

THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA  
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report  
of  
Committee on Examination

This is to certify that we the  
undersigned, as a committee of the Graduate  
School, have given Alta Keith Clark  
final oral examination for the degree of

Master of Arts

We recommend that the degree of

Master of Arts

be conferred upon the candidate.

Wasson W. Dyer

Chairman

Guy Stanton Ford

Wm Anderson

L. B. Shippee

C. W. Alford

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GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report  
of  
Committee on Thesis

The undersigned, acting as a Committee  
of the Graduate School, have read the accompanying  
thesis submitted by Alta Keith Clark  
for the degree of Master of Arts  
They approve it as a thesis meeting the require-  
ments of the Graduate School of the University of  
Minnesota, and recommend that it be accepted in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of Master of Arts

*Wesley W. Tyler.*

Chairman

*Gay Stewart Ford*

*W. W. Alvord*

Date 1922

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THE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN.

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1. THE BACKGROUND.
12. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE DECADE.
95. THE CONGRESS.
129. Bibliography.

337091

THE BACKGROUND.

3. Russia.

4. France.

5. England.

7. Germany.

8. Austria.

9. Italy.

10. Turkey.

10. The Balkans.

THE BACKGROUND.

Certain points on the earth's surface, certain territories of the earth's geography, have become symbols; for pages, for volumes, of the world's history.

Such a point is Constantinople; such a territory is the Balkan peninsula.

The one symbolizes imperial power and ambition, Emperors and Empresses, adventurers kingly and unkingly; even democratic governments have dreamed the Eastern dream. The other symbolizes ambitions, broken races, the dregs of discarded armies, forgotten peasant people whose ploughshares continually turn up broken bits of old swords that carry a gleam.

Coming through the continents, and coming toward Constantinople, the tidal highways of history have met, by land and by sea, moving westward, moving eastward. There they have tied themselves into a ~~kn~~ knot of varied human strands - race, religion, trade, adventure, obscure persistent localizations, vast imperial ambitions - until no diplomacy has been able to untie the knot, the sword alone has seemed competent, and neither has succeeded.

From time to time the threatening success of one Power has led the other Powers to thwart that success, and for the sake of the Concert of Europe, all the Powers would come together and write a new score for the cacophonous orchestra.

Such solutions were expressed at Vienna, Paris, London, Berlin, ~~Pa~~ Paris.

Of these Berlin was chief; more final in that its arrangement lasted much longer; much more dangerous because there was no give but all take; much less of a solution since European history, especially Nineteen-Fourteen, derives directly from it.

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The Russian claim resulted from the natural overflow of the human tide; there is no historic argument so indisputable. Slavs had pressed southward to the warm lands, At first there Russia. was no intention of going through the warm waters. Peter builded his Petrograd in the North on frozen waters. But Catherine was the more natural Slav, she sought the Straits and the Tsargard itself.

Constantinople, the Eternal City of the East, had gone out spiritually to Russia, claiming the souls of the Slavs. In turn the Slavs claimed the city; and through the centuries political and spiritual diplomacy became one. "Russia does not sulk, she meditates", said the Prince of Nineteenth Century Russian diplomats. A phrase, but it holds all Russian history. Nicholas the Last expressed this continuing ambition to Sazanoff, in a secret message dated April 31, '14 "to open the Straits I am prepared to use force"; 1) He expressed his race, and all their pre-Nineteen Fourteen history. The pressing forward is a subliminal urge of the people; no other nation has ever suggested that its psychology be expressed in terms of theosophy; this is evidence of Russia's essential Asiaticness.

Russia established her claim while Europe was settling its petty problems of narrow boundaries and family successions. Catherine's agents were busy, in Greece, Crete, Bosnia, Montenegro. 2) War came,

1. The Nation, Aug. 9. 1919, v. 109, p. 90.

2. Marriot, The Eastern-Question, p. 131.

a Russian fleet made the round from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, Europe was astonished. Russia won, altho Austria and Turkey had secretly compacted against her. 1) The treaty of Kainardji, 1774, gave to Russia the north shore of the Black Sea, an embassy in Constantinople, and a vague clause interpreted as a right to protect the Christians.

When Europe settled her quarrels in 1815, there was no hint in the treaty of Vienna of the Near East; it was understood as important; statesmen hoped its importance could be kept secret, each one until he was ready.

When Unkiar Skelessi was signed, 1833 - a treaty of Russo-Turkish alliance with a secret article closing the Straits in war time to foreign war vessels - Europe began to realize what was happening in the Near East, that the great crossing of sea and land ways was slipping, from an Asiatic Power to a European Power, to one of the European Powers. "'Ware the Muscovite" became the dominant policy of Western Europe.

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France as the eldest daughter of the church knew the East and claimed it, far before any of the other nations of Western Europe

knew the East or feared Russia, far before there was a France.

Russia, only a legendary Muscovy. The worldly-wise Francis shocked the Christians nations by entering into a treaty with Solyman the Magnificent Infidel, winning the right to protect the Holy Places and to protect the Christians interwoven with the Faithful - before Russia had conceived of being Holy and Liberator of oppressed Christians; before Western Europe had discovered that to protect Christians in outlandish places is the best way to win the trade, Christian

1. Marriott, op.cit. p.134.

or Infidel, of those places.

An alliance between the France of Louis XV and the Russia of Elizabeth was talked of - but this remained a conversational episode until 1893. In 1766 Choiseul wrote to Vergennes, French ambassador at Constantinople, "we must at all costs break the chain fastened on the world by Russia". 1) Even so far in the backward was Europe weary of Turkish inefficiency; Choiseul explained, as many a later statesman was to explain, "the Turks are hopelessly degenerate and the attempt will probably be fatal to them, but that does not concern us so long as we attain our object." 2)

Napoleon fought the preliminary skirmish of modern Western Europe for position in Egypt, he led the antagonism of modern Western Europe to Moscow. At Tilsit he refused Alexander the 'key to his house', Constantinople - "Never! that would mean the empire of the world".

The lesser Napoleon rejustified the Greater. He reasserted France in the Near East by means of the Crimean war. He reinserted France at Paris as the leading Power of Europe, champion not only of oppressed Christians but of oppressed nationalities.

France the Republic never yielded the dream and the rights of France the Empire. She based her shadowy suzerainty on these historic priorities. "Partant pour la Syrie" has ever been a chanson national.

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England's interest in the Near East was concerned with her intense interest in the Far East; from the beginning the Empire has been

England. India, the precious jewel in the imperial crown before it was imperial; India has ever stimulated the English imagination.

1. Marriott, op.cit. p. 131 .

2. ibid.



She defended her communication with those far flung riches; when the route was long, against the assertion of Portugal that no ship not Portuguese should round Good Hope; when the route was shortened, ~~again~~ against the different dangers in the Mediterranean where she fortified Gibraltar and Malta.

Her interest in the Near East was more casual - if English interest is ever casual; England always utilizes the excursions of her nationals when the time comes. Her merchants, her traders, her engineers, her adventurers, were throughout the region. England was not included in the arrangement of the Near East, 1781, made by Catherine for Russia and Joseph for Austria. But Pitt comprehended the meaning; circumscription of Russia was his answer in the triple alliance of 1798. England also kept the account of Russia's friendship for the lost American colonies. Castlereagh, Canning, Palmerston, made it part of the business of the Foreign Office to cope with Russia in the Near East. Only Gladstone forgot, and substituted sentiment for security; for the sake of the old Greek splendors he sacrificed Corfu to the new Greek ambitions, and surrendered the strategic hold on the Near East - and English Cabinet of the Seventh Decade was to "curse him roundly." 1)

Trade carried through the Near East gathered to itself trade in the Near East. Trade and trade routes must be made secure. Against the enemy, Russia, England found she could set Turkey. Therefore Turkey became the friend. England developed 'interests' in Turkey, it became a point in her foreign policy. Englishmen invested in Turkish consols, and these had their influence on foreign policy.

At Sebastopol she sacrificed her thousands, not in a Crusade,

1. See page 88

but for 'security'. At Paris she helped write the treaty which barred Russia from exercising the rights that were hers under old treaties, and barred her from the Black Sea.

Then isolated by her own statesmen, England, with protest from Lord Granville to be sure, was forced to accept the Conference of London, which let Russia again into the Black Sea - and Russia began to believe she could get back her old further rights.

She might well have thought so. Liberal England in 1870 had no intention of opposing imperial ambitions of other nations, especially when these were masked as Christian designs; and no intention of supporting any imperial ambition of England itself when these did not march as Christian designs. "The best bulwark against Russia is the breasts of freemen"; said Gladstone after the Crimea. A valid foreign policy, if it guards the free men against their enemy until they are truly free.

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Germany had only just become Germany, a great odds if with great splendor. Her boundaries still sounded with battle, Düppel, Sadowa, Sedan. The old bribe of Poland to Russia, the new Germany, bribe of Venezia to Italy, had been paid in full, by the neutrality of 1870. Germany could not expect to realize on those investments against. She was at watch against all Europe, if friends with all Europe.

Germany in the person of Prussia had not been at Sebastopol. And if she had been at Paris it was by a backdoor entry. It was inconvenient for Germany to think of the Near East in terms of desire. Von Moltke at Constantinople in 1841 had looked the land over. Roscher desiring the break-up of Turkey in the republican

year of 1848<sup>4</sup> had suggested Asia Minor as the imperial portion of Germany. But the consolidation of the Empire, of North and South, of ultramontane and socialist, was much more the business of the dominant statesman<sup>5</sup> than the acquisition of more troublesome territory.

Yet however busy Bismarck might be, he did not miss anything on the horizon, even if he refused to aim his gun.

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What Bismarck did not forget was that Austria was German, and that Germanic Austria must in some way be retained according to the spirit of the old German confederation. The French ~~attaché~~ Austria. attaché reported this from St. Petersburg early in the

decade. "The German interests of Austria are as dear to Germany as those of Prussia. In the eyes of every German all that is comprehended in the Empire of Austria is the heritage of Germany and all that may be added to these will be considered as German acquisitions<sup>1)</sup>

To satisfy Austrian ambitions which Germany had rudely shattered in order to become Germany, it was inevitable that Germany should urge Austria toward the Drang nach Osten, to become in truth Austro-Hungary, to recognize her manifest destiny toward the Southeast, to find compensations in the Near East.

Austria had a long history of contact with the East. She was made up of flotsam and jetsam of the West-East movements. She did not forget that she had checked the Turkish tide and saved Europe. She could not forget that Hungary was of the Huns and therefore of Asia. She was Balkan herself, a congeries of peoples, except that her iron hand had worked something of cohesion among shattered tribes

1. Laboulayé, q. Hanotaux, IV, Contemporary France p.67.

and sleeping nations. Whenever a bit of territory was without a master, it had been given to Austria even if not contiguous. Austria had the land-taking habit. If she merely held the cloaks of the wrestlers in the Crimea, she had been as important at Paris as an umpire. Austria saw also her future where Germany saw it, in the Southeast, in the Near East.

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Bismarck did not sufficiently remember Italy, nor did the other Powers. Italy had continually to remind them of her existence. She flung her troops into the trenches of Sebastopol, against Italy.

Russia, for the Near East, exactly to this end. She forced her way into the Conference of Paris, had herself recognized in the Treaty of Paris, exactly that she might affront Austria in the council, exactly that she might ultimately expel Austria from Venezia.

Italy become Italy, in the blood and mud of the Crimea, nothing was more to be expected than a continual antagonism toward Austria, a continual desire for further redemptions from Austria, an extended desire for Italia~~x~~ Irredenta wherever a broken Byzantine arch raised pathetic evidence of forgotten ancestry.

Italy had been too young to assert her aspirations. She was now too concerned in a living adjustment of her own Catholic problem, to think much of Catholic or Orthodox~~x~~ championships in the Near East. But from time to time she remembered. She if she bided her time through and past the Congress of Berlin - with one pertinent question there - it is still possible through and out of that Conference, to see the role Italy should elect to play, now within alliance, now with out alliance; a role so increasingly concerned with the Near East that Italy increasingly forgets the West and become of the East herself, a Balkan peninsula once removed, a Balkan by marriage.

Turkey was suzerain, Turkey was sovereign, over all the Near East, and at Constantinople. Turkey hurled herself into Europe on the backwash of the Crusades; if Europeans could come to Turkey.

Asia, Asiatics could come to Europe. That the Huns had tried it a thousand years before across the Northern plains, that the Moors had tried it seven hundred years before across the Pyrenees and neither had won, was remembered not at all by the Turks. Across the narrow waters of the Bosphorus the Infidels came in unnumbered hordes. They reached the very walls of Vienna, within two hundred years.

Thus far, and no farther. And, not thus far. The Turks fell back, to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In revenge they made those frontier provinces the most Turkish in Europe. Between those provinces and Constantinople all was Turkish, all the Balkans were Turkish. At Constantinople the Sultan ruled, over Turkey in Asia and Turkey in Europe.

There was always revolt, in Turkey in Europe. Always old memories were cropping forth, always deserted and oppressed peoples were crying aloud to those who had deserted them against those who oppressed them. From time to time the cry was heard. Battle or protest came, to the Turk. The Turk issued a Tanzimat, a Hatti Houmouzoun. Battle ceased. Protest was stilled. Then Hatti Houmouzoun lapsed - until the next time.

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Finally, there were the Balkans themselves - Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Montenegro, Macedonia! They had been left as flotsam when the waves of migration poured out of the East into the The Balkans. West; they had been complicated by jetsam when Roman

and Venetian, Hun and Turk marauded through. They had great memories not held in common. They had suffered great wrongs, under the still dominating oppressor. They had stirring ambitions, and these were held in antagonism. There was never a real boundary in all the Balkans, from Black to Adriatic, from Aegean to Danube. But none the less did tribes desire to become nations. If they had desired to become one nation, power would have come to them, and defeat to the Powers. There was a hint of a Balkan league as early as 1867. But cohesion was lacking. The tribes of the Balkans were as tangled as the ambitions of the Powers. The ambitions sought to work through the tribes, and prevented the tribes from finding a common ground.

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1. Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, ed. Thompson, I. p. 97.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE DECADE.

13 - Three Emperors League.

Personal Bund - To settle Eastern Question - Visits - Subcompacts - England becomes imperialistic.

17 - War Scare of 1875.

Franco-German Fears - Germany vulnerable - France ultra montane - British Note - Czar at Berlin - La Paix est assurée - Bismarck's Anger - Russia for France - Franco-German Rapprochement - Italy with Germany.

24 - Mediterranean League.

A Western League - France the Key - Greece, Austria, Italy, Old Hates.

31 - Notes and Revolts.

Powers divided - Herzogovina - Andrassy Note - Berlin Note - Bulgarian Atrocities. -

39 - Notre Guerre Deguisée.

Serbian War - Reichstadt - Russia and Germany - Guildhall Speech; 'by fingo' - Czar's Speech; 'act alone' - Bismarck's Speech; 'Pomeranian Bones'.

45 - Conference of Constantinople.

Who's Who - Turkish Constitution - Pas de Deux - Partition of Turkey - English Attitude - Elliott - Failure.

55 - The Interlude.

Ignatiev Abroad - London Protocol - Pan Slavs - Pesth.

58 - Russo-Turkish War.

English Neutrality - Constantinople - Austria - Adrianople - "Preliminary Basis" - England's Warning - Shouvalof's Telegram - Wires Cut - "Preliminary Treaty",

69 - England with Russia.

75 - England with Austria.

87 - England with Turkey.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE DECADE.

There began the Seventh Decade of the Nineteenth Century, the boundaries fixed as they were to remain for half a century. Yet, the vertigo of Europe was never so intense. A Pope dies in Rome, a Pope is elected in Rome; temporal power is technically renounced. A King dies in Italy, a King succeeds in Italy; Italy becomes historic. A Republic is born in France; Europe will not believe it; scarcely will France. Russia under an increasing tide of Pan-Slavism rushes toward a Holy War. Austria under a pro-German Hungarian Premier 'drangend nach Osten'. England Balancing as always between her passion for the moral and her passion for the material. Germany alone calm, alone magnificent, but watching at every point of the compass her unbounded boundaries.

These six Powers had met at Paris in conference, 1856, and had, significantly, admitted another power, Turkey, to the concert and to the public law of Europe. These Powers had met again in London, 1871, to readjust a provision or two of the treaty of Paris. They had declared that future revisions were to be made in concert. This was in effect the creation of a Concert of Europe, with a fuller orchestral score than Europe had ever before heard. The history of the seventh decade was to test that harmony. The Congress of Berlin was to reaffirm it, for the last time. It never held any sincerity.

The Great Powers since 1856 had been skirmishing for position. Now they must hold their positions, and scheme and ally to hold them. Never was there such a fear of coalitions, never so many projected and covenanted alliances. "Europe is probably mined beneath our feet with secret treaties," 1) said Sir Charles Dilke. "L'Europe á des nerfs" said Thiers. 2).

1. Gwynn, I, Dilke, p. 205.

2. Hohenlohe, II, p. Memoirs, 172.



The three Emperors leagued together (September 1872) to dominate Europe; the first alliance of the decade, itself an alliance out of an immemorial past, the past of Legitimacy that had its climax at Vienna: three Emperors; old William, young in 1815; old Franz Joseph, young in 1848 and to be much older; Alexander, never to be old.

The Three Emperors' League.

"The Dreikaiserbund was no mere diplomatic nickname for the combination which it represented. The personal idiosyncracies of the three Sovereigns had always to be reckoned with. They carried on a private correspondence among themselves upon State affairs, and even Prince Bismarck used to complain that its contents were not always communicated to their responsible advisers." 1)

These Emperors had still the autocratic comprehension of the State. Yet, always back of them, attempting to work the alliance as a machine, were the Prime Ministers, Bismarck, Gortschakof, Andrassy, imperious as their masters were imperial.

This alliance was by and large an alliance to settle the Eastern Question, since that question was the one standing between them. A Berlin Journal of October 1872 so defined it: "The present political situation offers a good opportunity for preparing an energetic solution of the Eastern Question. The wounds received by Russia in the Crimea have long since healed. France has suffered such military and financial disaster that she cannot realize her aspirations to the possession of Egypt. And the conflicting interests of Austria and Russia in the East have been reconciled by the meeting of the Three Emperors. If therefore Germany, Russia and Austria are now prepared to solve the Eastern Question, there can hardly be a single

1. Cecil, II Life of Salisbury p. 179.

statesman in Europe capable of preventing them." 1)

That is, Russia had recovered, France had not recovered, England negligible - not even mentioned in the Berlin journal. Strike while the iron is hot! And, there was no single statesman, certainly not Decazes in France, not Crispien in Italy, not Gladstone in England, to prevent.

After the September meeting that ended in alliance there ensued a round of imperial visits at the three imperial courts; in truth there was exchange of such courtesies throughout the decade; even Victor Emmanuel came to Vienna and to Berlin. There was also much swinging around the circle by statesmen on errands official and unofficial, and by publicists errant, commissioned or self-commissioned to feel out the political situation of the capitals. Salisbury, Ignatieff, Crispien, Drummond-Wolff, each made the capital circle; finally Gambetta almost came to Berlin. At no time have responsible statesmen been more zealous in seeking understandings face to face with Chancellors. Europe recognized it must come closer together; and in that still unmodern moment they sought it - in the confidential manner of Tennessee's pardner!

There was also from the jump, uncertainty, even disloyalty, in the Dreikaiserbund itself. The three Emperors were friends, but the three Chancellors were ambitions. Each sought to ally solely with each other. Not one hesitated to court, now one, now another, of the Western Powers. As Sir Robert Morier wrote "it is clear that in the 'happy family' of the three Kaisers each of the 'mutual friends' is endeavoring to convince the public that he has an exclusive monopoly of the affections of No. 3"<sup>2)</sup> - and each wanted to conceal how happy he could be with neither were to other dear charms away.

1. Busch, Secret Pages p. 104.

2. Morier, SI Memories, p. 362.

At St. Petersburg a sub-compact between Germany and Russia was signed, 1873, by Emperors and Field Marshalls, not by Chancellors. ~~The~~ At Vienna ~~and~~ sub-compact between Austria and Russia was similarly signed, Chancellors too. Russia was the dominating partner in the Three Emperors League when the Emperors themselves acted in its name; or acted without its name. "The Emperor William's affection for his Russian nephew - a notably attractive personality - had a ~~xxxx~~ recognized influence upon the action of his government, and Franz Joseph was also, on less personal grounds, possessed of Slavie sympathies which were diametrically opposed to those of his Hungarian Chancellor." 1)

But the Hungarian Chancellor, trying to make his dual house doubly sure, from the beginning schemed to eliminate Russia and Gortschakof, to make himself, Andrassy, and Austria, the dual ally of Bismarck and Germany. Ultimately he succeeded; Bismarck was not unwilling. Traditional as was the friendship between Germany and Russia, tender as was the affection between uncle and nephew, Bismarck builded on race, and he did not forget that Austria was German, he did not allow Andrassy to forget it, even while they pressed together and secretly ~~sudosten~~.

Much of the subterranean history of the decade is the play of traditional friendship between Germany and Russia, against the bond of race and the beckoning future between Germany and Austria ~~leading~~ leading finally to the announcement of Austria as Germany's choice, 1876, to the refusal of a formal alliance with Russia by Bismarck, 1877; 1878; to the final alliance with Austria, 1879 - leading at last to the Dual, then the Triple alliances. There were invitations from Germany to Russia, 1875, 1876, and later; but these offers of alliance 1. Cecil, Salisbury II, p. 179.

were due to temporary fears, were not indicative of permanent alignment.

As a broad historic proposition it may be said that the Three Emperors League came into being in 1872, was omnipotent in 1874, was checked in 1878, was transformed in 1882.

To present the historical parallel of opposition by dates, it may be said that imperial England came back in 1874, bought the Suez over night in 1876, created an Empress as answer to the Emperors in 1876, triumphed over Emperors and Balkan pawns in 1878, and was withdrawn by Liberalism in 1889.

Filling in all the interstices of the decade, making it history which "propositions" and "parallels" can never be; denying "omnipotence" on the one hand, and "triumph" on the other, are the efforts of the three Northern Powers to strain at the leash of the League, and to seek advantages which lured outside the League. These were countered by efforts of the three Western Powers to seek to weaken the Bund by detaching alliances. If only the West could break the power of the North, the West might believe in itself and gather confidence. Yet it was perhaps ~~individual members of the West~~ the Northern alliance itself, and the relations of its individual members with the Western Powers, which prevented a Western alliance.

The Russian Czar told the French Ambassador, 1875, that "the so-called alliance of the three Northern Powers has no other aim than the maintenance of peace." 1) An alliance merely to maintain the peace is as negative as peace itself in a still militant world. Therefore the Bund never succeeded in binding the policy, in pledging the peace, of any of its members. Whenever any one of these

1. Hanotaux, IV Contemporary France p. 57.

Powers looked forth on the world it considered what the Three Power Pact could do for it in the place toward which it was looking. ~~Ge~~ Germany had one fear - France. Russia had one ambition - the Near East. Austria had one perplexity - the Balkans. The Three Emperors League was depended upon in the eventualities of each case.

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Russian ambition and Austrian perplexity are the very material out of which the diplomatic history of the decade is made, with the climacteric in the Congress of Berlin. German fear of The War Scare of 1875. France was rather a subcurrent running through the major flow. But as it was a tremendously powerful undertow it affected the major issue, and its influence should be considered.

Emphasis in the popular memory is ever on French fear of Germany subsequent to 1870, and the Revanche is often spoken of as tho it were sounding only in France, and not heard in Germany. As a matter of truth contemporary letters and interviews, newspapers and Quarterlies, report the state of fear in Germany over its new and artificial boundary beyond the Rhine, and Bismarck forever haunted by the spectre of the war of revenge.

Lord Salisbury, writing in the Quarterly Review in an article on the 'Terms of Peace', forecasts German expectation of revenge as early as October 1870. "Count Bismarck does not affect to deny that his proposed annexations will arouse the undying resentment of the French. He cynically accepts and exaggerates the idea. He replies that in any case he believes the French will take the first opportunity of trying over again the conclusions of this campaign, whatever the terms of peace may be, and that this vindictiveness on their part will be so certain and so keen, that no annexation of territory can made it seriously worse. In any case, be the leniency

of Germany what it may be, he counts on another and an early war; and he avers that his one object in demanding a cession of territory is that he may possess a more defensible frontier to resist the invasion when it comes." 1)

There were several vulnerable points in the new German structure where France might attack. She might merely attack, on the Rhine, in a war of revenge, in a battle to regain the Lost Provinces; she might ally with the Catholics within Germany and endanger the internal peace of the new Empire, or with the Catholics without Germany, Belgian or Austrian, and endanger the peace of the Empire and of the frontiers; she might make a "white coalition", Orleanists of France with Pan-slavs of Russia, which would be the most threatening of all.

