The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Political movement learning through the Arab Spring protests, 2011-2013

*Keywords*: Jordan Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Action Front, Arab Spring, protests

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Abstract

This study seeks to use the period of 2011 to 2013, aligned with Jordan’s Arab Spring, to identify the extent to which the Islamic Action front and the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood underwent political and social movement learning during this time period. I used coding of newspaper and newswire service articles to examine how the Islamic Action Front and Jordan Muslim Brotherhood participated in protests and to understand what their calls for reform and cross-ideological cooperation with other political and social movements implied for their own future in the Jordanian political system. Additionally, previous survey data from other researchers was incorporated to provide a context for what level of support the Brotherhood and its political party have today in Jordan’s semiauthoritarian political sphere. This study found that the Islamic Action Front and the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood used strategic cooperation with other Jordanian organizations and movements in order to heighten pressure on the Jordanian government to undertake reform, despite the regime’s strict control over the Islamists’ ability to have power in parliament and within the political system.
Note on transliteration from the Arabic language to English

The method used for transliteration in this work adopts a system similar to that used by Jillian Schwedler in her book “Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen” (2006, p. xxi). To maintain the accessibility of this work to a non-Arabic speaking audience, this transliteration system represents only the medial ‘ayn, ‘ghayn, and hamza, save for rendering proper names. Arabic words appear in italics (e.g., shari'a). Proper names, most commonly those of Islamist leaders in this work, are often transliterated multiple ways depending on the news source. An effort has been made to ensure that all Arabic words follow my set forth system of transliteration with an Arabic professor at my university. All proper names will not appear italicized. I take fault for any erroneous translations based on the system I have set forth above.

Abbreviations and acronyms

CSS- Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan
HCCNOP- The Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties
IAF- Islamic Action Front
JMB- Society of Muslim Brothers in Jordan or Jordan Muslim Brotherhood
MENA- Middle East and North Africa region
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Introduction

The protests that spread across many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the early months of 2011, a period commonly referred to as the Arab Spring, brought an unexpected upheaval of long-entrenched regimes. The leaders of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were toppled. Yemen eventually saw a transfer in power of its top leadership, and the Syrian regime became embroiled in civil war. In Jordan, the Hashemite monarchy did not face calls for its overthrow, but instead faced heightened pressure for political and economic reform.

With an unprecedented wave of unrest sweeping the region, the political opportunity arose for the Islamic Action Front (IAF), a historical leader of government opposition in Jordan, to re-emerge and lead protests against policies of the Jordanian monarchy and government in the spring of 2011 and the years following. The IAF is considered the political arm of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and acts in coordination with its policies despite their registration as separate entities. Even though the IAF and the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) face a restricted political sphere and the Jordanian regime has remained relatively stable (with the help of fiduciary support from other countries), these two Islamist movements nonetheless chose to ratchet up their participation and leadership in protests during the Arab Spring.

The focus of this research paper is to understand to what extent protests led by the IAF and JMB since the beginning of the Arab Spring (2011 to 2013) reflect their learning as political and social movements and the formation of strategies by these Islamist movements to bolster their support among the Jordanian population. Building on the work of Nathan Brown (2012), it is important in the context of Jordan to improve our
understanding of how and why Islamist parties compete in Middle East political systems under authoritarian regime even when there is currently no chance of ruling over the government. The upsurge in protest activity in Jordan during the Arab Spring provides the perfect case study in which to explore what the calls for political and economic reforms and protest leadership by the IAF and JMB means for the future of their movements and the Jordanian political system.

To fully understand the historical context from which the JMB and IAF arose within the Hashemite kingdom, this paper begins by providing the historical background of both the JMB and the more recent history of the IAF (which was formed in 1992). The JMB’s historical relationship with the Jordanian monarchy has been one of peaceful opposition, however, the entry of the IAF into parliament as the JMB’s de facto political party has significantly elevated the level of contention and tension between the leaders of the Islamist groups and the regime. Despite the mooring of Islamists in the promotion of societal adherence to Islamic values and shari’a law, the recent history and the findings section in this paper show some interesting changes in the current issue areas of concern for the JMB and IAF.

Turning next to a review of scholarship, this paper identifies key theoretical frameworks that have been used to understand Islamic political movements and the role they play, specifically in the Middle East, in political systems that operate under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Recent work by Wickham (2013), Schwedler (2006; 2011), Clark (2006), and Browers (2009) has examined factors such as leaders, individuals, and cross-ideological cooperation in order to understand how Islamist movements moderate, change ideological stances, or choose to formally enter their
country’s (often restricted) political sphere over time. This paper will seek to move beyond a focus on Islamist movements’ moderation and ideological commitments and change over time, and instead seek to provide a theoretical link between Islamist social and political movement learning and mass mobilization to understand the protest activities of the JMB and IAF during the Arab Spring and the implications they have for the movements’ futures.

To draw the link between social movement theory and the actions taken by Jordanian Islamists during the Arab Spring, I employed a methodology primarily based in the coding of newspaper articles on all reported protests (under the stipulation of some criteria) in which the JMB and IAF led or participated in from 2011 to 2013. With original data on protests that reveals the current state of the JMB and IAF, the reforms they called for during the Arab Spring, and what their leaders say about their movements’ commitments to democracy and principles of governance, a clearer picture emerges of how the IAF and JMB have changed over time and what goals they have today. In supplementing the data I collected with surveys of Jordan’s general and Muslim populations, this research brings explanatory power to the effects of the Jordanian public and government on the strategic positioning used by the JMB and IAF to gain further support from and exert greater influence over Jordanian society.

**Historical background of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan**

The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan was founded in November 1945 by Sheikh Abd al-Latif Abu Qurrah and became registered as a charitable organization in Jordan in January 1946 (Wickham, 2013, p.197). The parent organization of the JMB, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (founded in 1928), would provide some influence over the
beliefs and values of its sister organization, but ultimately the two groups would take different political trajectories due to their distinctly different relationships with their state governments.

The JMB developed a relationship with the Hashemite monarchy at the organization’s inception that has proven crucial to the movement’s survival and continued to shape the group’s relationship with the monarchy to the present day. King Abdullah I attended the first meeting of the JMB, cementing the Brotherhood’s relationship with the monarchy as one characterized by a lack of confrontation and built upon family ties between early JMB East Bank leaders and regime officials. This relationship allowed the JMB to receive a special status as a “general multi-function Islamic group,” which allowed it to expand its activities and message to mosques and other public places without any interference from the state (Wickham, 2013, p. 197).

Early on, despite some internal debate over the benefits of political participation, the JMB had candidates enter as independents in the parliamentary elections of 1951 and 1954 and as candidates for the Muslim Brotherhood in 1956. In both 1954 and 1956, Brotherhood members won 10% of the available parliamentary seats. While holding parliamentary seats does not indicate that the Brotherhood had the power to guide the direction of the state, it does show that the movement was beginning to grow in popularity in the kingdom. According to Nathan Brown, the JMB maintained a comfortable space for opposition under the regime, where it could criticize the government for not pursuing fuller implementation of shari’a law, and in so doing appease its conservative middle class followers (2012, p. 188-89). While it could be critical of the government on some cultural issues, the Brotherhood continued to (and still
continues to) stay within the “boundaries of peaceful opposition” in Jordan (Brown, 2012, p. 189). Wickham notes that the JMB’s generally peaceful relationship with the regime allowed it to avoid Jordan’s ban on political parties in 1956 (due to a separate non-party association status), and in a move to protect itself from Arab nationalists taking power (who were more likely to be anti-Islamist) the JMB sided with the monarchy in the late 1950s and 1960s amid opposition protests (2013).

