

**The Philippine-American War (1899-1902):
Compassion or Conquest?**

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Figure 1—Map of the Philippines



The Philippine archipelago is situated between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, lying about 1,000 miles east of Vietnam. It is comprised of 7,107 islands that extend about 1,200 miles from north to south.

Timeline

1521 – Arrival of Ferdinand Magellan; the era of Spanish interest and conquest begins.

1543 – Spanish explorer Ruy Lopez de Villalobos names the islands Las Islas Filipinas in honor of King Philip II of Spain. The Philippines become part of the Spanish empire.

1571 – Spain establishes Manila as the capital of the Spanish East Indies.

1872 – Three Filipino priests accused of sedition and executed by Spanish colonial authorities; exacerbates revolutionary sentiments.

1886 - José Rizal, medical doctor and author, publishes his melodramatic novel *Noli Me Tangere (The Lost Eden)*. The novel is considered treasonous by Spanish authorities.

1892 – Rizal founds *La Liga Filipina*, a civic organization; Andres Bonifacio founds the *Katipunan*, a secret society which sought independence from Spain through armed revolt.

1896 – Rizal executed on charges of rebellion after lobbying for political reforms; Philippine Revolution begins.

December 1897 – Emilio Aguinaldo and his top aides leave the Philippines for exile in Hong Kong.

February 1898 – The explosion of the *USS Maine* in Havana harbor serves as catalyst for the Spanish-American War.

April 1898 – Spanish-American War begins in Cuba. The sinking of the *Maine* and sensational “yellow journalism” reports (with a rallying cry of “Remember the *Maine*, to Hell with Spain!”) prompt Congress to declare war against Spain, which soon reaches the Philippines.

May 1, 1898 – Commodore George Dewey easily defeats the Spanish navy in Manila Bay.

May 19, 1898 – Dewey and Aguinaldo meet in Hong Kong harbor aboard Dewey’s flagship the *Olympia*.

June 1898 – Aguinaldo assembles the Malolos Congress and declares Independence from Spain; the United States did not recognize the First Philippine Republic.

December 1898 – Treaty of Paris ends the Spanish-American War, the Philippines ceded to the United States after the U.S. pays Spain \$20 million.

March 1901 – U.S. Army General Frederick Funston captures Aguinaldo through a ploy hatched with Filipino Macabebe scouts, an ethnic group hostile to Tagalogs like Aguinaldo.

April 1901 – Aguinaldo issues a proclamation accepting American sovereignty and calling on his comrades to give up their struggle.

October 1901 – U.S. Brigadier General Jacob Smith (“Hell-Roaring Jake”) issues “kill and burn” orders against anyone over the age of ten on the island of Samar, in retaliation for the death of forty American soldiers.

July 4, 1902 – President Theodore Roosevelt proclaims the official end of Philippine-American War; sporadic guerilla fighting and rebellions continue for years.

1916 – U.S. Congress passes the Jones Act pledging independence to the Philippines as soon as a stable government is formed.

1934 – U.S. Congress approves Tydings-McDuffie Law, promising Philippine independence by 1946.

1941 – Japan invades the Philippines and defeats General Douglas MacArthur at Bataan and Corregidor; the Japanese establish a puppet government which lasts until 1945.

1945 – General MacArthur returns and liberates Manila.

July 4, 1946 – the United States grants the Philippines independence; Manuel Roxas is elected president.

Preface

“There was never a good war or a bad peace.” – Benjamin Franklin

Vietnam was my first war. This was the war I watched on television, the war where my brother’s best friend was killed and whose name joined 58,194 other names on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C. This was the first war I debated with friends, and the war I protested in a mild way by wearing a black armband to school after the Kent State shootings. I was acquainted with the adventure and romance of other wars through books and movies, but Vietnam was not romantic; it was real, brutal, and shocking. It was the My Lai massacre, the burning of draft cards, and massive anti-war protests. It was the secret bombing of Cambodia, Agent Orange, and learning to distrust one’s government.

This paper is inspired by the simple fact that I hate war but love discussing it. I would ask: is there anything *not* interesting about war? War is tragic but also romantic. War inspires literature, poetry, music, movies, and technological advances. War changes individuals, societies, and countries. For some, war means travel and adventure. For others, war represents a secure career in the military that brings with it health and education benefits.

I am fascinated to learn why countries go to war and why individuals go to war (many have no choice). I am interested in the nature of patriotism and courage, how war is reported by the press, and how politicians “sell” war to the public. I am interested in the impact of war and the military on civilian society and culture: canned food was developed in part because Napoleon needed a way to feed his troops, the GPS technology in our cell phones originated with the defense department, and President Truman initiated desegregation in the U.S. military six years before the Supreme Court’s *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decision launched the modern civil rights movement.

Why, then, did I pluck the Philippine-American War from this potpourri of bellicose interests? One reason is its very obscurity. “It arguably remains the United States’ least-known war,” writes historian James Hamilton-Paterson in *America’s Boy: A Century of Colonialism in the Philippines*. Following on the heels of the better-known

Spanish-American War (dubbed “a splendid little war” by Secretary of State John Hay), this long, nasty war has fallen into obscurity despite its controversial beginning and bloody nature.

Another reason for my interest is that the issues raised by the Philippine-American war—racism, guerrilla warfare, torture, human rights, religious concerns, and the separation of humanitarian motives from economic and military objectives—are as relevant today as they were in the nineteenth century. A third reason is personal. I spent two years in the Philippines as a Peace Corps volunteer (from 1978 to 1980), and this motivated me to explore one aspect of the complicated history of the country I had scant knowledge of when living there.

Despite centuries of scholarly and political debate, despite the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, despite President Obama’s discussion of the just war tradition during his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, horrendous war crimes and genocide continue to occur. *All* may not be fair in war (or love), but to this day a high degree of unfairness is either tolerated or impossible to prevent.

War should always be a last resort; can it ever be morally justified? Pacifists would answer that all war is morally indefensible. Others argue that war is permissible to deter aggression by another country or to secure peace. One reason given for the Philippine-American War was to bring “civilization” to a backward region. An ostensible reason for the Vietnam War was to help the “freedom-loving” South Vietnamese people defeat a foreign-sponsored Communist insurgency. However to some, this war more closely resembled the wars of empire so common in the nineteenth century (which may have prompted black activist Stokely Carmichael’s description of the draft: “White people sending black people to make war on yellow people to defend the land they stole from red people”).

At the time of writing this paper, Americans are grappling with whether or not the United States should intervene militarily in Syria. War-weary after ten years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, many are skeptical of any good coming from a military strike against Syria. This does not mean, however, that the United States is reconsidering its role as the world’s policeman. As British peace crusader and mathematician Lewis

Richardson observed in the nineteenth century, the only cure for the disease of war seems to be war itself: “A long and severe bout of fighting confers immunity on most of those who have experienced it.” But Richardson noted that this immunity fades after a decade or two, leaving the next generation eager to enter into war.

Benjamin Franklin is right, of course; war is bad and peace is good. Nevertheless, war is one of humankind’s oldest pursuits and a reality that has confronted every generation of Americans. Together, dear readers, we will explore how a war fought by a large, rich country against a small, weak country halfway around the world started the United States on the path to superpower status, brought into question its global responsibilities, and continues to affect geopolitical issues today. I will ask you to consider why the United States—the world’s “greatest” democracy—has been almost continually involved in war or military conflicts since its founding in 1776. The countries change and the decades roll by, but the issues follow an eerily similar pattern.

Chapter One

Introduction

“Take up the White Man’s burden/ Send forth the best ye breed/ Go bind your sons to exile/ To serve your captives’ need; – Rudyard Kipling¹

Some wars—the Civil War, World War II, or the Vietnam War—are imprinted on the memory of most Americans. Nearly everyone has heard of these wars, knows approximately when they were fought, and has a general idea of the origins of the conflicts. Other wars, however, are familiar only to the historian. The Philippine-American War falls into the latter category. Following close on the heels of the better known Spanish-American War, this war is largely unknown to the average American. Yet the Philippine-American War was long, controversial, bloody, expensive, and historic. It was one of America’s first foreign wars, and some historians refer to it as the war that started the United States firmly on the path to superpower status and building up its military.

In 1898 the United States defeated Spain in Cuba and Manila Bay and the Philippine Islands were suddenly free of colonial tyranny. But instead of independence the Filipino people found themselves in the position of exchanging one colonial power for another. This conflict gained the United States a foothold in the Pacific but it came at great expense to both nations. The United States maintained control of the islands until 1946²; this paper will explore whether war was justified and whether delaying independence for decades was a compassionate—or wise—decision.

The question arises: how did the United States—a democratic country with a liberal constitution centered on the recognition of individual freedom, a country that itself

¹ Kipling’s poem was first published in the London *Times* on February 4, 1899, shortly after fighting erupted between the United States and the Philippines. The poem appears to promote Western colonization and domination of the “new-caught, sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child” of underdeveloped areas of the world, and stimulated much debate between imperialists and anti-imperialists in the United States and Europe.

² Japan controlled the islands between 1942-1945.

had broken free of an imperial power—justify its foray into imperialism? “Humanitarian intervention” and the desire to “civilize and uplift” an uneducated people were among the reasons given for the conflict. This paper will explore whether the United States’ annexation of the Philippines delayed rather than promoted that nation’s independence, and whether U.S. motives in the Philippines were driven by compassion, or by political, military, and commercial interests.

An uneasy empire

“Americans have never been comfortable with the idea of empire.”³

Did the Filipinos benefit from Western contact? Can human rights exist under colonialism? “I am opposed to having the eagle put its talons on any other land,” Mark Twain wrote after reading the details of the 1898 Treaty of Paris that allowed the United States to annex the Philippines. Twain expressed the views of many anti-imperialists who believed annexation betrayed the ideals of American democracy and was contrary to its constitution. Those in favor of the war held similarly strong views. Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Naval Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, and other imperialists saw it as an opportunity for the United States to make its entry on the international stage. Senator Albert Beveridge viewed the conflict as necessary for economic expansion and justified it as “the white man’s burden” of extending civilization to peoples incapable of governing themselves.

An exploration into the issues and controversy surrounding a war that occurred more than one hundred years ago is not merely an historical exercise. In fact, an understanding of the debates swirling around the Philippine-American War increases one’s insight into America’s identity and reveals how the ideological legacies of the nineteenth century continue to affect U.S. military engagements in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As this paper was being written, Americans were grappling with the question of whether or not the United States should intervene militarily in Syria. Issues such as America’s role in the world, racism, guerilla warfare, torture, human

³ H.W. Brands in the preface to *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*.

rights, and how to separate humanitarian motives from military and economic objectives, are as relevant today as they were during the Philippine-American War.

It may be surprising—and a bit disconcerting—to reflect that the world’s “greatest” democracy” also has been one of the world’s most aggressive and militaristic nations. The list is sobering: since its founding in 1776 the United States has been involved almost continuously in military and social conflicts that include wars, invasions, rebellions, Indian wars, range wars, armed insurrections, boundary disputes, labor riots, state secession attempts, slave revolts, and bloody local feuds⁴. One has to ask: is the United States a powerful country because of its inclination to use military force to settle issues, or are its strength and wealth unrelated to military might? The United States begins the nineteenth century with the First Barbary War against the Kingdom of Tripoli and ends the century with the Spanish-American War.

The twentieth century is ushered in by the Philippine-American War. Walter G. Moss appropriately puts a question mark in the title of his book *An Age of Progress? Clashing Twentieth-Century Global Forces*. Moss examines the major twentieth-century global developments from such perspectives as violence, capitalism, socialism and communism, imperialism, racism, nationalism, westernization, globalization, freedom, human rights, science, education, and religion. He explores the ways in which the twentieth century made significant progress, and the ways in which it did not. Moss observes: “Wars, assassinations, atrocities—these words appeared often in the twentieth century. No earlier century had witnessed as much killing” (1). Ironically, it was some of the very technological “advances” of the century that made large scale killing and genocides possible.

⁴ A timeline of U.S. military operations from 1775 to the present listed on Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_United_States_military_operations) is extensive but does not, however, include other “wars” Americans are fond of conducting, such as the War on Drugs and the War on Poverty.

Pretty words and ugly motives

*“It is not just veiled imperialism; governments can sometimes be made to send troops not because of self-interest but because of a genuine sense of humanity.”*⁵

In addition to investigating the reasons for the Philippine-American War, this thesis will examine the morality of war, discuss the just war theory, and explore the causes of war in general. Prussian General and military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz famously described war as “politics by other means.” Simply put, wars are fought to obtain money or power in Clausewitz’s view. However, the United States has engaged in war to throw off the repression of a foreign tyrant and to achieve liberty and independence (the Revolutionary War), to liberate an enslaved people and save a nation (the Civil War), and to gain territory (the Mexican-American War). The goals of the Philippine-American War are less easy to state concisely.

In *The Causes of War*, historian Geoffrey Blainey surveys all the international wars fought since 1700 in order to document the revealing patterns and clues: an “intellectual detective story” (ix) as he describes it. Blainey says there is a widespread assumption that peace is the normal state of affairs, an assumption shown to be wrong by American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin. After tabulating the number of years which some European countries had spent at war Sorokin showed that his native Russia had been at war for 46 of every 100 years since 901 AD. England followed a similar pattern: since the time of William the Conqueror, it had been engaged in war somewhere in Europe or the tropics for 56 of each 100 years; and Spain experienced an even higher percentage of war years (Blainey 3).

Lewis F. Richardson, a mathematician and Quaker born in England in 1881, published *The Mathematical Psychology of War* in 1919. Richardson spent much of his time between the two world wars studying war, being convinced that scholars could discover clues to the causes of war if it was studied systematically. He could not find statistical evidence that showed that nations speaking a common language or sharing a

⁵ Gary J. Bass sounding a positive note in a discussion of military intervention in his book *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*. In Chapter One he asks whether humanitarian intervention is reality, or whether it is merely ugly motives masked by pretty rhetoric.

common religion were more likely to enjoy peace, and he also dashed the popular notion that extremes of wealth and poverty contributed to the likelihood of war. Blainey quotes Richardson's view that the only cure for the disease of war seemed to be war itself: "a long and severe bout of fighting confers immunity on most of those who have experienced it" (6). Unfortunately, after a decade or two this immunity faded and the next generation was again likely to enter eagerly into war.

The arguments for and against war are likely as old as war itself, and the very term war seems to defy the labels of "just" or "moral." However, philosopher and political ethicist Michael Walzer maintains that war is sometimes justifiable. He revitalized the just war theory (which had been part of Catholic moral theology in the Middle Ages) in his 1977 book *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. In general, defending one's country from foreign attack might be given as a valid reason for war, while colonialism—taking another country's resources by force—might be given as a poor reason for war. Adopting the opposite view is Robert L. Holmes, a philosophy professor who specializes in ethics and social philosophy, who argues that war in the modern world cannot be morally justified.

I invite you to embark on a journey into America's past. Together we will explore the controversy, social issues, and debates reverberating in nineteenth-century America as the country stood poised to enter into a war that changed the direction of the United States and continues to affect its role in the world today.

Chapter Two

The War Begins

*“Three centuries in a Catholic convent and fifty years in Hollywood.”*⁶

How does one “liberate” a country that has just thrown off one tyrant and spent the last eight months forming an independent government? In 1899 the United States responded to this situation with 70,000 troops and three years of brutal fighting against the Filipinos’ poorly armed but popular army in order to crush the newly established republic. What was first known as the “Philippine Insurrection”⁷ turned into the United States’ first land war in Asia and its first major venture into Asia as a global power. It also marked a turn in American foreign policy. Imperialists such as Senator Albert Beveridge hailed the Philippine venture as necessary for economic expansion and justified it as “the white man’s burden” of extending civilization to peoples considered incapable of governing themselves. Still flush with the success of the large territorial gains of the Mexican-American War, the United States may have felt invincible after the “splendid little war”⁸ against Spain that gained the United States control of Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands. A mixed blessing perhaps, since despite this success America soon found itself bogged down in a country where its soldiers were viewed not as liberators but as invaders.

Prior to exploring the causes of the Philippine-American War, let us first explore the society and economy of nineteenth-century America. Today’s Americans have transitioned from vinyl records to cassette tapes to CDs, from PCs to laptops and iPhones,

⁶ Stanley Karnow reflecting on the history of the Philippines in his book *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines*.

⁷ The term ‘insurrection’ did not sit well with prominent anti-imperialist Carl Schurz: “We are engaged in a war with the Filipinos. You may quibble about it as you will, call it by whatever name you will—it is a war; and a war of conquest on our part at that—a war of bare-faced, cynical conquest.” Quoted by Henry F. Graff, author of *American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection*.

⁸ The Spanish-American War was short (the three land battles lasted just 13 hours) and profitable. In addition to gaining control of Cuba, America had annexed Hawaii and was on the way to annexing Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands. All this for the “minimal” cost of \$250 million and the loss of fewer than 3,000 lives, prompted American diplomat John Hay to call it a “splendid little war.”

but they are not the first generation to experience dizzying technological and scientific changes. Without a doubt, the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century were tumultuous times. As stated by Theodore Roosevelt in an 1894 essay: “At no period of the world’s history has life been so full of interest and of possibilities of excitement and enjoyment as for us who live in the latter half of the nineteenth century (*American Ideals* 273); and later in the essay: “Signs do not fail that we are on the eve of great changes, and that in the next century we shall see the conditions of our lives, national and individual, modified after a sweeping and radical fashion”(276).

Within a few short years, Americans witnessed the construction of the Eiffel Tower and the Panama Canal, the development of radio waves, radioactivity, X-rays, and vaccinations. In 1870 Jules Verne’s Captain Nemo described electricity, which allowed him to travel 20,000 leagues under the sea in his electric-powered submarine, as a “powerful agent, obedient, rapid, easy, which conforms to every use, and reigns supreme aboard my vessel.”⁹ In 1876 Alexander Graham Bell placed the first telephone call and Thomas Edison recorded the first moving pictures in 1894. Cars were produced in Germany in 1886, French architect Gustave Zédé designed a successful submarine in 1887, and in 1890 French inventor Clément Ader left the ground and flew almost 200 hundred feet in an airplane of his design. (See Appendix A for a listing of numerous other momentous events that claimed Americans’ attention during the period of American rule in the Philippines.)

Also during this time, the phrase “survival of the fittest” entered the lexicon. Charles Darwin used the term to describe natural selection in his book *On the Origin of the Species*, published in 1869. Richard Hofstadter’s *Social Darwinism on American Thought* describes the impact on intellectual life of Darwinian ideas such as “natural selection,” “survival of the fittest,” and the “struggle for survival.” Hofstadter notes that British philosopher Herbert Spencer had coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” before the publication of *On the Origin of the Species* and applied it to his economic theories and the functioning of society: “But Spencer’s followers seized upon the authority of

⁹ “8 Jules Vernes Inventions That Came True,” *National Geographic*, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/pictures/110208-jules-verne-google-doodle-183rd-birthday-anniversary/>

Darwin's work to claim scientific legitimacy for their outlook and to press home the analogy between the natural and social worlds, both of which, they claimed, evolved according to natural laws" (xiv). Social Darwinism today has a negative connotation since it implies favoring social policies that apply to the strong and those ostensibly more deserving of survival. The impact of social Darwinism on imperialist and anti-imperialist thought as it relates to the Philippine-American War will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.


People, pawns, and geopolitics

During the late nineteenth century, the United States economy also entered a new era. From the 1870s to World War I American politicians and manufacturers feared that the nation risked outstripping its own capacities to absorb its goods. Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Naval Captain Alfred Mahan, and other imperialists hungered for economic expansion as well as military grandeur, and believed it was time for the United States to secure a niche for itself in the international community that was more in keeping with its size, economic strength, and strategic location, according to Matthew Frye Jacobson in his book *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad 1876-1917*.

Mahan picked up on the overproduction theme in his 1890 book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, and linked America's growing agricultural and industrial production to the need for a modern navy that could protect commercial fleets and control the waterways. Economist Brooks Adams expressed a similar concern about overproduction in his 1900 publication *America's Economic Supremacy*, and warned that the United States must make significant economic and administrative changes in order to avoid "gluts dangerous to her society" (Jacobson 23). Adams considered governments simply as huge corporations involved in competition and according to Jacobson, Adams' arguments, as well as the subtitle of his book—*The New Struggle for Life among Nations*—struck a Darwinian note: "If American is destined to win this battle for life, she must win because she is the fittest to survive under the conditions of the twentieth century" (24).

Moss says the “explosion of twentieth century consumption” placed increasing demands on scarce resources and underscored the need to find new ones. Before the Civil War most Americans spent little beyond the basic necessities of food, housing, and clothing, and until the 1870s about half of the population still lived on farms. However, in the late nineteenth century consumer habits changed, prompted in part by the desire of industry to sell more goods. Jacobson describes the astonishing scale of American industry during this period: the “sheer volume of materials needed to feed the engines of industrial production and the volume of production itself” (6). He analyzes industry’s impact on American immigration and foreign policy, and says that in 1803 geographical expansion was driven by desire for the resources found in the land. But in 1898 and after, expansion was tied to its connection with desired China markets. Jacobson asserts that the lives and rights of Hawaiians, Cubans, and Filipinos were incidental in the quest for naval bases and coaling stations: “This approach to entire peoples as pawns in a vast geopolitical game represented a heightened degree of imperialist vision, which was to become standard fare over the course of the twentieth century” (7).