The climax came in 1875, the 'War Scare', which so greatly agitated all Europe at the time, but which subsequently became almost an "annual phenomenon". 2) Bismarck ventured in the spring to make representations to the Belgian government against the Catholic party in that country. In a letter to Sir Robert Morier, that faithful correspondent, Dr. Geffcken declared that Bismarck was resolved to annihilate Belgium, regarding it as the central government of political Catholicism. 3)

France felt his hostility to its own ultramontane party, but France was chiefly alarmed at this moment because Germany forbade the exportation of horses. Did Germany keep them for military purposes of her own? France had been buying them only for cab horses! Yet Hohenlohe spoke sharply to Deaazes, "the German Government is not entirely convinced of the inoffensive character of the French armaments." 4)

1. Quarterly Review, No. cit. q. Cecil, II Salisbury p. 35.

2. Newton, Lyons p. 68.

3. Morier, Memoirs, II, p. 333.

4. Hohenlohe, Collisions, Origins, p. 58.

In any event, as Lord Odo Russell wrote to Lord Derby, "Bismarck is at his old tricks again, alarming the German thro the officious press, and intimating that the French are going to attack them, and that Austria and Italy are conspiring in favor of the Pope....The crisis will blow over like so many others, but Bismarck's sensation~~al~~ policy is very wearisome at times." 1)

Whatever the real intention in Bismarck's mind, or if there was no Bismarckian intention - Stockmar held the Chancellor responsible<sup>2)</sup> Morier held that Bismarck slipped out by accusing Moltke; 3) Blowitz held the Emperor responsible and Bismarck innocent; 4) - the result was precisely the opposite of what he would have desired. England and Russia instead of increasing their misunderstandings over this affair, both came to the support of France, and to a co-operation if unconcerted. Dr. Geffcken wrote to Morier, "England and Russia arrived at an understanding that there should be no war." 5)

The Czar and Gortschakoff visited Berlin in May, heralded by Shouvalof - who as the international itinerant of this decade must be given first place. Shouvalof prophesied that Bismarck would be compelled to keep the peace with France even after he had declared that Germany must defend herself against a France ready for revenge.<sup>6)</sup> The knowing Shouvalof foresaid also that Bismarck's endeavors to set Russia against England and England against Russia would fail.<sup>7)</sup>

In the meantime the British Government addressed to its ambassadors, at Vienna, Paris, Rome and St. Petersburg, identic notes instructing each to urge peace between France and Germany. Only Austria declined to send instruction to her minister at Berlin, lest she should embarrass Bismarck. 8)

1. Newton, II ~~1666~~ p.68.

2. Morier, II Memoirs, p.339

3. ibid. p.352.

4. Blowitz, My Memories, ch. on "Bismarck"

5. Morier, op.cit. p.340

6. Newton, Op.cit. p.76.

7. ibid. p.718 8. ibid. p.78.

The Russians came. Shouvaloff dined with their Majesties that night, and told the Emperor there was 'unveritable emoi'. 1) Lord Odo dined with Bismarck that night, and received felicitations for his good offices, but protests that there had been no need of them as there was no "war scare", and France and Germany were on excellent terms. "So far was I", he wrote in his reminiscing days, "from entertaining any such idea at the time or afterward that I would rather have resigned than lent a hand in picking a quarrel which would have had no other motive than preventing France from recovering her breath and her strength." 2) Surely Bismarck understood the situation, and himself.

He was not so amiable toward his ally, and never forgave Gortschakof his vainglorious telegram claiming peace in the name of Russia - La paix est assurée! He afterward complained to Busch of the "oglings and advances toward an intimacy between Russia and France of the revanche", 3) and blamed the Russian Chancellor rather than the French Prime Minister. He took his revenge at Berlin in 1878, not upon Russia, but upon Gortschakof. Bismarck was one of those amazingly endowed characters who could get even with a personal enemy while maintaining ~~even~~ friendship with the state toward which his antipathy was manifested.

General diplomatic satisfaction appears to have been felt over the results. As the British Ambassador at Berlin wrote to Morier, "behind our backs Bismarck raves like a maniac and swears he will take his revenge. 4) Lord Odo also wrote home, "altho Bismarck is as civil, confidential and amiable to me as ever, I fancy he must be frantic at our combined action with Russia in favor of peace, and he will get over it, as he wishes to keep well with us. But he will

1. Morier, II Memoirs p. 352.

3. Busch, Secret Pages

2. Bismarck, Reflections II, p. 192. 4. Morier, op. cit. P. 355.



seek an opportunity of paying out Gortschakof for having come the Peacemaker and Dictator over Germany again." 1) Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador at Paris was out of France at the time, but he found on his return to Paris, "an indication of a sincere disposition to accept heartily and ungrudgingly any proof of good will from England." 2)

Russia felt similar satisfaction. She had shown Bismarck that "it was after all plainly against the interests of Russia that France should be once more crushed, and still further weakened. The Czar had now shown that he understood this and wished to maintain the existence of France as a great Power, however inconvenient such an existence might be to Germany." 3)

The credit is given to Russia by two distinguished British statesmen. Sir Charles Dilke, considering the 'Present Position of European Politics', declared that the situation in 1875 had been one "when Russia prevented a war between Germany and France, and England took the credit for having done so." 4) Lord Salisbury who was ever inclined to give Russia her due, wrote to Lord Lytton, "nothing but the counterweight of Russia prevented it (war) in 1875, and if this counterweight is removed the policy or the terrors of Bismarck may again become uncontrollable". 5) And when Salisbury visited Berlin on his way to Constantinople, he found Bismarck still brooding over his peace. "He did not mention France but the impression he left on my mind was that it chiefly occupied his thoughts or shared them with his religious quarrel". 6)

1. Newton, II Lyons, p.

2. ibid, p. 84.

3. ibid.

4. Op.cit. in text. p.37.

5. Cecil, II Salisbury, p.129

6. ~~Op.cit.~~ ibid, p.97.

The possibility of Catholic intrigue directed from Paris was ever back of Bismarck's kulturkampf in the '70's. Sir Robert Morier reported Catholic sympathizers as believing that "the Chancellor's policy is rapidly becoming the handmaid of his passion. The increasing resistance of the Clerical party to the high handed measures dealt out to them, the consummate skill with which the leaders of this party know how personally to exasperate their powerful enemy are .. sufficient to account for the threat of war." 1)

The dangers of a Catholic triumph in the elections of May 1877 were feared, and hoped for, throughout Europe as the sign for a modern religious war. The Puignolo said editorially, "What would be the significance of the triumph of Marshall MacMahon's policy in the forthcoming elections? There would be but one as regards foreign relations, and that one would be - war! And were France to hesitate, prudence would advise Germany and Italy to take the Initiative in a struggle that no human power could possibly avert." 2)

From fear of France Bismarck enlarged to fear of coalitions, of alliances between France and its possible friends. For this reason he would prevent an alliance between France and England, "Bismarck's real bugbear", wrote Disraeli to Derby. 3) Yet even the Queen saw that Bismarck was overreaching himself, "Bismarck is making much mischief, and we may be driven to draw closer to France." 4)

The Duc Decazes, playing hot and cold with England and with Russia, suggested a secret alliance between France and England to protect Holland and Belgium. 5) And even Lord Salisbury who seldom looked for trouble before it came, ventured that "if things go wrong we may find ourselves fighting for Holland before two years are out" 6X)

1. Morier, II Memoirs, p. 323.

2. Puignolo, Milan, Hanotaux, IV Contemporary France q.p. 165.

3. Monypenny VI Disraeli p. 81.

4. ibid, p. 123.

6. Cecil, II Salisbury, p. 129

5. Newton, II Lyons p. 113.

Against these fears a certain element in political France proposed the program which Thiers had devised, a Franco-German rapprochement, absolute neutrality in the Eastern Question, and complete reconciliation with Germany. 1) To unofficial ambassadors, the Count Henckel von Donnersmarck and La Paiva, was consigned the promotion of the rapprochement. Count Herbert Bismarck carried on unofficially for Germany in his father's name, even declaring " we do not desire, we have no need of a war with France, we also believe that it will not ~~be~~ necessarily break out unless the Pope should give express orders for it." 2)

To strengthen Germany against the France which was still Catholic, Bismarck promoted friendship with that Italy which was not Catholic, and promoted the fears of Italy on its French border. The Nord Deutsche Gazette (Oct. 77) declared "the pending negotiations between Italy and Germany tend to a reciprocal agreement in the event that after the general elections (in France) the two nations should find themselves confronted by a clerical France, a France which would necessarily be aggressive, since her clericalism would constitute a standing menace to Italy". 3)

These "negotiations" were furthered by Crispi in Berlin. He could telegraph to his King "I have seen Bismarck, he accepts a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, should France attack". 4) Or, if Italy attacked France, Germany would join "against the common enemy". 5)

If Russia had failed Bismarck as a member of the Three Emperors League against the West, he would substitute Italy. There had been

1. Hanotaux, IV Contemporary France, p. 159.

2. ibid. p. 253.

3. ibid. q. 165.

4. Crispi, Memoirs. p 38.

5. ibid., p. 29.

talk of Italy in the Dreikaiserbund as far back as 1873 when Victor Emmanuel had visited Berlin. 1) Italy had certain strategic advantages to offset Russian defection. Even at this moment Italy's frontiers were being strengthened militarily, not with Bismarck's disapproval. He had protested to Crispien that he had no interest in the Eastern Question. But he made his bargains with the Eastern Question in the balance.

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There was talk from time to time of a Western League to offset the Three Emperors League, and to serve as a counterbalance in the issues of the Eastern Question. Running throughout the seventh decade there was a slender possibility of such an alliance. It was of course a natural contemplation, it was the only thing left to do. If the three Emperors united their power however loosely for the upholding of the old legitimacies, and in truth their common ground was found in little else -- the three constitutional and democratic power of the West would of necessity be forced to compact together. They were, but not to a final pact which should answer the Northern alliance.

The aim of England, of Beaconsfield, the aim continually confessed in his letters of the period, 2) and the aim triumphant as he declared in a letter to Drummond Wolff after the period was completed, 3) was to break up the alliance of the Northern Powers, the Dreikaiserbund, which he regarded as a menace; in itself, because it was consolidated in Middle-Europe leaving the other Powers as insignificant fringes on the map, and therefore it could dominate all Europe; and

1. Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance, p. 188.
2. Monypenny, VI Disraeli, pp. 264, 284, 314, 1044, 367 et seq.
3. Drummond Wolff, II Rambling Recollections, p. 253.

what was more, because it could dominate the British route to British India and increase the pressure in Central Asia.

Disraeli from the beginning of his premiership recognized himself as that "single statesman" 1) who had not been recognized at Berlin; his aim was steady, if his weapons were variable; he began to win March 27, 1878. 2)

In order to break the alliance he must make an alliance. Altho Disraeli did not place confidence in France, he wrote as early as September, '75, to Lady Bradford, "It is curious, but since the fall of France who used to give us so much alarm and so much trouble, the conduct of foreign affairs for England has become infinitely more difficult. Unless we go out of our way to act with the Three Northern Powers, they can act without us, which is not agreeable for a State like England." 3)

He was compelled because of the Northern alliance to seek political friendship with France. In spite of the French disaster of 1870, he had to recall the French triumph of 1856, and to build on that. Throughout the decade his appeal was to public law, to the treaties, to the Concert of the Six Powers which had sung its song of triumph in 1856. England was "high priestess of international law", as a critic of her policies called her. 4) When Disraeli saw three of those Powers allying in their own interests - singing in trio - he pressed the point of the six Powers as co-signatories and co-discussers. He worked also to create a three-power balance in the West against the three-power alliance in the North. Nor did he forget to invoke the Tripartite Treaty of defense of 1856, nor to remind France and Austria of their obligations under that guarantee.

1. Page 13 - 14 .

2. Derby resigns.

3. Monypenny VI Disraeli p.13.

4. Carlslake, II Public Opinion p.397, Daily News.

Perhaps he was conscious that in 1870 when he was not in control, the absorption of France in her home problem, her fight for existence, with no aid or countenance from her ally of 1853, had enabled the defeated Power of 1853, Russia, to swap with Germany neutrality for future favors, and so to gain a revision of the Black Sea exclusion.

France on the other hand, remembering 1870 and the neutrality of Great Britain, was not eager to grant present favors of alliance in memory of that past neutrality which she considered had imperilled her existence and cost her her place in Europe.

The alliance of the Northern Powers was in truth as perilous to France as to England; if maintained it meant as she suspected it was meant to mean, her "permanent "isolation", particularly as there seemed at that time a possibility that England herself might enter the Northern alliance. There was considerable and evident friendship between England and Germany, which had been fostered by the Prince Consort, which had been cemented by the marriage of the Princess of England to the Crown Prince of Germany, a friendship which might balance the historic hostility between England and Russia, a friendship which naturally supplemented by a more or less common objective between England and Austria.

Disraeli himself never had any intention of playing quatre in the game of the Three Emperors. But the idea of an alliance with Germany was not foreign to his calculations, multifold calculations at this time. "What if we could negotiate a treaty with Germany to maintain the present status quo generally,"<sup>1)</sup> he wrote to Derby in October, '76, in those beginning days of this reopening of the Eastern Question after Serbia had failed in her war with Turkey, but when it was evi-

1. Monypenny. VI. op. cit. p. 81.

dent who was back of Serbia. Bismarck made overtures himself, and he complained later that Derby had paid him no attention. He offered myself to England and Lord Derby would not notice my application for six weeks and then rejected it." 1) He must have repeated this after Derby had left the Foreign office, for Lord Salisbury wrote to Lady Salisbury, "Bismarck has made new proposals for an offensive and defensive alliance," which happily have not been accepted." 2)

As the situation stood England was too recently irrupted into continental affairs to take the lead in an opposing League; and if France remembered English neutrality in her time of need, 1870, Italy had not forgotten a neutrality, similar except for high moral English protestations, in her time of need, 1859. Imperial as Great Britain may have suddenly become, Beaconsfield inherited from Gladstone, and had to work with the old materials of blundering insular English diplomacy. If the Mediterranean seemed like a British lake, Gibraltar on the West British since 1704, the Suez on the east British since 1876, the other Mediterranean Powers were not certain of their unity either with Great Britain or among themselves.

The Powers suggested for the Mediterranean League were England, France, Italy, Greece, Austria.

Greece was extraordinarily important at this time, certainly as important in the eyes of England as was either France decadent or Italy resurgent. No one knew how far Greece might come back, how far she might extend. Austria had bitterly opposed the intervention of the Powers that led to the liberation of Greece, 3) - Austria even while she was the old Austria, had an eye on the Balkans. Russia

1. Monypenny, VI Disraeli p. 322,

2. Cecil, II Salisbury p. 127,

3. Coolidge, Origins, p. 75.

Russia feared Greek revival, feared the old Byzantine splendor might revive, might reseek its seat at Constantinople, and end the long Russian dream. More than one Czar had protested; Nicholas I, 1) Alexander II, 2) - as Russia today, 1922, without a Czar, protests the same thwarting of her old dream. 3)

But Greek splendors were vital in the minds of cultured men in the ~~mid~~ days of the seventh decade. Greece was an idea, an ideal, and she was the bulwark against the advancing tide of Slavic barbarism. "Those who do not wish to see Slavonic claims pushed much farther than justice needs", wrote Sir Charles Dilke, "should speak their word on behalf of Greece." 4) Lafayette had once remarked that "the greater part of Greece was left out of Greece". 5) He may have meant Greek spirit instead of Greek territory; but at this moment of territorial interest, a return to the material "glory that was Greece" seemed possible and desirable to the West. Other than Dilke had "dreamed of a new Greece", 6) and before the '70's. Alexandra, the young and beautiful Princess of England, pled continually for Greece where her Danish brother sat as King, and her beauty had its power. Greece was even the ground where Gladstone could unite with those who had not sufficiently denounced what had happened in Bulgaria.

To recreate Greece out of the petty creation of 1829, to establish Greece as a Power in the Mediterranean, became a major tenet in the foreign policy of the English people, if not of England. But even the Government must have seen the advantage; Greece would have been more than a Gibraltar in the Eastern Mediterranean. And in the mind of the English Premier an Eastern Gibraltar was the key to the whole situation.

1. Hanotaux, IV Contemporary France, p.74. 2. ibid, p.73. 3. Newspapers.  
4. Gwynn, II Dilke, p.238. 5. ibid, 231. 6. p.237.



To make the inland sea secure, and the Mediterranean League practical, it was necessary to have Italy. And Italy could not be had except at one price, the price England was not at this time willing to pay - exclusion of Austria from the League.

Disraeli still looked to Austria for co-operation, still thought Austria under Andrassy a Power, as it had been under Metternich in his own young days, did not sense as did Salisbury that "her vocation in Europe is gone." 1) And the imagination of Disraeli, bounded by its time, did not understand that the Adriatic was no longer a part of the Mid-land seas, but had become an inland lake with two nations contending for its possession.

Italy did understand. Italy even in the first decade of her existence as Italy comprehended her Irredenta. She had won back Venezia, Why not the Trentino, Trieste, Dalmatia? Italy at this time was not enough considered by the Powers. "Italy is of no importance" 2) said Bismarck to Hohenlohe; Italy that had made her way to a seat among the Powers was still anti-Austrian. She saw Austria restless on the other side of the Adriatic lake, in the hinterland of Dalmatia as well as in Bosnia. The promenade of the Emperor Franz Joseph in 1875 through Dalmatia, was not reassuring to Italy.

Crispien spoke to Bismarck of Austria, "whose conduct toward our government is anything but friendly." 3) Italy could not see Austria either more Adriatic or more Mediterranean. Italy, rightfully from the point of view of geography and of history, looked upon Austria as a Northern Power, and wanted her to remain that. Therefore she quashed the idea of a Mediterranean League which should include Austria. And as the cards lay, Austria would be in. Dilke says "Italy declining, the scheme collapsed. — foolish Italy." 4)

1. Cecil, II Salisbury p.85. 2. Hohenlohe II Memoirs p.141.

3. Crispien II Memoirs p.27. 4. Gwynn, Dilke p.249.

Austria was ambiguous as ever toward this or any project. But suspicion of opposition rests more upon Germany, since Germany's was the controlling voice in continental affairs. Disraeli found that his "secret of secrets" 1) was not received with continental favor, and turned his attention to a Gibraltar in the place of a League. 2) There is a suggestion that Bismarck saw, at the end of the Russo-Turkish war, both Russia and Austria emerging as Mediterranean Powers and by their apportioning of Asiatic and African Turkey, providing "material for exciting the susceptibilities of France and occupying her energies at a safe distance from the Rhine for years to come;" 3) France also saw this danger to the equilibrium and spoke against it. But, in any event Bismarck would not have welcomed any League which would have cared for this enlarged Mediterranean situation before it occurred, and which would have "balanced" the Powers in the Mediterranean without Germany being in the balance.

Yet it was in September, 1877, that Crispien had made his swing around the circle, and had had his interview with Bismarck, when the fortunes of the Russo-Turkish war were still in doubt, and Turkey was at the height of what seemed a demonstration of very substantial military power. An alliance of the Mediterranean Powers would not have been a small argument against Turkey, since she was geographically a Mediterranean power herself, and more afraid of attack from seas than from land.

Drummond Wolff, swinging round the capital circle of Europe in the spring of 1878, after San Stefano and before Berlin, found the Mediterranean League still possessing men's minds, still discussed as a possibility, a desirable possibility, in the European chancelleries. 3)

1. Monypenny, VI Disraeli, p. 254. 2. *ibid*, p. 259.  
3. Drummond Wolff, *My Rambling Recollections*, p.

It was a natural alliance, based on the geographic situation. But it was an alliance to succeed old enmities not yet healed. Therefore it was impossible at a moment such as the seventh decade, when even the Northern League was sub-written by more definite, more co-operative pacts among the three imperial Powers.

There was the old enmity between Italy and Austria, territorial in base. There was the current distrust between Italy and France, religious in base. There was the old doubt of England, based on her twice-told neutrality. Italy may have been 'foolish' in declining a Mediterranean alliance which would have given her a voice in any Balkan settlement, whether by sword or by word. But Italy recognized one enemy more subtle and more strong than Austria. ~~And Italy did not~~ Italy still felt that the power of the Quirinal was dependent on the temporary powerlessness of the Vatican, and would take no chances with the Extra-territorial Catholicity of France. "Italy declining, the scheme collapsed."

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By the mid-year of the decade the Powers were as on edge as if a war had been waged and the peace not made, more than if the threatened Franco-Prussian war of '75 had been fought. The diplomatic maneuvering which had prevented that war and brought Russia and England together as friends for the defense of France against Germany, had been succeeded by more skillful, more subtle and more general diplomatic maneuvers - suspicious rests on Germany - which was bringing Russia and England together as foes, in a similar but mutually opposing offensive against Turkey. For, however traditional was England's championship of the Ottoman Empire as the bulwark of Western Europe against Russia - "barbaric Russia," as the Queen had

1. Monypenny VI Disraeli p. 217.

said- their opposition was leading each, England as well as Russia, to consider an assault on the integrity of Turkey, in order to fortify each against the other.

France once had been used to divide Europe. But a second attempt to use her had brought Europe together. Decidedly France was not Turkey, was neither to be divided nor to divide. France might be useful for an indefinite time to come as argument for German army bills. But it was written plain that the Powers who had been passive in 1870 realized their mistake, realized how their own balance had been changed by the lightening of France in the scale, by the weighting of Germany in the scale; there was to be no more sacrifice of France; she was manifestly essential in a Europe which was not certain what had happened to it but which more than suspected that Bismarck had happened. Bismarck accepted his defeat of 1875, and began to turn it into materials of victory.

Turkey was the means at the moment of engaging the attention of the Powers, of setting them one against the other, particularly England against Russia, which two had come too near to common cause in '75. To permit that casual moment, that Russo-English rapprochement to become permanent, would be suicidal to Germany which lay between. Her safety depended on their incompatibility, Their harmony was Bismarck's cauchemar.

There began then a quasi friendship between France and Germany, not shared by the people and never published to the people- popular hostilities are of value in forcing through large army estimates in any country. But the Thiers program received some official attention. France sat beside Germany in certain minor conferences over the Eastern Question, 1) and as Decazees said to Hohenlohe, in regard to this same Question, "Mon cher Prince, il faut nous serrer les coudes." 2)

1. Nelidow, Souvenirs, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1915, May 15.

2. Hohenlohe, II Memoirs, p. 189, Nov. 1876.

In 1875 there came a revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the most Mohammedan if the most frontier province of Turkey in Europe; a most Slavic province and therefore under the paternal sympathy of Russia; the most adjacent province to Austro-hungary, therefore its unrest of immediate political concern to the Dual Empire.

Franz Joseph had made his imperial promenades through Dalmatia and looked sympathetically across to the Hinterland. Thereby he "inflamed the passions of a people who were fretting under the oppression of their Turkish masters." 1) Imperial promenades were never made without 'inspiration', especially in so difficult a region for tourists as Dalmatia.

The revolt came in Herzegovina. It reacted in Austria. It reacted in Russia. The passion for prestige, not satisfied since Sadowa, the passion for territory not compensated since Venezia, mounted in the breast of Austria. The passion for Christian suzerainty and for Slavic territory, for Constantinople the old dream of the Czars, the new dream of Pan Slavs passionately sympathetic with their Slavic brethren in Herzegovina, mounted eternal in the breast of Russia. The two nations most contiguous to and therefore most interested in the Balkans, glared at each other across the old partition of (Poland, 1771) and the old memory (Hungary 1848) of their Galician frontier. Would they act together, as allies of the Dreikaiserbund; would they act against each other as ambitious for the same territory?

The Three Emperors League functioned at this moment, but it merely requested consular co-operation. Consular agents were sent to labor with the insurgents. But to little avail. The Herzegovinians were oppressed, were rebelling. The three leagued Powers preferred to watch, not yet certain of their relations with each other, very un-

1. Walpole, IV Twenty Five Years, p. 69.

very uncertain; not yet meddling in the internal affairs of Turkey, for that would be an infringement upon the status of Turkey as established in 1856; and not yet aiding in repressing insurrections in Turkish provinces, for that would be to thwart the providential directing of Turkish provinces toward their destinies. 1) Austria and Russia maintained their ambitions and their agents, and Germany maintained her aloofness. Consuls could do nothing against such inevitables.