The JMB’s relationship with the regime has not been without some tension and the Jordanian government has kept a watchful eye over the movement and its activities throughout its history. Wiktorowicz explains that legal codes and administrative procedures are manipulated in Jordan to favor moderate social movement organizations like the JMB and IAF over the ability of radical Islamic activists to spread their beliefs (2004, p. 13). Brown and Hamzawy cite however that even in a time of less tension between the regime and Brotherhood in the 1950s through the 1970s, top Brotherhood leaders were arrested for political offenses (2010, p. 50). The Jordanian government as a way to coopt Brotherhood leaders, has brought them into top ministry and cabinet positions in order to tie them more closely to the ruling monarchy. In one of the other great political crises for the regime, when armed Palestinian groups posed a direct threat to Jordanian sovereignty in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the JMB stood neutral to preserve its power despite some of its members belonging to these groups and the expelled Palestine Liberation Organization.

In 1989, major riots occurred in Jordan over severe International Monetary Fund austerity measures imposed on the Jordanian government to end subsidies for food and other common items. In order to appease the protesters and end the political unrest with
some measures of political liberalization, King Hussein called for the first general parliamentary elections since they were suspended in 1967. The regime’s opening towards opposition voices led to increased political participation for the Brotherhood, with JMB members winning over a quarter of the seats in parliament (85% of the seats they contested) and Brotherhood members also participating in drafting a new National Charter for the country in 1990, which intended to provide guidelines for political party activity in the state (Wickham, 2013). The National Charter served the Islamist opposition well to the degree that it enshrined respect for political pluralism, the status of 

*shari’a* as the source of legislation, and Islam as the state religion (The Jordanian National Charter).

Through this time of protest and reconciliation of political values, King Hussein allowed parliament’s passage of a new political parties law in 1992, which the Brotherhood would seize upon to form their own political branch that same year under the name of the Islamic Action Front (IAF). While the IAF is a separate legal entity from the JMB, the IAF has deferred to the Brotherhood on critical decisions and almost by default they tend to select the candidate proposed by the Brotherhood to be the IAF’s next leader (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 53). Formation of the IAF allowed the Brotherhood a new opportunity to expand its appeal to other Islamists outside of its movement and to extend greater mobilization of its views in parliament and into the public eye.

The IAF’s electoral history has been one marked by both the Jordanian government’s manipulation of the electoral law and internal division among the party in forming its electoral tactics. After the Brotherhood had success in gaining 22 seats filled
by its members or aligned candidates in 1989, the IAF’s 1992 formation and the JMB’s 1989 electoral success drew regime concern towards rising Islamist power in the country. With the Islamists’ power increasing, their rise in power is speculated to have been the reason that the King and his cabinet decided to make amendments to the electoral law four months before the 1993 elections that would end up diminishing the IAF’s ability to win seats.

The 1993 constitutional amendment changed the structure of the voting system with voters formerly being able to cast votes for as many candidates as there were seats in the multi-member districts (i.e., three votes for a district with three seats up for election) to being able to only cast one vote (and the top three vote getters winning seats) in each multi-member district. This had an effect on many voters to choose a candidate based along their family and tribal lines, which could offer better connections and state patronage, over party orientations or their Islamic values (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 60). On top of this electoral amendment, a continued source of complaints for the IAF has been the skewed set-up of the electoral system, which provides over-representation for rural tribal areas traditionally supportive of the monarchy and less representation in traditional Brotherhood strongholds of urban areas with majority Palestinian populations. Perhaps surprisingly, the IAF still managed to win 16 of 80 seats in the 1993 elections despite the new electoral law being skewed against them, which could be attributed to their recent successful and popular entry onto the country’s political scene (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 61).

Even with the Jordanian monarchy’s restrictions on the ability of media and political parties to operate as freely as they would in a western democracy, Schwedler
notes that IAF has not chosen to halt its activities despite Jordan’s “stalled” state of true
democratic transition (2006, p. 29). Since the mid-1990s, the IAF has seen changes in its
“political structures (e.g., committee structures) and practices (e.g., reform demands)
even though the same regime remains in power and democratic processes are superficial
(parenthetical notes added by the researcher, Schwedler, 2006, p. 29). Thus, as will be
seen from the IAF’s electoral and political history to date, the party has continued to
value having a voice in Jordan’s political sphere even if that space remains restricted.

Since the 1993 elections, factions within the IAF have been divided over the
number of candidates to run for office and whether or not to boycott elections in order to
attempt to force the regime to change the rules governing the electoral system. In 1997,
the IAF boycotted elections for the first time, but with a lack of success in altering the
electoral rules of the game, the IAF re-entered the political sphere for the 2003 elections
(King Abdullah II suspended parliament from 2001-2003). The IAF’s return to politics
showed their recognition that parliament was the least-restrictive sphere in which the
party could raise its political and ideological views.

In 2003, the IAF would reclaim 17 seats, similar to its 1993 results, but now in an
expanded parliament of 110 members (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 61). It is also
important to note that the IAF has run fewer candidates than there are seats in every
election in which it has participated. This strategy comes from the party’s own choice to
exercise self-restraint under the assumption that the regime will continue to restrict the
party or political party system if the IAF has a chance to gain real power over parliament.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt used a similar strategy under the rule of Mubarak
when they remained publicly cautious of the potential implications of their public
activities after he allowed them greater societal space to carry out their mission. While the choice of self-restraint has merit, it also translates to the Jordan parliamentary setting as a factor that minimizes the political power the IAF can attain.

Tensions between the regime and the IAF and JMB have periodically flared up over the last decade and a half, particularly around the Brotherhood’s stance on issues related to Jordan’s foreign policy. Opposition from the Brotherhood and a coalition of secular groups to the Jordanian government’s normalization of relations with Israel in 1994 has continually caused a thorn in the side of regime, with violent protests erupting in 1997 and 2000 often centered around aggressive Israeli actions or to support Palestinian uprisings against the “Israeli occupation” (Clark, 2006, p. 544). The IAF’s support of Hamas (despite that group’s use of violence) and support for insurgency against occupation in Iraq have also drawn a disdainful eye from the Jordanian government and the Jordanian public, who carry skepticism towards support of those causes (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 59). What remains clear is that even though the JMB and IAF do not openly criticize the monarchy, the groups have taken stances that are visibly at odds with the foreign policy strategies used by the regime.

In more recent electoral history the IAF has not fared well. Internal disagreement over which candidates and how many to run in the 2007 elections led to the party’s worst result to date with only six candidates winning their elections (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 63). The IAF, in continued opposition to the voting and representation issues within the government’s electoral system, has subsequently boycotted the last two parliamentary elections held in 2010 and 2013. Despite, some internal discord within the IAF and correspondingly the JMB, Brown cites that angry factions tend to stay in the
movement due to the deep and personal bonds formed among members (2012, p. 129-30). Since entering politics, Brown explains that the IAF and many Islamist groups in general have a great capacity to learn. “Each election is followed by a series of studies and debates; each parliamentary session is followed by an accounting and a report; each strategic decision is reviewed for lessons learned” (Brown, 2012, p. 230).

Wickham cites the mid-1990s as the greatest ideological shift of the IAF to this date, from a focus on religious matters to government political and democratic reform (2013). However, Brown also offers the lead-up to 2003 elections, in which the IAF participated, as an important moment for the movement as well. The IAF’s platform in 2003 gave few details on how to ensure further implementation of the shari’a in society and instead drew focus to broader political reform and economic grievances that could be portrayed as part of a well-rounded Islamic agenda (Brown, 2012, p. 190). With this shift developing over the past decade, the years of the Arab Spring and its immediate aftermath (2011-2013), represents a new case study to examine whether the numerous protests of the present time period indicate a renewed or different shift towards calls for democratic and political reform than the past.

