The Wartime Basis of Postwar Political Development:
Civil War Termination, Resource Mobilization, and State-Building

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ABSTRACT

Can civil war build states? Since the end of World War II, civil war has eclipsed interstate war as the most dominant form of conflict. Yet, although the destructive consequences of civil war are fairly well-documented, we know little about its social and institutional legacies. Some nations have emerged from conflict and embarked on comparatively effective state-building dynamics, while others have been trapped in a vicious cycle of violence and instability. What explains this variation?

I argue that two factors jointly determine the nature and magnitude of postwar state-building: the form of war termination and the nature and extent of wartime state-building. Specifically, civil wars that end decisively through military victory create a structural window of opportunity to centralize state power. By marginalizing armed sub-state actors, victory reduces the likelihood of renewed conflict and allows the victor to monopolize the legitimate means of coercion. However, the end of an armed conflict does not signal a radical break from the past. No post-conflict society inherits a ‘blank slate’ upon which a new political order can be erected. I argue that wartime strategies of resource mobilization explain variation in the degree of institutional coherence with which nations emerge from conflict. In the absence of easily extractible resource rents, combatants must generate revenue by taxing the population. Legitimate taxation requires developing institutional capacity and bargaining with society. By contrast, when combatants have access to internally and externally generated resource rents, they have no incentive to bargain with local populations. This variation in wartime institutional residue, I posit, explains variation in the degree of postwar state-building.

These claims are tested using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The statistical findings show that military victory contributes to the postwar growth of state institutions, but these effects shrink when combatants can raise wartime revenue by exploiting natural resources. Three additional chapters feature case studies of post-civil war state-building in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique that serve to explore the theory’s causal claims and provide a rich narrative that deepens the analysis. I conclude the study by addressing the implications of the findings for scholarship and practice.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Can civil war lead to state-building? Can the breakdown of order in the short run give rise to a durable one in the long run? Given the death and destruction caused by civil wars, the proposition that conflict may catalyze institutional development is somewhat counterintuitive. It is easy to see the prima facie case that underlies the connection between the incidence of civil war and negative economic, social and institutional outcomes. A cursory overview of political developments in nations emerging from violent conflicts in recent years lends credence to these assessments, as they struggle to cast off the legacies of war. It is the case that internal conflicts pit some segments of society against others rather than mobilizing the entire population against a common external enemy. Consequently, that civil war tends to fragment power and sovereignty is not surprising. It is hardly a surprise, then, that much of the literature on civil war has emphasized its destructive consequences.

Yet, it would be a mistake to assume relative uniformity in postwar outcomes in the short run or in the long run.¹ Some nations have emerged from conflict and embarked on comparatively effective socio-economic, political and institutional reconstruction processes, while others have been trapped in a vicious cycle of violence and instability. This variation is far from negligible. For example, in Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone, civil wars led to the near-complete collapse of formal state institutions,

¹ Throughout this study, I use ‘postwar’ and ‘post-conflict’ interchangeably as a conceptual shorthand for the period following the formal cessation of hostilities either through military victory or some kind of peace settlement. Nevertheless, there are no sharp lines delineating the end of war and the beginning of peace, as states emerging from conflict may continue to face ongoing conditions of low-intensity violence.
exponentially compounding the challenges of establishing minimally functioning institutions in these nations. In contrast, others such as Guatemala, Indonesia, El Salvador, and Sri Lanka emerged from conflict with their political systems and administrative capacities somewhat intact, which contributed to comparatively successful state- and peace-building outcomes. The divergence in state-building outcomes is to be expected, given the fact that nations that have gone through violent conflicts vary in their pre-conflict economic, social and institutional profiles as well as the actual patterns of wartime change that carry over into the postwar period. However, to the extent that scholars have examined state-building, it is to highlight the prevalence of ineffective state-building dynamics in much of the developing world, with the modal European state providing the comparative yardstick against which progress is to be measured. But the emphasis on explaining the divergent trajectories of Europe and the rest of the world has come at the expense of explaining differences in the reach and quality of governmental institutions among late-developing postcolonial nations.

The aim of this dissertation is to explain, in a theoretically and empirically systematic fashion, these divergent post-civil war state-building outcomes. The study’s focus on state-building is motivated by a confluence of academic and policy interests in the dynamics of civil wars and their impacts on the societies in which they take place. Since the end of the Second World War (WW II), security threats to states have come from center-seeking rebels or from separatist groups determined to establish their own independent homeland, not from other states. Based on the 1,000 fatalities in a single year commonly used by the Correlates of War (COW) Project to distinguish civil war from other forms of political violence, a third of nations have experienced one or more civil war
episode. Changing the numerical threshold of fatalities to 25—a threshold used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) (Gledistch et al. 2002)—raises the number to over half (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 3-4). Furthermore, seventy three percent of the people in what Paul Collier calls the ‘bottom billion,’ seventy percent of whom live in Africa, have gone through an armed conflict (Collier 2007: 1).

It is, thus, no surprise that internal conflicts have drawn considerable scholarly attention, giving rise to a large body of research. Employing a variety of analytical frameworks and methodological approaches, scholars have produced path-breaking studies on civil war. Existing studies on civil war can be classified into three broad categories. The initial batch of macro-level studies focused on the structural determinants of civil war onset and duration (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2004). Conventional wisdom holds that ethnic and religious heterogeneities lead to elevated risks of civil war onset. However, recent research has shown this assumption to be just that: an assumption with little empirical support. After controlling for such factors as income per capita, religiously and ethnically diverse societies are no more likely to experience civil conflict. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), only “conditions that favor insurgency” predict the outbreak of civil wars. One such factor is state strength: all things being equal, states with limited military and bureaucratic capabilities face an elevated risk of civil war onset. A second strand of research focused on the microfoundations of civil war, highlighting the determinants of individual incentives for participation in rebellion and the collective incentives that shape the organizational structures of rebel groups and the degree of violence they perpetrate against civilians.
(Cohen 2010; Gates 2002; Humphries and Weinstein 2008; Metelits 2010; Weinstein 2005b, 2007). Finally, a third strand of macro-level research focused on war termination, the institutionalization of peace settlements and the likelihood of post-conflict stability (Walter 1997, 1999; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2008; Fortna 2004a; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Toft 2010). These studies have enriched our understanding of civil war.

However, despite the considerable progress we have made in treating civil war as an important object of explanation, much less progress has been made in treating civil war as itself an important causal force that can under some conditions catalyze institutional development. Although the proposition that war drives state-building is “virtually a truism of historical sociology” (Starr 2010: 50), researchers and analysts have paid inadequate attention to the relationship between civil war and state-building in the contemporary developing world. To a large extent, this neglect is driven by assumptions that have guided recent scholarship on the topic. Conventional wisdom holds that, in contrast to their counterparts in early-modern Europe, potential state-builders in the contemporary developing world have few incentives to establish efficacious state institutions, for they no longer face sovereignty-threatening territorial conflicts that could provide the necessary impetus for self-strengthening structural reforms. However, this account, while broadly consistent with the historical record, provides only a partial picture of the relationship between war and state-building. First, it overstates the salutary effects of territorial conflicts on state-building. While territorial conflicts generated pressures for institutional adaptations, not all states responded effectively to these structural dictates. Failure to mount effective response was state death. Thus, while for those that survived war appears
to have been a motor of institutional development, correctly assessing its causal weight requires examining the entire range of variation in outcomes (Kurtz 2009). Second, while civil war has undoubtedly eclipsed interstate war as the dominant form of conflict since WW II, it is not a new phenomenon. Several features of contemporary civil wars considered pathologies were already prevalent in civil wars in the early twentieth century and before. Even in early-modern Europe, the resolution of internal conflicts played a critical role in the establishment of centralized authority (Porter 1994).

Recent studies suggest that new institutions arise following civil wars, but we know little about why this happens in some cases but not in others (Bellows and Miguel 2006). As Blattman and Miguel (2010: 42) conclude, “the social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts.” That we do not have a good understanding of the institutional legacies of civil wars is remarkable in light of the previously noted significance of state capacity as a critical factor in the outbreak of conflict. There is, thus, a need to theorize and empirically test the conditions in which civil war may contribute to state-building.2

Paralleling advances in the study of civil war have been lively policy debates on the implications of domestic disorder in the developing world for international security and what, if anything, the international community can do about it (Brownlee 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Francois and Sud 2006; Fukuyama 2004, 2006; Gleditsch 2007; Lake 2010; Patrick 2011). As Robert Rotberg writes, “how best to understand the nature of weak states, to strengthen those poised on the abyss of failure, and restore the functionality of weak

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2 It is important to keep in mind that war does not directly cause any of the changes that take place in its wake. Rather, the conduct of war and war outcomes catalyze economic, political and social changes by creating the incentives and constraints to which political actors must respond (Avant 2010: 236).
states, are among the urgent policy questions of the twenty-first century” (Rotberg 2004: 9). Similarly, Francis Fukuyama writes that “given the genuine problems posed by failed states, it is unlikely that the United States or the international community will be able to avoid nation-building in the future” (Fukuyama 2006: 14). At least two interrelated factors have driven the unusually high interest in the internal politics of states in the developing world. The first is humanitarian, as internal conflicts result in immense human suffering. Since state weakness is implicated in the outbreak of civil war, mitigating its long-term impacts requires a broader state-building strategy to create effective and legitimate governmental institutions (Barnett 2006; Paris and Sisk 2009). Second, pathologies within the developing world have ramifications beyond the borders of weak states. As a result, state weakness is no longer viewed as a manageable security or humanitarian concern, as disorders in far-flung corners of the world tend to generate transnational security externalities or ‘public bads’ with adverse consequences for global security. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil—vividly demonstrated the dangers of illicit networks operating within the borders of weak states, fundamentally shaping the developed world’s conceptions of its own security vis-à-vis the rest. In this altered global security landscape, the problem of state weakness has led to the fusion of discourses on security and development, for what happens within the borders of weak states is deemed directly relevant to the security and welfare of peoples elsewhere (Duffield 2001).

Precisely for these reasons, state-building has become an important element of international security. In the context of violent instabilities, state-building is defined almost exclusively in terms of international efforts to stabilize post-conflict states or as acts of
“militarized intervention” by outside actors to bring about regime change in order to establish a state with sturdy foundations (Berger 2006; Lake 2010). But while there is a consensus on the need for well-functioning institutions, there is little agreement on how best to achieve them. Indeed, external state-builders “lack any viable theory about how to build a functioning state apparatus” under conditions prevailing in most weak or post-conflict states (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 37). Similarly, as Charles Call (2011: 312) writes, “how international actors can strengthen states remains an area of uncertainty and experimentation.” There is, thus, a need for a systematic theoretical and empirical research that can inform both scholarship and operational practice.

It should be noted that while state-building has begun to draw substantial attention from scholars and practitioners alike in the context of violent conflicts, inquiry into the origins of high-capacity state institutions has a long tradition in social science (Kohli, Migdal and Shue, 1994; Migdal 1988; Waldner 1999). The project to ‘bring the state back in’ in the 1980s highlighted the importance of the state as a central analytical unit in the study of politics (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). Although academic interest in the state has waxed and waned, there is no denying importance of the state both as an arena of conflict and as an autonomous social actor. As Peter Evans (1995: 4) writes, “one of the few universals in the history of the twentieth century is the increasingly pervasive influence of the state as an institution and social actor.” The renewed emphasis on the state in recent years is driven by convergence across several fields: international security, development, and civil war termination (Call 2011). Given the humanitarian and strategic consequences of internal conflicts, a theoretically grounded empirical analysis of the conditions in which indigenous state-building takes place can make contributions to current
debates on the necessity and efficacy of international interventions aimed at ending conflicts and building or rebuilding state institutions.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief summary of the core theoretical claims of the dissertation. The chapter then provides a discussion of the research design before ending with outlines of the dissertation in lieu of a conclusion.

THE THEORETICAL CLAIMS IN BRIEF

Employing an institutionalist perspective, this dissertation seeks to explain variation in state-building outcomes in the aftermath of civil war. Liberal and progressive conceptions of history treat war in general and internal conflicts in particular as an aberration, a temporary detour from the inexorable progress of civilization (Porter 1994: xv). The tendency to treat war as a transient phenomenon is striking in light of the fact that war between and within nation-states has existed for thousands of years. This project’s emphasis on the political and institutional legacies of civil war is a corrective. Rather than treating civil war as a manifestation of apolitical or senseless violence, the study treats it as a political process with potentially transformative impacts on institutions and state-society relations. I argue that two factors jointly determine the likelihood of postwar state-building: the form of war termination and the nature and extent of wartime state-building. In particular, civil wars that end decisively through military victory are more conducive to postwar state-building than those that end through negotiated settlements or fizzle out without formal peace accords. The decisive resolution of civil wars gives managers of the
state a structural window of opportunity to centralize state power, and broadcast state authority across the broad expanses of national territory, which are critical elements of state-building.

A brief discussion of why civil war breaks out in the first place will shed light on the implications of various civil war outcomes for postwar state-building outcomes. Centralized power is crucial for the state’s ability to fulfill a range of functions. In the process of extending its writ and making claims on society, the state encounters resistance from some segments of society, who even make their own counterclaims on the state. When differences over the fundamental rules of the political game prove irreconcilable, a violent struggle for dominance ensues. Civil war results when this struggle for dominance leads to “the effective breakdown of the monopoly of violence by way of armed internal challenge” (Kalyvas 2006: 18). In short, the onset of civil war reflects the breakdown of legitimate state authority. Reconstituting centralized authority in the aftermath of civil war, thus, requires establishing or reestablishing monopoly on legitimate force that Max Weber identified as the essence of the modern state. By eliminating the problem of ‘dual sovereignty’ that is the hallmark of civil war, military victory creates permissive conditions for the assertion of legitimate state authority. Once the contest over the fundamental rules of the political game is settled, those who take over the state have a chance to consolidate state power by institutionalizing it.

Nonetheless, whether or not postwar elites actually engage in broad-based state-building efforts cannot be inferred from their having vanquished their opponents on the battlefield. Although a decisive outcome through a military victory plays an essential role in the configuration of political power at war’s end, it does not give state managers carte
blanche to proceed as they please. This is because postconflict societies do not inherit a blank slate at war’s end. Wartime developments linger long after civil war has come to a formal end, shaping the broad contours of postwar developments. I argue that the origin of these wartime developments can be traced back to the manner in which combatants mobilize the means of war. War-making requires raising and sustaining a fighting force, which, in turn, require mobilizing extensive human and material resources. But not all states and their armed challengers are likely to adopt similar strategies of resource mobilization. The manner in which combatants go about the business of extracting the resources needed to meet the challenges of war-making has implications for the nature of social orders that take shape in the course of an armed conflict. I argue that the choice of mobilization strategies is a function of initial resource endowments. Resource endowments, because they determine the structures of incentives, opportunities and constraints in which combatants operate, shape wartime institutional patterns and relations with civilians.

Insurgents and governments may mobilize war-making resources in one of two ways. In the first, they may rely on easily extractible resources. The provenance of “easy financing” can be domestic via the exploitation of natural resource rents or external in the form of sizable sponsorship by one or more foreign actors. Regardless of the source, the effects of easily available resources on the organizational incentives of combatants are the same. When combatants have rents that can be captured with minimal efforts, they have few incentives to mobilize the means of war by bargaining with local populations in ways that would allow the latter to shape the trajectory of the conflict. The exploitation of rents does not require establishing institutional capacity and cultivating local legitimacy.
Political institutions to manage relations with civilians by setting up a system of participatory governance are less important than hierarchical structures of political control. Since combatants hardly make any claims on the population by way of taxation, they face little pressure to provide for and protect civilians. In fact, when combatants are financially autonomous from local populations, they can afford to rely on coercion to impose their will without fear of repercussions. When this is the case, the maintenance of wartime social order rests on domination by force rather than acceptance. Consequently, the centrality of natural resources or sizable external patronage to the prosecution of civil war sets in motion a suboptimal institution-building dynamic.

By contrast, when there are no rents to capture, combatants must generate revenue through taxation. The legitimate extraction of resources requires developing institutional capacity and cultivating reciprocal relationships with civilians. When the shadow of the future is reasonably long—as it almost always is in civil wars since the process of resource extraction is not a one-shot game—revenue generation requires fostering a culture of collaboration essential for the extraction of resources with some degree of regularity. In exchange for material and human support, combatants provide welfare services and security to the population. Thus, the long-term viability of these contractual arrangements rests on the presence of non-military institutions through which combatants manage their relations with local populations. Political institutions are necessary because rebels and governments have incentives to behave opportunistically and renege on their commitments, given the time-inconsistency of preferences. They must, therefore, find mechanisms to signal credible commitments. The establishment of political institutions in the case of rebels and the use of existing or new state institutions by governments plays
such a role by rendering relationships predictable. Although civilian governance imposes legitimate costs on warring parties, the willingness to bear the costs associated with commitment to civilian participation and governance signals commitment to routine, institutionalized interactions with local populations. Obviously, given the violent realities of war, the extent of these institutionalized interactions should not be overstated. But the essential point is that the establishment of a semblance of order is a strategic necessity for combatants that rely on civilians for material and political support.

The principal theoretical insight of the study is that just as the causes of civil war and state collapse can be located in prewar conditions, the causes of postwar state-building can be traced back to wartime politics. By shaping the type of institutional structures that emerge in wartime and carry over into the postwar period, how combatants extract war-making resources plays a critical role in shaping the type and degree of postwar state-building. I argue that variation in wartime institutional residue explains variation in the degree of post-victory state-building. The residual institutional capacity that carries over into the postwar period is a critical foundation for subsequent state-building. In essence, this is a story of path dependence, in which prior policy and institutional decisions generate a self-reinforcing dynamic that contributes to their “sticky” nature (Mahoney 2000). Once a particular trajectory is set, the rising costs of exit make departure from it decidedly difficult. Consequently, even socially suboptimal institutions can endure long after the need for change has become evident. A critical factor is the fact that institutions are a source of political power. Since institutional decisions have distributional implications, those that benefit from the status quo resist reforms that might threaten their interests. When this happens, the result is the perpetuation of collectively suboptimal institutional dynamics.
These theoretical claims build on emerging and prior research on warfare and state-building, a literature that has a long and distinguished pedigree in political science and historical sociology. Just as the study of early state-building entails the study of how specialists in violence interacted with local populations, the study of the relationship between civil war and state-building in the late developing world also involves the analysis of relations between war-makers and local populations (Metelits 2010). The study also draws on insights from the ‘resource curse’ literature, which describes the tendency of resource-rich nations to perform worse on a variety of socio-economic and political indicators than comparable resource-poor nations (Karl 1997). However, the resource curse and bellicist literatures have developed in isolation from each other, even as they seek to account for opposite sides of the same theoretical coin (Kurtz 2009, 2013). The institution-building effects of war result from its effects on the patterns of revenue extraction. Similarly, the paradoxically pernicious institutional and political dynamics associated with natural resource wealth come via its effects on the structure of fiscal bureaucracies. Drawing on insights derived from both literatures is, thus, critical in explaining divergent outcomes in the aftermath of civil war. The literature on war and state-building provides insights into why specialists in violence may also be state-builders, while the resource curse literature can offer insights into why some groups choose not to undertake broad-based state-building efforts.

State-building is an important concern for countries in peacetime, but it poses particularly daunting challenges for societies emerging from conflict. Although there is tremendous variation in state-building patterns and outcomes in different contexts, what distinguishes post-civil war state-building is the existence of security and legitimacy crises
(Barnett 2006). For these reasons, states that emerge from conflict with some degree of administrative capabilities and bureaucratic coherence are more likely to succeed in restoring legitimate authority than those that emerge with limited capabilities. This dissertation, thus, makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on war and state formation by highlighting path-dependent processes of institutional development and showing that wartime institutions do not disappear at war’s end. These wartime institutions can facilitate or disrupt post-conflict recovery. An important policy implication is that external interventions to ‘reconstruct’ war-torn states must account for wartime political and institutional developments. Additionally, by identifying the conditions under which state-building in the absence of international intervention takes place, the study offers positive and negative lessons essential for the formulation of more subtle and context-rich strategies and programs designed to rebuild war-torn societies.

RESEARCH DESIGN

I use both quantitative and qualitative analysis to test my hypotheses. Each approach has its own weaknesses and strengths but together each complements the other. Statistical analysis establishes broad correlations between inputs and outputs through the testing of hypotheses against a large dataset. In the case of this study, statistical analysis is used to establish correlations between the independent variables (civil war outcomes and wartime resource rents) and the dependent variable (postwar state capacity). Given the broad temporal and spatial scope of statistical analysis, findings based on such a method have a high degree of external validity. However, the results of statistical analysis cannot
tell us whether or not the dependent and independent variables are causally related. As a result, statistical analysis is a poor tool for probing causal mechanisms.

Case studies can overcome the data limitations inherent in statistical analysis, limitations that work against our ability to draw causal inferences. Thus, the main goal of case studies is not to establish correlation between the variables of interest, a task accomplished by the statistical analysis. Rather, the purpose of case studies is to probe the theory’s causal claims, with a particular attention to the causal chain linking inputs and outputs. Through case analysis, we can identify complex interactions between variables and establish a sequence of events that help link inputs and outputs. In this regard, the most important goal of case studies is process-tracing, which “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005: 206). Conducting ‘good’ process-tracing requires not only subjecting one’s own hypotheses to rigorous testing, but also showing that the available evidence is inconsistent with rival explanations. But it should be noted that the process by which inputs translate into outputs is by no means mechanical. Case analysis brings the goals and strategies of human actors into the narrative of postwar state-building in ways that statistical analysis alone cannot do, enabling us to examine the underlying causal processes. For these reasons, a mixed method approach is superior to each individual method alone.

By examining case studies carefully selected to maximize inferential leverage, we can ascertain whether or not the causal processes described by the theory unfold in the expected manner. I examine three cases in depth; each was selected on the basis of variation on the independent and dependent variables. The first is the Ogaden civil war that pitted
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) against the Ethiopian government (1976-78). This is an on-the-regression-line case in that it contains all the elements of inputs and outputs of theoretical interest: decisive military victory; lack of access to easily extractible resource rents and the mobilization of domestic material and human resources; and the postwar consolidation of state power. In contrast, the WSLF relied on external patronage in the form of financial and military support from the Somali Republic, reducing the imperatives for its leaders to generate domestic resources and nurture local legitimacy.

The second is the Angolan civil war (1976-2002). This case also falls on the regression line vis-à-vis the hypothesized causal relationships: the conflict ended through a government military victory; the exploitation of resource rents figured prominently in the civil war and the postwar period has seen limited state-building. Although the onset of the civil war had nothing to do with contest over natural resources, the country’s resource wealth affected the conduct of the war with far-reaching implications for war termination and state-society relations. Throughout the conflict, the government relied on oil revenues to finance the conflict. Consequently, it had few incentives to raise war-making resources by bargaining with the population, resulting in weak state-society linkages and ineffective state-building dynamic. Although the government’s decisive victory in the civil war generated opportunities for a new beginning, the powerful actors and vested interests that emerged in the context of the war economy continue to shape the reach and character of the state in the postwar period.

While the two cases cover the entire range of variation in outcomes, I have also selected a third case, the Mozambican civil war (1976-1992). This case represents an apparent anomaly in that the outcome of interest appears to deviate from the theoretical
expectation: a negotiated settlement, not military victory, contributed to successful post-war state-building. However, a close scrutiny of the case shows that the outcome is in fact broadly consistent with the theory’s causal claims. First, the paucity of domestic resources shaped the state-building strategies of the government led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) in wartime, forcing it to engage in broad-based institution-building and cultivate its local legitimacy. At the end of the civil war, the Mozambican state emerged with some of its capabilities and institutions intact, which served as a foundation for state-building in subsequent years. Second, although the civil war ended through a negotiated agreement, the negotiations took place within the context of a political opportunity structure that was decidedly inhospitable to the rebel group, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), putting it at a disadvantage at the negotiating table. A brief discussion of Renamo’s organizational evolution can provide some context. Renamo was created, armed and financed by Mozambique’s powerful neighbors: Rhodesia and South Africa. Precisely because of its external roots and its near-total dependence on outside resources to sustain itself, the rebel group avoided developing close links with local populations. The withdrawal of foreign support following the end of the Cold War left Renamo with few options. Consequently, it either had to come to the negotiating table or continue on a path of low-intensity insurgency with little chance of success. It chose the former but it had little leverage to extract significant political concessions at the negotiating table. As a result of this structural asymmetry, the government managed to achieve, at the negotiating table, that which had eluded it on the battlefield: a clear path to total control of the postwar state via winner-take-all elections. Thus, if the final peace accord is seen as
having taken place within the context of Frelimo-friendly structural conditions, the apparent anomaly of the case ceases being one at all.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 situates the present study in the context of relevant literatures on warfare and state-building and presents the core theoretical claims. It first provides an overview of key terms and concepts that appear in the study. I then provide a review of the relevant literatures in order to provide a broader context for the study. I do so in order to identify gaps in existing scholarship and highlight the study’s unique contributions. While the relationship between warfare and state formation is reasonably well-documented, I argue that the significance of civil war has been systematically underestimated. To a large extent, this neglect is driven by the belief that state-building in the ‘late developing’ world is fundamentally different from state formation in earlier periods. In contrast to early periods of institution-building, state-builders in the postcolonial world confront a geopolitical environment in which civil wars, rather than sovereignty-threatening territorial conflicts, are prevalent. While much of existing research regards civil war as the ‘wrong kind’ of conflict vis-à-vis state-building, I argue that this conclusion is based on an incomplete reading of the historical record. First, interstate conflict did not always catalyze state-building. War also served as an evolutionary selection mechanism, as states that failed to adapt to geopolitical pressures were eliminated from the interstate system. Second, the decisive resolution of internal conflicts was a critical element of state-building. Finally, I present the core theoretical arguments.
Chapter 3 subjects the hypotheses to a series of statistical tests. Given the conditional nature of the hypotheses, the statistical analysis estimates interaction models to test the effects of the various civil war outcomes on state-building conditional on the magnitude of wartime resource rents. I find that military victory contributes to the growth of postwar state capacity but these effects attenuate with rising natural resource rents.

In the next three chapters, I test the theory’s causal claims through case studies. Chapter 4 examines the impact of the Ogaden conflict on Ethiopia’s post-revolutionary regime and state consolidation (1976-1978). The internationalization of the conflict, following the direct involvement of the Republic of Somalia, allowed the Ethiopian regime to embark on an all-out mobilization that contributed to the end of potentially fatal power struggles within the young revolutionary regime. Evidence from this case supports the hypothesis that the effects of military victory on state capacity are at their highest when governments rely on domestic resources through taxation. The expansion of postwar state capacity was reflected in the growth of the central bureaucracy and the enhanced extractive capacity of the state.

Chapter 5 examines the Angolan civil war (1975-2002). I find that the Angolan government’s reliance on the exploitation of oil revenues led to a peculiar form of wartime state-building that was carried over into the postwar period. Freed from having to raise resources by bargaining with local populations, the government had little interest in governing much of the country. Relying on its access to large oil rents, the government cultivated complex patron-client networks essential for its survival. The result was the emergence of a state characterized by institutional duality, in which rickety formal institutions coexisted with powerful informal institutions where actual political power
resided. These wartime changes did not vanish at war’s end, continuing to shape the evolution of the postwar state.

Chapter 6 examines the case of Mozambique (1976-1992). Although Mozambique’s success is often attributed to an unusually robust international intervention, I show that the country’s state-building outcomes are broadly consistent with the study’s theoretical expectations. Initially, Frelimo undertook an ambitious, ideologically-driven nation-building project. When the failures of these projects along with the deteriorating security conditions in the countryside led to the erosion of its legitimacy, the party loosened its ideological commitment, making pragmatic course corrections that resulted in significant policy and institutional reforms. These reforms laid the ground work for a negotiated end to the civil and the frameworks within which the state was reconstituted after the civil war ended in 1992.

Chapter 7 concludes by providing a brief summary of the dissertation’s main arguments and findings, as well as theoretical and practical implications.
CHAPTER 2

CIVIL WAR, RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND STATE-BUILDING: A THEORY

Can civil war build states? A cursory look at the experiences of societies emerging conflict reveals mayhem and destruction. In some cases, civil war has led to the fragmentation of society and the collapse of state institutions. Even in the case of Somalia, long considered a paradigmatic example of conflict-induced state implosion, it would be a mistake to characterize the situation as one of complete anarchy (Menkhaus 2006/20070. While international efforts to help the Somalis reestablish a centralized state have not succeeded yet, the breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland have achieved a degree of autonomous capacity and fulfill many core functions of government (Weinstein 2005a). While a few prominent cases tend to suck the academic and media oxygen and generate a narrative of gloom and doom, there are also successful cases of postwar state reconstitution in the absence of direct international intervention (van de Walle 2001: 184).

War kills and destroys but it can also have ‘inspection effects’ in that it “unmasks the defects of a given political system more starkly than peacetime processes could ever do” (Porter 1994: 17). In so doing, war can have social-leveling effects (Porter 1994). For example, military service has provided previously marginalized groups with a powerful argument to use in their struggle for citizenship rights (Krebs 2006). Strategies of resource mobilization during war can also enhance the state’s extractive abilities and restructure state-society relations in ways that have far-reaching implications for a variety of postwar outcomes (Kage 2010; Kier 2010). Throughout history, the decisive resolution of civil wars was essential in asserting the all-critical monopoly on legitimate coercion widely considered the essence of the modern state. The victory of the North during the Civil War
laid the foundation for the subsequent development of the American state (Pollack 2009). It is now recognized that state-building is a crucial prerequisite for peacebuilding (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Paris 2004; Wesley 2008: 369). Even so, we lack a systematic treatment of the extent and manner in which the overall conduct of civil war may transform politics and restructure state-society relations in ways that shape institutional development and the evolution of state-society relations in peacetime.

Given that internal conflicts continue to be a fact of life for millions of people in the developing world, understanding how civil war may impede or facilitate long-term institutional development is crucial. I offer a theory of post-civil war state-building based on war outcome and wartime institutional development. The broad theoretical claim is that civil wars can and do contribute to state-building. I argue that civil wars that end decisively through military victory create a structural opportunity to centralize state power. To understand the importance of war outcomes, we need to look at why civil war begins in the first place. Civil war is almost always triggered by contest over the fundamental rules of the political game. Failure to reconcile these competing visions triggers a violent struggle for political supremacy that results in civil war. The resolution of this contest is a critical precondition for the reconstitution of legitimate state authority after civil war. By eliminating competing centers of power, military victory creates a structural window of opportunity for the extension of centralized authority.

Yet, the end of an armed conflict does not mean that the history of the war ceases being consequential. One of the legacies of civil war, which can be traced back to the nature of war finance, is the persistence of wartime institutions and patterns in the postwar period. Waging war requires mobilizing extensive material and human support. Combatants may
meet wartime revenue imperative in one of two ways. In the absence of easily extractible natural resource rents to capture or a sizable external patronage, they must raise the resources needed to wage war by bargaining with the population. Effective extraction requires developing adequate institutional capacity. While resource extraction rests, at least partially, on coercion or the implicit threat of coercion, effective resource extraction requires a degree of legitimacy. Revenue imperative in this case leads to a quasi-contractual arrangement with the population, in which combatants provide and protect in exchange for material and human support. With respect to wartime political orders, the forging of reciprocal relations with the population can be a powerful legitimating mechanism since the maintenance of order through acceptance is more effective in the long run than domination by brute force. The ability of the population to strategically withhold material and political support based on the behavior of combatants gives them a chance to shape the trajectory of the conflict.

By contrast, when combatants have easily extractible domestic resource rents or sizable external financing, they have few incentives to foster the kind of collaborative relations described above. Consequently, they have few incentives to establish robust non-military institutions necessary for the extraction of resources and the management of relations with the population. Given their financial autonomy from the population, resource-abundant rebels and governments can rely on a coercion-intensive approach to the maintenance of wartime political order, since the population does not have the ability to punish this behavior by withholding material and political support.

I argue that variation in the degree of institutional residue with which nations emerge from conflict explains variation in the degree of postwar state-building. The core
argument draws on insights from the ‘resource curse’ literature (Karl 1997). By fusing insights from this literature with the literature on warfare and state-building, the study provides another mechanism by which the ‘paradox of plenty’ operates. In so doing, the theory accounts for institutional divergence in cases in which civil wars end similarly.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief conceptual overview of state-building. The second section situates the present study in the context of the relevant literature on the relationship between war and state formation/state-building. The third section presents the theoretical arguments and related hypotheses to be tested.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN NATION- AND STATE-BUILDING

This section provides an overview of some of the key terms and concepts employed in the project. I use ‘state-building’ rather than ‘state formation’ for late developers whose leaders inherited fully formed territorial states and “where the challenges those leaders faced overwhelmingly exceeded the capabilities of the state” (Vandewalle 1998: 7). States are centralized and autonomous organizations with a monopoly on violent force within clearly demarcated territories (Tilly 1990: 43). According to Max Weber, nations are “communities of sentiment” upon which the political foundation of the state rests (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 110-11). The “profoundly emotive notion of nation invests the more arid, abstract, jurisprudential concept of state with a capacity for eliciting passionate attachment to it by civil society” (Young 1994: 32).
State-building and nation building are often conflated with each other, even though they are conceptually distinct. Nation building refers to the process by which affective ties between state and society develop (Callahan 2003: 13). State-building, which is the principal theoretical and empirical focus of this project, refers to the processes by which leaders develop the capacity to regulate, control and extract resources from society while commanding a degree of legitimacy. Postwar state-building involves establishing and/or re-establishing institutions, the objective manifestations of the state (Poggi 1978). This process entails two interrelated steps. The first step concerns the degree of stateness, or what is commonly known as state capacity (Nettl 1968). State capacity is measured in terms of the state’s monopoly of the legitimate means of coercion and its ability to regulate, control and extract resources from society (Barnett 2006: 91; Holsti 1996: 82-3). The ability of the state to fulfill these core functions rests on the expansion of centralized and professionalized bureaucracies (King and Lieberman 2009: 551).

The second step in the process of state-building entails establishing the legitimacy of the state. Legitimation is at the core of the Weberian notions of the state (Call and Wyeth 2008; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Young 1994: 37). Legitimacy refers to the state’s “right to rule” and the “intellectual and emotional” underpinnings of a national political community (Holsti 1996: 84). State authority is legitimated when it becomes “compatible with the freedom of those over whom it is exercised” (Abizadeh: 2012:867). Some aspects of state functions are, at least partially, coercive but the routine application of force would diminish its effectiveness (Holsti 2004: 30; Young and Turner 1985: 16). Consequently, establishing a legitimate and broadly accepted state authority requires balancing coercion against consent (Young 1994: 24).
The ultimate marker of legitimacy crisis is the “emergence of armed groups that openly mock the authority of the state and gain control of various areas of the country” (Ghani and Lockhart 2006: 101-2). The experience of the Republic of Congo in the 1990s exemplifies how the loss of monopoly on violent force leads to the breakdown of social order. During this period, Brazzaville became de facto partitioned into three militarized units. As the rival militias competed for control of the state, the country descended into a full-blown civil war that “seem[d] to defy any preestablished intellectual construct” (Azam 2002:135). Reconstituting state authority after civil war, thus, requires establishing or reestablishing the state’s monopoly on legitimate force. Doing so entails concentrating military and police powers under a central authority. Over time, sustaining these structures necessitates the development of extractive and distributive capacities (Fukuyama 2007: 11).

While there is no consensus about as to what constitutes legitimacy in practice, we can distinguish between two broad categories of legitimacy based on its provenance. In input or process legitimacy, the state derives its right to rule from a system of rules and procedures that defines standards of appropriate behavior, prescribing some actions while proscribing others. Commitment to a social order is explained in terms of the logic of appropriateness, in which habitual acquiescence to the state’s right to rule results from normative commitments (March and Olson 1998: 951). Internalized norms help solve collective action problems so that what is individually rational is also collectively rational (Hurd 1999: 388-9). In this type of social order, legitimate state authority can be derived from democratic representation. When democracy is consolidated, it is the “only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5). Rules in a democratic order are considered self-enforcing
insofar as actors have no incentives to deviate from the ‘equilibrium’ path (Przeworski 2006). However, when questions of membership in a national political community are not settled, democracy is of limited utility as a legitimating mechanism (Fukuyama 2007:11).

A second mechanism by which authority can be legitimated is through the provision of public goods. What matters most is the regularity with which public services are provided. To legitimize its power, the state strikes a basic bargain with the population: in exchange for the provision of social welfare and security, the population agrees to acquiesce to its rule. The roots of this contractarian approach to legitimacy could be traced to the Hobbesian and Lockean solutions to the problems of social order. When sovereign authority was no longer derived from Church and Emperor, progress became the principal pillar of state legitimacy (Krause and Milliken 2002: 758). Similarly, European powers in late colonial Africa introduced a developmental model of statehood, albeit with limited developmental outcomes, to make up for the colonial state’s lack of local legitimacy. Post-independence leaders adopted this developmental model in subsequent decades to legitimate their hold on power (Mayall 2005). When leaders fail to deliver on their promises, the state is in a condition of extreme vulnerability.

Before moving to a detailed discussion of the core theoretical claims, a brief survey of the literature is needed to situate the present study in the context of the relevant historical and contemporary literatures on war and state-building.
WARFARE AND STATE FORMATION: STATE OF THE LITERATURE

There is a substantial body of literature on the relationship between warfare and state-building (Downing 1992; Gurr 1988; Porter 1994; Tilly 1975, 1990). War destroys human and physical infrastructure. Yet, it was also one of the greatest exogenous stimuli to accelerated social, economic and political changes. Indeed, the modern national-state was forged in the crucible of war. As Bruce Porter writes, “the primacy of armed conflict in the evolution of the Western world is the essential tragedy of modern history” (Porter 1994: 21). It was through its comparative advantage in war-making that the modern national-state emerged as the most dominant form of political organization. Overtime, war-making and state-building unfolded in a symbiotic fashion. Hence, Charles Tilly’s pithy aphorism: “war made the state and the state made war” (Tilly 1975: 42).3 Waging war required resource extraction, which, in turn, necessitated the creation of centralized bureaucracies. At one point, Europeans could wage war by relying principally on small mercenary forces. Then warfare evolved into a large-scale enterprise, dramatically reducing the appeal of mercenaries (Chowdhury 2009: 38; Cramer 2006: 178). Large standing armies were necessary to thrive in an increasingly hostile security landscape.4 Over time, these state institutions had to be robust enough to make claims on powerful resource-holders, since raising and sustaining massive standing armies required enhanced extraction (Tilly 1975:73). Over time, the interplay of extraction and coercion—the ‘extraction-coercion cycle’—was crucial to this process (Finer 1975). States used a mixture

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3 According to Barkey (1994), the Ottoman Empire is an exception as it pursued an alternative path by negotiating with bandits in the process of state-building. For a useful review of alternative accounts, see Spruyt (2002).

4 As Michael Mann notes, “No European states were continuously at peace. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that a peaceful state would have ceased to exist even more readily than the militarily inefficient actually did” (p. 109 quoted in Herbst 19990: 120).
of coercion and inducements to extract resources from society. They then used their enhanced coercive power for subsequent rounds of extraction.

While extraction declined as war and the threats of war subsided, taxes did not revert to the prewar level. This ‘ratchet effect’ ensured the persistence of wartime institutions (Herbst 2000: 115; Rassler and Thompson 1985: 491; Tilly 1990: 89). The substantial revenues at the disposal of these early-modern Leviathans gave them a degree of structural autonomy, or the ability to act independently of or even against the wishes of major societal actors (Barkey and Parikh 1991: 525). As the scope of state activities increased, the need to broaden the revenue basis of the state and foster political integration increased, generating incentives to eliminate overlapping jurisdictions (Hui 2005: 35). The resulting administrative homogeneity provided economies of scale and rationalized the system of taxation. The elimination of competing centers of power also facilitated the assertion of centralized authority by allowing the monopolization of legitimate force (Spears 2007: 346). Rulers consolidated their power by making it “criminal, unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens to bear arms” (Tilly 1990: 69).

Although aggressive security competition necessitated the enhanced extraction of war-making resources, whether it led to the construction of effective and penetrating state institutions rested on the resolution of state-society conflicts over the terms of extraction (Kurtz 2013: 21). Only those rulers who overcame violent resistance from society were able to consolidate their authority (Barkey and Parikh 1990: 527; Rassler and Thompson 1985: 493). Coercion was critical in countering resistance from key resource-holders, but leaders knew that coercion alone was going to be ineffective in the long run. As result,
rulers bargained with local populations. Rulers could extract taxes and conscript soldiers; in return, they provided security to the population and made some social and political concessions (Tilly 1990: 99-103).

In general, these state-society bargains over resources led to the institutionalization of constraints on state power and the granting of social, economic and political rights (Hui 2005: 48). Rulers were reluctant to concede representation but representative institutions were the long-term ‘price of resource extraction (Tilly 1990: 64). Still, what we in retrospect call state formation “included the setting of ruthless tax terms against poor peasants and artisans, the forced sale for taxes of animals that would have paid for dowries, the imprisoning of local leaders as hostages to the local community’s payment of overdue taxes…the elevation of already arrogant property-holder into officers of the state, and the imposition of religious conformity in the name of public order and morality” (Tilly 1990: 98-99). Such coercive efforts to impose centralized authority triggered resistance from regional and local power centers (Cohen et al. 1981: 902). As a result, “centralization almost always precipitated some measure of civil war” (Porter 1994: 12-13). In France, England and Spain, the decisive resolution of center-periphery struggles was a crucial factor in the consolidation of centralized authority (Porter 1994: 29-31).

In recent years, attention has turned from the dynamics of state formation in Europe that gave birth to the above literatures to the experiences of postcolonial nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As scholars seek to make sense of the institutional evolution of ‘late developing’ nations, new questions have emerged: are the dynamics highlighted in

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5 Downing (1992), however, argues that domestic resource mobilization for war making was inimical to the rise of constitutionalism.
the bellicist literature portable across time and space or were they applicable only to Europe? What explains variation in the quality and efficacy of governmental institutions within the postcolonial world? By and large, researchers take the underlying logic of the bellicist perspective as a given and regard the underpinning conceptual assumptions as portable across space and time (Heydemann 2000: 3). For example, Miguel Centeno, while accepting Tilly’s basic argument, emphasizes the scale of warfare as the critical consideration in assessing the role of warfare in catalyzing institutional development outside Europe (Centeno 1997, 2002). In Latin America, limited wars generated limited states. Moreover, the availability of “easy financing” in the form of cheap loans and natural resource wealth enabled Latin American elites to wage war without bargaining with citizens. Limited wars along with the availability of ‘easy financing’ “produced blood and debt and not much more” (Centeno 2002: 127). Even if Centeno’s findings do not contradict the basic bellicist narrative, they highlight the underspecified nature of the underlying causal mechanisms.

Others concur, noting the absence of a generalizable relationship between war and state-building and emphasizing the contingent nature of that relationship (Kurtz 2009). Barnett (1992) examines the constraints Egyptian and Israeli leaders confronted in mobilizing the means of war, finding that territorial conflicts and threats do not give elites carte blanche to extract resources from society for they face greater threats to their political survival on the home front. In a comparison of Afghanistan and Vietnam, Botea and Taylor (2008) highlight the importance of a unifying national ideology and the existence of core ethnic groups in facilitating state-building outcomes. After analyzing 39 international and
civil wars in the Americas and Europe from 1815 to 1954, Jaggers (1992) concludes that the effects of war on state-building vary with the nature of war.

Other researchers attribute postcolonial state weakness to geographical endowments and changes in the structure of the international system. In Africa, a combination of low population density and difficult political geography stunted the development of states capable of broadcasting power across the broad expanses of national territory (Herbst 2000). In contrast to Europe, where land scarcity led to aggressive geopolitical competition over territory, land surplus in Africa meant that African leaders had few incentives to extend state authority to the hinterlands (Herbst 2000: 21). Norms of territorial integrity and diminishing returns from wars of conquest exacerbate these disincentives (Atzili 2006/7; Zacher 2001). Moreover, the cost of state weakness is no longer selection out of the system (Fazal 2007). The consequence of all of these changes in the structure of the international system is the persistence of ‘quasi-states’ whose juridical sovereignty is de-linked from their internal efficacy (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1990). These quasi-states lack the capacity to provide positive sovereignty needed to advance socio-economic and political developments. Since such states retain their juridical sovereignty regardless of their inability to broadcast authority, state managers are said to lack incentives to enhance the authoritative mechanisms of the state.

That postcolonial states emerged in a different structural—and far less belligerent—international environment is not deeply controversial. Consequently, late

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6 Ayoob (1995) posits that postcolonial state weakness stems from to inadequate time and lack of coercive license. While it is true that postcolonial state builders have had a fraction of the time their European counterparts enjoyed, this perspective wrongly implies uniform capacity across cases. In reality, there is substantial variation in levels of institutional and penetrative capacity that require explanation.
developers face substantially different challenges from those that began the state-building process much earlier. We know, however, that state-building is a quintessentially political process and leaders do not respond to systemic pressures with their hands tied behind their back. The preferences of regimes and leaders, which are largely determined by domestic political realities, shape state-building outcomes. In this sense, asking why Africa and other developing regions do not resemble Europe implicitly assumes that state-building outcomes are historically predetermined. But state-building is an ongoing historical process that unfolds over a lengthy period (Clapham 1998; Rassler and Thompson 1989: 19; Tull 2003).

In assessing the capacity of states in the developing world, scholars often rely on rigid binary qualifiers: strong and weak. But such measures are inadequate to capture the multidimensional nature of state strength (see Call 2010; Call 2011; Friedberg 1992: 110). The emphasis on why states in the postcolonial world typically have not generated high levels of institutional capacity akin to those found in Europe implies a teleological process in which state-building outcomes eventually converge on an ideal model (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009; Hagmann and Peclard 2010). Possessing the ‘blueprint’ for the desired outcome does not mean, however, that the long and uncertain journey can be short-circuited (Wesley 2008; 374). The development of the modern national-state was historically contingent, not inevitable. “To use twentieth century strength as the main criterion of effective state formation (as many analysts do) means succumbing to the temptation of teleology, misconceiving the relations among cities, states, capital, and coercion in the European past” (Tilly 1990: 31-2). Mamdani (1996) dubs this teleological approach ‘history by analogy’ that ascribes ‘predestiny’ to postcolonial nations, while mythologizing
the European experience. “If the former is rendered ahistorical, the latter is ascribed a suprahistorical trajectory of development, a necessary path whose main line of development is unaffected by struggles that happened along the way” (Mamdani 1996: 10).

Still other scholars argue that the comparative absence of war-making and the predominance of civil war in the postcolonial world account for the paucity of sociopolitically coherent states there (Herbst 2000: 126; Sorensen 2001). These unfavorable systemic conditions are contrasted to state formation in early-modern Europe, where geopolitical pressures compelled leaders to establish robust military and civilian institutions (Desch 1996: 242). Michael Mann captures the essence of this perspective when he writes, “the growth of the modern state, as measured by finances, is explained primarily not in domestic terms but in terms of geopolitical relations of violence” (Mann 1986: 490 quoted in Herbst 1990: 130).

The nature of warfare has changed drastically. While war might not be obsolete, the post-WWII period has seen a dramatic decline in interstate conflict. However, the argument that the paucity of external conflicts is to blame for postcolonial state weakness is problematic on several grounds. First of all, the effect of external conflict on state-building was not always positive. The experience of Castilian Spain illustrates this point. Internal revenues financed external war-making far from Spanish borders, which “meant that the largest standing army in Europe was not always available for quelling internal troubles at home” (Porter 1994: 45). Only after the Crown put down an internal rebellion—the revolt of the Comuneros from 1520-21—was the Spanish state able to consolidate its

7 Herbst (2000) appears to undercut his conclusion when he writes that “it would be foolish to say that significant interstate war would have solved Africa’s many fiscal problems” (2000: 126).
internal authority (Porter 1994: 45). Furthermore, although the proposition that war drove state-building is a well-established historical truism, war also acted as a selection mechanism in that it led to the elimination of unfit states that failed to adapt via institution-building and other self-strengthening reforms to sovereignty-threatening geopolitical pressures (Botea and Taylor 2008: 29; Holisti 1996:42; Starr 2010: 50-51). What this suggests is that bellicist pressures, while necessary, were insufficient conditions for state formation. The lack of automatic response to bellicist pressures in the form of self-strengthening reforms in some cases points to the essential role of domestic politics as a prism through which geopolitical dictates were refracted. By ignoring the cases that failed to adapt to bellicist pressures, a large segment of the relevant universe of cases is therefore discarded, leading to the overestimation of the role of war in stimulating state-building (Kurtz 2009, 2013). An accurate understanding of war as a causal force in state formation requires examining the entire range of variation in outcomes, since war can have both catalytic effects in institutional development and Darwinian effects as a selection mechanism (Starr 2010). While this point does not undermine the validity of the underlying causal relationships between war and institutional development, it highlights the importance of specifying the conditions under which war may or may not stimulate state-building. Furthermore, it partially counters the common assertion that the absence of interstate conflict is the critical factor in the absence of state-building in the postcolonial world.

While internal conflicts have had devastating effects on postcolonial societies, the dismissal of civil war as the ‘wrong’ kind of conflict vis-à-vis state-building is predicated on a misleading interpretation of European historical developments. While large-scale
territorial conflicts were prevalent in Europe during the formative years of the national-state, Europe was also rife with numerous civil wars. European elites spent much of their time from 1400 to 1700 “disarming, isolating or co-opting rival claimants to state power” (Tilly 1990: 76). The decisive resolution of these internal conflicts enabled rulers to assert internal sovereignty by monopolizing legitimate force. As civil wars unleashed chaos, only strong centralized governments could impose law and order. The reconstitution of European states following major civil war episodes suggests that civil war need not have disintegrative effects. In France, near-constant center-periphery struggles defined Louis XI’s reign. Victory over feudal lords resulted in the consolidation of the French state (Porter 1994: 74). In England, Henry VII’s victory in the War of Roses (1455-85) led to subsequent political settlements among kings and commercialized nobles (Cramer 2006: 182). In Spain, the alliance between Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile led to the reassertion of centralized authority following devastating civil wars (Porter 1994: 28). In short, while widely neglected in contemporary debates about the relationship between war and state-building, the decisive resolution of internal conflicts was critical to state-building in early-modern Europe, for only then were leaders able to establish the all-too-essential monopoly on violent coercion. For these reasons, state-making went hand in hand with war-making (Tilly 1985).

Recent research suggests that the adverse effects of civil war on institutional development and societal cohesion has been particularly pronounced in the post-Cold War period. Reno (2011) traces the shifting nature of warfare in Africa, developing a typology of insurgencies ranging from ideologically-based ‘reformist’ insurgencies of the Cold War era to the ‘parochial’ and ‘warlord’ insurgencies of the post-Cold War period. A key
consideration in Reno’s (2011) typology is the underlying rationale for insurgency. Whereas reformist insurgencies were driven by ideological and political principles, parochial and warlord insurgencies are driven by narrow economic interests. Reno’s (2011) typology dovetails with the distinction between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars in recent civil war research (Kaldor 1999). The so-called new wars of the post-Cold War era are said to lack broad political or ideological bases. In these wars, combatants pursue economic interests; victimize civilians; and lack clear political and ideological goals (Heupel 2009). Consequently, such insurgencies are said to forgo the construction of a social order characterized by a high degree of institutionalization (Reno 2003: 322).

This interpretation of recent conflicts comports with the ‘greed’ versus ‘grievance’ debate in civil war research (Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Given there is more grievance than civil war onset, the argument goes, the onset of civil war can only be explained in terms of greed. The outbreak of internal conflicts in resource-abundant nations provided prima facie evidence for greed as an explanation for civil war onset. Precisely for that reason, recent internal conflicts in Africa and elsewhere are regarded “as ultimately irrational, destructive and therefore without logic” (Cilliers 2000: 5). Holsti (1996) writes of ‘wars of the third kind’ that lack political content. Others describe these conflicts as “simply apolitical brutality” (de Soysa and Gleditsch 1999: 19). Enzensberger (1994: 22) sums up this view: “What gives today’s civil wars a new and terrifying slant is the fact that they are waged without political stakes on either side, that they are wars about nothing at all” (quoted in Kalyvas 2001: 103). War is no longer a continuation of politics by other means but ‘a continuation of business by other means’ (Cooper 2002: 942). Accordingly, “those who conceive of war in traditional Clausewitzian terms, based on
definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested interests, both political and economic, in the continuation of war” (Kaldor 1999: 90-91 quoted in Mello 2010: 300).

The notion that contemporary internal conflicts should be understood in the context of long-term processes of state formation runs counter to the dominant depiction of these conflicts as senseless. The supposed abnormality of contemporary conflicts is associated with the role of various natural resources in financing these wars (Cramer 2006: 171). But when these conflicts are placed in their proper historical context, the greed-grievance and ‘new’ versus ‘old’ debate loses its luster (Kalyvas 2001). In many cases, the onset of civil war predates the entry of a particular resource into the political economy. Resources may affect the duration and intensity of conflict but civil war cannot be reduced to simple greed (Sambanis 2004: 265). Looting as a means to an end is different from looting as an end. When the former is the case, looting may be no different from “revolutionary taxation” common throughout history (Kalyvas 2001: 104). The complexity of civil war also means that we have a limited ability to infer individual motivations from broad statistical correlations (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). As Kalyvas (2003: 475) notes, “civil wars are not binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and action—to such a degree as to be defined by that mix…the widely observed ambiguity is fundamental rather than incidental to civil wars, a matter of structure rather than noise.”