At the end of the mid-year, fires of revolt still burning, and threatening more direful things for 1876, the three Northern Powers decided that destiny was becoming manifest. Austria taking the lead, they drafted the Andrassy note, (Dec. 30, '75.) and asked the three Western Powers to adhere to it - Turkey to set her house in order. That is, the three Northern Powers, only one of whom had fought in the Crimea and that one against the Western Powers, dictated to Turkey in 1875. They invited the co-operation of the three Western Powers two of whom had fought the major fight in the Crimea, the other of whom had been made there - "out of this mud do I make Italy". Another three of these Powers, Austria, France and England, had signed an agreement to protect the integrity of Turkey, had wanted to make it a six Power pact, and Germany refused. And all six of the Powers as signatories in 1856 and 1871, were equals in whatever legislation was passed for Europe.

France and Italy agreed; the invitation was perfunctory; the response was perfunctory. England delayed. Turkey fearing more rather than less, asked England's assent, which was reluctantly given. Nothing came of it.

Nothing happened in Turkey, but more revolt, and the murder of 1. Reverteira. Deutsche Revue, May, 1904, 139-140, q. Coolidge.

the French and German consuls at Salonica (May 6, '76). This accidental linking of fate was calculated to make France and Germany feel and act together, for the moment. But it found Germany and Russia thinking together. When the news of the murder came to Ignatiev in the night in Constantinople, he sent Nelidow to carry the message to the German embassy. En route Nelidow met Rodolinsky, German counsellor carrying the news to the Russian embassy. If they watched each other in the Balkans, it was well to watch together.

The Chancellors of the three Empires met in Berlin, and drafted the Berlin Memorandum (May 11, '76). The Dreikaiserbund working true to form, Gortschakof dictating, Russia took the leading part. The diplomatic measures of December were to be supplemented by "vigorous" measures, if necessary. The ambassadors of the three Western Powers resident in Berlin were called to the Chancellery at night, were given the note, were asked to secure the endorsements of their governments, and, by telegraph.

Again France agreed; her consul had been killed with a consul of Germany's. Italy agreed. Italy was always more than a trifle pro-Russian. Victor Emmanuel might have remembered that Russia was pro-Neapolitan in 1859, but Humbert and his Italy were pro-Russian in 1876, as Salisbury found when he visited Rome in November. 1) And Italy was always looking across the Adriatic, always as Decazes was to whisper to Hohenlohe, desiring 'de pecher dans l'eau troublée.' 2)

England refused. "Her Majesty's Government appreciates the advantage of concerted action by the Powers in all that relates to the question arising out of the insurrections, but they cannot consent to join in the proposals which they do not conscientiously believe likely to effect the pacification which all the Powers desire to see attained." 3)

1. Cecil II Salisbury, 106. 2 Hohenlohe, II Memoirs p. 198.  
3. EE 1876 xxiv Turkey, No. 3, p. 471. q. Coolidge, p. 90.

It was a polite but categorical, ~~refusal~~ an imperial refusal. A London leader, looking forward, spoke prophetically, "History will perhaps see one of the great decisive turning points of civilization in this quiet and fearless act". 1) England did not consider the "plan" which Sir Stafford Northcote proposed as substitute 2) nor any substitute. She would take vigorous action herself, would send ships to protect the foreigners as had been suggested, 3) but not against Turkey. And would act, as England, not as one of the Powers subservient to the three Northern Powers. England was somewhat divided over England's stand in these first days of May; soon she was to take passionate expression; but as yet the people were not interested in foreign affairs. This act however caught the popular fancy, as imperial, independent acts so often do. "We are not a Monte negro", cried Disraeli.

The Concert of Europe was broken, not to be harmonized until 1871. The Duc Decazes, having estimates of the relativity of the Powers not always borne out by events, remarked "Eh bien, nous marcherons à cinq au lieu de marcher à six". 4) But, Bismarck saw the handwriting of Disraeli on the international wall, began to see that England meant to come back. He may have felt that he had wasted much of his life thinking England was a great Power, 5) but Bismarck was never so rigid that he could not alter when he alteration found.

It is probable that he felt something of the pro-english attitude at Court where Queen Victoria's daughter as Kron Prinzessin was not inactive. Bismarck would not have yielded to the Kron Prinzessin,

1. Carlslake ed. II Public Opinion p.288.

2. Monypenny, VI, p. 253.

3. Monypenny, II Disraeli, p.26.

4. Hohenlohe, II Memoirs, p.176.

5. Robertson, Bismarck p.179.



or to any woman. But he knew how to interpret the moment, and the man, and the woman. He told Lord Odo Russell that he was satisfied with the attitude of Great Britain toward the Berlin note, that he did not wish Russia to enter Turkey as conqueror, and that "at the right moment a combination would be found that would let Great Britain in on the ground floor with the Northern Powers." 1)

Turkey having listened to the Powers divide, as usual to her profit, countered as usual with a Revolution.

On the rejection of the Berlin Note, Disraeli had said "blood must flow". It began to flow, but not as he had anticipated. That very month (May, '76) there came the Bulgarian atrocities. Apparently they did not disturb unduly the other Powers, where public opinion was of less effect on diplomacy, and diplomacy less humanitarian. But England's moral passion, not always identical with her political or material interests, flamed into concern for what was happening in the Balkans. The news came round about, (June 26) and not well defined. Disraeli denied it by reduction in the Commons (July 10). Gladstone affirmed it by emphasis, in speeches, and in a still celebrated pamphlet (September 6). Bulgaria herself addressed the Powers. 2)

How atrocious were these massacres remains a historic dispute. The New York Herald carried correspondence, repeated in the London Daily News, that the atrocities were unspeakable. Sir Henry Elliot ambassador at Constantinople, having been slow to report what must have seemed to him by this time an ordinary Ottoman occurrence, was rebuked by England's sending out a special investigator to Bulgaria. Lady Gwendolen Cecil says the reports of the Daily Mail were found to have been exaggerated. 3) But in August, Baring the investigator, sent

1. Hanotaux IV Contemporary France p. 110.  
 2. ibid. p. 303.  
 3. Cecil II Salisbury p. 82.

back enough information to hang the whole Turkish government in the eyes of England, if not the English government itself.

Forty years later, when the Great War was running, Nelidow, counsellor for the Russian embassy where Ignatiev had been chief, placed the responsibility for the excessive massacres, not on the Turks but on the Russians. Practically he accuses Ignatiev of "inspiring" the American correspondents to exaggerate his report for English and American consumption.

C'est seulement plus tard que j'ai appris combine il y avait d'exaggeration et dans le mouvement pretendu unanime du Herzogoviniens, et dans les atrocities turques, et dans les recits reputes impartiaux du correspondant de New York Herald, MacGuhan et du consul des Etats Unis, Schuyler, qu'Ignatiev avait envoyees en Bulgarie accompagnees par le prince Tzeretelew, lequel leur fit voie et ecrire ce qu'il voulait ou plutot ce qu'il avait l'ordre de leur inspirer. Il l'avoué lui meme plus tard. 1)

Whatever the exact truth may be - and no doubt there were atrocities, and no doubt Ignatiev knew his business - they served to break up England as she had broken up Europe, to divide England as she never before had been divided in her Russophobia and in her Turcophilia. They prevented for two years that concentration of public opinion which in England which alone makes it possible for England to prepare for or carry on a war; they prevented a unity in the Cabinet, and not until one Turcophile resigned and one Russophile was converted, was it possible for England to present that united front to Europe which was to make a Congress of Berlin possible. In August Disraeli became Beaconsfield, and passed from the turmoil of the Commons to the quiet of the Lords; he had refused the elevation before; he could escape the extreme attacks there.

Russia had her wires to England. That there was a direct leakage of the Cabinet differences to Russia explains Russian protracted un-

1. Nelidow Souvenirs Revue des Deux Mondes, 1915.

belief that England meant "business", pacifist England the business of war. And that the later premature publication of the Anglo-Russian preliminary convention (see page 73) was an exhibition of Cossack tactics in wire tapping, is more than suspect by historians. The effect of the Bulgarian atrocities, of their exaggeration if exaggeration it was, on the British public, and the subsequent reactions of Russia against the English government, can be best understood if it is admitted that Nelidow knew what at last he reported, and that Ignatiev knew and played his game well.

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The Montenegrin-Serbian war against Turkey of that summer of '76 was but the continuation of the Herzegovinian revolt of '75, but the prelude of the Russo-Turkish war of '78; as Nelidow admits with much

naïveté, "c'était une guerre déguisée que nous faisons à la Turquie." 1) And there can be little doubt of the significance of the stream of Slavic volunteers from Russia of the numbers of Russian officers who came to organize the Serbian army. Pan-Slavism was running full-tide, from Russia, into the Slavic provinces of the Balkans.

Serbia seems to have been 'used' by Russia in this event; Montenegro, Russia's real outpost, came in later. And Serbia seems not to have lived up to Russian expectations. Prince Milan even announced himself as King while the war was in progress. The Czar said Serbia was not heroic as Montenegro was heroic. 2) Serbia seems to have forgotten her role and to have been fighting her own battles, not ~~à~~ notre guerre.

Well enough in July, when Serbia was winning. The contingency was provided for at Reichstadt. Serbia seemed about to accomplish

1. Nelidow, Souvenirs Revue des Deux Mondes, 1915. May 15.

2. Hanotaux, IV Contemporary France, p. 121.

that long desired ultimate, the break-up of Turkey; Russia stood ready to inherit. But there was more than suspicion of Serbia's self-interest; Russia did not mean to encourage that; Austria could not encourage that; it would quash the ambitions of both. Therefore Russia and Austria met, not trusting Serbia, not trusting each other entirely. They met at Reichstadt, to apportion the spoils of Serbia's war, they arranged the Near East. There should be additions to Serbia, also to Montenegro and to Greece; there should be an independent Bulgaria, but not a big Slav state. The *quid pro quo* consisted in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austro-Hungary at once, in a part of Bessarabia to Russia, and - most important and significant - a "rectification" of Russia's Asiatic frontier. (See also page 79.)

August came, and Serbia was losing; there was of a difference. The Powers must act. They acted variously, particularly the three Powers of the Dreikaiserbund. "All throughout this period the game of secret dealings beneath the outward march of events must be closely followed in order to understand this singular and distinctive phase of European history". 1) There was many a *tour de valse* - to borrow Von Bulow's figure for a later day 2), much *chassez, croisez, et changez vos dames*.

England determined to act first. Lord Derby, straight forward as ever, with a priority of activity unusual in him, put forth a "plan" demanded an armistice in the Balkans - Serbia had implored it. As to peace, he suggested the status quo for the warring provinces, local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, guarantees for Bulgaria. All the Powers agreed but Russia. 3) The British fleet rode off Besika.

Russian diplomacy was exceedingly active, that year of 1876.

Russia knew what she wanted. Russia was not certain how she should

1. Hanotaux, *IV Contemporary France* p. 113, note.

2. Von Bulow, *Imperial Germany* p.

3. Hanotaux, *op. cit.* p. 119.

get it. She had made her arrangement with Austria, at Reichstadt. But would it hold? She attempted an arrangement with Germany against Austria, after Reichstadt had been consummated. The attempt is full of interest, and while the negotiations are not clearly set forth even after so many post-Great War revelations, what is known does throw much light on the states and the statesmen of the seventh decade.

A telegram came to Bismarck, from General von Werder, German military attaché to the Russian court. Russia asked, if she found herself compelled to make war against Austria, would Germany remain neutral? That is, if the subcompact between Emperor Wilhelm and Emperor Alexander which Bismarck had not signed in 1873, should ~~not~~ be invoked, would Bismarck now underwrite it?

Russia was justified in her appeal. It was a counter suggestion. Bismarck had sent Radowitz in 1875. He had sent Manteuffel in 1876. As ever, throughout his chancellorship, Russia was important, she was too important if she succeeded in gaining Austria as a pledged and active ally. Bismarck's policy demanded the three-Power League - and secret understandings with each of the other two - and the prevention if possible of secret alliances between the other two. Germany must ever "serve as a connecting link between Austria and Russia". If either broke from the chain, Germany had nothing else to do but "isolate" that rebel. 1)

Bismarck wanted an "understanding" with Russia, an exchange of guaranteed interests - free hand in the Balkans for free hand in Alsace - Russia's old mistake of 1875 compensated, and France made helpless by lack of friends - the inevitability of the coming Franco-Russian alliance quashed by the omniscient, omnipotent Iron Chancellor - such an alliance for such an end Bismarck would have signed at any time.

1. Berlin Journal, q. Hanotaux, op. cit, p. 116

But the offer of the Russian alliance was not to this end. Austria was to Russia what France was to Germany. And if France seemed important in the working out of the diplomatic situation for Russia, Austria was precious to Germany, in a diplomatic or territorial situation. The two were inevitably at cross purposes.

Bismarck tried at first to evade the Russian question, he tried rather to work through the Dreikaiserbund, as three 'mutual friends'. But forced to a conclusion he answered, as he said, "unequivocally" that "our first care was to preserve friendship between the great monarchies, which in a struggle with one another had more to lose as regarded their opposition to the revolution than they had to win. If to our sorrow, this was not possible between Russia and Austria, then we could endure indeed that our friends should lose or win battles against each other, but not that one of the two should be so severely wounded and injured that its position as an independent Great Power taking its part in the councils of Europe would be endangered." 2)

What Bismarck really wanted with Austria was "an open constitutional alliance", a Germanic union which could not be dissolved by either Germany or Austria without the whole machinery of the Governments, Emperor, Reichstag, Bundesrath, et al<sup>y</sup>, consenting. Such an alliance has never been made. That is no answer to the needs of any time, not even of today, 1922.

What Bismarck wanted with Russia was friendliness, he thought that essential. He spent several years of his life thinking mistakenly that England was a Great Power 2); he spent all the years of his official life thinking Russia was a Great Power and acting on the thought. The first half of the period he carried favor with Russia, he guarded Germany's Russian frontier, he did not hesitate over the

1. Bismarck II Reflections and Reminiscences p.231.

2. <sup>4-22-28</sup>Robertson Bismarck, p. 179

Alversleben convention. Friendship with a strong Russia was essential to a Germany that would be strong. The climax came in 1866 and 1870, Germany won its reward. Germany was made possible because of Russian neutrality on the Eastern border.

During the second half of the period - the War Scare of '75 had demonstrated Russia's new conception of friends and allies in Europe - Bismarck fenced and parried, allied and sub-allied, in order that the inevitable might not happen, in order that the boundaries of East and West might not be threatened by allied foes whose chief fear was that of the increasingly powerful nation that lay between. Time shifts alliances and reevaluates them. Time has not yet demonstrated whether the natural alliance of Germany was and is with Russia or with Austria. Bismarck declared "Russia has no business in the West, there she can only continue nihilism and such distempers." Her mission is in Asia, there she represents civilization" <sup>1)</sup> \*) Bismarck himself thereby traced Russia's gigantic fatal Drang for supremacy in the Far East.

But the Dreikaiserbund was an artificial arrangement seeking to hold in check in Europe the diplomatic differences of each Power, each one's alliance for each one's end. The sub-compacts of the '70's, the reinsurance pact of the '80's, were diplomatic evidence that Germany regarded her Eastern neighbor as a Power to be reckoned with among the Powers. Germany was never quite able to use Russia, to subdue her - not even at Björko. Hence the over-estimate of Russia

Russia could not risk war against Austria alone, and especially with Germany back of Austria. Therefore the Russo-Austrian understanding held; no war for division of territory; a compact for division of territory.

1. q. Dillon "Russia and Germany Contemporary Review, Nov. 1905.

Sir Henry Elliott, watching from Constantinople, attributed the quick-following break-down of the Turkish Empire extending to its finances, to the influence of the Dreikaiserbund. 1) The Bund did not break, not even when Bismarck acknowledged his preference for Austria. For if Russia could not longer depend on imperial friends neither could she be certain of Western friends. So she continued to act with the Northern Powers.

Russia having refused England's proposal to end the Serbian war, acted on her refusal, proposed her own plan, based on her understanding with Austria; if Turkey rejected peace with Serbia, Bosnia was to be occupied by Austrian troops, Bulgaria was to be occupied by Russian troops, and the fleet at Besika was to be a fleet of All the Powers.

There was no doubt in the mind of England of the interpretation to be placed on this. She answered with the Guildhall speech of Disraeli (November 9) - "Great Britain is not an aggressive Power but" - the rest of the speech became the music hall ballad -

We don't want to fight but by jingo if we do  
We've got the ships we've got the men, we've got the money too!

Russia answered in the words of the mystic Czar, (November 30) If all the Powers and Turkey should disagree, if the general understanding he had hoped for did not come to pass - "it is my firm intention to act alone". 2)

Germany was still uninterested, at least disinterested, in the Eastern Question. The next month (December 6), Bismarck made his declaration in the Reichstag, about the superior preciousness 'die

Knochen eines einzigen pommerschen Musketiers. 3)

1. Walpole, IV Twenty five Years, p.71.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1877 xc p. 576.
3. Staats Achiven, 31, 57666



Russia, assured of the aloofness of Germany - unless it was rather on the advice of Germany - and with Austria and Germany forming a barrier against Western Europe, and with France in her debt, began to prepare to act alone, to make war alone. 'Notre guerre déguisée' was to become 'Our War' openly. There was even thought of beginning at once, of picking up the gauge of the Serbian armistice and throwing it down before the Sultan. The Grand Duke Nicholas was chosen Commander in Chief of the Russian armies, and the Grand Duke was given his goal in one word - "Constantinople!"<sup>1)</sup>

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But however much the Czar found the country ready, the fires of Pan-Slavism warming the winter way to the Tsargrad, the Grand

Duke did not find the armies equal to this objective. And the road past Austria was not yet made safe. Delay was necessary. Therefore Russia accepted England's counter to all this war preparation, a conference of the Powers. Russia could use the time with profit. So the Powers came, to the Conference of Constantinople, and, to adjust the ambitions of those Powers who could see Constantinople as nothing but desire or fear.

Calice came ~~for~~ Austria, chief of the Foreign Office at Vienna under Andrassy. Andrassy had at first refused the conference, the proposal had **carried** local autonomy for Bosnia. Later she consented, local autonomy for Bosnia was withdrawn. (Had Andrassy seen Mantouffell go to Warsaw, while he was at Reichstadt?) Austria had made her own terms as to Bosnia with Russia; she had no mind to see the Powers place Bosnia on the table at Constantinople. She carried on negotiations with Russia during the negotiations of the six Powers.

1. Hanotaux, IV. Op. cit. p. 123.

And Calice seems not to have taken a positive part in the proceeding, rather to have pursued a policy of watchful waiting - with communications open to Berlin.

Chaudordy came for France, Hohenlohe refers to his "ever smiling mouth". 1) It was symbolical of the way in which France met her defeat, of the way in which she was trying to mend her fortunes. France does not sulk, she smiles. France was watching the game but not getting into it, her best trick at the moment. Plainly she was anxious as ever over the Rhine. If Russia should become engaged in the Near East, and if Bismarck's offer, evidently a standing offer, should be accepted by Russia - free hand for free hand - France would lie helpless before the old enemy. Russia was however demanding the quid pro quo, playing for French support in the Eastern Question, not relying entirely on German disinterestedness. France had acknowledged her debt, hoping she would not have to cash the check. 2)

Lord Salisbury came for England, eager to bet on the right horse, with his complete family and complete entourage; 3) swinging round the circle of European capitals on his way; finding Berlin and Vienna in such absolute accord that he suspected an alliance; 4) hearing everywhere England urged to take Constantinople, to take Egypt - was this a Bismarckian gesture of generosity to embroil Russia and England, France and England; or the time-honored policy of "compensations", Bismarck's constant idea that everyone should "take something". 5)

The other Powers, Russia, Germany, Italy, contented themselves with their resident ministers. Germany and Italy might thereby be

1. Hohenlohe II Memoirs, p. 193.
2. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 64.
3. Monypenny, VI Disraeli, p. 97.
4. Cecil II Salisbury, p. p. 125, 94.
5. ibid. p. 125, 97.

advertising that their interest in the Balkans was theoretic. Germany was working through Austria. Italy would work against Austria. Their situations were explained. But Russia was explained in her resident ambassador, now with twelve years residence continuous behind him.

Ignatiev was a leader in the Pan-Slav movement, and was representative of the Russian Government at Constantinople, the dream-desire of the Pan-Slavs; therefore it cannot be held that the Russian government was irresponsive to the Pan-Slav urge. Ignatiev was, next to Gortschakof, chief of the diplomatic counsellors of the Russian Government, hoping to supplant Gortshakof himself; 1) therefore it cannot be held that the Russian Government was negligent of Russian interests at Constantinople. Closer and closer the Russian Government and the Pan Slavs were moving together in their ambition toward the only city capable of being capital of Pan Slavia.

Ignatiev was performing his work with Russian skill. He acted on his own initiative, as Russian ambassadors were always permitted, but always toward the single Russia ambition. He was supple as ever, and no doubt glad beyond expression - if any emotion was ever inexpressible to this Slav of Slavs - that England had sent its special negotiator, had not given its word to the resident British ambassador, to Elliot, so uncompromisingly pro-Turk.

There were preliminary meetings of the conference, from which Turkey was excluded, even within her own house. These meetings were held at the Russian embassy, which was significant, to Turkey or to any onlooker. "Preliminaries" were well thought of in the '70's, it left so little to be done at the formal; only ratification.

Turkey was also busy. On the very day the formal conference  
1. Nelidow, Souvenirs, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1915, May 15

opened Turkey sounded a salvo of guns in honor, not of the conference, but of her own well being. She had granted a Constitution to the Empire, a parliament of two Houses, a responsible Executive, freedom for press and creed. She had granted more reform than Notes and Revolts had urged, more than Tanzimat and Hatti Hamouzouns had ever expressed. Execution was not to be to the Powers but to the Porte. This was in effect an assertion of equality with the Powers that had been granted her in Paris in 1856. But it was an assertion of independent equality, for which she would pay later. It was a repudiation of that protection to her integrity, guaranteed in '56 and '71, the international servitude under which she existed.

This promulgation of the Constitution was a preliminary move of the Young Turk movement of the twentieth century; "young" in that it was democratic in appearance; Constantinople itself was feeling the restlessness of the provinces; Turkish in that its reforms stirred only the thinnest surface of the Government, and reached the provinces not at all.

Midhat Pacha was claimed by both England and Russia in turn; Ignatiev claimed him, England claimed him. 1) Whichever, he was, as Grand Viziers always are, Turkish; and that persistent fact is too often forgotten in any consideration of Turkey. The truth appears to be that Russia at this moment was bending every effort to "take" Constantinople by subtle diplomatic approach, and practically succeeded under Ignatiev, the climax of his victory being written in the peace of San Stefano. While England, becoming more and more fearful of the Russian advance as the year of 1877 went on, - not Salisbury but Elliott represents this conviction - succeeded in so blocking the Russian diplomatic campaign, that the military campaign

became necessary. The Conference of Constantinople therefore must be regarded as a most important moment in the deploying of forces, and Turkish action not the least of these.

"So far as the conference goes, it will consist of a meeting between you and Ignatiev", wrote Beaconsfield to Salisbury. 1) The event proved the prophecy; but it was not the expected duel, it was the unexpected duet that resulted. Salisbury and Ignatiev, England and Russia, were in accord - in that 'pas de deux' which Salisbury was to find himself making later with a partner even more strange to the British traditions of the House of Cecil. One of the curiosities of diplomatic friendship is this at Constantinople in December 1876 and January 1877, between the representatives of two eternally hostile nations. The very mendacity of Ignatiev, the 'mentir pasha,' 2) intrigued Salisbury, even when it was being employed to deceive him. 3) Of Lord Salisbury in general it may be said that conscious of the long and devious pathway of diplomatic history in which his family had taken a major part, he accepted his own task as always of the moment, and whatever it possessed of English tenacity, it had ever a Cecilian quality of the temporal.

If this momentary rapprochement between the two Conferencees could have become a permanent adjustment between the two countries - whatever, it would have been vastly different from what it was. It would have meant at this time, the partition of Turkey, and the establishment of autonomous Balkan states - autonomy to become - ? It would have been an exchange of the traditional policy of England for the traditional policy of Russia.

1. Monypenny II Disraeli. p. 103
2. Baddeley, Russia in the Eighties, p. 286.
3. Cecil, II Salisbury. p. 110.

England had put forth the conference in memory of 1856 and <sup>1871</sup> ~~1856~~ the territorial integrity of Turkey. Russia in accepting had objected to the territorial emphasis, for in the carrying out of the decisions of the conference she had suggested that occupation might be necessary. 1) She had declared "the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantee demanded by humanity, the sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace." 2).

