by a continued -albeit more complex- state-centricism (2016: 630).

One of the reasons behind the salience of anarchy and sovereignty is that the alternative approaches have not yet provided explicitly hierarchy-centered theoretical and empirical analysis of world politics. According to Bially Mattern and Zarakol, the proliferation of research into hierarchies is yet to produce a common conceptualization of hierarchy (i.e. which orders count as hierarchy) as different understandings of hierarchy inform different analyses of the relationship between hierarchy and power (18). Adding the diversity of theoretical and epistemological commitments among IR scholars concerned with hierarchy, it is hardly surprising that the research agenda on hierarchies follows different forms of power and authority arrives at different conceptualizations of hierarchy to analyze different aspects of world politics.

On this background, I argue that this conceptual framework of anarchy and sovereignty serves to silence racialization in this discipline by rendering theorization of hierarchies that could be constituted racially virtually impossible, and by excluding the experiences of political entities that have less-than total sovereignty and are subject to hierarchical subordinations from the parameters of the systemic study of international politics. However, for most of the discipline the recognition that some actors are not sovereign and some international relations are non-anarchic, does not change the basic parameters of the international system; the non-sovereign actors or non-anarchic relations are deemed inconsequential and remained ignored. Thus, the interrelated assumptions of anarchy and sovereignty render the scholars of International Relations unable to theorize the constitution and effects of the global relations of hierarchy, especially in regard to the constructions of race since racial hierarchies could be effective both domestically and

transnationally. Furthermore when the international system is viewed through lenses of anarchy and sovereignty, theories inevitably reproduce the status-quo of authoritative and unequal relations of power. Although not many IR scholars would openly embrace a racist ontology that assumes a higher order of being for whites, the empirical, ethical and epistemological assumptions underlying the paradigms of the discipline operate to hide the origins and consequences of racial thinking.

The assumptions of anarchy and equal sovereign rights for all the political units in the international system make it very hard to grasp the origins and effects of hierarchy as well as the exclusion of non-white subjects within the boundaries of the discipline. On the one hand, the reality of unequal power relations, especially between imperial centers and dependencies, belies the assumptions of anarchy by revealing the constitutive hierarchies of world orders that denied sovereignty to those “inferior” units. On the other hand, this denial of sovereign rights is not merely a product of unequal power relations, but further depends on a more fundamental presumption about the nature of the societies that are deemed to lack the capacity for self-governing. This presumption depends on the racist hierarchy that grants the capacity for self-governance only to the “white”, developed, European societies. Therefore, the notion of anarchy functions both to erase from view the reasons behind and consequences of hierarchical relations that are based on a racist categorization of world societies.

While in realist theories the distinctions between the properly sovereign political entities of the West and those other communities that lack such sovereign capabilities are presented more implicitly, the liberal theories of IR are much more prone to embrace

those distinctions explicitly. However, those distinctions function to silence race differently in variants of liberal international theory.

In distinguishing themselves from other approaches within the discipline of International Relations, contemporary liberal IR theories ground their approach in two basic assumptions. The first assumption is the significance attributed to the domestic “nature” of states as the conditioning, if not determining, factor of foreign policy behavior (Moravcsik, 1997: 513-54). Different from realism, liberalism argues that what goes on inside the state matters in more than one way: the nature of the domestic political system of a given country impacts not only the foreign policy of the particular state but also other states’ perception of and actions towards it. In the liberal picture of the international system, not only are the black boxes functionally differentiated; they are also treated differentially. On the one hand the liberal-democratic character of states is seen as the source of pacific relations among similar liberal-democratic states. Consequently the projection of such principles to the international realm is viewed as providing the best prospect for a peaceful world order. On the other hand, the more conflictual and warlike relations between and towards non-liberal states are explained by the perception of threat coming from those non-liberal states which are not restrained by legitimate domestic orders (Doyle 1983 &1987).

The second distinctive assumption of liberal IR theories is the combined belief in progress and human reason which leads to the view that world politics is a heterogeneous state of peace and war, and might become a state of global peace, in which the expectation of war disappears. In other words, given the appropriate institutional

structure – with varying explanatory emphasis on domestic democratic structures, free trade, and the role of international institutions and norms – conflicting interests can be managed, power can be balanced or tamed by reason, and a socially optimal outcome can emerge (Doyle 1997).

Read together these two assumptions illuminate how the distinction between the peaceful and civilized world of liberal communities and the conflict ridden outside world functions in liberal IR: while the responsibility for initiating and sustaining violence is transferred onto illiberal, uncivilized and non-white states and societies (Buchan 2002: 408), interventions in those states and societies by liberal states are justified on the grounds that changing the cultural, economic, and political constitution of the target states through the spread of European cultural, economic, and political development (representing the highest stage of human development) will benefit humanity at large (Beate 2005: 178). As such, liberal theories construct “illiberal,” “uncivilized” states and societies as racialized others that are either bound to remain outside of the civilized world of liberal states, or subject to interventions by those liberal states in order to bring them political development.

A general tendency of the Democratic peace literature and new conceptualizations of liberal interventionism continue to employ this line of logic both in their explanations and their prescriptions. One central and common tenet of the Democratic peace literature is that while liberal states do not fight each other, they might be less peaceful and more aggressive in their relations with less developed and illiberal states. There is a vast literature trying to explain the causal mechanisms behind the empirical observation that

liberal states do not fight one another. Nevertheless, the answers to the question of how those liberal states can be seen simultaneously as agents of peace and as potential aggressors towards what they perceive to be illiberal states²³ point to a common assumption of the normative superiority of liberal states over non-liberal states (Buchan, 410). The proponents of the Democratic peace thesis identify the real existing liberal democratic states as sufficiently embodying liberal norms to accord them with the rights of sovereignty and nonintervention (Jahn 2005: 186).

On the one hand the democratic peace literature represents existing liberal states as seeking the true interests of their citizens (Owens: 89), and as having a special capacity to make and sustain promises with each other due to being better equipped to forge durable, mutually profitable relationships (Lipson, 47). Whether seen separately or as working together, the representational mechanisms of liberal states, their common norms and institutional structures, are used to explain why liberal states are pacific and trustworthy. On the other hand, the illiberal states, or non-democracies, are seen either as lacking domestic accountability and hence legitimacy (Owens, 1983: 325) or as dangerous because they are “unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous... ruled by despots, or with unenlightened citizenries” seeking not the true interests of their citizens but other ends such as conquest or plunder (Owens, 89). These views continue to understand the international system as hierarchically divided by essentialized, and hence racialized cultural differences. Owen acknowledges that liberal states do not automatically fight all illiberal states in an endless crusade to spread freedom because

23 See Oren, Ido “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany,” *International Security* Vol. 20 No.2, 1995, for how the category of liberal states are defined and redefined according to whether or not states perceive other states to be similar or dissimilar to them.

they estimate that the cost of liberalizing other states is too high. Doyle, however, maintains that the imperialist interventions, which were waged in order to create liberal societies by promoting the economic development and political stability of nonliberal societies, have been unable to sustain or profit from intervention and have failed to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, nonliberal states continue to figure in those analyses as the obscure figures that not only lack the good attributes that liberal states have, such as reason, reciprocity, and trustworthiness, but also are “too powerful” rendering interventions too costly and dangerous enough to be perceived as a source of threat because they are “naturally aggressive.” Whether consciously or not the languages of Doyle and Owen reproduces in both tone and sentiment J.S. Mill’s arguments relating to interventionism and barbarity as the right to sovereignty or non-intervention is denied to the non-liberal states, and waging war in the name of serving liberal ends functions both as an explanation and justification of the aggressive policies of liberal states. In explaining how the very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies, Doyle writes:

If the legitimacy of state action rests on the fact that it respects and effectively represents morally autonomous individuals, then states that coerce their citizens or foreign residents lack moral legitimacy. Even Kant regarded the attitude of "primitive peoples" attached to a lawless liberty as "raw, uncivilized, and an animalic degradation of humanity." (1983: 325)

On the one hand, Doyle interprets Kant as arguing that when states reject the cosmopolitan law of access they violate natural law and hence they can no longer lay claim to moral legitimacy. On the other hand, however, as Doyle acknowledges, Kant

rejects conquest or imperial intervention. Arguably, what is significant here is the way in which Kant's viewing of barbarians as a degradation of humanity functions in Doyle's explanation: more than violating natural law, it is being primitive and uncivilized that results in a lack of moral legitimacy. Moreover, it is ambiguous if Doyle is merely explaining the justifications for past actions or if he is endorsing the continuation of these justifications and related suspensions of liberal principles in future.

The continuing spatial and conceptual demarcation of the boundaries between a civilized world of the inherently white and liberal countries and the "outside" of this world that is marked by the non-existence of progress and civilization underlie the justifications for the illiberal ways of dealing with the non-West, non-white subjects and the complicity of liberalism in the continuation of violence against such entities. As such, liberal theories of international politics continue to silence racialization through employing distinctions between white/western subjects and the non-West under the guise of "civilization" and viewing the non-western subjects' rights and capacity for sovereignty as questionable. There are, of course variants of liberalism, especially the discourse of human rights, that claim to espouse these rights universally. However, even the universalism of such claims are affected by the particularity of the Western experience and what is offered as a universal vision is grounded in the Western experience of human rights, liberalism and modernity.

This argument can be understood better if read alongside Charles Mills' argument that the social contract theories were indeed embedded in a broader "racial contract" (1997). To view anarchy as conceptualized by IR as a racialized construct, it is crucial to

bring forth Mills' contention that while the social contract theories presumably proposed a singular homogeneous humanity from which civil society emerges, the racial contract actually establishes a heterogeneous humanity that was hierarchically organized and reflects the fundamental dualism marked by race.

Accordingly, in his reading of Hobbes' state of nature, Mills argues that "there is a tacit racial logic in the text: the literal state of nature is reserved for nonwhites; for whites the state of nature is hypothetical" (65-66), as the only real life example of people in a state of nature Hobbes gives is "the savage people in many places of America," the very non-white people upon "whose land his fellow Europeans were then encroaching" (63). Furthermore, Mills asserts that for Hobbes:

The conflict between whites is the conflict between those with *sovereigns*, that is, those who are already (and have always been) in society. From this conflict, one can extrapolate (gesturing at the racial abyss, so to speak) to what might happen in the absence of a ruling sovereign. But really we know that whites are too rational to allow this happen to *them*. So the most notorious state of nature in the contractarian literature -the bestial war of all against all- is really a *nonwhite* figure, a racial object lesson for the more rational whites, whose superior grasp of natural law (here in its prudential rather than altruistic version) will enable them to take the necessary steps to avoid it and not to behave as savages (66).

Moralized and normatively regulated by traditional (altruistic, non-prudential) natural law, Locke's state of nature provides a normative rationalization for white civilizations' conquest of America as well as other white settler states in Africa and the Pacific through the characterizations of the white industrious and rational Englishmen in contrast to the idle Indians who is not adding value to their land through labor (67). Mills states that Rousseau's state of nature might be seen as an exception to the extent that in the *Discourse On Inequality's* reconstruction of the origins of society, everybody is

envisaged as having been in the state of nature, regardless of race. Yet, a careful reading again reveals that the only natural savages cited are *nonwhite* savages and for Europe savagery seems to be in the dim distant past: “So, even what might initially seem to be a more open environmental determinism, which would open the door to racial egalitarianism rather than racial hierarchy, degenerates into massive historical amnesia and factual misrepresentation, driven by the pressures of the Racial Contract” (69).

The lingering effects of the the Racial Contract are obvious in the democratic peace literature. The democratic peace project starts with equating the values of existing liberal states with the ideals of liberalism, and distinguishes between liberal and non-liberal states, which as we argue parallels the distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples and non-white/barbarian political communities. It then arrives in a position where there is a very thin line between the explanation of why liberal states go to war with non-liberal ones and the justification for the realization of liberal ends through illiberal means. This line, if it exists at all, is so thin as to be nonexistent because the temporal and spatial distinctions that the democratic peace theory depends on reveal the tensions between the universal character of its normative assumptions and the particularistic justifications of its realizations. On the one hand, the democratic peace theory depends on the universalizability of not only the liberal principles of equality and freedom, but also the liberal representational form of government, as a condition of achieving global peace. On the other hand, as Jahn argues, whereas all human beings were supposed to be born equal, free, and rational, from Locke onwards, liberal political inclusion has been contingent upon a qualified capacity to reason (200). The reflection of

this qualification in liberal IR theories has been the spatial and temporal demarcation of certain political communities as incapable of exercising the same liberal values; the distinction between civilized and uncivilized political communities brings along another distinction between those who can be governed through the promotion of liberty and those who need to be governed in other ways – and these distinction most commonly have been made in historicist, developmental, and gendered terms (2005: 200). As Chakrabarty argues, the form that the ideologies of progress or development assumed, from the nineteenth century on, posited historical time as a measure of the cultural distance assumed to exist between the West and the non-West (2000: 7). This form of historical consciousness converts history into a waiting room for those who are not yet civilized enough to rule themselves; the future for them could only be deferred.

The waiting room for the non-white societies exists at the same historical time as the civilized nations. Furthermore, the boundary-drawing discourse of civilization also depicts this waiting room as a realm of violence and hence a source of threats against the liberal zone of peace. The need for the elimination of this threat then requires certain “interventions” to the uncivilized world, and the possibility of progress requires that the waiting room is brought to the universal time of liberalism. Yet, as Walker points out, the affirmation of the hope in the liberal accounts of interventionism and cosmopolitanism can only be specified as the condition of its own impossibility not only because it reproduces the same particularistic and exclusive application of liberal principles but also because it does not take into consideration the ways in which those liberal principles are complicit in rendering the waiting room a realm of violence right from the very start.

Outside of the democratic peace literature, propositions for a new liberal interventionism and for cosmopolitan democracy as solutions to the escalation of “new forms of violence” after the end of Cold War, can be seen as other examples of attempts to justify illiberal policies to advance liberal ends against the non-Western subjects. Robert Cooper is the most striking example of the defenders of new liberal interventionism. As a senior British diplomat, who helped to shape British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s calls for a new interventionism, Cooper (2002) divides the contemporary world into a tripartite system of postmodern, modern, and premodern states. While the dividing line is drawn through the existence, demise or sublimation of the classical state system, the decisive importance of this categorization rests on the ways in which the threats to the postmodern world, coming from the modern and premodern worlds, are conceptualized and dealt with. Conceptualizing those worlds through spatial and temporal lines of division, Cooper is as unambiguous as possible:

The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle (ibid.)

While the fact that most of the premodern countries were former colonies is acknowledged in a passing note, and the distinguishing criteria seems to be a political one, i.e. the failed states, the characterization of the premodern world is built upon representations that view this unruly realm almost in naturalized terms: in the jungle of the premodern world chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. Accordingly, while those

failed states, which have lost either the legitimacy or the monopoly of the use of force – often both – are too weak to pose an international threat in terms of the classical categories of International Relations, they can provide a base for non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates for their attacks on the more orderly parts of the world. For liberals the problem thus becomes: What is to be done to eliminate those threats?

Cooper states that the most logical way to deal with this chaos, as has been done in the past, is colonization. Yet, although he does not give any particular reason as to why, he states that colonization is unacceptable to postmodern states. In that case, where “all the conditions for imperialism are there but the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up,” and where “the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world,” the solution is a new form of imperialism, “one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.” According to Cooper, the distinguishing feature of this new imperialism is that it rests on the voluntary principle. Nevertheless, either in “the voluntary imperialism of global economy” or in the “imperialism of neighbors,” there really is not much space for the articulation of what those countries living in chaos would ask for themselves. It is rather the case that they “voluntarily” accept to agree with the solutions that the postmodern world offers to them: “If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to the interference of international organizations and foreign states.” In case the premodern countries do not wish to, or are unable to cooperate, the sorry fact is that the postmodern world needs to get used to the idea of double standards. What underlies the whole approach here is that there is no questioning whatsoever of the

assumption that taking part in the new and more cooperative form of empire, which is supposedly “dedicated to liberty and democracy,” is the universal solution that benefits all.

In a similar vein, Ronald Paris presents the peacebuilding missions of the post-Cold War era as attempts to “transplant” the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states, which according to him constitute the new forms of *mission civilisatrice* (638). For him, what renders the contemporary peacebuilding practices different from old versions of *mission civilisatrice* is that the motivation behind them is less mercenary, and the ethics of modern peacebuilding are not built upon theories of racial superiority. He maintains that although modern peacebuilders have largely abandoned the archaic language of civilized versus the uncivilized, they nevertheless appear to act on the belief that one model of domestic governance – liberal market democracy – is superior to all others. Therefore, the new versions of *mission civilisatrice* again take the form of conveying “norms of acceptable or civilized behavior into the domestic affairs of less developed states” that are located in the poor and politically weak periphery (638-39). However, the language of civilization is far from being abandoned, even in Paris’ own language, and precisely this language can be seen as integral to the forms that racism takes in the era of decolonization. Thus, once again, as the liberal principle of “non-intervention” turns out to apply only to relations between “civilized” Western states, imperial hierarchies continue to characterize the relations between the West and the non-West, and racialization continue to produce the non-West subjects as incapable of self-governing and their lives

dispensable. In the next two chapters I will analyze how this racialization operates in turning the Muslims globally into a racialized group of precarious subjects, and how the in the perceptions of threat from the rise of China, the limits of the liberal international are revealed as unable to accommodate non-Western leadership.

Chapter 4: Islamophobia and the Racialization of Muslims

Nearing the fifth anniversary of September 11, an article in the San Francisco Chronicle, reported: “As the war on terror heads into its sixth year, a new racial stereotype is emerging in America. Brown-skinned men with beards and women with head scarves are seen as "Muslims" -- regardless of their actual faith or nationality.”²⁴ The authors continue the story by stating how the Muslim caricature has ensnared Hindus, Mexicans, and others across the country with violence, suspicion and slurs. Among the many examples is one US born fair-skinned white woman, who, wearing a headscarf, has been categorized by people as Palestinian and told “Go back to your own country.” Another example is a man who goes by the name “Sam” and does not tell people his real first name, Hussein, and that he is a Lebanese immigrant until he gets comfortable with them: “When they hear the name, I'm a totally different person," he says "They automatically think of trouble."

In the aftermath of 9/11, the discourses and practices associated with the “War on Terror” brought about a strong resurgence of orientalism and an immediate intensification of surveillance, detention, and the suspension of rights for the Muslim populations in the Western world. Government and citizen responses targeted Arabs, Muslims, South Asians and others presumed to be “Muslim extremists,” who have been subject to disparate and abusive treatment both in civil society and at the hands of state

²⁴ Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, 9/11: Five years later TYPECASTING MUSLIMS AS A RACE, San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday, September 3, 2006

actors including security, law enforcement and prison officials (Gott, 2005:1073). 9/11 seems to have facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that collapses numerous groups into a singular category of Muslim by grouping together persons who can be associated with being “Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.” In response to this, the term Islamophobia, originally developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, became a widely used concept to draw attention to harmful rhetoric and actions directed at Islam and Muslims in western liberal democracies (Bleich 2011). The term Islamophobia is used to identify anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments as well as to denounce them. On the one hand, academic research into what is termed “Islamophobia” have been burgeoning in an interdisciplinary manner (Allen, 2010; Kumar, 2012; Meer and Modood, 2008; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010). On the other hand, concerns about discrimination of Muslims became a global issue of contestation. On April 13, 2010 the UN Human Rights Council narrowly passed a resolution titled “Combating Defamation of Religions” condemning Islamophobic behavior.²⁵ The resolution views manifestations of Islamophobia as standing in sharp contradiction to international human rights obligations concerning freedom of religions, and it expresses "expresses deep concern ... that Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and terrorism."²⁶ .

