

THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report
of
Committee on Examination

This is to certify that we the undersigned, as a committee of the Graduate School, have given Ruth Whitaker Hopson final oral examination for the degree of Master of Arts . We recommend that the degree of Master of Arts be conferred upon the candidate.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

.....1921

W. W. Dyer

.....
Chairman

W. S. Davis

J. B. ...

N. S. ...

UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report
of
Committee on Thesis

The undersigned, acting as a Committee of the Graduate School, have read the accompanying thesis submitted by Ruth Whitaker Hopson for the degree of Master of Arts. They approve it as a thesis meeting the requirements of the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

W. W. Dyle
Chairman
Wm Anderson
Bill Alvord

Date _____

THE POLICY OF THE
LIBERAL PARTY IN
REGARD TO IRELAND

June 1885

to

July 1886

Ruth Whitaker Hopson

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of

The Graduate School

of the

University of Minnesota

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements of the

Degree of

Master of Arts

June

1922

MOM
9H779
8

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DISCUSSION

APPENDIX

316927

JUL 3 1944 Bod. U. of M.

ERRATA

McIntoch should be Mackintosh.

Gwym & Tuckswell should be Gwynn & Tuckwell.

Bibliography.

Bibliography.

- Argyll, The Dowager Duchess of : George Douglass, Eighth Duke of Argyll. Vol. II.
London John Murray. 1906.
- Bartlett, E. Ashmead: Union or Separation.
Westminster. National Union. 1892.
- Boyd, Chas. W., (Editor): Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches.
Vol. I. 232-79.
London. Constable & Co., Ltd. 1914.
- Bryce, James (Editor): Handbook of Home Rule.
London. Kegan, Paul, Trench & Co. 1888.
- Churchill, Winston Spencer: Lord Randolph Churchill.
Vol. I 375-473.
New York. Macmillan Co. 1906.
- Davitt, Michael: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland. 473-508.
London. Harper & Bros. 1904.
- Dicey, A. V.: England's Case Against Home Rule.
London. John Murray. 1887.
- Elliot, Arthur D.: Life of George Joachim Goschen.
Vol. I, II 1-90.
London. Longmans, Green & Co. 1911.
- Eversley, Lord: Gladstone and Ireland. 269-315.
London. Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1912.
- Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond: Life of the Second Earl of Granville. Vol. II 449-89.
London. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1905.
- Gathorne-Hardy, Hon. Alfred E.: Gathorne-Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrook. Vol. II 214-54.
London. Longmans, Green & Co. 1910.

- Gladstone, W. E.: The Irish Question.
New York. Scribner's Sons. 1886.
- Gladstone, W. E.: The Speeches and Public Addresses of the
Right Honorable W. E. Gladstone. Vol. IX
London. Methuen & Co. 1894.
- Gwynn, Stephen & Tuckwell, Gertrude: Life of Sir. Charles
Dilke. Vol. II.
London. John Murray. 1917.
- Holland, Bernard: Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke of
Devonshire. Vols II.
London. Longmans, Green & Co. 1911.
- Jeyes, S. H.: Life and Times of the Right Honorable, the
Marquis of Salisbury, K. G. Vol. IV. 105-39.
London.
- Lecky, E. D.: Memoirs of Wm. E. H. Lecky. 184-98.
London. 1910.
- Lee, Sidney: Queen Victoria. 488-94.
London. 1904.
- Lucy, Henry W.: Memoirs of Eight Parliaments. 182-87.
New York. 1908.
- Mackintosh, Alexander: Joseph Chamberlain. 87-132.
London. Hodder & Stroughton. 1914.
- Morley: W. E. Gladstone. Vol. III.
New York. Macmillan Co. 1909.
- Morley, John: Recollections. Vol. I 200-24; 233; 235-49.
New York. Macmillan Co. 1917.
- O'Brien, R. Barry: Life of Charles Stewart Parnell.
New York. Harper & Bros. 1893.

- O'Brien, Wm. An Oive Branch in Ireland and Its History.
London. Macmillan & Co. 1910.
- O'Donnell, F. Hugh: History of the Irish Parliamentary
Party. Vol. II 151-223.
London. Longmans, Green & Co. 1910.
- O'Shea, Katherine: Charles Stuart Parnell. Vol. II 18-41.
London. Cassell & Co. 1917.
- Parnell, John Howard: Charles Stewart Parnell. 211-16.
New York. 1914.
- Paul, Herbert: A History of Modern England. Vol. V.
New York. Macmillan Co. 1906.
- Purcell, Edmund Sheridan; Life of Cardinal Manning.
Vol. II 608-10; 617-25.
London. Macmillan & Co. 1896.
- (The) Speakers Handbook: An Irish Liberal.
Westminster. The Liberal Unionist Association.
- Redmond, John; The Home Rule Bill. Appdx. by Erskine Childers. 169-74.
London. Cassell & Co. 1912.
- Rosebery, Lord: Lord Randolph Churchill. 13-30; 47-50; 150.
New York. Harper & Bros. 1906.
- Thorold, Algar Labouchere: Life of Henry Labouchere. 227-323.
London. Constable & Co, Ltd. 1913.
- Trevelyan, George Macaulay; Life of John Bright.
London. 1913.

See also:

List of Magazines. (Section VIII)

Hansard: Parliamentary Debates.

The Bibliography.

In beginning a study of "The Policy of the Liberal Party from June 1885 to July 1886", one should first read Paul's History of Modern England Vol. V, to get a general outline of the subject. Eversley's "Gladstone and Ireland" (269-315) will supplement this outline. Eversley is authentic, but he does not give definite dates and places. He expresses his opinion clearly, but separates such expressions of opinion from his story so that there is no confusion. After the outline is well in mind, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (1885-1886) will supply the original record of all the Parliamentary happenings. For the speeches made outside of Parliament, Boyd's Speeches of Chamberlain, and The Speeches of Gladstone (Vol. IX), edited by AW. Hutton may be used. The weekly, monthly and quarterly magazines supply material for judging popular opinion. (See thesis for a discussion on these. p. 71 & 72) However both Hansard and the magazines have been so carefully read by the biographers that with care most of this original material could be gleaned from the secondary sources.

The biographies provide the most complete source of material. In general, there is in each one the story of the times, written from the viewpoint of the subject of the biography. The basic biography of Morley's Gladstone. There are, however, some points in the story that Morley did not touch because they were of only secondary importance to his-main theme. On the Whig side Holland's Devonshire and Elliot's Goschen supplement the outline. The author of the biography on Goschen was heartily in sympathy with Goschen's position, and this influences his opinions and his statements of fact. Holland's book on Hartington is carefully

done. Correspondence is quoted extensively. The book is as thoro in its way as Morley's on Gladstone, but it is not as well written. For the Radical side, we have Mackintosh's Chamberlain, Gwynn and Tuckwell's Dilke and Thorold's Labouchere. The Mackintosh book is rather superficial. It is interesting, popular and accurate, but it is little more than a compilation of material on Chamberlain. Gwynn and Tuckwell is more extensive. It quotes from letters and from Dilke's diary. However, it is influenced by the authors' exalted opinion of Dilke. It gives much light on the "behind the scenes" position of Chamberlain. The Life of Labouchere is extremely detailed. It consists mostly of the Labouchere correspondence, thus showing that Labouchere reported to Chamberlain. Its importance lies in the fact that it provides a check for the Gwynn and Tuckwell book and between the two a better picture of Chamberlain can be drawn. Trevelyan's Bright and Fitzmaurice's Granville give added material, but in neither is this period particularly emphasized.

For the Conservative viewpoint, Jeyes' Salisbury and Winston Churchill's Churchill may be used. Jeyes' work does not pretend to be extensive. Few speeches or letters are given in full, but the extracts selected prove the points. The Life of Churchill is detailed but contains little material on my subject. Gathorne-Hardy's Life is largely extracts from a diary. It has the air of being carefully censored for publication.

O'Brien's Life of Parnell is one of the most authoritative of the books on the Irish side. It is much quoted by other authors. O'Brien wrote from first hand knowledge and quoted from verified reports of men who had first hand knowledge. Katherine O'Shea was in a position to know the situation accurately

but her "Life of Parnell" is more general in character. She seems to have depended largely on her memory. O'Brien and O'Donnell are plainly carried away by their sympathies. They are telling their side of the story. Davitt's Fall of Feudalism in Ireland follows Morley closely, and is singularly lacking in first hand evidence.

Another class of books, from which local color can be gained, is the campaign handbooks. Some of these were published for the Second Home Rule conflict but apply to this struggle as well. The Liberal Unionist Association published, on their side, debaters' guides, giving arguments and refutation. "An Irish Liberal", and "Union or Separation", are of this kind. "The Handbook of Home Rule" contained arguments by Gladstone, Bryce, Morley, O'Brien, etc. Redmond's Home Rule Bill supplies other debating material. The book by A. V. Dicey, "England's Case Against Home Rule", is a clear and logical statement which sums up very well all arguments for and against the subject.

An attempt has been made not merely to tell the story of the events in connection with the first Home Rule Bill; but to trace the position of the leaders and to describe the public opinion of the time.

Index

- Section I: The Defeat of the Liberals, June 1885.
- Section II: The Tories Government, Summer of 1885.
- Section III: The Liberals in Opposition.
- Section IV: The Liberals, September 1885, to Election, December 1885.
- Section V: The End of the Year.
- Section VI: The Tories--their defeat.
- Section VII: Part I Formation of Liberal Government.
Part II Chamberlain's resignation.
- Section VIII: The Introduction of the Home Rule Bill,
April 1886, to its defeat, June 1886.
- Section IX: The Election.
- Section X: Conclusion.

CALENDAR FROM APRIL 1885 to SEPTEMBER 1886.

1885

APRIL							MAY							JUNE						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4					1	2		1	2	3	4	5	6	
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
19	20	21	22	23	24	25	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
26	27	28	29	30			24	25	26	27	28	29	30	28	29	30				
							31													

JULY							AUGUST							SEPTEMBER						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4						1		1	2	3	4	5		
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
26	27	28	29	30	31		23	24	25	26	27	28	29	27	28	29	30			
							30	31												

OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3						1	2		1	2	3	4	5	
4	5	6	7	8	9	10	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	29	30						27	28	29	30	31		

1886

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2						1	2		1	2	3	4	5	6
3	4	5	6	7	8	9	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
24	25	26	27	28	29	30	28							28	29	30	31			
31																				

APRIL							MAY							JUNE						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3						1		1	2	3	4	5		
4	5	6	7	8	9	10	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
25	26	27	28	29	30		23	24	25	26	27	28	29	27	28	29	30			
							30	31												

JULY							AUGUST							SEPTEMBER						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3						1	2		1	2	3	4		
4	5	6	7	8	9	10	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	29	30	31					26	27	28	29	30		

The Policy of the Liberal Party in Regard to Ireland.

June 1885 to July 1886.

The Policy of the Liberal Party in Regard to Ireland
June 1885 to July 1886.

Section I.

Introduction.

At a time when the question of Home Rule for Ireland is an important topic of the day it is a fitting thing to consider the history of the Home Rule Movement and to study the first attempt of the English Government to give Ireland Home Rule. This the Liberal party attempted to do in 1886. Moreover "The period between July 1885 and July 1886 determined the course of English history for a generation." (a) It has been said (b) the Parliament of 1886 "was the shortest and one of the most important of recent times, changing the fortunes of statesmen and the characters of great parties. Things were never again as they were when it met. From first to last it was a Parliament of strong, unsettling, dramatic events. It marked off the parliaments which were before from those which followed after. It saw the introduction of a project which influenced the politics of the country for a quarter of a century, it saw two sections lopped off from the Liberal party, and it saw several of the leading men in that country forsaking old colleagues and seeking new comrades."

- (a) Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 131.
(b) Mackintosh: Chamberlain 114.

In the spring of 1885 Gladstone had been in office for a good while and the original Liberal program had been largely completed. In the meanwhile, two distinct factions had grown up in the party. The Conservative element, or Whigs, led by Hartington; and the Radical group, headed by Chamberlain. Chamberlain's Ransome theory as explained by him at Birmingham January 29, 1885, was considered typical of his extreme ideas, "I hold that the sanctity of public property is greater even than that of private property, and that if it has been lost or wasted or stolen, some equivalent must be found for it, and some compensation may fairly be exacted from the wrong doer." (a) Chamberlain lived to admit that the word "Ransom" was not well chosen, but then it represented to him the loftiest of doctrines. (b) It was with difficulty that Gladstone was able to keep the two factors on a working basis with each other, for they differed so radically on every question especially on the extension of local government and local reforms.

The question of Ireland at this date had some new aspects not present before. By the Franchise Bill (1884) the number of votes in Ireland had changed from some 200,000 to about 600,000. This additional number of votes made the question of what Ireland would do more important to the English politician. In addition to this fact, this new mass of Irish

- (a) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 182 note.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 96-97

voters was being organized and directed by Parnell and their strength, under this direction, could be made to tell. Parnell, in 1884, had submitted to Gladstone the draft of a proposed legislature for Ireland. It was to attend to domestic business, not Imperial, to have a protection for the Protestant minority in the chamber, to maintain the police power, the judges and the courts; the assent of the crown was necessary to any enactment being made a law; the Imperial government was not to lay taxes but Ireland would pay £ 1,000,000 per annum to the Imperial treasury. Gladstone acknowledged the receipt of the memorandum, but that was all. (a) Then, on January 21, 1885, Parnell in a speech at Cork declared he would accept for Ireland nothing less than a Grattan Parliament. (b) At the time that sounded like a "wild hope" of the "mad Irish", for the wildest scheme yet proposed by the English was Chamberlain's Radical one of elected national Councils for Ireland. This was a part of the advanced idea Chamberlain was preaching. He explained it at Glasgow early in 1885. There was to be a council based on indirect election of county boards, to deal with National, not Imperial matters. It was to control matters now exercised by official boards in Dublin and Edinburgh and by departments of government in London. This would mean control especially of land, education, and such local matters. (c) Chamberlain was will-

- (a) O'Shea: Parnell 18-20.
- (b) O'Donnel: History of Irish Parliamentary Party 182.
- (c) McIntoch: Chamberlain 107-108.

ing to admit that there might have to be two central councils, one at Dublin and one at Belfast, but he preferred only one if possible. This council was not to legislate absolutely but should take the initiative in introducing bills. These bills, when passed, would not become law until sanctioned by the Imperial government. However, if the Imperial government did not act on them within forty days, they would automatically become a law. (a)

Mr. Goschen pointed out that scheme was not a "mere case of decentralization or devolution to local bodies" but that it was established upon the grounds of the existence of national differences in the United Kingdom. The Whigs were opposed to it. (b) The Irish Nationalists were supposed to be for it; Parnell and Manning were said to approve it. (c) One of the Irish authorities maintains that it was originally Parnell's own plan, that he simply influenced Chamberlain to accept and had it announced as Chamberlain's solution for Home Rule. While it was given out as having the backing of the Irish Party, it was never submitted either to the Irish party or to the executive committee of the Irish National League for an opinion. Both Chamberlain and Dilke were willing to make the National Council scheme an issue at the election but they dropped it when Parnell would no longer support it. (d)

- (a) O'Brien: Life of Parnell II, 34-36, quoting an interview^t with Chamberlain concerning this in February 15, 1898.
- (b) Mackintosh: Chamberlain 108.
- (c) Mackintosh: Chamberlain 108.
- (d) Davitt: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland, 474-75.

Another plan, more in line with mere "extension of local government" was Lord John Russel's proposal of provincial boards in each of the four great provinces of Ireland. Granville was in favor of this.

This was the situation in May 1885, when the cabinet was forced to face three problems. The coercion act expired in August of 1885. Was it to be renewed? Should a scheme of land purchase for Ireland be considered? And should local and county government be extended? In the attitude to these three

questions may be seen the line up of the factions. The Whigs, led by Spencer's opinion, were for a modified renewal of the Crimes Act, with the balm of land purchase and limited extension of self government in local areas. The Radicals were adverse to both coercion and purchase. Some of them would yield to a mild coercion to get ~~the~~ small measures of self government in local areas and the erection of a central board with administrative functions in Ireland. (a) It was believed that Parnell would not oppose a moderate coercion act and he would accept an elective National Council. (b) Gladstone, apparently, would not abandon coercion. Altho he had given Chamberlain no pledge, he was considered favorable toward extension of local government on an elective basis. (c) Thus the Whigs were for the old, tried and true method and intended to make as little concession as possible. The Radicals, with

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 190-91.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 194.
O'Shea: Parnell 21-22.
- (c) Morley: Gladstone 191-92.

their platform of extension of local right, were applying their principles to the government of Ireland, Gladstone was, as usual, maintaining a nice balance between the two extremes, offending neither, but at the same time giving neither his support.

On May 9, the Central Board plan for the government of Ireland came up in the cabinet. All the peers except Granville voted against it as not going far enough or else too far. All the Commons except Hartington voted for it, but the plan was defeated. Gladstone considered this defeat important. It showed two points; the Radical element could not induce the cabinet to go very far in indorsing local government and opinion was strong against concession to Ireland.