Lord Salisbury was never at any moment pro-Turk. As he wrote from Constantinople, "every day I am more convinced of the deplorable folly of the Crimean war." 3) He was not then nor later averse from a break-up of the Empire. Therefore he could listen to Calice in the name of Austria dividing the Empire altho protesting it was done with "disagreeable relief." 4) Therefore he could report "all is very smooth between us", Ignatiev and himself. 5)

Even England wavered, even Beaconsfield. The Prime Minister had stood on the treaties of 1856, he had upheld the integrity of Turkey. But the Disraelian attitude toward this traditional policy, his own and England's, was not so strong while Salisbury was in Constantinople, in a position to grab; while the break-up seemed so near and the pieces so desirable. Salisbury had answered Beaconsfield's note in Cabinet that he go to Constantinople,—"of course I will do what the Cabinet wants, but it is essential that your policy should be settled first". 6) On November 4, Beaconsfield had declared that the first object of English policy was "the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire." <sup>7)</sup> That day the call went forth.

1. Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, 1877, No. 9, p. 715, Cd. 1028.

2. Hertslett, IV, Sec. 4 74

3. Cecil II Salisbury, p. 123

4. ibid

5. ibid, p. 108, Letter to Derby, Dec. 7. 1876.

6. ibid, p. 91.

7. Monypenny, II Disraeli, p. 89

While Salisbury was en route to the Conference, Beaconsfield admitted to Hardy that while the Powers might not intend it, partition was pretty certain to come. 1) The next day he wrote his home thoughts to the British Commissioner, then in Florence digesting his impressions of Berlin and Vienna. In this letter Lord Beaconsfield accepted the possibility of taking a piece of Turkish territory, "from which we need never recede"; an item in his policy he retained till June 4, 1878, and the fruits of which England retains today. The taking of Cyprus was thus foreshadowed, of which Lord Salisbury was to hear much more. 2)

Beaconsfield was willing to go further - English occupation at the suggestion of the Porte, and the Porte "having taken this position, she must be inexorable." 3) That is, the Porte must invite England to infringe on her territory, and then prevent any other Power from attempting any similar infringement.

This would have been to realize on English friendship with Turkey, and would have accomplished an exclusion of Russia and Austria from the Balkan peninsula - and would have united them in war against the common enemy; not Turkey, but Turkey and England. This secret change of Beaconsfield's attitude toward Turkey - "of course it must be the last card to be played and it must be so done that we seem almost unwilling to consent" 4) - led Salisbury, not to engineer an occupation by the English with Turkish approval, but to put pressure on Turkey to persuade her that England would be firm, and to ask the home government to back that pressure. Unfortunately for Salisbury Lord Derby's telegram of December 22, 5) reaffirming the English policy of upholding Turkey, persuaded the Turks that England was still

1. Hardy, Memoirs II p.377

4 .ibid.

2. See page 90 passim.

5. Cecil II Salisbury p.127

3. Monypenny II Disraeli p.105. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, Dec.1.

in need of a buffer state.

This telegram may have been known in Constantinople; there appear to have been few untapped wires to Foreign Offices in those days. Salisbury found his difficulties increased by a multitude of English influences, influences that had entrenched themselves in that desirable place, and which could not be dislodged by any Salisburyian "off with their heads!" Some one was persuading the Turks that England would back them in any event. Salisbury found "English fanatics at work" 1); that a certain resident in Stamboul "professed to be the secret emissary of the Prime Minister" 2); and finally that a "colony of English and Greeks who make money out of war contracts and who think that by urging the Turks to stand out they will force England to spend money here" 3) were to blame. Gradually, finally, Salisbury discovered Sir Henry Elliott himself as the block. He wrote to Derby that all the other ambassadors, French, Italian, Austrian, German, had urged him that he must get Elliot withdrawn if anything was to be accomplished - "I am of their opinion". 4) A telegram to the same effect went to Beaconsfield at the same time.

But curiously enough, a similar telegram to the same effect and on the same day went to Lord Beaconsfield from General Ignatiev. Did Ignatiev really want Elliot withdrawn, really want Salisbury to co-operate with him? Or was his telegram, as Lady Gwendolen suggests, one of 'malice'? 5) a malice he seemed at times to indulge merely for its effect?

However that may be, Lord Beaconsfield replied that if it got out in England that they had acted on Ignatiev's recommendation, even if that were also Salisbury's, "he should be turned out the

1. Cecil II Salisbury p. 111.

2. *ibid.*

3. *ibid.*, p. 117

4. *ibid.*, p. 118.

5. *ibid.*, p. 119.



first day of the session". 1) Lord Salisbury agreed, but still protested privately. He insisted that his "powers of negotiation with the Turks were almost nil" 2) as against Elliot; but less than a week later, he admitted that "perhaps success was not possible" even if Sir Henry had been away". 3) Perhaps, Salisbury being what he was, Ignatiev being what he was, the historian must believe success was not possible, to England. Salisbury places the blame on the Turks, "the inconvenient Turks" 4) "the incorrigible Turks" 5).

The ultimatum was presented to Turkey on January 13: Peace between Turkey and Serbia based on the status quo; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria (a Bulgaria almost as big as Russia carved out at San Stefano) to be organized under the supervision of the Powers.

This was not what Austria had come for. This was not what Russia had come for. And, as was certain from the beginning, this was not what Turkey would accept. The Conference broke up - but the grand plan of all the Powers leaving together was prevented by the weather, a violent storm raging through the Bosphorus. Only, Salisbury, Britain true to form, embarked at the concerted moment. 6)

The Conference failed, and was meant to fail by all but England who had called it. The English Commissioner seems to have laid the failure not on Russia, but at first on "someone", 7) then specifically on Germany "playing the part of Sir Lucius O'Trigger and assuring Russia there was very snug lying in the Abbey". 8) Later on he reported "my impression still is that Berlin is the center of the great European intrigue, and that Turkey is a mere accident, a spark that may inflame a combustible heap, but not in itself of much

moment." 9)

1. Cecil II Salisbury p. 120

2. ibid.

3. ibid.

4. ibid., p. 125

5. ibid. p. 123.

6. ibid. p. 125.

7. ibid. 131.

8. ibid. p. 128.

9. ibid. p. 132.

The British and French ambassadors at Berlin talked it over and came to the conclusion that Bismarck was urging Russia on to war. 1) Hardy believed the failure due to the international complex - "Russian falsehood, Turkish evasion, German treachery", an irresistible combination. 2) Only the dominion of one, or the compromise of all, can carry through a conference; usually both are needed; Europe was not then ready for compromise, and Germany not yet ready to dominate.

Salisbury in gathering up what crumbs of success lay under the green table of diplomacy, found it in the hope that it had made "impossible that we should spend any more English blood in sustaining the Turkish Empire." 3) Yet, during the Conference - while Russia and Austria, Russia and Rumania, were laying plans for the coming war, ~~clearing~~ clearing their international decks - England, as Lord Beaconsfield's letters show, was beginning her military plans, 4) if not preparations, which were to become more and more evident and significant, and finally were to determine all things; compel Russia to accept the Berlin conference, compel Russia to accept the English ultimatum at the conference; all of course without the shedding of "English blood" but with the expenditure of English money, almost as precious to England, and the expenditure of much English diplomacy. "We have never been at war with Russia", wrote Beaconsfield afterward to Drummond-Wolf, "though we had to negotiate as if we virtually had been." 5)

1. Hanotaux, IV op.cit. p. 129.

2. Hardy, q. Monypenny, VI. op.cit. p. 112, note.

3. Cecil, II op.cit. p. 22. Salisbury to Carnarvon, Jan. 11, '77.

4. Monypenny, op.cit. VI. p. 105.

5. Drummond-Wolff, II, Rambling Recollections; p. 197. Beaconsfield to D.W. Nov. 4, 1880.

Gortshakof, hoping that the Salisburian-Ignatievian harmony might have permeated Europe, and disposed the Treaty Powers more generously

toward Russia the Liberator, issued a circular note - What now The-  
Inter-  
-lude. did Europe mean to do about it? Europe could have answered -

Holy Russia, carry on! But somehow Europe was not harmonious, did not urge Russia on, to war against Turkey and the rewards of that war. Ignatiev went abroad instead, to see if he could do in the capitals what he had failed to do in Constantinople; or, perhaps, to do precisely the same thing. More than content, he performed after the Conference, what Salisbury had performed before, a swinging around the capital circle - ostensibly in a search for aid to his eyesight! He came to Berlin and heard there "of two evils from which Russia suffers war may be the lesser". 1) It was what Ignatiev wanted to hear, from Bismarck. He even came to England, to Hatfield, and tried, professional kleptomaniac that he was, to take the English government, under the roof of his host, and hand it over to the Liberals. 2)

The nations increased activity in their skirmishings for position now that international co-operation had failed and the Turkish danger still remained. One final effort of the Treaty Powers was made, through the London Protocol of March 31, engineered by Ignatiev, finally signed by the Six Powers, who agreed to "watch" Turkey. But three of these signed with such reservations as to betray the lack of harmony, or of any concerted intention beyond the moment. Russia demanded that Turkey come to St. Petersburg, to negotiate disarmament. England ~~announced~~ announced that if Russia and Turkey disagreed on disarmament, England would no longer "watch" in concert. Italy did not merely sign, as she had the Berlin Note, but said even more positively than England,

1. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 135.

2. Cecil. II. op. cit. p. 133.

that if the agreement fell thro, Italy was no longer bound to act with the Powers.

England, on the return of Salisbury, was divided between the two policies, Partition or Integrity. Salisbury boldly proposed partition to the Cabinet; 1) he had become convinced that the guarantee of integrity had been repudiated by Turkey, and that anyway dead policies could not forever bind live issues; 2) dead policies such as came out of 1856 were out of date in 1877. The Government discussed the ~~choice~~ choice, never agreed; not even at Berlin; it held to both. Lord Beaconsfield recognized that the English people had been taught the ~~virtue~~ virtue of Turkish integrity, and a popular viewpoint is difficult to change. He himself had accepted partition, 3) as he was to accept it later. But he never advertised such ministerial variance from a less complex public opinion. Salisbury believed Beaconsfield was bent on war; 4) so did Europe. The most that can be said is that at no time did Lord Beaconsfield shrink from war during all his examination of the Eastern Question.

Russia was being urged forward. ~~Pan-Slavism~~ Pan-Slavic sympathy for oppressed race-men mounted. Public opinion was increasing its influence in Russia. Katkoff was editing the Moscow Gazette. That Gazette carried for its motto, 'Russia for the Russians'. He boasted afterward that his 'guerres diplomatiques' led to the Russo-Turkish war. 5).

Russia was feeling the old urge toward Constantinople, out of her traditional past. Russia was feeling the sly urge of Germany, "perfectly conscious of the intrigue of Bismarck to involve her in a struggle", 6) as Beaconsfield wrote to Derby soon after the close of the Conference

of Constantinople, but unable to escape the pressure of all these

1. Cecil, II, op. cit. p. 138

2. ibid. pp. 189, 145.

3. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 104.

4. Cecil, II Salisbury, p. 138

5. LeRoy Beaulieu, q. Baddeley, op. cit.

6. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 126 p. 302

urgings. So Russia cleared the way for action, cleared the way toward the Tsargrad.

That way led through Rumania and past Austria. Rumania had negotiated with Russia during the Constantinople conference. Rumania had appealed to the conference for a guarantee of her neutrality. Not strangely, the appeal was not heard. Now, the Russo-Rumanian arrangement was concluded, and Russia obtained the use of the corridor. →

Negotiations had been carried on with Austria since the preceding July. The Convention of Reichstadt, determining the spoils of war should Serbia have won, became the basis for the Conventions of Pesti. Seeing the conference fail, an agreement was concluded, as to the spoils of war out of the then accepted inevitable conflict between Russia and Turkey. To insure Austrian neutrality on her right flank, to keep the now secured Rumanian corridor safe for the passage of Russian troops, Austria was to have her price. On March 18, the arrangement was further strengthened and Austria farther assured of the rewards for her neutrality in the coming partition. She was to remain neutral, but give diplomatic support, with the old rewards of the provinces. "Rectification" in Asia, for Russia, remained secret.

St. Petersburg may well have considered that it had paid high for its visé, but the passport was worth it. Russia - Gortshakof - again issued a Circular Note (April 7) "Negotiations having failed ... the Emperor of Russia will therefore undertake alone what he had requested the Powers to perform with him". 2)

1. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 291.

2. It is not without interest that at this moment, April 12/1877, Bismarck tendered one of his chronic resignations. (Hohenlohe, II Memoirs, , 196.

April came, and the war came between Russia and Turkey. Austria, with the Pesth agreements in hand, folded arms and waited. Germany, not knowing of the Pesth agreements(?) looked on, not unwilling that Russia should fight to a comfortable exhaustion, Turkey to dismemberment. The Dreikaiserbund held.

Russo-Turkish War.

England warned Russia that the "decision of the Russian Government to undertake war was not one which had her concurrence or approval." 1) England could do nothing. Lord Derby openly admitted, before the Lords, that "England could hope for no allies, France would remain absolutely neutral, Austria was continually uncertain, Italy showed increasing signs of pro-Russian tendency, and Germany was holding herself in reserve." 2) England therefore declared her neutrality. It was a Conditional Neutrality, conditioned on Russia's observing neutrality on Four Points in the Near East - the Suez, the Persian Gulf, the Straits, Constantinople.

England called this "the charter of our policy", she spoke rotundly of "the diapason of our diplomacy". 3) She builded everything, neutrality of the present, security for the future, on these Four Points. If they were not conceded, England would attempt to gain the co-operation of Austria in order to secure them; they were precious to Austria. But if for any reason, Russian or German, Austria failed her, England would undertake the task alone. 4)

The Russian Commander in Chief had entered on his war work with the war cry, "Defend our insulted and oppressed brethren!" Defend the Faith of Christ!" The three Field Marshal's batons, which the

1 .Parliamentary Papers, 1877, xc, p.4. 1. Coolidge, p.117.

2. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p.296.

3. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p.136.

4. Cecil, II, op. cit. p.143.

Czar had caused to be touched with diamonds, 1) were to be used by the Czar himself and his two Grand Ducal Commanders in a Holy War. Russia had no intention of Acquiring Constantinople. "It is not toward conquest we march", cried the Grand Duke to his troops, and, in the ears of Europe. But, even in a Holy War Russia might have to occupy her Holy City, Constantinople, temporarily.

English and Russian interests were compacted in the Shouvalof-Salisbury Memorandum of May. Russia accepted the Four Points; and thereby circumscribed her ambitions, in deference to England; as she had similarly in deference to Austria. If Constantinople should be brought into question, it should be made the subject of general agreement. 2)

Russia even suggested to England [June 8] that she was then willing to make peace with Turkey, the battle not begin, if Turkey should ask for it - Batoum and Bessarabia to be ceded to Russia, Bulgaria to be autonomous, and the autonomous provinces to become independent. There was no reference to Bosnia, no reference to the arrangement made with Austria. What concerned Austria did not concern England, and vice versa. 3)

Now Russia did not ask more for herself than this at San Stefano, or, at Berlin. But the significance of what she did ask was to become more evident. And whereas in June 1877 she had declared that the making of the peace terms should be shared by those Treaty Powers who had remained neutral, later and victorious she became doubtful of their co-rights.

1. Baddeley, op. cit. p. 362

2. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 299.

3. Cecil, II, op. cit. P. 143.

Whether satisfied or not, England sat back and waited. She had to wait developments at home, developments in the Cabinet, development of public opinion. Decidedly Disraeli was not master in his house, but the lack of definition in England's policy during the war year of 1877 must be laid, not to the Prime Minister, or even to the age of the Prime Minister, but to England's divisions. A popular government can enter on no foreign policy that leads to war unless policy and logical war are popular. The British are naturally of the Thomases who doubt; unless they could see the Russian at the Gates of Constantinople, they would not believe that the Russians would enter or could enter Constantinople.

No positive measures were taken so long as Russian arms did not seem to be carrying Russian ambitions forward. Always doubtful of Russian faith, the English Government, Derby speaking, more than once sought reaffirmation from Russia as to her intentions toward Constantinople. At the end of July the garrisons were strengthened in the Mediterranean, and the Cabinet, for once unanimous, advised Russia that England would go to War if Constantinople were occupied for more than a military demonstration. 1) Even Beaconsfield sent a secret and private message to the Czar, of similar warning. 2)

Throughout the period there is evidence of England's increasing concern, and therefore increasing unanimity. Gallipoli as a desirable strategic point d'appui was spoken of by the Queen, and in the Cabinet. 3) Beaconsfield again advanced the suggestion to the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the Porte invite the protection of England. 4) The British ambassador at Constantinople was almost the

1. Monypenny VI. op. cit. p. 154.

2. ibid. p. 173.

3. ibid, p. 149.

4. ibid, p. 143.



only one at this moment on whom Beaconsfield depended. Salisbury ~~seem~~ seems rather to have been in touch with Lyons at Paris. The Queen to have relied on Odo Russell at Berlin. The divisions among the Ambassadors added to England's complexity.

Austria stated her position in response to England's query, in July. 1) She would not permit Russia to set up a principality in Bulgaria under Russian influence; or to stay in Constantinople; or to acquire Asiatic territory south of Constantinople; refusal of these points on the part of Russia would make a casus belli. But, Austria declined on her part to interfere in the war until the Turks submitted, even tho that might involve the entry of Russia into Constantinople - Austria wished to realize on her diplomatic investments. War would only follow if Russia attempted to establish herself permanently in the Tsargrad, but not follow mere entry into the city. It was precisely this waiting which Russia invited, Russia was ever strong for the fait accompli.

At this moment Austria and England found their policies in superficial accord. It was only later that they came to understand what Russia's compliance meant, ~~and~~ , and that something more than diplomatic accord might be necessary. It was a time of incomplete intentions, understandings, diplomacies. Europe did not understand why. Germany was not yet ready to tell it.

-9-

The two latest human floods to come out of Asia swept on, they met on the Balkan range; Plevna became the symbol for impassibility.

In December Plevna fell, and the flood poured through the Shipka Pass; Shipka Pass became the symbol for a flood-tide.

Victory  
Armistice  
Negotiation.

The Sultan appealed to the Collective Protectorate of Europe; (December 12) but these refused him, 1) as he had refused them the year before. Then the Sultan, remembering who had always been his friend, appealed to England. (December 24) He even considered taking refuge in England. England spoke to Russia. Russia referred the Sultan to the Commander in the Field. The Turks, finally humbled, telegraphed for an Armistice. But St. Petersburg sent such important instructions by messenger, not by telegraph. It would take the messenger ten days to reach the Grand Duke. 2) In the meantime the Russian Armies moved on.

In January the Russians were at Adrianople. In February an Armistice was signed, called "the Preliminary Basis of Peace". 3) Beaconsfield believed the armistice a comedy, and that Russia would keep on advancing. 4) His guess was right, as to the advance. But Russia, wishing to have everything in order for the final settlement - of which this was the preliminary base - had stipulated the possession of these places toward which she advanced in the terms of the Armistice itself. The "high priestess of international law" could not have been more correct.

In January Derby reminded Russia again that revising of Paris or of London, was an affair of the Powers. Russia did not answer. She did inform Austria of the terms on which the Armistice was being arranged before the Armistice was signed. Austria was her ally in the matter of the Balkans, and powerful as Russia felt herself with

1. Cecil II op.cit.p.185.

2. ibid, op.cit.p.186.

3. Hertslett, IV, Treaties, 2658.

4. Monypenny, VI, op.cit.p. 241.

Constantinople in sight, she preferred to have a friend in the Concert of Europe, and if possible to have Austria as that friend, since ~~xxxx~~ Austria could cut athwart her path and Austrian unfriendliness could be serious.

Yet, Russia felt herself master of the situation, with or without Austria. Was she not assured that England would no longer dispute her? At least the Russian ambassador at London so assured her. He sent telegrams to St. Petersburg urging the armies to enter Constantinople, affirming that England would not raise a finger against the occupation, provided Gallipoli should not be occupied and the English fleet before the Golden Horn not be blockaded. 1)

England may have understood then as forty years later, that Gallipoli was the key to the lock of the Dardanelles on Constantinople; Beaconsfield and the Queen had long been speaking of it. But Constantinople was as much a symbol to England as to Russia, and could not be allowed to go this way. Shouvalof may have telegraphed, but also Shouvalof here as elsewhere, may have been mistaken. He depended on those 'leakages' from the Cabinet meetings, which have not yet been satisfactorily explained.

His advice, as orders, was telegraphed from St. Petersburg to Constantinople. But the Turks naturally suspecting, so garbled the cipher that even the artful Ignatiev could not read the permission, and in such a case dared not make his own interpretation. The Turks in turn warned England and demanded help. England in turn telegraphed to Loftus at St. Petersburg. And Loftus, for once on the job, telegraphed back the affrighted message - the Russian Commander in Chief to occupy Constantinople, with the consent of the Sultan. 2)

The Russian meaning was growing clearer. What happened "with

1. Baddeley, Russia in the Eighties, p. 299

Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. 214.

2. ~~ibid.~~ p. 259.

the consent of the Sultan" was not a matter that came under the international laws passed in 1856 and 1871, since the Sultan was technically the peer of any of the European Powers, and had proclaimed his independence when he proclaimed his Constitution. There had even been a fear of Russia and Turkey drawing together. 1) Small wonder London was 'affole'. 2) What Beaconsfield had been waiting for had happened - 'The people, Mr. Speaker, are always right!' The people were with him. Crowds filled the streets, filled Hyde Park in mass meeting, singing, jingoing - 'By jingo, if we do!'

Ignatiev cut the wires which made Constantinople a European city. The British minister had to send what meager news he could by way of Bombay. 3) Russia had isolated herself, from the Concert of Europe. Ignatiev had also isolated himself as far as possible from St. Petersburg. His policy did not always accord with that of Gortschakof, perhaps because each had to an extent a personal policy. Ignatiev wrote into the Treaty of San Stefano what he, Ignatiev, Pan-Slav, wanted, for Russia. Bismarck complained of his greed, "The Peace of San Stefano was one of the most thoughtless acts of modern history. Ignatiev made the blunder which no true statesman would ever have committed. He took everything he could get." 4)

Ignatiev worked his will, wrought the long Russian dream into substance. A big Bulgaria, with Black and Aegean coasts under Russia in Europe; Kars and Batoum as additions to Russia in Asia - the Black Sea encircled, 1774 - 1878.

These were not precisely the terms of peace Russia had spoken of in the spring of 1877, in the autumn of 1877. Time and power had changed. As a Russian officer said later in Afghanistan 'nos frontieres marchent avec nous'. 5) Russia was not yet in Constantinople; she

1. Parliamentary Papers, 1878, XIV, And Monypenny VI. op. cit. p. 100.

2. Hohenlohe II, op. cit. p. 198.

3. Blowitz, Memoirs, p.

5. Baddeley, op. cit, p. 209.

5. Cecil II op. cit. p. 196

she had kept her faith technically. But she was everywhere in the Balkans, and she was in Batoum. Turkey from being suzerain in Europe and Asia, was by way of becoming vassal to Russia in Europe and Asia.

It is true that San Stefano was called a 'Preliminary Treaty of Peace', and was to be submitted to the Treaty Powers. Turkey understood it was to be submitted. But, Russia had specified the certain points which she would submit. The Straits were not one of these; the Question of the Straits would be settled by Russia and Turkey; Bosnia was not one of these; Bosnia and Herzegovina were left rather in the air than in Austria's clinging fingers. Batoum was not one of these; Batoum was in Asia, and the Treaty Powers were in and of Europe.

Yet, it was in Asia, it was at Batoum, that Russia had overreached herself. That point constituted true evidence and explanation of her long intention, a Eurasian intention. And because of Batoum, Bulgaria would be opposed. And being bigger than any Bulgaria ever dreamed of by any one but Russia, and to be under direct Russian control, the great Bulgar state itself would be opposed.

On February 3, a month before San Stefano, just after Adrianople, Austria had taken the lead and invited the Powers to a conference at Vienna. Later it was changed to Baden. Later, March 7, Austria again invited the Powers to conference, this time to meet in Berlin. ~~Russia~~ Russia would 'communicate' the treaty of San Stefano to the Powers. <sup>1)</sup>

England objected. She would confer, but every article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey should be placed before the Congress "in order that the Congress might determine what did or did not concern the six Powers." <sup>2)</sup> England still suspected the Dreikaiserbund. <sup>3)</sup>

Gortshhakof telegraphed to Shouvalof, 'Notre program est libere' <sup>1)</sup> Monypenny. VI, op. cit. p. 256.

<sup>2)</sup> Ibid. p. 257.