25 Available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_19.pdf

26 While 29 countries voted in favor of the resolution, 16 voted against, and seven abstained. The Organization for Islamic Cooperation sponsored several motions for a “defamation of religions” resolution since 1999, but critiques, including religious groups, human rights activists and several Western countries argued that such a resolution would amount to an “international blasphemy” law, that would be used to politically strengthen domestic anti-blasphemy and religious defamation laws that are used to imprison political dissidents (Graham, 2010). The European Union maintained that the concept of defamation should not fall under the remit of human rights because it conflicted with the right to freedom of expression, while the U.S. maintained that free speech could be hindered by the resolution (El Arabiya News, 25 March 2010)

However, despite the increase in its usage, in both the academic studies, and public and political discourses, there is no widely accepted definition of Islamophobia. While some scholars use Islamophobia without explicitly defining it (Halliday, 1999; Kaplan, 2006; MacMaster, 2003; Poynting & Mason, 2007) others offer varying definitions. For Lee et al. Islamophobia indicates “fear of Muslims and the Islamic faith” (2009: 93), and for Abbas it is “the fear or dread of Islam or Muslims” (2004: 28). Zúquete describes Islamophobia as “a widespread mindset and fear-laden discourse in which people make blanket judgments of Islam as the enemy, as the ‘other’, as a dangerous and unchanged, monolithic bloc that is the natural subject of well-deserved hostility from Westerners” (2008, p. 323). In the post-9/11 U.S. context, Semati views Islamophobia as as “an ideological response that conflates histories, politics, societies and cultures of the Middle East into a single unified and negative conception of an essentialized Islam, which is then deemed incompatible with Euro-Americaness” (2010: 256). Stolz's definition maintains that “Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereo-types. It may have emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements (e.g., discrimination, violence)” (2005: 548). The lack of, or the variance of definition makes it very difficult “to compare levels of Islamophobia across time, location, or social group, or to levels of analogous categories such as racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia” (Bleich 2011: 1582, also see Allen 2010). While lack of conceptual clarity makes it hard to identify the causes and consequences of Islamophobia, Garner and Selod find the relatively weak presence of field-work based studies, and academics' reluctance to use the concept of racialization

to be two other significant limitations as to the use of the term Islamophobia (2014: 2). Furthermore, as Garner and Selod argues, using the term “-phobia” while introducing the idea of irrational fears, also denotes a mental disorder and thus moves us further toward the individual and the psychological and away from the social, the collective and the structural or systemic.

In this chapter, I argue that Islamophobia is a specific form of racism targeting Muslims, and an outcome of the processes of racialization of Islam. As discussed in chapter 2, while moving us away from static conceptions of race based on phenotypes, racialization refers to the processes through which a set of characteristics ascribed to members of a group as inherent because of their physical or cultural traits, including language, clothing and religious practices. As such, racialization enables us to see how different groups can be racialized, i.e. made into a racial category by instigating groupness and ascribed characteristics, as well as how those categorizations change (e.g. inclusion of the Irish in whiteness in the U.S. context).

Accordingly, I argue that Muslims are racialized as they are amalgamated into one group, despite the diversity of muslim populations, through a set of ideas and practices, while the characteristics associated with Muslims (violence, misogyny, political disloyalty, incompatibility with Western values etc) are treated as if they are innate. The racialized figure of “the Muslim,” is brought into being through a set of ideas and practices, and gets to be mobilized as a unitary figure that encompasses many nationalities, social and cultural practices, religious affiliations and social realities. This figure of the Muslim is defined in relation and opposition to western identities that are

based on context-bounded articulations of characteristics such as modern, Christian and white. The racialized group identity is then ascribed to the individual Muslims, who are viewed as a threat in association with socio-economic problems or terrorism, and become targets of exclusion and discrimination, ranging from racial profiling to physical attacks and detention.

As forms of racism are always dynamic and specific to historical, cultural and geopolitical contexts, the processes of racialization take specific forms as they took place in particular social contexts. In this chapter I will focus on the racialization of Muslims in the US context in relation to the Global War on Terror. I argue that the racialization of the Muslims in the U.S. after September 11 was not caused by the attacks themselves but by preexisting social constructions that configured them as people who would readily conduct and approve of such attacks. These social constructions did not emerge on 9/11 but were the culmination of historical processes that involved constructions of whiteness, orientalist thinking, cultural stereotyping, and government policies. For decades prior to the attacks, Arabs and Muslims had been presented in the U.S. culture as monolithic groups that had an inherent proclivity to violence with “pathological cultures” and a morally deviant religion that sanctions killing. They were not only socially constructed as “others,” as people not like “us,” but were also targets of specific government policies that viewed them as a group inherently volatile and inclined to terrorism, hence threatening to American global allies and interests. While essentialized notions of human difference were always part of racial formation processes in the U.S. and constitute part of the historical condition of possibility for the racialization of Muslims, especially after

the 1970s, the global political and economic interests of a rising American superpower (or empire) played a significant constitutive role in these processes of racialization for the Muslims. By the time September 11 happened, the stage for Arab and Muslim communities to be held collectively responsible for the attacks by the government, media and citizenry was already set. In this context, the academic and public discourse of “Islamic terrorism” in the aftermath of September 11 played a significant role in racialization of Muslims.

Religion and Racialization

In the *Genealogies of Religion*, Talal Asad criticizes the notion of religion viewed as a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon that has an autonomous essence. Asad argues that instead of the Eurocentric conception that defines religion as bounded and universal, religion must be thought of as contingent and dynamic wherein the concept of religion changes alongside social practice, and religious symbols are intimately linked to social life, in which work and power are always crucial. He emphasizes that his argument is not just that religious symbols are intimately linked to social life, or that they usually support dominant political power, but:

It is that different kinds of practice and discourse are intrinsic to the field in which religious representations (like any representation) acquire their identity and their truthfulness. From this it does not follow that the meanings of religious practices and utterances are to be sought in social phenomena, but only that their possibility and their authoritative status are to be explained as products of historically distinctive disciplines and forces. (1993: 53).

Asad's call to study religion as contingent and dynamic, and religious representations in relation to specific practices and discourses is a starting point for thinking about the relationship between religion and race not as exclusive categories of analysis but as

social practices that interact with each other. If, religious representations acquire their identity in a field shaped by different practices and discourses, then religions are not immune to the effects of racial orders. In other words, religion can be racialized. In producing and reproducing representations of Islam, culturally and phenotypically diverse individuals can be transformed into a homogenous bloc . As discussed in Chapter 2, historically “race” has been derived from both physical and cultural characteristics, and racialized groups have been assigned to a hierarchy that has the white Europeans on top and other groups in their wake. While Muslims, among other religious groups, have historically been subject to discrimination and racism on the basis of their religion, today their racialization is achieved not only by reference to religion but also to cultural aspects including dress code or physical appearance.

Racialization does not only constitute the groups, but it also draws boundaries between groups and ascribe the possibilities or denial of belonging to a political community. The boundaries and the nature of the political community at question can vary from the borders of nation states to the realm of law and reason, or modernity and civilization at large. From the denial of due process rights to Muslim US citizens suspected of terrorist activities, to the racial profiling of persons from certain countries, at work is not just amalgamation of Muslims into a single group, but also designating them as undeserving members of or disloyal to political communities at both national and global levels. As Razack argues, although race thinking varies, for Muslims and Arabs it is underpinned by the idea that modern enlightened, secular peoples must protect themselves from pre-modern, religious peoples whose loyalty to tribe and community

reigns over their commitment to the rule of law (2008: 9-10). In addition to drawing boundaries between modern/enlightened/secular and pre-modern/religious peoples, racialization also situates the groups in a hierarchical relation. Seen as not committed to the rule of law, or to other markers of “modernity,” Muslims are relegated to the lower echelons of humanity. It then becomes the moral obligation of those located in the realm of modernity to correct, discipline and keep in line the Muslims, and defend their state or community from those who do not share its values, ideals and virtues.

In what follows, I analyze the process of racialization of Muslims through answering the following questions: How is it possible that in an era claimed to be post-racial by some, allegations of “being Muslim” can function to signify one's being a threat and hence not belonging to the national polity, constituting a new ground for exclusion where openly racist criteria of inclusion and exclusion are no longer feasible or politically correct? In other words, what are the historical conditions of possibility for this categorization of Muslims in such a way that it comes to signify a threat against the identity and security of a state and of a political community? How, then, does this contemporary racialization work: through what kinds of articulations does the discourse operate and what kinds of subjects are constructed? What are the legal, political, and cultural mechanisms that sustain and intensify this process of racialization in the context of the Global War on Terror? And, what kind of consequences does this racialization create for possibilities and limitations of inclusion and exclusion both at the domestic and global context of power relations?

Understanding the emergence, dynamics and consequences of the process of

racialization of Muslims, first requires understanding the conditions of possibility for such a racialization to occur. I first present a brief discussion of the ways in which western identities and whiteness came to be constructed through a symbiotic relationship with Christianity that was set against an essential Islamist subject as its constitutive outside .

The West-Christianity-Whiteness

The historical development of the notion of “the West” reveals a shift from being based on geographical location to a notion of Europe that encompasses Christian peoples of European descent. Drawing upon historian Marshall Hodgson, Mahmood Mamdani summarizes the development of the notion of “West” as such: Originally “the West” referred to the “western or Latin using half of the Roman Empire; that is, to the west Mediterranean lands”, then it came to refer to “the West European lands generally” but excluding “those west Mediterranean lands which turned Muslim,” and finally the term was stretched to include “all European Christendom” referring to a global Europe, western and eastern, encompassing peoples of European origin, no matter where they lived and for how long (Mamdani 2004: 29-30). Accompanying this construction of the West as a global Europe, was the construction of its two peripheries: “the East,” or “the Orient” was the more visible “other” of the West, whereas the invisible periphery was Africa, pre-Columbian Americas, and the lands of the Pacific which were “simply blanked out into a historical darkness” (Mamdani 2004: 29). In line with the shifting representations and justifications of systems of dominance and control according to historical context and practices, the Islamic East and the Asiatic-yellow East have been

the two prominent facets of the constructions of “the East” as the constitutive outside to “the West.”

For historians of race concept, one of the most significant precursors for the classification of world's peoples along racial lines lies within the fierce anti-Islamic and anti-Jewish campaigns of the Crusades and the Inquisition (Winant, 2001: 38). Accordingly, Muslims and Jews in the centuries preceding the onset of empire can be seen as the two paradigmatic early European “others,” whose experiences constituted the precedents for the early exercises in racial “othering” (41). As discussed in Chapter 2, the early precedent of racism emerged within the language of religion, specifically through the tension between the universal claims of Christianity and exclusionary treatment of particular non-Christians. The early recognition of religious difference dominated Spanish and European identities and have provided philosophical and intellectual antecedents to the Enlightenment (Fredrickson 2002; Majid 2004; Rana, 2011:34).

In Europe, by the eleventh century, as the pagans (e.g. Normans and Magyars) had been converted and integrated, Muslims remained as the only enemy that became a convenient “other” to mobilize support for the territorial ambitions of various rulers. Thus, the image of the Muslim enemy and of Islam as a demonic religion started to come into focus in the late eleventh century, as mobilizing the population for the Crusades and the Holy War required religious arguments (Kumar 2012, 14-15). As Europe became spiritually united under the leadership of the Vatican, the focus shifted away from the Muslim enemy and the fourteenth and fifteenth century saw a period of indifference, until the Ottoman Empire began to advance into Europe in the early sixteenth century,

heralding a new threat (23). Subsequently, the rise of the Europeans and the relative decline of the Ottomans gave way to perceptions of the Ottomans as inferior to the West and capable only of producing despotic societies. The overcoming of both the external and internal Islamic challengers (the Ottoman Empire in the Southeast Europe; the “Moors” in Spain and Portugal) represents a significant moment in the process of the development of imperial/state building projects.

The view of Muslim East as the source of danger to the West has old origins in Eurocentric discourses. The polarized construction of the relationship between Islam and Christianity, which goes back to the centuries when Europeans fought long wars with "Saracens," "Moors" and Turks, is not only reproduced in the classical literary works but also sustained in the post-Enlightenment worldview in which "Mohammedans" are essentially gripped by violence, lust, greed and barbarism (Karim, 2003:2). Enlightenment political thinkers characterized Islamic government as an ideal type of despotism in ways that formed one of the fundamental underpinnings of the development of the view of Islam in Europe and America. In the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin labeled the Ottoman Empire as a despotic government in which the Grand Seignior owned all individuals and property in his realm (Marr 2006:23). Denis Diderot described Turkey as "a herd of animals joined only by habit, prodded by the law of the stick, and led by an absolute master according to his whim" compared to France where “a society of men united by reason, inspired by virtue, and governed in accordance with the laws of justice by a leader equally wise and glorious” (1992: 10). It was Montesquieu who most famously popularized the rhetorical appeal of oriental despotism as the great opposition

to republican modes of government. His depiction of Islamic government as a despotic system that enslaved its subjects under an empire of fear and passion in *The Spirit of Laws* categorically allied despotism with Ottoman government in a way that produced a "landmark verdict" with a long term influence on how Europeans and Americans observed Turkey (Cirakman 2002: 125).

Nevertheless, it was not until the emergence of European imperialism that the concept of race attained its familiar meaning. Historians of race often locate the origin of the concept of race in Europe in fifteenth and sixteenth century Spain as part of the process of discovery that led explorers to the New World and, inevitably, to contact with Native Americans. The prevailing argument places the formation of *raza* (race) in terms of the religious opposition of Christianity to the so-called American Indian heathen (Rana, 2011: 35). Here religion becomes the central feature from which to understand the development of the notions of biological and cultural difference encapsulated in the race concept.

As the Enlightenment thinkers classified human beings into races and in the process produced a schema in which whiteness came to be associated with cultural and racial superiority, unreason and savagery was conveniently located among the non-whites (Eze, 1997:5). The West, by the late 18th century, had begun to claim the triad of Christianity, whiteness and superiority for itself: at the time of, and in response to, the emergence of European global hegemony, and the development of the biological concept of race in the late 18th century, Europeans came to view themselves as a uniquely capable and important racial group and labeled this entity "white" (Bonnett 1997:197).²⁷

²⁷ My theory chapter includes a more detailed elaboration of this articulation of the West, with modernity

Islam and Muslims in America

Scholars of American Orientalism have argued that throughout cultural, popular and diplomatic history, Islam and Muslims have been part of the American imagination (Marr 2006; Little 2002). Although geographically removed from the political struggles in North America, the world of Islam played a significant role in early national thought and culture because orientalist constructions of tyranny and despotism formed an integral part of the process of reinventing republicanism. Before the American Revolution, patriots used Islamicist images of Muhammad and the excesses of contemporary sultans as useful models to dramatize the injustice of British exploitation of their dependent colonies. After the revolution, while some Americans of the new nation conceived of Islam as an anti-Christian dispensation, many others continued to draw deeply upon the Enlightenment's equation of Islamic government with systematic despotism (Marr, 2006: 20).

Marr (2006) explores the ways in which Islamic orient served as a useful global field against (and in terms of) which different Americans measured and performed the transnational relevance of their republican project. Accordingly, Muslim ascendancy in the Mediterranean, and elsewhere in Africa and Asia, challenged American global aspirations for expanding its blend of democratic principles and Christian values. He argues that cultural negotiations of Islamic despotism comprised a key but critically neglected part of the symbolic construction and consolidation of early American nationalism. On the one hand, the Islamic Orient was conceived by many Americans as a vicious realm of inhuman bondage, unstable tyranny, illicit sensuality and selfish luxury

and Whiteness. In what follows, I focus more specifically on the American context

that symbolized the dangerous forces that threatened their fledgling political rights and freedoms. This orientalist construction of Islam as a cultural enemy, maligned as both antidemocratic and anti-Christian, served as an important oppositional icon in terms of which Americans of diverse denominational, ethnic, and partisan persuasions united in defining republican identities from the nation's founding through the Jacksonian era. (Marr, 2006: 21). On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire remained a global power in the late eighteenth century, and for half a century after the end of the American Revolution, aggressive acts by Muslims in North America, Greece and even Eastern Asia presented actual threats to American sailors and traders as well as emblematic affronts to national ideals. Muslim ascendancy in the Mediterranean, and elsewhere in Africa and Asia, challenged American global aspirations for expanding its blend of democratic principles and Christian values. A series of conflicts with the Islamic world during the early republic -negotiations with Algiers between 1785 and 1815, fighting in the Tripolitan War of 1801-5, supporting the Greeks during their war of Independence from 1821-2, and retaliating against Malays in Sumatra in 1831- served as sites for giving way to the imagination of the Muslim despot in many different political guises: as not only the Turkish tyrant, but also the Barbary pirate, the Algerian spy, and the treacherous Malay -all offsprings of the original corruption that Westerners believed that Muhammad had propagated through the introduction of Islam (Marr, 2006: 22).

Meanwhile, in the American colonies, the racial and religious systems of domination defined by Whiteness and Christianity overlapped and became intertwined such that a group's designation as an "inferior race" was in part informed by its

affiliation to an “inferior religion” (Brodkin 2002: 53-54). Religion played a significant role in construction of the American national community as correlating Whiteness to Christianity constituted part of the justification for subordination of “racially inferior others.” The correlation between Whiteness and Christianity in constituting American identity by excluding “inferior others,” and the consequence of this correlation can be clearly seen in Supreme Court decisions

In the 1823 Supreme Court decision *Johnson v. M’Intosh*, which decided the legality of white settlers’ claim of dominion and title to land possessed by Native Americans, justice Marshall decided in favor of the white settlers’ conquest because “the character and religion (of the Indians) ...afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy” (Ibrahim 2008: 127). In other words, the inferiority and savagery attributed to the “Indian character and religion” rendered the conquest of Native American lands lawful. As Nagwa Ibrahim argues, this case raises two important points:

First, with the Supreme Court expressing white European racism as a justification for conquest, Whiteness in the American context is being correlated to Christianity. Second, the Court is providing the legal authority for both expanding the geographic borders of the nation-state and restricting membership into the national community to those who possess white characteristics, such as the belief in or adherence to Christianity. Since Native Americans did not meet the mentioned criteria of Whiteness with their differing "character and religion," their rights to sovereignty, land, life, and liberty were considered by the Court to be legally expendable. In other words, because of their non-white status due in part to their non-Christian religious affiliations, Native Americans were considered "foreign" and outside of the American national community. (2008: 127-128)

This logic of racial exclusion, which positioned Native Americans outside the rule of law and hence permitted the lawless actions against them in order to secure the

interests of the white Christian settlers who defined the national community, was also at work in the justification of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 by President Jackson:

The consequences of a speedy removal will be important to the United States, to individual States, and to the Indians themselves... It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them from the power of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the Government and through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized, and Christian community.(Andrew Jackson, State of the Nation December 6, 1830)

The justification of state violence and force on the basis of characterizing Native Americans as “savages” whose religion, language and culture were inferior to the “civilized Christian settlers,” reveals how the US government and the Court, since the beginning of the formation of the US as a nation state, constructed the American national community as white, with Whiteness being inextricably linked to civilization and Christianity. Consequently, non-Whiteness, both in terms of skin color and characteristics such as religion, has served to subordinate groups as racially inferior others who did not belong to the national community. Roediger (2008) emphasizes that terms such as “heathen,” “barbarian,” and “savage,” -words applied in various ways and degrees to the victims of modern colonialism in its Irish testing grounds and in North America- did not directly refer to biology, nor even to skin color: Instead, these totalizing views emerged from colonizers' discussions about indigenous peoples' lack of Christianity, or the absence of what colonizers could recognize as the practices of settled agricultural production. Thus, what Theodore Allen calls “religio-racism” in Ireland links these early justifications for the dispossession of native peoples with the anti-black

racism that informed slavery -since Africans as well as Indians were said to be savage, barbarous and heathen. As such, Roediger concludes that “as much as anti-black and anti-Indian initiatives marked different moments in race-making process, they were never entirely separate” (18).

According to Karen Brodtkin, that Christianity continued to influence the construction of Whiteness throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century can be seen in the experiences of southern and eastern Europeans when “anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism overlapped and fused with racial stigmatization of southern and eastern Europeans” (1998: 55).²⁸ The religious affiliation of various Muslim communities in the United States can also be understood as a factor that contributed to their exclusion from Whiteness and hence the national polity. Furthermore, from conquest to slavery and the legacies they produced, Islam played an important role in constructing alternative ideas of self-identity to dominant modes of whiteness and Christianity (Rana, 2011: 39).

Islam came to the new World with Columbus; converts both crypto-Muslims and crypto-Jews arrived as sailors on explorers' ships. In addition, throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth century, enslaved Muslim Africans continued to practice their religion in the New World. Indeed they launched the first series of slave revolts in Brazil that culminated in a major rebellion in 1835 (Diouf 1998: 153-165; Gomez 2005). In *Islam and the Black American*, Sherman Jackson dates back the racialization of Muslims in the United States to the Spanish conquest, which exported the Spanish Inquisition to the Americas:

²⁸ For the connections between religion and racialization of the Irish see Allen 1993; Ignatiev 1995; and Roediger 2008.

