

CONDITIONS AND COURSES OF GENOCIDE

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*For my amazing husband, Michael, whose love and support have made
each step along this journey
a joyous and amazing one.*

Abstract

After the Nazi Holocaust, the international community vowed to prevent genocide from occurring in the future. Yet, genocide has continued to occur. Accordingly, this study seeks to better understand why and how genocide takes place. I ask two key questions: 1) What are the causes of genocide at societal, state, and international levels? and 2) What accounts for temporal and regional variation in violence within genocides?

To assess what leads to genocide, I conduct an event history analysis of the preconditions of genocide in all countries over the last 50 years. This quantitative analysis examines factors associated with the onset of genocide at the societal level (such as ethnolinguistic diversity), state level (such as type of government), and the international level (such as trade), finding that factors at each level must be considered in order to understand why genocides take place and that civil wars are the strongest predictors of genocide.

While the event history analysis treats genocide as a single event, viewing genocide as an undifferentiated event misses opportunities to better understand the violence. Thus, the second part of this dissertation draws upon three case studies to analyze regional and temporal variation in genocidal violence in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sudan. I rely upon quantitative models to test how numerous factors drawn from genocide studies, the study of political and ethnic violence, and criminology—such as ethnic diversity, resource scarcity, unemployment levels, education levels, or the presence of certain armies—influence the onset and magnitude of certain forms of violence at meso levels. I also conducted fieldwork and 113 interviews with survivors, scholars, and other witnesses.

Overall, I find that the factors associated with regional and temporal differences in violence vary based on who the perpetrators are and how they are organized. In Rwanda, members of the community who were not part of previously organized formal groups participated in the violence. As such, criminology's social disorganization theory—which argues that community cohesion influences crime rates—helps explain variation in this violence. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Darfur, however, previously organized armies and militias generally committed the violence. Accordingly, strategic concerns dictated patterns.

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Preface: Stories and Numbers

The cab driver dropped me and my research assistant off at the edge of a dirt path leading to a large apartment complex. The buildings were short compared to many I had seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though they still managed to invoke the drab Soviet high-rises found throughout much of the country. Adis peered at the apartments, attempting to differentiate between them. Finally, he pointed to the one whose inhabitants were expecting us.

As we neared the dilapidated building, stray dogs lying on the pavement rose to investigate. I followed Adis up a narrow stairway to a door marked with a small number 12. “This should be their apartment,” he noted as he quietly knocked. A woman in her mid-30s promptly opened it. She smiled nervously and hustled us inside, where two sets of house slippers had been set out by the door.

After we slid the slippers over our socks, the woman showed us to the living room, hazy with cigarette smoke. Speaking in Bosnian, Adis introduced me to the family seated there. Each rose to greet us, and, while many sat on the floor, they indicated that the open chair was for me. Eight apprehensive faces, spanning three generations, peered at me as the eldest son in the family spoke with Adis. He explained, “I know you were only expecting to speak with Velna and myself, but our families live here too. And, they also wanted to be here for this.” I nodded as Velna’s daughter brought me a paper plate filled with cookies and told Adis that Turkish coffee was being prepared.

Surveying the room, I wondered how so many people lived in such a small apartment. Despite its overcrowding, it was a bit sparse. The war and genocide had taken

place almost twenty years ago, but it was clear that the family had yet to recover many of the personal belongings they had lost, including their home.

Velna's daughter reappeared with coffee, and we began our conversation. Velna spoke softly about how four of her children were killed near Srebrenica. She remembered how her daughters screamed and how Serb soldiers had called her youngest child a "puppy" before they ripped him from her arms. Tears welling in her eyes, Velna repeated how she had been unable to save her children.

As she finished her story, her eldest son held up a family tree he had been clutching. One by one, he showed me pictures of their family members, explaining when and how they had been killed. "Two of my uncles are still missing," he noted, pointing at two faces. Many Muslim men in Bosnia-Herzegovina are still "missing," including Adis's own father. Yet, despite the uncertain terminology, we all knew what had happened to these men. They had been murdered during the genocide. Their remains had been tossed into as-yet undiscovered mass graves.

I heard multiple other stories that afternoon, and I remain grateful to the family for sharing their experiences, tragedy, and wisdom with me. Velna, her relatives, and every other person with whom I spoke during the course of this project trusted me with the darkest moments of their lives, stories that they struggled to understand for themselves. Each of these stories is distinctive and told from a unique perspective. Still, these stories and events are also part of broader patterns—patterns that took place over and over again in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Sudan, and many other countries around the world. Velna's family members are among the millions of people who have been

victims of genocide in recent history. She and her surviving family members join countless others who remain deeply affected by these genocides to this day.

In this dissertation, I seek to better understand why genocides happen and how they unfold. Throughout the course of this research, I heard many personal stories about the genocides. Each person deserves to have her or his story documented, and you will read pieces of these stories woven throughout the forthcoming chapters. Yet, the aim of this project is not to tell stories but to document and illustrate the broader patterns they produce. The aggregate of stories, situations, and events comprise genocide; and I attempt to analyze why and how these genocides occurred.

As such, while I draw upon stories, I base my analysis in statistics. These aggregate numbers are necessary for me to share the broader stories of the genocides, analyze the patterns of violence, and better understand why and how genocide occurs. Such numbers are powerful, though they are reductive. For example, to understand what factors influence how many people are killed in each community, individual deaths are combined into single quantities collapsed over many units of space and time. Numbers like these certainly do not privilege the individual's story, though they in no way mean to diminish it. Instead, I believe these statistics show a different side of the story—how an individual's experience can be contextualized in broader patterns.

It may be difficult to remember people and their stories amidst what are often mind-numbing statistics and (sometimes boring) quantitative models in the following pages. But, keep in mind that each number represents life stories and series of events that radically altered individuals, families, and societies. As I test and rely on these numbers, my broader goal is to use social scientific tools as a response to gross horrors. It is my

hope that, through social science, we can assess why genocides occur and better understand how to respond to and even prevent them.

Chapter 1: The Crime of Crimes

“Winston Churchill had called the offense, ‘a crime without a name.’

Raphael Lemkin called it ‘genocide.’”


– James T. Fussell, Prevent Genocide International

On December 9, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Still reeling in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the countries of the world declared that genocide was a crime of international law and vowed to prevent it. The next day, the United Nations approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), proclaiming that, “Disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” (UDHR 1948). Clearly referencing Nazi Germany’s campaign to eliminate the Jewish people, the UDHR reaffirmed that genocide was a scourge.

These documents defined genocide as a crime for the first time in history, marking a precedent in international law. Yet, genocide was hardly new. According to historians, the annihilation of communities in Canaan, Homer’s narration of the Trojan War, and Roman massacres at Carthage are evidence that genocide has been occurring at least as long as history has been recorded (Weitz 2003). Genocide was often part and parcel of modern conquest, and many empires eradicated indigenous peoples as they expanded their boundaries into “unchartered” territories. Even as the 20th century dawned, German colonizers intentionally killed the majority of the Herero, Ovambo, and Nama peoples in South-West Africa through starvation and harsh working conditions (Hull 2005; Steinmetz 2008), while the Ottoman government systematically exterminated between 300,000 and 600,000 Armenians (Akçam 2006).

The Genocide Convention and the UDHR were hopeful but unsuccessful. Today, pictures of piles of bodies, endless rows of faces behind barbed wire, and starving children in refugee camps fill news media around the world and remind us that genocides continue to occur with alarming frequency. In fact, since the Holocaust, genocide has taken place in over 15 percent of the world's countries, shown in Figure 1.1¹

Figure 1.1: Genocides 1955-2005



Some of these genocides captured international attention and are commonly recognized as genocides by scholars and activists. These include the slaughter of over one million people in Rwanda and the Khmer Rouge's murder of well over 1.5 million people in present-day Cambodia. Other genocides, such as the genocide of Iranian Bahá'ís, are less widely known.

Scholars differ on whether these modern genocides represent a more intense (e.g., Bauman 2000; Weitz 2003; Powell 2011) or less dramatic pattern (e.g., Pinker 2011) than violence in previous centuries. Some argue that global violence is on a long decline, and

¹ I explain the data I used to create this figure, including the definition of genocide, each case included, and the precise time period depicted, in Chapter 2.

others suggest that modernity has ushered in more intense genocides.² Regardless of divergent historical perspectives, genocides have affected the lives of millions of people throughout the last century. More people were killed by their own governments in the 20th century than on the battlefields of World War I, World War II, and all other international wars of the century combined (Rummel 1995). Further, more people died as a result of genocide than as a result of all homicides, manslaughters, and related crimes over the century (Brannigan and Hardwick 2003; Savelsberg 2010). As staggering as these numbers are, they do not begin to capture the full impact of genocide. The numbers of people who flee a country during or after genocide often surpasses the number killed. Rape, torture, the destruction of homes, and many other forms of genocidal violence—including the destruction of cultures and the attempt to erase certain peoples from histories—increase victimization tolls beyond measure.

Such horrific violence motivates many questions, and I seek to understand why and how genocide occurred in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. To do so, I examine the macro-level risk factors that have influenced the onset of genocide since the Holocaust, analyzing whether these genocides were random events or if certain patterns can be found in countries where genocide occurred. Then, I focus on three of the most

² Scholars like Weitz, Bauman, and Powell suggest that the modern advent of bureaucracy, as well as the relatively modern meanings attached to race and nation, have resulted in more intense, systematic genocides. Pinker, on the other hand, argues that genocide, as well as many other forms of violence, have been declining over time, falling in line with research on the “civilizing process” (Elias 2000) and analyses of long-term declines in violent crime (Eisner 2003). Overall, I do not seek to compare the current historical period to previous ones and thus do not speak to the debate regarding the frequency and intensity of modern violence compared to past violence. Nevertheless, much more research over centuries of genocide is needed to validate either argument, and both may prove true. Indeed, intensity and frequency are categorically different and may illustrate diverse patterns. Today’s genocides may be simultaneously less frequent and more intense.

recent genocides—those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sudan (Darfur)—to better understand the dynamics of genocide once it begins. For each case, I consider the determinants of the onset and magnitude of genocidal violence at the community level, providing a view of the causes and processes of genocide at meso levels as well as a glimpse at what drives the violence once it is set in motion.

In the following pages, I begin by defining genocide. I then explain how sociologists, criminologists, and other social scientists have studied the violence and argue that sociological and criminological inquiry should encompass the study of genocide. Next, I outline the three main theoretical interventions I make in this project and give a brief description of my case selection and methodological strategy. Finally, I preview the contents of this dissertation, highlighting each chapter and some of its main findings, which I more fully detail in the conclusion.

Defining the Crime of Crimes

During the violence in South West Africa, in Armenia, and even during the Holocaust, the word “genocide” did not exist. This changed in the early 1940s when a Polish-Jewish lawyer named Rafael Lemkin coined the term to describe the events taking place in Germany and Poland, drawing a connection with what had taken place in Armenia. He combined the Greek word *genos*, which means people or nation, and the Latin suffix *-cide*, which means murder. Specifically, Lemkin defined genocide as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Power 2003:43).

After coining the term, Lemkin successfully lobbied the General Assembly of the United Nations to draft a document on genocide (Power 2003). In 1946, the General

Assembly passed Resolution 96(I), affirming genocide as an international crime. This resolution was modified and became part of binding international law in the form of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (otherwise known as the Genocide Convention). According to this treaty, genocide is:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (1948).

Subsequent documents, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the criminal tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have reaffirmed this definition. It remains the legal definition of genocide to this day.

Legal scholars are quick to point out that intent is a key element of this definition, as intent to destroy distinguishes genocide from the many other civilian casualties that may occur during wartime (Schabas 2001/2007). For example, the bombs that the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II constitute mass killing, but they do not constitute genocide unless intent to destroy the Japanese people could be proven.

Social scientists often concur,³ though most scholars find fault with the international legal definition of genocide, casting it as both too broad and too narrow. For example, some scholars question what destroying a group “in part” entails, and these words have opened up a range of debates about numerical thresholds that will be discussed further in Chapter 4 (Weitz 2003). Others argue that the restriction of victim

³ Chapter 4 includes a more detailed discussion of the importance of intent as well as the different forms of genocidal violence.

groups is problematic. While the definition cites members of national, racial, ethnic, or religious groups as potential victims of genocide, multiple scholars have urged the inclusion of other groups, such as political groups (Kuper 1981; Fein 1993b; Chirot and McCauley 2006). According to Kuper (1981) and many others, it is virtually impossible to separate the racial, ethnic, national, or religious from the political. Further, political groups *were* included in earlier drafts of the Genocide Convention but eventually excluded—in part so that major powers could reserve the ability to act against political enemies (Kuper 1994; Orentlicher 1999; Hajjar 2001).

Clearly, a legal definition created through a political process should not constrain sociological inquiry. To this end, many scholars are more inclusive in their studies of victims of genocide. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990:23), for example, prefer to leave the question of which groups should fall within the limits of the definition to the particular situation, “... as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrators.” Similarly, Helen Fein (1993b:24, emphasis added) has proposed that genocide is “sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy *a collectivity* directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.”

Beyond proposing definitions of genocide that do not restrict group membership, scholars have suggested definitions that diverge on the actions that constitute genocide, who can be considered a perpetrator, and numerous other factors.⁴ Indeed, genocide runs the risk of becoming an over-defined concept, with each scholar working with a slightly

⁴ Many scholars have also created typologies of genocide, often attempting to differentiate between forms of genocide. For example, Fein (1993b) differentiates between ideological, despotic, retributive, and developmental genocides, while Kuper (1985) differentiates between domestic and international genocides.

different definition. Yet, despite some differences, the myriad definitions of genocide have much in common. Rather than adding yet another definition to a long list, I follow the convergence of scholars' various demarcations, defining genocide as actions with the intent to destroy a social group.

A Sociology and Criminology of Genocide

Despite the magnitude of the crime of genocide, sociologists and criminologists have been disproportionately quiet in discussions of the causes, constituent elements, and resolution of genocide. Indeed, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:35) note, "The criminology of genocide is only in its infancy." This is, in many ways, surprising. Both sociology and criminology emerged as disciplines in response to intense social change and perceived social problems. Indeed, sociology was founded after political and social revolutions in 19th century Europe and the United States, and as such, its founders were particularly concerned with societal cohesion. Criminologists have likewise been concerned with actions that transgress societal norms, focusing even more specifically on why people commit crimes.

Yet, a confluence of factors has likely kept sociologists and criminologists largely on the sidelines of genocide studies. First, genocide is an extremely complex social phenomenon, and data to study it are not readily available. "Genocide" has also become an increasingly politicized term, appropriated by many victims groups who seek to gain recognition of atrocities committed against them and despised by government leaders who resent the label when applied to their actions. Along these lines, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) aptly point out that a lack of will to come to terms with genocide in the United States' past has likely also influenced disinterest in genocide.

These factors have not deterred other disciplines, however. That points to additional reasons for silence. For example, both sociology and criminology within the United States have largely kept their attention focused inward on perceived social problems inside the country's borders. Over time, scholarship on the United States has simply become more highly valued, which may have deterred international research on any topic, including genocide. In addition, genocide has generally remained within the purview of the disciplines of history and political science, perhaps creating a path dependency of knowledge that is difficult to break (Savelsberg 2010).

At the same time, a number of sociologists and criminologists have begun to demonstrate what their disciplines *can* bring to the study of genocide (see, for example, the work of Alexander Alvarez, Augustine Brannigan, Bradley Campbell, Daniel Chirot, Helen Fein, John Hagan, Susanne Karstedt, Leo Kuper, Eric Markusen, Michael Mann, Nicole Rafter, Christopher Powell, Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Joachim Savelsberg, and Martin Shaw, among others). These scholars have analyzed why and how some genocides have taken place, testing theories generated by scholars in other disciplines and creating new ones. They are at the forefront of what I believe will become a large body of scholarship bringing sociological and criminological analysis to bear upon genocide.

Genocide is a structural, systematic, multifaceted, social phenomenon. It is driven by ideologies of race, nation, and exclusion; social relationships; and structural forces within and between societies. Genocide is also a state crime, and many actions perpetrated during genocide—such as killing, enforced disappearance, and rape—are crimes by practically any criminal code. For these and many other reasons, sociological

and criminological insights into the nature of groups, race, nationalism, ideologies, violence, ritual, crime, states, and myriad other social phenomena have much to add.

Accordingly, I apply sociological and criminological insights to better understand why and how genocides occur. To be clear, I do not attempt to uncover a single cause of genocide; genocide is far too complex a process to boil down to a straightforward claim of causation (or one would hope that cause would have been found by now). Rather, I seek to test how theories from within my areas of study can help explain this pressing social problem. As such, this dissertation makes three key theoretical interventions, or contributions, to scholarly literature.

Intervention 1: Genocide, Criminology, and Political and Ethnic Violence

While genocide studies has become an established area of inquiry, it is also uniquely positioned to gain from its interdisciplinarity. In fact, cross-concept and cross-discipline applications are often the most fruitful ways to shed new light on a social problem. Applying theories from other disciplines also allows for a test of the scope conditions of existing theories. Thus, it is mutually beneficial to explore if and how well-tested theories in one field might explain other social phenomena—a necessary step before building new theories to explain what existing theories cannot.

In this project, I draw upon established theories from genocide studies. Sociologists developed some of these theories, but not all. Rather than ignore the wealth of knowledge in history, political science, or other relevant advances in genocide studies, I consider and integrate theories from these disciplines as well.

As I also aim to test existing sociological theories, I draw upon two other bodies of sociological research⁵—the study of political and ethnic violence and criminology—to better understand genocide and its similarities with and differences from other forms of violence. The sociological study of political and ethnic violence, which is itself the merging of two previously nonintersecting literatures (Brubaker and Laitin 1998), analyzes a wide range of forms of violence, such as civil wars, human rights violations, and state repression. Though genocide is a distinct form of violence, it can certainly be considered a type of political and/or ethnic violence and may, accordingly, benefit from applications of relevant theory (Shaw 2003; Goldstone et al. 2010; Verdeja 2012). For example, while civil wars differ from genocide in that they are explicitly two-sided and there is no intent to destroy an entire group—regardless of combatant status—they share many similarities with genocide and may inform our understanding of it. Similarly, genocide is a human rights abuse and has much in common with other forms of state repression that violate physical integrity rights. As such, genocide may also be informed by findings from the study of human rights violations.

Just as genocide is a form of political and/or ethnic violence, it can also be conceptualized as crime. As noted above, criminologists have largely neglected genocide until recently (Alvarez 2001; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2008; Rothe 2009; Savelsberg 2010). Genocide is a violation of international law (Rome Statute 2002), and much violence perpetrated during genocide, such as murder and rape, violates criminal

⁵ I do not mean to suggest that these are the only bodies of research that apply or that they are even the most relevant, as many other theories and areas of inquiry hold insights for the study of genocide. For example, genocide is gendered, both in terms of the violence committed and who commits it. I do not consider literature relevant to these claims and others where they do not inform my study, though there is much to be done in terms of future research.

law on an incident basis in most of the world. As genocide is often a state crime, it may have properties similar to other forms of state or organized crime. It also involves the intent to *destroy* a social group, bearing a similarity to hate crimes motivated by the intent to *harm* a social group. In addition, genocide is perpetrated through co-offending, much like gang-related homicide and white-collar crime.

Thus, in this dissertation, I draw upon genocide studies, the study of political and ethnic violence, and criminology to better understand the onset, process, and meso-level dynamics of genocide. By allowing me to better understand how genocide is similar to and different from other forms of violence, this approach informs both the study of violence more broadly as well as specific knowledge about genocide.

Intervention 2: Levels of Analysis

Theories that help explain genocide—as well as crime, war, and other forms of violence—emphasize factors at different levels of analysis, such as the individual or the state level. In line with this, studies of the causes of genocide often emphasize a particular level, privileging depth over breadth. While they are not mutually exclusive, I suggest that levels can be grouped within five main approaches, including individual-centered, group-centered, society-centered, state-centered, and international-centered approaches.

Individual-centered approaches often focus on the perpetrators of genocide. Dating back to early studies of German Nazis (see, for example, Adorno, Levinson, and Sanford 1950 and Arendt 1963), much of this research finds its roots in psychological assessments of genocidaires (those who commit genocide). Yet, while some, like Chalk and Jonassohn (1990:28), assume that genocide “requires the recruitment of pathological

individuals and criminals,” most scholars disagree. Rather, the majority of research in this vein aligns best with the work of psychologists Stanley Milgram (1974) and Philip Zimbardo (2007), whose experiments illustrated that psychologically average people could commit seemingly unthinkable acts in certain situations. That is to say, most research shows that perpetrators of genocide are not, on the whole, psychologically unstable; they are, in many ways, ordinary citizens—a paradox that remains the hallmark of research on the perpetrators of genocide (Arendt 1963; Browning 1998; Mann 2000; Waller 2007).⁶

While individual-centered approaches are often applied to the “foot soldiers” of genocide, they also may help explain the behavior of those most responsible for orchestrating the violence. Valentino (2004), for example, argues that genocide occurs because extremist leaders face crisis and must continually adopt more radical policies in response. In line with this, Midlarsky (2005) posits that genocide occurs when leaders make rational choices in response to a threat, emphasizing how planning and orchestrating genocide can be seen as rational rather than pathological.

An associated approach takes note that genocide has, to date, been perpetrated by *groups*. For example, Fujii (2011) analyzed how ties between perpetrators influenced their participation in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Likewise, many scholars who focus on perpetrators as individuals also analyze how group pressure and social learning influenced their actions (e.g., Browning 1998), often examining the battalions, paramilitaries, and other formal organizations that commit genocide (Fletcher 2007;

⁶ Though some scholars have argued that perpetrators of genocide are motivated by extraordinary hatred (see, for example, the work of Daniel Goldhagen), the notion of “ordinary perpetrators” remains a cornerstone of genocide studies.

Mueller 2007; Savelsberg 2010). Still others, like Melvern (2006) and numerous scholars of the Holocaust, analyze the organizations (such as groups of powerful politicians and leaders) that plan, fund, and benefit from genocide.

Closely related, *society-centered* approaches look to the characteristics of the society in which the genocide takes place. Studies that take this approach often analyze societal diversity with a specific focus on intergroup dynamics and ethnic conflict (e.g., Kuper 1981; Campbell 2009). Others focus on the local dynamics of genocide (e.g., Straus 2006; Weidmann 2011; Verpoorten 2012). This is a comparatively newer field of inquiry, beginning to disaggregate the violence in genocides below the country-year in an attempt to understand the importance of local situations and actors in how genocide unfolded in a particular region or period. Often, this work draws upon group-centered research as well, though it is typically distinguished by a focus on the meso level rather than a more micro focus on individuals or specific groups.

While the Genocide Convention does not specify who can perpetrate genocide, *state-centered* approaches often argue that states have been key forces in the planning and execution of modern genocides. In fact, some scholars restrict definitions of genocide to instances in which the state is the perpetrator (e.g., Horowitz 1976; Harff 2003; Davenport 2007). For them, genocides cannot happen without the will and power of the modern state, and aspects of the state are seen as key to understanding why genocide takes place. These aspects may include the type of government, though many other state-level factors, such as the Gross Domestic Product or nation-building processes, have been tested. Examples of this approach abound, and they are considered in more detail in

Chapter 2. Note also that while I utilize the general term “state,” this approach includes the nation state,⁷ as will be seen in more detail below.

Lastly, the *international* system may also influence genocide. The vast majority of studies in line with this approach analyze the response to—and, in most cases, the failure to respond to—genocide (see, for example, Cushman and Mestrovic 1996; Rohde 1998; Kuperman 2001; Barnett 2002; Power 2003; and Totten 2013). Apart from this, some scholars have considered the link between colonialism and genocide, suggesting that colonialism contributes to the formation of in and out groups within societies (Mamdani 2001; Levene 2005; Moses and Stone 2013). As the forthcoming chapters illustrate, however, a number of other international factors may also influence genocidal violence.

Taken as a whole, none of these five approaches is sufficient to understanding when, why, and how genocide occurs. For example, state-centered approaches often fail to explain how the violence unfolded in a particular community, while society-centered approaches often fail to explain the onset of violence within a country. Instead, scholars must consider some levels in tandem.⁸

In this dissertation, I am concerned with broader, structural factors that influence why and how genocides occur. For this reason, and because individual-centered approaches are often less sociological, I do not rely upon individual-centered approaches. Likewise, while group-centered approaches are instrumental to better understanding the violence, I place more emphasis on the structural factors that influence patterns in

⁷ This is distinguished from a society-centered approach, which examines features of the people rather than features of the nation state or country as a whole.

⁸ Clearly, one study cannot consider each level in depth. Integrating factors across levels, even with foci at certain levels, will yield many insights.

genocidal violence throughout a country. Thus, I pay particular attention to the societal, state, and international levels, corresponding with meso and macro factors, though I incorporate factors at other levels intermittently.

Intervention 3: Genocide as a Process

Thus far, I have discussed how this dissertation integrates theories from genocide studies, criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence to analyze how factors at different conceptual levels influence genocide. But genocide does not happen in a single moment. Rather, genocide consists of a collection of actions that ebb and flow over time; treating genocide as a single event misses the opportunity to understand what drives the violence. Genocide is a process, and studies of genocide must consider temporal levels.

To be clear, historical work on genocide has long viewed genocidal violence as a series of events. Quantitative work has also, in some ways, viewed genocide as a process by attempting to narrate and quantify the events that lead to genocide. Many of these studies have only utilized one clock—the world historical one—rather than thinking of processes at different levels of analysis. In other words, genocide is not only a process; it is also a process at individual, group, societal, state, international, and other levels.

I include several temporal elements in this dissertation. In particular, I examine how societal, state, and international factors influence the onset of genocide at the state-level over time—both generally for all genocides that have occurred since the Holocaust and in depth for the recent genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter “Bosnia”), and Sudan. In addition, I analyze how community-level factors influence genocide with a specific focus on how these and international factors impact the onset

and magnitude of violence within communities. Indeed, as a recent annual review noted, the most promising avenue for future research on genocide is the microanalysis of sub-national units, both within and across countries (Owens, Su, and Snow 2013). In line with its second theoretical intervention, this dissertation delves into those sub-national units, striving to integrate temporal elements when possible.

To do so, I rely on recent research on the meso- and micro-level dynamics of civil wars. As Kalyvas (2008) explains, this research paradigm emerged in response to several issues with state-level econometric analyses of war that aggregated the occurrence of war into a single number. Inspired by quantitative (e.g., Tong 1991), qualitative (e.g., Brass 1997; Wood 2003), and mixed-methods studies (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998; Varshney 2003) of contentious politics and violence, research within this new paradigm analyzes sub-national contexts to comprehend the micro-level dynamics and mechanisms that influence how violent episodes of civil wars unfold. For example, some studies (discussed in more detail in Chapters 3-5) assess the process of violence in a particular region or why violence started in one town rather than another. This allows for an analysis of violence at different levels and time horizons, recognizing that violence is a collection of actions and, thus, inherently a process-oriented undertaking. As I explain in more detail in Chapter 3, criminologists have long been analyzing violence in much the same way.

This approach remedies some of the pitfalls of macro-level analyses, though it excludes macro-historical factors. Taking this more meso, process-oriented approach *in combination with* a focus on different levels, including the state and international levels, allows me to analyze both macro- and meso-level dynamics. Thus, drawing upon

literature from genocide studies, political and ethnic violence, and criminology, I explore the societal, state, and international factors that influence the onset of genocide from a macro perspective. Then, I turn to an analysis of the meso-level factors that influenced the magnitude and onset of violence at local levels in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. Throughout, I explore different levels of analysis and incorporate temporal dimensions, ending, in Chapter 6, with the extension of an emergent theory of genocide that integrates separate levels of analysis across time (Hagan and Raymond-Richmond's 2008/2009 Collective Action Theory of Genocide).

Methodological Strategy

To analyze the factors that influence the onset of genocide as well as regional and temporal variation within genocidal violence, I draw upon several methods. As noted above, these include a quantitative analysis of the risk factors that influenced the onset of genocidal violence in all countries over 50 years as well as mixed-methods case studies of violence in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan that draw upon quantitative analysis⁹ and 113 interviews. Overall, diverse methodologies allow me to analyze the different conceptual levels at play and the processes at some of these levels. Furthermore, they allow me to triangulate findings and provide analytic leverage, to which I return in the final chapter.

To better understand the situations in which genocide occurs, I begin by conducting an event history analysis of the risk factors of genocide globally between 1955 and 2005. This quantitative analysis tests the influence of societal, state, and international factors, such as societal diversity, type of government, and membership in international organizations, at the country-year level. Its main goal is to test a number of

⁹ Quantitative analytic techniques are explained in more detail as they are applied.

theories about why genocide occurs and to identify the factors that have been associated with its onset in the late 20th and 21st centuries.

As the event history analysis examines the influence of different factors separately, other methods are necessary in order to understand the preconditions of genocide holistically and to explore the process of genocide once it begins. For this, I turn to case studies. Comparative genocide studies have long been undervalued, as some argue that comparing genocides diminishes their significance (a complaint that may stem from a reluctance to compare the Holocaust to other genocides). Nevertheless, understanding the general conditions and courses of genocide requires comparison.

Specifically, to examine different conceptual levels and processes, I analyze the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan, three major genocides that occurred during the past several decades. In 1994, Rwanda saw more than one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus killed in less than four months. At the same time, Bosnia was in the middle of a war and a genocide that spanned from 1992 to 1995. This violence took the lives of roughly 100,000 people and saw the return of concentration camps to Europe. More recently, in 2003 the Darfur region of Sudan erupted into an unparalleled wave of violence targeting the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. Violence in Darfur continues to this day.

I chose these cases for theoretical and pragmatic reasons. Each is a modern genocide that occurred during the same world historical period. As noted, while genocides have been occurring for centuries, some genocide scholars differentiate genocides that occurred before the 20th century due to relatively recent developments concerning race, nation, and the bureaucratic state (Arendt 1951, 1964; Horowitz 1976; Weitz 2003). I control for these potential differences through case selection. Additionally,

each case occurred after the Cold War and thus was influenced by similar historical factors.

Partially as a result of their similar timing in history, each of the three cases experienced interventions. These interventions, including the presence of peacekeepers and determination of safe areas, may have influenced genocidal violence; and I test their impact on the process and meso-level dynamics of violence. In addition, each situation has been brought to international tribunals. The genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia have been tried at the ICTR and ICTY, respectively, while the case of Sudan is currently at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is important because each of these tribunals has proven genocidal intent,¹⁰ upholding an important aspect of numerous definitions of genocide and finding support in scholarly communities that have widely accepted these events as genocides (though not without debate).

Additionally, from a methodological perspective, an analysis of meso-level genocidal violence necessitates data at sub-national levels. The recency of these three cases made it feasible to obtain or construct data on the types and intensity of victimization. Unfortunately, this is not the case for many genocides that occurred earlier in the 20th century.

In each case, I begin by outlining the factors that led to genocide. Given the flexibility and historical sensitivity of the comparative case method, I can pay attention to particular features of the genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. Specifically, I use

¹⁰ The ICTR amassed much evidence that actions throughout Rwanda were genocidal, while the ICTY deemed actions in Srebrenica genocide, something I consider further in Chapter 4. In the case of Sudan, the Office of the Prosecutor has issued warrants, though the cases have yet to begin in May 2014. Nevertheless, the pre-trial phases uncovered enough evidence for the Prosecutor to confidently issue a warrant for the crime of genocide for the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir.

process-tracing (George and Bennett 2004) to observe mechanisms prior to the genocides, focusing on turning points (Abbott 2001) and temporal dimensions of social life (Aminzade 1992).¹¹ I also utilize history to understand the structural factors under which actors were operating and to identify legacies and memories that continue to shape the present. Among other things, this provides an opportunity to analyze how the factors identified in the event history analysis operated in concrete situations and how relationships between these factors influenced the occurrence of genocide.

Next, I turn to an analysis of prominent forms of genocidal violence by region and over time. In Rwanda, killing was a main form of violence, and detailed information on other forms of victimization is unavailable.¹² Thus, I analyze the factors that influenced meso-level variation in the magnitude and onset of killing. For Bosnia, however, forced internment was a key aspect of victimization. So, in addition to analyzing regional and temporal variation in killings, I analyze data on the location of concentration camps. And in Darfur, mass attacks on villages have been common. Thus, for Sudan, I operationalize air strikes as violence and analyze the damage and destruction of villages.¹³ For the most part, I obtained these data in my travels to the respective countries, and I detail the specific sources, as well as discuss why forms of violence are likely to have differed, in

¹¹ Please note that while I do not detail these methodological strategies further, I intend to spend much time explaining them when I turn part of this dissertation project into a book.

¹² In my prospectus, I detailed a plan to analyze the number of perpetrators by region using the *gacaca* data. This is not quite possible; while I was able to gain access to these data, they are not yet matched to the current administrative boundaries. Thus, this must be a future supplement to this project.

¹³ Again, there are many forms of violence during genocide, and this study does not imply that one is more important. Rather, I chose the form of violence to analyze based on the relative frequency of that violence and the availability of data. In addition, it is difficult to obtain completely accurate data on deaths and other forms of violence during mass conflict. I do not strive to obtain exact numbers of victimization but rather seek to understand general patterns in variation over time and space.

more detail in each chapter.

In the course of these studies, I spent two months living in Rwanda and two months living in Bosnia. In each, I traveled the country, learning about how the violence unfolded, visiting memorials and the sites of main massacres or concentration camps, and engaging in interviews and hundreds of informal conversations. As the violence in Darfur is ongoing, I was not able to obtain permits to enter Sudan, let alone the Darfur region. Thus, for the third case, I interviewed Darfuri refugees in Uganda.¹⁴

In total, I conducted 113 interviews, including 30 interviews in Rwanda, 40 in Bosnia, and 43 interviews for the case of Darfur. I spoke with government officials, genocide scholars, employees of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), survivors, and other witnesses of the violence in Rwanda and Bosnia and exclusively with victims and witnesses for the case of Darfur.¹⁵ The data are not meant to be representative. Rather, these informational interviews supplemented other data collection efforts by informing the analyses of the risk factors of genocide, influencing hypotheses and interpretations of findings, and providing additional information that cannot be captured quantitatively, such as the role of particular leaders. These interviews also allowed me to assess the validity of the patterns found in my quantitative data and cultural differences in the quantitative measures I employ, such as unemployment or divorce.

In general, I asked respondents about perceived causes of violence, the temporal

¹⁴ Darfuri refugees have fled to several countries, including Chad, South Sudan, and Uganda. I have worked with an organization—I-Activism—for more than a year to facilitate travel to the refugee camps in Chad. My trip has been cancelled three times. As it is not possible to visit these camps without humanitarian organization affiliation, data from Chad will come in a future trip to supplement and extend this project.

¹⁵ Again, as the violence is still taking place, it is not possible to live in Darfur and conduct interviews with scholars, leaders, and key NGO workers as I did in Rwanda and Bosnia.

and regional variation in the violence, how the violence unfolded in their communities, and their perceived impacts of interventions. In addition, I interviewed many people who witnessed the violence personally in an attempt to hear narratives from multiple sectors of society. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 4 hours.¹⁶ For each interview, I employed a semi-structured technique that allowed for standardized questions and flexibility in answers and elaborations (Lofland et al. 2006). In addition, I underwent training and spoke with several psychologists about how to ensure I did not induce trauma during an interview.

In total, 88 of the respondents were men, and 25 were women. This discrepancy is largely due to the fact that only five percent of the refugee community in Uganda is female¹⁷ (thus, just three interviews with Darfuri refugees were with women). In addition, most NGO workers and scholars in Rwanda and in Bosnia were men. Beyond this, ages ranged from mid-20s to mid-70s. I also attempted to speak with people from different ethnic groups, though for each case, the majority of respondents identified with the victim group.

I conducted each interview in the language chosen by the respondent. If the participant preferred English, I conducted the interview alone. If the participant preferred the official language of the country (Kinyarwanda, Bosnian, or the Darfuri dialect of

¹⁶ I asked respondents several other questions for future papers. As with most interview projects, only some of the data are represented in this dissertation, though I intend to use this interview data in several future papers and projects, including what will hopefully become a book.

¹⁷ There are two key reasons for this imbalance. First, the trek from Darfur to Uganda is long and difficult. Secondly and more prominently, it is culturally rare for women to travel without men in Darfur. As many of the refugees in Uganda fled Darfur when they were younger and not married, the women refugees in Uganda are typically married to men with whom they had fled the violence.

Arabic), I worked with a translator. Choosing an appropriate translator was not taken lightly. For example, I chose a translator who is fluent in English, Kinyarwanda, and Swahili for my interviews in Rwanda. He had lived in Rwanda his entire life, so participants recognized his dialect. Additionally, he had collected testimonies for other projects and had previous experience as a translator for sensitive interviews. Finally, my translator was young, had a caring demeanor, and was a member of the victim group himself; thus, it was my hope that he was not threatening to respondents. In general, my translators for the other case studies had similar characteristics and qualifications.

Overall, these methods allow me to triangulate sources and better understand the causes and processes of genocide at multiple levels. Yet, they are not without weaknesses. First, it is not easy to draw spatial and temporal boundaries around an episode of genocide; genocides have spillover effects into other regions, as Rwanda and the Congo illustrate. Furthermore, it is often difficult to pinpoint the precise day that a genocide begins or ends, and there are often many ideas about what the beginning or ending of a genocide truly means.

Second, each level of analysis comes with its own data constraints. At the international level, as is explained in Chapter 2, solid, reliable international data do not generally exist before the creation of the United Nations during the 1940s. Thus, I am not able to include the earlier half of the 20th century in the analysis. Third, data on killings and other forms of victimization during genocide are difficult to obtain, particularly at the community level. I needed to travel to both Rwanda and Bosnia to physically obtain the data, and even then, I only have partial access to these data, as will further be described in the methods sections of respective chapters. Nevertheless, data scarcity or data

imperfection is no reason to abandon a study. Data are not, and never will be, perfect when we are dealing with the social world. Rather, such imperfections must be kept in mind when interpreting results.

Turning to the project: this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I employ an event history analysis to analyze the factors that influenced the occurrence of genocide in 153 countries between 1955 and 2005. I consider risk factors of genocide at societal, state, and international levels, finding that factors at each level influence genocidal onset but that civil war and other forms of upheaval are the strongest predictors of genocide. I also test how these factors influence the presence of an exclusionary ideology and show that many factors proposed to explain genocide better explain exclusionary ideologies.

Chapter 3 turns the focus to Rwanda. After providing a history of the factors that led to the 1994 genocide and providing an overview of the patterns of genocidal violence, I analyze what influenced community-level variation in the rate of killing. I focus on targeted violence and ideologies that motivated violence; the community's ability to organize against crime; population pressures; organized actors; and broader spatial and temporal factors (such as proximity to a border or distance from the capital). These data generally show that the factors that influenced the *onset* of genocide are not sufficient to explain how it *unfolded*. Instead, as the perpetrators of the violence were largely members of communities who were not part of previously organized formal groups, I find that criminological theories pertaining to community rates of crime help inform the rate of genocidal killing in Rwanda. I also find that population pressures, widely heralded as a key factor in driving violence, did *not* influence community-level rates of killings and that the Rwandan institution of education had a dark side. The second part of this chapter

assesses whether the factors that influenced the rate of killings in communities also influenced the onset of violence in each community, generally finding that they did not.

Chapter 4 considers the genocide in Bosnia. Again, I begin with a historical narrative of the factors that led to the genocide. Then, after briefly considering the patterns in the violence, I provide a more detailed discussion of why violence in Bosnia constituted genocide. While Rwanda is a clear example of genocide, the violence in Bosnia is often analyzed as a civil war rather than as a civil war *and* genocide, necessitating a discussion about the differences between these forms of violence. The first part of the analysis considers municipality-level variation in the number of killings of soldiers, killings of civilians, and concentration camps, applying the theories tested in Chapter 3 when relevant. Due in part to the structure of participation in the violence, I find that the factors that influenced municipality levels of killings and concentration camps more closely reflect organizational strategy (such as the goal for a “Greater Serbia” influencing more violence in regions closer to Serbia) than characteristics of the community, as found in Rwanda. Then, in the second portion of the chapter, I again test how these factors influence the onset and magnitude of violence over time, generally finding that the same factors that influenced the magnitude of violence also influenced variation in onset in Bosnian municipalities—again confirming the more top-down nature of genocidal violence.

In Chapter 5, I extend the analysis to an ongoing episode of genocide—the genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. As the genocide is currently unfolding, the analysis necessarily takes a different form. Like in Chapters 3 and 4, I begin by detailing the road to genocide and explaining the patterns of violence and its perpetrators. I then

rely upon descriptive techniques to analyze the factors that influenced the bombing of villages as well as damaged and destroyed villages. I analyze analogous factors to those tested in Chapters 3 and 4, finding that the violence targeted certain groups and that other factors related to the unfolding of civil wars, such as elevation and location near a border, are associated with violence in this case.

In Chapter 6, I conclude by exploring the preconditions of genocide, analyzing how the case studies support conclusions from Chapter 2 and assessing whether anything else can be gleaned from studying the preconditions of genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. Generally, I find further support for the argument that strain and threat to the government influence genocide and highlight the importance of ideology as well as of ethnic-based political organization and previous targeted violence, two factors that I was unable to test in Chapter 2.

Then, I analyze the factors that influenced regional and temporal variation in each of the three cases. I assess patterns across the cases, finding that some factors, such as the ethnic population and the presence of armed actors, influenced the patterns of violence in each of the three cases. Yet, I also find that who the perpetrators are and how they are organized influences patterns in violence, with community characteristics (theorized through criminology) mattering more when the perpetrators are “ordinary” members of communities who perpetrate violence more spontaneously, and factors related to strategy and civil war (drawn from literature on political and ethnic violence) having more explanatory power when the violence is enacted mainly by previously organized militaries and militias.

To capitalize on the ability to examine both the macro-level factors that influenced the onset of genocide and the meso-level factors that influenced the process of genocide, I then briefly compare findings from Chapter 2 with findings from the case studies, again illustrating that the factors that influence onset are not sufficient to explain regional and temporal variation within genocidal violence. Finally, I draw on all of the chapters to inform a recent theory of genocide proposed by Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2008, 2009)—the Collective Action Theory of Genocide. I integrate my findings, analyze the process of genocide across analytic levels, and inform a promising new theory. I close by considering future directions for genocide studies within sociology.

Chapter 2: Assessing Risk Factors of Modern Genocide¹⁸

“*‘Never Again’ is in fact ‘Again and Again.’*”
-Samantha Power, Scholar and Diplomat

After millions were killed during the Holocaust, the international community vowed to prevent genocide in the future. The phrase “Never Again” echoed throughout the world, and the United Nations initiated work on the Genocide Convention. Today we are faced with the reality that it *has* happened again. In fact, genocide has claimed more lives than were lost in international wars during the 20th century. It has displaced millions and left indelible marks on peoples and cultures around the world.

In this chapter, I begin with a macro approach to genocide. While popular thought long considered genocide inexplicable, recent research is beginning to better understand the conditions under which it is more likely occur. This chapter contributes to this research by exploring what influenced the occurrence and duration of genocide between 1955 and 2005. Using event history analysis techniques, I argue that societal, state, and international factors must be considered if we are to comprehend the situations in which genocide occurs.

Overall, this chapter makes three primary contributions that are directly in line with the three interventions discussed in Chapter 1. First, it integrates previous findings with new insights from genocide studies and from the study of political and ethnic violence and criminology—areas of inquiry that can inform the study of genocide and

¹⁸ This chapter is a modified version of a paper that has been resubmitted for consideration at the *American Journal of Sociology*. Some parts of Chapter 1, such as interventions 1 and 2, are included in the journal article format of this chapter, which explains the relatively short literature review in this format.

help differentiate it from other forms of violence. Second, the chapter considers potential risk factors of genocide at societal, state, and international levels and tests how they explain both occurrence of genocide as well as the presence of an exclusionary ideology. Lastly, it capitalizes on the importance of time, absent in previous research, by analyzing when and for how long genocidal violence occurred.

To accomplish these goals, I first outline hypotheses regarding the occurrence of genocide, drawing upon hypotheses at the societal, state, and international levels. Then, I use event history analysis to test these hypotheses, highlighting the importance of civil war and other forms of strain and upheaval. Finally, I analyze the duration of genocide and perform several tests of robustness and mechanisms, including restricting the analysis to countries that experienced civil war and analyzing the determinants of an exclusionary ideology.

Risk Factors of Genocide¹⁹

Sociologist Irving Louis Horowitz (1976) was one of the first scholars to argue that genocide is not a random event. Genocide does not just happen, nor is it ever an inevitable outcome of a situation. Rather, certain social situations influence the occurrence of genocide in particular times and places. Consequently, a body of literature on the factors that contribute to genocide has begun to emerge. I test findings from this literature, though I also consider prominent explanations for similar forms of violence, such as civil wars, human rights violations, and violent crime. As I focus on the structural

¹⁹ There are only a handful of studies that make general causal claims about genocide. Causation is difficult to prove, especially in the case of such a multifaceted phenomenon. I focus on factors that increase or decrease the odds of genocide. While these could be termed probabilistic causes, I use the term “risk factor” so as not to misrepresent the claims of other authors.

factors that influence the onset of genocide, my hypotheses are informed by society-, state-, and international-centered approaches.

Society-Centered Approaches: Intergroup Dynamics

The society in which genocide occurs may hold clues about its onset. For example, several scholars have argued that *ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity*²⁰ increases the odds of genocide (e.g., Kuper 1981) or, at a minimum, that some degree of cultural distance must exist for genocide to occur (e.g., Campbell 2009). Several studies of civil wars confirm that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of war (Vanhanen 1999; Sambanis 2001), and analyses of other crimes, ranging from studies of homicide (e.g., Sampson and Groves 1989) to hate crime (e.g., Lyons 2008), come to similar conclusions.²¹

However, recent studies of political violence have gone beyond the notion that population heterogeneity is associated with higher odds of violence, turning instead to examine how ethnic diversity is reflected within societal power relations. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) found that societal diversity was not associated with higher odds of civil war; instead, violence is more likely to plague states that exclude segments of the population from political power, especially along ethnic lines. Indeed, Harff (2003) found that countries where the *ethnicity of elite rulers* was a source of recurring conflict, especially when it differed from that of the broader population, had higher odds of genocide. In line with these theories, *I expect that ethnic*

²⁰ I use the term “ethnicity” for this variable (as well as the variable on elite ethnicity described on this page) because this is the term that those who created the data utilize. In the next chapter, I further detail how I conceptualize ethnicity as well as race.

²¹ These theories have largely been created and tested to explain community- and neighborhood-level variation in violence. Yet, they may also be applied at the country-level.

heterogeneity is not associated with higher odds of genocide. More specifically, I expect that the odds of genocide will be higher when the ethnicity of elite rulers within a society is a recurring source of conflict.

Beyond ethnic and linguistic diversity of both members of society and their rulers, the age structure of a society may influence violence. Several studies have found that higher percentages of youth are associated with political violence, as youth bulges may increase both the opportunities and motives for participation (Goldstone 1991; Urdal 2006). It is also well established that higher proportions of youth participate in most forms of crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983). Accordingly, I include a measure of *youth bulges*, and *I hypothesize that youth bulges are associated with higher odds of genocide.*

Lastly, societal *ideologies* that turn dehumanizing and exclusionary may fuel genocide (Kuper 1981; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Fein 1993b; Harff 2003; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2008). These ideologies result in the exclusion of individuals from the universe of obligation, a notion drawn from Durkheim's theory of the collective conscience (Fein 1993b). The isolation, in turn, influences criminal behavior that is not seen by perpetrators or broader society as criminally or morally wrong. Thus, *I expect that the presence of exclusionary ideologies will increase the odds of genocide.*²²

²² Note, however, that existing data measure the ideology of state actors, which is assumed to strongly influence societal-level ideologies (Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2008). In addition, I would ideally be able to examine both exclusionary and dehumanizing ideologies, but data on dehumanizing ideologies for all countries over these years do not exist. It is noteworthy, however, that while many forms of ideologies can be exclusionary (such as nationalism), exclusionary ideologies in this context are narrower. As explained in this chapter, exclusionary ideologies in this context include an

State-Centered Approaches: National Politics and Economy

As the state has been involved in every recent genocide, state-centered approaches examine characteristics of the state to assess how they may influence the occurrence of genocide. Specifically, the *form of government* is related to the likelihood of civil war, human rights abuses, and many forms of crime, with democracies having much lower odds of violence in each case (Rummel 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Cooney 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Genocide scholars have also argued that democracies have lower odds of genocide (Kuper 1981; Fein 1993a; Harff 2003) because they retain checks and balances through a system of popular participation that prevents leaders from organizing and committing acts of violence.

While many of these theories pertain to established democracies, *transitions to democracy* may have a very different effect. Mann (2005) argues that countries undergoing democratic transition are more likely to engage in murderous cleansing and posits that the democratic rule of the majority can have pernicious consequences. For Mann, “we the people” often defines “people” by ethnicity, creating a basis for excluding others during transitions. In line with this, some scholars have argued that partial democracies are more unstable and dangerous than full democracies or even full autocracies (Tilly 1978; Goldstone et al. 2004). Accordingly, *I predict that established democracies have comparatively lower odds of genocide but that countries undergoing a democratic transition have higher odds of genocide.*

overriding principle or purpose that excludes some segments of people and are used to restrict or persecute categories of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose.

Broader state capacity may also influence the odds of genocide. While long-independent countries have been establishing economies and legal structures for years, countries that formed amid the cries for self-determination after World War II may rest on different foundations (Rotberg 2004; Hironaka 2005). These comparatively *newer states*, like Rwanda or Sudan, have seen overambitious attempts to impose state control, which have been linked to the presence of political and ethnic violence (Hironaka 2005). Further, new states often try to impose a strong sense of national identity, which may have exclusionary elements (Levene 2005; Verdeja 2010). Thus, *I expect that long-standing states have lower odds of genocide.*

Similarly, although the Holocaust was perpetrated by a developed nation with many resources at the perpetrators' disposal, the majority of modern genocides have occurred in developing countries. Multiple studies have found that conflict, as well as human rights violations and many forms of societal and state crime, are more likely in countries with low economic development (Davenport 1995; Poe et al. 1999; Goldstone 2002; Totten and Parsons 2008; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).²³ Accordingly, *I hypothesize that economic development, measured by GDP, is negatively associated with genocide.*²⁴

Related, studies of civil war have linked the onset of violence to conditions that foster insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Beyond poor economic development, rough

²³ As multiple studies of international crime have found crime to be associated with inequality (e.g., Gartner 1990; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997), I would ideally include a measure of income inequality. However, these measures (such as the Gini Coefficient) are not available for most countries until 1970, so they are not included.

²⁴ Note that I also test urban growth as an alternate measure of development, which is associated with significantly lower odds of genocide. It is excluded from analysis however, because data are missing the earlier years of the study.

terrain may facilitate insurgency and violence due to its distance from state power and control. To test this, I include a measure of *elevation* and *hypothesize that elevation is associated with higher odds of genocide*. Yet, as the state often perpetrates genocide, I recognize that the effect of rough terrain may be insignificant or may even run in the reverse direction.

The context in which a regime operates is also crucial and informs a number of hypotheses. Many genocides, such as those in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, occurred during periods of crisis and change. Consequently, the criminological concepts of strain and anomie may help explain risk factors of genocide. Building on Durkheim (1893), Merton (1938), and—more recently—Agnew (1985), scholars have advanced an idea that strain may motivate crime. Although strain, or pressure, is often seen as a micro-level factor, it has more recently been seen as a macro-level factor as well, suggesting that communities and, in this case, perhaps even governments, adopt to strain in various ways. In this context, structural conditions produce strain and, thus, crime and violence (Maier-Katkin et al. 2009). Indeed, both Fein (1993b) and Harff (2003) found that upheaval was associated with genocide. While these studies do not disaggregate types of upheaval, different perceived crises—such as *civil wars*, *revolutions*, *coups*, *population pressure*, and *resource scarcity*—may have diverse impacts on the odds of genocide.

Specifically, Poe and Tate (and, in 1999, Linda Camp Keith) found that civil war increased human rights abuses within states due to perceptions of threat (1994). Based on this finding and research that links genocide and civil war (e.g., Straus 2006), *I expect civil wars increase the odds of genocide*. Similarly, abrupt regime change has been theorized as a risk factor of genocide (Fein 1993a; Krain 1997; Weitz 2003). Beyond

influencing anomie and strain linked with rapid sociopolitical change at the macro level (Zhao and Cao 2010), regime change may permit repressive leaders to come to power (Melson 1992; Fein 1993b). Consequently, *I predict that states that have had recent regime transitions will have higher odds of genocide and that, in particular, coups and revolutions are associated with higher odds of genocide.*

Population pressures may also influence genocide. Several scholars have argued that the strain caused by population change is associated with increased repression due to uncertainty regarding resources and security (Henderson 1993; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Agnew 2012). Large populations have also been linked to the presence of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). For some genocides, like that in Rwanda, multiple scholars have cited high population density as a risk factor of violence (Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1999). Although studies of civil war, crime, and human rights violations have found divergent results on this front, some have found support for this relationship (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1999). Accordingly, I include measures of *population, population growth, and population density, and I expect that each will increase the odds of genocide.*

Much in line with this, *resource scarcity* has been theorized as a contributing factor to genocide (Diamond 2005; Tubiana 2007; Verpoorten 2012). While there are multiple theories about the mechanisms of scarcity-induced conflict (see Olzak 1990, 1992; Homer-Dixon 1994), the link between the environment and violent conflict is of growing interest, especially considering recent genocides in Africa. Consistent with these theories, *I expect that resource scarcity, measured through agricultural area, is associated with higher odds of genocide.* Yet, as resource abundance has also been linked

to conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ross 2006), I test measures of *oil production* and *diamond deposits*.

International Approaches and Dimensions

Finally, the international context may impact the occurrence of genocide. Just as war within a country may influence the odds of genocide, *international war* may contribute to a regime's perception of threat; elevated fear and uncertainty during times of conflict often influence repression (Erikson 1966; Skocpol 1979; Rummel 1995; Levene 2005; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Davenport 2007). *I therefore expect that international war is associated with higher odds of genocide*. In addition, I include a measure for *war in a bordering country*, which *I hypothesize is associated with increased odds of genocide*.

As noted in Chapter 1, many scholars have also considered a link between genocide and *colonial history*,²⁵ pointing to the colonizers' creation of boundaries as a precipitating factor to violence (Mamdani 2001; Levene 2005). In addition, studies of determinants of human rights violations have found that, in some cases, colonial history is associated with human rights violations (Poe and Tate 1994). Thus, *I expect that a history of colonialism is associated with higher odds of genocide*.

While most other international-centered studies have examined how international actors failed to respond to genocide (e.g., Power 2003), scholars have begun to consider several other international influences. In particular, *economic interdependency* has been cited as a factor that could decrease the odds of genocide (Harff 2003). Defenders of

²⁵ This paper does not deny that genocide occurred during colonialism; however, due to the time period studied, it focuses on colonialism's *legacy*—the idea that the view of the colonized as “others” remains long after colonial rule.

globalization claim increased trade leads to better human rights practices because economic interdependency, manifested through trade openness, promotes engagement in the international system. A high degree of trade openness also implies that a country has more resources, which may help in averting or managing crises (Goldstone et al. 2002). Accordingly, *I expect that trade openness is associated with lower odds of genocide.*²⁶

States are also connected through *membership in international governmental and nongovernmental organizations*, and these relationships may serve as an international system of checks and balances (Fein 1993a; Harff 2003). International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are important actors in the field of human rights, and their presence has been linked to respect for human rights within a country (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Therefore, *I expect that membership in international governmental and nongovernmental organizations are each associated with lower odds of genocide.*

From a more top-down perspective, world polity scholars argue that states attempt to comply with desirable global scripts and norms (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999). One way to do this is by ratifying international human rights treaties, which in turn encourage compliance through treaty monitoring mechanisms, conferences, and other measures. While the effects of human rights treaties vary (e.g., Cole 2012), *I expect states that have ratified the Genocide Convention have lower odds of genocide.*

²⁶ On the other hand, some scholars believe that involvement with capitalism and foreign investors increases human rights violations. For example, Chomsky and Herman (1979) find that human rights abuses increase in developing countries that receive aid and investment from the U.S. However, the World Bank Development Indicator data on this measure had too many missing values for the years covered by this study. Bivariate regression with foreign direct investment net inflows (as a percent of GDP) showed that foreign investment is associated with lower odds of genocide, however.

Together, I expect that societal, state, and international factors all influence the odds of genocide. Importantly, I do not view these as rigid categories or as deterministic causes of genocide but rather as general risk factors of genocide in the time period studied. The factors discussed are summarized in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Risk Factors of Genocide

	Domestic	International
Societal	Ideology (+) Ethnolinguistic Diversity (na) Youth Bulge (+) Ethnic power exclusion (+)	INGOs (-)
State	Democracy (-) Democratization (+) Regime Durability (-) GDP (-) Upheaval (war, coup, rev.)(+) Population Pressure/Scarcity (+) Resource Abundance (+)	IGOs (-) Trade (-) Colonialism (+) International War (+) Border Violence (+) Genocide Convention (-)

Data, Measures, and Methods

To assess the risk factors of modern genocide, I analyze data for 153 countries between 1955 and 2005. The 1950s represented a new era in international law with the adoption of the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. I chose to stop the analysis at 2005 so that time will have passed to ascertain whether genocides occurred, and I include as many countries as possible in the dataset. Those

excluded are small countries that lacked data on many variables; thus, the dataset contains 153 countries and 5,458 country-years.

Data are obtained from a variety of sources, including the Political Instability Task Force, Genocide and Politicide Project, Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset, Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset, Penn World Table, Polity IV Annual Time Series Dataset, World Development Indicators, Yearbook of International Organizations, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Diamond Dataset, Food and Agricultural Organization, Ross, and Fearon and Laitin.²⁷ I utilize listwise deletion for missing data, which lessens the likelihood of inferential errors (Allison 2001). I use linear interpolation when appropriate.²⁸

Dependent Variable: Genocide

As noted above, genocide scholars criticize the legal definition of genocide as being both too broad and too narrow, and many scholars have proposed alternatives. As such, there is not consensus about which events between 1955 and 2005 should be considered genocide. Yet, several case sets have been proposed, and I employ two of them.

First, I use the definition and designation of cases of genocide created by the State Failure Project (also known as the Political Instability Task Force, or PITF). The PITF included scholars who spent several years creating datasets on international conflict

²⁷ Citations include Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2006; Gilmore et al. 2007; Harff 2008; Cederman et al. 2008, 2009; Marshall 2009; Heston et al. 2010; Marshall and Jagers 2010; Political Instability Task Force 2009; World Bank 2010; FAO 2012.

²⁸ All bivariate models were run with and without interpolated data. The effects remained constant.

(Harff and Gurr 1998). Their coding of genocides and politicides involved four key criteria:

- 1) States or authorities must commit the killings or demonstrate complicity;
- 2) Evidence must show intent on the part of the authorities to isolate group members for mistreatment;
- 3) The victims must be members of an identifiable group; and
- 4) Actions committed pose a threat to the survival of members of one of these groups.

The events that meet these four criteria are presented in Appendix A (Harff 2003; PITF 2009).²⁹ Notably, since Harff (2003) published the results of her study using these cases, the PITF has added two additional cases of genocide—Nigeria in 1967 and Zimbabwe in 1983. They are included in this study. It is also noteworthy that the PITF's coding restricted the definition of genocide to events where the state or authorities were perpetrators of or complicit in the violence. This restriction is a point of contention among scholars, as other actors could feasibly perpetrate genocide. Yet, the state or its authorities have been involved—actively or tacitly—in all modern genocides.

Further, as discussed in Chapter 1, the legal definition cites members of national, racial, ethnic, or religious groups as potential victims of genocide, but this study includes political groups. Multiple scholars have urged this inclusion (Kuper 1981; Fein 1993b; Chirot and McCauley 2006), as it is virtually impossible to separate the racial, ethnic, national, or religious from the political.

²⁹ Harff's previous classifications of genocide have been criticized for focusing on the state as a case rather than particular victim groups in an attempt to create a general classification (Fein 1993a). While I understand this criticism, the reality of international quantitative data as well and the involvement of the state in modern genocides validate the use of state-level data.

Countries are censored after the year they experience their first genocide during the time period analyzed.³⁰ Several countries have experienced a second genocide based on the coding of the PITF, and both Fein (1993a) and Harff (2003) cite previous genocide as a predictor of genocide. However, since these effects may be difficult to disentangle and the determinants of a first genocide may be different from those that precede the second, this paper focuses on the former. I did, however, test repeated cases to ensure there were no key differences in findings.

Lastly, I also test the robustness of the results with a restricted set of cases based on Helen Fein's (1993a) coding. Fein analyzed cases that included sustained, purposeful action by a perpetrator (not necessarily the state) to physically destroy a collectivity, directly or indirectly. Her list is drawn from a compilation of other studies, and I use the 11 cases and associated years from Fein's study. In addition, I include Guatemala (Fein did not include Latin America in her cases) and recent cases of genocide beyond the date of her study that fit her classification scheme, including the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Sudan. Cases included are starred in Appendix A, and Fein's onset years are noted in parentheses.³¹

Independent Variables

Countries enter the risk set in 1955 or the year they gained independence (if independence took place after 1955). Ideally, countries would be included before

³⁰ Clearly, while the paper refers to the "first genocide," some countries (like Germany) experienced a genocide before the period of study. However, to my knowledge, none of the countries that experienced genocide in the time period studied experienced genocide in the time period immediately preceding 1955.

³¹ Bivariate analyses were also run with the restricted cases, and the significance, direction, and magnitudes of results were very similar to those presented in Table 3. Mid-level democracy variable was excluded, as it was "0" for all restricted cases that had experienced genocide.

independence, as genocides could be linked to independence struggles, but pre-independence international data are virtually nonexistent. Thus, time is measured as the years since a country enters the risk set and is logged to best fit the data, though other measurements of time were tested, as explained below. Table 2.1 includes descriptive statistics and operationalization of all variables.

Table 2.1 Dependent and Independent Variables for Chapter 2

Dependent Variable	Description	No Genocide	Genocide	Range
Genocide	0 = No genocide occurred 1 = Genocide occurred	123 countries (5,428 years)	30 countries (30 years)	0.00 to 1.00

Independent Variables		Mean (No Genocide)	Mean (Genocide)	Range
<i>Societal</i>				
Ethnolinguistic Diversity	Probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a country are from different linguistic groups	0.39	0.49	0.00 to 0.93
Ruling Elite Ethnicity	0 = Elite ethnicity is not a recurring source of conflict 1 = Elite ethnicity is a recurring source of conflict	0.36	0.84	0.00 to 1.00
Youth Bulge	Percent 15-24 year-olds relative to adult population (15 and older)	29.25	31.92	12.01 to 41.05

Exclusionary Ideology	0 = Ruling elite do not retain an exclusionary ideology 1 = Ruling elite retain an exclusionary ideology (See Appendix B)	0.22	0.58	0.00 to 1.00
<hr/>				
<i>State</i>				
Democracy	-10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy)	0.17	-4.32	-10 to 10
Mid-level Democracy	0 = -10 to 0 and 6 to 10 on democracy scale 1 = 1 to 5 on democracy scale	0.08	0.06	0.00 to 1.00
Democratization	$Democracy_{year} - Democracy_{year-1}$	0.08	-1.14	-18 to 16
Colonial Past	Proportion of years that state was under imperial rule (between 1816 and the respective year) ³²	0.48	0.53	0.00 to 1.00
Regime Durability	Number of years regime has existed since 1800 or since last regime change	21.54	5.26	0 to 157
GDP per capita	GDP divided by midyear population; data are measured in thousands of constant 2000 U.S. dollars (logged)	1.30	0.43	-3.09 to 4.49

³² Quantitative data for this measure do not exist before 1816; thus, this is the cut-off point for this analysis. The same is true of the measure of regime durability, which begins in 1800.

