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THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

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of

Committee on Thesis

The undersigned, acting as a Committee of the Graduate School, have read the accompanying thesis submitted by Gertrude Anne Jacobsen for the degree of Master of Arts.

They approve it as a thesis meeting the requirements of the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Chairman

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THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report

of

Committee on Examination

This is to certify that we the undersigned, as a committee of the Graduate School, have given Gertrude Anna Jacobsen final oral examination for the degree of Master of Arts . We recommend that the degree of Master of Arts be conferred upon the candidate.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

5th 1918

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE CONSERVATIVES TOWARD ENGLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY,

1895-1914.

(As typified by party leaders, the London Times, and
the National Review.)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

BY

GERTRUDE A. JACOBSEN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

JUNE

1918

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE CONSERVATIVES TOWARD ENGLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY,
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THE ATTITUDE OF THE ENGLISH CONSERVATIVES TOWARD
ENGLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY - 1895-1914.

INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of any country is regarded theoretically as something too sacred to be submitted to the wear and tear of party squabbles. Every English journal, no matter how partisan, if asked for its opinion on the matter, would acquiesce in the value of this attitude, and would affirm its intention of adhering to it. At the same time, since these same periodicals are not above making party capital out of the Government's successes and failures, it becomes inevitable that opinions on foreign affairs should succumb to this demand for definite scores against political opponents. Nevertheless party members, as well as party organs, all maintain their desire of abetting national glory. In the end, therefore, foreign politics come to be interpreted very largely in the light of imperialism. This is particularly true of England, where national existence is considered to depend on the maintenance of her colonial empire. Hence it is that party views come to be differentiated according to the emphasis a party lays upon foreign politics as compared to domestic affairs. It is necessary that all parties lay a certain degree of importance on imperial pursuits, but since 1895, when the struggle for spheres of influence and world empire began to display alarming proportions, definite distinctions have arisen. In England it is usually asserted that the Conservative party stands for an aggressive and forward foreign policy, because that party is believed to lay its whole emphasis on the upbuilding of the empire. To maintain and develop that empire, they

feel that England needs to secure a strict balance of power in Europe. The Liberals, on the other hand, are opposed to all aggression. England has her colonial interests; let her maintain them intact as best she can without spending too much money on them. Her greatest demands are to be met at home and her financial outlay ought to be calculated with that in mind. The very trait in the Liberals which causes them to take an interest in the alleviation of domestic evils leads them to assume a humanitarian's attitude toward abuses abroad, especially to the attacks of larger nations on smaller. This sponsorship brings them again into the field of foreign politics, where their views are bound to clash with the opinions of aggressive imperialists. Theoretically here again is a chance for party differences. This difference of opinion causes them to interpret the motives of foreign countries in opposite ways. The Liberal is the more credulous of the two; impelled by a desire to conserve time for his domestic policy, he credits foreign Powers with his own good faith. The Conservative, however, always on the defensive, prefers to charge other countries with the same aggressive spirit that controls him.

In theory the views of these two parties are clear-cut and easily differentiated. In practice the ability to distinguish depends on the degree to which the convictions of the members of the opposite camps have carried them. In both parties we have the ultras, the moderates, and the radicals. Periodicals as a rule are non-partisan, moderate, or extremist. In discussing the views of British Conservatives, therefore, we find a moderate view expressed by the Times, a more extreme by the National Review; the old-fashioned conservatism finds its expression in leaders such as Mr. Balfour, Lord Lansdowne, Earl Percy, and Lord Salisbury.¹

Careful and jealous of England's best interests, the Times never descends

1. I realize how hopelessly arbitrary any such delimitation is, but some method of division is necessary.

to the level of score-mongering. It prefers to state its views on the German menace, in which it came to believe after 1900, in dignified language to the men who have England's true interests at heart. Ranged with it in so far as views are concerned, but against it in so far as methods must be taken into consideration, is the National Review. Leopold Maxse, its editor, is a man with decided, usually rabid views on all questions touching foreign politics. His mission from his own standpoint is to jolt his readers into sensibility on all matters which he considers of interest. His method is one of violence. When Maxse has a lesson which he wishes driven home, he is not at a loss for words with which to convince his readers. Evidence he may lack, but a voluminous and peculiarly effective vocabulary never. In contra-distinction to these divisions of Tory opinion, we have the views of the leaders of the party as represented by the Government and members of parliament. Here, too, the same shades of difference necessarily hold true, but not to the degree that we find them expressed outside of parliament. Gibson Bowles is one of the few to express himself freely, and little importance was attached to his opinion. He began to be considered in almost the same class as Sir Ashmead Bartlett, a unique individualist. Nevertheless these two have in them a decided resemblance to Mr. Maxse. The statements of most of the men in parliament, particularly those of party leaders, are carefully guarded. Foreign affairs, because of their extreme delicacy, occupy little time in either House. Those which come up in connection with the king's speech and those in the House of Commons on the Foreign Office Estimates are the two noteworthy debates. Crises arising in foreign affairs call for special debate, but as these crises do not occur very often, this type is naturally limited. A certain amount of time, however, is devoted to the asking and answering of questions on foreign affairs, and through these is to be discerned the keenness of interest with which the various members are watching the trend of events outside of England. The

non-committal answers of members of the Government lead the reader at first glance to believe that England's interests were not being sufficiently guarded. This policy on the part of the administration is due purely to a desire to prevent public discussion; hence the key to British foreign policy may be found rather in action taken than in spoken words. The statements of party leaders such as Lord Salisbury, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Balfour give the cue to party policy. The periodicals then take up their suggestions, pronounce their judgment adversely or favorably, as the case may be, and then set their own pace. In watching the policies of the three types, there are naturally broad lines of uniformity. The criterion comes in the way in which they regard the German menace, which, in Mr. Maxse's case at least, became an almost fatal obsession, and the importance they attached to carefully selected friendships in contra-distinction to the Liberal desire for universal good will.

THE CONSERVATIVES' ATTITUDE TOWARD ENGLAND'S INTERESTS
IN THE FAR EAST.

In 1894, when the Far Eastern question had been forced into the foreground again, the National Review published an article which, as a digest of Lord Curzon's book on the Far East, is the plea of the typical Conservative imperialist for England to play her full part in coming developments. "In the course of the coming century a Pacific question will develop, the outlines of which can at present be but dimly foreseen. Japan, by virtue of her island situation on the flank of Asia, will undoubtedly play a considerable part, and Russia, with her Trans-Siberian Railway, will play a greater. But the greatest part of all is reserved here, as elsewhere, for the country which owns India and possesses mercantile and military Sea-Power..... We have always to recollect that every port, every town, and every village which passes into French or Russian hands is an outlet lost to Manchester, Bradford, or Bombay..... Moral failure on our part alone can shatter the prospect. Weakness on the part of our own rulers does us more harm than any foreign competition. Pray God our greatness may not fail through craven fear of being great!"¹

England's interests in the Far East were purely commercial and strategic. The latter, although the more remote, was none the less real. From China, as well as from the borders of Persia and Afghanistan, her position in India could be affected by the Drang nach Osten. England had no ulterior motives herself, no desire for political advancement in China. Even her trading interests, which in 1895 included about sixty per cent of China's foreign commerce, were not monopolistic. She had her major interests in the Yangtze Valley, which eventually became an English sphere of influence, but she had no intention of

1. Marse, F. Ivor, Problems of the Far East, The Future, National Review Vol. 24, P. 277, Oct. 1894.

blocking out others from her field, or of preventing them from securing spheres of interest themselves. Her policy has always been defensive with the intention of maintaining the status quo in China proper and of providing for some satisfactory arrangement, preferably a strong Chinese control, in the outlying provinces.

China's original concessions, namely the practice of granting treaty ports open to the trade of all nations, was entirely satisfactory to England from the start. What she wanted was an extension of the "open door" to the interior waterways of China. The war of 1894-5 and its after-effects, however, aroused the imperialists to the need of more forceful action. Herein arose the differences in policy between the rabidly imperialistic and the moderate Conservatives, the clash between the policy of aggression on the one side and of the status quo on the other. Up to 1894 England's policy toward China had been one of friendly cooperation, and the latter had come to look to England for the support she needed against the inroads of other Powers. The Chino-Japanese War was the turning point in Great Britain's position in the Far East. The conflict had met with no support from the administration of Lord Rosebery. England had simply maintained a benevolent neutrality. What she might have done, Mr. Chirol argued, was to have prevented the precipitation of the war by telling China that it was useless and that Japan's demands could have been settled by means of special trading or even political privileges. In that way she could have won the support of the latter and perhaps have prevented the coming years of conflict. In 1895, of course, England had no appreciation of what Japan's phenomenal growth had been, and no realization of the value of a Japanese alliance. She did, however, know the effects that war had upon trade. In addition she should have known what war meant to a tottering hulk like China.¹

1. Chirol, The Far Eastern Question, Ch. I, Pages 1 - 7.

The attitude of the Rosebery administration with regard to the aftermath of the Treaty of Shimonosiki has been variously interpreted. Valentine Chirol, writing in 1896, declared that England had followed the only possible course. Even if she had desired to have the terms of the treaty carried out, individual action would have been futile in the face of the Triple Alliance of the Far East. To have aligned herself with Russia, France, and Germany would have meant the loss of a Japanese alliance forever, an alliance which, in the light of the war itself, was not to be scorned. There was only one possible policy for England to follow, and that was to assist China in building up a strong system of government and thus to protect her own commercial interests, and, on the other hand, to inform the members of the Triple Alliance that she would stand for no further tampering in the Far East; i. e., to let the events of 1894-5 be a lesson to her once and for all.¹

Singularly enough, the warnings of Chirol and Curzon seem to have fallen upon deaf ears. The attitude of the National Review is curious when we consider the later jealousy of that periodical. It declared that the problem was a purely Asiatic one which did not affect India, and over which England could have no control. The latter had no paramount interest in China's integrity and Japan must be made to see that England could not interfere, even though Japan were shorn of her rightful gains. Still it was of no concern to England how far China succumbed to Japan. However, the latter would do well not to arouse Russian jealousy. The permanent annexation of any of the mainland by Japan would be a great blunder. Her real strength lay in remaining an Island Empire. There was no use for Japan to arouse bitter feelings over an Eastern Alsace-Lorraine.²

1. See Chirol, *The Far Eastern Question* (1896), particularly Chs. I, VI, X, XIII, and XIV.
2. *National Review*, Vol. 24, P. 447-8, December 1895.

Chisolm had rested great hopes on the administration of Lord Salisbury in safeguarding England's imperial interests. Surely a party so interested in preserving the peace would not hasten a dissolution in China which carried with it so many possibilities of international conflict.¹ Instead the Government maintained its old easy policy of laissez-faire. Certainly the discussions in parliament did not reveal a very keen insight into the question. As the Review said, the really able members were relegating the debates to the "bores and cranks".² Such wild jingoists as Ashmead Bartlett, and such aggressive imperialists as Gibson Bowles and Sir Joseph Walton came to occupy more than a fair share of the debates. To the demands that England ally herself with Japan, the United States, even Germany, or with all three, the Government replied that isolation and the Concert of Europe were all that was necessary as yet.³ The years from 1898 to 1902, however, proved to even the most conservative that England was no longer the power in China that she had been during her pioneer days. There, as elsewhere, her interests had been caught up in the maelstrom of world politics.

In 1898 Mr. Chamberlain made a speech on England's policy at Birmingham in which he declared that England's day of "splendid isolation" was past. The Times rather reluctantly admitted the truth of his statement. "We are as unwilling as we ever were to be mixed up in external quarrels with which we have no concern, but what region of the earth is there now in which we do not come into contact with some pushing and pressing rival?.....Events in China have opened the eyes of many to the difficulties of isolated action."⁴

1. Chisolm, *The Far Eastern Question*, Pages 179-181.
2. *National Review*, Vol. 31, Pages 176-77, April, 1898.
3. See Hansard, in general the debates for 1898, 1899, 1900.
4. *Times' Weekly*, May 20, 1898.

Even in spite of this realization, party leaders endeavored to convince themselves that the advance into China, Russian included, was nothing more than commercial. To the declarations that Germany was attempting to drive a wedge into China in Shantung between the Russian sphere on the north and the English in the Yangtze Valley, with the intention of practicing her Bismarckian policy in the Far East, they refused to attach any significance.¹ However, Salisbury declared that England did not regard China as a place for conquest or acquisition by any other European Power.² Nevertheless the administration, with a blind sort of credulity, failed to grasp the deeper meaning of Russian and French railway concessions. Particularly in the south in the Yun-nan Valley, where France and England had equal rights of exploitation, the Government refused to give much more than nominal support to its British financiers.³

The interesting developments of 1898 called for some sort of statement from the Government as to its policy, and enforced a more aggressive attitude. The discussion over the seizure of Wei-hai-Wei called up the remembrance of the situation in 1895. Earl Kimberley asked Lord Salisbury why England had permitted the Powers to force Japan out of Port Arthur and yet stood calmly by when Russia did the same thing herself. The latter replied that he wished England had taken a bold stand in 1895 and insisted on no further dismemberment in China when Japan relinquished Port Arthur. England was against the partition of China and knew that she had Russian antagonism to deal with. In regard to Wei-hai-Wei he declared that England had been obliged to do something lest China lose heart and think that she had

1. See Hansard, Vol. 66, pp. 221-231, Feb. 8, 1899.
2. National Review, Vol. 31, pp. 87-95, Mar. 1898.
3. Hansard, 4th ser. Vol. 57, pp. 184-5, May 3, 1898.

been deserted by England. British possession of that port would mean simply a strengthening of the Chinese Empire. To Kimberley's demand that England ally herself with Japan, Salisbury made no definite reply.¹

The Review attempted to belittle the advance of the Powers. The Russian menace was a mere bogey. England still had the vantage and had nothing to fear so long as the open door was maintained. As yet the three Powers, France and Russia particularly, were not so skilful in establishing themselves among foreign nations as England. Germany, with her desire for a finger in the pie, was as yet too new at the game to be a real danger,² although the kaiser had shown exceptional aptitude.³ What Mr. Maxse did deplore was the indecisive way in which the Government was taking matters in the Far East. Its policy was one of bluster only. Either England should have bowed Russia into Port Arthur and declared it the natural thing, or she should have treated her as Russia treated Japan.⁴

The Opposition was equally sure that England's policy was mere gusto and hopelessly inconsistent. Instead of concentrating their efforts in China, they were wasting their time in the Soudan. Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was too busy to devote proper attention to either office. To all of this Salisbury replied with equanimity. The members of the Opposition would have to remember that England was not the governing power of China, that that country as an independent nation would have to look out for her own interests; so long as the open door was maintained,

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 57, pp. 1506-21, May 17, 1898.
2. National Review, Vol. 30, pp. 811-815, Vol. 31, 87-95, 191-205, Feb.-Apr. 1908.
3. Ibid., May, 1898. Episodes of the Month.
4. Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 348, May 1898.

1

England had no right to make any objection. Brodrick, the under-secretary, made a very heated retort to Ashmead Bartlett's suggestion that Great Britain unite with Germany, the United States, and Japan to sweep Russia out of China. Such a proposition was absurd. England could not force Russia to withdraw unceremoniously. Besides, was Russia to be feared to the extent that the Opposition maintained? She had not the financial means to adopt a sweeping policy even if she desired it. Her undigested empire was for the present more than she could handle. England could never realize her aspirations in China by thus gibbeting other Powers into open hostility. Even though she had been the pioneer in China and had trading privileges which antedated those of any other Power, she must remember that foreign competition was inevitable. So long as England had the "open door" in China, development by the European nations would simply forward her commercial interests. Even the task of developing the mighty resources in the Yangtze Valley, to which Great Britain now had prior claims, could never be accomplished without foreign cooperation. Let England strive to make the exploitation of China not national and monopolistic, but international and cooperative, a question of trade, not one of politics.

2

The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1899 and the Anglo-German of 1900 were proofs of the fact that English statesmen had an honorable intention of maintaining the integrity of China. They were also proofs of the credulity of these "Minimizers" who were really loath to admit the futility of their policy of isolation. Even the Boxer Rebellion and the inability of the Powers to act together with any degree of success had not entirely shaken the belief of the Administration that the Concert of Europe as applied to Asia was a

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 66, pp. 30-31, Feb. 7, 1899.

2. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 66, 221-31, Feb. 8, 1899.

satisfactory method of maintaining the balance of power in China.¹ When the worthlessness of the agreement of 1900 had been realized as a result of German's intention of supporting Russian claims, Lord Lansdowne quietly acquiesced in Von Bulow's interpretation and declared that after all, although both countries had nominally promised to support Chinese integrity, strictly speaking, the agreement could be made to apply only to the ports and littoral of the German and British spheres. He showed the same faith in Russia's attitude. Her occupation of Manchuria was indeed extensive, but Lamsdorff had informed the British minister at St. Petersburg that it was only temporary, a modus vivendi, necessary until Russia could straighten out her railway interests.²

This attitude of high-mindedness on the part of the Government was severely criticized, particularly Lord Lansdowne's statement that the whole Far Eastern question was one of principles, not details.³ Far-sighted imperialists argued that it was all right for him to say that Manchuria was a district which did not concern England much, but it must be remembered that that was only one part of the bigger question of China's future. Mongolia and Turkestan were not beyond the Russian field of vision. The Times declared that the Foreign office lived in a "fool's paradise"; it had no idea of how to foster England's material interests and "was always knocking its sublime head against the stars of high policy".⁴ It was the opinion of the Review that England had lagged behind long enough; she had lost out in the race of 1898-1900 for territorial acquisition and political advancement by her

1. Hansard, 4th series, 88, 364, Dec. 10, 1900.

2. Ibid. Vol. 92, pp. 12-36, Mar. 28, 1901. H. of L.

3. Ibid. p. 168, H. of C.

4. Times' Weekly, Oct. 28, 1898.

diffidence. The only thing now was to prevent further inroads by an alliance with Japan.¹ Gradually, too, there had dawned on all thoughtful imperialists the realization that it was not only Russia that England had to fear.

England's utter isolation had been startlingly displayed as a result of the Boer War. Germany too would come to challenge Britain's imperial interests and with her advance came the growing danger of a new outburst of Bismarckian diplomacy.²

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was the inevitable result of the Far Eastern problem; a measure forced upon the English diplomat because all other measures had failed. Orthodox Liberals chided the Opposition for its departure from precedent, but Lord Lansdowne justified the move on the ground that a new era had arisen. On all sides England saw a tendency on the part of Great Powers to form in groups, a tendency to ever-increasing naval and military armaments involving increasing burdens. As a result war had become a matter of alarming suddenness. For England an alliance had become the only solution of the Eastern question and involved no departure from her former policy. It was a fortunate thing that Great Britain still had friends from whom she could select an ally.³ Cranborne's defense of the treaty was even more ardent. It represented no new policy, no surrender of England's desire for the integrity of China, but was simply the gradual outgrowth of events since the American note for the "Open Door" in 1899. Slowly and reluctantly England had come to realize that other Powers might not attach the same importance to their agreements as Great Britain. The alliance was a bulwark against further aggression, Japan as a military base and England with her naval

1. National Review, Vol. 35, pp. 23-27, Mar. 1900. Ibid. pp. 877-901, Aug. 1900.
2. Ibid. pp. 877-901, August 1900.
3. Hansard, Vol. 102, pp. 1172-80, Feb. 13, 1902.

power forming a natural corollary. Certainly the understanding was not unfriendly to anyone since it merely stipulated a policy to which the Powers had already assented. Here at last, he said, was a proof that the Foreign Office was not inefficient and had no intention of forcing England's interests¹ down hill.

Opinion on the Conservative side outside of the Administration did not take on quite the same self-satisfied attitude. The Government had gambled dangerously with England's interests, but fortunately had awakened to the dangers of its conduct in time to save itself. The attitude of the Times was one of satisfaction, not jubilation. The alliance would be a valuable adjunct in maintaining the status quo in the Far East, but was no lasting settlement of the question. The tone of the French and Russian note which was drawn up immediately after the Anglo-Japanese agreement, proved that. The two Governments thought it better to say "ditto" to the understanding than to say nothing at all, and their careful omission of any definite reference to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the two empires, China and Korea, was an excellent example of diplomatic finesse.² The National Review did not share the scepticism of the Times in so far as Russian and French duplicity was concerned. Again the matter was interpreted in terms of Germany. By the alliance the balance of power in the East had been restored, for the understanding was a definite counteraction of the "Dreibund". It was not directed against Russia, rather, and this was one of the chief attractions from the British point of view; it signified England's emancipation from the German yoke which she had borne so meekly for so many years. The only curious thing about the alliance was that it had been postponed so long; had it come sooner it would have spared both countries much humiliation. The Russo-French

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 102, pp. 1310- Feb. 13, 1902.

2. Times' Weekly, Feb. 28, 1902.

note was regarded as a friendly declaration in spite of Germany's declaration that it was distinctly bellicose. In fact the attitude of Russia, as expressed by Mr. Witte, clearly showed that she was tired of Germany and desired a friendly understanding with England.¹

Satisfied as the Review was over the attitude of the Muscovite in this instance, it did ^{not} want the administration to pryme itself over the alliance and blind itself to the true meaning of Russian activities in the Far East. There was a curious difference in the acumen which the Review showed as compared with that of the Government, an acumen largely the result of the former's fear of Germany and a desire for Russia's return to the European stage. In February, 1903, the Government was still withholding its judgment and declaring that Russia was fulfilling her obligations in regard to the modus vivendi.² In May, 1902, almost a year earlier, the Review was advising England to accept Russia's advance into Manchuria and realize that she had come there to stay.³ It shows the desire of the one to prevaricate, to refuse to admit the possibility of the conflict in the East which the Times pronounced inevitable; of the other to prevent the struggle by coming to an immediate settlement by admitting Russia's claims in Manchuria, Japan's in Korea, a suggestion for adjustment as futile at that time as the wavering policy of the Government.

Diverse as were the opinions of the various groups of Conservatives as to the solution of the problem, it seems to have been the common feeling that the Anglo-Japanese treaty was a guarantee against a European struggle over the question. This belief was voiced generally during the Russo-Japanese War when every atom of strength on the part of the Government was employed in

1. National Review, 39, 1-11, 176-9, Mar. and April, 1902.
2. Hansard, 4th series, 118, 230-36, Feb. 18, 1903.
3. National Review, 39, 850, May, 1902.

localizing the conflict.¹ Much of the opposition to the Tibet Expedition of 1904 was the result of the delicacy of the European and Asiatic situations.² No policy ought to be undertaken that would in any way excite the suspicion of Russia. The unfortunate Dogger Bank episode was a potent illustration of this general desire for peace. The attitude of the Government was one of grave, but firm moderation. The Times was probably the most bellicose; it summarized the incident as a glaring "outrage", the settlement of which would brook no delay. England's patience was nearly exhausted and Russia could not afford to be too dilatory in her reply. Furthermore, it refused to be convinced by Russia's explanations and chose to assume that England was making great concessions by referring the matter to the Hague Tribunal for settlement.³ The National Review was bold in its implications. As usual it took the stand that Russia was only a tool of Germany, as irresponsible as a child. Germany, on the other hand, was eagerly endeavoring to promote Russian interests so that she could annoy France and England, and was quite willing to act as "bottle-washer" for Russia so long as she could disconcert them.