The question of coercion and land purchase came up in the cabinet meeting May 15. The Radical leaders objected to land purchase and it was agreed to drop it. (a) Concerning coercion, it was decided to omit the coercion clause, but to give the viceroy, by statute, the power to enforce, when necessary, the "Proceedure clauses relating to change of venue, special parties and boycotting." (b) This did away with the name coercion, but left the fact very much the same. In parliament the same day, Gladstone announced the policy of the government. First the prevention of Crimes Act would be taken up. They would have liked to consider local government and land purchase but felt there was no time. (c) In the House of Lords the same

(a) Morley: Gladstone 194.

(b) Jeyes: The Rt. Honorable James Chamberlain 148--quoted by O'Brien's Olive Branch 46-47.

(c) Hansard 298: 629-31

day the Lords were unable to find out the government's exact plan.

Viceroy Spencer, however, objected to the land purchase bill not being considered. Now Gladstone understood Chamberlain and Dilke to object to the bill "lest it prejudice the future handling of local government," but that funds for one year would do no harm and so he gave notice of the introduction of a bill. Chamberlain and Dilke promptly resigned. This was on May 20. Gladstone explained the misunderstanding to them and they suspended their resignations. (a) Chamberlain the next day, blamed himself for not making his position plainer, but said he thought the difference of opinion in the cabinet should not be covered up but should be made known to the constituencies.

Mr. Gladstone was especially anxious that Chamberlain and Dilke should not resign on what he considered only a small point on land purchase, because it would weaken their position for the future. (b) So he attempted to arrange a compromise with them.

In the meantime, the Crimes Act was under discussion. The Viceroy was willing to drop coercion provisions, retaining only the provisions relating especially to Ireland. Other ministers were doubtful whether any special legislation was needed. (c) The point of for how long the act was to be in force

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 194-95.
- (b) Gladstone's letter to Hartington 5-30-85.
- (c) Morley: Gladstone 192.

caused a decided difference of opinion. Spencer was for two years, as was Goschen, who said that one year would mean another fight in the next parliament. (a) Chamberlain and Dilke were for one year, that being the concession they would make, tho their position was against the coercion act.

Finally on the day of June 5, the Cabinet agreed to give notice of a bill to take the place of the expiring Crimes Act.

(b) The operative provisions of the act had been agreed on. Whether these were to depend on the Lord Lieutenant's proclamation was left an open question. Gladstone's summary of the situation was this: They had decided to abandon the coercion clauses. The proceedure clauses they intended advise that the viceroy have power to bring into action. They were still discussing whether intimidation and boycotting should be subject to executive discretion or remain in full force. (c)

So Gladstone said that the Irish question was on a fair way to settlement. Dilke, however, points out that altho Spencer had made certain concession (i.e., that coercion bill should have effect only after a special proclamation had been issued) the members of the Cabinet who resigned refused to agree that Spencer's concesssion was sufficient. Therefore he does not agree with Gladstone that the Cabinet were not at odds over the Irish question. (d) Gladstone intended to continue his government even if the radical members persisted in their resignation. (e)

- (a) Elliot: Goschen Vol. I. 299.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 198.
- (c) Gladstone's letter to Queen 10-5-85.
- (d) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke (diary) 145.
- (e) Morley: Gladstone 199.

Thus the Irish question was very much to the fore in Cabinet discussion when the government was unexpectedly defeated on the day of June 8. Hicks-Beach moved an amendment in the Budget discussion: That the House regarded the increase proposed by this Bill in the duties levied on beer and spirits as inequitable in the absence of a corresponding addition to the duties on wine. The vote was 264 to 252; a majority of 12. (a) It would not have been necessary for the government to resign on a minor item such as this was. However, on the 9th, they resigned. Many felt that they had simply been looking for an excuse and were glad of the chance, to get out of office on a legitimate plea. (b) Chamberlain and Dilke were suspected of being at the bottom of it, because by this they were saved from weakening their cause on resigning. (c) It was conceded that the defeat was generally a surprise, especially to Gladstone. Its significance according to Morley, was not in the financial question involved, for that was of slight value, but in ^{the} combination of Tories and Irish which was felt to be "of cardinal importance." (d)

Thus the Conservatives came into power.

Section II.

Salisbury did not become Prime Minister until June 23, for he hesitated to accept office without obtaining promise

- (a) Hansard 298: 1436.
- (b) Elliot: Goschen Vol. I. 297.
- (c) Hardy: Hardy 214.
- (d) Morley: Gladstone 200.

of co-operation from Gladstone, Considering that the Conservatives had a minority in the House, Salisbury felt he must have a pledge that their plans would not be blocked. Altho Gladstone refused to give this, the Queen assured Salisbury she believed he could rely on Gladstone's good will. Salisbury then took office, with Hicks-Beach as leader of the House and Randolph Churchill as Secretary of State for India.

The policy of the Tory party in regard to Ireland must be briefly considered for the result of their tactics made a difference in the Liberals' position the next autumn. When the new ministers met parliament July 6, Carnarvon, the new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, made the governmental speech concerning the Irish policy. It was somewhat unusual for the Irish viceroy to make the speech, altho there was precedent for it. (a) After quoting figures on agrarian crime in Ireland, Carnarvon concluded that conditions were now nearly normal. The question of reenacting the Crime Act must be considered. No one advocated reenacting it, in toto, as it stood. Part of it, as change of venue, special juries, etc., might well be reenacted, but then it would take on the character of special legislation. He believed the Act had fulfilled its purpose and so should be permitted to lapse. His argument was that Scotch, Irish and English lived together in harmony in the British Colonies, so why shouldn't they at home. (b)

(a) Thorold: Labouchere 228 Lord Mulgrave in 1837 and Lord Clarendon in 1850.

(b) Hansard 298: 1658-62.

The Tories had been paving the way for such a right-about-face on coercion for some months. On May 20, Randolph Churchill at the Tory Club had intimated that the Tories would not feel it necessary to renew the Crime Act (as the Liberals were then considering doing). He pretended great sympathy for the wounded sensibilities of the Irish people that such a measure should be considered as a matter of course. (a) Moreover the Tory party did not disavow this statement. (b) It was believed that Salisbury was considering giving up coercion during the month of May, subject of course to official information. At least, certain Tories were endeavoring to negotiate with Parnell in Salisbury's name. (c) Salisbury trusted Gibson's judgment, feeling that Gibson knew more about the Irish situation than any other man to whom he could turn, and Gibson was opposed to coercion as unnecessary. (d) The result of the Tory decision to give up coercion necessarily resulted in a closer agreement between Tories and Irish in Parliament. Many felt that it was simply a move on the part of the Conservatives to get Irish support in the House and for the coming election. Lord Kimberley criticized it in the House of Lords (July 6) and said he was doubtful of its success. The Duke of Argyll pointed out the strange transposition of parties, with the Liberals for coercion and the Tories against it. (e) Chamberlain approved of the policy for he was against coercion; but he felt the

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 189
Davitt: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland 473.
- (b) Sp. Churchill: Randolph Churchill 391
Jeyes: Salisbury 109.
- (c) O'Shea: Parnell 22
Morley: Gladstone 190
- (d) Sp. Churchill: Randolph Churchill 393; 404
- (e) Hansard: 298: 1664-70.

Tories were acting not from conviction but for party advantage. Hartington, too, felt that the action was a blow to political morality and to the cause of Ireland. Morley interpreted it as a renunciation of the policy of the outgoing administration. (a) In fact many Tories even objected to Salisbury's change and criticized it as not true to Tory principals. (b) Salisbury, however, defended the dropping of coercion as a logical outcome of the Franchise Act of 1884. (c)

On July 17 the Tories had an opportunity of making the position even more clear. There had been an Irish murder case (the Maamtrasna affair) where the witnesses were found later to have perjured themselves. Parnell moved for an inquiry into such conviction. Hick-Beach, in answering him, said that the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland would consider any memorial offered to him on the subject. Parnell then withdrew his motion and in time the whole matter was inquired into (d) and the former decision upheld. (e) The important thing was that in his speech Hicks-Beach took occasion to say "There is much in the Irish policy of the late government which, tho in the absence of complete information, I do not condemn, I should be very sorry to make myself responsible for". Randolph Churchill, following him in the debate said, "The present government will be foredoomed to failure, if they go out of their way, unnecessarily, to assume one jot or tittle of the responsibility for the acts of the late

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 212-15.
- (b) Hansard: 299:1119.
- (c) Thorold: Labouchere. 7-29 at Mansion House.
- (d) Hansard: 299: 1101-2.
- (e) Sp. Churchill: Randolph Churchill 442.

administration. It is only by divesting ourselves of all responsibility for the action of the late government and by taking full responsibility for our own actions, that we can hope to arrive at a successful issue in the task on which we have entered." (a)

Thus the Tories publically answered that they would not be responsible for the acts of the former Liberal administration but for their own policies only. This might be considered another bid for the needed Irish support, "Maamtrasna Alliance" was the taunt of the Liberals after this. (b) Was it the price the Tories paid for Irish votes? That all the Tories were not behind the move is apparent. The Standard, a Tory newspaper, abused the Tory leaders as vigorously as any Liberal newspaper. In the Tory cabinet, Cranbrook complained of the speeches on the Maamtrasna murder, "I do not like the apparent Irish treaty, tho it does not really exist." (c) It was generally believed that Randolph Churchill was perfectly sincere in his position. (d) Even Hartington admitted that Randolph Churchill might be consistent in attacking the Liberal policy (tho he changed his grounds for attack), but did Gorst and Randolph Churchill speak for all the Conservative party? (e)

There was one other incident in the Conservative-Irish alignment. Sometime in July Carnarvon and Parnell had an interview in an empty house in London. The matter came out a year later (June 7, '86). They discussed their ideas of an Irish

- (a) Hansard 299: 1088-1101.
- (b) Sp. Churchill: Randolph Churchill 436-42.
- (c) Hardy: Hardy 223.
- (d) Sp. Churchill: Randolph Churchill 442.
- (e) Hansard 299: 1125-36.

Parliament. There is quite a question as to how far Carnarvon was giving Parnell his own views and how far he was speaking of the Tory cabinet's opinions. What concerns us is the result this interview had on the Irish. (a) Parnell seemed to have that Carnarvon told him that it was the intention of the government, if successful at the polls, to establish an Irish legislature, with limited powers and not independent of Imperial control. (b) Moreover, Randolph Churchill told Fitz Gibbon, "There was no compact or bargain of any kind but I told Parnell that if the Tories took office and I was a member of their government I would not consent to renew the Crimes Act." Parnell replied, "In that case, you will have the Irish vote at the elections". (c)

So we have the Liberals out in June and the Tories in. They immediately pronounced against coercion and we find several indications of at least a very friendly feeling between Tories and Irish. The Tories passed several important Irish bills in the brief time they were in, The Ashbourne Act, for selling Irish land to occupying tenants, and Irish Laborers bill, and an Irish Educational Endowments bill.

Parliament was prorouged August 11.

Section III.

When the Liberals resigned in June the main interest concerning them centered in the Radical-Whig split that was threat-

- (a) Its real point is what was the Tory policy at this date.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 230.
Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 273.
O'Shea: Parnell 23-4.

ening. The Whigs, headed by Hartington and Goschen were opposed to the Radical program. They were against the compulsory purchase of land, altho under certain conditions they were willing to have free trade in land. They consented to discuss the Radical program but that did not mean acceptance. "Feudalistic, not Socialistic", Hartington was described. Goschen was typically a politician desiring only moderate reforms. The Radicals, on the other hand, were full of their subject and enthusiastically preached their new doctrines. Chamberlain had announced his "Ransom theory" in March. He had sanctioned the Radical program, a series of articles published in the Fortnightly Review before June which set forth the Radical views: free schools, disestablishment of the church, triennial parliaments, graduation of the income tax, allotments for the laborer, increased power of local authority, etc. At the Trade Club Banquet June 13, Chamberlain spoke for increased power of local authorities to handle local business and rejoiced that, now he was out of office, because of the change of government, he was free to work for his program. (a) The Radical program was Radical, but more than that it was presented in a striking and vivid manner which made it seem even more Radical than it was. In the veiled war going on between the sections of the party, Gladstone did not take sides. When Goschen asked him how he stood (b) he replied that his method was "affirmation and construction" and that he did not think it necessary to pronounce on each point of Chamberlain's program. Chamberlain, however, felt that Gladstone

(a) 7-9. Argyll in House of Lords criticises the use he makes of this freedom.

(b) July 11.

sided with him on the question of local government. In fact Gladstone intimated as much to Hartington (May 30) but Chamberlain and Gladstone were not on intimate terms. (a)

Beside the question of the Whig-Radical split and yet closely connected with it, was the question of Gladstone's continued leadership of the party. It was generally conceded that Gladstone (and probably only Gladstone) could keep the party together. Many thought that it ought to be known before the election whether Gladstone was to lead, for the question of another leader would bring up other issues. The Whigs advocated Hartington. Might Chamberlain be considered? The "Unauthorized program" (as the Radical platform had been called by Goschen) might seem to suggest it. Chamberlain was popular and was much talked of. (b) Parnell, though, preferred Gladstone, thinking he could obtain more concession from him. The leaders of the party were anxious to keep Gladstone in, lest his retirement precipitate the division. Rosebury was sure "Gladstone's umbrella would cover all". By the end of June it was known that Gladstone thought the settlement would depend on the Irish question. On July 6 Gladstone told Dilke that if only local government were to be considered for Ireland, others than he could handle it. On July 11, he told Goschen he was considering retiring. In August he informed Childers that he would let him know concerning the leadership after his return from his trip to Norway. On September 3, Gladstone was

- (a) See for example the Ellington matter, when Chamberlain told Dilke he did not think Gladstone had treated them well, concealing his intention because he did know they did not approve. However, only a minor point. 6-28. Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 151.
- (b) As example see the increasing frequency with which his cartoon appears in Punch.

able to tell Hartington that he was still free, to take part in, or withdraw from the political issue. So thru the summer of 1885, the party was uncertain whether or no Gladstone would continue as a leader, If he did not, the difficulty of the threatening split was even graver.

In the face of these uncertainties the question of Ireland was not made a prominent feature. To be sure the late cabinet had had trouble over it. Gladstone seemed to be making it an important factor in his attitude, but it did not hold the center of the stage. Nevertheless, it was a minor character in the great drama, with power to change the development of the plot. Chamberlain, on July 17, opened this campaign with his notable "Dublin Castle" speech in which he criticized severely the former system of government in Ireland. He maintained that Ireland must be given the right to govern herself in purely local domestic business. At present peace and order were maintained by unconstitutional means. The time has come to reform that irritating anachronism known as Dublin Castle. Chamberlain all along had disapproved of Spencer's methods. In fact he had refused to sit again in the same cabinet with Spencer. (a) It is to be doubted, tho, if Chamberlain meant anything more than a large scheme of local government for Ireland by this criticism of the Liberal administration. It was local government he was urging in his political platform, it was a scheme of local government he had defended in the Cabinet dispute. This speech of

(a) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 149. 6-21.

July 17 was more a Radical's protest of autocratic government than any announcement of policy concerning Ireland. (a)

It will be remembered that the Conservatives had taken office early in July and one of their few acts had been to disavow coercion. This naturally changed the view point of many toward the Irish situation. Parnell, apparently, was no longer accessible to Liberal statesmen but rather had joined with the Tories counting on what they would do for him. (b) Gladstone feared the effect the Conservative concessions would have on Parnell's demands. On the day of the Maamtrasna debate, he wrote Derby that he supposed a central board scheme would not now suffice for the Irish but they must have a parliament! This might mean the repeal of the Union, an Austrain-Hungarian scheme, or a colony like Canada. Any one of these would raise new questions. (c) Derby considered all the schemes proposed unsatisfactory as going too far or not far enough. If he were forced to go beyond local government, he preferred the Canadian method. (d)

The Radicals were especially offended at this Alliance of the Irish with the Conservative. The Radical group (Chamberlain, Dilke, Trevelyan, Lefevre and Morley) met often to discuss topics. On the occasion of the Maamtrasna interview they were opposed to Spencer and were inclined to speak in Parliament against the inquiry but after an interview with Gladstone decided not to oppose the Irish demand. (e) Chamberlain and Dilke had been favorable to the Irish interests. Dilke,

- (a) Compare with his reaction to Parnell's Dublin speech, 8-24, at Warrington, 9-8.
 (b) See Section II. Also O'Shea: Parnell 23, concerning correspondence between Gladstone and Parnell, 7-14-85.
 (c) Morley: Gladstone 215.
 (d) Morley: Gladstone 215.
 (e) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 155-57, diary.