Civil War	0 = No civil war taking place 1 = Civil war (1000 battle deaths) taking place	0.07	0.71	0.00 to 1.00
Coup	0 = Coup not taking place 1 = Coup taking place	0.07	0.35	0.00 to 1.00
Revolution	0 = Revolution not taking place 1 = Revolution taking place	0.05	0.45	0.00 to 1.00
Population	Coded in thousands and logged	8.86	9.61	5.22 to 13.90
Population Change	$\frac{\text{Population}_{\text{year}} - \text{Population}_{\text{year}-1}}{\text{population}_{\text{year}-1}}$ ³³	2.01	2.31	-95.89 to 56.86
Population Density	Midyear population divided by land area (km squared) (logged)	3.66	3.68	0.49 to 8.73
Agricultural Area	Area of land (1000 Ha) that is arable, a permanent crop, or a permanent pasture (logged)	0.80	0.99	0.00 to 4.08
Oil Production	Oil production in hundreds of thousands of metric tons (logged)	1.77	1.91	0.00 to 8.73

³³ I also tried population change with the logged value, which did not produce qualitatively different results.

Diamond Deposits	Total number of lootable and nonlootable diamond deposits in country	8.66	4.32	0.00 to 239.00
Mountainous Terrain	Percent of country that is mountainous	16.50	27.24	0.00 to 74.50
<hr/> <i>International</i>				
Trade Openness	Exports + imports/ GDP	60.06	42.08	1.09 to 442.47
INGOs	Number of international nongovernmental organizations to which any citizen in a country belongs (logged)	5.61	4.82	0.00 to 8.34
IGOs	Number of international governmental organizations to which a country belongs (logged)	3.63	3.19	0.00 to 4.65
Ratification	0 = Has not ratified Genocide Convention 1 = Has ratified Genocide Convention	0.60	0.58	0.00 to 1.00
International War	Magnitude score of episode(s) of international warfare involving that state in that year scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest); magnitude scores for multiple are summed; 0 denotes no episodes	0.06	0.35	0.00 to 9.00

Bordering War	0 = War did not take place in any bordering country in previous five years 1 = War took place in at least one bordering country in previous five years	0.55	0.79	0.00 to 1.00
Time	Years a country is at risk of genocide; starting point is 1955 or year of independence for countries that gained independence after 1955 (logged)	2.82	2.38	0.00 to 3.93

Analysis

To assess the risk factors of genocide, I utilize a discrete-time hazard model, which draws upon the concept of the hazard, or the instantaneous propensity that an event will occur. Unlike many models, hazard models analyze the influence of time and allow for time-varying predictors and censoring of data. Specifically, I utilize a discrete-time logistic regression model³⁴ (Allison 1984):

$$\log[P_{it}/(1 - P_{it})] = \alpha_t + \beta_1 X_{it1} + \dots + \beta_k X_{itk}.$$

³⁴ The discrete-time hazard model invokes several assumptions. First, linear additivity, which means that a predictor's effect does not depend on the values of other predictors in the model or the position of the unit difference along its scale. Second, it invokes the proportionality assumption, that each predictor has an identical effect in every time period under study. Finally, the discrete-time hazard model assumes that there is no unobserved heterogeneity. Essentially, the population hazard depends only on predictor values (Singer and Willett 2003).

In this model, P_{it} represents the probability that country i experiences a genocide in time t (or $t-1$ if lagged). β signifies the effect of the independent variables; $X_1, X_2 \dots X_k$ denote k time-varying explanatory variables; and α represents a set of constants corresponding to each discrete-time unit of one country-year. I cluster by country identifier to adjust for correlated errors within countries over time.

Results are presented in odds ratios; coefficients larger than one are associated with increased odds of genocide, while coefficients smaller than one are associated with decreased odds of genocide. Logistic regression estimates are affected by omitted variables and, consequently, change across models should not be directly interpreted (Mood 2010). Since odds ratios also reflect the degree of unobserved heterogeneity in the model, I estimated the models standardizing on y^* and found that all effects remain similar across models. The small number of cases of genocide also means that results must be interpreted with caution. As such, I ran rare events logit models (Tomz, King, and Zeng 1999), and the significance and direction of all results presented below remained. While genocide is rare, this paper tests the entire universe of cases considered genocide in the time period studied rather than attempting to generalize from a sample. In light of this, even correlations are of interest, and results are considered statistically significant if their p values are .1 or lower.³⁵

After presenting results regarding the onset of genocide, I analyze the duration of genocide. As factors influencing the duration of genocide have yet to be tested or theorized, I test if and how each factor reviewed above also influenced the duration of the violence. I use a Weibull model, which specifies a monotonically increasing or

³⁵ This is the case throughout this dissertation; populations rather than samples are analyzed in every chapter.


decreasing hazard rate. To test a nonparametric model, I also ran Cox Proportional Hazard models. All results remained similar, and as the assumption of proportionality was not met, I present the results of the Weibull model, interpreting them cautiously due to the even smaller number of cases included.

Assessing the Onset and Duration of Genocide

Figure 2.2 illustrates the hazard of genocide over time. Again, countries are at risk when they enter the dataset, either in 1955 or in the year they became independent or gained recognition. As the figure illustrates, the hazard of genocide continually increases for the first 20 years a given country was at risk of genocide. At this point, it declines steadily. However, the low hazard 40 years after a country enters the risk set must be interpreted in light of the fact that multiple country genocides are not included in this analysis.

At first glance, it may appear that countries that gained independence after 1955 are driving the hazard curve, as it is quite plausible that initial regime instability is associated with higher odds of genocide. However, further exploration of the hazard (Appendix C) reveals that while these countries did see higher odds of genocide after entering the risk set, it is actually countries that were independent or created before 1955 that experienced an increase in the risk of genocide in the first 20 years of analysis. For these countries, the years 1975-1980 were particularly volatile, and multiple global factors could account for this particular time trend. For example, this coincides with the beginning of the third wave of democracy. It also coincides with the 1973 Oil Crisis and the subsequent global economic downturn, suggesting that time and international context are important considerations in this analysis.

Figure 2.2: Hazard of First Genocide



To assess other factors that influenced the hazard of genocide, I begin by examining each independent variable separately. Table 2.2 presents the results from 26 separate discrete-time logit models of a country’s first genocide.³⁶ These models do not include control variables other than time. The first column treats time at risk as a linear variable, while the second takes the log of time at risk and the third includes years and years at risk squared (note that five-year and ten-year periods, as well as cubic splines, were examined but are not shown).³⁷ BIC tests revealed that the log of years at risk is the best fit. It is used in the subsequent analyses.

³⁶ I also ran models with measures of world-level IGOs and world-level INGOs, though neither was significantly associated with the odds of genocide.

³⁷ Due to collinearity, “years” was centered around its mean before squaring.

Table 2.2 Predictors of First Genocide, 1955-2005
Discrete Time Hazard Models with Different Measures of Time
Results in Odds Ratios

Predictor	Model	Years at Risk	Years at Risk (Log)	Year Squared
<i>Societal</i>				
Ethnolinguistic Diversity	1	2.606 (1.630)	2.638 (1.642)	3.152* (1.996)
Ruling Elite Ethnicity	2	8.200*** (4.032)	8.256*** (4.064)	7.467*** (3.416)
Youth Bulge	3	1.069** (0.035)	1.072** (0.034)	1.067** (0.035)
Exclusionary Ideology	4	5.708*** (2.403)	5.918*** (2.454)	5.211*** (2.061)
<i>State</i>				
Democracy	5	0.936*** (0.022)	0.929*** (0.022)	0.940*** (0.022)
Mid-level Democracy	6	0.665 (0.498)	0.647 (0.488)	0.678 (0.504)
Democratization	7	0.589*** (0.072)	0.599*** (0.072)	0.589*** (0.072)
Colonial Past	8	1.377 (0.814)	1.459 (0.859)	1.393 (0.844)
Regime Durability	9	0.915** (0.041)	0.917** (0.039)	0.912** (0.042)
GDP per capita (log)	10	0.558*** (0.080)	0.556*** (0.079)	0.557*** (0.081)
Civil War	11	28.393*** (12.045)	29.934*** (12.429)	27.923*** (11.597)
Coup	12	6.788*** (2.640)	7.343*** (2.853)	6.531*** (2.535)
Revolution	13	16.397*** (6.880)	16.581*** (6.863)	16.457*** (6.968)
Population (log)	14	1.465*** (0.168)	1.444*** (0.162)	1.465*** (0.168)
Population Change	15	1.012 (0.031)	1.018 (0.035)	1.001 (0.029)
Population Density (log)	16	1.083 (.119)	1.073 (0.116)	1.081 (.119)
Agricultural Area (log)	17	1.327 (0.233)	1.372 (0.245)	1.316 (0.229)
Oil Production (log)	18	1.061 (0.078)	1.051 (0.078)	1.067 (0.078)
Diamond Deposits	19	0.992 (0.008)	0.992 (0.008)	0.992 (0.008)
Mountainous Terrain	20	1.019*** (0.007)	1.018*** (0.007)	1.019*** (0.007)

<i>International</i>				
Trade Openness	21	0.976*** (0.008)	0.975*** (0.008)	0.956*** (0.008)
INGOs (log)	22	0.820** (0.082)	0.813** (0.073)	0.823** (0.085)
IGOs (log)	23	0.737* (0.116)	0.742** (0.111)	0.730** (0.117)
Ratification	24	0.946 (0.320)	0.942 (0.321)	0.946 (0.326)
International War	25	1.416** (0.240)	1.441** (0.243)	1.411** (0.236)
Bordering War	26	3.150***	3.177***	3.093***

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To briefly summarize Table 2.2, societal ethnolinguistic diversity is not associated with higher odds of genocide. Youth bulges are significantly associated with higher odds of genocide, though the two strongest risk factors of genocide at the societal level are contention regarding the ethnicity of elites and an exclusionary ideology. These factors, though reflective of society, also point to the importance of the state in the onset of genocide.

Indeed, turning to state-level factors, democracies have significantly lower odds of genocide. Yet, countries undergoing democratic transitions also have lower odds of genocide, and mid-level democracies have lower odds of genocide yet are not significantly different from other countries. Comparatively higher GDP per capita has a negative effect.

Against expectation, the percentage of years under colonial rule does not significantly impact the odds of genocide. To probe this effect, I tested a dummy variable indicating whether a country was ever a colony, as well as a series of dummy variables testing whether a country was a colony of Great Britain, France, etc. and indirect/direct rule. The lack of significance of these variables is puzzling, as the vast majority of

countries that saw genocide were once colonies. However, most countries in the model were colonized. In addition, as many scholars have convincingly argued that the creation of boundaries and subsequent political identities by colonizers contribute to conflict (e.g., see Mamdani 2001 for the case of Rwanda), it is possible that the effects of colonialism are manifested in other variables, such as exclusionary ideology, which is further explored below.

Broadening to the context in which the regime operates, long-standing, stable regimes have lower odds of genocide. In line with this, societal upheaval influences the odds of genocide. Disaggregating the form of upheaval shows that the effect of civil war is particularly strong, followed by the effects of revolutions and coups, respectively. Yet, support is not found for concerns regarding strain induced by population growth, population density, and resource scarcity. To probe this, I also tested arable land, food supply, change in food supply, change in agricultural area, and whether a natural disaster had recently occurred. I then analyzed whether these variables interact with an exclusionary ideology (in other words, whether resource scarcity or pressure influences the presence of an exclusionary ideology). None of these tests significantly impacted the odds of genocide, which implies that resource scarcity and population pressure, as measured, do not influence the onset of genocide. Resource abundance, in terms of oil production and diamond deposits, is not significantly associated with genocide either.

Turning to international factors, international war is associated with higher odds of genocide, likely due to the destabilizing and potentially restructuring effects of war. Civil war in a neighboring country is also associated with higher odds of genocide, suggesting that the effect of violence may extend beyond national borders. In addition,

countries that are connected to other countries through INGO membership, IGO membership, and trade have lower odds of genocide, pointing toward the importance of an international system of checks and balances. Ratification of the Genocide Convention does not appear to influence the odds of genocide, however. In fact, 18 of the countries where genocide occurred had already ratified the Genocide Convention. This finding supports world polity research that has found that repressive states are likely to sign low-cost human rights treaties as a way to display legitimating commitments to world norms (Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and Meyer 2008). Known as decoupling or gap studies (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; see also Klug 2005), this gap between speech and action is common with global scripts like human rights.

Multivariate Analysis

Next I analyze how the relationships reviewed fare in multivariate models. I exclude variables that were not significant and variables that did not significantly improve the fit of the models, including measures of resource scarcity, population change, population density, oil production, diamond deposits, percentage of years colonized, mid-level democracies, violence in a neighboring country, and mountainous terrain. Membership in IGOs and GDP per capita are also excluded due to multicollinearity, and regime durability is excluded because its effect is captured in the measure of time at risk.

Building on the aforementioned theories about the risk factors of genocide and the analyses above, Table 2.3 illustrates four discrete-time logistic regression models that assess the risk factors of genocide, presented in odds ratios. Model 1 includes variables associated with intergroup relations. Model 2 introduces measures of national politics and

economy. Model 3 adds variables associated with international dimensions, and Model 4 adds measures of upheaval. These measures are added last due to the particularly strong effect of war on the odds of genocide and because many other variables tested also influence the occurrence of civil war. Note, in addition, that elite ethnicity and exclusionary ideology are lagged, and their effects are much stronger and significant at the .001 level when non-lagged versions are included. Overall, the comparative likelihood ratios are each statistically significant, which provides strong support that each additional model is a significant improvement. Model 4 is the most complete model, as it explains 40 percent of the variance in the occurrence of genocide.³⁸

Intergroup Dimensions

As seen in Table 2.3, an exclusionary ideology is an important risk factor of genocide. This is consistent with theories that link exclusionary or dehumanizing ideologies with the occurrence of genocide (Harff 2003; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2008). Indeed, many genocidal regimes of the 20th century drew upon concepts of human progress and desirability to deem some categories of the population, such as ethnic minorities in Cambodia or Bosnian Muslims, drains on the well-being of the larger population (Weitz 2003).

As found in bivariate analysis, ethnolinguistic diversity is not significantly associated with higher odds of genocide. This finding challenges ideas that diversity breeds genocidal conflict, a popular idea behind several partitions of the 20th century.

³⁸ Traditional R2 cannot be calculated with logistic regression. However, Stata users have created several pseudo R2s that approximate R2. Following Allison's (2013) suggestion, I have chosen to rely upon the pseudo R2 called McFadden's R2. See Allison 2013 for more details about this calculation.

**Table 2.3 Discrete Time Hazard Model Predicting First Genocide, 1955-2005
Results in Odds Ratios**

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Years at Risk (log)	0.534*** (0.397 - 0.718)	0.501*** (0.364 - 0.691)	0.626** (0.427 - 0.920)	0.461*** (0.281 - 0.755)
<i>Society</i>				
Exclusionary Ideology (lagged)	3.395*** (1.476 - 7.807)	2.860** (1.185 - 6.900)	2.845** (1.162 - 6.968)	2.595* (0.990 - 6.803)
Elite Ethnicity (lagged)	2.743** (1.185 - 6.349)	3.172*** (1.404 - 7.167)	3.143*** (1.341 - 7.365)	2.904** (1.153 - 7.315)
Youth Bulge	1.090** (1.008 - 1.178)	1.106* (0.999 - 1.224)	1.082 (0.958 - 1.222)	1.054 (0.919 - 1.208)
<i>State</i>				
Democracy		0.933** (0.872 - 0.999)	0.959 (0.892 - 1.031)	0.949 (0.866 - 1.041)
Democratization		0.589*** (0.443 - 0.783)	0.596*** (0.443 - 0.802)	0.598*** (0.428 - 0.836)
Population (log)		1.629*** (1.277 - 2.078)	1.690*** (1.235 - 2.311)	1.135 (0.841 - 1.533)
<i>International</i>				
Trade Openness			0.990 (0.973 - 1.007)	0.986* (0.972 - 1.001)
INGOs (log)			0.691** (0.515 - 0.928)	0.912 (0.583 - 1.425)
<i>Upheaval</i>				
Civil War				22.787*** (8.645 - 60.064)
Coup				4.013*** (1.624 - 9.916)
International War				1.327 (0.922 - 1.911)
Constant	0.001*** (0.000 - 0.011)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.001)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.010)	0.001** (0.000 - 0.364)
Observations	5,458	5,458	5,458	5,458
Events	30	30	30	30
McFadden's R2	0.101	0.169	0.191	0.402

Robust confidence intervals in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Diversity is a social construction; minor differences can be made significant and major differences can be ignored or even constructed depending on the social context. Yet, data limitations prevent the examination of other forms of heterogeneity, such as the presence of several polarized ethnic groups like the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia. I did, however, test mid-level ethnic heterogeneity and variables related to the size, polarization, and fractionalization of ethnic groups within society drawn from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). None was significantly associated with the onset of genocide.

While ethnolinguistic diversity is not associated with higher odds of genocide, countries with salient elite ethnicities have 2.9 times higher odds of experiencing genocide than countries in which the ethnic or religious identity of prime ministers, presidents, or other high ranking officials was not a source of inter-ethnic disputes over access to political power.³⁹ In Rwanda, for example, decades of exclusion of Hutus from government positions fueled violence, as is further detailed in Chapter 3. As high-ranking officials have planned the vast majority of modern genocides, this finding also suggests that contention over political power, rather than general diversity of the population, is important.

National Politics and Economy

Though democracies have lower odds of genocide in bivariate analyses, their effect is not significant in multivariate analysis. This effect was further probed by testing a threshold effect above “7” on the Polity scale (Davenport and Armstrong 2004), but it did not yield significant results. Rather, the effect of democracies is likely reflected in

³⁹ The effects of elite ethnicity and exclusionary ideology more than double and are significant at the .01 level when the variables are not lagged.

other variables. For example, democracies are generally more economically and politically interconnected and have lower odds of experiencing a civil war.

As in bivariate analysis, a test of mid-level democracies does not provide support for theories that democratization influences genocide. In fact, democratizing countries have significantly lower odds of genocide, illustrating that not all forms of rapid change are linked to genocide. While Mann (2000) concedes that established democracies have lower odds of genocide than authoritarian regimes or democratizing regimes, he asserts that democracies can have a dark side at their early stages of development. The findings here suggest otherwise, indicating that genocide may not be a dark side of democracy. However, Mann's focus on a key aspect of democratization—defining the people—points to nationalism or nation-building more generally. These are not unique to democracy but are, arguably, processes that all nation-states undergo in their effort to define, build, and, in essence, create boundaries (by definition exclusionary) around the nation. Indeed, Mann's argument speaks to the long *durée* of history and may speak to the entire period studied.

Broadening the scope to the context in which the regime operates yields the strongest risk factors of genocide. Specifically, civil wars have the largest effect on the onset of genocide (note the large odds ratio is consistent with Table 2.2 and that this effect remains significant with lagged and unlagged versions of the variable). This supports Maier-Katkin, Mears, and Bernard's (2009) proposition that widespread and intense societal strain is a risk factor of crimes against humanity and, in this case, genocide. The genocide in Cambodia, for example, followed several years of civil war. Coups, too, are significantly associated with the odds of genocide, paling in magnitude

only to the effect of a civil war and suggesting both that the rise to power of certain leaders and the uncertainty and strain associated with certain forms of rapid change influence the occurrence of genocide. In line with this, I tested the effects of revolutions, which are excluded due to their high correlation with civil war but which increase the odds of genocide by a factor of 14 in a model without civil war.

International Dimensions

International war is not significantly associated with genocide, though this measure was often significant throughout the model-building process.⁴⁰ Like civil wars, participation in international war can lead to societal crisis, such as was the case in Pakistan during the early 1970s. In addition, both civil and international wars are associated with increased militarization. Yet, international war is not as strong a predictor of genocide as civil war. This is likely because war, while one time largely interstate in nature, has become increasingly intrastate since 1945. Furthermore, during international wars, states wage wars against other states. But, when the state is involved in a civil war, it wages war against a segment of its population. Thus, the state is an inwardly violent actor rather than a protector of its citizens against outward aggression; this may create a structure that facilitates genocide.

Moving beyond international war, there is some evidence that engagement in the international system decreases the odds of genocide. An increase of 1 percent in trade openness is associated with a 1.4 percent decrease in the odds of genocide in Model 4.

⁴⁰ As noted above, the scale of international war and civil war are different. International war is operationalized by a 10-point scale of magnitude. However, as the corresponding scale for civil wars included genocide in the magnitude calculation, the civil war variable included is a dummy variable. To be able to analyze differences in the magnitude of the effects, I also ran models with dummy variables for international war.

This small effect of trade may reflect the presence of trade embargos, placed on some countries wherein strife and human rights violations are common. In addition, membership in INGOs is significantly associated with lower odds of genocide in Model 3, though the effect is no longer significant when civil war and international war are included. Once war begins, INGOs might be less efficacious in curbing genocide, and countries at war may also fall outside of international normative pressure.

Nevertheless, trade openness and INGO membership may be capturing different sides of a similar phenomenon: engagement in the international system. World polity theorists propose that membership in INGOs influences the adoption of global norms and keeps a country within the confines of international normative pressure. Trade ties may achieve a similar effect through different avenues, reflected in several studies of human rights violations (Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and Boyle 2012; Lim and Tsutsui 2012).

Taken together, these data affirm that genocide is not a random event and factors at societal, state, and international levels influence its occurrence. This extends previous studies of genocide (Fein 1993a; Harff 2003) by considering the effect of time, analyzing multiple new theories of genocide—such as the effects of democratization, colonialism, population pressures, resource scarcity/abundance, youth bulges, and disaggregated forms of upheaval, and conceptualizing risk factors by analytic level.⁴¹ Interaction

⁴¹ Fein (1993a) and Harff (2003) each find that key risk factors of genocide include prior genocide, authoritarian rule, political upheaval, and exclusion of certain segments of the population. Harff also adds trade openness and the ethnic identity of ruling elites. While their general agreement is important, these studies examined different subsets of cases/years with different methodologies. Fein's methodology involved comparisons of descriptive statistics, which require more rigorous scrutiny. Harff's study provides more rigorous scrutiny, but restricts its analysis to states undergoing state failure (it is *plausible* that only these countries are at risk of genocide, but we know from the Holocaust, which occurred in a context of state success, that state failure is not a necessary condition for

effects were also explored across levels and time periods, though they did not yield significant results and should be examined in more depth by future studies.

As I test how factors associated with other forms of violence influence the odds of genocide, it is instructive to briefly consider differences in findings based on the type of violence. The majority of factors significantly associated with higher odds of genocide point to the regime, the context in which it is operating, and its international relations; without a doubt, the state has played an active or tacit role in modern genocides.⁴²

Notably, this contrasts with some factors associated with civil wars, where conditions that favor insurgency are predictive of violence. These include large populations, youth bulges, lower economic development, and mountainous terrain, which are significantly associated with the onset of violence in previous studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Urdal 2006) as well as when the models presented above are run with civil war as the dependent variable (not shown). Violence in neighboring countries (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2002) and resource abundance (e.g., Ross 2006) have also been linked to state failure and civil war, though they do not significantly impact the odds of genocide.

In addition, although they were not significantly associated with the onset of genocide, population, economic development, and the type of government (which has seen mixed results in studies of political and ethnic violence) have been linked to

genocide). Two key variables—exclusionary ideology and salient elite ethnicities—in Harff's model have also been updated substantially. In addition, neither study takes the issue of time seriously, nor does it include other risk factors of genocide that have been suggested. Finally, neither model differentiates the *form* of upheaval, instead combining the effects of civil war, coups, revolutions, and international war.

⁴² I recognize that the coding of the dependent variable, especially with the inclusion of the state as an active or tacit perpetrator, may influence my findings. However, as the state *has* been involved in all modern genocides, I argue this is not an artifact of the coding of genocides but rather reflects the genocides that have taken place.

violations of personal integrity human rights (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994), and population structure and some forms of economic development have been linked to inter-country homicide rates (e.g., LaFree 1999). Like genocide, however, human rights violations and state repression are significantly impacted by civil war (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), illustrating complex relationships among different forms of violence. Overall, these findings illustrate the importance of the state, the context of upheaval, and international relations in understanding the onset of genocide, contrasted in part with the importance of conditions that favor insurgency as well as other societal-level factors for understanding the onset of civil wars and related violence.

Robustness Testing and Probing Mechanisms

To probe and test the robustness of these results and consider potential mechanisms, I perform three additional analyses. First, to analyze if the definition of genocide influenced the findings, I examine a smaller subset of cases based on a more restricted definition. Then, as some may argue that not every country considered was truly at risk of genocide, I restrict the risk set to countries that experienced a civil war, the strongest predictor of genocide. Lastly, as some may suggest that an exclusionary ideology is part of the process of genocide, I treat it as a dependant variable and analyze how the factors considered thus far influence its presence.

To start, it has been argued that the guidelines the PITF used to create their dataset were too broad (e.g., Mayersen 2010). While there will never be complete agreement regarding which cases constitute genocide, I address these concerns by restricting the 30 cases included above to a smaller sample of 15 cases, relying upon Fein's (1993a) coding as explained above. Due to the small number of events, I again

start with simpler analyses of each individual predictor and time. All effects shown in Table 2.2 remain similar except the effect of trade openness, which is no longer significantly associated with lower odds of genocide. Multivariate analysis with rare events discrete time logit models (not shown)⁴³ showed some evidence of instability in the predictors due to the small number of events, though results generally affirmed those reported in Table 2.3. Specifically, exclusionary ideologies, civil wars, coups, and autocratization remain associated with higher odds of genocide in these models, while trade openness and salient elite ethnicities are no longer significantly associated, though the direction and magnitude of the effects remain similar. International war is significantly associated with the odds of genocide in these models.

As to the potential argument that some countries, such as Great Britain or Canada, were not truly at risk of genocide during the time period examined in this study, I restrict the sample to the 51 countries that experienced a civil war between 1955 and 2005 and set the time of risk to the first year a civil war took place. In other words, countries are not considered at risk of genocide unless a civil war had taken place. This results in a slightly smaller number of genocides (28), illustrating that civil war is not a necessary risk factor of genocide.

Key findings remain in these models (not shown), as aspects of intergroup dynamics, national politics and economy, and international dimensions influence the odds of genocide. Ethnolinguistic diversity is not significantly associated with higher odds of genocide, though salient elite ethnicity and exclusionary ideologies are. Turning to the state, the key difference is that larger populations have higher odds of genocide, which

⁴³ Variables that were not significant are not included (such as youth bulge or democracy) due to the small *N*.

suggests that the effect of population is mediated by the effect of civil war in Table 2.3. Beyond this, the situation in which the regime operates significantly impacts the odds of genocide, with coups and revolutions each showing strong, positive effects. In terms of international dimensions, international war is significantly associated with higher odds of genocide, though the effects of trade openness and membership in INGOs are not significant, again suggesting that the influence of the international system may become less efficacious when a country plunges into civil war. Thus far, both tests of robustness confirm most findings but call the effect of trade openness into question. In light of this, and as this variable is only significant at the .1 level in the final model, future studies should analyze the mechanisms through which trade may impact the onset of genocide.

Lastly, as the exclusion of a group is a key element of genocide, some may argue that an exclusionary ideology is part of the process of genocide and could be treated as a dependant variable. Indeed, both Mayersen (2010) and Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2009) begin their process-oriented models of genocide with the establishment of an out-group and an ideology that excludes that out-group. Further, as many genocides were planned prior to the year in which they took place, predicting an exclusionary ideology may be an important aspect of understanding genocide.

Due to these considerations as well as potential issues of endogeneity, I examine how theories reviewed in this paper explain whether an exclusionary ideology existed in any of the 153 countries in the dataset over the time period analyzed. As outlined in Table 2.1 and further detailed in Appendix B, exclusionary ideologies are defined as “belief systems that are articulated by governing elite that identify some kind of overriding purpose or principle that is used to restrict, persecute, or eliminate categories

of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose or principle.” More than one-third of the countries examined had an exclusionary ideology at some point during the study, and many of the countries that experienced genocide had an exclusionary ideology present at some point prior to the violence. Independent variables can again be found in Table 2.1 and are analyzed under the assumption that theories that pertain to the occurrence of genocide also pertain to the presence of an exclusionary ideology. To test their influence, I utilize logistic regression with clustered standard errors, as an exclusionary ideology is not a singular event and could manifest multiple times over multiple years.⁴⁴

Results are presented in Table 2.4, and it is immediately clear that many of the variables associated with the occurrence of genocide are also associated with exclusionary ideologies. In fact, more of the variables tested are significantly associated with the presence of an exclusionary ideology (Table 2.4) than with the occurrence of genocide (Table 2.3), suggesting that many theories about the onset of genocide may more accurately explain the presence of an exclusionary ideology.

Looking at societal-level factors, more diverse societies have significantly lower odds of exclusionary ideologies. This provides support for the finding that ethnolinguistic diversity is not associated with higher odds of genocide and shows that more diverse societies actually have lower odds of exclusionary ideologies, perhaps due to intergroup contact (Allport 1954). In addition, as with genocide, societies in which the ethnicity of the ruling elite is a point of contention have significantly greater odds of an exclusionary ideology.

⁴⁴ Note that I am analyzing the best way to include timeperiod effects in the analysis but that models with time included did not see different results from those presented.

**Table 2.4 Logistic Regression of Exclusionary Ideology, 1955-2005
Results in Odds Ratios**

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Society</i>				
Elite Ethnicity (lagged)	4.426*** (2.299 - 8.519)	3.352*** (1.647 - 6.822)	2.854*** (1.406 - 5.790)	2.792*** (1.363 - 5.719)
Ethnolinguistic Diversity	0.164*** (0.051 - 0.530)	0.109*** (0.032 - 0.375)	0.098*** (0.028 - 0.344)	0.095*** (0.027 - 0.336)
<i>State</i>				
Democracy		0.857*** (0.802 - 0.916)	0.860*** (0.810 - 0.914)	0.854*** (0.802 - 0.908)
Population (log)		1.295* (0.995 - 1.686)	1.210 (0.851 - 1.720)	1.092 (0.775 - 1.540)
<i>International</i>				
Colonial Past			3.894** (1.094 - 13.855)	3.909** (1.129 - 13.531)
Trade Openness			0.991** (0.983 - 0.999)	0.989*** (0.982 - 0.997)
INGOs (log)			0.938 (0.692 - 1.271)	0.986 (0.722 - 1.347)
<i>Upheaval</i>				
Civil War				2.192* (0.997 - 4.816)
Coup				0.499*** (0.332 - 0.749)
International War				1.412** (1.080 - 1.845)
Constant	0.304*** (0.181 - 0.511)	0.030*** (0.002 - 0.373)	0.078 (0.004 - 1.665)	0.149 (0.007 - 3.032)
Observations	6,310	6,310	6,310	6,310
McFadden's R2	0.072	0.195	0.240	0.249

Robust confidence intervals in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Turning to the type of state, democracies have much lower odds of exclusionary ideologies. State upheaval in the form of civil war is associated with higher odds of an exclusionary ideology, though the magnitude of this effect is much smaller than the effect of civil war on genocide. Revolutions (not shown due to their high correlation with civil

wars) are also significantly associated with higher odds of an exclusionary ideology, though a coup has a negative, significant effect (consistent with bivariate analyses). This may mean that regimes with exclusionary ideologies are more difficult to topple or that exclusionary ideologies seldom occur with a coup, perhaps because new leaders seek support from the population (both possibilities should be explored in future research). International war has a strong, positive effect.

In terms of other international factors, each additional percent of time spent under imperial rule is associated with a four-fold increase in the odds of an exclusionary ideology. This underscores the finding that while colonialism is not directly associated with the onset of genocide, its effects manifest in other ways. By contrast, trade openness is significantly associated with lower odds of exclusionary ideologies, providing support for the effect of certain forms of international interconnectedness.

Again, theories that pertain to the onset of genocide are also predictive of an exclusionary ideology and, in fact, better explain the latter. An exclusionary ideology is clearly linked to genocide, as genocide involves the intent to destroy a group of people. While this factor (as measured) was not present before every genocide, ideologies of exclusion and other forms of classification are often the first steps in process-oriented models of genocide (Stanton 1996; Mayersen 2010). Thus, while an exclusionary ideology is not a necessary or a sufficient condition, it is a mechanism for genocide. Future researchers' models should examine the factors that lead to an exclusionary ideology and explore why some ideologies lead to genocide while others do not.

Duration of Genocide

Thus far, I have examined the factors associated with the onset of genocide and tested their robustness. Before concluding, I briefly turn to one other aspect of genocidal conflict: its duration. Comparative studies of genocide have yet to consider the factors that influence the duration of violence. While many of these factors are likely found at sub-national levels and potentially linked to the actions of external actors (such as armed interventions or economic sanctions), it is also plausible that more macro-level factors studied here influence the duration of genocidal violence. In fact, studies of the duration of civil war have found that, among factors related to the type of war (Fearon 2004), low economic development and moderate ethnic heterogeneity are associated with longer civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).

To examine whether factors studied here also influence the duration of genocide, I draw upon a Weibull model, as described in the methods section. The dataset is restricted to episodes of genocide, resulting in 30 countries. The genocides lasted from 1 year (the lowest possible) to 20 years (see Appendix A for the duration the PITF assigned to each case), and all independent variables are, again, described in the data section and Table 2.1. Note that I also ran analyses with Fein's coding, and all effects presented remain similar.

Results, shown in Table 2.5, illustrate that factors that influence the onset of genocide do not generally influence its duration. Salient elite ethnicities provide one example. Yet, exclusionary ideologies, which are key factors related to the onset of genocide, are associated with significantly shorter genocides. This may suggest that

Table 2.5 Weibull Model of the Duration of Genocide, 1955 to 2005

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Society</i>				
Exclusionary Ideology	-0.751* (-1.575 - 0.073)	-0.976** (-1.870 - -0.081)	-0.946** (-1.839 - -0.053)	-1.105** (-2.069 - -0.141)
Elite Ethnicity	0.116 (-0.917 - 1.148)	0.338 (-1.052 - 1.728)	0.437 (-1.020 - 1.895)	0.959 (-0.734 - 2.653)
Ethnolinguistic Diversity	-2.513*** (-4.076 - -0.950)	-4.454*** (-6.266 - -2.641)	-4.409*** (-6.224 - -2.594)	-4.741*** (-6.718 - -2.765)
<i>State</i>				
Democratization		-0.104 (-0.592 - 0.384)	-0.092 (-0.574 - 0.390)	-0.104 (-0.614 - 0.407)
GDP per capital (log)		-0.058 (-0.774 - 0.658)	-0.018 (-0.760 - 0.723)	0.142 (-0.647 - 0.931)
Population (log)		1.042*** (0.684 - 1.399)	1.021*** (0.656 - 1.386)	1.068*** (0.660 - 1.477)
<i>International and Upheaval</i>				
Trade Openness			-0.004 (-0.017 - 0.010)	-0.004 (-0.017 - 0.009)
Civil War				-0.252 (-1.282 - 0.778)
International War				0.194 (-0.161 - 0.549)
Coup				-0.454 (-1.464 - 0.556)
Constant	-2.559*** (-3.970 - -1.148)	-12.112*** (-16.333 - -7.890)	-11.937*** (-16.220 - -7.655)	-12.510*** (-17.089 - -7.930)
Observations	174	174	174	174
Events	30	30	30	30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

genocides where there was already in- and out-groups formed may see swifter violence.

Ethnolinguistic diversity is also significantly associated with shorter episodes of genocide, which may mean that the presence of other groups helps bring the violence to a close. However, probing this effect by examining moderate levels of ethnolinguistic

diversity (.4 to .6) shows that moderate levels are actually associated with longer genocides, paralleling findings related to the duration of civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).⁴⁵

Turning to national politics and economy, the type of government, democratization, and economic development are not associated with the duration of genocide. A country's population is, however, and an increase in logged population increases the duration by a factor of 3.4. This finding may indicate that larger countries have longer genocides; it may also indicate that more potential victims increases the length of the conflict. In addition, the presence of civil war—the strongest predictor of genocide—is not significantly associated with the duration of genocidal violence. Other forms of upheaval, including coups and international war, are also insignificant.

Overall, the interpretations of the effects presented here are largely speculative, and future studies should spend more time assessing the factors that influence genocidal duration and its impacts on measures like death tolls or regional stability.⁴⁶ What is significant here is the finding that factors associated with the onset of genocide do not significantly impact its duration. Factors associated with the state and its context are most important for understanding the onset of genocide, though it may be factors at societal and international levels that influence the duration, calling for alternate theories as well as

⁴⁵ Moderate levels of ethnolinguistic diversity are not associated with the onset of genocide, however.

⁴⁶ Again, analyses were run with Fein's restrictive case set of genocides, and effects remained.

analysis at sub-national levels, which I assess throughout this dissertation and to which I return in Chapter 6.

Reviewing Factors that Influence the Onset (and Duration) of Genocide

This chapter has drawn upon insights from the study of political and ethnic violence, genocide studies, and criminology to assess factors that influence the onset of genocidal violence at societal, state, and international levels. Testing numerous new theories about the occurrence of genocide, I find that exclusionary ideologies, salient elite ethnicities, autocratization, fewer years at risk, civil wars, coups, and lower levels of trade openness are associated with higher odds of genocide, indicating that the state and the context in which it operates is key to understanding the situation in which genocide occurs.

Civil wars are the strongest predictors of genocide, as the state is already inwardly violent toward a segment of its own population. This also suggests that strain—specifically in the form of civil wars and coups, which directly threaten a ruling regime—is a particularly salient factor for understanding when and why genocide occurs. This supports individual-centered explanations that purport that genocide can be a strategic decision on the part of threatened ruling elite (Valentino 2004; Midlarsky 2005) and provides structural explanations to accompany them.

Incorporating theories from several different areas of inquiry allows me to analyze whether factors that explain other forms of violence, such as a civil war, also influence the onset of genocide. While civil war is the strongest predictor of genocide, the factors associated with the onset of civil wars—including youth bulges, rough terrain, economic development, and large populations—are not associated with the onset of

genocide. This suggests that while factors that influence insurgency are strongly associated with civil wars, the onset of genocide is more influenced by the state.

I do not find support for several prominent theories regarding the causes of genocide. For example, I do not find that resource scarcity and population pressures influence the odds of genocide,⁴⁷ which is in line with Agnew's (2012) proposition that the effects of climate change may be more likely to lead to localized conflicts rather than larger, state-led atrocities. Nor do I find support for theories that democratization influences the onset of genocide. Rather, these theories (e.g., Mann 2000; Goldstone et al. 2002) may be useful in understanding the effects of nation-building as well as the broader socio-historical context of the time period studied.

Probing effects reveal that many of the factors I test significantly impact the presence of an exclusionary ideology. In fact, some factors—such as colonialism, type of government, and ethnolinguistic diversity—significantly influence the odds of an exclusionary ideology even though they do not influence the odds of genocide, with colonialism significantly predicting such ideologies and more diverse countries and democracies having negative effects. Notably, this further casts doubt on the “diversity breeds conflict” argument. It also shows that while colonialism does not directly influence genocide, it has a strong effect through the influence of exclusionary ideologies.

This suggests that many theories developed to explain the causes of genocide focus instead on the exclusion of certain peoples, the element of the definition linked most closely to intent. However, only *some* exclusionary ideologies result in genocide,

⁴⁷ Yet, additional studies with fine-grained measures of resource scarcity are also needed to better understand its potential influence.

and future research should explore why exclusionary ideologies manifest themselves in numerous forms of violence, ranging from discriminatory laws to genocide. Exclusionary ideologies are often the first step in many process-based models (e.g., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009), underscoring the importance of predicting an exclusionary ideology alongside genocide.

While these results are robust, this analysis is not without limitations. First, as noted, scarce data before the 1950s and before countries gained independence prevent this study from including earlier genocides as well as years before a country became independent. It would be ideal to examine a discrete time unit smaller than one year, which is also impossible due to data limitations. Finally, the small number of cases should be kept in mind while interpreting results. While the genocides analyzed here could be considered a census, there is (fortunately) a relatively small number of genocides to analyze.

Beyond exploring exclusionary ideologies as a process both part of and separate from genocide, future research should turn its attention to the duration of genocidal violence. In my brief examination of duration, I find that the factors associated with the onset of genocide do not significantly impact its duration. Thus, while many of the factors associated with the onset of genocide are tightly linked to the state, factors associated with the duration of genocide may be more strongly influenced by micro-level factors pertaining to the society as well as circumstances pertaining to the international response to the violence.

In sum, the findings presented thus far point to importance of multiple levels of analysis regarding modern genocide. Still, the significant factors relate to the regime, the

context in which it operates, and, to a lesser degree, its international relations. As modern genocides have been initiated by the state, it is clearly key to understanding genocidal onset. This contrasts with civil wars, in which conditions that favor societal insurgency are important factors in understanding why violence occurs.

Genocide is never inevitable, and it is not random. Certain factors pertaining to intergroup dynamics, national politics and economy, and international dimensions influence its occurrence. While this chapter has assessed general preconditions of genocide globally, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 assess these factors in specific situations, further exploring the conditions under which genocide occurs.

Chapter 3: Genocide in Rwanda

“If you must remember, remember this... The Nazis did not kill six million Jews... nor the Interahamwe kill a million Tutsis, they killed one and then another, and then another... Genocide is not a single act of murder, it is millions of acts of murder.”
-Stephen D. Smith, Executive Director, Aegis Trust

During several months in 1994, one million people were murdered in the small African country of Rwanda. An estimated 250,000 people were raped, countless individuals were tortured, and thousands of homes were destroyed. Many journalists and world leaders, even the United Nations, initially interpreted this violence as a civil war (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Yet, in its aftermath, it became clear that the violence targeted Rwandan Tutsi and, as such, constituted genocide.

The extreme number of individuals killed during a relatively short period of time has remained a defining aspect of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Several scholars have even attempted to quantify this intensity by noting there were 333.3 killings per hour, or 5.5 killings per second, throughout the country (Gourevitch 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 2004).⁴⁸ Although these rates of killing are powerful numbers, they obscure the complexity of the violence. While it is conceivable that killing took place at a constant rate, it is highly unlikely. Further, it is dubious that levels of violence were the same throughout the country. In short, this statistic speaks to a broader tendency to treat genocide in Rwanda, as well as other episodes of genocide and mass violence, as an undifferentiated event, missing an opportunity to better understand the violence.

Genocide is comprised of millions of events, and analyzing the meso and micro dynamics

⁴⁸ These rates have been calculated on the assumption that 800,000 people were killed over 100 days.

and process of these events is of critical importance to understanding the violence (Owens, Su, and Snow 2013).

Accordingly, this chapter analyzes determinants of regional and temporal variation in killings during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. After reviewing the events that led to the genocide and explaining how the violence unfolded, I discuss potential determinants of regional variation in killing and test these theories using fixed effects analyses in Part 1. In Part 2, I examine when genocide began throughout the country and analyze factors that influenced whether a community saw early, middle, or late onset of genocidal violence. Finally, I review the factors that influenced regional and temporal variation in genocidal violence.

Among other things, I find that the population of Tutsis and the spread of propaganda—through radio and through the institution of education—influenced the rate of killings within communities. Multiple community-level factors, including marriage rates and employment in the formal sector, also influenced the rate of killing. These factors are particularly linked to who perpetrated genocide in Rwanda; nearly one million people participated in the violence, so variation in that violence was heavily influenced by community-level differences. This contrasts with the onset of violence at the macro level, as seen in Chapter 2, as well as at community levels in Rwanda, as further detailed below.

The Road to Genocide

Rwanda is a land-locked country in Central Africa that is roughly the size of Maryland. Like many countries in Africa, it first became a polity when several chiefships combined to form a kingdom (Mamdani 2001). Rwanda's vibrant pre-colonial history is far too rich

to recount;⁴⁹ nevertheless, in order to understand why and how genocide unfolded in 1994, it is necessary to understand some of the factors at play in the decades prior.

Figure 3.1: 1994 Rwanda



Note: In 1994, Rwanda consisted of 11 prefectures (provinces), which were comprised of 145 communes (municipalities).

While Chapter 2 found that colonialism is not probabilistically associated with genocide,⁵⁰ colonialism *is* key to understanding the genocide in Rwanda. The Berlin Conference of 1884 assigned what is now present-day Rwanda, along with the territory that is present-day Burundi, to Germany. Throughout its rule from afar, Germany did not radically alter the political structure of Rwanda. Instead, it generally supported the King

⁴⁹ For a detailed historical account of Rwanda, see Prunier 1995, Vansina 2004, or Mulinda 2010.

⁵⁰ Again, in Chapter 2, colonialism was not significantly associated with the onset of genocide. However, it was a strong predictor of an exclusionary ideology, suggesting its indirect effect on genocide, further illustrated in this chapter.

(Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1999). As historian Alison Des Forges (1999) notes, Germany sought to rule Rwanda with the least cost and the most profit.

During World War I, Belgium took control of Rwanda and Burundi. Like Germany, Belgian officials sought to maximize profit in Rwanda, though it also implemented changes that directly affected Rwandans' daily lives. Many of these changes were linked to emerging favoritism for one of the three ethnic groups in Rwanda—the Tutsi. For example, in 1920, a new law declared that all local colonial authorities were to be Tutsi.

At the time, Rwanda was comprised of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa. The precise origins of these groups are widely debated (e.g., Newbury 1988, Straus 2006), though scholars generally agree that the categories began to organize social life in the late 1800s (Cornell and Hartmann 2007). At this time, raising cattle was considered a high-status occupation; since more Tutsis raised cattle, they were accorded prestige. “Tutsi” became synonymous with “rich in cattle,” while “Hutu” came to mean “servant” or “employee.” These categories were fluid. Once a person acquired 10 cows, he or she became Tutsi (Gasabo 2008).⁵¹

There is some evidence that the identities associated with “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were polarized even before colonialism (Joint Evaluation Report 1 1996; Des Forges 1999; Mulinda 2010).⁵² Yet, Rwanda did not have a history of ethnic-based conflict. In

⁵¹ While class is not a category protected by the Genocide Convention or even considered in most scholars' definitions of genocide, this is not the only genocide in which class categories became politicized, suggesting that future research should examine the link between class and genocide.

⁵² Several scholars point to the rule of the Tutsi King Rwabugiri (1860-1895) as a period in which the social categories of Hutu and Tutsi were created based on historical social positions (Joint Evaluation Report 1; Des Forges 1999). This period also saw the

fact, Hutus and Tutsis shared the same customs and language, and there are many verbal records of intermarriage (Gasnabo 2008). This began to change during Belgian colonialism. In the early 1930s, colonial officials reified ethnic identities by asking Rwandans to declare one on their identification cards.⁵³ Officials also sought to document phenotypical characteristics associated with these identities, racializing ethnicities by asserting that Hutus were shorter with darker skin and broader noses while Tutsis were taller and lighter skinned—in some ways, more similar to Europeans. As the recent lineage of Rwandan Kings was also Tutsi, many Belgians subscribed to the notion of Tutsis as members the Hamitic race, a Eurocentric idea that Tutsis were from *Northern* Africa and consequently superior to Hutus, whose ancestors were thought to be from Sub-Saharan Africa (Newbury 1995).

As Mamdani (2001) and Cornell and Hartmann (2004) argue, racializing ethnicities involved an attempt to biologicize differences. While both race and ethnicity are social constructs, race is typically construed by outsiders and does not tolerate multiple identities. As Cornell and Hartmann state (2004:28), “For race, the critical issue is who *they* are and how *they* are fundamentally different from *us*.” In this case, Tutsis were seen as outsiders and settlers, based on perceived differences in biology and in homeland. Although existing ethnicities became racialized, Hutus and Tutsis also continued self-identifying with these groups. Thus, I use the term

amplification of feudal labor systems, such as *uburetwa*, which involved labor in return for access to land.

⁵³ The precise date that identity cards were introduced varies in historical records, ranging from 1931-1935.

“ethnicity” throughout this chapter,⁵⁴ but I note that the racialization of these groups is key to understanding perceived differences and power relations between them.

Soon, Belgian colonial officials began enacting policies that benefited the Tutsis.⁵⁵ As noted above, Tutsis, the numeric minority, were appointed to fill all local government positions (Mamdani 2001; Melvern 2006). Catholicism was closely intertwined with the colonial project, too; once missionaries began to recruit native Rwandan clergy, they selected almost exclusively Tutsi (Longman 2011).⁵⁶

After World War II, Belgium continued to rule Rwanda, though it had become a United Nations Trust Territory. Belgium was mandated to oversee its eventual independence. Decolonization was sweeping across Africa, and it found much support from Rwanda’s King. Due in part to the Tutsi King’s excitement for independence, as well as growing discontent among Hutus and perhaps even a recognition of their long-time favoritism toward Tutsis, Belgian colonists began to shift their support toward Rwandan Hutus (Joint Evaluation Report 1 1996). The Catholic Church even began increasing the numbers of Hutu clergy.

As Hutus gained some power, their discontent regarding what they perceived as years of mistreatment and marginalization grew. In the mid-1950s, a Hutu emancipation movement emerged, led by Grégoire Kayibanda. A few years later, Kayibanda and other

⁵⁴ As I note in subsequent chapters, the same could be said of identities in the other two cases. This is something I discuss briefly in each chapter and plan to develop in more detail in the book.

⁵⁵ Around this time, Belgian officials enacted two policies of forced labor (*akazi* and *uburetwa*). See Gasanabo 2008 for more.

⁵⁶ See the work of Timothy Longman for in-depth studies of the role of the Catholic Church in the genocide.

members of this movement published what has become known as the Hutu Manifesto.⁵⁷ This document alleged that the Tutsi minority held a monopoly on the power in Rwanda and called for political and ethnic solidarity between Rwandan Hutu, who deserved to rule as the numeric majority. Kayibanda formed the Party of the Movement for Hutu Emancipation (Parmehutu), the political party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement⁵⁸ (Straus 2006). As a Rwandan scholar explained of the name, “This literally means party of Hutu. It was meant to incite Hutus to join the party” (Rwanda, August 2012). Ethnicity had long been politicized; now it was official.

In January 1959, Belgium announced its intention to grant independence to the Belgian Congo, increasing hope that Rwandan independence was near.⁵⁹ Dissatisfaction with the monarchy grew alongside dreams of independence, and citizens began to form more political parties. These included the Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses (Aprosoma), the Rwandan National Union (NAR), and the Rwandan Democratic Assembly (RADER). Importantly, these parties were divided along ethnic (which, again, were also racial) lines and sometimes joined in pursuit of what they deemed ethnically based goals. In September 1959, for example, Parmehutu and Aprosoma met in Butare⁶⁰ and called for Hutu support. At the meeting, Kayibanda declared, “Our movement

⁵⁷ This document, also known as the Bahutu Manifesto, was written in part as a reply to a government document entitled “*Mise au Point*” (To the Point), in which King Mutara Rudahigwa recognized inequalities in Rwanda but minimized issues between ethnic groups (Gasabo 2008).

⁵⁸ This movement was previously called the Hutu Social Movement (*Mouvement Social Muhutu*).

⁵⁹ Several months later, King Mutara Rudahigwa, who had served since 1931, died suddenly, creating a political crisis (Straus 2006). Some Hutus began to call for the installation of a republic. The crisis was temporarily abated by the installation of Rudahigwa’s brother, also a Tutsi.

⁶⁰ Names of regions in Rwanda have changed several times since 1994; this chapter uses the 1994 administrative boundary names.

concerns the Hutu—humiliated and despised, outraged by the Tutsi invader...” (Gasabo 2008:200). Ominously, Tutsis were increasingly seen as outsiders.

Tensions heightened, and, in November 1959, an influential Hutu was reportedly attacked by a group of Tutsis.⁶¹ Hutu leaders called for the death of Tutsi leaders, and the first outbreak of mass violence began.⁶² Supporters of the monarchy were arrested and tortured, and crowds of Hutus attacked Tutsis and their property throughout the country. As Placide, a survivor, recalled, “Cows were killed, houses were burned... And so they created this movement of hate and of violence. So this, to me, is the beginning. From 1959... there was no peace in Rwanda” (Rwanda, September 2012). In total, an estimated five thousand homes were burnt, and refugees fled to neighboring Uganda and Burundi (Des Forges 1999). The exact number of Tutsis who left is unknown, though estimates range from tens to hundreds of thousands (Des Forges 1999; Joint Evaluation Report 1 1996).

National elections were held for the first time the following year, and Rwanda became a republic (known as the First Republic) led by Grégoire Kayibanda. This culmination of the Hutu Emancipation Movement coincided with Rwandan independence in 1962. Hutus did not stop claiming they were marginalized, however, and Tutsi alliances strengthened. Ethnic boundaries were reinforced. Intra-group differences also became prominent, as the Parmehutu consolidation of state power drove a wedge between them and more moderate Hutu citizens.

⁶¹ Several interviewees told me that this event was fabricated to mobilize Hutus against Tutsis. Either way, the end result (increased mobilization against Tutsi) was the same.

⁶² Many argue that this event itself was a genocide, though this point is widely debated. An in-depth examination of this time period was not performed; hence, this dissertation does not offer an analysis of the type of violence that took place during the 1950s.

Discrimination against Tutsis began; soon, Tutsis were excluded from high-ranking jobs. As a survivor and government official explained,

Simply just because they are Tutsi... Not in army, not in administration, very few people in teaching, in education, in medical... We had these IDs that said if you were Tutsi or Hutu, so you really couldn't really have access to the basic things simply because you're Tutsi. Discrimination, official discrimination... in the school, in the workplace, in the army (Rwanda, August 2012).

Direct forms of violence continued, too. In 1963, some of the Tutsi who had fled attacked Rwanda across the Burundian border. The raids were used as an excuse for attacks on Tutsis within Rwanda. Even President Kayibanda stated, "Assuming that you [Tutsi] managed the impossible by taking the Kigali city, tell me in brief how you imagine the chaos that would follow in which you will be the first victims? ... *It will be the complete and rapid termination of the Tutsi race*" (Fieldnotes 2012; Kimonyo 2014). Violence continued. In 1968, Tutsis again tried to attack Rwanda through Burundi. The government responded by executing 20 prominent Tutsi, and Hutu civilians killed thousands of Tutsis (African Rights 1995). There was little to no international reaction, and those who killed Tutsi *inyenzi* (cockroaches) generally went unpunished.

In 1972, Hutu in Burundi began organized attacks on Tutsi. The Burundian government responded with large-scale targeting and mass killing of Hutu, and the government of Rwanda seized the moment to incite fear of Tutsi violence against Hutu. Rwandans began to worry about reprisal attacks from Rwandan Tutsi.

In the following year, General Juvénal Habyarimana, the most senior officer in the army, rose to power in a coup d'état.⁶³ He established the Second Republic and

⁶³ While it will not be reviewed here, President Kayibanda's repressive regime had received much criticism. For example, in 1962, he changed the Constitution to establish

promised to restore order to Rwanda. Two years later, he made Rwanda a single-party state under the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND).

Habyarimana sought to further organize Rwanda, whose administrative units were already centrally organized. He attracted foreign assistance during the 1970s and 1980s, which led to the development of roads, telephone services, and electric services (Des Forges 1999). Elites within Rwandan society enjoyed some prosperity, and killings decreased.

However, discrimination against the Tutsi remained and arguably strengthened. Tutsis continued to be excluded from some jobs, and there were quotas for how many Tutsis could attend schools. Beyond this, all students learned that Tutsis were outsiders who had taken power away from the native Hutu. As President Habyarimana was a Hutu from the northern part of Rwanda, regional differences also began to surface. Habyarimana's regime particularly favored northern Hutu marginalized southern Hutu alongside Tutsi.

Prosperity in Rwanda grew shaky in the late 1980s, when the price of coffee, which accounted for 75 percent of Rwanda's foreign trade, dropped sharply (Prunier 1995). Habyarimana's regime was under pressure from its donors to enact political reforms, such as returning to a multi-party system. While this pressure may have been tempered by donors' fears of antagonizing what appeared to be a democratizing country (Des Forges 1999), they nevertheless placed pressure on the Habyarimana regime.

Meanwhile, the Tutsi Diaspora, who had resettled in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and other countries in the region, had still not been reintegrated into Rwanda. In fact,

unlimited presidential terms. This and other repressive actions were met with increasing unrest among some factions of society.

Habyarimana's regime denied reentry to many. In response, a group of Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).⁶⁴ After several years of training, the RPF invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990, attempting to take power from Habyarimana.

This attack marked the beginning of a civil war and placed tremendous strain on the government. It also offered Habyarimana a way to rebuild his support by rallying Rwandans against the enemy: the RPF. Habyarimana's government began to imprison and torture Tutsis for their alleged support of the RPF—arguably an attempt to draw Hutu together in opposition to a common enemy, a phenomenon that many sociologists have observed during times of crisis (e.g., Erikson 1966). Anti-Tutsi propaganda swept through the country through venues like *Kangura*, a newspaper founded shortly after the RPF invasion. Its content was notoriously sensationalist, though perhaps the most infamous piece was the Hutu 10 Commandments, published in December 1990. The “Commandments” included items declaring that Hutus married to Tutsi or befriending Tutsi were traitors, that the education sector must be comprised of a Hutu majority, and that all strategic positions within the country should be entrusted only to Hutu. Other media sources, such as Radio RTLM,⁶⁵ were created to spread similar anti-Tutsi propaganda to those without access to newspapers or the ability to read.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ The RPF grew out of the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU). While Fred Rwigyema originally led the organization, it was led by Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda, throughout the civil war and the genocide (Mamdani 2001). See Mamdani for a detailed explanation of the RPF.

⁶⁵ Radio RTLM (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) was broadcast from July 8, 1993 to July 31, 1994. Its leaders have been charged with genocide, incitement to genocide, and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Though the government did not directly create the radio station or newspaper, it funded both.

⁶⁶ For detailed studies of the role of media in the genocide, see Thompson 2007.

Due in part to some of the pressure exerted on the regime, Habyarimana accepted a constitutional amendment that allowed other political parties in late 1991. Several months later, he agreed to allow some of these parties to join a coalition government—much to the dismay of some Hutus, who wanted to hold onto power, not share it with Tutsis. Fears that a broader coalition government would form swept the already unstable country and influenced the creation of youth political party wings. The *Interahamwe*, for example, was comprised of youth from the MRND party who pledged to defend the country from threats. Political leaders and citizens formed many other self-defense groups. In general, these groups urged individuals to train to defend themselves against Tutsi attacks. As a memorial guide and witness noted:

You see, they were called self-defense groups for a reason. This was a way to get the broader public to participate. Make them think they are in danger. Their families are in danger. That way, they slowly get ready to participate in the violence by thinking they are defending themselves (Rwanda, September 2012).

Another survivor explained, “So what the regime did is to incite people and to show that there is now public danger, public threat to everyone regardless of his level, educational, well being... it’s now the end: if you don’t defend yourself, you’re done” (Rwanda, September 2012). Beyond mobilizing ordinary citizens, these committees also created identities for Rwandan citizens as defenders, illustrating that it is important to understand the group identities of the perpetrators as well.

Meanwhile, the RPF and the Rwandan Government signed a ceasefire in July 1992, and peace talks associated with a series of agreements known as the Arusha Accords began. Habyarimana often disavowed the Arusha Accords when speaking about them in Rwanda. Other politicians voiced disapproval of a peace process and advocated for the continuation of violence. While speaking at an MRND event in 1993, politician

Léon Mugesera scolded that Hutus must not let themselves be invaded and urged them to execute the “scum” (Gourevitch 1998).

Yet, President Habyarimana continued to participate in the peace process and signed another protocol in January 1993. This established a plan for a broad based transitional government in which power would be shared until subsequent elections. Specifically, power was to be shared by the Habyarimana regime, the RPF, and a third faction comprised of other political parties. The tripartite proposition met much resistance among members of the incumbent government.⁶⁷

The RPF violated the ceasefire and invaded Rwanda on February 8, 1993, resulting in displacement within Rwanda and again placing pressure on the Habyarimana regime. After a few days of fighting, the parties agreed to another cease-fire, but support for self-defense groups and against the RPF grew. In August 1993, all three parties of the transitional government signed another agreement, and local-level leaders began to fear for their positions once—if—the Arusha Accords were implemented. The RPF, local youth militias, and self-defense committees grew (Des Forges 1999), while the government imported three-quarters of a million dollars worth of machetes (Melvern 2006).

On October 21, 1993, Tutsi army officers assassinated the President of Burundi. Both Hutu and Tutsi were slaughtered in Burundi, sending streams of Burundian refugees to Rwanda. Hopes that Hutu and Tutsi could share power peacefully were deeply shaken by these events, and the Habyarimana regime capitalized on them to instill fear. As a

⁶⁷ Violence also continued, and the United Nations initiated a Commission of Inquiry. The Commission found that both the Habyarimana regime and the RPF had committed human rights abuses, though this finding did not lead to prosecutions.

survivor explained, “So they [the Government]... said, ‘Don’t you know? The Tutsi are very bad. They killed even the president in Burundi. If you don’t pay attention, they’ll kill you’” (Rwanda, September 2012).

The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established to help keep peace, and troops were sent in December 1993. Yet, they lacked full numbers and basic supplies, as the budget was not formally approved for months. Even then, the general of the UNAMIR, Roméo Dallaire, heard warnings that government officials were planning genocide but was unable to obtain more assistance (Dallaire 2004).

Beyond the confidential information that Dallaire had received, many signs and preconditions analyzed in Chapter 2 were clearly present. In Chapter 6, I analyze these in more detail and in comparison to Bosnia and Sudan. For now, I review them briefly.

At the societal level, ethnic divisions were flexible categories that changed and took on new meanings over time. Such fluid understandings of ethnicity are difficult to model quantitatively—likely another reason why a simple measure of ethnolinguistic diversity is not a significant predictor of the onset of genocidal violence (Chapter 2). Rather, the politicization of ethnicity, especially through political parties but also through other intra-ethnic civil society organizations (Varshney 2003), is key. These polarized ethnic identities were also tied tightly to the ethnicity of those in power within the regime, and it is evident that there was much contention over the ethnicity of the ruling elite in Rwanda, lending credence to theories suggesting that such contention is a precondition of genocide and qualitatively supporting the quantitative results shown in Chapter 2. In addition, an exclusionary ideology, which in this case was led by the state and political parties and transmitted to broader society through media, was clearly

present, affirming many genocide scholars' focus on ideologies (Weitz 2003; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008).

At the state level, it again appears that the precise type of government may matter less than the perceived strain on that government, though a more detailed discussion of this will follow in Chapter 6. Indeed, the clearest precondition at this level was the civil war, including repeat attacks by the RPF, which placed pressure on the relatively new government and resulted in increased militarization (Straus 2006). As noted above, the civil war also provided the government with an opportunity to align all Tutsi with the RPF, cast all Tutsi as enemies and threats, and rally the public into self-defense committees. Paradoxically, the peace process caused additional strain and influenced fears of power loss.

The strain caused by the civil war was compounded by other shocks to the regime, such as the coffee crisis of the late 1980s. The effect of colonialism—another international factor—is most evident in its impact on Rwandan ethnic identities. Violence in neighboring countries, particularly Burundi, also impacted Rwanda in the years leading to the genocide, both through an influx of refugees as well as by inducing fears within Rwanda.⁶⁸

None of these preconditions is sufficient to cause genocide. Instead, these factors influenced a situation in which genocide was *possible*. The actions of those who planned the genocide (well documented in Melvern 2006), and the societal, state, and international context, set the stage for violence.

⁶⁸ As Mamdani (2001) notes, other regional influences also influenced the violence. In particular, the RPF learned how to become an army in Uganda.

Descent into Genocide

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi was shot down as it prepared to land in the capital of Rwanda. There were no survivors. Only a few hours later, targeted killing of Tutsis and moderate Hutus began. As a scholar and survivor explained,

...Immediately the army, Habyarimana army... started accusing RPF for having destroyed the plane. And then they put barricades everywhere... in Kigali. They started in the night, and in the morning, everyone who went out was killed. So they started in Kigali... and then it was spread everywhere... (Rwanda, August 2012).

Accordingly, the plane crash⁶⁹ is often cited as *the* cause of the genocide, yet, as the previous discussion illuminated, this is not accurate. Rather, the plane crash could be thought of as a proximate cause, or what genocide scholars typically call a “spark,” but genocide took place due to a combination of factors already in play well before the night of the 6th.