"Kaiser Wilhelm was throughout one of the principal obstacles to peace, just as he had been a chief promoter, inciter, and beneficiary of the war."⁴ He was responsible for the Dogger Bank episode when German diplomacy was within an ace of bringing on the long-desired conflict. It was a "matter of common knowledge that the German imagination was responsible for the fantastic notion that the North Sea was studded with Japanese torpedo boats..... Moreover, we have been informed on good authority that the German Emperor moved heaven and earth to prevent the Russian Emperor from yielding an inch to British

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 130, pp. 941-4, Feb. 23, 1904.

2. Ibid., pp. 1110-1150, Feb. 26, 1904.

3. Times Weekly, Sept. 4, 1904, and Oct. 28, 1904.

4. The National Review, Vol. 43, 11-12, Mar. 1904, Vol. 46, 178-193, Oct. 1905.

representations, and pledged German support in the event of an Anglo-Russian war..... Even the Government was alarmed and recalled part of the fleet
¹
 to home waters.

The end of the war brought with it the end of England's active participation in the Far Eastern question. Before the Treaty of Portsmouth had been arranged, there came the warning that some immediate settlement was necessary in the East in order that England might concentrate her attention on a more urgent problem, the Moroccan situation. Fully a year before the end of the war, the Times had declared that a truce in the East and an Anglo-Russian understanding in the West would grow out of the complications even then arising. The kaiser had no intention of wasting his efforts in so unremunerative a diplomatic field as the Far East.
² The Review likewise declared that a shift in interests was inevitable. "Russia has decided that the game of putting the screw down on India is not worth the candle. She is now ready to return to Europe where her absence has caused a void peculiarly painful to France.;..... She will no longer blunder ingloriously about the backstairs of Asia, but will resume her rightful place in Europe."
³ Correct as these surmises were, the Government did not yet feel that its re-insurance policy in the Far East could be abandoned. If England was to withdraw from active operations, the question of the approach to India still remained. There must be a guardian for the empire appointed. It was for this reason that she entered on a new Anglo-Japanese Alliance whereby she recognized Japan's paramount interest in Korea (in itself a partial abandonment of the old assertions of territorial integrity in the East) in return for a recognition of her special interests in Tibet, a field in which she was little interested.

1. National Review, October, 1907.
2. Times' Weekly, May 25, 1904.
3. National Review, Vol. 46, pp. 178-193, Oct. 1905.

For her superior advantages Japan promised to enter into the role of watchman for India. The Opposition objected to the renewal on the ground that the conditions which had called it forth, namely Russian aggression, would expire with the end of the war. The answer of the imperialists was that it had served a good purpose so far, its uses were not yet at an end, for the problem was still dynamic and any element that would tend to maintain the status quo¹ was valuable.

The subsequent policy of the Conservatives differed little from the earlier. Not until 1911 did the subject come up again for active discussion and by that time Japan had been discovered to be little better than Russia as a guardian of the "Open Door". The second renewal of the treaty called for statements on the part of the Conservatives as to their attitude toward the annexation of Korea (1910). England, they said, had no real ground for criticism, because of the efforts Japan had expended in building up the country. Moreover, she had defeated both of her rivals for that strategic peninsula, China by the war of 1894-5, Russia by the Russo-Japanese War. However, England had a new problem on her hands. Lord Lansdowne had recognised Japan's paramount interest in Korea in 1905 only on the condition that England have equal commercial rights with Japan. Now the latter had declared that the existing Korea^{British} treaties were no longer valid and ~~our com-~~mercial privileges were ^{to be} limited to ten years, when the "Open Door" Japan had decided, ^{was} to come to an end. Commercial relations between Southern Manchuria and Korea were so close that England's large trading interests in the former were seriously menaced. Japan had no right to put commercial checks on England because it was only through the latter's friendship that she was able to annex Korea. Her forward policy had been abetted by the alliance.² Was England now to secure nothing in return?

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 151, pp. 142-165, Aug. 3, 1905.

2. Ibid, 5th series, Vol. 7, (H. of L.) pp. 617-629, Mar 27 1911; Vol. 27 (H. of C) pp. 154-167, June 20, 1911.

The upheaval of China and the establishment of the republic had a definite reaction in England. It was an opening up of the old situation of a decade and a half before, a realization that more than ever before England needed an integral China because of her important commercial interests. It was because of this that England had approved of Mr. Knox's plans for the internationalization of the Southern Manchurian Railway in 1910, for this that she was urging on the upbuilding of China by the Chinese nation itself. English and Chinese interests were falling before Russia, Germany, and Japan. The former's financial interests in China were entrusted to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, five of whose eleven directors were German. Russia had secured her position in North Manchuria, she had taken advantage of the secession of Mongolia during the period of the Chinese Revolution to establish a virtual protectorate over that "outlying province". Japan had similar political aspirations. The railway projects, particularly the Hankow-Canton trunk line, ^{were} ~~was~~ in the hands of England's rivals in the Far East, the Five Power Group. Had England after all been so engrossed with principles that she had ignored the details? Had the policy of the "open door" been used as a blind by other Powers to the displacement of England? How far England was going to benefit by her policy of disinterestedness now rested with China herself.¹ Perhaps she had made a serious mistake in recognizing the new regime before she had come to a definite understanding on the matter of major and minor interests.

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 53, pp. 398-440.

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS, 1895-1904.

In 1895 England was confronted by the spectre of European isolation. On the one side was the Dual, on the other the Triple Alliance, groups in which as yet she had found no place. Before this time she had, by the strength of her insular position, been able to hold the balance in Europe. Her navy, which made her the undisputed sovereign of the seas, had secured for her a prestige in Europe which had put her in a class by herself. Her empire had made her the coveted nation of the world. Now England was at the cross roads; the theory of "splendid isolation" was on the verge of a crash. The imperial structure which had been built up as the result of several centuries of effort, was not so much an example of England's superiority as an empire builder, as it was an illustration of what a strong nation with leisure for colonial pursuits could accomplish when she was alone, or nearly so, in the colonial field. Peace in internal affairs and a strong system of government explained much of England's priority of interests. Now, however, she had been overtaken in the race. World problems were rising up anew. England's empire was reaching that stage of development when nationalistic aspirations on the part of the colonials required a policy of eternal vigilance. It was not an unheard of thing for dependencies to invite the assistance of other Powers to free them from the control of the mother country. Besides the advances to the colonies were being threatened. In the Far East Russia, France, and Germany were maneuvering for commercial privileges and territorial concessions. Japan was soon to be added to that group. In Egypt and North Africa France was giving England cause for worry. Germany soon was to be courting the hand of the sultan. In the Middle East Russia was at work to the detriment of English interests. On the sea Great Britain's position was still indisputable, but

not inviolable. And in Europe England alone of all the Powers was pursuing a solitary course. Had she the superior strength to remain the nominal friend of all and ally of none? Or were the other nations who were already making preparations for the commercial, colonial, and naval competition that was to characterize the twentieth century, capable of a growth that would make isolated action untenable? An exclusive policy on the part of England would require a skill in manipulation that would tax even a Bismarck. Were British statesmen equal to the task?

Isolation had come to be almost a "legend" in England. Consequently when the Review in 1895 spoke of alliances for Great Britain, it recognized and admitted that it was breaking a convention.¹ The Times did likewise when it made its first utterances in 1898;² so did Lord Lansdowne in 1902 when he explained the fact that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had become a necessity.³ Family tradition dies hard in a country as essentially conservative as England when it comes to foreign policy. Nevertheless precedent was broken and the change in England's attitude on the question in so far as the Conservative was concerned came between 1895-1902. Quite as might be expected, the Review as the extreme imperialist realized the need for a transition the first. By the time it had broken ground and prepared the soil, the moderate and the ultra-conservative elements were ready to fall into line. The difficulty which the Review had in finding itself, however, is typical of the pioneer and well worth observing.

The Review had been piqued, if not angered by the Russo-French alliance. It had brought out too clearly the fact that England was pursuing a lonely furrow. This isolation had been further revealed by the joint action of

1. National Review, Vol. 25, p. 739, Aug., 1895.
2. Times' Weekly, May 20, 1898.
3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 102, p. 1175, Feb. 13, 1902.

Russia, France, and Germany in the Far East. It was the verdict of Mr. Maxse that England's prestige had been sufficiently tampered with by the Liberals. Instead of strengthening her position in Europe, Lord Rosebery had allowed England to get out of touch with all the Powers. Now an ally was necessary, if not at present, at any rate in the near future. Not a nation, however, except Germany but what had some outstanding disputes with England. Racially and logically an alliance with Germany was the natural thing. However, Lord Rosebery had angered that Power by his persistent refusal to join the Triple Alliance and she was now turning to Russia and France. Very likely the Triple Alliance would be replaced by a Dual Alliance into which Germany had been taken. Germany would still, of course, have the support of Austria.¹ Just where England would find her place Mr. Maxse hesitated to state. It was a choice between the Dual and the Triple Alliance with the balance in favor of the latter. There was, of course, a chance of an alliance with Russia because she at least had some manly grievances, but France was the "nagging woman", the irreconcilable among nations. Even she, however, might succumb to reason, particularly if England added a little force on the Egyptian question. There was always one way of working on French emotions and Mr. Maxse realized the value to England of that one weakness when he said in 1895, "We had rather not be in a league which confirms the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but if France discloses such enmity to us, and at the same time forms an alliance which leaves us isolated - the only Great Power which is isolated - we are compelled to fortify ourselves by a counter-alliance."²

The Kruger telegram was a profound enlightenment for Mr. Maxse. It came as a shock to all England, but for most men it was little more than the bluster

1. National Review, Vol. 25, p. 739, August 1895.
2. Ibid, p. 739, August 1895, also pp. 852-59.

of an ambitious emperor, temporarily irritated by England's refusal to join the alliance. For Mr. Maxse, although even his indignation subsided again, it was more than a momentary effervescence. It was the indication of what the future was to be. The emperor was trying his hand at world politics; Germany was to be forced upon Europe's attention; if his first attempt had failed, that did not mean that there would not be another. The episode left behind it a deep feeling of resentment which it was not easy to shake. That even the Review permitted itself to think of a German alliance after this was because France and Russia failed to prove themselves as amenable as England desired. All Europe was being blinded by the clever and tortuous way in which Germany was trying to set nations against one another and falling easy victims to her snare.¹

The effect of the telegram on France and Russia came by way of a profound shock. As it openly avowed, the Review had expected that both Russia and France were longing for a chance to pay off old scores and would seize upon the first opportunity of picking a quarrel. "Men and nations misjudge one another and we confess to having in common with the bulk of our countrymen, signally misinterpreted the attitude of the French Government, as in a contrary sense, we have misread German feelings. France met the German overtures with the interjection, "Alsace Lorraine" and the Emperor's Conspiracy crumbled away". Russia did not feel that she had sufficient interests in the Transvaal to concur² and did not waste time in assuring the kaiser of that fact.

The excitement of 1896 did not die down before the Review had seized the opportunity of speculating on an Anglo-French rapprochement. Not, of course, that it was likely to come, it hastened to remark, but at any rate France might know that England's friendship was not a thing to be scorned. France need

1. National Review, Feb., 1896, July, 1896, Vols. 26 and 27. For the account of National Review attitude 1895-97 see Vol. 43, p. 358, April, 1904.

2. Ibid, Vol. 26, p. 719.

not, like Germany, think she could get it on the cheapest terms. The feeling was still rife that an understanding with either member of the Dual Alliance would unloose the "dogs of war". Still that fear ought to have been dispelled¹ by the event of January, 1896.

There was a conscious effort on the part of the National Review to convince France that the Dual Alliance had not been as satisfactory as had been expected. The re-insurance compacts which Bismarck had negotiated with Russia showed that after all the latter had not always been interested in the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and had even been pledged against it. France need never expect to convert Russia on the Egyptian question. Yet Russia expected France to assist her in the Far East in solving her problems. France was nothing more than the paymaster of the forces. She had thought her alliance was bread and had found it only stone. In fact any union between the two countries except from a financial point of view, was decidedly unnatural. France wished to carry it to Egypt, Russia to the Far East, whereas in Europe, where the alliance might be most effective, the two refused to coalesce except in the face of German aggression. England, on the other hand,² was a natural ally because an alliance with her rendered the French coast safe.

There were at least three obstacles, however, to a French alliance, the outstanding disputes, the French people, and the French press. The first were numbered at seventeen in all, but only one had any claim to seriousness, the Egyptian question. If France got the chance, she would slip in quietly into England's place, but not otherwise. She was using Egypt as a cause for worry, not war. All England had to do was to show her teeth and France would back down. Instead of concentrating on Egypt, she could then turn to Northwest

1. National Review, Dec., 1896, Vol. 28, pp. 447-49.

2. Ibid. Vol. 27, pp. 21-32, March, 1896; Vol. 28, pp. 447-449, Dec. 1896.

Africa. So that if France came to England in a spirit of frankness and concession, that hereditary breach could be settled without any difficulty and to the advantage of both parties.¹ The difficulties which arose as a result of the press and the people were a little harder to deal with. It was here that Germany could use her influence over France to England's detriment. The French people were much too docile and ignorant of public affairs. They refused to understand England's point of view and depended on the Boulevard "rags" which could not vilify Great Britain enough, for all information on foreign affairs. Once the irresponsible press had either been checked or laid bare as a result of a sound campaign on the part of respectable organs and once a government with a sound foreign policy had come into power, the coast would be clear. The trouble with the French Government was that they endeavored to divert attention from home disorders by a jingo foreign policy. Everybody knew that France was not looking out for an empire with an ultimate idea of colonization.²

The years from 1895 to 1897 were characterized by such speculation on the part of the Review. At times it really floundered on the matter of foreign policy. It had nearly convinced itself that England could not stand alone by 1895, though it hesitated again in the summer and fall of 1896. It made quick work of the possibility of a Quadruple Alliance. The question was whether England could take the Dual Alliance as it was or would she have to build up a new system of alliances? Would it be better if she gathered round her France and Italy and left Russia to Germany, or was the Muscovite equally valuable to England? For awhile it wavered, according to the way in which the diplomatic winds blew. It had not quite decided whether the rantings of the

1. National Review, Vol. 24, p. 305, Nov. 1894; Vol. 25, p. 444, Dec. 1896.

2. Ibid, Vol. 25, p. 33, March, 1895, Vol. 25, p. 578, July, 1895.

German Emperor were representative of the nation. By 1898 it had come to definite conclusions on that score. It was now a question of Germany and England, pure and simple; whether Germany should have France and Russia and thus isolate England, or whether Great Britain was to have the pleasure of isolating Germany. The Review lost no time in expending its efforts on bringing about a favorable solution. Russia was as valuable to England now as France, and the British would do well to bring about a satisfactory division of ¹ interests.

The sentiment of the Times had not yet shown any decided change. France was still England's chief foe and in 1896 when the Review was exclaiming over the new and surprising revelation of French attitude, the Times declared, "It is unfortunately the fact that there exists between ourselves and our French neighbors a considerable number of differences; the history, the traditions, and the sentiments of the two people makes them, to a great extent, inevitable." Even in 1898 the weekly contains articles such as the following: "We are not ignorant that preparations, both naval and military, are going on in France. We prefer to draw our own inference, and the inference from the silence and preparations of the French Government is that we ought to be prepared for whatever can happen." In so far as the colonial ambitions of France and Germany were concerned, the Times preferred the latter's: "In the colonial field we have not to complain of a policy of pin-pricks on the part of Germany, whose policy is always more positive and more obviously based upon the ² legitimate pursuit of solid interests than that of France."

The Review, the Times, and Mr. Chamberlain were all convinced by 1898 that England would have to come out of her isolation unless as the latter said, she could build up a tariff wall around herself and her colonies. But the two

1. National Review, Vol. 32, pp. 29-35, Sept. 1898.

2. Times' Weekly, Jan. 1896, Nov. 18, 1898.

last mentioned were filled with a fear of Russia and France still. An Anglo-¹ Saxon alliance was the solution. The Fashoda crisis, however, had left its impression on the mind even of the Times. The Review had been delighted by the stand taken by both the British and French Government. It had been a chance for the Egyptian question to be settled once and for all time. As Lord Salisbury had said, firmness, the policy which the Review had advocated since 1894, alone had been effective. Had the Government "climbed down" in this instance, there would have been a ministerial defeat. Affairs had been going too badly in the Far and Near East for the Administration to suffer defeat in the Soudan. In France, too, thanks to that sagacious statesman,² M. Delcasse, the outlook on foreign affairs had been extremely sensible. For the Times the effect had been somewhat similar to that of the Kruger Telegram on the Review in 1896, only much more moderate. "It was pleasant to be able to recognize that French newspapers have adopted a different tone in regard to Egypt and England." However, although relations had been slightly improved, the French were quite mistaken if they assumed that relations in West Africa³ were soon to be better, because England had no intention of giving way.

The Germany naval projects of 1899 and 1900 and the bitter attacks of the German press during the Boer War completely won over the Times to the need of a French entente. Like the Review it realized that French Anglophobia was something different. In the first place it was to be expected, in the second it was not official. Consequently "the impertinences or worse" of the boulevard⁴ of Paris could be rated at their proper value. The attitude of the Review was slightly different. It had expected exactly what had happened. The question

1. National Review, Vol. 31, June, 1898, Times' Weekly, May. 20, 1898.

2. National Review, Vol. 32, pp. 301-313, Oct. 1898.

3. Times' Weekly, April 15, 1898.

4. Ibid., January 5, 1900.

was whether England had insight enough to seize this opportunity; France was wavering between Germany and England. She had been disappointed by Russia's attitude over Fasboda. Now Germany was carrying on an open flirtation with France with some success; the ^{French} reactionary party, with its love of clericalism, had a distinct dislike for England and her democratic system of government, which made an understanding with Germany a desirable thing. Russia, however, now had a certain fear of Germany which had been awakened as a result of Germany's bellicose attitude toward peace moves on the part of Russia. It was very unlikely that the Dual Alliance could be strengthened by a blow aimed at England. Could France, however, be made to see that that was the only sop which Germany had to offer, that it was Germany's traditional policy to conciliate France and detach her alike from England and Russia? That Germany was not openly hostile to Russia now and was even endeavoring to get her into a Franco-German firm, was due to the fact that the great coalition which Germany was determined on building up in Central Europe had Russia only for its ultimate goal. In the attacks against England and the United States, Russia would be a very acceptable ally. Unless France did something now, she would fail as a world power, because she could never hope to be equally formidable on land and sea; i. e., she could not afford to cultivate two first-class hatreds, Germany and England; she would have to make a selection. The fickle populace of France could not be depended on to make a proper choice. The agrarian population would rather have a naval war than a military conflict; they had a horror of another German invasion. The commercial class was not so easily persuaded, but they would not exert themselves very much. France could afford to lose a distant colony, hence a naval defeat could be viewed with more complacency. Fortunately the situation was not yet lost to England; M. Delcasse and M. Cambon had shown an eagerness to cooperate with both Russia and

1. National Review, Vol. 34, pp. 476-78, Dec., 1899.

England and a level-headedness in foreign affairs in general that boded very well for the future. If England now would consent to make overtures to France and stop talking about the absurdity of the German menace, if they would prove to France that English friendship meant peace and that England was no longer "perfidie Albion", the entente need not be postponed for any length of time.¹

The period from 1900-1904 found the Review and the Times working hand in hand for an early consummation of the understanding. In 1901 the latter had admitted its conversion to the former's point of view and both an Anglo-Russian² and an Anglo-French agreement were talked of with considerable freedom. The growing friendship between France and Italy was welcomed as auspicious, the former was making a good show of independence towards her "powerful ally" to whom she had been too pliant and "was conducting her foreign affairs with the dignified moderation which comes from conscious strength."³ The Review had advocated a rapprochement with Italy since 1895 and looked upon it now as a reflection of French attitude toward England. It was very natural too that Italy should be tired of the moribund Triple Alliance in which everything⁴ went Germany's way and Austria and Italy were forgotten.

Both periodicals gave King Edward full credit for the felicitous turn which England's foreign relations had taken. The popular attitude in France had been transformed as a result of that sovereign. The Review, however, went through a period of torture for fear Lord Salisbury's successors would not follow up the advantage. The former premier had shown a determination in regard⁵ to Germany, but Mr. Balfour, whose view of foreign affairs was extremely limited, showed none of his predecessor's acumen. The Venezuelan fiasco and the Bagdad Railway project were adequate proofs of his shortsightedness. "The

1. Nat'l Review, 34, 184-191, Mar. 1899, Vol. 33, 862-72, Aug. 1899, Vol. 34,
2. Times' Weekly, Nov. 1, 1901. 807, Feb. 1900.
3. Times' Weekly, Nov. 8, 1901.
4. National Review, Vol. 25, p. 719, Feb. 1896.
5. National Review, for a belated tribute see Vol. 43, p. 704, July, 1904.

Foreign Office was exasperatingly slow in realizing that public opinion was in revolt against the Anglo-German regime, which seemed to the unthinking official world to offer the line of least resistance, and which was consequently pursued year after year through much tribulation and humiliation. Downing Street was content to be the phonograph of Wilhelmstrasse. It required the outbursts of popular indignation which makes the words "Venezuela" and "Bagdad" so unpleasant to official ears, before our ministers grasped the fact that the days of Anglo-Germanism were numbered.¹

The visit of King Edward to the Kneria in May, 1903, was the turning point in the rapprochement. After that period the entente was practically assured. The Times was distinctly well-pleased. Intellectual, commercial, and industrial bonds were such as to draw the two countries together on terms of "amity and good will".² (Compare this statement with the one of Jan. 1896, supra p. 26) It still reserved for England a certain right to haughtiness in the matter of colonies, although it welcomed the growing change in the outlook of the French colonial party. M. Henry Lorin's article, the Depeche Coloniale, met with the reply that France was rather presuming in asking for commercial priority in Morocco in return for French recognition of Egypt as an exclusively British sphere of influence. "That is rather a hard concession to demand in the first instance from the very Power which has taken the lead in affirming and practicing the policy of the "open door" all over the world, but, as the example of Tunis shows, we are not always indisposed to yield, even in the domain of economics and to the prejudice of our own trade, to the desires of France in certain contingencies. In this, as in some other respects, we cannot help thinking that M. Lorin to some extent loses sight of that doctrine of 'give and take' which, as he knows, is the foundation of most English bargains, whether in politics or in business. Not only does he forget that while we allow the fullest

1. Nat'l Review, Vol. 43, p. 349, May, 1904.

2. Ibid, Vol. 4, pp. 351 and 517, May and June, 1903. Times' Weekly May 8, 1903.

and freest play to French capital and enterprise in Egypt and in all our colonies and dependencies, France everywhere meets our trade with severe protective duties. He forgets, also, that if we compare the political balance in the Mediterranean as it stands now and as it stood in 1881-2, the gain has not been exclusively upon our side. If we have established ourselves in Egypt in spite of a good deal of French opposition, France in turn has established herself in Tunis without any opposition from us in the sphere of politics, and with our positive help in the sphere of commerce."¹ Such testiness on the part of the Times revealed little more than a desire to let France know that she was getting all that she was giving. In other words, English friendship was not yet at a discount. The Review had had the same feeling in the years from 1895-98.