Figure 2—McKinley Bill of Fare Cartoon



The new far west

Historian Stuart Creighton Miller, author of *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*, states bluntly that “the driving force

behind the expansion across the continent and out into the Pacific was, and still is, capitalist greed” (2). The five years preceding the Spanish-American War were depression years, which puts the desire for global expansion into an economic context. The 1893 depression strengthened an idea developing within the political and financial elite of the country that overseas markets for American goods would not only ease the domestic economic crisis but would also deflate strike and protest movements and unite the government and people; viewed in this light, the United States had no choice but to enter into a contest to maintain its economic supremacy.

The United States had long had a “keen interest in foreign markets and a determination to conquer them for the good of the country” (Jacobson 22). Secretary of State William Seward stressed the importance of international commerce during his tenure (1861-1869) and developed policies to achieve this by obtaining the Midway Islands and Alaska. Seward also had his eye on Hawaii and dreamed of expansion into the Caribbean and Latin America. Anti-expansionists blocked many of Seward’s plans during the 1860s, but as American agricultural and industrial production threatened to outstrip the nation’s domestic markets, Seward’s ideas gained popularity during the cycles of depression during the 1870s, and after that, the nation’s economic survival became associated with an aggressive conquest of foreign markets. Notwithstanding the opposition of some labor leaders (who feared a glut of cheap immigrant labor), overproduction and the need for foreign markets became a common theme during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Economists and industrialists such as Andrew Carnegie were in agreement that global expansion and foreign markets were necessary to alleviate the domestic production surplus. Senator Lodge argued: “We must have new markets unless we would be visited by declines in wages and by great industrial disturbances, of which signs have not been lacking” (Jacobson 22).

Jacobson refers to China as “the new far west” (26). As early as 1791, Alexander Hamilton declared that China and India represented an outlet for the commodities of the country. In an 1899 address, a cotton manufacturer stated that the government should protect and extend our interests in what was once “the old Far East, or what is now our new Far West” (Jacobson 26). In that same year, a writer in *Harper’s Weekly* proposed

extending the Monroe Doctrine (which since 1823 had opposed European intervention in South America) to apply to China as well.

Speaking at a Republican campaign rally in Indiana in September 1898, Albert Beveridge shared with the audience his view of America's destiny and the importance of continuing the tradition of territorial expansion by claiming the Philippines as its permanent possession:

The burning question of this campaign is whether the American people will accept the gifts of events; whether they will rise as lifts their soaring destiny; whether they will proceed upon the lines of national development surveyed by the statesmen of our past; or whether, for the first time, the American people, doubting their mission, will question Fate, prove apostate to the spirit of their race, and halt the ceaseless march of free institutions. (Jones 95)

Beveridge was dismissive of those who were critical of American expansion, and of those who were uncomfortable ruling a people without their consent. In his view, land acquisition—from the Louisiana Purchase to Florida to the Southwest—represented the fulfillment of America's divine destiny and the unstoppable “march of the flag.”

War and American manhood

Kristin Hoganson takes a different view of America's motives toward the Philippines. A professor of history and gender and women's studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Hoganson examines America's entry into imperialism from a gender viewpoint. She analyzes the cultural roots of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars starting with the premise that political decision makers are shaped by their surrounding cultures. In order to understand why the United States went to war at the turn of the century, she says it is important to focus on more than political debates and precipitating incidents. Prevailing gender beliefs, she maintains, fundamentally shaped U.S. politics, especially before 1920 when the Nineteenth Amendment granted women equal suffrage.

The standard reasons given for the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars include economic ambitions, annexationist aspirations, strategic concerns, partisan

posturing, humanitarian sympathy, a desire to avenge the sinking of the *Maine*, racial reasons, and Darwinian anxieties. After becoming involved in the Philippines as part of its war effort against Spain, the United States stayed there because of a desire to have bases close to the potentially lucrative China markets. Adding racial and religious convictions into the mix, politicians of the day stressed that the Filipinos were incapable of self-government and that the United States had an obligation to civilize and Christianize them (although many were already Roman Catholics). Hoganson asserts these reasons overlook an important motive: a solution for gender angst.

A diverse group of American men—from different social classes, party affiliations, and geographical regions—were all in agreement that American manhood was at stake in the Cuban and Philippine issues, and that aggressive international politics would build character in American men and bolster their manhood. Pro-annexation arguments included material gains and expanded overseas markets, but also referred to the added benefit of preventing American men from falling into idleness and allowing them to meet the basic male obligation of providing for their families. Hoganson asks: why did the gender anxieties of the late nineteenth century lead to an unusually bellicose spirit? Her answer: “They [jingoists¹⁰] viewed war as an opportunity to build the fighting virtues that allegedly were being undermined by industrial comforts” (12). Darwin’s ideas also came into play in the concerns of national struggle and national survival in the international arena. To compete, Americans needed to become tougher and Hoganson quotes Captain Mahan as calling for “manly resolve” rather than “weakly sentiment” in U.S. policy (9).

The benefits of war

Not surprisingly, Theodore Roosevelt held soldiers in high regard: “None of our heroes of peace, save a few constructive statesmen, can rank with our heroes of war” (Hoganson 39). Rather than dwell on the death and destruction of the war, Roosevelt wrote in an 1895 essay that the nation was “incalculably richer” because of the Civil War, and asserted that the character-forming battles had benefitted the nation: “But besides

¹⁰ Jingoism—a patriotic expression of aggressive foreign policy—originated in Britain. The term came into common usage in the United States after 1893 when used by the press to refer to the proposed annexation of Hawaii.

this, besides the material results of the Civil War, we are all, North and South, incalculably richer for its memories.... We have in us nobler capacities for what is great and good because of the infinite woe and suffering, and because of the splendid ultimate triumph” (*American Ideals* 3). The following year, Roosevelt reiterated this conviction: “I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one” (Hoganson 39).

Roosevelt was not alone in his pro-war sentiments. Nineteenth-century political commentator Robert O. Law described the desire for “war with anybody anywhere” as related to distress over the perceived debasement of American manhood and American government. Hoganson says this sanguinary state of mind had important policy implications that triggered the naval buildup of the 1880s and the outbreak of jingoism. During the United States’ intervention in the 1891 Chilean Civil War, the *New York Tribune* demanded that the United States be “more manfully and honorably represented in foreign relations” (Hoganson 40). In an 1896 essay, Roosevelt wrote: “No nation can achieve real greatness if its people are not both essentially moral and essentially manly; both sets of qualities are necessary” (*American Ideals and Other Essays* 241). In short, there appeared to be a widespread receptivity to aggressive policies in the United States during this time.

Sympathy for Cuba: Damsels in distress and gallant knights

After launching their war for independence from Spain in 1865, Cuban revolutionaries found widespread support in the United States. Americans raised funds and participated in pro-Cuban demonstrations. Some sympathizers thought the United States should offer only moral and material support, but jingoists called for military intervention. Why did *Cuba libre* strike such a powerful chord in the United States? Historians base their explanation on the democratic principles of self-government that form the backbone of American ideals, yet Hoganson is puzzled why this sympathy for Cubans did not also extend to America’s poor. “Given the racial prejudices, poverty, and political injustice tolerated within the United States, it appears that something more than humanitarian sympathy and democratic principles lay behind the outpouring of support for the Cubans” (44).

Hoganson feels the answer to this lies in the sympathetic portrayal of Cuban revolutionaries by the press. She says this caused many Americans to view Cuba metaphorically, as a “maiden longing to be rescued by a gallant knight” (44). Cuban men and women were portrayed as if they were protagonists in an adventure-filled romance novel; the revolutionaries were viewed in a chivalrous light as if they were on a heroic crusade. When the U.S. battleship *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, killing 265 American men, the disaster was blamed on Spain. Senator Richard R. Kenney responded to the supposed Spanish insult:

American manhood and American chivalry give back the answer that innocent blood shall be avenged, starvation and crime shall cease, Cuba shall be free. For such reasons, for such causes, America can and will fight. For such causes and for such reasons we should have war. (Hoganson 68)

Congress was not idle while it waited for the investigators to complete their report on the sinking of the *Maine*. With almost no debate or discussion, Congress passed a \$50 million defense appropriation to move the U.S. military to a wartime footing. The Senate passed the bill unanimously without discussion or an opposing vote; the House discussed the bill but also passed it unanimously.¹¹ The Spanish-American War began as a chivalrous crusade to redeem American honor and liberate the Cubans from Spanish oppression. It ended in the temporary occupation of Cuba, the annexation of Puerto Rico and Guam, and more importantly, with a bloody colonial war in the Philippines. Hoganson says for years historians have grappled with this question: Why did the United States finish one war, waged in the name of liberty, only to start another, waged in behalf of empire? (133).

Savage children

Strangely, while the Cubans were perceived to be involved in a glorious fight for liberty the Filipinos were characterized as savages that lacked the self-control, work

¹¹ After 9/11 in 2001 Congress passed the Patriot Act with similar rapidity. The measure's full name is: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. It moved through Congress with little debate and with only one senator—Russ Feingold of Wisconsin—and a few representatives voting against it.

habits, and chivalrous restraint that characterized civilized men (Hoganson 134). Ironically, American imperialists viewed the martial spirit as proof of manly character and ability to govern in white American men, but viewed the “warlike Filipinos” as savages who fought from animalistic instincts. Even more ironically, these “savage” Filipinos were viewed as children incapable of governing themselves. As stated by Senator Albert Beveridge: “We must never forget that in dealing with the Filipinos we deal with children” (Hoganson 135). She quotes Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as describing Filipinos as less able to govern themselves than primary school children were able to administer a public school system. Brigadier General Thomas Rosser was slightly more complimentary. He found Filipinos “as incapable of self government as college freshmen” (Hoganson 135).

The stereotype of childlike Filipinos allowed imperialists to justify their policies by saying they intended to care for the Filipinos until they reached maturity. Indeed, in my opinion, this served as a very adroit—and supposedly kind—way to simultaneously improve the American economy and obtain a naval base in the Pacific. This viewpoint allowed Americans to interpret its government’s actions as an expression of American benevolence rather than imperialism. The “splendid little war” that was the Spanish-American War seemed to reinforce the idea that military heroes were model citizens and leaders, and made the nation more receptive to military endeavors. According to Hoganson: “This assumption [that war built character among American men] was particularly noticeable in the thought of the prominent imperialists Theodore Roosevelt, Albert Beveridge, and Henry Cabot Lodge, all of whom regarded manly character as the bedrock of American democracy” (143).

In the period after the Spanish-American War, Theodore Roosevelt often spoke on behalf of imperial policies and what he called the strenuous life. In his view the two were related: imperialism was a way to attain the strenuous life, and the strenuous life was a justification for imperialism. Senator Lodge felt that a major purpose of government was to “manufacture manhood” and that imperialist policies were one way to do this. Beveridge cared about markets in addition to manhood, but according to Hoganson, markets were a means to the end, not the end itself; the ultimate purpose of commerce was to build character. War fever eventually reached President McKinley,

who had initially resisted military action. The success of the short Spanish-American War made him more receptive to taking the Philippines, and he stated in 1899: “We have not only been adding territory to the United States, but we have been adding character and prestige to the American name” (Hoganson 150).

Despite the enthusiasm for manly action, a growing number of Americans began to believe that imperial policies were undermining the American character. Senator Charles A. Towne, a Minnesota Democrat, asserted: “This new policy is advocated by some men because, as they contend, we need the discipline of war. I deny it. I affirm, on the contrary... that war in and of itself is an awful and unmatched calamity, and in no respect more so than it its effect on the character and morals of men” (Hoganson 180). The imperialist versus anti-imperialist controversy will be explored further in Chapter Five.

Enter Commodore Dewey and Emilio Aguinaldo

In 1898 Commodore George Dewey was sixty years old and three years from retirement after forty years of naval duty. In February 1898 while aboard the cruiser USS *Olympia* in Hong Kong harbor, Dewey received a coded telegram from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt: prepare for war with Spain in the Philippine Islands. Also in Hong Kong at this time was a 28-year-old Filipino exile named Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo had taken control of the Philippine revolutionary movement and started a rebellion against Spanish rule eighteen months earlier. Spanish spies were closely following the movements of both men.

Theodore Roosevelt became the Assistant Secretary of the Navy upon President McKinley’s inauguration in March 1897. As described by Brands: “For the first time Roosevelt was in a position to act on his grand ideas, and ... he set to his task with unparalleled zeal” (22). When the United States declared war against Spain in Cuba, Spanish-held territories around the world—including the Philippines—became potential prizes, and the United States’ humanitarian motives soon became intertwined with its economic and military objectives in Asia. As recalled by William Howard Taft more than a decade later: “If it had not been for Theodore Roosevelt we would never have been in a position to declare war [against Spain in Cuba], for it was he and only he who got from

Congress sufficient ammunition to back any bluff we might make with actual play” (Brands 22).

Similar to the rebellion in Cuba, anger against Spanish rule in the Philippines had been building for decades. In the 1860s and 1870s Filipino nationalists demanded the same rights granted to Spanish citizens in the Philippines, but their demands were ignored. In the 1880s, Filipino expatriates in Spain took up the cause, and churned out pamphlets and newspapers that called for equal rights back home. One of these writers—national hero and medical doctor José Rizal—wrote two novels that captured the plight of his countrymen. The most influential and popular was *Noli Me Tángere* (Latin for ‘don’t touch me,’ and translated into English as *The Lost Eden*). This melodramatic political novel, published in 1887, revolves around the love of a young Filipino couple and the difficulties of political changes under Spanish colonial rule. Spanish officials considered the novels subversive and promptly exiled Rizal to the southern island of Mindanao. Here, Rizal founded *La Liga Filipina* (the Philippine League). *La Liga* was soon outlawed, but the revolutionary momentum had begun.

Andres Bonifacio, a Manila native and nationalist, attended the first *La Liga* meeting and was inspired to found *Katipunan*, an underground nationalist organization. More militant than *La Liga*, the *Katipunan* supporters began to stockpile weapons stolen from the Spanish. In August 1896 Bonifacio organized a revolt in Manila, but it was quickly put down by Spanish authorities. In short order, Rizal was accused of organizing the uprising and executed before a firing squad. In his 1957 memoir *A Second Look at America*, Aguinaldo writes that the killing of Rizal killed Filipinos’ hopes of convincing the Spanish to reform their administration of the Philippines: “By martyring him, they also gave us a national hero. If, in life, Rizal was our inspiration, in death, he became our great unifying symbol around whom we rallied to the defense of our homeland” (21). Aguinaldo soon began a new offensive in the jungles of Cavite province on the southern shore of Manila Bay. Here, he and his men achieved a series of victories against the Spanish army. By the following May, Bonifacio was dead¹² and Aguinaldo was left the sole leader of *Katipunan* and the revolutionary movement.

¹² Bonifacio was accused of treason by Aguinaldo and executed by Aguinaldo and his men. He writes in his memoir: “While I deeply deplored Bonifacio’s loss, I could not show weakness. The

By the fall of 1897, the Spanish army found itself in a difficult situation. Tensions with the United States were increasing and the rebellion in Cuba was worsening. In peace talks with Fernando Primo de Rivera, the Spanish governor-general, Aguinaldo agreed to surrender his arms, renounce the rebellion, and leave the Philippines. In return, de Rivera agreed to pay him eight hundred thousand pesos and to consider a list of Filipino demands that included parliamentary representation for Filipinos in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of speech and press, curtailment of Catholic religious orders that controlled most of the land, and expulsion of the friars. The treaty was referred to as the Pact of Biak-na-bato, and was signed on December 14, 1897.

Two weeks later, Aguinaldo and his top aides left Luzon aboard a ship headed for Hong Kong, where they planned to await Rivera's promised reforms. By late February 1898, it was clear to Aguinaldo that the reforms were not going to happen. He writes in memoir: "The Spaniards failed to comply with their part of the bargain. They neither inaugurated the promised improvements in their administration of our country nor gave our people their promised rights" (29). Aguinaldo withdrew the pesos from the bank account, and ordered his guerrilla forces in the Philippines to resume their war.

Enter the United States

While in Hong Kong in late December 1897, Aguinaldo and his group of nineteen fellow officers heard rumors of the possible outbreak of war between Spain and the United States. By early March 1898 he and other political exiles were convinced war was imminent and began planning their course of action. He writes: "Our small Filipino community was electrified to learn one day in March [1898] that a flotilla of the American navy ... was on its way to Manila.... Greater still was the excitement ... when... Commodore George Dewey ... sought me for a conference" (30).

A series of secret conversations then ensued between Commodore George Dewey, commander of the American fleet and Captain Wood, commander of the warship *Petrel*. Aguinaldo writes that he was urged by Wood to return to the Philippines to reassemble his army and—supported with American advice and arms—to take up the

times and circumstances demanded of me firmness and sternness however heavy was my heart." Aguinaldo, *A Second Look at America* (26).

fight to free his country from Spanish rule. When told that the American fleet would soon proceed to the Philippines to attack the Spanish, Aguinaldo asked what the United States would do after Spain was defeated. He writes that he was told by Wood: “The United States, my general is a great and rich nation and neither needs nor desires colonies” (31).

Aguinaldo’s talks with the Americans ended in early April and a short time later he and his men fled to Singapore. Aguinaldo hid in the house of a Filipino residing in Singapore, where he met with E. Spencer Pratt, the American Consul General. Pratt repeated Wood’s offer of America’s help if Aguinaldo would return to the Philippines to continue his fight against the Spanish, and also said that the United States had no desire to possess the Philippines once the Spaniards were driven out. Aguinaldo agreed to fight side by side with the Americans: “I promise you that my people will rise as one man against the Spaniards” (34). The Filipinos did rise up against Spain, but after Spain withdrew from the islands an independent Philippines was not to be. As Aguinaldo notes in his memoirs: “[I]n almost all the history books on the Philippine-American War, it is of record that both Dewey, Pratt and Wildman completely denied having made every promise that they had made to me” (39).

The military-industrial complex begins¹³

Naval Captain Mahan shared Roosevelt’s zeal to build up America’s navy. Brands describes Mahan as a “defense intellectual,” the first of a breed that would proliferate in America half a century later. Brands says that Mahan interpreted Social Darwinism in military terms and interpreted naval rivalries as a manifestation of the endless struggle for survival among nations (13). In his 1890 book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Mahan wrote that people began by using oceans to explore, progressed to trading across them, and ended by fighting over them. He believed colonies were the best way to secure a country’s international interests; failing this, coaling and repair stations were the second option. Roosevelt applauded Mahan’s ideas related to strengthening the U.S. Navy, and perhaps took them a step further. Brands quotes a college friend of Roosevelt who remarked on his aggressive nature and propensity for war. “[He] wants to be killing

¹³ This term gained popularity after President Dwight Eisenhower used it in a farewell speech January 17, 1961. It refers to the powerful relationship between government and the defense industry.

something all the time.... He would like above all things to go to war with someone” (14).

After the February 1898 sinking of the *USS Maine* in Havana harbor, Navy Secretary John Long took a short leave of absence, leaving Roosevelt in charge. Roosevelt told American captains around the world to take on large fuel supplies and confirmed an earlier plan for attacking the Philippines. According to Brands: “He exercised to the limit, and beyond, the authority Congress granted the navy to purchase ships and supplies” (22). Long could have rescinded Roosevelt’s orders but did not. On April 25, 1898 Dewey received this message from Long: “War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor” (Brands 23).

Dewey and his fleet arrived in Manila Bay on April 30, 1898. En route from Hong Kong, he passed by Luzon’s Subic Bay, which he described as a “magnificent future site for a naval base”¹⁴ (Brands 23). Early the next day artillery fire from Manila was directed toward the American ships. Dewey’s six warships responded, and also bombarded the anchored Spanish fleet. The battle was short and one-sided. As stated by Brands: “By noon, the Spanish ships were in flames and their guns silent” (24). Three Spanish warships had been sunk and seven had burned, with hundreds of Spanish casualties. Dewey had lost no men or ships, and fewer than ten of his men had sustained light wounds.

¹⁴ With the exception of Clark Air Base on Luzon Island in the Philippines, Subic Bay Naval Base was the largest U.S. military installation until its closure in 1991.