June 22, had advocated Home Rule all around. He wanted to study out in Ireland a "plan for the devolution to Welsh, Scottish and Irish bodies such business which parliament is incompetent to discharge. (a) More information was needed before such a scheme could be worked out, so Chamberlain and Dilke proposed to make an investigating tour of Ireland. The idea was cordially received at first, but shortly afterward the Irish National Press intimated that they would not be received in a friendly way. Letters of introduction were refused by Manning. The trip was given up. When later the Carnarvon interview was made public, many thought that the temporary Irish-Conservative understanding was the reason for the cooling of Parnell's interest in Radical support. (b) Whether or not Chamberlain would ever have gone beyond his National Council scheme is of course a question; but Parnell's snub at this point may have been the factor that caused him to turn from support of the Irish plans to active opposition. (c)

Neither did Chamberlain endorse the Liberal policy as set forth in Spencer's administration. Gladstone reasoned with Chamberlain about expressing himself ^{as} opposed to it. He told the younger man that if he must go on to a party split, let it be over questions of the future, not over arguments of the past. (d) When the Liberals gave a banquet in honor of Lord Spencer on July 24, neither Chamberlain nor Dilke were present. Lord

- (a) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 148, note.
- (b) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke--the trip was abandoned because of the change in Dilke's personal fortune. Dilke was out of politics because of personal reasons from July on.
- (c) See Chamberlain's letter to Dilke 7-18, Thorold: Labouchere.
- (d) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 158-9. 7-21.

Hartington presided and Mr. Bright was present with about 300 from both houses. Chamberlain made a speech in another place that night, however, in which he recognized the high qualities of Lord Spencer, tho they often differed on details. (a)

During August the Liberal statesmen were turning the problem over in their minds. Granville made out a memorandum on the Irish question: the integrity of England must be maintained, but whatever was fair and just to the Irish would be advantageous to England, to prevent separation, to find safeguards and to provide against bad administration, were his aims. (b) Hartington's attitude was one of protest. He did not think the central council scheme would be supported. "Gladstone's state of mind about Ireland was extremely alarming", for he understood Gladstone was considering a separate legislature and was not willing to offer resistance to further Irish demands. (c) On August 6, Gladstone had written Granville that he had seen his way to the minor and rejected plan, but the idea of a wider one puzzled him. If the election returns were of a decisive character "the sooner the subject is dealt with the better". (d) Later in the month, it was intimated to O'Brien by a publicist that certain articles on the English-Irish Union were desired for publication. This suggestion came "from a very great man" (known later to be Gladstone) and was to be written in an historical rather than a political vein. The Article

- {a} Morley: Gladstone 214-5.
- {b} Fitzmaurice: Granville 459-60.
- {c} Holland: Devonshire 77-8. 8-8-85.
- {d} Morley: Gladstone 216.

was published in November. (a) Thus we see that in August the question of meeting the Irish demand was being considered by the Liberal leaders. (b)

Parliament had been prorouged August 11. Gladstone left on August 8 for a trip to Norway. Before he went he gave to the party leaders a rough memorandum of four points for the party platform for election. (c)

Gladstone had feared that the result of the Tory interest in Ireland would be to increase the demands of the Irish statesmen. In this he was correct for on August 24 Parnell made a speech at Dublin in which he demanded a national parliament for Ireland. He mentioned the power to promote the peasant proprietary, to admit leaseholders to land courts, to extend education on a religious basis, to improve the conditions of laborers and such other local matters. There was no mention of Imperial matters, but the government was to have fiscal independence and the right to impose import duties for protection of Irish industries, even against English goods. (d)

The press response was instantaneous and positive. The Times said an Irish Parliament was impossible. The Standard asked Whigs and Tories "to present a firm uncompromising front to the rebel chief". The Daily Telegraph "hoped the House of Commons would not be reduced or terrified into surrender". The Manchester Guardian "declared Englishmen would condemn or pun-

- (a) O'Brien: Parnell II 102-04.
- (b) This refutes the argument that Gladstone considered the possibility of Irish autonomy only after election.
- (c) Holland: Devonshire 87-89.
- (d) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 278.
Jeyes: Salisbury 114.
Holland: Devonshire 67-8.

ish any party or public man who attempted to walk in the path traced by Mr. Parnell". The Leed's Mercury did not think the question worth discussing. The Daily News felt "that Great Britain could be saved from the tyranny of Mr. Parnell by a strong administration composed of advanced Liberals." (a) In fact "the whole press, metropolitan and provincial, Liberal and Conservative, condemned Parnell's claim for a National Parliament." (b)

Hartington spoke~~d~~ at Waterfoot on August 29. He joined issue directly with Parnell. Parnell's proposal was impossible. He had gone further than his authority wa^ranted. The Irish would not risk their chance for sure reforms by backing this wild demand of Parnell's. English parties in the end would "impose a firm and decided veto upon proposals which are in their opinion so fatal and mischievous." (c) Parnell answered Hartington at a Mansion House Banquet in Dublin on September 1. He said Hartington was the same man who had said local government and equal electoral privilegeⁱ would be impossible. He predicted that England would either have to grant Ireland the right to rule herself or let her be like a crown colony. (d)

Gladstone regretted that Hartington had joined issue directly with Parnell. Parnell's speech he considered permitted only one answer. On the other hand the position of Ireland after election "is so new, so difficult and so little understood

- {a) Thorold: Labouchere 233.
- {b) Sp. Churchill: Randolph Churchill 453.
- {c) Holland: Devonshire 68.
- {d) Holland: Devonshire 69.

that it seems most important to reserve, until the proper time, all possible liberty of examining it". (a)

"If these are the terms on which Mr. Parnell's support is to be obtained, I will not enter into the compact" was Chamberlain's answer to Parnell. (b) In the speech he made on September 8, at Warrington he went on to say that such a restoration of a national parliament involved a great extension of any thing that was hitherto understood as Home Rule. He thought it dangerous to thus establish a hostile country within 30 miles of the English shore. (c)

Those who had considered Chamberlain's central council scheme as Home Rule did not think this Warrington speech consistent. But if the central council plan is considered as part of a local government platform there is nothing inconsistent in Chamberlain's refusal of Parnell's demand for a separate parliament. Eversley proposed to Chamberlain about this time that he simply call his national council scheme a parliament and thus appease the national sentiment in Ireland. Chamberlain would not consent. He expressed himself as fearful that Gladstone intended to propose a Home Rule policy. He, himself, would not go beyond National Councils. (d)

This speech of Parnell's thus forced the leaders to declare their position in regard to Ireland. Interest of the Liberals early in September was centering around Gladstone's election address. The two wings of the party were violently opposed to each other, distrustful of every move made by the other side.

(a) Morley: Gladstone 220. Letter from Gladstone to Hartington 9-12-85.

(b) Holland: Devonshire 6811.

(c) McIntoch: Chamberlain 111.

(d) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland. Autumn of 1885.

Gladstone hoped in his address to conciliate them both. (a) He told Hartington it would follow the memorandum of May 8. Upon Gladstone's refusal to call a consultation of the party leaders on the subject of the address, Hartington declined to be bound by it. (b) Chamberlain and Dilke insisted that it must contain mention of the power of local authorities over land and free schools. (c)

During the negotiations preceeding the publishing of the address, the question of Ireland cropped out again and again. Gladstone had criticized Hartington's answer to Parnell, but Hartington answered him that his section of the party could not keep silent but must put up uncompromising resistance to present demands. Hartington did not feel he knew enough of Gladstone's ideas concerning Ireland to say whether he could accept them or not. (d) Gladstone replied that he was in favor of waiting on the Irish question, less it prove embarrassing later. (e) The question would take much studying and he had been working hard on the Irish part of his address. Hartington answered that he knew Gladstone was prepared to grant much more self government than he ever would be willing to. It worried him in view of the cabinet. (f) Hartington's attitude very plainly was "No Compromise."

Morley, at the other extreme, had in an election speech of the 16th declared the separation would be a disaster to Ireland and a disgrace to England, but he acquiesced in some sys-

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 222.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 89.
- (c) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 184.
- (d) Holland: Devonshire 80. 9-6-85.
- (e) 9-8-85.
- (f) 9-12-85.

Here the "F^{II}"
correction was "F^{II}"
There was already a "F^{II}"
that day had?

tem of Home Rule fashioned on the Canadian model. (a)

Gladstone in this too, was conciliatory. He told Hartington that Ireland might have all that was compatible with the unity of the Empire. However, on September 11, he wrote Hartington that he did not consider the Irish question imminent. (b) The address was published on September 17. It contained two paragraphs on Ireland.

"In my opinion, not now for the first time delivered, the limit is clear within which the desires of Ireland, constitutionally ascertained, may, and beyond which they cannot, receive the assent of Parliament. To maintain the supremacy of the Crown, the unity of the Empire, and all the authority of Parliament necessary for the conservation of that unity, is the first duty of every representative of the people. Subject to this governing principle, every grant to portions of the country of enlarged powers for the management of their own affairs is, in my view, not a source of danger, but a means of averting it, and is in the nature of a new guarantee for increased cohesion, happiness and strength.

"I believe history and posterity will consign to disgrace the memory of every man, be he who he may, on which ever side of the Channel he may dwell, that, having the power to aid in an equitable arrangement between Ireland and Great Britain, shall use the power, not to aid but to prevent or retard it." (c)

- (a) O'Brien: O'Connell III II 101, 103.
 (b) Holland: Devonshire 86-8.

The address was considered a well written statement, but no one felt it said anything very positively. Morley says the Whigs found it vague; the Radicals, cautious; the Tories, crafty. (a) That was perhaps what Gladstone intended, for he was loathe to express himself since he felt that the Irish question depended on a hypothesis yet impossible to determine (b) and the Liberal success at the polls depended on keeping the party together and not offending the Whigs. (c)

It apparently succeeded in this, for Hartington thought the address moderate but weak, and not alarming. (d) Goschen praised it. (e) Chamberlain publically said it was a clear exposition of Liberal policy. Privately he told Dilke he thought it bad, especially concerning schools, and a slap in the face for the Radicals. He informed Gladstone he would have to have a broader basis before he could consider joining a government. (f)

In considering the Liberal policy for June, July, August, and September of 1885, we find that the main interest centered in the opposing platform of the Whig and Radical groups. Gladstone's leadership was an important matter. Throughout these discussions the thread of interest in the Irish situation runs, increasing in importance after Parnell's demand for an independent Parliament. The Whig attitude may be summarized as resistance. Chamberlain apparently has lost interest in his National Council scheme since it failed to pass in the cabinet and was

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 220.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 237--"If Parnell returns with a large majority, if the minority is not weighty enough, if the demand is constitutionally framed, if the Parnellites are unanimous then we will try Home Rule."
- (c) Elliot: Goschen I, 310.
- (d) Holland: Devonshire 75.
- (e) Morley: Gladstone 220.
- (f) Mackintosh: Chamberlain 98. Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 85.

There is no
product [on machine.
There is (-) Proanthocyanin

010000
011110
010010
000000

01000000
01001100
01000000
01001100

discarded by Parnell. Gladstone's position seems to be not to commit himself but to watch development. His address fulfilled its purpose in keeping the factions together but did not run forward to meet and settle issues.

Section IV.

After Gladstone's address, the campaign opened in earnest. Chamberlain planned to force the issue on social questions and overlook Ireland. There were numerous negotiations between the leaders, tho we will discuss them only as they affected Ireland. The situation within the party grew more tense--Whigs and Radicals attacked each other on public platforms. Hartington was so offended he said he would not sit in the cabinet with Chamberlain again. Added to this, there was still doubt whether or not Gladstone intended to lead the party.

In the election, the Irish problem was not much considered where there was not Irish vote. (a) Bright said they could wait longer for sentimental reforms. (b) Chamberlain expressed his opinion that the Irish question was not immediate (c) while Gladstone held that within ten years, the problem would have to be considered. (d) On September 28, Childers proposed a plan to his constituents at Pontefract that was essentially Home Rule, for it left to the decision of a legislative assembly in Dublin every subject specifically Irish. (e) Childers had consulted Gladstone on that and had Gladstone's consent, in that he had

- (a) Holland: Devonshire 70.
 - (b) Trevelyan: Bright 445-6.
 - (c) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 191. 10-17. Holland
 - (d) Recollections of Sir Algernon West Vol. II, p 151 in 465.
 - (e) Paul: History of England, Vol. V 14.
- Holland: Devonshire

written that he was in sympathy with the scope and spirit of the proposed declaration. He suggested, however, that Childers should not be too specific, for he thought that details made the Irish national leaders raise their terms. (a)

Gladstone's attitude on the subject of Ireland was of much interest to other statesmen. Derby wrote Granville (10-2-85) that he had visited Gladstone and had found him studying the Irish question. He had convinced himself that the Union was a mistake. He believed that, a single executive could co-exist with two independent legislatures. The Irish were not irreconcilable but had been quite ready to accept moderate terms before the Tories became interested in them. (b)

A few days later (c) Gladstone wrote Granville that ~~he~~ could not take office, except to deal with the Irish question. He avoided stating his scheme or even whether he had a scheme. (d) On October 8, came the conference between Chamberlain and Gladstone in which they discussed many points of party interest, Ireland among others. Gladstone urged Chamberlain to leave himself plenty of elbow room in his statement lest Parnell's demands create a new situation. He repeated to Chamberlain his intention of not leading except to handle the Irish question. In reporting this conference to Dilke, Chamberlain said he was not quite certain what Gladstone wanted. Gladstone was impressed with the advantages of a Central Council scheme. Chamber-

(a) Morley: Gladstone 235-36.

(b) Fitzmaurice: Granville 465.

(c) Russel reports that when Kimberly told Derby that when he had last seen Gladstone, his conscience was much troubled by the immoral means used to bring about the Union, Derby had said, "Damn his conscience."--

Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland.

(d) Fitzmaurice: Granville 463.

lain did not gather that he had a definite plan under the present circumstances. It was his conclusion that if the Liberals got a majority, Gladstone would try to find some basis for dealing with them and would open direct communications with them for this object. (a) Gladstone in writing to Granville concerning this talk with Chamberlain, said, "He and I are pretty well agreed on the Irish question," except on the point of whether Parnell would be satisfied with a County Government Bill. When Chamberlain was correcting this letter for Morley's book he said he proposed to exclude Home Rule as impossible and to offer instead a local government bill. Morley concludes that Gladstone's statement cannot mean, therefore, that Chamberlain was in favor of Home Rule. Gladstone said they agreed that the present relations of the Irish party were a disgrace and must not continue. (b) This letter to Granville Holland thinks shows that "in October 1885 there was some kind of an idea as to a 'moderate but substantial' policy; half-way it may be presumed, between the desired of the Radicals and the antipathies of the Whigs, and not, certainly, including the establishment of a separate Parliament for Ireland." (c)

Ten days later Gladstone wrote Hartington that the difficulties of one measure for Ireland were formidable but that a long series of parliamentary operations were heartbreaking. He suggested that the main question was: does Irish Nationalism contemplate a fair division of Imperial burdens and will it ag-

- (a) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 190-91.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 225.
- (c) Holland: Devonshire 66.

ree to a just provision for the protection of the landlords. The basis of proceeding had been changed by the change of form of the Nationalist demand from repeal of the Union (that is, from reinstating Parliament with original authority) to the form of a Bill for a derivative chamber acting under Imperial authority. (a)

On the same day (10-18) Labouchere reported to Chamberlain that Herbert Gladstone had been trying to open negotiations with the Irish thru him. He said that Herbert Gladstone said that his father "Was disposed to grant the fullest Home Rule, but does not think it desirable to formulate a scheme before elections". It was Labouchere's opinion that Gladstone evidently wanted to unite his party on Irish legislation, but wanted the assurance that the Irish would back him up. (b)

A few days after this (10-22) we find Gladstone writing to Granville about Ireland. He does not see his way to the protection of the landlords, yet he cannot make over judicial rents to Parnell's mercy. He is convinced that there is a great advantage in a constitutive measure, (which would be subject to change or recall) as against Repeal of the Union. (c)

Thruout October and November Gladstone was consulting with the Irish. Labouchere continually kept Chamberlain informed of what he said were Gladstone's attempts to find out the Irish demands. Labouchere told Gladstone and Rosebery and others that it was no use to negotiate with the Irish unless they had a majority. (d)

- (a) Holland: Devonshire 94-5.
- (b) O'Shea: Parnell 34.--Labouchere not reliable on Irish matters.
- (c) Holland: Devonshire 89-90.--"It seems hardly possible that Mr. Gladstone can have ever regarded a mere repeal of the Act of Union as ever a thinkable alternative. What would happen makes the imagination reel."
- (d) Thorold: Labouchere 240-44.

O'Brien had another interview with the publisher who wanted an article on Mr. Parnell's ideas--what he would accept. (11-15) O'Brien sketched these,--not local government but a national parliament. The numbers of chambers and retention of Irish members in the British Parliament were not considered important. They would want to handle land, education, law and justice, police, and customs. This information was sent in November 20 and was published in January (a) At the same time Katherine O'Shea tells of a communication received by Parnell, asking for a statement of the details of his proposed parliament. Upon receiving these, Grosvenor thanked them for the information but referred them to the government of the day. (b)

This, in fact, seems to have been Gladstone's attitude. He was considering the Irish question carefully. He was getting together all the information he could on the subject. But he wasn't doing anything. He was even avoiding committing himself. On November 13 he sent Rosebery a letter in which he gave his reasons for not framing an Irish plan.