The king's visit was an opportunity of explaining to Russia that the entente meant no menace to the Dual Alliance which both the Review and the Times recognized as the "cornerstone of French foreign policy and the principal pillar of European peace". Both warned the Russian Government to pay no attention to the insinuations that Germany was making, that England was flirting with France at the expense of Russia.² Any agreement would be purely defensive and offer no menace to the legitimate interests of any country. It would undoubtedly "offer an obstacle to the tortuous diplomatic combinations such as have often played too large a part in the affairs of Europe."³ When the rapprochement became a certainty, the opinion was generally expressed that although it came at a time when the allies of France and England were at war, it need meet with no disapproval provided Russia and Japan practised common sense. Germany was blamed for trying to make a delicate situation worse.⁴

1. Times' Weekly, May 29, 1903.
2. Ibid, July 10, 1903, Feb. 25, 1904. Nat. Review, Vol. 41, p. 519, June, 1903.
3. Times' Weekly, July 10, 1903.
4. National Review, April 1904, Vol. 43, Times' Weekly, April 15, 1904.

The announcement of the entente cordiale of April 8, 1904, met with the warmest praises. The Review had not a single criticism to make. It would "have to be said to the credit of Lord Lansdowne and his advisers, that having once appreciated the necessity for a new policy, they did the thing handsomely, and are to be warmly congratulated on the whole spirit and temper of their present handwork."¹ However, "we have no hesitation in saying, as careful students of this question, that without the courageous initiative of King Edward in paying his respects to France last spring, we should not be now celebrating an Anglo-French understanding."² The agreements themselves met with no dissatisfaction at all. Both periodicals had been too eager for the general agreement to bother much about the details, provided England was not too severely compromised. As the Review said, if France had any desire to Egyptianize Morocco, let her go ahead since she was the natural Power for that task.³ England had no such ambition.

The attitude of Germany was what was watched most closely. The Times was⁴ frankly taken back by the fact that the entente met with no storm of protest. The Review was a great deal shrewder. The reason for the absence of any rabid attack was because the Germans "in impotent wrath are clenching their fists in their pockets". It took no stock whatever in Von Bulow's statements as to his joy over the understanding. If he really did rejoice over it, he "ought to be one of the happiest men in Europe, because no one, not even his Sovereign, has contributed more to its consummation". The Review paid much more attention to the remarks of some of the more influential journals, the Reichsbote and the Rheinisch Westfalische Zeitung who were asking what had become of Germany's place in the sun. The latter journal, however, had expressed distinct pleasure

1. National Review, Vol. 43, 349 and 351, May, 1904.
2. Ibid.
3. National Review, Vol. 43, P. 353, May, 1904.
4. Times' Weekly, April 15, 1904.

over the Moroccan solution. England now was eliminated from the question, Germany would have only France to deal with. "The situation is so favorable that even Count Von Bulow will have the courage to exploit it. Is the German Michael to get nothing? The hour has come when Germany must secure Western Morocco from the Atlas to the sea."¹ As the Review remarks a month later, the English "mandarins" would have to be on their guard, for from henceforth Germany's chief efforts would be concentrated on the destruction of the entente cordiale and a renewal of the quasi-sovereignty over British foreign policy which she had had up to 1903.² European safety was not yet established, Germany was going to play the game of "sit still" and "watchful waiting" until she felt strong enough to strike.

Sentiment in Parliament on the entente cordiale had been nil, in so far as active expression was concerned, during the years preceding the agreement. Lord Salisbury's policy had been firm toward France in 1898, but he based his arguments for the campaign on facts which were not openly hostile to that country. He had simply make up his mind, he declared, that the Soudan must be conquered for Egypt alone.³ The administration refused to commit itself on France's activities in Morocco except to say that England had no intention of forcing an issue.⁴ In 1903 it displayed the same laconic attitude toward the increasingly friendly relations between the two countries. A conservative member remarked on the improved commercial relations between France and England as a proof of the former's conciliatory spirit, to which Balfour replied that he doubted if that spirit could really be called conciliatory.⁵ The entente, as the National Review and the Times declared, was certainly not the result of efforts put forward by the Government, but the product of public opinion and the

1. Quoted in Nat'l Review, Vol. 43, p. 357, May, 1904, from the Rheinisch
2. Nat'l Review, Vol. 43, p. 528, June, 1904. Westfalische Zeitung.
3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 66, pp. 28-9, Feb. 7, 1899.
4. Ibid, Vol. 84, p. 288, June 18, 1901, Vol. 121, p. 1197, May 4, 1903.
5. Ibid, Vol. 122, p. 310, May 11, 1903.

increasing efforts of Edward VII.

The actual agreement evoked a discussion in the House of Commons which was singularly free from rancour, if not quite spiritless. The general opinion of both parties was that the entente was a good thing for Europe, but there was considerable quibbling over which country had made the better bargain. Dilke accused Balfour of having made a complete reversal in England's foreign policy by switching over from Germany to France. Balfour responded very spiritedly that it was not a reversal, the agreement was not prejudicial to the interests of Germany or any other Power, and did not stand in the way of an agreement with the former. Had that been the case, the entente would have defeated the purpose for which it was drawn up, namely to insure the peace of Europe.

On the Moroccan question Balfour declared that England had secured a very fortunate settlement. His statement implies that he thought the question was hence forward to be closed. "The great dangers to the peace of the world lie in the relations between the semi-civilized states of the world... (i.e.), the non-Christian, Oriental States on the one side and the Great Western Powers on the other. They always play off one Power against another and in the friction which then ensues the risks of collision are enormous and the gains problematical and very often visionary."¹ If Mr. Balfour thought that Germany would lay down her schemes for advancement in Morocco now that French predominance of interests had been granted, he reckoned without that group of German statesmen typified by the *Rheinisch Westfalische Zeitung*.

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 135, pp. 570-74 (Mr. Balfour's speech)

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE CONVENTION OF 1907.

Conservative opinion in so far as Anglo-Russian differences in the Far and Near East are concerned, has revealed a spirit of tolerance during the period from 1895 to 1908, a desire to effect a settlement which would bring about a possibility for retrenchment in the field which most affected the vital interests of England, i. e., the Middle East and the approach to India. It appears to have been the desire of the Conservative party not to prevent entirely the Russian advance in the Far East, but to establish a bulwark which would prevent that advance from going beyond all bounds. That bulwark had been erected in the form of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. In the Balkans a similar policy was carried out by means of the Concert of Europe. It is not surprising to find that the Conservatives were advocating a similar solution in the Middle East. Here, however, the solution was to be, not a defensive alliance with any third Power, but a division of interests and the establishment of a strong independent buffer state, Persia. Desirous as England was of effecting an understanding, it is doubtful if it could have been brought about without the assistance of some exterior force. Hereditary enemies, such as the two countries according to Bismarckian theory were supposed to be, often find it difficult to obliterate the memory of past grievances. Two forces were at work, a favorable and a hostile, which made it clear to Russian and English statesmen alike that a reconciliation must be effected. On the one side was France, ally of Russia and friend of England, who was finding it difficult to be true to either one, so long as they remained at odds. On the other was Germany whose rapid development was a menace to both Russia and England, particularly in the field where the two had special interests to guard, eastern Asia Minor and the Middle East. It was Germany's plan for the Bagdad Railway and the unusual

activity of the railroad company in Persia that aroused Russia and England to the realization of a common danger.

There were four spheres of interest which would have to be dealt with before the two countries could come to terms, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and the Persian Gulf. In regard to the first there was already a nominal sort of understanding, the second had always been a bone of contention, the third was a distinctly British sphere of interest, if indeed any country could claim interests in that isolated province. The fourth was so strategic and crucial a sphere that England hesitated to mention it in connection with other countries and maintained that her entire dominance over India rested on preserving the Gulf as a purely British inlet. Before discussing the convention of 1907 itself, it will be better to trace English and Russian activities in the four districts.

Their first understanding in regard to Persia goes back to the year 1834 when a nominal pledge was given by Lord Palmerston and the Russian Foreign Minister to maintain the independence and integrity of the Shah's domain. This understanding was renewed on several occasions, the last occasion being on the 12th of March, 1888, when the pledge was confirmed by means of a correspondence conducted by Lord Salisbury.¹ No formal treaty, however, was drawn up so that there was considerable doubt in British circles as to the significance which Russia attached to the correspondence. From 1889 to 1900 Russia's trade interests in the north of Persia increased alarmingly and there was real danger that her influence would be extended further south where British interests had always been recognized as predominant. Russia's influence in the north had never been questioned by England. Russia had the same desire to protect her Persian frontier as England had to secure the Indian marches. What the British imperialists did mean to prevent, however, was Russia's advance to the Persian

1. For this correspondence see Chirol, *The Middle Eastern Question*, Appendices, pp. 437-444.

Gulf, an advance prompted by the desire to secure an open water outlet. Opinion was divided among Conservatives and Liberals alike as to the amount of aggression England should use in holding Russia in check. There was the provocative policy of Lord Curzon which had the support of such extreme Conservatives as Gibson Bowles and such imperialistic Liberals as Joseph Walton. Opinions differed according to the amount of intimacy the various members of Parliament had with the Middle Eastern question. Those men who had traveled extensively in Persia and India appeared to have been the ones who invariably stood for an aggressive policy. Party leaders during the period of Conservative administration from 1895 to 1905 maintained an attitude of moderation, which if it failed to provoke Russian ire, sufficiently aroused the wrath of certain Englishmen. The main criticism arose over the fact that England was permitting Russia to exploit Persia at the expense of British trade and was securing control over Persian finances. To the assertions of the extremists who declared that England's trade had fallen from 3,000,000 pounds in 1889 to 2,000,000 pounds in 1900-1, whereas Russian had risen from 2,000,000 pounds to 4,500,000 pounds in the same period, the Government replied that that was only the normal result of affairs.¹ England had been the pioneer in that district, but with the opening up of the Suez Canal and improved means of overland transportation, her monopoly had of course been destroyed. There was room for both Russia and England in Persia, certainly England had no intention of adopting the prohibitive tariff system of Russia.² To the charges that England had ruthlessly thrown away her opportunity in 1898-99 when she refused to assume a Persian loan which Russia had subsequently accepted, the under-secretary replied that England had made her offer, but Persia did not see fit to accept the terms.³

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 118, 215-220, Feb. 18, 1903. Earlier ref. see Ibid. Vol. 70, p. 825, Apr. 28, 1899, Vol. 73, p. 439, June 23, 1899., Vol. 80, 40-41, Mar. 22, 1900, Vol. 101, pp. 129-130, Jan. 16, 1902, etc.
2. Ibid. Vol. 101, pp. 624-28, 1-22-1902, Vol. 118, pp. 230-36, Feb. 18, 1903.
3. Ibid. Vol. 82, p. 878, May 7, 1900.

The laconic attitude of the Government during the period must be attributed not so much to blindness to Russia's forward policy as to complications in other fields which demanded the full attention of the administration, the Boer War in particular. The Government, moreover, chose to attach an importance to the understandings of 1834 and 1888 which it was charged was altogether out of proportion.¹ The rapid advance which Russia was making in the matter of railroad construction, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs declared was adequately counter-balanced by England's corresponding privileges in the south of Persia.² In fact the Government appears to have underestimated the Russian railway system which, it said, was a pure makeshift and poorly constructed.³ Even the Russo-Persian commercial treaty of October, 1901, which went into effect in February, 1903, and which was a direct blow to the Indian tea trade in Persia, the Government chose to discount. England still had a most-favored nation treatment at the hands of Persia.⁴

In 1902 Lord Percy, however, defended Mr. Walton in his fear of Russian diplomacy. What England should do would be to have more consular agents in Persia and throw her influence in on the side of the British and British-Indian capitalists who desired to obtain railway concessions from Persia. England ought not to support the practice of outlining spheres of influence in Persia because that would inevitably lead to ultimate partition.⁵ Cranborne, the under-secretary, in his reply vehemently defended the government's policy which aimed at maintaining the status quo.⁶

The increasing number of charges that Russia was seeking a naval base on the Persian Gulf and that England was doing nothing to prevent it, together with

1. Hansard, 4th ser., Vol. 118, pp. 227-8, Feb. 18, '03, Vol. 121, 1329-39, May 5,

2. Ibid., Vol. 118, pp. 230-36, Feb. 18, 1903. (Persian concession of '89) 1903.

3. Ibid., Vol. 98, p. 249, July 26, 1901.

4. Ibid., Vol. 112, P. 118 (Aug. 8, 1902). Vol. 118, p. 230-33, Feb. 18, 1903.

Ibid., p. 496, Feb. 23, 1903.

5. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 101, p. 598, Jan. 22, 1902.

6. Ibid., Vol. 101, pp. 624-28, Jan. 22, 1902.

the announcement of Germany's Bagdad Railway convention caused the Government to make definite statements in 1903 as to the position it took in regard to the Persian Gulf.¹ Cranborne had made the remark incidentally in 1902² that the administration stood for the status quo, but on May 5, 1903, Lord Lansdowne made a lengthy speech on the question which was both sober and moderate. "It was owing to British enterprise, to the expenditure of British lives and money, that the Persian Gulf is at this moment open to the navigation of the world. It was our ships that cleared those waters of pirates; it was we who put down the slave trade; it was we who buoyed and beaconsed those intricate waters." Although the policy of the Government was liberal enough to encourage the legitimate trade of foreign Powers, it must be remembered that England "stands with regard to the navigation of the Gulf in a position different from that of any other power". "The establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power" would be looked upon "as a very great menace to British interests which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal."³

Valuable as this declaration was, nevertheless Chirol, follower of Lord Curzon and Captain Mahan, maintained that its value was purely negative. It defined what England would not tolerate, whereas it gave no adequate indication of what the Government itself proposed to do. Nor did it do away with the fact that England had allowed a financial inferior to come in and monopolize the resources of Persia.⁴ Nevertheless it appears to have done much to bolster up public confidence into a belief that at last the policy of drift would be abolished. At any rate the Government's inaction in so far as Russia's enterprises were concerned, together with their stand on the Bagdad Railway project,

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 101, p. 598, Jan. 22, 1902; also Vol. 118, pp. 227-8, Feb. 18, 1903.
2. Ibid., Vol. 101, pp. 129-30, Jan. 16, 1902.
3. Ibid., Vol. 121, p. 1348, May 5, 1903.
4. Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question, pp. 266-7.

prevented an alienation of Russia, who was considerably disgruntled by fear of a German-Angle coalition in the southern section of Asia Minor.¹

Meantime the Times had been arousing its readers to the necessity for action by means of a series of articles on Persia and had displayed an ardour which Mr. Maxse highly commended. It accused England of having thrown away her chances through sheer timidity and indolence. She had made her big slip in 1898 by her refusal to accept the Persian loan.² "What we have forfeited for want of a little energy and foresight has been reaped by others who have had the wisdom to conceive, and the courage to adopt and enforce a continuous plan of action framed to accomplish ends clearly seen and deliberately pursued."³

It shared the opinion of Captain Mahan who in his article in the National Review declared that England had indisputable rights in the Persian Gulf which must never be ceded.⁴ England should be frank with Russia. Timely candour in such matters was the best remedy against dangerous complications at a later stage. There was wire pulling going on at Constantinople as well as at Teheran which was having its effect on the Persian Gulf. England must adopt the policy of incessant watchfulness advocated by Lord Curzon lest there be a repetition of the Chinese situation. "We are still the greatest traders in the East, but our monopoly of half a century ago is no more, and the trade we retain is menaced not by the honest competition of foreign merchants, but by the open and furtive rivalry of powerful states."⁵

Ranged with the Times was the National Review which was stout in its declarations that it preferred to have the Persian Gulf a sealed question. But if it must be opened, let England cooperate not with Germany, but with Russia, which was the only Power that had substantial interests.⁶

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 121, pp. 1329-39, May 5, 1903.
2. Editorial for Jan. 24, 1902.
3. Editorial for Jan. 2, 1903.
4. Times Weekly, editorial for Feb. 27, 1903.
5. Ibid, April 24, 1903.
6. National Review, Vol. 41, p. 169, April, 1903.

Afghanistan and Tibet had to be considered in their relationship to the Russian advance. In the former a laissez-faire policy was the only one worthy of consideration. England had had previous experience with the Ameer; any attempt at British interference meant an edging toward Russia on the part of that potentate, and England had come to see the truth of Lord Roberts's saying that "the less the Afghans see of us, the less they will detest us."¹ Desirous as the Government was of opening up a railroad from India to Afghanistan which could compete with the Russian Trans-Caspian Railway which extended within sixty miles of Herat, it decided that the subject must not be broached until the Ameer gave his consent.² Lord Curzon's careful cultivation of the Ameer's friendship did much to ease the situation, and in 1904 and again in 1906-7 that ruler unbent enough to permit an exchange of visits between Herat and Calcutta.³ The Louis Dane Mission to Cabool in 1905 was looked upon by the Marquis of Lansdowne as a decided success.⁴ Toward the Russian movement into Afghanistan the Government took an unflinching attitude. Afghanistan was entirely outside of the Russian sphere of interest, an ally of England, not a British protectorate with which England would tolerate no outside interference.⁵ Any attempt to violate the integrity of Afghanistan would be looked upon as a *casus belli*, Balfour declared in 1905, a statement which Lord Newton, a Liberal member of the House of Lords, maintained was pure Jingoism.⁶

With regard to Tibet Conservative opinion was divided. Lord Curzon, who advocated a laissez-faire policy in Afghanistan, was equally strong in demanding a provocative policy toward Tibet, which his more moderate colleagues in the Home Government at first refused to sanction. His attitude was the result

1. Quoted in Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, p. 245.
2. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 67, p. 1226, Mar. 3, 1899.
3. See Tardieu, pp. 245-6.
4. Hansard, Vol. 147, p. 564, June 2, 1905.
5. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 147, pp. 553-64, June 2, 1905.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 536-53.

partly of Tibet's stubborn resistance to England's request that trade relations be opened up, partly to the suspicion that Tibet was turning to Russia for aid instead of to England. The expedition under the command of Colonel Young-husband was undertaken in 1903 to force an opening in Tibet for Anglo-Indian trade. The Government's support of this project was not whole-hearted. It refused to attach a military significance to the expedition and looked upon it as a commercial mission.¹ When the character of the so-called pacific mission changed ominously, it attributed the change to Tibetan provocativeness.² Sir George Hamilton, Secretary for India, felt that Tibet ought to be left alone if she desired. England's frontier was large enough, her trade with Tibet would be almost negligible and it was useless to force a product like Indian tea on Tibet if she preferred Chinese.³ She was simply arousing Russian suspicion. Lord Lansdowne, however, declared that the Tibetans were a menace on India's northern frontier and their desire for commercial as well as political isolation was absurd. England had no desire to dispute Chinese suzerainty and was acting with China's cognizance and cooperation.⁴ Russia need not be alarmed over the mission and the Tibetans must be made to understand that Russia was not a natural ally.⁵

In the end, although the expedition was successful, that success was never followed up. China was perhaps the only one who made any real gains whatsoever. Lord Curzon's request that a British resident be appointed at Lhasa was never granted. The Government still clung to its belief that at most the relationship between India and Tibet should be commercial. Conservative journals had been enthusiastic about the expedition. The Times declared the resulting

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 131, p. 304, Mar. 7, 1904.

2. Ibid, Vol. 133, pp. 485-98, April 19, 1904.

3. Ibid., Vol. 130, pp. 1110-1150. Feb. 26, 1904.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., Vol. 133, pp. 485-98. Also Vol. 136, pp. 482-3, June 20, 1904.

treaty could meet with no legitimate objection from Russia, as it simply helped to insure a general balance of power in the Middle East. Incidentally it strengthened the Indian frontier. The delay which was caused in signing the treaty on China's part it attributed to the insidious influence of Germany working to maintain her own interests and to bring about a closer understanding with Russia, and thus make fresh mischief between Russia and England.¹ The National Review likewise offered its hearty cooperation and deplored the fact that the Government was substituting for Curzon's imperative policy one of inaction and disinterestment.²

Discussion over Anglo-Russian relations came to a standstill after the critical period in 1903 and was not renewed until the parliamentary session of 1906. Pledged to a policy of continuity, Liberal statesmen pursued the same course as their Conservative predecessors, although as the debates of 1903 and Liberal tendencies in general reveal, they had as much desire as the Opposition to cultivate friendly relations with Russia. The session of 1906 makes clear the fact that an Anglo-Russian agreement was a matter of only a few months. Persia in its connection with Russian and British interests, came to be discussed with increasing interest. In March, 1906, Sir Edward Grey was asked by a Conservative member if the Government intended to open up negotiations with Russia in regard to an amicable understanding which would secure the territorial integrity and help develop the industrial resources of Persia. Grey gave no further information except to say that the way was being opened and that there was a growing tendency towards an understanding on the part of both Governments,³ a tendency which there is no doubt found its start in the Algeiras Conference in the early months of 1906 and the friendly conversations

1. Times' Weekly, editorials for April 8, 1904, and Oct. 21, 1904.

2. National Review, Vol. 43, pp. 539-41, June, 1904.

3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 154, p. 1534, March 29, 1906. Also Vol. 157, p. 1416, May 24, 1906.

of Count Cassini and Sir Arthur Nicholson.¹ The Jewish massacres in Russia during the summer of 1906 and the reviving memories of the Dogger Bank outrage of the Russo-Japanese War raised questions in the minds of the radicals, Liberals as well as Irish Nationalists and Labor party members, as to the value of an understanding with autocratic Russia. To their protests the moderate Liberals and the Unionists were deaf; the best policy for England would be to let "bygones be bygones".²

Outside of parliament the old tendencies for rapprochement were revived and the subject pressed by the Conservative organs. Every step in advance was hailed with enthusiasm by the Times. The complaints of the radicals were seized upon with vehemence and strong advice was offered as to the necessity of keeping a sharp line of division between foreign and domestic politics.³ The National Review was jubilant over Russia's show of independence and delight was expressed over her escape from Germany's mesmeric control. At last the "Russian elephant" and the English "whale" were on the threshold of a rapprochement, a fact which the German "crocodile" had always declared an impossibility.

The Convention itself called forth a mixed kind of praise. In parliament it was an opening up of a debate on the Middle Eastern question which was destined to last up to 1913 and 1914. The consensus of opinion among Liberals and Conservatives there as elsewhere was that the understanding was an undeniably fine thing for the peace of Europe. Unionist members, however, were distinctly dissatisfied with the scope of the agreement, a dissatisfaction which is surprising in the light of Conservative inaction in the period from 1899 to 1905. Lord Lansdowne stood alone in his wholehearted praise of the convention and pronounced it a direct aid in the internal crisis then going on in Persia in preventing either Russia or England from stealing a march on one another.⁴

1. See Tardieu, France and the Alliances, p. 240.
2. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 159, pp. 1360-65. July 2, 1906.
3. Times' Weekly, editorial for May 29, 1908.
4. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 183, pp. 15-17, Jan. 29, 1908.