**Review of scholarship on Islamist politics under authoritarian regimes**

Political Islam or Islamism is defined by Guilain Denoeux as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations, that pursue political objectives” (as cited in Ayoob, 2008, p. 2). Under this definition, Islamism “provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition” (Ayoob, 2008, p. 2). Mohammed Ayoob’s (2008) work presents a
clearer picture of Islamist movements today, portraying these politically and religiously minded groups not as a monolith but as having differing views in the role they believe Islam should have in their state. For some Islamist groups, their goal is to see Islam and its values given a more prominent role in the state’s national life and symbols, while other groups seek a radical political transformation of the state into a theocracy or renewed caliphate.

The past few decades have seen a rise in political science scholarship in modernization theory and specifically into how states’ democratic transitions may be impacted by Islamist groups. For current and recently fallen long-standing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Islamist groups have often represented their most significant opposition. Some prominent theorists, such as Samuel P. Huntington, have raised questions as to whether or not Islamism and democracy can be compatible and if particularly radical Islamist groups can moderate to the extent that they lead in a country’s democratic transition.

For Huntington, the world is in a state of a clash of civilizations, leading to the potential for conflicts between predominately Muslim countries and Western predominately Christian countries. Huntington’s view of “democracy as a political form of Western civilization” aligns well with the viewpoint of Islamism’s incompatibility with democracy when combined with Wiktorowicz’s analysis that Islamist groups have used anti-Western rhetoric and mobilized support to rebuff the “Western ‘attack on Islam’” (1996, p. 43; 2002, p. 194). Additionally, Huntington believes Islam and democracy are incompatible because Islam does not recognize a division between “church” and state, and because the religion promotes community over the individual.
For Huntington, the individual spirit is a key asset to liberal democratic orders (as cited in Jamal, 2006, p. 53).

Despite examples of anti-Western views being espoused by some Islamist groups, researchers have also found Islamist movements willing to embrace the principles and processes of democracy that are more commonly associated with today’s societies in the West. Especially in the MENA region, where Islamists have long faced repression under authoritarian regimes, democratic ideals provide a method that can be used to open and grow public participation in their political system and support for their political parties.

Defining what democracy means in the MENA region, where it has little historical track record, is difficult. A common definition for democracy used by political theorist Robert A. Dahl provides five criteria for the democratic process: “(1) effective participation, (2) equality in voting, (3) gaining enlightened understanding (learning about alternative policies and their consequences), (4) exercising final control over the agenda, and (5) inclusion of adults” (parenthetical note added by the researcher, 1998, p. 38). In terms of the institutions deemed necessary for large-scale democracy, Dahl offers six: “(1) elected officials, (2) free, fair, and frequent elections, (3) freedom of expression, (4) alternative sources of information, (5) associational autonomy (independent from government), and (6) inclusive citizenship” (parenthetical note added by the researcher, 1998, p. 85).

Examination of Islamist groups’ beliefs through interviews of their leaders, reports on protests, and official statements has helped inform the field of political science on how these groups view democratic processes and the value (if any) they place in the importance of democratic institutions. With many regimes in the MENA region having developed limited forms of the democratic processes and institutions as described by
Dahl, a number of political scientists have focused their research on why and how Islamist groups choose to participate in the limited opportunities for political participation provided by regimes, particularly if the Islamists had previously promoted violent opposition towards their country’s regime (Wickham, 2013; Clark, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2002; Schwedler, 2006; Browers, 2009). To understand these processes of Islamist movement change and incorporation of democratic values and to exhibit their applicability to the Jordanian context requires turning first to the dominant theoretical frameworks constructed to explain these phenomena.

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2013) draws upon a long-term historical analysis of Muslim Brotherhood branches and their associated parties to form a baseline for comparing and understanding the development of these Islamist movements over time. She echoes Ayoob from the vantage point that Islamist movements are not monolithic in nature and she adds that ideational change and moderation within a movement is non-linear and may occur in some parts of a movement and not others (Wickham, 2013). Furthermore, in addressing the degree to which Islamist groups moderate and change their behavior based upon ideational changes towards democracy, Wickham sets a high bar for evaluating movement embrace of democratic values. She looks for movement rhetoric and leaders’ views to move beyond support of just procedural aspects of democracy (e.g., free and fair elections) towards support for democratic principles including those of tolerance for other religions, a commitment to individual rights and freedoms, and acceptance of the existence of different interpretations of Islam (Wickham, 2013, p. 6).
The second main area that Wickham draws attention to after ideational change is how strategic adaptation may affect Islamist attitudes towards democracy and the political system in which they are situated. As Islamist actors “enter a new institutional environment, they are under pressure to conform with its established rules of speech and conduct,” which Wickham argues could internalize behavioral change (2013, p. 12). Forming a connection to social constructivist literature, she draws links to the effects that interaction with other actors (e.g., political leaders, public officials) may serve as a causal factor to precipitate change in Islamist groups’ beliefs. Built upon an analysis of the historical understanding of these movements and the impact of ideational change and strategic adaptation on political participation, Wickham’s central hypothesis states, “observable changes in Islamist group rhetoric and behavior cannot be explained as an outcome of either strategic adaptation or ideational change but rather exhibit features of both” (emphasis added by author, Wickham, 2013, p. 17).

Jillian Schwedler brings a closer look at moderation of Islamist movements as a result of their inclusion in the political process. In her examination of theories on moderation as part of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, she disaggregates the concept of moderation into three areas:

1) the strategic behavior of moderates and radicals working within particular structural constraints; 2) attitudinal evidence about varying levels of tolerance between inclusive and exclusive political actors; or, less commonly, 3) the evolution of a political actor in terms of her actions, beliefs, and objectives before and after political inclusion (Schwedler, 2006, p. 21-22).
Schwedler’s research seeks further evidence of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in the Middle East context, particularly in Jordan and Yemen (2006). She builds upon work by other scholars such as Huntington (1991), Kalyvas (2000), and Przeworski and Sprague (1986), who used empirical evidence to show how strongly ideological socialist and Catholic political parties in the 20th century compromised on their political objectives when entering and settling into their respective political systems (Schwedler, 2011, p. 353-354).

Schwedler contends in her work that a government’s inclusion of a group (e.g., in elections and a legislative body) can discourage radicalism and have the overall effect of political moderation. Studies by Omar Ashour cite the example of the “de-radicalization” of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s due to the allowance of a greater number of opportunities to be active in civil society by the government (as cited in Schwedler, 2011, p. 356). Schwedler believes however that political inclusion is insufficient as a cause for the ideological moderation of a group (Schwedler, 2006). To explain what she means by moderation, Schwedler describes that:

[...] in broad terms, moderation entails a process of change that might be described as movement along a continuum from radical to moderate, whereby a move away from more exclusionary practices (of the sort that view all alternative perspectives as illegitimate and thus dangerous) equates to an increase in moderation (2007, p. 59).

Therefore, for Schwedler, the terms “moderate” and “moderation” are not a category for Islamist groups but are part of an ongoing process that these groups are involved in.
In the theoretical area of moderation, Schwedler and Wickham operate from perspectives that are not mutually exclusive. First, in terms of a group undergoing moderation, Schwedler points out that not all groups begin as radical entities. She cites the example of the JMB, which has a historically close relationship with the Hashemite monarchy. The Jordanian Brotherhood has never radicalized and instead maintains a moderate stance and has increased its engagement in “pluralist and inclusive practices of the sort we would recognize as moderate” (Schwedler, 2007, p. 60). Second, both Schwedler and Wickham recognize the importance of internal debates to causing ideological moderation. Wickham cites that individuals have their identities and beliefs constructed in their institutional and cultural environments and then use them to drive political action (2013, p. 11). The IAF presented an example of this in the 1990s when they debated internally to accept limited cooperation with ideological rivals (communist and socialist parties) based partially on their value of democratic participation (Schwedler, 2007, p. 60).