Figure 3—Admiral Dewey Defeats Spanish Fleet headline

The newspaper clipping is from 'The World' dated May 1, 1898. The main headline reads 'DEWEY SMASHES SPAIN'S FLEET'. Below this, a large sub-headline states 'Great Naval Battle Between Asiatic Squadron and Spanish Warships Off Manila.' The text continues with 'THREE OF THE BEST SPANISH VESSELS WIPED OUT, OTHERS SUNK.' and 'The Damage Done to the American Boats Engaged Only Nominal—Hundreds of the Enemy Slain in the Encounter.' The page includes two portraits: 'VICE-ADMIRAL MONTOJO' on the left and 'COMMODORE DEWEY' on the right. Several smaller articles follow, including 'ADMIRAL MONTOJO ADMITS HIS UTTER ROUT' and 'MADRID OFFICIAL REPORT ADMITS DISASTROUS DEFEAT'. There are also illustrations of ships at sea, one labeled 'THE THREE SPANISH CRUISERS COMPLETELY DESTROYED'.

Official news of Dewey’s unexpected and unequivocal victory took longer to reach Washington than the battle itself. Because Dewey had cut the telegraph cable¹⁵ after attacking the Spanish fleet, he had to communicate with the Navy Department from Hong Kong using the cutter ship *McCulloch*. Dewey’s ships had destroyed the antiquated Spanish fleet on May 1, 1898, and a Spanish report of the battle—greatly exaggerating

¹⁵ Dewey requested the Spanish Governor-General Basilio de Augustin y Davila to consider the telegraph cable as neutral so he could use it as well. The Governor-General refused and Dewey dredged up and cut the cable, preventing the direct flow of information out of the Philippines.

American losses—was printed in American newspapers on May 2. But nearly a week elapsed before an official account reached Navy Secretary Long by way of the *McCulloch*. Ivan Musicant, author of *Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century*, describes the effect of Dewey's victory: "It is an understatement to say that wild celebrations erupted nationwide on the publication of Dewey's reports and their elaboration in the press. Manila Bay was hailed as the greatest naval victory in history, and Dewey as the equal of the transcendent Nelson" (233).

Few Americans knew what or where the Philippines were as they read jubilant press accounts of Dewey's success. U.S. control over the islands began auspiciously but the quick, decisive success of Manila Bay was not to be repeated in the long and bloody war that followed.

Chapter Three

Our Little Brown Brothers

*“Would not the people of the Philippines prefer the just, humane, civilizing government of this Republic to the savage, bloody rule of pillage and extortion from which we have rescued them?”*¹⁶

A common practice of colonial governments was to refer to a subject people as unfit for self-government in order to justify harsh rule, and the United States made good use of this rhetoric during its tenure in the Philippines. If America overstayed its welcome in the Philippines, went the argument, it was only to protect the country from European predators waiting to pounce on a people incapable of defending themselves and to “educate” Filipinos in American-style democracy. Stuart Creighton Miller, author of *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines*, describes the patronizing attitude put forth by William Howard Taft, the first civilian governor of the Philippines. Taft told President McKinley that “our little brown brothers would need fifty or one hundred years of close supervision to develop anything resembling Anglo-Saxon political principles and skills” (134).

Prior to U.S. annexation, however, the “little brown brothers” had done pretty well toward forming a sophisticated government. Emilio Aguinaldo had declared independence from Spain in June 1898. Elections were held, and in September of that year the Malolos Congress was formed. The Congress ratified a declaration of independence that stated the sovereignty of the Philippine Republic, and approved a constitution that separated church from state, spelled out basic civil rights, and created a representative assembly. However, the United States ignored these achievements, excluded Filipino representatives from the peace treaty negotiations¹⁷ with Spain, and

¹⁶ Senator Beveridge speaking to Congress in 1900, quoted by Paul A. Kramer in *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (1).

¹⁷ After reading the details of the Treaty of Paris, Mark Twain decided that “we have gone there to conquer, not to redeem.” *Mark Twain’s Weapon’s of Satire: Anti-Imperialist Writings on the Philippine-American War* (xix). Jim Zwick, ed.

began a war of conquest to eliminate Filipino resistance to U.S. rule. President McKinley's 1898 proclamation to assure the Filipino people that America's mission was one of "benevolent assimilation substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule"¹⁸ quickly proved false, and thus began forty-six years of American control over eight million people living halfway across the globe.

The die is cast – now what?

President McKinley was initially reluctant to get involved in the Philippines, but the United States in effect crossed the Rubicon when it annexed the Philippines and Commodore Dewey soundly defeated the Spanish Navy in Manila Bay. But how to manage the newly acquired islands had not yet been determined. The debate over what sort of rights should be extended to the Filipino people brought the ethnocentric values of many Americans to the fore. As noted by Jacobson, Americans seemed determined at one and the same time to "uplift the savages of Asia" and to keep them in their place by means of an "ingenious array of legal and political mechanisms" (262).

It is not accurate to say that Filipinos did not have a voice during U.S. tutelage; however, this voice was defined through U.S. rule. W. Cameron Forbes, Philippine Governor-General from 1910 to 1913, refused to discuss independence with Filipinos because "it was a matter that concerned only the American Congress," as stated by William Pomeroy, author of *The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance* (9). While under U.S. rule, Filipinos did not enjoy "natural, inalienable" rights, bestowed for the simple reason of being human. The few rights Filipinos had were "group rights" imposed on them by American officials rather than individual rights or political equality bestowed on them by a government of their own choosing.

Rights for us but not for you

Americans had a clear human rights standard to follow in their democratic traditions and constitution, but this standard was not extended to Filipinos. The political implications of empowering peoples with certain rights became prominent at the end of

¹⁸ The American Presidency Project, McKinley's Executive Order, December 21, 1898. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69309&st=&st1=>

World War I when President Wilson made the case for self-determination in his Fourteen Points speech delivered to Congress in 1918.¹⁹ Wilson believed a major cause of war could be eliminated if nation-states were created that allowed people to be governed with their own consent. Micheline Ishay, director of the human rights program at the University of Denver, says one of Wilson's hopes for the League of Nations (established after World War I) was that it would create national borders around homogenous ethnic groups and allow for the recognition of human rights.

Filipino nationalists were inspired by Wilson's words and were determined to push for the promise of independence stated in the Jones Act²⁰ passed by the U.S. Congress in 1916. The Jones Act was also known as the Philippine Autonomy Act, and served as a Philippine constitution until 1934. In March 1919 a Filipino Commission of Independence delegation went to Washington to ask that independence be taken seriously. However, as described by Paul Kramer in *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines*, the Commission's goal was thwarted by the discovery that Wilson was "too busy liberating the colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire to liberate the Philippines" (385). Miodrag Jovanovic, senior lecturer at the University of Belgrade, says that only certain groups of people were deemed eligible to enjoy self-determination and human rights. In his 2012 book *Collective Rights: A Legal Theory*, he notes that in the end, the principle of self-determination was not applied consistently throughout Europe much less in other parts of the world (198). The Filipino people were clearly not among those considered eligible to govern themselves.

It is not surprising that those who are marginalized from the political process will challenge their exclusion, especially when an American president has proclaimed his support of universal human rights. German philosopher Immanuel Kant maintained it was a collective universal responsibility to protect those in need from economic hardship, but

¹⁹ Wilson stated that ethnic groups have the right to national self-determination: "It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak." Quoted by Micheline R. Ishay, *The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches, and Documents from Ancient Times to the Present* (301).

²⁰ The preamble to the Jones Act reads: "Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest for territorial aggrandizement; and whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein."

he entrusted only “active citizens” (property-holding males) with the right to vote. Ishay notes that the question of who constituted an active citizen was the subject of great debates and social upheavals throughout the Enlightenment and beyond. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch philosopher, laid the foundations for international law in his 1625 book *The Law of War and Peace*, and affirmed the rights of “strangers and refugees.” These rights (based by Grotius on natural law, which relies on the use of reason to analyze human behavior), were later embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights²¹ and other international legal documents. Grotius’s concept of natural law had a theological foundation and his beliefs had a strong impact on the philosophical, theological, and political debates during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And by way of his influence on John Locke, the thinking and philosophy of Grotius also became part of the American Revolution.

Human rights: universalism versus relativism

Ishay notes that globalization has both diluted and sharpened the distinction between national and cultural identities, which in turn has intensified the controversy between universalism and cultural relativism. The concept of universalism holds that “primitive” cultures will eventually grow to embrace the same system of laws and rights as Western cultures. Universalists believe that the individual comprises the basic social unit and that human rights are for everyone, regardless of one’s culture; that these inalienable rights are not privileges but extend universally to every human being.

Cultural relativism, on the other hand, maintains that human values are not universal and that these values may vary a great deal depending on one’s cultural perspective. Cultural relativists assert that since the community rather than the individual is the basic social unit, relativism supports self-determination through communal autonomy. The concept of individual freedom of choice and equality is not a part of relativists’ view; instead, the key to moral right is found in a community’s culture and not in values imposed by an outside authority. Abdullahi An-Na’im, law professor at Emory

²¹ Prompted in large part by the horrors of World War Two, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948. The thirty articles detailed the human rights of individuals. The first sentence of the Preamble states: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”

University and a scholar of Islam and human rights, emphasizes that people are more likely to observe human rights standards if they believe them to be sanctioned by their own cultural traditions and carry a cultural legitimacy. In his work *Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus*, he observes that it is “extremely important to be sensitive to the dangers of cultural imperialism, whether it is a product of colonialism, a tool of international economic exploitation and political subjugation, or simply a product of extreme ethnocentricity” (38).

Some feel that cultural relativism in its extreme form could undermine international human rights standards. If cultural tradition is allowed to trump international law, this could lend legitimacy to human rights abuses. As an example, universalists say the backlash against Western values is used as a rationale for repressing women and minorities. Ishay writes that “cultural rights advocates have argued that universalism remains another mechanism for the West to impose its (imperial) values regardless of indigenous patrimony. At the center of this debate remains the question: Whose group rights should be secured in our era of globalization?” (389).

On the universalist side of the debate, British historian Eric Hobsbawm condemns support for rights based on particular identities or cultural allegiances, such as one’s gender, sexual orientation, or ethnic identity. Ishay quotes Hobsbawm as saying that “promoters of identity politics are about themselves, for themselves and nobody else” (389). Hobsbawm maintains that human rights can never be realized by adding the sum total of minorities’ interests, and that a failure to emphasize the common ground holding together various identity groups leads to the fragmentation of the human rights agenda.


Ishay places the Malaysian political scientist and human rights activist Chandra Muzaffar on the cultural relativist side of the debate. Muzaffar is critical of Western values used as a basis for civil and political rights, and says the human rights double standards of Western domination is a cause for skepticism of Western values in the developing world. In Muzaffar’s opinion: “It is because many people in the non-Western world now know that dominance and control is the real motive of the West, that they become skeptical and critical of the West’s posturing on human rights” (Ishay 390).

The struggle to break free of the shackles of colonialism imposed by European powers was a central feature of world politics during the twentieth century, but Ishay

points out that this was not a new concept. The idea of self-determination was discussed in the nineteenth-century writings of German and other European nationalists and later taken up by European socialists, but it was its promotion by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson that made it a focus of international diplomacy. In addition to the attention Wilson paid this subject, Ishay points to the contributions of Eleanor Roosevelt,²² whom she describes as a “great human rights activist, stateswoman, and diplomat.” Roosevelt stressed that in order for self-determination to be recognized as an inalienable right, “it needed to be considered in relation to its impact on other nationalities, to ensure its consistency with the framework of universality and responsibility” (Ishay 283).

It soon became apparent that Wilson’s support for self-determination did not extend to those living under colonial rule, and demands for self-determination were shelved at the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. But Ishay notes that Europe’s imperial powers were weakened after World War II, making it impossible to ignore claims for self-determination from colonized people in Asia, Africa, and the Americas.

Figure 4—Uncle Sam Teaches Self-Government Cartoon



²² It is interesting to contrast Eleanor Roosevelt’s views related to race and self-determination with those of her Uncle Theodore fifty years earlier.

Manifest Destiny—then and now

What role did race play in America's expansionist zeal? John Quincy Adams was a great supporter of "continentalism," the nineteenth-century belief that the United States would eventually encompass the entire continent of North America. In 1811, Adams wrote in a letter to his father:

The whole continent of North American appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political principles, and accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs. For the common happiness of them all, for their peace and prosperity, I believe that it is indispensable that they should be associated in one federal Union.

(McCaffrey 66)

The Philippine-American War remains linked with a few prominent American names (President McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, among others) although it could be said that the roots of this war can be traced back many years before; in fact, to the very birth of the United States. In his book *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*, Harvard history professor Reginald Horsman asserts that when the Pilgrims first arrived in America in 1620 they brought with them the religious ideas that helped shape the notion of Manifest Destiny.²³ Horsman believes this concept of Anglo-Saxon superiority can be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and says the early colonists carried with them to America two myths: the religious myth of a pure Anglo-Saxon church, and the secular myth of the free nature of Anglo-Saxon political institutions. Horsman writes that "The vision of heroic, freedom-loving Anglo-Saxon England permeates the arguments of the Revolutionary generation, but it is in the writings of Thomas Jefferson that the theme

²³ Speaking on the November 15, 2013 edition of the American Public Media radio show "Dinner Party Download," British humorist, actor, and writer Stephen Fry pointed out that the Puritans did not leave England to escape religious persecution: "The exact reason Puritans left Britain to go to America was in order to be free to persecute, and until America understands that it will never understand itself." He noted that Nathaniel Hawthorne's fiction is full of "terrible tales" of Puritans hunting down, burning, savaging, and torturing Quakers and other nonconformists. Fry also recalled his friend Gore Vidal's observation of America's extraordinary ability to mythologize itself and its past.

appears most strongly, and he best reveals the form in which the myth was transmitted to future generations” (18).

John L. O’Sullivan, editor of the *Democratic Review*, a political and literary journal, is credited with coining the term Manifest Destiny. Picking up on the concept of continentalism, O’Sullivan wrote in 1845 that it was America’s “manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions” (McCaffrey 66). The phrase conveyed themes dear to the hearts and minds of many Americans, namely the virtue of the American people and their institutions, their mission to spread these institutions, and their destiny under God to accomplish this.

Never a specific political policy, the Manifest Destiny rhetoric underwent marked changes in the nineteenth century. Horsman notes that the debates and speeches of the early nineteenth century reveal a sense of the future destiny of the United States but do not contain the blatant racism of the mid-century debates. He says the mid-nineteenth century was a decisive time in the creation of a new Anglo-Saxon ideology, and that by the 1830s Americans were searching for reasons for their own success and for the failure of others. Horsman states that “white Americans could rest easier if the sufferings of other races could be blamed on racial weakness rather than on the whites’ relentless search for wealth and power” (210). The Philippine-American War provided a setting for Americans to confront their own racial and ethnic conflicts as they fought a war linked to white supremacy by both politicians and the press. The attitude that Filipinos were an inferior race in need of “uplifting” reflected strong prejudices about race, religion, and nationality among some Americans, giving tacit approval for U.S. control of the islands.

As noted by historian Walter Nugent, Americans early on learned the “habit of empire” and when they wanted something that belonged to another nation or people—whether land, oil, or another resource—they have generally found a way to take it. After all, it must be easier for politicians to convince the public to contribute the blood and treasure required for these ‘adventures’ when Americans are told it is their ‘divine mission’ to liberate other people from their ignorance or corruption, or that it is their duty to carry democratic values to them. The Philippine-American War is a prime example of

the intertwining of race and superiority, and as will be seen later in this paper, Manifest Destiny set the stage for future American foreign policy.

A racial contract

Charles W. Mills, philosopher and author of the *Racial Contract*, takes the long view of the United States and Europe's efforts at white domination in Asia. He argues that white supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today; like fish that don't see the water they swim in, whites take their racial privilege so much for granted that they do not even see it as a form of domination (1). Drawing on the views of political scientist Anthony Pagden, Mills describes the division of the European empires as two distinct but interdependent periods in history: the colonization of the Americas from 1492 to the 1830s, and the Western occupation of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific from the 1730s to the period following World War II (21).

According to Mills, race was the common denominator that determined a person's status in each period and he includes the Spanish-American war in his list of conquests by Europe and America. He describes a two-tiered moral code set up by Europeans that had one set of rules for whites and another for nonwhites: the colonial contract legitimized European rule over Asia, Africa, and the Pacific; and the slavery contract gave Europeans and Americans the right to enslave Native Americans and Africans at a time when slavery was dying out in Europe (24-5). Mills maintains this system was aimed at economic exploitation, and had to be enforced through violence and ideological conditioning: "The Racial Contract is an exploitation contract that creates global European economic domination and national white racial privilege" (31).

Race, war, and brutality

As noted earlier, race is given as a factor in the United State's decision to go to war in the Philippines and it also colored nineteenth-century American attitudes toward other races and ethnic groups. In reflecting on the role of race in the conduct of the war, consider these questions: Are war atrocities the aberration or a tragic fact of every military conflict? Would the "water cure" have been used in the Philippines, or would the My Lai massacre have occurred in Vietnam if the United States had been waging war

against Europeans? Would waterboarding have been used as an interrogation tactic in Iraq if the U.S. military had fought against a Christian foe?

In his 1980 book *The People's History of the United States*, historian Howard Zinn notes: "There is not a country in world history in which racism has been more important, for so long a time, as the United States" (23). White supremacy was a factor in American imperialism and expansion in the Spanish-American War and continued into the Philippine conflict. Race was a central issue of the debate as the McKinley administration attempted to defend Philippine annexation to the U.S. public, race formed a barrier to good relations between Filipinos and Americans during the entire period of American rule, and race also was a core element of formal colonialism in the Philippines and the shaping of Filipino nationalism.


Johns Hopkins history professor Paul Kramer describes the focus of his 2006 book *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines*, as the articulation of race and empire in Philippine-American colonial history. In 1898 U.S. troops occupying Manila initially were ready to recognize Filipinos as their equals and the Philippines as an independent republic. But when war broke out in 1899, Filipinos became the enemy and were racialized by U.S. soldiers with epithets such as "nigger" and "gugu" (the root of the word "gook" used during the Vietnam War). According to Kramer, these racial terms both "reflected and enabled a broadening of the enemy" (139). Racialization escalated in late 1899 when the conflict converted into guerilla warfare and Americans began to label all Filipinos—soldiers and civilians—as "savages" who did not deserve a civilized war. Thus a double racialization: Americans racialized themselves as Anglo-Saxons who had inherited the "virtue" of empire-building in order to justify the war, and simultaneously racialized Filipinos as "warring tribes" incapable of nationality (Kramer 90).

In late 1899, Filipino forces shifted from conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics. Filipino officers were mostly schooled in conventional European warfare and considered guerrilla warfare undesirable, but believed it was a tactically necessary response to America's superior military might. Americans considered this a type of "savage" warfare associated with the "lower races" and responded with savagery of their own. Kramer notes that, "In numerous settings, guerrilla war developed into a war of racial

extermination in which Filipino noncombatants were understood by U.S. troops to be legitimate targets of violence” (90).

Torture of Filipinos was almost always justified as a means of intelligence gathering, with the infamous “water cure” one of the most horrific examples. The water cure was conducted by forcing open the victim’s mouth and pouring gallons of water down his throat. This caused the stomach to swell making it difficult to breathe, and a soldier would then push or jump on the stomach to expel the water. This often killed the victim in the process, as happened to Father Augustine, a Filipino priest. Kramer notes that, “Despite later claims that distanced U.S. soldiers from torture, U.S. soldiers not only carried out the water cure but apparently did so in a jocular manner” (140).

Figure 5—Water Cure Cartoon




War is war

Filipinos’ adoption of guerrilla tactics in effect released American soldiers from the need to treat their opponents as civilized beings, worthy of compassion. Racial

impulses were evident in U.S. soldiers' descriptions of violence directed against prisoners and civilians alike, with the most notorious example being the orders for indiscriminant killing issued by Colonel Jacob Smith. Smith was a veteran of the Wounded Knee massacre and was well-known as an Indian fighter. In 1899 he told reporters in the Philippines that since Filipinos were worse than fighting Indians, he adopted the tactics he had learned fighting "savages" in the West.

Figure 6—Jacob Smith Cartoon



Smith ordered reprisals against the entire population of the island of Samar after more than forty U.S. soldiers were killed by Filipino guerrillas in a surprise attack on the island. He instructed that all persons capable of bearing arms against the United States be killed (which he clarified as anyone over ten years of age), and that the island be made a "howling wilderness." As described by Karnow, Smith told his soldiers: "I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn; the more you kill and burn the better you will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States" (191). Smith was later court-martialed but received a light sentence for these atrocities. Theodore Roosevelt agreed with the lenient sentence given

the “conditions and provocations of warfare with cruel and barbarous savages” (Miller 255).

Discussions of brutality in the Philippine-American War revive unpleasant memories of similar atrocities committed more than fifty years later in Vietnam. The political environment and culture of the United States was very different in 1899 than it was in the 1950s and 1960s, yet aspects of the Vietnam conflict mirrored the Philippine-American War and race played a factor in each.