<sup>3)</sup> Drummond-Wolf, II, op. cit. p. 151.

d'appréhension et d'action pour tous'. 1)

Derby, straightforward British Derby, who had remained in the Cabinet up to this time to keep his country out of war, grew stiff. 'Mon cher Comte, qu'est-ce-que cela veut dire? Est ce que la traité de San Stefano sur mis sur la table pour que nous le discussions, ~~par~~ point by point, you know' - the British vernacular was needed in such elucidation - oui ou non?' 2)

Gortschakof replied, and repeated, that the Powers could discuss but Russia would accept or not as she pleased. 3) He added to Shouvalof 'l'Empereur vous ordonné de vous y tenir'. 3) Gortschakof was evidently afraid of a personal conduct of Russian affairs by Shouvalof, as he had been by Ignatiev, and it was Gortschakof's habit to quote the Emperor on such occasions, whether the Emperor had spoken or not.

Russia was at that time at its highest moment, February 1878, the apex of Russian history. She had outwitted Europe, and out-fought the Turk, the Promised city was before her. ~~Yet~~ Yet, Russia was a house divided against itself, the Pan-Slavs and the war-party urging on to Constantinople, the conservatives and the financial advisers counselling moderation in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, and advocating richer spoils in Central Asia. And, against triumphant Russia, Austria was increasingly fearful, England increasingly belligerent.

England refused the conference. She carried on those war preparations against Russia, which had begun with a vote of war credits (January 28), and with the fleet ordered to the Golden Horn (February 8), which resulted in Indian troops to Malta, the Reserves out, Derby resigned (March 27) Salisbury Foreign Minister, and the Salisbury ~~Hot~~

Note April 1) protesting against Russian suzerainty in Turkey.

1. Baddeley, op. cit, p. 377.

2. ibid.

3. ibid. 4. ibid.

Disraeli having wavered in practical policy, while ever determined in imperial policy, had now become that 'single statesman' 1) who could act against Russia and against the Dreikaiserbund. It was March in England, the East wind was blowing. The Queen suffered from a cold. My Lord Beaconsfield was in bed from the flu. "The Kingdom was never governed with such an amount of catarrh and sneezing" wrote 'Dizzy' to Lady Bradford. 2) From that bed where he lay he dictated to Europe, he wove cauchemars for Europe.

Bismarck recognized a cauchemar, even before he saw it. Bismarck began to see that the time had come for him to take a hand; rather, to show his hand. He had spoken in the Reichstag, February 16, a master piece in German disinterestedness, yet certitude, as to what was the interest of each Power. Germany would suggest no fixed program, would not be 'schoolmaster', or 'arbitrator', certainly would not be 'policeman' for Europe, would only be the 'honest broker' in a position to pick up dropped threads of diplomacy which any of the Powers had let fall, and weave them together again. Just what Bismarck meant by this elaborate and cryptic address was not even clear, after he had directed the Congress of Berlin to many of the conclusions on July 13 that had been hinted at in the Reichstag on February 16.

He reiterated and reiterated that "what will entail a change in the stipulations of 1856 will doubtless need the sanction of the Powers that signed those treaties." 3) This was what Austria and England, even France had been saying. This was warning to Russia that she was alone on her height, and must come down. She remembered London in 1871

1. See page 12.

2. Monypenny, *Vi. op. cit.* p. 260.

3. Busch, *Deutsche Rundschau*, Dec. 1909.

But neither Russia nor Germany was in 1878 what Russia and Germany were in 1871.

Bismarck invited the Powers, signatory to 1856 and 1871 to, not a Conference but a Congress. Yet he would not issue the call until the nations in opposition should come to some agreement on the points in contention.

The spring months of 1878 were filled with cross currents of negotiations, seeking to adjust long differences, in order that a registration of the adjustments might be made, at Berlin.

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" Bismarck at length conveyed to us pretty clearly that he would support a Congress if he could be assured beforehand that it would not end in failure; and for this purpose he was anxious that England with Russia. Russia and England should have some kind of understanding as to the points which each would regard as so essential that sooner than yield on them, they would break up the Congress at the risk of bringing about war." 11

The differences between Russia and England were dangerous; the other differences were rather diplomatic. And, since England had been the most belligerent, it was England that had the largest preliminary program. Within three days before and after the call for the conference, she effected three preliminary arrangements - going farther than Bismarck expected, but winning Bismarck's approval even so.

These secret conventions were the fruits of what might be called English intrigue. England was no longer to maintain that integrity of Turkey for which she had fought the Crimean war and signed the Treaty of Paris; for which she had signed the Tripartite Treaty of guarantee with France and Austria; for which she had talked big when other Powers ventured to speak of division. Lord Henry Seymour may have spurned the division proposed by Czar Nicholas I, but in a quarter of a century much water had flowed through the Bosphorus. Beaconsfield and Salisbury were in power. Both thought imperially, in continents. Only Salisbury could have accomplished this volte face in English diplomacy. Only the combination of Beaconsfield and Salisbury could have accomplished this without a change of expression. Small wonder diplomatic Europe and the English public were amazed when the Arrangements were announced.

1. Money penny, VI, Disraeli, p. 288, Note, Northcote Memo.

Turkey was partitioned - and no amount of diplomatic language translating the Bosnian annexation into occupation, Batoum into a negligible quantity, and Cyprus into Turkish security, could deny the essential facts.

The issue between Russia and England was war or diplomacy. All Europe knew this, and there were few in Europe who were not believing it would be war. England itself was divided, People and Government. But when Russia won Adrianople, and looked like winning Constantinople England healed her division. The English people had an opinion, a simple opinion, as to Constantinople - it was not to be occupied by the Russians.

Therefore England backed the preparations for war, and these went steadily on - with objections from Mr. Gladstone, Historian Freeman, Historian Froude, Canon Liddon, et similes. The fleet, having seen-sawed back and forth on telegrams, was at last riding before the Golden Horn. Indian troops, forerunners of unmeasured multitudes, were at Malta, ready to fight for their Islamic brethren. The Reserves of England were out. Money was voted. England stood armed cap-a-pie. And England did not cease her preparations - even when she went to Berlin.

England could negotiate successfully only on an understanding that she was ready for war. Beaconsfield had prophesied as early as March that "as Russia finds England firm and preparing for conflict, she will end by offering separate negotiations with us." 1) Preparations for conflict were part of the diplomatic game.

Russia was not equal to a second war. England had once scornfully suggested that Russia was not equal to a second campaign. 2) Bismarck had expected her exhaustion and wished it. Now it had come. Russia

1. Monypenny. VI. op. cit. p. 260.

2. ibid, p. 92.

faced the situation with reluctance. For Russia was proud, Russia was at the Gates, and the Pan Slavs still clamored. The Russian people also had an opinion as to Constantinople - it was to be theirs.

But, there was a Council at Tsarkoe; the Emperor, the Grand Dukes, the Ministers of War and Finance, and Shouvalof. The Grand Duke Nicholas had resigned from his commander-in-chieftaincy, had given up his diamond-studded baton. "We have thousands of the Guard sick at San Stefano. In case of an attack it would be impossible to save the sick, let alone the guns." 1)

Beaconsfield had anticipated this condition in October. "All this is concealed from the Emperor and the Russian nation" he commented. 2) He had prophesied it in his Guildhall speech the year before 3). He may have been anxious as the Russians moved on to their victory before their exhaustion came. But at last he was justified. Finally the Emperor knew. His Grand Ducal Field Marshal had told him. Now all the diamond-studded batons of the Holy War were to be placed in sanctuary. He turned to Shouvalof, as ever conveniently near - "You and Bismarck are good friends. Use your influence and get the Congress arranged." 4)

Gortschakof was ill in St. Petersburg. So the weight of the negotiations fell on Shouvalof in London. Shouvalof himself had suggested a secret arrangement between Russia and England. Salisbury had rejected it because it would become public. 5) Shouvalof promised absolute secrecy. Beaconsfield approved. The arrangement was drawn up.

1. Baddeley reports Russian feeling afterward. "Think of it! We had gone to war for the liberation of our brother Slavs, we had suffered heavy losses in men and money. We had eventually fought our way to victory - and then, under the very walls of Constantinople-Tsargrad, the city of our dreams, we were told 'Enter at your peril, one step farther and England declares war.'" op.cit.p.19

2. Monypenny. VI op.cit.p.190.

4. Baddeley, op.cit.p.

3. ibid.p. 92.

5. Monypenny, op.cit.p. 335

"The negotiations proceeded swiftly and to an effective conclusion. It was a notable experiment in diplomatic candour. The concessions desired by England were discussed, and a statement was drawn up distinguishing between those for which she was prepared to fight and those which she would be willing to treat as subjects for bargaining. If a corresponding classification of Russian requirements could be accommodated to this analysis, peace would be ensured." 1)

Early in May Count Shouvalof started for St. Petersburg, with the statement, stopping en route as was his custom, to confide any choice diplomatic secret to Bismarck. "I always used to see him on my way through Berlin, and we took to one another", said the Russian. 2) "He was not accredited to Berlin but to London", wrote Bismarck of Shouvalof, "His personal relation with me however, enabled him on his occasional visits to Berlin on his journeys to and from England to discuss with me without restraint all eventualities." 3)

Shouvalof stopped this time at Salisbury's suggestion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs knew that the English concessions in Asia would astonish Bismarck, as they did 4). Perhaps he hoped they would perplex Bismarck. For the real explanation was not confided to the Chancellor until the Berlin conference was in progress. He may also have had some diplomatic pride in demonstrating to Bismarck that England could bring negotiations to a conclusion with a Northern Power without the hand of Germany being inserted.

The last word of Beaconsfield to the Russian Ambassador was "it is only fair to state distinctly that we could not in the slightest degree cease from our preparations, and that they must go on even if

there were a Congress". 5) After the Congress was over, long after-

1. Cecil. II, op. cit. p. 254 .

2. Baddeley, op. cit, p. 367

3. Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences, p. 241

4. Shouvalof, Memoirs, q. Hanotaux, -

5. Monypenny, op. cit. p. 292. op. cit

p. 336.

ward, Beaconsfield asserted that it was the English determination that "even if we were alone, we were ready ... to effect the Russian withdrawal by force, " which brought Russia to reason. 1) No doubt Shouvalof communicated this to Tsarkoe.

The itinerant Ambassador on his way back to London stopped again in Berlin, to report Russian answer to English demands, before England knew - Bismarck must know something beforehand - and to arrange the Congress as the Czar had commanded. 2)

According to the Shouvalof-Salisbury Memorandum, Big Bulgaria was to be reduced, to be divided, to be withdrawn from the Aegean; the Western frontier was to be made less inclusive of non-Bulgars. The ceding of Bessarabia to Russia was accepted "with profound regret". If in Asia Russia insisted on retaining Kars and Batoum, England warned that the duty of protecting Turkey in Asia from Russia in Asia would devolve on England, in both Asia and Europe - a forewarning of a convention with Turkey, but unheeded. Russia did pledge herself not to annex in Asia Minor after the Congress. As to the cantonning of Turkish troops on the South frontier of Bulgaria, they could not agree; it was left to the Congress.

Except for the pledge by Russia as to the future, this Memorandum was a temporary pact, preliminary to the Berlin conference. As such it was a part of the secret dealings of the day and not for public consumption. But no sooner signed on May 30 than published. Within twenty four hours the Globe published hints as to its contents. Later, while the conference was in session, and while the questions between Russia and England were on the green table of Berlin, the Globe set forth practically the complete agreement. The publication became a major influence on the diplomacy of the moment.

1. Monypenny, VI Disraeli, p. 293.

2. Bismarck records in his "Reflections", p. 215, that he had "an attack of shingles" resulting in "exhaustion of nerves" at this moment!

At first Salisbury denied it - "wholly unauthentic and not deserving the confidence of your Lordships' house". 1) This British statesman never hesitated to deny; he believed that Cabinet and Foreign Office secrets were secrets, and that since the public was not to know, the public should be told that it did not know. He did this more than once. Lady Gwendolen Cecil expresses the attitude of her house toward secrecy - "when a Minister's confidence is being forced no one has a right to read more than verbal accuracy into his reply". 2)

In this event Lord Salisbury felt that the publicity so prejudiced the case, especially as the preliminary publication left out the important concession of Russia as to the discussion of the Bulgarian frontier, that it was both "not so", and a deliberate betrayal by Russia in order to anger the English people and set them against the Government and the proposition. Not that Russia wanted the Agreement broken, but she did want England less certain of her role in the Congress, less domineering at the Congress.

Salisbury believed it was the Russians, doubted the faith of Shouvaloff to Shouvalof's face, and threatened to leave the Congress. 3) So did Sir Charles Dilke accuse the Russians. 4) So did Orczy, the Austrian. 5) Lady Gwendolen Cecil states that rumour ran that Marvin the clerk suspected of betraying his trust, was half Russian. 5) Years later Shouvalof explained it all quite simply. Marvin the clerk had acquired the Stokes method of memorizing, and ~~xxxx~~ he 'stok'd it', even the commas and periods. 6) The only surprising thing then is that he should have been so tactless of diplomatic

tension of the moment as to forget the Bulgarian frontier!

1. Hansard June 3, '78, q. Cecil, op. cit. p. 262.

2. Cecil, II op. cit. p. 262

3. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 351.

4. Swynn, Dilke, I, p. 254.

5. Wertheimer III Andrassy, p. 114

6. Baddeley, op. cit. p. 368.

On the other hand England was accused by Germany of putting out the premature version. Busch, a secretary of the conference, declared it was der alte Jude himself. "Die glimpfliche Erklärung für die Indiskretion der Globe ist nach die, dass Disraeli sich der Aufnehmen welcher die von Russland an machenden Konzessionen bei der englischen öffentlichen Meinung fände have vergewissern wollen". 1)

Diplomatic pots and kettles were accustomed to calling each other black in those days. Hanotaux declares it "a mystery that has never been explained." 2)

While England and Russia therefore had come to this Agreement between themselves as to what should be on the agenda at Berlin and what attitude they should take toward the main provisions of San Stefano, the publication did cause so popular a re-opening of the whole Anglo-Russian differences that, come Berlin, Beaconsfield and Gortschakof, Salisbury and Shouvalof, had to skirmish most actively for position, and the Conference nearly broke on this difference.

The plans of a Bismarck may gang agäee, the Marvins of diplomacy may be of the imponderables.

-6-

The second understanding required by England was with Austria. Reduced to a lowest common denominator through the war, it was protection against Russian advance that each sought. The England with Austria. Austrian numerator was Bosnia-Herzogovina, to whom should they appertain? The English numerator was the Bulgarian frontier where should it be drawn?

The working out should have been straight, for they had old traditions of friendship if these were not always operative. It

1. Busche, Deutsche Rundschau, Dec. 1909, V. 149

2. Hanotaux, op. cit. IV. p. 350.

should have been simple, for they had a common object to frustrate Russia in the Balkans, "verwandte Interressen im Orient" 1) said Busch; "inevitable allies" 2) said Hanotaux. It was neither simple nor straight, for there was no trust between the two. "Had London and Vienna come to an agreement in the beginning, if they had openly declared that they would not tolerate the war, the war would have been made impossible" 3) said Shouvalof, as usual wise ex post facto. But each feared the other was using it to pull the other's chestnuts out of the fire; Austria feared England 4); England feared Austria 5) Each was right.

The realpolitik of each at this moment was essentially practical. But Government decision was conspicuous in neither. The divisions in the English Cabinet were well known; its policy could not be counted on; to come to an understanding with England - who was England, and what was England's policy at this moment? Similarly the divisions of the Dual Empire were well known; Andrassy had to play to both his houses; Austria and Hungary; had to play with both his allies, Germany and Russia; had to curry favor with his single ally, Russia; had to submit to Bismarck; yet, was ambitious to play a major role; conscious also of the Austrian military party, which 6) was anti-german and finding in this difficult moment a chance for revenge for Sadowa. It is small wonder that Austria delayed coming to an understanding with England. The object of an alliance was plain. The value of the alliance was not so explicit.

The two Governments were negotiating throughout this period, definitely for two years - which would parallel the dates when Austria was coming to terms with Russia and attempting to carry out

1. Busch, Deutsche Rundschau, Dec. 09

2. Hanotaux, op. cit. IV, p. 68

3. ibid. p. 311

4. Monypenny VI, op. cit. p. 89

5. Wertheimer, II, op. cit. p. 28

6. Cecil II op. cit. p. 107, 109



those terms. England did not know the specifications of this Anglo-Austrian-Russian agreement. But she did know that whatever understanding there was or might be with Russia, it would disturb the very dubious equilibrium in the Balkan regions, and could not but concern her security. Therefore she sought an understanding with Austria. Austria, likewise dubious of her ally, Russia, and of her would-be ally, England, played a doubting game - and in the end the Arrangement was almost as uncertain as the negotiations had been.

While it is possible to see the hand of Bismarck in every move of this decade - one is reminded of Voltaire's criticism of reincarnation, that it 'explained everything' - it is certain Bismarck was in constant touch with Andrassy, working through Andrassy, and through Austria working against the other Powers. 1) 2)

Bosnia had long been the object of her Drang. In the years preceding the Russo-Turkish war, she had hesitated only because the internal difficulties of the Dual Empire might be increased at least one fold in a Tripartite Empire. Hungarians and Germans were never in agreement; more Slavs would bring more disagreement. Austria, once the chiffonier for European tatters, had lost much of her unassimilated territories. She recognized the difficulty of assimilating Slav-ic Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, land is land. And land hunger especially after land loss is irresistible.

In 1856 Radowitz had divided the Near East and had given Bosnia to Austria. In 1867, the year after Sadowa, the Austrian ambassador

1. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 144 .
2. As early as 1872 it was understood in Berlin and in Vienna that Bismarck was not neglecting the Near East, and that he was working with Austria. When von Keudell, a trained Bismarckian, was sent as ambassador to Constantinople, the Reichs-correspondance said "it may be fairly concluded that at this moment we have most important interests there, which can best be safeguarded by one who has been allowed to obtain an insight into Prince Bismarck's masterly plans." The Fremden Blatt of Vienna, carrying Berlin

at St. Petersburg in discussing a division of Turkey - which was never far from the conversation of any European chancellery - had suggested that if Russia regained Bessarabia which she had lost in 1856, Austria ought to have Bosnia and Herzegovina as compensation for what she had lost in 1859. 1 )

In 1873, when the Emperors of Austria and Russia met at Schonburg and formed a dual pact, Bosnia was discussed, but the definite conclusions are not recorded. 2) The time was not ripe.

In 1874 Andrassy had said to Elliot, "it could not but be to the advantage of Turkey if their people in the Slavic communities were taught to turn their eyes to Austria which was a thoroughly friendly power, and to look to her for sympathy and support in obtaining redress for their grievances, instead of to Russia of whose hostilities everyone was aware." 2)

Gortschakof, suspecting Austrian designs at this time, warned that an occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be regarded as a casus belli. 3)

In March 1875 the Duc Decazes could see the drift. "Bismarck advises Austria to make a military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even if it should have to be permanent, adding that Russia will find a natural opportunity for retaking Bessarabia." 4) Decazes

correspondence, declared "the choice by Prince Bismarck of Herr von Keudell for Constantinople is a clear indication that he intends to pursue the same policy in the East as Austro-Hungary, and that in view of a conflicting (with Russia) he considers an understanding with the Austrian Empire to be necessary for Germany and in harmony with her interests." Busch, Some Secret Pages of his History, (Bismarck) II pp. 104, 106. Reichs correspondance, Oct, 1872.

1. Revertera, Deutsche Rundschau, May, 1904, q. Coolidge, p. 93.

2. Walpole IV Twenty Five Years, p. 71.

3. Wertheimer, II Andrassy p. 118.

4. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 106.

2 (First 2) Coolidge, Origins p. 94

asserts that the proposal was regarded in St. Petersburg as deliberate trouble-making between Russia and Austria.

In the summer of 1876, during the war between Serbia and Turkey, Austria and Russia who had themselves been on the verge of war in the past year, had met at Reichstadt and decided secretly what they should do with the spoils of war in case Turkey lost. Russia was strong for autonomous provinces; autonomy would weaken Turkish hold without war. Austria was against autonomous provinces; too much independence might make for ultimate independence. There was ever a suggestion that Russia was benevolently back of these Balkan insurrections of the '70's, and would be benevolently back of the division of the spoils.

Russia, the disinterested Liberator, obtained territorial additions for Serbia and Montenegro and Greece, who were also interested in the fight. For herself she asked only a portion of Bessarabia, and the "rectification" of her frontier in Asia. Nothing was said of an enlarged Bulgaria or of Batoum. As for Austria she was at once to take possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1)

Turkey won. The division did not take place.

The Convention of Reichstadt was, on Bismarck's statement, secret, "without our consent, without knowledge". 2) At least officially. Not having shared in its compacting, he was able later to place blame for certain historic developments upon it. In Reichstadt, and not in Berlin, he found the basis for Austrian possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 3) In Reichstadt he found that Russia based her reliance on Austrian neutrality as the Russian armies made their long march into the Balkans, their flank exposed to any Austrian hostility. H

1. Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance. p. 97.

2. Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences II, p. 255

3. ibid. p. 235.

It was one of balanced interests, and even though Reichstadt was shaped to answer an expectation of the summer of 1876, an expectation of the division of Turkey, Bismarck found that Reichstadt must not be forgotten when the final reckoning came between Austria and Russia. This balance of interests was the result of each Government's definitely weighing its demands against the other. Russia, according to Bismarck would never have granted Bosnia to Austria for a promenade into the Balkans and back again. "It would have been selling Bosnia far too cheaply." 1)

While on his way to Constantinople Salisbury had found Andrassy at Vienna unfearful of any advance that might be made by Russia. Andrassy pointed dramatically on the map at the narrow Rumanian land which separated Austria from the Black Sea. 2) Evidently Andrassy still believed that Russia must 'take her passport' at Vienna for this journey, and he had not granted the visé without an appropriate price. It was a temporary moment of Austrian independence.

Yet at Berlin, just the week before, in December 1876, Salisbury had heard Bismarck advocate Bosnia to Austria, with an 'il n'y a repugnance' 3), when Andrassy's opposition was suggested; as well as Bulgaria to Russia without any defining of the boundary of Bulgaria, as it was to be defined by Russia with the sword, and disputed by England with a rattling of the sabre. It was at Berlin that Salisbury felt was centered the intrigue of the whole Question. Salisbury did not know of Reichstadt, and Bismarck may not have known of Reichstadt. But the provisions of that convention were even then current, and the proposed division of Turkey in Europe was along lines already being discussed in the chancelleries.

1. Bismarck II Reflections p. 235.

2. Cecil II op.cit. p. 177.

3. ibid., p. 104.

While the Conference of the Great Powers, toward which Salisbury had been journeying sat at Constantinople, Austria and Russia had met together in Pesth, and decided again what they should do in case of failure, the failure of the Conference which they expected, perhaps intended. The ultimatum was presented to Turkey January 13. It was not refused until January 20. The completed Austro-Russian convention was signed at Pesth, January 15. The historic sequence carried significance.

The convention provided that in case of war Austria should remain neutral, but give diplomatic support to Russia; that Serbia and Montenegro should not be used as military bases by Russia. Three months later, March 18, a second convention was signed, reaffirming certain provisions of Reichstadt, 1). In case Russia should be compelled to chastise Turkey, a necessity that seemed constant and imminent after Serbia's failure with Russian aid, Bosnia and Herzegovina should go to Austria, Bessarabia to Russia, ~~Serbia and Montenegro~~. Again there was no mention of a Big Bulgaria. Russia was again to be permitted to "rectify" her Asiatic frontier, but this time the secret was more secret than before, and at Gortschakof's wish the Asiatic provision did not appear in the compact. 2) Such rectification really did not concern Austria. But it did concern another Power which, like Russia, was both European and Asiatic.

Shouvalof told Salisbury who told Beaconsfield as early as March 1877

- that is before the agreement was signed at Pesth; but Shouvalof had ever a way of foretelling the inevitable, and sometimes the evitable - that Russia had "Squared Vienna" 3). Salisbury, still seeing Berlin dominating, said in comment, "I believe it, not so much

because he tells me, but because I believe Andrassy to be for the

1. Coolidge. op cit. p. 114

3. Cecil II, op. cit. p. 131.

2. Wartheimer, op. cit. p. 293. II.

present in Bismarck's pocket, and Bismarck's consent implies Andrassy's". 1) Salisbury, if he brought back no arrangement from Constantinople, did bring back an understanding of secret relations.

He had found Austria quiet at Constantinople. She had come with reluctance. She had remained with reserve. Calice admitted in private that on the failure of the Conference Austria would be "forced" after a time to occupy Bosnia, and Russia to occupy Bulgaria; <sup>2)</sup> ~~all th~~ all this to follow on a war between Russia and Turkey, and conditioned on Russia's subsequent inability to fight with Austria. Calice was of the Foreign Office, and of course must have known of the Reichstadt agreement and of the Pesth negotiations. These were unknown to Salisbury at Constantinople, but they exerted influence on the attitudes of Russia and Austria in that Conference, ~~xxxxxxx~~ which was visible to Salisbury while baffling him. "I greatly fear" he wrote, "that Austria, professing all the time the warmest friendship for us, is outwitting us, and will induce Russia to turn her attack from that quarter ... in other words that the Russians will advance along the Asiatic and not the European shore of the Black Sea."3)

Believing Shouvalof or not, England's game was to detach Austria from alliance with Russia. "Our path has very much been marked out for us by Austria", wrote Lord Salisbury as late as June, 1878; "if she would have agreed to fuller co-operation at an earlier period all would have been different"4) In truth during all this time it was England against the Powers. For the Austrian neutrality was paid for by Russia with the promise of Bosnia, and England could not offer

a higher price, or any price of territory.