After examining what factors affect Islamist movement change, including strategic adaptation, ideational change, and inclusion-moderation theory, an additional area of study is the effect of cross-ideological cooperation on movement change. Janine Clark conducted a case study of the IAF in Jordan on the party’s involvement in the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) (2006). Clark sought to examine the significance of cooperation with other parties for moderation of Islamist groups and if there might be an impact on overall political liberalization and democratization in Jordan. Through studying the IAF’s response to three laws that came before the HCCNOP in the areas of ending the legality of honor
crimes, establishing a quota for women’s seats in parliament, and granting women greater divorce rights, Clark looked to see whether the IAF’s actions showed any substantive ideological change or moderation (2006, p. 540).

Clark found that the IAF, while cooperating with the HCCNOP on a number of international affairs issues (e.g., opposition to the treaty with Israel), showed less attention to domestic issues and less willingness to tackle contentious areas such as women’s rights. As the strongest party the IAF had the greatest influence over the committee’s agenda, and HCCNOP members agreed to keep controversial items based in strong ideology or religion, here divorce rights and honor killings laws, off the table for discussion. The lack of IAF willingness to discuss these issues showed self-imposed “red lines” existed that limited the party’s engagement in substantive areas of democracy (e.g., women’s equal rights with men) and therefore led to little to no ideological moderation (Clark, 2006, p. 556). Thus, for Clark, her research questions the strength of the “inclusion leads to moderation hypothesis” specifically as it concerns cross-ideological cooperation with other groups.

A final wrinkle to the theoretical concerns with cross-ideological cooperation as a cause of moderation is posed by Michaele Browers. Browers portrays moderation with an emphasis on the individual versus a whole group or party. She sees the individual as being in wasatiyya or “in the middle” between left and right political orientations and not moderating from one extreme to this middle point (Browers, 2009, p. 48-49). In terms of political parties, Browers sees individuals in and outside of a group causing its moderation instead of moderation caused by the overall work of the party (2009, p. 9). These additional insights from Browers’ research brings further doubts on cooperation as
a cause for ideological change, but her work also highlights the importance of leaders within movements to bring about substantive change like following democratic principles.

The frameworks developed around Islamist movement change by Wickham, Clark, Schwedler, and Browers each provide a strong theoretical basis for the causes that underpin Islamist movements’ reasons for moderation and/or entrance into the semi-democratic institutions and processes of their respective country’s regime. While these frameworks provide a foundation for how the IAF and JMB have developed up until and partially through the Arab Spring, they do not fully account for the processes of social movement learning and the underpinning reasons for the strategic decisions made by the IAF and JMB from 2011 to 2013.

In the context of Jordan’s Arab Spring, Wickham’s hypothesis reveals some likely strategic adaptation on the part of the IAF to cancel their participation in elections and to promote calls for greater democratization and government accountability, however, ideational change during this time is more difficult to prove. Schwedler’s focus on the “inclusion leads to moderation” hypothesis may shed light on why the IAF entered politics and what types of moderation take place, but it carries less explanatory power in this study due to the lack of new political openings provided by the Jordanian government. Clark and Browers raise important concerns about the insignificant effect of cross-ideological cooperation on the IAF if it does not make more commitments to substantive areas of democracy. Mark Beissinger, however, might counter that the evidence of mass urban collective action, with significant cross-ideological cooperation seen in protests, may not indicate a more substantive commitment to democracy for the
IAF and JMB but it could have an impact on their power to pressure regime and/or government change (2013).

The final theoretical framework that needs to be established takes this research a step further than the foundation of how Islamists moderate, cooperate, and show commitment to democratic principles. A focus on social and political movement learning is key to understanding what the IAF’s and JMB’s involvement in the Arab Spring mean for those movements and the strategic approaches they took to attempt to achieve their political and philosophical goals. Brown (2012) explains that by entering the political system in Jordan, the IAF has chosen to “play the game” of the political system under a semiauthoritarian regime. He states that “[t]hey respond cautiously, unevenly, and slowly. And they complain. But they still position themselves to take advantage of the limited opportunities presented by semiauthoritarianism” (Brown, 2012, p. 126). Islamic movement members’ participation in politics affects their movement in a variety of ways, from diverting their resources towards campaigns, to raising suspicion and hostility from other political parties, and changing the time horizon on which leaders focus to implement Islamic ideals in society from a long term view to the short term of an election cycle (Brown, 2012, p. 133-34).

As Islamists begin to find themselves regularly running for elections, their participation can cause them to adjust their interactions with the public and their coordination with other political parties. Clark and Beissinger might agree that Islamists’ cross-ideological cooperation with other parties may not lead to further embrace of democratic principles, however, as this paper’s findings section will show, this cooperation can have implications for mobilization that leads to government reform. The
importance of applying a framework of political and social movement learning to the entire IAF and JMB respectively (over an emphasis placed only on their leaders) will allow for meaningful interpretation of the protest data collected for this research and a better understanding of the how the Arab Spring affected these movements. Additionally, Beissinger’s (2013) research on mobilization success of revolutionary movements will also bring to bear interesting implications for the protests carried out in Jordan (discussed in the findings section) and other countries in the Middle East during the Arab Spring.

Methodology

This research project draws upon a mixed method approach that incorporates use of secondary survey data of Jordanians collected by multiple research organizations, newspaper articles on protests involving the IAF and JMB from 2011 to 2013 with coding rules developed by the author, and a review of the scholarly literature on Islamist movements and democratization in the field of political science. The use of these sources provided the best approach, given a number of research limitations (discussed in the next section), to understanding the context surrounding the IAF’s and JMB’s involvement in protests from 2011 to 2013 and the effect their protest demands had on their movements, the Jordanian public, and the Jordan government’s policymaking environment. In using the method of coding a collection of newspaper articles and supplementing the data with previously collected survey data, I intend to add further depth and understanding to political science scholarship of the IAF and JMB and their continued demands for reform as they relate to how they shape and operate in the Jordanian political context.

The survey data used as part of the analysis found in the findings section of this paper captures Jordanians’ sentiment about the role of Islam in society and Jordanian
politics, as well as Jordanians’ views on democracy and the protests of the Arab Spring. The data from the surveys provide a method for incorporating valuable information into the analysis conducted in this research paper that I could not collect myself due to time and monetary constraints. The data also serves as method for finding variables that can serve as proxies to provide some indication of the Jordanian public’s support for the IAF and their calls for democratization and government accountability. Differences in questions asked between these surveys and at times between separate waves of the same survey make it difficult to account for change in these variables over time. The surveys which I utilize for this research include the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, the Center for Strategic Studies (at the University of Jordan) 2011 Democracy Poll, the second wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer survey, the Pew Research Center’s 2012 report on Muslims and democracy as part of the Global Attitudes Project, and the Pew Research Center’s 2013 report “The world’s Muslims: Religion, politics and society.”

The core data I collected for this research lies in the 103 protests catalogued and coded by examining articles published by international and local Jordanian newspapers and newswire services from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013. The goal of collecting data on protests that involved the IAF and JMB was to record the demands of these groups, particularly those that related to political reform, economic reform, and democratization, during the Arab Spring and its immediate aftermath in Jordan. To examine articles from this time period, a search of news articles through the ProQuest Newsstand (PQN) search engine with the search terms “Jordan Muslim Brotherhood AND Protests NOT Egypt” were used to find all articles that mentioned the JMB’s and
IAF’s protest activities during this time period. 1401 search results were returned and 139 articles were catalogued due to their coverage of protests or interviews with Islamist and government leaders about the IAF and JMB protests. 103 total protests would be officially coded from the newspaper and electronic media sources. At the beginning of this research, the World News Connection article search engine was used with the same search terms, however, a switch was made to the PQN service after the World News Connection service was discontinued in the spring of 2014. The effect of this switch is not verifiable, however, the PQN service appeared to return more results, though many of them were duplicates of the same news story coverage.