U.S. Army officer William Calley was convicted in 1971 for his actions during the My Lai massacre²⁴ during the Vietnam War. At his trial Calley admitted giving orders for the massacre but claimed he had acted under the stress of war and done “what any good soldier would do” (Neal 95). When Judge Robert Elliott released Calley on parole in 1974, Elliott stated: “War is war and it’s not unusual for innocent civilians such as the My Lai victims to be killed. It has been so throughout history” (Oliver 259). Remarks such as this assume that war itself is an atrocity and remove the blame from the individual who did the actual killing. In fact, Judge Elliott’s comments are eerily similar to Theodore Roosevelt’s reaction to the light sentence handed down for Colonel Smith’s atrocities in the Philippines, and also similar to the defense used by Nazis during the 1945 Nuremberg trials.²⁵

²⁴ The massacres took place in several small villages in South Vietnam in March 1968. The numbers killed are given as between 300-500 civilians (unarmed men, women, children, and infants).

²⁵ Nazi defendants accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg war crimes trials claimed they were not guilty because they were only following orders.

Chapter Four

Can War Be Justified?

“War is a blunt instrument. Once begun it is hard to control. As more blood is spilled, more resounding reasons must be given for the carnage until finally unimportant wars fought for doubtful causes are justified in the name of high principle.”²⁶

The very term “war” seems to defy the labels of “just” or “moral.” Can an event characterized by sorrow, death, dislocation, and loss of land and sovereignty ever be described as just? Is war morally wrong but a necessary evil? When is armed conflict justified, and what rules should guide the governance of war? Is the phrase ‘civilized war’ an oxymoron? In this chapter we will examine the history of the just war theory, analyze different views of this theory, and then consider the just war doctrine in relation to the Philippine-American War.

First, some definitions. A just war is generally defined as having a just cause, being declared by a proper authority, entered into as a last resort, having a reasonable chance of success, and with the goals of the war being proportional to the means used during the conflict. Walzer says a just war is a limited war governed by rules designed to ban the use of violence and coercion against noncombatant populations. Unjust wars, on the other hand, he describes as: “aggressive wars, wars of conquest, wars to extend spheres of influence and establish satellite states, wars for economic aggrandizement” (*Arguing About War* xi).

The definition of war itself also has varying interpretations. Stated simply, Merriam-Webster defines war as a state of declared armed, hostile conflict between states or nations. German-Prussian soldier and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote in the nineteenth century: “War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale.... War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” (75).

British philosopher Barrie Paskins expands on Clausewitz’s “duel on a larger scale” description, and lists four characteristics of war: one, it usually involves fighting to

²⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Realism and International Politics* (304).

the death; two, it usually involves fighting to the death between groups organized for such fighting; three, these groups use weapons designed for this purpose; and four, the fighting involves fundamental disputes over social, political, religious, or economic issues, not arguments related to personal quarrels (106). Paskins points out that it is also difficult to determine what constitutes aggression: “After seventeen years, the United Nations has arrived at an agreed definition [of aggression]²⁷ but it is impossibly vague” (270).

Starting with the assumption that war can be justified, three principles provide moral guidelines for the conduct of just war: *Jus ad bellum* refers to the conditions under which a state may resort to war; *jus in bello* refers to the fair conduct of the war itself; and *jus post bellum* governs the rights and duties of the warring states once the conflict is over (Fabre 1). Paskins echoes these principles in his list of requirements for a just war: a just cause, all peaceful channels have been tried and have failed, there is a reasonable chance of success, and the principles of proportion and noncombatant immunity are observed (194).

The just war tradition

Scholars, philosophers, and religious leaders have discussed ways to avert war, as well as the proper way to conduct war, throughout recorded history. Development of the just war doctrine is largely attributed to the early Christian theologian St. Augustine (354-430 AD). According to philosopher Robert Holmes, virtually every major just war theorist in the Western tradition has built upon the work of Augustine (146). The just war doctrine has carried over into modern Christianity and political thinking, and revolves around the idea that war is a necessary evil. Holmes writes in his book *On Morality and War*, that the second stage in the development of the just war theory occurred with St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century.²⁸ Aquinas considered the real evils of war to

²⁷ The United Nations adopted General Assembly Resolution 3314 in 1974. The lengthy resolution states in part that aggression is the “Invasion of a State by the armed forces of another State, with or without occupation of the territory. The Audiovisual Library of International Law website (<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/da/da.html>) notes that the definition has rarely been used by the Security Council in determining aggression by countries.

²⁸ Other early theologians associated with the development of the just war theory are Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617).

be “the love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity and the like” (Holmes 149). Aquinas agreed with Augustine that war must be declared by a legitimate authority and be for a just cause, and added a third requirement: one must have the right intention when resorting to war. Holmes interprets ‘right intention’ to mean that those engaged in war must intend to promote good and avoid evil (150).

The popularity and acceptance of Christianity changed the tone of early Christian theology toward war and aggression.²⁹ After the Roman emperor Constantine adopted Christianity as the empire’s official religion in the fourth century, a new set of ideas began to replace traditional Christian pacifism and the *just war* line of reasoning took hold. The just war doctrine held that military action is not wrong in and of itself, but depends on the purpose of war. If human life is sacred and taking it is morally wrong, human life must be defended from attack. Thus, in order to defend its citizens the state has a duty to maintain a military, and using military force may be necessary to protect innocent people. (The practice of “turning the other cheek” was replaced by the fierce attitude conveyed in a line of the nineteenth-century song *The Battle Hymn of the Republic*: “He hath loosed the fateful lightning of His terrible swift sword.”)

The definitions listed above describing just and unjust wars seem straightforward, but war is a messy business that often defies categorization. Paskins points out that the phrase “just war tradition” generally refers to the classic doctrine developed from the teachings of Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, and Suarez. However, in the book *The Ethics of War*, authors Paskins and Michael Dockrill attempt a restatement of some aspects of this doctrine in order to improve its application to real-world situations. They maintain there are different ideas of what constitutes just war, and give as an example the “aggressor-defender” theory of war. This theory distinguishes between aggressors and defenders in a conflict, and the kind of conduct permitted and expected by side each may vary greatly (191).

In addition, different types of conflicts may call for different ethical considerations. Paskins says the idea of “situation ethics,” in which morality judgments

²⁹ A well-known Biblical example of pacifism comes from Matthew 5:39: “But I say unto you, resist not him that is evil: but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.” And from the Hebrew scriptures, the Book of Isaiah states: “They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.” Isaiah 2:2-4.

vary as the situation varies, has stirred interest among some theologians. An example is a political system in which brute force is the only way to effect change. In this situation, one might conclude that violence directed toward deposing a totalitarian leader is justified if doing so will bring greater peace and security to the people. Is the just war doctrine relevant if the conflict is not a war, but a rebellion or a revolution? Paskins answers yes, that this doctrine should apply to all military activities, even if the situation is not a formally declared war (209).

The Melian dialogue

The secular tradition of moral thinking about war owes much to the lessons drawn from history. A notable example is *The History of the Peloponnesian War* by the Greek historian Thucydides (c. 460-400 BC) who recounted the war between the Greek city-states Athens and Sparta. Thucydides gave particular emphasis to the moral dilemma posed by the Melian dialogue. Halfway into the nearly thirty-year struggle, Athens demanded that the people of the island of Melos (a Spartan colony) either surrender their city and pay tribute to Athens, or be destroyed. Bosworth describes this aspect of the war as the “paradigm of imperial brutality” as the Athenians were driven by the desire to expand their empire. The Melians refused this offer, claiming their right to remain neutral, and entered into a debate with the Athenian generals. The standoff did not end well for the Melians: Athens laid siege to the island, executed all men of military age, made slaves of the women and children, and re-populated the island as an Athenian colony. In the centuries since Thucydides’ history, the Melian dialogue continues to prompt discussion about the morality of a stronger nation defeating a weaker state. This concept will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

Scholars in many areas of the world have long bent their intellect to developing effective ways of avoiding—and winning—war. The Chinese scholar Confucius (551-479 BC), who lived during a period of war among feudal states, urged rulers to ensure that people had enough to eat, believing this was the best way to avert war (Ishay 60). Sun Tzu, a Chinese general who lived in the sixth century BC, wrote a military treatise that is still widely read today. *The Art of War* was first translated into French in 1772 and vies with Machiavelli’s *The Prince* as a book popularly perused by politicians and

business leaders, as well as military strategists. Sun Tzu considered war a necessary evil that should be avoided whenever possible (similar to the thinking of St. Augustine nine centuries later). When unavoidable, it should be fought quickly to avoid economic losses: “No long war ever profited any country.” Sun Tzu also warned against committing atrocities because this can provoke resistance and retaliation from the enemy. North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, who died in October 2013 at the age of 102, had studied Sun Tzu’s teachings. Giap fought against French and U.S. forces in Vietnam and was considered a brilliant military strategist. As quoted in *The Art of War*, he perhaps utilized these words from Sun Tzu as his army of peasant farmers defeated vastly superior military organizations: “When I am few and the enemy is many, I can use the few to strike the many because those with whom I do battle are restricted” (120).

The Italian historian and philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) has maintained a similarly high profile throughout the centuries, in addition to the honor of having his name converted to an adjective (“machiavellian”) that has come to be synonymous with unscrupulous but cunning behavior. Machiavelli had a high regard for military force, and said that the only proper vocation of a leader is the organization of the army and military discipline: “a ruler, then, must have no other aim or consideration, nor seek to develop any other vocation outside war, the organization of the army and military discipline” (Parks 57).

Ishay points to the Enlightenment as a formative period in the conception of human rights and changing ideas toward war. Political thinkers began to contest the notion of divine right and although war was not condemned outright during this time, she says its pursuit was at least restricted under new guidelines that spelled out the conduct of a just war (93). Clausewitz developed his theories of war in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries while participating in numerous military campaigns (including the Battle of Waterloo in 1815). His scholarly and systematic treatise on war, still unfinished at the time of his death, continues to be studied today.

The immorality of war

Implicit in the just war theory is the assumption that war can be justified. Robert Holmes, professor of philosophy at the University of Rochester, takes a different view.

He argues in his book *On War and Morality* that war in the modern world cannot be morally justified. Holmes notes that humans have to cope with conflict in order to live socially but they do not have to wage war: “However much we wrap our rationalization in the language of necessity, we *choose* to do these things.... I believe it [war] is the most urgent of the problems we face today” (3).

Holmes (writing in 1989), says increased awareness of the danger of war is focused almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear war, which is misguided in that it lends a kind of respectability for conventional war. He maintains there is no moral difference between conventional war and nuclear war; death and destruction and the killing of innocent persons are central to both types of war, he says, and “nuclear war is not *in itself* any worse morally than conventional war” (7).³⁰

The “mere possession” of nuclear weapons, Holmes says, is not what heightens the risk of war. Rather, the danger is related to a country’s ideology and its attitude toward war and violence. He asserts there is little chance of reducing the risk of nuclear war without changing fundamental values: “When a country’s economy is permanently war-oriented, when nearly half its scientists and engineers work on military-related projects, and when force and the threat of force are accepted features of its foreign policy one can hardly expect to reverse a movement that is a product of these forces” (10). As President Dwight Eisenhower stated in his January 1961 farewell address to the nation: “we must guard against the military-industrial complex.”

Holmes says that “since originating an estimated forty thousand years ago, war has consumed more wealth, demanded greater sacrifice, and caused more suffering than any other human activity” (12). He maintains that war has eclipsed religion in the shaping of history, and quotes American philosopher John Dewey: “How long have we been taking steps to do away with war, and why have they accomplished nothing? Because *the steps have all been taken under the war system*. It is not a step that we need, it is a right-about face; a facing in another direction” (Holmes 10).

³⁰ Speaking to reporters in August 2012, President Obama said the use of chemical weapons by Syria’s government against its own people would be crossing a “red line,” implying that killing people with chemical weapons is worse than killing people with conventional weapons. A year later, an estimated 1,400 Syrian civilians were killed by chemical weapons. This compares to about 110,000 Syrians killed by conventional weapons since the revolution began in 2011.

Pro-war sentiments

It is difficult to imagine a positive side to war. Yet, certain scholars, politicians, and military leaders have not held back in proclaiming its benefits. Holmes refers to John Ruskin, an influential British art critic during the Victorian era, who claimed that war has been essential to art. Holmes himself concedes that war has inspired literature, led to scientific, medical, and technological advances,³¹ sometimes served as a cohesive force that has brought people together, and lent itself to the virtues of courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. He says some philosophers are convinced that in the absence of war mankind becomes “flabby and decadent and that periodic trials by fire are necessary for the moral health of persons and states” (13). Adolf Hitler’s politics supplied ample evidence that this view was central to twentieth-century fascism. Holmes quotes a phrase from *Mein Kampf*: “Mankind has grown great in eternal struggle and only in eternal peace does it perish” (13).

This attitude might be expected of Hitler. But Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a Supreme Court Justice and Civil War veteran, expressed a similar sentiment when speaking to the Harvard graduating class in 1895: [W]ar, when you are at it, is horrible and dull. It is only when time has passed that you see that its message was divine” (Holmes 13). Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke of the national need for a “teacher” like war, because of the ennobling virtues it instilled in man.

Theodore Roosevelt did not hide his enthusiasm for war. After his service in the Spanish-American war, he wrote in 1899 of this experience in a letter to a friend: “It was a great thing! A great crisis and a great movement in which to take part, and we have both cause to feel profoundly satisfied that in the biggest thing since the civil war we did actually do our part, and had the luck to get into the fighting” (Hoganson 144).

Holmes emphasizes, however, that most people are not in favor of war and would instead agree with Cold War adviser George Kennan’s summation that “major international violence is... a form of bankruptcy for us all” (13). Still, if a few prominent and influential voices trumpet the value of war, how much easier this must make the job

³¹ The Global Positioning System (GPS) is one of many military technologies that have found their way into civilian lives. Canned food is another. Napoleon Bonaparte famously remarked that “an army marches on its stomach” and in 1795 he offered 12,000 francs to anyone who could find a way to preserve food his soldiers could carry with them on their long campaigns.

of politicians when they rally the masses to support war. The “youth” in Stephen Crane’s *The Red Badge of Courage* was unable to withstand war’s call:

He had, of course, dreamed of battles all his life—of vague and bloody conflicts that had thrilled him with their sweep and fire.... He had burned several times to enlist. Tales of great movements shook the land. They might not be distinctly Homeric, but there seemed to be much glory in them. He had read of marches, sieges, conflicts, and he had longed to see it all. (Crane 7)

Politics by another means

Clausewitz famously described war as a continuation of politics by another means.³² In his book *On War*, published in 1832 a year after his death, he stated the reasons for embarking on war: “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” (579). To return to the Philippine-American War, three principal questions arise for consideration: Was the United States justified in starting the war? Were the Filipinos justified in engaging in brutal guerrilla tactics as a response to America’s military superiority? And was either side justified in committing torture and acts of atrocities in order to end the war?

It is difficult to know how carefully the Philippine war was planned. U.S. policymakers may have been clear about the expected benefits of the war for the American economy, but it appears the conduct of the war was not thought through wisely. The length and cost of the war, the brutal nature of the war, and the extent of Filipino resistance all seem to have been vastly underestimated. The United States was clearly the aggressor in this conflict, sending troops and warships halfway around the world to establish control over its newly acquired territory in the Pacific. But war is reciprocal, characterized by a cycle of escalation and increasing ruthlessness which in turn triggers violent resistance. Walzer quotes Clausewitz describing the logic of war in which “each of the adversaries forces the hand of the other” (*Just and Unjust Wars* 23).

³² “It is, of course, well-known that the only source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means” (Clausewitz 605).

Once the blunt instrument of war had begun, the United States may have believed that it was trying to establish peace and order and that the Filipinos were the aggressor.

It is hard to condemn Filipinos for resorting to guerrilla warfare. After more than three hundred years of colonialism, they were loath to pass up the opportunity for independence. The Filipino army was essentially David facing Goliath; poorly-equipped and vastly outnumbered. A sense of betrayal was also a factor. Aguinaldo had wanted American help in defeating Spain, but he was not willing to stand by while the United States replaced Spain as the new imperial power in the neighborhood.

Walzer says if war is an extension of politics, then it follows that military culture is an extension of political culture. He admits that good conduct during war cannot be enforced and that police power and authoritative courts are largely ineffective. But Walzer asserts that even if the rules fail to shape the conduct of a particular war, they might serve to shape the public's judgments of conduct during the war, and influence the training, commitment, and future conduct of soldiers: "Debate and criticism play an important, though not a determinative, role in fixing the content of both these cultures" (*Just and Unjust Wars* xvii). Walzer's view may hold true in a democracy, but I question the effect (or even the possibility) of debate and criticism on the political and military culture in a dictatorship or military-led government.

All's fair in love and war

War is bloody and tragic. Both the downtrodden and those with patriotic fever fight at the behest of the powerful. At war's end, the powerful are victorious and have more power; the downtrodden suffer and have lost what they cannot afford to lose. In his book *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Waltz says asking who won a war is like asking who won the San Francisco earthquake: "That in wars there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat is a proposition that has gained increasing acceptance in the twentieth century" (1).

Although American leaders appeared to be supremely confident in the "justness" of their decision to annex the Philippines and forcibly control its people, the Philippine-American War meets Walzer's definition of an unjust war (an aggressive war, a war of conquest, a war to extend spheres of influence and establish satellite states, a war for

economic aggrandizement). He says war is always judged twice: first, in reference to the reasons for fighting; and second, in relation to the means of fighting adopted by the warring states.

Walzer asks if laws and morality have relevance in situations where men and women are fighting to save their lives and homes. He suggests that perhaps what is called inhumanity is simply humanity under pressure, and posits that the sentiment “all’s fair in love and war” is what matters in the end. As historian H.W. Brands notes: “Guerrilla armies, ever on the move and usually short of supplies, do not often develop reputations for benign treatment of prisoners. While Aguinaldo’s army committed no greater crimes in this regard than many others in similar straits, captured Americans fared poorly” (55). It must be noted that Filipinos were fighting to expel an intruder—the U.S. military—from their lives and homes. Resorting to guerrilla tactics as the only means available to accomplish this goal, is understandable. However, committing atrocities—by either side— is neither understandable nor excusable.

Can war be justified? My pessimistic answer is yes. A way always has been and always will be found to justify war, because morality is malleable, and right and wrong is in the eye of the beholder. As stated by Waltz: “As more blood is spilled... wars fought for doubtful reasons are justified in the name of high principle.”

Chapter Five

American Imperialism: Accident or Design?

“Empires do not happen by accident. America, like Britain, gained an empire because Americans wanted one and went out and got it.” – H.W. Brands

“Americans have never been comfortable with the idea of empire,” begins Brands in the preface to *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*. But in the end, he says, the Philippines were “attractive and available” and America succumbed. By 1899 the United States had come full circle from a revolutionary war to free itself from Britain’s imperial rule, to itself becoming a colonial power; this controversial transformation is the focus of this chapter.

Nineteenth-century Americans uneasy with the idea of empire had only to look the U.S. Declaration of Independence for support of their views. The U.S. Constitution and U.S. imperialism made for strange bedfellows, as is evident by the Preamble to the Constitution:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, *deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed*. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, *it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government*, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.
(italics mine)

Later in the Preamble, the Constitution lists a specific grievance of the colonies against the British government: “For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.”³³

Despite the opposition and controversy created by possession of the Philippines, Jacobson maintains that “the United States consciously chose imperial power along with the antidemocratic baggage and even the bloodshed that entailed; and many Americans—none more than Teddy Roosevelt—*liked it*.”

American empire—sudden and unexpected

Thomas McHale takes a different view of American imperialism. In his article “American Colonial Policy towards the Philippines,” he states that “American entry into the ranks of colonial powers as an aftermath of the Spanish-American War was sudden, unexpected, and chronologically speaking, late in the game of colonial empire building” (24). He says several factors prevented the United States from following Europe’s style of empire-building.

As noted above, one impediment was the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence, which served as a legal barrier to building a colonial empire. Another factor, according to McHale, was a strain of egalitarian idealism in America “which found it hard to accept the idea of a permanent political inferiority status for any group of people” (27). But he says the primary reason was America’s inferior military power, especially in the years following the Civil War, which meant the United States was unable to compete with European countries: “There was no doubt that the United States was strictly a second rate naval and military power at the time [1891].” (See Appendices B and C for information related to United States’ military strength during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as compared to other countries.)

McHale maintains that American indifference or opposition to modern empire underwent a “rapid transformation” in the 1890s, but he says this shift did not occur as a “consciously evolved ideological position” (28). He points out that the 1890 publication of Captain Mahan’s book *The Influence of Sea Power on History* was “highly influential”

³³ A grievance which bears a strong resemblance to the United States’ decision to ignore the Filipinos’ declaration of independence and the 1898 Malolos Congress.

and “combined Social Darwinism, geopolitics and a new theory of the importance of seapower” (30). Another factor was the transformation of the United States’ economy from primarily agricultural to increasingly industrial, although McHale notes that historians have differing opinions on the importance of finding new export markets as a factor leading to annexation and war. He says that the “power politics of the era” were mostly focused on access to naval coaling stations and raw materials, but adds that “there is strong evidence that American policy makers contemplated nothing more than a naval show of force when they first considered the possibility of military action in the Philippines if war broke out with Spain” (33).