Mass action with the intention to destroy Tutsis and their associates began swiftly after April 6, 1994. Members of the army and political figures first targeted political moderates in Kigali who might stand in their way. Within an hour, the Presidential Guard had blockaded the home of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Next in line for the presidency, she had arranged for UNAMIR soldiers to escort her to the radio station in the morning, where she planned to tell the nation she was committed to the Arusha Accords. She never made it. Instead, Rwandan soldiers under the command of Colonel

⁶⁹ It is quite possible that Habyarimana’s own regime orchestrated the crash. Many members of regime planned the violence and had been instrumental in creating self-defense committees and warning citizens to be prepared to fight the Tutsi. In addition, roadblocks were set up and targeted killing began within hours, suggesting that the incident was expected. However, research on the crash’s cause has, to date, been inconclusive.

Theoneste Bagasora captured and killed her. Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch explained that she had been left naked on her home terrace with a beer bottle shoved up her vagina (Des Forges 1999). Many moderate Hutus, like Uwilingiyimana, were systematically killed over the next few days, and trials at the ICTR have confirmed that perpetrators were working from pre-collected lists of names of influential leaders—what scholars referring to other genocides have called elitocide (Gratz 2011).

Elsewhere throughout the city, *Interahamwe* and Rwandan soldiers patrolled the streets, killing anyone who attempted to stop them (Des Forges 1999). Roadblocks, mainly set up by government soldiers and *Interahamwe*, stopped those who tried to flee. One survivor recalled,

And here in the capital... they knew their neighbors. This wasn't a big city to us; it was quite small. They know their neighbors, and even when you didn't know, this is where the IDs now worked to their benefit. To pass a roadblock, they would say, "Bring your IDs." And every ID had your name, your parent's names, and whether you were Hutu or Tutsi. So this was very easy, even when their parents would really be doubted. They would use an ID (Rwanda, October 2012).

As word of the plane crash spread, similar patterns of violence began in many cities throughout the country. In Nyarubuye, a commune in Eastern Rwanda, Tutsis and their families fled to a large Roman Catholic Church, thinking they would be safe. On April 15 and 16, however, local police and citizens attacked the church. The mayor of the commune led the attack, first asking Tutsis and Hutus hiding in the church to separate and then leading the killings, which targeted Tutsis as well as Hutus who stood in the way of the violence. In just two days, more than 20,000 people were killed. A survivor said:

When there was violence in 1959 and other times, Tutsis sought refuge at these places.... And they were safe. Police, public buildings... and they were safe. And this time they thought maybe... this will pass. They thought this will pass; it is

just insecurity. We have seen this before; this will pass. And it didn't; it became worse (Rwanda, September 2012).

Privat, a child at the time, recalled his mother being torn away by several men who likely raped her before killing her. Their attackers had machetes, spears, and other common weapons, though they also used guns and grenades. Some people, including Privat, managed to flee, though after killing those hiding in the church, the perpetrators hunted down as many people as they could find in surrounding buildings, homes, and woods. Bodies were left where they fell (Rwanda, September 2012).

At this point, systematic violence had yet to begin in Butare,⁷⁰ a prefecture in southern Rwanda. Reasons for differences in onset are explored below, though one key reason is that Butare's governor, a Tutsi, opposed the violence. He was ultimately unsuccessful: the interim President had him removed from office and killed after just a few weeks. Subsequently, residents sought shelter within their homes or in common areas within their communes. An estimated 65,000 people, for example, sought refuge in and around a local technical school. After days without much food or water, the mayor of the Mudasmwa commune, soldiers, and other townspeople attacked the school on April 21. The death toll has been estimated at 50,000.

The violence was swift. Many scholars and writers note that the genocide took place within a matter of 100 days. Yet, as it is difficult to point to a day when the genocide began, it is also difficult to pinpoint an exact ending to the violence. Often, scholars cite the date the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda and took control of the capital on July 4, 1994. Others point to the installation of an interim government on July 19, 1994. However, almost every interviewee told me that killings and other forms

⁷⁰ The commune of Nyakizu provides one exception.

of violence continued past these dates. Both the International Criminal Tribunal and the Rwandan *Gacaca* Courts recognize this, and their jurisdictions extend through December 1994. Thus, while 100 days is in many ways a catch phrase for the genocide, it is not accurate. Rather, the ending of a genocide should be measured by when systematic actions with the intent to destroy a social group subside. Accordingly, this study focuses on the dates April 6, 1994 to December 1994, though the vast majority of violence occurred within the three-month period following April 6th.

Patterns of Genocidal Victimization in Rwanda

Genocidal violence can take several forms, bound by the common defining element of actions with the intent to destroy a social group. As the brief summary of the events in Rwanda illustrated, one of the main forms of violence in Rwanda was killing. In general, political opposition leaders were the first targets (Des Forges 1999; Melvern 2006), though all Tutsis, as well as Hutu moderates and Hutus associated with Tutsis, were targeted. In total, an estimated one million⁷¹ people were killed.

Many other forms of victimization were prominent. For example, it is estimated that 250,000 women were raped (Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1999). Torture, property destruction, and kidnapping also took place. There were also many internally displaced persons (IDPs), though many who were initially displaced were killed, making displacement figures almost impossible to reconstruct. Furthermore, as the period of most

⁷¹Popular estimates of those killed vary widely. The vast majority of the estimates fall between 500,000 and 1 million, though many estimates are acknowledged as rough guesses, at best (Davenport and Stam 2007). More recent studies have converged around one million. In addition, the two comprehensive studies taken by the Rwandan government cite 934,218 victims (Ministry of Local Administration 2004) and “over 1,050,000 victims” (*Gacaca* Final Report 2012). This study uses the data from the Ministry of Local Administration.

intense violence took place during such a short amount of time and as many of those who were displaced were hiding at the houses of neighbors, there are no reliable estimates of IDPs.

Most estimates place the number of refugees at around two million. A fraction of this number includes Tutsis who were able to flee Rwanda before the genocide began or as it unfolded. However, the majority of the refugees were actually Hutus. Many who participated in the killings, as well as those who feared reprisal killings, fled once the RPF took over the capital in July.

The Perpetrators⁷²

While the intensity of the violence has remained a defining aspect of the genocide, the proportion of citizens who participated in the violence has remained another. To be clear, this genocide was planned and executed by leaders within the government and political parties, including army officials, governors, and mayors (Melvern 2006; ICTR 1998-2013). Many other participants were members of the army or self-defense committees and organized militias, like the *Interahamwe*, that had formed in the years leading to the genocide. Some of these groups, including the Rwandan armed forces, traveled around Rwanda, wreaking havoc on citizens in many different communities.⁷³

⁷² It is important to underscore that the categories of perpetrator, victim, and rescuer are often complex. For example, LeAnn Fujii (2011) explained that someone could save several people and kill several within the same week or even the same day. Likewise, those who are forced to kill others are, in some ways, simultaneously victims and perpetrators.

⁷³ This dissertation does not study the *Interahamwe* and other militias, although much research is needed to better understand how they were organized and how they operated. See Savelsberg (2010) for analyses regarding how criminological theories may inform the study of the formation, socialization, and group processes within these militias.

Yet, the genocide could not have been executed to the extent it was without the participation of civilians. New data from the Rwandan National *Gacaca* Courts reveal an estimate of well over one million participants, and as co-authors and I demonstrate elsewhere, the majority of these participants were men between the ages of 18 and 45 (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo unpublished).

Records suggest that most civilian perpetrators were part of more loosely formed groups that remained within their community. In essence, they killed their neighbors (Des Forges 1999; Hatzfeld 2006; Fujii 2011). As a Rwandan scholar told me,

Because we just talk about this militia or just talk about the *Interahamwe*... but I think what we can discuss was how the population was mobilized because it wasn't the militia only, [it was] the neighbors. I mean, the one you call your friend could wake up one day and just pick up a machete (Rwanda, September 2012).

Several scholars have interviewed a small percentage of these perpetrators (Straus 2006; Hatzfeld 2006; Fujii 2011), and their data show that, for some, participation in the genocide became like a job. Radio RTLM broadcast messages telling people to “work” during those months of 1994, and the interim President often congratulated citizens for their “work.” *Interahamwe* literally means “those who *work* together.” This created a definition favorable to crime (Sutherland 1947), which may help explain the mass public participation.⁷⁴ Many other factors⁷⁵ likely influenced the participation rates and subsequent victimization levels, and for this, I turn to an analysis of the rate of genocidal killing at the commune level.

⁷⁴ While the precise number of *Interahamwe* is not known, many suggest that the group started at 4,000 to 5,000 in April 1994 and grew to 20,000 or 30,000 during the course of the genocide (Mann 2005).

⁷⁵ Local networks and ties also influenced participation in the violence, as Fujii (2011) shows. As explained in more detail below, I do not analyze these, though I also do not discount their import.

Part 1: Disaggregating the Violence

While efforts to analyze meso- and micro-level dynamics of genocidal violence pale in comparison to analyses of state-level planning, several recent studies have begun to explore regional-level variation in killings during the genocide. Most of these have focused on specific prefectures or communes⁷⁶ within Rwanda. For example, Verwimp (2004) conducted a quantitative analysis of death in the prefecture of Kibuye (a region in western Rwanda). He concluded that Tutsis who were not farmers and who did not flee to a large stadium had better odds of surviving the genocide. He also found that the probability of surviving the genocide in the prefecture increased with age up to the age of 20 and then decreased again with older ages. Similarly, Verpoorten (2005) conducted a quantitative analysis of deaths in the Gikongoro province (in southwestern Rwanda) with the goal of obtaining the most accurate death toll. In a subsequent analysis, Verpoorten (2012) also examined the relationship between population pressure and meso-level violence, concluding that the death toll was significantly higher in regions with high population densities and fewer opportunities for young men to acquire land.⁷⁷

In a different vein, Mulinda (2010) analyzed local dynamics in two small communes, finding that local leaders are key to understanding how genocide unfolded differently across communes. In his study of perpetrators, Straus (2006) also focused on local dynamics, ultimately arguing that fear and chaos were important factors in the five communes he studied.⁷⁸ These studies are novel, and more studies of the specific dynamics in each community are needed. This analysis, however, strives to fall between

⁷⁶ Again, at the time of the genocide, the country was divided into 11 prefectures (states) and 145 communes (municipalities), which were further subdivided into sectors and cells.

⁷⁷ Greenfield (2009) came to a similar conclusion in his unpublished thesis.

⁷⁸ Note that Straus also documented variation in violence between the 11 prefectures.

aggregated, nation-level analyses and smaller, commune-specific analyses by examining all geographic regions within Rwanda. Thus, its goal is not to understand the local dynamics or actions of particular individuals or groups but to explore general patterns in regional variation throughout the entire country.


Indeed, an analysis of the killings by commune (Figure 3.2⁷⁹) makes clear the municipality-level variation in the genocidal violence. Notably, there were more killings in the central and southern regions of Rwanda, especially in the capital and the prefecture Butare. By contrast, northern Rwanda saw comparatively lower rates of killing. Even communes that stood side by side saw markedly different violence. In fact, the number killed in a commune ranged from 700 to over 50,000. What could account for this?

As the disaggregation of genocidal events is a new area of inquiry, there are no established theories regarding regional variation in violence. To date, most theories about genocide focus on its preconditions, such as the presence of civil war or other societal upheaval (Fein 1993; Chirof and McCauley 2006), the type of government (Rummel 1995; Harff 2003; Mann 2005), the economic climate (Totten and Parsons 2008), dehumanizing ideologies (Weitz 2003; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2008), and many other factors reviewed in Chapter 2. While some of these circumstances may influence how genocides unfold over time, state-level factors do not completely explain why one region saw more violence than another. Instead, other factors at other conceptual levels may explain regional variation in violence.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Three communes in northwestern Rwanda are missing data and are included in the first category. Note also that, in a handful of communes, the rate of killing is above 1,000 per 1,000, likely due to the movement of people during the genocide.

⁸⁰ I do not argue that state-level factors cannot explain some of the more meso- and micro-level processes but rather that additional explanations are necessary.

Figure 3.2: Rate of Killing by Commune in Rwanda



Thus, I turn to theories from several fields of research, including genocide studies, criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence. These theories speak to targeted violence and ideologies that motivate it, the community's ability to organize against crime, population pressures, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors.

Targeted Violence and Ideology

Many studies focus on the factors that motivate genocide, assuming that such terrifying violence would not take place without motivation. It is difficult to capture intent and motivation quantitatively, but I can account for the targeted killing of certain

groups. Most directly, the *percentage of Tutsi* living in each commune likely influenced the rate of killings. During genocide, particular groups of people are targeted, and in Rwanda, there was a plan to exterminate *all* Tutsi. Thus, *I hypothesize that the percent Tutsi is associated with higher rates of killing*, which would also confirm the targeted nature of the genocide.⁸¹ However, I expect that other factors also influence whether the state-led goal of extermination is carried out at a regional level.

An alternate aspect of identity—religion—may have influenced regional variation. Though there is not documentation of people being targeted based on religious identity, the Catholic Church was heavily intertwined with the colonial project and often favored certain groups, restricting leadership positions first to Tutsi and later to Hutu. As such, it may have contributed to the politicization of ethnic identities and the ideologies that accompanied them. In addition, several leaders of the Catholic Church were implicated as participating and, in some instances, reinforcing discriminatory ideologies and even orchestrating killings (Des Forges 1999; Longman 2011).⁸² Thus, I test whether the *percentage of Catholics* in a region influenced the rate of killings, and *I hypothesize that the percentage Catholics in a region is associated with higher rates of killing*.

Ideologies that cast Tutsis as enemies and urged people to kill were also likely spread in other ways. It is well documented that Radio RTLM played much hate speech and propaganda throughout the genocide, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011) and many other scholars have argued that propaganda incited Hutus against Tutsis (see the eight chapters

⁸¹ If there were regions with a majority of Tusti, I would specify this variable in other ways and explore curvilinear relationships. However, there is no commune with more than 45% Tutsi.

⁸² It is also well documented that many priests attempted to stop the violence and save Tutsis.

on this subject in Thompson 2007). These broadcasts brought dehumanizing messages to many areas of the country and often explicitly urged Hutus to participate in the killing.

For example, one broadcast urged people to fight Tutsi by saying,

Do not be lazy; let us fight for this Rwanda. Do not say that you are fleeing, until when will you flee? What do you flee? They are as young as you are. You are even stronger than they are. Learn the tricks to catch them. You may set a trap for them; you may dig a hole in which they can fall (Radio RTLM April 1994).

Broadcasts like this played daily throughout the genocide. To test this influence of hate speech and propaganda at the regional level, the *percentage of households that owned radios* is included, and *I hypothesize that radio ownership is associated with higher rates of killing.*⁸³

In general, education is associated with political moderation and less political extremism (Krueger and Maleckova 2002), and a large pool of poorly educated men has been associated with armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Yet, some scholars have found that the education system can actually contribute to violence (Lange and Dawson 2010; Lange 2011). Educated individuals may be more likely to participate in violence, as education creates a gap between expectations and lived reality and instills in people the confidence to feel they should address these gaps (Gurr 1970; Goldstone 2002). Beyond this general effect, education laden with discriminatory beliefs or ideologies is likely to influence violence. In Rwanda, post-independence curricula taught that Tutsis were outsiders who had taken the land from the native Hutu (Gasnabo 2004). Students were also socialized to believe that Tutsis were inferior. As a survivor shared,

⁸³ It could be suggested that radio access would bring competing discourses, such as radio broadcasts from other countries, to the people of Rwanda. However, the radio stations were completely controlled by the state.

In the morning, they would have people stand up. “Hutu stand up.” They stand up; others remain seated. Then after they say, “Tutsis stand up.” They stand up; others laugh... I think that was to humiliate the children indirectly because at that time some children didn’t know if they were Tutsi or Hutu (Rwanda, October 2012).

In line with this, I include a measure of *average education*, and *I hypothesize that communes with higher levels of education had higher rates of killings.*

Community Organization

An ideology that motivated the destruction of Tutsis may not be enough to explain regional variation in genocidal killings. Criminologists have long examined how neighborhood, community, and regional-level characteristics influence levels of crime, and their most prominent theories regarding community-level variation in violence pay more attention to community-level controls. While these theories have never been applied to genocidal crime, it is feasible that community-level influences on homicide rates also influence rates of genocidal killing.

In particular, social disorganization theory⁸⁴ starts with the fact that crime is not randomly dispersed throughout cities or regions, but is concentrated in certain areas (Shaw and McKay 1942). These areas have structural factors in common that impede a community’s ability to prevent crime by affecting community trust, cohesion, and networks, all factors that may influence community-level violence during genocide.

Theories of social disorganization have been revised by a number of criminologists (e.g., Kornhauser 1974; Bursik 1988; Sampson and Groves 1999), and today, the idea that

⁸⁴ Although these theories have generally been applied at the neighborhood level, they have also been applied and found relevant at the supra-regional level (see, for example, Vuolo 2012). Furthermore, while these theories were originally called social disorganization theories, I use the more basic term “community organization” throughout this dissertation to signal that communities and other groups can feasibly be organized for or against crime.

community organization impacts its ability to achieve its goals—including lower crime rates—remains prominent and applies to many types of crime, such as homicide, crime committed by gangs, and burglary.⁸⁵

To test these theories, I rely on several specific indicators. Ethnic heterogeneity is always included in tests of social disorganization, as many studies have found that crime rates are higher in more heterogeneous areas. In the case of genocide, this measure takes on a new meaning. In addition, *residential mobility* has been seen as a key indicator of disorganization and has been linked to higher levels of crime (Shaw and McKay 1931; Sampson and Groves 1989). High levels of mobility may disrupt a community's network of social relations and act as a barrier to friendship bonds, making crimes more likely. Yet, it is also feasible that lower levels of residential mobility facilitate killing because residents committing genocide know where their fellow residents reside: targeted destruction is easier. To examine this, I test the percent of people who have *always lived*⁸⁶ in each commune, and, in line with theories of social disorganization, I *hypothesize that communes where a higher percentage of people have always lived will have lower rates of killings.*

⁸⁵ Sampson and Groves proposed that many factors that influence crime are mediated by collective efficacy, defined as social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good. This is often measured by surveys of trust within a community, but there are no measures of trust or other comparable measures for communes in Rwanda before 1994. Yet, the idea that social cohesion among neighbors influenced neighborhood participation and, thus, the rate of violence has much face validity.

⁸⁶ Note that previous censuses do not give a good picture of the mobility over time, so I just use data from the 1991 census. In addition, demographic data on foreigners are missing from the census, so I am not able to include the percent of foreigners in this analysis. It was, however, reportedly very small and likely did not have an effect.

Sampson (1987) has also argued that marital disruption may decrease informal social controls at the community level, and Sampson and Groves (1989) found that marital disruption, measured by divorce, was associated with higher crimes rates. Both of these studies were concerned with juvenile delinquency and linked family disruption to a lack of parental supervision at a community level, but divorce may also result in less social controls within a community. Thus, I include a measure of *divorce*, and I *hypothesize that communes with higher percentage of divorce have higher rates of killing*. As formal divorce was not common in Rwanda, especially in rural areas, I also test marriage rates among people age 15 and older.

Socioeconomic status, too, has been linked to community-level crime. Shaw and McKay (1942), as well as many others (Byrne and Sampson 1986; Sampson and Groves 1989; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001), have argued that communities of lower socioeconomic status suffer from weaker organization, which leads to more crime. This is much in line with theories of civil war, which have linked low economic development to both the onset of civil war (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and to meso- and micro-level studies of magnitude (e.g., Do and Iyer 2007). In line with this, I rely upon measures of *unemployment*, and I *hypothesize that higher levels of unemployment are associated with higher rates of killing*.⁸⁷ As unemployment levels are very low due to the agrarian nature of Rwandan society, I also construct and test a variable to capture employment in the formal employment sector. I created this variable using census data on the type of employment people claim; in particular, I assign those listing themselves as an employer or an employee as having

⁸⁷ At the individual level, unemployment could also influence strain. However, I focus on the community level and thus focus on community organization.

formal employment, while those listing themselves as self-employed, unemployed, or a family worker as not.⁸⁸

In addition, Sutherland (1947) suggested that an area with a large population of adolescents and young adults would have more crime. Indeed, the age distribution of crime, which ascends during adolescence, peaks in early adulthood, and then declines, would suggest that areas with more youth would have higher rates of crime and, in this case, genocidal crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Farrington 1986; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Massoglia and Uggen 2010).⁸⁹ This hypothesis also finds support in studies of ethnic and political violence, which have argued that higher percentages of young men translate to more potential perpetrators (Collier 2000; Goldstone 2002; Urdal 2006).

Accordingly, I include the *percent of young men*, defined as the men ages 16⁹⁰ to 30, and *I hypothesize that higher percentages of young men are associated with higher rates of killing*.

Lastly, interethnic marriage may influence rates of killing. It is often suggested that interethnic marriages may be associated with lowered violence during genocide, though few studies assess this relationship. Interethnic marriages provide more social

⁸⁸ I also just examined the percentage of employers within a commune, though the results did not vary from results presented below.

⁸⁹ Recent research specifically on Rwanda has shown that those who participated were actually older than traditional research on age and crime would suggest, with a median age of 30-34 (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, unpublished). This research also found that 89% of participants in the genocide were men, echoing criminological studies of gender (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983) as well as genocide studies literature on perpetrators (Browning 1993; Mann 2000). In line with this, I test a variety of other age groups, including middle-aged men, which are not significantly associated with the rate of killing once other variables, such as employment, are included in the model. Note also that I explore other reasons for the age of Rwandan perpetrators in another paper (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo unpublished).

⁹⁰ I set the minimum at 16 because this is the age at which people can enter the Rwandan army.

cohesion and indicate social integration (Alba and Golden 1986; Merton 1941), which might, in turn, positively impact the ability to organize. Thus, I include the percent of interethnic marriages in each commune, and *I hypothesize that higher percentages of interethnic marriages are associated with lower rates of killing.*

Differential Social Organization and Defended Communities

While social disorganization theories predict that socially organized communities would see lower rates of killing, each of the variables above may also have the opposite effect. For instance, it is typically assumed that a community's goal would be to organize against crime, but Sutherland's (1947) theory of differential social organization notes that communities can also be organized toward crime (Matsueda 2006). In other words, the structural characteristics that influence crime prevention may also positively motivate crime, depending on the goal of a community. A highly organized gang may organize around a goal of committing crime. In the case of genocide, an entire community may be organized around a goal of committing genocide.

Many things may motivate this goal. For example, the defended communities perspective suggests that people go to great lengths to defend their community identities. In line with this, Lyons (2007) found that socially organized, affluent communities sometimes experience *more* hate crime, outlining a "dark" side of social organization. Similar processes may be at work in genocide. Thus, while I hypothesize that indicators of differential social organization influence genocidal killings in much the same way that

they influence homicide or other forms of crime, I recognize that they may have the opposite effect in the case of well-organized community.⁹¹

Resource Competition

Resource scarcity and population pressures may also influence regional variation in violence. Indeed, resource scarcity has been linked to conflict, often in aggregate nation-level analysis (Homer-Dixon 1994) (as discussed in Chapter 2) but also in meso-level studies (Urdal 2008). In the case of Rwanda, Prunier (1995), Uvin (1998), Mamdani (2001), Verpoorten (2012), and others have hypothesized that resource scarcity contributed to violence because hunger and landlessness influenced feelings of hopelessness and because those who participated in the genocide often received rewards and the spoils from lootings. Generally, these hypotheses have been linked to the onset of violence, though Verpoorten (2012) tested them on a meso-level analysis and found that resource scarcity, measured with a proxy for landlessness, was associated with increased deaths during the genocide in Rwanda.

Closely related, Henderson (1993) suggested population pressures may cause strain within a country, arguing that pressure associated with population change is associated with increased political repression due to uncertainty regarding resources and security. This falls in line with criminological theories that suggest that situations that bring pressure to bear on an individual can influence criminal behavior (Savelsberg 2010; Agnew 2011). Population pressure has been linked to repression and violence in studies of civil war and other violence (Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Ostby et al. 2011), and

⁹¹ Ideally, I would be able to test data on various community-level indicators of a community goal, such as the political party of the mayor. I have yet to find these data, however. If they exist, this must be a future paper.

population *density* is often discussed in the case of Rwanda—in 1994, it had the world’s highest population density, leading many to refer to it as a “ticking time bomb.” To test the influence of resource scarcity and population pressure, I include measures of the *kilocalorie* production per capita per day—a direct measure of agricultural productivity—as well as *population growth* and *population density*. *I hypothesize that regions with lower kilocalorie production, as well as regions with higher population density and higher rates of population growth, have higher rates of killings.*

Beyond general levels of population pressure and resource scarcity, resource competition theories would also predict that unemployment levels should be associated with higher rates of crime. Yet, rather than linking unemployment levels to lower levels of community social controls, resource competition theory suggests violence should vary with the degree of interethnic competition (Olzak 1990, 1992). Indeed, much research has found connections between economic recessions and racial and ethnic-based conflict, as measured by crimes like lynching (Olzak 1992; Soule 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995). Similarly, relative deprivation theories (e.g., Gurr 1970) argue that poor, marginalized populations are more willing to join movements to topple forces seen as responsible for their marginalization. Though these forces are often the government, in the case of genocide, marginalized populations may be more willing to join movements against social groups seen as the cause of marginalization, much like the Tutsi were seen as the cause of Hutu marginalization. Thus, I also test *Hutu and Tutsi employment*. As unemployment numbers are small (less than 1 percent), I rely on *Hutu Employment in the Formal Sector* and *Tutsi Employment in the Formal Sector*, and *I hypothesize that genocidal rates of killing are higher in communities with lower levels of Hutu*

employment in the formal employment sector.

Organized Actors

Kalyvas (2008) has argued that research on the meso- and micro-level processes of violence is incomplete if it does not take into account territorial control or movement of armed actors. Despite this, none of the previous studies of regional variation in Rwanda include armed actors. A number of institutionalized organized actors may have influenced the rate of killing, often working as forces of criminal social organization (Vaughan 1999 Savelsberg 2010). The *Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)* clearly became a force of criminal social organization, participating in—and even leading—killings (Des Forges 1999; Melvern 2006). Thus, *I hypothesize that the presence of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) is associated with increased rates of killing.*⁹²

Other organized actors who were moving throughout the country also may have influenced regional variation in the rate of killing. The RPF re-invaded Rwanda as the genocide began, and it has been argued that their presence influenced fear and subsequent killings (Davenport and Stam 2009) or that they engaged in defensive killings themselves (Rusesabagina 2006). Alternatively, the presence of RPF soldiers may have deterred violence, as perpetrators may have fled regions in which the RPF gained control. Thus, I test the presence of *RPF armed forces*. Furthermore, as the RPF invaded Rwanda to fight the interim government, I analyze whether the *frontline* between the RPF and FAR influenced rates of killings.

⁹² Note that other organized groups, such as the Interahamwe, were also active throughout the violence, though data on their movements do not exist.

France sent troops in response to the genocide in late June under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,⁹³ though many Rwandans charge that French troops did not assist Tutsis so much as provide safe passage for Hutu perpetrators fleeing Rwanda. Nevertheless, as these troops were sent to keep peace, I test whether the presence of *French troops* was associated with lower numbers of killing; and *I hypothesize that French troop presence is associated with lower rates of violence.*

Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors

Lastly, factors pertaining to physical surroundings may have influenced regional levels of violence. Conditions favorable to insurgency, measured by *rough/mountainous terrain*, have been found to be one of the strongest predictors of civil war at the macro (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and micro levels (Murshed and Gates 2005; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009). To test whether this holds for genocidal violence, I include a measure of elevation to capture rough terrain, and *I hypothesize that rough terrain is associated with higher rates of killing.*

The capital, Kigali, and other urban areas, may have seen comparatively different rates of violence. As noted above, the genocide began by targeting political and cultural leaders (Des Forges 1999; Melvern 2006), and such leaders are concentrated in urban areas. This would also be in line with studies of crime, which have largely found that urban regions have higher crime rates. Yet, in his study of collective killings during the Cultural Revolution in China, Su (2011) found that killings were more likely in rural areas. It seems remoteness facilitated higher rates of killings, perhaps through distance

⁹³ Chapter 7 authorizes the use of force for peace. UN troops were also stationed in Rwanda in small numbers. I have been unable to obtain conclusive information about the communes in which they were stationed.

from information flow or from the organizational control from the Party Center, which, in that revolution, had no central policy to endorse collective killings. In Rwanda, the opposite could be true, as there *was* a central government endorsing the killings. In other words, distance from those directly planning and inciting violence may result in lower rates of killings.⁹⁴ Accordingly, I include dummy variables for the *capital region* as well as for all *urban areas*, defined as areas containing a prefecture capital city, and I *hypothesize that the capital and urban areas have higher rates of killing*. As a way to capture the ease of movement to and from these areas, specifically for armed actors, I also include measures of *distances from roads* and *distances from cities*, following studies of civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Raleigh and Hegre 2009).


Scholars and individuals in Rwanda suggested to me that leaders may have used violence in neighboring Burundi to incite fear and instability in Rwanda (Straus 2006). Further, many Hutu refugees fled violence in Burundi and settled across the border in Rwanda. Studies of political violence have found higher rates of violence near borders, perhaps due to the instability of these border regions (Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh 2009). To test the effect, I include a measure of whether the commune *bordered Burundi* and *hypothesize that communes that bordered Burundi had higher rates of violence*. I also include a binary indicator as a test of any *international border* violence to test whether Burundi's border differed from others.

Recall that Rwanda also saw much sporadic violence in the years leading to the genocide. Communes that experienced violence against Tutsis prior to the genocide may

⁹⁴ Those familiar with the Holocaust might find this surprising: killing in Nazi Germany took place in killing centers that were purposefully hidden. In Rwanda, there was little attempt to conceal what was happening; rather, perpetrators attempted to frame the violence as a civil war.

have had a culture of impunity, which may have influenced levels of violence in 1994. To test this, I include a measure of *past violence*, specifically measuring whether communes had experienced widespread killings during the 1990s.⁹⁵ Finally, the *violence in surrounding communes* may influence the killing in each commune. In other words, no commune is a self-contained region (Deane et al. 2008). Thus, I control for spatial autocorrelation.

Figure 3.3: Tested Determinants of Commune Variation in Killing in Rwanda



⁹⁵ Ideally I would include violence that took place before 1990, though I have been unable to find reliable measures of such violence. Episodes of violence included in this measure include Kibilira in October 1990, March 1992, December 1992, and January 1993; in northwestern Rwandan communes, including Mukingo, Kinigi, Gaseke, Giciye, Karago, and Mutura, in January and February 1991; in the region known as Bugesera, commune Kanzenze, in March 1992; in several communes of Kibuye in August 1992; and again in the northwest in December 1992 and January 1993 (Des Forges 1999).

In sum, many factors may have influenced regional variation in killings during the genocide in Rwanda, including factors pertaining to targeted violence and ideology, community ability to organize toward or against crime, population and environmental pressures, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors. These theories are illustrated in Figure 3.3.

Methods and Measures

Dependent Variable

To test the applicability of these theories in Rwanda, I draw upon a measure of killings per commune obtained from a survey conducted by the Rwandan Ministry of Local Administration and Community Development (2004). This survey sought to document the death of every person killed during the genocide in Rwanda between April and December 1994.⁹⁶ It includes reported and confirmed deaths, checked against other reports as well as records of human remains. These measures are correlated at .99, and I use the measure of reported deaths. This number ranged from 71 to 54,700 deaths in a commune, with a mean of 7,287 deaths. I transform this number into a logged rate that standardizes on killings per 10,000 people in each commune. A log transformation of the rate increases the normality of the distribution. Further, the number of deaths is never negative, and this transformation ensures that predicted values of y are always positive numbers. Note that I utilize a rate per total population rather than per Tutsi population because many Hutus were targeted for their association with Tutsis.

Killings were chosen as a dependent variable because they were a main form of victimization during the genocide and because numbers and patterns regarding those

⁹⁶ Again, the vast majority of killings took place within the three-month period beginning in April 1994.

killed are more reliable than other forms of victimization, such as forced displacement or sexual violence. It is dubious that the survey captures every person who was killed in the genocide, but it provides the most reliable estimates of death to date. Also note that the lowest administrative level for which these data are currently available is the commune level. Communes, or municipalities, were small areas governed by bourgmestres, or mayors, who were handpicked by the President and wielded much local power (see Wagner 1998 for an example of the power of the bourgmestre in shaping the genocide). Their presence and policies within the commune are likely captured in many of the variables in this study and validates the study of the commune level.

Data on the dependent variable are missing for three communes. As these communes were communes where the RPF was located throughout much of the violence, there were likely far fewer killings in these regions. Due to the missing data, though, they are excluded from the analysis.⁹⁷ Thus, this analysis includes 142 communes.

Independent Variables

As seen in Table 3.1, the majority of the independent variables are obtained from the 1991 Rwandan Census through IPUMS International (2012). As Rwanda conducted both a *de facto* and *de jure* census—meaning they counted present residents, absent residents, and visitors—the data are restricted to present and absent residents to avoid double counting. Individual-level data are aggregated to commune means; for variables that only pertain to adults, such as employment, I exclude children from calculations.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ It is not possible to analyze whether independent variables differed for these communes, as the census is missing data for them. The Minnesota Population Center is not aware of any systematic reason for these missing data.

⁹⁸ As an alternate measure, I ran models with median values. Results presented are qualitatively similar.

Variables that were not obtained from the census are also detailed in Table 3.1. Those measuring the presence of RPF, French, and FAR troops were obtained from the Genodynamics Project (2010), which constructed its measures using testimony from the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda and interviews with commanders. I constructed variables for the capital, urban location, elevation, distance from cities and roads, and whether a commune bordered Burundi or any other country based on maps of Rwanda using ArcGIS software. I created the variable on past violence based on Human Rights Watch reports (Des Forges 1999). Lastly, I constructed the variable on neighboring violence in GeoDa; this variable is essentially a spatial weight that takes account of the average violence in all communes that contiguously neighbor a commune.

Table 3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables by Commune

Variable	Description	Coding	Source	Commune Mean	Range
<i>Dependent Variable</i>					
Rate of Killing	Rate of those killed per 10,000 people in each commune, logged	Logged Rate	Ministry of Local Admin.	6.63	4.26 to 10.91
<i>Targeted Violence and Ideology</i>					
Tutsi	Percentage of population that is Tutsi	Percentage	1991 Census	9.15	0.00 to 44.46
Catholic	Percentage of population that is Catholic	Percentage	1991 Census	62.12	27.44 to 92.64
Radio Ownership	Percentage of population that owns a radio	Percentage	1991 Census	33.44	17.37 to 76.09

Education	Number of years of education, beginning at first grade	Years	1991 Census	2.88	1.73 to 4.18
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Community Organization

Always Lived	Percentage of residents who have always lived in a commune	Percentage	1991 Census	70.51	23.32 to 83.85
Divorce	Percentage of the adult population who are divorced	Percentage	1991 Census	3.07	1.05 to 6.07
Marriage	Percentage of the adult population who are married	Percentage	1991 Census	57.66	44.88 to 72.64
Unemployment	Percentage of the population who are unemployed	Percentage	1991 Census	0.30	0.00 to 6.76
Formal Employment	Percentage employed in formal sector (employer or employee)	Percentage	1991 Census	11.08	2.52 to 44.79
Young Men	Percentage of men age 16-30	Percentage	1991 Census	12.70	10.39 to 15.49
Intermarriage	Percentage of mixed Hutu-Tutsi marriages	Percentage	1991 Census	5.06	0.00 to 23.01

Resource Competition

Population Density	Population/km ²	Thousands of inhabitants/km ²	ArcGIS	0.42	0.04 to 1.37
Population Growth	Average annual population growth between 1978 and 1991	Percentage	Verpoorten 2011	2.81	0.03 to 7.63
Kilocalorie Production	Kilocalories produced per day per capita	100s	1989 Ag. Census	215.21	31.10 to 392.10

Hutu Formal Employment	Percentage of Hutus in formal employment sector	Percentage	1991 Census	10.56	1.72 to 40.50
Tutsi Formal Employment	Percentage of Tutsis in formal employment sector	Percentage	1991 Census	18.63	0.00 to 100.00 ⁹⁹

Organized

Actors

RPF Troops	RPF present (at any time) in commune	0 = No RPF 1 = RPF	Genodynamics	0.83	0.00 to 1.00
FAR Troops	FAR present (at any time) in commune	0 = No FAR 1 = FAR	Genodynamics	0.84	0.00 to 1.00
French Troops	French troops present (at any time) in commune	0 = No French 1 = French	Genodynamics	0.10	0.00 to 1.00
RPF/FAR Frontline	Frontline between the RPF and the FAR present in the commune (at any time)	0 = No Frontline 1 = Frontline	Genodynamics	0.70	0.00 to 1.00

Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors

Elevation	Average distance from sea level	Meters	U.S. Geological Survey	1765.82	1137.80 to 2634.19
Capital Region	Communes that contain Kigali	0 = Not Capital 1 = Capital	1994 Map	0.02	0.00 to 1.00
Urban Region	Communes that contain a prefecture capital city	0 = Not Urban 1 = Urban	1994 Map	0.12	0.00 to 1.00

⁹⁹ While the range of this variable is surprising, it is correct. Several communes had zero percent Tutsi, thus zero percent of Tutsis working in the formal sector. A handful of communes also had high percentages of Tutsis working in the formal sector, since their population of Tutsis was very small.

Distance from Roads	Distance between commune centroid and closest road (logged)	Kilometers	ArcGIS	0.94	-4.56 to 3.26
Distance from Cities	Distance between commune centroid and closest prefecture capital (logged)	Kilometers	ArcGIS	2.57	0.24 to 3.81
Borders Burundi	Communes that border Burundi	0 = No Border 1 = Borders Burundi	1994 Map	0.10	0.00 to 1.00
International Border	Communes that border any country	0 = No Border 1 = Int. Border	1994 Map	0.32	0.00 to 1.00
Past Violence	Communes where targeted killing of Tutsis took place pre-1994	0 = No Violence 1 = Past Violence	Human Rights Watch Reports	0.05	0.00 to 1.00
Surrounding Violence	Average violence in all border communes	Average magnitude of violence per 1000 people in border communes	GeoDa	7.31	0.22 to 27.62

Analytic Strategy

To analyze regional variation in killings, I begin with bivariate analysis. As this study includes all but three communes, and as many of these relationships have never been tested, simple bivariate relationships are meaningful. In addition, it is theoretically worthwhile to assess why factors that are associated with other forms of violence, such as

civil war, might not be associated with genocide. This may shed light on differences between forms of violence.

I then turn to multivariate models with a prefecture-level fixed effect. Fixed effects models are preferred due to the nested nature of the data (communes are nested within prefectures), which violates the assumption of independence required for regression. A Hausman test confirms that fixed effects are preferable to random effects.¹⁰⁰ They are also preferable to count models, such as Poisson regression, due to the high frequencies of killings. To address the violation of independence in bivariate analyses, I cluster standard errors by prefecture identifier. As explained below, I also use robust standard errors in the fixed effects models.

Results: Determinants of Regional Rates of Death

Table 3.2 includes 29 separate regression models of the rate of deaths per 10,000 people in each commune. Each model contains one independent variable, shown in the first column. The next main column, labeled “Tutsi (Control),” presents the same model with the inclusion of a control variable for the percent Tutsi. Again, I cluster standard errors in each model due to the nested format of the data.

Higher percentages of Tutsi are associated with higher rates of killing. Due to the nature of genocide, this is expected. It further confirms the targeting of Tutsis. Percent Tutsi was not the only determinant of regional variation in killing, however, and all subsequent effects reported held with a control for percent Tutsi.

While percent Tutsi influenced variation in rates of killing, percent Catholic did not. Even though segments of the Catholic Church may have been involved in the

¹⁰⁰ I analyzed mixed models with prefecture-level means, though no meaningful results were found.

genocide, regional differences in adherence to the Catholic faith are not associated with the rate of killing. This may mean that exclusionary ideologies were not spread throughout the Church, or that religious affiliation may not be an accurate representation of exposure to such ideologies.

There is support for the notion that a genocidal ideology was spread through other media, as radio ownership is significantly associated with higher rates of killing. This variable is unable to capture the complete effects of radio broadcasting, since people often gathered at neighbors' homes to hear broadcasts, but it suggests that variation in radio ownership, measuring exposure to hate speech and propaganda, may have impacted regional variation in violence. Note, however, that this variable is likely capturing wealth. Because of this, I am currently obtaining data on radio coverage, which will provide a more accurate measurement of exposure to hate speech and other propaganda on the radio.¹⁰¹

Percent education is associated with significantly higher rates of killings. Gasanabo (2004) has shown that the curricula used in Rwandan classroom between 1962 and 1994 reinforced, and even created, polarized ethnic identities. And as noted above, children were socialized to believe that Tutsis were inferior outsiders. In the case of genocide in Rwanda, then, there may have been a “dark side” of education, though multivariate analysis will further interrogate this finding.

Criminological theories of differential social organization also inform regional variation in genocide; their effects are in line with theories that assume communities organize against crime. In the case of genocide in Rwanda, it seems communities with

¹⁰¹ As of June 2014, I am waiting to obtain the data. When I obtain these data, I will explore interactions between radio coverage and education levels.

lower levels of trust and cohesion had higher rates of killing. Specifically, regions with less population mobility saw significantly lower rates of killings, while regions with higher percentages of unemployed residents and higher percentages of divorce (and lower percentages of marriage) saw significantly higher rates of killings. These findings do not mean that the genocide was not organized; instead, they suggest that characteristics associated with a community's ability to successfully organize against crime were associated with higher rates of killing in communes.

The percentage of young men is significantly associated with higher rates of genocide. This is in line with differential social organization theories as well as several theories from the study of political and ethnic violence (Collier 2000; Goldstone 2002; Urdal 2006). Lastly, communes with higher rates of inter-ethnic marriage had significantly higher rates of killing in bivariate analysis; but, as the effect is no longer significant with the inclusion of percent Tutsi, the significant positive effect is likely driven by the fact that areas with higher percentages of intermarriage had higher percentages of Tutsi. The measure may also be capturing Hutus who were killed *because* they were married to Tutsis and children of interethnic marriages who were killed because their ethnicity was uncertain.

Turning to resource competition, communes with greater population densities or higher rates of population growth did not have higher rates of killing, which contradicts some existing findings (Verpoorten 2012). The idea that resource scarcity, manifested as food scarcity, influenced regional variation in violence—as well as resource competition theories that would predict that Hutu or Tutsi employment rates would influence the rate of violence—was not supported. These results will be further probed in multivariate

Table 3.2: Bivariate Predictors of Logged Rate of Deaths per 10,000 people per Commune

Independent Variables	Model	Bivariate	SE	Tutsi (Control)	SE
<i>Targeted Violence and Ideology</i>					
Tutsi	1	0.132***	0.022	0.132***	0.022
Catholic	2	0.009	0.011	0.001	0.006
Radio Ownership	3	0.065**	0.021	0.040***	0.010
Education	4	1.712***	0.357	0.730***	0.173
<i>Community Organization</i>					
Always Lived	5	-0.049**	0.018	-0.249***	0.003
Divorce	6	0.622***	0.175	0.277***	0.060
Marriage	7	-0.161***	0.023	-0.082***	0.014
Unemployment	8	0.660***	0.099	0.340***	0.062
Formal Employment	9	-0.001	0.005	-0.001	0.002
Young Men	10	0.477***	0.125	0.155**	0.066
Intermarriage	11	0.218***	0.055	0.063	0.049
<i>Resource Competition</i>					
Population Density	12	-0.211	1.200	-0.594	0.725
Population Growth	13	-0.321	0.204	0.081	0.087
Kilocalorie Production	14	0.002	0.003	0.003**	0.001
Hutu Formal Employment	15	0.043	0.028	-0.001	0.022
Tutsi Formal Employment	16	-0.006	0.010	-0.001	0.006
<i>Organized Actors</i>					
RPF Troops	17	-0.545	0.499	0.260	0.170
FAR Troops	18	2.281***	0.355	1.196***	0.326
French Troops	19	0.309	0.471	-0.262	0.276
RPF/FAR Frontline	20	0.513	0.424	0.550	0.230
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>					
Elevation	21	-0.002***	0.001	-0.001**	0.000
Capital Region	22	3.092***	0.394	1.730***	0.149
Urban Region	23	0.317	0.609	0.443	0.287
Distance from Roads (log)	24	-0.154	0.114	-0.005	0.064
Distance from Cities (log)	25	0.100	0.164	0.099	0.129
Borders Burundi	26	0.603	0.463	0.454*	0.204
International Border	27	-0.205	0.247	-0.228	0.161
Past Violence	28	-0.587	0.439	-0.116	0.272
Surrounding Violence	29	0.177***	0.044	0.106***	0.025

Standard errors clustered by prefecture

* p < .1, ** p < .05, ***p < .01

Tutsi(control) includes the predictor as well as a control for the percent Tutsi in the commune.

analysis, though it is noteworthy that the *perception* of such pressures may have influenced violence.¹⁰²

Turning briefly to organized actors, the presence of the RPF troops did not significantly decrease the rates of killing.¹⁰³ Yet, the presence of FAR troops is associated with higher rates of killings, which suggests that the FAR's involvement influenced variation in regional rates of violence.¹⁰⁴ Notably, the French intervention, meant to respond to the violence, was not associated with lower rates of killings. French troops did not arrive in Rwanda until the end of June, and the majority of killing had already taken place by then. The timing of the intervention is likely responsible for its insignificant effect, though the data to test this do not exist. Notably, this does not suggest that such interventions should not be undertaken but that the timing of the intervention is crucial.¹⁰⁵

Lastly, broader spatial and temporal factors show mixed results. Communes with higher elevation levels had significantly lower rates of killing, contrary to my hypothesis. Studies of political violence may still inform this finding. In the case of genocide in Rwanda, rough terrain may have enabled successful resistance against the state, which was perpetrating genocide, and this may have, in turn, influenced lower rates of killing. Rough terrain may also have made some houses harder to reach, significantly decreasing

¹⁰² This is something I cannot test currently.

¹⁰³ This cannot inform deaths directly caused by RPF members, which would not be genocide and are likely not included in this survey. In addition, this study is unable to test whether and how their movements *over time* influenced violence in neighboring communes.

¹⁰⁴ I tried several other variations of these variables, such as the number of days that an army or organization was present in a commune, whether it was present during a certain month, or the number of days it was present in a certain month.

¹⁰⁵ In addition, while there was not a quantitative effect on aggregate violence, this does not mean that the intervention did not save lives.

the rates of killings. Yet, it remains to be seen whether this effect remains in multivariate analysis.

Urban areas generally do not have significantly higher rates of death, but communes in the capital region do, as expected due to the centralized nature of the genocidal plan. Thus, outside the capital, there was not a large urban/rural dichotomy. Distance from roads and cities also did not significantly impact the rates of killings, perhaps because neighbors of the victims executed many of the killings.

There is minimal evidence indicating that communes that bordered Burundi saw higher rates of violence, conceivably because, as previous work has suggested, communes that bordered Burundi were particularly militarized in the years before the genocide (Mulinda 2010). As noted earlier, this result may also be due to the presence of refugees from Burundi, which will be accounted for in multivariate models by including “always lived” in the same model. The effect does not apply to any international border, however. In addition, regions with past violence not only did *not* have significantly higher rates of killing, they saw significantly *lower* rates. It is difficult to know if this is because many of the Tutsi living in the area were already killed, because previous violence de-legitimated violence in 1994, or if some other factor is at play. Lastly, communes that were surrounded by violence had higher rates of violence, which illustrates the importance of controlling for spatial autocorrelation.

Multivariate Analyses

Table 3.3, which includes prefecture fixed effects models with a control for spatial autocorrelation, confirms many of these trends. These models excluded variables that were not significant in bivariate analysis and that did not significantly improve the fit

of the models. “Capital” is measured through the fixed effect for Kigali prefecture—a small prefecture in central Rwanda that comprises the capital—and is thus also excluded. I utilize robust standard errors, as regression diagnostics revealed slightly homoskedastic errors.

Model 1 is the simplest model, illustrating that percent Tutsi explains much of the variation in rates of killing within communes. Each increase in percent Tutsi is associated with a 7.1 percent increase in the rate of violence in a commune. Education also has a robust, large effect on the rate of killing. This variable captures average years of education, though I also tested a dummy variable measuring exposure to any education, similarly significantly associated with higher rates of killing.

Models 2 and 3 include variables to measure each commune’s ability to organize against crime. As education status and marriage status are highly correlated (-.8), I operationalized dichotomous variables to capture the percentage of the commune population who were married and had any exposure to the education system and the percentage of the commune population who were not married and had any exposure to the education system (note that dummy variables for any exposure to the education system and a continuous years of education were each significantly associated with higher rates of killing). This is well in line with theories that suggest that a pool of educated men may be associated with more violence—perhaps due to the state-controlled curricula (Lange 2011), associations formed in school, or the creation of confidence to address disconnects between expectations and reality (Gurr 1970; Goldstone 2002)—and expands these theories to bring in criminological theories of social controls, which would

suggest that marriage would exert social control in a spouse's life and a community (Sampson, Laub, and Wimmer 2006) and nullify the effect of education in this context.

I created four variables to ascertain these effects. These included the percentage of people who were married and had exposure to the education system (25 percent), married with no education (26 percent), had education but were not married (34 percent), and were not married and had no education (15 percent). As seen in the table, higher percentages of people who had exposure to the education system and were *not* married were associated with significantly higher rates of killing, while higher percentages of people who had exposure to the education system but *were* married are associated with significantly lower rates of killing. Though it is not shown, the other two categories (married/no education and not married/no education) were each associated with lower rates of violence. This confirms previous findings about the education system, but also suggests that marriage may have provided community-level social controls hindering the perpetration of violence.¹⁰⁶

In addition, the percent of people who always lived in a commune is no longer significant, though it remains negative. Yet, the percent employment in the formal sector is associated with significantly lower rates of killing, suggesting that communities of

¹⁰⁶ I also tested an interaction term between the percent Tutsi and intermarriage. Recall that I had hypothesized that intermarriage would result in lower rates of violence. Yet, higher percentages of Tutsi would theoretically be necessary for higher rates of intermarriage. As percent Tutsi is one of the strongest predictors of violence, intermarriage is associated with significantly higher rates of killing. Percent Tutsi and percent mixed marriage are centered for more accurate interpretation of the main effects, which remain positively associated with the rate of killings. The significant negative interaction effect illustrates that each increase in percent intermarriage is associated with a decrease in the effect of percent Tutsi on the rate of killings, signifying that intermarriage *did* function to decrease the targeted killing of Tutsis.

lower socioeconomic status saw higher rates of killing and confirming theories of social disorganization.

Model 4 tests ethnic-based formal employment measures as a test of resource competition theory. As seen in the table, the rate of killings was lower in communes where Hutus had higher rates of formal employment, while Tutsi formal employment did not influence the rate of killings. In line with resource competition theory, this suggests that strain on the Hutu population, in terms of employment, influenced the rate of violence. On the other hand, most variables measuring population pressure, such as kilocalorie production per day or population growth, did not significantly impact rates of violence. In fact, higher population density is actually associated with lower rates of violence in some models,¹⁰⁷ though it does not significantly improve the models and is excluded from the table above.

Turning to Model 5, the number of days the frontline between the RPF and the Rwandan Army was located within a commune is positively associated with the rate of killings. It is unclear whether this frontline represents strategic areas of interest, which are not well documented, or if represents where the Rwandan Armed Forces were present and threatened by the presence of the RPF, resulting in increased violence.¹⁰⁸ As noted above, I also tested dummy variables measuring RPF presence, French presence, and Rwandan Armed Forces presence—both in general and by month—as well as variables capturing the number of days each troop faction was present. None of these significantly

¹⁰⁷ This may seem surprising, but areas of higher population density may have been more integrated, which may have translated to lower rates of killing. These communities may also have provided anonymity to Tutsis who were hiding.

¹⁰⁸ It is plausible that a small number of the killings resulted from fighting between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the RPF. Yet, based on estimated numbers of troops, this would be only a fraction of the total killed.

impacted the rate of violence in multivariate analysis. Most surprising is the lack of significant effect for Rwandan army presence, though much of this effect is captured in the effect for the frontline. In addition, while accounts of the violence make clear that members of the Rwandan Armed Forces participated in the violence, many more citizens who were not members of armed forces also participated in killing.

Each model includes a spatial weight for the violence in surrounding communes. While much of the spatial patterns are captured in fixed effects at the prefecture-level, the significant effect illustrates other spatial clustering. This could be due to the strength of various political parties or other contingent factors, such as specific actors, that I am unable to measure quantitatively. The other variables discussed thus far remain significant when controlling for spatial autocorrelation. In addition, this model illustrates that all communes but Kigali, the capital, had lower rates of violence than Butare. Kigali had significantly higher rates of violence, while two northern prefectures—Ruhengeri and Byumba—had significantly lower rates. Beyond much lower populations of Tutsis, each prefecture had seen violence decades before the genocide. Specifically, the government had attacked and deported Tutsis from the north in prior decades, which may also partially account for what appears to be less violence during the genocide.

Table 3.3 Fixed Effects Models of the Rate of Death in Communes

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<i>Targeted Violence and Ideology</i>					
Tutsi	0.069*** (0.009)	0.070*** (0.009)	0.065*** (0.008)	0.064*** (0.009)	0.068*** (0.009)
Education (years)	0.355** (0.136)				
<i>Community Organization</i>					
Marriage		-0.045*** (0.017)			
Educated and Not Married			0.064*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)
Educated and Married			-0.033* (0.018)	-0.032* (0.018)	-0.035** (0.017)
Always Lived			-0.009 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Formal Employment			-0.027** (0.013)		-0.031** (0.014)
<i>Resource Competition</i>					
Hutu Formal Employment				-0.027* (0.015)	
Tutsi Formal Employment				-0.001 (0.006)	
<i>Organized Actors</i>					
Days in Frontline					0.008*** (0.002)
Surrounding Violence	0.036*** (0.012)	0.034*** (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.029** (0.014)
<i>Prefectures</i>					
Byumba	-1.724*** (0.248)	-1.478*** (0.268)	-1.658*** (0.242)	-1.647*** (0.245)	-1.554*** (0.257)
Cyangugu	-0.413* (0.224)	-0.181 (0.241)	-0.177 (0.227)	-0.172 (0.226)	-0.051 (0.231)
Gikongoro	-0.014 (0.178)	0.124 (0.181)	0.048 (0.173)	0.056 (0.173)	0.078 (0.173)
Gisenyi	-0.565* (0.295)	-0.134 (0.374)	-0.337 (0.290)	-0.329 (0.289)	-0.286 (0.296)
Gitarama	-0.195 (0.150)	-0.026 (0.128)	-0.195 (0.136)	-0.196 (0.138)	-0.246* (0.146)
Kibungo	-0.017 (0.167)	0.182 (0.186)	-0.040 (0.202)	-0.042 (0.202)	0.059 (0.201)
Kibuye	-0.252 (0.166)	0.003 (0.189)	-0.041 (0.172)	-0.031 (0.172)	0.035 (0.177)
Kigali	0.910*** (0.253)	1.144*** (0.217)	1.426*** (0.357)	1.422*** (0.356)	1.415*** (0.395)
Kigali Rural	-0.104 (0.160)	0.088 (0.160)	-0.237 (0.176)	-0.233 (0.174)	-0.370* (0.201)

Ruhengeri	-1.374*** (0.326)	-0.883** (0.395)	-1.118*** (0.336)	-1.101*** (0.343)	-1.276*** (0.339)
Constant	5.166*** (0.417)	8.578*** -0.909	5.815*** (0.882)	5.769*** (0.883)	5.805*** (0.814)
Observations	142	142	142	142	142
R-squared	0.840	0.845	0.855	0.855	0.870

Robust standard errors in parentheses; Butare prefecture excluded

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: As explained in the text, education is measured in years except for when I analyze whether someone had any education, which is a dummy variable. Note also as while R2 values using xtreg are incorrect, I estimated R2 using regress and a series of dummy variables.

Toward an Integrated Conceptual Model of Regional Variation in Violence

Overall, these findings suggest that genocide studies, criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence can all shed light on regional variation in genocidal violence. As hypothesized, the percent Tutsi is associated with significantly higher rates of killing, confirming the targeted nature of the violence. This further suggests that, while state-level analyses of genocide seldom find that ethnolinguistic diversity of the population influences the onset of violence, ethnicity (or other social groupings relevant to particular genocides) influences meso-level variation in the violence.

Ideologies that cast Tutsis as cockroaches and otherwise dehumanized them were spread through the radio and reached other segments of the population through the education system, which taught through curricula and socialization that Tutsis were northern outsiders who had collaborated with the Belgian colonialists. Broadly, this suggests analyses of meso-level genocidal violence should incorporate the spread of propaganda, at least when the violence is perpetrated through popular participation. However, it is noteworthy that quantitative techniques do not allow me to disentangle whether the effect of education is due to the particular curricula and socialization or

simply due to higher (but unmet) expectations, as general theories of political and ethnic violence would suggest (Gurr 1970; Goldstone 2002).

The effect of education is dampened by a marriage effect. This effect is prominent throughout criminological literature, which finds that at both the individual level and the community level, marriage is associated with less crime. This is likely due to individual and community-level controls on peoples' lives. Marriage is also associated with higher community organization, which theories of social disorganization cite as key to understanding regional variation in violent crime. Beyond marriage, employment in the formal sector is associated with lower rates of violence. This is also in line with social disorganization theory and contrary to a defended communities perspective, which would expect higher rates of killing in more organized communities.

The percent of young men was associated with significantly higher rates of killing in bivariate analysis, but this effect is no longer significant when other variables, such as marriage or employment, are included in the models, as is common in many studies of crime (e.g., Deane et al. 2008). Studies of civil war and other violence often find that the percentage of young men is significantly associated with violence, illustrating that these theories should perhaps pay closer attention to criminological theories of social controls.¹⁰⁹

Resource competition theory finds some support, as the rate of killings was lower in communes where Hutus had higher rates of formal employment. Yet, other theories from the study of political and ethnic violence—particularly those linked to Malthusian

¹⁰⁹ Age holds different meanings in different countries. As noted above, in a separate analysis, co-authors and I analyze the age of people who participated in the genocide in Rwanda and suggest other factors—such as age-graded memories—that may have influenced age trends.

concerns about population pressures—do not find support in this study. At the commune-level, population growth, kilocalorie production per day, and population density are not associated with higher rates of violence, casting doubt on explanations that focus on resource scarcity and population pressure. The evidence does not support theories that deemed Rwanda a “ticking time bomb” of population pressure either at the state (as shown in Chapter 2) or the regional level. As noted above, this study is unable to capture *perceptions* of resource scarcity, which may differ from quantitative measures. In addition, the relationship between ideology and resource scarcity, especially at the individual level, cannot be studied here, though it may have been an important factor in the violence. I test whether these factors influenced violence in Bosnia and Sudan in Chapters 4 and 5 before further assessing the explanatory power of resource scarcity and competition theories.

Taken together, many of these significant factors point toward the importance of community-level factors, such as meso-level marriage rates, employment rates, and education levels in understanding the magnitude of the violence. Indeed, as citizens of communities perpetrated the violence, characteristics of these individuals and these communities influenced the rate of violence—something previously unexplored within genocide studies. It remains to be seen whether this is the case for genocides with different groups and organizational levels of perpetrators. This is explored in Chapters 4 and 5 and revisited within Chapter 6.

While community-level factors are important in understanding the violence, institutionally organized actors also influenced the rate of killing. I am unable to capture the movements of all organized actors, but the length of time the frontline between the

Rwandan Army and the RPF was present in a commune influenced the rate of violence. This is likely because the Rwandan Army felt more threatened in these regions, though it may also capture some killings on the frontline. Either way, the result suggests a complex relationship between genocide and civil war; additional analyses should attempt to disentangle relationships between concurrent forms of violence.

Turning to broader spatial and temporal factors, the capital region had higher rates of violence, perhaps due to the centralized nature of the genocide as well as to the presence of political and cultural elites. Surrounding violence also impacted the rate of killing, but the distance from roads or cities and the presence along any border was not significantly associated with the rate of violence. Elevation is not significantly associated with the rate of violence, suggesting that multiple factors associated with meso-level variation in civil war were not associated with meso-level variation in genocide in Rwanda. Other theories—such as those pertaining to characteristics of the communities—must be taken into account.

While these results are robust, it is worth repeating that this study cannot account for the movement of people during the genocide, which occurred quickly and is not well documented. Similarly, the inability to analyze how these factors influenced the magnitude of violence over time means that some effects, like that of the French intervention, cannot be fully assessed.

There are several other data limitations. I would ideally analyze these factors at micro levels (such as neighborhoods within the communes), though data on the independent and the dependent variables do not allow for it. Nor can I account for the strength of certain political parties, which have been found to be associated with violence

(see, for example, Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012) and were likely associated with violence in Rwanda. Still, the survey utilized here provides the best estimate of those killed during the genocide, even though an exact number of those killed will likely never be known.

I also anticipate that some will question the applicability of theories created to explain crime in the United States to a very different form of crime in Rwanda.

Criminologists have extended theories of social (dis)organization to other countries, such as the United Kingdom (Sampson and Groves 1989; Lowenkamp, Cullen, and Pratt 2003) and South Africa (Breetzke 2010), as well as to rural areas (e.g., Bouffard and Muftic 2006). Scholars have more to do in terms of testing this theory internationally and in other contexts, but research to date has suggested that it helps explain crime across a diverse range of settings. I strove to create the most culturally appropriate variables, though some variables—like divorce—do not capture nearly the same amount of variation due to their lack of prevalence in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The generalizability of these findings is probed in Chapters 4 and 5, which consider the genocides in Bosnia and Sudan, and implications for these theories is explored in Chapter 6.


Part 2: Temporal Variation and Determinants of Genocidal Onset by Region

As the genocide in Rwanda took place within several months, there are not reliable records of when specific killings took place. Thus, it is virtually impossible to confidently examine variation in killings over time within communes, let alone in the country as a whole. Instead, I turn to a more reliable measure that captures a form of both temporal and regional variation—onset of genocidal violence.

Violence took place in every commune throughout Rwanda, but it did not start at the same time. As a Rwandan scholar and witness explained, “Violence started in Kigali, and it also started in many other places around the 6th of April. But it did not start in other places like Butare...until mid-April” (Rwanda, October 2012). Indeed, Figure 3.4 shows variation in early, middle, and late onset dates, explained in more detail below.

Understanding what influenced these differences in onset date will shed additional light on what may have driven the violence— it may even inform targeted interventions in ongoing episodes of violence in the future.

Figure 3.4: Commune Onset in Rwanda



As seen in Chapter 2, the vast majority of studies of genocidal onset have examined factors that influence the onset of genocide at the state-level. In fact, only one study has quantitatively examined determinants of onset of violence in Rwanda: Straus (2006) drew on bivariate regression to analyze the determinants of onset for the 11 prefectures within Rwanda, finding that violence did not radiate from the center. In other words, distance from Kigali—the capital—did not influence onset at the prefecture-level. Straus also found that education, population size, population density, age distribution, and ethnic diversity did *not* impact onset dates. Instead, he found that genocidal violence began earlier in areas with lower unemployment rates. A binary variable that he created to measure support for the ruling party and population growth were also each significantly associated with earlier onset. Yet, 11 prefectures contain other administrative units that may be obscuring other trends, as there was variation within prefectures. Thus, an analysis of smaller geographic units—such as the commune—is needed. In addition, while bivariate analysis can be powerful, multivariate analysis allows for a more thorough investigation.

To further analyze some of the factors that are associated with the onset of violence at the commune level, I test how the theories outlined in the previous section help explain the *onset* rather than the *magnitude* of violence. Indeed, many of the theories explained above are related to the presence of violence and may explain its onset. Furthermore, while factors that are associated with higher rates of violence may be associated with earlier onset, this has yet to be explored in scholarly literature. As the theories and variables I will test have already been reviewed, I explain my methods and present results, incorporating additional theoretical interpretations.

Data and Analysis

I measure onset of genocidal violence as a nominal variable of early, middle, and late onset. This measure is obtained from two groups of scholars—Scott Straus (2006) and the Genodynamics Project (2013). Straus drew upon six key sources to determine the onset date for each commune. These include transcripts from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and reports from a commission appointed by the Rwandan Ministry of Higher Education, Human Rights Watch, African Rights, Ibuka (a Rwandan NGO), and Straus' interviews with 230 perpetrators of violence (Straus 2006:249). In his book, Straus provides each of the onset estimates given in the reports and a final onset estimate he created after weighing the potential credibility of each report.