While non-Muslim slaves had to contend with the overriding stigma of color, Muslim slaves had to weather the much older and more deeply rooted stigma of religion. Whereas according to scholars like Theodore Allen, Whiteness as a racial category uniting first land-owning and then ultimately all Europeans (particularly against blacks) was not invented until the late seventeenth century, the negative image of the Moor and the Muslim went back more than half a millennium. The first Crusade began in 1095. Dante's *Divine Comedy*, with its horrific portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed, was completed in 1321. Grenada, the last great independent Muslim principality in Spain, fell to Christian conquistadores in 1492. Even the discovery of America that same year was ultimately a reaction to Islam. Christopher Columbus was prompted to seek his alternate route to India not by a spirit of discovery or adventure but by a fear of the dreaded Muslim masters of the Red and Mediterranean seas (2005: 39).

According to this line of argument, in the racial hierarchy that emerged among enslaved Africans, one axis of status was religion. Early on, Muslim slaves were identified using such racial terms as “overly tanned” and “Moor” giving an Arab valence to their Africanness (Turner 2003: 44). Thus the notion of the infidel Muslim as a menacing figure was transferred into the Americas from the imperial struggle between European Christians and North African Muslims (Rana 2011: 40).

When this fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims aligned itself with white supremacy and the dehumanizing institution of slavery in America, African Muslim slaves were not only subordinated on the basis of color but on the basis of their Muslim identity as well (Ibrahim, 129-130). Sylviane Diouf's *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas* corroborates the claim that many of the African Muslim slaves were subject to violent conversion and at times punished or even killed for outward expression of their Islamic beliefs (1998: 147-48).²⁹

29 The history of enslaved Muslim Africans took a different path in early twentieth century as Noble Drew Ali and his followers founded the Moorish Science Temple seeking to displace notions of biological race and to identify not with enslaved Africans but with the category of “Moorish American” -or the descendants of people from Morocco. For them, claiming a Moorish background represented a shift from racial identification to ethnic and religious identification that, they hoped, would shield them from discrimination and prejudice. Yet, their blackness remained a visible fact in an America that defined

The historical construction of the US national identity as white and Christian, with the accompanying construction of Islam and Muslims as opposite to Whiteness and Christianity, rendered the Muslims as inferior others that are to be excluded from the national polity. This can be seen through many examples of governmental and judicial decisions. For instance in 1811, in the case *People v. Ruggles*, which dealt with the legality of a law that prohibited utterance of blasphemous words against Christianity, Justice Kent stated:

The people of this State, in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order. Nothing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to declare such profanity lawful... . The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion, whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious subject, is granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole community, is an abuse of that right. ...Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the Constitution, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted [sic] upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of those impostors. (quoted in Ibrahim, 2008: 132)

A number of important things are happening here. On the one hand, not only does Justice Kent identify American national community as being founded upon Christianity, but he also characterizes the opposition to Christianity as a disturbance of public order. On the other hand, he excludes Islam, or what he calls “the religion of Mahomet,” from constitutional protections, positioning it outside the rule of law. He furthermore marks

proper citizenship and nationality through whiteness (Rana, 2011: 10-41)

the boundaries of national community and the possibilities of inclusion and exclusion by conflating morality with Christianity and Islam and Muslims with moral deception.

A cursory examination of immigration policy since the mid-nineteenth century reveals that classification by race has dominated official attitudes toward new Americans. With the possible exception of the period immediately after WWII, when Cold War political motives were of primary importance, the United States has continually struggled with reconciling its northern European settler identity with new groups whose culture, language or religion have not conformed to their Anglo-centric concepts of American identity. The early exclusion of Muslims from the US national polity can also be seen in immigration cases from the early twentieth century where exclusion from citizenship on the basis of Whiteness was at least in part contingent upon one's religious affiliation. Between 1790, when Congress enacted naturalization laws in which citizenship in the U.S. was limited to white persons, and 1952, when the racial restriction was formally lifted, a number of cases were brought to court in which people claimed a white racial identity in order to naturalize.³⁰ As Ibrahim argues, "these cases demonstrate the U.S.

30 From the first prerequisite case in 1878 until racial restrictions were removed in 1952, fifty-two racial prerequisite cases were reported, including two heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. They were framing fundamental questions about who could join the citizenry in terms of who was White. Although the courts offered many different rationales to justify the various racial divisions they advanced, two predominated: common knowledge and scientific evidence. Under a common knowledge approach, courts justified the assignment of petitioners to one race or another by reference to common beliefs about race. The courts deciding racial prerequisite cases initially relied on both rationales to justify their decisions. However, beginning in 1909 a schism appeared among the courts over whether common knowledge or scientific evidence was the appropriate standard. Thereafter, the lower courts divided almost evenly on the proper test for Whiteness: six courts relied on common knowledge, while seven others based their racial determinations on scientific evidence. No court used both rationales. Over the course of two decisions, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict between common knowledge and scientific evidence in favor of the former, but not without some initial confusion. In *Ozawa v. United States*, the Court relied on both rationales to exclude a Japanese petitioner, holding that he was

judicial system's active participation in determining Whiteness through deciding who was non-white. One determining factor that courts relied on to classify people as non-white was an applicant's espousal of and relationship to Islam.” (134).

For instance, in a 1925 case of an Armenian applicant, who was of “Armenian blood and race” but a native of “that part of the Turkish Empire known as Turkey in Asia or Asia Minor”, Judge Wolverton states:

It is now judicially determined that the mere color of the skin of the individual does not afford a practical test as to whether he is eligible to American citizenship, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, "even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette; the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races." The test is racial, and for practical purposes of the statute must be applied to a group of living persons now possessing in common the requisite characteristics for naturalization. ... Although the Armenian province is within the confines of the Turkish Empire, being in Asia Minor, the people thereof have always held themselves aloof from the Turks, the Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be said, on account of their religion, though color may have had something to do with it. The Armenians, tradition has it, very early, about the fourth century, espoused the Christian religion, and have ever

not of the type "popularly known as the Caucasian race," thereby invoking both common knowledge ("popularly known") and science ("the Caucasian race"). Here, as in the earliest prerequisite cases, science and popular knowledge worked hand in hand to exclude the applicant from citizenship. Within a few months of its decision in *Ozawa*, however, the Court heard a case brought by an Asian Indian, Bhagat Singh Thind, who relied on the Court's earlier linkage of "Caucasian" with "white" to argue for his own naturalization. In *United States v. Thind*, science and common knowledge diverged, complicating a case that should have been easy under *Ozawa's* straightforward rule of racial specification. Reversing course, the Court repudiated its earlier equation and rejected any role for science in racial assignments. The Court decried the "scientific manipulation" it believed had ignored racial differences by including as Caucasian "far more [people] than the unscientific mind suspects," even some persons the Court described as ranging "in color ... from brown to black." "We venture to think," the Court said, "that the average well informed white American would learn with some degree of astonishment that the race to which he belongs is made up of such heterogenous elements." The Court held instead that "the words 'free white persons' are words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man." In the Court's opinion, science had failed as an arbiter of human difference, and common knowledge was made into the touchstone of racial division. (Lopez 1996: 4-6)

since consistently adhered to their belief, and practiced it. (United States v. Cartozian 1925, quoting Ozawa v. United States 1922)

Relying on the “common knowledge” criteria pertaining to Whiteness, Judge Wolverton's decision to view Armenians as white is grounded on Armenians’ Christian history, while also implying the ineligibility of other groups living in the same country (Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples) on the basis of the religious comparison. In 1942, in a more explicit decision about an ethnic group's relationship to Islam as the basis of their exclusion from Whiteness, Judge Tuttle ruled that the Arabs were not white because:

apart from the dark skin of the Arabs, it is well known that they are a part of the Mohammedan world and that a wide gulf separates their culture from that of the predominately Christian peoples of Europe. It cannot be expected that as a class they would readily intermarry with our population and be assimilated into our civilization. The small amount of immigration of these peoples to the United States is in itself evidence of that fact. (re Ahmed Hassan, 1942)

While this decision refers to skin color and being associated with Islam as the basis for exclusion from Whiteness, it also describes “our civilization” as a Christian one, as distinct and separate from the “Mohammedan world” with all the inferences to inferiority.

However, it should also be noted that, two years later in 1944, in another case of application for citizenship, Judge O'Sullivan ruled in favor of the applicant and decided that Arabs are to be considered white and admissible as citizens. In his statement, Judge O'Sullivan makes no reference to Islam, but cites “speaking Semitic languages” as part of the “common knowledge” about Arabs' Whiteness, compares them to Jews “towards whose naturalization every American Congress since first has been avowedly sympathetic,” as well as referring to the long history of the interactions between Europe

and Arabs, claiming “to earlier centuries as to the twentieth century, the Arab people stand as one of the chief channels by which the traditions of white Europe, especially the ancient Greek traditions, have been carried into the present.” (Ex Parte Mohirez, 1944).

It is also the case that although most Arabs are Muslim, the Arabs who immigrated to the US during the first period of immigration (1880–1945) were predominantly Christians of the Eastern right sects of Greater Syria (Naber 2000: 38). Between 1909 and 1915 five racial prerequisite cases regarding Syrian immigrant were brought to court. While in the first three, the courts decided that Syrians are white, in *Ex Parte Shahid 1913*, an Arab Christian was denied the right to naturalization on the grounds of both illiteracy and racial ineligibility understanding the clause of “free white persons” to mean “to be of European habitancy or descent.” In the last case of the Syrian immigrant George Dow (*Dow v. United States 1915*), following the lower court decisions in *Ex Parte Dow 1914*, and in *Re Dow 1914*, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner’s right to naturalize based on “the generally received opinion . . . that the inhabitants of a portion of Asia, including Syria, [are] to be classed as white persons.”

These cases show that, on the one hand in the U.S. racial formation the conflation of religious and racial difference was an important ground for constructions of Whiteness and hence eligibility for inclusion in relation to an exclusive understanding of Christianity and the Western civilization. This grounding then can easily lead to constructions of the foreigner as a threat and enemy, imagined as racial figures. On the other hand, however, the continuous back and forth between court decisions and the availability of different narratives to substantiate the interpretations of the legal rules in

deciding what constitutes whiteness unambiguously reveals the socially constructed and contested character of racial categories. This background constitutes the conditions of possibility for racialization of Muslims in the twentieth century.

Muslims in America in the Twentieth Century

Although September 11 seems to have facilitated the consolidation of racialization of Muslims, it should be emphasized that September 11 does not mark the beginning of the process of racialization either in the United States or elsewhere, despite the intensification of the discriminatory discourses and practices in the wake of September 11. As discussed above, the construction of American identity show the intricate relations between Christianity and whiteness defined as opposed to non-Christian communities. On this background, to understand how racialization of Muslims took place in the twentieth century, we need to analyze the emergence and the transformation of tropes such as “the Arab terrorist” as well as the anti-terrorism policies that were in effect before September 11.

The targeting of Arabs and Muslims in the post-September 11 period needs to be understood in relation to a particular historical and legal environment preceding the attacks in 2001. During the Cold War the political elite in the US allied with Islamists until the 1970s against the secular nationalists in the Middle East as in the case of supporting the Saudis and the Muslim brotherhood as a counterweight to Nasser. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States, despite its lip service to freedom and democracy, did not eschew forging relationships with some Islamist groups when it was convenient for the US interests in the region, as can be seen in the support of the

mujahedeen against the Soviets, or of Taliban in Afghanistan (Kumar 70-73). However, a series of political events during 1970s and 1980s (1967 Arab-Israeli War, 1970s oil embargo, murdering of the Israeli team in Munich Olympics and the subsequent kidnappings, Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis) also contributed to the building of a narrative of “Arab terrorist,” significantly shaping the experience of the Arab community in the US, and prepared the ground for the later generalization of this narrative to encompass Muslim groups at large. As Akram and Johnson argue, since at least the 1970s U.S. laws and policies have been founded on the assumption that Arab and Muslim non-citizens are potential terrorists and have targeted this group for special treatment under the law (2004:10). The negative attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims can be traced to xenophobia fed by film and media stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims, hostility and violence related to foreign and domestic crisis in which U.S. citizens are seen as victims and deliberate misinformation, distortion and institutionalized racism existing in government, law enforcement and influential institutions that target Arabs and Muslims both within the U.S. and abroad (Akram, 2002: 62).

While the general profile of the Arab experience in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century displayed more social, political, and economic incorporation than that of racially excluded African Americans, Asians, Native Americans, and Latinos, the last four decades indicate a widening social distance between Arab-Americans and all other Americans as can be seen in government policies, mainstream cultural representations, public perceptions and attitudes, discriminatory behaviors, physical insecurity, and social and political exclusion (Cainkar 2006). A number of early

studies documented the construction of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim and anti-Middle Eastern stereotypes in the news media, literature and Hollywood (Said 1981; Suleiman 1988; Shaheen 1984; Terry 1985). Accordingly, the popular narratives of the period, and especially Hollywood movies, came to present the image of an “Arab enemy” which eventually found its incarnation in Saddam Hussein, as backward, savage and in eternal struggle with the forces of Western civilization, but also as incompetent (Kellner 1995: 83, Prince 1993). In a study based on more than 900 films, Shaheen (2003) shows how filmmakers consistently depicted Arabs as brutal, heartless uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural others bent on terrorizing civilized westerners, especially Christians and Jews. He notes that only five percent of Arab film roles reveal them as ordinary, human characters. The significance of this portrayal of Arabs, and the equation established between Arabs and Muslims, come from the ways in which such characterizations are consistent with widespread attitudes in US society:

To my knowledge, no Hollywood WWI, WWII, or Korean War movie has ever shown America’s fighting forces slaughtering children. Yet, near the conclusion of [the movie] *Rules of Engagement* US marines open fire on the Yemenis, shooting 83 men, women, and children. During the scene, viewers rose to their feet, clapped and cheered. Boasts director Friedkin, “I’ve seen audiences stand up and applaud the film throughout the United States.” (Shaheen, 2003: 177)

These popular narratives provided the initial framework for the media and state discourses that followed the events of 9/11 to facilitate the construction and intensification of the generic category of ‘Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim’ Other (Semati 2010).

Moreover, there is a high correlation between international or domestic crisis in

which American citizens are seen as victims of foreign aggression and an increase in hostility towards non-white, non-Christian people in the U.S. A series of events in the 1980s, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 on June 14, 1985, and the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* cruise liner in the fall of 1985 caused waves of violence against Arab Americans and U.S. residents of Middle Eastern origin, including bombings of mosques and offices of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee. The Reagan administration's "war on terrorism," at the time directed at Libya, as well as the Gulf War, intensified anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hostility.³¹ This pattern of hate crimes and violence against Arabs and Muslims will be repeated in the aftermath of September 11, with more intensity.

One of the least well-documented phenomena in the racialization of Arabs and Muslims leading to the widespread acceptance of profiling and related loss of civil liberties is the role of what Akram (2002) calls "institutionalized racism" in government and law enforcement, in collaboration with institutions and think-tanks having a specific ideological or foreign policy agenda driven by anti-Arabism. An earlier example of these is the Nixon administration's "Operation Boulder," which might be the first concerted U.S. government effort to target Arabs in the U.S. for special investigation with the specific purpose of intimidation, harassment, and to discourage their activism on issues relating to the Middle East. "Operation Boulder" comprised a series of Presidential directives issued by Nixon (ostensibly to deal with the terrorist threat posed by the

31 ADC Reports 1990 and 1991 and Abraham 1994 provide a long list of such incidents, which include four bombings, four cases of arson, three deaths, ten cases of serious bodily assault and seven other injuries, fifteen acts of vandalism, twenty threats, five complaints of harassment and at least one break-in. Not one of the perpetrators responsible for these attacks and violence has been apprehended or convicted.

Munich Olympics hostage-taking) that authorized the FBI to investigate individuals of “Arabic speaking origin” supposedly to determine their potential relationship with “terrorist” activities related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under Operation Boulder, the FBI investigated, interrogated and intimidated non-citizens and citizens only of Arab origin, often in early-morning visits, without making formal charges of any kind (Akram 2002; Hagopian 1975:76). Later investigations both by the press and by organizations in the Arab-American community confirmed that “Operation Boulder” was initiated as a result of pressure from Zionist groups both within the U.S. and from Israel to silence Arab-Americans from voicing opposition to U.S. and Israeli policies in the Middle East (Akram 2002). Similarly, combating terrorism has been the ground on which the Reagan administration justified the strikes against Libya in supposed retaliation for Arab terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports and the hijacking of the TWA flight, despite the lack of evidence that the Qaddafi government was behind the attacks. As mentioned above, those strikes caused another rush of vandalism and violence against U.S. residents of Arab and Middle Eastern origins. The first Bush administration's Gulf War, too, led to a massive surveillance campaign against Arabs in America, including a nationwide interrogation effort by the FBI against Arab-American community leaders, activists and others, particularly harassing anti-war demonstrators. Nationwide fingerprinting of all residents and immigrants in the U.S. of Arab origin, and the institution of an FAA system of airline profiling targeting individuals from the Arab world were other policies put in place.

Since then, appeals to threats of terrorism have been the most important axis

through which the racialization of Muslims operated. From 1984 to 1998 only two of the eighty-seven terrorist incidents in the US were committed by Muslim groups. In fact, the militia movement posed the biggest threat in terms of domestic terrorism. Yet, anti-terrorism investigations and legislation disproportionately targeted Muslims and individuals that looked like Muslims (dress, beard etc.) in the name of national security. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s with the conflation of Muslims with Arabs and vice versa, Arab-Americans and Arab-American organizations were the particular focus of FBI intelligence gatherings, which produced no results for the capture of real terrorists but rather mostly served to alienate the targeted communities. Foreign policy has played a big role in reinforcing discriminatory legislation and policies against Arabs and Muslims in the cases involving attempted deportation of individual U.S. residents of Palestinian origins such as Fouad Rafeedie and the LA-8, as these cases were brought at the same time as the U.S. administration was attempting to shut down PLO-representative offices in the U.S. (Banks 1999; Cole and Dempsey 2006: 119). In 1987, Congress enacted an Anti-Terrorism Act that mandated the closure of the Palestinian Information Office in Washington D.C., the official institution representing the PLO in the U.S. At about the same time, President Reagan issued a secret National Security Decision Directive, creating the National Program for Combating Terrorism. The Directive authorized the creation of the Alien Border Control Committee, a secret interagency task force, comprising members of the FBI, CIA and the Department of State, with the mission to create plans for the “expulsion from the United States of alien activists who are not in conformity with their immigration status” to prevent “terrorists”

from entering or remaining in the U.S. (Cole and Dempsey, 2006: 45). The Border Control committee, considered a number of different proposals to carry out its mission, including one to implement a “registry and processing procedure” to keep information on aliens in the United States, requiring the other agencies to provide the INS with names, nationalities, and other identifying data and evidence relating to alien undesirables and suspected terrorists believed to be in the U.S. Among the plans of the Border Control Committee was an INS created strategy called “The Alien Terrorist and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan.” The contingency plan proposed to apprehend and detain aliens only from designated countries, which consisted of all Arab countries and Iran, and involved building a detention center in a remote area of Louisiana to detain “alien undesirables” who are awaiting deportation. Essentially this plan treated those from Arab countries, which were predominantly Muslim, as a monolithic population of terrorists who deserved to be the subject of selective enforcement of immigration laws that denied them their civil and human rights of political expression (Akram 2002; Ibrahim 2008).