It was just such an arrangement as the Tories had desired. Unfortunately, as Sir Edward Grey said, the rest of the Conservatives did not share Lansdowne's optimism.¹ Balfour declared that the terms of the agreement were altogether too vague and sweeping.² Earl Percy³ in an exceedingly long speech deplored it as a material sacrifice of British interests which still left room for misunderstandings of a kind which both the contracting Powers desired to avoid. The Anglo-French entente had removed all differences between the two countries, and was really a comprehensive attempt to compose all rivalries, a thing which this new agreement failed to do. In Tibet, where by the Convention both parties recognized the suzerainty of China and promised to abstain from all interference in the internal administration of the country, he declared that England introduced and recognized what amounted to an equality of interests for both countries, a state which never existed before. To admit Russian interest in Tibet was to weaken our Indian frontier. England had given up all she had gained by the Tibetan expedition. In Afghanistan we had modified our exclusive control by allowing Russia to have a commercial agent there who in that primitive country would be regarded as a representative of his Government. In so far as Persia was concerned England had shown little discretion. She was attempting to guard against future collision by a purely arbitrary delimitation of territory. Russia had secured by far the better sphere; it contained the two important cities, Teheran and Tabriz, also the termini of the important trade routes which England used in carrying up her goods from the Gulf. With these termini in Russia's hands came the end of English trading prosperity in Persia, where Russia could impose any trading conditions she desired. Why,

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 184, p. 477, Feb. 17, 1908.
2. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 183, p. 127, Jan. 29, 1908.
3. Earl Percy it will be remembered was among the few Conservatives who advocated a forward policy in 1903. See supra p. 38.

he argued, should England be confined to the smaller sphere which included one of the most barren districts of Persia where England had no commercial interests? What England had needed in Persia more than anything else was strategic isolation.¹

Lord Curzon regarded the convention as a futile compromise. England had thrown away the fruits of a hundred years of diplomacy and trade. She had relinquished seven of her eleven trade routes to Russia. Her interests in Persia which had been built up so painstakingly by Anglo-Indian and British merchants, now were completely destroyed. England's power and prestige which had such effect over the Oriental mind, had been ruthlessly forfeited. In Afghanistan England had depreciated the value of the Ameer's growing confidence. At any rate he should have been consulted before the convention was drawn up. In Tibet, too, she had shown a weakening over her former policy by acknowledging Russia's demand that she evacuate the Chumbi Valley.²

Particular disappointment was expressed over the fact that England's position in the Gulf had not been vindicated and included in the treaty. Russia's statement in a subsequent letter had been grudging and little better than verbal.³ Now that Russia had the right to secure railroad concessions in the neutral zone of Persia, she would obtain one to the Gulf. Germany would construct a road on the other side and as a result British supremacy in the Gulf, which, as Curzon said, was useless without the littoral, would be gone.⁴ The only place where England had really maintained her declarations of preserving her approach to India free and untrammelled by means of buffer states, had been at Seistan, which had been included within the British sphere in Persia.⁵ Once Russia secured that for a military base, India would be seriously menaced.

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 184, pp. 460-76, Feb. 17, 1908.

2. Ibid., Vol. 183, pp. 999-1030, Feb. 6, 1908. H. of L.

3. Ibid., also, Vol. 184, p. 564, Feb. 17, 1908. H. of C.

4. Ibid. (a). For a general discussion see Ibid. Vol. 83, pp. 999-1039, Vol.

5. Ibid., P. 564, Vol. 184

184, pp. 460-564.

All of these complaints voiced by the Conservatives did not conceal their pleasure over the announcement of the Convention. Disappointed over England's surrender to Russia, they nevertheless felt that the latter's trading interests in Persia were predominant and that England could afford to lose some of her profits there in return for the increasing trade returns with Russia herself.¹ Lansdowne, who seems to have remembered the Conservative stand in 1903 more clearly than his colleagues, said that compromise was preferable to competition. Nothing was more unedifying than the struggle of two strong powers for the control of a weak state.² Much of their alarm was due to the fact that perhaps the Liberals were holding England's friendship too cheaply, that although England needed the Russian understanding she must never secure it at the expense of her prestige in Europe.

The feeling of party leaders was not openly reflected in the attitude of the Times. Since the termination of the Far Eastern question as a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth and the second Anglo-Japanese agreement that periodical had openly advocated the termination of the Middle Eastern question. Compromise, as it had already stated, was necessary because of England's previous supineness, so that while it did not hesitate to criticize the settlement in regard to Persia, it declared that England had herself to blame. On the whole, Sir Edward Grey was to be congratulated on accomplishing the most difficult part of the program he had outlined two years before.³

The National Review will have to be credited with sounding the highest praises of the agreement. It overlooked everything except the fact that the understanding was a direct blow at the would-be supremacy of Germany to whom every one of England's friendships was anathema. The convention marked "another notable step in the emancipation of Europe from the diplomatic

1. Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, p. 239.
2. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 183, p. 1324, Feb. 10, 1908. (H. of L.)
3. *Times' Weekly*, Sept. 27, 1907.

suzerainty established by Bismarck and, whatever we may be told by amicable ignoramuses as to the 'satisfaction' of Wilhelm II at the conclusion of the secular feud between Russia and England, as a matter of fact he regards the Anglo-Russian rapprochement with about the same enthusiasm as he viewed the Anglo-French entente. German influence was strenuously exerted to the nth power with the reactionary Party in St. Petersburg to thwart the Agreement, and but for the sagacious and steadfast support of the Tzar, the odds against Mr. Ievolsky and Sir Arthur Nicholson would have been overwhelming." The Convention had long been the desideration of thoughtful Englishmen. Lord Salisbury¹ had been strongly in favor of reconsidering Anglo-Russian relations.

To the argument that England had forfeited her better interests in the Middle East, Maxse displayed an attitude devoid of rancour. Although he did not stand for a policy of giving much for little, and although England had perhaps paid too high a price, nevertheless it must be remembered that this was more than a bargain of give and take.² The chief thing had been to close a hereditary feud and to round out the Entente Cordiale.³ The belief that there was room for both Russia and England in Asia met with his complete satisfaction. But there must be some understanding. There was room for all ocean-going steamers in the Atlantic, nevertheless such steamers found it more convenient to arrange their separate routes. Unless England and Russia came to some settlement, in regard to their respective spheres of interest, there would al-⁴ways be danger of a collision.

Resulting events in Persia put the Anglo-Russian agreement to a sharp test. The revolution which arose largely, as certain members of parliament maintained, because the two countries had failed to demonstrate to the Persian

1. The National Review, Vol. 50, pp. 165-66, Oct., 1907.
2. Ibid., Vol. 51, p. 505, June, 1908.
3. Ibid.
4. The National Review, Vol. 41, p. 170-1, March, 1903.

Nationalists that the convention did not mean the political partition of Persia, and which secured its impetus from the Young Turk revolution, called for a determined attitude on the part of England. Lord Lansdowne, like Sir Edward Grey, declared that the Agreement of August 31, 1907, did much to alleviate the chances of war between Russia and England. For the protection of British trading interests in Persia, that country must have a decent and stable government. But Russia and England must work together to secure it for her. Nothing, he said, was so discreditable as a policy based on suspicion of Russia, because she had deemed it wise to send in Russian troops to protect her trading interests. Let England give Russia the benefit of the doubt and believe that the latter's motives were as disinterested as her own. With Grey he maintained that a policy of coercion was possible; England could send in troops into her sphere just as Russia was sending them into the North, but would the "game be worth the candle"? England would do her best in encouraging Persia by means of moral persuasion and by showing her that England had no designs on Persian independence.¹ Lord Percy also advocated a laissez-faire policy. Great Britain had no right to force on Persia a policy she did not want. If she preferred an autocracy to a constitutional government, well and good. Let Russia and England cooperate in maintaining their commercial interests and Persia's integrity. If the latter would permit it, Europeans should be employed² by her in restoring internal order.

Only a few Conservatives, George Lloyd and Lord Curzon among them, advocated a policy of provocation. Mr. Yates, although he deplored the conditions in South Persia, where robbery and blackmail prevailed, and felt that perhaps Persian independence was a polite fiction, still maintained that England³ must pursue a detached policy. Persia perhaps deserved to be punished, another

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 183, pp. 15-18, Jan. 28, 1908.

2. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 2, pp. 1846-50, Mar. 24, 1909.

3. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 34, 659-62, Feb. 21, 1912.

member asserted, but to penalize her would be to annex her, an unheard of procedure.¹ There were others who agreed with the Liberals who declared that the Swedish gendarmerie, introduced into Persia at her own invitation, was a failure and that English officers with a knowledge of Oriental conditions should be introduced together with Russian to officer the Persian army.² When Mr. Shuster was dismissed at the order of Russia, Colonel Yates declared that Russian, English, and Indian representatives should be employed as a board for the financial administration of Persia.³ There seems to have been a general feeling that England needed Persia as an independent state, not only because of the position of India, but because of her own Mohammedan subjects, who would resent any inadvertent action on the part of England toward their Moslem brothers in Persia.⁴

In 1912 Earl Ronaldshay declared that England's policy, although a moderate one still, had nevertheless relieved the tension; in Persia her Indian troops sent in to guard British trade routes, had been more successful than the Persian troops at least. The proposed loan to Persia was a wise measure. In Russia since the accession of M. Sazonoff to the Foreign Office, Russian policy had been modified.⁵ On the whole the outlook, in spite of what Lord Curzon might say, was decidedly improved and England had no reason for being disgruntled over her bargain of 1907.⁶

In regard to the question of railroad extension in Persia, the Conservatives showed much the same spirit as they did to the Bagdad proposition. In 1912 the project of a Trans-Persian Railway from the Caspian Sea to the Indian

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 34, p. 671, Feb. 21, 1912.
2. Ibid, Vol. 50, pp. 1489-95, Mar. 25, 1913.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., Vol. 40, pp. 1937-42, July 10, 1912.
5. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 40, pp. 1937-42, July 10, 1912.
6. See Lord Curzon's speech of Dec. 7, 1911, Hansard, Vol. 10, (5th series), pp. 670-90. (H. of L.)

frontier was breached. It was to be undertaken jointly by English, French, and Russian capitalists. The general feeling was that the growing resources of Persia and the resulting increase in trade made the railway inevitable and that England might just as well cooperate and secure it on her own terms. Those terms were that England should have the right of determining where the break in gauge between the Russian and British should come. It must come north of the Persian Gulf, preferably in the Russian sphere, certainly not near India, where the frontier could be menaced. England was entitled to a clear¹ run from India into central Persia fully as much as Russia.

Lord Curzon, however, opposed the scheme for a Trans-Persian railway and declared that no one could be enthusiastic over it. In the first place it would reach unfavorably on the Bagdad Railway. In the second place it was bound to lay a huge financial burden on India. The overland route to India was no doubt inevitable, but England had better wait until she could build it herself. There were two routes already mapped out, one from Egypt through Arabia to the Persian Gulf, another by way of Afghanistan, which for the time being the Ameer opposed. England had better remember that her friendship with Russia was not eternal, and that India needed a barrier frontier more than she needed railways.² In Lord Curzon's attitude we see more of a distinct representation of Disraeli's policy toward India than in any of his colleagues.

The editorials of the Times and the National Review show little concern over internal affairs in Persia. In regard to the Trans-Persian railway, rumors of which came out in the summer of 1910, the former declared that the project held vast opportunities. "Sooner or later, too, the line would have to be linked up through Western Persia with the Bagdad Railway and here again might be found the opportunity and basis of a friendly agreement with Germany."³

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 40, pp. 1942, 1997, H. of C., July 10, 1912.

2. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 12, pp. 673-96, H. of L., July 15, 1912.

3. Times' Weekly, Nov. 25, 1910.

The sympathies of the Review were all on the side of the Russophiles and Persia. It declared that the Russophobes must be blanketed; they were waging a "newspaper vendetta" against Russia simply because she had ceased to be a hostile power. "They are merely using Persia as a stalking-horse, as may be gathered from what we all know to be the fact, namely, that if Germany occupied the position of Russia towards Persia, we should hear no more of Persia than we do about Prussian Poland where children have been flogged for saying the Lord's Prayer in their native tongue." ¹ With Earl Ronaldshay it declared that England's foreign policy now rested on the Triple Entente; it would be better for her to go more than half way in her concessions than to allow the entire ² edifice to topple to the ground.

1. National Review, Vol. 60, 163, Nov. 1912.
2. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 40, pp. 1933-36, July 10, 1912. National Review, Vol. 60, p. 163, Nov. 1912.

CONSERVATIVE OPINION TOWARD GERMANY, 1895-1914.

The sentiment of the British Conservatives toward Germany in itself is practically obvious. It was based on a deep feeling of distrust and suspicion and there was tangible enough evidence to show that their attitude was justifiable. They could well argue that Germany was not making her huge strides in industrial development or expanding her commerce for nothing. The Pan-Germanists and the Navy League had a meaning to which the Conservatives were not entirely blinded, if indeed they were deceived at all. Germany, they could see, had mammoth imperial ambitions, which, if ever attained, would have to be secured at the expense of England's material interests and prestige as well. If England refused to recognize these aspirations and share imperial honors with Germany, a clash was very likely to result. Great Britain, of course, would be at a moral advantage in such a case, because Germany and not she would be the intruder. Still rather than tolerate an interloper, England had better prepare for the crash.

The crux of the whole question lay in the fact that official evidence was lacking. Never by word or deed did Germany as a nation show that she cherished any other than the most cordial feelings toward England. During the entire twenty years there was no breach between the two countries. Neither were there any outstanding disagreements between the two Powers which could call for settlement. As the Times said in 1904, "Anglo-German relations were neither so embittered as to make agreement a matter of urgency, nor so spontaneously warm as to induce it as a matter of course." So year after year the king in his speech to parliament at the beginning of the session could make

1. Times' Weekly, July 1, 1904.

use of that stereotyped expression, "My relations with Germany remain friendly". Under such circumstances it is extremely difficult to bring legal charges against a nation. Yet the conviction of the Conservative was not shaken. Some day, unless England had rendered herself so formidable that an attack on the part of a foreign Power would be futile, she was not going to be able to say that her relations with her North Sea neighbor were those of amity.

Generally speaking, this attitude toward Germany represented the common feeling of the entire Conservative party. That feeling was what differentiated them from the Liberals who desired to prove their amicable intentions toward all Powers by coming to definite understandings with them. It certainly put them in a position diametrically opposed to the Nationalists who wanted an agreement with Germany because she was pro-Irish, and to the Labor party, which wanted an alliance because the two nations as the chief industrial and commercial Powers had interests in common. However, as the writer has said, the whole thing was obviously largely a matter of opinion and sentiment. It could easily be charged that the Conservatives were reading into the situations things that did not exist. When it comes to anything as intangible as sentiment, even though the guiding principle is the same, there is bound to be a difference in degree. This condition existed very clearly in the Conservative party. Curiously enough, it was a difference in degree, not only in so far as the sentiment itself was concerned, but in the matter of expression as well.

In fact the variation with which the German menace was regarded is glaringly obvious in so far as the three types of Conservative, the ultra, the moderate, and the imperial extremist are concerned. The diversity is the result partly of predilection, partly of official position. The views of responsible persons, particularly public servants, are not things which can be aired too freely when national interests are at stake. Diplomats have come to realize the value of the non-committal, guarded statement, which, far from

being laconic or indifferent, represents a very skilful command of term usage. This same thing applies to party leaders. In parliament opinion is limited by national and international considerations which render foreign politics a very delicate subject to discuss. Naturally men like Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour are not given to rash utterances, but not even inclination could render statements as guarded as those given in answer to questions on foreign affairs. Freedom of speech is a thing which does not exist in that case. The leaders must understand the value of being firm without provocative; every word must be weighed with careful consideration. The party out of power can afford to go somewhat farther in the expression of its views. They can always conduct an attack and charge the party in power with negligence, laxity, and trepidity when things have gone amiss in foreign affairs, but in that case it is a purely party affair. It is always a good way of registering the party thermometer. When the "outs", however, have made a compact with the "ins" to respect their opinion provided they maintain the policy of continuity in foreign affairs, even the party attacks vanish and the debates, save for the insinuations of the lesser parties, become singularly flat and insipid; exchanges of mutual admiration one of the Labor members called them in 1911. This was the situation in the English parliament after 1906 when the Liberals replaced the Conservatives. Before that time the Conservatives had been bound by their own position, after that by the pledge they had given to their opponents. Here was no atmosphere for Anti-Germanism to thrive, a fact which is adequately brought out after reading the account of the Morocco crisis of 1906 in Hansard and then comparing it with that in the Times or National Review.

The Times as a responsible journal, highly esteemed not only in England, but throughout the world, can likewise ill-afford to be a scoremongerer. Its dignity and reputation have staked it to a policy of moderation. Its party position permits it to level attacks at its opponents and even at members of the

Conservative party, but its attacks never go beyond the bounds of decency. If it feels that the Government is being duped at the expense of national prestige, bitter harangues are justifiable, but the language is always carefully chosen, and, if it is insinuating, it is certainly never insulting. Its attacks are more what those of the party leaders would be if they were not bound by considerations of public interests.

An irresponsible organ such as the National Review, which has nothing to lose by violence, can afford to let loose and rant to its heart's content. Mr. Maxse has the attitude of the man whose frankness has lost him so much of his reputation, that a little more or less squandered makes very little difference. He is absolutely impervious to criticism. If the debates, even the Times, err on the side of moderation, Mr. Maxse goes as far, if not further in the other direction. His argument is that in the matter of sentiment there is no need of a man's restraining himself. It is better to rant while ranting is good. Then if your predictions come true, so much the better for you; if not, there is always plenty of opportunity for making apologies. Lukewarmness is the cardinal sin, the policy of a coward, not of a gentleman.

The varying temperaments of the three groups come out most clearly in the light of Anglo-German relations. For Mr. Maxse it was the sine qua non of his foreign policy after 1898, the obsession of his life which was not in the least hampered by considerations of vocabulary. His command over the English language rendered him peculiarly fit to carry out an anti-German campaign. In Germany he would have made an excellent disciple of the Fatherland. In pacific England his value was probably less appreciated. The Times regarded the attitude of Germany as an unfortunate consideration which always had to be reckoned with; and the party leaders lamented it even more. There were the three steps in a political party's stairway. On the highest stood the group which scented the danger and wished to avoid it, not out of cowardice, but because they believed

that by ignoring and overlooking it, they could defeat it. Nevertheless they were not averse to naval and military preparations. On the second step was the group that saw the menace very clearly and was prepared to meet it half way. On the lowest stood the few who advocated not only firmness but force; Germany's own methods would have to be used against her or England herself would be obliterated.

This question too was a matter of development. In 1895 the Review was as pro-German as it was anti-French. The Kruger telegram marks the beginning of the awakening. Even that though was regarded as the act of a visionary, over-ambitious Emperor whose opinions carried little weight with his people. The danger lay in the fact that that ruler might eventually gain the control over the German nation which he coveted. Soon it saw that with such accomplices as the Pan-German League, the Navy League, and a chancellor of the type of Count Von Bulow, the kaiser could hypnotize his people with little effort. After all there was nothing that the Germans succumbed to so easily as force, particularly when that was applied under the soothing influence of a sovereign who could promise rewards as great as those which Don Quixote promised to his squire, Sancho.

In 1896 Mr. Maxse was pretty well cured of a German alliance unless England could get it on her own terms; a very unlikely thing since,-

"In matters of business, the fault of the Dutch
Lies in giving too little and asking too much." ¹

In 1898 he was outlining German aims with a clearness and confidence that brooked no contradiction. He said these aims were fourteen in all and listed them as follows:

1. To become a great World Power with an extensive Empire and a formidable Sea Power with a navy strong enough to hold the balance in Europe, and a large mercantile marine.
2. To become the first industrial community in the world, making everything for everybody.

1. National Review, Vol. 27, p. 29, March, 1896.

3. To detach Russia from the French alliance, or to neutralize that alliance by a Russian understanding.
4. If possible "to make it up" with France, without surrendering Alsace-Lorraine; or failing this, to fall upon her when Russia is detached.
5. To maintain the Triple Alliance and to strengthen it by the addition of Turkey.
6. To keep an eye upon Holland with a view to ultimate inheritance of the Dutch Empire.
7. To add German Austria to Germany when the Dual Monarchy breaks up.
8. To create one German Empire in China and another in Asia Minor without quarreling with Russia.
9. To create a German sphere of influence in South America without quarreling with the United States.
10. To have a coaling station in the Philippines.
11. To absorb as much of Africa as may be unappropriated.
12. To maintain peace while vigorously upholding German interests.
13. To set the three following groups of Powers by the ear; Russia and England, England and France, France and Russia." ¹

This elaboration of interests on the part of Germany Mr. Maxse declared he set forth in no spirit of cynicism, but there was no use for Germany "to hide her light under a bushel". She had now reached the fourth stage of her development. Schleswig-Holstein, Austria, France, all had had to yield before her, now it was England's turn. The day set for the attack was still remote; Germany was not yet ready for the inevitable conflict, and until she was ready, she would not strike. However, her hands would not be idle. Reinforcements and reinsurances had been Bismarck's favorite practise and the kaiser and his chancellor had the same predilections. "While the Austrians, the Dutch, the Chinese, the Turks, the Russians, the English, the French, and the Americans in turn deride "German designs".. all these Powers will be cleverly played off against one another, and while they are absorbed in mutual recrimination, or

1. National Review, Vol. 32, pp. 468-9, Dec. 1898.

exhausting themselves in fighting, the German jackal will stealthily appropriate¹ the bone of contention."

Meantime the Times too had had proofs of Germany's growing strength. The kaiser's visit to Turkey in 1898, which the National Review declared² was the turning point in Germany's policy, was looked upon by the Times as a glaring example of England's lost chances and a proof of German ability. "One may regret that British statesmen missed the opportunities that Germany has seized. One regrets it the more because our statesmanship is everywhere a generation be-³ hind that of Germany in the use of methods appropriate to an industrial age." There was no feeling of bitterness toward the Teuton as yet. The Times was quite willing to echo Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion of an Anglo-German understanding. "Another idea, of which Mr. Chamberlain has been the apostle, is that in spite of keen commercial rivalry and of differences of national temper, fundamental interests and general similarity of aim and ideals ought to place England and Germany side by side in the secular movement of humanity. It is satisfactory to note that the German Press begins to acknowledge that there is something in this ideal. As a matter of fact we have no standing dispute with Germany, nor is there any reason why the interests of the two countries should⁴ clash with Europe."

The calumny which the German Press heaped on England during the Boer War, however, brought about the estrangement in so far as the Times was concerned, which the Review had declared was inevitable. It confessed itself greatly shocked over the flood of Anglo-phobism. It had always known that the Junker class in Germany had an aversion to England, but it had never realized the extent to which that feeling had permeated the nation. "We have had, we may

1. National Review, Vol. 34, pp. 656-661, Jan., 1900.
2. Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 468, Dec. 1898.
3. Times' Weekly, Oct. 28, 1898.
4. Times' Weekly, Nov. 18, 1898.

acknowledge, but little to complain of in the public acts of the German Government, but.....;.. we cannot be expected to shut our eyes to the relations which notoriously existed between the German administration and the German Press. We may feel that the anti-English movement engineered in Germany got out of hand and went further than some of those who favored it desired. But we cannot forget that they dared not resist it, and that on several occasions the language of responsible ministers harmonized but too well with that of our traducers in the newspapers.¹ Henceforward there was never any talk of the community of interests and the need of a German alliance; instead there were frequent charges of duplicity against the Teuton cousin and many such admonitions as "Fine words butter no parsnips".