Admiral Dewey’s surprising victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay perhaps contributed to President McKinley’s difficulty in deciding what to do with the islands. As quoted by McHale, McKinley describes his decision-making process as told to a group of Methodist missionaries:

When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess that I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides—Democrats as well as Republicans—but got little help. I thought first that we would take only Manila; then Luzon; the other islands perhaps also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight, and I am not ashamed to tell you gentlemen that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don’t know how it was but it came; (1) that we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self government and would soon have anarchy and misrule worse than Spain’s was; and (4) there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the best we could for them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the Chief Engineer of the War Department (our map maker) and I told him to put the Philippines on the

map of the United States, (pointing to a large map on the wall of his office) and there they are and there they will stay while I am president. (34)

The U.S. Congress considered several resolutions when ratifying the 1898 treaty agreement with Spain. One of the key amendments would have limited U.S. retention of the Philippines, similar to the Teller Amendment³⁴ that had limited permanent U.S. sovereignty over Cuba. But McHale says voting on the treaty ratification and amendments was clear cut: “unrestricted acquisition with no commitment on future policy or disposition” (37). The United States did not make a formal commitment to a policy of future Philippine independence until passage of the Jones Act in 1916.

The business community and the public were initially strongly supportive of the decision of McKinley and Congress to annex the islands, but this attitude changed. McHale points to Theodore Roosevelt—“who, perhaps more than any other one man, was responsible for the United States venture into the Philippines in the first place”—as an example of the changing views toward the Philippines. By 1913 Roosevelt had expressed his hope that the United States would pull out of the Philippines. McHale quotes a letter Roosevelt wrote to the *New York Times* a year later: “I hope therefore that the Filipinos will be given their independence at an early date and without any guarantee from us which might in any way hamper our future action or commit us to staying on the Asiatic coast” (41).

The habit of empire, or westward ho

In an article titled “The American Habit of Empire, and the Cases of Polk and Bush,” historian Walter Nugent explains that imperialism came easily to the United States because of an unwavering belief in its own exceptionalism; a belief that was manifested by territorial acquisitions and which led to “imperialistic, unilateralist, aggressive, and tunnel-visioned behavior” (7).

³⁴ Senator Henry Teller of Colorado, a liberal Republican turned Democrat, wanted to be sure the United States policy did not “stray from the stated position of ultimate independence for Cuba.” He inserted an amendment that stated in part: “That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control of said island” and “to leave the government and control of the island to its people” (Musicant 186).

The geographical expansion of the United States began well before 1898. Within the first seventy years of its independent existence the area of the continental United States grew rapidly: the 1783 Treaty of Paris after the American Revolution ceded the eastern half of the Mississippi River valley to the United States, President Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana territory from France in 1803, President James Madison added West Florida in 1811 and Florida proper in 1819, President Polk obtained a large part of the western United States in 1848 after the Mexican-American War, and in 1867 Secretary of State William Seward persuaded President Andrew Johnson and Congress to buy Alaska. The American eagle had indeed expanded its reach.

Figure 7—The American Eagle Spreads Its Wings Cartoon



During the mid-1800s the population of the United States increased from under four million to almost twenty-five million, which Nugent says was a key factor in maintaining control of its extensive territorial acquisitions: “Americans’ phenomenal and unparalleled success in acquiring large pieces of North America, and what is more, settling them with young, lusty, nubile, and fertile frontier folk, inculcated in us Americans a habit of empire-building that is with us still, around the world and in Iraq” (6). Although the United States is no longer acquiring new territory, Nugent maintains the expansionist attitude did not end in the nineteenth century. In his view: “The

significance of the frontier in American history may well be that it instilled in us the bad habit of building empires” (24).

Nugent points to two examples of presidential empire-building that demonstrate why exceptionalism remains a part of America’s identity: James Polk in Mexico and George W. Bush in Iraq. He lists numerous similarities between these two presidents: both came from the Southwest, both were religious, both were expansionist and believed in American exceptionalism, and both employed frontier rhetoric and expanded the range of American military and presidential action. Each took America into war based on reasons which turned out to be untrue, and each cut taxes as they were going to war, causing the national debt to increase. Nugent says: “[T]he outstanding similarity of the two presidents is their foreign wars and the fact that the reasons Polk and Bush gave for their wars were either false from the start, or turned out to be false. Both wars had unintended consequences that were enormous, or may become so” (14).

Sociologist Roberta Coles analyzes the war discourse of two different American presidents: H. W. Bush in the Persian Gulf War, and Bill Clinton during the Kosovo conflict. In her article “Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined,” she concludes that the religious and civil themes of mission and manifest destiny are still factors in American foreign conflict. She argues that the manifest destiny doctrine is aptly suited for conflict: “Indeed, many have argued that war is inherent in this doctrine” (404). The terms may change—manifest destiny, chosen nation, or exceptionalism—but Coles says the concept of manifest destiny is still a vital part of the United States’ political rhetoric, useful for justifying war and maintaining its “chosen nation” self-image. As this rhetoric has endured, so also has debate over whether manifest destiny has had a positive or negative effect on American foreign policy. According to Coles, some scholars feel that the “chosen nation” myth has been used as an excuse for expansion and oppression, while others say this myth calls upon the nation to live up to a higher standard of morality and behavior.

The insular cases

Political scientist Bartholomew Sparrow focuses on a different aspect of American expansion: the political status of annexed territory outside the continental

United States. In his 2006 book *The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire*, Sparrow examines the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in the "insular cases" which came before the Supreme Court in 1898 and primarily concerned the status of territory acquired during the Spanish-American War. The Court's decisions in these cases addressed the political and constitutional status of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam after the 1898 peace treaty allowed the United States to acquire these island territories.

The insular cases (a total of thirty-five cases that were decided between 1901 and 1928), grappled with how the United States could govern its new territories without giving them either statehood or independence. Prior to 1898, new territory acquired within the continental United States had followed a predictable pattern of political absorption: the new land was administered by Congress and organized first into territories and then into states that became part of the Union. Congress decided when to allow these territories to become member states of the Union, and the length of time from when an area came under U.S. sovereignty and when it became a state varied considerably. Nevertheless, all acquired territories of the continental North America eventually were admitted as states (Tennessee was the first territory to become a state in 1796, and Hawaii the most recent in 1959). Sparrow notes: "So even as the United States kept growing in geographical size, it was—remarkably—able to keep its representative form of government" (3).

Most Americans think of the United States as a federal republic, made up of member states and ruled by elected representatives. The reality, Sparrow asserts, is very different: inhabitants of certain annexed territories (such as Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas Islands) still do not have full voting representation in either Congress or the Electoral College, nor did they have a say in the decision that resulted in their annexation. Sparrow says these territories occupy a political limbo, despite the fact their inhabitants are designated as U.S. citizens: "They are both a part of the United States and apart from the United States," an indeterminate status established by the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in the insular cases (1).

Following the flag

The United States had exercised sovereignty over areas outside the continental states before, but it was taken for granted that this authority was temporary. As described by McHale, U.S. expansion prior to the late 1890s had a distinctly “non-colonial nature,” with the inhabitants of new territories soon granted citizenship and all the rights and privileges that went with it. After the Spanish-American War, the United States suddenly had under its control several densely populated islands lying thousands of miles away; islands populated with inhabitants who were considered “unfit” to govern themselves or to become American citizens, living in territory that was not destined to become a state of the Union.

Previously, when the United States had extended the domain of its sovereignty, the protections of the U.S. Constitution followed. As stated by William Jennings Bryan during the 1900 presidential campaign, the Constitution “followed the flag” (Sparrow 2). A different view was held by Secretary of War Elihu Root, who summarized the insular decisions by saying: “as near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag—but doesn’t quite catch up with it” (Sparrow 101). Historian Eric Love says the Court’s decisions may have solved the legal and political questions of “alien, nonwhite citizenship that unsettled imperialists and made many anti-imperialists” but did not address the social, cultural, and racial aspects of the issues raised (199).

Secretary Root’s remark reflected the Supreme Court’s position on these cases. In the most controversial of the cases—*Downes v. Bidwell* (1901)—the Court decided in a 5-4 vote that the United States consisted only of the states within the Union, and that absent formal action by Congress to extend constitutional protections, the Constitution applied only to those states. According to Love, the insular decisions gave U.S. presidents and Congress “a free hand to carry out a grand expansionist project: to seize and annex distant places, to govern their populations as they saw fit” (197).

Curiously, neither imperialists nor anti-imperialists wanted the new territories and their large populations to become part of the United States. Many anti-imperialists incorporated the logic of Massachusetts Senator George Hoar into their arguments:

I claim that under the Declaration of Independence you cannot govern a foreign territory, a foreign people, an other people than your own, that you cannot

subjugate them or govern them against their will, because you think it is for their own good, when they do not; because you think you are going to give them the blessings of liberty. You have no right at the cannon's mouth to impose on an unwilling people your Declaration of Independence and your Constitution and your notions of what is good.³⁵

Even imperialists were concerned about the obstacle to American expansion plans presented by the U.S. Constitution. Sparrow quotes Naval captain Alfred Thayer Mahan: “Any project of extending the sphere of the United States, by annexation or otherwise, is met by the constitutional lion in the path” (1). Historian Thomas McHale agrees that the Constitution was an important—though not insurmountable—barrier to establishing a colonial empire. He cites the 1857 Dred Scott decision³⁶ as one example of several nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions that support this view: “There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way except by the admission of new States” (25).

As noted, the process of geographic expansion followed by the organization of territorial governments and then admission into the Union came to an abrupt halt after the Spanish-American War. At stake was how to define the United States and how to interpret the Constitution with respect to annexed territories; a debate which involved the nation's leading constitutional scholars and political thinkers. Sparrow notes: “Observers at the time reported that the *Insular Cases* aroused more political passion than had any action by the Supreme Court since its decision in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*” (5).

There was good reason for this passion and controversy. According to Sparrow, the decisions “had tremendous implications for the racial composition of the American people,” as well as an impact on the United States' strategic position in the world, its

³⁵ Hoar speaking before Congress in 1898, as quoted by McHale (26).

³⁶ In 1857 the slave Dred Scott sued for his freedom, and that of his wife and daughters. The Supreme Court ruled that his suit was not valid because he was not a person, but property (although he had lived with his master in states where slavery was illegal), and that no one of African ancestry could claim U.S. citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment repudiated this decision by declaring that all persons born or naturalized in the United States were citizens.

economy, and on the balance of power between Congress and the presidency (5). The immediate impact of the Court's rulings, however, was to ratify the expansionism of McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Lodge, and other prominent Republicans.

Although controversial in their day, the insular decisions lie forgotten today: Sparrow says presidents and politicians do not mention these cases, journalists do not comment on them, and students do not learn about them (9). However, he claims these cases deserve more than merely historic interest, primarily because the decisions still stand: Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Marianas, all remain unincorporated territories of the United States: neither states of the United States nor independent nation-states. Sparrow points to the unequal labor laws that apply in the Northern Marianas Islands, and the irony of Northern Marianas troops who fought and died for the United States in Iraq, and yet who competed against the United States in the Olympic Games (213).

Of primary importance is the insular cases' endorsement of expansion, marking the emergence of an American empire. Sparrow maintains that the idea of empire has been part of American political thinking since its founding, and quotes John Adams who stated in 1785 that the United States was "destined beyond a doubt to be the greatest power on earth" (218). With the Supreme Court's endorsement of Congress's authority over the island territories, the United States came to imitate the older European powers that exerted sovereignty over remote colonies.

Need + mission = U.S. foreign policy

The Philippine-American War was only one of many one-sided colonial wars³⁷ taking place in the late 1800s and early 1900s as the world's imperial powers scrambled for control of Africa and Asia. In her article "The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and U.S. National Identity," historian Mary Ann Heiss notes: "When the nation [United States] was weak and lacking in global status, it remained true to the anti-imperial principle....

³⁷ In her book *Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq*, Susan Brewer describes the 1898 Battle of Omdurman to re-take the Sudan where the British lost 48 soldiers in the few hours it took them to kill 11,000 Sudanese using modern rifles and machine guns (16).

Once the nation had acquired international standing, it seemed to subordinate anti-imperialism to practical geopolitical considerations” (540).

Heiss says the “imperial idea” became intertwined with American national identity, but emphasizes the United States’ fluctuating position on empire. She says the revolutionary period until the late 1840s was marked by American pronouncements against a European presence in North America, but at that time the country was too weak militarily or diplomatically to “put much muscle behind its words” (515). During this period the Monroe Doctrine was the clearest statement of U.S. opposition to European imperialism in the New World, and let the world know the United States considered itself the preeminent power in the Western Hemisphere.

The second phase of the United States’ imperial evolution (1846-1898) was bracketed by foreign wars with Mexico, Spain, and the Philippines, and was characterized by more aggressive measures to back up its aversion to a foreign presence in areas considered vital for U.S. security. Heiss says the United States generally ignored Europe’s “great game of empire” but this complacency changed when it appeared the European nations might soon control the world’s choice sources of raw materials, best sites for coaling stations and naval bases, and potential export markets. Similar to other nations, she says the United States was motivated by practical considerations and often abandoned principle to achieve its larger policy goals.

Might is right

Bass has expressed the idea that governments can sometimes send troops for benign motives or because of a genuine sense of humanity. However, Zinn maintains this was not the case in the Philippines: “The taste of empire was on the lips of politicians and business interests throughout the country now. Racism, paternalism, and talk of money mingled with talk of destiny and civilization” (306). An economic motive for colonies was also expressed by Theodore Roosevelt: “Meanwhile, the steady pressure of the machine which is represented by manufacturing concerns in civilized countries was being felt more and more.... What was sought was a market for manufactured goods and, naturally, at the same time, sources of raw material for the manufacturers” (*Colonial Policies* 27).

President Woodrow Wilson used different words to describe the United States' foray into imperialism. Jacobson quotes Wilson as saying that the United States ascended to global power "by the sheer genius of this people" and "not because we chose to go into the politics of the world" (264). Jacobson disagrees with Wilson's assessment and maintains that the United States' rise to global predominance cannot be passed off as blind, unintentional, or accidental. According to James Hamilton-Paterson, author of *America's Boy*, the United States expanding its continental territory and establishing a colonial empire halfway across the globe are two different things. He notes: "If this was a time of anguish for many Filipinos, it was the beginning of a badly muddled period for the United States as a champion of democracy.... It seemed after all that Uncle Sam was behaving no better than George III had" (37).

Whether one supported or opposed the idea of empire, each side claimed to be humanitarians and supporters of democracy. Interestingly, the ideology of both imperialists and anti-imperialists was spurred by racial motives. Two types of attitudes toward the Philippines predominated: compassion toward a backward people who needed American guidance to become civilized, and an overt racism; in either case, an inhospitable climate for democracy. Anti-imperialists argued it was morally wrong to subjugate others for American advantage. A noble sentiment, seemingly, but imbedded in the beliefs of some anti-imperialists was a belief in white supremacy; that contact with "tropical people" would dilute the racial stock of Americans. As stated by Jacobson: "It is one of the strange throughlines in the history of U.S. nationalism that since at least the mid-nineteenth century Americans have fancied their country as the savior of the world's peoples—redeemer nation, civilizer, beacon of liberty, asylum of the oppressed—even as they have expressed profound anxiety that the world's peoples might ultimately prove the ruin of the republic" (261).

Anti-imperialists such as Andrew Carnegie, John Dewey, Grover Cleveland, Samuel Gompers, Henry James, Jane Addams, Ambrose Pierce, Carl Schurz, and Mark Twain opposed annexation on the grounds of it being a sure step to war. *The Nation* editor E. L. Godkin shared this pessimistic view of U.S. involvement in the Philippines. His editorials invoked the arguments expressed by many opposed to the United States' involvement in Asia, and also conveyed a racial tone: "[T]he sudden departure from our

traditions; the absence from our system of any machinery for governing dependencies; *the admission of alien, inferior, and mongrel races to our nationality...* the un-Americanism of governing a large body of people against their will” (Brands 330, italics mine).

Some anti-imperialists saw the United States—not the Philippines—as the victim of empire, and envisioned the racial corruption of the United States by its colonial subjects. Others adopted the southern, white, paternalistic racism of Mrs. Jefferson Davis who thought the United States should refuse the additional “white man’s burden” of potentially allowing in millions of Filipinos which would exacerbate America’s “negro problem” (Brands 117). Kramer notes that the racial aspect of the war was also debated by the African American press, which argued that a colonial annexation would simply “provide a new outpost of Jim Crow”³⁸ (119).

Imperialism was a vague term,³⁹ but whether one believed in manifest destiny, exceptionalism, geographic expansion, geopolitical power, economic opportunities, or spreading democratic principles to backward peoples, America in the late nineteenth century was in the midst of a crusade of sorts. Juan Torruella, a Puerto Rican judge and author of *Global Intrigues: The Era of the Spanish-American War and the Rise of the United States to World Power*, notes: “The United States embarked on its own brand of ‘Darwinian imperialism’—a combination of geopolitics, religious righteousness, and just plain commercial entrepreneurship—to justify its territorial aggrandizement and the conquering, subjugation and absorption of other peoples” (28).

Some imperialists looked beyond economic reasons and used the principles of social Darwinism to argue that overseas expansion was the natural order of a “more-fit species.” They felt that the innate superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race justified its dominance in the world, and that American expansion was necessary in order to help others less fortunate. Social Darwinism—the application of natural selection to human society—was a useful tool to rationalize the subjugation of weaker races. Richard Hofstadter, author of *Social Darwinism in American Thought* notes: “If Darwinism was

³⁸ The Jim Crow laws in the southern United States were established between 1876 and 1965 and created a status for African Americans that was separate, but hardly equal.

³⁹ Sparrow describes imperialism as the acquisition and control of a territory and its inhabitants without their consent, and who are subject to the legal domination of the United States without receiving the privileges of its constitution.

not the primary source of the belligerent ideology and dogmatic racism of the late nineteenth century, it did at least put a new instrument into the hands of the theorists of race and struggle” (148).

The political leaders of the expansion movement—Senators Albert Beveridge and Henry Cabot Lodge, and President Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay, as well as Roosevelt himself—were quick to see the advantages of global expansion. Imperialism, in fact, was one of Roosevelt’s favorite themes early in his political career. As quoted by Hofstadter, Roosevelt warned Americans of the international struggle for survival in his 1899 book *The Strenuous Life*:

We cannot avoid the responsibilities that confront us in Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. All we can decide is whether we shall meet them in a way that will redound to the national credit, or whether we shall make of our dealings with these new problems a dark and shameful page in our history.... [I]f we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and will win for themselves the domination of the world. (180)

A century after the Philippine-American War the United States no longer has a formal empire. Racism is no longer as blatant, nor attitudes toward other cultures as insensitive. But the United States might still stand accused of “neo-imperialism”—of using capitalism and globalization as a powerful tool to manipulate weaker and poorer countries to its advantage. Just as nineteenth-century Americans were uncomfortable with the idea of empire, some Americans today are similarly uneasy with a blend of cultural imperialism and military strength used to enforce American ideals of what is right for the world. In the remaining chapters I will explore in more detail the ethics of war, the concept of utilitarianism (or “the greater good”), and discuss whether American control of the Philippines was beneficial to the islands.

Chapter Six

The War Game: Ethics and Methods

“Considering how long humans have been roaming the earth, the era of what we now think of as conventional conflict represents the mere blink of an eye.” Max Boot

Chapter Four addresses the question: can war be justified? This chapter delves further into the ethics of war, with a particular focus on the changing nature of warfare, the treatment of civilians during war, and the United States’ ever-growing defense industry.

War has been part of the world for an estimated forty thousand years, according to Paskins. This takes us back to the time of the Cro-Magnon man, who moved into Europe—likely from central Asia—about 40,000 BC. With a world population at this time estimated to be about 1.5 million people,⁴⁰ the Cro-Magnon man was better able to survive than the Neanderthal man he replaced: stronger, more intelligent, better able to use tools and weapons, and with more sophisticated clothing, diet, and habitation. Sadly, as humans grew in sophistication, this was mirrored by “advances” in their ability to kill one another. President Barrack Obama gave a nod to the ubiquity of warfare during his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. “War,” he said, “in one form or another, appeared with the first man.” The tone of the President’s speech, and its message related to the use of military force, is examined later in this chapter.

Wars does not equal politics

“War is not the continuation of policy by other means,” writes military historian John Keegan, taking exception with Clausewitz’s description of war (3). In his 1993 work *The History of Warfare*, Keegan acknowledges that the original German expression used by Clausewitz conveyed a more complex idea than the English words that are so often quoted. Keegan says Clausewitz’s thought implies the existence of states and state

⁴⁰http://qed.princeton.edu/index.php/User:Student/World_Population_Distributions_and_Densities,_38,000_BC_to_Present

interests that can be pursued in a deliberate manner, but he points out that war predates the state and diplomacy by many thousands of years: “War is almost as old as man himself, and reaches into the most secret places of the human heart, places where self dissolves rational purpose, where pride reigns, where emotion is paramount, where instinct is king” (3).