News articles on JMB and IAF protests were coded for this research with the following information: title of the news article, name of the article’s news media source, the date the protest was held, the date the news article was published, the database from which the article was retrieved, the location of the protest in Jordan, the estimated number of protest participants, the goals and topics of each protest, and what collaborating groups participated in each protest (if any) besides JMB and IAF members. The rule I used to qualify whether a gathering was a protest is that at least 20 people were present and that the word “protest” was used in the news article. Protest goals and topics were recorded as research was conducted and fell under the following categories: government accountability (e.g., cracking down on corruption, removal of the Jordanian prime minister, dissolution of parliament), electoral reform, economic goals (e.g., protest on subsidy cancellations), anti-Israel and Palestinian solidarity, anti-United States, solidarity with Syrian rebels, solidarity with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, conformity of Jordanian law with shari’a, releasing jailed protesters from prison,
freedom (i.e., for the press and/or individuals), and calls for a more democratic society in general.

In the findings section of this paper the number of protest goals and themes recorded is greater than the number of protests that were coded, as some protests had multiple calls for various goals and government reforms. The goals and themes of these protests were coded simply for whether or not they were mentioned in each article as part of the demands of government and society called for by protesters. The number of protesters recorded at a protest relied on estimates from the news sources utilized for this research. The rules used to classify what qualifies as a protest were drawn from Mark Beissinger’s research on demonstrations in the former Soviet Union and used the following five criteria (save for a modification on the cutoff number of participants):

1. it was a voluntary gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against public policies;
2. it involved a minimum of one hundred persons;
3. it was bounded by space and time (that is, occurred in a specific location during a limited time period);
4. the number of participants was not restricted by the organizers of the event (that is, it was not a conference, convention, or other restricted organization meeting); and
5. it did not have as its primary purpose the infliction of violence by its participants (that is, was not a mass violent event) (Beissinger, 2002, p. 462).

I chose to modify the second point of criteria on the number of people that qualifies as a protest event from 100 to 20. By lowering the cutoff number, I felt that the research gained more of an accurate breadth of understanding of the reform demands issued during the protests and the lower minimum number did not change the fact that the
protest’s occurrence would become well known because it was already published on in the news media.

To make the data more digestible on the size of the protests that occurred, I chose to break down the protests into categories based on size, with my numerical cutoffs based on the more common ranges of protest attendance estimates used by the news sources examined. The use of the numerical term “dozens” of people designated a protest as having 20 or more people, “hundreds” of people designated a protest as having 100-499 people, “thousands” of people designated a protest as between 1,000-4,999 people, and all other numerical categories (see Table 2) were more accurately stated in the news articles. It is important to note that the number of protesters counted at each event is based on the account of a single source and is the best information available to determine the number of protesters who attended each protest.

**Research limitations**

The primary limitation on this research was the inability to travel to Jordan to collect primary data through a survey of the general public about their level of support for the IAF as well as conducting interviews of JMB and IAF members on their views of democracy and the strategies they used in planning their protests during the Arab Spring (which could indicate ideational change and strategic adaptation). Even when researchers do have access to the region, interviews with IAF and JMB leaders, and the ability to survey the general public, gaining quality data in the MENA region in general can be quite difficult. Portions of the Jordanian population may not be familiar with surveys and
survey techniques, and survey or interview participants may not always feel comfortable with talking to an interviewer about their religious and political beliefs.

Additionally, survey data collected from Jordan and the region may not offer a true representation of the population depending on who is surveyed and who is conducting the survey. Generally, surveys from the organizations cited in this paper such as the Pew Research Center and the Center for Strategic Studies are deemed to be reputable organizations with excellent research teams, however, even these organizations recognize that the data they collect may include some errors. The Pew Research Center survey of the world’s Muslims (n = 966), the CSS democracy poll (n = 1,944), and the CSS-coordinated Arab Democracy Barometer, Wave II (n = 1,188) all included large sample sizes and conducted surveys in Jordan that covered all of its governorates (national surveys) with participants proportionate to each governorate’s population. One advantage in researching Jordan is that the country and its people are more heavily influenced by or accustomed to the West and its researchers than some other Middle Eastern countries, making it easier to carry out research in the country. A final limitation with using this survey data is that it does not precisely answer the questions that were focused on in this research or cover the exact time period analyzed. To accommodate this limitation, the survey data was used to form proxy indicators of support for the IAF and JMB and identifiers were examined that could explain these movements’ ideological and strategic stances.

The accuracy of news articles and the self-censorship (or at times direct government censorship) of news media sources in Jordan and the MENA region is another challenge to producing quality research on political topics in the Middle East.
This research relied heavily on articles from “The Jordan Times,” a privately held and independent English daily newspaper based in Amman, and a minority of articles from a scattering of Middle Eastern and London-based news organizations. “The Jordan Times” provided fairly unbiased reporting and published articles during the Arab Spring that even reported calls from protesters for the end of the Jordanian monarchy (a punishable crime in the Kingdom; however, it is possible that “The Jordan Times” may have underreported the amount of protests that took place in the Kingdom involving the JMB and IAF from 2011 to 2013 in order to avoid government scrutiny. Due to the lack of civil war or regime overthrow in Jordan during the Arab Spring, media organizations outside of Jordan paid less attention to ongoing political developments in Jordan, which makes it necessary to rely mostly on “The Jordan Times” as a source for news on protests. Arabic news sources from Jordan may have provided more information than “The Jordan Times,” however, they were not readily accessible in a compiled news article database like ProQuest Newsstand.

Some inconsistencies also exist in “The Jordan Times” and reports by other news sources of the protests that took place in Jordan. In 18 of the protests reported involving the IAF and JMB from 2011 to 2013, the article related to the protest did not record the number of protesters who attended. This makes it difficult to verify if these protests met the rule used in this research that a minimum of 20 people must participate in a gathering labeled as a “protest” for it to qualify as a protest. Despite incomplete data, these 18 protests were incorporated into the overall protest data compiled for this research due to the JMB’s and IAF’s protest record of typically organizing or participating in protests that numbered in the dozens to hundreds of participants. Overall, even with the
limitations that accompany any data and research, the news articles on protests combined with survey data still combine to provide a much clearer picture of the Arab Spring in Jordan and support for the JMB and IAF.

**Model and hypothesis**

The model for this research relies on a framework consisting of analysis of two key components: (1) analyzing the coded data collected from news media articles on protests involving the JMB and IAF to quantify and list Jordanian Islamists’ calls for democratic political reform, economic reform, and government accountability; and (2) incorporation of data from a small group of surveys (e.g., Arab Barometer, Pew reports) that can provide proxy indicators of the Jordanian population’s support or lack of support for Islamist movements in Jordan as a result of their protests and public rhetoric. Protest data from the two-year period from 2011 to 2013 to analyze the various reform demands used and co-protest leaders that partnered with the IAF and JMB under a theoretical framework of political and social movement learning to gauge how these movements adjusted based on their protest participation during this time period.

I hypothesize based on my literature review that the protest data on the JMB and their political party the IAF, which are the leading Islamist movements in Jordan, will show that these movements have significantly increased their calls for democratic political reform and government accountability since the beginning of the Arab Spring. While this strategy may have increased support for the IAF and JMB at protests and support for their specific calls for reform, I think that the survey data drawn from multiple sources will show that the Jordanian population is still averse to fully supporting
the insertion of Islamic ideals or the demands for a more democratic system into political action and discourse in Jordan.