Christian Davenport and Allan Stam's Genodynamics Project (2013) also sought to ascertain when violence started in each commune. They coded five sources—including the reports from the Ministry of Higher Education, Human Rights Watch, African Rights, and Ibuka—as well as a report from the Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Sport. Then, using Bayesian methodology, they analyzed these data to ascertain the best estimate for the onset date in each commune by allocating various amounts of credibility to the sources. They also assessed the validity of the dates by conducting interviews at the ICTR.

I obtained access to both of these datasets. As the specific date of onset varied widely across sources and when comparing the two datasets, here I rely on a measure of early, middle, and late onset, sacrificing precision in favor of validity. I define early onset as April 6-8th. While this is a small range of time, almost a third of the communes saw violence within these days. Middle onset is defined as April 9-14th, while late onset is

defined as April 15th and later. This matches Straus’ assessment of early, middle, and late onset, and it breaks the communes into three relatively even groups.

To assign the value of early, middle, or late to a commune, I followed three steps. First, if Straus’ estimate and Davenport and Stam’s fell within the same category (early, middle, or late onset), I assigned that category to the commune. Second, if one of the datasets was missing the onset date, the onset data from the other dataset was assigned, resulting in a total of 92 communes (onset agreement).¹¹⁰ Third, for the remaining communes, I analyzed the sources used by the two different research teams and drew a conclusion based on the agreement of the sources, was always in line with either Straus or Stam and Davenport (onset expanded). I use the more complete measure, onset expanded, for analysis, though I also restrict all analyses to the 92 communes (onset agreement) to ensure that the results remain similar across the two case sets (not shown). In addition, even with the more complete measure, reliable data on the onset of violence do not exist for 26 communes, and they are excluded.

Table 3.4: Commune Onset Dates

Data Source	Early	Middle	Late	Total
Onset (agreement)	31 (33.7%)	27 (29.4%)	34 (37.0%)	92 (100%)
Onset (expanded)	43 (36.1%)	40 (33.6%)	36 (30.3%)	119 (100%)

These dependent variables are summarized in Table 3.4, while Table 3.5 includes descriptive statistics by onset date. All independent variables match those above with the exception of the spatial autocorrelation weight, which now is a measure of the onset in

¹¹⁰ The nominal variable of onset in the two datasets is correlated at .72.

Table 3.5 Mean Values of Independent Variables by Onset (Expanded)

Independent Variables	Early	Middle	Late
<i>Targeted Violence and Ideology</i>			
Tutsi	9.99%	8.62%	13.51%
Catholic	56.63%	63.83%	67.83%
Radio Ownership	36.76%	32.28%	34.22%
Education	2.84	2.86	3.2
<i>Community Organization</i>			
Always Lived	67.08%	73.10%	69.16%
Divorce	2.99%	2.96%	3.66%
Marriage	59.77%	57.44%	52.41%
Unemployment	0.22%	0.27%	0.15%
Formal Employment	11.64%	10.75%	11.30%
Young Men	12.22%	12.57%	13.50%
Intermarriage	4.65%	4.59%	8.62%
<i>Resource Competition</i>			
Population	56,854	47,937	43,960
Population Density	399.04	455.81	411.68
Population Growth	3.47%	2.66%	2.25%
Kilocalorie Production	206.18	219.68	193.63
Hutu Formal Employment	10.99%	10.38%	10.55%
Tutsi Formal Employment	17.97%	18.56%	21.50%
<i>Organized Actors (April)</i>			
RPF Troops	30.23%	25.00%	5.56%
FAR Troops	88.37%	90.00%	94.44%
RPF/FAR Frontline	46.51%	40.00%	2.78%
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>			
Elevation	1,768.85	1,778.09	1,668.99
Capital Region	100%	0%	0%
Urban Region	16.28%	15.00%	2.78%
Distance from Roads	4.78	4.66	4.25
Distance from Cities	17.80	15.03	14.69
Borders Burundi	14.00%	5.00%	16.67%
International Border	41.86%	20.00%	19.44%
Past Violence	11.63%	2.50%	0%
Distance from Kigali	65.22	59.57	56.14
Surrounding Onset	1.50	1.80	2.64

Note: While these values are transformed in the analyses and in the other descriptive tables, values presented here are in original units.

surrounding communes.¹¹¹ In addition, troop location is restricted to troop presence in April, rather than throughout the entire episode of violence, since all onset dates were in April. Because of this, the presence of French troops is excluded. Population, which is included in the dependent variable (a rate) above, is now tested as an independent variable. Lastly, I include a measure of distance from Kigali to test the theory that violence radiated outward.

Descriptive statistics were also analyzed for the 26 communes missing an onset date. These communes had significantly lower percentages of Tutsi (three percent compared to eight percent in the non-missing communes). In addition, they had much higher average elevation (averaging over 1880 km²) and much lower numbers of people killed (averaging 2,000 deaths per commune compared to the total average of over 7,000 deaths per commune). The comparatively lower number of people killed likely explains why the onset date is unknown and, overall, illustrates that communes excluded are those with much lower levels of killing.¹¹²

Analysis

To analyze the factors associated with the onset of violence within a commune, I employ multinomial logistic regression, an appropriate model when the dependent variable is categorical and there are more than two outcomes. In this case, as discussed above, there are three outcomes (early, middle, or late), and early onset is excluded as the

¹¹¹ I created the onset variable manually, as GeoDa is unable to calculate onset when missing values are included. Thus, it is the average onset (1, 2, or 3, corresponding to early, middle, and late, respectively) of surrounding communes excluding those with missing values.

¹¹² Currently, there is no way to remedy this. However, on a future trip to Rwanda, I will conduct interviews to better understand the onset in these regions (specifically, before turning this dissertation into a book).

comparison outcome. As with models of magnitude presented previously, I begin by building bivariate models, shown in Table 3.6. I review these briefly and then turn to multivariate models, illustrated in Table 3.7. Note that results are presented in odds ratio, so coefficients *larger than one* suggest that the variable is associated with higher odds of middle or late onset in comparison to early onset, while coefficients *less than one* suggest that the variable is associated with lower odds of middle or late onset in comparison to early onset. Note also that I cluster standard errors by prefecture due to the nested nature of the data.¹¹³

Results: Determinants of Genocidal Onset

As seen in Table 3.6,¹¹⁴ the factors associated with the magnitude of violence generally did not influence the onset of violence. Namely, the percent Tutsi, significantly associated with higher rates of killing, did not impact the onset rate. Percent Catholic did have a significant effect on onset, however, with higher percent Catholic associated with middle and late onset dates. Recall that in analyses of the rate of killing, this variable was included to test the potential spread of a genocidal ideology through the Church, and it was not significantly associated with the rate of killings. In the case of onset, the significant effect may reflect the efforts of clergy to stop the genocide, delaying onset but

¹¹³ To my knowledge, Stata users are still creating a code for a multinomial logit fixed effects model, and any existing user-written commands are specific to time-series data. As fixed effects models produce results equal to including a series of dummy variables with one excluded, I also ran the models with a series of dummy variables, excluding Butare. Most of the results remained the same, but it was clear the inclusion of dummy variables resulted in unstable models with odds ratios far larger than normal. Thus, here I present models with clustered standard errors.

¹¹⁴ I tried excluding the other two categories of onset, and the basic picture remained the same. I chose to present the results with early onset excluded because this is the category I am most interested in. Thus, the models compare the other two categories against early onset.

ultimately not preventing genocide in most cases. Indeed, while scholars have confirmed that many exclusionary ideologies were spread through the Church (Prunier 1995; Rittner, Roth, and Whitworth 2004; Longman 2011), there is also clear documentation that many clergy attempted to save people during the genocide (Des Forges 1999; Fox 2012; author's interviews.)

Variables capturing the spread of propaganda, such as the radio and education levels, also appear to have influenced the onset of violence, with increases in radio ownership associated with decreased odds of middle onset dates and increases in education associated with greater odds of later onset dates. These seemingly disparate results are further probed in multivariate analysis.

Variables meant to measure social disorganization, many of which significantly impacted the magnitude of violence, are generally not significantly associated with the onset of violence. There are a few exceptions: areas of lower unemployment and lower mobility levels had a later onset when compared against early onset. In addition, areas with the latest onset had higher percentages of young men.

Population and environmental pressures generally do not help explain the onset of violence, though it is noteworthy that violence began comparatively later in areas with less population growth. The presence and movement of armed actors also may have influenced the onset dates, with the frontline associated with significantly higher odds of earlier onset, again suggesting that the presence of both the RPF and the Rwandan Armed Forces influenced strain within a commune.

**Table 3.6: Bivariate Analysis of Genocidal Onset in Rwanda
Early Onset Excluded; Presented in Odds Ratios**

Independent Variables	Model	Middle Onset	Late Onset
<i>Targeted Violence and Ideology</i>			
Tutsi	1	0.977 (0.906 - 1.055)	1.045 (0.962 - 1.134)
Catholic	2	1.026*** (1.008 - 1.045)	1.042* (0.995 - 1.091)
Radio Ownership	3	0.951** (0.913 - 0.990)	0.976 (0.925 - 1.030)
Education	4	1.091 (0.351 - 3.388)	6.004** (1.083 - 33.299)
<i>Community Organization</i>			
Always Lived	5	1.084* (0.999 - 1.175)	1.018 (0.950 - 1.091)
Divorce	6	0.973 (0.668 - 1.418)	1.76 (0.855 - 3.622)
Marriage	7	0.936 (0.858 - 1.022)	0.741** (0.569 - 0.964)
Unemployment	8	0.434* (0.179 - 1.051)	0.687 (0.377 - 1.250)
Formal Employment	9	0.976 (0.892 - 1.069)	0.992 (0.907 - 1.085)
Young Men	10	1.504 (0.788 - 2.871)	3.927*** (1.869 - 8.251)
Intermarriage	11	0.995 (0.839 - 1.181)	1.21 (0.950 - 1.542)
<i>Resource Competition</i>			
Population (log)	12	0.161 (0.017 - 1.509)	0.046 (0.001 - 1.973)
Population Density	13	0.999 (0.995 - 1.003)	1.001 (0.997 - 1.005)
Population Growth	14	0.453*** (0.276 - 0.742)	0.243*** (0.093 - 0.632)
Kilocalorie Production	15	0.994 (0.986 - 1.002)	0.997 (0.987 - 1.008)
Hutu Formal Employment	16	0.983 (0.892 - 1.082)	0.988 (0.897 - 1.088)
Tutsi Formal Employment	17	1.002 (0.963 - 1.044)	1.006 (0.967 - 1.046)
<i>Organized Actors (April)</i>			
RPF Troops	18	0.769 (0.338 - 1.753)	0.136** (0.024 - 0.768)
FAR Troops	19	1.184 (0.391 - 3.587)	2.237 (0.675 - 7.417)
RPF/FAR Frontline	20	0.767	0.033***

		(0.307 - 1.916)	(0.003 - 0.376)
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>			
Elevation (log)	21	2.401 (0.058 - 99.259)	0.159 (0.001 - 24.278)
Capital Region	22	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)
Urban Region	23	0.908 (0.227 - 3.635)	0.147** (0.031 - 0.704)
Distance from Roads (log)	24	1.160 (0.832 - 1.617)	0.960 (0.674 - 1.366)
Distance from Cities (log)	25	0.566 (0.249 - 1.286)	0.620 (0.274 - 1.406)
Borders Burundi	26	0.325 (0.047 - 2.238)	1.233 (0.224 - 6.782)
International Border	27	0.347* (0.114 - 1.059)	0.335 (0.086 - 1.309)
Past Violence	28	0.195* (0.030 - 1.266)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)
Distance from Kigali (log)	29	-0.133 (-1.003 - 0.737)	-0.085 (-1.584 - 1.414)
Surrounding Onset	30	1.634*** (0.598 - 2.669)	5.118*** (3.544 - 6.692)

Standard errors clustered by prefecture

* p < .1, ** p < .05, ***p < .01

As interviewees suggested, genocidal violence began in urban regions, including the capital, before other regions of the country. It did not radiate from the capital, however, reaffirming Straus' (2006) findings at a lower geographic level. The spatial weight *is* significant, indicating that communes in similar geographic proximities saw similar onset dates. Variables capturing the ease of movement, such as distance from roads, distance from cities, and elevation, did not significantly influence the onset of violence. Areas that had past violence had significantly earlier onset dates, suggesting that recent violence may have influenced genocidal violence, perhaps through an already existing structure that facilitated the violence or through the prior mobilization of self-

defense groups. This effect, as well as others briefly discussed here, is further probed in multivariate analysis.

Multivariate Analysis of Genocidal Onset

To further analyze these effects, Table 3.7 includes multinomial logit models of genocidal onset. Again, results are presented in odds ratios, and “early” onset is excluded as the comparison. Variables that were not significant or did not significantly improve each model are excluded. For the sake of space, some of the more parsimonious models are not shown.

Model 1 includes measures that capture the presence of ideology as well as social disorganization, while Model 2 adds factors related to resource competition, armed actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors. Model 3 includes all of these variables but excludes communes located in Butare. Recall that Butare had a later onset date in part because the governor, who was the only Tutsi governor in Rwanda at the time, attempted to prevent genocide from occurring there. As a resident of Butare told me, “...the governor said, ‘Please, please, don’t kill your neighbor. Don’t kill your friends’” (Rwanda, September 2012).

In fact, 19 communes in Butare had late onset dates, 1 had a middle onset date, and none saw early onset. This indicates that leaders at various administrative levels were key in implementing (and, in this case, preventing) the genocide, in line with the focus of other scholars (e.g., Mulinda 2010). This analysis seeks to understand if other community-level factors also inform why genocide began in some places before others. I cannot adequately control for the actions of all leaders. Yet, to ascertain how the actions of the governor may have influenced the onset dates in Butare, I run all models presented

below without communes in Butare included (Model 3). Note that I also ran a model controlling for Butare, and the results of this model (not shown) are almost identical to the results in Model 3.

In Table 3.7, the models illustrate that increases in percent Catholic were associated with higher odds of a middle onset date. In particular, each increase in percent Catholic is associated with about a five percent increase in the odds of having middle onset date relative to early onset dates. This suggests that the clergy's efforts to prevent the genocide and keep people safe may have influenced delayed onset, although it is not possible to further analyze this effect to ascertain other potential explanations. Note that the effect of the percent Catholic is not significantly associated with late odds, again emphasizing that the governor's actions and previous policies in Butare were the main driver behind the later onset dates.

Radio ownership is associated with comparatively earlier onset. It is likely that the news of the genocide spread most quickly through the radio and influenced earlier onsets in some communes. Notably, this effect holds when measures of economic status (education and formal employment) and the urban setting are included in the model. Nevertheless, data on radio coverage should also be examined as an additional test of this finding. In addition, the alternate measure of exposure to propaganda—education—is insignificant and thus not shown. While education had a large effect on magnitude of violence, it did not significantly impact its onset. This reaffirms that the significance of the radio is likely due to its role in spreading the news rather than any particular ideology behind the genocide.

**Table 3.7 Multinomial Logit Models of Genocidal Onset
"Early" Onset Excluded; Presented in Odds Ratios**

Predictors	All Communes		All Communes	
	Middle Onset	Late Onset	Middle Onset	Late Onset
Catholic	1.047*** (1.024 - 1.071)	1.034 (0.973 - 1.098)	1.047*** (1.026 - 1.068)	1.050 (0.983 - 1.122)
Radio Ownership	0.919** (0.853 - 0.991)	0.930 (0.846 - 1.022)	0.904** (0.826 - 0.989)	0.909 (0.792 - 1.043)
Young Men	1.990*** (1.202 - 3.295)	3.837*** (2.062 - 7.140)	2.042** (1.179 - 3.538)	3.436*** (1.775 - 6.649)
Always Lived	1.053* (0.999 - 1.110)	1.026 (0.939 - 1.122)	1.047 (0.987 - 1.111)	1.010 (0.928 - 1.099)
Tutsi Formal Employment			1.025 (0.982 - 1.069)	1.072** (1.015 - 1.132)
Front (April)			0.932 (0.343 - 2.528)	0.088*** (0.033 - 0.233)
Urban			0.907 (0.255 - 3.226)	0.056** (0.005 - 0.681)
Surrounding Onset	2.285 (0.822 - 6.354)	65.656*** (12.716 - 339.007)	2.175 (0.748 - 6.322)	45.360*** (14.107 - 145.853)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.001)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)
Observations	118	118	118	118
McFadden's R2	0.412	0.412	0.449	0.449

Confidence intervals clustered by prefecture

* p < .1, ** p < .05, ***p < .01

Predictors	Butare Excluded	
	Middle Onset	Late Onset
Catholic	1.049*** (1.028 - 1.070)	0.999 (0.939 - 1.063)
Radio Ownership	0.902** (0.822 - 0.988)	1.025 (0.857 - 1.225)
Young Men	2.033** (1.162 - 3.559)	4.421*** (2.195 - 8.904)
Always Lived	1.043 (0.982 - 1.108)	1.104 (0.923 - 1.321)
Tutsi Formal Employment	1.023 (0.981 - 1.067)	1.077*** (1.042 - 1.112)
Front (April)	0.935 (0.346 - 2.529)	0.122* (0.013 - 1.165)

Urban	1.003 (0.267 - 3.762)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)
Surrounding Onset	2.105 (0.704 - 6.297)	13.997** (1.073 - 182.615)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.001)	0.000*** (0.000 - 0.000)
Observations	98	98
McFadden's R2	0.367	0.367

Turning to indicators of community organization, the percent of young men in each commune has a large effect on the onset of genocidal violence, both in and outside of Butare. Specifically, higher percentages of young men have a strong and consistent relationship with comparatively later onset dates.¹¹⁵ Thus, while young men did not influence the magnitude of killing, this indicates that areas with higher percentages of young men had much higher odds of later onset. Most theories link young men with greater violence due to their prevalence as perpetrators (Goldstone 1991; Urdal 2006). This finding provides more nuance and is, in some ways, counter to expectations derived from these theories. Perhaps young men, most often thought of as perpetrators, also had a role as protectors and resisters.

There is not strong evidence that areas with greater strain on the population had earlier (or, for that matter, later) onset dates. Closely related resource competition theories did yield interesting results. While Hutu formal employment was associated with a greater magnitude of deaths, Tutsi formal employment is associated with comparatively higher odds of later onset. In areas with more Tutsis employed in the public sectors, Tutsis and Hutus may have been more integrated in public life. This also might reflect a

¹¹⁵ Minimal interview data support this, and I will probe this further in future trips to Rwanda.

lack of discriminatory policies and, thus point to more tolerant ideologies at the community level, which could delay genocidal onset.

As in bivariate analysis, the frontline is associated with lower odds of comparatively later onset, confirming that the presence of both the RPF and the FAR incited violence. These models confirm much earlier onsets in urban areas. As the violence was organized by the government and, in many ways, carried out by mayors, governors, and other political leaders, it is easy to understand why violence began in and near cities.

Areas that saw violence in the early 1990s had significantly lower odds of a later onset. In fact, none of these communes had a late onset date, so this is not included in the models above. It is impossible to ascertain whether other factors influenced the early onset in each of these cases, though it is possible that pre-existing structures facilitated earlier onset (e.g., it may have been particularly easy to mobilize the self-defense groups in these communes to begin killing due to previous mobilization). Nevertheless, much additional research is needed on the effects of these factors, as well as the effects of collective memory of recent violence, on violence during genocide. Lastly, surrounding onset is the strongest predictor of onset, suggesting that violence did spread in a way that is not captured by other factors. Most likely, this reflects individuals who moved throughout the country as well as other actions that cannot be measured quantitatively.

Understanding the Onset of Genocide in Rwanda

To briefly synthesize these results, models of onset suggest that factors that influence the *magnitude* of violence do not generally influence the *onset* of violence, and vice versa.

Indeed, with the exception of the influence of the radio and the presence of the frontline,

different factors influence variation in magnitude and onset of genocidal violence at the commune level. Overall, it appears that theories suggested thus far have more explanatory power when used to assess magnitude than when used to assess onset, which may be context-specific and depend strongly on the actions of particular leaders or groups.

Specifically, violence started earlier in urban areas and in places with higher percentages of radio ownership, suggesting the importance of the radio in spreading the message that violence had or should begin as well as the importance of those who planned the violence in orchestrating its onset. Indeed, leaders were particularly important, and it is likewise clear that the timing of the onset of violence in Butare was greatly influenced by the actions of the governor in seeking to prevent the genocide from taking place within his prefecture. Many other individual actions likely influenced the timing of violence in ways that may not have influenced the magnitude and in ways that cannot be measured quantitatively, as indicated by the measure of spatial autocorrelation, again suggesting that the onset may depend more on particular individuals than does magnitude.


Several other community-level factors influenced the onset of violence. Communities with higher populations of young males saw later onsets of violence, an effect contrary to theory and worth exploring in more detail. Communities with higher percentages of Tutsis employed in the formal sector had later onset dates, suggesting that the integration of Tutsis in public life (in part through the fewer discriminatory policies keeping Tutsis out of jobs) kept genocidal violence at bay briefly. Few measures of social disorganization and population pressure influenced the onset of violence.

These findings differ from Straus (2006), who found that the prefecture-level onset was associated with population growth and unemployment. Each was significantly associated with comparatively earlier onset in my bivariate analysis of communes, and as Straus only utilized bivariate analysis, these results do not contradict his but rather add more fine-grained analyses. Indeed, these variables were ultimately insignificant in multivariate analysis, showing that other factors were at play.

Note also that, as mentioned above, data on genocidal onset are valid, though data are missing for a number of communes. The violence took place quickly, and data on specific onset dates must be treated with some caution. In addition, there are no well-established theories regarding the onset of genocidal violence at sub-national levels. This chapter makes a first pass at establishing some theories for the case of Rwanda, but much additional research is needed to understand the timing of violence within communities.

Lastly, although I have considered them separately, it is instructive to briefly examine how the onset date may have influenced the magnitude of violence. Figure 3.5 illustrates the average number of those killed in a commune by onset date. Clearly, communes with earlier onset dates as well as those with late onset dates had the highest level of deaths. This reflects the high number and rate of killing in Kigali and Butare. Nevertheless, including onset as a predictor in models of the rate of killing does not yield significant results (not shown), illustrating that the onset did not necessarily influence the magnitude of violence in Rwanda.

Figure 3.5: Average Number Killed in Commune by Onset Date



Conclusion

In just a few months in 1994, more than one million people were killed in Rwanda. While this violence is often discussed in the aggregate, few attempts have been made to understand variation in the violence across the country. In this chapter, I have taken some steps in analyzing the factors associated with the rate of killing and the onset of violence in Rwanda's communes.

I began by assessing the preconditions of genocide, finding much support for factors identified in Chapter 2 and detailing how strain and threat to the government and the creation of us/them identities were key processes that influenced the road to genocide. I then provided an overview of the violence, focusing on the forms of victimization and the perpetrators. While the genocide was planned by key leaders and many of the perpetrators were previously mobilized in militias, the vast majority of perpetrators were citizens who joined the violence as it was unfolding.

This is important for numerous reasons—chief among them is my argument that who the perpetrators were directly influenced the patterns of violence. As the perpetrators were largely members of communities who were not members of formally organized militaries, I find that criminological theories pertaining to community rates of crime apply to understanding the rate of killing in Rwanda. Specifically, marriage and employment in the formal sector were associated with lower rates of killing. Further, the spread of the ideology against Tustis—both through the radio and through the institution of education—and the rate of killing in surrounding communes influenced patterns in the violence.

Population pressures, widely suggested as a key factor in Rwanda's violence, did not influence community-level rates of killings. Micro-level trends or individual perceptions of scarcity and pressure may be at play and merit future analysis, however. The movement of armed actors did influence the rate of violence, with the frontline between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the RPF significantly associated with higher rates of killing.

Interestingly, only a few factors that influenced the magnitude of the violence also influenced its onset. Places with higher levels of radio ownership saw higher levels of violence, indicating that the broadcasts about the plane crash and the violence around the country likely influenced its onset in other communities, a different explanation than the typical link to propaganda. Similarly, the frontline effect supports the explanation that the frontline is also capturing the strain felt by the armed forces when the RPF was in their territory.

Beyond this, different factors were at play in the onset of and the degree of violence. Urban communities saw earlier violence, while communities with higher percentages of Catholics and higher levels of Tutsi employment saw slightly later onset. Although I focus on broader structural factors, interviews, too, revealed other factors that influenced the violence. For example, the presence of a Tutsi governor in Butare was a key reason given for that community's later onset, but the rate of killing there was very high.

Overall, these findings make clear that the factors that influenced the onset of genocide are not sufficient to explain the magnitude of violence or even the onset of violence at more meso levels. Instead, in Rwanda, factors associated with the organization of the community, the spread of propaganda, surrounding violence, and the movements of armed actors influenced patterns in the magnitude of violence. Onset was influenced by more localized factors, such as the movements of armed actors, radio broadcasts that spread the news of the violence, resistance efforts, and even the efforts and actions of particular leaders within communities. This makes sense, as these factors influenced the events of one day rather than the rate of violence over several months. Of course, as noted above, many other more localized factors also certainly influenced patterns, but this chapter has also identified structural factors that influenced patterns in the violence. In the next chapter, I analyze whether and how these factors influenced a concurrent episode of genocide, this time in "Europe's Backyard."

Chapter 4: Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina

“When you think of the sort of things that happen when a genocide happens, it's again not people who are intrinsically evil.”

-Desmond Tutu

During the early 1990s, people around the world were shocked when pictures of concentration camps appeared in newspapers. Shirtless, emaciated men peered out from behind barbed wires. It looked like the Holocaust. These camps were located in a European country about the size of West Virginia—Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though different from Rwanda in many ways, Bosnia shared the experience of genocide.

Following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Bosnia erupted in violence. In the context of a fight for independence and regional territorial aspirations, more than 100,000 people were killed. Bosnian Muslims and many others were also forcefully displaced, detained in concentration camps, raped, and victimized in numerous other ways over the next three and a half years.

This chapter seeks to understand regional and temporal variation in Bosnia's violence. I begin with a brief summary of the preconditions that led to the onset of violence, highlighting similarities with the decades that preceded violence in Rwanda. I then consider the different types of victimization and discuss how genocide is differentiated from other forms of violence, building on and extending the discussion in Chapter 1, as the events in Bosnia are often considered a civil war rather than a civil war *and* genocide. Next, I analyze the factors that influenced regional variation in the killing

of civilians and soldiers as well as the location of concentration camps,¹¹⁶ drawing upon many of the theories outlined in Chapter 3. The chapter ends with an analysis of variation in the onset of violence and the magnitude of violence over time.

Overall, I find that the ethnic composition of a region influenced both the magnitude and the onset of violence. Specifically, violence targeted Bosniaks, though polarized communities with two large ethnic groups also saw comparatively more violence and earlier onset. Factors related to community organization, which had much explanatory power for the case of Rwanda, did not significantly impact soldier deaths, civilian deaths, or the number of concentration camps, however. This is likely because previously formed armies and militias perpetrated much of the violence in Bosnia. Instead, violence was largely influenced by the presence of these armies and militias, proximity to Serbia, and other factors related to strategy.

The Road to Genocide

Located at a cultural crossroads between Western and Eastern Europe, Bosnia has long been at the intersection of regional conflicts (Nation 2003).¹¹⁷ After the 2nd century, the line dividing the Western and Eastern Roman Empire ran through the region, and clashes

¹¹⁶ I am in the process of reconstructing data on forced migration patterns. I was able to obtain data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and I am working to harmonize them with previous Bosnian boundaries.

¹¹⁷ Like Rwanda, Bosnia's rich history is far too detailed to fully review in this dissertation chapter. Yet, while history is never a deterministic factor in the events of a genocide, Chapter 2 has shown that historical background can shed light on the events that take place during a genocide. Accordingly, while this brief history includes key historical events, it mainly focuses on recent preconditions leading to 1992, when Bosnia became an independent country.

Figure 4.1: The Former Yugoslavia



between these empires—and many subsequent empires—were fought on its soil (NIOD Prologue 2002).

Bosnia gradually evolved into a Kingdom that was relatively autonomous throughout the 12th to mid-14th centuries. Near the close of the 14th century, the Ottoman Empire attacked, ultimately taking control of the country in 1463. Serbia, Bosnia's eastern neighbor that had ruled its own Kingdom of Serbs since the beginning of the 13th century, also fell to the Turks in two crucial battles that have long remained part of Serbian mythology. Ottoman occupation spread throughout the Balkans. Ottoman Turks engaged in numerous battles with Bosnia's western neighbor, Croatia, and established a firm hold on the region.

Ottoman rule was characterized by a high degree of religious tolerance that was well in line with a history of co-existence in the region (Cigar 1995; NIOD Prologue

2002).¹¹⁸ This tolerance was maintained in part by the millet system, which allowed religious organizations (such as courts) to govern peoples' lives. The system defined people primarily by their religious identities, and it has been seen as an early example of religious pluralism (Sachedina 2001).

Although the Ottomans tolerated different religious identities, approximately two-fifths of the population of Bosnia converted from Christianity to Islam during Ottoman rule (Lampe 2000). This changing religious identity, as well as waves of migration to the region, meant that the population was roughly divided between Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics by the mid-19th century. Bosnia was the most ethnically diverse region in the Balkans (NIOD Prologue 2002). By contrast, most Serbs adhered to the Orthodox faith during Ottoman rule, while Croats and their western neighbors remained loyal to the Roman Catholic Church.

During this period, religious identities became increasingly intertwined with ethnic ones (Weitz 2003). "Orthodox" became synonymous with "Serb," while "Catholic" became synonymous with "Croat," the people who mainly occupied the region of present-day Croatia. Unlike Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia did not have a dominant ethnic group. Rather than "Bosnians," there were Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims (later known as Bosniaks), though many argued that the latter group was comprised of descendants of either Serbs or Croats who had wrongfully adopted Islam. Bosnian Muslims embraced their identity, however, making it an ethnicity that, as in Rwanda, later became polarized and racialized.

¹¹⁸ Indeed, while popular accounts of violence in the region place emphasis on "long-standing divisions" or "age-old conflicts," Bosnia, like Rwanda, had seen relative peace among ethnic groups in the broader historical period prior to the genocide.

The economic system of the Ottoman Empire relied heavily upon agriculture. Landowners were predominantly Muslim, while the tenants were mainly Orthodox and Catholic (NIOD Part 1 2002), mirroring Tutsi's predominant ownership of the land in Rwanda. Peasants were unhappy with this arrangement, and the 19th century saw numerous Serb peasant revolts against landowners' impositions (Lampe 2000).

Unhappiness regarding Ottoman rule also grew. Small battles between some countries in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire continued throughout much of their occupation, culminating in great discontent throughout the 19th century. At this time, ideas about Serbian and Croatian independence began to proliferate, and Serbia began to build an administrative and military framework for its future as a nation-state. Each sought greater territorial control in the Balkan region, dreaming about expanding their land to form "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia."¹¹⁹

Bosnia saw growing unrest, though much of it was between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. For example, a particularly violent Serb and Croat peasant revolt took place in 1875 in Herzegovina, a region in southern Bosnia. The peasants wanted greater representation and land, and Bosnian Muslims and Ottoman forces responded forcefully. By its end, an estimated 150,000 people (mainly Serbs) were dead or forcibly displaced (Lampe 2000).

Shortly afterward, Bosnia was included in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, through which the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire reassigned control over areas of Eastern Europe. The Treaty placed Bosnia squarely under Austro-Hungarian control. Several hundred thousand Bosnian

¹¹⁹ For more on rising nationalism and territorial aspirations, see Lampe 2000.

Muslims fled to the Ottoman Empire, giving Serbs a plurality in Bosnia, while those who remained under Austro-Hungarian control were forced to consolidate their cultural and religious autonomy (Lampe 2000).

Austro-Hungarian rule featured aggressive policies to enhance the industrial and agricultural development of Bosnia. While industrial production initially increased at a rate of 15 percent a year beginning in the 1890s, the agricultural project failed miserably. When Austria decided to formally annex Bosnia in 1908, the predominantly Serb peasantry comprised 42 percent of the rural population but made up 74 percent of the sharecropping landless (Lampe 2000:82). This fostered a growing sense of frustration and resentment amidst the Serb population. At the same time, Bosnian Muslims were increasingly concerned about maintaining their cultural autonomy within the predominantly Christian Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Growing nationalist tensions and struggles for political power culminated in the First Balkan War (1912-1913), during which Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria (the “Balkan League”) sought territory from the Ottoman Empire, which still laid claim to some of the region. The Balkan League was victorious and divided the majority of the Ottoman territories among themselves. Bulgaria was not satisfied with its territorial gain, however; several weeks later, in June 1913, it initiated the Second Balkan War by attacking some of its former allies. This war lasted several months. At its end, Serbia emerged with an increase in territory that almost doubled its claim from before the First Balkan War (Cigar 1995; NIOD Part 1 2002). This sparked a renewed commitment among Serbian politicians to the vision of Greater Serbia: now they aimed to create a

large southern Slav state to displace Habsburg rule. It also deepened anxieties between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia.

Peace in the region was short lived, and Bosnia's rule by numerous different political regimes continued. In 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand—the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne—and his wife in Sarajevo. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia shortly thereafter, triggering the beginning of World War I.¹²⁰

The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed during the war. In 1918, Balkan leaders created a new country—the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—in which united Slovenes, Kosovars, Serbs, Albanians, and Muslims could build a common life. King Alexander I formally ruled the Kingdom, which encompassed present-day Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, and several other areas within the region and later became known as the first Yugoslavia.

During the first Yugoslavia's early years, leaders attempted to integrate the diverse land, law, tax, and transport regimes of the constituent republics. Serbia was at the core of the Kingdom (Djokic 2007). Serbs comprised the numerical majority of the population (based on a pre-WWI census) and dominated the government and army leadership. Almost all of the 24 government ministers, as well as many army chiefs, were Serbian (NIOD Part 1 2002).

Not all citizens of the new country were happy with Serb dominance, making the unification of the various southern Slavic states into a single Kingdom more fragmented

¹²⁰ During the war, Croats and Slovenes fought in the Hapsburg Army against Serbs, and Croats created concentration camps for Serbs and Bosnians. Overall, Bosnia remained relatively sheltered during the war, though Austrian rulers displaced an estimated 100,000 Serbs from Eastern Bosnia (NIOD Part 1 2002).

than the name implied. There were constant struggles between Serb and Croat leaders over their different visions of a centralized or federalist state (Djokic 2007). Some Croats sought autonomy for Croatia, while Serb leaders generally championed the cause of a unitary Yugoslavian state. Meanwhile, Bosnian Muslims retained a degree of cultural and religious autonomy and sought to maintain ties to Turkey (Burg and Shoup 1999). Soon, new political parties formed to advance these different goals, and, as in Rwanda, they developed along ethnic lines (NIOD Part 1 2002).¹²¹ The parties politicized and polarized ethnicities to a degree previously unseen.

Fearing growing political threat inside the kingdom and from other countries, King Alexander tightened his reins in 1928, suspending the constitution and installing a monarchic dictatorship. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes officially became known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and Alexander undertook authoritarian measures to end the country's disunity and created a more centralized Yugoslav identity (NIOD Prologue 2002; Djokic 2007). He encouraged citizens to think in terms of Yugoslav allegiance rather than ethnic-based nationalism, and he jump-started the economy with an industrialization program.

Alexander's rule was cut short when he was assassinated during a visit to Marseilles in 1934. The path to a more centralized Yugoslavia continued, and in some ways strengthened, under the leadership of Prince Regent Paul and Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovic and their new political party, whose slogan was "one state, one people, one king" (Lampe 2000:176-8; Djokic 2007:106-120). Competing nationalisms continued to emerge, however, and remained salient (Djokic 2007).

¹²¹ See *Balkan Battlegrounds* (CIA 2002:122) for detailed information on the ethnically-based political parties.

Several years later, World War II broke out in Europe. Yugoslavia quickly declared its neutrality, but it was not an option for long, given Yugoslavia's geographic position between Hitler's Russian front, Germany, Italy, and the Adriatic passage to North Africa. In 1941, Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact (with Germany, Italy, and Japan). The signing of the Pact was swiftly followed by a military coup led by a group of Serb officers who protested against Prince Paul's decision to join the Axis powers. Hitler was furious and was determined to destroy the new regime (Lampe 2000).

Germany bombed the Yugoslav city of Belgrade, forcing the country's new leadership to capitulate. Nazi troops took control of many urban centers in Serbia, and Yugoslavia was partitioned into a Croatian state under Nazi rule. The Ustashe, a Croatian fascist and terrorist organization, led the state for the Nazis, and the rest of Yugoslavia was either occupied or annexed (Djokic 2007).

Under Croatian Ustashe occupation, Bosnia experienced a rule of terror characterized by atrocities against Serbs and some Muslims. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs were killed in the early years of the war. Croats dominated the region, and Ustashe leaders took action to implement parts of the "Final Solution" of exterminating Jews and other "undesirables," including Yugoslavian Serbs. Ustashe leaders forced well over 140,000 people to migrate from Serbia to other regions, such as Bosnia and Croatia, and many others were interned in concentration camps (Lampe 2000). In response to the terror, Serb nationalists organized the Chetnik movement, which called for an end to the persecution of Serbs and a "Homogenous Serbia" (Cigar 1995). As a Bosnian activist shared with me, "Multiple atrocities were committed against Serbs. And they didn't forget it. It became part of their identity as Serbian" (Bosnia, March 2013). Meanwhile,

Serbs and other Yugoslavs who were opposed to the Ustashe and Axis powers joined the Communist Party, helping to organize the Partisan resistance movement. The Partisans supported a unified, federal Yugoslavia and opposed the involvement of Italian and German powers.

After the defeat of the Axis powers and the military victory of the Partisans, the Allied powers supported the Communists in reconstituting Yugoslavia (Burg and Shoup 1999). The Communist Party quickly consolidated power and declared that all ethnic groups were welcome. Calls for “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia” were discredited, and Chetnik and Ustashe groups were banned. In the pursuit of a more unified country, the government also banned religious education and did not tolerate Islam.¹²² They prohibited Islamic courts and the wearing of the veil. These religious prohibitions were designed to grant all Yugoslavs equal opportunities for economic, social, and political advancement.

The constitution renamed the country the Federal Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six autonomous republics (the Socialist Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), an autonomous district, and an autonomous province. This reflected the pre-1914 regional territories, though Serbia had an advantage, as the capital was in Belgrade. Serbs also had a disproportionate share of the posts in the government, military, judicial system, Communist Party, and economic infrastructure (Cigar 1995).

¹²² Earlier versions of the census contained categories such as “Muslim Serb” and “Muslim Croat,” but, by 1953, the category “Muslim” was absent from the census. Muslims were again recognized in the 1963 Bosnian census.

After having lead the Partisans to victory, Josip Broz Tito emerged as the chief architect of the new Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. He became provisional leader of the country and was elected soon after. He began strengthening the country immediately. In 1948, Tito broke ties with Stalin's Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union), and, as a result, Yugoslavia enjoyed more autonomy than many other communist regimes. He drew upon Stalinist, fear-based tactics to rule the country, though Tito also emphasized Communism and Yugoslav identities over ethnic and religious identities. He implemented widespread economic and agricultural reforms, and during the 1960s, brought a period of widespread economic success to Yugoslavia. Within Bosnia, Tito was exceptionally popular. As a Bosnian lawyer recalled, "When Tito took over, he said now we will stop talking about what happened to the Serbs or the Bosnians or whoever. We will all be brothers and sisters... live in unity" (Bosnia, April 2013).

Bosnians have various opinions about whether this unity was really achieved. Some argue it covered a deeper simmering conflict, much like Habyarimana's regime in Rwanda appeared more stable than its predecessors to outsiders. Others insist that Tito's Yugoslavia was a glorious period with high levels of ethnic tolerance, prosperity, and urban cultural renaissances in centers like Sarajevo. A former political prisoner, now diplomat in Bosnia shared:

In the Tito's time, all criminals were in the prisons. Right now, most of the criminals are our ministers. In Tito's time, you were free to leave your car unlocked. Right now, you need to take the chain and to take your car to the tree, because there is no security. Probably the most important is that passport we had in ex-Yugoslavia; we didn't have visas. You could travel anywhere (Bosnia, May 2013).

Either way, Tito helped maintain some peace within the region. Cold War politics helped maintain equilibrium, too: Yugoslavia was courted by both the Soviet Union and the United States, and it had continually better relations with the West.¹²³ Yet, the country's need to stand on its own between the two global powers also influenced a heavy reliance on internal trade. Of all the Eastern European Community countries, only Romania and Albania had a lower level of foreign trade per capita between 1950 and 1965 (Woodward 1995).¹²⁴

After almost four decades of rule, Tito died in May 1980. Over the next few years, economic and political crisis emerged. Massive outmigration and movement away from rural peasant villages after WWII meant that some 9 million people had either moved within Yugoslavia or moved abroad. Many Serbs with education or skills left Bosnia in favor of Zagreb or Belgrade, generally more cosmopolitan cities, so the demographic plurality of Serbs was reversed in favor of Bosnian Muslims (Lampe 2000). After the international oil crisis in the 1970s and a host of other macroeconomic fluctuations, incomes had also begun to decline. Youth unemployment was increasing rapidly—by 1985, 38.7 percent of those under age 25 were unemployed (Woodward 1995). Across Yugoslavia as a whole, one million people were registered as unemployed (ibid).

These crises occurred in part under international watch. When Bosnia hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics, international attention focused on the region. In this context, nationalism was also on the rise. Serbia, in particular, saw nationalism parallel the rise of

¹²³ See NIOD 2002 Prolouge for numerous examples of these relationships.

¹²⁴ In 1963, the country formally changed its name to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Josip Broz Tito was named President for Life.

Slobodan Milošević, who ascended through the political ranks to become President of Serbia in 1989.

Milošević was previously well known for his pro-Serb rhetoric (NIOD 2002; Ramet 2006). Shortly after he was elected President, he gave one of his most prominent speeches, coinciding with the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, a military defeat of the medieval Serbian kingdom by the Ottoman Empire. The speech emboldened Serb nationalists who expressed grievances against the Muslim “Turks”—a term that racialized the ethnic group by suggesting that they were outsiders and settler peoples rather than native peoples¹²⁵—and suggested that violence might be necessary to secure Serb interests. It also furthered a populist movement that aimed to dismiss former Communist officials in favor of leaders who would ensure the protection of Serbs (Mann 2005). Milošević put the interests of Serbia ahead of the interests of Yugoslavia as a whole, promising a compact form of federalism that would defend Serbs anywhere they lived. By the end of the decade, ethnic rhetoric was again in full swing.

Partly as a result of Milošević’s increasingly polarizing politics and his growing control over the entire region, discrimination against Muslims also became more prominent throughout the late 1980s. Media attacks against Muslims in Bosnia as well as Albanian Muslims in Kosovo were prevalent, and public figures expressed their disdain at the minarets seen throughout Bosnia. More than 200 prominent academics from the Serbian Academy of Arts drafted the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1986) (Lampe 2000). Much like the Hutu 10 Commandments, this document

¹²⁵ As in the previous chapter, I utilize the term “ethnicity” because the groups celebrated and embraced a self-defined group membership. Yet, in the decades prior to the genocide, Serbs (and, to a lesser degree, Croats) increasingly constructed Bosniaks as outsiders and settler peoples, thus racializing the group.

claimed that Muslims threatened Serbian existence and that Serbs were repressed. It also expressed support for the quest for a Greater Serbia, arguing that the Serbian people did not have their own state.¹²⁶ Much in line with this, the Serbian Orthodox Church characterized Islam as alien, primitive, and aggressive. Inflammatory rhetoric about Muslims even appeared in official Church publications (Cigar 1995; Sells 1998).

As communist parties across Europe buckled and the Cold War came to an end, Yugoslavia's political system effectively ceased to function. As Woodward put it, within Yugoslavia, "There was no longer any uncontested authority... this political opening and free-for-all also encouraged others to pursue ambitions of political power and avenge perceived wrongs. The more the system dissolved, the greater was the incentive to seize the moment" (1995:116).

Representatives from the region gathered for the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990. The Serbian delegation, led by Milošević, attempted to secure power for Serbs by emphasizing greater control for the Federation. Conversely, the Slovenes sought reform that would result in greater power for the republics and less for the Federation. The Serbian delegation blocked Slovene proposals, and during debate, the Slovenian delegation literally stood up and left the Congress, followed by the Croatian delegation (Lampe 2000). They had been pushed to their breaking points.

In 1990, both Slovenia and Croatia held elections and threatened secession. Croatia's threats of secession and efforts to arm itself particularly pressured Serbia, whose leaders hoped to control all of Yugoslavia, and a series of conflicts unfolded

¹²⁶ This document did not advocate violence as blatantly as the Hutu 10 Commandments.

between Croatia and Serbia.¹²⁷ Kosovo declared independence in July 1990, adding an additional threat to Serbia, whose hold on power seemed to be unraveling much like the Rwandan Hutu government's power appeared to be unraveling during the Arusha Accord peace process.

On June 21, 1991, Croatia declared independence with a three-month moratorium. Slovenia followed on June 25, 1991. Determined to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav National Army (JNA) invaded Slovenia and Croatia. The JNA soon abandoned fighting in Slovenia and focused on Croatia, butting heads with its President, Franco Tudjman.¹²⁸ While the republics had territorial defense units,¹²⁹ the JNA vastly outnumbered the Croatian forces. Many Croatians were killed, and the forced displacement that followed presaged some of what was to take place in Bosnia—some scholars have since called it a “dress rehearsal” for the events in Bosnia (Cigar 1995).¹³⁰ Sporadic shelling of Bosnia from the Serbian side of the Drina River began, though the precise patterns and perpetrators are not well documented (Cigar 1995; NIOD 2002).

As Yugoslavia was crumbling, the international community became involved in discussions and plans for the future of the region. A number of peace plans, such as the Vance Owen Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, were proposed, but none was successful. The United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the entire

¹²⁷ See *Balkan Battlegrounds* (CIA 2002) for additional information on these conflicts.

¹²⁸ Again, as this chapter focuses on Bosnia, I will not be reviewing the events in Croatia in depth. Instead, I refer the reader to *Balkan Battlegrounds* (CIA 2002) and numerous works on the collapse of Yugoslavia.

¹²⁹ For a detailed analysis of the armed forces, see the work of Smail Cekic.

¹³⁰ Macedonia also declared independence in September 1991, though this was met with far less resistance.

region in September 1991 (Resolution 713). However, the effects of this embargo were mostly felt by Bosnia, as Serbia had control of the Yugoslav National Army and Croatia had been smuggling weapons through its position on the coast (Cigar 1995; NIOD 2002). The United Nations also created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February, sending peacekeepers to Croatia to monitor a cease-fire.¹³¹

Meanwhile, in Bosnia, public opinion about whether to follow other republics in secession was divided. Calls for change were common, as the situation within Bosnia was increasingly dire. Although Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović had declared the country was neutral in the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats, Bosnia was suffering. Its economy took a hit, as both Croatia and Serbia decreased exports to Bosnia (NIOD Part 1 2002). In addition, Muslims were increasingly targets of physical attacks (Cigar 1995).

During this period, Serb leaders in Serbia and in Bosnia amplified their calls for Serbs to protect themselves, declaring that they had been victims before and would not be again. Since the mid-1980s, Serbian popular culture had generated an obsessive sentiment that Serbs had been wronged throughout history—that they were the “Jews of the Balkans” (Ramet 2005:17). This sentiment was expressed in folk music, sporting events, and the media. In 1989, Serbian authorities even dug up mass graves from WWII to show their population how Serbs had been persecuted in the recent past (Ramet 2005). These sentiments only rose with anti-Serb rhetoric from Croatian President Tudjman.

Between September and November 1991, Serbs declared five autonomous Serb regions within Bosnia. Serbs in those regions began to assemble paramilitaries, were mobilized, trained, and armed by the JNA. In many ways, this echoes the training of self-

¹³¹ In June 1992, this mandate was extended to aiding Bosnia.

defense groups before the violence in Rwanda. These groups were designed to protect Serb citizens if Bosnia declared independence, at which point Serb leaders warned that Serbs might be at risk of attack. A former soldier explained, “They were like special units of the Yugoslav Army. But they called them paramilitaries, and why? Because they [the JNA] are not responsible” (Bosnia, April 2013).

In late November, the newspaper *Slobodna Bosna* published a secret plan showing that the JNA was planning to work with the Bosnian Serb Army (also known as the Army of Republika Srpska) and the paramilitaries to blockade Sarajevo. One month later, the JNA started digging in artillery in the hills surrounding Sarajevo.

Simultaneously, the General of the Bosnian Serb Army, Major General Ratko Mladić, began organizing volunteer formations, recruiting almost 70,000 men (NIOD Part 1 2002) and setting up “crisis staffs” of army members and Serb police around Bosnia.¹³²

All too familiar to Rwanda, these crisis staffs were organized around the idea of preparing for impending threats to Serbs. On December 5th, the Bosnian Serb Army created the Serb Republic of Bosnia (also known as Republika Sprksa). The Serb Republic of Bosnia then declared independence on January 9, 1992 (Weitz 2003). It was not recognized internationally or by the government of Bosnia, but its mobilization continued.

Many Bosniaks, as numerous respondents shared with me, still viewed their region as a place where people of different ethnicities married, worked together, and coexisted. They generally did not anticipate the violence. Some, however, fled the region

¹³² Note that the crisis staffs were part of a larger written plan—the “Organization and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances”—to take over municipalities in Bosnia.

in light of increasing instability.

On January 15, 1992, the European Communities (forerunner of the European Union) recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states, and many countries recognized them shortly afterward.¹³³ On February 29, 1992, President Izetbegović called for a referendum on Bosnian independence—strongly favored by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats and strongly opposed by Bosnian Serbs (who boycotted the referendum). Bosnian leaders put a provisional coalition government in place. Serbia refused to recognize Bosnian independence, however, and claimed it owned much of the land in Bosnia.

The next day, a Muslim reportedly shot a Serb during a Serb wedding in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Like the rumored attack of an influential Hutu by Tutsis in the late 1950s, Bosnian Serb leaders used this incident to illustrate the threat of Muslims (author interviews). Many Serbs feared attacks by their Bosniak or Croat neighbors, just as Hutus feared attack by the RPF. The next day, Serb paramilitaries were stationed around Sarajevo. Thousands of citizens took to the streets to protest the paramilitary presence, however, and no violence took place.

Two weeks later, international peace talks began in Sarajevo. Serb, Muslim, and Croat leaders agreed on a framework for establishing ethnic cantons in Bosnia (called the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan). While all of the leaders signed, the agreement fell through only days later. Fighting broke out in parts of Bosnia, including the towns of Bosanski Brod in the north, Jajce and Mostar in the center, and Neum in the south. Almost exactly

¹³³ Due to several other issues, such as Greek opposition, Macedonia was not recognized until April 1993.

two years prior to Rwandan President Habyarimana's plane crash, Bosnia teetered on the verge of war and genocide.

Descent into Violence

On April 5, 1992, the European Communities recognized Bosnia as an independent state. Previously, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had suggested that if Bosnia were recognized, it would not survive, leading, instead, to the annihilation of Muslims (Berg and Shoup 2000:78). As soon as Bosnia was declared independent, the longest siege of a capital city in modern history began.¹³⁴

As noted, the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) had already begun to dig artillery into the hills of Sarajevo, a capital city with roughly 525,000 inhabitants (1991 Yugoslav Census). In conjunction with the JNA, Bosnian Serb troops quickly surrounded the city on April 5th. The citizens of Sarajevo took to the streets, and while they protested peacefully as they had the previous month, troops shot several protestors, marking the first casualties of the siege. A protestor showed me a tattered photo from that day in which he was carrying a wounded man:

This is photo, my photo from the 5th of April 1992... I attended peace demonstration, demonstration against war. And then the Yugoslavian People's Army... started to shoot us demonstrators... So this guy [points at picture]... was so wounded I had to take him to help (Bosnia, March 2013).

Protestors surrendered, and the First Corps Sarajevo, the Bosnian defense force, was unable to defend the city against the Bosnian Serb Army. In fact, during the early part of the Siege, Sarajevo relied upon gangs—as they had access to the existing weapons—to defend the city. Despite their defense, they too were far outnumbered, and Serb forces

¹³⁴ For an in-depth understanding of the daily events of the siege, see the Study of the Siege of Sarajevo (United Nations 1994).

gradually took over the perimeter of Sarajevo.

By May 2nd, the Bosnian Serb Army had completely blockaded the city. They controlled all roads and the airport, and they cut off food supplies and medicine. They cut off the water and electricity.¹³⁵ The Bosnian Serb Army instituted curfews for Muslims, dismissed Muslims from their jobs, and prohibited Muslims from sending their children to schools (Weitz 2003). Bosniak houses in some areas of the city were ransacked, and many men were forced to move into makeshift prison camps.¹³⁶

Beyond controlling access to basic needs, the Serb Army regularly bombarded Sarajevo with mortars, tanks, artillery, and guns. “Sniper Alley” became particularly well known for its danger; snipers targeted civilians from their perches in high-rise buildings. The citizens of Sarajevo were in constant fear:

The siege was terrible. We were always afraid... always thinking that we were going to be killed. Walking outside was always danger, for three years...But, we also carried on. We put on plays for children indoors. We tried to find food. We, well, we did the best we could with the situation (Bosnia, April 2013).

The bombardment of Sarajevo was strongest at the beginning of the conflict, and it resulted in many deaths. As Figure 4.2 shows, the deadliest month was June 1992, when 1,706 people were killed. Bombardment continued throughout the siege, and in later months, several particularly deadly shells hit the market in Sarajevo. Overall, over 12,000 civilians¹³⁷ were killed (Cekić 2009; RDC 2013) and estimates suggest an additional 56,000 were wounded (UN 1994).


¹³⁵ The UN Mission was able to bring some supplies by air.

¹³⁶ As explained in more detail below, Serbs set up the majority of concentration camps, though Bosniaks and Croats also set up makeshift camps.

¹³⁷ This number is from a slightly earlier version of the Bosnian Book of the Dead (used in the analysis presented in Table 4.8). The newest version is slightly updated, but the basic trends remain the same.

Many homes and apartments were also destroyed or severely damaged during the siege. Other buildings were systematically targeted, including television, radio, and newspaper stations, as well as the Holiday Inn, where foreign journalists resided. Some of the shelling was indiscriminate, but some homes were targeted. Further, Serb areas of the city were rarely, if ever, hit. Muslim areas were hit more regularly and with more force (UN 1994).

Figure 4.2: Siege of Sarajevo Deaths



Note: The data are described in the methodology section.

Elsewhere in the country, violence took a similar pattern, though most cities toppled more quickly than Sarajevo, avoiding lengthy sieges. Many times, armed Serb paramilitaries worked with the Bosnian Serb Army to take the towns, doing the “dirty work” for the armies themselves (Hughes 1962). For example, Serb paramilitaries began erecting roadblocks in Prijedor, a region and city in northwestern Bosnia, on April 14, 1992. UN Observers were withdrawn two weeks later; and two days after they were withdrawn, the Serb Prijedor Crisis Staff took over all government offices within the city. Many non-Serbs lost their jobs, and residents were required to carry identification papers.

The local radio stations, such as Radio Prijedor and Kozarski Vjesnik, began to slander non-Serbs, illustrating that while propaganda spread through radio was likely a more important factor in the violence in Rwanda, it played a role in the violence in Bosnia as well (UN Commission Report 1994).¹³⁸

As Bosnian Serb forces took over smaller towns within the municipality of Prijedor, non-Serbs were required to wear white armbands and hang white flags from the windows of their homes (reminiscent of the yellow stars Jews were forced to wear during the Holocaust). As in Sarajevo, forces ransacked many of the houses, sending many people to concentration camps. The camps at Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm have become particularly notorious.¹³⁹ Once places of industry, these camps were filled with thousands of people, starting in late May of 1992. Serb forces usually separated men and women, often raping women in front of their family members. Both men and women were sent to camps, though men were usually sent to more notorious death camps, such as Omarska.

In the camps, living conditions were dire. People were crammed together, regularly deprived of food and water. Many died of starvation and malnutrition, while others were executed outright. Mirsad, a survivor of Omarska, told me the violence was not just physical. At night, the guards would walk outside and drag clubs, psychologically torturing those inside. They laid awake, knowing that, at any moment, they could be beaten or even killed (Fieldnotes, April 2013).

¹³⁸ I am unable to quantitatively test the role of the radio, as Rwanda had state-controlled radio stations, while Bosnia had local stations that were controlled by interim governments and other parties.

¹³⁹ Omarska and Keraterm were known as death camps, while Trnopolje was a transit camp with higher percentages of women and elderly. Serb political prisoners were also kept in the camps.

Mosques and other buildings that represented Muslim culture were destroyed, while “Muslim” named streets and cities were changed to Serb names in a concerted effort to eradicate Muslim culture. Though I do not analyze this form of victimization in great detail, the changing of names and the destruction of places of worship were meant to erase the very memory of a people.

The pattern in Prijedor was repeated throughout the country, though the most infamous violence occurred several years later in Srebrenica, a town and municipality located in the Drina River Valley in Northeastern Bosnia. It occupied a strategic position as a territorial area adjacent to Serbia. As Bosnian and Serb forces struggled for control of the area, the United Nations declared the city to be one of several Safe Areas in 1993 (Resolution 819). Shortly afterward, UN Peacekeeping troops were stationed there, and approximately 25,000 displaced people sought refugee within its borders.

Despite the Safe Area designation, Serb forces remained close and refused to withdraw their weapons. In March 1995, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić issued Directive 7, which instructed his soldiers to “...create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica” (ICTY Indictment, IT-04-80-I). After several months of sporadic violence, Serb forces began their offensive against Srebrenica and took the city in early July.

While the 25,000 Bosniak civilians gathered in Srebrenica and in the neighboring village of Potočari expected protection from the UN soldiers, they did not receive it.¹⁴⁰ Hasan Nuhanović, the interpreter for the Dutch forces assigned to protect Srebrenica as a

¹⁴⁰ For a detailed account of the violence in Srebrenica and Potočari, including why Dutch peacekeepers turned displaced peoples away, see Nuhanović 2007 and the ICTY proceedings.

Safe Area, explained that, after negotiating with Serb forces, the Dutch peacekeepers ordered the displaced peoples to leave (Bosnia, April 2013). Nuhanović had to translate this request, effectively giving thousands of men, including every member of his own immediate family, a death sentence.

With nowhere left to turn, the displaced Bosniaks were at the mercy of the Serb forces. Serbs began gathering the displaced peoples and separating them by sex, victimizing women and generally sending them away on buses. Many of the men attempted to flee for nearby territory controlled by the Bosnian army. While some of these men were soldiers, the majority of them were not. Boys were loaded onto buses; and many men of military age were taken to a building known as the “White House,” where many were killed both in the building and in the surrounding forest (Fieldnotes April 2013). A column of men tried to flee, and they were hunted down by the Serb Army and massacred, resulting in the murder of approximately 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in just a few days.¹⁴¹

Nuhanović also fled, realizing that the Dutch peacekeeping forces would not offer him protection. As he shared his story, he explained that killing continued after the main massacre:

When we came to Tuzla after [the] Srebrenica massacre, it was actually still going on. It took the Serbs several weeks to kill these people, although most of these people were killed within 72 hours... But they continued the killing for weeks, hunting people in the woods... (Bosnia, April 2013).

This massacre—known to the world by the name “Srebrenica”—was the largest that took place during the violence in Bosnia. It also marked the West’s most forceful

¹⁴¹ The majority of those killed were from the column of men who had tried to escape. For a much more detailed depiction of the events of the massacre, see Nuhanović 2007.

intervention. Numerous previous interventions by the United Nations, NATO, the European Community, and individual states could not stop the violence. But, the massacre at Srebrenica and Potočari, as well as a deadly Serb mortar attack in Sarajevo in August 1995, led to major NATO air strikes against Serbia. The violence was largely ended, and a few months later, the Dayton Accords were signed, declaring a ceasefire.¹⁴²

Patterns of Violence in Bosnia

Chapter 1 provided a brief overview of the definition of genocide. As the complex case of Bosnia is often considered a war, with some questioning the label of genocide, it is useful to revisit this definition. To do so, I consider the form of violence, the scale of the violence, and the type of victimization, all directly relevant for the forthcoming analysis of the number of soldiers killed, the number of civilians killed, and the number of concentration camps. While I suggested in Chapter 1 that sociologists need not be constrained by the legal definition of genocide, most scholars who argue that these events in Bosnia were not genocide draw upon this definition, so I use it to engage those arguments.

Although a comparatively small number of the killings that took place in Rwanda could be classified as a civil war—namely, when the RPF re-invaded Rwanda and fought the interim government—there is overwhelming consensus and evidence that the majority of the killings were a result of genocide. In Bosnia, the line becomes less clear. Some believe it was only a war, while others believe it was both a war and a genocide. In the abstract, differentiating between the two is feasible. Civil war can be defined as “armed

¹⁴² Most interview respondents in Bosnia did not believe that the violence was over when the Dayton accords were signed, and many felt that violence was ongoing. This dissertation does not analyze ongoing violence.

combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006:5), while international war takes place outside of the boundaries of a recognized sovereign. Genocide shares many similarities with war, though genocide is distinguished by the *intent to destroy a social group*. As discussed in Chapter 1, this could be an ethnic group, a religious group, or one of many other types of groups, though it is also generally a civilian group rather than a group of active soldiers engaged in two-sided combat. Even those killed during a civil war can be conceptualized as a social group, but the particular collective intent of soldiers is generally not to destroy their enemy but to win the war. Destruction through battle is a means to achieve victory, not a goal in itself.

Kalvyas’s (2006) typology of mass political violence (displayed in Table 4.1) is useful for further distinguishing between the production of violence and the aims of violence. Kalyvas distinguishes between whether the violence is unilateral or bilateral, as well as whether the political actor intends to govern the targeted population. According to him, genocide occurs in unilateral situations in which the political actor does *not* intend to govern the population targeted. To be clear, intent is also necessary for genocide—as genocide involves the intent to destroy a group. In addition, genocide is not necessarily unilateral but rather uneven.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, this typology is useful for understanding differences between forms of violence. Specifically, the intention of future governance is

¹⁴³ No genocide, even the Holocaust, has gone without uprising among the victims. In Rwanda, people fought the genocidaires in Bisesero for weeks. In Bosnia, Bosnian paramilitaries and the Bosnian armed forces fought both Serb and Croat forces, and all sides engaged in war crimes (just as the RPF in Rwanda engaged in war crimes as they attempted to stop the genocide). This does not negate the actions of the perpetrators, however: it is *their* intended actions rather than responses to those actions that constitute genocide.

important. During genocide, perpetrators seek to destroy the victim groups whether through killing, forced removal from land, or forced destruction of culture—in none of these cases does the actor intend to govern the population.

Table 4.1: Kalyvas Typology of Mass Political Violence

	Aims of Violence: Political Actor Intends to Govern the Population Targeted	
Production of Violence	Yes	No
Unilateral	State terror	Genocide and mass deportation
Bilateral	Civil war violence	Reciprocal extermination

Differentiating between forms of violence becomes more difficult when genocide and civil war occur at the same time. Many unarmed Bosniak citizens were targeted due to group membership, though there was also a Bosniak army fighting on their behalf. On the side of the perpetrators, Serbs (and, to a lesser degree, Croats) were attempting to defeat armies while simultaneously terrorizing Bosniak citizens and, at times, fighting each other. Thus, genocide and war occurred concurrently, and genocide could even be considered a strategy of war (with additional aims). It becomes virtually impossible to completely distinguish which killing may have been genocidal in intent and which would be better classified as war. However, each killing does not need to be motivated by genocidal intent in order to constitute genocide. Rather, the actions of leaders, as well as the broader structural plan, constituted genocide and classify the violence as such.¹⁴⁴ Genocide, in other words, is a collection of actions that, together, constitute a distinct

¹⁴⁴ See the many documents at the ICTY for proof of intent.

social phenomenon.