The effect of the Boer War on the National Review had been positively incendiary. Now Mr. Maxse had a real basis for the passion which he already cherished. His attacks from henceforward know no bounds. Germany's designs become the keynote of his entire foreign policy, for that Power was now the hostis generis, the instigator of every difficulty in international politics. Moreover, he had a new problem to deal with, the apathy of the Government. He was in paroxysm of rage over the imperial weakness of the country which the war had revealed, of the hopeless inefficiency of the navy and the military. Yet in the face of her weakness, England could still treat Germany aspirations with indifference. The laconicism of the Administration would be absurd, were it not so disastrous. Had they no self pride that they permitted themselves to be stepped on? The Government lived in a soporific atmosphere, its members were "arm-chair politicians and superior persons who were as ignorant of the affairs of Europe as of the politics of Mars." Why couldn't they treat Germany with the same frigid politeness with which she treated them? Didn't they know that if you kow-towed to Germany, you were invariably kicked?

1. Times' Weekly, July 25, 1902. The appointment of Von Bulow to the premiership in Germany had created a feeling of distinct alarm since his aims and strength were realized. See Ibid. Oct. 19, 1900.

Yet you had only to administer a similar blow to her, before she would kow-tow to you. However, there was no convincing the Government. "If the rupture with Germany came, it would find England totally unprepared and the ministers would feebly gasp, "Why who could have thought that the Queen's grandson would pick a war with England?" "If England would show a little less vis inertia towards Germany, her relations with the rest of Europe would visibly improve." "Let her eschew all Anglo-German understandings, keep an open door in St. Petersburg and Paris, put her trust in Providence and keep her powder dry."¹

The desires of the Review were not realized in the three years following these exclamations of disgust. Instead, it maintained, the Government fell so completely under the spell of the Teuton, that the very keys of Downing Street were kept in Wilhelmstrasse. The "Potsdam ~~game~~^{game}" had for its leaders Balfour and Lord Lansdowne. Lord Salisbury at least had some tact and judgment when it came to Germany.² With his death in 1902, however, every obstacle to a German alliance wherein England would be reduced to the political insignificance of the Isle of Man had vanished. Neither Chamberlain, Balfour, nor Lansdowne had the political stamina to resist the suave arguments of the German pirates. The premier in particular was unfitted for his position, he was more the philosopher than the politician, and his tastes in politics were domestic rather than imperialistic.³

The "Venezuelan mess" and the "Mesopotamian myth" were only proofs of how the Government was squandering national prestige. It was extremely curious that Balfour could not see any reason for German Anglophobia.⁴ Brodrick, too,

1. National Review, Vol. 34, pp. 811-13, Vol. 35, pp. 19-20, Feb. and Mar. 1900.
2. The Review declared that it now saw the value of the premier's answer to Wilhelm's invitation to join the Triple Alliance during "Cowes" week in 1895.
3. National Review, Vol. 39, p. 350 and p. 855, Vol. 40, pp. 320-22, May, Aug. and Nov., 1902.
4. National Review, Vol. 41, pp. 8-20, Mar., 1903.

was showing a marked subserviency to Germany, even though Von Bulow had said that to compare the German and English armies was an insult to the former. To turn the other cheek to the smiter was never a good policy in international affairs. ¹ Would England forever pull Germany's "chestnuts out of the fire"? Maxse was in a perfect furor of rage over the idea. Abetted by his marvellous and peculiarly adapted vocabulary, he stormed at the ministry for its gullibility, at Germany for her chicanery in attempting to "ticket England as a German sheep in the European fold". ²

Meantime the Government was pursuing a policy as pacific as even public propriety could desire. There were only two people who intimated in any way that Germany's designs were not all that they should be, Sir Joseph Walton and Gibson Bowles. The former, a distinguished Liberal imperialist, was treated as a man of broad experiences and sound judgment whose imperialistic jealousies unfortunately had led him slightly astray in this respect. The latter, however, was regarded as a "thorn in the flesh" whose aggressive attitude toward Germany was worthy of public rebuke. ³ It is wise to note, however, that to Sir Ashmead-Bartlett's suggestion that England ally herself with Germany, the Government made a pointed refusal. ⁴ The Bagdad Railway proposition which Balfour and Lord Lansdowne openly supported, was to be regarded only from an international point of view. As a German project it was not to be tolerated. There is evident at all times a feeling that a danger was near, but ⁵ that England had no right to bring it into the limelight by emphasizing it.

The way in which the Anglo-French entente of 1904 was regarded has been dealt with in another chapter. Both the National Review and the Times looked

1. National Review, Vol. 40, pp. 9-10, Sept. 1902.
2. Ibid., Vol. 40, pp. 163-65, Oct. 1902.
3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 110, p. 719, July 3, 1902.
4. Ibid., Vol. 66, pp. 221-231, Feb. 8, 1899.
5. Ibid., Vol. 79, p. 223, for Government's attitude toward German Anglo-phobia, and Vol. 80, Feb. 16, 1900, and pp. 34 and 918, Mar. 15 and 20, 1900.

upon it as a direct setoff to Germany, an obstruction in the way of Germany's schemes, but by no means a barrier. Amazed as the latter was at the way in which Germany took the entente cordiale, it nevertheless feared that that country was only waiting her chance. Mr. Balfour chose to regard it as a panacea for the Morocco question at least. The Review was jubilant over the propitious effect public opinion had had on the Ministry's apathy. The question now was whether they would have the good sense and courage to follow up their advantage.

The crisis which arose in the Far East and the ensuing Russo-Japanese War was regarded by both periodicals as due at least in part to Germany's insidious encouragement of Russia. The Government put a clamp down on any such suggestions made in parliament. The Times and the Review, however, maintained that the emperor was endeavoring to concentrate Russia's attention on the Orient so that at home Germany could strike a blow at the Dual Alliance and the Entente Cordiale. The way in which Germany regarded Japan after her victories was the attitude of the Power that "had backed the wrong horse and had to make up for lost time." There was not a thing to which Germany was too low to stoop in the matter of international intrigue.^{1 and 2}

In 1905-6 the storm which had been slowly gathering since the announcement of the Entente Cordiale burst. Morocco was the scene of the new coup d'etat. Here was a fresh example of indirect diplomacy, a repetition of the Kruger telegram of 1896. The respect which the kaiser had for smaller states when his own interests were not concerned was literally amazing. The attitude of the Times toward this new stroke in diplomacy was one of distinct annoyance coupled with the superiority which comes with prescience. It was the belated answer of the German Emperor to the Entente Cordiale. As the Review also said, the kaiser

1. National Review, Vol. 46, p. 178, Oct. 1905.

2. Times' Weekly, May 6, June 3, and June 15, 1904.

believed that the moment had come, now that Russia was temporarily impotent, to destroy the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France and to stampede the latter into an alliance with Germany (on Germany's term) while he calmly resumed the keys to Downing Street which the unsophisticated Liberal Cabinet would very meekly surrender. It was the kaiser's latest "pilgrimage of passion".¹

The opinions of the Conservatives and of the new Liberal regime were united on the attitude which England must assume. Only a united nation could relieve the highly charged political atmosphere. The Review was not satisfied with the way in which the party leaders handled the question; Balfour's attitude was too lukewarm and he was not conducting an opposition worthy of the name. Grey alone of the new regime had been impervious to the prompting of the "pro-Boer" Liberals, who were advancing Germany's "legitimate claims".² All of the Conservatives maintained that adherence to France was the only policy to pursue. Now was no time for the legend of "Perfide Albion" to be revived. The Conservative leaders, like Lord Lansdowne, also put forth the argument of England's own claims in Morocco which must be protected.³

The Review really welcomed the opportunity to lay Germany bare, it was a chance "to save all Europe from the German yoke and of preventing Prussian dictatorship from Antwerp to Constantinople and from Kronstadt to Gibraltar."⁴ Like the Times, it saw that there was never any real danger of war during the entire six or seven months; rather it was an example of a bully's policy of bluff.⁵ Fortunately the kaiser had miscalculated his ground. The attack which he had begun so gloriously by demanding and securing the resignation of M. Delcasse failed ingloriously in the Conference at Algeiras. The length to

1. Nat'l Review, Vol. 45, 46, 47, July to April, 1906, "Episodes of the Month". Times' Weekly, July 14, Oct. 20, Sept. 1, Dec. 1, 8, 22, 1905; Jan. 17, 1906.
2. Nat'l Review, Vol. 47, pp. 354-5, May, 1906. (Feb. 23, April 6, 1906.
3. Hansard, Vol. 149, p. 241, and p. 873, July 11 & July 15, 1905.
4. Nat'l Review, Vol. 47, p. 353, May, 1906.
5. Ibid. P. 32, Mar. 1906, also Times' Weekly July 14, 1905.

which that assembly had been drawn out was due entirely to the unwillingness of the kaiser to admit his own defeat; instead of shining in that dignified assembly as the dictator of Europe, he had found himself surrounded by a concert of determined Powers whose very union was proof of his ignoble failure. Austria alone had proved herself subservient to German aims. Instead of setting the nations by the ear, there was even talk of a new alliance between Russia and England. The missile which the kaiser had aimed at Great Britain had proved a boomerang. England alone stood assured of reaping the benefits of the plot he had so carefully laid. Was it possible that the kaiser was being found out?

The pity of it was, the Review argued, that he had been found out, but that England refused to see it. In fact certain Englishmen were happy only when they were being "hoodwinked" by the Teuton. Their policy was "to let bygones be bygones", they had no knowledge of how to press an advantage. Instead of abating the torrent of vituperations which he heaped on the heads of the Germans, Mr. Maxse increased his fervor and added the conservative party leaders as well as the Liberals to his list of those who needed a mental rebirth. He now declared that the Tory leaders were compromising their own party; they must remember the rank and file did not exist for the Central Office, but that the latter was a public servant. He had no time for that type of statesmen who invariably saw colour de rose because colour de rose was a pleasant thing to look upon. The guiding mottoes of the minimisers was "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof" and "Let us take no thought for the morrow", maxims which enabled them to shirk every disagreeable development calling for intellectual effort or political action. "Theirs is a creed of "muddling through", which is responsible for every British disaster since they muddled away the American

1. National Review, Vol. 47, April and May, 1906: Times' Weekly, Feb. 23 and April 6, 1906. There was no discussion in parliament, only brief statements of the situation on Feb. 19, 1906, Vol. 152, pp. 38, 153 and 166.

colonies, and that they failed to lose South Africa was due entirely to the accidental and unwelcome presence in their sacred councils of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner, neither of whom is given to "minimizing".¹ One good result, however, had come out of the Moroccan crisis, Germany at least had seen that England was not "perfidious Albion", she did not like Germany take advantage of her allies.² England was still hated, but she was no longer despised.

The Times took a much more composed view of the crisis. During the months between the visit to Tangier and the calling of the Algeiras Conference it had been working passionately for England not to allow this opportunity to slip of showing Germany her relative position in the world. It had advocated firmness; England must not allow France, whose interests were on the verge of being sacrificed to the kaiser's acquisitive passion, to lose heart. It had, moreover, fiercely resented any insinuations on the part of Germany that England would show the "white feather".³ Now Great Britain had helped to defeat Germany's plans. It was not gentlemanly to carry the issue any further. It was very likely that Germany's hands were tied in so far as Morocco was concerned.⁴ At any rate England could best guard her interests by being impervious to German demands for British friendship which invariably came after a crisis in which the kaiser had been defeated. This surmise on the part of the Weekly was soon realized. The Deutsche Revue which represented to an exceptional degree the views of the highest responsible statesmen soon began making overtures. The answer of the Times was that in spite of a slight rapprochement between the two Powers which had come with the relaxation of the extreme tension preceding the Algeiras Conference, there could be no entente,⁵ that would be simply to admit the hegemony of Germany in Europe.

1. Nat'l Review, Vol. 46, pp. 187-88, Oct. 1905; Vol. 47, pp. 885-86, Aug. 1906.
2. Ibid., Vol. 47, pp. 535-7, July, 1906.
3. Times' Weekly, Dec. 8, 1905.
4. Ibid., Nov. 6, 1906.
5. Ibid., Sept. 7, 1906.

In parliament the only interest on the part of Conservative members which was openly expressed was in the case of Mr. Ashby, Mr. Lonsdale, and in one instance Mr. Balfour, who inquired not with regard to the Morocco question, but as to the interest Germany was displaying in the case of the Turkish-Egyptian boundary dispute.¹ Questions on Morocco were limited to inquiries about the acceptance of the Algeiras agreement by the Moroccan sultan, the protection of British property, and the granting of Moroccan contracts to Germany instead of British companies.² Discussions were zealously avoided.

1907 still found Germany tampering in Moroccan affairs, but the Conservatives, save for the National Review, chose to ignore it as a matter which concerned France and Germany alone and upheld the Liberals in their attitude toward the Franco-German agreement of 1909 in regard to special interests in Morocco. It convinced the Times, however, that the question was not yet settled. Germany was doing her best to stir up mutiny in that wretched country. "She had no regard for Morocco, none for her promises to France".³ All England could hope for was an orientation of German policy.

The surmises that Germany had not yet shown her hand were all too true. There was to be one last blow aimed at the Entente Cordiale in Morocco. Again Germany's need of a port was to be made the nominal aim, with internal disturbances which endangered German commercial interests, as a pretext. The dispatch of the gunboat, the Panther, to Agadir in July, 1911, to protect German firms against the revolutionary bands at Fez, as the German ambassador at London said, opened up the whole question anew. It came at a time of severe party conflict in home affairs in England, but, as Balfour said, in spite of sharp differences in domestic politics, the two parties would unite on foreign

1. Hansard, Vol. 156, 4th series, p. 972, May 7, 1906.

2. Ibid., Vol. 165, p. 609, Nov. 20, 1906, Vol. 172, p. 1563, Vol. 181, P. 842, Aug. 21, 1907.

3. Times' Weekly, July 12, 1907.

policy. No one outside need expect to count on these differences for advancement. Contrary to the situation in 1906, the Agadir crisis received adequate discussion in both houses of parliament. In the House of Lords the Marquis of Lansdowne staunchly upheld Lord Morley in his statements that England was, in spite of what the radical Liberals declared, playing fair by Germany. The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 was not anti-German. Great Britain desired to be friendly to all countries, but it could not be denied that Germany had extreme, if not illegitimate ambitions.¹ Bonar Law made the most important answer to Sir Edward Grey's statement in explanation of the crisis. He declared that England's only concern had been the peace of Europe and the maintenance of her own rights. He cherished only the best of feelings toward the German people and he did not believe that a war with that nation was inevitable. The same remark had been made of Russia twenty-five or thirty years before.² The Morocco question once settled, one source of friction at least would be removed. "We do not grudge Germany.....her place in the sun. We do not wish to stand in the way of her legitimate aspirations, and we shall never show ourselves anxious to block her path merely to prevent her becoming a greater nation than she is. We shall never do so. The right honorable Gentleman (Sir Edward Grey) made another statement with which I also agree. He pointed out quite truly that we do not desire to extend our Empire further.....I believe I am speaking for the nation at large. We do not desire accessions of territory. Our responsibilities are great enough already. We have no wish to increase them.³ The one wish by which all my Friends behind myself are actuated, and I believe it is true of every man, it is true of the whole nation, our one desire, our one ambition, is not to enlarge but to build up our Empire."⁴

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 10 (H. of L.) pp. 385-90, Nov. 28, 1911.

2. Ibid., Vol. 32 (H. of C.) pp. 67-8, Nov. 27, 1911.

3. (Bonar Law was leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons)

4. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 32 (H. of C.) pp. 73-4, Nov. 27, 1911.

The Times did not cherish any tender views of Germany's ambitions. However, it regarded this incident not so much a stroke dealt for the acquisition of territory as an attempt to sound the European diplomatic situation. It did not agree with those who said that Germany wanted to establish herself at Agadir, nor with those who believed that she was attempting to open Paris money markets to German transactions. It was really nothing more than an "audacious and not very skilful or judicious bluff", possibly not without its electioneering motives.¹ The Times was extremely irritated over the fact that the German Press was exhibiting curiosity as to how England would take the incident. Such speculation, it declared, showed complete ignorance of English character. Just because relations had been better during the last five or six years was no reason why England should desert France. England's foreign policy would be the same under George V as under Edward VII; she would always act up to the letter of her treaties with France.² During the vacillating period of negotiations, its only hope was that the whole affair would happily end in a diplomatic version of "Much ado about nothing". The settlement which vindicated France's complete right to a Moroccan protectorate met, therefore, with no dissent.³

The National Review had been extremely depressed over the way foreign affairs had been going during the early months of 1911. The movement for the slackening of armaments, and the agitation over the reciprocity agreement between the United States and Canada had revived all of Mr. Maxse's old furor which the quietus of the years 1909 and 1910 had subdued. Grey had again become a "wishy-washy sentimentalist", Asquith was going about in the idealistic way of a man "who never knows anything he doesn't want to know."⁴ The crisis

1. Times' Weekly, July 21, 1911.

2. Ibid, July 7, 1911.

3. Ibid, Sept. 15th and Nov. 10, 1911.

4. National Review, Vol. 57, 359-371, May, 1911.

put Mr. Maxse into a new state of rage and fear lest England submit to it without protest. At first he believed his fears were justified. This new evidence of German treachery called for an overwhelming naval demonstration, but the "English mandarins chose to diplomatize". These "mandarins" of both parties were really happy only when they were allowed to shut their eyes and bury their heads in the sand. Germany was applying the screw to France and were that nation composed of Balfours, Lansdownes, and Curzons, she would certainly surrender. In England the lack of national patriotism among her leading public men was appalling.¹ The results of the crisis in so far as England was concerned met with a certain amount of approval from Mr. Maxse. The "sloshers and toshers" had almost won the day, it seemed as if England were ready to take anything from Germany lying down, but fortunately the administration had seen fit to take a bold stand at France's side. They had had the sense to follow out the policy which Lloyd George had outlined in his Mansion House Speech of July 21, 1911, which after all had been the only wise utterance that esteemed gentleman had ever made.² By January, 1912, Sir Edward Grey had redeemed himself in the Review's eyes. What Germany wanted to do now was to bring about his humiliation, he must be a second M. Delcasse and Germany would soon insist upon having his "head on a charger".³

There was no instance after 1911-12 where the Conservatives could bring in any direct evidence of German chicanery until the outbreak of the war. The political atmosphere, however, was still charged as a result of the naval rivalry to which no good Unionist could shut his eyes. Officially relations even improved. Germany's conduct during the Balkan Wars was all that it should be. She had made active efforts to support the Concert of Europe. The dispute

1. National Review, Vol. 57, 359-371, May, 1911.
2. Ibid, Vol. 60, p. 341, Nov., 1912.
3. Ibid, Vol. 58, pp. 682-83, Jan. 1912.

over the Bagdad Railway came to a satisfactory settlement at least from an official point of view. Only the National Review refused to take on a softened attitude; it had had experience with Germany at rest and with Germany in action and it did not know but what it preferred the latter state. The talk of a German entente, however, which the radical Liberals advocated, never met with any serious consideration in Parliament.¹ Terms of friendship were quite enough; besides, as Lord Lansdowne said, it would upset the new balance of power which was so much preferable to the old cumbersome Concert of Europe. England could ill afford to let her friendship with France and Russia slacken, because it would mean that she would stand alone in the Councils of Europe once more and that policy was not a safe one to revive until the millenium was at hand.² The old tirades against Germany disappeared from the editorial columns of the Times. That journal had relaxed its old feeling of tension when the kaiser recognized the Triple Entente as an essential feature in Continental diplomacy, but the lurking suspicion of danger close at hand remained. On the sea at least the reckoning had not come.³ As for the National Review its editorials were more than ever fraught with violent language and insinuations. The kaiser was now as before prowling around Europe and the world at large looking for a new spot, a new situation in which to don his "shining armour". Yet Liberals were talking of an understanding with Germany because it would help the "trade boom". While Germany was feverishly accelerating her preparations for war, the English pacifists were "sleeping quietly in their beds or hymning the praises of that great, loving Christian, kindred community across the North Sea that asked only for their affections."⁴

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 37, pp. 1679 and 1856, May, 1912. Vol. 41, p. 1952, July 10, 1912.
2. Ibid, Vol. 10 (H. of S.) p. 390, Nov. 28, 1911.
3. Times' Weekly, July 12, 1912.
4. National Review, Vol. 60, p. 880, Feb., 1913.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND NAVAL RIVALRY, 1895-1914.

Germany's naval ambitions were one of the outstanding reasons for the suspicion with which the Conservatives regarded her. If there is anything that will arouse the ire of the British Imperialist, it is the pretension on the part of any other Power to dispute Great Britain's naval supremacy. They declare that England's insular position demands that she be undisputed on the seas. She depends on her empire for food and raw materials; hence her connections with her colonies must be unchallenged and unbroken. The danger of invasion at home requires that England build up around herself a naval bulwark. There is every reason in the world why she should never relinquish her hold on the sea. They argue that her position is unique; no other Power is confronted by the same problems, therefore to no other Power is control over the seas so vital a concern. A nation such as Germany needs little more than a powerful mercantile marine. Her interests abroad are not imperialistic because Germany has nothing in the way of an over-seas empire. A few meagre colonies and some coaling stations are all that she has to protect. Her foreign commerce requires a navy strong enough to protect it, but not large enough to alarm or menace any other Power. Germany's principal military concern is a strong army that can protect her badly defined boundaries at home from attack. Her position on land is analogous to Great Britain's on the sea. For the one to dispute the other's supremacy is absurd as well as futile. The "land rat" and the "water rat" of Bismarck's day have particular spheres of interest which ought to prevent a disagreeable clash. England has no desire to dispute Germany's military strength. In fact there should be no thought of rivalry. Germany has needs different from those of England, so why should there be any talk of conflict?

This was the argument which the Conservatives put forward early in the twentieth century before Germany had made any adequate proofs of what her policy was to be. The argument in so far as England was concerned was the same in 1914 as it was in 1900; England still had no desire to dispute Germany's military strength. But by 1914 they had realized that the intentions of Germany were not so amicable. Germany without a doubt did intend to challenge Great Britain's naval supremacy. So that when the Liberals were benignantly urging naval holidays and deploring the expense of naval programs, the Conservatives replied that a rest from naval expenditure would indeed be desirable, but for Great Britain to presume that she could convince Germany of the fact was ludicrous. The latter desired a navy strong enough to dispute the navy supremacy of Great Britain and her sole reason for desiring such a navy was because she hated England and wanted to bring about her downfall.

England had maintained her naval supremacy unchallenged since the eighteenth century, when she had brought about the defeat of her last rival in the colonial field, France. Spain and Holland, the commercial rivals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had already succumbed. For a century England was destined to enjoy her position. Then toward the close of the nineteenth century her two "hereditary" enemies, France and Russia, began to show signs of naval activity. Out of the fear that her position was again to be threatened, England found recourse to her policy of the "Two Power Standard". England must have a navy as large as the combined naval strength of France and Russia with as much in excess of this as was deemed advisable. The standard was not a difficult one to maintain as neither Russia nor France were strong enough or in a position to dispute England's supremacy. For them active or acute rivalry was not "worth the candle".