Pleading the alleged ties to terrorism, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) continued to disproportionately target Muslims and Muslim-looking peoples for detention and deportation under the guise of national security. In the infamous case of L-8, involving eight Palestinians living in Los Angeles who had been targeted by the INS for deportation not for any serious immigration violation but because of their political views regarding the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the Supreme Court decided that foreign nationals have no constitutional claim against the selective enforcement of immigration laws against individuals based on their membership in a terrorist

organization. Although the LA-8 had never been convicted of terrorist activity, or found in any way to be engaged in terrorist activity, the invocation of national security led the Court to support and sanction the government's racial profiling tactics and allowed for the presumption of guilt based on one's Muslim or perceived Muslim identity (Cole and Dempsey, 51). In relation to this case, both the then-director of the FBI and the regional counsel of the INS testified to the Congress that the sole basis of the government's efforts to deport the LA-8 was their political affiliation: "All of them were arrested because they are alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist organization which under the McCarran act makes them eligible for deportation...if these individuals had been United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their arrest."³²

One of the most important examples of pre-9/11 targeting of Muslims came after the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995. Not only were there the now-usual attacks against Muslims during the two days between the bombing and the arrest of the main suspect, but also the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) focused again on targeting Muslims and Muslim organizations. According to the Act, providing any material support to the lawful or humanitarian activities of any foreign group designated by the secretary of the state as a terrorist entity is to be defined to be a crime for both citizens and non-citizens. It also gives the right to designate any foreign group as a terrorist organization if the group engages in terrorist activity that threatens America or the national security of the United States (Doyle 1996; Pearson 1997). National security, then, is defined as the "national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the

32 Senate U.S. (1987) *Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Nomination of William Webster to be Director of Central Intelligence*, 100th Cong. 94-95

United States.” As such, the secretary of state can determine any foreign organization that stands in the way of U.S. economic or foreign policy interests as a terrorist threat to national security. Moreover, the consequences of being designated as a terrorist entity include the provision that “all members of the group are barred from entering the United States, and are deportable if they were members prior to entry, even if they have never been involved in illegal activities.” Making things even worse is the fact that an organization deemed to be a terrorist entity cannot even effectively challenge the designation as the secretary of state is permitted to defend the designation in court with secret evidence, seriously limiting the due process rights for the individuals and organizations brought on criminal charges. From the passage of the act in 1996 until 2001, of the twenty eight groups identified as the most dangerous terrorist entities by the secretary of state, fourteen were Muslim and Arab (the other fourteen were from eight distinct nationalities from South America, Asia and Europe). From 1996 to 2000, the government expanded its use of secret evidence against more than two-dozen immigrants, all of whom were Muslim, to detain and deport them. Over time all the assertions of the government were proved to be unsubstantiated and to lack evidence, so each of the Muslim immigrants was released. This reveals that government was engaged in selectively targeting and racial profiling not based on any actual violent activity but the religious identity of the immigrants using national security measures (Akram 2002; Ibrahim 2008; Cole and Dempsey 2002).

Articulation of Islam with terrorism before 9/11 was not limited to state policies and media representation. In the wake of the Cold War, shaped by anxieties about the

changing world order, a wave of academic writings were particularly effective in representing Islam in association with terror, and Muslims as a threat. In the post-Cold War context, the articulation of terrorism with the adjective “Islamic” functions not only to qualify the term but also to explain it. Samuel Huntington's much debated *The Clash of Civilizations*, was the signpost work that prepared the ground for the post-Cold War discourse of politicizing culture. Claiming that “the great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural”, Huntington expected that “the iron curtain of ideology” would be replaced by a “velvet curtain of culture” which was drawn across “the bloody borders of Islam.” (1993: 31). While significantly informing a conservative policy perspective, Huntington's thesis was also subject to much criticism and was discredited for his parochial vision of cultures and civilizations. A more refined and perhaps durable version of his vision came from Bernard Lewis, who also coined the term “a clash of civilizations” in a 1990 article “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” While displaying more historical sensibility than Huntington, Lewis nevertheless describe Islamic civilization as if it were a veneer hiding its essence of an unchanging doctrine in which Muslims are said to take refuge in times of crisis (Mamdani, 2004: 22). In *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, Lewis writes:

There is something in the religious culture of Islam which inspired, in even the humblest peasant or peddler, a dignity and a courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equaled in other civilizations. And yet, in moments of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper passions are stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred which impels even the government of an ancient and civilized country -even the spokesman of a great and ethical religion- to espouse kidnapping and assassination, and try to find, in the life of their Prophet, approval and indeed precedent for such actions (1990: 59).

According to Lewis, Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties. Lewis elaborates the idea of a doctrinal core of Islam in his book *What Went Wrong*, claiming that “it is precisely the lack of freedom ...that underlies so many of the troubles of the Muslim world” (2003: 159). It should be noted that, different from the monolithic perspective of Huntington, Lewis also supported the idea that there are “good” as opposed to “bad” Muslims (which will be a keystone of the U.S. foreign policy in the coming years), but nevertheless both “good” and “bad” Muslims stand against the representatives of the “West,” which comes to signify the highest level of civilization as embodiment of modernity, and is in a fundamental opposition to the other civilizational categories. Neither Huntington's nor Lewis' narratives makes explicit references to race as a category of analysis in depicting the formation of and possible conflicts between civilizations. Yet, both accounts were instrumental in representing Islam as a homogenous entity an inherent disposition to violence, and such contributed to racialization of Muslims as opposed to the Western culture and values.

9/11, the War on Terror and Muslims

The most important effect of September 11 attacks regarding racialization of Muslims is the academic and public proliferation of the discourse of “Islamic terrorism.” Central to the post- September 11 discourse of Islamic terrorism, is the assumption that violence, -and by implication terrorism- is inherent to Islam, because unlike Christianity, Islam makes no distinction between church and state, has never discarded the notion of

religious war, purports to regulate both the public and private lives of Muslims and has much to say about the political life of the community (Jackson 2007: 403). Common to the accounts of Islamic terrorism is the presumption that Islam has a special status regarding religious violence. For example, Barak Mendelshone maintains that “religious extremists who wish to impose religious order exist in all religions, but evidently, religious terrorism looms larger in Muslim societies” (2005: 57). Similarly, Walter Laquer, an esteemed terrorism expert, claims that although there is “no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism...the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking,” and while “a discussion of religion-inspired terrorism cannot possibly confine itself to radical Islam ... it has to take into account the Muslim countries’ pre-eminent position in this field’ (1999: 129). Accordingly, the prominent position of Islam regarding religious violence stems from, directly linked to, or inspired by extremist and fundamentalist forms of Islam. For instance, from the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Reuven Paz refers to “Islamist terrorist culture,” and “violent Islamist ideologies, doctrines and activities” (2001). Accompanying the claims that violence is culturally embedded in Islam, is conflating and subsuming multiple social functions of groups like Hamas and Hizbollah, ranging from providing social welfare and education to banking, under the “fundamentalist” and “extremist” label (Jackson, 2007: 401-402). Another core aspect of the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” is the claims that Islamist terrorists are motivated largely by religious or “sacred” causes rather than political or ideological reasons, such as destroying Israel and the West, or returning to an Islamic Caliphate (405). Viewed as motivated not only by

religious goals, but also by a rejection of western culture and a deep hatred of America and the West, “Islamic terrorism” is portrayed as anti-modern, anti-secular, and anti-democratic. To give but one example, Benjamin Barber argues that “These Jihadic warriors detest modernity -the secular, scientific, rational and commercial civilization created by the Enlightenment as it is defined ... in its virtues (freedom, democracy, tolerance and diversity)” (2002: 247). This discourse then, reinforces the perception that contemporary ‘Islamic terrorism’ somehow emerges from, or is indeed rooted in, Islamic doctrine and practice, which leads to the assumption that not only is Islam itself a source of threat, but also that ‘the “jihadists” can be found in almost any place that Muslim communities can be found’ (Jackson 2007: 405). As intimidating as it is to find “jihadists” anywhere, it may be even more intimidating is the perception that ordinary Muslims across both the Muslim and Western worlds are sympathetic to “Islamic terrorism.” In this vein, Daniel Pipes (2002) comments that “the Islamist element constitutes some 10 to 15 percent of the total Muslim world population of roughly one billion -that is some 100 to 150 million persons worldwide” which means that “the United States has over 100 million Islamist enemies.” Furthermore, he claims that, although “reliable statistics on opinion in the Muslim world do not exist, my sense is that one half of the world's Muslims -or some 500 million persons- sympathize more with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban than with the United States.” Also notable within the discourse of “Islamic terrorism,” is the view that Muslims living in Western societies are vulnerable to extremism, due to lack of integration, alienation, unemployment, the failure of multiculturalism or the radicalizing influence of foreign jihadist, and can be seen as

“enemy within” (Jordan and Boix 2004; Jackson 2007). While this narrative of the vulnerability of Muslims can lead one to understand the social and political problems Muslims living in Western countries face, in the “Islamic terrorism” discourse, it makes it possible to see “Islamic terrorist” as weak-minded, or uneducated young men who are indoctrinated, brainwashed or radicalized into terrorism through extremist mosques, madrasas, or internet sites (Haqqani 2002).

In most texts, it is seen as self-evident that “Islamic terrorism” poses “one of the most significant threats to the Western world in general and U.S. National security in particular” (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 276). “Islamic terrorism” is seen to be such a big force that it threatens not only security, but also Western democracy, civilization and the Western way of life. What makes the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” even more alarming, is that since “Islamic terrorism” is seen as fanatical, religiously motivated, murderous and irrational, there remains no possibility of negotiation, compromise, or even a political understanding, and eradication, deterrence and forceful counter-terrorism become the only reasonable response. In Tony Blair's words: “you only have to read the demands that come out from Al Qaeda to realize that there is no compromise with these people possible, you either get defeated by them or defeat them” (quoted in Jackson 2007: 409).

Various aspects of this discourse of “Islamic terrorism” have been subject to critiques. Scholars argued that given the huge variation in Islam and Islamic movements (a billion people from more than 50 countries, languages and cultures, five major doctrinal groupings and hundreds of smaller sects), generalizations such as “the Muslim

world,” “Islam,” or “islamic terrorists” are misleading and using them requires a great deal of qualification and contextualization (Esposito 1994; Denooux 2002; Kazmi 2004). Similarly, the term “Islamic terrorists,” assembles a diverse set of groups, cells, movements and individuals into an artificial unity and obscures the social political contexts in which they emerge (Burke 2003). Furthermore, other scholars argued that Islamic doctrine and practice is not typically or necessarily violent, anti-democratic or incompatible with secularism and modernity (Ismail 2006; Esposito and Voll 1996; Shadid 2001). On the other hand, empirical studies questioning the link between religion and terrorism found little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape 2005). Against the common image of the brainwashed terrorist, Pape maintains that the typical profile of a “terrorist” resembles “the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots movement” rather than a fanatic (2005: 216). Regarding the threat posed by “Islamic terrorism,” a number of studies propose that the threat of terrorism in general and “islamic terrorism” in particular, especially the possibility of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction is exaggerated (Jackson 2007; Mueller 2006; Sprinzak 1998; Jenkins 1998). As broad as these critiques are, what is missing is an analysis of how the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” affects Muslims in general, and how this discourse can be seen as a pillar of racialization of Muslims.

In representing Islam as a homogenous religion that is inherently predisposed to violence, the discourse of “islamic terrorism” effectively groups Muslims into a unified entity, despite all the variance among Muslims. As the discursive boundaries around this

group of Muslims are drawn, the individual Muslims are viewed not through their individual characteristic but through their group identity. If violence stems from Islam, or if there is a fundamental incompatibility of Islam with Western values such as democracy, by definition all the Muslims, as followers of this faith, become potential terrorists, sympathizers, or bystanders against the violence. The ever-present calls upon Muslims to condemn and denounce terrorism, indeed show that Muslims are held accountable for terrorism, and despite the numerous declarations by various Muslim organizations, that demand can never be satisfied because it shares responsibility to the individuals defined by their belonging to an imaginary group. Furthermore, as the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” positions Islam, outside the realm of reason and in an antagonistic relationship with the Western values and ideals, individual Muslims are also seen as incapable of overcoming their religious predispositions through reason, and hence as unable to internalize the Western values. As such, the view of the “Islamist terrorists” seen only as vulnerable and brainwashed individuals motivated by religion, and not as politically conscious individuals, can easily be generalized to all Muslims. And most importantly, the discourse of “Islamic terrorism,” by denying the political character and demands of insurgent groups, by essentializing them as violent irrational fanatics, normalizes and legitimizes the coercive and punitive counter-terrorism measures as the only alternative by rendering non-violent alternatives unthinkable. Given that Muslims are seen as unified group, not necessarily on the basis of their individual beliefs, but through their affiliation or association with Islam, then each Muslim becomes a vulnerable target of these counter-terrorism measures. As such, Muslim are targeted not

because of their beliefs, but because of their affiliation, or assumed affiliation, which may or may not be their own choice, but is nevertheless essentialized through the gaze that ascribes certain characteristics to them as inherent. Thus, the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” constitutes the conditions of possibility for racialization of Muslims into a single group, as well as rendering the individual Muslims targets of racist attacks. The perceived innate danger and violence of the Muslim as the enemy is viewed to transcend citizenship, thus placing Muslims into a new zone of lawlessness where they are neither citizen nor alien, but inherently belong to this evil world called Islam (Ibrahim 2008: 143).

Given that there have already been a long history of viewing Muslims as antithetical to Western identities and values, it is not a surprise that the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the following discourse of “Islamic terrorism” resulted in targeting Muslims not only in the United States but globally as well. In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslim individuals were targets not only of government policies, such as racial profiling and USA PATRIOT Act, but also of violence carried by private individuals. Furthermore, as the discourse of “Islamic terrorism” sanctioned the violent counter-terrorism measures as the only alternative, Muslims outside of the U.S. increasingly became targets of such measures and “tragic but unavoidable casualties” in the exercise of state's power. On July 1, 2016 the U.S. government released the official civilian death count outside conventional war zones by airstrikes since 2009, to be somewhere between 64 to 116 (Savage and Shane 2016). This official number of civilian deaths is hundreds lower than than most estimates compiled by independent organizations (their estimates

range from 200 to 1000), and excludes civilian deaths in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Those civilians were killed because they happened to be in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, or Libya, and they were affiliated by Islamic terrorism if only by their geographical location.

Hate Crimes

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Arab, Muslim and South Asian communities in the United States experienced a wave of violence far greater in magnitude than they had experienced before (Ahmad 2004). Among the post 9/11 incidents of violence targeting individuals and groups viewed to be associated with Islam are murders, the fire bombings of mosques, temples and gurdwaras; assaults by fist, gun, knife and molotov cocktails; acts of vandalism and property destruction against homes and businesses; and verbal harassment and intimidation. As of February 8, 2002, in the course of five months after 9/11, 1717 cases of "anti-Muslim" incidents had been reported to the council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR reports: 289 reports of physical assault or property damage; 11 deaths; 166 incidents of discrimination in the workplace; 191 incidents of airport profiling; 224 incidents of intimidation by the FBI, the police, or the INS; 74 incidents of discrimination in school; 315 reports of hate mail; 56 death threats; 16 bomb threats; and 372 incidents of public harassment.³³ The physical nature of violence has subsided by time, but it took new forms especially in housing and

³³ See the website of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, at <http://www.cair-net.org>. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab-Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash 2002-2003, and 2003-2007 available on <http://www.adc.org/media/adcri-publications/>. See also: Robert Hanashiro, Hate Crimes Born Out of Tragedy Create Victims, USA Today, Sept. 11, 2002; Robert E. Pierre, Victims of Hate, Now Feeling Forgotten, Washington Post, Sept. 14, 2002.

employment discrimination. Facing the overwhelming number of complaints, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission created a new category “Z” to track acts of discrimination against Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian workers after 9/11. Between September 11, 2001, and May 7, 2002, the EEOC received 497 charges on the basis of Muslim religion.³⁴ During the comparable period one year earlier, 193 such charges were received. In the fifteen months after 9/11, the number of similar complaints rose to 705, to reach 1021 by 2009.³⁵ The actual number of incidents, however, is impossible to know as factors such as uncertain migration status and language barriers inhibit many victims of hate crimes from ever reporting them (Ahmad, 2004: 1266-1267).

Two aspects of such hate crimes are worth noting. The first is the emergence of an amorphous category of “Muslim-looking” people, that expands the trope of “the Arab terrorist” to a wider group of people. Various characteristics, both real and perceived, such as religion, skin color, phenotypic appearance, name, dress, language and accent can be used to categorize a wide range of people in this group, and constitute the ground especially for attacks against individuals. Sikhs, or non-Muslim Arabs were particularly victims of such violence, based on “appearing Muslim.” A second aspect is that, although condemned as individual acts of criminality, the phenomena appeared to need little explanation: they were viewed as regrettable but expected responses to 9/11, as the major newspapers reported predictions of violence against these communities.³⁶ Nearly two

34 <http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-15-02.cfm>

35 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fact Sheet: Backlash Employment Discrimination Charges Related to the Events of 9/11/2001 Against Individuals Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim, Arab, Afghani, Middle Eastern or South Asian (Sept. 11, 2009)

36 See Caryle Murphy and Emily Wax, Muslims Condemn Acts, Fear Reprisals; D.C. Area Islamic Groups Urged to Take Precautions, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 2001 (noting that Muslims who wear

years after 9/11, the violence continued, including the stabbing in the back of a Muslim woman in Virginia (while her perpetrator called her a “terrorist pig”), the brutal beating of a Hindu pizza delivery man in Massachusetts who was mistaken for a Muslim, and a cross-burning in front of an Islamic center in Maryland (Ahmad, 2004: 1263). Thus, despite the public condemnations of such crimes, post-9/11 anger directed at Muslims seems to be something normalized, understandable, if not sympathized with. Furthermore, a similar observation can be made regarding the public attitude towards racial profiling of Muslims.

Racial Profiling

Before 9/11, public polls showed overwhelming opposition to racial profiling; Gallup reports that in 1999, 81% of American public said they disapprove of the practice.³⁷ In March 2001, US Attorney General John Ashcroft urged Congress to take up legislation that would end racial profiling, backed by President Bush who issued a memorandum to Mr. Ashcroft directing him to work with Congress on developing ways to collect data from federal law enforcement agencies and to communicate with state and local officials to "assess the extent and nature of such practices."³⁸ In the aftermath of 9/11, this changed significantly: A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll taken a few days after the attacks showed that Americans were supporting special measures intended for those

religious attire were urged to stay out of public areas); Larry B. Stammer & Teresa Watanabe, Muslims in Southland Brace for Retaliation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, (reporting Islamic schools, centers and mosques closed for fear of revenge assaults); Robert Tomsho, A Day of Terror: Islamic-Americans Grapple with Quick Backlash, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 12, 2001, (reporting Muslim-American organizations' preparation for backlash).

37 Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 9, 1999), available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/3421/racial-profiling-seen-widespread-particularly-among-young-black-men.aspx>

38 See “Attorney General Seeks End to *Racial* Profiling,” New York Times, Mar. 2, 2001

of Arab descent. In the survey, 58 percent backed more intensive security checks for Arabs, including those who are United States citizens, compared with other travelers; 49 percent favored special identification cards for such people, and 32 percent backed "special surveillance" for them.³⁹

The public support for racial profiling, of course was matched with government policies. Subsequent to September 11, over twelve hundred non-citizens have been swept up into detention. The purported basis for this sweep is to investigate and prevent terrorist attacks, yet none of the persons arrested and detained have been identified as engaged in terrorist activity (Volpp 2002: 1577). The U.S. Department of Justice has also engaged in racial profiling in what has been described as a dragnet-seeking to conduct more than five thousand investigatory interviews of male noncitizens between the ages of eighteen and thirty-three from "Middle Eastern" or "Islamic" countries or countries with some suspected tie to Al Qaeda, who sought entry into the country since January 1, 2000, on tourist, student, and business visas (1578). These were called voluntary interviews, yet they were not free of coercion or consequences: there was an implicit condition that an individual's visa could be revoked for non-cooperation. Only five people declined to be interviewed, and 104 letters were returned because of incorrect addresses. Despite obtaining no useful information concerning terrorism, the Justice Department indicated soon afterwards that it would be contacting another three thousand young Arab men for "voluntary interviews."

The USA PATRIOT Act

³⁹ Sam Howe Verhovek, A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties; Americans Give in to Race Profiling, New York Times, Sept. 23, 2001.

On October 24-24 2001 the House and Senate approved the sweeping anti-terrorist legislation known as the PATRIOT Act. Building on the 1996 Anti-terrorism Act, the Patriot Act, besides providing law enforcement with new powers to conduct searches, employ electronic surveillance and detain suspected terrorists, made great changes in parts of the immigration law. The Act broadens the definition of terrorist activity to include virtually any use or threat to use violence, while defining “terrorist organization” as any group of two or more persons that had used or threatened to use violence. It also expands guilt by association, first by making aliens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity with a “terrorist organization” irrespective of any nexus between the alien's associational conduct and any act of violence, much less terrorism. Furthermore, the Act broadens the grounds of inadmissibility to include persons who endorse, use their prominence to endorse or have been associated with terrorist activity as well as spouses and children of persons engaging in terrorism, as well as permitting retroactive application of the terrorist provisions.