As noted in Chapter 1, many scholars have debated the scale on which genocide occurs, and Bosnia has been central to many of these discussions. Recall that the legal definition of genocide includes “the intent to destroy, *in whole or in part*, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” (Genocide Convention 1948, emphasis added). Some question the meaning of “in part,” with international trials at the ICTY concluding that the destruction of 8,000 Bosniak men at Srebrenica constituted genocide in itself (ICTY). As social science does not need to follow or constrain itself to legal guidelines, scholarly definitions should also be unbound from any form of numeric threshold. Such intent to completely destroy a people, as in Rwanda or the Holocaust, is often envisioned as necessary, partially due to the influence of the Holocaust on the definition and conceptualization of genocide. However, actions taken with the aim of destroying a group of people, even if it is not the *entire* group of people, based on their social group qualifies as genocide. This took place between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia.

The violence in Bosnia (and discussions of numeric thresholds) also brings into question the type of victimization that takes place during genocide. The legal definition of genocide includes killing as just one of five genocidal acts, though almost every scholarly definition focuses on killing. As noted in Chapter 1, some, like Horowitz (1976), believe killing should be a main aspect of the definition because it is irreversible. But, elimination of cultural ways of life and the psychological effects of rape and many other forms of sexualized violence are often irreversible as well. Others point to the fact that all of the genocides that have occurred during the 20th century involved killing, which is important yet should not constrain definitions.

Genocides *do* involve killing, though the form of violence during genocide can vary, as any actions intended to destroy a social group can be genocidal. In the previous chapter, it became clear that killing was a dominant form of violence in Rwanda. In Bosnia, killing was also a key form of violence, aimed particularly at men.¹⁴⁵ Throughout Bosnia, it followed a pattern not unlike what unfolded in Srebrenica. As an ICTY judgment noted,

Most of the mass executions followed a well-established pattern. The men were first taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being detained there for some hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks and taken to another site for execution. Usually, the execution fields were in isolated locations. The prisoners were unarmed and, in many cases, steps had been taken to minimize resistance, such as blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind their backs with ligatures or removing their shoes. Once at the killing fields, the men were taken off the trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those who survived the initial round of gunfire were individually shot with an extra round, though sometimes only after they had been left to suffer for a time. Immediately afterwards, and sometimes even during the executions, earth moving equipment arrived and the bodies were buried, either in the spot where they were killed or in another nearby location (ICTY Krstić Judgment 2001).

As the brief example of Prijedor illustrated, forced displacement and internment were also prominent. Such violence has since become associated with the euphemism “ethnic cleansing,” undertaken to “cleanse” an area of unwanted people. To “ethnically cleanse” a city, Serbian paramilitary forces (sometimes with the assistance of the JNA and Serb armed forces) began by taking over the city. In many cases, Serbian residents were told to leave before violence began. Then, the homes of non-Serbs, particularly Bosniaks, were targeted for destruction (UN Commission Report 1994). As in Prijedor, cultural monuments and buildings, such as mosques, were often destroyed; and

¹⁴⁵ While I do not consider it until Chapter 6—and even then consider it only briefly—it is important to note that cultural notions attached to characteristics such as age, gender, sexuality, and other social groups likely also pattern forms of victimization.

paramilitaries raped, humiliated, and killed Bosniaks and looted their possessions. Serbian authorities would then seize the area. Bosniaks, as well as some Croats, would often be transferred to concentration camps or makeshift detention centers, where sexualized victimization, mass killing, torture, and other forms of victimization were common (UN Commission Report 1994). As noted above, sometimes men and women were separated at this stage.

There is much debate regarding whether such “ethnic cleansing” constitutes genocide, with some scholars and legal analysts differentiating between destruction as death and destruction as removal. The UN General Assembly has labeled ethnic cleansing genocide in a resolution (47/121). Yet, the European Court of Rights and others argue that ethnic cleansing is not genocide: the intent to destroy is different than the intent to remove. As there is no formal legal definition of ethnic cleansing, these scholars, as well as some political scientists, have classified it as a war crime or a crime against humanity.¹⁴⁶

Again, I have focused on the legal definition because those who argue that the violence was not a case of genocide almost exclusively cite the legal definition,

¹⁴⁶ In line with this, the Rome Statute (1998) provides the current international definition of crimes against humanity and war crimes, and scholars have generally accepted these definitions. Crimes against humanity (Article 7) are widespread and systematic attacks directed against any civilian population, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, group-based persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, or other similar acts that cause great physical or mental suffering. War crimes (Article 8) include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions that are part of a plan or large-scale commission and are differentiated from genocide and crimes against humanity because they occur in the context of armed conflict. Generally, ethnic cleansing is seen as a crime against humanity; however, the forced transfer of children is listed as a crime of genocide. Both war crimes and crimes against humanity are seen as distinct from the intent to destroy a social group.

suggesting that since the violence largely targeted men, it was not intended to destroy the entire population, thus was not ethnically motivated, thus was not genocide. Others have relied upon the legal definition and come to the opposite conclusion: that the violence was genocide (Cigar 1995; Cushman and Mestrovic 1996). Still others have gone beyond the legal definition. For example, Sells (1998) returns to Lemkin's definition of genocide, arguing that Lemkin never suggested that an entire community must be destroyed, but that genocide entails a plan to destroy a group's foundations of life. Bennett (1995) argues that ethnic cleaning is simply a euphemism for genocide, and numerous other genocide scholars consider the case in their studies (e.g., Alvarez 2001; Weitz 2003).

Indeed, as this dissertation is a sociological analysis of genocide, the legal definition takes a backseat to an analytic one. The actions reviewed here were intended to destroy a group, aligning with the scholarly definition of genocide I articulated in Chapter 1. As noted above, while destruction in Bosnia involved killing, it also involved forced removal, the ruin of places of cultural importance (like mosques), and the removal of the traces of a people by changing town and street names. In line with Bennett (1995), I treat ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide. In the subsequent analysis, consequently, I analyze patterns in killings but also in the location and number of concentration camps.

The Perpetrators¹⁴⁷

Violence took many forms in Bosnia, and several different groups of perpetrators were responsible for this violence. First, it is clear that, as in Rwanda, key figures in

¹⁴⁷ As I focus on genocide in this dissertation, I focus on the actions of Serb forces and paramilitaries in particular. This is not to suggest that Croat and Bosniak forces and paramilitaries did not commit violence or even grave human rights abuses and crimes, as they surely did. Rather, I chose to focus on Serb actions in particular because those actions were genocidal, while Croat and Bosniak actions were not. This is not to diminish the latter group's actions.

leadership positions within the government of both Bosnia (particularly Republika Srpska) and Serbia coordinated the violence. Second, as detailed above, the governments worked with a number of armed paramilitary groups. Third, as in Rwanda but to a much smaller degree, non-soldier citizens participated in the violence.

While there is not space (nor aim) to fully analyze the participation of key government officials and army leaders, it is clear that many leaders joined in planning the violence that unfolded in Bosnia. Many of these leaders were tried at the ICTY, though one of the key orchestrators of the violence—Slobodan Milošević—died before his trial was completed. Two of the other people most culpable for the violence, the President of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, and the chief of Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, Ratko Mladić, are currently on trial at the ICTY.¹⁴⁸

As in Rwanda, members of armies also participated in the violence. However, many of the armies also worked with paramilitaries, perhaps to allow the armies of states to distance themselves from culpability. Some of the paramilitaries were highly organized and moved around the country, while others were more loosely organized and operated in just one city. There were paramilitaries on every side of the conflict and all committed crimes, though Serb and Croat groups outnumbered Bosniak ones. Armies organized many of these unofficial militias, though political parties, local police, or community leaders organized others (UN 1994).

Some local people were recruited to join paramilitaries, while others assisted the military forces in other ways. A lawyer in Bosnia explained:

...there were also people who were really neighbors of other people, you know,

¹⁴⁸ For more on the orchestrators of the violence, see the many judgments and documents publicly available on the ICTY website.

and used to live in, let's say, harmony or at least, you know, some good neighborly relations... And so suddenly, war starts, they take on guns, and they attack their neighbors. So this was, I think, a complete shock to the people who survived. The person who helped you when your baby was born, or you were drinking coffee with them every day, and suddenly they take on guns... I don't know about other conflicts, but it was quite specific for Bosnia and Herzegovina, that you really had neighbors that at one point overnight turned against you (Bosnia, April 2013).

Numerous survivors of concentration camps attested that it was their neighbors who had brought them to the camp or who had tortured them; others recalled local police, firefighters, and other members of their communities joining paramilitaries or more loosely organized groups.

Disaggregating the Violence

As with Rwanda, violence in Bosnia is often discussed in the aggregate (with the exception of Srebrenica and a few other locations). Indeed, there have been few attempts to analyze regional and temporal variation in violence in Bosnia, which has received comparatively less scholarly attention than Rwanda. To date, variation in killings has been analyzed in three existing studies. Weidmann (2011) sought to understand whether killings in municipalities in Bosnia were initiated “from above” or “from below.” In other words, he tested whether violence was linked to macro-political pursuits of territory (strategic importance) or to local ethnic conflicts (measured by local population of ethnic groups), concluding that both are important for understanding levels of killings within municipalities.^{149,150} In line with this, Beger (2012) argued that the distance from the

¹⁴⁹ Weidmann also controls for the impact of distance from borders, per capita income, road density, and urbanization, finding that none significantly impacted the rate of killing.

¹⁵⁰ While Weidmann's argument shows that ethnic composition and strategic importance must be considered, it is important to note that these are not mutually exclusive. In fact,

frontline must be included in discussions of the violence. Lastly, Costalli and Moro (2009, 2011, 2012) examined various indices of ethnic heterogeneity by municipality, including a temporal dimension and arguing that, over time, the frontline became a more important predictor of the level of violence than the ethnic composition of municipalities.

These three studies begin to paint a picture of the factors that influenced regional variation in killing, emphasizing ethnic heterogeneity, strategic importance, and the frontline. Yet, these studies have not analyzed camps or forced displacement, arguably the most prominent form of victimization during the conflict. Further, they conceptualize the violence as a civil war rather than a civil war and a genocide.

Thus, I analyze municipality-level variation in soldier deaths, civilian deaths, and the number of concentration camps (and explain the data in more detail below). This is the first study of Bosnia that disaggregates soldier and civilian deaths, beginning, however crudely, to differentiate between battle deaths and targeting killing of civilians. As an alternate measure of the targeting of civilians, I also test the number of concentration camps (again, this is also the first study to do so). Figure 4.3 shows the total number of killings in each municipality in Bosnia, while Figure 4.4 shows the location of concentration camps. As the figures illustrate, comparatively more killing took place in northern Bosnia and along the borders, and most concentration camps were located along borders.

To analyze what may have influenced this variation, I test a number of factors. These include factors that explain variation in violent crime and genocide, drawn from social disorganization theories as well as genocide studies. I analyze other micro-level

Kalyvas (2006) argues that ethnic composition influences strategic importance, as armed groups often target villages with low or moderate zones of control.

factors that have been found to influence variation in violence during civil war, such as population pressures and the movement of armed actors. Generally, I hypothesize that many factors influence the forms of violence in similar ways, and I focus on hypotheses linked to genocidal violence. However, analyzing soldier and civilian deaths separately, as well as a different form of genocidal violence, may lend insights to differences in determinants of distinct forms of violence. As many of these theories were reviewed in depth in Chapter 3, in this chapter, I limit the discussion to their potential applicability in the Bosnian case.

Figure 4.3 Deaths in Bosnia





Figure 4.4 Concentration Camps in Bosnia



Targeted Violence

As genocide targets certain groups, it is first necessary to examine whether the ethnic composition of communities influenced levels of victimization. Notably, this will

also test whether Bosniaks were targeted. Most simply, the percent Bosniak in a municipality may be linked to comparatively more victimization, as was the case for percent Tutsi in Rwanda. In addition, racial threat theories would suggest that relatively large numbers of Bosniaks may have been perceived as a threat by other groups in the municipality (Blalock 1967). Yet, there may also have been a threshold effect, as areas with a certain majority of Bosniaks may not have suffered as much victimization due to their clear dominance (Olzak 1990; Jacobs, Carmichael and Kent 2005).¹⁵¹

This idea also finds support in Tilly's (1978) argument that areas with a clear lack of control would see comparatively higher levels of violence and Kalyvas's (2006) idea that more violence takes place in zones of partial control. Yet, as Horowitz (1985) argued, conflict and violence may be most likely when an ethnic majority faces a large ethnic minority. As such, studies of political and ethnic violence have not only focused on the victim group but also on the relative composition of other ethnic groups within a region, pointing to the presence of two main groups as linked to violence. This is measured by polarization, which captures how far the distribution of the ethnic groups is from the (1/2, 0, ... 0, 1/2) distribution, a bipolar distribution that represents the highest level of polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Weidmann 2011). In other words, a measure of polarization is highest when two ethnic groups within a community are close to the same size.

To test these theories, I include a measure of *ethnic heterogeneity* (the probability

¹⁵¹ Recall that threshold effects were not as likely in Rwanda (at the geographic level studied), as no communes had a majority of Tutsis.

that two randomly drawn people are from different ethnic groups),¹⁵² a well-accepted measure of population heterogeneity. I also test measures of percent *Serb* and percent *Bosniak* as well as a *quadratic term for percent Bosniak* to test whether there is a threshold effect in line with racial threat theory. In addition, I test a measure of *ethnic polarization* to capture the presence of two polarized ethnic groups. *I hypothesize that ethnic fractionalization and percent Bosniak are associated with more killing and concentration campus within municipalities, though I also anticipate a threshold effect in line with racial threat theory. In addition, I hypothesize that more polarized regions have higher levels of victimization but that regions with more Serbs have lower levels of victimization.*¹⁵³

Community Organization

As noted in Chapter 3, criminologists have long studied the relationship between crime and space. They have found that certain factors linked to trust and cohesion in a community influence crime rates by neighborhood or region. These factors influence a community's ability to organize to prevent (or, feasibly, to commit) crime. While these theories have yet to be applied to the crime of genocide, Chapter 3 found that some factors associated with a community's ability to organize to prevent crime—such as

¹⁵² Note that religion and language each are highly correlated with ethnicity (approximately .95) and are not tested separately.

¹⁵³ As in Rwanda, an ideology that dictated that certain groups should be destroyed may have also influenced the level of victimization in different municipalities. There are few clear ways to measure the presence or spread of such ideologies for Bosnia, however. Namely, while the case of Prijedor illustrated that the radio did spread propaganda that discriminated against Bosniaks, this was municipality-specific and will not be explored. Furthermore, there is not evidence that discriminatory ideologies were spread through the curricula, as is further explored below. Thus, I test the presence of various ethnic groups, but do not have additional measures to explore for the presence or spread of ideologies that targeted those groups.

marriage and employment—are associated with lower rates of genocidal killing.

Notably, measures of community organization were easily applied to Rwanda, as the vast majority of perpetrators were “ordinary” citizens. In Bosnia, the perpetrators were primarily members of organized armies and paramilitaries but included citizens who were not members of armed groups. As such, it is questionable whether the theories that help explain regional variation in genocidal violence in situations where the majority of perpetrators are community members who were typically not formally organized prior to the violence (as in Rwanda) also apply. Nevertheless, as “ordinary” citizens often participated in the violence within their communities, including joining local paramilitaries, these theories may hold potential for explaining regional variation in killings and camp locations in Bosnia.

Beyond ethnic heterogeneity, which has a different meaning in the context of genocide, criminologists have argued that marital disruption is associated with higher rates of crime, linking the effect of marriage to social controls within the community (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989). This relationship has been found to hold for many forms of crime, such as homicide and burglary, and, in Chapter 3, genocide. Thus, I include a measure of *divorce* and *hypothesize that municipalities with higher percentages of divorce have higher levels of victimization*. Beyond this, I also test the percent of *intermarriage* between Serbs and Bosniaks. In line with theories that suggest that interethnic marriage positively influences social cohesion and social integration (Alba and Golden 1986; Merton 1941), *I hypothesize that municipalities with higher*

*percentages of intermarriage have lower levels of victimization.*¹⁵⁴

In addition, socioeconomic status has been linked to community-level crime. Shaw and McKay (1942), among many others (e.g., Byrne and Sampson 1986; Sampson and Groves 1989; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001), have illustrated that communities of lower socioeconomic status suffer from weaker organization and thus more crime. This theory of social (dis)organization is also in line with theories of political and ethnic violence that have found that violence is more likely in resource-poor countries (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and poorer regions within countries (e.g., Do and Iyer 2007). To measure this, I test the *unemployment level* and the *average salary of the average economy worker*, and I hypothesize that *unemployment and lower incomes are each associated with higher levels of victimization.*

Residential mobility has also been seen as a key indicator of disorganization linked to higher levels of crime (Shaw and McKay 1931; Sampson and Groves 1989). High levels of mobility may disrupt a community's network of social relations and act as a barrier to friendship bonds, which may make crimes more likely. To examine this, I test the percent of people who have *recently moved* in each municipality. In line with research in this vein, I hypothesize that *municipalities where a higher percentage of people have moved within the last five years will have higher levels of victimization.*

The percentage of youth and, in particular, young men may influence the rate of violence, as men may have been more likely to participate in the violence or to join paramilitaries within municipalities (Sutherland 1947; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983;

¹⁵⁴ Again, while this measure is not typically included in studies of community (dis)organization, it would feasibly influence community trust and cohesion and thus is similar to these other measures in many ways.

Farrington 1986; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Massoglia and Uggen 2010).¹⁵⁵ Scholars of ethnic and political violence have also argued that higher percentages of young men translate to more potential perpetrators (Collier 2000; Goldstone 2002; Urdal 2006), though criminology notably brings insights into how to interpret the prevalence of young men participating in violent crime, often linked to age-graded social controls (Laub and Sampson 1993) or age-graded notions of adulthood (Massoglia and Uggen 2010). Yet, unlike some of the other measures of social disorganization, this theory did not hold in the case of Rwanda, where I suggested that other factors in the model (like marriage) account for the lack of significance and also suggest that young men may have served in protective roles, staving off the onset of genocidal violence. Nevertheless, I include the percent of *young men*, defined as the men ages 15¹⁵⁶ to 29, and *hypothesize that higher percentages of young men are associated with higher rates victimization*.

Resource Competition

Population pressure and resource scarcity have not been cited as factors that motivated violence in Bosnia and also did not receive support in Chapter 3; nevertheless, they are theorized to motivate many forms of political and ethnic violence (Olzak 1990, 1992; Henderson 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999). In addition, strain induced by population pressure and resource scarcity has been linked to repression and increased

¹⁵⁵ As mentioned in Chapter 3, recent research on Rwanda has shown that those who participated were older than traditional research on age and crime would suggest, with a median age of 30-34 (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, unpublished). This research also found that 89% of participants in the genocide were men, echoing criminological studies of gender (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983) as well as genocide studies literature on perpetrators (Browning 1993; Mann 2000). In line with this, I test a variety of other age groups, including middle-aged men.

¹⁵⁶ Military age was 15 in the former Yugoslavia; thus, this is chosen as the lower threshold. Data are available in 5-year periods; thus, 25-29 is the upper threshold.

victimization in micro-level studies of civil war (Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Ostby et al. 2011). Thus, I include a measure of *arable land*, and I hypothesize that *municipalities with lower levels of arable land have higher levels of victimization*. I also include *population density*, and I hypothesize that *municipalities with higher population density have higher levels of victimization*.¹⁵⁷

Chapter 3 also found that education levels in Rwanda were associated with increased rates in killing, likely due to discriminatory curricula and to the socialization of students. In Bosnia, the education system had become segregated and polarized after the war, but there is little existing evidence of similar discriminatory messages or socialization in Bosnian schools in the decades leading to the war. Still, some studies have found that *general* education levels are related to higher levels of ethnic violence within a country (Lange and Dawson 2010; Lange 2011). In line with this and as outlined in the previous chapter, scholars have argued that educated individuals may be more likely to participate in violence, disenchanted by the difference between expectations and lived reality and emboldened to feel they should address these gaps (Gurr 1970; Goldstone 2002; Berrebi 2003). In the case of genocide, “other” groups are blamed for these gaps, in line with resource competition theories. I test both *literacy* levels and the percent of people who have *completed high school and college*, and I hypothesize that *education is linked to increased victimization*.

Organized Actors

As noted above, many groups committed violence in Bosnia. While some of the

¹⁵⁷ As I do not yet have access to the complete census, I am unable to test resource competition theories that would suggest that interethnic competition for employment would influence the levels of violence, as found in Chapter 3. Note that population is included as a control variable.

factors discussed to this point may have influenced citizens' decisions to participate in the violence or join paramilitaries, I must also account for the movements of key organized actors, including armies and paramilitaries. I hypothesize that these groups are key to understanding variation in the violence. Specifically, I test the presence of a number of *armed forces*, including the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), the Army of Republika Srpska, the Serb Republic of Krajina Army, the Croatian Defense Council, the Croatian Army, and the Bosnian Army.¹⁵⁸ *I hypothesize that the presence of each army is associated with increased victimization and, in particular, soldier deaths.* I also test whether the *frontline* influences victimization in line with Beger (2012), and *I hypothesize that the frontline is associated with higher levels of deaths but not the number of camps.*

As paramilitaries were often key to taking over a city and terrorizing citizens, the presence of paramilitaries (active on all sides of the conflict) likely influenced victimization within municipalities. I include measures to capture the presence of *Serb, Croat, and Muslim Paramilitaries*, and *I hypothesize that they are associated with higher victimization and that the effect of Serb Paramilitaries is stronger than that of Croat and Muslim paramilitaries.*

Lastly, as noted above, the UN declared the municipalities of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Zepa, Goražde, Tuzla, and Bihać as Safe Areas (UN Resolution 819 and Resolution 824). These areas were placed under the protection of the UN Peacekeeping Force, UNPROFOR, with hopes of decreasing victimization. While it is evident that the

¹⁵⁸ The Serb Republic of Krajina Army formed in March 1992 within the territory of Croatia, though it fought within Bosnia as well. Again, see *Balkan Battlegrounds* (2002) and the work of Smail Cekić for more details on these forces.

designation of a Safe Area did not prevent the massacre at Srebrenica, this designation and the presence of UNPROFOR troops may have lowered total levels of victimization in other municipalities. Thus, I include a binary variable measuring whether a municipality was declared to be a *Safe Area* and *hypothesize that Safe Areas had lower levels of victimization.*

Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors

The historical and international context may have influenced regional variation in violence within Bosnia. As noted, territorial aims were part of a plan for Greater Serbia. In addition, municipalities bordering Serbia were easily accessed not only by Serb forces but also by JNA forces from Serbia. Thus, I include variables that measure whether a municipality *bordered Serbia* and *hypothesize that municipalities that bordered Serbia had higher levels of each type of victimization.*¹⁵⁹ As alternate measures, I also explore *distance from Serbia* and *distance from Croatia.*¹⁶⁰

Some territories within Bosnia were already under Serb control—declared Serbian Autonomous Regions—when the violence started. Thus, it is possible that these municipalities may have had higher levels of victimization, since Serbs were already present, though they may have seen lower levels of victimization if they were already securely under Serb control. To test these ideas, I include a binary variable for whether a municipality was declared to be a *Serbian Autonomous Region*, and *I hypothesize that these regions are associated with higher levels of victimization.*

¹⁵⁹ There were also plans for “Greater Croatia,” but the majority of municipalities bordered Croatia, so this cannot be tested well with a measure of contiguity with the border. However, the distance from Croatia may help test strategic importance to Croatia. In addition, I explored regions that bordered Serbian Krajina.

¹⁶⁰ Note that I also explored distance from Montenegro as well as from any international border.

As noted above, Serbia had agreed to the proposed division of Bosnia during the peace talks of March 1992. While the plan was short-lived, it is feasible that Serbia became attached to these territories (or, alternatively, that their importance to Serbia is reflected in the plan). I include a dummy variable for whether a municipality was assigned to Serbia in the *Carrington-Cutileiro Plan* and *hypothesize that these municipalities had higher levels of victimization*.¹⁶¹

Beyond territorial claims, Serb memories of atrocities committed during World War II may also have influenced variation in violence and mobilized people to participate. As one respondent explained,

...When within the family you have I don't know how many members slaughtered and you haven't found the bones... This sticks with you. However much you want to live in unity... you have at least this family memory of you know what happened. And you transfer that to your children and to the next generation and so far so long. So, I think that those narratives were used; they were, exaggerated to a certain extent... "The Muslims... were with the Ustashe; now it's time for us, for our revenge" (Bosnia, April 2013).

Indeed, those who organized and led the violence capitalized on the collective memories of Serb marginalization and atrocities during World War II. Although it is difficult to measure such collective memories quantitatively, I include a dummy variable capturing whether a *World War II Serb concentration camp* existed in the municipality, and I *hypothesize that regions with Serb concentration camps had higher levels of victimization*.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ As Serbia had owned a larger share of land in the Balkans that was taken away when Yugoslavia was formed. If this territory had included part of Bosnia, I would have tested these municipalities as well.

¹⁶² I am in the process of obtaining data on the presence of memorials to Serb victims of World War II, as these memorials may indicate and perpetuate a strong collective memory of the violence. I am also attempting to collect data on massacres of Serbs during World War II.


Regional variation in violence may be facilitated by several other factors. In particular, conditions favorable to insurgency have been found to be one of the strongest predictors of civil war at both macro (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and micro levels (Murshed and Gates 2005; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009). These conditions may have influenced regional variation in victimization, especially as there were paramilitaries moving throughout the country. To test this, I include a measure of *elevation* to proxy rough terrain—a standard measure used in the literature—and I *hypothesize that rough terrain is associated with higher levels of violence.*

Distance from roads and cities may also limit violence due to the difficulty of reaching certain areas once insurgent or armed groups are formed (Kalyvas 2006). Thus, I also include a measure of the *average distance from roads* and *hypothesize that it is associated with lower levels of violence.* I also include a measure to capture the percent of the municipality considered urban. As discussed in Chapter 3, some theories (such as social disorganization theories) suggest that urban areas have high levels of violence, while others have found that urban areas have lower levels of violence during episodes of mass violence, due to the control of the central government in these areas (Su 2011). In Rwanda, urban areas did not have significantly higher levels of violence, but the capital did. Thus, I test *percent urban* and whether the municipality was part of the *capital* region.

Lastly, the victimization in surrounding municipalities may have an effect above and beyond the other factors discussed here. For example, in Rwanda, it was clear that spatial patterns were present; in other words, violence in surrounding communes contributed to broader patterns of violence within the region. As such, I include average

measures of each type of victimization for the surrounding municipalities. Variables tested are summarized in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Theories of Regional Variation Tested



Data and Analytic Strategy

To assess the factors that influence regional variation in violence in Bosnia, I rely upon several dependent variables, including soldier deaths, civilian deaths, and the presence of concentration camps. I obtained the data on killings from the Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo. This is an NGO that formed in April 2004 as a successor to the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes. The RDC’s main mission was to document everyone who was killed and went missing during the war and

the genocide.¹⁶³ To do so, the group collected as many primary sources as they could to document people who perished during the war. They visited gravesites, incorporated data from other NGOs, and collected thousands of primary sources. Once they had compiled their list, they launched the campaign “Has Anyone Been Forgotten,” during which they invited citizens to submit names and assess the database (Nettelfield 2007).

After the campaign, three demographic experts assessed the database, suggesting that it provides an approximation of the minimum deaths from the violence. They noted that including new cases only brought a marginal improvement to the database. Overall, their assessment was quite positive (Ball, Tabeau, and Verwimp 2007). The RDC worked to respond to the assessment, and their final database was published in March 2013. I obtained partial access to the database while in Sarajevo; this is the first study that uses the completed data.¹⁶⁴

The vast majority of casualties in the database (approximately 98 percent) are direct deaths, including all persons who died, went missing, or are unaccounted for and whose death or disappearance was caused by direct violence, including deportation to and imprisonment in concentration camps. The database classifies deaths by combatant and noncombatant status. Importantly, this is not perfectly correlated with the cause of death. In other words, anyone who died and was a soldier (member of the military or police), regardless of whether the incident occurred on duty, is categorized as a combatant death. Nevertheless, I assume that the majority of the soldiers were killed during combat, while

¹⁶³ The vast majority of the violence took place between 1992 and 1995, though the RDC included 1991 and 1996 in the database as well.

¹⁶⁴ After many meetings, hundreds of emails to the RDC and their funders, and phone calls over a two-year period, I was unable to obtain the person-level database to fully examine killings by region and over time. These data have not yet been released to anyone.

civilians were targeted as civilians.

I analyze all deaths (95,596), soldier deaths (57,584), and civilian deaths (38,012) as separate dependent variables. Sixty-five percent of all deaths were Bosniak, while 82 percent of all civilians killed were Bosniak (42 percent of the population was Bosniak at the time).¹⁶⁵ Thus, the analysis that restricts killing to civilian deaths is likely capturing civilians who were targeted based on group membership (genocide) and is most similar to the operationalization of genocidal violence in Chapter 3, while soldier deaths more accurately represents civil war deaths. Clearly, this is an overgeneralization, yet these categorizations speak to general patterns and are the most fine-grained categorizations possible.

I also analyze variation in concentration camp locations. I obtained these data by reading and coding UN Commission of Experts reports on the locations of concentration camps that existed in Bosnia between 1992 and mid-1994 (pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 780). This is the most complete source of data on the locations of camps to my knowledge, though it unfortunately excludes 1995. Nevertheless, as most camps were created in the earlier months of the conflict, I am confident that the majority is represented in the report.

When ascertaining whether a location constituted a concentration camp, the committee considered whether persons were alleged to have been held there against their will and whether the detention site appeared to have been established as a result of the armed conflict. To locate camps, the Commission drew upon myriad primary and secondary sources. Sometimes camps were well known and corroborated in multiple

¹⁶⁵ I do not have access to data that disaggregates death by ethnicity.

sources. Other times, their existence was asserted by one source and was uncorroborated. For this analysis, I test both a measure of corroborated camps as well as a measure of total camps, which includes both corroborated and uncorroborated reports. As they are correlated at .93, I display total camps.

The camps ranged in size from small centers that temporarily housed a few people to large camps such as Omarska in Prijedor. The vast majority of people in the camps were civilians rather than Prisoners of War, and the camps operated for anywhere from days to months. Notably, the Commission documented which “side” of the conflict ran the camps (in other words, whether they were run by Serb, Croat, or Bosniak forces or citizens). As this analysis is particularly interested in genocidal intent, Serb-run camps are employed as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, analyses of Bosniak and Croat camps are explored (though not shown). Note that number of camps does not necessarily correlate to the number of people interned in camps, as one large camp could feasibly hold many more people than 10 smaller ones. There are not reliable data on the sizes of these camps, so I cannot test this; however, I test a binary measure of whether camps existed as well as a measure of the number of camps.

These dependent variables are summarized in Table 4.2. This table also includes descriptive statistics for independent variables used to test the hypotheses outlined above. These variables come from a variety of sources. For measures related to the population, I draw upon 1991 census data. It was the last census conducted in the former Yugoslavia before the war; since it was conducted shortly before the violence began, it can be used to approximate the municipality characteristics in 1992. Notably, these census data are not available through IPUMS International. Instead, I contacted the government statistics

office in Bosnia and obtained PDF tables of the variables from the final published books of the Census. My translators in Bosnia assisted with the translation of these tables, and I copied the tables by hand. I am not able to analyze group-specific variables (such as Bosniak employment levels relative to Serb employment levels) at this time because of the existing format of these data.

Variables related to paramilitary presence were coded from the UN Commission of Expert Reports, mandated by a UN Resolution to investigate crimes in Bosnia. The Commission created a report of all paramilitaries operating during the conflict in each municipality between 1992 and the end of 1994 (for full methodological information, please see the report).¹⁶⁶ I read the report and created binary variables for whether Serb, Muslim, or Croat paramilitaries were ever present in a municipality. In addition, variables related to the presence of armed forces were coded from *Balkan Battlegrounds*, two volumes and 63 maps created by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to outline the conflict. These volumes and maps were coded to ascertain troop presence by month and by municipality. Lastly, I constructed spatial variables using ArcGIS and relevant historical documents, while several other variables were obtained from scholars. Spatially lagged variables were constructed in GeoDa and are not included in Table 4.2 but are included in the analysis.

¹⁶⁶ Regretfully, this report does not include 1995. It is incomplete, but it is the best source of data on paramilitary presence that exists.

Table 4.2: Dependent and Independent Variables by Municipality

Variable	Description	Coding	Source	Mun. Mean	Range
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Total Killed	Number of people killed within the municipality	Number	Research and Documentation Center	877	7 to 7243
Civilians Killed	Number of civilians killed within the municipality	Number	Research and Documentation Center	348	0 to 5398
Soldiers Killed	Number of soldiers killed within the municipality	Number	Research and Documentation Center	528	5 to 2054
Number of Camps	Number of Serb-run concentration camps existing within the municipality	Number	United Nations	3.16	0 to 36
<i>Targeted Violence</i>					
Bosniak	Percentage of population that is Bosniak	Percentage	1991 Census	38.64	0.01 to 97.29
Serbian	Percentage of population that is Serbian	Percentage	1991 Census	34.81	0.05 to 96.98
Ethnic Fractionalization	Probability that two randomly selected people belong to different ethnic groups ¹⁶⁷	0 to 1	Costalli and Moro 2012	0.48	0.02 to 0.74

¹⁶⁷ In subsequent analyses, ethnic fractionalization and polarization are included as percentages instead of probabilities so that the effect size is comparable to the other measures in the models, which are generally percentages.

Ethnic Polarization	Extent to which the distribution of groups in municipality approximates a bimodal distribution	0 to 1	Weidmann 2011	0.42	0 to 0.81
<hr/>					
<i>Community Organization</i>					
Divorce	Divorces per 1000 marriages	Rate	1991 Census	50.61	0 to 238.5
Intermarriage	Percentage of marriages between a Serb and a Bosniak	Percentage	1991 Census	0.34	0 to 1.13
Unemployment	Percentage of municipality that is not employed ¹⁶⁸	Percentage	1991 Census	59.85	52.30 to 71.20
Average Economy Salary	Average annual salary of economy worker ¹⁶⁹	Income (in YUM)	1991 Census	4603.05	3198 to 7913
Recently Moved	Percentage of residents who moved within the last five years	Percentage	1991 Census	5.69	2.14 to 16.29
Young Men	Percentage of population that are males age 15 ¹⁷⁰ to 29	Percentage	1991 Census	12.98	9.84 to 16.50
<hr/>					

¹⁶⁸ This measure is also a measure of agricultural work, as farmers were counted as unemployed in the census.

¹⁶⁹ Ideally, I would be able to test data on all salaries. Yet, the available census tables only include data on the salary of the economy worker. The census tables do not define this category, though interviewees suggested that an economy worker is someone who contributes directly to the economy through wage labor, most typically through work in industry.

¹⁷⁰ Youth were able to join the Yugoslav army at age 15.

<i>Resource Competition</i>					
Population Density	Population/km2 (log)	Thousands inhabitants /km2	ArcGIS	4.36	1.91 to 7.88
Arable Land	Area of farmable land in municipality (log)	Area (km2)	1991 Census	8.60	5.63 to 10.83
Literacy	Percent literate	Percentage	1991 Census	11.32	2.20 to 27.70
High School	Percent finished high school	Percentage	1991 Census	30.76	17.10 to 15.20
College	Percent finished college	Percentage	1991 Census	2.86	0.90 to 19.30
<i>Organized Actors</i>					
Frontline	Main frontline present in municipality at any time	0 = No Frontline 1 = Frontline	Maps of landmines and Balkan Battlegrounds	0.55	0.00 to 1.00
Serb Paramilitary	Serb paramilitary present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	United Nations Reports	0.33	0.00 to 1.00
Croat Paramilitary	Croatian paramilitary is present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	United Nations Reports	0.13	0.00 to 1.00
Bosniak Paramilitary	Bosniak paramilitary is present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	United Nations Reports	0.12	0.00 to 1.00
Yugoslav Army	Yugoslav Army present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	Balkan Battlegrounds Books and Maps	0.30 (Mean months is 0.59)	0.00 to 1.00

Republika Srpska Army	RS Army is present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	Balkan Battlegrounds Books and Maps	0.82 (Mean months is 8.56)	0.00 to 1.00
Serbian Army of Krajina	Serb Army of Krajina is present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	Balkan Battlegrounds Books and Maps	0.29 (Mean months is 0.90)	0.00 to 1.00
Croatian Defense Council Forces	Croat Defense Council Forces present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	Balkan Battlegrounds Books and Maps	0.56 (Mean months is 3.72)	0.00 to 1.00
Croatian Army	Croat Army present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	Balkan Battlegrounds Books and Maps	0.47 (Mean months is 1.83)	0.00 to 1.00
Bosnian Armed Forces	Bosnian Army present at any time during conflict	0 = Not Present 1 = Present	Balkan Battlegrounds Books and Maps	0.72 (Mean months is 7.74)	0.00 to 1.00
Safe Area	UN designated place within municipality as a safe area	0 = Not a Safe Area 1 = Safe Area	UN Resolutions	0.08	0.00 to 1.00

Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors

Borders Serbia	Municipalities that border Serbia	0 = No Border 1 = Borders Serbia	1992 Map	0.10	0.00 to 1.00
Distance from Serbia	Km between municipality centroid and closest point on Serbian border (logged)	Kilometers	ArcGIS	11.20	7.28 to 12.42

Distance from Croatia	Km between municipality centroid and closest point on Croatian border (logged)	Kilometers	ArcGIS	10.50	8.26 to 11.83
Serb Autonomous Region	Declared a Serb Autonomous Region	0 = Not Serb A 1 = Serb A	Maps of Serb Autonomous Regions	0.45	0.00 to 1.00
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan	Municipality was assigned to Serbia in CC Plan	0 = Not Serbia's 1 = Serbia's	Carrington-Cutileiro Plan	0.34	0.00 to 1.00
Past Violence	Municipalities that had Serb concentration camps during World War II	0 = No Violence 1 = Past Violence	Coded from numerous historical documents on camp location	0.17	0.00 to 1.00
Elevation	Average distance from sea level (logged)	Meters	Digital Chart of the World	6.29	4.42 to 7.16
Average Roads	Average road length per municipality (logged)	Meters of road/km ²	ArcGIS	4.31	0 to 6.06
Urban	Percent urban area	Percentage	1991 Census	32.11	5.28 to 99.78
Capital	Whether a municipality is in the capital region	0 = Not Capital 1 = Capital	1991 Census	0.05	0.00 to 1.00

Methods

Death counts and numbers of concentration camps are always positive integers, which indicates that the standard linear normal model is inappropriate for this analysis. In the

previous chapter, I transformed the dependent variable into a rate. Yet, the counts of deaths are much lower in Bosnia, indicating that they can be conceptualized as counts and that count models, such as Poisson or negative binomial regression models, are appropriate. As Table 4.2 illustrates, the mean total deaths per municipality is 877 (with a mean of 349 for civilians and 528 for soldiers), while the standard deviation is 1077. Thus, a standard Poisson model is not appropriate due to overdispersion. Instead, I use negative binomial regression.¹⁷¹ Each one-unit increase in the independent variable is associated with a change in the log of the expected count.

While I standardized killings based on the population in Rwanda, I do not use rates here because the denominator is unclear. For example, I do not know the total number of soldiers who could have been killed, let alone how many were present within a municipality. Likewise, while civilians were generally killed within their own municipality, it is clear that men and people of a certain age were targeted more often (as further discussed in Chapter 6). Thus, the entire population or even the population of Bosniaks may not be the most appropriate denominator, and count variables are more appropriate.

In addition, municipalities were clustered within seven regions. As such, models must control for regional-level variation in killing. As in Chapter 3, fixed effects models are preferred due to the nested nature of the data (municipalities nested within regions), which violates the assumption of independence required for regression. A Hausman test confirms that fixed effects are preferable to random effects.

As population may influence the number of people killed, I include logged

¹⁷¹ No municipalities had zero soldier deaths, and only one (Posusje) had zero recorded civilian deaths. Thus, a zero-inflated model is not necessary.

population in each model. As noted above, I also control for spatial autocorrelation by including spatially lagged dependent variables in each relevant model. This is the average number of (all, civilian, or total) deaths in contiguously bordering municipalities, and the models are spatially lagged negative binomial regression models with fixed effects for the region.

Similarly, I model camp presence in two ways. First, I assess whether or not camps were present within a municipality. As this is a binary indicator (0 or 1), I utilize logistic regression. In addition, I analyze the number of camps present. As the conditional variance exceeds the conditional means, I again utilize negative binomial regression models. In addition, there were 44 municipalities without any camps, so I analyze whether zero-inflated negative binomial models better fit the data. As Allison (2013) notes that zero-inflated negative binomial models are not necessary for count data with many zeros and that the differences between the models are often negligible, I present binary regression with simple negative binomial regression models. And, as with killings, I include a fixed effect for region as well as a spatially lagged variable for the number of camps and a control for population.

Results: Regional Variation in Violence

To assess the factors that influenced this variation in violence, Table 4.3 presents 37 separate negative binomial regression models with a control for population and clustered standard errors. As seen in the table, civilian deaths are significantly greater in areas with higher percentages of Bosniaks, while soldier deaths are not. This provides some evidence that Bosniaks were targeted. However, the significant negative effect of the squared term indicates that the positive effect of percent Bosniak was diminished in

municipalities where Bosniaks were the majority, as racial threat theory would predict.¹⁷² In addition, while the percentage of Serbs was not associated with municipality-level killings, it was associated with the number of concentration camps, indicating that camps were instituted in places with higher percentages of Serb residents.

A general measure of ethnic fractionalization is not significantly associated with any form of victimization, though the measure of ethnic polarization is significant for all types of death. Again, this measure captures how close a community comes to having two large ethnic groups, suggesting that killings of both soldiers and civilians were most likely in municipalities with two large ethnic groups.

Turning to measures of social disorganization, divorce is associated with higher levels of killing and strongly associated with the presence of concentration camps, though intermarriage between Serbs and Bosniaks did not significantly impact the violence. In addition, higher percentages of residents who moved within the last five years is associated with higher levels of soldier deaths but not other forms of violence, which is probed in multivariate analysis.

Neither unemployment nor income levels is associated with victimization. In addition, the percent of young men is not associated with levels of victimization. Yet, as noted above, this measure is likely masking more complex processes, as higher percentages of Serb men may have participated in the violence, while higher percentages of Bosniak men may capture increased victimization targeting men. Intermarriage is also not significantly associated with the violence. While many scholars and most narratives of Bosnia suggest tremendous amounts of intermarriage, this was, in some ways, a large

¹⁷² This effect is not significant in multivariate analysis, as much of it is captured in the measure of polarization.

exaggeration (Botev 1994). Thus, there are mixed results for measures of community organization.

As to resource competition theories, support is not found for Malthusian ideas that resource scarcity, measured as arable land and population density, influenced the violence. Elevation (or rough terrain) is also not significantly associated with levels of violence. However, there is minimal evidence that more civilian deaths took place in areas with higher levels of literacy. Though it is worth cautioning that this effect is significant at the .1 level, this speaks to literature that suggests that more highly educated people participate in violence as outlined in Chapter 3 (Goldstone 2002; Lange 2011), and it is further tested in multivariate analysis.

An examination of the many organized actors moving throughout Bosnia finds that they are particularly important to understanding the patterns of violence. Specifically, the frontline is associated with higher levels of soldier deaths but *not* higher levels of civilian deaths or concentration camps, illustrating the importance of disaggregating by type of death and victimization when analyzing the frontline (Beger 2012). Serb paramilitary and the Bosnian Serb Army presence is strongly associated with all forms of victimization, standing out from other paramilitaries and armies and indicating that, while all sides were involved in the conflict, those acting on behalf of Serbia and Serbs were particularly deadly. Serb paramilitary presence had a particularly strong effect on violence against civilians and concentration camps.

**Table 4.3: Bivariate Predictors of Municipality Variation in Violence
Control for Population Included in Each Negative Binomial Model**

Independent Variables	Model	All Deaths	Civilian Deaths	Soldier Deaths	Camps ¹⁷³
<i>Targeted Violence</i>					
Bosniak	1	0.018* (0.010)	0.033** (0.015)	0.011 (0.007)	0.003 (0.012)
Bosniak Squared	2	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Serb	3	0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.014)	0.001 (0.005)	0.032** (0.014)
Ethnic Fractionalization	4	0.014 (0.012)	0.016 (0.022)	0.013 (0.090)	0.017 (0.012)
Ethnic Polarization	5	0.018*** (0.007)	0.029** (0.011)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.010 (0.010)
<i>Community Organization</i>					
Divorce	6	0.004* (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)	0.003* (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
Intermarriage	7	0.094 (0.581)	0.029 (0.895)	0.135 (0.414)	0.787 (1.105)
Unemployment	8	0.020 (0.034)	0.045 (0.063)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.067 (0.064)
Average Economy Worker Salary (100s)	9	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.017)
Recently Moved	10	0.015 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.026)	0.045** (0.023)	-0.012 (0.068)
Young Men	11	0.045 (0.070)	0.077 (0.120)	0.019 (0.038)	-0.205 (0.157)
<i>Resource Competition</i>					
Population Density (log)	12	-0.094 (0.141)	-0.200 (0.233)	-0.013 (0.070)	0.038 (0.086)
Arable Land (log)	13	-0.013 (0.077)	0.021 (0.143)	-0.036 (0.031)	0.238** (0.108)
Literacy	14	0.074 (0.050)	0.118* (0.068)	0.040 (0.033)	0.090 (0.059)
High School Education	15	-0.021 (0.022)	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.020)
College Education	16	0.008 (0.035)	0.016 (0.053)	0.000 (0.022)	0.024 (0.093)
<i>Organized Actors</i>					
Frontline	17	0.503** (0.244)	0.574 (0.416)	0.456*** (0.151)	0.015 (0.396)
Serb Paramilitary	18	0.879*** (0.251)	1.498*** (0.248)	0.499*** (0.191)	1.461*** (0.346)

¹⁷³ Logistic regression of whether camps were present (0 or 1) and zero-inflated models yielded almost identical results (which include the number of camps) and are not shown.

Croatian Paramilitary	19	-0.143 (0.333)	-0.356 (0.610)	-0.018 (0.179)	-1.201*** (0.419)
Bosniak Paramilitary	20	0.198 (0.164)	0.042 (0.404)	0.290*** (0.083)	-0.349 (0.480)
Yugoslav People's Army	21	0.006 (0.119)	0.033 (0.197)	-0.019 (0.071)	0.257 (0.192)
Republika Srpska Army	22	0.045*** (0.017)	0.069** (0.029)	0.033*** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.019)
Serbian Army of Krajina	23	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.096* (0.056)	0.016 (0.018)	-0.038 (0.049)
Croatian Defense Council Forces	24	-0.016 (0.020)	-0.044 (0.027)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.038 (0.039)
Croatian Army	25	-0.045 (0.036)	-0.077* (0.045)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.032)
Bosnian Armed Forces	26	0.026* (0.016)	0.031 (0.029)	0.024** (0.010)	0.012 (0.021)
Safe Area	27	0.403*** (0.145)	0.400 (0.326)	0.406** (0.169)	0.083 (0.373)
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>					
Borders Serbia	28	1.072*** (0.193)	1.717*** (0.281)	0.497*** (0.125)	1.495*** (0.469)
Distance from Serbia (log)	29	-0.394*** (0.129)	-0.542*** (0.184)	-0.266*** (0.096)	-0.335** (0.166)
Distance from Croatia (log)	30	0.421** (0.199)	0.645** (0.262)	0.295* (0.161)	0.244 (0.272)
Serb Autonomous Region	31	-0.377 (0.380)	-0.681 (0.664)	-0.194 (0.219)	0.296 (0.622)
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan	32	-0.325 (0.416)	-0.722 (0.768)	-0.120 (0.233)	0.554 (0.664)
Past Violence	33	0.478*** (0.116)	0.715*** (0.230)	0.302*** (0.105)	0.997*** (0.383)
Elevation	34	0.916*** (0.281)	1.567*** (0.536)	0.663*** (0.205)	-0.586 (0.358)
Average Roads (log)	35	-0.043 (0.072)	-0.287* (0.150)	0.063 (0.044)	-0.142 (0.164)
Urban	36	0.000 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.001 (0.002)	0.014 (0.017)
Capital	37	0.235 (0.298)	0.351 (0.552)	0.146 (0.136)	-0.359 (0.310)

Standard errors clustered by region
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control for population not shown

Despite their designation, Safe Areas had more soldier deaths (and, correspondingly, total deaths). Additional research will need to ascertain whether other factors may have influenced cities initial designation as Safe Areas and whether violence in Safe Areas changed over time. Nevertheless, it is clear that Safe Areas did not have significantly lower aggregate levels of any form of victimization.

Lastly, looking at broader spatial and temporal factors, areas that bordered Serbia had higher levels of each form of victimization, suggesting that the strategic importance to Serbia influenced the magnitude of violence. In line with this, each increase in distance from Serbia was associated with less violence, while each increase in distance from Croatia (thus, toward Serbia) was associated with greater violence. Areas deemed under Serbian control in the Carrington plan did not have higher levels of violence, though areas with past violence against Serbs had higher levels of all forms of killing and camps, suggesting that enduring collective memory from World War II may have influenced violence in the 1990s. Areas with higher elevation had higher levels of violence, though violence was not significantly different in urban and capital areas than in rural areas.

Multivariate Analysis

To assess whether these relationships hold in multivariate analysis, Table 4.4 includes negative binomial models with region fixed effects. While I built models gradually, I present final models below due to the number of models created. As noted earlier, each model includes controls for population, a measure of spatial autocorrelation, and regional fixed effects (with Centralna Bosna excluded). Variables that were insignificant in bivariate analysis, as well as those that did not significantly improve the fit of the model, are excluded.

As seen in Table 4.4, when other factors are taken into account, percent Bosniak is associated with higher levels of all deaths, though the effect is particularly strong for civilian deaths. Concentration camps, by contrast, were located in municipalities with higher percentages of Serbs, as was the case in bivariate analysis. Notably, polarization is highly associated with all forms of violence and is, in fact, the strongest theorized predictor. Thus, as seen in Chapter 3, while the presence of certain ethnic groups does not influence the onset of violence at the state level (Chapter 2), it does influence the magnitude of violence once those ethnicities are politicized and polarized. Areas with two strong groups saw the highest levels of violence, illustrating that areas that were not under clear control saw comparatively more violence.

Unlike Rwanda, measures of community organization have almost no explanatory power in Bosnia. Rather, divorce is nominally associated with higher levels of concentration camps, which may suggest that more civilians were involved in creating and running concentration camps and that community-level controls would thus matter more for this form of violence. As noted in bivariate analysis, measures of resource competition and strain do not explain variation in the violence. Furthermore, the spatial weight—capturing surrounding victimization—is not significant, suggesting that there were not other spatial patterns in the magnitude of the violence.

Table 4.4 Negative Binomial Fixed Effects Models of Municipality Violence

Predictors	All Deaths	Civilian Deaths	Soldier Deaths	Camps
<i>Targeted Violence</i>				
Bosniak	0.008*** (0.003)	0.011** (0.005)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.008 (0.009)
Population (log)	0.808*** (0.076)	0.706*** (0.141)	0.835*** (0.064)	0.429** (0.199)
Serb	0.005** (0.002)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004** (0.002)	0.033*** (0.008)
Polarization	0.014*** (0.002)	0.025*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.018** (0.008)
<i>Community Organization</i>				
Divorce	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004* (0.002)
<i>Organized Actors</i>				
Serb Paramilitary	0.356*** (0.105)	0.611*** (0.179)	0.192** (0.092)	0.574** (0.277)
Serb Army	0.013** (0.006)	0.012 (0.011)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.035** (0.016)
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>				
Previous Violence	0.160 (0.125)	0.324 (0.231)	0.037 (0.106)	0.691** (0.274)
Distance Serbia (log)	-0.247** (0.106)	-0.395** (0.194)	-0.090 (0.088)	-0.497* (0.254)
Elevation (log)	0.170* (0.090)	0.306** (0.154)	0.109 (0.080)	-0.153 (0.291)
Surrounding Violence	0.103 (0.081)	0.140 (0.117)	0.128* (0.076)	-0.006 (0.045)
<i>Regions</i>				
Neretva	-0.127 (0.158)	0.639** (0.271)	-0.481*** (0.144)	1.404** (0.583)
Podrinje	0.060 (0.244)	0.297 (0.437)	-0.035 (0.208)	0.392 (0.690)
Posavina	0.100 (0.193)	0.482 (0.349)	-0.011 (0.164)	0.718 (0.609)
Pounje	0.796*** (0.224)	1.868*** (0.406)	0.189 (0.191)	2.251*** (0.610)
Sarajevo	-0.026 (0.181)	0.162 (0.324)	-0.076 (0.157)	1.139** (0.580)
Vrbas	0.299* (0.176)	0.629** (0.307)	0.057 (0.151)	1.645*** (0.545)
Constant	-2.517 (1.772)	-3.205 (3.108)	-4.134*** (1.474)	-1.676 (4.157)
Observations	109	109	109	109
McFadden's R2	0.132	0.120	0.140	0.195

Standard errors clustered by region

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Model building available by request; Centralna Bosna excluded

Armed actors and their movements clearly impacted the magnitude of victimization, however. Specifically, the presence of Serb paramilitaries is associated with higher levels of all violence analyzed, while the presence of the Army of Republika Srpska is associated with higher levels of soldier deaths (and, correspondingly, all deaths) as well as concentration camps. The frontline was also significantly associated with soldier deaths but is highly correlated with the presence of the Army of Republika Srpska—a stronger predictor—and thus excluded.

Lastly, there is evidence that municipalities that saw Serb concentration camps during World War II had higher numbers of Serb-run concentration camps during the violence. This suggests that a collective memory of violence may have influenced violence or perhaps even created a repertoire of violence. In addition, distance from Serbia is associated with lower levels of civilian deaths and concentration camps, suggesting the strategic importance of areas near Serbia and confirming that strategic importance of land (not just any land, but land imbued with cultural significance) played a role in patterns of genocidal victimization.¹⁷⁴

An Integrated Conceptual Model of Regional Variation in Bosnia

This analysis has examined municipality-level variation in deaths and concentration camp locations during the Bosnian war and genocide. I have drawn upon theories from criminology, the study of political and ethnic violence, and genocide studies to specify

¹⁷⁴ Elevation is also significantly associated with higher levels of civilian deaths (and all deaths), as theories of civil war would predict. However, while these theories focus on distance from the purview of the state, in this case, elevation may signify distance from the eyes of other actors, like international media.

factors that influence community-level victimization. Notably, I have also disaggregated types of violence, examining soldier deaths, civilian deaths, and concentration camps.

Overall, I have found that each form of killing took place in areas with higher percentages of Bosniak civilians, while concentration camps were located in areas with higher percentages of Serb civilians. This confirms the targeting of Bosniak citizens, though it is likely that Serbs set up concentration camps in areas they already controlled or just after gaining control because they had the time to do so. In other words, killing may have been used to establish control of a region, while camps were utilized to “clean” the region once that region is seen as under control. As they faced lower threat levels from the Bosnian army and other forces, they were able to terrorize the population by instituting camps.

Communities with two populous ethnic groups also had higher levels civilian deaths, soldier deaths, and concentration camps, indicating that measures of polarization are more appropriate than general measures of fractionalization, which had no significant effect. This is well in line with research that suggests that areas that are not under clear control see higher levels of violence (Tilly 1976; Kaylvas 2006). It also suggests that there was much strategy behind the violence.¹⁷⁵

Theories of differential social organization, key explanatory theories for understanding the violence in Rwanda, show little promise in explaining the violence in Bosnia. While municipalities with more divorce saw more concentration camps, other variables, such as unemployment, were not significant. Several things may explain this. First, I am unable to examine Serb employment (or Serb employment relative to Bosniak

¹⁷⁵ As noted above, this could not be tested for the case of Rwanda, as no commune had a majority of Tutsis.

employment) rather than general employment, which may yield differences. Second and perhaps more importantly, many of the citizens who participated in the violence did so through their careers. For example, many people told me that police or firefighters participated in the violence, showing the limits of theories of community organization when the violence is more institutionalized. Indeed, Rwanda had much higher levels of participation by lay people who were not previously formally organized, as further discussed in Chapter 6.

Rather than community organization, the presence of certain armed actors—specifically Serb soldiers and Serb paramilitaries—influenced the violence. Closely related, the strategy of these armies and their leaders also influenced patterns of violence. Areas of broader strategic importance to Serbia saw higher levels of civilian victimization (compared to soldier deaths). This suggests that broader strategic goals of “Greater Serbia” influenced municipality-level patterns in genocidal violence. Interestingly, areas that saw Serbs interned in concentration camps during World War II saw significantly higher levels of concentration camps but *not* other forms of violence, again suggesting that collective memories likely influenced the way in which the violence unfolded, as this form of violence was particularly used against Serbs during World War II.

Notably, as in Rwanda, there was not support for Malthusian ideas that resource scarcity, measured as arable land and population density, influenced the violence. Furthermore, one of the international community’s interventions in the violence—labeling certain areas as Safe Areas—did not significantly impact the violence, suggesting that this intervention did not have a significant impact on the types of violence tested in the aggregate, though this remains to be further analyzed over time. Note that

even with Srebrenica excluded, Safe Areas did not have significantly less violence.

There are a number of limitations to these findings. First, the data utilized here provide the best estimates of victimization during the violence, but an exact number of those killed will likely never be known. Similarly, although I focus here on certain forms of victimization, many other forms of violence, such as sexual violence, were prominent. In addition, while the municipalities were small geographic units and clearly administrative units ruled by mayors, smaller units of analysis may be preferred to test some of these theories.

Furthermore, as discussed above, there are also limits to the quantitative measures. It is difficult to disentangle civil war from genocide, and this dissertation illustrates that attempting to do so requires a number of assumptions. Ideally, I would be able to disaggregate various statistics by ethnicity, but this is not possible given the current availability of 1991 Yugoslav census data. Quantitative data are also unable to fully account for strategy and related actions of individual actors—clearly an important aspect of this story. As noted in Chapter 3, this dissertation does not seek to downplay individual actions but rather seeks to model more structural characteristics.


Temporal Variation

Thus far, I have analyzed municipality-level variation in soldier deaths, civilian deaths, and concentration camps, finding that institutionalized actors and their strategy had the largest effect on the violence. It is also important to consider variation in violence over time. As discussed in Chapter 3, violence during genocide does not occur at a constant rate, and violence may not begin in each municipality at the same time.

Regrettably, data on camps over time do not exist. Furthermore, the RDC is not

yet willing to share complete data on municipality deaths of soldiers and civilians by month.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, I am able to analyze two forms of temporal variation: onset of violence (killings) by municipality and total deaths by year by municipality. Little is known about the onset of violence by municipalities, as no study has analyzed variation in onset to date. In addition, only one study has considered variation in deaths in Bosnia over time. Nevertheless, as the map shows, there was indeed variation in the onset of the violence.

Figure 4.6: Onset of Violence in Bosnia




¹⁷⁶ Note that I will hopefully obtain these in the future and use them in a paper on the micro-level effects of various interventions in the violence.

Even an examination of the total number of people killed over time is telling.

Figure 4.7¹⁷⁷ shows total deaths by year, and it is evident that, excluding sporadic attacks and violence in 1991, the first year of systematic violence—1992—saw by far the highest number of people killed. The subsequent two years saw declines in violence, but violence spiked again as it neared termination in 1995.

Figure 4.7: Deaths in Bosnia by Year



Disaggregating the number of deaths by soldier and civilian deaths illuminates that this trend proves similar for both soldiers and civilians. Each saw by far the highest number of deaths in 1992, the first year of systematic violence. There were also subsequent declines in civilian and soldier deaths in 1993 and 1994, and 1995 saw an increase in both. For civilian deaths, the uptick is particularly large, reflecting the

¹⁷⁷ Year of death is missing for less than 3 percent of deaths.

massacre at Srebrenica, where almost 8,000 Bosniak civilians were killed in a matter of days.

Figure 4.8: Civilian Deaths in Bosnia by Year





Figure 4.9: Soldier Deaths in Bosnia by Year



To analyze what else may have accounted for this variation over time, I consider both determinants of onset and yearly levels of death below.

Data and Analytic Strategy-Temporal Variation

To test the factors that influenced the onset of violence in each municipality as well as the magnitude of deaths by year in each municipality, I rely upon three main sets of data.¹⁷⁸

In each, violence is operationalized as any form of violence (armed or civilian), as they often took place in tandem and cannot be temporally disaggregated in most sources of data. Currently, data on onset are not available from the RDC or, to my knowledge, from any other organization or scholar. Thus, I create my own measure.

First, I rely upon *Balkan Battlegrounds* (2002), the two-volume explanation of the violence produced by the CIA that I used to obtain information on troop movements. As noted, the CIA created these volumes, as well as 63 maps, to catalog the events of the violence across the country and over time. Thus, these volumes contain much information about when violence began. I created a measure of onset date based on this volume's information. To assess its validity, I assessed these onset dates against data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) database. The ACLED data are created by Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and are based on a number of sources.¹⁷⁹ The unit of observation in these data is the event. Events always involve two actors, and many events coded are battles or attacks on civilians.

In addition, I obtained data on onset dates for municipality from the ICTY. As there are millions of documents at the ICTY, I searched all judgments for the names of

¹⁷⁸ I also supplemented these data sources by searching numerous reports.

¹⁷⁹ The data were coded by Ola Listhaug (Department of Sociology and Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology).

each municipality and read each instance during which a municipality was mentioned. For the majority of municipalities, the judgment clearly listed when violence began.

I compared the onset dates across these three sets of data, finding agreement in many cases. Where the dates differed, I privileged the date listed in the ICTY judgment, as that was always supplemented with witness testimony, reports, or other in-depth evidence. After compiling dates, it became clear that there were two categories of onset. Namely, many municipalities saw violence within the first three months of the three-year conflict (66 percent), while others saw violence after the first three months (34 percent).

I also analyze deaths by year by municipality. These data were obtained from the RDC. Unlike the 2013 data used for the total number killed in each municipality in the analysis above, the data on total killed by year by municipality are from the 2008 data release, the most comprehensive data available over time. This release took place after the demographic assessment of the data, and the deaths in the 2008 data comprise 95 percent of those in the 2013 data. Regrettably, these data do not allow me to differentiate between soldier and civilian deaths. Yet, as seen above, civilians and soldiers saw similar trends by year, which suggests that analyzing them together is permissible.

For each analysis, all other independent variables remain largely the same as those described above. As in Chapter 3, the spatial weight for the analysis of onset in Bosnia is a measure of the onset in contiguous municipalities. In addition, data on the presence of troops is a binary variable of whether troops were present during first three months of the conflict, while the Safe Area designation is excluded, as there were no Safe Areas in 1992.¹⁸⁰ Descriptive statistics by onset are presented in Table 4.5.

¹⁸⁰ I am not able to disaggregate paramilitary presence by month.

Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics by Onset (Early or Late)

Independent Variables	Early Onset (72)	Late Onset (37)
<i>Targeted Violence</i>		
Bosniak	39.67	36.62
Serb	37.01	30.51
Ethnic Fractionalization ¹⁸¹	0.53	0.38
Ethnic Polarization	0.47	0.34
<i>Community Organization</i>		
Divorce	52.83	46.30
Intermarriage	39.81	23.98
Unemployment	59.07	61.38
Average Economy Worker Salary (100s)	47.69	42.79
Recently Moved	5.60	5.85
Young Men	12.80	13.33
<i>Resource Competition</i>		
Population Density	207	86
Arable Land	10,382	6,942
Literacy	11.17	11.60
High School Education	31.53	29.25
College Education	3.23	2.15
<i>Organized Actors</i>		
Frontline	0.63	0.41
Serb Paramilitary	0.49	0.03
Croatian Paramilitary	0.17	0.05
Bosniak Paramilitary	0.15	0.05
Yugoslav People's Army (April-June)	0.40	0.03
Republika Srpska Army (April-June)	0.42	0.14
Serbian Army of Krajina (April-June)	0.00	0.00
Croatian Defense Council (April-June)	0.24	0.19
Croatian Army (April-June)	0.21	0.11
Bosnian Armed Forces (April-June)	0.21	0.05
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>		
Borders Serbia	0.15	0.00
Distance from Serbia (km)	84.97	122.50
Distance from Croatia (km)	55.13	45.68
Serb Autonomous Region	0.46	0.43
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan	0.36	0.30
Past Violence	0.24	0.03
Elevation	637.86	677.29

¹⁸¹ I transform ethnic fractionalization and polarization into percentages in bivariate and multivariate analysis.