Keegan says war in the age of Clausewitz (who had witnessed the burning of Moscow during the Napoleonic Wars) was butchery. He describes the Battle of Borodino during Napoleon’s 1812 invasion of Russia where Russian soldiers reportedly stood under point-blank artillery fire for two hours, where the only movement in the infantry lines was that of falling bodies: “Men stood silent and inert in rows to be slaughtered, often for hours at a time” (9).

Chapter One of Keegan’s history is titled: What is war? He says one purpose of his book is to show there is no simple answer to that question; that war has a varied nature. Another purpose is to leave the reader with the hope that the affairs of the world can be settled in non-violent ways. He notes, however, that “the written history of the world is largely a history of warfare” since most states came into existence through wars of conquest, civil wars, or wars for independence (386). Keegan concludes: “politics must continue; war cannot” (391).

Small wars

According to military historian and foreign policy analyst Max Boot, conventional warfare is a relatively recent invention that occurred after 10,000 BC when the development of agricultural societies produced enough surplus wealth to allow for the design of weapons and fortifications and the professionals to use them. The first regular armies—trained soldiers commanded by a military hierarchy—appeared after 3100 BC in Egypt and Mesopotamia, although Boot points out that in most parts of the world state formation and army formation occurred much later. Over time, the Western way of warfare came to be dominant and by the nineteenth century most primitive peoples in the Americas, Africa, and the Pacific were unable to withstand Western military invasions.

The term “guerrilla” means “small war” and was first used to describe Spanish resistance against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814. After the devastating Thirty Years’ War

(1618-1648) which involved most of the countries of Europe, the distinction between regular and irregular warfare grew more pronounced. The early seventeenth century in Europe witnessed the formation of nation-states and the growth of formal armies, accompanied by barracks to house soldiers, professional officers to train and lead them, and factories to clothe and equip them (Boot, "Evolution of Irregular War" 3).

Boot takes issue with those who consider that terrorism and guerrilla tactics are a recent departure from traditional warfare: "Throughout most of our species' long and bloody slog, warfare has been primarily carried out by bands of loosely organized, ill-disciplined, and lightly armed volunteers who disdained open battle in favor of stealthy raids and ambushes: the strategies of both tribal warriors and modern guerrillas and terrorists" ("Evolution of Irregular War" 1).

Despite this long history of guerrilla tactics, Boot says that at least from the days of the Greeks and Romans irregular warfare has been belittled as "unmanly, even barbaric" ("Evolution of Irregular War" 1). This was the situation in the Philippines, where American soldiers considered the guerrilla warfare waged by their Filipino counterparts as uncivilized. Filipino forces recognized early in the war the futility of using conventional methods against the superior U.S. military. In his memoir, Aguinaldo writes of his decision to adopt guerrilla tactics:

We had not great expectations of being able to drive away the Americans from our shores by force. Our two wars with the Spaniards had cost us a great deal of life and money. Many of our most valuable and capable men had paid the supreme sacrifice on the battlefield. Our residual army was, for the most part, a motley crowd of crude recruits and volunteers.... On the other hand, the United States' forces were fast swelling in size and strength (97)... By November 12, 1900, our ammunition having been critically depleted, I decided to abandon open warfare and resort to guerrilla tactics. (107)

Onward Christian soldier

As discussed previously in this paper, Augustine was one of the first major theologians to assert that Christians need not always be pacifists, especially in the face of a grave wrong that could only be stopped by violence. Walzer points out that "He

[Augustine] replaced the radical refusal of Christian pacifists with the active ministry of the Christian soldier” (*Arguing About War* 3). Augustine insisted that Christians had to fight justly, without anger or lust, and only for the sake of peace. Soldiers were expected to refuse to fight in wars of conquest and to abstain from the standard military practices of rape and pillage after the battle was won.

Jesus advocated loving one’s enemies and turning the other cheek, which inclined Christians toward pacifism for years after his death. But when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, the Church evolved into one of the most powerful institutions in Europe. The Roman ruler Constantine brought Christianity into accommodation with a militarized state and the Church then directed violence against heretics and infidels, similar to the way violence had been directed against the Church in its early years. Holmes notes that from “the crusades and religious wars down to the twentieth-century’s world wars,” the main participants were predominantly Christian nations, except Japan and the USSR during World War II (117).

Let us return to Augustine’s admonition that Christians must fight justly. Several questions arise: How can one know whether a soldier is participating blamelessly in a war? How can one know whether a soldier’s action stem from fear, anger, cruelty, or a love of violence? Is it possible amidst the chaos of slaughter to remain free of cruelty and enmity?

Holmes notes the difficulty of distinguishing the action from the motivation for the action: an executioner might be acting in a lawful capacity but still take pleasure in another’s suffering, or a person may perform a legal act that is done from sinful and wicked reasons. The difficulty of determining the true motive provides another reason for Holmes’ moral opposition to war: “If we suppose a good motive to be essential for a truly just war, then it follows that we can never *know* that any given war is truly just because we can never be altogether certain of anyone’s motivation” (135).

Is it possible to apply morality to war or does the very nature of war lie outside ethical considerations? In Walzer’s view, the just war theory developed by early Christians “was simply an excuse, a way of making war morally and religiously possible” (*Arguing About War* 3). He believes that war can be justifiable and even morally

necessary, but concedes that the just war theory can also make it easier for those who subscribe to this theory to enter into war.

Warriors and wisdom

Numerous early philosophers and theologians bent their minds to the issues of wisdom, ethics, and war. Early Christian theologians speculated on whether wisdom is primarily grounded in God (faith) or in humankind (reason, or natural law). German psychologist Paul Baltes, writing in 2004, said Augustine limited wisdom to knowledge of divine things and allocated knowledge of human things to *scientia*, believing that wisdom requires acceptance of—and obedience to—God. According to Baltes, Aristotle considered that the practical sciences, such as ethics and politics, were concerned with action and conduct. Aquinas took a different view, and proposed “there is no hostility between human and divine wisdom” (Baltes 94). Related to war, *jus in bello* deals with the conduct of a war; that is, with the use of weapons and the treatment of prisoners and noncombatants, among other considerations.

According Aristotle, wisdom and prudence are “concerned with the things just, noble, and good for a human being,” as quoted by Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins in their 2011 translation of *Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* (130). Aristotle also said it is foolish to fail to be angry at the things deserving of anger (a sentiment later echoed by Augustine). Aristotle identified the exercise of rational powers as the end goal of humans, with the exercise of wisdom being the highest achievement of the intellectual virtues. He defined moral virtue as consisting of the appropriate middle ground between the extremes of deficiency and excess; in the face of danger, a coward will suffer too much fear and a rash person will suffer too little. In this way each virtue has two opposites, with the opposite of courage being both cowardice and rashness.

In her book *Stoic Warriors* Nancy Sherman, Distinguished Chair in Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy, explores the ancient theories of stoicism and the light they can shed on contemporary notions of the ethical conduct and self-discipline of individual soldiers. Today the word “stoic” means unemotional or indifferent to pain. However, Sherman says the Stoics did not seek to extinguish emotions but to transform them by

avoiding suffering and leading a life of self-control and objectivity.⁴¹ Socrates distinguished between external goods (wealth) and internal goods (wisdom). In a similar fashion, she says stoicism holds that emotions such as anger and hatred are based on the false investments of property, wealth, fame, and honor, all of which cause people to fail to appreciate what is of true value: reason in its perfected form, expressed as wisdom.

Sherman asks: What bearing does the enemy's style of fighting have on the ethics of the aggressor? Are combatants fighting for an unjust cause the moral equals of those fighting for a just cause? She says that Stoicism viewed anger as a dangerous emotion, the trait of a soldier who has lost control. Similar to Aristotle, Sherman makes a distinction between destructive anger and anger that is a morally healthy response to injustice. She notes that "anger is as much a part of war as weapons and armor" and describes Homer's war epic the *Iliad* as a story "about the fury of a warrior such as Achilles and the injuries to honor that can lead to that fury" (65). The Roman philosopher Seneca warned of the potential self-destructive and obsessive nature of anger and said it "whets the mind for the deeds of war." Re-phrased in more modern language, Sherman says anger provides the adrenaline rush that allows non-killers in civilian life to become killers in war.

Aristotle said that people can do wrong through unthinking brutishness and also through a lack of self-control. He also said choice is the best measure of moral judgment since humans can be held accountable only for actions that are performed voluntarily by means of rational deliberation. We discussed previously the brutality of Colonel Jacob Smith in the Philippines and Lieutenant William Calley in Vietnam. Using Aristotle's words as a guide, the actions of these soldiers were clearly immoral as they stemmed from a deliberate and apparently conscious decision to issue orders for the indiscriminant killing of civilians.

Sherman quotes Walzer as saying that although war is hell, it is still "a rule-driven activity" (173). Traditionally, *jus in bello* provides for the immunity of noncombatants. But Sherman notes that terror—especially in the post-9/11 world—has upset the rules of

⁴¹ The Stoic attitude brings to mind the Serenity Prayer: God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, The courage to change the things I can, And the wisdom to know the difference.

war: “It is not just that terrorists exempt themselves from those rules. It is that they challenge their victims to do the same” (173). She cites two examples of this: the Bush administration’s “infamous torture memo” of August 1, 2002 that stated torture was permissible as long as it did not cause “organ failure;” and the claims of President Bush’s choice for attorney general Alberto Gonzales, who at his Senate confirmation hearing stated that the war on terror renders “obsolete” the Geneva Convention accords⁴² on the interrogation of enemy prisoners (173).

In *Stoic Warriors* Sherman quotes at length from the Taguba Report, written for the U.S. Army by General Antonio Taguba and released in May 2004. The report cites the “egregious” and “sadistic abuses” and “grave breaches of international law” committed by U.S. soldiers against Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison (174). The Senate hearings and media coverage of these atrocities predictably resulted in moral outrage, but to what end? The American public was equally outraged at reports of torture in the Philippine-American War and in the Vietnam War; but it appears that torture continues despite public condemnation and abhorrence, and the international agreements prohibiting it.

The rules of war

As mentioned, the Geneva Conventions and numerous other international agreements and organizations have long addressed methods of war and the humanitarian treatment of civilians during wartime. The idea of human rights was at the core of the American and French revolutions, and the Enlightenment helped pave the way for efforts during the nineteenth and twentieth century to establish universal human rights. The League of Nations—inspired by President Woodrow Wilson’s vision of self-determination and founded as part of the Paris Peace Conference that ended World War I—was the first international organization with a mission of promoting world peace.

At the time of the Philippine-American War, the Red Cross had been founded and the 1864 Geneva Convention had been adopted by twelve countries (the United States

⁴² The Fourth Geneva Convention came about in 1949 after World War Two. Together with earlier conventions in 1864, 1906, and 1929, they established international laws to govern humanitarian conduct during war, such as the rights of prisoners, the protection of the wounded, and the treatment of civilians.

ratified it in 1882). An 1862 book by Swiss businessman and activist Henry Dunant (*Memoir of the Solferino*) called for a permanent agency to provide humanitarian relief in times of war, as well as a government treaty that recognized the neutrality of this agency.⁴³ Also in effect were the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, a series of international treaties that addressed the wartime conduct. They were largely based on the Lieber Code, which was signed in 1863 by President Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War and issued to the Union army. The Lieber Code was the first codified law that governed soldiers' conduct during wartime, and the ethical and humane protection of civilians was just one of many behaviors it addressed.

In spite of more nations recognizing the need for just conduct during war, the reality is that civilians caught in military conflicts are not exempt from violence. At least some aspect of each succeeding conflict seemed as horrific as the very conflict that triggered renewed calls for humanitarian rules. The League of Nations failed utterly in preventing another world war, but many of the rights listed in its charter (labor conditions, the humane treatment of native inhabitants and prisoners of war, and protection of minorities) were later included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established after World War Two.

Concentrated misery

The use of guerrilla war tactics in colonial wars saw the development of special areas set aside for the internment of civilians during wartime. The term "concentration camp" came into use with the British use of these camps in South Africa in 1900-1902, but the phenomenon is usually traced back to Spain's rule in Cuba (the Spanish-Cuban War of 1895-1898 and the Ten Years' War from 1868-1878).⁴⁴ Ian R. Smith and Andreas Stucki, authors of "The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps (1868-1902),"

⁴³ During his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama said: "The Nobel Committee recognized this truth [that we must think about how wars are fought] in awarding its first prize for peace to Henry Dunant—the founder of the Red Cross, and a driving force behind the Geneva Conventions."

⁴⁴ The concentration camps in Cuba are associated with the Spanish General Valeriano Weyler who was sent to Cuba in 1896. He was nicknamed 'Butcher' Weyler after hundreds of thousands died in the camps he organized to crush the Cuban rebellion and control the population. Weyler was recalled to Spain in 1897.

say concentration camps were part of the military strategy against guerrilla warfare during colonial rebellions.

The colonial use of these camps differed in purpose from the concentration camps established in Europe during World War II, which were intended as political repression (Smith 418). In the colonial concentration camps, the goal was not to kill those interned in them but rather to clear the surrounding area of civilian support for enemies engaged in guerrilla warfare. During the period from 1868 to 1902—the Spanish in Cuba, the British in South Africa, and the Americans in the Philippines—all found themselves involved in protracted conflicts with small numbers of guerrilla fighters. In each case the distinction between combatants and civilians became blurred, and the purpose of the concentration camps became a counter-guerrilla strategy; to separate the guerrilla fighters from their civilian support. Smith says the fact that the colonial powers had to resort to this strategy in order to contain rebellions “illuminates the fragility of colonial regimes which often found it difficult to occupy effectively the territory over which they claimed sovereignty” (418).

The U.S. military in the Philippines was influenced by the British and Spanish use of these camps in South Africa and Cuba, and also by the American practice of isolating Native Americans on reservations during the North American Indian Wars. And although the killing of civilians may not have been the purpose of these camps, Smith says that in the “concentration zones” in the Philippines “tens of thousands of people died in the space of a few months from malnutrition and disease” (424).⁴⁵

In addition to concentration camps, other anti-guerrilla strategies by the colonial powers included confiscation of property, summary executions, massacres, deportations, crop destruction, and civilian concentrations camps. Smith quotes historian Glenn Anthony May who says the U.S. “hearts and minds” campaign was a failure, because although Filipinos cooperated with Americans during the day, they served the guerrillas at night.

According to Smith, the “paternalistic gloss” applied to the annexation of the Philippines was accompanied by the declaration of martial law after McKinley’s 1900 re-

⁴⁵ Smith notes that the precise number of deaths will never be known because of the difficulty in determining the numbers who died in the camps versus the civilians who died as a result of cholera epidemics and other diseases.

election. Elihu Root, McKinley's Secretary of War, authorized the "tough methods which have proved successful in our Indian campaigns in the West." Since the U.S. Army officers regarded Filipinos' methods of fighting as barbaric, they set about subduing the Filipino insurgency in much the same way as they had reacted to Indian uprisings in the western United States.⁴⁶

The Philippine dialogue

As we have seen, the Philippines were not the first group of islands to be threatened by a stronger power. In the fourth century BC Athens wanted to add to its empire by conquering Melos, a small, neutral island. The ensuing dialogue between the Athenian generals and the people of Melos offers an interesting perspective to the reasons for starting a war, and the morality (or lack of it) that accompanies this decision.

The people of Melos based their resistance on several arguments: Melos is neutral and not an enemy, so Athens has no need to crush them; an invasion by Athens will alarm the other neutral Greek states for fear of becoming invaded themselves; they believed their Sparta kin would come to their defense; they believed that although Athens was stronger, there was still a chance they could win; they believed the gods were on their side.

The Athenians countered with arguments of their own: if they accepted the Melians' neutrality and independence they would look weak, leading others to think they spared Melos because they were not strong enough to conquer it; it is unlikely an invasion of Melos will alarm other Greek states; Spartans have much to lose and nothing to gain by coming to the Melians' aid; that god and men alike respect strength over moral arguments. The Athenian generals summarized their position in the famous dictum: "The powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must" (Ishay 56).

Fast forward to the nineteenth century, and substitute the United States for Athens and the Philippines for Melos. The United States maintains American control is necessary to "uplift and civilize" the Philippines. To the Filipinos' argument that it would be cowardly to surrender their independence without a fight, the Americans might counter

⁴⁶ Karnow says that the majority of U.S. soldiers fighting in the Philippines came from states west of the Mississippi, which may have accounted for the tendency to adopt the fighting methods used against Native Americans (213).

by saying that there is no shame in submitting to a stronger enemy. Similar to Melos, the Filipinos were faced with overwhelming odds, and found themselves in the situation of choosing independence at the price of destruction, or capitulating to save their island. Similar to Melos, Filipinos refused to surrender and through the course of a brutal war, Americans attempted to impart Western customs and values as they exerted their control over the islands. Neither the gods nor the Spartans came to the rescue of Melos; and unfortunately, neither the gods nor another country came to the rescue of the Filipinos.

Could Filipinos claim that having done no injury to the American people they had the right to be left alone? Not according to the Athenian generals: “Let us have no fine words about justice. [Y]ou must not claim that having done no injury to the Athenian people, *you have a right to be left alone*” (Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 5 – italics mine).

Peace through force

President Barack Obama spoke a great deal about war during his October 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. A quick review of the speech text showed he used the word “war” forty-one times and the word “peace” twenty-six times during his 35-minute talk that was titled “A Just and Lasting Peace.”

Obama’s selection for the award was controversial for several reasons, but especially because many felt he had not yet achieved any significant foreign policy accomplishments so early into his first term (nominations for the prize were due on February 1, 2009, twelve days after he took office). At the time of his Oslo speech, he was then a president in the midst of two wars; the Iraq war was winding down, but about a month after his speech he ordered a surge of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. The Nobel Committee cited as reasons for his selection: “his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples” and “a new climate in international politics,”⁴⁷ reasons which likely were intended as criticism of Bush Administration policies.

⁴⁷ http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/

During his address, the President referred to the efforts of philosophers, clerics, and statesmen to regulate the destructive power of war. He noted that for most of history the just war concept has rarely been observed, and said that “the capacity of human beings to think up new ways to kill one another proved inexhaustible.” Other observations: “the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace,” “war is sometimes necessary,” and “force can be justified on humanitarian grounds.”

President Obama acknowledged the accomplishments of Martin Luther King, Jr., and quoted from King’s 1964 acceptance speech: “Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones.” But he added that “a nonviolent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms.”

The President also noted that in today’s wars, more civilians are killed than soldiers. The overall intent of his speech seemed to be summarized in this phrase: “There will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” He concluded with the words: “We can understand that there will be war, and still strive for peace.... [T]hat must be our work here on Earth.”

Get them before they get us

After winning independence from Britain, the geographical size of the United States expanded rapidly. So, too, did its military. A War Department was established in 1789, but “early Americans considered a standing Army—a permanent army kept even in times of peace—to be a form of tyranny,” writes Jill Lepore in the *The New Yorker*. In an article titled “The Force: How Much Military is Enough?” she quotes Bostonian and Revolutionary War soldier Josiah Quincy, who wrote in 1774: “What a deformed monster is a standing army in a free nation.”

Oh, how times change. In 1934, North Dakotan Republican Gerald P. Nye, chair of the Senate Munitions Committee, led an inquiry into the arms industry. Lepore says that Nye wanted to restrict the manufacture of weapons to the government since “the removal of the element of profit from war would materially remove the danger of more war.” In 1961, President Dwight Eisenhower warned of the danger of the “military-

industrial complex,” the close relationship between the defense industry and the government:

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.... This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. *Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.*⁴⁸ (italics mine)

The growth of the defense industry did not slow in response to Eisenhower’s cautionary remarks; on the contrary, it only grew larger. In the 1950s the United States was focused on the containment of Communism, and according to Lepore, military spending during this time made up three-quarters of the federal budget. In 2012, the United States spent more on defense (\$682 billion) than did the countries with the next ten highest defense budgets combined (\$652 billion), according to the Peter G. Peterson Foundation.⁴⁹

The election of Barack Obama as president was viewed by many in the world—including the Nobel Committee—as a welcome change from the previous administration of George W. Bush, especially as related to the foreign policy initiatives that came to be known as the “Bush Doctrine.” The phrase was first used to refer to the Bush administration withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union and its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But after 9/11, the term referred to Bush’s view that the United States had a right to protect itself from countries that harbored terrorists, even if these countries posed no immediate threat to the United States.

⁴⁸ Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12086&st=&st1=>

⁴⁹ The ten countries listed for comparison are China, Russia, Britain, Japan, France, Saudi Arabia, India, Germany, Italy, and Brazil. http://pgpf.org/Chart-Archive/0053_defense-comparison

In an article titled “The ‘Bush Doctrine’: Can Preventive War be Justified?” authors Robert Delahunty and John Yoo⁵⁰ answer that question with a confident ‘yes.’ They assert that the Bush Doctrine falls squarely within the tradition of American strategic thought, diplomacy, and military practice during the last two hundred years: “[T]he justifications for a preventive war fought to protect the nation’s civilian population from the threat of mass killing have a deep resemblance to the justifications now commonly given, and accepted, for preventive ‘humanitarian’ interventions.... In contrast, a legal position that would forbid preventive war in all circumstances, but allow humanitarian intervention, would be incoherent” (865).