From its passage, the provisions of the PATRIOT Act have been principally used on Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. and on their community institutions, charities and business. The PATRIOT Act, as well the failed investigations and trials that produced no convictions had the effect of increasing fear among the Muslim population entrenching the feeling that everyone was vulnerable, especially the possibility of ex post facto indictments (Cainkar 2008; Bayoumi 2009).

In the U.S. the racialization processes for Muslims became visible much later than for African, Native, Latino, and Asian Americans. They intensified after the Civil

Rights movement, and in an era where racial profiling was losing credibility and public displays of racial diversity were perceived to be the norm. While the historical constructions of whiteness provide insights to the deeply rooted exclusive criteria for inclusion in the national community, the U. S. has also historically claimed to be the country of immigration, an open door to all migrants in need of protection and in search of opportunity, i.e. the “American dream” of material success through individual effort that is understood to be color-blind. How then, are we to make sense of this late-coming intensification of racialization for the Muslims?

First, it needs to be pointed out that in congruence with the theories of new racism, these processes of racialization described above co-existed with discourses about racial inclusivity. For instance the high-level appointments in the Bush administration (including the Secretary of Education, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor and Attorney General), as well as the promotion of life stories of Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice as figures of personal achievement against race and class advanced not only the idea of an administration dedicated to racial inclusivity but also that racial exclusion and discrimination were no longer issues. Furthermore, side by side with the policies of racial profiling were the condemnations of the hate crimes by the Bush administration: the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division announced in a September 13, 2001 press release that "any threats of violence or discrimination against Arab or Muslim Americans or Americans of South Asian descent are not just wrong and un-American, but also are unlawful and will be treated as such." To demonstrate further the administration's sensitivity to attacks on Muslims, George W. Bush visited the Islamic

Center of Washington, DC on September 17. Shortly thereafter a resolution was passed by Congress "condemning bigotry and violence against Arab-Americans, American Muslims and Americans from South Asia in the wake of terrorist attacks in New York and Washington." Moreover, a central section of the USA PATRIOT Act was dedicated to the sense of Congress condemning discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans: "Arab-Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia play a vital role in our nation and are entitled to nothing less than the full rights of every American." Beyond urging us to analyze the processes of racialization not through questions of intent but by focusing on the effects of discourses and practices, such statements also reveal one of the central aspects of racialization: that it is a continuous process of boundary-drawing and category constructing caught between the universalist appeals and particularistic politics. While these statements offer the protection of citizenship to Muslim Americans, not only their adherence to the culture and values of the U.S. but their agreement with and affirmation of the U.S. foreign policy interests and objectives become the ground such protections are dependent on. As Howell and Shryock argue, "in the aftermath of 9/11, Arab and Muslim Americans have been compelled, time and again, to apologize for acts they did not commit, to condemn acts they never condoned, and to openly profess loyalties that, for most U.S. Citizens, are merely assumed" (2003: 444). When such a fragile ground for the possibility of inclusion is contrasted to the experience of fear and alienation felt by the Muslim communities in the U.S. the effect that racialization creates become clearer: a continuous process of deciding between deserving and non deserving (or dispensable) subjects from the

viewpoint of the power, and continues demands to prove one's loyalties for the subjects, who are already seen to be associated with terrorism by the mere fact of being a Muslim.

Chapter 5: Racialization of the “Rise of China” Debates: Yellow Peril Again?

China’s rapid economic growth, military modernization, and a surge in energy demand, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War, have led many academics, policy makers and strategic thinkers to question whether a rising China was a threat or an opportunity.⁴⁰ This question of whether China was representing a source of regional and international instability evoked two main lines of response: those who viewed the rise of China as an opportunity suggested a strategy of engagement and viewed China as a status-quo power that does not threaten the hegemony of the liberal Western international order; and those supporting the “China threat” argument proposed a strategy of containment as they viewed the increasing power of China to be a challenge for the existing order and distribution of power.⁴¹

However, a sense of uneasiness about the possibility of China dominating the international system is present in both the threat and the opportunity arguments. For example, comparing the rise of the United States and China to power in the international order as examples of “peaceful rise”, Buzan and Cox nevertheless emphasize that “it is almost impossible to imagine the United States feeling as comfortable about China as Britain was able to feel about the United States” (2013:126). Buzan and Cox argue that the differences between China and the United States regarding culture and political order

40 Although the concerns about the future of the US hegemony has been the focus of the US public, those debates were not limited to the US but were more dispersed including regional concerns of the Asian and East-Asian states, Russia, and European states (Brown et. al. 2000).

41 In response to those, voices from China joined the debate as well, through concepts such as “great power diplomacy”, “responsible power”, “China opportunity” and “peaceful rise.”

(e.g. commitment to liberal individualism and market capitalism) constitute the main reasons as to why the United States would feel uneasy about the rise of China. But are “cultural and political differences” enough to explain why it is “almost impossible to imagine” the United States' feeling comfortable about the rise of China? How do we observe and explain this “feeling” of being uncomfortable in the face of a rising power, in the frameworks of International Relations that analyze *perceptions of threat*? What makes it impossible to imagine a changing world order that is not caught between the dualism of “either a threat or an opportunity” that the rise of China represent from the viewpoint of the Anglo-Saxon/Western liberal international order? Is it possible that the notion of “cultural differences” indeed indicate something about China that is irreducibly and inevitably different and incompatible with the principles of the contemporary liberal international order?

The common sense of the discipline of International Relations presumes that the diffusion of the norms of racial equality and sovereignty as well as the liberal nature of our contemporary world order render constructions of race inconsequential or irrelevant for the study of international politics. Contrary to that presumption, I argue that processes of racialization still operate at the core of international politics through constituting identities and framing the perceptions of threat, as well as limiting the possibilities of transforming the liberal international order into a more inclusive one. In response to the questions stated above, I argue that this sense of uneasiness regarding the rise of China, which is common to both Realism and Liberalism, cannot be explained only by referring to the analyses of material aspects of power politics among the states. However, taking

into consideration political and cultural differences alone is not enough either without questioning how such differences are made meaningful within an ideological framework that continues to view humanity as hierarchically divided into discrete groups that are essentially different from one another. In other words, without analyzing how racialization still operates to construct identities and difference we cannot fathom the worries that rise of China evokes in the Western world. Accordingly, in this chapter, I argue that within the scholarly debates about and the policy responses to the rise of China, China is constructed as a “racial other” that is inevitably different and incompatible with the principles of the contemporary liberal international order. It is this racial otherness of China that underlies and explains why the possibility of China dominating the international system is such a frightening prospect for the western liberal order.

The Rise of China Debates: Either Opportunity or Threat

For most scholars, the answer to the question of “does the rise of China indicate an economic opportunity or a military threat?” seems to depend on analyses of empirical facts: measuring China's economic and military power through its annual growth rates, GDP, foreign currency reserves, defense budget, the number of missiles pointed at Taiwan etc. In that vein, in the United States, the Department of Defense writes an Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC, and the bipartisan US-China Economic and Security Commission submits its reports to Congress, while the Japanese government also compiles statistics on China's military in its *Defense of Japan* white papers (Callahan 2005:702). However, not only the empirical difficulties of compiling

and interpreting such data, but also conceptual ambiguities regarding the categorizations of “status quo power” or “revisionist power” reveal the limitations of the existing approaches for understanding the perceptions of threat that the rise of China generates as well as the future policy recommendations on this basis.

Neither military nor economic power represent danger in and of themselves without the process of constituting them as threats through interpretation. Thus, while in the mainstream debates about the rise of China, economic, political and security rationales seem to be doing all the explanation, what is often missing is an analysis of how these specific “material” conditions come to be interpreted within a perception of threat. As Campbell argues, “danger is not an objective condition; it is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. ... danger is an effect of interpretation” (1998: 1-2). Therefore, instead of focusing on the empirical analyses of evaluation, in the present chapter I aim to analyze the debates about rise of China as an interpretive realm that is not merely dependent on “empirical facts” but is constituted by and in turn constitutive of the dynamics between domestic and international politics, understandings of self and other shaped by the constructions of US/Western/modern and Chinese identities, as well as the characteristics of the international liberal order that is being (re)produced.

Existing constructivist literature establishes the constitutive effects of shared values and identities in determining the perceptions of threat: identities of self and other as well as the perceptions of the other either as a friend or as an enemy, in other words how states see themselves in relation to other states in international society, shape

whether certain empirical indicators are seen as threatening or not. Nevertheless, even in the constructivist accounts that take into consideration the role of shared identities and values in perceptions of threat, the ways in which constructs of race play a role in shaping those shared identities and values remain overlooked. On this background rather than questioning the ‘objective’ quality of a threat a rising China signifies for the stability of the world order, or for the US hegemony, I focus on how China is constructed as an “other” in the liberal world order through processes of racialization that mark China as an irrational actor with a different culture and ideology and hence a source of threat.

China as the “other” of Liberal International Order

In stark contrast to the concerns of the discipline of International Relations in the formative decades of the early twentieth century, especially in the last three decades neither the questions about (restructuring of) the world order in general, nor the debates about the rise of China seem to be focusing on the role of racial constructs or processes of racialization in international politics. The discipline is largely based on the assumption that different from the domestic realm, where questions of race might still bear important social, political and economic effects, the realm of international politics is immune to such effects thanks to the diffusion of the norms of racial equality and sovereignty as well as to the liberal nature of our contemporary world order. Recently, in the introduction of the second book of a trilogy on Civilizational Politics on World Affairs, *Anglo-America and Its Discontents*, Peter Katzenstein made an argument that echoes the general acceptance in the discipline of International Relations:

Sustained by domestic liberalism steeped deeply in racism, over the last century Anglo-America has shifted from the pursuit of racial supremacy and empire

abroad to an interdependent community of states marked by complex sovereignties, shared diplomatic cultures, and special relations, grounded domestically in distinctive forms of democratic capitalism and multicultural politics (2012: 26).

Katzenstein emphasizes that Anglo-America, like all other civilizations, is marked by multiple traditions and internal pluralism, and furthermore that once deeply held notions and practices of imperial rule and racial hierarchy now take the form of hegemony or multilateralism, and politically contested versions of multiculturalism. Nevertheless, despite this optimistic reading of the “end of racial hierarchies and imperial pursuits,” he cannot but conclude the chapter by the following questions regarding the evolution of the “Anglo-American West from racialized empire to multicultural community” :

It also remains an open question whether liberal multiculturalism has eliminated traditional race-based hierarchies (by emphasizing the idea and practice of cultural diversity in the era of human rights); whether it merely conceals the racial-liberal symbiosis in a new kind of politics (which appears to accommodate diversity at the surface only to resist ever more strongly a more far-reaching transformation of its traditional core), or whether it accommodates itself to various sources of opposition through a series of pragmatic compromises (27).

It seems inevitable that the celebratory tone of the optimistic conclusions Katzenstein reached regarding the international scene are shadowed by the serious implications of such questions, especially if as he argues that “then, as now, the substance of and form of international engagements have been closely tied to domestic politics” (26). Katzenstein does not elaborate on the nature of those ties, yet we cannot escape the question: In the face of the ongoing influence of racial hierarchies and injustices in the realm of domestic politics, to what extent and in what ways does racialization and the consequent constructions of racial hierarchies continue to operate at the level of international politics? The debates about the rise of China and the possible

transformation of the international system and hierarchies such a rise indicate provide an illuminating example of the continuous operation of racialization in international politics. Revealing the mechanisms of racialization that construct China as an “other” of the international system shows how the international hierarchies are constituted racially, and how the possibilities of inclusion and/or exclusion within the order are shaped by racialized identities.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a brief period of optimism and triumphalism of the West soon gave way to new fears and anxieties over an approaching chaos. In the U.S. context a series of articles appearing in the *Atlantic*, from Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” to Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy’s “Must It be the Rest against the West?” and John Mearsheimer’s “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War” exemplified this sense of growing anxieties, which find their epitome in Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations.” A prevailing sense of threat finds its visual expression in these articles through the images of disease-ridden, violent, and proliferating colored people with whom one cannot reason, posed against the “innocent” Caucasians of America and the West. This is most fully embodied in Huntington’s much debated vision of the clash of civilizations, symbolized in the nightmarish possibility of the alliance between the Confucian and Islamic civilizations to challenge Western values, interests and power. The debates about the rise of China and the Islamic threat were symptomatic examples of a sense of threat in the Western world that revealed the anxieties about the characteristics of the emerging world order in the aftermath of the Cold War.

On the background of this general sense of threat and anxiety, IR scholars approached the rise of China through their own theoretical paradigms. From the Realist perspective it seems that the Chinese are predisposed to choose force over accommodation due to either the dynamics of power transition between rising powers and hegemons (Kennedy 1987; Mearsheimer 2001) or to the internal characteristics of China that are result of being socialized into a “hard realpolitik” *parabellum* strategic culture that find its expression in the maxim of “if you want peace, prepare for war” (Johnston 1995: 107). From the Liberal perspective, which claim that international institutions and interdependence restrain state aggression, the rise of China -if managed properly- is not a threat for the Western international order which is hard to overturn and easy to join due to its open, integrated and rule-based character and its deep political foundations (Ikenberry, 2008: 24). Yet, even in the liberal perspective there is a present sense of uneasiness about the possibility of China dominating the international system. For example, comparing the rise of the United States and China to power in the international order as examples of “peaceful rise”, Buzan and Cox (2013) nevertheless emphasize that “it is almost impossible to imagine the United States feeling as comfortable about China as Britain was able to feel about the United States” (126). Buzan and Cox claim that the differences between China and the United States regarding culture and political order (e.g. commitment to liberal individualism and market capitalism) constitute the main reasons as to why the United States would feel uneasy about the rise of China. I argue that this sense of uneasiness regarding the rise of China is common to both Realism and Liberalism as both accounts construct China as a “racial

other” that is inevitably different and incompatible with the principles of the contemporary liberal international order.

The policy response from the United States against the rising power of China represent a shift in the United States foreign policy orientation that can be seen as the latest stage in construction of a global world order that replaces the Cold War framework alongside the reproduction/reconstruction of the U.S. imperial power, and as such it responds to the anxieties and fears regarding the “threats” a rising China poses not only against the hegemonic position of the United States but also for the future of the liberal international order based on Western institutions and values.

Accordingly, as the U.S. forces were withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, a shift in the priorities of the United States’ foreign policy was crystallizing: the next phase of American foreign policy will be marked by a “pivot” towards the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. Department of Defense’s strategic guidance report for 2012 *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*⁴² emphasizes that “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia” while calling for *rebalancing* toward the Asia-Pacific region (p.2). Accordingly, in a speech to an international security conference in Singapore in 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that Navy would shift from the current 50-50 split of its fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to a 40-60 split favoring the Pacific in 2020,⁴³ in addition to deploying up to 2500 Marines to Australia – a move that

42 www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf

43 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/world/asia/panetta-to-visit-asia-to-discuss-militarys-shift-there.html>

marked the U.S.' most extensive reach into the region since the Vietnam War- announced by President Obama during a presidential trip to the Far East in 2011. In that trip, the US President revealed what is being termed the Obama Doctrine in relation to the Asia-Pacific region:

With most of the world's nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation...As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision — as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future...I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific a top priority...As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region. We will preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace...Our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring presence in the region.

The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay. Indeed, we are already modernizing America's defense posture across the Asia Pacific. It will be more broadly distributed — maintaining our strong presence in Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia. Our posture will be more flexible — with new capabilities to ensure that our forces can operate freely .. I believe we can address shared challenges, such as proliferation and maritime security, including cooperation in the South China Sea.⁴⁴

In November 2011 issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton detailed this new strategic approach the United States had been developing in/towards the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁵ Identifying the region as a key driver of global politics, Clinton pointed out that: “One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.” She compared the U.S. commitment in the Asia-Pacific region to the U.S.’ Post-

44 President Barack Obama, Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament, November 17, 2011, available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>.

45 Hillary Clinton, “America's Pacific Century”:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century

World War II commitment to “building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships.” While rejecting the calls for “a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities,” she reasoned that “From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home.” Clinton emphasizes that the strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region fits logically into the U.S. global effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership, and it proceeds along six key lines of action: “strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.”

Although Clinton in particular and Obama administration in general have repeatedly claimed that this new strategic focus of the U.S. foreign policy does not indicate a hostility towards China, many commentators view the policy as a “politely veiled containment policy”⁴⁶ towards China, while other scholars question the novelty of this “pivot,” citing the long history of the U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region.

From the perceptions and representations of the threat posed by the rise of China to the range of policy proposals put forth to “deal with” this threat, ideas about racial difference and processes of racialization continue to be intrinsic to the ways in which the liberal international order is reconstructed and the U.S. imperial power is restructured.

⁴⁶ See Roland Paris, <http://cips.uottawa.ca/a-pivotal-moment-u-s-policy-towards-asia/>

On the one hand, such ideas and processes reflect a *change of tone* from being blatantly racist to being based on more subtle references to racial differences, but on the other hand they also continue to reflect the enduring import of ideas about racial and difference and hierarchy, which are deeply entrenched in liberalism⁴⁷ as well as in the liberal world orders that have been in the making since the late 19th century, over the ways in which international politics are imagined. A crucial characteristic of this world order is that it is composed of inherently different discrete groups that are not only characterized by immutable differences based on nature but also are inherently conflictual. The borders between such units have been conceptualized and drawn in different ways: while the nation state territories are the common language of contemporary IR, racialized borders between human groups based on skin color was also part of the imaginary of 19th and early 20th century. Today, to a great extent skin color, et least explicitly and formally ceased to be such a marker, yet its replacements such as culture, civilizations, or “shared values and identities” can also be seen as racialized (e.g. as whiteness constitutes part of what is means to be civilized or sharing certain values). The liberal character of the contemporary world order does not necessarily indicate that racial constructs ceased to be affective at the international contexts, but indeed highlights how the criteria for inclusion and exclusion in such an order continue to be (at least partially) informed by racial thinking. As a result, despite the claims about the “openness” of the liberal system to any players that abide by the rules, the enduring racial criteria about who “belongs” to the political community (be it the nation-state or of the international society) and who is fit

47 My second/theory chapter, deals with those deep roots of racial thinking in the Enlightenment, modernity etc.

for governing (be it self-governing or leading the international community) at least partially constitute the limits of the imagination regarding the possibilities of a more inclusive international order. Although the contemporary forms and processes of racialization differ from the 19th and early 20th century version in that they are more subtle and indirect, the traces of continuity can also be observed in and through:

- the questioning of who belongs as rights bearing equal citizens in the national community, as well as in the international community of democratic states?
- who can be trusted in questions of security, compliance with the economic rules and regulations etc..?
- the questioning of, and responses to the questions of, who is and is not capable of not only self-governing but also leading the international community.

Within the debates about the rise of China, the responses to these questions are shaped by the constructions of China and the Chinese as unwilling to adhere to the norms and values of the liberal international order; as achieving economic success through questionable means such as currency manipulation and lack of labor regulations; as an irrational, and potentially untrustworthy actor that is motivated by a different strategic culture that emphasizes preparedness for conflict. In this picture, unfair trade, currency manipulation, nuclear spying, military buildup and the expanding influence in Africa and the Middle East all mark China as a dangerous actor, but the perception of threat is always grounded in China's difference, or otherness in regards to the “shared values and identities” of the West. Accordingly, China's commitment to market capitalism and liberal individualism are seen as questionable at best, and certainly not reversible given

its authoritarian tendencies.

Despite the efforts of the Chinese government to integrate into the international society over the last three decades, China is still far from being accepted as a “responsible” member of the international society and its rise is seen to be challenging for the West. At the center of such concerns is the contention that China is not yet conforming to the standards of the Western liberal order such as human rights and democracy. Accordingly, China is seen as not subscribing to the prevailing Western norms of individualism, human rights, transparency, while sticking to the 'traditional' norms of sovereignty:

Yet, even at the dawn of the new millennium, China’s full membership in the global international society continues to be contested, as many question China’s sincerity and willingness to accept the responsibilities that are associated with Great Power status. As a rising power, China, for its own part, has fiercely contested the normative changes in post-Cold War international society that have seen human rights and democratization become part of the daily round of political practice. As the world seems to be moving beyond Westphalia, China stands as a staunch defender of the Westphalian order (Zhang 2001: 63).