In 1898 any alarm which the Conservatives felt in regard to Great Britain's naval strength was the result of an attempt on Russia's part to accelerate her

ship building program. The answer of the party leaders in the administration¹ was that the situation was not acute, but needed watching. This was the general consensus of opinion among the various groups. The Times made a statement² to this effect. The Review declared that the increase in the English naval estimates of 1898 was pointed directly at Russia. It added that it was glad to note that the First Lord of the Admiralty was no longer a dinner bell.³ Germany's program of the year 1898 and 1900 was not looked upon with any serious concern. It was the result of Germany's alarming inflation and probably very short-lived.⁴ The kaiser was laboring under an epidemic of excitement and very little attention could be given to his startling speeches on the navy. In 1901 the Times assumed a very calm attitude toward German increases and remarked that "the kaiser rightly deems that a strong navy is essential to a great commercial⁵ and colonial world-power such as he has resolved Germany is to become. In 1902 its attitude was much less self-assured, but not openly hostile. It was too absurd to think that England's position could be menaced. "Their (the German) interests on the sea are undoubtedly large and growing. But the sea is not to them as it is to ourselves the ever-present and dominant feature in their economic and political outlook..... It is idle to deny that the recent and prospective expansion of the Germany navy is a matter of very serious concern to our country."⁶ The National Review took a slightly different view of the matter. England could afford to look upon the German Navy Bill with sympathetic interest, because it was the result of a highly inflated policy. It had shot up very suddenly, but that did not follow that it would keep on at the same rate. Next time the Reichstag might listen more carefully to Herr Bebel and less to

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 57, 179-81, May 3, 1898.

2. Times' Weekly, July 1, 1898.

3. Nat'l Review, Vol. 30, pp. 676-77, Jan. 1897; Vol. 31, pp. 781-88, Aug. 1898.

4. Ibid. (Note a): Times' Weekly, Nov. 8, 1901.

5. Times Weekly, Feb. 15, 1901.

6. Ibid. Feb. 7, 1902.

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the kaiser.

By 1902 the Boer War and Continental Anglophobia had revealed to England not only her isolation, but her fearful military state. Reforms were necessary, both in the army and the navy. England must devote less time to athletics and arouse her sense of public duty. The ambitions of the German Navy League had now been realized. England's answer, Mr. Maxse said, had better be an increased membership in her own navy league.² The Times said that the British navy must be restored to its former position of practical invincibility. England had better remember the German Emperor's famous expression, "Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser",³ or, as the Review always said, what was even more ominous, the words of Herr Bassermann, the Leader of the National Liberal Party in the Reichstag and one of Von Bulow's mainstays, "In our attitude toward England we must keep cool and until we have a strong fleet it would be a mistake to allow ourselves to be driven into a hostile policy toward England."⁴ The increasing dissatisfaction which the Liberals felt toward the burden of naval expenditure met with the response that no one derived "any satisfaction from the colossal estimates..... except so far as he regards them as the indispensable insurance for national and imperial interests of infinitely greater magnitude."⁵

The Conservative Party during its regime had carried out a consistent policy in the matter of naval increases. What the attitude of the Liberal Party on the subject was^{was} already known. Under its administration were[^] England's interests going to be adequately safeguarded?⁶ As the National Review said in 1906, it would be interesting to know how England's Empire was going to hold against "Haldanism".⁷ The talk of disarmament which arose even

1. National Review, Vol. 35, pp. 714-15, July, 1900.
2. Ibid, Vol. 39, pp. 11-14, March, 1902.
3. Times' Weekly, Oct. 2, 1903.
4. National Review, Vol. 40, p. 670, Jan., 1903.
5. Times' Weekly, Mar. 4, 1904.
6. Ibid., Aug. 3, 1906.
7. National Review, Vol. 42, p. 725, July, 1906.

before the second Hague Conference convened, realized for the Conservatives their worst hopes. Only a bitter fight could save England. Discussions in Parliament and out took on an added fervour. As both Salisbury and Disraeli had maintained, disarmament, Lansdowne said, was excellent in principle but impossible of attainment. England could not take the lead and propose that the subject be discussed in the Peace Conference. If England must have added security, let her turn to alliances instead.¹ Viscount Goschen said the success which England had had in her policy in Morocco and the Far East did not warrant any reduction. The Conservative attitude was not a "swagger policy" as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann had dubbed it. Nor was theirs a policy aimed at Germany any more than it was aimed at any Power. Germany had an Imperial ambition, the fulfillment of which she regarded as a sacred mission. It was not very likely that she would arrest her naval or military development. Those who thought England could do so in such an instance were living in a fool's paradise.² Earl Cawdor, who had devised a naval program in 1905 which had met with the full satisfaction of the National Review, was now advocating a greatly increased program. England was sooner or later to be challenged on the seas and any dispute could break out sooner than dreadnoughts could be built. It was best for England to be prepared on an instant's notice.³

The worst fears of the Review and the Times were that Germany was basing her naval policy on the assumption that the Liberals were less acute to the situation than their Tory predecessors. The attitude of Germany at the Peace Conference which, the National Review said, she changed into a war parley, was only a proof of that.⁴ Moreover, every reduction in the British estimates met with a corresponding increase in the German. England would have to realize

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 157, pp. 1517-46, May 25, 1906.

2. Ibid, Vol. 162, pp. 315-18, July 30, 1906.

3. Ibid, pp. 293-98, July 30, 1906.

4. National Review, Vol. 50, 167, Oct. 1907. Times' Weekly, Mar. 13, 1908.

that the problem which confronted her was unique; she had not had such a foe since the days of Napoleon Bonaparte. Germany knew that the average English citizen was so different from the German citizen whose whole conduct was based on duty, obligation, and sacrifice to the Government, that he would resent the increased expenditure and probably force it to be abandoned. It was to be a conflict between unequal forces and it was this reason that Germany was making her "gigantic gamble in sea-power".¹

The "Tweedmouth Letter" scandal was regarded as proof enough by the Times and the National Review that the kaiser was working on the weakness of the Liberal Party to his own advantage. The former, which had brought about the revelation, pronounced it one of the best examples of Germany's indirect diplomacy.² The latter was enraged at the fact that Balfour and Lansdowne had allowed the opportunity to slip. How long was Germany to be allowed to besmirch English honor?³ The Opposition should have demanded the publication of the letter; instead it had agreed with Lord Rosebery that indiscreet as the act was, the wisest course was to ignore it. Lord Lansdowne, however, refused to regard it with Lord Rosebery as mere "banter".⁴ It was rather an example of the extent to which England had fallen in Germany's eyes; the kaiser felt that he could induce England to lower her estimates still more.

The extreme tension of the years 1908 to 1909 caused the Conservatives to reinforce their demands for the maintenance of the "Two-Power Standard" which, they declared, was already slipping away. In Parliament only a few of the more daring members, such as Arthur Lee, dared to say openly that Germany was preparing to attack England, but there was nevertheless plenty of evidence that she meant to threaten England's naval supremacy. Germany was willing to pay the

1. National Review, Vol. 50, p. 678, Jan. 1907.

2. Times' Weekly, Mar. 13, 1908.

3. National Review, Apr. 1908, Vol. 51, pp. 169-80.

4. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 185, pp. 1067-75, March 9, 1908.

the price and England must not be so disloyal as to refuse. Social reforms were needed, but England's very life depended on her navy. ¹ Balfour, who attempted to decry the theory of invasion, said that the Government's policy was rightly one which strove for good relations with all countries. Good relations meant possible economics, but certainly they did not mean a letting down on national security. In order to prevent overstrained relations with Germany, the best way for England was to follow the former's example and adopt a program of acceleration without saying anything about it. Germany was reaping the advantages of England's divided situation. In 1909 Samuel Roberts drew attention to the preamble of Germany's Naval Act of 1900 and said that it was futile to deny that she was ^{not} acting on that principle. England's responsibilities were increasing instead of decreasing. In 1912 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would terminate and if Japan decided she did not need England longer, the patrol of the Yellow Sea and the east coast of India would have to be resumed again. England did not need to assume that Germany had diabolical intentions, but she must awaken at once to the realization of her vast ambitions. ²

The Times in addition to its other arguments for the maintenance of the "Two Power Standard", was calling attention to the type of ships Germany was building. "The German Navy is being increased with feverish haste, but the structure is perhaps more significant than the number of ships. They are not built to defend commerce or to carry on war at a distance. They are not like ours, ready to go anywhere. They are constructed to form a striking force at a short range." ³ It also declared that if England continued her vacillating policy, the result would be that acceleration would be hindered perhaps when it was most needed, because the ship firms had been starved out. ⁴

1. Hansard, 4th series, pp. 418-55, Mar. 2, 1908. Speakers, Arthur Lee, Sir Gilbert Parker and Arthur Balfour.
2. Ibid, 5th series, Vol. II, pp. 974-76, Mar. 16, 1909, pp. 1103-1133, Mar. 17, 1909, pp. 39-42, p. 126, Mar. 26, 1909. Conservative speakers, Balfour, Parker Arthur Lee, Samuel Roberts, Frederic Bowles.
3. Times' Weekly, Mar. 13, 1908. 4. Ibid, Mar. 19, 1909.

The National Review was devoting most of its time to naval propaganda, but its guiding principle was the statement which Herr Bassermann had made early in the century.¹ It was pleased over the unusual zest which the Conservatives displayed in 1908 and 1909. "In a way the kaiser was England's best friend because his truculence kept England from falling to sleep. Much as he would hate to make his influence soporific, his words, though suave, belied his actions."²

The Haldane Mission of 1912 and the desire of the Liberals for a European holiday in naval armament building in 1913 occasioned the last violent outburst of sentiment on naval expenditure before the war. The Conservatives were furious. Bonar Law, the most important speaker in the House of Commons, said that the incident was an outrage. Why should Haldane of all persons be sent, he who was known to be a friend of Germany's? Why was not Sir Edward Grey sent? He was the logical choice. England must pay no attention to such overtures. Her efforts must be devoted to the upbuilding of a supreme navy - Pacificism was all right in its place, but German propaganda ought to show England where that country was tending.³ The Times declared that Germany's refusal ought to have been a foregone conclusion; her Navy Acts were the best advice she could give England, so Great Britain need pay very little attention to her offer to exchange ideas on naval plans.⁴ The National Review was so disgruntled over the dispatch of Haldane, the "Potsdam disciple" to Germany that it could only gasp. Why must England pay any attention to the "eternal whining" for disarmament? Could she not instead listen to the cunning speeches of German professors, pastors, merchants... as to their devotion to England?⁵ There was end to British credulity.⁷⁷⁶

1. National Review, Vol. 52, p. 172-74, Oct. 1908.

2. Ibid., Vol. 51, p. 525, June, 1908.

3. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 34, p. 26, Feb. 14, 1912.

4. Times' Weekly, Apr. 7, 1911, Nov. 29, 1912.

5. National Review, Vol. 59, pp. 189-93, Mar. 1912., Vol. 58, pp. 1 and 4, Sept. 1911.

The discussions in Parliament after the Haldane-Cassell Mission are perhaps the most interesting. The question of the abandonment of the Mediterranean by the English fleet and the protection of British interests by the Russian and French Navies came up. To this Bonar Law objected vigorously. It was not enough for England to be even a naval Power in the Mediterranean, she must be strong enough to break any combination against the British fleet. She had no right to withdraw her ships there as she did in the Pacific. She must be adequately secure in both the Mediterranean and the North Sea. ¹ Sir Charles Beresford shared this opinion, but Balfour deprecated it, saying that to permit France and Russia to help bear the burden would be to show England's trust in the Triple Alliance. ² In 1914 the question was renewed and Aubrey Herbert made a rather lengthy speech on the matter which makes up in spirit what it lacks in rhetoric. England, he said, does not desire to use her fleet for any aggressive purpose any more than a person would desire to use a fire brigade aggressively, but she must maintain her fleet to protect her empire, to keep her position in Europe, and under all circumstances to guarantee the food supply for the British Isles. The Mediterranean was the keynote to England's entire foreign policy, the "wedding" of her imperial and foreign interests, hence a crucial position which must never be abandoned. ³

On no question, perhaps, were the three groups of Conservatives so at one as on the naval problem. The empire had been bought at the price of huge sacrifices, it had been secured, maintained, and protected as a result of naval supremacy. England as "mistress of the seas" had become a tradition in Conservative as well as Liberal circles. The difference in the party views lay not so much in the idea that Great Britain should or should not abandon her supremacy, but went right back to the emphasis which the two parties laid on domestic as compared to foreign affairs. The Liberals were willing "to buy off"

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 40, pp. 2031-35, July 10, 1912.

2. Ibid, Vol. 41, pp. 878-80, July 22, 1912.

3. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 59, pp. 2156-62, Mar. 18, 1914.

Germany, to compromise with her because they deplored an increase in the expenditures for defense; the Conservatives were determined to relinquish England's position only after grave sacrifices and military resistance.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND ENGLAND'S POSITION IN ASIATIC TURKEY.

Germany has had her eyes turned toward the East as a field for expansion ever since the last decade of the nineteenth century. The Anatolian Railway concession dates back to the year 1888. Since then Germany's strides have been long and rapid. The valley of the Tigris and Euphrates has been her ultimate goal with a view to an eventual outlet on the Persian Gulf. To realize her aims she has had to pierce regions over which she has had no control whatsoever. In Turkey her reception has been surprisingly warm, but her plans for appeasing the turbulent little Balkan states, particularly Serbia, into granting her an undisputed transit way have not been so successful. Men such as Gibbons attribute Germany's success in Turkey to the innate sympathy which the Teuton feels for the Oriental; the latter's autocratic system appeals¹ instinctively to the former's love of domination. Whether or not this be true, at any rate the Germans have turned their faces eastward with a natural desire for expansion supplemented by an even more natural desire of securing the best material in the shape of the richest district at hand.

England was not looking with unmingled satisfaction at Germany's progress. These "growing pains" of their North Sea neighbor were beginning to affect all thinking Englishmen with concern for their position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. It was felt that Germany had slipped in much too easily into the place England had vacated in Turkey in 1880 when she turned her back on Disraeli's policy. Coupled with this feeling was the fear that German advance into Asia Minor might threaten England's interests in Egypt and the old dread of a land attack from the north was revived. The crux of the whole situation,

1. Gibbons, H.A., The New Map of Europe, Ch. 3, p. 58.

however, lay in the Persian Gulf, where England had erected for herself a sphere of influence in which she would not allow anyone to interfere. Consequently when Germany's first concession for the Bagdad Railway in 1899 as a result of the kaiser's visit to Turkey in 1898, the Conservative administration took steps to strengthen its position on the Gulf by reinsuring itself with the Sheikh of Koweit. By an agreement of 1900 that tribal ruler agreed not to cede any of his territory in return for a guarantee of British protection. In 1901 an Anglo-Turkish convention practically confirmed the Sheikh's independence.¹ Once, however, England's position on the Gulf had been reinforced, Conservative opinion differed as to the attitude which England should take toward the German project, which, it was soon enough realized, was a very material one. At one extreme stood the Ultras, men of Mr. Balfour's and Lord Lansdowne's stamp; at the other the extremists, men of a type best represented by Gibson Bowles and Mr. Maxse. The attitude of the Times swung over from one extreme to the other, according as its Anti-German sympathies tempered its outlook on foreign policy. At first not a trace of opposition was revealed by that journal. In 1899 it declared with apparent satisfaction that Germany had succeeded in Turkey where Russia and England had failed.² It laid her success to the fact that she had not played too palpably the role of expectant heir to the "Sick Man",³ a failing of which Russia had always been guilty. It went much further in its approval of German policy and frankly sanctioned Germany's proposal that she would welcome the participation of British and French capitalists in promoting the scheme and would give equal rights and fair play to all concerned. In fact there was no Power into whose hands the Times would rather see the enterprise fall, because

1. Schmitt, B. E., England and Germany, p. 274.
2. Times' Weekly, editorial for Dec. 1, 1899.
3. Ibid.

there was no one who would make such substantial advances in the direction of England's liberal economic policy. "Both the establishment of flourishing German settlements and the general amelioration of the conditions of life among the people of the country which the existence of these settlements and of the railway will inevitably bring about, are distinct advantages to a great trading nation like ours."¹

By 1902 the Times had changed color and was not quite so sure of the benefit of the road to England. This change must be attributed largely to the transformation which German antagonism during the Boer War had worked, as the firman between the Turkish and German governments had not yet been concluded. Speaking of the project in January, 1902, it said that after all transportation by way of the Suez Canal was just as efficient and much cheaper. "Politically the scheme stands on the same footing as a good many others. It demands our attentive consideration. We shall consider if we are wise, all of its probable effects and take measures in good time to forestall any injury to our interests. But so long as we maintain our own superiority, we can afford to regard it not merely with equanimity, but with good will."²

Not until 1903, however, did the project attract any considerable amount of interest. In parliament the subject was touched upon only enough to enable the reader to determine in vague outline coming Conservative policy. In response to queries in 1899 as to the German concession, Brodrick, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would give no information further than to say that British interests were being protected.³ When alarm was shown over the fact that Russia had secured a concession in 1900 which gave her railway privileges in the north along the Black Sea similar to German's concession in southern Asia Minor, and that England was in danger of being banished from these

1. Weekly, editorial for Dec. 1, 1899.

2. See Weekly, editorial for Jan. 17, 1902.

3. See Hansard, 4th series, H. of C., Vols. 70, p. 529, vol. 72, p. 629, vol. 78.

spheres of interest and of being shut out from advancement of every sort, the only answer was an emphatic no, England was in no danger at all.¹ Chided over the fact that England was not showing the same zeal as Germany in securing Turkish contracts, the Government answered that British capitalists would have to guard their own interests; Turkey had the right to grant her contracts freely to whom she chose.² The attitude of the Government was one of apparent apathy, which if not real, was carefully simulated.

The National Review, with its usual Teutophobia, was giving England warning. There was a real danger, it stated, that Koweit would become the Kiaochau of the Persian Gulf.³ Germany's advance was so insidious that England was in danger of being completely deluded. Any war scare that the former could arouse, she would seize upon as a means of distracting England's attention from the real sphere of interest, Persia and Asiatic Turkey.⁴ By the winter of 1902-1903 both the Review and the Times were endeavoring to arouse interest by reviewing England's crucial position in the Persian Gulf.

Germany had no sooner obtained her concession for the road (March, 1903) than she began to be alarmed over the financial end of the scheme and as a result came to hawk her project over Europe. Strangely enough her proposal for British cooperation met with unexpected favor in the case of two members of the cabinet, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour. The attitude of these men, although it shows an untoward amount of credulity in Germany's good faith, reveals an acumen and a desire for England's welfare which are not to be overlooked. It was their belief that England now had an opportunity to clinch the situation and make an end to the question of the Persian Gulf and Germany's status once and for all. Their solution, which would have been a very logical

1. Hansard, 4th series, H. of C., Vol. 87, p. 170, July 31, 1900.

2. Ibid, Vol. 84, pp. 626-7, June 21, 1900.

3. National Review, Feb. 1903, Vol. 40, p. 858.

4. Ibid, Nov. 1902, Vol. 40, 325.

one, had the party in question been a Power other than Germany, whose ambitions would brook no restraints, rested on the basis of internationalization.

England, Lord Lansdowne informed the German and French ambassadors at London in March, 1902, would not look upon the project with unfriendly eyes provided British capital and interests were placed on an equal footing with that of other Powers.¹ To the three conditions which Germany intended to impose,

firstly, that the British Government should not object to a reasonable increase (3%) of the Turkish Customs duties, of which a part was to be used as a kilometeric guarantee for the railroad; secondly, that if the Bagdad Railroad proved a shorter and substantially better route, it should be used for the conveyance of British mails to India on terms to be agreed on at a later date; thirdly, that England should use her good offices in securing Koweit as a terminus for the road, Balfour and Lansdowne declared England could offer no reasonable

objection.² Great Britain held the trump card, Koweit. The fact that Germany was so insistent upon that port as a terminal proved that it was the best and that she would go a long way to secure it. Through it England could enforce her demand that the road be made, not a German project, but an international scheme for development. As to the increase of the Turkish Customs duties, that was a plan which England had already urged upon Turkey in return for a guarantee of reform in the Customs system. The question of the mails was a subject which could be dealt with more competently when the road was finished. The thing for England to do now was to seize this opportunity for cooperation in developing the magnificent resources of the Tigris and Euphrates Valley. Was it not better to internationalize the railroad which no nation could afford to build alone than to permit the shortest route to India to fall into the hands of French and German capitalists?³

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 120, p. 1247, April 7, 1903.

2. Ibid, Vol. 120, p. 1247-8, April 7, 1903.

3. Ibid, see complete debate, Vol. 120, pp. 1358-77, Apr. 8, 1903.

Mr. Balfour's announcement met with a storm of protest both within and outside of parliament. Sir Charles Dilke and Lord Fitzmaurice, both prominent Liberals, were among the few to support the premier.¹ The crux of the whole question, the opponents said, was whether England chose to be outwitted by Germany or not. Internationalization was a scheme to which Germany never would consent. Gibson Bowles in a very heated argument defied Balfour to prove that the Bagdad Railroad was not a German project pure and simple. Balfour had only to read the Turkish vice-consul's report to convince himself of the fact. Serell had admitted that the Bagdad road was to be a rival of the Smyrna-Aidin railroad, Great Britain's only railway in Turkey, and that the former was the more powerful because it had political advantages on its side. Moreover, the only support which the road would receive from Turkey was through an increase of the Customs duties, an increase which, although British trade was rapidly declining in favor of German, would still have to be paid largely by British merchants in Turkey. Had England come to such a pass that she needed to be hanging to the skirts of German financiers?² Although Balfour still clung to his theory that the road was not a German project, in fact no governmental scheme at all, simply a proposition to be carried out by the capitalists of the various countries, public opinion and resulting German disclosures brought about a summary abandonment of the affair. The Times now openly denounced the entire arrangement. All Germany's hatched-up proposals of advantages to England, it declared, were mere nonsense. ^{England's} Our particular sphere of interest lay in the section from Bagdad to the Gulf; yet the TUNISIAN between Turkey and Germany expressly stipulated that that part of the road was not to be opened up for service until the other sections were completed. In other words, ^{the British} we were to apply a self-denying ordinance in so far as ^{their} our interests were concerned, whereas ^{they} we were to assist Germany in promoting her trading interests in the field where

1. Hansard, Vol. 120, pp. 1366-7, April 8, 1903.

2. Ibid. pp. 1358-66.

her influence was predominant. If England was wise, she would permit no one to secure an entrance to the Persian Gulf except on English terms. Just at present she was in danger of being outwitted by German subterfuge.¹

The Review refused to mince matters at all and immediately dubbed the project the "Mesopotamian mess", on a par with the "Venezuelan Mess", in which the Government had so singularly disgraced itself. Germany was only hankering for an opportunity to say that she had England in tow again. "If only the Foreign Office were equipped with a Policy Department - A Thinking Department - a Brain!"²

By April 23, 1903, Germany's interpretation of Mr. Balfour's statement that the Bagdad Railway was not a German project, had been disclosed through the receipt of the Turkish convention itself. It declared that the entire road from Konia to the Persian Gulf was to be secured in German hands independent of the nationality of the capital used in constructing it. Regrettably the Prime Minister was obliged to announce that England could no longer give her assurance in view of the demands which Germany had presented.³ The announcement met with hearty approval,⁴ but as one Conservative imperialist, writing at that time said, "That England will be approached again may be taken for granted. The same reasons which induced the Germans to solicit British cooperation this year will hold good in the future.....The Germans are tenacious people and they will be careful not to betray their disappointment. Their cue is, of course, to proceed with the construction of the railway without displaying any concern about the future. They are, in fact, doing so, and we may be prepared to see the next two or three sections beyond Konia built without a hitch. But sooner or later they will have to face the difficulties to over-

1. Weekly, editorial for April 17, 1903.

2. National Review, Vol. 40, p. 672, pp. 858-61.

3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 121, p. 222.