The dominant depiction of recent conflicts as being driven by self-aggrandizing elites has detracted attention from the nature of wartime political order that shapes postwar developments. The reduction of civil war to greed “tends to delegitimize local politics as
venal and disruptive, as the problem to be addressed” (Wesley 2008: 380). Yet following multiple episodes of civil war in the late 1990s, a victorious militia led by former president Dennis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo used oil rents to establish a stable neo-patrimonial regime through elite co-optation (Ron and Englebert 2004: 62). In this case, class interests trumped the logic of warlordism. While warlordism conjures up images of rampant socio-political disorder, “warlords levy taxes, administer justice, maintain some degree of order, and generally assume the burdens of government in the areas they control” (Kalyvas 2001: 105). The idea of the state as an “exercise in legitimation” (Abrams 1988: 76) has a powerful appeal to such groups. Even the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, widely regarded as the paradigmatic parochial insurgency, had more political and ideological content than assumed, at least initially (Abdullah 1998, 2006; Reno 1997: 500; Silberfein 2005: 218). Thus, the idea that the ‘new’ wars are driven by economic motives to a much greater extent than ‘old’ wars has been asserted rather than demonstrated. Combatants throughout history have pursued economic interests. Yet, researchers and analysts tend to overstate the ideological content of ‘old’ wars (Kalyvas 2001: 106-7). The emphasis on the economization of motives may be a byproduct of the predominance of economics-based rational-choice theories that model rebellion as a criminal enterprise (Collier 2000a; Cramer 2002; Grossman 1999). Such explanations “can only deal in certain types of evidence: quantifiable evidence that can be assumed to ‘mean’ similar things across different contexts, in different countries and over a given span of time captured in the dataset that is matched to the model” (Cramer 2006: 8). However, the explanatory parsimony derived from such models comes at a cost: heterogeneous conflicts are treated as an identical class of events.
Although there is a wealth of scholarship on the structural determinants of civil war onset and duration, there is not nearly as much empirical research on the political consequences of civil war. But recent research on civil war has taken a political turn. Weinstein (2007) examines the role of resource endowments in shaping patterns of recruitment, insurgent organization and violence against civilians, though the implications of variation in rebel behavior for postwar politics are not studied. In addition, the theoretical and empirical focus only on rebels, thereby creating an unnecessary dichotomy between states and rebel movements. Using household data, Bellows and Miguel (2006: 397) examine the impact of civil war (1991-2002) on local institutions in Sierra Leone, concluding that “violence is associated with greater local mobilization and collective action postwar.” However, they do not provide a systematic theoretical explanation why this might be the case. Weinstein (2005a) argues that ‘autonomous recovery’—systematic reduction in violence and economic and political reconstruction in the absence of international intervention—is possible, though the empirical focus is on conflict recurrence. Slater (2010: 95) argues that internal conflict can build states, finding supporting evidence from cases in Southeast Asia. Another promising line of inquiry focuses on emergent orders in war-torn African nations that revolve around the notion of mediated statehood, in which societies in war-torn states adapt in a variety of ways to minimize the risks of disorder (Menkhaus 2006/2007; Menkhaus, Raeymaekers, and Vlassenroot 2008).

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8 Some scholars have also noted democratization in war’s wake. Wantchekon (2004) finds that nearly 40 percent of the civil wars that took place between 1945 and 1993 resulted in improved levels of democracy. Bermeo (2010) argues that electoral democracies that emerged in the immediate aftermath of war are more durable than those that emerged in peacetime, tracing this durability to wartime processes. Similarly, Huang (2012) finds that rebel reliance on civilians during civil war leads to postwar democratization.
This dissertation builds upon prior and emerging research on the dynamics of civil war by theorizing and empirically testing the conditions under which civil wars might contribute to state-building. I do so by examining the joint effects of war termination and wartime developments on post-civil war state-building. Although war outcome determines the broad contours of postwar state-building, wartime processes matter significantly for state-building over the long term. The decisive end of a conflict may present a window of opportunity for a fresh start, but wartime legacies linger long after war has come to a formal end, shaping the broad contours of postwar politics (Cramer 2009: 129-130; Wood 2008). Yet, the focus of the political economy literature remains on what happens at war’s end (see Flores and Nooruddin 2009). Yet, the exclusive focus on what happens at war’s end ignores the changes that transpire in the course of an armed conflict, some of which carry over into the postwar period. The common assumption that war is ‘development in reverse’ dovetails with “the equally widespread imagery of “blank slate” inherited by postwar societies” (Cramer 2009: 129).

In reality, wartime changes do not disappear at war’s end. For example, during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), numerous sectarian militias emerged following the disintegration of the central state. Initially created to protect their communities, the militias degenerated into instruments of predation, making a mockery of state authority. But the state did not vanish from the scene, since “the authority of state institutions to sanction certain kinds of activities, to license and authorize, was a significant asset for militia leaders looking to legalize and make systematic what might otherwise appear to be ad hoc pursuit of extortion, smuggling and theft” (Heydemann 2000: 16). A cursory overview of
Lebanese politics would show that the powerful actors that emerged during the civil war did not disappear from the political scene, showing the prolonged impacts of civil war.

The remainder of this chapter lays out the core theoretical claims on the relationship between civil war and post-civil war state-building. To foreshadow, I show that two factors that jointly determine the nature and extent of post-civil war state-building are the form of war termination and wartime state-building outcomes. I first discuss the relationship between civil war outcomes and state-building. Since part of the theoretical argument revolves around the notion that a decisive outcome through military victory is more conducive to state-building than any other outcomes, the discussion elucidates the causal logic that underpins this theoretical perspective. I then discuss how wartime resource mobilization, via its effects on the nature and character of wartime state-building, shapes the extent of postwar state-building. Finally, I discuss some mechanisms by which wartime legacies affect the broad contours of postwar developments.

A THEORY OF STATE-BUILDING AFTER CIVIL WAR

To understand why some civil wars are followed by greater state-building than others, a good starting place is war termination. Most civil wars end decisively through military victory by one side; some end through a negotiated settlement; some end through ceasefire accords short of a formal peace agreement; still others fizzle out without any recognizable end. How civil war ends is important as it affects the likelihood of conflict recurrence as well the makeup of the postwar political elite and the distribution of formal
political power. I posit that civil wars that end decisively are more conducive to postwar state-building than those that end in negotiated settlements or fizzle out on their own.\(^9\)

While military victory has been the most common historical outcome in civil war, negotiated settlements have become the preferred mechanisms of the international community for ending conflicts in the post-Cold War period (Paris and Sisk 2009: 1). Between 1989 and 2005, for example, about 144 peace accords were concluded, roughly a third of active armed conflicts since 1989 (Harbom, Hogbladh, and Wallensteen 2006: 622). Changes in the international environment explain the high rate of peace accords during this period. The end of the Cold War drastically reduced the level of ideological polarization and institutional paralysis within the UN Security Council, thereby leading to an unprecedented increase in the number and scope of peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Paris 2004:15). This new international environment has been conducive to negotiated settlements, given the increased credibility of the international community’s promise to ameliorate the security dilemma inherent in peace settlements through a mix of carrots and sticks, including coercive security guarantees.

Negotiated settlements have been the international community’s preferred choices for ending civil wars in the post-Cold War period (Wennmann 2011: 8).\(^{10}\) But the frequency of settlements is matched only by their propensity to fail (Walter 2004: 374). For example, Fortna (2004a) finds that the risk of recurrence declines by 70 to 80 percent

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\(^9\) Even when civil war ends through military victory, the actual process of formalizing the terms of victory entails some form of negotiation.

\(^{10}\) Some observers have noted the moral hazard created by the international community’s devotion to peace accords as conflict-mitigating tools in Africa. A significant concern is that negotiated settlements tend to generate perverse incentives in that political actors who otherwise stand little chance of dominating their rivals on the battlefield may instrumentalize violence to force their way into power via peace accords (Mehler and Tull 2005).
with an outright military victory. Similarly, Toft (2010) finds that civil wars ending in victory are twice as likely to endure compared to wars that end in negotiation or a ceasefire/stalemate. The main explanation for the high degree of instability has to do with the fact that settlements rarely dismantle the war-making capabilities of disputants and often preserve the very conditions implicated in the onset of civil war in the first place (Menkhaus, Raeymaekers, and Vlassenroot 2008: 11). The preference for a negotiated settlements has obvious normative underpinnings. Helping disputants iron out their differences at the negotiating table is naturally more appealing than letting them fight it out in light of the terrible human and material costs of war. But as research has shown, “negotiated settlements are not always the least costly solutions to civil wars since the rapid victory of one side over another can bring fewer casualties and longer peace over the long run” (Walter 1997: 362).

The recurrence rate of civil wars matters a great deal for settlement stability. But the reduced likelihood of recurrence per se is not what makes war termination through victory conducive to state-building. Rather, what matters is that victory allows the victor to take control of the instruments of state power, thereby allowing it to consolidate its position and monopolize violent force (Wagner 1993). After establishing monopoly on violent force, postwar elites can engage in “substantial and centralizing measures” (Rothchild 1999: 325). This feature of military victory is also behind calls to ‘give war a chance’ that some analysts consider necessary to the definitive settlement of civil wars (Luttwack 1999). The key argument is that a decisive outcome allows the winning side to
consolidate power quickly and deal with myriad internal challenges to state authority or risk facing a vicious cycle of internal instability.\textsuperscript{11}

Additionally, by dismantling the war-making structures of the losing side, military victory eliminates what Tilly (1978: 191) calls the condition of ‘dual sovereignty’ that is the hallmark of civil war. This permissive structural environment allows the victor to establish a robust security architecture essential for asserting the all-critical monopoly on legitimate coercion and put in place a system of revenue collection and service provision. Institutionalization—“the tendency of patterns of behavior, norms, or formal structures to persist through time” (Krasner 2009: 96)—might not necessarily guarantee peace. But there is a consensus that the absence of effective state institutions is an important permissive condition for a vicious cycle of conflict (Cramer 2006: 277; Paris and Sisk 2009: 3). A well-institutionalized state is necessary to advance socio-economic development, prevent the onset and recurrence of conflict and manage inter-groups relations in ways that are conducive to stability.

Civil war outcomes that do not settle violent contests over the fundamental rules of the political game are unlikely to provide the requisite political space for the centralization of state authority (Ottaway 2002: 1013). Somalia’s chronic instability can be used to illustrate this point. Since the implosion of the Somali state in the early 1990s, political

\textsuperscript{11} Some have argued that a government loss to rebel groups is more likely to lead to state-building than a military victory, “because power consolidation requires not only increases in revenue but also the distribution of these resources to the population in an attempt to forge new bonds of legitimacy between the masses and the new regime” (Jaggers 1992: 38-39). But in order for this to be true, one would have to assume that a victorious government faces no legitimacy imperative, which stresses the importance of adopting symbolic and substantive measures that convey legitimacy to citizens. Since the onset of civil reflects the failures of legitimate state authority, a victorious government must reestablish its legitimacy at war’s end. As discussed later in the chapter, whether or not it does so rests on complex calculations that, in turn, depend on a combination of incentives, opportunities and constraints.
actors in Somalia have not succeeded in reestablishing centralized rule. The failure to reconstitute the central state could be attributed to the inability of Somalis to reconcile divergent visions about the nature of the central state’s relations with society. These competing visions have been shaped by the legacy of the central state under the regime of Siad Barre. For most Somalis, the state was an instrument of centralized predation and patronage. Consequently, although most Somalis see the revival of centralized rule as necessary, “they are reluctant to see control of the state fall into the hands of rival clans or factions…Somali actors view efforts to revive the central government as a zero-sum game that has provoked rather than mitigated conflict” (Menkhaus 2006/7: 94). It is not surprising that regional and international efforts at reviving centralized authority have not come to fruition. Similarly, 7 factions in Liberia’s civil war signed 13 peace accords only to renege on their commitments shortly after each accord was signed (Alao, Mackinlay and Olonisakin 1999). Shortly after the formation of the Council of State in 1995, comprised of these factions, Liberia descended into yet another civil war as a result of the factions’ inability to resolve internal power struggles (Bekoe 2008: 119).

A number of factors undermine the durability of negotiated settlements. First of all, warring parties may capitalize on the lull in fighting as an opportunity to rearm and reorganize in order to dominate their rivals on the battlefield (Spears 2000: 109). This kind of opportunistic defection is especially likely when on-going access to natural resources facilitates rearmament (Spears 1999: 576; Stedman 1997: 42). During the Sierra Leonean civil war in the 1990s, the RUF defected from multiple peace accords after rearming and
regrouping during the ceasefire (Hazen 2013:67). Negotiated settlements are also vulnerable to manipulation by spoilers—“leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997:5). Spoiling is likely when there are multiple parties to a settlement (Cunningham 2011). For competing factions trying to outbid one another, “spoiling of negotiations offers an opportunity to advance their struggle for political dominance” (Pearlman 2008/2009:79). By contrast, military victory marginalizes spoilers and allows the victor to consolidate state authority (Licklider 1995: 685).

Third, a growing body of scholarship highlights the adverse effects of defensive incentives that motivate warring parties on the successful implementation of peace settlements (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 78). Such incentives arise in the domestic security dilemma. Because war is costly, bargaining should be the superior option to fighting (Powell 2002). Yet history is littered with bargaining failures (Walter 2009). Scholars in the rationalist tradition explain bargaining and settlement breakdowns in terms of commitment problems: the inability of groups to credibly signal their promise not to renege on a promise or exploit favorable shifts in the distribution of power down the road. During civil war, the domestic institutional landscape is anarchical, given the absence of a widely

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12 Following the 1999 Lome peace accord to end Sierra Leone’s civil war, Foday Sankoh of the RUF was appointed vice president and the head of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development. Sankoh used his influential position to undermine the peace agreement from within in the hope of achieving exclusive control of the state (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009). Also see Bangura (2000: 564-566).

13 Under conditions of international anarchy, the security dilemma results from uncertainty about intentions (Jervis 1978). Similarly, during civil war, it is uncertainty about what the other side might do during the implementation phase that generates the security dilemma (Posen 1993).

14 Fearon (1995) provides rationalist explanations for war, identifying three major obstacles to successful bargaining: commitment problems, information asymmetry; and issue indivisibility.
accepted authority that can guarantee the security of all sides. Since the government formally in charge of the central state is also party to the conflict, its commitment to the other side’s security lacks credibility. The ensuing commitment problem is “the critical barrier to civil war settlement” (Walter 1997). Commitment problems are especially acute during the implementation phase of peace accords, as security concerns are “partially superseded by the diffuse uncertainties of institution-building, where former enemies must learn to occupy the same political space and develop stable and effective constitutional structures for a durable peace” (Rothchild 2002: 117). Since institutions have considerable distributional consequences, concerns about changes in the balance of power down the road give institutional decisions a zero-sum character, as groups fearing threats to their political and physical survival seek to prevent their adversaries from dominating state institutions. But we do not have a good understanding of the kinds of institutions, political or legal, that can mitigate commitment problems and facilitate bargaining among warring parties (Blattman and Miguel 2010: 19).

Institutionalizing peace accords through power-sharing is one of the mechanisms peace mediators often deploy in order to mitigate the security dilemma and sudden changes in the balance of power that exacerbate distributional concerns and increase the risk of civil war recurrence (Fortna 2004b; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Spears 2000; Walter 1997: 362). A notable example of such an arrangement is the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) in El Salvador, which played a critical role in El Salvador’s successful transition from war to peace. Established with the help of the UN and other outside actors, COPAZ included equal number of rebel and government representatives (Lyons 2002: 229). But when power-sharing is not a viable
option and settlements are not self-enforcing, some form of third-party guarantee is considered critical to settlement durability (DeRouen et al. 2010; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Walter 1997, 1999). By providing material incentives and occasionally wielding coercive tools, outsiders aim to reward compliance and punish defection. While the scale of interventions has historically varied, the international community’s record in restoring legitimate and effective states is generally unimpressive (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779; Wesley 2008: 379). Interventions are subject to classic collective action problems. Even though intervention is collectively rational, the costs of intervention often exceed the expected benefits for any one power (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 13). Consequently, intervention decisions are plagued by free-rider problems. The result is a perennial mismatch between means and ends that limit the effectiveness of interventions at mitigating conflicts (Ottaway 2002: 1008). To assuage public sensitivity to open-ended commitments, governments seek assurances that interventions “are limited in scope and have a clear exit strategies linked to progress against measurable performance indicators” (Wesley 2008: 374). And opposition to taking casualties often generates domestic political pressures that result in an ‘exit strategy’ to be executed when some preset benchmarks are met. But when intervening actors come face to face with the high costs of intervention in areas considered strategic backwaters, the immediate impulse is to cut their losses and withdraw, even if doing so comes at the expense of reversing the progress made up to that

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15 Peceny and Stanley (2001) provide an alternative constructivist account, in which ‘non-coercive interventions’ transformed actors’ interests and identities along liberal lines, thereby helping end civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. But the inculcation of liberal norms has to happen during civil war; yet, because norms diffusion does not happen overnight, efforts at institutionalizing liberal social norms would necessarily have to accept prolonged hostilities—until the actors have been sufficiently socialized into these conflict-mitigating liberal norms.
point. In short, although coercive external intervention may alleviate the domestic security dilemma, it tends to be unreliable for the reasons described above.

Based on the preceding discussion, it is clear that military victory creates a structural window of opportunity centralize state authority. But victory alone does not convey meaningful information about the size of the opening. The likelihood of postwar state-building cannot simply be inferred from the postwar actors having vanquished their opponents, because elite preferences vis-à-vis state-building are not a mere function of their having vanquished their opponents on the battlefield. A decisive outcome is crucial, as it determines the postwar configuration of political power. At the same time, the postwar setting is not a tabula rasa upon which victorious actors can project their preferred vision. Civil war generates various transformations that endure long after the war has come to an end (Wood 2008). Thus, the analysis of postwar politics that treats the end of the war as the most important point of departure would miss much of what transpires in the course of an armed conflict.

In the next section, I argue that the conduct of war is the critical factor that produces these enduring wartime changes. Specifically, the manner in which combatants raise war-making resources shapes wartime institutional patterns and relations with local populations that, in turn, shape postwar developments. Furthermore, I argue that initial resource endowments, by generating the incentives and constraints facing warring factions, determine mobilization strategies.
The Political Economy of War Finance

War is an expensive undertaking. Combatants must raise resources to achieve military viability and/or get an edge over rivals. War-making requires raising the resources necessary to recruit, train, and equip a fighting force that has a chance of success on the battlefield. Historically, wartime revenue imperatives stimulated significant social, economic and political and institutional changes. How combatants raise revenue has implications for relations with society. At the time civil war begins, it is fair to assume that governments enjoy initial financial advantage over rebels. The civilian and coercive institutions of the state are at their disposal. By virtue of its sovereign authority, a government can tap into existing streams of tax and non-tax revenue. But once civil war is underway and governments face an organized insurgency, they must raise additional resources to deal with the emergent threat to their survival. Governments that have few sources of non-tax revenue, such as natural resource rents, raise revenue through taxation. Resource-strapped governments cannot dangle the promise of lucrative diamond and oil concessions in front of mercenaries in exchanges for defeating their rivals and securing key natural resource installations, such as oil and diamond fields.

In the absence of such resource rents, governments look to indigenous sources to raise resources through taxation. Legitimate taxation requires institutional capacity and the cultivation of reciprocal relationships with society. In order to raise tax revenue from the population, the formal fiscal institutions of the state, such as the finance ministry, play a crucial role. In order to mobilize non-tax financial resources and manpower, governments can use existing administrative and organizational capabilities or establish new ones. Either way, the exigencies of war create incentives in resource-poor states to find institutionalized
mechanisms to mobilize the means of war. Given the ‘stickiness’ of institutions, the resulting institutional residue shapes the degree of institutional and administrative capacity with which the state emerges in the postwar period, which, in turn, is the basis for postwar state-building.

While institutional capacity is critical to the state’s ability to raise revenue, extending the state’s power, including the power to tax, requires a degree of legitimacy. While taxation is partially coercive, coercion alone is counterproductive in the long run. Legitimate taxation is contingent on ‘quasi-voluntary’ compliance (Levi 1988). Thus, capacity and legitimacy are inextricably linked. Inducing quasi-voluntary compliance entails bargains with society. While the quasi-contractual nature of this relationship might not be ideal given the exigencies of war, it is crucial with respect to establishing order. A consensual approach is more likely to endow rebel political authority with a degree of legitimacy than one that is coercion-intensive. With respect to the maintenance of order, contract-based relationships have can legitimize rebel authority since order based on compliance and acceptance is more cost-effective than domination through the brute application of force (Metelits 2010: 26). In exchange for taxing the population, governments agree to provide public goods, such as security, healthcare and education. The extent to which governments can provide these functions is obviously dependent on the nature and scope of the fighting. But governments are mindful of the threat to their legitimacy from their perceived and real inability to provide minimal security and other services. The contractual nature of the relationship should not, however, be overstated. Wartime exigencies may force governments to employ coercion to extract resources from society, though, when the shadow of the future is long, coercion-intensive extraction is
counterproductive. Coercion gives rise to societal alienation and disengagement from the state. The outbreak of civil war, by definition, reflects the state’s diminished legitimacy (Doyle 2002: 71). A predominantly coercive strategy is bound to exacerbate the state’s legitimacy deficit. Consequently, governments without rents need to find an appropriate balance between coercive and non-coercive strategies of extraction. For this reason, governments resort to material inducements, nationalism and ideology or some combination of all to legitimate their demands on society.

Because control of the levers of state power gives governments the ability to make exclusive claims to its resources, they are in an advantageous position vis-à-vis rebels, at least initially. Rebel resource mobilization is, therefore, critical to their viability as credible challengers to the central state. The business of financing war shapes rebel organizational and governance strategies, including their relations with civilians (Metelits, 2010; Weinstein 2007). Rebels that have no access to resource rents or sizable external patronage must raise revenues through some form of taxation.16 To raise resources via taxation, rebels may pursue one of two strategies, each of which has radically different implications for the development of structures for governing civilians. Depending on time-horizons, rebel leaders may rely on coercive or consensual strategies.17

In his influential analysis of the relative efficacy of democracy and dictatorship in fostering economic development, Mancur Olson uses a deceptively simple theoretical model to contrast the behavior of the stationary bandit with that of the roving bandit vis-à-

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16 The extent of rebel taxation should not, however, be overstated as rebels operate in peripheral and often poor areas (Clapham 1996: 231).
17 I use the two extremes as ideal types for expositional clarity. In practice, rebels rely on some combination of both, though the balance between the two is likely to vary from one group to another.
vis institutional choices (Olson 1993). In Olson’s model, a bandit can either act in a predatory fashion or it can temper its coercive impulse and impose an acceptable level of taxation on people in its jurisdictions. The roving bandit has a short time horizon, as it is concerned with instant gratification and, thus, discounts the future heavily. Consequently, it has no incentives to establish consensual relationships with the civilian population. Predation may be a rational choice when rebels face a one-shot game with civilians. However, a one-shot strategic interaction is virtually unthinkable in the course of civil war.

When the expected shadow of the future is long, predation is sub-optimal. In contrast to the roving bandit, the stationary bandit has a long time horizon. A one-time predatory action, while maximizing short-term gains, is counterproductive in the long run. It, thus, takes a consensual approach to dealing with the civilian population. Even when rebels and civilians strike mutually beneficial bargains, however, questions of compliance arise. Specifically, rebels may renege on their commitments due to the problem of time-inconsistency. That is, rebels may promise to take a consensual approach in exchange for material and human support but act in a predatory fashion at a later date. As a result, they must find a way to address this commitment problem. In a strategic game of repeat play, actors may establish a reputation for good behavior as a mechanism of signaling credibility (North and Weingast 1989). Accordingly, when the shadow of the future is long, a cooperative equilibrium could be maintained through a strategy of tit-for-tat, in which participants respond to cooperation with cooperation and defection with defection. But when there is uncertainty about time horizon, reputation through repeat play may be inadequate to guard against the possibility of opportunistic defection. The inadequacy of reputation and repeat play, in turn, point to the endogenous role of political institutions.
Consequently, rebel groups that need to generate domestic resources tend to develop robust organizational structures and nurture close links with the population (Clapham 1996: 233; Wood 2009).

Rebel governance structures have been described as ‘states-within-states’ (Kingston and Spears 2004). Wickham-Crowley (1987:478) identifies a guerrilla “counter-state” that “establishes itself through exchange processes, in effect establishing a new “social contract” with the populace.” Ironically, rebels adopt some of the institutional features of sovereign states. In so doing, they replicate the discourses and practices associated with statehood. This “isomorphic mimicry” shows the essentially conservative nature of most insurgent groups: they contest the authority of regimes that run states but not the fundamental authority of the state as an expression of collective interests (Englebert 2009: 48). It should be noted that rebel governance structures are not uniform across space and time. Even when rebels have collective organizational incentives to establish and run civilian governance structures, their ability to do so depends on the degree of territorial control they are able to exercise (Weinstein 2007: 163). Without safe zones, rebel organizations cannot introduce governance structures.

For rebels with safe zones, responsibility for civilians and commitment to civilian participation are unlikely to conflict with their fundamental objective, namely, group survival. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka was known to have established state-like administrative structures to perform core government functions (Mampilly 2011). The LTTE controlled border crossing, issuing ‘visa’ for visitors and collecting customs and other forms of taxes (Stokke 2006). During Uganda’s civil war (1980-1986), the National Resistance Movement (NRM) was known to have developed
elaborate structures for governing civilians in safe zones under its control. In particular, the NRM introduced a system of participatory village governance. These structures, known as the National Resistance Councils (NRC), allowed the NRM to deepen its commitment to civilian participation and provide governmental functions (Kasfir 2005: 285-88). While these civilian governance structures have been described as forms of emergent statehood, they are different from established states in one crucial respect. Regardless of how elaborate these structures are, they lack the juridical sovereignty that comes with formal international recognition. The importance rebels attach to international legitimacy is often reflected in their diplomatic offensive, including the stationing of diplomatic representatives in friendly nations.

Still, rebels dependent on local support have collective organizational incentives to treat civilians well, since their survival is fundamentally tied to their ability to obtain the enduring allegiance of the people they wish to rule. The notion that armed groups may have aggregate interests is, of course, at odds with recent analyses that focus on individual incentives as drivers of internal conflicts (Metelits 2010: 179). As strategic actors, civilians can grant and withdraw support based on rebel behavior. At a minimum, therefore, rebels that rely on civilians must act as stationary bandits, extracting resources but also providing services in return. Rebels engage in, inter alia, “shielding” civilians from threats to their security and the “provision of benefits” that transform control into collaboration (Kalyvas 2006: 124). Even so, as with the government-civilian relationship, the rebel-civilian relationship is not free of coercion (Minter 1994: 288). Even when rebels generally take a consensual approach to dealing with civilians, an underlying sense of coercion lurking in the background plays an important role in the exercise of control over territories and people.
(Kasfir 2005: 285). Even when rebels take a consensual approach to deal with civilians, as in all state-society relations, coercion does play a role in the exercise of control over territories and people. Some Marxist rebel groups were known to deploy fearsome security services to maintain general order and to enforce the strict disciplinary requirements of democratic centralism (Pool 2001: 60). But overreliance on coercion reduces its utility as a currency of politics, since fear is a poor instrument for the production of loyalty (Kalyvas 2006: 115). A predominantly coercive strategy makes it difficult for rebels to generate popular support critical for the maintenance of a viable insurgency and the construction of wartime political authority.

While resource-scarce rebels with long time horizons may prefer consensus to coercion, commitment to civilian participation in wartime comes with costs. In the process of mobilizing material, human and political support from civilians, rebel groups must navigate between two fundamental but at times contradictory demands: responsibility for civilians and military necessity. The need to provide social services and security to people may at times clash with classic guerrilla military doctrine that requires retreat in the face of threats to the survival of the organization from a superior conventional force (Kasfir 2005: 273). Therefore, when consent-based civilian participation is critical to the long-term viability of the group, rebel leaders must balance achieving it against pursuing their military goals. Ultimately, the centrality of civilian support to rebel success and the balance of military strengths would figure prominently in the decision-making processes of rebel leaders. All things considered, the decision to bear the political and administrative costs of

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18 Some researchers argues that that when insurgents with little or no access to rents face competition from other insurgents for scarce resources, they engage in coercive extraction. “Setting up contractual relations is a long-term strategy, and focusing on this strategy in an environment of armed competition will lead to a speedy demise of cadres and perhaps the movement itself” (Metelits 2010: 27).
civilian governance, even in the face of adverse military conditions, can serve as a form of costly signal that establishes the credibility of rebel commitments. Doing so, in turn, fosters collaborative ties with civilians and establishes a reservoir of goodwill and legitimacy essential for long-term material and political support from local populations.

While both rebels and governments that rely on civilians need to cultivate local legitimacy, governments that rely on an ideology of development are particularly vulnerable to the erosion of their legitimacy. One of the ways in governments legitimize their hold on power is through the provision of welfare services. But when a government’s ability to protect and provide diminishes, as it almost always does during civil war, its legitimacy diminishes. Provision and protection presuppose a degree of territorial control that can easily be disrupted as a result of hostilities. In particular, rebels can target the institutional trappings of the state in order to undermine its authority and sever state-society linkages. By virtue of being at the helm of the state, governments are subject to greater expectation vis-à-vis provision and protection than sub-state actors. Consequently, rebels have a strategic incentive to demonstrate that the state is utterly incapable of fulfilling its core functions.

By sabotaging the social, economic and political structures that signify state authority, rebels can capitalize on the ensuing resentment against the state. Even when the local population does not buy into the particular socio-political vision rebels sell, undermining state-society relations by targeting the physical manifestations of state authority can erode regime legitimacy. While the ensuing resentment might not necessarily translate into active support for rebels, it may result in rebels being met with more indifference than outright hostility. Even so, the effectiveness of such a strategy is
contingent on the extent of rebel reliance on the civilian population for material and
political support. Rebels that are not structurally autonomous from the civilian population
need to cultivate local legitimacy. For such groups, a deliberate strategy of infrastructure
destruction to delegitimize the state may be counterproductive in the long run, given their
own legitimacy needs.

The institutional consequences of wartime revenue mobilization are, however,
different when combatants have access to easily extractible natural resource rents. Rents
allow combatants to bypass the politically sensitive and arduous process of raising revenue
through taxes from a recalcitrant population. By contrast, the extraction of mineral and oil
revenue requires little institutional capacity. When governments rely on ‘point resources’
like off-shore oil, they have exclusive access to the rents since offshore oil fields are not
vulnerable to forcible seizure by rebels (Le Billon 2007). Moreover, given the nature of the
international system that places premium on juridical sovereignty, it is almost always
governments that benefit from the export of oil. Extracting oil rents does not require greater
institutional capacity than the ability to sign contracts with multinational oil companies.
Such governments face little competition over control of rents. Accordingly, when
combatants raise revenue by extracting natural resource rents, the result is weak state-
society linkages and weak bureaucratic structures insulated from societal pressures.

The basic logic of the argument can be extended to resources other than oil, except
that non-oil resources are accessible to rebels as well. Diamonds and other precious gems
are geographically diffuse and they can be extracted through labor-intensive digging. Their
value and portability make them easy to smuggle. During the Sierra Leonean civil war
(1991-2002), access to diamonds played a major role in the duration and intensity of the
conflict, as well as the governance strategies the RUF and the government chose (Alao 1999; Campbell 2002; Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton 2000; Kawamoto 2012).

Consequently, control over diamond fields was seen as crucial to each side’s military and political strategies. The availability of rents had adverse effects on state institutions. To be sure, Sierra Leone’s institutional decay predated the civil war (Reno 1998). But once the civil war was underway, the presence of ‘unearned’ income intensified that process. Faced with a clear and present threat to its political survival, the government had neither the time nor the inclination to engage in wartime institution-building or cultivate local legitimacy.

In an effort to repel rebel offensive to control Freetown, the president of Sierra Leone mortgaged the country’s diamond wealth in exchange for weapons and manpower. According to Ross (2004a: 58-9):

During the war in Sierra Leone, the government saved itself from defeat twice by selling off the right to exploit diamond fields that it did not yet control. In March 1995, RUF had taken control of the country’s main diamond fields and advanced to within twenty miles of the capital. To stave off defeat, the government sold future mining rights to the Kono diamond fields—then in rebel hands—to Branch Energy, a South African company; the government then used the proceeds to hire a South African mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes, to beat back the RUF offensive and recapture the mortgaged diamond fields.

The existence of rents and/or sizable external support generates similar incentives in insurgent groups. Using contract theory, Weinstein (2005b, 2007) posits that resources shape patterns of rebel recruitment, organization and violence against civilians. Rebel groups with large material resources attract opportunistic recruits whose commitment to the civilian population is shallow. Such groups are “flooded with opportunistic gainers, committed only as long as the flow of short-term rewards continued” (Weinstein 2007: 614). Consequently, opportunistic insurgents tend to inflict a greater degree of violence on
civilians than resource-poor groups. They also face few incentives to develop governance structures and cultivate local legitimacy by articulating political programs since their operational success is not dependent on the material and political support of civilians. The RUF in Sierra Leone is widely considered a paradigmatic example of what Clapham (1996) calls a rentier insurgency. Particularly in the second half of the conflict, the RUF became totally dependent on rents from alluvial diamonds. Consequently, the RUF enjoyed considerable autonomy from civilians, using material inducements to attract opportunistic recruits that victimized civilians (Weinstein 2005: 614-18).

These arguments are obviously indebted to the ‘resource curse’ literature. There is a close affinity of causal mechanisms between the bellicist and resource curse literatures, since both take as central to state-building the creation of effective extractive institutions (Kurtz 2009, 2013). Whereas bellicist accounts emphasize war as the driver of state-building, the resource curse literature highlights the corrosive effects of natural resource wealth on institutional development. Yet, these literatures “have developed in near-complete isolation from each other, even as they seek to explain opposite sides of the same theoretical coin” (Kurtz 2013: 20). The present study seeks to deepen our understanding of state-building by examining how the exigencies of war interact with existing resource endowments to shape the nature of wartime political order and, by extension, the postwar order.

The notion of ‘resource curse’ describes the tendency of resource-wealthy nations to perform worse on a range of socioeconomic indicators than comparable resource-poor nations. The findings of the ‘resource curse’ literature are counterintuitive because resource wealth should normally help countries become economically prosperous. Paradoxically,
the availability of easily extractible rents has been a foundation for weakness in much of the postcolonial world. Initially cast in terms of the economic costs of natural resource wealth (Sachs and Warner 1999, 2001), subsequent theorizing about the resource curse has focused on rent seeking, generalized corruption and the overall efficacy of state institutions (Chaudhry 1997; Dunning 2005; Karl 1997; Morrison 2013; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2006; Snyder 2006; Ross 2012; Skocpol 1982). In these accounts, the unique patterns of state-building that historically develop in resource-abundant countries result in the formation of institutionally incoherent states. In such states, political leaders respond to resource endowments in ways that maximize their likelihood of survival in office but lead to institutional malformation. In most cases, they deliberately subvert the development of independent bureaucracies, since capable and autonomous institutions threaten the capture and redistribution of rents essential for political survival. The resulting state weakness is, therefore, intentional rather than accidental.\(^{19}\)

Similarly, while abundant resource rents impede wartime state-building in the Weberian sense, different forms of political order do emerge. Rentier regimes create a neopatrimonial order, in which power is centralized around a powerful presidency and a narrow set of elites within the security and intelligence services. Such states operate without hierarchically structured, rational-legal bureaucratic institutions. But the outward

\(^{19}\) Even though rentier states display a low level of institutionalization, some studies have documented resilience and durability among resource-rich authoritarian regimes. For instance, Bellin (2004) attributes Middle Eastern authoritarianism to the “strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus.” Smith (2004: 232) attributes this authoritarian resilience to the fact that “leaders in many of these states invested their windfall revenues in building state institutions and political organization that could carry them through hard times.” Even if these regimes were actually fragile, they were successful in projecting the appearance of strength.
trappings of the modern state coexist with informal institutions through which leaders exercise power (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 61). The maintenance of power requires access to state resources and their redistribution to privileged social groups (Jackson 2006: 23; van de Walle 2001: 119). Consequently, the patrimonialized state lacks bureaucratic and developmental capacities to fulfill its basic obligations (Brownlee 2002: 37; Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 67). Moreover, such a system lacks organizationally and normatively distinguishable private and public realms. Formal state institutions provide negligible constraints on the behavior of leaders, as the state is essentially “replaced by personality politics for which state structures are but an object of manipulation with no legitimate claims to a distinct existence or purpose” (Holsti 1996: 105). Still, in spite of the clientelization of state-society relations and the subversion of the rational-legal order, the ability of state elites to maintain their own positions rests on the existence of pockets of rational-legal order. Consequently, even in the least institutionalized rentier states, “there are rational-legal pockets attempting to assert themselves” (van de Walle 2001: 128).

The origins of the parallel structures of governance, though calibrated to the needs of a narrow constituency, could be traced back to the imperative of legitimation. Rentier governments could seek to legitimize their power through the provision of public goods. However, public goods provision requires functioning bureaucratic institutions; otherwise, service provision cannot be accomplished with a reasonable degree of regularity. But these leaders face a conundrum: given their already contested legitimacy, the legitimacy payoffs associated with the provision of public goods are unlikely to materialize in time to counter immediate threats to regime survival, making institutional-building a risky undertaking. Reluctant to make long-term investments in central institutions, ruling elites circumvent
formal institutions in favor of informal alternatives to guard against threats from enterprising rivals. In such contexts, resource-wealthy regimes are likely to choose “systems of elite patronage and clientelist personal networks within the narrow decision-making cartel” (Roberts 2009: 152). Substantial resource rents allows leaders to rely on a system of elite accommodation to consolidate their hold on the state. The “reciprocal assimilation of elites” into the structure of state power enables leaders to form cross-cutting alliances that, nevertheless, leaves the vast majority of the population to fend for itself (Bayart 1993, cited in Englebert 2000: 100). The decision to rely on such networks is, then, a rational response to the circumstances that leaders of resource-wealthy nations find themselves in during civil war. The distribution of private goods is cheap, fast, does not require vast institutional infrastructure, and the returns are relatively immediate. Due to this revenue-intensive nature, patronage is necessarily geared towards the cultivation of a narrow constituency (Collier 2006: 1484). Since the state barely makes any claims on society by way of taxes, it faces little pressure to provide and protect.

While elite accommodation may be superior to broad-based state-building for regimes awash with resource rents, it has its own risks. The stability of the system is the result of intra-elite cohesion. But such an arrangement is vulnerable to regime-destabilizing elite defection, which leads to a perennial problem of tenure uncertainty (Bates 2008). Tenure insecurity, in turn, determines whether leaders act in a predatory or act in a developmental fashion and stay on the equilibrium path. It does so by shaping their time horizons. When the shadow of the future is short and threats to survival are immediate, political actors are unlikely to invest in institution-building, since such investments are individually and collectively suboptimal in the short term (Englehart 2007: 148; Kurtz
In these situations, the ‘politics of survival’ (Migdal 1988) forces leaders to adopt defensive measures that undermine overall institutional coherence. “Mindful of this ever-present threat to their tenure, rulers pursue policies designed to safeguard their hold on power and neutralize the first-strike capabilities of those within their regimes” (Roessler 2011: 309). One such a strategy is the use of “revolving door” appointments of government officials. This strategy is designed to inoculate ruling elites against threats from within. The constant rotation of political appointees helps mitigate tenure insecurity by facilitating presidential control over the elite (Roessler 2011:309; van de Walle 2001: 125; Young and Turner 1985: 165-166).

Since rulers lack a broad-based political legitimacy, they deal with the occasional outbursts of social unrest with a combination of redistribution and coercion (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 67; Karl 1997: 83). In these situations, the armed forces play a crucial role in maintaining regime stability. Paradoxically, the military is also a potential source of threat to such regimes. In these situations, leaders rely on the decentralization of the instruments of coercion to keep the military in check (Englehart 2007; Reno 2003: 329). Since the army serve as a political instrument, rentier regimes avoid the creation of a unified force with a single command structure. Instead, such regimes establish countervailing security forces “as much to watch potentially dangerous rivals in their own ranks as to protect the regime against enemies from outside of their political establishment” (Reno 2011: 31). President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire was known to have perfected such tactics as an art form (Young and Turner 1984: 266). Such structural manipulations relegate the military as an institution to the margins of domestic politics, effectively preventing it from emerging as an alternative locus of power.
Mechanisms of Institutional Reproduction and Continuity

From the perspective of demonstrating the validity of the theoretical argument advanced in this project, the crucial question, then, is this: how does the presence or absence of wartime institutional residue shape the trajectory of postwar state-building? Stated differently, why and how might wartime institutions linger in the postwar period? What incentives do governments have to extend the lifetime of these wartime institutions into the postwar period? Wartime state-building has a functional logic: in exchange for the extraction of key resources from society, governments provide services and generally seek to legitimize their extractive efforts. It is quite possible for victorious regimes to reverse direction and abandon these wartime institutions. But if they do so, they must find different sources of social power by which they can order and organize society. At war’s end, the postwar political elite may no longer have incentives to preserve wartime institutions in the postwar period. And yet, wartime changes do not vanish when the war comes to an end (Cramer 2009: 129-30).

By and large, the persistence of wartime institutions in the postwar period is a narrative of path dependence, in which initial policy and institutional choices become self-reinforcing over time in ways that increase the costs of exit and militate path departure (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000a, 2000b). That the past matters is a fairly uncontroversial proposition. As a result, the focus has been on identifying specific mechanisms to explain institutional ‘stickiness’ or continuity or, alternatively, the difficulty of exiting from established institutional arrangements. Scholars in the macrohistorical/sociological institutionalist research tradition have identified at least two critical mechanisms of institutional persistence: ‘Sunk costs’ and ‘vested interests’ (Thelen 1999: 391). Sunk costs
refers to the unrecoverable time and effort invested in establishing institutions. Massive startup costs of establishing institutions and the costs of renegotiating new institutions can make militate against institutional reforms, resulting in institutional persistence.

Crucially, since politics is a contest over the distribution of power and resources, it produces winners and losers. As a quintessentially political act, institutional choice comes with distributional consequences (van de Walle 2001: 22). Stated differently, institutions do not exist only for the purpose of resolving coordination problems; they benefit some more than others. Given the distributional implications of reforms, resistance to change comes from vested interests or winners under the initial institutional arrangements, who stand to lose from change and, ipso facto, have a deep interest in preventing change, even when the institutions in place are clearly suboptimal from society’s standpoint. Normally, exogenous shocks, such as defeat or victory in war can create opportunities for leaders to initiate reforms that might otherwise be difficult to undertake. Even then, they must balance the need for reform against the imperative of political survival. Doing so is particularly important in cases where the presence of strategic commodities gives contest over political power a zero-sum character, since control of such resources by enterprising rivals may pose threats to the physical and political survival those who may be interested in initiating reforms. Under these conditions, although leaders can tinker with existing institutions at the margins, a fundamental path departure becomes decidedly difficult.

Governments without externally generated resource rents have to develop institutional capacity to raise the resources needed to wage war. Once structures of governance are in place, the initial time and effort invested in establishing institutions make them costly to abandon in the postwar period. In the course of mobilizing the means of
war, governments seek to strengthen state-society relations, which entails routine, institutionalized interactions. Abandoning these mechanisms in the postwar period would not make sense, given they have an even greater need to rely on institutions to legitimize their hold on power. In addition, since institutions develop incrementally, rather than in a big-bang fashion, discarding wartime institutions is a bad investment strategy in light of the potential loss of institutional memory. It would behoove postwar political leaders to preserve institutions that served them well during war and with which they are most familiar rather than search for new structures for ordering society.

But state-building is not just a function of elite preferences in that it does not unfold in complete isolation from wider societal interests. The process of mobilizing resources by taxing the population might also generate bottom-up pressures on state builders. Civilians bear the costs of war directly through blood and treasure and indirectly through lost opportunities for socio-economic and political progress. Moreover, when combatants raise revenue by taxing the population, they are forced to develop reciprocal relations with the population in order to cultivate local legitimacy. This ongoing process of negotiated, if asymmetrical, interaction between state and society is critical to the process of state-building, since a politicized population would seek to nudge state builders in a particular direction.

This logic of institutional reproduction is applicable to rebel groups as well. But it should be noted that victorious rebels do not inherit a blank slate; some of the institutional trappings of the state they take over cannot be wished away. Still, wartime rebel ‘quasi-state’ structures are critical during the transition period (Johnston 2008: 108). State-building rebels have incentives to use their wartime governance structures as they seek to
consolidate their gains. A functional explanation is that the institutions developed in the course of an armed conflict were successful in helping rebels manage relations with the population under their control. There is, thus, little reason to expect that these institutions would outlive their usefulness in the postwar period. Additionally, the process of cultivating local legitimacy may also generate bottom-up pressures on the new leaders as they go about reestablishing state authority. The NRM in Uganda, for instance, relied on the wartime Resistance Councils as a template for postwar state-building. The NRM had enjoyed a high level of popular legitimacy during the war, when the group relied on civilians for material and political support (Toft 2010). This residual legitimacy along with the Resistance Councils was integral to Uganda’s state-building efforts, as the Resistance Councils serves as a template for decentralization in postwar Uganda (Kasfir 2005: 29; Jones 2009: 65-4).

As previously laid out, victory is obviously necessary for rebels and incumbents to be in charge of postwar state-building. But the positive effects of wartime institutional capacity on postwar capacity are not limited to victorious actors alone. For instance, in a situation where rebels fail to achieve a military victory but get the chance to participate in electoral politics, wartime organizational effectiveness can be a source of advantage in electoral politics (Bermeo 2010). Rebels that were dependent on civilian support in wartime could draw on a reservoir of legitimacy and organizational capabilities to mobilize electoral support in peacetime. The experience of the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) could be used to illustrate this point. During El Salvador’s brutal civil war, the FMLN relied on the peasantry to mobilize extensive human and material support (Wood 2000). In the process, the rebel group nurtured local legitimacy and developed
considerable organizational capabilities. When the civil war ended after an internationally supervised peace agreement, FMLN leaders transformed their predominantly military organization into an effective political party in order to participate in the country’s postwar electoral politics. The FMLN has achieved a great deal of success as a political party. The high-water mark of the FMLN’s success came in 2009, when Mauricio Funes won the presidential election, ending two decades of conservative dominance in El Salvador. This success could, in turn, be attributed to the role of the FNLN’s stock of wartime institutional strength in enabling the party to compete aggressively in the electoral arena.

The FMLN’s subsequent success in electoral politics stands in stark contrast to other organizationally feeble rebel groups, such as Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Movement (URNG). Taylor and the NPFL relied on the exploitation of illicit natural resources to sustain the insurgency (Bangura 2000). Indeed, the NPFL spearheaded a paradigmatic ‘warlord’ insurgency (Reno 1998). The URNG was an amalgam of four different guerrilla movements that formed a united front under the tutelage of Cuba. The front failed to construct an organizational capabilities and popular support comparable to that of the FMLN, which limited its electoral viability in the postwar period (Bermeo 2010: 88).

The decision to dispense with wartime state-building need not be replicated in the postwar period. In practice, the wartime political economy does not disappear at war’s end, as potential state builders face top-down pressures from groups whose interests would be harmed by change. The ‘institutions’ of patronage, thus, persist in the postwar period because entrenched elite interests resist deviation from the institutional status quo in the post-conflict period. Elites with vested interests are actors “who are in a position to view
themselves …as chosen, either by others or by nature, to govern” (Scruton 1982: 143, quoted in Roberts 2009: 152). Elite entrenchments are “sustained through complex and shifting networks of personal alliances sustained through state funds” (Roberts 2009: 154). Efforts to make a clean break from the wartime past requires overcoming these entrenched interests. Efforts to break from the wartime past requires the existence of powerful social groups whose fortunes are not tied to the resource-driven wartime political economy. And yet, the previously discussed patrimonial logic makes it virtually impossible for such forces to emerge.

While civilians bear the brunt of civil war, there is evidence that some well-connected actors benefit from war economies (Collier 2000b; Cooper and Pugh 2004; Cramer 2009: 130; Hazen 2013: 34-5; Nitzschke and Studdard 2005). In all civil wars, diverse types of economic entrepreneurs emerge since some semblance of normal life has to take place. But war economies in the context of abundant rents produce particularly well entrenched interests that seamlessly straddle private and public realms. Since the powerful interests that develop in the course of an armed conflict are carried over into the peacebuilding period, they are a significant force to be reckoned with, as they have the capacity to influence the nature of postwar state-building (Cramer 2009: 134; Lyons 2002: 223). A state with extensive functional (regulatory) and geographical reach is a threat to these actors, who stand to gain much by “perpetuating war economies under conditions of non-war” (Cooper 2002: 941). For these actors, state-building is a leap of faith they may be unwilling to take since the revival of a functional state is a threat to their economic and

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20 Karl (1997) makes a similar point. According to Karl (1997), “the export of oil fosters especially powerful organized groups with very real interests in maintaining this model” (p.54).
political interests (Menkhaus 2006/7: 95-6). During the Cambodian civil war, illegal logging was an integral feature of the country’s war economy. But this practice has continued in the postwar period. Those with vested interests in logging in Cambodia included powerful members of the military, “who often create ‘zones of insecurity’ to prevent external monitoring” (Cooper 2002: 941-2). While a state with sufficient administrative and regulatory capabilities may be desirable from a societal perspective, vested interests prefer to operate via narrow and particularistic structures of governance. Stated otherwise, wartime institutions do not persist in the postwar period by default due to inertia. Instead, wartime institutions endure because powerful societal actors discover that they can advance their interests through them.

Rents accruing to a restricted elite raise the stakes of political conflict (Gould and Winters 2012: 316). In particular, control of strategic rents affects the how political elites choose to resolve political contest. But postwar departure from the wartime institutional status quo requires a collective commitment to change on the part of the political elite. However, when control of the state automatically translates into virtual monopoly of access to economic power, political contest takes on a zero-sum character. Lack of access to economic power can mean perpetual relegation to the margins of political power. Thus, elites in ‘shadow’ states “prefer weak formal and informal institutions, not only in the sense of straying from rule-based principles but also from the provision of public goods” because of their concern that successful institutions may come under the control of “enterprising rivals” (Reno 2000: 53). In these situations, ruling elites refrain from the type of state-building that involves extending the functional and geographical reach of the state. Accordingly, when it comes to postwar state-building, it matters whether a state with a
modicum of institutional capacity survived or whether a patrimonial structure with little rational-legal coherence evolved in the course of an armed conflict (Cramer 2009: 133).

The top-down pressures on state builders from vested interests could potentially be offset or even overcome by bottom-up pressures from the mass of the population. But the nature of wartime relations with the population limits the extent to which state builders might be responsive to these countervailing pressures. In contrast to the politicizing effects of raising revenue via taxation, the extraction of rents gives rise to weak institutional linkages and societal alienation. Under these circumstances, the population may not have the political clout necessary to make effective claims on the state in a way that would force state builders to factor these bottom-up pressures into their decision-making calculus.

CONCLUSION

In Charles Tilly’s famous aphorism, ‘war made the state and the state made war.’ War destroys human and physical infrastructure. And yet, war and the preparation for war also midwifed the birth of the modern national-state. The role of war as a causal force has produced an extensive and compelling macrohistorical literature that has considered numerous ways in which war, the threat of war and mobilization served as critical stimuli to the development robust state institutions. In recent years, scholars have turned their attention to the comparatively ineffective states of the ‘late developing’ world in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Fundamental changes in the structure of the structure of the international system and shifts in the nature of warfare are said to have eliminated the kinds of grave, sovereignty-threatening bellicist pressures that drove state-building in early-
modern Europe. Consequently, postcolonial state managers are said to lack the incentives to make costly investments in central institutions necessary to broadcast state authority across the broad expanses of national territory. Furthermore, as a result of the prevalence of internal conflicts in the postcolonial world, war has not been a causal force in catalyzing institutional development. If anything, internal conflicts tend to lead to societal fragmentation. But even in Europe, only after prevailing in civil wars were rulers able to establish central authority and monopoly on violent force. While civil wars naturally tend to fragment society, they can also, under some circumstances, conducive to state-building.

The argument advanced in this chapter rejects the characterization of recent internal conflicts as apolitical. Instead, characteristics of civil wars considered pathologies are in fact the kinds of processes that have historically and logically been part and parcel of state formation. This chapter has posited that civil wars that end decisively through military victory are conducive to state-building. Military victory creates permissive conditions to reconstitute state authority in the postwar period. It does so by eliminating competing loci of power. However, the postwar setting is not a tabula rasa. I have argued that the conduct of war generates enduring changes. A critical factor is the manner in which combatants mobilize resources, which is a function of their initial resource endowments. When combatants have few sources of sizable non-tax revenue, they raise revenue through taxation, which necessitates the creation of the requisite administrative structures. By contrast, when combatants have easily extractible resource rent at their disposal, neither institutional capacity nor bargains with society is required to raise revenue. Resource extraction gives rise to institutional residue and legitimacy payoffs in the first case but not in the second case. Resource mobilization determines the degree of institutional capacity
with which states emerge from conflict. Since wartime interests and institutions do not vanish at war’s end, they continue to shape the nature and extent of postwar state-building. In highlighting how wartime developments shape postwar developments, the theory presented here counters the erroneous, if implicit, assumption that the postwar setting is a tabula rasa.
CHAPTER 3
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, WAR OUTCOMES AND POSTWAR STATE-BUILDING: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Chapter two developed the notion that, beyond the mayhem and destruction, significant economic, political and social reforms have historically emerged in war’s wake. The broad theoretical claim is that civil wars can lead to state building. Specifically, civil wars that end in military victory are conducive to state building. But state builders do not inherit a blank slate, since wartime developments linger in the postwar period. One significant factor that shapes wartime developments is the political economy of war finance. In the absence of easily extractible resource rents or sizable external patronage, combatants have incentives to raise revenue through taxation. In addition to developing institutional capacity, they also need to cultivate popular support in order to induce quasi-voluntary compliance. By contrast, when combatants have access to resource rents or considerable external patronage, they face few incentives for establishing institutional capacity and fostering local legitimacy. Wartime revenue imperative leaves institutional residue in the first case, but not in the second. The extent of wartime institutional residue and legitimacy determine the degree of institutional coherence with which states emerge at war’s end, shaping the broad contours of postwar state building.

A large body of quantitative and qualitative research links the presence of natural resources—oil, minerals and other precious gems—to civil war onset and duration.21 Scholars of the ‘resource curse’ link natural resource bonanza to a host of social, economic and political pathologies. While there are opportunities for meaningful synergy among

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21 The literature on resources and civil war onset is vast but the findings are conflicting and the causal mechanisms remain vague (see Basedau and Lay 2009; Di John 2007; Fearon 2004, 2005; Humphreys 2005; Lujala 2009, 2010; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005; Ross 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Snyder 2006).
these disparate strands of research, research often takes place on parallel tracks. Civil war is all too often treated as an outcome to be explained. To the extent resources researchers study the link between resources and civil war, it is in the context of models that treat civil war as a criminal enterprise. Few researchers have looked at how the dynamics of civil war can explain important political developments, though most recent research is moving in this direction. This project contributes to this emergent scholarship by treating civil war as a significant explanatory variable.