1. It was not a task for the leaders of the opposition.
2. The Tories should carry it as their measure.
3. The Liberal and Nationalist parties did not work together in the last Parliament, so he was ignorant of the inner wishes of the Irish.
4. The basis of such a measure was already announced. The particulars ought to be left to the legislature.

(a) O'Brien: *Olive Parnell II*, 114-15.
 (b) 11-3-85.
 O'Shea: *Parnell* 25.

5. It would make the Tories against such a plan if a Liberal leader proposed it.
6. I am not afraid of the Lords' objections but it will be hard work to convince the Liberal party. It can only be done by letting them naturally consider what is due to the nation, when they express themselves unitedly and constitutionally.

(a)

Holland's opinion is, "It shows conclusively that he had by now fully accepted the principle of the grant of a national legislature to Ireland but that it would be vain to launch the project until the result of the polls had shown that there was an overwhelming majority in Ireland in favor of the change." (b)

Parnell on October 5, had made a speech at Wicklow declaring for protection and control of duties. Two days later Salisbury at Newport in regard to the Irish Question said that he would extend to Ireland the institutions of England, providing for the protection of minorities. As to local authority, he thought it was more fair when it extended over a larger area than over a small one for then it tended to correct itself. However, he later said that the Conservatives would stick to Tory precedent. This speech was variously interpreted. Friends of Home Rule saw in his opinion on large areas for local government an indication of Conservative plans along their own lines. Others held that the latter part of the speech qualified the for-

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 239-40.
 O'Shea: Parnell 29.
 (b) Holland: Devonshire 67.

mer. The Liberal Home Rulers held that it was this speech that convinced the Irish that they might count on the Conservatives.

(a) Randolph Churchill was known to be against coercion. He had told Rosebery that the abandonment of coercion was a condition of his entering the Tory Cabinet in June '85. (b) He was for extension of local government, especially in regard to education. But he was unalterably against Home Rule. When he visited Dublin (9-27) he told the attorney-general, Mr. Holmes, "none of us must have anything to do with Home Rule in any shape." (c) As a rule the Tory candidates were silent on the subject of Home Rule. Many said they were in favor of some scheme of local government in Ireland. (d)

The Whig branch of the Liberals, as represented by Hartington, was against concession to the Irish. Hartington wrote Gladstone (10-15) that he was against any great central body dealing with Irish local government (such as was, perhaps, suggested by Salisbury, 10-7) as being a step toward complete legislative independence. He did not see how to guard the minority--Ulster and the landlords. (e) At Belfast a month later (11-8) he said that neither Salisbury nor Gladstone had given "an absolute and unconditional negative to Mr. Parnell's demands" but in its present shape it was impossible. He, himself, would not go beyond administrative reorganization and the establish-

- | | | |
|-----|---|-----------------------------|
| (a) | Morley: Gladstone 243-44. | Elliot: Goschen I, 310. |
| | Holland: Devonshire 65. | Elliot: Goschen II, 20. |
| | Jeyes: Salisbury 115. | Fitzmaurice: Granville 465. |
| {b} | Rosebery: Churchill 19-22. | |
| {c} | Rosebery: Churchill 23. | |
| | Winston Churchill: Randolph Churchill 460 | |
| {d} | Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 281-82. | |
| {e} | Holland: Devonshire 93-94. | |

ment of county councils on an elective basis. He approved of small beginnings. (a)

Chamberlain during this period, was holding to the point that he would give only local government in granting concessions. He told Labouchere that he thought the English and Scotch workingman had given almost all they would to Irish demands. (b) To Gladstone he wrote (10-26) that he thought Ireland "had better go altogether than the responsibilities of a nominal union be accepted." The majority of Liberals, he did not believe, would give more than English local government and he thought if possible, Irish and English local government should be dealt with together. (c) Chamberlain did not believe that Gladstone could find a way of settling the Irish question that would make all groups forget their differences. The Liberals were tired of concessions to Parnell and Parnell could not be trusted--and these facts would work against any settlement of the question. (d) The plan he had proposed was the maximum the Radicals would stand and a great deal more than the Whigs would accept. It had been practically agreed to by Parnell, but he had later thrown it over. The Tories were not committing themselves and it would be better if the Liberals didn't. However, if Gladstone proposed a separate Parliament, Chamberlain did not believe he would find much support in any section of the party. (e) A good speaker with dictatorial powers could stop the Irish obstruction in Parliament which was the

(a) Holland: Devonshire 75-6.

(b) Thorold: Labouchere 250 (10-11).

(c) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 192-93.

Thorold: Labouchere 239-40--Chamberlain thought this last point could be discussed later. Letter of Labouchere 10-20.

(d) Thorold: Labouchere 239-40.

(e) Thorold: Labouchere 241.

Basis of Parnell's power outside Parliament. (a)

This was the situation then: Gladstone investigating the question, not saying what his plan would be were he in power, but preparing for that contingency; Hartington and the Whig branch opposed to any concession to the Irish; Chamberlain willing to consider only local government schemes for Ireland.

Early in November, Gladstone started his Midlothian campaign. There he pushed the Irish question to the front and warned his hearers of the gravity of the question. So long as the Irish demand did not infringe on the principles of the unity of the Empire, he held that they were bound to consider it if it were made constitutionally. Therefore he hoped that one or the other of the great parties would be given an out and out majority; for the worst possible situation would be for the Irish to hold the balance of power if the Irish Question were to be considered. (b)

The next day Parnell requested Gladstone to offer a constitution for Ireland. (c) Gladstone refused, saying that was a function of the government. It would be necessary to wait until after the Irish voted at the polls. This answer did not satisfy Parnell as to Gladstone's intentions, so on November 21, he issued his manifesto. He asked the Irish voting in Eng-

- (a) Thorold: Labouchere 243.
Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland.--Forster was against large commissions but for local government as in England and Scotland. He was not for Chamberlain's schemes, which he considered Home Rule.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 237-8.--"Apart from the term Whig and Tory, there is one thing I will say and will endeavor to impress on you, and it is this. It will be a vital danger to the country and to the Empire if at a time when the demand from Ireland for larger powers of self-government is to be dealt with, there is not a party totally independent of the Irish vote."
- (c) Holland: Devonshire 69.

land to vote for the Tories instead of the Liberals. (a) This shows that at the end of November Parnell believed that the Irish could secure better terms from the Tories than from the Liberals. (b) It is estimated that this action of Parnell's changed from 20 to 30 seats in Parliament. Parnell later confessed that this move was a mistake for had the Liberals had these very seats, it would have been to the Irish advantage. (c)

The elections ran from the 23rd of November to the 19th of December. When the votes were in, it was found the Liberals had 333, the Tories 251, and the Parnellites 86 seats. (d) This gave the Liberals 82 votes over the Conservatives; and the combination of Conservatives and Irish had only 4 more than the Liberals. The Tories, then, could remain in control only by complete dependence on the Irish support.

Elliot says the people withdrew their confidence from Gladstone but did not give it to Salisbury. (e) It was characteristic of the vote that the Liberals lost in the boroughs and won in the counties.

Concerning the subject of the Irish elections, there was much dispute. The Irish who were against Home Rule said it had been won by fraud. (f) Morley, Paul, Trevelyan, and Egersley point out that the majorities were overwhelmingly big. Home Rule won whether you count seats or votes. (g) "This allega-

- (a) O'Brien: Olive Branch 07-09.
- (b) Davitt: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland 481.
- (c) Morley: Gladstone 244-45.
Davitt: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland 481.
- (d) The rest of the 103 Irish seats were Conservative.
- (e) Elliot: Goschen I, 313.
- (f) O'Donnell: History of the Irish Parliament Party 88-91.
- (g) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 287.
Morley: Recollections 203. Argyll: Argyll 405.
Trevelyan: Bright 444.
Paul: History of England, Vol. V, 26.

tion--(that the Irish Nationalist members would not represent the Irish people)"--is not supported by evidence. Majorities were far too large to have been the result of pressure or alarm."

(a) "Anyway the election put an instrument of iron into Parnell's hands." (b)

The Whigs and Tories attempted to shift the blame for the defeat. The Radicals claimed that they had saved the party in the counties by their program. (c) The fault was because the election was fought along Whig lines. (d) However, the critics did not consider the elections favorable to advanced Liberals. The Whigs criticized Chamberlain for introducing party friction at such a crisis. (e) Hartington was much offended by Chamberlain's criticism of the Whigs. (f)

"There were two things evident: the Irish held the balance; and the hope of the supporters of Mr. Chamberlain had been disappointed in regard to English reforms." (g)

Section V.

During the early days of December there was a story current that Gladstone had given the Queen a scheme of Home Rule. Labouchere wrote Chamberlain about it on the 3rd. He said the plan had an Irish president, who could be deposed by the Queen and the council if it were necessary. Labouchere had promised not to tell this. (h) At a meeting of the Radical group on the

- (a) Paul: History of England Vol. V, 27.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 255.
- (c) Morley: Gladstone 250.
- (d) Thorold: Labouchere 244-45.
- (e) Morley: Gladstone 251.
- (f) Holland: Devonshire 96-7.
- (g) Fitzmaurice: Granville 466.
- (h) Thorold: Labouchere 245.

5th, this same information was given. The story went that the Queen had shown the plan to Salisbury, who told Randolph Churchill. He had told it to Lady Dorothy Neville, who told Chamberlain. They had had no statement from Gladstone. (a) It is to be doubted if this is true. It is not in line with Gladstone's plan of procedure. If Gladstone had given out any such plan, anxious as everyone was to know what he intended to propose, it would not have been kept secret. Gladstone's answer to all inquiries seems to have been that it was not for the opposition to move. On December 10, he gave this memorandum to Herbert Gladstone:

1. Nationalists and Tories are allies of long standing.
 2. The Irish Government should be settled by the allies for:
 - a. They are the Government,
 - b. Their measures will get fair play.
 3. The Allies are one-half the house so there is not majority against them and they can continue in office.
 4. A plan must be produced by a government. He will introduce no plan until the Government has arrived at some issue with the Irish.
 5. If the Liberals had to settle it, they would first have to settle the question of who are the government.
- (b)

When Granville was in consultation with Gladstone (early

- {a} Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 194.
 {b} Morley: Gladstone 258.

in December) they discussed the situation and decided the responsibility lay with the government and that the best chance of settlement was in a large concession. Granville then consulted with Hartington and Spencer, and Spencer with Gladstone and Rosebery. The conclusion was that it was up to the government and Gladstone refused to offer a plan while in opposition. ^(a) Spencer and others (believing the time for coercion passed), urged upon Gladstone that he give general support to Irish autonomy as a principle before particulars were ready. (b) Did Gladstone, then, submit a plan? Tuckswell mentions the report that certain politicians wrote Gladstone proposing to arrange a Liberal program. He sent them a sketch of Home Rule, which he said they might make public. (c) O'Brien says that early in December (it was before the 15) a communication, sanctioned by Gladstone was sent "to a leading Liberal", which contained a statement that he was willing to establish a Parliament in Ireland. No details were discussed but the principle of Home Rule was conceded. (d)

Moreover, on December 16, Hartington wrote Gladstone asking his plan and intentions concerning Ireland. He had been hearing all sorts of rumors and found his ignorance embarrassing. (e) Gladstone answered him on the 17th that he had opinions and ideas, but no intentions or negotiations. He consider-

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 261-62.--These consultations were before December 9.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone 261-62.
- (c) See McIntoch: Chamberlain 112.
- (d) O'Brien: ~~Clive~~ Parnell II, 115-16.
- (e) Holland: Devonshire 98-9.--Hartington wrote Granville at the same time saying that he did not see how a Home Rule scheme no one would accept would unite the party.

ed that Ireland had spoken. He thot that the government ought to meet the demands for an Irish legislative body for Irish (as distinct from Imperial) affairs. Only a government could do it, especially a Tory Government. He would make the following conditions of an admissible plan:

1. Union of the Empire and due supremacy of Parliament.
2. Protection of the minority, (difficult).
3. Fair allocation of Imperial charges.
4. Statutory basis better and safer than revival of Grattan's Parliament, (but not settled).

He did not intend to allow the Irish to establish rival biddings. Especially he urged that no one commit himself. (a)

In Gladstone's answer to Hartington I believe we have the answer to the above speculations. Gladstone was not announcing any plans. He knew what he thot should be done, he was considering the most important details of such action. Probably the "plans" referred to were memoranda beginning with "If" such and such conditions prevailed, such and such should be done. Gladstone consistently asserts, however, that is is for a government to act and he is not the government.

It was just at this point (and before Hartington received the above answer) that there appeared an announcement in the press. (12-17-85) It stated that Gladstone had taken up Home Rule. It described the main lines of his plan. The Unity of the Empire and the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament were

(a) Holland: Devonshire 98-100.

to be maintained. But an Irish chamber was to be created with full power, both legislative and administrative. Equitable distribution of Imperial charges, and representation of minorities was secured, among other means by nomination of certain Irish members by the Crown. (a)

Gladstone's answer was that the account was not an accurate representation but a speculation on his views. That was as far as the denial went. (b)

The story of the announcement is this. Dilke had made a speech (before December 14) which was taken to mean that his part of the party did not agree with Gladstone and that the Irish question should not be considered at this time. (c) Herbert Gladstone decided that the party needed a hint as to his father's idea to prevent them from drifting toward a split. (12-14-85) So he told Reed, of Leed's Mercury (12-16-85) in a general conversation, what he thought were his father's views. These were published as a positive statement. (d)

Upon seeing the announcement, Hartington, immediately, wrote Gladstone that he could not help but feel that Gladstone had committed himself. As he did not agree with Gladstone, he felt that he, too, must speak. Consequently on the 20th, he sent a public letter to his chairman in Lancashire that no policy on Irish demand had been communicated to him. He stood for

(a) Published in the Standard and the Leed's Mercury, 12-17-85. Gladstone's denial appeared in the evening papers of the 17th. Appeared in the Time and other London morning papers, 12-18-85. O'Brien says a similar paragraph was given to Mr. Dawson Rogers of the National Press Agency from another source, 12-16-85.

(b) Jeyes: Salisbury 126.
 (c) Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 195.
 (d) Morley: Gladstone 264-65.
 Thorold: Labouchere 253.

what he had said at the elections. (a) Gladstone told Hartington that, as he was working for agreement, he would overlook Hartington's public letter.

In regard to the publication of Gladstone's supposed plan, Chamberlain, publically, assumed quite the correct attitude. In his speech at the Birmingham Reform Club (12-17-85) he said that he did not doubt he could support any scheme that Gladstone would propose. Still he did not think it was time for the Liberals to interfere. The integrity of the Empire was important.

(b) It was noted that this was not a downright protest like Hartington's. (c) Jeyes says it showed that Chamberlain was willing to consider favorably Home Rule but was no suggestion that he would accept any particular scheme. (d) Probably Chamberlain did not think that when it came to an actual proposal, that Gladstone, remembering the Whig section, would suggest anything which would be more than he, as a Radical and for local government, could endorse. Chamberlain privately told Dilke they must be careful not to commit themselves. He thought Gladstone had sprung his scheme too soon. His plan he considered "death and damnation." He doubted if the country would support it. He, himself, would not agree to the Irish proposals. It was a good card for the Tories. (e) Chamberlain received a letter from Gladstone at this time urging him to be incredulous as to statements concerning his (Gladstone's) views. Most men, tho not

- (a) Holland: Devonshire 101-02.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 117.
- (c) Morley: Gladstone 111-12.
- (d) Jeyes: Salisbury 125.
- (e) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 196-97.

Chamberlain, were in too much of a hurry to make up their minds. This letter was probably due to Dilke's influence for he had sent word to Gladstone that Chamberlain was angry at not being consulted on this situation. (a)

The opinions of the various leaders of the Liberal party give us an idea of the party response to this question of Home Rule. Derby, all thru December, was against the plan. He raised the objection to the veto and to other details. 'The Liberals would be very unwise to take it up. He depended on Hartington to lead the opposition. (b) Goschen thot the Irish demands a menace to property of all kings. He was against Home Rule. The chief diffucilty, as he saw it, was what to offer as an alternative against Pamell's policy. Could they get support for a vigorous law enforcing campaign in Ireland? Goschen had consulted with the Queen. She was for United Moderates, slighting party lines. (c) Argyll, too, was against concession to the Irish. He thot that it was Radical influence on Gladstone that had made him loose his proper balance. (d) Bright, the middle of December, was considering the advantages of being rid of the Irish at Westminister. He saw difficulties, but tended to favor giving the rebel party what they wanted. Early in January, however, two Irish merchants who were much opposed to Home Rule visited Bright and succeeded in influencing him against it. (e) Harcourt was an "unwilling convert."