1. Cecil, op. cit. p. 131. 4 .ib.

2. ibid. p. 123.

3. ib. p. 128. Letter to Lord Lytton, Feb. 16, 1877.

But, as no one trusted any one else in those days of broken diplomatic promises, Austria could not altogether spurn England's advances, lest Russia find it convenient to break its word and refuse to pay the agreed price. Austrian policy no doubt was as shifty, and Andrassy was as vacillating as Salisbury found them, "indefatigable shiftiness to enable him to keep well at once with Hungarians, Russian English, Turks and Italians, while he steadily obeys orders from Berlin" . 1)

There is no record made by Bismarck that he did not know of the pacts at Pesth in '77. Rather, he was "invisibly present". 2) The third Emperor might have been absent, but the third Chancellor would not have contented himself with ignorance of any arrangement so pertinent to the continued program of the Dreikaiserbund. "We are sure of Prussia's attitude" admitted Andrassy as early as June, '77. 3)

And there is little doubt that Bismarck stood ever at the shoulder of Andrassy as he meant Germany to stand ever at the shoulder of Austria. All this was a part of a definite policy, part of that European intrigue Salisbury detected. While a post hoc interpretation is always easy and often dangerous, it is logical to ~~know~~ believe that Bismarck was not the only statesman of Europe who was not led by the Balkan lure. Bosnia had a meaning, even to Bismarck.

In September, '77, Andrassy directed by Bismarck had refused an alliance with England. 4) In December Andrassy refused the English plan, and proposed another. 5) Salisbury declared, "Austria as a natural ally is seduced from us, at least for the moment." 6) England had wanted definite diplomatic action, leading to definite military action if necessary, but at least no hesitation. Yet, after Plevna

1. Cecil. II. op. cit. p. 247

2. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 112

3. ib. p. 312.

4. Hohenlohe, II Memoirs, p. 202

5. Cecil II op. cit. p. 171.

6. Conynpenny. VI. op. cit. p. 211.

had fallen, throughout December and January while Russia was consolidating her victory, these two neutral and most concerned Powers seem to have spent their energies "maneuvering each other into the post of danger". 1) Andrassy still advocated separate diplomatic action if in the end common military action should be necessary. 2) A letter to Beust counselled, "eine gleichmässige jedoch gesonderte diplomatische Aktion, eventuell eine später vereinbarte Kriegrische Aktion in Aussicht genommen wird." 3)

"Austria is shaky, but we must go with her as she urges", was the comment of Hardy. (January 16) 4) The offer of an alliance on January 21 was refused. 5) In February the offer was still open. Austria was invited to co-operate in the Dardanelles expedition. 6) The Dardanelles were in danger, Russia had sent a corps d'observation to Gallipoli. 7) Austria could not see that with indifference. England offered to transport Austrian troops in her ships. 8) Beaconsfield had spoken of "the projected alliance" 9) before the Lords, and once of "anxious Austria" 10), an expression that so peeved Austria it cost England further delay in arranging the understanding. Finally, came March, came San Stefano. Not until then did the shadow of Bismarck appear behind Andrassy. 11) Not until then could Beaconsfield write, "Austria is on her knees to us to agree to Berlin, giving the most solemn assurances that she has no secret treaty with Russia; that Germany will support her, and that with the aid of Great Britain, Russia may be seriously checked." 12)

1. Cecil II op.cit.p.185.

2. ib.p. 178.

3. Wertheimer, III, op.cit, p.39.

4. Hardy, II Memoirs, p.47.

5. Monypenny, VI.p. 227.

6. ib.p.250.

7. Cecil II op.cit.p.190.

8. ib.140.

9. Monypenny.VI.op.cit.p.237.

10. Cecil, II, op.cit.p.177.

11. Monypenny, op.cit.p.250.

12. ib.p. 256.



Now that Russia was victorious, and more victorious than her neutral ally had anticipated when that vise was granted, Austria was eager for an ally with a different approach to the Question, one who could aid in guarding the treasure house of the Balkans from which its precious jewels seemed about to be filched. Austria did not mean to give up what Russia had guaranteed. If it is true that after San Stefano Russia had asked Austria to annex Bosnia according to their compact, and if Austria had in turn suggested something more, a semi-independent state under her protection with Salonica as the capital, 1) it indicated the future toward which Bosnia would lead.

Finally Andrassy was won to it. Shouvalof had stopped at Berlin to talk with Bismarck. Bismarck had no doubt told Andrassy about the Shouvalof-Salisbury Memorandum. Andrassy therefore notified England that Austria was willing, he too would make an agreement.

But Salisbury even so had no confidence in Andrassy, believing that if England came to terms with Austria, Russia would raise the bid, and Andrassy would be off again. Ignatiev was in Vienna, and wherever Ignatiev was, no property was safe, no bid final.

Layard had written from Constantinople in April, "were it not for that double-dealing, untrustworthy fellow" Andrassy, all would be well. 2) Salisbury wrote to Elliot at Vienna, "I doubt whether any written agreement will bind Andrassy, and fear that the moment one is made, Russia will raise her price and buy him off. His calculation I fear has been to use England as a bogey to frighten Russia, and if he could not get his end diplomatically, then to push England into a separate war with Russia and extort terms from the latter when she is exhausted. I feel therefore that coming to close quarters with

1. Carathéodory Pache, q. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 338.

2. Newton, Lyons II p. 138.

Andrassy is dangerous work, and I had rather avoid it till all hope of amicable settlement with Russia is at an end," 1)

The negotiations were finally signed June 6. "We have gone straight with Austria", 2) commented Beaconsfield. It was agreed Le Gouvernement de Sa. <sup>s'engage</sup> Majeste Britannique, a soutenir toute proposition concernant la Bosnie que le gouvernement austro-hongroise jugera a propos de faire au congres. 3)

1. Cecil. II, op. cit. p. 258. Letter to Elliot, May 22<sup>d</sup> 78.

2. Monypenny, VI & op. cit. p. 294.

3. Werthamer. 888, 122, note. — o —

Cross currents of negotiations were running between Austria and Russia over the same settlement. Austria was looking, bellicose, had in fact massed her troops in the Carpathians and hung there on Russia's flank. But Austria moves slowly, and in the end both her diplomacy and her military vantages were nullified. ~~The~~ Czar ~~xxxx~~ Gortschakof had attempted "Prememoria", but evidently not satisfactorily. The Czar wrote to Todleben (who had succeeded the Grand Duke as Commander at Constantinople, "The negotiations with Austria have so far given no positive result, but the main questions to be decided a few days time in London. If an agreement is come to with England it is not likely that Austria alone will decide to declare war on us and should she do so we may suppose that Turkey will be on our side rather, seeing that Austria will make no disguise of her desire to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina permanently." Badddeley, op. cit. p. 369

The third arrangement was one which completed the two.

It was a codicil to the Memorandum between England and Russia.

Without it that understanding would have been a sacrifice on England with Turkey. the part of England of all that had been the objective of her diplomatic and military policy. To agree to the cession of Batoum or Kars, without corresponding territorial balance, would have been to the imperial British mind of this moment suicidal. Russia was warned in the compact made with her. 1) She should have expected some countering cession.

It was a completion of the pledge between England and Austria. Austria in the summer of 1877, explaining to England what she would and would not tolerate from Russia, specified Russia south of Constantinople as a situation to which she would object. Austria's objections were not at the time sufficiently strong, and while she had entered into an understanding with England, that understanding might not be sufficient for a new occasion- when the past vacillation of Austria might crystallize into future opposition toward England.

Both of these pacts were built on unfaith. England felt she must have a better foundation for her future than this. She sought it in territory; she came to Russia's and Austria's point of view, but against Russia and Austria:- the division of Turkey, of course for Turkey's good.

A Mediterranean League of the interested Powers would have made it unnecessary for England to consider a strategic vantage point in the East. But the Powers could not agree. England as the leading Mediterranean Power felt that she must act alone to safeguard that inland lake through which floated her richest argosies.

1. Monypenny. VI. op. cit. p. 297.

She held Gibraltar on the West, Malta half way to the East. But in the East, since Corfu had been lost by a liberal Government - the Cabinet spent some time cursing Gladstone for giving up Corfu 1) - as a later Cabinet may have cursed Salisbury for giving up Helgoland - she held no Pied á terre from which to train guns on those who threatened the Suez canal and the Indian route.

To occupy Gallipoli was an immediate project since 1876, and it may have been the point from which England "need never recede". 2) That England should purchase some stronghold from Turkey was suggestion from Musurus, Turkish Ambassador in London, and also from a less accredited agent as early as May, 1877. 3) To seize a vantage point, by military force, for military reasons, was discussed in the Cabinet. Cyprus, Scanderoon, Alexandretta, Varna, Batoun, Sinope, Melod, Mytilene St. John d'Acre ± all were suggested in turn. The final choice was Cyprus, but to be secured by compact.

The island was an old dream of Beaconsfield's. He had been there fifty years before. He had said in "Tancred" that "the English want Cyprus and they will take it." Historically, romantically, Beaconsfield was not averse from the partition of Turkey. In November, 1876 Hardy reported "He (Disraeli) would like to buy a port in the Black Sea, from the Porte. What he wants is a Malta, or a Gibraltar which would prevent the Black Sea being a constant threat to our Maritime Power in the Mediterranean". 4)

Disraeli himself had written to Salisbury at Constantinople, "If we act in the manner I have generally indicated, we shall probably in the conclusion obtain some commanding stronghold in Turkey from which we need never recede. It will be for the interest of the

1. Monypenny. VI. op. cit. p. 251.

3. Hardy, II Memoirs, p. 377.

2. ib. p. 104.

4. Monypenny. op. cit. p. 104

Porte itself that we should; and if they should sell to us for instance Varna, the supremacy of Russia might be forever arrested." 1)

Nearly two years later, on May 5, just before Shouvalof started for St. Petersburg - and Berlin - and while Austria was being slowly brought to sign the diplomatic book, Beaconsfield wrote at length to the Queen concerning 'this charter of our policy' in the Near East.

"If Cyprus is conceded to your Majesty by the Porte and England at the same time enters into a defensive Alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region, and your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key to Western Asia. Such an arrangement would also greatly strengthen Turkey in Europe, and altogether she would be a stronger barrier against Russia than she was before the war. If this policy is carried into effect, and it must be carried, your Majesty need fear no coalition of Emperors. It will weld together your Majesty's Indian Empire and Great Britain." 2)

This letter would seem to fall under the Voltairian condemnation of reincarnation - it safeguards everything, concludes everything; Cyprus becomes the missing link of the Empire.

Having determined on Cyprus, Beaconsfield used all his influence in the Cabinet to secure it. Beginning a long fight, he won every Cabinet member but one to that agreement; and through what he and the Queen considered good fortune, he lost that one opposing member and replaced him with a Minister of Foreign Affairs who had no scruples when it came to the integrity of Turkey.

There has been much historic discussion of this matter. Was Cyprus agreed upon in the Cabinet, or was it merely talked about?

1. Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. 194.

2. ib. p. 291.

Were those members of the Cabinet who denied the Cabinet's intentions correct? Salisbury, Cross, Hardy? Historians have puzzled much over the matter. Even Rose could write, "Mystery broods over this as over so many topics in which Lord Beaconsfield was concerned."

Lord Salisbury in Parliament denied it, and for that reason history has been confused; not knowing that the noble Lord thought nothing of denial where official secrets were concerned. Lady Gwendolen Cecil, current biographer of Salisbury, denies it. Mr. Buckle, recent biographer of Beaconsfield, affirms it. Yet the controversy has something of the casuistical in it. Each side interprets the material to the justification of its chief.

Early in January when war against Russia had seemed probably, the Cabinet discussed bringing troops from India to seize some strategic point in order to safeguard British interests in Turkey. Early in June, when war against Russia seemed improbable because England was ready for it, an agreement was signed with Turkey, safeguarding with the occupation of Cyprus as the strategic point. Between these two dates, and between the discussion and the decision, runs the difference of opinion. The exact course of England toward the acquisition of Cyprus, set down by Buckle through letters and memoranda, leads to the conclusion that the Prime Minister wanted Cyprus, that he had wanted it ever since he felt that a war between Russia and England over Turkey was probable. If the Turkish convention was written by Salisbury, it was dictated by Beaconsfield. To this end, the acquisition of Cyprus, Disraeli was willing, eager, that Derby should resign. The event came, and Salisbury replaced Derby.

In July, after the Congress of Berlin was closed, and while it was being reviewed, Lord Derby in the House of Lords attempted to make

a full explanation of why he had resigned from the Cabinet when Salisbury replaced him. It was not because of the vague preparations for war, the calling of the Reserves, the voting of the credits, even the bringing of troops from Malta. It was because of the dangerous project of the Cabinet, an Eastern Gibraltar. "The island of Cyprus together with a point on the Syrian coast were to have been seized by a secret naval expedition sent out from England, with or without the consent of the Sultan." 1)

The Queen protested Derby's breach of faith in revealing Cabinet secrets, especially as ~~there was~~ even then, with the Congress of Berlin ended, the Sultan was delaying ratification of the convention. 2)

Salisbury, returned from Berlin, denied it. "A statement which so far as my memory goes is not true". Corrected on cries of 'Order!' to "not correct". 3) Later on, not before the Lords, he said of Derby that he "never could have brought himself to annex the Isle of Man". 4) Assuredly Derby would not have brought ~~himself~~ home Cyprus from Berlin.

The Northcote Memoranda on this matter, not used in full by Mr. Andrew Lang in his life of Iddesleigh, published in 1890, was given to Mr. Buckle without restrictions for publication in 1920, since the honor of no one living was now imperilled. The Memoranda were however written two years after the event, and like the later memoranda of Shouvalof- must have been hazy in Sir Stafford's mind.

He says of Beaconsfield that "he proposed to us the dispatch of a force from India which should occupy Alexandretta or Cyprus, and should so sever the Euphrates route and cut off the Russians from an advance on Egypt." 5)

In defense of Salisbury, Sir Stafford said, "Lord Salisbury was

1. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 274.

2. ib.

3. ib.

4. Newton, II Lyons, p. 104.

5. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 276.

quite justified in his contradiction, but I have no doubt that Lord Derby gave correctly his own impressions of what passed. It was at a moment of extreme anxiety... discussion of the possibility of the Russians coming to the ~~Asia~~ Minor coast.... the matter was then laid aside." 1)

Lady Gwendolen maintains this point of view. She says that Cyprus was "definitely decided upon in the Cabinet within the last fortnight," preceding May 16. Lord Beaconsfield did not correct his Foreign Minister to the advantage of the Foreign Minister's biographic daughter. But he left in his memoranda to the Queen proofs as to Cyprus which destroy the Salisbury defense; yet which Lady Gwendolen, writing, at least publishing, later, had not admitted as evidence or has glossed over.

The notations of Disraeli run: Feb. 27, "the idea first broached in the Cabinet"; 3) March 8, "the question of occupying a station on the Asiatic coast; 4) March 16, "new Gibralters"; 5) March 26, "Indian troops to occupy two important points in the Levant which will command the Persian Gulf and all the country around Bagdad entirely neutralizing the Russian conquests and influence in Armenia". 6)

Three verifications of the Cabinet talks were made by Lord Derby or his secretary. Sealed in the Derby private papers, they were given to Mr. Buckle for this final verdict. One Cabinet Memo reads: an Expedition from India should occupy Cyprus or Scanderoon; 7) an extract from the private diary reads: He (Disraeli) proposed to send an Expedition from India to occupy Cyprus and Scanderoon; 8) finally the word of Lord Derby's private secretary, Lord Sanderson, still living, to whom Derby confided the project. 9)

1. Monypenny, VI. p. 276.

2. Cecil II, op. cit. p. 269.

3. Monypenny, VI, op. cit, p. 252.

4 .ib.p. 254.

5. ib. p. 259.

6. ib. p. 262.

7. ib. p. 264.

8. ib. p. 266.

9. ib. p. 267.



The value of Cyprus as an offset to any annexation Russia might make in the Near East was evident to England. Russia had demanded Shumla, Varna, Batoum, from Turkey as her own strongholds, her own Cypruses. But the Sultan had refused. 1) If now Russia by treaty should keep Kars and Batoum, as she had declared she would in the treaty of San Stefano, as she had declared she should if not specifically in the arrangement at Pesth, England must protect Turkey and protect British interests. If England were to make any vigorous defense of Turkey and of British interests - the Porte must concede to England the occupation of Cyprus. Then, if Russia should give up Batoum, England would vacate Cyprus.

So while Shouvalof ~~was~~ voyaged to St. Petersburg, to find out the will of his master in regard to Batoum and Bulgaria, and while negotiations went on with Austria as to Bosnia and the Bulgarian frontier, Beaconsfield and Salisbury were in constant communication with Layard in Constantinople in regard to Cyprus and security.

The negotiations between London and Constantinople were between Salisbury and Layard. On Friday, May 24 - Shouvalof was back in London - a telegram instructed Layard to place the Convention before the Sultan. Let the Sultan accept within forty eight hours, or England will no longer oppose Russia, and Turkey will be partitioned. 2)

It was an ultimatum.

At Hatfield, the Crown Prince and Princess of Germany were guests. There was a sound of revelry by night, Saturday night. Yet, the Foreign Minister of Affairs was distraught. Would the Sultan accept? Would there be war? Would Russia and Turkey now unite? Nothing was certain. Nothing as yet was signed, with Russia, with Austria, or

1. Newton, II Lyons .p.137.

2. Cecil, II, Salisbury, p.276.

with Germany as to the Congress. Lord Salisbury, host to royalty, went about his duties, yet remembered with martial satisfaction that there was a powerful fleet at Portsmouth, that there were six or seven first rate iron clads in the Mediterranean. 1)

The Sultan's reply arrived Sunday morning. It was an acceptance.

~~It was a surprise~~

On June 5, Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Lyons in Paris, "The Convention at Constantinople has been signed, with expressions of lively gratitude on the Sultan's part." 2) The news must have been received by Lord Salisbury with a lively sense of relief- except that he foresaw that in the Conference now coming, France would be more concerned over Cyprus than was Turkey, or would be Russia. "Harcourt's manner had changed, Salisbury wrote; 3) Harcourt was French Ambassador at London. But Salisbury was ever confident, "I hope our friends at Paris will confine themselves to epigram." 4)

All three of the pacts were more or less known among the Powers. But the "less" knowledge was to have great influence on the proceedings at Berlin. Cyprus was the least known. Shouvalof later shrugged his shoulders, expressive Russian shoulders, over Cyprus and secrecy. "The English are always so suspicious, seeing deep designs where none exist." 5) They might have taken four islands for all Shouvalof and Russia cared.

The Convention itself was witness that England did not have confidence in Russia's "brittle pledges", 6) in her promises to remain out of Asia. That was the real difficulty, between Russia and England. Their 'guerre diplomatique' was over Asia.

1. Newton, Lyons, II. p. 144.

2. ib.

3. ib.

4. ib.

5. Baddeley, op. cit. p. 307.

6. Monypenny, VI, Op. cit. p. 289.

THE CONGRESS.

- 96 - Plenipotentiaries.
- 103 - Proceedings.
- 105 - Bulgaria.
- 110 - Bosnia.
- 114 - Batoum.
- 118 - Minor Matters.
- 121 - Minor Powers.
- 122 - Return from Berlin.
- 125 - Four Points.

THE CONGRESS.

The Conference was called on June 2, to meet June 13 - scant time for preparation, ominous date for meeting. But Bismarck had seen to it that preparations were complete before he issued the call - "With the object of discussing the stipulations of the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, the Powers consent to admit the free discussion of the whole contents of San Stefano."

The Concert was still playing.

That it was a brilliant gathering is evident; equalling Vienna, excelling Paris and Washington, if falling somewhat short of Versailles - as Berlin was in celebration of a World War which had not occurred, and Versailles in celebration of a World War which had ploughed up all from the vasty deep.

At Vienna there had hovered ladies, priests, and mystics. At Berlin outside influence was sought by nations desiring self-determination, and by peace societies; the modern day was coming if it had not yet arrived.

There were no von Krudeners, de Lievens, Recamiers, as there had been sixty years before. The Hausfrauen were rather present yet not representing. The Princess von Bismarck - "she is not fair to see" - performed domestic duty at the Prince's table, that table where the Prince entertained singly those whom he would more subtly reach, ranging from Beaconsfield to Blowitz. Lady Salisbury arrived from England to create the atmosphere en famille as at Constantinople, - and to terminate the gossip letters which for the first two weeks reported the Congress in the best Cecilian manner. The Countess  
1. Monypenny, VI, op.cit. p. 322, Memorandum from Beaconsfield to the Queen.

Karolyi - "very pretty"-4) did not venture farther than tea parties, no doubt wisely. And if the Princess Radziwill would have liked a larger scope, her Memoirs give no hint of it, to satisfy her or us. The Kron Prinzessin appears to have attempted some diplomacy, but British women however deeply they interest themselves in politics, are not expert in intrigue. The Crown Princess in England exerted a delicate influence for Danish George in Greece. But, the glamour of Vienna had departed from feminine Europe, and the straight forward dealing of Versailles had not matured.

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As at Versailles the chief states were represented by their chief ministers. Bismarck, Gortschakof, Andrassy, Beaconsfield, besped the omnipotence of their countries - there was Plenipotentiaries. to be no ad referendum. 2) Bread and circuses were still the pabulum of the people. Statesmen proposed and statesmen disposed # God and the People brought too slowly for 1878.

Gortshhakof came 'gegen der Willen Alexanders II', 3) also against the pleasure of Bismarck. Gortschakof was old, Salisbury found him "a little insignificant old man, full of compliments but otherwise (sic) having evidently lost his head". 4) Yet he had once been the great man of Europe. He belonged to the old regime, he had seen the preceding century, he remembered Vienna, he had been at Paris (1856), He had been Chancellor of the Russian Empire for fifteen years. And now, his sovereign had not wanted him to come. But come he had.

He was mocked and flouted by the President of the Congress, his old friend and pupil at Frankfort, in the 1840's, his old friend and

1. Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. 327. Memo, Lord Beaconsfield to the Queen

2. Ibid. p. 305. Prince of Wales to the Queen.

3. Wertheimer III. Andrassy, C. 119

4. Cecil, II & op. cit. p. 280. Lord to Lady Salisbury.

confidant at St. Petersburg in the 1860's. Beaconsfield saw that Bismarck hated Gortschakof, despised him a little, and was determined that the Russian Chancellor should "endure ineffable mortification by retreating, without the honors of war, after all his blustering". 1)

Did Gortschakof pretend at Berlin that illness which saved him from the dull sessions, and saved him from the humiliation of the reduction of Bulgaria? Bismarck remarked, "when Gortschakof 'nicht im Kreise der Kongress mitglieder erscheinen, sich doch am Parterrefenster seine Unter den Linden gelegenen Wohnung zeigte um dadurch seine Gesundheit zu manifestieren'. 2)

But in any event Gortschakof pulled off one diplomatic trick, perhaps the most important of the Congress. Usually he managed to do and say the wrong thing, from the point of view of Shouvalof, to confuse boundary lines of unknown lands for which he contended, and to speak grandiloquent nothings when sharp argument or suave word was wanted. Bismarck did not hesitate to correct him. Salisbury wrote, "there is no doubt the presence of Gortschakof materially complicates matters and if some kindly fit of gout should take him off we should move much faster." 3)

Russia came, with three pacts, with Turkey (San Stefano), with Austria (Pesth), with England.

Beaconsfield came, and he was old, very old and very tired. The Queen objected to his coming lest it hazard too far the strength of the first Prime Minister who had won her warm affection since Melbourne. But Disraeli wanted to put his wit against Europe. He had done it successfully at a distance; he would like to do it in person. Vivian Grey had been protagonist at a great European Congress. 1. Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford. 2. Bismarck, Erinnerungen, II, 106, q. Wertheimer. 3. Cecil, II, op. cit. p. 281

ference, and 'Dizzy' was always his own hero. He had even thought of going to the Conference at Constantinople. 3) He would go to Berlin, he and not Lyons nor another.