Average Roads	101.43	102.30
Urban Region	36.12	24.10
Capital Region	0.07	0.00

Note: In line with Chapter 3, these tables show the descriptive statistics by the original values (not the transformed values used in analyses, which are found in Table 4.2)

Analysis

To analyze the factors associated with the onset of violence within a municipality, I utilize logistic regression. As noted in Chapter 3, this model is appropriate when the dependent variable is categorical. In this case there are two outcomes—early or late onset; thus, multinomial logistic regression is not needed.

As in the analysis above, I begin by building bivariate models, shown in Table 4.6. I review these briefly and then turn to multivariate models, illustrated in Table 4.7. Results are presented in odds ratio, so coefficients *larger than one* suggest that the variable is associated with higher odds of early onset (coded as 1), while coefficients *less than one* suggest that the variable is associated with lower odds early onset. I cluster standard errors by prefecture due to the nested nature of the data.

Next, I analyze deaths by year. As with the analysis of the magnitude of death, I rely upon negative binomial regression as well as fixed effects for regions as well as for years. Many of the measures—particularly those from the census—do not change over time. In reality, they almost certainly did change. However, there are not data or even estimates of how unemployment or ethnicity changed over time; thus, I include the 1991 measure in each year. Geographic measures, such as being near a border, and historical factors, such as violence during World War II, do not vary by year. Some factors do vary temporarily, however. Namely, I include data by year for the location of all troops as well as the years in which certain municipalities were declared to be Safe Areas. I include a

lagged dependent variable to control for the potential effect of deaths in the previous year.

Onset of Violence

Table 4.6 presents 32 logistic regression equations of onset. Each model includes one predictor and assesses its relationship with early onset (April through June 1992). The capital and whether a municipality bordered Serbia are excluded from the models, as, in each case, the municipality saw an early onset of violence. In other words, the entire capital region saw an early onset, and each municipality bordering Serbia experienced early onset of violence.

Percentages of Bosniaks and Serbs influenced the magnitude of violence but did not appear to influence the onset of the violence. Increases in ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization each are significantly associated with higher odds of early onset, suggesting that violence first took place in areas that were not clearly under the control of any one ethnic group. More diverse areas saw violence first. However, this does not necessarily mean that ethnicity *caused* the onset of violence; the difference may have been part of a more strategic plan to take control of areas without a clear majority. Regardless, these effects are further probed in multivariate analysis.

In general, measures of community organization do not influence the onset of violence; those that had significant effects were significant in unexpected ways. While divorce is associated with the magnitude of some violence, it is not associated with the onset. Yet, areas with higher levels of intermarriage had earlier onset. As in Rwanda, this is likely due to the increasing prevalence of intermarriage in areas that were more ethnically diverse, and the inclusion of variables that capture societal diversity in

multivariate analysis will further explore this effect. In addition, areas with higher unemployment had lower odds of earlier onset. Multivariate analysis will allow for further assessment of whether other factors are behind these effects.

Turning to resource competition theories, resource scarcity and population density are not associated with the onset of violence. Yet, the presence of organized actors clearly impacted the onset of the violence, as they were generally responsible for initiating violence. These effects are all quite large, as these are all bivariate indicators. The presence of Serb paramilitaries is particularly linked to early onset. The presence of the JNA is also particularly strong, followed by the presence of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Bosnian army that was fighting it.

In terms of broader spatial and temporal factors, distance from Serbia is associated with later onset. Every municipality that bordered Serbia saw the onset of violence within the first three months of the conflict, likely linked to the strategic location in terms of expanding “Greater Serbia.” As with magnitude, areas that saw violence against Serbs during World War II had earlier onsets. Finally, urban regions saw earlier onset, which can perhaps help explain some of the other findings in this section (urban regions have more highly educated people and lower levels of unemployment). Indeed, this perhaps reflects the pattern of paramilitaries (and, to a lesser degree, armies) taking over cities and then spreading out to villages within the municipality.

**Table 4.6 Bivariate Predictors of Early Onset of Violence in Bosnia
Results Presented in Odds Ratios**

Predictors	Model	Early Onset (April -June 1992)
<i>Targeted Violence</i>		
Bosniak	1	1.005 (0.010)
Serb	2	1.009 (0.013)
Ethnic Fractionalization	3	1.048*** (0.018)
Ethnic Polarization	4	1.026** (0.013)
<i>Community Organization</i>		
Divorce	5	1.002 (0.003)
Intermarriage	6	1.032*** (0.007)
Unemployment	7	0.848** (0.055)
Economy Salary (100s)	8	1.049*** (0.018)
Recently Moved	9	0.933 (0.126)
Percent Young Men	10	0.775 (0.124)
<i>Resource Competition</i>		
Population Density	11	1.266 (0.213)
Arable Land (log)	12	1.191* (0.323)
Literate	13	0.970 (0.084)
High School Education	14	1.045 (0.037)
College Education	15	1.571*** (0.164)
<i>Organized Actors</i>		
Frontline	16	2.444 (1.415)
Serb Paramilitary	17	34.054*** (36.741)
Croat Paramilitary	18	3.500** (1.899)
Bosniak Paramilitary	19	3.156* (1.874)
Yugoslav People's Army (April-June)	20	24.279*** (21.537)
Republika Srpska Army (April-June)	21	4.571***

		(2.542)
Croatian Defense Council Forces (April-June)	22	2.171 (1.134)
Croatian Army (April-June)	23	1.325 (0.694)
Bosnian Armed Forces (April-June)	24	4.605*** (2.712)
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>		
Distance from Serbia (log)	25	0.990** (0.005)
Distance from Croatia (log)	26	1.008 (0.010)
Serb Autonomous Region	27	1.111 (0.517)
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan	28	1.336 (0.657)
Past Violence	29	11.127*** (9.953)
Elevation (log)	30	0.710 (0.431)
Average Roads (log)	31	1.154 (0.152)
Percent Urban	32	1.056*** (0.011)
Observations		109

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.7 includes multivariate logistic regression models of onset with clustered standard errors. Overall, patterns from bivariate analysis remain. In terms of targeted violence, ethnic polarization is associated with earlier onset, again indicating that areas that were not under clear control were targeted first (Tilly 1978; Kalyvas 2006). While this cannot be tested quantitatively in Rwanda, it was clear that the area that would be perceived to be most under Tutsi control—Butare—was targeted last.

Cities were also targeted earlier. In particular, municipalities with more urban regions had higher odds of earlier onset. Several other variables that were significant in bivariate analysis—such as college education levels and intermarriage—are captured in

this effect, which is also supported by the negative influence of unemployment (capturing agrarian employment). This likely points to a strategy to first take over the areas of control within a municipality and then spread outward. Indeed, anecdotal reports of the violence generally begin with soldiers and paramilitaries¹⁸² taking over municipal offices.

Strategy is also reflected in other predictors. Areas that are more distant from Serbia saw higher odds of later violence. In other words, areas that were perhaps more strategic were targeted first. JNA presence was also particularly important for early onset. Indeed, while the JNA was withdrawn after the conflict began, this confirms that they were particularly involved in perpetrating violence at its onset.

Overall, it is clear factors that influenced the magnitude of the violence also influenced the onset of the violence, with strategic importance having an even stronger effect on the magnitude. Recall that this was not the case in Rwanda, where there was less of a coordinated strategy for how the violence would unfold and where violence was perpetrated by a much higher percentage of the population rather than by armies and paramilitaries. As a result, in Rwanda, the factors that influenced the onset were much more contingent on local politicians as well as the actions of particular individuals, such as clergy, and did not match the factors that influenced the magnitude of violence.

To be clear, onset in Bosnia was likely influenced by municipal authorities. Ideally, I would be able to include a measure of the ethnic composition of municipal authorities, as patterns of violence may have varied based on whether the municipality was controlled by Serb leadership. Nevertheless, it is clear that a coordinated plan

¹⁸² Paramilitary presence is excluded from multivariate analysis. It is significantly associated with earlier onset, though the data are not time variant and thus include paramilitary presence at any time throughout the three years.

dictated the onset of violence within Bosnia.

**Table 4.7 Logistic Regression of Early Onset of Violence in Bosnia
Results Presented in Odds Ratios**

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2
Polarization	1.032*** (1.014 - 1.049)	1.025*** (1.012 - 1.038)
Unemployment	0.855*** (0.769 - 0.950)	0.847** (0.740 - 0.969)
Percent Urban		1.023* (0.998 - 1.050)
Yugoslav Army		40.019*** (3.029 - 528.771)
Distance from Serbia		0.273*** (0.124 - 0.604)
Onset Weight	1.029** (1.003 - 1.055)	1.006 (0.980 - 1.032)
Observations	109	109
McFadden's R2	0.337	0.391

Robust confidence intervals in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Magnitude by Time

Before reviewing and concluding, I also briefly consider the effect of various predictors over time. As it is impossible to include time-varying data on most indicators, this analysis is brief and is meant only to analyze the effect of different variables in each year and whether some of the variables that are time-varying, such as the presence of Safe Areas or the movements of armed actors, influenced the violence differently. As noted above, this analysis relies upon the 2008 data release from the RDC and is not able to be disaggregated into soldier and civilian deaths.

As descriptive statistics have been reviewed several times, I will move directly into a brief analysis. Specifically, to examine the influence of different predictors at

different times, I run five different models—all years combined, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995—included in Table 4.8. Model 1, which combines all years with fixed effects for region and year, illustrates that the influence of predictors on all deaths from the 2008 data release is very similar to that on all deaths (civilian and soldier combined) in the analysis above. Namely, the magnitude of violence is mainly driven by ethnic composition (percent Bosniak as well as polarization), the movement of armed actors (Bosnian Serb Army and Paramilitaries), and strategies, reflected in the polarization measure as well as distance from Serbia.¹⁸³

Examining deaths by year yields several interesting trends.¹⁸⁴ First, the only constant factors that significantly influenced violence in each year were the population and the percent Bosniak. Model 2 (and, to a degree, Model 3) reveals that strategy and targeted violence mattered more earlier in the violence, as distance from Serbia and polarization are significant in these years but not in later years. The number of months that the Serb army was present is significantly associated with higher levels of violence in 1992. The presence of the Serb paramilitary, as well as Serb Autonomous regions, are also associated with more violence in 1992.

In 1993, Serb Autonomous regions, distance from Serbia, and Serb paramilitaries are no longer significantly associated with the level of violence. The presence of Serb paramilitaries and the number of months the Bosnian Serb Army were present also do not influence the level of violence. Instead, the presence of Croatian troops influenced the overall level of deaths. Croatian troops were involved throughout the violence, and this

¹⁸³ As the two measures of deaths are correlated at .98, this is expected.

¹⁸⁴ I also ran models with a control for the number of killings in the previous year. This was not significant and did not change the results presented here.

analysis shows that their presence was particularly associated with death in 1993, likely capturing soldier deaths.

Table 4.8 Fixed Effects Models of Killing Over Time

Predictors	Model 1 All Years	Model 2 1992	Model 3 1993	Model 4 1994	Model 5 1995
<i>Targeted Violence</i>					
Percent Muslim	0.010*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.007** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.004)
Population (log)	0.835*** (0.073)	0.920*** (0.114)	0.847*** (0.075)	0.795*** (0.090)	1.089*** (0.114)
Percent Serb	0.005 (0.003)	0.011** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)
Polarization	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
<i>Community Organization</i>					
Divorce	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
<i>Organized Actors</i>					
Serb Paramilitary	0.196* (0.111)	0.653*** (0.152)	0.145 (0.117)	0.148 (0.131)	-0.067 (0.167)
Serb Army	0.015** (0.006)	0.048* (0.025)	0.008 (0.018)	0.051*** (0.013)	0.076*** (0.027)
Croatian Army	0.022*** (0.008)	0.080* (0.046)	0.094*** (0.017)	0.019 (0.017)	0.083 (0.051)
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>					
Serb Auton. Region	0.078 (0.151)	0.509** (0.223)	0.130 (0.152)	-0.015 (0.167)	0.155 (0.238)
Distance Serbia (log)	-0.177 (0.118)	-0.321* (0.177)	-0.034 (0.109)	0.124 (0.126)	-0.277 (0.183)
Elevation (log)	0.144 (0.090)	0.110 (0.148)	0.081 (0.092)	0.110 (0.117)	0.245* (0.147)
Surrounding Violence	0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)
Safe Area	0.217 (0.189)		-0.119 (0.183)	0.092 (0.211)	1.104*** (0.278)
<i>Regions and Years</i>					
Neretva	-0.391** (0.155)	0.371 (0.254)	-0.377** (0.172)	-0.784*** (0.190)	-0.639** (0.249)
Podrinje	0.064 (0.243)	0.979*** (0.346)	0.174 (0.250)	-0.266 (0.292)	0.016 (0.396)
Posavina	-0.234	0.384	-0.512**	-0.234	-0.110

	(0.201)	(0.331)	(0.205)	(0.225)	(0.303)
Pounje	0.695***	1.044***	-0.461*	0.227	0.897**
	(0.235)	(0.349)	(0.235)	(0.267)	(0.378)
Sarajevo	-0.177	1.156***	0.044	-0.307	-0.392
	(0.191)	(0.289)	(0.203)	(0.234)	(0.285)
Vrbas	0.128	0.553**	-0.346*	-0.221	0.354
	(0.180)	(0.267)	(0.177)	(0.201)	(0.285)
1993	-0.627***				
	(0.118)				
1994	-1.389***				
	(0.114)				
1995	-1.078***				
	(0.117)				
Constant	-3.580**	-3.743	-5.419***	-7.424***	-7.070***
	(1.635)	(2.656)	(1.530)	(1.821)	(2.373)
Observations	432	109	109	109	109
McFadden's R2	0.094	0.119	0.172	0.146	0.167

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Centralna Bosna excluded in all models; 1992 excluded in Model 1

In addition, the declaration of Safe Areas in mid-1993 did not quantitatively impact the violence. This could be because the designation came partway through the year. As in Rwanda, this intervention came after the largest peak in the violence, suggesting that late interventions may not be as efficient as early ones (although there is no counterfactual to test this possibility). Divorce is also significantly associated with killings in 1993.

In 1994, the effect of Croatian troops is once again replaced by the effect of the Bosnian Serb Army (and the Bosnian Army). Most other effects remain, though the effect of ethnic polarization is no longer significant, again providing support that areas that were polarized saw violence first. The diminished significance may also reflect changing populations each year, something I regrettably cannot measure.

In addition, Safe Areas are still not significantly associated with lower levels of

death in 1994 and are significantly associated with higher deaths in 1995, undoubtedly capturing the massacre at Srebrenica. Overall, this shows that the designation of Safe Area did not result in significantly lower violence in any year of the conflict. However, I only measure one form of violence here (killings). Further, as noted in Chapter 3, the lack of a significant effect does not mean that *no* lives were saved but that the effect was not large enough for significance by quantitative standards. Thus, this does not advise against Safe Areas but rather suggests that their timing may be crucial.

These findings over time must be interpreted with caution, as many variables (such as ethnicity) show no change when there was, indeed, change. The effects of other interventions, such as airstrikes or other UN Security Council resolutions, are also left out. Yet, these findings show that the factors that influence the magnitude of violence change over time. For the case of Bosnia, polarization, distance from Serbia, and Serb paramilitaries had a stronger influence on magnitude earlier in the violence.

Conclusion

While genocide was unfolding in Rwanda, it was also unfolding in Bosnia. Although these two genocides occurred on different continents, this chapter has illustrated numerous similarities. The parallels are especially prominent in the factors that influenced each case's onset. After examining these factors, I provided examples of victimization that took place once violence began (including killings, forced displacement, internment in concentration camps, gender-based violence, and numerous other forms of violence). Then, I discussed why the violence constituted genocide, arguing that the intent to destroy must be conceptualized broadly, with the conceptualization of destruction including death but also forced removal as well as the

destruction of culture. I differentiated between civil wars and genocide, arguing that both can occur at the same time and that one does not negate the other.

I then analyzed regional and temporal variation in both the death of civilians (roughly capturing genocide) and the death of soldiers (roughly capturing civil war), as well as the number of concentration camps, which I argue also supports the designation of genocidal violence. Overall, I found that factors related to targeted violence, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors influenced both the onset and the magnitude of the violence.

Specifically, percent Bosniak was associated with increased levels of civilian and soldier deaths, while percent Serb was only associated with increased soldier deaths, signifying the targeted nature of the violence. Contrary to expectations, there were more concentration camps in areas with higher Serb populations, likely because Serbs set them up in places they felt were safe from attack. Highly polarized regions also saw significant levels of each form of violence, illustrating the importance of polarization rather than the sheer presence of the victim group.

Measures of community (dis)organization were not associated with the level of any of the forms of violence tested, save small effects from divorce. This is likely due to the organization of the perpetrators, largely members of militias and the army rather than members of communities, like in Rwanda. To be clear, members of communities did participate in the violence in Bosnia. Police officers and firefighters even assisted Serb soldiers and paramilitaries as they took over towns. This is not reflected in measures of social (dis)organization, however, as they participated through their positions in local administration. Nevertheless, their participation did influence the violence. In fact, in

locations where the police force and/or firefighters participated in the violence, there were significantly higher magnitudes of violence against civilians and concentration camps (analyses not shown). Likewise, these regions saw comparatively earlier onset of violence.

Formally organized actors had a much larger effect on the violence. Serb paramilitary presence was associated with all forms of violence, while Serb army presence was associated with most. Likewise, it is clear that strategic aims of Greater Serbia influenced both civilian violence and the location of concentration camps. Concentration camps were also likely influenced by memories of past violence against Serbs, who were victimized in concentration camps during World War II.

Similar factors influenced the onset of violence, with violence occurring first in more polarized regions, regions that bordered Serbia, and regions where the Yugoslav army was present. Urban regions saw comparatively earlier violence, reflecting the pattern of perpetrators first taking over a main administrative city and then moving to other towns within a municipality. This was coordinated, however, as the measure of surrounding violence was not significant, suggesting that a contagion effect did not significantly influence the patterns.

It has been 20 years since this violence and the genocide in Rwanda unfolded. Now I turn to the last case study—an analysis of the Darfur region of Sudan, where genocide is currently unfolding.

Chapter 5: Genocide in Sudan

“Darfur is more than an occasional headline in the newspaper or 20 seconds on a forgotten nightly newscast. It is where genocide continues to happen...”

-Captain Brian Steidle, Author

In early 2003, a group of armed citizens initiated a rebellion against the government of Sudan. In response, the government unleashed a campaign of terror on the rebels’ homeland—a region in western Sudan known as Darfur. Today, that terror has evolved into a complex episode of mass violence that is still unfolding. Many people have been killed, tortured, displaced, and otherwise victimized.

In this chapter, I extend analyses from Chapters 3 and 4 to an ongoing situation of genocide. I do so cautiously, as it is considerably more difficult to ascertain facts, obtain data, and analyze a situation that is currently taking place. Indeed, the twenty years since genocide occurred in Rwanda and in Bosnia have allowed for detailed surveys of victims, criminal investigations, and myriad scholar and practitioner analyses of the violence. Through time and distance, relative clarity about these cases was obtained. Yet, even after twenty years, many elements of the violence in each case remain contested and unknown.

Proceeding with caution and an understanding that I must treat this case study differently due to its ongoing nature, this chapter begins by considering the preconditions that led to genocide in Darfur, including polarized identities, instability, and threats to the regime. Throughout this history, I focus more closely on the relations between Darfur and the capital of Sudan, as violence in this case targeted only a certain part of the country. I document the violence and then analyze temporal and regional variation in the bombing

of villages as well as the damage and destruction of villages (among the most prominent forms of violence taking place in Darfur). In line with Chapters 3 and 4, I assess how meso-level factors related to targeted violence, community organization, resource competition, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors influence patterns in the violence.

Although analyses are primarily descriptive, I find that the violence targeted certain groups, supporting theories that suggest the violence is genocidal. Yet, as in the other cases, the presence of those groups is not the only factor driving violence. The presence of organized, armed actors has also influenced patterns in violence in Darfur.

Unlike Rwanda, however, the organization of the community has not influenced the violence, as armies and militias whose members generally come from outside of the villages have perpetrated attacks. The types of violence I analyze are more prevalent in villages than in urban centers, which are more heterogeneous and more heavily monitored. Levels of violence are also higher in regions with better vegetation as well as along the border and in areas with higher elevation, pointing toward the relevance of theories of meso-level violence in civil war and resource competition theories for this case.

Before concluding, I briefly consider what may influence the ebbs and flows in the bombing of villages over time. I suggest potential actions that likely influenced increases and decreases in this form of violence, including rebel actions, peace talks, and international attention.

The Road to Genocide

The Republic of Sudan is a large country in Northeastern Africa. While it was once the largest country on the continent,¹⁸⁵ it became the third largest in 2011 when the southern portion of the state seceded to form the Republic of South Sudan. Much of the country is a vast plain covered by the Nile River and its tributaries, though deserts and mountain ranges are prevalent.

Figure 5.1: 2003 Sudan



“Sudan” is known in Arabic as *bilād as-sūdān* (السودان بلاد), or the “Land of Blacks.” Despite this literal translation, the ethnic composition of the state is anything but simple. In fact, some scholars suggest that over 600 ethnic and linguistic groups have resided within the country over the last century (Collins 2008). Global news media often

¹⁸⁵ Recorded history dates back to the Kingdom of Kush in 760 BCE. However, as in other chapters, I consider modern history in this narrative.

distinguish these groups by casting them as Arabs or Africans, associating Arabs with the northern regions of Sudan and Africans with what is now South Sudan. Scholars have criticized this distinction as vastly oversimplified (e.g., Flint and de Waal 2005; Mamdani 2010), especially when applied to the violence in Darfur. Still, many people throughout Sudan self-identify as Arab or African¹⁸⁶ (ADS 2004; Darfurian Voices 2011; Reeves 2013). In fact, each of the 43 refugees I interviewed discussed Darfur in terms of Arab and African¹⁸⁷ tribes and self-identified as African.

To understand these identities, I must turn to the roots of modern history in Sudan. Like Rwanda and Bosnia, some of these roots are found in imperialism.¹⁸⁸ In 1821, Egypt, itself controlled by the Ottoman Empire, invaded Sudan and successfully consolidated control over the region. While many groups were unhappy with foreign rule, the Egyptian conquerors immediately incorporated some Sudanese groups—like the

¹⁸⁶ This distinction intersects with several other identities. For example, Sudanese Arabs are often semi-nomadic herders, while Sudanese Africans are often sedentary farmers, though there are more nuances within these distinctions (Straus 2006). Nomadic peoples generally move 300 miles or more twice a year; more settled farmers also move to new areas of farmland, though they typically move shorter distances (Flint and de Waal 2005).

¹⁸⁷ Many of the Darfuri refugees interviewed by the Atrocities Documentation Survey in 2004, as well as refugees interviewed by 24 Hours for Darfur, self-identified as African and referenced Arabs in comparison. To better understand ideas surrounding race and ethnicity in Darfur, I asked each respondent I interviewed to discuss the differences between the two groups. While a few refugees responded that these identities were socially constructed and linked to power within society, the vast majority listed phenotypical differences (with Africans having darker skin) as well as cultural or linguistic differences. While there are varying ideas about when these differences became more prominent, scholars have documented the distinction during colonialism and nation-building (Collins 2008; Mamdani 2009) and suggested that it became more prominent in the decades preceding the genocide. Throughout this chapter, I refer to each as they are referred to by those involved in the violence. I also use the term “tribe,” as each interviewee used the term.

¹⁸⁸ To be clear, there were many wars and other issues in Sudan before the advent of colonialism; as in Rwanda and Bosnia, not all problems stem from imperialism, though it does mark an important turning point in history.

Shaigiya, an Arab tribe that was one of the largest tribes in Sudan—into their armies, beginning a long tradition of rulers showing favoritism (Natsios 2012).

Egyptian colonizers expanded across the country quickly. With its rich natural resources, as well as its agricultural potential and hydropower from the Nile and its tributaries, Sudan had many desirable features. Even more profitable, however, was the slave trade. Egyptian colonists transported between tens and hundreds of thousands of Sudanese men annually to conduct manual labor in Egypt throughout the mid-1880s (Collins 2008; Natsios 2012). As their rule expanded, they also instituted heavy taxes and undertook a mosque-building project, attempting to bring Islam to those who had yet to accept it and beginning a process of Arabization in what they considered an African country.¹⁸⁹

After six decades of Egyptian rule, a Sudanese Muslim cleric named Mohamed Ahmed initiated a revolution. He had been gaining support by preaching against imperial presence in Sudan and suggesting that Egyptian Islam was corrupt. In 1881, he proclaimed that he was a messianic redeemer known as a Mahdi and that violence was needed to defeat Turco-Egyptian rule. The Mahdist Revolution followed. The Mahdi died shortly after his victory, however, leaving a power vacuum and relatively tenuous stability in the newly independent country.

In 1899, Egypt reasserted control over Sudan through several agreements with the United Kingdom, which had an interest in the region given its proximity to the Suez Canal. In theory, these “Condominium Agreements” split power between Britain and

¹⁸⁹ While Islam was introduced to parts of the country peacefully during the 1300s (El-Din 2007), residents of the region practiced Islam, Christianity, and a number of local religious traditions at this time.

Egypt, though the structure of the agreements ensured full British control of the country. The British colonial administration was centered in Khartoum, a city in Northern Sudan that Egyptians had founded on the Nile in 1821. Political power and resources were concentrated there. As the city grew, the colonial administration and local leaders exploited the western and southern regions of Sudan (Khalid 1990).¹⁹⁰ Though this metropole economy brought some prosperity, it also divided the country, creating tension between the North and the South and bringing disproportionate prosperity to Khartoum and other cities in the North.

At the advent of British-Egyptian colonialism, Darfur was still an autonomous neighbor of Sudan. It had become a political entity during the early 1600s, when several tribes formed the Fur Sultanate.¹⁹¹ The Sultanate based its power in Jebel Marra, a mountainous region and watershed within the semi-arid plains of Darfur.¹⁹² By 1800, it was a well-organized, powerful state (Flint and de Waal 2005; Lemarchand 2006).

As the name implies, the Fur were a key tribe within the region. Yet, at least 40 other tribes¹⁹³ lived in Darfur. Almost everyone within the region practiced Islam, and many people spoke Arabic as well as traditional languages. Tribes self-identified as African or Arab, with African tribes—such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa—and Arab tribes—such as the Rizeigat and the Beni Halba—coexisting and intermarrying. As Flint

¹⁹⁰ Natsios (2012) notes that the British also isolated the South from the North in order to protect the North from slave traders, further influencing the uneven developments between the two regions of the country.

¹⁹¹ For a detailed description of the Darfur Sultanate, also known as the Keira Sultanate, see O’Fahey 1980.

¹⁹² The Darfur region is roughly the size of France.

¹⁹³ Flint and de Waal (2005) note that between 40 and 90 ethnic groups—depending on one’s definition—have emerged from Darfur. Note that I use the term “tribe” because that is how each of the Darfuri refugees I interviewed referred to ethnicity and because the term is used in the literature.

and de Waal describe, “Darfur was an African kingdom that embraced Arabs as valued equals” (2005:3).¹⁹⁴

In 1916,¹⁹⁵ British forces attacked the Fur Sultanate, killing the Sultan and incorporating Darfur into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Daly 2010). Traditional leaders took on new roles under what became known as “Native Administrations,” and British colonial officials tolerated leaders they believed would put down a Mahdist revival in the region, something the British continually feared. British leaders also sought to afford more systematic representation to Arab groups, empowering local sheikhs with judicial power and beginning a process of separating Arab and non-Arab communities (Tubiana, Tanner, and Abdul-Jalil 2012).

British policy brought other changes to the region as well, often dividing peoples who had lived in relative peace. For example, British policy offered recognition and land tenure to some tribes but not others. While they had recognized the homelands for almost all sedentary groups (typically African), they had left some nomadic groups (typically Arab) dependent on customary land use rights (Flint and de Waal 2005). Thus, much like the Tutsis in Rwanda and the Bosniaks in Bosnia, tribes that were considered African owned a larger share of the land. As Mamdani (2010) notes, this also racialized ethnicities by categorizing people into natives and settlers.

¹⁹⁴ Statistics on the ethnic composition of the region are scant before the first census in the 1950s. Then, 370,000 Darfuri residents self-identified as Arab, while 758,000 identified as Western African tribes, such as Fur or Masalit.

¹⁹⁵ When Egypt and the Ottoman Empire conquered Sudan in 1821, they did not directly rule Darfur. The Fur Sultanate crumbled during an attack in 1874, but Sultan Ali Dinnar restored it in 1890 (Collins 2006).

This land was becoming increasingly important due to drought that hit Darfur in 1926 (Daly 2010).¹⁹⁶ Locusts attacked what little food could be grown, and the drought and famine resulted in the first recorded epidemic in Sudan. Entire Darfuri villages were wiped out. Khartoum did little to respond to the turmoil or the subsequent economic downturn. Thus, while some Darfuris already resented Khartoum's grip over the region, resentment against the capital grew as its disinterest in developing Darfur became evident.¹⁹⁷

Resentment against the capital was also growing across the southern part of Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian administration had deliberately separated Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan into two autonomous regions within one state (Collins 2008). Yet, the administration of Northern and Southern Sudan as separate regions—as well as the metropole economy mentioned above—resulted in uneven development and exacerbated the separation of the two regions in terms of linguistic, religious, and political orientations.

Meanwhile, although Sudan had remained relatively immune to the violence of World War I, its position near Italian colonies and upstream from Egypt resulted in its involvement in World War II (Daly 2010). Sudan's defense force fought alongside Allied forces on the East African Front, gaining military skills. At the War's end, Sudan was relatively unscathed, and its soldiers—controlled by Khartoum—were more experienced.

¹⁹⁶ This followed a drought in the region in 1913.

¹⁹⁷ Beyond its failure to respond to the famine, British policy deliberately restricted education in the region to the sons of chiefs so that British rule would not be challenged. Darfur had just one elementary school, one tribal elementary school, and two sub-grade schools (Flint and de Waal 2005).

The end of World War II spurred several other developments within Sudan. Sudanese nationalism grew, and a Graduates Congress of intellectuals began to demand an end to divisions in Sudan and, later, to British rule (Fluehr-Lobban 1990). British colonial authorities decided to merge Northern and Southern Sudan in 1946, and began to consider possibilities for development throughout the country. Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, the British implemented five-year plans to facilitate economic and infrastructural growth in Sudan. As with other colonial initiatives, these plans privileged northern regions. They made scant mention of Darfur, contributing to its marginalization and continuing resentment of the colonial regime (Daly 2010). De-colonization soon began to occur across the continent, and colonial authorities and Sudanese citizens started seriously discussing an independent Sudan. In 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt decided to grant Sudan its independence and began preparations. Meanwhile, tensions between North and South Sudan, which had been on the rise for decades, grew treacherous. In 1955, an insurgency broke out in the southern part of the country, marking the beginning a civil war. The Southern insurgency was poorly organized but drew much support. It quickly developed into a well-organized secessionist movement and a guerrilla army—the Anyanya guerilla army.

Despite the war, the independence process continued, and Sudan became independent in 1956. Independence did not bring stability, however. In 1958, Major General Ibrahim Abboud staged a military coup, displacing the newly established government and implementing a military regime. The regime banned political parties and pursued policies of Arabization, seeking to spread Islam and Arab culture throughout the country. It instituted an Islamic center in Juba—the administrative center of the South, a

predominantly Christian region. It also switched the official “day of rest” from Sunday to Friday (in line with Islamic teachings) and replaced English with Arabic in all public schools.

Many of these changes strengthened Southern resolve and added fuel to the ongoing civil war. Although Darfur’s participation in the civil war was limited, grumblings about its own marginalization continued. Small rebellion groups, such as the Red Flame, Soony, and the Darfur Development Front, became active within the region. The Red Flame was organized by people who remained largely underground, and they produced leaflets condemning the economic structure of the region. Soony, comprised mainly of local soldiers, called for an end to exploitation, resulting in a purge of the army. Several educated civilians formed the Darfur Development Front, open to both Arabs and Africans who sought development of the Darfur region.

Abboud’s military regime ruled Sudan until 1964, when a series of strikes and protests known as the October Revolution jarred the country. Parliamentary elections were held in 1965, and Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub came to power, along with a coalition government of the Umma Party, associated with the Mahdist movement. Instability was becoming the norm in Sudan, however, as Colonel Gaafar Nimeiry staged a coup in May 1969, immediately abolishing all political parties and suspending the constitution. He renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and created a Revolutionary Command Council to run the country. The Sudanese Communist Party briefly came to power in 1971 by way of another coup, but Colonel Nimeiry regained control of the state within days.

To be sure, the government of Sudan was precarious. Instability also wracked Sudan's economy, which depended on agriculture and was unprepared to withstand the desertification and drought that continually plagued the country. Darfur felt the effects of desertification particularly hard because of its distance from large water sources like the Nile and, more importantly, because of government changes to policies regarding land ownership (Assal 2006). These effects were exacerbated by in-flows of refugees fleeing civil war in Chad, as well as Chadian rebels who, encouraged by Muammar Gaddafi's pan-Arab ideals, created bases in the Darfur region (Straus 2006). The presence of these rebels in the 1970s contributed to the availability of cheap weapons and promoted Arab supremacy within Darfur—an idea that many Arab tribes began to take seriously (Straus 2006).

Arab supremacy was beginning to take hold in other parts of the country as well. When Nimeiry took power, he deliberately changed the blue, yellow, and green Sudanese flag to one with horizontal red, black, and white stripes based on the Arab Liberation flag shared by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. He also propagated the dream of pan-Arabism, or the idea that Arabs in the region constituted a single nation, thereby excluding those who were not identified as Arab.

The civil war came to a close in 1972 with the Addis Ababa agreement, which designated South Sudan as an autonomous region. Shortly afterward, surveyors discovered oil in South Sudan. Colonel Nimeiry—who had been building his government's armed forces by obtaining arms from the Soviet Union, China, Egypt, and the United States—began disrespecting the Addis Ababa agreement after this discovery.

In 1983, he breached the agreement by declaring all of Sudan to be an Islamic State¹⁹⁸ and instituting what have become known as the September Laws—a series of laws meant to Islamicize the country. He terminated the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region. As Southern Sudan was not about to lose its new autonomy, it took up arms against the government in Khartoum once again through a movement called the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.

While I do not analyze the violence of the second civil war in depth, numerous scholars have suggested that, in the course of the war, the government of Khartoum committed genocide (Salih 1995; Totten 2012). Northern soldiers invaded the land of southern farmers in the Nuba Mountain region, selling their land and sending the farmers to concentration camps. Sudanese government soldiers murdered young men, sexually victimized many women,¹⁹⁹ and deliberately withheld foreign aid. Like in Bosnia and Rwanda, this previous violence may have served as a “dress rehearsal” or, at a minimum, may have shown leaders that they could act with impunity.

Drought and famine hit again in 1984 and 1985, exacerbating widespread unrest. In 1985, Major General Siwar Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Dhahab overthrew Nimeriy and instituted the Transitional Military Council (Collins 2008). As a new strategy in ongoing civil war, the new regime strategically armed the Missiriya and Southern Rizeigat tribes—Arab tribes residing in South Darfur and parts of South Sudan. The Sudanese state did not pay these militias, but the militias—popularly known as the *Murahaliin* —were allowed to keep whatever they looted from southern Sudanese

¹⁹⁸ For more on Islamization in Sudan, see Fluehr-Lobban 1990.

¹⁹⁹ These are general trends, though it is important to note that many women were killed and many men were sexually victimized.

communities. Using state-armed militias to fight the government's internal battles became popular: it reduced expenses, avoided the potential political costs of a military draft, and mitigated concerns about officer loyalty and the coup attempts²⁰⁰ (Flint 2009). As in Bosnia, militias may also have allowed the government to distance itself from culpability.

Elections held in 1986 brought Sadiq al-Mahdi, the great-grandson of Madhi, to power. He created a coalition government comprised of the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Nationalist Islamist Front, and representatives from the South (Daly 2010). Yet, the coalition government proved unstable and ineffective. Meanwhile, the economic situation in Sudan was similarly dire, and the Sudanese pound had lost 90 percent of its value from the previous decade (Daly 2010).

The effects of this economic downturn penetrated all regions of Sudan, though Darfur was hit particularly hard. The conflict in Chad had escalated during the late 1980s, bringing sporadic violence to the Darfur region. As a form of self-defense, Zaghawa, Fur, and several Arab tribes began forming militias. As in both Rwanda and Bosnia, these loosely organized militias rallied around the concept of self-defense, perhaps creating structures and patterns for future violence. Notably, the Government of Sudan also mobilized many members from the region to join the army and militias to fight the war with the South. In fact, some of these militias attacked Southern Sudanese tribes living in Southern Darfur. For example, militias from the Arab Rizeigat tribe perpetrated the 1987 Ed Daein massacre of displaced Dinka peoples with impunity.

²⁰⁰ This may be yet another reason for the relationship between coups and genocide, found in Chapter 2, which deserves additional academic attention.

In 1987, a group of Arab tribal leaders from Darfur addressed an open letter to Sudanese Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. They complained of underrepresentation in regional government (Daly 2010:265).²⁰¹ In a subsequent manifesto, Quraysh I, they explicitly advocated the destruction of the regional government and the elimination of black tribal leaders.²⁰² Just like the Hutu 10 Commandments and the 1986 Serbian Memorandum, Quraysh I spread a dangerous ideology that suggested one group was marginalized in large part due to the success of another. Perhaps motivated by the manifesto, as well as the pan-Arab ideology of Chadian soldiers, Arab self-defense militias attacked Fur villages in Jabal Marra, killing hundreds (Natsios 2012). Fur refugees poured into towns, and the influx of refugees, guns, and militias, as well as the tumultuous environmental conditions, exacerbated the already tense political situation in Darfur.

In response, a group of Darfur intellectuals formed the National Council for the Salvation of Darfur. They claimed that *all* of Darfur (not just Arabs in Darfur) had been marginalized for decades and organized demonstrations. Fur nationalism increased, along with sporadic violence that was longer and more intense than violence seen in the Darfur region before the 1980s. While this did not rise to the level of political parties divided by ethnic lines as in Rwanda and Bosnia, it was clear that ethnicity was becoming politicized and serving as a basis for collective action.

²⁰¹ This was partially a response to the Prime Minister's choice of a Fur governor for Darfur.

²⁰² Interestingly, the document also suggested disrupting their schools, much like the Hutu 10 Commandments suggested disrupting Tutsi education. This suggests that education is seen as a part of the culture and community and perhaps something to be destroyed during genocide, a phenomenon worthy of additional study.

Meanwhile, a military coup staged in June 1989 brought Omar al-Bashir—the current President of Sudan—and a military junta to power (Collins 2008). The coup drew heavily from Islamist ideology, proclaiming that a “Revolution of National Salvation” was needed (Salmon and Walmsley 2007:8). Just eight days after the coup, the new regime signed a tenuous peace agreement with leaders in Darfur. However, Khartoum never implemented the agreement, leaving the Fur and other tribes in Darfur with even more bitterness toward the central government (Natsios 2012).

Five months into Bashir’s rule, the government passed the Popular Defense Forces Act, supporting the formation of state-armed militias and self-defense committees that had begun in 1985 (Salmon and Walmsley 2007). According to the Act, the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) were intended “to train citizens on military and civil capabilities, to raise security awareness and military discipline among them, in order to act as a support force to the other regular ones on request” (Government of Sudan, 1989, Article 5). They recruited heavily among certain Arab groups²⁰³ and students. Many fought against the SPLA during the ongoing civil war, though others were meant to protect the regime from new uprisings and military interventions (Salmon and Walmsley 2007).

Bashir also appointed regional governors who stripped tribal leaders of their authority, redrew political boundaries, and quashed local customs. These individuals were generally part of the National Islamic Front, a political organization that began to dominate Sudan when Bashir took office, and the process helped immobilize potential opposition in Darfur, though it infuriated both Arab and non-Arab tribes in the region

²⁰³ Eventually, only Arab groups were recruited to join the PDF (Hagan and Kaiser 2011).

(Collins 2008). Bashir purged leaders in the army and dismissed thousands of public employees (Daly 2010), though he also began strengthening the army.

As the 1990s began, GDP declined while hyperinflation and debt soared. Sudan was politically ostracized. In 1995, President Mubarak of Egypt accused Sudan of involvement in a plot to assassinate him in Addis Ababa; rather than distancing themselves from the attack, a high-ranking official within Sudan (Hassan al-Turabi) praised it. In 1998, the U.S. bombed a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum that was supposedly a source of terrorist explosives, following its 1993 declaration that Sudan was sponsoring terrorism. Sudanese relations with many other countries declined, due in large part to these events.

Meanwhile, violence continued in Darfur, which was feeling the effects of marginalization. Indeed, when I asked Darfuri refugees to describe life in Darfur before the violence, almost all mentioned its marginalization. One said,

Life was good in a sense because there was no killing. But there were no services. If you were sick, you had to travel far. There was not electricity. And there were not many schools or chances for education (Uganda, March 2014).

Yet, it is important that while most narratives of the violence cite resource scarcity and climate change as a key factor prior to 2003, the two decades before the violence did not see a decrease in either rainfall or vegetation (Kevan and Gray 2008; Brown 2010). Thus, while drought and desertification clearly were taking place in Darfur over the 20th century, the decades most proximal to the conflict were not comparatively riddled with either. This suggests that the relative scarcity in Darfur in comparison to the rest of the country is perhaps just as important, if not more important, than resource scarcity among and between Darfuris.

In 1994, the government had divided Darfur into three regions—North Darfur, South Darfur, and Western Darfur. The Fur’s land was split three ways, making them minorities in each of the three states. The reform also created tribal hierarchies, as the government instituted numerous new positions and gave those positions to Arabs. As a Darfuri refugee recalled, “We would never have distinguish[ed] between this tribe or that tribe, but the reign of Bashir created things that never existed before in Sudan” (Darfurian Voices 2011). Unrest grew—particularly among the Masalit tribe in Western Darfur—and sporadic violence broke out in 1995 (Collins 2008). Government-armed militias, comprised mainly of members of Arab tribes, responded to the violence. Prominent members of the Masalit were arrested and tortured (Flint and de Waal 2005: 59), though members of militias went unpunished for their actions.

Back in Khartoum, Bashir tightened his rule on Sudan amid internal competition and strife within his ruling party. For example, in 1999, he declared a state of emergency and dissolved the National Assembly²⁰⁴ after a power struggle with the Speaker, the aforementioned Hassan al-Turabi. At the same time, a plan of action called Quraysh II surfaced (Daly 2010:266). This plan claimed that Sudan, from the Nile to Lake Chad, had been usurped from its rightful owners, the Arab descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Following the Quraysh I, it laid out aims and strategies to achieve Arab dominance in Darfur. It proposed feigning collaboration at the national level while secretly infiltrating the government (Flint and de Waal 2005).

The civil war between the North and the South continued, though the Government of Sudan and the SPLA/M entered peace negotiations in 2001. Darfur was not part of

²⁰⁴ Prior to this, he dissolved the Revolutionary Command Council, further increasing his power over Sudan.

these negotiations, leaving many Darfuri residents complaining about marginalization once again. As a refugee recalled, “We did not necessarily expect to be part of the negotiations since we were not part of the war, but we wanted our situation to change too. [It] was frustrating” (Uganda, March 2014). Community security forces from Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa villages gradually became convinced of the need to act against the Sudanese state, much like the RPF in Rwanda. These security forces formed the Darfur Liberation Front, which evolved into the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) (Tanner and Tubiana 2007).²⁰⁵

Another rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), also emerged in the early 2000s. Like the SLA, the JEM mobilized around the marginalization of Darfur. Shortly after they formed, members of the JEM compiled *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan* and circulated it across the country. *The Black Book* detailed the extent of the marginalization and neglect of all parts of Sudan except for the immediate area around the capital (Flint and de Waal 2005), highlighting the lack of services in Darfur, including education and health services, as well as the poor access to water and comparatively higher infant mortality rates. The book reached many parts of the country, including Khartoum.

Fearing uprising in Darfur, government-sponsored militias launched an offensive against Fur citizens in 2002. Mohammed, a refugee, recalled, “One of the first militias was comprised of Fur. So, the government said that the Fur are all rebels. But, they targeted civilians” (Uganda, March 2014). The militias killed an estimated 160 Darfuris,

²⁰⁵ Rebel groups in Darfur have changed, splintered, and reformed numerous times throughout the violence. I do not consider or discuss all of the changes here, but for more information, see Tanner and Tubiana 2007.

wounded many more, and caused the displacement of tens of thousands in the final months of 2002—mirroring rises in violence and displacement during the 1990s in Rwanda. Echoing both Rwanda and Bosnia, this preliminary violence targeted leaders within the communities. Numerous refugees shared with me that the violence first went after political leaders and educated members of their communities.

The militias perpetrating this violence, increasingly known as the *Janjaweed* (“men on horses”), were comprised mainly of Arabs. More specifically, scholars have suggested that the Janjaweed were former bandits, demobilized soldiers, fanatical members of a Libya-sponsored pan-Arab paramilitary force, and young Arabs with land conflicts with neighbors, although research must confirm these suggested trends. They faced few consequences for their actions. As a resident of Darfur noted, “When the Janjaweed burned a village, our people went to the police, but the government didn’t care about it. But if Zaghawa attacked Arabs, they went quickly to kill the Zaghawa” (quoted in Flint and de Waal 2005:65).

The government of Sudan was practically engaged in two wars—one in Darfur and one in South Sudan—though the latter appeared to be nearing an end. In early 2002, the government and the SPLA agreed to a ceasefire pertaining to the Nuba Mountains, and peace talks in Kenya led to breakthroughs toward ending the civil war. Parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol²⁰⁶ in July 2002, which paved the way for the South to seek self-determination. While this was a promising step toward ending what had become an almost permanent state of war, it also meant that Khartoum faced the prospect of losing almost half the country and the majority of its oil reserves.

²⁰⁶ This protocol was the first in a series of agreements that has become known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Thus, as in Rwanda and Bosnia, several preconditions existed. At the societal level, ethnicities had become polarized and politicized, especially with state-led Arabization campaigns in the latter part of the century. While this ideology did not blame others for the marginalization of Arabs to the degree blame was placed in Rwanda or Bosnia, it deemed certain ways of life and ethnicities as superior (and, by extension, others as inferior) and suggested that those adhering to those ways of life deserved more. This ideology was reflected in society through the neglect of the region and the actions of militias.

The state had struggled to become stable after its independence in 1956, with a series of coups and droughts that influenced instability and strain. Strain was further exacerbated by two civil wars with the southern part of the country and the threat of uprising in Darfur. As in Rwanda and Bosnia, the logic of war likely became closely linked to the logic of mass violence, with the state extending who it viewed as the enemy in a civil war to an entire group of people rather than an armed faction. Even as the civil war was ending, the government faced losing land and precious commodities, just as the Habyarimana regime had faced sharing power with rebellious Tutsis and Serbia had risked losing its control over Bosnia. As Sudan grew politically and economically ostracized by the international community, it was primed for violence.

Descent into Genocidal Violence

At the outset of 2003, violence in Darfur began to escalate as rebel movements grew and gained traction. Indeed, Darfuris had just witnessed that groups willing to fight the government, as in the South, could be successful, and low-level violence between government militias and emerging rebel groups was beginning to escalate. On February

26, 2003, several hundred SLA rebels attacked a government garrison in Golu, a town in Western Darfur. Two hundred government soldiers were killed in the attack, marking a rise in violence and SLA organization. Golu is widely cited as the genocidal “spark,” linking the rebellion and organization in Darfur to the government’s deadly response.

After the rebels took another town in March, President Bashir promised that Sudan’s army would be “unleashed” to “crush” the rebellion (Flint and de Waal 2005:99). Although the army was already operating in Darfur, it had yet to successfully quash the rebellion—in large part because of its lack of practice in desert warfare. Meanwhile, the rebels planned to attack the government’s planes in an attempt to dissuade aerial bombardments of villages, an increasingly prevalent tactic²⁰⁷ that left the rebels defenseless. On April 25, 2003, a joint force of SLA and JEM rebels attacked an air base in El Fasher, a city in Northern Darfur. They destroyed several Antonov bombers, killed at least 75 troops, and captured another 32 (Flint and de Waal 2005). In many ways, this attack was as much of a spark as that at Golu; it demonstrated to Khartoum that the rebels could damage the Government’s weapons and supplies—and were not backing down.

In May, the rebels successfully attacked government forces in Northern Darfur. Meanwhile, the government turned to its usual strategy of mobilizing militias throughout the region. As in Bosnia, some of these militias included people with criminal records (Flint 2009). In addition, non-locals were mobilized. According to a Darfuri refugee with whom I spoke,

²⁰⁷ As I further explain later, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw sporadic government bombing of villages in Darfur (confirmed by numerous human rights organization reports and ACLED data).

The Janjaweed were recruited from many places. Some were from local villages, but others were from other countries—Chad, Libya, and others. They were recruited in the 1990s but also as the rebels were attacking the government (Uganda, March 2014).

Local Darfuri government leaders were also promised development projects in exchange for contributing militia members from the region (Flint and de Waal 2005). Yet, while there are records of both Arabs and Africans joining the militias (Flint 2009), the government directly recruited Arab tribes and Arabs generally led the militias.

Soon, a full-fledged campaign of destruction was under way in Darfur. It was clearly targeting civilians alongside rebel groups. The government of Sudan initially denied participation in the violence, but their involvement was easily confirmed by the aerial bombardments that rained down on villages of Darfur. Many claim that these bombardments disproportionately targeted villages associated with African tribes, such as villages where Masalit, Fur, Zaghawa, and others resided (see, for example, numerous Human Rights Watch reports from 2004).

Often, the government soldiers bombing a village worked in tandem with the Janjaweed, who would enter a village after it was bombed, killing survivors, destroying buildings, and taking property (Human Rights Watch 2004; UN Commission Report 2005; author interviews). Other times, the Janjaweed and government soldiers would attack a village without assistance from the Anavov bombers that have become infamous in Darfur. Rape and many other forms of gender-based violence²⁰⁸ have also been common, with government soldiers, Janjaweed, and other perpetrators saying that they hoped to create Arab babies. Numerous refugees also recall babies being cut out of

²⁰⁸ In ongoing papers with Gabrielle Ferrales and Suzy McElrath, I consider the forms and variation of gender-based violence against both males and females in Darfur.

women's stomachs, killing both the unborn child and the mother (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009; author interviews).

These patterns have repeated throughout the Darfur region. For example, in mid-February 2004, government forces and Janjaweed militias attacked the village of Barey in North Darfur. Shortly afterward, residents of the neighboring village of Ankar witnessed between 400 and 500 Janjaweed advancing toward them. Some villagers fled, and soon, government forces began bombing the village with Antonovs. Over the span of two hours, the planes dropped between 20 and 35 bombs. Once the bombing had ceased, government soldiers and Janjaweed moved into the village. They looted livestock, clothes, and valuables, and they burned the buildings that had withstood the bombing, leaving the village completely destroyed (UN Commission Report 2005).

A Darfuri refugee recalled a similar attack in the village of Kabar. When interviewed by the Atrocities Documentation Survey (2004)²⁰⁹, she shared,

I was at home with my two children, mother and grandmother when the attack started. I saw a plane with a black bottom drop bombs on the village. I took my two children and we fled, but the main road was blocked by soldiers in pick-ups and on horses wearing camouflage uniforms. We ran down a small alley and into the bush. The soldiers were firing... While running away I stopped at my father's shop and found him dead and the shop looted... I saw two other dead bodies—two men I knew from the village were shot while collecting firewood. I also saw a one-year-old child of a woman killed while it was on her back.

²⁰⁹ The United States Government conducted the Atrocities Documentation Survey at the outset of the conflict. Trained workers interviewed more than 1,000 refugees in select camps in Chad between in July and August 2004. Numerous organizations (e.g., USAID, the Coalition for International Justice) worked on the survey instrument, and the teams used a semi-structured interviewing approach that allowed refugees to give the broadest possible accounts of what they had experienced. Interviewees were selected using a random sample design.

A refugee who fled Kornoï, a village in North Darfur, told of a similar attack. In his village, too, it started with bombing; then soldiers entered the village and went to the market, where they killed civilians. Next, they entered homes, including his:

They came and beat me and took my clothes... They took my clothes in front of everyone and burned them. I ran and left on a donkey but they chased me and took the donkey away. They whipped me on the back, saying "You are Zaghawa, why do you stay here? You must go" (ADS 2004).

As these examples suggest, soldiers and Janjaweed militia members have victimized numerous citizens in villages around Darfur. Every refugee I interviewed shared a story of their village's destruction at the hands of government soldiers and/or Janjaweed, forcing them to vacate the village, often without their family members. As in Rwanda and Bosnia, each example is a significant story, but there may be patterns in the collection of stories that help us understand how and why violence is unfolding in the Darfur region.

Patterns of Violence

Undeniably, the ongoing violence in Darfur has taken a number of forms, but there are distinct patterns in the violence. First, the Government of Sudan and its forces have bombed many villages, leaving them damaged and destroyed. This form of violence was not prevalent in Bosnia or Rwanda, where ethnic groups co-resided within the same cities and villages. While people of different ethnicities coexist in Darfur, the vast majority of villages are relatively homogenous,²¹⁰ which may have been a key reason behind the different form of victimization. In addition, the sheer size of Sudan and the distance between Khartoum and the Darfur region perhaps influenced the choice of aircraft.

²¹⁰ As is further explained below, I am still in the process of obtaining census data to further analyze the villages. However, when I asked each of the 43 refugees I interviewed, every person explained that villages are organized by tribe, with one tribe residing within one village.

Attacks by plane have often been coordinated with attacks on the ground, which include unknown numbers of massacres, gender-based violence, torture, humiliation, abduction, looting of property and livestock, and other forms of violence. At the outset, Sudanese Forces and the Janjaweed—discussed in more detail below—were responsible for these attacks. Sudanese Forces controlled the planes; then soldiers usually entered villages in Land Cruisers followed by Janjaweed riding horses and camels. After killing civilians,²¹¹ they loot property, destroy buildings, and sometimes set the village on fire.

As refugees recalled, attacks generally occurred in the morning when residents of the villages were either sleeping or at prayer and on days in which people were out of their homes, such as the weekly market days, Monday and Thursday.²¹² Bombings also occurred near nightfall, when the fires from evening meals easily identified where people were congregated.

The attacks have resulted in an unknown number of deaths. Estimated death tolls generally fall between 200,000 and 500,000, though they are uncertain and generally only cover some of the years of the violence.²¹³ For example, Hagan and Palloni (2006) suggested that the death toll was likely close to 400,000 by 2006. That same year, scholar-activist Eric Reeves (2006) estimated that between 480,000 and 530,000 people

²¹¹ Several refugees I interviewed recalled that some civilians were called by name, as if there were lists of who to target. This is not well documented and needs to be further explored.

²¹² These patterns were evident in the stories of the refugees with whom I spoke and in the ADS survey data. Notably, such patterns speak to many different temporal clocks in the violence, including daily and weekly clocks. For more on the temporal clocks of genocide, see Uggen, Nyseth Brehm, and McElrath 2014.

²¹³ For a detailed discussion of estimates of the death toll, how they are affected by disciplinary factors, and their change over time, see Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni 2006. In addition, see p. 295 of Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 for an excellent summary of mortality estimates.

had died. Epidemiological estimates have generally been lower (e.g., Guha-Sapir and Degomme 2005), with some finding that while violence was the main cause of death in 2004, subsequent years saw larger shares of disease-related mortality (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010). Still others have suggested that all estimates of the death toll have been exaggerated (e.g., Mamdani 2010). Clearly, various snapshots at different points in time and culled through different methods have led to a murky picture of total deaths. It is unlikely to become clearer until long after the violence has ended.

Beyond death, the attacks have influenced displacement. By the end of 2004, there were between 1 million and 1.65 million internally displaced peoples in Darfur (UN Commission Report 2005), and more than 200,000 refugees were living in refugee camps in Eastern Chad, among other countries. Today, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2013) estimates that 1.8 million people remain displaced in Sudan,²¹⁴ while hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees reside in neighboring countries.²¹⁵

Scholars and practitioners have debated how to label these and other forms of violence in Darfur. Several human rights organizations and prominent leaders, including George W. Bush, called the violence “genocide” as stories from the region reached the world through global news media in 2004. That same year, the UN created a Commission of Inquiry, which found that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been

²¹⁴ Recent UNHCR statistics cite 632,014 Sudanese refugees abroad, but this does not disaggregate between refugees from different time periods or between Sudan and South Sudan.

²¹⁵ As in other episodes of mass violence, statistics on the many other forms of violence are unclear. Yet another form of violence, generally unmentioned in studies of Darfur, is the changing of place names also seen in Bosnia. Numerous interviewees told me that the government and local Arab leaders changed the names of villages from original African names to Arabized versions. Several recalled discussions regarding changing the name of Darfur so that it would no longer be known as “land of the Fur.” This reflects a conscious attempt to eliminate a people from a region and to change a culture.

committed in Darfur, but did not label the violence genocide. Nevertheless, the finding of crimes against humanity and war crimes was enough for the UN Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005. After investigation, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC issued several warrants, including one for Sudanese President Omar-al-Bashir, making Bashir the first sitting head of state indicted for the crime of genocide.²¹⁶

As discussed in Chapter 1 and at length in Chapter 4, scholars are not bound to the legal definition of genocide. They have varying opinions about whether the former ICC Prosecutor's assessment of the violence was correct. In fact, some have been reluctant to use the term "genocide," arguing that the violence amounts to a repressive counter insurgency, war, and mass atrocity, but not genocide (e.g., Flint and de Waal 2005).

Others argue that genocide, defined as actions taken with the intent to destroy a social group, is taking place in Darfur. For example, Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2008, 2009) contend that many of the attacks in Darfur have been racially motivated. Drawing upon the Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS),²¹⁷ they analyze the racial epithets heard by Darfuri refugees when they were attacked (ADS 2004). Often, these included "Nuba" (black), "Blacks," and "Tora Bora" (terrorist). For example, one refugee recalled that his attacker screamed, "You blacks, you are food for vultures. Donkeys have

²¹⁶ Currently, no trials related to the situation in Sudan have begun.

²¹⁷ The United States Government conducted this survey in refugee camps in Chad in 2004.

more value than you. You are slaves.” Another heard, “Slaves, slaves, slaves; kill the slaves.”²¹⁸

Similarly, in my interviews with 43 refugees from Darfur, each recalled racist and dehumanizing language during attacks on their villages.²¹⁹ Most prominently, almost everyone recalled hearing shouts of “Abd,” which means slave. Victims of rape also recall racial epithets linked to the creation of Arab babies. For example, a woman who was attacked in her home was told, “You are black peoples’ wives and you bear black children, but now you have to bear white peoples’ child.” Others reported that children were targeted, presumably in an attempt to eradicate “the Blacks.” As one survivor recalled, a soldier explained the killing of a child by stating that, “A puppy can become a dog,” explaining the targeting of youth and dehumanizing the victims. Many of the Darfuri refugees in Uganda told me they had left Darfur particularly because young boys were being targeted.

According to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009), these racial epithets are verbal indicators of racialized intent to destroy groups considered African and, particularly, the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.²²⁰ The ADS provides strong supporting evidence, as these three tribes reported disproportionate levels of violence and

²¹⁸ Importantly, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) show, several government ministers were directly involved in the mobilization of the Janjaweed. Likewise, the government supplied aircrafts for the destruction of Darfur; and, as the ICC has argued, the state-led Arabization campaign influenced intent from the top-down. It is difficult to fully document the scope of this planning, as the violence is still ongoing.

²¹⁹ This is higher than the percentage in the ADS data; however, the much smaller number of interviewees for my project is likely key. Note that I asked respondents if they heard anything during attacks but never explicitly asked about racial slurs.

²²⁰ Just as Hutus and Tutsis or Bosnians and Serbs were not monolithic groups, these groups are far more complex in reality. There are *intraethnic* differences, as well as diverse class and regional identities.

disproportionate recollections of racial epithets. Notably, these are also the tribes that are associated with the rebel insurgency in Darfur (Lemarchand 2006). Yet, this does not mean that intent to destroy these groups could not be multifaceted, rooted in group members' identity as African²²¹ and their purported association with rebel groups in Darfur. In fact, as will be further discussed in Chapter 6, the extension of civil war mentalities to civilian populations is not an isolated trend in Darfur, but an occurrence in other genocides.

As Mann (2011) writes, the utterance of racial epithets also does not necessarily suggest pre-planned intent.²²² Rather, these racial epithets were likely often influenced by the situations themselves and, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009) argue, developed through collective action. Mann suggests that this casts doubt on the intention behind the actions, thus casting doubt on whether the violence was genocidal, but it is important to stress that intent does not need to be meticulously planned, as images of the Holocaust often suggest.²²³ Rather, intent can develop within the scope of a situation, as was likely often the case in Darfur.

Furthermore, the use of racial slurs does not mean that every perpetrator was motivated by genocidal intent or that perpetrators motivated by an intent to destroy were not *also* motivated by material or other gains; human motivations are multidimensional.

²²¹ Indeed, while the United Nations Commission of Inquiry concluded that these groups were not objectively distinct from other groups in the region (UN Commission 2005:129) and thus not groups protected by the Genocide Convention, a more sociological view of race and groups is necessary. As discussed in Chapter 1, race and ethnicity—as well as all social groups—are socially constructed everywhere, including in Darfur.

²²² Mann also notes that intent cannot necessarily be inferred from what people say, though it is perhaps one of the best inferences that exist.

²²³ Beyond creating documents with explicit plans, Nazi leaders met at the Wannsee conference to explicitly plan the Holocaust. Few other genocides have been documented in such great detail, though this does not mean they were unintentional.

Flint (2009), for example, argues that local politics sometimes trump identities in Darfur, not unlike the other factors that influenced participation in the violence in Rwanda or Bosnia. In addition, even if some Janjaweed members were motivated only by material gains, they were still enlisted and trained within a broader structure that sought to remove Black African tribes.²²⁴

The Perpetrators

The perpetrators of the violence include members of the Sudanese government, the Sudanese Armed forces, Janjaweed militias, and other paramilitaries. Unlike in Rwanda and Bosnia, scholars have yet to complete in-depth analyses of the planning of the genocide at the state-level, in large part because ongoing violence restricts the ability to access documents or interview key government figures. Yet, the research conducted by the Chief Prosecutor at the ICC has found that orders to bomb villages and to arm and mobilize the Janjaweed came directly from the government, including President Omar al-Bashir (ICC 2007, ICC 2009).

Under the government's command, members of the Sudanese Armed Forces²²⁵ have also been directly involved in the violence. In 2004, there were approximately 200,000 soldiers in the Sudanese army (UN Commission Report 2005). The government has supplemented them with paramilitaries of citizens known as the PDF. Members of the

²²⁴ Indeed, many argue that violence has not been intended to completely destroy the residents of Darfur but to remove them from the land. As argued in Chapter 4, however, the intent to remove—with no intent of governing those people—is also genocidal. Even by strict legal standards, the intent to destroy can be accomplished by forced outmigration and harsh living conditions, something that has also been documented in Darfur (Hagan and Kaiser 2011).

²²⁵ For more on the myriad branches of the Sudanese Armed Forces, see the work of the Small Arms Survey and the branches mentioned in the ICC warrants.

Armed Forces have bombed the villages of Darfur, and the Armed Forces and the PDF have attacked many villages on the ground.