- (a) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 198-99.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 120, 469, 478.
- (c) Elliot: Goschen I, 321; II, 4.
- (d) Argyll: Argyll 417; 399.
- (e) Trevelyan: Bright 446.

He saw reasons against the plan, but believed the present way impossible, especially since Gladstone's influence was for Home Rule. (a) Spencer thought the former way useless. He was for the plunge, with proper safeguards. He would proceed with caution, but he favored a large measure. (b) Granville said that he was much perplexed, of course. He favored most waiting until the Government and Parnell showed their hands. He was not against concession, providing the minorities and landlords were secured. He wished to be rid of the Irish members. (c) Morley was for Home Rule. He had committed himself at his speech at Newcastle on December 21. On January 7, he spoke for the removal of the Irish from Westminster. He stood with Gladstone. (d) Dilke, early in December, had advocated letting the Tories do it. He was for the extension of local government generally as well as in Ireland; and he favored concession to the Irish as a step in the right direction. (e)

As to the Irish, it seems that Parnell preferred his Tory friends but doubted their ability to convince the rest of their party. He was afraid to depend on the Liberals lest Chamberlain or Hartington should be ready for coercion. (f) Parnell wanted a pledge from Gladstone, of no more coercion, before turning the Tories out and putting the Liberals in. Gladstone refused them any such pledge. (12-31-85) (g) Healy and

- (a) Holland: Devonshire 117.
- (b) Fitzmaurice: Granville 474-75.
- (c) Fitzmaurice: Granville 468-69.
- (d) Jeyes: Salisbury 125.
Morley: Recollections. 204-09.
- (e) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 196-97; 203.
- (f) Morley: Gladstone 274-76.
- (g) O'Shea: Parnell 30-1.

Labouchere (who was a friend of the Irish) were each making proposals of constitutions they believed the Irish would accept. (a)

It is no wonder that the public did not know what position to take. The leaders were undecided and there had been no opportunity for them to inform the public on the issues involved. (b) "Strong men had to agree to differ and each go on his own way, tho none went rejoicing." (c)

Consistently with his attitude that the government should deal with the Irish question, Gladstone spoke to Balfour about the matter, when he met him at Eton on December 20. He sent word to Salisbury that he was willing not to consider the Irish question a party matter but to deal with it in the same spirit he had had in regard to Afghanistan and the Balkans. (d) He then put this in writing for Balfour. Balfour took the matter up with Salisbury, who on the 24th returned the answer that he thanked Gladstone but he did not think it advisable to make any communication before meeting Parliament. (e)

On December 26, Gladstone took the first step in the consultation of the leaders. He sent to Grosvenor, Granville, and Spencer, especially, a memorandum as follows:

1. Government should act.
2. Nationalists should support them.
3. Has tried to bring it about.

- (a) Thorold: Labouchere 12-26; 264-70. Letter to Times 1-4-86.
 (b) Elliot: Goschen II, 14.
 (c) Fitzmaurice: Granville 471.
 (d) Holland: Devonshire 102-03.
 (e) Jeyes: Salisbury 127.

4. If they do, we are justified in waiting for plan.
5. This would be best.
6. But if Government does not, and Irish break alliance, Government would have minority in House.
7. Concerning precedent, ministry should have confidence of House.
8. Allright for Government to join with Nationalists; but not for us to.
9. If alliance is dissolved, duty of Liberal majority to take office.
10. Then amendment to address necessary concerning asking Queen to choose ministers in confidence of House.
11. Sanction of previous meeting of party necessary for "10".
12. Probably would try to draw him on Irish question.
13. But not necessary to announce policy before they are the government.
14. But to obviate jealousy, it might be best for him to go to farthest allowable point.
15. If it happens as above, might be at first meeting that he would accept only if "assured of general support of party to a plan of duly guarded Home Rule"?
16. If support withheld, would stand aside.
17. The portion of party not agreeing with him should form Government, if Queen asks them to.

18. Irish Question paramount with him, but would support a Liberal Government ("17") rather than a Tory Government, neither of which offered an adequate Irish measure. (a)

Chamberlain was outspoken in his opposition to Gladstone's policy. He had told Gladstone he did not think the country would stand an independent parliament for Ireland. (b) If Gladstone carried out his plan to the point where, as the Government, he actually proposed this scheme for Ireland, Chamberlain was sure Gladstone would split the Liberal party. Gladstone would have the support of Morley, the Crofters' representatives, and some labor representatiges, but not the majority of the Radicals or the Liberals. The Scotsman and the Leed's Mercury were leading in this direction. But Chamberlain would not join a Government pledged to such a mad proposal. (c)

To Chamberlain there were two possible courses: National Councils and Separation. The Nationalists would not accept the first and everyone professed to reject the second. Gladstone's plan was a hazy idea between the two, Chamberlain held, really only a step removed from separation and scarcely preferable to it. Therefore he proposed another possible arrangement, tho it meant recasting the Constitution. This was the adoption of the American system. There would be five parliaments: England, Scotland, Wales, Ulster, and the three other Irish provinces combined. Each parliament would have its own ministry respon-

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 270-72.
- (b) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 199. 12-25-85.
- (c) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke, 201-02. Letter to Dilke.

sible to and dependent on it.. An Imperial Parliament, with its own ministry, would attend to foreign affairs, colonial, army and navy, postoffice, and customs. A supreme court would determine the attributes of these local legislatures and limit their authority. The House of Lords would have to go, for the five legislatures could not stand a second chamber apiece. Such a plan would be feasible, but would it be worth such a change to satisfy the Irish demand? This Chamberlain proposed to Dilke and to Labouchere in letters of December 26. (a)

At this time, I do not believe Chamberlain was so much advocating an adoption of such a Federal scheme as protesting against what he believed was Gladstone's half-way measure. This course would at once take one to the place where Gladstone's measure must eventually lead. It was a logical consideration, not a serious proposal of a counter policy.

This is in line with the fact that on January 3, Chamberlain wrote Labouchere that the only way of handling the problem was to call Ireland a protected state. England's responsibility was to be exclusively in protecting Ireland against foreign aggression. A financial arrangement should provide for a fixed annual payment to cover Ireland's share of the debt, a sinking fund to establish it in 50 years, and the cost of a military garrison. Ireland should have a constitution, providing for a governor with no veto but power to dissolve Parliament, a Senate with qualifications making it moderately conservative, and a House of Commons. There should be a guarantee of no dut-

(a) Thorold: Labouchere 272.
Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 199-201.

ies designed to injure English manufactures. (a) This scheme differs but slightly from the one attributed to Gladstone.

So at the end of 1885, we find it generally understood that if Gladstone took office, one of the first steps would be a Home Rule Bill. The scope, details and extent of such a Bill were unknown. (b) Gladstone himself, summed up his position (12-27-85 to Granville) "After giving an opportunity to the Government to deal with the Irish Question, it would be my duty of accept of- fice, if necessary, myself, and to bring forward a duly guarded plan of Home Rule." (c)

The closing days of the year were occupied with matters con- cerning a consultation of the party leaders. Gladstone refused to meet the ex-cabinet and neither Hartington nor Granville would ask for the meeting. (d) On December 31, and January 1, Harcourt Dilke, Hartington, and Chamberlain had a consultation at Harting- ton's house. They did not agree but were on friendly terms. (e) Gladstone, however, in spite of their request, refused to move. From the 10th to the 12th of January he met these men in separ- ate interviews in London. Hartington was reticent; nothing came of the Chamberlain, and Dilke interviews. Harcourt supported Gladstone. Then Parliament met on January 12.

Section VI.

The Tory-Parnell Alliance that began so well in June, was

- (a) Thorold: Labouchere 278-79.
Morley: Gladstone 113.
- (b) Jeyes: Salisbury 127. Morley: Gladstone 270.
Fitzmaurice: Granville 474. McIntoch: Chamberlain 111.
- (d) Fitzmaurice: Granville 472-73.
- (d) Fitzmaurice: Granville 472. Morley: Gladstone 269.
- (e) Holland: Devonshire 104.
Gwynn & Tuckwell 203.
Holland: Devonshire 106.

showing signs of breaking by the end of November. (a) Early in December the Tory cabinet had a crisis over the Home Rule situation. Carnarvan threatened to resign if the Cabinet did not go toward Home Rule and Randolph Churchill and Smith threatened to resign if Carnarvan's policy was accepted. Salisbury preferred to risk Carnarvan resigning, but he finally prevailed upon Carnarvan to remain as viceroy until Parliament met. On December 17, Smith became Chief Secretary for Ireland, but this was kept a secret until January. (b) The Cabinet considered the Irish situation was getting worse. (c)

Parliament met on January 12. There were two paragraphs concerning Ireland in the Queen's speech. She had seen with deep sorrow the attempt to excite the people of Ireland to hostility against the legislative law. She regretted that the practice of intimidation continued to exist in Ireland. No effort was to be spared to protect Irish subjects. "If, as my information leads me to apprehend, the existing provisions of the law should prove to be inadequate to cope with these growing evils, I look with confidence to your willingness to invest my government with all necessary powers." (d) Later, the speech says, "there is a measure for the reform of county government in Ireland, also in preparation." This was discussed on January 21. In the House of Lords, Granville said he did not think the government had used very clear language concerning its Irish plans.

(a) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 289-90.

(b) Hardy: Hardy 230-31.
Paul: History of England, V, 31.
Thorold: Labouchere 253-54.

(c) Hardy: Hardy 233.

(d) Hansard 302: 34-5.

When the Conservatives were, in in June they had found such a normal condition in Ireland that they had asked for no special legislation. Now, "instead of boldly asking for needed powers to bring order out of chaos, they hint that later they may propose something." Carnarvan had resigned (January 16). Now what was the Government policy? (a) Salisbury answered that the Government had been definite--they intended to maintain the Union. They had not asked for coercion because they were not sure it would remedy the difficulty. Mr. Smith had just been made Chief Secretary. Before they ask for any measure, they must wait for his report. (b) Spencer asked for Ashbourne's opinion on the state of Ireland. He replied that the law had been enforced, but that the Liberal attitude made enforcement difficult. (c)

In the House Gladstone spoke on the Address. He reviewed his position on the Irish question and said that from Salisbury's Newport speech he believed Salisbury agreed with him. The Union must be maintained but he was willing to consider Irish demands. He reiterated that it was for the Government to act. As "an old Parliamentary hand" he advised his followers to keep quiet until the Government moved. He hoped the Paragraph of the Address which referred to the Union as a "fundamental law" was not intended to mean that the Irish claim would not be heard. His plea was for immediate action and for harmony. (d)

- (a) Hansard 302: 51-8.
- (b) Hansard 302: 62-69.
- (c) Hansard 302: 69-78.
- (d) Hansard 302: 109-20.

Hicks-Beach, in answering this, demanded the Liberals' policy. He said the amount of concession would depend on Irish conditions, and the present did not warrant much. They were awaiting Smith's report before deciding whether to ask for additional powers. (a)

Others followed this address. Albert Grey criticized the Government. Parnell thot if the House approached the problem with the spirit shown in Gladstone's speech, it would not be difficult to find a solution. Ireland could be trusted with the right of self-government; the details could be arranged. Autonomy would decrease the chance of separation. Churchill made it clear that while the Conservatiges were willing to consider local government for Ireland, as far as it was safe, still they did not mean any kind of separation. (b)

On Jan. 23, Smith went to Ireland. While the House discussed two amendments to the address, the Lords attempted to find out the Government's policy. All they could get tho, was Salisbury's regret that they were changing horses in mid-stream, but that he hoped to be able to answer their questions in forty-eight hours. Kimberly retorted that it was odd that Smith could get information in forty-eight hours that they had not been able to get during the months of Carnarvan's time. (c)

The Conservative, however, did not wait until Smith's return. On the 26th, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that on the 28th, Mr. Smith would bring in a bill to suppress

(a) Hansard 302: 122-30.

(b) Hansard 302: 130-180.

Elliot: Goschen I, 11.--Gladstone's speech preceeded Elliot's and Grey's, not followed as Morley says.

(c) Hansard: 302: 297-302.

the National League and other dangerous associations, to prevent intimidation, and to protect life, property and public order in Ireland. (a) This was supposed to appear as if Mr. Smith, in consultation with the Irish leaders, had decided on coercion. As a matter of fact, the Cabinet had decided on the policy without Smith. Indeed, when consulted, Mr. Smith had desired that there be no hurry about the matter, but the Cabinet had not waited for his answer, before deciding to give the notice of the bill. (b)

The Conservatives had no opportunity to introduce their coercion bill for on the night of the 26th the Government was defeated on an amendment to the Address. Jesse Collins moved regretting that the Speech did not contain mention of methods for securing allotments, small holdings, etc. This was part of Chamberlain's unauthorized program, and the amendment had been drafted by Chamberlain and Dilke. (c) Gladstone spoke for it; Hartington against it. The vote was 329 to 250--a majority of 79 against the Government. (d)

The Conservatives resigned and Gladstone took office. It was a tactical victory for the Liberal leader, for he had obtained the government without being forced to declare his Irish policy. (e)

Section VII.

Part I.

When Gladstone took office the last of January, the ques-

- (a) Jeyes: Salisbury 131.
- (b) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 292-93.
- (c) Gwyn & Tuckswell: Dilke 205.
- (d) Hansard 302: 443-50.
McIntoch: Chamberlain 114-15.
Fitzmaurice: Granville 480.
- (e) Jeyes: Salisbury 131.

tion of his support was a very uncertain one. During the month he had been in communication with Hartington. Hartington considered the declaration of December 17 a fair presentation of Gladstone's views even if Gladstone would not admit the authority for the announcement. Consequently he felt that a situation might arise during the discussion of the address where it would be necessary for him, if he were to be consistent in his attitude, to speak out plainly for the legislative union. (a) Gladstone was anxious that there should be no commitment until the government had declared its intention. He wrote Granville that he would consider any such action by Hartington as open defiance. He did not intend to continue the leadership of the party if his plans were to be so openly disregarded. (b) As the case turned out there was no necessity for Hartington to thus defy the chief.

On the other hand, Chamberlain's position was doubtful. Of late there had been a growing coolness between him and Morley. (c) They criticized each other severely. Morley was very near to Gladstone on the Irish question; consequently Chamberlain's support might be in question.

In fact, the days preceding the forming of the Liberal cabinet were full of uncertainty for everyone. No one knew just what Gladstone proposed to do. Who would support him? How would the leaders stand on the question? Many thought Gladstone

- (a) Holland: Devonshire 112.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 112-13.
Elliot: Goschen II, 8.
- (c) Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 204.
McIntoch: Chamberlain 117-18.
Elliot: Goschen II, 8.

intended little more than some scheme of local government. Gladstone, himself, was uncertain how far the party would support him. Taking up the Irish question was not a bid for votes, for he had already tried to get the Conservatives to handle the matter. Gladstone was especially anxious that the question should not come up prematurely, for he felt that would ruin its chance.

(a) He told Harcourt he was prepared to go forward without Hartington or Chamberlain or any positive assurance of support.

(b) What would Chamberlain do? And Hartington? Would Hartington stand firm against Home Rule, or would his dread of breaking with the party be so great that he would acquiesce in Gladstone's plan? The merits of the Home Rule question, Gladstone's position, the support of the leaders--these were the topics of discussion at every political and semi-political meeting, at social gatherings and in the newspapers. (c)

This was the situation when Gladstone took office. He proposed to form a government on the basis of examination and inquiry. The subject of the investigation was the possibility of establishing by law a legislative body to sit in Dublin and to deal with the Irish as distinguished from British or Imperial affairs. This was to be just to all three kingdoms, equitable to all classes, and supporting the unity of the Empire. (d)

Hartington was at once invited to consult with Gladstone concerning forming a government on the above stated basis. After talking it over, Hartington declined to become a part of

- (a) Morley: Gladstone: 284-85.
- (b) Morley: Gladstone: 288.
- (c) Elliot: Goschen II, 5-6.
- (d) Paul: History of Modern England V, 36.
Holland: Devonshire 122.

such a government. He could see no practical difference between examination and actual conception and announcement of a plan. There was nothing to weaken his former objections to a legislature in Ireland, whether independent or dependent. He did not believe it would be consistent with his public utterances to joining a government whose intentions were to consider this. (a) Hartington's position was thus clear. He was against any consideration of Home Rule.