At Berlin he kept his bed when nothing important was going on; once Kidd had to be brought from London to resuscitate him; but he missed nothing important when it was on the carpet. And he was "the object of endless curiosity" wherever he went, on the streets, in the parks. 2) Salisbury paid him scant compliment, admitted grudgingly that his speech the opening day, in English, was "rather a good one"; 3) but generally Salisbury complained that he himself "had to act as flapper for Beaconsfield who forgets." 4)

Hohenlohe could not endure him, "a detestable Jewish face". 5) Bismarck saw him in truer proportion, "der alte Jude das ist der Mann". England's security was the stake of the Conference, and Beaconsfield meant that the Empire should be secure. For once England had statesmen who dared to bind even the English democracy to secret pledges.

England came, with three conventions; with Russia, with Austria, with Turkey.

Andrassy alone was young, but not too young. He had been burned in effigy for his radicalism of 1848. Now, very splendid and flashing, in gold and scarlet uniform, he represented his sovereign, and in a way he was the center of the Congress. Austria's stake in the Conference and in the future was tremendous. And her capacity for secret compacts was unlimited. Lady Gwendolen says of Andrassy, "there was ever a touch of the Gascon in him." 6) There was something chameleonlike, in Andrassy, and in Austria's policy. There had been for two years. There was to be, in the Congress. Austria knew what she wanted- Bosnia. She had made pacts of security beforehand with every

1. Monypenny, VI, op. cit., p. 89.

2. Public Opinion, II, p. 466

3. Cecil II op. cit. p. 281

4. ib. Hohenlohe, Memoirs II, p. 218

5. Cecil, II op. cit. p. 178

6. Cecil, II op. cit. p. 178

one. Her hesitation at the Congress is hardly comprehensible, altho it is capable of a variety of interpretations.

Austria came, with agreements with Russia, with Germany, with England, with understandings with France and Italy, with no antagonism from Turkey.

Bismarck was there. Bismarck was in his prime, and Bismarck was ill. He longed for the waters of Kissingen, and more than once he threatened to leave the Conference and go in search of them. He had no stake in the proceedings; he never had had; he was only an honest broker - to whom a liberal percentage was due. Yet throughout this perplexed decade, throughout the crisscross diplomacy on the Eastern Question, Bismarck was Europe.

And, Bismarck was the Congress. He himself said it in jest - there were those who thought his jesting inappropriate in such a solemn time as the month of June, 1878. 'Le Congres c'est moi', he admitted. It was he who had advocated the secret arrangements brought there by the Powers. And to him the Powers came and told their secret arrangements. He knew all. Andrassy told him of Bosnia. Beaconsfield told him of Cyprus. The Globe told him of Bulgaria before Beaconsfield had had the chance - unless the prevoyant Shouvalof had been before. He approved all. Looking through the yet undimmed eyes of Andrassy, he saw, past Bosnia and Herzogovina, the vision of the East.

Bismarck cut his beard on June 21. The fact was recorded by Hohenlohe (and by Salisbury 2). The Plenipotentiaries watched his every change with concern. They were sensitive to his caprices. They might intimate his intentions. They felt, as a European publicist wrote later, "Shave Lord Salisbury, and you would alter the history of Europe." 3)

1. Hohenlohe II, *Memoirs*, p. 230

2. Cecil II *Salisbury* p. 286.



Salisbury himself was there, bearded like a pard, uncut, as supple as ever, and as British, that is as immovable as ever. The "massive personality" 1) of the Foreign Minister supplemented the dramatic personality of the Prime Minister. He "pulled the laboring oar" 2) according to Beaconsfield. My Lord Beaconsfield went even further; Salisbury was one "whose presence at the Congress had produced an effect such as no other living man could have produced". 3) And one feels that if Disraeli was, according to the correspondent of the Daily News, "as careful of his prerogatives as Queen Elizabeth", 4) Salisbury was touched with something of the atmosphere surrounding the Eighth Henry on the Field of the Cloth of Gold. He rather thought himself that he saved the day for England on occasion.

Yet, there were those who thought Salisbury inadequate. Shouvalof years afterward protested that "he betrayed such weakness, such ignorance, always trying to make some deep combination out of which nothing ever came." 5) But Shouvalof was thinking ex post facto. And no plenipotentiary is a hero long after a conference. Certainly not Salisbury, and, not Shouvalof.

Shouvalof was there, Russian Ambassador in London, 'le confident particulier du Tzar' 6) intimate of Bismarck, a cosmopolite who was not even pro-Russian. But he was for Russia, at the Congress, successful because of his apparent guilelessness, and because of his personal relations with Bismarck.

Shouvalof's antipathy was his senior plenipotentiary. Gortschakof was not to have come to the Conference. Shouvalof was to have represented the Czar. His master told him so. He had stopped in Ber-

lin to tell Bismarck. Bismarck had highly approved. Now he could prove

1. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 114, Buckle.

2. ib. p. 346.

3. Cecil. II. op. cit. p. 302.

4. Public Opinion II, p.

5. Baddeley, op. cit. p. 304.

6. Mouy, Revue, des D.M. Nov. 1. 04

his friendship, for Russia, for Shouvalof, "not by words but by deeds"<sup>1)</sup>  
 Bismarck could do business with Shouvalof. Europe could do business  
 with Shouvalof. England had done so.

In the midst of their mutual felicitation a telegram came to  
 Bismarck. From St. Petersburg. Gortschakof to be first plenipotentiary.  
 Bismarck raged. "I retract what I said about helping you," 2) "we  
 will remain friends. But I will never again permit Prince Gortscha-  
 kof to mount upon my shoulders as pedestal". 3) The old wound of  
 'le paix est assuré' still rankled.

But the friendship between Bismarck and Shouvalof continued, ~~am~~  
 during the Conference. And it must be considered in any estimate of  
 the proceedings and conclusions of the Congress of Berlin, and in any  
 understandings of the ameliorations of hostility between Bismarck and  
 Gortshhakof.

Shouvalof was at everyone's ear, and his ear loaned to everyone's  
 lip. Yet, not with loss of dignity. His position as second enabled  
 him to circulate. He was present in Bismarck's garden at 10 P.M. June  
 12, and came suddenly on Montague Corry, secretary to Beaconsfield;  
 their cigar fires lighting each other the way. Beaconsfield had arriv-  
 ed in Berlin at 8 P.M. Beaconsfield was in conference with the Chan-  
 cellor. The two were renewing an acquaintance that dated back to a  
 sole meeting in London in the 1860's, when Bismarck had babbled of  
 imperial German greatness, and only Disraeli, who was the only truly  
 imperially minded statesman in England, had believed him. Shouvalof  
 seemed pained that the two had lost no time in getting together. But  
 Shouvalof neglected no tip of circumstance. He moved more circumspect-  
 ly thereafter, with Beaconsfield, with Bismarck. 4)

1. Baddeley, op. cit. p. 369.

2. ib.

3. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 370. q. Shouvalof

4. Cumming, History of Berlin Treaty-  
 Nineteenth Century July 395

Waddington was there, part French, part English, the English half doing valiant service for the French half. Beaconsfield wrote that he "looks like an epicier and I think his looks do not bely his mind and general intelligence". 1) Dizzy certainly could not appreciate the common run. But Baron de Rothschild, who was also commissioned by the Queen to report on Waddington, uses also the figure of 'epicier', - "but a good man. He thinks he talks English, but it is American." 2) Salisbury noted that "Anglo-Saxon look, and I suspect will give us some trouble". 3) Salisbury seems to have had a very acute consciousness of Cyprus whenever he saw Waddington.

Corti was there, for Italy. "Poor Corti" 4) was the contemporary verdict, and the historical. Yet a look, a question, of Corti's, was the key to Italian diplomacy for the next forty years.

Turkish representatives were there; a Turk, Sadoullah Bey, who had signed San Stefano, a Greek, Caratheodory Pacha, suave, superior, but snubbed; and Mehemet Ali, a German, 'un gamin de Berlin', as Bismarck remembered.

There was a spokesman for Greece, he became only an on-looker. There was Bratiano for Roumania, unheard when Roumania's cause was more than just. Each little Power and principality had its representative, eager to pour into Europe's ears the woes of his people. The ears of the plenipotentiaries were filled with wax, the wax of fear of Bismarck, if it must be told.

The Powers had not come indifferent to Greece, Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia, Armenia. They were highly moral Powers; something of the Liberator in Russia had passed into each. But Bismarck had no time, no sympathy, for oppressed Christian peoples, for 'la bonheur de ces gens la bas. 5) Of Armenia he shrugged his shoulders when Salisbury

1. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 327

3. Cecil, II op. cit. p. 280.

2. ib. note.

4. ib. p. 295.

5. ib. p. 287.

would have aired the woes of Armenia and incidentally have saved Europe much future woes - encore un de plus! Decidedly the Prince did not have the missionary spirit. He cared only for the law, not for the prophets. Review San Stefano in the light of Paris and of London - that was the object of the Congress. No truck or time for ces gens là bas.

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Bismarck had hoped to see the whole thing over in three days. So he had told the French Ambassador at Berlin in April. 1) And

Lord Odo Russell had thought that the Dreikaiserbund Proceedings. would be in control and nothing would happen but a formal 'communication' of their will. 2) There was the persistent fear of war throughout the Conference; some blamed Disraeli, some Bismarck. Perhaps for reason of this fear, the Chancellor advocated a three day-meet, and to avoid this eventuality he subdued all displays of eloquence and hastened the proceedings.

It took thirty days, with twenty plenary sessions, where the routine business was registered; with a multitude of private sessions for the Conference was well organized with committees where the work was done - "all questions are publicly introduced and then privately settled" 3) wrote Beaconsfield with approval. But these private meetings were often so difficult that Shouvalof did not attend them. "I could not stand the constant hecklings of Salisbury and Haymerle" 4) In the Congress Bismarck would not have allowed this. There was also much private and semi-private dining and talking, in order that conflicting points of view might be reconciled. The Preliminary pacts had not accomplished all. "Our meetings in Congress are perfectly futile" wrote Salisbury, "everything depends on our private fighting" 5)

1. Wertheimer, III Andrassy, p. 111.

2. Newton, II Lyons, p. 131.

3. Monypenny, VI, op. cit., p. 322.

4. Baddeley, op. cit., p. 372.

5. Cecil, II Salisbury, p. 283.

The presiding of Prince Bismarck was autocratic. Shouvalof admired the manner. - " a certain military brusqueness of manner which did not displeasethose present and which the representatives of all the Powers took in good part, the two English Ministers not excepted, from whom I had awaited more haughtiness" 1). Caratheodory Pacha, representing Turkey, and not enjoying the friendship of Bismarck, did not admire Bismarck's manner - "long accustomed to the most complete independence, he looked upon the slightest observation as a desire for resistance which he hastened to suppress with nervous impatience and a will of iron." 2)

That Bismarck established a too rapid pace was the criticism of a German Conferee, Hohenlohe. "This impatience on the part of the Chancellor, which was justified by the state of his health, accelerated the work, but its disadvantages will be felt later, since much will be only insufficiently settled. I should have preferred slower work". 3) At times his ill feeling got away with him, especially on the day when Bulgaria came up. "Der Furst war nicht glücklich in der Art der Behandlung der Sachse" 4) admits Busch. And Caratheodory Pacha records Bismarck's impatient exclamation, " Voila deux jours, que nous discutons sur la question bulgare; c'est la un honneur auquel les Bulgares ne s'attendent pas... je prends fort peu d'interet a tous ces details" 5) When Bosnia was before the Conference Andrassy telegraphed to Vienna, "Die Physiognomie der Sitzung war nicht sehr angenehm/insofern Bismarcks Lietung heute nicht so glücklich war und eigentlich nichts vorwärts gebracht wurde." 6)

There was at times a certain joviality in the Chancellor's manner. When it was found he was not in the exact center of the council table

1. q. Hanotaux, Contemporary France, IV, p. 347

2. ib.

3. Hohenlohe, II Memoirs p. 227.

4. Busch, Deutsche Rundschau

5. Hanotaux, La Guerre des Balkans, p. 188.

6. Wertheimer, Andrassy III

he exclaimed, "N'importe, je serais un peu trop à droit, mais j'ai pour le moment quelque inclination vers ce côté là". 1) Andrassy was at his immediate right, Beaconsfield was just beyond.

The big fights were over Bulgaria, Bosnia, Batoum - for England, for Austria, for Russia. These had been settled, in the preliminary pacts. They were all on the green table in the Palace of Radetsky.

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Bismarck had said "let us deal first with the great things that concern England, for England is quite ready to go to war with Russia". 2)

According to Beaconsfield it was Bulgaria that England regarded as the great thing - "the Sixth Article of the Treaty of San Stefano is the real point for which the Congress is assembled", wrote Beaconsfield. 3) "The whole peace of San Stefano is concentrated in Article VI", said Salisbury." 4)

Bulgaria was up on June 17; it was major on the agenda; it remained there until June 28. Gortschakof was absent for three days; on Saturday, when it was reported that on account of 'l'etat de sa santé' he kept his room, and Bismarck expressed the regret of the Congress and the hope for a speedy recovery; on Monday the 24, when his continued illness was reported and Bismarck did not regret; on Tuesday, the 25, when no report of his absence was made. 5) Shouvalof was councillor for Russia; Shouvalof had made the pact with England that bound Russia; let him carry on. On Wednesday Gortschakof was back, perhaps a little more acrimonious than ordinary with Beaconsfield, who sat in every session well or ill, never quite well,

1. Mouys, Souvenirs, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1904. Nov. 1. p. 21.

2. Monypenny, VI. p. 315.

3. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 315.

4. Cecil, II Salisbury, p. 115

5. Protocols, Das Staats Archiv, V 34.

England intended there should be no Big Bulgaria under Russia. letting Russia through to the Mediterranean - this was the real point. What she did intend is not so clear. There seems in the back of the English mind to have been some thought of Greece. Perhaps a new Byzantine Empire under Britain would not have been unwelcome in 1878, as in 1918. Salisbury certainly had Greek thoughts, but they seem not to have been long thoughts; they were nearly forty years too soon; or more. To assign any part of Bulgaria to Greece, openly, would be to partition Turkey, and England was high priestess of integrity. Lord Beaconsfield spoke to the Greek question, which preceded the question of Bulgaria, "no one could doubt the future of Greece" 1) but, Greece could afford to wait. There was no Venizelos present, to weep Greek tears, and win over the conference.

Reduction and separation had been agreed on in the Shouvalof-Salisbury Memorandum. But the authority of the Sultan, and his right to canton troops, had not been agreed on; that placed the whole ~~and~~ arrangement in apparent dispute. Beaconsfield "spoke thunder" 2) to Shouvalof, and contended for the Sultan, so he wrote to the Queen. On June 18, "Waterloo Day" as he himself noted, 3) Beaconsfield issued an ultimatum of 48 hours on the Delimitation of Bulgaria. 4) Turkey was astonished; Turkey had expected a friend in England. Russia was astonished; it was not quite what Russia had expected to get through the temporary alliance of the Memorandum.

It was necessary to telegraph to the Czar. The day went on, and yet another day. No word came from Russia. That evening, at a banquet, Disraeli sat beside Corti. "Knowing my man, that he was a favorite of

1. Hanotaux, IV, Contemporary France, p. 357.

2. Cecil, II, op. cit. p. 280.

3. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 322.

4. ib. p. 323.

5.

Bismarck, who talked freely to him and that ... he had the ear of everyone, I told him in confidence... that I took the gloomiest view of affairs, and that if Russia would not accept our propositions I had resolved to break up the Congress." 1) Salisbury in the meantime, under orders from his chief, was trying to "frighten" Shouvalof, which must have much amused that imperturbable, 2)

We know now that Russia had full powers in the Congress, no referendum, and need not have consulted the Emperor. We even know Russia did not consult the Emperor. Montague Corry, Lord Rowton, secretary to Beaconsfield, the "Monty" of the Letters, has left an account of ~~the proceedings of those days, whether written down at once, as Hohenlohe's, or remembered as Shouvalof's.~~ which should be considered reliable, or as reliable as any account of proceedings of those days, whether written down at once, as Hohenlohe's, or remembered as Shouvalof's. He says, "we did not discover until a good deal later that as a matter of fact the Russians had received orders from the Czar practically to submit to anything rather than to go to war with England". 3) Shouvalof's Memoirs in general bear this out.

But the Russian plenipotentiary was not anxious to use this power, and preferred the subtleties of delayed diplomacy.

Beaconsfield decided Russia was not coming to terms. He told his secretary to make arrangements, they would leave. "It seems to me impossible (for Russia) to concede these points, and if they refuse I have sketched out my plan. We will return to England at once..lay my report before Her Majesty. A declaration of war will follow."

Corry found the trains inconvenient. He wrote a telegram to the station master at Cologne, to have a special ready. In a letter from

1. Monypenny. VI. op. cit. p. 323.

2. Cecil II, op. cit. p. 289.

3. Cummings, Secret History of the Treaty of Berlin" Nineteenth Century



Berlin, to Lady Ilchester, dated July 2, 1878, Corry wrote "I had made arrangements for a special train for England at a few hours notice, when the incident of the Congress occurred, which I make no secret of though it is not known." 1) The next day Bismarck knew. The station master had told him.

He met Corry, conveniently out walking.

"Where is Lord Beaconsfield?"

Corry answered, "at the Kaiserhof".

"Can I see him?" asked the Prince.

He was told he could.

"Look here," said Bismarck, "at the present moment it is twelve minutes to four, and I am due with my Prince at the Palace at four o'clock. I wish to see Lord Beaconsfield and I shall go up to him. But I wish you would come to us at five minutes to four sharp, and announce to me the exact time."

At five minutes to four the plenipotentiaries were interrupted by the Secretary. They were talking of the horribly bad paving of the Wilhelmstrasse.

In two minutes Bismarck came out.

On going in, Corry found that Bismarck, on being informed it was five minutes to four, had asked directly 'Lord Beaconsfield, do these four points really represent England's ultimatum to Russia?'

The answer came direct, 'they do.'

But Bismarck had also time to ask Beaconsfield to dinner. 'I wish you would dine with me. I am alone at six o'clock.'

An engagement was broken - Lord Beaconsfield recognized his moment. He dined with Bismarck *à deux*. There must have been two long spoons at that table. And, over an after-dinner pipe, which Dizzy detested,  
1. Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. 326.

they settled the fate of Europe, they placed an answer to the Eastern Question. "He was convinced the ultimatum was not a sham," wrote Disraeli, and between four and six o'clock had convinced the Russians also; "before I went to bed I had the satisfaction of knowing that St. Petersburg had surrendered." 1)

The story of the special train and its train of consequences is put together out of Letters and Memoirs of varying authors and varying dates. Of course it may not be true. Lady Gwendolen Cecil says the incident of the train "must be taken in a dramatic rather than a historic sense". 2) Wertheimer doubts it, calls it dubious, post festum glorificationem Beaconsfields erfunden zu sein. 3)

But while both "Monty" and "Dizzy" were capable of substituting a dramatic for a historic moment, even while history was being made, contemporary testimony such as Corry's letter to Lady Ilchester, seems too acute to have been apochryphal. It is true that de Blowitz does not report it. And de Blowitz knew everything, and a few beside. That Shouvalof seems not to have remembered it *ex post facto* is curious, as Shouvalof could remember everything, even things that did not occur. Yet, since the evidence is conflicting, even the latest published evidence, Cecil versus Buckle, the historian will believe it or not, as he likes or likes not the persistently theatric in Lord Beaconsfield.

Salisbury said the object of the conferences was not 'entiere-ment aneantir les resultats de la guerre' 4) and Shouvalof picked it up on the phrase. The Turks protested 'les resultats' of the war and of the Congress. But it was then that Bismarck "cut his beard and sat on the Turks unmercifully". 5)

1. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 324.

2. Cecil, II op. cit. p. 283.

3. Wertheimer, Andrassy III, p. 115 note.

4. Protocool II, Staatsarchiv

5. Cecil, op. cit. p. 286 v34.

Bulgaria was divided, into three parts; a real Bulgaria, an artificial Rumelia which soon joined her, a Macedonia which became the plague spot of the Balkans. And the Sanjak of Novibazar came also under Austrian influence. Gortschakof agreed to this with Andrassy, in a secret pact signed on July 13, 1) altho Shouvalof was instructed not to let Austria come between Serbia and Montenegro. 2) Shouvalof protested the name Rumelia, declared Bulgaria was 'comme un drapeau' to the people of the whole region.

In revenge Shouvalof got the Sanjak of Sofia away from Rumelia and for Bulgaria, by pitting England against Austria, Salisbury against Andrassy. Beaconsfield admired his fight, in spite of having had to give him a "dusting" 3); "he fights a difficult and losing battle with marvellous talent and temper", 4) wrote Disraeli; perhaps Shouvalof ~~like~~ like Disraeli never knew when he lost. Kinglake in a letter to Mme. Novikof, called this Sanjak incident "one of the most signal diplomatic victories that was ever won". 5) Shouvalof was certainly most admired by his admirers.

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Since the Conference really busied itself with partition, perhaps the most significant disposition was the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-Hungary, the consummation of over Bosnia thirty years of intrigue. Bosnia was guaranteed to Austria by Russia, England, Germany, approved by France and Italy, one or more times offered by Turkey. Andrassy had the consent of everyone in his pocket. Yet he was as coy as if something were still to win. Was it more territory, or Turkish approval?

Hohenlohe criticized; he felt that "Andrassy had missed the

1. Wertheimer, III Andrassy, p. 135, note.      4. Monypenny, VI, op. cit. p. 328  
 2. Baddeley, op. cit. p. 372.                              5. Baddeley, op. cit. q. p. 304  
 3. Cecil, op. cit. p. 280.

opportunity of taking a decisive step in the Oriental Question, and wishes now that the Conference would compel him to advance into Bosnia." 1) In any event Andrassy would not himself propose it to the Congress. Germany had expressed herself as willing to speak for Austria, 2) although Hohenlohe himself did not think Germany would be willing to "extricate Andrassy from his scrape." 3) But, Hohenlohe should have seen more clearly, should have seen that Austria was winning the greatest victory, at San Stefano and at Berlin, and that it was a victory for Germany, with the help of England.

Andrassy preferred that England should do the proposing. Quite naturally. England was against the partition of Turkey. What more logical than that England should propose the partition of Turkey? A rumour of the Convention of June 4 had come to the Austrian Chancellor. Foreign Minister Salisbury stole to him and "begged him to hold his tongue." 4) But, Andrassy knew how to use his man. Austria had even at one moment invited England to leave the conference if they could not get, the one Bulgaria reduced, the other Bosnia annexed. 5) They understood each other. Salisbury's explanation of England's proposal, according to the Turkish plenipotentiary was of the kind that 'we did it because we did it'. "To those who asked him why he had assumed the role of initiator of the Austrian occupation, Lord Salisbury replied that as it was inevitable that the proposal should be made, it seemed to him better done by England than by Germany." 6) Lord Salisbury was even then beginning to intimate his natural inclination toward the Central Powers.

1. Hohenlohe, II Memoirs, p. 212.

2. Cecil, II op. cit. p. 282

3. Hohenlohe, supra.

4. Cecil, II, op. cit. p. 286.

5. Hohenlohe, ib. p. 218.

6. Hanotaux, Contemporary France II, p. 363, Caratheodory Pacha, g.

Count Andrassy then spoke, on June 28, merely declaring that the limitrophic provinces were too near Austria to longer endure their turmoil. Lord Salisbury then spoke, proposed to the Congress that Austria should take her own. "Her Majesty's Government proposed to the assembled Powers that the Congress agree that the provinces of Bosnia and Herzogovina be occupied and administered by Austria - Hungary." 1)

Not that they be annexed. Yet, annexation had been for years the desire of Austria, and the substance of her Agreements. Prince Bismarck at once approved. "Germany who is connected by no direct interest with the matters of the East"; 2) approves. Almost he spoke too quickly, for disinterestedness. Even Hohenlohe should have understood.

No one was surprised, unless it was the Turks. But Andrassy hesitated.

Bismarck commented. "I have heard of people refusing to eat their pigeon unless it was shot and roasted for them, but I have never heard of any one refusing to eat it, unless their jaws were forced open and it was pushed down their throats." 3)

Andrassy may have hesitated because of Turkey. The provinces if limitrophic to Austria, were precious to Turkey. Turkey could make it uncomfortable. She attempted it in the Congress. But Bismarck before this had warned the Turks that they impeded the work, that he would not tolerate it, that he might have to give practical proof of his meaning. 4) Decidedly he had cut his beard.

1. Protocol, Das Staatsarchiv. v. 34

2. ib.

3. Cecil, II, op. cit. p. 281.

4. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 357.