The theory, as discussed in the previous chapter, posits a conditional hypothesis: the net effect of victory on state capacity is dependent on the magnitude of wartime rents. That is, victory is associated with increased state capacity, but rising rents attenuate these effects. Hypothesis-testing in this case requires specifying an interaction model. For substantive interpretation of the results, marginal effect plots are provided. The hypotheses are tested on a dataset of civil wars covering the 1960-2005 period. I use the ability of the state to tax as a proxy for state capacity. In addition to coercive power, taxation requires a legitimate state that can induce ‘quasi-voluntary’ compliance. All things being equal, tax revenue is directly related to the capacity to penetrate society. Civil wars may end in a victory by one side, a peace accord or fizzle out without a formally recognizable end. I use three separate measures of natural resource rents to test the hypotheses: oil rents as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); oil and gas rents per capita; and total natural resource rents. The analysis confirms the hypothesis that military victory contributes to the postwar growth of state capacity, but these effects shrink when governments can raise wartime revenue by exploiting natural resources.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses the data and operationalization of the variables used in the analysis. The section also specifies the model to be tested. The second section subject the hypotheses to statistical tests. I then present and discuss the findings. Finally, I present further results that test the robustness of the main findings.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To assess the impact of civil war outcomes and wartime revenue generation, the subsequent empirical analysis draws on a dataset of civil wars covering the 1960-2005 period. Civil war is ubiquitous. Even so, operationalizing civil war for empirical analysis has generated intense debate among researchers (Sambanis 2004). The most widely used civil war data come from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small 1982). Among other things, civil war is distinguished from other forms of internal violence by the requirement that the conflict must exceed a certain threshold of fatalities (typically at least 1,000 in a single year). In addition, the conflict challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurs within the boundaries of that state; involves the central state as a party to the conflict; and includes rebels capable of mounting organized armed challenge to the state (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006).

Available civil war datasets are riddled with imperfections. For example, though the 1000-deaths threshold is commonly used in the literature on civil war, it is somewhat arbitrary. Another widely used dataset comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) (Gledistch et al 2002). This datasets includes all conflicts, in which there were at least 25 death per year. The lower fatality threshold does not make the UCDP/PRIO datasets any better or worse than the COW Project datasets. An additional issue that bedevils civil war datasets is the inherent ambiguity of coding the precise start and end dates of civil wars (see Sambanis 2004).
The dataset for the present analysis is adopted from Doyle and Sambanis (2006). I have included some civil wars that ended between 1999 and 2005 but were coded as ongoing in the Doyle and Sambanis (2006) dataset. This dataset requires a large number of deaths (between 500 and 1000 in the first year of civil war) and sustained violence in subsequent years, making it ideal for the present study. Irrespective of the particular selection criteria used, most civil war datasets start from 1945 (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Excluding pre-1960 civil wars from the analysis, as this study does, results in reducing the sample size. However, given the poor quality of pre-1960 data for a number of pertinent variables, the improved quality of the post-1960 data should make up for the loss of observations (see Thies 2010). For instance, widely used socio-economic data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) are available after the 1960s.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is postwar state building. The main question motivating this study is this: given the incidence of civil war, why do some countries have a higher level of capacity after the war than before the war? Because we are interested in how civil war outcome and wartime political developments affect postwar state building, the level of prewar state capacity is the appropriate basis for comparison. Thus, postwar state building is measured as the difference between postwar state capacity and state capacity one year prior to the outbreak of civil war. I measure postwar state capacity at five years after the war. While state building is a long-term process, the five-year period is sufficient to assess

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24 Fearon and Laitin (2003) rely on multiple imputation to replace missing data
changes in state capacity. To check for robustness, I also measure state capacity ten years after the end of the war.

There is no single agreed-upon definition of state strength. The proliferation of interrelated terms that refer to various institutional attributes of the state further complicates the task of operationalizing state capacity.\textsuperscript{25} State strength is a multidimensional concept; some states can be strong on one dimension while being weak on another. As discussed in chapter 2, state building outcomes can be measured in terms of the capacity of states to implement policies and their legitimacy. Even so, state strength is fundamentally latent in that it is not directly observable (Kurtz and Schrank 2012: 617). For these reasons, we need the most theoretically valid proxy that captures the essence of the concept. In some studies of civil war, researchers use GDP per capita as a proxy for state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lacina 2005). In Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) influential analysis of civil war onset, state capacity—understood to include military capabilities, bureaucratic strength and overall territorial reach—is a critical predictor of civil war. Yet GDP per capita as a proxy for state capacity does not adequately capture the underlying theoretical concept of principal interest in this particular context.

In the bellicist literature, researchers adopt a fiscal perspective on state capacity (Campbell 1993; Centeno 2002: 103; Herbst 2000: 113; Lieberman 2001; Snider 1987; Zee 1996). The ability of the state to extract resources is a theoretically attractive proxy since “revenue generation is not simply correlated with state capacity, it is its \textit{sine qua non}: that which the state must be able to do if any other goals are to be pursued” (Hendrix 2010:

\textsuperscript{25} For example, Hendrix (2010) uses factor analysis to examine the construct validity of 15 different but highly correlated measures of state capacity.
While taxation is partially coercive, it also requires a legitimate state that can induce ‘quasi-voluntary’ compliance (Levi 1988). Its implicit fiscal ‘contract’ with society is a source of power, authority and legitimacy for the state (Timmons 2005). In short, the extractive capacity of the state captures its institutional reach as well as its legitimacy. While resource extraction through taxation is a good proxy for capacity, states with relatively high extractive capacity may have a lower-than-expected tax ratio. For these states, low revenue reflects a policy choice rather than capacity constraints (Barnett 1992: 46).

Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (taxes/GDP) is one of the commonly used revenue-based indicators of aggregate state capacity (Cheibub 1998; Slater 2010). The main drawback of this aggregate measure lies in its inability to distinguish between states that rely on administratively challenging revenue instruments—direct taxes—than those that do not, since the measure includes both direct and indirect taxes. In addition, this measure also tends to overestimate the extractive capacity of states that derive sizable non-tax revenue from natural resources (Cheibub 1998: 360).

In this analysis, I use relative political capacity (RPC) as a measure of state strength (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al 2011). Specifically, I use a measure of relative political extraction (RPE), which is the ratio of actual to predicted government revenue. RPE is calculated in three interrelated steps (Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Feng, Kugler and Zak 2000). First, a series of ordinary least square regressions are run on a panel data in order to

26 For some scholars, measuring state strength in terms of extractive capacity and the degree of institutionalization alone is deeply problematic. Some regimes may be highly institutionalized and capable of extracting resources from society but still lack legitimacy (Holsti 1996: 84). While this is a fair critique, it is also reasonable to assume that highly institutionalized and fiscally capable states might enjoy a degree of legitimacy from society since the very act of extracting can only be partially coercive.
generate parameter estimates. In the second step, predicted values are generated based on
the parameter estimates derived from the first step. Finally, the RPE values are calculated
as a ratio of actual to predicted revenue. An RPE score of 1 means actual tax collection is
in line with the predicted value. When actual tax collection is greater than the predicted
value, the RPE score is greater than 1. Finally, when actual tax collection is lower than the
predicted value, the RPE score is less than 1. All things being equal, a score of greater than
1 indicates higher extractive capacity, relative to the structure of the economy. Initially
developed by Organski and Kugler (1980) as a way to capture the ability of nations to
mobilize resources necessary to execute government policies, the measure has since been
used in various studies (Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Hendrix 2010; Thies 2010).

This variable’s strength lies in its explicit focus on measuring the extractive
capacity of states at similar levels of development (Hendrix 2010: 279). That is, the
variable captures the extractive capacity of states relative to where it should be on the basis
of their economic structure. In so doing, it shows the extent to which revenue extraction
accords with expectations. Like other indicators of state capacity, however, this measure
has its own limitations. Specifically, since the ratio is based on predictions generated by
regression models, it lacks the directness of such measures as taxes/GDP. Additionally,
this variable is not as universally used as taxes/GDP, though universal use should not be
equated with intrinsic validity. For these reasons, further analyses are done in order to make
sure that the core findings are robust to other specifications of this variable.
Independent Variables

The independent variables of principal theoretical interest are the various civil war outcomes and the size of natural resource rents. Civil wars typically end in one of the following three possible outcomes—a decisive victory by one side; negotiated settlement; or a ceasefire/stalemate. Each outcome is denoted by a dummy variable coded as 1 if the outcome is present; 0 otherwise. Since the theoretical arguments posit a conditional/interactive relationship, the statistical tests are designed to probe the hypothesis that raising wartime revenue through the extraction of rents limits the extent of postwar state building. Military victory is expected to be positively correlated with postwar state building. But these effects are expected to decline when wartime rents are high.

I assess the impact of rents on the basis of three separate indicators of natural resource dependence. The three indicators capture slightly different conceptions of resource dependence. First, oil rents as a percentage of GDP captures a country’s overall dependence on petroleum relative to the size of the economy. Data come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2011).27 Even though it is widely used, oil/GDP as a measure of resource dependence can be crude and imprecise (Ross 2008: 111-112). Following Ross (2008), I employ an alternative measure of resource rents—oil and gas rents per capita—separately to guard against the possibility that a particular method of calculating rents might influence the results. Oil rents per capita is calculated by dividing the total value of oil and gas rents by a country’s total population. Because GDP in poor countries is smaller than in wealthy countries, the value of oil/GDP is inflated in the former. By using oil rents per capita, we can control for the effects of wealth.28

27 Data for the 1960s come from Ross (2001).
28 See appendix in Ross (2008: 121) for a detailed of discussion related issues.
The literature on the ‘resource curse’ has mainly focused on the insidious effects of oil on the evolution of state capacity (Karl 1997). However, a number of countries that have little or insignificant access to oil revenue still rely on significant non-oil natural resource rents. But using oil/GDP would systematically classify these otherwise rentier states wrongly as having little or no access to resource rents, which would bias the estimates. Accordingly, I use a third measure that captures the level of total natural resource rents measured as a proportion of GDP. Data come from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2011). For countries that rely almost exclusively on oil, this particular measure captures the magnitude of oil rents.

**Control Variables**

Since the goal of the analysis is to estimate the impacts of civil war outcome and wartime rents, it is important to control for other variables that may affect postwar state capacity. Accordingly, I include a number of economic controls that affect state capacity. The first economic control variable is income per head, measured as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP per capita controls for the level of development and is expected to have a positive correlation with state capacity (Cheibub 1998: 358-9). GDP data come from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summer and Aten 2011).

The second control variable is international trade, which is measured as the ratio of imports and exports to GDP in accordance with conventions established by prior research (Heston, Summer and Aten 2011). There are theoretical reasons to believe that the relationship between international trade and state capacity is ambiguous. On the one hand, since collecting taxes on international trade is not administratively complex and does not
require significant infrastructure of enforcement, high trade volume can mean opportunities for ‘easy’ revenue through tariffs and customs taxes, which, in turn, may reduce incentives to raise revenue through direct taxation. Consequently, we can expect international trade to have a negative correlation with state capacity. On the other hand, increased trade raises public spending, as governments seek to address the economic dislocations caused by trade liberalization through increased spending on social insurance and adjustment assistance, which, in turn, should lead to increased taxes (Rodrik 1998). In a post-conflict setting, booming international trade, especially in non-resource sectors, is associated with overall improvement in the postwar economic policy environment. On balance, then, international trade is expected to be positively correlated with postwar state capacity.

The third economic control is total foreign aid, measured as the natural logarithm of total official development assistance (ODA). The relationship between foreign aid and tax revenue has been a source of debate among scholars and practitioners (Brautigam and Knack 2004; Knack 2001; Rajan and Subramanian 2007). As an ‘uneearned’ income, foreign aid can provide incentives to continue current consumption expenditures without seeking offsetting tax revenue and to avoid having to raise revenues through taxes (Gupta 2007; Morrison 2009: 110-11; Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006). Large aid recipients have few incentives to improve tax collection and administration, which reduces revenue generation (Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008; Remmer 2004). ODA data are from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2011).

I also control for ethnic and religious polarization by including dummy variables, coded as 1 “where an ethnic or religious minority compromised at least 8 percent of the
The degree of societal fractionalization captures any latent ‘social conflict’ that may have adverse effects on state building (Hicken, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2005). This latent conflict may increase the transaction costs of revenue extraction. Both variables are expected to have a negative correlation with state capacity. Geographic characteristics are also thought to affect the ability of states to broadcast authority, which, in turn, affects the tax base (Herbst 2000). The proportion of a country’s territory that is mountainous (logged) is included as a control variable. We can expect this variable to be negatively correlated with postwar state capacity. Data come from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

While previous research does not provide definitive empirical signposts as to the probable effects of civil war characteristics on state building, I include civil war duration (logged) and war intensity, expressed in terms of total battle deaths (logged), as control variables. The assumption guiding the inclusion of duration as a control variable is that the magnitude of the postwar challenge to reconstitute the state may be greater following some civil wars that last so much longer than others. Accordingly, duration is predicted to be negatively correlated with postwar state capacity. In the war termination literature, battle deaths are used as a proxy for the costs of war (Quinn, Mason and Mehmet 2007). Civil wars that inflict high cost on combatants and their supporters may be associated with a reduced likelihood of civil war recurrence, likely due to resource and psychological exhaustion (Walter 2004: 373). But high-cost civil wars could also “create a strong desire for retribution even after the war ends” (ibid.). Battle deaths may either disrupt or facilitate state building depending on which one of the two effects is dominant. Battle deaths, then, have a generally indeterminate effect on state building. Data for this variable come from
Gleditsch and Lacina (2005). The final control variable is the prewar RPE, measure one year prior to civil war onset. All things being equal, we can expect an inverse relationship between the prewar RPE and postwar state capacity. States with relatively high prewar extractive capacity may have less room to maneuver by way of increased extraction in the postwar period than states with low prewar extractive capacity.\textsuperscript{29}

Since the theoretical argument posits that the effects of military victory is conditional on the size of wartime rents, I specify a multiplicative interaction model of the following form:

\[ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ + \beta_c Controls + \epsilon \]

Where, \(X\) stands for the main explanatory variable; \(Z\) stands for the conditioning variable; \(XZ\) is the interaction term; and \(Controls\) is a vector of control variables. For this type of interactive model, the marginal effect of \(X\), conditional on \(Z\), and is given by:

\[ \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 Z \]

**EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS**

In this section, I discuss the results, which focused on the interactive effects civil war outcomes and resource rents on state capacity. I estimated all models using Stata 12.0. The civil war episodes are clustered on country to account for the fact that each episode may not be independent of previous civil war episodes in the same country. Since my main hypothesis posits that the effect of military victory on postwar state building is conditional

\textsuperscript{29} In their study of postwar democratization, Fortna and Huang (2012: 326) hypothesize that the inverse relationship between prewar polity scores and postwar democratization may be the result of regression to the mean.
on the magnitude of wartime resource rents, the interaction of war outcomes and resource rents produces the following model:

\[
Postwar RPE = \beta_0 + \beta_1 WarOutcomes + \beta_2 ResourceRents \\
+ \beta_3 (WarOutcomes \times ResourceRents) + \beta_c Controls + \epsilon
\]

Addressing the question of how the size of total resource rents conditions the effects of civil war outcomes on postwar state building, Table 3.2 presents the statistical results for the interaction model specified above across all civil wars for the period 1960-2005. In all the models, a negative coefficient for an explanatory variable suggests that the variable has a negative effect on postwar state capacity. To recall the hypotheses, military victory is associated with a higher state capacity in the postwar period. We should, therefore, expect the coefficient estimate for military victory to be positive. However, since the hypotheses posited here are conditional on the extent of wartime rents, we are interested in the statistical and substantive effects of the interaction between war outcomes and wartime rents.

According to the results in Table 3.2, the coefficient for military victory is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, which is consistent with the theoretical argument. The interaction term (Victory *Resource Rents) is also negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, which is consistent with the theoretical argument. However, the numerical results presented in Table 2 and other tables are not intuitive. The statistical and substantive significance of the principal explanatory variables of theoretical interest cannot be established based solely on the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). In linear-additive models, the coefficient estimate for an explanatory variable would indicate the effect of a one-point increase in that variable on
the outcome of interest when the conditioning variable is zero. But in the real world, the value of resource rents is not zero. Therefore, looking at the coefficient for military victory does not reveal meaningful information about its effect on postwar state capacity since the value of rents cannot be assumed to be zero. Values for resource rents in the sample range from less than 1 percent of GDP for Ethiopia, 4 percent for Burundi to above 50 percent for Angola and Oman, with values for a number of other cases falling somewhere in between.

To obtain a clear picture of the substantive effects, Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012) recommend calculating marginal effects across the full range of the conditioning variable, a step necessary to avoid making strong out-of-sample claims. Based on the above equation, the marginal effect of war outcome, conditional on the magnitude of rents, is given by:

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 \times \text{ResourceRents}$$

At different values for total resource rents, the effect of military victory on state capacity is going to be different. Accordingly, interpreting the substantive effects of each war outcome entails calculating marginal effects across the full range of values of resource rents observed in the sample; the use of observed values helps us avoid inference problems associated with out-of-sample values. The results (Figure 3.1) show that effect of military victory on state building is positive and at its highest when the conditioning variable (resource rents) is at its lowest value. These effects decline when the magnitude of total

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30 In all the plots, the marginal effects of each war termination outcome on state capacity are shown on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis displays the full range of observed values for each measure of natural resource rents (the conditioning variable). All plots are shown with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). The
resource rents increases. When the value of total resource rents is less than 22 percent, the effect of military victory is positive but declining, though statistically insignificant at conventional levels. For example, when resource rents are close to zero, military victory is associated with a 0.183-point increase in state capacity. Recall that the dependent variable, RPE, is measured as a ratio of a state’s actual extraction of resources to its predicted value. A value of 1 indicates the equality of the actual and predicted values. However, when total resource rents reach 22 percent, the effect of military victory on state capacity is decidedly negative and statistically and substantively significant. In line with the theoretical expectation, the rentier effect dominates the structural effect of military victory on state building. However, less than 20 percent of the cases fall into this zone of statistical significance. While far from being negligible, this figure constitutes a fraction of the cases that ended through military victory.

I then disaggregated military victory on the basis of the identity of the winner—government or rebel—and included each variable in separate models (Models 2 and 3). The coefficient estimate for government victory is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient for the interaction term—the estimate of principal theoretical importance—is negative and statistically significant as well at the 0.001 level. On the face of it, the results suggest that government victory is associated with increased state capacity but it’s the effects decline as the magnitude of rents rises. The findings are consistent with the theoretical argument. As discussed above, however, the interpretation of the raw coefficient estimates for the government victory dummy and the interaction term is not

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marginal effects are statistically significant when both the upper and lower bounds of the CIs are above or below the zero line.
straightforward, given the conditional nature of the hypothesis. The substantive results can be interpreted with the help of a marginal effects plot. As Figure 3.2 indicates, the effect of government victory on state capacity is at its highest when resource rent is at its lowest. When rents are at set at zero, government victory is associated with a 0.34 increase in state capacity. But in real world cases, rents assume a wide range of values, not just zero. Understanding the statistical and substantive effects of victory on state capacity, thus, requires taking into account the full range of values for resource rents observed in the sample.

In general, as Figure 3.2 shows, the positive effect of government victory on state capacity declines as the size of resource rents increases. Furthermore, we can identify two broad trends with respect to the effects of government victory on state capacity. First, when total resource rents are between 0 and 12 percent of GDP, government military victory is positively associated with increased state capacity but these effects attenuate with rising rents. An important consideration in interpreting these results is the frequency distribution of the measure of resource rents across its entire observed range. Of the 36 cases that ended through government victory, 67 percent (24 out of 36) fall into this range of statistical significance. Some cases in the sample that fall into this category include Burundi, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka and Turkey. The extraction of rents played little to no role in the political economy of Burundi, Sri Lanka and Turkey. In Indonesia and Peru, rents accounted for 9 and 12 percent of GDP respectively.

While in-depth case studies are necessary to establish the theory’s causal claims (done in subsequent chapters), a brief empirical account of one of these cases can be used to illustrate the underlying logic behind the statistical findings. In the late 1980s and early
In the 1990s, Burundi went through several traumatic episodes of civil war. Natural resources were not implicated in civil war onset. In spite of being one of central Africa’s poorest countries, Burundi has made great strides in increasing its capacity to mobilize domestic revenue. The recent creation of the autonomous Burundi Revenue Authority (OBR) has begun to address the inefficiencies of previous tax collection efforts under the Ministry of Finance. In 2010, tax revenue as a proportion of GDP was 19 percent, which is considerably higher than the regional average for Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF 2011: 22). As a result, domestic tax revenue covers nearly 80 percent of current expenditures (The Economist 2014). If the current trends continue, domestic revenue is projected to cover 100 percent of current expenditures by 2017 (ibid.).

Second, when resource rents are at or greater than 42 percent of GDP, the rentier effect dominates in the sense that government military victory has a decidedly negative effect on state capacity. 3 out of 36 cases (8 percent) that ended in government victory fall into this range of statistical significance. In the sample, Angola, Iraq and Oman fall into this category. Iraq and Oman belong to a well-known class of Middle Eastern rentier states. We can use the Angolan case to illustrate how resource rents and civil war interact to generate a particular institutional outcome. Oil entered into Angola’s political economy shortly after independence. It assumed an even greater role in the 1990s, partly because the government faced short time horizon following UNITA’s unexpected military success in the aftermath of a failed peace accord. During this period, on average, oil accounted for 50 percent of Angola’s GDP and anywhere from 75 to 90 percent of government revenue. Because the government was able to pay for the skyrocketing costs of the war by exploiting oil, it faced few incentives to engage in broad-based state building, though it managed to maintain a
strong extractive state. All in all, 75 percent of the cases that ended through government victory fall into the range of statistical significance depicted in Figure 3.2, confirming the hypothesis that the effect of government victory on state capacity declines with rising rents.

The coefficient estimate for rebel victory is negative, though statistically insignificant. On the face of it, the negative coefficient suggests that rebel victory is associated with lower capacity in the postwar period. But it is the coefficient estimate for the interaction term that is of principal theoretical importance, since it tells us how rebel victory affects state capacity depending on the magnitude of wartime rents. As model 3 of Table 3.2 shows, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positive, albeit statistically insignificant. As previously discussed, however, these coefficient estimates in and of themselves do not convey meaningful information about the substantive effects of rebel victory on state capacity. For substantive interpretation of the results, we can consult the marginal effects plot depicting the effect of rebel victory on state capacity at different levels of resource rents observed in the sample. According to the results shown in Figure 3.3, the effects of rebel victory on state capacity is statistically insignificant and substantively trivial across the full range of values for resource rents.31

This finding is puzzling as it is runs counter to the theoretical expectation and some previous theoretical arguments. Toft (2010), for example, argues that rebel victory, more

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31 Extracting rents from some kinds of natural resources requires a system of national distribution that simply is not available to rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 87). Consequently, aggregate national measures may fail to capture the extent of rebel dependence on natural resource rents. There are few if any credible sources of rebel financing with broad temporal and spatial coverage. Recently, some attempts have been made to map the geography of civil wars on the basis of rebel control of natural resources (Lujala 2010). Using data from Lujala (2010), I test the effect of hydrocarbon and precious gem localities as proxies for rebel access to precious gems but the core findings remain unaltered (not shown in the main results). While these measures constitute a step in the right direction in terms of obtaining relatively precise data on rebel financing, they are coded as a dummies, which makes it difficult to assess how variation in the magnitude of rents may affect the degree of wartime and postwar state building.
than government victory and negotiated settlement, is conducive to postwar democratization and long-term stability. Even though the outcome of her interest—democratization—is different from the dependent variable in this analysis (state building), the inconsistent findings require some explanation. One potential explanation for the apparent inconsistency may have to do with methodological differences. In testing her theoretical argument, Toft (2010) relies on bivariate correlations, making her analysis vulnerable to the well-known problems of omitted variable bias in that it excludes other potentially relevant explanatory variables, but that still leaves the puzzle unexplained.

To check whether or not the results were sensitive to coding procedures, I made some modifications to how rebel victory was coded. Existing civil war datasets contain a hodgepodge of cases, ranging from long-running conventional insurgencies to short-lived but intense episodes of political violence. Civil wars precipitated by a bloody coup d’état for rebels, for example, typically end more quickly than conventional insurgencies that start out in peripheral areas. In these short-lived civil wars, we can expect little wartime state building, given they end quickly and are often concentrated in and around the capital city. To check whether or not this fact might have affected the results, I generated a new dummy for rebel victory by excluding all coup-driven rebel victories. Including the new dummy variable into the analysis did not, however, alter the results. In short, the present analysis does not have a satisfactory explanation for this puzzle.

Similarly, the coefficient estimate for negotiated settlement is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. On the face of it, this negative estimate suggests

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32 Results not shown in the main tables.
that negotiated settlement is associated with reduced postwar state capacity, which is consistent with the hypothesis. The coefficient estimate of principal theoretical importance—the interaction term—is positive but statistically insignificant. For substantive interpretation of the result, Figure 3.4 depicts how negotiated settlement affects postwar state capacity at different levels of resource rents. The results show that the effect of negotiated settlement on state capacity is statistically insignificant and substantively trivial across the full range of values for resource rents observed in the sample. Finally, the coefficient estimates for ceasefires and stalemates are substantively insignificant across the full range of values for the conditioning variable (resource rents).\textsuperscript{33}

Most of the control variables perform as expected. The coefficient estimate for prewar state capacity (RPE) is negative and statistically significant, confirming the hypothesis that states with relatively high prewar state capacity see less change in state capacity than states with low prewar state capacity.\textsuperscript{34} The coefficient estimate for foreign aid is negative and statistically significant, which accords with theoretical expectations and previous empirical findings. The coefficient estimate for international trade is also positive and statistically significant, which confirms the hypothesis. While increased trade can mean opportunities for ‘easy’ revenue through tariffs and customs taxes, booming trade in a post-conflict setting could also mean overall improvement in the macroeconomic environment, which, in turn, may reflect enhanced state capacity. The results support the latter effect. These control variables are statistically significant in the hypothesized

\textsuperscript{33} While ceasefires and stalemates are included in all the analyses, the discussion in this chapter is confined to victory and negotiated settlement, given they are the most theoretically relevant to the central research question of the project. In addition, ceasefires and stalemates constitute a negligible fraction of all civil wars in the sample.

\textsuperscript{34} Changing the baseline to three years prior to civil war outbreak does not alter the core results.
direction in all model specifications presented in Table 3.2. Surprisingly, the coefficient estimate for GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant in all model specifications.

The coefficient estimates for battled deaths is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level following victory by both rebels and governments. Previous research does not provide a definitive guidance as to the probable effects of war intensity, expressed in terms of battle deaths, on state capacity. As previously discussed, some studies in the war termination literature suggests an indeterminate effect of battle deaths on the likelihood of civil war recurrence on the basis of the ‘exhaustion’ and ‘revenge’ hypotheses. In all other model specifications, the coefficient for battle deaths is statistically insignificant at conventional levels, though it has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The coefficient for religious polarization is negative and significant at the 0.05 level following rebel victory but it is insignificant in all other model specifications. That is, religious polarization is associated with reduced state capacity following rebel victory. The coefficient estimates for the remaining control variables: duration, percentage of territory that is mountainous, and ethnic polarization are statistically insignificant in all model specifications.

As the results in Table 3.3 show, I use a different measure of resource dependence in the analysis: Oil/GDP. The literature on the ‘paradox of plenty’ has documented the adverse consequences of petro-dollars for institutional development and the state’s relations with society (Karl 1997). The core results are consistent with the results presented in Table 3.2. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term—the main variable of principal theoretical importance—is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
As with the previous results, I ran a series of marginal effects calculations to clarify the substantive effects of the various war outcomes on state capacity across the full range of oil/GDP observed in the sample. In contrast to the values of total resource rents, there is a wide range of variation across the cases in the value of oil rents as a percentage of GDP. On average, these values range from 0 for a number of cases to 48 for Angola and 60 percent for Oman. The results show that the effects of military victory on postwar state capacity is positive but this effect declines with rising oil rents. This downward-slopping marginal effects plot (Figure 3.5) captures this relationship.

As with the previous analysis, I disaggregated military victory into rebel victory and government victory and ran them in separate models. The coefficient estimate for government military victory is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term (Government Victory* Oil/GDP) is negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 level. According to the marginal effect plot (Figure 3.6), when the value of Oil/GDP is between 0 and 10 percent, the effect of government victory on state capacity is positive, though these effects decline with the rise of oil rents. When the value of Oil/GDP reaches 35, however the relationship between government military victory and state capacity is decidedly negative and statistically significant. Looking at the frequency distribution in the sample, 36 of the 57 civil cases that ended through military victory ended through government victory. Of these, about 80 percent fall into this range of statistical significance. In short, in line with the theoretical argument, government military victory is associated with increased postwar state capacity but these effects decline with rising oil rents.
The coefficient estimate for rebel victory is negative and statistically insignificant. The estimate for the coefficient of principal theoretical importance—the interaction term—is positive, though statistically insignificant. In spite of the prima facie evidence of statistical insignificance, the interpretation of these coefficient estimates is not straightforward. According to the marginal effects plot (Figure 3.7), the effect of rebel victory on state capacity is for the most part statistically insignificant. But when Oil/GDP reaches 40 percent, rebel victory appears to have a positive but statistically and substantively trivial effect on state capacity. Aside from the trivial impact, the frequency distribution in the sample shows that only a single case falls into this range of statistical significance.

Specifically, the civil war episode in Congo-Brazzaville in the 1990s is the only case that appears to accord with this particular finding. From 1993 to 1997 and also in 1999, Congo-Brazzaville went through a political convulsion. At the center of the conflict was an ongoing power struggle between former president Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who ruled the country from 1979 to 1992 and the then president, Pascal Lissouba. After a failed attempt at democratization, the country descended into conflict as rival militias engaged in a zero-sum struggle for control of the state (Englebert and Ron 2004). On average, oil accounted for more than 50 percent of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2011). Following victory over his rivals, Sassou-Nguesso relied on oil rents to establish a modicum of stability through cooptation and selective incorporation of elites into the structure of state power. “These coopted elites had been members of Congo’s state bourgeoisie in the prewar era, and after their 1999 defeat they rediscovered “class solidarity” with Sassou’s followers and neglected their ethnoregional ties to junior militia colleagues” (Englebert and Ron
2004: 62). While oil did not contribute to a broad-based state building, it did not lead to the persistence of zones of disorder either (ibid.). While the neo-patrimonial logic is not entirely surprising, the Congolese result also runs counter to the dominant perspective on political order in the postcolonial world. In particular, political order in Africa and elsewhere is uneven and complex. But the literature on ‘state failure’ tends to conjure up powerful images of chaos with ramifications for the stability of world order (Rotberg 2002). The norm in Africa and other developing regions is not widespread anarchy but states with authoritative presence in urban areas and most rural areas, but with limited ability to broadcast administrative and military authority over some peripheral corners (Bratton 2009: 365).

Turning to the other results shown in Table 3.3, we see that the coefficient for negotiated settlement is negative and statistically insignificant. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative but statistically insignificant. The marginal effects plot (Figure 3.8) shows the effect of negotiated settlement is statistically insignificant across the full range of observed values for oil/GDP. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are nearly identical with the results reported in Table 3.2. The coefficient estimate for foreign aid is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The level of prewar state capacity is negatively correlated with postwar capacity; the coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.001 level in all model specifications. Increased international trade has a positive effect on state capacity, which is also consistent with the theoretical expectation. The remaining control variables are statistically insignificant.

The previous results are reproduced using a third measure of resources: Oil and Gas Rents per Capita. As Table 3.4 shows, there are no major changes in the statistical and
substantive findings. The coefficient estimate for military victory is positive, though only significant at the 0.1 level. However, the coefficient estimate of principal interest (the interaction term) is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The marginal effect plot (Figure 3.9) suggests that the effect of military victory on state capacity is statistically significant at a high value for Oil and Gas Rents per Capita (ln); specifically, when the value reaches 5, the effect of military is negative and statically significant. Here only 15 percent of the cases fall into this range of statistical significance. However, when I ran government victory and rebel victory in separate models, I find nearly identical results as before. The coefficient estimate for government victory is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level as well. The marginal effect plot (Figure 3.10) shows that the effect of government victory on state capacity is positive but declining when Oil and Gas Rents are between 0 and 2.5. The frequency distribution in the sample shows that 58 percent of the cases in which governments achieved victory fall into the zone of statistical significance across the full range of values for oil and gas rents per capita. While the magnitude of the statistical significance has declined in this model, the core findings confirm the hypothesis that victory has a positive effect on state capacity but these effects attenuate with rising rents. As with the results of the previous analysis, coefficient estimates for rebel victory and negotiated settlement are negative but statistically insignificant. The marginal effect plots bear these results out (Figures 3.11 and 3.12). Most of the control variables perform as expected and remain unaltered from the previous results.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

I introduce some modifications to make sure the core results are robust to changes in model specification and variable measurements. The dependent variable in the previous analyses is measured at five years after the end of civil war. In the previous analysis, the dependent variable was measured as the difference between state capacity five years after the war and the level a year prior to the outbreak of civil war. I make two changes to the dependent variable. First, I measure it ten years after the war. Second, I include the absolute level of postwar state capacity, rather than the change in state capacity. The prewar level of state capacity is included as a control variable. However, contrary to previous expectations, the prewar RPE is expected to be positively correlated with the postwar state capacity. All things being equal, we expect states with relatively high prewar capacity to show higher postwar state capacity than states with low prewar capacity. The results are presented in Table 3.5. In Model 1, the coefficient estimate for the interaction terms (Resource Rents* Victory) is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the theoretical argument. The plot of marginal effects (Figure 3.13) indicates that military victory has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on state capacity when resource rents are between 0 and 28 percent of GDP. However, when resource rents reach 28 percent, the effect of military victory on state capacity is decidedly negative. The frequency distribution of the conditioning variable (total resource rents) across its entire observed range shows that about 26 percent of the 47 cases that ended through military victory fall into the range of statistical significance. These observations do not constitute a large percentage of the sample, though they are far from being negligible. When I ran the government victory and rebel victory dummies in separate models, the results again confirm the previous findings. The coefficient estimate for government victory is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. More importantly, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term (Government Victory*Resource Rents) is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, which is consistent with the theoretical argument. The plot of marginal effects (Figure 3.14) shows that the effect of government victory on state capacity is positive and statistically significant. When rents are between 0 and 8 percent, government military victory has a positive effect on state capacity, though these effects decline with rising rents. In the sample, governments won in 28 out of the 46 cases that ended through some type of military victory. 64 percent of the cases fall into this range of statistical significance. When rents reach 38 percent, the effect of government victory is negative. About 11 percent of the cases that ended through government victory fall into this range of statistical significance. All in all, 75 percent of these cases that ended through government military victory fall into this range of statistical significance.

As was the case in the previous results, the coefficient estimates for rebel victory is negative and statistically insignificant. The coefficient for the interaction term (Rebel Victory* Resource Rents) is negative. For a substantive interpretation of the results, we can consult the plot of marginal effects depicted in Figure 3.15, which shows that the effect of rebel victory is statistically insignificant and substantively trivial across the full range of values for resource rents in the sample. In line with the theoretical expectation, the coefficient estimate for negotiated settlement is negative. However, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term (Settlement* Resource Rents) is positive. As in the previous results, however, neither coefficient estimate in and of itself provides a clear signal as to the statistical and substantive impact of negotiated settlement on state capacity. The plot of marginal effects (Figure 3.16) shows a slightly positive and statistically significant effect
of negotiated settlement on state capacity. Specifically, the plot shows that when the value of resource rents is between 0 and 16 percent, the effect of negotiated settlement on state capacity is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. However, when the value of rents is higher than 16 percent, the effect of negotiated settlement on state capacity is positive and statistically significant. While this result is somewhat inconstant with the theoretical expectation, further examination reveals that the substantive impact is smaller than it appears. A closer look at the frequency distribution in the sample reveals that 3 out of the 22 cases that ended in negotiated settlement fall into this range of statistical significance.

Most of the control variables perform by and large as expected, though there were some changes from the previous results. The coefficient for international trade is positive and significant at the 0.01 and 0.001 levels across all specifications in Table 3.4, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation. As hypothesized, the coefficient estimate for the duration of civil war is negative and statistically significant across all models. The coefficient estimate for the prewar RPE is positive, which is consistent with the hypothesized argument. However, it is statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimate for foreign aid has the ‘wrong’ sign and is statistically insignificant. In the previous results, foreign aid was statistically significant and negatively correlated with state capacity. Other control variables are statistically insignificant.

CONCLUSION

This chapter makes empirical contributions to the study of civil war. Civil war has been the dominant type of conflict in the post WWII period. Once relegated to the periphery of world politics, internal conflicts have attracted significant attention from scholars. Still,
the overwhelming focus has been on the structural determinants of war onset and duration. In recent years, scholars have linked resources to civil war onset and duration, arguing that the availability of ‘lootable’ commodities increases the risk of civil war onset. By contrast, I focus on how the dynamics of civil war affect postwar state building. I argue that civil wars that end decisively through military victory create a structural opportunity to reconstitute state authority. While victory provides a permissive environment, state building is contingent on the preferences of postwar elites and the legacy of wartime developments. In particular, the manner in which resources are mobilized in the prosecution of civil war shapes the nature of the postwar state. When resource mobilization is broad-based, military victory is conducive to postwar state building. By contrast, revenue generation based on the extraction of natural resource rents reduces the state-making impact of victory in civil war. This theoretical argument accounts for why identical war outcomes may different effects on institutions-building. In making this path-dependent argument, the project departs from studies that treat civil wars as a cohesive class of events united only by their nature as traumatic political phenomena but not much else.

These hypotheses were tested on a dataset of civil wars in the period 1960-2005. After controlling for a number of control variables, the results show that military victory is associated with increased postwar state capacity but its effects shrink when governments raise wartime revenue through the extraction of rents from natural resources. These findings have implications for civil war research as well as policy. The findings show that not all civil wars are created equal. Some are followed by greater state building than others. Instead of treating civil wars as pathologies, scholars should theorize and empirically test ways in which different kinds of orders arise from the crucible of civil war. In terms of
policy, peace building through state building has become an important item on the international community’s agenda. Interventions to reconstruct fragile postwar states must account for wartime developments that may disrupt or facilitate postwar developments, since wartime developments do not vanish at war’s end. Because states are built on what already exists, external state-builders need not reinvent the wheel. It is, therefore, imperative that they take stock of inherited assets and liabilities in order to design and implement context-appropriate state-building strategies (Ghani and Lockhart 2006: 119).
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ceasefire and Stalemate</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21.85</td>
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<td>1.61</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>13.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (In)</td>
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Table 3.2. Interaction of Civil War Outcomes and Total Resource Rents

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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>-.009* (.004)</td>
<td>-.01** (.004)</td>
<td>-.009* (.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victory *Resource Rents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>-.228 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.006 (.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement * Resource Rents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.007 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefires</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.2 (.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.124** (.050)</td>
<td>-.154** (.054)</td>
<td>-.144** (.053)</td>
<td>-.138** (.054)</td>
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<td>-.534*** (.117)</td>
<td>-.525*** (.117)</td>
<td>-.572*** (.12)</td>
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<td>-.034** (.044)</td>
<td>-.038** (.046)</td>
<td>-.039** (.045)</td>
<td>-.037** (.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.011 (.011)</td>
<td>.012 (.012)</td>
<td>.012 (.012)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Death (ln)</td>
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<td>.089* (.044)</td>
<td>.090* (.046)</td>
<td>.083 (.045)</td>
<td>.084* (.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.061 (.052)</td>
<td>-.078 (.056)</td>
<td>-.045 (.054)</td>
<td>.084 (.058)</td>
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<td>-.141 (.085)</td>
<td>-.135 (.088)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.020 (.117)</td>
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<td>.096 (.12)</td>
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<td>.006*** (.002)</td>
<td>.005** (.002)</td>
<td>.006** (.002)</td>
<td>.005** (.002)</td>
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Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. +p≤0.1 * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p ≤0.001
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<td>(.003)</td>
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<td>-.031**</td>
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<td>(.043)</td>
<td>.043</td>
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<td>-.059</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
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<td>-.116</td>
<td>(.072)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.125)</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>(.094)</td>
<td>-.006</td>
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<td>.006***</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>.005***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.047</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
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Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. +≤0.1 * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p ≤.001
Table 3.4. Interaction of Civil War Outcomes and Oil and Gas Rents Per Capita

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<tr>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(.138)</td>
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Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. +≤.1 * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001
Table 3.5. Interaction of Civil War Outcomes and Total Resource Rents

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Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. +≤0.1 * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p ≤0.001
Figure 3.1
Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.2
Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity
Figure 3.3

Marginal Effects of Rebel Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.4

Marginal Effects of Settlement on State Capacity
Figure 3.5

Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.6

Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity
Figure 3.7

Marginal Effects of Rebel Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.8

Marginal Effects of Settlement on State Capacity
Figure 3.9

Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.10

Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity
Figure 3.11

Marginal Effects of Rebel Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.12

Marginal Effects of Settlement on State Capacity
Figure 3.13
Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.14
Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity
Figure 3.15

Marginal Effects of Rebel Victory on State Capacity

Figure 3.16

Marginal Effects of Settlement on State Capacity
CHAPTER 4
WAR IN THE OGADEN: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN ETHIOPIA

On September 12, 1974, the longstanding monarchical regime of Emperor Haile Selassie came to an ignominious end. Haile Selassie’s monarchical absolutism came as a result of instigation by students and urban dwellers concerned about the rising costs of living and the inability of the regime to meet their demands. In the end, however, the revolution was spearheaded by the armed forces. The collapse of the monarchical order that had held the multiethnic country together for decades unleashed a number of forces that threatened to tear the country apart. There were at least two reasons for this. First, following the collapse of the old order, the new regime had difficulties consolidating its authority. The intense power struggles within the military on the one hand and between the military and a number of civilian groups created a temporary institutional vacuum at the center. The perceived weakness of the new regime gave rise to fissiparous tendencies, which were particularly intense in territories that had been historically alienated from the state.

One such movement that threatened the centrifugal equilibrium of the historically multiethnic state was the conflict over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which constituted almost a third of the country’s landmass. Populated by ethnic Somali-Ethiopians, the Ogaden had been the flashpoint for a series of military confrontations between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia following the latter’s independence. As noted later in the chapter, Somalia’s interest in the Ogaden had to do with the historical circumstances in which the Ogaden was incorporated into Ethiopia at the end of the nineteenth century. As Somalia sought to realize its irredentist claims, it began to sponsor the emergence of armed
challengers within Ethiopia. One such organization was the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which capitalized on the vacuum at the center to begin military operations wrest control of the Ogaden from Ethiopia in 1976. In the absence of active Somali sponsorship, the dissident nationalism that the WLSF represented would not have risen to the level of a sustained, regime- and sovereignty-threatening threat. Direct military intervention by Somalia in the midst of the civil war gave the conflict an international dimension, forcing Ethiopia into an all-out mobilization with far-reaching implications for regime consolidation and state-building both during and after the war ended.

In this chapter, I examine the effects of the war on state-building outcomes. To recall, the core theoretical claim is that military victory is more conducive to state-building than any other form of civil war termination. But war outcome alone, critical as it is, does not explain the character and extent of postwar state-building, for it unfolds in the shadow of enduring wartime legacies. The previous statistical chapter provided evidence of correlation between wartime resource endowments, civil war outcomes and post-civil war state building. The findings confirm the hypothesis that while military victory leads to the postwar growth of state capacity, these effects attenuate with rising rents. While correlations between the main independent and dependent variables are one important type of evidence, they alone do not provide a satisfactory test of the theory’s causal claims. Having established the correlations, this chapter delves into a detailed case analysis in order to examine whether or not access to rents and civil war outcomes have the hypothesized effects on postwar state capacity. I use the case study to examine the theory’s causal claims, which were left unaddressed in the statistical analysis. A detailed case analysis is, thus, essential in adding historical specificity to the theoretical claims of the project.
Before proceeding further, I briefly recapitulate the logic of case selection. For the purpose of empirical analysis, the case falls on the regression line vis-à-vis the study’s principal causal claims. First, the conflict ended through a government military victory. Second, there was no “easy” financing either in the form of easily extractible natural resources or sizable external patronage that would reduce the government’s imperative for generating war-making resources through taxation. Finally, the end of the conflict was followed by the twin processes of regime consolidation and institutionalization. Process-tracing can be used to ascertain whether or not the available evidence supports the claim that the explanatory variables and the dependent variable are causally related. The findings of the case analysis provide robust qualitative evidence that supports the results of the statistical analysis.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first part provides a brief discussion of the historical evolution of the Ethiopian state. This project does not claim to offer a “big bang” approach to state building and the account of institutional elaboration provided here is incremental. Therefore, this discussion helps place the outcomes of interest in this study within a proper historical context. The second part discusses the dynamics of the conflict. In this part, I seek to accomplish two tasks. I first provide an overview of the long-term, medium-term and short-term determinants of the conflict. I then discuss the mobilization of war-making resources by the rebels and the government, highlighting the effects of these processes on wartime institution-building and relations with local populations. The final part discusses postwar developments, focusing on the impact of wartime state-building and military victory on the consolidation and institutionalization of state power in the postwar period.
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN ETHIOPIAN STATE

The historical roots of modern Ethiopia extend back thousands of years to the Axumite Kingdom in the northern highlands (Levine 1974). But until the late nineteenth century, the state lacked internal cohesion (Abir 1968). By all accounts, the ‘founder’ of modern Ethiopia was Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913), who oversaw a vast territorial expansion beyond anything his predecessors could ever dream of. In response to the threat of European colonialism, Menelik initiated processes of “defensive modernization” that entailed a number of authority-centralizing reforms, including the creation of a professional army (Keller 2005: 90).

Following Menelik’s death in 1913, the country was ruled by a system of regency. But in 1930, one such regent based in the eastern Province of Harar, Haile Selassie, assumed the imperial throne and sought to pick up where Menelik left off vis-à-vis administrative modernization (Hess 1970). However, the Italian occupation (1936-41) briefly halted these modernizing efforts. As a result, the country emerged from the occupation severely weakened. The Italians decimated traditional institutions in an effort to replace them “with what they considered to be more modern institutions conducive to exploiting the country’s rich economic potential” (Keller 1988: 65). As a result, the pre-World War II Ethiopian state was small, decentralized and comparatively ineffective. Given the scale of post-War developments, a preeminent Ethiopian historian considers the end of Italian occupation in 1941 as the beginning of modern Ethiopian history (Zewde 2001).

Following the Italian interlude, Haile Selassie turned to administrative modernization. The emperor’s state building challenge was to create a centralized
administrative system, which was fiscally, militarily and politically independent of the land-owning provincial nobility (Harbeson 1988: 44). But the brief Italian occupation had enduring political effects that facilitated the emperor’s centralizing efforts after his restoration. During the occupation, the Italians managed to break down the existing social structures that had sustained the provincial nobility, undermining their ability to resist centralization (Crummey 2000: 234; Keller 1988: 73).

As the emperor navigated between the dictates of modernization and the logic of political survival after 1941, the government introduced three major structural reforms. These reforms were aimed at eliminating overlapping jurisdictions and creating a rational-legal basis for centralized authority by monopolizing the legitimate means of coercion, rationalizing tax collection and bureaucratizing the government. All in all, these reforms put in place the three interlocking elements of the state: a structure of control; a structure of extraction; and professional bureaucracy. The first major reform dealt with the creation of a substantial standing army. Haile Selassie’s predecessors had relied on imported weapons to resist colonial aggression and establish themselves in power but the country lacked a professional standing army until after WWII (Clapham 1988: 28). By the 1960s, Ethiopia had about 44,000 troops, by far the largest in Africa next to South Africa (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 148). The armed forces along with the expanded Imperial Body Guard allowed the state to monopolize the means of coercion. It also enhanced the state’s capacity for control and defense unparalleled in the country’s history. In addition to enabling the center to weaken the provincial elite, the enhanced coercive capacity was critical to the survival of monarchical absolutism (Zewde 2001: 207).
In the second most important reform, for the first time in the country’s history, a salaried civil service tasked with tax collection was created within the Ministry of Finance, and taxes were directly deposited into the state treasury (Abate and Wubneh 1988: 19). This reform was significant in rationalizing tax collection as well as preventing arbitrary tax collection practices by the provincial nobility. Subsequently, the state introduced a number of agricultural taxes so as to expand the revenue base of the state (Keller 1981: 533-34). In spite of the meager taxes collected, the tax decrees were principally political and social acts directed against traditional structures within which the state was embedded. The reforms monetized taxes, regularize payment and weakened the role of social intermediaries between citizens and government (Crummey 2000: 240).

Finally, provincial administration was nominally brought under the control of the Interior Ministry. While the land-owning aristocracy continued to enjoy a degree of autonomy, these administrative reforms set in motion the process of professionalizing the central bureaucracy by establishing a network of field agents representing the various ministries in Addis Ababa. The gradual professionalization of the bureaucracy also began to strip provincial officials of “real personal base of support” (Keller 1988: 75). However, given the regime’s conservative bias, it was interested in those aspects of modernization that could sustain the monarchy (Abate 1983: 29; Keller 1981: 546-7; Reid 2011: 134; Zewde 2001: 178). Despite the regime’s lack of interest in fostering the spread of liberal ideas, the introduction of westernized education exposed a generation of progressive youth to these ‘subversive’ ideas (Crummey 2000: 245). It has been said that the lack of political opportunities for the urban intelligentsia and effective links with the countryside are
permissive conditions for revolutions (Clapham 1988: 3). Judged against these structural conditions, Ethiopia was ripe for one.

By the early 1970s, the regime had proven incapable of addressing the combined grievances of three major social groups in the country, the rank-and-file of the armed forces; students and teachers, and taxi-drivers in Addis Ababa, that debilitated the government (Crummey 2000: 245). Rising inflation also led to a series of mutinies by soldiers within some of the most influential bases across the country. June 27, 1974, the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (Derg for committee in Amharic) formed to articulate the soldiers’ demands. Its founding members were mostly junior officers and noncommissioned officers. After initially working with the civilian government formed in a desperate bid to placate the protesters, the Derg deposed Haile Selassie on September 12, 1974, setting in motion “a classically violent and transformative revolution that fundamentally changed old institutions and the feudal structures and myths that supported ad sustained them” (Tareke 2009: 15). The revolution and subsequent upheaval unleashed the centripetal forces of ethnic nationalism in areas that had been under the continuous domination of the Ethiopian state, but where legitimate authority had never been fully established. One such conflict took place over the Ogaden. The new government had to deal with this potentially fatal threat before it could consolidate and institutionalize its power.

35 According to Skocpol (1979), social revolutions are driven by class-based revolts from below. In Ethiopia’s case, class-based revolts from below played a negligible role in the revolution. For some of the best scholarship on the revolution, see Clapham 1988; Halliday and Molyneux 1981; Harbeson 1988; Keller 1988; Markakis 1987; Markakis and Ayele 1978; Ottaway and Ottaway 1978.
THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR

The confluence of three major factors contributed to the onset of the Ogaden conflict. The manner by which the Ogaden region was incorporated into the Ethiopian state provided the deep structural context for the conflict. Prior to the 19th century, no state had control of the Ogaden. Historically, the core of the traditional Abyssinian/Ethiopian state lay in the northern highlands. At the end of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia faced pressures from European colonial powers, forcing successive leaders to respond by converting the country’s traditional monarchy into a modernizing autocracy (Clapham 1988: 26). A critical element of this defensive modernization was the expansion of the boundaries of the state by taking control of substantial territories in the south (Marcus 1969; Crummey 2000: 229-33; Donham and James 2002; Keller 1981: 529). But nation-building entailed little more than assimilation into a national political culture, defined in terms of the language and culture of the Amharic core (Abay 2004: 594; Clapham 1988: 21). In theory, nationalism need not necessarily depend on ethnic homogeneity, as civic nationalism could lead to nation-building within the context of a multiethnic federation (Miller 2007). But the lack of politically integrative policies alienated the peripheral populations from the dominant inhabitants of the center, planting the seeds of “revolts from those who were not prepared to accept the terms on which incorporation into the national political system was offered” (Clapham 1988: 195).

Somali irredentism was the medium-term factor that contributed to the onset of the civil war. One of the legacies of colonialism in the region was the emergence of new borders that did not trace the boundaries of the Somali nation, with Somalis living in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia (Laitin and Samatar 1987). During the Italian
occupation, the Ogaden came under British military rule but was returned to Ethiopia in 1948. However, efforts to extend state authority to the region triggered resistance from the local inhabitants (Keller 1988: 157; Patman 1990: 43). But it was only after Somalia’s independence in 1960 that this resistance found a concrete political expression, when the newly independent state began to stir up pan-Somali consciousness (Lewis 1963: 150; Mayall 1978: 337; Somerville 1990: 46). Somali irredentism was driven by the interests of the dominant Somali clan—the Darod—to whom the Ogaden tribes belonged (Markakis 1987: 171). The Darod dominated the political scene in post-independence Somalia (Laitin 1977: 91; Lewis 1989: 574). But Somali irredentism is almost unique in Africa in that “national sentiment is a mass rather than an elite phenomenon” (Mayall 1990: 60).

Given the fact that these long – and medium-term conditions had existed for decades, they fail to adequately explain the onset of the war when it did. A complete account of the genesis of the conflict must thus, include the short-term or “generative cause” (Mahoney 2013) that precipitated the war. In this case, the trigger was the temporary loss of central control in Addis Ababa after the upheavals of September 1974. Scholars of international security have argued that revolutionary states face an elevated risk of international conflict. For example, systemic theorists attribute the effect of revolution on war to shifts in the balance of power (Walt 1992, 1996). During periods of turmoil and political reorganization, revolutionary states are perceived to be vulnerable to external pressure, giving other states “an opportunity to settle old scores or to extract new resources from the weakened state” (Maoz 1996: 92). When domestic disorder in Ethiopia appeared to present a narrow window of opportunity to strike a decisive blow, the Somali regime could not resist internal pressures to capitalize on it (Markakis 1987: 224). Some scholars
have attributed the conflict to psychological factors. Donna Jackson (2007), for example, notes that Siad Barre’s mother belonged to the Ogadeni clan, suggesting that the outbreak of the conflict was the product of familial pride. While individual-level explanations for war are generally hard to pin down, in this particular case, Barre’s clan affiliation or mental makeup cannot adequately explain the timing of the conflict.