When Gladstone asked Chamberlain to join the government Chamberlain did not consider that Gladstone's statement of intention went any farther than his own previous public statements. He had already told Gladstone, that according to his judgment, it would not be possible to reconcile the conditions Gladstone proposed with the establishment of a national legislative body sitting in Dublin. He had already explained his own preference for a more limited scheme of local government, plus a settlement of land and educational proposals. Still Gladstone had asked him into the cabinet, saying that he should maintain "unlimited liberty of judgment and rejection" and on that basis he would accept office. (b)

There is another element in connection with Chamberlain's place on the cabinet that may or may not have a bearing on the Irish question. Chamberlain was first offered the Admiralty but refused as he wanted the Colonies. Later he decided to accept the Admiralty when it was too late, and he had to take the Board of Trade. Some think this personal disappointment

- (a) Holland: Devonshire 122-26.
- (b) Boyd: Chamberlain's Speeches 233-34.
Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 205-06.
McIntoch: Chamberlain 118.

may have influenced Chamberlain against Gladstone's policy. (a) The lack of entirely cordial feelings between Chamberlain and Gladstone may have had the effect of making negotiations and compromise between them difficult, (b), but in itself would not have been sufficient to have shaped their policy. Chamberlain had made it clear all thru the winter that he was not in accord with Gladstone's proposals. To say he was willing to discuss a plan concerning Ireland did not promise that he would accept it if it did not coincide with his ideas. (c)

Altho he was known to disapprove strongly of Home Rule, Trevelyan accepted a place on the cabinet. He hoped Gladstone had some practical and satisfying scheme. If he did not, Trevelyan intended to withdraw his support. (d) Rosebery became foreign secretary (e); Granville was given the Colonies. (f) Harcourt's acceptance of position as Chancellor of the Exchequer was important for the government because he was an experienced man (g). Spencer's adhesion meant both social and political influence. When his battle of coercion had been repudiated in the summer of 1885, he gradually turned to Home Rule as the only logical way to handle the situation, as long as coercion was discredited. (h)

The appointment of Morley as Irish Secretary was practic-

- (a) Morley: Recollections 212.
Fitzmaurice 483.
- (b) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 300.
- (c) McIntoch: Chamberlain 118.
- (d) Elliot: Goschen II, 24-5.
- (e) Elliot: Goschen II, 24.
- (f) Fitzmaurice: Granville 483.
- (g) Gwynn & Tuckwell 206-07.
- (h) Morley: Recollections 214-19.
- (h) Morley: Recollections 219.

ally equivalent to an announcement for Home Rule. Morley would not have considered taking office if Hartington's policy concerning Ireland was to be followed. With Gladstone willing to consider an Irish Parliament, Morley felt he had no choice but to join. (a)

Thus of the old cabinet, five refused to enter upon the inquiry: Lord Derby, Lord Northbrook, Lord Silborne, Lord Cardigan and Lord Hartington. Chamberlain and Trevelyan agreed to join provisionally. Two were unavailable: Dilke, who would not take office for personal reasons, and Eversley, who had been defeated at the election. Seven accepted without reserve: Lord Granville, Lord Spencer, Lord Kimberley, Lord Ripon, Lord Rosebery, Sir Wm. Harcourt, and Mr. Childers. There were four new men: Morley, Campbell-Bannerman, Mundella, and Lord Herschell (b)

After the selection of the Cabinet, the division of the party on the Irish question was plainer. Hartington, at the head of a resolute group of Whigs, was going to oppose Home Rule. Gladstone had on his side: his great personal popularity, the party machine, the party prestige. But he was forced to introduce new and untried names into his Cabinet and there was a significant lack of certain names that meant authority and influence. (c)

Part II

When Parliament met February 18, Gladstone fixed March 22 as the date he would produce his scheme. This was later changed to April 8. In the House of Lords, an attempt was made to

- (a) Morley: Recollections 211-16.
- (b) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 299.
Quarterly Review: 162: 544-80. April '86.
- (c) Hardy: Hardy 241-42.

find out the government policy concerning Ireland, but Granville would only refer them to the election statements for a platform. As these did not agree the other statesmen insisted they had no guide. (a)

Gladstone, in the House of Commons, announced that finances would be considered first. The only statement regarding Ireland was negative--he did not intend to introduce coercion. Harcourt and Chamberlain made the point that the Government could not announce its policy concerning Ireland when it had just started to inquire. (b) Gladstone refused to explain why Hartington was not in the Government. (c) For the rest of the month discussions of Irish conditions, inequalities of taxation in regard to Ireland, the National League, and the tenants of the Glebe lands, occupied Parliament.

The Tories during this time, were defending their recent position as consistent. Churchill made a trip to Belfast where he spoke against a Dublin Parliament. In that case, he said, "Ulster would fight and Ulster would be right." It was he who labeled the adversaries of the Unionists Separatists, "an offensive, accurate and adhesive" term. Salisbury called the new Government a "cabinet of compromise and concealment." He accused Gladstone of being "reversible"--Home Rule when he talked to Morley; "his coat turned inside out" for Spencer and Kimberly. (d)

February and March were a period of waiting. Gladstone was working hard on the Bill. The House, impatient at the delay,

- (a) Hansard 302: 543-34.
- (b) Hansard 302: 581-624
- (c) Hansard 302: 428-37.
- (d) Jeyes: Salisbury 132.

refused the estimates for the Civil Establishment until the Government announced its policy. (a) The leaders were busy building up their support. Hartington acknowledged that Gladstone had given warning of his policy, but the scheme would have to be announced before the people could decide. (b) Friends of Hartington thought they could get together considerable support.

It was in March that Chamberlain and Trevelyan resigned from the Cabinet. At the time little explanation was made but when Gladstone came to introduce his Bill in April, Chamberlain and Trevelyan took occasion to explain their resignations. It seems that the Irish plans were not mentioned in the Cabinet until March 13. Then Chamberlain gathered that Gladstone had convinced himself that it was necessary to concede a separate legislative assembly to Ireland, with full power to deal with Irish affairs. To this policy, Chamberlain "opposed his own public utterances and consecutive convictions". (c) In connection with his Irish plan, Gladstone submitted a scheme of land purchase, which involved lending some 120 million pounds, sterling, to Ireland by the British tax payer. It was to this part of the plan that Chamberlain especially objected. Trevelyan's objection was somewhat different. He could not agree to hand over to an Irish Parliament and an Irish Executive the control of police and administration of law.

So Chamberlain and Trevelyan offered to resign. Altho Chamberlain said he could attend the Cabinet, only to gather

- {a) Hansard 302: 1917 ff.
- {b) Paul: History of Modern England V, 42.
Holland: Devonshire 135-36.
- {c) McIntoch: Chamberlain 119.

arguments against the scheme, Gladstone urged them to remain.

(a) However, as Chamberlain wrote Gladstone, as Gladstone had decided that local government would be inadequate and that Ireland must have a separate legislative body that would not control army and navy, or foreign and colonial policy, but should manage customs, civil forces, and even a volunteer army, Chamberlain considered this separation. Worse than that, he thought it would make an unstable and temporary form of government. Chamberlain was opposed to such a policy, so he resigned. (b)

The time gained by postponing the introduction of the Bill in Parliament was largely devoted to talking over scruples with Chamberlain and Trevelyan. Trevelyan was determined; but Chamberlain was willing to negotiate. He submitted counter-propositions, which "would not satisfy either Nationalists or their representatives in the Cabinet." (c) Chamberlain's four objections may be summed up: (1) The Irish were to be excluded from Westminster, (2) The English gave up the control of excise. (3) The English gave up the appointment of the judges. (4) Parliament should have only rights specifically mentioned. Morley points out that (1) was subsequently allowed; (2) was speedily allowed; (3) was a detail not worth breaking a party for; and (4) was only a question of drafting. (d) It is believed that Chamberlain thought Gladstone was not willing enough to consider his objections. Later provisions were made toward meeting Cham-

- (a) Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 211.
- (b) 3-22-86
O'Brien: O'Brien Parnell II, 128-29.
- (c) Jeyes: Salisbury 133-34.
- (d) Morley: Gladstone 302-03.

berlain's objections, but it was then too late. (a) Chamberlain's resignation became final on March 26. Several minor members of the administration resigned; Mr. Stansfeld and Lord Dalhousie took the place of Chamberlain and Trevelyan. (b)

Of course these resignations provoked much discussion. Chamberlain's enemies were eager to say that his resignation was due to personal spite, that he objected to Gladstone's scheme being carried thru rather than his, that it was jealousy of Gladstone's prestige, and so on. Chamberlain's friends pointed out how for his principle, Chamberlain sacrificed his chance of personal advantage, and how his action was perfectly consistent with his former declaration. (c) The question then resolved itself into: How many of the Radical Group would Chamberlain carry with him in his opposition to Gladstone's policy? (d)

Section VIII.

As the date for the introduction of the Bill drew near (April 8) interest increased. Dilke urged Chamberlain to keep quiet if he could not support the Bill, rather than incur the enmity of the Irish by fighting it. (a) Both Hartington and Chamberlain were opposed to Gladstone, so it was logical that they should join forces. As this opposition was almost the only point on which they did agree it was difficult for them to

(a) Holland: Devonshire 131.

Jeyes: Salisbury 171.

(b) See Hansard 304: 1186 ff.

(c) McIntoch: Chamberlain 119-21.

(d) See: Chautauqua Vol. VI, 259. March '86.

Littell's Living Age Vol. CLXVIII, 659-68. (3-13-86)

Contemporary Review: Some Aspects of Home Rule by Edward A. Freeman.

Westminster Review Vol. CXXV 442-44. (April '86)

as examples of magazine discussions showing popular interest in the Irish question.

(e) Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 214.

work together. Chamberlain thot Hartington too willing to follow the advice of the extreme Whigs; and Hartington objected to the way Chamberlain declined to be bound by the decisions they reached in council. They had considerable discussion as to which faction should immediately follow Gladstone's opening with an explanation; each was jealous of his perogative. (a)

The Irish leaders had kept in close touch with the development of the Bill. On the night before the Bill was introduced, Parnell had a meeting of the leading men of his party to explain the Bill. To them Parnell said he thot the financial settlement unfair, but he had not been able to get better terms. He did not approve of the land settlement part. However, he thot it was to the party's best interests to indorse the Bill and the meeting decided to do so. It as least recognized Ireland's right to nationhood. (b) Consequently, the next day, when Gladstone sent his private secretary to Mrs. O'Shea to get Parnell's final word, the answer was, "yes , introduce the Bill." (c)

Gladstone spoke from four thirty to eight o'clock. Altho the speech was long and technical, the large audience present gave it careful attention. (d) He began with a History of the Act of Union, then he showed how coercion, was proved a failure after a trial of 85 years, for law was still unrespected in Ireland where exceptional legislation was necessary for government. The remedy for this would be to make the Irish administration I-

- (a) Gwynn & Tuckwell: Dilke 213.
 Elliot: Goschen II, 38.
 (b) Davitt: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland 490.
 (c) O'Shea: Parnell 36.
 (d) Davitt: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland 491.

Irish, not English, by letting the Irish control it. A central elective body to control specific branches would meet the need, but Ireland did not want this. Ireland had spoken clearly and constitutionally. Conditions demanded a change. Keeping clearly in mind the preservation of the Union, Gladstone then unfolded his plan of Home Rule. (a) This was briefly: An Irish legislature in Dublin for Irish affairs; an Irish executive responsible to the Lord Lieutenant, irresponsible of English parties; two houses or orders: first, Irish Peers and Members elected under high pecuniary gratification, and second, present Irish representatives of 103 members, plus 101 chosen by all the constituencies except Trinity College. There was to be no representation at Westminster. Irish judges were subject to Irish legislation. The Irish executive was to control the police. The Legislature could not deal with matters affecting the Crown, military or naval forces, trade, navigation, coinage, establishment or endowment of religious institutions. The customs union was to be maintained and the Legislature should have no power to improve duties. Ireland was to levy her own taxes, and pay the Treasury in London a sum equal to one fifteenth of the British revenue. There was to be no separate provision for Ulster. Gladstone announced that there was also to be a Land Purchase Bill in connection with this Government of Ireland Bill, which he would present in a few days. (b)

After several minor speeches, Trevelyan explained why he

- (a) See Appendix for Outline of Bill.
- (b) Paul: History of Modern England V, 45.
Hansard 304: 1036-85.

left the Government. He was not for Home Rule and had not been at the time he joined the cabinet; but he thought it well to join lest the cabinet be too strongly Home Rule. He counted on the measure being "knocked around in the cabinet". When he found he could not mould cabinet opinion to his view, he resigned. To maintain order, he proposed that they support a strong central government. He was willing to grant freely elected local bodies in Ireland for the management of taxation, local government and so forth, but he objected especially to Gladstone's land settlements as a "sop to class". (a)

This speech was followed by one by Parnell. After criticising Tregelyan's position he took up the Bill. Of its spirit he approved. The question of the financial settlement he thought open to discussion. One twentieth would be a fairer proportion of Imperial expenses for Ireland, rather than the one fifteenth proposed. Parnell felt that this item might cause the Irish to withhold their support of the Bill, so he favored leaving the question to be argued in Committee. Other points which he felt must be adjusted were the condition of the Royal Irish Constabulary and ^{he} that the first order's power to hang up a bill for at least three years could be bettered. On the whole, he thought the Irish would be willing to support the Bill. (b)

This closed the discussion the first night. The question was debated four nights. There was no division for it was the general consensus of opinion that the Government should be allowed to give its position.

- (a) Hansard 304: 1104-23.
- (b) Hansard 304: 1124-34.

On the second night of debate, Chamberlain explained the reasons for his resignation. (a) Then discussing the Bill, he stated his objections to it. These were: (1) The exclusion of the Irish from Westminster, which he felt shut them out of Imperial affairs. (2) The financial arrangements, for he did not agree as to Ireland's share of the total, nor as to the source of her revenue. (3) The air of separation rather than Home Rule in the proposal as a whole. His solution would be along the line of a federal model; Ireland might then remain as an integral part of the Empire. For a century, the advance of the democratic movement had been along the lines of federation as in Italy, Germany and the United States. Federation would preserve the Union and at the same time satisfy Ireland's desire for a National local government. As he did not consider Gladstone's scheme adequate, he resigned. (b)

After several speeches, not especially noteworthy, Hartington spoke in explanation of his position. When asked to join the cabinet he had refused because he was opposed to action on the question of Home Rule and he had not believed that the cabinet could take up this kind of an inquiry without action following. He felt that such a matter ought to be passed upon by the constituents before being taken up by Parliament. In times to come, larger provincial, even national, organization of local authorities might be granted but if so they would be the outgrowth of institutions not yet established and England, Scot

- (a) See under date of resignation. 3-13-86.
 (b) Boyd: Chamberlain's Speeches.
 Hansard 304: 1181-1207.

land, and Wales would share equally with Ireland. After this explanation he gave his criticisms of the Bill. He thot it impossible for the Imperial Parliament to levy certain taxes on Ireland without Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament. It was not fair for Ireland to contribute such a large sum to Imperial expenditures and have no voice in controlling the expenditures. The difficulty of maintaining order in Ireland, he felt, had been exaggerated and had been subordinated to political and party questions. If it came to a choice between handling this difficult piece of work and of disrupting the Union, he was sure all would renounce their differences and work together for a greater Empire. (a)

This speech of Hartington's was well received. Churchill says the house was profoundly impressed. Chamberlain heard it with "unfeigned admiration" and "pronounced it the best he ever made". Salisbury maintained the speech "would make a difference in the situation". Auberon Herbert, tho he did not agree with the Irish policy expressed, was glad he had back bone enough not to weakly follow his party. (b)

Morley answered the speech. The power of both Queen and Parliament was intact, he said. The Royal Irish Constabulary was to remain with the Lord Lieutenant. The Government had not changed their position but the Tories' adoption of coercion had changed the situation. Them Morley criticized Chamberlain's course. If he (Chamberlain) was ready to go so far as a Parl-

- (a) Hansard 304: 1238-63.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 145-46.

liament in Ireland, then he was trying to break his party by his opposition. Chamberlain's objections to customs had been met. His point on the control of the judges was not worth breaking a party for. Morley considered Chamberlain's scheme of federation shadowy. Some of the details, as using British money to pay landlords rents while eviction is stayed, he thought would take too long to settle and the difficulty was pressing. So it was not possible to wait for a scheme of federation to be evolved. The suppression of the land ^a ~~league~~ was a task that called for no vacillation. Morley believed that in practice an Irish Parliament would be workable and that the Irish retained at Westminster would only do harm. He was for pacification and conciliation. (a)

On the third night of debate on the first reading, the Conservatives were the chief speakers. Randolph Churchill criticised the provisions of the Bill dealing with customs and excise. That the Bill meant repeal of the Union and that it was unfair to Ulster were two of his arguments. Gibson spoke against the Bill, especially if it were pressed on the grounds of what would occur if this concession was not granted to the Irish. He thought some points of the Bill absurd. (b)

Harcourt, in his speech on the fourth night, quoted the "Radical program" to show that Chamberlain at least let pass a statement that what Ireland needed was local government for local problems. As to the alternatives proposed, Trevelyan's plan of councils could get no support, not even from Chamberlain.

- (a) Hansard 302: 1263-78.
- (b) Hansard 302: 1318-1416.