So the Turkish protest was only a murmur. Caratheodory Pacha saw the hopelessness of objecting, and he too saw Bosnia in terms of an animal in a fable of LaFontaine's. "Das komm mir ungefähr so vor wie wenn man ein Huhn das geschachtet werden soll fragte of er lieber gebraten oder gekocht sein wolle." 1)

But because of that protest, Austria did not annex but occupied. Dem Sultan sollte durch die Wohl dieses <sup>Wortes</sup> sei Beitritt erlichtert werden." 2) Haymerle at dinner at Karolyi's, June 17, had taken Herr Secretaire Busch aside and asked him if he thought the Porte 'Bosnien gutwilling abtreten'. Busch answered, no, and they agreed it would be better 'Bosnien in Pfand zu nehmen vor einigen Monaten'. 3) Austria knew enough of race turmoil. Moreover Austria and Hungary were divided as to which should have them, and an "occupation" would leave them to the Crown.

The Mediterranean Powers also objected to the occupation, as they objected much later to the annexation. Italy posed her question. Corti asked Andrassy what point of view his government maintained as to the occupation. Count Andrassy turned first to Bismarck - the look is significant; both were looking sudosten. Then Andrassy, looking Corti in the eye, "Sir, Austria occupying Bosnia and Herzogovina maintains the European point of view - I have nothing further to add". 4) The Dreikaiserbund had lifted its head. Corti not only had nothing more to say in the Congress; But Caratheodory Pacha reports that he was warned that his continued interference would be regarded as casus belli. 5)

There is also the well known story from Drummond Wolff, of Corti's remark, "But my dear Count, your occupation of Bosnia is nothing but an annexation badly disguised", and Andrassy's admission, "very badly

1. Wertheimer, op. cit. III p. 130.

2. ib. III, p. 126.

3. Busch, Deutsche Rundschau,

4. Wolff, Rambling Recollections II

5. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 304.

disguised." 1) Italy's position was plain enough, if the greater of the Great Powers had been able to see. Salisbury wrote to Cross "the Italians are unhappy, not because we have got Cyprus, but because they have got nothing. I fear poor Corti will lose his place for his moderation." 2)

And so Austria occupied and administered Bosnia and Herzegovina for thirty years. Six years after she annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina the universal war, which the Congress of Berlin had been called to prevent, broke forth, fanned out of the smothered flames of the Herzegovinian revolt of 1875. Well might Jomini have said, in 1875, that Austria was to take "the leading part in the reopening of the Eastern Question". 3) Karolyi, applying to Andrassy to be associate plenipotentiary at Berlin, had spoken of 'unsern Einfluss im Orient'. 4)

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England had won, over Bulgaria. Austria had won, over Bosnia. Russia now proceeded to win, over Batoum.

There were those, even in England, who still insisted on Batoum. the Asiatic points as being the most important before the Conference, even with the Anglo-Saxon pact of estimates in their hand. The Daily News declared that Bismarck had persuaded Disraeli to talk over Bulgaria first in order that England might be first beneficiary of the Congress, might be exhausted by her negotiations, and Russia might then take what she wanted; that Bismarck had reserved Batoum to this end. Bismarck evidently did not quite believe in the Anglo-Saxon pact on Asiatic objectives, and Beaconsfield himself wrote to the Queen, "Batoum will be taken Thursday (July 6) which engrosses Lord Beaconsfield's mind." 5)

1. Drummond Wolf, Rambling Recollections, II, p. 194. 4. Wertheimer, III, op. cit. p. 108  
 2. Cecil, II, op. cit. p. 295. 5. Monypenny, VI p. 330.  
 3. Hanotaux, IV, op. cit. p. 64.

Beaconsfield had been concerned over the effects of the publication of the Anglo-Russian agreement in London, which had been followed by such an outburst of jingoism against Russia that he had thought he ought to go home. The men in the Cabinet were 'middle class men' and he had "always observed that middle class men were afraid of responsibility". 1) He even thought the Government might fall, and warned the Russians that a more warlike Government might come in. Salisbury too thought Beaconsfield ought to be at home. "The Jingoists require to be calmed in their own language and he is the only one among us who speaks it fluently." 2) But, Lord Beaconsfield stayed on. He recognized the logical climax to his career, he did not desert it.

Gortschakof too was engrossed in Batoum. He had given over Bulgaria to Shouvalof. He had reserved absolutely Batoum for himself, x himself and Beaconsfield. "I will see only Lord Beaconsfield", he cried. 3) He attended all the sessions on Batoum, public and private.

The question was opened July 6. Its settlement required four days of the attention of the Congress, of private meetings between the First Plenipotentiaries, and of sub-private meetings between Salisbury, Shouvalof and Haymerle.

Batoum, the city, was made a free port. Salisbury complained that England's interests were imperilled because Beaconsfield had not understood the French of Gortschakof. "What with deafness, ignorance of French, and Bismarck's extraordinary mode of speech", he commented in general, but felt in particular, "Beaconsfield has the dimmest idea of what is going on, understands everything crossways, and imagines a perpetual conspiracy." 4).

1. Cecil. II op. cit. p. 286.

2. ib. p. 288. Salisbury to Northcote.

3. ib. p. 287.



There was evidently misunderstanding, but whether due to bad French, bad eyesight, bad honor, or to all, who shall say? Certainly not Salisbury. Batoum was to be a free port, Beaconsfield had agreed with Gortschakof, 'essentillement commercial'. Salisbury got this changed to ~~l'essentielle~~ 'exclusivement commercial'. Gortschakof told Beaconsfield the two meant the same thing, and changed it back. Batoum became a free port, in the Russian sense. (Cecil, II.292.)

If Russia could not have Constantinople, her strategy satisfied itself with Batoum, and remained strategic. Bismarck said to Mouys, *il n'ya qu'un moment dans les chose, il faut le saisir.* 1) They were speaking of Constantinople. Yet, Constantinople was not lost if Batoum was won.

The boundary of the hinterland, an independent Khanate, lay much in dispute. England was concerned over the Lazi who lived there; exactly how many England did not quite know, but enough to make a sumner; they were Musselmans who had a right to be under Turkish rule. 'Encore une population insoumise', chirruped Shouvalof. 2)

Shouvalof left a map with Salisbury, with a line drawn which should save the Lazi. Beaconsfield took the map from Salisbury, took it to Gortshhakof. Gortschakof accepted the map, accepted the line.

The Congress met. Gortschakof produced a map and a line - "a totally different line", 3) not saving half the Lazi. England protested. Beaconsfield and Gortschakof quarrelled. 'Je croyais', cried Gortschakof, 'qu'un lord Anglais n'avait qu'un parole!' Beaconsfield came back at him, with his broken French, 'wee, wee, oon parole- ceci!' and pointed a long desirous finger where the right line should run.

1. Mouys, *Souvenirs*, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Nov. 1. 1904.  
2. Cecil, II op. cit. p. 289.  
3. ib. p. 293.

Gortschakof hissed 'trahison' in the ear of Shouvalof. Beaconsfield's suggested line was their line of last resort! Beaconsfield had stolen his map! But Salisbury believed Gortschakof had put one over on his chief. "The old wretch knew that Beaconsfield was short sighted, and ignorant of detail, and took the opportunity of substituting another line." 1)

Bismarck cried a plague on both these old men. But, it was not England's moment. The Congress had heard of Cyprus. It was the coup de Theatre of Beaconsfield's that had been expected. That Convention may have been accepted in the long run, objection may have been "envious rather than bitter." 2) But in the short run, July 8 to July 9, the Congress could take its revenge on England for England's success. It voted for Russia's line. The Lazis were lost. Russia was well into Asia Minor, not without the assistance of Bismarck. 3) The Treaty Powers had put her there. Shouvalof said, "the English were duped, with the help of Bismarck." 4) 5)

Bismarck recognized his service to Russia. "If I had not got long ago the highest Russian order set in precious stones, I ought to get it now." 6) Salisbury also appreciated the victory as Russian. He remarked to the Russian Chancellor, that 'er wage nicht nach England zuruckkehren; man möge ihm ein Asyl in Russland einräumen;' whereupon Gortschakof 'bot ihm sein portfeuille'. 7)

It is probable that Bismarck helped Russia at this moment because he knew that England had helped herself. By July 5, the day before Batoum appeared on the calendar, or possibly before that, Beaconsfield

1. Cecil, II, op. cit. p. 286.

2. ib. p. 294

3. ib. p. 286.

4. Baddeley, op. cit. p. 326.

5. Map story developed out of Shouvalof's Memoirs in Baddeley, pp 371 ff Monypenny, VI, pp. 337 et passim; Cecil; II, 291, et passim; Cumming, "Wire teenth Century," Secret History July 1905.

6. G. Coolidge, op. cit. p. 153

7. Zeitschrift, Deutsche Rundschau, Dec. 1 1909

had told Bismarck of the Anglo-Turkish convention, of Cyprus. Bismarck waxed enthusiastic. He recognized it as compensation in more ways than one. Beaconsfield reported Bismarck's approval - "You have done a wise thing. This is progress. It will be popular. A nation likes progress. He said he looked upon our surrender of the Ionian islands as the first sign of our decadence. Cyprus puts us right again." 1)

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The Cyprus convention was the bombshell to the Congress. And it was immensely important to France. For France had come with reservations as to the agenda, and especially as to the Minor Matters. Levant - nothing not mentioned in the San Stefano was to be discussed, no territory to be allotted. Now Cyprus was taken. It might have been Egypt. France rose, as though it had been Egypt. France was furious. Waddington at Berlin was less furious, but concerned.

Salisbury had been fearful of France since the end of May. He had written to Lyons May 29, of the Anglo-Austrian convention, "It is not necessary to tell Waddington this, but as we have advanced a step since he last asked the question, it is important to avoid language inconsistent with it." 2) After the Anglo-Turkish convention was signed, he wrote, June 5, "We have dangerous questions looming at Paris". 3) This consciousness of not having played square with France haunted Salisbury during the conference. He was not certain the French would "confine themselves to epigram". 4)

Finally, matters were coming so near revelation, he himself in Berlin, wrote a letter to Waddington in Berlin, July 6, that Cyprus was really quite a temporary occupation, that "advisers of no mean

1. Monypenny. VI. op. cit. p. 332. 3. ib. p. 144.

2. Newton, II Lyons, p. 143. 4. ib.

authority (no doubt Bismarck) had suggested that England should take Egypt, that they would not take it, not think of such a thing since they knew France had 'reserved' on Egypt. "We have turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that kind," 1) and, to a variety of suggestions. They had taken Cyprus as the least of offenses.

France had <sup>been</sup> squared with Waddington by the whisper of 'Tunis'. 'Der Versicherung Salisbury's dass Frankreich Tunis nehmen konnte scheint beruhigend zu haben'. 2) wrote Busch. Germany had once said Tunis should not be to France. But now England said it should be, and the Congress of Europe had in a way backed the pledge. Bismarck was offering Tunis, in whispers, to both France and Italy; it would ~~occupy~~ occupy both on the African coast of the Mediterranean, France far from Alsace, Italy far from the Balkans. Small concern to Bismarck, 1878, which should finally get it.

Hohenlohe wrote on July 9, "the subject of conversation in all the political salons was the treaty between England and Turkey about Cyprus. The Italians and French were disagreeably surprised about it." 3) And their surprise was of concern to Salisbury, at least that of France. If France should be angry, England would have to pacify her. England had accepted French reservations; she could not break in on those without compensations. Hence the whisper of 'Tunis'!

But it was slight concern of Salisbury's if Italy were angry. He noted a slight rapprochement of Italy and France to Russia in the matter of the Khanate boundary, but he called it a "small matter". He had meant to tell Waddington Corti as well as Waddington 4), but had forgotten to.

1. Newton II Lyons p. 150
2. Busch, Deutsche Rundschau. 1904, Dec. 1909. 149
3. Hohenlohe II Memoirs, p. 230.
4. Cecil II. Salisbury p. 295.
5. Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. 103

An Austrian editor had said to Drummond-Wolff that if Austria took Bosnia and Herzegovina Italy would demand Tunis and Tripoli. 1) Mazzini had wanted Tunis, it was an old desire. But unfortunately for Italy she was not ready to demand Tunis or Tripoli at that moment. Crispi had told Bismarck Italy would never allow Austria to occupy the Bosnian territory, and Crispi had repudiated Albania, offered by Bismarck in exchange; Italy would not know what to do with it. 2) Derby had also suggested this to Crispi. 3) When Bismarck offered Tunis to Corti, the Italian rejected it in terror. But Italy was sensitive. Italy felt much neglected. "We were humiliated at Berlin as the least people in Europe" cried Crispi, "we returned slapped and despised." 4) From that neglect at Berlin of Italy's interests in the Balkans may be dated Italy's determination in the Balkans. 5)

The question of the Straits was important; to England and to Russia it was most important. Russia had pledged the neutrality of the Straits to England, but Russia had altered her attitude toward the Straits as she went on toward them. In the conference Salisbury tried to get the Straits recognized as a part of the high seas, as the Danish Sound had been but recently. 6) He failed, and the Straits remained the private property of the Sultan - another failure to solve the Eastern Question simply, where it most centered.

1. Drummond Wolff, II Rambling Reminiscences, p. 284.

2. Crispi, Memoirs, p. 29

3. ib. p. 73.

4. Coolidge, q. Chiala. p. 190.

5. Dilke reports that "a great deal of offering of other people's property took place and that some of these offers were suggested by Prince Bismarck. In one case at least the same thing was offered to two parties, which is an ingenious method of inducing complications which may lead to war."

Dilke, The Present Position of European Politics. p. 28

6. Cecil II. Salisbury, p. 290

All things had been Turkey's - Bulgaria, Bosnia, Batoum, Cyprus. All things had been taken from Turkey. Care had been observed that there should be no 'scandal'. The Turks had been delayed, Minor Powers. they had been shipwrecked in the Black Sea - a curious route to take to Berlin. But the Powers were highly moral. Nothing was considered until they arrived. 1)

But they came in utter guilelessness - if a Turk can. They did not even know of Cyprus. They were scarce allowed a voice or a seat at the Congress. Yet, Turkey was co-signatory, at Paris, 1856, at San Stefano, 1878, and all the territories were hers. In 1856 things had been plain. In 1878 things had come to an impasse. The Powers were beginning to suspect that something was happening in the Balkans. But they did not know it was nationality. They still thought internationality, of a sort, would avail.

The small powers, with ambitions that swayed them passionately, and each with memories of a glorious past, had contended for territory. Salisbury wrote, "at Potsdam there are mosquitoes - here there are minor powers. I don't know which is worst." 2) Bismarck could not distinguish among them, they were 'merely 'encore un de plus.' "Where the Greek question is to come in I don't quite know", said Salisbury 3) And, when the question was reached, and Greece attempted to regain some of its old Byzantine splendor, Beaconsfield, Salisbury and Waddington, "slept the sleep of the just". 4)

The day of the Conference of Berlin was not the day of the little powers. Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania were granted independence. Roumania got an exchange of territory, rich lands for swamp lands, and Russia had definitely promised to respect her territory. Greece got nothing, but a promise, the future "rectification" of her boundary.

1. Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. 316

2. Paoli, II. op. cit. p. 233.

3. ib. p. 287.

4. Hanotaux, IV. op. cit. p. 225.

Yet Prince Carol of Roumania, not placed on the throne to sympathize with his people, but to be an outpost for the Hohenzollerns, could say "high diplomacy will never solve the Eastern Question; it can be solved only in the East, the theatre of the war, with the co-operation of the people directly concerned." 1)

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The Great Powers signed their pact 'au Nom de Dieu Tout-Puissant' on July 13, having sat in council since June 13 - Bismarck remarked the fatality of the dates. The Great Powers returned home. L'Entente de l'Europe avec l'aide de Dieu restera durable. 2)

England returned with 'Peace and Honour' and Cyprus. Austria returned with Bosnia and Herzegovina and a beckoning future. Russia with Bessarabia and Kars and Batoum and the oriental capacity to wait. France with the pledge of Tunis. Italy with empty hands. Germany remained in Berlin, and looked upon the Congress of Berlin and called it good. Did the Iron Chancellor curl his tongue in his ~~smile~~ cheek? He declared to the Conference in farewell, that 'le Congrès a bien mérité de l'Europe'. 3)

In reality there was no statesman who returned to his people with colors flying - except the two who made that most dramatic pas de deux. They all knew that they had not considered 'les aspirations de l'opinion publique.' 4) They would have difficulty defending themselves before the people, 'dans les chambres'. 5) Shouvalof declared he would find greater difficulty 'dans une chambre'; he was not so sure of the satisfaction of his master. "Shouvalof is much pleased" however Beaconsfield recorded, "at the result of the Congress. Prince 1. Marriott, The Eastern Question, p. 294. q. 3. ib.  
2. Protocol XX, Staats Archiv, v. 34. 5. Cecil, II. op. cit. p. 287  
3. ib.

Gortschakof went away deeply disappointed and dejected." 1) Disraeli might be met with Jubel they recognized<sup>2)</sup>, but Andrassy expected and got GattungKatzenmusik<sup>3)</sup>. There were other figures of musical speech. Prince Korshav thought the 'Berliner Vortraf' nothing better than opera bouffe, Offenbachsche Musik. 5) Decidedly the world was sceptical of the concert of its statesmen.

The Congress of Berlin settled nothing. The Great Powers did not know what they were about. They sat fearfully within their recently defined boundaries. They charted a region of the world of which they knew nothing geographically, of which they apprehended nothing racially. They adjusted according to their vague ambitions, and not according to the vague hopes of the Balkan peoples. They watched each other there and afterward, with suspicion; they expected the dragon's teeth so openly sown at Berlin to produce terrors.

Yet, like Berlin or not, according to your moral response to the adjustments made there, the sheer fact remains that the adjustments did endure. They endured beyond the twenty years of respite Bismarck told the Turks at the end they had won. - "a period of grace in which to put your house in order... perhaps the last chance... I'm pretty sure you won't take it." 5) They endured beyond the twenty five years that both Beaconsfield and Shouvalof hopefully set as the limit. It must be remembered that a conference contemporary to our high moral development did not better that adjustment.

To take the point of view, and of fear, of that time, it should be recalled that Russia had won. Russia had written in San Stefano a treaty which practically placed Europe at her mercy - routes, market, materials. Europe, what called itself Europe, was pent up in the

1. Monypenny, VI. op. cit. p. 345.

2. Wertheimer, III, Andrassy, p. 140

3. ib. 4. ib.

5. Marriott, Fortnightly Review, Oct. 1916, perhaps epochyphal.



corners of the continent by the Slavie flood as effectually as Celts had been cornered in Britain and Brittany by the Teutonic tidal wave. And what would be left of the world itself, when Russia stretched from Kamschatka to the Golden Horn? The dream of Peter was petty beside the achievement of Alexander.

To those who assert that Russia would be content, her dream and desire being fulfilled, it is enough to answer that Russia is never content. To those who assert that Russia was Holy and Liberator, it should be enough to answer that however much Russia believed in the holiness of her cause, no holy war ever denied the conquests of victory, and no liberation was ever accomplished with disinterest from the outside. Russia might champion the oppressed Christians in the Balkans, and seek to act under an unrepealed Kainardji; but she sought power and the seat of power. Unkiar Skelessi was also unrepealed in spirit, in spite of the London revisions of 1840 and 1841.

A recent historian, Lord of Harvard, following the recent history lead of 'Up with the Russians', had quoted with approval an unnamed fellow historian, who called the treaty of San Stefano "the wisest measure ever prepared for the pacification of the Balkan peninsula."<sup>1)</sup>

And Berlin he condemned, "no diplomatic performance has ever resulted in such genuine dissatisfaction."<sup>2)</sup> It is not necessary to assert a dissatisfaction with Berlin by means of the wisdom of San Stefano. Neither was wise, both were unsatisfactory. Both are part of that development of Europe which has never yet been "settled" by a satisfactory treaty.

Yet no modern historian contending for Russia ever went so far as Layard the diplomat, writing from Turkey for Turkey. "It appears to me that if ever an apple of discord was thrown amongst the nations

1. Lord. Three Peace Treaties, p.50.      2. ib. p.48.

this is one. I see in it the element of future wars and discords with out number and an uprooting of all the principles of right and justice which have hitherto governed the relations and intercourse of states... I anticipate no end of trouble and bloodshed for years to come in this unhappy country". 1)

Lady Gwendolen Cecil says "the actual provisions of the Treaty which it (the Congress) formulated, offered no permanent solution to the problems dealt with." 2) Which is quite true. But does any conference achieve a permanent solution?

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The Achievements of the Congress of Berlin, whereby the treaty of Berlin bettered the treaty of San Stefano, whereby the Powers of Europe substituted their interpretation of the Four Points in the Balkans for the interpretation of Russia, may be grouped under four general points, over and above the particular settlements of land and sea.

1. It averted a war between England and Russia. Into that war Austria was certain to enter, and therefore Germany. Out of that war Italy could not have restrained herself. Into that war France was certain to venture, one side or the other. It would have been the Great War, forty years too early!
2. It recognized religious freedom and equality. Not alone for the orthodox Christians rescued from the Mohammedan oppressor. But for Orthodox Catholics, and for Mohammedans, rescued from oppression one by the other. An impractical rescue in the Balkans, but Berlin attempted it. Russia, Holy and Pan-Slavic, did not grant this freedom in San Stefano.

1. Newton, II Lyons, p. 160.  
 2. Cecil II Salisbury p. 291

3. It recognized the principle of nationality in the Balkans. It established independent Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and autonomous Bulgaria - which latter Russia had not provided in San Stefano, which her continued 'occupation' of Bulgaria, her snatching of Bessarabia from Roumania, her officering of the forces of Serbia and Montenegro, would not seem to have guaranteed for the future.

4. It substituted a collective protectorate of the Powers for the single protectorate of Russia. This was without question to take from a Great Power what that Power had won, in open fight. But, it was also to dispute the greatness of that Power. Others of the Six Powers could have won the war of 1878 against Turkey. More than one of the five Powers could have disputed the victory of the victor and won - the Russian army was sick and dying. Austria and England were ready to contest the protectorate against Russia, and finally against each other. The Powers determined in the Congress of Berlin what should have been decided in the Conference of Constantinople, a collective protectorate.

Historian Lord says "At that time the proper solution of the Eastern Question at least with regard to the Balkan peninsula, was already clear to all reasonable and unprejudiced men. That solution was of course (Constantinople excepted) independent Christian states ... demarcation of frontiers based as far as possible on nationality of population." 1)

While the Congress of Berlin was not particularly intelligent about geography and race, its solution did lead, if not intended, toward such independence. And, of need, at first under a collective protectorate. Under that protectorate of the Powers, so often care-

1 . Lord, Three Peace Treaties p.67.

less - criminally careless in Macedonia 1), self-interested, other-distrustful, the nationalities were permitted to become themselves, a provision Russia forgot, a chance Russia would not have permitted. Lord Cromer has said, "Had it not been for the Crimean war, and the policy subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, the independence of the Balkan states would never have been achieved, and Russia would now be in Constantinople." 2)

The turmoil in the Balkans which has lasted from that day to this is due, not only to the scheming ambitions of the Great Powers, the collective protectrate; but, to the clashing ambitions of the little powers, if protected yet very far from being collected each within its own borders.

Berlin which did so little for the Balkans, did accomplish as much as was possible then or after. What Berlin did accomplish was the peace of Europe for the Europe of its day, a peace which endured for a generation - until no one who wrought at Berlin is left to do it the reverence of honour or of memory. Neither Balfour nor Barrere comes to the rescue.

History has denied peace after Berlin. Historians have denied honour after Berlin, and on account of Berlin. But, history and historians did this, after Vienna, have done this after Versailles. Only Paris, from which sprang definite and preserved international laws, has won approval. But, to Berlin there has come the greatest disapproval of historians; and from Berlin, on the assertion of historians, has flowed a history of hates and hopes, of combinations and absorptions, of assassination and the Great War.

1. Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections, II, p. 284.
2. Cromer, Essays, p. 275.

After all, was not Vienna of 1815 followed by a period need-  
ful for showing the world the uselessness of 'Legitimacy' and the  
anachronism of 'divine rights'? Was not Paris of 1856 followed by  
a period needful wherein nations might develop each within its pre-  
scribed boundaries? Was not Berlin of 1878 succeeded by an inevi-  
table period wherein old and new nationalities found themselves and  
their ambitions pressing beyond boundaries? And perhaps Paris of  
1919 is to be followed by a time wherein through international  
exhaustions and international hungers, nations great and small,  
shall learn to live together, in peace and with honour.

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of recent revelations from contemporaries. One's  
conclusion is firmer than ever that Bismarck delibe-  
rately did not remember what he was talking about  
at times.

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than in his noted contemporaries; probably weary of  
reporting them.

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but not particularly 'secret', not revealing.

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Butler, A. J. See Bismarck.

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