The 2002 National Security Strategy sets forth the Bush administration’s position on preventive war, as quoted by Delahunty and Yoo:

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends... Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. *We cannot let our enemies strike first.* (844, italics mine)

Harvard political scientist Dan Reiter takes the opposite view of the effectiveness of preventive war tactics. In a 2006 article titled “Preventive War and Its Alternatives: The Lessons of History,” Reiter analyzed the 2002 National Security Strategy that listed preventive attacks as a means of curtailing the threats of spreading nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to extremists and rogue states. He concluded that “preventive attacks are generally ineffective, costly, unnecessary, and potentially even counterproductive tools for use in behalf on nonproliferation and counterterrorism” (2).

⁵⁰ John Yoo is an American law professor and served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General during the Bush Administration. He drafted the “torture memos” which stated that “enhanced interrogation techniques” such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress positions could be considered legal given an expanded interpretation of the President’s authority during the ‘War on Terror’. In 2009, two days after taking office, President Obama repudiated all of Yoo’s legal guidance in this area. Robert Delahunty is a law professor at the University of St. Thomas, Minneapolis.

Reiter says other methods to deter threats—such as diplomacy, deterrence, and other counterterrorism tactics—have proven to be effective, but that the past record of preventive attacks is not encouraging. One concern, he maintains, is that preventive actions may “stimulate the very thing they were designed to prevent—terrorism” (10). Another concern is that the presence U.S. troops abroad provide “tempting targets for terrorists, because democracies are perceived to be highly sensitive to casualties.” He cites a study which showed that most of the 188 instances of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2001 were launched against targets associated with democratic countries because their military presence was perceived as an army of occupation. A third concern of preventive attacks is that they open the door to insurgency wars, in effect creating training opportunities for terrorist organizations.

War at arm’s length

Although President Obama stated during his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech that nations will sometimes find it necessary to use force, he has distanced himself from the murky legality of preventive war. Yet in one foreign policy area, Obama has exceeded the military initiatives of the Bush administration: drone strikes.


Drones—remotely piloted aircraft—can be used for innocuous surveillance, or armed with deadly missiles and laser-guided bombs. It is the latter which are increasingly causing the death of civilians in the U.S. war on terror, according to a recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report. Based on stipulations of the Geneva and Hague Conventions and international human rights law, HRW questions the legality of drone strikes. Their report (“Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen”) states that the fundamental tenets of the laws of war are “civilian immunity” and “distinction” (85). In other words, warring parties must distinguish between combatants and civilians, and direct attacks only against combatants.

The HRW report states: “Where the laws of war apply, combatants may lawfully be attacked. Persons who accompany or support an organized armed group, but whose activities are not directly related to military operations, such as engaging in recruiting or propaganda, are not lawful military targets” (2). In addition, civilians cannot be targeted

for attack because of past unlawful behavior, but only if they pose an imminent threat to life, and capture or arrest is not a possibility (84).

If the Bush administration counter-terrorism strategy favored preventive war, the Obama administration appears inclined to rely on covert drone attacks carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. During his presidency Obama has increased the number of drone strikes, and some of these strikes have killed civilians.⁵¹ Increased drone attacks are a concern but the larger question revolves around how to control the technology.

Figure 8—President Obama and Drones Cartoon



The United States, Britain, and Israel currently have a monopoly on this deadly weapon. But as with nuclear weapons, one can be assured that “drone capability” will soon fall into the hands of countries considered enemies of the United States. Perhaps the United States carefully plans its strikes, but will terrorists take similar care? Drones may

⁵¹ The Human Rights Watch report states that in four of the six targeted strikes investigated in Yemen, civilians were present at the strike location and were killed. In two cases the civilians killed included women and children (91).

not be a weapon of mass destruction, but they are certainly a deadly and dangerous weapon. In one sense, drone attacks could be viewed as a high tech version of “irregular warfare” or guerrilla tactics in the hands of the United States. Should the authorization for drone strikes be removed from the shadows of the CIA and require congressional approval? How would a Western country react if an extremist group selectively targeted for assassination individuals it considered to be “enemies”? Many in the world were uncomfortable with the “pre-emptive” nature of the Bush Doctrine that bypassed due process of law in order to target terrorists located in countries the United States is not at war with; how do drone strikes in the Obama Administration differ from this?

Over the centuries, many international agreements have sought to make war more just and humane. This raises the concern that drone attacks are veering in an opposite direction and moving away from the just war tradition. Will a new war convention be required to address the legal and humanitarian issues associated with drone attacks? Perhaps most importantly, are drone strikes an effective way to reduce the threat of terrorism? If civilians are killed, would this not serve to only to increase the hatred of extremists toward the West, and provide a fertile breeding ground for greater extremism?⁵² The possibility of civilian deaths is a tragic aspect of drone attacks, but use of the technology also raises many perplexing legal and moral questions.

⁵² On November 23, 2013, an estimated 10,000 to 13,000 citizens in Peshawar, Pakistan gathered to protest American drone strikes and vowed to stop NATO supply trucks unless the attacks stopped, according to a New York Times report. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/in-pakistan-rally-protests-drone-strikes.html?_r=0

Chapter Seven

Independence at Last

“Independence came to the Filipinos when they were profoundly divided by the touchy issue of collaboration, when they were in rags, when their country was prostrate and bleeding.”- Emilio Aguinaldo

The United States had always intended that the Philippines would become independent someday. Why did it take so long, and why colonize them in the first place? If the meddling of other countries after Spain’s departure was the concern, would it not have been simpler to implement some sort of Monroe Doctrine to let Europe and Russia know “hands off?” Did American “tutelage” benefit Filipinos?

One thing is certain; when the Philippines finally achieved independence in 1946, it was well-deserved and a long time coming. William Pomeroy, author of *The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance*, says that the Philippines had one of the longest colonial experiences on record: three hundred seventy-seven years under Spain’s rule, and forty-eight years as a U.S. colony. In addition, during three of those years, the islands were occupied by Japan during World War Two.


From annexation to independence, the Philippine-American saga was carried out through nine U.S. presidents.⁵³ McKinley annexed the islands in 1899; after his assassination in September 1901, Theodore Roosevelt oversaw the war from 1901 until he left office in 1909. William Howard Taft held the reins until 1913, followed by Woodrow Wilson who was president from 1913 to 1921. After Wilson came Warren Harding (president from 1921 until his death 1923); Calvin Coolidge (1923 to 1929); Herbert Hoover (1929 to 1933), and Franklin Roosevelt (1933 to 1945). Harry Truman, who served as president from Roosevelt’s death in 1945 until 1953, was the president who witnessed the Philippines’ independence in 1946. (See Appendix A for other

⁵³ An even larger number than the five presidents involved in the Vietnam War: Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford (though Wilson, FDR, and Truman also had some dealings with Vietnam during their administrations).

momentous events that occurred in the early twentieth century and competed for Americans' attention during the time the Philippines were an American colony.)

When independence did come, Pomeroy says it was not the result of a national liberation revolution that threw out the foreign occupier. Rather, it was a carefully-worded agreement between the United States and ruling Filipino elites that “stifled the revolutionary forces that desired a real change and preserved all the features of society and relationships that had made the Philippines a backward, subservient, exploited country” (*An American Made Tragedy* 5).

Figure 9—Uncle Sam Teaches Respect



Ending with a whimper, not a bang

On March 24, 1934 the Tydings-McDuffie Act was approved by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt, with independence to take place on July 4, 1946.⁵⁴ The 1916 Jones Act was supposed to grant independence as soon

⁵⁴ The date was chosen by the United States, and the fact that it matches the American Independence Day serves as a small reminder of U.S. influence over the islands' history.

as the Philippines had established a stable government, but according to Miller: “the First World War and ensuing peace negotiations probably distracted the Wilson Administration from meeting this pledge” (264). When Republicans took control of Congress in 1920 granting self-government again seemed unlikely, but Miller lists several factors that served to renew interest in independence: an increasingly isolationist mood among the American public, the concern of the U.S. Army over its vulnerable position in the Philippines given Japan’s growing military strength, American farmers who wanted protection from Philippine agricultural exports, and racial fears of Filipino immigration. The combined effect of these factors resulted in the Tydings-McDuffie Act being passed by Congress over “a somewhat peevish veto by outgoing President Herbert Hoover” (Miller 265).

Pomeroy asserts that the circumstances that led to independence did not begin or end in benevolence, and describes as myth the historical accounts that depict the end of colonial status as a voluntary handing over to Filipinos their national freedom after a magnanimous education in self-government. He says that throughout the decades of American rule the Filipino people never ceased to call for independence: peasant organizations, left-wing trade unions, local politicians, and Filipino delegates to the Independence Congress, all placed independence foremost in their resolutions.

The United States had a consistent response to these requests: to put down revolt with force, to outlaw nationalist movements, and to ignore resolutions. American officials disapproved of displays of Philippine patriotism, and the 1901 Sedition Act adopted by the Philippine Commission created harsh penalties—the death penalty or long imprisonment—for Filipino nationalists advocating for independence. The Sedition Act reflected Theodore Roosevelt’s sentiments: “It seems to me that what is important to cultivate among the Filipinos at present is, not in the least ‘patriotic national sentiment’... but the sober performance of duty” (Pomeroy 9).

In the end, Pomeroy says, passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act was determined by American interests—in U.S. boardrooms and legislative chambers—with the Great Depression serving as catalyst. As a result, the end of U.S rule crawled to a close with American economic interests—rather than Filipinos’ desires—dictating its demise.

Collaboration with America

Aguinaldo's description of the collaboration issue as "touchy" is an understatement. Pomeroy says that during the critical period of U.S. conquest (between 1898 and 1902), the majority of Filipinos resisted American rule and were calling for independence. A minority of wealthy elites, however, collaborated with American officials and provided the base for U.S. colonial rule (29). Pitting elites against the middle- and lower-classes was a successful colonial divide and rule strategy that created bitter animosities which lasted long after the war.

Many of Manila's powerful citizens began abandoning the cause for independence soon after Spain's departure (some had even sided with Spain against the United States) and rebuffed pleas for support from revolutionary organizations, such as the *Katipunan*, throughout the American occupation. Pomeroy quotes from José María Basa, a wealthy Filipino living in Hong Kong, who sent a manifesto to the Philippines in May 1898 shortly after Dewey's ships defeated the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay:

This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for contriving that our country, all the Philippine archipelago, may be counted as another star in the great republic of the United States. Now is the time to offer ourselves to that nation.... With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy. (24)

The loyalty of many elites was tied to their own interests, rather than with the goal of promoting their country's independence. Aguinaldo and others wanted the elite class and their money to join the independence movement, but Aguinaldo went against the advice of fellow revolutionary Apolinario Mabini who had urged him to limit elites' roles to advisory posts. As stated by Pomeroy: "Aguinaldo, however, who invariably bowed to the wishes of the wealthy, went far beyond [advisory posts]. He appointed them to key positions in the Philippine government and allowed them to carve a dominant role for themselves in the crucial months of 1898 when U.S. power was being built up in Manila" (25).

Business issues were an important aspect in the debate over how long to retain the Philippines as a colony. During Congressional committee hearings held in 1930 and 1932, the pros and cons of retaining the colony were debated. Members of the Philippine

Independence Missions⁵⁵ testified at the hearings but the main debate was between two competing U.S. interest groups: “those that profited from the colony and were opposed to independence, and those whose interests were adversely affected by the colonial relationship and wanted it ended” (Pomeroy 80).

Twenty-six years after the start of the war, the situation was no closer to being resolved. Writing in 1927 in an article titled “The Philippine Problem,” Pedro Guevara, a commissioner from the Philippines, asked:

If, then, the Islands are to remain under the control of the United States, shall American statesmanship further prolong the anomalous and unfortunate situation now prevailing? Should not the Filipino people enjoy the blessings of American traditions and history? Should not the Philippines be placed under a form of government which is truly American in fundamentals and character? (12)

Guevara said finding a solution to the “political problem” of the Philippines would also improve the islands’ economic development, and cited the 1916 Jones Law⁵⁶ as a reason for granting immediate independence.

Kramer describes the Philippine nation-building process as “fraught with tension.” American authorities considered that they were building a Philippine nation for the first time, and that only Americans could recognize Filipino capacities for self-government; Filipinos insisted the nation was theirs to make, as the Philippine Revolution and Philippine Republic had demonstrated. The gap between the “benevolent assimilation” myth and the realities of American rule was wide. As stated by George Kennan in 1901 in *The Advocate of Peace*:

Was there ever a stranger illustration of the irony of fate than that presented by such a situation as ours? We generously undertake to free eight million Filipinos from the tyranny and cruelty of Spain; and then, in the effort to convince them of the benevolence of our intentions and make them accept the blessings of security

⁵⁵ From 1919 to 1934 the Philippine Congress regularly sent Filipinos to lobby the U.S. Congress as part of “Independence Missions.” Manuel Quezon, a lieutenant in the Filipino resistance forces and president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines from 1935 to 1944, went to Washington in 1934 and helped secure adoption of the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

⁵⁶ Also known as the Philippine Autonomy Act, the Jones Act served as a constitution for the Philippines until the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1934, which led to independence.

and peace, we find ourselves following the example of General Weyler and resorting—if not forced to resort—to the old Spanish methods, murder, torture, and reconcentration. (83)

By building on the Spanish colonial structure, American officials—in response to Filipinos’ revolutionary challenge—established the foundations of the modern Philippine nation and effectively defeated the struggle for independence. Paul Hutchcroft, in an article titled “Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913,” states that Spanish and Malay customs generally get blamed for Filipino propensities for patronage and corruption, but notes: “Among the many problems with these analyses is the failure to acknowledge that it was precisely *American*-inspired structures of governance that encouraged the particular type of patronage-driven corruptions most commonly associated with *Filipinos*” (298).

According to Hutchcroft, the unusual character of American imperialism was related to state formation during the years William Howard Taft was the civilian governor of the islands.⁵⁷ Hutchcroft studied the relationship between Manila and the provinces during this period and determined that tensions between central authority and local autonomy were resolved in favor of provincial elites, who were empowered in new ways by American structures of government. Thus, he says, the quest for self-government became nearly synonymous with the quest for local autonomy and patronage opportunities.

In finally winning their independence it must be noted that Filipinos followed a conventional path for creating a nation-state: they used violence (guerilla warfare and brutal atrocities), they expressed the social in national terms (by working to convert the bulk of the population into nationalists), they used social and political movements to take advantage of people’s anger and to direct dissatisfaction toward the enemy (economic misery was blamed on the colonizers), and they won international support—especially

⁵⁷ Taft was selected by President McKinley in 1900 as Governor-General of the Philippines. He served until 1904.

among anti-imperialist Europeans and Americans—by periodic skirmishes and rebellions, which influenced U.S. politicians and American public opinion.

An ardent (but practical) imperialist

Theodore Roosevelt is well-known for his expansionist ideas, as noted by historian Stephen Wertheim in his article “Reluctant Liberator: Theodore Roosevelt’s Philosophy of Self-Government and Preparation for Philippine Independence.” Wertheim analyzes Roosevelt’s ideas related to self-government and reinterprets his Philippines’ directives in light of that philosophy. He concludes that Roosevelt emerges as “a reluctant anti-imperialist—an imperialist by desire but an anti-imperialist in governance” (494).

According to Roosevelt’s philosophy of self-government, Wertheim says, concern for the subject peoples’ wishes in relation to self-rule carried no moral weight as long as imperial rule seemed to provide greater benefits. He points out that Roosevelt presided over America’s rise to great power status at the turn of the twentieth century, a time that coincided with intense imperial expansion: “Europeans scrambled for Africa and vied for Asia, grabbing territories with unprecedented velocity and overwhelming ferocity” (496).

Roosevelt’s imperialist views are vividly reflected in his four-volume *The Winning of the West*. Roosevelt begins the first volume with this blunt assessment: “During the past three centuries the spread of the English-speaking peoples over the world’s waste spaces has been not only the most striking feature in the world’s history, but also the event of all others most far-reaching in its effects and its importance” (1). In Volume III, Roosevelt writes: “No other conquering and colonizing nation has ever treated the original savage owners of the soil with such generosity as has the United States” (43), and later notes that he considered wars with “savages” to be “the most ultimately righteous of all wars,” because “the rude fierce settler who drives the savage from the land lays all civilized mankind under a debt to him” (45).

It mattered little in Roosevelt’s view how whites won the land—whether by treaty, armed conquest, or a mixture of both—as long as the land was won. Wertheim quotes Roosevelt: “It was all-important that it should be won, for the benefit of civilization, and in the interests of mankind” (498). Roosevelt maintained these convictions throughout his public life, but putting imperial theories into practice under a

democratic political system was another matter. In his introduction to Roosevelt's book *Colonial Policies of the United States* (a reflection of his years as governor of Puerto Rico and the Philippines), Walter Lippmann observed:

For this book, as I read it, is a confession that the imperialistic dream of 1898 has proved to be unrealizable, that the management of an empire by a democracy like the American democracy is impossible. That this should be said by Theodore Roosevelt is to my mind one of those neat historical turns which the slovenly and inartistic Muse of history so rarely achieves; that it should be said at the end of years of practical experience in colonial administration, of an experience which was by worldly standards highly successful, seems to me most convincing. (xiii)

Like most leaders, Wertheim says Roosevelt had to reconcile the ideas that inspired him with the demands of practical politics. In Roosevelt's opinion, imperialism's ends justified its means. Prior to becoming president, Roosevelt was bullish on extending civilization to native people; after he became president, however, he was bullish on Filipinos' achieving self-government. How then, to interpret Roosevelt's change of heart and relatively decisive action to end American rule?

Some historians have cited strategic motivations, principally fears of a Japanese naval attack in the Philippines. But Wertheim says the true reason was a domestic concern: Roosevelt was astute enough to realize that negative American public opinion and the two-party political system eventually meant the demise of American imperialism. This change of opinion was in large measure determined by his "lack of confidence in the imperial will of his people" (Wertheim 509). If a democratic president⁵⁸ was chosen in the next election it was unlikely he would choose to continue Roosevelt's open-ended rule of the Philippines, or to keep as civilian-governor someone who shared Taft's views of the necessity of a very long period of American rule.

⁵⁸ During Roosevelt's presidency the Democratic Party opposed imperialistic policies and supported self-government for the Philippines, and made the occupation a significant campaign issue in 1904. After the start of the war public opinion also shifted and became more supportive of Filipinos' desire for self-rule.

Fickle opinions

The wisdom of Roosevelt abandoning his imperial desires for practical political reasons is borne out by Edward Loy's analysis of the editorial opinion related to the war in two American newspapers: the Portland *Morning Oregonian* and the Seattle *Daily Times*. (The *Morning Oregonian* was historically a Republican paper but was generally independent in its view. The *Daily Times* political leanings were Democratic.)

In an article titled "Editorial Opinion and American Imperialism: Two Northwest Newspapers," Loy tests the theories of historian Ernest R. May, who had studied what motivated the American public to initially favor overseas expansion in 1898, and how this sentiment influenced American foreign policy.

In the late nineteenth century, the American public was swayed by pro-imperialist arguments that touted the advantages of overseas expansion. These included an increase in national wealth and power, interest in establishing U.S. naval bases and coaling stations in the Pacific, the development of overseas markets that might ease the 1893 depression and labor unrest, the need for a country which had reached its limit of geographical expansion to look outward, and a race consciousness of Anglo-Saxon superiority to be achieved through Manifest Destiny and the spread of civilization. The result according to Loy: "A powerful imperialist movement which crossed party lines emerged... and convinced the McKinley administration and Congress that the American people favored overseas expansion" (212).

Loy says May's research showed that "the zest for imperialism was short-lived" and by 1903 public sentiment in favor of colonies had almost disappeared (212). The reasons for this were numerous: the tenacity of the Philippine insurrection, the expensive and bloody nature of the war, and the British experience in the Boer Wars⁵⁹ which caused Americans to think twice about the benefits of empire. In addition, any possible economic benefits to be gained from an overseas colony were so complicated that the public's interest in the issue waned, and foreign policy opinion leaders also began to turn away from their previous support for pro-imperialist policies.

⁵⁹ The dates of the second Boer War (1899-1902) match the dates of the Philippine-American War. This war converted independent Boer Republics in South Africa into British colonies, and resulted in high British casualties from combat and disease.

At the beginning of 1900 Loy found that both the *Oregonian* and the *Daily Times* “were enthusiastic members of the imperialist club.” In January the *Oregonian* printed an editorial titled “Vision of Empire” which expressed in flowery terms its approval of American empire. An *Oregonian* editorial that appeared in February asserted a similar view: “[N]o nation limits its own right of expansion.... National expansion, so controlled and directed, is the greatest civilizing force in the world.”