The Janjaweed²²⁶ have also been key perpetrators. As noted above, these militias—also referred to as *fursan* (horsemen) and *mujahedeen*—are typically Arab²²⁷ militias (Human Rights Watch 2004; UN Commission Report 2005). While Janjaweed take orders from the Government, they also have their own leaders, with some—such as Musa Hilal²²⁸ and Ali Kushayb—gaining international notoriety early in the violence. Their rank and file members come from both inside and outside of Darfur, though it is rare that they attack their own communities. For example, only a small fraction of the events reported in the ADS were instances in which the victim identified the perpetrator as someone from their community. While some refugees I interviewed reported knowing their attackers from previous relationships between villages—suggesting that there were ties between some members of the Janjaweed and their victims—the perpetrators are rarely, if ever, from the same village as their victims. Thus, as discussed in more detail in

²²⁶ In 2004, the United Nations Commission of Experts estimated that there was at least one large group of Janjaweed, as well as several smaller groups, acting within each of Darfur's three states. Today, there are no reliable estimates of the number of Janjaweed, in part due to their nomadic nature and in part because many refugees use the term "Janjaweed" as a blanket term for any perpetrators.

²²⁷ The fact that the Janjaweed are described as Arab militias does not imply that all Arabs take the side of the Janjaweed. As the Commission Report (2005) noted, many Arabs in Darfur were opposed to their actions, with some fighting on the side of the rebels. In addition, non-Arabs have been part of the militias.

²²⁸ Several refugees noted that Musa Hilal started urging reconciliation in 2013, a claim corroborated by others.

Chapter 6, the organization of the perpetrators in Darfur is much closer to that in Bosnia than the mass public participation of neighbors in Rwanda.²²⁹

Disaggregating the Violence

To better understand the patterns in the violence, it is necessary to disaggregate victimization numbers by time and space. Numerous NGOs attempting to track the violence (such as the Enough Project, Human Rights Watch, Bloodhound, and the Small Arms Survey)²³⁰ have shed light on some of these patterns, generally finding that violence was most intense between 2003 and 2005. Less is known about regional variation in the violence, in part because the ongoing nature of the conflict and the perilous situation in Darfur—including the restriction of aid organizations and the barring of journalists and human rights organizations from even entering the region at different points in time—has limited the information available.

Nevertheless, several scholars have attempted to document and explain patterns in the violence. As previously noted, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008; 2009) utilize ADS data to better understand the violence in 2003 and part of 2004. Using hierarchical linear models, they analyze the factors that influenced variation in the reporting of racial epithets and the severity²³¹ of victimization reported by Darfuri refugees in Chad. Among other things, they conclude that racial epithets were heard more often when the Janajweed and Sudanese soldiers attacked together, while violence was particularly strong when

²²⁹ Notably, the rebel forces in Darfur have also committed violence and crimes, likely amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity but not genocide, much like in Rwanda and Bosnia. I do not analyze this violence, as it is not genocide.

²³⁰ While this also occurred to a degree in Rwanda and Bosnia, twenty years have brought increases in (I)NGOs as well as technology and other changes.

²³¹ This is based on a severity score the authors create; see Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008 for additional details.

they attacked together and when Sudanese soldiers attacked alone. They find that rebels were less likely to be in villages with higher levels of victimization, casting doubt on the notion that the violence was simply a counter insurgency. In fact, villages with larger populations of several African tribes²³² saw higher levels of racial epithets and victimization, supporting claims that they were targeted.

Using the same data, Hagan and Kaiser (2011) examine two intervals of attacks in 2003 and 2004,²³³ finding that the risk of violence was greater in the second wave, which they pinpoint in December 2003. They also document the pattern of state-led attacks of food, livestock, and water in these years—victimization they argue was genocidal, but is rarely considered in analyses of genocide.

Focusing on a later period of violence, de Waal, Hazlet, Davenport, and Kennedy (2014) draw upon data primarily from the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to document ebbs and flows in 2008 and 2009, finding what they characterize as “spikey” periods of intense violence followed by periods of less sustained violence and documenting more violence in South Darfur than in Northern or Western Darfur. They conclude that numerous combatants and sub-groups perpetrated this violence, suggesting that the conflict defies easy categorization.²³⁴

²³² Fur, Masalit, and Jebel peoples were significantly more likely to hear racial epithets during attacks and were linked to higher levels of victimization. Notably, Zaghawa—another African tribe commonly listed as victims, do not report these vocalizations. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond note their villages may have been bombed more frequently.

²³³ According to their operationalization of time, the first wave of violence ended in June 2003 and the second wave started in December 2003.

²³⁴ Similarly, Gramizzi and Tubiana (2012) document three key waves of violence, beginning with a first wave (2003 to 2005) that largely consisted of Arabs attacking non-Arabs. Then, they find that Arab groups began to turn against one another in 2006 (second wave) and that 2008 brought a third wave in which Arab groups grew more


Many other studies and NGO reports, many of which are cited above in the discussion of patterns of victimization, have sought to document the violence in Darfur. They have often documented patterns over time or by region for certain years of the violence. Yet, no studies to my knowledge have examined violence spanning more than a few years. Even Hagan and Raymond-Richmond's groundbreaking study covers a limited range of time—2003 and part of 2004—and a limited geographic region, including just 6 of the 21 localities (counties) in Darfur that were closest to the Chadian border.

Thus, in the remaining pages of this chapter, I analyze several forms of violence by geographic region and by year. Specifically, I focus on variation in the bombings of villages as well as the damage and destruction of villages at the locality (county) level. In 2003, there were 21 localities in Darfur. Since then, the administrative boundaries of Darfur have changed several times, though data on the dependent and independent variables are mainly available at the previous administrative boundaries.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the locality-level variation in bombings in Darfur (displayed by quantiles). As in Chapter 3 and 4, regional variation in genocidal violence is immediately apparent. It ranges from no documented bombings in two localities to up to 162 bombings over nine and a half years. In addition, it appears that there were generally more bombings in the West and North of Darfur and fewer in the South.

reluctant to fight on behalf of the government, leading the government to turn to non-Arab militias. As I analyze bombings by the government and the related damage and destruction of villages, this changing nature of aspects of the conflict is not part of this analysis.

Figure 5.2: Bombings in Darfur, 2003 to 2012



Figures 5.3 and 5.4 display the villages in Darfur that have been destroyed and damaged, respectively. It is evident that violence has been particularly concentrated in the center of Darfur, again with more destruction in the West and North, but also a substantial amount of destruction in the South—a pattern supported by many of the people I interviewed. These figures illustrate that more villages have been completely destroyed rather than damaged.

Figure 5.3: Destroyed Villages in Darfur, 2003 to 2010





Figure 5.4: Damaged Villages in Darfur, 2003 to 2010



In part, this variation may reflect the general settlement pattern in Darfur, displayed in Appendix D (for example, the very northern part of Darfur is largely desert and has few settlements). Yet, other factors may also influence the variation. I consider the potential explanatory power of theories related to targeted violence, community organization, resource competition, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal

factors. As I discussed many of these theories in Chapters 3 and 4, I review them only briefly here. Note that, while some theories lend themselves to well-informed hypotheses, others influence competing expectations. In the latter case, I present each expectation without advocating for one over the other.

Targeted Violence

As many scholars and activists have suggested that violence in Darfur targeted certain groups, the presence of these groups may be linked to violence. Indeed, as was found in Rwanda and Bosnia, the *location of victim groups* is likely a key influence on the location and magnitude of violence during genocide. Accordingly, *I hypothesize that areas where Fur, Masalit, and/or Zaghawa tribes reside see higher levels of violence, which would confirm the targeted nature of the violence. In line with this, I hypothesize that areas where Arab tribes live saw lower levels of violence.*²³⁵

Notably, Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes only reside within the Darfur region of Sudan. This contrasts with Bosnia and Rwanda, wherein the targeted victim groups lived throughout the country. While this is perhaps not the only reason for the isolated violence in Darfur, relative isolation is the most prominent explanation for why genocide in Sudan remained largely within the confines of Darfur.²³⁶

²³⁵ As explained in detail below, there are minimal data to test the how the ethnic composition of different communities in Darfur was related to violence. Particularly, census data before violence began in 2003 are not widely available, and no census data regarding tribes are currently available. Thus, I am unable to analyze detailed measures of the percentage of ethnicities in communities or more fine-grained measures of general ethnolinguistic diversity of ethnic polarization. I can, however, test ethnolinguistic data from ethnolinguistic maps²³⁵ as a general test of the presence of ethnic groups and the association with violence.

²³⁶ As explained above, Arabization and Islamization ideologies were also spread in the years prior to the violence. At the moment, there is no way to measure the spread or impact of these ideologies, as almost all inhabitants of Darfur were Muslims and as it is

Community Organization

In Chapters 3 and 4, I analyze how factors related to community organization (drawn from criminological theories of social disorganization) influenced the violence. Yet, as I mainly consider bombings and the destruction of villages in the subsequent analysis, measures of community organization are not theoretically meaningful as theorized, illustrating important differences in the factors that influence meso-level variation in violence during genocide. Recall that in Rwanda, these measures (such as marriage rates) influenced the rate of violence because many of the perpetrators were from the communities and were not part of formally and previously organized groups. In Darfur, the bombings were perpetrated exclusively by the government of Sudan, meaning that community members did not participate in this form of violence. Likewise, villages were damaged and destroyed by bombs, but also by soldiers and Janjaweed militias that had previously been organized and recruited. As noted above, they were rarely members of the communities they attacked, but rather members of nomadic tribes that interacted with villages, again showing that measures of community organization are less meaningful in this context and also suggesting that these measures should be explored in the future with regard to nomadic communities.

Because of this, I do not hypothesize that measures of marriage, employment, or others measures that capture community organization influenced the bombings or

less clear if and how ideologies were spread. As the participants were recruited rather than local citizens who simply joined violence as it was unfolding, I would expect that the presence or spread of the ideology would matter much less in this case than it did in Rwanda.

damage/destruction of villages in Darfur.²³⁷ This also illustrates that measures of community organization are less likely to apply to genocide when the victims and perpetrators are residentially segregated or, for other reasons, do not reside in the same community.

Resource Competition

Almost every scholar and practitioner that discusses Darfur suggests that the violence is rooted in population pressure and resource scarcity (as was the case with theorizing about Rwanda). As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, these ideas find support in broader theories linking resource scarcity to conflict (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1994; Urdal 2008). Population pressures can cause strain within a country (Henderson 1993), and this strain may influence people to commit criminal acts (Savelsberg 2010; Agnew 2011). Population pressure has also been linked to civil war violence (Raleigh and Urdal 2007) and posited as a factor that influences genocide, though I did not find an association between population pressure and the forms of violence analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4. Nevertheless, I test a measure of *settlement density* and *anticipate that population density is associated with higher levels of violence*.

²³⁷ If anything, the measures I use in previous chapters to operationalize community organization may reflect other phenomena, such as the marginalization of areas with certain tribes, or the targeting of certain groups, such as educated peoples or young men (both suggested as targets during interviews). They may also yield insights into villages from which more members of Janjaweed were recruited, which is something I will explore in the future (the home villages of Janjaweed are currently unknown). In addition, the census data to test these measures do not exist. I have been waiting for two years for IPUMS International to finish these data, not yet finished due to problems with the data. Once the census data are ready, I will test measures related to community organization to ensure their lack of significance (or, if they are significant, to explore alternate explanations).

Resource competition theories argue that resource scarcity makes salient boundaries between groups, which can, in turn, influence violence (Olzak 1990, 1992; Soule 1992). For the case of Darfur, it is rare to read an account that does not mention increasing desertification and subsequent decreases in land as key causes of violence. However, the relationship between resources and the violence has not been tested empirically. Thus, to measure the effect that land scarcity may have had on the violence, I rely upon two measures. First, I analyze a measure of the percentage of households in each locality that *own land*.²³⁸ Second, I analyze the type of *vegetation* present in each locality.

As with community organization, the explanatory power of these measures may only go so far. Indeed, the perpetrators would need to be in competition for the resources, which may not be the case when the perpetrators and victims do not reside in the same region. Yet, many members of the Janjaweed are from the Darfur region, so they may perceive competition within localities.

Theories pertaining to resource scarcity would suggest that *areas with lower levels of land ownership and less desirable (or no) vegetation would see higher rates of violence*, as there are less resources and, thus, likely increased competition. Yet, measures of vegetation and land ownership may also capture the desirability of the land in a region, meaning that the *particularly coveted land may have been targeted during the*

²³⁸ In the future, it would be ideal to analyze land-ownership by ethnicity along with a more detailed study of *hakura*, the system of land ownership in Darfur, possible when census data become available. Indeed, I hypothesize that changing notions of land ownership have a higher impact on the violence when compared against stagnant measures. Notably, I will also search for other measures of land ownership, such as the amount/size of land.

violence.²³⁹ Indeed, numerous reports have documented that the Janjaweed militias were promised land in return for the villages they destroyed (Human Rights Watch 2008), and, as noted in Chapter 2, resource abundance has also been linked to conflict. Such abundance would also not necessarily need to be within the confines of a community, as perpetrators may travel to obtain perceived riches. Because of this, it is also possible that areas with better vegetation saw more violence, as this would capture an aspect of the desirability of the land.

Organized Actors

The presence of organized actors is also likely linked to violence,²⁴⁰ as certain armed and organized actors perpetrated the violence and as the presence of organized actors was significantly associated with violence in both Rwanda and Bosnia. In Darfur, however, the presence of certain groups is far less documented than in former cases. Nevertheless, using existing data, I analyze how the presence of several armed groups, including Janjaweed and rebels,²⁴¹ influenced the violence.

Documented reports and interviews suggest that Janjaweed militias set up camps around Darfur. While the groups changed camp locations often, Human Rights Watch attempted to document the main *Janjaweed camps* in 2004, which I am able to assess in relation to violence that year. *The presence of Janjaweed soldiers may be associated with*

²³⁹ I also sought to assess whether the presence of oil is associated with higher levels of violence. However, according to available data, oil is only present in one city.

²⁴⁰ Indeed, without them, there would not be violence. Yet, analysis of particular perpetrators allows us to further understand which perpetrator groups shared higher responsibility for the violence.

²⁴¹ Sudanese armed forces clearly participated in attacks. Yet, detailed information about the movements of the Sudanese military does not exist (or is not yet public). I was able to compile data on the presence of military bases; however, there was one military base in each locality, so until I examine these data at sub-locality levels, this variable is not meaningful.

increased victimization, as their presence likely facilitated easy attacks on surrounding villages. Yet, the *presence of Janjaweed camps may also be associated with decreased victimization*, as Janjaweed may have set up camps in areas they effectively controlled.

As the government of Sudan claimed the violence was a counterinsurgency, and as it is clear that rebels were also attacking different places in the region, rebel presence may also have influenced the violence. However, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009) found that reported rebel presence was not associated with higher levels of victimization in 2003 and 2004, suggesting that the violence was not merely a counterinsurgency. The data to effectively analyze whether rebel presence was associated with violence throughout the conflict is not yet available. Yet, certain areas were associated with the rebels. Thus, while I am unable to fully test the effect of rebel presence, I can analyze whether *rebel strongholds*²⁴²—those few key areas that rebels have controlled throughout most of the violence—were associated with violence.²⁴³

Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors

Numerous broader spatial and temporal factors may have also influenced patterns in the violence. While not significant in Chapters 3 or 4, conditions favorable to insurgency, measured by rough/mountainous terrain, are strong predictors of civil war at the macro level (Fearon and Laitin 2003) as well as at meso levels (Murshed and Gates 2005; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009). To test whether these conditions also influenced genocidal violence in Darfur, I include a

²⁴² It is also possible that key rebel leaders' home villages saw higher levels of violence, in part perhaps because the government may have tried to harm the leaders by harming their home villages. Currently, as I am analyzing locality-level data, I do not test this.

²⁴³ As in Rwanda and Bosnia, there were some interventions. In particular, the UN sent troops to monitor the region. The precise presence of these UNAMID troops is not yet public information.

measure of *elevation* to capture rough terrain, which *I expect is associated with higher levels of violence*.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I also analyzed whether the capital saw higher rates of violence. This is not a meaningful for Darfur, as violence has only taken place in one region of the country, and it does not include the capital. However, other urban (in this case, the few larger cities) areas within Darfur may have seen more violence, as was the case in Rwanda. Refugees with whom I spoke explained that, as in both Rwanda and Bosnia, the violence began with the targeting of elites. Yet, as in other studies of violence, the remoteness of villages may also have been linked to violence (Su 2011), this time perhaps due to the lack of international attention and monitoring. Thus, I assess whether *urban areas* saw more violence.

Studies of political violence have also found higher rates of violence near borders, perhaps due to the instability of border regions as contested spaces (Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh 2009) or, in the case of Bosnia, larger geo-political interests. In Darfur, there is evidence of instability along the border in years prior to the violence. In addition, weapons can be more easily smuggled across borders (Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh 2009), which would not influence bombings but could influence damage and destruction to villages. Thus, I include a measure of *distance from Chad*²⁴⁴ and *hypothesize that regions closer to Chad had higher levels of violence*.

²⁴⁴ I also assessed distance from the Central African Republic, another country to which refugees fled. Yet, as the majority of refugees fled to Chad, I include it in the analysis.

Violence may also have been influenced by *past violence*, possibly linked to cycles of violence, memories of violence,²⁴⁵ impunity, or previously mobilized actors within a region, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Indeed, sporadic violence against African tribes took place in Darfur in the years leading to 2003,²⁴⁶ and these places may have seen higher levels of violence due to an existing structure that facilitated violence and displayed impunity (Flint and de Waal 2005). However, there were also clashes between government troops and rebel groups before 2003, and these locations may also have seen more violence—this time because of a potential association with rebel groups. Thus, I differentiate between *violence against civilians* and *armed clashes* before 2003 and anticipate that *each saw more violence during the genocide*.²⁴⁷


Finally, I analyze a measure of spatial autocorrelation. This measure, meant to capture violence in surrounding communities net of other factors discussed above, was significant in Rwanda but not Bosnia, suggesting that surrounding violence may matter more when the perpetrators are largely drawn from the community than when violence is strategically implemented from “above.” To test this, I include a measure of *surrounding violence*, although, in line with Bosnia, I anticipate that it is not significant.

²⁴⁵ Several refugees noted that the Fur Sultanate enslaved Arabs and that this memory may persist among Arabs today. I have yet to find documented proof of this, but the memory and historical narrative (regardless of its historical *truth*) may be a factor in the violence.

²⁴⁶ There was also violence between militias from regional conflicts, and I am working to obtain data on the dates and locations of these violent events.

²⁴⁷ Alternatively, as was the case in Rwanda, it is possible that regions that saw previous targeted violence saw no significant difference or even less violence during the genocide, as the previous targeted violence may have been successful in eliminating groups from the region.

Figure 5.5: Theories of Regional Variation Tested



Data and Analysis

To analyze variation in violence in Darfur, I rely upon several sources of data. First, I measure *bombings* in the Darfur region using data from the They Bombed Everything that Moved Project. This project, spearheaded by Eric Reeves,²⁴⁸ documents bombings that targeted civilians²⁴⁹ in Darfur between 1991 and June 15, 2012. I restrict the dataset

²⁴⁸ Note that while Reeves is also an activist (as are many scholars), this project was undertaken with scholarly rigor. I also analyzed a small subset of the data tracked to their original sources and found no issues.

²⁴⁹ To determine whether the bombing targeted civilians, Reeves (2011:42) used the following criteria (paraphrased from Reeves): (1) Use of Antonov aircraft (“bombers”) near areas with significant civilian populations. The Antonov is very inaccurate, thus indiscriminate; (2) Use of helicopter gunships—which fly low and fire with considerable accuracy—can be judged to be attacks against civilians if they are the primary victims of

to 2003 and 2012, as systematic genocide began in 2003. The dataset includes every bombing reported in what Reeves deemed reliable sources. For Darfur, these criteria include:

1. Confirmation by a United Nations or nongovernmental humanitarian organization;
2. Confirmation by a credible human rights organization;
3. Confirmation by Sudanese church sources;
4. Eyewitness accounts by journalists;
5. Reports by civilians if there was more than one witness (this includes reports from Radio Dabanga, which often cited a specific witness who had been determined by Radio Dabanga to be representative of the targeted community);
6. Forensic investigation confirming a bombing; and
7. Confirmation by the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) or its predecessor (AMIS).²⁵⁰

As these bombs were all dropped from planes, it is clear that they were part of the government's scorched earth campaign and that government soldiers were involved in some way. It is unlikely that every bombing is reported, due to insufficient reporting presence in the region, and multiple bombings within a short period of time (such as five bombs dropped on a city within a matter of minutes or hours) are counted as one bombing event.

I analyze bombings by locality. The geographic administrative boundaries have changed numerous times throughout the last decade in Sudan, and Reeves collected data according to 2003 village names.²⁵¹ Villages are aggregated within 21 localities, which are aggregated within three states—North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur. As

an assault; (3) Eyewitness accounts of the purpose of particular missions by Antonovs, helicopter gunships, or military jet aircraft; and (4) Photographic or forensic evidence indicating civilians or humanitarians were the targets of an aerial attack.

²⁵⁰ Reeves only included reports by Darfuri rebel groups as confirming evidence and to augment information, such as the location and time of the act.

²⁵¹ As there are numerous spellings for the same village as well as villages with the same name, this proved a challenging task. For more details, see Reeves 2011 and Reeves 2013.

most independent variables do not exist at the village level, I analyze data at the locality level using the 21 localities that existed in 2003.

I also analyze the number of villages that were destroyed or damaged within each locality. The US State Department collected these data utilizing several methods, including satellite imagery, and attempted to include all villages damaged or destroyed between February 2003 and December 2010.²⁵² Damaged villages and bombings are correlated at .9, suggesting close correspondence, while destroyed villages and bombings are only correlated at .2, suggesting that villages that were completely destroyed were victimized by government soldiers and/or Janjaweed militias on the ground (though sometimes in tandem with bombings).²⁵³

²⁵² The precise date of destruction or damage is not included; rather, the dataset includes the date that damage or destruction was confirmed. As the name implies, “destroyed” villages were completely destroyed, while “damaged” villages sustained some damage to village infrastructure but were not completely destroyed.

²⁵³ Data do not exist to conduct a comprehensive analysis of killings to match the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4. I originally sought to create my own database from open source materials, including human rights organization reports, intergovernmental organization reports, and numerous other sources. A research assistant and I coded over 100 reports—some well over 100 pages—in an attempt to create a database of killings. However, these data skew far toward early years of the violence, and while it is clear that these years did see more violence, I hypothesize that the lack of data in the latter years is due to lack of interest as well as lack of access. In addition, it is tremendously difficult to ascertain repeat information across sources, in large part due to lack of specificity in the location and varying estimates of death tolls. Furthermore, most sources do not seek to compile a comprehensive list of fatalities but to document select examples. Finally, as detailed above, the percentage of people who died due to direct killings in Rwanda and Bosnia is very high; in Sudan, demographic experts estimate high percentages of indirect deaths. While this does not mean the deaths are not genocidal, it suggests that many other factors influence death tolls. Because of these reasons, I do not analyze data on deaths at this time, though I have them for the book project and am working on ways to analyze them.

Independent variables come from a variety of sources. As noted above, complete census data from before 2003 are not publically available.²⁵⁴ I was able to obtain several measures from published census tables in various libraries around the United States. As the administrative boundaries in 1993 were quite different, this required matching administrative boundaries across years, which I did using ArcMap.²⁵⁵ I created other measures, such as distance from the border and elevation, in ArcMap as well. Additional measures, such as ethnolinguistic diversity, vegetation, and previous violence, come from sources listed in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Dependent and Independent Variables by Locality

Variable	Description	Coding	Source	Mean	Range
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Bombings	Number of bombing events that took place in locality between 2003 and 2012	Number	Reeves 2013	32	0 to 162
Damaged Villages	Number of villages in locality damaged between 2003 and 2010	Number	U.S. State Department	24.43	0 to 131
Destroyed Villages	Number of villages in locality destroyed between 2003 and 2010	Number	U.S. State Department	143.71	0 to 517

²⁵⁴ As noted, I have been trying for two years to obtain census data. IPUMS International has the census data from 1993—the last census before the genocide—but they will not be formatted to share for another year or so due to the prevalence of errors.

²⁵⁵ Specifically, in the 1993 census data, there are 10 localities, while there were 21 when the violence began. Using ArcGIS, I was able to match localities to their previous administrative boundaries and assigned the remaining 11 localities values based on the 1993 value. This is clearly imperfect, but there are no other options today.

Targeted Violence

Fur	Significant Fur population	0 = Not Fur 1 = Fur	Izady 2012 and LL-Map ²⁵⁶	0.52	0.00 to 1.00
Zaghawa	Significant Zaghawa population	0 = Not Zaghawa 1 = Zaghawa	Izady 2012 and LL-Map	0.14	0.00 to 1.00
Masalit	Significant Masalit population	0 = Not Masalit 1 = Masalit	Izady 2012 and LL-Map	0.14	0.00 to 1.00
Arab	Significant Arab population	0 = Not Arab 1 = Arab	Izady 2012 and LL-Map	0.29	0.00 to 1.00
African	Significant Fur, Zaghawa, and/or Masalit populations ²⁵⁷	0 = Not African 1 = African	Izady 2012 and LL-Map	0.71	0.00 to 1.00
Mixed	Significant Arab tribes and Fur, Zaghawa, or Masalit	0 = Not Mixed 1 = Mixed	Izady 2012 and LL-Map	0.62	0.00 to 1.00

Resource Competition

Settlement Density	Villages per square kilometer	Number	ArcGIS	0.04	0.0 to 0.1 ²⁵⁸
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²⁵⁶ LL-Map is a joint project of Eastern Michigan University and Stockholm University, in collaboration with several archives in the US, Europe, and Australia. They have a collection of maps, including a collection of linguistic maps. I used these, as well as Izady’s (2012) linguistic map of Sudan, to ascertain areas where Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, and Arabic tribes were prominent. While this is not perfect, as all groups in Darfur speak Arabic, African tribes—including the three key tribes targeted—also have their own languages, which are considered in the linguistic maps. I checked the results with two residents of Darfur. As noted above, these data do not designate everywhere where certain tribes resided but locations where there were significant populations of these groups. Regrettably, neither source includes their operationalization of “significant.”

²⁵⁷ While there are other African tribes within the region, this measure captures the African tribes who are documented as targeted.

²⁵⁸ The number of villages ranges from 56 to 1,092 within a locality. Because of the low settlement density per kilometer, I multiply this number by 100 in the bivariate analysis below.

Land Ownership	Percentage of households that own land	Percentage	1993 Census	74.00	15.74 to 93.46
Vegetation	Arable land present	0 = Not Arable ²⁵⁹ 1 = Arable	ArcGIS and Earth Explorer	0.24	0.00 to 1.00
<i>Organized Actors</i>					
Janjaweed Camps	Number of known Janjaweed camps in 2004	Number	Human Rights Watch Reports	0.86	0 to 5
Rebel Strongholds	Areas rebels controlled for the majority of the conflict	Number	Author interviews	0.05	0.00 to 1.00
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>					
Past Civilian Violence	Violence that targeted civilians between 1995 and 2003	0 = None Documented 1 = Past Violence	ACLED	0.33	0.00 to 1.00
Past Clashes	Armed clashes between 1995 and 2003	0 = None Documented 1 = Past Violence	ACLED	0.24	0.00 to 1.00
Elevation	Average elevation (logged)	Meters	ArcMap	6.58	6.09 to 7.21
Distance from Chad	Kilometers from the Chadian border (logged)	Kilometers	ArcGIS	4.85	2.75 to 6.10
Border Chad	Borders Chad	0 = No Border 1 = Borders Chad	Map	0.43	0.00 to 1.00

²⁵⁹ As is seen in the figure of arable land below, quantification is somewhat crude. For now, localities with approximately 50% or more cropland, forest, or non-savanna, non-desert habitat are assigned a “1,” while others are assigned a “0.”

Methodological Strategy

Due to the paucity of data and the relatively small number of localities (21), I rely upon more simple, descriptive methods than I utilized in previous chapters. Though far from complex, descriptive statistics can tell powerful stories, especially when the patterns are undocumented and unknown. As I documented patterns in locality-level variation in the violence in Darfur in Figures 5.5 through 5.9, I begin with bivariate relationships to assess factors that may have influenced locality-level variation in violence. To evaluate these relationships, I first present a series of maps with selected independent variables of interest juxtaposed over the locations of damaged and destroyed villages. Then, I conduct negative binomial bivariate regression²⁶⁰ with 1) bombings and 2) damaged and destroyed villages as the outcomes, in order to test each variable in Table 5.2. As in Chapter 4, negative binomial models are appropriate because the dependent variable is a count variable.²⁶¹ I cluster standard errors by the three states (North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur) to adjust the standard errors accordingly.

Notably, I also assessed the percent damaged and percent destroyed villages (not shown) as an outcome to ensure that the sheer number of villages was not driving any of the relationships presented below. As anticipated, settlement density is significantly related to the number of damaged and destroyed villages, though it is not the only factor at play and does not explain other relationships explored below.

²⁶⁰ When village-level data become available, I will test these findings through multivariate analysis.

²⁶¹ As in Chapter 4, I also assessed Poisson regression models. The results were qualitatively similar (and, in most cases, quantitatively identical), but due to overdispersion, I use negative binomial regression here.

After exploring factors that influence regional variation in the violence, I turn to violence over time. First, I analyze bombings by month. Again, as there are not many theories regarding what influences the life course of a violent episode and as data to rigorously test potential explanations do not exist, I document patterns and discuss potential driving forces. I briefly document the spread of damaged and destroyed villages by region over time, focusing on basic patterns.

Locality Variation in Damage and Destruction


By definition, genocide involves the targeting of certain groups. In Darfur, these groups include members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.²⁶² Each of the 43 refugees I interviewed in Uganda was a member of one of these three groups. Likewise, more than 85 percent of the refugees interviewed by the ADS in Chad identified with one of these three groups, supporting claims that the violence targeted certain peoples.

More broadly, Figure 5.6 shows the location of damaged and destroyed villages²⁶³ relative to significant ethnolinguistic groups within each locality. Though this is a relatively simple measure of the ethnicity of residents, the figure clearly displays that Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples generally reside where villages were damaged and destroyed. In line with this, localities dominated by Arab tribes, particularly in the southern part of Darfur, saw far less violence between 2003 and 2010.

²⁶² Note that Hagan and Raymond-Richmond also found that Jebel peoples had seen higher levels of violence, which I will explore when I have access to census data.

²⁶³ In this and all subsequent figures, I display damaged and destroyed villages together unless specified otherwise.


Figure 5.6: Damaged and Destroyed Villages in Darfur by Ethnolinguistic Communities



Of course, there is likely more variation within these patterns. While villages in Darfur are relatively homogenous, localities generally consist of a mix of Arab and African tribes. Indeed, even at the village-level, there are potentially villages where Arab and African tribes reside (this will be assessed when census data are available). Nevertheless, it is clear from the figure that areas where Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes generally reside saw much higher levels of destruction and damage to villages, lending strong support to the notion that the violence targeted certain groups.


Turning to theories of resource competition, Figure 5.7 shows damaged and destroyed villages relative to the percentage of the population that owned land in 1993. Overall, it appears that there may have been less damage to villages in places where higher percentages of the population owned land, which would support theories of resource competition.

Figure 5.7: Land Ownership in Darfur in 1993



However, the desirability of land may matter more than land ownership, as Janjaweed and government soldiers chased landowners off their land and subsequently destroyed villages, likely as a strategy to prevent villagers' return. To assess the desirability of land, Figure 5.8 shows destroyed (left) and damaged (right) villages in relation to prominent forms of vegetation. Greener areas designate cropland, forest, and other more desirable regions, while tans and light greens designate savanna and arid plains.

Figure 5.8: Destroyed (Left) and Damaged (Right) Villages by Vegetation Type



As seen in the figure, many destroyed villages are in areas that are not arable, suggesting that the sheer presence of desirable land does not drive the patterns in the conflict by itself. Yet, desirable land may have influenced participation in the violence, as numerous interviewees and other sources suggest that Janjaweed militia members were promised land in return for their participation. Indeed, it appears that a higher percentage of damaged villages (right) are in areas with arable land, while a higher percentage of destroyed villages (left) are in areas without arable land. This suggests that there may have been a strategy to not completely destroy villages in areas with the most desirable land, perhaps because members of the Janjaweed hoped to one day own the land.²⁶⁴

The presence of certain organized actors may also have influenced spatial patterns in violence. Accordingly, Figure 5.9 displays localities by the number of known Janjaweed camps in 2004 in relation to location of villages that were damaged and destroyed that year. While it is clear that Janjaweed had camps in areas with little violence, it is also clear that their camps were associated with pockets of violence—most notably, the three most concentrated areas of damaged and destroyed villages are in the three localities with the highest number of Janjaweed camps.

Yet, the places that saw armed conflict before 2003—which generally consisted of rebel attacks and elicited responses—were not necessarily the places that saw this form of violence during the first few years of the genocide. As shown in Figure 5.10, these localities did experience some violence as the genocide began, though many other

²⁶⁴ Mann (2011) and other scholars have questioned why attacks on villages would occur if the Janjaweed wanted the land. Clearly these figures are only preliminary evidence, and more fine-grained analysis will better reveal these patterns.

localities also witnessed much damage and destruction, further proven in bivariate analysis.

Figure 5.9: Damaged and Destroyed Villages and Janjaweed Location in 2004





Figure 5.10: 2003 and 2004 Damaged and Destroyed Villages with Previous Violence



Lastly, a few observations about broader spatial and temporal factors can also be drawn. First, it appears that many villages along the border with Chad had higher levels of violence—perhaps due, in part, to the general instability of populations along borders, the ease of access for groups from Chad, or even the targeted prevention of people fleeing to camps in Chad. Yet, it also appears that this was largely the case for regions dominated

by African tribes. Indeed, there is less damage and destruction along the Chadian border in South Darfur, where more Arab tribes live.²⁶⁵

In addition, though it is difficult to display on the map, the three capital cities—Nyala, El Fasher, and Al Geneina—were not damaged or destroyed, indicating that there was less destruction and damage in more urban areas compared to the rural villages. Again, while these cities are not urban in the traditional sense of the word, their populations ranged from 200,000 (Geneina) to 560,000 (Nyala); and each has an airport. Many of refugees with whom I spoke fled their village to find refuge in one of the three capital cities, as it was common knowledge that there was more violence in the villages. There may be several reasons for this, but chief among them are likely the relatively heterogeneous populations and the public nature of cities, which hosted foreigners, NGOs, journalists, and other potential watchdogs. In other words, as in Bosnia, the remoteness of villages may have provided some cover for the government to attack and then blame the attack on rebel groups or paint it as well-founded attack on rebel groups, as few outside sources would have been present to argue the contrary.

This does not mean that violence did not occur in the cities but that it occurred in a different, less noticeable form. For example, many respondents noted that the government set up roadblocks to stop displaced peoples as they entered cities and that members of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes could be stopped and detained for allegedly supporting rebel activity. A number of young males with whom I spoke were also arrested (and subsequently tortured) in cities, often under the auspices of having

²⁶⁵ Note that, in more Northern communities along the border, the percentage of African tribes (specifically Zaghawa and Masalit tribes) is higher than in communities that saw some destruction but less than further down the border, where some Fur tribes live.

supported rebels. Even Darfuri refugees in Khartoum faced discrimination within the education system, suggesting again there was less damage and destruction in cities but that violence shifted forms to discrimination, targeted arrest, and other injury that could escape scrutiny or be blamed on other factors.

Bivariate Analysis

In addition to the descriptive maps shown above, I analyze bivariate relationships to further explore patterns in locality-level variation in violence in Darfur. As basic descriptive statistics and binary relationships can be quite meaningful and illustrate patterns, Table 5.2 includes 17 separate bivariate models that assess the relationship between quantitative indicators reviewed above and bombings and destroyed/damaged villages (considered together).

Measuring ethnicity, albeit in a rudimentary way, confirms patterns from the maps but adds more nuance. Particularly, areas with significant Zaghawa and Masalit presence generally saw higher levels of violence, though areas with Fur presence did not. This is likely due to the relatively simple measure of ethnicity (whether a group was present), as Fur peoples were spread out among many regions. These results confirm patterns found by Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2008, 2009). In their study, Zaghawa tribes saw comparatively less physical victimization, which they explain by noting that areas where Zaghawa tribes lived saw higher rates of bombing—a finding supported here. By contrast, they find that Masalit peoples saw much higher levels of victimization by soldiers and Janjaweed on the ground, which also could partially explain their significant positive relationship with damaged and destroyed villages and the

Table 5.2 Negative Binomial Bivariate Analysis of Locality-Level Violence in Darfur

Variable	Model	Bombings	Damaged/Destroyed Villages
<i>Targeted Violence</i>			
Fur	1	0.162 (0.581)	0.095 (0.577)
Zaghawa	2	1.313*** (0.268)	0.231* (0.128)
Masalit	3	-1.548*** (0.459)	0.349*** (0.061)
Arab	4	-1.871*** (0.312)	-0.886*** (0.217)
African	5	1.871*** (0.312)	0.886*** (0.217)
Mixed	6	1.855*** (0.301)	0.447 (0.523)
<i>Resource Competition</i>			
Settlement Density	7	0.140 (0.100)	0.254** (0.108)
Land Ownership	8	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.006* (0.003)
Vegetation	9	2.015*** (0.397)	1.005*** (0.359)
<i>Organized Actors</i>			
Janjaweed Camps	10	0.510*** (0.179)	0.326*** -0.116
Rebel Strongholds	11	1.008** (0.492)	0.192*** (0.045)
<i>Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors</i>			
Past Civilian Violence	12	0.129 (0.959)	0.366 (0.605)
Past Clashes	13	0.316 (0.319)	0.889** (0.419)
Elevation (log)	14	2.695*** (0.753)	1.483** (0.458)
Distance from Chad (log)	15	-0.106 (0.216)	-0.118 -0.203
Border Chad	16	0.079 (0.425)	0.192*** (0.038)

Surrounding Violence	17	0.035*** (0.009)	0.030** (0.016)
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Standard errors clustered by state
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

simultaneous negative relationship with bombings.²⁶⁶ In any regard, it is also clear that villages where Arab tribes were the majority saw significantly lower levels of each form of victimization, while areas with Fur, Zaghawa, and/ or Masalit (“African”) tribes saw comparatively higher levels of bombings and damaged/destroyed villages.

In terms of resource competition, Table 5.2 confirms visual patterns as well; areas where higher percentages of people owned land saw significantly less bombing and damaged/destroyed villages. While these measures are unable to capture the complex migratory patterns that may also influence resource scarcity, it is clear that areas with less land ownership saw higher levels of violence. Areas with more vegetation saw significantly higher levels of each form of violence, perhaps suggesting that the motivation to claim land drove patterns of violence. As Shatta, a refugee, explained,

Before the genocide, no one talked about their land in the same way. But, the government promised Janjaweed militias could have the land. Maybe because of this, the rebels also started reminding people that their land was important. Land became like a tool (Uganda, March 2014).

Again, visual patterns suggest that villages were completely destroyed in areas with less desirable land and damaged (but not destroyed) in areas with more desirable land.

Also confirming trends displayed in the figures, areas where the Janjaweed had camps in 2004 had significantly more violence, again suggesting that their proximity is associated with more violence, which was expected and found more generally in Rwanda

²⁶⁶ The reasons behind these findings are less clear, and I will explore them in the future.

and Bosnia. Rebel strongholds—in this case, the mountainous Jebel Marra region—also saw significantly higher levels of each form of violence. It is likely that the rebel presence and control over this region made it a target, though it is also noteworthy that this region is one of the most fertile places in Darfur and is most associated with the Fur Sultanate, suggesting a multifaceted reason behind the increased violence in its hills.

Areas where there were clashes between two armed factions (generally Arab and Africans) before 2003 saw more damage and destruction to villages in 2003 and 2004, suggesting that these areas were perhaps targeted first in retaliation.²⁶⁷ Yet, areas that saw higher violence against civilians before 2003 did not have higher levels of violence during the genocide. While I cannot fully measure the presence of rebels and government retaliation during the violence, the sheer scale of the destruction in Darfur underscores that the violence targeted civilians, not just rebels.

A specific border was associated with higher levels of violence, as was the case in Bosnia. However, Figure 5.5 suggests this was particularly true for African communities along the Chadian border, since there are far fewer damaged and destroyed villages in the Arab-dominated localities along the border in the south. Beyond targeting of certain communities, there may be several reasons for increased violence along the border, including the ease of access from multiple sides (as some reports suggest that Janjaweed attacked from Chad), the traditional instability of border communities, and the potential targeting of citizens attempting to flee to Chad.

Elevation is significantly associated with both forms of violence, supporting theories that link elevation and violence. It is noteworthy that rebels controlled the area

²⁶⁷ While I do not display multivariate models, this effect remained with a control for whether the region had significant numbers of Fur, Masalit, or Zaghawa tribes.

with the highest elevation; as such, multivariate analysis is needed to better understand this effect. Lastly, the variables that capture surrounding violence are significant in bivariate analysis. However, once a control for the ethnic population is included (not shown), this is, as anticipated, no longer significant.

Overall, as in Rwanda and Bosnia, regional variation in violence in Darfur was associated with larger populations of the victim groups, confirming that where the victim group lives influences the patterns of violence in Darfur. The presence of armed actors is also associated with violence, which is logical, since they perpetrate much of the violence. Yet, unlike in Rwanda, community organization did not influence patterns, as the perpetrators were largely recruited externally or acting within official capacity.²⁶⁸ More akin to Bosnia, strategic factors, such as whether the location was outside of the watchful eye of the international community and the desirability of land, influenced locality-level variation in Darfur's violence. While the precise reasons reviewed here may vary, this supports insights from Chapters 3 and 4, which showed that who the perpetrators of genocide are and how they are organized is instrumental to understanding the patterns that unfold.

Violence Over Time in Darfur

Thus far, I have examined violence by region. Yet, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated clear patterns in genocidal violence over time, and Darfur is likely no different. Thus, before concluding, I briefly turn to violence over time in Darfur. As I do not have a complete picture of the forms of violence, even to ascertain violence that strictly occurred on the ground, the examination of onset dates is not possible. Instead, I rely on descriptive

²⁶⁸ As noted above, these measures may have influenced the recruiting patterns (and who was recruited), which I will assess in the future.

statistics. First, I analyze bombings over time. Then, I integrate a spatial element by examining the damage and destruction of cities by time and by locality. As I do so, I discuss probable influences on the ebbs and flows in violence. I do not intend for this to be a causal discussion and do not yet have the adequate data to rigorously test these ideas. Thus, they are informed hypotheses and suggestions to be explored and tested at a future time, with a particular eye to factors that likely influenced and abated violence, focusing on strain and international attention.


Figure 5.11 illustrates bombings by year in Darfur, showing that the violence was certainly not constant over time. Specifically, aerial bombardments on villages were greatest in 2004, took a large dive in 2005, and then ebbed and flowed since then, with spikes in 2006, 2008, and 2011.

Looking at this in greater detail, systematic violence began in 2003, following several rebel attacks. Both sides mobilized and organized after this point, and violence escalated, with the most violence seen in 2004. While this figure only reflects bombings, almost every Darfuri refugee I interviewed recalled much violence in 2003 and early 2004, suggesting a broader pattern across forms of victimization.²⁶⁹

There may be numerous reasons for the drop in bombings in 2005, but one key reason is likely the war with South Sudan. In January 2005, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, effectively ending the Second Sudanese Civil War. While Darfur was not directly involved in the war, this agreement likely meant two things.

²⁶⁹ This pattern is also supported by a higher number of damaged and destroyed villages in 2003 and 2004.

Figure 5.11: Bombings by Year in Darfur



First, the agreement may have decreased strain that was felt by the Sudanese government.²⁷⁰ Second and perhaps more importantly, there was much international attention surrounding the agreement, and many journalists, human rights organizations, and prominent members of the international community were present in Sudan in the months following January 2005. While the presence of many monitors may have not kept violence from occurring on the ground, it is quite likely that their presence may have kept the government from using its own planes (clearly recognizable, since only the government owns planes in Sudan) to bomb the Darfur region.

To better understand these and other patterns, it is instructive to consider violence by month and to consider situations that may have increased or decreased violence.

²⁷⁰ It also may have meant that more troops and energy could be diverted to Darfur instead.

Without a detailed account of decisions from the inside—again, impossible until interviews and other forms of research can be conducted long after the violence has ended—it is difficult to know precisely what influenced the ebbs and flows of violence. Nevertheless, knowledge of occurrences both within Sudan and outside of it can begin to shed light on the patterns. Specifically, I focus on key rebel attacks, which would likely place pressure and strain on the government; peace talks, which could quell violence²⁷¹ by increasing monitoring and international attention as well as through influencing calculated elite decisions, in line with elite rationality theories (Valentino 2004; Midlarski 2005); and other forms of international attention, which may also serve to quell violence.

While I will not walk through every month of the last decade, a few examples—selected as representative of other trends—can illustrate these points. For instance, Figure 5.12 shows bombings over time in 2003, the first year of the genocide. As seen in the figure, there was one documented bombing a month between January²⁷² and April 2003. During this time, the rebel groups were beginning to attack the government soldiers, culminating in the April 25, 2003, attack by both JEM and SLA forces on military barracks in El Fasher. Following this attack, the government response escalated, with an increase to four bombings in May and five in June, which coincided with mounting rebel activity. In this period, the government also mobilized the Janjaweed. Then, in July, the government-armed Janjaweed began a large offensive led by Musa Hilal (HRW 2008).


While the bombings do not capture the offensive on the ground, many eyewitness reports

²⁷¹ It is also possible that peace talks could place strain on the government and have the opposite effect, though data below show this is likely not the case—at least in the weeks immediately following the talks.

²⁷² Again, the bombing in January serves as a reminder that there were bombings on villages before the rebel attacks, but that these bombings escalated afterward.

suggest that bombings were coordinated in tandem with the offensive on the ground, a likely reason for the large increase in bombings in July.

Figure 5.12: Bombings in Darfur by Month in 2003



In early September 2003, the government and one of the rebel groups—SLM—signed a 6-week ceasefire. Air strikes did not completely stop, but there was a noticeable decrease in bombings. The ceasefire did not last long, as bombings increased again in November, with each side claiming the other violated the agreement—a pattern that has repeated many times throughout the conflict.

Disaggregating 2004 by month (Figure 5.13) shows the large spike in 2004 was largely driven by an increase in bombings in January. The precise reason is not yet clear, though it appears that the government set in motion a coordinated attack on many villages, suggesting that the genocidal response was part of a strategy. Afterward,

bombings remained high (compared to 2003), though there was a large general decrease after January 2004. There may be several reasons, but it is noteworthy that the end of January is when humanitarian organizations began arriving in Darfur, potentially serving as guardians or monitors of the situation. Even within this, though, there were ebbs and flows in 2004. April, for example, saw a decrease in bombings following another short-lived ceasefire, negotiated between the government and both rebel groups (SLA and JEM) and signed April 8th. June saw a drop in violence as well, potentially because the first international observers from the African Union Ceasefire Commission arrived in Darfur, which was also visited by Kofi Annan and Colin Powell in the same period. Again, while findings in Chapters 3 and 4 cast doubt on the effectiveness of neutral observers with no mandate to forcefully intervene, patterns thus far suggest that the presence of observers may have influenced certain actions and, at least in Darfur, may have impacted the use of easily recognizable government planes to commit atrocity. The fact that bombings did not stop and that some attacks occurred within plain sight of international observers makes clear that mere presence was not enough to prevent violence, though international arrival may have abated some of the more prominent forms of violence (especially earlier in the conflict when it was still unclear how members of the international community would react).


The end of August saw another drop in violence, this time coinciding with the resumption of peace. These lasted three weeks before breaking down, potentially explaining some of the decrease in violence in September and mirroring the short decrease in violence after the ceasefire in 2003. In November 2004, the government and

rebels had signed yet another agreement, implementing a no-fly zone over Darfur.

Bombings continued, however, and even escalated in line with increased rebel attacks.

December 2004 and the beginning of 2005 brought another surge in government violence. Shortly after 2005 began, however, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, bringing much international attention to Sudan, both in the form of people interested in its governance and in additional attention on Darfur, which was viewed as the remaining warzone in the state. Violence remained subdued until July 2005. A small uptick in violence coincided with the death of John Garang, a key leader in Southern Sudan who had served briefly as First Vice President of Sudan. Many scholars and practitioners cite his death as detrimental to stability in Sudan, as he was instrumental to the peace process between the North and the South.

Figure 5.13: Bombings in Darfur, 2004-2005




Each subsequent year has seen similar ebbs and flows in violence. Some peace agreements, like the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the July 2011 Doha Peace Agreement, were followed by periods of sustained decreases in bombings, with some lasting up to several months. Yet, as with the other peace agreements, there were not lasting effects. The ICC issued several indictments in relation to the violence throughout this time, including indictments in July 2008 and March 2009 for President Bashir. It is unclear how these affected bombing, as July 2008 saw an increase in violence, while March 2009 saw a decrease. Yet, even if the influence on bombings is questionable, it is well known that Bashir kicked aid organizations out of the country after the second indictment, and that action directly influenced the survival and health of many internally displaced peoples as well as a lack of monitoring on the ground.

Briefly examining violence by region over time also yields interesting patterns. Figure 5.14 shows villages destroyed by year.²⁷³ Villages denoted by lighter green signify those destroyed in the earlier years of the violence. While these are located in a number of localities, it is evident that more villages were destroyed in the north and particularly the western part of Darfur in 2003 and 2004. Then, in 2005, violence appeared to shift to southern Darfur as well as to villages along the border. Again, future research will reveal reasons, but the vast majority of the targeted tribes live in the regions targeted in 2003 and 2004, which may suggest that the strategy was to start with the regions of most interest first, as was the case in Bosnia.

²⁷³ I have chosen to show destroyed villages (as opposed to damaged villages) as the number is much higher. The trend is very similar for damaged villages, however.

Figure 5.14: Villages Destroyed by Year in Darfur



Conclusion

Today, genocide continues in the Darfur region of Sudan. In this chapter, I have documented some of the patterns of this violence, showing how bombings and the damage and destruction of villages varied across the 21 localities in Darfur and presenting some patterns over time. As the violence is ongoing, there are many

uncertainties regarding victimization, and it is considerably more difficult to obtain data here than in other cases. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn.

First, violence in Darfur has targeted groups that the government and Janjaweed militias deem to be “African.” Interviews confirmed that the binary between “Arab” and “African” is perceived as real in Darfur; in other words, although some scholars argue this distinction is rooted in Western understandings of the violence, it is clearly a way that people in Darfur categorize themselves and one another. Yet, this distinction is likely also relatively new²⁷⁴ and has changed over time, much like identities in Rwanda and Bosnia changed and took on new meanings before the genocide.

The targeting of certain groups is not the only factor that influenced the violence. As suggested by scholars and practitioners, land appears to be an important part of the story. Specifically, places with higher levels of land ownership had lower levels of violence. Although I will also analyze this in the context of the traditional system of land ownership in Darfur and with updated data (available in the next two years from IPUMS International), this pattern suggests that areas with less competition over land (in terms of ownership) saw lower levels of violence, in line with theories of resource competition. Yet, there is also evidence that areas with better vegetation saw higher levels of violence, indicating that resource abundance is also an important factor, perhaps indicating that patterns of attack may have been driven by the goal of gaining land, which was promised to members of the Janjaweed militias.

²⁷⁴ When I asked younger refugees (in their 20s and 30s) about this distinction, they all noted that it had existed as long as they can remember. Several older refugees recall the distinction coming into place after Bashir came to power.

To be clear, the significance of vegetation does not negate that the violence is genocide. Intent to destroy, both through killing but also removal from land, is present at the state level and systematically throughout the Janjaweed, as was reviewed above. Yet, like in Rwanda, other factors are at play, again suggesting that motivations during genocide are multifaceted.

The presence of organized actors also influenced the violence. Areas where the Janjaweed were present in 2004 saw comparatively more violence that year, though this will need to be tested for additional years. Rebel strongholds also saw more violence, suggesting that genocide became like a strategy of civil war, much like it did in Bosnia. Perhaps because of this connection to civil war, other factors that have been found to be associated with meso-level civil war violence, including elevation and presence along a border, have also been associated with higher levels of violence in Darfur.

Beyond this, factors tested in previous chapters had less explanatory power. Unlike in Rwanda, measures of community organization are not meaningful, as the violence was perpetrated by armies and previously recruited militias (whose members generally did not attack their own villages). In addition, while surrounding violence is significant in bivariate analysis, multivariate analysis (not shown) illustrated that this was no longer significant once ethnicity is included in the model.

This analysis of locality-level violence is not without limitations. As I have stressed repeatedly, the ongoing nature of the violence has meant that much data are still unavailable. Similarly, until census data become available, I will not be able to analyze full multivariate models. Bivariate analyses and depictions of patterns are powerful and

can tell an important—if importantly tempered—story. That said, the patterns do shed light on the meso-level variation in the violence, a central goal of this project.

Brief analyses over time revealed that violence has ebbed and flowed since 2003. While I am unable to fully interrogate relationships, several spikes and drops in violence coincided with patterns. First, bombing and the Janjaweed surge at the outset of the violence occurred concurrently, suggesting coordination. Second, it appears that peace talks did lessen the amount of violence (at least in terms of bombings), though the effects of the talks usually only lasted about one month. Third, there is some evidence that the presence of the international community in 2005 was associated with a decrease in violence, though this requires much more thorough investigation, including an analysis of the decisions of leaders within the government, which will not be possible until after the violence has ended.

In the future, I will also analyze the effects of interventions in the violence. Yet, after more than 10 years, violence continues. Clearly, no intervention has been enough to stop the violence. Almost every refugee I interviewed asked me why people seem to have forgotten about Darfur and why violence continues. I had no answers.

Chapter 6: Case Comparisons and Insights

*“It is a case of genocide, of destruction, not of individuals only,
but of a culture and a nation.”*

–Raphael Lemkin

International actors have long vowed to prevent genocide. It has not yet worked. Actions taken with the intent to destroy a social group continue to occur with alarming frequency. During the 20th century, genocide killed more people than all of the wars of the century combined, leaving millions of others displaced and impacting untold cultures. In this dissertation, I have sought to understand why and how genocides occur. After introducing the concept of genocide and this project’s three core interventions in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 considered macro-level factors associated with the onset of genocide globally between 1955 and 2005. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focused on case studies of the genocides in Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1992-1995), and the Darfur region of Sudan (2003-present), detailing the preconditions of genocide in each case and analyzing violence by region and over time.

In this final chapter, I summarize and integrate findings from this project. I first return to the preconditions of genocide, focusing on how the case studies support conclusions from Chapter 2 and assessing whether anything else can be gleaned from studying the preconditions of three of the world’s most recent genocides together. Then, I analyze the factors that influenced regional and temporal variation in each case, looking for broader patterns in how genocide unfolded and assessing how theories from genocide studies, criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence explain these patterns (Interventions 1 and 3, as detailed in Chapter 1). To capitalize on the ability to examine both the macro-level factors that influenced the onset of genocide and the meso-level

factors that influenced the process of genocide, I then briefly compare findings from Chapter 2 with findings from the case studies (Intervention 2). Finally, I use insights from each of these analyses to extend a recent theory of genocide proposed by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009).

Risk Factors of Genocide

In Chapter 2, I assessed the factors associated with the onset of genocide globally between 1955 and 2005. Drawing upon a discrete time hazard model, I considered numerous theories about why genocide takes place. Many were based on case studies of particular episodes of genocide; while each historical event is unique, my goal was to generalize these events to identify general risk factors of genocide. To do so, I relied upon societal-, state-, and international-centered explanations (as opposed to individual- or group-centered explanations, as explained in Chapter 1), finding that genocide is not random and that factors related to each conceptual level are associated with its onset.

At the societal level, Chapter 2 identified an ideology that excludes a segment of the population as a prominent risk factor of genocide, in line with theories that focus on the importance of an ideology that casts members of society as unworthy or sub-human (see, for example, Harff 2003; Weitz 2003; Kiernan 2007; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008 and 2009, and hundreds of case study examples). Each of the three case studies I presented highlighted the importance of ideology in defining and demonizing the victim groups well before genocide occurred. In Rwanda, the ideology associated with Hutu power blamed Tutsis for the marginalization of Hutus and cast them as outsiders. Meanwhile, rising Serb nationalism accused Bosniaks of inhabiting what was rightfully Serbian land and painted them as deviants who had wrongfully accepted Islam,

and the Sudanese government's policy of Arabization declared that a certain form of Islam was superior and that its adherents belonged in the Darfur region. Similarly, perpetrators cast victim groups as outsiders. Tutsis were from Northern Africa and had invaded the rightful homeland of the Hutu; Bosniaks were Turkish invaders; and African tribes were living on land that "rightfully" belonged to Arabs, having only relatively recently become part of Sudan.²⁷⁵

A version of each ideology was also laid out in a clear manifesto. The Hutu 10 Commandments, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Quraysh I and II put many of these ideas into writing. While the level of blatant advocacy for violence varied, each document served to organize and define future perpetrator and victim groups by creating us/them mentalities (Semelin 2007). Each also propagated utopian ideas about the future—a future that would be better for one group, often at the expense of others (Weitz 2003).

In line with the ideologies, members of society began to see themselves and other citizens as belonging to two or three main groups (Hutu or Tutsi in Rwanda; Bosniak, Croat, or Serb in Bosnia;²⁷⁶ and Arab or African in Sudan—each along varying timelines and each in large part due to a legacy of colonialism and leaders' manipulation of identities). Those identities became primary identities, and political leaders boiled

²⁷⁵ To be clear, the tribes in the Darfur region had long lived on the land, yet the ideology nevertheless cast them as outsiders and unworthy of the land.

²⁷⁶ While ethnicity was being reified, recall from Chapter 4 that there were also movements urging people to claim Yugoslav identity, particularly beginning after WWII and heightening in the 1960s. As Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson (2006) show, claiming a Yugoslav (as opposed to an identity tied to one of the republics) identity was more prominent in youth, children of mixed marriages, Communist party members, and a few other groups, though it was not enough to counter the heightened ethnic nationalism during this time period.

multifaceted identities down to essentialist notions (see Calhoun 1997:18 for a definition of essentialism). They were also racialized as us/them groups (often attached to phenotypical characteristics) that drew sharp boundaries and did not allow for multiplicity. Rwandan students, for example, were not allowed to claim a mixed background during morning roll call and would rather need to stand when the teacher called either Hutu or Tutsi. Even for the case of Darfur—criticized by scholars who argue categories of “Arab” and “African” are vastly oversimplified (e.g., Mamdani 2010)—each of the 43 Darfuris with whom I spoke discussed the violence using these two essentialized categories. This does not mean that they always saw themselves as African and others as Arab—much like Hutu and Tutsi identities once had very different meanings in Rwanda—but that meanings associated with identity are fluid and change over time (Jenkins 1994; Brubaker 2004).²⁷⁷

As groups became essentialized, contentions over power arose. Indeed, Chapter 2 illustrated that countries where there was contention over the ethnicity of the ruling elite had much higher odds of genocide. Decades before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutus began to complain that Tutsis’ power was disproportionate to their share of the population. Likewise, Bosnian elites engaged in multiple discussions regarding ethnicity-based power sharing, with Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats each campaigning for equal representation of their ethnic group. Darfuri rebels also began to demand more power well before the genocide, as was evidenced in the JEM’s publication of *The Black Book* and increasing requests for African representation in Darfur governance.

²⁷⁷ Recall in Chapter 2 that I measured both ethnolinguistic diversity (associated with lower odds of exclusionary ideologies) as well as ethnic polarization, and neither was significantly associated with the odds of genocide. The fluidity of ethnicity complicates but does not wholly undermine quantitative measures.

As ethnic identities became linked to power, they also became a foundation for political organization. Rwandans, for example, began engaging in collective action based on their ethnicity in the 1950s, when they formed political parties like Parmehutu, a political party for Hutus. Bosnians joined popular ethnic-based political parties,²⁷⁸ reifying and essentializing ethnic identities and collapsing ethnicity and political identities. Even in Darfur, without ethnic-based political parties, people engaged in ethnic-based collective action as they expressed grievances against the government. While ethnic-based political organizing is not sufficient to lead to genocide, it likely reified groups, formed networks, and laid the groundwork for future action based on ethnicity—illustrating how the case studies extend findings from Chapter 2.

Thus, ideology, contention over the ethnicity of those in power, and ethnic-based political action are important preconditions of genocide at the societal level. Yet, these factors also point toward the significance of the state; in line with state-centered approaches to genocide, Chapter 2 illustrated that numerous factors related to the state are key to understanding the onset of genocide. However, it found the characteristics of the state itself, such as its GDP or the type of government, matter less than the context in which the state is operating.

Particularly, situations that cause instability and strain—like coups and revolutions—are associated with higher odds of genocide. Indeed, Rwanda and Sudan each saw coups that brought a series of repressive leaders to power and influenced

²⁷⁸ It is feasible that organization (as well as contention surrounding elites) could take place around other group characteristics as well, though these three genocides each unfolded along ethnic and racial lines.

instability within the government.²⁷⁹ The Habyarimana and Bashir regimes experienced civil wars that threatened their rule well before genocide occurred. Each of the three regimes also experienced civil war as the genocides were unfolding, supporting Chapter 2's finding that civil war is the strongest predictor of genocide and existing theories that argue that civil war and genocide are linked (Krain 1997; Straus 2006). As discussed in Chapter 2, civil wars influence threat and strain felt by a regime. In addition, during a civil war, a state becomes inwardly violent against its own citizens, which may create a structure that could facilitate other future violence against civilians.

Again, the case studies illustrated these dynamics in more detail. In Rwanda, the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October 1990 placed much strain on the government, whose members risked losing power. Beyond that, it afforded the government the opportunity to cast all Tutsis as enemies. The mentality of the civil war made all Tutsis potential threats to the state. In line with this, Rwandan leaders encouraged citizens to form self-defense groups, which created networks and "primed" (Hinton 2005) citizens for future participation in violence. These groups formed around the notion that civilians were in danger and might need to protect themselves, their ideals, and their families. In many cases, such ideologies also capitalized on memories of past marginalization.

²⁷⁹ In each case, however, the coup most proximal to the genocide was followed by a longer period of stability. The Habyarimana regime in Rwanda and Bashir's long grip on power in Sudan were both relatively stable and allowed the rulers to retain tight, autocratic grips. Although Tito's rule in the Former Yugoslavia did not follow a coup, he had a similar grip on power in the region. While there are clear differences between these periods, this also illustrates that none of the countries was caught in a continual state of instability.

Likewise, leaders in Bosnia and Sudan mobilized militias in anticipation of future violence, illustrating that even the idea of impending civil war influenced the mobilization of potential perpetrators. Like the self-defense groups in Rwanda, leaders within the government of the former Yugoslavia and Sudan mobilized militias in Bosnia and in Darfur, instructing them that they may need to defend their country and simultaneously informing them of the potential material gains of participation, especially in Darfur. While future research will help us better understand who were involved in these militias,²⁸⁰ their mobilization before the violence directly impacted who became the perpetrators during the violence.

In Rwanda, the civil war began three and a half years before the genocide, but a civil war also began alongside the genocide in 1994. The RPF reinvaded Rwanda as the genocide was unfolding, placing pressure on the government.²⁸¹ Likewise, civil war unfolded alongside genocide in Bosnia, where Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian forces fought for control of territory. Darfur, too, also saw civil war before the genocide, and the genocide itself could be considered part of a counterinsurgency strategy, suggesting that battles between rebels and soldiers could be classified as civil war. This paints a much more complex picture of genocide. Most scholarship on genocide has treated it as an isolated episode of violence—perhaps because the paradigmatic case of the Holocaust did not involve an ongoing civil war—but it is clear in these case studies that genocide often occurs alongside other forms of violence.

²⁸⁰ Most literature on the perpetrators of genocide points to “ordinary” citizens, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Yet, literature on militias often suggests that their members are drawn from prior criminals and “thugs” within society (e.g, Mueller 2007). To this point, data to study the militias has been minimal; this will be a fruitful area for research.

²⁸¹ In this and the other cases, the complication of civil war and genocide meant that leaders could frame the violence as civil war, not genocide.