4. See Ibid., also Times, May 8, 1903, June 12, 1903, also Chisol, V. The Middle Eastern Question, p. 227.

come which they wanted, and will still continue to want our help."¹

Mr. Chirol proved unerring in his predictions. The question was dropped until 1906-7, when a certain amount of interest was created by the proposed increase of the Turkish Customs duties as a guarantee for Macedonian reforms.² Conservatives made inquiries as to whether any surplus would be used for guaranteeing the Bagdad Railway. Lord Lansdowne reiterated his belief in the value of the road under international control.³ The second Turkish Convention of 1908 had been preceded by alarming rumors as to the extension of German influence in Asia Minor, and the destruction of the balance of power.⁴ A certain amount of anxiety was expressed over the extension of the Bagdad Railway Company's power in Persia.⁵ To the questions whether negotiations had begun again between England and Germany and whether the Government was taking care to see that Germany was securing no exclusive privileges, Sir Edward Grey replied that the project was solely in Germany's hands and that English interests were well-guarded.⁶ The session of 1911 contains the first real argument over the matter since 1903. The National Review, however, had availed itself of the slight opportunity offered in 1906 to review the Bagdad project in a way not complimentary to the political judgment of certain members of the administration. "To our mind it is utterly incredible that any British Government should touch the Bagdad Railway with a pair of tongs, but there is no doubt that hope runs high in Berlin that the Bannermans, the Bryces, the Birrells, the Burnses, and the Buxtons will smile upon a project which their predecessors were compelled by pressure of public opinion to discard." Its advice was that if Germany wanted a railroad, she had better build it herself.⁷

1. Chirol, V. The Middle Eastern Question, p. 228, pub. Oct. 1903;
2. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 159, debate pp. 1330-60.
3. Ibid. p. 1359.
4. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 184, p. 1560, Feb. 25, 1908.
5. Ibid., Vol. 172, p. 1138, April 18, 1907, Vol. 173, p. 266, Apr. 25, 1907.
6. Ibid., Vol. 178, p. 1168, July 22, 1907, Vol. 190, p. 164, June 4, 1908.
7. National Review, Vol. 47, pp. 540-41 and pp. 718-19, June and July, 1906.

By 1911 the way was open for the settlement which Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour had desired in 1903. The road which had been extended as far as Burgulu was now to be continued to Bagdad and some arrangements must be made for the southern stretch to the Gulf. Balfour now declared that the commercial, strategic, and political interests of England were threatened to a degree which brooked no delay. Germany and Russia were on the point of coming to an agreement which would destroy England's trade to the frontier of Persia. If Germany built a road from Bagdad to Khanikin on the Persian border and Russia extended her road from Teheran to meet it, they could extend that road to the Gulf by mutual agreement and England would lose her opportunity.¹ Lord Curzon supported Balfour whole-heartedly.² In fact the general consensus of opinion among the Conservatives was that the railroad was now inevitable and that England had better not lose her chance to partake in the construction of it, as she had in the case of the Suez Canal.³ The attitude which Germany took and the value she placed on English financial cooperation adequately fulfilled Mr. Chirol's prediction of 1903 that England's answer need not be an "unconditional non possumus". By the German-Turkish convention of March, 1911, Germany exchanged her right to construct the section from Bagdad to Bassorah for a railroad concession running from Osmaniye to Alexandretta on the Mediterranean, and the Bagdad section was placed under the Turkish Government's control to be built by an international company. The section from Bassorah to the Gulf was to be left to England, who was to overcome the prejudices of the Sheikh at Koweit into permitting the railroad to terminate at that port. The debate which arose in parliament as the result of this and the Potsdam agreement reveal the

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 22, pp. 1272-5, Mar. 8, 1911.

2. Ibid., Vol. 7, 578, Mar. 22, 1911. H. of L.

3. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 22, p. 2422, Mar. 16, 1911.

belief of the Conservatives that England should cooperate with France and Russia¹ in extending the Bagdad Railway to Bassorah. George Lloyd was among the few members to declare that England should not show any sign of weakening; if the English people were willing to make the sacrifices which the Germans and Russians made, they would endeavor to secure a rival concession from Turkey and from Persia and thus defeat the signers of the Potsdam agreement. So far as England had lost her opportunities through inaction; there was yet time for England to exert herself in a way that would not oblige her to lose her monopoly over the Gulf.² Men like Balfour and Curzon, however, decried such efforts at individualism; let the railroad come down to Bassorah, now that it need not be a purely German project. Further than that point it must not go unless the Sultan gave fresh guarantees of the Sheikh's absolute autonomy.³ In fact, Lord Curzon added, he would not like to see the road carried down to the Gulf; it would contain the elements of change, novelty, and possibly danger.⁴ The final arrangements which were made just before the war broke out in 1914 won the support of nearly the entire party if we may judge from the statements of one of its members.⁵ According to Sir Edward Grey's statement, Great Britain withdrew her claim to participation in the construction of the Bagdad-Bassorah section on the condition that the section to the Gulf was not to be built without England's approval. Balfour's old claim to equality for British interests as compared with those of Germany's was granted, as well as Lord Curzon's, that the navigation of the Tigris was a substantially British interest. The status quo in the Persian Gulf was not to be interfered with, a vindication of the predominance of British influence. In return for the guarantee of the Sheikh's

1. See Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 53 (H. of C.) pp. 358-401, debate over the Foreign Office Estimates. May 29, 1913.
2. Ibid, Vol. 22, pp. 1327-43, H. of C., Mar. 8, 1911.
3. Ibid, Vol. 7, pp. 578-588, H. of L., Mar. 22, 1911.
4. Ibid., H. of L., p. 588, H. of C., Vol. 53, 358-401, May 29, 1913.
5. Ibid., H. of C., p. 387, Mr. Maxse was irreconcilable - see National Review Vol. 63, p. 732, July, 1914.

autonomy, Great Britain admitted Turkey's suzerainty over Koweit. Finally the British Government agreed to the increase of the Turkish customs from eleven to fifteen per cent.¹ Essentially Lord Lansdowne's and Mr. Balfour's plan of 1903 had been realized; if England had not secured internationalisation, she had secured what was more necessary, a recognition of her prior interests in the eastern terminus of the road.

Substantially the Times took the same point of view as the party leaders. The agreement of 1911 it declared a good bargain, although it had apprehensions that the road might prove too lucrative to German promoters and the Turkish government to the detriment of England's trading interests. Although it did not regard the Potsdam Agreement with disfavor, it felt that Russia might have consulted the other members of the entente.² The negotiations in regard to a settlement for the section from Bassorah to the Gulf were looked upon with favor by the Times, so much so that in 1911 it advocated a half share in the railway for England, now that her position at Koweit had been definitely vindicated.³

The National Review laboring under its mighty obsession of hatred for all things German, refused to sanction any participation by England. Why, it said, was Germany making such an uproar over her railroad? Russia never made so much fuss over her Trans-Siberian Railway, neither did she peddle her project over Europe. If the scheme for the railroad were such a splendid thing as Germany made out, she would build it herself and insist upon a monopoly. As it was she was endeavoring to inveigle England into participating in a project which held no promises for the latter and which would weaken British hold over India.⁴

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1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 64, pp. 116-120. Also see Schmitt, England and Germany, p. 370.
 2. Jan. 20, 1911 (Weekly), also Mar. 24, 1911.
 3. Mar. 24, 1911.
 4. The National Review, Vol. 57, pp. 186-188, April, 1911.
Vol. 63, p. 732, July, 1914.

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION

The relations of the Powers to this turbulent section of Europe is a sad story in European diplomacy, at best, one of broken promises and bad faith. There is no question but what the Balkans have been a mere pawn in the game. It has never been so much the welfare of those little states that the nations have had at heart as their own ends and the peace of Europe. The strategic position of the Dardanelles and Constantinople has been the crux of the whole affair. The conflicting interests, mutual distrust and jealousy have all grown out of the fear of each Power that some rival in Europe would secure the key to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Far East. Ulterior motives and mutual suspicion have made a solution impossible and more than one statesman has felt that rather than to have Europe always on the verge of a conflagration it would be preferable to have the narrow strait between the Bosphorus and the Black Sea blown up by dynamite.

The Near Eastern question has been one of the main reasons for England's activity on the Continent. Her interest is in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, but the general problem has enforced an interest in the Balkan states themselves as a separate phase of the problem. As one of the Conservative members of Parliament stated, she is involved in the matter in two capacities; west of Constantinople and indirectly as a member of the Concert of Europe, east of that point as a directly interested party. That is, again England's attitude can be summed up in the one word, empire. It has caused her to court Turkey's friendship because that decadent nation by her geographic position controlled the entrance to Egypt and India and the key to England's whole imperial position, the Suez Canal. If she had any interest in preserving China, she had an

infinitely greater need of maintaining an integral Turkey. On the other hand it has induced her to play an active part in that guardian of the Turkish Empire established by the Treaty of Berlin, the Concert of Europe. That at least had pledged itself to maintain the status quo and for England, for whom peace was the prime concern, anything that was an insurance against the displacement of the much needed balance of power was not lightly to be scorned.

The argument of the Conservative since the time of Disraeli has been that England, much as she desired it, could not afford to take a humanitarian's point of view to the state of affairs in the Balkans, at least not until the conflicting interests of the Powers in Europe and of the high-spirited little states themselves had in some way been reconciled. Ultimately there would have to be a partition of Turkey unless that country was made to feel its responsibilities and institute, sincerely and consistently, a series of reforms. Until that time England had better turn her attention to bolstering up Turkey and for the rest let "sleeping dogs lie".

No one claimed that the Concert of Europe was a solution of the question; but according to the Conservative, it was a necessary evil which was "real enough to prevent war among its neighbors, but not strong enough to impose its will on Turkey."¹ The National Review never cared to delude any of its readers as to the real value of that august body. "It had no rosy visions of that concert being able to march through a vista of triumphs ending in a peaceful dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire which is the great problem ahead of Europe."² "Everything points to the necessity of preserving Turkey for a considerable period as a buffer state to ease the friction of colliding nationalities.....However, if there must be Turkish rule, there need not be Turkish misrule."³

1. Times' Weekly, Jan. 7, 1898.
2. National Review, 29, 152-3, Apr., 1897.
3. Ibid, Vol. 26, p. 594, Dec. 1895.

The Armenian massacres in 1895 and the Cretan War which followed brought up the old line of arguments between the follower of Disraeli and Gladstone. However, we do not find any of the Conservatives except that extreme individualist, Sir Ashmead-Bartlett, agitating isolated action in support of Turkey.¹ In fact there was a fixed determination on the part of the Government that no Power should have the privilege of acting alone. Lord Rosebery's approval of the idea that Russia intervene in subduing the harassed provinces of Asiatic Turkey, a plan of action which Russia subsequently refused much to the satisfaction of the Conservatives, was openly decried by his successors. England intended to stand by the agreement of the Congress of Berlin, that no country come to the rescue in the sultan's domain except on the invitation and with the full consent of that ruler and the Concert of Europe.² Their policy was a compromise between Disraeli's policy as typified by the Cyprus Convention which had been drawn up with Turkey before the Congress of Berlin had taken action, and that which Gladstone had advocated. Both stood for reforms; the one for isolated action by England in Armenia, with the nominal support of Turkey, the other for joint action with Russia. Neither one, the Government now declared, was opportune, the former was too expensive and cost England the friendship of all Europe, the other was only a way of ushering Russia into the Ottoman Empire. Hence it was that the Administration decided to abide by the policy of the Concert of Europe. In the Cretan insurrection the Government stood just as staunchly by the Concert, and was very firm in its belief that cautious action was the only one worth considering.³ The policy of reform would have to be coercive, of course, but the Opposition would have to remember that its success rested with the sultan alone.⁴ In fact the agitation of the

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 38, p. 48, Mar. 3, 1896.

2. Ibid, Vol. 37, p. 456-7, Feb. 17, 1896.

3. Ibid., Vol. 43, 704, July 28, 1896.

4. Ibid., Vol. 49, pp. 18-63, May 7, 1897.

Liberals during this delicate situation was extremely distasteful, and, as Curzon said, was simply alienating England from the rest of Europe. England could not afford to allow Greece to have Crete, much as both parties desired it; if she did, it would mean that a blaze of nationalism would flare up in the Balkans and once the acquisitive passion was aroused, European war would result. Unless she adhered to the Concert of Europe and did her best to maintain it,¹ her empire was doomed.

The Review was particularly incensed at the way in which the Liberals were attacking the policy of the Government. It had already expended its energy on the rashness, in fact idiocy of the Greeks in attempting to secure Crete by force and thus endangering the peace of Europe. If Turkey had had her way, Greece would have been wiped out, but the Powers kindly intervened to frustrate her exorbitant demands. Greece was after all much too pompous, she must remember that she was only the rickety offspring of European sentiment.² Much of her braggadocia (as Mr. Maxse irrelevantly termed it) was due to the untoward encouragement of the Daily Chronicle's correspondent in Athens who was a violent party man and chose to misrepresent British public opinion.³ To act upon the Liberals' suggestion that England should withdraw from the Concert would have been perfidy. If the Powers were callous to the fate of Greece and Crete, was the Opposition any more solicitous in regard to the welfare of Europe? Fortunately Lord Salisbury had identified himself with the European point of view and had regained the confidence of the Foreign Governments. He, like Lord Rosebery, saw that it was not for England to play the part of anarchist.⁴

The Turco-Grecian War marked a turning point in the outlook of the National Review on the Balkan situation. It had counted on a certain success

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 47, pp. 519-28, Feb. 10, 1897.
2. National Review, Vol. 29, p. 654, July, 1897.
3. Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 492, June, 1897.
4. Ibid., Vol. 29, pp. 1-6, Mar., 1897.

for England in the Cretan situation because of her naval position.¹ But the
 futility of leadership on the part of England in attempting reform was too
 visible to be concealed. No one except England had any sincerity. The
 regeneration of Turkey was a delusion, the fanaticism of the Turkish race was
 in itself fatal to any permanent regeneration.² "To suppose that European
 statesmanship is competent to reform Turkish administration is to suppose it
 capable of purifying a rotten egg. That is why we feel so little confidence
 in the future of the Concert as a resolver of the general Eastern Question,
 and while that question remains open, how can peace be assured?"³ "The only
 possible solution is the dismemberment of the Ottoman dominion by the Great
 Powers assembled in Conference, and when shall we see such a conference?"⁴

It was not only the aspect of the Turkish situation and the nationalistic
 aspirations of the Balkan states themselves which caused the Review to despair,
 it was the new policies of Russia and Germany. The former by her refusal to
 intervene in the Armenian question had proved that she was practicing new
 tactics, she now had too much sardonic influence over the sultan to whom she
 was hopelessly ingratiating.⁵ The pattern of the Eastern question was likely
 to shift for another reason, the German advent. It was impossible to predict
 what new freak would seize the German autocrat. German colonization in Asia
 Minor would be one means of easing the redundant population of Germany and it
 would gratify at the same time the unbounded ambition of the Emperor. Just
 now he was showing a curious sympathy for Turkey on the Cretan question and it
 was very likely that trouble would arise between Russia and Germany since both
 were working to obtain first place in the sultan's confidence.⁶ It was the

1. National Review, Vol. 27, p. 760, August, 1896.
2. Ibid, Vol. 29, p. 654, July, 1897.
3. Ibid., Vol. 29, pp. 152-3, April, 1897.
4. Ibid., Vol. 29, pp. 302-11, May, 1897.
5. Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 146, Oct. 1896.
6. Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 654, July, 1897.

advice of the Review that England take a minimum participation in Near Eastern affairs for the whole affair was hopeless; the Concert of Europe would have to be maintained because it was the only "pillar of peace" to be found.¹ For England to pursue a progressive and coercive policy of reform was not only useless, but dangerous. It might mean the establishment of a new Holy (or unholy) Alliance headed by Russia against her. If any other Power desired to tackle the regeneration of Turkey, well and good; for England the task was not worth the trouble.

The members of the Government did not share the pessimism of the Review over the situation. Certainly they did not share its despondency over the possible entrance of a new factor. In April, 1897, a discussion arose in parliament over the rumors of the spread of German influence in Turkey. The question was asked why Germany alone of the Powers had refused to send troops to Crete. Curzon responded that it was simply because German interests did not lie in the Mediterranean. He also expressed his doubt over the rumor that German officers were serving in the Turkish army. England would do nothing more than she had done to win the support of either Turkey or the Powers. She had no intention, as the Liberal rumor maintained, of giving way to Russia in the Far East to win the latter's support in the Near East. She intended to pursue a straightforward policy in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire and assume that the other Powers were equally so inclined. She had pledged herself to reform and she had no intention of backing down on her agreement.²

Coercion was the one policy which would have any effect on the sultan was the current belief, but it was a policy which the Government refused to carry out itself or permit anyone else to enforce. It was this fact which caused the National Review to despair of any satisfactory results being accomplished

1. National Review, Vol. 30, p. 500, Dec., 1897.

2. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 48, p. 1241, April 29, 1897.

through reform. Honeyed words would never effect a solution. Abdul Hamid was amenable to one thing only, and that was force. Once he realized that even a single Power meant business, he responded to its demands with alacrity. As it was, he knew that Turkey was a bone of contention among the Powers and that he could afford to be despotic.¹ The Times soon enough realized the truth of these statements, too, and came to believe that much of Abdul Hamid's laxity was the result of the exalted patronage of Central Europe on which he relied for impunity.²

In 1902, with the state of affairs in the Balkans as depressed as ever, the futility of the Concert was most obvious, but the attitude of the Government toward reform was unchanged. Cranborne admitted that the situation in Macedonia was extremely grave, but it arose out of Turkey's utter weakness, not from ill will. As far as England was concerned, the political status quo had been maintained and if Germany's advance had rendered British commercial ascendancy uncertain, that was the affair not of the Government, but the English merchants in Turkey themselves. Fortunately the situation had been relieved by the joint action of Austria and Russia in the matter of reform. The Murzsteg Program which was the direct outgrowth of the agreement on the part of these two most interested Powers in 1897 to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would receive the hearty cooperation not only of England, but of the entire Concert.³ As Balfour, who seized upon this solution with avidity, said, Austria and Russia could exercise an influence over the sultan which none of the other Powers could ever hope to exert.⁴ The Times accepted this plan to restrain the "hotheads" of Sofia and Belgrade and "to impress the irresponsible Abdul Hamid with his responsibilities" with a certain amount of reserve; it was not satisfactory, but

1. National Review, Vol. 30, p. 500, Dec., 1897.
2. Times' Weekly, April 10, 1903.
3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 101, p. 131, Jan. 16, 1902.
4. Ibid., Vol. 120, pp. 1358-77, Apr. 8, 1903.

it was preferable to the existing state of affairs provided the sultan saw that¹ it was to his advantage to carry the reforms out with promptitude. The Review, with the indifference which grows out of despair, refused to show any interest, the program would have to be given a fair and full trial. The only alarming feature of the whole plan was the suspicious alacrity with which Abdul Hamid accepted them and even extended them to other parts of his Empire for which they had not been proposed. Not much need be expected from Austria because her hands were tied by domestic difficulties. Everything depended on the seriousness with which Russia pursued the proposals. As yet there was no sign of any rift in the European Concert; as even Germany felt constrained by the general pressure to keep the tune, so that it might be hoped that after the usual delay² the new regime would be inaugurated.

The summary fashion in which Lord Lansdowne's proposal for an independent governor in Macedonia appointed by the consent of the Powers and removable only on their approval, was treated by the other members of the Concert, did not shake the Government's belief that in some way reform could be effected. Their credulity amazed the Times, who said it was really plain that neither Germany nor Russia was sincere in her policy. It was the latter's intention "to allow the Ottoman Empire to slide deeper and deeper into the pit of corruption before she again attempted to absorb it."³ The sultan was simply looking forward to an open divergence of views among the Powers to afford him an escape from his⁴ embarrassments.

The Government seems to have been so sincere in its desire for reform that it was willing to go to any lengths. Their eagerness was so pronounced as to make them the laughing stock of Europe according to the Review, which said that

1. Times' Weekly, May 9, 1902, Feb. 27, 1903, Apr. 10, 1903, Aug. 14, 1903.
2. National Review, Vol. 41, p. 354, May, 1903.
3. Times' Weekly, May 8, 1903.
4. Ibid.

ideals had better be a negligible quantity in so far as the Near East was concerned.¹ The imbroglio of the five years following the promulgation of the Murzsteg Program never shook the faith of the party leaders. They declared that the Christians were as guilty of atrocities and as unreasonable as the Porte. Abdul Hamid was characterized not by malevolence, but irritating and obstinate conservatism.² The Program was at least a basis of reform and England had the full right of making suggestions and corrections. The matter was not relieved by the implications cast that Austria and Russia had only their own interests at heart. As it was, there had been a slight improvement, the gendarmerie officered by Europeans had accomplished something. As yet it was too early to judge because the plan had not had a chance to show its real worth. The Conservatives certainly upheld the Liberals in their suggestion that a Christian governor be appointed in Macedonia, but the Concert refused to listen to it and England was not so especially interested in the Balkans that she could afford to act alone.³

In March, 1905, Lord Lansdowne declared that the situation had decidedly improved because the Powers were cooperating on a new scheme of financial reform for Macedonia, a policy which he had always advocated. According to it Macedonian finances were to be placed under the direct or indirect control of an international committee and the money was to be spent directly on that province. To recompense the Turkish Government for this loss to its revenues, a three per cent increase in Turkish Customs was to be permitted.⁴ The plan, however, depended on the consent of the Sultan, who was loath to concede to a plan which really involved reform. This scheme was still in consideration when the

1. National Review, Vol. 52, p. 187, October, 1908.
2. Hansard, Vol. 141, pp. 1372-1385, Feb. 27, 1905., Earl Percy.
3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 141, pp. 1392-95, Feb. 27, '05, also Vol. 140, pp. 384-401, Aug. 12, 1904.
4. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 143, pp. 1345-50, Mar. 28, 1905.