*The Political Economy of Insurgency*

Insurgencies are typically protracted affairs and most fail to achieve their objectives. The reason is that nascent insurgencies have to confront militarily superior government forces. Throughout history, guerrilla warfare has been the choice of militarily inferior subnational groups facing larger and stronger national foes. Paradoxically, the power imbalance is not always disadvantageous to insurgents, as weaker groups often seize tactical initiatives to harass superior but stationary conventional forces at a time and place of their choosing. Such tactics are consistent with the Clausewitzian injunction against head-on collision with a superior adversary (Kaempf 2009: 135; Malaquias 2007: 102). But by virtue of the initial structural asymmetry, rebels groups, in order to mount a credible challenge to central states, must raise war-making resources.

The goal of this section is to provide an overview of the process by which the WSLF sustained itself and how the circumstances of its emergence shaped its collective organizational incentives in ways that had far-reaching implications for the evolution of the rebellion. To foreshadow, the fact that the rebels were almost totally dependent on Somalia for war-making resources reduced their imperative to bargain with local
populations. As a consequence, they had few incentives to establish structures for governing civilians and cultivate local legitimacy.

The WSLF was created by the Somali Republic immediately after independence in 1960. Over the next decade, Somalia armed, trained and financed the group’s low-intensity armed campaign in the Ogaden and surrounding areas. The Somali government had its own reasons for sponsoring the formation of armed challengers to the Ethiopian state. The first was political: under the new Somali constitution, its leaders were obligated to seek the unification of ethnic Somalis scattered in neighboring countries (Mayall 1990: 60). The second was economic: the contested areas provided grazing pasture during the rainy season as well as a number of fertile areas, including the towns of Haran and Dire Dawa (Markakis 1987: 169-171; Tareke 2009: 186). The predominance of pastoralism in Somalia’s political economy made political integration decidedly difficult, given the negligible role of the state in the traditional livestock economy (Markakis 1987: 86). Somali leaders, thus, sought to mobilize a nationalist cause, such as the “liberation” of the Ogaden to “supersede these internal divisions” (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 201). In essence, the conflict was as much about Somali internal unity as it was about a piece of land. To help the rebels achieve their goals, Somalia provided a comprehensive aid package. Despite a brief rupture in relations following the advent of a military government in Somalia in 1969, Somalia would continue to arm and finance the rebels until their bitter defeat during the last conflict over the Ogaden (Habte Selassie 1980: 108)

While the Somali army provided senior members of the rebel leadership, the rebels had to recruit foot soldiers. Initially, the WSLF recruited ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden into the rebel army. In general, the initial recruitment phase was voluntary.
However, as I discuss below, the WSLF resorted to coercive strategies to recruit fighters after it came under military pressure and its fighters encountered resistance from the population when the conflict began in 1976.

In spite of the considerable material, political and military assistance from Somalia, the rebel group faced considerable difficulties in spearheading the drive for independence by organizing an effective uprising against the Ethiopian state. Earlier revolts in Bale and Sidamo (1963-68) by Somali and Oromo pastoralists foreshadowed the 1976 war over the Ogaden. After suppressing these revolts, the state extended its bureaucratic presence in the region and intensified its extraction of tax revenues (Crummey 2000: 243; Markakis 1987: 194). However, the long-standing practice of the state making its presence felt, predominantly for the purpose of control and extraction, had the effect of further antagonizing the inhabitants. If cultivated properly, the state’s antagonistic relations with the inhabitants could help the WSLF burnish its credentials as a credible alternative to the central government. The translation of grievances into concrete political demands requires effective mobilization, which, in turn, requires a measure organizational coherence. But factors that increase the structural autonomy of armed movements from local populations tend to reduce the imperative for leaders of armed groups to make costly investments in political mobilization. Given the WSLF was the product of external instigation and continued to enjoy the comprehensive backing of the Somali government, it chose to concentrate on developing its military capabilities, while paying scant attention to the political dimension of the military campaign. Since it was centrally directed from within Somalia and its main operational headquarters was based in Mogadishu, the WSLF abjured establishing permanent bases inside Ethiopia, where it might have had opportunities to
mobilize and politicize local populations with the goal of nurturing its legitimacy. But the rebels had no interest in developing close links to local societal forces, given their dependence on Somalia.

After several years of dormancy, a newly re-energized WSLF emerged in 1975. As previously noted, the immediate trigger was the post-revolution squabbles that had gripped the country and created a temporary loss of cohesion at the center. The WSLF commenced its operations in January 1976 and guerrilla activities intensified throughout the Ogden, the provinces of Bale and Sidamo in the south and southeast of Ethiopia. Six months later, a second movement, the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) emerged, again with the active support of the Somali government. The SALF was made of predominantly Oromo and Ogadeni Ethiopians. The leadership of the SALF was drawn mainly from veterans of the previously noted failed revolts in Bale and Sidamo in the 1960s. Despite well-known grievances against the state, the two groups lacked strategic clarity about their goals beyond driving the Ethiopian out of the region (Tareke 2009: 188).

The need to establish the SALF was driven by the tactical necessity of appeasing ethnic Oromo sensibilities and neutralizing the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an ethno-nationalist movement established by dissidents from the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. The OLF had begun operating in the provinces of Bale and Hararghe around the same time as the WSLF. But the two groups were fundamentally at odds with each other due to overlapping territorial claims. There was, thus, grave concern that competition over resources and territories could undermine the WSLF’s struggle against the Ethiopian government. President Siad Barre of Somalia admitted the tactical necessity of creating the SALF when he stated the following: “The Somalis in the lowlands of Bale and Sidamo
could not fight the Ethiopians without the support of the Oromo in the highland, so we called them the Somali and Abo” (quoted in Markakis 1987: 244, endnote 35). By preventing the emergence of rival ethno-nationalist movements in the region, the WSLF and their Somali sponsors essentially sought to avoid costly engagements that could distract them from the principal military goal of attacking government positions.

In the first few months of 1976, the guerrillas moved into the contested territories with relative ease. The rebels, rather than taking over existing institutions, began to dismantle anything that symbolized the authority of the central state, such as police stations, schools and clinics (Tareke 2009: 188). In so doing, the rebels sought to create a sense of permanency about the retreat of the state and to produce new facts on the ground. But due to the circumstances of the WSLF’s creation, the rebel group had few incentives to establish organizational structures for governing civilians. The group had few incentives—financial or political—to allow the civilian population to shape the trajectory of the rebellion. Since the WSLF was able to conduct its armed rebellion against the Ethiopian state without relying on civilians in territories in wished to rule, it had considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the local population. Consequently, even when the rebels appeared to have legitimate grievances that could serve as a focal point for an effective collective action, they had no interests in making costly investments in the mobilization and politicization of local populations.

On the face it, operating with the support of an established state appears to have provided the best chance for the rebels to realize their aspirations due to the weakness of the central government in Addis Ababa. However, this apparently beneficial arrangement came at a great cost: the two rebel groups operated under the strict supervision of their
external patron. In that respect, the WSLF and SALF were different from many other contemporary rebel movements in the developing world in the sense that, by operating under the comprehensive tutelage of an external actor, they ceded organizational and operational autonomy to an external power. They relied on Somalia for training, equipment and other logistical support necessary for the military campaign. For example, while the WSLF was divided into three regional commands, it lacked the autonomy to make even simple tactical decisions regarding when and where to attack. It could not initiate military operations without coordinating with the Somali army (Patman 1990:157). The lack of organizational and logistical autonomy was further evidenced by the fact that both rebels groups were under the overall command of the Somali Minister of Defense, General Mohammed Ali Samatar (Markakis 1987: 227). As previously mentioned, the SALF comprised of ethnic Somalis and Oromos. Perhaps due to the Oromo dimension, the SALF operated with a greater autonomy than the WSLF, with which it had problems over political and territorial issues. However, whatever comparative autonomy the SALF might have enjoyed does not appear to have been sufficient to counter the Somali control over its operations (Tareke 2009: 188). In short, the fingerprints of the Somali government were all over the political, military and organizational structures of the WSLF and SALF.

Initially, the rebels’ lack of significant prior interaction with the population did not have adverse effects on their ability to win hearts and minds. When the rebels arrived, the pastoral population in the lowlands greeted the group with considerable enthusiasm. The different groups and clans that had been alienated from the Ethiopian state strongly identified with the WSLF’s cause on ethnic-religious grounds. The Hawiya of Bale and the Oagdenis, for example, welcomed the WSLF with almost universal enthusiasm (Tareke
However, this enthusiastic reception was short-lived, as it soon became apparent that the rebels had no intention of giving the inhabitants any more freedom than they had. Any sign of resistance by civilians was met with the application of brute force.

All insurgent groups must navigate between competing imperatives. On the one hand, they seek to foster close links to local populations. On the other hand, they must deal with the exigencies of guerrilla conflict where military pressure and civilian resistance may necessitate resorting to coercion (Kasfir 2005: 273). But as strategic actors, civilians do have a say in how rebels deal with local populations. Given the inherently asymmetrical nature of the relationship between gun-wielding actors and unarmed civilians, coercion lurks in the background whether rebels depend on civilians or not. What separates some groups from others is the organizational incentives to deploy coercion strategically (Weinstein 2007). Although coercion is probably the most efficient means of imposing order and extracting resources, it undermines the development of long-term bonds with local population, which, in turn, militates against the emergence of a legitimate rebel social order (Metelits 2010: 26). As a result, rebels dependent on civilians for material and political support must strike a reasonable balance between these competing imperatives. The likelihood of a retaliatory withdrawal of support by civilians can be effective in deterring rebels from relying on coercion to get what they want. But when rebels, because they have access to domestic rents or external sponsorship, are materially and politically autonomous from local population, the potential loss of material and political support does not figure in rebel decision-making about, among other things, the use of violence against civilians.
As the rebels encountered resistance, they made few efforts to signal to the population that they were willing to invest time into the forging of reciprocal relations with local inhabitants so as to legitimize whatever social order would be taking shape down the road. Rather, they responded by trying to dominate the population through the application of brute force. The rebels “resorted to the use of terror, including pressgangs, torture, and wanton destruction of property” (Tareke 2009: 189). Migrants from other parts of the country, whom the rebels regarded as ‘settlers’ from the traditional highland core of the nation bore the brunt of the violence against civilians (Tareke 2009: 189). By early 1977, the rebels had established control over a significant segment of the country’s population in the east, including in the provinces of Bale and Sidamo. But control in this context meant the absence of effective state authority. Since the rebels did not have much interest in setting up structures for governing civilians, they continued to rely on coercion as an instrument for dominating the local population. But the propensity for indiscriminate violence proved counterproductive, as it hardened local resistance against the rebels and their Somali sponsors (Clapham 1988: 218). In addition to their failure to establish effective links to local populations, the WSLF and SALF also failed to coordinate their campaigns with each other. They competed with each other for “territory, men, and booty” (Tareke 2009: 189).

As the rebels moved into the highlands, they faced considerable resistance from the local population. For example, the SALF’s efforts to mobilize Oromo peasants on the basis of ethnicity and religion failed. The paucity of Oromo support for the SALF could be explained in terms of the radical policies that had been enacted by the new government. One of the revolutionary government’s early accomplishments was the passage of a
landmark land reform proclamation that fundamentally reorganized the underlying social structures that had been in place for centuries. The land reform abolished an oppressive system of land tenure and eliminated a predatory ruling class (Crummey 2000: 249). The newly liberated peasantry simply had few incentives to enter into an alliance with nationalist movements against a regime that had just given them a new set of rights. Even if the local population supported the government, research has established that interests and identities in civil war are fluid (Kalyvas 2006). Under this altered sociopolitical environment, in order for the local inhabitants to shift their allegiance to the rebels, the rebels would have had to persuade them that the movement was in their best interests. But because of their structural autonomy from the population, the rebels did have the patience to cultivate local legitimacy. Without being convinced that the rebellion held the promise of a better future than they had, the local inhabitants had few reasons to embrace the rebels with enthusiasm.

On July 13, 1977, the conflict took a dramatic turn as a result of the Somali army’s invasion. In order to avoid arousing the suspicion of the Ethiopians, members of the invading Somali contingent were instructed to remove the insignia on their uniforms. Why the Somalis suddenly decided to invade is not obvious, as the rebels had the upper hand up to that point. The likely explanation is that the Somali government simply did not have faith in the rebels’ ability to sustain their success and achieve the long-term goal of snatching the contested territories from Ethiopia. But why did it help ignite the civil war if it did not have faith in the rebels to achieve their objectives? Some observers have provided two related explanations for the Somali invasion. First, the Somalis counted on the quick disintegration of the Ethiopian government (Markakis 1987: 232). This assumption has
some merit, given the chaos and intense power struggle at the center in the aftermath of the upheavals after 1974. When the government did not disintegrate as expected, the Somalis assumed that it would not be long before the rebels would be crushed in a counterattack. The second explanation accepts the premise that the Somalis did not have faith in the rebels to begin with but that they used them to soften up Ethiopia’s defenses either in an attempt to bring the government to the negotiating table under duress or to intervene at an opportune moment (Tareke 2009: 187). Whatever the justification, a civil war that began because of the clash of competing values—the right to self-determination of Ogaden Somalis and Ethiopia’s right of territorial integrity—morphed into an instrument for Somalia’s revisionist aims (Marcus 1994: 198). Ultimately, the separatist nature of the conflict and Somalia’s direct intervention ran afoul of the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) founding Charter. Although the rebels were hardly concerned about international legitimacy, the fact that the balance of opinion in Africa was decidedly pro-Ethiopia raised the costs for Somalia of continuing to inject itself in the conflict (Markakis 1987: 231-2; Patman 1990: 214). To the degree that the rebels were dependent on Somalia for sustenance at the local level, the inhospitable diplomatic setting in which Somalia found itself became a threat to their long-term interests.

The next section provides an overview of the Ethiopian government’s mobilization of war-making resources, highlighting strategies and institutional mechanisms through which the government raised extensive material and human resources.
Government Resource Mobilization

By the end of 1976, when the civil war in the Ogaden was underway and the rebels had made substantial territorial gains, the government had not undertaken a forceful action to deal with the looming threat. Given Somalia’s well-established record on the issue of the contested territories, it could not have been lost on the Ethiopian government that the rebellion was product of instigation by the Somali regime. It is also possible that the Ethiopian government had taken the Somali government’s professed commitment to a negotiated outcome at face value. In any case, the government did not appear to have taken the threat from the WSLF seriously, at least initially. More importantly, in conditions of enormous flux following the revolution, the regime was too preoccupied with internal power struggles to protect its eastern flank.

But continuing rebel gains made the situation untenable. Consequently, the government had to mobilize material and human resources. The fact that the regime was caught by surprise, as evidenced by the fact that the Somali military was in the contested territories undetected, added a degree of urgency to the mobilization process. In the following pages, I provide an overview of the mobilization process, highlighting the strategies and institutional mechanisms through which the regime raised material resources as well as recruited men into the army.36

36 Governments facing revenue imperatives under conditions of “easy” financing must devise a strategy for mobilizing societal resources. Drawing on Amitai Etzion’s typology of organizational compliance, Elizabeth Kier (2010) identifies three distinct strategies of mobilization during war: normative, which emphasizes the development of affective ties between state and society; remunerative, which entails material payoffs and coercive, which entails inflicting pain and punishment to induce compliance. The choice of mobilization strategy has implications for state-society relations.
In early 1977, news of considerable guerrilla success on the eastern front jolted the revolutionary government from its torpor. As a result, the government called for a general mobilization, while at the same time making necessary adjustments on the battlefield. The National Revolutionary Operations Command (NROC) issued a series of directives outlining steps for an all-out national mobilization (Tareke 2009: 199). The NROC issued eight directives (memria in Amharic) designed to mobilize resources for the war effort, which included, inter alia, appeals to retired soldiers under sixty to return to active duty. In addition, the government reversed an previous decision by reinstating purged officers, providing the government with “logistical and technical services in which the old army excelled and making the war a patriotic issue that crossed political and class interests” (Marcus 1994:198-199).

Initially, the government’s strategy of mobilization rested on the activation of affective ties by deftly invoking historical symbols in a calculated effort to whip up patriotic fervor (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 153). This strategy was appealing due to the international dimension of the conflict, which was characterized as a sovereignty-threatening irredentist claim by Somalia, rather than a struggle for self-determination as the rebels characterized it. In the process, the government described itself as a legitimate successor to a national political tradition “lying in the direct line of succession to a series of centralizing and state-strengthening” leaders (Clapham 1988: 14). The centralizing ethos inherited from the nineteenth century emperor, Tewedros, who sought to create a centralized Ethiopian state, following a period of dangerous disunity during the Era of Princes (1769-1855), played a central role in the government’s nationalist mobilization. The principal goal of invoking historical symbols associated with past glory was to extol
the role of the masses in preserving the country’s territorial integrity. Since the country’s territorial integrity was under assault by separatist forces and their foreign sponsors, contributing to the war effort was a patriotic duty critical to preserve the country’s sovereignty.

Another principal symbol nationalist mobilization was the memory of the 1896 victory over Italy at the Battle of Adwa, where invading Italian forces were defeated (Marcus 1994: 198-9; Tareke 2009: 216). Whether or not this sort of nationalist mobilization would have succeeded in the absence of a direct invasion by Somalia is up for debate. Absent a direct intervention by Somalia, the military situation might not have risen to the level of mortal threat to the regime. But once the Somali military intervened, the strategy proved effective. The historical animosity between the two countries made it easy for the Ethiopian government to frame the conflict in terms of aggression, not self-determination. Consequently, the conflict “helped to evoke a sense of Ethiopian nationalism which went well beyond the highland core”, allowing the regime to burnish its nationalist credentials (Clapham 1988: 62).

The invocation of these historical symbols was effective in the rise of “militant patriotism” that the regime took advantage of (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 205). The most vivid expression of this domestic mobilization was the formation of Tatek camp, about 25 miles outside Addis Ababa, where thousands of militia drawn from the peasantry were trained. As Harold Marcus writes, “the elements of the new militia, 80,000 strong, marched in Addis Ababa before a cheering populace, amazing European observers” (Marcus 1994 198).
The upheavals of September 1974 upended a social order that had been in place for centuries. But the outcome did not appear irreversible, as the regime struggled to consolidate its power. For this reason, the outbreak of the conflict over the Ogaden, threatening as it was to the survival of the fledgling regime, was also a blessing in disguise. By forcing the regime to generate a new ‘social myth’ that would link state and society in the aftermath of the collapse of the previous order, the conduct of the war laid the groundwork for the consolidation and institutionalization of the new social order at the end of the war (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 152-53).

Across the country, the responsibility for mobilizing material and human resources rested on two structures of local administration that had just been established following the revolution: the Peasant Associations (PA) and Kebeles in rural and urban areas respectively. As will be clear later in the chapter, the success of these institutions in the mobilization effort would put them at the center of the state-building enterprise at the end of the war. Initially established within a context of uncertainty and institutional flux in the aftermath of the overthrow of Haile Selassie’s government, these local administrative structures played a major role in facilitating effective state penetration of society. When the war broke out, they played a critical role in mobilizing resources, including men and material essential for the war effort.

The rationale for the creation of the PAs was the need to replace the previous social structure governing peasant life. In so doing, the goal was to devolve more power to local communities (Keller 1988: 232). The PAs comprised households within predefined communities; the number varied depending on the total population size in a given locality. The PAs, more than any formal state bureaucracy, were instrumental in allowing the central
state to reach much of the country, given the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population lived in rural areas. The PAs were indispensable instruments of governance principally because they served as transmission belts for the extension of state authority down to the lowest echelons of regional administration, processing and interpreting policies from the center. These structures came to play an instrumental role as an elaborate infrastructure of control and extraction. In addition to extracting taxes and agricultural surplus from the rural population, the PAs were also tasked with maintaining law and order in their designated areas, and facilitating political mobilization through ideological indoctrination (Keller 1988: 232; Rahmato 1993: 39). The PA’s extractive role was critical in raising food and money for the war effort. The PAs assisted the government collect taxes on agricultural produce as well as land-use fees at a rate of 10 Birr, all of which was directly transferred to representatives of the state. The revenues raised from taxes on agriculture was low in absolute terms, though not entirely unexpected since the vast majority of peasants engaged in subsistent farming. But taxes from agriculture constituted between 15 and 20 percent of total tax revenues, which was considerably higher than previous governments had managed to collect (Crummey 2000: 248). This increased extraction reflected the enhanced capacity and reach of the state (Clapham 1988: 128).

In addition to mobilizing financial and material resources, the PAs had an additional task to accomplish: the recruitment of men into the regular army or into one of the irregular forces that spread throughout the country under the rubric of ‘people’s militia’ organizations. For the purpose of recruitment, each PA was given numerical targets it was expected to meet. In addition, the PAs were also put in charge of collecting food and arranging temporary housing for new recruits into the people’s militia (Shifaw 2012:83).
Each PA was also tasked with getting members to help those who were serving by performing a number of tasks, including ploughing land for the duration of their deployment.

There was a regional variation in the mobilization of war-making resources. The process of recruiting men into the armed forces and material resources was much more effective in the south than in the northern highlands (Marcus 1994: 198). The resistance to the regime in the northern highlands was not surprising, given the low-intensity separatist conflict in Eritrea that predated the revolution by about 15 years. The mobilization of large numbers of men depended, at least partially, on considerations of broader material interests. Tens of thousands of peasants were recruited principally from southern and western Ethiopia, where the population had historically been alienated from the Ethiopian state and where the 1975 landmark “land reform had its greatest impact in binding the peasantry to the new regime” (Clapham 1988: 61-2). As a result, people in these parts of the country was receptive to the government’s call for arms.

The centrality of the PAs to the mobilization process raises questions about whether they were a mere conduit for the transfer of resources from society to the state or whether they enjoyed a degree of autonomy. The extent of institutional autonomy is a critical factor in understanding the balance between the infrastructural element of state power and its despotic power (Mann 1993). Formally, the PAs were designed to serve as semi-autonomous mechanisms of self-administration for the peasantry. They were given plenty of leeway to undertake equitable distribution of land within their particular jurisdictions, though “tempered by a host of political and social considerations” (Crummey 2000: 247).
As a result, although land ownership patterns exhibited inequality, the range of inequality saw a marked decline.

The extent of their autonomy was, of course, circumscribed by the overall social-structural context within which they were embedded. Given the long-standing culture of centralization, the devolution of power was a new area of experimentation. Despite the lack of complete autonomy, the PAs still managed to resist efforts by the authorities to exercise tight control over their operations through the various political organs of the state. For example, some of this resistance was reflected in the peasantry’s pushback against the government’s uneasy relationship with organized religion. Although the post-1974 government had the good sense to avoid open hostility towards the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, given the exalted position of the Church in society, it was not as receptive to it as its predecessors. In some areas, the PAs, “in open defiance of the party officials who sought to control them and the clerical elites who for so long had ignored them, eagerly set aside land to build parish churches and to attract clergy to them” (Crummey 2000: 246). In effect, the decision to vest power over the distribution and management of land in rural areas in the hands of the PAs left the power of the Church intact, even as the government sought to rein in the church’s considerable social influence.

While the PAs were instrumental in mobilizing war-making resources in rural areas, a similar role in the towns and cities was reserved to the smallest unit of local administration: the Kebele. The Kebele as a structure of governance was officially inaugurated in the post-1974 period as an ad hoc mechanism for organizing and mobilizing urban dwellers. But it had antecedents in local mutual insurance arrangements that were common throughout the country in prior decades. Initially, these local administrative units
were given broad political, economic and judicial powers. For ordinary people, the Kebeles personified the state in their everyday life. Like the PAs, Kebeles operated with some degree of autonomy in fulfilling their functions. Kebeles comprised several community committees, each charged with different tasks, such as water management and maintenance. Initially, Kebeles were given broad powers but, as noted later in the chapter, the central authorities stripped the Kebeles’ of some of their security-related functions, as they consolidated state authority after the war.

The Kebeles had essentially identical functions as the PAs: to facilitate state penetration of society. Just as the PAs did in the countryside, the Kebeles served as decentralized structures of local governance in urban areas, enabling the government to develop its links to societal forces in large swaths of the nation. A typical Kebele was much larger than a typical PA, with an average population of 5000. Linked in the Urban Dwellers Associations, the Kebeles stretched “in succeeding layers that parallel the central bureaucracy, down to the neighborhood level” (Keller 1988: 233). A notable institutional feature of the Kebeles is that they were not budgetary units in the sense that they were statutorily allowed to impose taxes, “though they were also expected to establish judicial tribunals, and help provide health, education and similar services under government provision” (Clapham 1988: 132). But since they were in charge of urban housing, the collection of housing rents allowed them to fulfill some of these functions.

When the war broke out, the Kebeles in close collaboration with the trade unions were given the task of raising funds and material (Shifaw 2012: 83). The Kebels, like the PAs in the countryside, recruited men into the regular army as well into the people’s
militias. Furthermore, the Kebeles also provided temporary housing and food to recruits from the countryside on their way to training centers in different parts of the country.

While the government was able to mobilize extensive material and human resources for the war effort by tapping into a reservoir of patriotism, the mobilization process was not free from coercion. Although the regime avoided reliance on explicit coercion that included the application of brute force, the mobilization process entailed some degree of implicit coercion. In some cases, once voluntary contributions were exhausted, the regime imposed mandatory contributions, often totaling a one-month’s salary to be paid out in a year (Shifaw 2012: 83). Furthermore, while the PAs and the Kebels greatly expanded the geographical reach of the state, the expanded extraction of resources from society they made possible had a disproportionate impact on peasants, given the meager income they derived from rain-fed agriculture (Rahmato 1993: 43). The PAs were also subject to intense pressures to meet quota requirements with regard to financial contributions to the war effort. While often couched in languages that implied consent, some of the directives regarding contributions were implicitly coercive insofar as they provided little room for refusal to comply. But when the Somali stood threateningly around the strategically vital cities of Harar and Dire Dawa in the east, the resulting panic led to the adoption of a coercive recruitment strategy. As two of the largest urban centers in the east of the country, Somali control of the two cities would have had a devastating impact on the evolution of the conflict, mostly likely enabling the Somalis to achieve their strategic goals. To forestall that eventuality, the regime was willing to resort to mandatory national service.

While the regime was preoccupied with raising war-making resources, it was also aware of the fact that the cultivation of affective ties to societal forces without providing
certain public goods in return would only take it so far. As a result, it made some efforts to fulfill its social welfare functions. In the aftermath of the collapse of the previous regime, there was bottom-up demands for basic educational services (Keller 1988: 221). In prior decades, formal education was reserved to a narrow elite, as it was a widely considered a privilege rather than a right. As a result, less than 20 percent of school-age children were in school (Keller 1988: 221). However, due to intense power struggles among contending elites jockeying for national power, the regime lacked the ability to effectively respond to these demands. In early 1977, a literacy program was drafted. In 1977, the government selected a team of 121 educators from across the nation to devise a national literacy program to be organized around functional literacy programs. Although ideological factors were implicated in the drafting of a literacy campaign, the fact that it went into full force in 1977 is not a coincidence. As the regime sought to burnish its nationalist credentials, it had to do more than ask the people to make contributions to the war effort. In the first year alone, the program led to the successful completion of literacy class by 120,000 adults (Keller 1988: 220). The campaign that began during this period continued over the next decade, resulting in the doubling of the number of elementary and secondary schools and increasing the number teachers working across the country.

*The External Dimension*

The Ogaden conflict took place against a backdrop of the East-West ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Both superpowers played a significant role in the militarization of the Horn of Africa in the postwar period (Agyeman-Duah 1994; Lefebvre 1991; Patman 1990; Schraeder 1994: chapter 4; Spencer 1977). During the reign of Haile
Selassie, the U.S. was Ethiopia’s major patron (Keller 1985, 1987: 82; Patnam 1990: 36-7). Understandably enough in the international context of the Ogaden war, the level of Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia has attracted significant attention (Henze 1991; Jackson 2007; Marcus 1983). For a brief period, the Soviets had made some efforts to bind Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen into an alliance but national sentiments proved stronger than “commitment to the cause of international proletariat solidarity” (Crummey 2000: 251). Ultimately, Somalia expelled the Soviets at the beginning of the conflict on the grounds that they had failed to give them an unconditional support by condemning Ethiopia. Following its expulsion from Somalia, in true Cold War style, the Soviet Union took Ethiopia under its wing. The Ethiopian government undoubtedly benefited from Soviet aid but the acquisition of modern weapons would not have made a difference without the capacity for indigenous organization and mobilization discussed above (Clapham 1988: 221; Marcus 1994: 198-99). Furthermore, because the Soviet-Ethiopia relationship intensified only after the war was underway, it did not have material impact on the regime’s strategy of domestic mobilization.

POSTWAR CONSOLIDATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATE POWER

The WSLF and the Somali army had the element of surprise on their side, which contributed to the speed with they were able to overrun weakly fortified defensive positions and take control of the contested territories. As noted before, the rebels and the Somali government had gambled that the new regime would quickly collapse. But it became obvious that, once the initial burst of rebel and Somali army success on the battlefield stalled, the Somali military lacked the wherewithal to win a war of attrition (Tarke 2009:
184). The Somali military simply did not have the logistical capacity to replenish its suppliers and rearm its troops deep into Ethiopian territory, which left them exposed to a fierce aerial and ground counterattacks. Furthermore, given the demographic imbalance between the two countries—4 million versus 40 million—a war of attribution was not a viable option for Somalia (Marcus 1994: 199). After a fierce counteroffensive in the spring of 1978 directed by the Supreme Military Strategic Committee (SMSC)—with the aid of Soviet and Cuban advisors—the guerrillas and the Somali army were decisively defeated. In March 1978, the Somali regime sued for peace and Ethiopia declared victory.

Decisive victory over the guerrillas and the Somali army was consequential in more ways than the removal of an invading force from a sovereign territory. The outcome of the conflict had far-reaching implications for the institutional evolution of the Ethiopian state and its relations with the population. The withdrawal of the Somalis from the country and subsequent mop up operations to expel the rebels removed an immediate threat to the physical and political survival of the regime. This, in turn, created enabling conditions for the consolidation and institutionalization of power.

**Consolidation of Power**

Before turning to issues of institutionalization following the end of the Ogaden war, some discussion of how wartime mobilization contributed to regime consolidation is in order so as to clearly identify the causal effects of the conflict. The analysis must contend with the potential counterargument that wartime mobilization and victory did not fundamentally change subsequent development. By examining the political conditions
prevailing at the time the war broke out, we can construct a reasonable scenario of how mobilization and military victory helped the regime consolidate its power.

Skocpol (1994: 251) writes: “In the classic social revolutions, liberals and socialists—people who wanted to limit or to decentralize state power—invariably lost out to political leadership able and willing to mobilize and channel mass support for the creation of centrally controlled agencies of coercion and administration” (Skocpol 1994: 251). In Ethiopia’s case, the onset of separatist war in the Ogaden created such an opportunity for post-revolutionary elites in charge of the government. The processes of wartime mobilization and the government’s victory over the WSLF and the Somali army greatly contributed to the resolution of the internal power struggles in favor of the military-dominated government. Social revolutions are often led by ideologically cohesive elites, intent on radically restructuring state and society (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979). In the Ethiopian case, the diverse societal forces that caused the downfall of the Haile Selassie regime lacked a unifying vision but for their common aversion to the regime and interest in its demise. When the task of overthrowing the old order was accomplished with an alarming speed, it became obvious that these heterogeneous actors did not share common organizing principles around which a new order could be constructed. As a result, the subsequent phase was extremely tense and violent, as these groups struggled to take ownership of the movement. The period immediately after the revolution, the main urban centers experienced the outbreak of violence, as the military and the civilian parties aspiring to take over the state fought for supremacy. While there were a number of group contending for state power, the two largest civilian parties that competed with the armed forces were the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia
Socialist Movement (known by its Amharic acronym, MEISON). When it became clear that the military was not willing to relinquish power to them, a period of violent confrontation ensued, characterized by intense ‘revolutionary reigns of terror’ (Clapham 1988: 56-7; Keller 1988: 196). During this period, several thousand people were executed, mostly through tit-for-tat assassinations and summary justice (Clapham 1988: 55-6; O’Kane 2000: 976).

In light of the considerable difficulties the government faced in consolidating its power in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, some scholars have noted that the war over the Ogaden was a blessing in disguise for the Ethiopian government (Markakis 1987: 231). Despite the grave threats the rebellion along with the subsequent Somali invasion posed to the regime, the outbreak of conflict was indispensable in concentrating the minds of the elite on the immediate danger, thereby forcing them to put aside their internal power struggles. By the time the war ended in victory, the four-year period of urban upheaval in the aftermath of the revolution had ended, with the major towns under the unchallenged control of the government. The victory over the insurgents and their Somali supporters also increased the urgency of extending central authority throughout the country. The Ethiopian military, which was in complete disarray at the time the war, was rebuilt and expanded. The patriotic fervor was “such that the factionalism that had undermined the military in the early stages of the revolution quickly disappeared once the invasion threatened both territorial integrity and sovereignty” (Tareke 2009: 213). In the face of the government’s triumphant declaration of victory, both the EPRP and MEISON were no longer a threat to the regime, leaving it to revel in its newfound legitimacy to consolidate its power (Crummey 2000: 251). The parties’ propensity for dogma and ideological abstraction did
not help their cause, giving the government an opportunity to burnish its nationalist credentials at their expense. For example, even as the Somali army was threatening to take control of the largest cities in the east, MEISON demanded the dismantling of the inherited civilian bureaucracy (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 134-5). This kind of tendency made them ripe targets for the regime’s efforts to delegitimize them.

Once the essential task of consolidation was completed, the regime turned to institutionalizing its authority. The legitimacy that came with its success on the battlefield was critical to this post-conflict phase of institutionalization. Since the bureaucracy is the most important instrument of rule available to the wielders of political power, institutionalizing the state often means bureaucratizing it (Clapham 1988: 8). The bureaucratic paraphernalia of the state is essential to the expansion of its authoritative reach. It is through bureaucracies that states try to provide the material and logistical support necessary for the realization of political and ideological goals they seek to achieve. Bureaucracies also allow the state to regulate, control and extract resources from society, while commanding a degree of legitimacy. The extraction of resources, in turn, leads to further state development. In short, the gradual development of autonomous bureaucracies is a basic ingredient in the development of state infrastructural power or its penetrative capacity (Centeno and Ferraro 2013: 15).

**Institutionalization**

Although the central and provincial bureaucracies underwent substantial reorganizations, the Kebeles and the PAs remained firmly in place as structures of
decentralized governance. In effect, they served as a foundation for state-building. As noted before, these decentralized governance structures emerged as ad hoc mechanisms to facilitate state penetration of society within a prior context of institutional vacuum at the center. But because of their effectiveness in mobilizing men and materials for the war effort and their success in incorporating large number of people in their respective jurisdictions, the government had few reasons to do away with them. In fact, the number of PAs rose to over twenty thousand, encompassing millions of households throughout the country (Keller 1988: 232).

Both institutions continue to serve as the principal structures through which the state reaches most households in the country to this day. They have survived major regional reorganizations in the mid-1990s, following the adoption of a form of ethnic federalism. From the perspective of managers of the state, these institutions had several advantages as mechanisms for extending state authority across the broad expanses of national territory. Consequently, eliminating them or replacing them would have been a poor investment strategy, for doing so would have resulted in a near-certain loss of institutional memory. First, both institutions comprised a fixed number of households within predefined communities. But because they were vertically linked to the central bureaucracy, they enabled the central authorities to penetrate society effectively. Thus, the central authorities could still exercise control over society, even as they delegated substantial powers to these structures. Second, since the majority of the country’s population lived in rural areas, it made sense to retain the PAs not only as vehicles for reaching the peasantry but also as structures for regulating economic activities. Finally, since the PAs were restricted to local levels and were organized on the basis of numerically limited households, they were
effectively cut off from national politics. For this reason, they were unlikely to develop into a vehicle for articulating rural interests at the national level in ways that could facilitate a violent collective action (Abate and Wubneh 1988: 119). In the end, the decision was made to retain these institutions and they have remained in place to this day.

However, while the basic functions of the PAs remained unchanged, the government stripped the Kebeles of their security functions. During the period of “revolutionary reign of terror,” control of the Kebeles was the axis of conflict between the EPRP and MEISON. Even though both parties were of Marxist persuasion, they had divergent visions vis-à-vis how to achieve the desired change. When the regime discovered that the EPRP had infiltrated urban associations to undermine its authority, it hit back hard with the help of the Kebeles. Even though the Kebele administrations continued to engage in neighborhood watches in the ensuing years, their security responsibilities were taken away and their autonomy reduced, as they came under stricter oversight by the central authorities (Keller 1988: 233-34).

The broader strategy of state-building following the Ogaden conflict entailed administrative and bureaucratic reorganization, which was reflected in the expansion of the size, power, and scope of the preexisting central bureaucracy. Since the new government had ideas about a new political order, a seemingly logical step would have been to dismantle the bureaucracy inherited from the previous regime and replace it with one of its own creation (Keller 1988: 230). This did not happen for at least two reasons. The first consideration was pragmatic: dismantling the inherited bureaucracy would have left the regime “without sufficient numbers of educated and skilled administrative personnel to conduct even the normal affairs of government” (Keller 1988: 230). The second reason had
to do with the fact that the new leaders were drawn from the state bureaucracy (the armed forces) and, as such, shared “much of its elitist attitude and centralized organization” (Clapham 1988: 8). In fact, the military’s rupture with one of its early civilian allies—MEISON—was driven by disagreements about whether or not bureaucratic reforms should be radical or incremental. MEISON was committed to the total liquidation of the inherited bureaucracy and its replacement with a brand new structure. It insisted on the removal of the economic, social and political vestiges of the Haile Selassie era. However, the military-dominated government was unenthusiastic about the prospects of dismantling the state, for the armed forces shared Haile Selassie’s fundamental goal of creating a centralized and bureaucratized state (Clapham 1988). They overthrew him because the aging monarch was no longer an asset for the realization of that vision and because they thought they could do it more dynamically than he did. In short, the military-dominated government did not see the established machinery of the state as representing all that it stood against; it simply sought to use the state to restructure society and politics on its own terms.

Still, while bureaucrats from the previous regime were allowed to remain at their post, army officers were assigned to the various ministries to monitor their activities (Keller 1988: 231). In line with its socialist ideology, the regime also required senior civil servants to go through a period of ideological reeducation, which proceeded with intensity after the establishment of the Yekatit 66 Ideological School. In spite of the basic institutional continuity with the previous order, there were also consequential changes. One such fundamental change had to do with the nature of recruitment into the bureaucracy: ethnic particularism or heredity played a smaller role than before. This is not to say that a completely meritocratic system was in place, since political loyalty was a significant
criterion for acceptance into the bureaucracy (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 151-52). Ultimately, efforts to place the Ethiopian state on a sturdy bureaucratic foundation were circumscribed by the fragility and underdeveloped nature of its economic basis: agriculture. The country was too poor for a rationalized and highly bureaucratized state to develop but incremental additions were made to the central bureaucracy.

If the changes to the central bureaucracy were incremental, a much greater degree of transformation took place at the local and regional levels. As discussed early in the chapter, the post-WII II structural reforms laid the foundation for the expansion of the central bureaucracy. Between 1960 and 1973, the civil service grew from 35,000 to 100,000, but a third of this was based in Addis Ababa (Halliday and Molyneux 1981: 70). The importance attached to Addis Ababa is not surprising, since the social groups that had regime-threatening potential were based in the capital, as evidenced by the fact that the seeds of Haile Selassie’s downfall were planted in the capital. Consequently, local and provincial administration had been the least modernized aspect of the country’s bureaucracy. For the most part, local and provincial administrations depended on land-owning nobility in the northern highlands, and central appointees and settlers in the east and south (Clapham 1988: 105; Makki 2011: 272). These local intermediaries enjoyed considerable autonomy from the central state, even as they were formally expected to serve as representatives of the state. This “mediated” state37 was sustained by an institution of land tenure—known as gult—that limited the productive autonomy of peasants (Crummey 2000). In this institutional arrangement, producers supported privileged land-owners and

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37 Historically, mediated statehood “resulted from the incapacity of premodern states to overcome a basic structural dilemma inherent in the logistics of political power: pre-modern political units were created by concentrating military forces, but rule over conquered peoples required the dispersal of political power” (Waldner 1999: 21).
rulers. The state’s role was “one of legitimating the system and of regulating the competing claims of tribute receivers and, much more occasionally, the competing claims of tribute payers and tribute receivers” (Crummey 2000: 12).

This arrangement was appealing to the center, given its limited geographical reach. But it also limited the autonomy of the state, defined as the ability to “formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society” (Skocpol 1985: 9). A state with a degree of autonomy pursues its goals independent of, and even contrary to, the interests of powerful groups. The nature of this limited autonomy in the Ethiopian context is different from other instances in the sense that the state did not lack autonomy because it was captured by powerful social groups. Instead, the state’s limited autonomy stemmed from its administrative and political constraints, which forced it to delegate governance responsibilities to local intermediaries. Given the problems of information asymmetry and monitoring inherent in such principal-agent relationships, it is not surprising that the local intermediaries enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the center. In order to bring about fundamental changes in state-society relations, it was, thus, necessary to establish impersonal institutions to supplant local notables linking the state to societal forces.

While the land reform proclamation of 1975 put an end to the social and economic bases of the mediated state, the task of replacing the now defunct provincial administrative apparatuses was put on hold until after the regime consolidated its power, which experienced further setback when the Ogaden conflict started. In short, the process of institution-building was put on hold until after the conflict ended. In subsequent years, the provinces were divided into 102 sub-regions (Awraja) and 566 districts (Wereda). These
reforms fundamentally altered state-society relations, for the state became more firmly implicated in the lives of large numbers of people with whom it had not had meaningful interactions before. Markakis (2011: 81) captures these transformations in this way: “The rebuilt state had a vastly wider, longer, deeper and firmer reach than its predecessor. For the first time in the country’s history, it could be said that most of the subjects became aware of its presence and felt its impact” (Markakis: 2011: 81). This increased institutional reach was reflected in the extent of resource extraction from society.

As the ability of the state to enforce its writ across the broad expanses of national territory increases, its ability to mobilize national resources also increases. The extent of state-building can, thus, be captured by the level of resources extracted from society over time. As Margaret Levi writes, “Revenue enhances the ability of rulers to elaborate the institutions of the state, to bring more people within the domain of those institutions, and to increase the number and variety of the collective goods provided through the state” (Levi 1988: 2). Similarly, North (1981: 21) defines the state “as an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents.” Extraction-based relationships can, therefore, provide a useful framework for understanding the authoritative reach of the state. Furthermore, since the extraction of resources implies the existence of opposing interests between state and society, the manner in which the state extracts taxes can shed light on how such divergent interests are reconciled (Gallo 1997: 624; Slater and Fenner 2011: 21). Where capacity is limited, the state has few options to mobilize revenue. Thus, the extent of taxation is a good indicator of the state’s penetrative capacity or state infrastructural capacity (Mann 1993). As such, tax collection requires what Levi (1988) calls ‘quasi-
voluntary compliance’ in that it depends on a certain degree of legitimacy, not just coercion. Over time, the capacity of the state and the extent of resource extraction move in a mutually reinforcing manner.

Table 4.1. Ethiopia: The Composition of Government Revenue (average % GDP), 1950-1989

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<tr>
<td>Total Revenue (% GDP)</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>20.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenue (GDP)</td>
<td>7.81</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>15.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Tax Revenue</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>5.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes on International trade (% Revenue)</td>
<td>41.36</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>41.45</td>
<td>27.28</td>
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Source: Yirko (1994)

Figure 4.1. Ethiopia: The Composition of Government Revenue (% GDP), 1961-89

Source: Yirko 1994 (appendix table 2).

Table 4.1 presents summary figures for the structure of central government revenue. The state’s expanded capacity is evident in the enhanced extraction of resources, measured by the proportion of taxes as a percentage of GDP. For the purpose of comparison over
time, I have presented the structure of total central government revenues. The first three columns present revenue figures averaged over a decade starting in 1961. The last two columns capture the structure of government revenues in the pre – and post-Haile Selassie era. Looking at trends in revenue growth over time reveals a marked increase in the extractive capacity of the state. Total central government revenue (taxes and non-tax revenue) rose from 8.71 (% GDP) in the 1960-69 period to 12.54 in the 1970-79 period, a period that covers the immediate prerevolutionary era and the Ogaden conflict. This figure increased to 23.56 percent over the 1980-1989 period. Looking at only the tax component of total revenue reveals that the proportion of taxes (% GDP) rose from 7.81 in the 1960-69 period to 12.54 in the 1970-79 period. But this figure jumped to 17.14 in the 1980-89 period. Figure 4.1 captures these temporal trends in central government revenue.

Since the aggregate figures may include taxes that do not require sophisticated administrative infrastructures, it is important to make sure that the increase in overall tax collection does not reflect the centrality of such indirect taxes. Interestingly, the proportion of taxes on international trade (% revenue) showed a dramatic decline over time. Historically, taxes on international trade constituted a significant portion of central government revenue, though Ethiopia is not unique in this respect. International trade is a reliable tax handle for low-income countries constrained by a narrow fiscal base, as the collection of such taxes does not require a sophisticated fiscal infrastructure; all that it requires is minimal state capacity to control strategic checkpoints through which goods and services are traded internationally. Consequently, taxes on trade avoid the politically sensitive and costly investments in the development of reciprocal relations with society required by the administration of individual and corporate income taxes. But as extractive
capacity increases, the significance of trade taxes declines, since states begin to extract taxes from a broad-section of society.

In the periods under consideration, the growth of total central government revenue was driven by increased collection of direct taxes. Evidence for this claim comes from trends in the country’s volume of international trade and associated taxes. From 1960 to 1969, the revenue share of taxes on trade stood at 41.36 percent. This figure declined from 34.9 percent in the 1970-79 period to 22.09 percent in the 1980-89 period. In short, the tax share of revenue is on the rise, while the revenue share of taxes on trade is on the decline, implying that the increase in total government revenues is attributable to improved extractive capacity during this period.

There are two possible explanations for the decline of taxes on international trade. First, if trade saw a precipitous decline, then it stands to reason that the proportion of revenue collected would also decline. Historically, Ethiopia’s trading partners were mainly European nations. Could the adoption of a socialist ideology and the country’s alignment with the Soviet Bloc have affected the volume of international trade? Data on international trade from the Penn World tables (Heston, Summer and Aten 2011) do not support this hypothesis. In the 1960-69 period, international trade (imports+exports/GDP) stood at 18.5 percent. In the 1970-79 and 80-89 periods, the numbers were 20 percent and 22.7 percent respectively. The second possible explanation is trade liberalization, which requires further investigation but whether or not that in fact is the case is not directly relevant to the claim being advanced here. But the essential point is that increased taxes on trade do not explain the overall increase in taxes as a percentage of GDP, leaving us with the conclusion that the capacity of the state to extract resources increased over the period under consideration.
To sum up, the war-induced mobilization process and associated state-building along with the victory over the rebels created permissive conditions for the consolidation and institutionalization of state power in the aftermath of the conflict. These state-building outcomes were reflected in expansion of the central and provincial bureaucracies, with the PAs and Kebeles being retained as the smallest structures of local governance.

CONCLUSION

The Ethiopian revolution of September 1974 unleashed nationalist forces that had hitherto been alienated from the Ethiopian state. As a result, the immediate post-1974 period was characterized by violent instability, as rival groups jockeyed for control of the state. Of the many problems that emerged during this period, the most serious one came from Ogaden separatist rebels in the east. In this chapter, I have shown that the rebels, due to their virtually complete dependence on an outside power—Somalia—lacked political and organizational autonomy to conduct the war. They also failed to cultivate adequate local support and legitimacy. The conflict also triggered an interstate war, following Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia in mid-1977. The relative ease with which the guerrillas and later the Somali army controlled the Ogaden and other areas caught the Ethiopian government by surprise. After this initial setback, the government initiated an all-out mobilization that entailed recruiting tens of thousands of people into the armed forces as well as extracting other resources from the population. The government’s political and nationalist mobilization was facilitated by two structures of local administration that had just been created after the revolution: the Peasant Associations and Kebele.
I find that the government’s mobilization of war-making resources along with the military victory contributed to the expansion of state capacity in the postwar period. The outbreak of the civil war and the subsequent Somali invasion had galvanizing effects on popular attitudes towards the new regime, leading significant segments of the population to rally around it. In the short term, the process of mobilization effectively ended the internal power struggles that had been underway since 1974. In the long term, victory over the rebels allowed the regime to undertake consolidation and institutionalization, greatly expanding the reach and scope of the central state in a way that had not been possible before.

One relevant consideration in the discussion of state-building in Ethiopia is the country’s long existence as an independent nation. While the age of a state is not determinative, it is a good indicator of the overall stock of a state’s accumulated capacity. All things being equal, older states are more likely to have greater levels of cumulative capacity than those with a comparatively short history of stateness. This insight is especially relevant with respect to state building in Ethiopia, since it has long-established social and political structures that present claims for an exceptional treatment.

Within Africa, Ethiopia has a distinct political history. Unlike virtually all other African states, the Ethiopian state did not emerge as an artificial colonial construct bequeathed to the independent country by a departing colonial power. Indigenous state builders were able to expand and consolidate the state by tapping into existing socioeconomic and political structures, even as they relied on foreign technology to accomplish these tasks. Moreover, the various international links and alliances the country’s leaders established were “supportive but not constitutive” (Halliday and
Molyneux 1981: 147). Its long independent existence has also been a source of military and political power in the Horn of Africa, where complex processes of social and ethnic conflicts have often raised fundamental questions about the integrity of polities.

A number of implications follow from these considerations. First, each successive episode of state-building throughout history cannot be seen in isolation from previous outcomes. Successive state-builders throughout Ethiopia’s history have been able to draw on an existing capacity for military organization and resource extraction and a sense of national identity. As these leaders responded to the pressures of modernization by borrowing organizational techniques from the outside world, they benefited from the interaction of these techniques with specifically Ethiopian legacies. The previous edifice of the state serves as a brick for further institutional development. This basic institutional continuity has been instrumental in the reconstitution of state authority after major crises, such as following the Italian occupation.

Regimes often tamper with the institutional trappings of states they inherit but only at the margins (Slater and Fenner 2011). In Ethiopia, no leader had to “cope with the problem of creating either the state itself or the attitudes to authority which sustained it” (Clapham 1989:7). Even powerfully transformative political events—including the great social revolutions in history—have never begun on a blank slate. The bricks of the old edifice are often used to undertake a new construction, as when the revolutionary government relied on the central bureaucracy inherited from the previous regime as a foundation for its campaign of further state centralization and institutionalization (Keller 1988: 230-1).
But the Ethiopian state, despite its long independence existence, was stuck in feudal and pre-feudal political structures for much of its history. Consequently, the pre-WWII Ethiopian state was small and decentralized. As noted before, a standing army and a system of modern taxation were all put in place only after WW II. Seeing this modern phase in the development of the state as falling within the broad trajectory of political development in the developing world makes the Ethiopian case less anomalous than generally assumed. Finally, as the discussion of the creation of new institutions showed, the recent history of political development in Ethiopia has been characterized by change and continuity.
CHAPTER 5

WAR, NATURAL RESOURCE RENTS AND STATE-BUILDING IN ANGOLA

On February 22, 2002, Angolan government forces killed Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), thereby bringing one of Africa’s longest-running and deadliest civil wars (1975-2002) to a conclusive end. Since the end of the civil war, Angola has enjoyed the longest period of peace and stability in over forty years. The disintegration of UNITA as a military organization gave the government access to national territory previously beyond its reach. UNITA’s leaders transformed the remnant of their organization into a political party to take part in participatory politics, though in the context of a system dominated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

In spite of some significant changes and opportunities a new beginning, postwar Angola has not escaped its wartime past, as evidenced by a remarkable degree of institutional continuity. The empirical focus in this chapter is on postwar state building. I look at how the initial resource endowments of both the MPLA and UNITA shaped their collective organizational incentives; the kinds of relationships they established with the population in areas they dominated; the nature of organizational structures they created to facilitate the processes of capital accumulation; and how these wartime developments shaped the broad contours of postwar state building.

The previous two chapters provided both qualitative and quantitative evidence in support of the theoretical claims. The statistical analysis established correlations between civil war outcomes, natural resource endowments and postwar state capacity, finding that
military victory contributes to the postwar growth of state capacity but these effects attenuate with rising natural resource rents. In Chapter 4, I turned to the Ethiopian case to test theory’s causal claims, finding that the effects of military victory on state capacity are at their highest when combatants have little or no access to natural resource rents and, thus, are forced to raise revenues via taxation.

In order to cover the entire range of variation in the dependent variable, I turn to the Angolan civil war. For the purpose of this study, the Angolan case falls on the regression line vis-à-vis the hypothesized causal relationships. Angola is an on-the-regression-line case: the conflict ended through a military victory; natural resource rents figured prominently in the conflict; and the postwar period has seen limited state building. The case analysis identifies the sequence of developments linking the independent and dependent variables. The findings provide a robust qualitative evidences that supports the core theoretical claims.

Looking back at the raging Angolan civil war in the 1990s, it is not hard to see the prima facie connection between the conflict and the country’s natural resource wealth. However, the onset of the civil war predated the entry of oil into the political economy. Furthermore, unlike the MPLA, which relied on oil rents to finance the war, UNITA experienced shifts in its resource endowments during the course of the civil war. During much of the Cold War, it pursued a classic guerrilla strategy, raising resources from the population as well as providing some public goods in return, even as it capitalized on superpower competition to solicit aid from the United States and apartheid South Africa. The insurgent group established structures for governing civilians, culminating in the
formation of a ‘Republic’ at Jamba in southeastern Angola. This ‘state within a state’ was essential in legitimizing UNITA’s political authority.