Findings

IAF and JMB reform demands: What the Arab Spring protests tell us

The examination and analysis of 103 protests led by or involving the JMB and the IAF from 2011 to 2013 reveals a moderate degree of strategic adjustment and political learning on the part of the Islamist movements that, in accordance with Brown’s (2012) analysis, reflects an extension of the IAF’s ideological shift in 2003 to focus more on demands for political and economic reform over rhetoric related to firmer implementation of shari’a law. Protests held in Jordan during the Arab Spring did not, for the most part, call for the ouster of King Abdullah II but instead demanded a wide array of government reforms and openly displayed Jordanians’ concern for their own economic security. The choice of the movements to collaborate with other parties to focus on pressuring the government over the rise in fuel costs proved to be one rallying point that helped the IAF and JMB attract Jordanians to their protests even if fuel prices were not formerly a major item on the IAF platform. Despite some internal divisions within the JMB and IAF membership and their designation as two separate entities, the two groups tended to act in coordination with one another throughout the Arab Spring.

Following the ignition of the Arab Spring with massive protests and the subsequent downfall of long-standing regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, the IAF seized upon the spread of popular unrest that began in Jordan to take a prominent lead among opposition groups traditionally politically opposed to the government to invoke demands for a wide variety of reforms from the Jordanian government. Early
demands from the opposition called upon the King to create a fairer electoral law for the country’s political parties, to crack down on government corruption, and to reverse a hike in fuel prices. Protests against corruption and a rise in the price of fuel were not new demands from members of opposition parties, however, protests on these topics reached such a high frequency during the Arab Spring that they could be viewed as part of the IAF’s and JMB’s political learning to strategically seize discourse on matters where they can spread their influence and message. The majority of calls for reform issued during protests from 2011 to 2013 from protesters across Jordan centered on the theme of government accountability to create more democratic, transparent, and representative institutions of government and to address Jordan’s woeful economic situation.

**Table 1: Categories of IAF and JMB protest goals and themes from 2011-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of protest goal or theme</th>
<th>Number of times a protest goal or theme was issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government reform (e.g., corruption, electoral system, economic subsidies)</td>
<td>78 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of solidarity with Palestine and call to end peace treaty with Israel</td>
<td>12 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of solidarity with Syrian rebels</td>
<td>7 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for assurance of press and/or individual freedoms</td>
<td>6 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of anti-U.S. sentiment</td>
<td>4 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of solidarity with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>3 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for greater democratization in Jordan</td>
<td>2 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for further conformity of Jordanian law with shari‘a law</td>
<td>2 protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for the release of jailed protestors from detention</td>
<td>2 protests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the 103 protests of the Arab Spring in Jordan spanning 2011 to 2013, it is difficult to verify the degree to which the IAF and JMB underwent ideational change (as Wickham terms it) towards democracy that would in turn explain the other remaining goals and themes for protests used by the JMB and their political party. The JMB has consistently called for reform of Jordan’s electoral law since its enactment in 1993 due to the dilution in the law’s power granted to parties and the disproportional alignment of elected seats to favor the less populous areas inhabited by East Bank tribes traditionally supportive of the regime as opposed to more populous majority Palestinian areas. Two areas that may reflect some limited ideational change and movement learning towards democratic processes for the IAF are the tolerance of and cross-ideological cooperation with other opposition parties and movements, discussed by Clark (2006), during the protests and the commitment they showed to protesting for individual and press freedoms especially in relation to the passage of new restrictive laws on the media.

During the protests, the IAF collaborated first with a multi-party coalition that it already had membership in, the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP), which includes six parties with leftist (e.g., communist, socialist) political orientations. Over the two-year period from 2011 to 2013, the IAF would also come to lead or join in protests with Jordan’s professional associations, trade unions, newly formed popular youth movements, tribal groups, and a new opposition coalition called the National Front for Reform. These other coalitions often showed more concerns with the country’s economic situation and government corruption than the IAF’s main concern of electoral reform, but this did not stop these ideologically different groups from working together and aligning with each other.
Wickham cites tolerance of other religious groups and competing political parties as an important commitment to democratic principles (2013). Additionally, Dahl states, “gaining enlightened understanding” of policy alternatives and different ideas should be part of the democratic process for groups within society (1998). Clark warns however, that cross-ideological cooperation only goes so far to indicate true commitment of the IAF to the democratic principle of pluralism (2006). She indicates that even within the HCCNOP, the IAF maintains “red lines” over discussion of issues that it feels that only a religious party (like itself) should be entitled to decide to bring before parliament (such as women’s divorce rights), which lends less credibility to the party’s commitment to tolerance for other political opposition groups (2006, p. 556). While I do not have access to data related to past protest demonstrations in which the IAF and JMB collaborated with other parties, the Islamists do appear to presently show a strong commitment to protest collaboration (52% of their protests from 2011 to 2013, see Chart 1) on a wide range of issues (see Table 1), regardless of whether some “red lines” still exist.

Chart 1:

[Diagram showing collaboration between IAF and JMB during Arab Spring protests]
Despite concerns from scholars and pundits that the IAF’s commitment to democratic principles may be suspect and likely to change if they ever become the majority party in power in parliament, Wickham addresses this issue by saying that this line of reasoning is oversimplification in its impossibility to falsify any democratic move as bent on seizing power and represents a coordination problem (of thousands of individuals) over a long period of time (2013, p. 10). While Wickham and other scholars are still critical of the JMB’s democratic values when it has contrasting stances on issues like women’s rights, one topical area of the Arab Spring protests that may indicate additional ideational change for the JMB and IAF is on individual and press freedoms.

In 2011, the Chairman of the Political Department of the IAF, Zaki Bani Rasheed, said the following about new restrictions on media outlets that the government (the King’s administration) was bringing to parliament:

> The government is going to Parliament with a number of repressive pieces of legislation on the media and public freedoms. Instead of producing a modern law to reform the country, this government remains living in the period of political repression. (“Protesters call for reform,” The Jordan Times, June 26, 2011)

With such a strong public stance taken against the government over media and public freedoms, it is important to recognize that the IAF takes seriously its commitment to (at least some) democratic principles and that this influenced its behavior and rhetoric during the protests of the Arab Spring.

In an interview in Arabic published and translated online, Zaki Bani Rasheed went further to explain the IAF’s commitment to democratic principles and a more democratic society:
We welcome any criticism directed to us. We respect the other opinion and see the freedom of expression as a genuine right for all Jordanians to criticize the official, party, and popular bodies. We are interested in going ahead with our reform programme. We hope that there will be an opportunity for dialogue with those who direct accusations to us.’ He says everyone must have his voice heard based on true democracy without excluding or marginalizing anyone. He says the MB accepts the judgment of the people and the results of the ballot boxes (al-Dustur, October 14, 2011)

This rhetoric from a high-ranking officer in the IAF lends more evidence to the potential that the IAF has shifted ideationally over time to become more supportive of democratic principles and processes.

Strategic adaptation is a second area highlighted by Wickham (2013) as important to forming the behavior and rhetoric of the IAF; it could also fall under part of Brown’s (2012) discussion of the political learning of the IAF. Strategic adaptation proves much simpler to identify through the Arab protests than ideational change, since the data readily shows the protests the IAF has attended and what types of calls for reform it demanded of the regime. The data compiled in Chart 1 shows that the IAF and JMB were the leaders of the Islamist opposition and a prominent leader of the opposition during the protests from 2011 to 2013. The high number of protest calls for government accountability, electoral reform, and economic reforms (see Table 1) show that the IAF was relatively flexible in adapting their calls for reform to the broader demands of the opposition as opposed to leading a charge for further implementation of shari’a law.
The JMB has also taken the opportunity to denounce violence when it occurs and involves its members (either as perpetrators or victims) and has historically been viewed as a non-violent movement (‘Islamists warn against violence, ‘uprising’ should fuel crisis continue,’’ The Jordan Times, November 20, 2012). With a firm stand against violent activity, the JMB and IAF are much more easily able to work with other political parties in the Jordanian political system. Additionally, 52% of protests with IAF and JMB involvement-a majority- included other organizations either as participants or protest co-leaders (see Chart 1). This data reveals that the IAF and JMB were not alone in their calls for reform and sought to form a stronger pluralist coalition.