Chamberlain's federation needed preliminary steps, for example how to provide the 4,000,000 pounds needed to pay the landlords and how to get the machinery in motion quickly. The former Hartington-Spencer plan was coercion, but the changed conditions made that impossible. The Conservatives had only coercion to offer and that would make the situation worse. (a)

Harcourt was followed by Goschen. He was opposed to the Bill, disliking the exclusion of Irish members. He asked for an explanation of the veto and complained that too much power was given to Ireland. (b) Hicks-Beach said the measure was getting support only because it was backed by Gladstone's name. (c)

Gladstone then closed the debates with his second speech on the Bill. To Chamberlain he replied that his scheme held the field. Coercion was the only alternative but the country had rejected that in turning to the Liberals. He drew attention to the five essentials of the Bill. (1) It was consistent with Imperial unity. (2) It was founded on the political equality of the three nations. (3) It distributed the Imperial burdens equitably. (4) It safeguarded the minority. (5) It should be final. Goschen's questions, he referred for answer to the Committee. Hartington, he said, would find that the Reform Bill was not an election issue, either. Similarly in his forceful debate style, Gladstone met the arguments of all the other opponents of the measure. On April 13 the Bill passed its first reading. (d)

- (a) Hansard 304: 1439-1438.
- (b) Hansard 304: 1358-1482.
- (c) Hansard 304: 1518-34.
- (d) Hansard 304: 1534-1880.

On April 16, Gladstone introduced the land bill. This provided that every Irish landlord was to have the option of selling his estate to his tenants, who would become proprietors at once, tho liable to payment of interest at 4% for forty nine years. The price was twenty years purchase. The security was to be the revenue of Ireland which would be paid by the Irish officers to an Imperial Receiver-General, who would see that the debt to the Treasury was first satisfied. The Treasury was to be authorized to lend the purchase money. The state authorities in Ireland were encouraged to collect the rent by receiving 18% beyond that due the Imperial Exchequer. The British credit might be pledged to the amount of one hundred fifty million pounds, sterling. (a)

Chamberlain immediately objected to the bill. He admitted that certain changes had been made since he had resigned. He stated again that he was for the retention of the Irish members because it meant an Imperial Parliament. Then, if Ulster's claims were to be recognized, the scheme became little more than his National Council, or Trevelyan's National Councils. He had objected to the land scheme because it took so much money. He did not think there was sufficient security for repayment, or that it gave sufficient advantage to the poor tenant, as it was designed for the landlords' benefit. There had been corrections along these lines. The interest of the tenant had been decreased, as had the amount promised. Security had been improved by the English keeping control of the customs. But, said Chamber-

(a) Hansard 304: 1778-1811.

lain, if you are willing to trust Ireland to the extent of letting her have a legislature, why not trust her to deal with the landlords? He then went on to say that he was not an irreconcilable opponent, and respect^{ed} Gladstone very much. (a)

Parnell said he preferred to wait until he saw the bill before commenting. He doubted if a Receiver-General was necessary, considering the sum involved. He thought the contribution to the Imperial charges should be decreased, and that town parties should be included in the scope of the bill. The terms to the Irish tenants must not be too high. Parnell thought these were the best terms the landlords would ever get and they had better close with them. (b)

Thus the Home Rule Bill was introduced, debated and passed its first reading. It will be remembered that when Parliament met there was a great deal of uncertainty as to the intentions of the leaders, and as to the plans to be proposed. These questions, at least, were settled. There was now before the House, and before the public, a definite plan to be considered. The newspapers and magazines of the time portray the state of the public mind. (c) Besides numerous items on the goings and comings of the leaders, there were many articles on their views.

(a) Hansard 304: 1778-1824.

(b) Hansard 304: 1852-57.

(c) London Times.

Saturday Review.

The Nation Vol. XL, XLII, XLIII.

The Fortnightly Vol. XXXIX, XL.

The Contemporary Review Vol. XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII.

The Nineteenth Century Vol. XIX, XX.

The London Quarterly Review Vol. CLIX--1 to 3.

Blackwood Vol. CXXVII--CXL.

Lyttle's Living Age Vol. CLXVI--CLXIX.

Edinburgh Review.

Westminster Review Vol. CXXIV--CXXVI.

Past expressions of opinions were carefully remembered and every word of each statesman viewed in this light. In addition to this, there were published many articles of an informational character, discussing the history of the act of Union, the story of coercion, the economic conditions in Ireland, the business and political relationships of the two countries, and so on. After the details of the proposed plan were known, these too were discussed in the public print. The arguments follow those given in some one or another of the great debating speeches on the subject. They may be summarized as follows:

On the merits of the Government of Ireland Bill, the Irish were more inclined to criticise the financial arrangement. Parnell and Davitt objected principally to the proportion Ireland was forced to pay. Bartlett pointed out that the revenue for Ireland was based on a whisky budget and was not stable. (a) The English statesmen were divided on the question of the exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster. It was indeed a dilemma. Exclusion meant separation, many felt, inclusion would be no better than the present way. (b) To some, as to Bright, the chief merit of the Bill lay in getting rid of the Irish obstruction at Westminster; yet the opponents could argue that without them, England was guilty of "taxation without representation". To many the arrangement in order to be logical must assume the proportions of a federation and they were inclined to object to the amount of change required to perfect this. (c) It was argued that this

- (a) Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 300.
 Davitt: The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland 489.
 Bartlett: Union or Separation 28.
- (b) Jeyes: Salisbury 134-36.
- (c) Fitzmaurice: Granville 485-87.

measure was too much a product of Gladstone's own efforts; that it lacked the broadness that could have been obtained by wider consultation of the judgment of others. Dicey says, "The Bill is a most ingenious attempt to solve the problem, giving to Ireland a legislature which shall be at once practically independent and theoretically dependent upon the Parliament of Great Britain." It was a mixture of federalism and colonialism with the disadvantages of both and the advantages of neither. It left the sovereignty of the British Parliament in doubt, it did not provide sufficient securities against executive and legislative oppression. The veto of the Lord Lieutenant would be slight in practice. There was no provision for the enforcement of the decisions of the Privy Council. In fact, as there was no hope of its being final, Dicey believed it would prove an all around disappointment. (a)

Concerning this question of dealing with Ireland, there were three possible courses: separation, maintenance of the Union, and Home Rule. If Home Rule was to be considered, it might be handled as a federation, as colonial independence, as a revival of Grattan's Parliament, or under Gladstone's constitution. Any scheme must be (1) consistent with Parliament's supremacy, (2) it must be just, and (3) it must promise finality. With these points in mind as a standard, the arguments given may be summarized as:

Arguments in favor of Home Rule were based on foreign experience (1); the will of the Irish people (2); the lessons of history (3); the virtues of self-government (4); the necessity of coercion acts (5); the inconvenience to England of refusing

(a) Dicey: England's Case Against Home Rule 225 ff.

Home Rule. (a)

Arguments against Home Rule were (1) that it was repeal of the Union; (2) that there was no finality to the measure; (3) that it was unfair to the British taxpayer; (4) that it would mean complications with foreign countries; and (5) that it would ruin Ulster. (b)

In addition to the Government of Ireland Bill the Land Bill also had to be considered. The question was asked, Why a Land Bill at all? It was intended to protect a minority whom the Home Rule Bill might injure; but the landlords were only one part of such a minority. The Radicals were against using the public money and this appealed to the English small business man. The landlords themselves were opposed to it; economists objected; the bill was hastily and poorly constructed and if it had survived would probably have been rewritten. The newspapers did not support it and, in fact, public opinion generally was against it. (c)

After the Bill passed the first reading on April 13, it was not again debated until May 10. In the meantime, several events showed the way things were shaping up. On April 14, a meeting was held at the Opera House in which Whigs and Tories participated. Neither Chamberlain nor Randolph Churchill attended. Salisbury, Smith, Hartington and Goschen took part in it. They expressed themselves as for the Union and against federation for Ireland. (d) April 21, the Liberal two thousand of Birmingham

- (a) Dicey Outline.
- (b) Bartlett: Union or Separation 16-17
- (c) Bartlett: Union or Separation 2
Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 307.
O'Brien: Olive Branch 7-18.
- (d) Holland: Devonshire 148.

went on record as endorsing Chamberlain. (a) Chamberlain spoke pointing out objections to Gladstone's scheme: these were largely of a financial nature. He thought the Radicals would be beaten if the settlement were left to the Committee stage. (b). Gladstone on May 1, made the speech to his constituents in which he called the struggle a fight between mass and class. (c) Goschen, at Edinburgh, answered arguments of Morely, Spencer and others. The Liberal Association, however, stood by Gladstone and Home Rule. (5-5-86) The local caucus followed its example in approving him. (d)

Behind the scenes, a lively argument was going on between Hartington and Chamberlain over the question of procedure. Hartington was for a reasoned amendment. Chamberlain thought a move of rejection would be better to rally waverers. (e) In the meantime (4-15-86 to 4-30-86) Chamberlain and Labouchere were corresponding. (f) Labouchere was anxious to reconcile Gladstone and Chamberlain and urged Chamberlain to leave the fight for the Committee stage. Chamberlain thought the debate on the second reading was the place. He gave his ultimatum on May 1. The Irish must be retained. (This was clause 24.) (g) Chamberlain told Dilke (5-6-86) that he had really rather vote against the Bill.

On May 3, Gladstone announced that the Land Bill was not

- (a) McIntoch: Chamberlain 123.
- (b) Boyd: Chamberlain's Speeches 255-72.
- (c) Paul: History of England V, 54. Gives a list of notable names belonging to "class" who were not opposed to Gladstone.
- (d) Paul: History of England, 54.
- (e) Holland: Devonshire 149-50.
- (f) Thorold: Labouchere 292-94.
- (g) Thorold: Labouchere 303.

essential. A vote for second reading of the Home Rule Bill would mean only affirming it s principal. (a) Labouchere, in reporting progress to Chamberlain, told him that Morley would have left out the clauses on exclusion but Gladstone would not. (b) On the 8th, Labouchere gave Chamberlain to understand the Gladstone conceded his point; but this was denied. (c) Chamberlain answered that the replies were indefinite and so he would vote against a second reading. (d) May 11, Chamberlain refused to negotiate further. (e)

This refusal of Chamberlain's was on the day after the debate was opened on the second reading of the Bill.)5-10-86) Gladstone did not mention Chamberlain's ultimatum and Lucy thinks that Chamberlain's followers had expected some answer to it and were offended by his ignoring it. (f) Gladstone's speech was not as strong as his first or last speech on Home Rule. It was mostly answering questions that had been raised during the debate. He said they were asking for autonomy for Ireland and that autonomy was not incompatible with unity. "Taxation without representation" fell to the ground when it was remembered that the Irish had consented to the plan. He hinted that there might be some modification of exclusion during the committee stages on the Bill, as for instance, including the Irish members when excise and customs were to be discussed. There might be a joint committee on foreign affairs. Gladstone inquired what scheme Harting-

- (a) Boyd: Chamberlain's Speeches 235-36 note.
- (b) Thorold: Labouchere 303-06.
- (c) Morley: Gladstone 125.
- (d) Thorold: Labouchere 309.
- (e) Thorold: Labouchere 311.
- (f) Lucy: Memoirs of Eight Parliaments 186-87.

ton would propose. The only one he had mentioned was on November 5, when he suggested slow giving of benefits. (a)

Hartington's answer was one of the strongest debating speeches of the discussion. He accused the Government of experimenting in its Irish policy. The measure did not meet the needs; so he would not support it. The question of the Irish members' exclusion was too important to be left to committee. There were other faults that might be mentioned. Altho he was not forced to give an alternate plan, still he would say that his plan would be to confer on Ireland only the local institutions applicable to all parts of the Kingdom. (b)

While the debate was continuing in the House of Commons, a series of important conferences were being held outside the House. Chamberlain, May 12, met fifty two of his supporters at his house. Indignation was expressed at the pressure being brot to bear on the members. Chamberlain regretted that Gladstone insisted on excluding the Irish. The meeting seemed to be friendly toward Hartington and expressed a wish that Whigs and Radicals could cooperate. (c) It was the next day that Bright wrote Chamberlain that he was against the Bill but that respect for Gladstone kept him silent. (d) On the 14th, Hartington had a meeting at Devonshire House. There were sixty four present, Chamberlain among them. Hartington said he was determined to vote against the Bill for modifications might make it worse. The result of the meeting was practically unanimous against any compromise with Gladstone. The majority who would vote against the Bill was esti-

- (a) Gladstone's Speeches, IX 1-10.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 151-56.
- (c) Elliot: Goschen II, 69.
- (d) Trevelyan: Bright 450.

mated at from 30 to 70. (a) Thus it will be seen that the Whigs and Radicals were getting together in their opposition.

It was sometime during May that an attempt was made at reconciliation. Chamberlain and Trevelyan met Harcourt and Morley at the "Round Table Conference" to talk things over. Chamberlain revived his National Council scheme, but nothing came of the discussion. (b)

May 22, Hartington's faction organized the Liberal Unionist Association. Its purpose was to withstand the pressure of the Liberals' leaning toward Ireland. A strong committee was appointed and the names sent to the newspaper. They attempted to make it clear that they were not antagonistic to Chamberlain and his group, as their objects were the same. They were pledged to local self-government and did not wish to be identified with coercion. (c) The Liberal Unionist Committee met a few days later to talk over ways and means of defeating Gladstone. With Chamberlain's help, if he and his group would vote against a second reading, they could, perhaps, defeat the Bill.

On May 27, Gladstone called a meeting of Home Rule Liberals at the Foreign Office. There were 280 there. He wanted them to vote for the second reading, even if they did not agree with some of the details of the Bill. The vote would be understood to be on principle and the details could be settled in committee. He was willing to concede the exclusion of the Irish. He would "regard with open mind proposals for adjustments of taxation". In the fall, the Bill would be amended in committee or

- (a) Elliot: Goschen II, 69-70.
- (b) Lucy: Memoirs of Eight Parliaments 187.
See O'Brien: Life of Parnell, II-142.
- (c) Holland: Devonshire 157-58.
Elliot: Goschen II, 62-3.

a new bill introduced. (a)

Holland asks "Would these last concessions sap the opposition of the Radicals who went with Mr. Chamberlain, and were, with him, deeply committed to the approval of some kind of Irish self-government? Would the continuous pressure from the constituencies have been too much for the Liberal Unionist consciences to withstand?" (b)

Chamberlain called a meeting in Committee Room 15 of those members who disapproved of the Bill and yet believed in some sort of autonomy for Ireland. There were 88 present. (c) The question resolved itself into whether they should go into the "no" lobby or abstain. Chamberlain expressed his personal preference for taking no part in the division but he hoped that all would follow the course agreed on in the meeting. Then Chamberlain read a letter from Bright in which he said that he intended to vote against the second reading, but would not take the responsibility of advising others! (d) The meeting then decided to vote against the Bill, altho four would abstain and three vote with Gladstone. (e) It would seem that Bright's letter decided their course. In the end, these votes decided the question.

The Tory position during the months of April and May was clearly opposition. Randolph Churchill went to Belfast with his "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right". On May 15, Salis-

- (a) Elliot: Goschen II, 70-1.
McIntoch: Chamberlain 126.
Holland: Devonshire 156.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 156.
- (c) 5-31-86.
- (d) Trevelyan: Bright 484-85. This letter was not destroyed, and has been published in G. M. Trevelyan's Biography of Bright.
O'Brien says Bright did not think Home Rule necessary. II 145.
- (e) Elliot: Goschen II, 73.

bury had said at St. James Hall that Home Rule meant separation. Some races were not capable of self-government, as the Hottintots and Hindus. His alternative policy was to give the government power to govern Ireland. "Apply that receipt honestly and resolutely for twenty years" and then Ireland would be fit to accept gifts such as local government and repeal of coercion laws. Ireland needed a strict government, not a varying one. He would rather deport 100,000,000 Irishmen than buy out Irish landlords. (a)

At a meeting of the old Tory Cabinet (5-29-86) it was decided not to withdraw from Home Rule division as Chamberlain and Hartington advised, but to vote against the Bill. (b). This was a great contrast to the Tory position of the summer before. It was rather a return to the traditional Tory platform. Early in June, the Tories made an agreement with the Liberal Unionists that no Conservative candidate would oppose a Liberal Unionist at the next election. This had the effect of strengthening the Liberal Unionist ranks. (c)

On June 1, Chamberlain explained in the House his reason for refusing Gladstone's compromise. He would have voted for a resolution in favor of Irish autonomy, but to vote for the second reading of this Bill committed one to the general scope of the Bill. He had always been for the exclusion of the Irish and he did not see that the amendments proposed by the Prime Minister would meet the objections in any considerable measure. (d)

- (a) Jeyes: Salisbury 137.
- (b) Hardy: Hardy 249.
- (c) Paul: History of England V, 14.
Holland: Devonshire 157.
- (d) Hansard 306: 675-82.