In response to a rapidly changing regional and global landscape that culminated in the end of the Cold War, UNITA began to develop the tools that would enable it to exploit the country’s diamond wealth. When the civil war resumed after a short-lived peace accord at the end of 1992, UNITA took control of some of the most important diamond fields in the country. Over the next few years, UNITA achieved a degree of financial autonomy that made resource mobilization via taxation unnecessary. During this period, the consensual relationships it had established with the population began to unravel, as the insurgent movement prioritized its military needs over responsibility for civilians. As UNITA’s structures of social organization eroded, the provision of services ceased to be the principal pillar of its quest for political legitimacy.

By contrast, the MPLA-led government relied on the exploitation of the country’s oil wealth throughout the civil war. By creating substantial resource flows into the coffers of the government, oil revenues made taxation and, by extension, extractive bureaucracy unnecessary. Due to the absence of extractive tasks, the MPLA had few incentives to extend the effective writ of the state, resulting in weak state-society linkages. To insulate itself from potentially regime destabilizing societal protests, the regime relied on the targeted redistribution of oil spoils and a system of elite accommodation.

The government’s victory in the civil war eliminated the system of parallel sovereignty that had long circumscribed the scope of state authority, creating permissive conditions for broad-based state building efforts. However, the persistence of the wartime political economy has resulted in the reproduction of wartime institutional arrangements.
Since revenue mobilization for the allocative and distributive functions of the state continues to revolve around the collection and redistribution of resource rents, the state has few incentives to broadcast its authority across the broad expanses of national territory. The postwar consolidation of state power is principally geared towards freeing the MPLA from the constraints of social organizations and political institutions. In Goran Hyden’s (1983: 7) vivid description of state-society relations in Africa, the Angolan state “sits suspended in mid-air above society.”

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first part deals with the first phase of the civil war (1975-1991). It provides a brief historical background to the civil war; the manner in which UNITA and the MPLA mobilized the means of war and how mobilization shaped the nature of wartime state building. The second part of the chapter deals with the post-1992 phase of the civil war. In this part, I discuss the effects of dependence on oil and diamonds rents by the MPLA and UNITA respectively on wartime state building. The last part of the chapter discusses postwar state building.

CIVIL WAR, RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND WARTIME STATE-BUILDING

Angola’s post-independence civil war, which raged almost continuously for 26 years, had its origins in the country’s fractious anticolonial nationalism. While Portugal colonized Angola towards the end of the fifteenth century, its attempts to consolidate colonial rule unfolded over a lengthy period. At the Congress of Berlin (1884-85), Portuguese sovereignty over its African colonies was contested on account of its failure to meet the main standard of imperialism: effective occupation. To meet this standard,
Portugal undertook a campaign of pacification, erecting rigid and discriminatory racial and class categories (Bauer and Taylor 2011: 157; Guimaraes 1998: 32).

The decentralized colonial rule that was in effect until the 1920s changed with the inauguration of a right-wing authoritarian state in the metropolis, the Estavo Novo (new state). Sitting at the helm of the fascist state, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was determined to strengthen the Portuguese economy by exploiting its “Overseas Territories” (Heywood 2000: 63). In addition, the colonial bureaucracy was overhauled in ways that led to “the dismissal from the colonial service of most Angolan-born Portuguese, creoles, and assimilados and their replacement with pro-Salazar, Portuguese-born individuals” (Heywood 2000: 64). Since Portuguese settlers were the backbone of colonization, members of the educated class were kept from holding a responsible position in government, they lacked the management expertise to run a state (Ruigrok 2010: 641).

By the end of World War II, the wind of decolonization was blowing throughout Africa. By then, the colonial powers were making preparations to end colonial rule and hand over the state to indigenous elites. However, Portugal declined to participate in the drive towards decolonization. Because of the authoritarian and unrepresentative nature of the regime in Lisbon, colonial rule rested predominantly on repression, all but guaranteeing the emergence of armed liberation movements (Chabal 2008: 3). In Angola, three separate liberation movements emerged (Birmingham 1992: 46; Marcum 1969).

The MPLA began clandestine operations in and around Luanda in 1956. Led by Agosthino Neto from 1962 onwards, the MPLA was formed by educated Afro-Portuguese elite based in Luanda. But it also drew strong support from Angola’s second largest ethnic group, the Kimbundu. Given its roots in Luanda and outside connections, the MPLA had
a more modern and nationally-oriented outlook than its rivals (Chabal et al 2002: 7). The second movement was the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). Established in 1957 and led by Holden Roberto, this movement had its roots in the Bakongo people of northern Angola—the third largest ethnic group in the country (Birmingham 1992: 42). However, the FNLA never managed to acquire sufficient organizational and military capabilities to mount a serious military challenge to the colonial state (Chabal et al 2002: 7). The FNLA’s ineffectiveness prompted ‘foreign minister’ Jonas Savimbi to form a splinter group in order to “recapture the nationalist initiative” (Birmingham 1992: 43). In reality, Savimbi created UNITA in order to give “a revolutionary political voice” to the Ovimbundu—the largest ethnic group in the country, of which he was a part (Malaquias 2007: 65; Spears 2010: 181).

To maintain its colonial presence in the southern cone of Africa, Portugal invested considerable resources in the colonial war in return for a steady loss of territory. By the early 1970s, the Portuguese military had, in the words of Commodore Leonel Cardoso, “reached the limits of physical and psychological exhaustion” (quoted in George 2005: 49). The rising costs of the war led to the unraveling of the domestic consensus that had sustained colonial rule (Beck 2012: 76; James III 1991: 41; Newitt 1995: 535). On April 25, 1974, young, radical officers of the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) overthrew the Caetano government in Lisbon. Although the new regime was ready to divest itself of its various colonies in Africa, it had neither the will nor the capacity to ensure an orderly transition, resulting in a hasty departure (Minter 1994: 94).

In January 1975, the three nationalist movements signed the Alvor accords, agreeing to form a transitional government until formal independence, which was
scheduled for November 11 of the same year. However, each side made maximalist demands that foreclosed any possibility of a negotiated transition based on power sharing. Since the three movements lacked a unifying principle other than their common aversion to colonial rule, national political competition soon took on a zero-sum character. Consequently, the war for independence quickly turned into civil war for control of state power. On the eve of independence, the militarily superior MPLA took control of the central state. While the FNLA fizzled out as credible fighting force, UNITA retreated to the far corners of southeastern Angola to establish a base from which to resume the civil war.

In the next section, I provide an overview of UNITA’s efforts to lay the foundation for a protracted guerrilla war, highlighting its efforts to mobilize material and human support by establishing reciprocal relations with local populations and the evolution of its organizational structures.

UNITA: The Political Economy of Insurgency

Militarily, politically and diplomatically isolated, UNITA leaders began their “long march” to the far corners of southeastern Angola that the Portuguese dubbed the “lands at the end of the world” (Beck 2010: 146; Heywood 2000: 201). By 1979, Savimbi had transformed UNITA into a potent guerrilla army capable of mounting a serious challenge to the MPLA. In the 1980s, the insurgent group was in control of large swaths of territories, including such provinces as Cuando Cubango and Moxico (Beck 2010: 146-47). How did UNITA manage to rehabilitate its battered force and transform itself into a powerful
political and military organization? Due to its initial weakness, UNITA controlled little territory. Consequently, it was unable to tap into the country’s natural resource wealth. As a result, UNITA leaders’ plan to build a viable insurgency rested on their ability to establish political relationships with people in the countryside (Pearce 2012: 446).

UNITA’s leaders believed that their chances of seizing power lay in their ability to mobilize support from the peasantry (Bridgland 1986: 197; James III 1991: 91). As Savimbi noted, “[t]hose that have the people are never small, even faced with the giant imperialist Russian invaders. With the people you always win” (quoted in Bridgland 1986: 202). Based on a strategic approach derived from Mao’s doctrine of guerrilla warfare, UNITA came to rely on the peasantry in building a self-reliant guerrilla force (Heywood 2000: 169). UNITA had already adopted elements of Mao’s strategy during the anticolonial war (Marcum 1978: 182-83). Savimbi’s core message underscored the importance of self-reliance. According to UNITA’s foreign secretary, Tito Chingungi, Savimbi “wanted to dispel any notion that help would come from outside before the people helped themselves” (quoted in Bridgland 1986: 217).

Since the MPLA had not consolidated its power and lacked any presence in large swaths of the national territory, UNITA found a secure base in the southern and central highlands from which it could mobilize material and human support on the basis of local origins (Pearce 2012: 458). Persuading villagers to support the insurgency required either adapting UNITA’s core message to local beliefs or educating local civilians to change their preferences (Bridgland 1986: 290). UNITA found its legitimizing ideology in pre-colonial traditions and customs. Like other rural societies in Africa, the inhabitants of central and southern Angola had strong traditions of self-organization based on chieftaincy. Since local
chiefs commanded considerable authority, embracing them gave UNITA a measure of local legitimacy (Heywood 1998: 165; Potgieter 2000: 259). In contrast to the MPLA, UNITA eschewed ideological re-education. Instead, it mobilized people via party cells and village committees and village chiefs were incorporated into this emerging administrative system (Heywood 1989: 61; 2000: 213). It should be noted that UNITA’s reliance on Ovimbundu village structures was more instrumental than an indicator of its commitment to a decentralized democratic governance. Still, UNITA’s embrace of chiefs was an essential step that gave its supporters a chance to shape the insurgency (Heywood 2000: 212).

UNITA’s success in fostering linkages with people in the countryside was instrumental in the production of a cadre of loyal supporters, who mobilized support for the insurgency (Minter 1994: 218). For example, one such local leader, Antonio Vakulukutu, brought some hundred men and about 400 head of cattle to UNITA at the time when UNITA was in disarray (Bridgland 1986: 229). Local support was obviously essential for the legitimacy of the movement but the local population expected the relationship to be a two-way street. UNITA’s sensitivity to local concerns was reflected in Savimbi’s description of his typical day:

In the afternoon I hear petitioners for three hours. They bring many problems. For instance, a village leader will travel three hundreds of kilometers to say the local UNITA military commander is not respecting local property. Then I have to find what is happening, and act on it, because a struggle like ours cannot succeed unless the people are with us. (Quoted in Bridgland 1986: 285).

The peasantry’s acceptance of UNITA as legitimate was essential, among other things, for its ability to recruit soldiers. Local chiefs loyal to UNITA were responsible for the selection
of recruits. Prior to meetings between UNITA officials and the local village leaders at prearranged times during the year, the local leaders would already have chosen potential recruits for UNITA (Beck 2010:148). Even so, relations between insurgents and civilians are rarely symmetrical. Even in the absence of direct coercion, the potential threat of coercion from gun-wielding insurgents lurks in the background, shaping civilian choices. UNITA’s relationship with people under its control was no exception. At times, villagers felt an underlying sense of coercion and saw cooperation with UNITA as means of maintaining a semblance of stability (Beck 2010: 149). In the end, however, UNITA’s ability to mount a serious challenge to the authority of the MPLA rested on the fact that it was able to mobilize significant human and political support from the Ovimbundu and other Angolans in the countryside (Heywood 1989: 62; 2000: 214).

As UNITA grew in size and strength, so did its territorial reach. While this increased territorial control enhanced UNITA’s claim as a legitimate contender for state power, it also implied the assumption of responsibility for large numbers of civilians. As UNITA gradually expanded its areas of control to include large numbers of non-Ovimbundu people, the utility of Ovimbundu village structures as mechanisms for governing civilians diminished, making the creation of centralized and uniform administrative system a necessary step in UNITA’s political campaign (Heywood 1989: 61). As a result, UNITA undertook ambitious efforts at establishing more permanent, centralized structures for governing civilians. These efforts culminated in the establishment of an autonomous region, the “Republic” at Jamba. Established in 1979, Jamba served as the movement’s operational headquarters over the next decade. In 1989, close to a million people were estimated to live in Jamba, lending credence to Savimbi’s claim that UNITA
controlled a significant segment of Angolan population (Heywood 2000: 212). The establishment of a state-like entity was obviously critical to UNITA’s ability to legitimize its authority. These centralized structures were essential for the insurgent movement’s capacity to undertake a variety of governance activities that included the provision of security and various other services.

But no less significant than the instrumental assertions of power were the symbolic meanings attached to the state. As a rough approximation of a state, albeit without international recognition, the ‘Republic’ was significant as an expression of UNITA’s desire to challenge the sovereignty of the formally recognized MPLA state on an equal footing, confirming Philip Abrams’ characterization of the state as an ‘exercise in legitimation’ (Abrams 1988). The ‘Republic’ had a president, ministries, an army and sub-national bureaucracies that linked traditional village structures to the central administration of the embryonic state. UNITA’s transformation into a hierarchically organized organization with ministries, flag symbol, and bureaucracies could be viewed as a systematic attempt to meet the institutional prerequisites of a credible nationalist movement by replicating the symbolic and institutional trappings of the idealized sovereign state (Heywood 2000: 169). Specifically, the idea of the state as the “embodiment of national aspiration, as a provider, and as a defender” was central to UNITA’s quest for legitimacy (Pearce 2012: 443). As a result, UNITA exercised some of the basic prerogatives of statehood, including control of people and borders and the regulation of legitimate force (Jutted and Stuvøy 2005: 369; Spears 2010: 186). UNITA’s replication of the symbolic and institutional trappings of the state
These elaborate structures of governance were central to UNITA’s political campaign to have its authority accepted as legitimate (Heywood 1989: 60). But the insurgent group was also aware that erecting institutions of extraction and control alone would prove inadequate to legitimize its authority. Consolidating and normalizing the insurgent social order also required persuading people that the insurgency was in their best interests (Pearce 2012: 458). UNITA used its ability to fulfill certain prerogatives of statehood as a principal pillar of its quest for legitimacy (James III 1991: 110). UNITA’s claims as a provider and defender were reflected in Savimbi’s public statements. “We depend on the people. From the institutions here they deserve respect, kindness and consideration” (quoted in Bridgland 1986: 135). UNITA’s legitimacy claims were predicated on a basic bargain with the population: in exchange for security and other services, the population mobilized food, labor and fighters for the insurgency (Pearce 2012: 459). Civilians were also expected to provide intelligence on the movements of MPLA and Cuban troops (Heywood 1989: 60-61).

Echoing elements of Tilly’s model of state-building, UNITA claimed to provide security and various welfare services in exchange for political and material support. In alliance with traditional authorities, UNITA run schools and clinics. UNITA claimed to have established 22 secondary schools and 6,951 primary schools, serving a total of 224,811 students (James III 1991: 98). In addition to the obvious goal of expanding education, schools served as mechanisms for propagating UNITA’s particular narrative about the civil war (Pearce 2012: 459). Students were also sent abroad to study medicine, engineering and agriculture—skills UNITA leaders regarded as essential for their movement’s long-term drive towards self-sufficiency and institutional development. In
addition to schools, the insurgent group also claimed to have built 6 hospitals, including a 250-bed hospital in its operational headquarters at Jamba (James III 1991: 98).

This form of competitive state building was obviously essential for UNITA’s local legitimacy, as it gave substance to the insurgent movement’s claim as a creditable nationalist force. The more permanent and consolidated institutional structures at Jamba ensured that UNITA’s “efforts at political education were more fully realized there than in the village bases” (Pearce 2012: 459). By demonstrating its empirical abilities, UNITA also sought to improve its international profile. UNITA’s most controversial move was its tactical alliance with apartheid South Africa (Cornwell 2000: 62; de Beer and Gamba 2000; Heywood 2000: 197; Malaquias 2007: 93). The MPLA used this alliance to delegitimize UNITA by portraying Savimbi as an opportunist willing to sacrifice Angola’s freedom for political power (Minter 1994: 21; Pearce 2012: 456; Spears 2010: 184). Despite Savimbi’s various justifications, UNITA’s alliance with South Africa had adverse effects on its campaign to establish itself as a legitimate liberation movement worthy of international support.\(^{38}\) The extent to which UNITA paid attention to its international image was reflected in the measures it took to alleviate concerns about its nationalist credentials. For example, UNITA orchestrated visits by foreign journalists in order to showcase life in the liberated zones. For example, Lynda Schuster of the Christian Science Monitor (1988) reported that Savimbi had built a “new government replete with ministries of education, health, information, natural resources and such to rule the three million people in his

\(^{38}\) Savimbi justified the alliance in this way: “If you are a drowning man in a crocodile-infested river and you’ve just gone under for the third time, you don’t question who is pulling you to the bank until you’re safely on it” (quoted in Heywood 2000: 199). Savimbi was known for his ideological eclecticism, willing to solicit aid from anyone willing to provide it (Heywood 1998: 150; MacQueen 1998: 403; Pearce 2012: 459). The absence of a single ideology provides a counterargument to the notion that ideology, not resource scarcity, drove UNITA’s wartime state building.
country” (quoted in Heywood 1989: 60). UNITA undoubtedly had incentives to present a rosy picture of life under its rule but the basic fact of its provision of some governmental functions is not in dispute.39

In the next section, I discuss the MPLA’s wartime state-building efforts. Since the onset of the civil war overlapped with the beginning of Angola’s history as an independent nation, I begin the discussion by providing a brief overview of the MPLA’s early efforts to construct the postcolonial state. As it navigated the inhospitable sociopolitical terrain it inherited from Portugal to inaugurate the postcolonial state, the MPLA had an ideologically driven state-building agenda. But efforts to create a centralized state proved largely ineffective. While the expansion of the war in much of the country played a role in this outcome, I argue that the MPLA’s access to considerable oil rents was the single most important factor implicated in the country’s ineffective state-building dynamic, fundamentally altering the MPLA’s incentive structures in ways that had far-reaching implications for its relations with the population and approach to governance.

The MPLA, Oil Rents and the Construction of the Postcolonial State

As noted above, the MPLA assumed power in the shadow of violent challenges from rival nationalist movements. After taking over the state, the MPLA faced the difficult tasks of consolidating its power. This task entailed extending the writ of the central state

39 She also noted the length to which UNITA leaders went to burnish their image: “UNITA rebels provide a Madison Avenue-style public relations show, complete with safaris and video movies” (quoted in Heywood 1989: 62).
to areas beyond the capital city and the main urban centers. As the MPLA navigated the new postcolonial environment, it did so in the shadow of centuries of divisive and oppressive colonial rule. In the short term, the MPLA faced a crisis in the bureaucracy caused by the precipitous departure of Portuguese settlers that stripped the central state of administrative and managerial talents, creating a perilous institutional vacuum at the center that the MPLA was incapable of filling (Heywood 2000: 201; Hodges 2004: 48; Malaquias 2007: 93). In addition, due to its contested nationalist credentials, the MPLA did not enjoy a groundswell of popular support essential for translating revolutionary legitimacy into civil legitimacy. Indeed, most people was suspicious of the MPLA elite with firm roots in Luanda (Chabal et al 2002: 12).

Under these circumstances, it was critical for the party to introduce itself to the vast majority of the population. As discussed below, the MPLA had ideologically-driven state building ambitions in the immediate post-independence period. Soon, however, it became apparent that the MPLA had little or no interest in broadcasting the authority of the state throughout the national territory. UNITA’s armed challenge obviously circumscribed the scope of the state. But even after accounting for the fighting, the MPLA showed little interest in broadcasting the authority of the state to the hinterlands. The lack of interest could be traced back to the MPLA’s exclusive access to the country’s oil wealth. By shaping the manner in which the state collected and distributed revenues, oil led to a state building project that rested on a narrow social foundation. The occasional outburst of social unrest had no effect on regime stability, as oil revenue was used to “nourish the restricted political elite on which the regime [was] dependent for survival” (Chabal et al 2002: 62).
Initially, the MPLA’s contested legitimacy and narrow social base influenced the leadership’s immediate post-independence state building agenda. The MPLA, like most liberation movements, was essentially military in its origin. After coming to power, MPLA leaders soon transferred their loyalty from the military to the party in order to enhance their national appeal (Heywood 2000: 202; Malaquias 2007: 130). Central to these efforts was the MPLA’s “longstanding commitment to ideologically grounded political education and mobilization” (Marcum 1978: 278). At the party’s First Congress held in December 1977, the MPLA officially adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology (Bhagaan 1986: 166-67). The party’s campaign emphasized the notions of ‘people’s power’ and “one people, one nation” (Heywood 2000: 203). Institutionalizing popular participation required the creation of local, regional and national assemblies that would serve as mechanisms of vertical accountability and decentralized governance (Malaquias 2007: 125-26). But due to the party’s contested nationalist credentials, “its blueprint for nation-building was always suspect to a large proportion of the population” (Chabal et al 2002: 55). Since party membership and incorporation into the structure of state power rested on a rigorous program of ideological reeducation, the party effectively excluded large segments of the population, thereby impeding efforts to expand the party’s national appeal. By 1985, membership in the party stood at 34,732, of which only half could claim peasant and working class roots (Heywood 2000: 204).

Resistance to the MPLA was more pronounced in the central highlands, given the identification of the MPLA with the Kimbundu. “Building a strong government and ruling party presence in the region proved difficult, in part because the local population was suspicious of a government identified with the Kimbundu and the urban elite” (Heywood
2000: 204). As it navigated this rough terrain, the MPLA made a strategic choice to focus on retaining the central state and the narrow territorial area on which it depended. In the process, the gulf between state and society widened, since control of the main coastal cities and inland towns was considered adequate to retain control of the state (Chabal et al 2002: 101). The MPLA’s relations with the population generated intense debates within the party, culminating in the abortive coup of May 1977. Orchestrated by a one-time MPLA heavyweight and minister of interior, Nito Alves, the coup provoked a violent reaction that “marked the end of the revolutionary euphoria that drove the MPLA’s attempts to deconstruct the colonial system and create a new revolutionary state in its place” (Malaquias 2007: 127). A subsequent campaign of ‘rectification’ led to the imprisonment and execution of thousands of people (Hodges 2004: 50). Meanwhile, the civil war began to gather steam in the late 1970s, exacerbating the gulf between state and society.

But the party was under no pressure to take corrective measures after 1979, when oil became the most important sector in the economy and the largest source of government revenue (Heywood 2000: 203). Since the MPLA did not have to depend on domestic taxation to finance the war, it faced no scrutiny from citizens who pay the bills. Oil rents allowed the MPLA to build up a capital-intensive war machine. The MPLA was able to import modern weapons to the tune of 1$ billion every year. It also maintained one of the largest armies in Africa, which was estimated at two hundred thousand by the mid-1980s (Heywood 2000: 203). The offshore location of Angola’s oil reserve made it virtually invulnerable to disruption or forcible seizure by UNITA, providing the MPLA with a critical economic security blanket (Kyle 2005: 273; Le Billon 2001: 63). In addition, the capital-intensive nature of petroleum exploration and production along with the customary
requirement that oil contracts be signed with sovereign states meant that the MPLA alone was in a position to exploit the country’s oil wealth. The MPLA concentrated on retaining the central state, rather than enhancing its overall administrative capacity. In practice, this meant a tight grip on the capital city and the most productive offshore oil fields. The shift to a predominantly oil-based economy had predictable effects on, among other things, state-society relations and the development of state capacity. Since the state had access to externally derived, substantial oil revenues, extractive capacity was virtually nonexistent. By allowing the MPLA regime to undertake actions without routine, institutionalized negotiations with society, oil rents prevented the emergence of state bureaucracies with the capacity and autonomy to set and implement goals.

Oil exploration began in the 1950s, when Gulf Oil, now a subsidiary of ChevronTexaco, discovered oil offshore in Cabinda. Although production began in the 1960s, oil did not figure prominently in the economy until the late 1970s. However, the departure of Gulf Oil after independence led to the temporary suspension of production and exploration. Soon after independence, the government established the National Commission for the Restructuring of the Oil Sector (CNRIP). In line with MPLA’s Marxist outlook, the CNRIP recommended a dominant role for the state (Heller 2012: 845). In 1976, a national oil company—the Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis (Sonangol)—was established to manage the country’s oil interests. In 1978, Sonangol acquired a 51 percent stake in Cabinda, where Angola’s largest oil reserve is located (World Bank 2007: 39). After 1979, oil became the single most important sector in the economy. Oil production and rents rose without interruption over the next decade (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). During
this period, petroleum accounted for over 90 percent of exports, and over 75 percent central
government revenue (Clarke 2000: 196).

As oil became the country’s most important strategic asset, the construction of a
political order and the survival of the MPLA revolved around the collection of oil rents and
their redistribution to privileged social groups. Lacking incentives to nurture a broad-based
political legitimacy, the MPLA constructed a patronage-based political system to ensure
its political survival (Malaquias 2007: 127). The defining feature of this tiered system of
governance is the coexistence of feeble formal state institutions with powerful informal
institutions. The neopatrimonial state exercises “only limited effective sovereignty over the
national territory” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 67). Within the framework of Angola’s
patrimonial system, the presidency, Sonangol and, to some degree, the central bank
constituted the informal institutional nucleus of political power (Soares de Oliveira 2007).

Figure 5.1. Angola: Total Oil Production, 1965-1992 (Thosand Barrels Daily)

Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2013
The growing importance of these informal institutions as the locus of decision-making resulted in the progressive erosion of the party as the highest decision-making organ of the regime (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 606). Despite the party’s culture of collective decision-making on the basis of democratic centralism, the presidency emerged as the most dominant site of political power. In addition to the use of state resources to cultivate clientelist networks, a defining feature of neopatrimonial regimes is “the systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 63). In the first few years after independence, President Neto exercised a high degree of control over state matters but “did so within the MPLA structure and had to maneuver within the party to minimize the influence of rivals and officially link their policies to the vision dictated by the party’s formal ideology” (Heller 2012: 848). Upon Neto’s death in 1979, Eduardo dos Santos succeeded him as president. The systematic concentration of political power in the presidency that began under Neto increased under dos Santos. That the de facto adoption of a full-fledged presidential system intensified under dos Santos is not surprising.
As previously described, by 1979 oil had become the most important sector of the Angolan economy and the single most important source of government revenue. Access to substantial quantities of oil rents facilitated dos Santos’s dominance over the party and the state, since he was able to redistribute rents to cultivate an independent locus of power. In addition, the MPLA was gripped by a divisive debate over ideology, which the ideologues lost, further weakening the party. The concentration of power in the presidency continued unabated, further narrowing the already circumscribed institutional capacity of the central state.

In 1982, the Central Committee of the MPLA formally expanded the president’s power, empowering him to establish regional military councils as an “exceptional and temporary measure” in areas “affected by armed acts of aggression, vandalism and banditry” (Hodges 2004: 51-2). These military councils effectively supplanted the Political Bureau of the MPLA as the decision-making nucleus of the regime. As commander in chief of the armed forces, the president obviously had the final say with respect to the composition of the council and which areas warranted the presence of such councils. In many parts of the country, the population encountered the central state in the form of these military councils. All but 3 of the country’s 18 provinces came under the direct administration of regional military councils.

The escalating threat posed by UNITA led to additional reorganizations of the central and provincial governments. In 1984, the Defense and Security Council (DISA) was formed (Heywood 2000: 208). Chaired by the president, the formation of DISA led to the further centralization of decision-making in the presidency at the expense of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the MPLA. DISA allowed the armed forces
to assume a dominant role in public administration (Hodges 2004: 53). In theory, the military could be a potential source of threat to the regime. Yet, because the armed forces were integrated into the patronage system, their loyalty to the regime was unwavering (Chabal 2004: 12; Piombo 2013: 108).

Since the regime-stabilizing effects of patronage rested on a continuous access to state resources, the oil parastatal, Sonangol, became the principal pillar of the neopatrimonial order. Formally, the Ministry of Petroleum had the legal power to make important decisions regarding the country’s oil wealth. In practice, it was rare for international oil companies and professionals to interact with any public body other than Sonangol (Heller 2012: 855-56). The company’s unparalleled access to the Presidency was “a central ingredient in the synergy between principal desires and agent actions” (Heller 2012: 841). As an equity holder in the oil sector, Sonangol was a tax payer. But it also managed public investments on behalf of the government and regulated the oil sector. As discussed later in the chapter, the company also played significant roles in arms procurement and a number of other tasks that would normally fall under the purview of formal state institutions. Despite its expanded portfolio, Sonangol was good at fulfilling its core task, which was to maximize the government’s share of oil profits (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 606).

Access to substantial oil revenues enabled the MPLA to defray the astronomical costs of the war. Oil rents also enabled President dos Santos to cultivate “a clientele beyond the military apparatus, building a degree of legitimacy among those rewarded and allowing support or resistance to reforms, according to short-term expediency” (Le Billon 2001: 65). Given a patronage-based political system is resource-intensive, rents are “rationed by
leaders following a strict political logic” (van de Walle 2001: 120). The MPLA, thus, focused on retaining the support of people in the main coastal cities and inland towns, leaving the vast majority of the population in the countryside to fend for itself (Chabal et al 2002: 58; Minter 1994: 26; Ostheimer 2000: 121; Soares de Oliveira 2011: 290-1). Even in Luanda, the government’s provision of services was limited to the dwellers of the so-called asphalt city—where Portuguese settlers used to reside (Hodges 2004: 58). The token services that the MPLA provided in urban areas began a long-term decline in the early 1980s as a result of diminishing institutional capacity and the allocation of considerable resources to the war effort (Hodges 2004: 34; Vidal, 2008, 205–13).

What distinguishes the Angolan civil war from other internal conflicts in Africa during the same period is the level of interest it drew from the superpowers and a host of regional actors. Consequently, in the absence of a decisive military victory by either side, it was clear that efforts to end the civil war would hinge critically on the withdrawal of foreign actors from Angola. It is, thus, no accident that serious peace negotiations between UNITA and the MPLA began only after these foreign actors agreed to implement a phased withdrawal from Angola.

THE ROAD TO PEACE

By the late 1980s, the civil war had reached a stalemate. But due to regional and global changes, a negotiated settlement to the civil war appeared to be within reach (de Beer and Gamba 2000: 78; Minter 1994: 49). Political changes within the Soviet Union led to the reduction of Soviet commitments in far-flung conflicts, which, in turn, exerted
pressures on lesser actors to follow suit. Accordingly, on December 22, 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the New York Accords. Among other things, the agreement stipulated the phased withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola within 30 months (Hampson 1996:93). The end of the Cold War accelerated the withdrawal of destabilizing foreign actors.

In addition to these developments at the international level, political changes at home provide further impetus to the peace process. In July 1990, the MPLA abandoned Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology, which along with a new constitution laid the foundation for the beginning of multiparty politics (Pycroft 1994: 248). On May 31, 1991, the MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse accords. The agreement envisaged an eighteen-month transition period during which both sides would demobilize, to be followed by the formation of a unified national army and elections.

Although the disarmament and demobilization process was largely ineffective, foundational elections were held from September 29 and 30, 1992. While the MPLA won the majority of seats in the legislature (54 percent), there was no outright winner in the presidential race. President dos Santos won under 50 percent (48.57) of the votes for the presidency while Savimbi won 40 percent, forcing a runoff election to determine the eventual winner. Despite predictable irregularities in a foundational election held in the middle of considerable instability, the international community deemed the electoral process generally free and fair. Nevertheless, UNITA’s leaders rejected the results, leading to the resumption of the civil war. Between October 1992 and 1994, more than 300,000 Angolans died as a result of the renewed fighting (Human Rights Watch 1999: 16-17).
The civil war of the 1990s was different from previous decades in at least two respects. First, for the first time in the history of the conflict, UNITA managed to occupy and hold large cities, including five of the 18 provincial capitals (Hodges 2004: 14). Second, both sides were able to rely on domestically generated resource rents to finance the fighting. UNITA became exclusively dependent on diamond sales to finance the conflict, while the government continued to rely on oil revenues (Cilliers and Dietrich 2000; Le Billon 2011). While the government collected significantly higher oil revenues than UNITA did from diamonds, both sides had adequate resources to eschew peace talks and pursue a coercive strategy to achieve their principal objective: total control of the state.

Over the next decade, despite intermittent ceasefires, both sides fought tenaciously to dominate each other on the battlefield. Facing immediate threats to its survival, the MPLA had few incentives raise resources by taxing with the population. As it did during the previous decades, the MPLA relied on oil revenues, now larger than ever before, to prosecute the war with far-reaching implications for relations between the state and society. As oil became deeply embedded into the domestic political economy, it played a central role in the construction and maintenance of complex patron-client networks. The patrimonialization of the state resulted in the marginalization of formal institutions of governance, as these patrimonial networks assumed greater importance.

The MPLA, Oil Rents and State-Building Outcomes

By the time UNITA and the MPLA signed the Bicesse Accords in 1991, Cuban and Soviet soldiers had departed in accordance with the terms of the New York Accords. But the withdrawal of external aid did not have material effects on the MPLA’s war-making
capabilities, as it relied on oil revenues to sustain its military capabilities “at relatively high levels of sophistication” (Hodges 2004: 19). Despite the near-total collapse of the non-oil economy, the booming oil sector provided much-needed cushion against economic shocks. The offshore location of virtually all of the country’s oil was critical in shielding it from destruction or forcible seizure by UNITA. In the 1990s, oil accounted for over 90 percent of exports and between 75 and 80 percent of government revenues (Le Billon 2000: 61).

Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2013

Source: World Development Indicators 2011, the World Bank
When UNITA reignited the civil war, it quickly overpowered poorly fortified government positions, taking control of the vast majority of the countryside (Howe 1998: 311). In face of UNITA’s quick military success, the government struggled to regain its footing. Soon, however, the MPLA was able to fund a massive effort against a well-financed and well-armed challenger. In the first two years of the conflict, the government spent a total of $3.25 billion on the military (Heywood 2000: 229). This astronomical spending was possible as a result of the inflow of large quantities of oil rents into the coffers of the government. During this period, Angola benefited from the development of deep water technology, pioneered in the North Sea, ramp up oil production off the Angolan coast (Hodges 2004: 143). Figures 5.3 and 5.4 and capture the total volume of daily oil production and total resource rents as a proportion of GDP respectively. In the short-term, however, no amount of oil revenue was enough to protect the regime against UNITA’s military menace, given the speed with which the insurgent group took control of large swaths of the country and the disintegration of the FAA (Angolan Armed Forces).

Unlike during the Cold War, however, the regime could not count on its Cuban and Soviet allies to come to the rescue. As a stopgap measure, the regime made the decision to “substitute imports of commercial soldiery for the troops of solidarity” (Cramer 2006: 154). The MPLA’s turn to the private security market appears to have been a rational response to its security predicament, given the grave threat that UNITA posed to the survival of the regime. Indeed, as noted below, by harnessing the services of private security companies (PSCs), the MPLA was able to arrest UNITA’s advances and ultimately turn the military balance in its favor. But the decision to outsource essential state functions to private actors also had far-reaching implications for wartime and postwar state building. In the short term,
it allowed the MPLA to avoid making the necessary changes needed to enhance the core military capabilities of the state. In long-term, the appearance of foreign PSCs provided the backdrop to the expansion of wartime entrepreneurship within the Angolan political and security establishment. The money-making potential of the market for security created powerful incentives for influential elites to be involved in the provision of private security in ways that led to the diffusion of control over violence to a wide variety of actors. Over time, the market for security became an integral component of the complex system of patronage, contributing to the lack of political will essential to monopolize legitimate coercion.

Angola’s experience with transnational private security forces began with Executive Outcomes (EO), a Pretoria-based private security company (PSC). In order to regain the ground it lost to UNITA, the government signed a 14-month contract with EO. Over the next two years, EO deployed highly credentialed former special operations soldiers of the South African Defense Forces (Pech 1999). In addition to their obvious military pedigree, EO employees had an additional advantage that appealed to the FAA: their geographical familiarity with Angola. Ironically, this familiarity was the result of their participation in South Africa’s military incursions into Angola during the Cold War (Cramer 2006: 154; Harding 1997: 89).

In addition to direct combat operations, EO served as a “force multiplier” by deploying a small but highly skilled employees to train and enhance the effectiveness of a much larger Angolan force (Howe 1998: 312; Vines 2000: 172). EO deployed 400-500 heavily-armed employees training and fighting alongside FAA regulars, though there is some uncertainty about the precise size of EO’s footprint (Howe 2001: 199). EO’s contract
with the government was based on a “strategic privatization,” in which payment was contingent on securing oil and diamond fields located in UNITA-controlled territories (Singer 2001/2002: 207). As a condition of payment, the company had to seek out and attack UNITA positions, which “earned EO the reputation of advancing a novel form of international trade in the form of militarized commercialism” (Dietrich 2000b: 176). In addition to its $40 million a year payment, EO was awarded lucrative diamond and oil concessions (Pech 1999: 86). The rate of return on the MPLA’s investment was high, reflected in EO’s success in halting UNITA’s military drive (Howe 2001: 199). Within a year, the company helped government troops reverse UNITA’s territorial gains. EO success led the government to award the company a second $20-million contract in October 1994. The subsequent offensive drove UNITA out of the strategically and symbolically significant city of Huambo, which was UNITA’s operational headquarters (Heywood 2000: 229). In July 1994, EO recaptured Cafunfo, the strategic village in the diamond-rich Cuango valley of Lunda Norte province, which disrupted UNITA’s mining operations (Dietrich 2000b: 176).

EO’s success against UNITA shifted the balance of power in the government’s favor. UNITA’s struggles on the battlefield forced it to come to the negotiating table (Spears 2010: 111). On November 20, 1994, the two sides signed the Lusaka Protocol, affirming the main tents of the Bicesse accords. Savimbi and the rest of the UNITA leadership had long rationalized the ongoing civil war with the MPLA on the basis that they had been unfairly excluded from power at independence. But even after agreeing to a power-sharing arrangement in the form of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GUNR), Savimbi did not take it seriously enough for it to have a chance
to succeed (Spears 2000: 106). For example, Savimbi rejected the Vice Presidency, a position he dismissed as ceremonial, stating that “this is meaningless …it does not interest me to preside over a Council of the Republic made up of pastors, priests, and others. I am neither a pastor nor a priest” (quoted in Heywood 2000: 232).

The Lusaka Protocol called for the “repatriation of all mercenaries” from Angola. But EO continued to operate in the country until 1996. Even after the official termination of the relationship between government and EO, the latter continued to maintain a residual force. EO personnel took government jobs in private security companies (PSC) established by senior Angolan security and intelligence officials (Howe 1998: 313). The company’s ongoing role in the civil war could be traced back to the unregulated nature of Angola’s mining sector. When the civil war paused following the Bicesse Accords, the long-dormant mining sector came to life. But the overall environment of instability and the absence of effective central state authority created critical security gaps. The resulting demand for protection was far in excess of the state’s capacity to meet it, creating opportunities for autonomous armed gangs run protection rackets (Le Billon 2001: 70).

Although various armed groups managed to impose a semblance of order in their particular areas of influence, the proliferation of armed substate actors created its own challenges. Of particular concern was the destabilizing effects of armed competition for control of points of access to lucrative mining areas on the stability of mining operations (Dietrich 2000b). This increased demand for security led to the rise of wartime entrepreneurs within the Angolan military-security establishment (Dietrich 2000b: 177). Senior military officers sought to extract maximum profits by monopolizing the flourishing
market for security by establishing their own PSCs, which gave them a measure of autonomy from the central state (Cramer 2006: 154).

Over time, the relationship between foreign mining companies and highly influential political and military leaders extended beyond protection. These military and political elites had far more entrepreneurial ambition than simply providing security for a cut of diamonds but lacked the connections needed for expansion. The foreign mining companies, often operating with little transparency, had shadowy financial connections that allowed them to provide military officers “with tentacles into international commerce” (Dietrich 2000b: 180). In return, senior FAA generals and other high profile political leaders used their ability to navigate the country’s bureaucratic labyrinth to ensure that the business interests of their partners were protected. On some occasions, military leaders extended “the sale of ‘protection’ from private security to personalized services to assist in efficient business operations” (Dietrich 2000b: 180).

These extracurricular activities had devastating impacts on the military’s core mission. Military leaders devoted inadequate time to enforce discipline and exercise institutional oversight over the troops under their command, undermining the military’s battlefield effectiveness. The breakdown of discipline within the FAA eroded the legitimacy of the state, as “government soldiers, like their counterparts in UNITA, had to live off local population, through pillaging and extortion” (Hodges 2004: 74). The rent-seeking activities of military elites also undermined the extension of centralized state authority to areas under government control. For example, high ranking military and national police leaders—whichever institution controls the airport—levied 10 percent tax on goods arriving by air but the taxes did not flow into the coffers of the central state.
treasury, further eroding the legitimacy and resource extraction capacity of the central state (Dietrich 2000b: 183). 40

Although the collection of rents by senior military officers on the ground further undermined the integrity of the state, it was also a symptom of the overall institutional sclerosis that bedeviled the central state. As the civil war intensified, the MPLA’s interest in broadening the scope of the central state diminished, resulting in the progressive atrophy of formal state institutions. The central government’s focus on retaining the institutions most essential for its survival created an opening for powerful elites to fill the resulting institutional vacuum for personal gains. The downstreaming of rent-seeking activities is, thus, intelligible within the context of the overall deinstitutionalization of the state.

As formal state institutions became marginalized, the previously discussed parallel structures of governance assumed an even greater role than before. As it did in previous decades, the MPLA relied on Sonangol to maximize rent collection. Between 1998 and 2002, Sonangol managed to collect more than U.S. $15 billion from taxes, signature bonuses, and ‘profit oil’ (IMF 2003:75). Between 1997 and 2000, 14.4 percent of GDP was devoted to military expenditure, a figure that would have been impossible to sustain without massive oil revenue (Hodges 2004: 160). Sonangol also performed other tasks normally reserved to formal state institutions, including the procurement of arms. Sonangol’s dominant role marginalized the more formal but powerless state institutions. Indeed, the main locus of government decision-making was the so-called Bermuda

40 The propensity for self-enrichment by senior agents of the state and the centrality of diamond mining to UNITA led to a tacit agreement between the two sides regarding the division of mining spoils. In Cafunfo, located in the diamond-rich province of Lunda Norte, UNITA units mined the western bank of the Chicapa River while FAA units mined the eastern bank (Dietrich 2000b: 183 and endnote 40; Le Billon 2000: 68).
Triangle—the presidency, Sonangol and the Bank of Angola (Hodges 2004: chapter 6; Kibble 2006: 531). For the MPLA elite, the use of Sonangol, rather than formal state institutions, to conduct wartime business had a strategic logic. The company’s close relationships with the ruling party and the complete identification of goals mitigated the costs of monitoring and information asymmetry inherent in most principal-agent relationships. Crucially, Sonangol operated with little transparency, which shielded government expenditures from domestic and international scrutiny (Heller 2012: 869). The lack of transparency was central to the government’s somewhat unorthodox approach to deal with sudden fiscal pressures. In the 1980s, skyrocketing defense expenditures, the collapse of the non-oil sectors of the economy and the clientelist redistribution of state resources gave rise to a severe fiscal crisis. The regime’s oil-based fiscal base limited the short-term alternatives open to it in moments of resource constraints, forcing it to borrow a substantial sum of money from international lenders at staggering interest rates. When these loans matured in the early 1990s, the government was unable to fulfill its debt obligations. Even as the government struggled to service debts, the escalating threats from UNITA made additional borrowing necessary (Hodges 2004: 162).

But the government’s less-than-stellar repayment history made it nearly impossible to get new loans. The government relied on Sonangol to secure oil-backed loans, which essentially entailed mortgaging future oil production. Sonangol had developed a good reputation as a steward of the country’s oil sector in an overall environment of institutional atrophy, giving lenders “an important extra layer of confidence that they would be repaid” (Shaxson 2009: 74). The company’s relatively good international reputation along with the opacity of government finances was enough to secure oil-collateralized loans, in which
repayment was predicated on the future shipment of oil (Hodges 2004: 142; IMF 2003: 80). For the lenders, dealing with Sonangol had advantages that were not available to formal state institutions, such as the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Angola. In contrast to these institutions, Sonangol had the power to undertake tasks on behalf of the presidency without its transactions going through the domestic financial system. Shielded from public scrutiny, the company was able to set up Special Purpose Vehicles—offshore financial tools—to facilitate safe and accelerated repayments (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 607). These short-term loans continued to carry onerous interests rates, usually 2 or more percentage points above the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) (Hodges 2004: 163). The additional costs of these short-term oil-collateralized loans ranged from U.S. $50 to U.S. $100 million a year but avoiding conditionality was worth the premium (Le Billon 2001: 73).

This seemingly convenient financial tool was consequential in several respects. Since Sonangol’s transactions on behalf of the government did not pass through the country’s financial system, the lack of transparency resulted in long-term fiscal uncertainties (Amundsen 2014; Global Witness 2002; Hodges 2004: 165; Messiant 2001: 292). As an IMF report (2003: 81) noted, Sonangol’s unilateral withholding of tax payments was a source of “uncertainty about the revenue situation and the treasury’s cash position, making overall short-term macroeconomic policymaking more difficult.” At one point, the state oil company had underpaid the National Bank by more than $2.1 billion (Human Rights Watch 2004: 27). In addition to such tax leakages, the bifurcation of public finance also led to the missing of billions of dollars, further starving the state of the
resources needed to fulfill its obligations to the general population.\textsuperscript{41} The government attributed the missing monies to the lack of adequate accounting capacity. But that explanation was rejected by domestic and transnational civil society groups. “A government and state oil company that handle billions of dollars through complex offshore arrangements, including the use of Special Purpose Vehicles and foreign tax havens, can certainly manage a simple balance sheet” (Global Witness 2004: 50). Even if the government’s claims that it spent the money on legitimate arms procurement were true, the practice reflected the government’s preference for informal institutions in conducting official business that shielded its fiscal operations from scrutiny. Freed from routine audits, Sonangol paid considerable kickbacks to international arms dealers between 1993 and 1998, when arms embargo was imposed on both UNITA and the MPLA (Global Witness 2002; Hodges 2004: 165; Shaxson 2009: 75). From a state building perspective, the consequences were devastating, as it accelerated the progressive marginalization of formal state institutions, exponentially increasing the odds that this ineffective institutional dynamic would have a staying power.

\textit{Fostering Legitimacy through Trickle-down Patrimonialism}

Despite the government’s considerable financial autonomy, it still had to foster the support of key societal actors. Given the system of elite accommodation in place, ensuring

\textsuperscript{41} In 1997 alone, the government could not account for a total of U.S. $1.8 billion or 23.3 percent of GDP, while the figure for 1998 was U.S. $1.1 billion or 18.4 percent of GDP respectively (Human Rights Watch 2004: 36). In 2001, the government could not account for U.S. $1.4 billion, which constituted a third of the total revenue for that year (Global Witness 2004: 3).
stability at the apex of state power rested on the ability to prevent the emergence of competing centers of power. In order to inoculate itself against potentially regime destabilizing elite discord, the MPLA relied on the selective distribution of oil revenues (Hodges 2004: 161; Kibble 2006: 540; Messiant 2001: 293; Shaxson 2009: 98).

Another mechanism was the privatization of urban property and small businesses (Le Billon 2001: 66; Messiant 2001: 290). Officially, privatization was considered an essential step in the transition from a command economy to a free market economy. In practice, the privatization of public assets was another mechanism for the transfer of benefits to societal forces who were already enmeshed in the complex web of patron-client relationships (Malaquias 2007: 135). The process of privatizing state-owned businesses “took place without proper valuations or competitive bidding. As a result, army officers and other high-ranking officials were able to acquire farms and other businesses as political favors, often for nominal sums or for no payment at all” (Hodges 2004: 135). In addition, the privatization of previously state-owned farms benefited “the politico-military elite, at the expense of small peasants, who had been occupying and tilling much of the land of the former state farms on an ad hoc basis, without land titles, since the mid-1980s” (Hodges 2004: 135-136).

The progressive patrimonialization of the state reached its peak following the creation of the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) in 1996. Officially, FESA was created to promote social welfare and economic development by complementing the activities of the government (Hodges 2004: 61-2). In practice, FESA served as another vehicle of presidential patronage (Birmingham 2006: 150). Ironically, FESA’s main patron—the president of Angola—sat at the helm of the same government whose
shortcomings were said to have catalyzed the foundation’s creation. FESA’s core geographical areas of operations—the main urban centers—lend credence to the notion that the foundation was established to facilitate presidential patronage (Hodges 2004: 62). The reason is that potentially regime-threatening social discontent is more likely to emerge in urban areas than in the countryside. The foundation had access to resources unavailable to formal state institutions, which enabled it to “provide services that had ceased to be available through official channels but now privately accessible to the president’s clients” (Birmingham 2006: 151). In the end, FESA became much more an instrument for supplanting the state than for complementing and enhancing its capacities, “building its own fortunes on the ruins of the state” (Messiant 2001: 298).

The limited provision of services to people in urban areas helped maintain a modicum of social peace. But the regime was potentially vulnerable to destabilizing elite defection, given it rested on a narrow social base. To guard against regime-destabilizing threats from within, the president and a small circle of advisers relied on the manipulation of material incentives, including the constant rotation of political office (Hodges 2004: 61). “The Political class was kept on its toes by a constant game of musical chairs in which access to the benefits of office and oil wealth could be granted or withdrawn at the stroke of the presidential pen” (Chabal et al 2002: 163). Manipulating power by wielding sticks and carrots was easier and cheaper than winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population (Birmingham 2006: 151).

Disparities in public expenditure bear out the elitist nature of service provision. The government allocated more than a third of the 1995 education budget (36 percent) to overseas scholarship for the children of the elite, while an additional $400 million
subsidized electricity and water service “accessible only to a privileged minority within the population” (Le Billon 2001: 65-66). In contrast, only 17 percent was spent on technical and higher education in the country (Hodges 2004: 46). The funds, always directed at the Luanda-based elite and their families, were distributed based on a political rather than developmental logic. Indeed, as power became increasingly centralized, the president and his inner circles were preoccupied with satisfying the needs of strategic groups, such as senior police and military officers and other well-placed civil servants, who received an annual Christmas bonus of 25 thousand dollars—the equivalent of a ten-year salary for a junior civil servant (Birmingham 2006: 150). Since Sonangol was the regime’s main cash cow, the company’s staff received various perks unavailable to the general population, including overseas medical care. According to a 1997 audit of government finances, such expenditures contributed to a tax leakage of $180 million over the previous 15-month period (Le Billon 2001: 65). The use of public resources to foster the support of small segments of the population was wasteful from society’s perspective. But it was rational, as it allowed the MPLA use “shrewd cooptation and modulated authoritarianism” to ensure its survival (Chabal 2008: 5).

To sum up, the MPLA’s approach to wartime governance remained unaltered over the course of the civil war, since the extraction of oil rents was by far the most important source of revenue. By contrast, UNITA experienced changes in resource endowments, which resulted in significant changes in UNITA’s approach to civilian governance.
During the Cold War, the exploitation of Angola’s abundant natural resource wealth played a negligible role in shaping UNITA’s insurgency. In addition to domestic resource extraction, Savimbi capitalized on the East-West ideological rivalry to obtain political, military and diplomatic backing from the United States and South Africa. But due to the anticipated withdrawal of foreign actors from Angola following the New York accords, UNITA’s leadership realized that they could no longer rely on external aid to make up for the paucity of domestically generated resources. Success under this altered global landscape, thus, “required an even greater Clausewitzian content in the sense that the population had to be convinced a higher political goal existed to justify the suffering exacted by military options” (Malaquias 2007: 104). But UNITA took a different path: it began to lay the groundwork for financial autonomy by enhancing the professional capacity of its diamond mining workforce (Cramer 2006: 144; Le Billon 2001: 67). The organizational capabilities it had developed in previous years would play a critical role in UNITA’s complex war economy (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005: 369). The shift in UNITA’s resource endowments was deeply consequential. In the short term, access to diamond revenues boosted the group’s confidence to such a degree that Savimbi reignited the civil war after failing to win power at the ballot box (Greenhill and Major 2006/2007: 15-23; Le Billon 2001: 71). In the long term, access to resource rents gave UNITA a greater degree of structural autonomy than ever before. As I discuss below, this autonomy affected the nature of UNITA’s relations with the population.

Following the resumption of fighting in October 1992, UNITA capitalized on the sharp military advantage it had over the MPLA to occupy the main diamond-rich areas of
Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. To facilitate the seizure of the most lucrative reserve blocks, the insurgent movement relied on the “diamond reserve mapping” the Portuguese had undertaken before independence (Dietrich 2000a: 277). However, despite its military preponderance, UNITA did not have the capacity to regulate mining fields over the broad expanses of the Lundas. Still, UNITA imposed a 20 percent tax on garimpeiros (independent diggers), paid in diamonds or in cash (Dietrich 2000a: 277). According to rough estimates, UNITA collected as much as $4 million a month via taxes on independent diamond diggers (Le Billon 2001: 68). In order to put the insurgency on a solid financial foundation, UNITA sought to extract a greater share of the alluvial diamond reserves. Doing so meant assuming a direct role in the mining process by requisitioning a civilian workforce devoted to diamond digging.

In addition to direct taxation of garimpeiros, UNITA granted fee-based mining permits in areas under its control (Hodges 2004: 176). The large-scale industrial operations undertaken by foreign mining companies facilitated effective oversight through centralized administration, allowing UNITA to collect a 50 percent cut at the end of each month (Dietrich 2000a: 278). UNITA’s estimated revenue from diamonds was $300 million in 1993, $400 million in 1994, $600 million in 1995, $700 million in 1996 and $600 million in 1997 (Dietrich 2000a: 284). Revenue from diamonds allowed UNITA to finance all aspects of its insurgency, including weapons procurement, travel and diplomatic representation abroad. UNITA’s ability to purchase arms rested on good relationships with neighboring countries, which UNITA was able to cultivate by lavishing leaders with gifts.
in the form of diamonds and cash (Alao 2007: 128; Dietrich 2000a: 288-90).\textsuperscript{42} UNITA leaders and some in the international community saw diamond revenue as “a legitimate counterbalance” to the considerable oil revenue flowing into the MPLA treasury (Le Billon 2001: 68). General Arlindo ‘Ben Ben’ Pena, UNITA’s chief of staff, explained the importance of diamonds to UNITA in this way:

Diamonds are UNITA’s life blood. Without them UNITA wouldn’t be able to maintain its options. We needed to have choices, and as you see what the government is doing now, UNITA needed to maintain military reserves so that the government doesn’t destroy us. This is the reality. (Quoted in Human Rights Watch 1999: 188).