The protests that took place from 2011 to 2013 involved a large number of people, which could serve as an explanation for successful strategic adaptation and movement learning on the part of the IAF and JMB to promote democratic and other government reforms that would draw Jordanians into the street under a common banner. Beissinger’s (2013) research on the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine also draws a few important commonalities between the color revolutions of countries from the former Soviet Union and the countries affected by the Arab Spring in the Middle East. It is likely that the IAF and JMB were able to learn quickly from the Egyptian and Tunisian examples on how to mobilize people and build off of those revolutions’ momentum. Beissinger stresses the importance of symbolic capital (here a time of great upheaval across the Middle East) in bringing mass mobilization and a negative coalition together to protest the government (2013, p.574). A negative coalition can be made up of a number diverse opposition groups but does not necessarily need to be committed to democratic principles or strong core demands; we saw this take place in Jordan where the IAF and
youth movements joined together in protests without strong common and specific demands for reform or strict commitments to advancing democratic principles (Beissinger, 2013, p. 574).

While the table below shows that the IAF and JMB took part in 68 reported protests from 2011 to 2013 that recorded from a hundred to thousands of participants, two other points should also be considered in conjunction with these data. The first important point is that “The Jordan Times” also published articles related to sit-ins and protests that did not involve the IAF or JMB that were held across Jordan over the course of this two-year period of the Arab Spring, meaning that protests of various sizes (though likely not as big as the IAF or JMB protests) were held and organized without coordination with the IAF and JMB. Therefore, the IAF and JMB may have been able to draw more protesters to their protests, but they can by no means claim that they were able to adapt to become the leader of all opposition groups or speaking for all people in Jordan, with a majority of their protests only held in Amman.

The second point to consider is that at times during the period from 2011-2013 significant dissension emerged from youth movements, the prominent National Front for Reform, and other opposition groups surrounding concerns of the IAF and JMB hijacking the opposition reform agenda with their own Islamic ideological agenda (“Attack exposes cracks between Islamists, popular movements,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, January 3, 2012). Heading into 2012, the second year of protests since the beginning of the Arab Spring, many groups decided to draw out of IAF and JMB-led protests or to host their own protests, since the goals of other opposition groups usually aligned more with economic concerns over conditions of International Monetary Fund loans than
electoral reform or other issues (The Jordan Times, January 8, 2012). These contentions between the opposition continued throughout the period of 2012 through 2013 and by early 2013, a smaller proportion of protests were co-sponsored between the JMB and other groups than in the previous two years.

The six largest protests of the Arab Spring (5,000 people plus) in Jordan involving the IAF and JMB show diversity in the demands of these massive demonstrations. Two mainstays for the majority of these protests were calls for government accountability (specifically for a clamp down on officials’ corruption) and electoral reform (“Protesters Call for Political Reform,” The Jordan Times, February 27, 2011; “Islamists lead thousands in 'reform' demonstration,” The Jordan Times, March, 6, 2011).

Table 2: Number of protesters at protests involving the IAF & JMB from 2011-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of participants</th>
<th>Number of protests</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not available¹</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-99 people</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-499 people</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-999 people</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-4,999 people</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000+ people</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Articles that reported on protests but did not give an estimate of the number of protesters that attended a protest were also included in the overall data collected on protests for this research. I used my discretion to include them based on data showing that all other protests involving the IAF and JMB met the requirement of holding a "protest" by having 20 or more people in attendance.
² The percentages above total to 99.9%, which was then rounded up to 100%.
In two-thirds of protests involving collaborating partners with the JMB and IAF, a diverse array of groups from tribal groups (traditionally supportive of the regime) to the HCCNOP were part of what Beissinger would call a “negative coalition” carrying forth broad and generalized slogans to put pressure on the Jordanian government to change certain policies (2013).

By the end of 2013, fewer protests were occurring from all opposition groups due to a combination of reform demands not being met by the government (e.g., satisfactory electoral reform), the JMB being concerned about the military’s coup and suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood’s party and movement in Egypt, and the ongoing Syrian civil war and its significant impact on Jordanian society. This protest data provides a quality indication of how strategic adaptation, particularly in regards to calls for democracy, was a factor affecting the IAF’s and JMB’s rhetoric and behavior during the Arab Spring protests as they attempted to bolster support for their movement. In order to further analyze and provide a more well rounded contextual look at the political and religious environments the IAF and JMB operated in during these protests, it is necessary to take a final turn to survey data on the opinions of Jordanians related to these movements.

**Survey findings on Jordanian opinions of Islamist politics and democracy**

A number of surveys of the Jordanian population have been taken in recent years, including the year leading up to the Arab Spring and during the Arab Spring, which have polled the population for their opinions on democracy and their level of comfort with the amount of influence that religion has over the country’s politics. One reason that the IAF may have shifted some of its rhetoric towards urging the government to undertake democratic reforms during the Arab Spring could be due to a correlation with a change in
their internal values over time or the fact that the idea of democracy remains popular among Jordanians. In a 2010 poll taken as part of the second wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer survey, 64% of Jordanians picked between a 5 and 8 in support of democracy on a 1 to 10 scale (10 being the most supportive). 82% of Jordanians surveyed also felt that “a democratic political system ([described as] public freedoms, guarantees equality in political and civil rights, alternation of power, and accountability and transparency of the executive authority) is good or very good,” and a majority were opposed to an authoritarian political system (bracketed text added by the researcher, Arab Democracy Barometer, Wave II, 2011).

Despite the fact that Jordanians generally support democracy and a democratic form of governance, the reality is that they still live under a monarch who has given his parliament and people limited political and legislative power. There are also some aspects of democracy that Jordanians have not yet seen come to maturity in their country or that they do not fully understand when compared with a Western setting. For example, even though political parties are legal in Jordan, the IAF being one of them, in a Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) poll conducted in 2011 only 54% thought that the freedom to form a political party was guaranteed, 30% believed the freedom was not guaranteed, and 16% did not know (2012, p. 18). This is likely one of the reasons that the IAF faces difficulty in sustaining political support, aside from public skepticism of their motives and an electoral system that disproportionately allocates seats for less populous tribal areas (supportive of the King) over more populous Palestinian urban areas (supportive of the JMB and IAF). Approximately 1% of Jordanians affiliate with a political party,
although 4% stated they intend to affiliate with a party, movement, or political group in the future according to the most recent CSS democracy poll (2012).

The future strength of public support for the IAF does have some bright spots, even with a political system that limits their ability to attain seats and a public that is still growing in maturity in its knowledge of democratic processes and principles. A significant portion of the Jordanian population, 37%, believes that religious leaders (which could include JMB and IAF leaders) should play a “large” role in politics and 40% believe they should have some influence (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 11 and 64). Muslims in Jordan also indicated at rate of 46% that Islamic parties were better than other political parties in Jordan, 27% said they were same, and 14% said they were worse when compared to other parties (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 66). And finally, in the Arab Democracy Barometer survey 48% of Muslims surveyed said that if Jordan were to have a political party in which only non-religious parties compete, it would be absolutely inappropriate (2011). What these closing statistics mean is that even though political party involvement is not currently popular among Jordanians, the opinions and values are in place that would appear to lend well to some margin of future political success for the IAF and other Islamist parties.