Meanwhile, the *Daily Times*’ editorials offered equally fervent support of American imperialism. Loy quotes an example from January 20, 1900: “It is a matter of history that centuries have knocked at the door of the Orient, and found it closed.... [W]ho knows but the United States is destined to stand in the gateway of the ages, holding the key to the future of mankind.” That same month a *Daily Times* editorial responded to anti-imperialist objections to annexing territory against the wishes of the native populations: “Liberty is for every people, but national freedom is not for every people.... The root of the mistake made by such men as Senator Hoar⁶⁰ ... is their assumption that all men are equal in their capacities and powers... and that every people⁶¹ has the divine right to natural independence whether it have actual fitness for self-government or not.” Another January 1900 *Daily Times* editorial spoke to the economic benefits of empire:

Our industrial development and the accession of our new dependencies will exert a profound effect in lifting from trade the burden that heavy import duties have laid upon it. No one can foresee to what immense volume our trade may swell under these new conditions, to what vast proportions our shipping, our wealth and our sea power may expand. The building of the nation has been done. We stand on the threshold of one of the greatest empires, perhaps the greatest empire, the world has ever seen.

⁶⁰ Hoar was a prominent senator from Massachusetts and one of the Senate’s most outspoken critics of the annexation of the Philippines by President McKinley. Hoar also campaigned for the rights of African Americans and Native Americans.

⁶¹ In his 1901 anti-imperialist tract “To the Person Sitting in Darkness,” Mark Twain observed that “there are two kinds of Civilization—one for home consumption and one for the heathen market” (as quoted by Jacobson, 223).

How quickly opinions change. Loy reports that the enthusiastic tone of the pro-expansionist editorials of these two newspapers soon cooled. Beginning in the summer of 1900 the *Oregonian* announced its support for the Open Door policy,⁶² which was a departure from the pro-expansionist policies during the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations. A June 1900 *Daily Times* editorial stated: “If the administration descends from its high ambition to govern an empire, it will be because of the storm of indignation that is gathering from different parts of the country;” and in July: “Indeed, the United States army has been employed for no other purpose than to subjugate those identical people in the island of Luzon who had fought Spain for half a century for no other purpose than to gain their liberty.”

McHale noted a similar shift in public opinion toward maintaining control of the Philippines. After the 1902 Anglo-Japanese treaty⁶³ the United States suddenly realized that its position in the Philippines was a liability rather than an asset. McHale writes:

Thus the collapse of the great expectations that coloured the decision making in 1898, the dissipating strength of the intellectual ideas that were involved, and the realities of the United States new position in the international sphere, led to a rapid re-evaluation of Philippine-American ties. When the Philippines failed to provide any tangible material advantages to the United States, a reversal of the decision to annex colonially involved no great soul-searching.... Less than two decades after the annexing of the Philippines by the United States, the only substantive question involved in the relationship was the timing and nature of disengagement. (43)

⁶² Jacobson says the Open Door Policy was developed by an adviser to Secretary of State John Hay, and announced in September 1899 with the purpose of leveling the playing field for the United States with other countries that had a keen interest in China's markets, such as Europe, Russia, and Japan. Annexation of the Philippines improved U.S. access to China, but was not considered sufficient, and the “anti-colonial” Open Door Policy suited U.S. needs during this period. Hay requested formal assurances from other countries that they would not interfere in Chinese treaty ports or leased territories, which according to Jacobson, turned “U.S. foreign policy into *international* policy” (32). He notes that China was not consulted before this policy was issued.

⁶³ The 1902 naval agreement between Britain and Japan, as well as Japan's growing military strength, prompted American concerns of a Japanese threat to its position in the Philippines. The treaty required each country to come to the aid of the other if attacked by another country.

The greater good

Clearly, the end result is only one measure of what is important in matters of war. This raises the question: should the doctrine of utilitarianism—which states that the purpose of an action should be to bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people—be applied to war? Did U.S. policymakers decide that the suffering of a handful of Filipinos was the price to pay for the “greater good” they were bestowing on the country as a whole? Or was American policy principally guided not only by what brought the greatest good to the United States, but as a means to prevent other nations from becoming involved in the islands?

Utilitarianism was developed from the theories of British philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). It was based in part on an ethical system that determines morality by the end result. A focus of Mill’s ethical philosophy was “that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” Some considered that utilitarianism was at odds with Christian ethics, which are based on biblical morality and rules. However, Mill felt utilitarianism was unfairly stigmatized as an immoral doctrine. In his own words:

I must again repeat, what assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. (490)

Allowing the ‘greater good’ to guide behavior seems a logical approach to morality. But as with all matters of philosophy, this ethical argument is open to debate. The concept of utilitarianism provided a way for people to live moral lives separate from the dictates of formal religion. As might be expected, allowing reason and results rather

than divine revelation to guide morality and daily decisions was considered radical thinking at the time.

The peasant Valjean in Victor Hugo's novel *Les Misérables* serves as an example of doing wrong for a good cause (stealing a loaf of bread for his sister's starving family). The French police, unfortunately, did not consider the greater good conferred upon his sister's children and thus begins Valjean's long sojourn in prison. Another example: perhaps the logic of utilitarianism underlies the U.S. military's rationale for using drones to target terrorist suspects; if civilian deaths occur, the loss is outweighed by the greater good that results from the death of a terrorist.

Niccolò Machiavelli, fifteenth century Italian politician, historian, diplomat, and philosopher, believed that a ruler had to distinguish between public and private morality in order to rule well. The phrase 'the ends justify the means' is associated with Machiavelli's political ethics, although similar views were espoused centuries earlier by the Greek playwright Sophocles ("the end justifies any evil") and the Roman poet Ovid ("the result justifies the action"). Waltz says that since Machiavelli himself qualified this concept, it would be more accurate to say *these* ends justify *certain* means. Waltz quotes Machiavelli: "For he is to be reprehended who commits violence for the purpose of destroying, and not he who employs it for beneficent purposes" (*Man, the State, and War* 212). Waltz emphasizes that Machiavelli's views must be read in their entirety and in context of the circumstances prevailing during his time, and quotes from the diary of John Stuart Mill: "[E]ven good men reserved their conscientiousness for the choice of ends... Macchiavelli [sic] was a man of real patriotism, a lover of liberty, and eager for the good of his country. But he saw no reason for fighting with foils against those who fight with poniards" (*Man, the State, and War* 214).

In a new translation of *The Prince*, Machiavelli's ideas on how to achieve and maintain power, British scholar Tim Parks says Machiavelli made it clear that Christian principles and effective political leadership were not always compatible. Machiavelli did not reject all ethical values but if his goals were worth fighting for he apparently did not hesitate to discard Christian principles. According to Parks: "He took it as an evident truth: Christian principles were admirable, but not applicable for politicians in certain

circumstances; the idea that all human behavior could be assessed in relation to one set of values was naïve and utopian” (Parks xxv).

Keegan says Machiavelli’s military science treatise *The Art of War*, which appeared in twenty-one editions in the sixteenth century, “was a revolutionary text, because it was the first handbook that directly linked warmaking to the art of government” (353).

The greater good in the Philippines

Applying the concept of the greater good to the Philippines, Theodore Roosevelt touted the beneficial results of American rule:

The Americans during their occupancy had done a great deal for the Philippine people. To begin with, they improved sanitary conditions and reduced disease of every type... in 1935 more than one million three hundred thousand [Filipino children] were enrolled in the public schools... fifteen thousand miles of roads have been built... the wage of the Filipino workingman is nearly four times as large as the wage of the workingman in the adjacent oriental countries... every sizable town in the islands has its hospital, dispensary and high school, its cinemas, public playgrounds, tennis courts, radios and automobiles. That is part of the record of the United States.” (*Colonial Policies* 164-5)

Hamilton-Paterson also sees a positive side of American influence. He lists American administrators, bureaucrats, businesspeople, teachers, doctors, and missionaries who “were eager to demonstrate the advantages of American liberal democracy,” and notes the enormous sums of money Washington spent on infrastructure projects such as schools, roads, and hospitals. Writing in *America’s Boy*, Hamilton-Paterson asserts: “[T]here is no question that the Philippines—an ‘expensive nuisance’ and a colony by any other name—did profit greatly from American tutelage” (43).

Gregg Jones, author of *Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream*, points out the positive influence of the United States in rebuilding Manila. Overseen by U.S. Major-General Elwell Otis, stability and order returned to the city: a police force was created, military

courts were established, schools were reopened, health and vaccination clinics were established, roads were repaired, and the dumping of garbage and human excrement into city streets was forbidden. However, Jones notes that although Otis was an able administrator he was “singularly ill-suited to the delicate task of managing America’s fraying relationship with the Filipinos.... Otis had little contact with Filipinos and never even bothered to meet Aguinaldo” (99).

Pomeroy takes a less sanguine view of American rule. He maintains U.S. colonial policy relied on the divide and rule methods that were typical of imperialism, setting the Filipino middle- and working-classes against the wealthy elites. A system of “education for self-rule” was established with the intent of orienting Filipinos toward democratic principles, but it endorsed an American way of life that was made to seem superior, and created feelings of inferiority and of dependence.

McHale states that from an economic standpoint the Philippines “proved of indifferent value” (41). In his view the islands did not become an important outlet for American products or capital investment, primarily because most of the agricultural products produced by the Philippines were competitive rather than complementary to U.S. products. His conclusion: “After the initial flowering of interest, the opportunities for social and economic gain in the Philippines were largely ignored or discounted by Americans in general” (42).

War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength.

“We are not waging war against the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. A portion of them are making war against the United States” – President McKinley⁶⁴

Doublespeak characterized much of the American rhetoric related to the Philippine-American War. While other nations might take colonies and seek empires, the United States was the liberator of the oppressed. If America took control of territory that was not destined to be part of the union, it did so for positive reasons: to rule the territory in an enlightened and benevolent fashion and grant independence as soon as was practicable. The United States did not consider itself as “imperialistic” after the European

⁶⁴ McKinley speaking at his second inauguration in March 1901 (Brewer 39).

model; instead it was expansionist, it practiced benevolent assimilation, it took up the white man's burden, it followed its Manifest Destiny (Heiss 511).

Fierce Filipino resistance to U.S. rule required McKinley to make adjustments to the presentation of his policy; although he still portrayed the American cause as humanitarian he expressed his "sorrow" that certain foolish Filipinos failed to recognize America's generosity. In an 1899 speech given by McKinley in Boston, he said the fact that Filipinos were fighting for their independence was proof they were not ready for it (apparently forgetting his own country's revolutionary struggles). After this speech the anti-imperialist newspaper *The Nation* commented: "McKinley is one of the rare public speakers who are able to talk a good deal of humbug in such a way as to make their average hearers think it excellence sense and exactly their idea" (Brewer 34).

As opposition to the war grew at home, McKinley linked support for the troops with support for his policies, and national glory to power and economic interests (two timeworn tropes of war). The tragic result of this "generosity" was that some American troops practiced torture, executed prisoners and civilians, raped women, looted villages, and destroyed the rural economy. The U.S. Senate investigated war atrocities in 1902. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge regretted the brutality but blamed it on Filipino culture; somehow they had brought it all on themselves because they were a semi-civilized people with Asiatic tendencies for cruelty, increased by 300 years exposure to Spain (Brewer 42).

Speaking before the Philippine Congress in 2003 President George W. Bush brushed aside the tragic reality of the war as easily as Lodge: "America is proud of its part in the great story of the Filipino people. Together our soldiers liberated the Philippines from colonial rule" (Brewer 276). 'Liberation at the hands of American soldiers' may not have been the best way of depicting Filipinos' hard-fought independence from U.S. rule and Japanese occupation; nevertheless, on July 4, 1946, Filipinos celebrated their independence.

However, a tough road lay ahead for the shattered country that was finally free of foreign occupation. Pomeroy paints a grim picture of the early years of freedom:

The first years of independence in the Philippines had shown the Filipino ruling elite in its undisguised nature after half a century of U.S. colonial

conditioning—prepared to surrender the substance of sovereignty and the national interest to foreign wishes, to suppress with savage brutality the opposition movements among the people, to loot public funds and the economy in general in an orgy of corruption for private enrichment, and to violate democratic rights and processes wholesale in the struggle between rival elite groups for enjoyment of the fruits of power. (154)

Pomeroy says that the United States had been careful to protect its own interests before withdrawing from the Philippines, and maintains that American rule had nurtured a dependent economy in order to protect U.S. agricultural interests, which caused the Philippines to rely heavily on the trade of a few raw products, such as sugar, copra, and coconut oil.⁶⁵ He points out that at independence, nearly fifty percent of Philippine assets were in foreign hands, including banking, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, transportation, communication, and mineral production, to name a few. He notes: “Before the Filipino people had a chance to take a full breath of freedom, an all-encompassing neocolonialism was clamped upon them” (155).

The British had no expectation that the sun would ever set on their empire. The United States, in contrast, entered into imperialism with controversy and trepidation, and never planned to permanently control the Philippines. American rule was long but after nearly four decades America’s foray into imperialism ended. The Philippines were independent, but in the beginning at least, in name only.

⁶⁵ According to Pomeroy, in 1941, 84 percent of Philippine imports came from the United States and 81 percent of Philippine exports went to the United States (*An American Made Tragedy*, 9).

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

“They made a wasteland and called it peace.” – Tacitus

The Philippines was not a wasteland when American rule ended in 1946. But it was a country in shambles struggling to recover from centuries of colonialism, a brutal war, three-years of Japanese occupation during World War Two, a weak economy overly dependent on trade with the United States, and a divided populace caused by bitter feelings between Filipino elites accused of collaboration with the Americans and the masses who had never ceased calling for independence. Jacobson says pacifying the Philippines proved to be a difficult task: “Most Americans were stunned by the tenacity of what they thought a hopelessly outmatched enemy” (243).

The war started and ended in a brutal fashion. Approximately three thousand Filipino soldiers died on the very first day of fighting, according to Jacobson, and “after that first, extraordinarily grim day of battle, the war rolled on for some eleven hundred additional days” (243). The official end of the war did not see an end to the violence and sporadic guerrilla fighting continued for at least another decade.

Boot reports that between 1898 and 1902 a total of 126,468 American soldiers served in the Philippines (*Savage Wars of Peace* 125). By July 4, 1902 more than four thousand U.S. soldiers were killed and almost three thousand were wounded (which compares to 379 American soldiers lost in combat during the Spanish-American War). The U.S. Army reported killing sixteen thousand Filipinos in battle during the four-year war. But most Filipino casualties were civilians. At least 200,000 noncombatant men, women, and children died from disease and famine, according to Boot; Hamilton-Peterson and other historians have put the figure as high as a million.

President McKinley started a new global role for the United States when he acquired the Philippines as part of the treaty that ended the Spanish-American War: a democratic country with an empire. Annexation stirred controversy in both countries, and much blood and treasure was expended to convince Filipinos to submit to the “civilizing”

influence of American rule. Half a century and eight U.S. presidents later, the United States granted Filipinos their independence.

The path to war is often paved with good intentions. Many Americans initially may have been genuinely concerned about the fate of the Filipino people, but no good deed goes unpunished. After this “goodness” was sifted through the politics of American exceptionalism, religious ideology, and the paternalistic racism of the day and carried out using brutal military force, what did the people of the Philippines gain by America’s benevolence? What chance did they have against an odd mixture of superior military force and an onslaught of compassion?

The Philippine war gained the United States an outpost in Asia and changed the geopolitical map of the Pacific, but at an enormous cost on both sides. Historian Eric Love doesn’t question the inhumanity of the Philippine war but speculates that absent annexation and war with the United States the result may have been disastrous meddling into Filipinos’ lives by Germany, France, Britain, Japan or Russia. “The only thing worse we can imagine than the calamity of the two-sided war that did occur would have been the three-, four-, five-, six-, or seven-sided conflict that annexation almost certainly prevented” (14).

Could not the United States have foregone war entirely and instead issued a “hands off” Pacific version of the Monroe Doctrine to those it assumed were waiting to gobble up the islands? Not if America’s true motive for the war was to benefit itself rather than help the Philippines find its footing as an independent nation.

Scholars and historians will continue to debate the wisdom of this war and to speculate on what would have happened had the Philippines been allowed to become independent after the end of Spanish rule. Referring to the United States’ actions in the Vietnam War, Jewish scholar Rabbi Heschel said that when cruelties are committed in the name of free society “some are guilty but all are responsible.”⁶⁶

Americans’ effort to spread democracy and “uplift” the Filipino people was not compassionate, was not particularly successful, and served mainly to delay Philippine independence by decades. Eric Hobsbawm, writing in 2004 in reference to the United

⁶⁶ Quoted by Krista Tippett on her radio show *On Being* (The Spiritual Audacity of Abraham Joshua Heschel), broadcast December 8, 2012. <http://www.onbeing.org/>

States' missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, concedes that democracy is popular but says this does not mean it is applicable everywhere in a standardized Western form, and warns that it can sow disorder as well as bring peace.⁶⁷ He says that some humanitarians are still ready to support a world order imposed by U.S. power, and adds: "*But one should always be suspicious when military powers claim to be doing favors for their victims and the world by defeating and occupying weaker states*" (Ishay 463, italics mine).

As I noted in the preface to this thesis, war is one of humankind's oldest pursuits and a reality that has confronted every generation of Americans. Centuries of attention directed to war by scholars, theologians, philosophers, historians, military experts, and human rights advocates, have not ended military conflicts or the suffering they cause. History is often repeated but war does not need to recur endlessly. In President Obama's concluding remarks in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, he stated: "So let us reach for the world that ought to be—that spark of the divine that still stirs within each of our souls." In the words of Emily Dickinson, "hope is the thing with feathers." Let us work toward a future that contains more feathers and less violence.

⁶⁷ Contrast this with the views of Theodore Roosevelt, who wrote in an 1894 essay: "Nineteenth century democracy needs no more complete vindication than the fact that it has kept for the white race the best portions of the new worlds' surface, temperate America and Australia" (*American Ideals* 289).

Appendix A – Momentous twentieth-century events

Many momentous events occurred between 1900 and 1946, and competed for Americans' attention during the period when the Philippines were under American rule.

1900 – A hurricane in Galveston, Texas causes an estimated 6,000 to 12,000 deaths.

1901 – President McKinley is assassinated, Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt becomes president.

1906 – The San Francisco earthquake kills more than 3,000 and destroys most of the city.

1912 – The *Titanic* sinks, resulting in more than 1,500 passenger deaths.

1912 – Theodore Roosevelt shot but not killed while campaigning for president.

1914 – The Ludlow Massacre occurs when the Colorado National Guard attacks the camps of striking coal miners. Twenty five are killed, including eleven children.

1914 – The Panama Canal opens after years of construction.

1915 – A German torpedo sinks the British passenger ship *Lusitania*, killing 1,198 passengers.

1918 – The United States enters World War I.

1920 – Congress ratifies the Eighteenth Amendment, establishing Prohibition.

1920 – The Nineteenth Amendment grants women the right to vote.

1923 – President Harding dies of a heart attack; the Teapot Dome scandal erupts.

1925 – The Scopes Trial in Tennessee captures the nation's attention.

1927 – Charles Lindbergh achieves the first trans-Atlantic flight.

1929 – The Wall Street crash marks the beginning of the Great Depression.

1933 – President Franklin Roosevelt sets the New Deal in motion.

1933 – Orson Welles’ broadcast of War of the Worlds frightens the nation.

1941 – Japan attacks Pearl Harbor; the United States enters World War II the next day.

1942 – The United States surrenders to Japan in Bataan; the Philippines remain under Japanese control until 1945.

1943 – Detroit race riots break out and last for three days; thirty-four people are killed, and hundreds are wounded, with an estimated \$2 million in property damage.

1944 – The Battle of the Bulge, the war’s deadliest battle for the United States. The battle involved more than half a million American soldiers, with 89,000 casualties and 19,000 deaths.

April 1945 – President Franklin Roosevelt dies.

May 1945 – World War II ends in Europe after Germany surrenders.

August 1945 – Japan surrenders after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki kill an estimated 200,000 people.

November 1945 – Nuremberg Trials begin.

Appendix B – Warship Tonnage (1880-1910)

Country	1880	1890	1900	1910
Great Britain	650,000	679,000	1,065,000	2,174,000
Germany	88,000	190,000	285,000	964,000
Austro-Hungary	60,000	66,000	87,000	210,000
France	271,000	319,000	499,000	900,000
Italy	100,000	242,000	245,000	327,000
Russia	200,000	180,000	383,000	401,000
United States	169,000	240,000	333,000	824,000
Japan	15,000	41,000	187,000	496,000

Adapted from Torruella (10).

Appendix C – Military and Naval Personnel (1880-1900)

Country	1880	1890	1900
Great Britain	367,000	420,000	624,000
France	543,000	542,000	715,000
Germany	426,000	504,000	624,000
Austro-Hungary	246,000	346,000	385,000
Russia	791,000	677,000	1,162,000
Italy	216,000	284,000	255,000
United States	34,000	39,000	96,000
Japan	71,000	84,000	234,000

Adapted from Torruella (9).

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