Indeed, substantial revenues from natural resources enabled Savimbi to transform UNITA from a guerrilla force into a quasi-conventional force capable of mounting an even more serious military challenge to the MPLA than at any other point during the course of the conflict. This transformation came at a time when the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations had resulted in the proliferation of cheap arms and ammunition, creating opportunities for resource-rich insurgent movements like UNITA to acquire large quantities of weapons in exchange for diamonds and hard currency (de Beer and Gamba 2000: 84; Malaquias 2007: 110; Potgieter 2000: 263-64). UNITA’s military reorganization away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more

\textsuperscript{42} According to the Fowler Report, prepared pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, President Eyadema of Togo, and President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso provided such safe havens in exchange for Savimbi’s gifts of rough diamonds and cash (UNSC 2000: paragraphs 99-104).
conventional fighting force had far-reaching implications for the character of the conflict, UNITA’s relation with the population and the eventual outcome of the conflict.

UNITA’s deployment of heavy artilleries in some of Angola’s provincial cities resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians and the destruction of the country’s dilapidated infrastructure (Le Billon 2001: 71). Since UNITA’s conventional posture placed premium on mechanized warfare, control of territories, not people, became the insurgent movement’s main goal (Malaquias 2007: 111). When UNITA was dependent on the people for food, labor and other forms of support, it portrayed itself as a legitimate contender for state power by developing structures for civilian governance, which rested on keeping people in territories under its control. UNITA’s reliance on diamonds in the 1990s fundamentally changed this relationship. During this period, UNITA behaved in a predatory fashion towards civilians, losing the consensual relationships it had established in previous years (Malaquias 2007: 111; Pearce 2012: 460).

A significant consequence of UNITA’s financial autonomy was its decision to reverse its prior policy of keeping people in territories under its control. During this period, the insurgent movement forced large numbers of people into government-controlled areas. This action was intended to overwhelm the virtually non-existent service delivery and use the resulting humanitarian crisis as evidence of the MPLA’s callous indifference to the plight of its citizens (Malaquias 2007: 105; The Economist 13 March 1999). In contrast to the previous phase of the conflict when UNITA readily abandoned territories when it came under military pressures, the insurgent group now prioritized territorial control, often through the bombardment of previously safe areas and indiscriminate violence against civilians (Jutta and Stuvøy 2005: 372). The goal was to engineer regime implosion by
rendering the country ungovernable. In the end, this transparent ploy did not succeed, as most Angolans blamed UNITA more than the government for their suffering (Malaquias 2007: 105; *The Economist* 13 March 1999).

During this period, UNITA’s previous efforts at social organization effectively disintegrated, as the insurgent group’s conventional posture brought it under increased military pressure. In places where UNITA’s control was tenuous and the insurgent group was battling to stave off government attacks, “its behavior towards local people became more violent and predatory as the short-term survival of the rebellion became a more urgent concern than the nurturing of political support” (Pearce 2012: 446-47). As battlefield losses mounted and supply lines became overextended, UNITA began to target civilians for basic supplies (Dietrich 2000b: 182). UNITA fighters also engaged in abduction, arbitrary killings and sexual exploitation (Human Rights Watch 1999).

Between 1998 and 2002, UNITA suffered a series of military, political and diplomatic setbacks (Spears 2010: 214). While UNITA’s reliance on diamond revenues gave it considerable autonomy, it also increased the movement’s vulnerability to international sanctions. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions (Resolutions 1173 and 1176) prohibiting the sale of Angolan diamonds that did not have government certificates of origin (Kaplan 2003: 559). In addition to curtailing UNITA’s war-making capabilities, the imposition of sanctions signaled a turning point in the international community’s handling of the conflict. The unilateral nature of the sanctions captured the prevailing international consensus that UNITA alone was responsible for the breakdown of the peace process. These sanctions impeded UNITA’s ability to procure arms and maintain regional networks of friendships (Angell 2004: 203). By contrast, the government
benefited from rising oil revenues. In 1999, the government’s military expenditure was $1.6 billion or 26 percent of Angola’s GDP. While the military expenditure fluctuated annually, the defense expenditure averaged $985 million from 1997 to 2000 or the equivalent of 14 percent of Angola’s GDP, tilting the balance of power in the MPLA’s favor (Hodges 2004: 74).

On February 22, 2002, government troops killed Jonas Savimbi, effectively ending the civil war. Following Savimbi’s death, the remnants of UNITA’s leadership agreed to lay down their arms and transform the movement from a predominantly military organization into a political party in order to take part in the political process. Savimbi’s death and the end of the civil war meant that, for the first time since the war for independence, Angolans could imagine a peaceful future and much more. But the war-to-peace transition had just begun, as the victorious leaders faced the extraordinarily daunting challenges of consolidating and perhaps institutionalizing these gains.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAKE OF MILITARY VICTORY

The defeat of UNITA was a “foundational moment” for the MPLA in the sense that, for the first time since independence, it had a historic opportunity to chart a new course (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 291). This was especially true in light of the fact that UNITA had set up a sophisticated political structure—in the first half of the conflict—that enabled it to pose a multifaceted challenge to the central state. Since the end of the civil war, the MPLA-led government has managed to establish the jurisdiction of the state in much of
the country heretofore beyond its reach, while remaining largely unsuccessful at institutionalizing state authority.

Despite its military victory, the government did not seek to dismantle UNITA as a political organization. Shortly after Savimbi’s was killed, the two sides signed the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, formalizing the end of the civil war and outlining the terms of UNITA’s transformation from a predominantly military organization into a political party (Malaquias 2007: 166-7). This agreement was in line with the commonly held notion that, even after a military victory, the social basis for durable peace requires fence-mending efforts in order to grant the vanquished party a stake in postwar politics (Call 2011: 308).

But there was no doubt that the creation of a durable postwar order would be based almost entirely on the MPLA’s long-term vision for the country, at the heart of which is the party’s interest in maintaining its hegemony. By and large, the agreement reaffirmed the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, including the disarmament and demobilization of UNITA fighters in a way that ensured the MPLA’s monopoly of state power (Messiant 2008: 106; Vines and Oruitemeka 2009: 205). Soon after the war ended, about 80,000 UNITA soldiers were demobilized (Weigert 2011: 174). The government also agreed to absorb over 50,000 UNITA fighters into the national army (FAA). In return for being allowed to partake in electoral politics, UNITA agreed to recognize the MPLA regime as the sole legitimate government of Angola.

While UNITA has been operating as a legitimate opposition party to the MPLA in the National Assembly for more than a decade now, the political challenge to the MPLA is rather feeble. Since the Luena agreement essentially reaffirmed the previous peace
accords, the first step in charting a new post-conflict path was to hold elections. But legislative and presidential elections were delayed until 2008. When elections were finally held six years after the end of the civil war, the MPLA won more than 80% of the vote, which translated into 191 of the 220 seats in the National Assembly. While a presidential election was scheduled for 2009, a constitutional amendment was passed abolishing direct presidential elections. Instead, the leader of the largest party in the legislature would automatically becoming president. In the 2012 elections, the MPLA continued to solidify its electoral hegemony, though with a slightly lower vote total (72%) and 16 seats fewer than 2008. The MPLA’s electoral hegemony is not surprising in light of the MPLA’s exclusive access to the resources of the state and the formal legislative steps it took to solidify its position and its access to massive oil revenues. One such critical legislation was the Law of Political Parties (LPP), which outlined the parameters of electoral competition. In order to form political parties, would-be leaders need to have a membership list of 3000 citizens, with at least 140 members residing in 14 of the country’s 18 provinces (Malaquias 2007: 138).

On the face of it, this low membership threshold would be expected to have positive effects on democratic contestation by lowering barriers to entry. In reality, the MPLA’s principal goal was to undermine UNITA’s self-proclaimed role as the sole legitimate opposition capable of mounting a serious electoral challenge to its power. The LPP allowed the MPLA to manipulate the electoral system in a way that ensured the MPLA’s hegemony. Although the MPLA sponsored the emergence of numerous political parties that had no realistic chance of winning power through elections, their existence in some of UNITA’s traditional strongholds undermined eroded UNITA’s support. Given the ethno-regional
dynamics at play, the proliferation of political parties did not threaten the MPLA’s power. That is, by forcing UNITA to compete with smaller parties for a share of the vote, the MPLA effectively neutralized UNITA’s potential threat to its electoral hegemony. The MPLA’s access to considerable oil resources was critical to its ability to manipulate the electoral process and co-opt or neutralize its opponents (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 292). As it did in wartime, the MPLA relied on the distribution of material spoils—money, cars and housing—to tilt the playing field in its favor. Given the widespread poverty in the country, establishing political parties constituted a pathway to economic security (Malaquias 2007: 139). In effect, this practice is a continuation of the MPLA’s modus operandi: the use of state resources to coopt, cajole and neutralize opposition in order to solidify its position as the most dominant actor in Angolan politics.

Regardless of the particular configuration of state power in post-conflict Angola, the significance of the decisive end to the civil war could not be overstated in light of the staggering destruction of human and physical capital. Angola’s large cities, such as Huambo were obliterated by the fighting and hundreds of bridges were destroyed, making the country unreachable by road during the conflict (World Bank 2007: 13). Rehabilitating the infrastructure was critical to the state’s ability to extend its geographical reach by setting up civil administration in much of the countryside that had been neglected throughout the civil war (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 294). The government has undertaken large-scale reconstruction efforts to rehabilitate dilapidated roads and bridges, averaging a staggering $2.8 billion over the 2005-2009 period (Foster and Pushak 2011). The wartime destruction was such that “it is easy to sell a vision in which physical rebuilding is the primary focus of development” (Vines et al 2005: 6).
In practice, reconstruction policies reflected the narrow developmental ideology that underpinned the MPLA’s quest for legitimacy in wartime. In particular, the focus continues to be on splashy but poorly prioritized and unsustainable ‘white elephant’ projects that hardly meet the pressing needs of the majority of the population (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 294-5). The opportunities for rent collection associated with large-scale construction projects are essential for the maintenance of a patronage-based political system. This is reflected in “the overtly political manner in which the state apparatus is used to provide insiders with opportunities for accumulation of vast fortune, a process set in motion in the 1990s but deepened since 2002” (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 295). Roughly 40 percent of the U.S. $30 billion nominally allocated to public infrastructure rehabilitation over the last decade has been misappropriated (Amundsen 2014: 176).

Crucially, the importance of patronage as the regime’s preferred mechanism of governance is reflected in the marginal role of formal state institutions in overseeing the post-conflict reconstruction process. After the civil war ended, Angola and China concluded a series of mutually beneficial agreements. At the heart of China’s interest in Angola is its massive demand for energy supply and the latter’s abundant resources (Burgos and Ear 2012). As a result, it has made considerable investments in Angola’s reconstruction with the goal of cementing its reputation as a reliable ally. The two domestic institutions that operated in partnership with China to oversee the latter’s infusion of capital were the Finance Ministry and the Office of National Reconstruction (GRN). The selection of the two institutions is not accidental. As previously discussed, the co-existence of rickety formal institutions with powerful parallel networks of governance is one of the defining features of neopatrimonial regimes. The head of the GRN is Helder Vieira Dias, the head
of military affairs in the president’s office (Shaxson 2009: 97). Given the concentration of power in the presidency, the appointment of a military officer with close ties to the president was a clear signal that actual power reconstruction would reside in the president’s office. And since government officials owe their position to the president, they are reluctant to raise issues that may discomfort the president and his aides. “The result is an institutional culture that both abhors delegation of authority and, in turn, avoids responsibility for implementing policies” (Malaquias 2007: 136). Indeed, despite the finance ministry’s official role in overseeing the country’s finances, it continues to play a marginal role in overseeing the reconstruction process. At one point in 2006, the finance minister had to ask permission to visit projects being carried out under the GRN program (Shaxson 2009: 97). Formal state institutions have been stripped of their powers so much that “they are encouraged to “compete” against each other for the president’s favor” (Shaxson 2009: 97).

To analytically ground the narrative of Angola’s postwar state building, in the remaining pages, I further assess the development of state capacity on the bases of two criteria: the state’s monopoly on legitimate coercion and its extractive capacity. Since the extraction of resources requires the forging of reciprocal relations with society, it is an essential measure of the extent of state building.

*The Establishment of Monopoly on Legitimate Coercion*

Historically, the creation of a centralized military that claimed monopoly on the exercise of legitimate coercion was an integral part of successful state formation (Holsti 1996; Porter 1994; Tilly 1990). The assertion of monopoly on violent force is what Max
Weber identified as the essence of the modern state, a fundamental measure of its empirical efficacy as a sovereign entity. As such, the extent of successful state building depends on the degree of to which state builders are able to monopolize the legitimate means of coercion. Institutionally, centralizing and regulating the use of legitimate force entails establishing hierarchically organized police and military organizations under the control of a central political authority. State building may come in different forms but what distinguishes post-civil war state building is the fact that it unfolds in the aftermath of a debilitating conflict is daunting, given the existence of security and legitimacy crises (Barnett 2006). The immediate challenge for postwar leaders is the reestablishment—or in some cases, the establishment—of the state’s monopoly on violent coercion.

How does Angola’s postwar performance measure up to these state building benchmarks? While some nations emerging from conflict seek to reap peace dividends by cutting back on defense spending and redirecting resources to previously neglected areas, the Angolan government has invested considerable resources in the maintenance of robust security structures, expanding and strengthening the regular armed forces as well as several paramilitary and police organizations. The FAA has about 107,000 troops, making it one of the largest militaries in Africa. Angola also maintains a 10,000-strong paramilitary force tasked with presidential security, and a 10,000-strong Rapid-Reaction Intervention Police force (Vines and Weimer 2011: 14). Between 2005 and 2009, defense expenditure increased by more than twofold (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 292). The security services have been exempt from the severe underinvestment of resources that other state institutions have been subjected to because they are indispensable to regime survival (Hodges 2004: 72).
The various coercive instruments at the disposal of MPLA are central to what Janowitz (1977) calls ‘enhanced regime consolidation.’

Despite the numerical expansion of the armed forces, the MPLA regime has not shown much interest in establishing a unified military with professional ethos, primarily tasked with national defense against external threats. The party’s dominance over state institutions is such that the interests of the military as an institution are virtually indistinguishable from the interests of the MPLA. The very importance of the military in politics has resulted in efforts to manipulate and deinstitutionalize it. Like all other weakly institutionalized, Marxist-inspired regimes throughout the continent, the MPLA has been successful in eliminating the two most important characteristics of the military that make it a significant political force: their strong corporate identity and their monopoly of legitimate coercion. The rationale is simple: in weakly-institutionalized polities like Angola, a military organization powerful enough to ensure regime survival is also strong enough to pose a dangerous institutional threat to a regime. The MPLA has sought to address this ‘guardianship dilemma’ (see McMahon and Slantchev 2015) by establishing multiple paramilitary organizations that operate outside the regular military command structure.

This structural manipulation plays an essential role in diluting the power and professional character of the military as an institution, thereby preventing the emergence of alternative loci of power. In addition, these competing security forces provide the regime with a comprehensive capacity for surveillance and control necessary to keep rivals at bay. Fostering rivalries among the various military and paramilitary organizations and incorporating into an elaborate clientage are some of the mechanisms deployed to ensure
their ultimate loyalty to the regime (Hodges 2004: 60). Consequently, professionalism hardly figures in the military’s corporate identity. A unified and professionalized security force would, of course, better serve the state. Yet for the MPLA the army has always been a political instrument, given its origins as a liberation movement (Messiant 2008: 106; Vines and Weimer 2011: 14-15).

In terms of the capacity to wield coercive power, the Angolan state can be described as strong, though it lacks the capacity to perform many of the other functions that legitimate states are obligated to fulfill as a condition of their legitimacy (Cramer 2009: 136). But even this characterization must be qualified. Large numbers of weapons are still in the hands of civilians. This phenomenon can be traced to the MPLA’s decision to arm its supporters when UNITA controlled large swaths of the national territory following the resumption of the conflict in 1992 (Messiant 2008: 111). Out of sheer desperation, the MPLA decided to arm its supporters by handing out weapons in Luanda and surrounding areas. While the distribution of weapons to civilians might have been a rational response to a desperate situation, the absence of mechanisms to track and, if need be, retrieve these weapons complicated the government’s efforts at stabilizing the country in the postwar period. As a result, the collection of weapons in the hands of civilians figured prominently in the state’s postwar efforts to establish security. A campaign to disarm the civilian population resulted in the collection of more than 150,000 weapons by the end of 2008, though large numbers of weapons remain in circulation (Weigert 2011: 178).

In general, the MPLA faces no serious armed challenge to its rule and the likelihood of another civil war involving UNITA is low. However, the wartime political economy continues to shape the contours of postwar state building. One such legacy is the marriage
between natural resource extraction and the expansion of the market for security. The number of domestic PSCs has increased dramatically since the end of the civil war so much so that “the private security industry is one of the few booming non-oil sectors of the economy and a prime example of the involvement of senior state officials in private business” (Hodges 2004: 73-74). According to figures from the National Police, by 2004, there were a total of 307 PSCs, the overwhelming majority of which operated in Luanda (Joras et al 2008: 46). In recent years, PSCs have extended their operations beyond Luanda, particularly in the diamond-rich areas of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. Available estimates indicate that these PSCs have an effective force of more than 35,000 men (Amundsen 2014: 179).

The seeds of privatized security were planted at the height of the civil war, when the MPLA turned to the private security market to prevent UNITA from gaining further ground until the FAA could regain its bearing. However, the end of the civil war has not slowed down the growth of PSCs, since the basis for the legitimacy of the regime has not changed. In the postwar period, the same elites that run the various PSCs have access to large numbers of men with basic military training in need of employment. Wartime developments need not, of course, carry over into the postwar period. But when those charged with the task of shaping the character of the postwar state have considerable economic and political stake in the status quo, it is not surprising that the past is tightly clasped and wartime institutions tenaciously maintained.

The most plausible explanation for the expansion of PSCs in peacetime is the high demand for protection in a deteriorating security environment in which the state is unable or unwilling to provide basic security. As previously described, the state has a plethora of
coercive instruments at its disposal. But the various security services are geared towards monitoring potentially dangerous internal rivals and protecting the regime against enemies outside of the political establishment. Consequently, they have a less-than-stellar reputation as providers of peace and security to the general population (Vines and Weimer 2011: 15). The enhanced role of PSCs is, thus, intelligible in the context of critical “security gaps” arising out of the failure of the state to fulfill its security obligations. In contrast to the general population, both domestic and foreign businesses operating in Angola’s natural resource sectors can afford to rely on PSCs for protection. But this demand-based explanation ignores the fact that the security gaps that the PSCs filled were not exogenous. Rather, the shrinkage of the state reflected the country’s oil-based patterns of institutionalization, whereby MPLA leaders made a conscious choice to abandon their political obligations to the maintenance of the state apparatus in favor of cultivating informal networks essential for the maintenance of power. A significant consequence of this logic of political survival was the emergence of powerful PSCs, whose origins lay in the interconnections between Angolan military and political elites and foreign business interests.

As previously discussed, the integration of key political and military elites into the system of presidential patronage was a successful strategy of coup-proofing the regime and establishing some sort of political equilibrium (Hodges 2004: 61; Le Billon 2001: 70). Central to the stability of this patronage-based political system was the ability of autonomous military and political elites to divert public resources for personal gains. The PSCs that sprouted during the war were private only in the sense that they pursued private gains; after all virtually all of the domestic PSCs were founded by high profile FAA
generals, senior police officials and leading elites using state resources, including the soldiers that staffed these organizations (Joras et al 2008: 51).

Clearly, this arrangement served important regime-stabilizing goals. However, the economic interests of these powerful elites proved incompatible with broader state building interests. For example, the pursuit of private interests by senior military officers has led to the de facto privatization of the armed forces, threatening prospects for enhancing the political legitimacy of the state, since the state cannot act as an all-powerful sovereign entity. The regime continues to rely on the granting of lucrative and oil and diamond concessions to a restricted elite whose support is crucial for its survival (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 292). These same individuals have stakes in several PSCs. For example, senior generals and key actors inside the political establishment have significant financial stakes in two of Angola’s largest PSCs: Teleservices and Alfa-5 (Joras et al 2008). In addition to their participation in the booming diamond, oil and construction sectors, these elites are also able to extract additional rents when their PSCs are contracted to provide security (Amundsen 2014: 179; Joras et al 2008: 51).

If asserting monopoly over the legitimate instruments of coercion is essential for the emergence of a Weberian state, the market for security undermines any effort to bring about such a state. As previously discussed, PSCs do not operate at the margins, filling security gaps created by the absence of the state in some areas. In most cases, PSCs supplant the state as providers of security, which undermines the power of the state to exercise control over the use of legitimate force. Moreover, when private businesses turn to the market for security, “they become additional principals in the control of violence” (Avant 2006: 516). Even if these private actors are legally sanctioned, their widespread
presence “enhances institutional malformation that weakens the prospects for strong institutions to grow” (Avant 2006: 515). The expansion of the market for security is not of course a uniquely Angolan phenomenon.\footnote{Although the monopoly of the legitimate means of coercion is presumed to be the essence of the modern state, during the last few decades the demand for and, supply of, private security has increased so much that there exists now a flourishing transnational market for security alongside the system of states. While PSCs have a long historical lineage that predates the emergence of the modern national-state. And yet the scale and scope of their operations have dramatically expanded since the end of the Cold War, a trend that has accelerated in the post-9/11/2001 security landscape. The fact that PSCs are widely present in developed and developing countries alike, democratic and otherwise, suggests that the phenomenon maybe as much as much about emerging patterns of security reorganizations evidenced by the transfer of policing functions from public to private institutions as it is about state fragility and democratic institutions or lack thereof (Davis 2009). For an overview of the marketization of security, and implications for theories of international relations and norms, see Avant 2004, 2006; Avant and Sigelman 2010; Krahmann 2013; O’Brien 1998; and Singer 2001/2002, 2003.} What is different in the Angolan case is that the expansion of the market for security has taken place in a context where the state lacks the capacity or the political will to enforce rules that govern the activities of PSCs.

Even when PSCs play an essential role in providing security in areas where the state is absent or weak, their contributions must be weighed against the potential disruption of efforts to establish legitimate state authority after civil war. At one point, the General Commander of the Angolan National Police, José Alfredo Ekuikui, “accused them [PSCs] of banning the police from having access to places they are entitled to inspect, such as ports, airports, commercial aircrafts and ships” (Joras et al 2008: 42). But the challenges posed by the growth of PSCs is not limited to competition between state and non-state actors as purveyors of violence. In some cases, the problem is jurisdictional overlap that has resulted in the de facto blurring of lines between public and private security forces. When private security forces take on public policing functions, they undermine efforts to monopolize coercive capacity. In the absence of any meaningful distinction between the private and public deployment of violence, citizens may not have the ability to identify
who might be the source of harm or protection. Civil society organizations have rightly raised concerns about the negative effects of joint private-public law enforcement operations on citizens’ human rights, raising questions about the larger social contract between ruler and ruled (Joras et al 2008: 53). Such problems are particularly pronounced in contexts where democracy is not well entrenched and the state remains too weak to exercise meaningful regulatory power over the activities of PSCs. Of particular concern is the problematic issue of responsibility attribution, in which citizens are unable to “leverage institutional accountability” essential to clamp down on abuse of coercive powers (Davis 2009: 239).

The presence of PSCs does also reinforce the non-institutional nature of the regime (Howe 2001: 224). The deployment of “privatized violence” is visible in diamond mining fields far from the main urban centers. The routine deployment of private security forces in the pursuit of quasi-official or official goals undermines the authority of the military and other public security forces. The sight of heavily armed private armies does not do much to boost the public’s confidence in the capacity of the state to fulfill its security obligations. Indeed, the types of weapons PSCs brandish have generated intense controversy. Private security forces routinely carry AK-47s—the preferred weapon of war by rebels and government forces throughout Africa. Such unregulated practices risk perpetuating a culture of violence, intimidation and fear for a society still reeling from the debilitating legacy of a brutal conflict. In some areas, PSCs have supplanted state institutions, perpetuating the perception of weak state authority. For example, the Cuango valley region in the diamond-rich province of Lunda Norte has been under the “effective military control” of heavily armed private security forces (Joras et al 2008: 55). PSCs often dwarf
public police forces, which undermines efforts by public security forces to monopolize legitimate coercion. The consequence is a vicious cycle: the limited capacities of the state lead to the deployment of powerful PSCs but their routine deployment results in the de-legitimization of the state.

Even when PSCs may complement the capabilities of the state, they respond to fundamentally different incentives, complicating efforts to assert the state control of violence. PSCs are motivated by financial gains, which makes them efficient but that efficiency might have damaging effects on the long-term effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions. Even when PSCs may complement the capabilities of the state, they respond to fundamentally different incentives, complicating efforts to assert the state control of violence. PSCs are motivated by financial gains, which makes them efficient but that efficiency might have damaging effects on the long-term effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions.44 Since the growth of PSCs in Angola has taken place against the backdrop of weak law enforcement traditions, PSCs tend to operate without the constraints imposed by formal and informal rules governing the use of force. The police have made some efforts to regulate PSCs to no avail, given the organized resistance to reforms mounted by the elite that manage these companies and their partners in diamond mining (Cramer 2009: 134; Joras et al 2008: 51).

Revenue Collection and State Infrastructural Power

In addition to the previously discussed monopoly on legitimate coercion, the extraction of resources is a fundamental interest of states. In order for a state to fulfil its sovereign functions, it must have the capacity extract resources from domestic and external

44 Although Executive Outcomes played a crucial role in helping government forces reverse UNITA’s military gains, the company was known to resort to indiscriminate violence to achieve its goals. It was also accused of using fuel air explosives (FAE). The use of FAEs was considered a gross violation of human rights, “because they inflict particularly tortuous injuries and are prone to indiscriminate use” (Singer 2001/2002: 214).
sources. The extent and structure of taxation captures state capacity, since effective revenue mobilization through taxes requires elaborate administrative structures, including competent managerial and technical experts. In assessing the significance of taxation as an indicator of state capacity, the structure, not the volume, of taxation matters the most. Direct taxes pose greater political and administrative challenges than indirect taxes (Lieberman 2001; Snider 1987). In contrast, the collection of indirect taxes and taxes on easily extractible natural resources are not administratively challenging.

Data on wartime and peacetime revenues show the inordinate importance of oil for the state (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.5). In the 1992-1996 period, taxes from oil represented about 85 percent of total government revenue or 30.36 percent of GDP, while non-oil taxes represented about 13 percent of total revenue or a meager 4.8 percent of GDP. This period overlaps with the breakdown of the Bicesse peace settlement and the resumption of the civil war. From 1997 to 2002, the ratio of oil taxes to total revenue slightly decreased to 82 percent, though oil taxes actually increased to 33.87 percent of GDP.

Looking at the 2002-2007 period or the first five years after the end of the civil war, oil taxes account for 78 percent of total revenue (32.6 percent of GDP), while non-oil taxes account for 19 percent of total revenue (7.9 percent of GDP). In the second half of the decade after the civil war ended, oil taxes account for 76 percent of total revenue (33 percent of GDP), while non-oil taxes account for 18 percent of total revenue (7.9 percent of GDP). The flow of considerable oil rents into the coffers of the state gives the state considerable autonomy. In theory, autonomy should be a source of strength, as it can enable the state to resist pressure from interest groups and formulate policies independent of them (Barker and Sunita 1991: 525; Skocpol 1985).
Table 5.1. Angola: The Composition of Government Revenue (average % GDP)

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<tr>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>41.82</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenue</td>
<td>35.14</td>
<td>40.85</td>
<td>40.46</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Taxes</td>
<td>30.36</td>
<td>33.87</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Oil Taxes</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data from various IMF Article IV reports and statistical appendix (1997-2014)

Yet, autonomy and capacity are not identical. Indeed, state autonomy derived from large quantities of oil rents is inimical to institutional development, setting in motion ineffective state-building dynamics that tend to endure (Karl 1997). The importance of autonomy in allowing the leaders to implement policies presumes the existence of coherent state interests that state bureaucracies implement despite the wishes of powerful social groups. But when the interests of the state are defined in terms of the extraction of rents
and their redistribution to privileged social groups, the state has few incentives to enhance its authoritative mechanisms, especially its ability to raise revenue by taxing the population. The MPLA has created what can be described as a ‘dependent bourgeoisie’ that should, in theory, enhance the autonomy of the state. However, since clientelism dominates state-society relations, state bureaucracies become the principal means through which outside interests are satisfied. The average level of government spending as a share of GDP is over 40 percent, compared to 15 percent for non-oil economies, reflecting the centrality spending as a glue that binds the state and the elite (Shaxson 2009: 68). As a result of deeply entrenched interests, the state has not deviated from its wartime trajectory, “even though conjunctural economic imperatives or financial necessities may dictate periodic bursts of reform” (Hodges 2004: 139-140).

The ongoing dependence of the state on the extraction of oil rents and their selective redistribution domestically has affected the character of the state and the nature of state-society relations. The MPLA regime is adept at extracting maximum rents. Angola’s take from oil revenue after costs is estimated to be around 85 percent, which belies the widespread perception and reality of multinational oil companies riding roughshod over weak African governments (Shaxson 2009: 63). In addition to the standard ‘profit oil’—the government’s share of oil after foreign oil companies have recouped their initial investment—and corporate taxes on oil companies, the government also extracts rents by requiring signature bonuses. Signature bonuses are one-off payments that oil companies must make to the government for initial exploration rights (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 605). Since oil rents continue to be the most important source of government revenue, broadening the revenue basis of the state has not been a priority for the MPLA. While the
low level of non-oil taxes is obviously linked to the wartime devastation of the non-oil sectors of the economy, the MPLA has not made efforts to enhance the capacity of the state to extract non-oil revenues, reflected in the failure to modernize tax administration (Hodges 2004: 157).

The symbiosis between the MPLA regime and foreign oil companies has left the regime with few incentives to construct an impersonal state bureaucracy. “There is no sustained attempt to build the management system of the complex technology that is the modern state” (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 297). As formal state institutions continue to atrophy, the oil parastatal, Sonangol, has come to play an even more dominant role in the oil-based economy than it did in wartime. As a World Bank report noted, the company plays “a largely independent role in the economy which could be justified in a war period, but not in the context of peace” (World Bank 2007: 49). The company’s “CEOs have enjoyed direct communications and high levels of trust with Angola’s president, forged in the close-knit wartime decision-making hierarchy and their common place within a tiny ethno-political elite class” (Heller 2012: 840).

While the company’s close links to the presidency has contributed to the alignment of incentives, thereby avoiding many of the pitfalls inherent in such principal-agent relationships, it has also had a crowding out effect on the capacity of formal state institutions. The company enjoys considerable financial and human resources “that no other branch of the administration can rival” (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 603). In fact, the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Angola have been relegated to the margins of fiscal and macroeconomic policy management. Formally, the Finance Ministry’s National Tax Directorate (DNI) is responsible for assessing and collecting oil royalties. In practice,
Sonangol performs these and other tasks. In spite of its title, the DNI is staffed by no more than 4 employees (World Bank 2007: 46). In short, Sonangol provides the Angolan government with “an artificial functionality” that stands in the way of enhancing the capacity of formal state institutions (World Bank 2007: 52). Moreover, the company’s fiscal and quasi-fiscal activities are exempt from oversight by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum, giving the company unprecedented role in the economy.

Indeed, in addition to its core mission of maximizing revenues for the government, Sonangol is tasked with the creation of an indigenous ‘entrepreneurial’ class beholden to the regime. It does so by steering money and opportunities to individuals and by requiring that foreign companies allow minority participation by Angolan businesses with links to the MPLA (Amundsen 2014: 176; Heller 2012: 837). The principal goal is to secure continuing loyalty to the president by redistributing rents to strategic actors, who, if discontented, might pose a threat to the stability of the regime (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 608).

The regime has made some efforts at empowering formal state institutions, though these efforts have been inadequate. The government has introduced new monetary instruments in an effort to streamline fiscal operations. But given the fundamental institutional structures in place, these changes have proved more cosmetic than substantive. Indeed, patronage has shifted from the direct appropriation of state revenues to the expenditure side of government operations (Amundsen 2014: 176). The principal goal is “to give the appearance of change and greater transparency while essentially continuing to play the game of patronage politics” (Shaxson 2009: 78).
To sum up, the government’s military victory over UNITA created a window of opportunity for the consolidation of power and the extension of state authority to areas previous beyond its reach. In reality, the postwar political landscape has been characterized by a remarkable degree of institutional continuity. This continuity can, in turn, be traced back to the trajectories of resource mobilization and patterns of private accumulation developed over the course of the conflict. Since the entry of oil into the political economy overlapped with the beginning of the civil war and the formative years of the postcolonial state, it rendered the MPLA’s state-building enterprise ineffective, generating powerful vested interests that thrived on the exploitation of oil rents. These persistence of these vested interests, because they are fundamentally rooted in the oil-based political economy, has made departure from what is a collectively suboptimal institutional path decidedly difficult long after the end of the civil war.

CONCLUSION

The Angolan civil war—one of the longest and the deadliest conflicts in the world—came to an end following a military victory by the government. The end of the civil war was a momentous event in Angola’s turbulent postcolonial history. UNITA’s defeat led to the end of the system of parallel sovereignty that UNITA had established over in the course of the civil war, rating enabling conditions for the assertion of centralized authority. But while victory has given the government a more favorable structural opportunity than an unsuccessful peace accord in the early 1990s, the wartime political economy continues to linger. A strong coercive apparatus dependent on oil rents ensures
stability but the state faces few incentives to govern the hinterland. The regime relies on the selective redistribution of oil rents to co-opt elites that may threaten its survival.

In this chapter, I have argued that Angola’s limited wartime state building can be attributed to the MPLA’s limited wartime state building. This limited wartime state building had its roots in the nature of the MPLA’s resource mobilization. States normally have to develop the capacity to penetrate society in order to extract and redistribute resources. Due to the MPLA’s reliance on externally derived oil rents, it had no need to develop extractive capacities, since its main function was distribution. Furthermore, due to its financial autonomy, the MPLA did not face meaningful bottom-up pressures to enhance the authoritative mechanisms of the state in order to extract resources and provided public goods to the general population. The MPLA, rather than developing strong links with societal forces, relied on its access to large quantities of oil revenues flowing to the coffers of the state to maintain its power through a system of elite accommodation. Within the framework of the patrimonialized state, formal state institutions with little capacity for autonomous action coexisted with informal institutions. These informal institutions were used to conduct the business of distributing funds to privileged social groups based on a strict political logic, thereby fostering the emergence of a predatory elite and depriving all but a narrow segment of the population of access to the benefits of state power. This hybrid configuration is self-perpetuating, since it is designed to advance the interests of key political, economic and military players, whose enthusiasm for this system is matched only by their aversion to reform.

As it did in wartime, so the MPLA in peacetime continues to rely on its access to considerable state resources to consolidate its control of the state. Like the wartime state,
the postwar state is characterized by institutional duality: the outward trappings of a rational-legal order coexist with powerful parallel, informal structures of governance directly controlled by the Presidency. The state oil parastatal, Sonangol, continues to provide the rents needed to lubricate the patronage machine, effectively supplanting formal state institutions in the execution of critical fiscal and non-fiscal tasks on behalf of the state.
CHAPTER 6
THE POLITICS OF WAR AND PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE

This chapter focuses on the institutional legacies of the Mozambican civil war (1976-1992). Like Angola, Mozambique emerged from centuries of Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. Like Angola, Mozambique also descended into a brutal civil war soon after independence. Whereas the MPLA’s takeover of the postcolonial Angolan state was fiercely contested by rival nationalist movements—a contest that began during the war for independence and carried over into the post-independence period—the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) took over the state in the absence of significant domestic challengers to its nationalist legitimacy. Soon after independence, however, civil war broke out following the creation of the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo).

The war was notable for its brutality, as Renamo attacked civilians, clinics, schools and infrastructure (Vines 991, 1996). By the mid-1980s, the war had reached a stalemate, which along with the end of the Cold War and other developments created conditions for direct peace talks between the two sides. In October 1992, the Frelimo and Renamo signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome. The end of the civil war was critical to the ‘partial constitutionalization’ of politics (Carbone 2005). Since the end of the civil war, Mozambique has enjoyed a period of peace and economic prosperity and has undertaken efforts to consolidate peace through institution-building and routine electoral competition. While Renamo has struggled to transform itself from a predominantly military organization into a successful political party, it continues to challenge Frelimo at the ballot box. In spite of Renamo’s occasional threats to withdraw from the political process, it has refrained from escalating crises in ways that would jeopardize the carefully constructed postwar order.
The organizational incentives that made a negotiated settlement Renamo’s preferred pathway to political power—the lack of material resources that would allow it to pursue a military strategy—continue to influence its assessment of the relative payoffs from compliance with and defection from the peace settlement, ensuring durable peace.

Before proceeding further, a brief discussion of the logic of case selection is in order. On the face of it, Mozambique represents an off-the-regression-line case in that it appears to deviate from the theoretical expectation: a negotiated settlement, not military victory, contributed to successful post-war state building. The UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was mandated with the task of monitoring and verifying the implementation of the peace accord. It took the lead in demobilizing Renamo and Frelimo fighters prior to the 1994 elections. Despite some setbacks, this process achieved its main goals. Because of this, Mozambique is widely considered a rare case of successful international intervention.

While international intervention played a significant role in several aspects of the peace process, I show that the Mozambican outcome is broadly consistent with the project’s theoretical arguments. Renamo was created, armed and financed by Rhodesia for its own geopolitical reasons. Upon the collapse of Rhodesia, South Africa took over as Renamo’s most important sponsor. As discussed later in the chapter, Renamo’s failure to articulate a coherent political ideology can be traced back to its dependence on external resources to finance its operations. The end of South Africa’s support for Renamo left the rebel group without the resources needed to prolong the civil war. Consequently, Renamo negotiated from a positon of overall weakness that, in effect, allowed Frelimo to achieve the outcome it was unable to achieve on the battlefield: virtually total control over the state.
legitimated by democratic elections. In addition, Renamo’s failure to cultivate local legitimacy during the war also meant that it had no significant domestic constituency it could mobilize to prolong the civil war. This wartime legacy along with the lack of domestic resources to make up for the loss of external support effectively foreclosed another round of fighting as a viable route to political power. In contrast, Frelimo was a universally recognized government, in control of the national and provincial capitals, which gave it considerable negotiating leverage against what was essentially a military force with negligible political legitimacy. Since the end of the civil war, Frelimo has used its superior capacity to organize and mobilize as well as its control of the central state to fortify its position.

The origins of postwar institution-building in Mozambique can also be traced back to wartime political developments. After taking over state power, Frelimo found itself faced with economic, social and institutional crises. As it embarked on an ambitious program of national transformation along socialist lines, it sought to expand the effective writ of the state to parts of the national territory where neither the liberation movement nor the colonial state had substantial presence. While Mozambique and Angola gained independence under virtually identical circumstances, Frelimo, unlike the MPLA in Angola, had no access to externally generated resource rents at its disposal. Consequently, Frelimo’s post-independence state building emphasized the need to cultivate broad-based legitimacy. When, due to the party’s ideological rigidity, Frelimo’s legitimacy declined, the party sidelined its ideology and made pragmatic course corrections, adopting various reforms that prepared the ground for a negotiated end to the conflict and determined the parameters of post-war politics. Despite the destructive nature of the war, the state emerged
with a degree of administrative capabilities, which, in turn, served as a foundation for state building in the ensuing decade.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first part discusses the dynamics of the civil war. I first provide a brief historical background to the conflict, locating the origins of the conflict in Frelimo’s assertive foreign policy and the threats it posed to its powerful neighbors, Rhodesia and South Africa, as they sought to preserve white minority rule amidst a rapidly changing geopolitical setting. Second, I discuss the effects of Renamo’s origins as the product of external instigation on its organizational structures, political content and relations with civilians. Third, I provide an overview of Frelimo’s post-independence nation-building project, the resistance it encountered along the way and the party’s course correction. I conclude the first part of the chapter with a brief discussion of the signing of a peace accord between Renamo and the government. The second part of the chapter discusses postwar developments, highlighting patterns of change and continuity in state-building outcomes.

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO CIVIL WAR

Like Angola, Mozambique became a Portuguese colony towards end of the fifteenth century. Efforts to consolidate colonial rule did not begin until after the Congress of Berlin, when European imperialists powers questioned Portuguese sovereignty over its colonies due to its lack of effective occupation. The national ‘humiliation’ at the Congress intensified nationalist fervor in Portugal, ultimately leading to a brutal ‘pacification’ campaign to consolidate colonial rule, which was completed in the first decade of the
twentieth century. By the end of WW II, European powers in Africa were making preparations to relinquish their colonies and transfer power to nationalist groups. In contrast, Portugal’s intransigence in the face of demands for independence excluded the possibility of a negotiated path to independence (Henriksen 1983; Simpson 1993: 310). Although the colonial authorities sought to appease the population by introducing some economic and political changes, they were inadequate to counteract the persistence of repressive restrictions on the population, including the imposition of poll taxes and forced wage labor away from home for a period of six months (Hanlon 1996: 9; Newitt 1995: 29; Peclard 2012: 65). The foreclosure of a peaceful transition made armed struggle necessary to achieve independence (Alden 2001: 154).

By 1960, the anticolonial and nationalist fervor sweeping through Africa had begun to shape the worldview of a growing number of exiled Mozambicans. This emergent nationalist consciousness led to the formation of the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENMO), the Mozambique-Makonde Union (MANU), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI). Because each nationalist movement drew on narrow ethno-regional base, the nationalist movement lacked the unity of purpose and cohesion necessary for effective resistance (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 80). In 1962, Tanzania, where most of these movements were based, facilitated the merger of these diverse movements, which resulted in the creation of Frelimo (Andersson 1992: 23).

Frelimo was led by Eduardo Mondlane, a U.S.-trained sociologist, until his assassination in 1969. From the beginning, Frelimo was beset by internal divisions, mainly due to the perception of southern bias within the organization (Opello 1975; Simpson 1993: 236).
Still, by 1968, it controlled about 25 percent of Mozambique (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 86). To mobilize peasant support, Frelimo had to find ways to incorporate them into the nationalist struggle and improve their lives (Simpson 1993: 322-3). To that end, Frelimo established a ‘guerrilla counterstate’ to govern civilians and re-politicize subaltern classes disenfranchised by colonial rule (Dinerman 2006: 17; Luke 1982: 416). The movement established an embryonic educational system that played an essential role in countering colonial myths and propagating a new ‘social myth’ necessary for the emergence of a national political community (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 94).

By the 1970s, the anticolonial war had reached a stalemate. Like the rest of the Portuguese colonies, Mozambique gained independence following the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Lisbon. Following negotiations with the new regime, Frelimo gained acceptance as the sole legitimate representative of Mozambican nationalism and was given a free hand to form a government. On June 25, 1975 Frelimo inaugurated the postcolonial state under the leadership of Samora Machel, who had succeeded Mondlane upon his death.

Upon assuming control of the state, Frelimo embarked on ambitious efforts to restructure society along socialist lines. But while domestic politics was important, the backdrop to the civil war was Frelimo’s foreign policy posture that put it on a collision course with two of its militarily and economically superior neighbors: Rhodesia and South Africa. Frelimo’s accession to state power had a “galvanizing effect” on black liberation movements in the region (Dinerman 2006: 4). The Frelimo government supported the formation of an alliance of frontline states (Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique) whose goals were the spread of socialism and the complete decolonization of southern Africa (Hall and Young 1997: 140; Morgan 1990: 610). As the liberation war in Rhodesia
intensified, Frelimo provided rear bases to the guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (Manning and Malbrough 2009: 78). In addition, Frelimo enforced UN sanctions against Rhodesia by closing the border between the two countries (Young 1990: 494). The cost to Mozambique was staggering, leading, for example, to the loss of about $500 million in rail and transit fees (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 173). In response, Rhodesia assembled a group of former Portuguese soldiers and Frelimo dissidents and created what Ken Flower, the former head of Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), called a “pseudo-terrorist” organization: Renamo (Flower 1987: 301).

Renamo: The Political Economy of Rebellion

In this section, I discuss the dynamics of the civil war by focusing on Renamo’s origins and how its resource endowments shaped the insurgent group’s organizational structures and the nature of its relationships with civilians. Motivations based on resource endowments are not directly observable. But inferences can be made through the use of appropriate instruments, since resource endowments shape organizational structures, recruitment patterns and the degree of violence against civilians (Weinstein 2007).

Most observers agree that Renamo was the creation of Rhodesian military-intelligence, the CIO (Cabrita 2000; Fauvet 1984; Flower 1987; Simpson 1993: 318). Initially, the movement began as a radio station, ‘Voz da Africa Livre’ (Radio Free Africa), broadcasting anti-Frelimo propaganda from its base in Rhodesia (Andersson 1992: 49; Hall and Young 1997: 118). These broadcasts were organized by Orlando Cristina, an officer in the Portuguese colonial army in Mozambique. However, from Rhodesia’s perspective,
what was needed was a force that could be deployed to destabilize the government of Mozambique in order to raise the costs of supporting ZANU. To that end, CIO operatives and members of Rhodesian Special Forces provided training to anti-Frelimo elements that formed Renamo (Weinstein 2007: 111).

Initially, membership was limited to a small number of exiled Mozambicans living in Rhodesia (Manning 2008: 45; Simpson 1993: 318). The CIO fashioned Renamo out of counterinsurgency units, the ‘Flechas’ or ‘arrows’ that had been created and controlled by the Portuguese secret police, the Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (P.I.D.E.) (Morgan 1990: 605). After independence, in order to avoid almost certain retribution by Frelimo, many former members fled to Rhodesia. One such key figure was Orlando Cristina, who would later become Renamo’s Secretary-General (Hall and Young 1997: 117).

In addition to former officers in the Portuguese colonial army, Frelimo dissidents swelled the ranks of the nascent rebel army (Morgan 1990: 605). Pre-independence and post-independence leadership struggles within Frelimo had produced a number of dissidents, who, having lost their status and power, were willing to join forces with other likeminded actors to mount a challenge to the government (Kloeck-Jenson and West 1999: 460; Manning 2002: 85). The turning point in the operational life of the nascent insurgency came when the CIO recruited Andre Matsangaissa, a former Frelimo officer who was arrested for theft and sent to a ‘reeducation’ camp, from which he escaped in 1976 and fled across the border to Rhodesia (Vines 1991: 16; Young 1990: 494). Matsangaissa would later become Renamo’s first president. In this way, the insurgent movement “evolved into a broad, violent collection of FRELIMO’s enemies” (Finnegan 1992: 70). Insofar as these
loosely bound anti-Frelimo elements had a unifying thread—other than their obvious aversion to Frelimo—it was their collective desire for power (Vines 1991: 95).

From its inception until 1980, Renamo was comprehensively dependent on Rhodesia, leading one observer to characterize the group as “a Rhodesian, anti-Frelimo fifth column operating in Mozambique” (Vines 1991: 16). As Renamo’s first Secretary General, Orlando Cristina, put it: “It is the Rhodesians who pay my wages and upkeep here, as well as costs for those taken inside Mozambique. Without this support we would all be sitting in cafes in Lisbon, dreaming of unrealistic battles” (quoted in Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 62). In addition to weapons and uniforms, food and shelter, Renamo received money from Rhodesia. Matsangaissa and Dhlakama were paid Rh$75 and Rh $65 a month respectively, while others were paid salaries of Rh$20 a month” (Weinstein 2007: 111).

As the insurgency began to take shape under Matsangaissa’s leadership, the need to recruit fighters increased. Although induction into Renamo’s army was by and large draconian, based on coercion, it did not start out that way. Initially, Renamo relied on material payoffs as an inducement, recruiting large numbers of opportunistic joiners (Weinstein 2007: 111). Rhodesia’s direct monetary aid allowed Renamo’s leadership to offer new recruits salaries and other perks. But in 1979, Renamo faced a grave existential crisis, as the Lancaster House Agreement led to the end of minority rule in Rhodesia and the end of Rhodesian subsidies (Young 1990: 495). In 1980, Rhodesia handed over operational control of Renamo to South Africa (Simpson 1993: 326).

Although South Africa provided logistical support, military supplies and training, “the flow of salaries and food that kept Renamo comfortable in Rhodesia came to an end” (Weinstein 2007: 112). The lack of direct financial support was consequential. Given
Renamo’s reliance on the provision of material payoffs to entice recruits, the strength of social ties or the ethnic identities of its would-be fighters did not figure prominently in its recruitment strategies. By offering fighters material benefits, Renamo was able to attract recruits and maintain a semblance of cohesion within the movement. Now that the use of financial payoffs was no longer a viable option for recruiting fighters, it would obviously seem logical for Renamo to alter its recruitment strategy by fostering collaborative relations with civilians. However, Renamo chose a coercive strategy to induct fighters, abducting children and adolescents from the poorest parts of the country (Andersson 1992: 57; Nilsson 1999: 125-129). Based on extensive interviews, William Minter shows that over 90 percent of Renamo fighters were forcibly recruited (cited in Hall 1990: 45). By 1985 Renamo had a 20,000-man rebel army (Morgan 1990: 608).

On the face of it, fostering consensual relations should be preferable to coercion in the long run, as it might generate fighters committed to the underlying cause of the rebellion. But Renamo was content to rely on South Africa for military and logistical support, thereby obviating the need to cultivate local legitimacy. But Renamo’s coercive strategy was also shaped by its prior practice of using material payoffs to motivate potential recruits, resulting in the induction of opportunistic fighters, who had little or no commitment to the long-term goals of the organization. “Brought together by opportunity rather than conviction, Renamo’s core membership lacked a set of social ties that could be activated and mobilized to draw volunteers into the army” (Weinstein 2007: 115). Due to the considerable time and effort required to create substantial networks of support, efforts by Renamo to make a reversal by seeking to forge a consensual approach to recruitment might not have generated the desired outcome in time to stave off military collapse.
Renamo’s coercive recruitment naturally raised other organizational challenges, such as how to make captive soldiers fight for a cause to which they had little or no commitment. In fact, on average, recruits stayed with Renamo for about a year before deserting (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 92). Renamo’s leaders, thus, had to put in place various mechanisms to ensure the loyalty of fighters and prevent them from deserting. In line with its overall organizational character, Renamo employed harsh internal discipline to prevent defection. In the absence of financial payoffs, “violence was probably the most effective and cheapest means of obtaining obedience both within the ranks and outside them” (Hall and Young 1997: 171). Recruits were subjected to a series of abuses in order to socialize them into their new environment by breaking them psychologically before military training (Hall and Young 1997: 169-170; Vines 1991: 95; Wilson 1992: 545). Renamo interspersed harsh treatment “with moments of good will, friendliness and human understanding as a reward” for ‘good’ behavior (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 92). Recruits were also compelled to commit violence against fellow villagers or even their own family members. The resulting guilt and fear of retribution served as chilling disincentives to those considering returning to their villages (Hall and Young 1997: 170; Hultman 2009: 829).

But since Renamo had a large number of fighters scattered throughout the country, coercion was inadequate to prevent potentially fatal mass desertions. Consequently, the leadership had to employ additional mechanisms to deter escape and maintain stability within the rebel army. One such mechanism was the systematic transferring of recruits away from their home areas to make it hard for them to flee (Hultman 2009: 828). This practice was particularly relevant to central Mozambique where there had not been any
tradition of migration over large distance (Vines 1991: 96). As the organization grew in size and strength, the leadership also reintroduced the use of short-term material inducements as the principal mechanism of attracting and keeping recruits. As former Renamo soldiers recounted, the rebel group permitted its soldiers to loot private and public properties (Weinstein 2007: 116). Looting was an effective recruitment tool, given the economic hardship that prevailed in much of the country. One of the challenges for rebel leaders is how to motivate their followers. Recruitment is relatively easy when the opportunity costs of joining a rebel group decline, as is the case in the face of widespread poverty (Blattman and Miguel 2010: 10). This was the case in Mozambique, as becoming a Renamo fighter offered “the recruit the only chance of upward mobility to a better lifestyle” in an overall context of destitution and suffering (Vines 1991: 95). Renamo was, thus, able to capture and /or use material payoffs to entice people at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, who had low educational background (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 89; Manning 2002: 88-91). Given these incentives, however, Renamo was known for its legendary indiscipline with far-reaching implications for its relations with civilians. As a former Frelimo commander recruited by Orlando Cristina, Zeca Caliate, noted: “when I stressed the importance of discipline in a military organization, some of them said I had come from Portugal to become the Resistance leader” (quoted in Cabrita 2000: 165).

Structures for Governing Civilians

Comprehensively dependent on Rhodesia and South Africa for military, financial and material support, Renamo made minimal efforts to build non-military institutions and political relations with civilians (Hall 19990: 39; Hall and Young 1997: 175). Renamo was
generally “unable to articulate a political program with any elements of consistency or
depth beyond a crude anti-Frelimo formulation” (Alden 2001: 15-6). As Matsangaissa put
it:

We are not interested in policymaking … later we will have to work out politics but
first communism must go from our country. It is killing us, we have to kill for
everything we want. We kill for food, for pills, for guns and ammunition! (Quoted

This statement captures the essence of Renamo’s emergence and organizational evolution.
Conventional wisdom suggests that, since challenging an established government requires
considerable material and human resources, it is in the best interest of would-be insurgents
to forge reciprocal relations with the population. Indeed, in laying out his approach to
guerrilla warfare, Mao Zedong posited that “because guerrilla warfare basically derives
from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates
itself from their sympathies and cooperation” (quoted in Weinstein 2007: 163). To obtain
popular support, rebel leaders, thus, seek to nurture local legitimacy by convincing the
population that the insurgency is in their best interests. Renamo turned Mao’s logic on its
head by initiating an insurgency without laying the ground for attracting popular support.
Renamo’s shallow commitment to politics or ideology and, by extension, civilian
participation can, in turn, be traced back to its dependence on external patronage. Raising
resources domestically by bargaining with the population imposes legitimate costs on rebel
organizations. The time and energy invested into resource mobilization can detract from
military operations. External support, by acting as a substitute for local resources, allows
insurgents to bypass the politically sensitive and arduous process of domestic resource
extraction.
Around the time Renamo lost Rhodesia’s support following Zimbabwe’s independence, Mozambican government forces captured Renamo’s headquarters inside Mozambique in Gorongosa (Newitt 1995: 564). In the process, Matsangaissa was killed. After a violent succession struggle, Afonso Dhlakama was elevated to the top spot. With the end of Rhodesian support, Renamo moved to South Africa. Although former Rhodesian Special Forces personnel continued to train Renamo fighters, they operated under command of South African military-intelligence (Vines 1991: 19). South Africa’s support for Renamo came in the context of ‘Total Strategy’, the apartheid regime’s economic, political and military responses to the perceived threat of Total Onslaught’ from the communist bloc (Johnston 1991). In reality, the doctrine of total strategy was principally aimed at ensuring the survival of apartheid. The end of Portuguese colonial rule had eliminated a powerful bastion of white minority rule in the southern cone of Africa. Frelimo’s opposition to apartheid, along with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and the MPLA’s aid to freedom fighters in Namibia significantly raised the threat perception of the security establishment in Pretoria (Simpson 1993: 326). South Africa, thus, supported Renamo to pressure Frelimo to end its sponsorship of the African National Congress (ANC), which was operating out of bases in Mozambique (Finnegan 1992: 32).