Accordingly, China does not qualify for rightful membership in the international community as it is not recognized to be abiding by the contemporary norms of the international liberal order; at its best, China is seen as a country which has been instrumentally adopting human rights and democracy norms, or tactically adapting to growing international pressures.

Furthermore, China's claims to be a status quo power seeking stability in the international system, its commitment to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention do not ease the fears as “China’s position on what kind of international

society it would like to be part of remains murky” (Buzan and Cox, 127). Thus China is constructed simultaneously as a dangerous actor for the stability of the international order but also one that lacks the vision for leading the international society to a different form of international order. Despite the continuous enchantment by the impressive growth numbers, the fact that the rise of China happens within and through the liberal international order, and even the explicit fears that this might happen soon, somehow the possibility of China becoming the next hegemon in the international system seems to be challenging the limits of the liberal international imaginary. What is even more unimaginable is the possibility of a different international order that is not based on the Western/liberal/white identities and values but on a vision proposed and led by the Chinese, even if that possibility haunts all the scenarios of the “China threat.” Thus, in those debates there seems to be only one way of inclusion in/integration into the contemporary liberal international order: accepting the rules and leadership of the liberal West, whereas the capacity of the Chinese for effective self-governing, let alone for leading the international community is perpetually questioned.⁴⁸

Not only in the language of policy shifting between containment and engagement, but also in the simultaneously threatening possibility and unimaginability of a world order that is led, or worse re-constructed, by the Chinese leadership lies the ambivalent and contradictory constructs of China's otherness. The ambivalent and contradictory characteristics of racial constructs can also be observed in how the perception of threat

48 Capacity for self-governing, or lack of it thereof, was a constitutive aspect of the early racial thinking; especially in the context of the United States' imperial expansion, it could function both as a justification for imperial conquest and as a warning against such conquest when the subject population in question was too big to be successfully assimilated

the rise of China creates finds its expression at the intersection of domestic and international politics. It is not uncommon that the external categories of threat find their correspondence in the domestic politics through (re)inscriptions of racial markers to individual bodies upon which a categorical group existence is imposed. Such individuals and groups then become easily available for forms of racial subordination and discrimination, especially through their depiction of being “racially inassimilable.” A very striking example of this processes happened in the late 1990s in the United States.

In 1999 Wen Ho Lee, a nuclear-code physicist, who is a naturalized US citizen, was wrongly accused of spying for China. On March 6th, 1999, the front page of the *New York Times* had a breaking “special report” with the headline: “Breach at Los Alamos: A Special Report: China Stole Nuclear Secret for Bombs, U.S. Aides Say” that accused Dr. Wen Ho Lee of espionage. Within two days Dr. Lee was fired from his job. Three weeks later, he was arrested. Nine months later, the accusations against him were dismissed in federal court. Indeed non of the claims of the initial story would have stand up. Yet, as Bussolini argues treason is an exemplary crime in the sense that it immediately draws into question who is loyal and who is antagonistic, who is a member of one's community and who is a foreigner (2003: 18-19). In line with the earlier versions of the yellow peril trope, once again the case of Wen Ho Lee, brought forth not only the questions of who belongs to the “American” community, but also the figure of the foreigner and the enemy within who are not complete outsiders but are kept in a permanent foreigner status, who can deceive and take advantage of a society to gain its benefits while at the same time betraying it.

It was obvious that the accusations against Wen Ho Lee were based on his perceived racial identity. Yet, it is also very striking that in the process, the fact that Lee was a Taiwanese-American, having been born and raised in Taiwan before being naturalized as a U.S. citizen, was apparently disregarded. Why would Lee aid the People's Republic of China with nuclear arms that the PRC repeatedly threatened to use against Taiwan, where many of his family members and friends still live (Bussolini, 20), remains as a crucial question, which reveals the perception that primary racial/ethnic belonging trumps every other form of loyalty and identity.

Furthermore, the ensuing campaign after the *Times* article's initial publication in March, (to be followed by a series of front-page articles for five months), resulted in an intensification of FBI investigations of Chinese-Americans who had contributed to political campaigns. In the Chinese-American community these actions created a growing feeling of being the "permanent foreigner-within," the people who regardless of birthplace and citizenship are forever under suspicion about their "true" loyalty (Lyman, 2000:719). Nevertheless, the capstone in the Lee case was *The House of Representatives Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China*, popularly known as the "Cox Report" after Christopher Cox, the chairman of the House Policy Committee. According to *The Report*, the People's Republic of China "has mounted a widespread efforts to obtain U.S. military technologies by any means -legal or illegal." Citing a 1993 case in which a former Chinese philosophy professor, Bin Wu, and two other PRC nationals were convicted of smuggling third-generation night-vision equipment to the PRC, *The Report*

maintains that “Wu appears to have been a significant PRC intelligence structure in the United States. This structure uses 'sleeper' agents, who can be used at any time but may not be tasked for a decade or more.” After alluding to the possibility that anybody with Chinese origins might be a “sleeper agent” as such, *The Report*, more specifically states that:

The PRC also relies heavily on the use of professional scientific visits, delegations, and exchanged to gather sensitive technology Another risk in scientific exchanges is that U.S. scientists ... are prime targets for approaches by professional and non-professional PRC organizations that would like to coopt them into providing assistance to the PRC. In many cases, they are able to identify scientists whose views might support the PRC, and whose knowledge would be of value to PRC programs. The Select Committee has received information about Chinese-American scientists from U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories being identified in this manner. The PRC employs various approaches to co-opt U.S. scientists to obtain classified information . . . : appealing to common ethnic heritage; arranging visits to ancestral homes and relatives; paying for trips and travel in the PRC; flattering the guest's knowledge and intelligence; holding elaborate banquets to honor guests; and doggedly peppering U.S. scientists with technical questions by experts, sometimes after a banquet at which substantial amounts of alcohol have been consumed.

The implications of the Cox Report for Chinese Americans were that “every Chinese visitor to this country, every Chinese scholar, every Chinese student, every Chinese permanent resident, and even every Chinese-American citizen is a spy, potential spy, or ‘sleeper agent,’ merely waiting for the signal to rise up and perform some unimaginable act of treachery” (Nelson, 1999:6). The racialized stereotype of the unassimilable Chinese person subject to disloyalty, as represented by the figure of Dr. Lee, and through a process of extension, by every person associated with a Chinese origin, can be interpreted as the latest incarnation of the “yellow peril” trope, where ascribed and imposed racial understandings trumps any other assertions of identity or loyalty and leads

to discriminatory practices such as racial profiling.

However, on the other side of this whole story are present the narratives of “model minority” that might be seen as running counter to and invalidating the negative aspects of the racialization processes I described. The “model minority” narratives emerged in the United States in the 1960s depicting Japanese and Chinese Americans as the model minority groups who had close family ties, were extremely serious about education and were law-abiding (Kawai 2005). While at first glance model minority narratives might seem as effacing the negative stereotype attributes associated with Asian-Americans, to the extent that they stress that Asian Americans are Asian-Americans are succeeding through making efforts on their own despite their racial background, not only do they create another stereotype of their own, but they also further a colorblind ideology and “racial power, not through the direct articulation of racial differences but rather by obscuring the operation of racial power, protecting it from challenge, and permitting ongoing racialization via racially coded methods” (Kim 2000: 17). Critical race theorists argue that the ideology of colorblindness abstracts individuals from social and historical contexts and attributes the consequences of racial inequality to individual under-performance without acknowledging institutional racism (Guinier and Torres, 2002). Furthermore, it is possible to argue that “the concepts of the yellow peril and model minority, although apparent disjunction, form a seamless continuum” in the sense that Asian-Americans as the model minority is a “complementary, benign image of the yellow peril” (Okihiro 1994: 139, 141). Furthermore, viewing Asian-Americans through both the model minority and yellow peril lenses is not necessarily contradictory

because, as social constructs racial stereotypes do entail contradictory meanings simultaneously and are ambivalent.

The case of Dr. Lee also reveals how the new sense of threat and anxiety created by the rise of China taps into the historically existing symbols of threat as it also articulates elements of previous racial constructs with the new ones. In that sense, the debates about the rise of China cannot be understood without taking into consideration how the trope of “yellow peril” was a significant part of the racial imagination of international politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Early 20th Century Racialized Imaginary of the International and the Yellow Peril

By the end of late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the common sentiment especially among the Western intellectuals and politicians reflect not only the prevalence of racialized identities such that the elites on both sides of the Atlantic interpreted the social world as composed of different human races at different stages of civilization but also the beliefs about the inevitability of racial conflicts and the necessity of the segregation of races (Vucetic 2011: 5; Furedi 1998: 1-5; Vincent 1982). On the one hand, white supremacy, which could be based on biological, moral or cultural grounds, represented a positive ideal in the self-image of the West, but on the other hand race became a source of anxiety as the Anglo-American foreign policy elites regarded racial thinking as having the potential to disrupt the world system. From Japan's rapid military advance signified by Japan's defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905

which was seen as “the first real challenge to white world supremacy” (Grant 1916 quoted in Horne 1999: 442) to the end of the World War I, such anxieties pointed to the fears about Western global decline based on the proposition that races that had so far been submissive would begin to dream of throwing off white control and hence racial conflict would inevitably be directed against the status quo, that is, a world dominated by Western white races (Horne: 442: Furedi, 2).⁴⁹ While Japan's ability to mobilize significant regional and to a certain extent global support for its anti-Western propaganda until the early 1940s was a central cause to such fears, As Tinker maintains, before the Second World War “hardly anyone in the West questioned this conclusion: the whites were insisting that there was a problem created by the non-whites who were trying to invade their domain and not accepting the leadership of the whites” -and even in the 1970s there was a conviction among many in the U.S. and Europe that there is a “Negro problem” or an “Asian problem,” (Tinker, 1977: 131).

By early 20th century, Japan was perceived to represent a potential disruption for the international racial balance. The reactions of American and British diplomats to the victory of Japan against Russia in 1905 was informed by racial calculations as they thought that this was neither simply a conflict between two nations, nor a local triumph of one nation over another, but a victory with global implications, of the Mongolian people over the European (Vincent, 1984: 240). Accordingly, Japan's victory was thought to have implications for the entire white race, of which Russians were a part.⁵⁰

49 Horne claims that: “what was particularly upsetting to these influential racial theorists was Russia’s defeat at the hands of Japan; in retrospect they probably would agree with the assertion that this development served to inaugurate the 'general crisis of white supremacy,' not only because it signaled the rise of a legitimate Asian power but, as well, it signaled monumental changes in Russia that were to shake the very foundations of colonialism in Africa and Asia.”

50 The overreaction in Europe to Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 was part of a general crisis of

As racial conflict both within the U.S. and in a transnational sense seemed inevitable, any clashes between whites and people of color were thought to have far-reaching consequences based on the assumption that a blow to any section of the white race by people of color would weaken the existing balance of racial power (Furedi, 30). A British Foreign Office document concedes that “Japan is the only non-white first class power, but, however powerful Japan may eventually become, the white races will never be able to admit her equality” (quoted in Furedi, 30). That Western powers were not ready to accept the principle that all people, regardless of their race would be treated equally became evident in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 when Japan proposed that the clause in the League of Nations' Covenant providing for religious equality should be extended to include the equality of races was rejected, strongly by the Australia, Britain and the United States.

The dominant perspective of the period was based on the presupposition that relations between races necessarily implied the domination of one by the other so that a racial threat was perceived to be more dangerous than a conflict between white nations. However, it should also be noted that although the white consensus remained reasonably solid in relation to the colonial world, white solidarity had more the character of an

confidence in Europe's institutions and values, so part of the interwar pessimism and integral to the narratives of the “decline of the West” back then, but also was experienced as a racial decline. A well known example of reports reflecting the perceptions of the decline of white prestige is George Orwell's *Shooting an Elephant*, where he describes the experience of a minor colonial officer, possibly himself, that was called to kill a rampaging elephant: “And it was at this moment, as I stood there with the rifle in my hands, that I first grasped the hollowness, the futility of the white man's domination in the East. Here I was, the white man with his gun, standing in front of the unarmed crowd -seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd puppet punched to and fro by the will of the yellow faces behind. I perceived in this moment that when white man turns tyrant, it is his own freedom that he destroys.” (1950:6)

informal convention, an intellectual and ideological response to events rather than a formal principle, and it was subject to the effects of the contradictions in great power interests (Furedi, 32-37). Nevertheless, although white powers did not always act in solidarity, the principal of Western racial superiority was not questioned and it guided the informal and formal actions of white diplomats and politicians: “The Anglo-American elites showed little inclination to advertise their sense of superiority. Rather they felt that if equality was accepted, the system of discrimination which underpinned the prevailing global order would become discredited and eventually undermined” (43). The principle was enshrined in the conventions of the international order until at least the late 1930s. According to Hedley Bull, by the time the First World War broke out, “with the important partial exception of Japan, those racially and culturally non-European states that enjoyed formal independence labored under the stigma of inferior status: unequal treaties, extraterritorial jurisdiction, denial of racial equality.” Bull adds that this situation continued more or less intact until after Second World War. For instance, the League of Nations Mandate System can be seen as an example of how racial hierarchies reflect on the organization of the international system: the Mandate system established a three-tiered system of administration in order to integrate former German and Ottoman colonies in the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific into the international system as sovereign states, categorizing them as A, B, or C tier mandates supposedly based on their degree of “development” but also closely paralleling the global racial hierarchies of the period (Anghie 2004). Therefore, in the interwar years, on the one hand the assumptions of white superiority were accompanied by an implicit assumption of differential

treatment of members of different races by Western powers, and on the other hand especially after the First World War, witnessing the erosion of white solidarity among the warring parties,⁵¹ those assumptions of white superiority were threatened, and the consensus among the whites seemed more troubled.

In that framework, Japan's call for inclusion of racial equality in 1919 raised concerns about the consequences regarding white-black relations in the United States and the management of the colonies in Great Britain. Both British and U.S. military intelligence took careful note of an editorial in Marcus Garvey's newspaper, *Negro World*, which said as much: "With the rising militarism of Asia and the standing militarism of Europe one can foresee nothing else but an armed clash between the white and yellow races. When this clash of millions comes, an opportunity will have presented itself to the Negro people of the world to free themselves. ...The next war will be between the Negroes and the whites, unless our demands for justice are recognized. With Japan to fight with us we can win such a war." (Horne: 449). That after appearing to champion racial equality Japan garnered enthusiastic support from Africa and Asia, and emerged as a potential leader of anti-imperialist resistance did not help matters either.⁵²

In the United States, in addition to the concerns about how Japan would interfere in the

51 Apparently, employment of colonial troops in the War was a big part of the sense of anxiety about the decline of both white solidarity and white prestige. More than forty years after the end of war, The British Prime Minister Harold McMillan maintains: "what the two wars did was to destroy the prestige of the white people. For not only did the yellows and blacks watch them tear each other apart, committing the most frightful crimes and acts of barbarism against each other, but they actually saw them enlisting each their own yellows and blacks to fight other Europeans, other whites. It was bad enough for the white men to fight each other, but it was worse when they brought in their dependents. (quoted in Furedi, 40)
Need further research on that.

52 Dubois writes in 1935: "Japan is regarded by all colored peoples as their logical leader, as the one non-white nation which has escaped for ever the dominance and exploitation of the white world." (p. 85)

domestic racial politics through their relations with African-Americans in the U.S. there were also concerns about how domestic racial conflicts would undermine the United States' ability to influence world affairs (Myrdal 1944). Therefore, rather than being limited either to the domestic or to the international politics, such anxieties in particular, and the racial thinking of the era in general reveal the mutual constituency of the domestic and international levels in the formation of racial ideas and politics. In response to such fears and in relation to the acceptance that racial conflict was inevitable, strict immigration controls to keep the Orientals at bay were espoused on both sides of the Atlantic, and where different races had to live in close proximity segregation was the common solution to keep the different races separate. The development of the trope of yellow peril in Europe and in the United States should be contextualized and understood within this backdrop of the racialized world order.

In a very general sense the idea of yellow peril denotes the danger to Western civilization that was believed to be coming from the expansion of the power and influence of eastern Asian peoples. The yellow peril discourse orders the peoples and phenomena of the Far Eastern "Orient" into a modal moral logic such that positions Asians and Asian Americans as members of a single conceptual group or abstract category toward whom there is a collective or shared attitude (Lyman, 687). In other words, it can be analyzed as an example of race prejudice because it identifies the individual or the members of an aggregate with the conceptualized object and then reflects the attitude that one has towards the group onto the individual. Lyman maintains that in the matter of the yellow peril, the Asian aggregate, or some subsegment of it, e.g.

the Chinese or the Japanese, are feared because the dominant group, or more specifically, its spokespersons, leaders, intellectuals etc. believes that the particular element of the Asian aggregate is not keeping to its appropriately subordinated place but threatens to claim the opportunities and privileges from which it has been excluded; and even more fearsome is the belief, or sense that the Asian aggregate or its subset is a threat to the status, security, and welfare of the dominant ethnic group (687). Okihiro points out that “the idea of yellow peril does not derive solely from the alleged threat posed by the yellow race to the white race and their 'holiest possessions -civilization and Christianity- but from non-white People as a collective group, and their contestation of white supremacy” (1994: 120).

Raymond Leslie Buell's article “Again the Yellow Peril” in *Foreign Affairs* from 1923 provides a representative example of the racial thinking intrinsic in the period, as well as illustrating how the trope of yellow peril functioned in effecting racial ideas and politics at the intersection of the domestic and the international.⁵³ He opens the article by the following remarks:

Racial antagonism resembles justice in one respect if in no other: it may sleep but it never dies. The conflict of color is resurgent in the Dominions of the British Empire where Asiatic immigration is still a problem, and in the Crown Colony of Kenya where Hindus, Britishers and blacks are agitated over “racial equality.” It is resurgent in the United States, whether in the case of the negro, the Indian, or the Japanese. In a domestic sense, the Oriental problem in the United States is relatively unimportant. Contrasted with the million negroes and 250,000 Indians, there are less than 150,000 Japanese in the United States. But from the international standpoint the problem may become one of considerable magnitude. The Japanese cannot be called an “inferior” people as is done with the Indians and the negroes; and they, alone of the color groups in this country, are

⁵³ Raymond Leslie Buell was an influential figure in that period; Harvard Professor, president of the Foreign Policy Association, and author of one of the early textbooks on International Relations in 1925. I deal with the question of racial thinking in the early twentieth century, especially in the discipline of IR more extensively in Chapter 3.

represented by a sensitive and powerful government abroad (Buell 1923: 295-96)

Buell maintains that the international dimensions of the relations between the US and Japan, such as the Open Door, naval bases, spheres of influence etc are of interest only to the diplomats, rear-admirals and big business men whereas from the popular standpoint of the people in the U.S. and Japan the most important factors in the Oriental problem concern immigration and the treatment of Japanese in the United States (296). Particularly alarmed about the anti-Japanese campaigns in the Pacific Coast like the one to “Keep California White,” Buell views the future relations of the United States and the Orient to be determined by the attitude of the Pacific Coast toward the Japanese immigrants. Nevertheless, he obviously does not see the problem as limited to be merely a domestic issue, i.e. assimilation or management of an immigrant group. Referring to the occasions where the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Japan had been strained, such as during the propositions for school segregation in San Francisco, he counsels that although the present attitude of the Japanese government was more restricted than it had been in the past, “the diplomatic aspect of the controversy is by no means ended. If Japan is silent, it is the calm before the storm. It is impossible to believe that the two great powers of the Pacific can live together in permanent peace if this agitation continues indefinitely.” (304).

The solution to the problem of increasing immigration of the Japanese laborers into the United States, which if unrestricted, warns Buell “would wipe out American standards of living, eventually reduce us to the economic level of the Oriental, and implant an alien and half-breed race on our soil which might make the negro problem

look white” (307), then can be neither unilateral exclusion laws, nor informal agreements such as the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907, but it needs to be an exclusion treaty reached by mutual discussion, agreement, and understanding that places equal responsibility to enforce on both parties. Such a treaty, prohibiting future Japanese immigration, but also repealing the existing discriminatory legislation imposed on the Japanese in the U.S. and even making Japanese residents eligible to citizenship, nevertheless, concludes Buell “would establish the principle that the segregation of races of different color is necessary, as far as laboring masses are concerned, not because of racial inferiority but because of racial difference” (309).