He then gave his alternate plan. He believed the solution was to be found in Canada in the relation between the province of Canada and the Dominion Parliament. The Dominion Parliament had an absolute and effective supremacy over the provincial legislatures. The veto would be used. The provincial assemblies were subordinate bodies, with distinctly defined rights of legislation expressly given them by statute. Criminal law rested with the Dominion Parliament, not with local assemblies. He thought this plan could be made to work in regard to Ireland. Dissolution had no terrors for him. He was willing to go to the country, not on the principle of Home Rule, but on this Bill. That it would be to his personal advantage to side with Gladstone, he realized, but he would not vote for what he thought unwise. (a)

Here again, Chamberlain was advocating a Federal scheme. He said he was for Home Rule, but not for this bill. As a matter of fact, what he proposed would give the Irish greater freedom than the measure he objected to. (b)

Goschen summed up his side of the argument on the 7th. It was not clear how matters stood. So many charges had been made that no one was sure what they were asked to vote on. That was because they had been considering explanations instead of the Bill itself. He did not believe the Bill would bring prosperity to Ireland; the Union must be saved. (c) Parnell, the same night, said there was no half way house between despotism and

- (a) Boyd: Chamberlain's Speeches 248-54.
- (b) Paul: History of England 66.
Morley: Gladstone 317, 330-33.
- (c) Elliot: Goschen II, 75-7.

Home Rule. The Bill had been accepted by the Irish. (a) He appealed to the English to take the better way and close the strife of centuries and give peace and prosperity to suffering Ireland. (b)

Gladstone then closed the argument. He said that they did not know definitely that the Bill was the work of one man, for Chamberlain, who had made the statement, was not in a position to know what changes had been made. The Bill had been the object of anxious consideration between him and his nearest political friends. The ministers would not promise that the Bill would be reconstructed but this did not say it would not be. He had promised to change clause 24; but had not promised to make a change on the Ulster question. It was for the principle of the Bill that he wanted support. The supremacy of Parliament was not affected. The examples given did not prove that local independence led to separation. As it was, remedial legislation was not a success.

As to other plans, he did not wonder that Chamberlain did not fear dissolution for no matter which way the country went he was prepared. He was in favor of the principle, but he had voted against the Bill. If Gladstone's Bill was deemed too small he had been for a large plan on the basis of federation. If Gladstone's plan proved too large, he had suggested four provincial circuits controlled from London. Chamberlain had "boxed the compass". Salisbury had proposed reunion. His conclusion was: "Think, I beseech you, think well, think wisely, not for

(a) It was at this time he referred to the Carnarvon interview.

See July 1885

(b) O'Shea: Parnell 39-41.

a moment, but for the years to come, before you reject this Bill". (a)

Hartington then moved the rejection of the Bill. When the vote was taken, there were only eleven absent, ten of whom were Liberals. The vote stood 313 to 343, a majority of 30 against the Government. The 85 Nationalists and one Tory had voted for the Bill. Ninety three Liberals had voted against it. The combination of Whigs and Radicals against Gladstone had defeated the first Home Rule Bill.

Gladstone resolved to go the the country with the question. Accordingly on June 26, Parliament was dissolved to "ascertain the full sense of the people" on the proposal "to establish a legislative body in Ireland for the management of Irish affairs as distingusihed from Imperial affairs."

Section IX

An exceedingly active campaign was at once launched. There were numerous speeches made by the various leaders, the sides contested fiercely, personal remarks were many, and much bitterness was shown on both sides. Statesmen's present remarks were compared with past expression's of opinion, motives were criticized and platforms attacked.

Gladstone undertook a speaking tour, especially thru Scotland and to his own constituents. His plea was to vote for the principle of the Bill, even if dissatisfied with the particular

(a) Gladstone's Speeches IX, 102-25.

provisions. He tried to assure his followers that the Union was not at all in danger. He considered Chamberlain's proposals and pointed out that he was changeable--sometimes advocating local councils, again speaking for federation. Hartington, he summed up as being for a slow and gradual granting of limited local power, but characterized his proposals as poorly planned and impracticable. The Tories were for coercion. He urged that all rally to the support of the Liberals. (a)

Hartington, too, made many campaign speeches. He said the question was not one of justice and right but of expediency. He criticized the Bill in that it excluded the Irish from subjects in which they were vitally interested, as colonies and foreign affairs, and gave them exclusive control over property and crime in which others beside themselves were interested. Parliament ought to represent a whole, not a part. The powers should be delegated, not surrendered to local authorities, and these powers should be clearly defined. The right of control by the Imperial Parliament should be clearly reserved and the administration of justice ought to be in hands responsible to Parliament. If the Irish members would not agree but should attempt to block Parliament, the English parties ought to combine against them in defensive war. Hartington maintained that it was not he who had receded from the principle of his party. He was defending them. (b) Goschen took Ulster under his protection in the campaign. His argument was full of criticism of the Bill. (c)

- (a) Gladstone's Speeches IX, 138-50.
- (b) Holland: Devonshire 158-63.
- (c) Elliot: Goschen II, 86-7.
Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 312.

Thruout the fight for the defeat of the Bill Chamberlain had held himself aloof from Hartington's Liberal Union Association. He favored an independent course for himself and his followers. At a consultation at his home it was decided to start a National Radical Union. This was inaugurated at Birmingham in June. Their platform was a uniform scheme of local self-government for all parts of ~~the~~ United Kingdom under the supreme authority of Parliament. (a) Chamberlain's campaign was firey and denunciatory. He said that he had been for Home Rule, but not for such a bill as Gladstone proposed. He was for a greater colonial federation. The first step was not weakening it at home. He pointed out the danger and the weakness of the Land Bill. His proposal of federation was not so very different from Gladstone's after the retention of the Irish members, but it was a big step beyond his original National Councils. Chamberlain gained the support of Birmingham. (b)

Because of his large personal following the position of Bright was of keen importance. On July 1, in spite of the hopes of the Liberals that he would support them, he came out positively as against the Bill. He put it on the grounds that he considered the Union in danger. The one compensation was that the English would be rid of the Irish at Westminster, but this very advantage he considered unfair to the idea of equal representation. Thus Bright's influence was against Gladstone's measure and those who followed him were another deflection from the

- (a) Morley: Gladstone 130.
- (b) Boyd: Chamberlain's Speeches 271-79.
Eversley: Gladstone and Ireland 311.

Gladstonian ranks. (a)

It was not necessary for the Conservatives to say much. Keeping quiet, the Liberals would fight their fight for them among their own factions. The Conservatives' promise was kept not to run Conservatives in opposition to the Liberal Unionists and as a result 78 Liberal Unionists were returned. Salisbury made a speech or two to the effect that he considered the plan under consideration "dangerous to the Union". Randolph Churchill spoke disrespectfully of Gladstone as "an old man in a hurry" and of himself as in favor of a scheme of provincial councils. The interest of the campaign centered in the Liberal factions.

Elections were from July 2 to July 15. As the returns came in, it was found that Trevelyan, Goschen, and Dilke were defeated/ The final count stood:

Tories 316.	Irish 85
Liberal Unionists 78	Liberals 191

Unionist majority 118.

Parnell wanted Gladstone to wait till Parliament reassembled, but Gladstone considered the defeat so overwhelming that he resigned at once. (7-30-86) The Whigs rejoiced that the matter had been carried to the country, and such a decision showed unmistakably the opinion of the country. Liberals contented themselves that ignorance and hatred of change, as well as misrepresentation and misunderstanding had caused the defeat. (b) Some

(a) Trevelyan: Bright 458.

(b) Contemporary Review Vol. LXXX, August '86.
J. G. Rogers: The Fray and Afterwards

felt that tactically the appeal had been a mistake. Schadorst, the party manager, had apparently overestimated the strength of the party machine. The support of the caucus was not enough. Salisbury was summoned and Gladstone had his last interview with the Queen.

(a)

Section X

"The Policy of the Liberal Party in regard to Ireland, June 1885 to July 1886", is the story of Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill. The events of the year are summarized quickly. In June, 1885, the Liberal party resigned over a minor matter, after a serious Cabinet disagreement on the policy to be followed in regard to Ireland. The Conservatives immediately abandoned coercion. In the election of the fall of 1885 Liberals were careful not to commit themselves concerning Ireland, altho it was realized that the Irish demand, if correctly made, must receive consideration. Gladstone was known to be studying the matter. Just as the elections were over, and as it was found that 85 Irish Home Rulers had been elected, there was published a statement purporting to be Gladstone's plan of handling the Irish question. It was said to involve a separate legislature for Ireland and power to deal with Irish matters. In

- (a) Quarterly Review CLXIII: 257-88.
 Comtemporary Review L: 1-5; 128-36; After the Battle, by C. G. Duffy. ---August '86;
 Nineteenth Century in Lyttle's Living Age CLXIX: 579-90;
 Nineteenth Century: XX: 183-93; 297-98.
 Fortnightly XX: 183-93; 297 CLXIX: 600-06.
 Fortnightly XXXX: 1-8; 126-30; 244-54; 256-62.

spite of Gladstone's denial, it was felt that the article was not far wrong. From then until the meeting of Parliament was an anxious time for the Liberal leaders, many of whom were not certain as to their own opinion and no one was sure what Gladstone would propose. The Tories met Parliament and apparently intended to propose coercion when they were defeated and Gladstone took their place without having to declare his Irish policy. He formed his Government on the basis of willingness to inquire into a plan for Irish Home Rule. Hartington at once refused to join. During February and March Gladstone was busy over the Bill. Chamberlain resigned in March because he could not agree to the proposals.

The Bill for the Government of Ireland was introduced April 8. It passed its first reading. In the meantime, Chamberlain and Hartington, who opposed in most matters, were drawing together in opposition to Gladstone. When the Bill came up for second reading, May 10, there was a hard fight made. The Whig and Radical ranks did their best to rally support. Gladstone at last conceded that a vote for second reading should be taken to mean only support of the principle of the Bill; but even this would not induce Hartington and Chamberlain to refrain from voting against the Bill. Thus the Bill was defeated early in June. Gladstone then appealed to the country. The campaign was fiercely contested, but the country voted against Home Rule. Gladstone resigned.

One of the arguments used against the Home Rule Bill was

that the matter had not been an issue at the election of 1885, and consequently the people had not been consulted. Moreover, the general public was not well informed on the issue. Irish obstruction, Irish outrages had been a familiar topic for years; but Irish rights and Irish abuse had not received the same attention. Gladstone had drawn attention to the topic in his campaign in the fall, 1885, but the public had not considered the matter important. When Ireland suddenly assumed the center of attention, the people did not know what to think. They were adrift. Consequently they waited for their leaders to declare themselves. To many of the leaders, also, the consideration was a new one. Questions as to the welfare of the party and as to personal interest could not be separated from the Irish policy. Gladstone, Chamberlain, and Hartington may be taken as the types of how opinion divided.

Gladstone was sincerely convinced that the subject of Ireland must be dealt with. His greatest strength lay in the immense respect every one had for his judgment. Behind him was all the prestige and power of the established party. He carried with him the rank and file of the Liberals. The organization of the party and the prestige of his personality were strong factors on his side in the fight.

Opposed to him was Hartington. Hartington was an extreme Whig. The concessions the Liberal party had been making to the Radicals had been deplored by him. "Home Rule" to him meant separation. It was too extreme to be considered. He did not con-

against Gladstone's measure. He could even join forces with the Whigs whom he had been fighting. It is not necessary to ascribe this to offended dignity over Parnell's treatment, to jealousy of Gladstone's palm, to desire of breaking the leader's power. Chamberlain may be credited with as much sincerity as either Gladstone or Hartington. He did not believe Gladstone's Bill would solve the problem. Therefore he opposed it.

When the election of 1886 was over, it was clear that the issue had been over the particular bill, rather than the principle. The Bill was defeated. The Liberal party was split in two. Whigs and Radicals, bitter enemies for years, were together against the bulk of the party. As a consequence, The Tories were in power. Ireland again faced coercion.

Thus may be summed up the results of the Liberal party's policy in regard to Ireland June 1885 to July 1886.

Appendix.

The Bill for the Government of Ireland.

sider it. At the first mention of such a possibility, he took his stand against it. Men of like opinion rallied to him. He disliked the thought of breaking the party. This alone caused him to negotiate and consider proposals. In the end, he had found no inducement that would cause him to change his mind.

Chamberlain was much abused for his attitude on the question. As a Radical, he had been much before the public advocating changes. It was his plan of National Councils for Ireland that had caused the Cabinet disagreement in June of 1885. At that time, he was considered a friend of the Irish and was much distrusted in England because he was willing to grant them so much. When the Tories dropped coercion, Parnell refused to longer consider a scheme that meant only local government on a large scale. He made his demand for a Parliament. Chamberlain met this demand with refusal. During the campaign, Chamberlain pointed out that he was only for local government. In other words, his National Council scheme for Ireland was not prompted by desire to give the Irish Home Rule of a sort; but sprang from his interest in the extension of local government. If this statement is accepted, Chamberlain's subsequent position is consistent. He was willing to join the Cabinet, for he had no objection to considering plans for Irish government. He could refuse to accept the Bill, for it was not consistent with his idea of powers to be given Ireland. He could propose federation, or a protected state, as a more logical solution of the problem; but one which, as he, himself, said, would involve changes too vast to be immediately practical. He could refuse to accept concessions which did not meet his point; he could rally the Radicals

The Bill for the Government of Ireland.

Reference: For complete Text of Bill see--Dicey:
England's Case Against Home Rule. Appen-
dix 291-331. Government of Ireland Bill.
For Outline of Bill see--Childers' in Red-
mond: Home Rule Bill. 169-74.

I. Irish Legislature.

Crown and Two Orders.

Sit together and vote together, unless either order demand a separate vote.

1. First Order.

- (a) 75 members elected on a £ 25 franchise from a new set of constituencies. Term of ten years.
- (b) 28 peerage members--to give way to members elected as in "(a)".

2. Second Order.

- (a) 205 members elected as at present. (Two from each constituency, (alteration in case of Cork).

Disagreement between orders.

- 1. After three years, or a dissolution the question to be decided by a joint vote.

II. Restrictions on Irish Legislature.

Imperial matters.

- 1. No power to make laws about: Crown, War or Peace, Army or Navy, Treaties, Titles, Treason, Nat-

uralization, Trade, Navigation, Lighthouses etc., Coinage, Copyright, Paternnts, Post Office (except in Ireland).

Irish Matters.

1. No power to make laws for the purpose of:

(a) Establishing or endowing any religion or imposing disabilities or conferring privileges on account of religion, or affecting the undenominational constitution of National schools, etc.

(b) Impairing rights or property of corporation, without address from both Orders and consent of Crown.

III. Irish Representation in Imperial Parliament.

To cease altogether (except in the case of a proposed alteration of the Home Rule Bill).

IV. Executive Authority.

The Crown--as represented by the Lord Lieutenant, acting in Irish affairs with the advise of an Irish Cabinet responsible to the Irish Legislature.

Power of Veto--to be held by Lord Lieutenant. (Acting nominally on the advise of Irish Cabinet (?), but subject to instruction from Imperial Government.)

V. Finance.

Taxation.

1. Customs and excise still to be levied by Imperial Parliament, and collected by Imperial of-

ficers. All other taxes to be under Irish control.

Ireland's Revenue.

1. Gross revenue collected in Ireland from Imperial and Irish taxes and Crown lands, etc.; plus an Imperial grant towards the cost of Irish Police. (Total cost at that time £ 1,500,000. Ireland to pay a million and Treasury to pay any surplus over a million until cast reduced to that point.)

Ireland's Contributions to Imperial Exchequer.

1. For 30 years Ireland to pay fixed annual maximum sums, representing Ireland's share of:
 - (a) Army, Navy, Civil List, etc.
 - (b) National Debt.

Payments not to be increased, but might be diminished. Share for Army, Navy, etc., never to exceed 1/15 of total cost. Total payments under these heads for first year would be £ 3,-242,000.

2. After 30 years contribution to be revisable.

Contribution to Special War Taxes.

1. Optional with Ireland.

Post Office

1. To be taken over by Ireland under Irish Act.

VI. Police.

Dublin Police to be under Imperial control for two years. Constabulary "while that force subsists" to be under Imperial control, but Ireland to have power to create

a new force under control of local authorities.

VII. Judges.

Present Irish judges to remain.

All future Irish judges to be appointed by Irish Government.

VIII. Law Courts.

Constitution to remain the same.

Constitutional questions to be decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, (including one or more Irish judges).

IX. Exchequer Judges.

Legal proceedings in Ireland by or against Imperial revenue authorities to be referred, if either party wishes, to the Exchequer Division Judges of the United Kingdom.

X. Lord Lieutenant.

Might be of any religion.

Term of office indefinite.

(See following page.)

Irish Budget.

Reference: Bartlett: Union or Separation.

Customs	1,880,000	Toward interest	1,466,000
Excise	4,300,000	on debt. (£220-	
Stamps	600,000	000,000)	
Income tax	550,000	Army & Navy	1,666,000
Non-taxed revenue including Post Office.	1,020,000	Civil charges	<u>110,000</u>
			£3,242,000
		Imperial Charges	
		For Constabulary	1,000,000
		Civil Charges	2,810,000
		Revenue collec- tion.	834,000
		Total	<u>£7,586,000</u>
		Sinking fund	<u>360,000</u>
Surplus	£404,000	Grand Total	£7,960,000