With South Africa’s multidimensional support, Renamo expanded from a nuisance to a serious threat to Frelimo. Unlike Rhodesia, which essentially discouraged Renamo from establishing an independent political profile, South Africa was sensitive to Renamo’s international image (Hall and Young 1997: 131). Consequently, although Renamo emerged without clear ideological or political reasons for being, it did not remain an apolitical organization. Soon after the transfer of Renamo’s operational headquarters to South Africa,
South African military intelligence sought to change Renamo’s predominantly military structure by attaching “acceptable” political leadership to the movement (Manning 2002: 77). Orlando Christina was selected as the Secretary General of Renamo and Afonso Dhlakama as the President. Given the radioactive nature of the apartheid regime, association with it was bound to delegitimize Renamo. By draping Renamo in political rhetoric, South Africa sought to portray Renamo as a serious opposition to Frelimo worthy of regional and international support (Nilsson 1999: 57).

In 1980, Pretoria sent Dhlakama and his top aides to Europe in the first of several trips to meet with sympathetic right-wing groups in Portugal, West Germany and France (Finnegan 1992: 33). During his trip, Dhlakama learnt that, while Renamo had sympathy in the European capitals the delegation visited, European politicians expected the group to articulate a viable political agenda. As Renamo Secretary-General Orlando Cristina noted, Dhlakama and his top aides “have come to the conclusion that politics is a business and that no one would be willing to invest in a movement which does not offer guarantees that dividends would be paid later” (quoted in Cabrita 200: 186). Renamo’s actions in the ensuing decade reflected this basic reality, at least in rhetoric.

In 1981, Renamo issued a political manifesto, Manifest and Program, calling for, among other things, a government of national unity, economic reform and the formation of a new national army based on its own fighters but supplemented by ‘acceptable elements’ from Frelimo’s forces (Hall 1990: 43). In 1982, at the behest of South Africa, Renamo created a National Council, which was designed “graft a political superstructure onto an existing military organization” (Hall and Young 1997: 132). The establishment of this structure was intended to secure external funds by signaling the movement’s political
content (Manning 2002: 104). Despite its rhetoric, the movement did not have the political institutions through which it could articulate and represent the demands and interests of the population. When, in an effort to improve its international profile, Renamo held a National Political Congress during the war, it showed negligible interest in civilian participation, which was evidenced by the fact that the Congress brought together almost exclusively senior commanders and rebel soldiers (Weinstein 2007: 184). As late 1987, the movement’s political structure was essentially a military command structure with Dhlakama at the top (Hall and Young 1997: 133).

Insofar as Renamo is credited with any political program, “its ideology has been described as a ‘traditionalist’ inversion of Frelimo’s modernist goals” designed to appeal to those living at the economic and political margins (Alexander 1997: 8). Indeed, as it expanded its presence in the countryside, the insurgent group exploited Frelimo’s hostility to traditional authorities by returning power to local chiefs known as regulos (Weinstein 2007: 181). Due to the regulos’ deep roots in the country’s social fabric, they had served as critical transmission belts for colonial directives, even as the local population expected them to resist colonial rule (Goncalves 2005: 65-66). Frelimo, in its zeal to restructure society, had vilified these traditional authorities, a decision that generated considerable resentment against Frelimo, which Renamo exploited to advance its own agenda (Finnegan, 1992: 64-6; Morgan 1990: 613; Newitt 1995: 57). Some have characterized this approach as “an important ideological plank for Renamo” (Alexander 1997: 8). But the apparent re-empowerment of traditional authorities was not necessarily restorative, as the appointment of local notables produced a façade rather than substantive decision-makers (Sumich 2013: 104).
The reappointment of chiefs was a strategy aimed at consolidating hierarchical control by Renamo while limiting the ability of civilians to shape the rebellion (Weinstein 2007: 182-183). A variety of evidence support this argument. First, Renamo chose local notables who “promised to be pliant intermediaries” (Kloeck-Jenson and West 1999: 460). Second, the consent of the regulos was not necessary for Renamo’s governance system to function. When regulos resisted, they were replaced (Weinstein 2007: 183). Third, regulos were able to exercise only marginal control over Renamo soldiers and lacked the ability to shape the nature of the insurgency. Consequently, the population saw Renamo’s restoration of traditional authorities not as “a radical break with the past but as yet another round of coercive and disruptive rule in a long tradition of the same” (Alexander 1997: 9). Consequently, the emerging political system was characterized by unilateral decision-making and limited civilian participation.

Renamo’s failure to forge reciprocal relations with the population was evidenced by its lack of efforts to provide public goods in return for popular support. As the French anthropologist, Christian Geffray has argued, local populations were beginning to see by 1984 (it was then 1988) that Renamo had neither the will nor the ability to change things for the better: “Renamo does not have a way to maintain in the long term the credibility of its propaganda and to maintain the illusion that it has anything else in mind other than war” (quoted in Manning 2002: 88). In spite of abundant evidence to the contrary, Renamo’s leaders had a different take on the nature of the group’s relations with the population. In a 1989 interview, Dhlakama claimed, “we are building schools hospitals and even farms…. In the areas that are ruled by Renamo there is a considerably better infrastructure than in those of Frelimo” (quoted in Vines 1001: 76). There was, however, no evidence to back up
Dhlakama’s assertions. Journalists traveling to Renamo-held areas saw no evidence of such services and there were no local inhabitants who could vouch for the veracity of these claims (Vines 1991: 76). Even so, a semblance of civilian administration did take shape after 1988, when Renamo began training nurses and teachers in its areas of control. Such efforts were aimed at burnishing Renamo’s image as a credible opposition to Frelimo prior to peace talks (Vines 1991: 20; Weinstein 2007: 186).

A variety of evidence supports the argument that Renamo had failed to nurture consensual relations with the population. According to the accounts of Mozambicans refugees, the rebel group’s administrative setup could be classified according to geographical, logistical and local political considerations (Vines 1991: 91). Based on extensive interviews with refugees as part of a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of State in 1988, Robert Gersony identified three notional areas of Renamo operations labeled as “tax areas”, “control areas”, and “destruction areas” in ascending order of oppression (cited in Andersson 1992: 62-3; Vines 991: 91-93).

“Tax areas” were characterized by low population density in territory marginal to Renamo operations. In these areas, Renamo demanded food, clothing for fighters and short-term labor for portage duties in return for not killing them (Vines 1991: 91). “Control areas” constituted Renamo’s main areas of operation and the basis of its “liberated zones.” However, even in these areas, Renamo did not politicize the population (Weinstein 2007: 236). The main functions of these areas was to produce food and provide labor for the organization, almost always under harsh conditions modelled on early Portuguese plantations, “where the population was compelled, out of their inability to meet the heavy taxes imposed on them, to work for very little return” (Vines 1991: 91). Escape or dissent
was punished with death. Renamo relied on young civilian collaborators called the ‘Mujeeba’ that constituted an efficient spy and surveillance network, as a low-cost mechanism for enforcing this system (Hall and Young 1997: 176; Vines 1991: 92).

In “destruction areas”, Renamo did not distinguish between military and civilian targets, annihilating entire villages. Since communal villages were considered counterinsurgency tools for Frelimo, their destruction was treated as a strategic necessity (Newitt 1995: 571). In what some observers described as an “annihilative frenzy” (Finnegan 1989 as cited in Hall 1990: 59), Renamo also targeted rural communication and transportation infrastructure, such as the Beira-Umtali pipeline and the railway between Beira and Zimbabwe designed to “instill a paralyzing and incapacitating fear into the wider population” (Wilson 1992: 531). The rebel group also systematically targeted symbols of state authority, such as schools, clinics and infrastructure (Hall 1990: 52; Wilson 1992: 530). Between 1980 and 1988, Renamo’s attacks rendered inoperative about 1,800 schools and 720 health units (Vines 1991: 17).

Despite preexisting regional cleavages, Renamo’s attacks were surprisingly uniform. As the above mentioned report concluded, “that the accounts are so strikingly similar by refugees who have fled from northern, central and southern Mozambique suggests that the violence is systematic and coordinated and not a series of spontaneous, isolated incidents by undisciplined combatants” (quoted in Hall and Young 1997: 167). Renamo’s attacks on communal villages, even when articulated in terms of military necessity, were particularly brutal and could in no way be reconciled with the actions of a rebel organization concerned about local legitimacy.
Even so, the insurgent group was known to act opportunistically, occasionally adjusting its tactics in response to conditions on the ground. For example, in some areas, Renamo’s seemingly purposeless campaign of destruction was driven largely by strategic considerations: to make life unbearable for the population in ways that would delegitimize the Frelimo party-state (Dinerman 2006: 60). Since Frelimo had staked its legitimacy on its ability to provide for and protect the population, Renamo’s attacks, by disrupting the government’s ability to hold up to its end of the bargain with the population, eroded the principal pillar of the party’s legitimacy (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 65-66; Schutz 1995: 118). As Hall and Young (1997 168-169) note, “the argument that the violence directed against civilians was indeed purposeful and instrumental was supported by an apparent lessening of such activity in areas where the local Frelimo influence and presence had been eliminated and Renamo was relatively well established.” In general, however, Renamo’s violence against civilians extended even to areas likely to be supportive of its cause (Weinstein 2007: 79).

As the discussion so far has shown, Renamo’s lack of consensual relations with the population could be traced back to its dependence on externally generated resources. The anticipated withdrawal of external support should, thus, alter the movement’s organizational incentives. That is, the drying up of easy financing should incentivize Renamo to foster collaborative relations with the population. Yet, such a reversal did not materialize. In fact, in anticipation of South Africa’s withdrawal, Renamo acted in a predatory fashion, systematically looting household property. Renamo also obtained revenues from the sale of ivory and other goods, using its newfound wealth to purchase the loyalty of its fighters (Weinstein 2007: 271).
It is, of course, possible to imagine an alternative strategic response, but conditions on the ground militated against reversal. Renamo’s failure to make adjustments in the face of strategic shifts in the region clearly demonstrates the role of path-dependence in the persistence of calcified organizational practices, even when organizational adaptations seem to be essential for long-term viability. Given the immediacy of Renamo’s organizational needs, efforts at nurturing consensual relations with the population might not come to fruition in time to make a material difference in Renamo’s military situation. Given Renamo’s history of poor relations with the population, there was no guarantee that a reversal of course on its part would have generated meaningful support for the insurgent movement. Consequently, Renamo prioritized short-term military necessity over the need to adopt an alternative strategy with an uncertain outcome.

In the next section, I examine how Frelimo’s efforts to construct the postcolonial state. Although the civil war was the result of external instigation, Frelimo’s policy errors and ideological excesses provided the essential context for Renamo’s expansion. In particular, Frelimo’s zealous pursuit of societal transformation and ideological rigidity led to the implementation of policies that alienated the peasantry. In effect, these policies guaranteed the peasantry’s opposition to Frelimo or at best guarded neutrality (Carbone 2005:425). Renamo benefited from Frelimo’s various missteps, even as it made no meaningful effort to present itself as a viable alternative to the party-state. In the face of dwindling legitimacy, Frelimo was forced to act pragmatically in order to rehabilitate its frayed ties to societal forces. Accordingly, it made significant economic, political and social changes that laid the ground work for peace negotiations with Renamo and foreshadowed postwar developments.
Unlike the MPLA in Angola, Frelimo enjoyed uncontested nationalist credentials owing to the emergence of a cohesive anticolonial nationalism in Mozambique. But the transition to independence was haphazard, as the colonial authorities had neither the will nor the power to ensure a smooth transfer of power. As Frelimo navigated between the immediate demands of post-independence politics and a coordinated assault on its legitimacy by Renamo and Rhodesia, the need to pursue a broad-based state building project was apparent in view of the lack of preexisting institutional capacity. Unlike some of its continental counterparts, Mozambique had few natural resources and/or limited geostrategic value that would provide the country with a significant ‘unearned’ revenue. The country simply had no resources to produce and market without input from the peasantry. However, the new government also “faced the basic dilemma of having to extract from agricultural production the resources it needed to improve education, health, and urban welfare” (Cooper 2002: 143). The immediate challenge the new government confronted was how to arrest the collapse of agricultural production, without which it would not be able to extract the surplus essential to Frelimo’s developmentally-oriented political project. Economic policies in the ensuing decade reflected these priorities (Hall and Young 1997: 58-59).

National integration is decidedly difficult under the most favorable of circumstances. In Mozambique, these tasks were compounded by the fact that it unfolded in the shadow of a debilitating colonial past. Mozambique lacked prior state traditions. Frelimo could not draw on readily available historical symbols and memories to inspire the formation of a cohesive national political community. Due to the collapse of the colonial
state and the haphazard departure of Portuguese settlers that had staffed the colonial state bureaucracy, Frelimo inherited a rickety state structure with limited administrative capabilities (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 76). More strongly, Frelimo inherited an empty state apparatus:

Frelimo was left to run an effectively bankrupt country with virtually no trained people. The illiteracy rate was over 90 percent. There were six economists, two agronomists, not a single geologist, and fewer than a thousand black high school graduates in all of Mozambique. Of 350 railroad engineers working in 1975, just one was black (and he was an agent of the Portuguese secret police) (Finnegan 1992: 30).

Although Frelimo was a popular liberation movement, Most Mozambicans were largely unfamiliar with the party’s positions (Dinerman 2006: 50; Simpson 1993: 316). Frelimo could not, thus, assume that its role in ending colonial rule would be a source of national legitimacy (Schutz 1995: 113). For these reasons, the new government’s immediate task was national integration, which practically meant the need to extend state authority to areas where Frelimo had little or no presence during the anticolonial struggle (Hall and Young 1997: 55; Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 111; Luke 1982: 431).

As part of this drive to extend the institutional reach of the state, Frelimo established decentralized institutions known as Dynamizing Groups (GDs). “Given the limited resources at its disposal in terms of finance and manpower, there was no alternative but to delegate power and decentralise government” (Simpson 1993: 317). The GDs were based on the revolutionary committee structures developed in the liberated zones during the anticolonial war (Luke 1982: 432). The GDs were located in factories, communal villages and neighborhoods, “acting as a link between the party and the population, and responsible for organizing everything from literacy programs to the running of factories” (Simpson
1993: 317). They were staffed by local volunteer groups and Frelimo supporters that worked underground during the colonial era.

The GDs were semi-democratic in that membership was based on elections in public meetings in urban and rural residential areas (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 78). Each GD comprised of eight to ten people “chosen by a show of hands in public meetings in city neighborhoods, workplaces and local communities around the country” (Dinerman 2006: 50). But leadership of each GD was given to party members (Hall and Young 1997: 52). While GDs were hierarchically linked to the party, each local GD developed “far-reaching autonomy” (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 78). The GD’s emphasis on popular participation was critical to establishing social trust and placing the state at the center of political life (Minter 1994: 244).

Generally, the GDs were asked to perform tasks normally reserved to formal state institutions, including welfare, judicial, law enforcement, security and administrative functions (Dinerman 2006: 50). The GDs were also essential in educating the population about Frelimo’s history and political programs. As transmission belts for Frelimo directives and policies, the GDS facilitated the implementation of Frelimo’s “signature programs” such as the expansion of rural education, healthcare, and the supply of clean water to rural villages (Kloeck-Jenson and West 1999: 457-58).

While the GDs played a crucial role in the immediate aftermath of independence, they were a stopgap institutional mechanism until formal state structures could be established. Frelimo’s adoption of Marxism-Leninism at its Third Party Congress in 1977 was intelligible in the context of the need to create permanent state institutions (Schutz 1995: 115). The appeal of Marxism lay in the concepts of vanguardism and revolution,
which Frelimo equated with political discipline (Dinerman 2006: 176; Hall and Young 1997: 69; Simpson 1993: 321). In this way, Marxism provided Frelimo with a clear model of state construction, offering blueprints for the structure and operation of a modernizing state, its relations with the party and the people.

In fashioning their vision of the new society to be created, Frelimo elites drew on the liberated zones of the anticolonial war, which the new government treated as a ‘strategic politico-moral map’ of the country (Hall and Young 1997: 54). The leadership regarded the guerrilla counterstate that emerged during this period “as the practical prefiguration of social revolution after independence” (Luke 1982: 414). As the new government began to put its stamp on the new state, the country was administratively separated into 8 provinces and 128 districts (Hall and Young 1997: 72). Frelimo replaced previous district administrators with people from the middle ranks of the party (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 83). State structures at all levels were linked to the party, as the highest administrative official at the district and provincial levels was also the first secretary of the party (Alexander 1997: 3). Despite initial skepticism or even outright opposition from large segments of the population, Frelimo was able to establish a fairly centralized state within the first three years of independence (Chabal et al 2002: 55; Ciment 1997:142).

But while a centralized state was in place, its capacity to fulfill the ambitious tasks Frelimo had outlined were limited. The capacity of the state to craft and implement policies, extract resources and control society cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider society of which it was a part. Thus, governments operating within certain institutional constraints that limit their capacity for autonomous action may rely on their legitimacy to compensate for their weaknesses (Hall and Young 1997: 82). Based on its success in the
war for independence, Frelimo had a high degree of ‘revolutionary’ legitimacy. But translating this ‘movement’ legitimacy into “civic or governmental legitimacy” rested on the movement’s ability to cultivate popular support (Schutz 1995: 110-11). Given Frelimo’s control of the state was not mandated by democratic elections, it based its legitimacy on the ability to provide and protect. Given the poor state of the inherited economy and history of discrimination against indigenous Mozambicans in the provision of services, the notion of ‘development for legitimacy’ was an obvious choice (Hall and Young 1997: 90-1).

But the provision of services did not come cheaply in light of the country’s level of underdevelopment. Consequently, the mobilization of revenues was a priority for the government. To put central government finances on a firm footing, the government undertook a series of tax reforms. The first major tax reform took place in 1978. The reform was aimed at changing the fundamental nature of state-society relations. According to the governments legislative language, the reform aimed to alter the tax system from “[a] colonial instrument of domination [to]…the duty of each citizen to contribute …to the costs of the program of the Popular State in order to create the conditions for the introduction of socialism” (quoted in Byiers 2009: 19). This reform resulted in the introduction of the National Reconstruction Tax and the Circulation Tax. In addition, changes were made to consumption taxes. Due to the low fiscal baseline from which the government began, this tax reform had the immediate impact of boosting central government revenue. Tax revenue leaped from a meager 7.6 percent of GDP in 1977 to 11.1 percent in 1978, and 14.1 percent in 1983 (Byiers 2009: 19).
In using scarce resources to legitimize its hold on power, Frelimo’s priorities were driven by the legacy of discrimination against the indigenous population in the provision of healthcare and education. It is, thus, no surprise that those two sectors consumed a large proportion of the budget. The share of government spending devoted to healthcare rose from 3.7 percent at the end of the colonial period to 12 percent by 1982, which was one of the highest proportions in the world (Dinerman 2006: 52-3). Expenditure per capita went up from $1.7 in 1975 to $5.6 in 1982 (Melamed and Walt 1983: 139). With respect to healthcare provisions, Frelimo drew on its experience in the liberated zones, where Tanzania-trained healthcare workers cared for Frelimo fighters and the population in the territories it controlled (Hall and Young 1997: 82). At independence, less than 10 percent of the population had access to healthcare services. By 1982, more than 50 percent of the population had access to “preventive medical care and over one-third to some form of curative one” (Dinerman 2006: 53). The collapse of colonial education, which was directed at a narrow segment of the population, generated considerable demand for mass education (Hall and Young 1997: 57). This led to the establishment of 495 primary schools, seventy-one secondary schools and the training of 6,900 teachers, leading to a significant reduction in illiteracy (Dinerman 2006: 53). Between 1976 and 1981, illiteracy dropped by more than 20 percent (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 139).

In 1982, the World Health Organization (WHO) recognized Mozambique as a low-income country that had made “extraordinary” progress in rural health and education, which was evidenced by the fact that the Frelimo government had vaccinated 95 percent of the country’s children within three years of independence and quadrupled the number of primary and secondary school graduates (Ciment 1997: 65). As a result, Frelimo enjoyed
a degree of legitimacy, drawing popular support for improving people’s material lives (Hall and Young 1997: 82).

The gradual extension of state services to the population played a critical role in linking state and society. However, as Renamo’s operations intensified throughout the country, the rebel group’s violent campaign proved “effective in undermining Frelimo’s mobilizational capacity, its territorial control and its efforts to deliver services” (Alexander 1997: 20). In the countryside, large areas had been rendered inaccessible. Consequently, the state hit “the bedrock of physical security and minimal economic well-being” upon which its legitimacy claims were predicated (Young 1988: 184). The provision of primary health and educational services saw a progressive decline during this period. Consequently, Frelimo’s bargain with the population—the provision of social welfare and security in exchange for acquiescence to its rule—began to unravel (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 66; Cabrita 2000: 220; Hanlon 1996: 5).

While Renamo’s attacks played a significant role in undermining state-society linkages, the superimposition of a Leninist political model on the already centralized system inherited from Portuguese colonialism exposed the fundamental tension between Frelimo’s lip service to the notion of Poder Popular (people’s power) and its top-down vision of social progress, which antagonized large segments of the population (Hall and Young 1997: 74; Young 1988: 172; Simpson 1993: 318). Frelimo’s agenda of modernization had little or no room for preexisting traditional social structures (Young 1990: 507). For example, as noted earlier, the party’s modernization agenda led to the vilification of traditional authorities, dismissing them as “embarrassing holdovers from an embarrassing “feudal” precolonial past” (Dinerman 2006: 12). This hostility generated
legitimacy-sapping discontent among the people whose traditions and customs came under assault (Chabal et al 2002: 198-9; Dinerman 2006: 11; Nilsson 1999: 102; Van der Lijn 2006: 175). Even if Frelimo’s missteps were hardly comparable to Renamo’s brutalization of the rural population, “they produced a disaffected and apathetic peasantry who were more easily dominated and exploited by Renamo” (Newitt 1995: 572). Although Renamo lacked an extensive social base to engage in a conventional guerrilla warfare, it capitalized on the peasantry’s neutrality and “sullen acquiescence” to expand its operations (Hall and Young 1997: 158). In short, though Renamo began as the product of external instigation and was continually dependent on South Africa, its surprising resilience was also a reflection of peasant opposition to Frelimo (Cooper 2002: 144).

As Renamo grew in size and strength, it further benefitted from the costly failure of Frelimo’s socialist experiment, as the gap between the government’s ambitious economic goals and its limited capacity to achieve those goals punctured the credibility of its ideological programs. Between 1981 and 1986, the economy experienced negative growth rates (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 117). Industry was operating at twenty to forty percent of capacity (Arndt, Jensen and Tarp 2000: 303; Manning 2002: 122). Immediately after independence, the Frelimo government had adopted socialism, giving the state considerable role in virtually all aspects of economic management. Underlying the adoption of a strategy of a command economy was as an impatient impulse to modernization driven by the economic conditions Frelimo inherited at independence. While private economic actors remained in existence, they continued to play limited role in production. Despite the infusion of scarce resources into state-owned enterprises, Mozambique simply did not have the human and physical capital to achieve the kind of
economic growth envisaged by the government’s 10-year plan envisaged by the party. The infusion of scarce resource into state-owned enterprises had a crowding out effect on household production, which alienated the peasantry from the state, creating fertile conditions for Renamo’s growth (Arndt, Jensen and Tarp 2000: 301).

The spread of the war in the countryside was obviously the main reason for the contraction of productive economic activities, as Renamo’s attacks created a climate of fear and insecurity that disrupted economic activities (Ottaway 1988: 216). In a circular fashion, Renamo’s destructive campaign, by eroding Frelimo’s support, contributed to its expansion. As the war spread and its legitimacy eroded, Frelimo, thus, made a number of policy and institutional changes. Given the country’s lack of enclave natural resource sectors that could be sheltered from attacks, the government could not ignore the country’s dire economic condition. Frelimo’s subsequent policy and institutional adjustments stands in stark contrast to its Angolan counterpart: the MPLA. The latter had access to large quantities of oil rents at its disposal it could use to ensure a modicum of social peace in the main urban centers, effectively de-linking the problem of agricultural production from potentially regime-destabilizing urban discontent. Frelimo’s dependence on the peasantry for food production and the extraction of surplus via taxes meant that it could not ignore peasant discontent and its dwindling legitimacy. Crucially, Frelimo had to abandon ideological rigidity and adopt a pragmatic attitude.

Prior to the party’s Fourth Congress held in April 1983, the government had identified a number of policy errors that had caused and prolonged the country’s economic malaise and, by extension, created a fertile ground for Renamo’s growth (Marshall 1990: 29). During the Fourth Congress, “the core problem was seen to be that the concentration
of resources in the state sector had both been badly managed and had ‘crowded out’ other forms of economic activity to the detriment of production” (Hall and Young 1997: 152-153). Strikingly, the party identified the abandonment of the family farm and cooperative sectors in favor of agricultural enterprises, which had antagonized the peasantry, as the main problem (Ottaway 1988: 218). The lack of investment in the family sector had forced peasants to “retreat from the market to subsistence production” (Marshall 1990: 29). Frelimo’s Marxist-inspired policies in the first decade of independence had also antagonized private economic actors. As Renamo’s activities intensified in rural areas, Frelimo considered reconciliation with such would-be entrepreneurs to rehabilitate its image (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 199). To that end, the party proposed two major solutions to the problem: reviving a market system to encourage private initiative and reducing the size of the state sector and decentralizing economic management (Hall and Young 1997: 153; Ottaway 1988: 218).

The emphasis on securing economic efficiency “betokened the beginning of a shift among the Frelimo leadership from a socialist to a liberal vision of modernity” (Hall and Young 1997: 155-156). Against a backdrop of severe economic contraction and resource paucity, the Frelimo government had few viable options to address the country’s economic slide. Complicating the situation, by 1983 technical, financial and military aid from the Eastern Bloc had seen a precipitous decline, forcing the government to “look for greener pastures elsewhere” (Cabrita 2000: 221). In 1984, the government entered into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), resulting in admission to the Fund and a decision by the Paris Club of creditors to reschedule the country’s debt payment of about $350 million (Cabrita 2000: 221). Obviously, external aid in itself cannot be said to have
had salutatory effects on the government’s efforts to restore its domestic legitimacy or broaden its social support. But the conditions attached to these policies required fundamental changes in Frelimo’s economic model and the mending of fences with the rural population, at whom Frelimo’s policies were directed (Simpson 1993: 329).

In 1987, Frelimo formally launched its Program of Economic Rehabilitation (PRE) under the auspices of the World Bank. The aim was to arrest and, more ambitiously, reverse the spiraling decline of the economy through a series of liberalizing measures. The PRE was a comprehensive set of measures, whose principal purposes were to increase agricultural production and broaden the tax base via decentralized economic management (Hall and Young 1997: 196-197; Manning 2002: 122-123). Decentralization of economic management took several forms, such as giving provincial governments greater decision-making powers and more autonomy to state farm managers (Hall and Young 1997: 153). The PRE was also the basis for the government’s negotiations and subsequent agreement with the IMF and the World Bank that resulted in the implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which included standard stabilization measures such as fiscal adjustment, monetary contraction and currency devaluation. Although these measures had some success in arresting economic decline, the contractionary monetary mandated by the SAPs resulted in severe economic hardship in urban areas (Manning 2002: 123; Marshall 1990: 30). Fortunately, potentially regime-destabilizing political and social unrest did not materialize, likely because the population assumed the problem was beyond the government’s control (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 129-130).

Despite the short-term economic crises, the implementation of the program put the country on a sound macroeconomic path by setting in motion a series of economic, political
and institutional reforms that the government used as a basis for further changes in the postwar period. As part of PRE, the government introduced four different income taxes for businesses and employed individuals as well as consumption taxes (IMF 2009). Although the escalation of the war after 1980 and the consequent destruction of rural infrastructure had caused considerable economic hardship and the shrinkage of the tax base, fiscal reforms under the PRE resulted in improvements in central government revenue collection. In the interim, government revenues increased from 13 percent of GDP in 1985 to 26 percent of GDP in 1992 (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 120). These reforms would provide the basis for the government’s postwar fiscal reforms.

It was in this overall economic context that Frelimo moved to make political and constitutional reforms that had far-reaching implications for the relationship between state and society. The imposition of policies and institutional arrangements by a party elite on a society unfamiliar with top-down organizational culture could not but induce widespread discontent, narrowing the party’s support base (Ottaway 1988: 214). In 1983, the party had already signaled its interest in becoming a broad front, though it still remained committed to some tenets of the vanguard party. Following the 4th Congress held in the same year, Frelimo made changes to the party structure. To address the previously mentioned tension between Frelimo’s centralizing instincts and its interest in popular participation, the party “moved, if not toward the abandonment of the vanguard party concept, at least towards some of the old characteristics of a ‘front’ emphasizing patriotic virtue rather than the ‘class enemy’” (Hall and Young 1997: 156). The central committee of the party was numerically expanded in response to criticisms that the body was dominated by officials within the government, increasing from 67 to 130. By adding veterans of the anticolonial war with a
peasant background to the party’s central committee, Frelimo sought to repair its frayed relations with the population (Ottaway 1988: 215).

At the same time, the Central Committee of the party announced its intentions to proceed with elections for all People’s Assemblies. Since the country was administratively and politically organized on a provincial, regional and district levels, the People’s Assemblies at all levels of the state were supposed to serve as mechanisms of vertical accountability and decentralized governance (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 79). But elections had to be suspended for four years due to severe political instability in the country due to Renamo’s attacks. Given the security situation in 1986 was at its worst, the decision to restore elections was seen as evidence of the government’s need to signal its ability to mobilize public support (Hall and Young 1997: 162).

To broaden the party’s appeal, Frelimo took several interrelated measures. For example, the party opened up party membership by instituting a more inclusive recruitment process. During the war of liberation, when Frelimo confronted a militarily superior and politically fortified colonial state, membership in the movement was inclusive and the peasantry was the movement’s backbone (Simpson 1993: 322-23). In the post-independence period, however, party membership was reserved mostly to the elite, which along with top-down organization led to the loss of the party’s participatory tradition (Ottaway 1988: 217; Young 1988: 172). Negative criteria, such as cooperation with the colonial authorities, religious affiliation, polygamy and a vaguely defined notion of ‘tribalism’ were used to limit the extent of political participation, effectively de-linking large numbers of Mozambicans from the structure of political power (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 79; Alexander 1997: 4). With radical political changes on the horizon,
Frelimo began to appreciate the wisdom of appealing to various social groups previously considered ‘enemies’ of the party (Carbone 2005: 430). Frelimo also made some efforts reconciling “local realpolitik with modern ideals” (Finnegan 1992: 242-43). It, thus, began to repair its frayed relations with traditional authorities. As Luis Honwana, a renowned Mozambican writer and Frelimo politician, “we didn’t realize how influential the traditional authorities were. We are obviously going to have to harmonize traditional beliefs with our political project” (quoted in Newitt 1995: 572). Finally, Frelimo mended fences with the Catholic Church (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1995: 199). Since Frelimo had long treated the Church with hostility for its role in colonialism (Simpson 1993: 318), the rapprochement was seen as integral to the party’s legitimacy.

Paralleling efforts to change the party’s structure and its relations with society was a sweeping constitutional change. The withdrawal of Soviet commitments in Mozambique further underscored the rapidly fading chance of ending the war through a military victory. Renamo was also unimpressed by the political changes enacted up to that point, making some form of negotiated settlement unavoidable (Hall and Young 1997: 205). Throughout the civil war, Renamo had demanded, among other things, multiparty elections as a precondition for ending the war. Following Frelimo’s 5th Congress in 1989, the government announced constitutional changes in order to dictate the parameters of peace talks (Finnegan 1992: 247; Newitt 1995: 573).

The reforms included in the new constitution of 1990 covered a wide range of legal and political matters, “but in substance they clearly amounted to the adoption of a liberal understanding of the state” (Hall and Young 1997: 203). The constitution recognized various individual and collective rights, such as religious freedom, freedom of expression
and assembly, effectively de-linking the party’s state-building ideals from the Marxist formulas that had guided the country since independence (Hall and Young 1997: 202). Representative institutions included a 250-member unicameral legislature (Assembly of the Republic) and an executive branch headed by a president to be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term. Along with an independent judiciary, these institutions constituted a system of checks and balances. At Frelimo’s 6th Congress held in 1991, the formal separation of party and state was announced, a development that represented a radical reversal of assumptions that had guided the country since independence (Hall and Young 1997: 212).

Frelimo’s unilateral decision to introduce comprehensive political changes effectively eliminated the absence of “liberal democratic changes” as a pretext for the continuation of the conflict, creating permissive conditions a negotiated settlement (Chabal et al. 2002: 231).

Peace Negotiations

In addition to domestic factors, the end of the Cold War, political changes in South Africa and the consequent drying up of external resources provided further impetus to the peace process, nudging the two sides to the negotiating table. Severe economic decline and the lack of domestic or external rents to make up for it reinforced Frelimo’s conclusion that the war would not be won on the battlefield (Alden 2001: 24; Chabal et al. 2002: 220). Similarly, the withdrawal of South African support left Renamo without the resources needed to wage a viable insurgency, creating a basis for a negotiated settlement (Ajello and Wittmann 2004: 449; Chabal et al. 2002: 221). The Mozambican case stands in particular
counterpoint to the Angolan situation in which UNITA and the MPLA resumed fighting even after the end of outsiders’ interest in the conflict. Unlike Renamo and Frelimo, the warring parties in Angola were able to raise considerable revenues by exploiting the country’s oil and diamond resources, effectively immunizing them from the sticks and carrots approach the international community would deploy in Mozambique to ensure compliance with the peace process.

Despite the confluence of favorable conditions, the peace process required 12 rounds of protracted negotiations before an agreement could be signed (Hume 1994). Although both sides were operating under severe economic constraints, Frelimo was able to negotiate from a position of relative strength. The party’s control of the state, though tenuous in light of Renamo’s control of territories, allowed it to make exclusive claims to its resources. In contrast, because of Renamo’s history of dependence on external financing, it did not develop the kinds of deep linkages with society that resource-scarce rebels must develop to achieve military viability. Consequently, it had no significant domestic constituency essential to prolong the fighting (Manning 2002: 88).

The resource imbalance along with the international community’s bestowal of legitimacy on Frelimo created an asymmetry of power between the two sides that hobbled Renamo’s efforts to shape the trajectory of the peace process. Renamo’s lack of credible fallback option—the threat to resume fighting—worked against the group’s negotiating position in Rome. The international community capitalized on Renamo’s material poverty to re-incentivize it to participate in electoral politics within the framework of the reconstituted state. But precisely because of Renamo’s resource constraints, international mediators in Rome were able to inhibit the rebel group from demanding exorbitant payoffs
in exchange for calling off the war (Finnegan 1992: 247). Renamo was unable to use the threat of fighting as a bargaining leverage because it lacked credibility (Kirschner and Von Stein 2009: 295). Furthermore, although Renamo’s leaders were willing to live with a negotiated settlement, they still confronted the problem of civilian leadership and organizational weaknesses. Since Renamo was unprepared to enter electoral politics, some form of power sharing arrangement to be overseen by the UN was its preferred choice (Hall and Young 1997: 215). But because Frelimo was confident about its chances at the ballot box, it was unwilling to share power (Finnegan 1992: 248).

On October 4, 1992, three years after preliminary peace talks began, the Mozambican government and Renamo signed the GPA in Rome. The agreement was to be overseen by a robust UN Peacekeeping force. Pursuant to UN Security Council authorization, a 6,800-strong UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) came into effect. ONUMOZ cost about $503 million over a two-year period (Alden 2001: 65; Manning 2008: 47; Paris 2004: 141). Despite delays, ONUMOZ helped the parties demobilize, laying the groundwork for post-conflict elections in 1994. Shortly after elections were held in 1994, ONUMOZ terminated its mandate and departed from Mozambique, leaving the parties to embark on long-term political and institutional rehabilitation.

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

The significance of the end of the civil war and the stability of the peace accord could not be overstated, given the sheer magnitude of destruction. The war led to the loss of over 100,000 civilian lives (Vines 1998: 192). It also generated millions of refugees and internally displaced persons that compounded the challenges of postwar reconstruction.
The economic cost of the war was estimated to be $15 billion—the equivalent of 20 years of foreign aid (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 66).

Against all odds, Mozambique has charted a new path since the end of the war. While Renamo has struggled to transform itself from a predominantly military organization into a political party capable of mounting a credible challenge to Frelimo, it has for the most part adhered to the carefully constructed postwar political order. Mozambique enjoys considerable peace and stability. In the immediate postwar period, a significant problem that bedeviled the government was questions about the character of the postwar state, “where re-legitimizing the state through democratization disguised its superficial nature and the difficulties in developing power away from the center” (Alden 2001: 101-102). Frelimo had since independence struggled to balance the decentralization of ‘problem-solving’ in the countryside against its centralizing instincts (Finnegan 1991: 242). As discussed later in this chapter, the government undertook legal reforms and formal constitutional changes to decentralize power.

Post-conflict elections formed a central part of the implementation of the GPA, a necessary ingredient to consolidating the peace process. Elections held in the immediate aftermath of a bitter civil war can obviously lead to widespread violence, as the breakdown of the Bicesse accords in Angola tragically showed. But they can also serve as an essential source of legitimacy for postwar governance, promoting mutually reinforcing state-society relations. The founding elections were held from October 27 to 28, 1994, though Dhlakama’s threat to boycott of the national elections came close to derailing the peace process (Alden 1995: 127-8). In spite of these threats and the prevalence of fear and
insecurity in the wake of the end of brutal and protracted civil war, people turned out to vote in great numbers—overall turnout was around 90 percent. Turnout was high even in Renamo-held areas (Nordstrom 1997: 227). These elections, which international observers deemed free and fair, “served both as the centerpiece of the peace accord and the defining moment of the transition from war to peace and from monoparty to multiparty rule” (Manning 2002: 169). The country has conducted four successful general elections since then, including the last one held in October 2014.


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<th>Year</th>
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<td>144</td>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>36.6</td>
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Sources: Manning (2010); Mozambique News Agency (January 6, 2015).

As the results in Table 6.1 indicate, Frelimo captured 129 seats in the 250-seat Assembly of the Republic. The party’s candidate for president, President Joachim Chissano, won 53.3 percent of the votes. Renamo’s presidential candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, won 33.7 percent of the votes in the presidential contest. Renamo captured 112 seats in the legislature. These outcomes were not surprising for a number of reasons. First, as noted before, Frelimo was responsible for the political reforms that were “generally welcomed” and took credit for the democratic opening (Simpson 1993: 336). Second, large numbers of Mozambicans regarded Chissano as the principal architect of the peace process, giving him a boost in popularity. Indeed, after the signing of the GPA, Chissano “returned to a hero’s welcome” (Hall and Young 1997: 216). Finally, opposition political parties
lacked the national infrastructure necessary to pose a credible challenge to Frelimo (Simpson 1993: 336-37).

Yet, Renamo’s initial support, though insufficient to take over the state in the country’s winner-take-all electoral system, was surprisingly high in light of its well-documented wartime political and organizational weaknesses. As discussed earlier, dependence on external financing allowed to do without the investment of time and energy in generating domestic resources by bargaining with the population. Consequently, it had no clearly articulated political programs and it was a predominantly military organization. In addition, Renamo was known for its atrocity against civilians. The fact that some segments of the population was willing to embrace a party with a dubious record requires an explanation.

Some argue that Renamo’s better-than-expected performance was an expression of the population’s aspiration that Renamo’s transformation from a military threat into a political organization would fundamentally change Mozambican politics. “Hence the question of who allied themselves with the ‘political’ Renamo cannot be analyzed using the same criteria as those used when studying Renamo’s military strategy during the war” (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 96). Mozambicans are said to have split their vote in order to ensure the durability of the carefully constructed peace settlement. In effect, Mozambicans voted for peace (Manning 2002: 170). Support for such arguments comes from the fact that as the memory of the war recedes into the past, Renamo’s performance has eroded. While the 1999 results showed no meaningful difference from the 1994 results, Renamo’s performance in subsequent elections has declined. After relatively close presidential contests in the 1994 and 1999, Frelimo’s presidential candidates have managed
to win 64 percent of the votes in 2004, and 75 percent in 2009. As Table 1 shows, Frelimo’s share of seats in the legislature has followed a similar trajectory.

The breakdown of voting patterns by province does, however, show a clear regional cleavage (Table 6.2). The two parties have strong regional bases—Renamo in the center and center north, and Frelimo in the south and extreme north. This regional cleavage is clearly reflected in the patterns of electoral competition. In the 1994 and 1999 elections, Renamo achieved resounding victories in Manica, Nampula, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia. Frelimo won Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Niassa, and Cabo Delgado. These divisions reflect the conflictual legacy of the war for independence and subsequent civil war (Carbone 2005: 428).

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<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
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<td>Maputo City</td>
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<td>Sofala</td>
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<td>Tete</td>
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<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>112</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
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*Source: Manning (2002).*

During the anticolonial war, Frelimo was rocked by internal divisions. Several splinter groups, whose members would later join Renamo after independence, broke away from Frelimo due to what they considered to be southern bias within the organization and discrimination against minority Ndaus located mostly in central Mozambique and the
largest ethnic group, the Macua, concentrated in the north. During the war, Renamo made some efforts to highlight issues of ethno-regional disparities under Frelimo, even as it generally failed to politicize the population (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 96). Moreover, although Renamo took a predominantly coercive approach to recruitment, it was able to attract some voluntary recruits by exploiting regional grievances against Frelimo. This strategy was particularly effective in the central provinces of Sofala and Manica, where Renamo can be said to have developed a regional base (Hall and Young 1997: 186). The result was the formation of “two rival socio-political coalitions” that carried over into the postwar period (Carbone 2005: 425).

The division of the country along regional lines has in fact hardened over time, as evidenced by the outcomes subsequent elections (Manning 2010: 152; Weinstein 2002: 150-52). This regional polarization is consistent with recent studies that suggest that violent struggles give rise to enduring partisan identities (Kalyvas 2006). Frelimo’s campaign rhetoric during the 1994 elections was instructive in this respect. When campaigning in the northern and central provinces, where Renamo’s support was solid, Frelimo played up its liberation movement credentials, tapping into “people’s collective memory” (Harrison 1996: 27). President Chissano emphasized the party’s role in ending colonial rule and the creation of national unity, noting that Frelimo’s vision for the country would have succeeded had it not been for the war and promising to rebuild the country’s infrastructure, schools, and clinics. This strategy was particularly effective in the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado—the cradle of the anticolonial movement. During the campaign, “the message that one should vote for Frelimo because it liberated the country” had particular resonance, boosting Frelimo’s performance at the polls (Harrison 1996: 27). In the South,
where Frelimo’s support was solid, the party’s tone was less conciliatory and its rhetoric combative, highlighting the fact that Renamo was the product of external instigation and that it fought against the Mozambican people, not just against Frelimo (Manning 2002: 148).

Although the number of parliamentary seats held by Renamo are far from being negligible, its status as the largest opposition in the country has not translated into actual influence, given Frelimo’s dominance at all levels of the state. Consequently, Frelimo’s consolidation of power in the postwar period has been a source of tension between the two sides, with Renamo attacking Frelimo for its monopolization of political power and for its undemocratic attitudes (Carbone 2005: 434). Renamo’s discontent with the status quo reached a boiling point in the months before the 2014 national elections, when the former rebel group threatened to reignite the civil war, unless Frelimo made significant concessions.45 While the chance of another civil war is not high, the conflict between the two sides is unlikely to go away, since it is fundamentally rooted in the nature of the postwar settlement. When civil war ends through a negotiated settlement, the configuration of political power at war’s end can be minimalist based on elite pacts or maximalist through winner-take-all elections (Rothchild 1999: 328-30). In Mozambique, the parties adopted such a maximalist route. Frelimo, using its superior organizational and mobilizational capacities, was able to consolidate its power. As a result, Renamo and other political parties

45 Underlying much of the tension between Renamo and Frelimo is the previously noted regional disparities, which have in recent years been exacerbated by the uneven distribution of benefits from the country’s gas and oil discoveries in the far north. More recent discoveries could make Mozambique the third largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (The Economist October 11, 2014). In the absence of creative ways to deal with deep regional disparities, windfall revenues from natural resources may ultimately lead Mozambique to experience the kinds of social, economic and institutional problems that have characterized postwar Angola.
had no meaningful role in the country’s peace/state building processes. In fact, Renamo has been effectively excluded from all levels of government except parliament, even in the provinces where Renamo held parliamentary majority (Wood 1999: 157-158).

While the manner in which the peace process unfolded and the structure of the settlement undoubtedly played an essential role in freezing the structural asymmetry between the erstwhile warring parties, Renamo’s struggles in the political arena are not reducible to developments at the end of the war. The party has fundamental organizational weaknesses, which can, in turn, be traced back to the circumstances of its emergence as an armed challenger to the government. While military and political campaigns are not the same, the ability to mobilize extensive material and human support during civil war can facilitate the transformation of armed movements into political parties. Since party strength is critical to electoral viability, “the availability of conflict-related institutional bases for parties is an important asset for a new democracy” (Bermeo 2010: 84). Well-institutionalized parties have the organizational capacity to mobilize support (Levitsky and Way 2012). The reverse is also true: organizationally weak armed movements “make for organizationally weak political parties after democratization” (Bermeo 2010: 88). The differing experiences of Frelimo and Renamo in postwar Mozambique support these arguments.

As previously discussed, since Renamo was dependent on Rhodesia and later South Africa for military and financial support, it did not invest in the development of non-military capabilities that would allow it to foster cooperative relations with civilians and nurture its local legitimacy. When the civil war ended, Renamo emerged with a limited organizational capacity and a narrow social base. Political power within the party remains
centralized around its president, Afonso Dhlakama. As a result, “Renamo entered the political arena as a highly personalized organization, and there were no decision-making organs in the party that were even minimally independent of the leader’s personal discretion” (Manning 2007: 259). In fact, some of Renamo’s wartime well-known organizational practices persisted in peacetime, as the group sought to transform itself into a viable political party capable of mounting a serious challenge to Frelimo’s power.

The continuity between wartime and peacetime settings was evident in the manner in which Renamo addressed the challenges of entry into participatory politics. As Renamo navigated the rough political terrain at the end of the civil war, it had two immediate challenges. The first was financial. Renamo used the need for resources to complete its transformation into a political party as a leverage to “renegotiate or guarantee certain details of the peace process” (Manning 2002: 103). The international community had made considerable commitments, in resources and political capital, to the success of the peace process. Part of this commitment entailed the establishment of a trust fund to be administered by the UN. The goal of the trust fund, estimated at $ 17 million, was to provide Renamo with the resources it needed to transform itself from a predominantly military organization into a political party as well as to house its leaders and pay their salaries (Carbone 2005: 431; Manning 2007: 260). Dhlakama and Renamo received as much as $300,000 a month from the UN trust fund. As the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Mozambique, Aldo Ajello noted, “Democracy has a cost and we must pay the cost” (quoted in Lyons 2002: 227). But the disbursement of financial aid necessary for Renamo to transform itself into a political party was made conditional on the group’s adherence to the core provisions of the GPA (Alden 2001: 102).
In the language of deterrence theory, the rebel group’s ex ante knowledge that defection from the peace agreement would be met with a credible retaliation—the suspension of access to material benefits and the loss of international legitimacy—was effective in preventing Renamo from acting in ways that could derail the peace process. Still, “constant demands by Renamo, backed by threats to boycott the whole process, formed an almost permanent feature of the two-year period, threats which just before the electoral campaign netted another $5 million” (Hall and Young 1997: 232). Ready cash from the international community fortified Dhlakama’s leadership position and “permitted the party to payoff military leaders and other officials it could no longer use” (Manning 2002: 103). These practices are broadly in line with the party’s history of seeking outside help to survive but refraining from articulating political programs and enhancing the party’s organizational and mobilizational capacity.

Renamo’s other challenge was the need to expand the party’s support base and attract people with the skills required for long-term success. Here, Renamo’s past proved hard to shake off. In particular, the low educational background of Renamo’s recruits hampered its ability to compete effectively in the electoral arena. At the end of the war, the party’s dominant coalition comprised of individuals that had either been abducted by Renamo fighters or “arranged their capture out of frustration or difficulties with local governing authorities” (Manning 2004: 65). As a result, the party struggled to recruit loyal and competent people that could work effectively in this altered landscape (Manning 2002: 104). Consequently, “the political structures of the former rebels were still fragile, the internal procedures of the new party hardly effective, its presence on the ground rather unorganised, its policies in all evidence poorly articulated, and its personnel totally
inexperienced in modern politics and administration” (Carbone 2005: 426). Yet, Dhlakama continued to personalize power, dismissing the notion that “there was a significant connection between his party’s organizational development and its electoral fortunes” (Manning 2007: 260). As a result of the party’s propensity for personalistic factionalism, it is unable to provide ideological or programmatic alternatives in the country’s multiparty system (Carbone 2005: 437).

Some scholars have noted that parties that take over power through “a sustained, violent, and ideationally driven struggle” tend be characterized by a high degree of cohesion (Lucan and Levitsky 2012: 871). Having governed the country for roughly two decades, “Frelimo’s leadership and cadres were tested and experienced” in various aspects of political organization and mobilization, providing the party with considerable advantage in electoral politics (Carbone 2005: 425-426). In addition, Frelimo has also used its access to state resources to develop the party’s organizational structures and the capacity to mount effective campaigns, reinforcing its dominance at the polls. “Programs instituted by major donors to install ‘good governance’ and create a liberal democracy have resulted in reforms within the state, but paradoxically, they have also allowed the party to grow stronger and entrench itself more deeply” (Sumich 2010: 682). Frelimo’s dominance in the legislature has also allowed it to pass legislations necessary to advance the party’s core interests (Manning 2010: 154-58). The poorly institutionalized smaller parties had no chance against Frelimo’s well-oiled organizational structures. But in the 2014 elections, Renamo picked up 39 additional seats, bringing its total to 89, compared to 144 for Frelimo.\footnote{Renamo’s significant gains in the 2014 elections appear to have revived the ‘vote for peace’ thesis noted earlier. The latest conflict between the two sides broke out when Renamo’s leader, Afonso Dhlakama, fled to the forested Gorongosa hills after accusing the regime of concentrating power in the ruling party. During the eighteen months Dhlakama was absent from Maputo, the specter of another civil war hovered over the}
these gains were substantial, Renamo continues to hold fewer parliamentary seats than it did in the first three elections. The result is the persistence of an unbalanced party system characterized by the absence of alternation in power by different political parties, which is essential for democratic consolidation.

In the remaining pages, I further examine efforts to bring about broader macro institutional changes by focusing on the monopolization of legitimate coercion, administrative decentralization and fiscal reforms.

Reestablishing Monopoly on Legitimate Coercion

Since nations emerging from conflict suffer from security and legitimacy crises, the extension of state authority necessarily requires establishing or reestablishing both. The monopoly on legitimate force finds expression in the creation of hierarchically organized police and military organizations under the control of a central authority. In the post-Cold War period, security sector reform (SSR) has dominated international attention as an integral element of state building, given security is central to what states do (Jackson 2011: 1804). The restructuring of military and security institutions is essential to their legitimacy with the wider population (Griffiths 1996: 477-8).

One of the significant changes envisaged by the GPA was the creation of an integrated military, the Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (FADM). The peace accord
mandated the formation of a 30,000-strong force, comprised of equal numbers of volunteers from Renamo and Frelimo. The integrated military was supposed to have 24,000 men in the army, 4,000 in the air force and 2,000 in the navy. This task was scheduled to have been completed prior to the departure of the UN mission. However, due to delays in the deployment of ONUMOZ and Renamo’s delaying tactics, the process of restructuring the armed forces and creating the FADM did not begin until after postwar elections were held (Griffiths 1996: 475).

A joint commission was established to oversee the formation of an integrated national army by formulating the legal and administrative frameworks governing the FADM. The commission was also tasked with identifying criteria for the selection of volunteers from the Armed Forces of Mozambique (FAM) and Renamo. The process of creating the FADM did not, however, go as smoothly as anticipated in light of the paucity of volunteers. The 30,000 target proved unattainable, as only 12,195 volunteers joined the integrated military, of which about 8,533 were from the FAM, and about 3,662 from Renamo (Macuácua 2006: 142).

The failure of former FAM and Renamo soldiers to join the integrated military can be traced back to the problems encountered during the demobilization phase of the peace process. The demobilization process was protracted due to delays in UN deployment as well as disagreements between Renamo and the government about the number and location of assembly points. But ultimately, war exhaustion and unprecedented eagerness on the part of Renamo and Frelimo soldiers to go home was integral to successful demobilization (Dobbins et al 2005: 100; Synge 1997: 97). In some cases, there were acts of ‘self-demobilization’ where troops from both sides, dissatisfied with the pace of demobilization,
drifted home or rioted (Griffiths 1996: 476; Vines 1996: 154-155). This self-demobilization drastically reduced the pool of available soldiers that Renamo and Frelimo could draw on to meet the numerical requirements of the FADM (Griffiths 1996: 476). The vast majority of former Renamo and Frelimo soldiers declined to join the military, “as they did not want to repeat their previous experiences of long periods of service in generally poor conditions” (Macuácua 2006: 142). In effect, the material poverty that drove elites on both sides to come to the negotiating table had a trickle-down effect on the rank and file.