Published right before the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924⁵⁴, which completely excluded immigrants from Asia, Buell's article provides a good snapshot of some of the intricate and underemphasized aspects of the question of race in the early twentieth century as well as foreshadowing some of the ways in which the trope of yellow peril continues to be affective in later eras. Beyond showing how the imminence of racial conflict was commonly accepted and how the existence of “alien-races” posed a problem for American living standards -all to be resurfacing in the debates about the rise of China-, this article also reveals how a problem such as the Japanese immigrants in the U.S. could not be seen merely as a domestic issue, but as an international one not only because the Japanese, different from other racial groups in the U.S. were represented by a

54 “The 1924 Immigration Act also included a provision excluding from entry any alien who by virtue of race or nationality was ineligible for citizenship. Existing nationality laws dating from 1790 and 1870 excluded people of Asian lineage from naturalizing. As a result, the 1924 Act meant that even Asians not previously prevented from immigrating – the Japanese in particular – would no longer be admitted to the United States. Many in Japan were very offended by the new law, which was a violation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Japanese government protested, but the law remained, resulting in an increase in existing tensions between the two nations.” <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/ImmigrationAct>

“sensitive and powerful government abroad” but also because the ambitions of this same government for prominence in the international scene was thought to be constituting a danger against white supremacy.

A major claim of the present chapter is that the images and anxieties associated with the trope of yellow peril endures in the debates about the rise of China and analyzing those can be helpful in deciphering the more subtle ways in which racial ideas and processes of racialization operate in the contemporary world. Indeed, during the course of its becoming embedded in the Western imagination, the yellow peril trope seems to be capable of accommodating shifting objects and focus as it could be extended to diverse political units such as Japan, China, North Korea and Vietnam. After the Second World War, the communist takeover of China in 1949, the Korean War, and the subsequent Cold War China replaced Japan as the embodiment of the yellow peril (Zhou and Gatewood, 2000). Rather than having a literally defined object and articulating the same characteristics of population groups as signifying threats, those shifts in the objects as well as the fractures in the narratives of the yellow peril trope help us understand how racialization processes work by accommodating complex and shifting configurations of the biological, cultural and political through attaching racial meanings to different issues and constituting different groups of people as racial others. Those different configurations also show how racial thinking can operate both as a more offensive strategy based on feelings of supremacy and as a defensive strategy against the historically and contingently defined “threats” depending on the particular configurations of social forces both domestically and internationally. As such, the yellow peril shows

that neither is the realm of international politics free of the affects of racial thinking nor the domestic racial injustices and discriminations are independent of the international perceptions of decline or threats against the existing distribution of power.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The present dissertation started with a seemingly simple question: what is the role of race in contemporary International Relations? In no time this question proved to be not so simple at all. The discipline of International Relations was mostly silent about race and did not offer any conceptual tools to think about race in international politics. It looked like racial hierarchies and discriminations existed only within the context of domestic politics, whereas the international realm was defined by the sovereign equality of all states, and decolonization brought about the end of racial and imperial inequalities in the international realm, at least for the mainstream IR.

When the long historical entrenchment of the idea of race is taken into consideration, the claim that acceptance of international norms of racial equality would change global racial hierarchies and erase the effects of experiences of imperialism and colonialism seemed naïve at best. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, the racial order is so entrenched that one cannot think of self and others without reference to race. Chapter 2 traces the historical lineages of the notion of race and the ways in which race has been thought through Western modernity, and I found that racial categorizations were constructed by translating human difference to racial difference through the interpretation of the colonial experience, rationality and empiricism. The resulting racialized identities of self and other heavily depended on and bore the marks of a Western sense of superiority, that articulated diverse markers such as Christian, civilized, and white together in constituting the Western/non-Western or white/non-white dichotomies. Yet,

entrenched though is the racialized order of modernity, racial categorizations reveal considerable fluidity across and within different socio-political systems. Even in the U.S. that is still dominated by the black/white dichotomy, despite the significant presence of Hispanic and Asian Americans, who is considered to be white changed historically. Elsewhere, intermediate categories indicating variations between lighter and darker skin tones revealed a less strict, though no less inegalitarian, conceptions of race. Thus, in order to understand how racial categories are constructed and change, and how they affect international politics, I turned to critical race theories and the concept of racialization, as a dynamic process of construction. Focusing on the processes of social construction of race, racialization allows us to see how racial categorizations are fluid and open to change through social constructions, i.e. even if the idea of race still prevails, how can racial categorizations change in terms of both who is included in which groups and how these groups are defined through processes of racialization.

Turning back to the discipline of International Relations in Chapter 3, I found that scholars of IR approached questions of race and racial difference based on the political historical context. While questions of race and imperialism were central to the discipline in the early twentieth century, those concerns disappeared in the aftermath of World War II, not only because of the increasing affiliation of the discipline with the rising power of the U.S. but also due to the epistemological and political concerns of the scholars themselves. In the post-WW II era, the disappearance of race from IR was accompanied by decentering questions of imperialism in the discipline, as well as by the status-quo orientation of Realism. I showed how the fundamental concepts of the discipline, such as

anarchy and sovereignty contributes to silencing race by imagining the world order through implicitly racialized hierarchies while still clinging to the concept of anarchy.

In chapter 4, I put the concept of racialization to work in order to understanding the increasing targeting of Muslims on the basis of their religious affiliation after September 11 in the United States context. I argued that, this targeting cannot be understood solely as Islamophobia, but that Islamophobia as a form of racism is an outcome of the processes of racialization that Muslims have historically been subject to. Racialization, by grouping Muslims into a single category, and by attributing essentialized characteristics to the individual Muslims, such as an innate disposition to violence, at the same time rendered them vulnerable to racism.

Chapter 5, turns to the debates about the rise of China in the last three decades. Accordingly, I analyzed the academic and political discourses about the rise China that revealed certain anxieties. I argued that the sense of uneasiness regarding the rise of China, cannot be explained only by referring to the analyses of material aspects of power politics among the states. Without analyzing how racialization still operates to construct identities and difference we cannot fathom the worries that rise of China evokes in the Western world. Therefore I analyze the debates about the rise of China as a process of racialization that construct China/Chinese as a a cultural other, whose innate characteristics such as irrationality or untrustworthiness make them a source of internal and external threats. I argue that both in the scholarly debates about and the policy responses to the rise of China, China is constructed as a “racial other” that is inevitably different and incompatible with the principles of the contemporary liberal international

order. It is this racial otherness of China that underlies and explains why the possibility of China dominating the international system is such a frightening prospect for the western liberal order.

Arguably, the main finding of the dissertation is that processes of racialization still operate at the core of international politics through constituting identities and framing the perceptions of threat, as well as limiting the possibilities of transforming the liberal international order into a more inclusive one. Structurally and productively, racialization produces subjects as bounded by their religious or cultural affiliations, limits the possibilities of inclusion and legitimizes violence against such racialized subjects.

In the last couple of months as I was finishing the dissertation, several events led me to think about future research directions. Among those are the apparent return to more explicit language of racism, as can be seen both in the U.S. presidential elections and the repercussions of the Brexit vote, and the increasing anti-Muslim anti-immigrant sentiments in Western countries. At the same time, Islamic State seems to be presenting a bigger challenge not just for the Western world but for Muslims as well than any other similar organization did.

As alarming as these tendencies are, I think they collaborate the argument that the racial understanding of the world is so deeply entrenched that they can come back easily in terms of perceived crisis. Yet, this coming back is always conditioned by the current dynamics of the socio-political contexts as well. In that vein whether this return to explicit racism is just a transitional phenomenon or signifies a deeper change in the contemporary order is a big question. Another big question is how similar and/or

different forms these returns would reveal to be in relation to the turbulent history of race and racialization in the twentieth century. This dissertation prepares the ground for future research into the conditions of possibility and the consequences of constructing racial others through a more explicitly racist language for international politics.

Bibliography

- Abbas, T. (2004). After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and the state. *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 21 (3), 26-38.
- Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2007). Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7(3), 287-312.
- Agathangelou A. M. (2004). *The Global Political Economy of Sex: Desire, Violence and Insecurity in Mediterranean Nation States*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Agathangelou, A. M., & Ling, L. H. (2004). Power, borders, security, wealth: Lessons of violence and desire from September 11. *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(3), 517-538.
- Agathangelou, A. M., & Ling, L. H. (2004). The house of IR: from family power politics to the poisons of worldism. *International Studies Review*, 6(4), 21-49.
- Ahmad, M. I. (2004). A rage shared by law: Post-September 11 racial violence as crimes of passion. *California Law Review*, 92(5), 1259-1330.
- Akram, S. M. (2002). The aftermath of September 11, 2001: The targeting of Arabs and Muslims in America. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 61-118.
- Akram, S. M., & Johnson, K. R. (2004). Race and civil rights pre-September 11, 2001: The targeting of Arabs and Muslims. *Civil rights in peril: The targeting of Arabs and Muslims*, 9-25.
- Alexander, M. (2012) *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*. The New Press.
- Allen C (2010) *Islamophobia*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Allen, T. W. (1994). *The invention of the White race*, vol. 1. London and New York: Verso.
- Allen, T. W. (1997). *The invention of the white race: The origin of racial oppression in Anglo-America* (Vol. 2). Verso.
- Anghie, A (2006) "Decolonizing the Concept of 'Good Governance'" in B. Gruffydd (ed) *Decolonizing International Relations*. Rowman and Littlefield.

- Anghie, A. (2000). "Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspective" *Villanova Law Review*, 45:5, 887-911
- Anievas, A., Manchanda, N., & Shilliam, R. (2014). *Race and racism in international relations: confronting the global colour line*. Routledge.
- Ansell, E. (1997). *New Right New Racism: Race and Reaction in the United States and Britain*. New York: New York University Press.
- Arendt, H. (1973). *The origins of totalitarianism*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Asad, T. (1993). *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Islam and Christianity*. John Hopkins University Press.
- Ashworth, L. M. (2002). Did the realist-idealist great debate really happen? A revisionist history of international relations. *International Relations*, 16(1), 33-51.
- Balibar, E. (1991) "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'" in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein *Race, Nation Class: Ambiguous Identities*, London, New York: Verso.
- Banks, W. C. (1999). LA Eight and Investigation of Terrorist Threats in the United States, *The Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.*, 31, 479.
- Banton, M. (1967). *Race relations*. Tavistock publications.
- Barber, B. (2002) 'Democracy and Terror in the Era of Jihad vs. McWorld', in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Barker, M. (1982) *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe*. Maryland: University Publications of America
- Bartelson, J. (1995). *A genealogy of sovereignty*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bayoumi, M. (2009). *How does it feel to be a problem?: Being young and Arab in America*. Penguin Paperbacks.
- Bell (2013) "Race and International Relations: Introduction" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* , 26:1. pp.1-4
- Bhattacharyya G., Gabriel J. and Small, S. (2002) *Race and Power: Global Racism in the Twenty-first Century*, London and New York: Routledge

- Bially-Mattern J. and Zarakol, A. (2016). Hierarchies in World Politics. *International Organization*, 70(3), 623.
- Biswas, S. "‘Nuclear Apartheid’ as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?" *Alternatives*, 26:1, pp. 485-522
- Blakeslee, G. H. (1910). "Introduction" *The Journal of Race Development*, 1: 1, pp 1-4
- Blaney, D. L. and N. Inayatullah (2004). *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*. New York: Routledge.
- Bleich, E. (2011). What is Islamophobia and how much is there? Theorizing and measuring an emerging comparative concept. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55(12), 1581-1600.
- Bonnett, A. (1997). Geography, ‘race’ and whiteness: invisible traditions and current challenges. *Area*, 29(3), 193-199.
- Bonnett, A. (1998). Who was white? The disappearance of non-European white identities and the formation of European racial whiteness. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 21(6), 1029-1055.
- Bracken, "Philosophy and Racism," *Philosophic!* 7 (1978): 241-60
- Brodin, K. (1998). *How Jews became white folks and what that says about race in America*. Rutgers University Press.
- Broome, R. (2002). *Aboriginal Australians: Black responses to white dominance 1788-2001* (3rd ed.) Crowsnest, Australia: Allen & Unwin
- Brown M., O.R. Cote et. Al (2000) *The Rise of China*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Buell, R. L. (1923). Again the yellow peril. *Foreign Aff.*, 2, 295.
- Buell, Raymond Leslie (1925) *International Relations*. New York; Henry Holt and Company.
- Buchan, B. (2002). Explaining war and peace: Kant and liberal IR theory. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(4), 407-428.
- Bunche, R. J. (1968). *A world view of race*. Kennikat Press.
- Buzan, B., & Cox, M. (2013). China and the US: Comparable cases of ‘peaceful rise’?.

The Chinese Journal of International Politics.

Callahan, W. A. (2005). How to understand China: the dangers and opportunities of being a rising power. *Review of International Studies*, 31(04), 701-714.

Jason, B. (2003). *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*. IB Tauris.

Cainkar, L. (2006). The social construction of difference and the Arab American experience. *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 25(2/3), 243-278.

Campbell D. (1992) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Chakrabarty, D. (2000) *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chomsky, N. (1975). *The logical structure of linguistic theory*.

Chowdhry, G. and Sheila N. (eds) (2002) *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations* London and New York: Routledge

Çirakman, A. (2002). *From the "terror of the World" to the "sick Man of Europe": European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth* (Vol. 43). Peter Lang.

Cole, D., & Dempsey, J. X. (2006). *Terrorism and the constitution: Sacrificing civil liberties in the name of national security*. The New Press.

Connell, Raewyn (2007). *Southern Theory*. Cambridge UK: Polity Press.

Cox R. W. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10(2), 1981: 126-155.

Cox, R. W. (1992). Multilateralism and world order. *Review of International Studies*, 18(02), 161-180.

Cox, R. W. (Ed.). (1997). *The new realism: Perspectives on multilateralism and world order*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Crawford, R. M. (2001). *International relations--still an American social science?: Toward Diversity in International Thought*. SUNY Press.

Darby, P. and Paolini A.J. (1994) "Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism," *Alternatives*, 19:3, pp.371-97

- De Carvalho, B., Leira, H., & Hobson, J. M. (2011). The Big Bangs of IR: the myths that your teachers still tell you about 1648 and 1919. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 39(3) 735–758.
- Denoeux, G. (2002). The forgotten swamp: navigating political Islam. *Middle East Policy*, 9(2), 56.
- Der Derian, J. (1987) *On Diplomacy*, Oxford and New York; Blackwell.
- Diderot, D., Mason, J. H., & Wokler, R. (1992). *Diderot: Political Writings*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dikotter F. (1992) *The discourse of race in modern China*. Stanford University Press.
- Diouf S. (1998) *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas*. NYU Press.
- Doty, R. (1993) “The Bounds of Race in International Relations” *Millennium*, 22:3, pp.443-61
- Doty, R. (1996) *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Doyle, C. (1996). Antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996: A summary. *Congressional Research Service American Law Division*, 3.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1915). *The African Roots of War...* National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
- Duckitt, J. (1992). *The Social Psychology of Prejudice*. New York: Praeger Publishers
- Duffield, M. (2001). *Global Governance and the New Wars*, London and New York: Zed Books
- Duffield, M. (2006). “Racism, migration and development: the foundations of planetary order” *Progress in Development Studies*, 6, pp. 68-79
- Dunn, K. M, N. Klocker, and T. Sabaya (2007) “Contemporary Racism and Islamophobia in Australia” in *Ethnicities* 7:4, pp. 564-589
- Durrheim, K. and Dixon J. (2004). “Attitudes in the fiber of everyday life: The discourse of racial evolution and lived experiences of desegregation” *American Psychologist*, 59, pp. 626-636

- ed. Mary R. Lefkowitz, Guy MacLean Rogers, 1996 University of North Carolina Press.
- Eigen, S., & Larrimore, M. (2006). *The German Invention of Race*. SUNY Press.
- El Arabiya News (25 March 2010) *UN rights body passes Islamophobia resolution*
Available at: <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/03/25/104041.html>
- Emerson, R. (1962). Pan-Africanism. *International Organization*, 16(02), 275-290.
- Esposito, J. L. (1994). Political Islam: Beyond the green menace. *Current History*, 93(579).
- Esposito, J. L., & Voll, J. O. (1996). *Islam and democracy*. Oxford University Press
- Eze, E. C. (Ed.). (1997). *Race and the enlightenment: A reader*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Fanon, F., & Sartre, J. P. (1963). *The wretched of the earth*.
- Ford, G. (1991). *Committee of inquiry on racism and xenophobia: Report of Findings of the Inquiry*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community
- Fox, W. T. R. (Ed.). (1959). *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*. University of Notre Dame Press.
- Fredrickson, G. M. (2002). *Racism: A short history*. Princeton University Press.
- Furedi, F. (1998). *The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race*, New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press
- Garner, S., & Selod, S. (2014). The racialization of Muslims: empirical studies of Islamophobia. *Critical Sociology*.
- Gill, S. (1997). Transformation and innovation in the study of world order. *Innovation and transformation in international studies*, 5-24.
- Gilroy, P. (1998). Race ends here. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 21(5), 838-847.
- Gilroy, P. (2004) *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?*, Routledge: Abingdon.
- Goldberg D. T. (1993) *Racist Culture: Philosophy and Politics of Meaning*. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Goldberg, D. T. (1993). Modernity, race, and morality. *Cultural Critique*, (24), 193-227.

- Gomez, M. A. (2005). *Black crescent: the experience and legacy of African Muslims in the Americas*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gong, G. W. (1984). *The standard of civilization in international society*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Gott, G. (2000). "Critical Race Globalism?: Global Political Economy, and the Intersections of Race, Nation and Class" *U.C. Davis Law Review*, 15:3, pp.1503-1519
- Gott, G. (2005). Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law, *The Vill. L. Rev.*, 50, 1073.
- Graham. L. B, 25 March 2010. "No to an international blasphemy law." *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/25/blasphemy-law-ad-hoc-committee>
- Greenblatt, S. (1992). *Marvelous possessions: The wonder of the New World*. OUP Oxford.
- Grovogui, S. N. (2001). "Come to Africa: A Hermeneutics of Race in International Theory," *Alternatives*, 26, pp.425-448
- Grovogui, S. N. Z. (1996). *Sovereigns, quasi sovereigns, and Africans: Race and self-determination in international law* (Vol. 3). U of Minnesota Press.
- Guilhot, N. (2014). Imperial Realism: Post-War IR Theory and Decolonisation. *The International History Review*, 36(4), 698-720.
- Guinier, L., & Torres, G. (2002). The ideology of colorblindness. *The Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy*, 38-39.
- Hagopian, E. (1975). Minority rights in a nation-state: The Nixon Administration's campaign against Arab-Americans. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 5(1/2), 97-114.
- Hall, M. and Jackson P. T. (2007) "Introduction: Civilizations and International Relations Theory" in Hall. M and Jackson, P. T. (eds) *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of 'Civilizations' in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hall, S. (1992). The West and the Rest: Discourse and power. *The Indigenous Experience: Global Perspectives*, 165-173.

- Halliday, F. (1999). "Islamophobia" reconsidered. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22, 892-902.
- Hanes Walton, Jr., and Robert C. Smith, (2012) *American Politics and African American Quest for Universal Freedom*, 6th ed. New York: Long-man.
- Hannaford, I. (1996). *Race: The history of an idea in the West*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered," *Columbia Law Review* 48, no. 3 (1948): 350
- Haqqani, H. (2002). Islam's medieval outposts. *Foreign Policy*, (133), 58.
- Harding, H (1995) "The Concept of "Greater China": Themes, Variations and Reservations," in David Shambaugh, ed.. *Greater China: The Next Superpower?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Herz, J. H. (1951). *Political realism and political idealism, a study in theories and realities*. University of Chicago Press.
- Hesse, B. (2007). Racialized modernity: An analytics of white mythologies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(4), 643-663.
- Hobson (2014) Re-Embedding the Global Colour Line within Post-1945 International Theory. Anievas, A., Manchanda, N., & Shilliam, R. (eds.) *Race and racism in international relations: confronting the global colour line*. Routledge.
- Hobson, J. M. (2007). Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? Beyond Westphalian towards a post-racist critical IR. *Review of International Studies*, 33(S1), 91-116.
- Hobson, J. M. (2012). *The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760-2010*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, J. M., & Sharman, J. C. (2005). The enduring place of hierarchy in world politics: Tracing the social logics of hierarchy and political change. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(1), 63-98.
- Hoffmann, S. (1977). An American social science: international relations. *Daedalus*, 41-60
- Holloway, J. S. (2003). *Confronting the Veil: Abram Harris Jr., E. Franklin Frazier, and Ralph Bunche, 1919-1941*. Univ of North Carolina Press.