**Results of the Arab Spring protests for the IAF and JMB**

The concluding portion of this analysis centers on the outcomes of the Jordanian Arab Spring for the IAF, JMB, and general protesters. Scholars can only speculate as to the future success that the IAF will have in the next election (in which they choose to participate) due to their protest leadership during the Arab Spring or whether political parties will need to continue to wait for strategic political openings offered by the regime.
in order to be stronger competitors for parliamentary seats. While the protests from 2011 to 2013 did cause King Abdullah II to make numerous changes to the office of prime minister, to reshuffle his cabinet, amend significant portions of the country’s constitution, and sign a new electoral law, these changes did not meet the full demands of protesters and could lead to future unrest for the monarchy.

One of the main calls for reform from the IAF and JMB during the Arab Spring pertained to the “one person, one vote” electoral law that disadvantaged political parties in Jordan in favor of tribal groups that have traditionally strong ties to the regime. In critical comments towards the Jordanian government, the IAF Secretary General Hamzah Mansour stated, “the policy of appointing governments does not enhance political life and political parties. Electing governments is a significant step towards democracy” (Xinhua News Agency, August 28, 2011). As the IAF and JMB sought to continue to pressure the government on the issue of making freer and more fair elections (both for themselves and other parties), Jordanians would see a new election law passed in 2012 that gave the voting eligible population two votes and the option to vote for candidates from a national party list. Unsatisfied, however, the IAF still issued complaints that the problem of the electoral system’s overrepresentation of rural tribal areas over urban populations continued to persist. The dilution of political parties’ power to gain parliamentary seats and the IAF’s dissatisfaction with the new electoral law led to the boycott of the most recent January 2013 elections by the IAF and several other political parties.

The strategy of the IAF, JMB, and their coordinating protest movements to persistently pressure the regime over accountability for corruption within government and
for its slow pace of initiating reforms drew the most responsive actions from the King and his government from 2011 to 2013. Since the beginning of 2011, King Abdullah II has appointed five different prime ministers to rule over his government and a number of ministers resign over allegations related to corruption that occurred under their leadership (McClatchy-Tribune Business News, May 31, 2011). Prime ministers’ terms of service have traditionally not lasted long in Jordan, however, the pressure of protesters and groups like the IAF and JMB during the Arab Spring certainly played a role in an unprecedented period of leadership turnover in the government from 2011 to 2013. While some investigations and probes were conducted into or completed on corruption allegations between 2011 and 2013 it did not appear that such probes led to high a number of dismissals of officials from the government.

In spite of a period of general unrest in Jordan during and following the Arab Spring, the protests remained relatively peaceful and King Abdullah II was able to remain in power and not give away much of his power to parliament or political parties. Some of the protest movements’ recent demands (including those pre-2011) were met during the period from 2011 to 2013:

In the committee’s proposal, the amendments included several of the opposition’s demands over the last few years: the establishment of a constitutional court, an independent electoral commission and a restriction of the government’s ability to pass temporary laws in the absence of Parliament (The Jordan Times, September 19, 2011).

By the end of reported protests for 2013, some portions of the Jordanian constitution had been amended and the January 2013 elections still took place as planned despite the
boycott of the IAF and some other small political parties. These results show that even though the protests led to some concessions from the government during this period, the IAF and JMB did not achieve all of their protest goals, including reform for direct popular election of the Jordanian senate, and they subsequently did not generate political outcomes that appeared likely to bring more Jordanian support to their party and movement. Finally, the protest drive and opposition support also began to degenerate by early 2013 as the Syrian civil war and fuel prices increasingly drew the attention of Jordanians over concerns for government reform, and the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders of Egypt and July provided a cautionary note to the JMB in planning future activities and protests in their country.

**Conclusion**

This analysis of the case of Jordan during the Arab Spring showed that the IAF party continues to undergo political movement learning as it navigates a constricted political sphere. The IAF and the JMB both coordinated a significant upsurge in protest activity over the course of two to two and a half years from 2011 to 2013, which pressured the Hashemite monarch and his administration to meet head on the movements’ calls for reform. The unique protest data compiled for this research highlights the continuum of strategic adaptation by the IAF and JMB, focused on by Brown (2012), to move away from promotion of further implementation of shari’a towards more broadly appealing reforms. During the Arab Spring, the main issue areas touted by these Islamist movements were electoral reform, government accountability on corruption, and provisions for greater press and media freedom.
Although results were far from conclusive, the area of ideational change identified by Wickham (2013) was explored to examine the IAF’s and JMB’s political and social movement learning and their willingness to partner with ideologically different political parties and reform movements during the Arab Spring protests. Although Clark shows reason to be skeptical about cross-ideological cooperation of the IAF with other parties as a cause of ideational change, the willingness to coordinate with other parties cannot be wholly discounted as it provides some evidence of the IAF and JMB being ideologically open to other views (2006). The promotion of democratic principles (e.g., individual and press freedoms) and processes by IAF leaders in particular could also indicate a mixture of strategic adaptation and ideational change within the IAF as this rhetoric aligns well with the Jordanian population’s positive views of democracy seen in the Arab Democracy Barometer survey (2011).

From the survey data of other scholars utilized in this paper, it is notable that a number of indicators exist that show underlying support for strong Islamist parties in Jordan and for the Islamic religion to have an impact on Jordanian politics. The survey information on this topic also reveals some contradictions in the Jordanian (and broader Middle Eastern) tendency to associate democracy more with economic stability and strength than with some democratic ideals like the direct public election of their senate and prime minister (Jamal, 2006). And despite some indications of support for Islamist politics in Jordan, the knowledge of and support for political parties has not yet matured and flourished in the country, partially due to the gerrymandered system established under the government’s current electoral law.
As the IAF and JMB work to overcome internal divisions that have plagued the party and movement in recent years on decisions of whether or not to participate in the government’s imperfect election system or to what degree they should participate in the government administration, future research will provide important insights into Islamist political movements, particularly as they exist under authoritarian regimes. The original compilation of protest data from 2011 to 2013 provided in this research should serve as both a helpful informational source for historians and social scientists who conduct research on the IAF and JMB but also as evidence that the protest demands of the Islamist opposition did matter and have an impact on the Jordanian political system and government during the Arab Spring. With a number of protest demands left unfulfilled following Jordan’s Arab Spring, it remains to be seen if an urban civic revolution of the kind Beissinger described in countries in the former Soviet Union could catch fire in the streets of Amman and cause unrest for the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan once again.

**Recommendations for future research**

In order to conduct an updated and more conclusive test of Wickham’s hypothesis related to ideational change and strategic adaptation of the IAF with the Jordanian case the collection of more longitudinal data with specific questions pointed at understanding the Jordanian public’s views of the IAF and other political parties is necessary. The forthcoming release this year of data from the next CSS democracy poll, the sixth wave of the World Values Survey, and third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer report may aid in finding proxy variables that could also accomplish this objective. The collection of in-depth interviews with more IAF and JMB leaders may also shed further
light on whether evidence of ideational change within the party and movement can be verified.

An additional research topic to pursue would be to expand the methods used by Beissinger (2013) in the Ukraine to bring to bear data on Jordanian protesters, their age, and their commitment to democratic values, to see what the composition of mass protests in Jordan looked like during the Arab Spring. If limited data were available in Jordan, other Middle East and North Africa countries could also serve as interesting examples.
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Appendix: Map of Jordan

Source: [http://www.wordtravels.com/Travelguide/Countries/Jordan/Map](http://www.wordtravels.com/Travelguide/Countries/Jordan/Map)