Despite these difficulties, the eventual success of the demobilization and disarmament processes means that the state’s monopoly on legitimate force has been established, reflected in the absence of organized armed groups that challenge the authority of the state. Crucially, the reform, even with the above problems, has had a significant impact on the military’s self-image as an institution. The government’s decision to create a special paramilitary force—the ‘Lightening Battalion’—in response to increased crime rates in the mid-1990s was in part driven by the FADM’s refusal to take on domestic policing responsibilities, reflecting the military’s interest in maintaining its corporate identity by remaining above the fray (Vines 1998: 199).

While efforts to monopolize legitimate coercion were largely successful, rampant criminality was a major problem in the immediate postwar period (Alden 2001: 101). The proliferation of criminal networks and the limited capacity of the state to provide security against crime posed a challenge to the state’s fragile legitimacy. The spread of destabilizing criminal networks had its origins in the flawed demobilization and disarmament process.47

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47 The possibility has been raised that the government might have manipulated reports of rampant criminality to delegitimize Renamo in an eye toward the 1999 elections and long-term political hegemony (Schwartz 2010: 59).
While demobilization was largely successful, the process of collecting and destroying weapons did not take place until after the departure of the UN mission. And though disarmament was implicit in ONUMOZ’s overall mandate, the task of collecting and destroying weapons was left to the Mozambican government. But the failure to destroy weapons resulted in the proliferation of weapons in the hands of undisciplined private actors, contributing to the postwar growth of criminal networks and complicating efforts to assert monopoly over legitimate force. In some cases, soldiers went home armed with light weapons (Vines 1998: 197). Some criminals and bandits apprehended by police admitted to being former Renamo or government fighters (Griffiths 1996: 477). The chaotic postwar environment naturally provided opportunity for the rise of illicit activities. But economic factors also provided motive for former Renamo and Frelimo fighters to engage in criminal activities, given the fragility of the economy (Vines 1998: 1999).

The spread of criminal networks cannot, of course, be separated from the capacity of law enforcement forces. In addition to a unified military under civilian control, the development of a professional police force is critical to the exercise of legitimate state authority. “The Mozambican police as constituted were ill-suited to take on that role, having earned a notorious reputation for corruption which cut across all political affiliations” (Alden 1995: 124). Policy legislation after independence had given law enforcement carte blanche in fulfilling their tasks. During the civil war, the police along with the military were known to violate the rights of criminal suspects and individuals deemed enemies of the state (Kyed 2014: 426). It was, thus, to be expected that the police faced a crisis of legitimacy, especially in area “where Renamo had held administrative and military control in the last years of the war” (Kyed 2014: 427). Fundamental reforms were,
thus, necessary to reestablish the legitimacy of the national police and, by extension, the legitimacy of the state.

The police have undergone major changes since the end of the war. A National Commission for Police Affairs (COMPOL), which included both government and Renamo representatives was established to oversee police reform. In 1992, the existing police force, the Mozambique People’s Police (PPM) was replaced by the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM). The 20,000-man PRM is comprised of the National Police, the Criminal Investigation Unit, the Special Reserve Forces, the Immigration and Border Police and traffic police (Lala and Francisco 2006: 166). It is organized on a central, provincial and district level. While municipal police perform most routine administrative tasks, the PRM is responsible for overall public order and security.

In 1997, the National Assembly passed the Security and Defense Act, outlining the basic legal and institutional frameworks governing the military, police and intelligence services. The reform process had several goals. The principal goal was to enhance the capacity, professionalism and accountability of the force—essential goal in light of the poor human rights record of the police and other security forces. Another goal of reforming and restructuring the police was to depoliticize the force, which was necessary in light of their complete identification with the ruling party (Lala and Francisco 2006: 167). Since the appearance of a political role can compromise the integrity of law enforcement institutions, enhancing their legitimacy by enhancing their independence is critical to their legitimacy.

While human rights abuses and corruption are rife within the PRM, police reforms have begun to pay dividends, reflected in the PRM’s success in uncovering various arms
caches, breaking up criminal networks and expelling hundreds of officers from its ranks for various transgressions. In 1995 alone, 102 policemen were expelled from the force for various ethical transgressions; between January and October 1997, another 137 policemen were expelled and another 290 policemen faced disciplinary hearings (Vines 1998: 197). These actions have improved public perception of the PRM as well as its self-image as a provider of security for citizens (Malan 2000: 178). In addition, a drive by the national police to get illicit weapons out of circulation led to the reduction of crime. For example, in September 1997, the police captured and destroyed 11,734 firearms of different caliber and thousands of rounds of ammunition since 1995, curtailing the quantity of weapons available for criminals and enhancing the legitimacy of the police as providers of basic security (Vines 1998: 197).

Administrative Decentralization

Once a modicum of stability was achieved, the challenge for Mozambican leaders was to reform the radiation of power from the center. This was important in light of the particular colonial and postcolonial history of state-society relations. Until the late 1990s, urban and rural areas were politically and administratively subject to the authority of the central state. The colonial state was highly centralized and local ‘municipal boards’ lacked autonomy as members were chosen by the colonial authorities for the express goal of executing colonial policies. After independence, Frelimo established new institutions to replace the defunct colonial state. The new institutions as well as grassroots mobilizing structures—GDs—held the promise of a radical break with the colonial past by instituting a new system participatory governance. But Frelimo’s centralizing instincts led to a top-
down decision-making system, which in Mozambique’s multiethnic context exacerbated the colonial legacy of regional imbalances (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1995: 204). As previously discussed, the party began to make policy and institutional changes in the mid-1980s, reflecting the lessons drawn from the experience Frelimo’s centralizing efforts. In a self-critical report to the 6th Congress of Frelimo, the party’s central committee foreshadowed fundamental changes in state-society relations:

We sought to generalize to the entire country the experiences and sentiments of the populations of the liberated zones, without taking into due account the economic and social complexity of the nation, the types of social relations, the dominant form of property relations, and the structural consequences of the colonial order. We disregarded the value of these experiences, and this permitted ruptures in the wider social base and in the alliances forged during the armed struggle, in particular with traditional leaders. (Quoted in Manning 2002: 131-132).

The changes based on these lessons culminated in the adoption of a liberal constitution in parallel with the start of formal peace talks with Renamo. The new constitution envisaged administrative decentralization to make the state more efficient and responsive to the needs of the population, given the afore-mentioned problems of over-centralization (Chabal et al 2002: 232; Salamao 2000: 84). But the constitution was vague about the particular institutional configurations of decentralized local governance, the manner in which local leaders and representatives would assume office and the power and autonomy of local governments and their relationship with the central state (Igreja 2013: 321).

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48 Decentralization in Mozambique unfolded in the shadow of Frelimo’s rather unsuccessful experiment with a top-down system and lively debates in academic and policy circles over the necessity and efficacy of devolving power so as to achieve participatory governance. A number of African governments have adopted decentralized governance as a matter of formal policy, though the actual practice of devolving power away from the center varies from one case to another (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Boone 2003; Dickovick and Wunsch 2014). Against the backdrop of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and political liberalization, administrative decentralization was considered a panacea to the economic and political ills afflicting many African states (Dickovick and Riedl 2014: 321).
The Ministry of State Administration was later tasked with crafting a strategy for administrative decentralization. Given large numbers of Mozambicans live in rural areas and the role of traditional authorities, administrative decentralization was geared towards formalizing the role of traditional authorities. Over the next few years, the nature of the debate over rural society shifted, “broadly moving from a Marxist concern with class to a focus on chieftaincy, culture, ethnicity and 'civil society’” (Alexander 1997: 1). Although, as previously discussed, Renamo had already rethought its vilification of traditional authorities towards the end of the war, Renamo had demanded legal recognition of traditional authorities during the peace talks. While significant segments of the Frelimo rank and file and leadership agreed that the party’s mistreatment of traditional authority had been a mistake, for some within the party leadership, “legitimate forms of 'traditional authority' no longer exist and neither can nor should be reinvented” (Kloeck-Jenson and West 1999: 468). Even so, President Chissano publicly voiced support for traditional authority during the campaign in 1994 (Kloeck-Jenson and West 1999: 462). Prior to the 1994 elections, the government passed a bill, the Law of Municipalities, establishing the legal basis for administrative decentralization. The law called for “a wide range of state functions to be decentralized to elected district institutions, and for a greater role to be played by 'traditional authorities’” (Alexander 1997: 1). While the law was vague about the roles reserved to traditional authorities, it was specific about their role in the resolution of conflict over land (Goncalves 2005: 66).

After the newly elected government assumed power in 1995, a number of thorny questions were raised about the legality of the previous legislation. Specifically, the initial legal framework for decentralization did not define the local agents of the state and local
authorities as well as the modalities of citizen representation and participation in municipal politics (Igreja 2013: 321). In 1996, the Assembly passed a series of constitutional amendments clarifying the legal basis for the establishment of municipal governments. Based on these amendments, the Frelimo majority passed a new Local Government Framework Law (Law no. 2/97) along with associated legislations outlining the creation of local municipalities, municipal elections, oversight, and municipal officeholders. According to the new law, which took effect in 1997, municipalities are headed by a locally elected administrator and assembly as well as a municipal council appointed and headed by the administrator (Alexander 1997: 15). The first batch of municipal elections were held in late 1997 and the first 23 municipal governments assumed office in January 1998.

In 1997, the National Assembly passed a new ‘Land Law’ clarifying the role of chiefs in local governance, granting them a significant role in land distribution and management, reversing a previous decision by the council of ministers to strip them of this role. Traditional authorities were also given a role in the resolution of local disputes (Kloeck-Jenson and West 1999: 481-82). The draft law drew fierce opposition from Renamo in parliament on the grounds that it did not go far in empowering traditional authorities. The bill passed after a series of compromises. Extensive lobbying by two peasant organizations—the National Peasant Union and the Rural Organization for Mutual Help—was critical to its passage (Salamao 2000: 87).

A notable feature of this decentralization process is its geographical and functional gradualism. The geographical gradualism refers to the incremental extension of decentralization to an increasing number of towns in the country. In other words, large numbers of towns in the country are still under the central government’s jurisdiction.
Currently, there are 53 municipalities. Functional gradualism refers to the gradual transfer of functions to municipalities.

Local governments have wide jurisdictions, with responsibilities for social welfare, health, education, environmental protection, land management etc. In addition, municipalities have formal autonomy in decision-making over administrative and financial matters, including the power to “acquire, administer, tax and alienate resources” (Alexander 1997: 15). But they are subject to oversight by higher state institutions, particularly with respect to the legality of certain municipal decisions (Alexander 1997: 15). State institutions with formal regulatory power over municipalities include the Administrative Tribunal, the General Finance Inspectorate and the State Administrative Inspectorate. In addition, the central government exercises a significant influence over municipal affairs to ensure that their activities are broadly consistent with its policy priorities.

Frelimo’s hesitation to effect robust decentralization can be understood in terms of the history of state centralization in the country and Frelimo’s institutional interests as a political party. During parliamentary debates over the Local Government Framework Law passed in 1997, Armando Guebuza, the former head of the Frelimo party executive and later president of Mozambique, acknowledged the importance of devolving power to local communities but warned that “the dangers of this phase must not be underestimated. The national unity created by the Mozambican Liberation Front facilitated the liberation struggle and the creation of the nation and the Mozambican state.” He concluded by adding: “we think that the introduction of the autarchies should not mean the fragilization of the Mozambican state” (quoted in Igreja 2013: 321-22). This line of thinking is clearly in line
with the party’s perennial struggles to balance the necessity of decentralization against its centralizing instincts (Finnegan 1992: 242).

But there is another factor at work: the dynamics of party competition. Specifically, dominant parties tend to hesitate about decentralizing governance “where it threatens to give opposition a subnational electoral foothold, patronage opportunities, and legitimacy in governance” (Dickovick and Riedl 2014: 330). As previously discussed, the two parties have clear regional bases. While Renamo’s overall electoral support might be inadequate to obtain national power, it is enough to wield considerable influence in local and provincial governments. Limiting the number of municipalities keeps Renamo and other parties from controlling local governments.

Fiscal Reforms and Revenue Collection

In addition to the monopoly of the legitimate instruments of coercion, revenue collection is a fundamental interest of state and, as such, indicative of the degree of state building. States must mobilize revenue in order to fulfill their sovereign functions: protection and service provision. Taxation is not just a technical matter; it is a quintessentially political process. As Crawford Young notes, “state agents are inevitably mindful of the transaction costs associated with a given revenue strategy: the political instrument required to secure approval for a revenue source, implement collection, monitor compliance, and punish violators” (Young 1994: 39). While tax collection is partially coercive, effective extraction requires a legitimate state that can induce quasi-voluntary compliance, whereby citizens fulfill their tax obligations in exchange for some
institutionalized influence over government operations (Levi 1988). Tax payment is an essential element of the social contract between the state and citizens. Hence, the extent of revenue mobilization relative to national income is a good indicator of the authoritative reach of the state.

When using the extent of revenue mobilization to measure state capacity, what is important is the structure rather than the sheer volume of taxes measured as a percentage of GDP. Rentier states like Angola have high tax revenue as a percentage of GDP but, since taxes on natural resources are not administratively challenging, they are not described as high-capacity states. In assessing changes in fiscal capacity in Mozambique, I, thus, pay attention to both changes in the volume of taxes collected as well efforts to improve long-term revenue mobilization through institutional reforms and restructuring. In so doing, I trace the origins of these postwar changes to wartime developments. As discussed early in the chapter, Frelimo embarked on an ambitious project of political modernization whose goal was nothing short of a radical restructuring of society along socialist lines. However, over the next decade, the economy faltered, forcing Frelimo to initiate a series of reforms to resuscitate the moribund economy. The relaxation of ideological rigidity was one of the requirements. Frelimo had long used ideology to build legitimacy, many of the policies derived from it had the opposite effect (Carbone 2005: 433). Although Frelimo officially clung to Marxism, it adopted a pragmatic approach to economic policy making. As part of an internationally sponsored comprehensive package of policies, the government implemented tax reforms through the passage of Law 3/87 (IMF 2009). The result was the establishment of four direct incomes taxes for workers and businesses along with a number of indirect taxes. Despite the modest gains registered by these reforms, the spread of the
war throughout much of the country had severely circumscribed the institutional reach of
the state. As a result, tax collection was confined to the southern parts of the country, where
the central government’s control was solid. Since the fiscal base and territorial reach of the
state was limited to these areas, indirect taxation via customs duties figured prominently in
revenue collection during this period.

By the time the Cold War ended, Mozambique had already begun the transition into
a market economy. At the end of the war in 1992, the government commissioned a study
to assess the nature of reforms required to improve the tax base in line with the structural
adjustment policies adopted in the late 1980s (IMF 2009). The resulting law, Law 6/93,
made a number of changes to Law 3/87 passed during the war as part of PRE. These
reforms were intended to rationalize taxation by reducing the tax burden on individual and
businesses and promote investment and exports.

However, by the time the civil war ended, Mozambique was one of the poorest
countries in the world, with more than 60 percent of its population in absolute poverty. The
war had ravaged the bulk of the country’s infrastructure. Tax and customs administrations
were extremely weak. Consequently, the government saw fiscal reforms to streamline tax
administration and improve tax collection as critical to overall macroeconomic recovery.
The long-term objective of these reforms was to overhaul revenue collection by creating
new institutions. The ensuing reforms, completed in phases, aimed to rationalize tax and
customs administration and create institutional capacity to administer and collect new
taxes. The reform unfolded in two phases between 1994 and 2007. From 1994 to 1999,
efforts to improve tax collection by reforming customs administration.
Efforts to improve revenue collection have shown promising results, reflected in marked improvements in the size of government revenue mobilized via taxation. As Table 3 shows, the results of these reforms so far show respectable postwar progress reflected in the increased tax revenue of the state, going from a meager single digit in the immediate postwar period double digits in the postwar period. Nevertheless, the extent of tax collection is low relative to the peacetime regional average. But the country has shown a significant progress in view of the fragility and limited reach of the state’s fiscal institutions in performing their tax collection tasks during the course of the civil war.

Table 6.3. Trends in Mozambican Government Finances, 1992-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tax (% GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Monetary Fund (2013).

But the most important institutional development took place in the second phase from 2000 to 2007, culminating in the creation of the Tax Authority of Mozambique (ATM). Housed within the Ministry of Finance, the ATM enjoys a high level of organizational and managerial autonomy. In 2010, ATM had more than 3000 employees. The ‘tax staff per person’ for Mozambique is 0.131, lower than the global average, but higher than the sub-Saharan average. ATM has created tax districts throughout the country, which has led to the expansion of its institutional reach.

CONCLUSION

The focus of this chapter was on the Mozambican civil war. In particular, I have examined how the dynamics of the civil war shaped the trajectory of the country’s postwar
developments. After 16 years of fighting characterized by staggering brutality, Renamo and the Government of Mozambique signed a peace accord that ended the conflict. The war destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and killed over a hundred thousand people. Despite the brutal nature of the war, Mozambique has embarked on successful processes of socio-economic and political reconstruction.

In this chapter, I have argued that the roots of Mozambique’s postwar state building can be traced back to wartime developments. Renamo was created, armed and financed by Rhodesia and South Africa. As a result of its access to outside financing, it had few incentives to foster collaborative relations with the population and articulate political programs. Renamo acted in a predatory fashion, brutalizing civilians and destroying infrastructure, which in a circular fashion helped facilitate its expansion. In contrast, Frelimo inherited a bankrupt colonial state, a situation compounded by the lack of significant externally or domestically generated resources to make up for it. But the euphoric post-independence atmosphere generated significant developmental possibilities with potentially transformative effects on society, and Frelimo articulated an ambitious vision of socioeconomic and political progress along socialist lines. Despite some success in extending the institutional reach of the state to much of the country, this vision proved largely illusory. The failure to deliver developmental outcomes along with the deteriorating security condition caused by the growth of Renamo eroded the government’s legitimacy. Consequently, the government was forced to set aside its ideology and act pragmatically in light of its lack of a fallback option by way of natural resource wealth or sizable external patronage. The policy and institutional reforms that Frelimo set in motion in response to its legitimacy crisis set the stage for the end of the war through a negotiated settlement as
well as to the construction of the postwar order. Frelimo’s long tenure, its mobilizational and organizational capacities as well as the residual administrative capacity with which the state emerged from the civil war facilitated the reconstitution of the state following the end of the civil war.

As in the previous chapters, the core arguments in this chapter emphasize path-dependent processes, in which wartime changes shape postwar policy and institutional choices. A potential critique of the state building account presented so far may be that it does not adequately account for the legacy of colonialism. To address this concern, I provide a brief comparison of Angola and Mozambique. Postcolonial politics in both countries unfolded against the backdrop of centuries of divisive colonial rule. But, though significant, treating the colonial inheritance as an immutable structure exerting its will on postcolonial elites is “a rather too stifling notion of historical structure” (Cramer 1996: 484). That the colonial heritage posed tremendous challenges to state-making elites in both countries is fairly uncontroversial. But in responding to these challenges, the MPLA and Frelimo made choices that were refracted through the lens of political survival. Thus, when their ideologically-driven post-independence political projects faltered, the MPLA and Frelimo responded differently in ways that had far-reaching implications for war termination and postwar state building efforts.

Angola and Mozambique share several commonalities, making them ideal candidates for a brief controlled comparison. Both nations gained independence from Portuguese colonialism at the same time; Frelimo and the MPLA adopted Marxism-Leninism and set out to transform their respective societies along socialist lines; and both nations experienced post-independence civil wars. But despite virtually identical
background conditions, the two countries have evolved differently since independence. What explains this divergence?

Neither colonial inheritance nor ideology can adequately explain the divergent outcomes. Although Angola and Mozambique were burdened with an infelicitous background as former colonies of a relatively backwards and authoritarian imperial power, colonial rule left a particularly problematic legacy in Mozambique. First, it was a poorly integrated territorial entity, in large part due to the lack of north-south communications (Hall and Young 1997: 186). As a result, “millions of isolated peasants had to be persuaded that they belonged to something called Mozambique” (Finnegan 1992: 31). Second, colonial rule failed to integrate the country economically, “so that a marked legacy of the colonial past has been Mozambique’s fragmented economic development” (Hall and Young 1997: 186). The absence of a vibrant internal economy meant that the population was scattered in South Africa and elsewhere, compounding the difficulties of creating a national political community (Chabal et al. 2002: 112). To the degree that Mozambique can be said to have made a successful war-to-peace transition, as this projected has argued, it has done so despite, not because of, its colonial past.

Yet, colonial rule was not kind to Angola either. A marked legacy of Portugal’s divisive rule was the emergence of three competing nationalist movements that fought as much against one another as they did against the colonial state. The failure to resolve the conflict among the three movements prior to the haphazard departure of the colonial authorities was the principal reason for the country’s brutal civil war that lasted 26 years.

In explaining the variation in the two nations’ postcolonial evolution, I have focused on variation in their resource endowments. Variation in resource endowments
helps explain why Frelimo jettisoned ideology amidst deteriorating economic and security conditions but the MPLA did not. Whereas the MPLA could exploit its strategic commodity, oil, Frelimo had no access to externally generated rents. When Frelimo’s vision of rapid socioeconomic and political progress failed to materialize, Mozambique was “compelled to temper its socialist ambitions according to the very considerable economic constraints under which it labored” leading to a fundamental rethinking of the political and economic model in place since independence (Chabal et al. 2002: 118). The resulting economic and political reforms played a critical role in restoring some of Frelimo’s legitimacy and laying the ground for its continued control of the postwar state via routine democratic elections.

Like Mozambique, Angola also faced multifaceted challenges during this period. In the mid-1980s, the Angolan economy outside the oil enclave, which was shielded from the destructive consequences of the war, was on the verge of collapse. Yet, at its Second Congress held in December 1985, the MPLA reaffirmed its commitment to an even greater level of central planning, paying lip service to reforms but making few efforts to address the growing gap between state and society through fundamental policy and institutional changes (Malaquias 2007: 131). Since the oil sector was shielded from the destructive consequences of the civil war, it provided the MPLA with an indispensable economic sanctuary. Without the oil rents at its disposal, the “MPLA regime would not have survived the pressures it would have faced from the population” which had been left to fend for itself (Chabal et al 2002: 58). Consequently, unlike Frelimo, which by the early 1980s had been forced to relax its ideological rigidity and rethink its relations with the population, the MPLA “remained obdurately Stalinist” (Chabal et al 2002: 117).
One direct counterargument to this account of state building in the case of Mozambique is that, when all is said and done, Mozambique is a UN success story. What distinguishes the Mozambican case from other cases is the presence of a robust UN peace enforcement mission. The international community committed considerable resources to the tune of $503 million during ONUMOZ’s two-year mandate (Alden 2001: 65). Understandably, therefore, Mozambique is widely considered a UN success story. Yet according to one scholar, “post-conflict Mozambique and its erstwhile construction remain an anomaly, the product of a relatively brief episode of accelerated international activism in Africa” Alden (2001: 120). That the UN has embraced this narrative is not surprisingly, given the rarity of success stories.

The UN mission was certainly essential to the peace process. The international community’s deployment of appropriate sticks and carrots helped keep Renamo in line, reducing the likelihood of settlement breakdown. The UN mission was also instrumental in facilitating demobilization. But given that ONUMOZ departed shortly after the founding elections were held, it would be a stretch to claim the UN was responsible for developments long after it departed. In addition, while ONUMOZ was intimately involved in most aspects of the peace process over the course of its mandate, it was not involved in creating new institutions or directly administering the country. Indeed, the most significant episodes of state building in postwar Mozambique unfolded long after the departure of the UN mission. As discussed earlier, the passage of various legal reforms intended to devolve power away from the center, the creation of a unified military and the initiation of institutional reforms to standardize and rationalize tax collection all unfolded long after ONUMOZ’s departure.
and, as noted earlier, the origins of these developments can be traced back to the changes that took place long before the civil war came to an end.

Even as ONUMOZ managed to fulfil its core mandate under difficult circumstances, the sheer size of the mission had come under scrutiny for its adverse impacts on indigenous capacity-building efforts. The benefits of international interventions must be balanced against possible crowding out effects, where the pool of competent public servants shrinks as a result of increased salaries provided by aid agencies. Indeed, by the time its mandate was terminated, “ONUMOZ had come to be seen by many as a sledgehammer employed to crack a relatively small nut, and its disengagement was broadly accepted and welcomed by both its paymasters and its beneficiaries” (Synge 1997:12). Following the termination of ONUMOZ’s mandate, both sides had ample opportunities to reconsider their commitment to the peace process. Despite some grumbling by Renamo, both sides essentially agreed to abide by the peace process, suggesting that the parties’ own collective interests appear to have been important in shaping their attitudes towards the peace process.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

War causes enormous death and destruction, tearing apart the social fabric of societies. But it can also play catalytic roles in socioeconomic, political and institutional developments. As a large body of macrohistorical research has established, war was the greatest stimulus to state-building. Indeed, the modern national-state was forged in the crucible of war. This is the paradox of war that hinders its deeper understanding (Cramer 2006). To suggest that war may catalyze various social and institutional changes is not to glorify violence or discount the terrible costs of war in blood and treasure. But tempting as it may be to dismiss war as a destructive force with few positive institutional legacies, such a view would not comport with the historical record, for war has existed for thousands of years, restructuring societies and transforming institutions.

This concluding chapter has two goals. The first is to provide a brief summary of the theoretical claims and findings of the study. The second is to highlight the study’s implications for scholarship and operational practice.

RECAPITULATION

In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that civil war can contribute to state-building, which entails establishing the institutional trappings of the state necessary to regulate, control and extract resources from society while commanding a degree of legitimacy. Employing a perspective of path-dependence, this study has laid out a long-term account of state-building in the aftermath of civil war, identifying the form of civil
war termination and the extent of wartime institution-building as the main explanatory factors. Specifically, civil wars that end decisively through a military victory create permissive conditions for post-civil war state-building. The significance of a decisive outcome is obvious when one considers why civil war begins in the first place. While numerous factors may be implicated in the onset of civil war, at its core civil war is the product of contest over the fundamental rules of the political game. Consequently, the reconstitution of legitimate authority after civil war requires the decisive resolution of this contest. Military victory, by effectively degrading the war-making capabilities of the losing party or parties, prevents the emergence of peace spoilers and allows the victor to monopolize the legitimate means of coercion, a critical prerequisite for the radiation of political power across the broad expanses of national territory.

However, the postwar setting is not a tabula rasa upon which a brand new sociopolitical order can be built. While a decisive end to civil war may provide a window of opportunity for state-building, just how much that window is open cannot be inferred from the mere fact of military victory. I have shown that the form and degree of state-building in the postwar period finds its antecedents, path-dependently, in the prior stage of state-building in wartime. Thus, although the form of war termination is crucial, it is not until it is married to an analysis of wartime institutional outcomes that a complete account of postwar state-building can be produced. Such an approach has the virtue of adequately explaining divergent outcomes in cases in which civil war ends similarly.

It is precisely for these reasons that theoretical focus of this dissertation is squarely on the conduct of war. I have shown that the mobilization of war-making resources is key to unpacking the causal relationships between civil war and state-building. Waging war is
a resource-intensive undertaking. How combatants raise resources to meet the organizational challenges of war-making shapes the kinds of institutions that emerge in the course of an armed conflict. But since the extraction of resources generates resistance from society, the effects of mobilization on institutional development depend critically on the mobilization strategies combatants employ to extract war-making resources.

In mobilizing resources, combatants may rely on domestically generated resources via taxes imposed on local populations or they may rely on easily extractible resource rents. Each choice has different implications for wartime and postwar state-building outcomes. The particular choices that combatants make depend on their initial resource endowments, which determine the structures of incentives and constraints in which warring factions operate. Those that have access to easily extractible natural resource wealth have few incentives to bargain with local populations. Since the exploitation of resource rents does not require well-developed institutional structures, resource-abundant combatants have little or no need to establish elaborate extractive institutions. In short, resource-wealthy groups refrain from making costly investments in the forging of consensual relationships with local populations in areas they wish to rule. As a corollary, when “sovereign rents”—that part of public revenue over which citizens have no effective oversight—are considerably greater than “scrutinized revenues” or those that are secured via taxes imposed on individuals, political actors have no incentive to provide public goods with some degree of consistency (Collier 2006: 1484). Under these conditions, whatever social order takes shape in the course of an armed conflict is more likely to rest on force than acceptance. Consequently, although the victimization of civilians is a common occurrence in internal conflicts, violence against noncombatants is at its highest when warring factions
are financially autonomous from local populations. This is because resource abundance leads to an organizational culture that fosters indiscipline, which is often implicated in the victimization of non-combatants.

By contrast, in the absence of easily extractible resource rents, combatants must generate revenues via taxation. Legitimate taxation requires developing institutional capacity and cultivating reciprocal relationships with local populations. Combatants can, of course, rely on coercion to extract resources. For actors operating in inhospitable settings, establishing and maintaining quasi-contractual relations with civilians comes with a cost, as it may clash with military necessities. Under these circumstances, coercion may be the most efficient means for raising resources but it is counterproductive in the long run. Combatants with long time horizons cannot afford to alienate the very people whose support they need to legitimize their position. Consequently, resource-poor combatants have overwhelming incentives to cultivate cooperative relationships with local populations, providing public goods in return for material, political and human support.

Different strategies of resource mobilization, thus, produce different institutional patterns in wartime. I have shown that variation in the institutional capacity of nations emerging from conflicts accounts for postwar institutional divergence, even when civil war ends similarly. Thus, although a decisive outcome creates opportunities for potentially transformative institutional choices, just how far leaders can capitalize on these opportunities hinges critically on the nature and extent of prior state-building outcomes. This is because the institutions and interests that emerged during civil wars cannot be wished away. Consequently, comparatively effective state-building outcomes in wartime create a solid foundation for effective state-building in peacetime. Similarly, when
resource-rich rebels and governments abjure state-building in wartime, the result is ineffective state-building dynamic in wartime that translates into ineffective state-building dynamics in the postwar period.

Evidence from quantitative and qualitative analyses supports these interactive relationships. The statistical analysis confirmed the hypothesis that civil wars that end through a military victory are more conducive to state-building than those that end through negotiations or fizzle out without formal peace accords but these effects attenuate when governments raise revenues by exploiting natural resource rents. Three separate empirical chapters are devoted to exploring the theory’s causal claims. In the Angolan case, the MPLA-led government relied on massive oil rents to prosecute the civil war. Rather than investing in rational-legal bureaucratic institutions, the MPLA cultivated complex patron-client networks. Developed to cultivate the loyalty of potentially regime-threatening societal groups, these parallel structures of governance resulted in the marginalization of formal state institutions, setting in motion a dynamic of state-building that was suboptimal. Although the MPLA’s victory over UNITA was a foundational moment in that it created permissive conditions for significant institutional transformations, wartime institutions and vested interests have made path departure decidedly difficult. By contrast, in the Ethiopian and Mozambican cases, the lack of “easy financing” forced both governments to raise war-making resources through taxation, which, in turn, required making investments in central state institutions. These institutions served as a foundation for subsequent state-building in peacetime, resulting in enhanced state capacity in both countries.

The remainder of the chapter provides a discussion of the study’s theoretical and practical implications.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP

The theoretical claims and empirical findings of the study have a number of implications for scholarship on civil war. Although civil wars share several commonalities as inherently traumatic events, they exhibit variation in why they start, how they are fought and how they end, with far-reaching implications for the understanding of their political consequences. As the findings of this study have shown, effectively capturing the impacts of civil war on state-building requires peering into the ‘black box’ of civil war. Yet, when exploring the economic and political consequences of civil wars, the common tendency is to treat civil wars in binary terms (Kalyvas 2003). While the assumption of unit homogeneity may be a convenient methodological step in statistical analysis, it masks the complexity of civil war as a form of political violence. As Jaggers (1992: 31) writes, “the question cannot simply be, war—yes or no—but rather, war—what type, how much, to what extent, and with what outcome.” This insight is as relevant to the study of war today as it was more than two decades ago. Theorizing the complexity of civil wars is essential for systematic empirical analysis. While acknowledging complexity does not mean that each civil war episode should be treated as unique, it does mean that civil war should be treated as more than a dummy in regression models.

Furthermore, this study has shown that order can arise out of the chaos of civil war, suggesting that features of internal conflicts routinely described as pathologies are in fact the kinds of processes that were historically associated with state formation. However, the predominant tendency in scholarly and policy circles is to treat civil war as ‘development in reverse’ or an ‘apolitical brutality’ devoid of political logic. Understanding the political consequences of civil war requires unpacking the processes through which conflict
restructures polities rather than dismissing it as a pathology (Cramer 2006; Staniland 2012: 255). Much as we abhor the terrible costs of war, the historical record shows that a number of changes considered progressive had their roots in violence. A critical factor is the mobilization of war-making resources, which “can restructure political actors and transform the links between them, altering social identities, shared definitions of what is possible and desirable, and the costs and benefits of joint action” (Kier 2010: 143). In short, the process by which civil war is fought produces long-term legacies, since the mobilization of resources shapes wartime interests and institutions that shape the broad contours of postwar institutional developments. Consequently, a study of postwar politics that begins at war’s end is likely to miss much of what transpires in the course of an armed conflict. The postwar setting, while crucial, is itself shaped by the preceding war. Pushing the boundaries of civil war research, thus, requires situating it within broader political, social, and economic contexts.

Employing a perspective of path-dependence, this study has highlighted institutional continuity, even as the end of civil war creates opportunities for a new beginning. The nature and extent of wartime state-building define the paths down which states move in the wake of civil war. Research on related issues, such as economic development, democratization and the transformation of insurgent movements into political parties can benefit from further engagement with the complex institutional legacies of civil war. Nancy Bermeo’s work on the durability of electoral democracies that emerge during or after conflict, for example, emphasizes the long-term legacies of wartime developments (Bermeo 2010). According to Bermeo’s analysis, electoral democracies established in the shadow of conflict last longer than those that emerge in peacetime. Her
explanations highlight, among other factors, the importance of wartime administrative and organizational capabilities that facilitate the transformation of military organizations into effective political parties, which is broadly consistent with the theoretical thrust of this study. It is, thus, no accident that Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique have evolved differently in postwar Mozambique. Frelimo’s stock of accumulated organizational capacity—from its experience as a successful anticolonial movement and later from its experience running the country—has been a critical factor in its electoral hegemony since the end of the civil war. But Frelimo’s comparative strength stands in particular counterpoint to Renamo’s struggles in casting off its identity as a military movement and transforming itself into an effective political party. In this way, the study draws on insights from research in the institutionalist tradition that emphasizes the critical role of path dependence in shaping long-term institutional outcomes.

The notion of “institutional stickiness” has a distinguished lineage in economics, political science and historical/sociological institutionalism. Scholars within the institutionalist literature have long studied the prolonged impacts of changes during critical junctures—moments of institutional flux triggered by exogenous shocks, such as war, revolution or economic crisis—on institutional evolution (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2000; North 1990; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Historical institutionalists attribute the prolonged impacts of changes during critical junctures to self-reinforcing path-dependent processes that set a trajectory of institutional evolution from which departure is difficult to initiate. Central to the notion of path dependency is the truism that actors do not inherit a “virgin terrain” onto which they can project their preferred visions (Cramer 2006: 256). “Instead, actors find that the dead
weight of previous institutional choices seriously limits their room to maneuver” (Pierson 2000b: 493). In short, the shadow of the past makes it difficult to undertake institutional reforms, even when there is a clear need for reform.

A number of recent studies have drawn on insights gleaned from institutionalist literatures to examine path-dependent processes of institutional development, both in conflict and peacetime contexts. Timothy Sisk, for example, employs a perspective of path-dependence in examining the long-term impacts of electoral institutions on post-civil war state-building, arguing that “the transition sequences and institutional choices made in war-settlement negotiations often determine the nature and timing of initial postwar elections; in turn, these initial electoral processes deeply affect the nature of the state that emerges for years to follow” (Sisk 2009: 196). While the emphasis on prior choices is a step in the right direction in unpacking the long-term impacts of civil war, Sisk telescopes the analysis by focusing on how institutional choices made at war’s end shape subsequent developments. In theory, institutional decisions at time $t$ can path-dependently affect subsequent choices at time $t+n$. But when it comes to post-civil war state-building, it is critical that researchers revisit the war itself in order to examine how wartime processes may be implicated in the choice of institutions at war’s end. In other words, wartime processes may transform actors and institutions in ways that peacetime processes might not. Thus, while the choice of institutions at war’s end is crucial, the broader context within which that choice is made cannot be divorced from wartime developments. As a result, understanding the long-term social and institutional legacies of civil war requires examining wartime developments and how they may continue to influence institutional choices at war’s end.
But studies that emphasize the merits of institutional design at war’s end tend to treat institutional choice as a quasi-functionalist response to the needs of societies reeling from conflict. In these scenarios, actors are treated as having the ability to freely choose the best institutional model available. But this assumption ignores the deeply contested nature of institutional decisions. When it comes to the study of institution-building in developing countries, there is a problematic bias towards what Rodrik (2008: 100) calls a “best practice” model, which posits that “it is possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante, and views convergence towards these arrangements as inherently desirable.” But in a world where there are several alternatives, the choice of a particular institutional design over another requires examining contextual factors that determine variation in the effectiveness of institutional reforms (Kurtz 2013: 248-49).

Furthermore, institutional decisions have distributional implications. As a consequence, domestic or external actors do not have carte blanche to initiate institution-building. Institutional choice has been modeled in terms of Pareto optimum (Krasner 1991). Each point on the frontier reflects the prevailing balance of political settlement and configuration of societal interests. Changing institutions essentially entails shifting points along the Pareto frontier, which has the effect of making some groups better off while making others worse off. Consequently, efforts at institutional reforms tend to unleash resistance from actors whose interests would be harmed by change. Some real-world examples can be used to illustrate this point. In 2003, the ruling African National Congress rejected electoral reforms recommended by a task force appointed by the party. It did so because implementing the reforms would have weakened the electoral hegemony the party
has enjoyed since the end of the struggle against white minority rule (Mozaffar 2010: 99-100). Similarly, Terry Karl’s study of institutional development in petro-states, to which this study is indebted, follows the same logic (Karl 1997). Breaking out of a dynamic of oil-driven state-building is decidedly difficult because the dominance of oil in the political economy “fosters especially powerful organized groups with very real interests in maintaining this model” (Karl 1997: 54). The relevant point to the study of state-building in the shadow of conflict is that it is essential to examine the conflict itself and not take the end of the conflict as a foundational moment that presents an opportunity for a radical break from the past.

As the empirical analyses in this study also show, wartime processes can leave positive or negative institutional legacies that shape developments down the road. Although the statistical analysis in this study was based on a global sample, the empirical focus in this project has been on the experiences of states in Africa. But the theory is relevant to the experiences of countries across the contemporary developing world. Thus, one way to test the theory’s broad application is to examine its relevance to the experiences of non-African nations.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE**

The theoretical claims and findings of my study also matter for policy. As the study has shown, access to domestic resource rents and sizable external patronage reduce the imperative for rebels and governments to bargain with local populations to generate war-making resources. The consequent lack of incentive to tax reduces the need to build
institutions and forge consensual relations with local populations. In the following pages, I address two broad policy implications for policy.

The first focuses on the necessity and efficacy of intervention in civil wars. External actors intervene in civil wars for a variety of reasons—normative, strategic or some combination of both. Regardless of the justification, foreign intervention in civil wars has consequences not only for the duration of conflicts but also for political developments at war’s end. For example, Renamo’s struggles in transitioning from a predominantly military organization to an effective political party cannot be seen in isolation from its wartime history of comprehensive dependence on outside actors for sustenance at the local level. When Rhodesia and South Africa created, armed and financed Renamo, their overriding goal was to destabilize the Frelimo-led government as a punishment for supporting liberation movements fighting white minority rule in both countries. But the intervention had considerable effects on Renamo’s organizational evolution. By allowing Renamo to dispense with the task of cultivating local legitimacy, the availability of “easy” foreign financing gave it considerable autonomy vis-à-vis local populations. While Rhodesia and South Africa had no interest in fostering the development of a politically engaged and organizationally capable rebel movement, Renamo’s experience provides a crucial lesson: outside help that contributes to the disarticulation of relations with local populations can have unintended consequences that are almost always negative.

In recent years, publics and policymakers in the West have been debating the necessity and efficacy of military intervention abroad in the context of the Syrian and Libyan civil wars. These debates have revolved around normative and strategic considerations. Regardless of what the justifications are, coercive foreign intervention has
political ramifications for the state intervened in, but these long-term consequences figure inadequately in the decision-making calculations of foreign actors. It is, of course, the case that not every episode of intervention is equally consequential. But whatever form it takes, foreign interventions in internal conflicts that drastically reduce the imperative for warring factions to forge consensual relations with local populations is likely to have long-lasting consequences for domestic politics in ways that are almost always unforeseen by the intervening actors. In this regard, the historical record is discouraging.

Libya exemplifies the dangers of foreign interventions in civil wars. In 2011, foreign military intervention led to the demise of the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. In the aftermath of the overthrow of Gaddafi, the legacy of decades of institutional sclerosis reared its ugly head, as the lack of minimally functioning state structures that could be cobbled together quickly created severe difficulties in reestablishing order. This was not surprising in light of the dynamic of ineffective institution-building in the course of Gaddafi’s long tenure. After coming to power following a coup against the country’s aging monarchy, the Gaddafi regime came to rely on the country’s considerable oil wealth to co-opt and decapitate the country’s historically influential political and social elites, setting in motion pernicious political and institutional dynamics. Judged even by the standards of rentier states, Libya stood out for the extent to which formal institutions seemed to play negligible role in organizing and coordinating political life in the country. “In a fashion unmatched in the region, this price of wealth in Libya resulted first in a massive formal withdrawal of whatever weak elite groups existed under the monarchy and was then extended under Qadahafi to a more broad-based coalition that included virtually all of the country’s citizens…who were pampered and kept depoliticized by the egalitarian policies
of the distributive state” (Vandewalle 1998: 178-79). In short, Libya lacked a culture of rule through institutions that could provide a basis for rebuilding the country. Like other oil-rich regimes in the Middle East, the Gaddafi regime exhibited signs of stability, as evidenced by its success in holding onto political power for decades. Behind this facade, however, was a fragile edifice built on brittle foundations, as its rapid collapse amply demonstrated.

The dramatic collapse of the regime created a perilous institutional vacuum throughout the country, making it difficult for would-be state-makers to impose their will and reestablish order. Thus, it is within the context of decades of mismanagement and institutional regression that Libya’s descent into anarchy is intelligible. The success or failure of nations emerging from conflict cannot, of course, be measured by what they accomplish or fail to accomplish less than five years after the collapse of the old order. But in the case of Libya, there is abundant evidence to conclude that the circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Gaddafi regime set in motion a series of events with far-reaching implications for peace – and state-building.

Direct military intervention by Western powers under the banner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tipped the balance of power against the Gaddafi regime, effectively handing the keys to national power to loosely organized rebels forces. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, the United States and its allies hailed NATO’s intervention as a blueprint for future operations. From the vantage point of U.S. policymakers, the fact that European powers took the lead in Libya was also a bonus. The triumphant mood in the West was largely driven by the ease with which the Gaddafi regime collapsed without the deployment of ground forces, which was essential in
assuaging public concerns about the costs in blood of military interventions. As Western policymakers navigate between the imperative to respond to domestic disorder in the developing world and alleviate public concerns about the costs of potentially open-ended commitments, they tend to end up splitting the difference. The resulting half-hearted commitment is almost always incommensurate to the task. Intervention is often linked to clear exit strategies that are spelled out in advance, leaving indigenous actors within the states intervened in to pick up the pieces. In Libya’s case, although the principal military aim of removing Gaddafi from power was accomplished with relative ease, delivering on the promise of a stable, democratic Libya—the implicit justification for the intervention—has proven far trickier than anticipated.

Initially, there were some causes for optimism. Foundational elections for a General National Congress were held in July 2012, following which a prime minister was appointed to lead an interim government with the principal task of laying the ground work for a new constitution and fresh parliamentary elections. These early developments signaled what appeared to be the charting of a democratic path. Just a few months after the elections, a seasoned observer of Libyan politics wrote: “defying expectations, Libya stands out as one of the most successful countries to emerge from the uprisings that have rocked the Arab world over the past two years” (Vandewalle 2012: 8). In retrospect, this assessment was overly optimistic, even on the basis of what had already been achieved. Today, Libya bears no resemblance to the kind of successful state that Vandewalle saw emerging in the wake of the 2012 elections. The country has since become de facto partitioned into sectarian spheres of influence. The inability of the central state, such as it is, to assert itself has created institutional vacuum in much of the country. As a result, armed subnational and
transnational networks, including affiliates of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have occupied large swaths of the country’s ungoverned spaces, creating a new source of threat to international security.

As I have argued in this study, a win by one side is more conducive to state-building than any other form of civil war termination. But as I have also argued, a win is not adequate, as state-building takes place in the shadow of enduring wartime legacies. On the one hand, by decisively changing the balance of power on the battlefield, NATO’s coercive intervention helped the Libyan rebels achieve victory. On the other hand, the speed with which foreign intervention led to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime meant that the rebels did not have adequate time to cultivate strong local roots, effectively handing them an outcome for which they were utterly unprepared. Since the diverse fighters that constituted the backbone of the rebel army were united by little more than their common aversion to Gaddafi, the temporary unity of purpose did not survive the collapse of the regime. It can, therefore, be said that the civil war and the rapid collapse of the Gaddafi regime, rather than representing the birth pangs of a democratic and a Western-friendly Libya, appear to have planted the seeds of the country’s descent into near-total anarchy, not unlike Somalia after the collapse of the regime of Siad Barre in the early 1990s. In short, the Libyan case supports this study’s contention that, while civil war outcome matters for state-building, the conduct of war matters a great deal, as it determines the path down which nations move in peacetime.

The principal lesson to be drawn from Libya’s tragedy is not that all forms of intervention should be avoided at all costs. Such a conclusion would be unrealistic, given the subtle yet significant policy shift with respect to the use of force that has been
underway since the end of the Cold War (Chandler 2007: 78-79). However, intervention undertaken on the basis of nothing more than the need to be seen as doing something in the face of humanitarian crises—recent interventions have all been justified on humanitarian grounds—without giving serious considerations to its long-term impacts on the states being intervened in is a recipe for disaster. While few would argue that the removal of Gaddafi from the Libyan political scene was an undesirable outcome, few would also contest the judgment that Libya is nowhere close to being the paragon of stability and democratic success story that the proponents of ‘smart’ intervention hoped it would turn out to be. The failure to establish well-functioning state institutions in war-torn nations cannot simply be reduced to tactical mistakes or the commitment of inadequate resources. It is more fundamental than that, for it reflects the inability of outside actors with little or no political will to bring about fundamental institutional transformations in war-torn nations.

But policymaking does not entail making choices between the bad and the good. Just as domestic politics entails making complex trade-offs under conditions of finite resources, policymaking at the international level also involves making calculated decisions, which more often than not means deciding between two or more less-than-ideal options. The key consideration guiding actions should, therefore, be whether the costs of a particular course of action are considerably greater than the costs of inaction. Making such determinations is admittedly a daunting task; yet, sufficient care must be taken in balancing the ethical unpalatability of sitting on the sidelines in the face of domestic disorder against what international actors can and cannot realistically achieve. Otherwise, intervention will continue to be driven by the same “unblinking ideology, wishful thinking and blithe assertions of ahistorical universalisms” that have led to near-total anarchy in places like
Iraq and Libya (Dodge 2006: 198). Difficult as it may be to swallow, under some circumstances less international intervention may actually be the best course of action.

Second, the findings of the study have implications for the dilemmas of interventions aimed at stabilizing and rebuilding post-conflict societies. State-building has been an important element of the international community’s peace-building agenda for some time now. The foray into state-building overlapped with the transition from ‘first generation’ to ‘second generation’ peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). In consent-based ‘first generation’ peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers did little more than serve as a buffer between belligerents in order to prevent the resumption of fighting. ‘Second generation’ peacekeeping missions were based on the premise that ceasefires were insufficient to ensure long-term peace. As a result, the scope of peacekeeping missions was expanded to include broader economic, political and social transformations in the states intervened in. The creation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was a turning point in the transition from simple blue helmet operations to multidimensional peace enforcement operations. For the first time in its history, the UN took over responsibility for the actual governing of a post-conflict state (Roberts 2009). Similarly, the United States since the end of the Cold War has also invested considerable political, economic and military resources into state-building and various stability operations across the globe—from Somalia to Bosnia to Afghanistan and Iraq—with limited success (Brownlee 2007).

Initially developed in a relatively ad hoc fashion in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, international state-building has since become somewhat institutionalized. In 2004, the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change produced a report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, which, inter alia, recommended the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission to oversee state-building in failing and post-conflict states (Chandler 2007: 78-79). However, the record of external actors on state-building is not encouraging, as interventions justified in the name of nation-building have failed to deliver on the promise of establishing well-functioning institutions in the nations being intervened in (Chesterman 2004; Dobbins et al. 2005; Dodge 2006).

Analysts and researchers have provided several explanations for this lack of success. For some, poor state-building outcomes have to do with a mismatch between means and ends (Dobbins et al. 2003). According to this perspective, external actors pursue all-encompassing state-building programs that include democratization, judicial and police reforms, the empowerment of civil societies and the adoption of free markets but the commitment of resources is often incommensurate to the tasks. Similarly, Barnett and Zurcher (2009: 47) place responsibility for the failures of liberal peace-building “with the donors, funding agencies, and ultimately Western states, who do not give those in the field the time, money, and backing they need.” For others, the problem of liberal peace-building runs much deeper than disagreements about means and ends, ascribing failed state-building outcomes to the flawed nature of the liberal peace-building paradigm. In the specific case of post-conflict societies, the problem has to do with attempts to engineer a near-simultaneous triple transition: war to peace, democratization and economic liberalization (Paris 2004). Although elections can be a critical source of legitimacy, exposing fragile states to the glares of democratic contestation is said to increase the likelihood of renewed violence, raising serious questions about the utility of elections as a means of peace-
building (Call 2008; Fukuyama 2007: 12-13; Lake 2010: 270-72). Historically, institutionalization and liberalization/democratization unfolded over a lengthy period (Krause and Milliken 2002: 762; Robinson 2007: 14). In contexts where mass incorporation took place prior to the onset of an effective state-building dynamic, the challenges of constructing effective state institutions were particularly daunting (Kurtz 2013; Waldner 1999). As Huntington (1968: 8) put it: “Authority has to exist before it can be limited.” In short, sequencing matters.

But the shortcomings of liberal peace-building run much deeper than the paucity of resources and the concurrence of institutionalization and liberalization. Given the material needs of post-conflict states, greater resource commitments can probably make a difference. But resource wealth in many post-conflict nations has also been a paradoxical source of institutional weakness, best exemplified by Angola and other rentier states. Furthermore, the issue of sequencing, critical as it is, does not address the question of whether external actors can successfully engineer institutional transformations, even if they get the sequence right.

The findings of my study point to a different set of problems that might compound the serious challenges facing external actors seeking to engineer state-building in the developing world. Specifically, the path-dependent formulation raises questions about the emphasis on institutional design in trying to reconstruct states emerging from conflict and the extent to which outsiders can help reverse ineffective institutional dynamics already in place. Much of the attention to state-building from scholars and practitioners alike focuses on “how best to leverage external influence to generate desired changes within a domestic polity” (Krasner and Weinstein 2014: 125). Invariably, the search for the ‘right’ institutions
results in domestic actors taking a backseat, despite the fact that state-building is a lengthy process that is inseparable from the process of domestic politics. Historically, state institutions evolved as a result of ongoing processes of contestation, negotiations and renegotiations between rulers and citizens. When the process of state-building is divorced from domestic politics, it is unlikely to support the emergence of a social contract between states and societies.

Fashioning modern state institutions in inhospitable sociopolitical settings is decidedly difficult. But compounding these difficulties is a problematic assumption that has guided external state-building efforts in recent years, namely, the notion that “institutional development in a postconflict condition takes place on a green-field site, with the common refrain that there is nothing there and everything must be created from scratch” (Ghani and Lockhart 2006: 119). However, the postwar setting is not a tabula rasa. Civil wars restructure state-society relations and creates powerful interests that do not vanish at war’s end. But the implications of these constraints have yet to be fully appreciated and reflected in the plethora of international strategies and aid programs designed to rebuild postconflict states. Interventions based on the assumption of a blank slate are unlikely to succeed, as they “may produce a crowding-out effect, stifling the rise of indigenous state-builders rather than filling a hypothetical institutional vacuum” (Englebert and Tull 2008: 136).

As this study has shown, because states emerge from conflict with different institutional capacities, they also face different challenges in the postwar period. The roots of this variation can be traced back to prewar conditions as well as wartime processes and transformations. Consequently, state-building strategies must account for this diversity.
Yet, as Michael Wesley writes, “the steady rate of state-building interventions since 1999 has generated a cadre of international planning and operational personnel who move from one intervention to the next, applying familiar diagnoses of the problems of state failure and similar frameworks of response to often dissimilar situations” (Wesley 2008: 375). As a consequence, state-building is reduced to a technical exercise, when in reality it is a lengthy process rather than a discrete episode (Chandler 2007: 76; Cramer 2009: 134). Above all, such a narrowly technical approach to state-building underestimates its messy and complex nature.

This approach to state-building is “grounded in a first-best mindset” that ignores relevant contexts, including “potential interactions with institutional features elsewhere in the system” (Rodrik 2008: 100). Consequently, external actors choose institutional models that are not necessarily viable within the societies they seek to transform. We know that state institutions are built on what already exists. Since the wartime inheritance can impede or facilitate state-building, understanding the various institutional, economic and political endowments that exist in a particular post-conflict setting should be the critical starting point for a successful state-building strategy (Cramer and Goodhand 2002: 891). A state-building agenda that fails to consider the role of the powerful actors and institutions that developed in the course of an armed conflict is unlikely to succeed (Lyons 2002: 223). Only through a thorough assessment of inherited assets and liabilities can state-builders hope to build on the positive while systematically reducing the negative (Ghani and Lockhart 2006: 119).
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