- Horne, G. (1999). Race from power: US foreign policy and the general crisis of “white supremacy”. *Diplomatic History*, 23(3), 437-461.
- Howell, S., & Shryock, A. (2003). Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America's " War on Terror". *Anthropological Quarterly*, 76(3), 443-462.
- Human Security Report 2005. Human Security Center, available at : <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2005/overview.aspx>
- Hunt, M. (1987) *Ideology and the US Foreign Policy*, New Heaven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). If not civilizations, what? Paradigms of the post-cold war world. *Foreign affairs*, 186-194.
- Ibrahim, M. (2005). “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse” *International Migration*, 43:5, pp. 163-187
- Ibrahim, N. (2008). Origins of Muslim Racialization in US Law, The. *UCLA J. Islamic & Near EL*, 7, 121.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the West: can the liberal system survive?. *Foreign affairs*, 23-37.
- Ismail, S. (2006). *Rethinking Islamist politics: Culture, the state and Islamism*. IB Tauris.
- Jackson, A. (1830) *The State of the Nation Address*, available at: <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=25&page=transcript>
- Jackson, R. (2007). Constructing enemies: ‘Islamic terrorism’ in political and academic discourse. *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), 394-426.
- Jackson, R. (2007). Playing the politics of fear: Writing the terrorist threat in the war on terrorism. George Kassimeris (ed.), *Playing Politics With Terrorism*. Columbia University Press, 176-202.
- Jackson, S. A. (2005). *Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking toward the third resurrection*. Oxford University Press.
- Jamal, A. and N. Naber (2008). *Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Subjects to Visible Citizens*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Jenkins, B. M. (1998). Will terrorists go nuclear? A reappraisal. Harvey Kushner (ed.) *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, SAGE Publications.

- Johnston, A. I. (1995). Thinking about strategic culture. *International security*, 19(4), 32-64.
- Jones, B. G. (2006). *Decolonizing international relations*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Jones, B. G. (2008). "Race in the Ontology of International Order" *Political Studies*, 56, pp.907-927
- Jordan, J., & Boix, L. (2004). Al-Qaeda and western Islam1. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(1), 1-17.
- Kahler, M. (1997). Inventing international relations: international relations theory after 1945. *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, 20-53.
- Kaplan, M. (1957). *System and process in international relations*. Huntington, NY: Krieger.
- Kaplan, J. (2006). Islamophobia in America? September 11 and Islamophobic hate crime. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18, 1-33.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics*. Columbia University Press.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (2012). *Anglo-America and its discontents: Civilizational identities beyond west and east*. Routledge.
- Kawai, Y. (2005). Stereotyping Asian Americans: The dialectic of the model minority and the yellow peril. *The Howard Journal of Communications*, 16(2), 109-130.
- Kazmi, Z. A. (2004). Discipline and power: interpreting global Islam: a review essay. *Review of International Studies*, 30(02), 245-254.
- Kellner, D. (1995). The US media and the 1993 war against Iraq. *The US media and the Middle East: Image and perception*, (46), 105.
- Kemp, B. J. (2006). *Ancient Egypt: anatomy of a civilization*. Psychology Press.
- Kennedy, P. (1987). *The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers*. New York.
- Kinder, D. R. (1986). "The continuing American dilemma: White resistance to racial change 40 years after Myrdal." *Journal of Social Issues*, 42, pp.151-171.
- Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). "Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40, pp.

414–431.

Klotz, A. (1995). Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and US sanctions against South Africa. *International Organization*, 49(03), 451-478.

Klotz, A. (1999). *Norms in international relations: The struggle against apartheid*. Cornell University Press.

Krasner, S. D. (1993). Sovereignty, regimes, and human rights. *Regime theory and international relations*, 139-167.

Krasner, S. D. (1999). *Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy*. Princeton University Press.

Krishna, S. (2001) "Race, Amnesia and the Education of International Relations," *Alternatives*, 26, pp.401-424

Karim, H. Karim 2003. *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence*. Montreal: Black Rose Publisher

Kumar D (2012) *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire*. Haymarket Books

Kuruwila, M. C. (September 3, 2006) "9/11: Five years later TYPECASTING MUSLIMS AS A RACE," *San Fransisco Chronicle*..

Laffey M. and J. Weldes (1997) "Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations" in *European Journal of International Relations* 3:2, pp. 193-237.

Lake M. and H. Reynolds (2008) *Drawing the global colour line: White men's countries and the international challenge of racial equality*. Cambridge University Press.

Lake, D. (2003). The new sovereignty in international relations. *International studies review*, 5(3), 303-323.

Lake, D. (2009). *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Cornell University Press.

Lacquer, W. (1999). *The New Terrorism*. Oxford University Press.

Lauren, P. G. (1988). *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*. Westview Press.

Leach, C. W (2005) "Against the Notion of a 'New Racism'" *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 15, pp.432–445

Lee, S. A., Gibbons, J. A., Thompson, J. M., & Timani, H. S. (2009). The Islamophobia

Scale: Instrument development and initial validation. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 19 (2), 92-105

Lee, S. S. J., Mountain, J., Koenig, B., Altman, R., Brown, M., Camarillo, A., ... & Ford, R. (2008). The ethics of characterizing difference: guiding principles on using racial categories in human genetics. *Genome biology*, 9(7).

Lewis, B. (1971). *Race and color in Islam* (Vol. 1590). HarperCollins Publishers.

Lewis, B. (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 266(3), 47-60.

Lewis, B. (2003). *What went wrong?: the clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East*. Harper Collins.

Little, D. . (2002) *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press

Long, D. and B. C. Schmidt (eds.) (2005) *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*. State University of New York Press.

Long, D., & Wilson, P. (eds.). (1995). *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed*. Clarendon Press.

Lopez, I. H. (2013). *Dog Whistle Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Loveman, M. (1999). Is " Race" Essential?. *American Sociological Review*, 64(6), 891-898.

Lyman, S. M. (2000). The "yellow peril" mystique: Origins and vicissitudes of a racist discourse. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 13(4), 683-747.

MacMaster, N. (2003). Islamophobia in France and the "Algerian problem." In E. Qureshi & M. A. Sells (Eds.), *The new crusades: Constructing the Muslim enemy* (pp. 288-313). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Majid, A. (2004). *Freedom and orthodoxy: Islam and difference in the post-Andalusian age*. Stanford University Press.

Malik, K. (1996). *The meaning of race: Race, history and culture in Western society*. NYU Press.

Maliniak, D., Peterson, S., & Tierney, M. J. (2012). TRIP around the world: Teaching, research, and policy views of international relations faculty in 20 countries. *Report, The Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations*, The College of William

and Mary, VA.

Mamdani, M. (2004). *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*. Unisa Press.

Marr, T. (2006). *The cultural roots of American Islamicism*. Cambridge University Press.

Marx, A. W. (1998). *Making race and nation: A comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil*. Cambridge University Press..

McCoskey, D. E. (2012). *Race: antiquity and its legacy*. IB Tauris.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. WW Norton & Company.

Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2008). On Conceptualizing Islamophobia, Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Cultural Racism. *Thinking Thru 'Islamophobia'*, 34.

Mendelsohn, B. (2005) 'Sovereignty Under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al Qaeda Network', *Review of International Studies*, 31.

Miles, R. (1989) *Racism*. London: Routledge

Mills, C. W. (1997). *The racial contract*. Cornell University Press.

Milner, H. (1991). The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: A critique *Review of International Studies*, 17(1), 67-85.

Mishal, S., & Rosenthal, M. (2005). Al Qaeda as a dune organization: Toward a typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(4), 275-293.

Modood, T. (1999). New forms of Britishness: post-immigration ethnicity and hybridity in Britain. *The Expanding Nation: Towards A Multi-Ethnic Ireland*, 34..

Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. *International organization*, 51(04), 513-553.

Morefield, J. (2005). "A Liberal in a Muddle. *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*, 93.

Morgenthau H.(1948). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. New York, Knopf.

Mueller, J. E. (2006). *Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them*. Simon and Schuster.

- Murji, K. and J. Solomos (2005). "Racialization in Theory and Practice" in *Racialization Studies in Theory and Practice*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American dilemma, Volume 2: The Negro problem and modern democracy* (Vol. 2). Transaction Publishers.
- Naber, N. (2000). Ambiguous insiders: An investigation of Arab American invisibility. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(1), 37-61.
- Neumann I. B. (1999) *Uses of the Other: The "East" in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Neumann I. B. (1996) "Self and Other in International Relations" *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:2, pp. 139-174
- Newman, .S. and M. P. Levine (2006). "War, Politics and Race: Reflections on Violence in the 'War on Terror' " *Theoria* , 53:110, pp. 23-49
- O'Hagan, J. (2007). "Discourses of Civilizational Identity" in Hall. M and Jackson, P. T. (eds) *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of 'Civilizations' in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Okihiro, G. Y. (1994). Is yellow black or white?. *Margins and mainstreams: Asians in American history and culture*, 31, 33.
- Olson, W. C., & Groom, A. J. R. (1991). *International Relations then and now: Origins and trends in interpretation*. Routledge.
- Omi, M. and H. Winant (1994). *Racial Formation in the United States*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Omni, M., & Winant, H. (2006). Racial formations. *The social construction of difference and inequality: Race, class, gender, and sexuality*, 19-29.
- Osiander, A. "Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited," *ISQ* 42:3 (Sept. 1998) 409-432
- Pagden, A. (1993). *European encounters with the New World: from Renaissance to Romanticism*. Yale University Press.
- Paige, R. and E. Witty (2009) *The Black-White Achievement Gap: Why Closing It Is the Greatest Civil Rights*. Amacom.
- Panetta, L. (2012). Sustaining US global leadership: priorities for 21st century defense.

Washington, DC: US Department of Defense.

Pape, R. (2005). *Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism*. Random House.

Paz, R. (2001). Radical Islamist Terrorism: Points for pondering. *International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) Publication*.

Pearson, A. (1998). Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Return to Guilt by Association, *The Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.*, 24, 1185.

Persaud R. B. (2001) "Racial Assumptions in Global Labor Recruitment and Supply" in *Alternatives*, 26: pp.377-399

Persaud R. B. (2002). "Situating Race in International Relations: The Dialectics of Civilizational Security in American Immigration" in Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair (eds) *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations*, London and New York: Routledge

Persaud R.B. (1997) "Franz Fanon, Race and World Order" in S. Gill and J. H. Mittelman (eds) *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Persaud, R. B. and R.J.B. Walker (2001) "Apertura: Race in International Relations" *Alternatives*, 26, pp.373-376

Pipes, D. (2002) 'Who is the Enemy?', *Commentary*, 113: 1, available at: <http://www.danielpipes.org/article/103>

Poynting, S., & Mason, V. (2007). The resistible rise of Islamophobia. *Journal of Sociology*, 43, 61-86

Pratto, F., Liu, J. H., Levin, S., Sidanius, J., Shih, M., Bachrach, H., & Hegarty, P. (2000). Social dominance orientation and the legitimization of inequality across cultures. *Journal of cross-cultural psychology*, 31(3), 369-409.

Prince, S. (1993)'Celluloid heroes and smart bombs: Hollywood at war in the Middle East' *The Media and the Persian Gulf War*, ed. R. Denton Jr, New York, Praeger, pp. 235- 256

Rachlinski, J. J. and Parks, G. S. (2010) "Implicit Bias, Election '08, and the Myth of a Post-Racial America". *Cornell Law Faculty Publications*. Paper 178.

Rana, J. (2011). *Terrifying Muslims: Race and labor in the South Asian diaspora*. Duke University Press.

- Rattansi A. (2005) "The Uses of Racialization: The Time-Spaces and Subject-objects of the Raced Body" in Karim Murji and John Solomos (eds) *Racialization: Studies in Theory and Practice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rattansi, A. (1994) "Western Racisms, Ethnicities and Identities in a 'Postmodern' Frame," in A. Rattansi and S. Westwood (eds), *Racism, Modernity and Identity: on the Western Front*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Rattansi, A. (2007). *Racism: A very short introduction* (Vol. 161). Oxford University Press.
- Razack, S. (2008). *Casting out: The eviction of Muslims from Western law and politics*. University of Toronto Press.
- Reinsch, P. S. (1900). *World Politics at the end of the nineteenth century*. Macmillan.
- Rex, J. (1970). *Race Relations in Sociological Theory*.
- Roediger, D. R. (1991). *The wages of Whiteness. Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. London, New York.
- Roediger, D. R. (2008). *How race survived US history: From settlement and slavery to the Obama phenomenon*. Verso Books.
- Rosenau, J. N. (1970). *Race in international politics: a dialogue in five parts* (Vol. 2). University of Denver, Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of Internat. Studies.
- Said, E. W. (1981). Inside Islam. *How the press missed the story in Iran*. *Harper's*, 262, 25-32.
- Salaita, S. (2006) *Anti-Arab Racism in the USA*. London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
- Salter M. (2002) *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relation*. Pluto Press, London.
- Savage C. and Shane S. (1 July 2016) U.S. Reveals Death Toll From Airstrikes Outside War Zones. *The New York Times*. available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-reveals-death-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-zones.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur>
- Schorr, D. (2008). A new, "post-racial" political era in America. *National Public Radio*, 28.

- Semati, M. (2010). Islamophobia, Culture and race in the Age of Empire. *Cultural Studies*, 24, 256-275.
- Senate U.S. (1987) *Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Nomination of William Webster to be Director of Central Intelligence*, 100th Cong. 94-95
- Saxton, A. (2003). *The rise and fall of the white republic: Class politics and mass culture in nineteenth-century America*. Verso.
- Sayyid, S., & Vakil, A. (Eds.). (2010). *Thinking through Islamophobia: global perspectives*. Cinco Puntos Press.
- Schmidt, B. C. (1998). *The political discourse of anarchy: a disciplinary history of international relations*. SUNY Press.
- Schmidt, B. C. (2002). Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of a Discipline: American International Relations, Pluralist Theory and the Myth of Interwar Idealism. *International Relations*, 16(1), 9-31.
- Searle, J. R. (1976). A classification of illocutionary acts. *Language in society*, 5(01), 1-23.
- Semati, M. (2010). Islamophobia, culture and race in the age of empire. *Cultural Studies*, 24(2), 256-275.
- Shadid A. (2001) *Legacy of the Prophet--Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Shaheen, J. G. (1984). *The TV Arab*. Popular Press.
- Shaheen, J. G. (2003). Reel bad Arabs: How Hollywood vilifies a people. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 588(1), 171-193.
- Shepherd, G. W., & Le Melle, T. J. (Eds.). (1970). *Race among nations: a conceptual approach*. Heath Lexington Books..
- Shepperd G.W. (1969) *The Study of Race in American Foreign Policy and International Relations*. Denver: University of Denver Press.
- Sidanius, J and Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: an Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Silverstein, P. (2005) "Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration and Immigration in Europe" *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 34, pp. 363-384

- Smedley, A. (1998). " Race" and the construction of human identity. *American Anthropologist*, 690-702.
- Smedley, A., & Smedley, B. D. (2005). Race as biology is fiction, racism as a social problem is real: Anthropological and historical perspectives on the social construction of race. *American Psychologist*, 60(1), 16.
- Smith, S. (2000). The discipline of international relations: still an American social science?. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2(3), 374-402.
- Smith, S. (2002). The United States and the discipline of international relations: "hegemonic country, hegemonic discipline". *International Studies Review*, 4(2), 67-85.
- Snowden, F. (1983). Before Colour Prejudice. *The Ancient View of Blacks, London*.
- Snowden, Frank. (2014) "Bernal's Blacks and the Afrocentrists" In *Black Athena Revisited* Lefkowitz, M. R., & Rogers, G. M. (Eds.). UNC Press Books.
- Sprinzak, E. (1998). The great superterrorism scare. *Foreign Policy*, (112), 110-119.
- Squadrito, K. (1979). Racism and empiricism. *Behaviorism*, 7(1), 105-115.
- Steinberg, S. (1989). *The ethnic myth: Race, ethnicity, and class in America*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Stoddard, L. (1920). *The rising tide of color against white world-supremacy*. Scribner.
- Stolz, J. (2005). Explaining Islamophobia. A test of four theories based on the case of a Swiss city. *Swiss Journal of Sociology*, 31, 547-566.
- Suleiman, M. W. (1988). *The Arabs in the mind of America*. Amana Books.
- Sweet, F. W. (2005). *Legal history of the color line: The rise and triumph of the one-drop rule*. Backintyme.
- Taguieff P.A. (1990) "The New Cultural Racism in France," *Telos*, 83, pp. 109-22.
- Terry, J. (1985). Mistaken Identity: Arab stereotypes in American popular writing. *Washington, DC: American-Arab Affairs Council. United Nations (2001). Report on the Palestinian economy*.
- The UN Human Rights Council (2010). *Combating Defamation of Religions*. Resolution 7/19. available at:

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_19.pdf

Thompson, D. (2015) Through, Against and Beyond the National State: the Transnational Stratum of Race in Anievas, A., Manchanda, N., & Shilliam, R (eds). *Race and racism in international relations: confronting the global colour line*. Routledge.

Tickner, A. (2003). Seeing IR differently: notes from the Third World. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 32(2), 295-324.

Tickner, A. B., & Wæver, O. (Eds.). (2009). *International relations scholarship around the world*. Routledge.

Tinker H. (1977) *Race, Conflict and the International Order: From Empire to the United Nations*, London: Macmillan.

Todorov, T. (1984). *The conquest of America: The question of the other*. University of Oklahoma Press.

Torrers R.D., L. F. Miron, and J. X. Inda (eds) (1999) "Introduction" in *Race, Identity, and Citizenship*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Torres, R. D., Mirón, L. F., & Inda, J. X. (Eds.). (1999). *Race, identity and citizenship: a reader*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Turner, R. B. (2003). *Islam in the African-American experience*. Indiana University Press.

Valls, A. (2005). *Race and racism in modern philosophy*. Cornell University Press.

Van Dijk, T. (1987) *Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Van Dijk, T. (1992) "Discourse and the Denial of Racism" in *Discourse and Society*, 3, pp. 87-118.

Vincent, R. J. (1982). Race in international relations. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 658-670.

Vitalis, R. (2000). The graceful and generous liberal gesture: making racism invisible in American international relations. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 29(2), 331-356.

Vitalis, R. (2005). "Birth of a Discipline," David Long and Brian C. Schmidt(eds) *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*, Albany,

State University of New York Press

Vitalis, R. (2010). The noble American science of imperial relations and its laws of race development. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 52(04), 909-938.

Vucetic, S. (2011). *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations*. Stanford University Press.

Vucetic, S. (2014). Against Race Taboos in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line*.

Volpp, L. (2002). The citizen and the terrorist. *UCLA Law Review*, 49.

Wacquant L. (1997) "Towards and Analytic of Racial Domination" *Political Power and Social Theory* 11, pp. 221-34

Waever, O. (1998). The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in international relations. *International organization*, 52(04), 687-727.

Walker R. J. B. (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge University Press.

Waltz, K. (1959). *Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis*. Columbia University Press.

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of international relations*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Watson, H. (2001). "Theorizing the Racialization of Global Politics and the Caribbean Experience" *Alternatives*, 26:1, pp. 449-486

Wendt A. (1992) "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" *International Organization*, 46, pp.391-425

Wendt A. (1987) "Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory" *International Organization*, 41, pp. 335-370

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Wieworka M. (1994). "Racism in Europe: Unity and Diversity" in A. Rattansi and S. Westwood (eds), *Racism, Modernity and Identity: on the Western Front*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Winant H. (2004). *The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, Justice*,

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Winant, H. (2000). Race and race theory. *Annual review of sociology*, 169-185.

Winant, H. (2000). The theoretical status of the concept of race. *Theories of race and racism: A reader*, 181-90.

Winant, H. (2001). *The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War Two*. New York: Basic Books.

Winant, H. (2001). White racial projects. In Rasmussen, B. B. *The making and unmaking of whiteness*, Duke University Press. 97-112.

Winant, H. (2004). *The new politics of race: Globalism, difference, justice*. U of Minnesota Press.

Winant, H. (2006). Race and racism: Towards a global future. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29(5), 986-1003.

Zhou, M., & Gatewood, J. V. (2000). Mapping the terrain: Asian American diversity and the challenges of the twenty-first century. *Asian American Policy Review*, 9, 5-29.