In fact, other forms of violence that targeted civilians took place before genocide in each case. In Rwanda, Tutsis were massacred in the late 1950s²⁸²—deemed by many to be genocide—and at several other periods in time before 1994. There was also genocide in Sudan during the 1980s. Though it did not take place in Darfur, it may have shown the government that it could act with impunity and that genocide was a viable option as a solution to perceived problems. The prior genocidal violence in these two cases speaks to theories of “repeat offenders” (Fein 1993a; Harff 2003), though much more research is needed to understand the connections between these episodes of violence over time.

More immediate to each case of genocide, sporadic violence against civilians began in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur anywhere between a few years to a few months before full-fledged, systematic genocide began. For example, many Tutsis were tortured and massacred during the early 1990s in Rwanda, and the turn of the century saw the beginning of increased discrimination and targeted violence in Darfur. Bosnia also saw violence before the genocide, though the increase in violence began just several months before April 1992. In each case, the violence triggered waves of refugees, which could be seen as an early warning signal.

Closely related, the regimes in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Sudan each stood to lose power through peace negotiations that took place directly before the genocides. When Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, he was returning from peace talks that would lead to power sharing with Tutsis. Serbia risked losing control over Bosnia—which it had claimed through its de facto control over the former Yugoslavia—in peace

²⁸² As previously noted, numerous scholars suggest that the violence in 1959 constituted genocide, though it is understudied. Accordingly, I ran models in Chapter 2 with this violence included as the first episode of genocide and with 1994 as the first episode.

talks that discussed power sharing just one month before the genocide. Darfur also saw peace talks directly before the genocide, and while these talks did not directly involve Darfur, Khartoum nevertheless stood to lose half of its land.²⁸³ Such immediate threat helps draw in (and upon) theories that suggest that genocide is a rational decision made by government leaders in response to a perceived problem (Valentino 2004; Mann 2005; Midlarsky 2005).

These peace talks were all facilitated through international connections, and Chapter 2 also found that a country's international relations influence the likelihood that genocide occurs. In particular, countries that had lower levels of trade saw higher odds of genocide, suggesting that engagement in the international system could decrease the odds of genocide. Likewise, the case studies highlight the importance of engagement in the international system, though they also show that certain forms of engagement work in nuanced ways. For example, Rwanda received some international attention as it seemingly began to democratize; its gains toward democracy may have made international actors less willing to criticize the violence and discrimination that was also taking place. The former Yugoslavia received some international attention that was tied particularly to the end of the Cold War, though rather than engaging with interested international parties, the attention influenced a turn inward. Likewise, Sudan turned inward after international political ostracization linked to its alleged ties with terrorism.

Thus, the case studies illustrate Chapter 2's findings that exclusionary ideologies, salient elite ethnicities, autocratization, fewer years at risk, strain (in the form of civil wars, coups, and other factors), and lower levels of engagement in the international

²⁸³ And Darfuri rebels were perhaps inspired by the South's accomplishments, suggesting another potential influence of the peace talks.

system are associated with higher odds of genocide, indicating that the state and the context in which it operates is key to understanding the situation in which genocide occurs. These factors also add context and nuance, indicating the importance of ethnic-based political organization, the prevalence of violence before genocide begins, and the influence of strain, including the role of civil war and the prospect of losing power, even through peace agreements.

The case studies also shed light on a few patterns that were *not* associated with higher odds of genocide in Chapter 2. Namely, while colonialism (as measured) was not associated with the likelihood of genocide in the event history analysis, each of these countries had been under imperial rule at one time. That rule influenced their trajectories and, most clearly in the case of Rwanda, the exclusionary ideologies that contributed to the genocides.²⁸⁴ Although colonialism and imperialism are not sufficient to cause genocide, as the vast majority of countries were colonized at some point, such governance clearly affected identities and future violence.

Theories about the role of population density, population growth, or arable land found similar weak support in Chapter 2. In the decades before the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, population pressure and resource scarcity did not factor prominently in terms of preconditions, refuting theories that focus on these Malthusian concerns (e.g., Diamond 2005) and finding support in newer research on the link between resource scarcity and violence (e.g., Theisen 2008). In Darfur, however, resource scarcity *was* an important factor, though it was more tightly linked to political decisions by Khartoum

²⁸⁴ Indeed, models in Chapter 2 show that exclusionary ideologies are positively associated with colonialism, which finds further support through the case studies.

rather than depleted resources on the ground, suggesting that the state's response (or lack of response) to resource scarcity is vital.

Taken together, these findings paint a picture of genocide as state-centric but highly influenced by societal and international contexts. In terms of theories of genocide, they provide some support for elite rationality theories of genocide (Valentino 2004; Midlarsky 2005) as well as theories that suggest genocide results from escalatory situations (Shaw 2003; Mann 2005). They also fall in line with theories that emphasize civil war (Shaw 2003; Straus 2006; Ulfelder and Valentino 2008), the role of strain (Savelsberg 2010), and the importance of an ideology that excludes segments of the population (Weitz 2003; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2008, 2009).

On the other hand, these findings do not lend support to theories of genocide that emphasize bureaucracy or modernity (e.g., Bauman 2000). To be clear, I do not focus on the workings of the state or other criminal organizations, which is perhaps one reason for the lack of relevance of these theories. Yet, the case studies do not support the notion that genocide occurs because of the well-organized bureaucracies that have accompanied modernity, as only Rwanda was highly bureaucratic.²⁸⁵

In line with more recent work, my analysis also breaks from earlier theories that emphasize primordial or ancient hatreds (e.g., Kuper 1981) as well as culture-specific explanations for genocide (Goldhagen 1996). This study also does not weigh heavily on the debate regarding whether genocide is perpetrated by a strong state, like Nazi Germany, or a weak state that is failing. Similarly, it does not emphasize a particular

²⁸⁵ In addition, as I note in Chapter 1, I do not engage arguments that place genocide in modernity against other time periods, because I believe that a comparative perspective that includes genocides from previous time periods is necessary to make these claims.

form of government (Arendt 1951; Rummel 1994; Harff 2003; Mann 2005), as Chapter 2 found that the form of government is not significantly associated with the odds of genocide (though it did find the democratization is linked to lower odds of genocide, contrary to Mann's [2005] argument).

Overall, these findings point toward a complex, multi-faceted explanation for genocide. While numerous authors argue about one factor versus another—for example, Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2009) reject explanations of insurgency in favor of explanations tied to racial symbolization for the case of Darfur—I do not limit myself to either/or explanations but rather focus on genocide as a process that arises from many preconditions at multiple conceptual levels. This is not meant to suggest that every explanation is valid or that *no* explanation is valid, but that genocide is an intricate process informed by numerous factors. There is no one key precondition to genocide.

Violence and Its Onset

Many countries could experience each of the conditions discussed thus far yet not experience genocide. Indeed, what is missing in Chapter 2 but evident in Chapters 3-5 is the genocidal spark²⁸⁶—an event that serves as the catalyst to transform sporadic violence into systematic violence.²⁸⁷ An emerging body of literature focuses exclusively on escalating factors, though one theme of this dissertation is a focus on broader structural factors rather than specific events. Nevertheless, it is clear that there was some form of spark—or sparks—in each case. The plane crash on the night of April 6th was the spark

²⁸⁶ Though genocide literature uses the term “genocidal spark,” this is analogous to a turning point in historical sociological terms. Specifically, it could be considered the most proximal turning point before the genocide.

²⁸⁷ Again, while I do not consider these in detail here, it is feasible that these sparks could be either planned or spontaneous.

that marked a move toward more systematic violence in Rwanda, while the Bosnian declaration of independence was a turning point that directly influenced the subsequent escalation of violence there. Likewise, the Darfuri rebel attacks between February and April 2003 comprised a series of events that marked a turning point in the violence in Sudan.


After each spark, violence began targeting elites. Terming this form of violence *elitocide*, Gratz (2011) argues its prominence in Bosnia, where key political leaders, educational elites, and religious leaders were targeted at the outset. I find elites were also targeted first in Rwanda and in Darfur, eliminating potential opposition and, in some ways, directly attacking culture. In each case, elites were targeted as the genocide began as well as sporadically before the onset of genocide, illustrating that this may be an important early process of genocide.

None of the genocides stopped with elites, however. Perpetrators victimized many other citizens. This victimization was facilitated, in part, by dehumanization (Hinton 1996; Stanton 1998) tightly linked to an exclusionary ideology that was present before the genocide began, as explained above. For example, Tutsis were called cockroaches and snakes; Bosniaks were deemed Turks; and members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes were called slaves unworthy of Allah. Dehumanization and othering may have facilitated genocidal crimes by providing techniques of neutralization, allowing perpetrators to distance themselves from the victims and to rationalize crimes against them (Sykes and Matza 1957). It also served to essentialize identities; all Tutsis became cockroaches, all Bosniaks became Turks.

Indeed, most of these ideologies were dehumanizing, and another prominent form of dehumanization was the association of victim groups with filth or dirt (Chirot and McCauley 2006). In Rwanda, Tutsis were thrown in the river as trash to be swept out of the country. There are also records of massacres taking place in dumps, as Tutsis were literally seen as garbage (author interview). In Bosnia, “ethnic cleansing” became a popular term: Bosniaks were seen as filth. Likewise, refugees from Darfur recalled members of the Janjaweed chanting “clean up” as they attacked African villages. This rhetoric helped create situations favorable to crime, perhaps influencing perpetrators’ actions as well as bystanders who did not cease or object to the violence.

As groups were demonized and targeted, other identities also came into play. To be clear, ethnic group membership became the primary identity in each case, though other characteristics also influenced *who* was targeted and *how* they were victimized. Crenshaw’s (1989) concept of intersectionality emphasizes how different identities interrelate to influence situations. For example, in Rwanda, the violence targeted *all* Tutsi, and because of this, the age pattern of those killed follows the age structure of Rwandan society, with a comparatively higher percentage of youth dying. Yet, according to the survey used in Chapter 3, 56 percent of those killed in Rwanda were men, and 44 percent were women. Since men comprised about 47 percent of the population, they were perhaps targeted slightly more often in terms of killing during the genocide.

Figure 6.1: Percent Killed in Rwanda by Age




Note: ND signifies no data on age.

In Bosnia, by contrast, a much higher percentage of both soldiers and civilians killed were men—89 percent (the proportion is similar when just civilians are considered).²⁸⁸ This is perhaps directly linked to the civil war mentality and the organization of the perpetrators, as the vast majority of the perpetrators were members of armies and militias. As shown in Figure 6.2,²⁸⁹ data from the Bosnian Book of the Dead suggest that those killed in Bosnia were also far older than those in Rwanda (and again, this pattern is similar for both soldier and civilian deaths, showing that this does not just capture combatant ages and deaths).

²⁸⁸ Future work should assess *why* identities and situations influenced the targeting of certain groups within the victim group in Bosnia (as well as in other genocides).

²⁸⁹ The intervals for this figure are uneven, as they are necessarily based on only aggregate data.

Figure 6.2: Percent Bosniaks Killed in Bosnia by Age



This both supports and disconfirms criminological research that suggests that people who commit homicide kill people of a similar age and gender, which is only sometimes the case during genocide and may depend on those targeted as well as the entire population. Data do not yet exist to analyze these statistics for the case of Darfur, though interview respondents suggested that young men and boys have been targeted, perhaps again linked to the civil war mentality and the age structure of the society.²⁹⁰

Though these figures depict killing, perpetrators relied upon other forms of violence, which likely varied based on the victims' characteristics. Each of the three cases involved forced displacement²⁹¹ and the destruction of victims' homes, which Porteous and Smith (2001:3) have termed *domicide*. In addition, each genocide involved

²⁹⁰ Overall, it is difficult to estimate the total percentage of the victim groups that were killed in each case, as data on the population immediately before the genocides do not exist and ethnicity data are not yet available for Rwanda and Darfur and only minimally available for Rwanda.

²⁹¹ For an interesting analysis on the factors that influenced forced displacement in Darfur, see Hagan and Kaiser, forthcoming.

sexualized and gender-based violence—clearly linked to gender identities—along with other forms of violence, such as humiliation, abduction, and torture.

Certain types of violence were more prominent in each case. Rwanda was distinguished by large massacres, likely because victims congregated within churches and other public places, often at their own will though sometimes at the suggestion of local officials. Bosnia saw much more forced internment in concentration camps. This was perhaps linked to the use of concentration camps in the same location during World War II, though it may also be due to an effort to avert international attention (these could be cast as POW camps). And as noted in Chapter 5, Darfur has been distinguished by the bombing and destruction of villages, which may be partially explained by the relative homogeneity of the villages and their remoteness.²⁹²

In Rwanda and Sudan, this violence remained largely contained within the state borders as the genocide was unfolding. The *effects* rippled well beyond the borders, with refugees pouring into neighboring countries, but violence in Rwanda and in Sudan took the form of a government killing its own citizens within its own borders. In Bosnia, the violence also remained within Bosnia, though it was part of a larger episode of violence involving countries that had been part of the same state only several years earlier. Thus, it was international in a sense, though it differed from other international genocides, such as

²⁹² Future research will need to ascertain reasons behind these different forms of violence, but one potential explanation may be that comparatively higher amount of international attention on a European country resulted in conscious decisions not to engage in large scale massacres. The use of concentration camps in this same location during World War II also may have created a repertoire of violence, a concept that a colleague and I explore in a separate analysis.

colonial genocides, where the victims and the perpetrators were not part of one sovereign country in the past.

As covered in each chapter, clear similarities and differences emerged in who was perpetrating this violence. In each case, members of governments played a role in planning the violence, while armies and militias participated in the violence. Notably, the militias were generally mobilized, supported, and armed by the governments, again illustrating the importance of the state. Yet, the balance of perpetration from above and from below varied in each case. As discussed in each chapter and in more detail below, while previously formed militias and armies did participate in the violence in Rwanda, the vast majority of participants were local citizens who joined the violence as it was unfolding. In Bosnia, local citizens also participated, but in much smaller numbers and often through their positions (e.g., mayors, police, and firefighters) within the local administrative structures of communities. In Darfur, members of the armed forces and the previously recruited Janjaweed militias almost exclusively perpetrated the violence, and local members of the communities rarely if ever²⁹³ joined as the violence was unfolding.

The creation of each of perpetrator groups was also accomplished through processes of identity formation vis-à-vis the victim groups. Perpetrator groups were primed in different ways before the violence began. As the violence unfolded, each group was encouraged by the connection between work and genocide. In Rwanda, radio broadcasts and politicians specifically urged people to go to “work.” Citizens were told that they were serving Rwanda and contributing to society by participating in the violence. Soldiers in Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, and Sudan participated in the

²⁹³ I have yet to find an example of this occurring.

violence through their jobs, serving and defending the government. Local political leaders and other community servants also participated through their jobs, typically meant to serve society and keep law and order.²⁹⁴

Although I focus on the violence committed by the perpetrators, in each case, resistors also committed violence, refuting definitions of genocide as completely one-sided (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kalyvas 2006). In fact, while genocide involves disproportionate violence, every genocide has seen some form of resistance, ranging from uprising in concentration camps to armed insurgencies or armies fighting against a genocidal government.²⁹⁵ Both the RPF and local groups resisted the Rwandan government, with the RPF eventually taking over the capital and effectively triggering an end to the violence. Bosnian paramilitaries and a Bosnian army fought the Serbian (and Croatian) paramilitaries and armies, and Darfuri rebel groups have attacked the government and its soldiers numerous times over the past decade. These actions do not negate genocide, as it is the perpetrators' intent and actions rather than the response of the victims that defines genocide. Yet, they further illustrate that genocide is a complex, interconnected web of violence, and crimes and atrocities committed by these actors should also be studied.

²⁹⁴ Though I did not study this in great detail, it is likely that peoples' jobs also dictated their specific participation in the violence, with policemen and firefighters running camps and soldiers and militia members engaging in violence (Hughes 1962).

²⁹⁵ In each of the cases I consider, the organized opposition also committed crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. I do not study these here, as these are not genocide. Yet, it is another common thread that can be drawn across the three cases: multiple forms of violence occur alongside genocide.

Patterns of Violence

Though I have examined aggregate patterns to this point, I disaggregated the violence in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 to analyze regional-level variation in the magnitude and timing of violence. This is, in many ways, one of the most innovative parts of this dissertation, as the quantitative analysis of sub-national levels of violence is a new frontier for genocide studies (Owens, Su, and Snow 2013) and for the study of political violence more broadly (Kalyvas 2006). Specifically, I examined the rate of killing in Rwanda's 145²⁹⁶ communes; the number of civilian deaths, soldier deaths, and concentration camps in Bosnia's 109 municipalities; and the number of bombings, damaged villages, and destroyed villages in the 21 localities in the Darfur region of Sudan.

To assess what may have influenced regional and temporal variation in genocidal violence, I analyzed factors related to targeted violence, the spread of ideology, community organization, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors. Each potential influence was informed by literature from genocide studies, criminology, and/or the study of political and ethnic violence. At the close of each chapter, I assessed whether and how each influenced the magnitude and timing of violence. Yet, a benefit of case studies is that they also allow me to compare across the three cases, which I turn to now.

As anticipated, the ethnic composition of the geographic region significantly influenced the magnitude of violence in each case, as the violence targeted certain groups. In Rwanda, regions with higher percentages of Tutsi saw higher rates of killing. In Bosnia, the percent Bosniak in a municipality was significantly associated with higher levels of both civilian and soldier deaths, while areas where African tribes reside have

²⁹⁶ As detailed in Chapter 3, data are missing for three communes, so I technically analyze 142.

seen more damage and destruction in Darfur. The case of Bosnia added more nuance, as the presence and number of concentration camps were associated with higher percentages of Serbs, likely because Serbs set them up in areas they controlled. In line with racial threat theory, there was also some evidence of a threshold effect in Bosnia, as areas with the highest levels of Bosniaks did not see significantly more violence. Instead, polarized areas—those with the presence of two significant communities—saw much higher levels of violence.²⁹⁷

Numerous other factors influenced the violence in each case. For one, there was more violence in more populated areas net of the ethnic composition.²⁹⁸ Of course, people must be present in order to be victimized. Beyond this, in each case, people associated with the victim groups (or, in Rwanda, people whose identity was uncertain) were also victimized, suggesting another reason for the populous areas effect.

In each case, the presence of organized actors also influenced the violence. This is perhaps most surprising in Rwanda, where the frontline between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Rwandan Armed Forces was associated with higher rates of killing. While this measure does capture the civil war, it is also likely capturing both the presence of the Rwandan Armed Forces, who were committing genocide, and the strain caused in regions when the RPF was advancing on those forces. In Bosnia and in Sudan, the presence of armed actors, including both the army and paramilitaries, was also associated with higher

²⁹⁷ Going forward, I will analyze measures of polarization versus fractionalization for Rwanda and Darfur, as I anticipate measures of polarization are more meaningful than measures of fractionalization in genocide, as illustrated by the case of Bosnia.

²⁹⁸ Recall that in Darfur, I have tested the settlement density, since population data do not yet exist. For Rwanda, this variable was also significant but is included as a rate in the dependent variable. Note also that for Rwanda and Bosnia, I am referring to population, not population density.

levels of violence. This was anticipated because, in each case, the armies and paramilitaries committed most of the violence. In fact, in Bosnia, paramilitary presence had a stronger effect on civilian deaths than army presence, suggesting that they were tasked with the “dirty” work (and in this case, dirtier work) (Hughes 1962), something I will test for the case of Darfur in the future. Yet, the explanatory power of these measures, which seem self-evident in some ways, only goes so far. The presence of armed actors takes on a new meaning in the case of bombings in Darfur, where armed actors did not need to be “present” to commit damage.²⁹⁹

While armies and militias influenced patterns in violence, in Rwanda, the vast majority of the perpetrators were members of the communities who were not part of formally organized groups. Because of this mass public participation, factors associated with the communities significantly impacted the rate of violence. Specifically, marriage rates and Hutu employment in the formal sector were associated with lower rates of violence. These factors indicate the social (dis)organization of a community (Sampson and Groves 1989)—a theoretical concept from criminology that suggests that a community’s cohesion and trust influences community levels of crime—was associated with the rate of violence.³⁰⁰ This shows that these theories can be extended to the case of

²⁹⁹ Kalyvas (2006) suggests that control over an area is an important variable in meso-level studies of civil war. The inclusion of these variables begin to capture and control for this, though I will explore some Kalyvas’s theories regarding zones of control in future work on Bosnia, for which I have created fine-grained data on the movements of certain actors and their control over regions.

³⁰⁰ Note that, in Rwanda, the defended communities perspective was not accurate. While traditional social (dis)organization theories suggest that communities organize against crime, communities can also organize *toward* crime (Sutherland 1947; Matsueda 2006). Lyons (2007) found that socially organized, affluent communities sometimes experience more hate crime, outlining a “dark” side of social organization. Though I anticipated that

genocide, though they may only apply when there is a significant amount of community participation in the genocide and when that participation is not heavily recruited prior to the genocide.³⁰¹

Furthermore, as the general population committed violence in Rwanda, the ideology of genocide had to be spread to the population. The radio broadcast messages of hate and encouraged Rwandan citizens to participate in the violence, and preliminary evidence suggests that radio ownership is associated with higher rates of killing, further highlighting the role of ideology.³⁰² In addition, the education system taught that Tutsis were outsiders and socialized students to see differences between Hutus and Tutsis, spreading the ideology to a more educated population. In line with this, areas with higher levels of education in Rwanda saw higher rates of killing.

Also as a result of who perpetrated the violence, the rate of killing in surrounding communes in Rwanda was significantly associated with the rate of killing in each commune. Violence beginning in a neighboring community may have served as a catalyst for potential victims to take shelter together in a church or for potential perpetrators to take action. In Bosnia and Darfur, measures of surrounding violence are not significant when other factors, like ethnic population, are controlled for, suggesting that the violence

a similar process may be at work during genocide, this was not the case in Rwanda (or in the other countries, for that matter).

³⁰¹ Indeed, in Bosnia and Darfur, these factors did not matter nearly as much, though there was minimal evidence that divorce was associated with concentration camps in Bosnia, a form of victimization that many citizens participated in. Going forward, I will attempt to assess whether these theories hold for other cases. While Rwanda perhaps had the highest rate of public participation out of any modern genocide, other genocides did see much public participation, and the relevance and generalizability of these theories stand to be tested.

³⁰² Note that, as explained in Chapter 3, I am waiting for data on radio coverage and plan to test this instead of radio ownership, which is highly related to wealth and thus excluded from most multivariate models.

did not spread in the same way. Again, as the perpetrators were not often members of the communities they were victimizing, this points to the importance of the perpetrators and their organization and suggests that, in Bosnia and Darfur, they acted on the basis of a top-down plan rather than bottom-up collective action. However, it is also noteworthy that there may be some more micro-level trends that I could not analyze. For example, several refugees from Darfur shared that they were able to flee their village when they saw bombs or smoke from a neighboring village, suggesting that, at a more micro-level, the patterns of violence may be different in Darfur. This would not affect bombing and destruction of villages, but it would likely affect rates of death or displacement, which I will explore in the future.

While community organization, the spread of ideology, and surrounding violence influenced community-level rates of violence in Rwanda, strategic gains seemingly mattered more in Bosnia and Sudan. In Bosnia, it is clear that the goal of achieving Greater Serbia influenced regional variation in the violence. Particularly, greater distance from the Serbian border was associated with significantly fewer civilian deaths and camps. In other words, higher levels of civilian violence took place by the Serbian border, likely due to the strategic goal of garnering more land for Greater Serbia, lending support to theories that suggest that materialistic gains drive violence. While the border was not associated with violence in Rwanda, preliminary analysis revealed that there was more of certain forms of violence—specifically damaged and destroyed villages³⁰³—along the Chadian border in Darfur. As noted in Chapter 5, this is perhaps because of the ease of reaching these communities from multiple sides. It also follows research that

³⁰³ There were not more bombings, however, perhaps because they can be indiscriminate and perhaps because of fears regarding bombing too close to another country's land.

suggests that borders are contested areas that tend to see more violence, both during civil wars (e.g., Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh 2009) and in times of peace.

Several other theories related to civil wars were relevant for Bosnia and Darfur. Elevation was significantly associated with higher rates of civilian deaths in Bosnia and damaged and destroyed villages in Darfur. The presence of rebel groups in elevated areas in Darfur complicates this measure, but it does speak to the remoteness of the areas, a key reason that elevation is hypothesized to influence both macro- and meso-level variation in civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009). While these may apply to numerous forms of violence, the fact that these genocides were in some ways perpetrated like civil wars surely influenced the relevance of strategic, spatial, and temporal factors.

In Rwanda, the capital saw comparatively higher levels of killing, perhaps in part because there was a coordinated plan that unfolded under the eyes of the central government. There was more room for variation in other parts of the country. In Bosnia, violence also took place in both urban and rural areas, and, like in Rwanda, there was generally not a statistically significant difference between the two. In Darfur, however, the three capital cities—arguably the only urban areas in the region—saw much lower levels of bombings and destruction. The comparative heterogeneity of the cities is likely one reason. Another may be that these three cities remained in the watchful eye of the international community,³⁰⁴ which may help explain the shift in violence to unfounded arrests and discrimination. Indeed, although this is difficult to capture quantitatively, especially with analyses of only some of the forms of violence, Bosnia also saw some

³⁰⁴ Clearly, the presence of the international community is not enough to prevent all violence: there are records of violence taking place right in front of peacekeepers' eyes.

differences in the form of violence in cities, as Sarajevo and several other key urban areas saw sieges that kept people living in constant fear but generally did not see massacres.³⁰⁵

In terms of time, memories of violence may also be at play, though this is an area that merits much additional research. In Rwanda, previous violence in each region was not associated with violence during the genocide, suggesting that meso-level factors related to memory (or perhaps impunity or even previously formed networks) did not directly influence these patterns. Yet, in Bosnia, the number of Serb concentration camps during World War II was related to the number of Serb-run concentration camps between 1992 and 1994, suggesting that memories of specific forms of violence may influence the chosen forms of violence during genocide. Likewise, in Darfur, previous battles were associated with damage and destruction of villages in 2003, again suggesting connections between violence that occurred before the genocide and the violence that unfolded during genocide. As genocides are not isolated events and processes but are part of broader histories, future studies should consider connections between violence before and after genocide (Karstedt 2013).

Finally, contrary to the intentions, interventions did not significantly reduce violence in any case. In Rwanda, the presence of French troops did not lower the odds of genocide, in large part due to their late arrival. In Bosnia, Safe Areas where UN troops were present had more violence, although this effect is partially driven by Srebrenica, a Safe Area where 8,000 Bosniak men were murdered in just several days. This is not

³⁰⁵ Rwanda did not see this, and though it is speculative, one reason may be the comparative lack of international interest as the genocide was unfolding.

meant to argue against interventions but to highlight the importance of timing. I will further test for the case of Darfur when data become available.³⁰⁶

Several other common explanations of meso-level violence were negated in Rwanda and Bosnia.³⁰⁷ First, intermarriage is often discussed as having an ameliorative effect on violence and, more broadly, serving as a sign of tolerance (e.g., Alba and Golden 1986). In Rwanda and Bosnia, however, intermarriage was not significantly associated with lower levels of violence. While this finding is unexpected, intermarriage may be a marker of tolerance before the process of genocide begins, at which point identities become essentialized. Indeed, the first of the Hutu 10 Commandments was that any Hutu who married a Tutsi woman would be considered a traitor. This perhaps meant that those Hutus were targeted, perhaps partially explaining the lack of the significant negative effect. In Bosnia, the same thought process might have been prevalent.

Population density and resource scarcity did not influence the rate of violence in any of the three cases (in fact, population density in Rwanda was associated with less violence in some models, perhaps because these communities came into contact with one another and because population density is associated with economic growth [Crenshaw and Robinson 2010]). This refutes a number of theories (Homer-Dixon 1994; Urdal 2008). Yet, I interpret these results cautiously, as more fine-grained analyses may reveal different patterns at more micro levels. Second, while these findings suggest that resource scarcity (as measured) or population density as measured do not influence the rate of

³⁰⁶ I have a fine-grained dataset of all interventions (including economic sanctions, for example) in Bosnia, which I will also test against killing over time when the final data become available. I am also working to analyze the impact of economic sanctions on genocide more broadly.

³⁰⁷ Recall that I am not yet able to test this measure for Darfur, as census data are not available.

violence, places of particular forms of abundance in both Rwanda and Darfur saw less violence. In Rwanda, Hutu employment in the formal sector was associated with a decreased rate of violence, while Tutsi employment in the formal sector was not. Likewise, in Darfur, regions with higher levels of land ownership saw decreased violence. This suggests that multiple other measures of resource scarcity and resource abundance should be analyzed and that, rather than broad measures of scarcity that rely upon population density and arable land, context-specific measures that pay more attention to the meaning attached to certain commodities should be explored.

The increased violence in arable areas of Darfur further complicates the effect of scarcity, instead showing an instance in which people and culture were apparently damaged but land was specifically not destroyed because the abundant resources were coveted by the attackers (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ross 2006). Again, the context-specific resources likely matter here. In addition, this may suggest that motivations for participation, such as the potential to achieve land, may also influence meso-level patterns, though this may vary based on whether the perpetrators live within the same village or travel to attack other places, as did the Janjaweed.

Overall, factors that influenced regional variation in each form of violence included the presence of the victim group, the size of the general population, and the presence of organized actors (specifically armies and/or militias). As members of the community participated in the violence in Rwanda, community-level measures like marriage and employment influenced the rate of violence, which was also influenced by violence in surrounding communities. Likewise, methods used to spread the ideology against the Tutsis—including the radio and the education system—influenced the rate of

killings. This was not the case in Bosnia or Darfur, where the vast majority of perpetrators participated through their formal employment—especially those in armies, as well as local government officials, police, and firefighters—or were recruited into militias through specific mechanisms. In these cases, patterns of organizational action drove the violence,³⁰⁸ with organizations that were connected to the state perpetrating the majority of the violence. In Bosnia, this mainly involved distance from the Serbian border, as places that were closer had higher levels of violence because they were particularly important for Greater Serbia. In Darfur, borders and the remoteness from cities mattered.

Beyond magnitude, I analyzed the onset timing of violence, finding that violence did not begin at the same time throughout the country in any case. Indeed, while I previously mentioned the spark that begins genocide at the state level, the case studies also made clear that there are probably sparks at sub-national levels, something currently missing from genocide studies literature. For example, violence did not begin in the Butare region of Rwanda until the interim President traveled to give a speech in the region and removed the current governor. I do not study these particular sparks, as I seek to understand structural factors that influence onset. Instead, for Rwanda and Bosnia,³⁰⁹ I analyzed the factors that may have influenced the onset of genocidal violence, conceptualizing early and late onset in Bosnia and early, middle, and late onset in Rwanda. As there are not theories regarding the onset of violence, I analyzed if and how the factors tested regarding the magnitude of violence also explain its onset.

³⁰⁸ I do not study organizational-rule breaking in this dissertation. See Savelsberg 2010 for additional insights.

³⁰⁹ As noted in Chapter 5, my temporal analysis for Darfur was limited to a descriptive analysis of aggregate ebbs and flows over time due to a lack of data.

In general, I found that the factors that influenced the magnitude of violence in Rwanda generally did *not* influence the onset. One parallel is that regions with higher levels of radio ownership saw earlier onsets of violence—likely because the radio broadcast messages urging people to participate in the violence and spreading fear that the Tutsis were responsible for shooting down the President’s plane. Beyond this, factors that influenced the magnitude and onset differed. For example, cities saw earlier onset, again linked to the plan and leaders’ proximity facilitating this plan, although the urban/rural divide did not influence the magnitude of the violence. By contrast, regions with higher percentages of Catholic—which also did not influence magnitude—saw slightly later onsets, perhaps linked to the actions of clergy who sought to protect people. Alternatively, this effect may be explained by the sheer number of people who fled to their local churches, which may have slightly delayed, but not, in the end, deterred violence. Tutsi formal employment is also associated with later onset, suggesting that the integration of Tutsis into daily life may have delayed violence, though it did not influence the magnitude of violence.

In Bosnia, however, I found much similarity between factors that influenced the onset and magnitude of violence. Specifically, polarized communities and regions that bordered Serbia—two predictors of magnitude—saw violence comparatively earlier. Organized actors were also clearly associated with the onset. Yet, it was not the Serb armies or Serb paramilitaries but the presence of the Yugoslav Army that had the strongest effect. This fits the historical narrative of the violence, as the Yugoslav Army was controlled by Serbia and worked closely with Serbian forces in Bosnia, particularly at the outset of the violence.

Lastly, percent urban was associated with earlier onset,³¹⁰ capturing the pattern that soldiers and paramilitaries started by taking over main government offices in key cities and then spreading outward within a region. This draws an interesting parallel with Rwanda, where cities also saw violence first. Other than this parallel, the factors that influenced the onset of violence differed in the two cases, with community-level onset in Rwanda influenced by other local, more contingent factors and community-level onset in Bosnia generally linked to the same factors that influenced magnitude, suggesting a top-down strategy. This strategy was also present in Rwanda, but since the citizens largely implemented it, there was more room for variation in the factors that influenced the onset.

Overall, then, it is clear that who the perpetrators are and how they are organized matters tremendously for both magnitude and onset of violence at sub-national levels, with community characteristics informed by theories from criminology coming into play when there is mass public participation from the community, and larger strategic aims and factors that influence civil wars, informed by literature on political and ethnic violence, influencing violence when organized militias and armies commit the vast majority of the violence.³¹¹

These patterns may be complicated by analyses of the magnitude of violence over time, as well as the magnitude of violence over time by region, which is largely a future goal. Yet, analysis of this form for Bosnia illustrated that the factors that influenced


³¹⁰ Unemployment—capturing rural regions’ high levels of farming—is associated with later onset in Bosnia.

³¹¹ As noted previously, future projects could rely upon criminological literature on organizational-rule breaking to better understand the functioning of these armies and militias—not a goal here, but clearly a worthy area of study and a way in which criminological literature could further inform the study of genocide.

magnitude varied over time, suggesting the continued importance of incorporating a temporal element into meso-level studies of violence.

Furthermore, while I did not analyze the aggregate magnitude of violence over time in great detail, there were interesting patterns in the ebbs and flows of violence in Bosnia and Darfur. Figure 6.3 reproduces figures depicting these patterns from Chapters 4 and 5.

Figure 6.3: Violence over Time in Bosnia and Darfur



For each, it is clear that the highest levels of violence took place relatively early within the episode of violence; here, momentum does not lead to increased violence over time. This is also supported in anecdotal reports from Rwanda, which suggest much more violence in April than in subsequent months. Yet, there were other spikes after the largest spike of violence, with larger spikes occurring near the end of each episode—again something worthy of future study.

Analyzing the violence over time also brings several other differences to light. As discussed, the violence in Rwanda lasted just over three months, violence in Bosnia lasted three years, and violence in Darfur has been going on for over ten years. A few thoughts can be offered on factors influencing duration. First, the size of the countries likely matters. Rwanda and Bosnia are each much smaller than Sudan, a vast country in comparison and a place where travel to commit or respond to violence is difficult. Second, the violence in Rwanda saw the mass participation of over one million perpetrators, which likely facilitated quicker violence. Victims often congregated in large groups, further facilitating killings. Only one group was fighting the government, and regime change brought the violence to a close. In Bosnia, by contrast, there were three sides to the violence, adding more complexity, and international intervention in the form of NATO airstrikes helped end the violence. Darfur has even more factions; the two original rebel groups continually splinter and disagree among themselves, rather than joining forces to fight the government. Violence continues today, though it is worth nothing that every refugee I interviewed suggested regime change and international intervention as pathways to end the violence.

In sum, while analyses of the onset of genocidal violence are important, the disaggregation of violence over space and by time brings additional insights. Doing so for the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan illustrated that who the perpetrators are and how they are organized influences both the magnitude and the onset of violence, with community organization and the spread of ideology mattering when the violence was perpetrated more spontaneously³¹² by members of the community and strategic aims and broader spatial and temporal factors having a larger influence when the violence is perpetrated by formally organized groups.

Integrating Insights

Thus far, I have analyzed the factors that led to the violence, comparing insights from the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2 and the preconditions of genocide in each of the case studies. After reviewing how this informs the onset of genocide and linking it to general theories of genocide, I moved to sub-national levels, considering the factors that influenced the magnitude and onset of violence at meso levels. In this last section, I integrate insights, first discussing what influenced the onset and unfolding of the violence and then linking these factors to Hagan and Raymond-Richmond's (2008, 2009) collective action theory of genocide, using them to expand and specify this theory.

Considering what influenced the onset of genocide alongside what influenced the unfolding of violence yields several discoveries. At the societal level, an ideology that excludes and demonizes or dehumanizes segments of society was influential both as a factor in the onset of violence as well as at meso levels, with the spread of ideology

³¹² As noted in Chapter 3, there were some previously recruited militias, such as the *Interahamwe*. Yet, the vast majority of perpetrators were civilians, though network ties and other affiliations likely also patterned participation in the violence (in other words, it was not completely spontaneous).

linked to meso-level violence in Rwanda. Yet, this was not the case in Bosnia or Darfur, where the violence was organized by the state and enacted by state actors.

Though the ethnic heterogeneity of the population is not significantly associated with the odds of genocidal onset in Chapter 2, it was one of the strongest predictors of the magnitude (and, in Bosnia, onset) of violence at meso levels. Similarly, although the population of the country does not influence the onset of genocide directly, it does influence patterns in violence at sub-national levels.

Turning to state-level factors, I do not analyze whether and how some factors, such as the type of government or the GDP, influence the onset and magnitude of violence within a country's regions. It is unlikely that these would influence variation in violence across regions, as they would not vary by region. Yet, they could influence the process of genocide in other ways, which remains to be studied. In close connection with this, while years at risk is associated with the onset of violence, it is less clear here how it is associated with the magnitude or onset at sub-national levels.³¹³

The situation in which the state is operating influenced violence at both levels, however. Civil war, for example, is a prominent factor that influences the onset and unfolding of genocide, as was seen by the significance of the frontline in Rwanda and in Bosnia. International interconnectedness may also matter broadly for both, with trade levels influencing onset and interventions having the potential to influence violence on the ground. While analyses thus far did not find significant effects of international

³¹³ Again, however, there are feasible pathways. For example, time at risk (in capturing regime durability) may be related with state capacity, which may, in turn, be related to its ability to implement genocide and fight resistance movements.

interventions on the magnitude or onset of violence, it is clear from the case of Bosnia that such interventions have the potential to bring violence to a close.


This begins to draw connections across these conceptual levels, yet it does not yet *link* levels. To do so, I rely upon Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's (2008) Collective Action Theory of Genocide. This recent theory was devised to explain genocide in Darfur.³¹⁴ While it is not typically integrated into most work of genocide scholars, it holds numerous insights and is particularly valuable for analyzing the process of genocide at multiple levels.

Utilizing James Coleman's (1986) macro-/micro-scheme (see Figure 6.4), Hagan and Rymond-Richmond begin at the macro level, noting resource competition within Darfur and the Sudanese Government's ideologies directed against Black African tribes. This results in socially constructed identities and provides a vocabulary that reinforces an us/them theme. At the micro level, the us/them dichotomy and vocabulary influence individual racial intent. Collective action of individuals at the micro level transforms into collectivized racial intent, which aggregates to macro-level patterns of genocide and results in a genocidal state.

This theory is well supported by the ADS data that Hagan and Rymond-Richmond analyze, though it is not without criticisms. Particularly, the exclusive focus on race (rather than other potential motivations) is seen as problematic (Matsueda 2009; Shaw 2010; Mann 2011). However, this theory has yet to be extended to other cases and must be revised in order to be applied to other situations of genocide. Thus, I review how insights gleaned throughout this dissertation can inform, expand, and specify this theory.

³¹⁴ For additional levels and insights, see Saveslberg 2010.

Figure 6.4: Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s Collective Action Theory of Genocide



State Factors

Step one in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s collective action theory of genocide in Darfur is state-led Arabization, Arab supremacy, and related ideologies exacerbated by resource competition, resulting in dehumanization. This first step in the process highlights the conditions that influenced genocide in Sudan, suggesting it ultimately began at the state level because of several key factors. Yet, there have been many situations in which state-led ideologies privilege certain groups, dehumanization, and competition over resources, but genocide does not occur. Likewise, these factors do not explain the state-level onset of all genocides.


Instead, Chapter 2 paints a more general picture of conditions in which genocide occurs, pointing particularly to the state and the context in which it operates. In this regard, it falls in line with Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's theory, suggesting that genocidal violence begins with active (or, at minimum, tacit) state involvement, as seen in each of the case studies.³¹⁵ Yet, it also extends this theory by focusing on general preconditions.

Specifically, comparatively young countries with exclusionary ideologies,³¹⁶ salient elite ethnicities, and autocratizing governments have the highest odds of genocide. Importantly, genocide is most likely to occur when these regimes face some form of threat or upheaval—such as a civil war, coup, or revolution. Thus, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's general focus on ideology and land can be couched within this broader model, as seen in the figure below. And while this is the first step in the model, processes related to these factors may unfold over years before genocide actually begins.

³¹⁵ As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, state involvement is not necessary for an event to be considered genocide. Nevertheless, the modern genocides analyzed throughout this project all began with some level of state involvement.

³¹⁶ Notably, the collective action theory of genocide also begins at the point in which an exclusionary ideology is already present. Chapter 2 can also inform this. Specifically, I analyzed the factors that influence whether such exclusionary ideologies exist within a country, finding that autocracies with colonial pasts, low levels of ethnolinguistic diversity, salient elite ethnicities, comparatively low trade relations, and upheaval have the highest odds of fostering an exclusionary ideology.

Figure 6.5: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 1



Socially Constructed Identities

Before and during genocide, the state influences the social construction of social identities (Link 1 in each figure). As Hagan and Rymond-Richmond suggest, the Sudanese State and its agents constructed the identities associated with both the victim and the perpetrator group. This resulted in the depiction of certain groups as “African” and others as “Arab,” with Africans seen as inferior.

While the figure is particular to Sudan, Chapters 3 and 4 revealed similar processes in Rwanda and Bosnia. In Rwanda, government leaders had long labeled Tutsis enemies and invaders who were to blame for Hutu marginalization. In Bosnia, state leaders in both Bosnia and Serbia constructed Bosniaks as foreigners (“Turks”) who had

wrongly adopted Islam and lived on land that was rightfully Serb land (or, to a lesser degree, Croat). In each case, these processes were influenced by other actors, such as members of the Catholic Church or colonizers and the remnants of the institutions they created. While the state is key to the creation of these identities, other influences must also be considered in an analysis of locally organized and socially constructed identities.³¹⁷

Thus, the state and its agents, as well as other institutions, influence the social construction and essentialization of what will become perpetrator and victim groups, as well as the relationship between these groups. To be clear, the labels applied to these groups are often more fluid and complex than simple binary identities (again, even the labels of perpetrator and victim become complicated quickly, since someone might kill one neighbor, rescue another neighbor, and lose a family member during the same episode of violence [Fujii 2011]). Nevertheless, in the abstract, each genocide involves socially constructed victim and perpetrator groups; much of the construction of these groups is influenced by the state and other actors both before³¹⁸ and during genocide.


As the collective action theory of genocide is applied to Darfur, Figure 6.4 above includes three “Black African” tribes who were targeted in Darfur and specific groups of perpetrators, including the Janjaweed, Sudanese soldiers, and the Janjaweed and Sudanese soldiers acting in tandem. To apply this theory to other genocides, more general categories are needed to capture socially constructed victim and perpetrator identities,

³¹⁷ As discussed in Chapter 3, there are also often sub-identities within these groups that are too complex to include in a general theory. For example, in Rwanda, Northern Hutus and Southern Hutus were associated with two different identities.

³¹⁸ Indeed, this construction can often take place over years and even decades, as was made clear by the case of Rwanda, where Tutsis were demonized in the 1950s.

shown in the figure below. As illustrated in Chapters 3-5, the victim group is often constructed as outsiders responsible for the marginalization of the perpetrator group. The perpetrator group is often constructed as marginalized (by fault of the victim) and acting in self-defense. These identities provide an organizing foundation for ethnically (or group)-based political parties and similar organizations.

Figure 6.6: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 2



Individual and Collectivized Genocidal Intent

The social construction of groups influences individuals who participate in genocide. As noted previously, genocide is an event that is comprised of millions of individual actions, in line with Coleman's suggestion that macro phenomena result from

pathways that aggregate individual actions. Thus, at this next step, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond explain that identities influence individual racial intent. In a masterful analysis, they draw upon Katz's (1988) theory of righteous slaughter to argue that racial intent is signified by the racial epithets heard by victims in Darfur.

As my study does not analyze the individual level, I cannot inform this particular aspect of the model in great detail. Yet, I suggest three qualifications (gleaned from interviews and other aspects of this analysis) in the process of modifying the collective action theory of genocide to apply to other genocides. First, the form of the intent must be broadened. *Racial* intent is one form of genocidal intent; thus, the theory should be broadened to *genocidal* intent that targets any social group through the establishment of inferior and superior categories, as discussed in Chapter 1. Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, it must be qualified that it is not necessary that *each* person who participates in genocidal violence possess genocidal intent. Indeed, some of the perpetrators that Fujii (2011) and Straus (2006) interviewed in Rwanda highlighted how complex, interrelated motives—such as hope to acquire land or fear of personal harm—influenced participation in genocidal violence, falling in line with Brustein's (1996) suggestion that many joined the Nazi party because of its benefits, not because of their hatred toward certain groups. This does not mean that genocide does not take place at a systemic level but that individual intent is more complex and multifaceted. Third, individual intent (and associated actions) can influence the social construction of the groups. In other words, individual intent and actions reinforce and even change socially constructed identities in a feedback loop. Again, this is not something analyzed in this study, so I suggest these modifications—particularly the last one—as modifications for future exploration.

As Hagan and Rymond-Richmond explain, these individuals, who are motivated by genocidal intent as well as other factors, then commit genocidal acts; and the collection of actions aggregates to collective intent (Link 3a). Indeed, the greatest strength of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's model is in explaining explain how a genocidal system can emerge from the interdependent actions of individuals and how the yelling of racial epithets influences the production of collective intent in this case (for their particular analysis, see their 2008 and 2009 publications).³¹⁹

Yet, to even bring individual actions into play, the theory needs one additional modification. To this point, nothing in the theory explains why individual intent would translate into individual action, which is implicitly assumed. But, there have likely been many countries that fit this description up to this point, but did not experience genocide. And there are often individuals who harbor notions of superiority and inferiority, but do not act on those ideas by attempting to kill or remove members of that group. Thus, a genocidal spark must be specified. As noted earlier in this chapter, a "spark," a catalyst or turning point at the macro-level, influences the transition to genocide. All turning points are not sparks, but the spark is the most proximal turning point before systematic violence begins. All citizens or participants do not spontaneously pick up arms and begin engaging in genocidal action; a turning point, often both at the state level and at sub-national levels, influences the beginning of violence.

Once individual intent aggregates to collective intent and collective action, collective actions are organized in numerous ways. In their book, Hagan and Rymond-

³¹⁹ Here I also included a feedback arrow, suggesting that the group organization and action reinforces individual actions. This is well in line with Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's argument, though a feedback arrow is not included in their figure.

Richmond discuss the actions of government leaders, leaders of the Janjaweed, and members of the Janjaweed and the Sudanese army. Again, however, this must be generalized for other episodes of genocide. In the case of Bosnia and Rwanda, several groups of actors perpetrated the genocides, including state actors and armies, paramilitaries, and local citizens who were not members of institutionalized groups, both “ordinary” citizens and citizens acting through their local positions as agents of the state.³²⁰


Notably, these groups were mobilized in various ways (Link 1). Ordinary citizens in Rwanda were mobilized to participate in the violence through discriminatory, dehumanizing, and blaming messages. More proximal to the genocide, local citizens were mobilized through self-defense groups that stressed impending Tutsi threats, trained them to fight, and distributed weapons.

In Rwanda, the army was also under the control of those who planned the genocide. The balance of collective action, as discussed above, tilts far toward local actors, however. In other words, while the army participated, the genocide in Rwanda saw mass collective action from citizens who were not previously formally organized. This was not the case in Bosnia. While local actors participated, much of the violence was organized and implemented by soldiers and paramilitaries—working hand in hand—that moved throughout the country. These paramilitaries were also trained in local self-defense committees, though their organization was less organic than in Rwanda. These

³²⁰ While these are the three main types, there are certainly others. For example, there are often loosely organized perpetrator groups that may not quite rise to the organization of a paramilitary but are nevertheless organized actors exerting their will in tandem.

different organizations and forms of collective action taken by perpetrators are important, as they influence the last stage of the model—the patterns of genocidal violence.³²¹

Figure 6.7: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 3



Genocidal State and Patterns of Victimization

In the last step of Hagan and Raymond-Richmond’s model, the patterns of collective action aggregate to produce a genocidal state and genocidal victimization. The model has little to say about these patterns, however. Yet, the process to this point

³²¹ Note also that the organization and actions of these groups likely influences individual intent, suggesting another feedback loop and area for future research.

directly influences the patterns, and I suggest that findings from my case studies can inform our understanding of these patterns.

Namely, as I show in Chapters 3-5 and discussed above, *who* the perpetrators are and *how* they are organized directly influences the patterns of genocidal violence. The form of collective action is related to the variation in spatial and temporal patterns of genocidal violence. If state ideologies and actions target a broad participation base, community collective action—as in Rwanda—can result. However, if the state organizes paramilitaries and calls upon armies to perpetrate a larger share of the violence, the organization and actions of these armed actors plays a larger role in determining the patterns of genocidal violence that unfold.

Broadly speaking, then, genocide is perpetrated through community collective action and/or formally organized collective action, though different episodes of genocide experience different degrees of each so that they could be plotted on a continuum (ranging from only one form to different balances of each). The degree to which the collective action is community/participatory based or formally organized may have several key influences that stand to be further examined. First, when the participation takes the form of community collective action, there may be wider variation in the violence. Recall that Rwanda saw between 700 and 50,000 people killed in one commune. The factors that influenced the magnitude did not match the factors that influenced the onset—suggesting there was not a particular strategy but that local conditions influenced the onset of violence. This is, in part, due to the community participation in the violence, as a lack of formally organized action meant that community action occurred based on a broader number of factors. In Bosnia, variation in

violence was much smaller—between 100 and 9,000 killed within one municipality—and the factors that influenced the magnitude and onset of the violence were similar.³²² This does not mean that local conditions did not influence violence, as they surely did, but they are generally overshadowed in larger patterns in the Bosnian case,³²³ in part due to the formally organized nature of the violence—members of armies and paramilitaries carrying out strategic plans perpetrated much of the violence, minimizing variation.³²⁴

Thus, variation in violence and the patterns therein may be directly linked to the organization of the perpetrators who comprise the collective action. When “ordinary” citizens participate in the violence, the factors that help explain variation in the violence are directly linked to how community members learned ideologies and community organization. In Rwanda, for example, key factors that influenced the magnitude of the violence included spreading propaganda to citizens. In addition, measures of community organization—drawn from criminology’s social disorganization theory—influenced the commune-level magnitude of violence. As noted above, marriage rates and employment were associated with lower rates of violence in communes.

The Rwandan army also participated in genocidal violence, and their actions influenced the rate of violence, as seen in the significance of the frontline. Yet, other

³²² Patterns in the variation in *rates*, which account for the population, are similar.

³²³ This is less clear for the case of Sudan, which tends to fall in line with Bosnia but also shows that motivations to garner arable land may have also influenced patterns. Thus, more fine-grained multivariate analyses are needed before speaking about the relative balance of these influences.


³²⁴ I concede that variation could be large if the strategic plan that guides armies and paramilitaries dictates adaptation, but I propose that community collective action results in broader levels of variation in the violence. I also anticipate that the relative control of the state on these different factors matters. For example, in Bosnia, the state had relatively high control over paramilitaries, which worked in tandem with the armies. In Sudan, the state had less control over the Janjaweed, influencing greater variation in the violence.

genocides have been perpetrated through much more formally organized collective action. As noted, armies and paramilitaries (and, to a lesser degree, other citizens) were largely responsible for the violence in Bosnia and Darfur. Due to this, the factors that help explain the variation in violence are more closely linked to organized strategy, such as strategic importance to Serbia and polarization of the communities in Bosnia or the remoteness of villages in Darfur. This does not mean that other community characteristics were not at play but that institutionalized actors and their strategies are particularly important for understanding the patterns of genocidal victimization.

Of course, the perpetrators and how they are organized are not sufficient to explain patterns of genocidal victimization. For example, state-level factors may have also influenced patterns of violence. Indeed, Jepperson and Meyer (2011) have critiqued the Coleman model (the basis of Hagan and Raymond-Richmond's model) for its overemphasis on individual-level causes, suggesting that a causal arrow may also run between macro conditions. While I do not analyze this specifically in this dissertation, it is plausible that state-level factors, such as the organization of the state, directly influence the patterns of genocidal victimization, an area for fruitful future research.

Furthermore, while I did not find significant effects related to specific interventions in each of the three cases, it is likely that international interventions sometimes influence patterns of genocidal victimization. There may have been other barriers to the violence as well, such as the actions of particular individuals. And still other factors come into play, such as the population of the perceived victim groups, as depicted in the figure below.

Figure 6.8: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 4



Overall, these changes to the Hagan and Raymond-Richmond model must be tested on other episodes of genocide. However, my focus on both the macro-level factors and the meso-level factors at play complement and extend this model, ultimately informing both the conditions and the courses of genocide.

Concluding Thoughts

In this dissertation, I have examined the causes and processes of one of the worst crimes of humanity. Drawing upon quantitative techniques and novel datasets, historical analysis, fieldwork, and 113 interviews, I have analyzed the factors that influenced both the onset of genocide globally as well as regional and temporal variation within genocidal

violence in the genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. In doing so, I have drawn upon sociological literatures and, particularly, literature from genocide studies, criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence.

As reviewed in this chapter, I began by assessing the risk factors of genocides that have occurred over the past 50 years, finding that societal, state, and international factors influence the occurrence of genocide and that civil war is its strongest precondition. I also find that many of the factors proposed to explain genocide better predict the presence of an exclusionary ideology, an important area for future research.

Genocide is a process, and as such, I also assess meso-level variation in the magnitude and onset of violence. In general, I find that factors that influence the onset of genocide are not sufficient to explain meso-level violence during genocide. Accordingly, I turn to numerous other factors, finding that community organization helps explain patterns in genocidal violence in cases when the perpetrators are “ordinary” citizens and that factors associated with strategy and civil war violence help explain patterns in genocidal violence when the perpetrators are members of previously-organized militias and army units.

This research makes strides for genocide studies and sociology, though much remains to be done. Although the crime of genocide was first formally defined in the wake of the Nazi Holocaust, it has been a social problem for centuries. Yet, sociologists have remained surprisingly quiet in discussions of why and how genocide occurs. While my foremost goal has been to better understand genocide, I have also attempted to show that genocide is a worthy topic of sociological inquiry. Indeed, while the sheer death,

destruction, and social harm that genocide causes globally should make it a worthy topic, the study of genocide also aligns with other common areas of sociological inquiry.

As noted in Chapter 1, genocide is a form of collective action, committed by formal organizations as well through organic community action. People committing genocide target groups, a core subject of sociological inquiry, and often define these groups by race, ethnicity, religion, nation, and numerous other categories that create and reflect us/them mentalities. Though I have not analyzed it in great detail here, genocide is also gendered.

People who commit genocide attempt to radically remake their societies, drawing upon the sociological concept of utopias and exercising control and power over people, bodies, and cultures. As such, genocide is often a project of the state and of state building and can be informed by a wealth of knowledge on each, as well as sociological research on power and control.

Genocide is also a crime, likely to be informed by numerous theories in criminology, ranging from work on hate crimes to research on white-collar and organized crimes. For example, I have shown that criminology's social disorganization theory can inform genocide under certain situations, and this is just one application from a plethora of theories. Beyond this, genocide is a form of political and ethnic violence, alongside civil wars and human rights violations, and can be informed by and extend theories created to explain these social phenomena.

Additionally, genocide is social change. As sociology's founders were concerned with the impacts of social change, many of their theories—including those regarding the role of strain, relevant throughout this dissertation—can likely inform the study of

genocide. Genocide can also become a new norm within a society as it unfolds; the study of norms and rituals are likely fruitful avenues for future research.

Sociological inquiry can also inform processes that occur after genocide. The memory of the violence can have many effects on a society, an important topic for sociologists of knowledge. And, those who are interested in transitional justice should find much to study by analyzing how a country rebuilds after violence and experiences the many lasting effects of the genocidal violence. Furthermore, sociologists of health and medicine could assess the effects of trauma, sexualized violence, and displacement (including violence in refugee camps).

These are just a few of the many potential avenues through which sociological research can inform the study of genocide. Extending theories to explain these and other topics central to the study of genocide will provide tests of existing theories, further improving and extending the discipline of sociology. Sociology's vast methodological toolkit, ranging from quantitative analysis of patterns to in-depth oral history interviews, will also bring much to this area of inquiry. If this is the "crime of crimes," a thousand or a million individual crimes constituting a crime against humanity (both the collective of peoples and the very concept), it is well worth scholars using every skill at our disposal to analyze, ameliorate, and even prevent future instances of genocide.

Appendix A

Genocides, 1955-2005

Country	Years	Brief Description of First Genocidal Event since 1955 or Independence
*Afghanistan	1978(1980)- 1992	Widespread Mujahedeen rural insurgency provokes Soviet and Afghan government tactics of systematic terror, destruction of villages, and execution of prisoners.
Algeria	1962	In the wake of independence from France, Algerian militants attack Europeans and Muslim civilians who collaborated with French colonial authorities.
Angola	1975- 1994	The National Union for the Independence of Angola rebels and Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola led government forces in destructive campaigns and atrocities against civilians.
Argentina	1976- 1980	Military stages coup and declares state of siege. Death squads target subversives for disappearances, kidnappings, torture, and murder.
*Bosnia	1992- 1995	Muslim residents of Bosnia are subject to "ethnic cleansing" measures including destruction of property, forced resettlement, execution, and massacres by Serb and Croat forces seeking union with Serbia and Croatia.
Myanmar (Burma)	1978	To secure the border region, regular military units supported by militant Buddhist elements depopulate Arakanese Muslim communities in Western Burma by oppression, destruction, torture, and murder.
*Burundi	1965(1972)- 1973	Attempted coup by Hutu units in 1965 results in massacres of Tutsis. Ruling Tutsis respond by unleashing a Tutsi-dominated Army to destroy Hutu leaders.
*Cambodia	1975- 1979	Khmer Rouge initiate restructuring of society with massive deaths by starvation, deprivation, executions, and massacres of supporters of the old regime, city dwellers, and ethnic and religious minorities.
Chile	1973- 1976	In wake of military coup, supporters of former regime and other leftists are arrested, tortured, disappeared, exiled, and summarily executed.
*China	1959 (1956)	Army and security forces suppress counter-revolutionary elements of society, including Tibetan Buddhists, landowners, and supporters of former Chiang Kai-shek regime.
Congo-Kinshasa	1964- 1965	To consolidate control, rebels massacre counter-revolutionaries, including educated Congolese, missionaries, and other Europeans.
Congo-Kinshasa	1997	Laurent Kabila's movement systematically kills tens of thousands of Hutu refugees.
El Salvador	1980- 1989	In the face of widespread insurgency, military, security units, and death squads kill, imprison, and harass suspected leftists among clergy, peasants, urban workers, and intellectuals.

Equatorial Guinea	1969-1979	President Macias pressures Spanish residents to abandon control of the economy in February 1969. The ensuing crisis triggers an unsuccessful coup attempt, which triggers a violent and sustained crackdown on all political opposition.
*Ethiopia	1976-1979 (1983)	Army, internal security units, and civilian defense squads massacre political and military elites, workers, students, bureaucrats, and others thought to oppose the regime.
*Guatemala	1978 (1980)-1990	Military-dominated governments initiate series of anti-guerrilla campaigns with use of death squads against suspected leftists and indigenous Mayans.
*Indonesia	1965-1966	After attempted Communist coup, Muslim vigilantes massacre Party members and ethnic Chinese. After government formally bans Party; military eliminates suspected Communists and sympathizers.
*Iran	1981(1979)-1992	To consolidate Islamic revolution, government violently suppresses dissident Muslims (Mujahedeen) and rebel Kurds and selectively executes prominent Bahá'ís.
*Iraq	1963-1975 (1987)	1963: To suppress repeated rebellions for independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq, government engages in large-scale massacres. 1987: Military and security forces launch campaign of indiscriminate destruction across Iraqi Kurdistan to neutralize Kurdish guerrillas.
Nigeria	1967-1969	Government's deliberate blocking of international aid results in the death of Ibos.
*Pakistan (1949-1971)	1971	General strikes by Bengali nationalists are met with martial law. Military uses tanks, airpower, and artillery and attacks civilians.
Pakistan (1972-)	1973-1977	Baluchi rebellion suppressed by military using violence against civilians.
Philippines	1972-1976	Moro resistance to government-sponsored Christian settlement and support of guerrillas fighting for autonomy results in military and paramilitary terror tactics; many Moros are killed in massacres and napalm bombings.
*Rwanda	1963 (1962)	Local Hutu officials orchestrate vengeance attacks against Tutsis following cross-border incursions by Tutsi rebels.
Somalia	1988-1991	Rebellion in the north by Somali National Movement leads to government anti-insurgency operations, causing many civilian deaths (particularly among Issaq clan).
Sri Lanka	1989-1990	Revolutionary campaign by Marxist Sinhalese JVP prompts government to unleash military and police death squads. Killings of JVP leaders, supporters, and poor Sinhalese youth in rural areas eliminate JVP.
*Sudan	1956-1972 (2003)	1956: Government uses indiscriminate violence to suppress mostly non-Muslim Africans who support a secessionist movement in the south. 2003: Government-supported Arab militias kill, rape, and burn the homes of members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.
Syria	1981-1982	Government military and security forces crush revolt by Muslim Brotherhood centered in cities of Hama and Aleppo.

*Uganda	1971-1979	After General Amin seizes power, he systematically exterminates political opponents and personal enemies. Tribes closely associated with his predecessor also are targeted for destruction.
South Vietnam ¹	1965-1975	Government military and paramilitary forces engage in killings, reprisals, and bombardments against villagers supporting Viet Cong.
*Yugoslavia	1998-1999	Serb militias backed by Yugoslavian armed forces target ethnic-Albanians to counter insurgency and cleanse Kosovo of Albanians.
Zimbabwe	1983	State-sponsored massacre in Matabeleland.

Note: The table is adapted from the Political Instability Task Force. Also, note that there were too many missing data for South Vietnam, so it is excluded. Stars indicate countries included in the restricted definition of genocide based on Fein's (1993a) coding, and dates in parentheses are onset dates according to Fein.

Appendix B


Exclusionary ideologies are operationally defined by the Political Instability Task Force to include the following:

- Adherents of strict variants of Marxism–Leninism, such as the German Democratic Republic, are coded as exclusionary. Laos, Vietnam, the People’s Republic of China, and North Korea are coded as exclusionary up to 1998. Socialist regimes that tolerated some civil society organizations and/or allowed significant free enterprise (like Hungary after the 1960s) are not coded as exclusionary.
- Islamic states governed on the basis of Shari’a law, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, are coded as exclusionary. Islamic states that permit some expression of other religions, like Bahrain and Oman, are not coded as exclusionary.
- Advocates of anticommunist doctrines such as those advanced by military-dominated elites in some time periods in Taiwan and South Korea are coded as exclusionary. Additionally, national security regimes in some Latin American countries during the 1960s and 1970s are coded as exclusionary.
- Advocates of doctrines of ethnic and ethnonationalist superiority or exclusivity, including Iraq, South Africa during Apartheid, Serbia, and Bhutan, are also coded as exclusionary. Indonesia’s “Pancasila Democracy” is also coded as exclusionary.
- Advocates of doctrines of strict secular nationalism that exclude political participation of religious movements, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria, were coded as exclusionary (Harff 2003; PITF 2009; Marshall 2010.)

Notably, white supremacy is lacking from this coding scheme. While white supremacy has arguably been a driving factor in past genocides, it has not been noted as a factor in recent genocides. Furthermore, other racist and nationalist ideologies have been proposed as factors, though no variable exists to measure these to my knowledge.


Appendix C

Figure 2.3: Hazard of Genocide by Risk Set Entrance



Appendix D

Settlements in Darfur in 2004



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