Liberals took over the Government in 1906 and Grey in accordance with his general policy stated his intention of abiding by Conservative principles.¹ He did, however, decry the fact that the Turkish Customs duties were to be increased which he said was a direct blow at the British traders in Turkey.² Lord Lansdowne, however, retorted to these charges of the Liberals, and declared that since reforms were imperative, if they could be accomplished by means of this increase, the traders ought to be willing to make the sacrifice. It probably would be a burden, but it was not a crushing blow. To subdue Macedonia, that hotbed of Europe, and secure European peace, was worth almost any price.³ Early in 1908 Lansdowne congratulated the Government on the strength it had shown in regard to the Near Eastern question. At last the reforms were about to go into effect. After all the conditions had been due largely to the timidity of the Powers in waging up a European conflict, a fear which at length had been overcome.⁴

At the same time Lord Lansdowne was congratulating himself on the turn affairs had taken; Austria was securing advantages which brought an end to the structure England had taken such pains to build up and strengthen. In January, 1908, Austria received the concession for a railway through Novi-Bazar to Salonica. It marked the end of Austrian and Russian cooperation, and for the time being destroyed the Concert of Europe. The situation was extremely dangerous. The fact that Austria had acted alone proved to the Sultan that the Powers were no longer united and released him from his promises. However, as the Times said, the issues at stake were too grave to permit of a quarrel, some way would have to be found of rehabilitating the Concert. Separate action

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 157, pp. 1382-91, May 24, 1906.
2. Ibid., Vol. 162, pp. 1128-33, Aug. 1, 1906.
3. Ibid., Vol. 159, pp. 1330-60, July 2, 1906.
4. Ibid., Vol. 183, pp. 14-18, Jan. 29, 1908.

by England would without a doubt bring on a conflagration.¹ The Review refused to offer any advice further than to say that the episode was the work of the Kaiser and Von Bulow rather than of Franz Joseph and Count Aehrenthal. The former had been angered by the attempt to isolate Germany on the part of the Anglo-Russian Convention and hence determined to strike a direct blow at Russia's prestige in the Balkans.² The Conservative leaders were painfully startled; England, Lansdowne said, had always attempted to preserve the Concert of Europe, even though in doing so she could not get all she desired, and this was her reward. Now not even the Powers were in unanimity and the situation was deplorable. However, England could not abandon her old policy. More than ever she must adhere to a strict enforcement of the Bismarck Program and attempt to restore the Concert. Until the anarchy in the Balkans was put down, it was futile to think of new tactics.³ Earl Percy said there were three courses of action open to the Government: to wash its hands entirely of the whole Macedonian affair, to act with the Concert as before, or to act single-handed as the radical Liberals desired.⁴ By the Treaty of Berlin it was forbidden to undertake the first course, much as it desired it, and the third was equally incompatible with its previous policy. Fortunately Grey concurred in the Conservative belief that to push the reform project was the only tolerable attitude to resume.⁵ As the Times said, the Government had decided to take a simple and straightforward course - to fall back upon a proposal which Lord Lansdowne had made in 1903 and which he was constrained reluctantly to drop in deference to the wishes of the members of the Concert. They intended to revive the suggestion for the appointment of an independent governor for Macedonia, appointed by the Powers and removable at will.⁶ The Review, in remarking on this, said that

1. Times' Weekly, Feb. 21, 1908.

2. National Review, Vol. 51, pp. 7-9, March, 1908.

3. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 184, pp. 1819-40, Feb. 25, 1908.

4. Ibid., pp. 1863-1708, Feb. 25, 1908. (H. of C.)

5. Ibid. 6. Times' Weekly, Feb. 28, 1908.

nothing was likely to come of the suggestion owing to the opposition of Germany who desired to keep the Sick Man sick, but nothing amiss could come of making it, and if it was accepted, it would permit England to wash her hands of that "organized hypocrisy", the Concert of Europe.¹ The Times declared that the manner in which the suggestion was received would indicate just how much the Powers really desired reform. If it was rejected, England could at least feel that she had done her part. A few weeks later it declared that, quite as was to be expected, it had created "a very muggy diplomatic atmosphere" on the continent. It seemed that certain influences (it failed to mention which, but implied Austrian and German) were desirous of having the reforms shelved.² However, England had no intention of withdrawing her note.

The Reval meeting of King Edward and the Czar in June, 1908, marked the final effort on the part of England to enforce her system of reforms. England appeared to have taken upon herself the task which she had assigned to Austria as the more interested Power. It was the best proof of the seriousness with which England was pursuing her proposals. The event had results more far-reaching than was expected and showed that others had an equal assurance of Great Britain's sincerity and determination. The Young Turk Revolution was a direct outgrowth of the fear that Russia and England combined might succeed where Austria and Russia had failed.

The event provoked almost no discussion in parliament, but obviously met with amazed satisfaction. It was as if the well-wishers of Turkey were holding their breath for fear the whole affair might prove a delusion. After all it appeared that Turkey herself was going to perform the work that England desired. Balfour was among the few who expressed themselves. The Concert which had been

1. National Review, Vol. 51, p. 200, April, 1908.
2. Times' Weekly, Mar. 27, 1908. Also July 31, 1908.

threatened so seriously was now safely restored. Turkey was not going to decay if the Powers would only assist her in a sane policy of reform. From thence forward there need be no antagonism between the policies of Austria, Germany, and ¹ Great Britain.

The Times very wisely withheld judgment. It was delighted over the fact that the Powers had been relieved of their responsibilities. The situation was one of dramatic possibilities to be sure, - the granting of the constitution so quickly by Abdul Hamid proved that. Still scenes of such idyllic bliss were to be beware of. The Powers' only policy now was one of watchful and benevolent ² non-intervention. The National Review looked upon it with growing scepticism. Its first impulse had been one of extreme satisfaction, because it meant the end of the pernicious Balkan reform committees. More than that, it might mean a new member in the lengthening list of England's foreign friends. Germany's apparent ignorance of the coup was the best part of the whole thing. Even the astute Baron Marschall von Bieberstein had been so ignorant of the impending events as to allow his sovereign to confer the Black Eagle on the Grand Vizier of the old regime the day before its collapse, an incident which suggested that the decoration should be rechristened "the Order of the Falling Star". ³

However, the events falling close upon the revolution proved, as the Review said, that after all Europe had forgotten "the perils which accompanied ⁴ the delicate operation of putting old wine into new bottles". A cry of bitter rage went up over the way in which the honest efforts of the Young Turks were being thwarted. "For generations", the Times said, "we have made very serious sacrifices of political power with our eyes open, in order to ameliorate the conditions of all of the races - Christian and Mussulman - of the Turkish Empire."

1. Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 193, pp. 939-88, July 27, 1908.
2. Times' Weekly, July 31, 1908.
3. National Review, Vol. 52, p. 31, Sept. 1908, p. 186, Oct., 1908.
4. National Review, Vol. 52, p. 345, Nov. 1908.

They have borne hitherto little fruit. Now for the first time the Young Turks promise to realize our best hopes in the best possible way. It is intolerable that at such a moment they should be made the victims of the intrigues and of the selfish ambitions of others, whether within or without the Balkan Peninsula.¹ Mr. Maxse was in a paroxysm of rage such as he had never felt over the near Eastern situation since the critical period from 1895 to 1898. The hope that the Ottoman Empire would suddenly blossom out into a new "Japan" had been a beautiful illusion in which England had reckoned without the Powers of Central Europe. Bulgaria, he said, was guilty of the vilest selfishness. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in itself no decided change, everybody knew that Austria would never relinquish her hold over them. It was not the act, but the time and manner in which that act had been perpetrated. Why had Austria been guilty of such mystification in her conduct if she had not been aiming directly "in the first place at Russia, secondly at constitutional Turkey, thirdly, at the Dual Alliance, and fourthly at the Entente Cordiale?"² Still both Austria and Germany would learn that Machiavellian diplomacy was no longer popular in Europe. The solidarity of the triple Entente between Russia, France, and Great Britain, the equanimity of Turkey, and the impartiality of Italy³ proved that.

The first idea of all England, Conservative as well as Liberal, was that there must be a conference to settle the matter.⁴ The Times maintained that so flagrant a breach of the Treaty of Berlin must never be tolerated. If a state like Austria Hungary could tear up a treaty at will, so could Russia, and no Power had any desire to have the question of the Dardanelles brought up again.⁵ The Review, however, much as it desired a conference where a show of

1. Times' Weekly, Oct. 2, 1908.

2. National Review, Vol. 52, p. 695, Jan., 1909.

3. Ibid, p. 694.

4. No discussion in Parl. at all; for Lansdowne's support of Gray see Hansard, 4th series, Vol. 194, pp. 17-21, also 5th ser. Vol. 1, p. 15, Feb. 16, 1909.

5. Times' Weekly, Oct. 9, 1908.
(H.of.L.)

force could be made against Austria and Germany, doubted the value of it in this case because all of the Powers would use it to liquidate their claims at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. However, as it later remarked, it was not for England to settle the matter, for directly she "had shown any inclination toward a Conference, originally suggested by Russia and Turkey as a convenient method of regularizing the situation - not that we were ever enamoured of this particular procedure - it goes without saying that Germany, who had insisted on dragging Europe to Algenciras when there was no need for any Conference, pronounced against a Conference and imagined that she could humiliate us by preventing its meeting." Instead she "recommended direct negotiations with Austria, Germany acting in her favorite role of honest broker - the one and only friend of both parties. The Vienna Press squeaked in unison with that of Berlin. We need hardly say, not being agents provocateur like Germany, that this country would be delighted were the Dual Monarchy inclined to reconsider her non possumus attitude and settle matters amicably with Turkey, though we may doubt the necessity for any honest broker."

The Times, however, from the start did not realize, as did the National Review, that the matter had been lifted right out of the hands of Great Britain, in fact that it was useless for England to use her influence one way or another. It showed great relief when Austria expressed her intention of renewing relations with Turkey, and thus saving herself from the danger of a Balkan league of opposition and a financial boycott. As it was, she would have to pay dearly for her forward policy. It urged Bulgaria to follow in Austria's footsteps and resume her relations, saying that a Balkan federation with regenerated Turkey at its head would save Bulgaria from the far-reaching schemes of Germanism already in existence.

1. National Review, Vol. 52, pp. 365-66, Nov., 1908.
2. Times' Weekly, Jan. 15, 1909.

A month later when it became aware of the deadlock that existed between Austria and Serbia, it declared that some one would have to give way, surely neither side could desire war, although Austria was already making military preparations. If only she would give some idea of the concessions she was willing to make. It was unfortunate that Germany had again seen fit not to enter a conference; direct communications with Serbia did not seem very effective. Why not return to the original proposal of a conference?¹

In the end the Times reluctantly admitted that Serbia had yielded to Russia's advice and given in. The Powers could not support her at the expense of a European war.² Still the Times could not see why Austria should have been so obdurate since she herself had started the rumpus. It had half a conviction that Russia had been submitted to a sort of German blackmail. Events of course had been secret, but the Weekly suspected that Russia had been submitted to a sort of German blackmail, or "veiled ultimatum", a surmise verified a little later when the kaiser made his "shining armour" confession.³

The Review, once its original outburst of anger had subsided, regarded the affair with an assurance born of experience. Europe of course might as well regard the coup d'etat on the part of Austria as a *fait accompli*, as both Germany and the Dual Monarchy maintained, because it was useless to resist them. The affair had been originally purely Austrian, an attempt on the part of Aerenthal to play the part of a second Bismarck. However, Germany had no intention of playing Austria's part of "brilliant second" and had assumed control of the whole affair on the grounds that she was repaying Austria for her compliance in the Algeciras Conference.⁴ The kaiser's desire was to make Aerenthal as much of a lackey as Goluchowski.⁵ The outcome had depended purely

1. Times' Weekly, Feb. 26, 1909.
2. Ibid., Mar. 5, 1909.
3. Ibid., April 2, 1909, May 27, 1909, Sept. 30, 1910.
4. National Review, Vol. 52, p. 354, Nov., 1908.
5. Ibid., Vol. 56, p. 388, Nov., 1910.

and simply on whether the kaiser thought it was worth while to force the issue. If England "could answer the question, 'Does Wilhelm II want war', she might be able to forecast the future of the Balkan imbroglio."¹ The reason the scrimmage did not come then was not so much the fact that Germany knew everything was going her own way because neither Russia nor Turkey was in a situation where they could fight, but because the kaiser had decided that he was still as anxious to play up to Constantinople and St.Petersburg as to Vienna.² When the story of the Russian ultimatum came out in 1910, the Review said that it was simply a proof that Wilhelm thought Austrian diplomacy was slipping out of his hands, and the incident was aimed not at Russia, but Austria. "Without saying anything to Vienna, he had brandished his sword at St.Petersburg, pour se faire valour, as the phrase goes, or in other words, to obtain a cheap advertisement."³ The incident was pitiful enough indeed, but it was the subject of swagger for eighteen months. "Now Wilhelm can speak of the power of the shining armour."³

Curiously enough the Review took a decidedly cheerful view of the coup of 1908 in so far as England's foreign policy of the future was concerned. It took the opportunity of reinforcing its assurance of England's friendly feeling toward Austria and warned her that Germany's friendship was purely Bismarckian providing for an infinite number of re-insurances at Austria's expense.⁴ More than that it declared that the crisis was an opportunity for England to re-instate herself in Constantinople, now that Germany's baneful finesse had been revealed. "The British Government are abundantly justified in supporting Turkey, and if in the past, to recall a historic phrase, we "put our money on the wrong horse", it looks this time.....as though we had "spotted a winner." There is necessarily always a certain risk in.....adhering to any line of foreign

1. National Review, Vol. 52, p. 544, Dec. 1908.
2. Ibid., Vol. 52, p. 368, Nov., 1908.
3. Ibid., Vol. 56, 205-6, Oct. 1910.
4. Ibid., Vol. 52, pp. 879-81, Feb. 1909.

policy, but the risks of hesitation or wobbling are infinitely greater, and the manly and enlightened attitude of Sir Edward Grey, is the only sound one. For the moment financial assistance to Turkey would probably be the most welcome form of aid, and we trust there may be some foundation for the assertion of indignant Vienna newspapers that Great Britain is prepared to guarantee a Turkish loan in conjunction with the other members of the Triple Entente. The Triple Entente, in fact, holds the key to the position. Its existence is the outstanding feature of the crisis, and a very solid gain to Europe, to say nothing of the opportunity afforded to its members of setting themselves right with the entire Mohammedan world - an incalculable advantage to Russia, France, and Great Britain in more than one sphere of policy. The loyal and intimate co-operation of these powers, whose combination threatens the legitimate interests of no other nation, offers the only serious chance of preserving the public law of Europe, of securing the reformed regime in Turkey, and of maintaining peace. They may not unreasonably hope for the ultimate cooperation of Italy, whose interests are identical with theirs - interests which she cannot afford to have compromised.¹"

After the crisis of 1908-9 there was no great divergence among the Conservatives and the Liberals as to England's attitude toward the Near East. More than ever England needed a strict maintenance of the status quo. Mr. Maxse soon saw how utterly futile his predictions had been. He too had reckoned without his host, the German pirate of Europe. In 1910 he stated that the kaiser had found out his mistake in backing the old regime in Turkey instead of the new, and he was now just as solicitous to ingratiate himself with Young Turkey as he was with the old. The pity of it was that he was "hocussing" himself as well as others into the belief "that he was honestly the architect of Turkish Revolution - with mental reservations to abandon the Young Turks in the

1. National Review, Vol. 52, pp. 368-69, Nov. 1908.

event of their ultimate fiasco" and the credulity of the Young Turks was leading them to fall easy prey.¹ As the Times said, much as all England wanted to prove a true friend of Turkey, still there was a Chauvinist section among the Young Turks who had an imperfect knowledge of foreign affairs. They had a profound suspicion of Russia. It was a pity they could not see that that Power's main idea was to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.² Increasing good feeling between the Young Turks and Germany and Austria was a dangerous thing. But the Times realized what the effect of their earlier training had been on the Revolutionists. "No doubt there are amongst the officers who form the backbone of the Young Turk Party, many who have been educated in Germany and who have preserved a strong professional predilection for the Power that disposes of the biggest battalions. There are some also who, cherishing great and somewhat aggressive ambitions, look - we trust in vain - to Berlin and Vienna for the encouragement which a policy of military adventure cannot expect to find in London or Paris or St. Petersburg."³ The Germans had aroused the old Russian bogey and were inducing Turkey to strengthen herself against a growing rapprochement between Bulgaria and Russia; they also were encouraging the increasing friendship between Roumania and Turkey and were using the former, whose king was a Hohenzollern, as a "back-door to the Triplice."⁴

In Parliament there was a strong desire to keep the Near Eastern question in abeyance and resentment was felt toward the expression of any nationalistic aspirations on the part of the Balkan states. The Cretan and Albanian disorders met with no support, because England was now perforce Turcophil. Mr. George Lloyd in 1910 declared that the former were demanding an attention altogether disproportionate to their importance. It was only because they

1. National Review, Vol. 56, p. 195, Oct. 1910.

2. Times' Weekly, Mar. 25, 1910.

3. Ibid., Sept. 23, 1910.

4. Ibid., Sept. 30, 1910. Also National Review, Vol. 56, pp. 302-4, Oct. 1910.

might by their internal revolution spread a general spirit of unrest that the Powers took the trouble to quiet and appease them. Racial and ethnographical union would have to be a taboed subject in so far as the Near East was concerned, and the Powers would do their best to ameliorate the conditions in the various states by means of reforms forced upon Turkey by the Concert. The Powers had perhaps put too much faith in the Young Turk movement,- their work in Albania had proved a total failure and it was evident that it was hopeless to Ottomanize the Turkish empire. But now they would have to see the thing through and the best way would be by cooperating with Turkey.¹

There was a general feeling, however, that a crisis was approaching and the Turco-Italian War of 1911 only served to emphasize the fear of its proximity. Sympathy was all on the side of Italy in so far as the Conservatives were concerned, but that could not conceal their belief that Italy was speculating dangerously with the peace of Europe and was employing methods which were singularly inopportune. The Review was the only one who openly supported Italy's course, the Times and the party leaders advocating the strictest neutrality.² The former declared that Turkey's preoccupation in the Mediterranean was distracting her attention from home affairs with very deplorable results.³ Mr. Maxse with his usual rashness, declared that although it was not a business in which England had any right to meddle, her interests were directly concerned. Italy had as much right to Tripoli as the other interlopers of North Africa. It was her last chance for extension since every other place was filled, and certainly it was better that Italy secured Tripoli than Germany, who was known to have her designs even on that field. Italian government would be a welcome relief to the harassed inhabitants of the province after the inept administration of the so-called Young Turks, "pramaturely grown

1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 17, pp. 1350-66, June 15, 1910, Vol. 28, pp. 1834-74, July 27, 1911, Vol. 40, pp. 1952-5, July 10, 1912.
2. Times' Weekly, Oct. 13, 1911.
3. Ibid., Nov. 10, 1911.

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old." The position in which Germany had been placed by the war was described as distinctly uncomfortable, still not beyond the control of the astute German diplomats. In different ways she was backing both of the belligerents, selling war material to Turkey and secretly preventing mediation, while outwardly she was giving her "blessing" to Italy. She was equally anxious to stand in with both winner and loser, because the Turkish army was as necessary to the realization of her ambitions as the Italian army and fleet.²

When the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 broke out and the worst fears of England were realized, there was no longer any dispute as to the policy Great Britain should pursue. As Bonar Law expressed it, the main question was that England should not be involved in the Near East. "We must still have both Turkey and the Concert of Europe."³ The hopes raised by the efficiency with which the Balkan states first engineered the war soon faded; after all any partition of the Ottoman Empire was impossible because of the lack of geographical boundaries and the furor of the conflicting nationalities which soon changed a war of liberation into one of conquest.⁴ That the results of the conflict were as satisfactory as they were was attributed solely to the strong policy of Sir Edward Grey. "Diplomacy alone had saved England from a great European War."⁵ The attitude of all the Powers had been praiseworthy and singularly constrained, the Times maintained. Even Germany by her pacific conduct had rendered exceptional service.⁶ Only the National Review refused to give Germany and the Concert of Europe credit for the apparently felicitous ending of the war. The former, it did not hesitate to say, had financed the last Turkish coup d'etat and had encouraged the Porte to continue its usual dilatory

1. National Review, Vol. 58, 331-33, Nov. 1911.
2. National Review, Vol. 59, pp. 751-2, July, 1912.
3. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 37, pp. 1506-8 (H. of C.) Mar. 25, 1912.
4. Ibid., 5th series, Vol. 53, pp. 380-88, (H. of C.) May 29, 1913.
5. Ibid., p. 387.
6. Times' Weekly, Aug. 8, 1913.

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 tactics. As for the latter, it declared that "the cue this year has been to glorify the Concert of Europe and to belittle the handiwork of the Triple Entente to which alone is due the fact that so far at any rate a bloody local conflict in the Near East has been prevented from developing into a general conflagration."²

The question, however, every one knew, was not settled but stayed. There was an earnest endeavor on the part of the Times to convince itself that the wars of 1912-13 could be made the beginning of an era of peace. Shortly after the conflict began the Weekly remarked, "While the future of many millions of people still hangs in the balance, we may at least join in the hope expressed... by Mr. Winston Churchill that when this war is over, the nations will resolve 'that about these affairs, at any rate, there shall never be another war'."³ The Review, however, maintained that it had been a "mere toss-up" as to whether or not the Balkan Wars were to be the "Armageddon" or not. If Germany had wanted war then, she would have had her way.⁴ In parliament the attitude was feverish, as though England were working against time. Turkey at present was in a hopeless condition. There were six questions which had to be settled; the Armenian difficulty, the Arabian, the Khurdish question, the Syrian question and French interests, the Russian border interests, and German Anatolian interests.⁵ These interests were hard to reconcile and there was danger of foreign intervention in Asiatic Turkey which must above all things be prevented. The division of the Empire would lead to bad complications between Russia and Germany, both of whom would insist on more than their rightful if not the same, share.⁶ What if the rivalry of the Great Powers was

1. National Review, Vol. 60, pp. 882-83, Feb. 1913.

2. Ibid., p. 877.

3. Times' Weekly, Nov. 1, 1912.

4. National Review, Vol. 60, pp. 693-98, Jan., 1913.

5. Hansard, Vol. 53, 380-88, May 29, 1913. (H. of C.) George Lloyd.

6. Ibid., Vol. 56, pp. 2314-18, Aug. 12, 1913. (H. of C.) Sir Mark Sykes

substituted for that of the Balkan States! After all, the exit of the Turk could not bring an immediate cessation of troubles, as the Balkan War had proved. What the Liberals and Conservatives must do was to combine with the Concert of Europe to make one cohesive, independent central state out of the Ottoman Empire. If war could then be staved off for fifty years, it would be all right. By that time the Turkish federation would be on its feet.¹

By March, 1914, the optimism of the summer before had vanished among the Conservatives. The Ottoman Empire, it was declared, was fast approaching the crisis which preceded dissolution. The pity of it was that England had herself to blame for its state of corruption, as had all Europe. The Powers had not played fair by Turkey, they had allowed her to commit all sorts of atrocities so long as she paid her debt. Worse than that, they had allowed her to be exploited by financiers to the breaking point. Even France was menacing the Triple Entente now by her financial policy in Near Eastern Syria. With the collapse of the empire came the end of English safety. There was only one way in which England could redeem herself. It was not yet too late for a strengthened and united Triple Entente, Russia, France, and Great Britain, to enter upon a policy of cooperation in Turkey, entirely devoid of any idea of selfish gain. The Concert of Europe had become a mere farce; everything in Europe pointed to a coming turmoil; unless England seized upon this last plan of action, the thing which she had been striving for forty years to maintain, namely, the peace of Europe, would have vanished in a new, sickening imbroglio in the Near East.²

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1. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 56, pp. 2314-18, Aug. 12, 1913. Sir Mark Sykes, speaker.
 2. Ibid, Vol. 59, pp. 2154-2207, H. of C., Mar. 18, 1914.